HISTORY OF AURANGZIB

Vol. II.
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HISTORY OF AURANGZIB

Mainly based on Persian Sources.

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War of Succession.

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Reaching Ujjain with his army at the end of February, Jaswant was quite in Ujjain to oppose the dark about Aurangzib's intentions and movements. So strictly did that Prince watch the roads and ferries of the Narmada river that no news from the Deccan reached Jaswant. The Rajput general, however, learnt that Murad was coming from Guzerat. So, he issued from Ujjain, took post near Kachraud to bar the enemy's path, and sent his spies towards Murad's camp for further news. Murad was then 36 miles away, but on finding Jaswant's force greatly superior to his own, he prudently avoided a battle and making
a wide detour round Kachraud arrived south of it, in order to be near the Narmada and Aurangzib's line of advance.

Jaswant heard of this movement, and in his present state of ignorance could not account for it. Just then he got a letter from Mandu Fort telling him that Aurangzib had crossed the Narmada. A party of Dara's troops, who had fled from the fort of Dhar at the approach of Aurangzib, now joined Jaswant and confirmed the news. The Maharajah was at his wits' end; so well had Aurangzib's movements been kept secret that Jaswant had not heard of his march from Burhanpur, begun as early as 20th March, nor of his having crossed the Narmada. The first news that he got of Aurangzib was that the Prince was already in Malwa and rapidly marching on Ujjain.* At the same time, from Murad's present position, a junction between the two brothers was most likely.

In utter perplexity Jaswant returned to Ujjain. Here a Brahman envoy, surnamed Kavi Rai, delivered to him Aurangzib's message advising him to give up his opposition and return peacefully to Jodhpur as the Prince was only going to Agra to visit his father without any thought

of waging war. Jaswant declined, saying, "I must carry out the Emperor's orders. I cannot retrace my steps without disgrace."

He then advanced 14 miles south-west of Ujjain and encamped opposite Dharmat to block the path of the enemy coming up from the south. Here another startling news reached him: Murad had joined Aurangzib (14th April) and the two were within a day's march of him. This was a contingency that Jaswant had not thought of before. His waiting strategy had failed to keep the two princes apart. How was he to meet their united forces now? He quailed at the prospect. Next morning when Aurangzib's army had already begun to march to the encounter, Jaswant "in mortal fear" attempted to parley. He sent a messenger to Aurangzib to beg the Prince's pardon and say, "I do not want to fight, and I have no power to show audacity to your Highness. My wish is to visit and serve you. If you pardon me and give up your project of a fight, I shall go and wait on you." But Aurangzib knew his own advantage and was not willing to strengthen the enemy by granting him time. His reply was, "As I have already started, delay is out of place..."
now. If you really mean what you say, leave your army and come alone to Najabat Khan, who will guide you to my son Muhammad Sultan, and that prince will introduce you to me and secure your pardon.”

Such a humiliating submission before striking a blow, the chief of the Rathors could not bring himself to make. He prepared for fight. But a general who shrinks in terror, changes his mind, and attempts to gain time by parleying before a battle, is not likely to win in the clash of arms; he has already lost that confidence which is half the victory.

Jaswant had come to Malwa in the hope that the mere prestige of the Imperial standards would send the rebellious princes back to their provinces, and that all that he would have to undertake was a mere demonstration of force. Now, when too late, he realised that his adversaries were in deadly earnest and ready to fight to the bitter end. He marshalled his forces against them, but most reluctantly, as if he were going to commit a high crime; his spirit quailed before that of Aurangzib.

battle fought between two such generals can have but one issue.

Jaswant had been charged by Shah Jahan to send the two rebellious princes back to their own provinces with as little injury to them as possible, and to fight them only as a last resource. At all times, a subject opposing two princes of the blood, a servant fighting for a distant master against two chiefs who acknowledge no higher authority than their own will, is severely handicapped. In Jaswant's case the natural inferiority of his position was aggravated by the commands he had received from Shah Jahan. While Aurangzib followed his own judgment only, knew his own mind, and, fired by the highest ambition, pursued his object with all his resources and singleness of aim, ready to do and dare his utmost,—Jaswant was hesitating, distracted by the conflict between the instructions from Agra and the exigencies of the actual military situation in Malwa, and entirely dependent for his own line of action on what his opponents would do. A general so situated cannot have the advantage of taking the aggressive and forcing the enemy to

abandon his plans; nor can he pursue his aim with iron will to the bitter end.

His army, too, was an ill-knit group of discordant elements. The various Rajput clans were often divided from each other by hereditary feuds and quarrels about dignity and precedence. Unlike Jai Singh, Jaswant was not the commander to humour and manage them, and make all obey the will of one common head. Then, again, there was the standing aloofness between Hindus and Muhammadans. It had been found next to impossible to brigade these creeds together for a campaign under one general. Hence, in the first siege of Qandahar all the Rajputs of the Mughal Van marched under Rajah Bithaldas and all the Muslims under Bahadur Khan,\* two co-ordinate authorities subject only to the commander-in-chief. In the Bijapur war also all the Rajputs of the reinforcements sent from Hindustan were led by Chhatra Sal Hada, and all the Muslim troops by Mahabat Khan. It was only a commander standing in a position of unquestioned superiority above the heads of the other generals, that could make the two creeds work in amity. Aurangzib was one such by birth as much as by merit. But Jaswant was a

* Waris, 276.
mere *mansabdar*, only two grades higher than Qasim Khan, and socially equal to him, as both were governors of provinces. There could not, therefore, be unity of command in the Imperial army. Indeed, Qasim Khan's orders were to cooperate with the Maharajah, and not to act as his subordinate.

This division of command accentuated the difference of creeds in the Imperial army and rendered its success difficult. Several of the Muslim officers moreover, were, secretly friendly to Aurangzib or had been corrupted by him. The history of the battle that followed proves this suspicion true: while the Imperialists lost 24 Rajput chiefs in the conflict, only one Muhammadan general was killed on their side. "Qasim Khan and all the Imperial troops who in this battle had not become the target of the arrows of Fate, fled," as the official history issued by Aurangzib records. This circumstance lends colour to the theory that they had kept themselves out of harm's way. The day following the battle four Muhammadan officers of the Imperial army came over to Aurangzib and were rewarded by him. *

men could not have fought loyally twenty-four hours earlier.

Finally, Jaswant as a general was no match for Aurangzib, who had "aged incapacity as a in war." Contemporary historians* blame him for his incapacity, inexperience and faulty plans. He chose his ground badly and so cramped his men that the horsemen could not manoeuvre freely nor gather momentum for a charge; he failed to send timely succour to the divisions that needed it most, and, the battle once begun, he lost control over his forces as if he were a mere divisional leader and not the supreme commander of all. Lastly, he made the fatal mistake of despising artillery. It is said† that the night before the battle, his chief officer Askaran, surnamed Kirtiwant, had urged him, "The two princes have drawn up their guns in front of us. The brave Rajputs do not love their families or own lives very much, so that when they move to the encounter they will never step back. The artillery of the other side

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* Kambu, 11a & b. Aqil Khan 28, 30. Faiyas, 469.
† Isar-das, 20a.
will annihilate them. If you only give the order, I with 4000 of our men shall fall on their artillery at midnight, slay the gunners and capture the guns. Thereafter the enemy will not have strength enough to defeat us in a pitched battle.” But Jaswant replied, “It is inconsistent with manliness and Rajput usage to employ stratagem or make a night-attack. Next morning, with God’s grace, I shall use a plan by which their artillery will lie at its place on one side, and the Rajputs coming upon their troops will gain the victory. Not a man (of us) will be hurt by the guns.”

Evidently Jaswant’s plan was to skirt the enemy’s artillery and come to close quarters with their troops, disregarding the gun-fire during the first few minutes of the wild gallop. But such tactics could have succeeded only if the charge had been made on a wide level plain and also if the opposing artillery had been served by Indians proverbially slow in turning and firing their pieces. But when the battle began, the Rajputs were penned within a narrow space with ditches and entrenchments on their flanks, and subjected to a deadly fire before they could expand their formation for a charge. Secondly,
after they had passed by the enemy's artillery and engaged Aurangzib's troops, the French and English gunners of the Prince quickly turned their guns sideways and began to mow down the Rajputs in their new position. It was truly a contest between swords and gunpowder, and artillery triumphed over cavalry.

The ground* where Jaswant took his stand was narrow and uneven, with chosen for the ditches and swamps on its flanks. One historian asserts that Jaswant had deliberately poured water on and

* Kambu says, "These two inexpert generals, through faulty counsel, took post in a narrow swamp and uneven ground. Next morning when they marshalled their troops, a large body was packed in that narrow pass, one behind another, and some stood here and there on the sides, without order or method... Owing to the narrowness of the field and the pressure [of the enemy] from the two sides, the Imperialists found no space to manoeuvre." (11b). Aqil Khan supports this statement and adds, "Jaswant drew up his troops on uneven ground, on the bank of the Narmada (!); having poured water he made 200 yards of ground near it muddy." (28, 30.) Murad's own description is, "Jaswant encamped on a plot of land which had ditches of water on all the four sides [joined to] swamps, and set up entrenchments round it." (Faiyaz, 469). Bernier's description of the battle-field is very inaccurate; the Persian histories do not speak of any "disputed passage" across the river, as the fight seems to have taken place more than a mile from the bank. I have visited the scene and found there not a single "rock in the bed of the river"; and the banks are not of "uncommon height," as is asserted by Bernier, (38-39).

The battle evidently took place west of Fatihabad, close to the Ratan Singh Monument, and not east of the village of Dharmat. (A. N. names the village Dharmat-pur,
trodden into mud 200 yards of ground in front of him, evidently to arrest the enemy's charge. His position was also surrounded by trenches thrown up during the previous day, as the usual precaution against night attacks. In short, the Imperial army seemed to be standing on an island, ready for a siege. No worse disposition can be imagined for a pitched battle to be fought by cavaliers on mettled horses.

Of the forces engaged, we know that Aurangzib had 30,000 men with him. To this must be added Murad's contingent, probably less than 10,000. The Imperial army is variously estimated. Aurangzib puts it at "30,000 horse and many infantry," Isardas at 50,000; Murad goes even further and counts the enemy as 50 or 60 thousand. Aqil Khan estimates it at 30,000. So, we may conclude that the two armies were almost equally matched and numbered over 35,000 men each.*

but the *Ind. Atlas*, sheet 36 N. E., and the villagers call it Dharmat). We read in *A. N.*, "One kos from Dharmatpur Jaswant barred the Prince's road....Jaswant encamped opposite Dharmatpur, one kos from Aurangzib's army. ...Aurangzib's tent was pitched on the bank of the nullah of Churnarayanah." The right bank of the river, facing Dharmat, slopes gently, and could not have presented any difficulty to the attacking cavalry and guns. There is no swamp opposite Dharmat, but some damp soil and nullahs near Ratan Singh's Memorial. I conclude from the Persian accounts that the battle was fought in a plain and not in the bed of a river.

* *Adab, 164a. Isar-das, 19a, (but, on 17a, he puts Murad's army at 70,000 men.) Fasyaz 469. Aqil Khan, 28.*
On Aurangzib's side the divisions were thus formed: The Van, said to have consisted of 8,000 steel-clad veterans, under Prince Muhammad Sultan and Najabat Khan, with Zulfiqar Khan and some guns guarding its front,—the main artillery under Murshid Quli Khan,—the Right Wing under Murad,—the Left Wing under Multafat Khan, with the boy-prince Muhammad Azam as honorary commander,—the Advanced Reserve (iltimsh) under Murtaza Khan with Aurangzib's own guards,—the Centre under Aurangzib himself, with Shaikh Mir and Saf Shikan Khan guarding his Right and Left sides. Some pieces of artillery were posted with the latter. As usual there was a screen of skirmishers in front, composed of the scouts and the servants of the hunting department.

Jaswant's Van, 10,000 strong, was formed in two columns, one under Qasim Khan, and the other, composed of several thousand Rajputs, under Mukund Singh Hada and six other Hindu chieftains. On his two wings were Rajah Rai Singh Sisodia and his clansmen (the Right), and Iftikhar Khan with the Muslim troops of the Imperial service (the Left). The Centre he led in person, with 2000 of his devoted clansmen,
besides other Rajput and Imperial troops at his back. The Advanced Reserve was also composed of Rajputs, led by a Gaur and a Rathor, while the skirmishers were a party of warriors from Central Asia, expert in the use of the bow. The Camp and baggage, left close to the battlefield, were guarded by Maluji, Parsuji (two Maratha auxiliaries) and Rajah Devi Singh Bundela.*

It was a little over two hours from sunrise when the rival hosts sighted each other. The battle began with the usual discharge of artillery, rockets, and muskets at long range. The distance gradually decreased, as Aurangzib’s army advanced slowly, keeping its regular formation. Suddenly the kettledrums struck up, the trumpets pealed forth, and the conflict began at close quarters. The Rajputs densely packed within their narrow position, were severely

* A. N. 61—66. Aqil Khan, 28-29. Isar-das, 208. Masum (48a) cannot be trusted. For the description of the battle our main authorities are A. N. 66—73, Aqil Khan 29—31, and Isar-das 208-218, (extremely valuable for Jaswant’s doings), and secondarily Kambu 118, and Masum (inaccurate as usual), 48b—51a, Faiyas, 469-470, and Adab, 164a & b, 206b, 123a, 133b, are very meagre. Bernier is entirely unreliable. Tod (ii. 875) merely records the wild fiction of the Rajput bards. Khafi Khan (ii. 14—18) is not an original authority, but avowedly borrowed from A. N. and Aqil Khan.
galled by the *barqandazes* and archers of the Princes' army from front and flank, without being able to manoeuvre freely and give an effective reply. Their losses began to mount up every minute. Death has no terror for the Rajput, but then it must be death in conflict. If he is to die, it is better to perish after killing some of the enemy, than to be butchered while standing motionless in a dense column. So thinking, the Rajput leaders of the Van,—Mukund Singh Hada, Ratan Singh Rathor, Dayal Singh Jhala, Arjun Singh Gaur, Sujan Singh Sisodia and others, with their choicest clansmen, galloped forward. Shouting their war-cry of *Ram!* *Ram!* “they fell on the enemy like tigers, casting away all plan.” The flood of Rajput charge first burst on Aurangzib's artillery. The guns and muskets fired at point-blank range, woefully thinned their ranks, but so impetuous was their onset that it bore down all opposition. Murshid Quli Khan, the Chief of Artillery, was slain after a heroic resistance and his division was shaken; but the guns were not damaged. The artillerymen probably fled before the storm, and returned as soon as it passed away. Victorious over the artillery guard, the assailants fell on the front
part of Aurangzib's Vanguard. Here an obstinate hand-to-hand combat raged for some time. The Rajputs at first outnumbered their opponents. Zulfiqar Khan, the commander of the front division of the Van, when pressed hard by the enemy, followed the custom of Indian heroes in the sorest straits. Getting down from his elephant, he made a firm stand on foot in the centre of the carnage, fighting with the valour of despair, without caring for his own life or stopping to count how many backed him. But this heroic sacrifice could not stem the tide of Rajput onset: two wounds stretched him low, and the Rajputs, flushed with success, swept on and pierced into the heart of the Van. This was the most critical moment of the day. If the Rajput charge were not checked, all would be over with Aurangzib; the assailants, gathering impetus with each victory, would shatter his defence, and then all the divisions of his army would catch the contagion of panic and rush headlong out of the field.

But the Van was composed of his most picked troops, "eight thousand mail-clad warriors," many of them hereditary fighters of the Afghan race, and their generals were reliable men.
Muhammad Sultan, Najabat Khan, and other commanders of the Van, on their elephants kept their ground like hills, while the flood of Rajput charge raged round and round them in eddies. Here the most stubborn and decisive fighting of the day took place. Sword and dagger alone could be plied as the hostile cavaliers grappled together at close quarters. "The ground was dyed crimson with blood like a tulip-bed." The Rajputs, being divided into many mutually antagonistic clans, could not charge in one compact mass; they were broken up into six or seven bodies, each under its own chieftain and each choosing its own point of attack. Thus the force of their impact was divided and weakened as soon as it struck the dense mass of Aurangzib's Van. Each clan engaged the enemy for itself and whirled round its own antagonist, instead of battering down all opposition and cleaving through the Van in resistless career by forming one solid wedge, moving with one will.

Only a few men from Jaswant's Centre and Advanced Reserve had moved up to support their victorious brethren. But the Maharajah had chosen his position so badly that many of the Imperialists standing on the uneven ground could not join in the fight, and many others could
not charge by reason of their being cramped within a narrow space. Half the Imperial Van, viz., the Mughal troops under Qasim Khan, rendered no aid to their Rajput comrades now struggling hard with Aurangzib’s Van; they were suspected of collusion with the enemy or of antipathy to the Rajputs. The charge of Jaswunt’s Vanguard was not followed up. Aurangzib’s troops, who had parted before the rushing tide, closed again behind them, and thus cut off their retreat. Jaswunt, too, was not the cool and wise commander to keep watch on all the field and send timely support to any hard pressed division. And the development of the action now made the sending of aid to the Van impossible, and even rendered his own position untenable.

For, by this time the watchful eye of Aurangzib had taken the situation in, his Advanced Reserve had been pushed up to reinforce the Van, and he himself moved forward with the Centre to form a wall of support and refuge close behind them. Above all, Shaikh Mir and Saf Shikan Khan with the right and left wings of the Centre struck the Rajputs in the waist from the two flanks, while they were engaged with Aurangzib’s Van in front. Hemmed by foes on all sides, their
ranks getting constantly thinned, without support or reinforcement arriving from their own army, the Rajputs were disheartened and checked. Mukund Singh Hada, their gallant leader, received an arrow through his eye and fell down dead. All the six Rajput chieftains engaged in the charge were slain. Hopelessly outnumbered now, assailed in front, right, and left, and cut off from their rear, the Rajputs were slaughtered after performing frantic deeds of valour, as was their wont. "The dead formed heaps. The daggers grew blunt with slaughter." "Vast numbers of ordinary Rajput soldiers were killed." Thus the first attack was annihilated.

Meantime the action had become general. Recovering from the shock of Mukund Singh's charge as soon as the Rajput cavalcade swept on to another point, Aurangzib's gunners, with their pieces mounted on high ground, concentrated their fire on the enemy's Centre under Jaswant himself. The Imperialists, crowded together on a narrow ground flanked with impassable ditches and swamps, could not manoeuvre freely, and "sacrificed their lives like moths in the flame of war." At the sight of the
annihilation of their brave Vanguard and a triumphant forward movement on the part of Aurangzib, defection appeared in the Maharajah’s ranks. Rai Singh Sisodia from the right flank of the Centre, and Sujan Singh Bundela and Amar Singh Chandrawat from the Van, left the field with their clansmen and returned home.

But in the heart of the Imperial Centre, under the banner of Marwar, stood Murad attacks the Imperial Left Wing 2,000 Rathors, ready to live or to die with their chieftain, besides many other Rajput and Mughal auxiliaries; and these offered a stubborn opposition. But it was of no avail. For, meantime Murad Baksh with his division had fallen on Jaswant’s camp, close to the field, secured the submission of one of its defenders, Devi Singh Bundela, and driven off the rest. Then advancing into the field itself, Murad fell on the Left Wing of the Imperial army. Iftikhar Khan, the commander of this division, worn out with the day’s struggle and now attacked by fresh troops in overwhelming number, fought valiantly to the death; many of his colleagues, traitors at heart, fled to join Aurangzib the next day; and the Imperial Left Wing soon ceased to exist.
Rai Singh's flight had already uncovered Jaswant's right flank; the fall of Iftikhar Khan exposed his left. Meantime his Van had almost entirely melted away: part of it had perished around Mukund Singh in his heroic charge; of the rest, the Chandrawat Rajputs and Bundelas had fled, and the Musalmans under Qasim Khan, who had kept aloof from the fighting, prepared to run away as they saw Aurangzib's host advancing on them. Only one course was left to a Rajput general under such circumstances; he must charge into the thickest press of the enemy and die amidst a heap of the slain. And this Jaswant wanted to do. He had fought valiantly for four hours and by firmly keeping his own ground he had so long saved the Imperial Centre, is about to be surrounded at the Centre; the pivot on which his whole army rested. In spite of two wounds, his voice and example had cheered the Rajputs. But now Aurangzib from the front, Murad from the left, and Saf Shikan Khan from the right, were converging on him like a tumultuous flood, to envelop his small remnant of clansmen. Such a combat could have only one issue: victory was impossible, but a hero's death—no less dear to the Rajput heart—was within his reach. He wanted to drive his
horse into the advancing enemy’s ranks and get slain. But his generals Askaran and Maheshdas Gaur, and Govardhan and other ministers seized his bridle and dragged his horse out of the field. Mughal princes might cut each other’s throats, but why should the head of the Rathors and the hope of Marwar give up his life in their domestic quarrel? With a few Rathors, mostly wounded, the sole remnant of his gallant band, the vanquished general took the road to Jodhpur.

The battle had been already lost, and flight of the Rathors removed the last semblance of resistance. There was now a general flight of the few divisions of the Imperial army that had still kept the field. The Rajputs retreated to their homes, the Muslims towards Agra.

* Isar-das (216),—“Jaswant wanted to ride into the struggle and get slain, but Mahesh-das, Askaran and other pradhans seized his bridle and brought him away.” Masum (50b),—“The Maharajah was wounded and fell down from his horse. His devoted Rajputs wanted to take him to a safe place. He forbade it, saying, &c.... They did not listen to him, but removed the wounded man full of severe pains.” Aqil Khan (31),—“The Rajah, in spite of his receiving two wounds, stood firmly and encouraged the Rajputs as far as possible.” Bernier (39),—“Qasim Khan ingloriously fled from the field, leaving Jaswant Singh exposed to the most imminent peril. That undaunted Rajah was beset on all sides by an overwhelming force, and saved only by the affecting devotion of his Rajputs, the greater part of whom died at his feet.” Manucci (i. 259),—“The Rajah never ceased to fight most desperately, until at length he saw himself left with only the smallest remnant of his force.”
The soldiers had been under arms for more than eight hours of a hot April day. Victor and vanquished alike were worn out by the strife. So, Aurangzib “mercifully forbade pursuit, saying that this sparing of human life was his tithe-offering (sakat) to the Creator.” But the Creator in Aurangzib’s creed is evidently the Creator of Muslims only. The Prince’s instructions to his officers were to spare the life of every Musalman found in the field and to respect the property and chastity of the Musalmans found in the enemy’s camp. The Hindus were outside the pale of his mercy, though several thousands of this creed had fought loyally under his banners, and out of his four high officers wounded one was a Hindu.*

There was another and more probable reason for not ordering a pursuit. The deserted camp of the Imperialists close to the field, contained “booty beyond imagination.” Hither the victors flocked. The two brothers must have jealously watched that neither should seize more than his fixed share of the spoils,—two-thirds for Aurangzib, and one-

* a, N., 73, Maşum, 51a. But Kambu (116) and Aqil Khan (32) say that there was a pursuit for 3 or 4 kos during which many were slain. But we must accept the authority of Aurangzib’s official history.
third for Murad. The entire camp of Jaswant and Qasim Khan with all their artillery, tents, and elephants, as well as a vast amount of treasure, became the victors' spoil, while the soldiers looted the property equipment and baggage of the vanquished army. Long strings of camels and mules, laden with various articles, were seized as prize or pillaged by the common soldiers and camp-followers.*

But far greater than all these material gains was the moral prestige secured by Aurangzib. Dharmat became the omen of his future success in the opinion of his followers and of the people at large throughout the empire. At one blow he had brought Dara down from a position of immense superiority to one of equality with his own, or even lower. The hero of the Deccan wars and the victor of Dharmat faced the world not only without loss but with his military reputation rendered absolutely unrivalled in India. Waverers hesitated no longer; they now knew beyond a moment's doubt which of the four brothers was the chosen favourite of Victory. Even on the field of battle Aurangzib was hailed with "shouts of congratulation from the earth

* For the booty, A. N., 71-72, Khafi Khan, ii. 18, Kambu, 11b.
and the age," as his servant wrote with pardonable exaggeration.

No sooner had Jaswant and Qasim Khan turned their backs than Aurangzib’s band struck up the notes of victory: the drums beat, the kurka sent forth a merry peal, and the clarion sounded, proclaiming far and near that the battle had been won. Aurangzib knelt down on the field and with folded arms rendered thanks to the Giver of Victory. Then he marched to the deserted encampment of the enemy, pitched his own small campaigning tent there, and afterwards performed the evening prayer in full concourse of Muslim officers and men. Murad now arrived, congratulated him on his victory, and introduced the deserter Devi Singh Bundela. Murad’s co-operation in the victory was rewarded with 15,000 gold pieces, offered delicately as "surgeons’ fee for his wounded followers," besides four elephants and other presents.*

On the site of the conflict the victorious Prince ordered, a village to be founded, A urang zib’s memorial buildings at Fatihabad. with a garden, mosque, and serai. † The village, bearing the usual name of Fatihabad or ‘Abode of Vic-

* A. N., 74-75, Khafi Khan, ii. 19.
† Isar-das, 222. Dilkasha, 23. My description of the present condition of the place is based on a visit paid in October, 1909.
tory,' has now grown almost into a small town, as it is a railway junction. The mosque stands on a high platform, the front part of which has sunk in the middle, through the havoc of centuries and badness of masonry work. One of its three domes has fallen down and the red sandstone facing of the edifice has slipped down in many places, revealing the ill-laid concrete within. But its boundary walls enclose a vast area, and from their top a good view of the country can be commanded, especially on the west and north. The *serai* has entirely disappeared in two hundred and fifty years of neglect, unless the fragments of a few cloisters on the north wall of the quadrangle belong to it. The garden is probably represented by a patch of jungle north of the mosque.

Heavy was the loss on the Imperial side, and the main portion of it was borne by the Rajputs. Nearly six thousand dead enemy were counted by Aurangzib's officers. At least five hundred Rajputs had fallen in Mukund Singh's charge, and 2,000 Rathors were afterwards slain.*

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* A. N., 73, *Adab*, 164b, Khafi Khan, ii. 17. Bernier puts the loss among Jaswant's Rajputs alone at 7,400 (p. 39). Kambu's language is significant, "after some Musalmans and a great many Rajputs had been slain" (11b). *Dilkasha*, 23, says, "About 5,000 slain on the two sides together".
Every clan of Rajasthan contributed its quota to the band of heroes who sacrificed their lives in their master's service (swami-dharma). As the bardic chronicle records it, "The onset cost seventeen hundred Rathors, besides Gehlots, Hadas, Gours, and some of every clan of Rajwara." "This was one of the events glorious to the Rajput, shewing his devotion to whom fidelity had been pledged,—the aged and enfeebled emperor Shah Jahan, whose salt they ate,—against all the temptation offered by youthful ambition....The Rajput sealed his faith in his blood; and none more liberally than the brave Hadas of Kotah and Bundi. The annals of no nation on earth can furnish such an example, as an entire family [the house of Kotah], six royal brothers, stretched on the field."* Among the chiefs of note who fell were Mukund Singh Hada, Sujan Singh Sisodia, Ratan Singh Rathor, Arjun Singh Gaur, Dayaldas Jhala, and Mohan Singh Hada, besides eighteen other high Rajputs and

Isar-das's estimate is "24 eminent Rajput chiefs, 2,000 Rajputs of Marwar, and 6,000 troopers and officers of the Imperial service were slain" (21b). Aurangzib lost a priceless servant, Murshid Quli Khan, but no other officer of note. Isar-das makes the absolutely incredible assertion that 7000 troopers were slain on his side.

* Tod, ii. 875.
Iftikhar Khan, an Imperial officer. To Ratan Singh of Rutlam a noble monument was raised by his descendants on the spot where his corpse was burnt. Time overthrew it, but in 1909 its place was taken by a lofty structure of white marble, decorated with relief work of a bold but conventional style, illustrating the phases of the battle, and surmounted with a stone horse. It is the most striking sight of the place.

The day after the victory, the two brothers reached the environs of Ujjain, and issued a gazette of honours and promotions to their meritorious officers. Many traitors who had left the Imperial army during the battle, now joined Aurangzib and were welcomed with titles and posts. A three days' halt was made here for repairing his losses, making administrative arrangements, and transacting urgent affairs of State;—and then, on 20th April, the march northward was resumed, and a month afterwards (21st May) Gwalior was reached.

Here Nasiri Khan, a high commander who had found the Dholpur ferry guarded by Dara, won honour in the Bijapur war, joined Aurangzib, leaving the service of Shah Jahan, and was

† A. N., 75—78.
created a Commander of Five Thousand with his father's title of Khan-i-Dauran, which Aurangzib had solemnly promised to him in writing. It was now learnt that Dara had come to Dholpur with a vast army and seized all the well-known and frequented fords over the Chambal river. His entrenchments frowned on the crossing places; his artillery crowned the opposite bank; and everywhere strong parties of his troops were on the alert for the enemy's arrival. To cross the river with its steep rocky banks and wide ravine-intersected approaches, in the face of such opposition, would have led to a heavy loss of life. So, Aurangzib cast about for some secret and safe path and offered high rewards to the neighbouring landholders. One zamindar told him that forty miles east of Dholpur there was an obscure and out-of-the-way ford with only knee-deep water, by which no army had ever crossed before. Dara had omitted to guard it, as it was a petty ford unfrequented by travellers and Aurangzib was still far from the river bank.

No time was to be lost. In the very evening after the arrival near Gwalior crosses the Chambal at a neglected ford, (21st May), while the main army halted, a strong division under three generals and some artillery made a forced march all night, reached the ford next morning,
and crossed safely to the other bank. That day Aurangzib himself set out from Gwalior, covered the interval in two long marches and crossed the river at the same place with the rest of his army (23rd May). In these two marches, "the path was rough, the soldiers underwent much hardship before arriving at the ford; and on the way nearly 5,000 men died of thirst,"—these last being probably camp followers. But Aurangzib's unrelenting firmness overcame every obstacle and carried the army through, regardless of loss.* The military advantage of the movement compensated for the heavy death-list, equal to that of a pitched battle. By one stroke he had turned the enemy's position and rendered Dara's

* A. N., 79-80, 85, Isar-das, 23, Kambu, 126, Aqil Khan 33-34, Storia, i. 269-270, Dilkasha, 26. The Alamgirnamah and Aqil Khan name the place of crossing Bhadauriyah and Bhadaur respectively, and place it 40 (or 50) miles east of Dholpur. Isar-das calls it Kanira, and Bhimsen Gorkha. Now, Gorka is only 6 miles east of the Dholpur ferry, and therefore could not have been Aurangzib's crossing-place. (Ind. At. 50 S. E.). There is a Bhadaoli, 26°45' N. 78°36' E., 40 miles east of the old Dholpur fort on the Chambal, in a straight line; Kanera is 3 miles S. E. of it. (Ind. At. 68). The map gives a village road coming from the south-west (Gwalior side), crossing the Chambal a little west of Bhadaoli and then continued northwards to the Jumna. According to the Chhatra-Prakash (followed by Manucci and Bhimsen also), Aurangzib's guide to the ford was Champat Rao Bundela (Pogson, 32). Isar-das (235) calls him "Hathiraj Jat, zamindar of Gohad, in the sarkar of Gwalior." Aqil Khan (34) has only "the zamindar of Bhadaur."
elaborate trenches and batteries useless. The road to Agra now lay open before him. It was now Dara's turn to abandon the line of the Chambal and fall back on the capital, if he did not wish to be intercepted. In the hurry of his retreat he had to abandon many of his heavier guns on the river bank, and thus weakened himself in artillery in the next battle. By this detour to the right Aurangzib had left the high road to Agra and arrived a good deal northeast of it. From the Chambal he marched north towards the Jumna and in three days came in touch with the enemy near Samugarh.

As the Jumna sweeps eastwards by Agra Fort and the Taj, some eight miles down the stream we have the ferry of Raipur, and opposite it, on the southern bank, the village of Imadpur, with some fine mansions built by Shah Jahan for his residence when out hunting. (These are probably represented by the Badshahi Mahal of the modern maps.) One mile east of them stands the village of Samugarh, containing the ruins of Jahangir's hunting-lodge. East and south of Samugarh, as far as the bend of the

* Dilkasha, 26.
Jumna, stretches a wide plain*, a fit arena for the decisive combat for the lordship of Agra.

* Isardas spells the name as Sambhugark. "At Imadpur, one mile from Samugarh in coming towards the city, on the bank of the river, mansions were built by order of Shah Jahan at a cost of Rs. 80,000, and completed in November, 1653." (Waris, 816.) Samogar is given in Indian Atlas, Sheet 50 S. E., as 8 miles due east of Agra Fort. The Jumna is half a mile north of it and again four miles on the east. The day after the battle, Aurangzib halted in the hunting-lodge at Imadpur. (Aqil Khan, 49.) Isardas 23a. Aqil Kh. 42. "At Rajpura 10 kos from Agra, near the Jumna, Dara chose a field for the battle." A. N. 86.
CHAPTER XVI.

BATTLE OF SAMUGARH, 29 MAY, 1658.

Shah Jahan had been staying at Agra since November, 1657. He was not his former self again, and still suffered from weakness and traces of his old complaint. As the summer season approached, the doctors feared that his malady would increase in the hot climate of Agra, which was subject to sand-storms and heat-waves from the Rajputana desert. So, they advised a change to Delhi as a cooler place, with breezes constantly blowing from the south in summer, and possessing fresh gardens, flowing canals, and more commodious palaces. The Imperial Court set out from Agra on 11th April 1658, and had reached Baluchpur, eighty miles north-west on the way to Delhi, when the news of the defeat at Dharmat reached it (25th April). All the hopes built on Jaswant were gone. If the rebellious princes were to be stopped Dara must hasten to Agra, equip a new force, and person-
ally supervise the operations. Shah Jahan, though unwilling to turn back, was overcome by his favourite son’s importunity, and the party came to Agra again on 2nd May.♦

A new Imperial army was assembled in all haste. Dara summoned the nobles and commanders from all the provinces and jagirs within easy reach of him, equipped their men with armour and weapons from the arsenal of Agra Fort, and lavished money from the Treasury to pay for new recruits and to bind the captains over to his side. The numerous guns and elephants of the Government were at his disposal. A force of about 60,000 troopers was assembled under his banner in a short time. But this army was formidable in appearance only: it was composed of a miscellaneous host of diverse classes and localities, hastily got together, and not properly co-ordinated nor taught to act in concert. Moreover, many of its commanders were carpet knights of the Court, having neither the experience nor the courage of the veterans from the Deccan. Dara’s main reliance was on the Rajputs and Syeds, while the other Muslim troops of the Imperial army (especially the

♦ A.N. 81-82; Kambu, 12a; Aqil Khan, 32.
Mughals) were mostly traitors to him, or at least indifferent to his cause.* He had made the fatal mistake of sending away his trustiest adherents and ablest lieutenants with Sulaiman Shukoh to oppose Shuja, and now he felt sore need of such efficient instruments. Wherever he could not be present in person, his business was ruined by incompetent or faithless subordinates.

And he was also hampered by Shah Jahan. *Shah Jahan forbids a fight among his sons, but in vain.* Even now the Emperor urged him to avoid war; he still fondly hoped that the quarrel among his sons could be peacefully ended by diplomatic messages. His nobles, already corrupted by Aurangzib or caring for their own interests only, took advantage of this natural feeling of a father. They pointed out to the Emperor that it would be a family disgrace if the brothers fought with each other, and worse still if Shah Jahan identified himself with any of them. He should let his two sons visit him, and then use the awe of majesty and his personal influence to detach the ambitious nobles from their sides and send the princes, shorn of strength, back to their provinces. Shah Jahan approved

* A.N. 82-83; Aqil Khan, 33; Isardas, 226; *Storia do Mogor*, i. 265; Kambu, 96.
of this advice, which echoed his feelings. But Dara taunted the givers of such counsels with cowardice and treason, and indiscreetly boasted that though they might not follow him, he would drive Aurangzib's men back like hares with the help of Chhatra Sal Hada. The foreign Muhammadans (both Persian and Central Asian mercenaries) resented this speech. They withdrew their hearts from Dara* and secretly resolved to desert to Aurangzib at the first opportunity. Dara had professed no need for their services; well, then, they would not help him; they would leave him to his Rajput friends.

The advanced division of Dara's army set out for Dholpur on 9th May, to guard the ferries of the Chambal. The rest of his troops were to march on the 18th under his own leadership. The

*Dara leaves Agra.

"Shah Jahan constantly advised Dara not to engage in war, and always recommended peace;...but he had grown too weak and so yielded to Dara" (A.N. 84-85, cf. Kambu, 10 a.) Again, "Shah Jahan wrote to Dara [before Samugarh] urging him to make peace and give up the design of fighting, but in vain. At last the Emperor determined to extinguish the war by going in person to the camp, and make peace by his own exertions and speeches. So he ordered his advance-tents to be pitched between the two armies." (A.N. 86-87.) Khafi Khan, ii. 21, Masum, 568, and Agil Khan, 33-34, support the statement, Storia, i. 264-267. For the treachery of the Mughals (explained by Agil Khan as "both Turanis and Iranis"), in the Imperial army, see Agil Khan, 34 and Storia, i. 267, 263.
leave-taking of the Prince from his father was
most pathetic. To the aged Emperor it seemed
"indeed as the parting of life from the body."
He presented Dara with jewelled ornaments,
robes, arms, horses, elephants, and a chariot,
which last is held in Indian belief to be the most
lucky conveyance for a prince to ride in starting
for a campaign in the southern direction. In
excess of love the father held the son to his
bosom long and tightly, "like his own life and
soul." Dara replied with bows and thanks and
begged leave to go. Shah Jahan, moved to un-
controllable emotion, turned his face towards
Mecca and lifting up his arms prayed for Dara's
victory and recited the prescribed texts of the
Muslim scripture (fatiha) for his safety and suc-
cess. As a mark of special favour he ordered
the Prince to mount his chariot at the steps of
the Hall of Public Audience, to beat his drums
and march out in full regal pomp from that very
spot.

Leaving his father, Dara entered his car, which
he afterwards changed for an
Shah Jahan's
grief.
elephant. The nobles and officers
surrounded him in due order of
precedence. On his right and left were massed
captains with their cavalry beyond count, while
the rear was formed by footmen, retainers, spear-
men, and rocket-throwers. So the procession set out. Behind them, in the half-deserted Hall of Forty Pillars stood a thin old man, with a long fair face and grey beard, leaning on his mace and gazing pensively on the scene till the cavalcade filed out of the gateway of the palace quadrangle. What was his long and glorious reign to end in? What would be the fate of his beloved son and chosen heir? "He knew not that Heaven's will was adverse or that the issue of the contest would be other (than what he had hoped for) and that he would lose his throne". Little did either father or son imagine that this was destined to be their last meeting on earth.*

Dara reached Dholpur on 22nd May, and with the local zamindars for his guides he seized all the fords of the Chambal in the neighbourhood. Throwing up earth-works and mounting guns on the bank, he commanded the roads and crossing-places. His aim was to retard Aurangzeb's advance without precipitating a battle and thus to gain time for Sulaiman Shukoh's army to join him. But he had under-

* The parting scene is very graphically described in Kam- 
  bu, 12a, Storia, i. 267. Masum, 57a, is brief. Isardas des- 
 cribes the farewell (26b) but wrongly places it in the night 
  following Samugarh. For the march of Dara's army 
  Manucci has left a most vivid picture. (Storia, i. 268).
rated his rival's genius for military organisation and far-sighted plans. After passing a few days in a state of expectancy, he learnt to his consternation that Aurangzib had crossed the Chambal at Bhadaur, forty miles east of Dholpur, on 23rd May. Dara's rear was now threatened; he hurriedly fell back towards Agra. Eight miles east of the city he encamped close to the plain of Samugarh to offer battle to the enemy. Here Aurangzib arrived from the bank of the Chambal, on the 28th.

That day, Dara on hearing of Aurangzib's approach, drew up his troops and rode out as if to fight. But a short distance in front of his camp he came to a halt, refusing to advance any further and waiting to let the enemy take the offensive. It was a most unwise step: Aurangzib was numerically inferior and his troops were worn out by a ten mile march in the sun over a waterless dusty plain, while Dara's army was fresh. As their general hesitated to engage, the soldiers lost confidence in Dara, and Aurangzib, without striking a blow, gained a moral victory over his foolish brother. The victor of Dharmat was a foe to be dreaded, even by the lord of 59,000 horse.
Then, again, as Dara’s army stood to arms in battle formation hour after hour throughout that May afternoon, the fierce sun overhead, the sandy plain under foot, and the scorching wind around, dealt havoc among his steel-clad troops and horses. “Many perished from the heat, thirst, and lack of drinking water.” While the prudent Aurangzib rested his men all the evening and night for the morrow’s contest, Dara’s soldiers were worn out and his horses and elephants were prostrated by the extreme heat. As one of his men narrated his experience, “With all our armour on, we were dried up even as we stood. Our feet could not move. The field seemed a blazing hell to us.” At sunset Dara retreated to his camp,—a movement prophetic of his defeat in battle. His soldiers lost heart, because his genius had quailed before that of his rival in the sight of both the hosts.*

All that night Aurangzib’s officers patrolled round their camp, while their master heartened his followers by a spirited harangue: “Tomorrow is the day of valiant deeds. My capital (Aurangabad) is very far from this place. It

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* A. N. 85—91; Agil Khan, 42-43; Masum, 576—60a (for the heat); Storia, i. 271–273; Khafi Khan, ii. 22.
is necessary that with one heart and with your faces turned one way, you should attack the enemy and, with the blows of your keen blades, seize the records of the office of Fortune and make your names famous in the world for victory and (power of) breaking up enemies.”

At last the eventful 29th of May arrived. Long before the early dawn of the Indian midsummer, there was the stir of preparation and movement in both the camps. Squadron after squadron was formed in battle array and marched out to take up its appointed position. Hearing of Aurangzib’s advance, Dara marshalled his ranks on a wide sandy plain, two miles in front of his camp, His army numbered about 50,000. Its backbone was composed of the Rajput contingent and Dara’s own retainers, all devoted to his interests. But nearly half of his army belonged to the Emperor’s service, and these could not be relied on. Most of their captains made a show of fighting, but took care not to put forth earnest effort or to run into danger, and several of their chiefs, notably Khalilullah Khan, were rightly suspected of having been corrupted by Aurangzib.

* Aqil Khan, 43.
All his artillery was drawn up in one row along his entire front. Behind it, as if sheltered by a wall, stood a dense body of foot-musketeers, numbering several thousands. Next were placed 500 camels carrying swivel-guns on their backs, and, further behind, the elephants clad in barbs of steel. Then came masses of cavalry formed in the conventional divisions of an Indian army.

In the Van were contingents of Rajputs,—Hadas, Rathors, Sisodias, and Gaurs, led by Chhatra Sal, the chief of Bundi, whose firmness in battle had passed into a proverb in the entire Mughal army,—and also Dara’s own retainers, consisting of 4,000 Afghans under the doughty fighter Dilir Khan, and 3,000 choice cavalry under his Paymaster Askar Khan. It was the most efficient and reliable portion of Dara’s army, the edge of steel which he hoped would cleave a way for others through the hostile ranks. But so far as we can see, this division had no artillery specially attached to it. The Left Wing was commanded by Dara’s second son, Sipihr Shukoh and the renowned Deccani hero Firuz Jang, popularly called ‘the Rustam of the age’. Here were posted a band of the Syeds of Barha, famous throughout India for their obstinate valour and love of fight,—together with mace-
bearers and troopers of the Imperial escort,—
their total strength being from ten to fifteen
thousand. An Advanced Reserve was stationed
between the Van and the Centre as a sort of flying
column, ready to follow up the success of the
Van or the Wings, and to succour them in dis-
tress. It was composed of ten thousand troopers,
partly Rajputs and partly Dara's Muslim re-
tainers. Their commanders were Kumar Ram
Singh, the heir of Jaipur, and Syed Bahir Khan.

In the Centre sat Dara himself, on a lofty
elephant visible from all parts of the field, with
other elephants carrying his musical band in
charge of his retinue. Immediately under his
orders were 3,000 of his best cavalry and most
devoted followers, besides many Imperial troops,
the whole numbering 12,000. The two flanks of
this division were led by his intimate followers
Zafar Khan and Fakhar Khan.

The Right Wing was placed under Khalilullah
Khan, an old courtier and a noble of the first
rank, but destined to earn a shameful notoriety
by his treachery on this day. Here stood many
mercenaries from Central Asia and a few Raj-
puts. These five divisions completed the army;
there was no Main Reserve and no Rearguard,
for the small unserviceable and miscellaneous
body left in charge of the camp took no part in the battle.

To a superficial observer Dara’s army looked like a magnificent host, as it moved to the encounter with its noisy music, fluttering banners, gaily caparisoned elephants and horses, and warriors clad in polished or ornamented armour and flowing vests of embroidery and many-coloured cloth. But as an instrument of war it had some fatal defects. Apart from Dara’s incapacity and Khalilullah’s treachery, there was first, the mutual jealousy, lack of co-operation, and even positive ill-will between Dara’s own followers and the Imperial troops under his banner; he had had no time to weld the two into one harmonious whole. The cleavage was widened by the Rajputs being an important element of the host, for they always formed a class apart, fighting in their own style and obeying their own chiefs, but incapable of carrying out the supreme commander’s tactics implicitly, readily and efficiently, or of acting in exact concert with Muslim and foreign troops. Secondly, Dara’s artillery was less mobile than Aurangzib’s and all posted in one place. His horses and transport animals were out of condition; many of them, having been overfed in the
Imperial stables, were more fit for a showy procession than for the stern tasks of war, and all were half dead with yesterday's futile manœuvring in the sun.*

In opposition to this host stood Aurangzib's hard-bitten troops, seasoned veterans on seasoned horses, and his excellent train of field-pieces handled by the European gunners of Mir Jumla and well supplied with munitions. There was absolute unity of command in his army, and all the officers had been taught to obey without hesitation or question that master will which brooked no disobedience or delay in a subordinate.

His Van was formed by some 10,000 troopers, all Musalmans, commanded by his eldest son Sultan Muhammad, who acted under the guidance of the experienced general Najabat Khan, recently created Khan-i-Khanan. Its front was protected by artillery in

* For the divisions of Dara's army, A.N. 95-96; Aqil Khan, 44; Storia, i. 275. Its inherent defects, (Storia, i. 266-267, 273, 282). The numbers engaged are differently estimated: Dara's force is given as 60,000 troopers (A.N. 82); 70,000 (Adab, 166b, 133b); “70 or 80 thousand” (Khafi Khan, ii. 24); “about a hundred thousand” (Aqil Khan 33, but on p. 44 he gives a total of 45,000 excluding the Right Wing under Khalilullah, which on p. 46 he estimates at 15,000.) Manucci gives 1,20,000 (Storia, i. 265 and also 275.)
two divisions under Zulfiqar Khan and Saf Shikan Khan.

The Right Wing was commanded by Islam Khan. Here fought Indradyumna of Dhamdhera, Champat Rao Bundela, Bhagwant Singh Hada, besides many Muslim captains. Murad with his own men, probably under 10,000, formed the Left Wing. The Advanced Reserve under Shaikh Mir was a small body, about 5,000 strong, but all good men and true, ready to press into the thickest of the fight and restore the wavering battle. In the Centre, as usual, rode Aurangzib on a towering elephant, supervising the whole field. His right and left flanks were placed respectively under Bahadur Khan and Khan-i-Dauran (known to us as Nasiri Khan in the Deccan wars). Tall and fierce elephants, covered with barbs and steel-plates, and having many sharp instruments tied to their trunks, were stationed here and there amidst the dense masses of horse and foot, to stiffen the ranks. With their steel-coated hawdas they looked like towers rising out of the sea of human heads.*

*For the divisions of Aurangzib's army, A.N. 91—94, Aqil Khan, 44; Khafi Khan, il. 23; Storia, i. 274. His total strength is given as 40,000, plus about 10,000 under Murad (Aqil Khan, 44), 60,000 men besides the camp-guards (Storia, i. 274.) Manucci's numbers and positions are unreliable, when opposed to the Alamgirnamah, as he wrote from memory long after the event.
By eight o’clock the marshalling of ranks was complete, and Aurangzib’s army was set in motion. The few miles’ interval was covered in about three hours as the mighty host moved slowly and in good formation towards its adversary standing on the plain of Samugarh. Towards midday, “the steel-ball standards and crescent-marked banners of Aurangzib appeared in the distance.” Dara at once took up the offensive. He discharged all his artillery, making a frightful cannonade, and “covering the air with a think cloud of smoke, like the mantle of dark night,” but doing little damage to the enemy at that long range. Aurangzib gave a very short reply, and wisely reserved his powder and shot for closer range.

An hour passed in this kind of cannonade. Dara misjudged the effect of his own fire and the silence of Aurangzib’s guns. He was deluded by the smoke or by his own ignorance of war, and decided to follow up his seeming success by a charge upon the timid enemy. The gun-fire ceased; pipe and trumpet pealed forth; kettle-drums and big brass drums struck up, and amidst the deafening clanguour of musical instruments, the rattle of musketry, and the trumpeting of excited elephants, the battle joined.*

* For the description of the battle our chief authorities
It was already past noon. Suddenly a multitudinous shout was heard on Charge by Rustam Khan with Dara’s left, and then, out of the dark curtain of smoke hanging between the two armies, burst the sheen of ten thousand swords and lance-heads as a whirlwind of cavalry swept down upon Aurangzib’s host. It was Dara’s Left Wing, led by Rustam Khan. Filing out through the spaces between his guns, it formed a mass and attacked the opposing artillery with flashing blades and wild battle-cries. Aurangzib’s chief of artillery, Saf Shikan Khan, and the musketeers behind his guns stood their ground well and received the charge with one deadly volley from the guns and a shower of bullets, arrows, and javelins. The flood of onset could not reach and overwhelm the guns; its speed slackened as the cannon balls ploughed up its ranks. So Rustam Khan swerved to his right hand in search of an easier prey, and galloped towards Aurangzib’s Van, leaving a cloud of dust behind. But Bahadur Khan with the right flank

are A.N. 96–105; Storia, i. 296–282; and Aqil Khan, 45–48. Kambu (13b–15a) loses his usual fulness and accuracy of detail. Isar-das (24a–25b) is meagre and unsatisfactory. Masum (58a–64b) is invaluable for the closing scene. Khafi Khan, ii. 24–30. Adab, 133b, and Dilkasha, 27, (both meagre.) Tod, ii. 1341, (for Chhatra Sal of Bundi.)
of Aurangzib's Centre had hurried up to the front into the gap between the on Aurangzib's Right. Van and the Artillery, and barred the path of Rustam Khan. A close hand to hand combat now ensued; sword and dagger were freely plied. But superior numbers bore down the gallant defenders; Bahadur Khan fell down wounded; two of his captains, Syed Dilawwar and Hadidad Khan were slain; and his division seemed at the point of being routed, when Islam Khan came to its aid from the Right Wing and Shaikh Mir with the Advanced Reserve. It was now the turn of Rustam Khan to be outnumbered: assailed in front, right and left, plied with musketry-fire and a heavy discharge of arrows, he still maintained the combat on even terms. While the engagement was at its hottest, and (to borrow a hyperbole of the Persian history) "the blood had mounted waist-high," a bullet lodged in Rustam Khan's arm and he felt that his end had come. Quickly changing his elephant for a fleet horse, "he set his heart on the last voyage", and with a dozen other desperate men hewed his way to the centre of the enemy's ranks and there fell amidst a heap of the slain. It was a glorious end for the scarred veteran of many battles in
diverse lands. Islam Khan cut off his head and flung it on the ground before Aurangzib as a token of his victory. The small remnant of Dara’s Left Wing fled back under Sipihr Shukoh.

At the same time a more terrible fight was being waged on Aurangzib’s left. There Khalilullah Khan had made a dash forward with his Uzbak contingent and assailed with a discharge of arrows Murad, who had impetuously advanced to the front. Beyond this demonstration Khalilullah seems to have done little. But the Rajputs of the Imperial Van under Chhatra Sal slipped through the interval between Zulfiqar Khan’s artillery and Murad’s division and attacked that Prince with fierce vigour. They drove a wedge separating Murad from Aurangzib’s army. An incessant discharge of arrows darkened the air.

War is as the breath of his nostrils to the Rajput. To war he goes forth dressed as a bridegroom to a marriage. His favourite colour in battle is yellow,—the dye of the Indian Spring carnival. Rajah Ram Singh Rathor, wearing such a robe and with a string of priceless pearls tied to his turban, fell on Murad’s elephant, crying out in derision, “You want to wrest the throne from Dara!” Shouting to the driver to make the
elephant kneel down if he valued his life, the Rajah flung his spear at Murad, but it missed the aim, and the Prince shot him dead with an arrow. Other Rajputs fell as they swarmed round Murad’s elephant, and with their robes "made the ground look yellow like a field of saffron"! The Rajput horsemen could not reach the Prince on his lofty elephant; but Murad received three wounds in his face; his driver was killed, and the *hawda* of his elephant bristled with arrows like the back of a porcupine.* The Prince defended himself with the valour and skill which he never lost in battle. But he was also attacked by Daud Khan’s hardy clansmen, and borne backwards by the combined onslaught; his officers Yahya Khan, Sarsaraz Khan and Rana Gharib-das were slain, and his men scattered.

The victorious Rajputs pressed on to the Centre and fell on Aurangzib who was hastening to the aid of Murad on hearing, of the disaster on his left. The clash between these two powerful forces was terrible. Rajput and

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*This *hawda* was long afterwards preserved in the store-rooms of Delhi Fort as a memorial of the valour of the race of Timur. (Khani Khan, ii. 29-30). Manucci (*Storia*, i. 260) gives a slightly different account of the death of Ram Singh Rathor.*
Pathan grappled together in deathless hate. The fight that raged here is spoken of as without a parallel in the annals of that age. The Rajputs forced their way to Aurangzib himself, but that Prince’s guards offered an opposition equally heroic, and being themselves in fresh condition they prevailed over the Rajputs who were half worn out by the struggle with Murad and whose ranks had been greatly thinned by this time. Enveloped by superior numbers, shot down with arrows, bullets, and rockets, to which they could not reply on equal terms, the Rajputs fought on with the wonted valour of their race, “in utter contempt of life”. Even Aurangzib’s court-historian praises them for “their very heroic fight.” But it was of no avail against overwhelming odds. One by one all their leaders fell,—Chhatra Sal Hada, Ram Sing Rathor, Bhim Singh Gaur and Shivaram Gaur. But the remnant only made a more frantic struggle, “like ravening dogs”, as a European eye-witness describes the scene. Rajah Rup Singh Rathor in reckless audacity jumped down from his horse, with his drawn blade hewed a way to the elephant of Aurangzib, and tried to cut the girths of the hawda in the hope of hurling the Prince down to the ground. He slashed the beast’s leg,
but was himself cut to pieces by the bodyguard, though Aurangzib, in generous admiration, shouted to them to spare such a hero's life. The rest of the Rajputs "perished like moths in the fire of the hostile blades."

Thus both the Left and Right Wings of Dara had been annihilated by this time. We now turn to see how that aspirant to the throne had employed himself so long.

At the very beginning of the battle, as soon as Rustam Khan and Chhatra Sal had charged with his Left Wing and Van, Dara quitted his position in the Centre, rode through his artillery, and went towards Aurangzib's Right Wing in order to support Rustam Khan. No more fatal mistake could have been committed. Enveloped in a cloud of dust and smoke, whirled along with a dense body of cavalry within range of the enemy's guns, he virtually abdicated his position as a general and became a mere divisional commander. He could no longer survey the whole field and control the battle. His troops at once lost the one supreme leader who could have directed their movements aright with every fresh development of the action, given unity
to their efforts, and sent reinforcements where
and thus loses
the help of his
artillery.
Secondly, by advancing in front
of his artillery he obstructed their fire, while
Aurangzeb's guns continued to mow down his
ranks without any chance of reply. When Dara
discovered his mistake and made frantic signals
to his gunners to bring their pieces up to him,
it was too late; all the artillery servants had in
the meantime abandoned their position and
scattered to loot, because there was now no force
behind the fighting line to punish such acts;
the transport animals had perished of heat and
fatigue, and there was none to drag the guns
forward.* This mistake ruined Dara far more
than all other causes put together. The contemp-
orary historians† condemn him for this unwise
step. The Italian Manucci, then a captain of his

* I follow the graphic account of Manucci who was in
charge of some of Dara's guns. *Storia*, i. 277-278.
† "Dara, who was ignorant of the rules of war and lacked
experience in command, foolishly hastened with the Centre
and the Advanced Reserve in person, after the charge of
Rustam Khan, and placed his own Van and Artillery behind
himself." (Alamgirnamah, 99.) "Dara, in great excite-
ment and helplessness, forgetting true generalship, foolishly
drove his elephant beyond his own artillery, charged with
a party of Syeds of Barha and Mughals, and thus forced
his own guns to be silent." (Kambu, 15a.) "Dara like an
inexpert fighter disordered his own arrangement of troops and
advanced beyond his artillery." (Aqil Khan, 47).
artillery, clearly describes Dara’s successive movements and the evil consequences of his action thus:

Issuing from his Centre, Dara advanced by his left side towards Aurangzib’s right front, beating all his artillery, drums as if the victory had been already achieved by Rustam Khan’s charge and nothing was left but to follow it up and annihilate the enemy. But he was soon undeceived. Aurangzib’s artillery had, as we have seen, already repelled Rustam’s cavaliers, and stood calmly reserving their fire “until Dara had come quite close. Then all of a sudden the enemy discharged his cannon, musketry, and swivel pieces, which struck us and frightened numbers of our men, who scattered this way and that.” Finding himself in imminent peril, Dara did not yet lose heart but turned to the right, to avoid the enemy’s artillery, rallied his men, and fell upon Shaikh Mir’s division. Aurangzib had pushed up so much reinforcement to the front and so many of his men had dispersed before Dara’s advance, that for a time he was left without any guards. If Dara could then have forced his way to his rival’s side, the victory would have been his. “But he made a
short halt, owing to the difficulties of the ground and to the fatigue that overcame him." His force lost its growing momentum, the rate of its progress and the vigour of its onslaught greatly slackened, and the golden chance was lost for ever.* For, in the meantime Aurangzib had dressed his ranks and made new dispositions, and Dara was soon afterwards called upon to abandon his forward movement straight on his rival's elephant and to turn aside towards his own Right Wing in order to back the troops of Chhatra Sal. Thus Dara made a long movement across his entire front from the extreme left to near the extreme right. The frightful heat struck down his men and horses during this unprofitable manœuvre, while the artillery stationed in the enemy's front fired volleys straight into his left flank. Those who still kept up with him were exhausted by this long and toilsome march over loose burning sand, amidst suffocating dust, and under a blazing sun which made their armour blister the skin, while not a drop of water could be had to quench their thirst. By the time he arrived behind his Van, now acting as his Right Wing, his party was more dead than alive.

* Manucci's Narrative, Storia, i. 277—279.
And they were assailed by a fresh body of the enemy. During these early stages of the battle, Aurangzib’s Van, in obedience to his rigid discipline, had kept its proper position, where it had not been attacked either by the enemy’s Left or by the Van. Seeing Dara’s two Wings and Van overthrown, and his Centre in disorder and out of its proper place, Muhammad Sultan sprang forward with his own division (viz., the Van) to attack Dara. At the same time Aurangzib’s victorious Right wheeled round to envelop Dara’s division, while the right batteries under Saf Shikan Khan and the left ones under Zulfiqar Khan alike assailed it without the fear of a return of fire.

This was the beginning of the end. Dara had learnt of the death of his best generals, but he set his teeth and for a time exerted himself to stem the disaster. “He now utterly despised of victory, but made a stand with outward firmness and encouraged his men. But Aurangzib’s troops, like the waves of the sea, approached him with countless guns in front of them.” So heavy and well-directed was the enemy’s fire that every minute Dara’s diminished host met with heavy
Dreadful destruction by Aurangzib’s guns, losses: “Near him the deadly fire fell so thick that Wazir Khan and some other newly created peers who stood in front of him were slain. Cannon balls carried off heads or limbs; shots weighing 16 lbs and 20 lbs flew (through the air.)” A number of rockets from the artillery accompanying Aurangzib’s division fell in quick succession amidst Dara’s followers and around his elephant. His friends and servants cried out to him to “dismount from his elephant which had become a target” (for the enemy’s guns.) There was no help for it. The wretched Prince hurriedly got down from his elephant and took horse, “leaving his armour, weapons, and shoes behind” in the hawda.*

At once all was over with him. A little before this, while he was busy trying to force his way to Aurangzib’s side, “during the hottest of the

* That Dara dismounted from his elephant at a time of extreme danger, when he had lost all hope of victory, is asserted by A. N. (104), Aqil Khan (48), Masum (63b), and Kambu (15a, bottom.) These contemporary and first-rate authorities refute the bazar gossip reproduced by Manucci and Bernier that Dara changed his elephant for a horse at the treacherous advice of Khalilullah Khan at a time when he had almost completely defeated Aurangzib, and that this act on the part of Dara turned his assured victory into a rout. (Storia, i. 281-282, Bernier, 53-54, also Isar-das, 24d-25a.)
fight, some Imperial commanders who had stood idle and many who by hiding themselves in holes had received no hurt in the battle, had fled.”

And now his remaining troops, scattered far and near over the field, saw that his hawda was empty and concluded that their master had fallen. For whom should they fight any longer? Already they were half dead with yesterday’s fruitless toil in the field, today’s march and fight in raging thirst and under a burning sun from dawn till near sunset. To fill up the cup of their misery, a desolating hot wind sprang up and struck Dara’s fainting troops in the face. “Most of his officers and men, without strength to ply arrow or spear, with thirsty lips and parched tongues cried Oh the thirst! Oh the thirst! and gave up the ghost on all sides of the field.” Staying in such a place was no longer possible. The Imperial army had been only waiting for a decent pretext for flight, and the sudden disappearance of Dara from the back of his elephant gave them the wished for opportunity. At once the whole army broke up into small confused groups and fled from the field in the utmost disorder.

Dara stood almost alone, deserted by all save a few hereditary followers and friends whose fidelity was stronger than love of life. Just then one of his body-servants, in strapping his quiver
to his belt, was shot down. To delay any longer there was to court a fruitless death. Dara was distracted, and his son Sipihr Shukoh was crying. But some of his close attendants seized the bridles of the two and turned their horses' heads towards Agra.*

The fugitive Prince galloped for 4 or 5 miles and then sat down utterly exhausted under a shady tree, in the hope of talking breath and untying his burning helmet. But there was no rest for him. The roll of kettledrums was heard. Dara's attendants started up in alarm, and urged him to mount again and flee, if he wished to avoid capture. The Prince in utter prostration refused to move, saying, "Let what is destined to happen (to me) happen now. What can be better than this that one (of the enemy) should come and release me from this life of shame?" At last with much entreaty he was induced to mount again, and reached Agra at 9 p.m. in an unspeakably wretched condition.†

Meanwhile, in the field, as soon as Dara had left his elephant, Aurangzib sounded the music

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* The last stage is described on the authority of Masum, 626-646; Aqil Khan, 47-48 (esp. the hot blast); A. N. 104-105; Khafi Khan, ii. 28.
† Masum, 645-656.
of rejoicing and pressed forward as to an accomplished victory. His soldiers heartened by the joyous notes advanced from all sides. Dara's remaining troops at once submitted to the victor or took to flight. The last trace of resistance vanished; but there was no pursuit: the victors were as much worn out as the vanquished by that long midsummer day's life and death struggle.

Nor was any pursuit needed. No victory could be more complete. On Dara's side, the vanquished side ten thousand men had fallen, besides horses and transport animals beyond count. The fierce sun and the waterless plain had been as fatal to them as the enemy's blades. All over the ten miles from the field to Agra a sickening spectacle met the eye when the sun arose next morning on the horrors of this day's war. Every few steps the road was bordered with groups of wounded men, who had dragged themselves away from the field in the vain hope of reaching home and nursing and then died of exhaustion and agony, and with fugitives struck down by the murderous hot blast but unscathed by the enemy's sword. Mingled with the men, in the field and the roadside, lay the carcases of the dumb victims of war,—oxen, mules, camels, horses, and ele-
phants. Many of the soldiers also died after entering the city.*

Among the commanders who poured forth their life-blood in the service of the throne, nine Rajputs and nineteen Muslims are mentioned by name. Bravest among so many brave men was Rao Chhatra Sal Hada, the chieftain of Bundi and the hero of fifty-two fights. "With his Hadas clad in their saffron robes, the ensigns of death or victory, the Bundi prince formed the vanguard of Dara on this day....A panic ensued, which was followed by confusion and flight. The noble Hada, on this disastrous event, turned to his vassals, and exclaimed, 'Accursed be he who flies! Here, true to my salt, my feet are rooted to this field, nor will I quit it alive but with victory.' Cheering on his men, he mounted his elephant, but whilst encouraging them by his voice and example, a cannon-ball hitting his elephant, the animal turned and fled. Chhatra Sal leaped from his back and called for his steed, exclaiming 'My elephant may turn his back on the enemy, but never shall his master.' Mounting his horse, and forming his men into a dense mass, he led them to the charge against Prince Murad, whom

* A.N. 105-106; Adab, 167a, 133 b; Isardas says that 15,000 were slain (26a.) Storia, i. 282.
he singled out, and had his lance balanced for the issue, when a ball pierced his forehead." With Chhatra Sal fell also his youngest son Bharat Singh, his brother Mokim Singh, three of his nephews, as well as the choicest of his clansmen. "In the two battles [of Dharmat and Samugarh] no less than twelve princes of the blood, together with the heads of every Hada clan, maintained their fealty even to death. Where are we to look for such examples?" Tod asks in generous admiration.* Four Rathor and three Gaur chieftains were slain on Dara's side, and one Sisodia of note on Murad's.

The most renowned victim of the day, however, was Rustam Khan, surnamed chiefs of Dara's Firuz Jang, the hero of the Uzbek and Persian wars, and the main prop of Dara's power. Muhammad Salih, the diwan of Dara, two sons of Ali Mardan Khan, a brother of Dilir Khan Ruhela (second only to the latter in martial renown), besides five Syeds of Barha,—a clan whose tried valour gave them the right to stand in the van of Mughal armies in the post of the greatest danger and honour,—swelled the death-list on Dara's side.

* Tod's Rajasthan, ii. 1341.
The army of Aurangzib lost only one chief of the first rank, Azam Khan, formerly known as Mir Khalil, the active Inspector of the Deccan Artillery—who died of the excessive heat, and three minor officers,—Sazawwar Khan, Syed Dilawwar Khan, and Hadidad Khan. Eight others, including Zulfiquar Khan and Bahadur Khan, were wounded.* The Right Wing suffered the heaviest portion of the loss, as it bore the brunt of the enemy’s attack in the earlier stages of the contest and had long to defend itself against superior odds.

Dara’s plan of battle was extremely simple and primitive: he would penetrate his enemy’s line at any point found vulnerable to cavalry attack, then force his way to his hated rival, and by killing him end the war at one blow. With Aurangzib dead or captured, his army would submit as a matter of course. So he sent on wave after wave of cavalry in successive charges. Aurangzib, on the other hand, like Wellington at Waterloo, kept himself strictly on the defensive: he reserved his power patiently but firmly,

* For the casualties in the three armies, A. N. 105—107; Khafi Khan, ii. 28, 30; Isar das, 24a, 26a.
waited to let Dara exhaust himself,* and met the enemy's onset stage by stage as it developed itself. Unlike his tactics at Dharmat, he did not here assume the aggressive. Dara's folly and inexperience alone contributed to the victory of the defensive game of his rival. The general advance of Aurangzib's army and the utter dissolution of Dara's vast host at the close of the day afford another parallel of the final defeat of Napoleon, though here there was no newly arrived Blucher to carry on a relentless chase of the vanquished. Lastly, the Imperialists ascribed their defeat to the treachery of Khalilullah Khan, just as the French after Waterloo raised the cry *Nous sommes trahis.*

* Storia, i. 279, 276-277; Kambu, 136.
CHAPTER XVII.

CAPTURE OF AGRA FORT AND CAPTIVITY OF MURAD BAKHSH, JUNE 1658.

The livelong day of 29th May had been passed by the Court and the people of Agra in the greatest anxiety. Reports from Dara's camp had made it known that the decisive battle would take place that day. From noon the distant booming of cannon had been heard. What would be the result of the clash of arms? Would the heir apparent confirm his power and end the troubulous dispute about succession? Or, was their city to be subjected to slaughter and rapine by his victorious rivals? Such questions filled all minds,—the private citizens no less than the kindred of the soldiers or the members of the Imperial Court.

Fugitives from the field had begun to arrive in the city as early as 2 o'clock in the afternoon. But as they had evidently fled from the battle at
an early stage, their reports only agitated the citizens without confirming the belief of a disaster. As the day wore on, the public anxiety deepened. At last about 9 p. m., a small group of riders on panting horses, without torches, clattered over the streets and passed by the gate of the Fort to Dara's house in the city. It was Dara and all that was left of his retinue. He entered his house and shut the door. Loud lamentations broke out from within.*

At once the dismal news spread about; the city was filled with alarm and Shah Jahan's grief at the disaster, mourning. The scene within the Fort was equally sad. There Shah Jahan and Jahanara learnt of the disaster to their favourite son and brother, and burst into grief. The women of the harem lifted up their voices and wept.

When the first paroxysm of grief was over, Shah Jahan sent word to Dara by means of an eunuch, saying, "What has brought you down to such a state is only the decree of Fate. It is better for you now to come to the Fort and see me. After hearing what I have to say, you may

* Storia, i. 287, 288-289; Khafi Khan, ii. 30; A. N. 107; Masum, 65a and b.
go wherever Fate leads you. What is predestined for you will happen in every place that you may be in.”

But Dara was broken down in body and in spirit. The exertions of the last forty hours, his two days’ marching in the sun, the long and desperate struggle of today, and the hurried ride from the fatal field, had left him prostrate. Moreover, the iron had entered his soul: he had lost all, not excepting honour. He remembered that he had risked a battle with Aurangzib against Shah Jahan’s wishes; he had prevented his father from going out to meet the princes and ending the quarrel by his personal influence; and now the worst foreboded by his father had come to pass. He had been lavishly furnished with men, money and arms by a bountiful father, and he had thrown everything away in the gamble for the throne. He had left Agra shouting ‘Victory or a grave,’ * and now he had returned without victory.

Dara’s pathetic reply.

A bankrupt in fame and fortune, he hid himself in shame from friend and stranger alike, and sent this touching reply to his father, “I have not the face to appear before your

* Ya takht, ya tabut, literally, ‘Either the throne or a tomb’ (Storia, i. 242, ‘a proverb current among princes laying claim to a crown’.) Dara’s exact words are given on p. 262 of Storia.
Majesty in my present wretched plight. Then, again, if I stay here longer, the troops of death will encircle and slay me. Give up your wish to see my abashed face and permit me to go away. Only I beg your Majesty to pronounce the benediction of farewell (fatiha) on this distracted and half dead man in the long journey that he has before him.”

The arrival of this message doubled the grief of Shah Jahan; he seemed to feel “the parting of his own life from the body.” But cruel necessity did not allow him even a full expression of his sorrow. Preparations had to be immediately made for Dara’s flight, if he was not to be intercepted by his victorious rivals. Mules laden with gold coins from the palace treasury were sent out to him to provide for his journey, and Imperial orders were despatched to the Governor of Delhi to open the stores of the fort there to Dara as freely as to the Emperor in person. *

The miserable Prince, after snatching a few hours’ rest in his mansion, resumed his flight. His wife Nadira Banu, his children and grand children, and a few choice slave-girls were placed

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* Masum, 65b-66b; Storia, i. 287-288; A. N. 107; Khafi Khan, ii. 30. Against these authorities Isardas (266) wrongly asserts that Dara visited Shah Jahan that night.
in covered litters on elephants. Taking as much of his jewels, gold coins, and other valuable property as could be easily carried, he set off towards Delhi at about 3 A.M. with only a dozen servants and guards on horseback. All his other retainers were utterly overcome by the heat, the defeat, and the abandonment of their property in the field, and could not move that night. For the next two days, some of his soldiers and followers in small groups left Agra and joined him, and thus his force was raised to 5,000 men. Shah Jahan also continued to send him money and stores, till Aurangzib seized Agra city and closed the road to Delhi.

The slave-girls, musicians, and other women abandoned by Dara, took shelter in the Fort with Shah Jahan; but the property in his mansion at Agra, especially his furniture, elephants, horses, &c., was mostly looted soon after his departure. *

We now return to the victors at Samugarh. At Dara’s flight Aurangzib descended from his elephant and kneeling down on the ground rendered thanks to God. Twice did he do it, to show his sense of the crowning mercy vouchsafed by the Giver of Victory. Then he proceeded to Dara’s tent, but all its rich furniture and treasure had

* A.N. 108-109, 120; Storia, i. 287-290; Khafi Khan, ii. 30-31; Masum, 66b-67a; Kambu, 15b.
already been looted. The chiefs of the army flocked round Aurangzib to offer their congratulations, while they received praise for their exertions. Murad Bakhsh, too, arrived there and was received with every kindness, Aurangzib saying that the victory was entirely due to his younger brother's heroism and that Murad's reign would date from that day. Expert surgeons were appointed to treat Murad's wounds. If we may believe Khafi Khan, while the doctors were examining the wounds, Aurangzib laid the head of Murad on his own knees, wiped the blood with his own sleeves, and wept pathetically at the sight.

After a time his own tent arrived from the rear and Aurangzib retired to it. Here a grand audience was held, and those officers who had distinguished themselves in the fight were rewarded. All night the sound of revelry and merriment filled the two camps,* and the sky was lit up by the countless fires at which the Hindus burnt their dead.

In two marches the victorious Prince reached Agra and halted in the garden of Nur-manzil or Dhara, outside the city (1st June). Here he stay-

* A. N. 110; Aqil Khan, 49; Isardas, 25 b; Khafi Khan, ii. 29; Storia, i. 283.
ed for ten days. Every day large numbers of courtiers, nobles, and officers deserted the Imperial side and hastened to the garden to worship the rising Sun. Some of them had been so enterprising as to leave Agra and welcome him on the way the very day after the battle. The highest nobles of the capital, like Shaista Khan and Muhammad Amin Khan (the son of Mir Jumla), and Dara’s chief officers all proffered their homage and devotion to the victor. The vanquished nobles and army troops who had escaped the sword entered the armies of Aurangzib and Murad, some being unable, but most being unwilling to follow their fugitive master. Many new appointments and promotions were made, and the strength of the army rapidly increased.*

The appeal to arms having been decided against him, Shah Jahan next tried diplomacy. We have seen how as early as January, on hearing of the arrest of Mir Jumla, he had written to Aurangzib† rebuking him for this act

* A. N. 111–115; Aqil Khan, 49-50; Kambu, 156.

† Correspondence: Shah Jahan to Aurangzib, on hearing of Mir Jumla’s arrest (Kambu, 106); Aurangzib’s reply (purport only, Aqil Khan, 20); Aurangzib to Shah Jahan after reaching Burhanpur (A. N. 48, purport). Shah Jahan to Aurangzib urging him to give up the march to Hindustan (Insha-i-Farsi, A. S. B. MS. F. 56, pp. 59–61); Aurang-
of disobedience and ordering the release of that noble. Aurangzib took up the false plea that Mir Jumla had treacherously intrigued with the Deccani Sultans. After reaching Burhanpur Aurangzib had written a letter to Shah Jahan (middle of February), inquiring about his health and hoping that the Emperor would put an end to Dara's usurpation of authority and would personally conduct the government. To this no satisfactory reply had come. Again, after defeating Jaswant, Aurangzib had asked the new prime minister, Jafar Khan, to explain to his master how the two princes had marched from the South only to pay their filial respects to the Emperor, see him with their own eyes in order to disprove the alarming rumours current about his condition, and unfold to him all the bad turns Dara had done to them and the disorder into which his usurpation had thrown the whole empire. The battle with Jaswant, he said, had been forced on him by the Maharajah's obstinate resolve to bar the path to

sib's reply complaining of Dara's usurpation and protesting his own pacific intention to see the Emperor (Ibid 54-57. Cf. Masum 444-45a, incorrect paraphrase). Jahanara to Aurangzib before Samugarh (Faiyaz, 117-119, Kambu, 12b. Aqil Khan, 34-37, gives a long paraphrase of this letter, which differs from the short text given by Kambu). Aurangzib to Shah Jahan, really in answer to Jahanara, (Kambu, 12b-13a, Faiyaz, 119-121; Aqil Khan, 37-42, a paraphrase). Aurangzib to Jafar Khan same time, (Adab, 123a & b); Murad to Jafar Khan (Faiyaz, 465-468).
Agra, and must not be regarded as a war against the Emperor's authority. A month later when he was crossing the Chambal, he got a letter written by his eldest sister Jahanara, but really expressing Shah Jahan's views. It said,

Jahanara's remonstrances, "The Emperor has recovered and is himself administering the State and trying to remove the disorders that cropped up during his late illness. Your armed advance is therefore an act of war against your father. Even if it is directed against Dara, it is no less sinful, since the eldest brother, both by Canon Law and common usage, stands in the position of the father. If you value your good name in this world and salvation in the next, you should obey your father, and report your wishes to him in writing, without advancing any further."

To this Aurangzib had sent a long reply, following his usual line of defence:

how answered by Aurangzib. "Shah Jahan has lost all real power and control. Dara is doing everything himself and trying to ruin his younger brothers. Witness how he has crushed Shuja already. He also foiled my invasion of Bijapur, when complete success was at hand, and he emboldened the Bijapuris to defy me. He has poisoned the Emperor's ears against his two younger brothers, and taken away Berar from me for
no fault whatever. Against such overt hostility I am bound to take up arms in self-preservation. My wish, however, is only to go to Shah Jahan's presence and reveal everything to him personally. I shall not brook any obstacle to this loving design. See, how Jaswant fared in making the attempt. Dara should, therefore, be sent away from the Imperial Court to his province of the Panjab, to avoid mischief."

The day after Samugurh, Aurangzib wrote to Shah Jahan directly, excusing his late conduct as forced upon him by his enemies. On reaching Nur-manzil he received a reply in Shah Jahan's own hand (1st June), inviting him to an interview, as he had come so near and his old father longed to see him. The two bearers of this letter,—the aged chamberlain Fazil Khan and the chief justice Syed

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*Correspondence: Shah Jahan to Aurangzib, inviting him to an interview, (Kambu, 156; Aqil Khan 50-51.) Aurangzib's reply (Ibid.) Shah Jahan to Aurangzib, protesting against the suspicion of his good faith (Kambu, 166; Aqil Khan, 53). Aurangzib's reply (Kambu 166, Aqil Khan, 54). Shah Jahan to Aurangzib, complaining of the cutting off of Jumna water, translated by me in this chapter, (A.S. B. MS. F. 56, pp. 91-92, and, in a shorter form in British Museum Or. MSS., Addl. 18, 881, folio 77a, which alone gives Aurangzib’s reply, "on the back of his father’s letter," as 'Karda-i-khwesh ayed pesh; ziyyadah hadd-i-adab'). Shah Jahan to Aurangzib towards the close of the siege of Agra Fort (Kambu, 166-176, Aqil Khan.
Hedaitullah,—also delivered a loving oral message from the Emperor, and took their leave after getting Aurangzib’s consent to the proposed interview. Next day they visited him again with another kind message and many presents from the Emperor, including costly jewels and a famous sword known as Alamgir (‘Conqueror of the Universe’), and repeated the Emperor’s desire for an interview. But they found the Prince changed. Last evening his confidential advisers had told him that Shah Jahan still loved Dara best and was exerting himself actively to promote Dara’s cause, so that the invitation of Aurangzib to Agra Fort was only a trap laid for his arrest. Fazil Khan pleaded hard to remove these suspicions, but all in vain, and he had to return to his old master and report his failure. Shaista Khan must have deepened the Prince’s distrust of his father, for he was always friendly to Aurangzib and Shah Jahan taxed him with setting that Prince against the Emperor.

On the 5th the grey-bearded Khaliullah deserts Shah Jahan, Fazil Khan came a third time, with a letter from Shah Jahan protesting against the suspicions as cruel
calumnies and asking Aurangzib to come and see for himself the full extent of his father's love and kindness. Khalilullah Khan, who accompanied Fazil Khan, had been already won over by Aurangzib. He was now granted a private interview by the Prince, in which he confirmed his fears of his father's hostile designs and urged him to imprison the aged sovereign as the only means of making him harmless. The good old Fazil Khan who was waiting outside all this time, was told that Khalilullah had been placed under arrest by the Prince, and that he must return alone to the Emperor with Aurangzib's reply declining the proposed interview on the ground of his mind not being composed about what his Majesty intended to do during it. The chamberlain came back and said that "the matter had now gone beyond the stage of sending letters and messages."*

So, indeed, it had; for, that very night the siege of Agra Fort began. At last the last shred of pretence was thrown off; the mask was dropped altogether, and the Emperor himself was attacked.

* For the embassies of Fazil Khan, Kambu, 158-168; Aqil Khan, 50—54; A.N. 112. Shaista Khan is said to have visited Aurangzib on 5th June (A.N. 114), but he may have sent messages to the Prince before that date. For Shaista Khan's suspected partisanship of Aurangzib, see A.N. 114; Adab, 261a; Khafi Khan, ii. 21; Storia, i. 255, 292.
The arrival of the victorious armies in the environs of Agra threw the citizens into the greatest alarm and confusion. Murad’s troops, strangers to discipline and fearless of their gay and indolent master, entered the city to plunder and ravish, in defiance of Aurangzib’s order to spare life and property at the capital. These unruly soldiers, aided by the low-class ruffians of the city and the camp, threatened to create a great disturbance. So, on third June Aurangzib sent his eldest son into the city to keep the peace and protect the people. According to one account the prefect of the police (kotwal), Siddi Masaud, was executed, and a Tartar officer of Aurangzib appointed in his place.* The whole city fell under Aurangzib’s control, but the Fort was still in Shah Jahan’s hands.

On the return of Fazil Khan (5th June), the Emperor learnt that Aurangzib was bitterly estranged from him and that he could not hope to meet and induce him to make a friendly settlement with his brothers. The old monarch therefore prepared to stand a siege, and shut the gates of the Fort, lest some traitor should murder or imprison him in the hope of gaining Aurangzib's hands.

* Isardas, 268; A.d.N. 113-114; Storia, i. 292.
zib’s favour. The defence of the walls was entrusted to some officers whom he believed to be devoted to him, and there was a garrison of 1,500 foreign slaves,—Qalmaqs, Abyssinians, and Turks, who usually proved faithful to their salt.

At night a detachment from Aurangzib’s army, led by Zulfiqar Khan and Bahadur Khan, crept to the foot of the Fort walls and began the attack. Bombardment was tried at first. One gun was mounted on the terrace of the Juma Masjid, facing the western gate of the Fort, and another on Dara’s mansion by the Jumna. They are said to have done some damage to the Fort guns and the upper stories of the palace. But the Fort was one of the strongest of that age, "no assault, mining or sapping could capture it, with its deep moat and its towers and walls too thick to be battered down."

The artillery of the besiegers was ineffective. Success by breaching and assault was out of the question. The musketeers on the Fort walls

* Kambu, 16b; Aqil Khan, 54-55.
† The history of siege of Agra, in Masum 68 a—72 a; Isardas, 27b—28b; Aqil Khan, 55—58; Kambu, 16b—18a. The Alamgirnamah is entirely silent about the affair! Khafi Khan (ii. 32,) refers to it briefly. Storia, i. 293—295, is not of much use.
fought boldly and faithfully, and shot down every one who showed his head below. But most of the besiegers had taken shelter under the projecting eaves and porches of the Fort and the neighbouring trees, and in the houses which then closely adjoined it, while their officers lodged in Dara's mansion. They, therefore, suffered little loss of life. But at the same time they could not touch the garrison, and the capture of the Fort seemed as far off as ever.

A regular investment would have caused a long delay, detained the army there, and given Dara time to gather strength at Delhi. So, Aurangzib took counsel with his generals, and after a long discussion they hit upon a clever device, which reduced "this extremely strong fort in only three days." Thirst opened the gates of Agra more speedily than assault or bombardment.

Acting on this plan, Aurangzib's men by a sudden rush possessed themselves of the Khiziri gate which opens on the river. The arch of the gateway protected them from the fire of the defenders on the ramparts, and they could safely prevent the taking of water from the river into the Fort. The garrison now began to suffer the horrors of a siege. With the Jumna at hand, all other sources of water supply had been
neglected in the Fort. It had a few wells no doubt, but their water was bitter and they had been long disused. The Emperor and his Court, so long accustomed to the “molten snow” of the Jumna, found the well-water intolerable. Many of his officers, pampered idlers of the Court, being unable to bear the hardship for more than a day, slipped out of the Fort under the plea of looking after the admission of water. Others were corrupted by Aurangzib’s gold. The rank and file had indeed courage and fidelity, but all were disheartened in being led by an old and invalid master, and wanted to

Shah Jahan’s abject appeal to Aurangzib’s pity.

compelled in his old age and sickness to quench his thirst in the burning heat of June with the bitter well-water, wrote the following touching letter to his cruel son:—

“My son, my hero! (verse)
Why should I complain of the unkindness of Fortune,
Seeing that not a leaf is shed by a tree without God’s will?
Only yesterday I was the master of nine hundred thousand troopers, and to-day I am in need of a pitcher of water! (verse)
Praised be the Hindus in all cases,
As they ever offer water to their dead.
And thou, my son, art a marvellous Musalman,
As thou causest me in life to lament for (lack of) water!

O, prosperous son! be not proud of the good luck of this treacherous world. Scatter not the dust of negligence (of duty) and pride on thy wise head. (Know) that this perishable world is a narrow pass (leading) to the dark region, and
that eternal prosperity comes only from remembering God and showing kindness to men."

To this appeal Aurangzib sent the brutal reply, "It is your own doing." For Fazil Khan's fourth visit to three days Shah Jahan held out. Aurangzib. Then, amidst raging thirst, with only despair and treason around him, he decided to yield. For the fourth time Fazil Khan was sent to Aurangzib with a letter in which the Emperor sadly mourned for his own fate,—unprecedented in the history of emperors—ascribed everything to God's decree, warned his son not to be too proud of his power nor to put too much faith in his good fortune, and urged him to obey his father as the Qur'an enjoins, if he valued his good name in this world and feared the Day of Judgment in the next. He finally entreated Aurangzib to do his filial duty and not to ruin the Mughal Imperial family, then famous throughout the world for its splendour and power, nor lower its prestige abroad (especially in the eyes of the king of Persia).

Aurangzib replied by professing deep obedience and defending all that he had done as forced on him by the acts of his enemies. He pointed to his own loyalty to the throne in spite of Dara's acts of manifest hostility, and
concluded, "Owing to certain occurrences I am afraid to interview your Majesty....If your Majesty surrenders the gates of the Fort to my men and gives them free ingress and egress, and thereby removes my suspicion, I shall go and wait on you, consent to whatever you wish, and do nothing displeasing or harmful to you."

On 8th June Shah Jahan opened the gates of the Fort to Aurangzib's officers, who took possession of it and expelled the Emperor's officers from all parts of it. The treasure, jewels, rich robes, furniture, and Government stores within were seized by them and placed in several rooms which were strictly kept under lock and seal. Thus Agra Fort with its immense hoards of treasure and well-filled arsenals and magazines,—the accumulations of three generations of emperors of the richest country in the world,—passed into Aurangzib's hands almost without a blow.

Muhammad Sultan waited on his grandfather and was received with great kindness. For some days he acted as the captive Emperor's keeper under minute instructions from Aurangzib as to what he should do and whom he should admit. Shah Jahan was deprived of all power,
From being "the king of kings" (Shahanshah), he sank at once into the condition of a helpless captive, dependent on others even for a change of dress. He was confined within the harem of the palace, behind the Hall of Public Audience. A strong force was posted in and around the Fort to prevent any attempt at rescue, and careful watch was kept on the eunuchs and other servants leaving the palace, lest they should communicate with the outside. "For a long time none except a few servants were allowed to come and go to his Majesty on any account, or even to speak a word to him from a distance!" Physicians of Aurangzib's own choosing attended the old man."

On the 10th the Princess Jahanara visited Aurangzib to try the effect of her personal influence and sisterly persuasion. She told him of their loving father's wish to see him and proposed in Shah Jahan's name a partition of the empire between the four Princes: Dara should have the Panjub and the adjacent provinces, Murad

* For Shah Jahan's captivity, Kambu, 18a; Aqil Khan, 58-59, 63; A. N. 116 (silent about the object of Jahanara's visit); Masum, 72a and b, 77b-79a; Adab, 187b-189a (Aurangzib's instructions to Muhammad Sultan as keeper of Shah Jahan, a few days later), 260a-264a (Aurangzib to captive Shah Jahan); 137a and b (Aurangzib to Fazil Khan, in charge of Shah Jahan); A. N. 124; Khafi Khan, ii. 32.
Bakhsh Guzerat, Shuja Bengal, Muhammad Sultan the Deccan, and Aurangzib the remaining portion of the empire with the rank of heir apparent to the throne and the title of Buland-iqbal (which was to be taken away from the eldest-born)."

Aurangzib was ready with his plea for declining these terms: "Dara," he said, "is an infidel to Islam and a friend of the Hindus. He must be extirpated for the sake of the true faith and the peace of the realm. I cannot visit the Emperor before concluding this business."* But after long discussion and entreaty, he was once more induced to promise to visit Shah Jahan, and next day marched in a splendid procession from the garden to the city,—the streets being lined with dense crowds of sight-seers who cheered and blessed him. But on the way Shaista Khan and Shaikh Mir galloped up to him and dissuaded him from making the visit, as a needless running into danger. They told him that Shah Jahan had laid a plan to get him murdered by his fierce Tartar slave-women, as soon as he would step into the harem.

* Aqil Khan, 59—61.
of the Fort. Aurangzib’s purpose was shaken; he stopped his elephant, hesitating what to do. Just then a slave named Nahir-dil arrived from the Fort and betrayed into Aurangzib’s hands a secret letter which the Emperor had ordered him to smuggle out to Dara. It ran thus:

“Dara Shukoh! stay firmly at Delhi. There is no lack of money and troops there. Take care not to pass beyond that place, as I myself shall despatch the affair here.”

The warning of Aurangzib’s advisers was thus verified. Finding that his father’s whole heart was still devoted to Dara, Aurangzib was greatly displeased: he gave up his intention of an interview, passed by the gate of the Fort, and occupied Dara’s mansion in the city. Shah Jahan’s captivity was now made stricter, and communication between him and the outside world cut off.

Ever since Samugarh Aurangzib had been daily receiving deserters from the Imperial

* Aqil Khan, 61-62. Masum (79b—82a) says that Shah Jahan wrote a secret letter to Murad to murder Aurangzib! We read of Nahir-dil chela or slave having been appointed Kotwal of Agra in 1656. (Waris, 106 b.) Manucci (Storia, i. 296) and Bernier (65) declare this letter to Dara as a forgery of Aurangzib’s. For Aurangzib’s refusal to visit Shah Jahan, see also A.N. 122-123; Khafi Khan, ii. 34—36.
service and enlisting new troops and officers in large numbers. When Agra Fort surrendered, he became truly the sovereign, and the whole administrative staff submitted to him. A grand darbar was now held (10th June) in his camp. He sat on a couch of State and granted audience to the public, eager to see their new master. The new Chancellor Rai-i-raian, the grand wazir Jafar Khan, and all other departmental heads with their staffs did him homage. Hosts of men were passed before him by the paymasters and courtiers, and were given suitable rank at his command by the marshals (mir tuzak.) Fresh appointments were made on the 11th and 12th, after he had entered Agra City.* His preparations being now complete, and his mind at peace about Shah Jahan, Aurangzib on the 13th set out from Agra towards Delhi in pursuit of Dara, and arrived near Mathura† ten days later. His march had been slow and hesitating, because an alarming, but not unforeseen development had taken place in the meantime. Murad was trying to assert himself and cross the purposes of

* A. N. 111—119; Isardas 29a.
† Storia, i. 300 n (the place where Murad was arrested.) Aqil Khan 65; Isardas 316 (at Brindaban); A. N. 138 ‘the further side of Mathura.’
his masterful brother. This source of danger had to be crushed before it could grow too strong for control or remedy, and Aurangzib decided to settle the affair of Murad before proceeding further.

Since the battle of Samugah Murad* had kept to his own camp on account of his wounds. His courtiers showed him how jealous of power was daily slipping out of his grasp while Aurangzib was becoming all in all. They flattered his vanity by saying that both the victories over the enemy had been won by his own valour, while Aurangzib had kept himself out of the heat and burden of the day; and yet now all the Imperial officers were making their bow to Aurangzib and he was issuing orders in everything as the sole master. The surrender of Agra Fort had made this Prince Emperor in all but the name. Was it to promote his brother's elevation to the throne that Murad had bled? And what certainty was there that Aurangzib would peaceably deliver to him the full lordship of the western provinces

* The reasons for arresting Murad are given by Aurangzib in Adab, 1886, and in his official history, Alamgirnamah, 134—138. See also Kambu, 188 and margin; Isardas, 29b—31a; Aqil Khan, 64—66; Khafi Khan, ii. 37 (meagre); Masum, 79a—81a (probably a mere story); Storia, i. 263, 283-284, 298—300; Bernier, 66-67.
as agreed in their treaty of alliance? With his senior partner daily growing stronger, Murad must soon lose the power of enforcing respect to that treaty.

A keen disappointment is said to have aggravated Murad's jealousy and alarm. Ever since their meeting at Dipalpur Aurangzib had done everything to soothe and flatter Murad. His own interest in the war of succession, he said, was merely that of a pious Muslim, who could not bear to see Dara openly slighting his creed and cherishing the infidels. He aimed not at the crown, but at the extirpation of the heretical heir-apparent, the 'Idolator' as styled him. As soon as that object had been attained, Aurangzib would place Murad on the throne and himself take a low unambitious place as his minister, or retire to the life of a religious recluse. Hence in their conversation Murad used to address Aurangzib as His Holiness (Hazrat-ji), while Aurangzib referred to his younger brother as His Majesty (Padishah-ji). Again, after the victory of Samugarh, Aurangzib had congratulated Murad on the commencement of his reign, and yet he had now monopolised all power! Such is the story told by all the unofficial historians of that age.
But I find it difficult to credit this account as a whole. Murad must have been a greater fool than he really was if he ever truly believed in such delusive promises. It is possible that Aurangzib had pretended to defer to Murad’s judgment in public, and also by smooth words raised in his mind a vague hope that he would give Murad much more than the territory promised in the treaty. At least Murad might have imagined that Aurangzib would not seize the supreme power in the life-time of Shah Jahan, as he had hitherto avoided wearing the crown and had even urged Murad to desist from such a course in Guzerat.

At all events, Murad was keen on reigning as king. He could not banish the fond dream of royalty from his mind, but had kept with himself his throne, golden umbrella, and other insignia of kingship since leaving Ahmadabad, in the hope of using them in Northern India; and now he saw his hopes threatened with disappointment. With every successive victory and march, Aurangzib’s power was growing greater and his position higher, while Murad’s grew less and less. Flattering courtiers fanned the young Prince’s jealousy and ambition and prompted him to assert himself: the crown of Delhi would best
become a hero like him. If Aurangzib could usurp the supreme power, why could not Murad?

Led on by such counsellors who fed his vanity, Murad began to act in opposition to Aurangzib and to assert his own will. In order to rival his brother he began to increase his army, seduced from Aurangzib's side many of the recently joined Imperial troops by the promise of higher pay, and even intercepted and diverted to his own camp men who were coming to enter Aurangzib's service. His lax discipline and reckless generosity made him the darling of a certain class of soldiers. The Mughal mercenaries in particular were attached to such a liberal and lenient master. Many self-seekers, too, gladly deserted the strict and parsimonious Aurangzib for higher rank and pay under Murad. Thus, in a short time Murad's army was swollen to 20,000 men. In imitation of Aurangzib he conferred titles and mansabs on his followers, as if he had already become king. Lastly he gave up visiting Aurangzib as beneath his dignity.

Thus an open opposition to Aurangzib's authority was set up. The malcontents and plotters against him found a camp in which to take refuge and a regular organisation by means of which to display their hostility. The situa-
tion became very critical for Aurangzib, and a solution of it had to be reached before the chase of Dara could be undertaken with safety.

When Aurangzib started from Agra, Murad stayed behind in that city; but his advisers told him that if Aurangzib entered Delhi alone he would easily crown himself Emperor. So, Murad changed his mind, and followed his brother, always encamping a few miles behind him, as if waiting to deal a shrewd blow from the rear. The public mind was greatly disturbed by this open rivalry, and turbulent men rejoiced at the prospect of a civil war, which would leave them free to plunder the country. The acts of violence committed by Murad's men could not be punished, as Aurangzib had no influence over brother now. The work he had still in hand was thrown into disorder.

His plan was quickly formed.* With his inborn cunning, he first lulled Murad's suspicion to sleep. Two marches from Agra he presented

* For the arrest of Murad, Kambu, 19a; Aqil Khan, 66—70; Isardas, 31b—33b; Masum, 82b—86a; (the last two very detailed); A.N. 138 (merely mentions the event); Khafi Khan, ii. 38, and Dilkasha, 30, (both meagre); Storia, i. 300—306; Bernier, 66—69.
233 horses and 20 lakhs of rupees to Murad, as the latter had complained of being too poor to equip his troops for the march. Aurangzib further promised to send him soon one-third of the spoils of war, as previously agreed upon. Then he invited his brother to a feast in celebration of his complete recovery and also to hold a council of war for the projected operations against Dara. For some days after this Murad’s chief followers dissuaded him from putting himself in his rival’s power. That Prince, though professing firm faith in Aurangzib’s promises and oaths, seems to have been shaken in his purpose, and declined to make the visit, offering polite excuses. Aurangzib repeated the invitation daily. He had secretly corrupted Nuruddin, a personal attendant (khawas) of Murad’s, and this traitor induced the hapless Prince, when returning from a hunt, to enter his brother’s camp, (25th June.) The other officers protested, but in vain.

Murad was received at the gate by Aurangzib and taken within his tent. His officers were seated in a pavilion outside the portico and made welcome by his brother’s marshals. The courtyard was filled with the same Prince’s officers of the guard.

Murad was led into Aurangzib’s private
Murad welcomed in Aurangzib's tent, chamber, attended by only one servant, the eunuch Basharat. The two brothers sat down together on the same carpet. Aurangzib was all kindness and attention to Murad, smeared him over with essence and asked after his health, professing the utmost pleasure at his recovery and showering "favours beyond imagination and computation" on him. After some time a royal dinner was laid for both, and the hungry hunter did full justice to it. According to one account, Aurangzib even plied Murad with wine and overcame his natural delicacy in drinking before an elder brother by saying, "Drink in my presence, as I long to see you supremely happy after so many adversities."

Conversation followed the dinner. Gradually the fatigue of the chase and the fulness of the repast made Murad doze and yawn. Aurangzib told him to take a nap in a bed spread close at hand, while he himself retired to the harem on the plea of similarly reposing. The plan of campaign was left to be discussed till after the siesta.

Murad took off his sword and dagger, loosened his dress, and stretched himself at ease on the bed. Basharat sat down rubbing his legs. Soon
a lovely slave-girl entered the tent and, making a sign to the eunuch to go away, took his place at Murad's feet and began to shampoo him. The soft touch of her palms soothed Murad and threw him into a profound slumber. Then she arose and stealthily left the room, taking away Murad's weapons from the side of his pillow. The time long waited for had now arrived. Immediately after her departure Shaikh Mir with a dozen of the most trusty servants of Aurangzib entered the chamber and surrounded Murad's bed. They seem to have made a clatter, which awoke Murad. Starting up at the sound, he first tried to seize his weapons, but they were gone. In a moment he understood the meaning of this "strange change:" he had been caged! Resistance was hopeless. Sinking into despair, he upbraided his brother with treachery to a guest and ally and falsehood to his plighted word and to vows sworn on the Quran. Aurangzib, who was lurking in suspense behind a screen, replied, "As at the instigation of your wretched advisers, you have recently done acts likely to cause disturbance, trouble, and injury to the people and ruin to the country, and as your head has been filled with pride and insolence, wise people apprehended from this
state of affairs the destruction of public peace, injury to property, and confusion in the government. Therefore, with a view to reform your temperament and to promote the good of the kingdom and the congregation, I think it necessary to make you pass some days in patience and repose, in a retreat full of composure, and under my eyes, that you may not have to rack your head about issuing commands and prohibitions and may be freed from the hardships of the world. God forbid that I should, with regard to this 'light of the royal eye,' entertain the idea of doing any act to put your dear life in danger! Praised be Allah! the foundations of my promise and vow (to you) have not been at all weakened. My brother's life is safe in the protection of God. Eating the bread of wisdom daily...and knowing this (confinement) to be purely beneficial (to yourself), give no place to sorrow or fear in your heart."

Murad found expostulation and entreaty alike vain; resistance would have been suicide. He yielded in silence. Shaikh Mir placed before him a pair of golden fetters and with a courteous salam tied the Prince’s feet together.

After midnight the prisoner was placed in a
Captive Murad sent to Salimgarh prison.

covered litter, such as is usually used by ladies, mounted on an elephant, and sent away under a large escort of cavalry, in charge of Shaikh Mir and Dilir Khan, two of the trustiest generals of Aurangzib. By rapid marches they soon reached the fort of Salimgarh at Delhi and deposited Murad in the State-prison of that stronghold. To throw his friends off the scent, three other elephants, with similar covered havdas and escort of cavalry, were sent out east, south, and west!

This "excellent stratagem," as it is called in the history written by Aurangzib's order and revised by him,—had been carried out so smoothly that Murad's followers did not hear of his fate till it was too late. They had imagined that he was feasting or holding secret council with his brother all the time. Next morning his leaderless soldiery, to the number of 20,000, were taken into Aurangzib's service, Even his faithful officers,—blaming their master for his obstinate rushing into a trap in contempt of their loyal warning, and hopeless of attempting a rescue in the absense of a head,—submitted to the victor, who soothed their feelings with rich favours.
The entire establishment of Murad,—generals, ministers, clerks, soldiers, camp-followers, and servants, as well as his property, became Aurangzib's. His son Izid Bakhsh was sent to Delhi to share his father's captivity. The traitor Nuruddin and several others who had connived at their master's fall, or at least had not stirred a finger to rescue him, were highly rewarded by Aurangzib.*

His mind being thus set at rest about Murad, Aurangzib on 27th June resumed his march and arrived in the environs of Delhi on 5th July.

We may here complete the history of Murad. In January 1659 he was sent a prisoner in Gwalior. with his son to the State-prison of Gwalior, where he was suffered to live for nearly three years more. But he did not cease to be a political danger with his captivity. His prodigality of money and his spirit of gay comradery with the soldiers had made him very popular. Songs in praise of the captive Prince were sung in the bazars. At last a clever conspiracy to release him, which all but succeeded, roused Aurangzib to the need of

* For Murad's officers and property after his arrest, Aqil Khan, 70; Isardas, 34a and b; Storia, i. 305, 306; A. N. 139; Khafi Khan, ii. 38; Dilkasha, 30.
removing his rival beyond the reach of his earthly friends. Murad had cherished the Mughal mercenaries greatly in the days of his power, and even now he spent half his prison-allowance in supporting the Mughals who resided as faqirs in the plain below Gwalior and the Mughal wayfarers and merchants who arrived there. Some of his former officers, including the father of the historian Khafi Khan, also lived there in disguise. The grateful Mughals now planned a rescue; one night they contrived to fasten a rope-ladder to a battlement of the fort, kept a horse saddled ready below it, and sent word to Murad to escape. The Prince was infatuated with the beauty of his concubine Sarsati Bai, whom he had taken to his prison by entreaty with Aurangzib. At midnight, when all was ready for his flight, he went to take a lover's farewell of her. There was little hope of their meeting together again. At the news, the woman set up a loud lament, crying, “To whom are you leaving me?” Hearing the noise the guards awoke, lighted their torches and searchlights, and soon discovered the ladder.*

* Khafi Khan, ii. 155-156. The word ‘Mughal’ is used in India for the Persians, and sometimes for the people of Central Asia also, but never for the Mongols.
When the news of this abortive attempt reached Aurangzib, he determined to remove all anxiety on the score of Murad for ever. At his instigation a son of Ali Naqi, whom Murad had murdered at Ahmadabad years ago, now demanded justice for the shedding of their father's blood. The eldest son declined to seek vengeance. Not so the second son, who lodged a complaint in the law courts. Aurangzib, now Emperor, directed the criminal judge (Qazi) of Gwalior to decide the case according to the evidence and the Quranic law. The plaintiff arrived at the fort in charge of an eunuch of Aurangzib and opened his case before the Qazi. Murad indignantly refused to plead, saying, "If the Emperor, in accordance with his promises and vows to me, abstains from this miserable creature's blood, no harm will be done to his State and power. But if needlessly he wishes for the death of this helpless being, what merit or propriety is there in my meeting such low people as these face to face? Do what you wish."

The Qazi convicted Murad. As the avenger refused to accept any price for his father's blood, death was the only sentence possible under Islamic law. On
Wednesday, 4th December, 1661, two slaves with their swords "released this Prince from the narrow cell of his prison." His corpse was buried in the 'Traitors' Cemetery' of Gwalior Fort. Forty years afterwards, Aurangzib, then an old man hastening to his latter end, refers to the grave of his murdered brother, but without a word of remorse or pity.* Kingship does not admit of love for brother or tenderness to the fallen who may possibly be strong.

* Murad was sent to Gwalior at the end of January 1659, (A. N. 291, 304). Khafi Khan, 156, says that Murad was beheaded in the month of Rabi-us-sani, 1072 A. H.; Kambu 246 (both MSS. in the Khuda Bakhsh Library) gives the date as 21 Rabi-us-sani, 1070 A. H. Here the final figure 2 has been dropped by mistake; the year was certainly 1072 and not 1070, because in Jamadi-ul-awwal, 1071 A. H., Murad is spoken of as still in Gwalior (A. N., 603).

For the execution of Murad, Kambu, 246; Khafi Khan, ii. 156; Storia, i. 382-383; Dilkasha 35. The reference to his tomb is in Aurangzib's letters, Inayatullah's Ahkam, 289b, 302b.
CHAPTER XVIII.

THE PURSUIT OF DARA SHUKOH THROUGH THE PANJAB AND SINDH, JUNE—NOVEMBER, 1658.

We have seen how Dara reached Delhi with about 5,000 troopers on 5th June. Taking up his quarters in the ruined fort of Babar in the Old Town, he turned to his own use the Government property, horses, and elephants in the capital, and also seized the money and goods of some of the nobles. His plan was to raise and equip a new army with these resources and to wait here till he was joined by his eldest son, whom he had ordered to hasten back from Bengal and reach Delhi by the eastern bank of the Jumna, so as to avoid Aurangzib at Agra. He also busily sent off letters to all sides to secure the support of the Imperial officers and nobles, and kept up a correspondence with Shah Jahan for a few days.*

But it was soon found that Sulaiman Shukoh

* A. N. 120-121; Aqil Khan, 63 (meagre); Masum, 758.
could not possibly reach him quickly, and that Aurangzib was not going to let Dara stay in peace at Delhi. The surrender of Agra Fort (8th June) left Aurangzib free to go in pursuit of his defeated brother, and he openly made preparations for marching northwards. At this news Dara at once resolved on flight; with the victorious enemy coming from the south in overwhelming strength and the approach of the rainy season threatening to cut him off from the Panjab, it would have been fatal for him to linger at Delhi. Should he march east, join his eldest son's 22,000 victorious troops, make the impregnable fortress of Allahabad (then held by one of his devoted officers) his stronghold, and then, forming an alliance with Shuja, confront Aurangzib with their united forces? But Shuja was the ally of his foes, Aurangzib and Murad, and was besides smarting under his recent defeat at the hands of Sulaiman. His friendly co-operation was no more to be hoped for than an alliance with Aurangzib. Therefore, for Dara to move from Delhi to Allahabad would be to let himself be crushed between two enemies,—Aurangzib in the west and Shuja in the east. On the other hand, the Panjab strongly attracted him. It was the home of soldiers, and close to the Afghan border where the hardiest mercenaries could be
enlisted. The province had long been his vice-royalty and was held by his faithful deputy, Syed Ghairat Khan. Lahore Fort contained much of his property, as well as one krore of rupees of Imperial money, and a vast arsenal and magazine. So, Dara turned to Lahore, instructing his son to join him by making a wide detour round Agra and Delhi and crossing the Ganges and the Jumna at the foot of the Himalayas. This decision ruined both father and son.*

Leaving Delhi after a week’s halt, on 12th June, with an army swollen to leaves Delhi for Lahore; 10,000 men, Dara reached Sarhind, where he seized the property of the revenue-collector and dug out 12 lakhs of rupees which that officer had buried underground before his flight. Then, after crossing the Sutlej, he destroyed all the boats found at the ferries within his reach, in order to hinder the enemy’s passage. Reaching Lahore on 3rd July, he spent there a month and a half in enlisting new men and completing his military preparations in order to meet Aurangzib on equal terms again. Even before leaving Agra he had instructed his Lahore agent, Syed Ghairat Khan, to raise troops and collect guns, and he had also “written to every quarter of this martial province

* A. N. 125-126.
inviting the tribes to enlist, and sent robes of honour to the zamindars...and *faujdars* of the Panjab, Multan and Tatta (then in his vice-royalty) and to the troops near Peshawar, inviting them to join him. After entering Lahore he opened the rich Imperial treasury and began to distribute money lavishly to the soldiery, and to give *mansabs* and titles freely. In a short time his military preparations at Lahore; 20,000 men were assembled under him. Some Imperial commanders also joined him, such as Rajah Rajrup (zamindar of the Jammu hills) and Khanjar Khan (*faujdar* of Bhera and Khus-hab). His strength daily increased. He secretly wrote to Aurangzib's officers and to the Rajputs in their homes inciting them to rebel against Aurangzib."*

At the ferry of Talwan, on the bank of the Satlej, he had left his chief general Daud Khan to oppose the enemy's crossing, and now he sent there a reinforcement of 5000 troops with artillery and material out of his increased resources at Lahore. A second party under Syed Ghairat Khan and Musahib Beg was told off to guard the ferry of Rupar, several miles above

* A.N. 142-143, 178-179; Khâfi Khan, ii, 33; Storia, i. 310.
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Talwan. Letters were also sent to Shuja, urging him to make a diversion against Aurangzib from the east and promising a partition of the empire with him after the fall of their common foe.*

Dara had hoped that the exhaustion of Aurangzib's men and horses after their long march from the Deccan and two severe battles, the heavy rainfall of the monsoons, and the many rivers and miry roads of the Panjab would prevent them from following him, and that he would get a long respite at Lahore to organise his power anew. But in hoping thus he had counted without Aurangzib's energy and strength of will, before which every obstacle,—human or physical, gave way. A month after Dara's arrival at Lahore, his dreaded rival's Vanguard crossed the Satlej (5th August) and a few days afterwards Aurangzib himself reached that river with his main army (14th August.)

That Prince had left Agra on 13th June, and two days afterwards heard of Dara's flight from Delhi. There was no need to hurry on after him, at least for the present, while Murad's open hostility raised a formidable danger nearer at

* A.N. 143, 180. The text has Jusset Khan for Ghairat Khan. Tulwun, 31 N. 75°40' E. is 4 miles north of the battle field of Aliwal (Ind. At. 30); Rupar is sixty miles east of it (47° S. W.).
hand which cried out for remedy before everything else. So, Aurangzib contented himself with sending Khan-i-Dauran to wrest Allahabad from Dara's men and thus secure the eastern flank of Agra, while he detached Bahadur Khan to follow Dara (21st June). Then he devoted himself to the all-important but delicate task of arresting Murad. This being accomplished he pushed on to Delhi.

Here urgent affairs of State and uncertainty about Sulaiman Shukoh's movements detained him for three weeks. His army also required some rest after their long marches and strenuous fights, before they could be called upon to undertake a campaign in the Panjab during the rainy season. Therefore, he only sent off Shaista Khan to hold the right bank of the Ganges and Shaikh Mir to bar the Jumna against Sulaiman Shukoh, and reinforced the pursuing army under Bahadur Khan with a fresh division commanded by Khalilullah Khan, the newly appointed Governor of the Panjab. Meantime he set himself to construct a new administration in the place of the old one which his victories over the Imperial Government had shattered. New officers had to be appointed and sent off to their charges; arrangements had to be made
for re-establishing authority over districts which had lapsed into lawlessness during the civil war; a thousand details of the public services had to be considered and orders issued on them; the detachments marching to the Satlej had to be furnished with supplies, material, and supports; and lastly the throne left vacant by the imprisonment of Shah Jahan had to be filled. At last the time had come for Aurangzeb to throw away the mask and openly realise his long-cherished ambition. The gaoler of Shah Jahan could not pretend that he was only conducting the administration as that Emperor's faithful servant and obedient agent. Aurangzeb must assume the crown to give validity to his acts and appointments and to end the last remaining possibility of a conflict of authorities.*

The astrologers pointed out 21st July as an auspicious day for sitting on the throne. There was no time to make grand preparations for the coronation or to furnish the crowns himself palaces in Delhi Fort in a style worthy of Mughal tradition.

* A. N. 125, 126, 128, 144—148, 155—159; Kambu, 198 (brief); Aqil Khan, 63-64, 70-71, 72-73; Khafi Khan, ii. 39. The garden in which Aurangzeb was crowned was then called Agharabad and contained some fine Imperial palaces. Since Khafi Khan's time it has been known as Shalamar. It is situated about 8 miles N. W. of Delhi, close to another Imperial garden named Sahibabad.
But the lucky day was not to be missed. So, with hurried preparations and curtailed ceremonies he sat on the throne at the appointed hour in the garden of Shalamar outside the city of Delhi, and assumed the title of Alamgir ('Conqueror of the Universe') with the usual additions of Padishah and Ghazi (i.e., Emperor and Holy Warrior). Six days afterwards he resumed the march towards Lahore.

Meantime he had taken every step to expedite the pursuit of Dara and to leave to that unlucky Prince no time to recoup his power. With admirable foresight he made his naval department construct portable boats which were sent on waggons* across country to the Vanguard.

Bahadur Khan hastened to the Satlej at Talwan, but found the opposite bank held too strongly by the enemy. Then, guided by some friendly zamindars, he made a forced march to the ferry of Rupar, sixty miles further up stream, which was negligently guarded. Here he collected 25 boats,—partly brought on waggons from Delhi and partly secured locally with the help of the zamindars. In the night of 5th August, he crossed the river by means of these, with 800 men

* A. N. 164.
and some pieces of artillery, and advancing along the opposite bank "charged the slothful enemy like a dashing wave." They fled to Talwan and imparted their panic to its defenders, who all fell back on Sultanpur, on the eastern bank of the Bias.

All the ferries of the Satlej were at once evacuated, and the second division of the pursuing force (led by Khalilullah), on hearing the news in the night of the 6th, made a forced march and crossed the river at Rupar the next day.*

Only the Bias now lay between Dara and his enemies, and this river he held strongly. Daud Khan was sent from Lahore with orders to cross the Bias and fight the Imperialists if possible, otherwise to retreat across the river and hold its western bank. He hastened to the ferry of Govindwal and learnt of the exact strength of the Imperial host which had been doubled by the junction of Khalilullah with Bahadur Khan. A battle against such odds was beyond his power. He, therefore, recalled the troops from Sultanpur and held Govindwal, where Sipahr Shukoh (Dara's second son) joined him from Lahore with

* A. N. 164—166.
reinforcements and instructions to engage the enemy. But Aurangzib had but abandon it on the approach of Aurangzib's Van. ordered Khalilullah Khan to halt for reinforcements, without forcing an action. The Emperor himself reached the Satlej at Rupar on 14th August, and, while he halted there for eight days to take his vast army across in the few boats and to ascertain if the road to the Bias was clear, he sent off Jai Singh and Dilir Khan with the artillery under Saf Shikan Khan to join Khalilullah and make his strength superior to the enemy's. This division reached the Van at Garh Sarang (18th) and there learnt that Dara had fled from Lahore after recalling Sipihr Shukoh from the Bias and ordering Daud Khan to burn his boats and fall back on him when the Imperial army would actually arrive on the left bank at Govindwal.*

In fact, when the new Emperor's army crossed the Satlej and he himself arrived at that river, once more Dara's treachery and desertion in his army. Dara's despair; Dara's genius quailed before that of Aurangzib. How could he hope to resist a rival, who with inferior forces had

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*A. N. 182—186; Kambu, 19a; Sultanpur, 31'12 N. 75'15 E, on the eastern bank of the Kalna river, and 5 miles east of the Bias. Govindwal, on the western bank of the Bias, 11 miles N. N. W. of Sultanpur. (Ind. At. 30).
conquered Jaswant Singh and Rustam Khan, who had triumphed over fatigue, bad roads, and rain-swollen rivers, and who was now coming up with a large army of veterans that had never known a defeat? Against these Dara's raw recruits and heartless fugitives from Samugarh could make no stand. The traitors in his ranks and the mercenaries whose lukewarm services he had bought, became a source of danger to him as the enemy came nearer and made it easier for them to desert or mutiny. Dara now despaired of success in war and confessed to his confidential advisers, "I cannot resist Aurangzib. If it had been any one else, I should have fought him here." Their leader's despair infected the army; they lost heart and confidence in a chief who had no confidence in himself; most of the newly assembled troops abandoned the losing side and marched off to join the banner of victory and hope that waved over Aurangzib's head. That Prince had been busily sending letters full of temptation to Dara's officers and succeeded in seducing many of them, such as Rajah Rajrup, Khanjar Khan and some others.* Worse than the defection of these men, a clever ruse of Aurangzib paralysed Dara's right arm by sowing suspicion in his mind about his bravest

* A.N. 181—182; Masum, 88 b—89 a; Kambu, 19 a.
and most devoted officer, Daud Khan, “to whom his whole army looked up for encouragement and the example of steadfastness.”

Aurangzib wrote the following letter to Daud Khan and contrived that it should be intercepted by Dara’s patrols and placed before him:

“I learn from your letter, which has reached me at such and such a place, that you wish for my success beyond limit. I praise and approve of your conduct. As requested by you I am proceeding very quickly towards that side. God willing, you will soon have the honour of waiting on me. The proper course for a devoted servant (like you) is to act in this matter in the way mentioned in your letter, so that my mind may be entirely placed at rest about these affairs and Sipihr Shukoh,—nay, all the enemies of the Prophet’s path, and all deniers of the Prophet’s faith,—may be made prisoners by the troops of Islam.”

Every word of the letter was false, because the faithful Daud Khan had never corresponded with Aurangzib, still less had he conspired to seize and betray his master and his master’s son. But the lying epistle coming at a time when so many others were turning traitor, did the work intended. “The future grew absolutely dark to
Dara as he read it. He sank into grief. Suspicion got possession of his mind." He recalled Sipihr Shukoh from the side of Daud Khan and weakened the party that held the Bias river. Daud Khan on returning to his master found him a changed man, ever turning a clouded face and suspicious looks at him. Hearty co-operation between the Prince and his chief lieutenant ceased.*

When Daud Khan reported from Govindwal that with his inferior force he could not attack the Imperial Van, then about to be swollen by the union of four high generals—Bahadur Khan, Khalilullah Khan, Jai Singh, and Dilir Khan,—and armed with Saf Şikan’s artillery, Dara yielded to despair, and put into practice the flight he had long meditated and secretly discussed with his confidants. On 18th August he left Lahore with his family and all the treasure of the fort (amounting to more than a krone of rupees) besides the precious articles and stores of Government, and many guns and artillery material. Loading most of them in boats, and a small portion on transport animals, he hastened to Multan. Sipihr Shukoh by a forced march

* Maşum, 895—935. (There is no other authority for this incident except Manucci, Storta, i. 311-312.)
from Govindwal joined him outside Lahore, and so did Daud Khan after destroying the boats on the Bias. Nearly 14,000 troopers accompanied the Prince, "attracted by his hoard of gold."*

But the pursuer was not far behind. At the news of Dara's flight from Lahore, Khalilullah, then at Garh Shankar, had sent a party hurriedly to Govindwal to procure boats from the zamindars and raise those sunk by the enemy, and then throw a bridge over the Bias. Another party was sent under Tahir Khan to reach Lahore by forced marches in order to keep order in the masterless city and to save Dara's abandoned property and the Government stores from being looted. They arrived there on the 25th, exactly a week after Dara had left, and at once took possession of it.

The Van itself, led by Khalilullah Khan, after making long marches, arrived near Lahore on the 29th, and the very next day, without entering the city, set off towards Multan at the heels of Dara.† Aurangzib himself spent three weeks (from 14th August to 4th September) on the two banks of the Satlej in transporting his vast

* A. N. 186—188; Aqil Khan, 73 (meagre); Storia, i. 312.
† A. N. 186—188. Garh Shankar, 32 miles N. N. W. of Rupar. The text wrongly reads Garh Sarang.
army; then crossed the Bias on 11th September, and next day reached Haibatpur Pati. Here alarming news arrived from his Van; Khalilullah had reported, "It is expected that Dara will make a firm stand at Multan. The pursuing army has no general high enough to encounter a prince of the blood and to secure the obedience of the entire army. If a battle is precipitated now, a disaster may befall our army. So, we have slackened our pursuit."

At this Aurangzib determined to lead the chase in person. Sending his big camp, heavy baggage and unnecessary troops on to Lahore with his son Azam, he turned south-west towards Multan with a small tent, the indispensable stores and the pick of his soldiery, making forced marches of 14 to 22 miles a day. By way of Qasur, and Shigarh, he reached Mumanpur on the 17th, and there got the news that Dara had fled from Multan (13th September) southwards to Bhakkar, and that his army was daily decreasing through desertion. There was no need now for Aurangzib to tax the endurance of his men and animals. He henceforth travelled.

* A. N. 189, 192, 197—201; Kambu, 196 (brief.) Pati 31°16' N. 74°55' E., 11 miles north of the battle-field of Sobroon (Ind. At 3°).
shorter stages, but Saf Shikan Khan with 6,000 men from the Van was ordered to push on after Dara beyond Multan and expel him from the province. Twenty thousand gold-pieces were sent to pay his troops. Khalilullah with the rest of the Van was ordered to stay at Multan till the Emperor's arrival. Aurangzib reached the environs of Multan* on the 25th; but from this point he turned back towards Delhi five days later, because an alarming situation had been developed in the east, which required his presence there, while Dara's power was now so reduced that his pursuit might be safely left to divisional commanders.

We now leave the hunters and take up the history of the object of their chase. After Dara's flight from Lahore, the Imperial Vanguard followed him only twelve marches behind. Every day men deserted the hapless heir to the throne; even his own Paymaster, Khwajah

* A. N., 201—212; Aqil Khan, 73; Qasur, 32 miles S. of Lahore, is a station on the N. W. R., Shirgarh, 70 miles S. E. of the Satghara Station (Ind. At. 30). Mumanpur is said to be 38 miles from Shirgarh. I can find only a Mumandwala, 4 miles north of Harappa (Ibid, 17.)
Sadiq, went over to the winning side. On 5th September he reached Multan, but he was in no position to make a firm stand anywhere. Taking from the local Treasury its cash balance of 22 lakhs, he loaded all his wealth in large boats and sent them down the Indus to Bhakkar in charge of the trusty general Firuz Miwati and the eunuch Basant, while he himself started (13th September) by land towards Uch. At Multan most of his officers and men left him. Uch was reached on the 23rd, but there was rest for him nowhere. His pursuers had made up the distance by incessant and long marches: at Lahore their Van was 12 days behind him, at Multan only 8 days, and at Uch the interval had been reduced to four days' march.

So Dara fled further away and reached Sakkar on the west bank of the Indus (opposite Bhakkar) on 13th October. Here he stayed for five days only and then resumed his painful flight down the river (18th October).*

* A. N. 203—205; Storia, i. 316.
Meantime, Aurangzib’s Van under Khalilullah had reached Multan on 21st September, eight days after Dara’s flight from it. The scouts sent forward lost the trail of the fugitive; they could not learn whether he had gone south-eastwards to Rajputana or south-westwards to Sindh. After following the former route for some days they returned baffled. Soon the news arrived that Haji Khan Baluch, a great zamindar of the province had disputed in vain the passage of Dara’s treasure-boats down the river. The route of his flight was now ascertained. On the 22nd a courier arrived at Multan with Aurangzib’s instructions and 20,000 gold coins, and immediately afterwards Saf Shikan Khan marched out of Multan in pursuit. On the 26th Aurangzib sent Shaikh Mir and Dilir Khan with a corps of 9,000 men to reinforce the pursuers. By making long marches, Saf Shikan reached Uch on the 30th, four days after Dara’s flight from it. The work of bridging the Satlej (probably near Jalalpur) and the need of waiting for stragglers and treasure, delayed the advance. On 2nd October Saf Shikan received a party of musketeers, hatchetmen and water carriers, 80,000 gold coins and many necessary stores sent by
the Emperor, and resumed his march. As Shaikh Mir’s party was still 60 miles behind, Saf Shikan did not wait for him, but marched on to a place 126 miles north of Bhakkar, where he halted till the 17th, when Shaikh Mir’s force joined him. Here scouts brought the news of Dara having crossed to the right bank of the Indus on the 13th and entered Sakkar.*

The pursuing force now numbered 15,000, and was too large to march conveniently by the same path in one body. So, it was divided: Shaikh Mir with his division crossed the Indus and marched along the right bank, while Saf Shikan Khan moved along the left bank, towards Bhakkar and Sakkar,—the length of the two routes being 200 and 126 miles respectively.

On the 18th the two generals parted company near Kan, and while Shaikh Mir halted two days to throw a bridge of boats over the Indus, Saf Shikan pushed on by the left bank, and in three long marches reached Bhakkar on the 21st. Shaikh Mir on the other bank of the Indus covered 160 miles in three days, suffering great hardship from the jungles, briars and difficult ground.

* A. N. 205—209, 272—273. Uch, 29'15 N. 71'7 E. (Ind. At. 18 N. W.). Three months south of Multan the Mughal army had to cross the Bias, which then flowed in its old bed here. (A. N. 272).
crossed on the way; many transport cattle perished; the camp followers were exhausted; and on the 3rd day of the march the baggage and tents lagged so far behind that the troops had to live on scanty rations. On the fourth day, after travelling 24 miles, he reached Sakkar.*

Here the Imperialists learnt that their prey had again given them the slip. Dara had left much of his property, many ladies of his harem, some treasure, all his heavy gold and silver plate, and some of his big guns, in the fort of Bhakkar, and entrusted its defence to his eunuch Basant and Syed Abdur Razzaq, with plenty of munition, a body of musketeers, bowmen and barqandazes, together with many European gunners under Manucci. The rest of his property was conveyed down the river in boats, while he moved south (18th October) with his troops by the right bank of the Indus, cutting a way through the jungle. Only 3000 men accompanied him. The 14,000 troopers who had left Lahore with him, had been reduced by desertion to one-half when he abandoned Multan. And now when he refused

*A. N. 273-274. Sakkar is on the western bank and Rohri on the eastern bank of the Indus, while the island-fortress of Bhakkar is in midstream, between the two towns. (Postans’s Sindh, ed. 1843, pp. 30-31.)
to make a stand even in the impregnable fortress of Sakkar, his followers grew sick of their incessant toilsome and inglorious flight, their hopeless cause and their timid leader. As he left Sakkar, he was abandoned by four thousand of his soldiers, including nearly all the chiefs of his army and his most devoted adherents. Some of them returned to their jagirs, but most joined Aurangzib’s army.* Even the trusty Daud Khan at last left his cold and suspicious master.

Disgusted with the treatment he had been receiving, he had asked Dara bluntly for the cause of his being suspected, and had protested his loyalty. This speech Dara took to be the outcome of hypocrisy, and dismissed Daud Khan from his service, saying, “My circumstances are so bad that even those whom I have brought up are now ungratefully leaving me. On you I have conferred no such benefit that I can ask you to be a fugitive from your home and a wanderer in misery for my sake. It is proper that you should leave me at this point and go wherever your heart desires...Don’t insist on accompanying me beyond it.”

Daud Khan, astonished to hear such an order,

* A.N. 270-275; Storia, i. 318, 326-327 (siege of Bhakkar.)
again asserted his devotion and refused to desert his master even at his bidding. He murdered the honourable ladies of his harem, in order to be free from anxiety about them, and then reported to Dara how he had "composed his mind about certain objects which make men hesitate and shrink from (desperate) exertion and fighting at such times (of danger.)" He entreated Dara to banish all doubt of his good faith from his mind, now that he had no family tie which might counteract his constancy and fidelity. But even this proof of devotion did not convince Dara; he sent away Daud Khan from his side. The Afghan general had to leave the army per force, and afterwards joined Aurangzib who raised him to a high rank.*

With less than 3,000 men Dara reached a place (probably Larkhanah) 50 miles south of Sakkar, where the road to Qandahar begins. But his servants and wives flatly refused to go to the land of the ferocious and inhospitable Baluches. He had no help but to give up this plan and flee further south. By land he reached Siwistan (Sehwan), while his boats glided down the river.†

* Masun, 93b—96a (for the above details); A.N. 274, 275; M.U. ii. 33 (life of Daud Khan); Storia, i. 317-318.
† A.N. 275. Sehwan is always mentioned in the Persian histories as Siwistan. (See also Postans, 8).
Saf Shikan Khan, who had reached Bhakkar on 21st October, only three days after Dara’s flight from the opposite bank (Sakkar), halted one day to take possession of the city, posted a garrison at Rohri and a force at Sakkar to blockade the gates of its fort, and then on the 23rd resumed his march, without waiting for Shaikh Mir who had a longer journey to make and was three days behind.* On the 30th he got a letter from the qiladar of Sehwan, which was 26 miles ahead, reporting that Dara had arrived within ten miles of that fort and urging him to hurry up and intercept the enemy’s treasure-boats coming behind. At once he despatched a force of 1000 mounted barqandazes with 14 swivel guns on the backs of camels, and rockets, to outstrip Dara’s boats and entrench on the left bank of the Indus further down, near Sehwan, where the river was narrow, and thus prevent the escape of the boats. That very night he himself made a forced march of 24 miles down this bank and, leaving Dara on the right bank behind him, next noon overtook the barqandazes by the edge of the river, one mile below the fort (which was on the opposite bank).

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* A. N. 275-276.
Entrenching two miles of the river-side, he waited for the enemy’s boats.

Dara’s men removed their boats on the right bank to a point three miles above the Imperial trenches. Behind them could be seen part of Dara’s army—some 1000 cavalry, 10 elephants, and a few banners. This was the most critical stage of the pursuit. Now, if ever, Dara’s flight was to be barred. He had been placed between the two divisions of the Imperial army,—Saf Shikan Khan’s before, and Shaikh Mir’s behind; and these two together outnumbered his force as five to one. His boats had to run the gauntlet of the guns of Sehwan Fort on the right bank and those of Saf Shikan’s light artillery on the left. But one way of escape still remained open: these two divisions of the enemy were posted on the opposite banks of a large swift river, at a great distance from each other, and with no adequate supply of boats for communication with each other. Dara with great promptitude and dash seized this weak point to effect his escape.

As the Imperialists were very weak in boats, their immense superiority on land could be effectively used to close the river if only the fort and the army co-operated from the two banks. Saf Shikan Khan’s rapid march had left all his
boats far behind; and now Dara’s superior flotilla, stationed between, prevented them from passing down the river to his entrenchments. The Khan, therefore, asked for some boats from the fort of Sehwan in order to cross over to the right bank and fight Dara on land. He further instructed the qiladar to sally out and seize a narrow pass which lay in front of Dara’s path, and also to direct the full board-side of the fort guns and muskets on Dara’s boats if they tried to slip down the river along the right bank close to the fort wall. But the qiladar, Muhammad Salih Tarkhan, could not rise to the height of the occasion: he feared to risk a battle on land with his small garrison without reinforcement from Saf Shikan Khan, and yet he durst not take the only step by which such reinforcement could have reached him. His few boats, he said, in crossing the river to Saf Shikan’s trenches would be cut off by Dara’s superior naval power. He further reported that as the river was shallow near the right bank, Dara’s boats would have to hug the left bank where Saf Shikan’s guns would be easily able to overpower them.

The day wore on in corresponding with the fort. Saf Shikan could not cross over, but spent
all the night and the next day (1st November), standing on the alert in his trenches. The news reached him that Dara had come to a halt and that Shaikh Mir expected to come upon the enemy on the right bank in two or three days.

But about 9 a.m. on 2nd November a cloud of dust filled the western sky: Dara’s army was on the move. Soon his boats too were sighted from Saf Shikan’s position. The Imperialists stood armed and watchful on the left bank, waiting for the approach of the hostile flotilla.

But a cruel disappointment was in store for them. In an hour it became clear that Dara’s boats were passing by the further bank (near the fort) and not coming to the entrenched side. The artillery of Saf Shikan opened fire, but the width of the river was more than their range. Only two of the boats were damaged; all the rest passed safely downstream. The land-force, too, escaped capture. Dara issued from the narrow defile of Sehwan and hastened towards Tatta, which he reached on the 13th.

On the 3rd Saf Shikan Khan learnt of Dara’s successful flight from Sehwan the day before, and he at once marched down the left bank for two days in the hope of keeping up touch with the enemy. Then he halted for Shaikh Mir,
who arrived opposite him on the 6th and ordered a junction of their forces. Some days were taken in ferrying Saf Shikan’s army over to the right bank, as the boats were few. By making forced marches he overtook Shaikh Mir on the way to Tatta (14th November) and was again sent in advance of his colleague. On the 17th he got the news that at Tatta the pursuers reach Tatta. Dara had crossed over to the left bank of the Indus the preceding day, and that the Imperial scouts who had entered the city had had a brush with the remnant of the enemy’s troops in it, but that Dara was still halting on the other side. At this Saf Shikan made a forced march of 28 miles and reached the Indus two miles above Tatta. Next day (the 19th) he halted, took possession of Dara’s abandoned property in the town, and was joined by Shaikh Mir.*

On the 20th Saf Shikan Khan resumed his march from Tatta, advanced six miles south of the town and halted to collect boats for bridging the Indus. This work being accomplished, he crossed the river on the 23rd and encamped on the left bank. But the bird had flown away; no trace of Dara could be found in Sindh.

* * A. N. 276–282.
Taking advantage of the Imperialists’ enforced halt at Tatta, the Prince had hurried eastwards away from the Indus, reached Badin (the 24th) and was marching along the Rann towards Cutch and Guzerat.

Just then orders arrived from the Emperor recalling the pursuing force in hot haste to the Court, to repel Shuja’s invasion. The troops, utterly exhausted by their incessant marching over long stages through the dreary sands and jungles of Sindh and with most of their remounts and transport animals dead of fatigue, welcomed the command, and set their faces homewards up the Indus (5th December).* They had failed in their quest, but had still won glory. Their supreme feat of endurance had missed success when almost within their grasp, through their lack of boats. The pursuit which had been so relentlessly carried on for three months since Dara left Lahore, now ended. Nor was it any longer necessary; for Dara’s ruined condition and the terribly inhospitable region that lay before him promised little that he would ever again threaten the Imperial throne.

* A.N. 282-283. They joined the Emperor at the hunting-lodge of Rupbas on 8th Feb. (295).
CHAPTER XIX.

Shuja's Struggles for the Throne—Battle of Khajawah (5 January, 1659).

Prince Muhammad Shuja, the second son of Shah Jahan and now Governor of Bengal, was a man of great intelligence, elegant taste, and amiable disposition. But his constant devotion to pleasure, the easy administration of Bengal, and his 17 years' residence in that enervating country, had made him weak, indolent and negligent, incapable of arduous toil, sustained effort, vigilant caution, and profound combination. He had allowed his administration to drift, his army to grow inefficient, and all his departments to fall into a slack and sleepy condition. "Small things like the Chameli flower escaped his sight," as a writer of the time puts it. His health had been impaired by the pestilential climate of Bengal, and he already felt the touch of age, though only turned of forty-one. His mental powers were as keen as before; but they required great emergen-
cies to call them forth, and shone only by flashes; he was still capable of vigorous action, but only fitfully.

The story of Shah Jahan’s illness, with its embellishments by rumour, reached Shuja at Rajmahal, the then capital of Bengal. He immediately crowned himself king, took the pompous title of Abul Fauz Nasiruddin Muhammad, Timur III, Alexander II, Shah Shuja Bahadur Ghazi. The khutba was read in his name in the mosques, coins were struck bearing his title, and the assumption of royalty was complete. It only remained to defeat his rivals and seize the throne of Delhi.

For this purpose he started with a large army, an admirable park of artillery, and the highly useful war-boats (nawwara) of Bengal. Passing through Patna, he reached Benares by the end of January, 1658. Meantime Dara had despatched an army of 20,000 cavalry, 2,000 foot-musketeers, and 200 barqandazes, with a well-filled war-chest and many elephants. The nominal command had been given to his eldest son, Sulaiman.

* Khafi Khan, ii. 5; Masum 32b.
† Adab-i-Alamgiri, 215b; Alamgirnamah, 31; Masum, 34a; Kambu 9a.
Shukoh, a mere youth; but the real power lay in the hands of his associates, the politic and experienced Rajput chief Jai Singh, and the doughty Afghan leader Dilir Khan Ruhela. The old Emperor had entreated the generals to do their best to avert the fratricidal war; they were not to molest Shuja if he retired peacefully to his own province, and should fight him only if he persisted in advancing.* This army came in touch with Shuja's at Bahadurpur, 5 miles northeeast of Benares.†

Here on the high bank of the Ganges Shuja formed an entrenched camp, with his flotilla moored close at hand. Dara's army halted three miles off. For some days there was a distant artillery duel, and now and then skirmishes between the scouts of the two armies. The Delhi troops had no such decided superiority of strength as to storm Shuja's position with the certainty of victory. Sulaiman, therefore, carefully studied the enemy's position and habits. He found out that they did not take ordinary military precaution nor patrol round their camp, and that Shuja

* Adab-i-Alamgiri, 2160; Storia, i. 244; Bernier, 35.
† Bahadurpur (Indian Atlas, sh. 88) only 2 m. east of the right bank head of the Railway bridge over the Ganges at Benares.
was grossly indolent, letting things drift and sleeping till late in the morning.

So Sulaiman made his own preparations. Early in the morning of 14th February, 1658, he marched his troops out on the pretence of changing their ground, and suddenly fell upon Shuja's camp.∗

“The Bengal soldiers after rubbing their sleepy eyes found that the enemy were already around them; they had no time to put on their tunics, but took the shortest road to safety.”

The tumult broke Shuja's sleep on a couch hung round with mosquito-nets. He took an elephant and hurried out to retrieve the day, but the battle had been already lost. The enemy had swarmed into his camp and were looting it. “All his captains from their respective quarters had fled, without caring what became of their master.” Here and there a few knots of men were facing the enemy and offering resistance, but more with a view to win their way to safety than to gain a victory. Some three thousand of the enemy encircled his elephant and plied their muskets and bows at him. Their arrows rained down on his hadada, and some even glanced off his coat of

∗ Alamgirnamah, 31; Masum, 34a—40b. My account of the surprise and flight is taken from the latter's graphic description.
mail. But he boldly kept them back, emptying two quivers of arrows with his own hands. He shouted to his own men to rally and form behind his elephant, but it was of no avail. The enemy pressed closer still, and tried to capture the elephant, one of them coming near enough to slash its leg with his sword.

Only one path of safety lay open. The elephant was driven to the river-bank, where the fire of the naval guns checked the enemy's approach. But even this retreat had to be effected in the teeth of the enemy's keenest opposition and after repeated counter-charges by a band of his devoted followers under Mir Isfandiar Mamuri and Syed Ismail Bukhari. They gained time for the elephant to break through the enemy's cordon and reach the bank, where Shuja quickly dismounted and sought safety among his boats.

Sulaiman's men now plundered the entire camp. The tents, jewels, furniture, and all sorts of other goods, besides money, horses, and elephants, were seized by the victors. The Bengal troops had escaped with their bare lives, and left every thing behind. Shuja's own losses were estimated at fifty lakhs of rupees; his chief minister, Mirza Jan Beg, lost six lakhs worth of property in addition to horses.
and elephants. Even the humblest private had abandoned his little all. The total loss could not have fallen short of two króres of rupees.

The fugitive Prince immediately weighed anchor and sped down the river. Some of his followers who reached the bank shortly after him, were too late to embark, and perished helplessly by the enemy’s swords. For ten miles the flotilla was rowed in selfish haste, without a halt being made to pick up their own men running in distraction on the bank. At last the boats drew up in exhaustion on the further side, and here Mirza Jan Beg, the wasir, who had ridden away from the field with only 400 men, was taken on board. The nature of their panic may be judged from the fact that “he congratulated his master on his having saved his life, which, in such a carnage, was equivalent to a thousand victories!”

But the main portion of the army fled by the land route through Saseram to Patna. So thoroughly demoralised were they that disgraceful scenes marked their precipitate flight. Every small group of half-naked peasants, walking behind them stick in hand, was magnified by their terror-stricken imagination into the pursuing army, whose arrival they dreaded every moment. The vanquished warriors, though ten to fifteen
thousand strong, clad in mail and cuirass, and mounted on chargers, quietly let themselves be stripped of their all by small bands of such villagers! Some even threw away their own accoutrements and money to facilitate their flight! The village women lured the soldiers aside, promising to give them drinking-water, and then snatched away their clothes and property, while the heroes durst not protest even by a word! The entire road to Patna was littered with numbers of abandoned elephants, horses, load-camels, mules, costly articles and sacks of coins. These were quickly appropriated by the villagers.

Shuja reached Patna on the 19th and rallied his men to some extent. But the Shuja goes to Mungir, victorious Sulaiman Shukoh, after freely looting the Bahadurpur camp, was now coming in pursuit. So Shuja pushed on to Mungir (Monghyr), where he stopped to gather the stragglers, give respite to the wounded, and arrange for making a stand against the pursuers. By great efforts and daily supervision he built a wall two miles long from the hill to the river, across the plain outside the city. The rampart was strengthened with trenches, stockades, and batteries; soldiers manned them day and night, on the alert for
the enemy's approach. * This unforeseen obstacle brought Sulaiman to a sharp halt. He wavered, encamped 14 miles west of Mungir, and took time to mature new plans.

Just then alarming news reached him from the Court. His father wrote urging him to patch up a truce with Shuja and hasten back to Agra to meet a new danger coming up from the south. Aurangzib and Murad had advanced from the Deccan, joined their forces on the way, crushed Dara's army which barred their path at Dharmat (15th April), and were now in full march on the capital.

Terms were quickly arranged between Shuja's wazir, Mirza Jan Beg, and Rajah Jai Singh, and confirmed by the principals. It was agreed that Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar to the east of Mungir should be left to Shuja, but his seat should be Rajmahal, as his presence at Mungir, on his western frontier, would be a menace to the ruler of Delhi. As soon as the treaty was signed † (early in May, 1658), Sulaiman hastened back towards Agra, but, alas! too late to save either his father or himself.

* Masum, 40b and 41a.
† Masum, 52a—56a. Masum at one place (52b) says that Sulaiman's camp was 30 miles from Mungir, and at another (147b) 14 miles.
A complete change now took place on the political chess-board. Aurangzib became Emperor. Aurangzib pushed steadily on, defeated Dara himself at Samugarh, got possession of Agra Fort, deposed his father, treacherously imprisoned Murad Bakhsh at a banquet, and made himself the supreme ruler of Hindustan. While halting at Delhi to organise a new administration, and ascend the throne as Emperor, Aurangzib, to make sure of his rear, sent a most friendly letter to Shuja, adding the province of Bihar to his appanage and promising him other favours, in territory and money, when the affair of Dara would be over.

In Shuja's darkest hour (the beginning of May, 1658), the clouds that lowers over him were blown away by an unexpected side-wind. He not only got breathing-time and respite from pursuit, but was confirmed in his own possessions with some increase of territory. Aurangzib's letter to him breathed the tenderest brotherly love, "As you had often before begged the Emperor Shah Jahan for the province of Bihar, I now add it to your viceroyalty. Pass some time peacefully in administering it and repairing your broken power. When I return after disposing of the affair of Dara, I shall try to gratify
your other wishes. Like a true brother I shall not refuse you anything that you desire, be it land or money."* In the light of Aurangzib’s treatment of Shah Jahan, his loving father, and of Murad Bakhsh, the very ladder by which he had mounted the throne, his protestations of brotherly love were estimated by Shuja at their true worth. He sent in reply a polite letter of thanks and—prepared for war.

The news of his brother’s absence in the far-off Panjab at the heels of Dara, Shuja’s hope of capturing Agra by surprise. revived Shuja’s ambition. He could not let slip this golden opportunity. To the objections of his chiefs and ministers he answered, “Aurangzib has left between this place and the capital no general strong enough to oppose me. If Prince Sultan Muhammad bars my path, I shall win him over, and by a quick movement secure the person of Shah Jahan and restore the old government. And then I shall stay at Court as my father’s obedient servant.”†

So he went to Patna. There his general Mir Isfandiar Mamuri, who had been wounded and captured by Sulaiman Shukoh at Bahadurpur and had escaped from his prison at Agra in

* Alamgirnamah, 211, 223 and 224.
† Masum, 96a and b; Alamgirnamah, 224.
the confusion following Dara's flight, joined him. He, alone among the Bengal chiefs, fed Shuja's vanity and urged him to make a bold bid for the crown.*

At the end of October, 1658, the Bengal army, 25,000 cavalry, with artillery and Allahabad. His march on a vast flotilla, set out quickly from Patna. At first Fortune seemed to smile on the expedition. Dara's officers in charge of the forts in the eastern provinces had been ordered by that Prince, just after his defeat, to surrender them to Shuja and thus save them from falling into Aurangzib's hands. Rohtas, Chunar and Benares all opened their gates to Shuja, and the commandant of Allahabad wrote to him proffering submission. A detachment sent to the north of the Ganges captured Jaunpur. At Benares his war-chest was replenished with three lakhs of rupees extorted from the merchants and rich men of the city, both Hindu and Muhammadan. Allahabad was reached on 23rd December. A small division of Aurangzib's troops under Khan-i-Dauran, which had been besieging the fort, fell back at the mere approach of Shuja.†

But that Prince's victorious advance was soon

* Masum, 97a and 99a.
† Alamgirnamah, 224, 225, 239, 240. Kafi Khan, ii. 45—47. Masum is strangely silent about the details of this march.
reaches Khajwah. To receive a check and he was to confront enemies of a different stamp. Three stages from Allahabad he reached Khajwah* (30th December) and found Sultan Muhammad, the eldest son of Aurangzeb, barring his path. Three days afterwards the Imperial camp became the scene of unusual life and bustle: Aurangzeb himself rode into it and took over the supreme command. Now for the decisive battle!

To understand this startling development we must hark back to the end of July last, when Aurangzeb, after crowning himself at Delhi, set off for Lahore, to chase Dara. His mind was not at ease about his brother in Bengal. He had several agents in the eastern parts, who watched every movement of Shuja, and fast couriers who sped with their reports to the Emperor. Shuja's suspicious march from Rajmahal to Patna and his openly hostile action in advancing towards

In 1764 the English exacted a ransom of 4 lakhs from Benares as the price of not looting the city. (Broome, 485).

* Khajwah (Indian Atlas, sh. 69 N. E., Khajuha) is in the Fatehpur District, 5 m. S. S. W. of the Bindki Road Station on the E. I. R. It is situated at the same distance, 10 miles, from the Ganges on its north and the Jumna on its south. Eight miles west of it stands Korah, which has given another name to the battle. A century afterwards (3rd May, 1765) General Carnac routed the Maratha allies of the Wazir of Oudh on the plain of Korah. (Broome, 513.)
Allahabad had duly reached his ears. But he had a poor opinion of Shuja's ability, military strength, generalship, or rapidity of movement, and, therefore, decided to finish the hunt after Dara first. Hence the pursuit was pushed on down the Indus. But Dara fled like the hunted hare before Aurangzib's generals, without their being able to catch him anywhere. Meantime the news from the east grew more and more alarming. So, Aurangzib at Multan deemed it unwise to neglect Shuja any longer. Leaving Dara's pursuit in the hands of his officers (30th September, 1658), he with a select cavalry escort hastened back to the capital, travelling two stages every day to make up for lost time.* It was a splendid feat of endurance, and one supremely needed. Delhi was reached on 20th November. Three days afterwards he despatched a strong force from Agra with artillery under Sultan Muhammad, to join Khan-i-Dauran's division at Allahabad, block Shuja's path, and report the situation to the Emperor. A picked body of veterans lately returned from the Panjab was sent from Delhi to join the Prince. Shortly afterwards the army near Allahabad was still further strengthened by the arrival of Zulfiquar Khan with more artillery, one krore of rupees

* Alamgirnamah, 212 et seq; Masum, 100a and b.
from Agra Fort, and several other officers, mostly Rajputs, with their contingents. While these arrangements were taking place, Shuja was still at Benares: his one chance of swooping down on Agra was thus lost; the open road on which he had counted was now blocked, and the Emperor himself was within hail at Delhi.

Thus the state of the game was completely changed, and Aurangzib naturally expected that Shuja would now retire quickly from his vain quest, as any wise man would have done. So, he slackened his own speed, halted twelve days at Delhi, and then went to the hunting-lodge of Soron, to wait for news. If Shuja retired, Prince Muhammad would be recalled and the Emperor would return as from a hunt; otherwise he would hasten from Soron to join the campaign. Shuja, however, pushed blindly on and reached Khajwah, as we have seen. The Emperor, constantly informed of the enemy’s movements, left Soron on 21st December, ordering Sultan Muhammad not to precipitate an action but wait for him. On 2nd January, 1659, father and son united their forces near Korah, eight miles west of Shuja’s position. That very day, by a happy

* Alamgirnamah, 226, 234 and 235.
coincidence, Mir Jumla arrived from the Deccan by forced marches, and at once took his place as the confidential adviser and right hand man of the Emperor.

**Battle of Khajwah**

No time was now lost on the Imperial side. Next day, 3rd January, Aurangzib marshals his army, assigned to each division its proper position. Early at dawn on the fourth, the order of battle was issued: the artillery was to be planted opposite the enemy’s guns, and the army was to advance there. All was stir and bustle in the camp. The marshals and orderlies galloped about to arrange the ranks; trumpets sounded; the kettledrums struck up; the standards were borne aloft. Before each division moved the elephants and guns; behind them tramped the serried ranks of steel-clad cavalry. “A dense cloud of dust” raised by 90,000 horses’ hoofs “hid the earth and sky.”

* Alamgirnamah, 242, 245, 250. Khafi Khan, ii. 49. Aurangzib’s disposition of his troops is minutely described in the Alamgirnamah, 245–250, and Shuja’s on pp. 250 & 251; also Aqil Kh. 75. Khafi Kh. (ii. 49) merely gives an abstract of the Alamgirnamah.
From 8 a.m. Aurangzib himself rode out on a huge elephant inspecting his troops and cheering them by his presence in the field. Under his leadership the army advanced slowly and in perfect order, till about 3 p.m., when they halted one mile from the enemy’s force, behind the Imperial artillery, at a spot chosen by the scouts for the battle. Shujah, too, marshalled his ranks, but did not leave his position. Only his artillery was sent half a mile in front of his camp. The Imperial artillery replied to their fire, but little execution seems to have been done on either side.*

At nightfall Shuja’s artillery retired on his army, in order to keep touch with it. Mir Jumla, with a born general’s instinct, at once seized the deserted position,—which was a high ground commanding the enemy’s camp. By hard labour he dragged 40 guns to it and mounted them, aiming at the enemy and ready for action on the next morning. By Aurangzib’s order his soldiers did not take off their armour, their horses were not unsaddled; the men only

* Masum (101 b) says that the fire was continued all night, and many were slain. But this is very unlikely. The Alamgirnamah gives the more credible account, which I have followed.
dismounted and slept each at his own post. The Emperor himself occupied a small tent pitched on the field. His generals hastily entrenched in front of their divisions, and kept watch. Mir Jumla went his rounds during the first part of the night, superintending the entrenching and urging the sentinels to remain on the alert.*

The eventful 5th of January was about to dawn. A few hours of the night still remained; the Emperor was engaged in the prayer of the last watch (tahajjud), when a vague clamour arose in the far-off Van of his army and grew louder every moment.† The alarm and confusion rapidly spread through the camp. The air was thick with the yells of assailants, the cries of startled sleepers and timid fugitives, and the tramp of horsemen recklessly galloping away and of cattle stampeding in fright. The ruffianly element among the camp-followers seized the opportunity of plundering on their own account. The darkness heightened the confusion, and the ignorance of its cause added to its terrors.

* Alamgirnamah, 252.
† Ibid, 253. The Akham gives the time as "two and a half prahars of the night" (40); Khafi Khan (ii. 51) says, "when 4 or 5 gharis of the night remained"; the Alamgirnamah is vague, "towards the morning" (255.)
Messengers began to come running up to the Emperor to report the truth. An act of treachery, disgraceful in any servant, doubly disgraceful in a Rajput,* was the root of all this trouble. Maharajah Jaswant Singh (of Jodhpur), who commanded the Imperial Right Wing, had brooded over some fancied slight or neglect and matured a deep plan of vengeance. He had, it was said, sent a secret message to Shuja saying that he would attack the Imperial camp behind the field at the close of the night,† and that while the Emperor would hasten to the rear to repel him Shuja should swiftly fall on the disordered army and crush it between two adversaries. So, shortly after midnight he got his 14,000 Rajputs‡ ready,

* Aurangzib's own words, in a letter to Jai Singh, given in the Paris MS., 2b.

† For the attack on the Base Camp, see Masum, 110b-111b, Alamgirnamah, 253-256, Khafi Kh. ii. 51-53, Kambu, 19b, (meagre), Aqil Kh. 76 & 77 (brief and confused), and Akham, Irvine MS. 4b. (India Office MS. 34a gives a few lines more.) The best accounts are those supplied by the Alamgirnamah and the Anecdotes, § 7. Khafi Khan supplies a few interesting details.

‡ This number is given by the Akham. Masum says "5 or 6 thousand." I have taken the larger number, because Jaswant as commander of the Right Wing could not have had less than 10,000 men; in the reduced Mughal army of the next day that wing had 10,000 men, with a reserve of 3,000 more. Secondly, the Alamgirnamah admits that at dawn Aurangzib found that "nearly one half of yesterday's force had been scattered by the tumult!" (256.)
turned his back to the field, and rushed the camp of Prince Muhammad, which lay in the path of his flight. The few guards of the camp were soon overpowered, the followers who were found in the way were slain, and every thing that the Rajputs could lay their hands on was carried off. Some of the camp people, roused by the noise and mistaking it for the approach of the enemy, hastily loaded their goods on their beasts to prepare for flight. These now fell into the hands of the Rajputs, who were saved the trouble of packing their booty! Horses and camels beyond number and an immense amount in cash and kind were carried off. The baggage, stores, and draught-cattle of the Imperialists, from the Emperor to the meanest private, which lay in the camp behind the bivouacking army, were looted. “Everything in the Prince’s camp was swept away with the broom of plunder.” Much of the Emperor’s own camp suffered the same fate before the Rajputs gained the road to Agra. The confusion spread to the army at the front. Men assembled in broken groups, and rumours of a disaster spread through the ranks. “The news caused distraction among the troops; their order was broken; cowards and traitors fled away with or after Jaswant; some double-dealers went over to Shuja. Many commanders left their posts and
hastened to the rear-camp to look after their property."

But the situation was saved by Aurangzib's wonderful coolness and Shuja's hesitation. Shuja received Jaswant's message, heard of the tumult, but did not leave his own camp at night, fearing it might be a mere ruse contrived between Aurangzib and Jaswant to lure him on to destruction! So great was Aurangzib's repute for writing feigned letters, making false professions, and practising all the stratagems of war and policy, that Shuja durst not take advantage of his seeming distress. The general who hesitates is lost; the psychological moment passed away, never to return.

The Emperor was at his tahajjud prayer in his field-tent, when the news of Aurangzib's coolness reached him. Without uttering a word, he merely waved his hand as if to say, "If he is gone, let him go!" After deliberately finishing the prayer, he issued from the tent, mounted a takht-i-rawan (portable chair), and addressed his officers, "This incident is a mercy vouchsafed to us by God. If the infidel had played the traitor in the midst of the battle, all would have been lost. His flight (now) is good for us. Praised be God that by this means
friends have been winnowed from secret enemies in my army. The occurrence is a God-send and an omen of victory to us!"

So Aurangzib firmly kept his own position, and saves the situation, prevented the confusion from infecting his division too. His example put heart into others. Orderlies were sent off to urge the leaders of the various corps not to stir from their places; any one found away from his assigned post was to be dragged to the Emperor with insult.† Islam Khan was ordered to command the Right Wing in the place of Jaswant, and Saif Khan was given independent charge of the front section of that division. In all other respects yesterday's battle formation was retained. But Mir Jumla was empowered to make any change that he deemed necessary. The rest of the night wore on in watching and caution.

At dawn Aurangzib rode out on an elephant to inspect. Jaswant's exploit had scattered nearly half the Imperial army. But with the return of day-light many faithful officers, who had not been swept too far away by the tide of flight, hastened to

* Alamgirnamah, 255 and 256, Khafi Kh., ii. 53, Akkam
† Khafi Kh. ii. 53.
rejoin the royal banner. Thus Aurangzib saw around himself more than 50,000 soldiers, as against Shuja’s bare 23,000.* He issued the order of battle with an assurance of victory which the flattering Court annalist ascribes to “his trust in God and the escort of angelic legions,” but which the modern critical historian must set down to a more mundane cause, viz., his clear superiority of two to one over his enemy.

First spread a screen of skirmishers (garawwals), a small but picked body under

**Aurangzib’s battle array.** Abdullah Khan. These were the retinue of the Imperial hunt, men accustomed to track the deer and the tiger and to take advantage of every cover in the ground. The Vanguard was led by Zulfiqar Khan and Sultan Muhammad, the Right Wing by Islam Khan, and the Left Wing by Khan-i-Dauran and Kumar Ram Singh (the son of Jai Singh.) Each of these divisions was 10,000 strong and had a number of guns covering its front. Bahadur Khan commanded the *Iltimsh* or small Advanced

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* Aqil Khan (p. 76) gives Shuja’s numbers thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right Wing</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Reserve</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre (<em>tip</em>)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This gives a total of 23,000.

No main Reserve is mentioned.
Reserve. The main Reserves of the two wings, each numbering 3,000 troopers, were under Daud Khan and Rajah Sujan Singh respectively. In the Centre the Emperor’s banner waved over a vast host of at least 20,000 men.* His own right and left flanks were commanded by Amin Khan and Murtaza Khan. Khawas Khan brought up the scanty Rear. Aurangzib rode on a huge elephant with his third son, Muhammad ‘Azam, in his hawda. Mir Jumla was seated on another elephant, close to the Emperor’s, ready to help him with counsel at any crisis. The army marched slowly ahead in this formation, and clashed with the enemy at 8 a.m.

* The actual strength of the Imperial army is mentioned neither in the Alamgirnāmah, nor by Khafi Kh. The former only says that more than one half of the previous day’s force i.e., 90,000, was present (p. 256.) This would give 45,000 to 50,000. The latter adds that at dawn many of the dispersed officers came back to the presence (p. 53.) Therefore Aurangzib could not have got less than 50,000 men with him after Jaswant’s flight; 60,000 would be nearer the truth. Aqil Khan (p. 78) estimates the Imperial force thus: Van, Right Wing, and Left Wing, 10,000 each; Right and Left Reserves 3,000 each. The number in the Centre (under the Emperor) is unfortunately not given. But it must have been twice as strong as either of the wings, because the Alamgirnāmah mentions 43 officers as present in it, against some 20 in each of the wings (pp. 246-248). The statement of the Akkam that when the battle began Aurangzib’s army “did not number even one-fourth of Shuja’s” is an absurd exaggeration and occurs only in the India Office MS. of it (f. 34a).
Shuja had been impressed by yesterday's vast assemblage of the Imperial host, whose number rumour had swollen to above 90,000 men. He knew that he could not adopt the customary plan of battle, making his force correspond, division for division, to the enemy's dispositions. His small force would then have been overlapped and swallowed up by the vastly extended front of an enemy who outnumbered him as three to one. So, with great judgment he made a new formation to-day: all his army was drawn up in one long line, behind the artillery. His Right was commanded by his eldest son Zainuddin Muhammad and Syed Alam (5,000 men), and his Left by Hasan Kheshgi (4,000 men). Behind these two wings stood their Reserves, each 2,000 strong, under Isfandiar Beg and Syed Quli respectively. In the Centre rode Shuja with his second son, Buland Akhtar, (10,000 men), his front being led by Shaikh Zarif and Syed Qasim. There was apparently no main Reserve. With true generalship Shuja determined to assume the offensive, and make up for the smallness of his number by the moral superiority which the attacking party always has. The first stage of the battle justified his forecast.
The battle began at 8 a.m., with a furious artillery duel; cannon, rockets and muskets were discharged on both sides, doing great havoc. One ball struck Zainuddin’s elephant, wounding the driver and the servant at the back, while the rider and mount escaped scathless. The two Vans now closed together and plied their bows.*

The first move was made by Syed Alam with Shuja’s Right. He charged the Imperial Left Wing, driving in front three infuriated elephants, each brandishing a two-maund iron chain in its trunk.† Neither man nor beast could stand their impetuous onset. The Imperial Left, which had no Prince or great general to command it, broke and fled. The panic spread even to the Centre; the soldiers ran about in confusion; the faint-hearted fled without waiting to be attacked.‡ To make matters worse, a false report of the

* For the battle of Khajwah see Alamgirnamah, 257—265; Masum, 102b—105b; Khafi Kh. ii. 53-56 (mostly a repetition of the Alamgirnamah); Kambu, 20a & b, Aqil Khan, 75—79. The last adds many incidents which the Court historian has omitted. Masum is of special value as giving a picture of the battle as seen from Shuja’s side. Otherwise, the Alamgirnamah has been my chief authority.
† Khafi Kh. ii. 56.
‡ Kambu, 20b.
Emperor's death suddenly spread through the ranks and took away the hearts of the soldiers. Many fled away; "even veterans of the Deccan wars and old servants of the Emperor joined the stream of flight."* So great was their panic that some of the fugitives did not halt before reaching Agra. Jaswant's mysterious appearance and rapid flight had created along the route to Agra a story of the Emperor's defeat and capture. The later arrivals from the field confirmed the news, gave circumstantial details of the disaster like eye-witnesses, and announced the speedy advance of the victorious Shuja to release Shah Jahan. Agra then must have resembled Brussels just after Waterloo!

But the battle had yet to be fought and won. The enemy, after clearing the Centre, pushed on towards the Left Wing, where only 2,000 troopers now remained to guard the Emperor. But Murtaza Khan from the Iltimsh, and Hasan Ali Khan from the Left Reserve, each with a handful of men, flung themselves forward and barred the enemy's path. The Emperor, too, boldly turned his elephant's head to the Left to confront the enemy. Backed thus by the Centre, these few brave officers successfully repelled

* Aqil Kh. 76 & 77.
Syed Alam, who galloped back by the same path that he had come.

But the three elephants continued to advance wildly, their wounds having repelled. One of them came up to Aurangzib's elephant. It was the critical moment of the battle. If the Emperor had given ground or turned back, his whole army would have fled. But he stood like a rock, chaining the legs of his elephant to prevent its flight.* At his order one of his matchlockmen, Jalal Khan, shot down the mahut of the attacking elephant, and immediately afterwards some Imperial elephants surrounded it, a brave royal mahut nimbly leaped on its back and brought the riderless beast under his control. The other two elephants ran away in front of the Centre towards the Right Wing. The Emperor now got breathing time, and turned to succour his Right, which had been hard pressed in the meantime.

For, encouraged by the success of Syed Alam's charge, the enemy's Van and Left, led by Buland Akhtar, Shaikh Wali, Shaikh Zarif, Hasan Kheshgi, and others, had attacked the Imperial Right. In spite of their

* Khafi Kh. ii. 56.
small number, their gallant charge dislodged their opponents; many of the Imperialists fled, but the captains kept their places, though with very few men at their back.* All this time so severe was the stress of the fight on the Left that Aurangzib had no time to think of his Right. Now, freed from the danger on his Left, he looked at the Right and found there signs of confusion and flight. His first thought was to hasten to reinforce that hard-pressed division. But even in the greatest difficulty and danger, his coolness and presence of mind did not desert him.† It at once struck him that, as his own front had hitherto been turned towards the Left, if he were now to face suddenly round and march to the Right, the rest of the army would interpret this volte face as flight. So, he first sent orderlies to the Van to tell the generals of his real object and to urge them to fight on without fear or doubt.

Then he wheeled the Centre round and joined the Right Wing. The succour came not a minute too soon. The elephant of Islam Khan, the commander of that wing, taking fright from a rocket, had fled scattering and shaking the troops of that division. The commander of the Right Wing artillery and his son had been slain. But

* Kambu, 20a, Masum, 102b & 103a.
† Alamgirnamah, 261 & 262.
Saif Khan and Akram Khan, the leaders of the vanguard of the Right, with a few men kept their ground, and were fighting hard to stem the enemy's advance.

Just then the Emperor arrived and reinforced them. This was the decisive move of the day. The tide of battle now rolled resistlessly against Shuja. The Imperial Right, newly strengthened, made a counter-charge and swept away the enemy from before them, with great carnage. Shaikh Wali Farmuli, the leader of Buland Akhtar's Van, with some other commanders, was slain. Hasan Kheshgi, the general of Shuja's Left Wing, fell down wounded. Shaikh Zarif, a Daudzai Afghan, after a heroic fight in front of the Emperor, was captured covered with wounds. Buland Akhtar fled to his father.*

Meantime the Imperial Van, under Zulfiqar Khan and Sultan Muhammad, had beaten back the attack on it, advanced, and shaken the enemy's front line. There the Bengal leader, Tabawwur Khan, with a handful of men, offered a bold opposition and saved the fugitives from slaughter. But so thick was the shower of cannon-balls, rockets and bullets from Aurangzib's

* Alamgirnamah, 263; Aqil Kh., 78.
army that no man could stand it. The front line of Shuja began to gallop back to a safe distance in twos and threes at a time.*

There was now a general advance of the whole Imperial army, Right, Centre, and Left. “Like masses of dark clouds, they surrounded Shuja’s own division, the Centre,” his two flanks having been laid bare by the defeat and flight of his Right and Left Wings. Many of his personal attendants perished from the Imperialist fire under his own eyes. The cannon-balls carried off a head or half a body at a time. Some of them, weighing 46 or 20 lbs, flew about his own head.† Therefore, at Mir Isfandiar Mamuri’s advice he left the dangerous prominence of the elephant’s back and took horse.

This was the end of the struggle.‡ All was now lost. The sight of the mounts from his empty hawda, visible from the furthest limits of the field, struck terror into his soldiers’ hearts. Their master was

* Masum, 103a-104a.
† This last scene is graphically described by Masum, 103b & 104a.
‡ Bernier’s statement, copied by Stewart, that Shuja was on the point of gaining the victory when he lost all by dismounting from his elephant, merely gives the bazar gossip. None of the contemporary authorities on whom my account of the battle is based, supports such an idea, which is also naturally
slain, so they imagined. For whom would they fight any longer? They had been sorely tried by Aurangzib’s artillery and wanted only a decent excuse for flight. This was now found in the riderless elephant. In a moment the whole army broke and fled.

Shuja’s shouts to his men to stand firm fell on unheeding ears; he could not arrest the tide of flight, but stood in the field as a helpless ‘spectator of the hand of Fate.’ A few of his captains, who had been gallantly facing the enemy, now looked around and saw with amazement the field behind them deserted, and none of their followers present at their back. The enemy, emboldened by the sight, hemmed them round. It was only left for them to do and to die, and this they did. Syed Alam alone broke through the ring of his adversaries.*

Already the craven-hearted had begun to buy safety with desertion to the Right, first Murad Kam Safawi, surnamed Mukarram Khan), then Abdur Rahman Khan (son of Nazar Muhammad Khan, the ex-king of Balkh), improbable. Indeed, the battle had been already lost and Shuja was in imminent risk of being captured, when he took horse.

* Masum, 104a; & b.
and Sanjar Beg (the son of Alawardi Khan), left Shuja and joined him. Under their guidance the Emperor skirted Shuja's artillery on his left hand and charged the enemy's Centre, as narrated before.* But the victory had been already won. A courier now galloped up to him with the happy news that Shuja had fled from the field with his sons, Syed Alam, Alawardi Khan, and a small remnant of his army.†

Immediately the Imperial band struck up the 'music of victory,' which conveyed the happy news to every soldier in the field. The battle was over. Aurangzib descended from his elephant, and knelt down on the field to thank the Giver of Victory. Shuja's entire camp and baggage were plundered by the Imperialists. One hundred and fourteen large and small pieces of cannon, and eleven of the celebrated elephants of Bengal became the victor's spoil, as also did a small portion of treasure and jewels which had escaped plunder by the soldiers.‡

Reviewing the battle, we must give the palm of generalship to Shuja. Aurangzib showed great firmness and presence of mind, but no mili-

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* Kambu, 20b; Alamgirnamah, 263 & 264.
† Aurangzib's own account of the battle is given in the Ruqai-i-Alamgiri, No. 19 and the Paris MS., 2b.
‡ Alamgirnamah, 265; Khafi Kh., ii. 59.
tary genius. Shuja's plan of battle was admirable; it would have succeeded if he had not been so hopelessly outnumbered, and if Syed Alam had been supported from behind and pressed his charge home. The latter, after routing the Left Wing of Aurangzib, was confronted by the Centre, checked, and forced to retreat. If he had made a longer stand there, he could have utilised the opening made by the rush of his two furious elephants in front of the enemy's Centre, and crashed into Aurangzib's Right from behind, at the very time when that wing was shaken by the charge of Buland Akhtar from the front and the stampede of Islam Khan's elephant. This would have annihilated both the wings of Aurangzib; and after this splendid success his Van and Centre, left alone in the field, would have been demoralised and easily defeated. But either Syed Alam was not a stubborn fighter, or Shuja was too timid to risk his all on one throw by denuding his Centre of men to support his victorious Right. Probably he was held in check at his own position by Aurangzib's Van.*

* This conjecture is borne out by Aqil Kh., 78 and Masum, 103 a, who state that when Aurangzib's two wings were being dispersed (or soon afterwards), the Van under Prince Muhammad advanced on the enemy and "shook them" (Aqil Kh.) or "broke up their formation" (Masum.)
CHAPTER XX.

Battle of Deorai (Ajmīr), 12th—14th March, 1659.

We have seen how Dara had been pursued all the way from Lahore to Tatta in Lower Sindh and finally dislodged from that town. Leaving it on 18th November, 1658, he had struck inland to Badin, 55 miles eastwards, and then marched for three days along the northern shore of the salt lagoon or Rann, suffering unspeakable hardship through lack of water. That year the rainfall had been scanty, and the tanks on this route were all dry, while the few wells contained only a small supply of muddy water. Many of his transport animals perished of thirst and his soldiers were brought almost to death's door. The lagoon was eighty miles broad with many quicksands, and no drinking water at all. But everything must bow to necessity. Dara had no choice but to enter the Rann (27th November)
with his tender wives and daughters in order to
reach Guzerat.*

Crossing the Greater or Western Rann he
reached the village of Luna, at
the north-western end of the
island of Cutch. Then, making
his way through the desert and along the sea-
coast by a difficult and untrodden path, under the
guidance of some local zamindars, he arrived at
the capital of the island. The Rajah hospitably
received him, and overcome by the personal
charm of Dara and the hope of matching with
the Imperial house of Delhi, he betrothed his
daughter to Sipihr Shukoh† and gave every
help to Dara to make his progress easy. The
fugitive, replenishing his power in the dominion
of his new friend, crossed to Kathiawar. Here
the leading chief, the Jam of Nawanagar, offered
him presents and the necessary provisions and

* A. N. 282-283. Badin, 55 miles east of Tatta. Dara
probably crossed the Rann at Rahimki Basar, 30 miles S. E.
of Badin. Jai Singh afterwards reached the northern shore
of the Rann at "the village of Rahman" (Paris MS. 103a),
which I take to be another name of the same place.

† The Rao of Cutch, "when he appears in public, alter-
nately worships God in a Hindoo pagoda and a Mahom-
medan mosque....The royal family of Cutch have never
objected to form matrimonial alliances with Mahommedans
when the match was suitable, or when a political object was
to be gained....The Jharejahs employ Mussalman cooks, and
eat from their hands." (Burnes’s Visiit to Court of Sinds
& History of Cutch, ed. 1839, p. xiv.)
conveyances. Growing stronger as he advanced, he entered Guzerat. The local officers and jagirdars on the way were forced to follow him. On his arrival before Ahmadabad with 3,000 men, Fortune smiled on him unexpectedly. Shah Nawaz Khan, the newly arrived Governor of the province, cherished resentment against Aurangzib for having imprisoned him at Burhanpur on his refusal to join that Prince in the rebellion against Shah Jahan. True, Aurangzib had married the Khan's daughter, but that lady was dead, and Shah Nawaz Khan felt no natural attachment to his persecuting son-in-law. Besides, he had taken charge of Guzerat so recently that officers and troops serving in that province had not been yet brought under his control. His military force was small and too divided by mutual jealousy to offer an effective opposition to the invader.

Whether inspired by revenge or cowardice, Shah Nawaz Khan submitted at the very outset. With his chief officers he advanced to Sarganj, four miles from the capital, to welcome Dara, admitted him into the fort (9th January, 1659), and opened to him the Treasury containing ten lakhs of rupees belonging to Murad. Dara spent one month and seven days in Guzerat, and by
lavishly spending money soon raised his army to 22,000 men in that "land bristling with soldiers". One of his officers took peaceful possession of Surat from Aurangzib's Governor, seized the Imperial revenue, extorted contributions from the citizens, and brought away 30 or 40 pieces of artillery to his master. In the Ahmadabad palace Dara held Court, occupying a lower seat than the Emperor's, out of respect for his father. But Shah Nawaz Khan's importunity led him to appear at the window where the Emperors had been wont to show their faces to the public.*

Having gathered military strength, and secured a good park of artillery, His conflicting plans.

His material, and money, Dara cast about for a plan of operations. Which way should he turn? The Deccan tempted him most. He had long held friendly correspondence with Adil Shah and Qutb Shah; he had opposed Aurangzib's invasions of their territory,

* For Dara's journey from Sindh to Ahmadabad and his doings there,—A. N. 296—299; Khafi Khan, ii. 62-63; Masum, 136b-137a; Aqil Khan, 80-81; Isardas, 43a (meagre). The Persian accounts speak of a chief named Bahârà or Rao Bahara in this quarter. From Jai Singh's despatches (Paris MS. 109â and 96a) he can be identified with the Rao of Cutch. I think that the Mughals called him so from Bharmal (or Bahara Mal), the Rao who lived in Akbar's time and fought with the Imperial government. (Imp. Gaz. xi. 78). Once or twice Jai Singh speaks of 'the zamindar of Cutch' without using the title Bahara or Rao, but this need not mean that the latter was a different person.
and at the end of these invasions he had interceded with his father and secured lenient terms for them. Aurangzib was as much their mortal foe as his, and he might count on their assistance from vindictiveness if not from gratitude. Dara, therefore, at first wished to march into the South and set up his authority there, and then, by joining forces with Golkonda and Bijapur, take revenge on the common enemy of the three. The report that such a movement was contemplated by him reached Prince Muazzam, the Governor of Aurangabad, and he set about enlisting troops to be better able to bar the path of his uncle. But a new hope drew Dara off from this enterprise.

The news reached Guzerat that Shuja was rapidly advancing from the east, while Aurangzib was absent in the Panjab. Now was the time for Dara to make a dash on Agra from the west and release Shah Jahan. Soon rumour brought the flattering news that Aurangzib’s army had been routed in a battle with Shuja near Allahabad and that Jaswant Singh had returned home loaded with the spoils of the vanquished Imperial camp. The golden opportunity had come. Dara hesitated no longer. On 14th February he started for Ajmir, leaving one of his officers behind as Governor of Guzerat,
and carrying away with himself the servants, children and wives of Murad, as well as several local officers like Shah Nawaz Khan. Three marches afterwards he learnt the truth that Aurangzib had triumphed over Shuja; but this disappointment was made up for by a stroke of unexpected good fortune. Maharajah Jaswant Singh sent one of his high officers to Dara with a letter professing his devotion to Shah Jahan and asking Dara to reach Ajmir quickly, where the Rathors and other Rajputs were ready to join a leader who would take them to the rescue of their captive sovereign. With Jaswant’s promised help a vast Rajput army could be easily raised.

Ajmir is the very heart of Rajasthan, “the centre round which the homes of the Rajput clans cluster.” East of it lie Kishangarh and Jaipur, in the south Mewar, in the S. E. Kotah and Bundi, in the west Marwar, and in the north-west, beyond Marwar, are Shekhwati and Bikanir. Therefore the Mughals, and following them the English, have held the isolated district of Ajmir as a means of planting their feet on the breast of Rajputana and dominating all the Rajput clans with ease. With Jaswant as his right hand man, Dara would find Ajmir a most convenient place
for raising a vast Rajput army in a short time. On the way he received more friendly letters from Jaswant, till he reached Mairta, three marches from Jodhpur, full of high hopes.*

These hopes were soon dashed to the ground; for, in the meanwhile Aurangzib had succeeded in securing Jaswant. After the battle of Khajwah, the Emperor, justly angry with Jaswant for his treachery on that day, wanted to make an example of him. He despatched an army of 10,000 men and guns under Muhammad Amin Khan to invade Marwar, expel Jaswant, and place on the throne Rai Singh Rathor. For a time Jaswant meditated resistance, gathered troops, and offered an alliance to Dara. But he soon realised his own impotence. "As Agra and Delhi had fallen in a twinkle into Aurangzib's hands, how long could the fort of Jodhpur hold out against his power?" After waiting with all his troops for some days in uncertainty at Mandur, his old capital, and then learning that the army of his chastiser and his rival had reached Lālnuth, ravaging the country, he lost heart and fled to the hill-fort of Siwanah. Meantime, Aurangzib had realised the wisdom of not driving Jaswant into his enemy's arms.

* A. N. 229-300, 311; Aqil Khan, 81-82. Mairta, 37 miles N. W. of Ajmir and 68 miles N. E. of Jodhpur (Ind. At, 33 S. W).
In the impending conflict with Dara, Jaswant was the decisive factor. His adhesion would mean an addition of 20,000 of the hardiest warriors of India to the ranks of his ally, as well as unrivalled local influence in Rajputana. So, Aurangzib made Jai Singh write a friendly letter to Jaswant, professing true friendship for him and a natural reluctance to see such a great Hindu prince meet with utter ruin. As a friend, Jai Singh pointed out the folly of defying Aurangzib and the certainty of utter destruction as its result. He therefore tendered his good offices as a mediator with the Emperor, to secure for Jaswant a full pardon and restoration to his title and mansab, as well as a high post under the Crown, if he gave up Dara and returned to the path of loyalty. This letter reached the Rathor chief at a critical time, when the future looked darkest to him. He at once closed with the offer, decided to side with Aurangzib, and began a retreat to Jodhpur.

Hence it was that Dara on reaching Mairta saw no sign of Jaswant’s coming.

Dara presses Jaswant to keep his promise of help.

Alarmed and shaken in his mind, he halted and sent a trusty Hindu named Dubinchand to urge the Maharajah to keep his promise. Jaswant gave the lying reply that he was waiting
in expectation of raising more men and organising his force, but urged Dara to advance to Ajmir where he would join him with his Rajputs.

From Ajmir Dara again sent Dubinchand to bring Jaswant. But the embassy was fruitless; Jaswant had clearly given up all intention of going to Ajmir. The unhappy Dara made a third attempt. Stooping from his dignity under the force of necessity, he sent his son Sipihr Shukoh to Jodhpur to entreat the Maharajah to come to Ajmir, by appealing to his sense of honour and the sacredness of promises. Jaswant received the Prince with courtesy, but did not move from his purpose. After wasting three days in vain expectation and being put off with smooth words, Sipihr Shukoh at last returned to his father in disappointment. A Rajput of the highest rank and fame had turned false to his word. Of all the actors in the drama of the War of Succession, Jaswant emerges from it with the worst reputation: he had run away from a fight where he commanded in chief, he had treacherously attacked an unsuspecting friend, and now he abandoned an ally whom he had plighted his word to support and whom he had lured into danger by his promises. Unhappy was the man who put faith in Maharajah Jas-
want Singh, lord of Marwar and chieftain of the Rathor clan.*

But there was no escape for Dara. By this time Aurangzib had arrived near Ajmir and a battle could not be avoided. Dara, plunged into despair by Jaswant’s faithlessness and the defection of other Rajputs who were influenced by his example, had to prepare for battle, whether he wished for it or not.

Conscious of the smallness of his own force and the overwhelming strength of the enemy, Dara wisely changed his plan. Instead of fighting a pitched battle in an open plain, he decided to hold the pass of Deorai, four miles south of Ajmir,† in the narrow breadth of which a small host can keep a superior force of assailants back. His two flanks were protected by the hills of Bithli and Gokla; while behind him lay the rich city of Ajmir, where his officers had deposited their property and families and whence he could easily draw his supplies. He ran a low wall south of

* For Jaswant’s dealings with Dara,—A. N. 300, 309—312; Khafi Khan, ii. 65-66; Bernier, 85-86; Isardas, 43a; Kambu, 21a (meagre); Aqil Khan, 81—84. The Mughal invasion of Marwar after Khajwah is fully described in Isardas, 41b—43a, and briefly mentioned in A. N. 288, 308.

† Deorai is given as Dorai in Indian Atlas, (Sheet 34 N. E.), 42 miles south of Ajmir, a little to the east of the Rajputana-Malwa Railway line.
his position, from hill to hill across the valley, with trenches in front and redoubts at different points. The entire line was divided into four sections, each under a different commander with artillery and musketeers. On the right, at the south-western corner of the position, close to the hill of Bithli, lay the trenches of Syed Ibrahim (surnamed Mustafa Khan) and Jani Beg (Dara's Chief of Artillery) with a thousand barqandazes besides other soldiers. Next came the trenches of Firuz Miwati, and beyond them, on a hillock overlooking the pass, were mounted some big guns. Here, at the centre of the lines stood Dara with his staff. On his left the line was continued by the third section of the trenches (held by Shah Nawaz Khan and Muhammad Sharif Qalich Khan, the chief officer of Dara), and the fourth section under Siphr Shukoh at the south-eastern corner adjoining the hill of Gokla.*

The position was admirably chosen, and its natural strength was greatly increased by art. Two hill ranges running beyond Ajmir, rendered its flanks absolutely secure, as they could be turned only by making a very wide detour and threading the way through another defile. In front, the enemy toiling up the slope from the plain below.

* For Dara's dispositions,—A. N. 313-314; Khafi Khan, ii. 67; Aqil Khan, 84; Isardas, 43b.
and crowded together within the narrow pass, would suffer terribly from Dara's artillery ranged on an elevation and his musketeers standing safe behind their earthworks.

In this position Dara waited for the enemy. Marching from the Ramsar lake Aurangzib entered the valley from the south-east and halted one mile from Deorai (11th March). About two miles in front of him Dara's trenches barred his path and four miles further north lay the city of Ajmir.

That very night a gallant Imperial officer named Purdil Khan with 150 men climbed a mound a little north of Deorai and midway between the two armies, and passed the night there. The dawn revealed the party to the enemy who sent skirmishers to dislodge them. But the Imperial army pushed forward a body of 2000 men to assist in holding this advanced post, while Dara supported his skirmishers with an equally strong force. The contest raged for more than four hours; but the enterprise and tenacity of Purdil Khan had borne fruit: the Imperial artillery had been safely dragged to

* For the battle our authorities are A. N. 314–326; Aqil Khan, 84–87; Khafi Khan, ii. 68–71; Kambu, 21b–22a (very brief); Isardas, 43b–44b (brief); Masum, 137b–138a (bare mention). For the bazar gossip about the course of the fight, Storia, i. 342–343; Beriner 87–88 (a still more incredible tale.)
this position of vantage under cover of his resistance, and the post firmly secured. Dara’s advanced troops retired baffled behind their lines. The whole Imperial army now moved forward. The Van and the Right Wing took post opposite the eastern trenches, close to the Gokla hill, and the Left Wing faced the trenches near Bithli. It was impossible for Aurangzib’s army to be fully deployed; the other divisions were held back from the fighting line and surrounded Aurangzib’s tent which was now pitched \( \frac{1}{2} \) miles from the enemy’s position. That day (12th March) his guns were carried half a cannon-shot forward and disposed before the enemy’s guns in the centre of the line.

It was evening before this general movement, shifting of camp, and disposition of the artillery and the attacking divisions could be completed. Then the battle began in right earnest. First, as usual in Mughal warfare, there was an artillery duel. From the sunset of the 12th to the dawn of the 13th, there was incessant firing from both sides. “Earth and heaven shook with the noise.” “Clouds of gunpowder smoke covered the field.”

The 13th passed in the same manner. From

* A. N. 315; Aqil Khan, 85.
morning to 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the artillery duel continued. The cannonade continued. Imperialists were busily engaged in digging trenches to cover their front; but bands of brave men made sorties from Dara's lines, fell on these trenches, and after killing men and horses returned to the shelter of the hills. In the afternoon, from the right and left of Dara's army 2,000 steel-clad cavalry swarmed over the wall and entered the field, brandishing their swords and spears. The Imperial army accepted the challenge, and a hot hand-to-hand combat raged in mid-field till the sun went down.

Dara's artillery and muskets from their high position showered death on Aurangzib's gunners and troops. But the cannon-balls of the Imperialists fell on the stone-walls of the enemy or on the hill-side, doing no harm. All the night of the 13th also the guns continued booming, but evidently as a precaution against a surprise or night-attack.

The Imperial generals recognised the strength of the enemy's trenches as impregnable. "As the lines were strongly fortified and ensconced in inaccessible hills, the efforts of the Imperialists to capture them did not succeed."* Shaikh Mir

* Khafi Khan, ii. 68.
and Dilir Khan realised that an attempt to storm the enemy's trenches by a cavalry charge would lead to a fruitless loss of life. So an assault was forbidden. The night was spent in a council of war. Next morning (14th) Aurangzib assembled his generals, rebuked them for their delay in achieving success, and urged them to do their utmost to capture the enemy's lines.

A new plan of attack was also adopted. The conventional method of each division engaging the one opposed to it and the artillery opposing the enemy's artillery and trying to breach the earth-works, was abandoned as having proved itself useless after a waste of two days' time and much ammunition.

Aurangzib's generals decided to make a concentrated attack in overwhelming strength on Battle, third day. Shah Nawaz Khan's trenches, at the enemy's left,† while the

* Both the Alamgirnamah (319) and Aqil Khan (88) declare the 29th Jamadi-us-sani as the date of the victory. This date corresponds to 14th March, 1659 A.D. Both the Alamgirnamah and Jai Singh speak of the day as a Sunday, but 14th March was a Monday. From A. N. (330) it is clear that Jamadi-us-sani that year had a thirtieth day. In the history of the pursuit given in the next chapter the first few dates may be inaccurate by one day as the result of the above irreconcilable difference.

† Kambu (21b) says that this attack was made at a treacherous hint from Shah Nawaz Khan. Bernier, 87, also, Masum (138a) states, "Dara ascribed his defeat to the treachery of Shah Nawaz Khan, and on this false suspicion
Imperial Left Wing was to keep the enemy’s Right Wing in play. The success of the scheme, however, was to depend not on the attack in front but on a secret movement to turn the enemy’s left. On Dara’s right the high and steep hill of Bithli, running for a length of several miles forbade any attempt to climb it. But the Gokla hill on his left was much shorter in length, and lower in height, with gentler slopes and throwing off spurs on its eastern face, which was close to the assailants but hidden from Dara’s position by the summit. Rajah Rajrup of the Jammu hills was serving under Aurangzib with a body of his Rajput clansmen expert in mountaineering. His followers had discovered a path by which the back of the Gokla hill could be scaled. Aurangzib ordered the ascent to be made and lent a party of musketeers from his own army to support the attempt.

Towards evening when the gunners on both sides were tired with the day’s firing, Rajrup sent his infantry up the back of the Gokla hill, while he appeared with his cavalry in front of it slew him.” But there is no more reason for believing in Shah Nawaz Khan’s treachery here than in that of Khalil-ullah at Samugahr or of Alawardi at Khajwah. Indeed, Khafi Khan (ii. 70-71) holds that Shah Nawaz courted a hero’s death to avoid the disgrace of looking Aurangzib in the face.
to divert the enemy's attention. A body of one thousand troopers sallied out of Shah Nawaz Khan's trenches and encountered Rajrup. The other Imperial generals had been smarting under the Emperor's reprimand in the morning, and now the sight of the enemy within easy reach of their weapons roused their martial ardour. Dilir Khan with his Afghans galloped into the fray from the right side of the Concentrated attack on Shah Nawaz Khan's trenches.

Artillery; Shaikh Mir from behind the guns turned to the right and came up to the front line alongside of Dilir Khan. Shaista Khan with the Right Wing, the artillery men from the middle, and Jai Singh with the Van, all flocked to this point to support the fighters. The Left Wing also made a forward movement against Dara's extreme right.

The fight now became general. The bulk of the Imperial army was massed in front of the enemy's left, where the assault was delivered. Shaikh Mir and Dilir Khan together advanced on Shah Nawaz Khan's trenches in reckless valour. The Imperial artillery reopened fire with great rapidity and prevented the other divisions of the enemy from leaving their trenches and marching across the front to aid their hard-pressed friends in the plain on their left, who got supports only
from the trenches immediately behind them. The hardest fight raged in this part of the field. Dara's men obstinately defended their lines, and the rival generals freely exposed themselves to encourage their men. From Dara's second and third trenches cannon-balls and bullets were showered upon the assailants. Hill and plain were enveloped in a thick pall of smoke.

According to one account Dara's artillerymen were corrupted by Aurangzib's heavy and fired blank charges. But his musketeers at all events fought valiantly, and the slaughter in Aurangzib's ranks was heavy at this point. The vigour of the onset, however, did not abate. The blood of the Imperialists was fired by the fierce passion or combat; their horsemen dashed on towards the trenches in the face of a hail of bullets; the wounded who fell were trampled under the horses' hoofs beyond recognition, but fresh troops from behind pressed forward to take their places. The attack was persisted in for over an hour with undiminished vigour. Wave after wave of Imperialists swarmed up to the charge; and at last they pushed all the enemy out of the field and won the ground to the edge of the

* Khafi Khan, ii. 70.
trenches. Now, if ever, Dara's lines were to be entered, or all this loss of life would be vain.

By this time Rajrup's men had toiled up the back of the Gokla hill, while the enemy were absorbed in the severe contest in their front. They planted their banners on the top and raised a shout. The Imperialists were filled with joy and the assurance of success, and Dara's Left Wing was seized with despair at its rear being turned. An attack from this quarter had not been expected at all, and it had been left unguarded.

The exultant Imperialists redoubled their efforts to enter the trenches. But many of Dara's men still resisted with the courage of despair. To overcome the last opposition, Shaikh Mir drove his elephant forward. A bullet struck him in the breast and he felt that his end had come. But this faithful servant's last thoughts were still about his master. He told his kinsman Syed Hashim, who was sitting behind him in the same hawda, "I am done for. Clasp me round the waist and prop my head up, so that my followers may not know of my death and give up the fight in despair. I see clear signs of a victory to our arms, and very soon the Imperial band will strike up the music of triumph."

* Khafi Khan, ii. 71.
The struggle in Shah Nawaz Khan’s trenches was most terrible; “the firing was severe, the enemy resisted to the utmost. Shaikh Mir was slain and Dilir Khan received an arrow in his right hand.”

But the fight continued. The devotion of Shaikh Mir and the valour of Dilir Khan’s Afghans carried the day. The Imperial banners were planted in the trenches. Jai Singh entered with the Van and brought fresh strength to the assailants. “The enemy totally lost heart and firmness.”

The resistance in the third section of the lines was at last overpowered. Then a heavy slaughter of the vanquished began. Shah Nawaz Khan, standing on a height, was encouraging his men by voice and gesture when his body was blown away by a cannon-ball. Muhammad Sharif (Dara’s Paymaster) was shot through the stomach with an arrow; two others of his generals, Muhammad Kheshgi and Abu Baqr, were put to the sword. Shah Nawaz’s son, Siadat Khan, got three or four wounds. The rank and file broke and fled under cover of the darkness.

For, in the meantime the shades of night had closed on the scene, and made any general

* A. N. 323-324.
advance of the troops or direction of the battle impossible. Shaikh Mir's followers, too, at the death of their chief, got out of hand and dispersed for plunder, instead of continuing the fight. The sun set on a scene of wild confusion and tumult. "In the darkness swords played; friends could not be known from foes; the warriors of the two armies fell down fighting side by side."* But gradually as the night advanced, the truth became known that the battle had been already decided. True, only one of the four entrenchments had been captured; but it was enough. Dara's lines were fatally pierced. The redoubt on his extreme left, commanded by Sipihr Shukoh had been rendered untenable by the Jammu hillmen seizing its back and the Imperial troops who had entered Shah Nawaz's position turning its right. Thus Dara's Left Wing was entirely gone. His Right remained intact. Askar Khan still held the redoubt on his extreme right and kept the Imperialists back. Firuz Miwati's post, the second redoubt, was also uncaptured, and there were still about 6,000 men to uphold Dara's cause; but their chief was gone.

From his high position at the back of the

* Kambu, 22a.
Centre, Dara had been watching every phase of the battle. He had been steadily sending up supports to his hard pressed third division by the path in its rear. He had also ordered Shah Nawaz Khan, who was with him at the time of the attack, to hasten back to his redoubt and guide the defence. Up to sunset Dara had striven hard to maintain the fight; he had constantly put heart into his men and urged them to make a firm stand. But the capture of Shah Nawaz Khan’s redoubt and the turning of the Gokla hill shattered all his hopes. It became clear to his men that further resistance was vain. Dara’s comrades in these circumstances refused to throw away their lives and prepared for flight. Pleading with them was useless. Safety lay only in a hurried escape, for which the darkness of the night and the dispersion and disorder of the victors presented a golden opportunity. *

Fearing such a reverse, Dara had placed his harem and treasure on elephants, camels and mules, and kept them on the bank of the Anasagar lake, five miles behind the scene of battle, with an escort of troops in charge of his faithful eunuch Khwajah Maquil. He had intended to take them with himself in his flight.

* Kambu, 216—22a.
But when Shah Nawaz Khan's redoubt was carried and the victors pressed on towards Dara's position, the luckless Flight of Dara. Prince had not a moment to lose. Accompanied by his son Sipihr Shukoh and his general Firuz Miwati and followed by only ten or twelve of his men, he fled in head-long haste towards Guzerat by the first road he could reach. Terror and bewilderment urged him on, without leaving him the power to turn aside for his family at the appointed place or to send them orders to save themselves.*

Meantime the condition of the ladies was most pitiable. Ever since midday they had been kept in the saddle on the tiptoe of suspense for the terrible news of a disaster in the field and the order to escape. All the forenoon the cannon had boomed in the near battle-field; then there was a lull; but about two hours before sunset it broke out with redoubled vigour; the horizon was filled with smoke, and the horrid din of

* A. N. 325, 409. The slaughter was estimated by Isardas at 5000 men on Aurangzib's side and ten thousand on Dara's, —the last figure being too high for a force which numbered less than 22,000 men and held an almost impregnable line of which three-fourths were untouched by the enemy. One hundred and fifteen elephants were killed on the two sides taken together (44a.) Kambu says that a heavy slaughter took place in Shah Nawaz Khan's trenches after the Imperialists had forced them.
battle, louder than the last two days', reached their ears. Something terrible was happening. Their suspense became acute; but no news reached them. About sunset the first signs of the dispersion of a great army were seen: soldiers began to run away in groups from the field; the fugitives approached the city; then the Camp of Dara's army became a scene of wild confusion and noise, as it began to be plundered. Parties of victors were seen advancing to the city, slaying and looting. They approached the lake; and yet no news of Dara, no messenger, no order from him reached the agonised women and the anxious eunuch. But these signs told their own tale beyond the chance of mistake: Dara had been ruined and put to flight. The faithful servant by hard exertion removed the ladies with 12 elephants and some mules and camels, from this place of danger and fled by the path between the skirt of the hill and the valley. All but a few of the guards deserted their charge.*

For, the country round Ajmir had become a wild scene of plunder. In addition to the camp-followers of both the armies, whose trade it

* A. N. 325, 409-410.
was to engage in plunder whichever side might win, thousands of Rajputs had assembled in the neighbourhood of Ajmir at the call of Dara, but had held back from the fight at the defection of Jaswant, and were hovering round like vultures soaring over their expected prey. This night and the next day they got their chance. Most of Dara’s property and transport animals were looted. His mules laden with bags of gold coins were driven away by the very Rajputs of Ajmir district whom he had appointed as his treasure-escort! All his camp and base were swept bare by the plunderers from the victorious army, the camp-followers, and adventurers who profit by tumult and confusion. The stores of various departments and most of the money were carried off by the Rajputs and the aboriginal Mairs. “Booty beyond calculation was seized by the troops.” “Dara took away nothing beyond the jewels he wore on his person and some gold coins placed in the hawdas of his women.” “Wounded soldiers who had fled from the field were stripped of their all, and wandered crying in the hills.”

* A. N. 325-326, 329, 410; Khafi Khan, ii. 73; Aqil Khan, 88.
When night dropped the curtain on the terrible scene of the day’s slaughter, and Dara’s troops submit to the victor, Dara fled away, none of his officers (except Firuz Miwati) accompanied him, as their property and families were in Ajmir. Next day they submitted to the victor and entered his service. Askar Khan, Syed Ibrahim, Jani Beg and other officers who occupied Dara’s extreme right, had held their positions till about 9 p.m. Then the news of Dara’s flight reached them, and towards the end of the night they came to Saf Shikan Khan begging for quarter. The wounded Muhammad Sharif accompanied them, but, in spite of medical treatment by his chivalrous enemy, he died.*

The details of the situation and the full extent of his success became known to Aurangzib next morning (15th March). He mourned the death of Shaikh Mir, greatly rewarded that faithful servant’s clansmen, especially Syed Hashim, and ordered him to be buried with full honours in the hallowed enclosure of Saint Muinuddin Chishti’s tomb. Here, too, was buried Shah Nawaz Khan, who had fought against him and, if we can believe Khafi Khan, had courted death

* A. N. 325-326; Aqil Khan, 87-88; Kambu, 226; Khafi Khan, ii. 73-74.
to escape the shame of looking his hostile and victorious son-in-law in the face. In the consecrated soil of the Dargah of Ajmir, the two chief victims of the rival hosts are united in death. Aurangzib himself visited the holy shrine the day after the victory, did homage to the saint’s mortal remains, and presented Rs. 5,000 to the attendants as a thanks-offering for the victory. A strong force under Jai Singh and Bahadur Khan was detached in pursuit of Dara.*

* A. N. 330—332; Khafi Khan, ii. 72, 74; Storia, i. 342.
CHAPTER XXI.

THE END OF DARA SHUKOH.

From the ruin of his last hopes at Ajmir Dara fled with his second son and only one general, Firuz the Miwati. His women, too, were removed from danger by his faithful eunuch Maqul. All the night of 14th March and the whole of the next day they pursued their flight by different roads, till at last towards the evening of the 15th they met together on the way and reached Mairta, 37 miles north-west of Ajmir. Here the miserable victims of Fate, worn out by their twenty-four hours’ precipitate march, rested for a moment. But the enemy, flushed with victory, was sure to give them no respite. So, in that very night the wretched Prince and his family had to get up and resume their march with the same haste as before.*

* The history of Dara’s flight and the pursuit by the Imperialists is given in great detail in Jai Singh’s despatches
Only 2,000 troopers accompanied Dara when he left Mairta. Many times that number had run away from the battle, but they took other routes and never joined him,—some scattered to the right and left of his line of flight, and one party of the fugitives with his elephants moved in a different direction altogether, viz., north-east towards Sambhar.

At Mairta the pursuers were six days behind; but the rumour of their coming hastens towards Ahmednagar in great misery. at every halting place robbed the unhappy Prince and his followers of their sorely needed rest and lent wings to their flight. Covering thirty miles or even more a day, they fled southwards to Guzerat by way of Pipar (16th March) and Bargaon, and on the 29th reached a place 48 miles north of Ahmadabad, hoping to find a refuge in that city. Their misery was extreme. The baggage and tents had been

to Aurangzib contained in Haft Anjuman (Benares MS.) and Paris Bibliothèque Nationale Persian MS. No. Sup. 476 (Blochet's Catalogue No. 704). The latter will be referred to as the Paris MS. A general narrative with much supplementary information is given in A. N. 409—415, 418-419. Bernier's personal observations (85—97.) Kambū 22b, Aqil Khan 87, and Isardas 44a and 4 are very brief. Masum 138b—145b, though a little confused about the route, supplies very useful details about the capture and execution. Storia, i. 345—355, is of little value, as Manucci was invested in Bhakkar all this time.
abandoned in the wild rush to escape from the battle-field, and now all along the route various necessary articles and even treasure had to be sacrificed for want of porters. "The heat was intolerable, the dust suffocating," and the path a sandy waste. Bands of Kulis, a tribe of professional robbers, followed the fugitives day and night, pillaging and slaying stragglers. Horses, camels, and oxen perished from the heat and overwork. A French physician retracing Dara's path a few days later, noticed too often by the roadside the sickening "sight of dead men, elephants, oxen, horses, and camels; the wrecks of poor Dara's army."

In the meantime the hunters had got on the right trail and were following it with relentless vigour. So fast had been Dara's flight and in so many directions had his followers scattered that for three days after the battle none knew Dara's condition or the line of his flight. At first a rumour arose that he had turned north-east towards Sambhar. But when the pursuing force under Jai Singh and Bahadur Khan reached Mairta (20th March) the truth became known to them. Every path was closed to Dara. The

* Paris MS. 94b-95a; Bernier, 88—92; A. N. 410; Kambu, 22b. Pipar, 35 miles S. W. of Mairta. (Ind. At., 34 N. W.) Bargaon, 22 miles S. of Bhinmal (Sh. 21 N. E.)
Emperor had written to the Maharajah of Jodhpur to arrest Dara if he entered his kingdom. Jaswant got the letter three days after Dara had left Marwar; but he immediately set off in pursuit and reached Bhinmal, whence he turned aside to join Jai Singh in the march to Guzerat. Jai Singh sent off letters to the princes and zamindars in every direction to bar Dara’s path, —to Sirohi and Palanpur in the south, Daiwara in the south-east, to the princes of northern Kathiawar and Cutch and the zamindars of Lower Sindh, and to the officers of Guzerat. Thus it was that everywhere Dara found enemies warned of his coming and ready to seize him.*

The civil and military officers of Guzerat decided to adhere to Aurangzib; they arrested Syed Ahmad Bukhari, the Governor left by Dara at Ahmadabad, and took possession of the city and fort. Dara’s harbinger returned from Ahmadabad with the dismal news that he would be resisted if he tried to enter the city. This reply reached him at his halting-place some 48 miles north of

* Aqil Khan, 87; Paris M.S. 95a—96b, 97b, 108a. Bhinmal, 25° N. 72°20’E. (Ind. At. 21° N. E.); Sirohi, 24°53’ N. 72°55’ E. (Ibid). Palanpur, 24°10’ N. 72°30’ E. (Ibid. 21° S. E.); there is a Daiwara, 9 miles N. of Udaipur.
Dara is refused admission to Ahmadabad. The capital of Guzerat. It was break of day when the party became aware of the destruction of their last hope of a refuge, "and the shrieks of the females drew tears from every eye. We were all overwhelmed with confusion and dismay, gazing in speechless horror at each other, at a loss what plan to recommend, and ignorant of the fate which perhaps awaited us from hour to hour. We observed Dara stepping out, more dead than alive, speaking now to one, then to another; stopping and consulting even the commonest soldier. He saw consternation depicted on every countenance, and felt assured that he should be left without a single follower."

Nothing now remained for him but flight; but to which side? The north, east, and south were closed to him; only on the west the path to Cutch lay open. This he took of necessity. Misfortune had made him totally destitute of power and influence. "Neither his threats nor entreaties could procure" a single horse, ox, or camel for Dr. Bernier who attended his sick wife. Dara's retinue had dwindled down to four or five hundred horsemen, with only a couple of elephants laden with gold and silver coins. Even Bernier had to stay behind because of the absolute lack of transport. In this
miserable condition Dara turned (29th March) westwards to the Kari district, where Kanji, the Kuli chieftain, escorted him faithfully to the boundary of Cutch. On the way the fugitive was joined by Gul Muhammad, his late faujdar of Surat, with 50 horse and 200 foot musketeers. From Viramgaon, “reduced to the poorest and sorriest dress,—a tunic of thin linen and shoes worth eight annas,—with a heart broken into two and constantly shaking with fear, accompanied by one horse, one bullock-cart, five camels for his ladies, and a few other camels for transport, his retinue shrunk to Dara flees to Cutch, where he is refused shelter, a few men,” the heir to the throne of Delhi crossed the Lesser Rann and reached Bhuj, the capital of Cutch. But he found his former friend and protector changed; for, in the meantime Jai Singh’s letters “full of hopes and threats,” urging the arrest of the fugitive, had reached the ruler of the island and done their work. Dara prayed for a place in his dominions to hide his head in for some time; but the Rao could not afford to offend the Imperialists, especially as their rapid approach was noised abroad. He, however, harboured Dara for two days and then escorted him to the northern boundary of his island, whence Dara crossed the
Greater Rann and reached the southern coast of Sindh (beginning of May), with his retinue still further diminished.*

Here, too, Dara found his path closed in the east and north by his rival’s forethought and genius for combination. Aurangzib had sent Khalilullah Khan, his governor of the Panjab, down to Bhakkar, to prevent Dara’s marching further up the Indus, and he had posted men to close the eastern route to Jasalmir. Jai Singh also had warned the Imperial officers in Lower Sindh to be on the alert.

After crossing the Rann, Dara found Badin held by a thousand Imperialists under Qubad Khan, and he had to give up the hope of entering that village to refresh his men and animals after their terrible hardships in crossing the vast salt marsh. Aurangzib’s local officers and Jai Singh’s advanced detachments were converging on the prey from north, east and south-east.

Only one path of escape still reached Suhwan in Sindh remained open: Dara turned to the north-west, crossed the Indus and entered Siwistan, intending to flee to Persia by way of Qandahar. On the bank of the Indus even Firuz Miwati’s love of homeland prevailed.

* A. N. 410-411; Bernier 89—91; Paris MS. 97a, 100b—101b; Isardas, 44a.
over his constancy; he left his master’s hopelessly lost cause* and set off to join Aurangzib.

We now turn to the pursuers. Jai Singh reached Mairta on 20th March,† six days behind Dara, and there learnt the true route of his flight and immediately set out southwards after him by way of Jalor and Sirohi. On the way, one march beyond Sirohi, he was joined by Jaswant Singh and his Rathor army (31st March), and then, “in order not to allow Dara time to gain composure at Ahmadabad,” the Imperialists pushed on, marching from 16 to 20 miles a day, “in spite of scarcity of water, want of fodder, and exhaustion of the horses and transport-cattle.” Reaching Sidhpur on 5th April, they learnt that Dara had been refused entrance into Ahmadabad and had turned aside towards Cutch. Jai Singh had before this sent letters to the princes of northern Kathiawar and Cutch urging them to bar Dara’s path and seize him. Now he wrote to them again to be up and doing on the Emperor’s side. The pursuing army marched on to Ahmadabad to refit. Their misery was hardly less than that of Dara. The year was one of drought in Guzerat; and this vast army of 20,000 men moving to-

* Paris MS. 104a and b, 108a, 102a; A. N. 411.
† Probably 21st (See p. 176n.)
gether exhausted the scanty water-supply and fodder in their path. It was summer and the forced march broke down the horses and cattle; grass was very scarce and grain so dear that even six seers of bajra (spiked millet) could be had for a rupee with difficulty. To encourage the soldiers and compensate them for the heavy loss of transport cattle, cash salary was distributed among them, probably at a higher rate than usual. For this purpose Aurangzib had wisely sent up a sum of money from behind.

From Sidhpur to Ahmadabad, owing to "the utter scarcity of water both by the road-side and at the halting places," the army had to advance in three divisions, at intervals of one day's march from one another. Some delay thus occurred. Ahmadabad was reached about 11th April. Halting there for probably one day only, Jai Singh distributed 2½ lakhs of rupees from the treasury to his troops to enable them to provide themselves with enough water and fodder for the journey, and on the 12th set out again. Turning his face to the west, he arrived (22nd) in the Pathri district, west of Viramgaon, and there, getting further news of Dara's movements, advanced towards Halwad, en route to Cutch. On 3rd May he reached a place 6 miles from
Halwad and there learnt that Dara had crossed the Rann and entered Sindh again.*

On the 13th the pursuers reached the capital of Cutch. In this country, never trodden by Mughal troops before, as Jai Singh proudly writes, his letters and the rumour of his approach had already done their work. The Rao had refused to harbour the Emperor’s enemy in his land and had personally conducted him out of it. As Jai Singh approached Bhuj, the Rao sent his son in advance to welcome the Imperial general and then personally received him with due honours outside his capital (13th May), and gave him a bond solemnly asserting that Dara was not in his territory. Jai Singh halted there to learn the truth, and soon got news from the Mughal officer of Badin that Dara had reached Lower Sindh. A small detachment of 500 under two officers was at once sent ahead with orders to hasten onwards and cross the Rann, while the main army was to move more slowly at night.

In crossing the Greater Rann the army suffered frightful privations. The Rao of Cutch had turned unfriendly, and refused to supply a guide across the salt marsh; one of his grandsons accompanied Jai Singh, but only to the shore of it. At one halting place, six miles south of the Greater Rann, they found a few wells and the soldiers with all their exertions got out of them only some drops of water mixed with mud, with which they were forced to quench their thirst. Next day they heard of three or four wells, ten miles from their camp. The soldiers hastened thither for the precious water; a few got it, while the others returned with their thirst unquenched after twenty miles of fruitless marching. Towards evening the army arrived at the southern edge of the Rann, at the village of Lahu (Luna), and began to cross the salt plain at night. The Greater Rann was here 70 miles in breadth, in the whole extent of which not a drop of drinking water could be found, nor for 10 miles beyond its northern shore.

The army plunged into this dreary wilderness at sunset. Up to midnight the moon lit up their path, and when it set, torches were kindled at every mile's interval to guide the soldiers
on. No trooper or follower was lost in this trackless plain. It was two hours after dawn when the crossing was over and the northern shore was reached. An hour afterwards they came to the village of Rahman, into the small tank of which the whole army, dying of thirst and worn out by their toilsome march, rushed. In a moment it was filled with struggling men and the water was turned into mud. In their agony of thirst, men and beasts crying for water wandered to the nullahs of the village and drank up the putrid water, "the taste of which made life itself bitter to them." It was only after marching on till noon that they reached their camping ground at Kulabi, and got rest.*

The experience had been most terrible: the army had marched 8o miles without halting, and that march had consisted of wading through sand over a roadless wilderness with no water to slake their thirst. The horses and camels were so worn out by their long journey and scantiness of fodder and water that, after crossing the Rann as the sun grew hotter and they were urged to travel eight more waterless miles before reaching a suitable place for camping, they fell down dead in large numbers along the road. At every halting-place, many transport-cattle lay down, never.

* Paris MS. 102b-103b, 109a-110a.
to rise again. So disastrous was the march to them that out of Jai Singh's personal contingent of 4,000 troopers, less than a fourth had horses left for riding on. The loss was equally great in Bahadur Khan's division. Afterwards the Emperor made some amends by presenting 200 horses to the former and 100 to the latter general.

Jai Singh had thus achieved a most remarkable military feat; but he had to pay a heavy price for it. Even before reaching the Rann, the privations of the pursuing army had been very great: dearth of food had been added to the long familiar water-famine. At places grain had sold at a seer per rupee, and even at this price there was not enough for all. "At other places no food at all could be procured." His soldiers were dead beat; and his camels, horses and other transport animals had been almost exterminated. Halting was enforced on him by outraged nature, and his progress in Sindh was slow, as the remaining cattle were unable to walk more than eight or even six miles a day.* The southern coast of Sindh had been reached, probably near Rahim-ki-Bazar,† about 18th May, but it was the 29th before he arrived

* Paris MS., 1036—104a, 106a, 108a; A. N. 433.
† Paris MS. (103a) has 'village of Rahman.'
at Nasarpur, 7th June before he reached Hala, and the 11th of that month before he struck the Indus near "the river of Siwistan." Here he learnt that Dara had crossed over to the right bank of the Indus and entered Siwistan, intending to go to Qandahar with the help of the Maghasi tribe.

Jai Singh's task was done; the enemy was no longer on the Indian soil. So, he wrote to the Emperor asking to be recalled to Court,—"When appointing me to this service, your Majesty had told me that so long as Dara was not captured or killed, or did not quit the empire, I should not withdraw my hand from him. I have left no means untried to accomplish the first two alternatives. I have, at no place, however hard and difficult to traverse, taken thought of the scarcity of water and grain or of the predominance of lawless men. But God ordains every thing, and so the third alternative has come to pass. As your Majesty has now been freed from the mischief of that [enemy], I beg to submit that, in view of the extreme privations borne by the army and the weakness of the horses and transport cattle, which have not strength enough to move more than six or eight miles a day,—I should be recalled to Court."

* Paris MS. 105a—106a; A. N. 412.*
Manucci asserts that Jai Singh deliberately carried on a slack pursuit in order to leave Dara time to escape to Persia. There is nothing improbable in the suspicion, as no old general of Shah Jahan, whether Indian Muslim or Rajput, could have willingly consented to bring about the capture of his eldest son, since all knew that if they did it the result would be his murder by his victorious rival. But I can find no semblance of slackness in the pursuit, except (i) Jai Singh’s marching from Sidhpur to Ahmadabad, instead of turning due west to Kathiawar, and (ii) the long time spent between his crossing the Rann and reaching the left bank of the Indus near Siwistan. The first is, however, explained away by the need of taking money from the Ahmadabad treasury and furnishing the army with the means of securing water and fodder in advance for the waterless march through Kathiawar and Cutch, while the second is satisfactorily accounted for by the utter exhaustion of the troops and loss of transport, so graphically described in Jai Singh’s letters to his master.

With the object of returning to Northern India, Jai Singh was slowly moving up the Indus towards Bhakkar, when about the middle of
June he received the startling news that Dara had been captured on the 9th of that month and that the Imperial generals must hurry on to take charge of the prisoner.*

We left Dara in Siwistan bent on making his escape to Qandahar and Persia. In the trans-Indus country he was attacked and plundered by the Chandi tribe† and barely escaped capture at their hands by fighting desperately. The Maghasis whom he next visited were more hospitable; their headman, Mirzai Maghasi, welcomed the royal suppliant in his house and promised an escort of his men to the frontier of Qandahar, only twelve marches off. But Dara's women were utterly opposed to leaving India and entrusting their lives to the savage Baluches or their honour to the Persian King. His beloved wife, Nadira Banu Begam, was seriously ill, and the privations of a journey through the desolate Bolan Pass and the in-

† A. N., 412, has "the country of Chand Khan," or "of Jandban" according to a different reading. Khafi Khan, ii. 82, has Jawian. Jai Singh's letter has Rukhandia, (Paris MS. 105 b.) I get the correct name of the tribe from Masson's Kalat, 334. "The Pat of Shikarpur, [between Kach Gandava and Shikarpur] separates the lands of the Magghazis, subjects of Kalat, from those of the Chandi tribe, dependent on Sind."
hospitable hills beyond up to Qandahar, would have killed her. Others of his party, too, needed some days’ rest after the fatigue and hardships of the terrible two and a half months’ ceaseless flight through desert and salt marsh in summer heat,* before another and more terrible journey could be undertaken.

The last glimmering sparks of ambition also influenced Dara to linger in India. He wanted to make another effort before finally giving up the contest for the throne. His plan was to take the armed help of any friendly Baluch chieftain, relieve the fort of Bhakkar which was gallantly holding out under his eunuch Basant against Aurangzib’s forces, deposit his treasure and women in that island fortress, and then march into Afghanistan from the south, secure the adhesion of its Imperial Governor (once his partisan), and finally with a fresh army at his back enter India again through the Khyber Pass and try to wrest the crown of Delhi with fair hope of success.†

* "The Afghans have a proverb, ‘The sun of Sind will turn a white man black, and is sufficiently powerful to roast an egg.’.....The mountain tribes say of Sindh, ‘Duzak ast,’ it is pandemonium." (Postans’s Sindh, 11 and 14.)

† A. N. 412; Paris MS. 105a and b; Bernier, 94—96; Masum, 139 a; Storia, i. 347; Khafi Khan (ii. 83) supports Bernier by saying that Dara wanted to contest the throne again.
Dara, therefore, changed his mind, and looked about for a chieftain in that neighbourhood who would give him a safe shelter and the services of his clansmen. Such a friend he hoped to find in Malik Jiwan, the zamindar of Dadar, a place nine miles east of the Indian end of the Bolan Pass. Years ago this Afghan chief had offended against the State and been sent by the Governor of Multan, bound in chains, to Delhi, where Shah Jahan had sentenced him to be trampled to death by an elephant. Dara, then at the height of his father’s favour, had been interested in the case by one of his servants, and had successfully begged the condemned man’s life and liberty from the Emperor. He now looked for Jiwan’s gratitude in his own need. Giving early notice of his coming, he reached Dadar under the guidance of Ayub, a servant sent by Jiwan in advance. Two miles from the fort the chief himself welcomed his honoured guest and patron, and took him to his house, showing him every respect and care (probably 6th June).

On the way to Dadar the greatest of all misfortunes had overtaken Dara. His wife Nadira Banu, who had been long ailing of diarrhoea, and
was heart-broken at the loss of her eldest son, succumbed to hardship and want of medicine and rest. She was a daughter of Prince Parwiz and grand-daughter of the great Akbar on both sides of her parentage, and had borne her husband all his three sons and one daughter. Dara was frantic with grief at losing his constant companion and counsellor in weal and woe. "The world grew dark in his eyes. He was utterly bewildered; his judgment and prudence were entirely gone." "Death was painted in his eyes. He became helpless and weak through intense grief. Everywhere he saw only destruction (staring him in the face), and losing his senses became utterly heedless of his own affairs."

In spite of the warnings of his son and followers, Dara, stupefied with grief, entered Jiwan's house, wishing to spend there the three days of mourning, instead of at once marching towards the Persian frontier. His wife's last wish had been that her body should be laid in the soil of Hindustan. So, after two days he despatched her corpse to Lahore, in charge of Khwajah Maqul, to be buried in the grave-yard of the renowned saint Mian Mir, his own spiritual guide. By a supreme act of folly he sent his most devoted officer, Gul Muhammad, with all the seventy troopers still left at his side, to escort the
coffin. In a fit of magnanimity which can be ascribed only to utter despair and apathy to his own future, he left to his companions free choice between returning to their homes and accompanying him to Persia. None, he said, would be forced to go into exile and peril for his sake.* Thus it happened that no devoted officer or brave captain, not even a single common soldier of his own, now remained with Dara. He became utterly helpless and dependent on his host's fidelity.

And too soon was he to learn the strength of an Afghan's gratitude or faith when opposed to cupidity. On 9th June, when Dara began the march towards the Bolan Pass, the treacherous Jiwan with his wild clansmen surrounded the party, captured the rich prize and brought them back to his village. Against these human "wolves and robbers" of the desert, the few eunuchs and servants who still followed Dara could offer no defence. Only his second son, the lad Sipihr Shukoh, gallantly struck some blows for freedom, but he was overpowered, his arms were pinioned behind his back, and the

* Kambu, 23a.
party was dragged back to their host's house, now their prison. *

Malik Jiwan, with his greed sharpened by the hope of reward from Aurang-

Captive Dara delivered to Bahadur Khan zib, sent fast couriers with the news of the capture to Bahadur Khan and Jai Singh, who had reached the left bank of the Indus near Siwistan. But they had learnt of the event earlier from their agent Qazi Inayetullah, whom they had sent to instigate the zamindars of the Bhakkar district against Dara. They at once hastened forward, leaving their camp and baggage behind, and making a forced march through mid-summer heat and raging simoom. Near Bhakkar they crossed over the Indus to the right bank (20th June) and pushed an advanced detachment on to bring the captives away, while the two generals marched more slowly behind. On the 23rd Dara, with his son and two daughters, was delivered by Jiwan to Bahadur Khan, and the Imperialists set out on their return. The fallen Prince was speechless with despair and utterly dazed by calamity; he consented to everything that his captors suggested. They made him write a

* For the capture of Dara, Masum, 1396—142a; A. N. 412—414, 419; Kambu, 22b-23a; Khafi Khan, ii. 83-84; Storia i. 347—351; Bernier, 95-96; Isardas, 44b (meagre.) Paris MS. 108a and 6 (for dates only).
letter to the eunuch Basant, ordering him to give up to the Imperialists the fort of Bhakkar with Dara’s property and family lodged there, and sent the eunuch Maqul to carry it as a proof of Dara’s ruin.

The pursuers, at last successful after more than three months’ chase through desert and jungle, in summer heat and sand-storm, began their return march to Delhi, carefully guarding the prisoners. The Indus was recrossed above Bhakkar on 28th June. Passing over the rain-swollen rivers of the Land of Five Waters with due caution for their important charge, they arrived outside Delhi* on 23rd August, 1659.

The first news that Aurangzib received of the downfall of his rival, was on 2nd July, from Malik Jiwan’s letter forwarded by the faujdar of Bhakkar. He read the letter out in open Court. “But so great was his control over his emotions, that he did not go into exultation over it, and rarely referred to the capture, nor did he order the Imperial band to play the music of victory.” The true reason of his moderation was that the news seemed too good to be true.

But when, on 15th July, Bahadur Khan's despatch arrived, reporting that he had taken charge of the captive, there was no longer room for doubt. Rejoicings were ordered in Court, "to inform the public, who were still sceptical about Dara's capture."

On arriving outside Delhi the miserable Prince and his son were handed over to Nazar Beg, a slave sent by Aurangzib to work his purpose on them. The Emperor ordered that the captive should be paraded through the capital in order to let the people see with their own eyes that it was he and none else, so that in future no counterfeit Dara might raise his head in the provinces and by winning the support of the credulous create disturbances against the Government.

On 29th August the degrading parade was held. To complete his humiliation, Dara was seated in an uncovered hawda on the back of a small female elephant covered with dirt. By his side was his second son, Sipahr Shukoh, a lad of fourteen; and behind them with a naked sword sat their gaoler, the slave Nazar Beg, whose heart shrank from no act of cruelty or bloodshed at the bidding of his master. The

* A. N. 414—419; Masum, 142a; Kambu, 23b; Khafi Khan, ii. 85.
captive heir to the richest throne in the world, the favourite and pampered son of the most magnificent of the Great Mughals, was now clad in a travel-tainted dress of the coarsest cloth, with a dark dingy-coloured turban, such as only the poorest wear, on his head, and no necklace or jewel adorning his person. His feet were chained, though the hands were free. Exposed to the full blaze of an August sun, he was taken through the scenes of his former glory and splendour. In the bitterness of disgrace he did not raise his head, nor cast his glance on any side, but sat "like a crushed twig." Only once did he look up, when a poor beggar from the roadside cried out, "O Dara! when you were master, you always gave me alms; today I know well thou hast naught to give." The appeal touched the prisoner; he raised his hand to his shoulder, drew off his wrapper and threw it to the beggar.

If Aurangzib had wished to make Dara ridiculous to the public, the result proved the contrary. The pity of the citizens swept every other feeling away. Dara had been popular with the lower orders for his magnificent display and lavish charity, and now all classes were moved to sympathy at the sight of fallen greatness. Bernier, an eye-witness of the scene, writes,
"The crowd assembled was immense; and everywhere I observed the people weeping, and lamenting the fate of Dara in the most touching language....From every quarter I heard piercing and distressing shrieks,...men, women, and children wailing as if some mighty calamity had happened to themselves." But not a hand was raised in rescue, for, the prisoner was girt round by squadrons of cavalry clad in shining steel, with drawn swords in their hands, and mounted archers with arrows placed ready in their bows, led by Bahadur Khan on an elephant. In this manner the ignominious procession entered the New City or Shah Jahanabad by the Lahore gate, traversed the whole length of it, through Chandni Chawk and Sadullah Khan's Bazar, by the foot of the Fort, till it passed out to the suburb of Khizirabad in Old Delhi. There Dara was lodged in the Khawaspura mansion, amidst a strong guard, to await sentence.*

That evening his fate was the subject of a debate in the Emperor's Hall of Private Audience. Danişmand Khan pleaded for his life; but Shaista Khan, Muhammad Amin Khan, Bahadur Khan, and Hakim Daud demanded his death for the good of Church and State. The malig-

* Storia, i. 354-355; Beruier, 98-99 (an eye witness); A. N. 431; Khafi Khan, ii. 86; Isardes, 446-45a; Kambu, 236; (for Dara's public parade).
nant influence of his younger sister Raushanara was thrown into the scale against Dara, and her clamours silenced the feeble voice of mercy in a Court where most ministers shaped their opinions after their master's inclinations. The pliant theologians in the Emperor's pay signed a decree that Dara deserved death on the ground of infidelity and deviation from Islamic orthodoxy. "The pillars of the Canonical Law and Faith apprehended many kinds of disturbance from his life. So, the Emperor, both out of necessity to protect the Faith and Holy Law, and also for reasons of State, considered it unlawful to allow Dara to remain alive any longer as a destroyer of the public peace." Thus does the official history published under Aurangzib's authority justify this act of political murder.

The doomed Prince's agent tried hard to save his life by running to different mediators, but in vain.* Dara learnt of his fate and made a last appeal to Aurangzib's pity. He wrote, "My Lord Brother and Emperor! His appeal for mercy rejected. the desire of kingship is not at all left in my mind. Be (it)

* A. N. 432; Khafi Khan, ii. 87; Masum, 1426; Bernier, 100-101; Storia, i. 356.
blessed to you and your sons. The plan of slaying me which you are cherishing in your heart is unjust. If you only grant me a house fit for (my) residence and one young hand-maid out of my own hand-maids to wait on me, I shall employ myself in praying for your (good) in the retired life of a pardoned man.”

On the margin of the petition Aurangzib wrote in his own hand in Arabic, “You first acted as a usurper, and you were a mischief-maker.”* For Dara there could be no pardon from Aurangzib. For more than sixteen years Dara had been a blighting shadow on Aurangzib’s life: he had robbed his younger brother of the sunshine of their father’s favour; he had thwarted his plans and backbitten him at the Imperial Court; his had been the secret influence behind the throne that accounted for Shah Jahan’s attitude of coldness and undeserved censure towards the able Viceroy of Multan and the Deccan; he had intrigued with Bijapur and Golkonda in open opposition to Aurangzib in the wars against them sanctioned by the Emperor himself; every enemy of Aurangzib had found a ready patron in Dara; Dara’s officers had insulted and calumniated Prince Aurangzib without any punishment from their master; his sons had monopolised all the favours of

* British Museum, Or. MS. Addl. 18881, f. 77a.
Shah Jahan, leaving none for Aurangzib’s offspring. All these Aurangzib had borne with patience and even with affected humility for sixteen long years. Now at last he had got his chance of revenge; and he was not the man to give it up.

A riot on the 30th precipitated the end of Dara. The populace of Delhi had marked the traitor Malik Jiwan in yesterday’s procession; but in the presence of the strong escort they could not vent their indignation except by cursing and pelting at him. This ungrateful wretch and perjured host had been appointed a Commander of One Thousand Horse and raised to the peerage under the title of Bakhtyar Khan, as the price of his treachery. On thirtieth August, as he was going to Court with his Afghan followers, the populace of Delhi, instigated by Haibat, a gentleman trooper (ahadī) of the Imperial army, and joined by the ruffians, beggars and other desperadoes of the city and workmen from every lane and bazar, besides Dara’s friends, mobbed the party. From abuse they quickly passed to hurling stones, clods of earth, and sweepings at the traitors, and finally growing bolder assailed them with sticks. From the house-tops on both sides the women showered ashes and pots of filth
on the heads of the Afghans and spectators mingled in melee below. The tumult and noise were very great. Some of Jiwan's followers were slain outright, and some wounded; and if the Prefect of the City Police had not come to the rescue with his men, not one of the Afghans could have escaped from the crowd with life. The newly created Khan, going to his first audience at Court, was brought away in safety under cover of a wall of shields formed over his head.*

Immediately Aurangzib passed the order for Dara's execution, and entrusted the task to Nazar Beg and some other slaves under the supervision of Saif Khan. Early in the night (30th August) the wretches entered Dara's prison in order to separate Sipihr Shukoh from their victim before attempting the deed of blood.

Aurangzib's slaves separate Sipihr Shukoh from Dara.

On their hideous features and relentless eyes Dara read his doom. Starting up he approached them, and falling on his knees cried out, "You have come to murder me!" They pretended that their order was only to remove Sipihr Shukoh to another place. The boy, too, knelt down, nestling close against his father's body. Nazar

* For the riot, Khafi Khan, ii. 86; A.N. 432; Bernier, 99, mentions only the pelting on the first day.
with a malevolent glance bade him get up. In
madness and despair Sipihr began to weep and
clug to Dara's legs. Father and son hugged
each other tightly, with loud cries of grief. The
slaves grew more threatening in their tone, and
then tried to drag the boy away by the hand.
At this Dara wiped his own tears and calmly
appealed to the slaves to carry his entreaty to his
brother to leave Sipihr Shukoh with him. But
they scornfully replied, "We cannot be anybody's
messenger. We have only to carry out our
orders." Then with a sudden rush they tore
away the boy from his father's arms by sheer
force, took him to a side-room, and prepared to
despatch Dara. That Prince, knowing that his
end was near, had already prepared for a last des-
perate struggle. He had secured a small penknife
and concealed it in his pillow. Now he tore the
cover open, grasped the knife, and attacked the
slave who was advancing to
seize him. This small instru-
ment was driven with such force
into the wretch's side that it stuck fast in the
bones. Dara tugged at it, but in vain. Then he
flung himself blindly on them, dealing blows
with his fist right and left. But the slaves were
accustomed to such bloody work; they fell on
him in a body and seized and over-powered him.
All this time Sipihr Shukoh's agonised shrieks were reaching his father's ears. A minute after the room grew still; the daggers of the slaves finished the work; the struggle ended in a pool of blood.

The severed head was sent to Aurangzib, to satisfy him that his rival was really dead, and that no fraud or substitution of victims had taken place. By Aurangzib's order the corpse was placed on an elephant, paraded through the streets of the city a second time, and then buried in a vault under the dome of the tomb of Humayun, without the customary washing and dressing of the body, without a funeral procession following it. Beside him lies not only that royal ancestor, but also two of his grand-uncles, the younger sons of Akbar.*

Two centuries rolled by, and then the dynasty of the Great Mughal closed in a still bloodier scene. On 22nd September 1857, not far from the spot where the mangled remains of Dara

* For the murder and burial of Dara, Masum, 1436–1456 (most graphic account, followed by me); Bernier, 102; Tavernier, i. 354; Storia, i. 358; Kambu, 24a; A. N. 432–433; Khafi Khan, ii. 87 (all very brief.). The popular story of the insult done to his severed head by Aurangzib, rests solely on the doubtful authority of Bernier and Manucci. Masum says,—"When the head was carried to Aurangzib he said, 'As I did not look at this infidel's face in his lifetime, I do not wish to do it now.'" (1456).
Shukoh were laid in earth, Princes Mirza Mughal, Mirza Quraish Sultan, and Mirza Abu Bakht, the sons and grandson of the last Emperor of Delhi, and one of them his chosen heir, were shot dead in cold blood by a foreign soldier, as devoid of principle as of pity, while they were vainly protesting their innocence and crying for an inquiry into their past conduct.* The bodies of the last of the legitimate Timurids were flung like carcases on the terrace of the Police Office and exposed to the public gaze, as Dara’s had been. In brothers’ flood did Aurangzib mount to the throne, and in the blood of his children’s children did the royal name pass away from his race.

* "Unscrupulous, unprincipled,...[Hodson] was a man without fear, if not without reproach....In slaying them as he did he was guilty of an outrage against humanity." Holmes’s Indian Mutiny (4th ed.), 372, 377. "The spirit of the condottiere now came into play [in Hodson’s mind.] A more brutal or a more unnecessary outrage was never committed....Not a single item of evidence had been adduced to substantiate the charge [that the princes had instigated the massacre of Europeans in May.]” Malleson’s Indian Mutiny (ed. of 1879), ii. 77, 80. With their dying breath the princes vainly appealed to Hodson to make a tahqiq (investigation) into their conduct, before shooting them.
CHAPTER XXII.

THE END OF SULAIMAN SHUKOH.

Early in May 1658, Sulaiman Shukoh, then pondering how he should force or turn Shuja’s wall from the hill to the river at Monghyr, received a summons from his father to return quickly to him, as Aurangzib and Murad had overwhelmed Jaswant in Malwa and were marching on Agra. A peace was hastily patched up with Shuja, through the exertions of Jai Singh, and the Imperial army soon set out on its return. On 2nd July when he reached Korah, 105 miles west of Allahabad, fast couriers brought to him the fatal news of his father’s crushing defeat at Samugarh five days earlier. A letter from Shah Jahan sent with them urged him to make a rapid march with his army to join his father at Delhi. Dara, too, wrote to the Imperial officers requesting them to accompany his son. But it was in vain. The
news of Dara's downfall produced the greatest excitement in his son's army; the soldiers were distracted or openly hostile to the fallen cause; the road to Delhi was long and would soon be blocked by Aurangzib's men. What was Sulaiman Shukoh to do? The youthful Prince, bewildered by the calamity, took counsel with Jai Singh. The Rajput general advised him either to push on to Delhi or to fall back on Allahabad and there wait within its sheltering walls for news of his father. For himself, Jai Singh openly refused to follow the losing side any longer; he would go away with his troops and join the new Emperor. The hapless Sulaiman waited another day and held a second consultation. Dilir Khan, the Imperial troops, Afghan general, advised him to cross the Ganges at Allahabad, go to Shahjahanpur, the home of a large Afghan colony, and there raising an army of his clansmen wait for fresh developments. Only on such condition was he willing to accompany the Prince. Sulaiman had no help but to obey. So, he ordered a retreat from Allahabad (4th June). But meantime Jai Singh had convinced Dilir Khan of the folly of such unselfish devotion; these two generals with their contingents parted company with the Prince at Korah, and
so also did all the other Imperial officers and many newly enlisted troops* whose home was in this doab country. Only 6,000 men, less than a third of Sulaiman’s army, accompanied him in the retreat to Allahabad, under the guidance of his guardian, the faithful Baqi Beg. While he should have flown on wings to his father’s side, if he was to reach him at all, he wasted a week’s time here in distraction, daily consultation, and the maturing of conflicting plans. He was burdened with a harem of women and “furniture and articles of pomp beyond imagination.” Couches of gold, chairs of gold and silver, jewellery, gold plate, rich clothing,—in short every gift that a loving father and a doting grandfather could bestow on him on his first campaign, accompanied him and impeded his march. He could not carry them and yet he was loath to leave them. Some advised him to seize and govern the country from Allahabad to Patna and there build up an independent power. Others counselled him to retreat to Patna and by joining Shuja raise a strong force against Aurangzib. But the Syeds of Barha, who were among Dara’s chief followers, pressed him to make a wide loop

* Masum, 147a-148b; A.N. 168—170. Mamucci says that Sulaiman conspired to murder Jai Singh and Dilir Khan at an interview (Storia, i. 284—287).
round Delhi, march by the northern side of the Ganges, through their home the Middle Doab, and then cross the Ganges and the Jumna at the foot of the hills, near Nagina and Saharanpur, in order to reach Dara in the Panjab without fear of interception by Aurangzib's forces.

This last course Sulaiman Shukoh adopted. Leaving his surplus property, heavy baggage, stores, and harem attendants in the fort of Allahabad in charge of his father's trusty servant Syed Qasim of Barha, he crossed the Ganges with light kit (14th June), passed by Lucknow and Moradabad, and rapidly moved on Nagina, where he plundered the Government treasury of two lakhs of rupees and some private property also. But numbers of soldiers deserted him daily, and his following rapidly dwindled from the 6,000 men who had left Allahabad with him. Even for his diminished numbers he could not secure a crossing over the Ganges to the right bank. "At every ferry......the men took their boats to the other side at the report of his march... the doab to Hardwar. So he was forced to proceed further up the river towards Hardwar in the hope of crossing with the help of the local zamindars." At Chandi, situated in the Srinagar State opposite Hardwar, he halted for
some days, and sent his officer Bhawanidas to the Rajah of Srinagar to beg his help.*

But in these few days of enforced waiting his path was completely barred by strong forces of the enemy and his further progress rendered impossible. As early as the middle of July, Aurangzib from Delhi had sent an army under Shaista Khan to the Hardwar side to oppose Sulaiman Shukoh’s attempt to cross the Ganges. On 24th July another detachment was sent under Shaikh Mir and Dilir Khan to guard the right bank of the Jumna and prevent Sulaiman’s flight across that river.† Thus the young Prince’s path was closed on the south and the west; he was cut off from his father and the Panjab.

While Shaista Khan was advancing to the right bank of the Ganges near the hills, a very enterprising officer, Fidai Khan, fired by the new honours and favours received from the Emperor, outstripped him, reached the ferry of Puth, south-east of Hapur, in the expectation that Sulaiman would naturally cross the Ganges there in his westward movement from Lucknow. Here he learnt from a letter of the

* A. N. 125-126, 148, 170—173; Masum, 1488—151a.
† A. N. 148, 159-160; 126 (Khan-i-Dauran sent to besiege Allahabad); Aqil Khan, 71.
Rajah of Kumaun, the neighbour and therefore the enemy of the Rajah of Srinagar, that the fugitive was marching northwards to Hardwar in order to cross the river there with the help of the latter Rajah. Fidai Khan by hard riding covered 160 miles in one day and reached the right bank of the river at Hardwar in the afternoon. Sulaiman with several thousand men occupied the opposite bank, wishing to cross there that very afternoon. Only 50 troopers had been able to keep up with Fidai Khan in his strenuous march. But his appearance was enough. At once the rumour spread that this bank was held by the Vanguard of the Imperial army and that their main body under Shaista Khan was approaching. Sulaiman Shukoh lost heart, and durst not force a passage across. The precious moment was lost, and he had to turn back from the Ganges towards the Srinagar hills in search of an asylum.* His best followers, the Syeds of Barha, who had their homes in the Middle Doab, round Sambal, feared for the safety of their wives and children and refused to enter the hills.

His most faithful officer and chief manager of affairs, Baqi Beg, a Badakhshani, who had served Dara from his boyhood, died on the way. At the

death of such an experienced able and resourceful leader, confusion fell on Sulaiman’s party. The master-mind which had firmly held the men together was gone, and the party broke up into flying atoms. “At the death of such a faithful follower, utter despair and confusion overtook Sulaiman.” More than half the party with him fled back to their homes. His force was reduced to 2,000 men.*

Despairing to make his way to the Panjab, Sulaiman had appealed to the mercy of Prithwi Singh, the Rajah of Srinagar, and marched to his frontier. Here the Rajah’s men met him and guided him into their country. Four marches from the capital, the Rajah himself waited on the august guest and offered him a refuge in Srinagar on condition of his being accompanied by his family and a few servants only; but his army, horses and elephants were to be dismissed, as the country was poor and the roads bad.

The miserable suppliant hesitated before consenting to render himself utterly powerless and become absolutely dependent on his strange host. He spent a week in meditation and consultation. But there was no escape for him. The path to

* Masum, 152a; A. N. 174.
Hindustan was effectually closed. At Hardwar, Sambal, and the Middle Doab, strong forces of the enemy vigilantly waited for him; and a fourth force was already on the march to invest Allahabad, while Aurangzib himself had entered the Panjab. A dash to the plains would only make Sulaiman Shukoh fall into the jaws of death.

At last he made up his mind to accept the Rajah’s terms. Those of his servants who wanted to desert him but were deterred from the attempt by the roads out of the hills being guarded by the Rajah’s men, now advised Sulaiman not to trust his life to the hill people, but to return to Allahabad. To lend support to this counsel, they showed him a forged letter purporting to have come from his father’s devoted commandant of Allahabad and reporting that Shuja had arrived there with a vast army. Sulaiman, therefore, changed his mind, thanked the Rajah for his offer of hospitality, gave him some presents, and returned to Nagina. There all the traitors fled away, leaving only seven hundred men with him.

Despair seized Sulaiman Shukoh as he discovered the real motive of his faithless advisers. He decided to return to Srinagar. But his troubles
were only beginning. Next day, when he set his face towards the hills, "all the servants of the various departments and stores,—foragers, camel drivers, and elephant men,—fled away. From 700 men his train sank to 200 only. With such a diminished retinue and transport it was impossible for him to supply conveyances to the ladies of his harem, who numbered two hundred. The enemy were close behind; there was no time to be lost. So, he made up his mind to distribute his women to any body who would take them. At the very proposal these "ladies of spotless honour" who "had so long been kept in seclusion with care, became frantic with grief, plucking their hairs out and slapping their own cheeks." But misfortune is pitiless. Some of the women were given away to new masters, many others were abandoned, and only the highest ladies of his harem accompanied the Prince on the few elephants whose drivers still clung to him faithfully. The party now reduced to two hundred souls, made a precipitate flight, covering long distances every day without daring to halt, as the enemy was close on their track. Qasim Khan, the Imperial jagirdar of Moradabad, reached Nagina only 18 hours after Sulaiman had left it, and learning of the fugitive's
route he continued the pursuit without halting there. The news of the approach of the Imperialists and the rapidity of the flight dissolved Sulaiman Shukoh's party; most of his men deserted him, and at last with his wife, a few other ladies, his foster-brother Muhammad Shah, and only seventeen followers, he reached the entrance to the hills.* The Rajah of Srinagar gave him an asylum, promising to harbour the suppliant in spite of the danger and loss that were sure to befall him for his hospitality.

The host was all kindness and attention to his princely guest in distress. "He repaired the old and ruined palace of his ancestors, lodged the Prince in it, and day and night served him attentively. He considered the arrival of such a prince as a divine grace, because no such event had ever happened [to his dynasty] before." The Rajah even gave his daughter in marriage to

* Masum, 1516—1536; A.N. 173—177; Khafi Khan, ii. 42 (says that the Rajah treated Sulaiman like a prisoner in greed of his gold and jewels.) Sulaiman's flight to Garhwal took place at the beginning of August, 1658, as the detachment sent by Aurangzib from Delhi on 24th July under Shaikh Mir and Dilir Khan to watch the Jumna above Saharanpur against the fugitive, returned to Aurangzib some miles east of Rupar on the Satlej on 10th August with the report that Sulaiman had entered Srinagar. (A. N. 167)
Sulaiman, in order to mingle his blood with that of the Imperial house of Delhi.*

For a year Sulaiman enjoyed peace in his rude but safe shelter. He must have been sighing for the comforts of civilised life, the luxuries of his father's Court, and the power and wealth of a ruling prince. According to Masum, his evil counsellors,—or, as is more probable, his own restless ambition prompted him to sally forth from the hills and raid a Mughal village in the plains, in the hope of re-establishing his authority and assembling his father's old retainers and other officers from the neighbouring tract. The only result of the expedition was the plunder of his all by his faithless followers and his return in naked poverty to the Garhwal hills again.†

Aurangzib had already warned the Rajah that, if he did not wish to see the ruin of his house, he must yield the fugitive. Prithwi Singh tried evasion and pretended that Sulaiman Shukoh had found an asylum in a neighbouring hill-State and not in Garhwal. But the falsehood failed in its object.

* Masum, 153d, 156a.

† Masum, 154a—155a. The Alamgirnamah (175) places this return to the plains and desertion of Sulaiman by his treacherous followers before his entrance into Garhwal. This is more likely than Masum's version.
At the end of a year, Aurangzib now triumphant over all his rivals, was free to turn to Sulaiman Shukoh. On 27th July 1659 he sent Rajah Rajrup of the Jammu hills with a party of Imperial troops to influence Prithwi Singh, either by persuasion or by threat, to surrender his guest. For a year and a half the hill-Rajah struggled against temptation and fear in the sacred cause of hospitality. Reinforcements in pioneers artillery and musketeers were sent to Rajrup in October 1660.* But a campaign among the rugged hills of Garhwal was a slow and doubtful expedient. Aurangzib therefore fell back on diplomacy. He intrigued with Prithwi Singh’s all-powerful minister and virtual ruler of Garhwal, and promised him his master’s throne if he brought about the capture of Sulaiman. This man, corrupted by ambition, administered to the Prince a poison in the form of medicine. Sulaiman experimented with it on a cat and learnt of its deadly property. When he disclosed the plot to Prithwi Singh, the Rajah in righteous indignation cut the wretched minister to pieces.†

Aurangzib next employed Jai Singh, his agent

* A. N. 421, 589; Masum, 156b—157b.
† Masum, 157b—159b.
in all intrigues with Hindu princes. The Rajput chief wrote to Prithwi Singh professing his own extreme sorrow at the impending ruin of a Hindu ruler like him, and pressing him to give up Sulaiman as the only means of saving himself from the Imperial vengeance. The Garhwal Rajah was old and refused to undertake the sin and shame of betraying an accepted refugee. But his son and heir, Medini Singh, was more worldly-minded; the hope of rewards from Delhi conquered his scruples. There was also the fear of losing their kingdom, as Aurangzib was instigating the neighbouring and rival hill-Rajahs to invade and annex Garhwal. The three Mughal generals who had invaded the country, had seized and established outposts in some parts of it and pressed the Rajah hard.* So, Medini Singh overruled his father and decided to give Sulaiman Shukoh up to the Mughals. A submissive reply was sent to Jai Singh with a promise to obey the Imperial order. On 12th December 1660 Aurangzib despatched Jai Singh’s son, Kumar Ram Singh, to the foot of the hills to bring away the captive. Hearing the news, Sulaiman tried to escape over the snow to Ladak, and when pursued by the Garhwal troops he

*Sulaiman is captured and delivered to Aurangzib.

* Probably by cutting off his subjects’ access to the plains.
offered resistance. His foster-brother and some other companions were slain, and he himself wounded in the vain struggle for freedom against heavy odds. On 27th December he was sent down to the plains and delivered to Ram Singh,* and on 2nd January 1661 brought to the fort of Salimgarh at Delhi.

On 5th January the prisoner was placed before his dread uncle in the Hall of Private Audience of the Delhi palace.† His youth, extreme beauty, martial fame, and present misery deeply interested the courtiers and even the ladies of the Imperial harem in his fate. The eldest and most favoured grandson of Shah Jahan, he might under happier stars have one day adorned the throne of Delhi and sat on the seat of state in the very hall where he now stood as a captive in chains with a secret and ignominious death before him. "Many of the courtiers shed tears at the sight of this interesting young man....The principal ladies of the court,...concealed behind a lattice-work, were also greatly moved. Aurangzib spoke to him with apparent kindness, to relieve him of the fear of a death-sentence,
'Be comforted; no harm shall befall you. You shall be treated with tenderness. God is great, and you should put your trust in Him. Dara, your father, was not permitted to live only because he had become a *kafir*, a man devoid of all religion.' The Prince made the *salam* or sign of grateful acknowledgement....He then told the Emperor, with much self-possession, that if it were intended to give him the *pousta* to drink, he begged that he might be immediately put to death. Aurangzib promised in a solemn manner, and in a loud voice, that this drink should most certainly not be administered, and that his mind might be perfectly easy."

The *pousta* is a drink made of poppy-heads crushed and soaked in water for a night. This was the potion generally given to princes confined in the fortress of Gwalior, whose heads the Emperor was deterred by prudential reasons from taking off. A large cup of this beverage was brought to them early in the morning, and they were not given anything to eat until it was swallowed. This drink emaciated the wretched victims; who lost their strength and intellect by slow degrees, became torpid and senseless, and at length died.

* Bernier, who witnessed the scene, (pp. 105-106); *Storia*, i. 380.
But the fate that Sulaiman Shukoh had dreaded more than death itself, was meted out to him by Aurangzib in violation of his ‘solemn promise.’ The captive was sent to Gwalior (on 15th January) and there ordered to be plied with the drink of opium-seeds. In this dismal State-prison the hapless Prince dragged his miserable life on for a year, and finally, in May 1662, “he was sent to the next world through the exertions of his keepers.” His career that had begun with so much promise and splendour was cut off at the age of thirty. On the Gwalior hill he was buried close to another princely victim of Aurangzib’s ambition, and Sulaiman Shukoh and his uncle Murad Bakhsh were united in death in that unhonoured cemetery.*

* Kambu, 24b; Isardas, 41b; Bernier, 107; Storia, i. 380; A. N. 603 (silent about his fate); Inayetullah’s Akham-i-Alamgiri, 286b, 302b.
CHAPTER XXIII.

THE PURSUIT OF SHUJA AND THE WAR IN BIHAR.

After the victory Aurangzib marched through Shuja’s camp, near the tank of Mir Jumla to pursue Shuja. He halted for the night on the other side of it. To give the enemy no time to rally, he despatched a pursuing column under Prince Muhammad that very afternoon. Supplies, including horses, dress and arms, were given to him from the Imperial stores, as all his property had been plundered by Jaswant in the morning. Reinforcements were soon afterwards despatched under Mir Jumla, as joint Commander-in-Chief, raising the pursuing force to, 30,000 men. *

The unhappy pretender to the throne rode away 30 miles from the fatal field, before he halted to give repose to his exhausted body and drooping spirits.

* Alamgirnamah, 265—269; Aqil Khan, 91.
After four days of flight he crossed the Ganges and encamped at Jusi, opposite Allahabad. Dara’s commandant of Allahabad shut the fort-gates in his face, and invited the Imperialists to come and take delivery of the fortress, (which was done on 12th. January.)*

On reaching Bahadurpur, east of Benares, Shuja stopped for some days, repaired the wall and trenches round his former camp, and thought of making a stand there against his pursuers. If the worst came to the worst, he could retreat in his flotilla, which lay moored at hand. Seven large guns were brought away from Chunar and mounted on the ramparts.† Sultan Muhammad, who had no boats, could not cross the flooded Ganges near Bahadurpur; so he marched back upstream, forded the river near Allahabad, and advancing by way of Kheri and Kuntit arrived two stages from Chunar.‡

This fact, joined to the news that Fidai Khan, another officer of Aurangzib, was marching north of the Ganges from Gorakhpur towards Patna, alarmed

* Alamgirnamah, 285 & 286; Masum, 105b.
† Alamgirnamah, 492 & 493.
‡ Aqil Khan, 91. Kheree is in the Khyragarh Dist. Kuntit is near Bindhachal, 10 miles west of Mirzapur. (Indian Atlas, Sh. 88.)
Shuja, and he fled precipitately to Patna, arriving at the garden of Jafar Khan in its suburbs on 10th February, 1659.* Here some precious days were wasted in marrying his son Zainuddin to the daughter of the old and retired officer Zulfiqar Khan Qaramanlu, in the vain hope of thus buttressing up his fallen fortunes. Meantime the enemy arrived within 20 miles of the town, and there was another rapid flight to Mungir, which was reached on the 19th. Sultan Muhammad arrived at Patna about the 22nd, eight days after Shuja had left it, and here he was joined by Fidai Khan.†

At Mungir Shuja made a longer stand (Feb. 19th—March 6th). The ground favoured the defence against an invader from the west. The city of Mungir stands in a narrow plain, 2½ miles wide, bounded by the Ganges on the west and the Khargpur hills on the east. Along this plain runs the most convenient road from Patna to Bengal. If it were blocked, the invader would have to make a long detour through the desolate hills and jungles of the Santal Parganahs and Birbhum, far away from the Ganges and its populous

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* Aqil Kh., 91 & 92; Alamgirnamah, 493.
† Aqil Khan, 92.
cities, and strike the river again only in the
neighbourhood of Murshidabad.

During the period of Afghan rule, a wall and
moat had been run in front of
where he blocks the road.

Mungir, from the hill to the
river-bank, for the defence of
the town. Last year, when opposing Sulaiman
Shukoh, Shuja had repaired these old defences,
raised bastions every 30 yards along the wall, and
connected the ditch with the stream. Guns
were now landed from his boats and mounted
on the walls, the trenches were regularly manned
by his soldiers, and Rajah Bahroz, the samindar
of Khargpur, undertook to guard the southern
hills, through which ran a difficult path to
Rajmahal.*

Early in March Mir Jumla approached Mungir,
and finding the main road
Mir Jumla's turning movement through the
barred, did not waste his time
hills.
in attempting the siege of the
town, but bought over Rajah
Bahroz. Under the Rajah's guidance the Imperial
army marched through the hills and jungles of
Khargpur, and making a detour round Mungir,
threatened to seize Shuja's rear.† That Prince,

* Alamgirnamah, 493 and 494.
† Ibid, 494 & 495; Aqil Khan, 92; Masum, 1136. Kharg-
pur is due south of Mungir. (Indian Atlas, Sh. 112).
on hearing of Bahroz’s desertion and the unexpected movement of his enemies, fled from Mungir on 6th March. At this, Mir Jumla, who had reached Pialapur, 40 miles east of Mungir, left part of his army there under Prince Muhammed, while he himself hastened westwards to Mungir,* to take possession of it and appoint governors on behalf of the Emperor.

At Sahibganj † Shuja made another halt of 15 days (March 10th to 24th), built a wall from the river to the southern hill, barring the narrow plain through which the road ran. He had mistaken Mir Jumla’s westward march from Pialapur as a sign that the Imperialists were tired of crossing the hills and jungles and would now pursue him along his track by the southern bank of the Ganges. So he hoped to detain them.

* There is a Pialapur, 4 miles south of the Pir Pointy Station on the E. I. R. Loop Line, and 11 miles east of Colgong. It is more than 65 miles east of Mungir. Tarapur, 6 miles due east of Khargpur in Rennell’s Atlas, sh. 2, exactly corresponds to the description in the text. But the form Pialapur is given too often to be taken for a copyist’s error for Tarapur. There is a second Pialapur in the Mungir district, with a hill close to it, (Pioneer, 3 Jan. 1912, p. 2), but I cannot find it in the Atlas.

† Alamgirnámah, 495, gives “Rangamati, 33 kos from Mungir and 15 kos from Rajmahal.” Aqil Khan (92) gives Garhi, i.e., Teliagarhi. The place meant is undoubtedly Laimati, half a mile south of the Sahibganj station on the E. I. R. Loop Line (Indian Atlas, sh. 112). It is situated midway between Teliagarhi and Sikrigali.
long before his wall at Sahibganj. His right was protected by the river, his left by the Rajmahal hills stretching southwards in a long line from the Ganges to Birbhum. To guard against the Imperialists again turning his left flank by making a detour through the hills, he sent his follower Mir Isfandiar Mamuri to Khwajah Kamal Afghan, the zamindar of Birbhum and Chatnagar, with orders to oppose such a move and close the path on the south.

But again the gold of the Imperialists upset his plans. As at Mungir, so here too, Mir Jumla won over the trusted zamindar and purchased a safe passage through his lands. After twelve days of toilsome march through the hills south-east of the Mungir District, in which Raja Bahroz acted as guide and provided rations and fodder, the Imperialists emerged from the jungles* and entered the zamindari of Birbhum. The chief town, Suri, was passed on 28th March.

Here a strange piece of news damped the ardour of the Imperialists and weakened their strength. It had been known that Dara Shukoh had again made head in Guzerat, and that the Emperor had hastened thither to oppose him.

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*Rumour of Aurangzib's defeat.

* Alamgirnamah, 496 and 497; Aqil Khan, 92.
On 13th March 1659, the two armies clashed together near Ajmir; Dara’s power was destroyed for ever, and he was fleeing helplessly before the pursuing Imperialists. But rumour, with her usual love of falsehood, wafted to the Mughal army at Pialapur the news that Aurangzib had been routed at Ajmir and had fled to the Deccan abandoning everything. Distance magnified the extent of the disaster, and the tale received many embellishments as it flew from mouth to mouth. The whole army was thrown into alarm and confusion. Mir Jumla’s flanking movement through the hills was suspected to be not an attack on Shuja’s rear, but a covert design to flee with Prince Sultan Muhammad to the Deccan by the unfrequented route of Chota Nagpur and Orissa!

The Rajput contingent was particularly upset. As high caste Hindus they would have to undergo untold hardships regarding food and drink in a several months’ march through an unbroken wilderness. Their homes in the far west were exposed to the victorious enemies of Aurangzib. The wrath of Dara would descend heaviest on the house of Jaipur, as Jai Singh had deserted Sulaiman Shukoh and won over Jaswant Singh to Aurangzib’s side, and both he and his
son Ram Singh had done signal service to the Emperor. This march through the hills was bad enough, but the outlook before them was worse still. What could they expect on reaching the Deccan, even if the march were safely accomplished? To join the broken ranks of a defeated pretender to the throne, and to be for ever exiled from home and chased hither and thither with the fugitive Aurangzib! Better return west through Patna and Allahabad and make peace with Dara, or at least push on to Rajputana in time to guard their homeland.

The Rajputs brooded over the matter and slowly made up their minds. Some days after leaving Pialapur they stopped waiting on the Prince like other officers, at the times of his starting and dismounting. Then, on 26th March, after the day's advance they did not occupy the respective quarters marked out for them in the encampment, but all the Rajputs of the different divisions collected together and took up a position behind the camp. Next day they followed the main army at some distance, keeping their tents and baggage with themselves. On 30th March, two stages beyond Birbhum, the Rajput contingent, 4,000 strong, seceded from
the army and set out on their return towards Agra.*

Mir Jumla did not waste any time in trying to dissuade them or even to punish their desertion, but pushed steadily on towards his objective. He had still some 25,000 troopers† with him, double the strength of Shuja,‡ and every moment was precious to him if he hoped to cut off the enemy’s retreat to Dacca.

Shuja, hearing that the Imperialists had gained a passage through Shuja’s retreat to Tanda. Birbhum, evacuated Sahibganj and hastened to Rajmahal (about 27th March.) But he could not find safety anywhere on the right (or western) bank of the Ganges. Therefore, leaving Rajmahal, he planned to cross the river at Dogachi (a few miles south of the town), remove his family and army to Tanda (4 miles west of the Fort of Gaur), and prolong the struggle with the help

* Alamgirnamah, 497 & 498. Aqil Khan, 93, gives the inner meaning of the Rajput defection. Masum, 1156 & 1160 is very meagre.

† The Rajput contingent that seceded is numbered 4,000 men by Aqil Khan. Masum’s estimate of “about 10 or 12 thousand troopers” represents the exaggeration made by distance and rumour. All the Rajputs did not return, Rajah Indra-dyumna remained loyal. Aqil Khan says that two Muhammadan officers accompanied the deserters.

‡ Masum (1160) says that Shuja had not more than 5 or 6 thousand men.
of his powerful flotilla, against which Mir Jumla's purely land force could make no head.

But treachery was brewing in his ranks. The advance of the Imperial army in his rear destroyed his last chance of success; their arrival at Belghata, 30 miles from his position, supplied his wavering followers with protectors close at hand in case they deserted. Fidelity to Shuja now meant only a choice between two miseries, viz., slaughter by the overwhelmingly superior Imperial army, and voluntary exile to the dreadful land of the savage Arracanese. "Many of his old and trusted followers" now conspired to desert him. The leader of the malcontents was Alawardi Khan, a noble who had governed Bihar in the closing years of Shah Jahan's reign, and joined Shuja's standard at Patna when that Prince made his first attempt for the throne in 1657. Shuja had promoted him to the rank of his chief adviser, used to call him Khan Bhai (My noble brother), and had recently created him Amir-ul-umara or 'Premier Noble.'*

* For the affair of Alawardi Khan see Alamgirnamah, 421, 422, 499—501; Masum 114a—115b. Aqil Khan, 94, merely mentions the execution.
The plan of the traitors was to lag behind at Rajmahal after Shuja had gone to the ferry, and to slip away to the Imperial camp when he would be across the river. Shuja certainly went to the ferry of Doga-chi (1st April, 1659), but a storm prevented his embarkation that night, and he had to return to his tent, 5 miles from the river. The conspirators had not foreseen this delay. The plot had already got wind. Shuja heard of it at the end of the night, and acted with unwonted promptitude and decision. He had left two officers at Rajmahal to superintend the transport of the men and stores that were to follow him.

Next morning (2nd April), he galloped from his tent to the city, a distance of 10 miles, and alighted in his garden in the suburbs.* He was in a towering rage and kept shouting to his officers to bring Alawardi Khan. Man after man was sent on this errand. Meantime Alawardi Khan was guarding his house with his own retainers, against any attack. Shuja’s officers came in rapid succession and gathered round his house with their troops, waiting for the Prince’s order to storm it. At this Alawardi lost heart; his partisans were cowed down. So, when the

* Was it the Nageswar Bag garden given in Rennell, sheets 2 and 15?
diwan, Mirza Sarajuddin Muhammad Jabri, arrived to fetch him, he easily consented to leave his stronghold and accompany him to the Prince.*

Alawardi, with his younger son Saifullah, was taken to the Prince outside the city. They were immediately seized and handcuffed by the loyal soldiers, placed on an elephant, and carried back to the city with Shuja. Here at the palace-gate they were beheaded publicly. Two other mansabdars, who had joined the plot, shared the same fate.

After passing three more days at Rajmahal, Shuja, on 4th April, crossed the Ganges at Dogachi, and encamped at Baqarpur on the opposite bank, with the flotilla guarding his front. The Imperial army after leaving Birbhum, had turned to the N. E., wishing to strike the

* The official history accuses Shuja of having induced Alawardi to come out of his house by a false promise of safety, and then treacherously executed him. (Alamgirnama, 500). But the Tarikh-i-Shujia does not support the charge. It says, "Mirza Sarajuddin Muhammad, a confidential servant of the Prince, offered to bring Alawardi, went to the latter, and told him all the case (hagiqat-i-hal). The latter had no help but to come with one or two mansabdars engaged in the same plot." (f. 115a). I have accepted his account as more likely to be true under the circumstances. Alawardi had no chance of escape if he resisted arrest.
Ganges above Murshidabad and block Shuja's line of retreat to Dacca. It had reached Belghata* when it heard of Shuja's evacuation of Rajmahal, and immediately made a dash northwards to seize that town. The Van, under Zulfiqar Khan, entered it on 13th April, and established their own government there. Some 4,000 of Shuja's soldiers, having failed to get boats at Dogachi, returned helplessly to Rajmahal and submitted to the Imperialists. Thus the whole country west of the Ganges, from Rajmahal to Hughli, passed out of Shuja's hands.†

The river Ganges, after flowing due east for several hundred miles from Allahabad, takes a sudden turn to the right below Sikrigali and sweeps southwards for about 80 miles to Bhagwangola, where it again turns to the east. East of this stretch of the river lies the district of Maldah with the ruins of Gaur, on the west stands Rajmahal, and south of it the district of Murshidabad.

In its upper courses the rocky soil, as at Chunaur, Benares, Mungir, and Teliga- garhi, confines the river to a fixed bed. But after leaving

* Belgotta in Rennell, Sh. 2, about 2 miles west of Jangipur and 4 miles south of the battle field of Gheria.
† Alamgirnамах, 501 & 344; Aqil Khan, 94.
Sikrigali, it flows through a softer ground and
gives free play to its fondness for changing its
bed or splitting up into many streams. Thus the
valley of the Ganges, between the Rajmahal hills
on the west and the upland of Barind at the
back of Maldah on the east, is intersected
by countless thin serpentine brooks and *nullahs*,
dry sandy deposits marking the deserted beds
of the river, and the one or more streams of the
Ganges and the Mahananda. “The earth is as
water” here and travelling is extremely difficult.
On the north of this tract, the main artery of the
Ganges receives many straggling branches of the
lower Kushi, on the east the Kalindi, the Mahananda (the river of Maldah), and several of its
own ramifications. On the south, a little east of
Suti, the original Ganges branches off in a thin
tortuous stream, which still bears the name of
Bhagirathi or the Holy Ganges, and flows past
Murshidabad, Nadia, and Calcutta, to the sea.
But its main current flows eastwards by Raj-
shahi and Goalnand in a vast volume of water
known as the Padma.

During the rains much of this valley is flooded.

As the rains stop and the flood
full of water subsides, innumerable water
courses (*nullahs*) and lakes are
found to intersect the land. Only a few of the
nullahs carry off running water; all the others first grow stagnant, then their ends dry up, and they form slimy pools and soft morasses. Only in their last stage, in the hottest part of summer, do they present the solid land again, but immensely changed from its last year’s configuration. This process goes on year after year, making fantastic variations in the surface of the ground.

Shuja had a hopeless inferiority of troops. He had brought back about 10,000 men from Khajwah. Of these some had been lost by desertion, and many others had been intercepted by the Mughal capture of Rajmahal.* On land he could not have made an hour’s stand against the Imperialists. But he had an artillery of big pieces admirably served by European and half-caste gunners. He was also strong in an arm peculiarly suited to the theatre of the war, an arm in which Bengal, of all the provinces of the empire, enjoyed a notable superiority, and the lack of which paralysed his enemy’s efforts. Bengal is the land of water-ways, and its subahdar (viceroy) used to get a large assignment on the revenue (tankhah) and extensive jagirs (fiefs) for

* Aqil Khan, 95. For the state of the deserted Shujaites in Rajmahal, see Masum, 116d and 126a.
maintaining a flotilla (nawwara)* to patrol the rivers, convey officers and troops, and resist the pirates of Sondip and Chatgaon. The Mughals were proverbially bad seamen. Expert cavaliers, they were powerless on board a ship. The deep had unknown terrors for them, and even a voyage down a river was a penance to be gone through with set teeth and breathless expectation of its end, when they would tread on solid land again!

Mir Jumla's army was a purely land force. He had not brought a single boat with himself, nor could he get any in Bengal, as Shuja had anticipated him by seizing and sinking all the private boats in this part of the country. For want of water-transport Mir Jumla was confined to the western bank, unable to cross over and attack the enemy, or advance on Dacca, as many rivers intersected his path. Shuja, on the other hand, could mount his guns and men on his boats and employ this extremely mobile force anywhere he pleased along the entire Mughal line from Rajmahal to Suti. But he was too weak in troops to take the offensive against an enemy so over-whelmingly superior on land. The Bengali nursery tale of the duel between

* Talish's Continuation, tr. by me in Journal and Proceedings, A. S. B. June 1906 and June 1907.
the alligator and the tiger aptly typifies this stage of the war.

After a council of war with his generals, headed by Mirza Jan Beg, Shuja had decided to evacuate the western bank of the Ganges, to remove his headquarters and family to Tanda, (where he would be protected by the Ganges and a labyrinth of nullahs on his west,) to resist the hostile movements of the Imperialists, and to utilise the precious months thus gained through the enemy’s want of a fleet in “recruiting his shattered power.”* The plan was the best under the circumstances; but it failed through Mir Jumla’s wonderful activity in procuring boats from remote places, the Emperor’s fine strategy in sending another army under the Governor of Patna to make a diversion on the left bank of the Ganges and turn Shuja’s right, and lastly through both the roads for the arrival of hardy recruits from Oudh, Allahabad and Bihar being closed to Shuja by the Mughal occupation of Rajmahal and all the country west of the Ganges.

Shuja, making Tanda his base, entrenched on the eastern bank at various places opposite the entire Mughal front, which stretched from Raj-

* Masum, 116a and b,
mahal to Suti, on the western bank. On his own side Mir Jumla placed pickets at every ferry and road to prevent Shuja's deserted followers at Rajmahal from crossing over to him. After the occupation of Rajmahal (13th April, 1659), his first object was to get boats, without which he could not take one step forward. By persistent efforts for a fortnight he succeeded in securing a few,—kosas, khaluahs, and ránhwáras, from distant or obscure places.⁷

Taking up his quarters at Dogachi,† about 13 miles south of Rajmahal, he carried out his first bold and well-planned stroke. In mid-stream opposite his post there was a high island, which formed a half-way house to the other bank. A detachment from Shuja's army had already occupied it, and begun to entrench and erect batteries, in order to molest the Imperial camp in co-operation with their flotilla. Mir Jumla resolved to wrest it from them. Under his careful arrangement and personal supervision, his few boats made several silent and secret trips

* Masum, 118a.

† Dogachi is given in the Indian Atlas, sh. 112, about 13 miles south of Rajmahal. There is another Dogachi, 14 miles further south; but that is not the place meant in this history. Dunapur is given on the same sheet as Dugnapur near the S. E. corner.)
after midnight, transporting to the island 2,000 soldiers under Zulfiqar Khan and some other high officers, with 22 hatchet-men and a few guns. The morning discovered their arrival to the enemy, who fled away in their boats, carrying off their guns. The Imperialists occupied the deserted position and hastily entrenched. Next day they repelled a formidable attack by Shuja’s entire flotilla, sinking some of the boats. A party of the enemy that had landed on one side of the island and was trying to throw up entrenchments, was gallantly charged by a body of Afghans under Taj Niazi and driven out after a severe and bloody struggle. A second attempt of the enemy’s combined forces to recover the island was defeated two days later, and the Imperialists were left in undisturbed possession of the captured post.*

But here their success ended. Shuja, warned by Shuja vigilant. the past, now guarded his defences carefully, his flotilla daily cruised up and down the river, exchanging fire with the Mughals on the western bank, and his army and guns were massed opposite Dogachi. It was hopeless for Mir Jumla with his half dozen boats to carry his army across in small bodies or effect

* Alamgirnamah, 501—503.
a landing by surprise at this point in the face of such a powerful and vigilant enemy.

So, he made other arrangements and bided his time. The Imperial army was distributed along the entire western bank: Muhammad Murad Beg was left in command at Rajmahal in the extreme north; the Prince with Zulfikar Khan, Islam Khan, Fidai Khan, and the bulk of the army, remained at Dogachi 13 miles southwards, facing Shuja. At Dunapur, some 8 miles further south, Ali Quli Khan was posted, while Mir Jumla himself with six or seven thousand troops occupied Suti, the southernmost point of the Mughal lines, 28 miles south of Rajmahal.*

Here he collected about a hundred boats of various sorts, and daily watched for an opportunity to land on the other bank by surprise. The enemy had erected a high battery of eight large guns opposite him, which did great damage to his followers and cattle on the river side. An expedition sent one night in ten boats was detected by the enemy and repulsed. Next day the attempt was repeated, and succeeded by its very audacity. In the broad glare of noon, when the wind had freshened, and the enemy were off their guard, he

* Alamgirnamah, 503 and 504.
embarked 20 Imperial troopers and a party of his own retainers and sent them over. Quickly going across with the help of the wind, they fell on the battery, drove nails into the port-holes of the two largest guns and carried off the other six without any loss. This splendid feat struck terror into the enemy's heart. Shuja's general, Nurul Hasan, who had been thus caught napping, was removed from his command.*

But Mir Jumla was soon to learn the fickleness of fortune. Encouraged by the success of his first two coups, he planned another on a much grander scale. But this time Shuja was on the alert. His able and devoted officer Syed Alam of Barha with a picked force now commanded at this point. He left the trenches and batteries on the riverside scantily guarded as before, but posted his troops and fierce war-elephants behind them in ambushes cleverly masked in front. Mir Jumla had either not taken the precaution to reconnoitre and ascertain the enemy's strength there (as Masum says), or he had committed the fatal mistake of despising the enemy. But he was destined to get a lesson which made him extremely cautious and even slow for the rest of the campaign.

*Ibid*, 505;
At dawn (3rd May) when the first two or three boats of the expedition sent by Mir Jumla reached the opposite bank, Ihtamam Khan landed with some men and assaulted the enemy's trenches, driving them out and planting the Imperial banner there. Then Syed Alam issued from his ambush and fell upon this small party, which gallantly defended itself in the captured redoubt. Some of the boats were busy trying to land their men; most others had not yet reached the bank; these lost heart at the sudden appearance of the enemy and rowed back to their own side; only six boats were left behind. The enemy growing bolder turned aside from the redoubt to attack the boats, leading two elephants with them. The Imperialists were perplexed; of many troopers the horses had not yet landed, and even those few who were mounted could not gallop on the loose sand. To complete their misery, some of the enemy's fast boats (kosas) now surrounded them, and a confused naval battle began in which the odds were against them. Zabardast Khan, though wounded, cut his way through the ring of the enemy. His brothers and nephews, in another boat, were trying to disembark and aid Ihtamam Khan, when another party of the enemy, 200 strong, with a furious elephant (a noted fighter, named
Kokah), fell on them. It gored Shahbaz Khan with its tusk and sank two or three boats. Two other captains were slain. Of the common soldiers, “many were drowned or slain, and the wounded were made prisoners.”

After disposing of the boats, Syed Alam turned upon Ihtamam Khan, who was helplessly cooped up in the redoubt. The Khan fell fighting, with many of his men; the rest surrendered. “The very pick of the Imperial army thus perished miserably; 500 of them were taken prisoner, and some of these were afterwards put to death by order of Shuja.”

Meantime Mir Jumla had been a helpless spectator of this reverse from the western bank. In vain did he command and entreat his fugitive boats to return to the aid of their brethren; they were too demoralised to face the Bengal flotilla again. He was deeply mortified; the disaster dimmed the lustre of his hitherto victorious career; he had lost a choice body of men and given cause of exultation to his enemies, both across the river and in his own army.

Soon afterwards the Imperial party had to

* Alamgirnamah, 506—509; Masum, 118a—119b; Aqil Khan, 95.
meet with a loss which paralysed it for a time, and would have been disastrous but for Mir Jumla's wonderful courage, presence of mind, and mastery over men. Late in the night of 8th June, his camp at Suti was startled to hear that Prince Muhammad had deserted his post at Dogachi and fled to Shuja!

Sultan Muhammad had been long chafing under the tutelage of Mir Jumla. Youthful flatterers were not wanting to tell him that he was the hero of Khajwah, and that while the other divisions of the Imperial Army had been routed or shaken, his alone had stood its ground and beaten back the enemy's onset. Was he not more worthy of the throne than his father, especially as he was beloved by his captive grandfather? To these dreams of ambition were added the tenderer ones of love. Years ago, when the Emperor Shah Jahan was holding Court at Kabul, the Princes Aurangzib and Shuja had taken leave of him to go to the provinces assigned to them. Their way lay together up to Agra. In jealousy of their eldest brother Dara, they had vowed to unite against him on their father's death, and the vow had been strengthened by each entertaining the other for a week at Agra, and betrothing the young Sultan Muhammad to Shuja's little daugh-
ter Gulrukh Banu (Lady Rose-cheek).* Their fathers' quarrel had broken off the match when the pair came of age. Shuja, whose servants and agents in Rajmahal kept him constantly informed of the state of the Mughal army, had been sending secret messages to the Prince, offering him the throne and the hand of his daughter. The temptation was too great for a youngman, with his heart sore against his father and his father's confidant.

So, one dark and rainy night (8th June), he slipped out of Dogachi in a small open boat with only five confidential servants and some gold coins and jewels, and went over to Shuja's camp, where he was welcomed, married (after a time) to his betrothed, and made his father-in-law's chief commander and counsellor.†

Meantime alarm and distraction reigned in the Imperial camp. The news flew from tent to tent. But there was a born ruler of men on the spot: Mir Jumla at Suti firmly kept his own men

* Aqil Khan, 10 and 11.
† For the history of the Prince's flight, see Alamgirnamah, 511, 406 and 407; Khafi Khan, ii. 91; Masum, 1208—1240; Aqil Khan, 96 and 97.
quiet, and the morning after the flight rode to the Prince's camp at Dogachi, pacified and controlled the army. Mir Jumla harangued the leaderless troops, put heart and hope into them, and restored order and discipline. A council of war was held; all the other generals agreed to obey him as their sole head. Thus through his heroic exertion, the army weathered the storm; "it lost only one man—the Prince," as Aqil Khan pithily puts it.

It was now the middle of June. The torrential rains of Bengal suspended operations, and the army went into cantonments. Mir Jumla with about 15,000 men fixed his quarters at Murshidabad, "a high tract of land, with abundance of supplies." Zulfiqar Khan and many other officers with the rest of the army stayed at Rajmahal. Evidently the posts at Dogachi, Dunapur, and Suti were withdrawn.*

The moral effect of the Prince's flight was very great. Coming so soon after the reverse of 3rd May, it damped the spirit of the Imperial army and suspended its activity. The Emperor was alarmed at the news; he sent out strong reinforcements, and himself left the capital for Allahabad, to be within easy reach of the Bengal

* Alamgirnamah, 512.
army, should the danger increase and roll westwards. The Shujaities were correspondingly elated, and now for the first time in the war took the aggressive. Their enemy’s force was split up into two bodies separated by sixty miles of almost impassable road. They had only to wrest Rajmahal from Zulfiquar Khan, and then march south to crush Mir Jumla. A daring blow achieved the first of these objects with startling quickness and ease.

The rains had converted the environs of Rajmahal into one marshy lake (jheel), except at the N. W. corner where the hills approach it. Boats plied even in the midst of the city. The enemy’s flotilla prevented Mir Jumla from sending the promised supplies from Murshidabad by water. Harchand, the Rajah of the Majwah hills, stretching west of Rajmahal, on receiving Shujah’s subsidy, stopped the coming of supplies from that side, and robbed every grain-merchant (bunjara) who ventured to send even a bullock’s load of grain to Rajmahal. “Not a grain reached the city, the troops were weakened by abundance of water and dearth of (solid) food.” “Scarcity reached its extreme point. Grain rose to the price of gold. Coarse red rice and dal sold at nine seers for a rupee.” In the agony
of hunger men ate noxious weeds. The Imperial troops in the city were reduced to the last extremity by famine and the loss of their horses and draught cattle; and the discord among their generals made matters worse.

First, Shuja's admiral, Shaikh Abbas, seized a hilly tract named Paturah, recaptured by 5 miles south of Rajmahal. From this base he began to make boat-raids into the water-girt city. Then on 22nd August, Shuja suddenly attacked Rajmahal with his flotilla. The commandant, Zulfiqar Khan, was too ill to ride. Rajah Indrayumna alone offered a gallant opposition to the invader. The other Imperial officers wavered, held a council of war, could not agree to anything, but quarrelled with each other, and fled at night for Mushidabad, evacuating all their positions,—the city on the bank, the upland, (a spur of the hill), midway between old and new Rajmahal, which was their main camp, and the causeway leading from the hill-side to the new town. All their property was seized by Shuja, who thus recovered his capital and re-established himself on the western bank of the Ganges.

* Putoorah, 5 miles south of Rajmahal, (Indian Atlas, sh. 112.)

† Alamgirnamah, 516–519; Masum, 125a and b; Aqil
The rainy season wore off without any further adventure. At its close Shuja, renewed after the rains, marched from Rajmahal against Mir Jumla, who issued from Murshidabad and took post behind a deep nullah near Belghata, throwing two bridges over it and fortifying their heads.

The scene of the war now was the same which a century afterwards witnessed the final contest between the English and the Nawab of Bengal, Mir Qasim. Belghata is only four miles south of the battle-field of Gheria, and Dogachi about the same distance from the famous lines of Undhua Nullah.

On 6th December, 1659, Shuja came in front of Mir Jumla’s position. After spending some days in cannonade and skirmishing, he attacked the right bridge with all his force on 15th December and seized its head. In this obstinate contest both sides lost heavily. Their gallant leader Ekkataz Khan being slain, the Imperialists fled to their own side of the nullah and burnt the bridge of boats to prevent pursuit. While this fight was raging, Mir Jumla crossed the Khan, 98. The last two give graphic descriptions of the scarcity in the city.
nullah by the left bridge and marched on Shuja from behind. Catching up the enemy's rear on the bank of the Bhagirathi near the village of Gheria, which was afterwards the scene of two other memorable combats,—Aliwardi Khan's triumph over Nawab Sarfaraz Khan in 1740 and the rout of Mir Qasim's troops by the English in 1763,—he dispersed it with loss. But their main army came back and faced him in battle order, behind their guns, which did great execution and arrested the Mughal advance. Evidently there was a disorderly shrinking back among the Imperial troops. The Court historian tries to explain it away by saying that, as the officers disobeyed Mir Jumla's orders, the different divisions were separated too far, and the enemy could not be charged. At sunset Mir Jumla had to return baffled to his camp, after a little fruitless cannonade. Two days afterwards the Shujaites again came upon the Imperial army and did some damage with their powerful artillery.*

* Alamgirnamah, 519—525; Masum, 131a—133b. Aqil Khan (99—103) tells a story which cannot be reconciled with the other two histories. He says that Mir Jumla surrounded Shuja in the village of Gheria and could have captured him if he had boldly made a night-attack. In the morning Shuja escaped. This passage is incomprehensible to me; it does not look like an invention, but bears the stamp of an eye-
In this arm Mir Jumla was very weak. He had dragged only light pieces with himself by the land route from Allahabad, while Shuja could take his big guns in and out of his boats, and had also enlisted excellent gunners from the Europeans of Hughli, Tamluk, and Noakhali.

Mir Jumla retreats.

Mir Jumla without wasting any more men and ammunition, quietly retired to Murshidabad, as he was every day expecting a diversion in another quarter, which would send Shuja flying to his own base. That Prince, emboldened by the enemy's retreat and ignorant of the danger in his own rear, marched parallel to the Mughals down the other bank of the Bhagirathi, to Nashipur (12 miles north of Murshidabad), in order to cross there and cut off the Imperial army from the last-named town.

The Emperor with his usual foresight had ordered Daud Khan, the subahdar of Bihar, to march upon Tanda along the left or northern bank of the Ganges and co-operate with Mir Jumla who was on the right bank. The Khan had started from Patna as early as 13th

witness's report. But it is contradicted by the official history. Masum on the contrary asserts that if Shuja had charged he could have defeated Mir Jumla!
May, 1659, but the rains, the many flooded rivers of North Bihar, and the enemy's flotilla and trenches on the river-banks had brought him to an absolute halt at Qazi-Keria, opposite Bhagalpur. Early in December he resumed his advance, forced a passage across the Kushi, swept away a Shujaite detachment under Syed Tajuddin of Barha, Jamal Ghor, and Khwajah Mishki, which barred his path, and was in full march from the N. W. towards Maldah, (by 20th December). Shuja at Nashipur heard this dismal news in the night of 26th December and at once beat a retreat towards Suti, intending to cross the Ganges there and fall back on Tanda.*

Mir Jumla had been waiting for this development. He now sprang forward in pursuit. Starting at 9 a.m. next day, he sighted the fugitive enemy behind a nullah flanked with swamps. After an ineffectual artillery duel, Shuja fled from his position next morning, at 3 a.m. Very timely reinforcements with artillery, material, 700 rockets, and 12 lakhs of rupees now reached Mir Jumla from the Court. At sunrise he crossed the nullah, continued the chase, and at night halted at Fatehpur, 8 miles behind the enemy's former

* Alamgirnamah, 513, 514, 524-526; Masum, 134a.
position. Next morning (28th December), he advanced further, and came upon the enemy's army beyond Chilmari, near Suti.

Four or five days passed in a fruitless exchange of fire, the men on both sides standing to arms all day; but there was no fight at close quarters, though the scouts and patrols had daily skirmishes. Nurul Hasan now deserted to the Imperialists. In the night of 1st January, 1660, Shuja fled northwards to Dunapur, and thence in great disorder and confusion to Dogachi, Mir Jumla following hot at his heels, though delayed by bad roads, nullahs, and broken bridges. By this rapid march the Imperial general had outstripped his heavy artillery, and so when the enemy turned at bay behind the nullah of Dogachi, his men shrank from forcing a passage across in the face of Shuja's big guns. He therefore advanced by the left side towards Rajmahal (2nd January), Shuja marching parallel to him on the other side of the nullah, with the Ganges on his right. That Prince was now in a terrible dilemma: how could he cross the Ganges so close to an active enemy? If he went over first, his army would desert him; and if they were transported before him, he would be captured by the enemy. So he dug a deep moat round his camp, entrenched,
mounted guns, and then marched over the Ganges with his whole army by a bridge of boats, (9th January).

Next morning, Mir Jumla at Dogachi, hearing the news, pushed forward a detachment to occupy Rajmahal and open the river-side road to Mungir, which had been so long closed by the enemy. On 11th January, the Imperialists recovered Rajmahal. The whole country west of the Ganges was now lost to Shuja for ever. It only remained to crush his power on the eastern side of the river.*

* Alamgirnamah, 526—532; Masum (1342) is extremely brief; Aqil Khan (101—103) evidently refers to this stage of the war; but there is probably a gap after p. 100 in the A. S. B. Ms. of Aqil Khan which I have used.
CHAPTER XXIV.

The End of Shuja.

Preparations were quickly made for invading the eastern bank of the Ganges, and events moved apace. Daud Khan had now arrived at a place on the left bank of the Ganges, some 16 miles north of Rajmahal. A contingent of 2,500 Afghans under Dilir Khan had been sent by the Emperor to reinforce the army in Bengal.* These crossed the Ganges (9th January, 1660,) at the ferry of Kadamtali† and joined Daud Khan. Another equally necessary sinew of war reached Mir Jumla in the form of seventeen lakhs of rupees from the Court.‡

* Khafi Khan, ii. 93.
† Kadamtala is 9 m. due N. N. E. of Rajmahal (Indian Atlas, sh. 112). The Alamgirnamah gives its alternative name as Dodha (which I cannot find in the maps).
‡ Alamgirnamah, 533 & 534.
Last year Mir Jumla had attempted to cross the Ganges near Suti and march north-eastwards on Tanda, i.e., to attack Shuja from the south-west. This was a bad plan, as it involved the crossing of one large and many smaller rivers close to the enemy's position and in the teeth of his powerful flotilla. It was rendered impossible by Mir Jumla's lack of boats. This year his plan of campaign was brilliantly novel; he would attack the enemy from the opposite point, i.e., the north-east. He would make a wide detour round the enemy's position. He would cross the Ganges 10 miles above Rajmahal, join Daud Khan near Akbarpur (due east of Sikrigali), pass over the shallow upper courses of the Mahananda and some nullahs, reach Maldah, and then turn sharply south, cross the Mahananda again, swoop down upon Tanda from the east, and thus completely encircle Shuja in his net. All the while he would keep a screen of men in front of the enemy's trenches along the Kalindi river, and deceive him with feints. Shuja's position was a long line, stretching north-west to south-east, from Samdah.

*Samdah is given in Rennell, sh. 2 & 16. Chouki Mir-dadpur (Indian Atlas, 112) is 8 m. east of Rajmahal. Tanda is Tarrah in Rennell, sh. 16, about 4 m. west of the
(opposite Rajmahal) to his base at Tanda (south-west of the ruins of Gaur). His head-quarters were at Chauki-Mirdadpur, in the middle of this line. There was an off-shoot of defences north-eastwards to Maldah. Mir Jumla's plan, therefore, was to describe a semi-circle round this line, from the north of Rajmahal through Maldah to Tanda or Tartipur. It was only his immense superiority in number (five times the strength of his enemy) that enabled him to carry out such a vast turning movement while holding the western bank of the Ganges in force.

The Mughal general first posted troops at various points from Sikrigali to Mir Jumla's base at Samdah. Suti, to guard the right bank and prevent a repetition of the enemy's blow of last year. Then, with the help of the 160 boats brought from Patna by Daud Khan, he carried his army over the three streams into which the Ganges was split up near Kadamtali, some 9 miles north of Rajmahal (15th Jan.—7th Feb.), and joined hands with Daud Khan. But the big char (island) of Samdah, east of Rajmahal, remained his headquarters till 29th February.* The two generals now co-operated Fort among the ruins of Gaur. Tartipur is the Toorteeoor of Indian Atlas, sh. 119.

* Alamgirnamah, 534—536; Aqil Khan, 103; Masum, 134b.
to distract the enemy and converge on Maldah.

The rest of the story is soon told. Shuja offered an obstinate resistance along the banks of the Kalindi and the Mahananda. But he was hopelessly outnumbered from the first. The Imperialists were delayed only by their lack of boats, and by the dense jungles and countless nullahs that barred their path; their only losses were from drowning. The enemy were too few to face them in the open plain, and no more pitched battles took place. The details of the marching and counter-marching through this labyrinth of nullahs are neither interesting nor instructive to the student of the art of war. It will suffice to trace the outline only.

Shuja had built a wall and a double line of entrenchments along the Kalindi (a branch of the Mahananda) barring Mir Jumla's direct route to Tanda. But the latter made a feint in front, turned the enemy's flank by a swift march northwards, and safely crossed both the easternmost branch of the Ganges and the Mahananda. He now despatched a column towards Maldah on the eastern bank of the Mahananda, (8th February.)

* Alamgirnamah, 537—541; Masum, 135 a& b.
Ruin now stared Shuja in the face. On his west stretched the Mughal lines from Rajmahal to Suti; on his north they occupied various points from Samdah to the Mahananda, and now another force was moving southwards to hem him round on the east and finally to cut off his only line of retreat in the south. At this time Prince Muhammad deserted him and sneaked back into the Mughal camp at Dogachi as secretly as he had left it, (8th February).* The luckless youth was sent closely guarded to his relentless father and doomed to sigh out the remainder of his life in a captive cell of the rock-prison of Gwalior. Only two years before his death did he gain even a limited amount of liberty and transfer to the prison of Salimgarh (Delhi).

On 29th February Mir Jumla finally left Samdah, and on 6th March he reached Maldah. At Mahmudabad, a few miles below Maldah, he spent a month in active preparation for his crowning stroke. “He bade adieu to ease and rest, spending days and nights in exertion, in order to dispose of Shuja, and prevent the war

* Alamgirnamah, 542-544, 546; Khafi Khan, ii. 99
\& 100.
from being dragged on till the coming of the rainy season,"—which would mean the loss of another year.* A short distance further down the stream was the ferry of Bholahat,† where a detachment under Dilir Khan was entrenched. Four miles below it an obscure ford was discovered, which the enemy had neglected to guard well. The water was shallow for only a thin strip across, but very deep on both sides.

Everything being ready, Mir Jumla left Mahmudabad at 3 a.m. on 5th April, united with Dilir Khan’s force on the way, and after a march of 10 miles down the bank came to the ford at dawn. The enemy were taken by surprise; they had posted only a small force with some guns on the opposite bank. Without a moment’s delay the Imperialists began to ford. The leaders drove their elephants into the water; then the cavalry plunged in. “The soldiers rushed into the river from right and left, front and rear, troop after troop like a succession of waves.” All order was gone; many swerved aside to avoid the enemy’s shower of shot and bullet. In the rush of so many men and beasts

* Alamgirnama, 547 & 548.
† Alamgirnama (544, 545, 547, &c.) spells the name as Baglahat. From the bearings given it must be Bholahat (Indian Atlas, sh. 119, & Rennell, sh. 16).
the water was thrown into waves, the sand was kicked away, the two lines of sticks which marked the borders of the ford were knocked off, and the right track was lost. The smoke of gunpowder darkened the sky. Vast numbers went beyond their depth on the two sides. Swimming was impossible for mail-clad troopers on barbed horses. More than a thousand brave soldiers* were drowned,—Fatih, the son of Dilir Khan, a heroic Afghan youth of 20, being among them.†

But even this heavy price was worth paying for the passage across.‡ It was the decisive move of the campaign. All was now over with Shuja. His men, after some hours' fight, evacuated their trenches on the bank, leaving all their

* This is the estimate of the Alamgirnamah (550). Masum has "about 2,000," and Aqil Khan "nearly 3,000 men."
† Graphic descriptions of this disastrous fording are given in Masum, 161a and b; Khañ Khan, ii. 94—97, and Alamgirnamah, 548—551. Aqil Khan, 104, is very brief.
‡ The heavy loss of men, however, did one harm to Mir Jumla. He could not with decency leave the dead uncared for, and so he had to spend the whole of that day in "dredging the river for the corpses of the drowned men" to give them burial. Otherwise, he could have made a dash for Tanda immediately after fording, and captured Shuja's capital in the afternoon of 5th April, while Shuja was still at Mirdadpur, ignorant of Mir Jumla's crossing. Then Shuja would have been caught instead of gaining a day (6th April), for the escape to Dacca. Thus the loss of a single day at this critical time altered the history of the Prince and saved Aurangzib from another act of fratricide.
guns behind. Reinforcements under Syed Alam and Prince Buland Akhtar arrived when it was too late, and they fled at the sight of the triumphant Mughals. The Prince hastened to Tanda in distraction. Syed Alam carried the dismal news to Shuja at Chauki-Mirdadpur.

The Imperialists were now on the right bank of the Mahananda with nothing but eleven miles of road and the narrow brook of the Bhagirathi (or Bagmati) between them and Tanda. Swift must be Shuja’s flight to Dacca, if he did not wish to see the net completely drawn round him and his only path of retreat cut off from the south. Dazed at the news, he held a hurried consultation with Mirza Jan Beg, who gave the only advice possible in this case,—“You should cling to nothing here, but flee at once to avoid capture.” So, at nightfall he hastened back from Chauki-Mirdadpur to Tanda.*

Then ensued all the sad and sickening scenes from Tanda. which attend a sudden fall from power and the hurried flight of vanquished princes. Shuja reached Tanda at dawn, (6th April,) alighted in a garden outside the city, and immediately proceeding to the harem ordered his Begams to come away at once.

* Masum, 162a.
"without waiting even to change their dress."* By great exertions and constant supervision he loaded his treasure in two strong boats (ghurabs), and a selection from his property and stores in two others, and sent them off. Then leaving Tanda for ever, he went to the river bank at 4 p.m. and embarked. His two younger sons, (Buland Akhtar and Zain-ul-Abidin), his chiefs, Mirza Jan Beg, Syed Alam of Barha, Syed Quli Uzbak, and Mirza Beg, a few soldiers, servants, and eunuchs,—300 men in all,—accompanied him in 60 boats (kosas.) This was the sole remnant of the splendid Court amidst which he had ruled three provinces, and the vast army with which he had twice contested the throne of Delhi! The other officers and servants parted from the victim of misfortune, and went their own way.†

The 6th of April was a very busy day with Mir Jumla. Early in the morning he set out from the fatal ford towards Tanda, but on the way turned sharply to the left to cut off Shuja’s retreat at Tartipur on the Ganges. Hastening thither with a light division, he seized 400 loaded boats of the enemy’s flotilla, left a detachment

* Masum, 162a. Here the work ends abruptly. The author did not complete it. For the remaining portion of this chapter, the Alamgirnamah is our sole authority.
† Alamgirnamah, 552.
in charge, and then with only 400 troopers, made a forced march backwards to Tanda, arriving there at midnight.

He was not a minute too early. All through that day Tanda had been a scene of wild terror and confusion. The soldiers, deserted by their master, roved about in disorder, plundering his unguarded property. Treasure loaded on 6 elephants and 12 camels, which was being taken by the eunuch Sandal (the custodian of Shuja's toshakkhanah) to the bank for embarkation, was looted by the ruffians, as also were some led-horses of the Prince. “Men ran about in disorderly groups. Great tumult and confusion prevailed. Everyone plundered what he could lay hold of.”

But next day (7 April) Mir Jumla restored order; he seized for the Government all the property he found, and worked hard to recover what the ruffians of the army had looted. The women left behind were taken care of; guards were posted round the harem, and its officers and eunuchs ordered to do their duties as before.*

The fugitive Prince could not keep all that he was carrying off. Mughal troops had now hastened to the bank along his route down the river.

* Alamgirnamah, 552-553.
His two treasure-laden ghurabs were seized at Tartipur, and 30 boats of his flotilla (with many officers and men on board) were captured at Shirpur and Hazratali. His servants, who had refused to part from their families merely to show an unavailing devotion to a ruined man, now submitted to the victor (9th April), and were graciously taken into the Imperial service. Two of them, Mir Murtaza of the artillery and Ibn Husain* of the flotilla, afterwards covered themselves with glory in the Assam War and the capture of Chatgaon.†

After spending twelve days in settling matters at Tanda and organising an administration for the conquered districts, Mir Jumla left it for Tartipur (19th April). Thence he set off next day by land to Dacca.‡

On 12th April, Shuja reached Dacca, a bankrupt in fame and fortune. Shuja's flight from Dacca, But it was to be no asylum to him. The zamindars were all up against him, and he was too weak either to

* The Alamgirnamah, 554, speaks of Ibn Husain as the darogah of the artillery. But in Shihabuddin Talish's work he is repeatedly described as the darogah of the nawwara. Evidently he changed his branch of the service after entering into Mughal pay.
† Ibid, 554.
‡ Ibid, 555.
chastise them or to face Mir Jumla, who was coming hot foot on his trail. He had already begged succour from the pirate king of Arracan, but no reply had yet come. The near approach of the Imperialists, however, left him no choice. On 6th May, he bade farewell even to his eastern capital, and with his family and a few faithful nobles and servants glided down from Dacca to Dhapa, 8 miles southwards. Next day he reached Sripur (probably short for Srirampur.) At every stage soldiers and boatmen deserted him in large numbers; even his old ministers and confidential servants forsook their doomed master. On the 8th, shortly after leaving Sripur, he met 57 Magh and Feringi boats (jalbas), sent by the Governor of Chatgaon by order of the king of Arracan.

Next morning starting from the parganah of Lakhi-deh (=Lakhipur), he halted 8 miles from the fort of Bhalua,* and made a mad effort to secure its surrender by inviting its commandant to an interview and then treacherously imprisoning him. But the party sent by him with the captive commandant's letter ordering his men to sur-

* Dhapa is given as Daapeka Kella in Rennell, sh. 12. Sripur is evidently Serampur, and Lakhideh Luckipour of Rennell, sh. 9. Bhalua is Rennell's Bulooah, 10 m. S. E. of Luckipour.
render the fort, was attacked and captured by
the garrison.

On 11th May a Magh general arrived from
Chatgaon with three more ships.
Seeing Shuja's power hopelessly
broken and his fortune gone, he
refused to support his wild plan of an assault on
the fort of Bhalua. An open quarrel broke out
between the fallen Prince and his barbarous
allies. They frankly told him, "Our king had
ordered us to help you in fight, if you had any
chance of success or held a single fort. But you
cannot take even Bhalua unaided! So, you had
better at once start in our ships for Arracan, or
we shall leave you alone and return to our
country." The cup of Shuja's misery was now
full. He abandoned all hope and steeled his
heart to accept the former of these terrible alter-
natives and embark for Arracan.*

The news spread consternation among his
family and followers. The
Terror and ha-
tred inspired by
piracy of the Arracanese of
Chatgaon in the rivers of East
Bengal had made them too well-known to the
people. Whole districts in Noakhali and Baqarganj had been depopulated through their ravages

* For the last month of Shuja's stay in India our only
authority is the Alamgirnamah, 556—561. There are a
few additional details in Talish's Continuation.
and remained deserted even so late as 1780, when Rennell drew his maps. Their daring attacks, ferocious cruelty, uncouth appearance, barbarous manners, lack of religion and caste, and practice of eating unclean animals,—all made the people of East Bengal, Hindus and Muslims alike, regard them with a mixture of terror and loathing, to which history affords the only parallel in the Hun invasion of the Roman Empire and the Cossack raid into France after Leipzig. The dread of captivity under them was enhanced by the unknown dangers of their mysterious country, which was believed to be full of pestiferous jungles and separated by the perilous ocean from all civilised lands.*

And now Shuja was to go there! But to him it was a lesser evil than to fall into Aurangzib’s hands. The fate of his father and two brothers made him shun the idea of surrender. Shah Jahan, the kindest of fathers, was pining away in dishonoured old age as a prisoner in the very fort where he had once held Court as the “King of Kings.” The liberal and accomplished Crown Prince, Dara Shukoh, had been brought in chains

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* For the Bengali view of the Arracanese, see Shihabuddin Talish’s Continuation as translated by me in "The Feringi Pirates of Chatgaon," J. A. S. B., June, 1907.
to Delhi, paraded through the streets with every mark of humiliation and then, after the mummery of a trial, murdered by slaves. The gallant and generous Murad Bakhsh had been sentenced to captivity by his disinterested helper, his “darvish brother” Aurangzib! The handsome young and heroic Sulaiman Shukoh had been hunted into the land of hills and snow.

No! better, better far the cruellest death in the most barbarous of foreign lands than such an end as that of Dara or Murad. Farewell to Hindustan, with all its wealth, joys and culture, if Aurangzib was to be its king. Shuja’s mind was soon made up. Others might stay behind, but for him Hindustan was a home no longer.

So, on 12th May, 1660, he finally left the province which he had ruled for twenty years and the country where he had spent 43 years of his life, and sailed for Arracan with his family and less than forty followers. History has preserved some account of these men who were faithful unto the last. Ten of them were Syeds of Barha under Syed Alam, and twelve others were Mughals under Syed Quli Uzbak;* the rest were evidently servants. To the Syeds of Barha belonged the

* Alamgirnamah, 561; Khafi Khan, ii. 110.
hereditary right of occupying the place of honour in the Emperor's line of battle.* It was only fitting, therefore, that Syeds of Barha were found ready also to stand by their master's side in the hour of his supreme misfortune and danger.

Mystery shrouds the end of the ill-fated Prince whose history we have pursued so long. The author of the *Amal-i-Salih,†* writing in 1671, says, "Up to this time none knows anything about Shuja's fate in Arracan. It is utterly unknown in what country he is and what he is doing, or whether he has been sent to the realm of the dead." Sixty years later, Khafi Khan was no better informed.‡ He remarks, "In Arracan all traces of Shuja disappeared,—none [in India] got any sign of him." Nothing save the vaguest rumour passing through many intermediaries ever reached Aurangzib. For years afterwards wild tales came to India of Shuja having gone to Persia; and sharpers counterfeiting his son Buland Akhtar appeared in different parts of India. One such was arrested near Allahabad as late as 1699. A false Shuja headed a rising

† *Kambū, 21 a.*
‡ Khafi Khan, ii. 109.
near Murang in 1669 and another in the Yusufzai country in 1674.*

To remove the uncertainty, Aurangzib desired that Mir Jumla, the new Viceroy of Bengal, should after conquering Assam lead an army into Arracan to recover Shuja’s family if possible.† When Shaista Khan, Mir Jumla’s successor, conquered Chatgaon from the Maghs (1666), he evidently got no certain news of Shuja, or it would have got into the official history. The European traders who had free access to Arracan were likely to be best informed, and I believe that the truth lies in what they have recorded of Shuja’s fate.

From this source we learn, “Many dwellers in Arracan, Mogul and Pathan,... showed themselves inclined towards him [Shuja]. He planned an outbreak intending to slay the king and take his kingdom, and then advance once more to test his fortune in Bengal.” The king of Arracan heard of the plot and “planned the assassination of Shah Shuja. Shah Shuja with a few men fled into the jungle. The Maghs...pursued the poor prince,...cutting his body into pieces.”

* Masir-i-Alamgiri, pp. 405 and 84. Orme’s Fragments, p. 50.
† Shihabuddin Talish’s Fathiyya-i-ibriyya, p. 25.
This story is based on the report of a Dutch merchant named Jan Tak to Aurangzib. The official records of the Dutch factory first state that on 7th February, 1661, when Shuja's house was surrounded by the Arracanese, he set fire to it and escaped with his family and followers towards Tipperah. But they finally take a different view and assert, "Although there can be no certainty, the fact is that he was killed in the first outbreak," and that his followers concealed the fact and spread the false news that he had fled into the jungle.*

* Storia, i. 374—376, esp. the footnote.
CHAPTER XXV.

GRAND ENTHRONEMENT OF AURANGZIB.

Of all the coronations of Muhammadan rulers of India, that of Aurangzib was undoubtedly the grandest. True, Shah Jahan was the most magnificent of the Great Mughals. But when he ascended the throne in 1628, he had not yet made the Peacock Throne nor acquired the Kohiñur diamond; and his chaste white marble palaces, set with many coloured stones, which still excite our admiration at Agra and Delhi, were yet to be. All these were present at Aurangzib's accession.*

Another circumstance lent greater lustre to the son's coronation than to the father's. During the year before his enthronement, Aurangzib had gained a series of hard-fought victories over his rivals and made himself the undisputed sovereign of India. Of his three brothers, Murad Bakhsh

* The following description is based on A. N. 347—349, 351—354, 362—370, 388—398, 405. Also Khafi Khan, ii. 76—89, 86—88.
was a close prisoner in his dungeons, Shuja had been defeated at Khajawah and Dara Shukoh at Ajmir, and both were in course of helpless flight. The coronation that followed these grand victories naturally combined all the pomp and splendour of an oriental enthronement with the solemnity and grandeur of a Roman triumph.

The essential element of a Muhammadan coronation is the act of the king's sitting on the throne; hence its Arabic name jalus or 'sitting.' No high-priest has to anoint the new sovereign's forehead with holy oil or sandal-paste, as among the ancient Jews and Hindus, nor place on his brows a diadem, as is the practice with Christians. The Muslim sovereign mounts the throne fully dressed, with a cloth turban bound round his head. Diamonds and jewels glitter on that turban; an aigrette (jigha) with nodding tassels of pearls adorns the front part of it; but no crown of the type familiar to Europe from ancient times is necessarily worn by him. The Persian sovereigns, however, put on a crown of this pattern, with a narrow base and wide indented top.

No Muslim coronation is complete unless the new sovereign's name and titles are publicly proclaimed from the pulpit (khutba) and coins bearing his name are stamped (sikka.) To these must
be added, in most cases, his assumption of a title different from that he held as a prince, the offering of presents and largess by the nobles and officers, and the granting of titles, promotions and bounties by the new sovereign. Large sums are given away in charity to scholars, holy men, and beggars. Music, dance and illuminations at night complete the festivities.

The Court astrologers were of opinion that Sunday, 5th June, 1659, was a most auspicious day, and all arrangements were made for Aurangzib's enthronement on that day. A year earlier he had gained the crown of Delhi, but he was then too busy pursuing his rivals to hold a grand coronation, and only a hurried and curtailed ceremony had been gone through on 21st July, 1658. All the celebration and rejoicing had been left over for the present occasion.

On 12th May took place the Emperor's grand entry into Delhi, after the glorious campaigns of Khajwah and Ajmir,—though a march through the streets is no necessary part of a Muslim coronation festival. Early in the morning the

* Weighing the king against gold and silver, which were given away as alms, was a Hindu practice which our Mughal Emperors adopted and even the orthodox Aurangzib countenanced. It took place every year at the two birthdays, solar and lunar, of the sovereign, but was no part of the coronation celebrations.
Imperial procession started from Khizirabad, a suburb of Delhi, where the Emperor had encamped on his return from the war. First marched the band, making a deafening clang through the streets, of kettle-drums, tambourines, big brass drums, brazen pipes and trumpets. Next came a long file of huge elephants, richly caparisoned in gold and silver, their housings being of embroidered velvet and cloth of gold, thick set with flashing gems, with golden bells and silver chains dangling from their bodies. Each carried on its back an Imperial standard of polished balls slung from a pole, as ensigns of Turkish royalty. Then were led forth a troop of choice horses, of the Persian and Arab breed, their saddles decorated with gold, and their bridles set with jewels; behind them were marshalled female elephants and dromedaries. Then marched dense columns of infantry consisting of musketeers and rocketmen, carrying flashing blades. Behind them and girt round by a vast crowd of nobles and ministers, came the loftiest elephant of the royal stables, with a golden throne strapped to its back, on which sat the observed of all observers, the undisputed lord and master of all he surveyed, Aurangzib Alamgir Ghazi, Padishah of Hind.

He was a few months over forty. Long years of
campaigning in many lands had saved him from the stolid rotundity which bespeaks the indolent and self-indulgent life of so many Eastern

Appearance of princes. His frame was some-

Aurangzib. what thin, but tall and sym-

metrical. His face was rather long than round; it had lost the fulness that marked it in early youth, but had not yet acquired the sharpness of nose and chin, the hollowness of cheek, the beetling eye-brows and long gray beard which European visitors to his Court noted on it thirty years afterwards. Under that broad, unwrinkled forehead beamed two cold piercing eyes, whose serenity no danger or fear could disturb, no weakness or pity relax.

On his right, left and rear rode his troops in due order, each division keeping its proper position. The citizens gazed with wonder on the veterans who had defeated the choicest soldiers of Bijapur and Golconda, and nearer home had crushed Shuja and Dara, captured Agra fort, and held Shah Jahan a prisoner.

From the backs of the elephants handfuls of gold and silver coins were incessantly flung among the crowd right and left, as the procession moved on. In this order the Imperial cortege wended its way through the Bazar of Old Delhi and entered the Fort by the Lahore Gate. Then
all dismounted: the Emperor sat down for a while in the Halls of Public and Private Audience in succession. The nobles laid before him large sums to be given away in charity for averting evil from him. Finally, he retired to the harem.

The decoration of the two Halls of Audience for the coronation ceremony proceeded apace. A lavish display was made of all the precious things which the sovereigns of the richest empire in Asia had acquired in three generations, and all the rare articles which the most skilled artisans of home and foreign countries had made for sale.

The ceiling and forty pillars of the Diwan-i-am Decoration of (Hall of Public Audience) were Diwan-i-am. draped in gold-embroidered velvet and cloth of gold and silver from Persia and the famous flowered brocades of Guzerat. From every arch hung polished balls set with jewels, enamelled, or of plain gold, by means of golden chains. In the middle of the Hall a space was fenced round with a golden railing. Within it, amidst the dazzling lustre of diamonds, rubies and topazes, stood the towering Peacock Throne, one of the wonders of the East. Before it was stretched a most costly canopy of State, held up by four slender columns
encrusted with gems; its corners were fastened with strings of precious pearls instead of ropes. On the two sides of the throne-enclosure stood two jewelled umbrellas, with tassels of pearls hanging from them. Right and left of the Imperial throne were placed two golden couches, covered with enamel work. Behind it benches of gold were laid, and on them were displayed the Crown weapons,—jewelled swords, targes, shields, and spears. The courtyard in front of the Hall was covered with awnings of embroidered velvet borne aloft on silver poles, and similar canopies were stretched on all sides of it. Below were spread costly carpets of many coloured patterns. The outer sides of the Hall were enclosed by a silver railing. In the arena itself there was a second silver railing, forming an inner enclosure, while the outermost fence was of red painted wood. On the two wings were pitched lofty pavilions overspread with bright coverings. The door and walls of the Hall were tapestried with embroidered velvet, flowered velvet, European screens, and gold tissue from Turkey and China. The enclosures round the courtyard of the Audience Hall were furnished by the nobles from their own stores, in a befitting style, for the accommodation of their retainers.
From this the reader may guess the style in which the Hall of Private Audience (Diwan-i-khas) was decorated.

The astrologers had declared 3 hours 15 minutes from sunrise as the auspicious moment. The whole Court anxiously hung on the lips of the astrologers, who keenly watched their (water) clocks and sand-glasses. At last they gave the signal; the precious moment had arrived; the Emperor, who had been sitting dressed and ready behind a screen, entered the Hall of Public Audience and mounted the throne. At once there was a loud burst of joyous notes from the Imperial band in attendance. The musicians began their songs; the nautch-girls began their dances.

An eloquent chanter mounted a lofty rostrum (mimbar) and in a clear ringing voice read the khutba or public proclamation of the Emperor’s name and titles, prefaced with the praise of God and the Prophet, and followed by the names of his predecessors on the throne. As every such name fell from his lips a fresh robe of honour was bestowed on him. And when he came to the recital of the Emperor’s own titles, he got a robe of cloth of gold as well as a cash reward. Trays of gold and silver coins and plates heaped over with pyramids of pearls and jewels, were
showered in the Emperor's name among the assembled courtiers who picked them up as tokens of good luck.

The courtiers did homage by bowing low and raising their hands to their forehead, while they shouted 'Long live the Khalif of the Age!' The Emperor rewarded them all with robes of honour (khilat). The royal attendants swung round perforated flasks of scented water, and splashed the assembled throng with liquid fragrance. Trays of betel leaf (ban) were distributed to all. The air was charged with the fragrance of attar, musk and ambergris. The vapour of burning incense and aloe wood sweetened the atmosphere.

That day new coins were struck. Shah Jahan had inscribed the Muslim confession of faith (kalimah) on one face of his coins; but the pious Aurangzib forbade the practice, lest the holy text should be defiled by the touch of infidels! So, his coins bore on one face a Persian couplet meaning,—

"This coin has been stamped on earth like the shining full moon,
By King Aurangzib, the Conqueror of the World!"

The reverse bore the name of the mint-city, the year of the reign, and the Emperor's full title
in the Tughra script: Abul Muzaffar Muhiuddin Muhammad Aurangzib Bahadur Alamgir Padi-
shah Ghazi.

Formal letters were sent to all the provinces and cities to announce the glorious accession. In
this way two hours and forty-eight minutes were spent in the Public Audience. Then he retired
to the harem and held another Court there, at which the princesses, wives of nobles, and other
ladies “surrounded this Candle of the Assembly of Royalty like a swarm of moths.” They
offered their dutiful congratula-
tions and scattered large quanti-
ties of gold and silver, pearl and
jewel, in honour of the Emperor, while he made
rich presents to them in return. His sister Raushan-
ara Begam, who had supported him during
the war of succession and watched over his in-
terests in the harem of Shah Jahan, in opposition
to her elder sister Jahanara, the partisan of Dara
Shukoh, now received five lakhs of rupees in
cash and kind. Aurangzib’s four daughters got
4, 2, 1.6, and 1.5 lakhs respectively.

Thereafter the Emperor betook himself to the
Hall of Private Audience, to which only a select
few had entree. Here he presented to his four
sons 3, 2, 2, and 1 lakhs respectively. Other gifts
were made to the nobles, officers, scholars, poets
and musicians. Forty-eight minutes were passed here.

The poets taxed their brains to compose verses the numerical value of whose letters when added together would express the date of the accession. The most successful of these chronograms were highly rewarded and handed down to posterity.

As the Roman proprœtorors on assuming office declared the laws they intended to follow, so the Mughal Emperors at their accession often made changes in the established usage. Aurangzib, for instance, restored the lunar Hijera year in all public transactions, abolished the celebration of the Persian New Year's Day (nauroz),—an innovation borrowed by Akbar from the heretical Shiahs of Iran,—appointed Censors of Public Morals to put down wine-drinking and other vices condemned by Islam as sins, and lastly he abolished many cesses and the transit-duties and police-fees on grain.

The next day and for weeks afterwards, the festivities continued. Presents (peshkash) suited to the high occasion were received from the nobles, officers, courtiers, and feudatory princes, while they received in return titles, robes of honour, promotions of rank, and gifts in cash and kind,—such as elephants, horses, jewelled swords
daggers and pen-cases, necklaces of pearls, jewelled aigrettes waist-bands and other ornaments.

At night both banks of the Jumna river were illuminated. "The surface of the river looked like a flower-garden" of light. The nobles fitted out boats with planks on which lamps were arranged in tiers, and as they plied up and down the stream the bands seated on the decks discoursed sweet music. Myriads of people lined the banks to feast their eyes on the spectacle.

But the grandest display of fire-works was made by the Imperial Artillery Department (24th June),—evidently because it contained experts in the manufacture of powder and had an unlimited supply of the material. These were let off on the level bank of the river outside the Hall of Private Audience (Diwan-i-khas) in the Fort. The Emperor beheld it from a balcony on the eastern wall of that Hall, which looked out on the river.

Early in July news arrived of the arrest of Dara, and it heightened the joy of the Emperor and his courtiers. The coronation festivities were prolonged for more than two months, and formally ended on 19th August. The reign was ordered to be reckoned from 1st Ramzan 1068 A. H. (23rd May, 1658), in all official papers, because his second or grand coronation took place in this month of the year 1069.
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2. Padishahnamah by Abdul Hamid Lahori, printed in the Bibliotheca Indica series, 2 vols. The first volume is divided into two parts, paged separately and indicated in my notes as I. A. and I. B. It covers the first twenty years of Shah Jahan's reign and was written to order on the model of Abul Fazl's Akbarnamah. (Elliot, vii. 3.) Quoted as 'Abd. Hamid' or Pad.

3. Padishahnamah by Muhammad Waris, a continuation of Abdul Hamid's work. It covers the 3rd decade of Shah Jahan's reign. (Elliot, vii. 121.) I have used the Khuda Bakhsh MS. which once belonged to F. Gladwin, Major Fuller, Wm. Moorcroft, and Lewis DaCosta.

4. Aml-i-Salih by Muhammad Salih Kamba, gives the history of the 31st year of Shah Jahan's reign and of the War of Succession. (Elliot, vii. 123.) The author was an adherent of Shah Jahan. He uses the State papers.
and writes in the exact style and method of the Court annalists in continuation of Waris's history. But with the illness of Shah Jahan he evidently lost access to the State papers and his narrative from this point onwards lacks fulness and accuracy, and is either meagre of detail or padded out with rhetorical commonplaces and moral reflections. In a disjointed manner it continues the narrative to the death of Shah Jahan. The same volume as No. 3 above.

5. Alamgirnamah by Mirza Muhammad Kazim, (Bibliotheca Indica series), covers the first decade of Aurangzib's reign. Written to order and revised by the Emperor. Full of gross flattery and suppression of all incidents discreditable to Aurangzib. (Elliot, vii. 174.) Quoted as A. N.

6. Masir-i-Alamgiri by Muhammad Saqi Mustaid Khan, (Bibliotheca Indica series), written after Aurangzib's death, but on the basis of the State papers. (Elliot, vii. 181.) It is very condensed, giving the history of 51 years in 541 pages, while a regular Court chronicle like the Alamgirnamah takes 1107 pages in treating of 10 years only. I suspect that some of the leaves of the MS. from which this edition has been printed had got out of their proper places, and certain incidents of one year have been recorded under another year. But I have not met with any good MS. of the work. Quoted as M.A.

B.—PRIVATE HISTORIES.

7. Aqil Khan Razi, (life in Masir-ul-umara, ii. 821), an old servant of Aurangzib, wrote a short history variously entitled Zafarnamah-, Wakiat-, Halat-i-Alamgiri, and Aurangnamah. It begins with the invasion of Bijapur in 1657 and ends with the death of Mir Jumla. The author writes with independence and in some cases reveals facts which could not have been pleasing to his master. His
style is stiff with rhetoric, and the material portion of his book is really small in extent, though of undoubted value. I have used the A. S. B. MS. D. 239, occasionally comparing it with the Khuda Bakhsh MS. There are several copies of it at Rampur. (See Rieu, pp. 265, 792.)

8. *Tarikh-i-Shah-Shujai*, written at Maldah in 1660 by Mir Muhammad Masum, an old servant of Shuja. (See Elliot, vii. 198, for other titles of the book.) Masum's wife's brother (?), Muhammad Said, was the paymaster of Sipihr Shukoh (a son of Dara) and afterwards entered the service of Muhammad Sultan (the eldest son of Aurangzib.) So, our author learnt the different versions of events current in the camps of three of the rivals for the throne. But he lived and wrote in Bengal, where only distorted rumours of Delhi affairs reached him. Hence he is not always reliable about occurrences outside Bengal, and can be convicted of inaccuracy in certain details. But he mentions many facts not to be found elsewhere and seemingly true. For Shuja's doings he is our only authority and a very important one too. There is a striking agreement between him and Manucci in many particulars; evidently the two used the same source of information. Ends abruptly with Shuja's return to Tanda on the eve of his flight to Dacca. I have used the India Office Library MS. No. 533 (Ethe 340.) Khuda Bakhsh has a better copy of it.

9. *Muntaṣḥab-ul-Lubab*, by Muhammad Hashim Khafi Khan, (Bibliotheca Indica series), 2 vols.—a history of the Mughal Emperors from Babar to the 14th year of Muhammad Shah's reign (1733.) Khafi Khan's father was an officer of Murad Bakhsh, and he was probably related to several natives of Khaf who held the post of collector of customs at Surat and whom he praises. Khafi Khan himself conducted an embassy to the English at Bombay in 1694.
His history is professedly an abridgement of more original works up to the middle of Aurangzib's reign. Thereafter he writes from personal knowledge and supplements the meagre *Masir-i-Alamgiri* in many important points. He took care to consult many of the surviving actors of the earlier scenes and to verify his information by diligent inquiry. His reflective style, description of the condition of society, and characteristic anecdotes save his work from the dry formality of the Court annals, and he is specially informing with regard to Deccan affairs. But Khafi Khan at places seems to me to have added unauthorised touches for the sake of literary effect. (Elliot, vii. 207).

10. *Nuskha-i-Dilkasha*, by Bhimsen, a Kayeth born at Burhanpur and the son of Raghunandan whose brother was Bhagwan-das surnamed Dianat Rai, officiating *diwan* of the Deccan. Our author, therefore, lived in friendly intercourse with the highest officers, Hindu and Muslim, of Mughal Deccan. He spent most of his life as the agent of Dalpat Rao, the Bundela chief of Datia, who long fought in Aurangzib's wars in the Deccan with a contingent of his clansmen, usually as the lieutenant of Nusrat Jang. Bhimsen had to travel from Delhi to Cape Comorin and has left short but interesting accounts of the places he saw, besides recording many autobiographical touches and throwing much light on the manners of the age and the character of the administration. His book is of the highest importance to the historian, especially for Deccan affairs. An abridged and incorrect translation of a portion of it has been published as "the Journal of a Boondelah Officer" in Jonathan Scott's *History of the Dekkan* (Shrewsbury, 1794.) I have used I. O. L. MS. No. 94 (Etbe 445) as far as it goes, *viz.* to the fall of Golconda (pp. 1—208) and thereafter the British Museum copy (Or. 23), folios 94b—174a. The work
begins with Aurangzib's raid on Haidarabad in 1656 and ends with the death of Kam Bakhsh.

11. Isardas (sometimes written as Isridas), a Nagar of Pattan in Guzerat, wrote a history named *Fatuhat-i-Alamgiri*, (Elliot, vii. 198.) He was a servant first of the Shaikhul-Islam (the son of Chief Qazi Abdul Wahhab) and afterwards of the Mughal viceroy of Guzerat, being placed in charge of the Jodhpur district. Though like Masum he sometimes records the affairs of Northern India inaccurately, because only garbled popular tales reached him in his far-off province, yet he is a first-hand authority for much of what happened in Rajputana and Malwa. The book covers the period 1657 to 1698, but does not attempt a regular narrative of all the occurrences of any year. Parts of it look desultory. The colophon states that the work was "put down in writing as a memorial of Mehta Isridas." Does it mean that it consists of Isardas's reminiscences put together by another hand after his death? Br. Mus. Add. 23,884 is the only copy of it known to exist.

C.—PROFESSED ABRIDGEMENTS
(of little value.)

12. Inayet Khan's *Shah Jahan-namah*, (Elliot, vii. 73.) Khuda Bakhsh has a fine copy of it.


14. *Mirat-i-Alam* (Elliot, vii. 145), gives the accession of Aurangzib. An almost exact copy of the *Alamgirnamah*. The *Aina-i-Bakht*, of which two MSS. exist at Rampur, is probably the same work, or an eighteenth century recension of it.

15. *Lab-ut-Tawarikh-i-Hind*, by Brindaban-das, the
son of Dara’s diwan Bahara Mal, (A. S. B. MS. D. 265.)
Too brief to be of any use. (Elliot, vii. 168.)

16. Adab-i-Alamgiri, Khuda Bakhsh MS. f. 213a—259b,
gives a history of the 31st year of Shah Jahan’s reign and
of the War of Succession, avowedly abridged from the regular
histories (viz. the Aml-i-Salih and the Alamgirnamah),
but occasionally adds a line or two of information not to be
found in the sources.

D.—MONOGRAPHS.

17. Lataif-ul-Akhbar, probably written by Badi-uz-
zaman Rashid Khan, gives a detailed account of Dara
Shukoh’s siege of Qandahar. Khuda Bakhsh MS. (See
Ethe No. 331 and Rieu, i. 264.)

18. Fathiyya-i-ibriyya and its Continuation, by Shihab-
uddin Talish, (Elliot, vii. 199). The main work deals with
Mir Jumla’s invasion of Kuch Bihar and Assam, and an
abstract of it has been published by Blochmann in J.A.S.B.,
1872. I have edited the Persian text (as yet in MS.) on the
basis of 4 MSS.—A.S.B. MS. D. 72 and three others in the
Khuda Bakhsh Library (one of which was written in Eng-
land in Mr. Swinton’s house by Ihtisham-ud-din, the
author of the Shigarf-namah-i-Vilayet.) The Continuation
(Bodleian 589, Sachau and Ethe No. 240) gives the history
of Bengal from Mir Jumla’s death to the conquest of Chat-
gaon by Shaista Khan. I have published an abstract of its
contents and translations of three long passages of it in
J.A.S.B., 1906 and 1907. Fragments of the Continuation
have been found in the library of Nawab Abdus Salam
Khan and (probably) in I.O.L. MS. 1572 (Ethe 344).

19. Tarikh-i-Shivaji (I. O. L. Ms. 1957, Ethe No. 485,
cf. Rieu, 2: 327), an uncritical history of the rise of the
Maratha kingship down to Sambhaji’s accession, full of
popular stories, but giving the Maratha version of many important events. Evidently translated into Persian by some Hindu munshi from one of the Marathi bakhars of Shivaji. I have published an English rendering of it in the Modern Review, 1907. The Persian is very impure and the work bristles with Sanskritic words.

20. Masir-ul-umara, or a biographical dictionary of the peerage of the Mughal empire, (Bibliotheca Indica series,) 3 vols. (Elliot, viii. 187). Begun about 1742 and completed in 1779, on the basis of the existing and authoritative histories and letters,—thirty of such sources being named (i. 4-5). Where it conflicts with the original authorities, its evidence has necessarily to be rejected. But its chief value lies in the many characteristic anecdotes it mentions and the light it throws on the manners of the age. Evidently the authors used many true traditions preserved up to their time and some historical works now lost to us. Quoted as M. U.

21. Akham-i-Alamgiri, ascribed (on insufficient evidence) to Hamid-ud-din Khan surnamed Nimchah-i-Alamgiri, whose life is given in M. U. i. 605—611. I have published the text with a critical and annotated English translation under the name of Anecdotes of Aurangzib, using the only copies of the work known to exist, vis., 2 MSS. of Mr. Wm. Irvine (Nos. 252 and 340 of his library) 2 MSS. of Nawab Abdus Salam Khan of Rampur, and I. O.L. MS. 3388, none of which is complete. Other fragments of this work await discovery. It contains many anecdotes about Aurangzib, his sons and officers, and his orders on petitions, usually in a caustic vein.

E.—HISTORIES OF PERSIA (for the sieges of Qandahar).

22. Tarikh-i-Shah Abbas Sani, by Mirza Tahir Wahid
(Mulla Firuz Library, Rehatsek’s *Catalogue*, IV. 27 and Pers. 92).


also *Ruqat-i-Shah-Abbas Sani* (my MS).

**F.—DECCAN HISTORIES.**

25. *Basatin-i-salatin*, a history of Bijapur, by Mirza Ibrahim Zubairi, (Ethe 455,) written in 1824 but a reliable work, being based on older sources. I have used Major Vamandas Basu’s MS. Khuda Bakhsh has a very good copy of it.


28. *Qutb-numa-i- Alam*, by Syed Muhammad Mir Abu Turab, completed in 1806. A good abridgement of “the *Tariikh-i-Qutb Shahi, and other reliable histories*” of Golconda. I. O. L. No. 2428, (Ethe 465, where the title and author are given differently).

Nos. 26-28 reached me too late for use in my first two volumes.

**G.—COURT BULLETINS.**

29. *Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Muala*, R. A. S. MS. It consists of small slips of brown paper, each briefly recording one day’s occurrences at Court, *vis.* the movements and doings of the Emperor, the time of holding Court, the appointments made, the persons presented or given congee, the presents offered to the Emperor and the gifts bestowed by him, summaries of the despatches received and the orders passed on
them, &c. Such records have been preserved for the following years only of Aurangzib's reign: 3, 4, 8—15, 17, 20—22 (the number of slips ranging from 1 to 61), 36—40, and 42—49. Of these only 6 years, (38, 43—48), have records for more than 200 days each, the year 39 has 101 slips, and the other years less than 71. There are also bulletins of Md. Azam Shah's viceroyalty (years 46—49 of Aurangzib's reign, 271 slips,) and of the 2nd year of Bahadur Shah I's reign, (4 slips).

H.—LETTERS.

The letters of Aurangzib have reached us in (a) three compact and clearly defined collections made by his secretaries. (b) Three compilations consisting of selections from various earlier sources, made long after his death. These are generally of an ill-defined and mixed character, hardly any two MSS. agreeing in the number and arrangement of the letters. This is partly due to the fact that after the editors had issued their compilations with their own prefaces, later copyists covered the leaves left blank at the end of their transcripts by inserting other letters of Aurangzib out of the vast number of them circulating in India throughout the 18th century. There is a second difficulty with regard to this group: sometimes a letter of a certain purport differs so much in language and extent in two different collections that they must be considered as belonging to two distinct types. Which of the two faithfully represents Aurangzib's original letter and which of them is a later recension, it is difficult to say. (c) Two incomplete collections which stand apart from all other groups. (d) Short orders written on petitions, as given in No. 21 above. (e) Stray letters scattered through a large number of other works.

(a) 16. Adab-i-Alamgiri, being a collection of fully drafted letters of Aurangzib from 1650 to 1658 written by
his secretary Abul Fath, afterwards created Imperial Munshi and entitled Qabil Khan, who retired from service in June 1659 and died in May 1662. Aurangzib's last letters here are some addressed to Shah Jahan about two months after that Emperor was placed in confinement. The volume also contains (1) a number of letters written by Abul Fath on his own behalf or by order of his master, (2) letters written by Sadiq of Ambala, the secretary of Muhammad Akbar, on behalf of that prince and of himself, and (3) a history of the War of Succession. Compiled in 1704. (See Elliot, vii. 205 and Rieu on Br. Mus. Or. 177.) I have used the beautiful Khuda Bakhsh MS., which once belonged to the Fort William College. A few letters from it have been inserted in other collections and also in Khafi Khan. In every case the addressee is mentioned, and I have found out the dates of most of the letters from internal evidence, by a thorough study of Waris and Kambu.

30. Akcam-i-Alamgiri by Inayetullah Khan, the last and favourite secretary of Aurangzib. The volume contains not fully written out letters but only a precis of the points which the Emperor dictated to his secretary for inclusion in the letters. But they are not so brief and obscure as the contents of 31. The persons addressed are usually named. The contents refer to the last decade of Aurangzib's reign. I have used the Rampur State Library MS., a fine copy which must have belonged to the Delhi Palace Library, and collated it with the Khuda Bakhsh MS., a neatly written copy of the 18th century. No other MS. of it is known to exist.

31. Kalimat-i-Tayyibat, a precis of the points dictated, including scraps of verse and Arabic texts, for inclusion in the formal letters. Of the same character and date as No. 30, but the persons addressed are usually not named, and the contents are often hopelessly obscure from
their brevity. Compiled in 1719 by Inayetullah. I have used A. S. B. MS. F. 27, a fine old copy, probably of the Delhi Palace Library, and compared it with I. O. L. 1761 and 1594 (f. 52a to end.) Some letters from it have found a place in other collections.


33 and 34. Dastur-ul-aml-i-Agahi and Rams (or rather Rumus)-wa-Isharahha-i-Alamgiri, two collections of Aurangzib's letters formed at the instance of Rajah Aya Mal, the diwan of Siwai Jai Singh of Jaipur, in 1738 and 1742 respectively. (Elliot, vii. 203—206.) British Museum Addl. 26240, which bears the title of Rams and Addl. 18,881, which is named Dastur, are identical in contents and arrangement with each other and with the Ruqat-i-Alamgiri lithographed at Lucknow and Cawnpur and everywhere available in the bazar,—there being some slight differences and the inevitable additional letters at the end. The Ruqat has been four times translated into English. Br. Mus. Addl. 26239, bearing the title of Raqaim, agrees with I. O. L. 3021, 3388 and 1594 (f. 1—50b), and all of them reproduce the contents of the lithographed Ruqat, with some additions, omissions and changes in the arrangement. I. O. L. 3301 agrees with 3021, but with many differences and additions. I. O. L. 1761 agrees with Br. Mus. Addl. 26239. Irvine MSS. 344 and 350, though both entitled Rams, greatly differ from each other in their contents and arrangement. Most of their letters (esp. in 344) are to be found in the Ruqat and I. O. L. 1344. But there are large additions, many from the Kalimat-i-Tayyibat in the case of 350, and a few from sources not yet traced by me. Irvine MS. 350, f. 37a—43b,
contains a number of stories, epigrams, and maxims told by the Emperor, many of which are to be found in the *Ruqat*, I. O. L. 1344, and the *K-i-T*. I. O. L. 370, f. 56b—80a, mainly reproduces the contents of Irvine 350, with additions from I. O. L. 1344. Cambridge University Library Addl. 420 (Browne’s Catalogue, No. CXVII) is almost identical with Irvine 344, with a number of letters from Irvine 350 thrown in.

Thus we may take the bazar *Ruqat-i-Alamgiri* as the type of one class of this group. The other type is supplied by I. O. L. 1344, (agreeing with I. O. L. 3337), which reproduces many of the letters of the *Ruqat*, but usually in an altered form, and gives many others which are not to be found in the *Ruqat*, being taken mostly from the *K-i-T*, and in a few cases from the *Adab*.

(c) 35. *Kalimat-i-Aurangzib*, I. O. L. MS. 3301, f. 33a—60b, incomplete at the beginning. It contains letters belonging to the Emperor’s last years, none of which is to be found in any other known collection. A few seem to have been taken from Inayetullah’s *Ahkam*, but I have not yet compared the two works closely enough to pronounce an opinion on the point. The contents give information of value.

36. Rampur State Library, Insha 109 of the new Catalogue, is entitled *Kalimat-i-Tayyibat*, but does not at all agree with the A. S. B. MS. of that work except in the preface! It contains 204 pages of a very small size. The first two letters of it are found in 35 above. From the short examination I could make of it, it struck me as different from Inayetullah’s *Ahkam*. Ends with a letter of Aurangzib to Md. Akbar and that prince’s taunting reply (both abridged). Probably these letters were added on at the end. The conclusion is abrupt, without the regular *khatimah*. 
(e) 37. Paris Bibliothèque Nationale MS. Persan Suppl. 476 (Blochet's Catalogue No. 704), f. 1b—13a, gives Aurangzib's letters to Jai Singh, the replies to which are to be found in the *Haft Anjuman*.

38. Two *farmans* on revenue regulations [Berlin Royal Library, Pertsch's Catalogue Nos. 15 (9) and (23)], published by me with an English translation in *J. A. S. B.*, 1906. I was wrong in holding these *farmans* to be unique. The *farman* to Rasik-das is to be found in Bib. Nat. Sup. 476 and in the I. O. Library, while that to Md. Hashim was translated by Noel Paton in his *Principles of Asiatick Monarchies* and also in the *Persian Reader*, Vol. II. (Calcutta School Book Society, 1836), where the text also is given.

Aurangzib's correspondence with Shah Jahan and Jahanara is quoted by Kambu and Aqil Khan (a paraphrase) and given verbatim in the *Faiyas-ul-qawain* and the A. S. B. MS. F. 56.

39. Aurangzib's letters to Md. Akbar, his fourth son, after his rebellion, are given in the *Khatut-i-Shivaji* (R. A. S. MS. 71), and also in 40 below. The *Khatut* contains three letters of Aurangzib to three Maratha generals.


41. *Insha-i-Farsi* (A. S. B. MS. F. 56) contains, among other things, letters from Prince Akbar to Aurangzib, Sambhaji to Aurangzib (both given in 39), Muhammad Shah to Nizamulmulk on the invasion of Nadir Shah, Aurangzib to Md. Var Khan, Aurangzib to Shah Alam I., Shah Jahan to Aurangzib during the siege of Agra Fort, the Mughal collectors of Surat to Pratap Rao Gujar, Aurangzib to Siddi Masaud on the surrender of Adoni, Shah Jahan during his sons' advance from the Deccan, Aurangzib's reply,
Lutfullah Khan to Mir Jumla on his being taken under Imperial protection.

42. Some *farman* of Aurangzib published in the *J. A. S. B.* and also collected separately.

43. His letter of reprimand to Azim-ush-shan about private trade (*sauda-i-khas*), given in the *Riyas-us-salatin* and I. O. L. 3021.

Stray letters of Aurangzib are also found in I. O. L. 549 (f. 50a & b) and in some other MSS.

Letters of other Historical Personages.

44. *Haft Anjuman*, (Benares MS. belonging to Babu Shyam Sundar Lal and his brothers; many leaves hopelessly damaged through neglect.) Udai Raj was secretary to Rustam Khan Deccani and then to Mirza Rajah Jai Singh. On the death of the latter he embraced Islam with the name of Tala Yar. The letters he had written were collected by his son in a book divided into seven sections (called *anjumans*), thus:

(i) Despatches from Rustam Khan to Shah Jahan, f. 7b—26b.

(ii) Despatches from Jai Singh to Aurangzib during the pursuit of Dara after the battle of Ajmir, f. 26b—37a.

(iii) Despatches from Jai Singh to Aurangzib during the Deccan campaigns against Shivaji and Bijapur, f. 37a—94b.

(iv) Rustam Khan to Shah Jahan's sons, f. 94b—125a.

(v) a. Rustam Khan to nobles during Shah Jahan's reign, f. 125a—135b.

b. Jai Singh to nobles of Aurangzib's Court.

c. Jai Singh to nobles and officers posted in the Deccan.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.

d. Jai Singh to Sadat Khan, Qutb Shah, and candidates for office (i.e., deserters from the Deccani Sultans.) f. 135b—165a are covered by b, c, and d.

e. Jai Singh to the Imperial envoys to the Deccani Sultans, f. 165a—174a.

(vi) a. Letters written in Shah Jahan's reign about certain affairs of Rustam Khan and in Aurangzib's reign about the marriage of Raj Singh and other matters, f. 174a—187a.

b. Private letters of Jai Singh to his son Ram Singh, his agent Girdhar Lal, and others, in Aurangzib's reign, f. 187a—204b.

(vii) Letters written by Udai Raj for himself and others, f. 204b—243a.

The whole of Anjuman ii. and a portion of iii. are given in the Paris MS., No. 37 above. Several of Jai Singh's letters are also met with in the Faiyaz-ul-qawanin.

45. Faiyaz-ul-qawanin, belonging to Nawab Ali Husain Khan Bahadur of Lucknow, a MS. of 266 leaves, 17 lines to a page. It is a large collection of historical letters, several of them being taken from the official annals and other earlier sources. Divided into three books (called daftars): (i) Letters of kings and princes, (ii) letters from nobles to each other and to kings, and princes, and (iii) miscellaneous letters. Among the writers are the Emperors Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan (25 letters), Aurangzib (11), and Farukh-siyar, Jahanara, Dara Shukoh (8), Shuja (6), Murad Bakhsh (47), Jafar Khan, wasir of Aurangzib (9), the Shahs Tahmasp, Abbas I. and Abbas II., Adil Shah, Qutb Shah, Jai Singh and others. Some of Murad's letters are also given the Rampur State Library had MS. Qasir-ul-anamil (Insha 168.) Irvine MS. 371, a fragment, gives some
of the letters of the Faiyas. I have quoted the paging of Irvine's copy of the complete Faiyas.

46. Irvine MS. 257, a fragment of 6 leaves, contains the letters of Lutfullah Khan, the son of the wazir Sadullah Khan, to Aurangzib.

39. Khatut-i-Shivaji (R. A. S. MS. 71) contains, besides Aurangzib's letters to prince Akbar and three Maratha generals, the following:—Shivaji to the officers of Aurangzib before the siege of Purandhar,—Shivaji to Aurangzib,—Pratap Rao Gujar to the Surat officers,—letters of Sahu, Shêh Alam I., Namdar Khan, Dilir Khan (both to Shivaji), Prince Akbar to Aurangzib (most ironical), to Sambhaji and Kavi Kulesh, &c.

47. I. O. L. 2678, f. 72—128, miscellaneous letters, several of Aurangzib's time, very badly written.


50. Muraqat-i-Hassan, written in 1669 by Maulana Abul Hassan, an officer who served in Bengal and Orissa about 1655—1667, especially during Tarbiyat Khan's viceroyalty of Orissa. (Rampur State Library, Insha 182).

51. Majmua-i-munshat-wa-ghaira contains letters from and to Bidar Bakht, letters from Mukhlis Khan, Ruhullah Khan, Asad Khan to Md. Murad Khan, and from several other officers during the closing years of Aurangzib's reign. (Rampur State Library, Insha 176.)

52. British Museum Addl, 6600 gives letters from
Abdullah Qutb Shah to Shah Jahan, Dara, Shuja, Aurangzib, and Adil Shah, and also some other letters to Aurangzib and one from him. This MS. could have been of great use to me in connection with Chapters X and XIV, but I have not yet got a transcript of it.

53. British Museum Sloane 3582, f. 101—124, contains letters and official papers relating to the Karnatak down to 1102 A. H. Most of them belong to the time of Aurangzib.

54. Rūqat-i-Shah Abbas Sāni, a MS. which I picked up in the Lucknow bazar, contains some letters on the sieges of Qandahar, the Persian intrigue with Murad Bakhsh and the Deccani Sultans during the War of Succession, letters to Dara when a fugitive, to Aurangzib congratulating him on his accession and one (sent with Tarbiyat Khan) taunting him on his failure to subdue Shivaji and threatening an invasion of India!

English.

1. Tod's Rajasthan. I have given references to the edition published in Calcutta by Babu Ambika Charan Ukil, in two volumes, pagd consecutively.

2. The Imperial Gazetteer, new or 3rd ed., published by the Clarendon Press.

3. The European travellers in India have been consulted in Kerr's Voyages and Travels, as Hakluyt, Purchas and Coryat were not available at Patna.

The other English books call for no remark.
Corrections and Additions.

Vol I.

Page vii line 8, for garrison read garrison.

xvii 10 he had he has.

xx 16 Nur-ul- Maulana Abul.

8 6 dervishes darvishes.

16 15 weath wealth.

17 16 in given is given.

26 11 pleasant pleasant.

43 9 south south and east.

48 12 stand a stand.

59 5 behind behind.

70 note* add—She died on 7th May 1721, O. S., (Irvine in the Indian Antiquary.)

78 note* for mansavi read insima and after "turned hermit" insert (mansavi.)

81 note* for E 27 read F. 27.

91 line 1 feared feared.

116 note‡ add—A. N. 420 and 751.

127 line 20 for blessings read blessings.

134 26 surprised surprised.

177 23 add note—I am not sure that the Persian text means this.

251 23 for If explains read It explains.

282 17 where were.

288 24 without without.

296 note† add—Since the above was printed I have seen Dara’s tract named Risala-i-Haqnuma, in the English translation by Rai Srisa Chandra Vasu Bahadur.
Page 326 line 24, for imposed read imposed.

" 335 " 29 " Multan (210—214) read Multan (290—294).

Vol. II.

Page 31 note * add—For Aurangzib's stone records at Samugarah, see Atkinson's N. W. P. Gazetteer, Vol. VII. (ed. 1884), p. 611. Aurangzib's camp on the eve of the battle was at a large village 21 m. s. e. of Agra, which he renamed Fatihabad, and where he founded a sarai and a mosque called the Mubarak Mansil on the spot on which he rested after his victory, [here pp. 612 and 725 disagree; p. 612 being undoubtedly wrong, as Mubarak there should be Nur], constructed a tank, and planted a large grove to the s. e. of the place. The mosque was used as a custom-house, and the sarai as the tahsil office, the tank was nearly silted up and the grove remained in tolerable preservation in 1884. (Ibid, 611—612 and 724—725, where there are references to Keene's Handbook to Agra, ed. 1878, p. 111, Cunningham's Archaeological Survey Reports, iv. 195, and Elliot and Beames's Supplemental Glossary, ii. 87.) For Samuggar, Atkinson, vii. 765.

Page 55 note * for Narrative read narrative.

" 58 line 14 " arrow " bow.

" 68 " 3 after known as insert—Multafat Khan, diwan of the Deccan and elder brother of

" 73, 17 for futher read further.

" 83, 15 " man " man.

" 18 " influence " influence.

" 84, 5 " born " born.

" 94, margin " Aurangsib " Aurangzib.

" 96, line 26 " absense " absence.
" 115, note " Patf " Pati.
" " oi " of.
" 139, "† " Kafi " Khafi.
" 144, line 6 " they " it.
" 164, " 16 " officers " the officers.
" 165, " 11 " had been " were.
" 190, margin " Ahmadnagar " Ahmadabad.
" 197, line 4 " scare. " scarce.
" 222, line 7 " for ewildered read bewildered.
" 243, ll. 23 et seq, add note — This is my conjecture.
Works of Jadunath Sarkar, M.A.,
Professor, Patna College.

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Vol I. (1618-1657) is practically a detailed history of half
the reign of Shah Jahan, as it describes young Aurangzib's
viceroylalties, foreign wars, and diplomatic and military prepa-

rations.

Vol II. (1658-1662) gives an exhaustive and original ac-
count of the War of Succession between Aurangzib and his
brothers, ending with the death of the latter.

Sources.—This work represents the first attempt to write
a critical and scientific history of India during Aurangzib's
long reign (1658-1707.) All previous accounts of Aurangzib
in English are based upon the works of the Seventeenth
century European travellers, Bernier and Manucci, who had
little access to the makers of Indian history, knew Persian
(the literary language of the time)—but imperfectly, did not use
any contemporary written records, and merely repeated the
bazaar gossip,—or upon Khafi Khan's history written 115 years
after the birth of Aurangzib and avowedly compiled from
earlier works.

Professor Sarkar's History of Aurangzib, on the other hand,
is based mainly on original contemporary Persian sources, viz.,
the Mughal State Papers, daily bulletins of the Mughal Court,

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the records of impartial non-official writers (such as two Persian manuscripts by contemporary Hindu writers), the letters of Aurangzeb, his father, brothers, sons, grandsons, officers and vassal kings, and other makers of Indian history, revenue returns, &c. Most of these are preserved in Persian Mss, for which the author has exhaustively searched Indian and European libraries, viz.,—the British Museum, India Office Library (London), Bodleian (Oxford), Royal Asiatic Society's Library (London), Cambridge University Library, Bibliotheque Nationale (Paris), Royal Library (Berlin), Khuda Bakhsh Library (Patna), Asiatic Society's Library (Calcutta), Rampur Nawab's Library, &c.—besides making some important "finds" at Benares, Lucknow and Rampur. He has taken exact photographic copies of these. Of the letters of Aurangzeb and his contemporaries, more than 3,000 are in the author's possession. The author is also using the Marathi bakhars and Assamese buranjis, besides contemporary records in English and modern Gazetteers, maps and works on travel. A full, classified and descriptive bibliography is given at the end of volume II. To be completed in five volumes.

Importance of the subject.—The history of Aurangzeb is practically the history of India for sixty years. In this reign, the Mughal empire attained to its greatest extent and then began to decline rapidly, and the first glow of a new dawn was distinctly seen in our political sky. Hence Aurangzeb's reign is an object of supreme interest to the student of political philosophy no less than to the student of Indian history. For several portions of the reign, the author has been able to secure the very raw materials of history, viz., the letters of the leading historical personages of the time.

M. C. Sarkar & Sons, Publishers,
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Ch. I. Aurangzib's Boyhood and Education, 1618-34.
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IV. Marriage and Family: Viceroyalty of Gujrat, 1634-46.
V. Invasion of Balkh and Badakhshan, 1647.
VI. Governorship of Multan and Sindh, 1648-52.
VII. First siege of Qandahar, 1649.
VIII. Second siege of Qandahar, 1652.
IX. Second Viceroyalty of the Deccan, 1653-57—Murshid Quli Khan's revenue settlement.
X. Invasion of Golkonda, 1656—early history of Mir Jumla.
XI. War with Bijapur, 1657—storming of Bidar and Kaliani—rise of Shivaji.
XII. Illness of Shah Jahan—Dara Shukoh supreme at Court,—disorder in the empire, 1657.
XIII. Murad crowns himself in Gujrat.
XIV. Aurangzib advances from the Deccan to contest the throne, 1658.

Volume II.

Ch. XV. Battle of Dharmat and defeat of Jaswant Singh.
XVI. Battle of Samugarh and defeat of Dara Shukoh.
XVII. Aurangzib captures Agra fort and imprisons Shah Jahan and Murad.
XVIII. Pursuit of Dara Shukoh in the Panjab and Sindh, 1658.
XIX. Shuja's struggles for the throne—he is defeated at Bahadurpur and Khajwah.
XX. Dara finally defeated near Ajmir, 1659.
XXI. Pursuit and murder of Dara Shukoh.
XXII. Adventures of Sulaiman Shukoh and his death.
XXIII. Pursuit of Shuja and the war near Rajmahal.
XXIV. War in Malda, final defeat and flight of Shuja.
XXV. Grand coronation of Aurangzib described in detail.

Bibliography.

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Crown 8vo., pp. 248, Re. 1-8. (2s. 6d. net).

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The work is exceedingly interesting and valuable, as it throws much new light on Aurangzib and exhibits many unknown traits of his character, his pithy sayings, and his principles of government.
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(*Hindusthan Review*, January, 1903.)

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(*Journal R. A. S.*, July, 1902.)

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Author—Sarkar, Jadunath.

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