A HISTORY OF THE Pacific Area in Modern Times

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Preface

Previous to the discovery of America the peoples of European origin considered that the world centered around the Mediterranean. During the next 400 years the latter's place was taken by the Atlantic. Shortly after World War I many students felt that another change was in process and that within a short time the focal point of world activities would move to the Pacific. With that idea in mind in 1924 Dr. Robert Glass Cleland, Dean of the Faculty at Occidental College, asked me to offer a course aimed especially at helping students understand the problems of the Pacific Area.

Since, as far as I knew, such a course was unique, I decided to take advantage of the experience I had gained working for two years with Dr. Herbert E. Bolton of the University of California at Berkeley in his famous course, "The History of the Americas." In it he told the story of the coming of European civilization to the Americas — my goal would be to take it from the Americas to the Pacific Area, to show how it got there and what resulted from its arrival, and finally to dare a few prognostications.

There were, of course, no textbooks available for such a course, so originally the class and I both had to depend on the Encyclopaedia Britannica and such books on the Far East as Gowan's Asia — a Short History, Harris's Europe and the East, Williams's China, Yesterday and Today, and Golder's Russian Expansion in the Pacific. Gradually the course "jelled," and in 1927 I ventured to prepare a mimeographed syllabus. It was slightly revised in 1932 and friends were kind enough to say that it had some merit and deserved to be put in text form.

I hesitated, for my field of research was Hispanic America, but after a summer trip to the Orient and the opportunity to assimilate the many fine works which appeared in the twenties and thirties (I refer especially to those of Payson J. Treat, Harley Farnsworth MacNair, K. S. Latourette, H. B. Morse, and Harold Vinacke), I decided to make the attempt. Well started, I was interrupted by a chance to travel for one semester in South America. Then came World War II and a three-year tour of duty for the Board of Economic Warfare and the State Department in Washington, Panama, and the Dominican Republic.
During the latter period I proposed to my colleague, Dr. Glenn Dumke, that he help me in the completion of the book. He gladly came to my rescue and made possible the early publication of this book.

Our book is designedly a textbook, but we hope that it is written in such a manner that it will prove interesting to both students and casual readers. We have depended largely on the writings of specialists in the various fields and have borrowed far and wide. However, we do claim originality as to the idea which lies behind the writing of the book, we have evolved our own synthesis, we have drawn our own conclusions, and the prophecies are our own.

To aid students who wish to read more widely, we have appended a reading list which includes the more easily accessible books in the field under discussion. Since we are great believers in the value of map study, we have included maps of the Pacific Area which show every place mentioned in the text.

We wish to acknowledge with gratitude the constructive criticism of those who read the entire manuscript or a portion of it: Dr. Charles Sidney Gardner, of Harvard University, and Dr. Edwin O. Reischauer, of Harvard-Yenching Institute; Dr. Earl H. Pritchard, of the University of Chicago; Dr. James W. Morley, of Union College; and Miss Harriet B. Mills, of Columbia University. Chiefly because of their helpful and constructive suggestions we feel that the final draft of the manuscript is much improved in many ways over the earlier draft, though of course any errors either of fact or interpretation still in the book must be charged solely to the responsibility of the authors. In addition, Mr. H. Robinson Shipherd deserves our thanks for the careful styling of the manuscript and its preparation for the compositor.

In conclusion we thank for more personal help (1) our respective wives for their long-suffering patience and encouragement while we were in the throes of authorship, (2) the various book company representatives who encouraged us to believe we had an idea, and (3) Miss Florence Pennington who prepared the manuscript for us.

Osgood Hardy
Glenn S. Dumke
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The Geography of the Pacific Area

Introduction. Greatest of all the oceans of the globe is the Pacific. Her blue waters, island-studded in the south and west, roll from the frozen North to the frozen South, from ancient Asia to our own Americas. In so doing they blanket a third of the earth, a greater area than that of all the continents combined. When the first Peking and Java men began to learn the arts of civilization on her shores, they must have been impressed by the vastness of her barrier-like expanses and the natural variety of her coasts, along which for centuries they lived in small communities, separate racially and culturally. As civilization advanced on her shores, and especially in modern times under the common impact of European expansion, her watery expanses and coastal variety gradually ceased to be disuniting factors. More and more East and West merged, with the result that today around her basin a new and greater Pacific community is arising. It is the purpose of this book to trace the emergence of that community. In this chapter we shall see its geographic base.

Isolation of the Pacific basin. A great mountain rim long isolated the Pacific basin from the rest of the world. Northward from Cape Horn along the western shore of South America stretch the Andes. Through North America their line is continued by the Rocky Mountains. The frozen ranges of northeastern Siberia rise beyond Bering Strait. The Stanovoi, Yablonoi, Sayan, Altai, and T'ien Shan continue the barrier to deep in middle Asia, where the Pamirs climb into the sky to form the "Roof of the World." Southeastward the high plateaus of Tibet and interior China give way to that great mountainous arc which swings
out to sea through the Malay Archipelago. No great river, unless it be the upper reaches of the Amur and the Irtysh, cuts through the mountain barrier to provide easy communication between the one seventeenth of the earth's land surface within the basin and the greater part without. The frozen seas of the Arctic fill in the thirty-six-mile breach at Bering Strait. Beyond the rim stretch steaming jungles, deserts, tundra, and forests, still more completely cutting off the basin from the Near-Eastern and Indo-European lands where Western culture began.

Routes to the world beyond. Well isolated though it is, the Pacific world is not cut off completely from the world beyond. Mountain passes cut through the eastern rim. Two main routes break through the western: one, the water-portage route down the Amur River to Lake Baikal and across the plains of Siberia to European Russia via the adjacent branches of the Yenisei, the Ob, and the Volga; the other, the land route out over the sands of Chinese Turkestan through the rim via the Dzungarian Gate, the Ili or the Tarim basins into middle Asia and the west. But the greatest break is in the south. Here only the Indies and Australia block the open expanse of the Pacific, serving merely to deflect the powerful winds and currents which join the circulation of her waters with that of the rest of the globe. The northern and southern Equatorial Currents, pushed by the trade winds, and the Westerly Drift Current carry them out through the Malay Archipelago into the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, while the Northeast Drift and Equatorial Counter Currents bring them back. Far to the south the westerlies blow the West Wind Drift across the Indian and Pacific oceans and around the Horn of South America. It was via the northern portage route that the Russians penetrated the basin, via the central overland route that pilgrims and caravans for centuries passed between China and middle Asia, and via the southern all-water route that in modern times western Europeans came to the Pacific.

Diversity of the Pacific Area. Shores around an ocean which stretches nearly 10,000 miles in each direction naturally show great diversity. Climate varies from hot to cold, from oceanic to continental, coastal, monsoon, desert, and plateau conditions. Soils range from the most barren to the most fertile, land surfaces from vast plains to rugged mountains, land cover from dense jungle to frozen tundra. It is small wonder that the history of the basin was long one of diverse and exotic cultures. The most important cultural regions were distinguished by their location, physiography, and natural resources. The most distinct regions
have been: Siberia, China, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Indo-China, Siam, Malaysia, Australasia, the oceanic islands, and the Americas.

Siberia. Stretching across northeastern Asia is the cold, thinly populated land of Siberia. Strategically located to link East and West or to provide a base for a descent on the Pacific world, it is bounded on the north by frozen seas adjacent to the Arctic Ocean, on the west by the Ural Mountains, on the south by Turkestan, the Altai-Sayan Mountain systems, and the Amur River system, and on the east by the Bering, Okhotsk, and Japan seas, which find their way into the Pacific. Poor soils except in the western lowlands and along the Amur, the shortness of the growing season, and the extremes of temperature discouraged agriculture. Mineral deposits include gold, coal, and iron in quantity, but were long unknown. The use of its rivers — the Ob, Yenisei, and Lena — has not been commensurate with their length, for all flow northward to the Arctic. The use of its good harbors was long prevented by floes of ice, and much of Russia’s Far Eastern policy has been influenced by her need for an ice-free port. This cold desolate realm, then, was a world in itself, inhabited by a host of different primitive tribes who lived off the fish, the reindeer, and the fur-bearing animals in the extensive forest belt south of the tundra. It owed its long isolation more to cold desolation than to formidable barriers on its borders, for it could be penetrated easily from many sides. The most important early route was the water-portage trail from the Urals to the Amur. Not until the coming of the Tsarist Russians along this route, and after them the Soviets, was Siberia joined actively to either the Pacific or the Western world and enabled to support a population above the primitive, subsistence level.

China. Hemmed in by the Japan, Yellow, East, and South China seas in the east, steaming jungles in the south, mountains and deserts in the west and north, China formed another and vastly greater sheltered pocket in Asia. Within these confines the Ming emperors ruled over an area greater in size and population than all of Europe. High mountain ranges, generally extending from the Pamirs and the Tibetan highlands toward the sea, tend to divide China. The main cordilleras are the T’ien Shan in the north, next the Nan Shan and Kun Lun, then the Tsingling and Nanling, and finally a short range in the south. It is in the highlands in northeastern and central China that her mineral wealth is found: coal, iron, tin, antimony, tungsten, copper, lead, zinc, and others; but her supplies of petroleum, copper, sulphur, timber, and probably iron are hardly sufficient themselves to support a high degree of industrialization.
The coastline of China, with all its indentations, is 4500 miles long. It forms a huge semicircle with the Shantung peninsula and the Gulf of Chihli in the north and the Liuchow peninsula and the Gulf of Tonkin in the south. North of Hangchow Bay the coast is smooth, the sea shallow, and the ports, like Dairen, Port Arthur, Tientsin, and Tsingtao, are few. Its greatest port, Shanghai, is located in central China. The southern coast is irregular and the shores abrupt. Good harbors, like Amoy, Swatow, Kowloon, and Canton, are many. Likewise, off the southern coast are many islands. Largest of these are Formosa and Hainan, but more important in modern times have been the smaller islands of Hong Kong and Hsiang-shan; on the latter is the famous peninsular city of Macao.

Not the mountains and their minerals nor the seas and their harbors, but the rivers and the land have been the main geographically unifying forces and the main supports of the Chinese people. Four great river systems course through China to the sea. With the Grand Canal, which provides from 850 to 1200 miles of navigable water, these systems furnish China with most of its interior transportation facilities, its agricultural irrigation, and therefore its population centers. (1) The Hwang Ho or Yellow River runs for 2400 miles through northern China. Its silt-laden waters, which frequently change their course, are ill-suited to navigation, but enrich the broad, arable plain where China's civilization began. (2) The Hwai Ho, 800 miles long, is navigable for half its distance and extends the central China plain northward into Honan and Anhwei. (3) The Yangtze Kiang, 2900 miles long, is navigable in certain seasons for modern steamers from its mouth deep into Szechwan. On it are located the important cities of Nanking, Wuhu, Anking, Kiukiang, Hankow, and Chungking; at its mouth is Shanghai. Although its lower courses are prone to overflow their banks, this great river waters an important plain of arable land in central China. (4) The Si Kiang or West River, 1000 miles long, is navigable the year around by modern steamers for only 125 miles, but is the most traveled highway of South China. It is especially important for its delta, on which are located Canton, Hong Kong, and Macao.

While most of China's soil is poor and mountainous, the plains of her great rivers are relatively fertile and have been under intensive cultivation for centuries. In the north the chief crops are kaoliang, millet, wheat, and beans. In the south the land is devoted mostly to rice. Sweet potatoes are grown everywhere and are a basic food crop.

The diversity already noted in the nature of the coastline and the
nature of the crops reflects the rough geographical and human division of China into a northern half — ancient "Cathay," and a southern half — ancient "Manji." In the north the climate is semi-arid and more continental, agriculture is precarious, the coast is smooth, and the population is racially uniform. In the south the climate is subtropical and monsoon, agriculture is intensive, the coast is irregular, and the population is racially varied. Mandarin or a variety of it is spoken throughout China, but in the coastal provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, Chekiang, and Kiangsu there are wide dialectical differences.

Geography, then, helped the Chinese people first emerging from savagery in the valley of the Hwang-ho to develop a rich and varied, almost self-sufficient agricultural civilization, strategically situated and economically able to reach and dominate less fortunate neighbors. Geography, moreover, in our time brought the Russians to China via the overland route to the north, where lay the seat of government, and the western Europeans to China via the overseas route to the south, where lay the seat of commerce. This geographic difference in their approach may help to explain why the early western Europeans achieved closer commercial relations with China, and the early Russians, closer political understanding.

Korea. Separated from China by the Yalu and the Tumen rivers, the peninsula of Korea, about half the size of California, juts out from the continent between the Yellow and the Japan seas. Besides the Yalu and the Tumen, it has few navigable rivers. To a considerable extent this lack is compensated for by its numerous ports and consequent easy coastal navigation. Korea is very mountainous. Although it is rich in certain minerals and forest products, the main support of its people has always been agriculture. The climate is like that of North and central China, to which its cultivation of grains is also similar. For centuries this land has supported an agricultural civilization of high culture, but because of its geographical location adjacent to the better-endowed lands of China and Japan and in our times to the more powerful lands of the Russians, this "Land of the Morning Calm" has rarely enjoyed either cultural, economic, or political independence. It has served the Pacific basin most frequently as a transporter of alien cultures and of alien arms.

Japan. Off the coast of southeastern Siberia and Korea lies Japan, a cluster of some 3000 islands; their area is no greater than that of California, but the four main islands alone extend over the sea about as far as from Maine to Georgia. When Westerners first came to Japan in
the sixteenth century, its government ruled over the three main islands of Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu, to a lesser extent over the northern island of Hokkaido, and had some knowledge of though no control over Sakhalin, the Kurils, and the Loochoos (now called Ryukyus). Cut off from the continent by the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, its island people developed a culture of their own. Nevertheless, her good ports, like Nagasaki, Kagoshima, Kobe, Osaka, Nagoya, and Yokohama, and the adjacent Kuril and Loochoo island chains, the large island of Sakhalin and the narrow Strait of Korea encouraged relations with the continent. From the latter originally came the Japanese people and later Chinese and Korean culture. As the Japanese grew strong, they paid more attention to the mainland, and eventually came to exert a strong cultural, economic, and political-military influence on northeastern Asia. The position of the islands facilitates close relations by sea between the Japanese people and the Americas as well as with all Asia.

The islands themselves are a mountainous archipelago, whose jagged peaks separate the Sea of Japan side from the Pacific side, and whose central horizontal depression, the Fossa Magna, and Japanese Alps separate the north from the south. In her mountains, over 600 of which are volcanic, Japan has coal, copper, gold, silver, and sulphur in quantity, but does not have the necessary amount of minerals to support independently modern industrial civilization. From her mountains tumble short, rapid streams, suitable for water-power development, but not for navigation. Scattered among the mountains are isolated plains, altogether only half the size of Ohio. It is on these plains and their coasts, where good soil, a temperate climate, and monsoon rains have facilitated intensive farming, especially the culture of rice, that the Japanese people developed an ancient, localized, agrarian-fishing civilization. It was grounded on the hard labor of the fields and the sea. Full of stoicism as a result of constant earthquake threats, and inspired by the beauties of the land, Japan sometimes turned inward in insular isolation, sometimes outward toward the Pacific community.

The Philippines. Five hundred miles southeast of China and just north of the equator lie the Philippines, a string of 3141 islands, of which nearly nine tenths have an area of less than one square mile. Of the total land area of 115,000 square miles a little more than a third is embraced in the northern island of Luzon and a little less than a third in the southern island of Mindanao. Each has excellent ports: Manila on Luzon, Zamboanga and Davao on Mindanao. In the center of the
group on two small islands are the important ports of Cebu and Iloilo. Geographically related by the Sulu Archipelago and Palawan to the Indies, by a string of islands in the north to Formosa and the continent, and by good ports to the sea lanes of Asia, the Philippine islanders occupy a position off the South China coast similar to that of the Japanese off the North China coast.

The surface of the islands is much broken by hills and mountains, the highest of which, Mount Apo, rises over a thousand feet. These hills, running mostly north and south, are rich in gold, iron ore, chromium, manganese, and lumber, but these resources do not provide the basis for an independent Philippine metallurgical industry, for petroleum is lacking and coal supplies are insufficient. Like Japan, this mountainous country has many active volcanoes and frequent earthquakes, but because of the smaller and more thinly distributed population these natural disturbances have been less disastrous.

Unlike Japan, whose flora and fauna are adapted to the temperate zone, the Philippines sustain the tropical types of animals and plants common to much of Malaysia. The nature of her soils, the hot, humid climate, natural to low latitudes, heavy rainfall, and the violent storms of the monsoon realm make possible the cultivation of rice, corn, coconut palms, sugar, abacá, and tobacco. When Westerners first came to the islands, they found a Mongoloid people of Malayan culture, living in tribal communities by subsistence farming, hunting, and fishing, disunited, unchallenged to develop a higher civilization, and unable to defend themselves against European aggression.

Indo-China. Due west of the Philippines the peninsula of French Indo-China bulges out from the Asiatic continent into the South China Sea. It is on the great maritime route between India and China, and in the heart of the southeastern Asian world. With over half of the 290,000 square miles of the peninsula mountainous, it is difficult of access, but rich in the resources needed for modern industry, both heavy and light, such as coal, iron, tin, zinc, tungsten, chromium, antimony, manganese, phosphates, textile fibers, rubber, vegetable oils, and timber. Hydroelectric power is abundant.

Unaware of this unexploited wealth when he first touched on Indo-China, the Westerner long ignored it. He was rebuffed by the central mountains and unattracted by the great Mekong and Red rivers and the few good harbors, like Haiphong, Hué, Camranh Bay, and Saigon. He found unpleasant the sweltering heat and heavy rains of this tropical land in the center of the monsoon realm. Not until the nineteenth
century did he investigate the densely populated plains of the Mekong and the Red River valleys, where an ancient Mongoloid people carried on an intensive rice culture and lived in the mixed Chinese and Indian traditions of an old and artistic civilization.

Siam. West of Indo-China is Siam, a country of some 200,000 square miles, isolated from the rest of the continent by mountains in the west, north, and northeast, bounded in the east by the Mekong River, and opening in the south on the Gulf of Siam. The northern fourth, drained by the Mé Nam Chao Bhraya and its tributaries, is fairly fertile in the lower portion of the river valley. The eastern third is a dry basin drained by the Mekong. The central quarter, a great plain flanked by mountains, contains most of the population and nine tenths of the wealth, Siam’s chief wealth being deposits of tin and a soil and tropical climate suited especially to the culture of rice and rubber. In this plain, twenty miles up the Menam, is Bangkok, the chief city and capital of Siam. The southern portion of the country stretches out thinly into the Malay peninsula. A Mongoloid people of Buddhist religion and Chinese political institutions, the Siamese long ago developed a distinct civilization based chiefly on rice culture. Like French Indo-China, Siam for many years escaped the attention of the West. Unlike French Indo-China and all other countries in southeastern Asia, Siam maintained its independence even after the Westerners arrived, protected partly by its comparative poverty and less significant location, more by the rivalry of the Western powers who sought to acquire it.

Malaysia. From the Malay peninsula eastward an eighth of the way round the world stretch the islands of the Indies. The large western islands, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, and adjoining smaller islands, form the Greater Sundas. The chain of islands stretching between Java and Australia are known as the Lesser Sundas. The Moluccas and New Guinea geographically form part of the Australian continental shelf. While their nearness to Australia facilitated early penetration by the Negrito stock, their proximity to Asia encouraged a subsequent and greater invasion by Malayan peoples, and their location on Indian-Pacific sea lanes brought them early the culture of India, later the culture of Islam, later still the culture of the West.

The chief common features of the islands are their tropical-monsoon climate — they lie along the equator — and their volcanic mountainous terrain. The mountains generally run from east to west. Therefore, since in the winter heavy rains are brought by the northwest monsoon and the northeast trade winds and in the summer by the southeast trades,
rainy seasons vary generally from winter on the north sides of the islands to summer on the south sides. Rich deposits of petroleum, tin, bauxite, sulphur, manganese, and nickel are now being exploited; historically, however, the main interest of Europeans was in spices and plantations, and the main interest of the Indonesians in subsistence agriculture. When the luxuriant, tropical rain forests were cleared from volcanic soils, especially in Java, fertile land was found for the intensive, small-scale culture of rice, corn, sweet potatoes, and beans. Later the Westerner discovered the Indies were well adapted to large-scale plantation farming of such products as rubber, coffee, tea, sugar, and cinchona. Best endowed by Nature for the support of the ancient agricultural civilization of the East and the modern commercial-industrial civilization of the West, Java—a little larger than the island of Cuba—has always been the chief center of Indonesian population and culture.

**Australasia:** (1) Australia. "Way down under" the world, south and east of the Indies, lies Australasia, a vast area made up of the continent of Australia and the adjacent island communities of Tasmania and New Zealand. Far removed from the other continents, they were long a world apart. The largest of them is the Australian continent, which extends north and south a little less than 2000 miles and east and west a little more than 2000 miles; its total area is nearly 3,000,000 square miles. Favorable winds and currents, sheltered gulfs, such as those of Carpentaria, Van Diemen, King Sound, and St. Vincent, and the good harbors of Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane, all facilitate contact with the cultures beyond the seas and especially around the Pacific basin. Until the Westerner came, however, contacts were few and limited mainly to the prehistorical movement of a Negrito population northward into New Guinea.

Australia is a great natural saucer, its broad, depressed, overheated interior desert being fringed by low-lying mountains around a well-watered coast. Its rivers are short, and like those of Southern California "have the bottoms on top." The most important river system, the Murray, provides 2345 miles of navigable water; unfortunately it passes through a five-hundred-mile arid stretch just before it reaches the sea, and much of the water is here absorbed. Except for the Great Dividing Range along the eastern coast, Australia's mountains are generally too low to intercept rain-bearing winds. In spite of the partly tropical but mostly temperate climate, this aridity makes two thirds of the continent unsuited to normal agriculture, though subsist-
ence agriculture was begun early by primitive peoples inhabiting the southeastern coast. Western techniques have made of the land a great wheat- and stock-raising country. Other resources, such as timber, gold, coal, silver, lead, copper, tin, and zinc, also waited upon Western exploitation. This poor, isolated land long supported only a sparse population of aborigines, out of contact with the rest of the world.

(2) *Tasmania*. Tasmania is a triangular-shaped island about the size of Ceylon or Ireland. It lies due south of Australia and is separated from it only by Bass Strait. It is a wonderfully beautiful island, with open plains, bordered by far-extending precipitous mountains and isolated, shaggy peaks, and containing many small rivers and lakes. It is possessed of several natural harbors, has a temperate climate, and receives a moderate rainfall. Like Australia, its remoteness and its lack of a rich native culture left it long in isolation.

(3) *New Zealand*. The three large islands of New Zealand lie 1200 miles east of Australia. Together with their adjacent smaller islands their total area is slightly more than 100,000 square miles. The two largest islands, North Island and South Island, are mountainous, the former being noted for its volcanoes, geysers, and medicinal springs. A temperate climate and volcanic soil make two thirds of New Zealand suited to grazing and the cultivation of grains. Its mineral resources include gold, silver, coal, iron, copper, lead, zinc, antimony, manganese, and petroleum. Like the rest of Australasia, New Zealand long supported only a primitive people who were largely isolated from the other peoples around the basin in which they lived.

*The oceanic islands*. Scattered over the southwestern quadrant of the Pacific Ocean are a myriad volcanic and coral islands, some no bigger than the perch of a bird, others large enough to harbor whole fleets of battleships. The tier of islands farthest east is commonly grouped as Polynesia. Its most important groups are the Hawaiian Islands, the Tuamotus, including famous Pitcairn Island, the Marquesas, Cook, including Tahiti, and Line Islands. The next tier westward are known as Micronesia. Its most important groups, the Carolines, Marianas, Marshalls, and Gilberts, stretch from midway between Japan and the Indies down across the equator to the Friendly Islands. Nearly all were strategic battle areas in World War II. The westernmost tier, Melanesia, including chiefly the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomon Islands, and New Hebrides, was the first area to be won back from the Japanese.

Few of the oceanic islands are capable of supporting more than a small population of primitive culture; such islands as the Hawaiian are
Honolulu Harbor in 1870. The Hawaiian Islands are commonly called the "Crossroads of the Pacific," Honolulu being the most important harbor. Pearl Harbor before the military development which was to make it the tinder box of the Pacific.
exceptional. The importance of most of the islands arises from their location. Lying athwart the sea routes, their sheltered harbors, fresh food and water, and suitability for provisioning and fueling stations have made them valued aids to trans-Pacific navigation. These same values have given them an increasing strategic importance in modern war.

The Americas: (1) South America. Eastward from New Zealand no important land area is encountered until the South American continent is reached. Between the Andes and the Pacific stretches a narrow strip of land northward from Tierra del Fuego to the Isthmus of Panama. From an excessively wet, cold, forested plateau in southern Chile, the climate varies as it moves into lower latitudes, becoming Mediterranean-like in central Chile, excessively dry in the sterile Atacama Desert of northern Chile, California-like along the Peruvian littoral, temperate to frigid along the Andean plateau, then hot and wet in the equatorial forests of Ecuador and Colombia. Contact between these natural regions is aided by the northward-streaming Humboldt Current, but hindered by the fact that from Guayaquil to Concepción there are no natural seaports; Valparaiso and Callao both have required extensive harbor improvements. Although originally gold and silver drew the Spaniard, today the chief exports are copper, tin (from Bolivia), nitrates, and sulphur.

(2) Central America. Northwest of Panama the mountainous backbone lies relatively close to the western coast of Central America; the Pacific shore here is narrow and rises sharply from the water. Beyond the mountains to the east is a monsoon realm similar to that of southern China in its seasonal alterations. It is toward this section that Middle America's population has oriented itself.

(3) North America. Northwestern Mexico is an arid land of scorching summers and cool winters, as is also the trade-wind desert of Southern California and its man-made harbor, Los Angeles. The United States coast north of Monterey and west of the Rockies is a warm temperate zone similar to that of central Chile, well suited to seasonal farming, endowed also with forest and mineral wealth, watered by such rivers as the Columbia, and possessing several important harbors, notably those of San Francisco, Portland, and Seattle, which are swept by the California Current. Northward lies the wooded country of British Columbia, resembling New Zealand in climate; and above that the snowy, rocky peaks of the Alaskan coast.

Pacific Unity. What for long held the Pacific world apart — the
vast ocean itself — in our time has been providing the means of bringing its diverse cultures together. The partial geographical isolation of the entire basin has been tending to draw the energies of its peoples inward. More than that, the winds and currents have been facilitating growing inter-Asian and Asian-American contacts.

Two great circulatory systems flow between the continents. In the Northern Hemisphere the northern equatorial current is pushed westward to Asia just above the equator by the northeast trade winds. A branch there courses southward through the Indies, but the main stream turns north to follow the continental coast to Japan, and forms a warm current known as the Kuroshio or Japan Stream. Off Japan it swings out past the Kurils and is driven by the prevailing westerlies below the Aleutians to the Alaskan coast. There it curves southward and, as the California Current, flows back again to the equator. A similar system of winds and currents circles the southern half of the Pacific. The southeast trades blow the southern equatorial current just below the equator toward the Indies. Part of it pours southward through the oceanic islands. Part pushes on through the Indies. Another part circles Australia. Still another, known as the Australia Current, slips along that continent’s eastern coast until the westerlies turn it back again toward South America, where it bends northward to follow the coast to the equator as the Humboldt — now the Peru — Current. These winds and currents were the great highroads of ancient navigation, as they are now of modern.

As though to enable man to take advantage of these highroads to conquer the ocean, the Pacific basin is fairly well endowed with sheltered seas, good harbors, and scattered islands. The Asiatic coast is festooned with island chains which encircle such sheltered seas as the Okhotsk, Japan, Yellow, East China, South China, and Java seas. Both the island and continental coasts are generally low and irregular, providing excellent harbors all the way from Vladivostok to Melbourne. On the American coasts, from San Diego to south of Valparaiso, the only good ports are Acapulco and Guayaquil. Island chains not only facilitate inter-Asian navigation, but trans-Pacific as well. The Kurils and Aleutians stretch across the northern Pacific. In the central and southern Pacific, island groups form steppingstones all the way from Asia to the Hawaiian Islands, only 2000 miles off the California coast, and the Tuamoritus, about the same distance from the Galapagos Islands off the coast of Ecuador.

Finally, no one of the historic Pacific regions is physically able to
develop alone the richest prosperity and fullest culture possible for its people. The natural distribution of arable land, mineral resources, and transportation facilities makes each of the Pacific peoples more and more dependent on the others if any one of them is to rise to a newer and better civilization. This growing interdependence of the peoples of the Pacific basin, growing with every advance in the steamship, the railroad, and the airplane, makes common not only the problem of achieving abundance, but also the problem of building peace.

**Conclusion.** Nature so constructed the Pacific basin that it seemed to early man isolated from the rest of the world and divided within itself. He developed here, accordingly, many different cultures. Some rose little above savagery. Others achieved brilliant agricultural civilizations. As he rose in the scale of civilization he learned to use those highroads which led to the world beyond and especially to the other cultures surrounding the basin. In the sixteenth century came the modern European, bringing a new power, a new science, and a new culture. And in the succeeding centuries, stimulated by this common impact and building on those underlying geographic realities which make for Pacific unity, the peoples of the basin began to form a new community—a Pacific community of East and West. It is to the dramatic story of the rise of this new community that we now turn.
The Peoples of the Pacific Area

*Introduction.* For centuries the facts of geography had kept apart the peoples of the Pacific basin and the European continent. Ancient contacts had been so irregular that these peoples had little if any knowledge of each other, no fundamental understanding of their separate problems, and small appreciation of their separate achievements. They were consequently poorly prepared for their modern meeting. It was a long time before mutual respect could replace mutual disdain, and a spirit of community replace that of conflict. Some explanation of why that replacement has already taken over four centuries of struggle is to be found in the contrast between the conceptions these peoples held of each other and the realities of the world as it was at the beginning of the sixteenth century when Europeans began their modern penetration of the Pacific basin.

In this chapter we shall survey the peoples of the Pacific world as they had evolved by the time of Europe’s modern penetration. We shall sketch briefly their origins, economic foundations, political organizations, cultural achievements, and mutual relations. In the next chapter we shall see what relations they had had with the peoples of the European world by the end of the fifteenth century and what the effect of those relations had been.

1. *The Early History of Siberia, China, Korea, and Japan*

*Siberia.* Siberia is a land of ancient peoples. Paleolithic remains have been found in the river valleys of the central highlands. Neolithic
peoples, akin to the Aleuts and Eskimos and still surviving in the frozen mountains of the northeast, probably came up from the south to displace these earliest stone age men. They were in turn displaced by other peoples of more advanced culture, like the Ugro-Samoyede bronze workers of the third century B.C. Successive waves of Mongol and Turkic invaders followed, the backwash of greater migrations in the south. Probably no invader was able to set up political control over any large portion of Siberia, but scattered among the diverse tribes already there, bringing perhaps a few new skills and a few new stories. Some few no doubt drifted back to join the hordes of middle Asia or sought the amenities of life in China; most soon adapted themselves more or less to the primitive life of the reindeer hunters in the north or the fishermen, hunters, and trappers in the south.

China. Of all the peoples of the Pacific Area with whom the Europeans came into contact, the Chinese have the oldest history and the highest culture. Their origin, like the pre-history of Europeans, is shrouded in mystery, but explorations and study during the last few decades seem to confirm the belief that the Chinese emerged from savagery along the banks of the Yellow River some time probably in the second millennium B.C. There they developed an economy founded on intensive agriculture, supplemented later by handicraft industry and domestic and foreign commerce. This system provided the livelihood for an expanding population and the finances for a central imperial government.

Although recent studies indicate that accounts of the Shang dynasty are something more than tradition, definite history seems to begin with the Chou dynasty (about 1000 to 256 B.C.). From the era of the Chou to the era of the Ming, the Chinese had passed through several historical cycles. The Ch'in and the Han dynasties, roughly 221 B.C. to A.D. 220, had extended the imperial rule and Chinese civilization far beyond the Yellow and Yangtze river basins, northward into Korea and Manchuria, westward to Alexander's middle Asian colony in Bactria, and southward to the Red River valley of Tonkin. A long period of political disunion followed until about 590, when the Sui and then the T'ang houses reunited China and pressed out the imperial bounds roughly to the Han limits and beyond to include the South China coastal tribes. The collapse of the T'ang in 907 ushered in a period of secessions and northern invasions before which the Sung gradually retreated, until the alien Mongols finally swept away all lesser powers and assumed sway over all of China in 1279. Not until 1368 did Chinese rulers, this time the
Mings, again mount the celestial throne. It was in the consciousness of the two most brilliant periods of their imperial past that the Chinese, even of the Ming period, liked to call themselves "Men of Han" and "Men of T'ang."

It was not just the financial and military power of her rulers or the aristocratic class solidarity of her bureaucrats that united China. Indeed the most powerful despot on the Chinese throne together with the most effective administrative corps of provincial governors and their assistants were never able to overcome the considerable village and local autonomy, so vast were the distances and so many the people. Her greatest unity lay rather in her heritage of common customs and common culture. Whatever the racial origin or dialect of the peoples who came under Chinese influence, they came sooner or later to share in her system of agricultural economy, her admiration of the farmer and exaltation of the scholar, her brilliant achievements in handicraft industries and the arts, her Confucian philosophy and morality, and her Taoist, Confucianist, and Buddhist religions. By the end of the fifteenth century Chinese soldiers, merchants, and scholars had carried this brilliant civilization not only to China's nearest land neighbors in Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, Turkestan, Siam, and Indo-China, but also to the peoples of the islands of Japan and the Indies. Even the first haughty Portuguese trader felt obliged to admit: "They are people of great skill and on a par with ourselves."

Korea. A Mongoloid people with early affinities to the other peoples of northeastern Asia, the Koreans developed a semi-Sinicized state in the northwestern part of their peninsula in about the third century B.C. Chinese influence grew stronger with the colonial conquests of the Han and the Wei dynasties of China from the second century B.C. to the fourth century A.D. For the next three centuries Korea was divided into three native kingdoms. An independent civilization was however hardly possible in the face of the rapid spread of Buddhism from China and the presence of Japanese colonies on the southern coast. In 562 the Japanese were expelled, but native rulers were almost immediately faced with the rise of T'ang China. From then on Korea was more or less subservient to the successive powers of northern China: the T'ang, Khitan, Jüchen, Mongols, and the Ming. In 1392 distraught Korea was united by the Li dynasty. Although the Li family ruled until 1910, they were no better able than their predecessors to develop a state capable of defending itself against its more powerful neighbors.
Japan. Though by no means as old as China, Japan too is a land of ancient origins. Mythological history honored by Shintoists dates the founding of the empire in 660 B.C., when Jimmu Tenno, descendant of the Great Sun Goddess, is supposed to have ascended the throne, and his descendants being commissioned to rule over Japan in "lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal." Modern scientific and historical scholars believe that actually it was not until about 200 B.C. that a blend of Mongolian, southeast Asian, and Ainu peoples developed even a neolithic shell-mound culture in the islands of Japan.

During the first six centuries of our era, Japanese society, primarily agricultural, was organized into small, self-contained clan communities. Each community worshiped its own clan deity and was ruled by its clan chieftain, whose duties were both political and religious. In the Nature worship, purification rituals, and tutelary deities of this period are the origins of Shinto, "The Way of the Gods." Under their clan chieftain, the members of each community were divided by blood into clansmen, hereditary workers, and slaves.

Sometime around 40 B.C., one clan began to assume hegemony over its neighbors. Styling itself the imperial clan and claiming direct descent from the Sun Goddess, it gradually extended its power over central and southern Japan and beyond the seas in Korea. This rising Yamato Kingdom, as the new monarchical power was called, was early impressed with the power of China. Setting up a colony in southern Korea, it sought eagerly to acquire the arts, ideas, and institutions upon which China's greatness seemed to rest. The Chinese calendar, the Chinese system of writing, and the religion of Buddha were officially adopted. Persons versed in literature, astronomy, medicine, sculpture, painting, metal-casting, weaving, and ceramics were encouraged to settle in Japan. There was no realm of social, religious, or political life that did not succumb to some extent to the Chinese influence. In the seventh and eighth centuries the Tenno assumed the role of a T'ang emperor, ruling a centralized state through a great council and its subordinate bureaucracy. This vast pyramid of non-productive officials were supported by the native produce and forced labor exacted from a peasantry to whom the land was periodically reassigned.

It was not long before Japanese traditions of decentralized, clan government, deriving its authority from blood, not virtue, and exercising religious as well as political authority, succeeded in reasserting themselves. Japanese society returned to its hereditary classes of farmers-warriors, workers, and slaves. The imperial family and the great
nobles withdrew their lands from the tax rolls and set up vast self-sufficient manors; the most powerful of them gradually restricted the emperor to sacerdotal functions, while they themselves took over the political authority. Soon the manorial lords gave way to military-feudal lords, and the greatest of these, the Sei Tai Shogun ("Barbarian-Subduing Great General"), assumed both civil and military authority. From the middle of the ninth century until the coming of the Europeans in the sixteenth, Japan was actually ruled by a succession of great, non-imperial clans: the Fujiwara, the Taira, the Minamoto, the Hojo, and the Ashikaga. It was from the last of these that power was being wrested in a violent upheaval when the Europeans came.

2. Early Relations Between China, Korea, and Japan

Japan seeks China. As we have seen, relations among the three northern Pacific powers began with the planting of Han colonies in Korea in the second century B.C. and of Japanese colonies in the fourth century A.D.; after this came the Korean importation of Chinese civilization into Japan. Japan's loss of her foothold in Korea in 562 and the final destruction of her fleet in 663 ended for over 900 years her attempt to dispute China's political ascendancy over the peninsula, and ushered in a period of Japanese embassies, including priests, merchants, scholars, and diplomats, being sent directly to the court of the T'ang.

Private trade under Sung and Fujiwara. Toward the end of the ninth century, the embassies became fewer, as Japan's admiration for China declined with the weakening of the T'ang. When the embassies stopped, relations were largely private. A few monks continued to seek Chinese masters, but it was now the Chinese and Koreans who sought Japanese wares: lacquerware, crystal, screens, fans, swords, embroidery. Into Japan came many exotic products of the South Seas. When Japanese merchants did return to the trade, their activities were more piratical than peaceful.

Effect of the Mongol conquest. Relations between China and Japan were suddenly interrupted by the Mongol conquest of Korea in 1259 and of all China by 1279. It was not long before complaints of Japanese pirates and rumors of Japanese wealth came to the ears of the Great Khan. In 1274 and 1281 joint Mongol-Chinese-Korean armadas were sent against the island kingdom, but valiant samurai and raging storms both times destroyed the invading fleets.

Japanese pirates in Ashikaga times. Partly in revenge, but more from
the need of rice, coins, cloth, and farm labor — increasingly desired by the warring feudal lords of Japan — the strong chiefs of the southern maritime fiefs began late in the thirteenth century to send out great half-commercial and half-piratical expeditions to the coasts of Korea and later to China. Soon the searovers were joined by Chinese bands as well. Despite energetic military measures by China and diplomatic protests, these expeditions were only gradually reduced to peaceful trade; and were not wholly eliminated until Japan was subjected to a strong central government late in the sixteenth century.

Official relations in medieval times. So stricken were the Chinese and Korean populations by these piratical depredations that their rulers were forced to abandon their officially hostile attitude toward Japan. Although the proud Ashikaga were at first pleased to ignore these continental suppliants, it was not long before they saw the desirability of a change in policy. The two most important reasons were first, their Zen protégés desired contact with the continent, and second, that their coffers had been drained by self-indulgence and exhausting feudal wars. Accordingly Shogun Yoshimitsu and later Yoshinori in the first part of the fifteenth century themselves turned to the continent and anxiously tried to resume friendly relations, and especially the profitable exchange of "tribute missions" and trading vessels. In return for agreeing to suppress the pirates — though this was hardly in his power — Yoshinori secured trading privileges and the right to establish trading colonies in Korea. This right continued until 1510, when an altercation between Japanese settlers and Korean authorities resulted in a reduction in the trade permitted and the elimination of the settlements. Yoshimitsu for his part was so anxious to secure Chinese goods that he not only agreed to suppress the pirates, but went so far as to adopt the Chinese calendar and to recognize the Ming emperor as suzerain. Although this suzerainty relationship was denounced by later Ashikaga, they continued to profit from the official trade, by which the Ouchi and So clans acting for the shogun carried on an exchange of Japanese swords, fans, screens, lacquerwares, copper, and agate for Chinese brocades and other silk fabrics, ceramic products, jade, and fragrant woods. Official trade after the middle of the century fell once again to far less importance than that private, half-piratical activity of the powerful lords of southern Japan.
3. **Siam and Indo-China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Oceania, Australasia, and the Americas**

**Siam and Indo-China.** In the early centuries of the Christian era emigrants from India carried to Cambodia and southern Annam the whole fabric of Indian culture including both Hinduism and Buddhism. Although Han China established a characteristically Chinese colony in Tonkin and Annam, the culture of the Annamese was never more than a pallid reflection of that of China, while the Laos and Kmers who inhabited the Laos plateau remained in a primitive state. Between the fourth and tenth centuries A.D., a relatively high Indian culture existed in Cambodia under the Kmers; to this fact many magnificent ruins still extant bear witness. The overthrow of this culture was due, it is believed, to exhausting wars with the Chams of southern Annam, followed by Thai invasions from Siam. About the time of Kublai Khan, Siam received a fresh wave of virile Thai immigrants from southwestern China, which the Mongols had conquered. Siam then began to emerge somewhat from its age-long obscurity.

**Malaysia.** The inhabitants of Malaysia are believed to have been originally Negritos and Melanesians. Successive invasions, perhaps of Indians or other Caucasian peoples, resulted in the evolution of a Malay race which eventually overran the peninsula and archipelago. When modern Europeans arrived the Indonesians, now largely converted from Hinduism and Buddhism to Islam, were still largely Indian in civilization. The state of civilization, except among the Javanese and some Sumatrans, was for the most part low. Piracy, head-hunting, and cannibalism were common in Borneo and parts of the Philippines. Only the Javanese and the Sumatrans had developed a stable agricultural economy, an artistic culture, and a feudal government; but even they, weakly organized and lacking firearms, naturally fell prey to the Portuguese and then to the Dutch.

**The Philippines.** When the Spanish entered the Philippine Islands, this archipelago was being invaded by the Moros, the last of a long series of invaders. The original inhabitants are thought to have been Mongoloids, but a succession of Indonesian and Malay invaders had resulted in such an intermixture of peoples that the residents of the various islands formed a racial crazy-quilt. Extremely low in the scale of civilization, the natives were easily conquered by the Spanish and largely converted to Christianity, after which a slow intermingling went on—though not enough to have yet produced any real homogeneity of race.
Oceania. The oceanic peoples about 1500 likewise comprised many different races. They are customarily grouped in the same divisions as are the islands: Melanesians, Polynesians, and Micronesians. The Melanesians, sometimes called the Papuans, are probably the oldest inhabitants. Physically Negroid in character and appearance, they were found in all the islands, but chiefly in the southwesternmost belt. They had been there so long when the Europeans found them that they had lost even all traditions as to their place of origin and when they had left it. The second group, the Polynesian, was probably driven from the mainland of southeastern Asia by way of the Malay Archipelago; however, the evidence is not complete, and there is some possibility that they may have come from South America on the Humboldt Current. The first modern European navigators found this tall, light-skinned, handsome race in a state of high savagery, spread mainly over the easternmost islands. A few centuries prior to the coming of the Europeans a third group of peoples began to filter in, the Micronesian, a hybrid race of Malay stock, much modified by contact with the peoples of the regions through which they had traveled. Many of them are thought to have come from the Philippines. They settled mainly in that intermediate tier of islands to which they gave their name.

Australia and Tasmania. The inhabitants of Australia and Tasmania almost completely disappeared before the impact of the Europeans, and what may be said of them is only of academic interest. They were probably the lowest in the scale of material culture of any of the inhabitants of the Pacific Area. With primitive social ethics, their life was extremely simple. They lived in huts or hovels, went absolutely naked, and had no domestic animals or manufactures. They were a distinct race, without kinsfolk among the neighboring peoples. Although it is conjectured that they may have originated in Hindustan, they apparently had inhabited the Australian continent for a long time. Rock carvings which have been found indicate that they superseded a higher race, or else during their long residence without contact with other peoples they themselves gradually deteriorated. They had no resistance to the white man's diseases nor to his firearms, thereby making possible a "White Australia."

New Zealand. The aborigines of New Zealand were probably Melanesians or Papuans. Sometime between A.D. 1300 and 1400, the Maoris, a Polynesian people from Samoa, began to arrive by way of Rarotonga. A savage people without writing or literature, they had a religion that was only Nature worship. They were excellent warriors,
and much given to cannibalism and tribal wars; and by the time the Europeans arrived had secured control of the islands. It is not surprising, then, that they easily forced the white invaders to treat them with respect, and as a result were able to resist to a great extent the impact of white civilization. Today they form an integral part, though a small one, of the population of New Zealand.

Chile. Due east from New Zealand on the western shores of South America lies Chile, whose pre-Columbian inhabitants were the Araucanians, a stalwart race much like the Iroquois of North America. The Spanish could not dominate them, therefore gradually pushed them south of the Bio-bio River, which for centuries constituted the boundary line between the two races. Miscegenation took place on only a small scale; and when finally in the late nineteenth century they were incorporated into the population of Chile, their virility and fierceness made them the best cannon fodder in South America.

The Inca Empire. From central Chile northward to Quito the vast cordilleras of the Andes were inhabited by a group of fairly closely related peoples which made up the so-called Inca Empire. Under the leadership of a capable line of rulers, a high degree of civilization had been developed in this region — indeed, according to contemporary Spanish chroniclers, a Utopia. Interesting as this civilization was, only one feature of it needs to be stressed here, namely, that it was sedentary and peaceful and knew the art of extracting gold and silver. As a result, when the Spaniard appeared upon the scene it was easy for him to displace the native rulers whose wealth he wanted. With the conquest effected amalgamation quickly took place and a new civilization arose, Spanish in essence but based on that of the great mass of Andean peoples.

Colombia, Central America, Mexico. Peoples of a similar stage of progress occupied the territory north of the Inca kingdoms as far as central Mexico. In Colombia the Chibchas had a culture only slightly lower than that of the Incas. Here also the Spanish soon mixed with the natives to produce a mestizo population. In some places, such as on the Isthmus of Panama, the natives were in a low state of culture; and their natural fighting abilities, aided by the tropical climate, kept at bay most of the European invaders. In Central America the outstanding peoples were the Maya-Quiches, in some respects the most advanced of the American aborigines. They had invented a picture writing which had come to have some phonetic elements, and their system of number notation had enabled them to develop an accurate calendar system. When the Spanish arrived, however, they were on
the down grade, and their place had been taken by the Aztecs, the
dominating tribe in what is known as the Nahua group of central
Mexico. The Aztecs, like the Incas, had built up a highly centralized
sedentary civilization, which readily fell before the onrush of the gold-
seeking Spaniard.

North from Mexico. North from central Mexico the situation was
entirely different. The Yaquis and Apaches were apt in savage warfare
and hated invaders bitterly. The result was that Spain made little
headway in these regions, and the Yaquis are not even yet entirely
amalgamated into the Mexican population. On the Pacific coast of
what is now the United States the Indians were extremely low and
debased; they were still in the dead-whale and acorn stage, totally
unconscious of the mineral wealth around them. Farther north were
the Aleutians, in a similarly low stage of culture; but ahead in one
respect, in that they had learned to travel the open sea fearlessly and
did not have to wait until leviathan died from natural causes in order
to satisfy their appetites. Far from Europe and occupied only by sav-
ages, the western coast of North America was neglected by Europeans
until the middle 1700's, when the Russians and the English accidentally
became acquainted with the fur wealth of the Northwest. With the
coming of the Europeans the native inhabitants faded into insigni-
ficance; their only part in the story of civilization on the Pacific was to
occupy an apparently useless territory until the white man decided to
take it for himself. Incidentally, also, the indigenous people of both
Americas have provided archeologists and ethnologists with what is
thus far an unsolved problem, namely, where did they come from?
It is generally believed that the Aleutian Islands provided a land bridge
from Asia for them, but the evidence is not conclusive.

Summary. Historically the Pacific has been a divided world of
many separate cultures in various stages of development. The coming
of the European in the sixteenth century and after was to bring great
changes in the way of life of each group, varying according to their
ability to withstand Western firearms and Western diseases and to
resist the drive of Western capitalism and Western Christianity. The
most primitive, like the Australian bushman, could hardly preserve his
race. The more advanced were either racially absorbed like the Incas,
or dominated like the Javanese. Even the most advanced, the three
great cultural centers of China, Korea, and Japan, closely related for
nearly 2000 years and together forming a community of civilization the
most ancient and the most extensive of any in man's history, could not
escape the European influence.
Two Thousand Years of East-West Relations

Introduction. Although close and continuous relations between East and West began in the sixteenth century, they were preceded by nearly 2000 years of intermittent commercial and religious exchanges. For most of this long history, relations between Europe and eastern Asia were indirect or nonexistent, but during two periods in particular, that of the Han and Roman empires in the first two centuries of our era and that of the Tatar Empire in the thirteenth and fourteenth, they were sustained and direct. It was largely the knowledge of the East gained in these past relations that drew the modern European into the Pacific early in the sixteenth century, and in some measure the knowledge the East had of the West that determined her reaction.

1. East-West Relations in Ancient Times

The ancient Greeks. The ancient Greeks knew of the ancient Chinese only vaguely through the Scythian traders of southern Russia. These warlike horsemen, from about the sixth century to the fourth B.C., amazed the Greek merchants in their Black Sea colonies with the quantities of gold they acquired from their kinsmen—probably in the Altai Mountains. They also brought back stories of the one-eyed men and the gold-guarding griffins of Mongolia and of the Chinese, who lived "beyond the North Wind."

Alexander's conquest of middle Asia. Such stories had little influence on the Greeks, for when Alexander set out in the fourth century B.C. to conquer the world, he stopped at the Indus River and the rich
strip of oases in middle Asia known as Bactria, believing he had sub-
due all the civilized East. Although a Hellenistic community flour-
ished in middle Asia just west of the Pamirs for several centuries there-
after, no direct contacts with China are recorded. Contacts there must
have been, however, for during this period the Chinese acquired a
knowledge of the Pythagorean musical scale and of Western geomet-
rical axioms.

Han Empire. Following a pattern similar to that of the Greeks,
the ancient Chinese after several centuries of interstate wars and brilliant
intellectual development finally consolidated their states, first under
the Chin, then under the Han, and finally in the second and first centuries
B.C. undertook a tremendous imperial expansion. In 128 B.C. the greatest
of the Han emperors, Wu-ri, sent Chang Ch'ien out over the north-
western deserts to establish relations with the Yüeh-chih, who had
recently driven the Greeks out of middle Asia, hoping they would join
him in a pincer movement against his constant northern enemies the
Hsiung-nu. Chang Ch'ien brought back such glowing accounts of
the wealth and civilization of the western lands that Emperor Wu-ri
dispached gigantic armies to the west, establishing his hegemony over
Turkestan as far as the Syr Darya.

The Roman Empire. Meanwhile the Romans were building almost
as large an empire in the West; and after the conquest of Egypt in 31 B.C.
Augustus stretched his hand out to Asia across both the Indian Ocean
and Turkestan. For two centuries Roman silver, glass, precious stones,
jewelry, textiles — especially those dyed at Tyre — cloth-of-gold, and
medicines were carried from Syria to Persia across the Pamirs to the
northwestern marches of the Han Empire; or by sea from Egypt or
Persia to India, Bengal, Burma, or even Tonkin for transshipment over-
land to the Han Empire's southeastern coast or southwestern marches.
Back to the Romans flowed the highly prized silks, and to a less extent
furs, spices, and rhubarb.

Strabo and Ptolemy. This trade was carried on mostly by intermedi-
aries. Few if any Chinese or Romans could have made the complete
trip, but the stories of travelers added much to the Chinese knowledge
of Ta Ch'in, as they called the Roman Empire, and to the Romans'
knowledge of Seres or Siniae, as they called the Han Empire. Strabo
in the first century A.D. and Ptolemy in the second showed in their maps
and geographies some knowledge of the Orient. Strabo, a Greek who
lived in Rome, produced an easily read narrative which related his
wide travels and told something of the history of the places mentioned.
Ptolemy, who lived in Alexandria during the reign of Hadrian, has often been called the last of the famous scientists of the ancient world. He believed the world to be spherical and drew a map to show it. Fortunately or unfortunately he made it some 8000 miles too small in circumference, thereby leaving out the segment from the coast of China to the eastern coast of North America. His ideas were fairly well accepted. It is thought that they, together with the knowledge of Marco Polo’s travels, may have led Columbus to undertake his epoch-making voyage. It is interesting to conjecture whether Columbus would have had the courage to begin his enterprise or whether he could have secured any backing if the actual distance from Spain to the Cathay described by Marco had been known.

The end of the silk trade. The decline of the Roman Empire and the dissolution of the Han Empire in the third century A.D. permitted the control of the Indian Ocean route to fall into the hands of Indian, Ethiopian, and Arab traders, and forced the overland route, now handled by Persians rather than Parthians, to pass farther north through Armenia, then on to the new Roman capital at Constantinople. The silk trade however was too profitable and too well established to be curtailed by these changes. It continued to flourish until the sixth century, when the main routes through Egypt and Syria were seized by the Arabs. At about the same time the Byzantines learned how to make their own silk and began to lose interest in the eastern Asian supply.

Islam cuts the routes. From the seventh century to the thirteenth all middle Asia and much of the Near East lay in the grip of Islam. T’ang records speak of Roman embassies in the seventh and eighth centuries, and it may be that the Latins did seek Chinese aid against the Arabs. Other references to Western embassies are less credible, for Islamic power was a greater barrier than the height of the Pamirs. The routes between Europe and China were effectively cut.

The introduction of Buddhism. European contacts through the sixth century A.D. had brought to the Chinese a few new products and a few new ideas, but had brought no fundamental change to Chinese civilization. Much more important was the introduction into China of things and ideas from the peoples of middle Asia and particularly India. From India during the height of the Roman-Chinese trade came Buddhism, destined to become the most influential foreign religion in eastern Asia.

Southeast Asia. The Chinese were not the only Pacific people to have important early contacts with non-Pacific cultures. The peoples of southeast Asia, especially those in the Malay peninsula and Tonkin,
met merchants of the Roman world on their way to China in the first two centuries of our era. Following the Roman period came the great Indian expansion eastward into Indonesia. For the next four centuries Indian colonists came, bringing both Hinduism and Buddhism. After India came Islam. Thus while Chinese junks were drawing southeast Asia into the Pacific world Arab dhows and the merchant vessels of Ethiopia and India were drawing it even more toward the Indian-Arab world to the west.

2. East-West Relations in Medieval Times

The introduction of other western Asian religions. Other western Asian religions were introduced into China in the years following the break with Europe. The Persians, who took over the middle Asian trade from the Parthians, seem to have brought Zoroastrianism into China via the northern overland route early in the sixth century, and likewise Manichaeism late in the century following. At about this same time small numbers of Jews also seem to have made their way to China, both overland and by sea. And the Arabs, coming as merchants rather than as missionaries, developed a flourishing maritime trade with Canton, where Chinese sources record the existence of rich merchant communities ruled by Arab headmen who were responsible for the administration of their own law under Chinese authority. While trade continued by sea, political relations with the T’ang court were maintained by the overland route.

Persecution of alien faiths. In the seventh century Christianity also came to China. The Nestorians, although their doctrine had been condemned as heresy in the West by the Council of Ephesus in 431, were for centuries the largest Christian community in Asia. In 635, Nestorian Christian missionaries, probably Syrians or Persians, were received at Sian. They were led by a monk whose name is recorded by the Chinese as Alopen. Three years after Alopen’s arrival the emperor issued an edict permitting him to preach his doctrines and to erect a church in the imperial capital at Changan. At first the Nestorians enjoyed royal favor, but in 845 all alien religions were so persecuted in favor of native Confucianism as to be virtually driven out of China.

The Mongol Empire. European and Pacific relations were finally restored in the thirteenth century, when the hard-riding Mongols swept down out of the Gobi Desert into the great Eurasian plain. These nomad warriors built an empire extending all the way from the shores
of the Pacific Ocean in the east to central Europe in the west, from the
Siberian tundra in the north to the Indo-Chinese jungles in the south.
No one before or since has ruled over so vast an empire as did Genghiz
Khan and his descendants. At first Europe trembled before this
scourge from the East, but the "Golden Horde" did not follow up its
European invasion of 1241. When instead it appeared to be content to
limit its conquests to the Russians, Europeans began to wonder whether
the Mongol hordes might not be used to advantage against the Turks,
and to realize that the Tatar Empire made possible a resumption of
trade with the East.

The Crusades and the revival of East-West relations. Ever since the fall
of Jerusalem to the Caliph Omar in 638, pious Europeans had sought
its recovery. Finally the project to recover the Holy Sepulcher from
the Mohammedan infidel fired the imagination of the Western World
to conduct from the eleventh to the thirteenth century those vast
medieval expeditions to the Near East, the Crusades. Pious as was
their original inspiration, one of their greatest results was probably
the whetting again of Europe’s appetite not for righteousness but for
the silks and spices of the Orient. Once again as in the first centuries
A.D. East and West simultaneously reached out toward each other.

Genoa and Venice. Taking advantage of the Pax Tatarica, which
spread across Asia from the mid-thirteenth century to the mid-four-
teenth, international merchants and missionaries returned to the ancient
East-West routes and the great cities of the Black Sea, Persia, Turkestan,
and China. By the thirteenth century the Venetians had captured the
Egyptian trade with the eastern seas and the Genoese the Black Sea
trade with middle Asia. Genoa in her keen rivalry with Venice began
to dream of combining forces with the Ilkhanate in Persia and Mesop-
otamia and putting a Genoese fleet into the Indian Ocean, not only to
blockade the infidel in his Egyptian stronghold but also to capture
the eastern maritime trade from the Venetians. But these dreams were
soon dashed by the Ilkhan’s lack of interest.

Missions to the Great Khan. This same hope that the Mongols might
be brought into concerted action with the Europeans to crush their
mutual enemy the Turks caused first the Pope, then King Louis IX, to
send missions to the court of the Great Khan at Karakorum. In 1245
the Pope sent the Franciscan friar John de Plano Carpini to the Great
Khan’s court in Outer Mongolia to gain exact information about the
power and plans of the Mongols and if possible to arrange for their
co-operation. Until this time many monstrous stories had prevailed
regarding the Mongols. Carpini's *Historia Mongolorum quos nos Tartaros appellamus*, which was later made use of by Hakluyt in his *Navigations and Discoveries*, was the first book to discredit these tales. Then later Louis IX of France sent out Friar William de Rubruquis to open up communications with Sartak, son of the Mongol prince Buta Khan, a supposed Christian. The friar on his return journeyed over much of Asia, and upon his arrival at Tripoli wrote an account of what he had seen and done. No alliance against the Turk resulted from these missions, but both the East and West grew in knowledge of each other.

*Marco Polo*. These diplomatic missions did not induce the Mongols to participate in the Crusades. The Mongols however did show their friendliness by making the routes of travel safe for the Christian West, and by welcoming in the middle of the thirteenth century two Venetian merchants, Nicolo and Maffeo Polo, who penetrated Asia until they reached the court of Kublai Khan not far north of Peking. There they were well received, and on their return to Italy bore a message to the Pope to send to Kublai one hundred persons of the Christian faith, "men of intelligence, acquainted with the seven arts, and qualified to prove that idols were of the devil and that the law of Christ was better than the law he and his people knew." The ecclesiastical mission which should have answered this Macedonian call was not forthcoming, but in its stead the brothers returned to the Mongol court, taking with them young Marco, Nicolo's son. Arriving at their destination in May 1275, after a journey of almost three and a half years from Acre, they remained in China seventeen years. Marco especially won the favor of Kublai Khan. For seven years he was a minor official in the government salt service at a city on the Yangtze, and at other times he accompanied Mongol armies and missions to Pegu and Cochin-China. When in 1292 the three Venetians were finally permitted to leave the court, Kublai appointed them as an escort of honor to accompany a Mongol princess on her voyage to Persia as the chosen bride of the ruler of that kingdom. From the head of the Persian Gulf they made their way overland to the Mediterranean, the whole journey taking some three years. The *Book of Marco Polo*, dictated to a fellow prisoner while the author was in confinement in Genoa, may be said to have contributed more new knowledge of the earth's surface than any book before it. First circulated in manuscript in French, it was translated and printed in all the important languages of Europe, and became the inspiration of the voyagers who sought Cathay in the great age of discovery. It is interesting to note that although for centuries much
This painting by H. M. Burton shows Marco Polo being received by the Emperor, Kublai Khan. The celebrated Venetian went to China in 1274, bearing a letter from Pope Gregory X. During his twenty-four years in the East he held high civil office for three years as Governor of the city of Yangchow. The Mongol court at which he was received was far more magnificent than European courts of the same date.
of what Marco wrote was supposed to be fable, geographers today generally admit that what he said he saw he probably did see, and that the romancing in the book is only in those portions where he repeats hearsay.

Missionaries. The writings of Marco Polo and the visits of other traders finally aroused the Church, and Roman Christianity was taken to China by the Franciscan friar John of Montecorvino, who reached that country by way of India in 1292. Well received by the Great Khan, he even believed that the monarch was on the point of baptism, and in 1305 reported that up to that time almost 6,000 souls had been baptized. He died in 1328 after converting, it is said, more than 30,000 infidels. In 1318 Oderic of Pordenone made a wide circuit of the Orient; and in 1340 Giovanni de Marignolli, who had been sent out by Benedict XII, returned from Peking. Both reported progress in the spreading of the true faith, but the Roman Catholics and the more numerous Nestorians both disappeared when the Mongols were expelled and Chinese sovereignty restored under the Ming dynasty in 1368. More than 200 years passed before the seed could be sown again and before Western merchants as well were again admitted to the lands of eastern Asia.

Ming commerce. At the time when European merchants were beginning to resume their drive to the East, Chinese merchants were slowly withdrawing from the seas. T'ang traders had previously reached the Persian Gulf, possibly by sea, and Mongol merchants had sailed to the Malabar coast and Ceylon. Ming merchants however, after a sudden last flooding over the Indian Ocean, finally withdrew to Malacca. The Mings, who came to power in China in 1368, in later years became somewhat isolationist, and eventually permitted no foreigners to disembark in their ports. Before moving their capital from Nanking to Peking and turning their main attention to the threat of the Kalmuks in the north however, they sent out seven great naval expeditions. From 1405 to 1433 these Ming armadas under Admiral Cheng Ho brought to the emperor the trade and in many cases the submission of most of the Asian littoral states from Annam to the east coast of Africa. Then almost as suddenly as they were begun the expeditions ended, official interest shifted from the South Seas to the northern interior, and Chinese merchants limited their westward voyages to Malacca. How different might the course of history have been had Vasco da Gama sailed seventy-five years earlier or Cheng Ho seventy-five years later!
Results of 2000 years of East-West relations. During nearly 2000 years of intermittent intercourse East and West had merely touched finger tips. The culture of Greece, the religion of Christ, the polity of Rome — none of these was appreciably shared by the peoples of the Pacific. The peoples of Europe, on the other hand, had likewise developed their own civilization, relatively isolated from the Chou classics, the Taoist, Confucianist, and Buddhist religious movements, and the empires of the Han and the T'ang. There was no real merger of East and West in any sense — political, economic, or cultural.

Second, peoples so isolated could hardly be expected to have arrived at a clear conception of each other. In only two periods was contact direct: the Roman-Han and the Tatar. Even in those two periods few were the merchants or missionaries who made the complete trip and gathered firsthand information. Fewer still were those who having done so left their contemporaries or posterity a written description of what they saw. In Han times Chang Ch'ien reported on the peoples and countries of middle Asia, Kan Ying on western Asia as far as Babylonia. A Roman merchant, Maes Tittianus, wrote of his overland journey to Kashgaria. During the Pax Tatarica two friars, John of Plano Carpini and William of Rubruquis, described their trips to the Khan's capital in Outer Mongolia. Only a handful of missionaries, like Oderic de Pordenone, John of Montecorvino, and Giovanni de Marignolli, sent or brought to Europe reports on China Proper. Only the Polos, particularly Marco, returned with a detailed description of the vast expanse of the Chinese Empire. Except for these few reports Europeans at the end of the fifteenth century relied for what knowledge they had of China and the Indies on the tales brought back by merchants and missionaries from middle Asia and the trading marts of the eastern Mediterranean. Yet European knowledge of China was probably greater than Chinese knowledge of Europe. No Chinese missionary or merchant is known to have journeyed to Rome or Constantinople and returned with a written description. Chinese knowledge of Europe came mostly from the few reports of the European travelers who themselves had come to the Middle Kingdom and from the stories of merchant middlemen in the East-West trade. Nearly 2000 years of intercourse had yielded the European and Pacific worlds little knowledge of each other.

Third, this long history of occasional contacts had convinced China that European relations were relatively unimportant. European products and European ideas had not appreciably affected either her culture
or her economy, while her own goods, particularly silks and spices, appeared to her to be indispensable to Europe. Nothing in that long period had occurred to shake her conviction that she was the Middle Kingdom around which all other peoples of the universe revolved.

Last, this long history had convinced Europe, on the other hand, that relations with the Pacific world, particularly with China and the Indies, were very important. Here was a world to be conquered for Christianity, for the glory of the king, and for the profits of the precious spice trade. The stage was set for a great drama.
Portugal and Spain Sail to the Pacific

The Sixteenth Century

Fifteenth century Europe. The restoration of relations between the Latin West and the Byzantine East achieved in the course of the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries by the Italian merchants and the European crusaders not only revived the maritime trade of the Mediterranean but also stimulated the evolution of a new Europe. Trade spread northward to the Baltic. Flemish and German cities shared the prosperity of Milan, Florence, Genoa, and Venice. Other towns sprang up all over Europe. The old manorial economy gave way before the rising capitalism of the bourgeois class, eager for the gains of large-scale, wholesale industry and foreign trade.

Accompanying the new commercialism in economy was a rising secularism in art, humanism in learning, and practicality in science; Ptolemy’s Geography was translated and the compass and the astrolabe were widely used. The old feudalism in government had given way to a new monarchism. Louis XI had recently united nearly all France under his rule; Ferdinand and Isabella all Spain. The Tudors had taken over England. The Hapsburgs had acquired the Netherlands. By the end of the fifteenth century European merchants and missionaries, carried by navigators of wide experience in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, armed with firearms, financed by great capitalistic commercial companies, and directed by despotic monarchs, were prepared to carry their newly secularized but basically Greek-Christian-Latin civilization to wherever duty — and profit — called. Newly awakened desire for silks and spices turned European merchants to the East.

This was the trade developed by the Venetians and the Genoese;
but so long as the old overland and land-and-sea routes were controlled by the Mohammedan there could be no great expansion in the exchange of commodities or ideas between West and East. An all-sea route with its larger cargoes, cheaper freights, greater safety, and vast saving in time was needed. This direct route was not found by an Eastern people, nor by the Arabs, nor by the Italians, but by the daring captains of the Atlantic-washed Iberian peninsula.

1. Preliminary Discoveries

The Hispanic crusades. In this Iberian peninsula from 700 to 1490 there took place one continuous crusade against the Moslems from northern Africa. Bit by bit Christian states were carved out of Moorish dominions until in 1492 the fall of Granada (immortalized by the pen of Washington Irving) pushed the last of the infidels across the Strait of Gibraltar into Africa. Naturally this long period of warfare had a direct influence upon the character of the Hispanic people. It taught them how to fight, and above all it bred in them that religious bigotry and narrow-mindedness which comes from a long-drawn-out political struggle against a people of a different religion. This combination of military skill and missionary zeal was to prove the foundation on which was to be built the European discovery and partial conquest of the Pacific Area.

Portugal's discoveries. That the first Iberian to find the all-sea route to India was a Portuguese was no mere accident. For centuries that little country had been shut off from eastward expansion, first by the Moors, and then, when the Spanish succeeded little by little in driving out the invaders, by their fellow inhabitants on the peninsula. These barriers on the east literally forced the Portuguese to go to sea. In 1317 they began to build a navy, largely through the influence of the English (in 1387 John I, married to Philippa, daughter of John of Gaunt and sister of Henry IV, ascended the throne), and these beginnings were successful. Of the eight sons born to John and his English wife the most illustrious was Prince Henry, born on Ash Wednesday, 1394. From his boyhood this pioneer of ocean traffic saw that the future of his country lay on the seas. He studied the methods of the Moors, and when in 1415 after the conquest of Ceuta he was made governor of the new acquisitions, he considered entering the field of government. But the political field was not for him. In 1418 at the age of twenty-four he made what might be called the great renunciation in the interest of
the cause he had taken to his heart. Making a home on the wind-swept promontory of Sagres at the southern extremity of Portugal, he there established an observatory, an arsenal, and a school for the teaching of mathematics, navigation, and cartography. Thence he sent out expedition after expedition, some of which resulted in the discovery and occupation in 1418–1419 of the Madeiras (to offset the Spanish conquest of the Canaries a few decades before) and of the Azores in 1427. In 1437 Gil Eannes rounded Cape Bojador and reached Rio de Ouro, whence began the African slave trade. Yet all the while Prince Henry's eyes were fixed on a more distant goal, a sea route to the Indies. On his efforts to reach this goal he spent his entire fortune, and died in 1460 with it still unachieved. But what he sowed another reaped. The work of the school of Sagres went on as though the spirit of the dead director was still its living inspiration. So there followed finally in 1486 the expedition of Bartolomeo Diaz and the discovery of what he called Cabo Tormentosa. "No," said John II, under whose aegis had been held that celebrated geographical congress at which Martin Behaim and Toscanelli had given their opinion in favor of a sea route to the Orient, "call it not the Cape of Storms, call it the Cape of Good Hope, since now at last lies open the way to the Indies!"

Spain conquers the Atlantic. Unfortunately for the Portuguese, before they succeeded in finally opening that way their rivals to the east were to add a vast area to the known surface of the globe. That it should have been a Genoese was perhaps poetic justice. During the Crusades Venice had managed to monopolize the lion's share of the Mediterranean trade through its ability to keep Constantinople in the hands of the Greeks. When in 1453 that city fell to the Turks the Venetians usurped the Genoese Red Sea trade. Hence it is quite possible that Columbus, being a Genoese, evolved the plan of sailing west in the hope that this new route to the Indies might help to recoup the fallen prestige of his birthplace. If such were his idea Fate played him false, for it was under the flag of Spain that this Genoese navigator, married to a Portuguese sea captain's widow, discovered the western route to the American Indies and thereby helped to seal the doom of both Italian cities. On his return to Lisbon the news of the discovery of October 12, 1492, created intense excitement. When he reached Palos in Spain on March 15, 1493, the citizens adjourned business for the day; bells were rung, and at night the streets were illumined. The climax came when at Barcelona Columbus was allowed to be seated in the presence of the sovereigns.
The Treaty of Tordesillas. The King of Portugal, jealous of Spain's triumph, is said to have planned to send a fleet across the Atlantic to dispute the Spanish claims, but the Spanish rulers hurriedly secured from the Pope (May 4, 1493) confirmation of their claim to all the territory west of a meridian 100 leagues west of the Azores islands. King John of Portugal was not satisfied, and a year later secured the Treaty of Tordesillas, by which the line of demarcation was fixed 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands.

The Cabots. The King of Portugal was not the only one to be displeased with Spain's assumption of world dominion. England was represented when the Pope divided up the Americas, and when Henry VII saw that he was in danger of losing all claim to the spoils of the New World, he hired Giovanni Caboto, a Genoese then in his employ, to sail to "all parts of the East, of the West, and of the North." John Cabot, as he is known to the English, finally reached Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, on June 24, 1497. As soon as he had firmly planted the Cross of St. George in the barren soil, he hastened back to Bristol with the news, and was rewarded with the munificent gift of ten pounds sterling. On his second voyage he disappeared from sight but his son Sebastian carried on. Of the entertaining tales the latter told, the most important was one about great schools of cod off the Newfoundland banks. This succulent fish was a welcome addition to the Roman Catholics' meatless Friday menus, and later was to be a great source of wealth, but for the time being its importance was eclipsed by the further discoveries of Columbus and his immediate followers.

The significance of Portuguese and Spanish discoveries. The conquest of the Atlantic and the discovery of America, accident though the latter was, mark a turning point in the history of the world. For Europe as a whole it meant the end of medievalism, the dispelling of many century-old concepts, and the stimulation of man's imagination to the point where the dreams of the past were to become living realities. For Spain it meant a new continent which for three centuries was to pour into her coffers a golden flood. For Portugal for the moment at least it meant a dire catastrophe, because it seemed that all Prince Henry's work was gone for naught.

Vasco da Gama. But Columbus, great though his exploit was, had failed in his primary purpose. He had discovered America it is true, but he had not reached the Indies. The discovery of the first real all-sea route to the East was the epic story of Vasco da Gama. In July 1497 three small ships under his command sailed from Lisbon for the purpose
of following to its ultimate goal the path explored by his predecessors. Rounding the Cape of Good Hope, da Gama proceeded up the African east coast, landing at frequent intervals to secure information. At Malindi, a short distance south of the equator, he was able to obtain the services of an Arab pilot, and on May 20, 1498, his little squadron entered the harbor of Calicut. Here the Portuguese had little difficulty in exchanging their European goods for a cargo of spices, and in September 1499, after an absence of twenty-six months, da Gama returned in safety to the port of Lisbon. Only a third of his men survived the trip, but the cargo he brought home is said to have been valued at sixty times the entire cost of the voyage. Thus culminated nearly eight decades of patient toil and daring exploration on the part of the Portuguese. This epoch-making voyage, second only to that of Columbus in world significance, found the eastern route to the Indies, brought western Europe into direct maritime communication with India and with the entire Far East, and shifted the commercial center of Europe from the Mediterranean ports and the Baltic to those of the Atlantic. The Ottoman Turk lost the advantage which might have come from the conquest of Egypt by Sultan Selim in 1516, Venice and Genoa were faced by ruin, and even the far distant cities of the Hanseatic League felt the change. "Grass grew in the fair and pleasant streets of Bruges, and seaweed clustered about the marble halls of Venice."

2. THE DISCOVERY OF THE PACIFIC BY THE PORTUGUESE AND THE SPANISH

Portugal in India. Following the exploits of Columbus and Vasco da Gama, Spain and Portugal were both in a position to make the further discoveries which were to put a large part of the Pacific Area on the European world map. Although Spain had a slight head start, Portugal soon got the control of the Indies for which the Genoese had been searching. Six months after da Gama's return from Calicut, thirteen well-laden ships under the command of Pedro Alvarex Cabral set forth to repeat da Gama's exploit on a larger scale. This voyage was more rapid, and the fleet returned home in July 1501. The next February da Gama was sent out again, this time in command of twenty ships. Success once more attended his efforts, with the result that in the decade following da Gama's epoch-making voyage, spices and other Oriental goods poured into Europe in greater quantities and at cheaper prices than ever before, and Lisbon, as the distributing center for this flood of
Eastern commodities, quickly became one of the most important commercial cities of Europe. By 1505 the Far Eastern interests of the Portuguese king (who with the Pope's consent had assumed the ambitious title of "Lord of navigation, conquest, and commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, and India") had become so important that Francisco de Almeida was sent out with the title of Viceroy to assume command of the Portuguese forces in the Orient. Under his energetic leadership the Arab merchants were driven from the sea; in 1509 a combined Egyptian and Arabian fleet was destroyed in a battle off the port of Diu, and the Portuguese thereby secured complete control of the Indian Ocean. In the fall of 1509, Almeida was succeeded by Alfonso de Albuquerque, who as governor directed Portuguese affairs for nearly six years and definitely established the future of Portugal in the Far East. He it was who laid down the policy that a fleet operating at a great distance from its home ports must have a certain number of fortified bases for refitting and supply. Between 1510 and 1513 therefore he seized and fortified four widely separated and strategically important points: Goa on the west coast of India, Malacca at the southern extremity of the Malay peninsula, Ormuz near the mouth of the Persian Gulf, and the island of Socotra off the entrance to the Red Sea.

*Portugal reaches the Indies.* But the Portuguese did not stop here. Shortly after their arrival in India they discovered that only a part of the spices came from India itself and that many of the most prized varieties were from farther east. In 1509 therefore Diego Lopes de Sequeira was sent eastward with a number of ships to seek out the real source of the much-esteemed commodities. He visited several ports at the western end of Sumatra, and in September 1509 found his way to Malacca. Here the Portuguese arrogance awakened hostility, and Sequeira sent Albuquerque a call for aid. Responding with all the forces at his disposal, Albuquerque arrived at Malacca in the summer of 1511, attacked the city and quickly took it. The power of the hated "infidel" was completely destroyed, and Malacca was transformed into a Portuguese stronghold.

As soon as the city was taken Albuquerque dispatched envoys to Pegu, Siam, Annam, and the local rulers of Java and Sumatra. At the same time a small squadron was sent on to explore the archipelago farther to the east and north and to discover the more important sources of trade. In the course of an extended cruise it explored the coasts of Java, Sumatra, Borneo, and the Celebes, discovered the Moluccas (the "Spice Islands"), and visited a number of other islands, thus greatly
increasing Portuguese information about the East Indies. Adopting here the policy which had already been decided upon for India, the Portuguese soon established fortified bases of operation throughout the islands from Malacca to Amboyna. With their headquarters at Malacca and this chain of posts, the Portuguese were able to maintain an efficient patrol of the archipelago. The merchant ships of other countries were excluded from access to the spice-producing areas, and were compelled rather than invited to seek their spices at Malacca.

Spain discovers the western route to the Indies. By 1520 it seemed that the Pacific Ocean was well on its way to becoming a Portuguese lake. This however was not to be, for Lusitania's Iberian rivals, stimulated by the wealth that poured into Lisbon, never ceased in their efforts to find a way westward to the Indies. Columbus himself made three fruitless voyages in search of the desired strait. His followers, using Españaola (the early name of Haiti) as a base, soon were acquainted with the other islands and the South American shores of the Caribbean. Ojeda and Nicuesa visited the Isthmus of Panama, but their efforts to colonize Darien were blocked by the hostility of the natives, internal dissensions, and tropical diseases. Meanwhile Juan de la Cosa, Pinzón, and others sought for the strait, and in 1513 Vasco Nuñez de Balboa discovered the South Sea. North from Españaola went Ponce de León, hunting for the Fountain of Youth, and westward went Velásquez to conquer Cuba; but still the wealth of the Indies eluded the Spanish. Finally in 1519 Hernán Cortés and his little band of followers entered the plateau of Anahuac, and gave to Spain a wealth in the precious metals which would more than counterbalance her failure to find the westward route to the East.

Magellan. And yet strange to relate at the very time that the riches of the Aztecs fell into the hands of Spain, she also secured the passage to the Indies which for three decades had been beyond her reach. Ferdinand Magellan had served as an officer under Albuquerque when that great governor was laying the foundations of Portugal's commercial empire in the East. After Albuquerque's death in 1515, he returned to Lisbon, where he fell into disfavor at the Portuguese court. Believing himself unjustly treated, he renounced his allegiance to the Portuguese crown and became a Spanish subject. From the information he had acquired in the Orient, either by visiting the Spice Islands or by conversing with fellow officers who had accompanied the exploration, Magellan was convinced that these islands lay so far to the east that they were in the Spanish half of the world; that is, on the eastern side of a line drawn
from north to south halfway around the world from the line of demarcation. Because he had actually been in the Indies, Magellan was able to convince the Spanish government that he could find the long-sought westward route, and in September 1519 he sailed from San Lucar with five Spanish ships to discover a way past America.

Steering southwestward until he reached South America, Magellan sailed down the coast looking for the westward passage. Late in October 1520 after one of his ships had been wrecked, he arrived at the entrance to the passage which since has been called the Straits of Magellan. A second ship was lost — by desertion — while he was finding his way through the difficult passage, but on November 28, 1520, he led his three remaining ships out into the open sea, and to this body of water he gave the name Pacific.

After sailing northward almost to the equator, Magellan directed his vessels toward the northeast, expecting to reach the Moluccas after a short voyage. But the distance across the Pacific was much greater than he expected, and he was driven so far north that he finally reached the Indies, some distance north of his destination. On March 16, 1521, nearly four months after he entered the Pacific, his little squadron sighted the first group of islands, upon which Magellan bestowed, in honor of the date, the name Archipelago of Saint Lazarus, later changed to "the Philippines." Very shortly he learned of the large town of Cebú, to which he proceeded, and there found a people who had been long accustomed to trading with Arab, Siamese, and Chinese merchants. The Cebuans welcomed the new foreigners, and showed themselves quite willing to provide them with food in exchange for European goods.

El Cano. Shortly after his arrival at Cebú, Magellan was killed, and it was not long before the arrogance of the Spanish transformed the earlier friendliness of the Cebuans into bitter hostility. After some twenty-five of the Spaniards had been killed, the survivors determined to search for the Spice Islands. With the two ships that remained seaworthy they sailed southward, touching at Borneo and a number of other ports, and finally reached the Moluccas. It was then decided that one of the ships should return to Spain by the way they had come; but this ship fell into the hands of the Portuguese. The other, the Victoria, under the command of Sebastian del Cano, found its way safely around Africa, and on September 6, 1522, entered the harbor of Seville. One ship and eighteen men were all that remained of the expedition which had set out nearly three years before; but this ship and its handful of survivors had circumnavigated the earth.
3. Development of Spanish and Portuguese Power in the Pacific

*Spain in the Pacific.* The combination of Cortés’ conquest of Mexico and Magellan’s discovery of the Philippines was most significant. In the first place, the enormous quantities of gold and silver which flowed to Spain from Mexico (and later from Peru, invaded by Pizarro in 1532) furnished the Spanish and through them the rest of Europe with exportable wealth that could be exchanged for the products of the Orient. And in the second place, the occupation of Mexico established the Spaniards permanently on the American shore of the Pacific Ocean and thus made it possible for them to follow up the claims which resulted from Magellan’s voyage. Accordingly in 1525, 1526, and 1527, Charles I fitted out expeditions to the East Indies, the first two sailing from Spain and the third from the coast of Mexico. Only the first and last of them succeeded in reaching the Orient, and both these were promptly captured by the watchful Portuguese cruisers. Discouraged by these failures, the Spanish sovereign agreed to negotiate with the Portuguese, and in 1529 the question was settled for the time being by the Treaty of Saragossa. Spain in return for the payment of 330,000 gold ducats agreed that the Demarcation Line in the Pacific should be drawn 197½ leagues east of the Moluccas.

*Spain in America.* (1) *Peru.* Actually, Spain could well afford to give up her claims to the Orient, for the Americas deserved all the attention she could give them. From 1520 to 1540 Spain was busy consolidating her power in the new hemisphere, and beginning an expansion that two and a half centuries later was to take the lions of Castile to the Golden Gate. A decade after Cortés, another Estremaduran, Francisco Pizarro, found an *otro México* in the central Andes. The conquest was bloodier and more turbulent in Peru than in Mexico, but very shortly the gold and silver of the Incas joined that of the Aztecs.

(2) *The River Plate.* It is not surprising that these two initial successes should have inspired the Spanish to attempt settlement all over America, and by 1550 such success had been obtained that presidios topped by the Spanish flag were to be found all the way from the Río Grande to northern Patagonia. As early as 1526, Sebastian Cabot, the pilot major of Spain, sailed up the Río de la Plata. He then went up the Paraná, but the hostility of the natives and his lack of provisions forced him to give up the enterprise. Although on his return to Spain he gave a glowing account of the country, the lack of gold or of a native
civilization that could be plundered deterred Spanish conquest for another decade. In 1526, Pedro de Mendoza founded a town at Buenos Aires, which lasted only three years however because of pestilence, famine, and the active hostility of the indigenes. Accordingly in 1538 the remnants of the various Spanish colonies were gathered at Asunción, where a fort had been built the previous year, and this capital of modern Paraguay, though far in the interior, was curiously enough to serve as the principal base for the Spanish conquests in the River Plate area.

3) The west coast of South America. More successful were the Spanish on the Pacific coast of South America. Almost immediately after Pizarro's capture of Atahualpa and the occupation of the Inca capital of Cuzco, an expedition secured control of Quito, the northern capital of the Inca kingdom, and very shortly much of the Amazon basin to the east became known to the Spanish. In 1540 they conquered Chile. After the fall of Cuzco, Diego de Almagro tried unsuccessfully to carve out an empire for himself to the south, but failed to find wealth; and only later was Santiago established by Pedro de Valdivia. In the far north, two years earlier, Jiménez de Quesada had founded Santa Fé de Bogotá.

Brazil. Thus it was that with the exception of one portion of South America the whole continent became Spanish. This one exception was a region destined to become the great state of Brazil, today the chief monument to the colonizing ability of little Portugal. Discovered in 1500 by Cabral, possibly as a result of his effort to find more favorable winds on his voyage around the Cape of Good Hope, the "dye-wood" coast was neglected until 1531. In that year Martim Affonso de Souza started what became the first primarily agricultural colony in America, for the gold and diamond wealth of Brazil were not known until two centuries later. Colonization progressed steadily, and by 1550 it was certain that Spain was not to have a monopoly in South America.

4) The Philippines. Spain however did maintain control of the Pacific coast of America, and as a result was able to turn her attention once more to the Far East. Despite the Treaty of Saragossa, in 1542 Charles I made another unsuccessful attempt, through the Villalobos expedition, to invade Portuguese dominions. For twenty years no further effort took place, but in 1564 Philip II appears to have made up his mind that Las Filipinas, since they bore his name (bestowed by Villalobos), should also recognize his sovereignty.

Legaspi and Urdaneta. The new expedition, which started from Mexico in November 1564, consisted of four ships and 380 men under
the command of Miguel López de Legaspi. Associated with him as chief adviser and navigating officer was Andres de Urdaneta, a soldier-priest-scientist of high character and ability who had participated in the unsuccessful expedition of 1525. After its failure Urdaneta had spent ten years in the Indies, and was thoroughly familiar with the geography of the region. Thanks to his knowledge and to the pertinacity of Legaspi, a colony was established at Cebú, where Magellan had met his death. At last, forty years after Magellan’s arrival in the Philippines, the Spanish succeeded in gaining a permanent position in the Far East.

**Manila founded.** When the Legaspi expedition reached the islands, the Spanish knowledge covered only the southern part of the archipelago, and it was for this reason that Cebú was selected as the place for the first settlement. This location however soon proved to be unsatisfactory. The continued hostility of the Cebuans made it very difficult for the little colony to secure food; and they were also subject to Portuguese attacks. Accordingly, Legaspi decided to seek a more northerly location for his colony, and finally in 1570 Spanish explorers made their way into Manila Bay, on which was located a flourishing commercial town ruled by a Mohammedan prince. This port, situated in the south-central part of the island of Luzón, was immediately recognized as an admirable place for Spanish headquarters. In 1571 therefore the Spaniards attacked and captured the town and transformed it into the capital of their island empire.

**Philippine colonization.** Strong expeditionary forces were now sent to all parts of the islands for exploration and conquest. So energetically was the work carried out that by 1576, eleven years after Legaspi’s arrival, the Spanish had established their authority over all but the mountainous interior districts of the larger islands, and those areas which, occupied by the warlike Moors, always retained their independence. The compact island empire of the Spanish differed greatly from the far-flung Eastern dominions of Portugal. Although the fortified posts held by the Portuguese served as centers of trade and bases of operations for their naval patrol, their effective authority seldom extended inland more than a cannon-shot beyond the lines of their fortifications. In the Philippines on the other hand the Spanish established themselves as territorial rulers over a conquered area and a subject people.

The relative success of Spain’s Philippine conquest was due to the fact that to a considerable extent it was a missionary enterprise. Inspired
Corregidor Landing in 1870 was a far cry from what the "Heroes of Bataan" saw when they finally emerged from the detention camps established in and around Manila.

A Filipina "sampan" (canoe) off the coast of Leyte. The back country of the Philippines has changed very little since Magellan's time.
by apostolic zeal, friars braved the terrors of life in remote villages, gave the natives a certain amount of European culture, and taught them the outward forms of Christianity. As a result of these missionary endeavors, the Filipinos are unique; they constitute the only large mass of Asiatics to be converted to Christianity in modern times. Along with religion went a certain amount of economic development; native agriculture was developed, and supplemented by both European and American products. From America maize, cacao, and tobacco were most important.

The government that Spain established in the Philippines was patterned after that of Spanish America. At the top was a governor-general—the archipelago never became a viceroyalty—who was assisted by an audiencia or supreme court. His powers were extensive, although somewhat curtailed by the residencia or official investigation that supposedly took place at the expiration of his term of office. Minor officials were alcaldes mayores, who exercised both executive and judicial functions in their provinces.

In the Philippines, as elsewhere in the Spanish Empire, corruption and nepotism honeycombed the civil service—hairdressers were made alcaldes and common sailors were transformed into gobernadores by the miraculous grace of royal decrees. The provinces were subdivided into pueblos, each under a native gobernadorcillo, elected annually. Permanent offices could be bought, sold, and inherited; and salaries were so low that illegal practices were easily condoned. Since efficient and honest employees were hard to find, many civil functions were handed over to the friars. Naturally then the religious, as in America and especially in Paraguay, frequently became benevolent despots with no one to say them nay. In more than half of the 1200 villages there was no other Spaniard than a priest or friar. The Spanish language was practically unknown—as it is today in the larger part of the islands—for it was much easier for the padres to learn the native dialects than it was for them to teach the islanders the tongue of the conquistadores.

As for commerce and trade, one may note merely that by the end of the sixteenth century the right to use the Manila galleon had become a government monopoly, and the islands enjoyed little economic development. On the whole this situation was satisfactory to the natives, for it permitted them to live the indolent life of the tropics. Yet in the three centuries of Spanish domination the Filipinos did make some progress, and by and large Spanish achievements can well be compared with those of England and Holland in their respective colonial spheres.
Spain’s neglected opportunities. With the Philippines as a base, Spain might have had as great an influence on the Orient as she had in America; but the Spanish government discouraged all attempts to make the new colony a center of Far-Eastern trade. Several reasons led to this policy. In the first place, direct trade between the Philippines and the ports of Spain was practically out of the question; the route by the Cape of Good Hope was controlled by the Portuguese, while the voyage by way of the Straits of Magellan was too long and dangerous to be commercially practicable. It would have been quite possible to develop a flourishing trade between the islands and the Spanish possessions in America, but influential and interested groups in Spain succeeded in convincing the king that the growth of such a trade would injure Spain by diverting to the Far East a great part of the gold and silver of Mexico and Peru. And the representatives of the Church opposed from the outset an active commercial policy; for they had seen their labors in Spanish America frustrated by the rapacity of the conquistadores, and now sought to retain the Filipinos as a special field for their spiritual labors. Besides all these considerations, there was also the fact that Philip II, when he secured the Portuguese crown in 1580, pledged himself not to allow his Spanish subjects to trespass upon the commercial monopoly of his Portuguese subjects.

Portugal in China. Accordingly the Spanish left to the Portuguese the opportunity to develop the trade with China. This the Portuguese did, using Malacca as a base. In 1514, probably, the first Portuguese reached the shores of China. The first recorded name is that of Rafael Perestrello, who late in 1515 or early the next year reached Canton. He was well received, and the Portuguese at Malacca held high hopes of profitable trade. In 1517 a fleet conveyed Thome Pires as an ambassador from the viceroy of India in the name of the king of Portugal. He also was hospitably received, and after a long delay at Canton was sent overland to Peking, where he arrived four years later. But by this time news had reached the capital of the high-handed conduct of later Portuguese captains, and complaints of their ruthless treatment of Mohammedans. So Pires was looked upon as a spy rather than an ambassador, and he was hurried back to Canton and thrown into prison.

Macao. Unfortunately for the Portuguese, their first contact with Eastern countries had been with the petty coastal states and the equally weak Malay kingdoms, where they had easily demonstrated their superior power. They thought at first that they could do as they pleased in China, but they erred when they tried to carry these high-
Macao from Penha Hill. Macao is Portugal's lone testimonial to the fact that at one time the land of Camoens was an important factor in the Orient. Attractively located about fifty miles west of Hong Kong, for several decades it has provided China's tycoons with a place where they can gamble in safety and comfort.

handed tactics over to the shores of the great Middle Kingdom. Especially was it a mistake for them to wage a truceless war with their old foes, the Mohammedans; for the Chinese had welcomed Arab traders at their ports for centuries, and saw no reason why trade relations should be influenced by religious beliefs. Eventually the Portuguese saw the error of their ways. By adopting a more conciliatory policy, in 1557 they secured the right to establish themselves on a little peninsula of an island in the delta of the West River about eighty miles from Canton, where they built a trading city known as Macao. From that time until the establishment of the British at Hong Kong in 1842 Macao was the center of European intercourse with southern China.

Portugal's Eastern Empire. As a result of their own rapacity, the Portuguese as well as the Spanish failed to maintain the position in the Orient to which their early dominance seemed to lead. By the end of the sixteenth century Portugal's power in the East Indies had begun to decline. For this retrogression there were many causes. The maintenance of the ambitious empire made constantly increasing demands upon the none-too-plentiful manpower of the home state, demands which were made even heavier by the steady departure of her citizens to become mercenaries and pirates in the Orient. Although the policies adopted in the Far East aroused ever-increasing hostility among the
peoples over whom Albuquerque and his successors had extended their authority, the great wealth which Portugal derived from her monopoly steadily undermined the hardihood of the Portuguese themselves, and made them less fit — or less willing, or both — to make the effort necessary to keep the empire they had inherited. In the hunt for crews for the ships engaged in the Far-Eastern trade, jails were emptied of their prisoners, and eventually foreign sailors were taken into the Portuguese service, thus making it possible for their European rivals to learn all the mysteries of the Eastern trade routes.

Therefore, although the discoveries of Columbus and Vasco da Gama gave first to Spain and Portugal the opportunities to take European civilization to the Pacific Area, the Spanish and Portuguese were able to make full use of these opportunities only in America. Interesting indeed it is to realize that once again the stone that the builders rejected was to become the cornerstone of the Hispanic colonial empires. Today only in America south of the Río Grande is Hispanic culture predominant, for even in the Islas Filipinas, the largest portion of her colonial empire which remained in Spain’s grasp through the nineteenth century, English is fast taking the place of Castilian, and soon there will be but scattered reminders there of Spain’s former greatness.

And yet it ill behooves the historian to forget that it was the Iberian peninsula that put the Pacific Area on the Europeans’ world map. The sixteenth century was predominantly the era of the Spanish and Portuguese, and it was their intrepid work as world explorers and colonizers in America and the Indies which in the seventeenth century made it possible for the Dutch and English to found their colonial empires.
England and Holland
Enter the East

The Seventeenth Century

1. The European Background

The previous chapter has shown how Portugal and Spain, through their monopoly of Pacific commerce during the sixteenth century, were the first European countries to engage in direct trade with the East. Toward the end of the century that monopoly was broken, and in the seventeenth century England and Holland entered the Pacific Area.

The downfall of Spain under Philip II. Britain's seventeenth century expansion is the more remarkable because it followed what is commonly called "the Age of Philip II." From 1556 to 1598 Spain through him dominated western Europe; in that very domination, however, she sowed the seeds of her downfall. Philip II believed that all the world should be Roman Catholic. Enriched by the treasures of America, he put himself at the head of the Roman Catholic party in Europe and with the help of the Inquisition tried to stamp out all Protestant heresies. Though successful in the Latin portion of his dominion, he failed in the Low Countries, where religious persecution and the rapacity of his soldiers caused the revolution which under William of Orange threw off the Spanish yoke. In France too his interference had an unfavorable reaction, for the St. Bartholomew Massacre of the Huguenots in 1572 and the religious wars of 1580 notably weakened the Roman Catholic Church in that country. Finally his annexation of Portugal in 1580 and the consequent interference with the spice trade of Europe brought down upon him further suspicion and hatred. In 1588 this reached a culmination with the defeat of his Great Armada by England off
Gravelines, and Spain from then on fell to a position among the second-rate nations of Europe.

England in the sixteenth century. Spain’s international pre-eminence was taken by England, which in the sixteenth century had been only a second-rate power; its wealth was less than that of Holland, its population less than that of France, and its armies could not compare with those of Spain. Yet in that same sixteenth century the foundations were laid for the economic supremacy which eventually was to make Britain the world’s greatest commercial power. The first factor in this development was the manner in which the Tudor sovereigns patriotically pursued national interests. Under the aegis of the government wholesale confiscation of ecclesiastical property took place, and the accompanying process of enclosing estates for the especial benefit of sheep raisers served to enrich some Englishmen and to provide them with the capital for foreign ventures.

A second factor was the unique pioneering spirit of the age, which led English seamen to sail uncharted oceans and even stirred landsmen to explore unknown continents. For gold and silver alone they would hardly have risked their lives, but to the wanderlust of the age they willingly surrendered.

The religious motive also must not be overlooked. In 1535 England broke with Rome, and Henry VIII upon his excommunication established the Church of England. The inevitable outcome was a series of Spanish plots to put a Catholic sovereign on the throne of England under the domination of the Pope. During the reign of Elizabeth these attacks turned the English people against Catholicism and led them to sympathize with the French Huguenots and the Dutch Protestants who were struggling for religious and political freedom.

A fourth factor was the period of hard times toward the close of the sixteenth century. The increasing popularity of sheep raising, the dissolution of the monasteries, and the currency inflation caused by the outpouring of America’s gold and silver, all led to greatly increased prices while the abundant labor supply kept wages down.

All these reasons however were secondary to the desire of both merchant and government alike to promote English trade. The invigorating effect of the New World’s precious metals led to a veritable commercial revolution. As the rich became richer they demanded more and more of the luxuries of the East. They cheerfully paid the high prices; therefore the merchants made huge profits on their sales, and in turn found themselves forced to engage in foreign trade in order to use
their surplus funds. By the middle of the sixteenth century speculators were becoming "Merchant Adventurers"; the first of these so-called companies is commonly supposed to have been the Muscovy Company, organized in 1551 with Sebastian Cabot as one of the leaders and in 1555 receiving a royal charter. Annual fleets were dispatched to the White and Baltic seas, and agents of the company extended its activities to the Caspian Sea, to Bokhara, and to Persia. In 1679 the Eastland Company, a rival organization, was chartered; and in 1581 a charter was issued to the Levant Company, which engaged in trade with Turkish ports along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean.

In all these charters the English crown showed a generosity which revealed a kind of alliance between government and business. This was the period when the mercantilists dominated political thinking; in their minds the chief measure of a country's strength was the amount of specie it could put in its strong boxes, and any method by which the luxuries of the East could be secured at cheaper prices was looked upon with favor by both government and merchant. Naturally then the former stood ready to give special trading privileges to merchant adventurers trading in the East Indies; all that was lacking in the latter part of the sixteenth century was the weakening of Hispanic sea power.

France in the sixteenth century. During this same period France also began to recognize the possibilities of this commercial revolution, to catch the "capitalistic spirit" and to embody it in action. Her effective efforts, however, were weak compared with those of her British and Dutch neighbors. As a result of decades of civil and foreign war, with the turn of the sixteenth century France was nearly bankrupt, trade was at a standstill, and the French crown was in danger of being dominated by great noblemen who had taken many royal rights into their own hands.

There were numerous bankers in France however who sought opportunities to put their surplus funds to work at the expense of their southern neighbors. No special interest was shown in the Far East, but the attempts of Cartier and Roberval on the St. Lawrence (1534-1543), of Ribaut and Coligny in Brazil (1555-1557), and of Ribaut and Laudonnière in the Floridas (1562-1565), were all results of the desire of French capitalists and merchants to play a part in world trade. To be sure, the inability of these early colonizers to maintain contact between the colonists and the mother country, internal complications in France, and the temporary success of Spain and Portugal in keeping
out invaders, caused these efforts to fail; but they were all indications of what would happen to the Iberian colonial empires if Spain lost command of the sea.

2. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL LOSE CONTROL OF THE SEA

The English seadogs: (1) Hawkins. British threats to Hispanic control of the sea began in the second quarter of the sixteenth century, when William Hawkins, erstwhile mayor of Plymouth and member of Parliament, became interested in the slave trade. He made three voyages to Guiana and Brazil, but it was his son John who was first to make the English seadogs the terror of the Spanish Main. In 1562 he sailed for Africa to obtain slaves, which he disposed of in Española. In 1564–1565 he led a second expedition, which resulted in great profit. The third voyage however in 1567–1568 ended disastrously. The Spanish government had sent a fleet to stop the traffic. In spite of it Hawkins forced an entrance to the West Indian ports and disposed of his cargo, but being driven by a storm to seek refuge in the harbor of Vera Cruz he was attacked by a Spanish fleet, contrary to a truce agreed upon by the Spanish commander, and only two of the English ships escaped.

(2) Drake. It would have been better for the Spanish to have permitted the trade, for deprived of it the British seadogs then turned to successful attacks on the clumsy, undermanned galleons plying from Nombre de Dios to Spain and across the North Pacific from Acapulco to Manila. One of Hawkins's captains who suffered at Vera Cruz was his nephew, Francis Drake, who lost all his investment in his uncle's disastrous third voyage, and is said then to have vowed revenge and eternal enmity toward the Spanish. In 1572 Drake made an unsuccessful raid on Nombre de Dios, but was able, nevertheless, to ascend the Chagres River and waylay a train of mules laden with bullion. Tradition has it that while on this expedition he evolved the idea of going around South America and attacking Spain in her own back yard. At any rate he sailed in 1577 with another fleet for America. After capturing several Spanish and Portuguese vessels off the African coast, he crossed the Atlantic and with one ship finally passed through the Straits of Magellan. He continued up the coast, looting as he went, until his vessel was filled to capacity. In a harbor north of San Francisco Bay he refitted, and claimed the California region for his queen, naming it New Albion. He then sailed to the Indies, where he loaded a cargo of spice. From Java Drake proceeded to England, where in November
1580 he entered the harbor of Plymouth, having completed the first English circumnavigation of the globe. Elizabeth knighted him, ostensibly for having circled the earth, but she doubtless was more influenced by the fact that she was a stockholder in the *Golden Hind* that brought back a cargo which included thirteen chests of pieces of eight, eighty pounds of pure gold, jewels, and plate, and twenty-six tons of silver.

(3) *Cavendish*. It is not surprising that very shortly more than a score of English mariners were busily engaged in raiding the Spanish Main. They were assisted financially by the queen and by many of her councilors, who considered the raiding of Spanish commerce good business as well as good state policy. And well they might! Less than a decade later Thomas Cavendish followed in the wake of Sir Francis. He set out in 1586 for Brazil; from there he went through the Straits to the Pacific side, where he burned three Spanish towns and nineteen ships. With his vessels full of rich booty, especially from the Manila galleon *Santa Ana*, he returned by way of the Cape of Good Hope, arriving finally at Plymouth on September 10, 1588.

*The defeat of the Spanish Armada*. Seven weeks before Cavendish dropped anchor, the "Invincible Armada" of Philip II had entered the English Channel bent on the conquest of the troublesome island kingdom. The brilliant victory of the English against this mighty fleet did more than merely save the country from foreign invasion; it was the first of three naval victories which destroyed for all time the vaunted supremacy of Spain on the high seas, and inspired both the English and the Dutch henceforth to take to the ocean in ever-increasing numbers. Far and wide they captured Spanish vessels and gained possession of their sailing charts and maps, which were reproduced by Flemish craftsmen, and so became available to all seamen. It was only a matter of years until the exploitation of the Pacific Area should cease to be an Iberian monopoly.

(4) *Lancaster*. In fact even before the end of the century England had learned the way to the East, for in 1591 James Lancaster, who had fought at the battle of Gravelines and therefore had no fear of Philip II, led a small squadron of three ships to the East Indies. They touched at Ceylon, Sumatra, Pulo, Penang, and Malacca, and returned with a rich cargo. But since preying upon Spanish shipping in the Atlantic was somewhat less dangerous than legitimate trade, in 1595 Lancaster plundered Brazil with such success that he had to hire Dutch ships to help him take home his booty. Holland's participation in Lancaster's
The despoilment of Spain was indicative of the new trend, for once England had broken the power of Spain and Portugal, her Dutch neighbors, the "beggars of the sea," made the first inroads upon Portugal's spice-trade monopoly.

3. Holland Finds the Way to the East

Sixteenth Century Holland. It is not surprising that despite her smallness Holland should have beaten England to the lucrative oriental trade. Very shortly after the discoveries of Columbus and of da Gama, the bankers of the Netherlands began to provide the Portuguese and Spanish with the capital they needed in their overseas enterprises and to reap rich rewards therefrom. Unaffected by the advance of the Ottoman Turks, and free to trade with Russia, Scandinavia, and England, they had at their disposal the iron and copper needed to develop their manufacturing industries. They had no trade routes of their own in the Far East, but just as they formerly took their wares to Venice, in the 1500's they took them to Lisbon and Seville and exchanged them for the goods of Cathay, which in turn they distributed throughout northern Europe.

Of the Dutch cities Antwerp soon became the most important; by the middle of the sixteenth century more than a thousand foreign merchants, notably members of the famous Fugger family, were residing at Antwerp. Here developed many institutions of modern capitalism. It is claimed that the first stock exchange — originally called bourse — was established in 1531. Here too grew up a form of stock-market gambling, "betting on the exchange," and lotteries flourished. Insurance both life and marine came into use, and by 1564 some 600 people are said to have been making a good living out of it.

From Antwerp to the other countries of Europe went a considerable share of the sixteenth century major capitalistic profits. As a result by the end of the century capitalism was deeply rooted in the economy of all western and central Europe; and for better or worse it brought about as was mentioned above the stupendous effects commonly referred to as the commercial revolution. With most of this revolution the present book is not primarily concerned, and we refer only in passing to the blows it dealt to medieval agriculture and the manorial system, to the changes it caused in European industry, and to the clear marking of the line between capital and labor. Of much greater significance was the development of mercantilism and, consequent upon mercantilist prac-
tices, the establishing of absolute monarchies which for their own economic advantages and political power sought to monopolize oversea trade.

Quite naturally with the sudden rise of capitalism Holland along with the rest of northern Europe suffered many strains and stresses. Space limitations forbid their delineation here, but perhaps most significant of all the changes was the rise of wealthy townspeople — the capitalistic bourgeoisie — to places of importance. As a result investment in trade became respectable even for members of the nobility, and thereby were laid the foundations for the modern supremacy of the bourgeoisie.

Causes of Holland’s interest in the East. In no country of Europe were the effects of the commercial revolution greater than in the Netherlands; and it is quite understandable that in 1581, after their break with Spain and the closing to them of the Lisbon market, the Dutch should have determined to enter the Eastern trade on their own hook. As early as 1565 they had established a “factory” (or trading station), on the North Russia route to China, and their first efforts to preserve their Oriental trade led them in 1594–1597 to seek a northeast passage. Four expeditions failed, and since the Mediterranean route was closed to them they were forced to try to break Portugal’s hold on the Cape of Good Hope route. After Spain annexed Portugal the Dutch had an additional reason for striking at the Portuguese trade. Further stimulus to this idea was given by the publication in 1595–1596 of Johann van Linschoten’s Itinerario, describing the opportunity for trade in the East as he had seen it while living in the household of the Portuguese Archbishop at Goa from 1583 to 1589. Finally early in 1595 there appeared in Holland one Cornelius van Houtman, who had spent years in the spice trade of Portugal and who had returned home disgruntled with his former employers.

Holland invades the East. A few months later Linschoten and Houtman formed the Company van Verre for the exploitation of Portugal’s Eastern trade. Others who supported the plan were Plancius, a noted geographer; Keyser, who had seen service in the East; and John Davis, the celebrated English pilot for whom Davis Strait was named. Organization was quickly effected, and in April 1595 four ships carrying 250 men and sixty guns sailed from Amsterdam under the command of Houtman. They successfully rounded the Cape of Good Hope, touched at Madagascar, and reached Malacca and Bantam, near Batavia, where they made friends with the natives. They returned to the Texel in August 1597 with profitable cargoes, and more important with stories
of possible wealth which fairly intoxicated the erstwhile sober burghers. Five separate expeditions were sent out in 1598, and at least fifteen voyages were undertaken before 1601.

4. Holland Establishes an Empire in the East

The Dutch East India Company. With the establishment of many rival companies — Amsterdam and Rotterdam had two companies each — and with the dispatch of numerous ships to the East, it was soon obvious that there was danger of ruinous competition among the Dutch themselves. Therefore on March 20, 1602, the States-General of the Netherlands granted a charter and a twenty-one year monopoly of Far Eastern trade to a single company, which was empowered to enter into treaties and agreements with the rulers and peoples of the Indies, to
build forts, to establish governors, and to maintain troops and law courts for the preservation of peace and order. Every Dutch citizen was entitled to subscribe for stock. So great was the enthusiasm that by the end of the year the paid-in capital amounted to 6,459,840 florins. Nor was public confidence misplaced. During the first six years of its existence the company's annual dividend averaged 37.5 per cent, and in 1723 its shares, representing an actual investment of 840 florins, were valued at 22,000 florins each. Even in 1774, when mismanagement and corruption had greatly reduced the company's prosperity, its shares sold for more than 13,000 florins each.

Holland vs. Spain and Portugal. It could hardly be expected that Spain and Portugal would yield to the Dutch without a struggle. In 1608 a Spanish fleet was defeated off Gibraltar, and the following year the Portuguese at Malacca were so severely defeated that Spain was glad to make a twelve years' truce with the Dutch in 1609. The discovery of Cape Horn by Schouten of Hoorn in 1616 opened another route to the Indies. The closer association of the States-General in 1618–1619 under Prince Maurice helped to assure Holland's supremacy over Spain and Portugal in the East.

The policies of empire. The removal of Spanish and Portuguese threats however did not solve what was probably the most difficult of Holland's problems in the East. This arose from the fact that like England the Dutch did not produce many goods that could be traded in the Orient. Some of the Spanish gold from America filtered north throughout Europe, but the supply was never equal to the demand; and for the most part the Dutch and English found it impossible to get what they wanted in the East by direct trade.

Chain trade. As a result there developed what might be called "chain trade." Plying between the islands of the archipelago and the ports of India, Indo-China, China, and Japan (reached by the Dutch in 1600), the Dutch and English at the first port visited would exchange European goods for something that could be exchanged at a second port. Here they would obtain goods that could be exchanged at a third port; and this sort of thing would continue until eventually a cargo had been acquired that could be disposed of in Europe. This form of activity of course necessitated the removal of Portuguese and some slight Spanish competition, and then the displacing of that of the peoples of the Orient (the Hindus, the Malays, the Siamese, the Annamese, the Chinese, and the Japanese) who were efficient merchants and capable seamen and who were quite competent to carry on among themselves the trading activities
which for a thousand years before the arrival of Vasco da Gama had flourished along the southern and eastern coasts of Asia. To meet the competition of an established trade which rendered their own contributions practically superfluous, the Dutch and English were forced to follow the example of their Portuguese predecessors, and consequently resorted to the policy of getting exclusive control of the sources of various essential commodities.

Trade monopolies. Fortunately for the success of this policy, the East Indies offered a field in which the establishment of foreign political domination was comparatively easy. The multitude of petty states throughout the archipelago, without political unity except in the western portion of Sumatra, offered little resistance to foreign rule. Often however a practical overlordship was established less by actual conquest than by aiding the local ruler against an enemy and thus securing in return valuable commercial and political rights. By whatever method control was obtained, it proved to be a twofold source of profit enabling the Europeans to sell at their own price in the markets of the East and affording them, as taxes or tribute, a plentiful supply of commodities for export to Europe.

Dutch imperialism. As her power became stronger Holland went ahead and planted her flag in numerous places. Ceylon, Java, Sumatra, Ternate, the Celebes, Banda, and Amboyna all fell under her influence. With the help of the English the Dutch unsuccessfully tried to expel the Portuguese from Macao.

Governor Coen. From 1618 to 1623 Jan Pietersen Coen was Governor-General of the East Indies. During his term of office relations between the Dutch and English became increasingly tense, and culminated finally in the so-called "Massacre of Amboyna" in which many Englishmen lost their lives. This marked possibly the only time when Britain admitted an open season on Englishmen; shortly after she gave up her attempts to trade in the Spice Islands. In 1619 Coen captured the important town of Jacatra and upon its still-smoldering ruins founded Batavia, which ever since has been an outstanding trading center in the East Indies.

Governor Van Diemen. Perhaps the ablest of the governors of this early period was Antony Van Diemen, who ruled from 1636 to 1643. He strove to promote the strength and profit of the Netherlands in the East; in 1641 he captured Malacca, thus ending Portuguese hopes in the Indies. Keen to explore the uncharted lands of the South Seas, in 1643 he sent Abel Janszoon Tasman, the Dutch explorer, on one of the most
remarkable voyages in history. From Batavia Tasman proceeded to
Maritius. On his return he sailed due east until he bumped into Tas-
mania, which out of loyalty to his superior he named Van Diemen's
Land. Still going east, he discovered New Zealand and the Friendly
and Fiji islands. Winding through the archipelago to the north of
Australia he arrived in Batavia, having entirely circumnavigated the
southern continent without having touched or seen it. In 1644 he made
a second voyage to New Guinea and New Holland and discovered the
Gulf of Carpentaria.

These explorations gave Holland a fairly complete knowledge of the
islands which for centuries were to be the greatest source of her wealth.

5. England Follows Holland to the East

The English East India Company. The story of English adventure in
the Orient is one of mingled romance, humiliation, and success. It may
be said to have begun with the publication of Linschoten's Itinario,
which had excited the English to action. Despite the relative lack of
success of Lancaster's expedition of 1591–1594, London merchants, who had raised 30,000 pounds for a trial voyage, at a meeting held at Founder's Hall on September 22, 1599, decided to organize the semi-private London East India Company. It was chartered by Queen Elizabeth on December 31, 1600, and despite various changes in its corporate structure English chartered trade in the Far East through the East India Company was to have a continuous history for 258 years. Some 125 persons constituted the stockholders of the original "Governor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies," and the company's charter gave it a monopoly for fifteen years of all trade between the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Magellan.

The policy of the company was to work "for the honor of our Nation, the welfare of our People, the increase of our Navigation, and the advancement of lawful Traffic to the benefit of our Commonwealth," all of which was a euphemistic way of saying that the English hated the Spanish, were jealous of the Portuguese, and had had their feelings hurt in a most tender spot (i.e., their pocketbooks) when in 1599 the Dutch doubled the price of pepper. In the beginning the company was a regulated one requiring a royal commission for each voyage, settling accounts and distributing profits after each venture. Despite the temporariness of such arrangements, more or less permanent factories were soon established at certain points, and elaborate arrangements were made for their proper government.

*Early voyages.* The company's first voyage in 1601–1602 was under the leadership of "General" James Lancaster, who commanded four vessels and a supply ship loaded with iron, tin, lead, cloth, and presents for native princes. Merchants were appointed to each vessel. In 1602 Sumatra was reached, where the king of Achin, living on the northern part of the island, was presented with gifts and a letter from Queen Elizabeth expatiating on the advantages of mutual trade. After capturing a richly laden Portuguese vessel off Malacca, Lancaster proceeded to establish a factory at Bantam, the most important town on the island of Java before the foundation of Batavia by the Dutch. As luck would have it, the first venture of the company proved a success; the fleet brought back over a million pounds of pepper, sufficient to set all England sneezing or to make palatable many tons of too-well-hung meat. The "General" became "Sir" James Lancaster. A second and third fleet were dispatched, and by 1610 seventeen vessels had gone to the East. For that year's voyage the company built two new ships, a pinnace and a large vessel of 1100 tons burden which was the largest
English merchant vessel of the time. Such significance was attached to the ships' launching that the king attended the ceremony and named the smaller Peppercorn and the larger Trades Increase.

*Charter revision.* By 1612 the single-voyage system had been proved so inconvenient through the overlapping of voyages, the value of permanent factories had become so clear and the profitable nature of Oriental trade had been so well established that in 1613 the English company became a joint-stock organization like the Dutch.

*Anglo-Dutch rivalry.* This tribute to the sagacity of England's competitors, however, did not prove sufficient to make the Dutch willing to have the English trading in the Indies. In the early years of the seventeenth century the representatives of the two nations got along fairly well together and frequently co-operated for defense and aggression against their common enemy, the Portuguese. About 1605 the Dutch at Amboyna permitted English merchants to establish a trading post beside the Dutch factory, and for several years at Jacatra both companies also maintained factories. But as the Portuguese were gradually ousted from their entrenched monopoly the bond of a common fear disappeared, and relations between the Dutch and English became steadily worse. In 1618 the English aided the ruler of Bantam in an unsuccessful attempt to destroy the Dutch factory at Jacatra. The following year the Dutch sank one British ship and captured three others.

*The "Massacre of Amboyna."* Alarmed at the news of these clashes, the two governments in 1619 concluded a treaty providing for co-operation in defense of their common interests. The English were to have one third of the trade of the Spice Islands and of the Banda group, and the two countries were to join in maintaining a combined Anglo-Dutch "defense fleet" operating in Far Eastern waters. This effort at co-operation, however, proved a failure. In 1621 a joint expedition against Manila broke up in a dispute between the allied commanders; in 1622 the Dutch governor-general at Batavia wrote that friendship with the English could be maintained only by giving them the whole earth; and in 1623 the Dutch governor at Amboyna, on the ground that eighteen Englishmen were conspiring against his garrison of 200 men, arrested, tortured, and executed twelve of the factory's staff. This "Massacre of Amboyna" put an end to all pretense at co-operation, and shortly thereafter the English practically abandoned the archipelago to their Dutch rivals, retaining the trading post of Bengcoolen on the southwestern coast of Sumatra, and a foothold in Bantam where they were allowed to remain until 1682.
The foundation of British India. This withdrawal from the Indies was not, however, a fatal blow to the British East India Company; it meant merely that from then on it gave more attention to its activities in India. This change of attitude had begun in 1607 when Captain William Hawkins was sent to Surat on the west coast of India north of Bombay at the mouth of the Taptee River. After three years of intrigue at Agra, where the Mogul had his court, he obtained permission for the establishment of a factory. His work was continued by Sir Thomas Roe in 1614, and after a Portuguese fleet was destroyed in the following year the foundations were laid for a flourishing trade. Surat remained the center of the company’s commerce for half a century. In 1668 the island of Bombay, ceded by Portugal to England in 1661 as part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza, Charles’s queen, was turned over to the East India Company for an annual payment of ten pounds sterling. Although only a miserable fishing village, it was so free from attacks by warlike tribes that finally in 1687 the presidency of the west coast was transferred from Surat to Bombay.

On the Coromandel coast Masulipatam had been the seat of an agency as early as 1611. In 1640 the English bought from a native ruler a favorable site farther south, Madraspatam, where Fort George was erected. It was the beginning of the great city of Madras, and the first acquisition of territory on the mainland of India by the British. Farther north on the east coast the English were slower in establishing themselves. In 1634 the Mogul of Bengal gave them the privilege of trading in that region, and in 1640 a factory was placed at Hugli just above modern Calcutta. Two years later another factory was located at Balasor, about a hundred miles down the coast in Orissa.

6. ENGLISH AND DUTCH ACTIVITY ON AMERICAN PACIFIC SHORES

The Pichilingues. The establishment of the English and Dutch East India companies in India and the Indies respectively was so successful that it is not surprising little or no attempt was made at the time to interfere with Spain’s possessions on the American shores of the Pacific. It is true that in the latter part of the sixteenth century Drake skirted the coast of South America and visited California, but he left no lasting influence. Aside from looting Spanish treasure all he did was to give England a nebulous claim to the northern Pacific shores of North America. In 1615 George Spillberg, the Dutch navigator and pirate, appeared in Mexican and California waters and made a fortune by loot-
ing pearl boats off Baja California. He was followed by other Dutch freebooters, of whom Schouten of Hoorn was the most famous. They were a veritable plague to the Spanish, and were prevalent enough so that to the Spanish language was added a new word, *pichilingues* (doubtless from *pecho*, meaning chest, and *lingua*, language, and based on the guttural character of the Dutch speech which appeared to issue from the chest of the speaker). The *pichilingues* brought no civilization to America, but they did cause Spain to renew her efforts from time to time to prevent any encroachments on her colonial preserves in America.

7. **Dutch and English Efforts to Gain a Foothold in China**

**Early efforts of the Dutch.** Mention has been made of the fact that both the Dutch and English not only found it desirable to curtail the Portuguese trade of the East but also to get into their own hands both the "China trade" and the chain trade of the Chinese merchants who had long been acquainted with the spices of the Indies. As in the Indies, so in China Holland showed the way to England. The first Dutch ship was sent to Canton in 1604, but permission to trade was refused through the influence of the Portuguese at Macao. Another attempt in 1607 also failed. As a result, when in 1622 Kornelius Rayer-zoon made a third effort, he appeared at Macao with a fleet of some fifteen ships. The presence of this fleet was not agreeable either to the Chinese or to the Portuguese; when the Dutch attacked with 800 men, they were driven off with the loss of the admiral and 300 men.

**The Dutch in Formosa.** Unwilling however to resign all hope of a profitable venture, the fleet set sail and took possession of the Pescadores, a group of islands lying between Formosa and the mainland. The seizure of these islands was eminently distasteful to the Chinese authorities, who, after failing in several military attacks, opened negotiations and induced the Dutch to exchange the Pescadores for Formosa. This island was a no-man's land, and with no one to oppose them the Dutch established themselves at Fort Zelandia, where they administered some rough-and-ready justice in the neighborhood of their settlement. Here the Dutch departed from their usual custom of paying no attention to local religious conditions, and made an effort to provide for the spiritual interests of the natives. In 1616 George Candidius and several helpers began missionary activities. Converts flocked to them, churches were built, and schools were established at which the natives were taught
to write their language in Roman letters. The success was brief however, and for political reasons the missionaries were withdrawn.

**Dutch failure at Peking.** By 1653 the Manchus had defeated the Mings and were in a position to revive commerce. Accordingly, the Dutch sent Schedel to attempt to open trade at Canton, but again Portuguese influence prevailed, and the Dutch were forced to depart, advised that they should send an embassy to Peking. This they did in 1653, when Messrs. Peter de Goyer and Jacob de Keyser with two merchants, six writers, a steward, a surgeon, two interpreters, a trumpeter, and a drummer set out from Canton, and going by way of Nanking arrived at Peking. Since these envoys represented the company and not the government, they yielded to the kowtow demands of the Chinese and performed the humiliating ceremonies. Before the emperor himself as well as before his name and throne they bowed and struck their heads to the ground nine times. All they gained from their genuflexions was the right to send eight years later another embassy of not more than 100 men and four trading ships.

**The end of Dutch efforts in China.** Shortly after their failure at Canton and Peking the Dutch were forced to abandon any lingering hopes that

*Garden of the Imperial Palace in Peking, headquarters of the Manchu emperors until the revolution of 1912.*

*(From a steel engraving)*
they might build a profitable trade in Formosa. In 1661 Cheng Ch’eng-kung, a partisan of the deposed Ming emperors better known as Koxinga, pressed by the ruling Manchus at his continental base at Amoy, sailed for the island with a force of 25,000 troops. He closely invested the Dutch in Fort Zelandia, and after a siege of nine months made their stronghold his own. The Council of Batavia then sent a force of twelve ships to Foochow to co-operate with the imperial forces against Koxinga; Amoy was captured and the area brought under the Manchus, but no effect was produced on Formosa. In the later sixties, counting on gratitude for the aid so loyally rendered as to a suzerain, the Dutch sent another embassy to Peking. Though coming with the prestige of doughty deeds of valor done in the interest of the Manchu dynasty — and of their own — this envoy, Pieter van Hoorn, was forced like his predecessors to perform the kowtow. Like them, all he got for his tribute, kneelings, and prostration was the enrollment of his nation among the tributaries of the Great Emperor. Finally, after another failure in 1685–1687, the Dutch yielded to the inevitable. No more embassies were sent, and for the next century they satisfied themselves with clandestine trade at ports in Fukien and at Canton, buying permission on each occasion.

English efforts in China. English interest in the "China Trade" dates back to the reign of Elizabeth, when in 1600 the East India Company was chartered and Benjamin Wood lost three ships in an effort to open trade with the celestial empire. The next attempt took place in 1635. In that year, under license from the Portuguese viceroy at Goa, the English East India Company dispatched the London from Goa to Macao, but the venture failed because of the opposition of the Portuguese governor of Macao.

In the following year Captain John Weddell with four ships was sent to Macao, where he arrived on June 27, 1637. The authorities, fearful of English competition, threw every obstacle in his way, and after some days of patient waiting Weddell proceeded with his ships to the Bogue, where he was fired upon as soon as his ships came within range of Chinese guns. He returned the fire, silenced the shore batteries, and proceeding to Canton disposed of his cargo and loaded his ships with sugar and tea. The Chinese excused their hostile attitude by claiming that it had been inspired by slanderous misrepresentations of the Portuguese, who feared an attack on their monopoly. In 1664 another effort proved a failure, for although agents were permitted to begin trading operations at Macao the Chinese adopted the expedient
of levying such heavy charges on their ships and cargoes that the agents were obliged to give up the enterprise. Accordingly the English turned to Koxinga and his son, and in 1670 a working system of charges was formed which for the time being satisfied both parties, and considerable trade took place at Amoy and Formosa. It was subjected however to many vicissitudes; the factory at Amoy was closed in 1681 and reopened in 1684. Finally the capture of Formosa by Manchu forces in 1683 put an end to English trade with the island.

The Canton factory. Meanwhile another attempt was made at Canton. In 1684 the English got a foothold, for when all the ports of China were opened to foreign trade by a decree of the emperor the English secured the right to a factory at Canton. The East India Company dispatched its first ship to Canton under this permission in 1689, but British trade at Canton was not definitely established until the voyage of the Macclesfield in 1699. Although the trade rose and fell in value depending upon the exactions and restrictions imposed by local officials, from this time on the British may be said to have put an end to the Portuguese monopoly of trade in the vicinity of Canton.
Conclusion. With the establishment of the British East India Company factory at Canton the story of seventeenth century East-West contacts may well be ended. Two portions of it however have been reserved for later chapters, namely, the opening and closing of Japan and the eastward expansion of Russia. But before these developments are discussed it seems advisable to make a brief survey of the Pacific Area in 1700. By that time the American continent south of Mexico had received Spanish civilization, and although the amalgamation of foreign and native cultures varied in degree from place to place, Spain had nevertheless firmly established her American empire. The northwestern coast of America though claimed by Spain was open to further exploration, as were most of the islands of the Pacific. In the Indies Portugal had had to yield to the Dutch, but Spain still held the Philippines. The Dutch had confined themselves to trade, and the European civilization they had brought had been largely commercial and political. Spain on the other hand had pursued in the East the same policy she used in America, and a modicum of Spanish language, religion, and government had spread throughout the archipelago. Australia was as yet an unknown continent, although Tasmania and New Zealand had been definitely put on the map. On the Asiatic mainland itself Europe had made little impression. China was closely wrapped up in its self-sufficiency, and Macao and Canton were mere peepholes through which Europe could glimpse the celestial empire. Japan had been opened and shut; and "the Bear that walks like a man" had lumbered his way across Siberia and had at last dipped his paws into the Pacific. These two developments are treated in the following chapters.
Japan Receives and Rejects Western Civilization

Japan's opportunity. Of all the Pacific peoples Japan was the best fitted to be a dominating factor during the era when Europe was establishing contacts between the East and the West. Situated off the coasts of China and Korea, she was in a position to take from those countries the best they had to offer. Occupying a relatively small, compact area with a favorable climate, she had an active, energetic population that could easily have been united and led in constructive channels of endeavor. Furthermore because of the Japanese Current and the prevailing westerly winds the Nipponese had every inducement which Nature could offer to undertake the exploitation of the Pacific shores of North America. Instead, for 200 years when she might have been developing acquaintance and commerce all around her, she confined herself persistently to her private economic, intellectual, and literary skills. By what manner this came about the present chapter will seek to indicate.

I. Reception and Total Rejection of Christianity

Origin of Portuguese trade with Japan. As far as can be ascertained, the first Europeans to come to Japan were three Portuguese who in 1542 or 1543 were voyaging in a Chinese junk from Malacca and Siam to Ningpo. Contrary winds blew the little vessel out of its course and it finally reached Tanegashima, a small island lying south of the province of Satsuma on the island of Kyushu. The Japanese, always hospitable and inquisitive, welcomed the newcomers, who through a Chinese
interpreter succeeded in explaining their presence in Japan. The ship was then piloted to a more commodious harbor, Kagoshima, where the foreigners were most kindly treated by the Japanese. From this contact the Nipponese first became acquainted with gunpowder and firearms. Two arquebuses sold to the local feudatory became models for the subsequent manufacture of new weapons of warfare; thus early did the Japanese reveal to Europeans their ability at imitation which eventually was to be the despair of Western inventors and patent holders.

Misunderstanding and hostilities. The return of the Portuguese to Malacca was followed by the fitting out of regular merchant ventures to trade with the newly discovered land. At least seven of these expeditions were sent out in the next few years, in each case the objective point being the island of Kyushu. Here at the port of Kagoshima, the daimyo of Satsuma encouraged the Westerners to continue their trade and endeavored to discourage their visiting the ports of his rivals. But although Chinese silks, Indian spices, and Portuguese weapons received a cordial welcome at Kagoshima, Satsuma offered few export commodities to tempt the Portuguese merchants. Since the more northern provinces of Kyushu were rich in the attractions which the southern region lacked, the Portuguese were soon carrying their commodities to the more northern ports, and the Satsuma daimyo's earlier friendship for the Europeans gave way to a growing anti-foreignism as he saw his neighbors reaping all the benefits of the trade. To this trade jealousy among the Japanese themselves were soon joined difficulties that arose out of the rivalry of Holland and England with the Portuguese and Spanish, and out of the fact that the Spanish for a time made serious and successful efforts to spread their religion. From all these misunderstandings and mutual hostilities finally came first the total rejection by Japan of Christianity, and second, her almost total rejection of foreign contacts of every sort. These two subjects will be treated in this order.

Anjirō. The pioneer propagandist in Japan was Francis Xavier, a Spaniard who in 1540 was one of the co-founders of the Society of Jesus, better known as the Jesuit Order. In 1542 he sailed for India to carry the faith into the recently gained Portuguese possessions. After preaching the Gospel in southern India and the Moluccas, he met in 1547 at Malacca a Japanese by the name of Yajiro, whom the fathers spoke of as Anjirō and who subsequently attained celebrity under his baptismal name, Paul of the Holy Faith. Anjirō, already able to speak Portuguese, soon mastered it sufficiently to interpret for Xavier and his fellow missionaries. To his linguistic skill he also added extraordinary gifts of
intelligence and memory. To Anjiro's appeal that Xavier take the Gospel to Japan was added an invitation from a chief of the Bungo sief, and accordingly in 1549, after Anjiro had taken a course of study in the college of St. Paul at Goa, Xavier, with a fellow priest and lay brother Anjiro, and two Japanese converts, sailed for Japan, where they landed on the fifteenth of August at the port of Kagoshima. Here they were excellently received by the feudal chiefs of Satsuma and were given permission to preach their doctrine in any port of the sief. This permit, however, was not due to sympathy with the foreign creed but rather to the fact that the daimyo thought the presence of Jesuits in Kagoshima would certainly lead to the coming of trading vessels. Much to his disappointment, within a few months one of the expected merchantmen sailed to Hirado without touching at Kagoshima, and her example was followed by two others in the next year. As if this were not enough to cause trouble, although the Buddhist priests received Xavier with courtesy and listened respectfully to the doctrine he expounded through the mouth of Anjiro, the good friar himself displayed an aggressive intolerance which shocked and alienated the local religious. They accordingly represented to the Satsuma chief that peace and good order were inconsistent with the foreigner's display of militant propagandism; and as a result in 1550 the daimyo, already chagrined at the traders' snub of his port, issued an edict making it a capital offense for any of his vassals to embrace Christianity. Anjiro however, along with some 150 converts, was permitted to remain unmolested, but Xavier himself found it necessary to go on to Hirado, the center of Portuguese trade.

Francis Xavier. Here the respectful consideration shown to Xavier by the Portuguese traders made a deep impression upon the local authorities, who were keenly interested in fostering trade relations. The daimyo, wishing to cultivate the good will of the merchants, gave orders that the foreign teaching should be given earnest attention. In ten days a hundred baptisms took place, and Xavier was encouraged to go to the capital of the empire. His first stop was at Yamaguchi, capital of the Choshu sief on the northern shore of Shimonoseki Strait. There he was given scant attention, and so pushed on to Kyoto. Unfortunately this city had been reduced almost to ruins by internecine war, and consequently he and his companions failed to obtain audience with the emperor or shogun. He and his followers then turned to street preaching, but a fruitless fortnight convinced them that Kyoto was barren ground, so they returned to Yamaguchi. Having now learned a lesson, Xavier sought permission to preach from the Choshu chief, and
success accompanied his efforts. From Yamaguchi he went to Bungo, where he repaired to the local ruler’s court escorted by a large number of Portuguese traders gorgeously arrayed and carrying their arms and banners; and as a result his preaching again was favorably received. But by now he had decided that educated Japanese would give consideration only to ideas which reached them by way of China, so in 1551 he sailed for India. The following year he arrived off the coast of China, where he died.

Missionary success: (1) Kyushu. During the thirty years after the departure of Xavier, Jesuit missionaries came to Japan in increasing numbers, and Christianity made steady progress, especially in the southern island. Perhaps the chief reason for the great success of this period was the fact that feudal anarchy had left the people crushed by excessive taxation. The native faith, Shinto, offered no heavenly rewards; Buddhism offered some, but far in the future, after desire had been extinguished; Christianity offered many rewards immediately. Accordingly numerous churches were erected, the daimyos generally were friendly, and a few of them even accepted the new faith. Where this occurred, the people usually followed their example. This was notably true in the Omura fief, whose chief, Sumitada, for commercial reasons became a most stalwart Christian. In 1567 he built a church at Nagasaki in order that Portuguese commerce might have a center and Christians an assured asylum. Nagasaki was then a little fishing village. In five years it grew to be a town of 30,000 inhabitants and Sumitada became one of the richest of the Kyushu feudatories.

(2) Kyoto. Outside of the southern island Christianity grew slowly. Not until 1568 did the missionaries secure permission to reside in Kyoto and there build a church. Its final authorization was due largely to the fact that Nobunaga, the chief military power in central Japan, who was then assuming control over the government, considered the Buddhists among his greatest enemies; their communities were a source of trouble for him till his death in 1582. Accordingly, with Nobunaga’s backing, for fourteen years the missionaries carried on their work at the capital without fear of persecution.

Valegagni. In 1579 Alexander Valegagni, whose interest in China had been stirred by a visit to Macao, went on to Japan as visitor-general. Three years later he organized a mission consisting of four noble youths who visited Lisbon, Madrid, and Rome; in each city they were received with honor, and were impressed with the splendor of sixteenth century Europe. That he was able to send such a mission to Europe is proof
Indeed of the progress of Christianity, and it is not surprising that the 1582 Annual Letter of the Jesuit Order in Japan recorded that at the close of the previous year there were in that country 150,000 converts, 125,000 in Kyushu and the remainder in and around Yamaguchi and Kyoto. The friars in the empire numbered seventy-five, a large increase having been made in the preceding four years, for in 1577 there had been only eighteen. The harvest was certainly great in proportion to the sowers.

Hideyoshi's edict. Unfortunately however the harvest was based largely on artificial growth forced by the despotic insistence of feudal chiefs who possessed the power of life and death over their vassals and who were chiefly interested in attracting foreign trade. It is true of course that for five years after the death of Nobunaga missionary hopes ran high. And during the first years of his successor's rule, while he was consolidating his power, Hideyoshi gave the missionaries favor and protection. In the spring of 1586, when he was preparing for the conquest of Kyushu, he even went so far as to state that he intended to divide the island among the Christian daimyos and to hand over to the Jesuits the port of Nagasaki. As proof of his friendly feeling he gave their leader, Coelho, a document granting Christians permission to preach their doctrine in all parts of the empire, immunity from the inconvenience of having soldiers billeted in their homes, and exemption from all local taxes. Then the axe fell. To the utter amazement of the missionaries, on July 25, 1587, after the conquest of Kyushu, Hideyoshi issued an edict charging the priests with preaching a law contrary to that of Japan and with destroying temples, and ordered them to leave the country within twenty days under pain of death.

Causes of Hideyoshi's action. Various reasons, many of them unsound and even trivial, have been assigned for Hideyoshi's change of attitude. Some historians insist that at the outset of his rule he intended to drive out the Christians, but concealed his intentions until he had conquered Kyushu. Others say that after visiting Kyushu, where he saw Christianity preached at sword point and missionaries treated as demigods, he decided that a choice finally had to be made between his own supremacy and that of the alien creed. A third theory is that he realized that if Christianity were established in Japan he would fall in his lifelong ambition to be put after his death in the pantheon of national heroes. A fourth conjecture is that he became irritated because some of the Christian ladies refused to submit to his overtures; and still another is that the dissolute conduct of the Portuguese and Spanish sailors may have influenced his decisions. Undoubtedly the prime reason was to be
Gate of Tenjin, a Shinto Temple, at Kameido, Tokyo. Shinto worship has been Buddhism’s chief religious competitor in Japan. “The Way of the Gods” is an ancient indigenous ritual of observances which places the emphasis upon loyalty to the emperor and reverence for ancestors. The architecture of its edifices is marked by extreme simplicity.

found in the fact that Christianity threatened the traditional beliefs and customs of the country and gave promise of dividing it at the very time when Hideyoshi was fighting for unity and stability.

Propaganda continues sub rosa. Whatever the reasons, the edict it should be observed did not forbid the Christian religion, but was designed merely to expel the foreign missionaries. It did not affect the Portuguese merchants, who were still permitted to reside at the ports and trade, although they were not to bring the priests with them. Only a few of the Jesuits left for China; most of them stayed behind to continue their work semi-secretly. In the next year Hideyoshi was assured by the Portuguese envoy that interruption of missionary work would interfere with foreign trade. Rather than lose trade Hideyoshi preferred to make concessions, and statistics show that in 1595 there were in Japan 137 Jesuits and 300,000 converts, of whom seventeen were feudal chiefs.

Spain enters the picture. What would have happened if Spanish friars
had not appeared on the scene is hard to say. In 1593 however four of them arrived from Manila. For years the Franciscans and Dominicans in the Spanish islands had cast envious eyes at Japan, from which they were barred by a bull of Gregory XIII (1585) and by an agreement between Spain and Portugal. But at length an opportunity presented itself. Having heard that the Spanish hold on the islands was weak, Hideyoshi in 1591 dispatched a letter to the Spanish governor calling upon the latter to acknowledge Japan as suzerain. Governor de Marinis replied two years later with an embassy which included four missionaries. Entering Japan as ambassadors, the friars thus circumvented the papal, Spanish, and Portuguese governments. They soon obtained permission to visit Kyoto, Fushima, and Osaka, where, in defiance of Hideyoshi's edict and other express commands and in opposition to all friendly advice from both Jesuits and native Christians, they began to carry on their work in an open and even ostentatious manner. They built a church in Kyoto, established a convent at Osaka, and seized a Jesuit church in Nagasaki.

**Hideyoshi's Korean campaign.** From 1593 to 1596 they were left alone, for Hideyoshi was engrossed in greater problems than the position of the Portuguese and Spaniards in his empire. For two centuries Korea had failed to send to Japan tribute-bearing embassies, and at length Hideyoshi decided something must be done to revive the custom. With his imagination stimulated by the continental goods brought in by the Portuguese trade, in 1590 he acquired still more grandiose ideas and declared his intention to conquer China. Korea was ordered to give aid. She refused, so the *taika* (Hideyoshi never took the title of shogun, for he was a peasant's son) got together an army of 300,000 men, sent 200,000 of them to Korea, and by May 24, 1592, was in control of Seoul. Then began his downfall. The Korean admiral Yi Sun-sin invented a warship (possibly the first ironclad in history) which was proof against boarding or setting on fire by the enemy, which could protect its occupants from attacks by arrows or firearms, and which was fast enough to be able to take the offensive. This ship caused the Japanese to lose control of the sea, and the Koreans with Chinese help reduced Hideyoshi's armies to the mere occupation of a few fortified camps on the southern coast. In 1594 the invaders attempted to bring about a peace among the three countries, but when Hideyoshi discovered that China wanted to make him her vassal he renewed the war. By March 1597 there were 140,000 Japanese troops in Korea. They won several battles, and in that of So-chon took 38,700 heads. The death of Hideyoshi on
September 16, 1598, however, removed the impelling force, and very shortly afterward the war ended, a war which brought no material gain to Japan and which resulted only in stirring up in the Koreans a hatred that still causes them to call Japan the "accursed nation."

The San Felice incident. Among the motives assigned as causing Hideyoshi's desire to conquer Korea and China was a wish to find in those countries a place in which to locate the Christian daimyo and their followers, whose growing power under Portuguese and Spanish leaders he was coming to fear. If this is true, it is easy to see why an incident in the latter part of 1596 (on the eve of his second invasion of Korea) brought the full weight of his wrath upon the Spanish missionaries who as mentioned above had continued to disobey his orders. It seems that a Manila galleon, the San Felice, was driven out of her course by a typhoon and took refuge off the coast of Tosa. Japanese boats towed it into the port of Urado, and probably with malicious intent ran it upon a sandbank. Thereupon the local daimyo seized the cargo, declaring the law of the country gave to the authorities all stranded vessels. Captain Landecho, when he learned that Hideyoshi was willing to make the most of an opportunity to enrich his depleted purse at the Spaniard's expense and was therefore inclined to support his feudatory, tried intimidation. Using Franciscans as intermediaries, he boasted of the greatness of the Spanish Empire, produced a map to show the vastness of its possessions and indicated that it would not be well to arouse the hostility of his monarch. Thereupon he was asked how it was possible for such a widespread empire to be built up. To this question he replied: "Our kings begin by sending into the countries they wish to conquer religieux who induce the people to embrace our religion, and when they have made considerable progress, troops are sent to combine with the new Christians, and then our kings have not much trouble in accomplishing the rest."

Hideyoshi's second expulsion edict. On learning of this speech Hideyoshi was overcome with fury. The expulsion edict of 1587 was put in force, and on February 5, 1597, six Franciscans, three Japanese Jesuits, and seventeen Japanese laymen were crucified at Nagasaki. The persecution continued until Hideyoshi's death, which came just at the time most of the friars in Kyushu were awaiting deportation.

Ieyasu's edicts of 1612 and 1614. With the death of Hideyoshi power fell into the hands of his ablest general, Ieyasu, who in 1603 revived the title of shogun and founded the Tokugawa shogunate. As a part of his liberal commercial policy (to be discussed later) he tolerated the foreign
missionaries, but as time went on he too, like his predecessor Hideyoshi, turned against the foreign religion, and in 1612 absolutely forbade its practice in Japan. It is difficult to determine definitely the motives which brought about this fateful decision. The sectarian rivalries among the foreigners probably caused him to feel that their presence was a menace to the peace of his realm. A Japanese who had visited Europe brought rich accounts of the Inquisition and the stake, of unlimited aggression in the name of the Cross, and of the Pope’s overlordship which entitled him to confiscate the realms of heretical sovereigns. At the same time a conspiracy was disclosed in which Christians were involved. Whatever may have been the causes — and any one of these might have been enough — following the promulgation of the edict of 1612 all the Franciscan churches were demolished as well as eighty-six Jesuit. The next year twenty-seven Japanese Christians were executed at Yedo (now Tokyo), and in 1614 a drastic proclamation ordered the suppression of Christianity throughout the empire.

*Hideyoshi’s policy.* After Ieyasu’s death in 1616 his son Hiderada
became shogun in fact as well as name (he had received the title in 1605, but Ieyasu ruled till his own death). Under him a strict enforcement of the previous decrees was carried out, and priests and laymen in large numbers were martyred. Accurate figures are not available, but it is estimated that between 1614 and 1635 some 280,000 Japanese and foreign Christians suffered punishment of some kind. Hidetada followed his father's example and retired in 1623, although he wielded the power until his death in 1632.

Iemitsu's edict of 1636. Hidetada's son, Iemitsu, followed his father's policy, and finally concluded that the only way to get rid of Christianity was for Japan to go into seclusion. The edict of 1636 which brought this about was followed by the Shimabara revolt (1637), which it was claimed was instigated by Christians. When it was finally put down the following year the bulk of the remaining Christian population had been destroyed; by the end of the century Christianity had been pretty well extirpated from Japan.

2. Reception and Near-Rejection of Foreign Trade

The efforts of the Portuguese and Spanish to make a Christian country out of Japan have been discussed in some detail because without the complications caused by the mixture of religion with business and politics it is doubtful if the seclusion edict of 1636 would ever have taken place. The effects on trade of that edict come now to be considered.

Kyushu's trade monopoly. As mentioned above, when the Portuguese traders reached Japan they were eagerly welcomed, and this welcome held for fifty years, during which they enjoyed complete freedom from European competition in Japanese markets. Although a few of the Portuguese merchants found their way to the imperial city, their destinations were almost exclusively the western ports of Kyushu. This monopoly by the southern island was due largely to the fact that its ports, having been for centuries the centers of commercial intercourse with China and Korea, had developed a commercial machinery capable of handling the new foreign trade. Furthermore, since the Portuguese and later the Dutch and English ships approached Japan by way of the Chinese ports, the harbors of Kyushu could be reached with less difficulty and danger than those farther to the east. Only for the Manila galleon on its annual voyage from Manila to Acapulco did the eastern harbors of Japan constitute attractive ports of call and unfortunately their
development was prevented by the stupidity of the Spanish government and the cupidity of the Manila merchants.

**Hideyoshi's trade efforts.** The Spanish opportunities to develop trade with Japan arose because during the rule of Hideyoshi Japanese merchants had penetrated the Philippines. Hearing that the Spanish hold on the islands was weak, Hideyoshi as mentioned above demanded that the island governor recognize him as suzerain. This led to the mission of 1593, by which the Spanish ruler sent a temporizing reply to the Japanese demands. Anxious to develop trade, the Japanese ruler did not press the matter and even winked at missionary activities. No trade however resulted from the embassy, and possibly that fact, following the San Felipe episode, helped to increase his fury against the Spanish priests.

**Ieyasu's trade efforts.** Under Ieyasu further efforts were made to develop trade with the Philippines, for he even more than his predecessor tried to distinguish between Christianity and commerce. In fact the three objects Ieyasu most earnestly desired to accomplish were (1) the development of foreign commerce, (2) the acquisition of a mercantile marine, and (3) the exploitation of Japanese mines. The year he came into authority, 1598, he intimated to a Spanish friar that he would be glad to have the Manila galleon stop for trade in Japan, and the following year he sent an envoy to Manila to press this request. When the Spanish governor did not accede, Ieyasu thought it was because of the depredations of Japanese pirates; accordingly the shogun seized and executed 200 of the buccaneers. He then sent a second envoy to Manila with the message, "Nothing would satisfy my desires so much as to see merchant vessels establishing frequent communications between my country and New Spain [Mexico]." The governor of the islands finally petitioned the Spanish crown for permission to establish the trade, and in the next few years several voyages between the Philippines and Japan were made. Nothing was done however about trade with Mexico. In 1608 Will Adams (of whom more later) was sent to Manila, and he arranged for the galleon to touch at Japan, but no trade with New Spain was provided for. The following year on his way home to Mexico Governor Vivero was wrecked off the coast of Japan and remained there a year, well treated by Ieyasu because of the advice he gave concerning mining, and his suggestions that miners be brought from New Spain to Japan. When Vivero sailed for New Spain in 1610 he was accompanied by twenty-three Japanese merchants and an envoy from the shogun to the Spanish king. A second important Spanish visitor was Sebastian
Vizcaino, the discoverer of Monterey Bay, who reached Japan in 1612 in connection with his hunt for the Islas Rica de Oro and Rica de Plata. He was guilty of several indiscretions, so that when he departed in 1613 for Mexico in a vessel belonging to a Japanese lord (his own had become unseaworthy) he was virtually no more than a passenger.

**Opposition to Japan-Mexico trade.** By this time the Spanish crown had decided to permit trade between Japan and Mexico, and in 1612 the Council of the Indies gave advice to that effect. Immediately there was a chorus of objections. The Portuguese of Macao feared it would ruin their trade; the Jesuits felt it would give Japan to the Franciscans from Manila; and the Manila merchants, who were profiting by the trade between the Philippines and Japan, were inclined to believe that they would be injured by the competition of Mexico. These elements were able to carry the day. Japanese trade with Manila was saved however and continued till 1624, when Hidetada, who had found reason to distrust the Spaniards, refused audience to a mission from the Philippines and ordered the departure from Japan of all Spanish.

**The Dutch reach Japan.** The failure of the Spanish to grasp their trade opportunities with Japan was undoubtedly a big factor in the warm welcome given the Dutch when they finally arrived upon the scene. Having declared their independence from Spain in 1581, and their British allies having crushed Spanish sea power in their victory over the Invincible Armada in 1588, the Dutch responded to their exclusion from Lisbon (Portugal then being united with Spain under Philip II) and its trade by an immediate attempt to seize the commercial empire of the Portuguese, both in America and in the East. The first Dutch ship to reach Japan seems to have been the *Liefde*, which, blown out of its course by storms, entered the harbor of Bungo in April 1600. The pilot of the vessel was an Englishman named Will Adams. Brought into the presence of Ieyasu, he made a good impression; and because of his knowledge of shipbuilding and navigation soon became a favorite. He built several ships for Ieyasu, taught him a smattering of geometry, handled his commercial affairs, and gave him a good deal of information, not wholly of an unbiased nature, regarding the Portuguese and Spanish. The other survivors of the *Liefde* were first cast into prison, but succeeded in making a friend of the feudatory of Hirado, and two of them were allowed to leave Japan. In 1605 Ieyasu granted the Dutch a license to trade in Japan, and in 1609 two Dutch ships followed the *Liefde* and established a factory at Hirado.

**The British East India Company reaches Japan.** The news that the
Dutch had established themselves in Japan of course reached London speedily, and the East India Company lost no time in ordering one of its vessels, the Clove, under Captain Saris, to proceed to Japan. On June 11, 1613, he reached Hirado, where he located a factory under a charter given by Ieyasu. Unfortunately for the English, Captain Saris seems to have been obstinate and opinionated. Accordingly, although the shogun’s charter plainly indicated that it was expected that the English would put their chief center of trade at Edo, a port which Ieyasu was trying to build up, and although Will Adams tried to show him that it was a better harbor and was free from all competition with an immense market at the very door, the Englishman saw fit to enter into the Kyushu Field. As a result of his mistaken choice and subsequent bad management, the English factory was closed December 24, 1623 (old style), after having incurred a loss of about 2000 pounds. The closure however was purely voluntary, for there was no serious friction between the Japanese and English. The company’s houses and godowns were left in the hands of the daimyo of Hirado, who promised to restore them in the event the English should reopen business in Japan. This they tried to do in 1673 when a ship aptly called the Return was sent to seek permission. The Japanese after mature reflection made answer that as the king of England was married to a Portuguese princess, British subjects could not be permitted to visit Japan.

The end of Portuguese trade. The English left Japan in 1623. The Spanish were driven out in 1624. The third to leave were the Portuguese. The handwriting appeared on the wall just about the time the English quit, and the Portuguese must have realized that it was only a matter of time until they too would have to leave the markets of Japan to the one people who could hold onto them. As early as 1623 they were faced with the burning of their galleons and cargoes and the execution of the crews if any foreign priest were found on board the vessels. On arrival their ships were inspected to see if they carried any contraband, and persons and cargoes were checked against a list drawn up by Japanese inspectors stationed at Macao, the port of embarkation. In 1635 the Japanese began heaping indignities of a personal nature on the Portuguese; the latter were forbidden to employ Japanese to carry their umbrellas or shoes, only their chief men could carry arms, and each year they had to hire a fresh lot of servants. In 1636 their trade and their embarkation was confined to the artificial island of Deshima in front of their old factory at Nagasaki. The final blow came in 1638. In that year an edict was issued proclaiming that since
The Geisha girls of Japan, contrary to western concepts, generally have been trained musicians, educated to provide entertainment for gentlemen who found their home life too boring. Often poverty-stricken peasants would sell their girl-babies to individuals who made a practice of preparing them for a profession not unlike that of the big-city American models.

In defiance of the government's order the Portuguese had continued to bring missionaries to Japan, that since they had supplied these missionaries with provisions and other necessaries, and that since they had fomented the Shimabara rebellion, thenceforth any Portuguese ship coming to Japan would be burned, together with her cargo, and everyone on board would be executed. Ample time however was given them to close up their business, and in 1639 the entire Portuguese commercial community sailed away to Macao.

The authorities there regarded the loss of Japanese trade as a major calamity, and made a desperate attempt to regain Japanese favor. The following year four aged men, the most respected citizens of Macao,
were sent to Nagasaki on a ship carrying no cargo but only rich presents and a petition declaring that for a long time the Portuguese had brought no missionaries to Japan, that the Portuguese had not been connected in any way with the revolt, and that the interruption of trade would injure Japan as well as Portugal. When the ship arrived on July 1, 1640, the Japanese removed the rudder and sails, the guns and ammunition, and put all on board under guard. A month later came peremptory orders from Yedo for compliance with the decree of 1638; and on August 3, after the Portuguese had refused to save their lives by apostatizing, the four envoys and fifty-seven of their companions were beheaded. Thirteen were saved to carry the news to Macao. This they did, after having been shown the heads of the victims and above them a tablet with the story of the execution that ended with these words: "So long as the sun warms the earth, let no Christian be so bold as to come to Japan, and let all know that if the King Philip himself, or even the very God of the Christians, or even the great Shaka contravene this prohibition, they shall pay for it with their heads."

In this same year 1638 Portugal gained her independence from Spain; and five years later a second embassy carried the news to Japan with a plea for the renewal of the old intercourse. This request also was refused, but since the Portuguese had not given up their rudders and arms they were able though menaced by a large force of samurai to make their escape.

_The Dutch hang on._ The departure of the Portuguese left only the Dutch to maintain European contacts with the Japanese. They were in a better position to keep the Japanese trade than their Iberian rivals, for their interest in commerce was not complicated by any missionary problem. Unfortunately they too had chosen Hirado for their headquarters, but the disadvantage of this choice was not apparent for many years. Their exclusive possession of the Spice Islands and their own enterprise and command of capital gave them the leading place in Japan’s oversea trade. Even when things changed for the worse and when England’s representatives closed their books with a large loss, records show that the Dutch were making an annual profit of 70 per cent. Most of this was from trade, but often the Anglo-Dutch “fleet of defense” made Hirado a base of operations against the Portuguese and Spanish. In 1622 such activities involved the sum of 100,000 pounds.

_The Shimabara revolt._ After the Spanish were expelled, the Dutch, like the Portuguese, began to suffer increased restrictions. Then came the Shimabara revolt, which for a time seemed to help the Dutch situa-
tion. The circumstances of this uprising, to which reference has been made, were these. The seifs of Shimabara and Amakusa had been more thoroughly Christianized than any other parts of the empire; consequently the persecutions were here the worst. Likewise in this area the people had suffered intolerable taxation and misrule by their feudal lords. Whether the revolt was started by Christians it is impossible to say, but in any case some 20,000 men and almost as many women and children rose in rebellion and took refuge in the old castle of Hara. Iemitsu called on the Dutch for aid, and Koeckebecker, the head of the Dutch factory at Hirado, who had been instructed “to save at any price the commerce of Japan,” took charge himself of Dutch participation. Stationing his ship with its great guns out of danger, he dropped in a period of fifteen days 426 cannon balls upon the beleaguered Christians, who after two and a half months of siege were finally all put to the sword.

The Dutch established on Deshima Island. This co-operation with the shogun however availed little for the Dutch. In the same year they received an imperious warning of what would happen if their ships should import priests or religious books. They even found it desirable to tear down some new warehouses on which were inscribed the dates of erection according to the Christian era, and further to promise that the Christian calendar and Sabbath would no longer be observed. An edict requiring them to sell their goods within a year after arrival put them at the mercy of the local merchants; and finally they were forbidden to slaughter cattle or to carry arms. To these exactions an envoy from Batavia protested, with the result that in 1641 the Dutch were removed from Hirado to Nagasaki, where they were consigned to the old Portuguese factory on Deshima Island.

This island from that time on became the sole portal through which trickled into Japan a tenuous stream of Western civilization. At times it seemed doubtful that even this would remain open. The Dutch traders were horribly abused. They were confined on a little island 200 by 80 yards, and almost no intercourse with the mainland was permitted. Dead Hollanders could not be allowed to pollute Japanese soil and had to be committed to the deep. No religious services could be held. No Japanese other than prostitutes could live on the island. Sometimes the Dutch were cudgelled by petty Japanese officials. In short they lived a life of extreme abasement so uncomfortable that from time to time the company considered abandoning the whole project. Hopes of improvement however, supplemented by natural reluctance to sur-
render a monopoly which despite Japanese restrictions still brought large gains, induced them to persevere.

3. Results to Japan of Her Policy of Isolation.

Such then is the history of the first century of Japan’s relations with the West. In 1541 the Japanese were known as “kings of the sea”; they welcomed foreigners with cordiality and imposed no obstacles to foreign commerce or even to the propagation of foreign creeds. In brief there were present in Japan all the elements of commercial enterprise, ocean-going adventure, and industrial liberality. A century later trade was interdicted to all Western peoples but the Dutch, no foreign creeds were permitted, any Japanese attempting to leave the kingdom would be beheaded, and not a ship large enough to pass beyond the shadow of the coast could be built.

For these changes there were three explanations. The first was a fear of the Christian religion and its possible social and political implications, which despite all effort could not be divorced from Spanish or Portuguese commerce. A second explanation was the shogun’s fear of indiscriminate importation of Western firearms and his desire to make their importation a shogunal monopoly — thus to insure the stability of his régime. The third was the desire of the Tokugawa shogunate to centralize the government’s powers in the central and eastern provinces of Honshu; the permanence of this control depended on keeping the western daimyo from becoming prosperous. Since it seemed impossible to transfer the center of trade from Kyushu to the shogun’s immediate vicinity, the only thing to do was to confine all foreign trade — Chinese as well as Dutch — to the single port of Nagasaki, where a shogunal governor could control the trade and collect for the Edo treasury the heavy taxes levied upon it.

And what was the harvest? Hard indeed is it to estimate. On the one hand there is no doubt that as a result of her self-imposed isolation Japan was protected against contamination from the Occident; she was not exploited as were China and the other countries of the Far East. During the era of her seclusion she was able to enter upon a period of freedom from internal and foreign strife which enabled her to be prepared for the reception of Western civilization when it arrived. But while Japan was sleeping, the rest of the world went ahead; while Japan remained medieval, the rest of the world turned modern. During the first half of her long sleep Japan suffered little in comparison with
Western nations, but when the Industrial Revolution gave the West its opportunity to forge ahead, Japan still slumbered among her cherry blossoms. The efforts of Japan to catch up with this march of progress make one of the most fascinating chapters of modern history. What would have happened if Japan had found it possible to carry out the liberal foreign policies of Ieyasu and had not receded to a policy of seclusion and exclusion affords a rich field for the imagination.

Most Japanese homes are esoteric in design and location. Entrance to them is made through narrow alleyways. Incidentally, the Japanese do not lock up their homes.
Russia Reaches the North Pacific
(The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries)

Introduction. In the seventeenth century, following the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and English, came infiltrations into the Pacific Area by the Russians. The Russian activities differed from those of their predecessors first, because land expansion preceded that by sea, and second, because the Russians were interested in the fur trade rather than in spices and silks. Despite these variations, all Westerners showed one common trait: Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutchmen, English, Russians, all were so much interested in getting economic advantage for themselves that they gave short shrift to the rights and happiness of the native inhabitants. This chapter then will deal with the coming to the Pacific Area of a fifth people of Europe.

1. Russia’s Eastward Expansion to the Pacific

First contacts. Russia’s first close contacts with the East came about as a result of the thirteenth century Mongol invasion of Europe. These contacts continued for more than 200 years, until toward the end of the fourteenth century the power of the Horde was weakened by the conquests of Tamerlane, and it split up into wrangling rival hordes and khanates. The centrally located principality of Moscow took advantage of this Mongol dissension and deterioration to become gradually the most powerful state in Russia. During the reign of Ivan III or Ivan “the Great” it became so strong that in 1480 the Muscovite threw off the Mongol yoke and assumed sovereignty. Expansion then began, particularly against the eastern and southern
khanates of Kasan and Astrakhan, and when Ivan IV died (Ivan "the Terrible," 1533–1584), both of them had been conquered and the way had been opened to Muscovite expansion beyond the Urals.

Causes of expansion into Asia. This Russian expansion into Asia started in Europe during the early 1500's when the farming folk about Moscow began migrating south and east into the fertile plains of the Don and the Volga. Unlike the expansion of the nations of western Europe, Russia's eastward movement was not motivated by religious upheavals or the rise of capitalism, and not till later decades by the new learning or by scientific development. In the first place, the religion of Russia was the direct heritage of the expiring, non-combative Eastern Empire, with a difference from Roman Catholicism and Protestantism that tended to keep Russia separate from central Europe. Second, as a result of their long contacts with Mongols and Tatars the Russians were Asiatic rather than European. Third, the physiography of the country encouraged agriculture, discouraged industry and foreign commerce, and turned emigration eastward. And finally, western Russia lacked the seaports which would have enabled her to trade with Europe and thus be influenced by its culture.

The chief factor in the early eastward movement, then, was the need of security on the frontiers — to this end the Kalmuks, Bashkirs, and Buryats were suppressed. As the newly created autocratic state became more powerful, its need for revenues became greater and taxes were increased. As a result life on the frontier, where it would be easier to evade tax payments, became more and more attractive. At the same time individuals who performed conspicuous military service gradually came to possess most of the land in European Russia, and peasants fled to escape the expanding agricultural system. Once the fur and mineral wealth of Siberia was known, the commercial class became interested in the Far East. And finally still later, when Russian geographers began to be aware of the continent in which they lived, there grew up a desire for scientific achievement.

The Cossacks. While Russia was expanding and consolidating her position in eastern and northeastern Europe, she naturally was vulnerable on her southern and southeastern frontiers. The burden of guarding these lines against invasion was gradually turned over to Cossacks, pieceworkers who had fled forced labor on the fields of the great landowners to work as hired laborers inside the line of the military frontier. Many however did not stop within this line, and the name "Cossack" came to be applied more and more exclusively to the adventurers who
The fur-famed Cossacks were big factors in making it possible for Russia to carry her eastward expansion to the North Pacific.

were first employed as scouts, and then gradually developed into a hardy, semi-nomadic type of frontiersman.

The beginnings of Siberia. Cossack connection with the eastward expansion of Russia began during the reign of Ivan IV as a result of a conflict between the wealthy merchant family of Stroganov and the khan of Sibir, ruler of the Siberian Tatar khanate lying between the Ural Mountains and the Ob River. For several centuries the Stroganovs operated salt-mining concessions between the Kama River and the Urals, just to the west of Sibir, and when at length they began expanding eastward, hostilities resulted. When the Stroganovs appealed for help, the tsar gave them permission to recruit a force of Cossacks for use
against the khan. As a result, in the fall of 1580 there appeared at the
salt mines a Cossack leader by the name of Yermak Timofeyevitch, an
outlaw brigand with a price on his head. In September 1581 with
several hundred Cossacks he crossed the Urals and attacked the khan
of Sibir. The Tatars fought courageously, but their skill as horsemen
availed little against the invaders' firearms and coats of mail. Within
four years the little province which was to give its name to a vast area
stretching to the Pacific was in the hands of Yermak. After his first
victory he had sent a present of captured sables to the tsar, and in
return received a pardon for his past crimes and a commission to operate
for the tsar in the Ob-Irtysh region.

Russia reaches the Pacific. In 1584 Yermak was drowned while trying
to cross the Irtysh River, and his followers prepared to give up the enter-
prise. But opportune reinforcements arrived. Furthermore, the death
of Ivan IV in that same year brought civil war and disorders to Russia,
so that large numbers of peasants fled to the eastern frontier. These
newcomers made it possible in 1587 to establish Tobolsk, where Russian
peasants found the agricultural possibilities excellent. Once begun,
the eastward movement steadily continued. In 1604 the town of
Tomsk was founded in the upper part of the Ob valley. Ten years later
the Russians had reached the Yenisei, where the town of Yeniseisk was
built. From the upper waters of the Yenisei they crossed to the Lena.
Pushing northeastward they established an outpost at Yakutsk (1632);
and in 1638, fifty-seven years after Yermak had led his Cossack band
across the Urals, another party of Cossacks reached the shore of the
Pacific Ocean at Okhotsk.

The fur trade. This eastward expansion of Russia in Siberia, like the
later westward occupation of Anglo-Saxon North America, was largely
the work of the hunter, the trapper, and the fur trader. The cold, rugged
country of northeastern Asia, though sparsely inhabited by primitive
hunting tribes, was rich in fur-bearing animals, whose pelts, especially
those of the sable, found a ready market in Russia and later in China.
As furs became scarce new regions were opened up, and the demand for
more and more furs was the economic motive that drove the Russians on
until they eventually reached the Aleutian Islands and Alaska.

Racial mixtures in Siberia. In Siberia they found a rather primiti-
tive people accustomed to being dominated by Tatar tribes. Like the
Spanish in America, the Russians made no attempt to drive out the
native inhabitants; in fact it was preferable to have them remain as the
lower stratum of a new society. Since as on most frontiers the invaders
had left their own women behind, the Russians mixed with the natives; and after half a century there was a considerable mixed population.

Colonial government in Siberia. Although some furs were obtained from the natives by trade, the larger part came as tribute exacted by local officials. To administer the tax system, and to keep peace among the Tatar and other tribes, the Russians developed, especially east of Yakutsk where agriculture and mining never flourished, a centralist form of government well suited to the country. This government, since Siberia was the tsar's preserve, differed from that of European Russia, and was aimed to accomplish the easiest and most profitable exploitation of both land and people. The ruler of each province was a voevod or voevode; his two major tasks were to see that the tribute was gathered and to prevent anything, such as drunkenness and gambling, which would unfit individuals to serve the tsar. Taxation was the voevod's greatest problem, for it was difficult to get tribute out of the natives and yet keep them alive and peaceful. In the final analysis, when the natives refused to pay war was made on them. This harsh treatment caused many uprisings and sometimes flights into Chinese territory. Pursuit of fugitives and the normal wanderings of hunters eventually led the Russians not only to the east but also to the south.

2. Southward Expansion and Contact with China

Causes. Although the Russians had sent an embassy to China as early as 1618 it was not until 1638, the year they reached the Pacific, that they really became aware of the economic possibilities of the country south of eastern Siberia. In that year the group of Cossacks which reached Okhotsk heard of the great Amur which flowed into the ocean 500 miles to the south. At the same time a second party of explorers starting from Yeniseisk pushed southward along the upper branches of the Lena River until they came in touch with some bands of Tungusic Tatars, who reported that in the valleys beyond, notably the Shilka, much grain and not a little silver was to be found. This news was important, for Yakutsk often suffered hunger because of the difficulties encountered in bringing grain from western Siberia. If food supplies could be had on the upper tributaries of the Amur, the bread problem could be solved, for the portage from those streams to the sources of the Lena was comparatively simple.

Payarkof. During the next five years these reports received further confirmation. In 1643 the voevod of Yakutsk sent out a large expedition
under Wasili Poyarkof, a mighty wielder of both the pen and the dagger. He left Yakutsk July 15, 1643, with 112 Cossacks, fifteen hunters, two clerks, two interpreters, a guide, and a blacksmith, and returned June 12, 1646. During these three years he ascended the Aldan, crossed over to the Dzeya, descended it until he reached the Amur, and then made his way to the coast. From there he went north, and returned to Yakutsk by way of the Maya and Aldan rivers. The expedition was a success in so far as it separated myth from fact, but the harm it did to the cause of Russian expansion was probably greater than the good. On several occasions when food ran short the Russians treated the natives with gross cruelty which even went as far as cannibalism. Whatever faults the Chinese tribute gatherers may have exhibited, they were not guilty of such inhuman acts as the Russians, and the latter were to pay heavily for the terror and destruction which they spread among the primitive hunting peoples who inhabited the valley of the Amur.

Khabarov. Despite the hardships suffered by Poyarkof's expedition, the Russians decided to attempt the occupation of the Amur country. This task was undertaken by Yarka Pavlov Khabarov, who offered at his own expense to bring this region under the banner of the tsar if he might have charge of tribute collection. His first reward came from uncovering large supplies of grain which the natives had buried. Encouraged by this initial success he came again to the Amur valley, where at Albasin he surprised a village of Dauri Tatars who had not expected him to return. The Dauris were defeated with great slaughter, and a fort immediately established. The next summer Khabarov continued down the Amur, plundering as he went. Guigudar, a settlement of some thousand people, was captured with plunder which included 143 women, 118 children, 237 horses, and 113 cattle. In September at the confluence of the Ussuri and the Amur he made a winter camp on a site which was later to become the important city of Khabarovsk.

Russo-Chinese hostilities. Here in the spring of the following year occurred the first conflict between Russians and Chinese. The Dauri tribes appealed to the Chinese for protection, and an army of a thousand men suddenly descended upon the Cossack blockhouse. At the beginning of the fight the Chinese had the best of it, but when the Cossacks discovered that the Chinese were trying to capture them alive they stiffened their resistance and opened a deadly fire which drove the enemy from the field. Historians differ as to how great the Russian victory really was. It appears at least that from then on Russian aggressiveness moderated, and the Cossacks kept a wholesome respect for the fighting abilities of the Chinese.
Russian retreat. Further proof of Chinese prowess was soon forthcoming. Khabarof surrendered his command in the summer of 1653, and in the following year his successor Onufria Stepanof advanced up the Sungari River. He was driven back to the Amur, where at Khamarsk in 1655 he successfully withstood a siege by the Chinese. This temporary success of the Russians held back the Chinese for the time being, so that for three years bands of Cossacks were able to ravage the Amur valley. At length, though, the Chinese were prepared to proceed against the marauders, and in June 1658 they attacked Stepanof’s forces on the Amur just below the mouth of the Sungari and annihilated them.

This defeat cleared the lower Amur of Russians and left them only Albassin on the upper Amur and Nurchinsk on the Shilka. Nurchinsk attracted little attention from the Chinese; but Albassin was a constant challenge, for year by year the number of Russians there increased, and local appeals for aid were made to the Chinese central government. To make matters worse, the presence of a lawless foreign population within China’s borders attracted many of China’s own criminals to Albassin, where they had Russian protection. Accordingly in 1685 China sent an army to Albassin which after a short siege forced its surrender. Some of the defenders were taken to Peking (Peiping) as prisoners of war, and the rest were allowed to go to Nurchinsk. The fortifications were destroyed and the Chinese departed thinking the job was finished. But the Cossacks returned, harvested the grain that the Chinese had not destroyed, rebuilt the blockhouse more strongly, and the next year again gathered tribute from the natives. For a second time the Chinese in 1686 besieged Albassin, but this attack was not so energetically pressed, and the Russians were able to hold out until the arrival of a Russian envoy, whose proposals for a diplomatic settlement led the Chinese to change their operations to a defensive blockade.

The Treaty of Nurchinsk: (1) Equality and Longevity. This diplomatic settlement, known as the Treaty of Nurchinsk, was finally concluded in August 1689. It was the first treaty ever negotiated by China with a European power, and most important of all it was signed on a basis of equality. Furthermore it was destined to be one of the longest-lived treaties in diplomatic history. With modifications in 1727 and again in 1768 and 1792, it regulated the relations between the two empires for 169 years.

(2) Boundaries. The first problem the treaty settled was the boundary question. The Russians hoped to make the Amur their southern limit, while the Chinese insisted that the border be the watershed sepa-
rating the Amur and Lena river systems. This dispute continued for more than two weeks, and negotiations might have failed but for the presence of a Chinese army of over 10,000 foot soldiers and 3000 camel riders. This show of force made the Russians more amenable to Chinese reason, and the final boundary followed the Shilka River to a point east of Nerchinsk and then went north along the Yablonoi Mountains to the sea.

China’s unyielding attitude over her northern boundary was undoubtedly due to her age-long concern over the area whence most of her invaders came. At the same time she could not be too obdurate, for she needed a free hand in dealing with the western tribes, who made difficult the preservation of peace and order along the frontier.

(3) Frontier peace. This problem was partly solved by a provision that Chinese or Russians who crossed the frontier illegally, or who committed offenses beyond the territorial limits of their own country, should be apprehended by the authorities of the territory where the crimes were committed and handed over to their own national officials for punishment. This was an early form of extraterritoriality.

(4) Free trade. In addition to establishing a boundary and providing a crude sort of mutual extraterritoriality, the treaty laid the foundations for lasting and important commercial relations in an article which stated, “All persons, of what condition soever they may be, may come and go reciprocally, with full liberty, from the territories subject to either empire, into those of the other, provided they have passports by which it appears that they come with permission, and they shall be suffered to buy and sell whatever they think fit, and carry on a mutual trade.”

This feature of the treaty was relatively less important than the first three provisions, for political relations with Russia were always paramount with China; with the other Europeans she had no frontier problem, for they came by sea from the south and in turn were concerned entirely with trade.

(5) Results. The results of the Treaty of Nerchinsk were far-reaching. First, although its form implied the equality of the rulers and powers involved, the Chinese undoubtedly carried away from the negotiations an exaggerated sense of their own importance. This notion was strengthened when the Russian ambassadors Everard Ysbrandt Ides and Leoff Ismailov in 1693 and 1720 respectively yielded in Peking to Chinese requirements in regard to the kowtow. Second, under the Treaty of Nerchinsk there developed a profitable exchange of goods
with the Amur region, while Kyakhta, southeast of Irkutsk, eventually became the point of departure for a brisk trade across Mongolia to Peking. Third, the subsequent development of diplomatic contact with the Chinese gave Russia an entrée into the Manchu kingdom which later furnished Russia with a political advantage over the other European nations, even though her ships were excluded from the Canton trade. A fourth important result was that the treaty freed China to deal with the Tatar tribes threatening her in the west. Fifth, and probably most important of all, the forced withdrawal of Russia from the Amur valley, coupled with increased demands for furs on the part of Chinese traders, drove Siberian trappers and fur traders into the most remote northeastern regions of the continent, until finally they crossed the northern Pacific to the American mainland, where their outposts met those of the British and Spanish.

3. Occupation of Kamchatka and the Kurils

Preliminary advance. The emphasis given above to Russian attempts to occupy the Amur does not mean that the northeastern part of the continent had escaped their attention. During the years 1630 to 1650 Russia made remarkable progress in this direction. Okhotsk was reached in 1638, and a decade later the Anadyr River was known to them. As early as 1652 one Staduchin had established posts along the Penzhinsk, and a document of 1674 refers to the Kamchatka River as a stream already known. It was not however until the end of the century that Kamchatka was occupied, a delay partly due to the weakness of the Russian forces and the bitter hostility of the natives between the Anadyr and Kamchatka rivers. These Koriaks, although not at first openly hostile, grew bitter as they saw the Russians encroaching upon their game preserves, and served notice that they would neither permit the invaders to go to Kamchatka by land or by sea nor would they surrender. By plunder and by purchase they secured firearms which made them equal if not superior to the Russians in warfare. In addition they had a well-organized method of communication which enabled them to circumvent the most secretly laid plans of the Russians.

Kamchatka. Despite Koriak resistance, by the end of the century the first blockhouse was finally established on the Kamchatka peninsula. In 1697 Vladimir Atlasof, while on the Anaduir as the prikazchik or agent appointed by the woewod at Yakutsk, commissioned Luke Morosko to go to Kamchatka to explore and to collect tribute from the
inhabitants. Morosko returned with furs, and Atlasof himself then started on an expedition which lasted three years. By June 1700 when he finally returned he had explored the western coast of the peninsula from Penjinsk to the Itcha River, and possibly as far as Cape Lopatka and the eastern coast to the Kamchatka River. Here he left fourteen of his men with thirteen natives to build a blockhouse and hold it until they were relieved.

A period of lawlessness. Despite the hardships of Atlasof's expedition, his reports on the possibilities of the fur trade were so encouraging that the Sibirski Prikaz, the Bureau of Siberian Affairs located at Tobolsk, determined to develop the trade, and numerous companies were sent out. But their first efforts were unsuccessful, and many of the leaders, including Atlasof himself, turned bandit. Their maraudings, coupled with the hostility of the natives, made Kamchatka an enormous drain on the Yakutsk office. Between 1707 and 1711 as many as 290 men were sent to this frontier. Communications became so difficult that in 1712 five years' tribute payments were marooned in Kamchatka. In the spring and summer of 1714 nearly one hundred Russians lost their lives in fights with Koriaks, Yukagirs, and Chukchi, and in 1716 Russia was on the point of losing Kamchatka.

A sea route to Kamchatka. At this point Fortune finally smiled once more. A new route to the peninsula, eventually known as the Okhotsk-Kamchatka passage, enabled the Russians to avoid the hostile natives. Since 1710 there had been talk but no action regarding a passage across the Okhotsk Sea and about new lands to be discovered in the Arctic and Pacific oceans. In 1714 a well-equipped company was commissioned to go to Okhotsk to build boats with which to cross to Kamchatka. One thing after another caused delay, but in the summer of 1716 an open boat did find its way to the peninsula. Late in the summer of 1718 another boat made the trip and in the fall of 1719 returned loaded with tribute. Again in 1719-1720 a successful round trip was made; and from this time on Russia's occupation of Kamchatka was assured.

The charting of the Kuril Islands. In the southern part of the peninsula was a tribe of natives called Kurils, quite distinct from the Kamchacels, who lived in the center, and the Koriaks, who gave the Russians so much trouble in the north. They were first mentioned by Atlasof, and proved so hostile that in 1705 the prikazchik of Kamchatka sent out an expedition to put them down. In the course of its wanderings the group eventually came to Cape Lopatka, which overlooked a chain of islands stretching far to the south. Further information came
in 1700 when a Japanese junk was wrecked on the coast of Kamchatka.

Acting on this knowledge in 1713, Ivan Kaziretski and several other criminals offered to expiate their misdeeds by undertaking to explore the Kuril Islands. This they were permitted to do, and some fifty Russians, eleven natives, and a Japanese pilot-interpreter set sail. On three of the islands they made landings, and brought off articles made of silk and grass, as well as sabers and other metal objects. From what was learned on this trip a fairly accurate idea of the whole chain of islands was obtained. In 1720 another expedition was sent out by the tsar. This one merely added two more islands to those seen before, a meager achievement when compared with the royal orders, which read in part, "You are to go to Kamchatka and farther, as you have been ordered, and determine whether Asia and America are united; and go not only north and south, but east and west, and put on a chart all that you see." The final charting of the islands was done by Martin Spanberg, a lieutenant of the man who really carried out the above instructions.

4. Southeastward Expansion and Contact with Japan

Russia, after opening up China's northern frontier, came in contact with another Oriental nation, Japan, and during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries their relations had a serious effect on Moscow's foreign policies.

First contacts. Just when Japan learned of her great Muscovite neighbor is not known. Records indicate that as early as 1604 there were Japanese castaways on Siberian shores; but their presence on the mainland was without significance, for three decades later Japan entered upon her period of seclusion. Therefore when in 1739 a Russian ship appeared off the coast of Shimoda it apparently was the first time that the Tokugawa shogunate was made aware of Russia's existence.

Spanberg's expedition. This ship, according to both Russian and Japanese records, was the St. Gabriel. Lieutenant Martin Spanberg commanded it, and the fleet of which it was part was in Japanese waters as the result of Bering's proposals in the early 1730's to the effect that it would be advantageous to find a sea route from Kamchatka to Japan. Accordingly in 1735 Spanberg went to Okhotsk, where he built three ships, and in the summer of 1738 sailed southward along the Kuril Archipelago. Because of heavy storms the little fleet was unable to reach Japan, but the following year—now increased to four ships—
it was successful. Spanberg with three ships touched the Japanese coast as far south as 38° 25' N., where he was given excellent treatment by Japanese officers, apparently of high rank. He returned to Siberia certain that he had discovered the water route from Kamchatka to Japan.

In the meantime the St. Gabriel, which under the command of Lieutenant Walton had become separated from the other ships, reached the coast of Japan as far south as Shimoda. Three entries were made by Lieutenant Walton, and he like Spanberg was given friendly treatment.

_Eightheenth century expansion_. On the basis of these explorations and because Russian advance in the territory under the control of China had had to be abandoned, Russia in the middle 1700's concentrated her Far Eastern undertakings upon Japan. The teaching of the Japanese language was encouraged so that Russians could be prepared for future relations with Japan. Advance into the Kurils was followed by the conquest of all the northern islands as far south as Urup. In 1766 the largest island of the Kurils, Etorofu, was taken over, and with it as a base advance began on Yezo Island just north of Honshu, the main island of Japan.

_Japan's dilemma_. This threat to Japan's northern border naturally caused alarm; but unfortunately for the Japanese their long seclusion made them ignorant not only of conditions outside Japan but even of the exact boundaries of their own national territory. Therefore, when they became convinced that Russia would be a great and dangerous nation, the plans suggested by Japanese leaders for checking Russia revealed their deplorable ignorance of conditions. One historian proposed that Yezo Island be laid waste, since a barren and abandoned Yezo would hold no attraction for Russia. Another argued that Yezo should be occupied and developed before Russian expansion could take place. A third insisted that either Japan should go to war with Russia or else that through a grant of trading privileges Russia's good will should be gained and friendly relations be thereby established. For over half a century while Russia established herself in the North Pacific the argument went on. Finally in 1807 the entire island of Yezo was put under the direct control of the shogun; and explorers were sent north with the hope of establishing Japanese rule over Etorofu and southern Sakhalin.

_Laxman's expedition_. This action did not come a moment too soon. In 1792 Russia had sent to Japan its first official expedition. Ostensibly its object was to return two shipwrecked Japanese sailors, but its real
purpose was to establish permanent trade relations — Russia's activities in the North Pacific by this time had demonstrated conclusively the fur traders' continued need of foodstuffs. On October 9, 1792, under the leadership of a Finn, Adam K. Laxman, the brigantine *Ekaterina* cast anchor in the harbor of Nemuro on the northeastern part of Yezo. Well received by the Japanese, Laxman presented a request for trade privileges. Since this was the first time a foreign nation had asked for the reopening of Japan for trade, the Japanese gave the matter serious attention. The ship was allowed to proceed to Hakodate, and at Matsumaye in Yezo a formal interview was granted Laxman and his party. The state paper which the Russians had presented at Nemuro was returned, but Laxman was provided with a pass permitting him to enter Nagasaki, the only place so he was informed where trade and foreign intercourse might be conducted.

*Rezanof's raids.* Ten years later — thanks to unsettled affairs in Europe consequent upon the French Revolution — Nicolas Petrovich Rezanof was named Russian ambassador plenipotentiary, and in September 1804, he arrived at Nagasaki. Then followed six months of profitless discussion, after which the Japanese withdrew the trading permit they had given Laxman. Rezanof then decided that a bit of terrorizing might prove efficacious. Accordingly, raids were made on Sakhalin, Etorofu, and Urup, and repeated in 1806 and 1807. It is significant that Japanese historians often begin their account of the Russo-Japanese War with accounts of these raids.

*The Golovnin incident.* It is not surprising then that in May 1811 when Captain V. M. Golovnin arrived in Kuril waters to make island surveys the Japanese should have taken their revenge. When the captain and a party of seven came ashore they were imprisoned and kept in jail until October 7, 1813. Golovnin then returned to St. Petersburg (July 1814) and immediately afterward in his *Narrative of My Captivity in Japan* predicted that the Japanese would become a great people.

*The Lindenberg expedition.* For some forty years following the Golovnin incident Russia made no attempts to secure trade relations with Japan. Then in 1852 the Russian-American Company sent a ship to Shimoda, again ostensibly to return sailors wrecked in Russian waters but actually to establish trade relations. The commander, one Lindenberg, cast anchor on July 26, 1852, and at first was well received though not permitted to go ashore. Very shortly however relations grew worse, and on August 2, 1852, the Russians were ordered to leave Japanese shores immediately.
The Putiatin expedition. On August 10 of the following year, 1853, a Russian squadron of four vessels under the command of Admiral Efimii Vasilievich Putiatin, Russia's third envoy to Japan, anchored in Nagasaki. Naturally the Japanese were greatly alarmed, but Putiatin gained their confidence and negotiations began. Russia's demand was that the Russo-Japanese boundary be delimited and that one or two Japanese ports be opened to trade. The Japanese were hesitant about granting Russia any special privileges and tried to draw out the negotiations as long as possible. Finally in November the admiral made a trip to Shanghai, and then spent most of the next year visiting the Ryukyu Islands and Manila. After his return to Siberian waters he sailed back to Japan, and at Shimoda on December 8, 1854, negotiations were resumed.

The Shimoda Treaty. Shortly thereafter an earthquake, a tidal wave, and a heavy storm combined to destroy Putiatin's ship, the Diana. These disasters seemed to further a feeling of good will, and on January 26, 1855, the Treaty of Shimoda was signed. It provided first that the Russo-Japanese boundary in the Kuril Islands should run between the islands of Etorofu and Urup; all the islands north of Urup were to belong to Russia. The negotiators found it difficult to come to an agreement on Sakhalin Island, and after long discussions it was decided that it should be occupied jointly by Russia and Japan without establishment of any boundary. Finally under the most-favored-nation provisions the Shimoda Treaty included all the concessions which Japan had granted to the United States and England the preceding year.

With the Treaty of Shimoda Russia's expansion at the expense of Japan stopped for the time being. But before discussion of the later events which led to the Russo-Japanese War it is desirable to study the Muscovites' eastward expansion to the coasts of North America.

5. Bering's First Voyage

Causes. The question has often been raised why Peter the Great was willing to spend the vast sums involved in the expeditions of Vitus Bering. The French geographer Guillaume Delisle and the French, Dutch, and Russian academies all have been given the credit for applying the pressure which certain historians seem to think was necessary. All these conjectures may be true, but the simplest answer seems to be the emperor himself. As a young man Peter worked in the dockyards of the British East India Company, and his enthusiasm for foreign trade
led him to build St. Petersburg. Since he himself always regretted that it had been impossible for him to sail the "seven seas," it was only natural that when he realized he had not long to live he should make one final effort to satisfy his curiosity about the eighteenth century Ultima Thule. He had heard of the many legends about a land to the east of Siberia; his library contained maps showing a passage to China and India through the Arctic Sea, a mythical strait called Anian. Cartographers for a long time had placed on their maps a Terra de Jese or Gama Land; and now tales of trunks of strange trees not found on the Siberian coast, of an occasional dugout canoe, and of whales with strange harpoon heads imbedded in their backs were brought to Peter from Kamchatka. Land birds came from the east and went away again. Among the Chukchi in the Anadyr region were strange women wearing walrus-ivory lip ornaments and speaking a peculiar tongue.

The Bering contract. It is not surprising then that the inquiring mind of Peter the Great should have sought the explanations of these riddles. On January 26, 1725, Peter signed a document remarkable for its brevity and its significance. In it he ordered Vitus Bering

I. To build in Kamchatka or in some other place one or two decked boats.

II. To sail on these boats along the shore which runs to the north and which (since its limits are unknown) seems to be a part of the American coast.

III. To determine where it joins America. To sail to some settlement under European jurisdiction, and if a European ship should be met with learn from her the name of the coast and take it down in writing, make a landing, obtain detailed information, draw a chart and bring it here.

Vitus Bering, who was selected to carry out these orders, was born in Denmark in 1681. Since 1704 he had been in the Russian navy and had served with distinction. For lieutenants he was given Martin Spanberg, also a Dane, and Alexei Chirikoff, a Russian.

Bering's first voyage. Limitations of space unfortunately make it impossible to describe the two voyages of Bering in the detail they deserve. In preparation for the first voyage he took three years. His company and supplies were transported across Siberia to Okhotsk, sailed thence to the Bolshaya River on the western side of Kamchatka, and finally made their way overland to Petropavlovsk, where on June 8, 1728, the St. Gabriel, a sixty-foot vessel, was launched and christened. A month later all was ready, and on July 13, 1728, with forty-four men on board, the St. Gabriel weighed anchor and headed out of the harbor.
Bering's course lay northward along the coast of Kamchatka. Frequent stops were made for water and for the questioning of natives. Finally on August 16, 1728, he reached latitude 67° 18', and Bering therefore considered that he had proved that there was no land connection between Asia and America.

Furthermore, the natives told him it was possible to go by sea from the mouth of the Anadyr River which flowed into the Pacific Ocean to the Kolyma River which flowed into the Arctic Ocean. As on this northern coast there were no harbors or wood and the natives were unfriendly, he decided to put back to the Kamchatka River in order to save his men and his boat. The return trip was uneventful, and the St. Gabriel dropped anchor at home on September 7, 1728.

The following year he sailed south to latitude 53° 32' and then around the cape of Bolshaya River. He next sailed for Okhotsk, which he reached on July 14, 1729. From there he went to the capital, where after some routine hardships he arrived on March 1, 1730.

His reception at St. Petersburg was distinctly cool. Many called his mission a failure, saying that at the most he had merely charted the northern limits of Kamchatka. His reward of 1000 rubles and his salary were held up for two years. But worst of all perhaps from the standpoint of his reputation in history was the fact that by his failure to go on into the Arctic, he had stamped himself as one fitted neither by nature nor by education to be more than a ship captain with plenty of courage but no vision.

6. The Real Discovery of Alaska

Fate however was on the side of the Dane. Bering will always be known as the discoverer of Alaska, despite the fact that his exploit was antedated nine years by Michael Spuridovinich Gwosdef.

Shestakof. Mention has been made of the difficulties that beset the occupation of Kamchatka until the Okhotsk sea route was established. Even then the existence of unsubdued tribes to the north was a constant threat to peace, and when in 1727 Atanase Shestakof proposed that he be authorized to conquer the Anadyr country his petition was gladly granted. Providing himself with 1500 men and the necessary war material, Shestakof led his expedition from Russia to Siberia. After two years of preparation he went to Okhotsk, where he took over Bering's ships, the St. Gabriel and the Fortune, and built two others, the Eastern Gabriel and the Lion. After dividing his men into contingents
he himself set out for the Oliutora River, from whence he intended to go to the Anadyr. Near Penzhinsk Bay however he was attacked by the natives, and he and thirty of his men were killed.

**Gwosdef and Moshkof.** Command then fell on Dmitri Pavlutski, who on April 25, 1730, ordered Michael Gwosdef, then at Okhotsk, to bring men and provisions to Anadyrsk. It took Gwosdef two years to get to the lower Kamchatka, and in the spring of 1732 he received orders to take his vessel, the *St. Gabriel*, to the mouth of the Anadyr and from there to go in search of the Large Country, the name given Alaska by the natives from whom he was expected to levy tribute. These orders were carried out in the summer of 1732. The log book kept by Gwosdef and his assistant Moshkof was sent to Okhotsk, where it was given no attention, and the Admiralty College heard nothing of it until 1738. A complete account was finally forwarded in 1743, from which it seems clear that on August 20-21, 1732, Gwosdef's ship was off the coast of Alaska. But apparently none of the party was aware of their discovery, and this fact, coupled with the delay which their reports suffered in arriving at St. Petersburg, cost them the fame which should have been theirs.

**Deshnif.** It would seem however that they were no more unfortunate than a Cossack by the name of Deshnef who in 1662 at Yakutsk wrote an account for submission to the tsar in which he claimed that in 1648 he went from the Kolyma to the Anadyr by water; he therefore must have traversed Bering Strait, and presumably saw the shores of Alaska. He disappeared after 1655, and since no one was then interested in the matter his petitions to the tsar seem not to have left Yakutsk. In the middle of the eighteenth century the historian G. F. Muller, in a book based on manuscripts which he found in Siberia, made positive assertions that would give Deshnef the honor of having preceded Bering into the North Pacific. In 1890 a Russian archivist published four of Deshnef's petitions to the tsar in which he recorded his long service and hardships and begged that his efforts be rewarded. From these documents Muller and his followers have concluded that Deshnef's name should rank alongside those of Captain Cook and Sir John Franklin.

Whether there is any truth in the Deshnef claims is beyond the province of this book to consider; what really counts is that Bering on his second voyage achieved his goal.
An uncivilized Eskimo family. The Eskimos of Alaska, both civilized and uncivilized, are striking examples of the ability of man to adapt himself to his geographical environment.

7. BERING'S SECOND EXPEDITION TO THE NORTH PACIFIC

Preparation. Despite the indignities which Bering suffered for the so-called failure of his first expedition he had some influential friends at court and the good will of a number of young and enthusiastic scientists, who had come to Russia at the invitation of Peter the Great. These scientists especially favored Bering's being given a second chance. As a result his proposals for the development of Siberia and the exploration of the American coast finally were given a hearing and in March 1733 were granted. Then began one of the largest and most complete expeditions of discovery ever attempted. In fact so huge were the preparations that although the first division started for Okhotsk in February 1733 it was not until 1740 that all the necessary supplies found their way to the Pacific. Not until June 1741 were the St. Peter commanded by Bering and the St. Paul commanded by Chirikoff ready to sail from Petropavlovsk, the port which Bering had built at Avatcha Bay in southeast Kamchatka when preparing for his first expedition.
The voyage of the St. Paul. At length however after eight years of preparation everything was ready and on June 4, 1741, the much-prayed-for fair wind took the little ships out of the bay. It was originally planned that the two ships should keep together, but on the 20th they became separated. Chirikoff in the St. Paul continued to sail to the northeast, and on the morning of July 15 sighted land in about latitude 55° 21'. For ten days he explored the islands and bays as far north as 58° 21'. At length after having lost all his small boats, whether from attacks by natives or treacherous currents is not known, he decided to return home, and on July 26 started for Kamchatka. He arrived on October 8, having lost twenty-one men. The following summer he went on an unsuccessful search for Bering, during which he touched at some of the eastern Aleutian Islands.

The voyage of the St. Peter. After his separation from Chirikoff, Bering spent several days trying to resume contact. Finally on June 25 he gave it up and ordered an east-by-north course. Day after day he and his men sailed with no land in sight, until on July 15 one of the scientists caught a brief glimpse of what appeared to be a coastline. The following day, in latitude 58° 28', snow-covered mountains loomed in view. On the 20th a landing was made, but to the disgust of the expedition's scientists, Bering insisted on starting for home the next day. The commander's fears that the advancing season would render difficult the return to Kamchatka proved only too well grounded. For three and a half months the St. Peter wandered in unceasing fog and rains among the many small islands. Water gave out and scurvy raged among the officers and crew. Finally on November 5 a little island (since known as Bering or Commander's Island) was reached, and the next day a heavy surf cast the ship ashore. The landing had been attempted against the advice of Bering, who insisted that they were within reach of Kamchatka. After a horrible winter during which Bering himself died, the survivors the following spring succeeded in making a small boat in which on August 27, 1742, they reached Petropavlovsk.

Fortunate it was perhaps that Bering did not survive his second voyage, for once again he had failed to answer definitely the question of the separation of Asia and North America. It was left for Captain Cook a half century later to clarify the question of the width of Bering Strait and for Baron Wrangell, another fifty years in the future, to prove that the continents were separate.
8. The Swarming of the Promyshleniki

The beginning of Russian fur trade in America. Because Russia kept Bering’s reports secret, there was read before the Academy in Paris in 1750 a scholarly paper proving that he had not reached America. Although the scientific side of Bering’s voyages was thus not all that had been hoped for, there can be no doubt of their economic importance. During the winter on Commander’s Island, Bering’s men killed a great number of sea otter whose skins with other pelts provided them with clothing. When the bedraggled castaways arrived at Kamchatka, they were greatly surprised to find that their makeshift attire created a sensation among Chinese merchants, who offered fabulous prices for their furry garments.

Unregulated trade. Immediately interest was aroused in the fur-trading possibilities of the newly discovered land, and without waiting for authorization from the tsar, traders scurried from Kamchatka to the Commander and Aleutian Islands. From 1743 to 1767 this fur trade was quite unregulated, and although it laid the foundations for the settlement of Alaska, the atrocities committed by the Russian fur traders or promyshleniki make a sorry tale. It is hard to decide which suffered most, the natives or the animals; they were treated with equal indifference. At first the Aleuts, who did the actual hunting, were willing to serve for slight pay, but later they had to be encouraged with vodka or threatened with beating. Soon a more refined form of persuasion was used, such as seizing their women and keeping them as hostages until they were redeemed with pelts. On one occasion a ship full of these wretches was blown back to Kamchatka, and rather than come into port with such incriminating evidence, the Russians unceremoniously dumped the women overboard to drown.

Licensed trading. By the middle 1760’s the natives were sufficiently aroused to attempt retaliation. Furthermore the Russian traders themselves were not averse to preying upon each other. And finally the Moscow officials came to realize that a trade as profitable as the North Pacific fur trade was turning out to be should be taxed for the benefit of the state. As a result the tsar decided that unregulated hunting should cease. Henceforth traders must secure licenses and pay certain duties. A governor was sent out for the express purpose of regulating the trade, his efforts however were only partly successful. The Aleuts received but meager protection, and the tsar’s revenues were not augmented to the extent anticipated.
Eskimos in Alaska still use primitive methods to drill ivory artifacts, which today are sold chiefly to tourists.

9. The Beginning of Colonization

Sishikof. The effort at regulation did however have one important effect — it helped to get the fur trade out of the hands of the small traders and put it under the control of a few large operators. Of these the most important was a Siberian merchant, Gregor Shelikof. In 1783 he headed an expedition of over 200 men which settled on the island of Kodiak and soon after spread over a large portion of western Alaska. Trading stations were established at strategic points such as Cook's Inlet and Prince William Sound.

Having founded his trading company, Shelikof returned to Russia to secure monopoly privileges. Catherine the Great was favorable to this scheme because government regulation had failed to halt abuses
and because she felt that the new system would better protect Russia's commercial and national interests. After much deliberation, Shelikof was granted exclusive control of all Alaska and the surrounding islands. Migration then started, with the result that into the discard went the old motto of the promyshleniki: "Life is good and the tsar is far away."

10. The Russian-American Fur Company

Under the monopoly grant independent traders still had a chance in the area not controlled by the company. But as the company increased in power and enlarged its organization the open areas decreased in number. Bitter fights resulted between free traders and representatives of the company, with the result that the government was finally converted to the advisability of establishing a corporation similar to the Hudson's Bay Company. This was made easier because some of Shelikof's company were of the nobility, and they provided the necessary "pull" to get the charter of the Russian-American Fur Company ratified.

The new firm began operations in 1799 under a charter which granted it a monopoly of the fur trade for twenty years. The geographical limits of its domains extended from Bering Strait to the fifty-fifth parallel on the American coast, and included the Aleutian, Kuril, and other islands in the North Pacific. The company was supposed to make new discoveries and occupy such land as was suitable. Its political control was ample, but contingent upon its maintaining missionaries of the Greek Catholic Church and encouraging agriculture and industry.

Under the company's rule conditions in Alaska improved, especially during the "reign" of the great governor Alexander Baranov. The company's charter was renewed from time to time, and until 1866 it was the ruling power in Russian America.

Conclusion. With the rise of the Russian-American Fur Company the story of the Russian advance to the Pacific may well close. Thanks to the Muscovites' expansionist activities, by the end of the seventeenth century one more portion of the Pacific rim had been brought under European influence. Spain in the sixteenth century had established herself in America; Holland in the seventeenth century had acquired predominance in the South Seas; and in the eighteenth century Russia was in complete control of Siberia and Alaska. Her hold on her American possessions was tenuous however; the next chapter will show how she came in conflict not only with Spain but also with England and with the newly created United States, and how eventually she was forced back again into Siberia.
The Contest for the Northeastern Pacific

(The Nineteenth Century)

Introduction. For two and a half centuries, Spain succeeded in making a Spanish lake out of the eastern half of Balboa's "South Seas." Except for the occasional intrusions of English seadogs and Dutch pachlingues, the Manila galleon placidly made its annual voyage back and forth between the Philippine Islands and New Spain, while Spanish civilization spread slowly northwestward from central Mexico into Lower California and the southern portions of Arizona and New Mexico. Southward from Panama, Spain ruled supreme. New Granada, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile all were dominated by the lions of Castile. Bold indeed would have been the man who in 1750 would have dared to predict that in seventy-five years Spain's American empire would consist only of the "ever-faithful isle" (Cuba) and its small neighbor, Puerto Rico. But in the breakup of the Spanish Empire this account is not interested except as that breakup affected the Pacific Area. Our concern here is with Spain's failure to maintain its monopoly of the North Pacific, and the consequent rivalry which developed among the nations who desired to be her successor.

1. The Origin of the Contest

Spain learns of the Russian threat. The first break in Spain's dominion over Pacific America came when, as told in the previous chapter, Russian fur traders followed Bering into the northeastern Pacific. Although Russian colonization in North America did not begin until the close of the eighteenth century (Kodiak Island was occupied in 1784, and the
Russian-American Fur Company established headquarters at Sitka in 1799), within two decades after the swarming of the promyshleniki, Russian activities gave concern to Spain. As early as 1767 the Spanish ambassador at St. Petersburg sent to Madrid an account of Russia's poaching on Spanish preserves, and from that time on the Castilian monarch never lost sight of the possibility of encroachment on his territory by subjects of the tsar.

To residents of California the Spanish ambassador's report of 1767 is of special importance, for it, coupled with the desire of José de Gálvez to make himself famous, led to the well-known Portolá expedition and to the first settlement of Europeans in the "Bear Flag State." Unfortunately it is not possible here to recount the romantic story of Spanish California and the building under the leadership of Fathers Junípero Serra and Fermín Lasuén of that remarkable chain of Franciscan missions which eventually dominated the landscape from San Diego to Sonoma. The significant point is that Spain decided to set up a defense against Russian expansion in the northwestern Pacific and in so doing colonized California.

Pérez. For a time it seemed that Spain had become unduly alarmed, and Portolá's negative report as to the presence of Russians in California was confirmed by two subsequent expeditions. The first was led by Juan Pérez, the maritime head of the California expeditions, who in 1774 was commissioned to explore the Pacific coast north of California in search of Muscovites. His instructions were to go as far as latitude 60° (opposite Mount St. Elias) and, after charting the coast and finding strategic positions for future settlement, to take possession of all this territory in the name of the Spanish crown. Pérez set forth from Monterey June 11, 1774 in the Santiago. He sailed to a point somewhere in the neighborhood of 54° (not far from Prince Rupert), and made the first authentic discovery of any part of the coast north of 42° (the northern boundary of California) and south of Alaska. He found no Russian settlements, but neither did he prove that they did not exist.

Heecea and Bodega. The Spanish government, however, was still dissatisfied, and in 1775 the Santiago again sailed north, this time with Pérez as second in command under Bruno Heecea. Accompanying her on this voyage was the schooner Sonora, under the command of Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Cuadra. The Santiago and Sonora sailed from San Blas in Mexico, and without stopping in Alta California went to the Far Northwest. Shortly after leaving Mexico the two ships became separated, and did not meet again until they came together at Monterey
on the return voyage. Heceta went as far north as 49°, somewhere near Juan de Fuca Strait. His reports indicate that he discovered the Columbia River, thereby antedating Gray's claims to its discovery. Sickness in his crew forced him to return to Monterey. Bodega, in the tiny Sonora, sailed almost to 58° (approximately the Baranof Islands), and took possession of more new territory in the name of Spain. He also was forced to return because of the illness of his crew. On the return to Mexico of Heceta and Bodega, their voyages were pronounced successful, because in addition to adding a new domain to the Spanish crown, they had found no evidence of Russian exploration or occupation.

The British threat. Accordingly, then, in the decade immediately following the occupation of California, Spain was able to relax her vigilance and to cease worrying about the Russian threat. And yet, at that very time, unknown to her, events were taking place which were to give her in the North Pacific an even more dangerous rival than Russia. This rival was Great Britain, and the seriousness of the latter's competition lay in her double approach to Oregon and Alaska.

The Hudson's Bay Company. England's first penetration into this area was from the east, and was the result of the activities of the Hudson's Bay Company. Under the charter which the company was given in 1670 it had a monopoly of the fur trade in the regions adjacent to Hudson Bay, and in return therefor it accepted the obligation to search for "a passage into the South Sea." During the next century, however, the directors showed much interest in trade but little in discovery; in short, they exercised their privileges but neglected their obligations. As time went on this policy elicited much adverse criticism, especially on the part of one Arthur Dobbs, who sought a charter to trade and explore in these regions and based his claim on the ground that the Hudson's Bay Company was not living up to its agreements. As a result, in 1769 the company sent Samuel Hearne to explore northwestern Canada. His instructions were to reach a certain river reported to abound in copper ore and fur-bearing animals. After several unsuccessful attempts, he finally reached the Coppermine, and in 1771 descended to its mouth in the Arctic Ocean. Because of Hearne's discoveries, the company decided to extend its trading operations throughout the interior, and thereby started a westward movement which inevitably brought the English into conflict with the Spanish.

Captain Cook. England's second penetration was from the sea, in the person of Captain James Cook. After two successful voyages to the
Captain James Cook (1728-1779), by his discovery of the fact that lime and potato juice are effective anti-scourbutics, helped make it possible for British sailors to avoid the scurvy as they carried the Union Jack "from Greenland's icy mountains to India's coral strand."

South Seas (an account of which will be given in the next chapter) he sailed on July 12, 1776, to find the Northwest Passage. From England he reached the Pacific by way of the Cape of Good Hope. The following year he spent in the South Pacific, and early in 1778 he discovered the Sandwich Islands, which he named after his financial backer, the Earl of Sandwich. In March 1778 Cook reached the Oregon coast at about 43°. Proceeding northward he missed both the Columbia River
and Juan de Fuca Strait, and became convinced that no passage was to be found in those latitudes. He then entered Nootka Sound, where he landed and spent a month trading with the natives. Here he secured some 1500 sea otter pelts in return for trade goods of trifling value. From Vancouver Island north he made an almost continuous running survey of the coast as far as Bering Strait, through which he passed only to be stopped by an impenetrable ice barrier. Reasonably convinced that no Northwest Passage existed, he returned by way of Kamchatka to the Hawaiian Islands. While wintering here he was killed by warlike natives on February 14, 1779. The expedition, now under the command of Captain Clerke, made a second passage through Bering Strait, but again the ice-barrier proved too formidable. Accordingly, the search for the Northwest Passage was given up, and Clerke made his way back around the world to England.

*English "Promyshleniki."* The chief significance of this so-called "third" or Northwest Passage expedition of Captain Cook lay in the fact that it caused a rush of English traders and trappers into the North Pacific. The companions of Cook on their way home stopped at Canton, China, where they sold their pelts for such great profit that only with difficulty did Clerke succeed in getting his men to complete their voyage. "Skins which did not cost the purchaser six pence sterling sold . . . for one hundred dollars." An English captain, Hanna, who was at Canton when Clerke stopped there, was the first to follow Cook into the fur country. His monopoly was short-lived, however, for immediately following Clerke's return home English interest in the North Pacific was aroused. The possibilities of big profits in the fur trade were obviously great, and during the next two years Meares, Barclay, Dixon, and many other Britishers joined in the search for the northeastern Pacific's "Golden Fleece."

2. Spain's Failure to Hold Her Monopoly

The discovery by the English of the fur-trade possibilities of the North Pacific was a mortal blow to Spain's attempt to monopolize that area. Against Russia alone she might have been able to hold on, but England's appearance made retreat inevitable.

*Spain discovers the Russian.* Spain did not, however, surrender immediately. In 1779 Bodega and Arteaga again were sent to the North Pacific, and the latter reached latitude 65°. This voyage, inspired possibly by reports of Cook's presence in the Oregon country, gave the
Spanish further geographical knowledge, helped to validate Spain's claim to the entire coast, and above all, since no Russians were met, allayed Spanish fears. Only for the time being however did Spanish authorities have peace. In 1786 the great French navigator La Pérouse touched at Monterey. This visit is known best because from it came an excellent contemporary description of Spanish California; in this discussion it is important because the Frenchman's reports of Russian posts in the Far North forced Spain to renew her efforts to find the intruders. This time, to her dismay, she was successful. In 1788 Esteban
José Martínez and Gonzalo López de Haro were sent to the north and discovered both Russians and English; the latter, they learned, were planning to occupy Nootka Sound.

The Nootka Sound episode. This news was indeed ominous, and Spain took immediate action. In 1789 Martínez was sent in a naval vessel to Nootka Sound, where he proceeded to destroy Meares’s trading post. He followed this seizure by building a Spanish fort and capturing several English trading vessels. One of the more recalcitrant English officers, a Captain Colnett, he sent in one of the confiscated ships to Mexico for trial.

From Spain’s point of view, since she claimed sovereignty over the whole of the North Pacific, Martínez’ action was quite justifiable. But while Martínez’ frigate was more than a match for all the English trading schooners at Nootka Sound, in Europe England’s power far exceeded Spain’s. Furthermore, even though as will be remembered England did on one occasion (the Massacre of Amboyna) fail to avenge the murder of her citizens overseas, Spain’s open season on Englishmen had been definitely closed with the defeat of the Spanish Armada. Accordingly when word came through Spanish diplomatic channels of the seizure of the English ships and trading post and of the insult to the Union Jack, a great hue and cry was raised in the “tight little isle.” Responding to public opinion, the English government demanded restitution of the ships, surrender of the fort, and compensation to Meares, Colnett, Douglass, and others for the damages they had sustained.

The Nootka Sound Treaty. In Spain these demands appeared excessive, for Martínez had only done his duty, and surely it was proper for a nation to repel invaders. In fact some impulsive hidalgos clamored for war against England rather than concede to her “outrageous” demands. The Spanish government however was in no position to fight, for her lone supporter in Europe, France, was in the throes of the Revolution. Consequently, despite protests that her national honor was being disgraced, she yielded to English demands and in 1790 accepted the Nootka Sound Treaty. By it Spain agreed to let others trade north of the occupied portions of the Pacific coast (which meant north of San Francisco), to restore Meares’s fort, and to compensate the traders for their losses. The only quid pro quo Spain got was England’s agreement not to trade south of the actual northern frontier of Spain on the Pacific coast.

The second Nootka Sound Treaty. The restoration of Meares’s fort in 1792 was not accomplished without considerable difficulty. Martínez and Captain Vancouver argued violently over terms, with the result
that a second Nootka Treaty was drawn up in 1794. This "Convention for the Mutual Abandonment of Nootka" provided that neither Spain nor England would maintain fortified posts or permanent establishments in the region where the intense friction had arisen.

This second Nootka Treaty ended Spain's attempts at a monopoly of the North Pacific. From that time on she tried no more to maintain inviolate what had been for 250 years a Spanish lake.

3. The Entrance of the United States into the North Pacific

_Causes._ Russia and England however were not to be the only ones to enjoy the fur trade of the North Pacific. In 1776 was fired "the shot heard round the world," and although Spain might have thought it was a salute in honor of the foundation of San Francisco, the fact was that it marked the beginning of a nation whose establishment was to be the biggest single factor in the downfall of the Spanish Empire. Out of the American Revolutionary War emerged the United States, a union of thirteen British colonies which had become disgruntled with the mother country's navigation acts. Much to their disgust they found that the Treaty of Paris of 1783, while it gave them political freedom from England, did not however break the economic chains which bound them to their late oppressor. Consequently they soon learned that if they were to profit from being outside the British Empire it was necessary that they find new channels of trade. This with typical Yankee ingenuity they proceeded to do.

_John Ledyard._ Even before the American Revolution broke out, reports of the possibilities of oriental trade had begun to circulate in New England, and contemporaneously with the Treaty of Paris there appeared in Boston a fervent evangel spreading good news of Far Eastern commerce. This propagandist was John Ledyard of Hartford, Connecticut. A corporal under Captain Cook during the latter's expeditions to the Pacific, when he left home Ledyard had been a British subject, but returned to find himself an American. Full of enthusiasm over his new citizenship, he determined that the United States should get a share of the rich fur trade. In 1783 he published an account of his experiences on the northwest coast of North America, and told of the great profits obtained at Canton from the sale of American pelts. Following his literary venture he tried to get Boston businessmen to finance an expedition to California and the Pacific coast. At first he failed, for his extravagant ideas were looked at askance.
American trade starts. Eventually however his enthusiasm penetrated American consciousness, and interest was aroused in the North Pacific. Curiously enough though, silks and spices again were the lure which brought the Westerners to the Orient, and United States traffic in North Pacific furs actually developed as a sort of by-product of the China trade. For this trade Canton was the starting point for the Americans as well as the English. To Canton in 1784 came the Empress of China, the New York vessel which has come down in history as having started United States trade with Cathay. Its initial voyage was successful, but it nevertheless served to demonstrate that at the beginning there was an almost insuperable barrier to any great growth of this trade. The thirteen states of the new republic produced little that the Chinese wanted; consequently Yankee traders were forced to pay specie for most of the oriental goods they wanted. Unfortunately there was not enough precious metal in the United States to take care of local needs, much less to provide a surplus for foreign trade. Accordingly it was clear that the sine qua non of the China trade was a commodity or commodities that the Americans could obtain in exchange for their own products and that in turn were sought after by the Chinese.

Kendrick and Gray. Of all possible commodities, there were perhaps none as well adapted to the China trade of the early days as furs. The desire of the Chinese for warm pelts has already been mentioned, and it was not long before Yankee traders saw that in Ledyard’s North Pacific was the apex of an extremely profitable triangular trade. The idea of trade connections among the United States, the North Pacific, and China was first successfully carried out in 1787, when Joseph Barrell of Boston sent out the Columbia and Lady Washington under the command of John Kendrick and Robert Gray respectively. They arrived in the fur country by way of Cape Horn after a voyage of nearly a year. In September 1788 they reached Nootka Sound, and wintered there after spending some weeks in trading along the Oregon coast. After having collected many valuable pelts, Gray sailed in the Columbia for China. He sold his furs at Canton, filled his ship with tea, and returned to the United States by way of the Cape of Good Hope in 1790, being thereby the first man to carry the American flag around the world. Incidentally, this voyage was the first of a long series of maritime exploits which were to make American vessels famous in all parts of the globe.

The discovery of the Columbia. In September 1790 Gray was again sent to the North Pacific. On June 3, 1791, he reached Clayoquot on Vancouver Island, southeast of Nootka Sound. The rest of the summer
was spent in trading, and the winter was passed at Clayoquot. In April 1792 Gray set forth in quest of more pelts, and on May 11 he crossed the bar at the entrance of a great river which he named the Columbia. From May 11 to 19 he traded with the natives, sailing up the river for several miles. On May 20 he recrossed the bar and started for home. A few hours out of the river he encountered Vancouver, who was much chagrined to learn that a Yankee trader had definitely put the Columbia on the map and that he himself had thereby lost a great opportunity to strengthen Britain's pretensions to the Oregon territory. As it turned out later, Gray's discovery greatly aided the United States in her claim to sovereignty over Oregon.

American North Pacific trade. Americans discovered after a short time that the richest sources of pelts had been worked out by the Russians, and that the actual gathering of the furs took much time. The Russians, while they knew how to handle the natives and force them to gather pelts for them, were far from their home base and lacked many of the necessities of life. As a result the Yankees entered into a combination with the Muscovites of Alaska. The New Englanders exchanged food and supplies for furs; in turn they sold furs at Canton for oriental goods, thus accumulating huge profits in a triangular trade. If they could not obtain a full cargo of furs in one trading season, they went to the Hawaiian Islands, and after a carefree winter on the beach at Waikiki returned to Alaska, completed their cargoes, and then sailed for China. When the sea otter became scarce seals took their place, and when seals in turn became hard to get in the north the Boston ships engaged in trade with California. As long as Mexico was a part of the Spanish Empire, this trade was of course illicit, but after 1821, when Mexico secured its independence, legal barriers were removed. Here too the seals were gradually killed off, but trade continued, for the cattle of California produced hides and tallow, while occasionally American trappers from the Rockies and Sierras brought beaver skins to the California coasts.

Astor. In fact at one time it looked as if a vast combination of sea and land fur trade might develop, for John Jacob Astor of New York dreamed a mighty dream. Toward the close of the Napoleonic period, when American trade in Europe was suffering the customary fate of neutrals, he planned a line of fur trading posts from the Mississippi along the Missouri and Columbia rivers to the Pacific coast, together with a fleet of vessels to supplement the land operations. In 1811 he succeeded in establishing the post of Astoria; but it was abandoned in
1813 when to prevent its capture by a British naval vessel it was sold to the North West Company.

4. Anglo-American Conflict for the Oregon Country

Aside from marking the end of Astor’s grandiose scheme, the acquisition of Astoria by the English was significant because it brought clearly into view the conflict then under way between England and the United States for the possession of what became known as the Oregon Country. After the Nootka Sound Treaty Spain held the coast as far north as San Francisco Bay while Russia was in control as far south as the Alexander Archipelago. Between was a vast expanse of country which both Russia and Spain wanted but which neither had the power to occupy and which neither was destined to possess. After half a century of conflict it was eventually to be divided between the two English-speaking aspirants.

England’s claims. England obtained her chief claim to the Oregon territory through the discoveries of Sir George Vancouver, who as mentioned above was sent out in 1792 to take over Nootka Fort. Because of disagreement as to the terms of the treaty, Vancouver sailed away without actually having received the fort, but while he was in this region (from 1792 to 1795) he took the opportunity to explore far and wide. Most of the Northwest’s geographical names like Vancouver Island and Puget Sound were bestowed by him, and his charts of the coast from Alaska to California were so accurate that they are still in use today.

England’s claims were further strengthened by overland explorers and travelers. In 1793 Alexander Mackenzie, working for the North West Company, reached the Pacific. In 1789 he had left his headquarters on the Peace River, and setting out for the Pacific had explored to its mouth the great river which today bears his name, but which of course does not reach the Pacific. Three years later on a second exploring expedition he ascended the Peace River, crossed the Rocky Mountains, followed the Fraser River (which he thought was the Columbia) for some distance, and then struck overland to the Pacific, which he reached near Cape Menvies. Despite this achievement he was greatly disappointed, for he had not discovered the Columbia. When he returned to Europe he wrote an account of his explorations, and this book was a prime factor in persuading the British of the value of the Northwest fur trade.

The United States’ claims. But before England could establish a
monopoly in the Oregon country, the United States had secured claims of equal value. As mentioned above, Gray was the first European as well as the first American to enter the Columbia River, though his title to being its discoverer is clouded by the fact that its existence had previously been recorded by Spanish mariners. During the following decade New England traders were present on the coast in increasing numbers, and then with the turn of the century the vision of Thomas Jefferson gave the United States a further claim to the region "where rolls the mighty Oregon." Before the Louisiana Purchase the curiosity of Jefferson, whetted by his contacts with John Ledyard, had determined him to explore the country west of the Mississippi; hence it can be easily understood that when the greatest real estate transaction of all times had been completed the Lewis and Clark expedition was inevitable. Preparations for it were made in the summer and fall of 1803, and in May 1804 the ascent of the Missouri River was begun. After many hardships and exciting episodes, in November 1805 the two explorers reached the Pacific Ocean. Here in the most humid section of the Oregon coast Lewis and Clark spent the winter. Early in the spring of 1806 they began the return journey, and on September 23, 1806, the whole party entered St. Louis. The results of this expedition were highly significant. By it Lewis and Clark opened a practical route across the continent, established a strong United States claim to the valley of the Columbia, and started a westward movement which ultimately was to carry the customs and institutions of the United States across the great plains and over the rocky plateau until it gave the nation a frontage on the Pacific slope similar to the one it had already on the Atlantic.

Renewed English activities: (7) Fraser. The English were not unaware of the possible consequences of the Lewis and Clark expedition, and almost immediately upon learning of it the North West Company decided to follow up Mackenzie’s explorations; Simon Fraser was chosen for the task. He completed the descent of the river which today bears his name and thereby was probably more responsible than any other one man for the inauguration of English fur trade on the Pacific coast. From 1806 to 1808 he established so many Scotch trading posts in what is known today as British Columbia that for many years the Fraser River country was known as New Caledonia. In fact so great was English activity that it seemed more than likely that the Columbia River region also would fall into their hands.

(2) Thompson. This possibility was strengthened by the famous
trader-explorer David Thompson, who finally succeeded in doing what both Mackenzie and Fraser had failed to do, namely, discovering the headwaters of the Columbia. Thompson was a rather remarkable person. Formerly an employee of the Hudson's Bay Company, he had resigned when refused an opportunity to explore, and his connection with the North West Company was maintained only because it gave him a chance to indulge his "yen" for ornithology and geographical observation. In 1805 he crossed the Rocky Mountains to the upper Columbia, just failing to meet Lewis and Clark. For the next five years he traveled hither and yon among the tributaries of the Mackenzie, Fraser, and Columbia rivers, until in 1811 he was ordered to the mouth of the Columbia. Obeying instructions, he started leisurely down the river, and at the mouth of the Snake he erected a pole announcing that he had taken possession of that region for his company and his king. One can imagine his chagrin when he finally reached the mouth of the Columbia only to find that the Astorians had already arrived there. To him however went the honor of being the first white man to run the entire course of the Columbia.

The Pacific Fur Company. The failure of the North West Company to monopolize the Columbia valley was due to the already-mentioned scheme of John Jacob Astor. Astor's plan aimed to combine the fur trade of the Rockies with that of the Pacific coast, and its success hinged upon the control of the Columbia River valley. To secure this control he sent two expeditions to the Oregon country. In 1810 he dispatched the Tonquin, commanded by Captain Jonathan Thorn, who arrived at the mouth of the Columbia early in 1811. After much difficulty the little vessel crossed the bar and went a small distance up the river. While waiting for the overland expedition Thorn and his men explored the country and built a post on Point George, which in honor of their employer was called Astoria. On June 1, 1811, Thorn set out on a trading voyage which met disaster at Clayoquot on Vancouver Island. A surprise attack by natives resulted in the massacre of all but five of the crew, and four of these were killed while attempting to reach Astoria. The fifth, who on account of wounds had remained on board the Tonquin, waited till the ship was crowded with natives and then, making his way to the powder magazine, emulated Samson by destroying himself and hundreds of his enemies.

The overland expedition left New York in July 1810. After terrible hardships, innumerable privations, and several deaths, the decimated party finally straggled into Astoria in February 1812. Shortly after,
in May, the second ship sent out by Astor, the Beaver, anchored in the river. She brought an abundant cargo, with clerks, employees, and a number of Sandwich Islanders. Plans were made for opening trade with the Russians by sea and for extending the trade into the interior. In fact, despite the destruction of the Tonquin and the difficulties endured by the overland expedition, the success of the enterprise seemed assured. But all was changed by the outbreak of the War of 1812, news of which reached Astoria early in 1813. Since the little post was at the mercy of the English fleet, Astor's representative in October accepted an offer from an agent of the North West Company to purchase Astor's posts, furs, trade goods, trading rights, and good will at about a third of their value. Although Astor later fumed at Duncan McDougall's act there really was no alternative; in fact a month afterward a British naval vessel appeared on the scene, and its officers registered no small chagrin because the sale had robbed them of the rich prize of furs they had counted on as a reward for their long voyage. But it mattered little whether or not Astor was robbed by his own men, for the sale of Astoria ended his enterprise and put the English in the lead in the struggle for the control of the Oregon area.

5. England and the United States Divide the Northeast Pacific

This lead however was not long held by England. At the end of the war the Treaty of Ghent decreed that all captured possessions should be returned. Astor at once put in a claim for Astoria, and after some haggling England agreed to construe the phrase broadly and return the post because the captain of H.M.S. Raccoon had taken possession of it. The ceremony of return was, of course, an empty formality, but it served to revive American claims to Oregon—claims which increased in strength yearly with the predominance which American ships came to have in the fur trade.

Spain quits. Coupled with the pre-eminence of American traders was the gradual recognition by Spain that her days in the North Pacific were numbered. Rebellious activities in her American colonies finally convinced the Iberian ruler that it would be impossible for Spain to retain control of California, much less of Oregon. Consequently in the Treaty of 1819, when Spain ceded Florida to the United States, she also gave the States all her claims to the Pacific coast north of California.

The Russian advance. This act came at a very opportune moment for the United States, because for some time the Russians under the able
Alexander Baranov had been extending their influence southward from Alaska. This Muscovite interest in the Oregon country and California was not however due merely to a desire for more territory, but to a very great degree was based on necessity. As mentioned above, the problem of providing Alaska with food supplies was at all times very difficult. Accordingly, when in 1805 Nikolai Rezanof arrived at Sitka on a tour of inspection and found the little settlement threatened with starvation and suffering from scurvy, it was only natural that he should consider California, already known for its fur possibilities, as possibly a permanent source of supplies. In the spring of 1806, therefore, Rezanof himself came to California to purchase supplies and incidentally to investigate colonizing opportunities. On April 5 he entered San Francisco Harbor. At first the Russians and Spanish had a great deal of difficulty conversing with one another, but finally this obstacle was surmounted when it was found that both engineer Langsdorff and Father Uria were familiar with Latin. A second barrier was the Spanish law, which forbade any trade with foreigners, but in a short time Rezanof, by enlisting the aid of Concepción Argüello, daughter of the San Francisco commander, was able to obtain his supplies. The whirlwind romance between the tsar’s chamberlain and Doña Concepción is perhaps the most famous of all California love stories. Whether Rezanof’s love was genuine has always been open to controversy, but at any rate he secured a full cargo of foodstuffs and on May 21 sailed to succor Sitka. From Sitka he returned to Kamchatka, and started across Siberia to report to the tsar and presumably to seek permission to marry his California love. At Yakutsk unfortunately he was stricken with a fatal illness; and to assuage her disappointment Doña Concepción became a nun.

**Fort Ross.** The nonconsummation of Rezanof’s love affair however had no effect on the Russian-American Fur Company. Besides a cargo of supplies Rezanof carried to Alaska a very enthusiastic description of California. This report led Baranov in 1808 to send two ships south. One was lost off the mouth of the Columbia, but the other arrived at Bodega Bay, where for eight months Captain Kuskoff traded and hunted furs. Three years later he returned to the bay region, where he bought from the natives a site for a trading post for which he paid three blankets, two axes, three hoes, and a miscellaneous assortment of beads. The following year he returned with a hundred Russians and eighty Aleuts, with whom he established Fort Ross a short distance north of Bodega Bay. Though severe hardships marked the first years of its existence, within a decade Fort Ross achieved prosperity. Agriculture and stock
raising flourished so that it was possible to send supplies from California to Sitka and thus assure its survival. At length, since the tsar had become alarmed at the growing interest of other nations in the North Pacific (the Hudson’s Bay Company had sent an expedition to Hawaii in 1815), he decided to rid Alaska of foreign danger; and in 1821 he issued an edict (ukase) declaring that the whole west coast of America north of the fifty-first parallel was reserved exclusively for the Russians, and foreigners were forbidden under heavy penalties from approaching within a hundred miles of the coast.

The Monroe Doctrine. In February 1822 the Russian decree was forwarded to the United States. Naturally it brought a prompt note of surprise from the American Secretary of State, who wanted to know on what grounds Russia claimed so much of the North American continent. In the discussion that followed, Secretary Adams discovered that Russia really felt entitled to all the territory as far south as the forty-ninth parallel. Adams of course denied this claim and insisted that since the charter of the Russian-American Fur Company indicated the fifty-fifth parallel as the southern limit of Russian claims it should continue to be the boundary. Negotiations went on through 1823. In December of that year President Monroe embodied in his message to Congress certain phrases which Adams had used in his discussions with Russia. One of them declared that "the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent conditions which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered subjects for colonization by any European power" — the far-famed Monroe Doctrine. The determined attitude of the United States caused Russia to weaken, with the result that on April 5, 1824, a treaty was signed at St. Petersburg leaving the North Pacific open to the fishing and trading of the citizens of both countries. At the same time colonizing activities were to be kept separated, with the parallel of 54° 40’ serving as the boundary.

The joint occupation of Oregon. With the Russian advance stopped, England and America were at liberty once more to resume their rivalry for possession of the area between Alaska and California. As mentioned above the Treaty of Ghent had provided for the mutual return of captured territories, but it had left unsettled among many other things the boundary between the United States and Canada west of the Lake of the Woods. In 1818 a joint commission tackled this problem. Little difficulty was encountered in agreeing on the forty-ninth parallel as far
The entrance to Siska National Park is marked by two enormous Totem Poles.
west as the Rockies, but accord could not be reached on Oregon. It was finally determined therefore that all territories and their waters claimed by either nation west of the mountains should be open to the subjects of both for a period of ten years.

At the time the treaty was signed and for the next decade it seemed that joint occupation really meant that the entire Northwest was destined to become a part of the British Empire. The Hudson's Bay Company, which in 1811 absorbed the old North West Company, spent large sums of money in its efforts to found trading posts along the rivers and to extend its influence over the Indians of the surrounding territory. In fact its success under the leadership of Doctor John McLoughlin, who ruled Oregon from 1824 to 1846, was so marked that when in 1828 the Treaty of 1818 was extended and continued in force only a presumptuous American would have dared venture the opinion that the Oregon country was not to be English.

The end of joint occupation. But the very completeness of the Hudson's Bay Company's monopoly was eventually to lead to England's failure to secure the whole region. The fur trade of course could exist only in relatively unoccupied areas; consequently the company did all in its power to discourage settlement. As far as Canadian settlers were concerned it was successful — even eastern Canada was but sparsely populated — but the traders could not stop the onrush of Americans, who in the late thirties and early forties were influenced by the spirit of "manifest destiny" to take the trail for Oregon.

The United States secures Oregon and California. In the meantime California had also come within the vision of the American people, who felt that it was only a matter of time until like Texas it too should fall like a ripe peach into the waiting hands of "Uncle Sam." When in 1844 that indomitable expansionist James K. Polk was elected president, the hand could be seen writing upon the wall. In his inaugural address Polk stated, "Our title to the country of Oregon is 'clear and unquestionable,' and already are our people preparing to perfect that title by occupying it with their wives and children." In April 1846 Congress gave the president the authority to notify England that at the end of one year the United States would lay claim to all of Oregon. For two months discussion between the representatives of the two countries was tense, but finally on June 15, 1846, Secretary Buchanan and Minister Pakenham signed a treaty that gave the United States all of Oregon south of the forty-ninth parallel. A month before, General Taylor had been ordered to cross the Sabine River into Texas in order to protect
it pending annexation. Then followed the Mexican War, which was concluded in 1848 by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and which gave the United States California and the rest of the so-called Mexican Cession.

Alaska. The last event in the contest for the Pacific coast of North America was the elimination of Russia. In 1818 the energetic manager of the Russian-American Fur Company, Alexander Baranov, died. By 1820 the sea otter had begun to disappear, and with its virtual elimination the importance of Alaska gradually diminished. Pronouncement of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, and the treaty signed with the United States in 1824, militated against any additional expansion south of 54° 40', and consequently in 1841 the Russian-American Fur Company disposed of Fort Ross to Captain Johann Sutter, thereby terminating Russian influence south of Alaska. In the meantime Alaska had gone from bad to worse; it was administered as an investment rather than as a colony. The company in its effort to preserve the fur trade had not only subordinated but had actually discouraged all other activities, with the consequence that the majority of Alaska's resources were completely neglected. When the fur trade approached exhaustion the Russians saw their one source of profit disappear. Quotations for the company's stock fell from 500 rubles in 1834 to seventy-five rubles in 1865. Not only had Alaska become an economic burden, but the tsar's government realized that it was impossible to defend it against either the English or the Americans. It was only natural then that when just after the Civil War Secretary William H. Seward proposed the purchase of Alaska Russia should accept. The story of the midnight treaty need not be told here; suffice it to say that on March 30, 1867, "Seward's Folly" and "Johnson's Polar-Bear Garden" became a part of the United States.

6. RESULTS

With the purchase of Alaska by the United States the contest for the control of the North Pacific area was concluded. Spain, the first European country to appear in these waters, never obtained a foothold north of the Philippines on the west, or north of California on the east. California she gave up in 1821, the Philippines in 1898. Russia secured the Siberian coast in the early 1600's, and a century later crossed to North America, where in Alaska she reigned supreme until 1867. By that time the United States had fallen heir to Alta California and had divided the Oregon country with Great Britain.
At the conclusion of the contest, Russia controlled the northwestern Pacific, while England and the United States ruled the northeastern part of that ocean. From the standpoint of the problems of the Pacific Area that division of power meant, first, that Japan presented the main obstacle to Russia's becoming the dominant factor in North Pacific Asia; second, that the United States became a Pacific power and established its interests on the western shores of North America against the time when it would spread farther west; and third, that with the planting of her flag on the Canadian Pacific, Great Britain helped to make more intricate the complications which were to become hers as a result of her widespread possessions in the Pacific Area.

Harbor of New Archangel in Sitka, with Russian fort at right. Recaptured from the Thlinket Indians in 1804, Sitka became thereafter the chief port, the seat of government, and the center of culture in Russia-America.
The Contest for the Southwestern Pacific

Introduction: The previous chapter has told the story of the contest among Spain, Russia, England, and the United States for predominance in the northeastern quadrant of the Pacific Hemisphere. The present chapter will tell of another conflict which simultaneously took place in the opposite quadrant of the Pacific Area. Between the two struggles the chief points of similarity were the time element, the significance of the part played in both by Captain James Cook, and the final dominance in each of Anglo-Saxon culture. In most other respects they were as antipodal as their geographical relationships. In the first place, the number of nations involved in the Southwest Pacific was greater, for Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, England, and even the United States all at one time or another were connected with Australasia. In the second place, whereas the fur trade gave immediate and early economic value to Alaska and Oregon, for many decades after it had been put on the map the country "down under" was considered worthless. From this fact came a third dissimilarity, namely, that in Australasia the contest was only to a small extent political in character; it was mainly a question as to which nation would first find something which would make it worth while to occupy the region. It was England that gradually took it over; and when finally in the latter half of the nineteenth century other European nations began hunting new places "in the sun," Britain's hold on her antipodes was so secure that no Nootka Sound Treaty or Monroe Doctrine was necessary to make her claims definite. As a result there was a fourth difference between the northeastern and southwestern Pacific areas: the latter was not divided among two nations but became in its entirety a part of the British Empire.
Stages of discovery. As has been indicated already, phrases such as the "discovery of America" lead to misconceptions, for they give the impression that some voyager merely drew aside the curtain and there stood revealed a new continent. The actual process of discovery, however, is very different. Some navigator blunders on one bit of the coast, another skirts a stretch of unknown shore, and gradually, after many mistakes, after many false starts, and after many extraordinary errors the true configuration of a new part of the earth's surface is discerned. Especially was this true in the case of Australia, so much so that one finds three fairly distinct phases in its emergence from the darkness of medieval oblivion.

Possible discovery. The first stage is the dawn of discovery, in other words a period in which historians consider it possible that Australia might have been known to some people outside the continent. Such a people of course were the Chinese, for Marco Polo, while in the service of the Great Khan, is supposed to have visited the East Indies; and although his description of the lands he visited bears little resemblance to Australia, his reference to "a Great Southland" indicates that the southern continent was not unknown to the people he visited. It is true there are no records now extant which show that the Chinese knew of Australia, but nevertheless their junks reached Java, Timor, and other adjacent islands. Furthermore it is known that in the Middle Ages the Moors invaded Java and penetrated as far eastward as New Guinea. Consequently it seems possible that Cathay knew of the fifth continent even before Europeans put it on the map.

The Portuguese. The first Europeans to be listed among the possible discoverers were the Portuguese. By the first decade of the fifteenth century they had reached the Moluccas, which are but a short distance from the "Terra Australis," and in 1511 Abrea touched the western tip of New Guinea. Just who was the first Portuguese to reach Australia is not known, but such there must have been in this early period, for Dutch, English, and French maps made between 1536 and 1555 indicate that it was more than a desire for symmetry which led to the insertion of a land then called "Java la Grande." The outlines of the northern coast of what must have been meant for Australia are too accurate to have been the result of sheer guess.

The French. It is of course possible that the early French map-makers might have obtained their ideas from a countryman. In the
eighteenth century there was current a rumor that one de Gonneville in 1503 had been driven to the shores of Australia, but his description of that new land makes it seem more likely that it was Madagascar. Another Frenchman, Jean Parmentier, is reported to have voyaged into Australian waters some twenty-six years later. Neither of these voyages however is sufficiently well authenticated to give them credibility.

The Spanish. Spain also might have been the discoverer of the fifth part of the world. In 1526, shortly after Cortés had conquered Mexico, Saavedra was sent forth in quest of the Indies. He finally reached the Moluccas, but the Portuguese were too strongly entrenched there for him to start any trade. In 1528 he was followed by a countryman, Meneses, who after crossing the Pacific sailed among the islands to the north of Australia. Somewhat later other Spanish navigators came to the southeastern Pacific, notably Alvaro de Mendaña in 1567 and again in 1595. None of them seem to have reached Australia, and the chances of any Spaniard doing so diminished once the Philippine trade began, for the Spanish route to the Orient lay so far to the north that Manila galleons would have had to be driven out of their course to reach Australia.

Wytfit. It is believed therefore that it was the Portuguese (whose jealousy and desire for secrecy regarding their trade routes kept them from achieving the fame as explorers to which undoubtedly they were entitled) who enabled a Flemish geographer, Cornelius Wytfit, in 1598 to give a remarkably correct description of the new continent. Summing up the current ideas regarding it he said:

The Australis Terra is the most southern of all lands, and is separated from New Guinea by a narrow strait. Its shores are hitherto but little known, since after one voyage and another that route has been deserted, and the country is seldom visited unless sailors have been driven there by storms. The Australis Terra begins two or three degrees from the Equator and is maintained by some to be so great an extent that if it were thoroughly explored it would be regarded as a fifth part of the world.

Probable discovery: Torres. But enough has been said regarding possible discoverers of Australia. Even less attention need be given the probable discoverers, for like those probable discoverers of America, the Norsemen, their deeds had little effect on the rest of the world. When Mendaña undertook his ill-fated voyage of 1595 one of his officers was Pedro Fernández de Quiroz. He like Magellan was a Portuguese sailing under the royal banner of Spain. Believing firmly that there existed a great southern continent which was replete with gold and
silver, he finally secured a commission to colonize the islands which
Mendaña had discovered and to explore the supposed southern continent.
On December 21, 1605, he sailed from Callao, Peru. His fleet finally
reached the New Hebrides Islands, where the crew of the flagship mutin-
ied and forced de Quiroz to return to Peru. His second in command,
Luis de Torres, was made of sterner stuff. Quelling the mutinous crews
of the other two ships, he sailed westward until he reached the south-
eastern coast of New Guinea. Thence he worked westward through
the strait which today bears his name, and no doubt sighted the hills
at the tip of Cape York peninsula, the most northern point of Australia.
He took them however for just one more group of islands, so continued
his voyage. Rounding the western end of New Guinea he sailed north,
and eventually reached Manila. Here he deposited an account of his
voyage, but from the records it would seem that he was unconscious of
having discovered a new continent. Certainly the Spanish authorities
gave it little attention, and it is doubtful if Torres' name would have
been given to the strait had it not been that the English in 1762, when
they captured Manila, found among the archives a copy of Torres' letter
to the king of Spain. De Quiroz on his return to America claimed he had
reached the great southern continent, which he named "La Australia
del Espíritu Santo." Though he never reached Australia, the name he
applied as a punning compliment to Philip III, a member of the House
of Austria, became permanent.

Actual discovery. Australia therefore was named by a man who never
got within a thousand miles of the continent and was probably discov-
ered by another who was unaware of what he had done. From these
ineffectuals one turns in relief to the individuals who brought "the last
sea thing dredged by Sailor Time from space" out of the realm of half-
forgotten, vaguely known things. And what more natural than that
it should have been those practical-minded "beggars of the sea" who
finally made real what for nearly a century had existed in the fancies of
their Latin rivals.

Janszoon. An earlier chapter has told how in the 1600's the Dutch
drove the Portuguese out of the East Indies and firmly established their
own control over the Spice Islands. Even before this achievement was
definitely accomplished, the Dutch began to want to know what there
was to the south and east; with the result that in March 1606 William
Janszoon in the little Duyfken investigated the southern coast of New
Guinea. A few weeks before Torres found his strait from the east the
Dutchman reached the western end. He did not enter it this time how-
ever because he suspected shoals and also because he was forced by bad weather to run southward into the Gulf of Carpentaria. Along the west coast of Cape York peninsula he went as far as Cape Keer-Weer ("Turn Again"), there deciding that there was no channel between New Guinea and the Southland. Of interest also is the fact that Janszoon was probably the first European to come in contact with the Australian aborigines, who murdered nine of the *Duyssken*’s crew and in every way justified their description of "wild, cruel, black savages."

*Hartog.* This deliberate attempt of the Dutch to increase geographical knowledge turned out to be of little value; a sheer accident however had important consequences. In 1611 Captain Hendrik Brower discovered that the quickest way to go from Africa to Batavia was to sail due east until the longitude of Java was reached and then to sail north. As a result all Dutch captains were instructed to follow this route. The inevitable of course happened. On October 25, 1616, Dirk Hartog went too far east and bumped into uncharted land which he called "Eendracht" ("Concord"). Immediately sailing directions were revised and Dutch skippers were admonished to sail east until they reached the "New Southland of Eendracht."

* Tasman.* With the exploits that occurred during the next decades this book cannot concern itself; in fact only brief mention can be made of the heyday of Dutch exploration, namely, the governorship of Anthony Van Diemen (1636–1645). He was not convinced that New Guinea and the Southland were united, so in 1636 he sent Gerrit Thomas Poole to the New Guinea coast. Poole was slain by the natives and his two ships returned without finding Torres Strait. The governor then coupled his desire to explore Australia with the search for a short passage to the gold mines of Peru. In 1642 and 1643 Abel Janszoon Tasman made his celebrated circumnavigation of Australia without ever seeing the continent—though he did discover Tasmania and New Zealand—and on his return was immediately sent out again to solve the mystery as to the existence of a strait. Once more, although he charted the northern and northwestern coasts of Australia, the strait eluded him.

*The end of Dutch exploration.* With the death of Van Diemen in 1645 Dutch exploration in Australasian waters practically ceased. Until Cook’s voyages in 1770 the map of the fifth part of the world remained as Tasman left it. Dutch vessels of course occasionally sighted the western coasts, but their visits added little to what was already known. The last Dutch discoverer of any importance was William Vlaming, who
in 1697 first explored the interior of the continent. He discovered Swan River, and carried to Batavia the first black swan as well as a number of botanical specimens. The directors of the company however looked on his work with disdain; bark and leaves could be gathered nearer home and at less cost. Furthermore Van Diemen's hope of finding another Peru in the newly discovered lands did not appeal to their imagination. "The gold and silver mines that will best serve the Company's turn have already been found," they wrote, "and which we deem to be our trade over the whole of India."

**Dampier.** About the time that the Dutch decided Australasia was not worth consideration England also got evidence to the same import. It seems that in 1688 a group of English buccaneers who found things too warm for them in the Spanish West Indies decided to betake themselves to the East Indies and plunder Dutchmen. They finally arrived on the northwest shores of Australia, where they careened and over-hauled their vessel, the *Cygnet*. Their visit would probably have been as forgotten as most of the exploits of their countrymen had it not been that one of the crew, William Dampier, possessed a genius for description. On returning to England he published an account of his voyage which excited so much interest that he was able to promote an expedition to "New Holland" under his own command. In 1699 he set out in the *Roebuck* to make a careful survey of the coast. Unfortunately he returned to the same inhospitable part of the continent, with the result that when a little bit later he came upon New Guinea and other richly wooded tropical islands, Australia lost all of its former attractiveness. Accordingly when he returned from his second voyage he told quite a different tale; the country was dry, barren, and sandy, and as to the inhabitants, "the Hottentots, though a nasty people, were gentlemen by comparison."

**De Voutron.** Of the three European nations which at this time might have entered the Southern Hemisphere, France alone received favorable information regarding colonizing activities in Australia. This report came as a result of the voyage of one de Voutron, who in 1687 while traveling to Siam made the coast in longitude 31°, just north of the mouth of the Swan River. In a letter to the French Minister of Marine the Frenchman urged that these lands might be fit for colonization and that if a good harbor could be found a French colony would be valuable as a place of call for vessels in the Eastern trade. The French government however refused to become interested in the "Terres Australes."
Australian bushman showing Captain Dampier a boomerang.
Accordingly at the end of the seventeenth century Australasia was no more than outlined on Europe’s world map. Before the details could be fitted in, it was necessary that some motive other than trade should be found. This motive as it turned out was to be a rather unusually high type of international rivalry.

2. The Rivalry of England and France in the Southeast Pacific

The first great advance in knowledge regarding Australasia over what had been secured by the Dutch came in the decade immediately following the Seven Years’ War. During this struggle the old colonial empire of England was formed, and from it she emerged “mistress of the seas,” eager for new worlds to conquer. France on the other hand, having lost heavily in North America and India, was forced to hunt for other lands if she were to rebuild a colonial system. The upshot was a keen competition between England and France for the discovery of the great continent believed to extend through the South Seas from Australia to the Americas. In this competition both spoke of the glory which would come from taking the lead in scientific and philanthropic pursuits and in the arts of peace; but one hardly needs to be a cynic to believe that both remembered the Heights of Abraham and the Black Hole of Calcutta, and furthermore that each sought the products of exotic and luxuriant continents yet undiscovered.

Byron, Wallis, Carteret. Accordingly almost immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the state then being “in a time of profound peace,” the English government sent forth royal ships with a commission to advance “the honor of this nation as a maritime power... and the trade and navigation thereof.” Right royal indeed were the results. Byron (1764–1766) annexed the Falkland Islands and saw the Tokelau and Gilbert groups. Wallis (1766–1768) discovered and annexed one island in the Low Archipelago and another in the Society Islands, Tahiti. Carteret (1766–1769) discovered or rediscovered other islands in the Low Archipelago, Mendaña’s Solomon Islands and Santa Cruz group, Dampier’s New Britain, and other islands off New Guinea.

Cook’s first voyage. These voyages show clearly the extent to which interest in the Far South had been aroused in England; but the great step in the unveiling of Australasia was partly due to an event far beyond the earth’s limits. On June 1, 1769, the orbit of the planet Venus was to cross the face of the sun, and to watch the eclipse under the most favorable conditions the Royal Society of London considered
it eminently desirable that an expedition should be sent to the recently discovered Tahiti.

The Admiralty was even more interested in such an expedition; and to its leader, Lieutenant James Cook, were given secret orders to chart the South Seas and search out trading possibilities. Accordingly, in 1768 the *Endeavor Bark* sailed for the South Seas with a large party of scientists, among whom was a wealthy amateur botanist, Sir Joseph Banks. After the eclipse had been observed, Cook sailed for New Zealand, which he proved consisted of two separate islands unconnected with any southern continent. Leaving New Zealand on March 31, 1770, he made his way to the mysterious east coast of Australia, along which he worked until he reached what today is called Botany Bay. After several weeks of desultory exploration (the magnificent Sydney Harbor a few miles to the north was completely overlooked), Cook followed along the coast to its extreme northern point at Cape York. On the way the *Endeavor Bark* struck a reef, and fatal consequences were avoided only by the timely skill of the commander. Through Torres Strait he proceeded west, and without further incident arrived home by way of the Cape of Good Hope.

**Cook’s second voyage.** In 1772 Cook was sent forth again; this time with two vessels, the *Resolution* and the *Adventure*. Once more he met with remarkable success; this time however he completely avoided Australia because he had no idea of the importance of his previous discovery and because he did not believe it was the Great Southland. Yet he sailed all over the South Pacific looking for it. From Tahiti he went south to Antarctic ice, and from South America to New Zealand, returning finally to England convinced that there was no antipodal continent.

**French explorers.** Cook’s third voyage (1776–1779), as mentioned in the previous chapter, led to the development of the Anglo-American fur trade; which was the only immediate result as far as England was concerned of the eighteenth century Pacific Ocean exploits of her mariners. The narratives of Cook’s voyages however were widely published. They soon crossed the Channel to France; and since England did nothing but put up lead plates claiming the newly discovered lands, France was able to participate in the scramble for “equinoctial” possessions. De Bougainville (1766–1769), Surville (1769–1770), Marion (1770), La Pérouse (1785), and d’Entrecasteaux (1792) joined with the English in pale parodies of the sixteenth century Spanish methods of conquest. Each and all left memorials of where they had been, memorials which
generally were as harmless as visiting cards put in a bottle on a mountain top. Often the same area was claimed and reclaimed; and despite Anglo-French warfare elsewhere, rivalry in exploration at times led to mutual aid and exploration.

Accordingly then the rival explorers of this decade, although not forgetful of their hostile political and commercial interests, really formed a single group of great voyageurs and unitedly achieved two important results. First, the Pacific Ocean was robbed of its terrors, for on Cook’s second voyage the use of antiscorbutics kept the losses among the crew to only one per cent per annum. Second, every island cluster in the Pacific was made known, and the outlines of Australia and New Zealand stood out clearly through the mist. In one respect however there was failure. After a decade of exploration and despite dozens of lead plates, Australasia was still unoccupied.

3. The Founding of Australia

One of the features of the American Revolution which students of United States history are prone to forget is that the successful rebellion of thirteen British colonies led to the establishment of not one but of three great nations — the United States, Canada, and Australia.

American loyalists. The simultaneous origin of the three nations came from the lack of unity in the rebelling colonies. Probably only a third of the inhabitants wanted independence from Great Britain, another third was indifferent, and the last third was actively loyal. As a result at times the conflict took on the character of a civil war, and when the rebels finally won it became impossible for the loyalists who had fled and also for many who had stuck it out till the end of the war to live in the new United States. Accordingly many Englishmen felt that the mother country was honor bound to find some place where those who had suffered for their loyalty could find peace. To some of the former, notably Sir Joseph Banks, it occurred that such a place might be the land which Cook had discovered; and Banks is commonly given the credit for first pushing the possibilities of Australia. Actually though as early as 1773 James Maria Matra, who had been a midshipman in the Endeavor Bark, drew up a scheme by which loyalists should be set down in New South Wales, there to found a colony with Chinese and the South Sea Island laborers to do all the hard work. The problem of the loyalists however was settled without the use of his suggestion. Those who early went to upper Canada found it an excellent haven of
Captain Phillip inspects the convict settlers in Sydney, Australia.
refuge, with the result that the stream of migration turned to that former French colony, where very shortly were laid the foundations of what was to become the Dominion of Canada.

Prison problems. This settlement of the problem of what to do with the United Empire loyalists nevertheless left England with another puzzler. For more than a hundred years certain classes of prisoners had been shipped to America, where they were used by the landowners as laborers. After 1776 of course it was impossible to continue this practice. During the war the prisons filled up at the rate of a thousand or more per year, and in 1779 Banks proposed that convicts be sent to Australia. He favorably impressed a parliamentary committee. In 1785 Lord Sydney, the Home Secretary, became interested in the proposal of Admiral Sir George Young, a friend of the botanist Banks, that all the people whose disposal was troubling him, both convicts and loyalists, might be arranged for in the new country. The British government as usual took a long time to make up its mind, so that when it was decided to act upon the plan the loyalists as stated above had all settled in Canada. Thus it came about that when Australia was founded the colony was made up of criminals and the marines sent out to keep them in order.

The founding of New South Wales. January 18, 1788, may be taken as the foundation date of Australia, for it was then that the first fleet arrived at Botany Bay under command of Captain Arthur Phillip, for four years the captain-general of the little colony. If any name is to loom large in the pages of this book it must be that of the sailor-farmer who safely conveyed more than a thousand people, three quarters of them prisoners, on an eight months' voyage across seas not very well known to a country of which still less was known. Arrived there, he had to direct the making of everything that men need in a civilized settlement; houses had to be built, crops cultivated, cattle raising started, roads made, and all this with the labor either of prisoners who did not want to work or of marines who had quite enough to do looking after the prisoners. Furthermore he had to maintain the laws, many of which in such a new situation he had to make himself, in a new country where three people out of every four would be likely to break the laws whenever they could. Small wonder then that after four years he resigned on account of ill health. By that time though the natives had been tamed, agriculture had removed the danger of permanent famine, and New South Wales, including its dependency, Norfolk Island, had a population of some 3000.
The critical epoch. Until 1824 however it was always touch and go as to whether the colony would survive. This Australian critical epoch falls into three periods, ending approximately in 1801, 1810, and 1824. In the first period food was the great problem. To meet it Captain Phillip started state agriculture, state cattle and sheep raising, and state industry, all of which failed. Because of the absence of free settler immigration and the control of the rum industry by the military officers, who thereby dominated the money market and secured large grants of land, it seemed at the close of the first period as if England were spending £180 per felon, for the benefit chiefly of the officers of the New South Wales Corps.

In the second period however the situation improved. During the Napoleonic Wars, Sydney (Phillip had immediately realized that Botany Bay was a poor harbor and a week after reaching that point had established himself at Port Jackson on Sydney Bay) developed rapidly. It became a naval center for the sale of prizes, the whaling and sealing industries of the South Pacific used it as a base, coal was found in paying quantities at nearby Newcastle, and timber was exported to England. As a result of French rivalry colonies were founded at Hobart and Launceston in Tasmania and at Port Phillip, and these became successful. Finally the agitation of Captain MacArthur in favor of Australian wool possibilities caused an invasion of capitalists.

The result of all this was that in the last period Australia made real progress. Governor Macquarie put an end to military domination, instituted banks, stimulated wool raising, aided exploration and generally brought the colony to the point where Englishmen wanted to come to Australia. The finishing touch came under the rule of Sir Thomas Brisbane (1821–1825). He transformed New South Wales from a purely penal settlement into a colony in which the controlling element consisted of free settlers using the labor of convicts; he introduced the revolutionary principle of selling crown lands; and he paved the way for constitutional government.

The Commonwealth. With Brisbane's administration the founding of Australia was accomplished, for New South Wales' transformation from a penal settlement to a real colony began the development which in the following seventy-five years made possible the Commonwealth of Australia. Immigration increased, especially in the 1830's as a result of the Wakefield propaganda and in the early 1850's as a result of gold discoveries; so that in 1855 responsible government was established in New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, and South Australia. As a
The first flag-raising in Australia, Sydney Harbor.

consequence of this growth of the colonial population, opposition to the transportation of convicts became strong. As was to be expected, New South Wales first secured the elimination of penal immigration (1840); the last to obtain it was West Australia (1868). The fifth separate self-governing colony to be organized was Queensland (1859). The last region to secure responsible government was West Australia, which as a result of gold discoveries in the 1880's finally reached that status in 1890. In the meantime railroad building, mainly by state enterprise, linked the colonies together. These closer contacts and common external interests based on the establishment of spheres of influence in the Pacific by various European powers, especially Germany, led finally in 1901 to a combination of the six colonies in a single federal state, the Commonwealth of Australia.

4. The Founding of New Zealand

Comparison with Australia. About 1200 miles southeast of Australia lie two islands which with the continent constitute Australasia. These
two widely separated regions are alike in that they were isolated from the rest of the world until very modern times. Both were discovered and left unused by the Dutch, and rediscovered and in the end occupied by the English; in both cases English occupation was hurried on because of a fear of French forestalling. In most other respects however Australia and New Zealand are dissimilar. Australia is a dry land of vast plains and low ridges, with only two or three hummocks in one corner rising more than 7000 feet above sea level. Australia's trees have a stiff gray foliage that is admirably suited to withstand hot winds; its native inhabitants were few and far between, and their chief occupation was getting food enough to keep them barely alive. The islands of New Zealand on the other hand are mountainous from end to end, and the one great plain of Canterbury is furrowed with rivers fed from perpetual snows. Almost everywhere, save on ridges lofty enough to be covered with ice, there is fertile soil covered with pasture, bush, or forest, all equally green. The natives, called Maoris, were until the white man came spread thickly over the whole of North Island and a great part of its southern neighbor, while the abundance of food supplies made possible an increase in their numbers despite decimating tribal wars.

_Early settlers._ As already mentioned New Zealand was put on the map by Tasman in 1642, and as far as is known was not again visited by Europeans till 1769, when Cook circumnavigated the islands and charted their coasts. Following him came Vancouver (1791), Malaspina (1793), and other explorers; but the islands remained relatively unnoticed except for a few sealers and navigators in need of ships' timbers. In the early 1800's whaling ships took to calling regularly at some of the harbors of North Island, and a trade in whale products, seal skins, oil, timber, and flax developed slowly; as a result several of the governors of New South Wales, notably King and Macquarie, claimed jurisdiction over the archipelago. The mother country however was not interested in New Zealand. In fact, on eight different occasions between 1817 and 1836 the British authorities disclaimed possession of the islands, and for many years they were the happy hunting ground of runaway convicts, deserters from vessels, sealers and bay whalers, many of whom served to vary the menu and provide new vitamins for the Maoris.

_Civilizing influences._ Accordingly then European civilization may be said to have been brought to New Zealand in a most haphazard manner, with at least three widely divergent influences as the chief factors. The first of these were the bay whalers, who from 1803 on
occupied many points on the coast. As late as 1843 it was estimated that there were more than 1000 of them scattered along the shores, most of them with Maori wives, and many of them leaders in the neighboring tribes. The second group of civilization's emissaries consisted of missionaries. In 1814 Samuel Marsden, senior chaplain in New South Wales, established a mission station at the Bay of Islands. In the beginning the Christian religion made slow progress (it took ten years to gain one convert), but after 1833 its influence began to tell. The missionaries gave the Maoris a written language, and did much to protect the natives from the rapacities of foreigners. The most important influence however was exerted by men who dealt in muskets and ammunition, and it was probably they who paved the way for the white occupation of New Zealand. Widespread sale of these instruments of warfare led to twenty years of bloodshed and slaughter which swept away many thousands of Maoris and finally led to British intervention.

Annexion. British action when it came at length in 1840 was however only partly altruistic. French claims by then had taken a threatening turn; and although the ministry in London, worried with political troubles in Canada and with racial disturbances in South Africa, was inclined to think colonies an unprofitable nuisance, it dared not close its eyes to the dangers inherent in Louis Philippe's unscrupulous diplomacy. Even then the English government tried hard to do nothing, but its hand was forced by the Wakefields, who taking the bull by the horns formed a New Zealand Company for making a colony on regular Wakefield lines. Colonel W. Wakefield then softly and silently stole away from England; and while he was on the sea and before he possessed an inch of land, 1000 colonists started in his wake to buy from him land which he did not yet own. Accordingly the government was forced to act. The Wakefieldians held the theory that savage lands were unoccupied and that a native law of real property need never be recognized by any Christian nation, a belief that certainly boded mischief if any attempt were made to carry it out among the high-spirited Maoris. Action came quickly. Governor Gipps of New South Wales proclaimed jurisdiction over New Zealand (1839), and on January 29, 1840, Lieutenant Governor Hobson annexed it, annulled land titles already acquired (pending revision by a commission), and prevented future land purchases from natives by investing the crown with pre-emptive rights over land.

The Treaty of Waitangi. Using missionaries as heralds, interpreters, and diplomats, Hobson summoned a great meeting of chiefs at a port in
the Bay of Islands. Here on February 6, 1840, 512 Maori chiefs signed the famous Treaty of Waitangi, in which they yielded to the queen of England all the rights and powers of sovereignty which they had in their districts and in return were guaranteed possession of their lands, estates, forests, fisheries, and other properties, with the proviso that if at any time the natives should wish to sell their land, they should offer it first to the British government. A third clause gave the New Zealanders all the rights and privileges of British subjects.

**Difficulties.** The formal annexation of New Zealand in 1840 did not however bring peace to the islands, but was merely the beginning of difficulties that lasted for some thirty-five years. Despite the Treaty of Waitangi the New Zealand Association sold large amounts of land to English colonists, and the government's delay in settling questions which arose from contested land grants culminated in the Maori War of 1848. Shortly afterward in 1852, after having brought out 30,000 settlers, the New Zealand company resigned its charter, thereby bringing to an end the unseemly quarrels that continually arose between the Wakefieldians and the missionaries. The latter from the beginning had undertaken the protection of the natives, a task which grew more difficult as the white population increased and the British authorities continued a policy not so much of misgovernment as of nongovernment of the indigenes. Since the law courts were generally closed to them and the gun shops were open, the Maoris at length took up arms. From 1860 to 1871 warfare was incessant; and racial troubles continued until a settlement was reached by which the Maoris were given their own special representation in the legislatures.

**The Dominion of New Zealand.** In 1876 the provincial legislatures were abolished and New Zealand became a unitary state with fully responsible government, its capital being fixed at Wellington. At that date, only thirty-six years after annexation, the population had risen to 350,000. From then on progress was continuous, with the result that at the Imperial Conference of 1907 New Zealand was recognized as a Dominion of the British Empire.

5. **Non-English Interest in Australasia**

In view of the relative ease with which England came into possession of Australasia as compared with the steps by which she secured British North America, the reader by now may wonder whether the title of this chapter is not perhaps a misnomer. And yet in many respects
the contest was very real. In the beginning it was a contest to see who would first put this area on the map. Next it was a contest to see who would find anything worth while in it. Again it was a contest to see who would carry out the colonization which alone could give actuality to presumptuous lead plate claims. Finally, since fear of foreign intrusion many times did force England to expand her territorial claims, and since it was not until 1840 that the last foreign threat ceased to be important, it seems therefore advisable before we close this chapter to sketch briefly the non-English interest in Australasia during the period when England was making good her title.

**Cook's contemporaries.** Although Holland was the first non-English nation to get acquainted with Australasia, it was France that gave Great Britain the most concern. Simultaneously with Cook's second voyage in 1772 the French were busy at each end of the continent. In that year St. Allouen followed the coast of western Australia from Leeuwin to Shark Bay, where on March 30, 1772, he took formal possession of the land for France and hoisted the French flag. Meanwhile Marion du
Fresne, sailing from Mauritius, landed in Van Diemen's Land and went on to New Zealand, where he was slain by the Maoris.

*La Pérouse.* Sixteen years later, just as Captain Phillip was starting his colony, La Pérouse put into Botany Bay. Though there is no evidence that the Frenchman had any intention of founding a settlement, England was already jealous of French intervention in the South Seas, and it was probably fear of the French that led to the early occupation of Norfolk Island on February 14, 1788.

*The French Revolution.* With the outbreak of the French Revolution began a period of twenty-five years during most of which England was at war with France. Since England retained control of the sea France was prevented from paying much attention to Australia, but a few events took place that showed what France might have done had she been able. In 1792 d'Entrecasteaux led an expedition in search of La Pérouse (who it is now known was wrecked shortly after leaving Botany Bay) which charted the southeast coast of Tasmania, but d'Entrecasteaux had to give up the search for La Pérouse because of difficulties which arose between the royalist captain and his republican crew. Ten years later another French expedition commanded by Baudin spent much time on the coasts of Tasmania and Australia. There is no evidence that Baudin intended a settlement, although the British believed at the time that he planned to occupy Van Diemen's Land and therefore his activities led the British to colonize it the next year, September 1803. It is believed however that the French gathered much information about the military strength and weakness of the colony and the way in which it could be attacked.

*The Essex.* Nothing of a hostile nature happened though until 1813, when the American privateer *Holkar* forced a British convict ship to strike her colors. Later in the year the American war frigate *Essex* appeared in South Pacific waters. Yankee seamen were well acquainted with that region, for as early as 1790 the *Philadelphia* had begun a trade which assumed considerable proportions; because of the hated East India Company's monopoly, American ships were welcomed. For a time the *Essex* wrought much havoc among British shipping, and it is alleged that her activities were part of a plan by which Americans and French were to attack Sydney and by giving arms to the convicts secure control of the colony. The French ships however could not run the European blockade, and the *Essex* was sunk the next year off Valparaiso.

*The last French threats to Australia.* After Waterloo French activities
subsided for another decade, to be revived in 1825–1826 when Dumont d'Urville carried out extensive explorations on unoccupied Australian coasts. Whether his activities had any real significance is not known, but British authorities were so alarmed at his presence and that of an American war vessel, which it was claimed was also seeking a place for a settlement, that colonies were planted in 1826 at Westernport and King George's Sound. As a result the French were forestalled; although fifteen years later French whalers were accustomed to raise vegetables, sheep, and goats on the desolate islands near Albany.

The French in New Zealand. The last French threat to British supremacy in Australasia took place in New Zealand. In 1822 a French adventurer who called himself Baron de Thierry bought a couple of hundred acres of land from a native chief, Hokianga, and conceived the idea of starting a native kingdom. For twelve years he wandered around the world trying to make his fortune, and in 1835, recurring to his former plan, he announced himself as sovereign chief and defender of New Zealand liberties. The British merely scoffed at him; but in 1838 a Roman Catholic mission was set up in Hokianga, and another Frenchman named Langlois bought 300,000 acres in Bank's Peninsula in the South Island. Moreover d'Urville had already (1837) transferred his exploring activities to New Zealand. The result of this rather intense French interest was as mentioned above the annexation of New Zealand in 1840. In July, shortly after the Treaty of Waitangi was signed, a French frigate appeared in the Bay of Islands with the object of supporting, so it was rumored, Langlois' Nanto-Bordelais Colonizing Company. Immediately H.M.S. Britomart was sent to Akaroa, and when the French arrived British authority had been established; the company's settlers however were allowed to occupy the land their countryman had bought. Thus it was that although Bank's Peninsula remained French for some years and French warships often hovered about for its protection, France lost all excuse for challenging the British occupation of Australasia.

6. Interesting Features of England's Entrance into the Southwest Pacific

This brief account of the way in which Australasia became a part of the British Empire may well be ended by the pointing out of several features that made the whole process somewhat distinctive. First, at the time England began to give it her attention it was a region in which
no other European country was interested, and against this headstart no other nation could prevail. Second, it became British not so much because of any desire on the part of the government for imperialistic aggrandizement but rather because of the empire-building instincts of Englishmen acting in private capacities. Third, it showed that where the native — such as the Maori — really had a culture that deserved preservation, the British government was ready to protect him even against its own citizens. Fourth, the history of Australasia, like that of Canada, shows that England learned from the American Revolution the proper way to build a colony and retain its loyalty. Fifth, since Australia soon became entirely a white man's country and New Zealand is today almost one, Australasia along with Canada helped to make more complex the race problems inside the British Empire. And finally, with Canada in the northeast and Australasia in the southwest of the Pacific, England was forced to realize that her foreign policy could no longer be based alone upon her Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Indian Ocean outlook.
Introduction. The establishment of British sovereignty in Australasia concluded the first phase of European expansion into the Pacific Area. By 1850 the major portion of the area had been explored fairly accurately and Western overlordship had been set up all along the perimeter of Balboa's ocean except in Japan, Korea, Indo-China, and the Chinese Empire. Some however of the less important islands of the Pacific did escape European political domination until the latter part of the century. The story of their ultimate submergence belongs in later chapters, which will describe the oriental colonial empires of occidental nations. But Hawaii's struggle for independence is of such great interest to the people of the United States that it seems desirable to give it special comment here. Furthermore, although the archipelago preserved its independence until the end of the nineteenth century, its integrity was always endangered by the same European rivalries which affected the regions considered in the two previous chapters.

1. Prehistoric Hawaii

The Hawaiian Islands are located almost midway between Asia and America along the Tropic of Cancer. With an area of some 7000 square miles, they are part of a 2000-mile-long submarine platform which at the southern end has been heaved upward in a series of lava domes to form a group of eight large islands and a number of smaller rocky peaks. Like the other islands in the trade wind belt the Hawaiian Archipelago has an average temperature in the low seventies. Its rain-
fall is ample but somewhat lopsided; on the northern part of the islands it is usually too heavy whereas in the south irrigation is often needed.

The prehistoric inhabitants of the South Seas seem to have reached Polynesia some 1500 years before the Europeans discovered them, and they settled in Hawaii some ten centuries before Columbus discovered America. It is apparent that by the seventeenth century they had made some progress in the agricultural and industrial arts; sufficient at least to have enabled them in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to become provisioners for Pacific Ocean voyageurs. Their most outstanding characteristic however was their devoutness. Expressions of piety both casual and formal were a part of the Hawaiians' daily life, and their numerous temples, idols, priests, and chiefs were protected by various types of tapus (kapu, tabu, and taboo are alternate spellings of this word) which seem to have been the foundation stone of their culture. The tapu may be described as a sacred interdiction laid upon the use of certain things or words or the performance of certain actions and designed to prevent pollution or to secure certain privileges or properties, as when a field is tapued against trespass. A tapu is commonly imposed by chiefs or priests, and among the Polynesians is indicated by a sign or mark.
2. Discovery

Nonhistorical. Like all the other regions that have been studied thus far, the Hawaiian Islands present a puzzle to the historians who would record their discovery. Native traditions tell that centuries before Captain James Cook sailed his ships into Hawaiian waters some fair-haired and light-complexioned people were shipwrecked on these shores. It is generally believed that there is some truth in the tradition, for evidences of European blood were early noticed among the Hawaiians. As to who the castaways were there is less agreement, but the most likely conjecture, based on traces of Spanish customs found among the indigenes, is that they might have been the survivors of some of the expeditions sent out by Cortés soon after his conquest of Mexico. Mention has already been made of Saavedra’s fleet which sailed from Zacatula in 1527. When the ships were over a thousand miles from home they were scattered by a tempest and two of the vessels were never heard of again; one of them very likely may have reached the islands. Another possibility is that they were visited in 1555 by Juan Gaetano, who had previously (1542) crossed the Pacific with Villalobos.

Whether any of these reached the islands is not known, but some Spaniard must have visited the archipelago long before Captain Cook appeared upon the scene. The islands were correctly located on an English map of 1687 which was apparently based on Spanish charts. In 1743 Lord Anson captured a Manila galleon and on it found a Spanish chart which also correctly portrayed the islands. When in 1748 an account of Lord Anson’s voyage was published, a copy of the manuscript chart was also printed. But it was not until thirty years later that a discovery was made about which there could be no doubt.

Historical. On January 20, 1778, Captain James Cook, on his way to the northwest coast of North America in search of the Northwest Passage, anchored in the Bay of Waimea on the island of Kauai. For nearly two weeks the English ships remained at Kauai and the neighboring island of Niihau engaged in filling their water barrels and in trading with the natives, who treated the foreigners with the greatest kindness. They showed an inordinate desire for iron, with the result that Cook easily obtained ample supplies of hogs, yams, and other foodstuffs. To the entire group of islands he gave the name of “the Sandwich Islands,” in honor, as mentioned above, of the Earl of Sandwich. Finally on February 2, without having seen other than Kauai, Niihau, and Oahu islands, Cook sailed away to the northwest fur country.
Cook's death. Cook failed to find the Northwest Passage, and in November returned from the north with the idea of wintering in the islands. As before the Hawaiians received the English with great cordiality. Off the coast of Maui the ships were visited by Kalaniopu, king of the island of Hawaii, and a group of his followers, among them Kamehameha, who remained on board all night. Nearly two months were spent in sailing along the coasts of Maui and Hawaii. No landings were made, but a continuous traffic was carried on for provisions such as pork, fish, breadfruit, and vegetables. The middle of January the Resolution and the Discovery sailed around the south of Hawaii and on the 17th came to anchor in Kealakekua Bay. The ships were immediately visited by several chiefs, among them a priest, and when Cook went ashore he was treated with religious veneration by high and low alike. There can be no doubt that at first Cook was regarded as the incarnation of the Hawaiians' god Lono, though this fact does not seem to have been understood by Cook and his men.

The next day astronomical instruments were set up in a sweet potato patch which was made immune to molestation on the part of the islanders by the establishment of a tapu. On January 25 King Kalaniopu arrived from Maui, and a period of mutually interesting entertainments followed. Unfortunately though the relations between the English and Hawaiians did not remain friendly, thanks largely to the high-handed actions of the strangers toward the native women and also to the natural tendency of the natives to help themselves to whatever they wanted. But the efforts of the leaders on both sides prevented any serious friction, and on February 4 the two ships took their departure. A week later they returned to Kealakekua, a serious defect having been discovered in one of the masts, which made it necessary to take it on shore for repair. By now the natives were definitely unfriendly. On February 13 a boat was taken from the Discovery, removed to another part of the bay, and broken to pieces for the nails it contained. Considering this theft a serious matter, Cook went ashore the next morning, and a quarrel developed which led to the death of the explorer himself, four marines, and about a score of the islanders. Captain Clerke, second in command, effected a reconciliation with the natives, recovered the bodies of Cook and his dead companions, and on February 21, 1779, gave them Christian burial. The following evening the ships left the bay, and on March 13, after brief stops at Oahu and Kauai, the English continued their course to the north to complete their explorations in that region.
3. Growth in Importance of the Islands

The Northwest fur trade. As mentioned in a previous chapter, one of the most important results of Cook's last voyage was the accidental discovery by his men on their homeward voyage that a great deal of money could be made out of the fur trade between the Orient and the American Northwest. As soon as this fact became known, traders of all the leading maritime nations flocked to the Pacific Ocean. Naturally they made the Hawaiian Islands their chief stopping place. Not only did they find here sandalwood, a product highly prized by the Chinese and therefore doubly valuable because the Westerners were hard put to find trade goods which the Chinese wanted, but in addition to hogs and yams the islanders furnished the visiting ships sugar cane, coconuts, taro, plantains, melons, salt, wood and water, calabashes, mats, feather capes, and helmets, as well as other natural and manufactured products. Furthermore, since the mild climate was a delightful contrast to the weather of the North Pacific, the islands early became a favorite winter resort. Among the first of the fur traders to reach the archipelago was an Englishman named John Meares, who arrived in 1787. In the winter of 1789-1790 the first American ships visited the islands. Of the four the best known were the Columbia, which, commanded by Captain Robert Gray, was the first American ship to circumnavigate the globe, and the Lady Washington, commanded by Captain John Kendrick, the first American ship to visit Japan.

Kamehameha I, 1736-1819. From time to time, even in the late 1700's, white men found it impossible to resist the lure of Hawaii's beauties, both natural and human, and most of them entered the services of the different chiefs. Of these native rulers the one who eventually gave political unity to the islands was the great Kamehameha I. He was born about 1736 or 1737 of royal lineage and spent his youth at the courts of the Hawaiian island kings, Alapainui and Kalaniopu. The latter, his uncle, became king of Hawaii about 1755 and died in 1782. Shortly afterward Kamehameha revolted against the rule of his cousin, Kiwalao. As a result the island of Hawaii was divided politically into three parts, but in 1791 with the death of his chief rival Kamehameha became the undisputed mai (king) of the whole island.

In the meantime Kahokili, king of Maui, had acquired control of the four other important islands, Maui, Molokai, Oahu, and Kauai. On his death Oahu and Molokai went to his son Kalanikupule, and Maui and Kauai to his brother Kaeo. Warfare in which several foreign
Kamehameha I was the greatest ruler of Hawaii.

ships were involved soon broke out between the two rival chiefs. When Kamehameha heard of it he decided that the time had come for him to complete the conquest of the archipelago. By 1796 he had secured control of all the islands but Kauai and its dependency Ni'ihau; eventually these islands were ceded to him without the need of armed conquest.

Increase in trade. At the end of these many years of warfare the islands were naturally in a bad condition. There had been a large shrinkage in population, many of the farm plots were devastated, and a considerable part of the crops had been destroyed. Kamehameha gave his whole attention to the problem, and since no one was strong enough to oppose his rule he completed his program, encouraging industry and suppressing crime and disorder. Agriculture, fishing, and other useful industries were carried on in peace and security. To meet the expenses of his government he required that all people pay taxes in proportion to their ability. Furthermore he maintained the ancient religion of his
people with great strictness. Under his wise rule the islands rapidly became prosperous. Though fresh meat, vegetables, firewood, and water were the chief items bought by the early traders, the inventory was increased as time went on. Most important perhaps in the early years was salt; another article in demand was *olona* fiber, used in the repair of ships' rigging. After 1800 the trade in sandalwood, esteemed by the Chinese for its pungent fragrance, became of great importance.

At first trading was generally carried on in foreign ships, the natives bringing off their products in canoes. It was not uncommon for vessels to visit several islands before completing their purchases. But after about 1795 the neighborhood of Honolulu Harbor gradually came to be the principal trading center, and its importance was enhanced in 1804 when the king took up residence at Waikiki. Storehouses of stone were built near the harbor to hold the king's possessions, which are reported to have included 200,000 or 300,000 Spanish dollars. Much of the produce of the other islands was collected and brought to Oahu. After a time some traders ventured to bring their goods on shore and place them in storehouses.

*John Young and Isaac Davis.* This development may be considered as definite recognition of the attainment by the islands of a civilized trading status. In that attainment two English members of the king's council undoubtedly played a great part, John Young and Isaac Davis. Young was the sole survivor of the *Fair American*, which in 1790 was captured off the island of Hawaii by some of Kamehameha's subjects. At that time Davis, boatswain of the *Eleonora*, commanded by Captain Simon Metcalfe, owner of the *Fair American*, happened to be ashore. To prevent his telling Captain Metcalfe what had happened the king kept him a prisoner; then, having had no part in the capture of the *Fair American*, he took both Davis and Young under his protection. Although they tried several times to escape, the two Englishmen became reconciled to their situation and were finally made chiefs, with important and responsible positions in the government.

*Vancouver, 1792–1794.* Equally important was the series of visits made by another Englishman, Captain George Vancouver, from 1792 to 1794. Vancouver came to the North Pacific as a result of the Nootka Sound controversy, with instructions to make a careful survey of the American coast from Alaska to California, to continue Cook's search for the Northwest Passage, and to survey the Hawaiian Islands. Reaching the island of Hawaii March 1, 1792, he proceeded to Oahu and Kauai without having seen Kamehameha. He treated the natives well,
giving them useful seeds and plants but refusing to trade them arms or ammunition. A year later he returned for a second visit, when he met the king and presented him with cattle from California. On his third visit (January–March 1794) he brought more California cattle, and at Kealakekua his carpenters constructed the framework of the Britannia, the first vessel ever built in Hawaii. Shortly before Vancouver's departure the king and his advisers, to protect the archipelago against enemies near or far, deeded it to Great Britain. Fortunately for the United States this cession was never accepted. The visit of Vancouver however made a great impression on the Hawaiian people. The attention he paid to Kamehameha increased the prestige of the king, making it easier for him to conquer the islands and thus pacify the whole group. Moreover Hawaiian tradition says that Vancouver promised to send teachers from England to explain the Christian religion to the Hawaiians.

4. The Coming of Christianity

Opukahaia. Fate however willed that Christianity was not to come to the Hawaiian Islands from England but from the United States. And the instrument chosen was a mere Kanaka sailor from Kau on the island of Hawaii. The natural sailing abilities of the islanders led many of them to ship before the mast on foreign trading vessels. One of these islanders, Harry Opukahaia (commonly called Obookiah), was brought to the United States in 1809 by a Captain Brintall of New Haven, Connecticut. While in the "City of Elms" Opukahaia frequently visited Yale College, where according to tradition he was found one day on the steps weeping at his ignorance. Their interest excited, a number of Yale men gave him the rudiments of an education and led him to become a fervent Christian. Through him attention was drawn to other Hawaiian youths living in the United States. In 1816 four of them including Opukahaia were taken under the patronage of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions with a view to educating them and then sending them back to their native isles as preachers or teachers. Though Harry Opukahaia died in 1818 while still a student in the Foreign Mission School, his life and experiences were the original motive for sending missionaries to Hawaii.

The Sandwich Island Mission. By the time of Opukahaia's death the intense interest developed among the churches of New England had led several young men to volunteer as missionaries. On October 15, 1819,
Hawaiian fishermen still use a circular fish net with a dexterity which amazes the tourist visitor.
in Boston the Sandwich Island Mission was organized as a church to be transplanted to the new field. Since this infant church was eventually to bear such fine fruit it is only fitting that its members be recorded in the pages of history. They were the Reverend Hiram Bingham and the Reverend Asa Thurston, preachers; David Chamberlain, farmer; Dr. Thomas Holman, physician; Samuel Whitney and Samuel Ruggles, catechists and schoolmasters; Elisha Loomis, printer; the wives of these men; and three Hawaiian youths, Thomas Hopu, William Kamui, and John Honoli. On October 23 the members of the mission together with the five Chamberlain children and George P. Kaumuali, son of the king of Kauai, sailed from Boston on the brig Thaddew. On March 30, 1820, after a voyage of five months, they came in sight of the island of Hawaii.

Kamehameha II (Liholiho). The arrival of the missionaries was most opportune, for at that very time the islands were in the midst of a religious upheaval. Kamehameha II (or Liholiho, as he is more commonly called), who had succeeded to the throne of his father in May 1819, had decided that the ancient idolatry of his people should be wiped out. His decision was motivated by the facts that (1) for three decades foreigners had been disregarding the age-old oppressive tapus without suffering for their impiety, (2) Hawaiians in increasing numbers had been traveling abroad and in no way had been penalized for their neglect of the gods, and (3) certain powerful female chiefs resented the restrictions imposed on their sex against men and women eating together and against women eating pork, bananas, coconuts, or certain kinds of fish. After much urging on the part of his foreign counselors and the two dowager queens Liholiho took the decisive step. About November 1, 1819, a great feast was prepared. To the astonishment of his followers Liholiho sat down and ate with the women. Since no harm came from it, the people were convinced the tapus were futile and the old gods a lie. Immediately orders were sent out to all the islands to destroy the heiaus (sacred places) and to burn the idols. Although some idols were hidden away by those who kept to the old faith, in most places the orders were obeyed. Thus it was into a sort of religious void that the American missionaries entered when they landed at Kailua, the residence of the king.

Missionary progress. On going ashore Bingham and Thurston paid their respects to Liholiho and the other chieftains, stated their purpose in coming to Hawaii, and requested permission to undertake their project. After some argument consent was finally given, and by the
end of July stations had been established on the islands of Hawaii, Oahu, and Kauai. Three months after landing the Reverend Asa Thurston preached before the king on the text, "I have a message from God unto thee." It was the first sermon ever heard by Hawaiian royalty. With this auspicious beginning missionary progress was rapid. Schools founded at the mission stations had by the end of the year about a hundred pupils. The language difficulty of course was very great, but fortunately in 1822 the Reverend William Ellis of the London Missionary Society joined the American Board Mission. Speaking fluently the language of Tahiti, which was much like that of Hawaii, he was of inestimable help. Soon the Hawaiian language was reduced to writing. A translation of the New Testament was completed in 1832, and by May 10, 1839, the entire Bible had been printed in the Hawaiian language.

Effects of Christianity. In the two decades following the introduction of Christianity a remarkable change, much of it due to missionary influence, took place in the Hawaiian Islands. The bad example often set by the foreign traders was combated and a fight for law and order was undertaken which eventually met with remarkable success. Even more effective was the educational campaign which had almost wiped out illiteracy. In the early years the evangelization of the natives was slow, only 1259 persons being admitted into the Protestant Church in the first seventeen years of the mission. But the years 1838 to 1840 witnessed a great revival, with more than 20,000 members received. By 1848 the American Board had come to look upon the Hawaiian Islands as a Christian nation and in 1864 it practically withdrew from the field, leaving the general work of the Hawaiian churches under the jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Evangelical Association. The economic and industrial life of the islands was also greatly influenced by the missionaries and especially by their children, many of whom remained in the islands and became leading citizens.

John Quincy Adams's estimate. The best estimate of the work of the missionaries is perhaps that of John Quincy Adams, who in a report to Congress in 1843 spoke of their achievements as follows:

It is a subject of cheering contemplation to the friends of human improvement and virtue that, by the mild and gentle influence of Christian charity, dispensed by the humble missionaries of the gospel unarmed with secular power within the last quarter of a century, the people of this group of islands have been converted from the lowest abasement of idolatry to the blessings of the Christian gospel; united under one balanced government; rallied to the fold of civilization by a written language and consti-
tution providing security for the rights of persons, property and mind, and
invested with all the elements of right and power which can entitle them
to be acknowledged by their brethren of the human race as a separate and
independent community.

5. Threats Against Hawaiian Independence

Vancouver, 1794. Fortunate indeed it was for the Hawaiian Islands
(and eventually for the United States) that the American government in
the 1840’s was convinced of Hawaii’s qualifications for independent
existence. Without such an attitude by this nation it is doubtful if
independence could have been maintained. The first threat to it, during
the third visit of Captain Vancouver, has already been mentioned.
Despite the fact that on February 24, 1794, the British flag was run up
on the island of Hawaii and Lieutenant Puget took possession in the
name of the king, England was too engrossed in European affairs to be
concerned with the acquisition of the distant Sandwich Islands. Thus
the first threat never materialized.

Russia. The second threat came from the great bear of the north,
Russia. As previously mentioned, by 1798 the Russian-American Fur
Company had secured a monopoly of the fur trade in Alaska. Experiencing
difficulties in obtaining food supplies, Baranov, the governor of the
company, cast longing eyes on both California and the Hawaiian Islands.
In 1814 he sent a ship to the islands to purchase supplies, but it was
wrecked on the island of Kauai (the place where the best yams were
grown). The following year Baranov sent out in an American ship one
Dr. Scheffer, who was to recover what had been saved from the wrecked
vessel and if possible establish a trading post in Hawaii. He was so
kindly received that in 1816 Baranov sent out two ships to be used in
connection with the proposed trading post. Scheffer then went to
Honolulu, where he built a blockhouse and started foundations for a
fort. On the advice of John Young Kamehameha ordered him to leave.
He went to Kauai, where he tried to persuade the local ruler, Kaumualii,
to declare himself independent of Kamehameha and to place himself
under the protection of Russia. Encouraged by Kaumualii’s favorable
attitude, Scheffer built a fort at Waimea and early in 1817 raised the
Russian flag. This action alarmed the American traders, and their
influence together with further orders from Kamehameha led to the
forcible expulsion of Scheffer and the repudiation of his activities by
Baranov and the Russian government.
Foreign consuls: (1) American. In 1812 three Americans, Jonathan Winship, Nathan Winship, and William Heath Davis, secured a ten-year monopoly on the export of sandalwood and cotton from Hawaii. The importance of this trade, and alarm at the Russian threat, convinced the United States government that it should be represented officially in the islands. Accordingly in September 1820, the year of the coming of the American missionaries, President Monroe appointed John Coffin Jones to be the agent of the United States for commerce and seamen, and to have general supervision of American interests throughout the Hawaiian Islands.

(2) British. This appointment was especially important because up to that time, despite the significance of American trade, the official relations of the Hawaiian government had been exclusively with England. The Hawaiian king and people looked upon Kamehameha's agreement with Vancouver as putting the islands under the protection of England. And the first ships of war that came to Hawaii were those commanded by Cook, Vancouver, and Broughton; and the principal advisers of the king were Englishmen, Young, Davis, Beckley, and Adams. Because of the influence which the British had thus exerted upon his father it was natural that Kamehameha II should feel drawn to England. He saw that the interests of the United States were continually increasing as fur traders, missionaries, whalers, and finally a government agent all appeared upon the scene. Fearful of American designs and still distrustful of Russia, in the fall of 1822 Kamehameha II sailed for England, where the following year both he and his queen died from an attack of measles. While the king was still alive, Richard Charlton was appointed British consular agent, and reached the islands shortly before the bodies of the dead sovereigns arrived.

The growth of American interests. The appointment of a British agent did not however hinder the growth of American commercial interests. The sandalwood trade remained almost wholly in the hands of Americans, who had cunningly succeeded in getting the native rulers heavily in their debt. American whaling vessels so increased in number that in the spring of 1826 alone nearly forty of them, representing a value of approximately $2,000,000, visited Honolulu. Desertion of many of the whaling crews at the islands caused trouble not only to the ships' masters, but also by their disorderly conduct to the Hawaiian government. As a result the shipowners joined with the sandalwood traders (who were having difficulty in collecting on sandalwood notes, now that the forests were becoming depleted) and appealed to the American government to
Within a generation after the arrival of New England missionaries the Congregational churches of Hawaii were on a permanent self-supporting basis. Honolulu's church attendants today attest to the effectiveness of the "Melting Pot of the Pacific."

sent a warship to Hawaii to protect their interests. Accordingly in the spring of 1826 the United States ship-of-war *Dolphin* in command of Lieutenant John Percival was sent to the islands, where it remained for several months. It is a question whether this ship did more harm than good, for its commander refused to obey the local laws on prostitution and alcohol. Percival even went so far as to serve his men double rations of rum before they went ashore, and on one occasion the Reverend Hiram
Bingham's home was badly damaged by the *Dolphin* sailors, who resented the missionary's efforts to preserve the morals of the Hawaiians. In the fall of the same year however came the United States sloop-of-war *Peacock*, Captain Thomas ap Catesby Jones commanding. Of different caliber from Percival, Captain Jones showed a friendly spirit toward the Hawaiians and encouraged the missionaries in their work. At the same time he protected the interests of the whaling ships and successfully handled the sandalwood debt problem. Finally on December 23, 1826, he signed the first treaty ever negotiated by the Hawaiian government with a foreign power. This treaty provided for perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries and for the protection of American commerce on the islands, and though not ratified by the Senate was observed by both Hawaii and the United States until it was replaced by the treaty of 1849. In 1829 the United States sent another warship to Hawaii, the *Vincennes*, under command of Captain Finch, who brought with him from the Secretary of the Navy a letter which expressed to King Kamehameha III the good wishes of the American president. The king was gratified, and this letter did much to cement friendly relations. On their part the Americans were impressed by the sincerity of the natives in their Christian beliefs and by their progress in the arts and in civilized life.

*French threats.* Fortunate it was for Hawaii that the difficulties with the Americans were largely settled during the 1820's, for the following decade brought a serious threat from the French. It began as the result of the activities of the Frenchman John Rives, friend and secretary of King Kamehameha III. In 1823 Rives went to England with the king's party. Dismissed from his position, he went to France. There he persuaded a religious order, the Congregation of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary, to undertake a Catholic mission in the Hawaiian Islands. Three fathers and three lay brothers were sent out. Arriving at Honolulu July 7, 1827, they secured after some difficulty permission to establish a mission. At the end of two years approximately a hundred baptisms had been performed. Though undisturbed for the first two years, the Catholics in August 1829 were the target of a proclamation prohibiting the natives from attending their services. Despite prohibitions and persecutions however some natives continued to attend, until in December 1831 the priests were expelled and sent to California. Another effort was made in 1836 by Father Walsh, a British subject, but although at that time the English government secured a treaty giving its subjects the right to trade, to reside, and to build warehouses in Hawaii, Father
Walsh was not permitted to perform Catholic rites except for foreign communicants. In the meantime the French fathers who had been expelled to California had not given up hope. On April 17, 1837, they returned to Honolulu only to be banished again on April 30; but not until eight months later did they actually leave the islands. After their departure King Kamehameha III prohibited all Catholic practices; but continued pressure by foreign officers finally caused him to change his attitude and on June 17, 1839, he issued an edict granting religious toleration and freeing all who had been confined because of their Catholicism.

What was the reason for this anti-Catholic attitude of the Hawaiian rulers? The explanation given at the time was that the rulers, accustomed to a fairly close connection between church and state and regarding Protestantism as a state religion, felt that a second religion in Hawaii would create division and lead to trouble. They asserted that the Catholic missionaries had come to the islands without permission of the government and had no legal standing. They also imagined a resemblance between Catholic ceremonies and the idolatry which had been abolished in 1819.

Be that as it may, the French government, assuming the position of defender of Catholic missionaries throughout the Pacific Ocean, decided that to persecute the Catholic religion, to tarnish it with the name of idolatry, and to expel French missionaries from the Hawaiian Archipelago was to insult France. Accordingly on July 9, 1839, less than a month after the issuance of the toleration edict, Captain Laplace with the French frigate Artemise arrived at Honolulu. With no investigation other than an interview with the French consul, he sent a manifesto to the king demanding a treaty with the following provisions: (1) that Catholic worship be declared free in the Hawaiian Islands, (2) that land be given for a French Catholic church in Honolulu, (3) that the persecution of native Catholics cease, (4) that $20,000 be deposited with Captain Laplace as a guarantee of good conduct, the money to be returned when France was satisfied that the Hawaiian government would observe the treaty, (5) that the money and the treaty signed by the king be taken on board the Artemise by a high chief, and (6) that the French flag be saluted with twenty-one guns. Since the king was absent when the demands were presented, his prime minister and the governor of Oahu, to avoid war, signed the treaty demanded and from the foreign merchants of Honolulu borrowed the $20,000. A few days later however the king returned to Honolulu and approved their action.
But the reading of the lesson was not ended. The captain induced the king to sign a general treaty of friendship and commerce. This treaty had two very objectionable provisions. One gave to Frenchmen who ran afoul of the law the right to be tried by a jury of foreigners named by the French consul, a provision tantamount to giving France the right of extraterritoriality. The other practically abrogated the spirituous liquor prohibition act of 1838 and set the duty on imported French liquors at 5 per cent ad valorem.

Soon after the departure of the Artemise Catholic missionaries came to the islands and established their missions on a permanent basis. Many difficulties arose, particularly over the interpretation of the school and marriage laws. With the probable design of causing trouble which might lead to annexation, the French consul advised the Catholics to look to France for enforcement of their views; hence the Hawaiian government often did not hear their complaints. In July 1842, the Embuscade, one of the squadron which had just taken possession of the Marquesas, came to Honolulu, Captain Mallet in command. A few days after his arrival the captain sent a letter to the king complaining that the Laplace Treaty had been violated and presenting a series of demands calculated to give to Catholics certain special privileges in regard to schools and marriages. The king denied all the allegations, and Captain Mallet withdrew.

British threats. Scarcely had the French threats to Hawaiian independence abated when there came another of still greater significance. Richard Charlton, the British consul, had for some time been complaining that British property rights were not respected. (He himself was involved in what was probably a fraudulent land claim.) Finally he persuaded the commander of the British squadron in the Pacific Ocean, Rear Admiral Richard Thomas, to send the frigate Carysfort to make an investigation. Captain Lord George Paulet, on his arrival at Honolulu February 10, 1843, sent the king a series of unjustifiable demands based on Charlton’s complaints and threatened in the event of noncompliance by four o’clock the next day to bombard the city. Yielding under protest after a series of unpleasant interviews, the king on February 25 signed a provisional cession of the islands to Captain Paulet as Queen Victoria’s representative, subject to review in London. Paulet then decreed that though the natives should be ruled under existing laws foreign residents and foreign relations should be governed by a commission consisting of himself, one of his lieutenants, D. F. MacKay, and Dr. G. P. Judd, a leader of the American colony.
The commission proceeded to govern the country in a most high-handed manner. The British flag superseded the Hawaiian banner, land and government schooners were expropriated, and a regiment of native troops called the "Queen's Regiment" was enlisted and paid out of the king's treasury. Dr. Judd soon resigned, and fearing the commission might seize the government records secreted them in a royal tomb. Eventually news of Paulet's actions reached Admiral Thomas at Valparaiso. At once he sailed for Hawaii on the Dublin, and after interviews with the king restored July 31, 1843, the independence of the islands in a brilliant and impressive ceremony enacted in the presence of a multitude of natives and foreigners.

6. Recognition of Hawaiian Independence

The Richards-Haalilio Mission. The course of Admiral Thomas was approved by his government; in fact four months previously (April 1, 1843) Lord Aberdeen had stated officially that the British government was willing and had determined to recognize the independence of the islands. This action was the result of a movement on the part of the Hawaiian government to secure a recognition and guarantee of Hawaiian independence by the United States, Great Britain, and France. The first efforts in 1840 through an American lawyer failed. Two years later the great Sir George Simpson, governor of the Hudson's Bay Company, visited Hawaii on a tour around the world. He became very much interested in the islands and proposed that a commission of which he offered to be a member be sent to the three powers. The king followed his advice, and April 8, 1842, appointed his secretary, Timothy Haalilio, William Richards, and Sir George as his representatives. Sir George left for London by way of Alaska, while Richards and Haalilio came first to the United States. After some difficulty the Hawaiians secured from Secretary of State Daniel Webster a letter, dated December 19, 1842, which declared that the Hawaiian government should be respected by the foreign powers, that no nation should be allowed to take possession of the islands either by conquest or colonization, and that no foreign power should try to run the native government. This declaration was officially sent by Mr. Webster to the governments of France and Great Britain.

From Washington Richards and Haalilio went to London, which they reached February 18, 1843. Here they were joined by Sir George Simpson. After unsatisfactory interviews with the Earl of Aberdeen,
they crossed over to Paris. On March 17 M. Guizot, French Foreign Minister, announced that although he would not make a new treaty he had no objection to acknowledging the independence of Hawaii. When this statement was followed by Aberdeen's declaration of April 1 (noted above), success seemed in sight. M. Guizot however delayed putting his recognition of Hawaiian independence in writing, and when about June 1 came the news of the Paulet annexation, once more "the fat was in the fire." France was not willing to grant recognition until England gave up her possession of the islands, and England did not wish to give them up until she was sure that France would not take them herself.

The joint declaration of 1843. But Richards and Haalilio kept up the fight. The claims of Charlton were submitted to British legal advisers, who in all cases but one decided in favor of the Hawaiian government. With these out of the way it was possible on November 28, 1843, to get Lord Aberdeen and the French ambassador to sign a joint declaration to the effect that those governments

taking into consideration the existence in the Sandwich Islands of a government capable of providing for the regularity of its relations with foreign nations, have thought it right to engage reciprocally to consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent state, and never to take possession either directly or under the title of a protectorate, or under any form, of any part of the territory of which they are composed.

Although the United States refused to join France and England in this recognition of Hawaiian independence, the statements of Secretary Webster did away with any possible fear of aggression by his country; and the question of Hawaii's independence for the next half century was settled.

7. Favorable Treaties with the United States, Great Britain, and France

First steps. The recognition of Hawaii's independence by the three great powers did not mean however that there was to be no further trouble with these nations. Difficulties continued, and at times even the independence of the kingdom was endangered because none of the great nations of the world seemed to be willing to treat Hawaii as an equal. The French attitude was clearly shown by the Laplace Treaty of 1839; and similar concessions of extraterritoriality and tariff duties were secured by Great Britain in 1844 and asked for by the United
States. In 1846 however the kingdom of Denmark made a fair and reasonable treaty of commerce and friendship, and when that example was followed by the United States in 1849 with a treaty which went into effect in 1850, Hawaii was encouraged to hope for similar treatment at the hands of Great Britain and France.

Further French aggression. This hope had been aroused first in 1846 when the $20,000 taken by Captain Laplace was returned to Hawaii by a French admiral, and at the same time, on March 26, 1846, somewhat more favorable treaties were granted by both Great Britain and France. Unfortunately the French consul, Patrick Dillon, who arrived in February 1848 to exchange ratifications, seemed determined to cause trouble. He complained that partiality was shown to the English language, protested at the duty on French brandy, and sought to create ill feeling between the Catholics and the government. Accordingly in April 1849 the Hawaiian government asked for the recall of M. Dillon. The latter appealed to the French naval commander in the Pacific, Rear Admiral de Tromelin, who in August came to Honolulu with two warships. When the king courteously refused the French demands, de Tromelin dismantled the native fort, destroyed furniture in government buildings, confiscated the king’s yacht and a number of merchant vessels, and then departed.

The Judd Mission. Since both the British and American consuls protested at the high-handed actions of the French, the Hawaiian government decided to send a special mission to France. Dr. G. P. Judd was called upon to head the delegation, and sailed in September 1849, taking with him the two young princes, Alexander Liholiho and Lot Kamehameha. Two and a half months of negotiations in Paris were unavailing, but in London the basis was laid for the Hawaiian-British Treaty of 1851 similar to that signed with the United States December 20, 1849. The Judd Mission was thus partly successful in getting the treaties it wanted; but in other ways it brought Hawaii great benefit. The two princes received attention wherever they went, and their natural intelligence, their education, and their gentlemanly conduct created a most favorable impression.

France yields. Soon after the return of the Judd Mission to Hawaii a French envoy arrived to take up again the points at issue between the two countries. M. Emile Perrin brought forward the same ten demands that had been presented by Admiral de Tromelin. His attitude was so intransigent that on March 10, 1851, the king signed a secret proclamation putting the islands under the protection of the United States until
the relations between France and Hawaii might be placed on a proper basis. When M. Perrin got wind of this action he realized that he had gone too far and immediately began to talk more moderately. A final adjustment was made which provided full liberty for Roman Catholic clergy and schools, reduction of the duty on French brandy, and eventual ratification of a treaty without extraterritoriality features. The Hawaiian-French Treaty went into force in 1858, and with its promulgation Hawaii took the final step in complete international enfranchisement.

8. The Importance of Hawaii’s Relations with the United States

For four decades the Hawaiians remained the only people in the Pacific Area except China, Korea, Japan, Siam, and Indo-China who were independent of Western political domination. In this retention of her independence Hawaii of course did not depend upon her own strength. As an actual fact the little island nation was to all intents and purposes an undeclared protectorate of Great Britain, of the United States, and in Roman Catholic matters of France. It was the rivalry of these three countries, each of which wished to extend its control to the central Pacific, that throughout the last half of the nineteenth century enabled Hawaii to remain independent. During the forty years in question the only real threat of a change in the status quo came when in the “manifest destinies” 1850’s Kamehameha III went so far as to authorize a treaty providing for annexation to the United States. His death on December 15, 1854, put a stop to any such action; for Fate willed that the island kingdom should govern itself during the forty years in which the United States through the activities of its whalers (up to the Civil War) and sugar raisers (stimulated by the stoppage of Southern sugar culture during the Civil War) gradually became so inextricably bound up with the welfare of Hawaii that the union of the United States and Hawaii finally took place almost as naturally as the process of osmosis. Concerning that event more will be said later. It now becomes necessary to turn again to the great Oriental nation which stood out so long against the impact of Occidental culture.
The Opening of China

Introduction. By the early part of the nineteenth century European civilization had come to be an effective force throughout most of the Pacific Area. In America and Australia the natives had practically disappeared from the picture. In Hispanic America, New Zealand, the East Indies, and Siberia, although much of the aboriginal culture remained, the white man was the ruler, and even in the independent kingdom of Hawaii malehini (foreign) customs were no longer tapu. China and Japan however still led the three-century-old struggle against the rising tide of Occidental influence. But Fate willed that at length their Canute-like efforts should fail. Since China was the first to yield, the attention of the reader is directed to the opening of China.

1. Review of Early Trade Relations Between China and the West

China's civilization. Inasmuch as the coming of European civilization to the Pacific Area resulted to such a great extent in political domination by the invaders, one may be tempted to raise the question why China was so long able to maintain its political integrity. One reason of course was the immensity of its area and population. A second was the cultural height it had attained. Centuries before Sir Francis Drake circumnavigated the globe, when Shakespeare's breech-clouted ancestors were still wandering around the swamps of western Europe, the celestial kingdom had gunpowder, printing presses, and silken raiment. The Western World coveted Eastern luxury, and as long as trade could be carried on with China questions of political domination were of little significance.
Portugal. European maritime trade with China as we have noted was begun by the Portuguese, who reached Canton about 1515. By 1557 they had succeeded in establishing themselves at Macao, a small peninsula joined by a narrow neck of land to the island of Heang-shan in the delta of the West River south of Canton. History shows that it was unfortunate that the Portuguese should have first given the Chinese an idea of Europeans. The truculent and lawless sons of Camoens regarded all Eastern peoples as their legitimate prey, and were little if any better than the contemporary Japanese pirates who pillaged the Chinese coasts. Whether any other Westerners would have behaved better is of course open to question; but by 1545 the Chinese had driven the Portuguese out of Amoy, Ningpo, and Foochow, and even when finally the Chinese gave permission for the erection of a few buildings at Macao these were kept under strict supervision. In 1577 trade was confined to Canton and permitted only under stringent regulations; buildings could not be repaired or new ones erected without permission; and every precaution was taken to prevent any usurpation of rights which might be derogatory to Chinese sovereignty. Although the foreigners were allowed to settle their private disputes according to their own laws, a Chinese official usually resided at Macao, where he governed the city in the name of the emperor and decided cases in which Chinese alone were involved. Despite this surveillance (and even after Portuguese trade declined) Macao flourished and was the base for the trade of all nations with Canton. On their arrival off the South China coast all ships went to Macao to engage river pilots and purveyors, and from it took their departure. To it the Canton traders returned at the end of the trading season, and there they awaited the coming of the next season's access to Canton. In fact until the cession of Hong Kong to the British in 1842, Macao remained the center of the Westerners' commercial and religious contacts with China. Since then it has steadily declined, for its harbor proved to be unsuitable for modern shipping. Today it is hardly more than a picturesque spot whose chief claim to fame lies in its large revenues from gambling and the sale of opium. To the historian however it still remains important, for at Macao in the sixteenth century the Chinese developed toward foreigners and foreign trade a deepening of their traditional mistrust. This attitude was to cause untold difficulty, the end of which has not yet been reached.

Spain. Spain it will be remembered closely followed the Portuguese to the Indies but not to China. For centuries before Magellan's voyage merchants of the southeast Chinese coast had carried on a profitable
trade with the Philippines, and with the arrival of the Spanish the wily celestials quickly saw new trade possibilities. Consequently, although the Spanish were blocked out of Macao by the Portuguese and although they themselves made little effort to develop trade with China, the merchants of Canton, Amoy, and neighboring ports found the Manila market a veritable gold mine, and Chinese junks for centuries made possible the maintenance of Spain’s far-flung Manila outpost. Spain thus needed no Asiatic mainland base—the fort which the Spanish occupied from 1626 to 1642 in Formosa was not for trade purposes but merely as a defense against the Dutch.

Holland. The early failures in China of the "beggars of the sea" have been recounted. After the Dutch were driven out of Formosa they conducted a clandestine trade at ports on the Fukien coast, and received some Chinese goods in Java. In 1729 they finally established a factory at Canton, where the Chinese, having set up special facilities, had come to feel that a few foreigners more or less could do no harm. The coming
of the Dutch gave the Chinese one of their first contacts with Europeans of the Protestant faith. Though they sent no missionaries the Holland traders did not hesitate to warn the Chinese against the political dangers inherent in the Roman Catholic system that would transfer the spiritual allegiance of Chinese converts from Peking to Rome.

**France, Sweden, Prussia, Denmark.** Other European nations except for Great Britain played but an inconspicuous role in the early eighteenth century China trade. The first French ship arrived at Canton in 1698. From 1720 to 1770 the *Compagnie des Indes Orientales* reaped splendid profits, paying annual dividends that ranged from 67 to 141 per cent. After its dissolution French trade began to decline, and when the French Revolution broke out the French factory at Canton was closed. During the eighteenth century Sweden (1732), Prussia (1753), and Denmark (1731) sent their first merchant ships to Canton, but no sizable trade resulted from these efforts.

**Russia.** Quite different however was the case of Russia. Her expansion across Siberia and the establishment of diplomatic and trade relations with China has been already told. In 1727 Kiakhta was established as a trading post, and from this frontier town caravans brought to Peking by way of Urga and Kalgan the furs of Siberia for which China offered an insatiable market. In addition to furs the Chinese imported from Russia European textiles, leather, glassware, and hardware. In return they exported all kinds of manufactured silk, cotton cloth, tea, porcelain, sugar, preserved ginger, rhubarb, and lacquered work. By 1777 the annual trade across the frontier at Kiakhta amounted to around 4,000,000 rubles. In the meantime there was some slight infiltration of Russians into China. In 1727 an ecclesiastical mission was established in Peking, and from this time on the Russians were assured of a supply of adequately trained interpreters for their commercial and diplomatic intercourse with China. In 1733 an embassy was sent from Peking to St. Petersburg, the only embassy sent by the Manchu dynasty to a foreign court until the reign of T'ung Chih (1861-1874). This however did not mean that the Chinese considered the Muscovites to be their equals, and when in 1806 two Russian ships tried to enter the Canton trade their participation was forbidden.

**Great Britain.** Russian failure to secure an entrance into China's maritime commerce may be considered evidence of the predominance won by British traders during the eighteenth century. An earlier chapter has told of the rise of the English East India Company. After several attempts to trade elsewhere, in 1699 the company established a
factory at Canton, and this city remained the base of its Chinese operations until 1834 when its monopoly was abolished. For over a century its ships and the so-called "country ships" — ships built in India and trading at Canton under licenses issued by the company — completely monopolized the import of Chinese commodities into Great Britain and the British possessions. This monopoly eventually proved harmful. Since profit was the great objective the company’s representatives for many decades submitted to Chinese restrictions and exactions which the British government, once it was officially represented in China, could not afford to tolerate. Furthermore monopoly led to inefficiency, and this in turn led to successful competition by American seamen.

The United States. Previous to the War of Independence the thirteen colonies obtained silk and tea by way of England, but as soon as the Treaty of Paris was signed American merchant set out to participate directly in the rich trade of Cathay. Their first ship, the Empress of China, sailed from New York City in 1784 and returned the next year with a modest cargo. In the beginning the United States had little to offer the Chinese except ginseng, a medicinal root whose cathartic and aphrodisiac properties made it popular with the wealthy gluttons of the celestial empire. Very shortly however American traders realized the possibilities of the raw cotton, lead, iron, fur, sandalwood, sea-slug, and later the textile trade. Since their ships were faster and cheaper to operate than the clumsy East Indiamen, by 1795 American commerce with China exceeded that of every other nation except Great Britain.

2. The Characteristics of the Canton Trade

The Chinese attitude. As indicated above, what brought the Western trader to the East was his desire to share in the wealth of Cathay. The resultant commerce in turn eventually led the European to interfere in the internal affairs of the celestial empire and to "open up China." To understand how the one followed the other we must have a clear idea of the Chinese attitude toward foreign trade. First it is to be noted that while China possessed many things the West wanted, the West had very little that China wanted. The outstanding products of Cathay were tea, silks, cotton fabrics, metal work, porcelains, and lacquers. In exchange for these what did the West have to offer? Only some metals (especially coined silver), ginseng, sandalwood, firearms, clocks, some scientific instruments, textiles, and furs. Naturally the Chinese merchants were in a strong position when it came to dealing with the
Temple images at Soochow. Chinese religion has always had a philosophical bent, and the varying expressions of these gods demonstrate this very well.

Western traders, and it is not surprising that the Chinese government assumed that its products, especially medicinal plants like rhubarb, were indispensable to the outer "Barbarians." In the second place the Chinese considered their kingdom to be the greatest and strongest in all the world — the only real focus of civilization. Since their policy was one of seclusion and not expansion, since they did not seek intercourse with Western peoples, and since they needed almost nothing the foreign trader could bring them, they were firm in their belief that they could fix their own terms in dealing with the outlanders. In short, the Chinese felt that the emperor's will and not the terms of formal treaties should fix the regulations for commercial procedure.

**Regulations:** (1) **Restriction to Canton.** As time went on the Chinese government finally came to insist upon two things. First, that all trade should be confined to Canton, where special administrative bodies
were created to deal with it. By 1757, when the edict providing for this restriction was issued, the government’s control of customs was in the hands of the 

 were created to deal with it. By 1757, when the edict providing for this restriction was issued, the government’s control of customs was in the hands of the *hoppo*, an official whose name might have been derived from the *Hu Pu* (Board of Revenue) to which he was directly responsible. The first *hoppo*, according to some authorities, was not a member of the official class but a merchant who was given an exclusive monopoly of foreign trade in return for annual contributions to the imperial treasury. After 1710, because of the increase of trade and the envy of other merchants, the *hoppo* became the administrator of the Canton customs.

(2) Restriction to Co-hong monopoly. Second, all trade was placed exclusively in the hands of an “official” guild or *Co-hong*. The latter was set up in 1760, and in return for enjoying a monopoly of the foreign trade its members, the *hong* merchants, stood as security for the foreigners, both for their good behavior and for the payment of duties and port fees. All relations between foreign merchants and Chinese officials had to pass through the hands of the *hong* merchants. This meant that only by way of the *Co-hong* could foreign merchants petition for redress of grievances or for improvement of trading conditions. As far as the relations between foreign and Chinese merchants were concerned, this last regulation was not unduly oppressive. The *hong* merchants were generally of the highest integrity, and many of our modern ideas of the high business morality in China were gained during the years when a small group of Chinese merchants — usually twelve or thirteen — handled the entire trade between China and the West. But this regulation made it almost impossible to present any effective remonstrance against the many minor restrictions, delays, interminable negotiations, constant uncertainties, and legal conflicts, which made the life of the foreign trader extremely unsatisfactory and unsafe. Ships of war had to remain outside the river. Women could not be brought to the factories; nor could guns or other arms. Foreigners theoretically could not engage Chinese servants (a rule not always enforced), could not use sedan chairs, could not row for pleasure on the river, nor walk extensively on shore, and once the trading season was over were obliged to return home or go to Macao — although this last regulation was not always obeyed.

3. The Macartney and Amherst Missions

*Objectives.* Despite the fact that even under these restrictions the Chinese trade was extremely profitable, the British government finally
decided that imperial guarantees for English trade must be obtained. The hoppo regulated import and export duties in such an arbitrary manner that the merchants could not foretell the sums that might be demanded of them, and worse yet, trade was burdened with irregular gratuities and perquisites which had to be paid to officials great and small. Only a treaty-made tariff would regularize duties and fees and remove from commerce the illicit burdens that oppressed it.

Macartney's mission. Accordingly, although the East India Company was apprehensive lest the Chinese government should take alarm and stop all commerce, in 1792 the British government determined to dispatch an embassy to the court of Peking in the hope of removing restraints and exactions on the Canton trade and of securing the liberty of trading at other ports. Lord Macartney, Viscount of Dewock, sailed from Portsmouth on September 26, 1792, and on August 5, 1793, arrived at Taku at the mouth of the Pei River. From Tientsin his party ascended the Pei-ho in boats which carried at their mastheads banners inscribed, "Ambassadors bearing tribute from the country of England." On arrival at Peking the embassy learned that the emperor was at his summer palace. After a few days of rest in the capital Macartney went to Jehol and then returned to Peking, where he stayed until October 7. Although everywhere given a courteous reception, the Englishman was not able to discuss a single point of business. He presented his 700 cases of presents and in turn was given entertainment said to have cost the Chinese government $850,000. Whether he performed the bow-tow is still a subject of discussion among historians, but it is certain that not one real advantage was gained except that he was able to show the Manchu court that civilized Englishmen did exist. He was received with courtesy, treated with hospitality, watched over carefully, and dismissed with civility. England was now listed as a tribute bearer, and Macartney bore to George III a letter from Ch'ien-lung that was most indicative of the Chinese point of view.

As the requests made by your ambassador militate against the laws and usages of this our Empire, and are at the same time wholly useless for the end proposed, I cannot acquiesce in them. I again admonish you, O King, to act conformably to my instructions, that we may preserve peace and amity on each side, and thereby contribute to our reciprocal happiness.

European complications. For the time being further efforts by England to secure a treaty were interrupted by affairs in Europe. From 1793 to 1815 England and France were continuously at war. Repercussions even reached the Far East, where each nation tried to poison the minds of
the Chinese against the other. A crisis occurred in 1808, when Admiral Drury occupied Macao. His excuse was fear of French aggression and a desire to protect the Chinese against a French attack. The Chinese however saw through the flimsy subterfuge, and the viceroy decreed that if the English did not evacuate Macao the Canton trade would be closed. Chinese obstinacy won and the English were forced to yield. A little later when the European struggle cast its shadow across the Atlantic there were further complications. In 1813 H.M.S. Doris captured the U.S.S. Hunter and took it to Macao. The viceroy immediately ordered the Doris to leave, and in light of other impositions on Chinese and Americans alike ordered all English trade suspended until the English mended their reprehensible conduct. Throughout the War of 1812 China’s sympathies were with the United States; official relations begun in 1786 by Consul Shaw and skillfully continued by Snow (1804) and Carrington (1812) had redounded to the benefit of the younger nation.

The Amherst Mission. With the peace which followed Napoleon’s overthrow England decided to send another mission to Peking. Like that of 1793 it was to aim to obtain removal of outstanding grievances and establishment of the company’s trade upon a secure footing, free from the aggressions of local authorities and under the protection of the emperor. Lord Amherst and his embassy arrived in China in August 1816. But he did not get the courteous treatment given to Lord Macartney, and as a result during the voyage from the coast to Peking the British envoys, whose boats bore the customary flags inscribed “Tribute Bearers,” had to submit to a continuous wrangle on the subject of the kow-tow, or formal obeisance to the emperor. Although the British government had given Lord Amherst permission to perform the kow-tow if he felt it necessary, the ambassador took the advice of the East India Company’s representative and refused to make any concession, in matters of ceremony or reception, that might diminish the national prestige. Arriving at Peking late at night on August 29, Amherst was hurried to the summer palace where at 5 A.M. — the normal hour for courts imperial — the officials insisted on taking him immediately to the audience chambers. Travel-worn, dusty, and exhausted, without court costume or credentials, the ambassador naturally asked to have his interview postponed. His excuse of illness was reported by the royal physician to be a sham, whereupon Emperor Chia-ch’ing decreed that the unmannerly envoy should be expelled from the place immediately and escorted to Canton, where without delay he was to embark for his own country.
The history of these two embassies dispatched to Peking by the government whose nationals dominated the Canton trade puts in clear relief the attitude during the early 1800's of the Chinese government. At that time the celestial empire was determined that the Canton trade should be conducted on such terms as the Chinese saw fit to dictate. The implications of England's last failure to secure a treaty meant that the Canton traders had but three choices: (1) to abandon the Canton trade; (2) to continue it under what Westerners regarded as unreasonable and arbitrary Chinese regulations; or (3) to use force and compel China to adopt a more liberal and Western commercial policy. The first was of course unthinkable because of the financial loss that would result. The third was undesirable. The second then would have been accepted had it not been for three important factors.

4. Basic Causes of the Anglo-Chinese Conflict

(1) Opium. The first of these factors was the Chinese attitude toward the opium trade. Opium, the dried juice from the capsule of the poppy flower, was known to the Chinese as early as the T'ang dynasty (618-907), and appears to have been used originally as a medicine. From the Spanish about 1620 the Chinese learned the practice of smoking tobacco; from the Dutch, who controlled Formosa for a brief period after 1614, they learned that smoking a mixture of tobacco and opium was a preventive of malaria; by the end of the century they had discovered for themselves that opium smoked alone was a strong soporific. The habit spread so rapidly that in 1729 the Emperor Yung-cheng decreed the closing of opium-smoking dens and the prohibition of opium sales for smoking purposes. At that time the Portuguese annually were bringing from India to China about 200 chests (of 133 1/2 pounds each). But after 1729 the quantity increased. In 1773 the East India Company monopolized opium production in its Indian possessions, and by the end of the century several thousand (estimates run from one to five) chests of 160 pounds each were being imported into Canton.

By 1800 the effect of opium smoking on the Chinese people had become so apparent that the Emperor Chia-ch'ing prohibited both the cultivation of the poppy in China and the importation of the drug into his dominions. The latter was a serious blow to foreign traders, for prior to that time opium was brought to Canton and sold through the hang merchants like any other commodity; in fact the demand for it was welcomed as a means of reducing somewhat the serious drain on the
Western World's reserves of silver caused by the withdrawal and retention in China of the specie required for tea purchases. After 1799 the Co-hong ceased to deal in the drug at Canton and the East India Company prohibited its transportation in company ships, but profits were so great that an illegitimate traffic immediately grew up. For about twenty years opium was discharged at the mouth of the river into hulks anchored in sheltered havens, from which it was delivered upon orders from its owners to the Chinese buyers. In 1821 a quarrel among the officials whose duty it was to receive the illegal levies on the opium traffic caused the receiving ships to be stationed outside Chinese jurisdiction and the contraband trade became more open. A special type of fast sailing craft, the lorcha, was developed to deliver the drug to points along the coast where the Chinese dealers, having taken the precaution to purchase protection from the ranking civil or military officials, received it and paid cash. From an average of about 5000 chests annually in the period 1811 to 1821 the estimated import increased to nearly 10,000 in 1821 to 1828 and to over 18,000 in 1828 to 1835; in 1839 it reached 40,000.

This eightfold expansion of the opium traffic meant that during the first four decades of the 1800's the Chinese viceroyos, hoppos, governors, admirals, magistrates, down to the insignificant person with the slightest of government connections, all connived at the breach of the laws. Then about 1835–1836 the Chinese officials made several discoveries. The first was that as the opium trade became more and more open the "squeeze" diminished. The second was that as the proportion of legitimate trade declined (as a result of the increase of the opium traffic) the perquisites of the Canton officials and the prerogatives of the Canton merchants suffered. Besides, China was sacrificing food acreage for opium growing, and the balance of trade was turning against her. Accordingly in the years 1836–1838 there emerged from the opium trade a war of memorials, edicts, proclamations, orders, and repressions which greatly enlarged the confusion, uncertainty, and strained relations between the English and Chinese at Canton.

2) Legal disagreements. The second problem contributing to the Anglo-Chinese conflict grew out of the disputes that arose when rough-and-ready "John Bulls" came ashore at Chinese ports. These disputes almost always involved the problem of criminal jurisdiction. Civil suits between foreigners and Chinese were readily settled, since the power of dictating terms was always in the hands of the Chinese merchants, and business disputes between foreigners were never brought to
the knowledge of the Chinese. The English, as the most numerous, were more concerned with the question of jurisdiction than were any other foreigners. In Macao the Chinese kept criminal jurisdiction in their own hands, so Portuguese trade presented no involvements. Until 1844 American traders adopted the attitude that while in Chinese territory they must abide by Chinese law however unjust it might be. And as for the status of sailors from national ships, until 1820 the English alone suffered complications since they alone regularly stationed war vessels in Chinese waters.

Causes of foreign opposition. It must be recognized however that although the English were the ones most concerned with this question, when they took the lead in opposition to Chinese criminal jurisdiction they really did have the support of the foreign traders at Canton, for one and all looked upon Chinese ideas of justice as decidedly barbarous. In the first place the distinction in Chinese law between accidental and willful homicide were so slender as to seem to the Western view almost negligible. The execution in 1821 of an American sailor who dropped a jar overboard and accidentally killed a Chinese woman confirmed the foreigners in their resolve never to allow one of their number to get into the hands of the Chinese if it could be avoided. Hence the British in 1833 established in Canton a criminal and admiralty court which began to function in 1839. In the second place, the accused was not represented in the Chinese courts and could not interrogate the witnesses; and the difficulty of securing evidence or an actual confession made the use of torture a recognized feature of Chinese trials. Furthermore, the accused was considered guilty until proved innocent. In the third place the corruption of the Chinese magistracy and judiciary was notorious. The final reason for foreign objection to Chinese justice resulted from the application therein of the Chinese principle of community responsibility. In the celestial empire if a son commits an offense the father is held responsible. If a clerk strikes a blow and goes into hiding his employer is held responsible for his appearance. This principle the Chinese applied to the foreigners. If a Chinese killed a foreigner some other Chinese at least was strangled. If a foreigner killed a Chinese and the culprit could not be found the Chinese insisted that some other foreigner from his group would do; and if he were not surrendered the entire trade might be threatened. Such an arrangement was thoroughly repugnant to Western ideas, and it was inevitable that steps should be taken to overthrow a system whereby the lives and property of innocent men were held in jeopardy to answer for the actions of an individual over whom they had no control.
An opium merchant at his trade. The widespread use of opium in China made it an important article of commerce—so much so that when the Peking authorities tried to interfere with British opium cargoes international tension and war resulted.

Smoking opium. Tales of the use of that drug by the celestials have been exaggerated, but there is no doubt that it was greatly encouraged by the Japanese during the decade when they occupied Manchuria.
(3) The end of the East India Company's monopoly. The third factor which contributed to the approaching crisis in Anglo-Chinese affairs was the Parliamentary Act of 1833 which abolished the East India Company's monopoly of British trade at Canton. This action, partly the result of agitation by English country merchants who were suffering at the hands of American competition, had been planned as early as 1830. Late in that year the company's agent at Canton informed the Chinese authorities through the Co-hong of what was to happen, and stated that after the modification of their charter they could no longer exercise jurisdiction over all their fellow nationals. In answer to this communication the Co-hong in January 1831 informed the company that in the event of any such change it would be necessary for the British government to appoint a "headman" (t'ai pan) who as authoritative chief of the British "merchant guild" would act as its representative in all necessary dealings with the Co-hong and would be responsible for the behavior of the British at Canton.

The Napier mission. In this demand the Chinese undoubtedly had no idea of changing the system then in vogue at Canton, and certainly had no intention of making possible direct relations between Chinese officials and representatives of the British crown. To the British government however there was but one possible response to the Chinese request. On December 10, 1833, it appointed a commission to act as His Majesty's superintendent of trade in China and gave to its head, Lord Napier, the duty of announcing his arrival at Canton by letter to the viceroy.

Lord Napier's failure. Lord Napier arrived at Macao on July 15, 1834, and ten days later reached Canton. On his arrival he immediately tried to communicate with the viceroy but could find no Chinese official who would receive his letter; he in turn refused to receive any messages from the viceroy by way of the senior Co-hong merchants. For two months the impasse held. The Chinese claimed that the British superintendent had committed three sins. First, he had come straight to Canton without waiting for permission at the Bogue or Macao. Second, he had tried to communicate directly with the viceroy. Third, he had not labeled his letter to the viceroy a "petition," the form used by vassal states. For the viceroy to have pardoned these sins would have meant recognition by him of the Britisher's equality; consequently the Chinese was as adamant as the Briton. On September 4 the Chinese ordered the cessation of all trade, surrounded the factories with troops, and ordered all Chinese in British employ to withdraw from the factory. Lord Napier attempted a show of force but it proved to be inadequate, and
he had no alternative but to yield to the demand that he retreat to Macao. Here on October 11, 1834, he died, and with his death went glimmering another British attempt to secure equality. Once again the Chinese were convinced that in the stoppage of trade they possessed a weapon before which the British and other foreigners would always yield. But tucked away in one of Napier’s dispatches was a bit of advice on which eventually the British were to act. On August 21 he had written, “I feel satisfied your lordship will see the urgent necessity of negotiating with such a government, having in your hands at the same time the means of compulsion; to negotiate with them otherwise would be an idle waste of time.”

5. The Opium War

England turns to force. For two years following the death of Lord Napier the British followed a course of absolute silence and acquiescence; but when Lord Palmerston became Foreign Secretary England took a more aggressive attitude. It was becoming clear to the British government that there could be no satisfactory relations with China until three things were secured: (1) diplomatic intercourse on a basis of equality, (2) some form of extraterritoriality which would abolish Chinese jurisdiction over foreign persons and property, and (3) free access to Chinese markets. To secure the first Palmerston directed Captain Charles Elliott, then chief superintendent of British trade at Canton, to seek direct communications with Chinese officials upon terms of equality; and as an aid to Elliott’s efforts there arrived off the China coast in July 1838 a small British squadron.

Lin Tse-hsü. Unfortunately there came at just this time a momentous decision by the Emperor Tao-kuang. For nearly forty years the imperial ban on the importation of opium had remained a dead letter while officials both central and local and merchants both Chinese and foreign waxed rich on the contraband trade. After some two years’ discussion as to the advisability of legalizing the traffic in order that it might be controlled and made to yield a revenue, the Peking government in 1838 decided on its suppression. Accordingly on March 10, 1839, Lin Tse-hsü arrived at Canton clothed with the dictatorial powers of imperial high commissioner and under instructions to “go, investigate, and act.” Eight days later he read the riot act to the hong merchants and promised several of them the death penalty if the opium held by the foreigners were not given up. At the same time he ordered the foreigners
View of Hong Kong from East Point. This lithograph of 1856 shows Hong Kong during the years when it was first being developed by the British as the focus of their power in South China.

to hand over the contents of their opium hulks and to give bond on penalty of death to cease further operations. The next day, under order of the hoppo, Chinese troops and war junks surrounded the factories and cut off all trade. Confronted at last by a Chinese official who was determined to enforce the law, and resistance being out of the question, Captain Elliott decided that the "firm tone and attitude" he had planned to pursue was also out of the question. Accordingly he assumed responsibility for all British-owned opium which should be surrendered into his hands, and by May 21, 20,291 chests had been delivered to the Chinese authorities. To the surprise of the foreign traders, who had regarded Lin as merely a militant blackmailer, the surrendered opium to the value of $10,000,000 was mixed with salt, lime, and water and poured into the sea.

Jurisdiction. Once the opium was in his possession Lin had withdrawn the cordon around the factories and announced that when the required bond was given trade could be resumed. All the American and other non-English foreign merchants, to whom the opium trade meant
little, agreed to sign a bond for each ship which arrived, so their trade was resumed. The British community however which had virtually monopolized the opium trade, backed up Captain Elliott in his refusal to yield to Chinese demands and left Canton, some members going to Macao and others to Hong Kong Island. From here English goods were transported to Canton in American, Danish, German, and Spanish ships; and Commissioner Lin found himself a victor who could not reap the fruits of his victory. On July 7 he was goaded to further activity when a sailors’ riot on the Kowloon side of the Hong Kong anchorage resulted in the death of a Chinese. Fines and imprisonment were meted out to English sailors by Captain Elliott, who to the extent of $1000 indemnified the family of the deceased and the village which had suffered damage. Lin however refused to recognize British jurisdiction and demanded that the guilty persons be handed over to the Chinese authorities for trial and punishment. When Elliott refused to comply with these demands the commissioner and viceroy moved with a large force to Hsiang-shan midway between Canton and Macao and on August 15 ordered an embargo at Macao on food supplies for the British and a walkout by all Chinese in British service. The English then congregated at Hong Kong, where on November 3 twenty-nine junks clashed with two British warships and four of the junks were sunk. Lin then became more determined than ever. Since the British would not give bond nor surrender the guilty sailor, on November 26 he decreed the cessation on December 6 of all British trade; and on February 12, 1840, an imperial edict confirmed his decree.

An opium (?) war. In trying to destroy opium Lin had brought about the destruction of British-Chinese trade and thereby made a war inevitable. To the Chinese the war which started in such an impromptu fashion on November 3, 1840, had but one cause: opium. The British and other foreigners however looked upon the opium question as purely incidental, and considered that the real purpose of the struggle was to force upon the Chinese government a modification of its arrogant attitude toward the outside world. In this point of view the English government clearly concurred, for on August 15, 1840, in a document delivered to the Chinese officials at the Pei-ho, Lord Palmerston demanded (1) payment for the opium which they regarded as a ransom exacted by the Chinese as the price of the lives of the superintendent and the imprisoned British merchants at Canton, (2) equal treatment of British officials, and (3) cession of an island off the Chinese coast to insure the future security of British trade and the protection of British merchants.
Warfare. Naturally the celestial emperor was not inclined to yield to the "outrageous" demands of the "Barbarians," and war began. The British fleet, augmented two months before by the arrival of twenty warships and twenty-eight transports, blockaded Canton, and when no payment for the opium was forthcoming in January 1841 bombarded the city. The negotiations which then ensued were futile, for the Chinese insisted that the draft treaty granted too much while the British disavowed it because it did not provide (1) sufficient indemnity, (2) payment of the hong merchants' debt to English traders, or (3) greater surety to trade. Military engagements were resumed, except for a period of six weeks in March and April while the new tea crop was being shipped. In May Canton, at the mercy of the British fleet, was ransomed for $6,000,000, and Commissioner Lin was rewarded for his patriotism by exile to the remote province of Ili. British reinforcements arrived, and Sir Henry Pottinger, whose superseding of Captian Elliott meant that English national interests would no longer be subordinated to commercial interests, then moved northward along the coast, capturing city after city. When he went into winter quarters Amoy, Tinghai, Chinhai, and Ningpo were in his possession. In the spring he resumed military operations, and in quick succession Chapei, Wool sung, Shanghai, and Chinkiang were captured. On August 9 Sir Henry's fleet lay off the old southern capital of Nanking; and from its walls five days later floated a white flag. On August 29 on the deck of the British flagship Cornwallis was signed the treaty which legally at least ended China's diplomatic superiority among the nations of the world.

6. The First Treaty Settlement, 1841-1847

The Treaty of Nanking. The important terms of this epoch-making treaty are briefly as follows:

a. Peace and friendship were established between the two sovereigns.

b. The ports of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai were opened to British residence and trade. British superintendents or consular officers were to reside at each.

c. The undeveloped island of Hong Kong was ceded to Great Britain.

d. Six million dollars was paid for the opium delivered up as a ransom for the lives of Her Britannic Majesty's superintendents and subjects who had been imprisoned and threatened with death by the Chinese high officers in March 1839.

e. Three million dollars was to be paid for debts due British merchants, and, of tremendous importance, the monopoly of the Co-hong merchants was abolished.
f. Twelve million dollars was to be paid to indemnify Great Britain for the costs of the punitive expedition.

g. It was agreed that a fair and regular tariff of export and import duties together with an agreed internal transit tax should be promulgated.

h. It was agreed that properly accredited officials of both states would henceforth conduct their business as equals according to the rules of Western diplomacy.

Such were the main provisions of the treaty which concluded the first British war with China. To the Chinese the derogatory name applied to the Anglo-Chinese conflict of 1840–1842 is indicative of the true cause of the struggle. Western students however feel that opium was at most only a pretext; that the real and basic cause was the impact of two antagonistic civilizations. When Chinese commissioners affixed their seals to the Treaty of Nanking they tacitly admitted the fact that the ancient civilization of the celestial empire must at long last recognize and yield its first concessions to the vitality of the Western World.

The Treaty of the Bogue. The Treaty of Nanking dealt largely with principle, and the following year, on October 8, 1843, it was implemented by the Treaty of the Bogue. The latter incorporated the tariff and general trade regulations drawn up and proclaimed at Nanking on July 22, 1843, and thereby also put in operation a crude extraterritoriality provision. Another clause granted to the British the privileges of the most-favored nation. Since this latter clause was inserted in the treaties subsequently negotiated with other powers, the rights of each nation vis-à-vis China soon consisted of all the privileges granted in all the treaties.

Chinese-American relations. Scarcely was the ink dry on the British treaties when other nations sought to "climb on the bandwagon." In this scramble the United States took the lead, inspired it is true by the Chinese government itself, for in the Bogue Treaty was an article which clearly stated that the emperor of China had been "graciously pleased to grant to all foreign countries, whose subjects or citizens have hitherto traded at Canton, the privileges of resorting for purposes of trade to the other four ports of Foochow, Amoy, Ningpo, and Shanghai on the same terms as the English." Even without this concession however the United States would probably have tried to take advantage of the British treaties, for more and more America was being drawn into Far Eastern affairs.

After the War of 1812 the first outstanding event in Sino-American diplomacy arose in 1821 from a question of criminal jurisdiction, com-
monly known as the Terranova case. The situation as previously men-
tioned arose when a member of the American vessel's crew dropped
overboard an earthen jug which killed a Chinese woman in a sampan
moored alongside. Chinese authorities summarily demanded the sailor's
surrender, but the Terranova's captain firmly refused to give him up.
Chinese forces thereupon surrounded the vessel and seized the unfortu-
nate crewman. What happened next is best described in the picturesque
words of the Canton viceroy:

Now it is written in the law when persons outside the pale of Chinese
civilization shall commit crimes they too shall be punished according to
law. I, therefore, ordered them [the authorities] to take the said foreigner
and, according to law, strangle him, to display luminously the laws of the
Empire. In every similar case foreigners ought to give up murderers, and
thus they will act becoming the tenderness and gracious kindness with
which the celestial empire treats them.

Although this law defined a valid legal principle, its application
was extremely galling to the American merchants, but since they pre-
ferred their continued trade to diplomatic satisfaction they sought
no reprisal.

In 1831 however a Salem vessel, the Friendship, was seized by
Sumatran natives, plundered, and the crew murdered. Although this
was not a clash with the Manchu court, America's attention was once
more drawn to the Far East. President Jackson lacked the equability
of Monroe, and referred to the matter repeatedly in his official messages.
He was not one to accept willingly the Chinese application of an old
maxim: "The barbarians [i.e., foreigners] are like beasts and are not to
be ruled on the same principles as natives. Were anyone to attempt
controlling them by maxims of reason, it would tend to nothing but
confusion. The ancient kings well understood this, and accordingly
ruled barbarians with misrule." Finally, he decided to dispatch a special
agent to the Orient to smooth out commercial difficulties, and the indi-
vidual selected was Edmund Roberts of New Hampshire, a shipowner
with some knowledge of Asiatic commerce. In 1832 Roberts was sent
to the Far East on the ship Peacock, accompanied by a naval vessel as
escort; he was directed to sign treaties with Siam, Muscat, Cochin
China, and later Japan, but to leave the more difficult missions to China
for later settlement. Roberts sailed via the Cape of Good Hope to
Canton, where he met with his first rebuff. The Chinese, suspicious of
the character of the envoy's vessels, ordered them to leave. "He
[Roberts] is not allowed to frame excuses," said the imperial edict,
and so involve offenses, that would be examined into and punished. Let the day fixed for her [the Peacock's] departure be reported. Hasten! Hasten! A special order." Despite the threatening character of this missive Roberts ignored it and remained for six weeks, secure in the knowledge that if circumstances warranted the Peacock alone could have sunk the entire Chinese imperial navy.

In Cochin China Roberts encountered his second disappointment. The representatives ordered to meet him astounded him with their "duplicity and prevarication," and when he explained that the ruler of the United States was not a king and that no orders of nobility existed their attitude became markedly insulting. He was quick to comprehend that something must be done to give him standing and "face" in native eyes, and resorted to a typical Yankee stratagem: when the scribe sat down to list Roberts's titles for purposes of comparison with the various ranks of the country's chief minister of state, the American obligingly listed after his name all the counties of New Hampshire, and was about to follow with the towns, mountains, rivers, and lakes, when the weary scribe acknowledged that his nobility was probably equal in quality to that of the Cochin authority. Nevertheless the officials were adamant in their demand for the kow-tow; Roberts's refusal to comply forced him to go away empty-handed.

Results were better in Siam. Here in 1833 a treaty was signed which measurably improved trading relations between the two nations, for it included an adjustment of customs and port charges, and the abandonment of barbarous penalties for debt. Roberts gave many elegant presents to Siamese officials, including pearl-ornamented watches, silks, and silver filigree baskets with bird-and-flower enamel decorations. These were graciously accepted by King Phaya Phra-hkang; but before Roberts left he was informed that other gifts would be expected, notably a set of stone statues clothed in American costumes, ten pairs of vase lamps, and gold-hilted swords designed to minute specifications.

In Muscat Roberts encountered a powerful and enlightened ruler who controlled an empire extending from the Persian Gulf to Zanzibar. This aggressive sultan possessed a strong navy, and enjoyed a prosperous trade throughout the Middle East. Roberts was welcomed in a civilized manner, and the sultan signed a generous treaty in which all of Roberts's demands were met with willing understanding.

From Muscat Roberts returned home to submit the treaties to the Senate for ratification, and was immediately sent out again in a man-of-war to inform Siam and Muscat that the United States approved of
their agreements. He was then to reopen negotiations with Cochin China, and proceed to Japan. After exchanging ratifications Roberts went to Canton, where he contracted the plague, which caused his death at Macao in June 1836.

**Commodore Kearny.** Of the Sino-American disputes which Roberts was instructed to leave for later consideration the most important was the question of reparations for American opium destroyed by the Chinese. When Commissioner Lin started his opium seizures as previously noted the Americans surrendered their opium but asked their government for a commercial agent to negotiate a treaty and for a naval force to protect persons and property. In satisfaction of the latter request Commodore Kearny was sent to Chinese waters, where he succeeded in obtaining Chinese friendship and even in persuading the governor of Canton to pay damages to the amount of several hundred dollars for injuries suffered by Americans during the Opium War. He watched with interest the British negotiations for the Treaty of Nan-king, and shortly after its signing requested the Chinese government to extend most-favored-nation treatment to Americans. Less because of Kearny's request however than because of the desire to remove possible difficulties with foreigners, the Chinese officials decided to agree, and the desired provision as we have seen was incorporated in the Treaty of the Bogue. When news of these developments reached the merchants of Boston they persuaded President Tyler to ask Congress on December 30, 1842, to approve the appointment of a resident commissioner in China to care for the commercial and diplomatic affairs of the United States.

**Caleb Cushing.** Congress approving, the post was conferred upon Caleb Cushing, Congressman from Massachusetts. Cushing has been described as "a shrewd lawyer and a plain-spoken man," well fitted to cope with tortuous Oriental diplomacy. His political career showed that he was opportunistic and never blindly loyal to his superiors. Although his abilities earned him nominations to the chief justiceship of the Supreme Court and the secretariaship of the treasury, neither appointment was confirmed. His mastery of tactful diplomacy however and his awareness of the difficulties inherent in legal phraseology made him the ideal emissary; moreover British force and diplomacy and the Chinese pledge to Kearny had paved the way. It is not surprising that the treaty which resulted from his mission was better in most respects than the British document that preceded it.

Cushing, with Daniel Webster's son as his secretary, arrived off
Macao in February 1844 with a squadron designed to emphasize the dignity of the mission, and the strength of the United States—a squadron including a frigate, a steam frigate, and a sloop-of-war. He immediately notified the provincial governor of his presence, and asked him to notify the emperor of his approach. To force a settlement Cushing threatened to arrange for treaty negotiations at Tientsin, but although the provincial officials were courteous they were adamant in their refusal to permit him to go to Peking. After Cushing had waited more than two months at Macao the emperor deigned to dispatch an emissary, one Chi-ying, who had had previous experience in treating with "the foreign devils." A treaty was signed on July 3, 1844, in a Macao suburb named Wanghia, and the document has since borne that name.

**The Wanghia Treaty.** The Wanghia Treaty, signed on July 3, 1844, incorporated in one text and frequently in cleverer and more exact terms the privileges granted in the previous British treaties. Americans were permitted to rent houses and places of business and even to lease sites on which they themselves could construct houses and hospitals, churches, and cemeteries. In addition to several advantages having to do with the payment of duties, the treaty contained permission for Americans to buy Chinese books and employ teachers of the language. Perhaps the most important contribution of Cushing's diplomacy was its definition of extraterritoriality and the extension of the principle to civil cases. Of scarcely less significance in the light of later events were the stipulations that the treaty might be revised after the lapse of twelve years and that the American minister might communicate with Peking not only through the high commissioner at Canton but also through the viceroys at either Nanking or Canton.

Only three untoward incidents marred Cushing's stay in southern China. One occurred when the captain of the American frigate decided to cruise up the river and was summarily stopped at Whampoa. The second arose when a new flagstaff and weather vane which arrived on Cushing's vessels were installed at the American consulate in Canton. Ignorant citizens ascribed an epidemic raging at that time to the devilish machinations of the weather vane, "which shot toward all quarters, thereby causing serious impediment to the felicity and good fortunes of the land," and the consulate was obliged to take it down. A third difficulty resulted from the death of a Chinese rioter killed when in the midst of a mob he assaulted the foreign settlement. The killer was singled out, tried by a consular court, and liberated on the grounds of
Chinese punishment: the teba or cangue, a form of stocks. Such cruel and unusual punishments led to the insistence of foreigners upon their own judicial systems, a practice which became known as extraterritoriality.

self-defense, and Cushing induced the Chinese authorities to accept the court's findings. This was the first case to be settled under the new provisions of extraterritoriality as defined by the Treaty of Wanghia.

Other treaties. The French followed closely in the footsteps of the Americans. On October 24, 1844, at Whampoa M. Theodore de Lagrené signed a treaty which added nothing to the previous treaties except a provision that in the absence of a French consul French merchants and ships could seek the intervention of the consul of a friendly power. During the course of the negotiations however the plenipotentiary of the nation which considered itself the protector of Catholic missions in non-Catholic lands persuaded the Canton viceroy to obtain two important imperial decrees. The first (December 28, 1844) canceled the ancient proscriptions against Roman Catholicism, and the second (February 20, 1846) restored to the Roman Catholics church property which had been confiscated in 1724. Naturally the first decree did not satisfy other Christian groups. Consequently they brought their claims to the attention of Viceroy Chi-ying, who on December 22, 1845, declared that all
the Western nations were to be treated on the same footing in the exercise of their religion.

Immediately after the French negotiations came a Belgian effort to secure a treaty. China proved obdurate, but the Belgian agent did secure on July 25, 1845, an imperial edict granting Belgians the right to trade under the procedure of the existing treaties. The king of Sweden and Norway however was more successful, and on March 20, 1847, his commissioners and Viceroy Chi-ying signed a treaty which followed the American model.

This was the last of the treaties which grew out of the Opium War, and may be said to mark the end of the first treaty settlement. With it the Western World's long effort to open up China to secure for its traders improved treatment on the part of the Chinese seemed at last to have been successful.
The Walls of China Crumble

(1844-1894)

Introduction. The treaty settlement which followed the Opium War broke the walls of Chinese complacency, and the West then felt it would be relatively simple to open the whole celestial empire to Occidental commercial endeavors. This idea however turned out to be erroneous, for actually the Chinese had not learned a lesson from the events of the 1840's. Although the foreigners indeed were beginning to lose all respect for China's military forces and for her ability to impose her will upon the aliens within her borders, the Chinese did not yet realize the weakness of her imperial armies. Furthermore British arms had touched merely the fringes of the great empire. The majority of Chinese officials were still ignorant of foreign desires or else indifferent to them, while scores of millions of inland inhabitants, if they had heard of the West at all, were yet unable to conceive its power or to comprehend the new conditions brought about by the foreigners. The Manchu dynasty, itself an alien interloper, felt its hold on the empire weakening and stiffened its resistance. As a result once more the irresistible met the immovable. Great as were the concessions granted by the treaty settlements, the foreigners wanted still more. China on the other hand wished to whittle down the concessions she had been forced to yield, and to continue her old policy of having as little as possible to do with the West. Under the circumstances a second conflict was inevitable.

1. The Failure of the First Treaty Settlement

The opening of Canton. The intention of the Chinese to renege on their treaty obligations was first shown at Canton. Although the people
of Shanghai, Amoy, Foochow, and Ningpo received the foreign traders amicably enough, the situation was very different at the port which had had most experience with foreigners. Here the populace had not forgotten the misdeeds of unruly seamen, and still smarted under the losses occasioned by the recent bombardment. Naturally then trouble arose when the Westerners, remembering the high-handed treatment they had received for so many years, insisted that their new treaty-defined status should be recognized and that they should be permitted to leave the cramped and unhealthful quarters of the old factories outside the walled city; the British wanted not only better living quarters but in addition demanded entrance to Canton as a sign of national equality. Chinese officials however asserted that it would be impossible to protect foreigners in the crowded streets of the city, and also insisted that the treaty did not definitely confer the right to enter the walled town. In 1846 therefore it was agreed to postpone indefinitely the opening of the city; but when in the following March several Englishmen and Americans were stoned at a nearby village (Fatshan), the British fleet captured the Bogue forts and spiked their cannon. With Canton at the mercy of the gunboats, the viceroy agreed to open the city by April 6, 1849; but when the day arrived there was no compliance. British protests were unavailing. A final insult was added when the emperor awarded honors to his jingoistic officials and presented the people of Canton with honorific tablets inscribed "The People’s Will Strong as a Walled City." The Cantonese won a victory — but in so doing took the initial steps toward another war.

Revision of the treaties. A second issue grew out of the refusal of the Chinese government to consider a revision of the first treaty settlement. The American and French treaties of 1844 were revisable at the end of twelve years, and the British government, under the most-favored-nation clause, naturally claimed that the Treaty of Nanking (1842) was also revisable at the end of the same period or in 1854. Representatives of all three nations agreed that relations with China needed many alterations. The most important desiderata were:

a. Access generally to the interior of China and the coastal cities, or at least free navigation on the Yangtze as far up the river as Nanking and the opening of the seaboard cities of Chekiang.
b. Legalization of the opium trade.
c. Abolition of inland transit duties.
d. Suppression of piracy.
e. Regulation of Chinese labor emigration.
f. Residence of foreign envoys at Peking or at least habitual correspond-
The Morrison. The American attempt to enter Japan that at the time probably attracted most popular attention was the voyage of the Morrison in 1837. The vessel belonged to a Canton firm, Olyphant and Company, which in every possible way had aided the work of missionaries on the China coast. C. W. King, a young member of the Olyphant firm, proposed to occupy the Morrison’s layover time while she was waiting for a return cargo in a voyage to Japan. A pretext was furnished by the presence in Canton of seven shipwrecked Japanese seamen, and on board also were S. Wells Williams and Peter Parker of the American Missionary Board. Unarmed, since the trip was entirely exploratory, the Morrison sailed into Yedo (Tokyo) Bay and anchored at Uraga, where an attempt was made to land a missionary. The hostile Japanese spurned both the preacher and their own shipwrecked countrymen, and as a final gesture of determination the harbor forts fired upon the vessel. The Morrison made a second attempt to land at Kagoshima, but was again fired upon and forced to retire. The effect of the voyage was to bring Japan clearly into public view for the first time, and from that year American interest in the island empire and its resistance to foreign advances never lapsed.
The rise of American interest in Japan. Meanwhile other factors had entered the situation. During the early 1800's the New England ports had developed a lucrative whaling traffic. It was the custom for whaling vessels to operate for two or three years in the Pacific, using the Hawaiian Islands as a base, but some of the best whaling grounds in the world lay north and east of the Japanese islands. From time to time storms drove whalers aground on Japan, and the Nipponese government's policy of severity to shipwrecked seamen made the establishment of amicable relations with Japan a strong necessity. In addition the simultaneous development of Pacific coast ports and steam navigation fostered plans for trans-Pacific steamer routes, which would necessarily include Japanese ports of call for coaling and provisioning. Moreover reports that Japan owned large coal deposits and other wealth stimulated interest in a treaty of commerce. Finally international jealousy played a part; Russian and Dutch contacts with Japan, coupled with rising British and French interest in the Orient, impelled alert businessmen in the United States to consider seriously the consequences of delay.

Biddle's visit. These factors were brought clearly to public view by a series of incidents which occurred shortly after the visit of the Morrison. In 1845 the whaler Manhattan, Captain Mercator Cooper, tried the same dodge that had been unsuccessfully tried by the Morrison — the return of shipwrecked Japanese mariners to their homeland. The vessel anchored in Yedo Bay but was permitted to stay only a few days, and on her departure she carried away some Japanese stowaways who expressed a desire to view the Western World at first hand. During the same year the United States dispatched its first accredited representative to China under the terms of the Treaty of Wanghia, and among the emissary's instructions was an order to negotiate a treaty with Japan. The minister, Alexander H. Everett, fell ill before his arrival in China and turned his commission over to Commodore Biddle, commander of his escort vessels, the Columbus and Vincennes. Biddle proceeded to China, exchanged treaty ratifications, and then went to Japan, where he arrived in July 1846. He frankly requested a treaty arrangement, and was turned down in no uncertain terms. To make matters worse, a Japanese soldier struck him; and Biddle’s mildness in accepting whatever punishment the Japanese chose to inflict on the offender was apparently interpreted by them as a sign of weakness and brought about some loss of respect for America and its people. When news of this incident reached the United States pressure groups utilized it to strengthen their demands for a more forceful approach to the
government of Nippon, and accordingly when the whaler Lagoda was wrecked in the Sea of Japan in 1848 and its crew was imprisoned in Nagasaki, the United States government took action. The U.S.S. Preble was ordered to rescue the imprisoned seamen, and despite many difficulties Commander James Glynne in 1849 brought about their release. In 1851 three more marooned Americans were sent home by way of the Dutch factory at Deshima. It became clear that contacts between Japan and the United States were increasing at such a rate that relations between the two countries needed to be placed on a firm diplomatic basis. In short the stage was set for the Perry expedition of 1853—America's first great gesture toward the Orient, and one whose effects were so far-reaching that it truly might be said to have been a cornerstone in the foundations of World War II.

2. The Perry Expedition

Commodore Perry. Matthew Calbraith Perry, commodore in the United States Navy, was born in 1794 of a navy family. His father had
fought in the American Revolution, and his brother Oliver Hazard was already one of the nation’s great naval heroes. Perry himself had been aboard the President in 1811 when it helped bring about the War of 1812 by defeating the Little Belt, and later he had been an officer in the expedition which established the colony of Liberia on the African coast. He was largely instrumental in starting the Naval Lyceum and the first real gunnery school, and he also is credited with starting a genuine interest in the training of engineers for the new steam navy. In the Mexican War he successfully commanded the Gulf Squadron. Naturally, then, after the first commander of the China Squadron, Commodore J. H. Aulick, had retired because of illness, Perry was the logical choice to lead the proposed expedition to Japan.

Diplomatic motives. The instructions Secretary of State Webster issued to Commodore Aulick in 1851 were mild and conciliatory toward Japan. They stressed the need of coaling ports and protection for shipwrecked seamen, but omitted reference to the numerous insults the Japanese had offered American vessels and citizens. Aulick was to have only one steam vessel and two sloops-of-war—surely not a prepossessing squadron with which to break down the tightly held barriers of a stubborn nation. In 1852, however, when acting Secretary C. M. Conrad transmitted instructions to Perry, he adopted an entirely different tone. First of all he assigned Perry a powerful fleet—five steamers and six or more sailing vessels—to act as “persuaders.” In addition to the objectives of the Aulick instructions, which included protection of seamen, designation of treaty ports, and the right to purchase coal, Perry was expected to make the Japanese realize that they had acted like a “semi-barbarous” people, who in their childish isolationism had infringed the law of nations. At all times of course he was to remember that the expedition was a peaceful one, not in any sense a punitive or marauding mission; but in the final analysis if persuasion did not work he was to be permitted to use force.

The voyage. As it turned out the numerous vessels promised were not forthcoming. When Perry finally sailed his fleet consisted of two ships, the Mississippi and the Princeton; the latter however broke down before leaving America. The Mississippi alone therefore made the long trip via the Cape of Good Hope to the Pacific, where it was to be joined later by the steamer Susquehanna and the sloops-of-war Plymouth and Saratoga. Accompanied by S. Wells Williams, his interpreter, Perry then sailed via the Ryukyu Islands for Yedo Bay, where he anchored on July 8, 1853.

Perry’s policy. During the preparation of the expedition and the
months at sea Perry had steeped himself in all the knowledge he could glean from the Navy Department's books on Nippon and its people, and he had resolved that as far as his instructions permitted he would not repeat Biddle's mistake. Accordingly he had determined upon a definite if somewhat strange course of action. Since the Japanese apparently respected dignity and formalism he had decided to provide these
in large quantities, along with a degree of pageantry hardly to be expected from an emissary of the democratic United States. From the beginning of the negotiations then he dealt with the ordinary Japanese only through subordinates; he himself refused to have anything to do with persons of less than the highest caste and rank. He stubbornly secluded himself in his cabin, had his interpreter refer to him as "Lord of the Forbidden Interior," and insisted upon direct negotiation with the central authorities, although the Japanese duped him into receiving lesser fry. While this policy drew upon him the criticism — and in some cases the mockery — of his own crews, it proved highly successful. The Japanese were a medieval people, and they responded to medieval panoply. Perry had hit upon the exact method calculated to produce results.

Perry in Japan. On his arrival in Yedo Bay Perry immediately became aware of the exotic characteristics of the people with whom he had to deal. The hillsides it was reported were lined with low white barriers which appeared to be some sort of fortification — Perry later discovered that they were fences of lath and cheesecloth designed to slow down the shells and bullets of the foreigners' strange firearms. Japanese naval vessels — decorated war galleys (really large rowboats) — attempted to board but were firmly discouraged; and when one of the American vessels blew its steam whistle the entire crew of a Japanese tender dove overboard in panic. The Japanese first threw a scroll aboard the Mississippi, containing a French message ordering the strangers to depart, but eventually a Dutch-speaking Japanese arranged for a meeting with the governor of the immediate province, and it was agreed that Perry's letter to the emperor should be received at Urage by a commissioner named Toda, supposedly high in the emperor's councils. Accompanied by an honor guard of 300 and covered by the guns of his warships, Perry landed with much dignity, conferred with the shogun's emissaries, and was again ordered to leave. But he had won two important points: he had forced the Japanese to receive him formally, and he had penetrated Japan at a place other than Nagasaki, the traditional point of contact with the foreigner. He warned the Japanese to consider his request for a treaty, and told them that he would return the following spring for their answer. He then went to Canton, leaving the shogun and his fellow officials an opportunity "furiously to think."

Successful negotiations. Perry's return to Japan somewhat earlier than he had planned was hastened by the presence of the French frigate Constantine in nearby waters, and by the announced approach of the
Russian Admiral Putiatin. Since America had made the first opening in Japanese seclusion Perry reasoned it should be the nation to profit, and he re-entered Yedo Bay in February 1854. This time he had under his command a much larger force — ten ships and approximately 2000 men. On March 8 he had his first meeting with Japanese emissaries; and on March 31 the Treaty of Kanagawa was signed, the first treaty Japan had ever deigned to negotiate with any Occidental power. To this achievement Perry’s policy of pomp and circumstance had doubtless contributed greatly. His landing for the final negotiations was in the form of a military parade. It was led by two Negro flagbearers; then followed the commodore and his chief aides in glittering naval dress uniforms, a band playing “Yankee Doodle,” and finally a platoon of seamen who guarded with bared cutlasses a truly Oriental aggregation of gifts for the emperor. These gifts were among the most interesting features of the expedition; they included champagne, whiskey, Madeira wine, perfumery, books, telegraph wire, agricultural tools, stoves, charts, clocks, firearms and swords, and a miniature steam railroad, complete with track. The model railroad made an enormous hit, and very shortly the dignified officials of the shogunate were riding in sedate circles behind the small locomotive, their robes fluttering in the breeze. The idea was of course to give the Japanese some notion of the marvels of the Western technology of which they had deprived themselves during their long centuries of isolation, and which the new treaty agreement was now making available. The shogun however did not properly appreciate the gifts, for it was later reported that the presents lay neglected in Tokugawa headquarters and that the emperor never saw them.

The Treaty of Kanagawa. The Treaty of Kanagawa, signed near Yokohama on March 31, 1854, opened two ports, Hakodate and Shimoda, to American commerce. The Japanese originally offered Nagasaki, but Perry would have nothing to do with the port in which foreigners had historically been subjected to indignity. But Shimoda, despite the fact that a consul was permitted to live there, proved so useless that the United States was glad to add Nagasaki to the list of treaty ports under the most-favored-nation guarantees when in a later treaty Britain secured that city as a place of entry for her commerce. In addition the Japanese pledged that shipwrecked sailors would be protected and not subjected to insult or imprisonment. Two items were omitted from the treaty: access to Japanese coal deposits, and extraterritoriality. The omission of extraterritoriality was probably due to
Delivering American presents to Japan at Yokohama during Perry's visit. The gifts included examples of western technological skill, designed to impress the Japanese with what they were missing by not having trade relations with the Occident.

the efforts of S. Wells Williams, who disapproved of the effects it had had in China; later however it was included. Like the British treaties of Nanking, Perry's agreement proved to be chiefly an entering wedge. It was followed immediately by a British treaty (1854), a Russian (1855), and a Dutch (1856). The chief significance therefore of the Kanagawa accord was that it signaled for the first time the opening of the barred gates of Nippon, just as the parallel treaties of Nanking had first breached the walls of the celestial empire. Even more to the point, it marked the entry of the United States into the field of Pacific relations, giving her a paternal and generally altruistic interest in the fate of her protégé. Finally, when the Japanese realized their inability to cope with the highly developed technology of the West, a revolution occurred both in politics and economics which was to bring Nippon into the ranks of the great powers and enable her to join Germany in upsetting
the precarious peace of 1918. Perry’s voyage marked a turning point—and a great one—in Pacific history.

3. The Work of Townsend Harris

Harris’s early work. The Treaty of Kanagawa, at least according to the American interpretation, provided for a permanent resident-consul at Shimoda, and the man appointed to fill this significant post was a New York merchant, Townsend Harris. Harris had been a good citizen, a loyal Democrat, and a civic worker, but an 1849 trading voyage he made to the Orient turned out badly, and in Hong Kong he applied for a job with the American diplomatic service. Despite the best efforts of influential friends he was rewarded with the inconsequential position of consul at the minor port of Ningpo. He appointed a substitute and made his way to the United States where he applied for the newly opened Japanese post. His suave, genial personality gained him the appointment, and in 1855 he departed again for the Far East, commissioned also to negotiate a new treaty with Siam en route. Revision of the Roberts treaty with Siam was necessary because the stipulations as to tonnage dues were so high that trade was seriously hampered, and besides the Roberts accord had omitted any mention of extraterritoriality. Harris went to Siam via England, and drew up a treaty immediately after the conclusion of successful British negotiations. Thence he proceeded aboard the San Jacinto to Shimoda, where he arrived in August 1856.

The Convention of 1857. For the first eighteen months at Shimoda Harris was left to his own devices without communication from the American State Department. He early concluded that the town had been chosen by the Japanese because of its very unsuitability—it was at the end of a mountainous peninsula, virtually cut off from the rest of the island, and its only export was quarried stone. He was also hampered by a quite obvious Japanese reluctance to let him stay; representatives of the government assured him that their interpretation of the treaty was that a resident could remain only if both powers desired it—and they most certainly did not. When he had successfully broken down this opposition he was confronted with Japanese horror at his demand that he be permitted in person to deliver his credentials to the shogun at Yedo. While engaged in undermining this barrier he managed in June 1857 to negotiate a new convention, in which the United States gained by direct acknowledgment what had been tacitly implied by the most-
favored-nation clause — the benefits in other words accorded Britain, Russia, and Holland by agreements signed after the Kanagawa Treaty. The Convention of 1857 granted the opening of Nagasaki as a port of call, the residence of a vice consul at Hakodate, extraterritoriality, the right in case cash were not available to pay for a ship’s provisions in goods, and a more favorable basis of currency exchange.

Airdues with the shogun. Harris’s abilities were now shown to good effect. Lack of communication with his home government had reduced his personal living scale to that of the Japanese, and his health was severely affected. Moreover Japanese authorities still persisted in their traditional opposition to a personal interview between Harris and the shogun. Harris however refused to be disconcerted or put off. By the use of combined tact, persistence, frankness, and good will, he engineered in 1858 an audience, from which came a new treaty also in that year. His conversation with the shogun was the first audience a shogun had granted a foreigner since 1613 — and Harris seemed not to be fazed, much to the astonishment and chagrin of sycophantic hangers-on of the Tokugawa court. An additional triumph was Japanese permission to omit the obeisance in greeting the minister. His audience was followed by a score of long conferences in which the terms of the treaty were laboriously drawn up. In the conferences Harris continued his policy of honesty and open dealing. He constantly refused to take advantage of Nipponese ignorance of Western ways, and the result was a credit to the nation he represented.

The Treaty of 1858. The Treaty of 1858 included provisions guaranteeing regular consular and diplomatic relations with Japan, the opening of four additional treaty ports with trade privileges — Kanagawa, Nagasaki, Niigata, and Hyogo (Kobe), and the offer of American “good offices” in case Japan got into international trouble. Despite Harris’s qualms extraterritoriality was also established. A preferential tariff was set up favoring American exports, although the advantage to the United States was quickly countered when the other powers secured agreements that reduced their duties to the American level. Of doubtful value also was a provision for currency exchange; it had a harmful effect in quickly causing speculation on the currency market. Harris’s attempt to pave the way for the reception of foreign missionaries failed.

The Japanese delayed in signing the treaty from February, when the negotiations were concluded, till July 1858. The reason was a serious split in the Japanese political structure; many conservative nobles stood pat in their opposition to negotiations with the hated foreigner, while
the weakening Tokugawa shogunate was disposed to accept Harris's argument that it might be better to sign the American accord voluntarily than to be forced into an agreement at gun point by the British. The matter was brought to a sudden conclusion by the arrival in Yedo in June of the American warships Mississippi and Powhatan, bringing news of the conclusion of the treaties of Tientsin, and of the projected plans of Lord Elgin to follow up that victory by an expedition to Japan. The shogun then displayed actual eagerness to conclude the negotiations, and on July 29, 1858, Harris's policies were officially approved. The emperor, influenced by certain feudal lords, did not support the document, and the shogun's willingness to negotiate with the West was a major cause of his own eventual downfall, but the influence of the treaty was none the less great. It was followed shortly by similar agreements with the Netherlands, Russia, Britain, and France.

The United States has therefore had in its diplomatic relations with the Orient two representatives of whom it might well be proud—Anson Burlingame, who injected a note of high idealism into a sphere of diplomatic activity hitherto characterized chiefly by selfish squabbling, and Townsend Harris, who illustrated the best principles of American democracy in his refusal to take advantage of a backward people, and who so impressed the Japanese with American fairness that they revered the United States for many years—in fact, until the war party came into dominance after the turn of the century.

4. Effects of the Treaty and Final Ratification

Japanese politics. The breaking of Japan's wall of isolation was the signal for a revolution in Japanese life. Perry was not wholly responsible; conditions in Japan were ripe for a change. But foreign contacts accelerated the process. The normal succession of earthquakes, conflagrations, storms, epidemics, and floods was taken by many of the frightened islanders as portents of doom and as retribution for the government's failure to repel the foreigner. Quite naturally then a sharp division in attitudes showed itself after Perry's departure. The shogun's party maintained the realistic view that the foreigners were strong enough to take what they wished if Japan proved unwilling to give it. The shogun's political authority however had been weakened by inept domestic policy and by feudal jealousy, and he greatly needed the support of a group of willing liberals—men who, like Inouye and Ito later, appreciated the benefits of Western civilization and determined
Fujiyama, Japan. This sacred mountain has always been a symbol of Nippon; its symmetrical contours illustrate in interesting fashion the characteristic scenic beauty of the islands.
to have it for Japan. In opposition to the shogun was the Emperor Komei, who, dominated by feudal enemies of the shogun, notably the western clans of Choshu and Satsuma, led a party of intransigents, and this clique was chiefly responsible for the unfortunate incidents that marred Japan’s foreign relations between 1858 and 1863. It later turned out however that the western clansmen were not so much antiforeign as they were anti-shogun, and when they had become firmly convinced of the value of Western ways they shifted their ground. The arrival of the foreigners therefore served to complicate Japanese internal politics and eventually became responsible for a complete change in the government. Most of the clashes with the Occident occurred during the rule of the Shogun Iyemochi, who acceded in 1858 at the age of thirteen to these heavy responsibilities, and who remained at the head of the state until 1866.

_Tardy fulfillment of the treaty._ The year 1859 was the date set for putting the treaty provisions into force, but mob spirit among the natives became so great that the shogun, fearful of antiforeign demonstrations, refused to open Kanagawa on the main highway to Yedo, and persuaded the foreigners to settle in Yokohama, which later became one of Japan’s most important ports. The first tragedy to occur was the murder in 1861 of a Mr. Heusken, Dutch interpreter for the American legation. His death was followed by exhibitions of antiforeign sentiment so intense that the foreign representatives moved from Yedo to Yokohama in protest at the Japanese failure to maintain order; the one exception to this exodus was Townsend Harris, who appreciated the shogun’s difficulties and was not disposed to force a difficult issue. After the ministers returned to Yedo the British legation was attacked and one of its attachés wounded. As a result the desperate shogun wrote a personal letter to Queen Victoria requesting postponement of the opening of the ports.

_The Richardson incident._ In 1862 the Richardson incident brought matters to a new climax. A group of three British merchants with a woman companion were riding on horseback from Yokohama to Yedo when they encountered the feudal procession of the father of the lord of Satsuma. They pulled their horses to the roadside but neglected to obey the ancient Japanese custom of dismounting when in the presence of a daimyo, and as a result the nobleman’s retainers — eager to demonstrate their hostility to the foreigner — attacked the party and killed Mr. C. L. Richardson. The following year the British presented their demands, an indemnity to be paid by the shogun, a smaller indemnity
to be paid by the lord of Satsuma, and trial and execution of the assassins in the presence of a British representative. The unhappy shogun however was helpless. He was summoned before the emperor to explain his policies, and the result of the conference was not satisfaction of the British demands but a new exclusion order by which the daimyodominated ruler ordered the foreigners out of his country. The Western nations replied that the treaties must be lived up to, and offered military aid to the shogun against the vassals who constituted the backbone of the antiforeign party, but the shogun, insecure in his office, turned down the proposal. He refused however to carry out the imperial decree.

The bombardment of Kagoshima. Meantime the impatient lord of Choshu, whose feudal fortresses guarded the entrance to the Inland Sea, fired on an American vessel off Shimonoseki and followed this attack by others on Dutch and nearby French vessels. French and American warships immediately took reprisal by attacking the Choshu forts, and the British, realizing that the western clans were the spearhead of opposition to the foreigner and desiring retribution for the Richardson affair, sent a naval expedition to Kagoshima, Satsuma’s capital. The bombardment was interrupted by a typhoon which completed the destruction of the town, but stubborn Japanese die-hards, pleased that the British had been unable to seize the Satsuma-protected assassins of Richardson, rose from the wreckage and shortlisted over their “victory.” Shortly afterward however Satsuma representatives offered to pay an indemnity to the British, promised to continue their “search” for the murderers, and requested foreign naval assistance in building up their own fleet.

The bombardment of Shimonoseki. In the following year, 1864, Sir Rutherford Alcock, the British minister to Japan, determined upon a resolute course of action designed to decrease the influence of the western clans over the emperor at Kyoto. He organized a naval expedition ostensibly for the purpose of punishing Choshu for attempting to seize the emperor’s person but actually planned to undermine the power of the antiforeign, anti-shogun clique. The squadron consisted of nine British warships, four Dutch, three French, and one American; the last was not a regulation ship-of-war but rather a chartered merchant vessel hired for the occasion to clarify America’s diplomatic position. On September 5, 1864, the forts at Shimonoseki were bombarded, and within three days naval projectiles and landing parties had silenced their guns and ended their resistance. Alcock, who had undertaken this mission without the approval of his home government, won its com-
mendment, and Choshu, finally sold on the value of Westernization much as Satsuma had been following the Kagoshima bombardment, did not rebuild its fortifications and shortly agreed to pay an indemnity. The shogun refused to permit foreigners to treat with a rebellious clan, and insisted on paying the indemnity himself — further straining his financial resources — and the consequent Shimonoseki Convention included a pledge on the part of the shogun to pay $3,000,000.

The Four-Power Convention of 1866. The terms of the convention were not lived up to in detail, primarily because the British did not intend them to be. Sir Harry Parkes, Alcock’s successor, was much more interested in the opening of additional treaty ports than he was in the payment of the full indemnity. He arranged another naval demonstration, this time at Osaka near the capital, Kyoto, in which British, French, and Dutch vessels participated, and as a result of the military pressure thus applied the Shimonoseki Convention was modified. Parkes proposed to reduce the indemnity by two thirds if Kobe and Osaka, not originally supposed to be opened to foreign trade until 1868, were opened immediately, if the tariff were reduced, and if the emperor would personally approve the treaties. The Japanese, again finding themselves helpless before foreign military strength, gave in to the demands for the emperor’s approval and tariff reduction, but refused to accelerate the opening of the ports. Because of their defection in this last provision they agreed to pay the full indemnity and thereby satisfied France, which had been more interested in cash than in additional port trade. The chief consequence of the 1866 Four-Power Convention was the final granting of the emperor’s approval to the treaty agreements. This removed at last what had been the greatest obstacle to the full success of the entire program of opening Japan. In addition the United States gained another opportunity to show its friendliness; it remitted its share of the indemnity, some $785,000. With the imperial signature on the treaties, and the realization by the western clans that anti-shogun sentiments did not require an acceptance of antiforeignism, the chief stumbling blocks to Japan’s intercourse with the West were removed. At the same time the foreigners’ share in transforming the life of ancient Japan came under Japanese control, and from this point on the revolution was largely in Japanese hands.

5. The Last Steps in the Opening of Japan

First voluntary contacts with the West. With the application of foreign pressure Japan’s last objections to contact with the Western World
gradually died. The shogun’s administration early decided that copies of the treaties should be distributed to foreign nations by Japanese delegations, and in 1860 the first of these missions left Japan bound for the United States. The commissioners traveled on the U.S.S. Powhatan, accompanied by the Japanese steamer Kaorin Maru, and arrived in San Francisco in March, where they were given a warm welcome. They then journeyed via Panama to Washington, where they were received by President Buchanan. Delegations to Britain and other nations left Japan in 1862. These were the first in a long series of such expeditions, by which Japan proved that once her original antipathy had been broken down she was willing to learn from the foreigner. From 1860 on Japanese delegations went to various parts of the world to study how to adapt Western institutions to Japanese life, and much that is good in modern Japanese culture came through these official contacts. In 1866 the law against foreign travel was repealed, and from that time on an increasing number of Japanese students went abroad.

Missionary activity. The opening of Japan was also utilized by the Christian Church in its missionary policy. The first Christian missionaries to arrive soon after the signing of the Treaty of 1858 were representatives of the Episcopal Church of the United States. Presbyterians, members of the Dutch Reformed group, and Roman Catholics soon followed. The government at first was not willing to accept their ministrations and their converts were arrested, but by 1873 — despite Harris’s initial failure to have missionary activities protected by the government — most official opposition had ceased, and from then on the Japanese Christian colony became an important segment of the population, forming the basis for future expansion led by such outstanding native ministers as Kagawa.

The end of the shogunate. Internally the administrative policy of the Japanese government was influenced by two important changes in personnel. The Shogun Iyemochi died in 1866 and was succeeded by Keiki (Yoshinobu), the last of the shoguns. A year later the Emperor Komei, who had succumbed to the antiforeign blandishments of the western clans, died and left the imperial throne to his fourteen-year-old son Mutsuhito, whose reign-name Meiji became illustrious in Nipponese history. Feudal jealousy of the shogun’s powers was not yet dispelled, and shortly after Keiki’s accession a group of powerful daimyo advised him to end the age-old dual authority and turn his administrative power over to the emperor. Keiki, loyal to the imperial family, was willing to follow their advice if he thereby could avoid trouble, and in Novem-
The Mikado (Mutsuhito). Japan abolished feudalism shortly after Mutsuhito became Mikado. He chose as his nengo (period name) Meiji or "Enlightened Government," thus indicating an aspiration achieved during his long reign (1865 to 1912).

ber 1867 finally gave up his high office as chief minister of the realm. The emperor accepted his resignation, but commissioned the shogun for the time being to continue the administration of foreign affairs and imperial defense. This procedure irritated some of the impatient western clansmen, who thereupon brought about a palace revolt in which the four clans of Satsuma, Tosa, Owari, and Echizen seized the person of the young emperor and brought about a complete surrender of the shogun's authority. Despite Keiki's willingness to relinquish his power his own clansmen objected most strenuously, and a brief "war of restoration" broke out in which Tokugawa retainers battled the imperial forces and allies from the western clans. Temporarily Keiki was induced to lead his rebellious vassals, but he soon placed himself voluntarily in the power of the opposition and allowed his followers
to continue the war without his aid or approval. The French offered naval assistance to the shogun but he shrewdly refused it and thus avoided dangerous foreign complications. The struggle lasted from January until November 1868 when the forces of the shogun were finally conquered, and thereafter the imperial prestige was unchallenged. In many respects of course the war of restoration was not the most significant part of Japan’s transformation; actually much deeper and more fundamental alterations occurred later through a gradual process of attrition and peaceful change. But the immediate effect of the civil war was significant: the shogun was forever removed as a complicating factor in Japanese government administration, and since in effect the shogun had assumed the responsibility for the ‘‘loss of face’’ incident to foreign intrusion the emperor was now free to borrow from the West all the Western technological skills and ‘‘know-how’’ that might be needed for the modernization of Japan.

Conclusion. The United States role in Pacific affairs achieved an unprecedented degree of importance in the 1850’s with the opening of the Japanese Empire to foreign contact and trade. Of course the United States was not completely responsible for the transformation in Nipponese policy — a foundation had already been laid not only by liberal and progressive natives such as Takano and Fukuzawa but also by the infiltration of Western knowledge through the controlled Dutch port of Deshima, Japan’s only concession to foreign contact during the centuries of Tokugawa isolation. Also if the American State Department had not listened to the demands of shippers, whalers, and military advisers, the British government, once its hands were freed from Chinese affairs connected with the second Opium War, would have been only too willing to breach the walls of Japan. But a series of incidents, beginning with Russian expansion from the north, British contacts during the Napoleonic Wars, and American commercial penetration into the Orient, furnished reason enough for the United States government to take decisive action. Japanese mistreatment of shipwrecked seamen, and the growing American interest in the Pacific after the rise to importance of San Francisco as a commercial port, added to the merchants’ demands the necessary stimulus, and in 1853 Commodore Perry was dispatched with a naval squadron to effect an entry.

Perry’s expedition marked a turning point in Pacific history. Through shrewd bargaining Perry negotiated the Treaty of Kanagawa, which proved the entering wedge for foreign trade much as the British treaties of Nanking had first opened the gates of China. The American
representative who followed Perry, Townsend Harris, laid a firm foundation for future peaceful relations by his refusal to take advantage of Japanese ignorance, and the Treaty of 1858 was a model for other trade conventions. Although the Japanese leaders at first were unwilling to sign, they eventually decided that they would prefer a voluntary agreement with America to a forced convention with the British, who had just successfully concluded another campaign in North China.

This foreign intrusion had a really tremendous effect on Japan's internal structure. Feudal daimyo already jealous of the shogun's authority used his willingness to negotiate with the foreigner as reason to depose him, and the western clans led by Choshu and Satsuma proceeded to gain an influence over imperial policy that led to a series of incidents which threatened Japan's foreign relations. Military reprisals by foreigners followed, and once the shogun's power had been broken the western clans eventually became the foremost advocates of Westernization. Finally in 1867 the shogun relinquished his position as actual ruler of Japan, and the dual government that had persisted since 1192 was decisively brought to an end. Though the shogun's retainers made a brief effort to keep him in power hostilities ended before the year was out, and Japanese modernization came not through military rebellion but through a subsequent generation of peaceful if revolutionary change.
The Rise of Japan—

Internal Affairs

Introduction. Once Japan had been forcibly opened to foreign penetration, her reaction to the situation contrasted sharply with that of China. The latter, in her ineffectual struggle against Western ways, attempted to block foreign infiltration by her own institutions, and when her methods proved unavailing she sank first into political ineptitude and then into revolution. Japan on the other hand determined that if Western methods were strong enough to force her to terms they must be worth adopting, and her history during the last half of the nineteenth century shows her deliberate transformation from an Oriental, feudal nation to a highly industrialized constitutional monarchy, able—forty years later—to struggle against Western nations on their level of power. That this transformation in her way of life was incomplete in no way detracts from the impressiveness of what she did accomplish. Only extreme shortsightedness on the part of Western nations blinded them to the potential menace which Japan presented as guardian of the western Pacific.

1. Political Reorganization

Despite the use of the term "Meiji Restoration" to describe the political revolution of 1868, the downfall of the Tokugawa shoguns must not be considered as a complete freeing of the emperor's hands. What actually happened was that the emperor's hereditary Tokugawa ministers were replaced by the clan leaders of Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen, and Tosa, an influential combination commonly called the "Satcho-
Hito" group. During the immediate post-Perry period when the shogun advocated Westernization, these men were unalterably opposed to it. Changing their colors almost overnight, they became its foremost exponents, and the rapidity of Japan's progress during the following quarter century must be attributed largely to their clansmen, men like Kido, Ito, and Okuma, whose progressivism directly influenced imperial policy.

*Early incidents.* Two incidents clearly demonstrated the completeness of Japan's break with her past. One was the transfer of the imperial court from tradition-ridden Kyoto to Yedo, which thereupon was renamed Tokyo, "Eastern Capital." There was some opposition to this move by certain western clansmen who favored Osaka, but the historic headquarters of the Tokugawa offered undeniable advantages in that the bureaucracy was already established there; and Tokyo became the scene of Japan's new order. Kyoto was renamed Saigo, "Western Capital," but it never regained its former glory. The second incident was Mutsuhito's first attempt to justify his reign name Meiji — the "period of enlightened government." On March 23, 1868, the emperor broke precedent by granting audiences to all the foreign emissaries, an act which so shocked conservative Japanese that they made an effort to interfere. The Dutch and French ministers completed their interviews satisfactorily, but when Sir Harry Parkes, representing Great Britain, arrived with his party, two crazed reactionaries fell upon them and seriously wounded thirteen men. The emperor expressed his indignation, commiserated the Britishers, and held another interview for them a few days later.

*The charter oath.* Mutsuhito's general policy was quickly defined in the Charter Oath of 1868. This impressive document has few parallels from the standpoint of the lengths to which it went in its willing abandonment of tradition, and illustrates the fact that whatever the place Japan holds today in the opinion of other nations, she has never been surpassed in the wholeheartedness with which she has accepted the inevitable. While China struggled futilely against Western bonds, Japan set out to learn to untie the knots, and her unshakable determination was clearly expressed in this imperial proclamation issued on April 17. The oath first of all guaranteed that national problems should be open to discussion and deliberation, and that both high and "low" classes should participate in the solving of national issues. It then provided that there should be no great division between civil and military authority, that no classes or groups should be privileged, and that an attempt should be made to satisfy the general demands of the Japa-
The Four Classes of Japanese Society: Military, Agricultural, Laboring, and Mercantile. Of the four classes the Samurai were the most affected when Japan set out to modernize itself.

Chinese people. It decreed that the usages of custom and tradition which acted as a bar to progress should be abandoned, and that the justice of natural law should be accepted as a model for administrative policy. Finally it encouraged all Japanese to seek throughout the world for ideas and methods with which to solve the great problems which confronted them. The Charter Oath, in short, defined Japan's purpose as Westernization, and clarified her method as the complete abandonment of isolation.

The end of feudalism. One of the greatest tasks confronting the new government was the abolition of feudalism, that age-old institution whose customs and practices had intensified isolationism, and whose traditional strength had prevented complete centralization even under the most powerful of the shoguns. Initial impetus to this vital reform came in 1869 when the daimyo or chiefs of the four most powerful western clans voluntarily relinquished to the emperor their landed estates, dismissed their hundreds of retainers, and kept only a portion of their once great revenues. Their example was followed by nearly three hundred other feudal lords in a mass movement of self-denial which was to end forever the separatism of the feudal system. Thus
supported, Mutsuhito appointed these former daimyo as imperial governors, who, like Carolingian misi, carried at least a portion of the emperor’s authority into each feudal fief. In August, 1871, even the territorial divisions of these feudal fiefs were destroyed, for an imperial decree divided and rearranged the lands of the clans into the fu and ken of modern times.

Daimyo and samurai. At first however many of the daimyo and their samurai retainers were most unhappy. The daimyo felt keenly the loss of their feudal privileges, especially the symbols of rank and privilege. Financially of course they were little harmed, for under the new arrangements they retained one tenth of their former income, an amount often much larger than their former net profit; and they no longer had to support the samurai. These advantages helped to reconcile the daimyo to their lot.

The situation of the samurai however was more difficult. Politically a few were better off than under the old régime, for some had a much greater opportunity to mold imperial policy. But financially many of them were worse off, for since under feudalism their paper income was about the same as their actual income, the new arrangement halved their receipts and forced them to a much narrower way of life. And besides, since the samurai dignity really rested more on military rank than it did on wealth, they resented even more than the daimyo the snatching away of the distinguishing insignia that elevated them above the commoners.

The final blow came for the samurai in 1873, when the government found that it could not bear the burden of providing an income for the 400,000 retainers of the former feudal lords. In that year the finance minister offered to buy up the samurai pensions, commuting hereditary pensions to a six-year term and life pensions to a four-year term. In 1876 this commutation program was made compulsory, and many of the samurai joined the discontented group which later became interested in military imperialism as a means of retrieving its fallen fortunes. How much of Japan’s recent chauvinism and warlike propensity was due to administrative errors in dealing with the samurai is difficult to determine; it is safe to say however that one of the strongest single forces supporting the imperialist war party in recent decades was a group who hark back to the military tradition of the samurai. The turmoil and hardship experienced by this class when feudalism was abolished apparently produced a psychological repression which recently burst its bonds in the modern trend toward imperialism and war.
The new militarism. Leaders of the new government also determined upon a sweeping military reorganization. Like medieval European rulers in time of war, the shoguns had been dependent upon feudal levies for their troops. Firearms had been known and used in Japan ever since their introduction by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century; and the infiltration of Western learning through the Dutch factory at Deshima had provided the military with some knowledge of Western military tactics and strategy. Immediately after the overthrow of the Tokugawas, the emperor was forced to rely on the troops of the Satcho-Hito clans, but in 1872 a complete nationalization of the army was accomplished. Universal conscription was commenced, new weapons acquired, and the study of Western European tactics begun under French instructors. The rise of Prussian prestige in the military arts however led the Japanese to change masters, and in 1885 German tutors and methods were introduced. And as she turned to the outstanding armies of the world for instruction in land fighting, so she applied to the world's greatest navy for tutelage in sea warfare, and British advice, engineering help, and in some cases vessels were obtained for the Japanese fleet. In military reorganization at least the last point of the Imperial Charter Oath of 1868 was carried out with a vengeance.

The new aristocracy. As Japan's political, social, and military changes crystallized it was inevitable that a new aristocracy should arise. When experimentation began in 1868 four classes had to be considered: the princes of the blood, the court nobility (kuge), the feudal nobility (daimyo), and the feudal retainers (samurai). A peerage law of 1884 provided also for an aristocracy of merit. A system involving a prime minister with two advisory councils including these classes was first tried, and when it immediately failed a reorganization into a council of state and assembly was attempted. The most influential group in the new empire was the progressives of the Satcho-Hito clans.

The new bureaucracy and legal system. A new bureaucracy to replace the old feudal governments was also needed, and it was established and manned largely by ex-samurai. No official could participate in provincial government however in the same district in which he had been a feudal noble, and he was responsible directly to the government at Tokyo. Eventually a civil service system grew up based on competitive examination rather than on former rank or appointment. In the organization of her new internal machinery Japan thus showed her willingness to adopt foreign ways; and she demonstrated the same willingness in reorganizing her legal system. Legal reform was accelerated by the
early growth of sentiment for treaty revision, especially the abolition of unilateral provisions such as extraterritoriality. Japan well knew that no Western nation would relieve her of the onus of consular courts until she showed more adaptability than China had in legal reform. In 1872 she began to set up criminal, civil, and commercial law codes. The criminal code was based chiefly on French law, derived from the Code Napoléon and its ancient Roman progenitors, and was well designed to fit a high degree of government centralization. The civil code followed the general practices of Western nations. The commercial code, put into effect in 1899, was first modeled after the French, and later revised to include many Germanic elements.

The revolt of Satsuma. These sweeping changes were not accomplished without opposition, and the leadership early formed itself into two cliques which became the basis of later political party lineups. One clique, with an eye to imperialist expansion in the Ryukyus and Korea, played on the discontent of the samurai to foment chauvinism and anti-Western sentiment, while the other clique followed the advice of the Japanese missions abroad, advocated a program of peaceful change and Westernization, and generally sought to have the nation mind its own business. Fortunately for Japan and the rest of the world during the formative years of the new order, this second group remained firmly in control, in spite of frequent incidents that revealed a seething discontent. In 1876 the government policy toward recognition of Korea and commutation of pensions brought matters to a head. Field Marshal Saigo withdrew in anger from the government, and took upon himself the task of training the samurai youth of Satsuma in traditional martial practices. In January 1877 a rebellion started — not against the emperor, but rather against his aides who were "disgracing" him by their advice. Saigo himself was unwilling to go this far, and joined the rebels only after an imperial conscript army had been sent against them. Many Satsuma clan leaders fought on the side of the imperial forces, and the affair must be described as a clique revolt rather than a provincial one. Hostilities continued for nine months, ending with the capture of Kagoshima and the death of Saigo, who had himself beheaded by a friend. The rebels were regarded by the imperial authorities as less guilty of treason than of bad judgment, and only twenty executions took place, although 2800 deprivations of rank, fines, or imprisonments were levied. Fully 39,000 individuals were pardoned. The significance of the Satsuma rebellion lay in the fact that certain elements had reluctantly come to realize that the Meiji Restoration would not give them
the power they had sought, that there remained some antagonism to Westernization, and that the imperial conscript army was fully able to exercise its power over feudal military remnants.

Administrative reforms. Immediately following the promulgation of the Charter Oath in 1868 there began a movement for constitutional government. Quite obviously it had not been in the emperor’s mind to establish a truly representative system, for the deliberative and advisory assemblies composed of court nobility, daimyo, and samurai were in no sense representative of all population groups, and the leaders of the new order apparently agreed with the emperor in considering representative government as not involved in the oath. Nevertheless, consideration of public opinion had been promised, and as early as 1872 the progressive leader, Kido, on his return from the Iwakura Mission (to modify the treaties), recommended the institution of a representative assembly. Two years later in 1874 Viscount Itagaki organized a political club, somewhat on the order of the French Jacobins, and through this organization petitioned the throne for a representative body. The result of these demands was the 1874 Osaka Compromise, which established a Senate and High Court of Justice as additional elements in the administration, and provided for an Assembly of Prefectural Governors as a decentralizing factor. But even these bodies were still not actually representative, since their entire membership was appointive; and the continuing dissatisfaction finally in 1878 brought about the institution of provincial assemblies to aid in local government.

The rise of parties. Sentiment grew so rapidly in favor of some modification of the makeshift system that two new political parties crystallized. One was the Liberals (Jiyūto), built on the foundation provided by Itagaki’s political club. It was formally set up in 1881, and nominally favored constitutionalism combined with imperialist expansion. The second party was formed in the following year by Count Okuma, the Progressive (Kaishin) Party. In the meantime (1881) the emperor had issued an imperial rescript, promising a national assembly for the year 1890 and ordering that all political agitation on the issue cease forthwith. The consequence of the imperial attitude as well as of internal party disunity was the dissolution in the early 1880’s of both new parties. This dissolution had a bad effect on the new constitution, in that it became the product not of popular demand as voiced by party organizations but rather of the ideas of a single individual who was then at the head of the government, Count Ito.

Ito’s influence. This remarkable man, Count Ito, in 1882 went
abroad to prepare himself to carry out the provisions of the Charter Oath for constitutional reform. He studied foreign constitutions, keeping in mind Japan's unique characteristics and remembering that the revolution in his country was founded on the emperor's nominal return to power. He knew that the entire basis of the new order would be shaken if the organization he proposed did not incorporate a high degree of centralization with its exaltation of imperial power. Of necessity he passed over the American, British, and French constitutions as being too democratic, and finally settled on the Prussian constitution as having the elements he wished, namely, a high degree of centralization, a strong executive power, and no direct responsibility of the authorities to the people. On his return to Japan he was made head of a commission to write a constitution; and when its work was nearly completed, a privy council was created to ratify it. Concurrently, the Nipponese nobility was reorganized on the Prussian model. At the top were the princes of the blood; then came five new classes of peers: princes, marquises, counts, viscounts, and barons. In addition, the old Council of State, dominated by remnants of the feudal nobility, was replaced in 1885 by an imperial cabinet. These changes all augmented Ito's influence, and the Japanese Constitution of 1889 therefore can be said to have been very largely the work of one man and one group, with the inevitable weaknesses of such a unilateral product. Ito's native intelligence, it is true, enabled him to choose instinctively the type of governmental organization which at the time best suited his politically adolescent compatriots, but in the long run the new government might have avoided much trouble if it had given some heed to the opinions of Itagaki's and Okuma's liberal party groups. There is no guarantee that their influence would have had any measurable effect, but it is interesting to speculate on what would have been the course of Pacific history if in 1889 Japan had acquired a government more subject to popular will and less amenable later to the maneuverings of the military imperialists.

The constitution. The constitution provided for a highly centralized system of government. The emperor was supreme head of the state, commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and controller of the budget. He was aided by two advisory bodies, the Council of Ministers, or cabinet, and the privy council, both constituted wholly of appointees. The Diet, or parliament, was bicameral, and consisted of an upper house of peers and a lower house of elected members. The peers consisted of several classes, those sitting by right of birth and position,
Japanese envoys to the United States

The first Japanese parliament was opened November 20, 1890, under a constitution drawn up by Prince Itô. From an old Japanese engraving.
those elected by their classes, and those appointed by the emperor. Eventually in the upper house there were nearly 400 members, including the forty-five highest taxpayers in the empire. The lower house, or House of Representatives, consisted at first of 300 members, chosen by a limited electorate. The chief duty of the Diet was to approve legislation, although bills might originate in either house.

_The emperor's power._ In view of the above administrative setup even a cursory consideration of the Japanese constitution of 1889 makes evident the nominal supremacy of the emperor as head of the state. Under Ito's scheme, and before the militarists seized _sub rosa_ control, a strong emperor and his associates and advisers could virtually control the nation. The close union of military power with civil authority, illustrated by the admission to the cabinet of generals and admirals on active service, made the emperor as commander-in-chief extremely influential if he chose to use his power. Another point of strength for the throne was the fact that the House of Representatives did not have the absolute power of the purse, and that if the Diet refused to approve a new budget the budget for the preceding year automatically went into effect. In fact the emperor could be a dictator if he wished; the limitations on his authority — such as the provision that required annual convocation of the Diet — were innocuous and could be neutralized if the emperor wished and were able. As it turned out however the emperor came under the control of his associates — bureaucrats, militarists, and nobles.

_A multiparty system._ The greatest weakness in the constitutional structure was probably the Diet's position as an obstructionist group. It could prevent an increase in the budget, but it could not design a new one; it could refuse to approve ministerial legislation, but it could not create a new ministry. These blocks in the course of administration eventually brought about the same unfortunate situation — to a lesser degree — that has afflicted France, Chile, and some of the Balkan countries — a multiparty system in which no cabinet was really secure because it was the outgrowth of a coalition among dissident cliques.

_The genro._ One other development which must be noted had not been planned by the framers of the constitution — the formation of a veritable "kitchen cabinet" of imperial advisers who influenced internal policy by working outside the framework of regularly constituted authority. These elder statesmen — known after the turn of the century as "genro" — were men who had led in the Restoration movement and in the creation of the new Japan, and therefore were Emperor Meiji's
most trusted advisers. All were men of ability and long experience, and were looked up to as the real leaders of the country and entrusted with the highest offices of government. They set the new state firmly upon the policy of national strength and imperial expansion, but at all times served as restraining influences on the more radical or rabid elements, which however as time passed came more to the front.

2. Economic Reorganization

Japan's self-imposed political revolution was of major significance in Pacific history, but of equal importance was the industrial revolution which transformed a feudal, agricultural people into one of the world's leading industrial nations. Incidentally it turned out that Japan's menace to democracy in the twentieth century was in direct proportion to her industrial development whose foundations were laid in the nineteenth. It is also necessary to emphasize the fact that Japan is the only major nation in the world besides Soviet Russia which deliberately set out to industrialize herself; and perhaps because of this very objectivity of attitude the process was completed in approximately one third the time it required Britain and the United States to pass through their unplanned technological transformation.

Agricultural reforms and population pressure. When Japan's modernization program began, the economic activity of first importance was agriculture. In an attempt to extend the benefits of the destruction of feudalism to the lower classes, the peasants in 1872 were given legal title to their lands, which they previously had held under feudal tenantry. But they soon discovered that land ownership was not an unmixed blessing. With ownership came taxation, and under its crushing burden many of the new independent farmers were forced back into the status of tenants. Agricultural labor migrated to the cities and aided mightily in Japan's industrialization.

This shift of population however was not entirely advantageous, for joined to the relative increase in urban population was the lack of application of machine methods to agriculture. Furthermore the amount of land available for cultivation on the rugged islands of Nippon was of course relatively small. As a result, the marginal food supply was always scanty, and during World War II one of Japan's most pressing problems was to get sufficient food during the American-British blockade.

The industrial revolution. In Japan's industrial revolution two factors stand out. One was government subsidization. No better example of
Nippon's willingness to break with the past can be found than the sudden elevation of money-making — formerly considered socially inadmissible despite the growth of mercantile fortunes — to a position of respect. Many of Japan's brainiest men soon appeared in business circles. Accordingly, since textiles, shipping, and banking activity for decades enjoyed governmental protection, it is not surprising that one of the greatest causes of international friction in more recent years has been the ability of government-supported Japanese industry to compete with and even to undercut British and American Asiatic trade. In one other way the Japanese government contributed to the nation's relatively quick success in the business field: she made no effort to change her people's historic habits of work. The Japanese laborer has been used to long hours at low pay, looking on his superiors as a child on his parents, and little protected from exploitation by industry; he therefore gave his employer an almost inexhaustible supply of cheap and docile labor.

The second important factor in Japan's industrial revolution was the close relationship between war and business. Japan's initial aim of building a militarily powerful and expanding state, combined with her participation in struggles with China, Russia, and Germany, caused sharp fluctuations in her business cycle. During war booms her economy was accelerated to unprecedented growth. Then came resultant depres-
sions which increased the demand for government intervention and for the adoption of new programs of militaristic expansion to solve the problems created by the downswing of business activity. From each of these interventions, the government emerged with new power. War indemnities stimulated industry, and heavy industries with war-making potential were subsidized.

Incidentally, it may be well to point out here that the effect of industrialization on population growth is nowhere better illustrated than in Japan. Other nations of the world, in passing through a period of industrialization, consistently increased their population by large percentages. But Japan in less than half a century nearly doubled her population, and during the seventy-seven years between Perry’s arrival and the world depression of the 1930’s the number of Nipponese rose from about 27,000,000 to more than 64,000,000. Japanese militarists were thus able to utilize the Lebensraum argument in their propaganda, for the lack of agricultural modernization referred to above and the scarcity of raw materials for a voracious industry, with attention to foreign markets rather than domestic, brought about a new and keen awareness of population pressure and a marginal standard of living for the masses.

Commerce. One of Japan’s biggest commercial booms followed her war with China in the middle 1890’s. Within ten years her foreign trade increased nearly fourfold, and by the end of World War I it had reached a volume more than sixty times as great as in 1885. The number of corporations more than doubled in the decade before World War I, and industrialists — with government encouragement — developed textile weaving, shipbuilding, iron and steel refining, paper manufacturing, and artificial fertilizer production, most of which made possible an increasing export trade. Despite this development of Japan’s export trade however a great change had occurred by the close of the century in the nation’s export balance. The first few decades following Perry’s voyage had seen Japan export more than she imported, but rapid industrialization, coupled with an increasing volume of foreign trade and other contacts, multiplied the demands of the Japanese people to such an extent that their imports eventually exceeded their exports. In this unfavorable balance of trade, Japan resembled Britain; she imported raw materials, processed them, and then exported them, for the most part in Japanese ships. And the profits from these transactions paid for the manufactured goods Japan could not produce.

Banking. Trade of course required banking, an activity supported
The Morrison. The American attempt to enter Japan that at the
time probably attracted most popular attention was the voyage of the
Morrison in 1837. The vessel belonged to a Canton firm, Olyphant and
Company, which in every possible way had aided the work of mission-
aries on the China coast. C. W. King, a young member of the Olyphant
firm, proposed to occupy the Morrison's layover time while she was
waiting for a return cargo in a voyage to Japan. A pretext was furnished
by the presence in Canton of seven shipwrecked Japanese seamen, and
on board also were S. Wells Williams and Peter Parker of the American
Missionary Board. Unarmed, since the trip was entirely exploratory,
the Morrison sailed into Yedo (Tokyo) Bay and anchored at Uraga, where
an attempt was made to land a missionary. The hostile Japanese spurned
both the preacher and their own shipwrecked countrymen, and as a
final gesture of determination the harbor forts fired upon the vessel.
The Morrison made a second attempt to land at Kagoshima, but was
again fired upon and forced to retire. The effect of the voyage was to
bring Japan clearly into public view for the first time, and from that
year American interest in the island empire and its resistance to foreign
advances never lapsed.
The rise of American interest in Japan. Meanwhile other factors had entered the situation. During the early 1800's the New England ports had developed a lucrative whaling traffic. It was the custom for whaling vessels to operate for two or three years in the Pacific, using the Hawaiian Islands as a base, but some of the best whaling grounds in the world lay north and east of the Japanese islands. From time to time storms drove whalers aground on Japan, and the Nipponese government's policy of severity to shipwrecked seamen made the establishment of amicable relations with Japan a strong necessity. In addition the simultaneous development of Pacific coast ports and steam navigation fostered plans for trans-Pacific steamer routes, which would necessarily include Japanese ports of call for coaling and provisioning. Moreover reports that Japan owned large coal deposits and other wealth stimulated interest in a treaty of commerce. Finally international jealousy played a part; Russian and Dutch contacts with Japan, coupled with rising British and French interest in the Orient, impelled alert businessmen in the United States to consider seriously the consequences of delay.

Biddle's visit. These factors were brought clearly to public view by a series of incidents which occurred shortly after the visit of the *Morrison*. In 1845 the whaler *Manhattan*, Captain Mercator Cooper, tried the same dodge that had been unsuccessfully tried by the *Morrison* — the return of shipwrecked Japanese mariners to their homeland. The vessel anchored in Yedo Bay but was permitted to stay only a few days, and on her departure she carried away some Japanese stowaways who expressed a desire to view the Western World at first hand. During the same year the United States dispatched its first accredited representative to China under the terms of the Treaty of Wanghia, and among the emissary's instructions was an order to negotiate a treaty with Japan. The minister, Alexander H. Everett, fell ill before his arrival in China and turned his commission over to Commodore Biddle, commander of his escort vessels, the *Columbus* and *Vincennes*. Biddle proceeded to China, exchanged treaty ratifications, and then went to Japan, where he arrived in July 1846. He frankly requested a treaty arrangement, and was turned down in no uncertain terms. To make matters worse, a Japanese soldier struck him; and Biddle's mildness in accepting whatever punishment the Japanese chose to inflict on the offender was apparently interpreted by them as a sign of weakness and brought about some loss of respect for America and its people. When news of this incident reached the United States pressure groups utilized it to strengthen their demands for a more forceful approach to the
Visit of the U.S.S. Columbus and Vincennes to Yedo Bay in 1846. The Japanese courteously requested the commanders to land all weapons, which request was politely refused. This marked one of the few American contacts with Japan preceding Perry's visit.

government of Nippon, and accordingly when the whaler Lagoda was wrecked in the Sea of Japan in 1848 and its crew was imprisoned in Nagasaki, the United States government took action. The U.S.S. Preble was ordered to rescue the imprisoned seamen, and despite many difficulties Commander James Glynn in 1849 brought about their release. In 1851 three more marooned Americans were sent home by way of the Dutch factory at Deshima. It became clear that contacts between Japan and the United States were increasing at such a rate that relations between the two countries needed to be placed on a firm diplomatic basis. In short the stage was set for the Perry expedition of 1853—America's first great gesture toward the Orient, and one whose effects were so far-reaching that it truly might be said to have been a cornerstone in the foundations of World War II.

2. The Perry Expedition

Commodore Perry. Matthew Calbraith Perry, commodore in the United States Navy, was born in 1794 of a navy family. His father had
fought in the American Revolution, and his brother Oliver Hazard was already one of the nation’s great naval heroes. Perry himself had been aboard the *President* in 1812 when it helped bring about the War of 1812 by defeating the *Little Belt*, and later he had been an officer in the expedition which established the colony of Liberia on the African coast. He was largely instrumental in starting the Naval Lyceum and the first real gunnery school, and he also is credited with starting a genuine interest in the training of engineers for the new steam navy. In the Mexican War he successfully commanded the Gulf Squadron. Naturally, then, after the first commander of the China Squadron, Commodore J. H. Aulick, had retired because of illness, Perry was the logical choice to lead the proposed expedition to Japan.

*Diplomatic motives.* The instructions Secretary of State Webster issued to Commodore Aulick in 1851 were mild and conciliatory toward Japan. They stressed the need of coaling ports and protection for shipwrecked seamen, but omitted reference to the numerous insults the Japanese had offered American vessels and citizens. Aulick was to have only one steam vessel and two sloops-of-war — surely not a possessing squadron with which to break down the tightly held barriers of a stubborn nation. In 1852 however, when acting Secretary C. M. Conrad transmitted instructions to Perry, he adopted an entirely different tone. First of all he assigned Perry a powerful fleet — five steamers and six or more sailing vessels — to act as “persuaders.” In addition to the objectives of the Aulick instructions, which included protection of seamen, designation of treaty ports, and the right to purchase coal, Perry was expected to make the Japanese realize that they had acted like a “semi-barbarous” people, who in their childish isolationism had infringed the law of nations. At all times of course he was to remember that the expedition was a peaceful one, not in any sense a punitive or marauding mission; but in the final analysis if persuasion did not work he was to be permitted to use force.

*The voyage.* As it turned out the numerous vessels promised were not forthcoming. When Perry finally sailed his fleet consisted of two ships, the *Mississippi* and the *Princeton*; the latter however broke down before leaving America. The *Mississippi* alone therefore made the long trip via the Cape of Good Hope to the Pacific, where it was to be joined later by the steamer *Susquehanna* and the sloops-of-war *Plymouth* and *Saratoga*. Accompanied by S. Wells Williams, his interpreter, Perry then sailed via the Ryukyu Islands for Yedo Bay, where he anchored on July 8, 1853.

*Perry’s policy.* During the preparation of the expedition and the
months at sea Perry had steeped himself in all the knowledge he could glean from the Navy Department's books on Nippon and its people, and he had resolved that as far as his instructions permitted he would not repeat Biddle's mistake. Accordingly he had determined upon a definite if somewhat strange course of action. Since the Japanese apparently respected dignity and formalism he had decided to provide these
in large quantities, along with a degree of pageantry hardly to be expected from an emissary of the democratic United States. From the beginning of the negotiations then he dealt with the ordinary Japanese only through subordinates; he himself refused to have anything to do with persons of less than the highest caste and rank. He stubbornly secluded himself in his cabin, had his interpreter refer to him as "Lord of the Forbidden Interior," and insisted upon direct negotiation with the central authorities, although the Japanese duped him into receiving lesser fry. While this policy drew upon him the criticism — and in some cases the mockery — of his own crews, it proved highly successful. The Japanese were a medieval people, and they responded to medieval panoply. Perry had hit upon the exact method calculated to produce results.

Perry in Japan. On his arrival in Yedo Bay Perry immediately became aware of the exotic characteristics of the people with whom he had to deal. The hillsides it was reported were lined with low white barriers which appeared to be some sort of fortification — Perry later discovered that they were fences of lath and cheesecloth designed to slow down the shells and bullets of the foreigners’ strange firearms. Japanese naval vessels — decorated war galleys (really large rowboats) — attempted to board but were firmly discouraged; and when one of the American vessels blew its steam whistle the entire crew of a Japanese tender dove overboard in panic. The Japanese first threw a scroll aboard the Mississippi, containing a French message ordering the strangers to depart, but eventually a Dutch-speaking Japanese arranged for a meeting with the governor of the immediate province, and it was agreed that Perry’s letter to the emperor should be received at Uraga by a commissioner named Toda, supposedly high in the emperor’s councils. Accompanied by an honor guard of 300 and covered by the guns of his warships, Perry landed with much dignity, conferred with the shogun’s emissaries, and was again ordered to leave. But he had won two important points: he had forced the Japanese to receive him formally, and he had penetrated Japan at a place other than Nagasaki, the traditional point of contact with the foreigner. He warned the Japanese to consider his request for a treaty, and told them that he would return the following spring for their answer. He then went to Canton, leaving the shogun and his fellow officials an opportunity "furiously to think."

Successful negotiations. Perry’s return to Japan somewhat earlier than he had planned was hastened by the presence of the French frigate Constantine in nearby waters, and by the announced approach of the
Russian Admiral Purtiatin. Since America had made the first opening in Japanese seclusion Perry reasoned it should be the nation to profit, and he re-entered Yedo Bay in February 1854. This time he had under his command a much larger force — ten ships and approximately 2000 men. On March 8 he had his first meeting with Japanese emissaries; and on March 31 the Treaty of Kanagawa was signed, the first treaty Japan had ever deigned to negotiate with any Occidental power. To this achievement Perry’s policy of pomp and circumstance had doubtless contributed greatly. His landing for the final negotiations was in the form of a military parade. It was led by two Negro flagbearers; then followed the commodore and his chief aides in glittering naval dress uniforms, a band playing “Yankee Doodle,” and finally a platoon of seamen who guarded with bared cutlasses a truly Oriental aggregation of gifts for the emperor. These gifts were among the most interesting features of the expedition; they included champagne, whiskey, Madeira wine, perfumery, books, telegraph wire, agricultural tools, stoves, charts, clocks, firearms and swords, and a miniature steam railroad, complete with track. The model railroad made an enormous hit, and very shortly the dignified officials of the shogunate were riding in sedate circles behind the small locomotive, their robes fluttering in the breeze. The idea was of course to give the Japanese some notion of the marvels of the Western technology of which they had deprived themselves during their long centuries of isolation, and which the new treaty agreement was now making available. The shogun however did not properly appreciate the gifts, for it was later reported that the presents lay neglected in Tokugawa headquarters and that the emperor never saw them.

The Treaty of Kanagawa. The Treaty of Kanagawa, signed near Yokohama on March 31, 1854, opened two ports, Hakodate and Shimoda, to American commerce. The Japanese originally offered Nagasaki, but Perry would have nothing to do with the port in which foreigners had historically been subjected to indignity. But Shimoda, despite the fact that a consul was permitted to live there, proved so useless that the United States was glad to add Nagasaki to the list of treaty ports under the most-favored-nation guarantees when in a later treaty Britain secured that city as a place of entry for her commerce. In addition the Japanese pledged that shipwrecked sailors would be protected and not subjected to insult or imprisonment. Two items were omitted from the treaty: access to Japanese coal deposits, and extraterritoriality. The omission of extraterritoriality was probably due to
Delivering American presents to Japan at Yokohama during Perry’s visit. The gifts included examples of western technological skill, designed to impress the Japanese with what they were missing by not having trade relations with the Occident.

the efforts of S. Wells Williams, who disapproved of the effects it had had in China; later however it was included. Like the British treaties of Nanking, Perry’s agreement proved to be chiefly an entering wedge. It was followed immediately by a British treaty (1854), a Russian (1855), and a Dutch (1856). The chief significance therefore of the Kanagawa accord was that it signaled for the first time the opening of the barred gates of Nippon, just as the parallel treaties of Nanking had first breached the walls of the celestial empire. Even more to the point, it marked the entry of the United States into the field of Pacific relations, giving her a paternal and generally altruistic interest in the fate of her protégé. Finally, when the Japanese realized their inability to cope with the highly developed technology of the West, a revolution occurred both in politics and economics which was to bring Nippon into the ranks of the great powers and enable her to join Germany in upsetting
the precarious peace of 1918. Perry’s voyage marked a turning point—and a great one—in Pacific history.

3. The Work of Townsend Harris

*Harris’s early work.* The Treaty of Kanagawa, at least according to the American interpretation, provided for a permanent resident-consul at Shimoda, and the man appointed to fill this significant post was a New York merchant, Townsend Harris. Harris had been a good citizen, a loyal Democrat, and a civic worker, but an 1849 trading voyage he made to the Orient turned out badly, and in Hong Kong he applied for a job with the American diplomatic service. Despite the best efforts of influential friends he was rewarded with the inconsequential position of consul at the minor port of Ningpo. He appointed a substitute and made his way to the United States where he applied for the newly opened Japanese post. His suave, genial personality gained him the appointment, and in 1855 he departed again for the Far East, commissioned also to negotiate a new treaty with Siam en route. Revision of the Roberts treaty with Siam was necessary because the stipulations as to tonnage dues were so high that trade was seriously hampered, and besides the Roberts accord had omitted any mention of extraterritoriality. Harris went to Siam via England, and drew up a treaty immediately after the conclusion of successful British negotiations. Thence he proceeded aboard the *San Jacinto* to Shimoda, where he arrived in August 1856.

*The Convention of 1857.* For the first eighteen months at Shimoda Harris was left to his own devices without communication from the American State Department. He early concluded that the town had been chosen by the Japanese because of its very unsuitability—it was at the end of a mountainous peninsula, virtually cut off from the rest of the island, and its only export was quarried stone. He was also hampered by a quite obvious Japanese reluctance to let him stay; representatives of the government assured him that their interpretation of the treaty was that a resident could remain only if both powers desired it—and they most certainly did not. When he had successfully broken down this opposition he was confronted with Japanese horror at his demand that he be permitted in person to deliver his credentials to the shogun at Yedo. While engaged in undermining this barrier he managed in June 1857 to negotiate a new convention, in which the United States gained by direct acknowledgment what had been tacitly implied by the most-
favored-nation clause — the benefits in other words accorded Britain, Russia, and Holland by agreements signed after the Kanagawa Treaty. The Convention of 1857 granted the opening of Nagasaki as a port of call, the residence of a vice consul at Hakodate, extraterritoriality, the right in case cash were not available to pay for a ship’s provisions in goods, and a more favorable basis of currency exchange.

*Audience with the shogun.* Harris’s abilities were now shown to good effect. Lack of communication with his home government had reduced his personal living scale to that of the Japanese, and his health was severely affected. Moreover Japanese authorities still persisted in their traditional opposition to a personal interview between Harris and the shogun. Harris however refused to be disconcerted or put off. By the use of combined tact, persistence, frankness, and good will, he engineered in 1858 an audience, from which came a new treaty also in that year. His conversation with the shogun was the first audience a shogun had granted a foreigner since 1613 — and Harris seemed not to be fazed, much to the astonishment and chagrin of sycophantic hangers-on of the Tokugawa court. An additional triumph was Japanese permission to omit the obeisance in greeting the minister. His audience was followed by a score of long conferences in which the terms of the treaty were laboriously drawn up. In the conferences Harris continued his policy of honesty and open dealing. He constantly refused to take advantage of Nipponese ignorance of Western ways, and the result was a credit to the nation he represented.

*The Treaty of 1858.* The Treaty of 1858 included provisions guaranteeing regular consular and diplomatic relations with Japan, the opening of four additional treaty ports with trade privileges — Kanagawa, Nagasaki, Niigata, and Hyogo (Kobe), and the offer of American "good offices" in case Japan got into international trouble. Despite Harris’s qualms extraterritoriality was also established. A preferential tariff was set up favoring American exports, although the advantage to the United States was quickly countered when the other powers secured agreements that reduced their duties to the American level. Of doubtful value also was a provision for currency exchange; it had a harmful effect in quickly causing speculation on the currency market. Harris’s attempt to pave the way for the reception of foreign missionaries failed.

The Japanese delayed in signing the treaty from February, when the negotiations were concluded, till July 1858. The reason was a serious split in the Japanese political structure; many conservative nobles stood pat in their opposition to negotiations with the hated foreigner, while
the weakening Tokugawa shogunate was disposed to accept Harris's argument that it might be better to sign the American accord voluntarily than to be forced into an agreement at gun point by the British. The matter was brought to a sudden conclusion by the arrival in Yedo in June of the American warships Mississippi and Powhatan, bringing news of the conclusion of the treaties of Tientsin, and of the projected plans of Lord Elgin to follow up that victory by an expedition to Japan. The shogun then displayed actual eagerness to conclude the negotiations, and on July 29, 1858, Harris's policies were officially approved. The emperor, influenced by certain feudal lords, did not support the document, and the shogun's willingness to negotiate with the West was a major cause of his own eventual downfall, but the influence of the treaty was none the less great. It was followed shortly by similar agreements with the Netherlands, Russia, Britain, and France.

The United States has therefore had in its diplomatic relations with the Orient two representatives of whom it might well be proud—Anson Burlingame, who injected a note of high idealism into a sphere of diplomatic activity hitherto characterized chiefly by selfish squabbling, and Townsend Harris, who illustrated the best principles of American democracy in his refusal to take advantage of a backward people, and who so impressed the Japanese with American fairness that they revered the United States for many years—in fact, until the war party came into dominance after the turn of the century.

4. Effects of the Treaty and Final Ratification.

Japanese politics. The breaking of Japan's wall of isolation was the signal for a revolution in Japanese life. Perry was not wholly responsible; conditions in Japan were ripe for a change. But foreign contacts accelerated the process. The normal succession of earthquakes, conflagrations, storms, epidemics, and floods was taken by many of the frightened islanders as portents of doom and as retribution for the government's failure to repel the foreigner. Quite naturally then a sharp division in attitudes showed itself after Perry's departure. The shogun's party maintained the realistic view that the foreigners were strong enough to take what they wished if Japan proved unwilling to give it. The shogun's political authority however had been weakened by inept domestic policy and by feudal jealousy, and he greatly needed the support of a group of willing liberals—men who, like Inouye and Ito later, appreciated the benefits of Western civilization and determined
Fujiyama, Japan. This sacred mountain has always been a symbol of Nippon; its symmetrical contours illustrate in interesting fashion the characteristic scenic beauty of the islands.
to have it for Japan. In opposition to the shogun was the Emperor Komei, who, dominated by feudal enemies of the shogun, notably the western clans of Choshu and Satsuma, led a party of intransigents, and this clique was chiefly responsible for the unfortunate incidents that marred Japan's foreign relations between 1858 and 1865. It later turned out however that the western clansmen were not so much antiforeign as they were anti-shogun, and when they had become firmly convinced of the value of Western ways they shifted their ground. The arrival of the foreigners therefore served to complicate Japanese internal politics and eventually became responsible for a complete change in the government. Most of the clashes with the Occident occurred during the rule of the Shogun Iyemochi, who acceded in 1858 at the age of thirteen to these heavy responsibilities, and who remained at the head of the state until 1866.

Tardy fulfillment of the treaty. The year 1859 was the date set for putting the treaty provisions into force, but mob spirit among the natives became so great that the shogun, fearful of antiforeign demonstrations, refused to open Kanagawa on the main highway to Yedo, and persuaded the foreigners to settle in Yokohama, which later became one of Japan's most important ports. The first tragedy to occur was the murder in 1861 of a Mr. Heusken, Dutch interpreter for the American legation. His death was followed by exhibitions of antiforeign sentiment so intense that the foreign representatives moved from Yedo to Yokohama in protest at the Japanese failure to maintain order; the one exception to this exodus was Townsend Harris, who appreciated the shogun's difficulties and was not disposed to force a difficult issue. After the ministers returned to Yedo the British legation was attacked and one of its attachés wounded. As a result the desperate shogun wrote a personal letter to Queen Victoria requesting postponement of the opening of the ports.

The Richardson incident. In 1862 the Richardson incident brought matters to a new climax. A group of three British merchants with a woman companion were riding on horseback from Yokohama to Yedo when they encountered the feudal procession of the father of the lord of Satsuma. They pulled their horses to the roadside but neglected to obey the ancient Japanese custom of dismounting when in the presence of a daimyō, and as a result the nobleman's retainers — eager to demonstrate their hostility to the foreigner — attacked the party and killed Mr. C. L. Richardson. The following year the British presented their demands, an indemnity to be paid by the shogun, a smaller indemnity
to be paid by the lord of Satsuma, and trial and execution of the assassins in the presence of a British representative. The unhappy shogun however was helpless. He was summoned before the emperor to explain his policies, and the result of the conference was not satisfaction of the British demands but a new exclusion order by which the daimyodominated ruler ordered the foreigners out of his country. The Western nations replied that the treaties must be lived up to, and offered military aid to the shogun against the vassals who constituted the backbone of the antiforeign party, but the shogun, insecure in his office, turned down the proposal. He refused however to carry out the imperial decree.

The bombardment of Kagoshima. Meantime the impatient lord of Choshu, whose feudal fortresses guarded the entrance to the Inland Sea, fired on an American vessel off Shimonoseki and followed this attack by others on Dutch and nearby French vessels. French and American warships immediately took reprisal by attacking the Choshu forts, and the British, realizing that the western clans were the spearhead of opposition to the foreigner and desiring retribution for the Richardson affair, sent a naval expedition to Kagoshima, Satsuma's capital. The bombardment was interrupted by a typhoon which completed the destruction of the town, but stubborn Japanese die-hards, pleased that the British had been unable to seize the Satsuma-protected assassins of Richardson, rose from the wreckage and shorted over their "victory." Shortly afterward however Satsuma representatives offered to pay an indemnity to the British, promised to continue their "search" for the murderers, and requested foreign naval assistance in building up their own fleet.

The bombardment of Shimonoseki. In the following year, 1864, Sir Rutherford Alcock, the British minister to Japan, determined upon a resolute course of action designed to decrease the influence of the western clans over the emperor at Kyoto. He organized a naval expedition ostensibly for the purpose of punishing Choshu for attempting to seize the emperor's person but actually planned to undermine the power of the antiforeign, anti-shogun clique. The squadron consisted of nine British warships, four Dutch, three French, and one American; the last was not a regulation ship-of-war but rather a chartered merchant vessel hired for the occasion to clarify America's diplomatic position. On September 5, 1864, the forts at Shimonoseki were bombarded, and within three days naval projectiles and landing parties had silenced their guns and ended their resistance. Alcock, who had undertaken this mission without the approval of his home government, won its com-
mendation, and Choshu, finally sold on the value of Westernization much as Satsuma had been following the Kagoshima bombardment, did not rebuild its fortifications and shortly agreed to pay an indemnity. The shogun refused to permit foreigners to treat with a rebellious clan, and insisted on paying the indemnity himself — further straining his financial resources — and the consequent Shimonoseki Convention included a pledge on the part of the shogun to pay $3,000,000.

The Four-Power Convention of 1866. The terms of the convention were not lived up to in detail, primarily because the British did not intend them to be. Sir Harry Parkes, Alcock's successor, was much more interested in the opening of additional treaty ports than he was in the payment of the full indemnity. He arranged another naval demonstration, this time at Osaka near the capital, Kyoto, in which British, French, and Dutch vessels participated, and as a result of the military pressure thus applied the Shimonoseki Convention was modified. Parkes proposed to reduce the indemnity by two thirds if Kobe and Osaka, not originally supposed to be opened to foreign trade until 1868, were opened immediately, if the tariff were reduced, and if the emperor would personally approve the treaties. The Japanese, again finding themselves helpless before foreign military strength, gave in to the demands for the emperor's approval and tariff reduction, but refused to accelerate the opening of the ports. Because of their defection in this last provision they agreed to pay the full indemnity and thereby satisfied France, which had been more interested in cash than in additional port trade. The chief consequence of the 1866 Four-Power Convention was the final granting of the emperor's approval to the treaty agreements. This removed at last what had been the greatest obstacle to the full success of the entire program of opening Japan. In addition the United States gained another opportunity to show its friendliness; it remitted its share of the indemnity, some $785,000. With the imperial signature on the treaties, and the realization by the western clans that anti-shogun sentiments did not require an acceptance of antiforeignism, the chief stumbling blocks to Japan's intercourse with the West were removed. At the same time the foreigners' share in transforming the life of ancient Japan came under Japanese control, and from this point on the revolution was largely in Japanese hands.

5. The Last Steps in the Opening of Japan

First voluntary contacts with the West. With the application of foreign pressure Japan's last objections to contact with the Western World
gradually died. The shogun’s administration early decided that copies of the treaties should be distributed to foreign nations by Japanese delegations, and in 1860 the first of these missions left Japan bound for the United States. The commissioners traveled on the U.S.S. Powhatan, accompanied by the Japanese steamer Kanrin Maru, and arrived in San Francisco in March, where they were given a warm welcome. They then journeyed via Panama to Washington, where they were received by President Buchanan. Delegations to Britain and other nations left Japan in 1862. These were the first in a long series of such expeditions, by which Japan proved that once her original antipathy had been broken down she was willing to learn from the foreigner. From 1860 on Japanese delegations went to various parts of the world to study how to adapt Western institutions to Japanese life, and much that is good in modern Japanese culture came through these official contacts. In 1866 the law against foreign travel was repealed, and from that time on an increasing number of Japanese students went abroad.

Missionary activity. The opening of Japan was also utilized by the Christian Church in its missionary policy. The first Christian missionaries to arrive soon after the signing of the Treaty of 1858 were representatives of the Episcopal Church of the United States. Presbyterians, members of the Dutch Reformed group, and Roman Catholics soon followed. The government at first was not willing to accept their ministrations and their converts were arrested, but by 1873—despite Harris’s initial failure to have missionary activities protected by the government—most official opposition had ceased, and from then on the Japanese Christian colony became an important segment of the population, forming the basis for future expansion led by such outstanding native ministers as Kagawa.

The end of the shogunate. Internally the administrative policy of the Japanese government was influenced by two important changes in personnel. The Shogun Iyemochi died in 1866 and was succeeded by Keiki (Yoshinobu), the last of the shoguns. A year later the Emperor Komei, who had succumbed to the antiforeign blandishments of the western clans, died and left the imperial throne to his fourteen-year-old son Mutsuhito, whose reign-name Meiji became illustrious in Nipponese history. Feudal jealousy of the shogun’s powers was not yet dispelled, and shortly after Keiki’s accession a group of powerful daimyo advised him to end the age-old dual authority and turn his administrative power over to the emperor. Keiki, loyal to the imperial family, was willing to follow their advice if he thereby could avoid trouble, and in Novem-
The Mikado (Mutsuhito). Japan abolished feudalism shortly after Mutsuhito became Mikado. He chose as his nengo (period name) Meiji or "Enlightened Government," thus indicating an aspiration achieved during his long reign (1868 to 1912).

ber 1867 finally gave up his high office as chief minister of the realm. The emperor accepted his resignation, but commissioned the shogun for the time being to continue the administration of foreign affairs and imperial defense. This procedure irritated some of the impatient western clansmen, who thereupon brought about a palace revolt in which the four clans of Satsuma, Tosa, Owari, and Echizen seized the person of the young emperor and brought about a complete surrender of the shogun's authority. Despite Keiki's willingness to relinquish his power his own clansmen objected most strenuously, and a brief "war of restoration" broke out in which Tokugawa retainers battled the imperial forces and allies from the western clans. Temporarily Keiki was induced to lead his rebellious vassals, but he soon placed himself voluntarily in the power of the opposition and allowed his followers
to continue the war without his aid or approval. The French offered naval assistance to the shogun but he shrewdly refused it and thus avoided dangerous foreign complications. The struggle lasted from January until November 1868 when the forces of the shogun were finally conquered, and thereafter the imperial prestige was unchallenged. In many respects of course the war of restoration was not the most significant part of Japan’s transformation; actually much deeper and more fundamental alterations occurred later through a gradual process of attrition and peaceful change. But the immediate effect of the civil war was significant: the shogun was forever removed as a complicating factor in Japanese government administration, and since in effect the shogun had assumed the responsibility for the “loss of face” incident to foreign intrusion the emperor was now free to borrow from the West all the Western technological skills and “know-how” that might be needed for the modernization of Japan.

Conclusion. The United States role in Pacific affairs achieved an unprecedented degree of importance in the 1850’s with the opening of the Japanese Empire to foreign contact and trade. Of course the United States was not completely responsible for the transformation in Nipponese policy — a foundation had already been laid not only by liberal and progressive natives such as Takano and Fukuzawa but also by the infiltration of Western knowledge through the controlled Dutch port of Deshima, Japan’s only concession to foreign contact during the centuries of Tokugawa isolation. Also if the American State Department had not listened to the demands of shippers, whalers, and military advisers, the British government, once its hands were freed from Chinese affairs connected with the second Opium War, would have been only too willing to breach the walls of Japan. But a series of incidents, beginning with Russian expansion from the north, British contacts during the Napoleonic Wars, and American commercial penetration into the Orient, furnished reason enough for the United States government to take decisive action. Japanese mistreatment of shipwrecked seamen, and the growing American interest in the Pacific after the rise to importance of San Francisco as a commercial port, added to the merchants’ demands the necessary stimulus, and in 1853 Commodore Perry was dispatched with a naval squadron to effect an entry.

Perry’s expedition marked a turning point in Pacific history. Through shrewd bargaining Perry negotiated the Treaty of Kanagawa, which proved the entering wedge for foreign trade much as the British treaties of Nanking had first opened the gates of China. The American
representative who followed Perry, Townsend Harris, laid a firm foundation for future peaceful relations by his refusal to take advantage of Japanese ignorance, and the Treaty of 1858 was a model for other trade conventions. Although the Japanese leaders at first were unwilling to sign, they eventually decided that they would prefer a voluntary agreement with America to a forced convention with the British, who had just successfully concluded another campaign in North China.

This foreign intrusion had a really tremendous effect on Japan's internal structure. Feudal daimyo already jealous of the shogun's authority used his willingness to negotiate with the foreigner as reason to depose him, and the western clans led by Choshu and Satsuma proceeded to gain an influence over imperial policy that led to a series of incidents which threatened Japan's foreign relations. Military reprisals by foreigners followed, and once the shogun's power had been broken the western clans eventually became the foremost advocates of Westernization. Finally in 1867 the shogun relinquished his position as actual ruler of Japan, and the dual government that had persisted since 1192 was decisively brought to an end. Though the shogun's retainers made a brief effort to keep him in power hostilities ended before the year was out, and Japanese modernization came not through military rebellion but through a subsequent generation of peaceful if revolutionary change.
The Rise of Japan—

Internal Affairs

Introduction. Once Japan had been forcibly opened to foreign penetration, her reaction to the situation contrasted sharply with that of China. The latter, in her ineffectual struggle against Western ways, attempted to block foreign infiltration by her own institutions, and when her methods proved unavailing she sank first into political ineptitude and then into revolution. Japan on the other hand determined that if Western methods were strong enough to force her to terms they must be worth adopting, and her history during the last half of the nineteenth century shows her deliberate transformation from an Oriental, feudal nation to a highly industrialized constitutional monarchy, able—forty years later—to struggle against Western nations on their level of power. That this transformation in her way of life was incomplete in no way detracts from the impressiveness of what she did accomplish. Only extreme shortsightedness on the part of Western nations blinded them to the potential menace which Japan presented as guardian of the western Pacific.

I. Political Reorganization

Despite the use of the term "Meiji Restoration" to describe the political revolution of 1868, the downfall of the Tokugawa shoguns must not be considered as a complete freeing of the emperor’s hands. What actually happened was that the emperor’s hereditary Tokugawa ministers were replaced by the clan leaders of Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen, and Tosa, an influential combination commonly called the "Satcho-
Hito’ group. During the immediate post-Perry period when the shogun advocated Westernization, these men were unalterably opposed to it. Changing their colors almost overnight, they became its foremost exponents, and the rapidity of Japan’s progress during the following quarter century must be attributed largely to their clansmen, men like Kido, Ito, and Okuma, whose progressivism directly influenced imperial policy.

**Early incidents.** Two incidents clearly demonstrated the completeness of Japan’s break with her past. One was the transfer of the imperial court from tradition-ridden Kyoto to Yedo, which thereupon was renamed Tokyo, “Eastern Capital.” There was some opposition to this move by certain western clansmen who favored Osaka, but the historic headquarters of the Tokugawa offered undeniable advantages in that the bureaucracy was already established there; and Tokyo became the scene of Japan’s new order. Kyoto was renamed Saigyo, “Western Capital,” but it never regained its former glory. The second incident was Mutsuhito’s first attempt to justify his reign name Meiji — the “period of enlightened government.” On March 23, 1868, the emperor broke precedent by granting audiences to all the foreign emissaries, an act which so shocked conservative Japanese that they made an effort to interfere. The Dutch and French ministers completed their interviews satisfactorily, but when Sir Harry Parkes, representing Great Britain, arrived with his party, two crazed reactionaries fell upon them and seriously wounded thirteen men. The emperor expressed his indignation, commiserated the Britishers, and held another interview for them a few days later.

**The charter oath.** Mutsuhito’s general policy was quickly defined in the Charter Oath of 1868. This impressive document has few parallels from the standpoint of the lengths to which it went in its willing abandonment of tradition, and illustrates the fact that whatever the place Japan holds today in the opinion of other nations, she has never been surpassed in the wholeheartedness with which she has accepted the inevitable. While China struggled futilely against Western bonds, Japan set out to learn to untie the knots, and her unshakable determination was clearly expressed in this imperial proclamation issued on April 17. The oath first of all guaranteed that national problems should be open to discussion and deliberation, and that both high and “low” classes should participate in the solving of national issues. It then provided that there should be no great division between civil and military authority, that no classes or groups should be privileged, and that an attempt should be made to satisfy the general demands of the Japa-
The Four Classes of Japanese Society: Military, Agricultural, Laboring, and Mercantile. Of the four classes the Samurai were the most affected when Japan set out to modernize itself.

Chinese people. It decreed that the usages of custom and tradition which acted as a bar to progress should be abandoned, and that the justice of natural law should be accepted as a model for administrative policy. Finally it encouraged all Japanese to seek throughout the world for ideas and methods with which to solve the great problems which confronted them. The Charter Oath, in short, defined Japan’s purpose as Westernization, and clarified her method as the complete abandonment of isolation.

The end of feudalism. One of the greatest tasks confronting the new government was the abolition of feudalism, that age-old institution whose customs and practices had intensified isolationism, and whose traditional strength had prevented complete centralization even under the most powerful of the shoguns. Initial impetus to this vital reform came in 1869 when the daimyo or chiefs of the four most powerful western clans voluntarily relinquished to the emperor their landed estates, dismissed their hundreds of retainers, and kept only a portion of their once great revenues. Their example was followed by nearly three hundred other feudal lords in a mass movement of self-denial which was to end forever the separatism of the feudal system. Thus
supported, Mutsuhito appointed these former daimyo as imperial governors, who, like Carolingian missi, carried at least a portion of the emperor’s authority into each feudal sief. In August, 1871, even the territorial divisions of these feudal siefs were destroyed, for an imperial decree divided and rearranged the lands of the clans into the fu and ken of modern times.

Daimyo and samurai. At first however many of the daimyo and their samurai retainers were most unhappy. The daimyo felt keenly the loss of their feudal privileges, especially the symbols of rank and privilege. Financially of course they were little harmed, for under the new arrangements they retained one tenth of their former income, an amount often much larger than their former net profit; and they no longer had to support the samurai. These advantages helped to reconcile the daimyo to their lot.

The situation of the samurai however was more difficult. Politically a few were better off than under the old régime, for some had a much greater opportunity to mold imperial policy. But financially many of them were worse off, for since under feudalism their paper income was about the same as their actual income, the new arrangement halved their receipts and forced them to a much narrower way of life. And besides, since the samurai dignity really rested more on military rank than it did on wealth, they resented even more than the daimyo the snatching away of the distinguishing insignia that elevated them above the commoners.

The final blow came for the samurai in 1873, when the government found that it could not bear the burden of providing an income for the 400,000 retainers of the former feudal lords. In that year the finance minister offered to buy up the samurai pensions, commuting hereditary pensions to a six-year term and life pensions to a four-year term. In 1876 this commutation program was made compulsory, and many of the samurai joined the discontented group which later became interested in military imperialism as a means of retrieving its fallen fortunes. How much of Japan’s recent chauvinism and warlike propensity was due to administrative errors in dealing with the samurai is difficult to determine; it is safe to say however that one of the strongest single forces supporting the imperialist war party in recent decades was a group who hark back to the military tradition of the samurai. The turmoil and hardship experienced by this class when feudalism was abolished apparently produced a psychological repression which recently burst its bonds in the modern trend toward imperialism and war.
The new militarism. Leaders of the new government also determined upon a sweeping military reorganization. Like medieval European rulers in time of war, the shoguns had been dependent upon feudal levies for their troops. Firearms had been known and used in Japan ever since their introduction by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century; and the infiltration of Western learning through the Dutch factory at Deshima had provided the military with some knowledge of Western military tactics and strategy. Immediately after the overthrow of the Tokugawas, the emperor was forced to rely on the troops of the Satcho-Hito clans, but in 1872 a complete nationalization of the army was accomplished. Universal conscription was commenced, new weapons acquired, and the study of western European tactics begun under French instructors. The rise of Prussian prestige in the military arts however led the Japanese to change masters, and in 1885 German tutors and methods were introduced. And as she turned to the outstanding armies of the world for instruction in land fighting, so she applied to the world's greatest navy for tutelage in sea warfare, and British advice, engineering help, and in some cases vessels were obtained for the Japanese fleet. In military reorganization at least the last point of the Imperial Charter Oath of 1868 was carried out with a vengeance.

The new aristocracy. As Japan's political, social, and military changes crystallized it was inevitable that a new aristocracy should arise. When experimentation began in 1868 four classes had to be considered: the princes of the blood, the court nobility (kuge), the feudal nobility (daimyo), and the feudal retainers (samurai). A peerage law of 1884 provided also for an aristocracy of merit. A system involving a prime minister with two advisory councils including these classes was first tried, and when it immediately failed a reorganization into a council of state and assembly was attempted. The most influential group in the new empire was the progressives of the Satcho-Hito clans.

The new bureaucracy and legal system. A new bureaucracy to replace the old feudal governments was also needed, and it was established and manned largely by ex-samurai. No official could participate in provincial government however in the same district in which he had been a feudal noble, and he was responsible directly to the government at Tokyo. Eventually a civil service system grew up based on competitive examination rather than on former rank or appointment. In the organization of her new internal machinery Japan thus showed her willingness to adopt foreign ways; and she demonstrated the same willingness in reorganizing her legal system. Legal reform was accelerated by the
early growth of sentiment for treaty revision, especially the abolition of unilateral provisions such as extraterritoriality. Japan well knew that no Western nation would relieve her of the onus of consular courts until she showed more adaptability than China had in legal reform. In 1872 she began to set up criminal, civil, and commercial law codes. The criminal code was based chiefly on French law, derived from the Code Napoléon and its ancient Roman progenitors, and was well designed to fit a high degree of government centralization. The civil code followed the general practices of Western nations. The commercial code, put into effect in 1899, was first modeled after the French, and later revised to include many Germanic elements.

The revolt of Satsuma. These sweeping changes were not accomplished without opposition, and the leadership early formed itself into two cliques which became the basis of later political party lineups. One clique, with an eye to imperialist expansion in the Ryukyus and Korea, played on the discontent of the samurai to foment chauvinism and anti-Western sentiment, while the other clique followed the advice of the Japanese missions abroad, advocated a program of peaceful change and Westernization, and generally sought to have the nation mind its own business. Fortunately for Japan and the rest of the world during the formative years of the new order, this second group remained firmly in control, in spite of frequent incidents that revealed a seething discontent. In 1876 the government policy toward recognition of Korea and commutation of pensions brought matters to a head. Field Marshal Saigo withdrew in anger from the government, and took upon himself the task of training the samurai youth of Satsuma in traditional martial practices. In January 1877 a rebellion started — not against the emperor, but rather against his aides who were "disgracing" him by their advice. Saigo himself was unwilling to go this far, and joined the rebels only after an imperial conscript army had been sent against them. Many Satsuma clan leaders fought on the side of the imperial forces, and the affair must be described as a clique revolt rather than a provincial one. Hostilities continued for nine months, ending with the capture of Kagoshima and the death of Saigo, who had himself beheaded by a friend. The rebels were regarded by the imperial authorities as less guilty of treason than of bad judgment, and only twenty executions took place, although 2800 deprivations of rank, fines, or imprisonments were levied. Fully 39,000 individuals were pardoned. The significance of the Satsuma rebellion lay in the fact that certain elements had reluctantly come to realize that the Meiji Restoration would not give them
the power they had sought, that there remained some antagonism to Westernization, and that the imperial conscript army was fully able to exercise its power over feudal military remnants.

Administrative reforms. Immediately following the promulgation of the Charter Oath in 1868 there began a movement for constitutional government. Quite obviously it had not been in the emperor’s mind to establish a truly representative system, for the deliberative and advisory assemblies composed of court nobility, daimyo, and samurai were in no sense representative of all population groups, and the leaders of the new order apparently agreed with the emperor in considering representative government as not involved in the oath. Nevertheless, consideration of public opinion had been promised, and as early as 1872 the progressive leader, Kido, on his return from the Iwakura Mission (to modify the treaties), recommended the institution of a representative assembly. Two years later in 1874 Viscount Itagaki organized a political club, somewhat on the order of the French Jacobins, and through this organization petitioned the throne for a representative body. The result of these demands was the 1874 Osaka Compromise, which established a Senate and High Court of Justice as additional elements in the administration, and provided for an Assembly of Prefectural Governors as a decentralizing factor. But even these bodies were still not actually representative, since their entire membership was appointive; and the continuing dissatisfaction finally in 1878 brought about the institution of provincial assemblies to aid in local government.

The rise of parties. Sentiment grew so rapidly in favor of some modification of the makeshift system that two new political parties crystallized. One was the Liberals (Jiyūtō), built on the foundation provided by Itagaki’s political club. It was formally set up in 1881, and nominally favored constitutionalism combined with imperialist expansion. The second party was formed in the following year by Count Okuma, the Progressive (Kaishin-tō) Party. In the meantime (1881) the emperor had issued an imperial rescript, promising a national assembly for the year 1890 and ordering that all political agitation on the issue cease forthwith. The consequence of the imperial attitude as well as of internal party disunity was the dissolution in the early 1880’s of both new parties. This dissolution had a bad effect on the new constitution, in that it became the product not of popular demand as voiced by party organizations but rather of the ideas of a single individual who was then at the head of the government, Count Ito.

Ito’s influence. This remarkable man, Count Ito, in 1882 went
abroad to prepare himself to carry out the provisions of the Charter Oath for constitutional reform. He studied foreign constitutions, keeping in mind Japan's unique characteristics and remembering that the revolution in his country was founded on the emperor's nominal return to power. He knew that the entire basis of the new order would be shaken if the organization he proposed did not incorporate a high degree of centralization with its exaltation of imperial power. Of necessity he passed over the American, British, and French constitutions as being too democratic, and finally settled on the Prussian constitution as having the elements he wished, namely, a high degree of centralization, a strong executive power, and no direct responsibility of the authorities to the people. On his return to Japan he was made head of a commission to write a constitution; and when its work was nearly completed, a privy council was created to ratify it. Concurrently, the Nipponese nobility was reorganized on the Prussian model. At the top were the princes of the blood; then came five new classes of peers: princes, marquises, counts, viscounts, and barons. In addition, the old Council of State, dominated by remnants of the feudal nobility, was replaced in 1885 by an imperial cabinet. These changes all augmented Ito's influence, and the Japanese Constitution of 1889 therefore can be said to have been very largely the work of one man and one group, with the inevitable weaknesses of such a unilateral product. Ito's native intelligence, it is true, enabled him to choose instinctively the type of governmental organization which at the time best suited his politically adolescent compatriots, but in the long run the new government might have avoided much trouble if it had given some heed to the opinions of Itagaki's and Okuma's liberal party groups. There is no guarantee that their influence would have had any measurable effect, but it is interesting to speculate on what would have been the course of Pacific history if in 1889 Japan had acquired a government more subject to popular will and less amenable later to the maneuverings of the military imperialists.

The constitution. The constitution provided for a highly centralized system of government. The emperor was supreme head of the state, commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and controller of the budget. He was aided by two advisory bodies, the Council of Ministers, or cabinet, and the privy council, both constituted wholly of appointees. The Diet, or parliament, was bicameral, and consisted of an upper house of peers and a lower house of elected members. The peers consisted of several classes, those sitting by right of birth and position,
Japanese envoys to the United States

The first Japanese parliament was opened November 20, 1890, under a constitution drawn up by Prince Ito. From an old Japanese engraving.
those elected by their classes, and those appointed by the emperor. Eventually in the upper house there were nearly 400 members, including the forty-five highest taxpayers in the empire. The lower house, or House of Representatives, consisted at first of 300 members, chosen by a limited electorate. The chief duty of the Diet was to approve legislation, although bills might originate in either house.

The emperor's power. In view of the above administrative setup even a cursory consideration of the Japanese constitution of 1889 makes evident the nominal supremacy of the emperor as head of the state. Under Ito's scheme, and before the militarists seized sub rosa control, a strong emperor and his associates and advisers could virtually control the nation. The close union of military power with civil authority, illustrated by the admission to the cabinet of generals and admirals on active service, made the emperor as commander-in-chief extremely influential if he chose to use his power. Another point of strength for the throne was the fact that the House of Representatives did not have the absolute power of the purse, and that if the Diet refused to approve a new budget the budget for the preceding year automatically went into effect. In fact the emperor could be a dictator if he wished; the limitations on his authority — such as the provision that required annual convocation of the Diet — were innocuous and could be neutralized if the emperor wished and were able. As it turned out however the emperor came under the control of his associates — bureaucrats, militarists, and nobles.

A multiparty system. The greatest weakness in the constitutional structure was probably the Diet's position as an obstructionist group. It could prevent an increase in the budget, but it could not design a new one; it could refuse to approve ministerial legislation, but it could not create a new ministry. These blocks in the course of administration eventually brought about the same unfortunate situation — to a lesser degree — that has afflicted France, Chile, and some of the Balkan countries — a multiparty system in which no cabinet was really secure because it was the outgrowth of a coalition among dissident cliques.

The genro. One other development which must be noted had not been planned by the framers of the constitution — the formation of a veritable "kitchen cabinet" of imperial advisers who influenced internal policy by working outside the framework of regularly constituted authority. These elder statesmen — known after the turn of the century as "genro" — were men who had led in the Restoration movement and in the creation of the new Japan, and therefore were Emperor Meiji's
most trusted advisers. All were men of ability and long experience, and were looked up to as the real leaders of the country and entrusted with the highest offices of government. They set the new state firmly upon the policy of national strength and imperial expansion, but at all times served as restraining influences on the more radical or rabid elements, which however as time passed came more to the front.

2. Economic Reorganization

Japan's self-imposed political revolution was of major significance in Pacific history, but of equal importance was the industrial revolution which transformed a feudal, agricultural people into one of the world's leading industrial nations. Incidentally it turned out that Japan's menace to democracy in the twentieth century was in direct proportion to her industrial development whose foundations were laid in the nineteenth. It is also necessary to emphasize the fact that Japan is the only major nation in the world besides Soviet Russia which deliberately set out to industrialize herself; and perhaps because of this very objectivity of attitude the process was completed in approximately one third the time it required Britain and the United States to pass through their unplanned technological transformation.

Agricultural reforms and population pressure. When Japan's modernization program began, the economic activity of first importance was agriculture. In an attempt to extend the benefits of the destruction of feudalism to the lower classes, the peasants in 1872 were given legal title to their lands, which they previously had held under feudal tenancy. But they soon discovered that land ownership was not an unmixed blessing. With ownership came taxation, and under its crushing burden many of the new independent farmers were forced back into the status of tenants. Agricultural labor migrated to the cities and aided mightily in Japan's industrialization.

This shift of population however was not entirely advantageous, for joined to the relative increase in urban population was the lack of application of machine methods to agriculture. Furthermore the amount of land available for cultivation on the rugged islands of Nippon was of course relatively small. As a result, the marginal food supply was always scanty, and during World War II one of Japan's most pressing problems was to get sufficient food during the American-British blockade.

The industrial revolution. In Japan's industrial revolution two factors stand out. One was government subsidization. No better example of
Nippon's willingness to break with the past can be found than the sudden elevation of money-making — formerly considered socially inadmissible despite the growth of mercantile fortunes — to a position of respect. Many of Japan's brainiest men soon appeared in business circles. Accordingly, since textiles, shipping, and banking activity for decades enjoyed governmental protection, it is not surprising that one of the greatest causes of international friction in more recent years has been the ability of government-supported Japanese industry to compete with and even to undercut British and American Asiatic trade. In one other way the Japanese government contributed to the nation's relatively quick success in the business field: she made no effort to change her people's historic habits of work. The Japanese laborer has been used to long hours at low pay, looking on his superiors as a child on his parents, and little protected from exploitation by industry; he therefore gave his employer an almost inexhaustible supply of cheap and docile labor.

The second important factor in Japan's industrial revolution was the close relationship between war and business. Japan's initial aim of building a militarily powerful and expanding state, combined with her participation in struggles with China, Russia, and Germany, caused sharp fluctuations in her business cycle. During war booms her economy was accelerated to unprecedented growth. Then came resultant depres-
sions which increased the demand for government intervention and for the adoption of new programs of militaristic expansion to solve the problems created by the downswing of business activity. From each of these interventions, the government emerged with new power. War indemnities stimulated industry, and heavy industries with war-making potential were subsidized.

Incidentally, it may be well to point out here that the effect of industrialization on population growth is nowhere better illustrated than in Japan. Other nations of the world, in passing through a period of industrialization, consistently increased their population by large percentages. But Japan in less than half a century nearly doubled her population, and during the seventy-seven years between Perry's arrival and the world depression of the 1930's the number of Nipponese rose from about 27,000,000 to more than 64,000,000. Japanese militarists were thus able to utilize the Lebensraum argument in their propaganda, for the lack of agricultural modernization referred to above and the scarcity of raw materials for a voracious industry, with attention to foreign markets rather than domestic, brought about a new and keen awareness of population pressure and a marginal standard of living for the masses.

Commerce. One of Japan's biggest commercial booms followed her war with China in the middle 1890's. Within ten years her foreign trade increased nearly fourfold, and by the end of World War I it had reached a volume more than sixty times as great as in 1885. The number of corporations more than doubled in the decade before World War I, and industrialists — with government encouragement — developed textile weaving, shipbuilding, iron and steel refining, paper manufacturing, and artificial fertilizer production, most of which made possible an increasing export trade. Despite this development of Japan's export trade however a great change had occurred by the close of the century in the nation's export balance. The first few decades following Perry's voyage had seen Japan export more than she imported, but rapid industrialization, coupled with an increasing volume of foreign trade and other contacts, multiplied the demands of the Japanese people to such an extent that their imports eventually exceeded their exports. In this unfavorable balance of trade, Japan resembled Britain; she imported raw materials, processed them, and then exported them, for the most part in Japanese ships. And the profits from these transactions paid for the manufactured goods Japan could not produce.

Banking. Trade of course required banking, an activity supported
and regulated by the government from the very start of the modern era. In 1872 the American system of national banking was instituted, and wealthy families were commissioned to organize separate banks. Within seven years more than 130 institutions were established, and the overexpansion of credit thus engendered made further control necessary. Ten years after the passage of the national banking regulations the Bank of Japan was chartered, and eventually special banks for specific purposes were organized, such as the famous Yokohama Specie Bank, which was set up for the purpose of financing foreign trade. In 1896 the government went on the gold standard, and thereby stabilized the financial conditions of the country.

The Zaibatsu. Mention was made above of the tendency in agriculture toward concentration of ownership; this trend was even more noticeable in industry, where five great families, who in some cases

Two types of Japanese dwellings. Flimsy, paper-walled houses on the water-front stand back of houseboats inhabited by Nippon's poor.
had drifted into politics at the time of the Restoration, now succeeded in seizing almost complete control of Japanese business. Their success grew out of the persistence of the clan idea, a holdover from feudalism which produced a queer grafting of family unity on corporation politics; and, helped by the direct encouragement and subsidization of the government, this family economic hierarchy found it easy to take the place of the older political system. The Mitsui family, for instance — by far the most powerful — built up a control of Japanese economy which included nearly one sixth of cotton and rayon weaving, almost one fifth of the cement and mining industries, more than 10 per cent of coal extraction and shipping, and more than three quarters of paper manufacturing. Eventually, as in the Renaissance communes, the Mitsui entrusted general managership of their vast holdings to a non-member of the family, known as the "Banto." The Mitsubishi corporations, owned and controlled by the Iwasaki family, were less interested in heavy industry and more concerned with commerce and finance; Americans came in contact with Mitsubishi interests in the Nippon Yusen Kaisha line of steamers before World War II, and with Mitsubishi bombers during hostilities. Sumitomo, with its headquarters at Osaka, concentrated on engineering and heavy industry; Yasuda was predominantly a banking concern; and Okura, which specialized in engineering, was closely allied with the military imperialists. In 1946 General MacArthur, commanding the occupation forces in Japan, undermined the influence of these families — collectively known as the Zaibatsu — by forcing them to relinquish their holdings.

The story of Japan’s rise to economic prestige is such an impressive one that before her political greed became clearly evident many observers were inclined to credit her with being the only Eastern nation to possess real potentialities. Such a view was defensible before 1931. Then it was easy to regard the Japanese people with awe and wonder because of their tremendous accomplishments in such a relatively brief time. Unfortunately the nation drifted into an expansionist policy; her industrial strength no longer was a potential benefit to Asia’s masses, but rather a monster which at a time of terrible crisis threatened the whole world’s freedom.

3. Cultural Changes

While Japan was experiencing political and economic alterations, her culture underwent a searching investigation, and foreign ways were
deliberately combed for possible application to Nippon's civilization. It must be emphasized, however, at the outset that Japan never learned the Western viewpoint. Her Weltanschauung remained characteristically Oriental, feudal, and non-Christian; and though she had a veneer of Western ways and political and economic structure, her culture remained essentially Japanese. The relative ignorance and fanaticism of the Japanese trooper during World War II was ample evidence that while his hands pulled the trigger of a machine gun, he was mentally wielding a samurai sword.

Educational reform. The important year 1872 also saw the beginning of Japan's new educational system. Foreign developments were analyzed carefully, with the result that primary and secondary education roughly

"Teaching the art of flower arrangement in Japan. This illustrates the appreciation of most Japanese for the beauties of nature. But even this activity has been hedged about with extreme formalism and ceremony."
followed the American model; university training copied the French; and vocational and terminal aspects of the system utilized German theories. Elementary training lasted six years, and most schools were controlled by the state. Propagandization in fanatical patriotism was started early, and as militarism became more and more important the idea of army service as a part of each person’s life became important. The press was not given much government encouragement, and journals that criticized public policy were banned. Magazines early became popular, chiefly because of their nonpolitical nature. Despite the fact that the Japanese were highly literate and were avid newspaper readers, in general it is safe to say that the Nipponese press never influenced public opinion as it does in Western nations. Publications increased rapidly, but because of censorship failed, except in isolated cases, to bring about basic reforms.

Religion. Religion in Japan was influenced strongly by the Meiji Restoration. While Buddhism and Confucianism dominated the philosophies of most Japanese, before the accession of Meiji to real power an attempt was made by the government to return to Shinto, Japan’s ancient cult of patriotism, which it was felt would strengthen the new movement. Shintoism is a religion of Nature-and-ancestor-worship in which national heroes and patriotic legends play a great part. It has therefore become a useful instrument of the state for channeling the nation’s thought down age-old grooves. Shinto increased in importance following the Restoration and then declined slightly following World War I. In the early 1930’s there were about 17,000,000 adherents of the Shinto sects and most Japanese gave lip service at least. Buddhism, after 1300 years of development in Japan, boasted nearly 30,000,000 adherents before World War II; but because of the peculiar philosophic character of the two religions, it was possible and usual for a Buddhist also to be a Shintoist and vice versa. Christianity, although introduced into Japan in the sixteenth century and extremely influential, never achieved much modern strength. Despite the presence of great leaders like Kagawa, there were fewer than half a million Christians in Japan in the 1930’s. The militaristic emphasis of Shinto decreased the importance of Christianity in the years before Pearl Harbor. It can be seen therefore that although toleration was officially approved, it only periodically amounted to more than lip service. The Japanese way of life was too much bound up in Oriental attitudes to be able to appreciate Western religious ideals.

Foreign fads. One of the most interesting developments in Japanese
A priest of the Zen sect in Tokyo. There are six main Buddhist sects in Japan, and the Zen, although not the largest numerically, has the most temples. Its emphasis on stoicism and training of the will fitted in remarkably well with the philosophy of the samurai.

Living was their addiction to foreign fads following the opening of the country. During 1874 and 1875 cock-fighting had a vogue; in 1882 innumerable dictionaries were printed and clubs organized; athletics became the craze in 1884; and in 1886 and 1887 a variety of things were attempted, ranging from waltzing to big funerals. "German measles"—the practice of imitating everything German—together with mesmerism, table-turning, wrestling, and other interests combined to warp the Japanese opinion of foreign cultures.
None of this deliberate copywork on the part of the Japanese achieved any deep results. Basically, the nation remained semi-medieval and completely Oriental, with its own culture, and only a thin veneer of Western ways. Only gradually did Japan gain a more fundamental understanding of the culture of the nations she had imitated, and it required the seismic cataclysm of defeat in World War II to disturb in any large measure her traditional way of thinking.

4. The International Enfranchisement of Japan

Japan deeply resented the unilateral provisions of the treaties with the Western powers that she had been coerced into signing. It was bad enough that the commercial provisions favored the foreigners, but the climactic insult was the inclusion of extraterritoriality rights on which foreign nations insisted because of their lack of respect for the Japanese courts and judicial system. In the celestial empire the detested extraterritoriality long existed because China made no effort to secure judicial efficiency; in Japan however not only did public opinion resent the situation, but the nation was willing to do something about it.

The Iwakura Mission. Japan took her first step toward treaty revision in 1871 when the mission of Counts Iwakura, Okubo, and Ito went to Washington to protest the inequality of the treaties. Nippon’s ignorance of Western ways was embarrassing, for Okubo and Ito had to go back to Japan to obtain regular diplomatic credentials before the American State Department, under Hamilton Fish, would receive them. The situation was not helped when because of their exotic court dress, wooden shoes, and picturesque paraphernalia members of the Iwakura Mission were made the butt of cartoonists. Although the emissaries were well received once their credentials had been accepted, their attempt to regain control of the customs and to repeal extraterritoriality failed in Washington, and Europe paid little attention to their dilemma. In 1878 the United States made a pretty gesture by agreeing to modify her treaty if other powers paralleled her act, but as had been anticipated none of the others was willing, and the proposal fell through.

The end of extraterritoriality. Finally, when Japanese officials realized that no change in the foreign attitude toward extraterritoriality could be expected until Japan modernized her court system, she proceeded to do so, copying French and Prussian models. At the same time she made a definite effort to convince foreign nations that she was adopting Western dress and customs generally. In 1882 the Japanese Foreign Office made
another attempt to revise the treaties. This time the foreign powers agreed to the setting up of Japanese courts, but insisted on the presence of foreign jurists (the “mixed court” arrangement) in all cases where foreign nationals were being tried. The Japanese refused to accept this modification, and again the agreement collapsed. At last in 1888 Count Okuma hit upon the method that was to achieve final success — treating with each nation separately, beginning with those whose interests in Japan did not militate against treaty revision. Mexico, whose relations with her were minor at best, agreed readily to a change; the United States repeated her 1878 offer to modify her treaty if other nations made similar concessions.

The beginning of real independence came in 1894, when an agreement was reached with England whereby the latter consented to relinquish extraterritoriality and partial customs control after 1899. Within five years most important nations had made similar agreements, and the Japanese goal was achieved. Japan was jubilant over her victory; she had accomplished in half the time what China had been struggling for ever since the first Opium War. Foreigners at first were inclined to resent the changed conditions; but later, as Japan proved able and willing to rise to her responsibilities as an equal member of the family of nations, foreign opposition faded. Again Japan had justified the hopes of her supporters by capably adopting Western techniques.

Conclusion. Japan, confronted with the same problem that had disrupted China a few years before — foreign insistence on the opening of relations with the rest of the world — rose to the crisis in a unique manner. Deliberately she set about to Westernize her political and economic structure, and she accomplished her design so well that by the end of the century Western nations were willing to accept her on an equal footing. Culturally, her transformation was not as complete, but her veneer of Western ways served to satisfy the Occident and to place her in a position where she could later menace the safety of the very nations who had first broken down her isolationism. Her political transformation was called the Meiji Restoration, but actually it meant a substitution of western clan leaders and other progressives for the Tokugawa shogunate. Economically she passed through a complete industrial revolution in a fraction of the time required by other nations who approached the change less deliberately. Altogether the picture of Japan’s rapid switch to a new way of life was impressive; it demonstrated her great potentialities as a nation, and at the same time blinded possible critics to the danger she might represent if her institutions came under the control of aggressive militarists.
The Rise of Japan—

External Affairs

Introduction. Although Japan's internal progress was highly significant in laying the groundwork for her role in recent times, her aggressive foreign policy was the chief cause of her important place in modern history. Step by step she extended her influence into the lands of eastern Asia. Although at first her weakness and the internal strife between advocates of peaceful progress and her more aggressive leaders caused her imperialist program to stumble and falter, it gradually gained momentum until the militarists became so firmly entrenched that they could take advantage of the least upset in Nipponese economy or disorder in neighboring lands to give her a new excuse for territorial expansion. Rumbling onward at an ever-increasing pace, the Japanese military machine rolled over the Ryukyu Islands, Formosa, and Korea, threatened Chinese integrity during World War I, dominated Manchurian economy and later took possession of that country, and then after additional aggressions culminating in the invasion of North China in 1937, embarked upon its last great adventure—World War II.

Japan was well fitted for imperialism. Her historic tradition exalted the military caste, and bushido, the way of the warrior, was linked closely with Japanese political and military development. Her enforced departure from isolation had impressed on her the power of armed might, and when she came into contact with the Western World she was made quickly aware of the advantages and shortcomings of her insular position. Her commercial expansion developed her desire for new markets; her industrialization demanded new sources of raw materials, and intensified population pressure. Finally, the weakness of China encouraged
her in aggression, and the example of Western imperialistic powers led her still further astray.

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the opening events in Japan's militaristic career — her acquisition of the Ryukyus, her war with China, and her participation in the European scramble for economic power in China sometimes known as the "battle for the concessions."

1. Revising the Onesided Treaties

Concurrent with the first phases of Japanese expansion, and a necessary basis for its later achievements, was the revision of the onesided treaties which had been forced on her by foreign nations following Perry's arrival in 1853. Japan resented deeply the extraterritoriality which enabled foreign governments to maintain their own courts on Japanese soil, and she also chafed under the bonds of imposed tariff agreements. As early as 1871 as previously mentioned she sent an embassy abroad to request revision, but this attempt failed. In 1878 the United States, customarily generous with the Orient, agreed to modify its treaties if other powers would conform, but their refusal caused further delay. Conferences with Tokyo representatives of the powers followed, but had little success. A sample difficulty was the compromise agreed to by the Conference of 1886, in which mixed courts were suggested; the Japanese stiffly refused anything but complete judicial independence.

Japan's deliberate Westernization was adopted largely with a view to forcing the Occident to revise the treaties, and eventually her success in this modernization, coupled with her diplomatic persistence, bore fruit. In 1888 Mexico relinquished extraterritoriality, followed by Great Britain in 1894. The United States and other nations followed suit, so that by 1899 extraterritoriality was at an end. Tariff autonomy came about the same time; and by 1900 Japan was free from the pressure of the unequal treaties. Although territorial expansion was to be the most significant phase of her foreign policy, it must be admitted that treaty revision was her major diplomatic objective from the 1860's to 1894.

2. The Beginning of Japanese Expansion

In 1871 Japan signed a treaty of commerce and amity with China. The chief difference between this document and those China signed with
Occidental powers was that in this treaty extraterritorial rights were extremely limited. Both nations felt themselves in a vulnerable position with regard to judicial organization, and therefore jointly refused to recognize the existence of such an issue. Despite this favorable beginning it was not long however before friction arose between Tokyo and Peking.

Formosa. One of the earliest incidents happened in the same year that the treaty was signed, namely, the Formosa affair. In 1871 a group of Ryukyu fishermen were shipwrecked on Formosa's southern coast, and the primitive Formosan tribesmen attacked and killed them. Because the Ryukyu (Loochoo) chain forms a series of island stepping stones, strategically located south of Kyushu which, in spite of China's vague claim of suzerainty, had been under the control of the lord of Satsuma since the seventeenth century, the newly organized Meiji government considered them its private preserves. Acting on this assumption the Japanese government immediately requested that China, nominal overlord of Formosa, pay an indemnity for the damage her "vassals" had done to "Japanese subjects." China refused on the ground that both Formosans and Ryukyuans were China's vassals, and Japan therefore had no business interfering in what was purely a civil affair. The Japanese military leaders refused to give in and their position was strengthened by the fact that during the long negotiations several of the most influential members of the peace party departed for foreign lands on the Iwakura Mission, and thus the militarists temporarily had things their own way. For a brief time war with China threatened. But the return of the Iwakura emissaries served sharply to neutralize chauvinistic propaganda, and although the population was divided and some minor riots and uprisings occurred, the imperialists were eventually satisfied with a compromise—a punitive expedition to Formosa in 1874 without declaration of war on China. For two months after a landing at Liangkiao Bay, Japanese troops skirmished with Formosan tribes, and China finally was induced to pay 500,000 taels damages. The Ryukyu Islands thus became an active part of the Japanese Empire and discontinued their triennial tribute payments to China; and Nippon's first step in her program of modern conquest had succeeded. It was not until 1881 however that China recognized Japan's claim to suzerainty over the Ryukyus, and then only on the friendly advice of President Grant.

Korea. In 1875 Japanese militarists were given fresh encouragement by a Korean attack on a Japanese survey vessel, and again war with
American travellers in Japan about 1860, as seen by the Japanese. Colored woodcut by Yoshifuji. Note that the Americans have Japanese features, and that the mother is carrying her child in typical Japanese fashion.

China was strongly demanded. This time — as related in the previous chapter — discontented samurai demonstrated their dissatisfaction with government leniency by the Saigo revolt in Satsuma; but again the government emerged victorious, with those who favored the policy of preliminary internal development still in control of the nation. In 1876 Tokyo sent a naval squadron to secure satisfaction, but the threat was
directed against Korea alone, and no war with China occurred. Korea responded by a treaty of commerce and amity, resembling on a smaller scale what Japan had signed at Perry's behest a generation earlier.

The Bonins. Japan also began to acquire certain undisputed adjacent territories. About 500 miles from Japan, lying eastward in the Pacific at approximately the same latitude as the central Ryukyus, are the Bonin Islands, a small group of about twenty land dots, aggregating only twenty-eight square miles in all. First discovered by Japanese fishermen in the seventeenth century, then claimed by England and the United States in the nineteenth century, the Bonins were always tacitly considered by the Japanese as their possessions, and in 1876, largely as a sop to rising Japanese chauvinism, they were formally annexed to the empire.

The Kurils. At about the same time Russia began negotiations for Sakhalin, which was more or less within the Japanese orbit and which had been jointly occupied. Japan offered to divide the island in half, or to buy the Russian claims, but neither solution satisfied St. Petersburg. Eventually in 1875 an agreement was concluded whereby Russia gave up her title to the Kuril Islands, the chain connecting the eastern tip of Hokkaido with the Kamchatka peninsula, in return for Sakhalin. The latter was to figure prominently in subsequent Japanese relations with Russia, and even in the stress of World War II the resources of the territory came in for negotiation and transfer.

These were Japan's first steps in her march to imperialist power. In the 1870's discontented samurai and impetuous government officials had twice nearly forced Japan to war. The government remained however in the hands of moderates who believed in a policy of modernization, industrialization, militarization, and peace — until Japan was better prepared. By the 1890's even they were convinced that Japan was ready, and they then set out to effect the policy desired by both groups — national expansion on the Asiatic continent.

3. Steps Leading to the Sino-Japanese War

Causes. The Sino-Japanese conflict had four basic causes: Japanese expansionist tendencies, China's reluctance to permit either Japan or Russia to intervene in Korean affairs, Russian imperialism, and Korea's own troubled internal scene. All four played a part, but it can safely be said that if Japan had not modernized herself to the point where she considered a vigorously aggressive policy to be within her power to
enforce, there probably would have been no war; Korea might have drifted more and more into the Russian orbit, but open hostilities could probably have been avoided.

*Japan and Korea.* In preceding chapters Japan’s relations with Korea have been briefly sketched. As noted, they were long-standing, and friction between the two regions was constant. About the beginning of the Christian era Korea became the channel through which Chinese culture passed to Japan. Later it became the springboard for military aggression on both sides — the Mongol emperors of China used it in attacking the Japanese islands, and Hideyoshi, the great military dictator, planned to invade the continent by way of the Korean peninsula. In this Japanese invasion Korea, bolstered by the Ming armies, repelled the attack. Although when the Manchus seized the Dragon Throne they reasserted Chinese dominance over Korea, relations between conqueror and conquered were slight, and because of Korea’s subsequent isolation, she became known as the “Hermit Kingdom.” When benefits or profits were to be expected the Chinese claimed a shadowy sort of suzerainty, but they rejected all responsibility when expense or trouble was involved. The previously mentioned 1875 incident resulted in the re-establishment in 1876 of treaty relations between Japan and Korea, and Japan thus did for Korea what the United States did for Japan. Chinese authority in the peninsula naturally began to weaken when Korea undertook separate foreign negotiations, whereas Japan became more and more influential in the Hermit Kingdom. After all, it lay a mere hundred miles from Kyushu across an island-dotted strait; whatever occurred in the peninsula was bound to have even more important repercussions in the island empire now than in the past. Nippon’s chauvinists realized this, and capitalized on it to strengthen their own position and to impress their compatriots with the necessity of maintaining a deep interest in Korean affairs.

*China and Korea.* China, meanwhile, was beginning to realize that initially she had made a mistake in refusing to accept responsibility for Korean damage to foreign vessels and insults to foreign citizens. As a result of this changed attitude, and because most of the Western powers were glad to sidestep trouble by permitting their ministers in China to act as emissaries to Korea as well, by the 1880’s China had signed treaties which recognized her suzerainty over Korea with Germany, England, Italy, France, and Russia. The United States and Japan however established separate legations in Korea and considered her as nominally independent. The United States was inclined to follow along
with Japan, and when Commodore Shufeldt attempted to gain entry into Korea Li Hung-chang with difficulty channeled American negotiations through Peking rather than Tokyo. Japan's intransigent attitude toward China's control over Korea was clearly expressed in the Convention of Tientsin (1885), by which it was provided that neither nation should send troops to Korea for any purpose without first notifying the other of its intention. This treaty of course was merely a stopgap, and was bound to fail, since neither party wished to share Korea with the other.

Russian relations. The position of Russia in eastern Asia constituted a perennial question mark in the minds of statesmen interested in the Far East. Since the sixteenth century Russia's record in Siberia had been one of persistent eastward expansion; in the 1700's she had reached the
Pacific; and her 1858 treaty agreement with China had given her the Amur as her southern boundary. Her natural interest lay in maintaining friendly buffer zones between her own lands and a potentially troublesome China and an already ambitious Japan. One of these zones was Manchuria, and as the nineteenth century drew to a close the St. Petersburg authorities concerned themselves more and more with the possibilities of economic penetration of that area. Russia undertook negotiations for a Trans-Siberian Railroad, and showed an ever-increasing interest in the port of Vladivostok which had access to the Sea of Japan. That she had an eye on the Hermit Kingdom as well was brought out clearly in 1884 in her proposed arrangement for Russian military advisers to train the Korean army in return for Russian possession of harbor facilities at Port Lazareff. To Japan then Russia was the greatest danger—China merely a potential one. And yet since Tokyo needed a free hand south of the Yalu in order to counter the Russian threat, the Japanese realized that the war with China must come first. Hence Tokyo's friction with Peking over Korea constantly increased.

**Korean internal politics.** The internal affairs of Korea added to the complexity of the situation. Because of her insecure position as a buffer on the borders of three great powers, her politics were torn by factionalism, and her difficulties were intensified by her failure to develop a stable and prosperous economy. Nearly half of her foreign trade was under Japanese control, and her primitive industrial and agricultural systems failed to prepare her people for the looming crises. A low standard of living was not at all mitigated by a greedy bureaucracy which capitalized on Korean traditional respect for rank to maintain innumerable incompetents in office. If an ordinary man dared to show the trappings of wealth, he immediately laid himself open to confiscatory taxation. These evils could be corrected only through armed rebellion, and then only locally — there was no redress for the population as a whole.

The factional line-up in Korea has already been briefly described. In 1863 a twelve-year-old boy ascended the throne, with his father, known as the Tai Won Kun, acting as regent. The boy-king was married to a woman of the powerful Min family, and two political cliques immediately developed — the Mins, led by the queen, devoted to progress, Westernization, and friendship toward the Japanese; and the

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1 This was the incident that inspired England to seize Port Hamilton as a temporary counter-measure, but her occupation of that town ceased when the Russian bargain with Korea fell through and Lazareff kept its freedom from Russian control.
Yis, led by the king's associates, friendly toward China and historic traditionalism. The famine-induced revolt of 1881 caused a popular antipathy to Min policies, and Japanese nationals were killed. When Japan intervened to obtain redress, China resolved to adopt a stronger policy toward her vassal, and sent Yuan Shih-kai as special commissioner to see that Chinese influence in Korea remained active. This event brought about a complete reversal of Yi-Min politics — henceforth the Mins were pro-Chinese, and the Yis turned to the Japanese for aid and counsel. The immediate outcome of this about-face was the revolution of 1884, which began in a Yi plot to murder several conservative ministers. The plot succeeded only partly, and China quickly intervened to drive out the Japanese advisers who were stimulating the Yis to violence. But troubles with France in Indo-China prevented Peking from taking a strong stand, and Japan once again demanded redress for the insult to her nationals. China was forced to apologize, to pay a $30,000 indemnity, and to permit the establishment of a Japanese legation guard. Because at that moment neither side wished to fight, a modus vivendi of 1884 temporarily stabilized the situation. By the 1883 Convention of Tientsin both China and Japan agreed to withdraw their troops from Korea, and to give preliminary notice to the other should either again send troops. Japan both won and lost in this bargain; she decreased to a certain extent the validity of Chinese claims to suzerainty over Seoul, but she was forced to accept a drastic weakening of the Yi or progressive influence at the Korean court. It was at this moment that Russia chose to send her abortive military mission to Korea, and Japan responded by becoming more than ever determined to keep Korea free of foreign domination.

The Tong Hak Rebellion. For nearly ten years conditions in Korea were fairly quiet; then in 1894 came the immediate cause of the Sino-Japanese War, the rebellion of a conservative clique known as the Tong Haks, who were determined to bring the nation back to age-old ways of doing things and were violently opposed to foreign and especially to Japanese influence. Although the first outbursts of Tong Hak belligerence were quelled, the rebels eventually managed to seize some of Korea's provinces and the king found it necessary to ask aid from China. The latter responded with 2,500 troops, and simultaneously in accordance with the Tientsin Convention notified Japan of her action. The Japanese, ostensibly to protect their nationals in Korea, replied in kind. The king of Korea was of course much worried lest hostilities break out between the Chinese and Japanese, and being of no mind to have his
kingdom made into an arena for the settlement of imperialistic quarrels, urged the Chinese to withdraw; but they refused to do so unless the Japanese withdrew also. The Japanese in turn then proposed that a commission be organized to investigate the internal conditions in Korea and suggest reforms, but China dissented on the ground that Japan had made a great point of recognizing Korea's independence, and as an independent, sovereign state, Korea should therefore not be subject to the authority of foreign commissions of investigation. Japan then countered with a question: was Korea independent or under the suzerainty of China? China, not wishing to shoulder the responsibility for the Tong Hak troubles, answered that Korea was independent, and upon receiving this reply—which was what she had been hoping for—Japan submitted to Korea an elaborate program of reform. In her acceptance of the Japanese suggestions Korea notified China that since Peking had refused to support Korea in her hour of need, no blame could be attached to the Japanese government for what might occur by reason of Japan's taking advantage of China's lost opportunities. In addition, it was stated that further movement of Chinese troops to Korea would be considered an unfriendly act.

The dethronement of the king. In the midst of this tense atmosphere and apparently unnerved from watching his two antagonists maneuver for position, the Korean king suddenly broke, and made the fatal error of requesting the Japanese commander to withdraw his troops as well. The Japanese authorities, insulted and angry, proceeded to depose him and to install on the throne his father, the Tai Won Kun. The new monarch, subservient to Japanese policy, made a treaty with his sponsors which gave them the right to evict Chinese troops from the peninsula.

4. The Sino-Japanese War

Hostilities begin. Meanwhile war had actually begun. Chinese reinforcements numbering approximately 8000 men set out from Tientsin, and two Japanese cruisers sailed to intercept them. On July 25 the cruisers happened upon a convoy which included three Chinese warships, and when the firing ended one of the Chinese war vessels had been run aground and a Chinese transport had been sent to the bottom with a loss of 1200 lives. In August both parties declared war. The rest of the world considered that the strange conflict could have only one possible outcome; China had a million men and a huge empire, while Japan had an army of 70,000 based on a few tiny islands. But observers were due
for a tremendous surprise, for Japan's modernization enabled her to win a quick victory, and Western nations for the first time were given an opportunity to realize how complete and sweeping had been Japan's transition from medieval feudalism to modern industrialism.

The invasion of Korea: Battle of the Yalu. In the first phase of the combat, Japanese troops, ably convoyed by their new navy, landed on Korea's west coast and occupied the capital city, Seoul. The Chinese attempted resistance, but were defeated in a battle near Pyengyang. Then followed a sea battle which turned out to be decisive. It took place on September 17, 1894, when the Japanese and Chinese fleets met near the mouth of the Yalu River, and the ensuing Battle of the Yalu insured Nipponese control of the sea and thereby eventual victory. This conflict was significant because it was the first naval engagement that utilized large numbers of quick-firing guns, and also because from it the future Admiral Togo gained experience that was to be of value to him in the later war with Russia. When the battle began the Chinese fleet, under Admiral Ting and his advisory personnel from various nations, consisted of twelve vessels, some of them armored. The spearhead of the Chinese squadron was composed of two second-class battleships, the Ting-yuen and the Chen-yuen, both designed for head-on rather than broadside fighting. To cover a convoy in the mouth of the river, Ting anchored his fleet in line abreast, but unfortunately his flanks were exposed. Although the Japanese squadron, under Admiral Ito, in numbers was hardly equal to the enemy, its efficiency was far greater. As a result when Ito unhesitatingly charged the Chinese line and then swerved sharply to port before the battle was fully joined, the relatively weak Chinese right flank collapsed under the pounding of Ito's quick-firers. Two older Chinese vessels, with wooden superstructures, were set afire; the rest of the fleet — with the exception of two vessels that escaped to Port Arthur — was surrendered. Interestingly enough, the last shell fired by the Chen-yuen started a blaze on the flagship of Admiral Ito, who had ordered a withdrawal just as the Chinese ammunition gave out. The victory was complete; China's half-hearted attempt at a modern seagoing navy was chocked off at the start, and thereby the issue of the war was decided.

The end of the fighting. Japanese troops in Korea immediately crossed the Yalu River into Manchuria, and shortly thereafter a combined land-sea attack was staged against Port Arthur under the direction of Japanese Field Marshal Oyama. The fortress soon surrendered, with a loss to the Japanese of only 400 casualties. In January 1895 Weihaiwei on the
Shantung peninsula was besieged, and a month later capitulated. Meanwhile the Chinese fleet once more had been attacked, and on its surrender Admiral Ting committed suicide. In March two Japanese armies which were invading Manchuria converged on the Liao River, and broke down the last Chinese barriers to Peking. Actual hostilities had lasted only seven and a half months.

*Peace negotiations.* In November 1894, four months before the end of the war, Li Hung-chang began peace negotiations, but made little progress until the following spring. His first attempt consisted of sending a personal emissary to Ito, but his accreditation was faulty and Japan refused to receive him. In January an American, John W. Foster, accompanied a second mission, but the Japanese again refused to negotiate on the ground that Oriental diplomacy too often involved refusal by a superior to countenance the acts of his subordinates — their own tactics with Perry were probably fresh in their minds. Eventually in April Li himself went, accompanied by a large staff, including Foster. Strangely enough the Japanese emissaries, Ito and Mutsu, were also ably supported by an American, Henry W. Denison. The confidence both nations showed in the integrity of the United States had been shown before by their commissioning the American government to oversee each other’s property in the belligerent zones. Li’s first request for an armistice was unavailing because the Japanese demands were so excessive that not even a beginning of peace negotiations could be made. Gloomily returning from the fruitless first session, Li was fired on by an over-patriotic Japanese, the bullet lodging below his left eye. The Japanese were chagrined and humiliated at this mishap, and attempted to recover their lost “face” by coming to a ready agreement with Li on armistice terms. These included recognition of Korean independence, cession of the Liaotung peninsula of south Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, trade concessions, and a large indemnity. Li agreed to the first demand, but objected strenuously to the others. Ito however stood firm; he gave Li four days to consider, and the Chinese government was forced to acquiesce.

*The Treaty of Shimonoseki.* The Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on April 17, 1896, guaranteed the Chinese recognition of Korean independence, ceded to Japan the Liaotung peninsula, Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands, provided for an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels (about $144,000,000) to be paid to Japan within seven years with interest at 5 per cent, agreed to the opening of four additional Chinese treaty ports, and promised a new commercial treaty — Japan to enjoy the most-favored-nation clause until the terms were arranged.
Japanese gains. For the Nipponese the Sino-Japanese War was a glorious triumph. China's relinquishment of suzerain powers, shadowy though they had been since 1876 when Japan had first recognized Korea's independence, gave Tokyo a free hand in Korea. Japan thus was enabled to begin a deliberate program of political and economic intervention which fifteen years later was to culminate in open annexation. In Formosa (Taiwan), a large, rugged island inhabited chiefly by descendants of Chinese settlers and remnants of bloodthirsty hill tribes, Japan obtained an area which later was to be the most important source of sugar for the Japanese Empire. It also was valuable for rice, camphor, silk, tea, and tobacco, and in recent years has produced coal and petroleum in small quantities. Formosa was strategically so significant that it placed Japan in position to dominate the central and southern coasts of China. The Pescadores, a tiny group of islands lying between Formosa and the mainland, made Japanese possession of the larger island secure. The Liaotung peninsula, tipped by the fortress of Port
Arthur, constituted the southernmost extension of Manchuria into the Yellow Sea, and was perhaps Japan's most important territorial gain. Japanese armies had invaded it during the war, and by right of conquest it belonged to Japan. But this cession to Japan of a mainland territory so close to other foreign areas of influence excited the jealousy of the European powers to such an extent that, as will be pointed out later, Japan was forced to rewrite the terms of the treaty that gave her title to this peninsula.

Even though she lost the Liaotung peninsula, Japan's gains from the Sino-Japanese War were so great that thenceforth she could discard her policy of nibbling at her neighbor's lands and could prepare for large-scale military annexations. Twice more was she to engage in similar wars; and then, with her preliminary objectives achieved, she permitted her overweening ambition finally to plunge the entire Pacific Area into World War II. Today one can realize how unfortunate was Japan's war with China; she won it so easily that her militarists were encouraged to make further demands, and when the opportunity arose for future aggression, chauvinistic leaders, seeking to inspire the population with military fervor, had only to refer to the easy gains of 1895.

5. Japan Learns Militarism from Europe

As noted above, the idea of Japan's acquiring mainland territory in the Liaotung peninsula did not meet with the wholehearted approval of the powers of Europe. Russia was especially worried, realizing that Japan now had not only the means of dominating Korea completely, but had even a foothold in Manchuria that might be dangerous to Russia's Siberian possessions. Other powers, busily engaged in carving out for themselves regions of influence in helpless China, were only too glad to find a means of reducing in a small way the hostility Peking naturally felt toward them; consequently some were willing to help Russia try to save for China a part of her treaty cessions. European politics being what they were, continental intrigues also played a part; it has been suggested, for instance, that Germany favored helping Russia get into trouble with Japan in order to divert St. Petersburg's attention from the simmering Western caldron.

Three-power intervention. Conferences accordingly took place among the European powers, and when Li Hung-chang begged European help in easing the terms of the treaty, three nations responded—Russia, France, and Germany. Russia's aims were clear; Japan's occupation of
Liaotung menaced her own position in eastern Asia. The attitude of France was also quite understandable; the Franco-Russian alliance tended to draw France into Russia's program. Germany's motives though were not so clear. Possibly she desired to support and appease Russia, in view of the lines of belligerence being drawn in Europe; equally probable was her interest in fomenting Asiatic discord to distract Russia's attention from Berlin. Whatever their complex motives, the three powers decided to act in unison, and on April 23, 1895, the ministers of Russia, France, and Germany appeared at the Japanese Foreign Office and presented identical notes.

These notes demanded that Japan renounce possession of the Liaotung peninsula, on the ground that her continued possession of that area would make fictitious the nominal independence of Korea and would disturb the peace of the Orient. Japan, wrathful but unwilling to go to war with most of Europe, agreed to give up all the peninsula but the tip, including Port Arthur. The powers consulted and refused to accept the concession. Four days later Tokyo reluctantly and with poor grace agreed to surrender the entire peninsula, provided the terms of the treaty were unchanged — she insisted that the treaty be ratified as it stood; then she would give back Liaotung to China in exchange for an addition to the indemnity amounting to 30,000,000 taels ($21,000,000). This was agreed upon, and Japan thus gave up one of the chief prizes of her first war of aggression.

This intervention by the powers was neither forgotten nor forgiven by Japan. Like Turkey at the Congress of Berlin, she found herself the pawn of power politics, and if anything was needed to harden her determination — born in 1853 with Perry's arrival — to develop herself to a point where foreign nations would not dare to trifle with her imperial ambitions, the three-power intervention provided it. From 1895 on Japan clearly distrusted Occidental motives and prepared in the future to play a stronger hand in the powers' own game. But the United States remained largely unaware of this Japanese distrust and determination; Americans for another decade continued to consider the Japanese their friendly Pacific protégés. Little by little however farseeing persons noted that the Rising Sun looked ominous in the heavens; and at the Portsmouth negotiations Japan's greed demonstrated that Tokyo harbored resentful ambitions which were neither understood nor correctly interpreted by the Western powers.

Conclusion. Japan's greatest significance in recent Pacific history is her success in using both her political modernization and her mastery
of Western technology for purposes of conquest. Starting slowly, she adopted early in her career the formula of seizing upon "incidents" to force concessions; her early relations with Formosa and Korea were based on this system. She then took the Bonins and the Ryukyus, and traded her claim to Sakhalin for Russia's Kurils. Her recognition of Korean independence in 1876 laid that region open to imperialist aggression, and the peninsula became a pawn in the maneuvering of Japan, Russia, and China. Following two decades of imperialistic scheming came Japan's first great adventure into military conquest, the Sino-Japanese War. With Russian influence temporarily distracted, Japan intrigued in Korean internal politics until China's resentment grew to dangerous proportions. A fortuitous rebellion that drew Chinese troops to the area gave Japan her opportunity, and the brief war resulting forced China to recognize Korea's independence and paved the way for eventual Japanese acquisition. China had been induced to cede the Liaotung peninsula as well, but she appealed to the Western powers for aid in revising the treaty; and Russia, France, and Germany responded and forced Japan to give back Liaotung. Japan neither forgot nor forgave this intervention, and as a consequence of it her aggressiveness increased, and in succeeding years made her even more greedy and devoted to militaristic ways.

The question why Western nations intervened in the Sino-Japanese quarrel has been partly answered, but the true explanation of their willingness to participate in Far Eastern diplomacy can be found only in terms of their Asiatic empires. Accordingly the next six chapters will deal with this interesting and highly significant phase of Pacific history.
Holland in the Pacific Area

Introduction. The struggle at the close of the nineteenth century among Russia, Germany, France, and Great Britain for the control of China showed clearly that the West felt that Atlantic civilization was about ready to move into the Pacific basin. Certain features of European expansion to the Orient have already been outlined, but a clear understanding of the twentieth century contest between East and West requires a somewhat more detailed description of imperialism in the Pacific Area. Accordingly these six chapters will be devoted to accounts of Oriental empire-building by Holland, France, Great Britain, Russia, Germany, and the United States.

1. Insul Inde in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

Native culture. A previous chapter pointed out that the Dutch came to the Indies with two objects in mind: to damage their Portuguese and Spanish oppressors by interfering with their Eastern trade, and to enrich themselves by breaking the Iberian peninsula's monopoly of spice production. The extermination in the early 1600's of the decadent Iberian traders was relatively simple, but the building up of a successful trade was no easy task. The Malaysia of that time was an ethnological crazy quilt resulting from succeeding waves of invaders. These began with a Negroid people, probably from the southeast, and were followed by Malays, Hindus, Mohammedans, and Chinese from the continent. The Dutch thus found that most of the islands were inhabited by tribes in various stages of savagery. The Javanese it is true had had a long history as an agricultural society under kingly rule and had reached
the heights of a rather involved feudal system, but native chieftains ruled the backward tribes in the interior of most of the islands and on the coasts Hindu, Islamic, and Indonesian traders had built up commercial empires. By the seventeenth century the archipelago had been divided at least nominally among fifteen principal sultanates which generally shared the same type of decentralized social organizations and the same Islamic religion.

Political advance. It is easy to understand then that though the Dutch originally were interested solely in trade, their desire to monopolize that trade brought them into conflict with native as well as European competitors and confronted them not only with economic problems but also those of politics and war. Whether the Dutch could have done better had they realized at the outset the task that confronted them is difficult to say, but in all fairness it must be remembered that the burghers never intended to become conquistadores. But when they found their trade hampered by native potentates they did not hesitate to sacrifice the native potentates for the trade.

Native rights. Whenever possible they utilized the influence of native rulers, and as long as their demands for the produce of the country were met they left a semblance of independent power to the petty Mohammedan sultans among whom the islands were divided. Furthermore, refraining to a great extent from interfering with local customs, the Dutch at no time attempted to disturb the local religious beliefs. In these respects the Hollander were perhaps less subject to modern criticism than their forerunners, the Portuguese and the Spanish. But the record shows that even the burghers were true products of an age when the pursuit of wealth, urged by a spirit of adventure, was the dominant impulse, and when America, Africa, and Asia were looked upon merely as happy hunting grounds where fortunes might be rapidly made.

Company ascendency, 1674-1749. In the early years and to a considerable extent all during its heyday the Dutch East India Company, which from 1602 to 1798 was the main organ of Dutch imperialism, concentrated its chief efforts on the Molucca Islands and Java. Batavia, capital of Java, was the heart of a commercial empire stretching from Japan all the way round to Persia. In the Moluccas and other outlying spice islands Dutch authority was limited to such influence as was exercised by a few fortified places to protect factories and shipping ports. Java however, only about the size of England, was soon discovered to be an immense garden in which most of the valuable plants and products of
the tropics grew in abundance. This island therefore, because of its more manageable size, its wonderful fertility, and the comparative docility of its population, by 1674 was completely under Dutch rule. For the next seventy years the company prospered at the expense of the natives. Even during the first twenty-five years, while the company was becoming established, its profits were enormous; it is said that in 1624 one stockholder left to his heirs seven tons of gold and another eight tons. During the later period dividends seldom fell below 12 per cent, and sometimes mounted as high as 63 per cent. The company maintained monopolies in coffee, opium, timber, tin, salt, pepper, and other spices such as nutmeg and cinnamon. It levied import and export taxes, demanded seigniorage, exacted fees for real estate transfers. The natives were forced to labor for the benefit of their foreign overlords, and it is said that one may search in vain among the records of the company for a single measure which aimed at the moral, social, or national progress of the native peoples.

Company decline, 1749–1798. Eventually however the dry rot that destroyed the foundations of the Portuguese and Spanish empires attacked the Netherlands East India Company. Slavery and monopolies led to abuses that increased governmental difficulties. Other tropical countries began to compete with the Dutch company and dividends decreased. Much of its profit came from inter-Asian trade, and this declined in the eighteenth century with the loss of Dutch prestige in India, Ceylon, Persia, and Japan. In the early 1760's the company was forced to convert to a territorial government exploiting Javanese plantations and mining instead of continuing to concentrate on its spice monopoly. But after these problems were solved decline again set in. In the early 1780's the British fleet cut off the Netherlands East Indies from Holland, and British and American traders entered the spice lands and broke the Dutch monopoly. Finally in 1795 the French overran Holland and a democratic government under French influence was set up. Oligarchy was frowned upon and as a result in 1798 the company's charter was abolished and the Netherlands took over the rule of Insul Inde.

2. The Dutch East Indies During the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Period

Futile reforms. When the rule of the Dutch East Indies was transferred to the Batavian Republic, as the Dutch state now called itself,
actual administration was placed in the hands of the Council of Asiatic Possessions. Influenced no doubt by the spirit of the French Revolution, a commission was instructed to devise a system of trade and government "such as would produce the greatest welfare of the East Indies, the highest profits for the commerce of the Republic, and the greatest advantage for the country's finance." Unfortunately the investigators turned a deaf ear to the reforms proposed to them. Though advocating free trade, they upheld for the most part the main portions of the old company system. But before their report could be made effective the British Navy once more cut off the Indies from the mother country. The result was that for a decade the old abuses were carried on under new names and officials in Batavia ruled and traded much as they pleased, especially with the British, the Danes, and the Americans, until the Napoleonic Wars in 1807 cut off that trade as well.

The Daendels reforms. Finally in 1808 Governor-General Marshall Daendels, sent out by the new Dutch king, Louis Bonaparte, began a reconstruction that saved Holland's colonial empire from the disintegration that had threatened it during the company's last years. Under his rule a great highway was built the length of Java. This highway not only aided trade, but enabled the quick movement of troops whenever native uprisings endangered peace. To lessen discontent he abolished forced deliveries of spices from the Moluccas, although extending government coffee culture on Java. Administrative graft was punished and made less necessary by a general salary increase. His greatest reform however was in Dutch-native relations. He established the complete supremacy of the government over both its official servants and the Javanese rulers, regents, and lesser chiefs. In short, Daendels transformed a loose commercial organization into a centralized state authority supported by a disciplined Dutch and Javanese administrative body.

Sir Stamford Raffles. Since under Daendels Java began to resume its former capacity to produce wealth, it is not surprising that when in 1810, through the passing of the kingdom of Holland to the French imperial crown, the Indies fell into the hands of Napoleon, Great Britain decided that so valuable a prize should not remain there. In August 1811 therefore Lord Minto landed in Java with 11,000 soldiers. After a few sharp skirmishes the recently arrived rulers who had been appointed by Napoleon left the island and the Union Jack was raised. For the next five years under the wise rule of Acting Lieutenant-Governor Sir Stamford Raffles the affairs of the country were administered with wisdom and success. Public revenues are said to have increased eight-
fold, while the facilities given to transit trade and to shipping in general made Batavia one of the greatest trading centers of the East. Raffles extended Daendels's prohibition of forced spice deliveries to include all products. Abolishing the custom of exacting from the native princes forced labor in lieu of taxes, he wiped out many tolls and imposts that had become especially hard on the growing Chinese population. In the liquidation of feudalism he went even further than Daendels, and introduced a close-knit and well-trained official hierarchy which he planned should come into direct contact with the natives instead of utilizing the chiefs as intermediaries. He even abolished the sultanates of Bantam and Cheribon and lessened the prerogatives of the still-surviving states of Jogjakarta and Soerakarta. On the other hand, by giving seats on the British Council in Batavia to prominent Netherlanders, he achieved considerable cordiality between the British and the Dutch. In 1816 he was succeeded by John Fendall, to whom, after the redistribution of colonies at the Congress of Vienna, fell the duty of returning the Netherlands Indies to their original owners.

The restoration. British occupation of Java ended only over the earnest remonstrances of Raffles, but from the standpoint of England's European policy the return of Java to the Dutch was a piece of consummately wise diplomacy. Holland in alliance with a strong continental power would have constituted a dangerous threat to England's "splendid isolation." With their return of Insul Inde, accompanied by a guarantee of possession, to the Dutch, the English secured for themselves Holland's neutrality in any future war. A century later this sacrifice on the part of the British crown paid big dividends.

3. Restoration and Reform (1816-1871)

Anglo-Dutch agreements. England's return to Holland of Insul Inde was proof to the Dutch that England was more concerned with the peace of Europe and the safety of Great Britain than with adding to her Far Eastern holdings. Consequently Holland proceeded again to establish her trade monopolies, to exclude British ships from all ports in the archipelago except Batavia, and to reassert her power over the local native rulers and her control over the native rulers in the outer islands. However, despite the acquiescence to Dutch ambitions of his home government, Sir Stamford Raffles, representative of the British government in the Eastern Seas, refused to give up his dream of English colonization in Malaysia. Accordingly on January 29, 1819, Raffles
hoisted the Union Jack at Singapore. On this almost deserted island, despite the objections of Indian, local, and Dutch authorities, he established in four months a thriving colony with a population that increased in that time by over 5000. Convinced by the continued progress of the little settlement that the British were still a threat to the Indies, the Dutch were willing to sign at London on March 17, 1824, a treaty that regularized the positions of the two nations in Malaysia. The general principle of this agreement was that each of the two powers should be given a free hand in the areas already under its control. With the exception of Achin all land to the right of the East Indiamen's course to China fell within the Dutch sphere of influence; all land to the left, including Malacca, within the British sphere. As for Achin, the leading native state in northwestern Sumatra, the Dutch promised that while restraining disorder and piracy they would do nothing to deprive the native rules of their independence. Later this engagement was an obstacle that until its abrogation in 1871 prevented the Dutch from doing much to colonize Sumatra.
The significance of Java. But the Treaty of 1824 did remove the most prolific sources of dispute between the British and the Dutch; and for the latter it made possible fifty years of uninterrupted development of the territories already theirs. This meant of course chiefly Java, for at the close of the Napoleonic Wars the Dutch effectively possessed, exclusive of Java, only the Moluccas, Makassar and Minohassa in the Celebes, Padang and Palembang in eastern Sumatra, and a few stations in Borneo. During the next fifty years negotiations with the native rulers led to only a slight increase of the territories in which Dutch control was a reality; therefore in this period the history of the Dutch in Java for the most part constitutes the history of Insul Inde.

The Java War of 1825. In the story of this half century the first item of importance was the Java War of 1825. In the decade after the return of the Dutch to power the two important Javanese states of Soerakarta and Jogjakarta had a discontented people, an embittered aristocracy, a weak native administration, and a European administration disdained by the majority and distrusted by all. Therefore when in 1825 the Dutch attempted to curb the exorbitant leasehold revenue obtained by the native princes from their tenants, trouble arose. The ringleader was Depo Negara, an illegitimate son of the former sultan of Jogjakarta. By raising the Islam standard of the "Holy War" and declaring that he fought in the name of the Prophet he brought almost the whole Mohammedan population to his side. The fighting was extremely bitter, with all the European inhabitants, including the English and French, aiding the Hollanders. Finally after five years of warfare, waged primarily against Jogjakarta but with the constant threat of a general rebellion, the Dutch put a large army in the field and Depo Negara was captured March 28, 1830. Although the contest cost the government 15,000 lives and $25,000,000, it helped to consolidate Dutch rule in Java and made possible the substitution of Dutch exploitation of the natives for that of their own rulers.

The culture system. The instrument of this new exploitation, the so-called culture system, immediately provided a new grievance that lasted four decades. During the fifteen years after Insul Inde had been returned to the Dutch, their lack of both men and money kept them from accomplishing any real economic development. The Netherlands treasury was so badly drained by the Javanese and Belgian revolts that the government had to contract a loan, the proceeds of which were to be expended for the benefit of the colonies. It guaranteed principal and interest, and then sought ways and means for the colonies to pay for
their own benefits. Left to themselves the natives would have been satisfied to work only enough to provide a bare subsistence. But in 1830 Governor-General Van den Bosch devised the "culture system," under which the natives, through their chiefs, who shared with the Dutch a portion of the profits, were forced to plant one fifth of their rice lands to products indicated by government officers. Definite quotas of sugar, tobacco, coffee, and other valuable crops were demanded at prices far below market rates. Shortly instead of one fifth, the government insisted that more than a fifth of the fields be devoted to specified crops. Laborers were paid for their work in kind, and local sales were possible only at a very low figure. Although the natives thus became subject to grinding tyranny, the system was financially successful, and nearly $200,000,000 was sent to the exchequer in Holland over a thirty-five year period.

Reforms. The hardships suffered by the natives gradually became known and reforms were begun. After the constitutional revision of the Netherlands government which in 1848 grew out of the European tide of revolution, control of colonial affairs was transferred from the absolute power of the crown to the authority of the Dutch Parliament. Six years later came the Regulations for the Government of Netherlands India, which partially substituted statute law for administrative decrees. Even then however reform was slow. Not until 1860, when Douwe Dekker, a retired Netherlands East Indian functionary, in his famous book Max Havelaar bitterly condemned the culture system abuses, did the Dutch in Holland awake to the need of more positive action. In 1860, as a result of this Javanese Uncle Tom's Cabin, slavery was abolished, and in 1863, under the leadership of Franzen van de Putte, the first colonial budget was drawn up. Two years later tariff reforms were secured and the abolition of the culture system was begun. One culture after another was abandoned, and finally the law of 1870 sounded the death knell of the whole system, only the compulsory production of coffee being continued until 1917. In 1890 forced labor on the lands of the native princes was prohibited, and by 1900 Dutch policy, once selfish and conservative, had become capable and honest, with a steady and constant pressure in the direction of reform.

4. The Dutch Forward Movement

A New Imperialism. One of the fundamental laws of imperialism seems to be that momentum carries it beyond its original anticipations.
This native village on Biak Island is typical of the back-country life in the Dutch East Indies.

Despite the purely commercial intentions of the Dutch, the logic of imperialism as shown above forced them into the acceptance of a considerable degree of territorial government in Java. It is true that the responsibilities thereby involved made some of the leaders agree with the famous British comment that "colonies are millstones around our necks." In fact in 1861 the Minister of the Colonies affirmed, "I regard every extension of our rule in the Indian Archipelago as a step nearer to our ruin, and that the more since we have already, in this respect, grown far beyond our strength." In the last quarter of the nineteenth century however the combination of (1) a need for strategic frontiers, and for a logical rounding out of the territory in their hands, and (2) a need for the suppression of the trouble-making adjacent peoples, together with the expansive enthusiasm of the local officials and "unofficials," overrode the cautiousness of the home government. Furthermore, with France, England, Germany, Italy, and Russia all feeling the pressure generated by the development of capitalism and all hur-
rishly staking out claims for the future, lest the desirable places of the
earth be gobbled up by insatiable rivals, Holland had to face the dis-
tressing fact that vast stretches of the archipelago were far from being
effectively occupied. As a consequence, about the time that definite
political and economic reform finally brought to Java a measure of
economic stability and peace and when the opening of the Suez Canal
and the expansion of world markets were bringing and expanding trade,
the home government, trembling at the thought that some hitherto
ignored isle of the Indies might pass irrevocably from Dutch grasp,
sanctioned a new policy of advance.

The conquest of Sumatra. This new policy began with the extension
of Dutch rule into northwestern Sumatra. As mentioned above, the
problem of dealing with the sultanate of Achin under the restrictions
of the Treaty of 1824 worried the Dutch almost continuously for half a
century. Piracy, rampant in Achinese waters, frequently involved the
ships of other powers. To prevent intervention the Dutch in 1857
concluded a treaty of permanent peace and friendship by which both
the Dutch and the Achinese bound themselves to combat piracy. But
when relations became steadily worse in spite of the treaty, the Dutch
gradually became aware that their policy of holding back further
expansion into Sumatra would have to be abandoned. This change
became possible in 1871, when by an Anglo-Dutch treaty the British
withdrew their objections in return for a promise of equal treatment
for British commerce. Two years later the Dutch discovered that the
rulers of Achin were seeking help against Holland from representatives
of France, Italy, and the United States, and were even proposing that
the latter establish a protectorate. Left no choice but to show the
mailed fist, the Dutch in January 1874 began a thirty years' war. At the
war's end in 1904 the entire country and its neighboring dependencies
were under effective Dutch control. Thereafter only minor armed out-
breaks disturbed the peace.

Twentieth century conquests. As might be expected, failures of the
Dutch in the early years of the Achinese War lowered Dutch prestige
in the outer islands, especially the Moluccas. Not until the dawn of
the twentieth century were the anti-expansionists sufficiently subdued
to permit attention to be given these other restive areas. When J. B.
Van Heurz became governor-general and in 1904 brought to a successful
conclusion the war in Achin, a determined policy of expansion was
undertaken which soon firmly established Dutch rule throughout the
islands. In this final "forward movement" the colonial policy Holland
has followed in the twentieth century was developed. This policy of course varied greatly in the different islands, and no generalization can be entirely true; but since one of the objectives of this chapter and the next five is to make possible a comparison of Western colonial methodologies in the Pacific Area, it seems desirable to give as accurate a summation as is possible.

Dutch colonial policy. At the outset Dutch colonial policy frankly called for the extension of Dutch influence in uncivilized regions where circumstances militated against the development of the country and the people. In native states where the aristocrats had kept considerable power, the government recognized that it would have to secure guarantees of improvement in administration and justice. Especially in finance intervention was necessary, in order that taxation might serve taxpayers as well as princes. Though the Dutch hoped force could be avoided, they felt that part of the "white man's burden" was to induce native rulers to strive for the welfare and economic improvement of their people. As far as possible native states would be incorporated into government territory, but on request of the chiefs or the people, or where it appeared unavoidable in the interest of the people, they would not hesitate to act. Finally in Java itself the native states were to be induced to adopt a system of administration which should lead to the gradual assimilation of social and economic conditions to those existing in the areas directly under Dutch rule.

Bali. Since our space limitations prevent a description of the extension of Dutch rule throughout the whole archipelago, a brief survey of Holland in the famous paradisiacal island of Bali may well illustrate the process generally used in more recent times. Contact between the Dutch and the nine Balinese principalities of the island was negligible until 1839, when fear of British occupation led to a series of treaties that placed Bali under Dutch sovereignty. Because the Balinese broke certain provisions of these treaties, in 1854 and 1856 two of these principalities were taken over by the Dutch, who appointed native regents to head the local administrations. Repeated interventions followed, induced by the constant civil warfare waged by the local states. In the course of this warfare the favorite military action was the destruction of the enemy's irrigation systems.

In 1882 the residency of Bali and Lombok (Bali's island neighbor on the east) was established; then in 1894 when the Dutch were forced to impose direct rule in Lombok, a third principality that had been a vassal state of Lombok was automatically joined to the Dutch posses-
A typical "Tjandi Bentar" (open gateway) through which an Indonesian woman is passing. Since time immemorial Balinese women have kept the upper part of their bodies uncovered, but on approaching a temple they don sarongs as a sign of respect for the gods.
sions. Five years later a fourth principality grew weary of attacks by its neighbors and turned itself over to the Dutch. In 1905, as a result of the plundering of a ship wrecked on the coast of one of the five remaining principalities and the failure of the ruler to pay an indemnity, a military expedition was sent to the island. Twice in the course of the expedition the troops were confronted by rulers who, facing defeat and desertion by their people, preferred death to submission. Surrounded by their families and immediate followers and armed with nothing but spears and kris, they flung themselves on the invaders' guns until all, men, women, and children, were destroyed. As a result two more principalities disappeared. The seventh had been wiped out in the previous century by local wars; and by 1910 the last two survivors had been drawn completely within the Dutch sphere.

5. Government of Insul Inde in the Twentieth Century

Political administrative divisions. Shortly after the beginning of the twentieth century, as a result of the "forward movement" the Dutch held sway over an East Indian empire which measured some 3,000 miles from east to west. It had an area of over 500,000 square miles and a population of about 40,000,000. (The 1920 census showed almost 50,000,000 and that of 1930 slightly over 60,000,000.) Politically the archipelago was divided between (1) lands under direct government and (2) subject native states. Administratively the islands were separated into two groups: Java and Madura forming one; the other consisting of Sumatra, Borneo, the Riouw-Lingga Archipelago, Bangka, Billiton, Celebes, the Molucca Archipelago, the Lesser Sunda Islands, and a part of New Guinea — outer possessions, as they are known collectively.

The frame of the government. To rule this vast extent of land and such a congeries of peoples, the Dutch were obliged to develop a centralized form of government, though they increasingly realized their need of enlisting the co-operation of the native inhabitants. To a large extent Insul Inde was ruled autocratically. The chief official was the governor-general, appointed by the crown of Holland and responsible to the Minister of Colonies. He was aided by the Council of the Indies, five members presided over by a vice president. Partly legislative and partly advisory, this body had no share in the executive work of the government. The cabinet consisted of the heads of the nine executive departments. In addition there was a general secretary who acted as executive
secretary to the governor-general. The latter not only had supreme executive authority, but could issue decrees which had the status of laws, except when the nature of the problems indicated that they properly belonged to the home government. Moreover the governor-general was bound by the constitutional principles of The Regulations for the Government of Netherlands India, passed by the king and the States-General in 1854.

No step was taken toward representative government until 1916. In that year a movement began which culminated in May 1918, when the governor-general opened the first Volksraad or People's Council. This body, composed of forty-eight members, half of whom were appointed or nominated by the crown and the other half elected by minor local councils, had no great power; it was purely consultative, and therefore did not satisfy the more advanced sections like Java. Aided by influential people in Holland, the fight for more power for the Volksraad was finally rewarded in 1925 with a reform bill. Under this bill a new constitution was provided for the "Oversea Territory" (since the Dutch East Indies were no longer "colonies"), and the new legislature came into being during 1927. Of its sixty members no fewer than thirty-eight were to be elected and no more than half could be Europeans. To it the governor-general had to refer the annual budget, colonial loan agreements, and proposed laws relating to military service.

Administration: (1) Java and Madura. The Dutch attempted to provide an administrative system suited to the degree of advancement and civilization attained by the people whom they governed. Consequently there were two types of administration, one for Java and Madura and another for the "outposts" or "outlying possessions." In Java and the more advanced sections the rule was carried on by native chiefs and local officials with resident advisers behind them. More recently local representative councils that were formed showed such a tendency to think for themselves that the prestige of the native chiefs as well as that of the Dutch officials was dimmed.

Just before World War II many of the Dutch were wondering if their giving the natives an increasing share in the government of the country was not unduly endangering the interests of those who, as the Dutch felt, by their energy, foresight, and enterprise had created the civilization which the indigenous people were enjoying.

(2) Outposts. These worries were not so applicable to the "outposts," for there the population is more scattered, and primitive conditions enabled the Dutch officials to play a more prominent role. The
geographical divisions were regencies, districts, and villages. The regencies varied in size as well as population, and a regent might rule over as few as 100,000 people or as many as 1,000,000. Regents were native born, and wherever possible the Dutch recognized hereditary rights. Ability determined the amount of power exercised by the regents; if a regent was capable, the Dutch officer remained in the background. Incapable regents were mere figureheads, the Dutch officials actually holding the power. Regencies were subdivided into districts, each of which had its head man, and these districts in turn were divided into villages, with a chief as head man of each village.

**Complexity.** It should be clear then that the Dutch system of colonial government has been deeply and inherently complex, a product of a basic social structure which—in architecture for example—runs the gamut from the antiquity of the great pyramid at Jogjakarta to the modernistic buildings of the newer sections of Soerabaya. Furthermore the primitive and the modern have so far interpenetrated each other that any clear separation is impossible. A great modern city will include a native village where laundry is still done on the banks of a canal. Before World War I the Javanese peasant alternately drove a water buffalo in his own rice field and a tractor on a plantation whose shares were owned largely in Holland; or he might be transplanted to Sumatra to raise rubber or tobacco for the United States market. In the same family one brother might produce batiks, another wear the headdress which denotes a pilgrimage to Mecca, while a third might be an engineer who learned his profession in Leyden and his political theories in Moscow. For four centuries Java has been in contact with Western civilization, but in the four principalities still persist the old culture and a proud native aristocracy which in the past has been opposed to democracy and liberty for the Javanese peasantry. In the outer islands there are scattered regions which before the last war were bound to Europe, but there are great stretches which no European has seen but briefly from a plane. On such a diversified base it would have been foolish for the Dutch to attempt to build any single and uniform structure. When at length they recognized the diversity, they acted upon it. After 1900 they began to take local folkways into account and preserve them against the onrush of Western "progress," at the same time that the lack of uniformity in East Indian civilization encouraged a vast deal of governmental experimentation.
6. Social, Cultural, and Economic Problems

**Justice.** The experimentation that went into Dutch efforts to find a government suitable to Insul Inde was carried over into social, cultural, and economic life. Because the Dutch were subjected to much criticism, no discussion of Holland's imperialism in the Pacific Area can be complete without at least a brief comment on certain nongovernmental aspects. The first to which attention may be called, the administration of justice, is normally thought of as a governmental problem. But since in the Indies a distinction was maintained between Europeans (and persons assimilated with them) and natives, Chinese, Arabs, and other Orientals, the problem there was both governmental and social. Europeans and Eurasians were subject to laws closely resembling those of the mother country, whereas local customs and institutions had to be taken into account when justice was administered to the natives. The penal code however was the same for Europeans, natives, and foreign Asiatics; and the tendency was also to make the civil and commercial law equally applicable to all sections of the community.

**Taxation and Finance.** The Dutch consideration of the native's welfare in taxation and finance has also been questioned. It has been pointed out that though from 1830 to 1877 the Indies contributed 832,000,000 florins to Holland, the only direct return the mother country made to the treasury of the colony was a wiping out in 1905 of an advance of 40,000,000 florins and a contribution in 1936 of 25,000,000 florins. Not until 1908, when an effective income tax for Europeans and European corporations was introduced, did the government try to see that private capital contributed adequately to the cost of the new and more expensive type of administration it demanded. Even then expenditure exceeded income; and at the end of 1934 the funded debt of the Netherlands Indies amounted to 1,215,000,000 florins.

But on the other side it must be said that Dutch interference in the systems of the native states led to a constantly rising revenue and to stable treasuries, even at the sacrifice of native participation in the handling of local finances. In this connection note should also be made of the extensive use by the Dutch of monopolies. Considerable criticism has been levied at the opium and salt monopolies, although salt prices do not seem to have been higher than in other countries. As for opium, which involved a social problem, the Dutch insisted that since prohibition would be impossible their form of regulation was helpful because it led to decreased use.
Education. The problem of what kind of education to provide and how much also caused the Dutch much thinking and brought them some criticism. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century virtually no attention was paid in the Dutch East Indies to the education of the Javanese, although a fairly elaborate school system was provided for European children. Because about 1845 the Minister of the Colonies discovered that the lack of education was hampering the work of the official native hierarchy, a start was made three years later with a provision of 25,000 florins annually for schools primarily intended to raise the standards of the native officials. Until 1893 the only assumption was that the primary purpose of the schools was to provide education for the children of the native aristocracy. Finally however the schools were organized in two groups, one with the same aims as the earlier schools, the other of a simpler and more rustic type adapted to the native environment and intended for the rank and file. Dutch was not taught in either group.

Modern education. In the next two decades, ending the nineteenth century and beginning the twentieth, came further changes. The demand for natives who could speak Dutch increased and that language became a major subject in the schools of the first group. And to meet the demands of modern industry it was necessary to found technical schools. A third line of advance consisted of an attempt to bring the schools nearer the mass of the people. As a result, in the first quarter of the twentieth century the annual school population increased from 128,000 to 1,041,000. Even so, while the school population of Holland in 1928 was 19.5 per cent of the total population, in the Indies the percentage was only 2.9 per cent. Since the beginning of the great depression financial difficulties prevented any appreciable advance; and in 1940 over 90 per cent of the population was still illiterate.

Labor. In the formulation of a labor policy the Dutch had to face two problems: unequal distribution of population, and the desire of foreign capitalists to keep in their own hands the profits from plantation products. The population problem was aggravated by the unwillingness of the people of Java, where the density is 700 to 800 per square mile, to go to such outer possessions as Sumatra where the density is less than fifty or to New Guinea where it is estimated to be as low as one and a half. To meet this situation the Dutch adopted the so-called "penal sanction," the attachment of a criminal penalty to the breaking of a civil labor contract. At the same time however the employer was obliged to treat the laborer humanely and justly, to pay wages regu-
The carabao is the tractor of the Netherlands East Indies. These eccentric beasts have little regard for grown-ups, but graciously obey commands of their child-Jesus.

larly, to furnish free and adequate lodging, to give free medical treatment and ample water supply (the Javanese are inveterate bathers), and at the termination of the contract to return the laborer to his place of origin. Undoubtedly there were abuses, but many coolies who were transported to Sumatra renewed their contracts voluntarily. The great depression however ended any abuses that might have been customary, for after 1929 there was a glut of labor in the outlying possessions as well as in Java.

The attitude toward foreign capitalists. As for the second problem it is to the credit of the Dutch that in 1870 they began to protect the small landholder. Through the Department of Agriculture instructions in
better methods were furnished and every effort was made to help the peasant compete with the capitalist. Land sales by Indonesians to "foreign" individuals, even though they were Hollanders, were forbidden by law. Long-term leases were permitted, but the use of the land thus held was strictly regulated, and it was provided that land used by a foreign lessee for raising sugar cane must be restored to the Javanese owner on alternate years for the production of rice. As for the regulation of hours, wages, and working conditions, little more can be said than that conditions were shockingly bad from the standpoint of the Western World. The Dutch government, necessarily itself a large employer of coolie labor, resisted all attempts at unionization, and just before World War II the average pay for unskilled labor was about twelve cents (United States currency) per twelve-hour day.

_Favorable activities._ Lest the above comments paint too dark a picture, it is only right to state that in the present century Holland has probably had less trouble with her colonies than has any other Western nation. This fact would seem to indicate that the Dutch made a substantial contribution to native welfare. About 3000 miles of rail and tramways were built in Java with the result that the coolies always seemed to be going somewhere. In the two decades before World War II, automobile highways were built throughout Java and much of Sumatra; highway congestion was daily worse than that of a Sunday afternoon in the outskirts of New York City or Los Angeles. Shipping was encouraged in every way, and regular service, albeit expensive, was maintained with all the larger islands. The police system, consisting of three classes corresponding with the city, county, and state police systems in the United States, gave satisfaction to both natives and foreigners. Telegraph, telephone, and postal service was most efficient, and to stimulate air mail, rates from the Indies to Holland were lower than from Holland to the colonies. Electric light and power were available in Java and Sumatra and in many of the chief centers of the outer possessions.

_Pro-native activities._ While it is true that these improvements benefited the Europeans as well as the natives, certain others were carried out entirely for the natives. To protect them from the usurers—especially Arabs and Chinese—the Government established village rice credit banks, village cash credit banks, and provincial district banks. Even more used were the government pawnshops, which kept the improvident Malays out of the grasp of those who would despoil them. Civil medical service enforced health regulations. In the economic
field were irrigation projects largely for the benefit of the natives, veterinary service to take care of the water buffalo, and government fisheries and reforestation projects.

Conclusion. Such then is a brief account of the oldest enduring Pacific Ocean colony of a European nation. Established for trade purposes, Insul Inde eventually became Holland’s chief experiment in empire building. In the three centuries after the founding of the Dutch East India Company the whole gamut was run from the mercantilism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’ commercial revolution,
through the *laissez-faire* doctrine of the nineteenth century, to the twentieth century recognition that a profitable exploitation of the Dutch East Indian empire depends upon the continued welfare and contentment of the Indonesians. In the three decades before World War II some steps were taken to secure these objectives, and the Netherlands Indies learned much from their imperial masters. Unfortunately improved medical facilities, modern transportation methods, and peace encouraged a tremendous growth in population, so that when Pearl Harbor was attacked Java was being faced with one of the world’s most pressing population problems. European material improvements, without changes in the native mores and patterns of social life, had created new economic problems. As a result the East Indians had become more and more dissatisfied with their colonial status, and when V-J Day arrived a spirit of nationalism was so rampant that it seemed certain their demand for independence could not be denied.
France in the Pacific Area

Introduction. A study of Holland's imperialism in the Pacific Area is quite naturally followed by a similar account of French colonization. Both Holland and France, and their respective colonies, are (or were before World War II) approximately adjacent. Both were affected by the commercial revolution, for capitalism was as much developed in France as in Holland and England; both were anxious to secure a good share of world trade and dominion; patriotic Frenchmen, even though Roman Catholics, detested Philip II of Spain; and finally, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries their colonizing activities stretched from the fish and fur centers of North America to the spice islands of southeastern Asia and the Indies.

At the close of the eighteenth century however the two nations had little in common, for as a result of the Seven Years' War the French colonial empire was destroyed, whereas Holland was able to retain its far-flung Insul Inde. For the next century French colonizing activities were extremely meager, and in the Pacific were pretty much limited to scientific expeditions in the South Seas and missionary endeavors in what is now French Indo-China. Then in the middle 1800's Napoleon III started a vigorous new imperialism founded on the identity of interest between churchmen and traders. The traders wanted markets for their goods and investment opportunities; the churchmen wanted converts to Christianity; both sought and secured state protection for their undertakings. At the same time also the patriotic motive became significant, and large numbers of Frenchmen decided that they wanted colonies for national power and prestige and to provide outlets for a surplus population if and when it should develop. As a result during the
decade 1853–1863 the Second Empire conquered Algeria, acquired islands in the Pacific, wrested favorable trade concessions from China, and began activities in southeastern Asia which were to lead to French control of Indo-China.

This vigorous foreign policy was continuous under the Third Republic; by the outbreak of World War I, French colonies in area and population ranked second only to those of Great Britain, while the annual trade of France with her colonies increased between 1879 and 1914 from 350,000,000 francs to nearly 2,000,000,000.

I. The Beginning of French Indo-China

Early contacts, 1627–1747: (1) Missionaries. French imperialism in the Pacific Area began in the "Golden Peninsula," the region later divided between Siam and Indo-China. The latter area, through the activities of Portuguese and Italian Jesuits, seems to have attracted the attention of the French in the early 1600's. The first Frenchman to visit the peninsula is thought to have been Alexander of Rhodes, who in the second quarter of the seventeenth century was a missionary in Cochin China and Tonkin. Banished because of his Gospel propaganda, he went to Rome. There he was instrumental in forming the Society of Foreign Missions, which in 1664 sent its first representative to Annam.

(2) Traders. French missionaries therefore had been working in Indo-China for nearly forty years before traders awoke to the commercial opportunities. In 1665 a trading company was finally formed, but its avowed purpose was to have missionaries combine commercial and religious activities. Four years later the company got a ship to the Tonkinese coast, where were established several stations for joint religious and commercial activities. It was not very successful, however, and it is necessary to turn to Siam for the next step in French Eastern expansion.

(3) Phra Narain. In 1680 the ruler of Siam, Phra Narain, by the advice of a Cephalonian adventurer, Constantine Phaulcon, sent an embassy to Louis XIV. In 1682 the French monarch reciprocated with a mission to both Siam and Annam. But the visit of the royal mission to Siam turned out disastrously. The eagerness of the ambassador for the king's conversion to Christianity, added to the intrigues of Phaulcon, who sought French supremacy, led to the death of the adventurer, the persecution of Christians, and the cessation of all intercourse with France.
(4) Annam. In Annam, although the mission was somewhat successful in appeasing the uncompromising attitude of the antiforeign officials, the hostility of the Dutch prevented the French from carrying on other than religious activities. Even these were limited — in 1722 there were but four priests in Tonkin and four in Cochin China — and continual bickerings among French, Italian, and Portuguese representatives of the Jesuits, the Franciscans, and the Society of Foreign Missions did not help the situation.

Commercial contacts, 1747–1777. This combination of the cross and the purse did not therefore effect any real French entrance into Indo-China. Nor were the efforts of certain traders in the years from 1747 to 1777 to substitute the crown for the cross much more successful. These attempts, originating both in the Canton trade and in French India, did little more than get the French government interested in the possibilities of recouping her losses sustained in the Seven Years’ War. When Louis XVI came to the throne in May 1774, he showed great enthusiasm for obtaining commercial footholds in Cochin China, in which he received fervent support from his Minister of Foreign Affairs, de Vergennes. But the American Revolution, followed by the French Revolution, put a stop to royal efforts to get a foothold in Indo-China.

Gialong. The cross however still persisted, and this time tried to make capital of the constant uprisings that embroiled in incessant warfare the countries composing Indo-China. It so happened that toward the close of the eighteenth century a civil war drove Gialong, the heir to the throne of Annam, to seek concealment in Cochin China beneath the shady branches of a sacred banyan tree. Here a priest saved his life. His position being still uncertain, Gialong sought aid of Pigneau de Behaine, apostolic vicar to Cochin China, Cambodia, and Tonkin. The missionary advised an appeal to Louis XVI, and himself escorted to Paris Prince Canh, young son of the former ruler of Annam. The prince made a great impression in Paris, where the ladies-in-waiting induced the queen’s hairdresser to imitate in their coiffures his red silk and gold turban. On November 20, 1787, Louis’s Minister of Foreign Affairs signed a treaty which provided that France aid the fugitive king to the extent of a fleet of twenty ships, seven regiments of soldiers, and $1,000,000. The bishop, innocently supposing that the French government intended to observe the treaty, sailed for Pondicherry, the French base in India; but there after a year’s delay he was finally undeceived. Thereupon, at his own expense he fitted out an expedition and sailed to Saigon. Then began a campaign which by 1804, despite the
death of the warrior-priest, was completely successful. Until Gialong died in 1820 he treated the French with marked consideration.

The expulsion of the French, 1848. During the period of the Revolution France had little interest in overseas affairs, and Restoration efforts to reorganize trade with Indo-China also produced meager results. In the meantime however Annam rulers had been noting what was taking place in their part of the world. They had seen the Anglo-French conquest of India, the Dutch conquest of Indonesia after the ineffective Javanese revolt, and in the 1840's Britain's war against China. Accordingly the Annamese arrived at the same conclusion all other Asiatic peoples had—that European missionaries and their converts were a fifth column to prepare the way for eventual conquest. It is not surprising then that upon the death of Gialong his son, Minh Mang, asked the French officers who had come with de Bahaine to leave the country, and took advantage of their departure to begin a persecution of French missionaries and their converts. The Emperor Thieu-Tri (1841-1847) was violent, and his successor, Tu-duc, went to even greater excesses. When the news of the Revolution of 1848 reached Indo-China the latter decided France would be too preoccupied to worry about the Annamite empire and in July 1848 decreed that

the religion of Jesus . . . is evidently a perverse religion. . . . Consequently, the European masters of this religion are to be thrown into the sea with rocks tied to their necks. A reward shall be given for every one seized. . . .
The converts, after severe castigation, are to be sent back to their families. . . . These barbarians enter every land with neither fear nor weariness; they conquer all peoples, regardless of expense. . . . Therefore, we must not make peace with them, neither must we wage war but hold ourselves on the defensive, and to do that we must surround ourselves with obstacles.

The conquest of Cochin China. Ironically enough it was this effort to rid the country of missionaries that precipitated exactly what the Annamite emperors had been trying to avoid. In 1855 Napoleon III became aware of the fact that Tu-duc, a most ineffective ruler, had lost control of Cambodia and retained only slight authority in Cochin China and Tonkin. Accordingly, in keeping with his pre-Crimean War reassertion of France's ancient Christian protection privileges in the Levant, he decided to make the persecution of French missionaries a pretext for occupation of the peninsula. In 1858 the death by exposure of a French priest and the murder of a Spanish Dominican led to a joint Franco-Spanish naval demonstration which brought about the fall of Tourane (September 2, 1858), Saigon (February 18, 1859), and Bienhoa (Decem-
ber 9, 1861). These events finally made Tu-duc see the light, and the combination of a revolt in Tonkin and the stoppage by the French of rice supplies from Saigon obliged the king to sue for peace. On June 5, 1861, a treaty was signed which provided for payment to France of a war indemnity over a period of ten years; cession to France of the three Cochin China provinces of Bien-hoa, Saigon, and My tho, and the island of Pulo-condore; liberty for Christians throughout Annam; commercial freedom in the ports of Tourane, Balat, and Luang-nam; the right of the French to use the Mekong River for trading purposes; and the transfer to France from Annam of suzerainty over Cambodia. Since Spanish participation in the enterprise was slight—a corps of Tagals was sent from the Philippines—by the Treaty of 1862 the Spanish received only a small indemnity and religious freedom for their missionaries. Shortly after the treaty was signed the French admirals forced the Spanish contingent to withdraw from the expedition, an exclusion which was long resented by Spain. The second section of the treaty soon proved to be a mistake. The three provinces of Cochin China which were not taken over by France became the centers for native plots, and as a result in 1867 the governor of Cochin China took over the administration of Vinh Long, Haiien, and An-giang. After the French seizure of these areas peace followed, and on March 15, 1874, the Treaty of Saigon transferred the whole of Cochin China officially and permanently to France.

1. The French Acquisition of Protectorates over Cambodia, Annam, and Tonkin

Cambodia. In the previous chapter it was stated that the momentum of imperialism always carries it beyond its original anticipations. The history of the French in Indo-China is an example, for the Treaty of 1862 which gave the French their foothold in Cochin China also led to the establishment of a protectorate over Cambodia. This little kingdom, lying between Siam and Cochin China in the basin of the lower Mekong, had for centuries been the unfortunate victim of its more powerful neighbors, Siam and Annam, which competed for its control. In 1847 these two countries signed a treaty agreeing that a protégé of Siam should assume the crown of Cambodia under the joint protection of Siam and Annam. When this ruler died in 1860 a contest for the throne ensued between his two sons, and Norodom, aided by Siam, finally won. Naturally he was forced to accept a considerable
degree of Siamese supervision. When Norodom found this distasteful and found Annam quite unable to help him, he signed an agreement on August 11, 1863, that placed Cambodia under French protection. France thereby received certain property and trade rights, consular privileges, and freedom of religion. To supervise the protectorate under the authority of the governor of Cochin China a French adviser was to be stationed at the capital of Cambodia (Pnom-Penh), while a Cambodian representative at Saigon (the official residence of the French governors of Cochin China) was to serve as Cambodian liaison officer. But quarrels, unrest, and misbehavior continued, and since the king showed a tendency to ignore his French advisers the French in 1891 made their authority supreme. In that year a royal ordinance was issued providing that the administration of the country should be in the hands of a French resident-general who took over the direction of the budget, the collection and disbursement of all revenues, the execution of all reforms, and the supervision of local government in the towns and districts.

Failure in Tonkin. The acquisition of Cochin China and the establishment of a protectorate over Cambodia gave the French control over the southern portion of Indo-China, but not the route into southern China which her traders desired. The next step was to extend that control northward to Tonkin, the richest province of the Annamite empire. That extension may be said to have begun in 1859, when after the capture of Saigon several officers and colonists planned to carry French influence into the southern provinces of China by way of the Red River, the great fluvial artery of Tonkin. One of these individuals, Jean Dupuis, a Cantonese merchant, entered into an agreement with Yunnan officials to transport goods, especially arms needed by the Chinese rulers for the suppression of an impending revolution. Thanks to the fact that he had acquired a knowledge of the route through a previous expedition and also to the aid given by Lieutenant Garnier and 175 French soldiers, his efforts were successful. When Dupuis returned the Tonkinese officials at Hanoi tried to confiscate the tin and copper with which he had been paid, so his expedition, aided by French troops and ships sent from Saigon, proceeded to capture Hanoi and the other delta ports. Tu-du, realizing the magnitude of the invasion, sought protection from China. The latter hastened to his relief and dispatched a detachment of Black Flag partisans from Kwangsi and Kwangtung. Garnier marched to meet them but fell into an ambush, and on December 21, 1873, the French forces were wiped out.

The Treaty of Saigon, 1874. The death of Garnier delayed the con-
quest of Tonkin for ten years. The passing of Napoleon III and French psychological defeatism after the Franco-Prussian War made the government chary of even a display of force, and since it believed that the projected conquest of Tonkin had been fatally jeopardized, the mother country abandoned the fight. As a result the Treaty of Saigon, on March 15, 1874, provided for French recognition of the sovereignty and independence of the emperor of Annam, promised to protect his kingdom against all foes, and forgave Annam the unpaid indemnity obligation of the Treaty of 1862. In return the Annamite ruler confirmed the cession of Cochin China to France, extended full toleration to the Roman Catholic religion, pledged himself to regulate his foreign policy by that of Paris, and opened the Red River and several cities to French commerce.

China however did not recognize the French assumption of overlordship, and Annam did not keep her promises. The Red River was not opened, massacres of Christians were more frequent than ever, and the Black Flags were encouraged to extend their antiwhite activities to the southern regions of Indo-China, while the Chinese used these raids as an excuse to send more troops into Annamese territory under the pretense of checking the bandit raids. This last move gave the French the idea of killing two birds with one stone: establish their influence in Tonkin and end once for all the Chinese pretension of suzerainty. Accordingly in April 1882 Captain Henri Rivière captured Hanoi and began the "pacification" of the delta; but the Black Flags of Tonkin secured Remington rifles and reinforcements and on May 19, 1883, killed Rivière with three other officers and twenty-six men.

Final success: (1) The Treaty of Huế, 1884. Although the French had not officially sanctioned the operations in Tonkin the Rivière disaster confirmed the Paris authorities in their aggressive policy. Just before Rivière was killed the Chamber had voted 3,500,000 francs for war expenses; and an expedition sent out in the summer of 1883 captured Huế, the capital of Annam. Meanwhile other forces proceeded to Tonkin, and by April 1884 all the Red River delta had been occupied. Accordingly on June 6, 1884, by the formal Treaty of Huế Annam placed itself irrevocably under French protection. Its foreign affairs were turned over to a French resident-general and French residents were to administer Annam and Tonkin. Three ports were opened to trade, the customs and finances of the country were put under French control, and the French were to supervise the administration of Tonkin through an Annamite viceroy and other local officials selected by them.

(2) The Treaty of Tientsin, 1885. News of this treaty was not received
with acclaim by the Chinese officials, who wanted to keep up a pretense of the Middle Kingdom's overlordship; and the war party at Peking, virtually disavowing the Li-Fournier Convention of 1884 by which Li Hung-chang had agreed to recognize the Treaty of Hue, refused to accept the agreement enforced by the "soldiers of the devil." Accordingly a French squadron, after destroying the Chinese fleet and the arsenal at Foochow, blockaded the Yangtze. Their control of the sea enabled the French to stop rice shipments north from Canton, so that on June 9, 1885, Li Hung-chang, now with full imperial backing, signed with the French the Treaty of Tientsin. This treaty, following the lines of the Li-Fournier Convention, confirmed Chinese abandonment of all claims in Tonkin and Annam, initiated commercial agreements for trade between Tonkin and the southern Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Kwangsi, and gave the French definite preference in the construction of railroads and public works in Yunnan.

3. Westward Expansion at the Expense of Siam

Causes. Thus by 1890 France had acquired control of the four main sections of Indo-China. But to write "Finis" to her expansion in the Golden Peninsula she had to solve the problem of the Laos territory, a vast region of high valleys and plateaus lying between Siam and Annam. Its inhabitants, not affiliated with either neighboring nation, were descendants of Chinese who 2000 years before had pushed into it from the Chinese provinces of Szechuan, Yunnan, and Kweichow. About 1750 the Siamese began an annexationist policy, to escape which some of the neighbor provinces voluntarily became tributary to Annam while others joined outright. A thirty-year truce between Siam and Annam regarding Laos began in 1828; but during the three decades after the truce, between 1858 and 1886, while Annam was otherwise occupied as indicated above, Siam annexed nearly all of Laos. This aggression led to constant friction on the western border and a state of uproar and unrest which made impossible any security of life, property, or trade. Meanwhile Great Britain, by the annexation of Burma in 1886, also threatened to move into the peninsula; therefore France very shortly after the settlement of the Annam-Tonkin protectorate question decided that she must give some attention to the Laos country.

Methods. The first task of the French was to ascertain what ought to be the boundary between Siam and Laos. After surveys in the years 1879 to 1888 by A. Pavie, France determined to revive the ancient Ana-
mite claims to the territory north of Siam between the mountains east of the Mekong River and the river itself. She first set up a small military post in that region; and then in 1893, when a French expedition sent to arrange for the evacuation of the region by the Siamese was attacked and a French military inspector slain, France had the desired excuse to use military measures. A French fleet forced its way up the Menam River after capturing the defending forts and occupied Bangkok. In the meantime forces from Annam seized several important towns in Laos.

The Treaty of Bangkok, 1893. The result was the Treaty of Bangkok on October 3, 1893. By it Siam gave up her claims to all territory east of the Mekong River and to the islands in its stream bed, promised to pay France an indemnity of 2,000,000 francs, and agreed not to construct any forts within fifteen miles of the right bank.

Later negotiations. The newly acquired territory was not incorporated into Annam but was organized into a separate protectorate whose boundaries were not finally settled until 1907. This delay was chiefly due to the rivalry between England and France over their spheres of influence in the Golden Peninsula. Their first agreement was made in 1896 but it was not until 1904 that a final understanding advanced the French sphere of influence westward to the Menam River and the Gulf of Siam with the British sphere located west of the river and the gulf. Both countries promised to respect the territorial integrity of Siam; and although after 1895 Siam with the help of foreign advisers managed to maintain a fairly modern type of government, it was Anglo-French rivalry, not Siamese strength, which preserved her independence. In 1904 France gave up extraterritoriality in exchange for further "rectification" of the boundary; in 1909 England did the same in return for a protectorate over four Malay states that formerly owed allegiance to Siam. As a result of these treaties, although Siam yielded 90,000 square miles to France and 13,000 to Great Britain, she was able to maintain her independence, and in recent years has become one of the best governed and most prosperous communities in Asia.

4. Government in Indo-China

Generalizations. With the settlement of the Laos boundary question the story of the establishment of the French in Indo-China may be concluded. The next task is to study the results of French imperialism there. Of these the most important certainly is the form of government that
has been developed. To understand what has finally evolved it is desirable to remember that Indo-China as compared with the Netherlands Indies is a relatively recent creation. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while the Dutch were seeking sites for factories, the French were more concerned with saving souls and earning martyrs’ crowns. It was not until about 1850 that the French became really interested in Indo-Chinese commerce, and then they were forced to overcome a prejudice against them that their religious proselyting had started. As a result, they had to use naval forces to acquire new trading posts and commercial openings rather than to protect factories already started; therefore all factories and places they succeeded in occupying were under the control of naval officers. To make matters worse, when the French did start building a modern empire in Indo-China the political theories applied to the colonies by the home régime were constantly being changed. In the past half century the pendulum swung from the subjection favored by the ancien régime to the liberalism of the Revolution. The resulting compromise suffered from its inherent contradictions, and yet through it all up to World War II France thought of Indo-China as an integral part of herself, as a point from which French culture and commerce should radiate to the neighboring countries and from which the products of the East should be channeled to France.

Experiments: (1) Cochin China. French experiments in Far Eastern colonial administration began in Cochin China, a country with a present area of about 26,476 square miles and a population of some 4,615,000. Acquired by military conquest, it was administered for the first fifteen years by a succession of admirals whose title was “Governor of Cochin China.” France wanted it to be a protectorate similar for example to Tunis, but the general exodus of native officials before the invaders made it necessary to give the conquered area a definitely colonial type of government. In this colonial status Cochin China has remained, even though in 1887 it was grouped together with Tonkin, Annam, and Cambodia under the governor-general of French Indo-China.

(2) Cambodia. The administration of Cambodia was fairly simple, for as pointed out the French protectorate was established there at the request of the native rulers. Furthermore French protection secured native approbation from the natives by restoring two Cambodian provinces previously seized by Siam. Today the raj of Cambodia is sovereign, in name at least, over 67,550 square miles of territory and about 3,000,000 subjects.

(3) Tonkin and Annam; failure. Tonkin and Annam however pre-
sented a much graver problem. When the French conquered Annam (a region of 56,973 square miles and a population today of about 6,211,000) they thought they would be able to convert Tonkin (40,530 square miles, present population about 9,264,000) from vassalage to Annam. This they did, but when the king of Annam fled, the people of Tonkin, whose submission to their Annamese viceroy had always been very slight, proceeded to rise against their "deliverers." Six years of warfare and military administration caused so many deficits that the very name of Indo-China became a byword and a reproach to the central government.

Solution. What would have happened had the governor-general continued to scan financial statements in red ink while his eyes smarted from the smoke of villages burning at the very gates of his capital can only be imagined. Fortunately on April 21, 1891, France decided to give the governor-general complete administrative control over Indo-China, and to the newly strengthened office appointed J. M. A. de Lannesan. The latter had visited Annam in 1887 and at that time had become convinced that the pacification of Annam and Tonkin depended upon harmonious relations between the French government and the Annamese court. Accordingly Lannesan concluded an agreement based on the principle of Annam being a "loyal protectorate" and thus reassured the rulers, who up to this time had been fearful of outright annexation. Immediately the king issued a proclamation ordering all his subjects to obey the French authorities, to respect the governor-general, and to lay down their arms. The result was miraculous — disorders in the delta ceased, pirate chiefs surrendered, the Indo-Chinese budget regained its balance, and with the annexation of Laos (now 82,600 square miles, population 840,000) the cornerstone was laid in the foundation of Indo-Chinese administration.

Central government. With this return of peace that followed the reforms of Lannesan, France was able to adopt a government for Indo-China which up to Pearl Harbor was but slightly modified. The governor-general was the sole intermediary between the home government and the Indo-Chinese Union, the latter consisting of the colony of Cochin China, the protectorate of Annam, Tonkin, Cambodia, Laos, and (since 1900) the leased territory of Kwangchow (325 square miles, population 300,000). He controlled the civil service, and though prohibited from commanding in the field controlled the country's land and sea forces. He was assisted by the Superior Council of Indo-China, which met monthly in the various capitals and was composed of the
chiefs of staff of the general government, the deputy of Cochin China, the presidents of the chief chambers of commerce, and a few important natives. Its chief task was to draw up the budget, which was dependent upon the Ministry of the Colonies in Paris.

Local government. As in Insul Inde, so in Indo-China there has been considerable diversity in local government. Cochin China was governed by a lieutenant-governor, a colonial council of twenty-four members, and a privy council which was a deliberate body composed of colonial officials. Direct administration encountered few difficulties here, for the Annamese had not been in control of this region long enough to give it any traditional administration or any deeply rooted institutions. As a result this area received a more distinctly French form of government than the rest of Indo-China. Since 1926 natives of equal qualifications had free access to all posts in the French administration. Tonkin was ruled almost as directly; its chief native officials were appointed by and were directly under the control of a resident-superior aided by a deliberative council of natives. The same was true of Laos. On the other hand Annam and Cambodia were ruled respectively by an emperor and a raj. Both rulers however were advised by resident-superiors, but local administration to a very great extent was in the hands of the native official.

Modern trends. Further description of the government of Indo-China is unnecessary; we may conclude with a final word recapitulating the general trends. In the beginning, that is during the rule of the admirals (1861–1879), the French took the attitude that subjection of the natives was the only path to be followed. Then in 1879 a civilian government was created that substituted assimilation for subjection. Under this policy the French sought to make the Indo-Chinese as much like themselves as possible, for they believed that French civilization was the most perfect on earth. As applied in Indo-China this theory produced rebellion, for the country was no primitive settlement but one with a highly developed Oriental culture, admirably suited to its people. Finally the bubble of French self-complacency burst and in April 1909 the Chamber of Deputies recorded its conviction

that the policy of association is necessary for the well-being of the population and for the security of our possessions in the Far East: that in order to make it a reality, it is recognized, that a change is necessary in the fiscal, judicial and economic régime; that it is suitable to prepare gradually and wisely an advisory participation by the natives in public affairs.

And up to World War II the French worked on this basis that the
association of East and West in the great work of making the world bigger and better must be the motif of their empire building. Yet since Japan’s defeat of Russia showed the East that the West is not invincible, every step France took toward self-government led to further unrest, discontent, and demonstrations against French control. In short, in carrying out their ideal of association France was hard hit by the ironic fact that the more peoples under the domination of foreigners are encouraged by law and precept to associate with their masters, the more they agitate against these selfsame masters. And thus the vicious circle threatens to close itself: subjection is given up to make possible assimilation; assimilation means native unrest and yields to association; association eventually spells independence. It remains to be seen whether Indo-China will achieve independence, and if it does whether independence will provide peace and prosperity.

5. Results of French Imperialism in Indo-China

Economic aspects. The previous section indicated that the French colonial régime has not been entirely satisfactory to the peoples of Indo-China. This attitude of theirs naturally raises the question whether they have been "biting the hand that fed them"; and it seems needful to make some attempt to evaluate the justness of their complaints. This might well start with economic criticisms based on the premise that France has always thought first of herself and secondarily of the Indo-Chinese.

Under the Annamite government rice export was prohibited, but as soon as the French administration was established great quantities began to be shipped abroad and its export added enormously to the wealth of the country; but its effect on the common man is questionable. Under the French also the production of raw silk and the culture of rubber have become important industries. To aid in the transportation of native goods the French built over 2000 miles of railroad and nearly 17,000 miles of highway. The railway construction has been bitterly criticized as not yet needed and as through the accompanying graft needlessly adding to the taxpayer’s burdens. The Indo-Chinese however seem to enjoy travel as much as the Javanese, and the railroads have stimulated a valuable tourist industry. In more recent years such public works as irrigation systems and swamp drainage have been undertaken in an effort to increase the food supply. This objective has also led to agricultural banks, farm advice, and numerous scientific institutions.
But when all is said the fact remains that under French rule Indo-
China’s economic advance has been meager and the scale of living has
remained desperately low. The French themselves have invested in the
colony only about 4,000,000,000 francs; the all-native investment has
been 20,000,000,000. Of the nearly 24,000,000 population fewer than
30,000 are Europeans. Unfortunately the natives in most cases are rather
indifferent to modern progress, and in Cambodia for instance only one
seventeenth of the land is cultivated. Tariffs have been maladjusted
in France’s favor. Finally, it is to be noted that the great depression
hit Indo-China very hard, and although after 1936 there was some
improvement, World War II completely upset Indo-China’s economic
applecart. What the future holds one can hardly guess.

Social and cultural aspects. In social welfare the picture is not quite
as black, for medical advancement under the French is admitted on every
hand to have been real and lasting. Though there is still a great lack
of equipment and personnel, when it is realized that ninety years ago
there was not a single unit engaged in the elimination of sickness and
disease as against some 600 today, it can be seen that there has been
considerable progress. In labor legislation however Indo-China is
decidedly backward, the only real progress having been in sanitation.
The greatest change brought by Western culture has been in education.
The French found in Indo-China a widespread system of education
similar to that of China. It was of course despised by the invaders,
who completely overthrew the native institutions and substituted for
them a bewildering conglomeration of Western facts and Eastern morals
taught by teachers who knew little Annamese to pupils almost com-
pletely ignorant of French. Consequently there have been turned out
distressed hybrids who have neither assimilated the beauties of French
culture nor obtained the consciousness of their own great teachings.
It is perhaps fortunate that according to prewar statistics out of a school
population of 2,000,000 only about 225,000 were in attendance.

Racial aspects. The most important aspect of all is perhaps the
effect which the French and the Indo-Chinese have had upon each
other. And here again the picture is most unpleasant. In the first place
the French who go to the colonies do not get along well with each
other — separatist forces are stronger than cohesive ones. Unlike the
Dutch, many of whose retired colonial officials spend their declining
years happily in the land where they have worked, most French officials
have no loyalty to the region which provides them with high-paid posi-
tions, and they look on their stay in the Orient as an unhappy exile.
Furthermore the decadent, destructive atmosphere which encircles the white man is contagious even for refined and sensitive people, so that colonial society is but a caricature of that of the homeland. This the Indo-Chinese realizes, and even though he has mainly adapted himself to Western civilization with remarkable facility, at heart he despises the invader. Not only does he resent the presence of foreign rulers, but he feels it a real burden to provide the taxes demanded by a relatively high-paid, excessively overmanned hierarchy of French officials who in the past lived only to return to France. Before World War I over one fourth of the French civilian population was made up of officials and about half the European population was composed of French soldiers. To make conditions even more unfortunate, just as the Indo-Chinese seem to have brought out the worst in the French, these seem to have affected their subjects the same way. Assimilationist policy had as its first reaction the creation of a destructive self-doubt. Then followed a demolition of Confucianist ethics, and since little instruction was given to the children of a people whose standard of literacy had always been high, no substitute for Confucianism was available. Confucius' precepts had subordinated the individual to the group, and when the principles of the French Revolution were assimilated and an Annamite individualism was born, demoralization resulted. The old-time scholar who made an art of living was superseded by an upstart go-getter suffering from an indigestion of Western culture. Since altruism was conspicuously absent from Oriental psychology, Christianity has gone only far enough to be a disruptive force. Proselytism is to the native intelligentsia only another proof of European discourtesy, and thoughtful Indo-Chinese go so far as to declare that the Roman Catholic Mission has deliberately encouraged greed and materialism as a means of spiritual salvation. In conclusion then it would seem that on the whole there is in Indo-China more loss than gain. If France loses her control of the "Golden Horn" she will have only herself to blame.

6. The Pacific Islands of the French

Classification. The colonial problems of the French in the Pacific Area are further heightenened by the ownership of a number of widely scattered island possessions. Of these the most important in the Eastern Pacific are the Society Islands (Tahiti), Tuamotu (Paumotu), and the Marquesas; in the Western Pacific are New Caledonia, the Loyalty Islands, and the New Hebrides.
The eastern islands. The Society Islands, so named by Captain Cook in honor of the Royal Society which sponsored his famous voyage to the South Seas, have a total area of 657 square miles and a population of about 25,000. Tuamotu or the Low Archipelago consists of islands with a land area of 330 square miles and a population of somewhat less than 4000. The Marquesas have an area of less than 500 square miles and a population of about 2700. The Marquesas were discovered in 1595 by Mendaña, the first two groups by Quiros a decade later. In the early 1800's all three island chains were visited by French missionaries, and pressure from them led to the annexation of the Marquesas in 1842 and in 1844 the establishment of a protectorate over the others. In 1881 Tahiti and Tuamotu were joined for administrative purposes, and in 1903 the Marquesas were added to "The French Possessions in the Eastern Pacific." They are all governed from Papeete (chief city of Tahiti) by a governor with an administrative council consisting of the chief officials, the mayor of Papeete, and the presidents of the chambers of commerce and agriculture. The natives are all excellent specimens of the Polynesian race. They readily accepted Roman Catholicism, and are a happy, contented people — thanks to the fact that only on Tahiti is there any large number of foreigners (about 2200).

The western islands: New Caledonia. Of the western islands New Caledonia, off the Australian coast in the Coral Sea, is the largest group, with an area of about 8,448 square miles and a population of over 53,000, one third of which is white. It was discovered by Captain Cook in 1793, and was early important for the sandalwood trade. French missionaries arrived in 1843; ten years later, despite a counterclaim by the British, it was annexed by France, and in 1860 became a separate colony. Since 1864 it has had the central government of the nearby dependent islands including the Isle of Pines, the Wallis Archipelago, the Huon Islands, Futuna, Alofu, and the Loyalty Islands. The latter, unlike the other islands, received Christianity from native teachers who migrated from Rarotonga and Samoa.

The New Hebrides. The New Hebrides (5,700 square miles, population 60,000), like the Society and Tuamotu Islands, were discovered in the first decade of the seventeenth century by Quiros. They became important after 1816 when the sandalwood traders, who had exhausted the Fiji Islands supply, diverted their attention to the New Hebrides. Shortly afterward both English and French missionaries began their work, but since trade was mainly with New Caledonia France was indicated as the dominant power. In 1878 however Great Britain and France
Most of the South Pacific natives are fond of making figurines or human likenesses. Left to right, top: large wooden tiki from the Marquesas Islands; female figure carved in wood, 14 inches high, from the Fiji Islands; wooden figure from the Solomon Islands. Bottom: prehistoric figurine sculptured from stone, found in Huon Gulf, New Guinea; head modeled in clay over a skull, found in the Sepik River area, New Guinea.
declared the New Hebrides neutral. But neutrality failed to work, for the presence of British and French settlers under independent authority led to administrative difficulties, especially in matters of jurisdiction over the native population. Various agreements were drawn up, but it was not till 1906 that a workable system was evolved. The Convention of October 20, 1906, provided that the islands should form a “region of joint influence” in which British and French subjects should have equal rights, with each power retaining jurisdiction over its own citizens; all other residents must be under one or the other. A British and a French high commissioner, each assisted by a resident-commissioner, equal police forces, a joint naval commission, and a joint court, the third member of which is appointed by the Spanish government, form the administering body of the islands; and on the whole this plan has worked well. But it has been bitterly criticized by Australia, on two grounds: first, because many provisions supposed to establish equality worked to the advantage of the French, and second, because the Australian government was not represented nor fully consulted during the negotiation of the treaty.

The significance of the French Pacific island colonies. From the standpoint of French colonial history the Pacific possessions are more significant than their size, population, or economic resources would indicate. In the first place, they provided a locale where the amour propre, wounded by the Hawaiians’ rejection of Catholicism, could regain “face”; and except in the New Hebrides Protestantism has had little opportunity to work on the natives. In the second place, they gave the French places where the Fleur de Lis might wave defiance at the Union Jack, and out of this competition came a friendly relationship which in turn was to be a small factor at least in the Anglo-French entente cordiale of the present century. In the third place, the western islands unwittingly have been a factor in increasing the anti-French attitude of Indo-China. The Melanesian inhabitants of New Caledonia and New Hebrides were naturally poor workers — who would not be, in the gentle climate of the South Seas where the palms and the ocean provide fruit and fish for anyone who can climb a tree or bait a hook? Accordingly in the 1890’s a group of French merchants, through Chinese agents, recruited Annamites for work in the Pacific islands. All the phenomena of the Canton coolie trade characterized this abominable practice, but it continued despite the criticisms of the more socially minded. After World War I it increased with the discovery of mineral deposits and the diminution in the number of the natives. Between 1920 and 1928
seven ships carried 9363 coolies to New Caledonia and to New Hebrides, about half to each. Eventually a terrific uproar arose, headed by a prominent French colonist whose interests were affected by the draining of Tonkinese labor (which is cheaper even than Chinese) to the Pacific islands. Government investigators however insisted that the coolies were better off in the islands than in the Tonkin delta, as numerous renewals of labor contracts testified, and also that new consumers of Indo-Chinese goods would be created in the underpopulated Pacific islands. Whatever may be the truth, the abuses of the Pacific islands coolie trade were capitalized in Communist propaganda and helped develop opposition to what offhand would seem to be a most sensible proposal, namely, to unite France’s Pacific colonies in a union headed up by Indo-China. In this dream of a Pacific federation however Indo-China sees for herself only an onerous burden which is rightfully not her responsibility but the mother country’s.

Conclusion. With this jarring note it seems well to conclude this account of French imperialism in the Pacific. Of all the European Far Eastern empires Indo-China was the most artificial, and when the Japanese invaded the Golden Horn French pretensions were swept away like cards before a breeze. The Indo-Chinese showed no loyalty to their conquerors, while the French lost face through their inability to protect their subjects.

As a result, just as in Indonesia so in Indo-China the end of World War II saw an enormous development of nationalism. A later chapter will have more to say on this topic; but it is desirable to point out here that if the day of the white man in the Western Pacific Area is at sunset, Indo-China may be the first bit of Europe’s Far Eastern dominions to disappear.
Great Britain in the Pacific Area

Introduction. During the first decades of the seventeenth century, Holland, France, and England all considered the possibilities of establishing empires in the Pacific Area. Holland was the first to acquire a foothold, France was the last, and in between was England. The Dutch single-mindedly sought trade, and although previous to World War II their colonial policy was somewhat tempered by the idea of association, on the whole it was almost unwaveringly one of subjection. The French on the other hand were influenced in their Eastern expansion by religious, political, and economic motives, and their colonial policy veered from subjection to assimilation and from assimilation to association. Again in between were the English, and since their objectives and colonial methods have varied immensely both from time to time and from place to place our description of their Pacific empire must be different in procedure from that used in discussing the colonization of the Dutch East Indies and Indo-China. A central thought however can be held, and the aim in this chapter will be to show how it came about that when the "Land of the Rising Sun" set out to save "Asia for the Asiatics" it could not escape the fact that "the sun never sets on the British Empire."

1. Weihaiwei

Description. In 1900 the spot of British soil nearest the mikado was Weihaïwei, a naval and coaling station on the northeast coast of Shan-tung which was leased from China in 1898 but never fortified. Its area
of 285 square miles comprised the harbor formed by the island of Liu Kung and a belt of mainland ten miles wide skirting the whole length of the bay's ten-mile coastline.

"History. As mentioned in a previous chapter, the territory was leased to Great Britain under the convention of July 1, 1898, "for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia," and its acquisition was therefore distinctly aimed at preserving Britain's position among the European nations interested in the politics and commerce of North China. Its location was most strategic, and if a naval base had been developed there it would have given England partial control of the sea approaches to the politically most important portion of the Manchu Empire. Britain's close friendship with Japan which followed the Boxer uprising apparently convinced the British that no naval stronghold was necessary, and in 1901 Weihaiwei's administration was transferred from the War Department to the Colonial Office. Even though Russia was driven out of Port Arthur in 1905, since the Japanese kept it, England felt justified in retaining Weihaiwei. The territory was then formally given a status similar to that of a crown colony, and ruled by a civil commissioner who controlled the Chinese population through native head men. This system of indirect rule worked well, for the population, over 90 per cent Chinese, increased from 147,000 in 1911 to 155,000 in 1921 and to 300,000 in 1931. Since it was a free port it had some importance as a transit port, and Europeans found its summer climate especially attractive.

"Rendition to China. At the Washington Conference of 1922 (to be discussed in a later chapter) Mr. Balfour announced British willingness to surrender the lease to China in the event of Japanese withdrawal from Kiaochow. After this withdrawal negotiations accordingly began, and on October 1, 1931, rendition took place. No longer a British possession, Weihaiwei is noted today chiefly because it might have been another Hong Kong, and also because in their three decades of control the British showed marked ability at ruling a foreign and subject population.

2. Hong Kong

"Description. As one travels south from Weihaiwei along the coast of China the next British possession to be encountered is Greater Hong Kong. This consists of the island of Hong Kong and the peninsula of Kowloon, ceded by China to England in 1841 and 1860 respectively,
and a portion of territory back of Kowloon between Mers Bay and Deep Bay leased to Great Britain by China on June 9, 1898, for a period of ninety-nine years. The total area of the colony is about 350 square miles and the population, which grew rapidly between 1937 and 1941 when World War II began in south and central China, was estimated to be well over 1,000,000. After the Japanese seizure of Hong Kong in 1941 the population declined; it is now on the increase again.

History. Prior to British occupation Hong Kong Island (thirty-two square miles) was a desolate waste occupied by a small fishing and pirate population. During the Opium War it was used by the English fleet as a naval base. Barren and unhealthful though it was, the British quickly realized the great commercial and strategic significance of this deep, sheltered harbor, ten square miles in area, with both eastern and
western entrances, and lying directly on the chief trade routes to China. Despite the fact that its only resources were commercial, in less than a century it became one of the world’s greatest ports and incidentally one of the most beautiful. Because of the menace which lay in Hong Kong’s proximity to the mainland the British next acquired Kowloon. Even then Hong Kong was not completely defensible; the whole harbor was not contained within British territory. Consequently during the struggle for concessions at the close of the nineteenth century Great Britain obtained the mainland lease. She then thought Hong Kong was impregnable.

*Administration.* A crown colony, Hong Kong is administered by a governor who is assisted by an executive council and a legislative council; three members of the latter are Chinese. Since the island had a population of but a few thousand when the English acquired it, they have been able to establish in Victoria (the main city) a distinctively British civilization, albeit one with a Chinese base. That the British government has been successful is shown by the population statistics. From choice and choice alone the Chinese have moved to the island, and when World War II broke out most of the population of this British-ruled island was Chinese.

*British colonial policy.* To define Britain’s colonial policy in both Weihaiwei and Hong Kong is not easy. It has been unquestionably one of subjection: there has been little assimilation and almost no association. And yet to use the word “subjection” is to imply a wrong connotation, for the Chinese population probably has been better off and consequently happier and more contented under foreign rule in these British colonies than it could possibly have been had the Opium War turned out differently. Britain has ruled justly; at the same time there has never been any question that the colony has existed for the benefit of its owners. There has been no attempt at assimilation, and the fifteen government schools for the 3700 Chinese in attendance make no attempt to Anglicize the natives. It must be noted however that in the late 1930’s there formed a cloud at least the size of a man’s hand, and no matter who wins in the present Chinese civil war it is going to be increasingly more difficult for the West to rule the East in Hong Kong. In recent years industry in Kowloon and agriculture in the leased territory developed, except during Japanese rule, so that the English like the Dutch and French are facing the social problems involved in the new industrialization of the Far East. These political, economic, and social problems, despite factory legislation, increased
attention to education, and improved sanitation, will have to be settled before English occupation in Hong Kong can be considered permanent.

3. British Malaya

Description. A third region of British interest in the Pacific Area is the southeastern corner of Asia, the long Malay peninsula and the adjacent islands which by their geographical position ought to be a part of the Dutch East Indies. Until 1946 the states that make up the newly formed Malayan Union were divided into (1) the Straits Settlements with a total area of 1350 square miles and a population estimated in 1941 to be 1,435,000; (2) the Federated Malay States with an area of 27,550 square miles and a population of 2,212,000; and (3) the Unfederated Malay States in which some 1,660,000 people inhabited a region of 22,000 square miles. Effective April 1, 1946, the old designations were abolished and a simplification of the political structure of British Malaya was provided. The present description however will follow the old nomenclature.

A. The Straits Settlements

History. The Straits Settlements, a crown colony, previous to World War II comprised the "settlements" of Singapore, Penang, the province of Wellesley, Malacca, and Labuan (six miles from the north-west coast of Borneo). For administrative purposes the Cocos or Keeling Islands, 600 miles southwest of Java Head, and Christmas Island, about 225 miles south of the same point, were incorporated with the settlement of Singapore in 1903 and 1900 respectively. British interest in this area began in the early 1600's, but it was not until 1786 that the East India Company became sufficiently concerned with the trade of the Malay peninsula to effect a settlement. In that year the British flag was hoisted on the little island of Penang (110 square miles) at the northern entrance to the Straits of Malacca. Pleased with the annuity of $6,000 he received for the cession of the island in 1800, the sultan of Kedah in return for an additional annual payment of $4,000 sold some 290 square miles of land on the mainland (the province of Wellesley). Malacca (660 square miles), one of the oldest settlements in the East, was taken from the Dutch in 1795 but restored in 1818. In 1824, however, when the Dutch and English finally delimited their East Indian claims, Malacca went back to the British. In the meantime (1819) Sir Stamford Raffles had founded Singapore (220 square miles),
its acquisition being conceded by the local chief and the sultan of Johore in 1824, and in 1826 the three settlements of Penang, Malacca, and Singapore were incorporated under one government. From 1830 to 1867 they were under the presidency of Bengal but from 1867 to 1946, together with Wellesley Province and Labuan, they formed a separate crown colony. Labuan, acquired by England in 1846 from Brunei, was made a separate settlement in 1912, under the governor of the Straits Settlements, then in 1946 rejoined to Brunei.

Administration. The administration of the colony was in the hands of a governor aided by an executive council and a legislative council. He appointed the municipal commissioners who directed the governments of Singapore, Georgetown (Penang), and Malacca, the leading cities of their respective settlements. In 1946 the crown colony of Singapore with its dependencies—the Cocos and Christmas islands—was made a separate geographical entity, remaining for the present outside the Malayan Union. The other portions of the former Straits Settlements are now a part of the Malayan Union.

Colonial policy. The entrance of the British into this area was for the purpose of trade; political control developed out of the necessity for protecting that trade from native piratical attacks. Penang and the province of Wellesley were acquired by purchase from a complacent overlord. Singapore was first leased and then (1824) secured by negotiation from the local chief and the sultan of Johore, who saw no value in an island that had been deserted for over half a millennium. Labuan was ceded to England in 1846 by a local Borneo potentate who wanted protection. The Cocos Islands and Christmas Island were annexed (1857 and 1888) because it was felt that the thousand or so inhabitants of each area would soon be annexed by some country anyway, and since they were located on regular trade routes and had some resources in copra and phosphates it might be well if they were British. Malacca only of the Straits Settlements was acquired without any special regard for the natives; and at that it would be hard to say that its population suffered by the change from Dutch to British overlordship. The English perforce provided direct rule, and on the whole it was satisfactory. Certainly the fact that out of the 1,435,000 population 927,000 are Chinese and 148,000 are Indians would seem to indicate that Britain has at least made possible an economic development which has attracted rather than repelled. There have been of course many unsettled problems, such as the protection of the Malays against the competition of the immigrants, especially the Chinese, who by failure to bring their women
with them have caused a 3 to 2 preponderance of males over females. Most students however feel that the balance has been in favor of British rule in the Straits Settlements.

Singapore is of course by all odds the most important spot in the Straits Settlements, and in all of Malaya for that matter, and its acquisition by Sir Stamford Raffles has been justified many times over. Its geographical location has given it a strategic importance equal to that of Gibraltar and the Suez and Panama canals. Commercially it has achieved significance because it is the principal emporium of the Malay States and Archipelago, and it is the great port of call for ships passing to and from the Far East. Its prosperity following World War I was enhanced by the enormous development in both British and Dutch East Indies of both rubber plantations and tin mines; on the island of Pulau Brani was located one of the world’s largest tin smelters. Though temporarily eclipsed during World War II it has made rapid recovery, and its annual trade of some $100,000,000 is more than double what it was before Japan took over. Culturally it can compete with Hawaii for recognition as an international crossroads, and its representatives of almost every Asiatic nation and race make it one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the world.

B. The Federated Malay States

History. The Federated Malay States comprised Perak (7980 square miles, population, 1941, 992,000), Selangor (3160 square miles, population 701,000), Negri Sembilan (2580 square miles, population 296,000), and Pahang (13,800 square miles, population 221,000). For about 350 years after their discovery by the Portuguese, various Europeans (chiefly Portuguese, Dutch, and English) tried to engage in trade with the people of these little states but civil wars and piracy made trading almost impossible. After the formation of the Straits Settlements colony English influence predominated, and in the period from 1874 to 1895 the British finally succeeded in persuading the native rulers to accept the “assistance” of residents and other British advisers. In 1895 the four states formed a federation, and in 1909 established a federal council presided over by a high commissioner who is also the governor of the Straits Settlements. Each state was ruled over by a sultan and a council; of the council the English resident was always a member, and the real administrative work of the states was carried out by him and his staff of European officials.
C. The Unfederated Malay States

Johore. Of the Unfederated Malay States, Johore with an area of 7500 square miles and a population (1940) of 737,000 is the most important. Since it is separated from Singapore only by the narrow Straits of Johore the British naturally found themselves forced to concern themselves more and more with its government. In 1941 the sultan was prevailed upon to agree to accept and act upon the advice of a British officer called the general adviser.

Siamese states. The four states of Kedah (3660 square miles, population, 1940, 515,000), Perlis (316 square miles, population 57,700), Kelantan (5750 square miles, population 390,000) and Trengganu (3050 square miles, population 271,000) like Johore were conquered by the sultan of Malacca after his expulsion by the Portuguese in 1511; but unlike it toward the end of the eighteenth century they fell more and more under the influence of Siam. Civil war and anarchy were common under Siamese suzerainty until toward the end of the nineteenth century when British officers in the service of Siam became advisers of the first three; Trengganu continued its unhappy type of untrammeled Malay rule until 1909. In that year Siam transferred to Great Britain the rights of suzerainty, protection, administration, and control of the four states. Since then under the guidance of British advisers and aided by state councils each raja has given his people an administration in line with tradition provided it was compatible with justice — and the demands of British trade.

Colonial policy. In its attitude toward the Malay States both federated and unfederated the British have followed a colonial policy very similar to that of the Dutch in their relations with the native states. British officials have meticulously avoided interfering with the religious life and customs of the natives, and have given no thought either to assimilation or to association. British administration of the Malay population makes great use of the native aristocratic system, the peasants being governed largely by their own chiefs, head men, and village elders under the supervision of British district officers. The result has been a benevolent autocracy which is said to have been well adapted to local conditions and to the character and traditions of the people. Certain it is that under the British economic development has been enormous, and much of the world's supply of both tin and rubber today comes from this area. Yet the same spirit of unrest that has risen in the Dutch East Indies and that is marked in Indo-China is now showing
itself among the Malays. The lack of education for instance (even in the Straits Settlements only 79,000 out of a population of 1,435,000 were in school in 1941) is being cited as an indication of British neglect, and the Malayan tendency today is to forget all that has been done to provide modern communication systems, sanitation, and opportunities for self-improvement. The Malays themselves have unfortunately done little toward their own betterment; sound administration has been provided by the British, enterprise and capital by the Chinese, and the labor is provided almost entirely by Chinese and Indian immigrants. As a result in the Federated States the Malays make up only about 41 per cent of the population, the Chinese 45 per cent, and the Indians 13 per cent. In Johore the figures are 43 per cent, 43 per cent and 12 per cent respectively. Only in the states formerly controlled by Siam have the Chinese and Indians failed to immigrate in sizable numbers, but as soon as modern economic development reaches these areas the story of the other states will probably be repeated. And when it is the Malays of the Federated and Unfederated Malay States will begin to resent a government which, good though it may be, is run by the British largely for the benefit of themselves and the Chinese and the Indians.

4. Borneo

Early history. The island of Borneo (about 290,000 square miles, of which less than 90,000 is under British control) began to be known to Europeans after the fall of Malacca in 1511. Throughout the sixteenth century it was frequently visited by both Portuguese and Spanish; the sultanates of Brunei in the north and Bandjermasin in the south were the chief centers of trade. Around 1600 Iberian monopoly was broken, and for the next 175 years England and Holland carried on a desultory rivalry. The natives however were hostile to both, and by 1800 British influence was extinct; in 1809 the Dutch, always interested more in Java, also gave up their posts. After Java was returned to Holland in 1816 the Dutch revived their interest in Borneo and got concessions for most of the southern half, although troubles in Java prevented their making much use of their opportunities. In the meantime the rise of Singapore led the English to trade with Sarawak and Brunei. This trade however was seriously menaced by the piratical attacks of nearby natives, so that in 1839 James Brooke, a retired officer of the army of the British East India Company who in 1830 had visited Borneo on a voyage to China, determined to deal with the nuisance. He was so
successful that in 1841, as a reward for his services in suppressing the rebellious Dyak subjects of the sultan of Brunei, the latter ceded the huge district of Sarawak, about 50,000 square miles, to Mr. Brooke, who then became the rajah of Sarawak.

Sarawak. Brooke's appointment was acclaimed by the natives, and so successful was his rule that in 1863 Britain recognized Sarawak as an independent state. In 1888, in return for British protection, a treaty was signed giving Her Majesty's government control of Sarawak's foreign relations, but the internal administration was left entirely in the hands of the rajah. Three generations of Brookes administered the country with the aid of a civil service of British officials, and under their enlightened policy the native state developed into a highly organized community. The most remarkable achievement of this benevolent despotism has been the flexibility of governmental organization, without which it would have been impossible to keep peace between the Mohammedan Malays of the coast, the head-hunting Dyaks of the interior, and the Chinese who form an increasingly important part of the 490,000 (1941 estimate) inhabitants. Second only in importance is the fact that even during the world-wide depression of the 1930's Sarawak's budget was balanced and its public debt was nil. In 1941 the rajah's powers were limited by a constitution; in 1946 the colony was turned over to the British government and the Brooke romance ended.

Labuan. While the first Rajah Brooke was helping the sultan of Brunei subdue the pirates of North Borneo the British government cooperated by a loan of several warships. As a result in 1846 the sultan ceded to Britain the island of Labuan, from which the English were able to exercise a certain control over Brunei. The little island of thirty-five square miles was incorporated with Singapore in 1907 and then in 1911 created a separate settlement, thereby being brought directly under the rule of the governor of the Straits Settlements. In 1946 it was incorporated into the sultanate of Brunei.

Brunei. The state of Brunei (present area 2,226 square miles) was at one time the overlord of most of northern Borneo. After the coming of the European it gradually shrank, and the cession of Sarawak in 1841, the cession of Labuan in 1846, and the Treaty of 1847 by which an agreement was made with Great Britain for commercial relations and the suppression of piracy all marked the beginning of the end. In 1888 the state was placed under the protection of Great Britain, and in 1906, when the general administration of the country was entrusted to a British resident, Brunei acquired the governmental status of one of the
Unfederated Malay States: The resident has been an officer of the Malayan civil service and was under the governor of the Straits Settlements, who was also high commissioner for Brunei. The population in 1931 was estimated at something over 30,000, nearly 90 per cent Malays. British rule seems to be satisfactory but the little state is still rather backward.

North Borneo. The last territory to be shorn from the ancient sultanate of Brunei was the state of North Borneo, estimated to contain about 30,000 square miles and a population of 270,000 (1939). Modern British interest in this region began in the 1870’s when a trade syndicate induced the sultans of Brunei and Sulu to transfer all their rights in North Borneo. The syndicate’s plans were approved by the British government, which in 1881 granted a charter to the British North Borneo Company. Under this charter and in spite of diplomatic protests from the Dutch and Spanish governments the company took over all the sovereign and territorial grants of the earlier cessions and proceeded to organize the administration of the territory. In 1888 the state of North Borneo became a British protectorate but its administration remained in the hands of the company, which from 1890 to 1905 also administered the colony of Labuan. The foreign relations of the colony were kept under the control of the British government through the governor of the Straits Settlements, who is also British agent for North Borneo and Sarawak. Internal affairs were administered by a governor whose appointment was subject to the approval of the home Colonial Office and who was responsible to the court of directors in London. He was assisted by a civil service of some sixty European officers. On July 15, 1946, the administration of the chartered company was terminated and the area was proclaimed a crown colony with capital at Jesselton.

This act ended the last of the British chartered companies, and it remains to be seen what will follow the British North Borneo Company’s control. Although by the terms of its charter the company could hold no trade monopoly, its trade rights were so extensive that private capital accomplished almost nothing in the way of economic development. Its colonial policy was one of subjection, yet it is hard to see how it could have been otherwise. Furthermore the company’s political and economic overlordship was imposed with but little objection from the inhabitants, and except for piracy the only important uprisings were those which took place in North Borneo at the turn of the nineteenth century.
The Japanese invasion of North Borneo resulted in such complete devastation that it is not surprising that the company decided to sell its sovereign rights to the British crown for upward of £2,000,000. Just before World War II the company’s annual exports amounted only to some $10,000,000. Although by 1947 rubber production was approaching prewar levels the precarious rubber market leaves Borneo’s economic situation not too certain. There seems however to be some grounds for hope of oil and tin discoveries; in that case the entire aspect of things would change immediately.

5. British Pacific Island Possessions

Significance. The discussion of Britain’s colonization in Borneo has drawn the reader’s attention from the continent of Asia and the next step naturally is toward the British possessions in the Western Pacific Ocean. These are geographically the most important of all the British colonies, because since they are scattered over eighty degrees of longitude and thirty-five degrees of latitude they provide the flagpole sites to keep the sun always shining on the Union Jack. A second significant feature of this colonization lies in Great Britain’s reluctance to acquire much of this territory; and this attitude helps to temper the oft-made charges of overweening British imperialism. A third value of a brief study of these island colonies is a realization of the remarkable diversity of the political institutions developed here to fit the needs of the polyglot civilization. And in this diversity is displayed that ability to meet any situation that is perhaps the outstanding characteristic of British colonization.

The Fiji period. The development of Britain’s power in the Western Pacific Area naturally falls into three periods, the first of which is known as the “Fiji period” because up to 1874 that archipelago was the only important English acquisition. The Fiji Islands were first put on the map in 1643 by Abel Tasman; then rediscovered by many English explorers, and regularly visited after 1804 by sandalwooders. Very shortly runaway convicts from Australia, whalers, and other traders began to appear, and in 1835 missionaries from Tonga arrived. Then followed four decades of trouble. Traders took sides in the local civil wars while British and American consuls tried to keep the peace. Frequently raiders from the Tonga (or “Friendly”) Islands left a trail of burning huts. The result was that in 1854 the leading chieftain asked for protection. Although England a decade before (1842) established
a protectorate over the famous Pitcairn Island (uninhabited previous to the *Bounty* mutiny), she still felt there was little to be gained by extending her influence into the Pacific, and King Thakombau's request was refused. In the 1850's and 1860's both American and German traders began to show such interest in the islands that Australians, who in 1868 formed the "Polynesian Company" for the purpose of developing the islands, began to be worried. Furthermore, since a labor trade similar to the Canton coolie trade was starting to bring laborers from nearby islands to work in the Fiji cane fields, on October 10, 1874,
Great Britain, because of her traditional attitude toward slavery, accepted cession of the islands. Despite the desire of Australia to become responsible for their administration, the home government decided to make them a crown colony. In 1880 Rotuma was added to the Fijis, and as time has gone on the importance of the group has increased. The total area of the archipelago is slightly over 7000 square miles and the population was estimated in 1943 at 240,000. The governor of Fiji is also high commissioner for the Western Pacific, and has jurisdiction over all islands not administered by the commonwealths of Australia and New Zealand, the colony of Fiji or any other civilized power.

International rivalry. After the Fiji period came fifteen years of Anglo-German-French rivalry during which the British government was obliged to make up its mind what its attitude should be toward expansion among the Pacific islands. On the whole the English were opposed to increasing "the white man's burden" but their hands were forced. Labor traders began to haunt the Solomon Islands, New Guinea, and the New Hebrides, and when Great Britain tried to prevent outrages by stopping the sale of arms she met opposition from both Germany and France. France increased her influence in the New Hebrides, but Australian pressure caused England finally to insist on a condominium; despite its inefficiency, it has continued to the present. France however established herself in the Society Islands, so that New Zealand also began to bring pressure on the home government. Meanwhile German traders who in the 1870’s began flitting hither and yon in the Western Pacific finally sold their colony idea to Bismarck. Their activities will be related in a subsequent chapter; suffice it to say now that German invasion of New Guinea, the Solomons, the Carolines and Marshalls, and the Tonga Islands, coupled with French threats, finally convinced the British leaders that international rivalry made British inaction no longer feasible. Another factor was the completion in 1886 of the Canadian Pacific Railroad, for it was then easily seen that the Vancouver-Australasia steamship and cable connections (completed during the decade 1893–1903) would require the annexation of the islands along the desirable routes.

The British advance. All these reasons therefore made inevitable a great increase from 1890 to 1910 in British holdings in the Pacific. In 1889 the Union group was made a protectorate. In 1891 the Cook group and the Manahiki Islands were annexed to New Zealand. In 1892 the Gilbert and Ellice islands became a protectorate, finally to be
annexed in 1915 (at the request of the native governments) as crown colonies. In 1893 a protectorate was established over the British Solomon Islands; and in 1898 over the Santa Cruz group and the Swallow group. In 1900 the Tonga Islands, which up to 1899 had been neutral in accordance with the Declaration of Berlin, on April 6, 1886, became a protectorate of Great Britain. In 1901 and 1902 this period of advance closed with the lease of a number of pearl and guano islands (the Phoenix group, the Swallow group, Starbuck, and Jarvis) to private companies.

Colonial policy. As can well be imagined, in these scattered possessions every type of political institution was used. Fiji is a crown colony. Tonga is a protectorate governed by a king (since 1918 by a queen), the only connection with the British government being the agent and consul who in turn are under the direction of the high commissioner and consul-general for the Western Pacific. The Gilbert and Ellice islands colony and the British Solomon Islands are administered by the high commissioner through resident commissioners. The islands annexed to New Zealand are administered through the chiefs by a resident. The small islands leased to trading companies have few inhabi-
tants and are administered by company representatives. Most interesting of all is Pitcairn Island, inhabited by descendants of the Bounty mutineers; it is under the jurisdiction of the high commissioner but its two hundred inhabitants elect their chief magistrate. From the standpoint of trade, area (probably about 20,000 square miles), or population (about 150,000), the island possessions are of little importance. In the final analysis the primary cause of British colonization in the Western Pacific was the fact that in the hands of a hostile power they would be dangerous. Consequently the type of colonial government is that which has best coincided with military strategy. In most cases however England has considered the welfare of the natives. They have been given effective protection, and since their original civilization proved susceptible to missionary and other Western influences a very considerable degree of voluntary assimilation has taken place.

6. Australia

Introduction. But assimilation in the Pacific island possessions is but a shadow of what has occurred in the three great dominions of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Here British civilization rules supreme, and since the reader is undoubtedly somewhat acquainted with these areas our comments on them will aim merely to show their place in the empire’s relations with the Pacific Area.

The Commonwealth. The discovery of Australia and its settlement have already been discussed. Thanks to the lessons learned from George III’s mismanagement of thirteen North American colonies, Britain gave the great southern continent as it developed more and more self-control. After the various original states had acquired responsible government the benefits of a closer union became manifest, and on January 1, 1901, they were finally united in the Commonwealth of Australia, with an area of 2,975,000 square miles and an estimated population in 1943 of 7,329,000. The government of the commonwealth is similar to that of the other dominions. Legislative power is vested in a federal parliament consisting of Great Britain’s king (represented by a governor-general), a senate, and a house of representatives. Administrative power is exercised by an executive council of nineteen ministers, all members of the Federal Parliament, to which the council is responsible.

Significance. The significance of Australia in the Pacific Area is of course the South Seas dominance it gives the British Empire. At the same time the increased strength of the dominion, its control over
Papua (annexed in 1883 by Queensland; 90,540 square miles, population estimated at over 337,000), and its assumption after World War I of mandate responsibilities over the former South Pacific German territory, all mean that Downing Street must give greater and greater heed to the voice of Canberra (since 1927 the dominion capital). Furthermore, Australia is showing more and more tendency to think for itself; and this tendency is especially important since in 1931 the Statute of Westminster definitely proclaimed that the dominions are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any respect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of nations." Yet such acts as immigration restrictions on British subjects of Malaya and India based on their Chinese and Hindu ancestry indicate that though the early disappearance of most of the population made possible the establishment of a distinctly English civilization in the country "down under," Australia nevertheless still furnishes problems for the empire to solve.

7. New Zealand

The Dominion. Although New Zealand did not become a British colony until half a century after the beginning of Australian colonization, it obtained a unitary constitution in 1870. Made the Dominion of New Zealand in 1907, its government is similar to that of the Commonwealth of Australia but differences in nomenclature (New Zealand's Parliament is a "General Assembly" with the upper house called a "Legislative Council"), in term of office (seven years for members of the Legislative Council, six for Australia's senators), and in salaries (New Zealand's representatives get £450 per annum, Australia's £1000) make a comparison of the two frames of government worthy of more detailed study than can be given here.

Significance. Although New Zealand is often combined with Australia under the general term of Australasia or British Oceania and is only 1200 miles east of its neighbor, there are actually many and great dissimilarities between them. New Zealand's smaller area (103,400 square miles) and relatively larger number of inhabitants (1,653,000 as of 1944) give it a much greater density of population (fifteen per square mile as opposed to two and one half). Two thirds of the surface of New Zealand is suitable for agriculture and grazing—not much over half of Australia;
The name of Captain Cook is found throughout the Pacific Area. No spot can more fittingly preserve the memory of the great navigator than beautiful Mt. Cook in New Zealand.

and the amount of land under cultivation is about the same in the two dominions (roughly 20,000,000 acres). Australia has already about reached the limit of its agricultural development, but New Zealand can still go ahead; and since agricultural resources constitute the backbone of each region's economic life, the larger country is much nearer a static
condition. A second dissimilarity is the fact that while in Australia the aboriginal population has been reduced to some 75,000 and will probably not survive, in New Zealand the Maoris increased from 50,000 in 1911 to 83,000 in 1939. Furthermore the Maoris participate in politics and have four members in the House of Representatives. A third difference between the two dominions is Australia's greater willingness to co-operate with the mother country. Whether it is the cause or the result of this difference, there is little real unity between the two dominions.

8. Canada

Comparisons with the other dominions. Australia went to England by default; that is, since no European power seemed to want it England felt justified in using it as a penal station. New Zealand also was acquired without a struggle. Missionaries wished to protect the Maoris at the same time that other Englishmen wanted to pioneer under the British flag, and again there was no European power to object. Canada's membership in the British Empire, on the other hand, was the result of military endeavors — the Seven Years' War gave England French or Lower Canada and the American Revolution gave Upper Canada (Ontario) to the United Empire Loyalists, an enterprising, nation-building lot of self-exiles. To these individuals must go the credit for creating the present British Empire, for it was their fight in the 1830's for responsible government in Canada that really reversed the current of British colonial policy and made possible the development of self-governing dominions. Even that term "dominions," so much in use today, owes its origin to Canada, since the British North America Act of 1867 provided a constitution for the "Dominion of Canada." The history of Canada since union has been like that of Australia one of western expansion; and also like New Zealand Canada has not secured sufficient population to make full use of her natural resources. With an area of 3,466,556 square miles Canada has a population estimated at 11,500,000. A further similarity with Australia is the fact that the native population of Canada also failed to present any great obstacle to the white man's advance. The approximately 125,000 Indians and Eskimos are an insignificant element in the population.

Colonial theory. In government there is little difference between Canada and the other dominions. Here too the king is represented by a governor-general, a reigning but not a ruling official, for the
cabinet is responsible to a parliament which since the 1931 Statute of Westminster has no legal limitations on its legislative autonomy. The upper house is a Senate of not more than 104 members appointed by the governor-general for life. The other half of the Parliament is a House of Commons of 245 members elected for five years unless the House is sooner dissolved.

Significance. In the international relations of the Pacific Area Canada's role in the activities of the British Empire is very important. Naturally Canada's Pacific seacoast stretching from Vancouver to Alaska makes her, and consequently the British Empire, a factor in the affairs of the North Pacific. At the same time the close and friendly relationship between Canada and the United States, and the growing tendency for Canada, in any consideration of international policy, to be influenced more by the policies of the United States than by those of the mother country, indicates that the time has come when Downing Street can claim no more than parity with Ottawa. And a corollary of this situation is the fact that from now on in all her Pacific Area activities England must first ascertain the viewpoints of both Australasia and Canada.

Conclusion. Brief as has been this cursory description, the writers trust it has served to make clear a number of pertinent points regarding the British Empire and Commonwealth in the Pacific Area. In the first place, its land area is but a little less than twice that of the United States with all its territories, and even though its population is only about one fifth that of the United States the great ubiquity of the Union Jack has meant that it was no easy task for Uncle Sam to acquire in the Pacific Area his now unquestioned predominance over John Bull. In the second place, Great Britain on the whole has borne well "the white man's burden" and has shown a marked degree of versatility in providing governments suitable to a series of civilizations ranging from the Chinese and the French Canadians down through the Malays, Polynesian, and Maoris to the head-hunters and the bushmen. Finally, just as it is the tall pine that gets the full effect of the tempest, so it was England's predominance in the Pacific Area during the nineteenth century that made her in the twentieth one of the chief targets of the Nipponese attempt to secure the hegemony of eastern Asia.
Russia in the Pacific Area

Development of Siberia: Equaled only by Great Britain as an obstacle to Japan's Far Eastern pretensions has been the nation that Kipling described as "the Bear that walks like a man." Previous chapters have told how, about the time that the western Europeans were reaching Cathay by sea, the Muscovite lumbered his weary way overland until he finally reached the Sea of Okhotsk. Eastern Siberia however proved so inhospitable that the Russians turned south into the upper Amur country. Here their advance stopped, for as has been related by the Treaty of Nerchinsk on August 27, 1689, Russia not only gave up her penetration of the southeastern Siberian seaboard and the course of the Amur, indispensable for the development of the lands around Lake Baikal, but her territorial expansion toward the Middle Kingdom was so effectively checked that the government at Peking was able to attack internal problems of empire free from the threat of Cossack brigands on the Amur. For 150 years Russian activities in the Far East were confined largely to slow colonization and widespread fur trading in Siberia and the North Pacific, and to intermittent trading across the Chinese border. Aboriginal tribes were driven from the settlements, stockaded posts and fortresses were built at strategic intervals, and in western and central Siberia between the Ural Mountains and Lake Baikal the steady immigration which followed the Cossacks brought under cultivation the more fertile lands. Even in the region east of the lake colonial occupation though less spontaneous gradually increased when the Russian government, adopting the English policy in Australia, decided to utilize the area as a place for the disposal of undesirables. Criminals,
political offenders, and, especially after the 1825 conspiracy against
Nicholas I, even aristocrats were sent as exiles into the Far East. In
many cases the families of the banished men followed them, and even
when the term of exile was not for life a large portion of the unfortun-
ates remained in eastern Siberia as permanent inhabitants.

Renewed aspirations. As the colonization of eastern Siberia increased,
it was inevitable that the Russians should again consider the possibili-
ties of southeastern migration. Even though their complete desires
had been frustrated by the Treaties of Buria (1727) and Kiakhta (1727)
and the supplementary articles of 1768 and 1792, overland trade with
China was continuous. Another contact with the Middle Kingdom was
through the colony of prisoners of war and deserters which gradually
grew up in Peking, where Russian priests were permitted to maintain a
regular ecclesiastical mission. By 1800 Russia felt emboldened to ask
permission to navigate the Amur, and though her request was refused,
Russian settlement so much increased and border disputes and violations
became so frequent that Russia could not much longer be kept out of a
wealthy area where Chinese control at best was most informal. In
1846 Nicholas I, who had become fully aware of the deplorable conse-
quences of the Treaty of Nerchinsk and the consequent reduction of Rus-

1. The Annexation of the Amur Region

or Siberia’s Pacific coastline to the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk north
of the eastern end of the Yablonoi Mountain Range, decided that the time
was ripe for an invasion of the Amur. His first emissary returned as
pessimistic a report as that of the majority of the spies Moses sent into
Canaan. Lieutenant Gavriloff reported that the Amur could handle
only ships of not over three-foot draft and that Sakhalin Island was a
peninsula. But the tsar was not to be deterred, for English entry into
China had disturbed what Russia had come to hope might be her
monopoly. He sought again for a man who might carry out his desires,
and his second attempt was successful.
and securing navigation rights on the Amur. To the latter objective he
gave his special attention. In 1848 preliminary exploration was made;
then during the next two years Captain Nevelsky ran the full length of
the Amur. Sakhalin was found to be an island, and on it in 1853 the
tsar approved the location of two small ports. Meanwhile in 1851
Nikolaevsk and Mariinsk were founded to control the mouth of the
Amur. These activities of course violated the previous Russian treaties
with China. The tsar therefore hesitated to sanction any definite oc-
cupation of the Amur, although he did authorize the occupation of Sakha-
lin Island.

*Effects of the Crimean War.* Whether or not "fortune favors the
brave," the full implications of Muraviev's bold refusal to be disturbed
by the fact that the Amur lay completely in the territory of a foreign
and a friendly power were soon seen. In the following spring the
Crimean War began. The Hudson's Bay Company and the Russian-
American Company had agreed to remain neutral, but Muraviev de-
cided it was his duty to help provision three Russian ships then at
Petropavlovsk, Kamchatka. To save time he started down the Amur
in May 1854 with a steamer (built on the Shilka River and powered by
an engine brought overland from Russia), fifty barges, innumerable
rafts, and 1000 soldiers. At Aigun he had a desultory discussion with
the head of the Manchu garrison as to his right to use the river, but
he continued without incident and on June 25 was at Mariinsk. In
August an English and French squadron from Callao attacked the Rus-
sians at Petropavlovsk and was temporarily repulsed by the Russians' spirited defense. The next year when they returned with reinforcements
all they found was a deserted settlement which they gallantly razed to
the ground. The Kamchatka setback however was of slight signifi-
cance, especially in comparison with the information Muraviev secured
about the lower Amur country. Other expeditions followed that of
May 1854, and with them came not only soldiers but colonists with
livestock and supplies for permanent settlement. Hence it was that
the defeats Russia sustained at the Peace of Paris (1856) were more than
redressed by her securing practical possession of what for centuries had
been Manchu land. When Muraviev returned to St. Petersburg in 1857
his activities on the Amur were approved and his award of the title
"Count Amurski" commemorated the immense service he had rendered
the empire.

*The Treaty of Aigun.* When peace was restored in Europe Muraviev
sat firm in the valley of the Amur. His colonies continued to settle on
THE RUSSIAN PACIFIC EMPIRE
its banks, and all that remained was for Russian diplomats to confirm what Count Amurski had accomplished. And again, just as English and French activities in the Crimean War had provided Russia with an excuse to intervene in the Amur region, so in the period after the war their attempts to force a revision of the Nanking Treaties gave Russia another chance to “fish in troubled waters.” With Great Britain and France making life difficult for the emperor of the Middle Kingdom—as if the T’ai-p’ing Rebellion, now some six years old, were not enough—the tsar felt quite safe in issuing on October 31, 1857, a ukase which created the “Maritime Province of Eastern Siberia” and included in it the Chinese territory north of the Amur. With this decree behind him Muraviev decided not to wait for negotiations by the Russian diplomatic representatives, and he himself at Aigun proceeded to put pressure on the Tatar general commanding Chinese forces in the Amur country. As a result, without the drawing of a sword and without any cost, on May 28, 1858, he secured a treaty which provided that the Amur should become the legal as well as the actual boundary between Manchuria and eastern Siberia. In addition Russia was admitted to joint occupation with China, pending a final decision as to its ownership, of the territory on the Pacific coast lying east of the Ussuri. Both the great Manchurian branches of the Amur, the Sungari and the Ussuri, were to be opened to Russian merchants and travelers provided with proper passports.

The Treaty of Tientsin. The Treaty of Aigun was of course only an agreement between two frontier leaders; it could have real standing only when confirmed by a similar protocol drawn up by the diplomatic representatives of the countries concerned. Fortunately Russia had already taken the preliminary steps necessary for such negotiations. In 1857 Admiral Count Putiatin had been sent overland to obtain a commercial treaty that would admit Russian ships to such China ports as were open to other powers and to revise the boundary along the frontier. When he was denied permission to enter China at Kiakhta he proceeded down the Amur, and finally at the Pei Ho in August 1857 delivered his letter to Chinese officials. These insisted that he should return to Kiakhta to receive his reply, since Russia was a land neighbor, but Putiatin by devious methods persuaded them to give him a reply at the coast. When it arrived it was thoroughly unsatisfactory, so it was agreed that a final answer from the emperor of China should be delivered at Canton. This gave the Russians a chance to join the British, French, and American envoys, with whom they returned to the north when the Anglo-
French attack was made on the Taku forts in May 1858. June 13, he secured the first of the so-called Treaties of Tientsin. His treaty like the American merely conferred on Russia through the most-favored-nation clause all the privileges won by England and France. Two days later he learned of Muraviev’s success at Aigun, and it is generally believed that it was his firm faith in his colleague’s ability to obtain a treaty that would contain all Russia’s frontier desires that caused Putiatin to limit his demands at Peking to a grant of posts for Russian trade and the raising of the clerical mission to the rank of an embassy. Muraviev’s treaty, however, did not meet all the exigencies of the situation and further negotiations were necessary.

2. The Beginning of the Drang Nach Korea and Manchuria

Settlement on the Amur. Despite its nonratification by the Peking authorities the Treaty of Aigun was considered to have legalized the Russian advance into the Amur country which even before Muraviev’s negotiations was already under way. On October 31, 1857, and again on December 31, 1858, the tsar issued ukases encouraging settlement. By 1859 20,000 Cossacks are said to have been located in the former Chinese territory, and in that year 10,000 more colonists passed through Irkursek. By 1860 the population of Siberia was estimated at over 3,000,000, mostly of course in western Siberia.

The Treaty of Peking. This rapid Russian migration to Siberia made it essential that the abovementioned treaties with China be formally ratified. General Ignatiev, the Russian minister who succeeded Putiatin, had no trouble in securing action (April 1859) on the Treaty of Tientsin, but neither country as it turned out favored the Aigun Agreement. China naturally felt it went altogether too far; and Russia wanted a favorable definition of the boundary east of the Ussuri and also of that between Siberia and Chinese Turkestan as well as better trading facilities along the frontier. Once again Russia secured help from her Crimean War adversaries. They again in 1859 attacked the Chinese government at Peking, this time because of its unwillingness to ratify the Treaties of Tientsin. During the campaigns of 1859 and 1860 the Russians played fast and loose with both sides; when the Allies suffered defeats in 1859 it is now thought that Chinese success was due to Russian advice as to the location of defenses and even to some active Muscovite participation. And yet when the Chinese resistance was finally broken and the Allies reached Peking, along with them came General Ignatiev.
During the subsequent negotiations the Russian minister supported the Chinese as against Britain and France, and actually persuaded Prince Kung (head of the Peking administration) that it was he who prevented the city itself from the destruction that befell the summer palace. Accordingly when he asked for an agreement to replace that of Aigun, China could not well refuse. On November 14, 1860, a treaty was signed at Peking which provided for (1) full cession to Russia of the Manchurian seacoast from the Amur to the Korean border, (2) delimitation of the western frontier as far as Kokand, (3) opening of trade routes from Kiakhta to Peking and trade marts at Kashgan and other places, and (4) more careful definition of Russian extraterritoriality.

Results of the Treaty of Peking. The Treaty of Peking definitely and for all time made Russia a dominating factor in northeastern Asia. It was the crowning touch of a policy, both logical and unscrupulous, which opened the Mongolian border to Russian traders and fixed Russia's southern boundary along the course of the Amur and the Ussuri to the very borders of Korea. Through diplomatic maneuvers and colonization she deprived China of 350,000 square miles of loosely held territory draining into the Japan Sea and got for Siberia a new road to the ocean. With wisdom based on experience, in 1860 Muraviev founded at the southern extremity of the new territory the harbor and site of Russia's future fortress of the Pacific, Vladivostok, "Lord of the East."

The Kuldja incident. The founding of Vladivostok greatly increased the economic possibilities of the Amur region, especially northern Manchuria, and these areas profited greatly from the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. Within the next decade the Chinese, Koreans, and native Tungus, Tatars, and Burats, who had previously provided most of the population, found themselves joined by thousands of hardy peasant farmers who gladly availed themselves of land rent-free for twenty years, imperial-tax-free for twenty years, rural-tax-free for three years, and carrying a ten-year military exemption. During the 1870's and 1880's however Russia failed to take advantage of the pouring into the Far East of these thousands of virile individuals anxious to start life anew. The tsar and his advisers felt that Vladivostok was a long way from the center of Russia, and when they learned that it was icebound for much of the year they turned their attention to central and western Asia.

Since the days of the great khans there had been some border trade between the central Asian lands of Russia and China. In 1871, as a result of Yakub Beg's Mohammedan rebellion in Chinese Turkestan and
on the pretext of preserving order, Russia occupied Kuldja in the Ili Basin. In 1881, four years after the rebels had been subdued, Russian invaders finally restored the area to China in return for an indemnity of 9,000,000 rubles and more regular trading rights. The Muscovite, however, still had ambitions in central Asia, and dreamed of a corridor to the Persian Gulf. In 1891 he reached the Pamirs, but here he stopped. Further attempt to extend the tsar’s dominions at the expense of either Persia, Afghanistan, or India would inevitably have resulted in open war with England; therefore that same year the Russian River which had long been seeking an outlet to warm seas turned once again to the Far East.

The Trans-Siberian Railway. As a preliminary, in 1891 Alexander III authorized the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The start was made on May 12 by the tsarevitch (afterward Nicholas II) and it was planned that it should be entirely within the Russian borders following the Amur and Ussuri to Vladivostok. Its original purpose appears to have been primarily economic. Alexander III and his finance minister, Count Witte, had no interest in any fresh territorial acquisitions in the East, but they did hope that the projected railway would aid in Far Eastern economic exploitation. As an actual fact however the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway had quite different consequences. The difficulties involved in running the line from Vladivostok to Khabarovsky and thence along the northern bank of the Amur to Chita were great, and very shortly it was seen that if the line could be built across northern Manchuria not only would some 343 miles be saved but also many costly bridges. Accordingly the Russian authorities set to work to secure from China the privilege of carrying the railway across northern Manchuria on a direct line to Vladivostok.

3. The Sino-Japanese War and Russia

Prewar Russo-Japanese relations. As was pointed out above, Russia’s advance south of the Amur was facilitated by the Anglo-Chinese troubles of the late 1850’s. Three decades later Japan went to war with China, and again the Muscovite profited from China’s misfortunes. To show how Russia once more made use of her neighbor’s adversity it is necessary to describe what went on between the two nations following the Treaty of Peking. In the 1860’s Russian migration into northern Manchuria was considerable. During the next two decades, as pointed out above, the movement slowed, although some 20,000 exiles did go
annually to Siberia. Russia's activities in northern Manchuria however were limited largely to the work of surveyors and missionaries. As events turned out Russia missed a great chance, for when her attention came to be centered again on the Far East Japan had emerged from her medievalism and had to be considered in all Russian calculations.

In the 1880's the Russian government began to revive its interest in the country south of the Amur, especially Korea. In 1885 it negotiated an agreement for the occupation of Port Lazareff and the use of Russian instructors to train the Korean army. Although Russia was forced out by British, Chinese, and Japanese opposition, from that time on Japan realized that she must watch Russia; and when in 1891 the Trans-Siberian was begun Japan decided that if Korea did not fall to China, she would certainly fall to Russia — unless Japan acted first. The result of course was the Sino-Japanese War, an account of which has already been given.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki. The Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the Sino-Japanese War, gave to Japan among other gains, a leasehold of the Laiotung peninsula, and thereby made sure that Japan would incur the active opposition of several European powers. In fact it is generally believed that before proceeding to Japan Li Hung-chang consulted the ministers of Russia, France, and Germany, and also that the original Japanese demands were made known to them immediately after Li received them.

Three-power intervention. Whether the three powers had agreed before Li's departure to prevent Japanese expansion to the mainland cannot be stated definitely. They did not take long however to make up their minds, and on April 23, 1895, only six days after the signing of the treaty, the three European ministers called at the Japanese foreign office in Tokyo with identical notes. In the curious language of diplomacy these stated that "the possession of the peninsula of Laiotung, claimed by Japan . . . would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the peace of the Far East," and therefore they "advised" Japan to renounce her definite possession of the peninsula.

The French objective. We have already mentioned the causes of the intervention, but it is necessary here to probe them further. That France took the lead seems doubtful, though there is no question that the close financial connection between Russia and France made France quite willing to support Russia in any act that would be of economic benefit to the chief field of Russia's investments and that also might offer Russia a chance to win favor in China.
The German objectives. Germany might well have had several reasons for trying to push Russia and France into such intervention. Naturally she desired to divert their attention from European affairs. She wanted to help France forget her late unpleasantness with Bismarck. She wanted to reduce the Russian threat on her eastern border. And she also had begun to think of footholds in China and was not averse to taking action that might make those footholds easier to get.

The Russian objective. The idea of the intervention then seems to have arisen in Russia, when the tsar's foreign minister convinced his government that it must not permit Japan to get a foothold on the Asiatic continent. Russia's interests were in a "strong but passive China" that would provide security for her own Far East and economic opportunities in Korea and Manchuria. Furthermore there was that matter of the Trans-Siberian Railway — Japan in Manchuria might mean a difference of 343 miles and many costly bridges. Why indeed should a tsar hesitate to proffer a mikado a bit of "friendly" advice? And why did Japan accept it? While ratifications of the amended treaty were being exchanged on May 8, 1895, a Russian fleet and two German cruisers were at Chefoo. Politely then Japan murmured "So sorry!" accepted the coalition's suggestions, and started a long campaign of war industry development against the day when through a bit of jujitsu she might still come out the winner.

4. Li Hung-chang and Russia

The Russo-Chinese Bank. From the period of the Opium War to the Sino-Japanese War British influence had been supreme in the Far East. The demands or advice of the British representatives were heeded with deference equally at Tokyo and Peking. During the 1880's however, when Britain was suffering from Russophobia and saw in the Middle Kingdom a possible check to Russia on the north, England tended more toward co-operation with China. After the Sino-Japanese War however, during which Britain had remained aloof, the coalition of Germany, France, and Russia displaced England from her leadership in China and England drew nearer to the recently humiliated Japan. That humiliation, the result of the three-power intervention, was sweet indeed to Li Hung-chang — until he found out that every quo must have its quid: The first installment was innocent enough, merely the request for a grant to Russia of the right to guarantee a Chinese loan of 400,000,000 francs (to be advanced by a syndicate of French and Belgian bankers)
at the remarkably low rate of 4 per cent. Both Great Britain and Germany protested, but with French support Russia was able on July 6, 1895, to force her request through. The loan, to be used in the first payment of the Chinese war indemnity, was secured by duties of the Chinese maritime customs. Its chief immediate effect was to strengthen Franco-Russian co-operation and to bring about the creation of a new financial agency, the Russo-Chinese Bank, established on December 10, 1895. Its long-range objective was of course to give Russia another opportunity to cast a hook into Chinese seas.

The Li-Lobanov Convention. The indemnity loan was on the whole but an empty satisfaction for the tsar’s government; the real compensation Russia wanted was a railroad franchise across Manchuria. In the past such an idea would have been flatly rejected, but the China of 1896 was ruled by a much-chastened Son of Heaven whose chief minister (although at that time in disfavor) was Japan-hating Li Hung-chang. Accordingly when plans were being made for the coronation of Nicholas II in June 1896, Count Sergius Witte decided that China must be represented at the festivities by no one but the eminent Li. China granted the Russian request and Li arrived at St. Petersburg some weeks before the Moscow ceremonial. After some discussion he signed June 3, 1896, with Foreign Minister Lobanov a treaty the contents of which were not officially published until given to the Washington Conference on January 24, 1922. Its existence was rumored, however, even before it was signed, and a fairly correct version called “The Cassini Convention” was printed in the London Daily Telegraph on February 15, 1910. Primarily it was an alliance under the terms of which the two nations agreed to support each other with all their military strength against any aggression by Japan directed against either Russian or Chinese territory in eastern Asia. During military operations all Chinese ports would be open to Russian vessels. The right to build a railroad across Manchuria would be granted to the Russo-Chinese Bank, and the treaty would remain in force for fifteen years after the railway contract was confirmed.

The Chinese Eastern Railway. In order to prevent the outside world from suspecting just how serious were the provisions of the Li-Lobanov Treaty, on September 8, 1896, at Berlin (for Li was also accredited to Germany) a formal agreement was announced in regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway. It was to be built by the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, a subsidiary of the Russo-Chinese Bank. Aside from the usual provisions respecting construction and operation those of special
significance were (1) a grant to the company (i.e., the tsar) of absolute and exclusive administration of the lands ceded to the railway, including mining rights within the railroad zone, (2) a reduction of one third of the Chinese customs duties on goods moved over the railway, (3) the right of purchase by China at the end of thirty-six years after its opening, and (4) reversion to China without payment at the end of eighty years. The statutes of the company were of course to be confirmed by the Russian government; and since the latter gave the broadest possible interpretation to its "absolute and exclusive right of administration," it very shortly transformed the railway line into a Russian zone with an adequate police force of regular troops thinly disguised as "railway guards." Substantial indeed was Russia's reward for her intervention in 1895. The railroad gave her economic and political penetration into Manchuria. Unfortunately for Count Witte, who frequently protested his own peaceful intentions, in the establishment of the Chinese Eastern Railway he forged a weapon that Russian imperialists could use too well; to change the metaphor, he laid another steppingstone in the path that was to lead to the Russo-Japanese War.

5. Acquisition of the Liaotung Peninsula

Causes. China's agreement to permit the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway did away with one defect in Russia's plan to use the Trans-Siberian in the consolidation and expansion of her interests in eastern Siberia, North China, and Korea. But there still remained a second difficulty; its terminus, Vladivostok, though possessed of an excellent harbor, was icebound many months of the year and only in Korean or Chinese territory was there a desirable, completely ice-free port. Advance into Korea would of course immediately lead to trouble with Japan, so Russia turned to the Liaotung peninsula in the hope that it might be secured without causing too much Japanese ill feeling.

German help. For several months therefore ways and means of obtaining a South Manchurian foothold were sought by such Russian expansionists as Foreign Minister Muraviev and War Minister Kuropatkin. It was undoubtedly their influence that caused the tsar in August 1897 to approve the kaiser's plan to occupy Kiaochow in Shantung (a discussion of this incident will be found in the next chapter), for it was felt that German intrusion across the gulf from Port Arthur would give Russia just the needed excuse. German action was held
up until November 1, 1897, when the opportune murder of two Catholic priests gave the German fleet a reason to appear in Kiaochow Bay.

The occupation of Port Arthur. To the Russian conservatives and especially to Count Witte Germany’s act was most displeasing. The latter had hoped to keep Russia’s Manchurian adventure predominantly economic, and realizing that with Germany in Kiaochow it would be almost impossible for him to hold out against Foreign Minister Mura-
view’s cold-blooded imperialism, he tried his best to get the kaiser to withdraw his fleet. The kaiser’s reaction, however, was to encourage the tsar to take a port for himself; so the Russian ships, which a few days after the occupation of Kiaochow had gone to Port Arthur and Talien-wan to winter there temporarily, remained permanently. The Chinese government was informed that a lease of Port Arthur must be granted, and since it was confronted by the Russian fleet refusal was out of the question. Negotiations were speeded up by Witte’s making available to Li Hung-chang a “gift” of 500,000 rubles. The transaction was embodied in two agreements signed March 27 and May 7, 1898. They granted Russia a twenty-five-year lease of the southern part of the Liaotung peninsula, including Port Arthur, Talien Bay, and adjacent waters, “for the purpose of ensuring that the Russian naval forces should possess an entirely secure base on the littoral of northern China.” Within this leasehold of some 1300 square miles Russian military and civil administration was supreme. Port Arthur was to be a military base open only to Russian and Chinese vessels but Talien, called Dalny by the Russians, was to be an open, commercial port. Right was given to connect both cities with the main line of the Chinese Eastern Railway at Mukden. Mining and other concessions in a neutral zone surrounding the lease were open only to Russians. Finally, as if there were need for a bit of humor, it was definitely stated that the building of the railway which was to connect Dalny with the Trans-Siberian would “never under any form serve as a pretext for the seizure of Chinese terri-
tory or for an encroachment on the sovereign rights of China.”

Results. The effects of Russia’s occupation of the peninsula were far-reaching. The Japanese, who had won Port Arthur in a fair fight and had been forced out by the coalition “for the peace of the Far East,” naturally viewed the presence of Russia in these ice-free ports with deep concern. If in 1895 she had entertained any doubts as to what Europe meant by “the peace of the Far East,” in 1898 these doubts were assur-
edly removed. Great Britain liked neither the presence of Russia at Port Arthur nor the closing of the port to all but Russian and Chinese
ships. Consequently she felt it necessary in self-defense to occupy Weihaiwei. France countered with Kwangchow (Canton); and thus another round was fired in the "battle of the concessions." For Russia herself the effects were twofold. In the first place it meant a definite end to the relatively easy progress of her eastward movement. Russia's activities in the Far East during the twentieth century were to be dominated by political and military considerations rather than economic. And in the second place, with the extension of her lines as far as Port Arthur and the proximity of their Eastern termini to the nation best fitted to attack her, Russia lost her centuries-old invulnerability. As a result in the first decade of the twentieth century Japan was encouraged to attempt what a hundred years before even the great Napoleon had failed to accomplish.

6. RUSSIAN COLONIAL POLICY

Russia a colonizer. With the occupation of the Liaotung peninsula, Russian expansion in the Far East reached its southeastern limits. The next century's backward movement will be described in later chapters. But before this discussion of Russia in the Pacific Area is concluded, it seems desirable to point out several features of Russia's colonial policy which may be of special interest. This is the more desirable because her expansion, like that of the United States before the twentieth century, took place in contiguous areas occupied by peoples who were readily swallowed up by the invading civilization, and it is therefore often forgotten that Russia's eastward movement was really colonization.

Colonial policies. In this colonization Russia had three outstanding policies. In the first place, Siberia was always looked upon as a place to which undesirable subjects were to be sent. Some of these were criminals, anarchists, and socialists, all dangerous to established society and therefore fit subjects for banishment to a far country. Others were members of the economically submerged classes and therefore it was desirable to send them to the vast unpopulated but potentially rich lands of Siberia. In the second place, even though Siberia might be a land of exiles it was still a part of the Russian Empire, which was always thought of by its rulers as a homogeneous unit. Even when toward 1900 its population reached some 6,000,000, Siberia was not given any special form of government; its laws were Russian laws administered by officials who were responsible directly to the tsar. But because in the
To people the vast unpopulated wastes of Siberia the Russians made use of convicts. Some of them were sent as far east as Sakhalin Island. The above picture shows prisoners eating and drinking in the exercise ground.

last three decades of the nineteenth century about 2,000,000 free immigrants entered Siberia, that region by 1900 had acquired the quasi-democratic institutions of old Russia: assemblies (dumas) in the provinces and citizens' committees (zemstvos) in the towns. These institutions of course were more important in the western provinces of Tobolsk,
Tomsk, Yeniseisk, Irkutsk, and Yakutsk. In the Far East a viceroyalty provided government for Transbaikalia, Amur, the maritime region, and Sakhalin Island. In the third place, Siberia was administered for the purpose of exploiting its resources — especially its gold and furs — for the benefit of the state.

Modern Siberia. In all Siberia however the hand of the law rested but lightly, for like the frontiersmen of all countries the land-hungry peasants who followed the Cossacks, trappers, and fur traders were hardy, self-reliant, and undisciplined. The population moreover was so firmly anchored that its uprooting seemed unthinkable and its domination by an outside authority unbelievable. Legal successors of the Russia which by natural processes expanded into and occupied sparsely settled Siberia, the occupants of the Far Eastern areas came to be a monument to the colonizing ability of the descendants of Peter the Great. Thanks to the fact that the Russian colonizers were almost as much Asiatic as European, their policy of subjection yielded readily to one of assimilation, and while 90 per cent of Siberia’s population was classed as Russian it was in large measure Asiatic. Consequently when in the early twentieth century the colonizing West looked at the East it was forced to realize that of all the European-Asiatic empires that of Russia had the most legitimate reason for existence and the greatest likelihood of continuance. The Russians of Siberia were not interlopers from whom Asia was to be saved, they were a part of Asia itself.
Germany in the Pacific Area

Introduction. Since Germany no longer has any colonies a chapter discussing its lost Pacific empire may at first thought seem to have merely academic interest. A more careful consideration however shows that some account is necessary if the story of the impact of West on East is to be complete. Even if one puts aside the possibility that in the future some of Germany's former overseas possessions may be restored to her, it is impossible to escape the significance of German colonization in the past. It played a large part in the Weltpolitik of the Far East, of Europe and of America. Furthermore, since German invasion of the Pacific Area had its own "made in Germany" characteristics, one finds a study of German colonial policy decidedly valuable.

Character. By 1850 Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands had been building empires for several hundreds of years; Spain and Portugal had risen and fallen; Russia's push to the Pacific was 250 years old. Not until 1884 did Germany, almost out of a clear sky, suddenly start on a colonial career. At that time "places in the sun" were a bit hard to find; hence when she started to follow the path the other European powers had laid out in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, she encountered a certain amount of congestion. This always causes trouble whether it be in traffic or in colonial ventures; perhaps if Germany had heeded the "Stop" signs in certain regions she would not have had to "Go" from them all.

1. Germany Becomes a Colonial Power (1884)

Previous attitude. Previous to the latter part of the nineteenth century the region which had then become Germany was little inter-
ested in colonization. This attitude dated back to the beginnings of the commercial revolution which in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries helped stimulate Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, English, and French expansion but bypassed central Europe. It is true that individuals, and companies like the famous Welser Company which operated in the early 1500’s, did serve to keep alive the old Hanseatic traditions; but the Thirty Years’ War so devastated Germany that she gave little thought to foreign trade, and on into the seventeenth century few of the Teutonic rulers agreed with the Great Elector (1640–1688) that “Trade and commerce are the most important foundations of the State.” This situation continued into the eighteenth century, when the expansionist tendencies of the German states were taken up in colonizing and developing contiguous lands like Prussian Poland and former Turk lands in Hungary. After the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire state power was largely dissipated in interstate rivalries within Germany and Austria, with the result that the energies of central Europe were devoted to the problems of internal consolidation and to the expulsion of the Turks from Europe. Even Frederick the Great, who during his reign from 1740 to 1786 made several attempts to establish Asiatic trading companies, is reported to have said, “All distant possessions are a burden to the State. A village on the frontier is worth a principality 250 miles away.” Therefore it is not surprising that while Germany was merely a “geographical expression” her colonial attempts should have been so separate and disunited as to make them weak and disorganized. Especially was this true in the half century following the Napoleonic period; and even after 1871 when Germany emerged as an empire it was a full decade before she undertook active overseas expansion.

Causes of change in the German attitude. This expansion when it came was the result of a new colonization movement that received its impulse from the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution. The technological advances of the first increased production, reduced distances, made the occupation of colonies much more feasible since their commerce was more valuable and their administration more easy, and created capitalists with money to invest in distant enterprises. The French Revolution enabled the bourgeoisie to overthrow feudalism and divine-right monarchy and to control the government for the benefit of business interests. At the same time the French Revolution developed such an intense national patriotism that all classes were proud to assist in any colonial endeavor that might add to the nation’s prestige and power.
This nineteenth century awakening of interest in colonization—commonly called the "New Imperialism"—had three distinct motives. The first or economic motive was the result of a revival of seventeenth century mercantilism whose leaders were "neo-mercantilists" advocating high protective tariffs and active colonial expansion. The real economic reason for imperialism though was not so much benefits for the mother country as benefits for individuals who participated in colonial enterprises.

The second motive was the result of a new spirit of patriotism which made its devotees want to stick small flags all over world maps—they gloried in national power and prestige, and were particularly impressed with the desirability of having colonies to which to send surplus population.

The religious motive grew out of a desire to Christianize the heathen, and since it made sympathizers out of many earnest Christians who would otherwise probably have disapproved of colonial expansion, the importance of the missionary movement can hardly be overemphasized.

Germany's new attitude. It is sometimes said that 1884 marks the point when Bismarck, after resisting for thirteen years the pressure of practical advocates and businessmen, finally yielded to the entreaties of sword-rattling chauvinists who regarded colonies as the natural appanages of an empire. It seems more likely however that from 1871 to 1876 Bismarck's policy was not one of hostility toward colonization but rather one of watchful waiting and cautious preparation. When preparations were complete, the years 1876–1884 marked the establishment of official protection for overseas commercial undertakings, combined with an effective though unadvertised official co-operation with the colonies, and a climaxing act which really showed the true colonial aims of the great chancellor. At any rate, when he finally started colonization, he had a united German Empire behind him. The annexation in 1874 of the Fijis by England precipitated a growing Anglo-German rivalry which was fanned by constant writings of German explorers whose ubiquitous travels served both science and colonial propaganda. Added to the geographers and the geologists were the sociologists. These from their population studies learned and then made public the fact that in 1881 123,000 people or .0475 of the German population had emigrated from the Vaterland. Such a loss of good German citizenry (not to mention cannon fodder) was most perturbing, and on December 6, 1882, there was organized at Frankfurt the Kolonialverein, a society which
definitely advocated the acquisition of colonies on the grounds that they would provide (1) a place under the German flag for the surplus German population, (2) a market for German manufacturers and a source of raw products, (3) an opening for the investment of surplus capital, and (4) an opportunity to increase the international prestige of the youthful empire.

April 24, 1884. The Kolonialverein was such an extremely efficient propaganda society that German public opinion became rapidly pro-colony, especially as throughout Germany spread accounts of British opposition that developed in Southwest Africa where for some time one F. A. E. Luderitz had been engaged in business. Luderitz, an ardent advocate of colonies, as early as 1875 had secured from Bismarck the promise that the government would embark upon colonization "when there shall have been created a deepseated national movement in favor of it." For a year diplomatic correspondence continued, with England following a dog-in-the-manger policy of evasion that caused the thermometer of popular indignation and national chauvinism in Germany to reach the danger point. Bismarck finally saw that the crisis had arrived, took advantage of the "natural impulse for expansion," and on April 24, 1884, dispatched an official proclamation to Luderitz declaring his settlements to be under German protection. With this stroke he inaugurated the German colonial empire, and the aged Kaiser William I was able to announce, "Now I can look the Great Elector in the face when I cross the long bridge in Berlin."

2. Germany Enters the Pacific — New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago

Early relations. Once Bismarck had made up his mind to acquire a colonial empire he moved with surprising rapidity. His activities in Africa lie outside the scope of this volume, but it may be mentioned in passing that while the protectorates of Kamerun, Togoland, Southwest Africa, and East Africa were being put on the map, the German flag was raised in German New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago. These areas had been explored early in the sixteenth century, but because of the difficulties of navigation, the exclusiveness of the Dutch, and the diversion of the stream of enterprise to the more temperate regions farther south, they had been pretty much neglected. In 1874 however Captain J. Moresby thoroughly explored the eastern coast of New Guinea, and his reports brought home to the Queenslanders the
A native festival in New Guinea, and a closeup of the leading participants.
realization that were the coasts opposite to Torres Straits to fall into foreign hands their commerce would be vitally endangered. Accordingly in 1883 Queensland annexed that part of New Guinea not owned by Holland, and although the British government refused to sanction the act, on November 6, 1884, England did establish a British protectorate over the southern portion of the eastern half of New Guinea. In so doing she barely got the jump on Germany, whose Otto Finsch in 1882 made some valuable explorations that provided the basis for the formation on May 13, 1884, of the German New Guinea Company.

This company's charter was similar to that of its predecessor, the East African Company, but the New Guinea Company's sovereign rights were more specifically and precisely defined; lawmaking was reserved to the empire. The company's monopoly right was also more clearly defined, namely, "the exclusive right of taking possession of and of disposing of the unclaimed lands, and of concluding with the natives contracts relative to the soil and to the right of property." The government, besides reserving the right of legislation, reserved also the right to conduct all foreign affairs and to organize and command all military forces in the protectorate. The company for its part was under no obligation to render any return whatsoever; and in that respect its charter more nearly resembled those of the colonial companies of the early commercial revolution than the English companies of the nineteenth century.

Occupation. After the grant of this charter, Dr. Finsch was sent back to northern New Guinea to unfurl the German flag; this he did on November 16, 1884. Other explorers and merchants freely dispensed flags, nailed on the palm trees signs entitled Kaiserliches Schutzgebiet (Imperial Protectorate), and made treaties with the nonresisting natives to such an extent that Bismarck on December 23, 1884, felt justified in notifying the powers that imperial protection had been extended to settlements on the northern coasts of the New Guinea Archipelago. All these events of course precipitated British counter-activities, urged on by the insistent demands of the Australian colonies. Finally in 1885 an agreement was reached with England and confirmed the following year that gave Germany a very respectable colonial empire in the Indies.

Colonization. When Germany took over a quarter of New Guinea (more than 70,000 square miles), which she rechristened Kaiser Wilhelmland, and the Bismarck Archipelago (11,000 square miles) she acquired a region almost devoid of white men and with a native population estimated at 250,000 to 750,000. After the annexation the suze-
rainty of the new territory was given to the German New Guinea Company. It encountered so many practical difficulties in the exercise of its administrative rights that some of them were given back to the government in 1889. Ten years later the empire took over the whole administration and the company became an ordinary trading organization. Even then it failed, chiefly because it was run by a group of officials who thought they could solve the problems of administering the undeveloped country and governing the primitive inhabitants of the Pacific islands from their comfortable offices in Unter den Linden. But even under direct government control the colony was not much more of a success; it required a subsidy from home to keep up its administration, and it was never attractive to the German emigrants. At the outbreak of World War I the white population was less than 1000; by 1939 it had risen to no more than 6000.

3. The Marshall Islands

Acquisition. Two thousand miles northeast of New Guinea are the Marshall Islands (160 square miles; 1935 population 10,000), which were acquired shortly after Dr. Finsch distributed German flags throughout New Guinea. The empire extended protection to the islands in April 1886, and German possession was recognized by Great Britain on April 10, 1889.

The Jaluit Company. These islands are of interest chiefly because they furnished the longest-lived and the most successful attempt of Germany to revive in the nineteenth century the old privileged companies of the seventeenth. During the 1860's and 1870's a German firm of Robertson and Hernsheim traded among the islands, and in 1878 secured by treaty the port of Jaluit as a coaling station for the government. In 1887 the Jaluit Company was formed, agreeing to support the imperial government in return for (1) possession of all unclaimed land, (2) monopoly of guano and pearl industries, and (3) the right to be consulted about all colonial legislation. The company met with unusual success. Eventually it concentrated on copra and returned profits to its stockholders; furthermore it got along well with the natives. In 1906 however the German government took over the rights of the company in order to display greater political strength in the South Seas. Its chief settlement, Jaluit, remained the center of administration.
4. Samoa

When Bismarck set out to build a colonial empire in the South Pacific he hoped to acquire areas unclaimed by any other civilized power and thus avoid international rivalry. But this hope failed; and in the case of Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the Bismarck Archipelago he found it necessary after making treaties with the native chiefs to confirm the boundaries with Great Britain. The same situation arose with Samoa, Germany's next colonial acquisition.

The Significance of Samoa. Germany's entrance into this area was motivated by hope for colonial trade and desire for investment opportunities; and also—since toward 1900 international rivalry was increasing—by the need of coaling stations. From this point of view Samoa was specially important, located as it was in the middle of the South Seas. From the standpoint of international relations it played a big role; and to the student of literature it will always have a special appeal in that here lived and died the beloved Robert Louis Stevenson.

Condominium. The Samoan Islands were put on the map in the early 1700's, but were of little interest even to missionaries and traders until the second quarter of the nineteenth century. In the next quarter trade increased despite numerous civil wars which the presence of both Germans and Americans helped to stimulate. As a result in 1872 Commodore Meade on a visit to the islands accepted the outright cession of Pago Pago Harbor and a protectorate over the rest of the archipelago. The American Congress, however, had forgotten about "manifest destiny," so let the islands go back to the even tenor of their internecine strife. Five years later the United States consul raised the American flag and again Congress pulled it down, but in 1878 the United States did accept a coaling station. The same year the famous Colonel A. B. Steinberger, as agent of President Grant, arrived in the islands. Financially skillful, he became the native ruler's premier, and thereby made himself persona non grata to the local European representatives. After the United States established a coaling station at Pago Pago, Germany and Great Britain did the same at other spots in the islands, and a sort of condominium was established with each power agreeing that it would appropriate no islands to itself.

The Berlin Conference. During the next decade, while war was incessant among the three contenders for the throne, Malietoa, Tamasese, and Mataafa, the international pot was constantly boiling over. A conference at Washington in 1887 failed to accomplish anything, and
The dance plays a large part in the religious life of the people of the South Pacific. Participants in these activities customarily wear masks such as those shown here. Top: dance masks covered with bark cloth used by natives in the Gulf of Papua, New Guinea. Bottom: tortoise-shell mask, 14 inches high, from Torres Straits; mask with cone-shaped headdress fringed with dyed sage bark, from Gulf of Papua, New Guinea.
when the British warship *Calliope* sailed into the port of Pago Pago a real "incident" was prevented only by a fortuitous hurricane which sank all the foreign war vessels except the *Calliope*. The result of this near contretemploi was the Berlin Conference of 1889. On June 14 of that year a treaty was worked out by the three contending countries and Samoa by virtue of which the independence and autonomy of the islands was guaranteed and Malietoa was made king. The three powers constituted for themselves a protectorate over the islands and established European justice. But this arrangement did not work out well, and upon the death of Malietoa in 1899 the rivalry between his son Tana and Maraafa (who had returned to the islands in a German warship) caused a native civil war, with England and the United States on one side and Germany on the other. The three powers sent a commission to the islands to investigate, but the situation was so embarrassing and so complicated that it was finally decided in November 1899 to divide the islands between Germany and the United States. Germany received Upolu and Savaii, we received Tutuila. England secured as rectification the Tonga Islands, part of the Solomons, and certain African rights.

*Results.* The negotiations that led up to this treaty were extremely difficult, and many scars of ill feeling were left, some of which never healed. Undoubtedly these feelings played a part in Germany's attitude toward the Boer War, and likewise in the development of British ill will toward Germany. As for the United States, the episode in its beginning gave birth to a German "bogey" which was further fed by the Spanish-American War, the later Samoa incident, and German adventures in the Caribbean, and which eventually helped to cause the United States to enter World War I.

*German Colonization.* The two islands which Germany received had an area of about 12,000 square miles and a population upward of 25,000 — in 1944 about 65,000. The islands were made a crown colony and given a government similar to that of a British crown colony. Under an imperial governor was a native high chief assisted by a native council, and there were both German and native judges and magistrates. Despite the fact that Germany seemed willing to precipitate a war in order to acquire her share of the Samoan Islands, they were never of great value. Just previous to Sarajevo the total annual trade was about 10,000,000 M., government expenditures were about 150,000 M. greater than revenues, and the white population was under 600.
5. Colonization in China

The "New Course." Germany's acquisition of the Samoan Islands may be considered as the transition from the Bismarckian theory of colonization to the "New Course" of William II. When Germany's interest began in Samoa it was almost entirely economic; when title to the islands was finally secured the commercial revolution which followed Germany's industrial revolution had channeled the German colonial movement into a course that was closely identified with the political ends by which it sought economic concessions and spheres of interest in territory already occupied — in short, into economic imperialism. This imperialism definitely appealed to the young kaiser, for like most rulers he looked upon colonies not as an end in themselves but as means to an end. He wanted more colonial possessions in order to transform Germany's European hegemony into world power. And nowhere better than in Kiaochow was illustrated the kaiser's desire to secure overseas territory as a means of obtaining for the Vaterland the position in world affairs which his ambition desired her to occupy.

Early German interest in China. When the German Customs Union entered into treaty relations with China in 1861, the opportunities for trade and travel made a special appeal to the adventurous and searching minds of that rising young German nation. During the 1860's one of these, Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen, a geologist, traveled extensively in the Far East. In 1882 he published an account of Shantung based on his own investigations and also on those of the British Admiralty and a Scotch missionary, Alexander Williamson. In this illuminating travel book he advocated the acquisition of Kiaochow because it had (1) adequate harbor facilities for the largest ocean-going vessels, (2) direct and easy possibilities of railroad access to the great populous plains of North China, and (3) proximity to rich deposits of coal. During the next decade Richthofen's recommendations began to receive serious consideration, for by 1890 German commerce in China was larger than that of Russia and France; of foreigners in China, Germans were second in number. Many of the leading commercial houses in the treaty ports were German firms, a German-Asiatic Bank had been established for about a decade, and a German mail steamer service was operating successfully. All of these commercial developments indicated that Germany had a tangible stake in China, and that stake of course demanded naval protection.

The Sino-Japanese War and the triple intervention. As far as Germany
was concerned the chief immediate effect of the Sino-Japanese War was the kaiser's belief that the Chinese Empire was about to break up, and that his representatives should be on hand to pick up as many valuable pieces as possible. As early as November 17, 1894, the emperor suggested to his chancellor that England, Russia, and France would undoubtedly take possession of strategic points and that it would be advisable for the Eastern Asiatic Squadron, in secret understanding with Japan, to take Formosa before it fell into the hands of France. On November 23 the German minister at Peking proposed that Germany make use of the opportunity to acquire a base for her significant commercial interests in eastern Asia, and recommended the Pescadores Islands or Kiaochow. By March of the next year it was seen that Japan would be an easy winner, and Germany began to worry about what would happen if Japan were permitted to keep all the fruits of her victory. On March 11, 1895, the foreign secretary in a note to the naval secretary implied that Germany would participate with the other powers in an intervention on behalf of China, and requested a memorandum showing why the navy department wanted a Far Eastern port together with suggestions for suitable ports. The above implication became fact on April 22; and as a result of the joint intervention Germany along with Russia and France was in a position to receive a quid pro quo.

The search for a port. Germany at first neglected her opportunities. For the time being she seemed satisfied with the grants to her (October 3 and 30, 1893) of concessions at Hankow and Tientsin; and when in the same month China refused her request for a coaling station Germany meekly acquiesced and for two years apparently did nothing. The reason for this seeming delay in obtaining compensation was probably the desire, typical of German thoroughness, to be certain as to what port she should seek. It had to be a port which would (1) enhance German prestige, (2) develop German trade, (3) provide a base for vessels of war and merchant ships, and (4) serve as a refuge, supply base, and rallying point for German citizens in China in time of war. If possible it should be a port on a main trade route, but it had to be so situated as not to embroil Germany with other powers. With these ideas in mind Admiral Hoffmann of the Eastern Asiatic Squadron throughout 1895 carefully explored the China coast, and largely for strategic reasons chose Samsah, Chusan, near the mouth of the Yangtze, was preferred by Admiral Hollmann, secretary of the navy.

The selection of Kiaochow Bay. Neither of these ports appealed to Tirpitz, who in 1896 succeeded Hoffmann, and who very shortly made
up his mind that the best possible place available to a nation which had once more arrived too late was the excellent harbor of Tsingtao in Kiaochow Bay. He was opposed from the beginning by Baron von Heyking, who in July 1896 came to the Far East as German minister to China. Before he left Germany Tirpitz had decided on Amoy, and became the more determined in his belief when on August 19, 1896, he learned from Count Cassini, the Russian minister, that Russia had decided to occupy Kiaochow. Tirpitz however felt that the Shantung harbor would be of no use to Russia, and his views were confirmed by an interview he had with Admiral Alexeiev at Vladivostok. Therefore he wrote on September 5, 1896, a long message to the German High Command in which he lined himself up with his geologist predecessor Richthofen. In the meantime on October 11, 1896, the emperor had received an account of the argument between Tirpitz and Heyking, and naturally was much upset at the sharp disagreement between his naval and diplomatic representatives. Two years before he himself had wanted to take Kiaochow as an indemnity from China but Heyking’s strong stand had made him waver. Finally in January 1897 Georg Franzius, a naval engineer, was secretly dispatched to the Far East. Jointly with Captain Zeye, who as acting commander of the Far Eastern Fleet had replaced Tirpitz when the latter was promoted to Hoffmann’s position as secretary of the navy, he investigated Amoy and Kiaochow, and on May 5 on his advice Minister Heyking changed his mind and sent to Berlin a recommendation favoring the Shantung port of Kiaochow.

*The search for an excuse.* Heyking’s note reached Berlin on June 19, 1897, and ended all doubt as to which port was most to be desired. Two other questions however remained to be answered: “What definitely is Russia’s attitude?” and “How can pressure be brought to bear on China which will lead to the cession of Kiaochow?” The first caused considerable correspondence and negotiation. The Russian government was inclined to be noncommittally acquiescent, so on October 1, 1897, Minister Heyking informed the *Tsungli Yamen*, “We reserve the right during the coming winter to anchor, in case of need, German vessels temporarily in Kiaochow Bay.” Here the matter rested while Germany sought a “case of need.” This came on November 1 when Providence showed it was “mit uns” and provided an excuse for the seizure of Tsingtao.

*Aid from Providence.* To understand this incident we need to remember that since 1842 France had assumed the protection of Roman Catholic
missions in China. For the next four decades the German neglect of the Chinese mission field provided no complications. Then in 1873, a German Catholic priest, Arnold Jannsen, founded the Society of the Divine Word to train German-speaking missionaries for work in foreign fields, and four years later sent two men to China. Some success attended their efforts and in 1885 southern Shantung was created a separate vicariate. But with success came opposition, for this area was the home of Confucianism, and missionary work, especially in the chief cities, was constantly obstructed by the native religious scholars. The situation finally became so difficult that the bishop, John Baptist Anzer, applied to the French minister for protection. To his surprise he received the reply, "Our intervention can have no other aim than to secure observance of engagements which have been entered into with us." He then appealed to his own country, which stood ready to come to the aid of the missionaries, and on October 23, 1890, in Rome and in the presence of the Pope Bishop Anzer chose the kaiser's government as the protector of his mission. With strong German support an active propaganda campaign was carried out and new missions opened in the cities of southern Shantung. Here in the little town of Changkiachwang on the night of November 1, 1897, a band of twenty to thirty men, presumed to be members of the "Society of the Great Knife," stabbed to death Fathers Nies and Henle. Five days later, on November 6, the kaiser learned of the assassination and that night he sent to Rear Admiral Diederichs, who had recently been appointed chief of the Eastern Asiatic Cruiser Squadron, the following telegram:

Proceed immediately to Kiaochow with the whole squadron, seize suitable points and villages, and, in such manner as may appear best to you, compel full satisfaction by the greatest possible application of energy. The purpose of the mission is to be kept secret.

On November 14 the squadron of four ships arrived at Kiaochow Bay and without resistance from the Chinese garrison took possession of Tsingtao.

Vengeance. With Tsingtao in its hands the German government rapidly drew up the demands which on November 22, 1897, were presented in Peking. They called for (1) the erection of an imperial tablet in memory of the murdered priests, (2) an indemnity, (3) the perpetual degradation of the governor, (4) payment of the expenses of occupation, and (5) preference for German engineers in Shantung railway construction and in the working of mines along the railways. On the advice of England China hesitated about conceding item five. This infuriated
Emperor William, who had determined to take advantage of this excellent opportunity before another great power should either dismember China or come to her help, so in December he sent to Shantung his brother Henry. The latter left Berlin with his ears full of a banquet speech to the effect that "Should anyone essay to detract from our just rights or to injure us, then up and at him with your mailed fist," and with instructions from the kaiser "to make clear to the Europeans in China, to the German merchants, and above all to China herself that the German Michael has planted his shield firmly in the soil." With Prince Henry's squadron on the way and no help forthcoming from any European power, China was forced to yield. On January 24, 1898, Prince Bülow announced in the Reichstag that (1) the Governor of Shantung was dismissed, that (2) 3000 taels indemnity was promised for each missionary, that (3) the Chinese government would build three churches at a cost of 66,000 taels each, furnish the sites for two of them, and contribute 24,000 taels for seven mission buildings in the district where the murder occurred, and that (4) a special edict for the protection of missionaries would be issued.

The Kiaochow lease. China's yielding to the missionary murder demands did not however end the affair, for the kaiser was determined that out of it should come the cession of Tsingtao and Kiaochow Bay. Immediately he found that Count Muraviev was pressing Russia's claim to that region, and it was not until the middle of December, after the Russian fleet had taken up "temporary" quarters at Port Arthur that Russian opposition was withdrawn. On December 19, 1897, "Willy" was able to send to "Nicky" the following telegram:

Best thanks for kind wishes for Henry. Please accept my congratulations on the arrival of your squadron at Port Arthur. Russia and Germany at the entrance to the Yellow Sea may be taken as represented by St. George and St. Michael shielding the Holy Cross in the Far East and guarding the gates of the continent of Asia.

Willy.

British consent to German occupation of Tsingtao had been received even earlier, on November 12, 1897, so that in January Minister Heyking was emboldened to demand from China a lease on Kiaochow, promising that as long as Germany remained there she would make no demand for indemnification for the costs of intervention. On March 8, 1898, the Chinese government finally yielded, and the lease was granted as "a special proof of their grateful appreciation of the friendship shown to them by Germany." By the treaty Kiaochow Bay with about 200 square
miles of land was leased to Germany for ninety-nine years. A neutral zone, thirty miles wide, was established around the bay. The right to construct fortifications and maintain troops was accorded Germany. In addition German financial interests were granted a priority in all railroad or mining developments that might be undertaken in the province of Shantung.

Results. With Kiaochow Bay the kaiser acquired an economic sphere and a military base with which to shield the Holy Cross and to guard more effectively the gates of the Asiatic continent. In addition he secured the increased hostility of Great Britain, the suspicion of France, and the indignation of the rising Far Eastern power, Japan. Whether these harmful effects might have been overcome had there been no World War no one knows. At the end of fifteen years of occupation Germany was ruling over about 200,000 contented Chinese, and the 4500 Europeans were over twice the foreign population of her other Pacific possessions. Since Tsingtao was made a free port, trade developed just before 1914 to over 85,000,000 M. a year. Expenditures on administration, railroad construction (Germany built about 450 miles in Shantung province), and port development, however, were considerable, and annual deficits of over 10,000,000 M. were not uncommon. As it has turned out the verdict of history will undoubtedly be that it was not worth while for Germany to have fixed a new stain on the escutcheon of Western civilization for the sake of the Kiaochow lease. Germany’s move touched off similar moves by Russia, as mentioned above, England, and France. It increased nationalism and antiforeignism in China, and finally when World War I broke out Germany was unable to defend her naval base at Tsingtao.

6. The Carolines, the Marianas, and Palau

Causes. The acquisition of the naval base at Kiaochow merely whetted German appetite for more places in the sun, and the kaiser naturally turned toward the South Seas where substantial foundations for occupancy had already been laid. This region increasingly acquired strategic importance as the possibilities of Panama Canal construction became more likely, and when the Spanish-American War thrust the whole region into the limelight the kaiser again decided to go fishing in troubled waters.

Early relations. The islands on which his acquisitive glance rested were the Carolines, Marianas (Magellan’s “Ladrones”), and Palau.
Lying some 1500 miles north of Kaiser Wilhelmsland, these islands though discovered early in the 1500's had been pretty much neglected for three hundred years, except that in the late 1600's Spain gave them just enough attention to keep other nations out. In the third quarter of the nineteenth century traders, especially German, began to visit the islands in some numbers, so that in 1875 Spain definitely claimed them. The German government protested and went so far as to raise its flag on the island of Yap. Spain of course objected, and after some years of negotiations in 1885 the question was referred for arbitration to Pope Leo XIII. The Holy See decided that the islands always had belonged to Spain, that they were not devoid of ownership, and therefore that they should remain the property of Spain. Germany however was accorded trading rights.

**Purchase.** When the course of the Spanish-American War showed Spain's weakness Germany dallied with the thought of establishing a protectorate over the Philippines. Admiral von Diederichs was sent to Manila ostensibly to protect German lives but actually to grab a naval station if the estates of Spain were suddenly liquidated. Very shortly Germany learned that the United States had determined to keep the Philippines and that England supported her in that intention. Consequently Germany changed her tactics and proposed to the United States a colonial deal: Germany to obtain Samoa, the Carolines, and a naval station in the Philippines in return for German support of American occupancy. The kaiser's chief argument was that Germany should receive some reward for her "neutrality" during the war and her rejection of all opportunities to become the leader of European intervention to preserve the monarchical principle. President McKinley however did not feel any debt of gratitude, so Germany concentrated on Spain. On September 10, 1898, the kaiser secured a secret agreement giving him a lien on Kusaie, Ponape, and Yap of the Carolines in the event that the peace treaty between the United States and Spain so permitted. Negotiations continued throughout the winter and on February 12, 1899, all the islands except Yap in the Marianas were sold to Germany for 25,000,000 pesetas (US$4,200,000).

**Results.** With these new possessions Germany added to her colonial empire a host of small coral islets and lagoon islands with a total area of about 600 square miles and a population of perhaps 15,000 natives. Wholly without economic value, they served merely to give the kaiser naval stations and cable landings. Internationally they were a total loss, for although the kaiser did attempt to avoid difficulties and mis-
understandings with the United States as long as that course of action was compatible with the dignity of his empire, from 1898 on German diplomacy was suspect in Washington. Most important of all, the acquisition of these islands coupled with the Samoan episode already mentioned undoubtedly accentuated Anglo-German colonial rivalries and definitely incited Great Britain to attempt to block Germany in the Pacific.

7. German Colonial Policies

**Government.** The German colonies were officially known as *Schutzgebiete* or protectorates which in so far as they were directly controlled by the home government may be said to correspond to British crown colonies. The governors were all-powerful, but in Kiaochow and Samoa ruled through native advisory bodies and native officials. Kiaochow was controlled by the Admiralty; the other possessions were under the imperial foreign office, in which was developed a special colonial department.

**Native Welfare.** Previous to 1890 control of the natives was pretty much in the hands of the trading companies; then the government took over. In both cases the indigenous inhabitants were most cruelly treated and unjustly exploited. In 1907 however Bernhard Dernburg became the first secretary for the colonies and a new era was inaugurated. One of his first statements was, "The most valuable factor in our colonies is the native... He constitutes, in fact, our chief problem." Acting on this principle he so successfully established what was called "scientific colonization" that from 1908 to 1914 peace prevailed throughout the whole overseas empire and there was considerable economic and social progress. Civil administration replaced military officers. Education through governmental schools in Kiaochow and private missionary institutions in the South Seas made a rather remarkable development; in Samoa one third of the natives were reached by educational influence. Most important of all was the establishment of an efficient health service, and while the campaign of Robert Koch against tropical sickness in East Africa is the most famous, the work of his fellow doctors in New Guinea, Samoa, and Kiaochow is worthy of commendation.

**Conclusion.** World War I ended German empire building in the Pacific Area, and because of its brevity it is difficult to evaluate it. For its relative lack of success a ready explanation is to be found in the fact that Germany started colonizing activities after all the best areas
had been pre-empted. Furthermore, as a sort of *nouveau riche* member of international society she was afflicted with the usual *gaucheries* of the untutored. But she learned fast, and her colonial administration just previous to 1914 by no means deserved the bitter criticism which World War I propaganda generated.

Much of that criticism arose from the definite difference between the colonization under Bismarck and the *Weltpolitik* of William II's "New Course." Although in the late nineteenth century the objectives of German colonization were partly political, nevertheless the economic and religious factors were definitely important. Under the kaiser the chief objectives were prestige, a place in the sun, and the acquisition of regions which were primarily important for their political and strategic value. The later colonies in the Pacific Area were quite artificial — there was nothing natural about Germany's advance into Shantung — and in 1913 their maintenance cost the German government some 12,000,000 M. Just before the war under the leadership of
Colonial Secretary Dr. Bernhard Dernburg there was some progress, both economic and social, but it was not enough to justify the suffering that German imperialism caused the island population or the distrust of Europeans caused by German aggression in China.

In short, though for a while through the use of force the kaiser's imperialism was successful, it is clear today that like all the other European countries who used the mailed fist or even the well-gloved hand to further their colonial ambitions, in the long run their activities have been a detriment to mankind just to the extent that the hand was extended to exploit rather than to help.
The United States in the Pacific Area

Introduction. The previous chapter's account of German colonization completes the narration of European empire building in the Pacific Area. Nevertheless it is not yet possible to resume description of the modern struggle between East and West, for in the twentieth century the West of course includes America. For one more chapter, therefore, it is necessary to neglect the main trend of this book in order to describe very briefly the events which made the United States a leading factor in the Far East. This story has so many facets that it is difficult to know where to begin, but it seems safe to start by pointing out that America's direct relations with the East are almost as old as the nation itself; in a sense their origin may be traced to British imperial policies in the days before our independence. And yet, because United States colonization of noncontiguous and non-Anglo-Saxon areas did not gain momentum until 1898, the rise of American imperialism is commonly considered to be a twentieth century phenomenon. As a result of this combination of antiquity and modernity the establishment of our colonial empire in the Pacific Area has points of resemblance with the expansionist policies of each of the European nations. Just as in Germany, so in the United States, the commercial revolution followed the industrial revolution. In her attitude toward the "white man's burden" America resembles England, whereas in her colonial policy she has inclined toward the assimilationist ideals of France. The westward movement of the United States brought her boundaries to the Golden Gate in the same natural way that the minions of the tsar reached the Kamchatka peninsula. And as for Holland and the United States, if
one stops with a single similarity it is perhaps best to point out that
the Dutch regard for the elusive guilder in their colonization processes
is quite equaled by the Yankee respect for the power of the dollar.

1. THE GROWTH OF UNITED STATES INFLUENCE IN THE PACIFIC AREA

**Western expansion.** The influence of the United States in the Pacific
Area is the result of the westward movement which in the three quarters
of a century after the Declaration of Independence finally in 1850 made
California the "Golden State." The Civil War of course interrupted
this normal westward flow of population; but in 1867, shortly after
Appomattox, a "dastardly deed done in the dark" (so Seward's detrac-
tors labeled his diplomatic master-stroke) secured Alaska, and Midway
Island in the warmer waters of the central Pacific received the Stars and
Stripes. Two years later, after a decade of conflict with Indians, weather,
and politicians, the Union Pacific Railroad was joined to the Central
Pacific at Promontory Point, Utah, and the United States was truly
united. The dream of "manifest destiny" was fulfilled; that is, until
the beach at Waikiki should produce other visions.

**Early interest in the Pacific.** The extension of American territorial
aims beyond the mainland was perfectly natural. Before the Battle of
Bunker Hill New Englanders were pursuing "Moby Dicks" in the
farthest reaches of the North Seas, and when American traders discov-
ered that independence from Parliament meant also an exit from the
empire's customs walls, they sought to replace their lost commerce
with that of the South Seas and Cathay. After the War of 1812 Pacific
trade once more accelerated, and while Yankee clippers broke all trans-
portation records Congregational missionaries built in Hawaii the only
modern colony founded on the Ten Commandments.

**Japanese relations.** In the meantime the Asiatic coast was presenting
opportunities and difficulties. It was the second rather than the first that
brought "the great commodore" to Japan and resulted in the opening
of the mikado's kingdom to Western influences. The story of America's
part in the modernization of Japan has already been told; here it is de-
sired merely to reiterate that it was on the whole a successful venture
and that when finally the American flag began to wave within sailing
distance of Nippon Japanese reaction for a while was distinctly friendly.

**Chinese relations.** Relations with China however were difficult. It
has already been pointed out that in the opening of China the United
States followed in the wake of Great Britain and France, avoiding for
the most part the onus of having used force, but at the same time taking advantage of all "most-favored-nation" clauses. As a result in China Proper Americans managed for some years to preserve a fairly favorable status. This is the more remarkable because after the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 gave the Chinese rights of voluntary emigration to the United States the tendency here was toward more and more restriction. In 1879 only President Harrison's veto prevented the passage of an exclusion act, and in 1882 President Arthur was forced to accept a bill suspending Chinese immigration for ten years. A more drastic law came in 1888; the Geary Act of 1892 continued that of 1882 for another ten years; and in 1894 the Chinese government agreed to a treaty that meant continued exclusion. The reaction of the Middle Kingdom to America's Oriental immigration policy was naturally not too happy, and when the Boxers began to reverse "Sandlot Kearney's" keynote and to demand that the "Barbarians" go, Americans were included with all other foreigners.

Samoan relations. The last area with which the United States had relations in this period was Samoa. An account of the episode that brought the island of Tutuila (76 square miles, population in 1940 13,200) and its harbor Pago-Pago under the aegis of America has already been given. Commercially of little value, although Pago-Pago was an excellent coaling station, American Samoa's chief importance was that it definitely aroused the interest of United States citizens in overseas expansion and thereby helped to stimulate a twentieth century spirit of "manifest destiny" which in some respects may be likened to Kaiser Wilhelm's "New Course." This change was gradual and often is hardly noticed. In the beginning, relations of the United States in the Pacific Area were trade, pure and simple — the exchange of Western goods for those of the Orient. At first the use of force was avoided but by 1850 England's example began to have its effect, and our warships on the China coast gave tacit support to the Opium War, and at the point of a gun Perry opened Japan to Western commerce.

For the next three decades the American people showed their unwillingness to acquire noncontiguous colonies — witness our abstention in the Caribbean and toward the annexation of Hawaii — but in the 1880's the tide turned. The United States acquired a navy and with it the desire for coaling stations. The American nation saw European countries get prestige from their empires. The result was that although we had no economic need for overseas possessions the glamor of imperialism got the better of our good sense and economics gave way to politics.
2. The Annexation of Hawaii

Relations, 1850-1876. Modern United States expansion into the Pacific begins where that of the last century left off, for the greatest step toward the annexation of Hawaii was the acquisition of California. During the latter's Mexican period the archipelago was closer to California than was the United States, and it was not uncommon for wealthy Anglo-Californians to send their children to the excellent schools of the islands. This relationship became ever closer in the gold rush era, when thanks to the lack of labor in the mining area dirty linen was often sent to the laundries of the mid-Pacific kingdom. During the period of Walker's filibustering expeditions to Mexico and Central America the Hawaiians rightly wondered if they too might not be the object of such an attack. In 1853 proposals for annexation were numerous, but they got no further than a reciprocity treaty that was turned down by the United States Senate chiefly because of the Louisiana sugar growers' opposition. After the Civil War, in 1867, reciprocity was again refused the Hawaiians, not so much because of Southern opposition as because of fear that import revenues would be lost and that it would be a step toward annexation. President Grant would undoubtedly have been willing to take more than a step, because he had a horror of having outposts like Hawaii in the hands of those who might sometime use them to the disadvantage of the United States. In 1875 this policy was embodied in a treaty of commercial reciprocity which provided that no part of the territory of the Hawaiian Islands should be leased or disposed of to any third power and that none of the privileges granted by the treaty to the United States should be conferred on other nations.

Effects of reciprocity. This treaty went into effect on September 9, 1876, and opened an era of unprecedented prosperity for Hawaii. Particularly was this so for sugar growing, which, following the successive ups and downs of fur trading, sandalwooding, and whaling, now became the chief industry. In fifteen years the annual sugar export increased from 25,000,000 pounds to 250,000,000 pounds. It enriched the American colony, many members of which were descendants of the missionaries and early traders, but the effect on the native Hawaiians was very different. The impact of Western civilization (at least its alcoholism, venereal disease, and smallpox) had already decreased the number of the indigenes from about 200,000 in 1800 to 65,000 in 1860, and by 1890 they were fewer than 40,000. For laborers the planters
Cattle were early imported to Hawaii from Mexican California. Cowboys' equipment is still similar to that of American "vaqueros."

turned to Chinese and then to Portuguese. When these proved too expensive, Japanese were sought. The result was that by 1890 Hawaii was an archipelago ruled by white traders and planters on a basis of immigrant Oriental labor.

Permanent reciprocity. By the terms of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1876 its abrogation could be brought about by action of either the United States or Hawaii at any time after September 9, 1883, provided either country gave twelve months' notice to the other. Hawaii of course wanted the continuance of the treaty, but in the United States
there was a considerable movement for its termination. American sugar growers naturally opposed reciprocity, and were able to obtain support on the grounds that it cost the government a large amount through loss of import duties and also that the industry in Hawaii was dependent on a scandalous Oriental contract labor system. As a result it was only by agreeing that the United States be given the "exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River, in the Island of Oahu, and to establish and to maintain there a coaling and repair station for the use of vessels of the United States" that the Hawaiian government secured in 1884 a further extension for seven years.

Foreign jealousy. America's exclusive right to a fortified naval base hard by Honolulu, the matchless harbor of the mid-Pacific, was naturally not appreciated by either England or France. The early efforts of those two countries to secure a foothold in the islands have already been told. The Reciprocity Treaty of 1876 was a blow to British hopes, for in 1873 Hawaii sent more than a third of its sugar to Australia, New Zealand, and British Columbia; and it was reported that the whole crop of 1875-1876 would have been sent to these places but for the treaty. Its renewal in 1884 was a second British disappointment, for when in 1881 King Kalakaua made his trip around the world England gave him a great reception at London and for his coronation on February 12, 1883, the British dispatched a warship to Honolulu. When Pearl Harbor was granted to the United States the English protested, but in vain, for Mr. Blaine's declaration during Garfield's administration to the effect that the islands were a part of the "American System" to which the Monroe Doctrine was applicable really represented the American thought of the period. In 1886 England tried to lend the Hawaiian government $2,000,000 for which the customs revenues would be hypothecated, but because of American opposition the deal was not consummated. The last effort of England to prevent the inevitable came in 1887 when the United States was proposing a tripartite protection of Samoan independence. At that time Britain countered by suggesting a joint declaration guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of the Hawaiian Islands, but Secretary Bayard, in Cleveland's first administration, very quietly sidestepped the overture.

The reign of Kalakaua, 1874-1891. Any other course than that which Secretary Bayard took would have been unthinkable, especially at the very time when the Hawaiian Revolution of 1887 showed that American influence in the islands was definitely dominant. This uprising grew out of a political struggle that really began on February 13, 1874, when
King Kalakaua had delusions of grandeur and dreamed of establishing a Polynesian empire. Coupled with this megalomania was the harmful influence of an American renegade, Walter Murray Gibson; the result was evil compounded and the determination of the foreign colony to get good government for the Hawaiian Islands. Before anything could be done, the king died (1891) at San Francisco, where he had been recovering from the effects of his debaucheries. It was left to his sister Queen Liliuokalani to witness the annexation of her brother's kingdom by the United States.

Kalakaua was elected king. Despite the fact that he owed his election very largely to American support, when he obtained his office he adopted the idea that the king had the absolute right to rule as he saw fit. Since the 1864 Constitution of Kamehameha V left the way open for the king to do about as he pleased, he had all the best of it in a fight which soon developed with the proponents of "responsible government."
Queen Lilinokalani, the last of Hawaii's native rulers, is still remembered for her musical contributions, especially "Aloha Oe." Desirous of maintaining Hawaii for the Hawaiians, she ran afoul of America's "Manifest Destiny" and in 1898 lost her tottering throne.

When he made his trip around the world he was shown so much attention that his head was turned; his coronation was an extravagant combination of the customs of European royalty and of the ancient Hawaiian chiefs. In his megalomania he was encouraged by Walter Murray Gibson, who was premier from 1882 to 1887. Gibson was a Mormon missionary who started out to colonize the East Indies. When he was expelled from Batavia in 1861 he came to Hawaii, and three years later, on being dropped from the rolls of the Church of the Latter Day Saints, he became a Protestant; he finally ended up a Roman Catholic. As
early as 1873 he was a partisan of Kalakaua, and since he was thoroughly in sympathy with the king's views and also fairly unscrupulous in his methods, he became the power behind the throne. Under Gibson's leadership evils and abuses became rampant. The sale of alcoholic liquor to Hawaiians was made legal. The leprosy question was handled loosely. The public debt increased (from $355,000 in 1874 to $2,600,000 in 1890) with such foolish acts as an expedition to Samoa in 1886-1887 to attach that archipelago to the "empire" of Kalakaua. Finally when Gibson systematically tried to stir up among the Hawaiians hatred against the foreigners, a secret political organization was formed called the "Hawaiian League." Its members provided themselves with arms; and on June 30, 1887, when scandals in connection with granting an opium license became public, a mass meeting adopted resolutions calling for the dismissal of Gibson and changes in the constitution. With little delay the king yielded, and on July 7, 1887, a revision went into effect that established responsible government and enabled the foreigners to have control of the legislature. The king however did not give up the fight, and both by revolution and through political action sought to get back his lost power. Revolution failed, although scarcely a year passed from 1887 to 1895 without an uprising of some sort, the most famous failure being that of Robert W. Wilcox in 1889. Political action was more productive, and in June 1890 the reform party lost control of the legislature.

Queen Liliuokalani, 1891-1893. The king however did not enjoy the fruits of his victory, for on January 20, 1891, while on a recuperative visit to San Francisco, Kalakaua died. His place was taken by his sister, Princess Liliuokalani, who for many years had been prominent in the social life of the kingdom. She was a poet and a musician; her song "Aloha Oe," of which she wrote both the words and music, is the best known of her more than a hundred compositions. In 1887 she had attended the Golden Jubilee of Queen Victoria, at which time she is reported to have said that (thanks to early Hawaiian cannibalism) she too had English blood in her veins. Her political ideas were similar to those of her royal brother, but she had more strength and tenacity than he and was opposed to both the Pearl Harbor clause of the 1884 Treaty and to the "bayonet" constitution of 1887. Accordingly she threw all her influence against any constitutional limitation of her power. In the early part of January 1893, while some of her opponents were absent from the legislature, she succeeded in having passed an opium license bill, a lottery franchise bill, and a resolution of noncon-
confidence in the cabinet, which she disliked. On January 14, 1892, she prorogued the legislature and it was reported that in the afternoon she planned to proclaim a new constitution similar to that of 1864. When the news of her action got out, some of the members of the Hawaiian League of 1887 organized a committee of safety of thirteen members which in turn called a mass meeting for Monday afternoon, January 16. Participants in the meeting were largely white residents of Hawaii who owned some two thirds of the island real estate and wanted protection for their lives, property, and liberties against capricious native government. The sugar interests seem to have been divided; some were opposed to annexation because they feared they would lose their contract laborers; those in favor wanted to get inside the United States tariff walls. After some discussion the Committee of Safety decided to set up a temporary government, and to apply for admission into the United States.

Successful revolution. This revolt was similar to the Texan Revolt of 1836 in that it had the object of annexation to the United States, but it was bloodless and unlike the Texan Revolt it was connived at by the United States government. The American Secretary of State was previously informed of the substance of the plans, and he left a wide range of discretion to the American minister, John L. Stevens. The latter, who was an ardent advocate of annexation, asked for marines from the United States cruiser Boston; and when on Tuesday, January 17, a provisional government secured the surrender of the queen, the cabinet, the police and the royal military force, Stevens ran up the American flag in protection of the new de facto régime. "The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe," he wrote to the Department of State, "and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it."

Cleveland and Queen "Lil." The committee of Honolulu businessmen who under the direction of Judge Sanford B. Dole formed the provisional government, "to exist until terms of union with the United States could be negotiated," immediately sent a diplomatic commission to Washington. Here on February 7, 1893, they signed a treaty of annexation with Secretary of State John W. Foster. The United States Senate, however, felt it improper to ratify the treaty until the newly re-elected Grover Cleveland had had a chance to express his ideas. Soon after his inauguration the Democratic president sent James H. Blount to pull down the American flag and to uncover the relationship of Stevens to the revolution. Convinced that American troops had improperly connived in a sinister plot, he sent a new minister, A. S. Willis, to put Queen "Lil"
back on the throne provided she granted amnesty to the revolutionists. This she would not do. Dole and his friends, in turn, would not step out, and since Cleveland dared not use force in behalf of the queen the impasse continued.

Annexation. In view of the fact that annexation was impossible as long as Cleveland was in office, Dole and his associates on July 4, 1894, proclaimed a constitution for the Republic of Hawaii. Shortly the new government was recognized by all the leading nations of the world, and early in 1895, after the failure of an abortive revolution in her behalf by that arch-conspirator Wilcox, the queen formally abdicated. The following year the Hawaiian annexation issue played some slight part in the presidential campaign; therefore soon after McKinley took office annexation negotiations again began. Immediately Japan protested on the ground that annexation would jeopardize the rights of the 25,000 Japanese residents in the islands. But after Hawaii paid Japan $75,000 indemnity for exclusion of a thousand Japanese early in 1897, Japan withdrew her protest. Even then it was impossible for the president to get a two-thirds majority in the Senate in favor of the treaty, so in March 1898 he resorted to the precedent of Texas and urged annexation by joint resolution. Here too he failed despite a very considerable campaign for annexation on the part of the "big navy" advocates (Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, and Lodge), and Republican politicians who saw that voters were becoming increasingly receptive to imperialistic ideology, missionaries, and the Hawaiian sugar lobby. Then the Spanish-American War broke out. Impelled by the rushing events of the war and especially by Dewey's actions in the Philippine Islands, Congress at last caught up with McKinley and marched down the historic road of American expansion in the Pacific. On July 7, 1898, a joint resolution of annexation was signed and the islands were formally transferred to the United States on August 12, 1898.

3. The Acquisition of the Philippines

Pre-1898 History. The Philippine Islands, which as stated above helped to cause the annexation of Hawaii, were discovered in 1521 by Magellan, a Portuguese in command of a Spanish expedition. After having been neglected for nearly half a century they were finally conquered in the years 1565 to 1572 by Miguel López de Legazpi. Then followed three centuries of unimportant colonial history during which Spain had scant success at Hispanicizing the Malay and Moro indigenes.
In the field of transportation the Philippine Islands have long been ahead of the other Asiatic countries. Instead of a coolie-bailed ricksha the Filipino has a donkey-drawn cart.

The chief excitement during this period was the conquest and temporary occupation of the islands by the British in the years 1762 to 1764.

Colonial discontent. Beginning with about 1825 the more enlightened natives began to resent the increased wealth of many of the religious orders, especially when they saw that perhaps half the best land was falling into the "dead hand" of the Church. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century this discontent became articulate in the writings of José Rizal (1861–1896), whose Noli Me Tangere turned out to be a veritable Filipino Uncle Tom's Cabin. In 1890 he organized a Liga Filipina to further the interests of his countrymen, and about the same time was formed the Katipunan, a secret society which aimed to cast off both the political and religious control of the Spanish. In August 1896 an armed uprising started which, despite the death of Rizal at the hands of the Spaniards, lasted until February of the following year. By this time the Cuban situation had become so difficult that Spain decided to secure peace at any cost. On December 12, 1897, was signed the Treaty
of Biacabato by which the governor-general gave the twenty-eight most important Filipino leaders, of whom Emilio Aguinaldo was the chief, 400,000 pesos as a reward for leaving the islands. Payment of an equal sum was to follow on their departure, while a meager 200,000 pesos was to be distributed among the nonexiled insurrectos. After the revolutionary committee reached Hong Kong it blamed the nonreceipt of the second 400,000 pesos on Aguinaldo, and on April 5, 1898, the latter with 50,000 pesos sailed for Europe. He got as far as Singapore when he heard the news that was to change the course of his and all other Filipino lives.

**Dewey.** This news was none other than that the United States was at war with Spain. Aguinaldo returned to Hong Kong, where he learned of the destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay by Commodore George F. Dewey. The latter, through the foresight of Theodore Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, had been given the command of a well-appointed Pacific squadron located at Hong Kong with orders, once war broke out, to proceed immediately to Manila. This he did, and on May 1, 1898, totally destroyed a small Spanish squadron. Before sailing from Hong Kong Dewey had become acquainted with Aguinaldo, and while he was blockading the city of Manila the American commander invited the *insurrecto* chief and his followers to return and help undermine Spanish authority. At no time did Dewey promise independence, but apparently Aguinaldo thought it was to come with Spanish defeat; so after his arrival on May 19 he enthusiastically rallied the natives to the American cause. With the coming of reinforcements from San Francisco the Americans on August 13, 1898, secured the surrender of Manila. Much to his disgust Aguinaldo was not permitted to enter the capital (nor to plunder it), so in September he organized the "Visayan Republic" and prepared himself to take over when the Americans should leave.

**McKinley.** Unfortunately for the United States the Americans did not leave Manila. Victory there even more than in Cuba made the American people suddenly become empire-minded. Even though most of them did not know who or what a Filipino might be, they got out the family atlases, and after reading congressional speeches came to realize that even though the United States at the beginning of the war had pledged its word not to annex Cuba, no such self-denial had been promised with respect to the Philippines. After peace was declared on August 12, 1898, the president found himself in a quandary, for, as he said,
When next I realized that the Philippines had dropped into our laps I confess I did not know what to do with them. I sought counsel from all sides — Democrats as well as Republicans — but got little help. I thought first that we would take only Manila; then Luzon; then other islands, perhaps, also. I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way — I don’t know how it came: (1) that we could not give them back to Spain — that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany — our commercial rivals in the Orient — that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves — they were unfit for self-government — and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain’s was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize them and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could for them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ also died.

American desire to keep the islands continued to grow, and when the American delegation to the peace conference arrived in Paris it carried the president’s instructions not to “accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzón.” For over two months the question of the disposal of the archipelago was discussed, and when the treaty was signed on December 10, 1898, the United States kept all the islands and compensated Spain to the extent of $20,000,000. Two months later the Senate ratified the treaty.

Aguinaldo’s revolution. The news of the Senate’s action finally confirmed the worst fears of the Filipino leaders, who had been hoping against hope that the islands might be given their independence. They had abortively proclaimed it on June 12, 1898, and on September 29, 1898, they had “established” the “Philippine Republic.” On January 23, 1899, a Constitución which few could read and fewer still could understand was announced, and two weeks later (February 4, 1899) in the hope that news of warfare might prevent the ratification of the annexation treaty they opened fire on American troops near Manila. On March 31, 1901, after two years of warfare which cost the United States over 1000 lives and $170,000, Aguinaldo was finally captured, and by June 1902 the Filipinos everywhere had accepted American overlordship.

4. The Acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone

The last pre-World War I acquisition of the United States was the Panama Canal Zone. Discussions of a trans-isthmian canal began as
early as the reign of Charles V of Spain, but little serious thought was
given to the project previous to gold discoveries in California. Then
both the United States and Great Britain became interested; the task
however was too stupendous for either one alone and they contented
themselves with an agreement — the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty — which
provided for the neutralization of any canal which either might build.
American engineers nevertheless continued to make surveys.

*De Lesseps.* In 1878, following the successful completion of the
Suez Canal, Ferdinand de Lesseps secured a concession from Colombia
to build a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. After twelve years of extravagance (his engineers used more champagne than oil), corruption, and vain attempts to conquer the yellow and malaria fevers he went bankrupt. From the wreckage of his organization the New French Canal Company was formed; it did no digging and spent its time in a search for someone who would buy the assets of the old company.

The Hay-Herrán Treaty. Then came the Spanish-American War and it was clear that the United States needed either a two-ocean navy or an isthmian canal. A commission was appointed which recommended the Panama route provided the French assets could be secured for $40,000,000; otherwise the Nicaragua route was considered superior. The New French Canal Company quickly saw the light; it accepted $40,000,000 for its assets and in January 1903 the Hay-Herrán Treaty was negotiated. By it Colombia gave the United States a hundred years' lease of a strip of land ten kilometers wide across the isthmus; the United States in turn was to pay $10,000,000 down and a yearly rental of $250,000. The United States Senate for once ratified a treaty with a modicum of discussion — the French representative, Felipe Bunau-Varilla, saw that the skids were properly greased — but much to the surprise of everyone the Colombian Congress refused its assent. The reasons given for their action were (1) that the price was not big enough, and (2) that such sale of territory was contrary to the constitution of the Colombian Republic. The real reason seems to have been that Colombia wanted to delay the transaction till 1910 when the French company's concession would expire and thus the $40,000,000 which the United States proposed to pay the company would go to Colombia. Also there is little doubt that the Colombian president realized that $10,000,000 in his treasury would be enough cause for an attempt on the part of the “outs” to get “in”; a revolution would certainly take place if the treaty were signed.

The Panama revolt. President Roosevelt himself was completely devoid of the mañana spirit and the Panamanians very shortly realized that if they did not want to lose their chance for prosperity by letting the United States government turn to the Nicaragua route they had better do something. Revolutions of course were an old story to Panama; that area had been in and out of Colombia several times, for the Bogotá políticos had always looked on Panama as a sort of milch cow. Accordingly a group of Panamanians who probably were stockholders in the New French Canal Company and who were assured that the American government would send war vessels to "protect life and
property" proclaimed the independence of Panama and its establishment as a republic. United States naval forces allowed Colombian army officers to cross from Colon to Panama, but they could accomplish little since the judicious distribution of a few pesos among the noncoms and petty officers convinced the soldiers that it was better to remain on the Atlantic side. On November 6 the American government recognized the new republic, and on November 18 Panama's representative — queer as it may seem he was none other than Felipe Bunau-Varilla — signed a treaty similar to the Hay-Herrán Agreement except that (1) the Canal Zone was made ten miles wide, (2) the United States' lease was in perpetuity, (3) the American government agreed to guarantee the independence of Panama, and (4) the cities of Panama and Colon were not to be part of the Canal Zone.

Results of the Panama episode. Work on the canal began immediately, and was completed in 1914 at a cost, including fortifications, of some $400,000,000, a sum well within the amount budgeted. As an engineering feat it stands a monument to United States engineering and medical skills; the latter was most important, for without the eradication of the yellow fever and malaria mosquitoes the canal might never have been built. Its economic importance can hardly be overestimated, for it changed many of the world's trade routes.

From the standpoint of international equity however the Panama Canal episode leaves much to be desired. It is true that Theodore Roosevelt gaily boasted, "I took Panama," and then left to his secretary of state the task of justifying his act. But many citizens of the United States still feel that despite a gratuity of $25,000,000 paid to Colombia during the Harding administration, the small republic was not properly compensated. In addition the episode caused many Latin Americans to feel that Uncle Sam was certainly a "Coloso del Norte," and not till another Roosevelt promulgated his "Good Neighbor Policy" was the stain on the United States' national honor somewhat obliterated.

5. Colonial Policies

A. Minor Dependencies

Guam and Samoa. The conquest of the Philippine Islands was the high point in American colonial advance. By that time the American people had come to realize that the acquisition of noncontiguous areas inhabited by natives of other than European stock meant that the
processes of colonization laid down in the famous Northwest Ordinance of 1787 had to be abandoned for America's possessions in the Pacific Ocean. Especially was this true in the case of Guam (206 square miles), obtained from Spain along with the Philippines, and of American Samoa (76 square miles), acquired as the result of the negotiations with Great Britain and Germany in November 1899. Guam was inhabited by Chamorros, a mixed race with the Malay strain predominating; Samoa by Polynesians. Since the chief importance of both dependencies lay in their strategic location they were turned over to the Navy Department. Its administration has been fairly successful. In Guam illiteracy has been cut down to less than 20 per cent, while the birth rate has increased; the population in 1941 was 23,000, and more than half the inhabitants over ten years of age speak English. In Samoa, thanks to the long-continued work of missionaries, the natives had developed their own civilization and language and though only a few (less than 10 per cent) of the 13,000 inhabitants speak English, they are better than 96 per cent literate.

The Canal Zone. A third dependency which must be mentioned is the Panama Canal Zone, with an area of 550 square miles, a civil population in 1930 of 28,000, and a military establishment numbering 10,000. Since the civilians are about 43 per cent white and 56.5 per cent West Indian Negroes, American institutions have easily prevailed. Because of the Zone's strategic importance, it is ruled under the War Department by a governor appointed by the president for a four-year term.

B. Alaska

Government. When Alaska was acquired the value of its 586,000 square miles was not fully appreciated (although much more so than historians have been accustomed to state). Of its 30,000 inhabitants about 70 per cent were Eskimos. Today the population is about 72,500, with less than 60 per cent natives. Because of its scanty population Alaska was given no fully organized government until 1912. Since that time it has had a regular territorial form of government with a governor, a bicameral legislature, and a complete judiciary system. Much of the actual work of administering the territory is carried on through the federal departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and the Interior. Because of its distance from Washington—3000 miles—these departments keep ex officio commissioners in Alaska who are empowered to make decisions without referring matters to the home offices.
Stripping top soil or muck to reach gold-bearing gravel at Fairbanks, Alaska. "Seward's Folly" has paid many times over its purchase price.

Statehood. Despite these efforts to facilitate administration, many of the 39,000 whites in Alaska feel that they would be better off if they were given statehood, and in recent years there has been some agitation along that line. Opposition to such an idea is obvious — isolation,
small white population, large percentage of unassimilable natives, and expense—but perhaps the greatest hostility comes from military circles. The strategic importance of the Aleutian Islands was demonstrated in World War II, and the War and Navy departments still feel that they are freer to handle problems of defense with Alaska in its present status. Certain it is that both whites and Eskimos have been well governed with Alaska as a territory, and it may be doubted whether statehood would add any great benefit. There are of course many Alaskans who resent the influence of the armed forces and would like the democratic government which can come only with statehood.

C. Hawaii

Government. Hawaii (6400 square miles) had a population of about 150,000 when it was annexed to the United States. Its long experience in independent self-government made it immediately eligible for territorial status. Under the Organic Act of 1900, as amended in 1910, the United States Constitution and most of the federal laws are applicable to the territory, for like Alaska the Hawaiian Islands form an "incorporated" territory where all constitutional provisions and limitations apply. Like Alaska the territory has a governor, a bicameral legislature, a judiciary, and a territorial delegate to Congress. In practice Congress has exercised a "hands off" policy as regards acts passed by the Hawaiian legislature, and the islands have had a considerable degree of self-government.

Statehood. Perhaps for that very reason in recent years agitation for statehood has been fairly strong in Hawaii. Thus far the only important opposition seems to be based on the constant increase of the Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino population which is really making Hawaii an outpost of the Orient. Despite the fact that Chinese immigration stopped with annexation and Japanese with the American Exclusion Act of 1924, in 1940 Hawaii's 423,300 population had a distinctly Asiatic character. Thirty per cent were Japanese, 8 per cent Chinese, and 17 per cent Filipinos. Moreover the Japanese had by far the highest survival rate (35.03) and clung with great determination to their separate language, schools, and communal life. Accordingly before World War II there was fear that as the younger generation of Orientals grew up its representation in the voting population would increase greatly and in time might dominate the elections. But Hawaiian loyalty after Pearl Harbor was 100 per cent; and today it seems fairly clear that this motley and picturesque gathering of Japanese, Filipinos, Koreans,
Hawaiians, Portuguese, Spaniards, Puerto Ricans, and Americans can be welded into a unified and loyal American citizenry capable and worthy of statehood.

D. The Philippines

A "White Man's burden." The development of a colonial policy for Samoa, Guam, the Canal Zone, Alaska, and Hawaii were not difficult, but when the United States took over the 7000 islands of the Philippine Archipelago, an area of 114,400 square miles and a population of about 16,900,000, she saddled herself with a colonization problem to which the answer has not yet been found. The first difficulty arose out of the fact that the people of the United States were not unanimously in favor of acquiring the Philippines. Many of them doubted both the good sense and the good poetry of Kipling's admonition:

Take up the White Man's burden —
Send forth the best ye breed —
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need;
To wait in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild —
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half-devil and half-child.¹

Nevertheless, as time went on and despite the fact that the Filipinos demonstrated a lamentably deficient sense of gratitude to those who had freed them from the tyranny of Spain, the majority of Americans came to approve of President McKinley's reasoning processes and were glad to have the United States assume the white man's burden in the Philippines.

Type of government. The second problem was to determine the best type of government for the new wards of the American people. Until 1901 the islands had a military government under the military authority of the president, but the chief factor in the administration was a commission made up of five prominent Americans. Under it remarkable progress was made in commerce, sanitation, and education. A second commission appointed in April 1900 carried on further preparations for civil government, and in 1901 William Howard Taft became the first civil governor of the Philippine Islands. Until 1907 the Philippine commission, with three of the nine members Filipinos, was the sole legislative authority. From 1907 to 1913 this authority was divided

between a popularly elected lower house and the commission, still dominated by an American majority, which acted as an upper house. In 1913 the Filipinos were given five members of the commission. Finally in 1916 the Jones Act abolished the commission and substituted a popularly elected senate. The act also extended to the Philippines the territorial form of government and most of the guaranties of the Bill of Rights, although some parts, such as trial by jury, did not apply, since the islands were an "unincorporated territory" and the Filipinos were merely citizens of the Philippines subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

The fight for independence. This jurisdiction of the United States from the beginning of American occupation always rankled in the hearts of the Filipino politicians. As a result they never seemed to recognize the good effects of American domination, and their constant agitation for independence gave the United States a third problem to solve. It was the more difficult because under the direction of American authorities the islands did make surprising progress. In thirty years the population almost doubled, the number of children in schools increased from fewer than 5,000 to more than 1,000,000, and the death rate dropped from 30.5 per thousand to 20 per thousand. Since economic, educational, and social progress did not satisfy the políticos, the abovementioned Jones Act in 1916 gave the islands almost complete self-government, and in its preamble promised that the United States would get out of the Philippines as soon as the latter should have achieved "stable government." From 1916 to 1921 the abuses made possible by the almost complete Filipinization of the administration under Governor Harrison showed that a "stable" government was far in the future. So much of the good accomplished by the Americans during this "wrecking" period was eliminated that Leonard Wood in his term as governor-general was confronted by a herculean cleanup task. His efficiency so trod on the toes of Filipino and American grafters alike that Manuel Quezón, who for two decades before the establishment of the commonwealth was the most active of the two Philippine resident commissioners at Washington, kept up an unremitting fight for "immediate, absolute, and complete independence." Whether he really wanted independencia seems doubtful. Most of his constituents thought it meant low taxes and little work. It seems more likely that he used it as a campaign slogan to help him build up his own political machine. Certain it is that his influence defeated Filipino approval of the Hawes-Cutting Act of 1932 by which the United States granted the islands a dominion status which
Drying fish nets in the Philippines. The man on the left wears a western hat and Hollywood dark glasses, while the fisherman in the center is satisfied with a Chinese straw hat and a bamboo pail.

In the Philippine Islands coconut harvesting goes on the year round and makes possible large-scale export of copra.
in turn was to lead to complete independence at the end of ten years. The American proponents of independence, however, were adamant. Filipino sugar, copra, and coconut oil competed with America’s depression-priced sugar, dairy products, and cotton-seed oil to such an extent that the thirty-year independence campaign at last had an appeal both to the practical and to the altruistic. The combination was unbeatable. In 1934 the Tydings-McDuffie Bill was forced upon Quezón, and on November 15, 1935, he became the first president of the Philippine Commonwealth. All went well for two years, and the Filipinos hopefully made plans for independence in 1945. Then in 1937 came the Japanese “undeclared” war on China, and when after Pearl Harbor Japan’s prowess was brutally manifested the sober thinkers of the islands began to wonder if independencia ever would come. But come it did, on July 4, 1946. Today the Philippines have their independence, but Uncle Sam still does not know whether he has really given up “the white man’s burden.”

**Conclusion: Desirable colonization.** Whether the Philippine Islands will be able to make the most of their recently won independence is still an open question, but the granting of it has had the very desirable effect of causing the United States to reconsider the value of its venture into the Far East. Alaska, Hawaii, and American Samoa form an arc in the mid-Pacific to which American expansion was perfectly natural. In these areas American influence was welcomed, and a policy of assimilation was so easy that all of them have presented a minimum of colonization difficulties. Furthermore they like the Canal Zone are strategic outposts whose possession by another nation would be distinctly disadvantageous to the United States; and in their acquisition this country did not depart from either of its two cherished policies, the doctrine of isolation and the Monroe Doctrine.

**The Great Aberration.** The entrance of the United States into the Philippine Archipelago, however, has turned out to be highly questionable; in fact many Americans will agree with Samuel F. Bemis that it may very properly be called “The Great Aberration.” Unlike the other Pacific colonies the Philippines were acquired by conquest; neither Spain nor the Filipinos welcomed the transfer of the islands. Once they were in the possession of the United States the latter was forced by its humanitarian instincts to attempt assimilation. This resulted in the islands having the highest scale of living of any Oriental people; but at the same time, since it was largely artificial and has been dependent upon the archipelago remaining within the American customs
walls, the United States finds itself faced by the fact that the departure of the American flag may mean the downfall of the present Filipino civilization. Accordingly some Americans consider the granting of independence to be a blameworthy "scuttle policy."

The Philippines and the open door policy. A second difficulty resulting from America's seizure of the Philippines arose from the connection between United States occupation of the islands and the open door policy. One argument advanced in 1898 in favor of an expansionist policy was that the islands would provide a good base from which the United States could counter Europe's successful "battle of the conces-

*In the third quarter of the nineteenth century it began to be apparent that Ivan and Uncle Sam were two young giants reaching for the Pacific Islands from opposite directions.*
sions" in China and advance her own interests in eastern Asia. Accordingly once the islands were acquired the United States was encouraged to advance the open door policy, a policy well suited to American interests but for the enforcement of which in the decade before World War I it was not prepared. After that war the United States quixotically reduced her armaments, only to find in the 1930's that the "open door" in China was so full of Japanese that without the use of force American concerns were going to be shut out of Chinese trade. American feeling has always been against using force anywhere, and hence in the great depression decade it seemed that the United States was going to see one of its most favored international policies relapse into innocuous desuetude. From that loss of face America was rescued by its prompt acceptance of the Pearl Harbor challenge, but it is to be noted that while the Japanese threat to the open door policy has been obviated that of the Soviet Union daily becomes more virulent.

The third difficulty that arose from McKinley's "great mistake" lies in the field of military strategy. Without the Philippines and Guam America's Pacific possessions are a military asset, but with them, as was shown in World War II, America's western front is vulnerable to attack by any strong eastern Asiatic power. It is probable indeed that even if before Pearl Harbor the United States had put the "scuttle policy" into effect and had pulled down the Stars and Stripes, the appearance of the Rising Sun in Manila would have forced the United States into war with Japan. Today, thanks to Guadalcanal and the long chain of subsequent American victories, the Filipinos are able to start their career of independence free of all Nipponese aggression. But the shadow of the Russian bear hangs over eastern Asia, and it remains to be seen whether in the event of a new threat to the independence of our "little brown brothers" the United States may not again suffer the consequences of its "great aberration."
China Rebels Against Western Domination

Introduction. The account in the previous chapter of America’s entry into the Far East ends our summary of the Western nations’ imperialism in the Orient. Now we must turn to the Asiatic countries themselves to consider how they reacted to this imperialism.

China felt very keenly the Far Eastern expansion of Europe. The fruits of the opium wars were fully realized in the decade of the 1890’s. Foreign invasion, the breaking down of her vaunted isolation, civil war, inept leadership, and the growth of imperialistic fervor among Western nations led China rapidly down the road toward collapse and revolution. Her inability to defend herself against aggression — demonstrated again in her war with Japan — paved the way for a scramble for power, in which foreign nations struggled with each other and with China for “concessions” and “spheres of influence.” After 1895 the China coast was divided by the Western powers into mutually exclusive spheres of economic activity. Quite naturally China’s leaders attempted to stem the tide, first by recourse to Japan’s method — reform and alteration of the nation’s internal structure — then when this failed by open rebellion against the “foreign devils.”

The failure of both methods accelerated China’s hurtling descent toward chaos. It is the purpose of this chapter to describe the foreign aggression of the 1890’s, China’s vain attempt at reform, and finally her open battle with the foreigners.
1. The Battle for the Concessions

France. Gradually China lost her outlying possessions. Tibet, Formosa, the Ryukyus were already gone, and now after the opium wars foreign aggression along the China coast took the form of new demands for outright concessions of land or property. These intrusions, commonly called "the battle for the concessions," started by France in 1895, were an outcome of her participation in the three-power intervention which as noted above forced Japan to give up the Liaotung peninsula, one of the spoils of the Sino-Japanese War. France felt that she should be repaid for her aid to China in this matter, and two months later on June 10, 1895, she demanded an adjustment of her Tonkin boundary which amounted to an addition to her territorial holdings in Indo-China and a commercial treaty that gave her mining rights in Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwantung, and railroad privileges in southern China. Three years later France obtained a ninety-nine-year lease on Kwangchow Bay.

Russia. Russia immediately followed her example. Russia's first demands were moderate; she requested and secured the right to guarantee a loan to China through the Russo-Chinese Bank, a concern actually financed by French and Belgian bankers. Her designs of course went much deeper, for obviously she could not be expected to profit much from a loan guarantee, and since she was not essentially a creditor nation her objectives were bound to be in fields other than finance. As it turned out the Russo-Chinese Bank was utilized indirectly to further Russian economic intervention in Manchuria. In 1896 at Moscow Nicholas II was crowned tsar of Russia. Attending the pageant, as representative from China, was Li Hung-chang, still embittered over the recent drubbing Japan had given his nation and determined to seize upon any opportunity for redress. As already related, his chance came at the coronation ceremonies when Witte, Russian Minister of Finance, asked Li if China would be willing to permit Russia to build a railroad across Manchuria. A glance at the map will show why Witte's request was made. Russia had originally planned that the Trans-Siberian Railroad chartered in 1891 should follow the Amur and Ussuri rivers to Vladivostok. Surveys soon showed however that if the right of way could be located in Manchuria the route would be shortened by more than 300 miles. Previous to her defeat by Japan, China would not have listened to any such suggestion, but now Li was ready to enter into friendly relations with any nation which might support China against
her island enemy. Russia was in a specially good position to do this, considering her competition with Japan over Korea. In view of Russia’s previously expressed attitude concerning Japan’s occupation of Manchuria, Li was fairly sure that in case of further friction between Peking and Tokyo, Russia could be induced to stand firmly by the dragon throne. The upshot of the Moscow conversations was the organization of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, a subsidiary of the Russo-Chinese Bank, and the signing of a treaty providing that Russia would protect China against any third power. Under the articles of incorporation the Trans-Siberian was to extend from the western edge of Heilungkiang Province via Tsitsihar and Harbin to Vladivostok. China was to have the right to buy it at the end of thirty-six years, and it would automatically go to China after eighty years. The terms of the treaty were kept strictly secret for some time, for Russian diplomats apparently realized the strategic implications of their move. When the news eventually leaked out Japan roundly resented Russia’s acquisition of this railroad concession, and it became one of the primary causes of the Russo-Japanese War.

But Russia was still unsatisfied. Confronted in 1897 by the German occupation of Tsingtao, she sent a fleet to Port Arthur and demanded economic privileges in southern Manchuria. China, more helpless than ever, gave in and leased her 1300 square miles bordered by a neutral zone. Russia could do much as she pleased in this area, and in addition was given the right to build a railway connection from Port Arthur to join the Chinese Eastern at Harbin. This line, called the South Manchurian Railway, became another thorn in the side of Japanese expansionists.

Germany. Germany under the kaiser was anxious not to lose out in any scramble for concessions. For nearly a decade she had been casting covetous eyes on the China coast. Her participation in the three-power intervention after the Treaty of Shimonoseki placed her in a position where she felt she could demand favors from Peking, and when in 1897 two German missionaries were assassinated in Shantung she sent a naval squadron to occupy Tsingtao, the best port on the peninsula. After some delay, China gave in to the German demands for an indemnity, permission to construct missionary churches and a railroad, and a ninety-nine-year lease on Kiaochow, including a 200-square-mile tract, and recognition by the Chinese government of Germany’s prior economic rights in the Shantung peninsula. Barefaced as French and Russian greed had been, this agreement which Germany forced on a prostrate China was worse, for it constituted the first recognition of
the troublesome "sphere of influence" — an area economically dominated by a foreign power — and as such set an unfortunate precedent that threatened to complete China's downfall.

*Great Britain.* Despite the fact that Berlin's acquisition of a sphere of interest in Shantung to some degree neutralized Russia's lease on Port Arthur, Britain decided to play safe. In 1898 she occupied the Shantung port of Weihaiwei and caused China to give her a lease on a 285-square-mile zone which should continue as long as the Russian occupation of Port Arthur. Thus the British lion scurried to an outlying position where it could crouch watchfully to forestall any hostile moves by the Russian bear. At the same time Britain moved to neutralize French expansion in the south and erect a territorial buttress against French probings northward into the Yangtze valley, which Britain regarded as her own preserve. To that end, the British negotiated an extension of their lease of Kowloon to ninety-nine years, along with 376 square miles of adjacent territory. They also secured from China an agreement not to alienate any of the provinces along the Yangtze to a third power.

*Japan.* Not to be outdone, Japan demanded and received of China the promise of the imperial government that Fukien, the mainland province opposite newly acquired Formosa, would not be alienated to any third power.

*Italy.* Throughout all these negotiations, the Chinese government had shown itself to be virtually helpless. Only once in this long and disgraceful period of sacrifice of its national integrity did Peking show any real virility. This was when Italy in 1899 requested a lease on Sanmen Bay in Chekiang Province. China turned thumbs down on this foreign request, and because Italy was in no position to start serious trouble in the Orient the refusal stuck; nor did Italy ever again try to crash the party of European empires in the East.

Foreign powers used several methods to secure footholds in China. One was the "concession," or grant of a residential and trading section in a port or city to be used as the outsider saw fit; most of these were granted early in the nineteenth century. Good examples are the International Settlement and the French concession in Shanghai. Some powers obtained "leaseholds" for long periods, often ninety-nine years, of an entire port or municipal areas; Russia's lease of Port Arthur, for example. Such a lease gave the occupying power much more authority and freedom than did the concession. Where larger areas were concerned a "sphere of influence" was sometimes marked out; this implied a positive acquisition of specific economic rights in the area. Sometimes the
“sphere” carried with it as well the negative assurance that no other power would be allowed to compete with the nation obtaining the privileges.

Concessions and spheres. The establishment of these spheres naturally intensified friction among the Western powers holding them, and special treaty arrangements became necessary among the foreign nations themselves. Two examples of such agreements were the Anglo-German Accord of 1898 and the Scott-Muravieff Agreement of 1899. In the first, Britain assured Germany that British acquisition of the Weihaiwei leasehold would in no way interfere with the German sphere on the Shantung peninsula, and that she would build no railways from the port to the interior. The second was a mutual pledge on the part of Britain and Russia to respect each other’s economic spheres in the Yangtze valley and north of the Great Wall respectively.

By 1900 the China coast was sliced up into a series of these spheres, foreign powers having control of many of the most strategic coastal points except in the immediate region of Peking and Tientsin. In the north, Russia claimed as her sphere part of Outer Mongolia and Manchuria as far south as Harbin, with a further concession at Port Arthur. Japan, notwithstanding Russian control of the South Manchurian Railway, was growing interested in southern Manchuria and Korea. The Shantung peninsula and part of the Yellow River valley were claimed by Germany as her sphere, despite Britain’s lease of Weihaiwei on the peninsula’s northern coast. Great Britain, chiefly because of her early appearance on the scene, drew the plum — the great and rich Yangtze River valley, plus a broad belt of territory connecting the Yangtze with the Canton-Hong Kong area. Her hold was tenuous and vague; but still significant. This made Britain pre-eminently interested in China’s fate, and helped lead to the Anglo-Japanese alliance a few years later, in which Japan became trustee for Britain’s Pacific possessions while the European caldron bubbled. Like an island in the huge British sphere lay Fukien Province, reserved to Japan; Yunnan, the Kwangchowan area, and Hainan Island were French preserves.

Besides causing trouble among the Western nations the struggle for concessions incited deep Chinese resentment at the land-grabbing of the foreign powers. To stop it two solutions offered themselves. The first required that the celestial empire use as an example the Japanese nation, which had met and overcome the Western threat by a deliberate program of modernization and reform. The other was armed resistance to the Western advance. That true statesmanship was present in Peking, at
least in small quantities, was shown by China's decision to try the first solution; she would meet and counter the threatened economic attrition by a liberalization and strengthening of her internal structure. That the reform program failed in no way condemned the judgment of those who had persuaded the authorities to adopt it. Rather, it demonstrated the essential weakness of the empire; it showed that China's illness was so serious that a long period of crisis had to precede the cure.

2. THE HUNDRED DAYS OF REFORM

Chinese leadership. By 1898 China was humiliated by military defeat and humbled by peacetime helplessness. Her political and intellectual leadership was split into two factions, each with a solution to her foreign problems. The northern group, led by the empress dowager and her associates, Jung Lu, viceroy of Chihli, and Yuan Shih-kai, judicial commissioner of Chihli, favored conservatism and resistance to foreign aggression through an understanding with Russia. The southern party, composed largely of intellectuals like Weng Tung-ho, tutor to the Emperor Kuang-hsü, and Sun Yat-sen, who in 1895 had led an abortive rebellion in Canton and was later to become the George Washington of the Chinese Revolution, favored the Japanese method of meeting the foreign advance—that is, by reform and modernization based on a complete discard of traditional and outmoded administrative procedure.

Weng Tung-ho. This reform party got under way first, and for the time being was able to gain the ear of the emperor through his former tutor, Weng, and a rising young Cantonese intellectual named K'ang Yu-wei. The young ruler, though not at all vigorous in his policy, was patriotic and listened eagerly to the reformers' suggestions. The immediate outcome was an edict on June 9, 1898, that urged the investigation of foreign learning to determine just what phases of knowledge could be best applied to the modernization of China. Subsequently princes of the empire were advised to seek foreign education and to admit the worth of Western techniques.

As it turned out Weng's influence was only temporary, for when the empress heard of the edicts she was angered to the point that through her influence Weng was dismissed. Fortunately for the cause of reform, before he went the old scholar advised the emperor to listen to the counsels of K'ang Yu-wei.

K'ang Yu-wei and the hundred days. K'ang was a progressive addicted to Western learning. He carried on where Weng left off, and strongly
urged his ruler to modernize the entire administrative system. Beginning on June 14 and continuing for a hundred days thereafter, K'ang’s reform program was put into effect by imperial decree. The examination system was to be revised, with more attention paid to modern political science than to medieval literary craftsmanship as exemplified by the old-fashioned “eight-legged essay.” The ancient military structure, with its dependence on ill-trained militia and medieval tactics, was to be modernized, with due attention to foreign ideas. Sinecures were to be abolished, a translation bureau established, and education reformed.

For a brief time K'ang had his way and was able to lay the foundation for peaceful revolution, because the empress, always and constitutionally opposed to novelty, had theoretically retired from politics. While she was busying herself with her hobby, the magnificent summer palace, K'ang enjoyed carte blanche. But the reformers were realistic enough to know that as long as she was alive she would be a serious threat to the success of their program; and on September 20, 1898, Emperor Kuang-hsü was induced to issue an edict for her arrest and imprisonment and for the execution of her most loyal conservative supporter, Jung Lu, viceroy of Chihli. Through some administrative stupidity, the man commissioned to carry out this revolutionary command was Yüan Shih-kai, subordinate to Jung Lu and a political opportunist. Yüan, it is claimed, immediately informed Jung of the plot, and the empress in turn was apprised of the order. Without a moment’s hesitation she rapidly gathered about her some important officials, who “begged” her to assume the reins of government. She “condescended” to do so, and the southern party’s coup was reversed. On September 21 — for Tzu Hsi acted like lightning once her power was in danger — the emperor was imprisoned, and though for a time his life seemed in danger, it was finally spared and he was kept a hostage until his death ten years later. K'ang Yu-wei was pursued vigorously, but although six of his followers were executed he managed to escape.

The significance of the reform program. Whether the reform program could have succeeded even if it had been supported by the empress is questionable. Despite their enthusiasm its progenitors were men of little practical experience, and their notions were too theoretical to be of sound value to the nation. Besides, the political structure of the country was still too much divided, and many of the adherents of the northern conservative faction were far too strong to be ignored; whatever success might have been achieved their efforts would soon have been neutralized. At any rate, the failure of the abortive “hundred days of
reform" discredited this more statesmanlike method of dealing with the foreigner — internal reconstruction. That the reform effort failed was of course no measure of its efficiency, but showed rather the impracticality of the intellectuals and the weak executives who attempted to put it into practice. An even more important result of their failure was the inception of a period of reaction during which impassioned nationalists sought a solution by violence.

The open door doctrine. While China was trying in vain to find a way to meet European aggression, the United States was being maneuvered into a position where it had to take a clear-cut stand in Pacific affairs. As we have noted, during the early and middle 1800's America's interest in the whaling industry and Oriental trade and her relations with China and Japan had brought the economy of the Far East definitely within her field of interest. With her development of the west coast and her acquisition of Alaska, Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands, the United States had become a Pacific power, but too late to prevent or join "the battle for the concessions." She had been accustomed to follow Europe's lead in China: to let Europe fight for commercial privileges while avoiding political intervention herself, then by a "most-favored-nation" agreement with China to claim some economic rights. The European powers and Japan were busy carving China up into mutually exclusive spheres of economic interest which looked ominously like the forerunners of colonial acquisition. Too late to stake out a suitable claim for herself, not wanting to use European methods, and yet quite unwilling to abandon her growing Chinese trade to her hungry European and Japanese competitors, America faced the question: How preserve her trade with a China pre-empted by her rivals?

Beresford and Hay. The American answer to the battle for the concessions was the open door doctrine. Its origins are complex, but one fairly satisfactory explanation indicates that it grew out of British desires for American support in China. When on a tour through the United States Lord Charles Beresford made a series of speeches advocating joint action to maintain the "open door" in the Far East the State Department took up the matter, and on August 28, 1899, W. W. Rockhill at Secretary John Hay's request produced a memorandum that utilized Beresford's recommendations. The memorandum incorporated three main points: (1) No nation should interfere with any treaty port or vested interest within its sphere of influence; (2) Chinese tariffs should continue in force and should be collected by Chinese officials; and (3)
there should be no discrimination in any sphere in the matter of port
dues or railroad rates. In September 1899 Secretary Hay incorporated
these proposals in identical notes which he sent to England, France,
Italy, Germany, Russia, and Japan, and at the same time requested
formal assurances that they would be accepted.

Hay's maneuver. The replies to the notes were not completely favor-
able, but they were as satisfactory as could be expected, since Russia was
the only nation which made serious reservations. Hay of course knew
that the proposed signatories would not be materially benefited by his
proposals, and realized that it would be necessary to force the dose down
their throats. Therefore he quickly announced that as all the replies
had been favorable, he would assume that all had accepted the plan.
The result was that the nations approached found themselves consid-
ered as supporters of the open door even before the matter had been
thoroughly discussed through diplomatic channels.

A corollary to Hay’s initial notes served to round out the doctrine.
This was a note issued by the United States on July 3, 1900, during the
Boxer Rebellion, which advocated respect for China’s territorial integ-
rety, protection of the economic status quo, and the advancement of free
trade. The idea of the protection of the territorial integrity of China
eventually became the principal part of the doctrine, and the United
States stood firmly for that idea thenceforth.

Results of the policy. The open door doctrine gave the United States
a positive Far Eastern policy, though it was highly unsatisfactory and
in many ways downright dangerous. Because American tradition would
not countenance a scramble for concessions in a foreign land, even had
the best areas not been pre-empted, our diplomats were forced to find a
solution that would permit the United States to share in the economic ex-
ploration of China without embroiling her in war and without putting
her on a level with her contemporaries. The result was a pronouncement
so high-minded that no other nation could afford, in the face of world
opinion, to turn it down flatly; and yet it was geared so poorly to their
aspirations that although they gave it lip service they felt it unnecessary
to live up to its basic principles.

The open door was in effect a finger-shaking policy. It grew into a
pledge that the United States would support the territorial and adminis-
trative integrity of China. Thus the United States interfered in Oriental
affairs to the extent of warning, pronouncing, commending, and threat-
ening — but never was the doctrine taken seriously enough to warrant
its support by outright armed force. Gradually the other nations of the
world realized that all the United States expected of them was lip service; certainly Washington intended no serious reprisals when their actions failed to match their promises. The only time when the United States supported its open door doctrine by military strength was when it was compelled to by Japan in December 1941. At other times the doctrine cast America repeatedly into the Pacific caldron, but never when she had strength or determination to enforce her policies.

At the time it was issued, it was perhaps the only policy that could have protected American interests in the Pacific; yet we cannot say that it did protect those interests, for it lacked the *sine qua non* of all effective foreign policy — the determination of the nation to back it with force.

3. The Boxer Rebellion

While the United States was making its feeble gesture toward limiting European intervention, the failure of the hundred days of reform had brought about an extreme conservative reaction in China which strengthened antiforeign opinion. The creation of spheres of influence had even so disturbed the life of the countryside that the ordinary peasant, who had previously heard of his government’s dealings with the “foreign devils” only indirectly, now saw European locomotives puffing past his huts and fields and came into close contact with Christian missionaries. Drought and famine increased the number of irresponsibles, and the dowager empress’s mobilization of the militia to counter the foreign threat excited the populace. The refusal of the conservative clique to grant Italian demands at Sanmen Bay inspired a widespread fear of possible reprisal, and the national temper was aroused. The growth of Christianity in China also caused resentment; conservative elements accused the missionaries and their converts of lack of patriotism, of practicing strange and wicked rites, of refusing to contribute toward village ceremonials, and — worst of all — of egotism in their faith. Hostility toward “the foreign devils” grew rapidly; it sought only a medium through which to express itself.

*Patriotic societies.* Such a medium was provided in the organization of numerous antiforeign, patriotic societies that gave expression to the sentiments mushrooming throughout the empire. A group of these societies united into a confederation known as the I-ho-ch’uan, or Patriotic Society of Harmonious Fists. Membership involved participation in a gymnastic ritual that resembled boxing, and foreigners soon nicknamed all radicals “Boxers.” One of the benefits of affiliation was
The fact that the antiforeign Chinese guerrillas were called "Boxers" made it possible for the cartoonists to have a veritable field day. In this case Uncle Sam is announcing, "I occasionally do a little boxing myself."

a supposed magical invulnerability to wounds, and the war-cry of the agitators was "Preserve the dynasty!" Such organizations stiffened the antiforeign prejudices of the conservatives, and it was not long before active violence occurred.

The beginning of the rebellion. It began in 1899, and at first the Boxers confined their demonstrations to attacks on Chinese Christian converts in and around Shantung. Villages were looted and individuals attacked. When the dynasty called out the troops to put down the insurrectionists the widespread popular approval of the antiforeign movement forced local officials to refuse to co-operate, and the governor of Shantung, Yu-hsien, dismissed those officials who attempted to suppress the agitators. On December 31, 1899, the first foreign fatality was reported — the assassination by the Great Sword Society of a British missionary,
the Reverend Mr. Brooks. Five responsible persons were punished for this crime and a small indemnity exacted, but nothing was done to undermine the fundamental strength of the movement.

Foreigners intervene. Gradually the excitement spread from Shantung to Chihli and approached the environs of Peking. German trains were confined to Kiaochow, and although the government responded to foreign demands by issuing an edict suppressing the Great Swords and the Harmonious Fists, the two most troublesome societies, agitation still continued. In May and June the Western nations sent legation guards to Peking, and though hostile violence was still confined to "secondary devils"—the native Christians—evidences of trouble accumulated daily. The American minister demanded the removal of Yu-hsien, the conservative governor of Shantung who had previously prevented suppression of the Boxers; but even though the empress acquiesced in his removal it was a Boxer victory, for she received him with every protestation of favor and preferment. The only advantage was that he was replaced in his strategic job by Yüan Shih-k'ai, who, despite his conservatism, frowned upon the Boxers' methods. Meanwhile other foreigners were attacked—a group of railway engineers at Paoting and Fengtai, and two English missionaries near Paoting.

The Seymour expedition. It is not surprising then that the foreign colony at Peking took alarm. The countryside was in a veritable uproar, and the British minister requested aid of Admiral Seymour, commander of the British squadron anchored off the Pei Ho. He responded with an expedition of 2,066 men, nearly half of them British; the rest were German, American, French, Russian, Japanese, Italian, and Austrian troops and seamen. Halfway to Peking they met a strong imperial contingent, and since the Peking-Tientsin Railway had been cut they were forced to discontinue their advance. The expedition then retreated by way of the Pei-ho to an abandoned Chinese arsenal near Tientsin where they were relieved by local troops. Casualties numbered sixty-two killed and 238 wounded.

Assault on the Taku forts. Meanwhile the squadrons had again attacked the Taku forts, and the angry empress determined on war. All the foreign squadrons except the American under Admiral Kempff took part in the assault. Kempff was supported in his decision by his government; and his prediction that opposition to the foreigners would grow more violent with the seizure of the forts was borne out. The angry members of the patriotic societies, now sure of support by the empress, attacked foreign holdings in Peking outside the legation and burned
most of the property. They next invaded Tientsin and burned the mission chapels and the cathedral. In the tension preceding these overt attacks, the chancellor of the Japanese legation in Peking, Sugiyama, was murdered by a Chinese soldier. The die was now cast; the Chinese, supported by the conservatives in the imperial government, had chosen the way of violence, and another foreign invasion was inevitable.

The assault on the Taku forts was considered by the imperial government as a declaration of war, but the foreign emissaries in Peking still hoped for a peaceful settlement. The diplomatic group sent a joint message to the Chinese authorities advocating a conference to settle the outstanding differences, but the empress had received from a chauvinistic
member of her staff a false report to the effect that the foreigners had demanded her abdication and the restoration of the emperor. This sent her into a fury, and she issued an order that the foreigners should be exterminated "before breakfast." The Tsungli Yamen, the imperial foreign office, made no reply to the diplomats' request for a conference, and when Baron von Ketteler, the German minister, bravely attempted to go there for a reply he was murdered by an imperial trooper.

The siege of the legations. That afternoon the siege of the legations began. Already under a state of semi-siege in three areas — the legation quarter, the Pehtang Cathedral, and the Methodist mission compound — the foreigners and Christians finally concentrated in the first two. In the legations were 920 foreigners and about 3,000 Chinese. Among the foreigners were ministers and nationals of the United States, Great Britain, Spain, France, Italy, Russia, Belgium, Japan, and the Netherlands, chargés and nationals of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and citizens of Portugal and Switzerland. About 400 soldiers constituted the core of the defense, but everyone in the compounds, including the women, were assigned responsible tasks. The Pehtang Cathedral, some distance from the legation quarter, was defended by a bishop, thirty priests, forty-three seamen, and 2,000 Chinese converts.

The barricades of both makeshift fortresses were thin, and the Chinese authorities had the equipment to breach them at any time had not dissension in the imperial staff prevented. The savior of the foreigners was Jung Lu, viceroy of Chihli and one of the empress's favorites. He was in command of the Chinese artillery, and he refused to use it, arguing constantly that the government should abandon its warlike policy and begin peace negotiations. The empress wavered and vacillated, turning first to Prince Tuan, who advocated bloody massacre, and then to Jung Lu, who counseled moderation. When Jung was in the ascendancy her actions resembled strangely the weird fraternization incidents that reportedly occurred in 1914 on the Western Front. She relented periodically, sent presents of food to the besieged foreigners, and at one time opened a market to supply their needs. At no time was the full power of the Chinese military turned against the legations. If it had been, the Boxer Rebellion would have had a different ending for them.

Despite the divided counsels of the imperial government there was much opportunity during the frequent heavy attacks for the foreigners to display high heroism and fortitude. For six weeks the besieged inhabitants of the legations had no communication with the outside,
and when relief finally arrived their ammunition and provisions were almost exhausted. Even more desperate was the plight of the defenders of Pehrang Cathedral, who were completely out of food when the siege was lifted.

**Other areas.** In the provinces north of the Yangtze outside of the Peking region the Boxer movement produced a modicum of violence. On June 24 jingoist authorities issued a decree ordering the massacre of all foreigners in the interior, but some anonymous foreign sympathizer in the government altered the character sha, meaning "to slay," to pao, meaning "to protect," and a few of the missionaries were able through the delay occasioned by this trick to gain refuge. As it was however more than 200 missionaries and their relatives were slain in the interior, three fourths of them Protestant. Many Chinese Christians sacrificed their own lives to save their foreign mentors, despite the government's offer of a bounty for the heads of foreigners — fifty taels for a man's head, forty for a woman's, and thirty for a child's. The uprising was limited to Shantung, Chihli, Shansi, and Manchuria; the other great viceroys, like Li Hung-chang in Canton, observed with dismay the madness of their countrymen and did all in their power to keep the peace in their own provinces. In Manchuria attacks on foreigners began in June and continued into July, including an assault on Russian steamers and a cross-river bombardment of Blagovestchensk. The commander of the city herded the Chinese inhabitants out of town and ordered them to cross the Amur into Chinese territory. The lack of boats was no deterrent, and 4500 helpless Chinese were driven into the river and either killed by Russian troops or drowned. Russia then proceeded to occupy Manchuria.

**The relief expedition.** Eventually news filtered through to foreign capitals that the gallant defenders of the legations in Peking were still alive, and preparations for a relief expedition were hastened. By July 14, 1900, enough troops were present at Tientsin to break through the defenses of Peking, and when additional reinforcements arrived plans were made for an immediate march to the capital. On August 4 a force of 16,000 Japanese, Russians, British, Americans, French, Austrians, and Italians set out for Peking. The Japanese had 8000, nearly twice as many as Russia with the second largest contingent; the United States had 2500. The force met considerable opposition, but finally routed a large Chinese army fifteen miles outside the capital. In ten days they reached the city, the van led by Sikh and Rajput troops vying with the others for the honor of entering the capital first. The city fell after the
troops had forced five gates; much of the heavy fighting was done by American soldiers. On August 14 the siege of the legations was lifted, and casualties there were found to number sixty-seven killed and 168 wounded. Two days later the heroic defenders of Peh tang Cathedral were relieved by Japanese, British, and French troops.

When the siege of the legations was ended, the foreign soldiers gave themselves over to a disgraceful period of looting. Fortunately some attempt was made to preserve the historic riches of the capital, and France later returned scientific instruments that had been seized by her soldiers. Germany however installed some of her stolen souvenirs on the lawn of the kaiser's palace at Potsdam, whence they were returned only through pressure applied at the Versailles Peace Conference.

The empress and her court had fled the palace on August 15 and eventually reached Sian on the Yellow River. It was well that she left, for the foreign occupation troops were not through fighting even though the capital was occupied. Punitive expeditions into the surrounding country began at once. Germany because of the murder of her minister von Ketteler had requested the honor of appointing a commander-in-chief for the allied occupation forces, and this man, Count von Waldersee, finally arrived in October determined to do some fighting even though the war was over. As a result the punitive expeditions were multiplied, and during a four-month period forty-six such parties were sent out, thirty-five of which consisted of German troops. Feeling ran high on all sides, and only the absence of any acceptable substitute régime saved the empress and her clique. As it was, the foreign troops continued to disgrace themselves by plundering and behaving as badly toward the Chinese as the Boxers had toward the residents of Peking.

Diplomatic results. The Boxer Rebellion produced many diplomatic complications. Consistent with her policy of respect for China's independence, America issued on July 3, 1900, while the siege of the legations was still in progress, the note previously mentioned which defined the purposes of the United States in intervening. Though this note was unsupported by military force, it helped to prevent the partitioning of China, and the threat of a postrebellion extension of the "sphere" idea was eventually quelled.

Negotiations for settlement of the controversy between China and the Western powers began in mid-July, 1900, under Li Hung-chang, now restored to his post of viceroy at Tientsin. Some of the nations were inclined toward harsh terms; Germany, for example, wanted negotiations held up until the guilty had been surrendered. Finally however
the moderating influence of the United States and France prevailed, and in October and November a series of terms were drawn up by the ministers at Peking. In December the preliminary agreement was approved by the allied powers, and after seven months of negotiations — delayed largely by disagreements over the size of the proposed indemnity — on September 7, 1901, the Boxer Protocol was signed.

The Boxer Protocol. Its terms included the payment of a heavy indemnity of 450,000,000 taels or some $336,000,000; the punishment of guilty individuals, including Yu-hsien; the reorganization of the Tsungli Yamen; suspension of civil service examinations in all cities where anti-foreignism had been rampant; the temporary prohibition of arms imports; reparations for the murders of von Ketteler and Sugiyama; raising of the tariff to enable payment of the indemnity; and the quartering of adequate legation guards in Peking so that the foreign colony would never again be in danger of attack.

These terms need only brief comment. The role of the United States in the indemnity payment has been often told. America reluctantly received $24,440,000, which was found to be in excess of actual claims and expenses; then later generously returned its share of the indemnity, for the specified purpose of supporting the education of worthy Chinese students. Those who question the altruism of the open door doctrine would do well to remember this episode; it certainly did not cancel out all hard feeling between the two nations, but it helped greatly toward that end. The significance of the establishment of permanent legation guards was not fully realized until the beginning of the second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Then the deliberate "incidents" which began that conflict owed their success partly to the presence of a Japanese legation guard which was large enough to cause trouble if it so desired. In sum, the Boxer protocol was merely an addition to the long series of unequal "agreements" which characterized Chinese foreign relations during the nineteenth century. It helped to lay the foundations for the Chinese Revolution, and also for additional foreign complications; notably the Russian occupation of Manchuria, which paved the way for the Russo-Japanese War. Moreover the attitudes of the participating powers demonstrated clearly their intended role in Far Eastern affairs; the contrast, for instance, between American generosity and Russian self-interest was very sharp.

China and Japan compared. The entire Boxer episode was but added proof that China had failed to meet the challenge of Western civilization. Japan successfully confronted and coped with the Occident in a
manner that made her a great power. But China could not forget the national egotism which had made her the glorious "Middle Kingdom" of past centuries; furthermore her administrative structure was so poorly suited to nineteenth century developments that her decision to resist the encroachment of foreign nations not only came too late but did not take into account the impossibility of her succeeding. The Manchu dynasty now had its death blow, and though its coup-de-grâce was delayed for another decade, it no longer was able to govern effectively.

Conclusion. The forcible opening of China by Britain in the first half of the century was followed by a growing desire by other nations to share in the spoils of imperialism in China. In the 1890's the struggle for territorial concessions and spheres of interest and influence in China reached its height, and Russia, Japan, Britain, Germany, and France all seized privileges to an extent that left the imperial government but a shadow of its former power and prestige. The United States, too late and unwilling to participate in such a sordid struggle (which besides did not conform to her commercial interests), contented herself with enunciating the open door doctrine, by which in 1899 the nations concerned in the economic partitioning of the Orient pledged themselves to go no further and to respect what was left of the idea of equal opportunity. The doctrine served to draw the United States actively into Asiatic affairs without providing either the stimulus or the means for making its weight really felt.

After a few intellectuals who gained the ear of the emperor had engineered a brief and abortive attempt at reform, Chinese reactionaries, wearied of the constant encroachments on their national sovereignty, organized themselves into fanatical patriotic societies, and finally laid siege to the foreign legations in Peking. During a few weeks of open warfare these societies were supported by the empress dowager; then they were defeated by a powerful foreign expeditionary force. The nations whose property had been damaged and whose nationals had been injured imposed upon China the ill-famed Boxer Protocol, in which China surrendered the last vestige of her national dignity.
Japan Takes the Offensive Against the West

**Japanese strength.** As we have pointed out, by 1900 Japan in contrast to China had achieved considerable success in coping with Occidental intrusion in the Far East. During the Boxer Rebellion she demonstrated her determination by contributing to the allied forces a detachment larger than any single European unit. In the subsequent negotiations she participated equally with the other "Barbarians," and in the protocol which established the right of China's conquerors to send troops and legation guards, Japan enjoyed complete equality—incidentally securing thereby the forces for her efficient beginning in 1937 of the second Sino-Japanese conflict.

**Japanese weakness.** But despite Japan's apparently favorable situation and her newly won dominion over the Korean peninsula, she was still to a certain extent in a vulnerable position. This vulnerability was demonstrated when she was forced to accept the three-power intervention that deprived her of part of her Sino-Japanese war gains, and it was still more evident when Russia acquired in southern Manchuria rights and privileges that were a definite threat to Japan's mainland ambitions. As a result Russia assumed the proportions of a dangerous enemy, and as Japan became more and more convinced that Russia must be beaten back from her coastal foothold there crystallized in the minds of the Japanese leaders the idea that the nation must perforce enter upon a second great imperialistic venture—the Russo-Japanese War.
1. Basic Causes of the Russo-Japanese War

The expansionist program of Russia. As has already been told, Russia's eastward movement from the Urals to the Pacific began in the sixteenth century, and by 1636 the tremendous surge of migration started by Yermak the Cossack had swept across the vast steppes and mountains of Siberia to the Sea of Okhotsk. Here on the Pacific coast the chief goal of Russian imperialists became the acquisition of an ice-free port, and in search thereof Russian explorers probed farther and farther southward. From Nikolaevsk the Russian frontier advanced to the Ussuri, and finally in 1860 Vladivostok was established. This port to be sure was not ideally located, for it also was too far north to be entirely free from weather disability. But it was better than nothing, and Russia felt she could well turn now from territorial acquisition to economic exploitation of her new lands and of those of her neighbors to the south. It was with this in mind that she began the Trans-Siberian Railway.

As the tentacles of the Russian Empire stretched eastward, Japan began to realize that such a program was dangerous to her aspirations. Industrialization had not only increased her population but had made her want the sort of raw materials the Korea-Manchuria area produced, and she began to look toward this region as properly belonging within her sphere. China was helpless; Russia was her main opponent. And the building of the Trans-Siberian seemed a portent that her struggle with the empire of the tsars was to be a difficult one.

The Trans-Siberian Railway. Planned as early as 1870, the Trans-Siberian Railway comprised a grandiose scheme — the laying of more than 5000 miles of railway track between St. Petersburg and Russia's Pacific provinces. The line reached Orenberg in 1877, and the Volga River was bridged three years later. In May 1891 European Russia was left behind and the construction crews plunged into Siberia. A single-track line was rapidly completed to the Manchurian border, and when Li Hung-chang signed the agreement with Witte which provided for construction of the Chinese Eastern across Manchuria, the necessity of following the Amur in its northward bulge was obviated. For some three years Lake Baikal interrupted the continuous line of track, and early travelers either made their way across its frozen surface by sledge or took a ferry to the rail terminus on its eastern shore. By 1895 however the rails were around the lake, although some trains were still ferried across. After the Port Arthur concession the South Manchurian Railway was constructed from Harbin to Liaotung. In more recent years
When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904 the world at large thought that the Japanese were engaging in a "dangerous venture."

The entire Trans-Siberian has been double-tracked, and other branches and extensions have been added: but at the time of the Russo-Japanese War the Trans-Siberian was merely a single-track line extending from European Russia to Vladivostok, with a southern spur to Port Arthur. Nevertheless, despite its early inadequacy the Trans-Siberian gave Russia's sprawling land empire a unity it had never had before, and at the same time put into the heads of jingoists the notion that in order to develop the Far Eastern lands the railroad had opened up, all hindrances to Russian domination over Manchuria, Mongolia, and possibly even Korea must be eliminated. Eventually this obsession became the fundamental cause for Russia's acceptance of war with Japan.

The three-power intervention. But the railway was not the only cause of tension. As already related, Russia added to Japanese doubts of her purposes by participating in the three-power intervention that followed the Treaty of Shimonoseki and that forced Japan to give up the Liaotung peninsula. Because she had conquered and occupied it, Japan considered this acquisition legitimate and logical despite its blatantly imperialistic character; and when Russia, France, and Germany interfered with her possession of it, she deeply resented their act.

Timber concessions on the Yalu. Meanwhile the weak-willed and
incapable Tsar Nicholas II was being swayed from side to side by various factions within his own government. The moderate group, those who did not desire war with Japan and who believed in a common-sense policy of peace in the Far East, was headed by Minister of Finance Count Witte, aided from time to time—depending on how Witte’s ideas affected military organization—by Minister of War General Kuropatkin. The extremist clique boasted as its most noteworthy member a retired army officer named Bezobrazof, who was well acquainted with the Far Eastern provinces and took a great interest in Russian expansion south of the Yalu. Bezobrazof’s scheme was ambitious to say the least; it involved the organization of a firm for the exploitation of economic resources in the Far East—the East Asiatic Industrial Corporation. This however was to be merely a front behind which Russia could mature her plans for political aggression in Manchuria and Korea. In 1896 Bezobrazof was given a timber-cutting concession along the banks of the Yalu River, and he boasted that when the time came for Russia to take over Korea she would have ready to hand hundreds of trained Russian troops disguised as woodsmen. The significance of Bezobrazof and the East Asiatic Industrial Corporation lay not so much in the timber concession itself as in the evidence it provided that in his vacillation Nicholas was being influenced more and more by the extremists.

The Lobanov-Yamagata Protocol. As a consequence of the rise of chauvinists like Bezobrazof and of the suddenly increased vigor of Russian Far Eastern policy after the success of the three-power intervention, Japan was induced in 1896 to sign a new agreement with St. Petersburg. The immediate cause of the agreement was another flare-up in Korean internal affairs. Although Japan had more or less held the ascendant in Korean politics during the early 1890’s, the Korean queen stubbornly resisted Japanese encroachment; the result eventually was a midnight attack on her palace and her assassination by pro-Tokyo progressives. Koreans in general thereupon suffered a revulsion of feeling, and adopted an attitude of marked hostility to Japan. Russian marines had protected the king during the riot, and the inevitable diplomatic negotiations between St. Petersburg and Tokyo resulted in the Lobanov-Yamagata Protocol, which for the moment admitted Russian equality (virtual ascendancy) in Korean affairs. It was not long though before Russia presumed too much on her favorable position in Seoul, and shortly the Koreans turned against her just as they had previously turned against Japan.
MANCHURIA, KOREA, AND LIAOTUNG PENINSULA
Port Arthur. Japanese-Russian tension flared up again in 1898, when Russia brazenly acquired by lease the territory she had forced Japan to relinquish in 1895 — the Liaotung peninsula. The Port Arthur leasehold gave Russia a strong naval base close to Japanese interests in Korea, and intensified Russian interest in maintaining close supervision over Manchurian railways and other economic developments.

The Nishi-Rosen Convention. Japan realized therefore that strong action must be taken to place diplomatic obstacles in Russia’s path. She took advantage of the reversal of feeling in Korea to promulgate in 1898, a new accord, the Nishi-Rosen Convention, which increased Tokyo’s political privileges in Seoul, and correspondingly reduced St. Petersburg’s. Russia however was not to be thwarted in her desires for Korea, and in 1899 she attempted to get possession of the port of Masampo, near Fusan, just a few miles from Kyushu across Tsushima Strait. Japan acted immediately to prevent it by buying up the leasehold Russia wanted.

The Boxer Rebellion. Russia’s attempt to extend her influence in eastern Asia was not very effective until China engaged in its futile Boxer Revolt. Then, as previously related, the ill-advised tactics of the patriotic societies in threatening Russian railroad-building activities in Manchuria and in bombarding the river port of Blagoveshchensk stimulated Russia to vigorous activity. The first step in her program was to seize Manchuria; then she began negotiations to get control over most of the railroads in North China. At the same time she asked for and took the largest share of the indemnity money paid by China to the injured powers, while professing to be China’s friend and protector against the voracious Japanese imperialists. The presence of strong Russian troop concentrations in Manchuria aroused Japanese hostility, but Russia ignored this and attempted openly to annex the area — an effort thwarted only by the combined pressure of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. Russia’s special privileges in the region were obvious however, and in 1903 she went so far as to appoint a “viceroy” to administer her interests in the Amur-Manchuria region. Russia insisted on considering Manchuria as her own preserve — or at least an area in which Japan had no rights whatsoever. Her actions in fact were so violent and threatening that Japan and Britain both protested, and the Tokyo government again was forced to recognize that if Japanese pretensions were to be valid, steps must be taken to curb Russia’s designs in eastern Asia.

Ito’s Mission. But before Japan could take decisive action she had
to resolve the conflict among her leaders over what action to take. As in Russia, there were two factions influencing administrative decisions: one group, headed by the leader of Japan's elder statesmen, Marquis Ito, was convinced that friendship with Russia could be maintained; another, including Premier Katsura, was equally sure that war with Russia was inevitable. Ito because of his prestige was permitted to visit Russia, but by then plans for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were so far along that negotiations fell through. And besides, Japan's demand for control of Korea could not be admitted by the tsar's government.

*The Anglo-Japanese Alliance.* A powerful school of pro-British thought had already grown up in Tokyo, but its work had been delayed by Ito's Russophile tendencies. Now however circumstances seemed to force the Anglo-Japanese *rapprochement.* England, facing a tense situation in Europe, was waiting eagerly, and on January 30, 1902, she presented Japan with suggestions for an alliance. Despite Ito's hesitanty, before the year was over a treaty was signed to that effect. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 guaranteed the maintenance of the status quo in the Far East and provided for the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea; at the same time however Japan's "peculiar" interests in Korea and her rights to equal trade in the Orient were fully recognized. If one of the signatories got into war with a third nation, the other party to the treaty would remain neutral, but if a second power "ganged up" on the first, then the other signatory was bound to intervene. The treaty was to last five years, with one year's warning to be given if either power desired to withdraw.

*Results of the alliance.* For both countries the results of the treaty were highly advantageous. England obtained a powerful ally in the Orient to balance Russia's southward advance toward Manchuria, Afghanistan, and India. Britain's European situation was also improved; since Germany was misbehaving and Western tensions were increasing, it was highly convenient for London to have a Pacific ally to whom she could shift the responsibility for preserving the Oriental status quo. Japan in turn gained a friend whose interests temporarily paralleled hers in China and whose cooperation would eliminate any repetition of the three-power intervention idea. Although as events turned out Russia did not keep her word, for the time being she recognized the turning of the tide by promising to evacuate Manchuria; and furthermore France and Russia declared that their dual alliance was extended to cover the Far East, and that they were in complete sympathy with the open door policy.
Thus it was that for a few months after the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance peace prospects in the Orient looked brighter. Unfortunately the alliance did not eradicate the fundamental causes of the Russo-Japanese conflict, especially as they pertained to China. In this area they were "natural" enemies, and since for better or worse both Russia and Japan had adopted policies of imperialistic expansion, a clash between them was unavoidable.

2. IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR

Diplomatic maneuvering. A few months after the announcement of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance tensions increased again. Certain Japanese
leaders realized that Russia probably did not intend to evacuate Manchuria, and the old problem returned — how to come to an agreement with St. Petersburg that would satisfactorily divide the Manchuria-Korea area into fixed spheres of influence. In August 1902 Japan repeated her initial offer, a guarantee of Korea's independence coupled with special recognition of Japan's position, and Russia once more refused to sign. Instead, in 1903 Russian diplomats approached Peking with the proposal that Manchuria and Mongolia be turned over to Russia as virtual protectorates. Meanwhile the Russians consistently delayed their evacuation of Manchuria on the ground that "order" had not yet been restored; and during the early months of 1903 with her creation of the viceroyalty of the Far East Russian actions became so menacing that despite a few concessions she made to stave off the crisis it became clear that war was virtually inevitable.

Direct negotiations. Therefore Japan determined to resort to direct negotiations in a final attempt to stave off conflict or at least to get a breathing spell for her better preparation if conflict did come. Ito still fought hard for a patched-up agreement with Russia, and the Japanese proposals of August 1903 were essentially the same that he had taken to St. Petersburg two years earlier. These included mutual recognition of the independence of Korea and China, with maintenance of the open door in China; Japanese supremacy in Korea; and Russian economic supremacy in Manchuria. Russia evasively replied that she could not include Manchuria in the negotiations, as it was entirely outside Japan's sphere; she also refused to guarantee the independence of China; she wanted a pledge that Korea's coasts would not be fortified; and she suggested making Korea north of the thirty-ninth parallel a neutral zone.

War. During the talks Japan rapidly became convinced that war was certain, and busied herself preparing for conflict. Warships were purchased from foreign powers and military expenditures increased. By December the government wished to break off relations, but the navy procrastinated, arguing that its preparations were not yet complete. By February however all was ready, and on the 4th the fateful decision was made. Having defeated China with dispatch, Japan's leaders now prepared to fight the behemoth of all the European powers, and thanks to Russia's inept diplomacy they approached the conflict with public opinion solidly behind their warlike policy.
3. Military Operations

Naval attack on Port Arthur. The Japanesecharacteristically began the struggle with a surprise blow struck before the formal declaration of war had been issued. On February 8, 1904, two days before hostilities became formal, a Japanese destroyer squadron conducted a torpedo raid on Russian naval units at the Port Arthur base. This quick naval assault had the effect of demonstrating that Russia's paper naval strength was actually not equal to Japan's, and it cleared the waters around Korea so that Japanese troop transports could begin their landings on the western coast of the peninsula.

Japan's strategy. Inasmuch as the Japanese had a decade before won in juj time their war with China, they hoped to repeat the accomplishment against Russia. Most of the military world was even then still deeply impressed with Prussia's quick conquest of the French Empire, and the goal of most strategists was a quick, decisive blow that would gain its objective without the dangers attendant upon a more cautious, drawn-out conflict. This "Sedan strategy" apparently influenced Japan's pace of campaign both in 1904 and again in 1941. In 1904 it paid dividends; and that success doubtless brought about Tokyo's recent confidence that if the Netherlands, Britain, and America were thrown back on their heels in a quick initial series of campaigns they would acquiesce in Nippon's Oriental policy.

Russian unpreparedness. Russia on her part was faced with the maddening knowledge that though her military power was theoretically more than sufficient to account for two Japans, most of her troops were needed on her western border and to keep order in Europe; then, too, her contact with the Far East depended upon a single-track railway line 4000 miles long. During most of the war Russia had to meet quick, widely dispersed enemy thrusts while waiting for reinforcements that dribbled into Mukden at the rate of 30,000 a month. At no time during the conflict did Russia have more than 200,000 effective troops so disposed as to constitute a threat to the Japanese army. Besides this, before the war was over Russia's administrative weaknesses in military organization as well as in the civil bureaucracy were clearly evident. General Kuropatkin, in command of the tsar's armies in the East, was hindered continually by Viceroy Admiral Alexeiev, who represented the worst elements of the heterogeneous advisory staff that caused Nicholas to vacillate when decisiveness was needed and to be firm when concessions were imperative.
Japanese landings. Japan's general plan of campaign was to seize Port Arthur and the peninsula, then to converge upon the Russian positions centering in Liaoyang and Mukden. It cannot be overemphasized that the chief reason for the success of this strategy was Japan's early and complete mastery of the sea. Without that naval superiority, Nippon might then have learned the lesson that she later had to learn the hard way in World War II — that militarism does not pay. But in 1905 she had naval superiority, and therefore as soon as Russia's Port Arthur squadron was immobilized, the Japanese First Army under General Kuroki began to arrive at Chemulpo, the port of Seoul. At about the same time the Second Army under General Oku landed on the east shore of the Liaotung peninsula near the Elliot Islands, and was quickly reinforced by the Third Army under General Nogi and the Fourth under General Nozu.

The Battle of the Yalu. The first major land engagement of the war occurred when General Kuroki after occupying Seoul and central Korea moved his troops northward. At the Yalu River, the boundary between Korea and Manchuria, 40,000 Japanese met 7000 Russians, hastily disposed in defensive positions. The Japanese planned the engagement carefully, for it was of more than tactical significance — it was the first major encounter between yellow and white races on a modern battlefield. Japanese planning was effective. Exhibiting rash bravery and ignoring their losses, the Japanese assaulted the Russian positions with great force, and plunged across the river in the face of withering gunfire to displace their enemies completely. The victory at the Yalu gave Kuroki a position whence he could communicate with his associates farther down the Korean peninsula, or could threaten the Russian positions in south-central Manchuria. As it turned out, the Yalu affair gave him an opportunity to do both. In addition, the victory gave Japanese morale a lift that intensified the vigor with which Nippon prosecuted the war.

The siege of Port Arthur. Meanwhile one of the major campaigns of the war was shaping up in the south. General Oku, with the Second Army, moved southward along the Liaotung peninsula to begin a drive on Port Arthur itself. Russian advance positions were seized with little difficulty, but when Oku came to Nanshan, where the peninsula bottlenecked into a narrow isthmus, he found General Stakelberg with 3000 men able to block his passage. On May 26 Oku energetically assaulted the Russian positions and after suffering heavy losses managed to drive Stakelberg from his strong lines. Casualties were heavy on both sides;
the Japanese suffered 4500 killed or disabled, and the Russians lost fully half their men. But the victory of Nanshan increased the confidence of the Japanese, and enabled them to reshuffle their positions so as to split the Russian forces. Nogi's Third Army replaced Oku's Second, which turned north to join Nozu in a drive to separate the Port Arthur garrison from Kuropatkin's main armies based on Liaoyang. In addition, Alexeev abandoned his policy of complacency and decided on an "active" strategy which Kuropatkin strongly disapproved. The latter realized that Russian forces would have to be much stronger than they then were in order to halt the Japanese in an all-out combat, but he permitted himself to be swayed by the viceroy, and adopted an aggressive plan of campaign which doomed Russia's prospects. Furthermore Alexeev managed to get Nicholas to support his views, and Kuropatkin was left no alternative when the tsar informed him that he would be held personally responsible for the fate of Port Arthur.

*Stakelberg's counterattack.* As Oku was moving northward, before the abovementioned Japanese reshuffle had been fully accomplished, General Stakelberg moved out of his entrenched positions near the naval base to recover some of his lost ground. At Telissu in June Oku met him again and once more inflicted a severe defeat. From this point on the Port Arthur garrison fought a strictly defensive campaign.

*The surrender of Port Arthur.* General Nogi took up where Oku had left off, and conducted a well-managed siege. The port of Dalny (now Dairen) was seized without difficulty, and the Japanese utilized it as a base of operations. The task before Nogi was no small one. In the first place his army was only slightly larger than that of General Stoessel, commander of Port Arthur; and second, his siege train was said to be inadequate for the job it had to do. But despite the fact that Port Arthur's geographical position gave its defenders marked advantage, the maladministration of the Russians had neglected to complete its defensive system. The fort was surrounded on the land side by a twelve-mile chain of hills, most of which had been studded with artillery emplacements and earthworks, but on the northwest the defenses were weaker, guarded only by works on 203-Meter Hill. Nogi wisely concentrated his assault on that area, and in December after a six-month struggle 203-Meter Hill fell. The siege was characterized by much night fighting, by the use of searchlights and grenades, and heavy personnel losses — especially in the ten days preceding the fall of the strategic hill, when Japanese casualties totaled more than 1000 a day. With the seizure of the hill, the Japanese turned the Russian artillery against the ships in the
In the siege of Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War, underground fighting was carried on to such an extent that the breaking in of an earthen partition often brought adversaries face to face in a deadly grapple.

harbor, and on January 2 Stoessel surrendered the port with its garrison. Of his original 47,000 men he had left only 24,000 effectives and 15,000 sick and wounded. The fall of Port Arthur gained for the Japanese one of their major goals of the war; the disgrace of the three-power intervention had been bloodily avenged.

The Battle of Liaoyang. Meanwhile in eastern Manchuria events had been shaping up which were to bring about two great land battles. In August the Japanese First, Second, and Fourth armies, numbering 125,000 men, converged on the Russian base at Liaoyang, and between August 23 and September 3 fought a battle with 158,000 Russians under Kuropatkin. Marquis Oyama was in over-all command of the Japanese forces, and he and his associates were apparently convinced that their strategy of a knockout blow might be brought to a climax here. On September 1 they even informed their men that that day was the anniversary of the Battle of Sedan, as if to inspire them to repeat the Prussian accomplishment. But their objective was not achieved, for although
they defeated the Russians the latter retreated in good order and the Japanese suffered heavier casualties.

*Fall and winter campaigns.* Two minor engagements were fought before the climax of the land fighting was reached. The first was the Battle of the Sha-ho, a stream running east and south of Mukden, where Kuropatkin had retired after his defeat at Liaoyang. Here in October a Japanese assault was very nearly broken, and the opinion of experts is that if the Russians had been better organized they might have turned a stalemate into a victory. In January 1905 the Russians counterattacked in a violent snowstorm, and once again had victory within their grasp; but their drive broke before stiff Japanese resistance, and once again the Russians were forced back on the defensive.

*The Battle of Mukden.* Following these preliminaries came the greatest struggle of the war and one of the most imposing land battles up to that time ever fought anywhere in the world — the Battle of Mukden. This engagement lasted from February 23 to March 10, 1905, and although the Japanese won, and despite the fact that by February Russian prospects were at their nadir, the Nipponese were still thwarted in their hope of a Sedan-like victory. Marquis Oyama had 400,000 men under his command, while Kuropatkin could mobilize only 325,000; Port Arthur had fallen; and Japanese naval victories had continued in unbroken succession. The Russian armies were poorly supplied and organized, and Kuropatkin realized that another defeat was inevitable. After the first Japanese assault, Kuropatkin asked to be relieved of his command, and he was replaced by General Linievitch. The climax of the battle came when Oyama managed to outflank the Russians, but again a rout was avoided when the Russians withdrew seventy-five miles and re-formed their lines. The victory lay with the Japanese, although again they suffered heavier casualties (97,000 to the Russians’ 50,000). Today it is known that Mukden was really a Pyrrhic victory, for Japan was militarily exhausted, while Russia had just begun to tap her vast European resources. But Russia was unaware of Japan’s weakness, and the error of not following Kuropatkin’s original recommendation of fighting a delaying action until adequate reinforcements could arrive bore bitter fruit for St. Petersburg. Strategically, victory was still within Russia’s grasp, but tactically the Japanese had won. As a result the Russian government, shot through with corruption and inefficiency, and facing a revolution in its European province, was easily persuaded by the advocates of a negotiated peace.

*Sea Warfare.* As we have noticed, Japanese naval superiority played
a great part in her eventual victory; had it not been for the efficiency of Admiral Togo and his associates, the Russo-Japanese War might have been a very different story. In boxing parlance, the Japanese army won three technical victories, Port Arthur, Liao-yang, and Mukden; but the navy won by three knockouts — Russia's Port Arthur squadron, her Vladivostok squadron, and her Baltic fleet.

The Port Arthur squadron. The first blow against the Port Arthur squadron was the Pearl Harbor-like initial attack by torpedo boats preceding the declaration of war. The Russian commander, blamed for his lack of preparation, was replaced by a vigorous leader, Admiral Makaroff, who immediately began a campaign of swift sallies and surprise raids against the Japanese blockading squadron. Then the Japanese, after suffering some losses, resolved to defeat Makaroff by trickery; they planted mines outside the harbor entrance and lured him across the field during another of his raids. To Togo's surprise, the mines did not take effect on Makaroff's egress; but after the raid, when the Japanese had suffered additional damage, the Russian force was heavily injured by the mines. The admiral's flagship went down, and he himself was killed. Makaroff's successors were not as brilliant as he, and in August Togo lured the squadron out again — this time to confront an unbeatable superiority in ships and firepower. After some maneuvering, a lucky shell-hit crippled the Russian flagship, killed the admiral, and disorganized the entire Russian fleet.

The Vladivostok squadron. Four days after the defeat of the Port Arthur fleet, the Japanese searched out the Vladivostok squadron and dealt it a crushing blow. This victory completely wrecked Russian naval power in the Far East. If command of the sea were to be regained Russia must send some of her European units on the long journey to the Pacific.

The Baltic fleet. Therefore preparations were rushed to complete this almost impossible task, and on October 18, 1904, Admiral Rozhestvensky, with a squadron of twenty-one vessels, left the Baltic to recover Russia's lost naval power in the Orient. The misguided enthusiasm of Russia's lay leaders had forced Rozhestvensky to take with him many vessels that were completely outdated and in poor repair, and these of course held him back. Besides, with Port Arthur under siege and the Vladivostok squadron defeated, the admiral was worried as to whether when he reached the North Pacific he would find a base of supplies. As a consequence of this anxiety he took with him many tugs, trawlers, and supply vessels to obviate the necessity of landing, and in addition
piled coal in every available space — even on the decks of the fighting ships. The expedition was therefore in anything but combat trim. And as an augury of the bad fortune awaiting him, an international incident was very nearly precipitated in the North Sea when one of the Russian vessels, jittery from rumors of Japanese ships near by, fired on some English fishing trawlers.

The Battle of Tsushima Straits. After making extremely slow progress around the Cape of Good Hope, Rozhestvensky on May 27, 1905, finally encountered Togo’s battle line of twelve vessels in Tsushima Straits. The scouting on both sides had been poor and both commanders were more or less taken by surprise. The Russians formed into two columns, with the unarmed supply vessels concentrated at the rear. Togo detailed cruisers to attack the rear of the Russian line, while with the main Japanese fleet he made for the Russian left flank. There he turned and "crossed the T" by running his battle line broadside across the bows of the Russian squadron. This extremely favorable tactical position enabled him to counterbalance the Russian superiority in heavy guns with his more numerous eight-inchers and quick-firers. The Ossliabya, lead-vessel of one of the Russian columns, went down beneath the concentrated gunfire of seven Japanese war vessels, and the Suvaroff, leader of the other column, was crippled and lost steering way. The engagement was significant if only that the sinking of the Ossliabya marked the first time that any modern battleship had ever been sunk by
direct gunfire. After a complicated day-long battle of maneuver between the rival lines, torpedo boats and destroyers joined the attack at night while Togo drew off his capital ships to the north to rest and cut off any Russian escape to Vladivostok. In this he was eminently successful, and forced the surviving vessels of the Russian fleet to surrender the next morning when they fled past his rendezvous off Natsushima Island. So ended one of the most complete naval victories in modern history, in which the Russians lost 4830 lives to 110 Japanese and suffered destruction or capture of every vessel in the main line. The surrender of the remains of Rozhestvensky’s fleet marked the end of Russian military effort and complete Japanese naval supremacy in Far Eastern waters.

4. The Peace of Portsmouth

Position of the powers. Despite Japan’s success at sea, on land she was merely winning battles, and to her leaders it was clear that her Sedan strategy was well on its way to failure. Japanese armies had not crushed the Russian forces in Manchuria, although they had inflicted severe defeats on them, and control of the sea would mean little if Russia were able eventually to bring more of her tremendous land strength against Oyama’s exhausted legions. Moreover the strain was beginning to tell at home. Japan had drained herself dry financially, and any further effort would be sure to have unpleasant internal political repercussions. She had gambled on a quick victory and a quick peace, and if the peace were not soon forthcoming Russia might turn temporary defeat into triumph.

There were however some definitely favorable factors on Japan’s side. Russian administrative muddling had multiplied her military misfortunes, and factionalism still split the ranks of the tsar’s advisers. The threat of revolution at home prevented an all-out military effort. Already a peace party was vociferously demanding a negotiated settlement, even though several Russian military men felt that time played into Russia’s hands and that if the war could be prolonged Japan might still be made to pay for her temerity.

The Portsmouth Conference. A third nation — the United States — had interested itself in the fate of the combatants. For many years, in fact ever since Townshend Harris had cemented friendly relations, America had regarded Japan as her Pacific protégé and tended in many cases to take her part in international squabbles. Theodore Roosevelt, then
The part played by President Theodore Roosevelt in the termination of the Russo-Japanese War was signalized by his receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize. In this picture he is shown flanked by Baron Komura and Sergei Witte.

president, respected Japan's Westernization program, and the events of the war impressed him with her military and especially her naval efficiency. He thought as did some of the Russian generals, that a long war would play into Russia's hands, and that if Japan expected to emerge the victor a peace conference must be quickly brought about. In consequence of his own personal feelings, and also as a result of his conviction that a Japanese victory was to America's best interests, Roosevelt resolved to act as a go-between in the promotion of peace talks. After Russia had extended a peace feeler, the Japanese leaders, realizing T. R.'s position, sounded him out on the possibility of arranging an
immediate peace. He urged them to make the first move, i.e., to offer
to negotiate with Russia. They replied by requesting him to organize a
peace conference.

With typical Roosevelt decisiveness the president brought about a
meeting of Japanese and Russian representatives at Portsmouth, New
Hampshire. The Russian emissaries were Count Witte and Baron Rosen;
the Japanese, Foreign Minister Komura and the ambassador to the
United States, Takahira. The Japanese, considering themselves the vic-
tors, did not hesitate to present a list of comprehensive demands, which
included the following: (1) Recognition of Japanese supremacy in Korea
and the making of Korea into a virtual Japanese protectorate; (2) evacu-
atation of Manchuria by Russia and the transfer to Japan of all Russian
holdings in the Port Arthur leasehold, together with the South Man-
churian Railway from Harbin to Port Arthur; (3) the cession of Sak-
halin Island; (4) permanent limitation of the Russian Asiatic squadron
and surrender of all interned vessels; (5) the granting of fishing rights to
Japan in Russian territorial waters off Siberia; and, finally, (6) an in-
demnity. The Russians, feeling that Japan’s victory was not as decisive
as her claims seemed to indicate, rejected the naval limitations proposal,
the cession of Sakhalin, and the indemnity; and there arose a hope among
those Russians who wished to prolong the war that Japan’s flat refusal to do business on this basis might result in a continuation of hostilities.

*The Treaty of Portsmouth.* But the intransigents reckoned without
the influence of Theodore Roosevelt. Although acting the part of an
impartial mediator, he was definitely pro-Japanese, and convinced that
he was playing the role of Japan’s friend by securing a quick peace he
prevailed upon the Japanese representatives to modify their demands.
He suggested that the naval limitations guarantee be given up, that the
northern half of Sakhalin be returned to Russia, and that the indemnity
be reduced and take the form of Russian payment for return of her share
of Sakhalin and for payment of the expenses of Russian prisoners of war.
The Japanese reluctantly gave in; and the final provisions of the Treaty
of Portsmouth, signed on September 5, 1905, included strong Japanese
influence in Korea, the cession of Russia’s Liaotung leasehold and her
rights in the South Manchurian Railway between Changchun and Port
Arthur, the restoration of Manchuria to China with the exception that
fifteen Japanese railway guards per kilometer of track would be per-
mitted, the cession of Sakhalin Island north of the fiftieth parallel, the
granting of fishing rights in Russian waters, a guarantee that the for-
eign-owned railways would not be used for strategic purposes, and expense money for the Russian prisoners of war.

The significance of the treaty: (2) China. The Peace of Portsmouth produced repercussions in Japanese relations with three other nations—China, Britain, and the United States. In December 1905 a new Sino-Japanese accord was signed by which China agreed to all Japanese war gains. Succeeding agreements resulted in the opening of sixteen Manchurian towns to Japanese economic activity, Chinese permission for Japan to improve and make permanent the temporary military railway running from Antung to Mukden, and an arrangement whereby joint Chinese-Japanese firms would take over the timber concessions on the Yalu that had played such a great part in starting the war. So-called "secret protocols" were added whereby China agreed never to build a railroad paralleling or in a position to compete against the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian line. In short then the war gave Japan an opportunity to extend her sphere of influence from Korea into southern Manchuria, and it paved the way for later Japanese encroachments both in North China and in Inner Mongolia.

(2) Britain. Britain, naturally pleased with Russia's downfall, promptly renewed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; albeit with some modifications, the most important of which was that England recognized Japan's political, economic and military supremacy in Korea, and Japan agreed to extend the scope of the alliance to include India. The two powers also once more gave lip-service to the open door policy in China.

(3) The United States. Most important however was the change in Japan's relationship with the United States, a change ultimately to have world-shaking effects, whose significance it is difficult to overemphasize. Before 1905 the Japanese had been content to look up to America as a nation to be emulated, confident that the United States would take their part during the struggles of their adolescence. Now that they had matured however they began—like growing children—to resent America's proprietorial air. When Theodore Roosevelt, to save Japan from what he feared would be inevitable defeat in a longer struggle, prevailed upon Japan to relinquish her excessive demands for an indemnity in a war she had barely won, many Japanese turned against the United States with a hostility that was to ripen thirty-six years later into open war. Although some of Japan's more intelligent leaders recognized what Roosevelt had done for their nation, many Japanese harbored a foolish resentment against the American nation for interfering in their affairs and for being party to negotiations that deprived
them once again of some of the spoils of imperialistic conflict. They were too shortsighted to realize that if Roosevelt had not intervened, if he had not brought about a final and definite settlement at Portsmouth, Japan might have been forced to fight on only to win no more in the end, and possibly to lose what she had won.

Of less significance but at the same time important was the effect of the war in changing Theodore Roosevelt's attitude toward Japan from paternity to uneasiness, resulting in the Taft-Katsura Memorandum signed in 1905. This exchange of views guaranteed that Japan harbored no aggressive intentions toward the Philippine Islands, that the United States under certain conditions would co-operate with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and that America recognized Japan's paramount interests in Korea. The memorandum was no more than the general ratification of Theodore Roosevelt's own opinions, and remained effective only during his administration. But Japan's pledge regarding Philippine independence — although she pretended to respect it — plagued her when she began her "Greater East Asia" campaigns, and Roosevelt's recognition of Korea as a Japanese sphere of interest very effectively stopped America's later efforts to preserve Korean independence.

(4) Russia. The effect of the Japanese victory on Russia was obvious. In 1815 Russia had stood at the pinnacle of military prestige because of her valiant stand against the might of Napoleon. Events during the nineteenth century had somewhat dimmed that reputation, but the general opinion still existed in Europe that although the Russian army was a cumbersome and unwieldy weapon it was nevertheless capable of powerful effort. Japan's defeat of Russia therefore dealt Russia's reputation its greatest blow. The notion that a country as great as the Russian Empire could be defeated by puny Nippon seemed outlandish, and the world's surprise was great. But this view had important corollary aspects. First, some military experts had been so well aware of Japan's preparedness and efficiency that her victory was no surprise to them. Second, the fact that the victory was a quick one still impelled many persons to feel that if the war had lasted longer Russia would have certainly won. Finally, Russian military prestige was still so tremendous despite the Peace of Portsmouth that many European tacticians continued planning as if Russia had not been defeated. The chief example of this was Germany's Schlieffen Plan, which dictated the strategy of the opening campaigns of 1914, and was based on the idea that France could be defeated rapidly and that Russia would be the tougher foe.

(5) Japan. The effect of the war on Japan was to lift her immedi-
ately to the position of the most important of Oriental nations. She was the first who had dared and conquered a country of the West. Now her domination over Korea was assured, and her influence in southern Manchuria was unchallenged. Foreign investments, new raw materials, population shifts—all followed in the wake of the war. The war stimulated Japanese economy and accelerated her industrialization. She emerged from the war the mistress of the East, prosperous, powerful, and influential.

Conclusion. The development in the 1890's by both Russia and Japan of an aggressive imperialistic policy in the Far East served to bring about a clash of interests whereby Japan threatened for the first time the position of a Western power in the Orient. Because of Russia's part in the three-power intervention of 1895, and also because Japan wished to warn off Occidental nations from what she considered to be an Oriental preserve, when negotiations failed she was only too willing to take decisive steps. In her war with Russia, Japan adopted a "Sedan strategy" of surprise attack; her success in gambling for a quick victory caused her later to use the same tactics against America and Britain in World War II. On land her forces were able to drive back the Russians but not to defeat them decisively; but on the sea her victory was complete. If however Russia had been able to prolong the war, Japan's prospects would have been measurably reduced, for by mid-1905 she had exhausted her trained troops and her economic resources. Theodore Roosevelt's sympathetic understanding of Japan's problems led him to intervene to bring about a peace conference, and when in the course of the conference he used his influence to get the Japanese to reduce their initial demands he paved the way for future trouble by causing the Japanese to harbor a baseless resentment against America for depriving them of the indemnity they had demanded.

As a result of the Russo-Japanese War, Nippon went merrily along the path to military imperialism. Twice encouraged—first in her brief war against China and again in her successful venture against a major European power—she gladly took up her self-imposed task of extending her political and economic influence over the Orient.
Reform, Republic, and Wreckage in China

Introduction. After more than sixty years of futile resistance to voracious Western imperialism, and with the added bitterness of seeing at close hand how her puny neighbor Japan had dealt successfully with the same problems, China by the turn of the century was ready for drastic change. The first phases of the Chinese Revolution passed through three steps: (1) the attempt by the tottering Manchu dynasty, which had now learned its lesson, to fall in line with Western ways; (2) the failure of that dynasty to solve China's problems, and its consequent overthrow; and finally (3) the displacement of left-wing reformers and the acquisition of control over the revolution by conservative reformers. After each step in the progress of the revolution the world — and China too — thought the revolution was over. But a complete turnabout in the way of life of 400,000,000 persons is not easy to accomplish, and the end of World War II found China still in the midst of its revolution, with a multiplicity of problems before it. A description of these problems will come later; only the early phases of the cataclysmic change will be considered in this chapter.

1. Manchu Reform

Japanese influence. The failure of the Boxer uprising convinced even the stubborn old dowager empress that China did not have the weapons to resist Occidental imperialism. She was shrewd enough moreover to realize that unless her government improved China's situation, her own troubles would multiply. As a result from 1901 until her death in 1908
she more or less sponsored a program of reform legislation. In this pro-
gam Japanese influence came to be a major factor, for the pro-Russian
tendencies of men like Li Hung-chang were greatly discredited by
Japan’s new policy of jockeying with Russia for control of Manchuria,
and after the Russo-Japanese War a veritable epidemic of Japanophile
propaganda swept over the celestial empire. Japanese education, Japa-
nese military tactics, and Japanese government institutions became all
the rage in China as the latter realized to the full how mistaken she had
been in not adopting Japan’s policy of Westernization as a means of
combating Occidental encroachment on her preserves.

In the beginning of the reform movement the empress followed her
own dictates and proceeded to issue administrative edicts which in a
manner of speaking aimed at streamlining the old order. Several factors however prevented the reform movement from accomplishing its aims. One was China’s innate conservatism, a sort of national inertia that led away from change and perpetuated old abuses under new names. Another reason for its failure was the steadfast provincialism of the people— as a result the central government was unable to apply measures uniformly to all sections of the country. Enforcement of the reforms was generally left to local officialdom; therefore where local governors and viceroyes were in sympathy with the reform objectives reforms were made, but where they resisted nothing was done. And besides, lack of funds and trained personnel also hindered real accomplishment.

Educational reforms. The place where reforms were perhaps most needed was the Chinese educational system, a weird combination of good and bad which from a modern viewpoint was neither educational nor a system. In its favor was the fact that it was greatly esteemed by the average citizen. The classical scholar-official was the most honored man in China, and it was perhaps only natural that for centuries the complex Manchu bureaucracy had depended for its recruits upon such scholars. Unfortunately these men were not trained in practical subjects but in classical literature, and the most highly respected mark of greatness was the ability to expound the classics and write in the classical style. The candidate for government appointment had to pass a difficult series of examinations— district, province, metropolitan, and palace— but when he had proved his superiority by surviving all the elimination contests and approached the central government at Peking for his appointment, he was still only an expert in the Chinese classics and the ethical political system which they expounded.

Since in the back of the dowager empress’s mind there had undoubtedly grown up a sneaking suspicion that lack of Western technical education was partly responsible for China’s defeat in the Boxer uprising, she issued in 1901 an edict ending the “eight-legged essay” requirements for the civil service. In 1903 an educational commission issued a report, adopted the following year, that abolished the medieval and outmoded examination system. This report, based on Japanese educational theories, gave only elementary education to women, but favored the establishment of modern schools in each province, and the increase of training in modern and technical subjects. The enforcement of this edict was of course left to local officials, and immediately there sprang up a hodgepodge of attempts to obey or to evade the reform. The province that went farthest in its co-operation was Chihli, ruled by Viceroy Yuan
Shih-k'ai. Perhaps the greatest stimulus to educational reform was provided by America's return of its share of the Boxer indemnity and its use to establish a high school and college in Peking for those who wished to complete their education in the United States. Educational reforms however were not uniform throughout the nation, and even in the bright spots such as Chihli Province some ground gained was lost again when the revolution reached a state of violence.

Military reorganization. Almost as greatly needed as educational reform was military reorganization. The old Chinese army had consisted largely of conscript militia, usually untrained and often weaponless. As a nucleus of "invincible" strength, there was a corps of "Bannermen," largely Manchus with some Chinese, who, though courageous in the Boxer troubles, had been quite unable to resist Western weapons and tactics. In 1906 a proposal was advanced to rebuild the entire Chinese army, first of all through a recruiting program, later by conscription, until a total permanent peacetime strength of 450,000 men was reached. The recruit was to spend three years in regular service, three years in the First Reserves, and then four more in the Second Reserves. Since in those few instances where he had been given a chance to show what he could do the Chinese soldier had proved himself notably capable, high hopes were held that this reform would give China what it needed before it could hope for real independence -- a modern military establishment. But the same pitfalls faced military reformers that stopped educational enthusiasts: reform was made a provincial matter, and while some provincial leaders like Yuan Shih-k'ai proceeded to raise the required number of troops, others neglected their responsibilities. Again the reformers succeeded only in putting a colorful new label on the same old bitter medicine.

Juridical reform. Like Japan a few years before, China was much interested in revision of the unilateral treaties that imposed extraterritoriality and other insults upon her national dignity. But the Manchus knew that before they could hope for any treaty revision they would have to establish a more competent court system, and in 1902 an edict was issued ordering an investigation. Three years later a commission turned in a report recommending the abolition of torture, the reform of prisons, and the modernization of criminal codes. And still again the inability of the central government to enforce its own edicts prevented its recommendations from being effectively carried out.

Currency stabilization. The fourth reform the Manchus attempted was currency stabilization. The money problem in China had always
been complicated, largely because each province minted its own coins, and other provinces would often refuse — sometimes justifiably — to accept them at their face value. Brass cash, copper cents, the Mexican dollar, and silver taels (an uncoined unit of value), plus a completely decentralized currency policy, combined to make China the "paradise of money-changers." Some foreign governments because of the inadequacy of Chinese currency even issued their own special coins for use in China. With reform in the air the Chinese asked for advice from the United States, and in 1904 Dr. J. W. Jenks arrived to study the situation. He made a report recommending a "gold exchange" basis for Chinese currency, with provisions for controlling fluctuations in its value, and some foreign loans. Conservative opposition however blocked his plan, and China was finally forced to resort to borrowing abroad. In 1910 she requested 50,000,000 taels from America, but United States bankers were involved in an arrangement with bankers of Britain, France, and Germany, and consequently a four-power loan had to be floated. It would have stabilized Chinese currency on a silver basis; but it was destined never to be tried. Like Jenks's plan, the loan proposals met interminable delays, and finally the revolution put an end to both schemes.

Constitutional reform. Similar failure balked the efforts of the reformers to revise the basic structure of Chinese government. In 1905 a board was appointed to review suggestions for reorganization, and a special commission on the Japanese model was sent abroad to study representative government in Western nations. On its return the following year the commission presented a list of recommendations, which included representative government on the Japanese model when the people should be ready for it — and readiness meant to the reformers a degree of literacy much greater than the fraction of 1 per cent then prevailing. In 1906 arrangements were completed for the election of provincial assemblies; in some cases the elections were not held, in others they were not administered properly; and the attempt to foist representative government upon a people completely untrained in democracy miserably failed.

The abolition of slavery. Only in the field of social relations did the planners have any substantial success. In 1906 the suggestion was made that the purchase and sale of human beings be abolished, and after some delay an edict to that effect was issued by the throne. In 1910 partial freedom was given to agricultural slaves who now, though bound to the soil, were transformed into serfs. The reform was otherwise incomplete
in that the sale of children was still permitted under certain conditions, but their bondage was not to last beyond their twenty-fifth year.

The end of the opium evil. The government had notable success in dealing with the opium problem. As we have shown in a previous chapter, for many years the importation of opium caused diplomatic difficulties between China and the Western powers, and the opening of China to Western trade was partly due to the British desire to continue that lucrative trade. All efforts to stop opium imports failed miserably, and the problem seemed insoluble. But in 1906 the authorities hit upon a method that was to bring eventual if temporary success — namely, the regulation of internal consumption. To that end laws were passed restricting the cultivation of the narcotic and ordering addicts to free themselves from the habit within ten years. All smokers had to be licensed — with the exception of those over sixty, which nearly exempted the dowager empress. And finally, for incorrigibles severe punishments were provided, most of which emphasized the losing of "face" rather than corporal penalties. At the same time the government began negotiating with Britain to cut down imports from Bengal. In 1909 an international opium commission met at Shanghai, and in 1911 an Anglo-Chinese Agreement was signed providing for the annual reduction of the amount imported and the total ending of the trade by 1917.

The campaign was a success. Imports from India ceased in 1913, and a widespread campaign led by the grandson of Commissioner Lin, the man who had precipitated the first Opium War by destroying chests of the drug, succeeded in rousing public sentiment in favor of the experiment. Pipes were burned publicly, and China rejoiced at its new freedom from this repulsive form of bondage. But unfortunately the chaos of civil war broke down the reform, and somewhat later Japanese invaders completed its destruction by reintroducing opium and even more deadly narcotics in certain areas of occupied China which they hoped would be softened by a moral breakdown.

The end of the reform movement. The revolutionary chaos that destroyed most of the Manchu reforms came about because they had no firm basis. They were instigated by the Manchu dynasty and its advisers not because these had the welfare of the Chinese people at heart but because they thought that in these reforms they saw a way of saving themselves in a time of growing crisis. And one of the chief reasons that crisis had enveloped the dynasty was its lack of strong and progressive leadership. For half a century the government of China had been in the hands of a tiny, black-eyed, strong-willed woman who played
The approach to Shanghai, although devoid of beauty just as are the approaches to New York City and Buenos Aires, is spectacular because the harbor is always full of a great variety of vessels, many of them of the type used when the Treaty of Nanking opened up China to foreign trade.

with emperors like puppets and controlled their every move. It was but natural that in the dying struggles of the dynasty all efforts at reform should have been instituted by her, and it was equally understandable that at her death the era of reform should have ended. That long-postponed event occurred in 1908. In the spring she suffered a slight stroke, which altered her facial expression somewhat and for the first time in her long life made her look like an old woman. At the same time the emperor’s health grew progressively worse, and — strangely enough — both the Emperor Kuang-hsi and the Old Buddha died in November, he on the fourteenth and she on the following day. Before her death she had sworn her followers to adhere to the grandson of her staunchest supporter, Jung Lu, and thus the two-year-old infant, Pu-yi, became the last Manchu emperor of China.

Prince Ch’un. Under this infant emperor, China was guided in its uncertain course by a weak-willed nobleman named Prince Ch’un. He
seemed unaware that the dynasty cried for strong leadership if it were to survive, and since he was unable to provide it the patriotic thing for him to have done would have been to retain in a powerful post the strongest man in China, Yüan Shih-kai, viceroy of Chihli. But Prince Ch'un resented Yüan’s influence and dismissed him, to the immeasurable damage of the régime. Without strong leadership the reform movement tottered, then collapsed; and ironically enough one of the very reforms which had been proposed as a method of saving the dynasty proved the means of overthrowing it.

The national assembly. The Frankenstein which turned upon its creators was the national assembly, convened in Peking in October 1910. A unicameral body with half of its members appointed, it nevertheless showed definite anti-Manchu tendencies. The sessions were stormy, and a clear call for reform was issued. In January of the following year it adjourned, after having arranged for the gathering of a national legislature in 1913. The legislature was destined never to meet in the way mapped out for it; for before the year was out the country was to be in the throes of armed rebellion.

2. Setting up the Republic

Causes of the revolution: (r) The reformers. Revolution had been brewing in the celestial empire for nearly a century. The Middle Kingdom’s egocentric isolation and its failure during the nineteenth century to repel foreign intrusions had branded the Manchu dynasty as ineffective, and the example of Japan’s much more successful dealing with the foreigners provided a constant irritant. The mass of Chinese of course were too much ground down by poverty and illiteracy to be capable of self-help, and it was left to a small group of educated liberals to apply the spark to the smoldering embers of revolt.

Leader of the revolutionists was Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The son of a farmer near Macao, he became a Christian, attended a medical college at Hong Kong, and went to school in Hawaii. Very early in life he became associated with revolutionary movements; in 1895, the year after his graduation, and again following the Boxer Rebellion, he was implicated in political plots. Sometime before 1900 he evolved three basic principles which were to be the foundations of the Chinese Revolution — nationalism, socialism (“The People’s Livelihood”), and democracy. His ideas of change however were far more socialistic than democratic, and continued in that trend when after the Boxer Rebellion
Statue of Sun Yat-sen, Canton, China
his goals became clearer. In association with other liberals he organized a political society, the T'ungmenghui, on the order of the Jacobin Club, and began at the same time to collect funds for the revolution. Fortunately for him, many of the wealthiest elements in China, including the Canton merchants, favored some governmental change; and in addition thousands of Chinese emigrants who had prospered abroad, now thoroughly shamed by the ineffectiveness of the Manchus, contributed millions to his coffers. The dynasty became aware of his widespread activities and offered a reward for his capture; at one time while an exile in London he was kidnapped and held a prisoner in the Chinese legation, and obtained his freedom only through the efforts of influential English friends. Sun returned to China in 1911 on the outbreak of revolt, and — though he was never able to consolidate all of revolutionary China under his influence — became the spiritual head of the revolution, "China's George Washington," while the society he had created grew into the dominant political party of modern China, the Kuomin-tang.

Associated with Sun in these early days were student groups, convinced that the millennium was possible with the overthrow of the Manchus, and many extreme radicals whose thinking passed far beyond Sun's mild socialism. Merchants and businessmen, particularly in the south, also showed a tendency to sympathize. Together these factions inspired China to rebellion; and their first task, the overthrow of the dynasty, proved easy. The building of a united nation however was a different matter; the various groups were never welded together, and the resolving of their differences is still in flux.

(2) Foreign influence. The work of the reformers was aided by foreign encroachments on the celestial empire. Missionaries and educators had inculcated Western ideas in the Chinese mind. The battle for the concessions had divided the country into economic spheres which never really operated for the benefit of the Chinese themselves, and wealthy merchants and bankers desired a change that would make the nation capable of economic self-defense. The constant retreat of the Chinese government from the place it had once held in the family of nations was a source of shame to most educated persons. The last-ditch attempts of the Manchus at reform had ended the old civil service, which, venal and corrupt though it was, had operated on a higher level than did the new bureaucracy that arose after the revolution, composed largely of military adventurers who half-heartedly and inefficiently tried to imitate foreign methods. Finally, the nation was so unstable
financially that some sort of foreign aid was essential, and it was very largely over the foreign financing of China's railroads that the fighting began.

(3) The standard of living. The persistent nagging of the reformers plus the irritants provided by foreign intrusion added to the troubles of a nation already suffering from a multitude of problems. Although the map gives the impression that China is big enough to support many more than her 400,000,000, the population is closely crowded along the coast and in the Yellow and Yangtze river valleys in a relatively limited agricultural area. So precarious was the balance between life and death that the failure of a single crop condemned thousands of peasants to death, while the habitual floods of the Yellow River dispossessed thou-
sands more. And with the organization of a vernacular press in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the accompanying betterment of communications, the people’s misfortunes were brought home to them as never before.

(4) Railroad centralization. Volumes could be written on these matters, for they were the basic causes of the Chinese Revolution. But we must turn now to the immediate causes of the revolt. One of these was the government’s attempt to centralize control of the railroads. This policy was inconsistent to say the least with China’s traditional reliance upon provincial authority for execution of the laws. Provincial capitalists who had financed railroad construction concluded that the national government was perfectly willing to see them take the risks in a speculative enterprise, but when railroad profits proved to be sure and good, then Peking wished to step in and skim off the cream. Therefore when government agents assigned the job of centralizing the lines were accused of graft and corruption to the detriment of provincial investors, some of the provinces resisted the government agents. These dissenters organized a "Patriots’ Society" and a "Rights Recovery Group," and stimulated student strikes. As a result the throne issued an order to Chao Er-feng, viceroy of Szechwan Province, where agitation was at its worst, to quell the disturbance; and his method of obeying the throne’s command led to the first bloodshed of the revolution.

Opening guns of the revolution. Viceroy Chao was nicknamed "The Butcher," and his actions in carrying out imperial orders fully confirmed his title. After warning the foreign residents of Chengtu to stay out of danger, he invited the disaffected elements of his province to a discussion meeting on September 7, 1911, at his headquarters or yamen. When they arrived he seized and imprisoned them and closed down the propaganda press. A crowd of sympathizers gathered before the yamen, crying for their leaders, and dispersed only when Chao ordered them to be fired upon. Chao had unwittingly grasped a tiger by the tail; malcontents rapidly mobilized into guerrilla armies and attacked the provincial capital. The regent in Peking, seeing which way the wind was blowing, speedily turned his coat and abandoned his viceroy. A commission of investigation recommended a further scrutiny into Chao’s methods, and after a farcical trial, during which the administration of the province fell into the hands of military adventurers and rebels of many stamps, Chao was executed and his head carried on a pike with the label, "You love to look down upon men."

Hankow and Wuchang. On October 9, 1911, a bomb exploded in
This marble barge in the magnificent Summer Palace of the Manchu emperors at Peking is one of the most commonly-pictured examples of the imperial grandeur of the Dragon Throne.

Chinese dwelling in Hankow, and the authorities discovered that a veritable bomb factory was in operation there, complete with flags and documents that proved the proprietor's complicity with Sun's revolutionary groups. Several of those implicated were beheaded; and in the midst of the attendant excitement some regiments of provincial troops mutinied. On October 10 the viceroy of Hupeh Province, Jui Cheng, had a visitor — his military aide, Li Yuan-hung. Li informed his superior that he had been chosen generalissimo of the revolutionary armies, and offered Jui his choice of escape or suicide; Jui chose escape. After some hesitation, Li announced his intention of overthrowing the Manchu régime. Twenty thousand troops, mostly from Wuchang across the river joined Li, and for a time there was complete chaos — every soldier not wearing the white armband of the revolution was shot on sight, and much looting and rioting occurred despite Li's efforts to keep some degree of order.
The revolution spreads. The successful outbreak in Hankow and Wuchang stimulated similar uprisings all over China, especially in the Yangtze River towns. Between China's first independence day — October 10 — and October 30, when the Manchus surrendered their power, city after city fell in line. Changsha, Sian, Canton, Tientsin, and other important places either declared their independence or demonstrated their sympathy in other ways. The throne, desperate and seemingly aware that this was indeed the end of the dynasty, mobilized its few remaining loyal troops and placed them under the leadership of Yüan Shih-kai, who, still smarting from his earlier dismissal, showed no eagerness to assume the command. By October 28 the revolutionists felt themselves ready to call a meeting of delegates at Wuchang; two days later the throne appointed Yüan Shih-kai premier and turned the government over to him.

Yüan's counteroffensive. As commander-in-chief of the imperial forces, Yüan staged a half-hearted campaign against the Yangtze cities. Both success and failure attended his efforts. At Hanyang, across the Han River from Hankow, imperial troops drove Li's revolutionary armies steadily back, and finally recaptured the entire north bank of the Yangtze River in that vicinity. Then Hankow, badly damaged by warfare, was lost to the rebels. In Nanking Yüan's forces, under the command of the one general known to be staunchly loyal to the Manchus—"Old Tiger," Chang Hsun—won decisively. In Peking, headquarters of the Manchu régime, chaos was complete, and thousands of Manchus fled north. Prince Ch'un resigned the regency, and a veritable epidemic of queue-cutting, which symbolized riddance of the Manchu yoke, took place. Yüan's military efforts have been assessed as an attempt to play both ends against the middle; he was well aware of China's unpreparedness for democracy, and yet he realized the strength of the revolutionary movement. His goal probably was some sort of constitutional monarchy, with himself in the driver's seat, and in order to achieve this without losing national unity he was obliged to be lenient in his warfare against the rebels.

The Shanghai junta. Meanwhile in Shanghai a powerful mandarin named Wu T'ing-fang had seized the reins of government and had organized a junta which purported to represent the entire Chinese Revolution. Shanghai was the chief point of contact between China and foreign nations, and foreigners obtained their view of the revolt through the bombastic reports, proclamations, edicts, and shrill claims of this interesting upstart. By the time Li Yuan-hung and the other revolutionary leaders
were ready to organize a formal government, Wu and his cohorts had risen to such prominence that they could not be ignored. In fact it was Wu's proposal which in the main was finally carried out — that a republic be established with Yuan as president, Dr. Sun as vice president, and a parliament supposedly elected by the people, but actually under the control of the Shanghai junta.

The return of Sun Yat-sen. Meanwhile the ideological chief of the revolution had returned to his native land. Dr. Sun, hearing of the stirring events in China while on a tour in western America, hastened home. With him went one of the most interesting personalities of modern China — an American soldier of fortune, Homer Lea. Lea was a Californian, a hunchback, and a military expert. His deep interest in China and its military problems had made him Sun's confidant, and it was Lea who designed the grand strategy for Sun's part in the revolution. He declined Sun's offer of a cabinet position because he preferred to remain an unofficial adviser. His farsighted understanding of the Far East and its problems led him to believe that Japan was capable of becoming a troublemaker, and his books, the most important of which was *The Valor of Ignorance*, were avidly read by Americans after Pearl Harbor, as a literary substitute for locking the barn door after the horse was stolen.

Sun arrived in China at the height of the hostilities. Yuan had turned down Wu's proposal that he be president of a Chinese republic, because of his fear that China was not yet ready for democracy. Wu then turned to Generalissimo Li and organized a provisional government at Nanking, which on December 29 proceeded to elect Dr. Sun president. Yuan had already tried to get in touch with Li to start negotiations, but when the Nanking régime was organized, he transferred his attention to Dr. Sun. It became quite evident to all factions that however much they might want to squabble over the spoils they must get together. Sun and the Nanking group had the allegiance of the radicals and rebels; Yuan could count on the support of what was left of the imperial army, the bureaucrats, and the foreign powers. Dr. Sun had behind him most of the revolution, but Yuan had the means of getting foreign loans; each was helpless without the other. After a deadlock of some weeks, Dr. Sun generously and on his own initiative telephoned Yuan, offering him the presidency of the Chinese Republic. Again Yuan hesitated; and the Manchus seeing him waver desperately made counteroffers on condition that he continue to support the dynasty. Yuan finally perceived that a constitutional monarchy was impossible
and completely against the will of the leaders of the revolution. Accordingly he broke with the Manchus, accepted Sun's offer, and thus ended the three centuries of Manchu rule.

The abdication of the Manchus. On February 12, 1912, the dowager empress, Lung Yu, who had taken over the regency on the resignation of Prince Ch'Un, formally abdicated the throne in the name of the infant emperor, Pu-yi. The Manchus were to be honorably treated and provided with a generous financial settlement, and a republican government under Yuan Shih-kai was set up by imperial decree. Thus the dynasty of interlopers who had held the dragon throne for 268 years was destroyed by its own ineptitude and the rise of forces inside and outside of China which it could not hope to control.

3. The Wrecking of the Republic

Yuan's policy. Yuan Shih-kai, who found himself in power at this point, was largely responsible for the creation of the new imperial army, and counting with some justification on its loyalty, felt that he had the north and east of China solidly under his control. His conservative views and sympathetic regard for monarchy won the allegiance of the old bureaucracy, and in order to guarantee their support he refused to set up his government in Nanking, as the radicals wished, but instead remained stubbornly in Peking, headquarters of the old imperial régime. For better or worse, Yuan soon found himself heading one of the two major factions into which a badly split China was divided. His group favored centralization, conservativism, military strength, preservation of the old bureaucracy, and dependence upon foreign financial aid; the other faction, with its strength concentrated in and south of the Yangtze valley, was composed of radicals and revolutionaries, dominated largely by the Kuomintang and Sun Yat-sen. Yuan's policy was necessarily to maintain his own influence by favoring the conservatives, for he soon found that the old hostility directed for years against the Manchus was now directed against him.

Yuan's government. The first administrative machinery with which Yuan attempted to solve China's multitudinous problems consisted of a council of five members from each province, and an assembly elected indirectly, with one representative for each 8,000,000 persons including overseas Chinese. The council was soon hopelessly split into factions representing the conservative and liberal viewpoints; the assembly was dominated by Sun Yat-sen's adherents, the Kuomintang. Yuan's own
cabinet and prime minister thereupon came under the influence of the assembly, and Yuan had to reorganize it to obtain co-operation. His vice president was Li Yuan-hung, former general of the Wu-han armies.

Finances. Party factionalism was increased by the government’s monetary problems. A four-power banking group (the United States, Germany, Great Britain, and France) had been formed in 1908 to finance Chinese railway construction. This group was willing to provide funds. Yuan negotiated a loan of $125,000,000, but when this proved insufficient and he attempted to supplement it with additional money from private sources, the four-power group (now actually six powers, because they had had to invite Japan and Russia to participate) refused to do business without a monopoly guarantee. President Wilson came to the conclusion that the loan would have undesirable effects on China’s independence as a sovereign nation and the United States withdrew, so that in 1913 the final loan agreement was signed by five powers only.

The Kuomintang, which dominated the assembly, decided that the loan issue was as good as any to test the party’s real strength in the nation. Their members objected to it because it would strengthen Yuan’s hand and limit Chinese sovereignty, and accordingly they insisted that Yuan submit the terms of the loan to the assembly for its approval. He refused, to the satisfaction of the foreign powers, who preferred to see financial transactions kept out of the whirlpool of republican politics. Partly because of their dissatisfaction over the loan issue the radicals in 1913 started a “summer revolution” in the Yangtze valley, and though it was crushed without much difficulty it robbed the nation of many of its liberal leaders. Yuan purged the assembly, declared the Kuomintang subversive and membership in it unlawful, and even exiled the revolution’s great sponsor, Sun Yat-sen.

Yuan as dictator. The government Yuan administered during the first months of his administration was recognized as provisional, and the assembly even before its purge had been drawing up a plan for a permanent constitution. Certain provisions of this constitution were withheld through Yuan’s extralegal influence because they provided a degree of centralization not favored by the majority of the Kuomintang; and when it was promulgated in 1913 it gave the executive powers that made him a veritable dictator. Yuan further accomplished this objective by appointing a constitutional council to rewrite the constitution; and when this second document was put into effect he emerged as warlord of republican China. As president, he had a ten-year term of office; the right to prolong that term under certain circumstances, and the abil-
try to choose his own successor. As if that were not enough, the council was replaced by a secretary of state, responsible only to the president. The assembly was to continue but in a merely advisory capacity. Yüan found it necessary to resort to terrorism of a sort, a national spy organization, and many of the trappings of dictatorship in order to preserve his régime against the struggles of the liberals. But he managed to restore order, and during his brief life China was united in name if not in fact.

Foreign affairs. China's chief foreign problems during and after the revolution concerned the relations of Russia, England, and Japan with her border provinces. Russian economic penetration into Mongolia had been recognized for several years, and when largely because of the upheaval occasioned by the revolution a revolt took place, Russia sent troops into Outer Mongolia and negotiated a new treaty with China. The terms provided for the independence of the area under Chinese suzerainty but Russian rights were recognized and protected. Almost the same state of affairs prevailed in Tibet, where shortly before the revolution the government of the Dalai Lama began to protest China's strengthening of her tenuous hold. Britain was interested in maintaining her influence in Tibet, and although Yüan signed a treaty providing for a closer degree of Chinese supervision in Tibetan affairs and the division of the country into outer and inner zones, it was never ratified and Britain seemed well satisfied. Japan's relations with China took the form of the "Twenty-One Demands"; they will be discussed in the next chapter in connection with World War I.

The ruin of democracy. Like most dictators, Yüan Shih-k'ai found it easier to increase controls than to modify them. Urged on by the conviction that China needed a strong hand and by his own overweening ambition, he decided to reinstate the empire. Aided by a conservative society known as the Chou-an-k'ai and by his American adviser, Dr. F. J. Goodnow, Yüan called a national convention in 1915 to decide whether to bring back the monarchy. As the convention had been handpicked, its decision to make Yüan emperor was a surprise to no one, and Yüan announced that January 1, 1916, would see the revival of the dragon throne. Liberal opposition to this move was seconded by the protests of Britain, France, and Russia; and when a revolt broke out in Yunnan and the southwestern provinces Yüan reluctantly postponed the change. In March he was forced to admit that he had been misinformed regarding the public will; and less than three months afterward he died, thoroughly disappointed with China, his own failure, and future prospects.
President Li Yuan-hung. Yuan was succeeded on his death by his vice president, Li Yuan-hung, who proved to be a better soldier than statesman. His was the only strong hand capable of guiding China through these tumultuous years, primarily because his was the only authority that the troops would recognize. But under him China fell apart. The first step in her breakup was a quarrel between Li and his prime minister, Tuan Chi-jui; and Tuan’s dismissal was the signal for another outbreak of militarism. Tuan won the aid of many of the northern warlords who had previously accepted Yuan’s rule, and marched on Peking. After a brief attempt to revive the monarchy a second time, China dissolved into military chaos, with provincial bureaucrats and military upstarts ruling autonomously and semi-autonomously throughout the nation. (For a fuller discussion see Chapter 27.) The Chinese Revolution had entered its second and most tragic phase — the period of the Tuchunate, during which the tuchuns or warlords controlled China’s destiny. But out of this anarchy was to arise a new government and a new strong leader, with the Kuomintang reigning supreme. First however there had to be many years of trial and sorrow. “He who rides a tiger cannot dismount,” the sages had said. On Yuan’s death those who had famously felt that the revolution had ended in 1912 with the Manchu abdication realized for the first time that China was still “riding the tiger.”

The significance of Yuan’s death. If Yuan Shih-kai had lived, and, more important, if he had been able to foist his unpopular ideas of monarchy upon China, there is a possibility that China might have avoided the period of chaos that followed. It is not fair however to claim that the prolonging of the revolution was due to his death alone, for even if he had been able to suppress liberal thought for many years, and even if his successors had been able to carry on in the same way, the voice of Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang would not have been stilled. As it was, the Tuchunate was overwhelmed by the Kuomintang — although that organization was admittedly greatly modified when it came to power — and by that triumph China was assured a degree of unity that enabled her successfully to hold out against Japan for the eight long years of World War II.

Conclusion. The climax to the stirring events in China’s nineteenth century history came with the turn of the century. After the Manchu dynasty had vainly tried force against the Western intruders, Tzu Hsi, the Old Buddha, suddenly became converted to policies of reform. For a decade edict after edict was issued in an attempt to modernize China as
Japan had been modernized. But the authorities neglected to take into account the growing opposition to their methods, and the age-old provincialism which prevented any policy from being applied consistently throughout the empire. Reformers arose and the traditional buttresses against rebellion were broken down until finally in 1911 fighting broke out in the Yangtze valley. The dynasty found itself helpless, and called on its most powerful supporter, Yuan Shih-kai, former viceroy of Chihli and organizer of the new imperial army, to put down the rebellion. Yuan found that things had gone too far, and saved his own position by deliberately refusing to crush the rebels. Sun Yat-sen returned from exile, and was elected provisional president; then Yuan, with the support of his troops and his influence with foreign nations, switched to the side of the revolutionists and thus made Sun's position secure.

As president, Yuan attempted to discard liberalism and to rule by despotic methods. Thwarted in his attempt to bring back the monarchy, he nevertheless succeeded in centralizing controls to such an extent that the Kuomintang and Dr. Sun were temporarily discredited. When Yuan died in 1916 the military warlords and powerful provincial bureaucrats seized power for themselves, and China was broken up into feudalities. This unfortunate condition was to endure for more than a decade, and then a new leader was to arise to reunite China once again, this time under the banner of the Kuomintang.
World War I and the Pacific Area

Introduction. A discussion of the ways by which China and Japan individually dealt with their Occidental entanglements is naturally followed by a description of the events that intertwined the destinies of West and East so complexly that they can never again be unraveled. Although World War I was primarily a European conflict, it nevertheless had repercussions in the Pacific which, even though enlarged upon tremendously in the recent military sequel to Versailles, in the year 1914 did end once and for all the myth of Oriental isolation.

1. Britain's Pacific Possessions in the War

One segment of the Pacific Area which could not hope to be left out of the world conflict was that which included Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and portions of Melanesia and Polynesia; all parts of the British Empire. Britain had played an important role in the political maneuverings that preceded the Austrian attack upon Serbia in 1914, and not least of the tensions most responsible for the struggle were those that grew out of the jealousies caused by England's imperialistic success. Most unhappy of Britain's rivals was Germany, hungry for "a place in the sun," and unable to find it because her late entry into the race for colonies left her only the lands that had been ignored by more fortunate early comers. Among these areas were the Bismarck Archipelago (the islands of New Britain and New Ireland, northeast of New Guinea), part of New Guinea itself, a fragment of the Samoan Archipelago which included the bay of Apia, the German Solomon Islands, and the Caro-
Arts and crafts of the South Pacific. Tapa cloth is a characteristic pounded bark fabric of the Pacific. The above examples are from the Tonga Islands (top) and the Fiji Islands (bottom). Of the two drums the carved signal drum is from New Ireland in the Bismarck Archipelago, and the hollow drum is from the Cook Islands. The mother-of-pearl and shell pendants are from the Solomon Islands; and the twenty-one inch breast ornament is from Easter Island.
line, Marshall, and Mariana islands, part of that region of tiny, economically unimportant land-dots known collectively as Micronesia. Nor even her successful participation in the "battle for the concessions" and her consequent "acquisition" of the Shantung peninsula as a sphere of influence with its port of Tsingtao could give Germany equality with Great Britain in the Far East; and the situation was made worse when all the different units of Britain's far-flung empire immediately came to the aid of the mother country.

Canada. History shows that although during peacetime Britain's dominions customarily affect an indifference to the welfare of the mother country and prate much of their independence, when crisis comes they are uniformly loyal. This was specially true in World War I when Canada, one of the most self-sufficient of Britain's overseas possessions, sent about 500,000 men to the battle fronts. It is true that her citizens of French ancestry characteristically opposed conscription, but despite their objection a conscription bill was passed in 1916 by the Canadian Parliament, and Canada's regiments provided one of Britain's chief military props in the hard fighting of the Western Front.

Australia. Australia, the "land down under," participated voluntarily to the extent of 1,000,000 troops, and the famed "Anzacs," the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, gained everlasting glory in the bloody, discouraging Dardanelles campaign of 1915 — the single great attempt at a combined land-sea operation that was made during the first World War.

New Zealand. New Zealand, with a population of little more than 1,000,000, contributed 110,000 men to the armed forces, and gallantly adopted compulsory training to insure the adequacy of its aid.

New Guinea and Samoa. Operations involving British Pacific possessions included the occupation of German territories south of the equator, the running down of commerce raiders, and participation in a major naval engagement. The British squadron at Hong Kong, under the command of Admiral Jarram, opened hostilities in 1914 by raiding the German wireless station on the island of Yap. Following this, British vessels co-operated with the Australian fleet in blockading and harassing the German Admiral von Spee and his squadron, attempting at that time to get home via Cape Horn, and also on August 9 participated in a raid on Rabaul, capital of German New Guinea. Somewhat later, on August 30, Jarram was able to aid the New Zealand Samoa expedition in forcing the surrender of German Samoa. The British then co-operated with an Australian expeditionary force which landed at Rabaul on Sep-
tember 11 and brought about the surrender of the Bismarck Archipelago and German New Guinea four days later.

**Commerce raiders.** One of the most successful of the German commerce destroyers was the light cruiser *Emden*, which commenced operations in the Indian Ocean shortly after the war began. The *Emden* cruised the Bay of Bengal, bombarded Madras, raided the waters of Ceylon, and finally — only after the loss of its mother ships — fled toward Cocos Island. On November 9, 1914, after a career of depredation in which it sank fifteen Allied vessels, the *Emden* was cornered by the Australian warship *Sydney*, and sent to the bottom. An even more picturesque German raider was the *Seeadler*, under the command of Count Felix von Luckner — a disguised windjammer which operated against the remains of the Allied sailing fleet. After a highly successful period in the Atlantic, the *Seeadler* fled to the Pacific and was wrecked in December, 1916.

**The Battle of Coronel.** The one major sea battle in Pacific waters was the Battle of Coronel, which took place off the coast of Chile on November 1, 1914. Admiral von Spee, commanding four cruisers, was frantically attempting to evade the Allied naval blockade in the South Pacific, and eventually fled toward Cape Horn. Admiral Cradock, in command of the British South Atlantic Squadron, was ordered by the Admiralty to prevent von Spee's egress, and the two met — inadvertently, and much to the Britisher's surprise — at Coronel. Cradock was in no position to fight a successful engagement. Von Spee's ships outgunned his by far, and Cradock had been obliged to take with him into conflict an obsolete battleship that slowed his progress and made him highly vulnerable in maneuvers. Von Spee's superior speed permitted him to hide against the South American shore, while the British squadron was silhouetted brilliantly in the rays of the setting sun. Two British vessels, the flagship *Good Hope* and the cruiser *Monmouth*, went down with all hands, including Cradock. The other three British vessels, including the ancient battle-wagon *Canopus*, which, after delaying Cradock's advance failed to reach the scene of action until too late to be of any assistance, had to flee to their Falkland Islands base. The Battle of Coronel was one of the most decisive defeats ever suffered by the British in their entire naval history. A short time later, von Spee was to pay for his success in the Battle of the Falkland Islands, when British Admiral Sturdee sank four out of von Spee's five vessels.

The British Empire therefore participated to good effect in the Pacific phases of World War I. Britain and her dominions successfully
cleared the German menace from all of the lands south of the equator, and their naval strength, together with that of Japan, made the Pacific safe for Allied merchant shipping and troop convoys.

2. The Pacific States of Latin America and World War I

Hispanic America maintained its neutrality until 1917; then the influence of the United States induced most of the Western Hemisphere to line up on the side of the Allies. Most of the Central American states—Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, with Panama—entered the war as active belligerents, while Peru and Ecuador satisfied themselves with breaking off relations. Those states which remained neutral were Chile, her actions then an interesting prognostication of what was to be her attitude during World War II; Colombia, still slightly irked about the Panama Canal episode; Mexico, which had been openly approached by Germany in the famed Zimmermann correspondence and which had already engaged in a diplomatic clash with President Wilson; and El Salvador, influenced by Germany's extensive participation in her coffee business.

Latin America's attitude was fairly unimportant as far as major military issues were concerned. If the British navy had not been so powerful in the Pacific, friendly west coast states might have offered convenient harborage for units of the German fleet, but as it was they generally extended benevolent neutrality to the Allies. Economically they provided some assistance through increased nitrate and copper exports, and psychologically the knowledge that most of the Western Hemisphere was sympathetic aided Allied morale.

3. Japan in the First World War

Reasons for entry. Of all the Pacific nations Japan was most affected by World War I. Of her two reasons for entry into the conflict on the side of the Allies one was altruistic (to an extent); the other was purely selfish and completely in line with her growing policy of imperialism. The first cause was Japan's treaty of alliance with Britain, first signed in 1902 and thereafter renewed. There was really nothing in the treaty that required Japan to enter the struggle, but the British alliance had been the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy for so many years that certain Japanese officials considered her participation a matter of course. The second and more important cause for her entry was her desire to rid
herself of the threat which she felt Germany's occupation of Tsingtao represented. Moreover she still felt a rankling resentment over the part Germany had played in the three-power intervention of 1895 when Germany aided Russia and France in forcing Japan to relinquish the Liaotung cession. Besides, the time seemed to be ripe for expansion in China while the powers of Europe were busy in Flanders. All these reasons combined to lead Japan into the war in August of 1914; and before the year was out Germany's possessions in Shantung were in Nipponese hands.

The siege of Shantung. Japan's participation in the war began with a curiously worded ultimatum to Germany, "advising" her to cede Shantung and its outworks to Japan with the ultimate objective of turning it over to China. Germany did not bother to reply to this demand, and on August 23 Japan declared war. The chief German stronghold on the Shantung peninsula was the port of Tsingtao, defended by a garrison of more than 4000 men and protected by a double line of forts and a naval base. The Japanese repeated their Port Arthur strategy by beginning the campaign with a naval bombardment; from that point on however they moved more cautiously. Considering the preoccupation of Germany with her European enemies and her probable inability to send reinforcements, Japan could afford to proceed leisurely. Her first step was to force from China permission to march over Chinese territory behind the city, so as to envelop it in a pincers. China after some objection established a war zone within which the Japanese were warned to restrict their combat operations. The Japanese then landed troops at Lungkow, and aided by a British detachment proceeded to cut off Tsingtao's communications with the interior. Gradually they advanced behind siege guns and an elaborate trench system, and on November 7, 1914, Tsingtao surrendered; Japan thereby became proprietor of the German sphere of influence in China.

The Pacific islands. Japan's second accomplishment in the war was to capture and occupy the German-held islands in Micronesia — the Carolines, Marshalls, and Marianas. This operation was completed without much opposition, and Japan soon found herself in possession of all former German properties north of the equator. The islands were turned over to Japan as mandates under the League of Nations, and how poorly Nippon lived up to her responsibilities as a mandatory power was seen in World War II, when Allied troops encountered positions so strong that only years of extralegal military preparation could have accounted for them.
Convoys and destroyers. The third method by which Japan aided the Allies was to contribute vessels for convoying Australian and New Zealand troops and to act as a supply base for Allied navies. Japanese war vessels also patrolled the waters of the Pacific, on guard against ubiquitous German commerce destroyers. In addition, when the U-boats began taking a heavy toll of Allied shipping, Japan agreed to send a destroyer squadron to the Mediterranean to aid in the antisubmarine campaign. The only time Tokyo failed the Allies was when she rejected the suggestion that Japan send an expeditionary force to the Balkans.

The significance of Japanese aid. Although it is easy now to be overcritical of Japanese motives at the time of World War I, objective appraisal of the cost and profit of her entry leaves one with the conviction that she risked little and gained much. Gambling on German preoccupation in the West was not too chancy a wager; and as it turned out Japan made gains in both China and the Pacific which enabled her to fight a better war in 1941–1942. It is probably too much to say that Japan as a nation realized that her gains in 1919 would be the stepping-stones to greater adventures in the future; but it is entirely safe to say that at least a few leaders in Japan chortled over her acquisitions and made plans then to utilize them some years hence. That her viewpoint was not completely altruistic should have been realized by her Allies when she followed up her conquest of German Pacific possessions by an inexcusable pressure-play against China. Only the fact that the war ended when it did prevented Japan from squeezing even more advantages from it. By 1915 Japan’s policy was definitely Machiavellian.

Sino-Japanese friction. Its evil characteristics were most clearly shown in China where, although the government had consented albeit unwillingly to establish a war zone within which Japanese troops might operate, the Japanese failed to stay within the prescribed bounds. Troops were maneuvered outside the zone, and the German railway was occupied more than 250 miles inland. The Chinese government watched these proceedings angrily, and when Tsingtao capitulated, took steps to end the existence of the war zone. On January 7, after giving the Japanese time to withdraw their troops to former German territory, China announced to both Japanese and British legations that the war zone was abolished. Japan seized upon this hasty renunciation as an excuse to create an international incident. Premier Okuma called a general election, and upon his return to office ordered the Japanese minister in Peking, Mr. Hioki, to transmit to the Chinese government a list of twenty-
one demands, which had been prepared for some time and which the Japanese had merely been holding for an opportune moment.

The Twenty-One Demands. Collectively the Twenty-One Demands if they had been granted would have given Japan economic control so complete that most of China would have become a Japanese sphere of influence. The demands were divided into five groups, of which the fifth was the most obnoxious to the Chinese. (1) The first group required that Japan's arrangements with Germany regarding disposition of the captured territory be approved—whatever they might be. In addition Japan was to have a monopoly of privilege in Shantung, and was to be given railroad and trading rights not extended to any other power. (2) The second group of demands gave Japan pre-eminent rights in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Japan's leases of Port Arthur and certain Manchurian railways were to be extended to ninety-nine years, and Japan was to have economic control of the area. In case China felt the need of foreign advisers in these regions, she was to employ only Japanese in that capacity. (3) The third group concerned iron and coal mines and mills in the Yangtze valley. Japan was to be given interests in the major companies operating there, and these joint Sino-Japanese corporations would thereafter have monopolistic control of the region. (4) The fourth in the series was a simple insistence that China cede no more territory to other foreign powers. (5) Finally group five was a miscellany that caught up all the loose ends the authors of the proposals might have forgotten in preceding sections. Japanese advisers were to be employed by the Chinese government in varying capacities, China was to be required to buy arms and munitions from Japan, some areas were to be policed jointly, certain Yangtze railway concessions were to be given to Japan, Tokyo's approval was to be obtained before China acquired foreign capital for use in Fukien Province (opposite Formosa), and Japanese churches, schools, hospitals, and missionary establishments in China were to be given special rights and privileges.

The Twenty-One Demands were significant for many reasons, but two stand out especially. First was the fact that Japan had chosen well the time to issue the demands. Most of the world was busy with the central powers of Europe, and no single nation—not even Britain, which was greatly disturbed over the clause in group five that demanded the cession of railway rights in the Yangtze valley—was willing to antagonize Japan to the point of hostilities at that particular moment. Second, was the glaring spectacle of Japan, an Oriental nation, behaving toward China precisely as Western nations—whose
actions Japan had protested — had behaved earlier. The demands were unilateral; Japan was to get all the benefit, while China would receive nothing. It was a blatantly self-evident pressure-play, to which later analysts have ascribed the real beginning of Japan’s modern belligerence.

China’s reaction. On receipt of the demands the government of Yuan Shih-kai was dismayed and protested vigorously. Japan however rested secure in her knowledge that the European nations interested in the Orient could do nothing because of the war, and that the only great nation not yet involved in the conflict had consistently refused to use force to support the open door. That one nation which might have come to China’s aid was the United States; but with her attention concentrated on Europe, she fell back on her long-standing policy. America refused to act, and contented herself with a mere memorandum and notes reaffirming the open door principle and reminding Japan of the pledges she had made in 1908 in the Root-Takahira Agreement. Thus left alone, China helplessly endeavored to bring about some modification of the demands, and finally agreed to fifteen of the original twenty-one. Japan, faced by international opposition, grudgingly revised the demands, softened the requirements of group five, and urged China again to make haste in her acceptance. China still procrastinated, and on May 7 the Japanese government gave Yuan Shih-kai a twenty-seven-hour ultimatum. China was unable to risk war, being entirely unfit for conflict with such a redoubtable foe, and on the “day of humiliation” Yuan sadly accepted the revised list. Unquestionably even this modified list left China with but little economic independence, and it is now clear that even had Japan failed to secure Germany’s island possessions or her own increased interests on the mainland, she would still have profited immensely from the war. It was little wonder that her easy victories in 1895 and 1905, followed by her happy experiences in 1914 and 1915, taught her that war could be profitable, and her people began to look more and more to the militarists to control their destiny.

Treaty guarantees. Japan’s next task was to guarantee that the Western powers, when finally freed from the enthralling tasks of war, would not rob her of her profits as they had done in 1895. Accordingly she took immediate steps to assure herself that the benefits would remain permanent, and in February and March 1917 obtained treaties to that effect from Britain, Russia, France, and Italy. In return for destroyer squadrons sent to the Mediterranean to aid in the fight against the U-boats, these four nations promised to support the Japanese claims to German rights in Shantung and to the former German islands north
of the equator. In addition Japan tried to impress China with the need for close co-operation with her, and in order to put over this idea adopted a policy of superficial friendliness and ready financial aid. During 1917 and 1918 a series of agreements was drawn up between the two nations which increased Japanese political influence in China manyfold. One group of negotiations concerned the loans of 125,000,000 yen made by an agent of the Japanese government named Nishihiara to the political clique then in control at Peking. These Nishihiara loans were utilized by the northern Chinese warlords to tighten their stranglehold on the country and to prevent the liberals and the Kuomintang group from getting political influence. Other treaties provided that Japan and China should co-operate in case the Russian Bolshevik government threatened the Orient, and that Japan should command the proposed joint military forces. In general the concluding years of the war were utilized by Tokyo in negotiating insurance policies by which its wartime gains would be firmly guaranteed.

*The Lansing-Ishii notes.* After the issuance of the Twenty-One Demands anti-Japanese feeling in the United States grew rapidly, and for the purpose of neutralizing if possible this hostile trend the Japanese government sent to America in 1917 its former foreign minister, Viscount Ishii. Ishii made a series of good-will talks and held conversations with important persons. The outcome of his visit was, first, the betterment of Japanese-American relations and, second, an exchange of "notes" between Ishii and Secretary of State Robert Lansing which reaffirmed the stand of the United States with regard to Japan's position in eastern Asia. This declaration by the United States was self-contradictory, in that while the principle of the open door was emphasized Japan's "special relations" with China created by "territorial propinquity" were also admitted. Obviously maintenance of the open door would be difficult indeed if Japan's "special interests" were to be considered with every move, and the United States merely weakened its policy — if such an indecisive position could be called a "policy" — by the Lansing-Ishii notes.

*The effect of the war upon Japan.* Economically the war served to stimulate Japan's trade and industry remarkably. The trade volume in 1918 was three times that of 1914, and its most interesting aspect was the fact that Japan was exporting more than she was importing. Also the character of the exports had changed, with semi-finished and finished articles now outnumbering raw materials. The market for Japan's products was measurably expanded, with price rises and inflation at
Japanese students being taught Ken-jutsu, the art of sword-handling. Like most Japanese activities, this one is complicated by age-old ceremonialism. Although the Japanese soldier handled a machine gun in World War II, he had been trained in the ways of medieval samurai.
home. During the postwar years there was a reaction, beginning with a wild boom in 1919 and falling off in 1920; once again imports surpassed exports. Industrially the war doubled the aggregate horsepower of Japanese production facilities and increased the ranks of labor by half. The long-range effects of the war were to stimulate both trade and industry in Japan, expand her world market, and give her a broader basis for future prosperity.

Politically the first World War served only to confuse existing issues. When the elderly Okuma, reputedly the champion of cabinet responsibility, took power in 1914 the liberal elements rejoiced, but it was under Okuma and his 1916 successor Terauchi that the aggressive policy against China was attempted. The end of the war saw the accession of Hara, the first commoner to become premier, but his assassination in 1921 once more quenched the hopes of the moderates. During the 1920's there was a clear trend toward democratic principles and a temporary cessation of aggression, but with the accession of men like Tanaka toward the end of the decade Japan once again looked overseas for further loot.

Japanese motives. Like those of most other nations which participated in World War I, Japan's motives were primarily selfish. Few of the other participants however won so much and lost so little. In China itself, in Shantung, and in Micronesia, Japan's Machiavellianism paid off extremely well.

4. Asiatic Russia and the War

Russia entered World War I as one of the original members of the Triple Entente and with a military reputation dating from her defeat of Napoleon that was only slightly dimmed after the passage of a century. The Allies however were shortly to be disillusioned in a tragic manner, for the discontent which had been brewing for decades took advantage of the ineptitude of the Romanovs and utilized military defeat on the eastern front to bring about a revolution; in March of 1917 Tsar Nicholas II lost his throne. The first phase of the revolution saw the rise to power of a group of constitutional moderates led by Alexander Kerensky, but before the year was out the Bolshevik or "majority" faction of the Social Democratic Party had seized the reins of government. On March 3, 1918, Communist Russia was forced to sign with Germany the disgraceful peace of Brest-Litovsk, by which Russia surrendered many of her western borderlands and relieved the German high command of the problem of a two-front war.
Revolution in Siberia. After the tsar's overthrow in 1917 the Communists of Siberia organized a government, first in Vladivostok, and later in Khabarovsky, under a leader named Krasnoschekoff. By the middle of 1918 this group, called the Far Eastern Council of People's Commissars, had fairly effective control over Siberia east of Lake Baikal. The region between the eastern provinces and European Russia however remained in a state of political chaos for many months. Several groups competed for supremacy.

First in importance were about 50,000 Czech troops, who before Russia's collapse had deserted the Austrian armies in order to join Russia in fighting the Hapsburgs. After the revolution the Czechs were supposed to be transported via the Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok, where they were to embark for Europe for more fighting. But a misunderstanding developed between the revolutionary and Czech authorities, and very shortly the Czechs found themselves in trouble with various Communist groups along the railroad. The Czechs, scattered from the Urals to the far eastern provinces, in mid-1918 seized many of the important towns along the railroad, including Ekaterinburg, Omsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Irkutsk. They were also responsible for the overthrow of the Far Eastern Council of People's Commissars, which had moved to Vladivostok; and by July were in control of much of the country. It was the presence of these Czech troops — plus the determination that Japan should not intervene alone — that led the Western nations to intervene, for the opinion of the anti-Communist world was that the Bolshevik government was encouraging Austrian and German war prisoners in a Czech persecution program and that the Bolshevik descent on Irkutsk threatened to cut off those Czechs who were still in western Siberia.

Another claimant to power was a conservative Russian named Admiral Kolchak, who by a coup d'état seized control of a moderate revolutionary government that had been set up at Omsk. Kolchak organized an army and advanced westward against the Red troops, but a series of defeats soon robbed him of his followers, and he was eventually captured and executed in February of 1920. Upon Kolchak's defeat the Communist government began to organize western Siberia; but the eastern regions now fell into chaos as a result of a struggle for power among the various claimants of Kolchak's mantle. Three of these anti-Communist warlords — Kalmikov, Rozanov, and Semenov — maintained some degree of authority in their respective bailiwicks, Khabarovsky, Vladivostok, and Chita. But despite obvious foreign sympathy toward their
conservative pretensions they were unable long to withstand the Communist advance.

**Foreign intervention.** The chief reason however that affairs in Siberia merited world attention was not because of the internal squabbles, but because the unfortunate position of the Czech troops won the sympathy of the Allied nations and also provided an excuse for an expeditionary force which they hoped might discourage further Communist expansion eastward. Despite the reluctance of the United States to interfere in the affairs of other nations, Americans started the Allied invasion of Siberia when at the request of the Kerensky government an American railway corps undertook to run the Trans-Siberian. Shortly after Brest-Litovsk, both Britain and Japan suggested military intervention, but President Wilson frowned on the proposal. Eventually however the Allied Supreme War Council in Paris in July 1918 decided on armed intervention in Siberia to aid the hard-pressed Czechs and to restore eastern pressure on the Germans. This time America joined the project. Pledges were made individually by the participating nations that no thought of infringing on Russia's territorial integrity was in their minds; intervention was solely a military move to aid Allied detachments in need of succor.

**Motives.** The participating nations — the United States, Britain, France, Italy, China, and Japan — had different motives for this intervention. Britain and Japan were clearly fearful of Communism in the Far East. Certain Japanese factions had territorial designs as well. The French were said to hope for a reorganization of the eastern front, using the Czech troops as a rallying point for all anti-Communists. The United States was interested in aiding the Czechs and in sending such assistance to the Russian people as to enable them to organize stable and prosperous conditions, but had agreed to participate in the intervention mostly in response to Allied pressure.

**The expeditionary force.** Detachments began to arrive in Vladivostok in August of 1918. No participant was supposed to send more than 10,000 men, and China and the United States lived up to this requirement; Britain, France, and Italy sent only token forces of a few thousand each; but Japan, enthusiastic over the prospect of fishing in troubled waters, gradually increased her forces until they finally totaled 70,000. Her willingness to co-operate paralleled her attitude during the Boxer Rebellion, when her contingent surpassed all others in size. In Siberia the foreign troops worked at cross-purposes, and very nearly lost sight of their original motive — the desire to aid the Czech soldiers. One
conservative upstart after another was given a measure of aid, and at least one authority has concluded that the presence of these foreign military contingents served merely to hasten the consolidation of the Siberian population under the Soviet régime. By the spring of 1920 it became apparent that the presence of the troops was serving no useful purpose except to aid Japan in her project of complicating the situation, and by April all foreign troops but the Japanese had departed.

*Japan in Siberia.* Left alone, the Japanese contingent made every effort to consolidate Japanese control in eastern Siberia. With Japanese assistance Russian conservatives seized the local government of Vladivostok, and later in April the maritime province was forced to sign an agreement that made it a virtual Japanese protectorate. Fortunately for Nippon’s imperialistic schemes, her Nikolaevsk garrison had been massacred in May by Russians, so that her actions now were defined as defensive reprisals. Japan very probably hoped that large sections of eastern Siberia, together with northern Sakhalin, would remain in a state of disorder and thus permit her to seize and maintain control.

*Communist victory in Siberia.* But Krasnoschekoff had not been idle. Moving inland to Verkhne Udinsk he organized a government which he called the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia. He was careful to follow a moderate course so as to avoid the appearance of extreme Bolshevism, and his policy bore fruit in Japan’s eventual recognition of his authority. Krasnoschekoff moved his government to Chita and attempted as an independent state recognized by the Soviets to evict the Japanese from Siberia. Japan tried to maintain her position in the maritime province with headquarters at Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, but the Chita régime called on European Russia for aid, and in November 1922 Japan, as a result of the pressure of world opinion and the growing home opposition to what was apparently a futile policy, reluctantly withdrew her troops. She insisted however on occupying northern Sakhalin until Russia made reparation for the Nikolaevsk massacre. Meanwhile the Chita government had joined the Soviet Union, and the basis for Russia’s modern power in the Far East had been laid.

*Significance.* The consequences of the Siberian situation and foreign intervention there were deep and lasting. First of all, the traditional hostility between Russia and Japan was intensified, so that there was no question in Russia’s mind that Japan’s greed would have to be controlled. Second, the chaos in Siberia convinced Soviet authorities that if Russia expected to keep Siberia it would have to be settled, developed, and made prosperous; therefore a planned policy of colonization and
emigration from European Russia to the new industrial towns of the steppes was accelerated. Third, the foreign intervention helped to persuade Russia that Western nations were constitutionally anti-Communist and therefore not to be trusted. Perhaps one of the chief causes of Russia’s later suspicion and strong-arm tactics was this Allied expeditionary force of 1918–1919. Western nations have a tendency to forget it, but Soviet Russia does not forget that her government has already been at war though briefly with the United States, Britain, France, Italy, China, and Japan.

5. CHINA’S ENTRY

China was both helped and harmed by World War I. Preceding paragraphs have given a part of the picture, but highly significant features remain to be drawn in.

Benefits of the war. Among the benefits China got from the conflict were the ending of the unequal treaties with Austria-Hungary and Germany and the acquisition of their property in China and their concessions in Tientsin and Hankow, and a five-year suspension of Boxer indemnity payments, still an important drain on her revenue. With the collapse of tsarist Russia, ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria became an issue, and though Japan generously offered to assume the entire responsibility of management, the United States objected and an interallied commission, of which China was a member, assumed control. Russia also in the end gave up extraterritoriality and other special privileges in China. At the beginning of hostilities China had obtained the help of the United States in urging the belligerents to treat Chinese soil as neutral and to keep hostilities out of the Orient. Only Germany agreed, and her agreement meant nothing; for the central powers were not able to extend the struggle to the Pacific on a large scale even had they wanted to. Later China abandoned her neutrality, and her entry into the combat assured her a place at the peace table, where she was able to present to the world at least part of her case. The utilization of thousands of Chinese coolies as labor battalions on the Western Front also could be considered an advantage for China, since the Allies thereby provided a living for a portion of China’s huge population and thus in some degree relieved the press of poverty.

Disadvantages of the war. The benefits to China however were far overshadowed by the harm she suffered. Japanese intrusion into Shantung and the Twenty-One Demands have already been described, and
these alone more than neutralized the war’s good effects. In addition
the United States in the Lansing-Ishii notes of 1917 agreed to Japan’s
claim of “special interest” in North China; and although the American
government sought to neutralize this concession by guarantees of China’s
integrity, the open door was still as far as China was concerned merely a
noble idea. Besides these obvious bad effects the war brought about a
complete disintegration of the republican government at Peking and
accelerated the dismemberment of the country into its feudal compo-
nents.

Causes of China’s entry into the war. China entered the conflict not
because she expected to aid in bringing victory but rather because she
wished to get a better bargaining position with the Allies. Yüan before
he died had offered to enter the combat if the Allies would support his
pretensions to monarchy; but when that was refused China again re-
turned to her position of watchful waiting. There was indeed a strong
pro-German sentiment in China which rather hoped for the victory of
the central powers so that Russian, Japanese, and British influence
would be curbed. But when in 1917 China’s friend, the United States,
entered on the side of the Allies and urged neutrals to demonstrate their
sympathy by severing diplomatic relations, China responded. With the
severance of relations, many Chinese began to think seriously of the
advantages that would accrue if China became a full combatant — the
chief of these being the opportunity to sit at the peace table and present
China’s case to the world. In addition there was a strong feeling among
the conservatives and moderates in the republican government that only
with China’s entry could she get the foreign financial assistance she
would need to suppress the Kuomintang and other liberal activities.
Consequently a clique favoring entry soon arose, led by Tuan Ch’i-jui,
premier under President Li Yüan-hung.

The parliament vs. the premier. Opposition to entry was strongest
among the members of parliament, who still were largely Kuomintang
sympathizers. It appears that their antagonism was due not so much to
lack of sympathy with the Allied cause as to the realization that Tuan
represented a group of reactionary warlords who were utterly opposed
to liberalization of the revolution and whose real purpose was the gain-
ing of foreign financial aid. Consequently parliament resisted strenu-
ously, so much so that President Li dismissed his pro-war premier,
Tuan thereupon called upon his warlord associates for help, and they
rose to his support and marched on Peking. President Li on his part
requested aid of General Chang Hsun, the former loyal adherent of the
Manchus, and Chang willingly came to Peking. When he arrived however he demanded that Li dismiss parliament, and when the helpless president acquiesced Chang proclaimed the return of the Manchu Empire, with the boy emperor Pu-yi as ruler. But this attempt to bring back the empire soon failed, for in July Tuan's followers captured Peking, even though Pu-yi dissolved parliament, reconstituted a rump conclave, and with its aid elected a docile puppet to the presidency. Tuan again became premier, and the conservative elements found themselves in full control.

*Effects of entry.* Once in power the conservatives began negotiations with Japan for financial aid (the Nishihara loans, already described), and formed a "War Participation Board" aided by a Japanese adviser. The disgruntled liberals of the dismissed parliament reorganized at Canton, established a new government under the sponsorship of Sun Yat-sen, and proceeded to contest the authority of the Peking régime. This split assured the breakup of the republican government consolidated by Yuan Shih-kai, and formed the basis for the political chaos of the ensuing Tuchunate. The southern group, although at first unalterably opposed to belligerence, soon realized that aid from the Allies would be limited to Peking if Canton did not declare war also, and by the fall of 1917 both halves of discordant China were engaged in ineffective "combat" with the central powers. There was no military action to speak of, the seizure of enemy property and its utilization by the Allies was the chief gain of belligerence.

China therefore, in sharp contrast to Japan, was in most respects injured by the war. Her small gains could not compare with the damage done by political chaos, Japanese encroachment, and the preoccupation of her few real friends with wartime problems.

### 6. The Influence of the United States

The influence of the United States on Japan. It now remains to draw together the items previously mentioned and to discover in what way Washington affected Pacific affairs during World War I.

Previously, as shown above, the United States had always maintained an attitude of friendliness and trust toward Japan, but during the World War that friendliness was tinged with warning. When Secretary of State Bryan issued his first note to Japan on March 13, 1915, he flatly stated that it was difficult for his government to reconcile the Twenty-One Demands with Japan's previous commitments regarding the open
door, and that the United States "could not regard with indifference the assumption of political, military, or economic domination over China by a foreign power." On May 11, after China's enforced acceptance, Bryan issued another statement that the United States could not "recognize any agreement or undertaking . . . impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy." Later, when America tried to prevent China from falling apart as a result of her proposed entry into the war, Japan protested, and in conversations between Ambassador Sato and Secretary of State Lansing attempted to get the United States to admit that American interests in China were not political. Lansing acquiesced, and Japan immediately transformed the oral admissions into written memoranda which implied that the United States recognized Japan's "paramount" interests in China. Lansing denied this intention, but the subsequent Lansing-Ishii notes at least partly justified the Japanese assertion.

(2) Siberia. In the Siberian venture America protested her intention not to meddle with Russian politics, delayed the venture in general, and kept strictly to the letter of the agreement, sending only 7500 troops and about 1000 civilian aides. After all the Allies but Japan had evacuated, the United States protested Nippon's obvious intentions there.

(3) China. With China America's relations were more complex. The United States had openly urged China to sever diplomatic relations, but when the question of belligerence threatened to disrupt the internal political structure the United States in June 1917 invited Britain, Japan, and France to co-operate to restore Chinese peace and unity and to relegate the war question to second place. It was this episode that brought about the Lansing-Sato conversations mentioned above. By 1917 also America's fears about the five-power banking consortium had been largely dispelled and the United States re-entered the group, which proceeded to provide minor financial aid for the Peking factions in the government.

The Fourteen Points. One psychological influence of the United States must not be omitted — the effect of the Fourteen Points upon the Pacific Area. The generous provisions of those pledges, their fairness and consideration of national aspirations and self-determination, made a tremendous impression upon the Pacific peoples. The natives of the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies especially saw no reason why these principles, applied to peoples of Europe hardly more advanced
than they, should not be extended to the Pacific. As in Europe the Fourteen Points had the initial effect of stimulating hope and agitation for freedom; but their secondary and more important result was disillusionment, for it was soon seen that these lofty aims were too high to be achieved.

In sum, the influence of the United States upon the Pacific during the war was good, even though at no time was America able to guarantee the conditions she wished to attain, and benevolent, even though she was still unwilling to fight for her favorite Pacific policy, the open door.

**Conclusion.** World War I saw Japan rise to new heights of ambition and importance, and of all the nations of the world Japan probably benefited most from the conflict. China, caught in the midst of her revolution, was precipitated by the question of entry into the war into a period of political chaos which was not ended until the following decade. With Europe's hands tied, Japan seized the opportunity to enlarge her claims upon China, and the seizure of German properties and the Twenty-One Demands both strengthened her position at China's expense. The Communist revolution in Siberia brought about foreign intervention, and again Japan attempted (without much success) to profit from the intervention. Finally the United States continued her policy of benevolent participation in Far Eastern affairs, but — save in the case of the Siberian expedition — never to the extent of using force. Relations between Japan and the United States became fairly strained during the war, and America for the first time became aware of the broad pretensions of Japanese imperialism. In general, the forces of nationalism were greatly strengthened throughout the Far East, and the foundations were laid for the great struggle against imperialism that broke out twenty years later.
World War I Settlements

*Introduction.* The first World War left the Pacific Area facing many major problems. Some of the issues were settled at the peace conference, but on the whole the Pacific nations emerged from the Versailles talks thoroughly dissatisfied with the results. It therefore became necessary to hold a second series of discussions, which for the Pacific region proved most significant, because at the Washington Conference it was possible to catch up some of the loose ends of the Paris sessions and to formulate a policy which, though still unsatisfactory to most of the participants, lasted for better or worse until World War II. The Pacific aspects of the war settlements are therefore worthy of more detailed consideration than space will permit, but some slight idea of their implications is here attempted.

1. The Peace Conference at Paris

*The problem of security.* When representatives of the nations of the world gathered at Paris in January 1919, two great forces immediately began striving for supremacy. One was the postwar determination of the countries that had suffered severely to secure a settlement based on military alliances that would prevent a recurrence of the conflict. The other was the personal influence of Woodrow Wilson, who idealistically insisted that national security could be obtained only from a league of nations. With this background, when the conference organized on January 18 it soon developed that the plenary sessions were to be relatively unimportant; actually most of the significant business was conducted in
subcommittees. Of these the most important was the Council of Ten, later reduced to the so-called "Big Four," consisting of Wilson from the United States, Lloyd George of Britain, Clemenceau of France, and Orlando of Italy. Japan, represented by Marquis Saionji, played an important role in some of the discussions, but deliberately withheld her influence from European problems in order to gain a generous consideration of her pretensions in the Pacific. This policy was successful because Wilson continually though reluctantly sacrificed points he desired to defend, in return for assurances that the League Covenant would be included in the final document. The American president was so sure that if the signatories would guarantee to set up the League in accordance with his ideas all the world's multitudinous problems would be solved, that he became more and more willing to include items in the treaty that he knew were unworkable and unfair. The Pacific was the scene of several of these concessions.

Pacific problems. The Pacific Area problems which were considered by the Paris Peace Conference can be placed in three main categories. The first involved the question of what to do with former German possessions, notably the Shantung leasehold and the Pacific islands occupied by Japan and British Empire troops. The second originated in China's desire to lay some of her complex problems before the world and thereby secure foreign help in her efforts to repel imperialistic encroachment on her lands. The third grew out of the rankling discontent in the minds of both Chinese and Japanese — especially the latter — caused by the various unilateral agreements, such as the Chinese exclusion treaties and the Gentleman's Agreement of 1907, which refused racial equality to Mongoloid peoples. Unfortunately all these problems were in the opinion of most of the world's population secondary to the major issues discussed by the conference; and since they therefore had to be more or less dragged in by the heels they suffered a subordinate status.

Disposal of the German lands: (3) Shantung. In the problem of the disposal of German territories the Shantung question was first in importance. When in 1914 Japan conquered Tsingtao she realized that she might meet opposition from the Western powers, and having no mind to repeat her experience of 1895 in which she lost the spoils of war through international pressure, she proceeded to fortify her position; she therefore signed a series of treaties with the major Allies in which her possession of the German leasehold in Shantung was guaranteed. But it remained for the peace conference to validate her claims. China of course vigorously resisted Japanese pretensions to permanent control
of the area, especially in view of the fact that Japan's ultimatum to Germany had contained the expressed intention of ultimately restoring Shantung to Chinese possession. Britain, France, and Italy had signed treaties agreeing to support Japanese claims, and although Wilson was constitutionally opposed to Japan's acquisition of the leasehold, he realized that if her claims were denied she might withdraw from the conference and the League, and leave the new world organization with but shadowy influence in the Pacific. Reluctantly therefore Wilson agreed to the inclusion of Articles 156, 157, and 158 in the Treaty of Versailles, which collectively turned over to Japan — at least temporarily — all German rights, property, and diplomatic arrangements in the Kiaochow area and the Shantung leasehold, including the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway. China was so enraged that she refused to sign the Versailles Accord, and gained entry into the League only through her acquiescence in the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, which ended the war with Austria.

(2) The islands. The German islands which the Allied forces seized during the war were, like other portions of the German Empire, turned over to the League for distribution as mandated territories. Japan however had already obtained an agreement from the major Allies that the islands north of the equator (the Carolines, the Marshalls, and the Marianas) should continue in her possession, and she professed herself willing to accept them as mandates under League jurisdiction. It was this "cession" that enabled her to keep the war from her shores for such a long period after 1941, for though she was obligated to refrain from fortifying mandated territory she ignored this obligation and made Truk Island, in the Caroline Archipelago, a naval base so strong that the powerful Allied navies preferred to bypass it during World War II. One exception to her easy victory was Wilson's oral reservations about the island of Yap in the Carolines, one of the chief cable stations in the Pacific. Japan however gained title by agreeing to America's use of the island for cable termini.

Of the former German islands south of the equator, Australia received a mandate over New Guinea and the islands composing the Bismarck Archipelago, New Britain and New Ireland. New Zealand obtained mandatory rights in German Samoa.

China's problems. Meantime in the diplomatic maneuvering at Versailles China had been coming off second best. First of all she presented to the conference a request that German rights in Shantung be restored to her and that her unequal treaties be revised. The Shantung problem
Weapons and utensils of the South Pacific. Although Pacific Island peoples were considered to be fairly primitive when Europeans first contacted them, they nevertheless had developed an aptitude for certain types of craftwork well illustrated by these examples. The large bowl, 54 inches in diameter, is from the Admiralty Islands. The Solomon Islands fishing-float, in the shape of a frigate bird, is inlaid with mother-of-pearl. The New Caledonia war club resembles the head of a bird. The bamboo lime containers are from New Guinea. The swords from the Gilbert Islands, of coconut wood, have cutting edges of sharks' teeth.
was handled as described above, much to China’s resentment, and the second proposal was sloughed aside rapidly by the decision of the conference not to consider any “local” problems of the Allies. China’s entry into the war, which had occasioned her so much internal trouble, therefore turned out to be not worth the candle, for the concessions she did receive failed to equal the losses she sustained in the Shantung cession. Among the unimposing benefits guaranteed her at Paris were the remission of further Boxer indemnity payments to Germany, permanent possession of German and Austro-Hungarian concessions in Hankow and Tientsin, an end to German and Austrian extraterritoriality privileges, and — vying with the others in its unimportance — the return of the astronomical instruments stolen from Peking by German troops during the Boxer Rebellion. China in fact found herself a helpless pawn at the peace table. Her disrupted internal political structure, her failure to keep up with Japan in past decades, and her obvious dependence upon the charity of others — especially the United States — for any advantages whatsoever, combined to rob her not only of privileges but also of respect. She emerged from the conference with her minor status among the powers of the world definitely fixed.

Racial equality. The third problem of the Pacific Area to be taken up at the conference — and dealt with as summarily as were the issues presented by China — was the question of racial equality. Japan suggested that a clause be inserted in the League Covenant guaranteeing the equality of all nationals and races in the League. Her obvious purpose was by trading on Wilson’s determined sponsorship of the League to force America and Britain to rescind their unilateral treaties respecting the immigration of Oriental labor. But despite the threat that Japan might withdraw from the conference, the delegates refused to consider such a guarantee. Japan thereupon revised her original demands to read equality of “nations” rather than of races, but even this compromise was turned down. The obvious implication was that the conference had already committed itself not to intervene in “local” problems, and a racial equality clause that would involve immigration controls would obviously infringe on the sovereignty of the signatories.

Neglected problems. Considering that the conferees dealt with many matters of only minor concern to the great belligerents, it was unfortunate that they neglected two issues of the Pacific that had been irritants for many years. One was the problem of Korea, now a part of the Japanese Empire, but still inhabited by a people hostile to Japan and with a long history of vassalage to China. The other was the question as to
whether Peru or Chile should possess the border provinces of Tacna and Arica. As a result, these troublesome regional problems were not solved until long after World War I was history.

Results of the peace conference: (1) Japan. Despite the fact that at the conference no Pacific nation obtained everything it desired, it is evident that Japan did remarkably well by herself. Territorially she acquired the Shantung leasehold with its appurtenant privileges, the Carolines, Marshalls, and Marianas, and she held the northern half of the island of Sakhalin as security for the Nikolaevsk massacre indemnity. She forced the nations of the world to accept China's surrender to the modified Twenty-One Demands, and her economic position on the Asiatic mainland was measurably stronger. And though she failed to bring about agreement to her demands for racial equality, she made it clear that she was the most powerful nation in the Pacific, and — after 1919 — a military force to be reckoned with.

(2) China. As for China, the conference merely served to expose to the world her innate weaknesses. Because of Japan's strong bargaining position and her ready threat to desert the League if her wishes were not granted, there was little hope that China would profit territorially from the treaties. Her most plausible hope was that there might be some revision of the unilateral treaties which kept her in a state of diplomatic vassalage to the rest of the world and particularly to Japan. But the decision of the conference to ignore internal problems left her with little to show for her pains.

(3) The United States. The United States too lost "face," for as a result of wartime occurrences in the Pacific she was faced with a gradually closing open door. Wilson had doggedly protested Nippon's every move toward encroachment on foreign territory, but in both Shantung and Siberia he was unable to make his influence felt. The one victory the United States won in the conference was Japan's agreement to become a member of the League; but in view of the way the American Senate treated Wilson's covenant immediately afterward that was not so much a victory for the nation as for the president personally.

2. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Causes. It was almost inevitable that the inconclusive Peace of Paris should be subject to modification. The failure of the United States to join the League of Nations and its consequent refusal to sign the Treaty of Versailles, of which the League Covenant was an integral
part, made some amends necessary; and though many rock-ribbed reactionaries quailed at the thought of forthright international co-operation, there was little dissent to a conference which would discuss disarmament and some of the complex questions of the Pacific. The Washington Conference was in a manner of speaking America’s amends for having failed to join the League. This American contribution to world peace through disarmament cleared the consciences of many sincere citizens, and they were able to embark upon a temporary program of isolation with the conviction that Washington’s Farewell Address and Wilson’s Covenant had somehow been integrated.

American goals. The chief American goals therefore were naval disarmament, some sort of a guarantee that the status quo in the Pacific would be maintained in the postwar territorial reshuffle, and a restatement of the open door principle. The first item, naval disarmament, was in line with America’s traditional repugnance to large permanent (and expensive) armed forces; and since navies were by all odds the most expensive of all military obligations, it seemed well to begin there. But disarmament would be a dangerous policy, considering Japan’s growing imperialism, if diplomatic protection for the United States’ enlarging Pacific empire were not achieved; hence item two. And finally, there still lingered in the minds of American statesmen and businessmen the faint but stubborn hope that perhaps through some miracle the open door policy could be reaffirmed in a way that would guarantee its success without our being called on to use force to defend it.

Britain’s goals. Britain too was interested in disarmament and the open door policy; but there was another angle to the conference that was much more unpleasant for her to think about. Since 1902 the cornerstone of her Pacific diplomacy had been the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But Japan’s clashes with the United States were multiplying, and there was the possibility that sometime, somehow, they might result in war. Where then would Britain stand? The shadowy possibility of hostilities between the British Empire and the United States shocked Washington, London, and all the dominion capitals — especially Canberra and Ottawa. Britain then was willing to yield to Canadian pressure and support a conference that might lead to a revision of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in such a way that England’s responsibility would be spread a little thinner, so that the United States and Britain would be kept on the same side.

China’s goals. Finally China herself, realizing that unless the United States came to her aid she would continue helpless, agitated
continuously for a revision of the Shantung grant. The possibility that this question might cause serious repercussions if left unsettled also contributed to the calling of the Washington Conference.

Organisation. Invitations were issued in the late summer and fall of 1921 to Britain, France, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal. Some of the powers accepted with suspicion—notably Japan, which resented the inclusion of "Pacific problems" on the conference agenda. But the delegates arrived, and after a fitting keynote had been struck by the entombment of the Unknown Soldier on Armistice Day, the first session opened on November 12.

Membership in the conference was distributed among the world's great. The United States was represented by its brilliant secretary of state, Charles Evans Hughes; Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and Oscar Underwood, of the Committee on Foreign Relations; and former Secretary of State Elihu Root, another recognized ornament of American statesmanship. Arthur Balfour, foreign minister of Great Britain, Aristide Briand, premier of France, Admiral Tomosaburo Kato, Japanese minister of marine, and Wellington Koo, one of China's most brilliant and progressive diplomats, were among the other delegates.

Armament limitation. The agenda of the conference was divided into two main parts: armament limitation and Pacific problems. Secretary Hughes, in sharp contrast to the stodginess of most keynoters, opened the deliberations with a clarion call for sweeping naval disarmament. To the amazement of most of the delegates and the world at large, Hughes flatly proposed the scrapping of sixty-six warships, totaling more than 1,800,000 tons. Despite their surprise, the delegates accepted the suggestion "in principle" and then proceeded to modify it somewhat. But their discussions revolved around one undeniable fact: the ability of the United States to beat any or all of them in a naval construction race. The war had left America with a huge navy and plans for an even bigger one; if limitation were not agreed upon, the United States would soon be the world's pre-eminent naval power anyway. There was little reason then for Britain and Japan not to agree, considering that the country which stood to lose most was the United States itself.

5:5:3:1.7:1.7. The solution finally arrived at by the powers was a permanent ratio of capital ship strength in the proportion of 5:5:3:1:7:1:7 for the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, respectively. Another way of putting it was to say that the United States and Britain were permitted to have 525,000 tons of capital ships each, Japan 315,000
tons, and France and Italy 175,000 tons each. The limitations applied only to vessels of more than 10,000 tons, and thus exempted light cruisers and auxiliaries. Additional provisions however defined ratios in other classes. For instance the United States and Britain could build 135,000 tons of aircraft carriers, Japan 81,000 tons, and France and Italy 60,000 tons each. Agreements were signed limiting the use of submarines in warfare, and certain controls were adopted over chemical warfare, especially the use of poison gases.

_Japan and the Pact._ The Western powers accepted the naval limitations pact with a sigh of hope and relief, but Japan carried from Washington a deep and abiding resentment that she had not been granted parity. The fact that considering the goals of the treaty she did not need it made little difference. Britain’s far-flung empire and America’s two-ocean frontier were as nothing in the eyes of Japanese navy experts, who perhaps even then envisioned the Rising Sun fluttering from Siberia to the Indies. As the treaty stood however the nations’ navies were so balanced that a war of aggression was manifestly impossible; each power had been given enough naval strength to defend its own shores — but no more. In fact the only way in which aggressive military operations could have a chance for success under the naval limitations terms was for two of the powers to “gang up” on a third; therefore to preclude that possibility was the second big task of the conference.

_The Four-Power Pact._ The method the conferees adopted to preserve the status quo in the Pacific and at the same time eliminate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a Four-Power Pact signed by the nations deemed to be most interested in Pacific peace, namely, Britain, the United States, Japan, and France. Of the four the first was the most anxious for an adequate treaty agreement, because as mentioned above the dominions were demanding an arrangement that would eradicate the frightening implications of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The accord that resulted provided that there should be (1) no increase in armaments or fortifications on British possessions east of a line running from the 110th meridian near Singapore around Australia and New Zealand; (2) no increase in fortifications on American possessions west of a line drawn from Alaska (excluding the Aleutians) through Pearl Harbor to Panama; (3) no fortifications at all on Japanese outlying possessions, including the Kurils, the Ryukyus, the Bonin Islands, and the mandates as well; (4) mutual respect for each other’s Pacific possessions; (5) conferences if diplomacy failed; (6) co-operation in case of threat by a third power; and (7) a ten-year term for the agreement, subject to renewal.
The importance of the pact. It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of this treaty; for in its limitation of fortifications it virtually divided the Pacific into zones of influence — the Alaska–Pearl Harbor–Panama triangle for the United States, Singapore and Australasia for Britain, Indo-China for France, and all the Western Pacific for Japan. Nippon thus became trustee for some of the West's most valuable colonial possessions — the Philippine Islands, Hong Kong, and the Dutch Indies. How well she lived up to the responsibility of trusteeship was shown in 1942 by the speed with which she conquered Luzón and the strongholds on the China coast and the Indies, and by the excellent defenses she had erected in defiance of the pact on the mandated islands of Micronesia. By this pact the westernmost outpost of American military might became Pearl Harbor; and Britain's eastern strategic frontier stopped at Singapore. As a result it is now appreciated that the entire history of the Pacific phases of World War II was molded by the Four-Power Pact of 1922.

And yet it is not fair to say that the treaty was a mistake. After all there was little reason then for the West to mistrust Japan deeply enough to foresee the black future. Actually in those days before the world became disillusioned with the League there was every reason to hope that diplomatic co-operation would work in the Pacific just as international co-operation seemed to be working in Europe. The Four-Power Pact was a noble attempt at stabilization of the Pacific Area; that it failed was no measure of its virtue.

Treaties concerning China. In the discussions over arms limitation and the maintenance of the status quo in the Pacific, China came in for a large share of attention — and this despite the fact that her government was torn by dissension. The Peking government sent China's official representatives to the conference, but Dr. Sun, in charge of the Canton régime, protested and wished to send his own. When Sun's request was refused he boycotted the conference and held that its decisions were not binding on all of China. This political chaos was unfortunate, but it did serve to demonstrate that the settlement of China's problems, whether presented by Peking or Canton, would require outside help. The conference therefore sought ways and means (1) to maintain the open door, (2) to satisfy China's desire for the recovery of Shantung, (3) to provide financial aid for China, and (4) to establish a basis upon which extraterritoriality might be abrogated.

Open door agreements. The open door policy was supported by a treaty and a resolution. The treaty, emphasizing principles and policies
to be followed in regard to China, was called the Nine-Power Pact, and the nations involved were the United States, Britain, France, Italy, China, Japan, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal. Like other international agreements fostered by the United States on this subject, it provided a degree of lip service to the ideal, but failed to define ways and means of practical support. The pact, by guaranteeing the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China, by fostering in China a stable government, and by defending the principle of equal economic opportunity for all nations, attempted to put an end to the scramble for concessions. If this pact had been strictly lived up to there would have been no more acquisitions of spheres of influence; but unfortunately like its predecessors it provided no penalties for wrongdoers, and the signatories accordingly still felt fairly free to do as they pleased even though a resolution was accepted for a board of reference to deal with questions arising from attempts to enforce the open door policy.

Definition. This policy was defined in the legal profession's typically obfuscatory manner, according to which the policy consisted of avoiding:

(1) Any arrangement which might purport to establish ... any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China.

(2) Any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese government or with any local authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration, or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

The significance of the Open Door Pact. The significance of this agreement was that for the first time the United States managed to get its theories regarding the open door in China formally written into a treaty. The change however lay solely in the greater publicity; there was no alteration of the American attitude that though the open door was a nice policy to have it was not worth fighting over. And as long as the United States refused to defend it by force of arms — and the rest of the world knew that it would so refuse — the open door, no matter how many signatories it might have, was little more than a generous gesture, even though it did give China moral support and provided a mildly beneficial diplomatic influence.

Shantung. The Chinese delegates were not particularly concerned
over the open door problem, but they were uniformly insistent that the conference alter the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles which had turned over the German rights in Shantung to Japan. Japan declared that the conference had no jurisdiction over the problem, and consented only to "conversations" with China. China at first was inclined to oppose any settlement which did not involve modification of the Versailles agreement; but the efforts of Hughes and Balfour smoothed the path, and a treaty was finally signed between Japan and China by which Japan agreed to give back most of her special rights in Shantung. The German leased territory of Kiaochow together with all of the German property thereon was to go to China without compensation to Japan save for the expenses of occupation. Japanese troops were to be withdrawn from the Shantung area, and the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway was to be transferred to China and paid for in full by her. Until China completed her payments Japanese personnel would continue to manage the railroad. Finally three German mines were to be turned over to joint Sino-Japanese corporations, with China guaranteed an equal financial interest in them. China never fully paid her obligations to Japan; even so it seems logical to ask why she should have been billed at all merely to get back her own territories.

The settlement of the Shantung issue pacified China temporarily, and deprived both nations of an immediate excuse for hostilities. Another significance was that it paved the way for additional concessions. Japan for instance in an effort to appear brimming with generosity remitted some of the Twenty-One Demands already granted by China, including preferential railway rights in Manchuria and the requirement of having Japanese advisers and instructors in certain Chinese organizations. The British, not to be outdone, promised to give back Weihaiwei; as already related this was accomplished after some delay in 1930.

Financial reforms. China's apparent need for outside economic support led to several agreements designed to relieve her financial distress. One of these was the Nine-Power Tariff Pact, signed by the same nine nations that had committed themselves to observe and maintain the open door. The pact provided for a commission to increase the tariff rates to an effective 5 per cent. Other tariff conferences were planned to set up the board of reference mentioned above to protect the open door. In line with the policy of stiffening China's internal organization, she was advised strongly to streamline her management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and with the aid of foreign financial and technical aid eventually to unify all her railway systems.
The reduction of foreign privileges. To help China's economic relationships with the rest of the world and with Japan, the conference gave some attention to the reduction of foreign privileges. A nine-power commission was set up to discuss extraterritoriality with a view to modifying it, and the foreign powers promised the withdrawal of their own postal systems as soon as China should set up an efficient service of her own. Another promise made at Washington, which as it turned out meant little, was the pledge to withdraw the foreign legation guards permitted by the Boxer Protocol — as soon as the situation in China permitted. As late as 1937 the "situation" was still apparently not such as to warrant this reform.

Post-conference events. How these provisions of the conference were carried out makes an interesting sequel to the meeting itself. After its adjournment on February 6, 1922, steps were taken to carry out its decisions. First in importance was the Japanese evacuation of Tsingtao, an event which should have caused much happiness for the new republic. But when local Chinese bandits discovered the Nipponese intention to withdraw they made plans to seize the city, and consequently Chinese troops were forced to the ignominious measure of begging arms from the departing occupation force in order to resist this threat. The tariff problem was discussed as scheduled by the conference newly set up for that purpose, but its deliberations were disturbed by Chinese civil war and domestic chaos. The conference finally emerged with a plan resembling the 5 per cent arrangement decided upon at Washington. Foreign post offices were closed by 1922 — with the exception of the Japanese postal service maintained in the South Manchurian Railway zone. The commission on the abolition of extraterritoriality finally met, and in 1926 recommended certain changes in the system of Chinese justice to some of which China agreed. Partly as a result of the commission's activities and of world political conditions in general, Russia gave up her extraterritoriality rights in 1924, and various minor nations followed suit. The United States relinquished its extraterritorial claims in 1943.

Significance. The Washington Conference contributed to world peace by providing for naval disarmament, and helped to assuage the conscience of internationalists in the United States, who were troubled because of our failure to join the League. Its decisions regarding Pacific affairs resulted in the scrapping of the old Anglo-Japanese Alliance and in the formation of a substitute for it — the Four-Power Pact, which more or less divided the responsibility for the status quo among three
nations, the United States, Britain, and Japan. Unfortunately however Japan emerged from the conference with a rankling resentment toward the United States and Britain because they refused to grant her naval parity; and disregarding the pact's promises for military limitation in the Western Pacific she so armed herself that within two decades the Philippines, the China coast, and the Indies lay helpless before her. Today it is clear that the Washington Conference merely postponed the inevitable.

Conclusion. By the Peace of Paris and the Washington Conference a war-weary world attempted to make it impossible for another world war to take place. These efforts failed because Germany and Japan both developed delusions of grandeur and determined to rule the world. Japan was able to start on her great adventure because of China's internecine strife, and throughout the 1920's grew stronger and stronger. In the 1930's however China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek began to acquire a unity that boded ill for Japanese ambitions. As a result the militarists of Japan struck, first in Manchuria, then in the Yangtze valley, and finally in the East Indies. Flushed with these successes the "New Order in Asia" saw no limitations to its expansion; and the result was Pearl Harbor.

The next chapter therefore will tell the story of West and East from the age of the military warlords to the rise of Nationalist China.
China from Tuchunate to Kuomintang

Introduction. The history of China between the two world wars is an account of unceasing civil strife. The revolution, started with such high hopes by the liberals of 1911, as it plodded slowly along toward democracy found its bloody road lengthened immeasurably by China’s traditional hostility toward extreme centralization. This internal discord, coupled with the decline of the country’s prestige after Japan’s rise to international prominence, made the two decades after the Washington Conference a period of dark and unrestrained turbulence. Hope however still continued, justified first by the emergence of a personality strong enough to weld many of the discordant factions together, and second by China’s newly found and surprising ability to unify itself in the face of foreign aggression. As a result Chiang Kai-shek and Japanese imperialism accomplished what many great leaders previously had failed to do; by the beginning of World War II, the major factions in Chinese politics had diminished to two, and the pressure of world events temporarily forced even these two together. This chapter then describes the third and fourth phases of the republican revolution — China’s emergence from warlord domination and the rise to power of General Chiang Kai-shek.

I. The Tuchunate

Yüan Shih-kai, who ruled China from 1912 to 1916, was the only man of his time strong enough to hold the nation together. None of his followers could hold the loyalty of all the troops, so upon his death
there was a consequent tendency for the government which he had built up by main strength and will power to disintegrate. Li Yuan-hung, the general who found himself at the head of the opening phases of the revolution in 1911 and who was vice president at the time of Yuan's death, valiantly attempted to hold the nation under his rule, but the task was too great for him. He quarreled with his prime minister, Tuan Chi-jui, over the issue of entering World War I, and lost more face when, at his invitation, Chang Hsun invaded Peking and made an abortive attempt to reinstate the Manchu dynasty upon the dragon throne. As a result General Li was overthrown by Tuan and his associates.

Factions and tuchuns. For the next decade China was the prey of faction leaders who depended for their power on military force. These warlords, whose very existence was a challenge to the traditional Chinese contempt for the military, squabbled among themselves for many years; and though there were several great men among them whose ideals were high and who in some instances had the welfare of the people at heart, for the most part they were a motley, selfish crew, who maneuvered their troops with the skill of chessplayers in a bloody political game that generally ignored all values save those of profit and power. They became known as tuchuns, or "military superintendents," and were broadly divided into four major factions, though their loyalties were by no means constant and there were many who operated solely by and for themselves.

The Anfu Club. One faction was the Anfu Club, organized by Hsu Shu-ts'eng, a clerk and gambler who had lifted himself by his own bootstraps to become chief aide to Tuan Chi-jui. The Anfu group was China's Tammany Hall, and its methods greatly resembled the operations of the American political machines during the latter part of the nineteenth century. The word was derived from the first syllables of the two provinces, Anhui and Fukien, from which most of the members had come, but the word an also meant "peace," and fu meant "joy." The name was highly appropriate, for the club's activities were chiefly directed toward acquiring peace and joy for Tuan and his friends — no matter what it cost the rest of China.

The Chihli clique. In the province of Chihli another tuchun arose named Marshal Ts'ao Kun. Although he dominated local politics in that vicinity the real military leader of his group was General Wu P'ei-fu, Ts'ao's chief lieutenant and one of the ablest and most high-minded of the warlords. One of Wu's aides, who later became an inde-
pended tuchun, was a huge soldier named Feng Yu-hsiang. Because of his religious affiliation, he was nicknamed the "Christian general," and organized what was known as the "Christian division." Feng was noted for his abilities as a disciplinarian and organizer, and also for his inability to co-operate with his associates.

The Fengtien clique. In Fengtien Province, with headquarters at Mukden, there centered another political faction which dominated the three eastern provinces collectively known as Manchuria. The warlord here was a diminutive, soft-spoken, mild-mannered ex-bandit named Chang Tso-lin, whose shrewd Machiavellian techniques made him one of the most feared of the warlords. The fact that he had formerly been a bandit was no particular disgrace; China's political chaos had given many great bandit leaders the reputation of being Robin Hoods — persons who had adopted a career of outlawry to mulct the vested interests engaged in grinding down the four hundred million.

The Canton clique. In the south Dr. Sun Yat-sen, himself not a tuchun but aided by two important followers, T'ang Shao-yi and Wu T'ing-fang, still maintained a tenuous hold on Canton and a few adjacent provinces. Standing solidly behind Dr. Sun were the adherents of Kuomintang policies and — less loyal but co-operative through a sense of expediency — the bourgeois classes of Canton and south-central China, who resented the domination of business by militarism in the north. Some of the lesser southern tuchuns of Kwangsi and adjacent provinces also proffered sporadic loyalty to Sun's group.

The rise of the Anfu group. The first clique to gain control over China was the Anfu Club; dominated by Tuan Ch'i-jui, it came to power after the downfall of President Li and his abortive attempt at monarchy in 1917. Tuan did not assume the presidency, but permitted Li's vice-president, Feng Kuo-chang, to finish out the term of office while he contented himself with his old strategic post of prime minister. In October 1918 when Feng's term ran out Tuan called together a subservient parliament and put into the presidency a docile ex-viceroy of Manchuria, Hsü Shih-ch'ang — called "Big Hsü" to distinguish him from "Little Hsü," founder of the Anfu Club. The policies of the Anfu group centered in subservience to Japan, which offered financial aid, and in support of a war program against the central powers in order to gain a place at the peace table. Tuan was also willing to enter into correspondence with Dr. Sun with a view to uniting northern and southern China, but after some talks at Shanghai Tuan's power dwindled so rapidly that the prospect of union was indefinitely postponed.
The fall of the Anfu. The prestige of the Anfu was wrecked by a student revolution in 1919 during the peace conference at Paris. The issue was whether China should sign the Treaty of Versailles with its cession of German rights in Shantung to Japan. While negotiations were proceeding in Europe a rumor swept over China that Tuan’s government, notoriously pro-Japanese, had given in to Japanese pressure, and immediately wave after wave of student riots broke out. On May 7, anniversary of the presentation of the Twenty-One Demands, about 10,000 Peking students paraded through the city. The legation quarter repulsed them, and on their return they halted at the gate of the minister of finance, who was popularly supposed to be an instigator of the hated pro-Japanese policies. When he refused to interview a delegation the students besieged his house, did some damage to his property, and injured his aide. The minister himself escaped. The student ring-leaders were rounded up and threatened with execution, whereupon the entire student population of the nation rose to protest. Chinese businessmen responded with boycotts of Japanese goods, and pressure was exerted on Tokyo by its nationals in China. Eventually even some of the dependable Japanese financial support was taken from the Anfu clique; and this was the beginning of the end. President Hsü finally had to capitulate; he apologized to the students, thanked them for exposing government corruption, and ordered the arrest of Ts’ao and Chang — after they had escaped safely to Japan.

The rise of Wu P’ei-fu. Coupled with the student revolt as a cause of Anfu decline was the sending by the Peking government of one of its subordinates, Chang Chin-yao, to Hunan Province as local tuchun. Chang proceeded to squeeze the region of every jot of its revenue, and tried to discredit Wu P’ei-fu and his associate Feng Yü-hsiang, who were attempting to get military control there. Chang’s methods were so obviously corrupt and his superiors were by now so fully discredited because of their pro-Japanese bias that when Wu proclaimed war on Chang and urged liberals to rise in opposition to extortion and administrative corruption the revolting students attached themselves to his banner by the thousands. Wu, aware of his temporary advantage, came to terms with his old chief, Ts’ao Kun, tuchun of Chihli, in an agreement under which Ts’ao was to contribute troops to Wu’s banner and wait on the sidelines until Wu’s plot against the Peking government hatched. If Wu succeeded, Ts’ao would join him; if not, Ts’ao would conceal his connection with the plot and maintain his neutrality. Wu also had the promise of help from Chang Tso-lin of Manchuria,
who brought up troops from the north. When Wu attacked government forces attempting to hold the Peking-Hankow Railway, Anfu opposition rapidly dissolved, and on July 28, 1920, Tuan Ch'i-jui resigned to enter a Buddhist monastery. Because of Wu's success, Chang and Ts'ao entered Peking and took control of the government. The Anfu Club was temporarily out of the picture.

*Wu P'ei-fu's régime.* The marriage of convenience between Chang Tso-lin on the one hand and the Chihli clique on the other did not last long. By this time Feng Yü-hsiang, the "Christian general," had ceased being a mere subordinate of Wu's and had graduated to full tuchun status. With his aid Wu and Ts'ao leagued together against Chang, and in mid-1922 managed to drive him back into Manchuria. Wu then forced President Hsü Shih-ch'ang to resign and called from retirement General Li Yuan-hung, who with some reluctance accepted the presidency. Wu next attempted to unite the north and south of China by summoning the members who remained of the original 1912 parliament, but his régime collapsed in 1923. President Li failed to get along with General Feng, and finally was forced out of office by Feng's adherents. Marshal Ts'ao stepped into the office in October 1923 while Wu remained on the sidelines, still influential, but obviously not in supreme control.

*The return of Chang Tso-lin.* Wu's rise to power had made him many enemies, including Dr. Sun and Chang Tso-lin. The latter struck up an alliance with remnants of the Anfu clique, and in 1924 attacked Peking. Wu and Ts'ao stubbornly resisted, but when General Feng changed sides and joined the enemy, Peking fell to Chang's forces. With the help of the ever-ready Tuan Ch'i-jui and Feng, Chang organized a coalition government which lasted until 1925. Then Feng, for reasons of his own, again turned upon his associates.

*The three-cornered war.* For the next two years, 1925 and 1926, the political situation in North China was utterly confused. Feng established a semiautonomous government in Inner Mongolia with Russian military aid, while Chang ruled an independent Manchuria under the aegis of Japan. For a time Tuan became chief executive in Peking with Chang's support. In the meantime however Wu p'ei-fu, still a fugitive in the south, had become one of the most popular men in China because of his relatively clean hands, politically speaking, and also because he was temporarily the underdog. He rapidly gained new support, marched north, and began to press Feng's and Chang's forces. This second rise to power of General Wu marked the virtual end of the tuchunate except
in Manchuria, for Dr. Sun’s Kuomintang movement in the south was gaining support and was shortly to end the squabbling of the warlords.

2. Mission from Moscow

Dr. Sun and the tuchuns. The ideological nucleus of the Chinese Revolution had its birth in the principles advanced by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang political party. With the rise of Yuan Shih-kai to supreme control the Kuomintang and its founder lost influence. Nevertheless during Yuan’s term and after his fall, Dr. Sun worked busily to reorganize his political group. Although part of the time an exile, he changed the open party structure of the Kuomintang to one more suited to its sub rosa status. In 1913 he revived the old secret society, the Tungmenghui, and pledged its indoctrinated members to personal allegiance to him. This procedure succeeded remarkably well, as a Jacobin doctrine Sun’s program carried more appeal than it would have had as a simple political party; also it was better calculated to survive the rapid changes and variant moods of the Peking government.

Sun’s maneuvering. Although Sun maintained a rather vague authority over the southern provinces, his political life was by no means peaceful. His major task was to win military help without sacrificing his authority to southern tuchuns; but this was not easy. In 1918 for instance he and his two chief aides, T’ang Shao-yi and Wu T’ing-fang, gave up and left for Shanghai, and the liberals in Canton were on the point of moving their headquarters also; but the militarists who had temporarily seized control came to terms by the end of the year. Again in 1920 Sun and his two friends fled to Shanghai, where Sun began his ill-fated attempt to hitch his wagon to Tuan Ch’i-jui’s declining star. His idea was that both he and Tuan should voluntarily turn over their power to a new national parliament at Peking and thus unify the nation.

With Tuan’s fall Sun was thrown back on his own resources, and in 1920 he attempted a reorganization of the Kuomintang aimed at taking advantage of the widening possibilities of political action in the south. He maintained the trappings of secret brotherhood but abolished the oath of personal allegiance to himself, and succeeded in somewhat enlarging the membership. But he realized that additional military strength was needed, and he still saw no way of getting it without sacrificing his political principles. In 1921 however he was encouraged by the strengthening of his influence in Canton to the point where he was called back and elected constitutional president of China by remnants of the old parliament of 1913.
Joffe. In 1923 Sun again found himself jockeyed out of power at Canton, and he once more fled to his customary refuge in Shanghai. By this time he was thoroughly discouraged by his repeated failures to get help. The tuchuns were undependable and dangerous; foreign nations suspected his liberalism and disapproved his military weakness. From Russia though he might get aid; he therefore entered into conversations with Adolf Joffe, the Russian emissary in Shanghai on his way from Peking to Tokyo. Joffe had failed to get anywhere in his negotiations with the Peking government, and was on his way to Japan to feel out the situation there. As a result of his disappointment in Peking he was inclined to view Sun's Nationalist movement with favor; and a series of talks led to an offer of Russian help. The Soviet government declared itself willing to aid China to unify itself without insisting upon the sovietization of the country. When Sun returned to Canton that same year of 1923 he took with him the promise of Russian assistance.

The Russian Revolution of 1917, though it represented the triumph of extremist elements, served as a model for revolutionary groups the world over. It not only had succeeded in overturning a government that had all the force of historic tradition behind it, but its methods seemed applicable to other situations. And what was much more, the triumphant revolutionaries deliberately set out to overturn other existing non-socialist régimes through the formation of the Comintern, or Third International: an organization devoted to sponsoring Communist groups in other countries and bringing about the eventual adoption of the principles of Marxism and the class struggle in every nation. All this meant that Russia was indeed willing to help China.

Borodin. Accordingly in 1923 Michael Borodin arrived from Moscow to aid Sun in his reorganization of the Kuomintang. This was accomplished with some dispatch, and on the Russian model. Borodin convinced Sun that a strong, staunchly loyal party group highly organized and centralized was a necessity; and the Kuomintang was completely revamped. Like the Communist "cell," the basic unit of the Kuomintang became the local group, meeting every two weeks, which only indoctrinated party members of assured loyalty might attend. Above this local group were sub-district, district, and provincial councils, topped by a party congress which was to meet annually. The disturbed political conditions in China prevented regular annual meetings from being held and the national congress met only in 1924, 1926, and 1929 before Nationalist control was achieved over all the nation. A central executive committee, with an odor of Communism in its title, and a super-
visory committee, were to centralize party controls; and Dr. Sun was made party chief for life.

The Three Principles. Borodin also urged Sun to crystallize his party's principles in a form that could be easily understood by loyal members, and the result was the publication of some of Sun's lectures in a book known as the Sun-min-Chu-i, the 'Three Principles of the People.' This, plus a party manifesto issued in 1924 and Dr. Sun's will, restated the basic principles of the revolution. The three points enumerated were nationalism, socialism, and democracy. Nationalism Dr. Sun felt was a prerequisite to progress. Imperialism had made China a 'hypocolony' — less than a colony in its international significance. The variant races of China must be united behind a single cause, and the country must present to the world a centralized government heading a loyal population if it were ever to amount to anything. Socialism as defined by Dr. Sun was a rather vague recognition of China's need for a planned economy. It seems apparent that Sun never believed he was laying the foundations for a Communist China by inviting Russian aid; his sympathies were leftist, it is true, involving land-equalization schemes and other government controls, but as he envisioned socialism it did not include sovietization. Democracy in Dr. Sun's view was China's ultimate goal, but the political immaturity of her people precluded an immediate realization of true democratic principles; the masses of China were clearly unfit to govern, and authority would have to be exercised by a few trained men. But the influence of these few should be controlled by such limitations as the referendum and recall. Besides, democracy could be attained only gradually, after adequate ground-laying. A concession was made to China's ancient form of government by dividing the authority into five branches: legislative, executive, judicial (from the Western system), examination, and censorship (from ancient Chinese practice).

The party's first task was obviously the reconquest of all of China and its unification by military force. The second period should produce a one-party government, whose chief task should be the education of the people for democracy. Third — after military controls were no longer needed and after the party had done its work — a truly constitutional and democratic government would be set up and operated for the people's benefit.

Russia's influence. Although Russia's aid to Dr. Sun proved a welcome support for the tottering Kuomintang, the seeds for later trouble were sown by Michael Borodin and his associates. Despite Russia's
pledge not to use her advisory position to expand Soviet influence, Borodin and his associates while they were in China apparently managed to indoctrinate a nucleus of followers who later strengthened the Chinese Communist Party. On the surface therefore Russia saved China for the Kuomintang; *sub rosa* however foundations were laid for the structure that was to be the chief threat to the Kuomintang's power.

*Sun's last days.* Despite the reorganization of the party structure, Sun was still partly at the mercy of the Canton factions. In 1923 he had been returned through the efforts of the Kwangsi and Yunnan tuchuns, who considered him a desirable puppet, and he was forced to balance the tuchuns' influence against that of the Cantonese *bourgeoisie*, who had organized a merchants' volunteer corps to resist the encroachment of the military. Eventually however the volunteer corps turned against Sun and was about to oust him, when Sun by a military coup seized their arms and by force maintained his mastery. In December of 1924 Sun left for Peking to begin a series of talks with Tuan, Chang, and Feng, with the object of resolving the differences between North and South China, but his health failed rapidly and he died on March 12, 1925, before his major goals had been reached.

*The deification of Sun Yat-sen.* Like many political leaders, Dr. Sun dead became a much more powerful force for unity than he had ever been alive. He became the titular deity of the Chinese Revolution, and his Three Principles swept like a Yellow River flood over all of China. Eventually, with the subsequent capture of the Yangtze valley by Nationalist forces, Dr. Sun's body was installed in a magnificent marble tomb at the new capital, Nanking, and this mausoleum on the slopes of Purple Mountain has become the shrine of the New China.

3. The Northern March

*Succession to the leadership.* Although the death of Sun Yat-sen provided the Kuomintang with a strong bond in the form of a sainted leader, certain problems immediately became evident. One of these was the question of the succession, for Dr. Sun had made no provision for his political heir. There were three men who might logically don his mantle. One, Hu Han-min, stood on the right, counting on the support of the Canton merchants and the tuchuns of the southern provinces; but he was shortly bereft of influence. Another, Wang Ching-wei, favored the leftist and — temporarily — a strengthening of the Communist connection; but the obvious disapproval of the foreign govern-
ments to any further intrusion of radical influence in China left him with but little foreign financial support. The third and successful candidate was Chiang Kai-shek.

Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang stood in the middle of the road. He was shrewd enough to realize that the leftists constituted a vigorous branch of the Kuomintang and therefore should not be completely alienated, but he also knew that the world at large would never stand behind a régime that was too radical. He grew to appreciate the value and power of money and the influence of the bourgeoisie and the bankers, and if he showed preference at all in his later career it was for the moneyed interests who could support him and his party in their rise to power. Chiang was born in 1887 in Chekiang Province. Coming from a family of moderate means, he had the education that was available in his day — preliminary schooling in China, then military training in Japan. It was there that he met Dr. Sun and in 1909 became a member of the Tungmenhui. When Sun returned to China in 1911 Chiang followed, and fought in the many civil skirmishes of the south as Dr. Sun's supporter. In 1917 he became disillusioned with the seeming hopelessness of his task and decided upon a drastic step; he resigned from Sun's service to enter business, where he hoped and expected to gather the financial resources to enable him to become a tuchun on his own. Chiang was blessed either with uncommon luck or with the right connections or both, for within four years after he had left the army he had a comfortable income. In 1921 he was ready to return to Sun's service, went on a military mission to Russia, and on his return became in 1924 head of the Whampoa Military Academy. 

Chiang's character. Because Chiang became the greatest leader of modern China we need to understand clearly his character, personality, and policies. A man of medium height, he wears simple khaki uniforms and dramatic black cloaks. A devotee of discipline, he even abstains from coffee and tea. Though sensitive and a poor mixer, he nevertheless has the ability to make people follow him and to believe in his ideals. Many of his advisers, foreign and otherwise, consider him of almost superhuman genius. Chiang married twice; his first wife, an old-fashioned Chinese lady, bore him a son who for a time joined the Reds, then later returned to his father's service. His second wife, the celebrated Madame Chiang, was formerly Soong Mei-ling, one
of three famous sisters who inherited one of China’s great fortunes and who married respectively Chiang, Sun Yat-sen, and H. H. K’ung, a prominent banker. Chiang’s military ability and his political stature were without a doubt one of the major reasons for China’s stubborn resistance to collapse during the long dark years of the second World War.

Party politics. Chiang was immediately faced as general of the Kuomintang forces by a serious split within the party ranks. The leftists, tending more and more toward Moscow, played an important part in two clashes with foreign interests that for a time turned the Western World against the Kuomintang and its policies. One of these clashes was the Shanghai riot of 1925, in which Chinese liberals demonstrated in support of employees striking against Japanese millowners. A detachment of International Settlement police commanded by an Englishman fired on the mob, killing twelve and wounding twoscore more. Less than a month later Canton liberals engaged in an anti-British demonstration along the waterfront opposite the foreign-occupied island of Shameen. Someone fired a shot, and the resulting mêlée caused the deaths of five Europeans and fifty-two Chinese and the wounding of more than a hundred other Chinese. In 1926, on the occasion of the annual party conference, the radicals were so firmly in control of the party that the disgruntled moderates and conservatives bolted the convention and held what was known as the “Western Hills Conference” to crystallize their anti-Communist policies. Chiang early lined up with the anti-Communist elements of the party, and it was largely through the influence of the Communists themselves, who feared his presence in the south, that one of Dr. Sun’s great ideas, the “northern march,” took form that same year.

The march to the Yangtze. The northern expedition was planned by the Russian general Blücher but Chiang was placed in command. Preceded by propagandists to win rather than alienate the population, the army was to move north to Hankow and proceed down the river to the coast, occupying Nanking and Shanghai en route. From there the march would be resumed to the north, with the final goal the occupation of Peking, still under the influence of Chang Tso-lin. In July 1926 the Kuomintang armies under Chiang began their triumphal trek. The propagandists did masterful work, and in the early stages little opposition was encountered. At Hankow Wu P’ei-fu’s adherents quickly quit and the city was taken in October. By the spring of 1927 Chiang was in possession of most of the provinces south of the Yangtze, and mean-
while had gained two new adherents in the persons of General Feng, tuchun of Inner Mongolia, and Yen Hsi-shan, tuchun of Shansi. Both of these warlords perceived in the approach of the Kuomintang forces a prospect of dealing a deathblow to their political competitor, Chang Tso-lin, and they willingly fell in line. In March 1927 Nanking fell, but here party politics again erupted and served to halt the northern march.

The end of Communist influence. The absence of Chiang from Canton was hailed by the Communists and their sympathizers as an opportunity to consolidate their position. In November of 1926 the Kuomintang headquarters was moved from Canton to Hankow, and the radicals took steps to remove Chiang from command of the armies. Even in Chiang's forces many of his followers took occasion to express themselves in opposition to imperialism, and in Nanking Red sympathizers engaged in looting and shooting foreigners in an attempt to involve Chiang and the moderates. As it was six foreigners were killed and property was damaged, and finally the rioters had to be warned by a salvo from American warships. The governments of the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan sent warning notes to the Nationalists, and though the matter was amicably settled in 1928 similar events in Shanghai resulted in increasing the size of foreign troop detachments there to protect the international and French settlements. In protest against the radical influence in the Hankow government Chiang and the moderates, sometimes called the Western Hills faction, withdrew to Nanking and set up a régime upon which the Western powers looked with much more favor. In August of 1927 a settlement was reached whereby Chiang resigned his command, and the Hankow government under the influence of conservatives pledged itself to continue its purge of Communist elements. With Feng's aid Chiang saw to this house-cleaning, and Borodin's influence came to an end. This purge had many beneficial effects but also some unfortunate ones, in that some of the early liberal Kuomintang principles were abandoned to the extent that certain progressive groups felt unable to follow either Chiang's faction or the Communists. In the spring of the following year however the Nationalist government was so hopelessly muddled that a strong hand was needed, and Chiang was recalled to resume command of the armies.

The end of the revolution's first phase. At the end of 1927 after the purge of the Reds prospects for a Nationalist China seemed fairly bright. The leftists had deserted the Communists and these had been read out of the party. The entire Yangtze valley was in Nationalist hands. Chiang had regained military control, and by the spring of 1928
was ready to resume his northern progress, with Peking, still under the
control of Chang Tso-lin and his Manchurian troops, as his objective.
Unfortunately Chiang soon ran into unexpected difficulties. Chang
Tso-lin had maintained fairly close relations with the militarists in the
Nipponese government; his clique had accepted Japanese financial as-
sistance and had studiously maintained amicable relations with Tokyo.
The militarists of Nippon perceived that if Chang fell their opportunity
in northern China would be suddenly at an end; and they determined on
a desperate venture to halt the progress of the Nationalist armies. The
result was the Tsinan incident, in which the Japanese Sixth Division
met the Chinese troops on May 3 at Tsinan and attempted to stop them.
But world opinion at this time was against Japanese intervention, and
even Japanese liberals protested vehemently at the government's policy.
The Japanese forces were withdrawn and Chiang occupied Peking, driv-
ing Chang Tso-lin northward. In June Chang was killed when a bomb
exploded under his railway car and control of his troops devolved upon
his son, the "Young Marshal," Chang Hsueh-liang. The son abandoned
his father's pro-Japanese, anti-Nationalist front and joined the National-
ist cause. He was later to play a major part in the struggle to unify
China.

With the occupation of Peking Chiang Kai-shek considered that the
first or "military" phase of the revolution was over. Accordingly he
turned over his command to the Nationalist government now located
at Nanking. According to the 1928 organic law, Chiang and his fol-
lowers considered that they had entered on the second phase of the
revolution as defined by Dr. Sun, the period of political tutelage. In
this system the party was supreme; the country was to be ruled by a
party-dominated central political council appointed by the central
executive committee of the party. The central state council was the
nominal head of the government. The chief executive of the nation was
the chairman of the state council, and the five-board administrative
organization envisioned by Dr. Sun was rigorously adhered to. Nomi-
nally the Nationalists were in complete control of most of China;
actually their dominance was threatened not only by dissension between
right and left within the party itself, but also by the fact that their
strength depended largely on temporary alliances with the remaining
independent tuchuns — Feng, Yen Hsi-shan, the tuchuns of the south-
ern provinces, and Chang Hsueh-liang. But prospects were brighter
than they had been for years, and Dr. Sun's program seemed to be in a
fair way of being realized.
4. The War Against the Reds

The program of the Nationalists; (2) Foreign relations. The Nanking Nationalist government despite its tenuous hold on the nation was soon given recognition by foreign powers as the legitimate government of China. It immediately set about to justify its existence, and the problems to which it first turned were those arising from foreign imperialism. One of the major successes of the régime was the achievement of tariff autonomy. It will be recalled that foreign nations ever since the first Opium War had dictated China’s tariff policy; but beginning in 1928 with American surrender of tariff rights other nations gave back to China her own customs jurisdiction, and by 1930 the duties were being controlled by the Nanking government. Extraterritoriality, still insisted upon by many nations, was another problem that beset the Nationalists, and their negotiations aimed at the abandonment of extraterritorial rights by most of the world; but the United States, Britain, Japan, and France took exception, though they professed themselves willing to consider a “gradual” abolition of their rights. Internal strife coupled with Japanese aggression prevented any further achievement in this matter until World War II, in the midst of which the United States abandoned the extraterritorial privileges it had held for more than a century. Another cause for resentment on China’s part was the maintenance by foreign governments of concessions in many of the great ports and cities. Some of these concessions and leases were abandoned; the British restored Weihaiwei to China in 1930. In Shanghai, where the foreign concessions were so important economically that their return was out of the question, the Chinese were given more rights in municipal administration. The Nationalist government then with all its weaknesses in some nineteen years accomplished more toward restoring China to a position of dignity among the nations of the world than the Manchu régime had done in the course of nearly a century.

(2) Domestic reforms. Domestic problems also merited and received much attention. Minister of Finance T. V. Soong, brother of the three famous sisters, refunded China’s debt and increased her income. An attempt was made to reform the judicial system so as to justify the government’s efforts to end extraterritorial privilege. Transportation and communication came in for attention, and special problems such as control of opium and improvement of laboring conditions were investigated. It was obviously an impossible task for the Nanking govern-
ment to stage an economic revolution within half a decade, and the Communists capitalized in their propaganda on the government's failure to raise the standard of living of the masses. While these reforms were being undertaken, China was undergoing an important revolution in its educational system which not only modernized educational technique but also profoundly changed the psychological and spiritual approach to the problems of education. The government tried to take over all Chinese (non-mission) schools, and made an effort to control textbooks. The so-called "New China" was therefore a result not only of the Nationalist reforms but also of the educational revival and reorganization that accompanied them.

(3) Economic progress. Under the Nationalists Chinese economy also made some progress, the outstanding feature being the changes in foreign trade. Great Britain for instance, traditionally dominant in China's economic life, fell in importance behind Japan and in some cases behind the United States. League of Nations commissions and foreign advisers aided China in developing its industries, despite Japan's evident opposition to Western co-operation with China. Japan already considered East Asia to be her personal preserve, and was prepared to eliminate any economic aid that might give China the strength to resist her further encroachment. China's industry remained relatively unimportant, her great western provinces were still undeveloped, currency stabilization was still unachieved, and social problems arising from a marginal economy multiplied. And yet backward as China was her foreign trade improved markedly, and if political disunity could have been ended in the early 1930's the Nationalist government might have accomplished much.

Political disunity. The chief obstacle to China's progress under the Kuomintang was internal strife. In 1929 civil war broke out anew with a revolt of the Kwangsi tuchuns, who had been inspired to act by leftist disaffection in the south. General Feng allied himself with Chiang to defeat these southern troublemakers, but confidence between the two dissolved, and in 1930 Chiang attacked his ally. Feng got the promise of Yen Hsi-shan's support, but Chiang countered by an alliance with Chang Hsüeh-liang. Independent governments were set up temporarily at Peiping and Canton, while Chiang in association with Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei dominated the Nanking régime. But despite these troubles and the disunity evident among the conservative factions Chiang concluded that the Reds constituted the chief menace to Nationalist control of China.
The Chinese Reds. The rapid growth of the Chinese Communist Party was a direct result of the Sun-Borodin rapprochement. Russia attempted to capitalize on this growth by establishing the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow for the purpose of indoctrinating Chinese youth. Sun Yat-sen himself had extracted from Russia a pledge that the cooperation would not be utilized for the Communist and Soviet system, but propaganda activities went on nevertheless, with or without the approval of Russia's official representatives. In May 1921 the Chinese Communist Party was formally organized, and began its work among industrial laborers in Shanghai. Although the party membership in 1922 was only about 300, the party congress in 1924 decided to ally itself with the Kuomintang. Dr. Sun agreed, provided that no large-scale program of communization be attempted. Adolf Joffe had returned to China in 1922, and his conversations with Dr. Sun resulted as we have seen in a joint declaration on the part of the two men in 1923 whereby Russia pledged her sympathetic support to the cause of national unification and independence. Party membership increased rapidly from that time on. By 1924 there were 2,000 active Communists, and the labor organizations they controlled claimed 60,000 members. In 1926 the Communists proposed to the Nationalist government an augmentation of its own program of land redistribution and the creation of an army modeled on Trotsky's Red Army, but the suggestion was not accepted. The Hankow régime of 1927 which deposed Chiang from command marked the high point of Communist influence in the Kuomintang, for shortly thereafter, as previously related, the Kuomintang purged itself of active Communists, and the more conservative elements under Chiang regained control.

Regional control. With its elimination from the Nationalist government the Chinese Communist Party devoted itself assiduously to the seizure of Nationalist influence through its advocacy of a land distribution program that appealed greatly to the poverty-stricken Chinese peasants. The province which was the focus of Red activities was Kiangsi, south of the Yangtze. From there the Reds spread eastward in the coastal province of Fukien and westward to Hunan. The agricultural policy they advocated was the seizure of the major landholdings and their redistribution among the peasants, the abolition of the old tax system, and the introduction of a new scale of levies based primarily on crop percentages. In the cities they stood back of labor unions and syndicates, and by fighting for higher wages and better working conditions won the confidence of large numbers of the workers.
These activities, coupled with the highly organized propaganda campaigns which have become such familiar Communist technique, eventually succeeded — by 1945 — in winning for them control of about one sixth of China — 300,000 square miles of territory and about 90,000,000 persons, though not all of the 90,000,000 by any means subscribed loyally to Red doctrines.

Chiang's campaign. Chiang had made up his mind that the Reds constituted a greater menace to China's unity than the rising threat of Japanese imperialism, and accordingly embarked upon a series of campaigns designed to recapture the Red regions of southern China. By 1934 he had organized five great campaigns against them, and although their resistance was savage and stubborn in the extreme, consisting largely of guerrilla tactics in rugged and mountainous areas, Chiang was eventually able in 1934 to dislodge them from their southern strongholds. They then decided that they would be able to defend themselves better in the more sparsely populated northwest. After carefully laying the groundwork by sponsoring a local Communist movement which infiltrated the local administration, they set out on a 6000-mile trek to Shensi Province, west of the big bend in the Yellow River. This "northern march" was an epic of no mean proportions. Its "anabasis" has been written by several people, and the undeniable courage with which the Communists faced hardship, war, and death awakened in many foreign observers sympathy for their cause. Once in Shensi, the Reds set up a capital in Yenan, about a hundred miles south of the Great Wall, and proceeded to expand both east and west.

In his campaigns against the Reds Chiang adopted many techniques that bore the stamp of dictatorship. He organized an armed corps known as the "Blue Shirts," which had at least a fascist label; with the aid of Madame Chiang he instituted a nationalistic cultural revival called the "New Life Movement"; finally, in order to maintain the allegiance of the wealthy whose financial aid he badly needed, he organized the landowners in areas threatened with Red infiltration, and consequently widened the gap between the upper and lower classes. As a result of his policies Chiang was accused of dictatorship, of being nothing but a super-tuchun, and of not having the true interests of the people at heart. Americans and other Occidentals, constantly on the search for "democracy," sometimes concluded that the Communists were more democratic than the Nationalists under Chiang. What they failed to realize was that China was in no condition for democracy at the time, considering its low standard of living and its lack of education, and that many
years would be required for democratic institutions to evolve. Chiang was also blamed for using methods against the Communists which they were perfectly willing to use against him; and many Americans were strangely unable to understand why Chiang should insist on the disbandment of the Red armies — a surprising attitude considering that less than a century before the ancestors of these Americans had fought a bloody civil war over the issue of whether a minority could be allowed to wreck a government by armed force. Parallels are always dangerous, and perhaps the criticism of Chiang was fully justified, but it must be remembered that he represented duly constituted authority recognized even by Moscow, and the Reds did not.

Chiang's war against the Reds. Despite the growing menace of Japanese imperialism, which in 1931 had engulfed Manchuria and since then had been extending its tentacles into Chahar and Hopei provinces, Chiang determined to fling all his available military strength against the Reds in their new position. He realized that the situation involved both advantages and disadvantages. There was the danger that in their location the Reds might be able to maintain much closer relations with Moscow. If Russia chose to help them openly Nationalist China would suffer. On the other hand Tokyo persisted in interpreting every northward move of Chiang's troops as a gesture hostile to Japan; but when the Reds were in the north even the Tokyo militarists could not logically object to Chiang's concentrating Nationalist armies in that area. At any rate, Chiang enlisted the help of Chang Hsüeh-liang and began immediately to exert strong pressure against the Reds — who by now had another string to their bow: the growing fear of Japanese aggression, shared by many other groups in China. The two Communist chiefs, Generals Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, embarked upon a campaign designed to persuade the Kuomintang that they wanted nothing more than to join with Chiang so as to present a united front against the Japanese. Chiang refused to listen; but the propaganda began to take effect upon the troops of Chang Hsüeh-liang, and many even of Chiang's loyal adherents protested his stubborn policy. Chang endeavored to carry on the war against the Reds in their western strongholds, but his forces were shot through with doubt and disloyalty, and finally even Chang began to wonder whether the generalissimo's policy was dictated by wisdom or by shortsightedness.

The Sian kidnapping. The result was one of the most spectacular incidents in China's modern history — the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek by his subordinates. In December 1936, after Chang had been
repulsed in his efforts to get the anti-Communist policy modified, Chiang made a tour of inspection of the northern fighting fronts. On this tour he was forcibly detained — "kidnapped" — by Chang and some of his generals and kept in custody for about two weeks. While in confinement he was subjected to a barrage of arguments for the union of the Nationalist forces with those of the Reds so as to present Japan with the spectacle for the first time in modern history of a united China. Chiang stiffly refused to come to terms, although he conferred with his captors and even interviewed a leading Communist. His adviser, W. Donald, an Australian newspaper man, his wife, and her brother, T. V. Soong, all joined him at Sian and urged him to listen to reason; but with an air of unapproachable dignity he persistently refused to do business with the men who had disgraced themselves and him by this act. There was also a report that Chang and his associates fully intended to do him violence if he failed to acquiesce but that when Chang read his commander's diary he was convinced that the generalissimo was acting in high-minded good faith and became his staunch supporter.

*Results of the Sian episode.* Chiang was released toward the end of December and returned to Nanking, to find the people of China united in their resentment against his captors. To "save face" he subjected Chang Hsüeh-liang to trial for treason and the latter voluntarily submitted, but the dispatch with which he was liberated — although he was kept under technical "house arrest" — seemed to indicate that the proceeding had been prearranged. Though Chiang had refused to make a written agreement with his captors he apparently had a change of heart, and shortly afterward agreed to join forces with the Reds in opposition to Japan. The Communists organized a fighting force known as the Eighth Route Army, and though constantly at odds with Nationalist forces made a good showing in World War II. Another result of the Sian episode was Japan's decision to act before China could unify itself still further. There appears to be ample support for the claim that Chiang's union with the Reds hastened Japan's attacks and had much to do with the time-schedule of World War II.

*Constitutional developments.* While these stirring events were taking place and forming an important part of the background for the second World War, the Nationalist government had passed through two more phases in its constitutional development. In 1931 the organic law of 1928 was moderately revised, some power being taken from the executive branch of the government. Revision however was not sufficient, and commissions set to work with the idea of presenting to the people
in 1935 a new and more democratic constitution. But political strife interfered, and the period of so-called "political tutelage" lasted all through the war and even until December 1947.

Conclusion. Between the two world wars the Chinese Revolution passed through two more of its bloody phases. From the death of Yuan Shih-kai to the expansion of the Kuomintang's influence in 1926, there was a period of anarchy in which China was dominated by warlords known as tuchuns. During this period Dr. Sun engaged in negotiations with Russia and obtained Russian help in reorganizing his political following. The result was that in the mid-1920's the Kuomintang, after strengthening its position in the south, embarked upon a program of expansion under the leadership of one of Dr. Sun's followers, Chiang Kai-shek.

Chiang's military career for the next decade was divided into two parts. The first was the prosecution of the "northern march" which succeeded in expanding Kuomintang influence throughout the Yangtze valley and in driving Chang Tso-lin from Peking. The second phase consisted of a series of campaigns against the Chinese Communists, who first established themselves in Kiangsi and Fukien and then moved westward via Szechuan to the northern provinces of Shensi and Kansu. The climax of this campaign was the Sian kidnapping, in which Chang Hsüeh-liang and other followers seized Chiang and prevailed upon him to unite with the Reds so as to face Japan with added strength. This strength was greatly needed, for though Nationalist China had accomplished much in the brief period between 1927, when its government was organized, and 1937, when the Japanese once again attacked, she was still coping with problems arising out of the revolution, and she was still neither democratic nor well organized.
The Rising Sun Over East Asia

Introduction. Coincident with China's great revolution was the Japanese government's adoption of an imperialistic policy that eventually gave it control over a vast Pacific empire ranging from the Kurils to the Solomons and from Wake Island to the big bend of the Yellow River. The narrative of how this came about requires an extension of the previously told story of Japan's encroachments; an extension that will attempt to analyze the major areas that came under Japan's control and to describe the events that finally enabled her in the period between Portsmouth and Pearl Harbor to threaten the independence of half the Pacific world.

1. Japan in Korea

Japan's protectorate over Korea. The Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) made the Hermit Kingdom of Korea, though nominally an independent nation, actually a part of the Japanese Empire. For some years of course Japan had considered Korea her private preserve, and accordingly in 1904 when Russia threatened encroachment south of the Yalu River Japan went to war with her. Throughout that conflict Korea valiantly attempted to maintain a status of neutrality, but her geographic position made it impossible; and early in the war Japan forced her to sign two agreements by which she bound herself to accept Japanese advice regarding foreign and domestic affairs and to employ a Japanese financial adviser. Japan's victory in the war enabled her to extract from Russia a pledge of noninterference, and President Roosevelt indicated
his willingness to consider that Japan had special rights in the peninsula. When the war ended the helpless Seoul government was forced to accept a new agreement that gave Japan complete control of Korean foreign affairs through a resident-general, who would have the right of audience with the Korean emperor, and who would be assisted by a corps of residents in the ports and principal cities.

*Ito as resident.* The first resident-general was the Marquis (later Prince) Ito, author of Japan’s constitution and an exceptionally able administrator. He had originally opposed the annexation of Korea, but fell in readily with the protectorate theory and applied his numerous talents to the reorganization of the peninsula’s muddled affairs. He gave special attention to hospitals, the police service, reform of the courts, mining controls, protection of emigrants, economic and educational reforms, and related matters. As a result of these improvements Korea’s standard of living went up somewhat and the population increased to a dangerous pressure point. The Koreans however were still restive and dissatisfied, and their opposition to Japan’s gunpoint paternalism was shown in 1907, when they surreptitiously sent three representatives with an American escort to the Hague Tribunal to plead Korea’s case. Japan however prevented the mission from being heard, and to punish the Emperor Yi Hyeung for his contumacy Tokyo brought about the immediate succession of his son, Yi Chuk. Korean hatred thereupon became so intense that it got out of hand, and Ito in 1909, after his resignation from the resident-generalship, was assassinated in Manchuria by a Korean fanatic.

*Annexation.* In apparent retribution, Japan struck like a thunderbolt. The new resident-general, Terauchi, interviewed Emperor Yi Chuk and forced him to agree to the annexation of his realm by Japan. On August 22, 1910, the Hermit Kingdom surrendered its pseudo-independence and the emperor accepted a Japanese peerage and pension in return for his domain. But the formal act of annexation did not by any means end the troubles, for the Korean hatred of Japan that had been piling up for centuries now reached heights of unmitigated fury. The Koreans, inspired in their patriotism by foreign missionaries, refused to co-operate, and even the best of the Japanese policies were never appreciated or utilized. This situation was most marked in the economic field, where definite progress did take place; but relations between Japanese and Koreans were not improved because the margin of betterment went to Japan and not to the natives. Japan on the other hand failed to permit Korean participation in government as she had
promised, and her lack of experience in dealing with colonies caused her to commit many serious errors.

The outbreak of 1919. With the death in 1919 of the old deposed Emperor Yi, unrest in Korea broke out in a series of mass meetings. Much of the discontent was based on Korea’s determination to participate in the world movement for self-rule advocated by President Wilson, and some of it owed its strength to the Christian colony, both native and foreign, which stood staunchly behind the independence idea. Three days before Yi’s funeral thousands of patriots assembled in various cities and listened to proclamations of independence read by patriot leaders who then cheerfully submitted to arrest and imprisonment in a remarkable demonstration of passive resistance. The Japanese called out the troops and struck again, causing 2,000 casualties among the demonstrators. About 30,000 of them were arrested; of these 10,000 were flogged and 5,000 were imprisoned. The uprisings however convinced Tokyo that its policies were not succeeding, and some reforms were immediately instituted. For example the governor-general, who after annexation had replaced the resident-general, had always been an army officer; now the Japanese proclaimed that they would generously permit the governor to be chosen from organizations other than the army. This ostensibly meant the establishment of a civilian bureaucracy, which would have been a real step forward; but instead the next incumbent of the strategic office was an admiral, Saito. A degree of local self-government was permitted, some educational improvements were made, a regular police force was substituted for the gendarmerie with its unpopular military connections, and some unpopular laws were abrogated. But none of these reforms satisfied the real desires of the Koreans — independence and a decent standard of living, unhampered by mercantilistic Japanese controls.

Recent developments. The independence movement in Korea simmered for years under Japanese domination, but it never died. Representatives of Korean patriot groups traveled abroad, writing and speaking. When World War II broke out the independence movement developed a propaganda campaign which urged the United Nations to utilize Korea’s strategic geographical position as a springboard for the main attack on Japan — surely nothing less than a magnificent hatred would offer the homeland as a cockpit of modern war! Following World War II Korea was obviously a pawn of Russia and the United States; but one thing at least was certain, that when Japan surrendered to the Allies in August 1945 Korea’s half century of slavery to Nippon was finally ended.
2. JAPAN IN MANCHURIA

The story of Japan’s intervention in Manchuria from 1905, when she established a sphere of influence over its southern portion, to 1932, the date of the establishment of Manchukuo, is a typical account of modern military aggression in which both economic and psychological factors played a big part.

The beginning of Japanese influence in South Manchuria. When Japan declared war on Russia one of her chief objectives was control of South Manchuria, and once the fighting was over she set to work to secure the two diplomatic agreements which would give her what she wanted. The first was the Treaty of Portsmouth. This accord, already described, provided that Japan would take over Russian economic rights in southern Manchuria, including both the South Manchurian Railway and the Liao-tung leasehold with its naval base of Port Arthur — provided Chinese acquiescence could be obtained. The second treaty consequently was an agreement with China in 1905, whereby both published and secret provisos gave Japan China’s permission to take over the South Manchurian line, to open sixteen new treaty ports, to rebuild the military railway between Antung and Mukden for permanent use, and to acquire monopolistic economic privileges in southern Manchuria.

Japan and the open door. Despite these diplomatic guarantees Japan soon found herself facing a difficult situation. The territorial division of Manchuria into two spheres of influence, one Russian and one Japanese, although highly satisfactory from an economic standpoint, placed Tokyo in a highly vulnerable position in view of her previous acquiescence in the doctrine of the open door. Russia had nominal control over the vast, empty wilderness of Heilungkiang Province and the northern part of Kirin — some 175,000 square miles; Japan however dominated the most thickly populated portion and the areas with the richest economic resources, the southern half of Kirin Province and the entire southern province of Fengtien. As a result, because Japan’s share was the more valuable her blocking of the open door got more publicity and consequently more blame than did Russia’s.

Population. Another situation that annoyed Tokyo’s statesmen for many years was the predominance of Chinese in Manchuria. Despite the fact that China had not permitted emigration to Manchuria until the 1870’s and therefore did not have as secure a hold over the land as over the provinces farther south, the number of Chinese in Manchuria completely overwhelmed the relatively tiny Japanese population. By
1930 the Chinese numbered 29,000,000, the Japanese only 250,000; the latter were even outnumbered threefold by Korean emigrants who had fled Tokyo's domination in their homeland. As late as 1937 there were fewer than 1,500,000 Japanese in Manchuria.

Railway problems. Because Manchuria was a frontier zone that required settlement to increase its value, transportation assumed a political importance far in excess of its usual significance. Immediately after the Russo-Japanese War China began her attempts to obtain foreign financial assistance with which to compete against Japanese railway domination, but her efforts were largely unsuccessful. In 1907 a British firm was given a concession for a short line, but even the British government protested, loyally adhering to its diplomatic pledges not to extend its railroad construction activities north of the Great Wall. China was aided temporarily by E. H. Harriman's grandiose scheme of a round-
the-world railroad system; his agent Willard Straight attempted to
force Japan to sell him the South Manchuria Railway by threatening to
build a line from Chinchow to Aigun on the Amur, but Harriman died
before the scheme could be brought to fruition. During Taft’s adm-
istration American Secretary of State Philander Knox made a “neutral-
ization proposal” whereby the powers pledged to support the open door
were to join in lending money to China so that she could retrieve her
Manchurian railroads from Japan and Russia. Neither of the two powers
concerned however looked upon the scheme with favor; Japan felt that
the proposal was merely another attempt to deprive her of war spoils,
and Russia insisted that the Chinese Eastern line was an integral part
of the Trans-Siberian and therefore could not be given to China. Mean-
time Japan had forced China to give in on two important points:
when Japan suggested rebuilding the Antung-Mukden narrow-gauge
military line for permanent use, China refused and wanted to submit
the matter to the Hague Tribunal, but Japan presented an ultimatum
and Peking gave in; another surrender was made by China in 1913 when,
as reparations for the murder of Japanese nationals in China, Japan re-
ceived permission to build three short railways in Manchuria.

Army politics. To complicate the situation still further, the way in
which Japan organized its Manchurian holdings permitted the creation
of a semi-autonomous army group which took the international affairs
of Manchuria into its own hands and paid little attention to more
conservative advice from Tokyo. The economic domination of Man-
churia was accomplished through the South Manchurian Railway
Company, an organization subordinate to a military-political command
known as the Government-General of Kwantung. The governor-
general had to be a general officer of Japan’s army, and in consequence
the Kwantung army became the real ruler of Manchuria and the arbiter
of Japan’s policies there. It was the Kwantung army which furnished
many of the more fanatical military imperialists who helped prepare
Japan for World War II, and it was the Kwantung clique that kept ten-
sion with Russia at the boiling point. No other single group perhaps
ever did a nation so much permanent damage as did the Kwantung
chauvinists who spent years rattling their sabers in the great frontier
land between Liaotung and the Amur.

The “Young Marshal.” The final crystallization of Japanese prob-
lems in Manchuria came in 1928 with the death of Chang Tso-lin, and
the accession of his son, Chang Hsüeh-liang, the “Young Marshal,” to
his military power. The old warlord had been clearly pro-Japanese,
but his son soon joined the Nationalists and became one of Chiang Kai-shek’s most loyal followers. If Japan, as some allege, were responsible for Chang Tso-lin’s assassination, the assassins must later have won the undying hatred of the Japanese foreign office, whose difficulties in Manchuria were at least partly due to the work of Chang Hsüeh-liang.

Japanese accomplishments: (1) Economics. Although these problems puzzled the best brains of Tokyo, Japan’s Manchurian venture produced some very real achievements. Economically of course Manchuria progressed under Japanese control. The great port of Dairen was developed into one of Asia’s most modern harbors; despite diplomatic pressure and the constant threat of competition, Japan controlled the railroad traffic of the south; and coal and iron deposits were successfully exploited. Manchuria had a coal reserve of about 7,000,000,000 tons, approximately equal to Japan’s, and its iron deposits were ten times those of Nippon. In addition the plains of Manchuria were found to be excellent for the growing of wheat and millet, and of the soybean — of which about 6,000,000 tons were produced annually. The region promised to become one of Japan’s chief sources of food supply.

(2) International: In the international field there was less to worry Japan, for in 1905 the Russian menace had diminished; the United States, although tending to frown upon economic monopoly, agreed in the Root-Takahira notes of 1908 that Japan had special interests in Korea and North China; and China in the midst of its revolution was still too weak to resist. The only obvious danger was the improbable prospect of the Western nations uniting forcefully to defend the open door. That could not happen without the leadership of the United States, which was not forthcoming. Thus the Japanese imperialists hoped the Manchurian venture would provide a big return for little expense.

3. The Military Get Control

Domestic politics. The political history of Japan from the end of the reign of Mutsuhito (the Emperor Meiji) to the beginning of World War II — with the exception of the period 1918–1928 — showed a fairly consistent increase in the power of the military. Although non-military elements were at work they were overshadowed more and more by the imperialists, and partly because of the complex structure of party politics in Japan the nascent democratic forces were eventually crowded out of the scene. Party politics in Japan never achieved the importance they did in many other countries because of the lack of a
democratic tradition, the constitutional weakness of the Diet, the executive control of the cabinet, and the lack of a real sense of responsibility for government policy. Political shifts were rapid, and during the early 1930's the assassination of leaders became a common occurrence. Only two periods following World War I showed any tendency on the part of the nation to discountenance militarism and adopt the practices recommended by the more peaceful civil bureaucrats. One of these was the period of reaction following World War I, before depression struck and while the League was in the ascendant, and the second was a very brief episode after the great outbreak of assassinations in 1936.

The emperor. During this period several forces were at work influencing Japanese policy. One was the emperor. Mutsuhito was a strong-minded man who held the respect of his advisers, but his son, Yoshihito, who succeeded him in 1912, was mentally deficient and provided no real leadership, though his reign name Taisho meant "Great Righteousness." Because of Yoshihito's illness in 1921 his son Hirohito became regent, and in 1926 when his father died Hirohito assumed the throne. The new reign was called Showa, "Enlightened Peace." A more anomalous title could hardly have been found, for the emperor of "enlightened peace" led his people into the bloody holocaust from which they emerged defeated and broken. Hirohito was more "progressive" than his predecessors and demonstrated an early willingness to break with tradition and to support Japan's technological revolution. It is not clear whether his intentions actually were peaceful, but he proved himself completely unable to control the warlike forces about him, and probably was not much more influential than his feebleminded father.

Parties. Another force that affected Japanese politics was that exerted by political parties. The history of these groups is so complicated that a detailed recital would accomplish little. Basically they represented both military and antimilitary elements, and practically all the elements working for the democratization of the government were found in one or another of the party organizations. Through various mergings and divisions in the old Jiyuto (liberal) and Kaishinto (liberal conservative) parties there had emerged by the 1920's two principal party groups, the Minseito and the Seiyukai. From time to time these altered their views on fundamental issues, and though a nucleus of party members favored a responsible ministry (most vociferously supported by Seiyukai elements) neither group was able wholly to achieve it. Besides, party politics became corrupt and graft-ridden and many
of the basic problems of the nation remained unsolved — notably the economic hardships of the peasant classes and, beginning in the late 1920’s, the dislocation caused by uncontrolled fluctuations of the business cycle. These unsolved problems were seized upon by the militarists as good reasons for the ending of purely party government, and by the 1930’s the parties had lost much of their influence.

*The army and navy.* At all times the military maintained a strong position in politics, chiefly through the requirement that the ministers of war and navy be general officers on active duty. In addition, the navy and army through their formative years had been dominated by men from Satsuma and Choshu respectively, the two clans which achieved tremendous prestige and power through their support of the restoration. And after the Saticho group lost control of the armed forces when a new conscription law and a new generation provided a nucleus of younger officers who were not members of the old clans, many of the military leaders became even more militantly minded, lacking as they did the moderating influence of traditional association with the status quo. Since there was nothing to hinder their demands for power, they became more voracious, especially as the economic situation darkened. In July 1927 General Baron Tanaka was reputed to have presented to the throne a statement defining Japan’s imperialist ambitions, as viewed by the military. Although this "Tanaka Memorial" was publicized by a horrified China, its authenticity has never been verified; but it remains an interesting though possibly spurious declaration of aims by Japanese militarists.

*Secret societies.* Supporting the military with every means at its command was a group of secret patriotic societies which were said to have been largely responsible for the political assassinations of the 1930’s. Of these the most famous was the Black Dragon Society. That these societies existed there is no doubt; how important they actually were in molding Japanese policy is still open to question.

*The Genro.* Although the elder statesmen were dying off, the genro — the unofficial advisers of the Meiji Emperor — still influenced politics. Most of the genro were Satsuma or Choshu men, prominent in the restoration or in the political leadership of the new Japan. They contributed by advising the emperor concerning the organization of cabinets — and on every other subject of importance.

*The Zaibatsu.* Finally, the great families of Japan who had profited so tremendously from Japan's expanding banks, commerce, and industry, found themselves growing richer as the nation became more important
in world affairs. These Zaibatsu or family combines first allied themselves with certain bureaucrats and party politicians, but with the decline of party government (partly as a result of upsetting exposés of financial scandals involving politicians and industrialists) they turned more and more to the military. There is every reason to believe that many of the wealthy men of Japan co-operated with the military only with the greatest reluctance; they realized that events might soon remove them from a position of authority if militarism grew rampant, and they accepted the coalition only when the military became dominant. Other groups exerting minor influence were the aristocrats and the older bureaucrats.

The course of domestic affairs. The conjunction of these various forces produced a fluctuating state of affairs in Japanese politics. The military did not have control continuously but the intervals between their epochs of power grew shorter, and their hold upon the nation when they did achieve supremacy lasted longer each time they did get control. Ito, the constitution-maker, led the nation through the Sino-Japanese War, and he was succeeded by Okuma. After a brief return to authority with a new party organization, Ito was replaced by a Choshu supporter, Katsura, who established a military régime which ran Japan during the Russo-Japanese War. Saionji and Katsura divided power between 1905 and the first World War, and then Okuma, who was premier when hostilities began, took a leaf from the book of the militarists and embarked Japan upon her aggressive program in China. The war drew toward a close while Japan was under the rule of another militarist, Terauchi; and only during the 1920’s, when the reaction toward peace was world-wide, did the party politicians regain influence. The peak of democratization was reached under the premiership of Hara (1918–1921), a Seiyukai party man who tried to purge the government of its militaristic elements. He accomplished little however, for in 1921, shortly after he took office, he was assassinated by a fanatic.

Government by assassination. The murder of Premier Hara was the first of a series of political killings, which stained Japanese annals for the ensuing two decades, and which increased in number as the army became impatient with the liberals and moderates. Premier Hamaguchi was killed in 1930, and in 1932 a member of the Zaibatsu, the premier, and a former cabinet official were murdered. Then a number of younger army officers who were no longer members of the old Satcho-Hito group, incensed at Japan’s inability to secure parity in naval armament, decided that the older military authorities had brought
themselves into disrepute, and in 1935 assassinated a major-general. The climax came in 1936 when Admiral Saito, lord keeper of the privy seal, Viscount Takahashi, minister of finance, General Watabe, director of general military training, and other officials were murdered by 1400 rebels led by officers under field grade, who seized several of the public buildings in Tokyo and held them for four days. The assassinations were committed, the rebels said, to remove from influence men who had disgraced the nation by agreeing to the London Naval Pact and who had shown themselves subserviant to nonmilitaristic doctrines. Since military officers themselves were included among the victims, stiff penalties were meted out to the offenders, and seventeen of the troublemakers were executed. But even this disgraceful incident failed to remove the military from power, and in 1937 when Prince Konoye, not himself a member of the military cliques, became premier, the world generally recognized that his government was but a front for a military dictatorship. By a gradual process of encroachment, therefore, the military elements — no longer controlled by the men of Satsuma and Choshu — rose to power, and in the 1930's committed the nation to reckless adventures in imperialism.

Economic militarism. One of the fundamental excuses the militarists used in persuading the nation to accept their nostrums was the vulnerness of Japan's economy to the world business cycle. Japan's chief export was silk, and her best customer was the United States; this fact obviously made her prosperity very largely dependent upon that of America, for a slump in the Western Hemisphere would of course cut down markedly the purchase of such luxury products. Japan's greatest imports were cotton, coal, iron and steel, and machinery, but the manufactured cotton products she sold in exchange for these were subject to severe competition by the British Empire and other producers. Her industrial economy could not be called stable, since it was so completely dependent on fluctuating foreign markets.

Nor did Japan possess an internal economy which could stand heavy shocks. Agriculture, the traditional backbone of the national economy, had of course decreased in financial importance proportionally with the rise of industry, but the Japanese peasant was still a significant element in the population. He was severely oppressed by taxes relatively much higher than those levied on industry, nor was he granted government protection through tariffs and subsidies which he badly needed. The hardships of the peasant class were a perennial irritant to be capitalized by the militarists in their arguments for change.
The crisis of 1927. Thunderheads in the economic sky loomed shortly after Hirohito's accession. One of the smaller industrial combines, Suzuki, emerged from World War I like a phoenix from the flames, and because of government patronage became temporarily very important. Naturally the Zaibatsu were not inclined to look upon their youthful competitor with favor, and when the arms holiday brought about by the Washington Conference ended much of Suzuki's business, the young firm found itself heavily in debt, its notes held chiefly by the Bank of Formosa. Prospects grew very dark in 1923. Earthquake reconstruction brought about a financial reshuffle in the course of which the Bank of Japan temporarily lent its prestige to support of the Suzuki indebtedness, but in 1927 returned its Suzuki notes to the Bank of Formosa. To prevent the latter from going under, the Minseito ministry under Wakatsuki attempted to prop up the Bank of Formosa with government funds. Political opposition thereupon developed, backed probably by the Zaibatsu, and the ministry resigned. The firm of Suzuki then collapsed with a resounding crash; other business failures followed. To save the situation the government eventually had to provide about two and a half times as much capital as it would have if the original Wakatsuki grant had been approved.

The Tsinan incident. Obviously this evidence of government inefficiency was a blessing for the militarists. General Baron Tanaka came in as minister, and soon afterward at his direction the Japanese Sixth Division intercepted the advancing Kuomintang armies in Shantung. On May 2, 1928, General Chiang entering Tsinan was confronted by Japanese troops whose ostensible function was to protect Japanese residents and property, but who obviously were there to prevent Chiang from advancing too rapidly on Tokyo-dominated Chang Tso-lin. Discussions were held, and though they began amicably enough fighting broke out on the following day, because, the Japanese claimed, the Chinese began looting. Skirmishing continued until May 10, and during the violence a large part of the town was destroyed and twenty-seven Japanese soldiers, a handful of civilians, and about 2000 Chinese were killed. Chiang Kai-shek wisely withdrew and marched around the city. In June, when Chang Tso-lin's usefulness to the Japanese seemed ended, he was killed by a bomb exploding under his railway car. The culprits have never been accurately identified; but the Japanese have been suspected because Chang's weakness was permitting the struggle to enter Manchuria, and this the Japanese were determined to prevent. The Chinese retaliated for the Tsinan affair with a boycott which had
an extremely deleterious effect upon the Japanese economy. It was
lifted only when milder policies were instituted under Baron Shidehara,
foreign minister of the Minseito cabinet that followed Tanaka's downfall.

*Japan and the depression.* Premier Hamaguchi, who succeeded Tan-
aka, did what he could to reduce the influence of the militarists, but he
was faced immediately with the American stock market crash and the
depression of the 1930's. Japanese silk exports declined sharply; and in
1930 when the government proved unable to solve its many problems
malcontents in protest shot the premier. Hamaguchi survived the
wound for only a short time and was replaced in office by Baron Waka-
tsuki.

4. **Thirty-One Inches of Railroad Track**

*China's policy in Manchuria.* As Japan's economic situation grew
worse and opportunities increased for the militarists to deride pacifist
policies, the Nationalist government of China decided upon a vigorous
attempt to drive foreign influence from Manchuria. This policy was
aided immeasurably by the allegiance of Chang Hsüeh-liang to the
Nationalist government. Immediately after his accession to his father's
power, Nanking acted. Its first step was to reduce Russian interests in
northern Manchuria. Russian commercial operations were forcibly
halted, some Russian residents were placed under arrest, and the climax
was reached when the Manchurian authorities, under the sponsorship
of Nanking, seized full control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Al-
though Russia did not want war at this time, she responded immediately
by mobilizing troops along the Amur frontier, and after several months
of skirmishing, in the course of which some pitched battles occurred,
China gave in. On December 22, 1929, an agreement was signed at
Khabarovsky which restored Russian rights in Manchuria to the status
quo ante.

The Nationalists immediately turned to peaceful measures with a
program of railroad construction designed to wrest economic control
of the area from both the Japanese and the Russians. The basis of the
plan was the construction of Chinese-owned lines throughout Manchu-
ria, and the improvement of a great port at Hulutao, west of the Liaot-
tung peninsula, as a substitute for the Japanese-controlled port at Dairen.
Coupled with this activity, the Nationalists embarked upon a propa-
ganda campaign with the object of ending foreign influence throughout
the region.
The Wanpaoshan and Nakamura incidents. The Japanese response to China’s attempt to bring Manchuria back within the bounds of China was a vigorous denunciation of the railroad-building campaign and even more violent opposition to the Chinese propaganda activity. With regard to the railroads the Japanese were within their rights, at least as far as any treaty extracted by force can be said to be binding upon the weaker power. But treaty or no the Japanese were guilty of the most flagrant aggression in their willingness to permit or to create “incidents” that gave them an opportunity to use force. The first of these incidents occurred in June 1931 at Wanpaoshan in central Manchuria. Koreans who had fled from Japanese rule in their own land had leased some land from the Chinese, on which they made irrigation improvements before their lease was finally validated. When the Chinese refused to complete the lease arrangement the Koreans were driven off the land, and Japan as the sovereign of Korea came to the aid of her “subjects.” Anti-Chinese riots occurred in both Korea and Japan; and China, resentful at Japan’s intrusion, reinstated the boycott against Japanese goods. During the same month a Major Nakamura, pretending to be an agricultural expert traveling in the interior of Manchuria, was apprehended by Chinese troops as a spy, tried, and executed. Although Baron Shidehara attempted to calm the troubled waters, Japanese public opinion immediately responded to chauvinistic demands for a stronger policy against China. Incidents multiplied; altogether some 300 were recorded as the tension grew. Obviously a dangerous storm was brewing.

The Manchurian incident. The Kwantung army, surging with discontent at Shidehara’s moderation, determined to create a situation which the home authorities would have to follow up or lose face; and one “incident” seemed made expressly for their purpose. On the night of September 18, 1931, a small bomb displaced approximately thirty-one inches of track on the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway. The Kwantung troops acted in retaliation and swept down upon Mukden. After their occupation of the city Japanese and Korean troops from Liaotung took over all the Chinese railroads in southern Manchuria. Chang Hsieh-liang slowly withdrew, apparently counseled by the Nanking authorities to avoid any cause for an outright war, for which China was unprepared; by December he had given Japan almost complete control of southern Manchuria.

The Shanghai incident. Meantime the Chinese boycott was having devastating effects on Japan’s economy. Nipponese exports to China
decreased by nearly five sixths, and the already strained home industrial situation reached the breaking point. It was clear therefore that more military activity was in order — China must be convinced of Tokyo's desire to have the boycott lifted; and to separate the boycott issue from the Manchurian matter, which according to Japan was already finished, it was desirable to have hostilities take place in the south. Fortunately for Japan on January 18, 1932, five Japanese Nichiren priests in Shanghai were set upon by an irritated Chinese mob, and the next day a group of Japanese residents attempted to avenge the murder of one of the priests by setting fire to Chinese property; in a clash with Chinese police one Japanese was killed. Admiral Shiosawa, in command of the Japanese squadron at Shanghai, informed the local authorities that he expected apologies and restitution for the damage done and for the baseless Chinese claim that the Japanese navy had incited the mob. Since these were not forthcoming Shiosawa began on January 29 bombing the Chinese portion of the city with carrier planes, which caused terrible damage, thousands of casualties, and a condition of panic and horror seldom equaled except in the worst days of World War II. Chinese inhabitants fled in every direction, thousands swarming frenziedly into the international settlement and the French concession, where the authorities were hard put to maintain even a semblance of order. Japanese marines landed, followed by troop reinforcements which eventually brought the total to 70,000 men. Much to their surprise, the invaders met stiff resistance from the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army, commanded by General Tsai Ting-kai, which stubbornly fought for every inch of ground. Shiosawa was then replaced by Admiral Nomura, who prosecuted the attack with vigor. Toward the end of February however the Chinese began to drive the Japanese back; and the Japanese militarists, finding it difficult to explain the situation at home, resorted to trickery. They requested three privates to "volunteer" to sacrifice their lives by carrying a huge cigar-shaped bomb behind the Chinese barbed-wire barriers. This it was believed would have the double effect of breaking the Chinese defenses and of giving the Japanese home populace something to think about while the hard-pressed troops were recovering lost ground. The three martyrs followed their orders and blew themselves to glory; and although their deed was not decisive, by the first of the month the tide had turned. On March 3 the fighting stopped, leaving Chapei, the Chinese section of Shanghai, a bloody shambles.

*The League and Manchuria.* The League of Nations meanwhile took
up the problem of whether the 1931 seizure of Manchuria had been justified. On December 10 the council established a commission of inquiry, headed by the Earl of Lytton, and including General Frank McCoy of the United States, Henri Claudel of France, Count Aldrovandi of Italy, and Dr. Heinrich Schnee of Germany. In February 1932 the commission began a six months' investigation in the Orient. The League also appointed a committee of nineteen to follow through on the Manchurian problem; and it was this committee which, guided by the Lytton report, made the recommendations regarding Manchuria. The Japanese government of Manchuria, it asserted, could not be considered as "a spontaneous and genuine independence movement," and it further announced that "no question of Chinese responsibility can arise for the development of events since September 18, 1931." In view of the state of the world, however, and the depression which focused each nation's attention upon its own problems, the commission felt that international co-operation in support of a vigorous policy was practically impossible, and its recommendations perforce were weak and unsatisfactory. It proposed that Manchuria should be returned to China but that it should have its autonomy; and Japanese rights there were to be protected. In other words, China had right on her side and therefore merited satisfaction; but as that was obviously impossible, the present situation (which satisfied the Japanese) was to be altered and the previous status (which satisfied nobody) was to be reinstated!

In February 1935 the League approved the report of its committee, and when the resolution was passed the Japanese delegates walked out. The withdrawal of Japan from the League became effective in 1935, and in this way the small bomb which displaced thirty-one inches of track on the South Manchurian Railway also blew up the prestige and significance of the League of Nations.

5. Japanese Pressure in the North

Manchukuo. Despite the League of Nations, Japan rapidly took steps to consolidate her rule in Manchuria. In February 1932 local groups of Japanese residents and authorities banded together to create the new state of Manchukuo, eventually to consist of the four former Chinese provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin, Fengtien, and Jehol. In March Henry Pu-yi, the last of the Manchus, was installed as regent in the new capital, Changchun, and a government was organized that consisted of willing Chinese puppets controlled by Japanese advisers. In
September Japan announced that the new state was under her protection. In March 1934 Pu-yi was given imperial honors, becoming the Emperor Kang-Te, but this change was in name only and did not alter the basic Japanese control of the government.

The "Stimson Doctrine." The attitude of the United States toward this establishment of a new state in eastern Asia assumed a very interesting form. It will be remembered that when President Wilson was confronted by the military dictatorship of Victoriano Huerta in Mexico, he consistently refused to recognize that president, giving as his reason that no government set up by armed force merited such recognition. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, in Hoover's cabinet, took a leaf from Wilson's book in 1932 and issued a pronouncement which strongly resembled that of America's World War I president. The so-called "Stimson Doctrine," based on the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928, maintained that, as Manchukuo had been established by military force against the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants, it therefore could not be recognized by the American government. And throughout the troubled 1930's, until World War II settled the problem once and for all, the Washington government staunchly maintained the fiction that the Manchukuo administration did not exist. The significance of this stubborn stand was that tension between Japan and the United States increased rapidly, and China was given more reason than ever to consider America her friend. Moreover the doctrine proved to be a rallying point for those elements in the world which had been disappointed by the League's ineffectiveness in dealing with the aggression in Manchuria. Even though the United States had refused to join the League it was at least standing for League principles, and in some ways more effectively than the League itself.

Jehol and Hopeh. The enthronement of Pu-yi was followed in 1933 by opposition in Jehol Province and by the massing of Chinese resistance in Hopeh Province south of Jehol, the former Chihli Province. This situation necessitated countermeasures, and a series of winter campaigns in Jehol, culminating in an attack on Shanhaikwan, successfully ended whatever hopes Chinese patriots there might have had. In the northeastern section of Hopeh, the Japanese applied military pressure with such effect that the Nanking authorities were forced to agree to the establishment of a demilitarized zone in that area, managed by a pro-Japanese military police corps. This agreement, called the Tangku Truce, was shortly followed by an accord signed in Dairen which gave the Japanese permission to enlist ex-Japanese troops in the Peace Preser-
vation Corps which was to police the demilitarized zone. By the end of 1933 Chinese resistance to Japanese occupation of Manchukuo had been reduced to a minimum, and there was little reason to fear an immediate threat by Nanking.

Clashes with Russia. Russia, though, presented a different problem. By the 1930's the Communist government had gained much strength and was in a position to adopt a stronger foreign policy. In 1934 however Moscow was still not strong enough to resist Japanese demands for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In early 1935 Russia sold the line to the state of Manchukuo, and it immediately became the North Manchurian Railway. This surrender however by no means indicated that Russia was prepared to retreat entirely from eastern Asia. Slowly and with cautious deliberation Moscow laid the foundation for a much more vigorous policy along the Amur. Colonization in eastern Siberia was stimulated by the government, self-sufficiency in food supply was set up as an immediate goal, coal and oil were exploited profitably, and the Trans-Siberian Railroad, which now had to follow the Amur River from Chita, was double-tracked, while another line was reported under construction from the Baikal region to Okhotsk. Most important perhaps was the construction along the Amur frontier of a line of defenses consisting of a series of pillboxes with here and there a strong base, such as Khabarovsk and Blagoveschensk; at the same time the army along the Amur was increased to 250,000. Japan responded immediately by extending her defenses in Manchukuo, by building to the border railways which could have had no purpose other than a military one, and by stiffening the Kwantung army's occupation of Heilungkiang.

The Mongolian situation. At the same time Japan began to extend her tentacles into Inner Mongolia, which includes the provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan. Traditional hostility between the Mongols and Chinese, plus a deliberate Japanese policy of generosity toward Mongols in Manchukuo, resulted in rapid Japanese encroachment in Chahar. By 1935 China was forced to sign an agreement which demilitarized eastern Inner Mongolia, prevented further Chinese immigration there, and ended Kuomintang propaganda. Russia, foreseeing Japanese encroachments on her preserve of Outer Mongolia, immediately became worried, and in 1934 and 1935 border clashes occurred with increasing frequency. By 1936 they reached alarming proportions, even though neither nation seemed to anticipate open warfare; both Japan and Russia appeared intent on feeling out each other's strength but no more. In
1936 however a Japanese force of more than 2,000 aided by tanks, planes, and artillery undertook a six-mile invasion of Outer Mongolia. A Russian force of 4,000 fought a pitched battle with them, and forced them to retreat. From March 25 to 29, 1936, the two armies glared at each other across the Amur; then the tension decreased and incidents became less numerous. Each side had discovered what it wanted to know — its antagonist was ready to fight and was so strong that neither one could be sure to succeed. An indirect result was Japan's signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and Italy in 1936.

Relations with China. During this period Japan was quite aware that her occupation of Manchuria and her efforts to neutralize the buffer provinces between that region and the area controlled by the Nanking government were bitterly criticized by the Western nations. In self-defense she formulated a "Japanese Monroe Doctrine." This involved the idea of "Asia for the Asians," and gave Japan a chance to announce that she was trying to defend China against Western imperialism. China on the other hand protested that Japan's imperialism was much worse than that of the Western nations, and she consistently refused to recognize the government of Manchukuo. As a result, between 1933 and 1937 negotiations continued that consisted chiefly of restatements of both positions. In 1935 the Tangku Truce was redefined in the Ho-Umetsu Agreement, which provided that the Kuomintang would withdraw its objectionable personnel and troops from the demilitarized zone and that all anti-Japanese activities would cease. In 1936 Foreign Minister Koki Hirota produced a three-point program which defined Japan's aims; it included cessation of unfriendly acts by China, recognition of the independence of Manchukuo by the Nanking government, and the complete eradication of Communism from China. At the same time, with a view to the formation of an autonomous buffer area guarding Manchukuo, Japan endeavored to whip up artificial revolts in five provinces near Manchuria — Hopeh, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shantung, and Shansi — but this plot failed. Ensuing negotiations however brought about the formation of a political group to govern eastern Hopeh Province — the portion controlled by the Japanese. It was called the East Hopeh Autonomous Council, and it was dominated by Tokyo. With it was organized the Hopeh-Chahar Political Council, which had control over the remainder of Hopeh Province and the Chahar region; the Japanese tried vainly to achieve control of this group as well, but Chinese resistance was too great. As it turned out however Chiang Kai-shek had little real power north of the Yellow River.
Japanese interest in North China. As the Kuomintang lost strength Japan gradually reached the conclusion that North China was necessary to her economic existence. Manchuria alone did not produce the profit and power necessary to fulfill the added commitments and responsibilities which a large-scale program of imperialism entailed. North China produced cotton, iron, and coal which would be very useful in rounding out Japan’s economic control of northeastern Asia. Then too the population of North China would provide a market which Japan badly needed. Consequently Japan adopted a program of deliberate infiltration which it was hoped would eventually bring about an opportunity for open intervention. Japanese goods were smuggled into the northern provinces, with the result that the Chinese customs collections decreased; the narcotic traffic, designed to reduce the resistance of the population, was greatly expanded. Tokyo established a partial control over the currency in the provinces; and periodically there were threats of military force.

Meantime events occurred that brought matters quickly to a head. Growing Chinese nationalism was feeding upon Japanese imperialism, and hatred of Japan was mounting. The movement of the Red armies northward had given Chiang the excuse he was looking for to shift Nationalist forces in that direction, which made them more of a threat to the Japanese. Finally, the Sian kidnapping and its result — the merger of the Nationalist and Communist armies to meet the Japanese menace — convinced the Tokyo militarists that if their vigorous policy were ever to succeed they had to strike before the coalition could be firmly consolidated and before China’s nationhood became a fact. In 1937 therefore, under the premiership of Prince Konoye, a descendant of the ancient aristocratic Fujiwara clan, a new professedly nonpartisan government was organized, but its backing consisted of a dangerous union — that of the saber-rattling militarists with the powerful Zaibatsu.

War was the next and final step in Japan’s militaristic program.

Conclusion. The acquisition of Korea was the first great climax of Japan’s imperialism, and gradually the warlike elements in the government assumed more and more influence and authority. Military incidents paved the way for more conquests: the Russo-Japanese War, the stubborn prosecution of the Twenty-One Demands, the Tsinan affair, and the invasion of Manchuria. As years passed the military extremists came to power oftener and stayed in power longer, and in the decade of the 1930’s they and their adherents adopted the practice of purging the
government of nonwarlike leaders by assassination and barracks revolts.

Manchuria proved to be the region in which Japanese imperialism reached its next great climax. The Russo-Japanese War gave Japan southern Manchuria as a sphere of influence, but economic pressure induced by the depression gave the militarists the excuse they wanted to seize openly the control of the country. In 1933 this was virtually accomplished when the last Manchu emperor of China was placed on a puppet throne. Voracious and never satisfied, the militarists next attempted to set up autonomous governments in the provinces south and west of Manchuria, and when this failed they prepared again to use force. Their decision was hastened by the temporary unification of China as a result of the Sian kidnapping, and with the formation of the Konoye government in 1937 the stage was set for another Sino-Japanese War—the real beginning of World War II in the Pacific.
World War II in the Pacific

Introduction. The entire history of the Pacific Area seems for centuries to have been building to a massive climax — the climax of conflict between West and East. In the centuries following Magellan’s epoch-making voyage wars of one sort or another had belied the Pacific’s name; but they were of minor importance, and not until Pearl Harbor did Orient and Occident meet on equal terms. From that combat came the most smashing chapter in world history, one in which the surging, nascent nationalism of Asia’s millions was coupled with the introduction of a weapon that made the longbow, gunpowder, the submarine, and the airplane — heretofore warring humanity’s greatest military achievements — seem puny indeed. Again in history the yellow man challenged the white — and was repulsed to the cataclysmic obbligato of exploding atoms.

Why did Japan start the war? The answer lies in her whole past history. The feudal military tradition, the bushido philosophy, her low-cost profitable military ventures in China, Manchuria, and Korea, and the rising strength of the military clique which seemed to offer the most efficient antidote to the poisons of the depression — all these combined to convince Japan that the “China incident” which developed into World War II was a worthwhile venture. Japan had never suffered greatly from militarism; she still had her great lesson to learn. That the lesson turned out to be a tragedy for the world at large was one of the disastrous accidents of history.
The Marco Polo Bridge incident: (1) The Japanese account. Near the ancient city of Peking (now Peiping) is a small village called Wanping. One of the landmarks of this village is an old stone span, the Marco Polo Bridge, known in Chinese as Luk’ouch’iao ("Broken Reed Bridge"). In its vicinity, by permission of the Boxer Protocol, the Japanese troops quartered at Peiping were in the habit of conducting maneuvers. The Chinese did not like these activities, and permitted them only because they were unable to prevent them. As a result, when in the middle 1930’s anti-Japanese feeling was on the increase the circumstances were comparable to a tinder box awaiting a spark. Furthermore the Japanese had a much larger garrison than they were actually supposed to have, and in addition the maneuvers they engaged in near Wanping were not carried on perfunctorily but were more on the scale of war games. Such was the situation on July 7, 1937. What actually happened on that fateful day still is not quite clear. The Japanese claimed to have been engaging in lawful maneuvers — with unloaded rifles to prevent an "incident" from occurring — when the Chinese suddenly began firing on them from the brush along the bank of the creek beneath the Marco Polo Bridge. Shocked and horrified at such barbarity, the righteous Nipponese hastened to arm themselves — purely in self-defense — and some skirmishing resulted. Thereupon the Japanese immediately requested the Nanking government to permit them to "localize" the dispute by dealing independently with provincial authorities.

(2) The Chinese account. The Chinese version differed markedly from the Tokyo tale. The Chinese asserted that the war games were of such undue proportions that they had attracted much attention, and that in the midst of the maneuvers armed Japanese troops in trucks rolled up to the gates of Wanping and demanded entry for the purpose of searching out a Nipponese trooper whom they claimed the Chinese had kidnapped. When the Chinese refused — entirely according to the terms of the treaties — the Japanese forced entrance, and casualties resulted. The Chinese point of view was that if the incident were localized, the Japanese would be in a position to overwhelm the local authorities because of the propinquity of areas under their control; Nanking therefore wished to conduct negotiations through the central government.

The Langlang incident. While these charges and countercharges were flying between Nanking and Tokyo another episode occurred that
increased the tension. On July 26 a Japanese construction crew set out on a gay picnic party, one of the purposes of which was to repair the military telegraph line near Langfang, cut supposedly by the destructive and hostile Chinese. Again the Nipponese were unarmed, and again they were set upon by the vicious barbarians whose land they occupied. Disillusioned, they rushed back for rifles, and returned to give their attackers better than they had received. Once more the Chinese version differed sharply. The aggression, said Nanking, was all on the side of the Japanese. And as for being unarmed, both sides did plenty of shooting.

The Shanghai incident. To cap the climax, on August 9 a Japanese officer was seized by Chinese troops guarding the Hungjao Airdrome near Shanghai, and killed during his attempted escape. The Japanese were highly incensed, but the Chinese pleaded innocence by virtue of the fact that the Japanese officer had been lurking around the airdrome in the best spy-story tradition, and had made his operations so murkyly obvious that the Chinese had no alternative.

The occupation of Peiping and Shanghai. The above incidents occurred in such quick succession that in the view of some experts they must have been deliberately staged so that Tokyo could create an excuse for large-scale hostilities. Whether or not this was true, as Nanking and Tokyo drifted farther and farther apart Japanese troops poured into Manchuria. Peiping was seized almost immediately, and Japanese armies surged southward over the railroad lines from the Peiping area into the Yangtze valley. At the same time Japanese troops landed at Shanghai in large numbers, carefully avoided the English and American sections of the international settlement and the French concession, and proceeded to attack the Chinese city with even greater vehemence than in 1932. Nationalist armies faced them west of the town, but Japanese equipment and air power were so far superior that Chiang Kai-shek's men were forced to fall back. The generalissimo attempted a stand, but soon made up his mind to sacrifice territory rather than men; and although the Japanese for eight long and weary years occupied almost any section of North China that they wished, they never could destroy the armies of the Kuomintang, for Chiang always preferred retreat to defeat.

The fall of Nanking. Shanghai fell in November, and Japanese troops hastened upriver to strike what they thought would be the final blow against the capital of Nationalist China, Nanking. Although by December they were able to occupy the city and the campaign was ac-
counted a victory for them, it was here that the Nipponese armies quite probably lost the war. For despite Chiang’s determination to preserve his forces, his defense of the city had been so hard fought and the final Japanese occupation so rapid that for a short time after the city’s fall his men were badly scattered and highly vulnerable. If the Japanese had pursued the ruptured remnants of the Nationalist troops they might very well have destroyed entirely China’s ability to resist. Instead they halted to subject the capital to such a sack and looting as had been hardly equaled since the Middle Ages. The “Rape of Nanking” became a legend of horror, and reminders of it served the same psychological purpose for China as the phrase “Remember Pearl Harbor” later served America. There is evidence that the sack of the city occurred in spite of Tokyo’s military policy, rather than because of it; in other words while the High Command was frantically preparing to pursue the broken Chinese armies for a crushing blow, the enlisted men went berserk and nothing could be done with them while the looting was going on. Whatever the cause, Japan apparently lost her great opportunity to end the China incident, and later analysis may prove that the Rape of Nanking was the event that saved China from defeat.

The fall of Hankow. Unlike France, China did not fold up completely with the capture of its capital (perhaps an argument for a decentralized form of government, of which China was the epitome, just as France represented the acme of centralization). Instead, the machinery of government was hastily moved 600 miles up the Yangtze River to Hankow. This city was the important center of a network of rail and river transport, and if the Chinese could hold it they could maintain supply lines to Russia through Sian, and to the sea by way of the newly completed Canton-Hankow Railway. The Japanese therefore put on a masterful effort to capture Hankow, using a favorite form of attack, the three-pronged pincers movement. But the Chinese deliberately broke the Yellow River dikes and flooded the country, so that Japanese approach by rail from the north was blocked. The attackers therefore had to move their cumbersome siege machinery by slow river transport; but on October 27, after a slow campaign during the late summer of 1938, Hankow fell. Here the Japanese did not make the same error that they had made at Nanking—they pursued the fleeing Chinese armies west and south. But this time Chiang had his men in better order, and again the crushing blow was avoided.

The puppet government. As soon as Peiping was occupied in 1937 the Japanese had seized the opportunity to set up a puppet government
for North China. When Nanking fell the focus of administration was moved south to that city, and the Tokyo statesmen tried to build up a nucleus of Chinese loyalty by choosing a prominent Chinese as head. Their first choice was Wu P'ei-fu, but this warlord emeritus declined the questionable honor, and they then picked Wang Ching-wei, one of the three heirs of Sun Yat-sen, who had lost out in the struggle for prestige against Chiang Kai-shek. Wang's motives may have been better than they seemed; that is, he may have accepted because he was convinced that the Japanese could not be stopped, and he would thus be able to do more for China through co-operation than through opposition. But personal ambition and jealousy of Chiang also played a part, and Wang lived to regret his decision. In 1944 he died, having been a helpless prisoner of the Japanese generals for more than six years, as pitiful a character in his way as Henry Pu-yi in the shoddy imperial purple of Manchukuo.

The campaign in the south. In South China Japan was not successful, but she made several moves that hindered her enemy's defense. On May 10, 1938, Amoy was taken, and—probably as a result of Japan's conviction that the Munich accord proved western Europe's helplessness—Canton was bombed. After a rather complex campaign, in which fifth-column activity and treachery within the city played a conspicuous part, Japan took Canton—one of her major achievements south of the Yangtze.

The box score to 1938: (1) Gains. By the end of 1938 Japan seemed completely victorious. She had seized China's largest cities (Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, and Canton), had occupied the northern provinces down to the Yangtze, and had invaded the south and west. She had control of the major railroads, communication centers, and industries. A large part of the Chinese population was under her domination. Superficially at least she seemed to have gained all her major objectives.

(2) Losses. Actually however she was not well off. The China incident had already lasted longer than the militarists had promised the Japanese people that it would last, and control of North China meant only control over cities, ports, and transportation. The back country was as much Chinese as ever, harboring fierce guerrilla bands which operated night and day against the Japanese army of occupation. Moreover Chiang's armies had not been destroyed, and the stubborn Chinese refused to surrender even when their second capital Hankow was taken; instead they merely packed up and moved farther west, this time
beyond the difficult gorges of the upper Yangtze to Chungking. Though that city could be bombed by air, it would be a much tougher military task than either Hankow or Nanking, and the disappointed Japanese generals knew that penetration of this rugged interior country would take a long time.

Most important of all, the Chinese did not seem to realize that they were beaten. At the end of 1938, when everything seemed lost, Chiang Kai-shek was calmly telling his people:

It is better to be a broken jade than a whole tile. The Wuhan cities have fallen into the hands of the enemy; but what they have is only scarred earth and dead cities in exchange for five months of fighting and hundreds of thousands of casualties. Already the Japanese are deep in the mire and from now on they will tread on thornier ground. China should continue to draw the enemy farther into the interior in order to force them to play an increasingly passive role. Irrespective of changes in the international situation, Japan must one day collapse from exhaustion. China is fighting a revolutionary war for national liberation ... and in a revolutionary war there is no end until the final victory is won.

2. The Stalemate

From 1938 to 1941 Japan struggled in the toils. Like Napoleon's France, she came to realize that some countries are too big to conquer, especially when their people are fiercely devoted to resistance. She recorded minor gains and suffered minor setbacks, but her big advances were over. Like an attacking wasp which dives through a few strands of spiderweb, she ended by beating her wings futilely and buzzing angrily; but there were always more strands to break, and her foe wisely stayed beyond her reach. The Japanese campaign in China can be said to have raced over more than 1000 miles the first year, but the lines were extended only 200 miles the second year, and a mere 100 the third.

Military objectives. In the north the Japanese wanted three things: complete domination over Inner Mongolia, so as to block Russian southward expansion; occupation of the territory west of the big bend of the Yellow River, stubbornly held by the Communist Eighth Route Army; and severance of the tenuous supply line which extended from Chungking via Sian to Siberia. One incident that stood out in this campaign occurred in 1940, when 100,000 guerrillas staunchly held against a Japanese drive and finally repulsed it near Ninghsia.

In central China the Japanese objective was to approach and menace Chungking, a task which entailed a difficult drive up the Yangtze River.
New advance bases were seized in 1940, but the main Japanese armies were never able to extend their lines far enough to support an all-out campaign toward the western capital.

In the south the Japanese never gained control of more than a few key points. This region, including the famed "rice bowl" of China, was badly needed by the Japanese as their own food supply diminished. In 1939 the Nipponese captured Hainan Island and the port of Swatow, and followed it by the seizure of Nanchang, south of Hankow. The Chinese during most of this period stubbornly held parts of the Canton-Hankow rail line, so that it was little use to the invaders. The Japanese were also much interested in destroying the supply line into Burma—the famed 800-mile winding Burma Road, constructed at tremendous cost and effort by Chinese hand labor; but it was not until pressure on Britain resulted in a diplomatic agreement that the Burma Road was temporarily closed. In 1941 the Japanese organized a massive push in the south, but in the fall they were repulsed at Changsha—one of the high points in the Chinese war of defense.

*The home front in Japan.* The stalemated compelled the military elements in Japan to justify their program. They had promised the people a short war—in fact the China incident never reached the stage of declared hostilities. Instead it was a long one, and in 1940 prospects of an end to the struggle seemed farther off than ever. In return for 500,000 square miles of precariously held Chinese territory, and an uncertain casualty list of perhaps 5,000,000 Chinese (1/4 per cent of the population) of whom 2,000,000 were soldiers, Japan had gained economic domination over China's cities and railways and most of the northeastern provinces, and had suffered about 800,000 casualties (a little more than 1 per cent of her total population). Besides—still on the wrong side of the ledger—the Japanese people had surrendered many of the limited privileges they had obtained after the restoration: party politics for instance had been banned by General Hayashi when he became premier in 1937, and the militarists extended the use of security police much on the order of the Gestapo, who endeavored to indoctrinate the people with blind loyalty to the imperialistic program through a "National Spiritual Mobilization Campaign," commenced in 1937. Under this program many liberals and pacifists were purged from the government and even imprisoned. And in 1938 the National Mobilization Bill made Japan a completely regimented nation. The government took over the formulation of the policies of industry, trade, labor, and the press. Laborers were allocated to jobs where they were needed, strikes and
Chinese rice fields. The staff of life in the Orient is rice, and southern China produces large quantities.
lockouts were prohibited, and the government fixed wages, hours, and working conditions. Economic police held a club over the heads of businessmen. Although the Diet vainly fought against this extreme measure it was forced through by the military, and Japan in 1938 became helpless under the iron heel of the militarists. The Zaibatsu still managed to retain a voice in the control of policy by occupying high administrative posts, but the most that could be said of this arrangement was that it was an "uneasy partnership." Rice shortages developed, and food riots were reported in some areas. The standard of living dropped still lower, until because of the textile shortage even civilians wore uniforms of drab gray. In sum, if the military elements expected to retain their position of prominence, they had to bring the China incident to an immediate and successful conclusion; otherwise revolution might be the alternative.

The extension of the war program. Their solution was strategically very simple. They would cut off China's supplies by application of pressure on the British and French zones that produced them. There was an excellent possibility that the European nations would adopt a policy of appeasement because of their own war; but if Britain proved troublesome Japan could find no better time to strike than now, while Churchill's hands were tied by Hitler. Furthermore the extension of Japan's pugnaciousness would divert popular attention; and if successful pressure-plays could be negotiated against western Europe, the military would find themselves in a much stronger position at home.

The appeasement of Japan. The first step in this program was the signing in July 1939 of the Craigie-Arita Agreement by which Britain consented to respect Japanese "military necessities" in China and give tacit consent to Nipponese aggression. By 1940 France had signed a similar agreement and had surrendered her concessions at Shanghai. Also in 1940 Japan occupied the territory north of Hong Kong and demanded that Britain not only cut off supplies filtering through Hong Kong to Nationalist China, but that the Burma Road be closed. Britain was forced to acquiesce, and on July 18 Churchill announced with chagrin that Britain had agreed to close the Burma Road for three months. In September Japan occupied northern Indo-China with the help of German diplomatic pressure at Vichy, and during the same month her ambassador at Berlin, Saburo Kurusu, signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. In 1941 Thailand, taking advantage of Indo-China's helplessness, demanded territorial concessions, and Japan aided her to get 25,000 square miles of land.
The Russian Neutrality Pact. This policy of taking advantage of Axis aggression to squeeze concessions from the Allies seemed to be working so well that Foreign Minister Matsuoka went to Europe in 1941 to reassure Berlin and Rome of Japan's loyalty to their ideals. On the way home he stopped at Moscow, and in April signed an agreement with Russia whereby each power promised neutrality in case the other became involved in war. Japan was thus freed from the responsibility of intervening in case Russia and Germany went to war, and she also obtained a guarantee of Russian noninterference in case her tension with Britain resulted in hostilities.

The United States stiffens its policy. Events seemed to be moving very smoothly for Japan's warlords, but suddenly trouble loomed up for them from a new quarter. For many years Japan's foreign policy in China had been predicated on the conviction that America would never go to war to defend the Open Door doctrine, and Washington's attitude during the 1930's had seemed to strengthen that theory. Although the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 had given the president permission to increase the navy, it was not until 1938 that he acted, despite Japan's refusal to abide by naval limitation agreements after 1936. Even after the Panay incident in 1937 (the sinking of an American gunboat on the Yangtze) and Japan's adoption of a frankly aggressive program in China, the United States along with other nations continued to ship scrap iron, petroleum, and other products to Japan, despite the common knowledge that they were being devoted to war purposes. The actions of the United States during these years can be defended on the ground that her love of peace and her unpreparedness were so great that she refused to consider harsh measures even against Japan until all the alternatives of diplomacy had failed. But in July 1939 Secretary Hull gave the Japanese the required six months' warning that the American-Japanese commercial treaty would be suspended. Later when the Tripartite Pact was signed creating the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis the United States really began to consider seriously her involvement in Pacific affairs, and in March of 1941 American lend-lease assistance was extended to China. Finally, when after Hitler's attack on Russia Japan seized the opportunity to repeat her accomplishments of World War I — to press her advantage while Europe's hands were tied — by issuing new demands to Indo-China and moving her military forces there in a menacing gesture as a prelude to complete occupation, the United States at last decided to stand firm. In July Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in America; Washington thus served notice on Tokyo that although
American patience was elastic; it would not stretch indefinitely. Tension between the two nations rose to a new peak.

Tojo's diplomacy. In 1941 the ministry of Prince Fumimaro Konoye fell before the onslaught of the militarists. Though Konoye was little more than a puppet in their hands, they needed still more direct authority to guide the nation in the perilous path they had mapped out for it. Konoye's successor was General Hideki Tojo, who committed Japan to a colossal task that proved far too great for her strength or resources. Admiral Nomura, ambassador to Washington and the man who had commanded operations at Shanghai in 1932, was ordered to define Japan's intentions and to warn the United States that Japan's "New Order," defined by Prince Konoye as early as 1938, would brook no opposition. A series of conferences therefore began in which neither side would recede from its fundamental stand; the United States held to its traditional policy of opposition to military aggression and support of the open door, while Japan attempted to make Secretary Hull realize that she regarded all of eastern Asia as her proper sphere of influence. America quietly made naval and military preparations in the Pacific, although most of these passed unnoticed by people generally, so engrossed were they in the European tragedy. At the same time the Japanese staff began plotting the strategy of a vast war which would involve all the Pacific powers. Nippon was sanguine; in October the director of naval intelligence announced that the Japanese navy was in full fighting trim and "itching for action," and similar jingoistic pronouncements multiplied. The talk of war grew both grim and commonplace.

The Kurusu Mission. On November 15 Saburo Kurusu, Japan's former ambassador to Germany, arrived as special envoy to make a final attempt to relieve the growing tension. He was acquainted with American slang, and took full advantage of his knowledge to sell himself to the American people. "We must all pull together for peace," he told reporters, and larded his expressions with American sporting terminology. Whether he represented a sincere effort on the part of the few remaining conservative elements in the Japanese government to prevent hostilities, or whether his coming was merely a blind to cover actual preparations for war, only future analysis can disclose. Whatever his purpose, he and Nomura, the Japanese ambassador, were unable to break the deadlock, and at 2 P.M. on the afternoon of December 7, 1941, Kurusu and Nomura entered Secretary Hull's office for what purported to be merely another in the series of conferences.

One hour before, however, Japan had struck.
3. The "Day of Infamy"

Pearl Harbor. American military forces defending Pearl Harbor, the greatest Pacific outpost, were poorly prepared for a surprise attack. Admiral Husband Kimmel, naval commander, and Lieutenant General Walter Short, army commander, had apparently neglected to work together in setting up precautionary measures. The official Pearl Harbor investigation which followed the war placed the brunt of the blame on Kimmel and Short for what happened on that fateful day; but it also seems that Washington was at fault, for up to the day of the onslaught it had succeeded only in persuading Short to apply Alert Number 1, designed to forestall sabotage and treachery rather than open attack. In either case it is certain that army and navy air patrols were inadequate; two incidents occurred the morning of December 7 that should have apprised the garrison of what impended. At 7 A.M. an enemy submarine was sunk by a United States destroyer in the forbidden zone outside Pearl Harbor, but this was not considered important enough to warrant a general alert. In addition, an aircraft detector picked up a flight of planes when they were more than 100 miles from the base, but the lieutenant in charge refused to take the report seriously. Meanwhile midget enemy submarines had scouted the harbor and reported the positions of the various vessels.

The attack. At 7.48 A.M. the first flight of Japanese aircraft zoomed over the naval base, attacking seaplane bases and army airfields, grounding fighters and bombers. Sixty-six bombers then concentrated on the moored fleet. The battleship Arizona blew up and sank, the Oklahoma turned turtle, and the California was sent to the shallow mud bottom. Within two hours the Japanese airmen sank or badly damaged nineteen vessels, destroyed 177 planes, and caused casualties of 2343 dead, 1272 wounded, and 960 missing. The defenders though caught unawares shot down more than 100 Japanese planes and sank five submarines; most of this damage was done by good antiaircraft fire and a few army and navy planes that arrived from neighboring areas.

Japanese strategy. The strategy of the Pearl Harbor attack was basically simple and typically Japanese. First, it resembled the bombardment of Port Arthur in 1904, in that it preceded the actual declaration of war and was designed to immobilize the enemy by a surprise blow. Second, the attack was designed to cripple the United States Pacific fleet to keep it from interfering with concurrent Japanese invasions of the Philippines, Malaya, and the Indies. In these two objec-
tives the Japanese obviously succeeded. Many Americans took comfort from the fact that the enemy had not been able to occupy the Hawaiian Islands, but it is now clear that they had no such intention. Their theory was that with the immobilization of the American fleet they could make such huge immediate gains in eastern Asia that the United States would be discouraged and would come to terms. It was “Sedan strategy” with a vengeance; but like Japan’s attempt to use it against Russia it did not work as planned. Tokyo gambled on an Axis victory in Europe, and on a lack of spirit on the part of the American people. In both hopes her statesmen were disappointed.

The Japanese offensive. The Japanese offensive lasted a brief four months; then — with the exception of a few surges of waning power — her drive bogged down into the same sort of stalemate as that which took place in China after 1938. But this time she had attacked the world’s mightiest industrial nation and two of the world’s greatest empires; the outcome therefore was not to be the same.

After the Pearl Harbor attack Japan on December 10 caught two more mammoth naval prizes, the British warships Prince of Wales and Repulse, cruising off Malaya. Without air defense the ships were helpless and both went down; Britain thus lost her chief naval strength in Eastern waters.

At the same time Japan embarked upon a series of land invasions which within eight weeks enlarged the Japanese Empire to proportions not previously thought possible. Guam, America’s outpost in the Carolines, fell on December 13; Wake, after a heroic defense by its small marine and navy garrison, on December 23. The Philippines, defended by an insignificant squadron consisting of two cruisers, thirteen destroyers, twenty-seven submarines, and some auxiliaries, were occupied rapidly, and although American motor-torpedo boats and aircraft performed meritorious work, the garrison was finally penned up in the Bataan peninsula on Luzon and on Corregidor Island in Manila Bay. General Douglas MacArthur, commander of American forces in the islands, made a successful escape to Australia, leaving the garrison in the command of General Jonathan Wainwright, who was forced to surrender Bataan on April 9. Corregidor Island managed to hold out for nearly a month more, but finally on May 6 it too was overwhelmed.

Success followed success for the arms of Japan. Thailand was rapidly occupied and used as a base of operations for the ensuing attack on Malaya, where the Japanese achieved the miraculous feat of moving 360 miles down the peninsula in seven weeks. Singapore, Britain's
naval outpost in the Orient, surrendered in February. In the same month Japan invaded Burma, seized Moulmein, and crossed the Salween River. Attacks also were prosecuted against Java, Sumatra, British North Borneo, and Sarawak. It was during this drive for the Indies that the United States struck its first telling naval blow against the enemy; on January 23 and 24 four destroyers attacked a Japanese convoy in the Battle of Makassar Straits; aided by submarines and planes based on Java, they badly damaged the convoy. In February the Battle of the Java Sea was fought between Japanese vessels and the famed ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) fleet under Dutch Admiral Helfrich. The American cruiser Marblehead was disabled off Borneo, and its companion vessels, encountering a superior Japanese force on February 27, were disabled or sunk.

By the late spring of 1942 Japan had or was in process of achieving possession of Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, the northern Solomons, Guam, and Wake. She had occupied the foreign-held zones on the China coast, including Britain’s Hong Kong colony, the international area of Shanghai, and the foreign concessions in other Chinese cities. She was extending her operations in the north toward the Aleutians. Within a few short months she had seized complete military control of the mandate entrusted to her by the World War I treaties. Had her plans worked as scheduled, the war would then have ended with foreign nations unwillingly recognizing Japanese supremacy in the Orient.

4. THE AGGRESSIVE-DEFENSIVE

Allied policy. One of the greatest historians of Spanish America has labeled the Hapsburg policy of the seventeenth century the “aggressive-defensive,” because Spain exercised force overseas only as a method of warding off enemy encroachments on her long-held territory. Though the parallel is not exact, American policy in the Pacific from 1941 to 1944 could justifiably be labeled an “aggressive-defensive” of another kind, for the master strategists of the United Nations had decided that Germany was the proper initial target, and only after Hitler was accounted for would Japan be given full attention. A strictly defensive campaign in the Pacific however was out of the question, because of the Japanese position. From New Guinea and the Solomons the Japanese threatened Australia; from Burma they menaced India; with their new sources of oil and rubber and other war material they promised to over-
whelm China. Clearly then, although the United Nations were devoted to the idea of defeating Hitler first, they could not fail to recognize the need of conducting some sort of a makeshift counteroffensive in the Pacific even though on a veritable shoestring.

Accordingly the Allies did the best they could — and their best proved fairly satisfactory. As early as January 1942 the new Pacific naval commander, Admiral Chester Nimitz, made plans to conduct a series of raids on outlying Japanese possessions. In line with this policy a carrier-cruiser force under Vice Admiral William Halsey attacked the Marshalls on January 31, Wake Island on February 14, and Marcus Island on March 4. Two carriers operating south of New Guinea in March struck a telling air blow at Lae Harbor on the northern coast, sinking three cruisers and damaging auxiliaries.

The Battle of the Coral Sea. Japan's first real naval setback came in May, when Tokyo sent two great invasion fleets steaming southward apparently with a view to attacking Australia. American scouting planes discovered the enemy's approach so early that carrier planes severely damaged a large part of the enemy fleet before it left Tulagi Harbor at Guadalcanal. On May 7 the main action started with the sinking by planes from the Lexington and Yorktown of a carrier and a cruiser east of New Guinea. On May 8 south of the Solomons carrier planes from both sides staged large-scale attacks, and though the Lexington sank, two Japanese carriers were put out of action and the invasion fleets had to turn back. The significance of the Coral Sea engagement is twofold: it was the first major sea battle conducted entirely by carrier planes; and there was no meeting of surface craft. And more significantly, it constituted the first serious naval setback for the Japanese — not only in World War II, but in their entire modern history. The Coral Sea was prophetic of events to come.

The Battle of Midway. The most decisive naval engagement of the war came in June 1942, when Japan began a drive against American defenses in the central Pacific. By this time Tokyo was aware that America was not going to collapse as rapidly as she had hoped, and the militarists began to realize that Japan's Pacific frontier would have to be extended; for while the United States held Pearl Harbor Japanese control over the central Pacific would be menaced. The first step in the Japanese campaign against Pearl Harbor however was the seizure of Midway Island, America's farthest western outpost. Again American scouting and intelligence gave the advantage to the defenders. A task force was sent out from Pearl Harbor on June 2, and the next day air
scouts reported the approach of a vast Japanese squadron, consisting of four cruisers, fourteen supply ships, and a convoy of destroyers and submarines. Flying Fortresses from Midway attacked, damaging two cruisers and a transport, and sank another transport that night. On June 4 a second Japanese squadron was sighted which included five carriers and two battleships. Japanese carrier planes attacked Midway, and about forty were shot down, while at the same time American torpedoes were retaliating on the main Japanese fleet. Marine dive-bombers entered the fray, followed by more Flying Fortresses. On June 4 the American squadron got within range, but the Japanese had suffered so much damage that they were already maneuvering for a retreat. During the attack of the American carrier planes one entire squadron of torpedo planes from the Hornet was annihilated with but one survivor. The Yorktown was damaged and abandoned, but an American submarine got three torpedo hits on the Japanese carrier Soryu. Another enemy carrier was set afire that afternoon, and more Fortresses from Midway added to the havoc done the emperor's navy. On June 5 and 6 the attacks continued, and on June 7 the United States fleet, having forced the Japanese to retreat, turned back. The final episode of the engagement was the remanning of the Yorktown, and its final sinking by Japanese submarine torpedoes on June 7. Again an engagement had been fought entirely by air, and again the Japanese had gone down in defeat. The Rising Sun had received its greatest blow.

The Aleutian campaign. While the Midway drive was impending, the Japanese made plans as well for a strike at the Aleutian Islands, and an assault was made on Dutch Harbor, at the eastern end of the chain, which if successful would have given the Japanese a magnificent base for further operations in Alaska and western Canada. But the American army had already occupied Umnak Island west of Dutch Harbor, and had built there makeshift airstrips. During the attack the Japanese were themselves assaulted — from the west! This surprise blow from an entirely unexpected direction broke up their plans, and though they managed to seize Kiska and Attu islands at the western tip of the chain their plans for Dutch Harbor failed.

The Guadalcanal campaign. The first major land offensive of the American forces in the Pacific was the assault on Guadalcanal. Guadalcanal Island is one of the largest of the southern Solomons, and the Japanese had occupied it with a view to making it an airbase for further southern expansion. To block this move American forces built airstrips on Espiritu Santo and New Caledonia, 500 and 1000 miles respectively
south of Guadalcanal. Military strength, still thin and inadequate because of the decision to knock Hitler out first, was husbanded carefully, and in August of 1942 a drive was started which it was hoped would dislodge the Japanese from their positions northeast of Australia. On August 7 marines landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Gavutu. The Japanese airstrip was captured quickly, and renamed Henderson Field. But the naval task force aiding the invaders was not so lucky; on the night of August 8 Japanese naval units attacked and sank four cruisers, the American Quincy, Vincennes, and Astoria, and the Australian Canberra, in the tragic Battle of Savo Island. But the troops held their positions on Guadalcanal, and despite Japanese reinforcements which shuttled toward the Solomons with such regularity that the convoys were named the "Tokyo Express," the Japanese constantly lost ground. On October 12 the Tokyo Express was intercepted, and the ensuing Battle of Cape Esperance resulted in the sinking of four Japanese cruisers and five destroyers, while the major United States loss was heavy damage to the cruiser Boise. Shortly afterward the Japanese made a major effort to reinforce their hard-pressed Guadalcanal garrison, but again the American fleet intercepted the advancing squadrons, and the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands turned out to be another victory for the United Nations. It was in this engagement on October 26 that the Hornet was lost. But the new battleship South Dakota, armed with better antiaircraft protection than any of its predecessors, succeeded in shooting down thirty-two planes without suffering major damage, proving that warships could still resist air attack. The climax of the Guadalcanal campaign occurred on November 13 and 14 — the Battle of Guadalcanal, in which three Japanese naval columns arrived to assault the American positions on the island. Admiral Callaghan with a squadron of cruisers and destroyers plunged daringly between two of the enemy columns, and when the engagement was over Japan had lost a battleship, five cruisers, and five destroyers, while America lost two light cruisers and seven destroyers. Subsequent encounters in the same battle resulted in the sinking of eight Japanese transports, another battleship, three more cruisers, and a destroyer. When the army took over the campaign from the marines and surrounded the remaining Japanese encampments on February 3 the enemy had evacuated the island. Truly the Rising Sun was growing dim.

The Burma war. One of the most viciously contested and difficult theaters of operation was Burma. Here the Japanese had as their major objective the cutting of the Burma Road, and two weeks after the cam-
paign started on January 15, 1942, they had taken Moulmein and were sweeping toward Rangoon. That city fell in March. After these conquests the Japanese swept up the Salween and Irrawaddy valleys, pushing the British and Stilwell's Chinese before them, and by the summer of 1942 they had most of the strategically important parts of Burma in their hands. The British and their American associates were forced to take countermeasures which were realized at the start to be inadequate; an example was the exploit of Wingate's raiders, who supplied only by air maintained operations behind enemy lines. At the same time the Ledo Road, from Ledo to Lashio, was being built to bring aid to hard-pressed China, and a trickle of supplies was flown over the "Hump," as the Himalayan cordillera was nicknamed. The operations in this region were combined with the defense of India and the problem of China supply, and the setup was known as "CBI"—China-Burma-India. Its commander, General Joseph Stilwell, leading American-trained Chinese troops, did what he could to press the Japanese back. In 1944 the tide turned; Myitkyina, an important military base in the north, was retaken on August 4, and junction with Chinese forces from the east was made in January 1945. At last the land route to China was clear.

China during the struggle. China meanwhile was hard put to hold out during the long and grueling struggle. Chiang Kai-shek did not get along with his Communist associates, and he diverted Nationalist military strength (armed with lend-lease materials) in order to limit the activities of the Reds. China confronted moreover a determined Japanese attempt to save a "face" which was being rapidly ruined by losses in the Pacific and the Indies. The Japanese therefore wiped out many of the airfields from which American airmen—the famed "Flying Tigers"—had operated with impunity earlier in the war. The Japanese in addition made a determined effort to carve out a section of southern China, especially that portion that contained the Canton-Hankow Railway. In 1944 the Japanese got full control of the line, but periodically the stubborn Chinese retrieved sections of it. Finally however the Japanese in June 1944 seized the city of Changsha, which had held out gallantly up to that time, and with its fall China approached her nadir. Internal squabbling among political factions, ruinous inflation, the prospect of a long wait before material could be shifted from Europe to the Pacific, and the pitiful trickle of supplies that came into Kunming from India—all these combined to worry her allies. If the war lasted much longer China might have to surrender.
The Burma Road, which winds and twists its way into China
The war had profound effects upon China’s internal structure. In 1938 an emergency party congress was held, which gave Chiang Kai-shek more powers than he had held before. He was now known as Tsung-ts’ai (“Chief”), with chairmanship and veto power over both the party congress and the central executive committee. A supreme national defense council replaced the central political council in authority, and the military affairs commission was given expanded powers. A representative body, the people’s political council, was also created to preserve democratic rights during the emergency; it had the right to criticize and advise on government policies. There emerged during the war a threefold division of authority — the party, the bureaucracy, and the army. Although there was some friction there was much overlapping of personnel, and Chiang himself centralized much power in his own hands.

Further complications were caused by difficulties in Sino-American relations. American lend-lease was vital to China, and yet misunderstandings and friction could not be avoided. General Joseph Stilwell, America’s first representative, was accused of clashing with Chiang over the issues of diverting lend-lease to anti-Communist efforts, over Chiang’s lack of real co-operation with the Eighth Route and New Fourth (Red) armies, and over Stilwell’s desire for a position of real military authority in China. Chiang demanded Stilwell’s recall, and the United States ambassador, Clarence Gauss, resigned. General Albert Wedemeyer replaced Stilwell, and managed to get along better with the generalissimo. At the end of the war General Patrick Hurley became ambassador and adopted the policy of supporting Chiang’s faction, but the renewal of civil war forced his resignation as well. The United States, though somewhat critical of Chiang’s over-all policies, maintained a fairly consistent attitude of support of the Nationalist government, although this was complicated by a broad split in American public opinion.

5. Counterattack

Although things looked black for the United Nations in the Pacific as the German war drew to its tedious close, there were signs that recovery was not far off. Two major campaigns were shaping up — one a purely naval affair which under the command of Nimitz drove westward through the numerous archipelagoes that flew the Rising Sun; another under MacArthur aimed at removing the Japanese menace from
Australia and the Indies, and by a program of daring island-hopping returning to the Philippine Islands which remained MacArthur’s immediate goal.

**Tarawa.** The naval drive in the central Pacific got off to a spectacular start by an assault in November 1943 against the Gilbert Archipelago. The major attack was aimed at Tarawa Atoll, a ring of twenty-five coral islands surrounding a lagoon. One of the islands, Betio, contained an airstrip and well-built defenses. A preliminary bombardment proved not to have appreciably softened the garrison’s ability to resist, and the island was taken only after a stubborn battle, during which more than once the attackers were on the verge of being driven off. The thousands of casualties that America suffered in this single engagement provided a gloomy outlook for those who believed that all of Japan’s island outposts would have to be taken before the homeland was attacked. But the archipelago was occupied, and a great advance thus made toward Tokyo.

**Kwajalein.** In early February 1944 another seven-league step was taken by the navy in an attack on the Marshall Islands. Here on Japan’s home ground, so to speak, an assault was made on Kwajalein Atoll, which was seized with much less trouble than Tarawa; the reason being, it was believed, a more thorough preliminary bombardment, during which 5,000 tons of shells and 500 tons of bombs were dropped on the small land area. The casualty list numbered 8,122 Japanese killed—and only 286 Americans; this box score encouraged those pessimists who had been depressed by Tarawa. Eniwetok Atoll was taken in February, under cover of a carrier attack on Truk Island in the Carolines, the chief Japanese base in the central Pacific. The Truk raid, though it did not achieve comparable publicity in American newspapers, actually was excellent revenge for Pearl Harbor, for the Japanese lost under carrier-plane attack nineteen vessels and 201 planes. After this defeat the Japanese naval chief of staff was dismissed.

**Saipan.** In mid-June 1944 Saipan Island in the Marianas was attacked. Here the invaders encountered a much larger land area than the coral atolls represented, and the struggle was consequently fiercer. After a fortnight of bloody combat, in the course of which 22,000 Japanese—including the admiral who had commanded the Pearl Harbor attack—lost their lives, Saipan was taken. But the optimism occasioned by Kwajalein’s easy fall was gone; it was clear that there was still tough fighting on the road to Tokyo. Concurrently, a Japanese fleet steamed out of the Philippines to relieve the Saipan garrison, but
it was intercepted by Admiral Mark Mitscher, with his famous fast
carrier Task Force 58, and damaged so heavily that it was forced to
withdraw. The fall of Saipan had another effect; Premier Tojo re-
signed, and with his departure from the cabinet the extreme military
dictatorship ended. Although the nation continued to be regimented,
more moderate counsels began to prevail.

_Iwo Jima._ On February 19, 1945, American marines landed on Iwo
Jima, an island in the Volcano Archipelago, only 600 miles from Tokyo.
The island is a mere dot of eight square miles, covered by weird volcanic
cinder ash and crested with an extinct volcano, Mount Suribachi. De-
termined not to repeat the mistake of Tarawa, the navy spent seventy-
two days in the preliminary bombardment, but even that terrific blasting
failed to dislodge the fanatic defenders. The campaign lasted until
March 16, and the invaders suffered casualties of 20 per cent—the
hardest fighting the marines had experienced in their long history.
But inevitably the island was taken, and though thousands of American
deaf lay beneath the cinder ash an air base had been won within flying
distance of Japan.

_ Okinawa._ About two weeks after the fall of Iwo Jima, on April 1,
the American Tenth Army invaded the largest of the Ryukyus, Okinawa.
The Japanese were panic-stricken; Iwo Jima was bad enough, but Okinawa
was practically on Nippon's front doorstep. The dreaded bombers
could make a shambles out of the home islands if Okinawa fell. Be-
sides, the invasion of the island seemed to indicate that the Japanese
islands were the next step, rather than the China coast as many Japanese
had optimistically predicted. At last the war was coming home to
Nippon. The struggle however was a vicious one, for the Japanese gar-
rison defended every foot of land. The desperate Nipponese trained
hundreds of suicide pilots and built special kamikaze ("Divine Wind")
planes for the express purpose of diving at the 1400 vessels of the Ameri-
can naval blockading squadron. General Simon Bolivar Buckner III
with his 100,000 men took Naha, the island's capital, on May 30, but
it was not until June 21 that the final victory was won, at the cost of
45,000 American casualties, one of whom was General Buckner himself.
But 90,000 Japanese were obliterated and—most significant—4000
were taken prisoners, the first large bag of captives in the Pacific war.
Previously the Japanese had preferred death to surrender; now they
seemed to be losing their faith in the destiny of the Rising Sun.

Again the Japanese tried to salvage some of their loss by a reckless
naval assault, but American carrier planes sank the new 45,000-ton
Mat weaving on Okinawa — a peaceful scene which makes a striking contrast with the scene below, where United States troops are shown in action on Leyte Island.
battleship *Yamato*, two cruisers, and three destroyers, and the Nipponese navy turned back. Its control of the Pacific was gone for good.

Okinawa was the last step in the central Pacific campaign. In two years — short for history, long for the participants — the American Pacific fleet had driven from precarious control of the Hawaiian defense triangle more than 3,000 miles westward to the very doorstep of Japan. By 1945 the Japanese fleet was shattered, and at great peril sallied forth only on last-ditch defensive missions. The American navy on the other hand had grown to monstrous proportions — the most massive armada the world had ever seen; it sailed where it willed, secure in its strength. The "New Order in East Asia" gave way to an even newer order — one dictated by American battle-wagons and carrier planes.

*MacArthur's island-hopping campaign.* While the naval campaign proceeded apace, MacArthur's men were moving west into the Indies. In New Guinea the Japanese had early seized the northern coast, and at the end of 1942 had crossed the rugged, jungly Owen Stanley Mountains to threaten Australia's northernmost frontier of Port Moresby. In December of 1942 and January of 1943 MacArthur sent Australian and American troops against the Japanese and drove them slowly back in some of the worst jungle-fighting of the entire war. By the following September Lae and Salamaua, Japanese bases on the northern New Guinea coast, had fallen, and the westward drive toward the Philippines had begun.

*The northern Solomons.* Meanwhile the Japanese bases in the Solomons came under heavy attack. The first major objective after the seizure of Guadalcanal was the airbase of Munda on New Georgia Island, and in August 1943 that island surrendered. Next came Bougainville; it took a longer campaign, which ended with the pushing of the defenders onto a mountain where they were helplessly penned in by superior Allied forces. The Japanese made one supreme naval attempt to relieve the pressure in this area — the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in March. In that engagement, declared by MacArthur to be the most decisive of the war, 90,000 tons of Japanese shipping was sent to the bottom, and 15,000 enemy troops were killed.

*The Bismarck Archipelago and the eastern Indies.* New Britain and the adjacent islands were gradually brought under allied domination, and by mid-1944 MacArthur felt secure enough in his New Guinea-Solomon theater to attempt operations farther afield. In April American forces invaded Hollandia in Dutch New Guinea, in June Biak Island, and in July Noemfoor Island, only 800 miles from the Philippines. Peleliu
Island in the Palaus came next (September), with harder fighting even than was required to take Guadalcanal. MacArthur then boldly skipped over to Morotai Island, and on October 20 reinvaded the Philippines.

The reconquest of the Philippines. The attack there began when an invasion army of 250,000 landed on Leyte Island. The Japanese realized the significance of this move and decided to risk what was left of their fleet. In the first Battle of the Philippines, the American squadron repulsed three enemy columns, sinking three battleships, six cruisers, a large carrier, and several small ones. Admiral Halsey announced after the battle that the Japanese navy was "beaten, routed, and broken," and subsequent events proved him correct. One of the most amusing incidents of the war — if any part of it could be called amusing — was the announcement of the Tokyo propaganda office following the battle that the "ghastly annihilation of Allied naval units resulted in forty-

A miller on Leyte Island.
five ships sunk... What the Tokyo radio did not explain was that most of the forty-five were Japanese.

_Luzón_. Between the invasion of Leyte and the occupation of Luzón MacArthur's men seized Mindoro and Marinduque islands, and their naval escorts were compelled to fight two more engagements with remnants of Japan's fleet. But on January 8, 1945, Luzón was invaded at Lingayen Gulf, north of Manila, and by February 4 Manila itself was occupied. MacArthur's pledge — "I will return!" — had been dramatically fulfilled. Hard fighting still remained to seize all of Luzón and the rest of the archipelago, but the issue was no longer in doubt. Baraán was avenged.

_The Aleutians_. The presence of Japanese soldiers on Kiska and Attu in the western Aleutians was a constant source of irritation to the Alaskan garrison. It was May 11, 1943, however, before Attu was invaded by American troops. By May 29 organized resistance had collapsed, though the fighting here was hindered by the worst of wintry weather, as the troops in New Guinea were annoyed by the most difficult tropical conditions. In August Kiska was invaded, and it was expected that resistance here would equal that on Attu; much to everyone's surprise however the Japanese garrison had withdrawn. The mikado's men had decided that their lines were overextended in the north. From this time on the Aleutians were used as a base from which the Kurils (especially Paramushiro Island) were bombed, but weather conditions in that area prevented major military operations.

_The air war against Japan_. On April 16, 1944, the Tokyo radio had complacently announced: "The Chinese government has been spreading the most laughable false propaganda that the Japanese capital has been bombed. The people of Tokyo pleasantly enjoy the quiet, peaceful and delightful spring days, observing the beautiful cherry blossoms. Now the residents are celebrating our glorious victories under very bright lights." Two days later however observation of the cherry blossoms was interrupted by General "Jimmy" Doolittle with a flight of American bombers, which dropped high explosives on Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagoya. This — the first air raid over Japan — was symptomatic of the future; in 1944 raids on Japan began on a large scale, and rose to a smashing crescendo in 1945. On August 20, 1944, Superfortresses (B-29's) raided the Yawata steel plant, and from that time on the dreaded drone of bombers was heard more and more often over the emperor's cities. From November 1944 to August 1945 B-29's dropped 169,000 tons of bombs on Japan in 30,000 sorties. For the first time in
their history the Japanese now learned what it meant to have war reach their homeland. Up to 1944 the warlords had practiced militarism with impunity; now their "chickens were coming home to roost."

Atomic warfare. Meanwhile scientists of most of the great nations had been secretly experimenting, under government subsidization, with a new and horrible weapon — the atomic bomb. Fortunately for the United Nations, American scientists, in co-operation with British, Canadian, and European refugee specialists, happened upon the solution first, and on July 16, 1945, a test bomb was exploded in the desert near Alamogordo, New Mexico, which proved to be the greatest explosive force ever designed by man. On August 6 an atom bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. After the tremendous concussion, when the huge, varicolored, mushroom-shaped cloud had drifted miles into the air, it was found that the center of the city was completely devastated, with hundreds of thousands of casualties, many of the wounded dying later from the effects of radioactivity. The effect upon Japan of this new weapon was decisive. Already pleading with Russia for mediation, which was refused, Japan was forced to sustain a second bomb — this time of greater power — dropped August 9 on the city of Nagasaki. The results were equally terrible. As much as any other single factor, the frightening atom bomb brought Japan to the point of immediate surrender. At the same time the bomb was a warning to the world that for the first time in history militarism was actually and literally getting out of hand. Despite the world-wide happiness at imminent victory, there was sober trepidation in the hearts of many as they considered the awesome forces of destruction that had been unleashed in 1945. For centuries Japan had depended upon the sun god for protection; now the enemies of Japan had turned to the cosmic energy of the sun itself for their fighting strength. It was no wonder that the emperor's vassals were disillusioned.

The end of the war. Events moved swiftly toward a climax. The invasion of southern Japan had been scheduled for November (Operations Olympic and Coronet), but it was destined never to take place. On August 8 Russia declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria. On August 10, a day after the Nagasaki bomb had been dropped, Japan offered to surrender. Four days later the terms were accepted; they were "unconditional," except that Japan was given some encouragement in her expressed wish to retain her emperor. General MacArthur was made chief of the occupation forces, his commanding personality shortly winning the respect of his charges, and on September 2, 1945, on
After the atomic bomb hit Hiroshima a two-foot layer of twisted tin and rubble marked what once was Japan’s most industrialized city. In block after block all that remained were fire-blackened trees, and here and there the shells of buildings that miraculously escaped pulverization by the terrific power of the first atom bomb.

board the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay, standing near the spot where Perry’s squadron nearly a century before had first entered Japan, the warlords of Nippon admitted in writing that they had been humbled for the first time in history.

The Pacific war was over.

Why did Japan lose? Japan lost the war primarily because she had assumed too large a task for her capacities. Her population, industry, and armed might were not alone capable of holding out against the combined strength of the United Nations. Moreover two of her basic assumptions failed to work out. One was her fond hope that she could transform the struggle into a war between East and West. She tried valiantly to masquerade as the defender of the Orient against the evil encroachments of Western imperialism — and in this she failed miserably. Her own methods were so much worse than those of the Western imperialists that the people of the Orient could not be deluded. The
"New Order in East Asia" represented a Japanese domination quite as hateful as that of the Western European. Another misapprehension was Japan's confidence that once she had achieved her major military objectives in the spring of 1942 her foes would be so shaken that they would accept a negotiated peace; and in this also she was woefully mistaken. The economic and political might of her enemies was such that they did not have to accept the situation she created, and their stubbornness proved Japan's downfall.

Specifically, the fact that Japan lost command of the air and sea around her outlying conquests made their surrender a certainty, and as her frontiers contracted she lost command of the air over her own industrial bases. Heavy explosive and incendiary bombings destroyed Japan's closely packed municipalities and zones of production, while the gradual destruction of her fleet and merchant marine convinced her that no relief could be hoped for. Furthermore Germany's being thrown on the defensive after 1942 robbed Japan of hope of aid from that quarter; and the prospects of Russia's eventual entry dimmed her hopes to the vanishing point. The atom bomb, though probably not in itself the major reason for the surrender, put an explosive period to Japan's self-confidence.

International co-operation. During the war the foes of Germany and Japan held a series of conferences which not only had profound effects upon military strategy, but also laid the foundations for the organization to be known as the United Nations. Many of these discussions concerned the nations of the Pacific, and changed the course of hostilities in that theater. On January 1, 1942, twenty-six nations, including the United States, China, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and several Latin-American countries bordering on the Pacific, signed the United Nations Declaration, pledging agreement with the principles laid down in the Atlantic Charter of August 1941. Each power pledged its full co-operation, and promised to make no separate peace. In November of that year President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek met in the Cairo Conference to discuss the basic strategy of the Pacific war and lay the foundations for closer co-operation. In the fall of 1944 the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China sent representatives to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, held near Washington, D.C., which formulated the basic principles of the world organization that was finally set up in the early months of 1945 at San Francisco. A final conference that included no Far Eastern representatives but had great effects on the Pacific was the Yalta or Crimea
Conference of February 1945, attended by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. At this conference President Roosevelt promised to help persuade China that Russia should regain many of its rights in Manchuria and the Liaotung peninsula in return for her entry into the Pacific war. Consequently China was said later to have been "sold out" at Yalta, but the true evaluation of this issue is highly complex and still incomplete.

Conclusion. Although the Manchurian incident of 1931 laid the foundation for World War II, large-scale fighting did not begin until 1937, when Japan seized upon some incidents in China Proper to perpetrate an invasion. For a year Japan marched roughshod over China, but in 1938 the struggle became a stalemate. In 1941, as a result of Hitler's successes in Europe and because of the need to bring the China incident to a quick conclusion, Japan began encroachments upon French and British held territory in southeastern Asia. Tension with the United States grew, and finally Japan decided to risk all in a tremendous military gamble.

The Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, immobilized a large part of the American Pacific fleet, and Japan in the next half year was able to seize Malaya, Siam, Burma, the Philippines, the Indies, the northern Solomons, and additional Pacific islands. Her offensive however weakened in mid-1942, and as a result of Allied naval victories she began to feel pressure on her overextended lines. Despite the fact that the United Nations were obliged to limit their objectives in the Pacific because of the decision to beat Hitler first, the campaign against Japan, beginning with the Guadalcanal invasion of August 1942, reached larger and larger proportions, finally culminating in two massive drives, one across the central Pacific and the other by way of the islands north and west of Australia toward the Philippines. Although an invasion of the Japanese homeland was scheduled for November, the air attack on Japan, the dropping of two atomic bombs, and the entry of Russia into the war helped bring about Japanese surrender on August 14, 1945.
The Postwar Pacific

Introduction. When on September 9, 1945, Japan signed the surrender document on board the United States battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay, ending World War II in the Pacific, the nations once again had an opportunity to see demonstrated the unpleasant fact that wars seldom solve problems, but rather create them. In the past major issue had followed major issue in the Pacific basin. Opium had given way to extraterritoriality, extraterritoriality had been pushed from the limelight by racism, which in turn was ousted by the repercussions of imperialism and aggression. During the opening decades of the twentieth century, however, a new problem had arisen, one which after the second World War threatened to be the greatest obstacle to peace. This problem was nationalism.

The background of Oriental nationalism has already been sketched in previous chapters. Events like the failure of reform of the Manchu dynasty and the rise of revolutionary intellectuals who finally managed to upset the government itself in China, the shift in power in Japan from the old genro and Satcho clique to a new group of younger, aggressive militarists represented by the Kwantung faction, Aguinaldo’s turn-of-the-century effort in the Philippines — all these typified the growth of nationalistic sentiments which were to break out in violence in later years.

What was this nationalism? Was it any different in the Pacific area than in the rest of the world? These questions must be answered by anyone hoping to understand the contemporary situation in Asia, and more than that they must be understood not only as an academic prob-
lem, but also as a basis for future action. For nationalism seems liable to persist as the chief obstacle to peace in Asia for many years to come. Nationalism as a phenomenon of modern history is the growth of a consciousness of nationhood, and such consciousness is mainly a feeling of historical and cultural unity. Race and language are usually included in this feeling of nationality, but not necessarily. The outstanding characteristic of modern nations is their feeling of unity; but unity which might be based on a diversity of factors. Nations in other words are groups of people with the idea that they ought to work together; and as such they were no different in Asia than they have been for the past four hundred years in western Europe.

The intensification of nationalism in China, Russia, and Japan, and the rise of new sentiments of nationality in French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies were the most important parts of the story of the postwar Pacific.

1. China

The three outstanding developments in China in the years following the second World War were first, a continuation of the civil war between the Nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai; second, a futile attempt to reorganize the political structure of the country as a basis for foreign aid, without the full co-operation of the Red-dominated areas; and third, a series of economic misfortunes topped by a ruinous inflation. These three developments not only kept China busy during this period but also added to the growing international friction between the United States and Soviet Russia, and made China a potential arena of serious future trouble.

The civil war. Immediately after the World War Chiang issued three invitations to the Chinese Red leaders to open negotiations, and finally, with the encouragement of Ambassador Patrick Hurley of the United States, Mao Tse-tung arrived in Chungking in August 1945. On October 10 Chiang and Mao announced an agreement that promised eventual settlement of most of the outstanding issues between the Nationalists and the Communists. A political consultation council was to meet to draw up plans for a new united China, and a military committee was to take over control of the existing military establishments, consisting then of more than 3,000,000 Nationalist troops, part of whom were trained and equipped under United States techniques, and about
1,500,000 Communist troops, poorly armed but still with high morale. But fighting broke out before the political consultation council could meet, and persisted until December, when General George Marshall arrived to take charge of American negotiations.

The Chinese Communists by this time controlled an area inhabited by nearly 60,000,000 persons, centering in northeastern China. The provinces of Shantung and Kiangsu and the area around the great bend of the Yellow River were shot through with Communist activity, and a capital had been set up at Yenan in Shansi Province. Although as previously related the Communists and Nationalists managed to co-operate superficially during the war, many instances of their basic lack of sympathy had occurred, and hostility between the two groups was at a peak when Japan surrendered.

General Marshall's arrival stimulated the renewal of negotiations, and the fighting tapered off. On January 3, 1946, the two groups got together again, and on January 10 an armistice agreement was signed, followed by a cease-fire order three days later. The political consultation council then met, with eight Kuomintang members, seven Communists, nine Democratic League members, five from the Youth Party, and nine nonpartisans. At the end of January the council announced an agreement involving a reorganization of the government with a broadening of representation to include many leftist groups hitherto excluded, the calling of a national constituent assembly in May, the carrying out of sweeping political, economic, and social reforms, and the unification and reduction of the armed forces. These forces were to consist of 108 divisions, ninety Nationalist and eighteen Communist. This announcement seemed to indicate that Marshall's special mission had been successful and that China could now expect an end to her long and bitterly contested civil war.

But just as hopes rose the Soviet occupation troops evacuated Manchuria, timing their withdrawal so that Chinese Communist forces could move in immediately and take over. Mukden for instance was evacuated on March 10 and Chinese Reds moved in on March 11. The evacuations were completed in March and April, and when they were concluded the Chinese Communists occupied many thousands of square miles of new territory, of great economic significance to China. The Nationalist troops immediately attacked, and toward the end of May seized Changchun, the Manchurian capital; but it was recognized that their hold was tenuous and did not represent control of the bulk of the region.
Fighting continued throughout the summer, although negotiations produced a temporary fifteen-day truce in June of 1946. Most of the hostilities centered in Jehol, northern Kiangsu, Hopeh, and southeastern Shantung. Meantime Marshall and the new American ambassador, John Leighton Stuart, tried vainly to bring about a full-scale resumption of negotiations, which failed mainly because neither side was willing to surrender any part of its military gains. The Nationalists gained an advantage with the siege and capture in October of Kalgan, an important Communist base, and a few days later General Chou En-lai, one of the Communist leaders, went to Nanking to resume the talks. A month of conferences failed to produce results however, and Chou returned to Yenan in November, wiring Marshall that he was willing to resume negotiations if the "illegal" National Assembly which was then about to meet without Communist delegates were disbanded, and if the military and territorial status quo of the preceding January 13 were reinstated. Chiang could not agree to these conditions, but he did consent to issue another cease-fire order and postpone the opening of the National Assembly for three days. The year 1946 ended with President Truman restating American policy in regard to China, emphasizing the necessity of recognizing Chiang's authority as the real government of the country, ending the civil war, and broadening the national government so that leftist forces could be included.

General Marshall returned to the United States knowing that his mission had been a failure, and the following year (1947) saw no real progress in the settlement of the basic issues. In 1948, affairs reached a new climax with the collapse of Nationalist resistance in Manchuria and the retreat of Chiang's troops all along the line. The Reds seemed in a position to seize all the nation north of the Yangtze, and Madame Chiang made a hurried trip to the United States to seek additional aid. America, however, realizing that much of the $3,000,000,000 given to China had been wasted, refused to act at the time, and at year's end prospects for a coalition or Red-controlled government with the possible deposition of Chiang were being freely discussed.

*Politics.* The postwar political scene in China was influenced largely by the continuation of the civil war, but other events also occurred which were of some significance. In May of 1945 the Kuomintang government announced that the "period of tutelage"—Sun Yat-sen's second phase of political evolution—would officially end in November with the calling of the National Assembly; and the latter, after almost a year's delay, did meet and announced the promulgation of a new consti-
tution in December 1946. This document was drawn up without the assistance of Communist or extreme leftist forces, and was therefore unsatisfactory to the Chinese Reds. It was to go into effect on Christmas Day, 1947.

A further accomplishment of the government was the revision of the unequal treaties, a process which had been begun during the war. The revision was concluded in mid-1945 with agreements among China and Sweden and the Netherlands, ending the long period of inequality which had started with the Opium Wars and which Chinese patriots had so much resented.

Another agreement of outstanding importance was the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, drawn up on August 14 and ratified ten days later. It included provisions that strengthened Russian claims to northern frontier areas, in return for recognition of Chiang's Nationalist government. China for instance was forced to recognize the "independence" of Outer Mongolia if a plebiscite approved it, although it was very clear that by now it was a Russian sphere; the railroads of Manchuria were to be operated for thirty years under joint Sino-Soviet control and ownership; Port Arthur would remain for thirty years a joint Sino-Soviet naval base, and Dairen would be a free port; and Russia on her part promised to withdraw from Manchuria, stay out of Sinkiang, and give moral and military assistance to the National government of China. The evacuation of Manchuria as previously related showed that Russia intended to keep the letter but not the spirit of the agreement; and the chief benefit for China was the recognition by Russia of the authority of Chiang's régime.

Economics. China's chief postwar economic problem was inflation. The official rate of exchange rose from twenty Chinese dollars to one United States dollar in 1945 to 3350 Chinese dollars to one American dollar in 1946. In 1945 it was estimated that prices had risen 1000 per cent since 1937, and that percentage had been multiplied fourfold by the following year. The basic causes of the violence of the upswing were the scarcity of goods, the unbacked paper currency, and an active black market, which made no pretense of adhering to the official rate of exchange and which dominated Chinese economy. It was literally true in these postwar months that 'ricksha boys who had seldom had at any time more than a few coppers now counted their wealth in sheaves of banknotes — and yet continued to starve because of the food shortages and ruinous prices. This inflation upset government finance as well, and it was estimated in 1945 that less than half of the budget could
be met by taxation, the rest depending for payment on the issuance of paper money. To add to the disheartening situation, production had dropped off sharply in 1944-1945, and China was nowhere near being self-sufficient in food production. Japanese occupation policies, coupled with the damage done by the unending civil war, had placed China in a disastrous economic position, where foreign assistance seemed her only recourse. During the year following V-J Day China obtained about $1,000,000,000 of American lend-lease aid, and in August of 1946 the United States gave China $800,000,000 worth of war surplus materials to help her economic recovery. A further complicating factor was the inevitable unfavorable trade balance, which in 1946 caused China to import seven times as much as she exported. The government tried to control this by restricting imports, but the lack of balance was bound to continue until China's own production increased greatly over its postwar levels.

In conclusion, China after the war was a nation ripped and torn by invasion, split asunder by revolution, poverty-stricken, and dependent on foreign aid. The end of hostilities with Japan solved only one of her problems; the others still remained, and threatened to be intensified as the tension between America and Soviet Russia deepened. Yet there was a strong sense of nationhood in China. The Kuomintang tradition had left a deep impress, and even the Communists had to emphasize a national policy of reconstruction instead of their world-revolution idea. China had the makings of the greatest nation in Asia, but she still had a rocky path to travel before she could have real unity and peace.

**Manchuria.** Manchuria continued its prewar role as an area of international conflict. When Japan surrendered, the Manchukuo government was dissolved, and Manchuria theoretically came back under the sovereignty of China. Russian troops invaded Manchuria five days before the war ended and occupied much of the country, and it was natural that the first phase of the military occupation should be in Soviet hands. But both the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Sino-Russian Treaty of 1945 had pledged the return of Manchuria to China, though China had assigned certain economic rights to Russia. The Soviet government agreed to withdraw its forces by December 3, 1945, but this promise was not kept because of the civil conflict in China. The time was extended to March 3, 1946, and during the first part of that year Russian troops were withdrawn from most parts of Manchuria save the southern tip of the Liaotung peninsula. This withdrawal as previously mentioned
was so timed as to permit Chinese Communist troops to occupy the area immediately, and this *contretemps* reopened violent hostilities between Chiang’s forces and the Chinese Communists. The Nationalists seized most of the southern coastline and a salient extending into the interior between Changchun and Harbin, but most of the rest of Manchuria was securely held by the Chinese Reds. In the fall of 1948, Nationalist resistance in Manchuria collapsed, and the entire area fell to Communist forces.

One of the sources of dispute between the United States and Russia that served to delay reparations agreements was Russia’s seizure of Manchurian industrial facilities as booty of war. When Edwin W. Pauley on his second mission in 1946 inspected Manchurian industrial facilities, he reported that the Soviet withdrawals had deprived Manchuria of 71 per cent of its electric power, 50 to 100 per cent of its iron and steel production, 80 per cent of its metalworking facilities, 75 per cent of its nonferrous mining, 65 per cent of its liquid fuels and lubricant processing, 50 per cent of its cement production, 50 per cent of its chemical manufacture, 75 per cent of its textile fabrication, and 30 per cent of its paper and pulp processing. The United States looked upon these installations as a legitimate part of reparations, but the Soviet refused to modify its view that they were spoils of war.

Manchurian economy was therefore in an unfortunate state during the postwar years. Inflation struck the region as it afflicted other Asiatic nations, and the unfavorable trade balance of 1939 reached by 1945 a point where there were almost no exports at all. The one surplus product of the area was food, and great varieties of this were raised on Manchuria’s rich agricultural lands. Millet, kaoliang, maize, soybeans, potatoes, cotton, rice, livestock—all combined to make Manchuria one of the great economic hopes of the Far East. Despite her truncated industrial establishment, her food production made her a desirable area, and her untapped natural resources gave her a strategic value that attracted the eager attention not only of China, her legal owner, but also of Russia, and of the “state within a state,” the Chinese Communist government of Mao Tse-tung.

2. Japan

On the Japanese islands nationalism worked in reverse. Instead of growing, it was choked by foreign controls. For the first time in a century Japan’s national pride was humbled by the tread of conquerors
on her home soil, and her problems were largely centered in the military occupation. She did though make some attempts, fostered by her conquerors and regulated closely by them, to resume the practice of politics and to restore her shattered economic system. The occupation, political revival, and economic rehabilitation then were Japan’s chief concerns during the postwar years.

The occupation. When MacArthur’s men flew into Tokyo they found a nation heavily damaged by the battering of war. The best estimates were that more than 8,000,000 persons were war casualties of one sort or another — dead, wounded, or homeless. The great bombings by the Superfortresses had killed 241,309 civilians and wounded 313,041. About 30 per cent of Japan’s buildings had been destroyed — some 2,300,000 structures — and 1215 square miles of her great cities and industrial areas had been laid waste by high-explosive and incendiary projectiles. Superficially the nation presented the aspect of a ruined land, with famine, disease, and revolution threatening.

General MacArthur seized firm hold of the situation and by the terms of the surrender document was able to make use of the Japanese government structure itself as a tool for the carrying out of his policies. The fact that the emperorship had been retained and Hirohito still occupied his tottering throne was an item of great importance, for the Japanese, accustomed through long centuries to authoritarianism of the most rigid sort, needed some rallying point on which to focus their loyalties. The throne provided that focus, and as a result the Japanese were much more docile than they would have been if their governmental structure had been completely shattered. The first acts of the military occupation consisted of attempts to clean out the means by which policies of militaristic aggression had been foisted on the people. The political police and their policy of thought control were abolished immediately; and the educational system was revamped, with Japanese history texts combed and sifted to eliminate the jingoism that had been the brain food of Japanese children for generations. Although MacArthur was willing to utilize the throne as a means to an end, he saw to it that Hirohito deliberately divested himself of the claim to divinity that had been maintained by Japanese emperors for more than two and a half millennia. These reforms, together with the rounding-up of war criminals for trials by United Nations powers, formed the basis of the primary policy adopted by MacArthur as military governor of the Japanese Empire.

Two important events occurred in December 1945 which helped
A young Japanese girl operates a machine in the Osaka mint which gives the slugs their 50-sen value. The finished products are then distributed throughout Japan.
to shape the future course of the occupation. One was the Moscow Conference which organized the Far Eastern Commission, given the task of supervising the occupation of Japan. The commission consisted of delegates from the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippines. Four of these member powers, the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and China, possessed veto power on the same basis that the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations possessed it — in other words their approval had to be unanimous for any policy to be carried out. The commission was to meet in Washington, but representatives of the four powers with veto control sent representatives to Tokyo to form the Far Eastern Council, which was to supervise affairs on the ground.

The second event of significance in that month was the submission of the Pauley report on reparations. Edwin W. Pauley had been sent as special commissioner with ambassadorial rank to Japan to appraise its assets and determine the basis for possible reparations payments. He took with him a group of experts in Far Eastern affairs and economics, and drew up as the first step an interim report which urged immediate removal of certain types of industrial installations, with a view both to disarm Japan industrially and to aid the victors in rebuilding their own damaged economies. The installations that Pauley felt should be removed included army and navy arsenals, and factories producing aircraft, light metals, machine tools, sulphuric acid, ships, ball and roller bearings, iron and steel ingots, soda ash, chlorine, and caustic soda, besides thermal power units — in other words the industrial plants that could be most fully applied to warmaking. To carry out the provisions of this interim report MacArthur in January 1946 ordered Japan to set aside as potential reparations 505 of her biggest plants in eight basic industries, including 273 private munitions plants of one sort or another, ninety machine-tool factories, twenty-two iron and steel mills, twenty electric stations, thirty-two bearing plants, twenty-five shipyards, including five large naval bases, and other similar installations. The theories regarding reparations varied widely, but investigation seemed to show without much doubt that Japan’s industrial potential although damaged was still powerful, and needed careful attention to keep it from future troublemaking.

By the beginning of 1946 the occupation policy had been crystallized. It was founded first on the Potsdam Accord, then on the surrender document itself which pledged maintenance of imperial authority
in Japan, the Moscow Agreement of December 1945, and the United States announcement of the postsurrender policy for Japan issued in August 1945. The chain of authority thus set up was headed by the Far Eastern Commission in Washington, which formulated the basic policy. This was transmitted to MacArthur as head of the occupation forces by the United States government; he had the task of executing it, aided and advised by the Far Eastern Council in Tokyo. The troops entrusted with the carrying out of MacArthur’s orders consisted largely of United States detachments, with small contingents from Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, and India. China also was invited to send troops, but the war between Chiang and the Chinese Communists prevented.

MacArthur continued to rule with a strong hand. Purges of known militarists and ultranationalists prevented them from influencing Japanese public life, and war crimes trials progressed efficiently under the administration of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, holding sessions in Tokyo. Two of the arraigned leaders of wartime Japan had already gained notoriety in 1945, former Premier Fumimaro Konoye by suicide and ex-Premier Hideki Tojo by attempted suicide. The doctrines of Shinto were cleared from the educational system in an attempt to divest government of its religious connotations, and the slow process of screening schoolteachers was begun. The centralization of economic power in the hands of a few great families, the Zaibatsu, was ended when MacArthur dissolved five of the great clan combines, the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Yasuda, Sumitomo, and Fuji. Their assets were turned over to the Holding Company Liquidation Commission, and the unique monopoly of Japan’s economy was finally ended. Before the first postwar year was out, MacArthur had completely demobilized and disarmed Japan, and steps had been taken to rebuild the nation along more democratic and less warlike lines.

Reparations negotiations proceeded slowly. In April 1946 the United States suggested that the victorious powers organize an inter-allied reparations commission to allocate and supervise reparations suggested by the Pauley report, but an attempt to set it up in August met with Soviet opposition. The factor that blocked the creation of the commission was the dispute over Russian seizure of industrial establishments in Manchuria, the Soviet claiming that the seizures constituted legitimate war booty and the United States insisting that they belonged in the category of reparations. The Far Eastern Commission in May and June 1946 approved an interim program for the removal of industrial
equipment. The victors were to receive all but 3,500,000 tons of Japan's 12,000,000-ton annual steel production equipment, half of her electric power plants, all arsenals, aircraft, and light metal factories, and many production units of chemicals, shipbuilding, machine tools, and similar facilities. Immediate removal of these items was delayed by the squabble over allocations, and in November the United States decided to go ahead without Russian approval, inviting her to reparations conferences but not permitting her to delay further allocation agreements.

In May 1946 Pauley had made a second trip to Japan, Manchuria, and Korea with another group of experts and authorities on Far Eastern affairs. He inspected Japan again, and was even permitted by Soviet authorities to spend six days in northern Korea in the Russian zone of occupation. The Pauley commission then produced its final report on Japanese reparations, and summed up its recommendations by urging removal of all war plants, including synthetic rubber, magnesium, and aluminum production. The suggestions made in Pauley's first report were in general retained. Immunity was promised for Japanese handicrafts, including pearl culture, silk manufacture, and leather, fish, and light electrical appliance industries. Other facilities granted to Japan included some building materials industries, and food processing, lumber, ceramics, coal, crude oil, and crude rubber installations. Pauley urged the maintenance of a self-sustaining Japanese industry, but insisted that Japan was not as badly off economically as many persons thought.

Domestic politics. As political activities resumed under the control of the Far Eastern Commission, it was seen that the conservatives and moderates dominated the national scene. In April 1946 the first Diet election was held, and 2,500,000 voters turned out, about 72 per cent of the electorate. The election was also notable because it was the first time that women had voted in Japan. The Liberal and Progressive parties, both moderate in view, dominated the new legislature, and although there had been much talk of a possible growth of extremist strength, the Communists won only five seats. Baron Shidehara, who had led Japan as premier since the surrender, was forced to resign in favor of Liberal chief Yoshida, but the ministries were all troubled by much Social Democratic, Communist, and other leftist agitation. In 1946 a new constitution was formulated which contained many provisions that must have seemed strange to the descendants of the samurai. Japan renounced war as an instrument of national policy, and abolished her standing army, long a part of her political establishment. The emperor, formerly the focus of constitutional authority, was divested
When the U.S. Navy decided to make atomic bomb experiments on Bikini Island it moved the Alap natives to Rongerik Atoll. Here the immigrants are holding the South Sea equivalent of New England town meetings.

of his political as well as his religious significance, and became a mere figurehead. The lower house of the Diet, formerly innocuous, now was much more influential in policy-making, and full cabinet responsibility was pledged. Civil rights were guaranteed all Japanese citizens.

Postwar economics. Like most other nations, Japan found herself after the war with a tremendous debt, 221,000,000,000 yen. Although this was diminished slightly by the canceling of many wartime obligations, it was still large enough to throw the economy off balance and to help create a severe inflation by 1946. This situation was made worse by the failure of the rice crop in 1945, which, because of lack of fertilizers and supplies, was smaller by more than a fourth than in 1944. In the spring of 1946 the food shortage was severe in the cities, with a daily average of only 1352 calories in Tokyo. MacArthur was able to relieve it somewhat by releasing food imports from the United States for distribution. Industrial recovery was slow in the postwar years, and
housing shortages, unemployment, and other symptoms of a badly strained and maladjusted economy were evident on all sides. Japanese labor was given a new lease on life in March 1946 when the Trade Union Act legalized trade unions. Enthusiasm for the new law was so great that by July unions had nearly 4,000,000 members. Attempts were also made to distribute agricultural land more fairly and to end the evils of absentee ownership.

*Japan's empire.* Of the far-flung empire which Japan had seized by force and treachery little remained. Korea was under American and Russian management, Manchuria was legally a part of China, Formosa was a part of China, Sakhalin and the Kurils went to Russia, and the Carolines, Marshalls, and Marianas, where so much tough combat took place during hostilities, were occupied by the United States under a *de facto* control that seemed likely to last at least until the United Nations had proved its strength. All the outlying areas had of course been returned to their legitimate prewar owners, and Japan now consisted chiefly of the four islands with which she had started in the nineteenth century; the hundred-year cycle was complete.

In sum, then, Japan had far to go to regain her lost stature. One of her most outstanding characteristics, and the one perhaps which puzzled foreign observers most, was her apparent willingness and even enthusiasm to abide by the policies set forth by MacArthur. The latter was personally so popular that he was practically mobbed every time he appeared in public, and the Japanese attitude in general was far different from that of the defeated Germans, who had little respect for the occupation authorities. The Pauley reports outlined an industrially demilitarized Japan which would be harmless for years to come; but if occupation policies were carried out to their completion the quick recovery of Japan seemed a much surer thing than the recovery of the other defeated nations. International complications however shadowed the scene, and the future of the Japanese, abiding under the authoritarianism of their military conquerors as obediently as they had under the earlier authoritarianism of their emperors and shoguns, was still in doubt.

3. Korea

Korea was without a doubt one of the trouble spots of the world after World War II. A brief military campaign by Russia and the United States had cleared Japanese military opposition from the peninsula, and as a basis of temporary military occupation northern Korea
above the thirty-eighth parallel was taken over by the Soviet while the southern part of the peninsula was occupied by the United States military authorities. A month after hostilities ended, in September 1945, a "People's Republic" was organized by leftist and extreme liberal groups under the leadership of Yo Unkyang. When the Soviet occupation authorities began their control they utilized this organization to govern their section of the peninsula, much as MacArthur utilized the Japanese bureaucracy to run defeated Japan. It was however renamed the Korean People's Interim Committee. The American military commander, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, refused to recognize its authority in the American zone, and helped to organize the Korean Advisory Council, a group of eleven members of the Korean Democratic Party, a moderate group headed by Kim Koo and Dr. Syngman Rhee, leaders of the wartime provisional government. Two governments therefore existed in occupied Korea, and the rift between the conquerors of Korea appeared to widen.

The Moscow Conference of 1945 had specified that the United States and the Soviet government were to agree on the unification of Korea and the abandonment of the thirty-eighth parallel division, but the two powers could not come to an agreement, and negotiations broke down in May 1946. The United States military governor, Major General Archer L. Lerch, realizing that the division was greatly hindering Korea's economic and political recovery, called an interim legislative assembly in southern Korea, with forty-five elected and forty-five appointed members, which met first in November 1946. These stopgap measures however were no real solution to the problem, and Korean intellectuals kept up a constant barrage of demands that the two occupying powers resolve their differences and turn the country back to its citizens.

Difficulties were immense. To begin with, the political scene was complicated by more than sixty native political parties. Economic conditions grew steadily worse as inflation reached the astronomic figure of 14,000 per cent above 1937 prices. The country was importing far more than it was exporting, and floods ruined the 1946 harvests. Lack of technicians and the fact that what little industry existed was four fifths owned and controlled by Japan prevented industrial rehabilitation from progressing. Raw materials produced in one zone were processed in another. The country remained a predominantly agricultural region with the same problems as China — except that they were perhaps intensified in Korea because of the population pressure and the small size and helplessness of the nation.
4. French Indo-China

While the urge toward national development was stultified in Korea because of the military occupation, French Indo-China went far along the path to national independence. British military forces occupied most of the "Golden Peninsula" at the close of the war, and the area was turned over to France in March of 1946. Chinese troops had occupied part of Tonkin and at first were unwilling to leave; but after some armed clashes, and urgent appeals from Paris to Chungking, the Chinese were withdrawn. The first step toward realization of nationality was the appearance in Paris of a delegation from Cochin China with a petition to Colonial Minister Marius Moutet requesting autonomy. This was granted, and Cochin China was made an independent republic in the Indo-Chinese Federation of the French Union. A provisional government was set up under Dr. Nguyen van Thinh and a constituent assembly planned, but early plans failed and van Thinh committed suicide. The plans for national development therefore suffered a setback but the republican form still existed as the basis for future progress. Shortly afterward Cambodia requested "independence" as well, and was given similar rights in the French Union under its king, Norodom Sihanouk.

The Viet-Nam revolt. The most vigorous campaign for national existence took place, however, in Annam and Tonkin, which together organized the Viet-Nam Republic. This government was set up in March 1946 under Dr. Ho Chi-Minh, and a round-table conference called at Dalat to which all parts of Indo-China were invited to send delegates; but the conference broke down when Viet-Nam demanded control of Cochin China. In July a second conference was called at Fontainebleau, led by Ho Chi-Minh, but this also failed to settle the problem of the status of Cochin China. Uprisings and riots caused French troops to use force to quell revolutionary activity, and negotiations came to a halt when French forces bombed the Annamese village of Bac Ninh. In September a modus vivendi was issued by France, which provided no real settlement but furnished a working base for future talks. The agreement gave priority to French cultural establishments, technicians, and advisers; and though a cease-fire order was futilely issued on October 29 it failed to stop the skirmishing. Ho Chi-Minh formed a new government toward the end of the year, but in December the rebellious Annamese laid siege to French garrisons in Tonkin, and France sent 75,000 reinforcements to the peninsula. Warfare continued until mid-1947, when a truce occurred that gave some hope of a lasting agreement.
Hopes were vain, however, and fighting continued, with French offers never going quite far enough to suit the Vietnamese.

The Viet-Nam revolt was but one of many examples of the surging of nationalism in the Far East. As such it was an excellent example of the clash between nascent Oriental nationalism and nineteenth century imperialism; and though France like other European colonial powers seemed willing to make sweeping concessions it was clear that the native inhabitants did not consider the concessions sweeping enough.

5. Indonesia

Like French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies after the war were torn by nationalistic sentiments. The Japanese occupation forces were given instructions to maintain peace and order until Allied troops could arrive, and in September 1945 a British contingent under Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christison moved in because of the temporary unavailability of Dutch troops. When the British arrived they found Indonesian Nationalists in control of the interior and of local government. The Nationalist movement had been under the leadership of Achmed Soekarno but when the war ended, Sultan Sjahriir was dominant. When the Dutch replaced the British garrisons a few weeks later they refused to deal with the Nationalists, and fighting broke out. It grew to such intensity that the United Nations was appealed to, and in February 1946 the Netherlands government announced that Indonesia would be given the right of deciding its own destiny after a period of preparation and tutelage. The Netherlands authorities hoped of course that the Nationalists would be satisfied with a status paralleling that of a dominion in the British Empire, and Dr. Hubertus Van Mook, acting governor-general of the Netherlands Indies, entered into negotiations with the Sjahriir faction with that in mind. The conferences began on March 13 with an Englishman, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, later Lord Inverchapel, acting as chairman. The conferences were subsequently moved bodily by air to the Netherlands, but even proximity to the Dutch seat of power could not solve the fundamental differences, which centered in the Nationalist demands for immediate sovereignty and full control over Sumatra and adjacent areas that were not fully sympathetic to the Sjahriir faction (which was led mainly by Javanese intellectuals). On June 17 Sjahriir tried to break the deadlock with a series of counterproposals, which proved insufficient; and shortly afterward he was kidnapped by partisans and was succeeded in authority by Soekarno.
Violence continued unabated. In June 1946 the so-called Tangerang massacres occurred in the interior of Java when Indonesian Nationalists assaulted and massacred Chinese residents. The Nationalists found their cause in poorer condition in midyear, because by that time most of the Japanese troops were evacuated and they had stimulated the Nationalists to resist European reoccupation with their false propaganda of "Asia for the Asiatics." Dutch reinforcements also began to arrive in larger numbers, and finally by November were able to replace the British completely. These events, plus Communist infiltration which frightened both sides, hastened the possibility of settlement, and in October negotiations were reopened.

In August a commission-general with three members had been created by Queen Wilhelmina. On October 7 the commissioners met with the Nationalists, again under a British umpire, Lord Killearn, British high commissioner for southeastern Asia. A truce was agreed upon a few days later, and on November 15 an agreement was reached at Cheribon, Java. The Cheribon Accord included the creation of an Indonesian Commonwealth under the Dutch crown. The United States of Indonesia, which was to be its official title, was to become a sovereign state by January 1, 1949, to consist of three subsidiary states: the Republic of Indonesia, made up of Java, Sumatra, and Madura; East Indonesia, formed out of Celebes, the Moluccas, Bali, Lombok, and Dutch Timor; and Dutch Borneo. These states were to have coequal status with the Netherlands under the Dutch crown. The Republic of Indonesia, the largest of the component parts, began its career with Soekarno as president and Sjahrir premier. Troubles still continued, and the Cheribon Agreement did not end the fighting, though some progress was made toward a definitive settlement. Continuation of the tension resulted in the appointment of a United Nations Good Offices Committee, which negotiated the Renville Accord in early 1948. This agreement provided for a truce and renewed bases for negotiation, but it, too, was futile. Toward the end of 1948 the Dutch renewed hostilities on a broad scale, despite United Nations protests.

Of all the colonial powers the Dutch probably did the best job next to the British, and much of the formative strength which lay back of the Indonesian Nationalists' campaign was due to the liberties and training the Dutch had provided. The Netherlands was anxious to retain some sort of control over her Pacific possessions, because without them she was an extremely weak nation; but her policy of a moderate retention of control did not suit the Nationalists, who demanded broad and immedi-
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ate privileges. Many years must pass before the difficulties between the crown and Indonesia are smoothed, but of all the nationalist movements against European empires in the Pacific Area the Indonesian effort seems destined to the brightest future, both because of the tradition of good government which had been provided by The Hague and because of the richness and wealth of the areas themselves.

6. SIAM

Siam — formerly Thailand, "Land of the Free" — was in an anomalous position at the close of World War II. Guilty of having welcomed the Japanese with more or less enthusiasm during the war, and yet backward enough so that the mass of her people could not be blamed too severely for the acts of their government, Siam expected complications — and got them. On January 1, 1946, a peace treaty was signed with Great Britain and India. All British territory occupied by Japanese-supported Siamese occupation forces was restored, and Siam pledged that no canal would be built across the peninsula without British consent. The nation promised to co-operate with the United Nations, provide rice for other areas of Asia which were short of food, and stimulate its own production of rice, tin, rubber, and tea.

Relations with France however were not as peaceful. The Vichy government had been forced by Japan to cede some French Indo-Chinese territory to Siam, and negotiations lasted long. The Viet-Nam revolt caused border clashes when Annamese guerrillas fled into Siamese territory, and the French repeatedly crossed the border to round them up. In May and June of 1946 these troop movements increased, and on June 1 Siam appealed to the United Nations. In July she requested that the matter be brought before the Security Council, but agreed under French urging to postpone the demand pending further negotiations. In November the Vichy-ceded territory was returned to Indo-China, and Siam withdrew her protest against the French troop crossings. In return France withdrew her opposition to Siam's admission to the United Nations.

Two events in Siam's internal history attracted the attention of the world. One was the murder of King Ananda Mahidol on June 9, 1946. The monarch was found dead in his bed with a fatal gunshot wound, and twelve members of the commission of twenty appointed to investigate the tragedy decided it was murder rather than suicide. He was succeeded by his eighteen-year-old brother Phumiphon Aduldet. The
second event was an armed coup staged by army elements in November 1947 which overthrew the existing government and put into power a prewar incumbent.

Siam's history had been one of independence that was constantly precarious because of its position as a buffer between British and French colonial properties. It seemed destined to continue on this course, although the virtual independence of India in 1947 inserted a puzzling factor into the country's future.

7. The British Dominions in the Pacific

The dominions of the British Empire in the Pacific basin passed through parallel experiences. None of them except Australia had been directly endangered by combat during the war, and most of their economies were strained but undamaged. They were in process of passing through their inevitable shift of view—from full wartime co-operation back to their normal peacetime feeling of independence and of resentment toward British control.

*Australia.* Australia, the only large part of the empire that had been under Japanese attack, participated in United Nations councils as a force for the strengthening of the rights of smaller nations. Postwar inflation, industrial unrest, and social conflict occurred, but not on a dangerous scale. The Labor government elected in 1943 was re-elected in 1946 for a second three-year term—the first time in the country's history that Labor had ever been re-elected.

*New Zealand.* New Zealand backed Australia in the latter's support of small nations in the United Nations, and led the fight against the veto power, which was considered the greatest barrier to small-power influence. Although the Labor government, which had been in power since 1935, was re-elected in 1946—maintaining New Zealand's tradition of being the most liberal of Britain's dominions—the vote was close, and there was some agrarian dissatisfaction with the government's policies.

*Canada.* Canada had been affected by the war much as had the United States, with a tremendous stimulus to its industrial and agricultural production, and with a severe financial strain. Inflation however was not in general as great as in the United States; and the government of MacKenzie King continued in power.

The British Pacific dominions were not greatly injured by the war. Island possessions had in many cases been stimulated economically by
troop movements; and British stations along the Asiatic coast had been somewhat damaged. But the British Empire in the Pacific was in the main what it had been before the war — a far-flung, powerful chain of ports, outposts, garrisons, and dominions controlling a large section of Pacific trade and strategy.

8. The Philippines

The only other area of the Pacific basin where a truly significant and basic change took place was the Philippine Islands. On July 4, 1946, as previously described, the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act were carried out and the Philippines were given their independence.

With independence the Filipinos suddenly became aware of the benefits they had enjoyed under American protection, and provisions were made for the continuation in many ways of American aid. It is fairly clear that no Philippine government will ever resist the strengthening of American military power in that area, for American control of the sea is the Filipinos' best guarantee of future freedom. The happy conclusion of the United States experiment in beneficent imperialism was a friendly liaison between the new nation and the great power. There were numerous problems, of course. One concerned the Bell Bill, which laid down principles for economic relations between the new Philippine Republic and the United States. Liberals in both countries protested that it merely guaranteed a continuation of Philippine subservience to the American economic system, but Commissioner McNutt and President Roxas both favored it. Another problem concerned the rise to power of collaborationists, prominent among the accused being President Roxas himself. Evaluation of these problems was difficult, and caused strong factionalism to arise. But the overall situation was a marked exception in the general history of colonialism, and the United States deserved much credit for her role.

9. Communism in the Pacific

The Chinese civil war brought to the attention of the world a problem that had many facets in the Pacific area — the rise of Communism. True, China was the only place where Marxism threatened the overturn of the existing government, but it had appeared all through the crowded lands of the Far East.

In Indonesia, Communism had been active since the 1920's, when
its leaders had set up a center of activity in Madioen, Java. In 1946 membership in the Communist Party was variously estimated from 20,000 to 200,000, and in 1948 the Reds felt strong enough to attempt a coup. Leader of the uprising was Moeso, one of the three natives who had first helped to start Marxism in Indonesia. He had been in exile, part of the time in Moscow, and returned in disguise to organize a National Front, composed of Communist and other left-wing groups. The National Front seized the town of Madioen, and the Dutch called off hostilities with the Nationalist government long enough to offer aid in crushing the Reds. The offer was refused, and the Nationalist authorities proceeded to drive the rebels out. They retreated to the mountains, where they maintained two strongholds and preached resistance to the Dutch and an end of co-operation with America.

In Indo-China, the Viet-Nam movement was headed by Ho Chi Minh, a known Communist; and one of the strongest political factions, the Viet Minh, was supposedly shot through with Red activity, although the Viet-Nam movement as a whole was apparently not Communist-dominated.

Malaya also saw an upsurge of Red activity following the war when leftist resistance forces took up arms from stockpiles they had secreted in the jungles and instigated raids on villages and violence in a flare-up of labor disputes.

Korea was openly split between Communist and anti-Communist forces. In the north the Soviet-sponsored Korean People's Interim Committee dominated the political scene and clearly exerted itself to indoctrinate a nucleus of Communist strength in case the peninsula should ever be left again to its own devices.

Communism, in fact, was growing and growing rapidly in the Pacific region. Particularly in the thickly-peopled lands of China and the Indies, where western democracy had appeared only in the guise of imperial domination and where no real democratic tradition existed, did the arguments of the Stalinists reap their richest harvest. Red promises, though ill-founded on fact, nevertheless appealed strongly to peasants who disliked tenantry and wished more to say about their own affairs. Moreover, in the rising nationalism of the Orient Communist agitators discovered a useful medium; at least in the first phases of their work they appealed to the hostility to western colonialism which was an integral part of the nationalist movements. Later, of course, the falsity of Red claims to "democracy" would become as evident as the false "independence" which they preached, but the poorly-educated and dis-
contented Pacific peoples proved to be excellent grist for the Red propaganda mill. The "selling" techniques of democracy had far to go to catch up with well-developed Communist tactics.

**Conclusion.** The chief trend in the Pacific during the first two postwar years was the growth of nationalistic sentiment. China's struggle for nationhood continued unabated, with a renewal of the civil conflict that had been postponed during hostilities with Japan. Japan's government was under the control of military occupation forces. Korea's yearnings for nationhood were choked off by Russo-American difficulties and policies of the divided occupation. In both French Indo-China and Indonesia, strong nationalist movements occurred which resulted in open war with the European colonizing powers, and in the British dominions there was a return to the normal peacetime urge toward their independence of Downing Street and London, intensified somewhat by the savage struggle for nationhood being waged by many of their Oriental neighbors.

Looming over all as a major factor in Pacific politics was the growing hostility between the United States and Soviet Russia, which was evidenced in China, in the occupation of Japan, in reparations agreements, in Manchuria, and especially in Korea, a hostility that seemed to illustrate clearly the difficulty of co-operation between the two colossi of the postwar world. The Soviet régime had taken up Asiatic imperialism where the tsars left off, probing for the control of Manchuria, Korea, Mongolia, and Sinkiang, and while officially recognizing Chiang's government in China giving aid and comfort to the Chinese Communists in their struggle against the Kuomintang. More and more it seemed clear that unless China were saved from Communist control most of eastern Asia was destined to follow in the path of extremism, and the Chinese arena became the most significant trouble spot in the Pacific Area.

The Pacific was growing in importance in the world's affairs. As the crowded millions of the Far East achieved nationhood the international balance of power would have to be drastically readjusted; and there was the clear possibility that the East might eventually outweigh the West in the councils of mankind.
Problems of the Pacific:

(1) Extraterritoriality

Introduction. With Japan’s surrender in August 1945 came the end of her effort to rule the Pacific Area. The West gave a sigh of relief, and many of its citizens turned to domestic affairs feeling that the Far East no longer need concern them. Unfortunately there was little basis for such optimism, for V-J Day did not end the conflict of differing civilizations that began five centuries ago when Europe first found its way into the Pacific Area. Out of this conflict arose a multitude of problems, many of them still unsolved; and they must be solved, for in their solution lies mankind’s opportunity for the first time in history to build not a Pacific Area but a world civilization. One of the cornerstones of such a world civilization must be the establishing of the confidence of all nations in each other’s judicial structure. In the Pacific the establishment of this confidence has been slow and difficult; for until the nineteenth century all the European invaders hesitated to leave the legal rights of their citizens in the hands of Oriental jurists. Accordingly they demanded and secured the right of extraterritoriality. This grant of course was a derogation of national sovereignty; and as the East became really aware of what it had done it began to try to re-enfranchise itself. Gradually the cherished goal was achieved, and World War II saw juridical independence acquired by all the nations of the Pacific Area.

At first thought then the reader may ask, “Why should attention still be given to this problem of extraterritoriality in the Pacific Area?” The answer is fairly obvious. The struggle Japan and China had to make to win their re-enfranchisement left scars which have not yet healed; and no one can understand the relations between those two
countries and Europe and the United States without a thorough knowledge of that long, hard struggle for the abolition of extraterritoriality. Furthermore it is barely possible that the civil war still going on in China at the end of 1948 may lead to a twentieth century scramble for concessions, and in that case extraterritoriality might come back in eastern Asia. For these reasons it is felt that a discussion of Pacific problems may well begin with this one of extraterritoriality.

1. Definition, Origin, Extent

*Definition.* Extraterritoriality (from now on the shorter colloquial term "extrality" will be used) means the exemption of foreigners residing in a country from the jurisdiction of its local courts. Such exemption is an impairment of a nation's sovereignty, and the country that receives the right to exercise jurisdiction over its nationals residing in the country granting extrality should look upon that grant as a privilege. Since it is a power specially delegated (usually by treaty), and since its delegation is due to the fact that the grantor nation apparently is not capable of administering justice or affording protection according to the standards of the grantee, extrality is generally considered to be only temporary.

*Origin.* The origin of extrality is not certainly known. Under the Caesars foreigners held an extralegal status which is believed by some to indicate the presence of the germs of extrality in the Roman Empire. In medieval days in Europe racial consanguinity was treated as the sole basis of amenability to law, so that for instance in the twelfth century in Paris in a group of five students it was not uncommon to find five different types of law in force. In the Levant however religious differences were of chief importance; and it is thought that these were prime factors in causing the Testament of Mohammed, which as early as A.D. 625 afforded protection to Christians through their own judges. As time went on the Mohammedan states of the Levant became more and more anxious for infidel trade, and it is quite probable that the Mussulman's desire to develop commerce and navigation led Mohammed II after the fall of Constantinople to grant the capitulations which are suggested as the origin of the extrality that later developed in the Far East. It is to be noted however that the Levantine capitulations terminated with the death of the ruler, and their continued renewal through the next four centuries was probably as much for Moslem convenience as for that of the foreigner.
Problems of the Pacific: (1) Extraterritoriality

Extent. In the Pacific Area however none of the causes that led to extrality in the Mediterranean were present; and here the basic cause seems to have been the Westerners' distrust of the legal systems of the nineteenth century in Hawaii, Siam, Borneo, Tonga, Samoa, China, Japan, and Korea. In the rest of the Pacific Area the European nations took complete control and established their own judicial systems. Therefore this discussion of extrality concerns only these eight portions of the Pacific Area.

2. Hawaii

The beginning of extrality. Hawaii's brief experience with extrality was definitely due to French aggression. As shown in a previous chapter the first treaty between the island government and a foreign country was that signed December 23, 1826, by Captain Thomas ap Catesby Jones. Although it was not ratified by the United States Senate it guided Hawaiian-American relations until the signing of the permanent treaty of 1849; and it is further significant because in it there was no mention of extrality. In half a decade then the nations under the guidance of the New England missionaries had advanced to the point where Captain Jones saw no need for exempting American traders and sailors from the exercise of local justice. Not so with the French! The Treaty of 1839 forced upon the Hawaiians by the guns of the Artemise gave French defendants in a criminal suit the right to trial before a jury of foreigners in a court presided over by the French consul. Five years later this form of extrality was secured by the English.

The end of extrality. The United States however asked no such favors. In fact when in 1849 the American nation finally made a definite treaty with Hawaii all discussion of extrality was omitted and the complete sovereignty of the island kingdom was recognized. As a result the Anglo-Hawaiian Treaty of 1851 and the Franco-Hawaiian Treaty of 1858 both gave up the extrality rights which England and France had previously enjoyed. Thus were the Hawaiians rewarded for their prompt acceptance of Western civilization and their establishment of a judicial system which could dispense modern justice.

3. Extrality in Siam, Borneo, Tonga, and Samoa

Siam. Although strict chronology would require that extrality in China be considered next, it is perhaps desirable to discuss first the en-
A Queen of Siam. Relations between Siam and the two great Anglo-Saxon powers have always been friendly, and by dint of this friendship the small nation has been able to maintain its independence. The country’s upper-class women are famous for the delicacy of their features and the modesty of their behavior.

joyment of consular jurisdiction by foreign powers in four less important areas. Of these areas Siam is the most significant. This country exercised complete jurisdiction over foreigners until 1664, when a treaty with the Dutch East India Company provided that cases of grave crimes committed by Dutch merchants were to be disposed of by the company’s chief according to Dutch law. Similar rights are said to have been secured by the French in 1685 and 1687; later practice however was directly contrary to the spirit of these treaties. In the Anglo-Siamese Agreement of 1826 it was expressly provided that defendants on either side should be examined “according to the established laws of the place”; and the United States-Siamese Treaty of 1833 specified that “Merchants of the United States trading in the Kingdom of Siam shall respect and follow
the laws and customs of the country in all respects." After the establishment of extrality rights in China, since comparatively little was known as yet concerning Siamese laws and customs, British negotiators in 1855 concluded that their citizens should be placed under the sole jurisdiction and control of their consular officials. As a result of this infringement of her authority Siam undertook a series of judicial reforms, with such success that in 1883 Great Britain agreed to the establishment in the three more modern provinces of an "international court" composed of Siamese judges who would administer Siamese law in cases involving British subjects, but with the British consul having the right to intervene. This British procedure naturally was followed by the other Western nations. A quarter century later, in conformity with the actions of several other European countries, Great Britain abolished her courts throughout Siam and placed all her subjects in that country under the jurisdiction of Siamese courts, retaining however the right to exercise diplomatic revision in case of apparent injustice. By the Treaty of Versailles Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians lost all rights of extrality in Siam while the United States, Japan, and ten European states still enjoyed limited extrality. In December 1920 the United States took the lead in relinquishing her remaining privileges. Three years later other treaty powers followed suit, until finally in February 1929 Siam took her place alongside Japan as one of the two Far Eastern states which had succeeded in gaining freedom from the humiliating limitations of "unequal treaties."

**Borneo.** The other three areas need no long discussion. The non-Dutch portions of Borneo granted extrality rights to the United States in 1850 and to Great Britain in 1856; but these grants lost all meaning when as described previously in the latter part of the century Sarawak, Brunei, Labuan, and British North Borneo all came under the Union Jack.

**Tonga.** The first grant of extrality by the chiefs of the Tonga Islands seems to have been made in 1879 to Great Britain. Similar privileges were given to Germany in 1876 and to the United States in 1886. In 1899 Germany renounced all her rights in favor of Great Britain. In 1900 the British, in establishing a protectorate over the islands, announced that "Her Majesty shall have and exercise jurisdiction... in the case of the subjects or citizens of all foreign powers in Tonga," but it was not until 1919 that Great Britain in behalf of the queen of Tonga through denunciation of the Treaty of 1886 formally deprived the United States of her jurisdictional rights.
Samoa. Extrality rights were secured from Samoan chiefs by the United States in 1878 and by Great Britain and Germany in 1879. In the Berlin Treaty of 1889 these three nations recognized Samoa as an independent power, and a supreme court was established whose chief justice was to be nominated by the three governments in common accord and appointed by the Samoan government. With a few exceptions the court had jurisdiction over all the residents of Samoa. This régime lasted ten years until 1899, when the Samoan Islands were divided between Germany and the United States, and each renounced its extrality rights in the part falling under the sovereignty of the other. Since the first World War the German islands have been a British crown colony. American Samoa is under the Office of Island Governments in the Navy Department and is governed by naval officers.

4. The Establishment of Extrality in China

Ancient origins. The origin of extrality in China is clouded in uncertainty. Some writers attempt to find its germ in special privileges granted in the ninth century, perhaps even earlier, at Canfu (often erroneously confused with Canton) to Arab traders, who seem to have had the right to erect a mosque and to live under their own laws. Other authorities believe that the Chinese in conformity with their own communal practices merely made one of the foreigners responsible for the rest and still insisted that Chinese authority be respected and Chinese laws be enforced. Whatever truth there may be in the Canfu tradition, it had fallen into disuse before the formal introduction of extrality into China.

Russo-Chinese treaties. A second possible origin of Chinese extrality is found by some authorities in the previously mentioned Russo-Chinese treaties of Nerchinsk (1689) and Kiakhta (1727 and 1768). In the famous Article 4 of the first agreement is the provision, "If hereafter any of the subjects of either nation pass the frontier or commit crimes of violence against property or life, they are at once to be arrested and sent to the frontier of their own country and handed over to the chief local authority for punishment." Chinese writers however insist that these treaties constituted no recognition of extrality and that the whole arrangement, being reciprocal, was merely a temporary expedient to facilitate the administration of the frontier by the two governments, the equality of whose rulers and powers was distinctly recognized in the treaties. Additional evidence of the truth of this view is the fact that
the Chinese penal code in force before the introduction of extrality definitely provided that "In general, all foreigners who come to submit themselves to the government of the Empire, shall, when guilty of offenses, be tried and sentenced according to the established laws." Furthermore, as late as the second decade of the nineteenth century the United States on her part unconditionally submitted to China's assertion of territorial jurisdiction. This attitude was most clearly shown in the Terranova case of 1821 when American merchants frankly admitted, "We are bound to submit to your laws while we are in your waters, be they ever so unjust. We will not resist them."

**Causes of Chinese extrality.** But this attitude of nonresistance came to an end in the misnamed Opium War, one of the results of which was the establishment of extrality in China. The reasons for the British demand for its formal recognition are two. In the first place, although as stated above the Chinese authorities claimed complete jurisdiction over all foreigners, as an actual fact during the four decades previous to the war foreign merchants and missionaries in China were only nominally under Chinese law; indeed for some years the Portuguese at Macao to all intents and purposes had maintained exclusive jurisdiction over their nationals. This situation was partly due to Chinese officials being so contemptuous of aliens that they felt it beneath their dignity to concern themselves with "outside barbarians." Furthermore the Peking government at that time had no clear notion that the sovereign rights of a state included the right of jurisdiction over foreigners within its dominion, and it deliberately refused to grant them judicial redress. The second reason for the British demand was the general opinion among the Canton traders that the Chinese judicial handling of homicide committed by foreigners was not only unjust but intolerable. The summary proceedings, the corporal punishment, and the filthy prisons which were characteristic of Chinese judicial administration could not fail to be repugnant to Europeans, and especially when applied to themselves always led to complaints from their home governments.

**The establishment of extrality.** Accordingly it is not surprising that the English, who for a generation had acted on the principle that none of their nationals should be surrendered to Chinese criminal jurisdiction, should in the treaties that followed the capture of Nanking in 1842 take advantage of their opportunity. Although nothing was said about extrality in the Treaty of Nanking it was understood that the system was to be introduced. In 1843 Article XIII of the General Resolutions issued in accordance with the treaty of the previous year provided that
British criminals would be punished according to British laws enforced by their consul and Chinese offenders against the British would be tried and punished according to their own laws. In following the Treaty of Wanghia in 1844 the American minister, Caleb Cushing, secured a somewhat clearer definition of criminal extrality, and secured also the extension of the right to civil cases. A final definite statement was made by the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1858, which provided that

Art. 15. . . . all questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person arising between British subjects shall be subject to the jurisdiction of British authorities.

Art. 16. Chinese subjects guilty of a criminal act shall be arrested and punished according to Chinese law. British subjects committing any crime in China shall be tried and punished by their consul according to the laws of Great Britain. Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides.

As a result of the "most-favored-nation" clauses inserted in all the so-called Nanking treaties, extrality rights were obtained by all the nations subsequently securing trade or other agreements with China. By 1918 nineteen countries enjoyed jurisdiction over their nationals in China; Japan was the only Oriental country in this number.

5. Japan and Extrality

The establishment of extrality. As a result of the experience of the Western nations with China it is not surprising that as soon as Japan was opened up by Commodore Perry they should seek extrality rights in the Land of the Rising Sun. In the additional regulations signed at Shimoda on June 17, 1854, a crude extrality provision asserted that Americans who were found transgressing Japanese laws might be apprehended by the Japanese police and taken on board their (American) ships. The Russo-Japanese Convention of February 1855 advanced foreign intrusion a second step by providing a general extrality provision which however was to be reciprocal. The third and last step came on July 29, 1858, when Townsend Harris in his famous treaty secured for the United States both criminal and civil extrality rights. Within a few months Great Britain, France, Russia, and Holland had all secured similar agreements; and eventually seventeen countries succeeded in putting in force among foreign residents of Japan seventeen different systems of law.

Japanese opposition. A previous chapter has told of the restoration
of the emperor and the subsequent fight by Japan for her enfranchisement from the hardships of the conventional tariff and extrality. The tariff restrictions prevented the raising of tariffs according to local revenue needs and also denied Japan the protection which foreign tariffs gave the national industries of other countries. An even greater hardship was the extrality, for it not only impaired Japanese sovereignty but also showed the low esteem in which foreigners held the Japanese law codes and courts. But it was not only Japanese pride that was damaged. Most foreigners took the position that they were not bound by Japanese law; and in 1879 as a result of British and German refusal to obey local quarantine laws cholera was introduced into Yokohama from a foreign ship. It is true that the abuses of extrality were not as great as in China, for the Japanese controlled the movement of foreigners in the interior with careful passport regulations, and furthermore did not hesitate to arrest foreign malefactors even though they were forced to surrender them later to consular officials.

The Iwakura Mission. Since the Townsend Harris Treaty of 1858 provided for a revision of the treaties at the end of fourteen years, in December of 1871 a mission was dispatched to consult with the treaty powers. Of these only the United States was favorable. The other nations selfishly wanted to continue the old tariff conventions, but not wishing to admit the economic reason for their opposition to treaty revision pleaded the excuse that the new Japanese code of laws, based largely on those of China, did not guarantee justice. Furthermore they insisted that Japan's proposal to open up the whole country to foreign residence in exchange for the abolition of extrality was of no particular benefit, nor were they interested in the offer to withdraw the prohibition of Christianity. As a result the mission returned empty-handed to Japan in September 1873.

Count Inouye. Its efforts however were not all in vain. From it the Japanese learned that the chief objection to their system of justice lay in the criminal laws and procedure, and that if foreign lives were safeguarded questions concerning property would cause little trouble. As a result a distinguished French jurist was employed as adviser, and in July 1880, after seven years of research and study, a penal code and a code of criminal procedure were promulgated to go into effect in January 1882. Naturally the Japanese thought that treaty revision, at least as regards extrality, would follow quickly. But they were doomed to disappointment. For six years Count Inouye, the minister of foreign affairs, made proposal after proposal to the foreign representatives at
The shrine-island Miyajima in the Inland Sea of Japan, between Honshu and Shikoku islands.
Tokyo; again only the United States made any friendly response. Eventually Inouye went so far as to propose a gradual abolition which would leave foreign judges in Japanese courts until 1903. Unfortunately when news of these concessions leaked out Japanese mobs made such a violent ant foreign demonstration that all negotiations ceased.

**Final success.** After Inouye's failure in 1890 Count Okuma took up the struggle. He had succeeded in getting a treaty with Mexico and had treaties with the United States, Germany, and Russia well under way when the public again learned that Japan was being compelled to make some concessions. As he was returning from a cabinet meeting Okuma was seriously injured by a bomb hurled by a former samurai who committed harakiri on the spot. The next year Viscount Aoki resumed negotiations, but internal politics interrupted his work. Finally Foreign Minister Mutsu decided to negotiate alone with England at London, where he could be away from the pressure of the treaty-port communities. The discussions proceeded with such success that on July 16, 1894, the revision of the Anglo-Japanese treaty was effected, and it was agreed that in 1899 consular jurisdiction would be abolished and all Japan should be opened to foreign residence. Once Great Britain's agreement had been secured the rest of the task was easy; and at the end of the century Japan was the first non-Christian land to gain freedom from extrality and thus be admitted to the family of nations. Although some foreigners were fearful of what might happen when they passed under the jurisdiction of Japanese codes and courts their fears were not justified. In fact a decade before the abolition of extrality Japan had a thoroughly modern system of courts well equipped with trained personnel, and before the consular courts were abolished all the new penal, civil, and criminal codes were in operation. It was unfortunate therefore from the standpoint of later relations between Japan and the West that what should have been merely a question of fact — namely, Japan's ability to assume responsibility for the lives and property of foreign residents — became a bargaining contest in which European diplomats tried to protect the profits of their nationals on the no longer valid claim of Japan's judicial incompetence.

6. Korea and Extrality

*The beginning of extrality.* The ability of Japan to modernize herself and thereby escape the hardships of extrality is perhaps best exemplified in her relations with Korea. Throughout the two centuries and a half
which followed Hideyoshi’s Korean adventure intercourse between Japan and Korea had been extremely limited, but upon the establishment of the Meiji régime an attempt was made to break down the isolation of the continental kingdom. The Hermit Kingdom however refused to comply with Japan’s request, and even denounced the Japanese for having become through acceptance of Perry’s demands a renegade among the peoples of the Orient. Relations became more and more strained until finally Japan followed American example and at the point of a gun forced the opening of Korea. On February 26, 1876, a treaty was signed similar to that which opened Japan to outside intercourse; it included an article that gave Japanese subjects the very extrality privileges whose inclusion in her own treaties with the West Japan had come to resent bitterly.

The end of extrality. The United States very shortly (1882) followed Japan; and by the turn of the century Great Britain (1883), Russia (1884), Italy (1884), Germany (1886), Austria-Hungary (1892), China (1899), Belgium (1907), and Denmark (1907) all had similar rights. In 1910 however Japan annexed Korea, and on August 29 the Japanese Foreign Office issued a statement that from that day the right of extrality which foreigners had hitherto enjoyed in Korea had come definitely to an end. All the powers but the United States acquiesced in the Japanese announcement. The American republic maintained that consular jurisdiction should be continued until the Japanese system could replace the old Korean court structure. Japan insisted that the judicial system of Korea was then so similar to that of Japan that the transition could be easily effected and that the system of consular jurisdiction was “both unnecessary and inadvisable.” The United States continued to protest, but Japan was adamant. Eventually, without any agreement having been signed (as far as the authors can discover) the American government gave up its claims, and since about 1915 has not enjoyed extrality rights in Korea.

7. Administration of Extrality in China

The system. After Japan’s absorption of Korea, China was the only Pacific nation suffering the disability of extrality. Before we take up the story of her efforts to get rid of it we should perhaps give a brief account of the administration of extrality in China, in order to see why from a practical standpoint the celestial empire was so anxious to abolish it. The system in short was based on consular courts presumably
located in each consular district. Appeals from these courts went in most cases to a supreme court located in Shanghai. From here appeals were taken, in the case of the United States, to the federal courts in California and thence to the Supreme Court in Washington. Cases originating in Shanghai were taken before a mixed court of foreign judges, but if the defendant were a Chinese the presiding judge was Chinese. In concessions (land leased by China to foreign governments) or settlements (land leased by Chinese owners to foreign merchants) the foreigners developed separate municipal organizations but Chinese sovereignty was not surrendered.

The practice. In practice extrality provided interesting problems. In a case where no foreigners were involved of course Chinese authorities and law prevailed. If two foreigners, both nationals of the same treaty power (i.e., two Americans), got into trouble even though they could be arrested by Chinese police they were tried by their own consul. If on the other hand they happened to be citizens of two different treaty powers (i.e., an American and an Englishman) their trial was conducted according to the provisions of the treaties between their home governments. If the quarrel was between a national of a nontreaty power and a national of a treaty power (i.e., between a Greek and an American) and if the American was the defendant the case was tried by the treaty power (American) consul; otherwise it went to a Chinese court. When nontreaty power nationals were involved Chinese courts had original jurisdiction unless some treaty power saw fit to tender its good offices. In suits between Chinese citizens and treaty power nationals trials took place in the courts of the defendants, but if the plaintiff was a Chinese he had the right to have a representative sit with the foreign authorities. Although as mentioned above Chinese police might arrest foreigners they had no right of search in foreign houses or ships, and extradition had to be obtained through the consular representative.

Disadvantages to China. It will readily be seen from even this bare outline of the system and practice of extrality that abuses were inherent in it; and it is difficult to decide whether in the long run the Chinese or the foreigners suffered more. In addition to the national humiliation of this derogation of sovereignty the Chinese had to contend with the unfamiliar practices of the consular courts, and when they won a case it was often difficult for them to know whether the penalties had been enforced. When the case came before a Chinese court foreign assessors would interfere, often with distressing arrogance. To make bad matters worse, Chinese from Korea and Formosa pretended Japanese citizenship,
and made it almost impossible for the local officials to enforce law and order among their own people. In civil cases foreigners often used their corporation names to bring about a miscarriage of justice: it will be remembered that the ill-famed Arrow was really a Chinese ship. But perhaps the greatest hardship for the Chinese was their inability to cope with the unwarranted practices which can take place under the protection of extrality. A notorious example is the way Japan used her own post offices in northern China to carry on the drug traffic.

Disadvantages to foreigners. But the foreigners too, Chinese opponents of extrality declare, suffered disadvantages. In the first place, as long as extrality existed China could not open up the whole country to foreign residents, who must generally therefore be confined to the treaty ports. The foreign businessman also suffered from the multiplicity of courts and legal systems. Furthermore the consuls were seldom well trained in the intricacies of the law, and even though as most laymen think their ignorance of law might tend to sharpen their sense of justice, the pressure of their other consular duties made it often difficult for them to give proper care and attention to their judicial activities. And since the consul’s jurisdiction was personal, he often had difficulties in controlling the plaintiff and the witnesses. Especially was this so if the case originated in the interior; evidence was always hard to obtain, and it was expensive to bring witnesses from a distance.

8. Attempts of China to Secure Abolition of Extrality

Early negotiations. From all this, then, it is not hard to see why China has wanted to abolish extrality. After the failure of her use of force (i.e., the Boxer Rebellion) she turned to diplomacy. Naturally her first efforts were directed toward Great Britain, from whom by the Mackay Treaty of 1902 she secured the agreement to relinquish extrality "when she [Great Britain] is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangement for their administration, and other conditions warrant her in so doing." In 1903 Japan and the United States made a similar proposal, and in 1908 Sweden followed suit. Unfortunately however China failed to realize that it was her duty to set her judicial system in order just as Japan had done so that she might be enabled to safeguard both her own and foreign citizens; that only thus could she hope to secure relief from a treaty obligation that impaired her sovereignty. Instead she did practically nothing to revise her law codes, establish proper courts, or train honest judges.
Versailles. It is not surprising therefore that when the Chinese delegation at the Paris Conference of 1919 sought the abolition of extrality the powers turned, if not deaf ears, at least hesitant ones. China of course made many promises. She agreed to have in operation by 1924 criminal, civil, and commercial codes together with codes of civil and criminal procedure, and to establish new courts where foreigners might be tried. As evidence of her faith she maintained that progress had been made in the previous decade: legal training was now required of judges, an improvement had been made in the police and prison systems, civil and criminal cases had been separated, publicity was now being given to all trials, and confessions were no longer exacted by force. In fact so impressed were the Chinese with their progress that they demanded immediately complete Chinese jurisdiction over all aliens in mixed cases and right of search in the concessions without preliminary examination of the warrant by foreign officers. But the powers refused to take China's insistence seriously — only Russia in 1924 yielded to her demands.

The Washington Conference. As a result therefore at the Washington Conference in 1921 China once again sought removal of the "limitations on China's jurisdictional, political, and administrative freedom." Her representatives set forth at length the advances she had made in modernizing her judicial system. Finally they did secure an agreement that, three months after the close of the conference or not later than May 3, 1922, a commission should be appointed to inquire into the facts and to assist China in reforms that would warrant relinquishing extrality. At the end of a year the commission was to report to all the powers, each of which was to be free to accept or reject but in no case to use acceptance as a lever to extort special privileges.

Force. The powers however postponed the appointment of a commission and to the delay China consented, for internal strife was rampant and not conducive to the proposed investigation. Many Chinese students though felt that the delay was due to foreign intransigence, and this belief undoubtedly helped to stimulate the unfortunate "Shanghai affair" of May 30, 1925. Before it was over all the worst of extrality had been put in sharp relief. Considerable doubt was expressed as to the justice of the sentences returned by the mixed court against the strikers; and informed Chinese came to the conclusion that if necessary force should be used to abolish the pernicious system.

The Extrality Commission. Spurred on by student agitation the Chinese government finally invited the commission to meet in Peking in
December 1925, and the first session took place on January 12, 1926; on September 16 its report was issued. Part I gave a description of the practice of extrality; Part II outlined the laws, the judicial system, and the prison system of China; Part III described the administration of the Chinese judicial system; and Part IV outlined the steps that would be necessary before the powers would be justified in relinquishing extrality. In these recommendations the commission categorically stated that the first necessity was ample protection for the judiciary. The old judicial system, it said, needed to be wiped out completely and a whole new setup provided together with ample financing. When definite progress became assured, it concluded, progressive abolition might be undertaken. Pending the abolition of extrality the commission felt that (1) the powers should use Chinese laws and regulations wherever possible, (2) in mixed cases no foreign assessors should be used, (3) the registration of Chinese as foreigners should be stopped, (4) all possible judicial assistance should be given the Chinese, and (5) foreigners should pay Chinese taxes. The report was signed by representatives of the United States, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. The Chinese delegates subscribed to the recommendations but not to all the statements concerning the existing conditions.

9. The Enfranchisement of China

The report of the commission was generally accepted by the treaty powers, but unfortunately China was not able to do much toward carrying out the suggested recommendations. Nevertheless on April 27, 1929, the Chinese government made bold to ask for the relinquishment of extrality. After some six months the United States replied, refusing; as did Britain and France. On September 5, 1929, China repeated her request, and on November 1, 1929, the United States again refused. On December 28, 1929, the Chinese government issued an order abolishing extrality as of January 1, 1930. The powers later agreed that this date should be regarded as the date "from which the process of the gradual abolition of extraterritoriality should be regarded as having commenced in principle." On May 4, 1931, China issued another mandate and regulations providing for the assumption of jurisdiction over all foreigners, to go into effect on January 1, 1932. Later in 1931 however Japan started her war with China, and in view of her need of diplomatic support against Japan the Chinese did not push negotiations. In Janu-
ary 1934 however the Nanking government opened discussions with the United States and Great Britain for revision of the extrality provisions of the existing commercial treaties; still nothing happened, although as indicative of their friendship for China the two powers in May 1935 raised their legations to the status of embassies.

For the next six years extrality was out of the picture. Then on May 31, 1941, as a sort of recognition of China’s valiant struggle against Japan, Secretary Hull notified the Chinese foreign minister that as soon as conditions of peace again prevailed his government would move toward the relinquishing of all agreements that provided for extraterritorial jurisdiction and related practices. Conditions of peace did not come immediately; therefore to stimulate China’s war effort the United States and British governments announced in 1942 that they were ready to negotiate treaties providing for the immediate abrogation of their extrality rights. Discussions opened in October; in December 1942 the treaties were reported ready for signature; and on May 20, 1943, they went into effect.

Conclusion. When the treaties of 1943 went into effect China’s enfranchisement appeared to be complete. As far as unsettled conditions have permitted, China has reorganized her judicial processes; and it now seems that the foreign governments that followed the lead of the United States and Great Britain may not have cause to regret their abolition of extrality.
Problems of the Pacific:

(II) Opium

Introduction. A second problem facing those interested in the welfare of the Pacific Area is the discovery of an efficient way to combat the drug menace. That such a way must be found is clear from several standpoints. First, poppy culture monopolizes vast areas of land in the more poverty-stricken areas of the world where increased food culture is desperately needed. Second, the drug business has always had an evil effect on both public and private morality, because it harms the producer, the processor, the purveyor, and the purchaser. For the historian the drug traffic has a special significance, because it was the Opium War that began the long series of attacks on the integrity of China described in previous chapters. More recently the importance of this traffic has been accentuated by the way Japan used opium to weaken resistance to her aggression in northern China. Today it is noteworthy because throughout the world at large the coagulated juice of the poppy is endangering mankind's health and morals; its abuse, no longer confined to the "heathen Chinee," has become an international menace. Finally, the inability of the Western nations to unite to do away with one of the world's greatest international evils is a striking illustration of Western ineptitude.

1. The Manufacture of Opium

Opium poppies are commercially raised on a large scale in Turkey, Iran, India, and China. The seeds are usually planted in ground which for six weeks before has been worked over some half dozen times. After a period of seventy-five to eighty days the flowers appear. On the third
day after the expansion of the capsule the petals are carefully removed and baked in clay ovens. These so-called "leaves" give the opium its aroma.

In the afternoon following the petal-stripping the capsules are scratched with a minute instrument which has four blades one thirtieth of an inch apart and with which incisions are made from below upward. The next morning the exuding juice is scraped off with a small metal scoop and carried to the farmer's house, where it is allowed to settle in an earthen pan. The capsules normally are lanced three or four times at intervals of from two to three days.

After a few days of settling the useless liquid can be poured off, and the residue, after being tested for purity and quality, is darkened by exposure to the air. During this process the "leaves" are kneaded in by men walking up to their knees in the putty-like paste. After a thorough mixing the paste is deposited in small earthen cups, then dried, and finally packed for shipment in chests weighing 133½ pounds or 149½ pounds.

2. China and Opium

China's importance. Such briefly is the process of manufacturing the drug which has played such an important part in the history of modern China. In fact opium has made the celestial empire a classic example of what happens to a country when it is thoroughly drugged. To make matters worse, that unhappy state has been only partly of China's own choosing. Unable to protect herself from the onslaught of Western "civilization," she yielded perforce to outside influences determined to exploit and debauch her for the sake of profit. It is perhaps only justice, then, that inasmuch as two centuries ago a "higher" civilization through the British East India Company brought ruin and degradation through the opium trade, in recent years this same "higher" civilization should have had to fight for its very existence in the area it helped to debauch.

The opium habit begins. The poppy as a plant has been known to China for at least twelve centuries; opium has been used as a medicine for probably nine centuries. About 1650 the practice of smoking it mixed with tobacco was brought by the Dutch from Java to Formosa and thence to Amoy and the mainland. For some fifty years its use was far from general. About 1700 however the Portuguese at Goa began to stimulate the trade, and by 1725 some 200 chests a year were being consumed.
Early efforts at prohibition. Hardly had the habit got well under way when the central government took action against it. In 1729 Emperor Yung-cheng issued an edict against its use; but in vain. By 1790 several thousand chests were being imported annually. Other edicts followed, notably in 1799 and 1800, but still the trade increased. The 1820 import was 5000 cases, and each year the profits grew. In this disgraceful commerce the British merchants led, and this despite the fact that the great Warren Hastings, once governor-general of the East India Company, is reported to have said, "Opium is not a necessary of life but a pernicious article of luxury." But with typical British smugness he went on to say, it "ought not to be permitted except for the purposes of foreign commerce only and which the wisdom of the government should carefully restrain from internal consumption." When however Commissioner Lin attempted to "restrain" it from internal consumption at Canton and put on his famous "tea party" of 1839, the sight of 20,000 chests of opium being mixed with lime and salt water and the resultant mixture being drawn off into an adjacent creek was too much for English officiandom.

The Opium War. As described in a previous chapter, some writers say that the resulting Opium War is a misnomer, that it would have happened even if there had been no opium and that it should be called simply a "trade war." And yet many Britishers themselves have expressed regret over the struggle's connection with opium, so much so that it may be well to quote an authority like Lord Morley—even though his statement is hardly accurate:

The Chinese question was of the simplest. British subjects insisted on smuggling opium into China in the teeth of Chinese law. The British agent on the spot began war against China for protecting herself against these malpractices. There was no pretense that China was in the wrong, for in fact the British Government had sent out orders that the opium monopoly smugglers should not be shielded; but the orders arrived too late, and war having begun, Great Britain felt compelled to see it through, with the result that China was compelled to open up four ports, to cede Hong Kong and pay an indemnity of £6,000,000.

Seventy years of degradation. Whether or not the struggle was really an opium war, the fact remains that in the next thirty years the trade reached enormous proportions. By 1858 the annual import was over 70,000 chests. After the "Arrow War" the Chinese government gave up the struggle; the sale of opium was legalized and poppy raising on a large scale took place in China itself. In fact the only adver...
during the rest of the century was an agitation which in the 1880's did lead to the successful imposition of a revenue duty (not prohibitive) on opium importation.

Twentieth century opposition. During the seventy years of China's degradation many Chinese leaders of course opposed the opium trade; and strong action finally took place. Shortly after the Boxer uprising and the consequent sending of Chinese youth to study in the schools and universities of the United States, the St. Louis Exposition featured a series of opium dens purportedly typical of those prevalent in China. So realistic were they that the Western world came to believe that the outstanding characteristic of Chinese life was enjoyment of "pipe dreams" by smokers reclining on luxurious silken divans. As a result of their perturbation that the West might consider China and opium to be synonymous, these students brought effective pressure on their home government. On September 20, 1906, the Chinese government issued an edict demanding the eradication of the traffic within ten years. This time Great Britain co-operated, and agreed to lower Indian exports for three years at the rate of 5000 chests a year, with the understanding that China should bring about a corresponding decrease in her local poppy culture. In 1911 a new agreement provided that all Indian exports to China should cease in 1917, China at the same time guaranteeing to end her own opium manufacture. The falling Manchu government carried out its promises, so that in 1913 legal Indian exports ceased. For a few short years therefore the opium traffic in China was limited to black markets. Here unfortunately it greatly increased; Shanghai's imports in 1907 had been 87 chests, but in 1914 they were 663.

Renewed degradation. In the light of later events this increase was most significant. As has been explained, the establishing of the republic proved no panacea for China's difficulties, many of which came from lack of funds. Early in 1917 the Shanghai Opium Combine convinced Vice President Feng Kuo-chang that the purchase and resale of some 3000 chests of opium at a price of $20,000,000 would give his government a substantial profit. As a result, instead of April 1, 1917, being a day of rejoicing as it should have been under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1910 providing for the end of Indian export and of local manufacture that day, it marked a return to the old conditions. The revolutionary generals set about raising poppies everywhere, and soon the local supply became so great that Chinese producers were actually smuggling the drug into Burma. By 1924 in some areas more than half the agricultural land was given over to poppy raising, and the annual pro-
duction was not far short of 200,000 chests. Up to World War II there was little if any change for the better. In 1932 the Kuomintang made an ineffectual gesture against the opium traffic, but the combination of Japanese smugglers in Manchukuo with other foreign and local participants in the treaty ports' opium trade prevented any improvement. China has taken part in the international antinarcotic conferences (of which more later), but the general opinion was that her representatives could give nothing but lip service.

3. JAPAN AND OPIUM

Prohibition at home. In view of Japan's willingness to help China degrade herself, it is perhaps surprising to see how successful the land of the Rising Sun was in solving her own problems. Japan's success in preventing the spread of the drug habit among her own people is due to the fact that she never let it get started. Perry's opening of Japan did not involve permission to import opium, and the restoration of 1868 continued the prohibition of the trade. Legislation of 1878 and 1897 made the manufacture and sale of opium as a drug a government monopoly, with poppy cultivation limited to a certain definite area and the export of raw opium prohibited. The penal code of 1880 and its amendments of 1907 prohibited the importation, use, sale, and distribution of opium by private individuals and at the same time barred all opium "joints" or "divans."

Regulation in the possessions. The control of the drug traffic in the homeland is remarkable because Japan has been one of the heaviest purchasers in the Calcutta market, and huge amounts of opium and morphine have been handled under an import certificate system. Practically none however got into the hands of the Japanese and very little into Korea. In 1912, after Korea had lost its last semblance of independence, the new penal code provided for the suppression there of opium also. Since this proved impossible because of her nearness to China, in 1919 the sale of opium became a government monopoly, and then there was a great decrease in Korea's opium traffic. To a less extent the same situation prevailed in the Kwantung leased territory. Smuggling by the Chinese ruined all attempts at prohibition, so in 1924 an opium law put control in the hands of the Social Welfare Society, which carried on the policy previously established in Formosa. When Japan acquired Formosa in 1895 the population was so drugged that regulation seemed the only way out. Government officials took complete charge of opium
sales, putting the price so low that smuggling did not pay. All addicts were registered, and after 215,476 users had signed no new licenses were issued. By 1924 the number had dropped to 38,000, and in recent years the drug problem in Formosa has been quite insignificant.

_Protect abroad._ With prohibition at home and effective regulation in her possessions, why then was Japan such an important purchaser of opium? Simply because she had followed the example set by the Western countries and did not hesitate to make a profit wherever possible outside her own boundaries, notably in China. Statistics are not available, but the testimony of many travelers is to the effect that the modern debauchery of China has been largely due to the opium trade carried on by the Nipponese Empire. It remains to be seen whether the Western nations will allow this malevolent trade of Japan's to be resumed.

4. **European Opium Interests in the Pacific**

_Great Britain._ Of all the European countries having possessions in the Pacific Area, Great Britain, because of the large number of Chinese living under her flag, should have been most concerned over the opium traffic. But instead England has opposed all sumptuary legislation motivated by moral principles; her restrictions have been aimed more at acquiring revenue than at curtailing traffic. This policy has been specially consistent in British Malaya. Here the wholesaling of opium has been a government monopoly. All retailers are licensed, and are supposed to restrict both purchasers and quantities. These limitations however have not been too burdensome; and before World War II the government revenues from opium sales were regularly more than $300,000,000 a year. Hong Kong, though smaller in population than British Malaya, has been perhaps fully as important in the opium business, because it has been a free port and a transshipping point for Iranian, Turkish, and Indian exports. Up to 1914 the opium traffic in Hong Kong was farmed out by the British authorities to Chinese merchants; but when these were unable to cope with the rampant smuggling then in vogue the government monopolized the traffic. Shortly after the first World War measures were taken to reduce the sales; prices were raised and the amount available except for registered addicts was strictly limited. After 1937, with the huge influx of Chinese refugees, control became more difficult; and from then until Japan captured Hong Kong more than a fourth of the Hong Kong revenues came from opium taxes. In North Borneo, where a quarter of the population is Chinese, the North
Borneo Company handled the wholesale business; the retail business was in the hands of licensed vendors. In Sarawak and Brunei opium sales have furnished most of the revenue despite the fact that the Chinese population is not large. In the rest of the British Pacific possessions, where Orientals are few, the opium traffic has been negligible.

Portugal. Portugal's opium trade has been centered in Macao, where the business is farmed out to Chinese merchants. Much of the traffic is undoubtedly illegal, for it is estimated that imports are customarily many times greater than the needs of the colony's own population. Macao thus has served chiefly as a transshipping point; in 1922 9500 chests were said to have passed through the port on their way from Persia to Chile. From India to Macao the average known imports are about 500 chests a year. Before Japan's last war on China Chiang Kai-shek's efforts to clean up Canton led to a large increase in Macao's opium traffic, but after Japan gained control of Canton it was no longer necessary for Chinese addicts to go down the river to get their opium.

France. The French attitude toward the opium traffic as might be expected was extremely realistic. Up to World War II France prohibited it at home and in the island possessions, but in Indo-China and Kwang-chow-wan she merely tried to prevent it from becoming too deleterious. The price of the drug was kept as high as smuggling would permit, opium dens which became notorious were closed, and a general campaign of education about the harmful effects of the drug habit was conducted. In the period between the first and second World Wars there is said to have been a decrease in consumption of perhaps 50 per cent.

Holland. The presence of large numbers of Chinese in the Dutch East Indies gave Holland the same problem the other European nations faced. Up to 1913 the Dutch farmed out the traffic to the highest bidders; afterward the sale of opium was made a government monopoly; all sales were officially supervised, and even the smoking had to be done in government "divans." As a result it was asserted that by World War II the use of opium had been cut in half.

5. The United States and the Opium Problem

The Philippines. The last country of the Western World to become interested in the opium problem was the United States. Shortly after the Stars and Stripes had been raised in the Philippines it was discovered that some attention must be given to the islands' drug traffic. In 1903 the Philippine Commission recommended a government monopoly and
restricted sales. But since this seemed to many Americans to be a partnership with the devil, in 1903 an act was passed providing for gradual decrease in imports and absolute prohibition after 1908.

The United States. In the meantime the people of the United States had awakened to the fact that the use of opium in this country was not confined solely to the Chinese. In 1907 for example it was estimated that thirty-five tons (about 500 chests) were imported. Accordingly in 1909 the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act was passed prohibiting the importation of narcotics except for medical purposes. But like most preliminary steps this legislation was ineffective, for at the end of the first World War the United States was importing somewhere near 5,000 chests (233 tons) annually. Much of this was supposedly transshipped in bond, but apparently a great part never left the country. As a result the Jones-Miller Act of 1922 forbade all such traffic. But still the use of narcotics increased, until finally the informed citizens of the United States were convinced that the opium problem is neither local nor even confined to the Pacific Area, but that essentially it is a task confronting all the nations of the world.

6. The International Problem

The difficulty. Unfortunately when the United States sought international co-operation in putting down the drug menace she encountered a widespread economic imperialism that was highly apprehensive of any loss of profits. Practically all national leaders would admit in private at least the need for suppressing the narcotic traffic. But, as the poet says,

... the jingling of the guinea helps the hurt that Honor feels,

And the nations do but murmur, snarling at each other's heels.

Early efforts. This situation was made clear to the American representatives at the Shanghai International Opium Commission of 1909, but they did not despair. In 1912 twelve countries signed the Hague Convention which aimed to suppress illicit traffic in habit-forming drugs by attempting to regulate transportation and sale. Unfortunately the agreement did not put enough restriction on production, nor did it have a definition of "legitimate needs" adequate to prevent France, Germany, Switzerland, and Holland from continuing to pour illicit drugs into nonmanufacturing countries. About the only good result of the convention was the stoppage of the India-China opium trade, a stop-
page that as mentioned above gave China a momentary hope that her debauchery might cease.

The Treaty of Versailles. That hope of course proved illusory; and undoubtedly conditions in China helped to persuade the leaders at the negotiations in Paris in 1919 to put into the Covenant of the League of Nations an article (23) giving that body general supervision over agreements about opium and other narcotics. On December 15, 1920, the Assembly established an advisory committee on the traffic in opium. This committee however merely drafted a resolution (later passed by the Council with minor amendments) urging a restriction of poppy cultivation and opium production to strictly legitimate purposes.

The first Geneva Conference. Since nothing came of this resolution interested persons in the United States continued their antiopium activities. As a result on November 3, 1923, there assembled at Geneva representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, India, Japan, and China, all supposedly anxious to stop the traffic in narcotics. There was immediate and general agreement that the only way to stop the traffic was by limiting production to needs. But that was as far as unanimity went. Great Britain in particular had large ideas as to what constituted "needs"; and she was joined by France and the Netherlands in the fear that if they took the lead in limiting production other nations would take advantage of their sacrifices. Accordingly about the only forward step of this conference was an agreement to bind the opium consuming territory in the Far East to stronger measures for the complete suppression of opium smoking within fifteen years, by which time it was expected that the poppy-growing countries would have sufficiently checked the smuggling of opium.

The second Geneva Conference. One reason for the failure of the first Geneva Conference was the nonrepresentation there of many important countries. When late in 1924 a second conference met with thirty-six nations represented, hopes for real progress in narcotic limitation were high. But again a stalemate resulted. The American delegates obstinately contended that all use other than medical should be considered "abuse," and that to prevent abuse it would be necessary to stop the production of all opium except that intended for medicinal or scientific purposes. England on the other hand insisted that the use of raw opium as carried on in India was not abuse and not illegitimate. Japan at first proposed the general adoption of her Formosa regulatory plan but finally sided with the United States. Yet Japan's attitude did not prevent some of the American representatives from charging that both
Japan and England came to the conference less interested in limiting the manufacture and distribution of drugs produced under their jurisdiction than in excluding competitors from their markets. When the United States delegates were unable to win their point, they (along with the Chinese) withdrew, and only fourteen of the forty-one members on February 9, 1925, put their signatures to the final agreement.

Results. In short only two things of significance came from the second Geneva Conference. First was the declaration that it was the duty of the signatory powers to establish such control over opium production that within five years the illicit trade in opium would no longer seriously obstruct the effective suppression of the use of prepared opium in those territories and possessions where such use might be temporarily authorized. Second, the Council of the League of Nations was formally requested to examine the suggestion that a commission be appointed to visit certain countries to determine the difficulties of limiting opium production in those countries, and to advise them as to the measures that might be taken to limit production to the quantities required by the world for medicinal and scientific purposes.

The Opium Advisory Committee. This second suggestion was carried out; and in due time the Opium Advisory Committee undertook its task of watching trade, compiling statistics, and generally keeping a sharp eye on the narcotics traffic. Its figures and the discussion for which its existence furnished a forum caused uneasiness and heartburning in one country after another—India, Iran, Turkey, and Germany—countries which greatly wanted the good opinion of the world but found fingers of scorn pointed at them because certain of their drug manufacturers were known to be supplying "bootleggers."

The Geneva Conference of 1931. Because of the Advisory Committee's 1929 report disclosing that large quantities of narcotics were still passing into illicit traffic, the League of Nations issued invitations to another narcotics conference to be held at Geneva in 1931. Delegates from forty-six countries (Turkey was the only important nation not represented) participated in this conference, the United States receiving a special invitation since she was recognized as being the greatest sufferer from drug addiction among the more advanced nations of the world. Mindful of previous experiences, the American delegation this time set its aims somewhat lower, and possibly as a result of that change was able to help bring about several practical measures. For the first time a definition of narcotics was drawn up broad enough to include under habit-forming drugs anything manufacturable "now or at any time in
the future." This included narcotic drugs, compounds from which narcotic drugs could be made, and compounds not then known to science which might come under either of those classifications. Codeine was recognized as a dangerous habit-forming drug and the necessity for its limitation and control was accepted. Every signatory nation was required to submit to the League an annual statement of its medical narcotics requirements, and all importations over that amount were to be prohibited. Finally plans were drawn up patterned after regulations in the United States that provided for the limitation and control of all raw material in factories.

Progress under the 1931 Convention. Forty-six delegations signed the Limitations Convention of 1931; and during the next five years the League's Opium Advisory Committee and the Permanent Central Opium Board gathered a vast amount of information on the basis of which was drawn up the 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs. On May 10, 1939, Turkey, the last of the necessary ten ratifiers, signed the convention and it became effective.

Trouble in China. The League immediately had an opportunity to go into action, for the Chinese representative stated that the Japanese authorities in Manchukuo were increasing poppy-growing in North China, were importing opium from Iran and Korea, and were allowing unrestricted sale. In Harbin authorities reported that 1,500 drug-poisoned corpses were picked up in the first seven months of 1937. Japan of course denied all these allegations, but the League was not satisfied and protested to the Japanese government. Later, during the 1940's, Japanese opium policy began to backfire, and to its chagrin the Japanese government discovered that some of its own soldiers were seeking relief in debauchery supposedly reserved for the inhabitants of the celestial empire.

The Acts of 1938. For their own protection both the United States and Great Britain in 1938 passed new food and drugs acts, and in the two years just before World War II there was evidence from many reliable sources that addiction to narcotics in those countries had reached a decidedly low ebb. But the United States could not slacken its antinarcotics campaign, for much of the raw opium seized in the Far East during 1939 was of Iranian and Chinese origin, the type most commonly smuggled into the United States.

Progress during World War II. The outbreak of World War II did not diminish the importance of the League's antinarcotics campaign, for though hostilities did interfere with the normal routes of trade both
legitimate and otherwise, the demand was increased by the psychological and other conditions created by a state of war. Accordingly during 1940 the League committees met as usual and prepared studies on which were to be based a convention to limit the production of raw opium.

In February 1941 the League established in Washington branch offices of the Permanent Central Opium Board (P.C.O.B.) and the Drug Supervisory Board (D.S.B.). As a result, despite the European conflict, the League was able to continue its supervision of international trade in dangerous narcotic drugs and to take care of the estimated needs of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. As the war progressed the international illicit narcotics trade diminished except in territories occupied by the Japanese, and in the United States the shortage of smuggled drugs was reflected in thefts of drugs from pharmacies and other sources of legitimate drugs, while there was considerable increase in the smuggling of marihuana on vessels coming from Latin America. Fortunately in 1942 (for the first time) all sovereign countries in the Western Hemisphere co-operated with the League in submitting estimates of their requirements, and with this backing the United States, through an aide-mémoire (September 21, 1943) addressed especially to Great Britain and the Netherlands, pressed diplomatic discussions which along the line of the Convention of 1936 sought an international agreement prohibiting the cultivation of the poppy except for medical and scientific needs. This note received due consideration and on November 9, 1943, the Netherlands and British governments announced that they had decided to suppress opium smoking and opium monopolies in their Far Eastern colonial empires after the liberation of these areas from Japanese domination.

These decisions gave new impetus to further planning at the international level. In April 1944 the Permanent Central Opium Board met in London and stressed the importance of re-establishing complete control over narcotic drugs in enemy-occupied countries as they were liberated, and in particular recommended that arrangements to this end should be concerted without delay with the military authorities, who in the first instance would be in control. In July 1944 the president of the United States made representations to the various nations in response to which the government of Afghanistan announced (November 1944) that it would ban all planting of opium beginning March 21, 1945. In 1945 the government of the French Republic announced the adoption of the principle of absolute prohibition of the use of prepared opium in all territories in the Far East under French control. In 1946 Portugal issued
a decree prohibiting opium smoking in Macao, which was formerly one of the worst spots in the entire world. In the same year prohibition was effective in Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements, the Malay States, French Indo-China, and Netherlands India; so that Siam and India were the only countries where the smoking and eating of opium was under government license.

In this connection some attention should be given to recent events in Japan. Immediately after V-J Day General MacArthur briefed 2000 army and navy civil affairs officers on the need of bringing the opium traffic under control in Japan and in former Japanese-occupied territories; and issued orders to Japanese authorities to account for the production, distribution, and consumption of all narcotic drugs after 1930. Complete controls with adequate penalties were set up and some 70,000 dealers in all kinds of drugs were licensed. The necessity of stringent regulation was clearly shown when it developed that Japan, while pretending to live up to its treaty obligations, maintained duplicate sets of records — one for its own use and one for the League of Nations. It was also discovered that both in 1938 and 1939 the Japanese government manufactured and sent to Manchukuo enough heroin to supply the entire world's medical needs. It is not surprising that General MacArthur had his troubles; but the reported smashing of a Japanese Hong Kong black market ring in February 1947 indicates that he has been on the job.

What is perhaps the best basis for hope of the effective international control of opium is the attention the United Nations is giving the problem. At the San Francisco Conference it was decided that specialized agencies operating under existing treaties, of which the Permanent Central Opium Board is one, should be brought into relation with the United Nations organization. A few months later the Assembly in London adopted a Chinese proposal establishing a commission on narcotic drugs. This commission convened for its first meeting at Lake Success on November 27, 1946, and after much discussion forty United Nations members signed a narcotics control protocol and agreed to present to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations suggestions for narcotics control. A further indication of progress was the ratification on June 25, 1947, by the United States Senate of a treaty transferring the League of Nations drugs control to the United Nations. Later meetings of the Narcotic Drugs Commission took place in 1947, and though few tangible results have occurred as yet the situation is definitely hopeful.
Conclusion. This brief outline of the opium problem in the Pacific Area may well close by stressing again the very real interest the United States has in its solution. Authorities in this country assert that in normal times a large proportion (perhaps 50 per cent) of the serious crimes committed here are perpetrated by narcotics addicts or by persons connected with the traffic as importers, wholesalers, or retailers. This situation would seem unnecessary, for local production can be wiped out fairly easily if a country wishes so to do; a field of poppies cannot readily be concealed. On the other hand, opium and its manufactured derivatives are easily smuggled; and since the addict will go to any extremity to satisfy his desires, the richest nation of the world will always be the most attractive field of endeavor for narcotics racketeers. And that means of course that the United States must work for the abolition of illicit narcotics production in Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Iran, India, Mexico, and China.

Of these countries China, though it used to be the most important, will probably be the least important. It is true that it alone can produce from ten to twenty times the world’s annual needs (350 to 700 tons); but China has definitely set her face toward the eradication of the drug traffic, and with General MacArthur taking care of Japan from now on the Chinese should be important only as users and traffickers. The biggest sources of supply in 1946 were Turkey, Iran, and India. These countries of course are outside the Pacific Area, but within its perimeter they make possible the illicit use of narcotics, constituting as they do the largest producing areas. Of the three mentioned Turkey gives evidence of being willing to co-operate with world opinion. Iran and India however are still perverse. Their production can be large, and it seems therefore that unless those two countries can be brought into line only increased vigilance will prevent another wave of drug addiction such as that which followed the first World War.
Problems of the Pacific:

(III) Economics

1. The Importance of the Subject — Past and Future

Past. Whatever may be one’s philosophy of history it is impossible for any intelligent person to neglect the importance of the economic factor in the relations between the East and the West. The desire to find new sources of wealth led Westerners to force the opening to trade of China and Japan. In the regions inhabited by the less civilized peoples the possibility of exploiting the natural wealth brought about colonization, especially on the continents which for so long served only to bar European advance to the Indies. Unfortunately, even though in Cathay there was wealth for all, the innate rapacity of mankind again proved unmanageable, and uncontrolled economic greed made an anomaly of the name “Pacific” that Magellan gave to Balboa’s “South Sea.” In short it is believed that in every large conflict which has thus far taken place anywhere in the Pacific Area — the Opium War, the War of the Pacific, the Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion, the Spanish-American War, the Russo-Japanese War, and World Wars I and II — the desire for economic advantage has been the most significant cause.

Future. Nor does the future appear less likely to be studded with Martian conflagration. It is true that for the moment peaceful relations now seem to be in order between the West and the East, because the West has conquered that Oriental nation which emerged so successfully from its industrial revolution that it thought it could establish a “New Order in East Asia.” And yet it is clear that outside of Japan the East is merely beginning to suffer the transition pains inherent in the change
from a domestic to a machine form of industry. If this prognostication be true then, and allowing that the world will pass unscathed through this atomic age, the West is faced with the obligation of seeing that while it imposes its economic structure on the East it does not build a Frankenstein that will turn and rend its maker. Finally, it seems inevitable that in the Pacific Area as in Europe the machine age will stimulate the spirit of nationalism, and that nationalism will make still more tense the relations between the Orient and the Occident. Because then both in the past and in the future great importance has been and will be attached to the economic relations between West and East, and even though the economic factor has been already referred to in this book, it seems advisable to give it special consideration in a separate chapter.

2. The Pacific Area as a Producer of Raw Materials

Original Western desires. The first question to be raised has to do with the future of the Pacific Area as a producer of raw materials. As has been pointed out, the development of machine life in the East has at no time been a major objective of the West. The early European traders to Cathay were looking it is true for silks and jewels, products of a domestic primitive type of machine manufacture, but were much more interested in spices, tea, raw silk, precious metals, uncut precious stones, and whale oil.

Modern demands. Of course these products still have their value, for though jewels and the precious metals have lost their early significance the Orient still has a monopoly of silks and spices. Today however jewels and precious metals are less sought than tin, iron, coal, and petroleum; while the lowly eucalyptus probably has a greater value than all the sandalwood ever cut. Furthermore the nineteenth century has added many new products to the list of these furnished the West by the Pacific Area. Only a few can be mentioned, such as the cobalt and nickel of Canada, the phosphates of the Pacific isles, the guano of Peru and the nitrate of Chile, rubber from Malaysia, sugar, copra, cotton, and hemp from the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, wool and mutton from Australia, and innumerable vegetable oils and gums, such as kauri, from New Zealand.

Possibilities. What the future will provide in the way of new raw products from the Pacific Area is of course impossible to predict. With the increased use of the automobile and the airplane there should be a much greater need for rubber and petroleum, and as the standard of living
rises throughout the world there should be a more universal use of sugar and other luxuries. There is however one fly in the ointment. Thanks to World War II artificial silk and synthetic rubber have proved their merit, and who knows what may be the effect of the recent effort on the part of the United States to develop in America the raw products which until Pearl Harbor she had been purchasing in Asia?

3. The Pacific Area as a Market for Western Goods

Early trade goods. Fully as interesting as the changes that have taken place in the type of products sought in the East by the West are the changes in the goods the West has shipped to the East. As we have pointed out, the biggest obstacle to early trade was the lack of goods Europe could offer Cathay. In 1800 raw cotton, opium, woolens, furs, and ginseng were the raw products most used. In the matter of opium it is only fair to reiterate that the West was not really anxious to debauch China — the difficulty was that opium was the product for which there easily developed a steady demand. At about the same time that opium became important and for half a century or so thereafter the fur of the northwest American coast was also valued both as a product used by East and West and as a medium of exchange for Oriental goods.

Modern trade. Today however the situation is reversed. No longer does the West have difficulty finding the wherewithal to pay for what she wants; the great task is to enable the East to pay her bills. With the overpopulation of the Asiatic countries there is a constant need for foodstuffs from the West, and as the Eastern standard of living rises the demand grows for manufactured goods. Lumber, petroleum products (especially kerosene, candles, and lubricating oils), cheap cloth, and machinery of all sorts, both industrial and transportation, now provide bills of lading that would have been almost incomprehensible to the supercargo of the first Empress of China.

Future trade. What will be the future demands of the non-European portion of the Pacific Area it is impossible to predict. The potential market always has been enormous, and it is not surprising that before World War II American salesmen could envision a huge stream of profits from a successful campaign to put an American cigarette in 400,000,000 Chinese mouths, while the English proposed to add an extra inch to every Chinese shirt tail. Today perhaps the greatest possibilities are for the Western automotive and airplane industries. Eastern Asia is a country of magnificent distances, and now that China is awakening to the
China’s many waterways and excellent harbors make up, to some extent, for the lack of modern methods of transportation. In Shanghai’s harbor even the sampans have their license numbers.

desirability of building highways and establishing air transport routes it is possible to foresee in the not too distant future enormous sales opportunities for inventions of the wizards of Dearborn and Dayton.

4. Problems Arising from the Changing Economic Life of the Orient

Plantations. Important as are the problems arising from the changes during the past four centuries in the trade between East and West, even more significant are the problems that have arisen out of the transplanting of European economic life to the Orient. It is of course impossible to discuss these in detail, but there are three developments that may be considered typical of all. The first is the Western plantation system. Very shortly after the Dutch had secured political control of Java they realized that the production of spices could be enormously increased if
more efficient methods of extraction could be introduced. Since the natives were quite satisfied with the status quo, efficiency could be obtained only when the white man took over the land and directed the natives in their labor. But just what the Spanish had earlier discovered in the West Indies the Hollanders found in the East Indies, namely, an unwillingness on the part of the local inhabitants to engage in any large amount of labor. Out of this condition of affairs grew up, at opposite ends of the New World, the encomienda system and the penal sanction, institutions which no longer live in name but which survive in the peonage to which so many of the natives are still subject.

Along with the problem of labor supply has been ever present that of landownership. It has usually been relatively easy for grasping foreigners to secure questionable but legal land titles from venal or ignorant rulers; and even where the foreign authorities have desired to deal fairly with the natives it has not been easy to harmonize the need of extensive plantations for efficient large-scale production with the necessity of keeping the natives in possession of their little garden plots. On the whole it may be said that the Dutch in Java and the Americans in the Philippines have protected their wards fairly well. In overpopulated Java the biggest difficulty has been to persuade the inhabitants to migrate to the outlying provinces, especially Sumatra, where until the depression of 1929 there was a decided lack of labor. With the British the labor problem, at least in Malaysia, has been quite simple. China has provided efficient, willing, hard-working, thrifty farmers, miners, and shopkeepers for all the British Asiatic possessions. And she would do the same for Australia, New Zealand, and Canada were these three countries willing to lower their bars to Oriental immigrants. Since American occupation of its Pacific possessions has been relatively recent, both Chinese and Japanese were fairly well established there before the United States with its anti-Oriental feeling appeared upon the scene. In the Philippines there was considerable infiltration of both Chinese and Japanese, especially Japanese in the southern island. Indeed so many Nipponese went to Mindanao that just before Pearl Harbor they practically dominated the island. In protecting the native landholders the United States would seem to have done better than Great Britain—in fact the claim is made that one reason rubber production has not got under way in the Philippines is the impossibility of securing large enough landholdings to make the industry profitable. At any rate the problem of efficient and just land distribution is going to be increasingly important in the immediate future.
Manufacturing: Japan. More widespread and hence more important than the problems arising out of plantation development are those caused by the introduction of machinery into the Orient. Because of Japan's ready acceptance of Western ideas during the Meiji period that country became extensively industrialized. As a result she was the first Oriental nation to suffer the transition pains naturally attendant upon the rapid change from domestic to factory economy. The first result of the widespread use of machinery in Japan was an increase in the population. Next came the need for more agricultural development, and when it was not immediately forthcoming, even though her wealth and power were growing the rise in the standard of living of the labor population was slowed down. The realization of this situation led to a rampant economic imperialism, the outcome of which World War II made only too apparent. On the other hand, in all fairness it must be recognized that the machine age brought with it education for the Japanese, and until Nazism showed the greater temporary efficiency of the totalitarian state there was in Japan something of an approach to democracy. And even if it is true as some think that the machine brought to Japan more loss than gain, it is also true that, for once at least, the foreigners need not take the blame for an unhappy situation in the Orient. Although the West did force Japan to open its doors to trade, the Japanese themselves introduced the machine into their island empire, they kept the control of industry in their own hands, and they put the profits in the kimono sleeves of their own industrial tycoons.

Manufacturing: China. Very different is the story of China. It was the foreigner who brought machinery to the celestial empire. Consequently it is not surprising that the hardships resulting from the downfall of the domestic system led to a bitter antiforeign feeling. Furthermore, at the same time that the British were trying to protect factory workers in their "tight little island" their exploitation of Chinese labor was nauseating to the beholder; and when the Japanese entered the field, as they did in Shanghai, all the evidence goes to show that they introduced certain refinements of exploitation not even imagined by the white operator. Where the domestic laborer or the farmer held out, seeking to escape the hardships of factory life, he was faced with falling prices for his handmade articles due to the competition of manufactured products and to the rising prices of the raw materials he had to buy in competition with the purchasing agents of mill owners. As shown in a previous chapter, all these evils finally led to antiforeign agitation, which, directed especially against Japan, helped to lead to the second
Sino-Japanese War. By 1938 most of the industrial life of the coastal and treaty port areas had fallen into the hands of the Japanese. Then as perhaps never before the Chinese showed their tenacity and adaptability. Gathering their meager possessions and trekking far into the interior, there a few technically trained Chinese successfully undertook the re-birth of their industries; this time however by Chinese for Chinese. Since at length the veil which hid much of what went on in the celestial empire during World War II has been finally drawn, it is clear that in the future there will be a new and different economic picture.

Inter-Oriental trade. The third change in the economic life of the Far East that has resulted from the coming of the Westerner is the development of inter-Oriental trade. To a considerable extent this has taken place in the last half century, with Japan naturally the chief participant. When World War II broke out a constant stream of raw products from the rest of the Orient was pouring into Nippon while goods "made in Japan" were penetrating every nook and cranny of eastern Asia, the Indies, and Australia. Australia too no longer thinks only of markets in Europe; and the Philippines, facing ejection in the next decade from their favored position inside the American tariff wall, are realizing that much of their future is bound up in trade with their immediate neighbors.

5. The Economic Factor in the Growth of Pacific Nationalism

Nationalism. Closely corollary to and coincidental with these changes in the economic life of the Far East has been the growth of nationalism. In its development there have been numerous factors, the most obscure of which is perhaps the hatred, envy, and jealousy caused by foreign exploitation. In more recent years this state of mind has become extremely manifest in China, and as we have pointed out she has put her neighbor Japan in the same category with the Western "barbarians." After World War I, especially in the years 1926 to 1929, this hatred of the foreigners increased. In the 1930's under Chiang Kai-shek anti-foreignism changed to anti-Nipponism, which as we have seen alarmed Japan, especially since in her hatred of Japan China tended to align herself with Russia. Russian influence to some extent has been felt also in Java, where the natives have come to wonder whether too much of the wealth of their island had been going to the Netherlands and whether it might not be desirable to keep Java for the Javanese.

Conservation. A second factor is the realization, by a few of the leaders of the more backward nations, that foreign exploitation of some
These "Babe Ruths" of the Pacific area are being taught all forms of American democracy. Using a pineapple or a coconut heart as a ball and a makeshift bat, these youngsters "take their cuts" like incipient big-leaguers.
of their nonreproducible goods threatens the exhaustion of these resources. On the American side of the Pacific, Mexico is a notable example in its attitude toward foreign oil companies. In Australia there is a definite feeling that the limit of its possible sheep production has been reached and that any attempt to increase the number of head on the ranges will definitely lead to disadvantageous overstocking. And while of course Japan has lost all hope of possessing Borneo and New Guinea, Nippon will continue to feel that the oil reserves of the Indies should be saved for the Orientals.

Import duties. In Japan an important cause of nationalism was the efforts of the foreigner to impose upon her extrality and a conventional tariff. Both these have been discussed, but the tariff must be mentioned again, for it shows the part the economic factor has played in stimulating nationalism. In China the tariff was equally important—perhaps more so, for her struggle for justice was much longer than Japan's. Not only did the treaties oblige her to submit to a conventional 5 per cent import duty, but after 1861 even the collection of the duty was in the hands of the foreign-managed Imperial Maritime Customs. Previous to the Boxer uprising and again following the first World War, the Chinese unavailingly sought revision of the tariff agreements. Finally at the Washington Conference China secured a nine-power treaty calling for the meeting as soon as possible at Shanghai of a tariff revision conference to raise the rates of duty to an effective 5 per cent and for a special conference to prepare the way for the abolition of the likin and the subsequent imposition of certain luxury surtaxes. The Shanghai Conference met in 1922 and on January 17, 1923, an effective 5 per cent duty went into force. The special conference was delayed, but finally in 1926 it agreed to a resolution favoring China's complete tariff autonomy and the abolition of the likin by January 1, 1929. Treaties to validate these resolutions were put into effect between 1928 and 1930. Nevertheless foreign injustices, especially on the part of Japan, still raddle and are a potent help toward unifying the Chinese national spirit.

Self-government. The fourth way in which the economic factor has contributed to the growth of nationalism has been as indirect as it has been effective. The best example of it perhaps has occurred in the Philippine Islands, where nationalism has grown in direct proportion with economic progress. Until 1946 the agitation for independence kept close step with the rise in the standard of living, and the desire for political independence was equaled only by the Filipinos' belief in their economic independence. Now that they have won their long-sought goal,
some of the natives are beginning to realize the effect of political independence on their economic independence, and they are now wondering just how desirable is *independencia*. Before the depression in the Dutch East Indies the improved economic position of the natives there had begun to stir thoughts of autonomy in the minds of some of the educated native leaders, and Holland's defeat by Japan seemed to assure autonomy if not independence. Even in the British dominions economic progress has led to self-assertion. Canada and Australia now receive ministers from the United States; Australia and New Zealand after the first World War took over the German Pacific possessions as mandates under the direction of the League of Nations; and local pride has increased to such an extent that woe betides the casual tourist who mistakes a Canadian warship for one of His Majesty's fleet.

6. The Economic Factor in the Growth of Pacific International Rivalries

*Tariffs*. From nationalism to international rivalry is only a short step, and in the causation of that step the significance of the economic factor cannot be overestimated. Its importance is perhaps best shown by a study of the part tariffs have played in engendering trade rivalries. From the dawn of European entrance into the Pacific all the Western nations have attempted to control trade to their own benefit; and it makes little difference whether such attempts are called "mercantilism" or are given a more modern term. In practically all the present-day empires preferential tariffs are in effect (i.e., imports into Australia from Great Britain are taxed at a lower rate than those from the United States). In the French and American possessions greater protection is afforded the members of the empire by assimilated tariffs (i.e., trade is free of duties between the Philippine Islands and the United States but American tariff regulations are imposed on all colonial imports from the rest of the world). Since by the United States Constitution export taxes are prohibited, citizens of this country are apt to be ignorant of the prevalence in the Pacific Area of that form of duty. Most of the South American countries add mightily to their revenues by export taxes, while the potentates of the Malay peninsula live handsomely from the charges levied on outgoing rubber. Up to World War II this latter tax was of extreme importance to the United States, especially when as in the case of the Stevenson Plan it was used to bolster rubber prices in the international market. In 1910 during the trade slump that followed the first
World War rubber was a drug on the market, so the Rubber Growers Association (membership largely British) decided on a 25 per cent voluntary reduction of output. When this effort failed the Stevenson Plan was adopted on January 1, 1922. This provided for a sliding scale of export taxes determined quarterly and graduated according to the amount of rubber exported every three months. A minimum export duty was levied on the exportable quota, with an increasing rate on all exports above the minimum. For a while the plan seemed to work well, and the price of rubber was raised from 14 cents a pound to over a dollar. As a result Americans and Dutch started new plantations in Dutch territory, and the percentage of rubber produced under the British flag dropped from 71 per cent to 51. In 1928 the plan was given up. Prices fell, and at the depth of the depression (1932) some sales were made at one cent a pound. Today, with the United States able to manufacture all the synthetic rubber it needs, the future of the business is again problematic, and it is safe to say there is not much likelihood of another threat to international good will such as England’s use of export taxes to increase rubber prices.

Monopolies. The temporary success of the Stevenson Plan was due to the fact that at that time the British industrialists had a near monopoly on the raw product. There were two industries in the Far East however which up to World War II were absolutely monopolized, that of camphor by the Japanese in Formosa and of quinine by the Dutch in their Indies. Fortunately neither country saw fit to exact an untoward profit, and these monopolies did not cause the ill will they might have. Just what will happen to Formosa’s camphor remains to be seen. The invention of a quinine substitute (atarbine) and increased production of quinine in Latin America will end the Dutch monopoly.

Mandates. A third field where the economic motive has engendered international rivalry is the mandate system. As will be remembered, after the first World War Germany’s island possessions in the Pacific were parceled out between Great Britain and Japan to be ruled as mandates under the direction of the League of Nations. In the Carolines, a mandate over which was conferred on Japan, was the little island of Yap. This islet was important to the United States because on it was maintained a station of an alternate cable route useful in the event of an interruption in the American San Francisco-Guam-Manila-Shanghai route. Accordingly on November 12, 1920, President Wilson informed Japan that the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference had reserved for future consideration the final disposition of Yap with a view to placing
it under international control as a cable station. Japan delayed answer a few weeks, and then, with considerable justice, replied that the control of Yap was settled on December 17, 1920, when the League of Nations defined the Japanese mandate as "all the former German islands situated in the Pacific Ocean and lying north of the equator." Japan then went ahead and occupied the Carolines, while the United States insisted on a reservation concerning Yap and the control of its cables. As a result there arose an international dispute that was bitter and at times extremely dangerous. Finally in 1922 a United States-Japanese treaty was signed by which the United States recognized Japan's mandate over Yap but secured League members' privileges in the island, equal footing with the Japanese regarding the Yap-Guam cable, and unrestricted rights for the entry and residence of its citizens in Yap. And then, interestingly enough, after all the fuss and bother the United States never exercised the cable privileges secured under the treaty. The other mandates produced no quarrel as sharp as that over Yap; but it may be well to record in passing that the United States and New Zealand exchanged a few ideas regarding tariff regulations in Samoa as well as several rather sharp statements when New Zealand tried to limit the sale of Nauru Island phosphate to Great Britain, New Zealand, and Australia. Australia's mandate over New Guinea also developed some correspondence, for Australia has had visions of a British monopoly of the island's oil. As a result of World War II Japan quite properly lost all her mandated territory; its distribution is still to be determined.

**Fisheries.** Far north of Yap is another area where the economic factor has been a potent source of ill will, namely, the Bering Sea and the waters surrounding the Aleutian Islands. For decades Russia, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States discussed the seal fisheries question, with the United States usually losing, for justice always had to bow to international law. The chief cause of the trouble was the nature of the fur seal. Being "amphibious, ubiquitous, carnivorous, uniparous, gregarious, and polygamous" he was an easy prey to foreign marine hunters, who, since the homes of the seals were on islands belonging to the United States, did not care if the herds were wiped out by indiscriminate killing. The efforts of the United States to protect the seals led to bitter feeling, especially between this country and Canada. Finally all four countries joined in the North Pacific Sealing Convention of 1911. This agreement, which regulated the whole industry of the North Pacific with a definite scale of profit-sharing, has been so successful that the animals have since increased tenfold. Unsettled for a much longer
time was the salmon fisheries question. Just before World War II Japanese fishermen had the habit of placing floating packing houses outside the three-mile limit, and by using nets and other means prohibited to American fishermen by United States laws committed depredations which imperiled the future of the North Pacific salmon industry. In the summer of 1938 actual hostilities threatened. Fortunately they were avoided when Japan yielded to American demands, and of course now there is no likelihood of further trouble between Japan and the United States. Japan’s chickens however are coming home to roost, for reports from Japanese islands north of Hakodate indicate that the Russians are driving Japanese fishermen from a region where they once held a fishing monopoly.

7. Difficulties in the Solution of Pacific Area Economic Problems as Illustrated by the Open Door Policy

The significance of the Open Door policy. Further discussion of the trade barriers which in the past have hindered trade in the Pacific Area seems unnecessary, for the reader can hardly fail to realize their significance in the past and the important role they will play, it is feared, in the future. If the peoples of both West and East are to have the standard of living to which they are entitled, a freer exchange of goods must be developed within the Pacific basin (and throughout the world for that matter). That the United States should attempt to take the lead in any such move would indeed seem to be an anomaly in view of its record as a tariff nation. And yet the fact remains that during the nineteenth century the United States favored equal opportunities for all nations trading with China. In so doing the United States developed a Far Eastern doctrine known as the "Open Door policy," which through World War II it hoped might serve for the Orient as did the Monroe Doctrine for the American Hemisphere. The importance of the Open Door policy can hardly be overestimated. Even though one may not feel with Samuel Flagg Bemis that its pronouncement was the first great error in American statecraft, the fact remains that for some forty years it was the guiding star of this country’s Pacific Ocean policy. It was one of the most likely causes for the United States being involved in a major war. And finally it was a principle about which the average American has little accurate knowledge.

Origin. The commonest ignorance is about its origin. It is generally believed to have originated in 1899 with the famous notes addressed
by Secretary John Hay to the great powers requesting them to respect the principle of equal commercial opportunity in China. As an actual fact McKinley's secretary of state merely reaffirmed the policy of most-favored-nation treatment which the United States had maintained since 1833 when Edmund Roberts negotiated commercial treaties with Siam and Muscat. The idea of the Open Door found expression again in the Treaty of 1844 between China and the United States. As a doctrine of free competition it reached its maximum of theoretical development in 1858, when the United States made the treaties with China and the first commercial treaties with Japan. In that year all the foreigners trading with the Far East were on an equal footing, and the geographical area to which the doctrine was or might be applicable was at its maximum.

*Political aspects.* A second misapprehension by American students of Pacific affairs grew out of their tendency to ignore the fact that since in the Far East, as elsewhere, trade and politics were never confined to watertight, noncommunicating compartments, the most-favored-nation
doctrine and its offspring, the Open Door policy, inevitably had political connotations. By the treaties of Nanking Great Britain may have desired merely to force open a little wider the door of commercial intercourse, but when Britain stipulated the cession of Hong Kong she immediately transformed the most-favored-nation policy into a political as well as a commercial doctrine, not only for the British but also for their competitors.

Ineffectiveness. The failure of the United States in the days of Cushing to recognize that the most-favored-nation doctrine of commercial equality was prospectively dependent upon equality of political privilege was an indication that this country apparently never would be aware of the real ineffectiveness of the doctrine. It is generally believed by Americans that in 1900 Secretary Hay gained a great victory when he announced the acceptance by Great Britain, Germany, France, Japan, and Italy (but not of Russia) of the following principles:

First. The recognition that no power will in any way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any leased territory or within any so-called "sphere of interest" it may have in China.

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said "sphere of interest" (unless they be "free ports") no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese government.

Third. That it [each power] will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such "sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such "sphere" than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distance.

And yet careful study shows that even in Secretary Hay's time the Open Door policy was an international understanding of doubtful value because each power made its adherence conditional upon full acceptance by all the other powers. Since Russia did not so agree the doctrine could carry but little weight. Furthermore, not till 1922 did it open the door to equal opportunity of investment or of industry. In the first year after its issuance it did not even attempt to preserve the independence of China, and the gradual control by foreigners of China's sovereign rights in the next twenty years destroyed any power China might have had to maintain the Open Door. Finally in the four decades following Hay's pronouncement exclusive waterfront privileges were granted in open ports, mineral resources were pre-empted and earmarked, lines of communication were monopolized in such a way as to embarrass perfectly
free trade, a system of advisory supervision was introduced which every year more and more threatened free competition, and finally exclusive and arbitrary banking privileges appeared in connection with loans and thereby created a general atmosphere of restriction and repression that had the effect of closing the door to many commercial privileges theoretically open.

*British influence.* But Americans not only have been ignorant of the ineffectiveness of Hay's Open Door policy, they also have been ignorant of the part that Great Britain played in its announcement. In the latter 1890's that country was seeking some peaceful method by which to check Russian political and commercial advance in North China. American trade was also involved, though this nation's commercial interests were largely prospective while British interests were real. At that same time Mr. Hay was seeking through a revision of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty to secure control of the future isthmian canal and to bring about the retirement of Britain from the Caribbean Sea. England of course wanted a *quid pro quo.* She got it when Mr. Hay accepted the counsel of his adviser on Far Eastern affairs, Mr. W. W. Rockhill, who in turn was acting on the suggestions of Mr. Alfred E. Hippisley, a British subject formerly in the Chinese customs service. Hay probably wanted to go ahead jointly with Great Britain, but he knew that the Irish and German voters in the United States would punish any political party that apparently made any concessions to England. Therefore, like the author of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the Secretary of State in 1899 ostensibly refused to be a cockboat in the wake of a British man-of-war. On its own hook the McKinley administration imposed upon all the powers in China two self-denying ordinances, one already mentioned regarding trade and the second the famous circular of June 3, 1900, which said:

The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.

*British advantages.* These notes naturally were extremely gratifying to England. In China she was already superior to all other nations both in trade and in finance. A continuance of the status quo was all she needed to maintain her economic advantage. In the political field too she wanted no changes. Satiated herself with colonies, all she needed to do was to prevent further attacks on the territorial integrity of China.
For this objective she felt her navy adequate; but when her good friend the United States by promulgating the Open Door doctrine and keeping the Philippines tied herself up in the diplomatic entanglements of the Far East, England knew that for some time to come her own economic and financial dominance of China was guaranteed.

*American disadvantages.* The final way in which the economic factor can so often produce grave political consequences is illustrated by the fact that the Open Door policy has been a failure. Hay’s doctrine did not turn out to be a wise one, because the policy was bound to be threatened as soon as any one power should become paramount in the Far East. In the 1930’s Japan so became, and closed the Open Door; and for a while there seemed nothing for the United States (and incidentally, Great Britain) to do but to retire with as little loss of face as possible. The Open Door notes did not prevent the Boxer uprising. They did not prevent Russia and Japan from ultimately engaging in a duel to possess themselves of large portions of Chinese territory. They did not provide Knox with the power to carry out his neutralization proposal in Manchuria. And finally, and most important of all, they committed the United States to a policy of obligingly helping to hold open a door used far more by other nations, and to a policy that until Pearl Harbor was a forlorn attempt to defend the integrity and independence of a distant, vast, and uncertain country where neither its economic nor its political interests were really vital.

*Conclusion.* With this brief account of the Open Door policy and of the economic problems its enunciation brought to the United States this chapter may well close. Only time will tell whether it will be necessary for the United States to make a second effort to preserve for all nations equal trade opportunities in the Pacific basin. One thing however is certain: if the resources of the Pacific Area are placed at the disposal of the world at large and if the barriers that hindered trade during the nineteenth century are wiped out, the goal Secretary Hay sought with his Open Door policy should be reached.
Problems of the Pacific:

(IV) Race

Introduction. Fully as important as economic rivalry in causing strained relations throughout the Pacific Area has been the race problem. To some extent, at least from an objective view, the problem has been economic in that conflicts apparently arising from race differences have often really come from the difficulty of keeping the proper relation between population and food supply. Even more important, because more tangible, has been the subjective side of the problem, i.e., race prejudice. Because such prejudice is an illusory factor with no real excuse for existence, the problems attached to it must be cleared up before one can undertake a discussion of the practical aspects of the race problem.

I. The Problem of Race Prejudice

The breadth of the problem. Race prejudice has many ramifications in the Pacific Area because it has all three primary groups of the human race; the black, the yellow, and the white. Just what caused the development of these three separate groups is still an unanswered question. But even if the cause of the differentiations is unknown their characteristics are clear to all. In physical appearance, in mental habits, in social customs, and in religious beliefs the peoples of the Pacific Area present every variation thus far discovered by the ethnologist, and therefore provide a breeding ground for every type of race prejudice.

The basis of the problem. A second question here that remains unanswered has to do with the impossibility of explaining the apparently universal existence of a feeling of race superiority. The red man of
America, even though forced to submit to the white man's power, still preserves a lordly disdain for his conquerors. The Chinese it will be remembered have always been confident of the superiority of their civilization and scorned the first "Barbarians" who invaded their shores. The Japanese before Hiroshima taught their children that their rulers were heaven-descended; even the much-buffed Koreans still consider themselves superior to all other peoples. The black man of Africa despite his frequent enslavement sees no supremacy in the culture of the whites and finds little or no consolation in the faith that "all God's chillen gwine to Hebbin." Perhaps the best evidence that race prejudice is universal will strike North Americans when they travel in Hispanic America. We are so accustomed to thinking of the people south of the Rio Grande as "greasers" or "spigotties" that it is a new sensation to hear ourselves called "gringoos" with all the contempt the Spanish tongue can give that word.

Errors in the idea of race superiority. This prevalence of the feeling of race superiority has naturally bred in it a number of serious errors. The first is the tendency, especially among English-speaking people, to assume that their own standards are right and that people who do not conform to them are wrong. A second mistake is to assume that backwardness is inferiority. And along with this goes the erroneous assumption that the apparent inferiority of a people is due to race, heritage, or destiny rather than to lack of motive, opportunity, or inspiration. A fourth perversion of truth is the belief that race character is fixed, that no change in geography or opportunity can make possible a variation in the destiny of a people.

The rising tide of color. Out of these combined errors has come the fear on the part of the white race that the consequences would be disastrous for them if the colored peoples should be able to establish an equality with their present masters. That this "rising tide of color" is inevitable is the feeling of some ethnologists. They assert that the number of blacks, including the dark-skinned peoples of India, is already twice that of the whites, and that whereas the whites double every eighty years the yellow peoples double every sixty years and the blacks double every forty years. Other authorities however refuse to admit that "mankind is at the crossroads," and insist that as the blacks and yellows approach equality with the whites the rise in the low standards of living will cause a corresponding decrease in race reproduction. Furthermore they point out that the whites are in control of the temperate zone and that Mother Nature herself has foreordained the inability of the tropical peoples to dominate the world.
Street scenes such as the above are common in North China. The joviality portrayed here contradicts the Western idea of the inscrutability of the Chinese.

Is race equality possible? The white man's strong conviction of his superiority raises a final question: "Can there be racial equality?" The outstanding effort to secure world-wide recognition of its possibility came at the Paris Peace Conference when the Japanese delegation presented a proposal to the effect that "the equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord as soon as possible to all aliens, nationals of states members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality." Even though this resolution was not adopted its proposal was a good thing, for it brought out clearly the necessity of the modern
world’s answering several rather difficult questions. Thus far no one knows exactly what race equality is; certainly there is no agreement as to whether a desire for race segregation and a recognition of racial differences necessarily constitute racial inequality. As long as climate does have an effect on the human race can there be equality of peoples living in different temperatures and climes? Even more difficult to answer is the query, “Is racial assimilation possible or even desirable?” As will be readily understood, it is a hard task to find the answers to these questions, and before it is undertaken it seems best to discuss at some length the more objective side of the race problem.

2. The Problem of Population-Food Equilibrium

The problem in general. It is obvious then that there is a subjective psychological basis for race prejudice. But its real cornerstone is the difficulty Malthus pointed out so long ago, namely, the apparent impossibility of keeping the proper ratio between population and food supply. This problem seems to have been constantly facing mankind since the dawn of history, and since the Industrial Revolution it has become increasingly serious. Overpopulation affects standards of living, and these in turn help to produce racial problems — that is, racial hostilities. Overpopulation is of course the chief cause of emigration, especially with Orientals, who, innately conservative, leave their homeland only when pushed out by economic pressure. Naturally emigration in large numbers creates at once a new problem; nations fearing for the dangers of overpopulation yield more readily to demands for immigration restrictions even when those demands have no real economic foundation and are based only on race prejudice.

The distribution of peoples in the Pacific Area. These general problems become especially clear when studied in the Pacific Area, which has a most unequal distribution of population. The American coasts and those of Australasia are relatively uninhabited, at least they appear so to the Chinese, who on 1,500,000 square miles support a population of nearly 500,000,000. Certainly they appeared so to the Japanese when they realized that the area of California is about equal to that of Japan proper and yet has only about one tenth the population. When Japan started her “New Order in Asia” campaign she had a population density of about 450 per square mile. Her acquisition of Korea and Formosa, with populations of 220 and 220 per square mile respectively, helped very little in reducing population density in Japan, but Sakhalin Island (one
Outdoor kitchen, Peiping. The poverty of the Chinese masses makes these restaurants popular.

per square mile) and Manchuria (twenty per square mile) seemed to provide havens for her surplus population.

*Overpopulation in the future.* But unfortunately the Japanese people have not cared to go in any large numbers to Sakhalin and Manchuria, so that Japan as well as other portions of the Orient, and despite World War II casualties, probably faces difficulties arising out of overpopulation. The old methods of human limitation have been dying out. Infanticide
for example is now rare in Hawaii and Tahiti, while in China it is not nearly as prevalent as it was. At the same time modern methods of birth control have not been received in the Orient with any great degree of favor. And to intensify the problem, Nature's methods of preventing overpopulation have lost some of their effectiveness. Modern science even in the Far East has decreased infant mortality and increased life expectancy. Plagues are less common, and improved means of transportation and communication have greatly alleviated the ravages of famine. All these developments mean that our civilization has become more complex and that the pace of our mixed industrial-agricultural economics must be stepped up so that more life can be supported than was possible under the old domestic economy. In China especially the sources of subsistence must be increased by improved agriculture and expanded industry, while greater use must be made of underpopulated areas like Manchuria. And meantime there is hope in the fact that in Japan the initial population increase caused by the Industrial Revolution has about spent itself, and as other parts of the Far East reach a higher standard of living the rise in population increase may disappear. But that rise has not yet ceased to be a problem, and the West must face the probability that in the future the pressure for the migration of Oriental people may be greater than in the past.

3. The Chinese Immigrant Problem

Beginnings. The movement of the people of the Far East away from the continent of Asia is relatively recent. It began on an extensive scale about 1850 with the Chinese, though it was not till 1859 that the Peking government legalized emigration. The first departures of Chinese occurred in the late 1840's when the African slave trade was dying out and there was a demand for field laborers, especially in the sugar regions of America. News of the gold rush of 1849 took many celestials to central California, and though very shortly they were forced out of the gold fields, yet until the decade after the Civil War the lack of labor in the West induced a steady flow of Chinese. The explosive factors in China itself were the recurrent periods of starvation and famine and the disorders attendant upon the Tai-p'ing Rebellion, which began in 1850 and lasted for nearly fifteen years.

Emigration to Malaysia. The first recipient of any large number of Chinese emigrants was nearby Malaysia and portions of the Dutch East Indies. Here both the English and Dutch sought cheap labor, and until
the depression of 1929 a warm welcome was given the migrants. England especially made a strong effort to prevent abuses on the part of labor contractors, and unlike that of the United States most of Britain's legislation relating to the Chinese was for their benefit. The situation remains the same today, and in such cities as Singapore the Chinese have become the dominant element in the population.

Emigration to Australasia. By 1850 the importation of coolies to Australia had become a regular institution. After the discovery of gold there the contract system was changed to a credit system. By 1854 there were as many as 2,000 Chinese working in the gold fields, and in 1857 the total Oriental population was estimated at some 26,000. Relatively few went to New Zealand, where the immigrants as late as 1871 numbered only some 4,200.

Emigration to the Philippines. Before the American occupation of the Philippines not many Chinese went there, but for a few years after the downfall of the Spanish Empire there was a large influx. The explanation is simple. Generally speaking, the Chinese have been able to get ahead better in those countries where there is a superior standard of living to which they could offer the competition of their own meager living. Not until the Americans came to the islands was it worth while for the Chinese to migrate there.

Emigration to Hawaii. To Hawaii some Chinese began going as early as 1789, but the migration was not at all extensive till 1850. About that time the sugar planters began to need Chinese laborers, and for a decade local laws definitely encouraged the coolie trade.

Emigration to Hispanic America. In Hispanic America the Chinese immigrants played a very minor role. In Chile as late as 1885 there were said to be only 797. Not till the period of Diaz did many Chinese go to Mexico, where they were employed on the henequen plantations. The largest number went to Cuba and Peru. There are no statistics as to the total number, but it is known that in 1865 some 15,000 were shipped from Macao and Canton. In the Cuba-Peru coolie trade frightful abuses arose, for the passage to the West Indies was far more unhealthful than the old "middle passage" from Africa. On the "floating hells" that carried the emigrants the average space given them was only eight square feet, and it is estimated that 14 to 45 per cent of the coolies died en route. From 1857 to 1859 some 8000 are said to have died on the Canton-Cuba passage. After 1874, as a result of agreement among China, France, and England, the coolie trade died out, and without replacements the Chinese portion of the total population of Cuba and Peru became insignificant.
Emigration to the United States. Chinese emigration to the United States began as soon as news of the discovery of gold in California reached Hong Kong. Fifty-four vessels left that port in 1850, and by the end of 1852, 25,000 Chinese are thought to have been in California. At first they were given a decent reception in the diggings, but shortly heavy taxes forced them out of mining. They then turned to domestic employment, agriculture, land reclamation, and railroad building, where until the period immediately following the Civil War they were generally welcomed.

Emigration to Canada. Canada’s gold rush started in 1858 and for a few years there was a slight flow of Chinese immigrants, though at no time were they welcomed by the miners. In the next decade however, 1870–1880, coal mines, farms, public works, fisheries, and railroads produced an active demand for cheap labor, and by 1885 half the population of British Columbia was Chinese.

Anti-Chinese feeling. From the above it can be clearly seen that the opening of China to Western influences produced an effect that Europe had hardly anticipated. Within two decades after the Opium War Chinese immigrants had penetrated most of the Pacific Area, and their numbers were increasing so rapidly that the English-speaking countries very definitely changed their attitudes. The causes of the anti-Chinese feeling that developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century are not hard to find. The most obvious one was the fear that if Chinese immigration continued unchecked the teeming millions of the celestial empire would totally engulf the relatively underpopulated white areas. This fear was heightened by the marked social and cultural differences which soon led to a feeling that the “heathen Chinee” was a subversive influence. Since in the early days the immigrants were not accompanied by their wives, prostitution was a regular part of Chinese life; and “Chinatown” was often the equivalent of “red light district.” Since the Orientals were accustomed to living in cramped quarters by themselves and were given to strange forms of diet, clothing, language, and religion, the idea soon became prevalent that their habitations were dirty, unsanitary, and disease-ridden. Especially was it feared that their quarters would become focal centers for bubonic plague and leprosy. How much truth there was in these complaints it is impossible to say, but there can be no question that the Chinese were guilty of one charge, namely, that they worked longer hours for smaller wages and thereby provided economic competition which their white neighbors could not or would not meet. In the final analysis however the funda-
A ginkgo tree in a Peiping monastery. The adoption of this rare tree by the Western world as an ornamental plant illustrates one of the few cultural transfers moving from East to West; in most cases the shift has been in the other direction.
mental issue was the desirability of permitting the immigration of large numbers of what seemed to be a nonassimilable race.

**British restrictions: Australasia.** Great Britain has found the handling of the Chinese immigrants difficult because Hong Kong is a British possession largely inhabited by Chinese, and Malaysia has a large Chinese population which is a respected part of the community. Australasia however has almost from the first been determined to restrict Chinese immigration to keep it from threatening white predominance. In Australia anti-Chinese agitation began as early as 1849. In 1855 Victoria limited the number of immigrants a ship could bring in and imposed a ten-pound head tax. From time to time anti-Chinese riots broke out, licenses were imposed, and such hostile legislation was passed that even the usually submissive Chinese government protested. In 1890 the British Privy Council gave the Australians complete control over immigration, and after the dominion was formed a stringent exclusion policy was inaugurated. This was accomplished by language-test legislation which enabled the examining official to require the immigrant to know any language the official might choose to demand. In 1903 a naturalization act was passed which made it clear that the idea of a "White Australia" was the Monroe Doctrine of that continent and that the "land down under" was not to be a subject for further colonization by Eastern races or even for their immigration. New Zealand has followed a similar policy; there, in addition to a head tax of £100, a language test requiring a knowledge of a hundred words of English has been so administered that Chinese immigration has been negligible.

**British restrictions: Canada.** The Canadians became alarmed at the dangers of Chinese immigration somewhat later than the Australians. In 1884 a committee appointed by the prime minister to consider all phases of the question reported that the Chinese morals and culture were open to criticism but that coolie labor was an asset and did not prevent the growth of the white population. The people of western Canada however were not convinced of the truth of this report and in 1885 established a fifty-dollar poll tax and a limitation of one immigrant per each fifty tons of shipweight. In 1900 the poll tax was raised to $100, in 1903 to $500. Today any Chinese is free to enter Canada if he can put up $300, but since a Chinese coolie with that much capital would not want to leave his home the Canadians have effectively barred any large amount of Chinese immigration.

**United States restrictions: continental.** The first anti-Chinese legislation in the United States was enacted by the state of California. In the
period 1855–1862 most of it was declared unconstitutional; and for thirty years after the arrival of the Chinese in California the United States as a whole failed to understand the west coast attitude toward the Orientals. As a result the Burlingame Mission, as noticed above, was given a flattering welcome in Washington in 1868 and the eight articles of the treaty signed July 28 provided for (1) the maintenance of the integrity of China, (2) Chinese control of their own inland trade, (3) appointment of Chinese consuls in American ports, (4) reciprocal freedom from persecution for religion, (5) encouragement of the immigration of Chinese coolies into the United States but with a prohibition of contract emigration, (6) reciprocal rights of residence and travel, (7) access to the schools of either country, and (8) freedom from interference in the development of China. Articles 5 and 6 almost immediately began to cause trouble, for the following year, with the completion of the Central Pacific Railroad, some 9000 Chinese were thrown on the labor market. Then when the transcontinental railroad did not immediately usher in a period of prosperity for the Pacific coast, both political parties took an anti-Chinese attitude. Despite the protests of fair-minded Californians the Chinese were subject to outrageous abuses, and it soon became evident that the Burlingame Treaty must be sacrificed for political expediency. In 1876 a joint special commission of Congress was appointed to investigate Chinese immigration, and it is not surprising that its findings were based on political considerations rather than on the facts. As a result, after the American minister to Peking dodged an effort in 1879 to bring about an abrogation of the coolie section of the Burlingame Treaty, the United States government in 1880 appointed the Angell Commission to negotiate a new treaty with China. To secure California's vote by playing to popular local prejudice, the new treaty on November 17, 1880, stated in its first clause,

Whenever in the opinion of the Government of the United States the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States, or their residence therein, affects or threatens to affect the interests of that country . . . the Government of China agrees that the Government of the United States may regulate, limit, or suspend such coming or residence, but may not absolutely prohibit it. The limitation or suspension shall be reasonable and shall apply only to Chinese who may go to the United States as laborers.

Congress soon took advantage of its opportunity and passed a bill to "suspend" Chinese immigration for twenty years. When President Arthur vetoed the act on the ground that it was a practical violation of the treaty, the national legislature reduced the period of suspension to
ten years; and in 1882 the bill became law. Some Chinese however continued to filter in, therefore in 1888 more drastic legislation was passed. The Geary Act of 1892 was recognized two years later by the Chinese government in a treaty giving the United States the right to prohibit absolutely the immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years. In 1902 the Exclusion Act of 1888 was renewed without any consultation with China, and in 1904 it presumably was made perpetual.

United States restrictions: insular. In Hawaii restrictive measures began in the 1880's. The first excuse was improper sanitation on the part of the Chinese; later the preponderance of Chinese males was considered a threat to morals. The need for cheap labor on the sugar plantations however prevented exclusion. When the islands were annexed to the United States exclusion of course was inevitable, and on April 22, 1902, American laws went into effect. The place of the Chinese was soon taken by the Japanese, and today the Chinese make up less than 10 per cent of the population. In fact as anti-Japanese feeling developed it was suggested that possibly it might be advisable to permit the coming of more Chinese and thus give the Japanese more competition. In the Philippines American exclusion laws were put in force in 1902 and met instant favor on the part of the Filipinos, who greatly feared Oriental competition. On the part of the United States the extension of exclusion to the islands was due to the fear that if the Chinese were permitted to go to the Philippines they might easily slip into the United States.

Removal of restrictions. The situation of Chinese immigration into the American "empire" remained unchanged until World War II, when the heroic defense of the Chinese against Japan convinced the United States that Chinese exclusion laws were outmoded. On December 17, 1943, a bill was signed repealing all the old offensive measures; Chinese were made eligible for citizenship and Chinese immigrants were put on a quota basis (105 per year).

Just what attitude the newly formed Philippine Republic will take toward Chinese immigration is not known, but certainly it can be no less favorable than that of the United States.

Hispanic American restrictions. For the most part the Hispanic American countries have not concerned themselves with the few Chinese immigrants who have come to their shores. In times of revolution it is always "open season" on the Cantonese storekeepers, for their mother country has been unable to afford them protection. In 1932 the Mexican states of Sinaloa and Sonora conducted a successful "oust the Chinese"
campaign, only to discover that their banking establishments were severely menaced by the withdrawal of Chinese deposits. On the whole though Hispanic America has been more inclined than Anglo-Saxon America to look upon the Chinese as human beings, and has learned that the Orientals do have commendable traits.

4. The Japanese Immigration Problem

General features. As compared with the Chinese the Japanese immigrant problem has had several distinct differences. In the first place, it became important about half a century later than did the Chinese because from 1638 to 1868 Japanese emigration was prohibited; in fact it was not actually legalized until 1885, nearly two decades after it got under way. In the second place, in Japan much more than in China the pressure of a rapidly increasing population has been a powerful expulsive factor. A third difference is that the Japanese from the beginning have suffered from the anti-Oriental prejudice caused by Chinese immigration. When they took over the occupations formerly held by the Chinese they inherited all the stigmas the Chinese had created. In addition, the small size of the Japanese, their willingness to outdo the Chinese in undercutting prices, and the presence of larger numbers of their womenfolk who worked in the fields along with their husbands, all these traits caused an even greater prejudice than had been aroused against their coolie predecessors. The last important difference arose from the fact that just about the time Britain and the United States became alarmed over Japanese immigration Japan became a world power, and as a result the English-speaking nations found it extremely difficult to handle satisfactorily the problems which have arisen from Nipponese immigration.

British problems. In the British Empire both Australia and Canada have had to cope with Japanese immigration. Australia was just as hostile to the Japanese as it was to the Chinese. Therefore, when in the 1890's the Japanese started coming to Australia, the people "down under" merely applied the Chinese exclusion laws and the number of Japanese in Australia has been kept to around 5000. Canada in the 1890's proved attractive to the Japanese because of the fishing industry, and it is estimated that by 1900 there were about 3500 in the Fraser River district alone. The agitation which soon arose against the Japanese was not as great however as that against the Chinese, for the Japanese stayed out of agriculture and on the whole lived more like their neighbors.
Many of the immigrants brought capital and diversified their activities, salmon fishing and logging receiving the most attention. Since the restrictions were not great — the immigrant merely had to possess twenty-five dollars if he came in the summer and fifty dollars if in the winter — the numbers eventually reached some 20,000. Since in 1902 Great Britain made an alliance with Japan, the mother country naturally brought pressure on British Columbia (where most of the Japanese were located) to treat the Japanese well, and in 1908 Japan reciprocated by giving Canada a “gentleman’s agreement” similar to that signed with the United States. On the whole the British government tended to follow the lead of the United States; and as pointed out previously the British desire to escape the difficulties caused by the Pacific dominions was a potent factor in leading England to back up so wholeheartedly the Washington Conference.

**United States mainland problems: origin.** In the United States the Japanese problem became important around 1900. Census figures for the Japanese population on the mainland are as follows: 1870, 55; 1880, 148; 1890, 2039; 1900, 24,326; 1910, 72,157; 1920, 111,010; 1930, 138,834; and 1940, 126,947. These figures show why, although the Japanese immigrants were not welcomed, there was little agitation against them before 1900; after that the situation changed entirely. As mentioned above they fell heir to the anti-Chinese feeling. In the second place, the tide of immigration increased at what seemed an alarming rate — over 12,000 were admitted in 1900. Also, since the Hawaiian sugar planters from 1900 to 1910 lost some 40,000 laborers by migration from the islands to the mainland, it is possible that these migrants helped produce both in California and British Columbia an anti-Japanese feeling which soon ran the gamut of all the old anti-Oriental charges from non-assimilability to moral degradation.

**California’s campaign.** Since over 60 per cent of the Japanese in the United States were in California, it was natural that the focal point of the anti-Japanese movement should be in that state. In 1901 the Governor’s message called attention to the “danger in the unrestricted immigration of Japanese laborers.” Local newspapers took up the cry, and when the Japanese by their criticism of the United States after the Treaty of Portsmouth seemed to “bite the hand which fed them,” public opinion throughout the United States began to sympathize with the Californians. As a result, even though at the time of the San Francisco earthquake and fire Japan contributed for relief a sum more than half the total sent by all foreign countries, in October 1906 the San
Francisco Board of Education directed that all Chinese, Japanese, and Korean children should attend the city's Oriental school. The Japanese immediately described the resolution as "unfair" and "discriminatory." When Tokyo brought pressure to bear on Washington and showed that there were only ninety-three Japanese children attending the San Francisco schools, President Roosevelt secured the rescinding of the objectionable act. At the same time an immigration law forbade the entry of Japanese laborers from Hawaii, Mexico, and Canada, while by the gentleman's agreement Japan promised not to give passports to laborers wishing to come to the United States. So well did Japan carry out its engagement that from 1909 to 1913 the annual number of Japanese entrants into the United States was only 4288. Friends of Japan therefore thought the anti-Japanese movement would cease.

California's land laws. But their hopes were doomed to failure. The census of 1910 showed an increase in the Japanese population of California from 10,151 to 41,356 and thereby seemed to demonstrate the impotence of the gentleman's agreement. Consequently the Asiatic Exclusion League redoubled its efforts. The 1910 platforms of the Republican, Democratic, and Socialist parties of California all demanded Oriental exclusion, completely ignoring the fact that after 1907 the increase in the Japanese population was largely due to the growing number of American-born Japanese. Most of the early immigrants were single men who, as soon as their economic status permitted, contracted marriage in absentia and on the basis of an exchange of pictures. These marriages, carried out under the provisions of Japanese law and duplicated upon the arrival of the young women in the United States, were not understood by the Californians, who called the newcomers "picture brides," a term that carried a connotation quite different from the legal fact. As a result, when in 1911 a new American-Japanese treaty contained no provision specifically enabling the federal government to exclude the Japanese, the Californians forgot entirely the 1910 report of their state commissioner of labor which indicated that Japanese labor was essential to much of the state's agricultural industry. In 1913 California passed its notorious land law, the stated purpose of which was to prevent any alien not eligible to citizenship from owning lands — actually aimed primarily against the Japanese. In 1920 a new alien land law stated that aliens ineligible for citizenship could acquire real property only as provided by treaty and could no longer lease land for agricultural purposes. Alarmed at this treatment of its nationals, the Japanese government tried to pour oil on the troubled waters by refusing to issue
passports to "picture brides." This ruling of course enforced celibacy on many Japanese immigrants in the United States and naturally increased resort to prostitution by the unattached Japanese males. The Californians still remained adamant; and in 1923 the legislature forbade the use of cropping contracts.

*Japanese exclusion.* During the whole period of the anti-Japanese movement in California official amity was preserved between Tokyo and Washington and was even reinforced by the Washington Conference of 1922. In November of that year however in the Ozawa case the federal Supreme Court declared Japanese (and later Hindus) ineligible to United States citizenship. As a result and from that time the Japanese considered America's verbal protestations of friendship as mere verbiage. This opinion was reinforced two years later when the Immigration Act of 1924 refused Japan and China a quota, and definitely provided that no "alien ineligible to citizenship," with the exception of the regular privileged classes, should enter the United States. During the debate in Congress over this act it was shown that with a quota similar to that granted the European nations the Japanese would have received a minimum allowance of only 100. Furthermore the Japanese minister pointed out that from 1908 to 1923 the excess of Japanese admitted to the United States over those departing had averaged only 378 annually. Unfortunately, in his note of protest to the secretary of state Minister Hanihara used the words, "I realize ... the grave consequences which the enactment of the measure would inevitably bring upon the otherwise happy and eventually advantageous relations between the two countries." These words were taken by the American Senate to contain a "veiled threat" and the patriotic (?) senators, with their eyes on Western votes, felt obliged to vote 70 to 4 in favor of the measure which the Japanese minister indicated "would seriously wound the proper susceptibilities of the Japanese nation."

*Japanese in Hawaii.* In Japan the Act of 1924 naturally caused intense indignation, and the problem was made more acute by the presence of many Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands. Their immigration had been encouraged from 1868 on and especially after 1884, when they largely took the place of the Chinese on the sugar plantations. After the annexation of the islands by the United States many left for the mainland, much to the disgust of the sugar planters, and after 1920 the alien Japanese population decreased. But the native-born population continued to increase, with the result that in 1940 well over one third of Hawaii's population was of Japanese origin. As a consequence Japan's movements
in the Far East were constantly viewed by American militarists in the light of possible fifth-column activities by the Hawaiians of Japanese ancestry. Furthermore the Japanese had to bear the obloquy of being the main obstacles to the granting of statehood to Hawaii, since the chief argument against statehood was the fear that the American Japanese would not be loyal to the United States in a war between the two nations.

**Japanese loyalty.** As it turned out however, these fears were quite unjustified. The native-born Japanese both in Hawaii and in the United States remained completely loyal to their mother country, and even the Japanese-born made little trouble. As a result therefore, even though immediately after Pearl Harbor there was a great hue and cry against the American Japanese, which did not lessen as reports of atrocities became commoner, yet because of the excellent Nisei record within a few months after the end of the war prejudice against American Japanese was probably less than it ever had been.

**Japanese in the Philippines.** America's other Pacific possession, the Philippine Islands, was little affected by Japanese immigration until the third decade of the twentieth century. Previously the Japanese had looked on the archipelago with disfavor because of the humid climate and because they there saw few economic opportunities. In the 1930's however they began to gain a foothold around Davao in Mindanao. During the next few years Japanese infiltration was so successful that the leaders of the commonwealth became perturbed over the possibilities of the extension of Japan's political influence when 1946 should bring independence. As it happened that feared influence came five years before independence, but thanks to America's army and navy independence came on schedule, Japanese atrocities in the Philippines will never be forgotten, and Japanese influence in the islands is probably gone forever.

**Japanese in Hispanic America.** Like Japanese immigration to the Philippines, that to Hispanic America has been of concern to the United States only within the last few years. Up to 1930 it is doubtful if there were more than 25,000 in all Hispanic America, but in the last decade the Japanese population under the Southern Cross certainly doubled, perhaps even trebled or quadrupled. The great stream of migration was to Brazil, where agriculture was the magnet. Throughout Hispanic America in general the Japanese went into small business lines, where the excellent steamship service offered by the N.Y.K. and the O.S.K. afforded them a decided commercial advantage. Japan's alignment with the Axis powers of Europe of course gave a political tinge to her activities, so that
after Pearl Harbor the relations between Japan and Hispanic America had increased significance for the Allied nations. Fortunately at the outbreak of the war Brazilian authorities acted immediately and the Japanese in Brazil were completely sequestered; in the other countries the number of Japanese was too small to be any danger.

Conclusion. Hawaii: a successful melting pot? The above description of the immigration difficulties faced by the West in its relations with the two most important Oriental peoples should indicate that in the final analysis the race problem resolves itself into the question as to whether the Pacific Area’s white, yellow, and black races, who for centuries have guarded their own racial integrity, can lay aside their scorns, prides, and prejudices to join on an equal basis in a common brotherhood. There are those who say they can, and point to Hawaii as proof. The federal census of 1940 shows the Hawaiian admixture of races as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>14,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Hawaiian</td>
<td>49,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>103,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>28,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>52,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>157,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others: (Korean, Puerto Rican, Negro, and others)</td>
<td>15,981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From all accounts this melting pot has functioned well. "Why, then," ask some students, "cannot there be the same friendly relationship among races in other parts of the Pacific Area?" In answering the question one must point out several factors which in toto exist nowhere except in Hawaii. The latter was fortunate in coming very early under the effective influence of Christian missionaries, who preached and lived (to a considerable extent) the doctrines of brotherly love and whose preachings were put into practice by the whites. As a result the racial barriers which grew up in Shanghai, for instance, never got a start in the "crossroads of the Pacific." In addition, by the time the Chinese and Japanese began to come to the islands the Caucasian minority had had a half century of experience with dark-skinned peoples and had even submitted to their political domination. Thanks to a nonsegregation system, from the earliest days education provided a real melting pot and no social caste barriers developed. Finally, and probably most important of all, in Hawaii Oriental labor displaced no Aryans; when the "heathen Chinese" there entered the laundry business no white washerwoman called on a Dennis Kearney to sound the slogan, "The Chinese must go."

Solution to the problem of race prejudice? The absence of the economic
factor from the Hawaiian melting pot has been in the last analysis probably of chief importance. People can put up with differences in color, body odor, physical features, and social mores, but when the pocketbook is touched there seems to result a paralysis of man's better nature that leads inevitably to race prejudice. It would seem then that the problem can never be eradicated entirely in areas where inequality is based on economic gradations. But it is believed that the most harmful results of racial prejudice can be modified if only:

a. Each race will cultivate a feeling of respect for and tolerance toward all other races.

b. It is recognized that the source of civilization is not in the white man or the yellow man or the black man, but in the individual, white, yellow, or black, who is truly a man.

c. The stronger nations can be brought to realize that their strength involves the obligation of watching over and aiding in every way the weaker nations.

d. The weaker nations will understand that the inevitable result of weakness is the necessity of accepting aid and guidance until they can stand alone.

e. All the races of the world will work together for a common good, and unitedly build a human commonwealth; realizing all the while that a recognition of racial differences and a desire for racial segregation need never imply racial inferiority.

Only the chemist can tell, and not always the chemist
What will result from compounding
Fluids and solids.
And who can tell
How men and women will interact
On each other or what children will result?
There were Benjamin Pantier and his wife,
Good in themselves, but evil towards each other;
He oxygen, she hydrogen,
Their son a devastating fire.¹

Problems of the Pacific:

(V) Culture

Introduction: Definition. The most important of all the problems the Pacific Area faces today are those which for want of a better term the writers call "cultural problems"; i.e., those connected with the training, disciplining, and refining of the intellectual and moral nature of the peoples of the Pacific Area to the end that they all may enjoy the finest way of life.

The content of the subject. The subject properly involves a two-way discussion, but the writers have arbitrarily limited it mainly to a study of the effect of Western culture on Eastern. This approach does not necessarily mean that the Western manner of living is superior to the Eastern (even though we believe it is) or that there is nothing the West can learn from the East (this certainly is not true). The fact is however that while for better or worse the East has taken to itself a modicum of Western culture, the West has taken little from the East.

Differences. The reason each has taken so little from the other is to be found to a considerable extent in the differences between their cultures. These differences, notable in many fields, can perhaps be illustrated best in the field of religion: here are the conflicts between (1) love and duty, (2) personal initiative and loyalty to the past, (3) activity and contemplation, and (4) monotheism and pantheism.

Missionary activities. Since both the Orient and the Occident have produced fervent protagonists of their respective religions it is not surprising that missionary activities have been great in both East and West. Those of the East have not had noticeable effect except as they
have made an impression on Western philosophical thinking, whereas the influence of Christian missionaries in the Far East has been disproportionately great. Two aspects of their influence must be noted.

First: For a century now the Western nations have been offering to the Far East a civilization based on machinery, democratic forms of government, and lip service at least to Christianity. The first two factors have had an enormous effect on the West, and the fact that they have generally been on the profit side of the ledger is largely due to the leavening processes, imperfect though they have been, of the Christian religion. The effect of the machine age and new forms of government on the East also has been stupendous; and if their capacity for harm is to be kept down the East must have the chance to embrace the idealism of the West which, faulty though it has been, has made the West’s accumulation of wealth possible and its uses not entirely inhuman. In the past the presentation of Western ideals has been undertaken largely by the missionary preacher, teacher, and doctor; until recently neither government agencies nor business enterprises have recognized that to give the Orient machine-age economics and rule by the people without at the same time developing an appreciation of man’s obligations to his fellow men, as taught by both Confucius and Jesus Christ, is to invite calamity for both East and West.

Second: Rightly or wrongly the Orient often fails to distinguish between Christianity and Western culture. Furthermore it sees Western culture grouping many strange and diverse elements: capitalism, Communism, Socialism, Fascism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism; struggles between rich and poor, between capital and labor; unethical business and government practices; struggles for peace and preparation for bloodier wars. As a result of all this, the East sees the West in confusion, disunited, uncertain, unable to solve its own problems. Naturally as the East seeks to adjust its cultural inheritance to the Western impact, to select that part of its heritage it wants to preserve and to abandon what is incompatible with that part of Western culture it wants to take in, hesitation, skepticism, and confusion are rampant. The point is of course that there is no one West for the East to analyze, copy, or reject; therefore it often tries to get uniformity by making Christianity the basis of Western culture.

Under the circumstances then it is easy to realize that a desirable cultural fusion of East and West will be hard to come by. But before we give up hope we should see what contributions the West has really made to the Pacific Area.
Pagodas on the western hills, near Peiping. This architecture is typically Chinese, and features ornate carving and tile work.
1. The Contributions of Western Culture to the Pacific Area

Democratic ideas. Despite this gloomy picture the fact remains that the West has made many and great contributions to the civilization of the Pacific Area. Which one is the greatest is hard to say; but certainly the democratic ideal the missionaries have carried to the four corners of the earth has been significant. Much of course still remains to be done. Such elementary factors as sportsmanship and acceptance of the rule of the majority still are not widely accepted. Unfortunately personalism in Latin America and face-saving in the Orient are old established customs that prevent the graceful acceptance of defeat by the minority; yet without that sportsmanship there can be no true democracy in politics or business or religion or even in athletics.

Humanitarianism. A second contribution of great significance has been the checking of age-old abuses. In the Pacific Area human sacrifices, cannibalism, and self-torture have practically disappeared. Suicide has greatly diminished. Slavery is to be found only in isolated areas, although it is true that in Latin America a quasi-slavery, peonage, is prevalent. Immoderate use of alcoholic liquors is seldom a part of religious rites, and the opium traffic which was brought to the East by the West may at last be destroyed by those who initiated it.

Woman's position. Of the abuses which have been checked the most important are those which were suffered only by women. Concubinage has diminished; and though prostitution is still prevalent it is no longer respectable, as it was when the professions of "dancing girls" and "temple girls" were distinctly honorable. Infanticide as applied to girl babies is much less common; and the unhappy custom of foot-binding no longer afflicts Chinese women. Most important of all is the change in education for women. Eventually, when and if the democratic process becomes prevalent in the Far East, it may well be that the education and emancipation of those who have become the mothers of a new generation of Orientals will prove to be the greatest gift of the West to the East. Meanwhile the new view of women in many cases has upset old family and village mores with disruptive results.

Physical well-being. A fourth contribution has been the improvement of Eastern physical well-being. This change is most significant in sanitation, where American commissions and foundations have accomplished much. Of course witch doctors still exist and superstition survives; but the death rate throughout the East has been lowered, especially in countries like Japan and Java; although unhappily a lowered
death rate poses the problem of feeding the constantly increasing populations. Another recent significant influence, though it has not yet reached the great mass of the population, is provided by the construction of modern mission compounds and foreign houses. Little by little the superior living conditions Westerners demand are being recognized and the force of example is exerting wholesome pressure.

Along with a higher standard of living have gone also a host of modernisms which are changing the industrial life of the Far East. Improvements in communication and transportation have been perhaps the greatest contribution of World War II to the welfare of the Pacific basin. In the business world the typewriter has replaced ancient writing implements, and modern methods of record keeping are increasingly prevalent. Modern science is moving into Cathay, and recent technological advances have been so great that probably never again will be seen the back-breaking toil which went into the construction of the Burma Road.

Education. Education has been both a contribution in itself and a factor in making possible other contributions. Whether it has been most successful when given by Westerners working in the Orient or when given to Orientals studying in the West is a question that cannot be answered definitely — both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. Likewise it is hard to say whether the Western educational contribution has been more valuable because of its content or because of its method. Certainly the latter has been greatly needed, for the East has had to learn (1) that education should be available for all social classes, (2) that there should be no discrimination between sexes, (3) that provision should be made for the physically underprivileged — the lame, the deaf, and the blind, (4) that mankind is never too old to learn, (5) that mass education can be successfully used in regions where teachers are few, and finally (6) that the content of education must reach from the classics to vocational training.

Religion. The last of the West's major contributions to the civilization of the East has been in religion, and here again its significance has been both in content and in method. The extent of Eastern acceptance of Christian dogma has varied greatly — certain islanders such as the Hawaiians have entirely forsaken their old-time religion, while others like the Moros of the Philippines are still afflicted at times with religious insanity and run amuck in the best barbarian fashion. In China and occasionally in Japan cynics have been inclined to doubt the sincerity of the so-called "rice Christians," but the martyrdom which native
converts have suffered from the Shimabara Revolt to the Boxer uprising has given proof that for some at least of the orientals Christianity was more than a passing fancy or a chance to get something to eat. And yet it is true that the number of Christians in the more densely populated countries like China and Japan has been relatively insignificant; and for that reason one is inclined to suggest that perhaps the greatest good the Western faiths have brought the East is the competition they have given the older native religions. To see this effect in operation before Pearl Harbor it was not necessary to leave the continental United States. In the section of Los Angeles occupied chiefly by Japanese, Buddhist temples showed the influence of American architecture; and the church service definitely demonstrated that the priests in charge recognized that to keep the Japanese children attending they must follow some of the customs of an American Sunday school.

2. THE DIFFICULTIES FACING THE PROPAGATION OF WESTERN CULTURE IN THE FAR EAST

Unworthy exponents. Great as has been the contribution of the West to the culture of the East, it could have been greater had there not been three outstanding obstacles. The first was the failure of many exponents of Western culture to live in such a manner that the East could find something admirable in the culture they were supposed to represent. The hell-raising, hard-drinking American, the sex-indulging Frenchman, and the snobbish Britisher who fails to recognize the difference between Chinese and dogs — these have been altogether too common in the Far East. The causes are obvious: usually it was the restless and the daring who sought a fortune in the far Pacific, and the influence of strange surroundings and the absence of customary restraints too often have led to disaster. Even the missionaries were not always what they meant to be, for some heard the call of adventure and forgot the call of God; others yielded to their longings for delightful homes, luxurious surroundings, and many servants. Of course missionaries no less than Standard Oil representatives should live in sanitary, comfortable quarters, both for health’s sake and to set a good example. And also of course in the East even more than in the West the lives of the clergy are books so much read of all men that missionaries have often been subjected to criticism that never would be directed against members of any other profession.

The poor adaptation of Western culture to Eastern needs. The second
Come what may, Western culture will never cause the Chinese to give up their age-long tea-drinking habits. In Shanghai the most famous tea-houses are located in the Old City, outside the International Settlements.

obstacle that has hindered the spread of Western culture in the East is the difficulty of adapting it to the needs and prejudices of the Orientals. In education there have never been enough teachers or native workers; and too often there has been a local prejudice growing out of the fear that education might get too completely into the hands of the foreigners. In religion two factors have hindered. First, in the early missionary days many of the newcomers failed to make use of the native religions, and instead of using them as a foundation on which to build set out to extirpate them entirely. Second, the Westerners brought with them their denominational religious differences. The wonder is that Christianity made any progress at all, with one faith demanding church services on Saturday and others insisting that Sunday is God’s Day; with one denomination satisfied with sprinkling and another insisting that salvation comes only
with immersion; with one sect believing that Jesus was only a great teacher and another declaring that he was the Son of God!

The failure of the West to solve its own problems. The third and most serious obstacle has been the failure of the West to solve its own problems. For instance, every Oriental who comes to the West and especially to the United States cannot but be aware of the widespread race prejudice he sees about him. And those Easterners who stay at home, if they can read, learn from the newspapers that all is not well with the West; if they cannot read they learn about the West from the motion picture. Above all they have learned that the West has not found a way to settle international differences except by the sword. After World War I the West apologized and promised that since the world had been saved for democracy there would never be another such holocaust. A generation later, Fascism, Nazism, and the "New Order in Asia" were permitted to bring about World War II. Civilized mankind was saved again — only to stand shaking in its collective boots while science prepared the atom bomb which could return the earth to primeval chaos.

Such then are the major cultural contributions the West has made to the East. There remains now to describe very briefly the extent to which Western culture has specifically affected the separate regions of the Pacific Area.

3. The Extension of Western Culture to the Pacific Area

A. The Islands of the Pacific

The Philippines. The Philippines were the first islands of the Pacific to receive Christianity. After the explorations of Legaspi, Spanish civilization gradually infiltrated; unfortunately it was of the medieval type, and thanks to Spain's mercantilistic economic theories the Filipinos stagnated for 300 years and were almost as innocent of world progress as were the Japanese. Large-scale landownership devolved upon the few Spaniards and friars who ventured to come to the islands, and in time they possessed most of the soil that was adapted to agriculture. Gradually the Filipinos came to realize how unjustly they were being treated both by political and religious authorities, and just before the Spanish-American War broke out they had begun their fight for freedom. During the next five decades the economic and cultural institutions of the English-speaking nations to a very great extent supplanted the Spanish; English became widely spoken and the school systems were based on American educational theories. Religious liberty
followed the American flag, and although Roman Catholicism presumably has the largest number of adherents, Mohammedanism and Protestantism are both important factors in the religious life of the archipelago. Protestantism is specially influential because of its educational work. Finally, even before World War II — and increasingly since — industrial advance was making a modern nation out of las Islas Filipinas. Accordingly it may be said that the Philippine Islands today are an Oriental nation which by its acceptance of Western culture (even though Tagalog has become the official language) is a monument to the colonizing ability of the United States.

Insul Inde, Malaysia, and Indo-China. In contrast to the Philippines the Dutch East Indies, Malaysia, and Indo-China have taken unto themselves very little of Western culture. In the 1500's the Portuguese tried vainly to mix religion and trade. During the next two centuries quarrels among Portuguese, British, and Dutch precluded any attempts at cultural propaganda. By the beginning of the 1800's Britain, Holland, and France had divided up southeastern Asia and peace more or less prevailed. With peace came considerable industrial development — tin mines, oil wells, sugar-cane fields, and rubber forests — but that was all. British, Dutch, and French firmly believed in a "hands off" policy as far as the social and religious life of their colonists was concerned, and the inhabitants of these areas are still, except the Chinese immigrants, largely Mohammedan, and quite uninterested in the Western way of life.

Australasia. In the wake of her prison ships Britain brought her civilization to Australasia. The natives completely succumbed to it, and today, except for approximately 50,000 bushmen in Australia and some 90,000 Maoris in New Zealand, Australasia is a white man's country. A few native words have crept into the vocabulary of the "downunders"; otherwise the culture of Australasia is entirely Western.

Other islands. The influence of Western culture in the other Pacific islands varies greatly. Hawaii is but an extension of the United States; much of New Guinea and Borneo before World War II was scarcely out of the head-hunting stage. Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia have been pretty thoroughly Christianized and in many respects Westernized, and on the whole it may be said that Western culture has been successful in its penetration of these areas. Cannibalism, human sacrifice, and infanticide have been suppressed, while civilization and trade have been marvelously advanced. The Western religions have been widely accepted, and many a GI today can bear fervent witness to the evangelical
devotion of the erstwhile South Sea "heathen." The one thing that seems essential in the immediate future for these island areas is that the West provide the best type of rulers, so that those seekers after Western civilization may receive only that which is most worth while.

B. China

China: (a) Confucianism. When the Europeans came to eastern Asia they found, as has been recounted, three countries whose culture had been so long established that there was little likelihood of its being superseded by Western civilization. Nor did the Westerners have any such desire — all they wanted was a chance to trade with the East.
This privilege, to be sure, was obtained only with difficulty; but once secured it led to increased commercial intercourse between the Orient and the Occident and that in turn brought other features of Western culture to the East. The infiltration of Western religions into China was slow, for it was strongly opposed by Confucianism. The fundamental practical principle of Confucianism is social propriety; its ethical ideal is for every man to do his proper part in the immediate relationships of life. The center of Confucianism is ancestor worship or commemoration, and extravagant respect for the teachings and practices of dead ancestors.

(2) Buddhism. Buddhism, which came to China from India, is based on "Four noble truths": all existence involves suffering; all suffering is caused by indulgence in inherently insatiable desires; all suffering will cease upon the suppression of all desires; this suppression of desires must take place in accordance with the "noble eight-fold path." When the Europeans reached China Buddhism had pretty much lost its force.

(3) The failure of China's religions. As time went on and China little by little became somewhat Westernized, her two great religions as well as her minor ones, such as Taoism, failed to meet the needs of a modern age. The ethics of Confucianism were formulated in an age self-contained and self-satisfied; they look backward rather than forward, and like all other early philosophies do not provide for the problems of industrialism, or democracy, or internationalism. Buddhism, too, has made little attempt to adapt itself to twentieth century philosophy. Modern man will not accept the "law of the deed"; he will not take upon himself the blame for the consequences of his evil deeds, but puts it upon heredity, society, fate, God, or the Devil.

(4) Communism vs. Christianity. The result is that in the last hundred years, and especially in the last twenty-five, more and more of the leaders of China, especially those who have studied in the West, have given up their old culture. In this change Western missionaries, doctors, and teachers have been most important, and the courage of these people in staying "on the job" through the darkest hours of the last war decade has increased their effectiveness enormously. Along with their contributions must be mentioned those of the Soviet Republics; i.e., a new political ideology, a new form of economic organization, and above all, social unrest. Since World War I the Reds have been increasingly influential; and it very much looks now as if in the near future China may be the battlefield where Communist and Christian ideologies will come to grips for control of the Far East.
Japan: (1) Buddhism. In Japan as in China Western culture came into conflict with an Oriental culture hundreds of years old. As in China so in Japan culture was centered in two great religions. Of these Buddhism from the seventh century A.D. until the opening of Japan was the more important. It had been brought from China, and by the sixth century it had gained a strong footing. It was not well fitted however to the Japanese philosophical concepts, for the Nipponese believe in life; they are active, sensuous, ambitious, and aggressive. As time went on therefore the influence of Buddhism tended to be aesthetic rather than ethical.

(2) Shintoism. As a result in the Meiji era Buddhism was disestablished and its place taken by Shintoism, which is somewhat like Confucianism in that at one time it involved ancestor worship, but unlike it in that it includes Nature worship and has no explicit code of morals. Like some Western religions, it is said to believe that human beings are virtuous by nature, and it assumes that each man’s conscience is his own best guide; others say it has no philosophic concept and that it has no theory as to the pleasures or pains of life beyond the grave. The dead are disembodied spirits inheriting a world of darkness who must be propitiated because they have the power to bring sorrow or joy into the lives of their survivors. Purity and simplicity are essential characteristics of Shinto, and accordingly its shrines are built of white wood fashioned as were the huts of the aboriginal settlers of Japan without any decoration or graven image. The most common emblems of the deity are a sword, a mirror, or a jewel.

(3) Missionary activities. As has been pointed out, when Japan decided to go modern it went the whole way, even to the point of permitting Western religious propaganda. Missionary work began at Nagasaki in 1859 (S. R. Brown, J. C. Hepburn, and G. F. Verbeck are famous names in the annals of Christian missions there); in 1872 the first Japanese church was established, and in 1875 Doshisha College was started under the leadership of the famous Joseph Neesima. From these beginnings an extensive missionary movement developed, and by 1930 there were those who hoped for at least the partial Christianization of Japan.

(4) The test. Then came the Manchurian incident and the beginning of the “New Order in Asia.” Clearer and clearer it became that Japan’s leaders were taking from Western civilization only its technology, not its democracy; only its ideas, not its ideals. In so doing Japan’s warlords became intoxicated with delusions of grandeur to the point where they felt it their duty to impose upon the East the bastard culture they had
The Kamakura Buddha is one of the most famous Buddhas in the world.
developed. They struck at Pearl Harbor; and where the Japanese Christians were forced to choose between the teachings of Christ and Shinto, most of them, even the celebrated preacher, Kagawa, patriotically remained loyal to their emperor. To their surprise the culture of the West proved superior in might, at least, to that of the Sun Goddess's children.

(3) The future. As a result of Japan's defeat her cultural life as well as her political and economic life are in a state of flux. The enfranchisement of Japanese women has added to the confusion. To attempt to prophesy how far the Western way of life will replace that of the Orient in Japan would be foolhardy indeed. One statement however may be made with certainty: never since the opening of Japan has the West had such an opportunity to establish its culture in Japan as it has now.

Korea: (1) Westernization. The third country of eastern Asia to receive Western culture was Korea. As in so many other areas the religious factor was pre-eminent; but unlike other countries Western religion was introduced into Korea by Koreans. It seems that members of Korean missions in Peking had become converted to Roman Catholicism, and returning to their homes took the new religion with them. In the early 1860's it spread like wildfire, then slowed down till after the treaties of the 1880's which opened the country to foreign missionaries. These, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, were extremely successful, for they came to Korea not to superimpose a foreign doctrine but to help the effectiveness of a religion already established.

(2) The future. Today with Korea divided between Russia and the United States at the thirty-eighth parallel the Koreans are most unhappy, and distrustful of the Western attempt to provide for their future. The foundations for the development of Western culture in Korea have been laid however, and if the menace of Communism can be averted there is a likelihood that the influence of America on Korean culture will become very great.

C. Latin America

In the 1500's the culture of Spain and Portugal was brought to America, and twenty different republics stand as monuments to the colonizing abilities of the Iberian nations. Where the native culture was low it was eradicated; and those areas, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, acquired a truly European culture. Where the natives had a high state of civilization it was preserved; miscegenation took place, and today there exist mestizo republics such as Mexico, Guatemala,
Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Where the climate made hard work disagreeable, Negro slaves were imported; today in the Caribbean are such Negro and mulatto states as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Panama.

It was unfortunate that during the three centuries or more that Spain and Portugal ruled Latin America those two nations were obsessed with the economic doctrine of mercantilism. The result was that when the leading strings of the mother countries were cast aside the children started their independent careers completely untrained and ill fitted for their great adventure. For a century they plowed the sea, but at length they achieved their majority, and now on a European basis are developing a culture of their own which may eventually make a contribution to the Pacific Area equal to that made by the English-speaking peoples.

D. Anglo-Saxon America

To the north of the Rio Grande lie the United States and Canada, two great examples of the colonizing ability of Great Britain. The United States eventually preferred to "go it alone," but in the loss of that colony England learned a lesson in colonial administration that enabled her to maintain her colonial empire until World War II. Whether or not V-E Day meant the obsequies of the British Empire remains to be seen — but even if it did Anglo-Saxon culture would be available for the Far East, for there would still remain as outposts in the northeastern Pacific the United States and Canada, and in the southwestern Pacific would stand Australia and New Zealand.

E. Siberia

The last of the Pacific areas to which European culture has gone is Siberia, Russia's great eastern province. Now an integral part of the U.S.S.R., it is strategically located to enable it to exert pressure on China, the world's most populous nation. That pressure is being exerted, and today the nations which so recently fought to preserve democracy in the Pacific Area are wondering whether World War III will be necessary to obliterate Communism.

Conclusion. For 450 years the culture of western Europe filtered into the Pacific Area. It easily engulfed the Americas and Australasia, it infiltrated many of the oceanic islands, it achieved political dominance over the East Indies, Malaysia, and Indo-China, and it forced many of its ideas on China, Japan, and Korea. For the most part Britain and its offspring were the chief agencies of transmission; except for Macao and
the Philippines the Iberians paid little attention to the Far East, and even there the layer of Latin culture was extremely thin.

At the outbreak of World War II Japan seemed to be the chief obstacle to the infiltration into the East of Western political, economic, and cultural ideas. V-J Day removed that obstacle, and all seemed well — except that to the north of China lay Russia. The latter very shortly showed that it is determined to spread abroad its Communistic doctrines and to overthrow the capitalistic system of western Europe and the United States. China with its 400,000,000 inhabitants is a possible cockpit for these two great forces to meet. Whether atomic warfare can be prevented remains to be seen. If it is not, chaos will reign and mankind might return to monkeydom. To prevent this, careful study of the world's problems, and especially those of the Pacific area, is absolutely essential.
Reading Suggestions

There are several basic works useful in many broad phases of Pacific history. Instead of repeating their titles in connection with several chapter headings, we have listed them here at the beginning of this essay on authorities. Some are texts and some are more specialized, but all contain much excellent information on Pacific development.


Some histories of China and Japan can also be utilized in connection with many phases of this subject. Kenneth S. Latourette, *A Short History of the Chinese* (1934), 2 vols., is a good treatment by an outstanding scholar; his brief *Development of China* (1917) is a short survey with emphasis on the earlier centuries. The classic history of China is S.


Two popular surveys are Hendrik van Loon, *Story of the Pacific* (1940), and Felix Riesenberg, *The Pacific Ocean* (1940).


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**Chapter I**


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**Chapter II**

Chapter III


Chapter IV


Chapter V

The Dutch Empire is treated in B. H. Vlekke, *Nusantara* (1943). A classic account of English commercial expansion is H. B. Morse, *Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834* (1929), 5 vols.; and E. H. Pritchard, *The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations, 1750–1806* (1936), though concentrating on a narrower period, is also helpful. The histories of China and Japan already cited are useful, and several volumes published by the Hakluyt Society deal with early voyages, i.e., *Voyage of Captain John Sartus to Japan* (1900), etc.
Chapter VI


Chapter VII

Two volumes by Frank A. Goldsir give accounts of Russian expansion toward the Pacific: Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1641-1850 (1914), and Bering's Voyages (1921). J. Schafer, A History of the Pacific Northwest (1918), discusses Russian expeditions to North America, as does John W. Caughey, History of the Pacific Coast (1918). Contacts with China are taken up in G. Cahen, Some Early Russo-Chinese Relations (1936), J. Dudgeon, Historical Sketch of ... Relations of Russia with China (1872), and E. H. Parker, China: her History, Diplomacy, and Commerce (1919). Two general works on Russian expansion in Asia are also worth consulting: Robert J. Kernor, The Urge to the Sea (1942), and A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Asia (1933). Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent (1940), 3 vols., has a chapter on Russian contacts.

Chapter VIII

Russian adventures in the northeast Pacific are discussed by Goldsir, Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1641-1850 (1914). British competition is described by A. Campbell, A Voyage around the World, 1806-1812 (1816), James Cook and J. King, A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean (1785), an account of Captain Cook's famous expedition, J. Mearns, Voyages ... from China to the Northwest Coast of America (1790), by a participant in the fur trade, and George Vancouver, A Voyage of Discovery (1798), 3 vols., by an official government explorer. Several books have been written on American participation in Pacific commerce. Notable among them are Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia (1922), Sidney and Marjorie Greenbie, Gold of Ophir (1925), G. S. Kimball, The East India Trade of Providence, 1787-1807 (1894-99), Kenneth S. Latourette, History of Early Relations between the United States and China, 1784-1844 (1907), B. Lubbock, The China Clippers (1914), and Samuel E. Morison, The Maritime History of Massachusetts (1921). A classic account of American maritime trade with California is Richard H. Dana, Two Years Before the Mast (numerous ed.) See also Jean Ingram Brookes, International Rivalry in the Pacific Islands, 1800-1875 (1941).
Chapter IX


Chapter X

The best recent history of Hawaii is Harold W. Bradley, The American Frontier in Hawaii: the Pioneers, 1789–1843 (1942); other volumes are to follow. See also W. D. W. Alexander, History of the Hawaiian People (1892), and A. Forandier, Account of Polynesian Races and the Ancient History of the Hawaiian People to . . . Kamehameha I (1878–85), 3 vols. The missionary viewpoint is well expressed by Hiram Bingham, Residence . . . in the Sandwich Islands (1847); travelers’ accounts include Alonzo Delano, Narrative of Voyages (1818), G. W. Bates, Sandwich Island Notes by a Haole (1854), and H. M. Lyman, Hawaiian Yesterdays (1906). Foreign contacts are described in two items by W. D. Alexander in Hawaiian Historical Society Publications, The Proceedings of the Russians on Kauai, 1814–1816 (1894) and The Relations between the Hawaiian Islands and Spanish America in Early Times (1892), and in S. W. Castle, An Account of the Visit of the French Frigate l’Artemise (1839), and George Simpson, A Journey around the World (1847), 2 vols.

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**Chapter XVII**

South China (1902). French contacts with Siam are described in K. P. Landon, Siam in Transition (1939), V. Thompson, Thailand, the New Siam (1941), A. C. Carter, The Kingdom of Siam (1904), and in a classical older account, E. Young, The Kingdom of the Yellow Robe (1898). General policies of French colonization are described by H. Bell, Foreign Colonization in the Far East (1928), and more specialized aspects in greater detail can be found in H. I. Priestley, France Overseas: a Study of Modern Imperialism (1938), and S. H. Roberts, History of French Colonial Policy (1929), 2 vols.

Chapter XVIII

Britain’s adventures in the Pacific have been described at length in hundreds of works. The following therefore are merely examples of type; many others are equally good. L. A. Mills, British Rule in Eastern Asia (1942), is a recent study of the intensified problem of nationalism versus imperialism. See also A. J. Herbertson and O. J. R. Howarth, Oxford Survey of the British Empire (1914), 7 vols., notably the sections on Asia and Australasia. C. P. Lucas (ed.), A Historical Geography of the British Colonies (1900), 15 vols., is another excellent set, emphasizing historical development. For a fairly complete picture of British penetration of China see C. A. M. Smith, The British in China and Far Eastern Trade (1920), together with C. E. Bruce-Mitford, The Territory of Weihsien (1902), and R. F. Johnston, Lion and Dragon in North China (1910). For Malaysia see R. Emerson, Malaya, a Struggle in Direct and Indirect Rule (1937), R. H. B. Lockhart, Return to Malaya (1936), and D. C. Boulger, Life of Sir Stamford Raffles (1899). The British in Borneo are discussed by S. Baring-Gould and C. A. Bamfylde, History of Sarawak (1909), and S. St. John, Rajah Brooke (1899); the latter describes the romantic career of the white rajah and the growth of his private state. The Pacific islands and Australasia are described in many older works, one of which is James A. Froude, Oceanic or, England and her Colonies (1886). For more recent treatment, see publications of the IPR. Items already listed on Australia and New Zealand apply here as well. Canadian relationships in the Pacific are described by C. P. Lucas, A History of Canada (1909).

Chapter XIX

Items already listed on Russian eastward expansion, such as Kerner and Lobanov-Rostovsky, should be consulted. See also A. R. Colquhoun, The “Overland” to China (1900), and Memoirs of Count Witte (1921). Russia’s empire in Siberia is described in W. Mandel, The Soviet Far East and Central Asia (1944), Elma Dangerfield, Beyond the Urals (1946), and Corliss Lamont, The Peoples of the Soviet Union (1946). See also S. A. Korff, Russia’s Foreign Relations during the Last Half Century (1922), A. Krausse, Russia in Asia . . . 1958-1899 (1899), L. Pasvolsky, Russia in the Far East (1924), and V. A. Yakhowitoff, The Chinese Soviets (1934). Details of Russian imperial administration under the Soviet régime are less well known and subject to biased treatment on both sides.
Chapter XX

Basic works include M. E. Townsend, _The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire_ (1930), and by the same author, _Origin of Modern German Colonization, 1871-1885_ (1921); also P. Giordani, _The German Empire, its Beginning and Ending_ (1916). Britain's worry over Germany's advance into the Bismarck Archipelago and New Guinea is discussed in C. K. Cooke, _Australian Defences and New Guinea_ (1887). Accounts of Pacific island possessions include F. W. Christian, _The Caroline Islands_ (1899), F. Reinecke, _Samoa_ (1901), and a thrilling account of the international friction, climaxd by the hurricane, by Robert Louis Stevenson, _A Foot-Note to History: Eight Years of Trouble in Samoa_ (1892). For Germany's adventures in China see R. A. Norem, _Kiaochow Leased Territory_ (1936).

Chapter XXI

General works include William H. Haas (ed.), _The American Empire_ (1940), which has excellent sections on Hawaii and the Philippines, F. R. Dulles, _America in the Pacific_ (1936), J. H. Laranjol, _America as a World Power_ (1927), E. A. Falk, _From Perry to Pearl Harbor_ (1941), and A. W. Griswold, _The Far Eastern Policy of the United States_ (1938). For Hawaii, see R. S. Kuykendall, _A History of Hawaii_ (1935), an elementary text; also J. A. Gillis, _The Hawaiian Incident of 1893_ (1897), and L. H. Hallock, _Hawaii under King Kalakaua_ (1914). Much has been written on the Philippines and their relation to America. A standard work is David Barrows, _History of the Philippines_ (1925). J. H. Blount, _The American Occupation of the Philippines_ (1912), and M. Storey and M. P. Lichauco, _The Conquest of the Philippines by the United States, 1898-1921_ (1926), deal with the acquisition. Administrative problems are dealt with in W. Cameron Forbes, _The Philippine Islands_ (1928), J. R. Hayden, _The Philippines, a Study in National Development_ (1942), and D. R. Williams, _The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission_ (1913). The problem of independence is excellently handled by G. Kirk, _Philippine Independence_ (1936), and is also discussed in C. Porter, _Crisis in the Philippines_ (1942). See also D. M. Lett, _Uncle Sam's Pacific Islets_ (1940).

Chapter XXII

Among the standard authorities already listed, Harold Vinacke, _History of the Far East in Modern Times_, gives the best survey of China during the 1890's. See also C. Beresford, _The Breakup of China_ (1899), a classic reference; W. W. Rockhill, _Diplomatic Ambassadors at the Court of China_ (1905), by an American diplomat; and A. Krausse, _China in Decay_ (1900). For details on the Boxer revolt consult J. O. P. Bland and E. Backhouse, _China under the Empress Dowager_ (1910), a revealing and intimate account of high court politics during the crisis; P. H. Clements, _The Boxer Rebellion_ (1915), W. A. P. Martin, _The Siege of Peking_ (1900), and A. S. Daggett, _America in the China Relief Expedition_ (1903).
Chapter XXIII


Chapter XXIV

Problems of the reform era in China are discussed in J. W. Bashford, China: an Interpretation (1910), W. Cecil, Changing China (1910), E. J. Harrison, Peace or War East of Baikal (1910), and P. H. Kent, Railway Enterprise in China (1907). The outbreak of revolution is best treated by Harley F. MacNair, China in Revolution (1931); other accounts include A. J. Brown, The Chinese Revolution (1912), E. J. Dingle, China's Revolution, 1911-1912 (1912), and A. N. Holcombe, The Chinese Revolution (1910). See also Harold M. Vinacke, Modern Constitutional Development in China (1920), J. O. P. Bland and E. Backhouse, Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking (1914), J. Cantlie and C. S. Jones, Sun Yat-sen and the Awakening of China (1912), and P. Linebarger, Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic (1925). Of the histories of the Far East, Steiger gives the best historical account of the revolution.

Chapter XXV

China's part in World War I is described in T. E. LaFargue, China and the World War (1917), the best account; and W. R. Wheeler, China and the World War (1919), an older, brief survey. See W. O. Stevens and A. Westcott, A History of Sea Power (1942), for naval operations in the Pacific. Two titles published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace deal with the Shantung question: Shantung Treaties and Agreements (1922) and The Sino-Japanese Negotiations of 1915 (1921). See also S. K. Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East (1916), G. Z. Wood, The Twenty-One Demands (1912), takes up the matter from the Chinese point of view. The Siberian expedition is described by F. Coleman, Japan Moves North (1919), and W. S. Graves, America's Siberian Adventure, 1918-1920 (1931).
Chapter XXVI


Chapter XXVII


Chapter XXVIII

Works dealing primarily with Japan's expansion in east Asia are seldom objective. Most are journalistic in character and frankly anti-Japanese. Some few however have attempted a more scholarly approach. Two good background items are J. F. Embree, The Japanese Nation (1945), and the already-cited

**Chapter XXIX**

Of the texts, Latourette’s *Short History* and Steiger have the most complete accounts of World War II. For combat operations see Walter P. Hall, *Iron out of Calvary* (1946), a swiftly-moving account of the war; F. T. Miller (ed.), *History of World War II* (1946), a poorly organized collection of combat accounts; R. Shugg and H. A. DeWeerd, *World War II, a Concise History* (1946), a more objective survey; and periodicals such as *Foreign Affairs*, *Time*, and *Newsweek* for the war years. Of the newspapers, the *New York Times* had by far the best coverage of both diplomatic and military operations, publishing communiqués which were merely summed up by most newspapers and wire services. A rather full running account of the combat can be gleaned from the *Encyclopædia Britannica Yearbooks* from 1939 to 1945. A vast literature of journalistic accounts of various phases of Pacific combat operations also exists. Many are of high quality, but they should be used with caution, as drama and box-office appeal often supersede accuracy. Three good ones are William L. White, *They Were Expendable* (1942) and *Queens Die Proudly* (1943), and Richard Tregaskis, *Guadalcanal Diary* (1943). For causative factors, see United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1932–1941* (1943), 2 vols., and other works pertaining to China and Japan during the 1930’s already cited.

**Chapter XXX**

The history of the Pacific Area since the end of World War II must necessarily be gleaned from periodical literature. Probably the best source for any subject of this kind is the *Encyclopædia Britannica Yearbooks*, which consider in detail the political and economic developments in most areas of the Far East. The major lack in this reference is sufficient information about Soviet Siberia — but detailed information on this topic is, in any case, very scarce. *Time, Newsweek*, the *New York Times*, and the *Christian Science Monitor* provide current information of great value, although the editorializing of the first two must be taken into consideration. *Current History* has, besides useful articles on phases of the subject, a country-by-country chronology which provides current information, and periodicals like *Foreign Affairs*, the *Far Eastern Quarterly*, and others of similar nature
should be consulted. A good summation of Pacific problems is found in Kenneth S. Latourette, *The United States Moves Across the Pacific* (1946).

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# Picture Acknowledgments

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