DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THOUGHT IN INDIA

S. K. RAMACHANDRA RAO
Head of the Department of Psychology
All-India Institute of Mental Health
Bangalore (India)

MYSORE
KAVYALAYA PUBLISHERS

MUNSHI RAM MANOHAR LAL
Oriental & Foreign Book-Sellers,
P. B. 1165, Nai Sarak, DELHI-6.
INTRODUCTION

As a science psychology is young, perhaps an infant; but as a subject it is ancient, perhaps the first of subjects. The unusual experiences of the earliest of primitives like dreams, apparitions, ailments, and physical effects of emotions, struck in their minds not only surprise, but also curiosity concerning their explanation. Before the ancestral man turned his attention to the world, he turned it towards himself. Psychological studies may be said to have grown out of such savage speculations. Gradually the body of these speculations became less and less savage until about a century ago when in the West a scientific status was carved out for it: it was beginning to be recognised as an independent, academic discipline. Thanks to Francis Galton and Wilhelm Wundt the methods of rumination and introspection (which were the only methods employed before their time) were supplemented by experimental procedures and mathematical techniques. In our day, Collins and Drever could say: "A psychology without the experimental part to-day is an anachronism". But it was certainly not so until recently. In the light of scientific methods, the psychological subject-matter also underwent a transformation: the students know the passage from the 'psyche' to consciousness, from consciousness to mind, and from mind to behaviour. They are doubtless acquainted with its early associations with philosophy and later flirtations with physiology; its present wooing the biological sciences is yet incomplete.

But the past sticks: the subject and methods. Although there was a call from the enthusiastic America to rechristen the old-fangled Psychology more appropriately as 'Anthroponomy', in the conservative Germany psychology is still the 'Wissenschaft' of 'Seele'. The most persistent attempts to eliminate soul and consciousness have proved of little avail: they have reappeared under different masks. Despite the interesting and creditable advances in methodology, it must be admitted that conjecture
and introspection are still reigning in the field. Theoretical formulation is even to-day a favourite pastime for professional psychologists.

In India, psychology was never an independent discipline: it was not included among the traditional branches of knowledge listed in the Upaniṣads, or by authorities like Pāṇini, Śukra and Kauṭilya, or taught in the Nālandā College. Even subjects like military science (kṣatravidyā), astronomy (nakṣatravidyā), mathematics (rāśi), polity (ekāyana), logic (vākovākyā or hetu), medicine (cikitsā) and sexology (kāmaśāstra) were taught in our country as distinct disciplines since very ancient times. But it never occurred to our ancients to consider psychology as worthy of an independent educational status: in fact, Sanskrit has not an exact word for psychology that has a classical touch.

It does not, however, mean that psychological aspects of knowledge were altogether ignored by the ancients. No, far from it. There was very much of psychologising, as we shall have occasion to learn from the ensuing pages; but it was incidental. The main problem before the Indian mind was the relating of experience to reality, and all knowledge was systematically poured into this mould. Thus philosophy came to steal the focus of attention. But the Indian word for philosophy, darśana (from the root drś, 'to see') emphasises that within this nomenclature were included 'perceptual observation, conceptual knowledge and intuitive experience' (in the words of Radhakrishnan). It was not a mere bundle of empty ratiocinations that was styled as philosophy but an ordered employment of observation, inference and introspection. No doubt they did not work with experiments, and they had no laboratory; they were indeed ignorant of the possibility of reducing the observational data to mathematical formulae. But their speculation was by no means allowed to be bizarre; it was restrained at every step by an elaborately developed logical machinery. The facts obtained by observation and introspection were tested carefully in the crucible of logical reflection.

In their attempts to solve the problems raised by philo-
sophy, the ancients had necessarily to handle psychological topics: man’s original nature, consciousness, experience, perception, illusion, will, desires, and emotions. All the philosophical systems in India have thus inquired into psychological processes in different contexts. These inquiries, however, do not occur in one place, or as a connected account; and no classical writer was ever interested in this task. There were (and are) some understandable difficulties in this venture even if the interest were there: the field of philosophical inquiry was structured into numerous interests, orthodox and heterodox, so that the compilation of relevant reflections of all the interests concerning a specific problem was almost impossible; psychological speculations were extant in diverse and even disparate disciplines (like metaphysics and medicine, logic and sexology, religion and poetry) so that no writer could be expected to have a competent acquaintance with all of them sufficient to sieve out the psychological contributions; and, the multiplicity of languages in which Indian works are written (as, for example, Vedas in archaic Sanskrit, the Upaniṣads and later scholastic works in classical Sanskrit, the early Buddhist books in Pāli, the Jaina texts in Ardhamāgadhī and mixed-Sanskrit) prevented a writer who was not also versatile from attempting such a psychological compilation.

The indologists, Indian and other, have presented to the world the important philosophical contributions from this country; it is now commonly accepted that India had something very profound to offer by way of metaphysical speculations. But little is known yet about what we now designate as Indian Psychology: most of the important indologists worked when, even in the West, psychology was still endeavouring unsuccessfully to be weaned out of philosophy; and the training of indologists precluded for the most part an acquaintance, with, or interest in, academic psychological problems. Knowledge of Sanskrit, Pāli and Ardhamāgadhī (all three of which languages are almost dead now), acquaintance with Indian philosophy and allied branches of study, and academic training in modern psychology seem an unusual combination.
I have attempted to sketch in this work, in broad outline the main lines of development of psychological thought from the earliest of recorded sources available, viz. the Vedas, to comparatively recent times. The stream of Indian psychology comprehends a time span of over three thousand years; and it has run in twenty different areas. It is certainly impossible for an individual, at least for one with my equipment, to present an exhaustive output on this soil. I have ventured, however, to piece together the information I have been gathering for over ten years now, with the hope that this will provide the stimulus for further and more comprehensive works on the subject. In the present publication, I have dealt with the major psychological contributions of the important disciplines, both orthodox and heterodox. As the careful student will readily notice, the psychological speculations in the Tantric and Ayurvedic systems, and the psychological theories involved in literary criticism (Alankāra sāstra) are glaring omissions. I intend bringing out shortly a companion volume covering these fields of inquiry.

I owe a deep debt of gratitude to my teachers, the late Mahavidwan Palghat Narayana Sastri, the late Vidwan Chandrasekhar Ghanapati, the Venerable Narada Mahāthera (Vajirarama), and the Venerable Vijayamuni, who afforded me an insight into the psychological position of our thought-systems. I am grateful to Dr. B. Kuppuswami and to the late Dr. M. V. Govindaswami who evinced great interest in my work and encouraged me. I am grateful to my friend, Sahityaratna Nandagudi Krishnamurthi with whom I have had profitable discussions and Sri R. Hari Rao who as Curator of the Mythic Society, Bangalore, placed its valuable library at my disposal.

I am thankful to Sri G. H. Rama Rao of the Mysore Printing and Publishing House, Mysore, for printing this work neatly and expeditiously.

S. K. R.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Origins in Inspired Poetry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Development in the Confidential Documents</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Psychological Theory and Practice</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV The Uncompromising Intellectuals</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V The Ethical Interlude</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI Speculations in the Cloister</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII The Scramble of Scholiasts</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII The Logic of Grammar</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX Counselling on the Battle-field</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X A Bird’s Eye-View</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplement</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

ORIGINS IN INSPIRED POETRY

Beginnings of Vedic Records

We must go back in our minds to about 3,000 B.C., and focus our attention on the area now familiar to us as the Punjab. The early streams of Indo-āryan adventurers had already arrived, after an arduous travel through the mountain ranges of Afghanistan. The communion with the jungle tribes of the aboriginal Kōls and the more civilised Dravidians of the plains had already been accomplished; and the newcomers had settled down to a peaceful, pastoral life. Enjoying the health and light of life, the early unknown āryan poets poured out in profusion, songs and hymns, prayers and praises. The collection of these outpourings was the Ṛg-veda, representing the grand ancestral wisdom of India.

The bulk of this huge document (of 10,622 songs) lacks unity of design or a central idea. It is densely crowded with a medley of matter. But, for the major part, it comprises lyrical descriptions of the elementary forces of nature idealistically conceived: glory of the tawny dawn, terror of the hurricane, darkening floods, womanly love and earthly beauty. The prevailing atmosphere is one of poetic fervour, of intuitive imagination. The mood is uniformly one of bold optimism, of quiet confidence, of joy of life. The entire expanse is marked by an originality of form; and the document is the source of later poetic styles, literary ventures, art ideals and speculative systems in the country. As a product of emotion, imagination and vision, it has retained an imperishable celebrity through the ages.

The original, magnificent chants, which were periodical outpourings, were carefully selected, arranged and conserved in a standard, accented pattern before humanity had learnt the art of writing books. This compilation of inspired poems,
known as *Saṅhitā* (‘got-together’), came, in the course of a few centuries, to be supplemented in answer to the changing needs of time by priestly dissertations on theological and liturgical matters. Styled as *Brāhmaṇa*, these instructional treatises were learned attempts to build a ritualistic community with sacrifice at its centre; they are tedious, prosaic, uninspired and monotonous (in strong contrast to the enchanting *Saṅhitā*), and became utterly worthless as the wheels of time rumbled along. But we find here intellect at work. We miss here of course the intuitive poetic imagination of the *Saṅhitā* and its ample majesty of expression; but instead, a tidy mind intent on cataloguing, classifying, interpreting and explaining is in evidence. The growth of ancestral thought which culminated in the *Upaniṣads*, which are marked by an honest love of truth and diligent research, gathered speed at this period, about eight hundred years before the birth of Christ.

Alongside the development of these supplementary dissertations, the emergence of the sacrificial era necessitated the applicative collections of the original *Rg-veda-Saṅhitā*. From among the mass of its inspired poetry a large collection of hymns, which could serve as liturgical formulae (*yajūṃśī*), was segregated into a separate book with a sacrificial bias, and, this was styled *Yajur-veda*. The collection with a different liturgical arrangement was chanted melodiously (*sāman*) during the performance of sacrifices involving the offering of soma-juice; and this was the *Sāma-veda*. These were the three principal primitive literary collections of a bygone past held by posterity in profound veneration; they presented the picture of an extraordinary jumble of songs and fables, emotion and imagination, metaphysics and mysticism. The oldest of them, the *Rg-Veda*, is also the richest, brightest, and most magnificent.

In later times, another quaint collection was got up and ushered into the fold of the sacred literature: *Atharva-veda*. It is principally the work of fire-priests and wizards: we are here in a world of goblins and ghosts, magic and sorcery, spells and curses, diseases and cures. Demonology and medicine vie with
each other to hold our attention. The bulky work exhibits two distinct interests: defensive (atharva) and offensive (aṅgīras). The former comprehends prayers and formulae for prosperity, rites and prescriptions for curing ailments, and magic rituals for controlling and counteracting evil influences from demons and sorcerers. Incidentally is presented an elaborate materia medica with more than a hundred diseases enumerated, alongside an extensive therapeutics. The offensive interest whips out to our view a black and hideous world of witch-craft, sorcery and gruesome rituals: dreadful spirits strut across the stage in a wild fury throwing their awful glances on the meek and defenseless victims of the sorcerer’s curses.

The Analytical Interest

The picture of nature which the Vedic poets sought to depict necessarily involved the picture of man’s relationship with nature. While the personalised natural forces were addressed and explained in bright images and graceful allegories, the thinker too from whom the earnest devotion springs came in for consideration. As a ‘praiser’, as a ‘singer’, as a ‘thinker’, as an ‘agent’, as an ‘actor’, man was worthy of the poet’s objective attention. The ‘sin’ of man apropos the Will of God, his fears and joys, hopes and anxieties in relation to the bold and bright gods of the above were problems that troubled the poet’s mind. The sin was alienation from God, and transgression of His order. The cosmic order (ṛta) borne by Varuṇa’s discipline, was the profoundest discovery of the Vedic poets : the order was observed with immaculate precision by the material world, by the animal kingdom, and by the forces that bind the heavenly vault with earthly scenes. And man, being an aspect and expression of this order, has within him a reflection thereof: in the words of Adolf Kaegi, “the external ordinances of the rulers of the world were as inviolable in mental and moral matters as in the realm of nature”. That human conduct illustrates order is indeed an important conception, a conception that paved way for furtherance of thought.
The order in nature and in man was described as "unchanging amidst change". Amidst the seasonal variations, and the diurnal alternations, vegetative growth and animal movements, torrential downpour of rain and the changing breeze of wind, Varuṇa's *law* reigns necessarily, uniformly, and inexorably. Even so amidst the changing moods of man, and amidst the turns of his temperament and swings of inclinations abides necessarily, uniformly and inexorably an inner principle, invisible but real. There is in the world at large a duality: a stagnant world of mortal matter (*sthitaṁ*), and a moving world of undying forces (*yat*). Correspondingly, in man there is a concrete aspect of rigid and material form (*rūpa*) which is seen and touched, as also an abstract aspect of moving and immaterial name (*nāma*), which is but inferred. This primitive analysis of man (which reminds us of the Platonic division of man into *morphē* and *eidōn*) assumes a definite shape in the *Satapatha-brāhmaṇa*, where the two aspects are described as the ‘great magnitudes’ (*mahāti abhve*) : ‘name’ is whatever has a name, says this ancient text, but where no name obtains it is ‘form’ only; indeed, form is greater than name, for it comprehends both what is named and what cannot be.

Naming is a psychological operation; it involves the capacity to conceive, understand and designate. Form is what exists and is apprehended directly by the senses. The distinction between name and form underlines the difference between conception and perception; between abstraction and sensation; between the psychical and the physical. The essence or meaning consists in the former, while the latter is but an instrument, a vehicle. The former is the energising force, and the latter is mere inert matter. The Vedic thinker was of course familiar with the distinction between a man alive and the corpse: the very *meaning* is missing in the corpse, which therefore belongs to the stagnant world of mortal matter. We find here, at the dawn of analytical interest, the vague beginnings of the conception of soul or self or spirit in man.

*Man and his Spirit*

The far-seeing Vedic poet recognised without a fuss the
animal nature of man, howsoever preoccupied he was with the multitude of divine constructions. Man is a beast (paśu), more specifically a biped (dvipad). This plain assertion is at times clothed in glittering compliment: he is ‘the first of beasts’; he is ‘the king of animals’. Man’s distinction, which also is recognised, is subjected to inquiry and analysis: man spoke and prayed, constructed chariots and performed sacrifices, penetrated into things with thought and composed verses with a heart full of faith.

Man had, in common with animals, a body which was both mortal and material. It grew and withered, was made and unmade. Made it was in many parts: in the Yajur-veda-Samhitā we are presented with a long list of bodily organs. This list is an indiscriminate medley of anatomical, physiological and psychological categories: head (sīraḥ), face (mukham), hair of the head (keśa), facial hair (śmaśru), breath (prāṇa), eyes (cakṣu), hearing apparatus (śrotam), tongue (jihvā), speech (vāk), mind (manas), fingers (aṅgulih), arms (bāhū), hands (hastau), ears (karnau), soul (ātmā), breast (uraḥ), vertebrae (prāśṭeḥ), belly (udara), neck (grīva), buttocks (sroṇi), thighs (ūrū), knees (jānuni), legs (jaṅghe), foot (pad), navel (nābhi), anus (pāyu), testicles (aṅdau), nails (lomāni), skin (tvac), muscle (māṁsa), bone (asthi), marrow (majja). The list indeed is a curious congregation of odd categories; of especial interest is the inclusion of speech, mind and soul in this enumeration. Elsewhere in Vedic literature head is further analysed into skin (tvac), bone (asthi) and brain (mastiśka).

The material outfit of man is composed of these parts; and what we style as life is merely a conglomeration of parts. Life is indicated in Vedic literature by two expressions: asu meaning the abstract vital principle, and prāṇa signifying the actual vital process. Men are described as ‘possessors of asu’. The ‘incoming’ of asu is an energising influence: it rises up and enlivens us; it lights up the den of darkness. It is a distinct principle, distinct from the body. Devoid of it the body is dead; its presence enables the vital breath move in and out. Prāṇa, on the other hand, is a physiological
reality: it is described as the essential vital constituent in an organism. However, in poetic imagination it is identified with Prajāpati and Agni to symbolise the functional unity of ‘name’ and ‘form’. Its primary meaning is the respiratory process composed of inhalations and exhalations; and it is this meaning that has survived to our day. But sometimes in the archaic texts, the expression is employed to connote sense-function or even mind.

Closely associated with the problem of vitality was the problem of Spirit, responsible for consciousness and action. The Vedic texts have given us the word ātman, although its employment is infrequent in the early books. The origin of the expression remains obscure despite the valiant attempts by various authors to fix up its genetic history. There is a Greek word structurally similar to ātman, ‘atmos’, meaning ‘smoke’, ‘vapour’; provided there is an ancient link between the two words, Vedic ātman may be an alternate expression for prāṇa or āsu; although in its later history, especially in the Upaniṣadic period, it took on a different meaning. In fact, the Vedic commentator Sāyaṇa derives the word from the root an, which signifies the breathing process. But the Nirukta attaches importance to the root at: to spread, to pervade, to fill. Modern scholars, however, are attracted by the suggestive ending of the word with ‘+ man’, which renders it a nomina actionis; the importance of the expression consists in its indication of the Spirit’s capacity for action. A synthetic view, which probably was current in a rudimentary form during the Vedic age, is cited by a much later philosopher, Ānandagiri: Ātman fills (the body), receives (the impressions from the outer world), and enjoys (or experiences) the presentational objects. The spirit was thus conceived of as the foundation of life, as the primary agent in experience, and as the necessary pre-condition for action.

The distinction between body and spirit has clearly been recognised even at this early stage of philosophical thought. The ancestors are of course ‘dead’ (utparāsah); they once had life but now they are bereft of it. But have they ceased to
exist altogether? The Vedic poet stoutly affirms their continued existence, albeit in a different and invisible world; for the Spirit does not die. Even when a person swoons, the body falls down inert and is dead for all practical intents; but when he wakes up and resumes his normalcy, we realise the continued presence of the Spirit. By such observations and inferences, the early thinker arrived at the conception of an independent Spirit, whose fortunes were unaffected by bodily mishaps. But we fail to find in the early Vedic records a clear formulation of the doctrine of transmigration (saṃsāra,) although, according to Macdonell, the germs are to be seen in the tenth book of the Ṛg-Veda.

The Mind and its Mysteries

The primitive poet had doubtless his share of joys and sorrows, passions and dejections, moods and urges in life. And he had the right sense to turn his attention to these ‘inner breezes’ within his own heart. Yes, it was the ‘heart’ (hṛt) that was involved in all these psychological experiences. The poet speaks of ‘the pangs of grief in the heart’,

\[ "soma\]

enters the system, it is the heart that is readily ‘touched’. The heart indeed is the proper fountain of all song. It is surely not the mere physical heart that the poet means, but the psychological faculty characterised by ‘feeling’; but of course the physical heart is the one bodily organ that is readily affected by intense feelings. It is different from mind (manas), but its close relative. The distinction is clear inasmuch as the heart is identified as the source of all involuntary, irrational and normally uncontrolled psychological processes. Fear enters, not mind, but heart; it is not mind but heart that occasions longing, grief, or pleasure.

The Vedic thinker has recognised, and rightly so, an intimate connection between heart and mind: indeed there are in the Vedic texts numerous references to mind being located in the heart. Frequent are heart’s associations with manas and with maniṣṭā which Śāvyā interprets as involving ‘ardour’,
Development of Psychological Thought in India

'faith'\textsuperscript{32}. The dart that is born of an angry mind (\textit{manyor manasah}) smites the hearts of foes\textsuperscript{33}. But mind comes in for independent consideration also: it is \textit{par excellence} an instrument of reason, it symbolises the rational faculty in man. Its function is likened to the winnowing of barley through the sieve\textsuperscript{34}: selective reception by mind is here suggested. Mind can be 'truthful'\textsuperscript{35}, 'unruffled'\textsuperscript{36}, 'mature'\textsuperscript{37}, 'firm'\textsuperscript{38} and 'sharp'\textsuperscript{39}. It is essentially intellectual, and only indirectly connected with our emotional life. Mind is even invoked to exercise restraint over the tempestuous surgings of the heart. One is reminded of the piteous pleadings of the love-bom Purūravas when his beloved Urvasī turns indignantly away from him: he begs her to 'stay with mind'\textsuperscript{40}. Elsewhere\textsuperscript{41}, mind is said to 'investigate and consider'. In fact, it is with mind's help that the poet inquires and discovers the mysteries of creation\textsuperscript{42}. While heart represents rather the stirred-up state of the individual, mind symbolises the reflective aspect of mental life.

There is in the tenth book of the \textit{Rg-veda} a hymn that is at once sublime and enigmatic. It is known as the 'Nāsadiya-Sūkta' after the opening expression in the first line; and Western scholars are acquainted with it as the Hymn of Creation. While this hymn does not deal with creation, it formulates the mystery concerning the origin of the universe. The poet's imagination conjures up the vision of nature before phenomenal presentations arose: darkness was hidden in the womb of darkness and everywhere was the watery mass, but then there sprang up \textit{kāma} which was the primaeval germ of \textit{mind}. Winternitz has translated \textit{kāma} as \textit{sexual desire} which no doubt it means to-day; but Schopenhauer and Deussen rightly take the word to represent \textit{Will}. It is not, however, the human will that is intended here, but the inscrutable \textit{Will} that is in the background of all phenomenal emanations; the world is the fulfilment of this \textit{Will}. And it is intriguing to note that mind is mentioned as the first-born of this \textit{Will}. The commentary on this hymn occuring in \textit{Sātapatha-brāhmaṇa} explains that mind in a sense existed and in a sense did not; but it wished to manifest in definite forms, and
acquired consistency. Desire as the seed of mind is a very
responsible conception: the poet has sought to explain the
emergence of mind on the basis of the creative urge of life to
grow and become more efficient.

This hymn indicates the importance attached during this
period to the rôle of mind in human life. There were prayers
sent out for mind which was necessary for physical growth4.
Maintenance of mind contributes to life; and death is
associated with the dissolution of mind. A magical hymn of
great antiquity that used to be employed for reviving the
dead6 is primarily an invocation for consolidating again
(āvartana) the scattered mental faculties. Not only was mind
important in individual life, its contribution to social well-
being was also recognised. We may close this section with
that celebrated prayer in the Rg-veda (applicable to all times
and all nations) which emphasises the psychological concord
in social life:

"May our resolutions be uniform,
and our hearts united;
May our minds be one,
that we live well together!"4

REFERENCES

1 The Rgveda, 1886, p. 13
2 Satapatha-brahmana, 11.3.3.4
3 ibid., 113.3.5
4 Taittiriya-Samhitā, 4.2.1.18.
5 Satapatha-brähmaṇa, 4.2.1.18
6 ibid., 4.2.10.1
7 Rf. The Vedic Index, p. 361; also Rg-Veda, 10.163.3
8 Satapatha-brähmaṇa, 12.2.4.9.14
9 Rg-Veda, 10.6.3
10 " asum ya iyuḥ "
11 Rg-Veda, 1.113.16
12 Atharva-Veda, 11,2,4,12
13 Satapatha-brahmana, 10.3.3p.
Development of Psychological Thought in India

14 ibid., 14.1.3.32
15 ibid., 14.1.3.32
16 "an prāṇane"; also Vopadeva: "ana khalu prāṇane"
17 "ātmā atater vā, āpter vā; api v' āpta iva syāt".
18 This has an etymological justification also: "an ceṣṭāyām"
19 "Yac cāpnoti yad ādatte yac cāttī viṣāyani ti" Ānandagiri cites this as a Sūtrī.
20 Ṛg-veda, 10.15.1
21 Vedic Mythology, p. 166; Ṛg-veda, 101.6.3
22 Ṛg-veda, 10.103.2 "ḥṛṣu śokaih".
23 ibid., 10.84.7, "bhīyam dadhānā hṛdayeṣu".
24 ibid., 10.8.1, "hṛdā matim".
25 ibid., 10.2.25 "hṛdisprṣa"
26 ibid., 1.60.3; 3.26.8; 4.58.5; 8.76.8
27 ibid., 1.32.14; 10.84.7
28 ibid., 1.123.6
29 ibid., 10.103.12; also Atharva-Veda, 6.18.1.
30 ibid., 1.43.1; 8.43.31
31 ibid., 105.5; 10.50.7; 10.191.4 etc.
32 ibid., 10.177.1; 6.28.5; 7.98.2; 8.89.5; 1.61.2
33 ibid., 10.10.13
34 Ibid., 10.10.6
35 ibid., 10.5.7 "satyena manasā"
36 ibid., 10.6.2 "aheṣṭa manasā"
37 ibid., 10.10.2 "pākena manasā".
38 ibid., 10.10.5 "sthiram manah"
39 ibid., 10.5.1 "mano...tigmam".
40 ibid., 10.8.5 "manasā tiṣṭha".
41 ibid., 10.7.5 "manasā vimṛṣṭam".
42 ibid., 10.10.3
43 ibid., 10.59.5 "mano asmāsu dhāraya...jīvātave"; also 10.57.6 "manas tanūṣu bibhṛataḥ".
44 ibid., 10.59 (Mṛtsaṇṭhijīvini-sūkta).
45 ibid., 10.191.4: "Samāni va ākūtiḥ, samānā hṛdayāni vah; samānam astu vo mano, yathā vas susahā sati"
CHAPTER II

DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

The Upaniṣadic Origins

Towards the close of the great Vedic period, poets gave way to philosophers: the conceptions that were gradually taking shape in the enormous mass of inspired and imaginative hymns acquired an unmistakably intellectual orientation about 1200 B.C. The final portions of the Vedic literature, which occur more like dissertational appendices than legitimate parts, are styled as the Upaniṣads. These “first recorded attempts of the Hindus at systematic philosophising” (according to Hume) were also the “products of the highest wisdom” (in the words of Schopenhauer). The Upaniṣads have indeed engendered an indelible impression on the progress of Indian thought, and have exercised a far-reaching influence on almost all the systems of philosophy that have sprung up in this country for about three thousand years now.

The word ‘upaniṣad’ is very hard to define. The derivation of the word from the root sad with the prefix ni (‘to sit’) along with upa (‘near’) suggests that the expression was originally exclusively applied to the sessions “consisting of pupils, assembled at a respectful distance round their teacher” (as it occurred to Max-Müller). Great truths are never broadcast to the surging multitudes but whispered to the alert student in small class-rooms. But Max-Müller apparently missed the mark in his enthusiasm for assembly; it was not the assemblage of pupils round the teacher that was the main import of the word, but the confidential character of such assemblies (as was recognised by Deussen). The contents of these primitive dissertations were indeed in the nature of secret
instructions to the eager aspirant, who was not only eager but equipped mentally and morally to understand the instructions aright.

The really ancient, and therefore genuine, Upaniṣads were ten or eleven in number; they are found to be composed in archaic prose and verse in a uniformly simple, direct and sincere style. But with the passage of time, and inspired by the celebrity of the Upaniṣads, the number of these Mystical Texts (as R. D. Ranade has called them) swelled to as many as 118; some of them are shamefully recent and horribly puerile. The imposters however are easily indentified by their utter lack of the honest and “mysterious forcefulness in their expressions” (as worded by Dasgupta)—which is characteristic of the ancient Upaniṣads. The ancient Upaniṣads attained their present documentary form by about the fifth century before the birth of Christ; and they were so sacred and mysterious that Saṁkara, the earliest known of the Vedāntic philosophers, was prompted to prepare commentaries on them. Winternitz has classified the important Upaniṣads in three chronological groups: Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad, Chāndogya-U., Taittiriya-U., Aitareya-U., Kena-U., Kauśitaki-U. (all of which are in ancient prose), Kaṭha-U., Isa-U., Svetāsvatara-U., Muṇḍaka-U., Mahānārāyaṇiya-U. (which are composed in ancient verse), Praśna-U., Māṇḍūkya-U., and Maitri-U. (which are in later prose). Saṁkara has not commented on the Kauśitaki (although he cites from it) nor on the Mahānārāyaṇiya: perhaps they were unimportant during his days.

The Upaniṣads grew at different times and in different conferences (pariṣads) of philosophers; they are by no means all of them integrated structures. It is historical blindness to suppose that all the Upaniṣads uphold a common viewpoint or a common system of thought. From about 1200 B.C. to about 500 B.C. the intellectual pulse of the country was throbbing with great vitality, and numerous academic sessions independently arrived at different ideological conclusions. There may indeed have been communication between such sessions, and correspondence in philosophical formulations is not unknown
in the Upaniṣads but the claim that all the Upaniṣads were meant to crystallize a particular doctrinal system is untenable. But the style of Upaniṣadic composition lends itself to extensive interpretations which in turn bend the contents to suit any creed or dogma. And this is actually what has happened, and the result is seen in the warring Vedāntic schools. Regardless of this latest phase of Upaniṣadic history, it should be conceded that such of these Confidential Documents as are accreditedly ancient represent not only the intellectual brilliance of a high order, but an honest and intuitive alertness that any nation may justly be proud of.

The Indian attaches, naturally enough, great importance to the Upaniṣads; but it is remarkable that these quaint, most unintelligible, texts have enthusiastically been receive abroad. Schopenhauer’s enthusiasm for the Upaniṣads is well-known. It is uncertain how much of Upaniṣadic philosophy this honest German philosopher could digest, but he burst out in passionate compliments: “From every sentence, deep original and sublime thoughts arise, and the whole is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit.... In the whole world there is no study, except that of the originals, so beautiful, and so elevating as that of the Oupnekhat. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death!” Oupnekhat is the Persian corruption of the Sanskrit Upaniṣad; and Schopenhauer was referring to Anquetel Duperron’s Latin version published in 1802, on the basis of Dārā Shukoh’s Persian Oupnekhat of 1675. I have called the European enthusiasm for the Upaniṣads remarkable: for the feelings and sentiments, terms and thoughts that the Upaniṣads are made up of are peculiarly and characteristically Indian, and Indian of a bygone age. During the early centuries of the Christian era, they were enigmatic and obscure even to Indians: hence the necessity for Śaṅkara’s commentaries! Gough is not to be blamed for describing the Upaniṣads as mere babblings of a primitive race, of a “barbarous and unprogressive community”; for that is how the Upaniṣads would appear to one unacquainted with the mysterious modes of the Indian quest after perfection.
Development of Psychological Thought in India

Intent Introspections

From the Vedic temperament to the Upaniṣadic, the passage involves a noticeable shift. The Vedic poet was pious, and his fine sensitivity was held captive in the objective magnificence of phenomena; now and then he looked within himself, but inquiry into the inner mystery was not his vocation. When he moved from prayer to sacrifice, his attention was entangled in the welter of ritualistic details; and in this entanglement it lost its pristine vigour. We have before us as illustrations of this loss the Brāhmaṇas: lifeless enumerations of the meaningless details of a myraid of ceremonies and sacrifices. But the naturally robust mind of the ancient Indian shook off this shackle in the dawn of the Upaniṣadic period. The Upaniṣads are no longer the inspired ejaculations of excited poets, but cogent presentations of deep cogitations; the mind that produced them was reflective, not given to flights of fancy. The author is not a poet (although some Upaniṣads exhibit very fine literary flourish), but essentially a philosopher.

The important feature in this shift was the increased employment of introspection. The philosopher is less preoccupied with objective appearances than the poet; he introverts his attention to his own inner world. An Upaniṣad actually mentions this shift from the extro-vert orientation to the intro-vert; there is mention of the opening of the inward eye; and there is also a hint at the unnaturalness, or at least the unusualness, of this procedure. The Ṛg-veda is acquainted with four methods of acquiring knowledge; sensory perception or observation²; testimony by one who knows³; reasoning or ‘investigation by mind’; and finally ‘heated insight’, tapas⁴. It is not clear in the Vedic context as to what the fourth method actually consisted in; but tapas as a major method of arriving at inner truths plays a prominent rôle in the Upaniṣadic period. The other methods were of course employed but only as supplementary to tapas. The Taittiriya-Upaniṣad boldly proclaims: "By tapas wilt thou understand."⁶.
Thus *tapas* came to acquire in later times the meaning of austerity but originally the word had strong etymological associations with the ‘heated’ mind. I do not preclude from the possible origins of the word the production of ‘heat’ by auto-hypnotic practices in the savage communities. But I intend emphasising the deliberate and methodical application of mental faculties that was indispensably involved in all such practices; the firm holding of the mind against odds of all type generates ‘heat’. And this internal ‘heat’—even if a metaphorical expression—makes for visions not possible in ordinary states. The Vedic poet regarded even dream as born of the ‘heated’ mind. These extraordinary perceptions obtained by ‘heating’ the mind in a prescribed manner were what the Upaniṣadic philosopher looked for.

The ‘heat’ was necessary not only for the realisation of spiritual truths but for the ordinary understanding of one’s own psychological mechanisms as well. As applied to the latter, *tapas* in plain language would represent intent introspection by means of which the subtle events that occur in the heart or head would flash before the inward vision. The Upaniṣadic thinker passionately advocated self-observation as the proper study of man. We hear the voice of Yājñavalkya rising above the contemporary squabble of intellectual anarchy: “The self indeed is to be seen and heard, thought of and reflected upon!”8. This then was the outlook of the Upaniṣadic philosopher: investigation into the subjective world of man. And the major method that he employed in his search for psychological facts was introspection.

Prayer and sacrifice, worship and ritual were dismissed summarily as preoccupations of inferior and immature personalities, or in more generous moods were sublimated into picturesque symbolism. The emphasis of the new age was not on action patterns prescribed by religious texts, but on the liberating knowledge of one’s own real nature. There was no longer an enthusiasm to commune with the outside forces of nature and beyond; it was substituted by an eagerness to reconcile with oneself. Reflection and not prayer, self-study and not
ritual, meditation and not sacrifice, man and not the universe were the major notes of the Upaniṣadic orchestra.

The Problem of Person

Who is man? What is the stuff he is made of? What is his real nature? These are the questions that confront us at every turn in these Confidential Documents. The Vedic poets had already suspected that the visible was not the real, that hidden within the material mass was the spirit, unseen and intangible but nevertheless a mover. The Upaniṣadic thinker clearly formulated a philosophy of the Person, structurally totally dissociated from the body. Before this extreme position was reached, there were even in the Vedic records uneasy and unsuccessful adventures in the same direction. The Sanskrit word for person is ‘puruṣa’, by no means unknown to the Vedic poet. In fact, as an early portion in the Ṛg-veda is included an entire section dealing with puruṣa (Puruṣa-sūkta). But the conception here is cosmic in import: they speak of the puruṣa with a thousand heads, a thousand feet, the puruṣa who envelops the world in all directions and transcends it; he is the material and spiritual ground of the entire universe (skambha in the words of Atharva-veda). But as we approach the Brāhmaṇa stage of Vedic thought, we find that the imaginative exuberance has considerably subsided. Alongside the cosmic puruṣa, the Aitareya-āraṇyaka (3,2,3) mentions the human puruṣa, the puruṣa of the metres, and the puruṣa in the sacrifice. In the Satapatha-brāhmaṇa¹⁰ we suddenly find that puruṣa is no longer the magnificent cosmic being with thousands of parts, but a much humbler one of but seventeen aspects: ten vital breaths, two hands, two feet, a torso, neck and head. Verily a human puruṣa! And the puruṣa of the Gopatha-brāhmaṇa¹¹ is identified by hair, skin, marrow, bone and brain.

There are numerous references in the Upaniṣads¹² which indicate this transformation of the cosmic Puruṣa into the psychological person; and an Upaniṣad even refers to the former as non-human (amānava)¹³, in which the Upaniṣadic thinker was fast losing interest. The early explanation of the
Development in the Confidential Documents

word puruṣa as one who before creation burnt up all evils was replaced at this stage by a later one that puruṣa was so called because he 'dwelt in the citadel (of heart)—an individualised soul, or 'person' of modern psychology. Man came to occupy the centre of attention, and at this point sustained psychological speculation became an integral part of philosophical endeavours in the country for times to come. We are not here concerned with the profusion of metaphysical and eschatological implications extant in this important transition from the cosmological standpoint to the psychological. Our main interest is to delineate the speculations current at this period concerning man, his nature and his constitution.

Plants and animals have life like man: but plants have only sap in them, and animals awareness of a crude kind. Intelligence is essentially man's attribute: among all the forms of life he alone speaks, makes observations and plans his activities. This indicates progression, propelled by the inherent urge in life to multiply and attain to superior possibilities of manifestation. This is in the Upaniṣads metaphorically described as 'conquering higher worlds'. But the person is not a product of this progression, but the ground of all changes that are involved in progression. The ultimate and fundamental unit of the universe is not obscured by the multiplicity of beings, and the Upaniṣads are unequivocal regarding this position. The person is characterised by 'desire' (kāma), 'light' (tejas), and 'purpose' (kratu): Desire is an old concept: it occurs even in the Rg-veda. The 'Nāsadiya-Sūkta' in the Tenth Book mentions the emergence of desire as the first-born from the inscrutably dark state before creation. The desire as the primaeval urge to express is frequently found in the Upaniṣadic passages: 'He desired: May I become many'17. It is the very basis of all life-functions, and occurs in the human being also as one of his major processes. The 'light' signifies consciousness, which we will discuss in the subsequent section. The 'purpose' is the necessary background of all action: it comprehends not only the volitional activities in human life, but the deeper
motivational factors of organismic nature also. Further, there is a hint, however vague, that even personality organisation is referred to in this context, for consider this statement from Chāndogya-Upaniṣad: “Let man form for himself a purpose; he is composed of purposes”\textsuperscript{21}

The person in the Upaniṣadic analysis functions in five dimensions: body, sensations, mind, consciousness and bliss\textsuperscript{22}. The original Sanskrit for dimension is kośa which really signifies ‘case’, ‘sheath’, ‘covering’; but the import of this metaphorical expression is ‘functional field’ or ‘phase of activity’. While describing the koṣas, the Upaniṣad speaks of them almost as layers, rather like the Pandora’s boxes: contained within, and filled by, the body is the kośa of sensations; contained within, and filled by, the sensations is the mind; contained within, and filled by, the mind is consciousness; and finally contained within, and filled by, consciousness is bliss. But there is no indication that, excepting the body and to an extent sensations, the koṣas were looked upon as concrete ‘coverings’; rather, they represent psychological abstractions. The body, made up of ‘food’ (and hence called annamaya-kośa), is the physical basis of the person’s functions; it occurs concretely as a structure and facilitates the person’s individuation. It gives him a relatively stable external form. Not so physical, nor so stable, is the pattern of sensations. The original for ‘sensation’ is prāṇa which really means ‘breathing’, ‘vital current’; but the Upaniṣads usually employ the word in the sense of sensation. In the present context the expression indicates the presence of life which animates the body and generates sensations therein; unlike the body, it is not seen but its influence is felt. Based on the body, this aspect further individuates the person. The next dimension in which the person is said to function is mind (manomaya), which represents the transition from the concrete to the abstract. Perceptual processes and ideations of all type are included in this phase: they are indirectly expressed and inferentially cognised. The dimension of consciousness (vijñāna) will be considered in detail in the ensuing section; suffice it
here to mention that this forms the very core of personal life, and is not to be confused with the usual mental operations. Finally, ‘bliss’ is inadequate English for अनन्द; and its import is not easily realised unless we appreciate fully the illustration that is usually given of bliss, namely, deep and dreamless sleep. The utter and refreshing satisfaction that results on waking up from sound sleep is evidence for the undifferentiated comfort during that state. The phase in life where objects and ego are dissolved, where sensations and ideations do not arise, is said to be the most natural phase; the other phases are mere disturbances from this condition of rest. Are we to recognise in this the germs of a conception of homeostasis?

Function in the five dimensions serves the purpose of enabling the person to ‘rule over everything, govern the world’ —in modern words, to exercise control over the environment. The essential nature of the person, however, is said to be consciousness, although it is ‘made of mind’ and ‘dwells in heart’. It is interesting to read in one of the Upaniṣads that even the body is an aspect of consciousness. Yes, when the body is ill, consciousness gets clouded; and when one is about to die the body is said to groan under the weight of consciousness, even as the heavily loaded cart goes creaking. When referring to the person’s essential nature, the word self (ātman) is employed. In the Upaniṣads the expressions self and consciousness are interchangeable.

The Theory of Consciousness

The Upaniṣadic thinker readily recognised the importance of consciousness as the basic principle in all manifestations of life; and they formulated an elaborate, intricate and profound theory of consciousness. This was the solution they arrived at in their endeavour to explain human nature. The Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad has the following interesting dialogue between the unusually academic-minded sovereign Janaka and the profound sage Yājñavalkya. The sovereign questions and the sage answers:

“What serves man for light?” “Sun” “When the sun has set?” “Moon” “When the moon also has set?”
"Fire" "When the fire has gone out?" "Speech" "When the speech is hushed?" "Ones own consciousness".

Light indicates the favourable condition for transaction: "for sitting, moving around and doing work" (in the words of Yajñavalkya). The other favourable conditions such as receptivity, ideational facility and competence for response closely follow the first and fundamental condition, namely consciousness. Hence it is described as 'the light of lights'. It is not merely the presence, but also a power. It is the internal guide and control for all experience and action.

The world 'Ātman' is both interesting and intriguing. It occurs infrequently in the early Vedic records; it is only in the Atharva-veda that the crystallised word stares us in the face. In the Upaniṣads, however, it is perhaps the only expression that is most tossed about. This sudden rise to eminence is explicable by the synthetic character of the word: it comprehends all that the archaic thinker wanted to say about the conative, affective and cognitive aspects of human life.

The word unfortunately is of obscure origin. Scholars have tried to trace the word to the root an, which according to Śāyaṇa means 'to live', 'to breathe', and according to Vopadeva 'to act', 'to move': this would represent ātman as the dynamic principle of breathing. There are others who hold to the root at in the sense of 'pervading': ātman is the principle that fills the body and enlivens it. It is possible that the Sanskrit word is related to the Greek ἀτμος (ἀτμος) which means 'vapour', 'smoke'. Indeed the conception of life emerged this way: it is well-known to the anthropologists that all animistic ideas in primitive society stemmed from beliefs about the all-pervading but intangible vapour. It is interesting also to consider in this context the suggested affiliation of the word brahman (in the Upaniṣads, the counterpart of ātman) with the Latin flagro meaning 'fire': ātman is the internal fire, giving light and also heat (necessary for life). It is thus essentially a hidden dynamic principle, a fundamental capacity, a power in the background. It is not directly seen, but intuitively inferred; in fact, even
seeing is a derived power, derived from ātman.

Although in different contexts it is said to 'reside in the heart' as sword in a sheath, it is undoubtedly the prevailing doctrine in the Upaniṣads that it pervades the entire body, even as the fire in the āraṇi fuel or, to employ a modern analogy, like electricity in the live wire. When a late Upaniṣad describes ātman as 'the smokeless flame in the heart', it has only a metaphorical import. The more serious illustration, however, is that of salt dissolved in water: it 'consists through and through entirely of savour'. It is by no means physical, occupying space; its description as of the size of 'a barley grain', or of 'the thumb' is only meant to drive home its imperceptibility associated with great capacities.

When consciousness gets enclosed in the corporeal frame, we speak of it as an individual, subjectively cognised as 'self'; and it is this sense that has survived in our present-day idea of ātman. The individuated consciousness is equipped with instruments of life, apprehension and expression; and the instruments are collectively designated as prāṇa. The doctrine of prāṇa, the origins of which we have considered in Inspired Poetry, is greatly elaborated in the Upaniṣads. Prāṇa etymologically signifies the invigorating power which is incessantly active in life; the organisation of the living body implies a vital principle which provides the potentiality for experience and action. All beings are sustained as long as prāṇa inhabits them. Respiration, which the word originally meant, came later to represent only a phase of prāṇa's activity. We find frequently in the Upaniṣads the mention of prāṇas in the plural: the word is used for physiological functions like alimentary system (apāna), metabolism (samāna), and circulation (vyāna); and also for special sense-functions like vision, audition and olfaction. But the main import of the word seems to be the non-conscious self-preservation functions of the organism (vidhāraṇā) in contradistinction to the conscious, non-vital, intellectual processes. "As spokes are inserted into the navel of a wheel, so everything is inserted in prāṇa"; the presence of prāṇa stimulates the organs to their respective functions.
even when in stupor (samshmoха) one sees not, hears not, speaks not and thinks not, he lives, for prãna continues. It is nevertheless interesting that Kausitaki identifies prãna with consciousness (pra;jñã); the argument is that without the basic-consciousness no organ can function. While the expression átman is employed to designate subjective consciousness, it would appear that the term prãna signifies objective consciousness, as inhereing in the body.

Sense and Common Sense

The equipments of life for apprehension and action are called ‘capacities’ (indriyas) in the Upaniṣads; there also occurs in these texts a fairly elaborate discussion concerning them. While these capacities are collectively known as prãna, individually they are styled as ‘senses’ or rather ‘graspers’ (graha): grasp, seize hold of, the objects of the environment and render consciousness ‘bound’ with them. They are entirely physical in character. Yajñavalkya mentions to Jaratkārava in the Brhadāranyak-a-Upaniṣad that senses as apprehenders are eight in number: eye (apprehending appearances), ear (catching sounds), smell (receiving odours), tongue (getting in tastes) skin (grasping touches), mind (cognising desires), speech (working with names), and hands (performing actions). To this number another leading Upaniṣadic thinker Gārgyāyaṇī added three more: feet (performing movements), sex-organs (causing delight) and intelligence (cognising thoughts). By the time we leave the Upaniṣadic period, these amorphous cogitations concerning sense function get crystallised into a list of ten senses in two groups: senses of apprehension: eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin; and senses of performance: vocal organs for speech, hands for prehension, feet for locomotion, sex-organ for procreation and the organs of elimination of waste. It should, however, be noted that in their nomenclature the Upaniṣadic thinkers were rather careless: they hardly seem to distinguish between structure and function.

A frequent theme in the Upaniṣadic texts is what is known as the ‘War of Senses’: the animated discussion among the
five senses (eye, ear, speech, mind and prāṇa) for supremacy is finally settled in favour of prāṇa.

"Now the senses started quarrelling among themselves, each claiming superiority for itself, saying ‘I am superior!’ They then went to their father Prajāpati, and asked: ‘Sir, Which of us is most superior?’ He said to them: That one without which the body is very worst off is the most superior among you’. Speech then left the body and went off. He remained away for a year and on returning was surprised to find that the body continued as it ever used to, if only as dumb. Then eye went off, then ear, and then mind, but when they returned they found that body continued, if only as blind, as deaf, or as a simpleton. It was now prāṇa’s turn to go off, but when it attempted to go they all cried: ‘Do not go! Remain, You are the most superior!’, for as a fine horse would pull out the very pegs to which it is tied prāṇa pulled out the other senses”.

The story is interesting in more details than one. The senses are here called prāṇas and are spoken of as Prajāpati’s children; the Atharva-veda identified Prajāpati with prāṇa while the Maitri-Upaniṣad takes Prajāpati in the sense of individuality. The allegory suggests that various senses are merely specific emanations of consciousness, modifications or structurings thereof.

This is also what the final moral of the tale points to: And there is a distinction between the essential biological functions and the secondary functions. Again, they suggest the possibility of mind’s absence in biological function: the Upaniṣad describes the state like that of simpletons, as ‘mindless’ (amanasah) which expression is interpreted by Śaṅkara as ‘underdeveloped minds’.

The senses are subordinated in their function to mind, which is described in the Upaniṣads as the common sense, the sense common to all the other senses. This psychical equipment which depends for its quality and efficiency upon the food that we take is termed manas from the root man, ‘to think’. Originally it appears to have had a very general meaning,
comprehending all dispositions and feelings, conceptions and volitions; but in due course it came to signify specifically "that faculty in an organised body which thinks". The nebulous conjectures during this period suggest that there was already a two-fold division of mental function: transformation of sense-impressions into ideas, and stamping the ideas with resolves (saṃkalpa). The former function engages the five senses of apprehension, while the latter the senses of performance. The Kaṭha makes mind the bridle for senses as horses yoked to the waggon of body; the Maitrāyaṇī likens mind to the driver, senses of apprehension to the reins and senses of performance to the horses. Without the conjoint operation of mind, no sense can possibly function effectively. Even when the object is in front of us we may fail to perceive it owing to some preoccupation: how often do we not say, "I did not see, my mind was elsewhere!"? The Upaniṣad cites such instances and concludes that the function of mind is shared in common with all the senses; it is in this sense that manas is sometimes identified with prāṇa.

But mind is not to be confused with consciousness: mind is in its constitution physical and in its function biological. It is an instrument, an equipment, a capacity of prāṇa; its function continues in waking and dreaming, but during deep sleep it is resolved in what we call the vegetative function of the body. Consciousness, on the other hand, would continue even in deep sleep, and is the background for the physical frame and the biological functions.

Conditions of consciousness

The consideration of consciousness, mind and senses brings us to the Upaniṣadic analysis of human experience in three states: waking, dreaming and sleeping. The distinction between these states is really of Vedic origin, but a systematic inquiry into them is the Upaniṣadic achievement. Of especial interest in this connection is a short and late Upaniṣad, Māṇḍūkya, which deals exclusively with this problem; it has acquired celebrity by an excellent gloss over it by the famous philosopher of mediaeval times, Gauḍapāda, which in turn was annotated upon by the
great Śaṅkara. The doctrine of the three conditions of consciousness grew to immense importance in the later Vedāntic schools after the seventh century A.D.

The waking condition (jāgrat) which is ‘common to all men’ (as the Māṇḍūkyya says) involves the operation of senses along with mind. When the prāṇa stimulates the sense organs to be alert, the objective processes of the world pour into the individual, and the mind is busily engaged in receiving and registering them. Consciousness in this condition is supposed to work under conditions quite foreign to it: in the archaic terminology, it is ‘the condition of being in this world’\(^5\). There is here object-consciousness and also transaction with the outer world.

The dreaming condition (svapna) which is ‘inwardly cognitive’ occurs when the individual has gone to sleep: the senses are shut and no longer do they carry messages from the outer world, but mind continues to be busy. The Atharva-veda looks upon dreaming as a condition ‘which is neither alive nor dead’\(^3\). The transaction with objects around is suspended, and the individual withdraws entirely; but the impressions left behind from waking experiences engage the mind. It is physiological rest and psychological activity. The Upaniṣad describes the latter: “When an individual falls asleep, he takes from the objective world its timber, himself cuts it down and builds it up by his own light...There are really no objects (in the dream); but the dreamer projects them from himself...He is a creator...As a great fish moves along both the banks of the stream, even so the dreamer moves along the two conditions: sleeping and waking”\(^1\). The rôle of impressions in dreaming is an important factor, but the dream may be merely reproductive, or may involve a creative process. One is said to fancy in dream only what he has seen in the waking state; “One fancies in dream only that fear which he sees in waking”\(^5\). The contribution of fancy to the bizarre presentations of dream forms has however been fully appreciated. Psychoanalysts would be intrigued to find in an early Upaniṣad (composed earlier than 500 B.C.) the following statement: He who desires, dreams; he who does not
desire does not dream". To be considered in the same context is the remark from another early Upaniṣad about ‘moving happily in a dream’ and another description that the dreamer’s world is his ‘pleasure-ground’. Here consciousness is partially awake and partially asleep: it is characterised as a ‘twilight state’ where one sees this world as well as the other world.

The state of deep, dreamless sleep (ṣuṣupti) which occurs “when one knows nothing whatsoever, having crept through the seventy-two thousand channels called hitā, which lead from the heart to the pericardium, one rests in the pericardium” is clearly a condition of perfect rest, wherein along with the senses mind also ceases to function. The condition is said to be non-conscious (asaṃjñī) in the sense that neither the objects nor their impressions determine in any way the individual orientation. The senses, which are responsible for our daily transaction with the environment, are withdrawn into, or immersed in, the prāṇa; there is no experience therefore of any type: no perceptions, no desires and no dreams. In this ‘marvellous phenomenon of sleep’ consciousness gets perfectly tranquil, serene and whole (samasta). There is a suggestion that fatigue is the reason for the restful state of sleep: “Even as an eagle, having flown in air, gets tired, folds its wings and descends to its nest, even so an individual fatigued from the waking life falls asleep”. This is said to be the ‘natural condition of consciousness’ and hence we return to it periodically.

The Modes of Mentation

Man’s conscious intellectual operations come in for consideration in several Upaniṣads. There is in one of the early texts a quaint enumeration of what may now be termed psychobiological processes; the purpose here perhaps was to work out a casual sequence. All our transactions are carried out by speech (vāc), the lingual faculty; but speech is impossible without mind (manas) as the volitional agent; and there can be no volitional process whatever, unless conception (saṅkalpa) is in the background. Conception involves thinking (citta) which
in turn involves application (dhyāna). Application is intent attention to an object, and is commonly described as meditation. In this connection, the Upaniṣad makes an interesting observation: “Small people quarrel, carry tales and slander; but superior ones meditate. The greatness of any person is a partial reward for his meditation.” Application stems from understanding (vijñāna) as the fundamental object-orientation. At this point the chain is broken by the interpolation of purely biological categories such as physical strength, food intake, water absorption and the necessary heat in body. And the thread is resumed when memory (smara) is made responsible for understanding. This is an insightful psychological observation bringing out the importance of memory traces in our transactions; “without memory one could not even identify his children!” Memory in this fundamental capacity is made to depend upon aspiration (āsā) which forms the background for all learning and other actions. Aspiration in this context is more biological in import than psychological; it signifies instinctive predispositions. And it is said to be rooted in life (prāna). Doubtless, it is an interesting account of the psychological life of man.

The Aitareya7 presents an interesting list of mentations: consciousness (samjñāna), perception (ajñāna), discrimination (vijñāna), intelligence (prajñāna), wisdom (medhā), insight (dṛṣṭi), perseverance (dhṛtī), thought (mati), impulse (jūti), memory (smṛtī), conception (saṁkalpa), purpose (kratu), desire (kāma), and will (vāsa). There are only vague identifications of these psychological categories in the Upaniṣadic period; but it was given to the later commentators, especially Śaṅkara, to define the concepts with considerable precision.

REFERENCES

1 Kaṭha, 4th Vallī, 1
2 Rgveda. 1. 184. 2; 8. 25. 9; 10. 67. 2
3 Ibid. 1. 164. 4; 10. 129. 6
4 Ibid. 10. 81. 4; 10. 4. 5
5 Ibid. 8. 59. 6: also Taittirīya-Saṃhitā, 5. 3. 5. 4
6 * Bhṛgu-Vallis*, 3. 1. “Tapasā-vijijñāsasva!”
Development of Psychological Thought in India

7 Atharva-veda, 19. 56. 5
8 Brhadaranyaka, 2. 4. 5
9 RgVeda, 10.90
10 Satapatha-brahma, 6.2.2.9
11 Gopatha-brahma, Second Half, 6.6.8
12 E.g. Brhadaranyaka, 2.5.1f; Muni, 2.1.2,3
13 Chandogya, 4. 15.5
14 Brhadaranyaka, 1.4.1
15 Aitareya, 3.5.3
16 Chandogya, 3.14.1
17 "So'kāmāyata: Bahusyaṁ prajāyeyeti"
18 Aitareya, 3.5.1
19 Brhadaranyaka, 5.15; also Isavan, 17. 'kratu' and 'kṛta'.
20 Aitareya, 3.5.1
21 Chandogya, 3.14.1
22 Taittiriya, 3.1-7
23 Brhadaranyaka, 5.6; also Svetasvatara, 3,12-13
24 Ibid, 4.3.35
25 Kausitaki, 3.5
26 Brhadaranyaka, 4.3.35
27 Ibid, 4.3.1f
28 "an prāñane", Sāyaṇa on RgVeda, 10. 12.3
29 "an cēṣṭāyāṁ".
30 "at sātatyagamane; yaḥ atati āpnoti sa ātmā"
31 Chandogya, 8.3.3. The etymological explanation of heart (hṛdayam) is said to be "This one is in the heart" (hṛdi ayam).
32 Brhadaranyaka, 2.4.12
33 Svetasvatara, 3.13
34 Chandogya, 1.11.5
35 Ibid, 7.15.1
36 Kausitaki, 3.7
37 Ibid, 3.3
38 Ibid, 3.4
39 Ibid, 3.7
40 Brhadaranyaka, 3.1.1-6
41 Kausitaki, 1.7
42 Chandogya, 5.1 6-12; Brhadaranyaka, 6:1.7-13; Kausitaki, 2.14
43 Brhadaranyaka includes semen also as as one of the contestants
44 Atharva-veda, 11, 2, 4, 12
45 Maitri, 2.5
46 Chandogya, 6.5.1; 7. 26.2
47 Aitareya-aramyaka, 2.4.3.6
48 Kaṭha, 3.3.4
Development in the Confidential Documents

40 Maitri, 2.6.
45 RgVeda, 10.164; Atharva-veda, 19.56.57
51 Brhadaranyaka, 4.3.9
52 Atharva-veda, 6.46.1
58 Brhadaranyaka, 4.3.9-18
54 Ibid, 4.3.20
55 Ibid, 3.3.19
56 Chandogya, 8.10.1
57 Brhadaranyaka, 4.3.13
58 Ibid, 2.1.19 (Hume's translation)
59 Praśna, 4.2; Chandogya, 4.3.3; 6.8.2; also Satapatha-brahmaṇa, 10.3.3c
60 Brhadaranyaka, 4.3.19f; Manjuśūkya, 5
61 Brhadaranyaka, 4.3.21
62 Chandogya, 8.6.3
63 Brhadaranyaka, 43.19
64 Manjuśūkya, 6
65 Chandogya, 7.1-15 (Sanatkumāra’s instructions to Nārada)
66 Ibid, 7.6.1
67 Aitareya, 3.5.1
CHAPTER III

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE

The Sources of Sāṃkhya-Yoga

The Confidential Documents engineered an intellectual revolution in the country: they relaxed the Vedic hold on the élite concerning ritualistic obsessions, and stimulated free inquiry into cosmological and psychological problems. One of the brilliant children of this revolution was the Sāṃkhya system of thought. We do not know when exactly, where or how, this exceedingly bold and interesting note was struck in our intellectual adventure; it is unfortunate that its origins are immersed in utter obscurity. But it is certainly the oldest of Indian schools of philosophy, and it is also certain that its prevalence closely followed the heels of the Upaniṣadic period. It is not improbable that this style of thinking emerged directly from the teachings of that foremost sage of the early Upaniṣadic period, Yājñavalkya. In fact, Kapila, reputed as the founder of this system, was a Vedic sage of the hoary and almost mythical past; but his disciple Āsuri appears in the Brhadāraṇyaka as Yājñavalkya’s pupil; and his supposed successor in the Sāṃkhya list of teachers, Pañcaśikha, is mentioned in the epic, Mahābhārata, as having met the king Janaka at Mithila. Although it is not easy to find in the ancient Upaniṣads definite indications of the Sāṃkhya influence, comparatively later texts like Śvetāsvatara (5.2; 4.5) and Maitrāyaṇi (3.2; 5.2) betray a marked impact of this ideology. We may reasonably assume that it was during the close of the Upaniṣadic period (about 600 B.C.) that the Sāṃkhya system rose to eminence as a rational discipline.

Our uncertainty regarding its origin and our ignorance concerning the exact meaning of its name need not hold us from appreciating the importance of this system. It was
Psychological Theory and Practice

ostensibly atheistic in orientation, and held out knowledge as the highest objective in human life. It was the first systematic attempt to formulate a view-point on the sole basis of reason, disregarding entirely authority from unseen sources. Although in the early stages it seems to have met with no resistance, its academic rigour had to be toned down considerably owing to aggression from the orthodox quarters in later times. And when this was done, its ideology became the backbone of most of the other systems of thought in the country. The fact that it was originally a work of irreverent men with little religious belief was readily condoned by the orthodox; the Vedic etymologist, Yaska, apparently had the Sāṃkhya thinkers in mind when he remarked: "Whatever meaning a learned one deduces by reasoning comes to acquire authority equal to the inspired utterances of the sages".

It is true that the Sāṃkhya ideology did not get settled in a day; it is also true that during the long course of its development a multiplicity of standpoints was occasioned. There are theistic and atheistic Sāṃkhyas; there are also differences, minor however, regarding the enumeration and definition of categories. But the mainstream with a distinct psychological orientation has survived through these vicissitudes. If we let the mythical Kapila (whom even the great Saṅkara could not identify) enjoy his obscurity, Āsuri is the next prominent name in the Sāṃkhya history belonging to an uncertain past. He is known to have held that the individual soul is the 'foundation' or 'foot-step' (Padāniya) of all the functions; and that its equipment includes powers, reception, mind and speech. But it was his student, Pañcaśikha (first century A. D.) whom we meet in the 'Śāntiparvan' of Mahābhārata, that brought back to life the ancient Kapila. His teachings are reflected in the Sāṃkhya standpoint of Caraka (about 78 A. D.). It is heartening to discover that at this remote period in the past, Pañcaśikha taught that man is a 'functional field (kṣetra) of constitutional forces (guṇas)', with the individual soul (puruṣa) at its vortex. He appears to have laid emphasis on the natural origination (svabhāva) of
phenomena: nature spreads the web of forces within which the soul gets involved and obscured. The last celebrity in the succession of masters after Pañcaśikha was Iśvarakṛṣṇa (whom Takakusu and Keith identify with Vindhyavāsin), who probably lived in the second century of the Christian era but certainly not later than the fourth century. The so-called orthodox Sāṁkhya is associated with his Sāṁkhya-kārika, a little work of 69 verses in the āryā metre. The oldest commentary on this oldest extant Sāṁkhya work was by one Māṭhara (who, incidentally, gives the number of verses as 73); and this was translated into Chinese by Paramārtha during the Khan dynasty (557-589 A. D.). Another celebrated commentary goes under the authorship of Gauḍapāda, the elder contemporary of Śaṅkara (6th century?). Still another is Tattvakaumudi by Vācaspatimisra who lived about the eighth century.

Iśvarakṛṣṇa's work is in the nature of a brief manual, and definitely presupposes a rich literary background; but unfortunately no Sāṁkhya texts prior to his time are extant, although we hear occasionally of Saṣṭiśātra, Sāṁkhyaśātra and Tattvasamāsa. On the basis of an ancient Sāṁkhya text now lost to us, Vijñānabhikṣu, who lived in the sixteenth century, composed his Pravacanabhaṣya. He appears anxious to reconcile the Sāṁkhya thought with the Upaniṣadic philosophy as systematised in Vedānta; and he endeavours to give a theistic turn to what in his days were essentially atheist tenets. It is amusing to consider his attempt to explain away the rejection of God by the Sāṁkhyaans as 'a concession to the popular views', and as calculated to dissuade folk from an excessive and futile absorption in the subject of God. But Dasgupta argues that originally the Sāṁkhya system was theistic but that it was Pañcaśikha who gave it the atheist turn - he further argues that the standpoint of this 'pristine theist Sāṁkhya was retained by Patañjali, the well-known exponent of the Yoga system.

It is well known that Sāṁkhya has furnished the back-ground for the Yoga system; Yoga is claimed sometimes as an improvement over Sāṁkhya. All the early descriptions of the
Yoga school were as a branch of the Sāmkhya ideology. We find in the Mahābhārata an attempt to transform the philosophical Sāmkhya into a religious discipline, and to reconcile the Sāmkhya theory with the Yoga practice; the standpoint assumed by the celebrated Bhagavadgītā reflects this attempt. It is interesting to find in Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra, Sāmkhya, Yoga and the Lokāyata school of materialists clubbed under the common denomination, anvikaśaki. The early Buddhist biography, Lalitavistara, includes both Sāmkhya and Yoga in the curriculum of study of the young Buddha. Haribhadra, the fifth century author of the compendium Saḍdarśana-samuccaya, considers the Sāmkhya and Yoga schools together. Dasgupta mentions a Kitab Pātanjal (the book of Patañjali) which Alberuni translated along with ‘Kapila’s Saṅka’ (Sāmkhya).

Beyond doubt Sāmkhya-Yoga represents an old tendency in the country, decisively pre-Buddhist. Gough is probably right in tracing the origin of Yoga in the primitive ecstatic rites of the dark-skinned aborigines: the Sanskrit word for asceticism, tapas, signifies ‘heat’, ‘warmth’, ‘fervour’—the internal heat generated by hard practices. That this system was originally outside the circle of āryan orthodoxy (though in course of time it was included in some form or other as an essential in all systems) is suggested by the fact that no ācārya has cared to comment on the Yoga-Sūtras. But as a tendency its origin belongs to a distant past: Jacobi has identified a Yoga school as early as 300 B.C. The germ are to be discovered in the RgVeda itself and the influence of this system is clearly seen in the Svetāsvatara and Kaṭha Upaniṣads, leaving out of consideration several later Upaniṣads known specifically as Yoga Upaniṣads. It has lived vigorously in Indian tradition throughout the ages and in all the schools. Its distinguishing feature is the practical orientation: the Yoga philosophers were more interested in concrete methods of self-improvement than in theoretical speculations. All the various possible meanings of the word Yoga alike point to the practical aspect: ‘magical make-become’, ‘physical exercise’. 
Development of Psychological Thought in India

'skill', 'protecting the possession', 'mind-control', 'concentration', 'decorating', 'uniting'. The theme is man, and the end is efficiency, improvement or success.

The great name associated with this school is that of Patañjali, who in all probability was a historical personage of the third century A.D. belonging to South India: his Yogasūtra is the first systematic account we have of the Yoga techniques. But he was by no means the founder of this system; he was only an 'editor', as indicated by his commentators, Vācaspatimīśra and Vijñānavihikṣu. Tradition identifies him with the author of the celebrated Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyi, but modern scholarship is skeptical about it. The Yogasūtra has an important and voluminous commentary by Vyāsa, a fourth century writer, about whom we know very little. This in turn is equipped with a lucid and interesting gloss, Tattvavaiśāradī, by Vācaspatimīśra, the author of the Saṃkhya treatise, Tattvakaumudi. Vijñānavihikṣu, another Saṃkhya writer whom we have considered above, is the author of Yogavārtika, a celebrated text-book of this school.

Analysis of Experience

We live in a world of concrete objects; we see them around us, and transact with them. They are real, extended in space, independent of us, and material in constitution. But when we know them, they somehow get into us, belong to us, depend on us. As objects they exist in the outer world; but as images they occur within us. This transformation of objects into images is known as knowledge, an aspect of experience. The Saṃkhyan thinker proceeds with an examination of this position. The images, although internal, are often times exact copies of the objects; they emerge only subsequent to objective presentation; it is true they are not extended in space, but they always represent space. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that they are also material in character; not of course so gross as the outside objects, but subtle. In fact, we experience sensations and perceptions; the senses and mind which actively participate in this transaction are doubtless material. Material
processes are characterised by form and movement (objects have mass also). But, it is pointed out, we not only have sensations, and mental images, but we know that we have them; we are conscious of them. And we are in reality numerous, in accordance with objective presentations; but somehow we continue to retain our identity in the midst of a constantly changing network of images and sensations. Further, our being conscious of the images and sensations is not a quality warranted by the objects that evoke them; we must look for its explanation within ourselves, not in the objective world. Images and sensations are like objects in a dark room; they are there as real and material. But they do not appear to us, they are not known by us, unless light is brought into the room. All experiences, likewise, involve such illumination, which constantly endures despite the fleeting and changing contents of experience. The individual therefore has something within him which functions as a light, making experience possible.

In fact, each one of us employs the notion of ‘self’ which necessarily enters into all our knowings and doings; it gives in life a continuity and identity. But no one has sensed this ‘self’, or has had an image thereof: it is not an object. It has neither mass, nor form, nor movement. It functions as mere light, coördinating the diverse conscious states; it occurs uniformly as the background for all images and sensations. Āsuri described it as ‘foundation’, ‘foot-step’, (padaniya); Pañcásikha called it ‘knower of the field’ (kṣetrajña); the expression that has survived is ‘person’ (puruṣa). Puruṣa, as we have seen, is an old word, occurring even in the Vedic records and extensively employed in the Upaniṣads. But the Śaṅkhyan thinkers crystallised its connotation as ‘the principle behind consciousness’. As a result of their searching analysis of human experience they arrived at the irrefutable premise of an expericer in experiences, which is itself beyond experience.

This however, is not to be confused with the Upaniṣadic ‘Self’ (or ātman) which has dense mystical associations. The Śaṅkhyan puruṣa is out and out a psychological reality. “It is postulated as an element in our personality to illumine the
mental processes, which are the outcome of the physical organisation". It is not a truth that is intuitively apprehended; but an inference to explain the subjective aspect of experience. It is not immanent in the entire universe (as the Upaniṣadic ātman is) but is only an aspect of existence. And puruṣa is not 'one without a second'; the Sāṃkhya philosophers postulate the infinite plurality of puruṣas. There are in the world as many puruṣas as there are organisms; they are empirical individuals, and no transcendental subject as in Vedānta is implied here.

Although implied in experience, the puruṣa is not involved in it. Experience is an organisation of physical, physiological and psychological processes. The objects which are present in the outer world are material; characterised by mass and relative stability they tend to remain where they are unless disturbed by the application of external force. The Sāṃkhya theory employs the expression tamaś for physical processes which are the objective data of experience. When, however, the sense-organs apprehend these objects by means of physiological mechanisms, we speak of them as sensations which are also material processes but without the solidity and stagnancy which characterise the physical objects; these processes are distinguished by energy and activity. The intangible sensations do not stay, they constantly fluctuate. Such processes are denoted by the word rajas. Occasionally we see activity in the gross, material objects also. Thus, according to the Sāṃkhya, matter is distinguished by tamaś and rajas, mass and energy. The analysis of experience further reveals that there are processes beyond sensations: what we know as mental functions or thought, do not exhibit the characteristics of solidity or stability, nor can they be readily identified as activities although they incessantly change. They appear merely to 'shine forth', to reveal the presentational details. But they are material processes all the same, evoked by objective stimulations and occurring in the organism phenomenologically. The Sāṃkhya reserves the expression sattva for these exceedingly subtle operations which introduce the element of awareness and produce fleeting
images. Thought thus is distinguished by the predominance of \textit{sattva} and \textit{rajas}. The expression \textit{sat-tva} is significant: \textit{sat} means 'to be', 'being', 'existence'; and \textit{tva} is a conceptualising suffix. Here is an indication that it is not available for observation like \textit{tamas} and \textit{rajas}, but is a fact that is inferred; it is more abstract than concrete.

Thus an experience when analysed reveals the characters of physical, physiological and psychological processes, apart from indicating the presence of \textit{puruṣa}. The character of these processes is denoted by the term \textit{guṇa} \textsuperscript{14} which signifies 'capacity', 'potentiality', 'power', 'excellence': capacity to cognise (\textit{sattva}), capacity to work or make movements (\textit{rajas}), and capacity to be stable (\textit{tamas}); or in other words, illumination, energy and inertia. All material processes involve the interplay of these three capacities. The illustration of lamp is homely and apt: the light involves the interplay of the wick (\textit{tamas}), oil (\textit{rajas}) and flame (\textit{sattva}). But sometimes one, sometimes the other predominates: in the physical processes inertia prevails, in the physiological processes energy and in the psychological processes illumination. When, however, one capacity prevails the others are suppressed but not erased. These capacities operate in a functional field; in fact, they belong to the field. An old Śāṁkhya thinker, as we have seen, named it 'field' (\textit{kṣetra}), an outfit of the \textit{puruṣa}. This field is full of forces, often contrary to each other: activity and inertia; illumination and clouding: movement and restraint; facilitation and obstruction. Indeed there is the expression \textit{"the web of guṇas"} (\textit{guṇajāla}) to illustrate life. Experience, in its ultimate analysis, is found to involve the conjunction of the subjective aspect denoted by \textit{puruṣa} and the objective aspect denoted by \textit{prakṛti}.

\textit{The Idea of Evolution}

The Śāṁkhya theory looks upon the individual as a dynamic complex of material processes arranged round an immaterial, fundamental principle of consciousness. This distinction between \textit{puruṣa} and \textit{prakṛti} is the cardinal doctrine in this theory. But it was recognised that life involves their conjoint functioning;
the dust of prakṛti is somehow enchanted by the puruṣa (to borrow the fine expression of Radhakrishnan), the womb of prakṛti is impregnated by the puruṣa. This intimate association between the two incompatible principles calls for explanation.

The prakṛti is the sum-total of material processes, but without the light of consciousness it is blind and ineffective: the puruṣa on the other hand is a mere light and has no means of action. If prakṛti is blind, puruṣa is lame. Their companionship is described as ‘extraordinary’ (samyogaviśesa); the analogy is adduced of a blind man making a journey along with his lame friend who mounts on his back, showing the way. Action is in prakṛti but guidance comes transcendentally from puruṣa. They represent two inseparable tendencies that make up the world and make for its growth.

The Saṃkhya thinkers were perhaps the first group of human beings anywhere to believe in evolution. This was a necessary corollary to their conception of a continuously dynamic world. What we call world is only a field of interaction for the guṇas; it implies incessant change, a struggle for dominance between illumination, inertia and energy, which three streams of tendencies mix and un-mix successively. At one time, hypothetically, they must have been in a state of quiet balance. But, due to some inscrutable reason, they were thrown off this equipoise, and since then tension has been the lot of the guṇas; their ceaseless struggle to get back to rest has been a failure. Evolution is an expression of this failure. The Sanskrit for evolution is pariṇāma, which really means ‘effect’, ‘modification’. The Saṃkhya philosophers hold that effect is merely a modification of the cause; there can be no production of anything which did not exist before. It is of course absurd to imagine that something can come into being out of nothing: there are no creations, but only productions. The statue comes out as the product of the sculptor’s genius; but objectively it was all along hidden in the stone. Other illustrations are also furnished: oil in the sesame seeds, curd in milk, and so on. Vacaspati explains the effect as merely a manifestation (āvirbhāva) of what was hidden or obscure
The dominance of one guṇa over others that we considered above really belongs to this group of changes. In a solid object that is resting mass is manifest, but there is in it energy also, although in a latent form; when the object begins to move, energy becomes manifest and the mass is overcome. In the Sāṃkhya terminology, the former illustrates tamas being dominant, while the latter exhibits rajas overcoming it. No new material is ever added in the long procession of changes which evolution implies. What is real is development (udbhāva) amidst the contending forces of manifestation (prakāśa), activity (pravṛtti), and restraint (niyamana) representing the three guṇas.

But the Sāṃkhya theory does not reduce evolution to mere movement in circles, pointless and profitless. They postulate a direction, a purpose, a meaning, a design in the changes that have gone on and are going on. The material processes (prakṛti) are blind; they only work out the purpose of the puruṣa. It is the puruṣa that supplies the design for evolution; but he himself remains unchanged, unmodified. The Sāṃkhya view of the puruṣa's purpose is irrelevant to our discussion here. But what is important is that the need for transaction between the subjective consciousness and the objective environment is implied in this purpose. In fact, evolution is merely successive production of instruments that facilitate this transaction. The puruṣa is totally inactive, and the presentational data would remain entirely unknown but for the mediation of several instruments sharing the qualities of puruṣa and prakṛti. The nearest analogy is that of the presence of objects in a lighted room: the objects would not in any way be influenced by the light, and would remain unnoticed and unhandled except for the presence of an organism with eyes and hands and will; in the individuation of the organism eyes, hands and will are of the nature of instruments. However, the analogy is not perfect, for light and the organism are totally independent of each other.

Evolution as visualised by the Sāṃkhya thinkers is very much different from our modern notions of evolution. They consider the entire cosmos as subject to the evolutionary pro-
cess, and consider the individual organism also as subject to the same process. For them, evolution does not consist in the production of new species of organisms, but in the production of new faculties. Evolution is not a gigantic cavalcade of changes that commenced its journey in some distant past and is still jagging along: it is a very subtle process that gets repeated in every organism, differentiating new stages in what was originally integrated. It is something like the series of roots, stem, leaves, flowers and so on: these latter are not creations, but only developments of the original potentiality hidden in the seed. Or, in the realm of animal evolution, we are acquainted with the general capacity to receive impulses present in the lowly organisms; it gets, in the course of evolution, structured into vision, audition, olfaction and so on. The Sāṅkhya defines evolution simply as ‘differentiation of the undifferentiated’ (saṃsīrṣṭa-viveka), and this refers only to matter and, not to the puruṣa.

The Dimensions of Personality

Consciousness is the most basic element in all evolutionary processes: this is the first factor to emerge when matter is rendered fit for evolution. It does not however involve differentiations of any type: it is altogether undifferentiated and rudimentary. The impressive analogy furnished to illustrate this stage draws our attention to the swollen state on the surface of the ocean just prior to the onset of a wave: it is not rest, but there is no movement in any particular direction either. It represents a general and potential tendency to activity; consciousness, likewise, is a mere orientation to the environment, without specific contents. In its cosmic import, this consciousness is denoted in the Sāṅkhya system as mahat, which world is derived from magha (‘to reveal’, ‘to illumine’). The idea is that this stage due to the preponderance of sattva renders prakṛti objective to puruṣa; thanks to consciousness, puruṣa becomes the experiencer. The aspect of this consciousness inhering in the organism is styled buddhi (from the root budh, ‘to know’). Mahat and buddhi are expressions denoting,
consciousness in its two contexts: universal and individual. We are naturally here more interested in the latter.

The organism emerges as the result of a fundamental urge for differentiation; and the base-line of this differentiation is consciousness. When the new-born babe is introduced initially into the world of multitudinous dimensions, its first response is the amorphous experience of an undifferentiated environment. The babe is aware of the objective impact, but there is no specificity in the stimulations, nor is there an awareness of the stimulated subject. There is naturally some vagueness in the Sāmkhya theory about the function of this buddhi; but it can hardly be denied that this is a very valid hypothesis and exhibits remarkable psychological insight.

The general consciousness in course of time gets individuated: it acquires a subjective frame of reference. This state, a further development of the capacity to be conscious of objects, may be designated as self-consciousness. The Sāmkhya theory has brought into currency the expression ‘ahaṃkāra’ to denote this. This is a curious word which superficially signifies ‘I-making’ (the suffix kāra meaning, ‘doer’ as in ghaṭakāra ‘pot-maker’) but its real import is the ‘utterance’, ‘ejaculation’, ‘cry’ of ‘I’ (as in the Vedic Vaṣaṭkāra, Svāhākāra). Miss Steiner has valourously sought to discover the early prototypes of this word in the Upaniṣads; the expression suggests to her ‘erroneous self-projection’ of the spirit as creator. The importance of the expression appears to consist in the emergence of experience as bipolar in its process; one side tending towards the source of consciousness and the other towards the environmental presentations. The main function of self-consciousness is said to be self-assertion (abhimāna) or the imposition of ego on experiential modalities. “This web of egocentric concern fortifies him and differentiates him from the amorphous base of life.” Ego as an evolute from general consciousness is doubtless an important conception. The presence of puruṣa represents merely a favourable condition for consciousness to function; buddhi is the actual consciousness ready to develop into an experience; and ahaṃkāra facilitates the development by furnishing a fixed
Development of Psychological Thought in India

frame of reference in the individual, viz. ego. Puruṣa with the ego is spoken of as the ‘person’ (jīva, empirical self).

Despite the object-orientation and the ego, experience fails to be crystallised if the objective details are not apprehended. It is for this purpose that as the next stage in evolution we have the appearance of mind (manas) along with ten organs, five of perception and five of action. These eleven faculties (indriyas) are said to be evolved directly from self-consciousness and indirectly from consciousness; and their main function is to receive impulses from the environment and transmit them to consciousness for being experienced. The five organs of perception are: eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin with the functions of vision, audition, olfaction, gustation and kinaesthesis. The five organs of action are speech, hands, feet, ejective and generative organs with the functions of expression,prehension, locomotion, elimination and reproduction. The former group is for receptive experience, in observation; while the latter for action in relation to the objective environment. They are all considered outward organs (bāhyendariya), as their processes involve actual contact with the world outside the individual; they have specific organs in the body (sthāna) which are grossly material in character, and subtle function (vṛtti).

Mind, on the other hand, has no specific organ located in the body, but consists only in its functions. However, it works in close association with the ten outward organs: it acts as the ‘door-keeper’ for the ‘doors’ which the organs represent. Sometimes it is spoken of as the ‘eleventh’ indriya, possessing the powers of perception as well as action. It is the prevailing opinion that without the conjunction of mind, the organs fail to function. Vijñānabhirṣu however, holds that the organs can directly cognise, without the help of mind; and he restricts the function of mind to desire, doubt and imagination. Vācaspati-miśra emphasises the rôle of mind in arranging the sense-data in definite patterns. Mind not only transmutes the impressions received from the organs of perception into ideas, but prompts also the organs of action in their function. Mind’s main function is said to be sāmkalpa which word signifies ‘con-
structing well’. Vācaspati-miśra explains it thus. The sense-organs are meant to receive specific stimulation; but they do so vaguely and inadequately, because they function only in the present. What the senses apprehend lacks meaning-determinants; the diverse characteristics of objects fail to be coördinated or ordered to fulfil the semantic function. But mind takes up what the senses have prehended and reconstructs the impressions by selectively attending to them. It is due to the mind’s activity that we say: ‘This is simple!’, ‘This is not so!’ and so on.29 Thus, apart from functioning as the sensorium communae, mind constructs the world as an organised affair of ideas and ends, decisions and desires. The mass of sensations are synthesized by mind and are presented properly to the ego.

The interaction between these aspects of personality are illustrated in the classical simile of King’s Tax-Collection. The King, to whom taxes really belong, never bothers to collect them; he is like the Sāṁkhyan puruṣa, practically inactive. But his reflected authority rests with the Chancellor (consciousness) who directs his Agent (ego), who in turn prompts the local chief (mind) to collect taxes from the individual villagers (sense-organs). The villagers severally pay their taxes to the local chief who collects them all, makes note of them and delivers them to the Agent who appropriates them officially and deposits them finally with the Chancellor, who acts on behalf of the King. Consciousness, ego and mind are together named as ‘internal instrument’ (antahkaraṇa) or ‘cognitive structure’ (citta); they are sometimes described as three functions of the same structure. Vācaspati-miśra writes: “Man first employs his outward senses, then considers the sense-data with his mind, then refers them to his ego, and finally decides what to do with his consciousness”.30 Although in the actual dynamics of personality these are the dimensions that participate, they all alike presuppose the presence of puruṣa. This position is clearly brought out in the Sāṁkhya discussion on perceptual processes.

The Problem of Perception
The material objects of the outer world present themselves
as impulses which are caught up by the sense-organs (which are not merely bodily organs but essentially modifications of the ego). The mind, whose association with sense-function is necessarily involved, lifts these impulses from the state of unconscious and indeterminate sensations to certain spontaneous deliberations, also unconscious; assimilations, associations, classifications and characterisations which happen at this stage are collectively termed ‘good constructions’ (sāṁkalpa)—‘good’ in the same sense as the ‘good figure’ of the Gestaltists. Sensations now acquire form and meaning. The Śaṅkhya theory makes clear distinction between these two stages: mere sensations without the ‘constructions’ (nirvikalpa) which occur as indeterminate presentations; and sensations with ‘constructions’ (savikalpaka), or percepts. They thus steer clear of the extreme view of the Buddhists who hold that all valid perception consists in freedom from ‘constructions’ (kalpanāpoḍha), and of the grammarians who contend that verbal associations as ‘constructions’ are inevitable in any perception. The Śaṅkhya theory recognises ‘pre-constructional’ and ‘constructional’ stages in the perceptual process. The first stage endows specificity on the sensations, although the object apprehended is still vague and formless (sammūḍha-vastumātra), while the second stuffs the sensation with identifiable form so that the object apprehended is defined and distinguished (vastuvīśeṣa). It is the second stage, where there is a ‘determinate intuition’ of the object, that may be termed perception proper.

It is a significant argument in the Śaṅkhya theory that whenever there is ‘determinate intuition’ of an object, there is also a judgement in the form of subjective approval. When we perceive an object, say a jar, we also implicitly make a judgement (although we may not vocalise it): “It is a jar and I know it is so.” Not only is the object given a form by the mind, but the perceptual process is equipped with a subjective frame of reference. In other words, there can be no perception without ego-involvement. However, neither the mind’s rôle nor the ego-involvement is as important in the Śaṅkhya doctrine of perception as the part played by consciousness. Consciousness is not
only the unfailing ground on which the ego-involvement and mental modifications rest, but it is also a storehouse of impressions of past experiences (saṃskāras), and is full of tendencies (vāsanās) or predispositions. During the perceptual process consciousness itself undergoes a modification corresponding to the objective presentation: it is said to reach the subjects through the sense-doors and automatically get converted to the object’s form. The implication in such an argument is that when an object comes to be perceived, the memory traces and the predispositions of the individual contribute their shares in the act of perception.

The ticklish point in the problem of perception as dealt with by the Sāmkhya theorist is the function of consciousness. By definition, consciousness is inert and cannot function except under the influence of puruṣa; but puruṣa is absolutely passive and is not involved in any manner in the perceptual process. Nevertheless, the real perceiver is said to be the puruṣa, and how does this happen? Being entities of disparate natures the conjunction between puruṣa and consciousness becomes problematic. Vācaspati overcomes the difficulty by denying conjunction altogether: "there is no conjunction (saṃyoga) between the two, but only proximity (saṃnidhi), and this proximity provides consciousness with fitness (yogyatā) to function." Owing to proximity, puruṣa’s reflection is caught up in consciousness, which then begins to cognise. But when consciousness undergoes transformations according to objective presentations, the puruṣa remains unaffected, although in the experiential context he occurs as the perceiver suffering the transformations. To illustrate this projection of the function of consciousness on the puruṣa, a beautiful analogy is given. A transparent crystal, pure and colourless, when placed in close proximity to a red flower appears red; when the flower is removed the perceived redness of the crystal also vanishes. The crystal was all along colourless, although we perceived red therein. It is consciousness that really perceives, but the agency is projected on the puruṣa, for without the puruṣa’s presence the cognitive apparatus is ineffective. The postulations of a perceiver beyond the percep-
Development of Psychological Thought in India

...tual process is interesting, and reminds us of Stern's maxim: Keine Gestalt ohne Gestalter.

Psychodynamics

If the Sāṅkhya was preoccupied with theoretical formulations, the Yoga was practical in its orientation. The latter accepted the Sāṅkhya theoretical framework with a minor amendment in favour of theism: the Yoga was by profession theistic, although this was only in profession. The attention however, was focussed on the 'cognitive structure' (citta), its motivational dynamics and training possibilities. The cognitive structure here was viewed as endowed with energy (citiṣakti), which operates in the ordinary individuals automatically, unconsciously and often erratically. But it is possible by effort to introduce restraints in its function so as to render it deliberate and efficient. The methods of imposing effectively these restraints constitute the central theme of the Yoga practice. Puri-

fication of the physical body, improvement in health and strengthening of mind engage the attention of the Yoga masters. The system undertakes to investigate the sources of human weakness and discomfiture, and also to formulate conditions of rejuvenation, reintegration and relaxation. The Yoga is thus essentially a system of psychodynamics elaborating the methods of reconditioning the mind for a creative career, freeing it from the yoke of unconscious impulses.

The Yoga is often likened to the art of medicine: the procedure in both involves diagnosis (heya), prognosis (hāna), aetiology (hetu) and treatment (upāya). The understanding of the ailment which must be eliminated constitutes the first step; insight into the phenomenon of elimination is the essential feature in the second; discernment of the conditions responsible for the ailment is the third; and prescription of curative measures tending towards complete elimination of the ailment is the final step. Patañjali's great, little tract adopts this procedure in an excellent manner. His approach is not that of a theoriser; his book is not meant to fulfil one's curiosity (jiññāśā, desire to know), but it is a manual of practical instructions (anusāsana).
But, as background to methodology he has engaged his analytical skill to theorise about man’s nature and constitution.

Man’s activities are distinguished by the involvement of the ‘cognitive structure’ (citta), the details of which we have considered earlier. This aspect is of especial significance in Yoga, as it stands for the unity of everything that is psychical in man: it is the organised totality of our experience. The ‘cognitive structure’ is dominated by the disposition to activity (rajas), although it comprehends also the dispositions to brightness (sattva) and inertia (tamas). It is ceaselessly active, manifesting itself along with the first breath in the person’s life; in fact, citta and prāṇa are intimately related. They represent two aspects of human life: biological and psychological. It should be said to the credit of these early thinkers that they were the first in the world to recognise the psychobiological nature of man.

Perhaps my expression, ‘cognitive structure’ is somewhat misleading, for citta is not a structure in the physical sense; it has no bodily counterpart or location. I have employed the term ‘structure’ only to indicate the ‘arrangement’ of three functions: consciousness, ego and mind. (Even the English noun ‘mind’ is similarly misleading, for what is real is only minding.) By this expression we mean ‘being conscious’, ‘involving egoism’ and ‘attending’. The Yoga speaks of ‘mental actions’ (mānasam karma), ‘processes of the cognitive structure’; the Sanskrit for this is vṛtti, emphasising the kinetic nature of citta. We frequently hear of cittavṛtti: the very first Yoga-sūtra introduces this concept.

Patañjali catalogues five kinds of ‘mental actions’: cognition (pramāṇa), illusion (viparyāya), imagination (vikalpa), sleep (nīdrā), and memory (sṃpti). Cognition is further analysed into observational, inferential and authoritative. Illusion is erroneous knowledge, as for instance when the person with diplopia sees two moons, or when a rope in twilight is seen as a snake, or when a tree-trunk in dim light is mistaken for a man. There is, no doubt, a real experience of the objective presentation, but the idea is incongruous with the objective nature, Vācaspati explains that the idea in this case
is not based on the objective nature and that the idea may subsequently be inhibited by real cognition. Imagination or abstraction is the functioning of mind without real, external objects corresponding to ideas. It involves an element of creation: and its stuff is verbal, symbolic. It is interesting that in the Yoga theory sleep is regarded as a type of positive mental action. It is a state of repose when the organism is not stimulated by external presentations, nor are there imaginative constructions (as in dreams), but the cognitive structure here is comparatively contentless. But Vyāsa argues for its positive character on the ground that on waking from sleep we can always recollect the kind of sleep we were in—heavy, deep, uncomfortable, pleasant, and so on; he speaks of the ‘connecting memory’ as indicating the continued mental action during what we call sleep. Memory is mere recollection: it brings back to activity certain impressions that were left behind from previous experience. Patañjali points out that in an instance of memory ‘nothing is added surreptitiously’ to an experience; it does not go beyond the limits of past experience. Vācaspati clarifies the position by introducing the concepts of ‘manifestation’ (aṅjanā) and ‘suggestive stimulus’ (udbodhaka): the content that is already in mind comes up as a response to an appropriate stimulus currently.

Mental actions are necessarily influenced by the impressions left behind by the earlier mental actions. Every mental action, when it ceases to operate, is said to be transformed into an impression: we are normally unaware of these impressions; but they lie dormant and whenever a suitable condition presents itself they endeavour to emerge again into action. There can be no action devoid of the influence of impression, and no impression can occur without being first an action. The two are related to each other in a cyclical manner. The Sanskrit expression for ‘impression’ is saṃskāra, which etymologically signifies ‘improving something already existing’. The impressions are not to be considered as static, dead traces that are passively ephorised under favourable conditions. They are dynamic processes; they are not mere memory-traces, but
dormant potential energies. They are essentially unconscious, but they are betimes lifted to the level of consciousness; the sanśkāra may become a vrtti. Normally, the impressions of an organism represent a constant and smooth flow (svarasavāhi) supplying the necessary impetus and energy for the ‘will-to-live’. The cognitive structure successively and incessantly becomes ‘fixed in different forms’ (to employ the happy expression of Vyāsa) and is likened in its function to a fish-net that is spread around. While the subconscious impressions are unintermittently generated by conscious mental actions, there are in the organism certain impressions that were there already when the organism commenced its career. They were not generated during this life; and they may properly be designated as instincts or innate tendencies. The Sanskrit word vāsanā (which is derived from the root vas, ‘to stay’) indicates such predispositions. The impressions and predispositions together constitute the motivational dynamics: they are the springs of our thought and action.

The Yoga thinkers have further inquired into the realm of subconscious impressions, strongly reminding us of the Freudian speculations. In the apartment below our awareness, the impressions being dynamic are truly in a jumble: each is in conflict with the other. And every impression scrambles to manifest itself, but no one may come up while another is on. The Yoga commentator illustrates this phenomenon curiously: “When you are in love, you cannot be angry.” Love in this case is designated as the operation that has acquired the status of a mental action (labdhavṛtti), while anger though present is in a dormant and inactive state (prasuptavasthā). We will return to this interesting discussion at a later stage when we deal with ‘conditions of afflictions.’

Mental actions are of two types: ‘afflicted’ by impressions and predispositions (kliśṭa); and ‘unafflicted’ (akliśṭa). The former represents the normal condition of an organism, caught up in the worldly meshes, while the latter refers to the cultivated conditions that lead to emancipation. We will here focus our attention on the former. The concept of afflictions (kleśa)
is not peculiar to the Yoga system; but we find here a rational approach to the problem. Kleśa is whatever hinders, thwarts, affects the progression of the person in the direction of the sum-mum bonum; it is productive of misery and involves the individual in the tiresome web of the world. Although they are described in un-complimentary terms, it is the conglomeration of these afflictions that motivates us in our daily activities. Five groups of such afflictions are isolated for enumeration in the Yoga texts: ignorance (avidyā), egoism (asmitā), attachment (rāga) aversion (dveṣa), and urge-to-live (abhiniveśa). Ignorance is of metaphysical import. Egoism is essentially involving the clean puruṣa in the mud of experience: it is also described as the sense-of-personality which mistakes the objects of experience to be subjects. Attachment is responsible for our approach behaviour; it is felt as inclination towards pleasure and expressed as application to the means of obtaining it. Vācaspati interprets the inclination towards pleasure as the outcome of recollections of pleasure.46 Aversion, on the other hand, involves recollection of pain: it is felt as repulsion, expressed as applications to avoid the object connected with it (withdrawal) and it involves anxiety for that object’s removal. The urge-to-live which is said to ‘sweep on its own nature’47 is felt as clinging to life, and expressed as fear of danger and death. These five afflictions constitute the motivational dynamics in the organism.

The afflictions exist and operate in different conditions.48 There is a dormant (prasupta) condition in which they exist as merely potential forces, in the absence of appropriate stimulations; in this condition the energy is not lost but is momentarily inactive. A man in love is capable of getting angry, but when he is actually loving, anger is in a dormant condition. That is why the forces in this condition are described as ‘future mental states’ (bhaviṣyadvṛtti). The afflictions may be in an attenuated condition (tanvavasthā): owing to the overpowering influence of adverse forces certain afflictions occur as mere associations, not rising to the operational level. The cultivation of contrary conditions by a yogin is an illustration to the point. There is another condition in
which the afflictions are ‘isolated’ (vicchhina). This condition, in a sense includes the first two conditions. When love is actively moving forth (in the example of man in love) anger, which belongs to a different type of afflictions altogether, is overcome: anger now is dormant and also reduced to a powerless association; it is intercepted, isolated, separated, cut off the main cognitive stream. When the afflictions are neither dormant due to absence of excitations nor attenuated by an overpowering opposite, nor intercepted by conflict, they are active in form (udārarūpa), having acquired the status of mental action, Vyāsa offers an unsophisticated and chivalrous illustration: Caitra is head over heels in love with a certain woman, and his attention is entirely fixed on her. This does not, however, mean (so Vyāsa argues) that Caitra cannot or does not love other women or other objects; but only his cognitive stream is in full operation in regard to, and sustained by, that particular woman for the time being.

The interplay of these conditions is responsible for the various states or expressions of the cognitive structure in daily life. The Yoga texts describe five types of these expressions: restless (Rśipta), infatuated (mūḍha), distracted (vikṣipta), concentrated ekāgra, and restrained (niruddha). It must be noted that the Yoga recognises all these as normal and ordinary expressions occurring in every individual; but the superior persons tend to eliminate the first three and cultivate the last two. In the restless state, there is an excessive influence of energy (rajas) which renders the cognitive structure highly unstable: it wanders, oscillates, swayed to and fro by passions and stimulations; and the organism experiences hurry and worry. The infatuated state is characterised by the predominance of dullness (tamas) and vulnerability to emotional experiences: the organism is inactive, absorbed and agitated. While these two are occasional expressions, the distracted state of the cognitive structure is more often experienced by most of us. Distraction is different from restlessness: there is not in the former that incessant instability that characterises the latter. We are distracted by the multiplicity of stimulations all round us; but we
exercise our rational equipment in order to avoid pain and seek pleasure from such stimulations. Despite the frequency of these three afflictions, we do now and then tend to concentrate, focus our attention, and make our cognitive apparatus single-in-intent. And at times we also experience the cessation of fluctuations of the cognitive structure; our inner life becomes restricted to a particular area—as for instance when we are absorbed in a piece of music. The latter two expressions indicate the possibility of higher life: they can be cultivated with great advantage by the person who aspires for a quiet life of serene harmony.

**Personality Reintegration**

The Yoga system is indeed meant for a person who longs fervently for the higher life: precise and minute regulations are laid down in this system for an aspirant to improve the efficiency of his physical and mental constitutions to enable the light of perfection descend and suffice his whole being. The aim that is held out is the transformation of the normal cognitive structure into stable tranquility (*cittaprasādana*) or tranquil stability (*cittasthairya*); this aim is reached by a patient and persistent cultivation (*bhāvanātah*) of all our faculties. Great importance is naturally attached to the rôle of cultivation which reintegrates the cognitive structure (*cittaparikarma*) and brings about the unshaken equipoise in a person.

While formulating the techniques of this reintegration, the Yoga system emphasises the psycho-organic character of the human being. He has a material constitution and a store-house of instincts; he has also constitutional possibilities of balance and understanding. These two aspects of life need to be harmonised before lasting efficiency could characterise his behaviour. It is for this purpose that the method of reintegration involves outward regulation of behaviour as well as inward organisation of thoughts and feelings. The method has two major modes: practice (*abhyāsa*) and detachment (*vairāgya*). The former involves repeated exertion, persistent effort, a steadfast pursuit, whereas the latter is a mental deconditioning to normal stimulations and cravings. Practice provides the foundation
for detachment which is progressive in four stages: withdrawing oneself from objects of enjoyment after experiencing their unwholesome effects; selective pursuit of enjoyments after deliberation regarding their consequence; minimising the intensity and eliminating the specificity of sense-desires with concomitant intellectualisation thereof; and complete detachment from worldly longings and enjoyments.\textsuperscript{52}

The method of reintegration is arranged in a graduated series of eight stages, traditionally known as ‘eight-limbs’ (\textit{aśṭāṅga}); the first four are intended to restrain the normal, unwholesome tendencies, and the last four are exercises in higher life. The first stage is called ‘restraint’ (\textit{yama} from the root \textit{yam} ‘to restrain’, ‘to control’) and the second ‘discipline’ (\textit{niyama}). These two together contribute towards self-regulation and temperance; they tone up the entire system to an ethical outlook. The third stage is essentially a physical exercise, known as ‘posture’ (\textit{āsana} from the root \textit{sat} ‘to sit’): the habitual acquisition of continuously ‘steady and pleasant’ bodily positions as preparatory to stabilising the mind. The physical balance is believed to be essential for mental stability. This stage consists in assuming a certain posture (—there are numerous postures suggested—) and retaining it for a specific stretch of time without moving. The next stage is linked up with this stage and together they are said to contribute towards bodily regeneration: in this stage the breathing mechanism is brought under control. The name \textit{prānāyāma}, implies restraining or regulating the vital current in a methodical manner. The aim is to produce the condition of respiration favourable to contemplation. There is a very rich literature on this subject; and numerous tracts have prescribed, suggested and explained a large number of \textit{prānāyāma} methods, although a majority of them are difficult to practice. The ancient Persians seem to have known this technique; they called it ‘habs-i-dam’. The general outcome of this stage is rendering mind fit for exertion in the higher life.

The first of the second four stages which pertain to higher life consists in withdrawal \textit{pratyāhāra} (from the root \textit{hṛ}
Development of Psychological Thought in India

‘to collect’ with the prefix prati ‘back’) of the sense-function from its normal outward orientation; the mental energy now is taught to return to its matrix. The condition of the organism at this stage is that of intensive introversion. The next stage is fixed attention (dhāraṇā from the root dhar ‘to hold’) of the cognitive structure: mind no longer wanders (and according to Jaigisavaya, there is no sense-function either in this stage) but is bound at a ‘place or object.’ It is a condition of focussing the mind intently, and of developing the capacity to hold the meditational subject for long without distraction. In the next stage of contemplation (dhyāna from the root dhyai ‘to consider’, ‘to reflect’) the mind is entirely and continuously focussed on an object: indeed the subject and the presentational object fuse into unison. The entire internal instrument in this condition is described as a single, uniform, and unbroken flow (ekatānata, sadṛsapraṇaḥ). This is a highly charged state of concentration where the light of consciousness shines brightly. The advanced condition of this contemplation is samādhi, a word which defies translation. The mind here is entirely unburdened, the pillars of individuality crumble to the surface, thus releasing consciousness to its freedom, tranquility and purity. Emotionally, it is described as ‘sweet’ (madhumati), cognitively as ‘bright’ (jyotīsmati) and ethically as ‘upright’ (dharmamegahā). It is the summum bonum of individual life.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1 The term ‘Sāṁkhya’ has presented an enigma. Some derive it from ‘number’ (which sāṅkya ordinarily means); Mahābhārata equates it with ‘parisaṅkhyāna’ or ‘enumeration’ (311, 42). Others emphasise the power of discrimination (viveka) which ‘leads to emancipation’ as the real meaning of sāṅkya.

Psychological Theory and Practice

Like the Śāṅkhya of Caraka, the Śāṅkhya in Mahābhārata, the Śāṅkhya of Patañjali, the Śāṅkhya of the Vaiṣṇavas, the Śāṅkhya of Vijñānabhiṣkṛ, the Śāṅkhya in Bhagavad-gītā, the Śāṅkhya of Iśvarakṛṣṇa and so on. Bhagavata (11, 22) refers to the various schools of Śāṅkhya.


Pravacanasūtra, considered by some as the oldest Śāṅkhya work, has another commentary by Aniruddha: Saṅkhyaśatārīti

Pravacanabhaṣya, 92


For instance, Vyāsa who wrote a commentary on the Yogasūtra gives at the end of each chapter the colophon: “iti śrī-Patañjale śāṅkhya-pravacane yogaśāstre.........”. Mādhava in his Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha describes Patañjali as the formulator of the ‘sāvarsa-sāṅkhya’ (“sāvarasa-sāṅkhya-pravataka”) ‘sāṅkhya-yama lokyatam ce’tynavikṣaki’


It was Vijñānabhiṣkṛ who systematically inquired into the guṇa theory and crystallised the conceptions that were nebulous before his time

Iśvarakṛṣṇa’s Saṅkhyakarika, 21

Vācaspatri’s Tattvakaumudi, 13-16

This view is known as ‘satkāryavāda’

Tattvakaumudi, 9

The purpose is stated as the experience of prakṛti and its evolutes by puruṣa as well as the emancipation of the puruṣa from the bondage consequent upon such experience. “Puruṣasya darsanārtham, tathā pradhānasya” (Saṅkhyakarika, 21). For a detailed exposition see A.K. Majumdar: The Saṅkhya Conception of Personality, Univ. of Calcutta, 1930, pp. 77 f

Vācaspatri-misra employs the expression ‘yogyatā’ to denote the contact between puruṣa and prakṛti; Vijñānabhiṣkṛ merely called it ‘samyoga’
Especially in regard to the buddhi’s connection with the puruṣa


In fact, the early poet Aśvaghoṣa in his Buddhacarita has identified ahaṅkara with Prajāpati (Canto I); The Chandogya-Upaniṣad employs the word ahaṅkara in the sense of atman (7.25.1)

Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Saṃkhya Karika, 24. Gauḍāpāda in his comments on this verse says: Abhimāna is forming concepts involving ‘I’ and “I Know”, “I do”, “This if favourable to me”, “This refers to me, and so on. (Banaras Sanskrit Series, No. 9, 1905, p. 24)


Saṃkhya Karika, 26: buddhīndriyaṇī cakṣuḥ-śrotṛa-grhaṇa-rasana-tvag-ākhyaṇi; Vāk-pāṇi-pād-pāyu-pasthāni karmendriyaṇy āhuh
‘Udbhayāttamakam utra manaḥ’

R. Garbe follows this lead: See his Saṃkhya Philosophie, p. 252. Ouspensky also contends that different organs of the body have a primitive type of consciousness associated with them. A New Model of the Universe, Kegan Paul, 1938, p. 281

“ālocitam, indriyeṣa vastu idam iti sammugdham itam evam, na’ivam iti samyak kalpayati, viśeṣana-viśeṣyabhāvena vivecayati.”

Tattvakaumudi, 23

Pravacananabhasya, 2.41-42

But Vijñānabhaṭṭa argues that although in perception there occurs a real conjunction between puruṣa and consciousness, the contac does not involve any change in the puruṣa

Vijñānabhaṭṭa cites this illustration from Sūryapuruṣa (Pravacana-bhaṭṭa, 1.19)

Vyasabhaṭṭa, 1.2

Yogasūtra, 1.6

Tattvavaiśāradī, 1.8

Yogasūtra, 1.9

Vyasabhaṭṭa, 1.10

‘asampramoṣa’, 1.11. Vācaspati derives the word from the root muṣ meaning ‘to steal’

“vṛttisaṃskāraçūram anisam āvartate” Vyasabhaṭṭa, 1.5

“sata utkārsādāhām samāskāraḥ”, Kaśika on Pāṇini, 4.21.6

Vyasabhaṭṭa, 2.4

“sammūrcchita”: Vācaspati paraphrases it as “being rolled together in a lump”, Tattvavaiśāradī, 2.13


Vyasabhaṭṭa, 2.4

Tattvavaiśāradī, 2.7
Ibid, 2.9

Yogasūtra, 2.4

“viṣayō yo labdhavṛttih sa udārah”, Vyasaḥpaśya, 2.4

Vyasaḥpaśya, 1.1

‘abhyāśaśāprāgyabhyām tam nirodhaḥ’, Yogasūtra

The stages are styled ‘sāmśaṇas’: yatamāna-, vyatireka, ekendriya, and vaśikaraṇa-sāmśaṇas

CHAPTER IV

THE UNCOMPROMISING INTELLECTUALS

Opposition to Orthodoxy

There is a general belief among those unacquainted fully with India’s intellectual history that only Vedic orthodoxy is admitted in this country; it would surprise them to learn that all through the ages there has been a persistent voice of opposition to orthodoxy. This opposition was not only tolerated, but even encouraged and sometimes absorbed into orthodoxy. The Śāmkhya–Yoga is an excellent illustration to the point; even Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika are said to have been originally antagonists to the Vedic religion; the great philosopher, Kumārila, testifies to the existence of an atheistic group in the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā fold.¹ Of course, Jainism and Buddhism were never totally organically absorbed into orthodoxy, but it must be recognised that their influence rendered orthodoxy progressive. These two were instances of organised opposition. Besides the founders of these protestant systems there were in our history numerous intellectuals whose teachings violently inconvenienced the traditional beliefs. There was however no personal or social restraint imposed upon them for their heterodoxy; there is no record of a heretic being harassed in our country at any time. But usually it so happened that the influence of these upsetters did not outlive their times. In the torrential flow of thought some of them were entirely ushered into oblivion, some retained merely their names; a few were fortunate in leaving fragments of their thought to posterity. All the attempts to break away from the main stream were collectively remembered under a blanket expression ‘matrialists’ (lokāyata). While employing this term, it must be borne in mind that diverse viewpoints and philosophies are included in that crowd-concept.

Opposition to orthodoxy was felt even in the Vedic times. It is recorded in Taittiriya-brāhmaṇa that the wise Brhaspati
hit the head of the sacred Gāyatrī (the old symbol of Vedic orthodoxy) and smashed it into pieces; but luckily she was immortal and did not die. This Bṛhaspati (whose identity is uncertain) was a clever and energetic sage who was given to free-thinking. Although a Confidential Document inaudibly called him names ("deceiver", "barren woman"), he was too great a personage to be so easily brushed aside. Indeed he was a celebrity, he was peer to Āṅgirās, Ayāsya and Baka-Dālbhya; and the orthodox records are ostensibly reverent towards him. But he it was that inaugurated the opposition: he was the forerunner of a materialist tradition in the country; the alternate nomenclature for the materialists became Bārhaspatyas (Bṛhaspati's fold). Patañjali in the third century informs us that an old and celebrated grammarian, Bhaṭguri by name, lent his support to this tradition. Jábalī, whom we find mentioned in the epic Rāmāyana, appears to have been a reputed and thoroughly practical-minded materialist; he is described as the best among brāhmīns, although he carelessly announces that there is no world beyond this and advises Rāma to concentrate on worldly pleasures. During Kaṇṭilya's days, materialism was an accepted branch of study along with Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Anvikṣākī.

Six hundred years before the birth of Christ was a remarkable period of intellectual adventures in our country. It was then that the two great heterodox movements, Jainism and Buddhism, gathered momentum; it was also then that numerous intellectuals were wandering about the country announcing their rebellious viewpoints. It was during this period that the Sāṃkhya and Yoga were busy systematising their theory and techniques, ignoring the Vedic tradition. It was again during this period that an integrated school of materialist thought took shape; the major conceptions of this school survived vigorously until a few centuries after Christ. It was this school that is described by Mādhava in his Sarvadarśasaṅgraha and by Haribhadra in his Saḍdarśanaśamuccaya. We will consider in this chapter the psychological outlook of this school and also the viewpoints of six of the intellectuals who flourished contem-
poraneously with the Buddha and Mahāvīra.

The various names for materialism require explanation. Four names are used in connection with materialists: lokāyata, Bārhaspatya, cārvāka and nāstika. Lokāyata, the expression known to Vālmiki, Patañjali and Kauṭilya, merely meant ‘the worldling’, completely confined to the material world, who opposed orthodoxy and believed in enjoyment. Bārhaspatya, as already explained, refers to the early protagonist of this creed. Cārvāka is a word of uncertain origin: often it is split into cāru (fine, sweet) and vāk (speech). The word suggests the appealing and entertaining nature of the materialist philosophy which gained immense popularity. Nāstika is doubtless a negative expression coined by the orthodox for those who did not believe in the other world (according to Pāṇini) or in God (according to Kumārila). The several intellectuals we referred to above were designated by the Buddhists as ‘wandering ascetics of different persuasions’ (ānātātthiyā-pāribhājakā).

Materialism in India never seems to have had a text-book; if ever there was one, it has been lost for thousands of years now. The earliest connected account of the materialist standpoint is contained in Tattvopapālava (‘Upsetting philosophy’) composed by Jayarāsi who probably lived during the early seventh century of our era; but this can hardly be described as a text-book, for we find there an irresponsible love of controverting all conceivable viewpoints. While the materialists themselves have nowhere formulated their standpoint, we have accounts of materialism in the works of authors who were hostile to materialism: Haribhadra-sūri’s Saḍdarśanasamuccaya (fifth century A.D.), Jayanta-bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamaṇḍari (880 A.D.) and Mādhava’s Sarvadārśanasamgraha (1331). Occasional references to the materialist doctrines are made by Vatsyāyana, Saṅkara, Kamalāśīla, Śaṅtaraṅgita, Guṇaratna and others; they cite short postulates pregnant with the materialist outlook. It is likely that the materialists carried their philosophical literature lightly, in less than a dozen maxims. In the second act of an interesting Sanskrit play, Kṛṣṇamīra’s Prabodhacandra-drodaya (composed between 1050 and 1116) we find a character
brilliantly expounding the Cārvāka philosophy. But such citations and representations of the materialist creed by hostile authors do great injustice to a school that was sought to be constructed on the basis of rigorous reasoning.

Materialism is frequently associated with hedonism, hedonism of a vulgar type. Complete denial of divine agency in human actions and utter absence of religious inclinations are of course the distinguishing marks of a materialist; but to reduce his reasoning to an erotic outburst is highly unjust. The Indian materialists have unfortunately been judged thus. The verses expounding the Cārvāka ideology preserved by Mādhava in his Sarvadarsānasaṅgāraḥ hold out that pleasure was their only goal: “There is no heaven, and no salvation: the religious rites are all futile. Orthodoxy is a clever game of self-seeking brāhmins; their injunctions concerning sacrifices, death ceremonies and oblations are unnecessary and irrational. The Vedas are the work of knaves and rascals. They should not prevent you from attaining the highest goal of life, namely happiness. Make the best of this life; enjoy while you live and do not bother about morality.” This is the gist of the eleven verses cited by the pious author. Needless to say, it is a misrepresentation, for (in the words of Professor Hiriyanna) “No serious thinker could conceivably have inculcated such a teaching.” The enthusiasts of orthodoxy have blackened the materialists who were complete sceptics in matters of religion. Although there was definitely a bias among the materialists in favour of normal and happy life unrestrained by religious considerations, there was never an encouragement to licentious living. In fact, the preserved maxims indicate a social (and also political) conscience on their part and an anxiety in favour of orderly conduct. It is true they emphasised wealth and happiness as the highest objectives in human life; but in this they were only practical-minded; they had the courage to announce what the majority of mankind secretly holds. We are reminded of the austere Greek philosopher, Epicurus; but how much discredit the epicureans have fallen into!
Here are three materialist maxims preserved by the eighth century Buddhist writer, Kamalasila: "Ultimate constituents of all things are four only: earth element, water element, heat element and wind element." "Their combination is responsible for the human body with its sensibility."; "Consciousness is likewise the result of this combination." These three cryptic statements excellently and adequately summarise the lokayata psychology. These thinkers commenced controverting all positions based on inference, analogy or authority; for them the sole reliable source of valid knowledge was observation. Hence they found it hard to accept the intangible ether as one of the ultimate elements; and for the same reason they rejected the orthodox assumption of a non-material consciousness. The four material elements combine in numerous ways and produce this manifold universe. Despite the immense diversity of effects, there is no fifth element present in their causation. The elements combine, moved by their own propensity; there is no outside agent or inward regulator. The material processes are the only reality. And the human body is but an instance of this reality. Consciousness? Yes, we do find consciousness in the body; the lokayatas do not deny this. But is it something distinct from bodily processes, and immortal? This they deny, uncompromisingly. What you call consciousness is of course intangible, but it is nothing more than an epi-phenomenon. When the fire burns, heat is present. Heat may not be handled, although it is felt; but it is a mere by-product of fire and not a distinct entity. It is present so long as the fire burns; and when the fire is extinguished heat disappears. Similar is the situation of consciousness in the body.

It is true that consciousness is not a quality of any of the four elements in isolation; but when they begin to interact life is generated, and consciousness is another aspect of life. A homely illustration is offered, homely to the Indians given to betel-chewing. The lips and tongue turn red when betel-leaves, areca-nut and lime are chewed together; the redness, which the
three constituents do not contain severally, emerges as a new quality. It would not however have emerged but for the interaction of the three constituents. The inebriating effect of the brewer’s concoctions is another illustration. This is doubtless an important speculation and anticipates in a manner the Gestalt arguments of organisation. Consciousness is a form that emerges sui generis, the elements and the relations between the elements determining the emergence; it is a “whole, the behaviour of which is not determined by that of their individual elements”. The lokāyata, like the Gestaltist, believes in parts, whole and intrinsic determination (svabhāvavāda). The emphasis on intrinsic determination was so great that often the creed was designated as ‘svabhāvavāda’ (the doctrine of intrinsic determination). A lokāyata verse pertinently asks: “Who makes the thorn sharp? Who is responsible for the delightful variety in bird’s wings? Which person makes the sugar-cane sweet and the nīḥba bitter?” And the answer is “everything is determined by its own nature!”

To return to consciousness. As an epi-phenomenon, it is not continuous: it consists of a sequence of conscious processes. We cannot speak of it as a stream; there are spurts and gaps in the sequence. During sleep, for example, consciousness ceases; and it reappears on waking. Consciousness in the lokāyata conception, thus, is entirely object-oriented; mind has no function independent of the senses which contact the objective presentations. This is of course an unphilosophically simple view, and short-sighted too; for consciousness is not explained by merely identifying it with sensations. But it must be remembered that we are judging the lokāyata standpoint on the strength of a few unconnected maxims that have been preserved by unfavourable critics; we are not aware of the quantity of maxims that have disappeared, and we are therefore not in a position to reconstruct fully or faithfully the lokāyata psychology.

The Wandering Wisecracks

Two thousand and six hundred years ago in the Northern
provinces of India were numerous courageous but queer souls wandering about incessantly, thinking hard and talking tall. Each had a theory of his own to explain man and universe; tradition had no hold on him, and debates did not disturb him. These wanderers were free from family ties, unmarried and unbefriended; they were celibates and often ascetics given to rigorous forms of self-torture. Normal social life had no attraction for them; and they created intellectual unrest wherever they went. Some of them proudly called themselves ‘vagabonds’ (dīśācaras). They were everywhere and talked about everything. The Buddha is reported to have met more than thirty of these wanderers; and the Jaina, and Buddhist works of a subsequent age have preserved the names, and in some cases the viewpoints, of many of them. There was Moliyasīvaka, whom the Buddha met at Rajagaha, and who was interested in the problem of phenomenal presentations to consciousness; there was Poṭṭhapāda who discussed about the nature of soul; there were Ajita and Pāṇḍissa who discussed with Sāriputta (the Buddha’s foremost disciple) the five hundred states of consciousness; Vekhānasa was interested in the method of purifying the soul; Dīghanakha (‘the long-nailed one’) taught that ‘nothing in him abided’; Susāma, Tiṃburuka, Nandiya, Sandaka, Māgandiya, Annabhāra, Nigrodha and Bhaggavagottā were some of the others. It is beyond doubt that these wanderers stimulated considerable zeal in academic matters among the populace: a Buddhist document reports that the entire kingdom of Magadha (modern Bihar and parts of U.P.) was seething with the speculative fervour they set up. Of course, they faded into oblivion (like fireflies on sun-rise, as the Jātaka puts it, or like crows before a peacock) as time passed by, because of the indubitable eminence of two of their contemporaries: Mahāvīra and the Buddha. Indeed their names have been preserved only as acquaintances of the latter two.

The Buddhist records, especially the Sāmaññaphalasutta, have given us some details concerning eminent wanderers of those times; from the Chinese and Tibetan versions of this
source they appear to have been exceedingly interesting specimens of humanity. Pūrṇa-kassapa, for instance, ended his life by throwing himself into a river with a large jar tied round his neck. He believed that neither the present world nor the next existed in any real sense. Beings of course have body and life; but nothing outlives death. Actions are seen and may be real in a sense; but it is absurd to speak of the intangible and utterly passive 'soul' responsible for actions. Things are what they are due to pure chance, and the reason you see therein is figment of your imagination. For anything may come to pass without necessary cause or sufficient condition. Queer ideas indeed! There was another eccentric philosopher, Ajita, who was always seen with a hair-blanket wrapped round him (kesakambala); it kept him warm in summer and cold in winter! He sounded the war-cry of opposition to Vedic orthodoxy; rituals and ceremonials infuriated him. He was a most thoroughgoing materialist, who roundly described the soul as a byproduct of the body composed of the four elements; 'what is psychical is also corporeal.' An old Jaina text recognises that in his system of thought experience was somehow viewed as an indivisible whole. It is also given as his idea that when one dies, being foolish or wise makes no difference in his destruction. As almost his antithesis was another, Kaccayana, with a hump (kakuda) on his back, who argued that body and soul were different; that nothing came out of nothing; and that what was never ceased to be, and what was not did not come to be. Experience indicates the interplay of several principles (seven according to the Buddhist references and six according to the Jaina): earth, water, air, fire, soul, space (in Jaina enumeration), pleasure-and-pain (added in the Buddhist list). The elements perpetually join together and tear asunder; they unite by pleasure and separate by pain; and this goes on for ever. The wise Sañjaya, who scoffed at this ideology, was a most irresponsible teacher: he was easy-going in his convictions and placed implicit trust in the inability of human mind to understand anything finally. The fifth wanderer, Gosala of the bamboo staff, deserves some
more attention (*ad infra*) because of his influence as well as the profundity of his thought. All these wanderers, together with Mahāvīra the 'fetterless' ascetic, were senior contemporaries of the Buddha.

The Naked Naturalist

There was a group of eccentric ascetics who continued to hold public attention from a century prior to the Buddha till at least the days of the Mauryan king, Asoka, and probably till a still later date. They called themselves ‘Ājivikas’ and went about in summer as in winter naked, covered with dirt and dust, rejecting with contempt all comfort, and frequenting forests. They were by choice and profession ‘ugly in habits’, ‘given to hard life’, ‘loathing things the ordinary folk aspire for’, and ‘solitary’

But they were zealous advocates of right living and were intent on seeking truth. The Jaina works however attempt to paint them in black tints, and describe them as profligates and moral wrecks; but this is understandable in view of the difference of opinion that prevailed between Mahāvīra and the then leader of the Ājivika hosts, Gosāla.

Gosāla, perhaps so called because he was born in a cowshed, belonged to an order of ascetics distinguished by their bamboo-staves (*maskarin, makkhali* in Pāli). He was a recluse for twenty-four years and predeceased Mahāvīra (who predeceased the Buddha). The most interesting period in his life was his association with Mahāvīra for ten years when they dwelt together, practised penances together, and exchanged ideas; but later owing to an uncertain reason they fell out and remained bitter enemies till their ends. The Jaina books describe Gosāla as mischievous and mad. But beyond doubt, he was a powerful teacher whose influence survived for centuries and his thoughts, although preserved in fragments, reveal a resourceful mind.

The most characteristic feature of his philosophy is his theory of evolution which he set up on the tripod of destiny (*niyatī*), differentiation (*saṅgati*) and nature (*bhāva*). The universe is incessantly undergoing transformation, which is pro-
gressive in character. The propelling agent in evolution is the very nature of things: "all sentient beings, all living creatures, all creation are without power, force, might, will, control; they are subject to existences which are inherent in their natures". A ball of thread dropped in space unwraps itself to its full length, necessarily and naturally. Likewise is this stupendous process of evolution (parinām) during the course of whose onward march innumerable stages and species come to exhibit themselves: there is gradual development, or, in the archaic language, 'perfection by transformation' (saṁsārasuddhi). This is indeed a curious creed. Nature is blindly pushing forward the procession of evolutionary changes; and none can escape participation in the festivity. The procession is moving inexorably towards destiny. Nature is pushing and destiny is pulling, and into the bargain are the species evolved. Gosāla's philosophy implies a grim determinism, but has a human side also. Man is the highest in the graded species; he has evolved as a result of transformations in recurrent cycles of existences in infinite time. He has in him the potentialities to attain to the highest of grades, that of the jīna (the perfect and free being who has conquered evolutionary transformations). The realisation of this potentiality again is a law of nature, predetermined and destined: none can avoid becoming a jīna!

The organic world is a field of three pairs of conflicting forces: gain and loss, pleasure and pain, life and death. The two forces in each pair are incessantly at war with each other. Human life is thus a stressful contention of opposing processes. Gosāla recognises eight developmental stages through which human life should pass (aṭṭhāpurisabhāmiyo); and holds that alongside the physical development there occurs mental maturation also. It is exceedingly unfortunate that details of this interesting doctrine are almost permanently lost to us. Gosāla further appears to have been the first Indian to attempt a classification of human types; there is mention in the Buddhist works of his having spoken of eight groups of persons (Abhijātis). Perhaps the retention of the colour-character typology in Jainism is due to Gosāla's influence; and perhaps
we find there the survival of Gosāla’s own idea. But one would wish he knew more about the life and gospel of this naked ascetic who gave unto nature that was nature’s and unto man that was man’s.

REFERENCES

1 See Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, p. 281 n. 2
2 Dakshinaranjan Shastri: *A Short History of Indian Materialism*, Sensationalism and Hedonism, 1930, p. 12
3 *Maitri-Upaniṣad*, 7.9
4 *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad*, 1.2.10-13
5 ‘Ayodhyākāṇḍa’, 108
6 *Arthaśāstra*, 1.1
7 Dakshinaranjan Shastri: *op. cit.* p. 55
8 *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, Allen & Unwin, 1949, p. 58
9 Cf this maxim: “Daṇḍanitiś eva vidyā” (preserved by Kṛṣṇaśāstra)
10 “arthakāma puruṣārthau”.
11 Tattvasaṃgrahapanjikā, p. 520; also Guṇarata’s *Tarkaratrasaṃgīta*
12 It is said that there were even in the olden days two groups of materialists: ‘the intractable’ (dhūrtā) and ‘the cultured’ (satīkṣaṭa). The latter condescended to accept inference as reliable in a limited manner
13 This example is found in *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṅgraha*, ascribed to the authorship of Śaṅkara (2.7); its earlier origin is unknown
16 Majjhima-nikāya, vol. 2, p. 2
18 Kern: *Indian Buddhism*, p. 33
19 Sūtrakṛtāṅga, 2.1.15-17
20 ‘aññyayājīvo-aññāsāraravāda’, ‘noya uppajjaye asaṁ’, ‘sato naṃchi
vināso; asato nacchi saṁbhavo'.

21 For an excellent account of the Ājīvikas, See Benimadhav Barua: "The Ājīvikas", Journal of the Department of Letters (Univ. of Calcutta), vol. II, 1920, pp. 1-80

22 According to Pāṇini, Sūtra 4-3-35

23 There are alternate explanations in the Buddhist and Jaina texts for this word; the latter spell the word as maṅkhaḷi and designate Gosāla as 'Maṅkhaliputta'. But according to Patañjali the expression indicates a philosophy which insists on seeking peace as the highest end and on not performing actions.

24 'lābhaṅg-alābhaṅg; suhang-duhang; jīveyam-maraṇang'. (cf. Bhagavati-sūtra)
CHAPTER V

THE ETHICAL INTERLUDE

Genesis of Jainism

There was, about 2,530 years ago, a queer person who lived in what we now call Bihār. "He wore no clothes and wandered homeless all round the year but for brief spells. In biting winter he would be under shade; but in the scorching summer he would be out in the sun. For months he would not drink water; and for days would not eat. He never bathed, nor washed, nor cleaned his teeth. He utterly disregarded all bodily cares and comforts, but was steadfast in his meditations. People jeered at him, beat him with sticks and threw filth on him; dogs were set on him and a hundred inconveniences were set up to distract him from his contemplative fervour. But he withstood them all like a hero on the battle-front."

He was known as Mahāvīra (the Great Hero). His heroism however was spiritual; the battles he fought were against man's baser nature filled with passions and prejudices, desires and anguishes; and the victory he won was the very summum bonum of human life. His personal name was Vardhamāna, which means 'growing': he grew not only in spiritual stature, but in his influence on a large community directly and over the entire nation indirectly.

Jainism holds him in the highest esteem: in fact the form and philosophy of present-day Jainism is due to his effort and influence. But Jains do not recognise in him the founder of their faith; and rightly so. Jainism is perhaps the oldest religion in the country: even in the Indus civilization (3000-2500 B.C.) traces of Jaina practices (nudity, asceticism, bull-worship etc.) are discernible. The religion is probably pre-āryan and certainly pre-Buddhist. The Jaina belief is that Mahāvīra is the last of the 24 ford-making saints (tīrthaṅkaras) who have appeared during the past two 'aras' of the present avasarpini phase of time in the Bharata-ksetra of Jambūdvipa.
The date of his passing away has been conjectured as 468 B.C. The first of the twenty-four *tirthaṅkarās* was Rṣabha, who figures also in *Viṣṇupurāṇa* and *Bhāgavata*. Passing through the legendary careers of the subsequent *tīrthaṅkaras*, we come to the twenty-second, Ariṣṭanemi, who was a contemporary, perhaps a cousin (or uncle), of the Kṛṣṇa of orthodox religion. Conceding that even Ariṣṭanemi was mainly mythical, it is indubitably certain that his successor, Pārśvanātha, was a historical character. The Jaina tradition holds that he passed away 250 years before the birth of Mahāvīra, that he was the son of King Asvasena of Kāśi belonging to the Uragavamsa and that Mahāvīra's parents were devotees of Pārśva. His date has been worked out as 880 to 780 B.C.; he is said to have lived a full hundred years. Colebrooke considers him as the real historical founder of Jainism. This may be, for even Mahāvīra lived for thirteen months in the dispensation of Pārśva, and when Mahāvīra emerged as a teacher he was more a reformer than a founder. Mahāvīra introduced innovations in Pārśva's creed but did not supplant it. A follower of Pārśva, Kalāsavesiyaputta, who is described as 'a homeless elder-monk', holds a discussion with a pupil of Mahāvīra and accepts Mahāvīra's fifth vow in addition to the four of Pārśva. The four vows of Pārśva, known as the four-fold restraint (*cāujjāmasaṃvāra*) are: restraint from injury to life (*pāṇāivāya*), restraint from untruth (*musāvāya*), restraint from theft (*adinnādāna*) and restraint from possessing property (*bahiddhādāna* or *aparigraha*). And Mahāvīra added to this list restraint from sexual misconduct, or insistence on chastity (*brahmacaryā*). Besides the ethical teaching of a high order, Pārśva is also said to have contributed the conception of six types of human beings (*cājīvanikāya*) which persists in Jaina metaphysics in the shape of the *lesyā*-theory. Pārśva may thus safely be credited with historicity; in fact it is surmised that all along in the Jaina community there has been a persistent loyalty to Pārśva which led to the formation, around A.D. 80, of the Svetāmbara sect which is nearer to the teachings of Pārśva as the Digambara is to that of Mahāvīra. Mahāvīra did not
found a new religion: he was more in the nature of a reformer. The Jain religion is indeed of hoary antiquity; and there was an ancient doctrine (Puvva) surviving through the ages and reaching Mahāvīra, who is said to have taught it to his eleven leading disciples (gaṇadharas), Indabhūi and others. But it is inconceivable that the teachings of the eminent Mahāvīra were a passive transmission of the old creed; they must have distinctly borne the stamp of Mahavira’s originality. It is likely therefore that his early disciples distinguished between the Old Doctrine (Puvva) and the Modified Doctrine (Aṅga); and it is natural that the Old Doctrine in fourteen sections soon became obsolete and gradually faded into oblivion. When thus the Old Doctrine ceased to exist independently an epitome of it was preserved as an appendix to the Modified Doctrine which was in eleven sections; but curiously enough, this twelfth section of the Aṅga which contained the epitome, Diṭṭhivāya, was also lost. It is hard to explain adequately this persistent misfortune of the Puvva. The Aṅga however has remained as the most venerated and fundamental part of the Jaina canon: it has been described as maṃṭṭhāna or matrices.

The spiritual knowledge of the Jains (suyanāpa) is styled as Siddhānta or Āgama. As regards the texts thereof, there is a major difference of opinion, and this refers to the great division in the following of Mahāvīra into two groups: the Dīgaṁbaras (sky-clad) and the Svetāṁbaras (white-clad). The division, however, is not fundamental or doctrinal: it is due more to tradition and customs. But it must be recognised that in the enumeration, identification and acceptance of canonical texts, the two groups branch off irreconcilably.

The Giants of Jaina Thought

The saint Bhadrabāhu, whose death occurred 170 years after the demise of Mahāvīra, heralded the Jaina age of unsurpassed mental activities: he was the fore-runner of a long line of very eminent intellects. He was so supremely a great writer that his Dasāo (better known as Kalpasūtra) was soon elevated to the canonical status; but what held the attention
of the erudite for generations were the Prākrit commentaries known as Nijjuttis that he prepared on ten canonical works. After a lapse of nearly four hundred years we hear of the next great name in the Jaina world of letters, the South Indian Kundakunda. According to the Dīgāṃbara genealogical records of saints (paṭṭāvalī), he lived in the first century of the Christian era, and was the fifth master in succession to Bhadrabāhu. It is reported that he presided over a dṛṇiḍa-saṅgha of Jains at Tiruppāpuṭiyūr near the present-day Cuddalore in Madras province. This indefatigable intellectual wrote no less than eighty-three treatises in Prākrit elucidating various aspects of Jaina thought; but it is unfortunate that all but seven were in course of time totally lost. The regret mounts when we realise that what remains of his writing is exceedingly brilliant and beautiful, especially his famous trilogy (known as Prabhāttratraya): Pañcatthiyasāra, Pavayansāra and Saṁyasāra. He discusses philosophy and dogmatics, ethics and psychology; he elucidates, exhorts, admonishes and opposes; his style is clear and forceful. The crystallisation of the Jaina philosophical thought largely owes to his efforts. He was blessed with an even more brilliant disciple; Umāsvāmin (known to the Śvetāmbara sect as Umāsvāti) who, according to the Dīgāṃbara records, was born in 135 A. D. and died in 219 A. D. He is reputed to have written 500 books, but the one that preserved his name and eminence for posterity was Tattvārthādhigamasūtra (‘The Manual for Understanding the True Nature of things’) in Sanskrit. This is doubtless a remarkable dissertation, which has had the fortune of meritng commentaries by several of most distinguished of Jaina thinkers including Siddhasena, Samantabhadra, Haribhadra, Vidyānanda and Prabhācandra. The work is encyclopaedic in character, charming in style and vivid in presentation. He is among the first Jaina authors in Sanskrit; and as such marks the end of an era of Prākrit under-currents and the beginning of an age of ripples and waves in Sanskrit.

This gigantic intellect was directly responsible for a whole crop of astute and elegant writers, of whom Devanandin (alter-
nately known as Jinendrabuddhi) was the foremost. He, whom the pious posterity has always addressed with a hushed reverence as ‘Pūjyapāda’ (the Venerable One), is supposed to have flourished around 251 A.D. He was a scholar and poet, metaphysician and psychologist; he also exhibits creditable proficiency in grammar and rhetoric. His Sārvārthasiddhi, which seeks to illumine the dark nooks in the celebrated text of Umasvāmin, is a monument to his outstanding brilliance. Siddhasena-divākara was another ancient author whose greatness has survived till our day. He was essentially a logician but was also a lyricist of considerable skill. Besides a commentary on Umasvāmin’s text, thirty-two treatises on logic were prepared by him, the most famous of which is Nyāyāvatāra. A philosophical tract, Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa, is also ascribed to his authorship.

The second half of the seventh century in our country was a live with philosophical disputations. The renaissance of the orthodox faith concurred with the renewed vigour of Jaina dialecticians. The eminent scholiast Kumārila attacked with ferocity the Jaina philosopher, the author of Laghiyastraya and Tattvartharājavārttika; and Akalaṅka was defended with immense gusto by Vidyānanda and Prabhācandra; great books emerged in the bargain. Haribhadra (705-775 A.D.) wrote vigorously, profusely (—he is said to have written 1444 books, and it is maintained that 88 of them are still extant —) and elegantly; he wrote poetry and prose with equal skill, in Prākṛt and Sanskrit with equal facility. He was born in the present-day Chittore in Rājasthān in a Brāhmin family and was accomplished in the orthodox lore; he became, however, a Jaina monk in later life under the influence of a nun, Yākini. Although a Jaina by religious conviction he remained open in intellect. Towards the end of the tenth century South India contributed another important architect of Jaina dogmatics: Nemicandra (who bore the title ‘Siddhāntacakravartin’, ‘Emperor in the field of philosophy’). This eminent writer, belonging to the Digambara sect, was tutor to the famous minister and general Cauṇḍarāya in the court of the Gaṅga prince Rācamalla II.
The Ethical Interlude

(974-984 A.D.). His Pañcasāṅgāha, popularly known as Gommaṭasātra, is a huge thesis of nearly 2,000 Prākrit verses, covering all the essential details of Jaina philosophy. In contrast to this bulk, he wrote another small tract of less than 60 verses, Davvasaṅgāha. Perhaps the last of the outstanding names in Jaina thought was Hemacandra (1089-1172) who was responsible for a Jaina renaissance in Gujarat: born as a merchant’s son near Ahmedabad of to-day, he studied under Devacandra and became teacher to the Cālukyan king Jayasiṃha-Siddharāja (1094-1143) and to his successor Kumārapāla. Hemacandra was not only an eminent author (as illustrated by his Trīṣaṭṭisālākāpurusacarita) but a forceful personality: if Gujarat to-day is a stronghold of the Śvetāmbara Jains, it is due to the untiring efforts of this monk who combined sagacity with scholarship, influence with austerity, activity with asceticism, extraversion with holiness.

The Biological Bent

It is interesting that Jaina metaphysics has a biological foundation. It will be remembered by the reader that Mahāvīra was considerably influenced by Gosāla, the Ājivika naturalist’, who suggested the idea of organic evolution as well as a classification of human beings into types. The Jaina philosopher worked on the suggestions and arrived at an elaborate grouping of living beings (jīvasamāsa) into 406 types. The student of modern zoology will of course find the grouping queer and crude, but when he considers the facts that the grouping was done not by men of scientific persuasion but by hermits engaged in spiritual upliftment, and that it was done nearly 2,000 years before Linnaeus and Darwin were born his dissatisfaction is likely to turn into admiration. The classification of species as given in an ancient Jaina text1 is as follows:

Organisms are distinguished by the presence of life (jīva, cognate with the Greek zoōs). They are bound in various ways to worldly existence, except the highly evolved and emancipated human beings. The living beings that are bound thus are
divided into two Classes: Static and Dynamic. The former Class comprehends earth, water and vegetation (plants, trees, shrubs, creepers, grass, palm, herbs etc.). The latter Class is divided into three subclasses: 'fire-lives' (coal, burning chaff, flame, meteor, lightning etc.), 'wind-lives' (squalls, whirlwinds, thick-winds, gale etc.) and 'organic lives'. Organic lives are distinguished by the presence of sense-organs (indriya), by means of which they transact with the world. This subclass is further divided into four orders: Organisms with but two sense-organs (tactile and gustatory) including such animals as worms, shells, earthsnakes and leeches; Organisms with three sense-organs (olfactory being the third) including such animals as ants, bugs and animalcules; Organisms with four sense-organs (visual being the fourth) including all higher animals and human beings. The number and nature of sense-organs form the basis for this classification; and the Jaina naturalist points out that the sense of touch is the most important in all organisms, for it is universal in its possession (that is to say, all animals without an exception possess it) and it is not localised in specific areas of the body but pervades all over.

The subclass of higher animals (possessing all the five sense-organs) is classified into three orders: Aquatic, Terrestrial and Aerial. The Aquatic Order includes such animals as fish, tortoise, crocodile and porpoise. The Terrestrial Order has two suborders: Quadruples and Reptiles. The suborder of Quadruples includes the following general; solidungulars (like horse), biungulars (like cow), multiungular (like elephant) and animals like lion with developed toes and nails. The Reptile suborder comprehends the animals like lizards which move on their arms, and the animals like snakes which move on their breasts. The Aerial Order has several genera: birds with membraneous wings, feathered wings, box-shaped wings and outspread wings.

It is further recognised that higher animals and human beings are endowed with thinking faculty and hence are designated as Rational (saṃjñī) and animals lower down in the scale of evolution, which are devoid of this property, are
described as Non-rational (asamjñī). The rational animals are equipped with mind (manas), physical strength to move and manipulate (kāyabala), power of expression by making sounds (vacanabala), an elaborate respiratory mechanism (śvāsocchvāsa) and span of life (āyus). The exact import of the last attribute is uncertain.

The Jaina thinkers neatly classify the contents of the world into the Biological (jīva) and the Material or Non-biological (ajīva). The Biological world is characterised by the presence of conscious ness (cetanā), while the Material world is non-conscious. The former is composed of organisms, whereas the latter consists of material substances. The material substances may have identifiable form or may be formless. Those with form are referred to as ‘things’ (pudgala), which can be seen, smelt, touched and tasted. Substances without form are: the medium of motion (dharma), the medium of rest (adharma), space (ākāśa) and time (adīhāsamaya). These formless substance: though intangible engage, support and change the ‘things’ dharma is likened to water in which the fish move and adharma to the earth on which creatures stand; things move and have their being because of these two formless substances. Space is basic to both of them. And time, which is really not a substance, is what makes changes possible. We must pause to inquire into what the Jainas mean by the curious word astikāya which I have here rendered as ‘substance’. The world is composed of two stems: āsti (is) and kāya (body). This composition indicates that substances exist (āsti) in the sense of extention in space and are made up of many distinct and divisible parts or aspects (pradeśa or kāya). Time is not a substance like matter, or media of motion, and of rest; it is not extended, and there is no composition of parts in it.

In an organism, the material body with the sense-organs represent the material aspect of the world, while life is the biological aspect. The body is the garb and support; and life is the animating principle. Without life, body is mere matter. And life, which is devoid of an identifiable form is not localised anywhere in the body but fills it through and through;
it is equal in extent to the body. Vadideva summarises the Jaina views regarding life: “Its nature is consciousness; it is changing; it is agent in actions and also the direct experiencer. It is in extent equal to its body; it is different for every individual; and it comes to be possessed of material karmas”. Its being equal in extent to the body is said to be a doctrine that is uniquely Jaina; and in this context, the simile of the lamp is offered: the light that emanates from the flame of a lamp (which is placed in a corner) fills the whole room; its scope is large if the room is large and small if the room is small.

How do we know its presence? We know it directly by introspection (ahanpratyaya) and by inference. In the earliest portion of the Jaina scriptures there is recorded an interesting dialogue between Mahāvīra and Goyama: it pertains to the doubt entertained by some exacting philosophers whether or jiva really exists. And Mahāvīra sums up his view: “If the object about which one has doubt is certainly non-existent, who has a doubt as to whether I do exist or don’t? Goyama, when you yourself are doubtful about yourself what can be free from doubt?” Doubt presupposes a doubter, an agent in the mental process of doubting; and this doubter must necessarily be beyond doubt, or else doubt is impossible. And when conscious subject is vouchsafed by our personal experience, why bother about other evidences? Secondly, our life-activities are like characters (guna): they cannot occur without a substrate (gupin). Passing changes do require a persisting background; the painting does require a canvas. Finally, psychological processes such as cognition, recognition, memory and desire do not belong to the body; they are absent even when the body is there, as for instance in death, or in sleep. Thus the Jaina thinkers argue for the presence of an immaterial but extensive principle of consciousness obtaining in the organisms as life, soul, or subject. The principles of life and consciousness are thus identical for the Jaina. And it is interesting that soul is looked upon in this system as a biological substance (dāvva, Skt. dravya). One who believes in soul in this manner (āyāvāti) must necessarily be a realist, a believer in the world (logāvāti) and a
believer in behaviour (kiriyāvāi). This was Mahāvīra’s position.

*Aspects of Understanding*

The essential characteristics of life, holds Umāsvāmin, is ‘understanding’ (upayoga). Nemicandra defines the concept thus: the psychological mode that arises in consciousness for the purpose of apprehending a presented object.21 J.L. Jaini interprets this mode as a sort of inclination, or ‘attention’;22 Understanding, in other words, is the initial orientation of an organism towards an environmental detail that functions as a stimulus. It is important to note that it is viewed as a response, as arising from the phenomenon of stimulation. In the Jaina text-books another expression is employed as an equivalent (or almost so) of upayoga, viz., bodha (awareness), which when evolved is said to become cognition. The import gets clarified when we consider the aspects of understanding.

Understanding has primarily two aspects: intuitive apprehension (damśaṇa, Skt. darśana) and cognitive comprehension (nāṇa, Skt. jñāna). The former is by definition form-less (nirākāra), that is to say, indeterminate: it is the apprehension of an object in a very elementary and general way without differentiating or identifying details thereof.23 It is in the nature of just ‘picking up’ an object (oggaṇa): the grasping is both preliminary and primitive. Intuition is mass-perception, and is in no way descriptive (nīvāṇṇanā). Cognition, on the other hand, works with psychological ‘forms’ (sākāra), or figures: it is determined. The assumption of form refers to differentiation of details, identification of name and association of values. Virasena defines cognition as the understanding of the generic as well as the specific natures of the external object.24 The assumption of form involves the determination of contents as well: the import of the presented object is enriched. We may with reservations view this aspect as perception; in fact, Jinabhadra has described it as ‘empirical perception’ (sāṁvyavahārapratyakṣa). If intuition is presentation, cognition is representation, in the former is an undifferentiated mass presented while in the latter we have a definition in our perception. The two are really stages in a perceptual experience,
“What imprints the work of true objectivity is not the sensuous vividness of impressions but the wealth of inner relations”\textsuperscript{25} Intuition grasps, and cognition knows. Siddhasena thinks that sensation (avagraha) is involved in intuition,\textsuperscript{26} whereas Vādideva makes sensation the core of cognition.\textsuperscript{27}

Intuitive apprehension is of four kinds: visual, non-visual, clairvoyant (avadhī) and omniscient (kevala). The last is reckoned as natural or innate (svabhāva) whereas the other three are modifications (vibhāva). The last two essentially belong to metaphysical discussions and may here be left out of consideration. Cognitive comprehension is of eight types: perceptual (matijñāna), verbal (srutajñāna), clairvoyant (avadhījñāna), telepathic (manāhparyāya), omniscient (kevalajñāna), incorrect perceptual, incorrect scriptural and incorrect supernatural particular. The first four types in this list are normal and ordinary: they are described as non-natural, in the sense of being indirect or dependent on the sense-organs for experience. The other four are of little psychological import.

Perceptual cognition (matijñāna or abhinibandhikajñāna) involves the operation of senses (including mind)\textsuperscript{28} and is confined to the present time (sāmpratakālavīśaya). Bhadrabāhu furnishes a list of functional synonyms of this variety of cognition: searching (magganā), fathoming (gavesanā), sensory cognition (mai), investigation (vimaṁsa), differentiation of attributes (apohā), memory (sai), recognition (saṁnā). The listed words bring out the role of sense-impressions of memory traces, of intellection, of testimony through signs, and of the volitional drive in fulfilling the requirements of cognition. The inferences based on observation are included in this category. Umāsvamin makes a distinction between sensory cognitions and mental cognitions;\textsuperscript{29} and his commentator Siddhasena distinguishes three types of cognitions: predominantly sensory, predominantly mental and partially mental as well as partially sensory. Srutajñāna is verbal in the character of comprehension; it involves the operation of symbols and signs (words and concepts). While perception holds true only for the present time, verbal cognition may function in regard to the past, pre-
sent or future. The Jaina thinkers have recognised that verbal
cognition presupposes the perceptual: observation precedes
ideas. Perceptual as well as verbal cognitions are indirect
(parokśa), inasmuch as they depend on the functioning of the
sense-organs and mind.20 Both, further, are liable to error; and
being ordinary cognitions, they easily succumb to doubt
(samśaya).

Clairvoyant cognitions (avadhi) are direct:and supernormal
comprehensions, confined to particular objects having form.21
This mode of comprehension is unaffected by distance and do
not involve the mediation of sense-organs. The telepathic
cognition (manahparyāya) is likewise direct and supernormal,
but comprehends not objects but ideas in the minds of others.
This is independent of sense-organs, and even mind contributes
nothing towards comprehension. It is by no means an inferential
procedure, for in the Jaina telepathy not only do the senses
stand aside but the mind is entirely inactive. The highest kind
of comprehension is the omniscient (kevala), which is the
perfect and most direct cognition of everything. Hemacandra
describes it thus: the cognition which is really the manifesta-
tion of the true nature of consciousness, and which follows the
cessation of all obstructing factors.22 The latter three are direct
and immediate, attainments rather than equipments; and
indicate spiritual preparation.

In perception, verbal comprehension and clairvoyance
intuition and cognition are distinct processes whereas in
telepathy and omniscience they are identical.23 This is one of
the views and in regard to this problem there is considerable
diversity of opinion among Jaina writers.

Sense and non-sense

Let us now take up the first type of comprehension, viz.,
Perception (matijñāna, in later terminology pratyakśa) for
consideration in some detail. The Jaina authors derive
pratyakśa from the root as or aks, 'to pervade' (the sense-
organ whose processes 'pervade' the object), and interpret the
prefix prati as 'dependent' or 'resident' (pratigata): cognition
dependent on sense function. The expression popularly and extensively employed to denote sense-organ is *indriya*. Pāṇini explains that the word means 'sign of Indra'; 'created by Indra' etc.: "The functioning sense-organs are visible symbols of life within". Indra is taken by some Jaina authors to stand for *karma*, and they explain 'indriya' as produced by *karma*. Thus *pratyakṣa* concerns sensory or empirical comprehension. However, in text-books we find that this comprehension is referred to specifically as *indriyapratyakṣa* in contradistinction to the *nōindriyapratyakṣa* by which are meant the clairvoyant, telepathic and omniscient comprehensions.

Māṇikyanandin defines empirical perception (*saṃvyavahār-ikapratyakṣa*) thus: "Comprehension that is occasioned by senses and mind that is particular in character." Human senses are five in number: touch, smell, taste, sight and audition. And each sense has two aspects: structure (*dravya*) and function (*bhāva*). The former is material in constitution, meant to pick up objects of a particular type; the constitution is appropriate to the objects that are picked up. The eye picks up forms, the ear grasps sounds, the tongueprehends taste, the nose catches up smell and body-surface apprehends touch. The physical organ provides mechanical contact with the external objects. Function is of course the counterpart of structure, but is entirely psychological. It occurs in two steps: attainment (*labdhi*) and activity (*upayoga*). Attainment is capacity to prompt the sense-organ to its appropriate functioning; and activity is the actual modification of soul in the shape of an object as a result of the attainment.

Mind (*manas*) is a close associate of the five senses but is quite distinct from them. It is designated as 'non-sense' (*anindriya*), which term, however, is explained by Devanandin as 'quasi-sense' (*nōindriya*) and not as absolute negation of sense. Mind is a sense inasmuch as it apprehends objects, but a 'subtle sense' (*sūkṣmendriya*), 'internal sense' (*antarindriya*), 'quasi-sense'. It is different from other senses in that there is no specificity of objects for mind: it grasps all objects. Further, the other senses grasp the objects that occur within the
perceptible range, while mind's activity is not thus restricted. Mind, unlike the senses, suffers from a disadvantage in that it cannot hold the objects for long: it is dynamic and unstable. Like other senses, however, mind too has a structure as well as function. Structure is explained as the material atoms transformed into the form of the mind; but the explanation appears both forced and far-fetched. And function is the conscious activity.

From Reception to Retention

Four stages are recognised in the sensory perceptual process. The initial and indistinct stage is designated as Reception (avagraha), the earliest definition of which is 'taking hold of sense-data'. Several synonyms have been suggested for this term like 'holding' (upadhāraṇā), 'reception' (avagraha), and 'prehension' (avalamābanā). The main import is the grasping of external objects by the senses. Umāsvāmin writes: "Reception is indeterminate, intuitional cognition of objects by the sense". And he distinguishes between 'intuition' (ālocanā) and 'prehension' (avadhāraṇā): the former expression indicates a certain spontaneity while the latter a certain deliberation. The contact between the sense and an object is followed by an initial orientation in the direction of stimulation. There are Jaina thinkers who roundly equate this stage of apprehension with sensation, but there are others (like Vādideva) who nicely distinguish between sensation as an involuntary physiological process consequent on the contact of the sense-organ with the object and the resultant stimulation in consciousness. But Hemacandra insists that reception does not involve 'mental construction' (manaso vikalpaḥ), but is dependent on the external object; according to him, it is awareness of sense-data immediately following intuition. Vidyānanda, however, points out that in reception we cognise the individuality of a thing: in other words, there is here a preliminary organisation of fragmentary and indistinct characteristics that are given to sensory experience.

Reception operates in two steps: form-reception (vyanjalā-
vagraha) and content-reception (arthāvagraha). Form-reception is essentially a relation (saṃbandha) between the individual and the presentational object,"^{46} between the organ of sense and the datum of sense. This relation is involuntary, instantaneous and the immediate function of physical stimulation. The simile is given of a sleeper being roused by the ringing of a bell: as soon as he wakes up, the second step of adverting to the contents of stimulation starts. The inceptional stimulus now acquires the character of a 'thing' or an 'object'; and there is a slight involvement of psychological processes. However, this step is merely the completion of the process started in the first and there is hardly any significant qualitative difference between the two steps both being predominantly at the sensory level. There is a transition from vagueness to clarity in these steps, to facilitate the next stage of Attention. While the content is received in an elementary fashion, the meaning however still remains to be apprehended. The traditional view that both steps are indeterminate in character in the sense that the perceiving subject assumes no perceptual modality as yet is supported by Jinabhadra, while Devanandin, Hemacandra, Akalanka and others insist that even at this stage a distinct perceptual modality will have already been assumed and that sensation is thus determinate in character. Akalanka points out that in between the steps of form-reception and content-reception it is reasonable to assume another step wherein the mere presence of an object is intuitionally apprehended (saṃmātradarśhana): this is the necessary fore-runner of the second step, and the ground for content-reception is thereby prepared.

Reception is immediately followed by Attention (iśā). We have in the old texts several suggestive synonyms of this expression: 'inclination towards' (ābhogana), 'inquiry' (vimarsā) 'search' (mārgaṇā). Umaśvāmin defines the word thus: "Readiness to comprehend the details of the object received."^{47} Devanandin rightly introduces the element of 'striving towards specificity' as a necessary feature in attention; Jinabhadra underlines the urge towards definition of the object
in terms of its distinctive features. When a sound is heard (reception), a desire is immediately instituted in our minds to know the source of the sound: is it the sound of a conch? or of a horn? But Jinabhadra and Siddhasena hasten to point out that it is not doubt (sañśaya), although doubt is implicit in, and antecedent to, attention. Doubt is essentially a state of confusion, an inability to sort out the false from the true in a multitude of details. But in an act of attention there is application of mind of a positive type towards organisation of relevant details and ascertainment of the precise nature of the object. Attention thus is action, dynamic in character.

The result of attending is Apperception (avāya). "Specification-in-adverting" (āvartana) is suggested in Nandisūtra as a synonym of apperception. Umāsvāmin defines the word thus: "Determination of the specific nature of object of attention". The object attended to is identified at this stage as such and such: "It is the sound of a conch, not of a horn." The act of identification involves the element of recognition, which in turn implies an association of the present sense-datum with a past experience. Thus, the stage of apperception is one of active organisation: it is here that the sensation is transformed into a specific idea. It is not an involuntary transformation that is central to the idea of apperception, but a judgment, a deliberation, an attainment.

What is thus apperceived is resolved finally into Retention (dharāṇā). Synonyms of retention given in Nandisūtra include: 'placement' (sthāpanā), 'fixature' (pratiṣṭhā), and 'firm hold' (koṣṭha); Umāsvāmin defines the term as "the condition of recollection". This stage, however, is not to be mistaken for memory: it is the stage where apperceptional impressions (sañskāra) which later function as memory-traces (vāsanā), are formed. The important process here is not recollection (smṛti), but prevention from lapse (avicyuti); the etymological sense of 'bearing', 'holding up', 'supporting' is suggestive. Vādideva recognises in retention the process of perceptual consolidation; and he explains that this process is facilitated by the deliberation on the part of the perceiver. The acquisition
of a form or figure which persists in the mind for some duration as a subjective representative of the external object completes the perceptual process.

There are mental processes that are not perceptual in character but empirical in scope. Recollection (smṛti), recognition (pratyabhijñāna), reasoning (ūha) and inference (anumāna) are considered under this head in the Jaina text-books. Recollection as an operation depends upon retention, which we have just now considered. Hemacandra defines it thus; “Awakening of a memory-trace (retained in the mind consequent on a prior experience) in the form of ‘that’”. There are thus involved in recollection two sequential operations: arousal of an impression already present, and indication of its content by referring to it as ‘that’. Hemacandra explains awakening of the impression (vāsanodbandha) as emergence to the level of awareness. Recognition is the product (saṃbhavaṁ) of recollection and perception of an object. The object is at once apprehended directly by the sense-organs and identified with a memory-trace already present in the perceiver’s mind. Recognition necessarily presupposes the contemporary perceptual process, while recollection does not; but recognition is basically recollection, recollection in the presence of an object. However, in an act of recognition the two elements are operationally indistinct: the apprehension is a Gestalt. Reasoning and inference are treated merely as logical categories; and are therefore omitted from our consideration here.

The colours of character

We have seen that the naturalist Gosāla was interested in the classification of human beings into types (abhijñāt); and he transmitted this interest to Mahāvīra, who was his friend for some years at Nālandā. The followers of Mahāvīra subsequently developed the typological doctrine of leṣyā. Leṣyā is an old word, employed in the Yoga school; it occurs in one of the earliest texts of the Jaina scripture, Sūyagaḍāṃga (1.6.13), in the sense of colour. The description of colours to character-types is also a Yoga practice. Leumann renders leṣyā as soul-
type' and the commentator of *Gommaṭasāra* as 'thought-paint'.

In the Jaina ideology the expression signifies the character-types of human souls; and there is an elaborate consideration of the differential nature of these types in many books, especially in *Uttarādhyayanasūtra* and *Gommaṭasāra*. Basic to this conception are the postulates that there are individual differences among human beings, and that characters are liable to be coloured by actions.

A word about the doctrinal context of the *leśyā* theory. The Jainas believe that human actions (bodily, vocal and mental) generate a variety of subtle matter called *karma*; passions attract this *karma* matter, which pours into the soul and sticks to it. The soul, as a cumulative result of the sticking of *karma* matter, gets coloured; and the colouration indicates the character of the soul. The colouration is technically described as 'arising' because it causes or prompts 'the vibratory activity of the soul'. The Jaina works distinguish between the actual material colouration of the soul (*dravyaleśyā*) and the effective tendencies conditioned by this colouration (*bhāvaleśyā*). It is important to remember that the colouration determines, and is determined by, both action and emotion; and that this determination is not inherent in the soul, but is consequent on external conditions. If we choose to dilute the metaphysics of it, the character-types are not inborn but acquired.

Six human types are enumerated and are designated by the names-of-colours: Black (*kṛṣṇa*), Blue (*nīla*), Dove-Grey (*kapota*), Flaming Red (*rakta*), Pink or Yellow (*padma*) and White (*śukla*).

**Black type**: Individuals who are of fierce disposition, hostile, pugnacious, cruel, wicked, impulsive and uncontrollable; also those who are lazy, witless, unskilled, vain, and undependable.

**Blue type**: Individuals who are indolent, cunning, intent only on money-making, short-tempered, arrogant and sensuous.

**Dove-Grey Type**: Individuals who always complain, curse, criticise and condemn, fear and regret; trust none, and love
flattery.

*Flaming Red Type*: Individuals who are discreet, sincere, gentle, courteous and charitable; also those who love fair-play and discipline.

*Pink Type*: Individuals who are generous, kind, intent on incessant and wholesome activity; also those who are humble, disciplined, attentive and respectful.

*White Type*: Individuals who are impartial, indifferent to pleasures both present and future, free from passions and settled in equipoise.\(^{56}\)

The types are illustrated by a delightful simile: \(^{57}\) Six men, travelers all and lost in a jungle, beheld a jambu-tree laden with tempting fruits. Each of them plans to get at the fruits by adopting a method characteristic of his temperament. The first plans to uproot the tree (the Black type), the second to cut down the trunk of the tree (the Blue type), the third to cut off the big branches (the Dove-Grey type), the fourth to sever only small branches (the Flaming Red type), the fifth to pluck the fruits (the Pink type) and the sixth to pick up the fruits that have fallen of their own accord (the White type). Their plans are described as 'action by speaking in mind', *(jaṁ maneva vayaṇam kamma)* and are explained as due to the *lesyaśas*.

The concept of colouration is intimately related to the theory of *guṇas*, which was developed by the *Sāṁkhya-Yoga*. The Black and Blue types together represent *tamas*; the Dove-Grey and Flaming Red types *rajas*; the Pink and White types *sattva*. It is important to note that the typology suggested by the Jaina thinkers is motivated predominantly by an ethical consideration, and is of psychological interest only incidentally.

*The Seven Standpoints*

The *leit-motif* of Jaina metaphysics is the doctrine of epistemological relativity, *(sivāvāya, Skt. *śādvāda)*. It is difficult to ascertain the origins of this doctrine, but I feel that it was unimportant, if existent, during Mahāvīra's days; it was a later age, probably post-Christian, that witnessed the development of this constructive doctrine concerning probability.
While the details of this doctrine are irrelevant for our present discussion, a passing acquaintance with the import thereof may prove interesting.

They started by rejecting the principle of certainty in knowledge: they argued that it would be futile as well as fallacious if an attempt were made to arrive at general, constant and certain laws about reality. The universe abounds in empirical objects, each with innumerable changing and empirical properties (anantadharmātmaka). What we call a thing is merely a presentation of some of these properties. The content of an object therefore has but a relative significance: it can be apprehended only with reference to its context. It would be wrong to affirm with certainty that 'A thing is so'; the truth is that it is so only in a particular sense, and it would not be so in other senses. We are therefore justified only when we say 'It may be so' or 'probably it is so.' The Indian word for 'probable' is syāt, which has entered into the nomenclature of this doctrine.

Thus in knowledge, standpoint (naya) or point of view becomes important. A standpoint recognises that knowledge can never be absolute or complete. An object can be viewed from different standpoints and the judgment in regard to the object is relative to the particular standpoint taken; and from any standpoint only an aspect of the object is apprehended, and others are omitted. A person is father to his son, son to his father, husband to his wife, uncle to his nephew and nephew to his uncle, master to his servant and servant to his master. What he is depends upon the viewpoint taken. The doctrine of standpoints is, in the words of Devanandin, 'a technique of ascertaining precisely one of the several aspects of an object from a particular standpoint.'

Theoretically, standpoints are infinite in number; but the Jaina thinkers, motivated by pragmatic considerations, have arrived at seven standpoints grouped in two categories. The first category relates to the general properties of an object (dravyanaya: dravya here means 'general rule'): and the second category refers to the constantly changing properties (paryāya-
naya : paryāya means ‘particular’). The first category has three forms: Figurative (naigaṇa), Synthetic (saṅgṛaha), and Analytic (vyavahāra) standpoints. The Figurative standpoint is the common sense view. A person is fetching fuel, water etc. and says that he is cooking food. The food of course is not being actually cooked, but what he says is true inasmuch as he is engaged in an activity which will ultimately result in cooking. A person says that he is writing a book when all that exist are pages, and no book whatever. Activity here is sequential and a purpose runs through all the stages. The Synthetic standpoint comprehends several modes under a common head for they belong to the same class. When we say ‘jar’ we include under it all kinds of jars and all the jars we are acquainted with; common characteristics are considered here. The Analytic standpoint concerns itself with the division of reality, or analysis of actual experience into its composite aspects. We speak of a book conventionally as a unitary entity; but practically the book is divided into chapters, chapters into sections, sections into paragraphs, paragraphs into sentences and so on. The second category has four forms: Direct (ṛjusūtra), Verbal (śabda), Conventional (samabhīrūgha) and Realist (evaṁbhūta) standpoints. The Direct standpoint confines itself to the present (ṛju, straight) and ignores both past and future. What exists exists in this moment; an object is a mere assemblage of properties at a given moment, and this assemblage is subject to incessant shift. The Verbal standpoint emphasises the rôle of words in representing external objects. The Conventional standpoint is an application of the Verbal, and confines itself to the etymological import of words. The Realist standpoint ascertains the object in its present mode and presupposes the Conventional standpoint. The expression ‘teacher’, to take an illustration, should be employed in regard to a person only when he teaches.

It is mentioned that these seven standpoints are inter-related. There is a successive dependance on the preceding standpoint: the Synthetic dependent on the Figurative, the Analytic on the Synthetic and so on. According to the Jaina
scholiasts, the seven standpoints represent the seven philosophical theories in India: the Figurative is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika standpoint, the Synthetic the Vedānta view, the Analytic the Sāṁkhya standpoint, the Direct the Buddhist standpoint and so on. Each standpoint, however, overlooks its complementary character and holds that its own view is absolute. This error is known as nayābhāsa. In reality the standpoints are like cotton-threads that are interwoven in a particular manner to become a shirt for one to wear; if each thread chooses to remain isolated and independent, no purpose is served. The ‘venerable’ Devanandin concludes: “Transaction in the world is facilitated by combining all the standpoints.”

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1 Āyāraṅgasutta, ‘Ohaṇasūyam’
2 A Rg Vedic hymn has preserved his name: “svasti nas Tārkṣyo Āriṣṭanemīḥ svasti no Bhaspatir dadhaḥ”
3 For an interesting account of Pārśva’s life, Cf. M. Bloomfield: The Life and Stories of the Jaina Saviour Pārśvanātha
4 Bhagavati-viyāgha-panṇatti, 1.76. Also Cf. Uttarādhyayanāsūtra. 23
5 Āyāraṅgasutta, 2.15.16
7 Chapter IV. p
8 Uttarādhyayanāsūtra; 36.
9 Bhagavati-viyāgha-panṇatti, 25.2 and 4
10 Kundakundas Niyamasūra, 37. “Cedāṇabhāvo jīo cedāṇaṅguṇa-vaijīyā sesā”
11 So called because they are subject to accretion (pūraṇa) and decomposition (galana): atoms unite and form into a molecule (saṅghāta); and molecules break up and dissolve into atoms (bheda)
12 Cf. Kundakunda’s Pavayaṇasūra, Part I
13 “anidīṭha-saṁṭhānam” (Kundakunda)
14 Pramāṇanayatatvāloka, 7.55-6
15 Tatvārthasūra, 3.14
16 Vādideva says: “pramāṇa pratyakṣādiprasiddha ātmā”, Pramāṇanaya-
Development of Psychological Thought in India

tattvālōka, 7.55

17 Vīsesāvāsaya, 1557
18 Bhāṣya on the above, 1549-1656
19 Prabhācandra’s Prameyakamalamārtanda, p. 114
20 Which Umāsvāmin equates with sat or tattvārtha (in the sense of reality)
21 Gommaṭasāra, Jivakāṇḍa, 672 “vatthuṇimittam bhāvo jādo jivassa jo du uvayogo”
23 Davasaṅgha, 43, ‘Sāmāṇḍar gahaṇaṁ’
25 Ernst Cassier : Substance and Function and Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, Dover, 1953, p. 281
26 Sammatitarkapārakaraṇa, 2.21
27 Pramāṇanayatattvālōka, 2.7
28 Cf. Umāsvāmin’s Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, 1.14
29 Umāsvāmin’s own Bhāṣya on the above
30 Akalaṅka, however, boldly regards perceptual cognition as direct (pratayaṣṭa). Cf. Laghiyastraṇya, 3-4. But he is alone in his argument, abandoned even by his admirers on this issue. The consensus of Jaina opinion is that this cognition is indirect
31 Cf. Bhadrabāhu’s Avassaya-nijjutti, 45. The expression ‘avādhi’ means ‘limit’, ‘particular’ or ‘restriction’
32 Pramāṇamīmāṃśa, 1.1.15
33 Cf. Siddhasena’s Sammatitarkapārakaraṇa, 2, 3
34 Cf. V.S. Agarwal : India as known to Pāṇini, Lucknow University, Pāṇiṇīmukhasūtra, 2.5
35 Hemacandra’s Pramāṇamīmāṃśa. 1.2.21 f.
36 Sarvārthasiddhi, 1.14. He gives the illustration of the expression “anuddārā kanyā” (girl without a belly) which only means “girl with a narrow waist”. Vidyānanda, however, argues that mind is not a sense-organ at all. Cf. Tattvārthasloka-vaśītika, 2.15
37 Pramāṇamīmāṃśa, 1.2.24 “sarvārthagrahaṇam manah”
38 Sarvārthasiddhi, 1.14
39 Vidē. M.L. Mehta, op. cit. p. 70
41 Bhadrabāhu’s Avassaya-nijjutti, 3, “atthāṇam uggahaṇam”
42 Tattvārthādhigamasūtra-bhāṣya, 1.15. Nemicandra, however, equates intuition (darśina) with sensation (avagraha)
43 Comm. on Pramāṇamīmāṃśa, 1.1.26
44 Vidē discussion on this topic in M.L. Mehta, op. cit. pp. 73-76
45 “parinayadavvasambandho”; Cf. also Comm. on Vīsesāvāsaya, 194
46 Ibā is generally translated as ‘speculation’; but in consideration of the psychological function of this stage I have employed the rendering ‘attention’ although it is rather inexact linguistically.
"Tattvārthādhigamasūtrobhāṣya, 1.1.5
"jam āneganatthālambanaṃ...appāṇam"
"svitaviśeṣanirṇaya"
"smṛtihetu"

Pramāṇanayatattvāloka, 2.10
Pramāṇamāntā, 1.2.6

Ibid. 1.2.7

Gommaṭasāra, 'Jivakāṇḍa', 505 (J.L. Jaini: S.B.J. Vol. 5)
Devanandin’s Sarvārthasiddhi, 1.6
Cf. Gommaṭasāra, 'Jivakāṇḍa', 509-517
Ibid. 507-608; also Uttarādhyayana, 35

Sarvārthasiddhi, 1.33
Vide. Syādvādamāṇjarī and Syādvādaratnakara
Cf. Sarvārthaisiddhi, 1.33 (S.A. Jain: Reality, Vira Sasana Sangha
Calcutta, 1960, p. 41 f.)

Ibid, 1.33
CHAPTER VI

SPECULATIONS IN THE CLOISTER

_Buddhist Psychological Books_

When, 2549 years ago (according to the Ceylonese reckoning), Gotama of the Sākya clan obtained the wisdom that made him the Buddha, an intellectual revolution was set afoot: a great religion which later spread its rich influence throughout the continent of Asia was then born. All the subsequent sermons the Buddha had occasion to deliver were memorised with characteristic Indian accuracy by his devout disciples, and soon after the passing away of the master in 544 B.C. they were recited and ratified in a convocation of all the immediate disciples. The orthodox opinion traces the origin of the classified Buddhist sacred literature styled as _Piṭaka_ to the deliberations of this convocation: the sermons of the Master were compiled, labelled and grouped under three major divisions—the codes for conduct within the monastic order (vinaya), the general teachings (sutta), and the abstruse metaphysical and psychological essays (abhidhamma). It is uncertain whether all that now goes as _ipsissima verba_ of the Buddha is really so, but there is strong evidence for the high antiquity of the first two divisions. The School of Elders (theravāda), the oldest of the Buddhist schools and presumably the most authentic, appears to have already been crystallised during 400 B.C.; and this school has through the ages retained its pristine purity to a large extent, and is now the prevailing creed in Ceylon, Burma and Siam. Probably within a century or two after the formation of the first school, in the Western regions of India emerged the Sarvāstivāda school; and by about 250 B.C. there arose another school, the Mahāsāṅghika, from which the later Mahāyāna schools branched off.

The bulk of _theravāda_ literature is in Pali, the māgadhan variant of Sanskrit. Its scriptural contents in the extant form are the results of five great conferences of erudite ‘sons of the
Buddha.' The first conference was held immediately after the demise of the founder, and the sixth one completed its deliberations in Burma only last year, 2,500 and odd years after the first. The third conference, presided over by Tissa-moggaliputta, was convened by the great emperor Aśoka, 236 years after the Buddha's passing away, and the form which the teachings assumed then was brought to Ceylon by the celebrated missionary son of Aśoka, Mahinda. The scriptural texts which constituted this 'orthodox' teaching were for the first time committed to written form in the first century B.C. during the reign of the King Vaṭṭagāmaṇi-abhaya in Ceylon. Subsequently three major Sinhalese commentaries came to be composed on these texts: Mahāaṭṭhakathā, Mahāpaccariya-aṭṭhakathā and Kurundi-aṭṭhakathā. There is considerable uncertainty regarding the origin of these commentaries and none of them is extant. Perhaps the celebrated mediaeval scholiast Buddhaghosa took the Mahā-aṭṭhakathā as the ground-plan for his own Pāli commentaries.

The abhidhamma collection of metaphysical and psychological tracts, which forms the third group of the scriptural texts, is certainly not contemporaneous with the Buddha. It is clearly later than the other two groups, Vinaya and Sutta, and betrays a period of growth. Tradition, however, holds that the outline of Abhidhamma was intuitively apprehended by the Buddha during the fourth week after his enlightenment; that he preached the Abhidhamma doctrine 'in brief' for three months to the spirit of his departed mother and other devas in the tāvatiṃśa heaven; that he recapitulated this brief teaching in the form of mātikā (headings, lists, summaries) to his disciple Sāriputta, "as though he stood on the edge of the shore and pointed out the ocean with his open hand"; and that Sāriputta, 'who was endowed with analytical wisdom,' expanded this teaching during his instructions to his five hundred students. Mrs. Rhys Davids has in fact discovered in the Sutta and Vinaya texts the employment of the expression mātikā along with vinaya and dhamma. It is probable that out of an original nucleus of suggestions Sāriputta developed this aspect of Buddhist wisdom,
and in this he may have been helped by his ‘brother-in-religion’, Mahākoṭṭhita, who has been described as ‘the chief of disciples who were masters of logical analysis.’ Even the orthodox scholiast, Buddhaghosa, concedes that the arrangement of the Abhidhamma texts was due to Sāriputta. But the codification of concepts and elaboration of themes were later and gradual achievements.

As the collection stands today, it consists of seven treatises: Dhammasaṅgaṇi, Vibhaṅga, Dhammapañṇatti, Kathāvatthu, Yamaka and Paṭṭhāna. Of these the Puggalapañṇatti as Rhys Davids suggests, may be the earliest; and Kathāvatthu was composed by Tissa-moggaliputta in connection with the monastic convocation during Asoka’s time. Winternitz thinks that an original Kathāvatthu composed during the third century B.C. was augmented by additional portions from time to time.

It is remarkable that these exceedingly dry treatises of Abhidhamma which can naturally interest only specialists and the understanding of which demands intellectual acumen above the ordinary, should be so highly adored by the laity and populace in Burma and Ceylon: in Ceylon during the tenth century King Kassapa V had all the Abhidhamma texts engraved upon gold plates, and Dhammasaṅgaṇi was studded with precious stones!

In addition to these seven canonical treatises, the most interesting contribution to the Abhidhamma literature is the Pali tract known as Milindapaññhāṁ “The Questions of Milinda”, composed probably in the first century of our era. This work records the conversations (probably mostly imaginary) between the erudite Greek King Menandros who ruled over the north-western region of India and the brilliant monk Nāgasena on diverse metaphysical and psychological problems.

An important landmark in the evolution of Abhidhamma literature is the fourth century scholiast Buddhaghosa. There is some uncertainty regarding his life and career. The old texts, however, describe him as a brāhmaṇ from central India (or from Andhra country, being born in Moraṇḍakheṭaka-gaṁa) who became a Buddhist monk under the guidance of Revata therā; he
is said to have repaired to Ceylon during the reign of Mahā-
nāma in order to retranslate into the māgadhi dialect the Sinhā-
lese commentarial literature. Staying in the Mahāvihāra mona-
stery in Anurādhapura, he wrote the celebrated treatise Visuddhi-
magga (‘The Path of Purification’), perhaps one of the most
brilliant books of the world. He also compiled glosses
(āṭṭhakathas) on all the important sections of the Pāli canon.
The seventeenth century Burmese work Gandhavaṁsa (‘The
History of Books’) mentions that he wrote commentaries on all
the seven books of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, collectively entitled
Paramatthakathā. But celebrated are his commentaries on
Dhammasaṅgaṇi known as Atthisālini (‘The Expositor’) and on
Vibhāṅga known as Sammohavinodini (‘The Dispeller of Con-
fusion’). A contemporary of Buddhaghosa, Buddhaddatta, who
hailed from Kāśicīpurāṇa in South India wrote two abhidhamma
treatises: Abhidhammāvatāra and Rūpārūpavibhāga. A monk
of the Mahāvihāra in Ceylon,Ānanda Thera composed a gloss on
the Piṭaka commentaries, which goes by the name of Mūlaṭikā.
The fifth century monk Dhammapāla (a native of the present
Nāgapatam in South India) compiled ‘Notes’ (Aṇuṭikā) on the
Mūlaṭikā. No less than three other explanatory notes were
compiled on this Mūlaṭikā in Burma. There is also a com-
mentary on Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga entitled Paramatthamaṇ-
jūsā. Buddhaddatta’s Abhidhammāvatāra has a gloss on it,
Abhidhammatthavīkāsini, by Sumaṅgala.

A remarkable little manual characterised by erudition and
analytical skill is Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, written by Anuruddha.
a monk hailing from Tanjore in South India. He is said to have
lived in the twelfth century; but another opinion makes him a
contemporary of Buddhaghosa. Mrs. Rhys Davids, however,
puts his date at circa 1000 A.D., and this seems probable. The
work named above has served as the most popular handbook in
Burmese and Ceylonese monasteries for centuries; and numerous
explanatory treatises have been compiled thereon both in
Burma and in Ceylon, the most celebrated of which is the
Vibhāvani-ṭikā by Sumaṅgala (a pupil of the famous Sāriputta
Thera of Polonnaruwa). Nāmarūpapariccheda is another im-
Development of Psychological Thought in India

important and interesting contribution by Anuruddha to the abhidhamma literature. When in course of time the abhidhamma study was losing both encouragement and application, it was the energetic devotion of Dhammaratana Thera who lived about 400 years ago in Ceylon that gave the fresh impetus. He was a prolific writer on abhidhamma topics, and his tracts include an Explanation of Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha.

Abhidhamma and Illustrations

The abhidhamma collection has been described as an exposition (vēyyākaraṇa).11 Dhamma is ‘doctrine’, ‘teachings’, ‘discourse’ or ‘instruction’ (desanā); and the prefix abhi intensifies the succeeding noun: it signifies ‘over’, ‘higher’, ‘special’, ‘additional’. It also means, as Horner has pointed out, ‘relating to’, ‘concerning’. The expression ‘abhidhamma’ has been variously rendered into English: ‘special dhamma’ (E. J. Thomas and G. P. Malalasekara), ‘more-dhamma’ (E.M. Hare), ‘further doctrine’ or ‘extra-doctrine’ (Mrs. Rhys Davids), ‘higher branches of the doctrine’ (Lord Chalmers), ‘higher subtleties of religion’ (M. Winternitz). Nyānapoṇika Thera paraphrases the expression: ‘Systematisation of doctrines contained or implied in Suttapiṭaka’. The great Buddhaghosa himself takes up this problem in the Introductory Discourse of his Aṭṭhasālini and concludes that the prefix abhi must, like ati, be taken in the sense of preponderance and distinction; abhidhamma is ‘that which exceeds and is distinguished from the dhamma (the Suttas). This distinction refers to the rigorously analytic and abstract method (nippariyāyena) employed in the abhidhamma collection in contradistinction to the picturesque treatment of the topics with parables and literary flourish in the other two canonical collections. The ‘speciality’ consists in the cold, dry and purely intellectual approach. It is not without some reason that abhidhamma has been styled sometimes as ‘metaphysics’, although it is strictly more ethico-psychological than metaphysical. While the other tracts of the canon consider objects, events and persons in their conventional connotation, we find in the abhidhamma tracts a phenomenological approach. Here
we no longer have identifiable objects and persons but a treatment of them in terms of abstract processes and ultimate constituent factors (*paramattha*). There is evident the application of a relentless analysis... doctrine (*abhipisittadhāma*). A simple and most adequate explanation of abhidhamma would be 'analysis of phenomenal processes into mental and material' (*nāmarūpapariccheda*).  

We may consider as an illustration of the abhidhamma treatment of subject matter the very first of the tracts *Dhammaśaṅgani* which is held in high esteem, especially in Burma. The title of the tract means 'an enumeration of phenomena'. All possible phenomenal processes, mental and material, have here been analysed, listed, classified and sometimes defined; the interrelationships between these have been brought out, and their various combinatious worked out; word-definitions abound almost to a tedium. The text is prefaced with an elaborate table of contents (*mātiṅā*), arranged under fifteen heads and comprehending no less than 330 items. The first section deals with mental processes as they obtain in four groups corresponding to the four planes of thought. The items listed in the table of contents are here taken one by one for definition, analysis and explanation. The presentation assumes the form of a leading question (*pucchā*) and the reply to it comprising an exposition of occasion (*samayani-ddesa*), enumeration of categories (*dhommuddesa*) and a summing up (*āppanā*). The explanation is in terms of synonyms emphasising the significance common to them all. Explaining mind, for instance, the author gives a string of suggestive synonyms: "mano, mānasam, hadayam, paṇḍaram, manāyatanam, manindriyam, viññāṇam, viññāṇakkhando, tajjā manoviññāṇa-dhatu." After this kind of explanation of all the mental phenomena, there is an attempt to group them variously according to certain criteria: direction, spontaneity, predominant factors, stages of meditational absorption, attainments etc. The second deals in a similar, but much briefer, manner with eleven groups of material constituents such as the body and sense organs. Then follows what by some scholars is
considered the main text,14 the brief but comprehensive exposition of the table of contents, as nikkhepakāṇḍam. In this interesting section the sources of the different psychological processes are traced and explained; this is the most readable part of this difficult tract. Following this is the commentarial appendage, ascribed sometimes to the authorship of Sariputta, containing a sort of abridged version of the preceding chapter.

The commentary on this work known as atthasālīnī, attributed to Buddhaghosa, offers an etymological and contextual explanation for every important concept and formula of the original text. Cross-references to concepts in different parts of the canonical literature are supplied and there is an endeavour to arrive at precise and workable connotations of the terms employed. The style of writing is engaging, if not always illuminating. During the course of explanation numerous psychological problems have been discussed.

A contrast in many ways to the terse Dhammasaṅgāni is the famous Milindapañha, a work of unknown authorship. The work in its extant form betrays many periods of growth and multiple authorship; but it holds the reader's interest throughout with powerful imagery, charming style, clever exposition, brilliant suggestions, and wit. Facility of expression and argumentative flourish have combined with profound scholarship and mature wisdom to render this book at once abstract and interesting. Problems of doctrine and metaphysics are discussed with consummate skill in the form of dialogues between a king and a monk: the viewpoint has expressly been stated as ābhidhamma. The book has seven chapters, the last four of which are considered later additions. The first chapter supplies an elaborate occasion for, and an account of, the two participants in the dialogues: it does not touch the subject-matter at all and has appropriately been styled as the ‘Extraneous Account’ (Bāhirakathā). The second chapter warms up the reader with a string of witty and clever conversational pieces on a variety of topics, purporting to convince the reader of the exceptional abilities of the monk who solves the riddles for the king. The monk protests at one stage: “We
want to arrive at truth; let therefore our discussions be concerning truth. The third chapter initiates serious discussions: the attainments of the Buddha, the kinds of wisdom, evil in the world, analysis of mental conditions, the worth of renunciation, and so on. The major interest of the work seems to lie in the fourth chapter, which is also the longest: 'Difficult Dilemmas' (menḍaka) in eight sections. Most of the problems discussed here pertain to dogma and doctrinal matters, but the first suggestion of the bhavaṅga-consciousness in the history of Buddhist thought occurs in this chapter during a discussion on sleep. The fifth chapter containing a descriptive imagery of the Dhamma-City, the next dealing with ascetic practices and the last treating a variety of problems in meditational exercises continue and maintain the abstract and serious level of discussions begun in the third chapter. A systematic search for all possible problems in connection with an idea or formula and an attempt to solve them mostly by means of homely similes and citation from scriptural texts are the major characteristics of this book; arguments there are that appeal to reason, but logic here is not invariably the last word. However, this work not only codified the abhidhamma conceptions current about the first century A.D. but stimulated subsequent inquiry, exposition and speculation.

By far the biggest landmark in the history of abhidhamma literature is Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga, composed nearly a thousand and five hundred years ago. The work has exceptional merits of clarity, conviction and comprehension; unlike in the author’s other work, Atthasālini, the endeavour in this work is not towards analysis but towards synthesis. The scope of the work is encyclopaedic: there is hardly an important idea of early Buddhism that has escaped attention and explanation here. Buddhaghosa reveals himself not only as a profound scholar but as an astute thinker also: the ease with which he can explain the most difficult conceptions is indeed remarkable. “Indeed”, writes Professor Lanman, “there is a certain fitness in comparing him with the most illustrious of the Latin fathers, and in calling him the Saint Augustine of India”.17 Visuddhi-
magga is a gigantic treatise of twenty-three long chapters, written in an elegant style and covering all aspects of the Buddhist doctrine and discipline. It is said that the high and honoured authorities of the celebrated Mahāvihāra monastery in Ceylon challenged the Indian author to prove his worth by explaining the significance of a verse in Samyutta-nikāya: "Within is tangle, without is tangle; by tangle are tangled the folk. Who now, I ask thee, Gotama, may this tangle untangle?"; and that Buddhaghosa composed Visuddhimagga in answer to this challenge. In point of fact, the book opens with a citation of this verse and proceeds with a detailed comment on it.

The book focusses its attention on three aspects of the Buddha's teaching: conduct (sila), wisdom (pañña), and mental culture (cittaḥ or samādhi). Devoting the first two chapters to conduct, especially monastic conduct, the author takes up the problem of meditational exercises in nine excellent chapters: the forty classical exercises are described in detail with copious instructions to the beginner. During the course of these explanations we find valuable psychological contributions made: mind, memory, emotions, temperamental types, inclinations, sublimation, higher mental states, mind-control, training and so on. Of particular interest is the section on the "mindfulness on respiration," where the author reveals a remarkable insight into the mental dynamics. Devoting the next chapters for spiritual attainments, the rest of the book treats the various aspects and factors of wisdom; here again, significant psychological concepts are presented and considered. Throughout, we find lively discussion and excellent style: to read this book is indeed an intellectual adventure, apart from the great practical interest it has for the aspirant.

Anuruddha's Abhidhammatthasangaha is indeed a wonderful handbook: it presents the abhidhamma ideology in the most concise but clear manner with an analytical skill of a high order. It generally presupposes an acquaintance with Visuddhimagga and stands as a text-book for advanced students. Written in an extremely terse style, it deals in considerable detail with mind and mental states alongside matter and nibbāna. I
have elsewhere given a detailed analysis of its contents.

New Waters

The abhidhamma tradition continued, although in a weak and slightly modified form, in the Mahāyāna branch of Buddhism during the early centuries of the Christian era. The earliest name of great celebrity is that of Asaṅga (probably between 375 and 450 A.D.), who continued this tradition and contributed to the development of that quasi-mystical and psychological school known as Yogācāra (more correctly Yogacaryā) or Vijnānavāda. The Tibetan Religious Annals (Bu-ston) ascribes three volumes in Sanskrit to his authorship: Pañcabhūmi, Abhidharmasamuccaya and Mahāyānasāṅgraha. The first one, for long lost, was recovered about twenty years ago by Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana from a collection of palm-leaf manuscripts in Sa-skya monastery (Lha-khang-chhenmo) of Tibet. An interesting part of this book is the 13th section, entitled Śrāvakabhūmi, which in many respects is similar to Buddha-ghosa’s Visuddhimagga. The manuscript has not been published, but Alex Wayman has furnished a summary of its contents. The book deals with the practical path of discipline for one who has the potentiality of attaining to the sumnum bonum; and there is a preliminary discourse on the theoretical aspects of the discipline, description of personalities (pudgala), and meditational exercises (ālambanas) proper to them. In the second chapter, personality is classified into six types (as in Visuddhimagga) with reference to the prevailing moods; and in the subsequent chapters there occurs a detailed account of the various processes involved in the mental orientation (manaskāra). Under the heading “Cultivation of mental Orientations”, the author discusses the stage of ‘unsteady’, ‘interrupted’, ‘involuntary’ and ‘effective’ orientations.

The second of Asaṅga’s works, Abhidharmasamuccaya which is the more important one, was translated into Chinese by Hieun-Tsang. Fragments of the palm-leaf manuscript containing this text were discovered in 1934 in the Shu-lu monastery in Tibet by Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana; V. V. Gokhale has critically edited the available text and P. Pradhan has furnished a
notice of it.\textsuperscript{24} Asaṅga’s tract in its available form deals with two important problems: factors constituting the \textit{skandhas}, and the doctrine of dependent origination (\textit{pratityasamutpāda}). The texts dealing with ‘body’ and ‘sensation’ are missing, and the discovered portion starts abruptly with the latter half of a sentence concerning ‘perception’ (\textit{saññā}), enumerating its types and defining them; then follows a minute inquiry into the various psychological states contributing to the ‘mental organisation’ (\textit{sañskāra}). In the enumeration of states as well as in their definitions, the author closely follows the Pāli tradition. Interesting, however, is the distinction made in this work between ‘consciousness’ (\textit{vijñāna}) and ‘mind’ (\textit{manah}). There was also a commentary on this work by Yaśomitra.\textsuperscript{25}

Asaṅga’s brother, Vasubandhu, was indeed ‘the most celebrated man of the middle ages’ (I-tsing). Takakusu gives his dates as 420-500, but Wogihara fixes them at 390-470; and Paramārtha in his Chinese \textit{Life} tells us that he died at the age of 80 at Ayodhya. His great treatise \textit{Abhidharmakośa} was compiled from the standpoint of the Hīnayāna Sarvāstivāda school: its Sanskrit original is lost, but the Tibetan and Chinese translations have come down to us. From the latter (done by Hieun-Tsang), it has been gathered that the work deals with ontology, psychology and that it makes an extensive use of the Pāli conceptions. That the work made a great name for itself is evident from the description in the great Sanskrit novel \textit{Kādambari}, of parrots in the Buddhist hermitage reciting verses from the \textit{Abhidharmakośa}. It is a consoling thought that a commentary on this work, \textit{Sphuṭārthā}, by Yaśomitra is available for study.

About 600 A.D. a scholar, teacher and thinker of great renown presided over the Nālandā College: Dharmapāla, of Vasubandhu’s school. He was 106, when Hieun-Tsang visited him in 935 A. D. Of the works he left behind, a commentary on \textit{Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi} has come down to us in the latter’s Chinese translation;\textsuperscript{26} it was recently restored into Sanskrit by Rahula Sāṅkrtyāyana with the help of Wong Mow Lam.\textsuperscript{27} This is doubtless an important compendium of theories and
conceptions of different abhidharma schools as current in those times; several thinkers are mentioned in the work as holding independent views. The problems dealt with are essentially psychological, and some of the definitions given are remarkable for brevity and effect. Of especial interest are the author’s explanation of the familiar compound, ‘manovijñāna’ (4, 5, 1), identification of ‘ālayavijñāna’ with ‘bhavaṅga’ (3, 4, 7), definition of ‘attention’ (3, 4, 2), and the account of ‘perception’ (5, 6, 1).

Vasubandhu’s pupil, Dignāga, was responsible for a definite shift of interest from psychology to logic. His works on logic have been described by Stcherbatsky as ‘a most excellent achievement of the Indian mind.’

His eminence prompted the Buddhist thinkers for centuries to be preoccupied with the problems of logical analysis and expression. While this interest helped systematise the theoretical framework of Mahāyāna philosophy, the psychological orientation of the early Buddhism was irretrievably lost in a maze of imposing logical structures. A concept of considerable significance that emerged in this atmosphere was that of ‘relativity’ (śūnyatā), which was the basic postulate of the Mādhyamika school; this concept, which of course was mainly metaphysical, indirectly influenced the subsequent development of the Pāli abhidhamma thought. Parenthetically, mention may be made of a humorous illustration of this concept by Candrakīrti, a writer of the sixth century. In his commentary on Catuḥśatikā, he gives a story to illustrate a point:

A certain astrologer once predicted that it would rain, and that those who used the rain-water would become mad. The King of the region who heard this prediction had his well immediately closed so that no rain-water may fall into it. In time, it did rain and the people of the region (who had disregarded the astrologer’s words) used the rain-water, only to go off their wits! The King, who used the water from his own well carefully preserved from the rain-water, continued to be normal; but all the others. who were indeed mad considered that it was the King that was mad and not
themselves! The King in despair also used the rain-water and happily became mad like all the others.

After the mediaeval times, the Pali abhidhamma literature ceased to grow. Now and then there appeared in Ceylon and Burma a tract or two intending to explain the knotty points in the old abhidhamma texts: but such attempts were merely in the form of conventional glosses and did nothing to further the thought. Talents were utilised in hair-splitting arguments to prove the age-worn propositions, and for over a thousand years there has been no evidence of original thought or independent judgment. In very recent times, however, the efforts of Dhammaratana in Ceylon and Ledi Sayadaw in Burma have renewed an interest in abhidhamma. Special mention must be made of the latter, whom Mrs. Rhys Davids credits with "so much independent and progressive judgment." Mahāthera Nyāṇa (1846-1923), who was the abbot of the Ledi monastery in Burma, has written numerous tracts in Burmese and in Pāli, explaining the most difficult psychological and ethical problems in Buddhism and shedding fresh light on them. A work of particular interest to psychologists is his Vipassanādipani (The Manual of Insight), which discusses, among other subjects the problems of hallucination (vippallāsa), fantasy (maññanā) and delusion (abhinivesa). Hallucinations are classified according to the role of perception, of thought and of beliefs. Fantasy is traced to three possible causative factors: desire, conceit and error. Delusions are explained as due to emotional and intellectual factors. The Manual also discusses in a systematic manner fifty-four types of mental phenomena, the problem of attention and the higher levels of consciousness.

Analysis of Man

The Buddhist enthusiasm for analysis was probably inspired by the Sāṅkhyan philosophers; like the latter the Buddhists were rather empirical in their approach. Godless and soulless, their theory sought to explain man by resolving him to his constituent aspects. The soul of the orthodox thinkers was a hasty hypothesis to account for man's thoughts
and actions; it was a confession of their inability to analyse sufficiently the observational and inferential data. The Buddhists began with zeal to correct this error by initially dismissing the mysterious soul; they settled their attention on man as body-and-mind and went about analysing this compound into its component parts. The idea of analysis was certainly not a Buddhist innovation; it was known for at least a couple of centuries before the Buddha's days. But the credit for having first applied this method thoroughly and insightfully must go to the Buddha (or to his early disciples).

The Buddha's word for component parts, *khanda*, occurs in the Upaniṣads in its Sanskrit form (*skandha*); but not in the human context. The *Maitri upaniṣad*, for instance, speaks of *skandha* in the sense of 'branches of a tree' (7.11). The Buddha, however, employed the expression to designate the items in man's personality. The *khanda* is not an element, nor is it ultimate; it is a collective expression, meaning 'aggregate', 'group', 'heap', 'compound'. Each *khanda* is not a part that is static and stiff, isolated from the rest; it is an aspect that is essentially dynamic, composed of numerous processes and interacting with the other *khandas*. The simile of flame is often offered; it is not a substance but a continuous activity. The original classification of *khandas* was dichotomous: bodily and mental. But later the mental underwent a further classification into initial object-experience (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*) volitional organisation (*sāṅkhāra*) and consciousness (*viññāna*). This five-fold classification soon became standardised and has remained traditional since then. Mrs. Rhys Davids suggests that the five-finger formation of the human hand was the inspiration for this five-fold division of *khandas*. It may be so, but the orthodox explanation is that all the psychophysical processes that characterise human life are neatly grouped under these five heads. The analysis is meant to emphasise that in the constitution of man is not involved the influence of any other factor such as the Soul. Man when analysed is resolved into five *khandas*.

But the five *khandas* together make up the man; in fact, the *khandas* always occur together. The interacting assemblage
of khandas is designated as the ‘person’ (puggala), which is defined as the "bearer of the khandha-burden". Person (or rather personality) has no existence an sich; its reality is conventional. Nor is it unitary in constitution; it is a complex with various elements held together so as to function as a unit. In the Tibetan books the person is compared to a committee consisting of several members: the members talk, listen, discuss, argue, quarrel; some go out and others come in; some rise to prominence and others shrink into the shade. But there is continuous action in the committee, and irrespective of members going out or coming in, participating with vigour or snoring in comfort, the committee endures with a dynamic reality. But there is no committee apart from the members, and members acquire meaning only as units of the committee. There is unity in action but diversity in existence. Person thus is, in the Gestalt phraseology, a form-quality, an organised whole. When we speak of a person as 'so-and-so' (evaṁ-nāmā) we do not refer to the khandas that go to compose him, but to the 'form' presented by them in interaction. This reference is what is implied in the expression 'puggala', which is made up of put ('to put together') and gala ('to separate')—signifying a process that is continuously on and off, rather than a substance. The Sammitiyas, an early school that branched off the Theravāda orthodoxy during the early centuries before Christ, identified puggala with Soul in a curious manner. They applied the Buddha's principle of the golden mean to the puggala theory: that soul is body is one extreme, while soul is different from body is another, and the middle position would be to hold that soul is neither identical with the body nor different from it. The khandas are impermanent processes but not so the puggala, which is neither the same as khandas nor different from them! It was doubtless difficult to get on with the psychology of personality without a person and during the history of Buddhist thought there were various approximations to the Upanisadic soul, as for instance the bhavaṅga of the orthodox school, or the ālaya-vijñāna of the progressive groups. But the emphasis on analysis in all the
Buddhist schools prevented irrational leaps in the dark. The prevailing viewpoint in the early schools was the affirmation of the individual notion of ego (attabhāva), or the person-complex (sakkāya), which when analysed would yield the five khandas. The introduction of meta-psychological principles to explain personality was vigorously resisted. How do the various khandas stand together without an external binding force? Śāriputta answers: Like two bundles of faggots that stand up when propped against each other. He mentions two bundles deliberately; for in his opinion human constitution has two major aspects: the body together with vedanā, saññā and sankhāra (which are closely dependent processes and of a similar kind) and consciousness (viññāna). Each of these two aspects provide the ‘forming power’ to the other. The former prepares the field (ayatana) for consciousness to operate: the organismic receptivity is structured into six sense-bases, and consciousness takes six-fold shapes (which will be discussed later). Anuruddha, on the other hand, speaks of three bundles (leaving out of count the non-psychological nibbāna): body (rūpa), consciousness (citta), and mental states (cetasika). But whatever the combinations, the constituent aspects are always counted as five.

The Mechanism of Matter in Man

The Pāli word for matter, rūpa (literally ‘form’, ‘shape’) is explained etymologically as subject to change, mutation, transformation. Sufficiently intensive analysis of matter would reveal constant vibrations of elements (dhātu), the mad hurrying of forces and qualities. The elements are grouped into four types: extension, substantiality and tangibility characterise the ‘earth’ element (padhāvu); cohesion, agglutination, fluidity and prevention of matter from disintegration are the characteristics of the ‘water’ element (āpodhātu); capacity to change, transform and ripen belongs to the ‘heat’ element (tejodhātu); and finally movement ((vāyodhātu). These four are inseparable and their combination in various proportions is the secret of the physical world. The expression ‘matter’ includes
not only these elements (*bhūtarūpa*) but their products (*uppādaraṇā*) as well. In man, the material products occur as sensitive parts which function as sense-organs, whereas elements combine in the formation of the body. Eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body-surface and ‘heart’ (*hadayavatthu*) are the six sense-organs with form, sound, smell, taste, touch and thoughts as their respective fields of operation (*gocara*). The sense-organs are merely designated as ‘sensitive’ (*pasāda*) ; the eye, for instance, is the sensitive part in the centre of the pupil enabling objects to be seen. The inclusion of ‘heart’ (the primitive version of the seat of mind) as a sense-organ is not uniform among Buddhist writers, and even in the case of its inclusion there is considerable reservation: the ‘heart’ is described as very fine, bright and subtle matter from which thoughts arise. This is interestingly paired with another material product, vitality (*jivitindriya*), or the principle of life which uniformly fills the physical body. Besides these, there are twenty other items listed among material productions; but they are of little interest in a psychological discussion. There are likewise various classifications of the body into their component parts (into 32, 42 and 60 parts) which are of insignificant psychological value.

Each sense-organ has four functions, according to Dharma-trāta. Production of sensory awareness, reception of respective stimulations from the objects, protection of the organism and beautification of the body. The last mentioned function may be dismissed with a smile, and the third function remains enigmatic. But the first two are valid and rational. The equipment for sensory reception is known as ‘subjective spheres’ (*ajjhatt’āyatana*); and sensory awareness (*viññāna*) results from the interaction of these subjective spheres with the presentational objects (*bahirāyatana*). The following table illustrates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective spheres</th>
<th>Objective spheres</th>
<th>Resultant awareness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eye (<em>cakkhu</em>)</td>
<td>form (<em>rūpa</em>)</td>
<td>visual awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ear (<em>sota</em>)</td>
<td>sound (<em>sadda</em>)</td>
<td>auditory awareness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*cakkhuviññāna*)
Speculations in The Cloister

Nose (ghāṇa) smell (gandha) olfactory awareness (ghāṇa-)

Tongue (jīvhā) taste (rasa) gustatory awareness (jīvhā-)

Body-surface (kāya) touch (phoṭṭabba) tactual awareness (kāya-)

Mind (mano) thoughts (dhamma) mental awareness (mano-)

The purpose of the material equipment thus is to establish contact (phassa) between the individual and the objective world. The clever Burmese translator of Anuruddha, Shwe Zan Aung, defines contact as ‘awareness of the objective presentation’. This objective awareness, however, is independent of mental function, for one of the characteristics of material processes is independence from mind. It is of the nature of automatic ‘collision’ of the sensory structure and the sensible object.

Psychological Dynamics

There is a quaint little tract in Burmese, which is inadequately rendered into English, entitled The Seven ways to Neibban; this is a popular epitome of the Pāli volumes, but its presentation of classical psychological categories reveals a resourceful mind. After an account of ‘matter’, the author proceeds to explain the category of formless and non-material processes (nāma) which he collectively designates ‘mind’ (citta). He remarks that the normal mind ‘inhibits the sense-organs,’ and enumerates eighty-one modes of mind. He then goes on to describe the stages in the process of the mental mode in relation to objective presentation: contact (agreement between the sensory idea and the sensible object), sensation (awareness of the impression of this contact), perception (comprehension of the impression), orientation towards the object, organisation of the past and present details concerning the object; and finally cognition. Here is emphasised the continuity of material and mental processes. Sensation (vedanā) is partly physical and partly psychological: its function is in the realm of nāma, but its base is in the rūpa. Mrs, Rhys Davids
rightly explained that sensation is generalised to include all receptive experience, sensory as well as ideational. Hardy used the handy ‘sensation’ to express vedanā in English; but sensation in Western psychology is mostly, if not wholly, physiological in nature while the word vedanā in Buddhist psychology is mostly psychological. It includes feelings both bodily and mental, and even emotions like joy and sorrow. On the material side, vedanā extends to the present sensible object (and in this function it is designated dhammarammanā). Its usual classification as pleasant, unpleasant and indifferent refers to the latter function; this classification, however, does not imply hedonism, but indicates only an organismic discrimination. Saṅghapāla defined vedanā simply as experience of objects, and distinguished between the apprehension of the object and the apprehension of its sensory stimulation.¹⁴

Unlike sensation, perception (saññā) is entirely psychological. The oriental word signifies symbolisation; its association is with the carpenter’s mark made on the wooden planks for subsequent recognition and utilisation. This involves ‘knowing the object well’ (Saññājaññāti). It follows sensation but is not confined to sense-perception. McGovern has rendered the expression saññā as ‘ideation’; and it is not very inaccurate, for the mediaeval master Vasubandhu explains that saññā is ‘grasping of differences in characteristics.’ But perception is a better word inasmuch as its being occasioned by sensations is an important particular.¹⁵ Mrs. Rhys Davids has discovered in an ancient abhidhamma text, Vibhaṅga, a classification of saññā into perceptual and conceptual stages: the former is the cognitive assimilation of the presented object on the occasion of sense, whereas the latter is the cognitive assimilation of the same by way of naming.¹⁶ A psychological consideration of the sense-impressions forms the first stage, and is immediately succeeded by the association of the corresponding verbal label to that impression-complex. The recognition of the necessary involvement of lingual equipment in psychological comprehension lifts perception above the level of sensation,
Speculations in The Cloister

The resultant awareness is variously worded as viññāṇa, mano and citta. While most authors (including Buddhaghosa and Dharmatrāta) find hardly any distinction between these expressions, there are some (like the author of Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi) who take the three in distinct senses: viññāṇa for them is awareness of objective presentations, mano is cogitation, and citta refers to the continuous and fundamental stream of consciousness.46 It must be confessed that in the Pāli records there is quite some confusion about the usage of these expressions; but we may rely on the authority of Buddhaghosa and treat them as equivalent expressions. R. C. Childers offers as alternate translations of viññāṇa, ‘consciousness’, ‘knowledge’, ‘intelligence’, ‘thought’, ‘mind’. The orthodox interpretation has always been in terms of the relation between the subject (ārammanika) and the object (ārammana), that is to say, in this group are included both sensory and ideational aspects. In fact, in the traditional classification of awareness (already referred to) the sensory apparatus is associated: visual awareness, auditory awareness, olfactory awareness, gustatory awareness, tactual awareness and mental awareness. The last category is interesting: both mano and viññāṇa (which are taken usually as synonymous) occur combined (manoviññāṇa). Here the resolution of this compound should be ‘awareness of mind (or thought)’.47 Besides these sensory aspects, awareness has other more fundamentally psychological aspects which will be considered later.

The fifth khanda is both important and interesting. The Pāli word sañkhāra (Skt. saṁskāra) has greatly embarrassed the translators, and numerous renderings are current: ‘concepts’ (Burnouf), ‘composition-notion’ (Csoma), ‘discrimination’ and ‘conscience’ (Hardy), ‘confections’ (Mrs. Rhys Davids), ‘coefficients’ (McGovern), ‘affections’ (Kern), ‘aggregations’ (Childers), ‘predispositions and volitions’ (U Ba), ‘les idees’ (Foucaux), ‘tendencies’ (Rhys Davids), and ‘Gestaltungen’ (Oldenberg). Although there is an element of justification in each of these renderings, Oldenberg’s hits the mark best: the German word strictly means ‘forms and shapes’, but
usually ‘conformations’\textsuperscript{48}. The etymology of \textit{sāṅkhāra} indicates ‘preparation’, ‘arrangement’, ‘formation’; it is essentially an activity. It is traditionally paraphrased as ‘sāṅkhhatam abhisāṅkharonti ti’ (‘synthesises the conglomerated’, ‘makes the made’, ‘composes the compound’): the other four \textit{khandas}, which are themselves organised wholes of similar processes, are brought together, kneaded and integrated by \textit{sāṅkhāra} so that there obtains a psychophysical unity. Thus it refers to the phenomenal production of a configured ‘form’ in the experiencing individual; it involves directed psychological effort and in this sense it is alternately designated as ‘volition’ (\textit{cetanā})—which is synonymous with ‘work’ (\textit{kamma}).\textsuperscript{49} The Pāli word for volition involves the ideas of ‘connecting’, ‘getting together’, ‘arriving at action’\textsuperscript{50}. We might therefore legitimately borrow the modern phraseology, ‘determining tendencies’ (given currency by the Würzburg School), to explain the import of the Buddhist volition: and Buddhaghosa presents a list of fifty-one such tendencies including abilities, dispositions, character-traits, and psychological processes.\textsuperscript{51} These volitional tendencies are usually grouped in three categories: physical, vocal and mental. The prior psychological determination of all actions,\textsuperscript{1} physical or mental, is an accepted tenet in all the Buddhist schools; and this is the foundation of their ethical idealism.

The dynamic approach in the study of human experience is further illustrated by their analysis of the receptive experience in terms of constant and variable factors. These factors are merely modes of awareness (\textit{cetasika}). Among the constant factors, there is the initial stage in experience: contact (\textit{phassa}) or the preliminary and bare impression of the objective presentation; sensory apprehension (\textit{vedanā}); perception (\textit{saṅñā}); volition (\textit{cetanā}); individuation of object (\textit{ekaggatā}); the basic and uniting principle of psychic life (\textit{jivitindriya}); and selective attention (\textit{manasikāra}) which orients the organism towards the object. The first stage is more or less physiological in nature although there is a subtle streak of awareness running through it. But sensory apprehension which emerges after the contact
involves the organism’s awareness of stimulation; it is described as ‘subjective affection’; and it may be physical or mental, pleasant, unpleasant or indifferent. In perception, the sensation acquires precision and meaning; the organisational details of perception will be dealt with in the next section. Volition prepares the organism for appropriate mental action; it is the subtle motor aspect of awareness. Individuation helps the development of temporal, spatial and situational frames of reference for the phenomenal object; time and space in Buddhist thought are subjective projections upon the presentational world. Psychic life, which is rather a curious conception, is the integrating principle in mental operations; the various processes are welded into a ‘mental state’ by this factor. Attention, which is the final stage in an experiential act, is dual in its function: it selects the object for further handling and it directs the mental energies towards that object. Aung describes this factor as “the alpha and omega of an act of consciousness”55. And an old text says: “Its job is to advert (āvarjanaṁ) the mind to the object: it prompts the mental energies to arise in that regard, and holds them dependent upon the object”55. The act of attention is said to have three modalities: as related to the object, as related to sensory apprehension and as related to apperception.56 These seven factors, contact etc., are designated as ‘constant’ for they invariably operate in all experiences.

There are, however, variable factors occurring in particular experiences: the Pali name for these factors (pakīṇṇaka) means literally ‘scattered’ or ‘particular’. Six of them have been recognised and discussed in the old texts: initial application (vītakka), sustained application (vicāra), decision (adhimokkha), effort (viriya), interest (piti) and desire to act (chanda). The first factor is the process of raising the mind to an object, directing the other psychological processes towards the object. When we make a judgment, for instance, the mind is initially raised to a proposition; when we are in doubt, on the other hand, the mind is raised to one alternative object, then to another, then back to the first and so on. When we say we are distracted,
we mean that the mind’s application is at once directed severally to different objects. But this application is usually in conceptual processes, imaginations, reasonings and judgments. This mental direction when continued results in the second factor; the object here is attentively considered. To illustrate these two factors by an old analogy: A man trying to clean up a rusty copper vessel holds the vessel in one hand (vitakka), and with the other rubs it up and down, right and left (vicāra). In the second stage the mind frequently passes and repasses the object so as to clearly comprehend it. The next stage, decision, follows a tacit, unsettled state of mind such as doubt; and the Pāli expression means ‘freedom’ from this doubt. Even on comprehending the object there will crop up evaluative indecisions and waverings in judgment; decision sets these at rest. Effort refers to mental energy being roused after the cognitive reception of the object. The experience at this point takes a conative turn. With the application of mental energy, the object comes to acquire a positive valence, an interest for the experiencer. This interest, although positive, is not an emotion and has no hedonistic association. In the wake of this interest in the object, there comes about intention in regard to it (‘desire to do’, kattukāmyatā) which is at the back of our judgments and resolves. Dhammapāla identifies chaṇḍa with saṅkappa (‘will’, ‘resolve’), the final stage in the conative aspect.55

Processes of Perception

Buddhist psychology as was crystallised in the early centuries of the Christian era toys constantly with the conception of the sub-liminal stream of consciousness; and a curious word came to be coined, bhavaṅga, which appears irregular in its formation.56 The word was unknown to the Buddha, to his early disciples and even to the compilers of the canonical texts of the Tipiṭaka. The earliest employment of this expression was in the first century Mīlindapañha: ‘in deep sleep mind would be resolved into bhavaṅga”57 But its use in the Abhidhamma texts is both frequent and important. The main
purpose of this conception was to explain the continuous identity of the individual amidst the welter of discrete and momentary processes. The dynamic notion of bhava as becoming is of great antiquity; and the Buddha readily and fully recognised the truth of this notion and characterised the phenomenal world as 'a stream of becoming' (bhavasota). He understood the individual as but an instance of this universal feature; man, according to him, was a 'succession of psychological states' (dhammasantati). Being not metaphysically oriented, the great master did not feel called upon to explain how this succession was maintained without a soul; his golden gospel was meant to improve life, not to explain it. But the later and lesser teachers who had to expound and build an ideology appreciated this theoretical inadequacy and offered the idea of bhavaṅgā as a more rational and less mysterious substitute for the Upaniṣadic ātman.

Sāriputta-Saṅgharāja, the celebrated Ceylonese commentator of the twelfth century, explained as the orthodox view that bhavaṅgā is 'bhavassā anga' or the cause of the unbroken continuity in individual life ('anga' taken in the sense of 'kāraṇa'). Sumaṅgala-thera, another Ceylonese celebrity of the mediaeval times, elucidated bhavaṅgā as the "reason, indispensable condition of our being regarded subjectively as continuous". The Burmese master of recent times, Ledi Sayadaw (1846-1923) interprets the idea as "the function of being, by reason of which the passive side of existence continuously exists." In short, bhavaṅgā is the principle of individuality, the source of our identity and continuity. It is described in the Pali books as a 'stream' (sota) but as an undercurrent passively but necessarily flowing throughout one's life. It is interesting to note that bhavaṅgā is always considered as a variety of consciousness, strictly private to the individual and having no relation whatever with the presentational world outside. This consciousness is incapable of being cognised by observation or introspection; in fact it is below the threshold of cognitions, and may rightly be characterised as sub-liminal consciousness. The scholiasts describe it
as process-free (*vīti-mutta*). The Pali word for 'process' meant originally 'road', 'avenue', along which mind travels in precise stages (according to the law of psychological fixity or *cittaniyāma*). In its extended sense, it came to connote active states of consciousness, object-directed and within the range of ready recognition. *Bhavaṅga*, presumably, would be free from such particular modalities of consciousness. An illustration of this state would be deep sleep. But it is not by any means akin to the psychoanalytic unconscious. In the Buddhist theory *bhavaṅga* and 'process-consciousness' do not co-exist; when one is on, the other is out. And at no time, nor by any method, can the *bhavaṅga* as such be converted into a 'process'. It is not something that permanently subsists in some inaccessible corner of our mental life. The function and nature of *bhavaṅga* is best brought out by the Buddhist account of perceptual processes.

Whenever the organism is stimulated by an object both the sense-organ and the mind are affected simultaneously. The analogy is offered of a bird that alights on the bough of a tree, causing the bough to move as well as throwing its shadow on the ground at the same time. This happening, consciousness now assumes a process (sensory or ideational) and the *bhavaṅga* is no longer on; they speak of the *bhavaṅga* being 'cut-off', 'interrupted' (*bhavaṅg’upaccheda*). Before being completely interrupted, however, there is a stage of disturbance, when the uniform, even and calm flow of *bhavaṅga* is set into convulsions (*calana*)—the birth-pangs of experience, as it were. When, however, the *bhavaṅga*-stream is dammed up by a phenomenal presentation, the individual attends or advert(s) (*āvajjana*) to the stimulus that now enters the field of wakeful awareness; an active and conscious process has now already started. With the individual thus becoming object-oriented, sensations arise in profusion: the processes of spontaneous observation like vision and audition (*dassana* etc.) commence. The mind in sequence actively assimilates the sensory impressions, apprehends them by receiving and internalising (*sāmpatićchana*) the phenomenal object as an item in consciousness, and quickly
examines (*santirāṇa*) the impression thus formed. Mind (*manodvāra*) steps in when and where *bhavaṅga* is interrupted. Due to the mind’s intervention there is an evaluation, decision, judgment or determination (*votṭhappana*) in regard to the object being attended to. After this initial determination, apperceptive processes (*javana*) occur in quick impulsions. This stage is psychologically most significant as it represents cognition proper: here “the subject interprets the sensory impression, and fully appreciates the objective significance of his experience.” Apperception holds the bond between the individual’s mind and the objective presentation; but for this operation, the object would escape attention and attention itself would lapse into the passive *bhavaṅga*. The final stage in the perceptual process is the complete and meaningful apprehension of the object by registering and identifying the object as “that” (*tadārammanā*) in its sensory and semantic contexts; this registration is the mechanism of retention (and this is different from memory). With this, the active consciousness ceases and *bhavaṅga* resumes its subliminal flow.

The sequence of these perceptual stages is traditionally illustrated by what is known as ‘the mango-simile’ (*ambopama*). Imagine an individual asleep under a fruiting mango tree: he represents the *bhavaṅga* flow, withdrawn and dissociated from external objects. Let now a ripe mango dismember itself and descend to the ground, grazing the sleeper’s ears: this is the first stage in the perceptual process, being the initial stimulation. The sleeper would immediately wake up; he is no longer asleep and insensible (*bhavaṅga-upaccheda*), but he adverts to the surrounding (*āvajjana*). He then sights the mango (*dassana*), stretches out his hand and takes hold of the mango (*samphatīcchana*); he examines its colour, texture, hardness and smell (*santirāṇa*). He determines the edibility of the fruit (*votṭhappana*), and starts eating it. The actual eating behaviour is the apperceptive stage (*javana*), and swallowing the last marsel is *tadārammanā*. After all this, he resumes his sleep.

The later Buddhist theorists evolved a peculiar calculation
of the duration of the perceptual processes. The unit of measurement was called *cittakkhaṇa* (thought-moment), which (according to Ledi Sayadaw) was equal in duration to between a billionth and two millionth part of time taken to snap your finger or wink your eye. The entire perceptual process would consume seventeen of such thought-moments. The following table presents the classification of perceptual processes into four stages along with the thought-moments in each stage:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thought-moments</th>
<th>Processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I stage (Primary):</td>
<td>stimulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>disturbance in <em>bhavañga</em> (calana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>interruption of <em>bhavañga</em> (upaccheda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II stage (Operative):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>adverting (<em>āvajjana</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>sensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>receiving (<em>sampaticchana</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>examining (<em>santirāṇa</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>determining (<em>voṭṭhappana</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III stage:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th to 15th</td>
<td>apperceiving (<em>javana</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th to 17th</td>
<td>registering (<em>tadārammaṇa</em>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The notion of 'thought-moment' is both interesting and intriguing; although it involves some scholastic speculations hard rationally to justify, it emphasises the dynamic character of mentation. In fact, not even a 'thought-moment' is a static unit: each is said to be further composed of three successive phases: genetic, static and cessant. And also, the interruption of *bhavañga* on the presentation of an object, sensory or mental, is styled as 'genesis of thought' (*cittuppāda*); the rest of the stages (4th to 17th) make up the 'static phase', and after the 17th stage the presentational object drops off the field of active consciousness (this is in Pali known as *bhavañgappāta*), or it ceases to stimulate and hold the individual's attention. Thus even the static phase is actually a process of psychological development, or growth from objective
obscurity to clarity, a passage from subjective indifference to apprehension.

When consciousness in this way assumes a process (vīthi) there are involved four quick and continuous steps through which the object is meaningfully apprehended. The first is the sensory such as visual (cakkhuḥūravīthi): the object presented stimulates the visual apparatus and sets definite physiological processes. Following this is what Aung calls ‘reproductive sequel’ (tad-anuvattaka-manodvāravīthi): the visual excitations pass beyond the sensory level and begin to acquire mental contents but closely following the sensory cues. The infusion of mental contents occurs in two stages: designation of the sensory-complex by a sound, sign or name determined by convention (sutta or nāma-paññatti) and understanding the import or meaning of the presented object (attha-paññatti). These two are conceptual stages: the former makes objects known suggesting a meaning while the latter conceives the meaning that is associated with name. The two stages may broadly be characterised as Name and Notion, Term and Concept, or Sign and Significance. Unfortunately this aspect of the problem of perception, exceedingly interesting as it is, remains in the main neglected by the Buddhist philosophers; only logicians and grammarians have by fits and start exercised their minds on the non-psychological implications of the problem.

Closely associated with the foregoing is the problem of communication (vīññatti), which again has been raised by the Buddhist scholiasts only to be soon ignored. This refers not to perception so much as to expression or intimation. The Pāli word strictly means ‘sign’, ‘symbol’ or ‘gesture’ which the individual seeks to communicate to others; there is in it an element of purpose involved. When the individual employs speech for this purpose, it is styled ‘verbal communication’ (vacaviññatti); and when gestures and bodily movements are involved, the communication is ‘physical or bodily’ (kāyaviññatti). Laughter is an instance of the latter; in its expressive behaviour it involves several types and stages.
Pattern of Personality

The problem of personality types has again and again occurred to the Indian mind: the old Upaniṣads gave broad hints about the temperamental traits, the Śāṅkhya developed the theory of guṇas, the naked wanderer Gosāla gave a preliminary classification of human beings, and Jainism formulated a six-fold division of mankind in terms of character-colours. Probably Buddhism drew its inspiration from these sources, and arrived at the psychological theory of personality patterns. The theory was necessitated by a practical consideration. The religious discipline in Buddhism being godless, meditation as a "severe exercise in attention, discipline of will and mind, and concentration of thought" was of immense importance. And before the novice is assigned a subject of meditation (there were 40 major subjects), the master would study his disposition and temperament. Not all temperaments would profit by the same subject: the commentary on Dhammapada describes in detail the individual differences in regard to meditational attainment and natural inclinations. So it became essential for the Buddhist masters to prepare a chart of meditational exercises alongside temperamental types.

Human beings were classified into six types according to their conduct (carita); and conduct includes bodily, vocal and mental behaviour. The classification, however, was not on the basis of observable behaviour, but on the determining tendencies within the individual. These tendencies are enumerated thus: attachment (rāga), aversion (dosa), dullness (moha), faith (saddha), rational thinking (buddhi), and imagination (vitakka). The preponderance of attachment in an individual
leads him to be discontent, unstable, ambitious and proud. Aversion expresses itself as anger, envy, aggression and hypocrisy. Dullness is at the root of idleness, obstinacy, indecision and agitation in mind. Faith prompts one to be honest, generous, religious, credulous and pleasant. Rational thinking makes one tolerant, amiable, moderate, alert and active. Imagination is responsible for dissatisfaction with persons and places, wandering tendencies and argumentations. Attachment and faith, aversion and rational thinking, dullness and imagination are said to be related. These dispositions reveal themselves in one's postures (walking, sitting, standing, reclining), action, modes of eating, ways of looking at things and traits peculiar to an individual. The individual characterised by attachment walks evenly and carefully with springily steps; his postures are pleasant, graceful and confident. His actions are likewise careful and confident. He relishes sweet, delicious food, which he eats without haste and with visible pleasure. He is a ready admirer of beautiful objects; he looks for merit and ignores defects. But he is floppish, proud, ambitious and not always sincere.

The individual with aversion as his major trait is seen to walk as if he is digging the ground with his toes; he moves with effort and drags his body along. His manners are not elegant and he is in needless haste in his actions; he puts on a scowl on his face and frowns at things. His taste is for hot and sour food; which he eats with haste and awkwardness. Beautiful things make him agitated; he is eager to pick faults in the best of things. Anger, vanity, jealousy and envy are his traits.

The dull individual walks with a puzzled gait, his steps are hesitant and unsteady. His postures exhibit a disinclination to face the world, and a diffident attitude. His actions are muddled and unfinished. He has no definite tastes and eats his food distracted in mind. His opinions are stamped in by others; he has no judgment of his own. Temperamentally he is given to worry, doubt, restlessness and anxiety.

These are the three major patterns of personality; indivi-
duals characterised by faith, rational thinking and imagination are akin to the individuals characterised by attachment, aversion and dullness respectively in matters of posture, actions, food habits and inclinations. Buddhaghosa is careful to point out that these six are but provisional types, and that there are in actuality numerous types resulting from the combination of the six dispositions. 

REFERENCES AND NOTES

2 Ajñāthanāsini, Introductory Discourse
3 Mahāvīradasutta
6 Mahāvīraśa, 37, 215-246; Saddhammasaṅgaha, 7
7 Cf. Dhammananda Kosambi: Visuddhimagga, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1940, Preface, p. xv
10 The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism, 1936, p. 402
11 Saddhammasaṅgaha, 1, 26
12 Samantapāśādikā
13 'Cittuppādakāṇḍa', 1, 6
14 Nalinaksha Dutt: "Dhammasaṅgani", Indian Historical Quarterly, 1939, 15 (3), 345-372
15 Miṅdpanhaṅ (ed R.D. Vadekar) 1940, p. 33
16 Ibid. p. 293
18 Visuddhimaggam (ed. Dhammananda Kosambi), Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1940, pp. 180-199
19 "An Eighth Century Manual of Buddhist Psychology", Supplement I.
*Ind. Hist. Quart.*, 1948, 24, 2, pp. 87-93
Nanjio’s catalogue No. 1197
Appendix to *Jour. Bihar and Orissa Society*, 1933 and 1934
*The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism* 1936, p. 498
This has been translated into English by the Patamagyaw of the Masoyeine monastery in Mandalay
Mm. Alexandra David-Neel: “What is a Person”, *The Mahabodhi*, (Calcutta), 1953, 61 (5-9) pp. 165-167
Nalinaksha Dutt: “Doctrines of the Sammitiya School of Buddhism”. *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1939, 15 (1) pp. 90-100
‘Mahāpadānasutta’, *Dīghanikāya*
*Abhidhammatthaśaṅgaha*, Section 1, verse 2
There is difference in the order of enumeration of the khandas. *Samyuttanikāya* gives this order: rūpa, vedayita, saññas, viññāṇa and sañkhāra. Buddhaghosa considers viññāṇa before vedanā, saññas and sañkhāra; and this is the order recognised by Śāṅkara (in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.2. 17 f.). In Vasubandhu’s list however viññāṇa comes last
I have based this account of the Burmese tract (in its English version) on my notes; but unfortunately I have forgotten to note the publication details of this interesting tract.
Cited in Yuan Chwang’s *Vijnaptimāratādīddhi*, 3.4-3, restored into Sanskrit by Rahula Sankritiyayana, *Journal of the Bihar Oriental Research Society*, 1933-1934, 19-20, Appendix
Cf. ‘Vedallasutta’ of Majjhimanikāya; and also C.A. Foley’s note on it in Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, 1894, p. 329

44 The Pāli names for these stages are patighasānañña and adhivacanasānañña. Cf. Mrs. Rhys Davids: Buddhist Psychology, pp. 49-50

45 Op. cit., 5.5.7; Ānāgāriyakathāsūtra is also cited (p. 143). But in the Pāli books, citta is always interpreted as ‘ārammaṇam cinteti ti cittam’ Ledi Sayadaw, however, explains viññāṇa as the “specific awareness of the material quality (rūpa) called heat”. I am unfortunately unable to understand the import of this explanation.

47 “manaso viññāṇam” as a tatpuruṣa-compound; it could also be a karmadārāya-compound: “manascādā viññāṇam” Cf. Viññaptimātratāsiddhi, 4.5.1


49 The Buddha says: “Monks, I mean by volition work” (cetanā haṁ) bikkhave, kammam vadami)

50 Cf. the interesting note on ‘cetanā’ in S.Z. Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids: Compendium of Philosophy, p. 235-236


53 Viññaptimātratāsiddhi, 3.4.2 (My free translation from the original Sanskrit restored by Rahula Sankrityayana, See fn. 42)

54 S.Z. Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids: op. cit. p. 95 fn. 1

55 Ibid. p. 238. fn. 1

56 Mrs. Rhys Davids splits the expression into bhavaṁ and gaṁ suggesting the word’s non-Sanskrit origin. F.R. de S. Saratandra interprets it as a compound of bhavaṁ and ga (in the sense of bhavaṁ gato) and even this is as far-fetched as the former. Cf. “Bhavanaga and the Buddhist Psychology of Perception”, University of Ceylon Review, 1943, 1 (1) p. 94-102

57 Milindapañha, ‘Mendaka’ section

58 From the root ju ‘to be swift’, ‘to go’, (ju javē ca gati ca). Knowing, remarks Aung, is a mental going


60 This expression was probably coined by Buddhaghosa; it is definitely a late invention.

61 This illustration occurs in Buddhaghosa’s Atthasālīni. In the earlier work, Upatissa’s Vimuttimagga, this illustration assumes a variant form: The king is asleep, he wakes up hearing a knock at the door, under his instruction the attendant opens the door, and lets in the gardener who offers the King a mango fruit; the queen cuts the fruit into slices and hands them over to the King who eats and
announces his opinion about the quality of the fruit. He then goes back to sleep. (Cf. P.V. Bapat: "Vimuttimagga and Visuddhimagga", *Indian Culture*, 1935, January, pp. 455-450)

65 Anuruddha speaks of the former as ‘making a thing known’ (*pannāpanato*) and of the latter as ‘being itself made known’ (*pannāpiyattā*). The Name (*nāma*) may be invented, conventional, expressive, indicative or suggestive; the Notion (*attha*) may be derived, collective, general, conventional, formal and pertaining to location, direction, time, continuity, absence of a thing or images.

66 Cf. S.Z. Aung: *op. cit.* "Introductory Essay", p. 22. "There are six classes of laughter recognised in Buddhist works: (1) sita: a smile manifesting itself in expression and countenance; (2) hasita: a smile consisting in the slight movements of the lips just enough to reveal the tips of the teeth; (3) vihasita: laughter giving out a slight sound; (4) upahasita: laughter accompanied by the movement of the head, shoulders and arms; (5) apahasita: laughter accompanied by the shedding of tears; and (6) atihasita: an outburst of laughter accompanied by the forward, backward movements of the entire body from head to foot."


65 *Visuddhimagga* (Buddhaghosa), 3, 74 f. (Kosambi’s ed. p. 68 f.)

65 *Ibid.*, 3·75 (sabhago)

67 *Ibid.*, 3·74 (pp. 68-69)
CHAPTER VII

THE SCRAMBLE OF SCHOLIASTS

In Tune with Tradition

In India’s intellectual history, Buddhism marks a glittering chapter; but when its power waned (and it soon did) there was confusion in the field. There was always in the country a widely distributed group of thinkers who were loyal to the Vedic tradition, and who were enormously embarrassed by the advent of Jainism and Buddhism. It was to their relief that Buddhism began in the first few centuries of the Christian era to degenerate into an outlandish concoction of Buddhist ideas and Hindu beliefs and rituals before it finally disappeared from India around the eighth century. The development of endless divisions in the body of the Buddha’s disciples, the introduction of divinities and the programme of their appeasement, the relaxation of the monastic rigour of original Buddhism, and the appropriation of popular conceptions and ideals into the Master’s teaching weakened the vigour of this remarkable religion and hastened its departure from its motherland. It is historically inaccurate to imagine that an orthodox movement drove this protestant creed out of the country: it was the cancerous affliction in its own body that brought about the decay of Buddhism.

But the disappearance of Buddhism was synchronous with the rise of numerous orthodox voices; there was a scramble to reorganise the traditional religion on rational foundations. The word mīmāṁsā, which designates an orthodox school of thought that rose into prominence during this period, means ‘examination’, ‘investigation’, ‘application of rational thinking.’ In its intent this school sought to examine Vedic tradition in the light of reason. The thinkers of this school boldly rejected the idea of God bestowing infallibility on the Vedas: the Vedas have a claim on our respect not because they are revelations of God, but because they stand to the test
of reason. In fact, we are informed by the eminent scholiast, Kumārila, that the early trend of the mīmāṃsā school was atheist. And the famous mīmāṃsā scholiasts, Jaimini, Śabara, Prabhākara and Kumārila have a doubtful reputation for piety: their eagerness to re-establish the Vedic tradition ignored the importance attached to Godhead. Following on the heels of this early movement, known to Indians as Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā (Earlier School of Rational Thinking), there sprang up another orthodox movement mainly to safeguard the interests of Godhead, the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā (Later School of Rational Thinking). The latter, also known as Vedānta, called the country’s attention to the spiritual wisdom enshrined in the Upaniṣads which were the end-portions of the Vedic literature (Veda-anta). The two movements alike owed allegiance to the old Vedic tradition and sought to introduce into it the element of rational inquiry.

The application of critical thought engendered bold speculation and encouraged independent views. In the ‘Earlier Mīmāṃsā’, the groundwork of which was prepared by Jaimini two centuries before the birth of Christ, there came to pass three brilliant scholiasts: Śabarasmā, Kumārila and Prabhākara. Śabarasmāmin (who lived probably in the first century of the Christian era) prepared the celebrated commentary on Jaimini’s original aphorisms, and furnished the Mīmāṃsā school with an ideological standpoint. His major interest being the establishment of Vedic authority in the face of heterodox protests, he had to contend against the nihilistic idealism of the later Buddhist schools like the Yogācāra. He had therefore to enter into an inquiry concerning knowledge and formulate a realist position. Incidental to this necessity was the nucleus of psychological doctrines concerning cognition which were later elaborated by Kumārila and Prabhākara. Cognition, according to Śabarasmāmin, is essentially an action (kriyā) which has its foundation in real, external objects (karma). Objects are not ideas externalised; but the ideas correspond in cognition to outer objects which exist in their own right. Introspection in the sense of simultaneously reflecting on the
cognitive process is impossible; reflective consciousness only succeeds simple apprehension. Indeed, cognition is never cognised as such; but only inferred on the strength of the object cognised. Although the immaterial soul is the fundamental principle that is responsible for cognition, mind and senses are primarily involved in the process; and senses (of vision, smell, taste, sound and touch) are ineffective without mind. Cognition carries with it the conviction of certainty and thus we are enabled to engage ourselves in action. Knowledge enshrined in the Vedas is in this manner valid by itself; it does not by any means derive its validity from Godhead.

The thread of this argument was taken up by the foremost of mediaeval scholiasts, Kumārila (about 590-650 A.D.), who is reverently referred to as the ‘Doctor’ (Bhaṭṭa). It is regrettable that we know little about the life of this eminent thinker who held the country’s attention for nearly a full quarter-century. He was a brāhmin from Bihār who studied under Buddhist masters only to refute their tenets; he was acquainted with Jainism and Saṃkhya, but had a predilection towards the Vedas and Upaniṣads. He had his genius to count upon; his philosophical position thus exhibits a synthesis of all the then current trends of thought and paved the way for Vedānta, which was developed by his junior contemporary, Saṃkara. He was a remarkable dialectician who stirred up an intellectual storm. His Šlokavārttika, Tantravārttika, and Tuptikā are treatises outlining the Mīmāṃsā position: his writings are characterised by clarity, critical acumen and erudition. He was fortunate in having three eminent thinkers as his students; the philosopher Maṇḍana-Miśra (about 633-690 A.D.), Umveka (620-680 A.D. identified with the poet Bhavabhūti), and the scholiast Prabhākara (who was nearly of the same age as Kumārila). Pārthasarathi-miśra (about 1300) has written a racy commentary on Šlokavārttika entitled Nyāyaratnākara, and also an independent treatise Sāstradīpīkā, elucidating Kamārila’s viewpoint. Umveka is the author of another commentary on Šlokavārttika, Tātparyaṭīkā, and a commentary on Maṇḍana’s Bhāvanāviveka. Prabhākara, who
The Scramble of Scholiasts

was a pupil of Kumārila, had the courage to differ from his eminent teacher on many issues and set up his own view-point independently in his Brhati, a commentarial work on Sābara-bhāṣya. Kumārila, however, readily recognised his student’s brilliance and even spoke of him as his “master”; and hence Prabhākara’s views have come to be curiously styled as “the Master’s views” (gurumata). Śālikanātha’s Prakarana-paṇcikā is a manual elucidating Prabhākara’s position. In the later scholastic convention, however, it was Kumārila’s guidance that was accepted.

The relationship between Kumārila and the other celebrity of the times, Gauḍapāda, is obscure; tradition not only makes them contemporaries, but makes Kumārila a teacher of Gauḍapāda whose student Govinda was the great Śaṅkara’s teacher. Śaṅkara, however, is known to have met the aged Kumārila but not Gauḍapāda. The only work of Gauḍapāda that has survived the passage of time is his gloss (kārikā) on Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad, which betrays definite Buddhist influence although it cannot be doubted that Gauḍapāda’s avowed interest was to uphold orthodoxy. Perhaps Dasgupta is right when he argues that Gauḍapāda was a Buddhist who “considered that the teachings of the Upaniṣads tallied with those of the Buddha.” Indeed, Gauḍapāda’s intellectual position as can be gleaned from his Gloss on the minor Upaniṣad is a curious but bold combination of the Śūnyavāda nihilism, the Vijñānavāda subjectivism and the Upaniṣadic monism. The work is devoted to the analysis of human experience in the waking, dream and sleep states and attempts to equate the waking and dream states, the phenomena presented in both being equally unreal. Gauḍapāda pushed the proposition to its logical extreme and reduced initially the world to a mere mental construction, and then rejected even mind as unreal. The modern phenomenologist finds much that is interesting in Gauḍapāda’s arguments, but his importance in the history of Indian thought consists mainly in the great influence he exerted on Śaṅkara.

The earliest name associated with the later Mīmāṁsā system
is that of Bādarāyaṇa, about whose life very little is known. Perhaps he was contemporaneous with Jaimini and probably was his intellectual antagonist, although he cites Jaimini quite often. His cryptic tract of 555 formulae (sūtras) arranged in four chapters (pādas), known as Brahmastūtra, heralded the Vedāntic age in Indian thought. Great minds undertook to interpret this delightfully obscure tract, and in the process established diverse schools of thought: Saṁkara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Madhava, Vallabha and Śrikanṭha were among them. Bādarāyaṇa was acquainted with the Saṁkhya-Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Lokāyata, Bhāgavata school, and several schools of Buddhism. While he severely attacked the Saṁkhya ideology, he incorporated the notions of puruṣa and prakṛti, not however as independent entities but as aspects of the same reality. His main interest was to expound the theory of Brahman as the central reality and to explain Brahman’s relation with the world of consciousness and matter. Saṁkara who was among the earliest of his commentators was the first to recognise the great merit of Bādarāyaṇa’s book in crystallising the Upaniṣadic doctrines and reconciling the divergent Vedic texts.

Saṁkara’s is perhaps the greatest name in the history of Vedānta; his works at any rate constitute the earliest commentarial literature on Vedānta extant. But there is sufficient reason to believe that several important thinkers preceded him in Vedāntic interpretation, and some from whom Saṁkara derived great benefit. Among the latter group may be mentioned Bhartṛhari (who died about 600 A.D) the author of the celebrated Vākyapadiya, a remarkable treatise establishing the Absolute Logos (śabdabrahman) as the one reality and the phenomenal world as a mere transformation (vivartia) thereof. This viewpoint is supposed to have directly inspired Saṁkara’s Advaita theory. Professor Hiriyanna has recovered fragments from Bhartṛprapaṇca, who “lived long before the time of Saṁkara”; Brahmadatta “who could not have been later than Saṁkara”; and Brahmanandin, “who was long anterior to Saṁkara”. Besides these, Śabara, Saṁkara and Rāmānuja cite the views of one Upavaraṇa who is said to have prepared exten-
sive commentaries on the earlier as well as the later Mīmāṃsā aphorisms. Unfortunately, the cloud of obscurity hangs over these and other pre-Śaṅkara thinkers. Indeed this was largely due to the brilliance of Śaṅkara’s own career: his glittering personality pulled a veil over all the earlier names.

Śaṅkara (655-687 A.D.), details of whose life are uncertain, ushered the earlier Mīmāṃsā school into obscurity and inaugurated brilliant philosophical inquiries which continued for several centuries. He was a junior contemporary of Kumārila and Gauḍapāda, whose influences are evident in Śaṅkara’s writings, and of the famous Buddhist logician, Dharmakīrti. He prepared elaborate commentaries on the Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa (whom he nevertheless subjected to criticism occasionally), on the major Upaniṣads and on Bhagavadgītā. He gave a monistic interpretation to all these texts and thus brought into the world the now well-known Advaita doctrine (which was suggested earlier by Upāvarśa and considerably elaborated by Gauḍapāda). He thus founded a school of thought popular all over the country and in which tradition there was a succession of eminent thinkers and writers.

Śaṅkara’s greatness is also seen in the stimulus he provided for the huge intellectual opposition to his own view; there were gigantic tirades against him, and a less vigorous school of thought would have soon sunk in the sea of criticism that was brought forth by a team of hundreds of eminent dialecticians and masters including the famous Bhāskara, Rāmānuja and Madhva. No criticism, however, could obscure the greatness of his genius; the celebrity of his name and the popularity of his doctrine have persisted to this day.

Shortly after Śaṅkara’s days, the philosopher Bhāskara endeavoured to uphold the old Vedantic view known as Brahmaparipṛcchāmavāda, but met with little success. However, he succeeded in becoming the first serious critic of Śaṅkara, whose views (according to Bhāskara) were not traditional but his own; he was also the first to indicate the suspiciously close affinity between Mahāyāna Buddhism and Advaita Theory. Bhāskara’s viewpoint found an echo (modified though) in the
speculations of the tenth century thinker, Yādavaprakāśa of Kañcī, who upheld the theory of evolution of the Absolute into consciousness, matter and deity. His rebel student was the celebrated Rāmānuja (born 1027), the founder of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta. A religious reformer of great influence, he was also an astute thinker who prepared original commentaries on the Brahmasūtra (entitled Śrībhāṣya) and on the Bhagavadgītā, besides writing independent tracts like Vedārthasaṃgraha, Vedāntadīpa, Vedāntasūra and Nityagranth. Sudarśana-Sūri who lived about 1300 equipped Rāmānuja’s Śrībhāṣya with a brilliant gloss, Śrutaprakāśikā. But the greatest name in the history of the Rāmānujiya school is Veṅkaṭanātha’s (about 1350), also known as Vedānta-deśika; he it was that fitted Viśiṣṭādvaita theology and metaphysics with a critical apparatus and systematised the philosophical standpoint of qualified non-dualism. He wrote with fire and in plenty: his Tattvajīta and Tātparyacandrikā which are intended as commentaries on Rāmānuja are powerful treatises; and his Seśvaramimāṃsā is a bold and skilful attempt to represent the earlier and later Mīmāṁsā schools as complementary to each other. It is curious that Rāmānuja did not comment upon the Upaniṣads: and this was done by Raṅga-rāmānuja in the eighteenth century as acceptable to the Rāmānujiya school.

Madhva, the last of the three great Southern ācāryas, was born in 1199 in a sea-coast village near Uḍīpi in the present-day South Canara district; and was responsible for an intellectual renaissance, initially in this part of the country and subsequently all over the South. He is known for his sharp antagonism to Śaṅkara’s theories, and the powerful school of opposition that he inspired. His philosophical standpoint, known as Dvaita theory, was elucidated in his commentaries on the Brahmasūtra, the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā, as well as in his ten independent tracts (prakaraṇas). Padmanābha-tīrtha (d. 1324), Narahari-tīrtha (d. 1333), Jaya-tīrtha (d. 1524), and Rāghavendra-yati (d. 1671) are some of the remarkably astute intellects that Madhva stimulated. Jaya-tīrtha’s Nyāya-sudhā
with Rāghavendra-yati's gloss thereon entitled Parimala, and Tattvapratikā with Vyāsa-tirtha's commentary on it known as Tātparyaacandrika have been reckoned as landmarks in the history of this school of thought. Vyāsatirtha's Nyāyāmṛta is likewise famous and profound.

Vallabha (1481-1533) who belonged to the present Andhra province and studied under teachers of the Mādhva persuasion was mainly a theologian: he is reputed to have written 84 works and taught 84 disciples. While the idea of devotion to Godhead looms large in his writings, there is in them a metaphysical orientation also.

Saṃkara was the last giant who worked with numerous psychological concepts; and his early followers contributed considerably to the psychological trend of the Advaita metaphysics. With Rāmānuja however the emphasis changed, and psychological ideas constituted but an undercurrent: the main note was religious and theological. This psychological undercurrent shrivelled in Madhva and was dried up in Vallabha.

Thinking About Knowing

Sabarasvāmin's anxiety was to safeguard the importance of Vedic authority; and he recognised readily that the Veda was essentially of the nature of knowledge (from the root vid 'to know'). He forthwith applied himself to the task of affirms the self-validity of all knowledge; and hence has emerged a series of serious speculations in the country concerning the source and manner of cognitions (saṃvedana). Both Kumārila and Prabhakara were intensely preoccupied with this problem, and what follows is an attempt to reconstruct briefly their psychological theories.

Kumārila's masterly treatment of this problem in S'loka-vārttika is at once interesting and amazing. I am disposed to believe that this celebrated mediaeval doctor did not seriously believe in God; but in demonstrative contradistinction from the views of his Buddhist brethern, he announced his belief in a persistant, non-material and personal self (ātman) for every breathing individual: the Mīmāṃsā thinkers are
pluralists, postulating as many selves as there are individuals. The self is responsible for our behaviour as well as our experience: and in accordance with its transaction with an incessantly fluctuating environment, there obtains a continuous modal transformation (parināma) in the self. The transformation facilitates the transaction between the subject and the objective presentation; but despite the transformations the self retains personal identity. Kumārila holds that the transaction is transitive, in the sense that the effect manifests itself elsewhere, not in the subject. The analogy of cooking is offered: the agent in cooking is of course the cook, but the result of cooking is not seen in him but in the rice-grains (which become soft and edible). The object (karma) is affected in a particular manner so as to bear the results born out of subject’s action.

Knowledge (jñāna) is a variety of action (kriyā); it is a process (vyāpāra) having self as its foundation. In fact, the essential function of the self is production of knowledge. Knowledge consists of processes that relate uniquely the subject and objects; knowledge is of the nature of such relatings (viṣayaviṣayibhāva) between the external objects (independently existing in space and time) and their organismic receptions (dependent upon the percipient subject). Consequent upon this process, the object is illumined, made known. In an act of knowledge Kumārila distinguishes four elements: the knower (jñātā) or the subject, the object of knowledge (jñeya), the instrument of knowledge (jñanakaraṇa) and the resultant character of the object ‘being known’ (jñātatā). The followers of Kumārila emphasise the fourth feature, and it really reveals commendable psychological insight. It is only by means of the known character of the objects that the event of knowledge is inferred. Kumārila avers that knowledge is not directly known, but only inferred (jñātātānumeyam jñānam). It is wrong to suppose that knowledge, like the lamp, is itself known while it illumines objects. Pārthasārathi-miśra, the able exponent of Kumārila’s theory, writes: “When the object is revealed (by knowledge), there is no manifestation of knowledge as such; much less is there any knowing of that knowledge.”
table in front of me is cognised it is the table that flashes forth in my mind; and not the cognition of the table. If, however, I subsequently come to realise that "I am knowing the table", it is but an inference. Objects are cognised, but cognitions are inferred.

The problem of ego-involvement in knowledge looms large in Indian Psychology; and Kumārila's reflections on this problem are interesting. In the event of my cognising the table I become aware of my self (though this does not happen in every instance of cognition) as the agent in cognition. (Mūrārīmiśra calls this 'becoming aware' secondary apprehension). Knowledge thus has two frames of reference: the object in question, viz., table, and the subject or self denoted by 'I' (as in "I know the table"). The self is not directly observable, but is inferred by each individual's ego-involvement. It is accessible to introspection ((mānasapratyakṣa), which process, however, does not refer to the cognitive processes as such (as the expression indicates in Western Psychology). Introspection is merely mental or internal perception. A mental process in perception can never perceive itself; its function is to perceive objects that are present in space and time and are suitable for perception. While thus the self is perceived, it becomes an object as well as the subject of cognition. The self is of the nature of consciousness and functions as the substratum of mental processes. At times, the presence of self is immediately (but never simultaneously) manifested in a mental process, and we have a distinct awareness of the ego (ahām-pratyaya or I-notion); but more often the mental process is entirely preoccupied with the objective frame of reference and ego-awareness is unmanifest. In other words, all experience does not necessarily involve the notion of 'I': for most of our experiences are objectively oriented.

Perception (pratyakṣa) is defined as the knowledge of an external object brought about by the mediation of senses. The perceptive process as such is altogether independent of our lingual behaviour, and thus its non-learned character of novelty in perception. We apprehend something that is not
already apprehended and reduced to a trace (in which case it would be merely recollection). Perception is an activity in the present, and in the presence of external objects. In other words, sensation forms the core of perception. Kumārila distinguishes between two stages in the perceptive process: the initial, indeterminate apprehension (nirvikalpaka) and the subsequent, determinate comprehension (savikalpaka). The former immediately follows the sense-function in relation to an objective presentation; it is simple, elementary, indistinct, unstructured and meaningless. This preliminary ‘subception’ (ālocana) is described as purely objective, independent of mind’s associations and projections. This is followed by the second stage where the object is comprehended with reference to past experiences, memory traces and lingual associations: it is a matter of active organisation. At this stage the object is identified by its qualities, assigned its value, and apperceived. Perception both assimilates and discriminates; it is said to be ‘inclusive’ (anuvṛttta) as well as ‘exclusive’ (vyāvṛttta). The object is identified as such-and-such, as an individual, as a unique entity standing out in a situation; and the perceiver also knows the class to which it belongs, the relation it bears to other objects, its belongingness, in short.

When we are awake, perceptions are clear, certain and valid. They are valid because of our continued transaction with the objective presentation: my eyes being open, the table in front of me is seen continuously, not in spurts or with gaps in perception. The validity of perceptions depend upon coherence and not merely upon correspondence with objective forms. A perceptually valid object is not contradicted (abādhita) by subsequent perception. Dreams and illusions are also perceptions: they involve objects which seem ‘real’ and ‘external’ during their experience. They are not altogether imaginary, for dreams depend upon memory traces of past experience, and illusions do have their real, objective counterparts (which however are wrongly perceived). But they are by no means valid, because they fail to persist: dreams disappear on our waking and illusions are gone when
The Scramble of Scholiasts

139

conditions clear. Kumārila discusses the problem in some detail in the second section of the fifth chapter (Nirālanābana-vāda) of his Sūkavārttika. Dreams, like waking experiences, are also in a way related to objects 'out there.' It is true they lack corresponding objects in the physical world spatially and temporarily coexisting; but so long as we are dreaming we do not recognise this defect. Nevertheless, a dream is not pure imagination; its contents are necessarily derived from the real external world. Experience in dream is of the nature of remembrance: memory traces of our past experience (in waking life) are roused again into action under the pressure of some 'unseen' (adṛśta) forces. Not all, however, of our experience is available for dreaming about, but "only that part of past experiences which would make the individual happy or otherwise, and for which the individual is ripe at the moment." While the dream contents are thus real, the forms they assume are unreal: the connections (saṁsarga) between objects and episodes are all fabrications of the mind. This explains the private character of dream experience: Kumārila points out that mind is the main agent in dream-production, for we do not dream while fast asleep (when mind does not function).

Illusions likewise are founded on past experience. The perception of water on the distant sands of a sunny desert, the vision of fine mansions in the curious clouds, and the perception of a static circle in the speedy whirling of a fire-brand are impossible save for our previous experiences of water, mansions and circles. Even the figment of imagination like 'the horns of a haré' is merely an unjustified conjunction of our impressions of horns and hares we have seen separately in actual life; a person who has seen neither horns nor hare would not be subject to this illusion. But the snag in such experiences (dreams and illusions) is that they are soon sublated, and subsequently judged as unreal. They are liable to be contradicted and therefore lack the quality of persistence. Hence, although real experiences, they are not valid ones. The ego-function, however, continues to characterise these experiences. It is only in deep sleep, that the ego (āhānvṛtti)
lapses, and the subject is not qualified by any cognitions; indeed there is no notion of the subjective character of the self.

Misgivings of the 'Master'

Prabhākara, who was in fact Kumārila's student, is known to posterity as the 'Master'. He was indeed a master-mind and upset Kumārila's views considerably, although like his master he relied on the authority of Śabarasvāmin. He reflected on the nature of self, the nature of knowledge, the differentia of perception, analysis of volition and the nature of dreams.

The self (ātman), held Prabhākara in common with Kumārila, is real, different from the body, agent in experience, and distinct to each individual. But he denied modal transformation (pariñāma) in the self. The self is inert (jaḍa), non-sentient, and incapable of being the object of cognitions. The self is always a subject, and what is a subject cannot at the same time be an object. Prabhākara challenges his master's view that self is the object of I-notion: being the object of knowledge (prameyatva) does not necessarily involve perceptuality (saṃvedyatva). The self is not perceived in any sense. But in every cognition there is an immediate and inevitable ego-involvement. The self flashes forth in all experience, and were it not so, argues Prabhākara's advocate Śālikanātha, how can my experience be different from yours? In an experience the self as well as the objects are simultaneously manifested. In sharp contradiction to Kumārila, Prabhākara affirmed the role of introspective awareness in every case of cognition: when I know a table, I also know that I know it.

The self being non-sentient, needs something that is sentient as well as self-luminous to render itself manifest. Prabhākara calls this latter 'consciousness' (saṃvīti), which in import is identical with Kumārila's 'knowledge' (jñāna). Consciousness is self-luminous (svaprakāśa) and does not need aught else to make it manifest; and consciousness is always (except in sleep) object-oriented and involves the self. The cognising consciousness is three-fold in its structure (tripuṭī): the cogniser (ahamvīti), the cognised (viśayavīti), and the cogni-
tion (svasaṁvitti). When I cognise a pot, the consciousness is analysable into ‘I’, ‘pot’ and ‘I cognise’. All the three aspects occur simultaneously in consciousness. It should not, however, be imagined that the object and its cognition are identical. Perceptual experience proves that they are distinct, although they are presented to consciousness together: cognitions are merely modes private to the individual, their nature is that of forms; while the objects are physical and real, outside the individual. There is no way of the external objects manifesting themselves unless through the instrumentality of cognition.28 According to Prabhākara, introspection is impossible: cognition cannot cognise itself objectively. When we do examine our own thoughts, it is strictly retrospection and recollection.

Perception is defined by Prabhākara, as ‘direct apprehension’ (sākṣāt pratitiḥ). The expression ‘direct’ indicates the participation of sense-organs and external objects. Like Kumārila, Prabhākara enumerates two stages in the perceptual event: the initial indeterminate and the subsequent determinate. He also emphasises the rôle of memory images in the latter stage. It is interesting to note that Prabhākara anticipating the configurationists avers that only wholes (avayavi) are objects of perception; objects exist as wholes and it is not essential that parts thereof (avayava) are perceived separately before the whole is apprehended.

Prabhākara’s analysis of volition is presented in Siddhānta-muktāvali. The problems of action and volition loom large in the discussions of the Mīmāṁśā thinkers. What are the motives of human action? How are they related to the Vedic injunctions? How to reconcile pleasure with duty? It was Kumārila that gave expression to a now familiar statement: ‘Not even a fool would do a thing without a purpose.29 He conceded that pleasure was the ultimate motive: his doctrine is styled as psychological hedonism. And according to him, the Vedas fully appreciate this fact and endeavour to augment it by tuning the individual to ethical ideals: Vedic injunctions only seek to enhance pleasure and minimise pain: we must adhere to them because they serve our good. Prabhākara, however,
is impatient with this explanation of Vedic authority: Vedas demand our acceptance unconditionally and the Vedic injunctions are in the nature of categorical imperatives; we must adhere to them in the spirit of Duty for Duty's sake, and not seek justifications and rationalisations. The motive for action is the awareness of what is to be done (kāryatājñāna); and this is the initial link in the volitional chain. This awareness leads to a 'desire to do' (cikirṣā), which implies the 'appreciation of the possibility of doing it' (kṛtisādhyatājñāna). The desire directly sets up volition (pravṛtti) in the individual: this is a specific urge to act. This is followed by the orientational reactions (ceṣṭā): what is implied here is the set of motor tendencies that immediately precede behaviour or action (kriyā).

Explaining Illusions

Perceptual error (bhrama or viparyāya) figures prominently in Indian philosophical discussions. Frequently in the history of our thought the validity of empirical experience has been called to question. There are schools of thought which chose to dismiss the entire phenomenal world as illusory; and there are, on the other hand, die-hard realists. Notwithstanding the extreme positions, all schools concede the possibility of error in perception due to subjective and objective defects. The following illustrations of erroneous perception are familiar to the student of Indian thought: the rope in twilight being mistaken for a snake; the desert sands appearing as a lake for the thirsty traveller; a piece of conch-shell being mistaken for silver; and the colourless crystal appearing red when in close contact with a hibiscus flower. In all these cases of perceptual errors or illusions the object is real and right; but perceptions involve characteristics not contained by the object. The object is right and the sense-organs are wholesome; but the network of conditions prevalent at the time of perception is the source of error. An illusion is impossible without the transaction between the sense-organ and some external object; the error lies in interpreting the object differently from what it is, or in
imposing on the presented object characteristics which it does not possess. Illusions are essentially misapprehensions, unlike hallucinations (vikalpa) which are subjectively constructed notions without any objective correspondence really. Jayantabhaṭṭa, one of the most remarkable of Indian thinkers, distinguished between illusions (indriyajā bhrānti) and hallucinations (mānasī bhrānti): the former arise from defects in external objects or in sense-organs or from memories of similar objects, but involve the transaction between the individual and an objective presentation, whereas the latter are aroused by irrelevant memories in the absence of any objective presentation and as creatures of pure imagination. Hallucinations are entirely subjective productions and do not form a perceptual category. Illusion, on the other hand, is a variety of perception for it is impossible when sense-organs do not function. But the veridicality of normal perception is stifled by outward projection of an inner meaning in the mind of the perceiver: 24 The veridical form is obscured (pihitasvākārā) and the projected form is assumed (parighīta-parākārā).25 The error lies not in the presentational object, but in the representation thereof as something other than what it really is. Illusion in this theory is a phenomenon where the object is apprehended differently (anyathākhyāti) by the actively participating subject: the presence of an objective ground (adhīṣṭhāna) and erroneous ascription (āropa) of a recollected idea are essential features of an illusion.

This position in regard to illusory experiences is endorsed by Kumārila (and also by the Jaina thinkers and by the Rāmānujiya school of Vedānta in a slightly modified form), who prefers to style illusion as malperception (vīparitakhyāti). A piece of sea-shell glistening in sunlight is easily seen as silver. That the object is silver is perceptually provided, but not objectively warranted. But one who has had no knowledge whatever of silver would be unlikely to misapprehend shell as silver: silver does enter into the perceptual transaction, although at the time it does not occur objectively. The illusion is explained as due to a wrong synthesis between the object
presented (viṣaya) and the idea represented (prakāra). The shell which forms the sense-data now is connected psychologically with silver known to the subject previously owing to numerous common details: apprehension of this connection (saṁsargagraha) results in illusion. Or, take another illustration: a crystal (which by itself is colourless) when placed adjacent to a red hibiscus flower, appears as red crystal. The redness of the flower and the colourless crystal are two different details in the presentational world, but in the illusory experience they are mixed up. They are not connected in reality (although spatial contiguity is there), but are fused in the perceptual process with the result that the object appears differently from what it is. Illusion thus involves an error due to commission; something not present in the sense-data is included in the perceptual act. We project that something from within ourselves so that the presentational item acquires a meaning. The effect of illusion is similar to that of right perception: we perceive things in contexts and proceed to act in characteristic ways with respect to them. When, however, the error is discovered, we no longer persist in our activities. When the shell is mistaken for silver, we pick it up as a thing of value; but when it turns out to be mere shell, we throw it away as useless. The discovery of illusion serves to readjust our ideas concerning, and attitudes towards, objects. But so long as illusion lasts, the perceptual experience is as valid as any veredical transaction; at that moment and to that person, the perception appears valid and real. Thus Kumārila.

While Prabhakara subscribes to this notion of temporal validity of illusory experiences, he rejects in main Kumārila's explanation of illusion. In contradiction to the Malperception Theory of Kumārila, he puts forth the Perceptual Inadequacy Theory known to Indian students as the Impereception Argument (akhyātivāda). In illusions, the error is one of omission: we fail to apprehend some significant element in the presentational datum. When, for instance, a shell is mistakenly apprehended as silver, the shell is of course actually perceived. (In our statement “This is silver”, “this” refers in fact to the shell.) But
this veredical perception is immediately followed by the arousal of a memory-trace of earlier experience (in regard to silver). In illusion thus there is apprehension that is factual together with a recollection that is irrelevant, but the fact of recollection is lost sight of owing to confusion (smṛtipramoṣa) that is caused by the presence of identical aspects in both shell and silver. The presentative details (of the shell) and the representative factors (of silver) are really unrelated; but this absence of relation goes unperceived (asaṁsarga-agraha). The projection of a wrong idea on an object that forms the sense-data indicates incompletion or inadequacy of perception: a failure to appre hend the relevant aspect of the object in question. When we subsequently know the shell as shell, the apprehension part of our original experience is not disturbed but the recollection is sublated; thus the disillusionment is really a case of perceptual completion. Prabhākara means by illusion a subjective appearance of an object, idea or image in the mind as referred to a given object and becoming one with it.  

Prabhākara objects to the expression erroneous perception: he insists that there can be no error in perception for the perceiver during that experience. If a person sees the shell as silver, he knows it is silver and proceeds to pick it up: inasmuch as the perception prompts and guides an activity it is valid enough; and the person is sure of his perception at least for the time being. All is right on the receptive front, but when the person picks up the object and examines it, his original apprehension breaks down. The error thus lies in the ineffective action-orientation that is brought about by the receptive experience. Perception of course leads to successful action, but here is a case not of perception but of imperception.

The thinkers of the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism who hold that all human activity, whether deliberate or involuntary is purposive in character explain illusion in terms of defeating this character. Veridical perception should enable one to act fruitfully on the information provided thereby (saṁvādakatya); but the individual acting on an illusion cannot get at the object as he perceives it. There is, in an instance of illusion, a large
element of imagination (kalpanā or abhilāpa) which welds names and forms in a mosaic of perceived objectivity. An illusion is practically ineffective: it does not work in actuality. The Vijñānavādins, who are the subjective idealists among Buddhists, explain illusion as perception of a mental content in a material context. In the example of shell-silver illusion, shell is a material fact, extended in space and external in location, while silver is merely a mode of mind, an idea, private to the perceiver. But the perceiver sees silver not as his idea, but as an object external to him and extended in space. When subsequently he realises his mistake, he only sublates the externality and objectivity of silver but his idea of silver continues. The shell as an object and silver as an idea are both real, but cognition of an idea being confused with apprehension of a fact is the source of illusion. This view which emphasises the rôle of subjective projection or externalisation of an idea is styled ātmakhyāṭhi. The protagonists of the Yogācāra viewpoint of Buddhist subjectivism argue that although all phenomena are in the ultimate analysis merely mental constructs, what we know as external and objective reality is distinguished by being common to the bulk of individuals, by practical utility and by facilitating interpersonal intercourse. These qualities are lacking in illusions, which are in no sense real, but purely imaginary. The Mādhyamika Buddhists who profess thoroughgoing nihilism dismiss illusions as figures without ground, as substrateless perceptions: the silver that is seen in a shell is a figure that is conjured up from the void and equipped with an artificial externality. They illustrate the process by calling our attention to the appearance of bright woolly mass when we press the closed eye with our finger-tips. This view may be called Objectless Perception Theory (asaṭkhyāṭi).

Madhva represents a position of extreme opposition to the view just described. He is a thoroughgoing realist, pinning great faith on sense-perception. For him, illusion does involve a detail not warranted by the presentational object, but is not absolutely unreal on that account. When silver is seen in a shell, silver does not of course occur in the shell; nevertheless
silver as such is real and occurs elsewhere. An illusory experience has a basis in reality and consists in the misinterpretation of sensory data.\textsuperscript{28} This theory represents a modification of the \textit{anyathākhyātivāda} described earlier.

Psychologically interesting is the explanation of illusion offered by Rāmānuja, who was a realist but inclined in favour of Prabhākara’s Imperception theory. Illusion, according to him, is by no means an unreal or invalid cognition: insofar as it indicates an objective presence outside it is real enough, and inasmuch as the shell does contain parts which are similar to those of silver (like glistening, whiteness etc.) it is valid enough. No one would mistake a piece of coal for silver: it is only when common characteristics occur predominantly that one is mistaken for the other. There is neither a defect in the sense organ nor is there an unwarranted imagination at work. It is true that shell is not the same as silver, but the shining shell has a large amount of the characteristics which silver also has, and this is the source of illusion. Further, illusion is not without an effect: under the pressure of an illusory experience we blunder into certain factual details that remain unnoticed under normal conditions. The striking similarity of shell with silver, for instance, is driven home to us in an instance of illusion. Thus although an illusion indicates failure in full perception (as Prabhākara argues) it is real, valid, and has a purpose to fulfil.

Vallabha sought to explain illusion on the basis of dynamic and inertiac tendencies of personality. In a case of illusion there is the conjoint operation of projection and suppression. The former is the result of the \textit{rājas} tendencies which quickly ephorise a memory-trace (of silver, say) and project it on the object in sight (shell). And suppression results from the \textit{tamas} tendencies which cloud the exact nature of the object presented.\textsuperscript{29} The idea of silver is projected on the object shell and illusion results because the idea and object do not factually agree although they do in perception. It is unfortunate that theological preoccupation did not allow Vallabha to do anything more than merely suggest this significant explanation of
The World is an Illusion

This shockingly bold notion is ascribed to Śaṅkara, who did not live long enough to realise the full and practical import of this notion: he died in the prime of his youth when the spirit of adventure was still bubbling within him. It was his mission to combat the heretic nihilists and restore Vedic orthodoxy: he had also to combat the orthodox evolutionists (parināmavādins) who explained the world with all its defects and evils as directly evolved from the taintless Absolute. His intellectual eminence suggested to him that the Absolute was without identifiable characteristics (nirguna), and that it was fantastic to ascribe human deliberation to the Absolute in its involvement in the worldly confusion. He was anxious nevertheless that his conception of the simple, pure and featureless Absolute was not mistaken for another version of the Absolute Void of Mādhyamika Buddhists. He formulated as a solution the theory of transformation (vivartavāda) or illusion (māyāvāda): the world is an unreal but active transformation of the passive Absolute under conditions of clouding, and would cease to exist when the clouding cleared—even as an illusion. To explain this position, the great master was obliged to investigate into the nature of illusions.

Illusion is incorrect perception; but what is perception? Perception is presentation of an external object to the senses: the object that is fit (yogya) enough to stimulate the sense-organs (unlike abstract qualities), when spatially present at the present time (unlike distant objects or recollected facts), makes an impact on the individual. Psychological processes (vr̥tti) thereupon flow out of the individual and assume the form of the object thus presented. The simile that stimulated the idea of the dynamic character of the psychological processes is that of “water in a tank flowing through the sluice to a field to be irrigated and assuming its shape”. When the particular psychological processes on an occasion coincide with the factual details of the presented object we have the phenomenon
of perception. There can of course be no perception without a corresponding object being there, external to the individual: when, however, the individual psychological processes are qualitatively different from the factual details we speak of an illusion. Illusion is an appearance (pratibhāsa) that is unfit for normal transaction (vyavahāra).

Śaṅkara recognises three orders of reality: the ontological (pāramārthika-sattā), viz. the Absolute; the empirical (vyāvahārika), viz., the world we live in; and the apparent (pratibhāsika), viz., the illusions and hallucinations. The empirical as well as the apparent orders are beset with errors and are called realities by courtesy only, for they are liable later to be eliminated. But the empirical is backed by collective experience, stands on convention and persists uncontradicted for all beings until they are emancipated. The apparent, on the other hand, consists of discrete appearances: short-lived, for they are soon sublated by other experiences, and private inasmuch as other individuals do not share them. The appearance of silver in a shell, the appearance of a rope as snake in twilight the appearance of water on the desert sands on a sunny day are instances of illusions included in the apparent order of reality. It should be borne in mind, especially by his critics, that Śaṅkara does not mean by illusion, void, nothingness, or pure imagination: he emphasises that illusions cannot occur without a basis in factual objects, they invariably required an objective foundation. His commentator, Vācaspastimisra, explains that the source of illusions are not mere ideas, but real and external objects which serve as excitants. But the trouble with an illusion is that it is unpractical, it does not represent the objective data veridically: there is suppression of some details as well as substitution of other details. Factors within the perceiver and conditions outside him conspire to obscure (āvarana) some features; and to split up (vikṣepa) names and forms. The result is the transformation (vivarta) of the object (say shell) into an idea (silver) that does not correspond to the object at the time presented but is similar to it. The operation involved is projection (adhyāsa), which is defined by
Saṁkara as 'the appearance of the nature of recollection in a place of what is seen before elsewhere.'\textsuperscript{44} Projection is the unwarranted transference of an idea on an object that is different; and it is a composite production of both truth and error.\textsuperscript{35} It is not merely erroneous apprehension (viparyaya) but a positive phenomenon involving an element of reality. In the words of a later text-book writer, Nṛsiṁhaśrami (1500 A.D.), it is 'absence in the locus of appearance'\textsuperscript{36}: the projected idea does not actually occur in the object on which it is projected. The fact belonging to the apparent order of reality is transferred to the empirical, and hence the error.

This transference in projection is not a case of sequential evolution (parināma) but is one of sudden appearance (vivarta). The former is a process in the same order of reality, like milk becoming curds; the stuff persists despite the changes. But in the latter, the order of reality undergoes a shift, like the rope (object) appearing as a snake,\textsuperscript{37} the shell appearing as silver. This reminds the students of modern psychology of the theory of Gestalt phenomenon. Silver that appears is obviously not real (relative to the shell), nor is it totally unreal (for it is indubitably an item of the individual's cognitive equipment) nor as yet is it both real and unreal at once. It is a datum of experience, but is not objectively vouchsafed. When the conditions facilitating illusion are withdrawn, silver disappears leaving the substrate shell unchanged: the reality of silver is coeval with the endurance of illusion. This short-lived, apparent reality of illusion is indefinable (anirvacāniya).\textsuperscript{38}

In illusion is involved a cognitive complex of two distinct sets of processes: psychological processes of perception (vṛttis of the (antahkarana) and the more fundamental processes of avidyā. The conception of avidyā has generated a world of confusion among the scholiasts. Generally, however, it is looked upon as a process (vyāpāra) occurring on the basis of consciousness.\textsuperscript{39} Maṇḍana (800 A.D.) describes it as 'false appearance' (māya) having an action-orientation.\textsuperscript{40} Padmapāda (820 A.D.) takes avidyā as synonymous with 'non-apprehension' (agrahaṇa), 'inertia' (tamas), 'lapse' (laya) and 'the
The Scramble of Scholiasts

insensibility of sleep’ (nidrā); it obtains as a painting on canvas (citrabhātītta). The implications of this illustration were later worked out by Vīmuktatman (1200 A. D.): the canvas (consciousness) is neither the stuff of the painting (avidyā processes) nor an integral part of it; it was existing before the painting was done and would remain when the painting fades or is washed out; and without the canvas no painting can possibly be executed. In terms of personality dynamics, however, avidyā represents the principle of individuation: consciousness as the ground, individuality emerges as a figure and serves as ground for all the subsequent diverse psychological (antahkarāṇa) and the gross physiological (sthulāsarīra) processes that characterise the waking state. Bereft of the gross physiological processes, we sleep light and dream; and devoid of the psychological operations we are said to sleep deep. The conjunction of avidyā and antahkarāṇa are productive of perceptions and illusions: waking experiences and dreams.

Dreams are illusory in nature, and we describe them as unreal because they disappear on our waking up. But during the time the dream occurs, we are as if awake in a world of reality: the dream character is appreciated only when the state is sublated. And, argues Śaṅkara, who knows if wakefulness is not similarly sublated? If the apparent order of reality is sublated by the empirical, it is not unlikely that the empirical is likewise sublated by the ontological. If the shell-silver illusion is short-lived, the phenomenal illusion of the world is long-drawn but is an illusion nevertheless. We find indeed a suggestion in favour of this possibility in our deep sleep experience when our ego, perceptions, conceptions and illusions all alike cease to exist. Śaṅkara concludes: The world is an illusion and we live with different degrees of illusion. But we must stop here for Śaṅkara at this point leaps from the crags of psychology into the abyss of metaphysics.

The Paradox of Perception

For a theory that dismisses the world as an illusion, the problem of perception assumes profound importance. It is
elaborately discussed by the greatest of Advaita scholiasts although Śaṅkara himself skips it unceremoniously. Śrihariṣa, who lived around 1190 A.D. was perhaps one of the greatest of Indian dialecticians. And his bulky treatise, inappropriately named ‘The Sweetmeat of Attack’ (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya), is a monument of severe destructive criticism; it is at once knotty and naughty. But the merit of the book consists in the collection of numerous Indian views on perception, although their mention is only for refutation; after an elaborate and painstaking examination of all the diverse views he mischievously concludes that it is impossible to define perception: what is known as truly indefinable, for what appears as phenomena is highly relative in character, drawing its stuff from custom and convention. However, let me mention the views on perception Śrihariṣa has taken the trouble to collect.

(1) Perception is the immediate apprehension of the true nature of things. (2) Perception involves cognition that corresponds with the object it indicates (yathārthānubhava). (3) Perception is ‘entire’ discernment (samyak-parichitti) of the object. This is the definition suggested by Udayana, a tenth century writer. (4) Perception is experience that is not defective and therefore not incorrect (avyabhicāri-anubhava). (5) Perception is knowledge of an object that is not incompatible with it (avisamvādi). This is the Buddhist view. (6) Perception is what prompts the perceiver to attain the object he perceives (arthaprāpaṇakatva). This pragmatic definition is ascribed to Dharmakīrti, the famous Buddhist logician of the eighth century. (7) Perception is what has effects on the perceiver (pravṛtti-sāmarthya).

Both Śrihariṣa and his commentator Citsukha diligently pick holes in every one of these views and cleverly avoid announcing their own views. (1) No perception can be immediate; the instrumentality of sense-organs is indispensable. (2) How do we ascertain the correspondance? The true nature of the object is obtained only by an act of perception; it is really indeterminable. (3) No one, except an omniscient one, can know all the visible and invisible parts and traits of an object,
(4) This definition ignores the condition that the object must concurrently exist with its cognition. (5) Non-incompatibility is hardly a reliable criterion. Even erroneous cognitions endure uncontradicted for at least some time by other cognitions. (6) Attainability of objects is not easily determined: stars and planets are not attainable but are perceived nevertheless. Besides, this criterion would hold true of illusions as well. (7) Even illusions have effect on the perceiver: the rope mistaken for snake does frighten the perceiver.

As regards the functions of perception, Maṇḍana, who was a contemporary of Śaṅkara, mentions three alternatives (kalpaḥ): indicating the nature of an object, differentiation between objects (exclusion of objects other than the one in view), and both indication and differentiation. In the last alternative there are three further possibilities: indication and differentiation simultaneously; indication initially and differentiation subsequently; or differentiation initially and indication subsequently. Maṇḍana argues that perception is a unique and unitary process, not involving stages as suggested by the third alternative; and that differentiation is but a corollary of the function of indication. Although all perception involves the dichotomy of subject (draśī) and objective forms (dṛṣṭya), no perceptual process reveals the distinction between the two; perception brings out distinctions amongst the objects themselves. In the presence of an objective excitement the individual's psychological process (vṛtti) flows out and assumes the form peculiar to that object; the various objective forms thus assumed constitute the world of our normal transaction (dṛṣṭya).

Despair for the Moment

The scholastic period in Indian thought commencing in the sixth or seventh century after Christ and reaching as recent a period as the sixteenth century was the most productive. It is true that most of the hundreds of scholiasts during this period were content to function merely as commentators, expounders or textbook writers, and not as authors of original
thought. But in the course of discharging the modest rôles they
assumed, a large number of writers have revealed brilliant ana-
lytical skill and profound insight into man's nature and mind's
mechanism; they have contributed depth to original thought
and worked out elaborately the implications. Maṇḍana-
Padmapāda, Suresvara, Sarvajñātman, Ānandabodha, Citsukha,
Vimuktatman and Vidyārāṇya were not mere commentators on
Śaṅkara's thought; Sudarśana, Veṅkaṭanātha, Meghanāḍri,
Raṅgarāmānuja, Vātsyavarada and Vādihamsanavāmbuda were
not merely expounders of Rāmānuja. Jayatīrtha, Vyāsatīrtha,
Rāghavendra-yāti and Vādirāja were not mere text-book writers
of the Mādhva pursuasion. Śrīnivāsa, Mādhava-mukunda and
Vanamālīmiśra did not merely repeat parrot-like the ideas of
Niḥārka. These and a score of others were intellectual giants
who expended deep thought on the problems suggested by
their ācāryas and recorded the results of their cogitation.
Within the framework of tradition they accepted, they thought
freely and boldly. In a comprehensive history of psychological
thought it is improper to ignore their speculations and theories.
But to enumerate and discuss them would require a bulky
volume devoted exclusively to the scholastic period; and the
task therefore is obviously beyond the scope of this brief
history. Major personalities with their major ideologies have
found place in this chapter; others have entered my note-book
and I intend presenting their contributions in a separate
volume.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1 Slokavārttika, 'Granthakārapratijñā', verse 10
2 Sābarabhāṣya, 80-1 (arthaviṣayā hi pratyakṣa buddhiḥ)
3 S.N. Dasgupta: A History of Indian Philosophy, Cambridge, 1957
vol. I, p. 423, cf. Also S. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy, Allen
4 M. Hiriyamma: "Fragments of Bhartṛprapāṇa" Report of the Oriental
Conference, Madras, 1925, pp. 439-450. His doctrine is described as
brahmapariñāmavāda, the theory that Brahman, which is the permanent unity underlying the phenomenal diversity, is transformed into the individual self and the world. The individual self different from the body (which is its support), both acts and experiences: it cognises, but it cannot be cognised in any manner; it is the subject of all experience.

5 M. Hiriyanna: “Brahmadatta: An Old Vedantin” *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, pp. 1-10. He is said to have held a curious and bold view that the individual self both emanates from the Absolute and ceases to exist on liberation. He is classed among ‘pseudo-Vedāntins.’

6 M. Hiriyanna: “Fragments from Brahmanandin” *Pathak Commemoration Volume*, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1934, pp. 151-158. He had the distinction of being cited by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara as a protagonist of their different views. His theoretical standpoint was a synthesis of the theories of transformation (vivarta) and evolution (paripāma); while practically he advocated the path of devotion (bhakti).


8 Recently R.D. Karmarkar has doubted Śaṅkara’s authorship of Bhagavadgitābhāṣya.

9 For more details regarding Śaṅkara, see my Śaṅkara: A Psychological Study, Kanyakalaya, Mysore, 1960. Introduction.


11 *Sastradipika*, p. 160.

12 Murāri-miśra distinguishes between primary knowledge (vyavasāya) e.g. “This is a pot”, and secondary knowledge (anuvyavasāya) e.g. “I know the pot”. The latter is also the later. According to Kumārila the latter is only an inference.

13 S’lokavārttika, ‘Pratyakṣasūtra’, verse 84.

14 Expression by M. Hiriyanna: Outlines of Indian Philosophy, 1951, p. 305.


17 *Ibid.*, verses 112-115 (see also Nyāyaratnākara on these verses; and the account of perception in Mānameyodaya, p. 8 f.).


20 *Sastradipika*, p. 163.

21 Nyāyaratnākara, p. 246 (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1898).

22 Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 62.
Development of Psychological Thought in India

25 "prayıjanam anuddhiṣya na mūḍhopi pravartate", Ślokavārttika, 55
26 "hrdaye parisphurato' rthasya bahir avabhāsanam", Nyāyamaṇḍari (Chowkhamba Skt. Ser. 1936), p. 180
27 Ibid, p. 180
28 Vide Ganganath Jha: The Prābhākara School of Pūrvamimāṃsāī pp. 28-32
29 Cf. Jadunath Sinha: Indian Realism
30 Cf. R. Nagaraja Sarma: The Reign of Realism in Indian Philosophy, p. 45
32 Śaṅkara has nowhere in his writings presented an integrated account of the perceptual process. Padmapāda, who was his student, was the first to attempt an essay on perception according to the Advaita theory; it was later elaborated by Prakāśātmāna (A.D. 1200), his commentator.
33 Dharmarāja’s Vedāntaparibhāṣā, p. 57. Cf. M. Hriyānna: Outlines of Indian Philosophy
34 Even Prakāśānanda, the extreme subjectivist among Śaṅkara’s followers: “There can be no illusion (bhrama) without a substrate (nir-adhiṣṭhāna). Vedaṁatiśiddhamuktavali, Ed. A. Venis, Banaras 1890. p. 73
35 Bhāmati on Śaṅkarabhāṣya, 2:28
38 Vedāntatattvaviveka, p. 15
39 Vedāntaparibhāṣā distinguishes between evolution and appearance a, follows: “upādāna-samabhartāka-kāryāpattiḥ; upādāna—viṣama-sattāka-kāryāpattiḥ.”
40 Cf. Citsukha’s elaborate argument in favour of indefinability of illusory experience in his Tattvāpradīpikā, Bombay, 1916, p. 79
41 Sarvajñātmāna’s Saṅkṣepāśārīrakā, 2.174. “cinmātrāśritavaiṣayam”
42 Brahmasiddhi, p. 9. “vyavahārabijam”
43 Iṣṭasiddhi, p. 73 “yathā citrasya bhittih......”
44 Cf. Madhusūdana-Sarasvatī: Siddhāntabindu (3-53), Baroda, G. O. S; LXIV, 1933
45 'Brahmasiddhi'. Ch. I (Brahmākāṇḍa): (1) vastusvarupasiddhi; (2) vastvantarasya vyavacchedah; and (3) ubhāyam va
46 Śriharṣa’s Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhaṇḍa, p. 214
CHAPTER VIII

THE LOGIC OF GRAMMAR

Grammar and Genius

The Theory of Sphoṭa suggested by Indian grammarians over 2,600 years ago and subsequently developed into an elaborate argument bears remarkable affinity to the Gestalt theories of modern psychology. In fact, it offers the latter an excellent supplement: while the Gestalt theory has drawn much of its material from visual forms in perception, the Sphoṭa theorists have concentrated on the audible structure in language. The two alike argue against analysis of the experiential datum into discrete bits and emphasise its indivisible character. Both doctrines recognise phenomenal 'wholes' in cognition, and explain meaning in terms of organisation. The Sphoṭa theorist, in common with the Gestaltist, maintains that the meaningful apprehension is not built in parts but is a sudden manifestation: he emphasises the rôle of psychological integration in a perceptual process.

It is a curious coincidence that the Sphoṭa exponents, like their Gestaltist brethren in the West, had to contend against a severe protest by associationists of different dyes. But, while the Gestaltists succeeded, the Sphoṭa theorists failed with the result that their speculations remained in oblivion for several centuries save for specialists in Sanskrit grammar. The doctrine, bold and original as it was, met with disapprobation from most of the classical schools of thought in India, and was eventually stamped out of currency. The very vigour with which this doctrine was opposed is an evidence for its importance. However, it has lingered only in the grammatical discussions of a highly technical character.

The two points of view differ in details of approach and argument, although they agree about the essential ideology. The Sphoṭa is a hypothesis to explain the process of conveying
information by way of spoken signals; it is a construct to describe the configurational trend in auditory perception. This argument is an invention of the grammarians, and naturally, therefore, its frame of reference is principally lingual, although its implications extend to perception in general. An attempt is made in this chapter to present the psychological standpoint of the Sphota theory, without, however, dilating on its significance to psycholinguistics and communication theory.

The germs of this theory are to be traced in the grammatical aphorisms of Pāṇini, who is assigned to c. 700 B.C. by Professors Goldstücker and Belvalkar. His name has survived as the author of the most perfect grammatical treatise in the world and as the father of classical Sanskrit literature. Born in Śālavat, identified with the modern Lahaur near Attok in the Yusufzai Valley in the N.W. Fr. Provinces of Pakistan, he is said to have studied under the famous teacher Upāswāpśa according to a later authority (Śabaravāmin), who, was an associationist. Pāṇini, seems to have broken away from him, although he does not clearly espouse the Sphota doctrine in his only extant work, Astādhyāyi. He, however, mentions a ‘sphota-theorist’ (Sphōtāyana), and has founded a school of grammarians who have all upheld the Sphota theory.

He crystallised the conception of ‘mind’ as associated with the cognitive processes through the instrumentality of senses; and held that the spoken word had the dual functions of object-specification and object-differentiation. This view emphasised the tendency for forming ‘figures’, exemplified in language; and thus facilitated the emergence of the Sphota school of thought. Pāṇini also assumed that the word was essentially an event that could etymologically be resolved to a process. This is how the verb came to acquire the great importance it has in Indian grammar: it was said to contain in an embryonic stage all the possible variations of sentence; “the pre-developed immanent general potentiality” was centered in the verb. It may easily be seen how helpful this viewpoint was to the development of the concept of Sphota.

In a later work on Sphota, some Audumbarayana has been
mentioned as an ancient exponent of this view; but nothing more about him is known. Vyādi, a contemporary and relative of Pāṇini, is supposed to have been the author of Saṅgraha, which according to Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, was an exposition of the Sphota theory; but this work has long since been lost. The name definitely associated with the Sphota theory, however, is that of Patañjali.

Patañjali, one of the profoundest of ancient thinkers, was probably a South Indian, associated with the present-day Chidambaram in Madras State; and Professor Max-Müller assigns him to the second century before Christ. In the course of his excellent and voluminous commentary on Pāṇini’s Astādhyāyi, known as Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya, Patañjali has outlined the Sphota theory. He commences his celebrated commentary with an inquiry into the psychological nature of word’ (śabda). A distinction between ‘signal’ and ‘noise’ is suggested, and the symbol function of the former is brought out. His definition of ‘word’ implies the detection of signals in the presence of sound. The word is manifested by sounds, and then the ear perceives it; but it is apprehended by mind, and this is the essential stage of the process. The component units of the word, although sensed severally, are in perception integrated, because of the presence of one meaning as their common object. Without the psychological import, there can be no word; at best it can be noise. Thus the mental organisation of the word which conveys a meaning is the real word; the audible form which it assumes for purposes of communication is secondary and reflected. It is interesting that Patañjali further holds that ‘consciousness remains as subtle speech’ and its attempt at expression results in words. In its origin as well as in its apprehension, word is thus a psychological event, implying an organisation.

The pregnant speculations of Patañjali stimulated much thought and controversy. However, the thinker that worked out in elaboration Patañjali’s suggestions was the grammarian Bhartrhari, whose fame had spread the entire country when the Chinese pilgrim I-tsing was here. He belonged to Kashmir
and lived in the fifth century of our era. His commentator, Puṇyārāja, mentions that Bharṭṛhari studied under Vasurāta, a thinker contemporaneous with Vasubandhu and Candragomin. Vākyapadiya, a lucid treatise of about 200 verses on the philosophy of grammar, is the only work of Bharṭṛhari that has come down to us; and in the first of the three sections of this work ('Brahmakāṇḍa'), he ably sets forth the Sphota theory. This is indeed a remarkable work exhibiting a giant intellect and vast erudition; it is even asserted the Śaṅkara took the clues for the development of his Vedantic doctrine from this treatise. It is on this work that the entire system of thought concerning Sphota rests, and it is this work that all the later exponents employed as their guide-book. For Bharṭṛhari, the Sphota was no longer a mere linguistic principle in a grammatical context; it was for him a universally valid principle of phenomenological import. The opening verse in Vākyapadiya unfolds the immeasurable canvas of the world on which the operative gestalts eternally appear, transforming the blind events into meaningful occurrences.

Bharṭṛhari's work evoked a severe protest from that famous master of the middle ages, Kumārila. Kumārila devoted a whole chapter of his splendid Slokavārttika for presenting the associationist viewpoint of the Mīmāṃsakas and for proving the hypothesis of Sphota to be unnecessary and irrelevant. This attack elicited an elaborate defence in the body of Sphotasiddhi by his pupil, Māṇḍana-miṣra, a seventh century philosopher. This excellent work was in its turn criticised by Vacaspati-miṣra (c.800 A.D.), who upheld Kumārila's views in his Tattvabīndu; and Jayantabhaṭṭa, the author of Nyāyamāṇḍari, presented another type of associationist viewpoint of the Naiyayikas, in opposition to the Sphota theory. The latter, in particular, was a very able thinker and has suggested alternative explanations to Sphota.

A huge controversy raged on this subject for centuries until in the seventeenth century Nāgēśa-bhaṭṭa silenced it effectively. His Sphotavāda is an admirably lucid treatise bringing out the essential ideas of indivisible unity in apprehensions. In this work as well as in his masterly Laghu-mañju he pro-
pounds the necessity and utility of the *Sphoṭa* hypothesis. Other works on this subject include *Sphoṭasiddhi* by Bharatamisra, *Sphoṭatattvanirūpanā* by Śeṣa-kṛṣṇa, and *Sphoṭacandrīkā* by Mauni-kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa. It is rather curious that the theory so well propounded and so elaborately worked out should have died out in this country where intellectual tolerance has throughout history been practised as a virtue.

**Word and Meaning**

The word ‘Sphoṭa’ is derived from the root *sphuṭ, which signifies ‘splitting,’ ‘bursting into view,’ ‘manifesting’ (*vikasane*). There occur expressions such as *sphoṭā* for the ‘whipped out’ hood of an angry serpent and *sphuṭi* for the cracking of skin by bursting blisters.10 There is an element of suddenness involved in the process, and an unanalysability into distinct stages or aspects: a total actualisation of some potentiality. The expression is also associated with the flash of lightning, to signify that its occurrence is independent of our deliberation and beyond our control: spontaneous and irrepressible. There is, further, the common word *sphuṭa* meaning distinct, clear, definite. The expression ‘Sphoṭa’ in its technical usage comprehends all these connotations with reference to the emergence of meaning in auditory perception.

There are two ways in which the word ‘Sphoṭa’ is traditionally understood 11: (a) manifestation of some totality by the constituent parts; and (b) emergence of meaning from such a totality. In the realm of language, the ‘word’ is manifested by letters or phonemes, and when the word is thus manifest a meaning is conveyed by it. The *Sphoṭa* is a hypothesis to explain both these processes: word-formation and symbol-function.

We are here confronted with a cognitive situation. What happens when a word is heard? Do we indeed hear the *word* at all? What in fact is a *word*? The ears of course receive certain acoustic patterns: a series of discrete auditory sensations are caught up and registered. But in actual experience, we are not aware of apprehending separately these sensations;
we seem to grasp a 'significant’ whole, before we can say we have understood the word. In other words, we do not merely ‘sense’, but ‘perceive’ also. There is a psychological something over and above the physiological. Patañjali appreciated this essential dynamics of the cognitive situation: "What is the word, e.g. ‘cow’? It is that which, when uttered, generates the mental image of an animal with dewlap, tail, hump, hoof, horn, etc." The heard sound is transformed into a mental experience. In this formulation is implied the conception of capacity of words: in the presence of noise we detect certain signals which point to 'meanings'. A word thus is primarily a symbol function; it is in contradistinction with the actualised sound (or noise) which is physiological—the presentational data. This distinction is made by Patañjali.

Do we then hear the word? We hear the isolated sound-scratches in a sequence, which somehow get integrated into a pattern: and we appear to apprehend this pattern all at once, although in fact its elements were presented in a time-series. In other words, we receive the word-as-a-whole, which along with its significative capacity is styled as a 'nominatum' (vācakapada). This, however, is not to be confused with 'meaning' (arthā). Word is a signal, and meaning is the information or object represented or indicated by it; we may here remind ourselves of the distinction between the red flag and the danger it signifies.

Now we have three factors in our understanding: the presentational data (dhvani), word (śabda) and meaning (arthā). The sensational data of course generate the word, but what is the nature of relation between the word and its meaning? Does the word generate its meaning? Bhartṛhari denies this possibility: according to him, the word itself is 'transformed' (vivartate) into meaning. The relationship between them is not that of 'generator-generated but that of signifier-signified.’ The word and meaning are in essence identical, they are but two aspects of the self-same process. It is in this context and sense that the expression sphoja is employed. It refers to the word (śabda) which is generated by the sensational data, and
from which the meaning ‘bursts out into view.’ Reverting to the earlier analogy of the red flag signifying danger: the cloth of which it is made and the visual apprehension of it as having a particular colour and form belong to the realm of presentational data; the ‘red flag’, not ‘out there’ but inside our minds, is the word (or Sphota); and the sense of danger suggested by it is the meaning. The sense of danger ‘bursts into appearance’ as soon as we are aware of the ‘red flag.’ There is a certain spontaneity in the transformation of the notion of the red flag into the suggestion of the sense of danger: a process of reasoning does not seem to intervene. It is an instance of ‘phenomenal transposition’.

There can be no Sphota without meaning, nor any meaning without the Sphota. It is an indispensable intervening factor not only in acoustic and other receptive processes but in articulation also. The emergence of a configuration which is transformed spontaneously into import is in fact postulated by Bhartṛhari as necessary for all conscious behaviour, whether receptive or expressive. It is what makes for coherence in speech, order in perception and purpose in activity: it is a force that ‘structures’, ‘orders’ the presentational data into integrated patterns, and thus fulfils the functions of life in manifold ways. While speaking of the hypothesis of Sphota, Bhartṛhari’s imagination extends to the entire gamut of phenomenal processes.

The Bursting Out

But the Sphota is not a part of the scheme of things outside the individual; it is an internal, experiential event. Both Patañjali and Bhartṛhari emphasise the subjective character of Sphota: it is entirely psychological. But it is not ‘mental’ in the sense of selective integration of sensory impressions and the subsequent translation of this complex into a semantic denotation. Indeed it is the ‘meaning’ that belongs to the realm of mind in this narrow sense of the term (manas in Indian thought is always taken in this sense). The Sphota, however, belongs to a deeper and more fundamental aspect of
psychological life, viz., consciousness. There is a peculiar appropriateness in referring to Sphoṭa as 'intuitional enlightenment.' Patañjali and Bharṭṛhari ascribe the Sphoṭa phenomenon to buddhi (consciousness with ascertainment or determination as its major function); it is, in their ideology, a consciousness-modality. Bharṭṛhari illustrates this concept with an analogy:\[\text{arani} \text{ stick} \] (it is an old Indian belief)—fire is latent, it comes out when subjected to sufficient friction, and will light up other objects. This is an instance of the actualisation of a potentiality under favourable conditions. Even so, in consciousness Sphoṭa lies latent, and provided a situation, it underlies all our various understandings.

While Sphoṭa is thus a latent tendency of consciousness, it cannot be manifested unless through the instrumentality of the presentational data. This necessity explains the apparent assumption by Sphoṭa of diversity of forms appropriate to conditions determining it, although the Sphoṭa itself is a pure unitary tendency. Bharṭṛhari explains: The Sun's reflection in water appears to move as the water moves, it shakes when the water shakes, it is different in still water from what it is in ripples; there is of course no movement in the Sun, the observed movement in its reflection is owing to the conditions in which it obtains. Vacaspati offers another analogy:\[\text{a face is reflected differently in a mirror, in a gem, in the shining blade of sword; the face itself is one and is of a particular kind, the variety and apparent differences in its reflections being due to the materials in which it is reflected. Even so the} \text{Sphoṭa remains an invariant behind all the figural variations.} \]

The Sphoṭa is an experiential datum, but it is never expressed as such. Thus it is likely to be mistaken for the presentational data which are, however, expressed. In other words, the Sphoṭa is confused with the normal 'word' which we employ and which is composed of syllables in a sequence. It is true that the Sphoṭa cannot at all be manifested without such words, but the words are not themselves the Sphoṭa. The words we speak belong to the physical world, but the Sphoṭa is a psychological fact; the word is a complex of syllables whereas the Sphoṭa is a
The Logic of Grammar

whole, utterly devoid of parts; the word can be analysed into its constituent members, but the Sphota is indivisible. The same applies to other types of presentational data.

How then is the Sphota revealed by the presentational data? Let us take the word as an instance of the latter. When we hear the word, a particular meaning dawns in our minds, and, according to hypothesis, this ascription of meaning is due to the function of Sphota which intervenes as a tertium quid between the heard word and the intellectual meaning. The heard word is the presentational data; it is made up of isolated parts such as syllables, phonemes or letters (designated in Sanskrit as varnas). Suppose a word consists of four or five syllables, which are heard in a particular succession. Now at what stage of hearing is the Sphota generated? What is the value of separate syllables in the word? How is the meaning forced out? The Sphota-theorists concede that the word as uttered or heard is analysable into stages, but they deny that that the word is understood in these stages. The comprehension of Sphota is not a summation of a series of perceptions, the syllables do not separately convey bits of meaning which will make up the final meaning of the word. The syllables are not, in this sense, independent entities, nor the meaning a construction from pieces. The syllable discharges a real function only in so far as it participates in the total activity of the word; removed from the word, a syllable is meaningless. The syllables depend upon the word and not vice versa. The syllables, therefore, occurring in a mere combination do not compose the meaningful word; there occurs a more primary quality, not contained in the syllables severally, but common to all the syllables, and which will completely emerge from the word-as-a-whole.

The exponents of this theory further admit that the word as heard (or uttered) does not occur as a whole, all at once: the syllables are apprehended by the ear successively, in a time series. In what sense then can we speak of the unity of the word making for the emergence of meaning? When the first syllable in the word is heard, the Sphota underlying the word is
already manifest, but it is a preliminary, indistinct manifestation. And when the next syllable is heard, this psychological Sphota is strengthened and acquires greater clarity. This process is completed when the final syllable is heard: the Sphota is clearly crystallised and the meaning shoots forth. Bhartihari illustrates this process\textsuperscript{23}: A student reads a text for the first time, for the second time, for the third time. The very first time he reads, he understands, but when he finishes the third reading his understanding is richer, clearer, more definite; he now finds more meaning in the text than when he finished reading the text once. Manvantanamisra gives another example\textsuperscript{24}: It is like examining a precious stone. The expert has his first look at it, looks at it again, and again. Every time he looked at it, he assessed its worth, he understood it; but there were degrees of clarity in his understanding, the final look brought the precious stone vividly to his understanding. Even so, the Sphota occurs in its entirety \textit{ab initio}, but grows in vividness and distinctness by successive perceptual acts. We are reminded of the theory of tendency towards good Gestalts.

The possibility of error in the preliminary stages of the Sphota manifestation has been recognised. In dull light there lies a rope, which at first we perceive as a snake; or, a distant tree in a jungle appears verily like an elephant. On closer scrutiny the rope is seen as such, or at a closer proximity the tree is no longer mistaken for an elephant. The error is due to non-agreement of form with the object. The rope does have the form of a snake; the Sphota revealed by this form is later supplanted by subsequent cognitions which reveal the 'correct', the final, clear and distinct Sphota. Different aspects of the presentational data afford clues for cognition, and situational pressures facilitate errors therein. In cases of perceptual apprehension the objective data ultimately triumph over such situational facilitations for error, through a gradual transition from obscurity to clarity.\textsuperscript{25} The Sphota-theorists thus admit the growth and development of Sphota, and account for perceptual errors by pointing to underdeveloped or interrupted Sphota.
Critics' Attack

This doctrine had the good fortune of being questioned and criticised by brilliant minds; it was put to the test of severe inquiry, and thus its formulation gained in depth and accuracy. Adverse criticism came principally from two quarters: the Mīmāṃsā theologians and the Naiyāyika logicians. Śabaravāmin and Kumārila-bhaṭṭa led the former group. Śabaravāmin (c.200 A.D.), like Patañjali, instituted an enquiry into the nature of the word. What is a word? He answered: a combination of letters (or phonemes or syllables) and nothing more. The argument of this school is as follows: The syllables (or phonemes or letters) are independent and real units, and a complex of these units brings into being a less real and dependent entity, namely, the word. Take away the syllables, the word ceases to exist instantaneously. In fact, we apprehend any word as syllables and syllables are all that we apprehend; the word is a grammatical fiction, it has no real existence. The word ‘transit’ for example is merely ‘tran-sit’. But can the syllable ‘tran’ convey any meaning? or does the syllable ‘sit’ convey a meaning in keeping with the final meaning associated with ‘transit’? The syllables severally cannot convey meanings, but when combined they become capable of it. A single strand of thread cannot indeed hold a horse, nor two thousand strands severally; but when they are twisted into a rope the horse is certainly held by them. In other words, the Mīmāṃsakas stop at the presentational data and explain meaning as brought out therefrom. They find no justification for the tertium quid, Sphoṭa: it does nothing in cognition.

This position entails a difficulty. The syllables are not heard all at once, but in a succession; there is no simultaneous presentation of the data. How then is their association effected? This difficulty is surmounted by an ingenious hypothesis. Of course, the critics argue, the syllables are apprehended separately and in a sequence. But when a syllable is thus received, it leaves a subliminal impression or ‘engram’ (saṅskāra) in the mind, and this, along with similar ‘engrams’ of subsequent syllables will be revived (ecphorised) when the final syllable is being apprehended so that the final syllable associated with the
‘engrams’ of other syllables in the word is sufficient to convey meaning.\(^{27}\) Cognition thus is a complex affair: it involves actual perception as well as memory images. And meaning does not flash forth, but is gradually built up in parts. Kumārila concludes: it is unnecessary to assume a \textit{Sphoṭa}, distinct from the elements, to account for meaning.\(^{28}\)

The difficulty however, persists. Vācaspati rightly points out\(^{29}\) that in their enthusiasm to defend their position at any cost, the theologians do not mind postulating multitudinous imaginary ‘engrams’ instead of one \textit{Sphoṭa}! When many syllables are presented as parts of the word, save for the one being heard others do not exist as presentational data: the previous syllables are but vanished sensations, without enduring identity, and the subsequent ones are still in the womb of future. The perceptive apparatus is incapable of apprehending either the past or the future. And the ‘engrams’, if any, do not exist as the presentational data of the present. It is indeed a wild notion that in an act of perception sensations and ‘engrams’ jostle along and generate one meaning. The \textit{Sphoṭa}-theorists, however, do not deny the rôle of memory in cognition, but they fail to appreciate the extravagant admixture of immediate memory traces with the sensational data.

The other group of critics, the logicians, are headed by an undoubtedly eminent thinker, Jayanta-bhaṭṭa, who lived in Kashmir during the ninth century of our era. He argued that it is improper to assume the existence of anything not directly apprehended by the perceptive apparatus: the syllables are indeed heard, but who ever perceived a \textit{Sphoṭa}? The word is a collection of syllables, and sentence is a collection of words.\(^{30}\) He approved the basic tenet of Āśārasvāmin concerning the association of the final syllable with ‘engrams’ of the preceding ones; the syllables in a sequence make for the meaning, and not the hypothetical \textit{Sphoṭa}. Do we, for instance, make out the meaning of a word when its syllables are pronounced so rapidly that they are indistinct? It means that the syllables are important as producers of meaning. It is true, however, that the word is cognised as one, despite the numerous syllables involved in it,
The Logic of Grammar

But this unity is not inherent; it is endowed on it by an extraneous association, namely, the unity of the object in view.\textsuperscript{81} It is analogous to visual perception: When we see a cat, there is a plurality of factors involved, eyes, sufficient light, attention and so on; nevertheless we are aware of one visual perception, and this oneness strictly pertains to the cat.

Jayanta, however, is not quite reconciled to the hypothesis of ‘engrams’; he has suggested a modification. The unitary apprehension of meaning *apropos* the successive presentation of syllables presented a problem to him, and he solved it by postulating the hypothesis of ‘synthetic cognition’. It is true that the meaning-bearing syllables are heard one after another, and never all at once; but the impression of ‘total cognition’ is due to the synthesis of the different successive cognitions in a final judgment.\textsuperscript{82} He explains his idea: We say “Devadatta has eaten a hundred mangoes”. Did he eat them all at once? He surely ate one at a time, and the hundred in a sequence. How then do we have one notion of his having eaten a hundred mangoes (instead of a hundred such notions each of having eaten one mango)? It is because we make a *judgment* on the basis of collective recollection. The argument is no doubt ingenious, but carries little conviction. What Jayanta refers to here as judgment is in fact a higher logical process, an abstraction, and a species of inference; it is by no means a substitute for *Sphota*, which is a simple, fundamental attribute of consciousness. And the experiential fact of degrees of vividity in perceptual apprehension cannot be explained by the hypothesis of judgment.

Of the minor critics of this theory, the most prominent is Śaṅkara, who was born in Kerala about 655 A.D. This eminent philosopher was naturally partial to the theologians and logicians and appears to have found it obligatory to offer a criticism of the hypothesis of *Sphota*, however unwillingly. While there occurs in his works\textsuperscript{83} a formal attack on this doctrine, his basic philosophical position of *advaīta* would tacitly imply the notion of *Sphota*. Śaṅkara admits the totality in our apprehensions, but he ascribes it not to *Sphota*, but to the ‘synthesising activity of mind’. The mind apprehends the separate syllables one by
one and later binds them together into one word. Of great importance is the sequence. Śaṅkara draws attention to the appearance of a ‘row’ of ants when a large number of them are marching in a file: the ants are real and they are many, but the one row that appears is a mental fiction. But it is an irrelevant analogy. While the *Sphoṭa*-theorist grants the importance of sequence, he points out that the syllables in a word and ants in a row are not identical in their functions. The ant has an independence of its own, and the row may indeed be a matter of summation; but a syllable torn from the word is inane and ineffectual.\textsuperscript{44}

**In Defence**

The criticisms helped the *Sphoṭa*-theorists to reconstruct their system with greater precision, and a major effort in this direction was due to Nāgeśa-bhaṭṭa, who gave currency to the concept of indivisible proposition—Gestalt (*akhaṇḍavākya-Sphoṭa*).\textsuperscript{45} He recognised two major types of *Sphoṭas*: individual and collective. In the former type, it may be ‘divisible’; or indivisible; when it is ‘divisible’ we may speak of the syllable, word and proposition as each a *Sphoṭa*-unit; and when it is ‘indivisible’ we can consider only words and ‘propositions as *Sphoṭas*. In the collective (or class) type, the syllable, word and proposition occur as individual *Sphoṭas*. While there are thus eight possible *Sphoṭas*,\textsuperscript{46} the primary one is the ‘indivisible’ proposition *Sphoṭa*. A proposition involves completion of the intended sense; it is often a sentence, but it may sometimes be a single word, as in the case of ‘Come!’ or ‘Go!’. The propositional fulfilment is said to be a matter of ‘intuition’ only.\textsuperscript{47} Nāgeśa means by ‘intuition’ a capacity acquired in states of existence prior to the present one: and his commentator explains the idea in terms of instinctive tendencies.\textsuperscript{48}
REFERENCES

1. ’avaṅg Sphoṭāyanasya’, 6. I. 123. Haradatta in his commentary (Pada-
maṇḍari) on this aphorism describes Sphoṭāyana as a great gram-
marian; Hemacandra identifies him with the sage Kāśiṇīn (Abhidhā-
nacintāmaṇi); and Nāgėśa-bhaṭṭa calls him a sage (Sphoṭavādaṅ
Colophon). His identity, date and work, however, are uncertain.

5, 3, 109-122

presented to Professor P.V. Kane, (ed. Katre and Gode), Poona, 1941,
222

4. Bharata-miśra’s Sphoṭasiddhi

Rangaswamy Aiyangar Commemoration Volume, 1940, 509-515

6. Section: Pratyāhārānkhika (Mahābhāṣya, Kielhorn’s ed. 1892)

7. “kas tarhi śabdah? yeno’ ccāritena sāsna-lāṅgula-kakuda-khura viṣa-
niṇām saṃpratyayo bhavati sa śabdah.” (Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, 16)
Kaiyāṭa paraphrases Patañjali’s question: “What is the word for
that object (animal) which we know already as cow?” Cf. also
“arthavāsāyapravasavanimittam śaṅba ibhyate” (Maṇḍanamiśra)

8. “śrotro’palabdhiḥ buddhirgṛahyāḥ prayogābhijvalitaḥ” (Op. cit., 1,
517)

9. Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini, I. 4. 29


11. (a) sphaṛtyate (═ abhivyayyate) dhvanibhirayam (śabdah);
(b) sphaṛtyat (arthah) asmāt (═ abhivyaktaśabdāt). Also cf.Mādhava’s
Svaryadarśanānangraha, 13, 19

12. Cf. note 7, supra Also Cf. Sastrī, V. A. Ramaswami: “The Doctrine
of sphoṭa”, Journal of the Annamalai University, 1932, 1, 2, 231-240
and 1933, 2, 1, 109-119

13. Pratyāhārānkhika in Mahābhāṣya (N. S. ed.) 107, 517, 531

14. Vākyapadīya, I, 1 “śabdātattvam...vivartate’rthabhāvena...”

15. Ibid., 2. 31 “ekasyevatmano bhedān śabdārthān apṛthakshhtītan”. The
nature of the relation is ‘abhivyāgyābhivaṇjakabhāva’ and not
‘utpādyotpādakabhāva’

16. Ibid., I, 124 “na so’sti pratyayo loke ya śabdānugamādṛte”

17. Ibid., I, 1. “...prakriyā jagato”

Theory of Linguistic Symbols”, The Adyar Library Bulletin, 1956, XX,
1&2, 84-116

19. Vākyapadīya, I. 46. also Cf. Nāgēśa’s Laghuṃjaṅgūṣa, p. 45


21. Vākyapadīya, 1. 46 “aranisthām yathā jyotiḥ prakāśāntarakāraṇam i
Development of Psychological Thought in India

tadvac chabdo’pi buddhistah ārutilām kāraṇāṁ prthak’

23 Tattvabindu (Banaras ed), p. 6. Cf. also his Tattvavaliśāradī, 3, 17; and Šeṣa-kṛṣṇa’s Sphoṭatattvavakireṇāya, verse 11

24 Vākyapadiya, I. 83. also Cf Iyer, K. A. Subrahmany: “The Doctrine of Sphoṭa”, Journal of the Ganganāth Jha Research Institute, 1948, 5, 2, 121-147

25 Sphoṭasiddhi, pp. 129-131 “...krameṇa cetasi ca kāsti ratnatattvam”

26 Cf. Māṇḍana’s Sphoṭasiddhi, 23

27 Mīmāṁśāśāstrabhāṣya, I. I. I

28 “pūrvavarṇajānitasamāśīkārasahito’ntyovarṇahpratyayakaḥ”

29 Slokavārttika, ‘Sphoṭavāda’, verse 133. “nā’rthasya vācakas sphoṭo varṇebhyo vyatirekataḥ”

30 Nyāyamañjarī, p. 136

31 Ibid., pp. 382 f.

32 Ibid., p. 376

33 Brahmāsūtrabhāṣya, I. 3. 28


35 Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntamaniṣṭā, I. Also Cf. the Kuṇḍikāṭikā on it

36 Sphoṭavāda (ed. V. Krishnamacharya with his own Sanskrit commentary), The Adyar Library Series 55, 1946

37 Nāgēśa’s Laghu-maniṣṭā, 417. “vākyārthas ca pratibhāmātra-viṣayah”

38 Kuṇḍikāṭikā on the above passage
CHAPTER IX
COUNSELLING ON THE BATTLE-FIELD

The Song Celestial

There is hardly a Hindu household wherein is not found a copy of the the Bhagavadgītā; there is scarcely an adult Hindu of some schooling who has not read it in the original Sanskrit or in translation, the original text itself or some exposition thereof. This has been so for about two thousand years now. This didactic poem in eighteen chapters and seven hundred verses was composed in the early centuries before the birth of Christ, and was incorporated as a section in the Sixth Book of the great epic, Mahābhārata. Popular as a guide-book for everyman, it attained philosophical celebrity when the great Śaṅkara (655–687 A. D.) wrote the first extant commentary on it. Since then, innumerable commentaries, glosses, annotations and explanations have been attempted; and the book has now been translated into all the existing languages of the world. The Sanskrit poet Bāṇa who lived in the seventh century was acquainted with the greatness of this philosophical poem; the Kashmirite King Avantivarman, who died in 883 A. D. had the whole Bhagavadgītā read out to him—so we are informed by Kalhaṇa, the author of Rājatarangini.

The Bhagavadgītā is doubtless a text, perhaps the earliest, belonging to the devotional school of Indian religion, the Bhāgavata. This monotheistic School was founded by one Kṛṣṇa-Vāsudeva belonging to the Śātvata sect of the Yadu class and he was reverently referred to as ‘Bhagavān’ (Lord). The Gītā unmistakably bears the influence of Upaniṣads, especially the Kaṭha and the Śvetā́śvatara²: there is even a suggestion that the Song Celestial was originally a Yoga-Upaniṣad which was later Vaiśnavised. Kṛṣṇa, the founder of this cult (and who is the spokesman in the Bhagavadgītā) was by birth a Śūdra (being Yadu) who was later raised to the rank
of a kṣatriya. There is in Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, a reference to 
Kṛṣṇa-Devakīputra’ (‘son of Devaki) who was a disciple of
the sage Ghora-Aṅgirasa. The Jain Harivaṃśa mentions Kṛṣṇa
as the cousin and contemporary of the holy ford-maker,
Neminātha (who is believed to have lived about eight centuries
earlier than Christ). And the famous Indian battle which was
fought on the Kurukṣetra grounds (where Kṛṣṇa belonging to
the Pāṇḍava hosts gave out the Song Celestial) is dated about
eighth or ninth century B.C. The Purāṇas contain legendary
narratives of the amorous and heroic exploits of Kṛṣṇa who is
lifted to semi-divine or divine heights: popular belief in India
makes him an incarnation of Viṣṇu.

But in the Bhagavadgītā, he is mostly represented as a
human teacher of great wisdom and erudition; he figures as a
Yogi. The Bhāgavata records that Kṛṣṇa sat up every morn-
ing for meditation ‘merging himself with the transcendental self’.
We read in the Mahābhārata also that Kṛṣṇa was in the habi-
of meditating on Brahman in the hours before sun-rise. Kṛṣṇa
in all probability was historical in character and was a philo-
sopher who harmonised the Sāṁkhya-Yoga with the brahmavāda
of the Upaniṣads.

The poem has justly acquired an honoured place in the
religious literature of the country, for it is at once philosophi-
cal in outlook and practical in intent. Working with meta-
physical concepts, it prescribes concrete rules of efficient
conduct: it contains a message for the sage, a lesson for the
king, an instruction for the layman, a warning for the delin-
quent. Diverse temperaments find their reflections in this tract,
and various aspirations find in it their fulfilment. The poem
deals with the dialogue between the Pāṇḍava prince Arjunat
who was in mental agony and emotional conflict, and his friend
Kṛṣṇa) who in this work appears as philosopher and teacher,
and not as a popular god of later Hinduism). Kṛṣṇa clears the
knotty tangles in Arjuna’s mind and heart, and remakes of him
a valiant hero. It is a story of skilful and successful counsell-
ing; and what follows focusses attention on this particular
aspect of this great book, as the modern ideas of guidance and
counselling are amply illustrated there.

War In The Mind

In the background of the story is the family feud between two ruling tribes, Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas, related however by ties of blood. The battle, which was a historical event (although it assumed mythical proportions in later narratives) was a spectacular event in India's history during the epic period; indeed it was styled as the 'Indian fight' (Bhāratayuddha) and forms the theme of the famous epic, Mahābhārata. The fight was invested with this celebrity for it marked the triumph of righteousness over evil: the good-natured and unjustly treated Pāṇḍavas worsted in the end their crafty and mean-minded cousins, the Kauravas. After a colourful series of approaches and tussles, the issue was finally settled in the battle on the site Kurukṣetra, near modern Delhi.

The scene of the Song is laid in one of the days of the great battle: the two opposing forces are arrayed on the battlefield, and the war-car of the Pāṇḍava hero Arjuna is parked in the centre. He interestingly surveys the opposed armies, and is in particular curious to have a last look at the "well-wishers of the evil-minded Duryodhana", the leader of the Kaurava host. All on a sudden, however, he shrinks with remorse and dismay as he finds in the enemy camp his own teachers, elders, relatives and friends. His conscience is stricken with the enormity of the unwilling sin he is about to commit; compassion for his kinsmen and sudden awakening of self-abnegating love of humanity unhinged Arjuna's courage and presence of mind. Kṛṣṇa who was driving Arjuna's car lifts him by an elaborate counselling out of the despondent mood. Incidental to counselling, there is a display of high philosophical wisdom and metaphysical subtlety.

The episode represents a symbolism. Arjuna indicates the individual-in-stress. He is confronted with a critical situation, which clouds his thoughts, renders him anxious and makes him fly reality. He is unable to act. A valiant hero, who had
fought without a wrinkle many a tough battle, now entered the field with confidence, ready to fight and sure of victory. When he asked Kṛṣṇa to drive his car to the center of the battlefield to weigh the strength of the opposite force, he had even lifted up his mighty bow. But this preparatory set was soon broken, and an internal conflict raged wild. There was real anguish interfering even with normal bodily functions:

"Seeing these kindred, assembled battle-bent, my limbs wither and my mouth becomes parched. There is trembling in my body and my hair stands on end; my bow drops from my hand, and my skin burns fiercely. I am not able to remain firm seated; my mind also seems to wander, and I perceive omens of evil!"

Verily, a picture of anxiety neurosis! The war is no longer on the grounds of Kurukṣetra; it is within the mind of Arjuna. He exhibits symptoms of anxiety, insecurity, confusion and phantasy, together with the physical manifestations of sweating, weakness, tremulousness and palpitation. He is depressed (vīṣidantah) and excited (saṃvignamanāh). His intellectual functions remain intact and he has an insight into his own mental state; his thinking is not entirely unrelated to logic and he readily rationalises his inability to act. He presents the arguments of "tearing down the family tree" and "inflicting injury to friends" as reasons for refusal to fight. Kṛṣṇa, knowing well that these were ego's defences, listens patiently and allows him to unburden himself of the disturbing thoughts and fears. At length Arjuna seeks guidance from Kṛṣṇa:

"I am thy pupil: instruct me, who in thee have sought refuge!"

Kṛṣṇa was his close friend, in whom not only Arjuna but his entire family placed an implicit trust. He was known for his maturity of mind, honesty of purpose, and love of right conduct. The whole world knew of his affectionate concern for the welfare of the Pañcālavas, in particular of his favourite friend Arjuna. Numerous were the instances when he had retrieved the Pañcālavas from moments of embarrassment and misery. He
Counselling on The Battle-Field

naturally now commanded the entire confidence of Arjuna. The counsellor thus was both intelligent and co-operative.

The Business of Counselling

Krṣṇa proceeds to help Arjuna out of the dark mood; and his manner of doing it illustrates the technique of an efficient counsellor. He starts by roundly dubbing Arjuna’s trouble as ‘cowardice’ (klaibya), ‘faintness of heart’ (hrdayadaurbalya) and ‘dirt’ (kaśmala). While he spoke so directly he was nevertheless aware that the source of Arjuna’s grief was the contending value systems: though intellectually alert, Arjuna’s will was weak and his withdrawal (refusal to fight) indicated a cleavage in his personality and a consequent disorientation. Krṣṇa readily recognised that this was a problem of adjustment: Arjuna was not acting in accordance with the expectations of his social class and status, and his present mood was justified neither by his talents nor by his temperament. Krṣṇa realised that Arjuna needed to acquire a wholesome attitude and learn to perceive things in their proper frame of reference. For this, Arjuna had to discover more about himself.

The first task of Krṣṇa as counsellor was to induce in Arjuna an insight into his own problems. And this he did by analysing the problem from diverse angles. It is somewhat strange that he should have begun with the metaphysical viewpoint. But when we realise that Arjuna suffered from an exaggerated emotional attachment to his kith and kin, it appears reasonable that Krṣṇa suspects an ego-involvement on his part and hastens to correct it. At the back of Arjuna’s love of his folk was a love of himself and an anxiety for the welfare of his own self. Krṣṇa therefore commences with an exposition of the true nature of self: unborn, immortal, immutable, intangible and immeasurable. He preaches the doctrine of untroubled existence of the divine self independent of the mortal body, and explains our affective attachments as due to improper ego-projections of bodily characteristics on to the self. Krṣṇa’s purpose in this exposition is to transpose Arjuna’s problem to a totally different context, and to help him
develop a new method of evaluation: the intention is to provide a wider and deeper basis for Arjuna's sentiments.

Without affording Arjuna a chance to doubt or argue Kṛṣṇa immediately poses another problem for consideration: Arjuna's social status and the responsibilities associated with it. Belonging to the Kṣatriya class in the social milieu, invested with the firm duty of upholding the cause of righteousness and suppressing evil tendencies in the community, Arjuna was guilty of an impropriety by being indifferent, soft and sentimental; he swerved with indecision from the conduct, normal and approved in his class. A battle like this was indeed a welcome opportunity for a kṣatriya to discharge his duties and prove his worth.¹⁰ And if Arjuna for any reason refused to countenance the situation squarely, what would the world think of him? He would for ever become the butt of ridicule, and his enemies would gloat over this demonstration of infirmity.¹¹ In short, Arjuna, preoccupied as he was with his dwarfish and selfish sentimentalism, did not evaluate the situation properly; his humanistic considerations ran counter to the more urgent consideration of mores and of the class-approved behaviour. In the flush of this disorientation, his capacity for rôle-assumption was undermined. His emotions inhibited his leadership abilities.

It was this rôle-conflict that landed him in inactivity. Similar to clinical depression, it meant an inhibition of the capacity to act. Although Arjuna readily and elaborately rationalises it, it is inescapably a pathological state, beyond voluntary control.¹² There was in the presence of a crisis clouding of thought, expression of anxiety and indication of despair. He could not see his way about in adjusting to a real life-situation: he failed to appreciate the necessity for proper conduct in keeping with the situational needs, and in keeping with his hereditary and acquired talents, temperament and social rôle. This is precisely what Kṛṣṇa meant by “failing in svadharma”¹³ which aggravated internal conflict.

*The Psychology of It*

In order to facilitate adjustment, Kṛṣṇa undertook to
reinforce the ego dominion by liberating it from the introverted, protective tendencies. The ego in Arjuna’s case had shrunk to a narrow range, sharply contoured by conventional relations with the kith and kin. And this sudden shrinking of the ego was attended by anxiety. **Krṣṇa** as counsellor had to enable the ego develop an extensive feeling which met adequately the real situation in the external world. Hence his exposition of the immortality, immutability and essential divinity of the individual self. By transforming Arjuna’s problem into a theoretical, academic and metaphysical standpoint, **Krṣṇa** sought to minimise Arjuna’s ego-involvement and eliminate the anxiety associated with it. It was necessary to make wholesome Arjuna’s perception, which had become distorted owing to the inner emotional stress. This was achieved by fitting the practical problem to a philosophical context.

**Krṣṇa** teaches the doctrine of intellectual alertness and emotional stability which enables the individual to be at peace with himself and others. The maintenance of a state of psychological equipoise (**sthitaprajña**) is earnestly recommended. The excellent account of the features of a person who has achieved the equipoise also lays down the basic principles of mental hygiene:

“He is known as one with equipoise when he eschews all overmuch desire and learns to be satisfied with himself. Difficulties disturb him not, and pleasures fail to tempt him; freed from longing, dread and hate he is a sage with steady mind. His heart is settled in nothing, meeting good or evil he is neither happy nor sad. His senses are all withdrawn, like the limbs of a turtle; and his mind is steady. Objects of lust, unfed, disappear... Senses indeed are naughty and snatch the mind away. The wise one controls them all... for when they are controlled, mind can be steady. Brooding over objects of enjoyment, one gets fixed on them; being fixed, he craves for them. Craving (unfulfilled) leads to anger, and anger to confusion; confusion makes for unreasonableness and that results in madness, which is the road
to destruction. Bereft of love and hate, senses bridled by the self the individual obtains calmness. In calmness do all cares and worries find their end; calmness helps the mind settle. One that is unadjusted thus lacks resolve, and absence of resolve is difficulty to cultivate (one’s mind), and an uncultivated mind cannot attain peace, and without peace where is happiness? When mind yields to the whims of senses, it is led hopelessly astray, like a boat on water wafted by the gale.”

Overwhelming Experience

After an elaborate argumentation concerning the merit of work and wisdom, convention and reason, intellection and insightful understanding, application and devotion, Kṛṣṇa realises that mere intellectual conviction would be insufficient for effecting a lasting change in the ego-involved attitude of Arjuna. He felt the necessity of driving home the thesis by a more direct and personal experience. This he affords by way of exhibiting the pervasiveness and supremacy of the Divine (viṣvarūpadarśana). This sudden and unexpected revelation of the Deity served as an Erlebnis with a vivid and impressive demonstration. It was a sight that filled Arjuna with terror, it was an experience that was emotionally overwhelming. It convinced him so thoroughly as no amount of argumentation and reasoning could ever have. It brought home to him the reality with a terrific force, and his ego-involvement was broken into bits. Arjuna was ducked in a shock. And when he came out of it he was a changed man.

By argument and Erlebnis, Kṛṣṇa lifts Arjuna out of the dark mood of profound depression and inactivity, but insists on his ‘examining the position thoroughly and acting with full deliberation.” The book closes with an optimistic note: Arjuna is now ready for action—

"The dark clouds have disappeared, and I have won back the presence of mind. I stand here free from doubt, and shall indeed do as you guide!" Arjuna was disoriented to reality; although he was in capacity
equal to the situation, he found himself unable to act owing to intrapsychic conflicts which engendered in him anxiety reactions. He had lost self-appreciation and his personality suddenly lost the flexibility essential for satisfactory adjustment to situational needs. By skilful counselling Kṛṣṇa strengthened Arjuna as a man, raised his dynamic adaptation level and enabled him to plan his action for a suitable and acceptable-goal. He made Arjuna appreciate his own personal dignity and recognise his work capacity.

Command Versus Counsel

It is significant to note that Kṛṣṇa does not command but counsels. This raises an important issue: the differential value of injunctions and suggestions. And this refers to the problem of motivational dynamics. Indian tradition classifies human action into purposeful (kāmya), prohibited (pratiṣiddha) and paramount (nitya). The purposeful is also optional: occasional needs and situational demands determine these actions. The prohibited are actions disapproved by custom and convention in view of personal integrity and group solidarity. The paramount are actions unconditional in their applicability, necessary for all individuals and at all times. These are of two sorts: sin-eliminating (duritakṣaya) and sin-preventing (pratyavāya). By the performance of these actions, no one expects a positive benefit: they are done with a sense of duty. The example is the daily sandhyā for the twice-born castes in our country: the scriptures insist on its daily performance. But no reward is promised: it must be done because of the scriptural command, and it admits of no reasoning. Virtue is accordingly defined as performance of the duties enjoined and abstension from those forbidden. The Vedic injunction (niyoga, vidhi) is said to goad us to work, initially as a verbal prompting (śabdibhāvana) whereby a volitional tendency is aroused, and subsequently as action prompting (ārthibhāvana), whereby the resolve actually to perform the act is set up. The notion of ‘prompting’ (bhāvana) in Mīmāṁsā is interesting: it is defined as an operation (vyāpa-ra) which sets an action-orientation (pravartanā, preranārūpā).
Maṇḍana interprets it as ‘an inner volitional direction of mind towards an action’ (in the words of Dasgupta).¹⁹ Thus a Vedic command (niyoga) has a driving power (vidhi), which arouses a felt intention (ākūta) and immediately ceases; in the natural course of events, action (artha) results. In all this discussion, the main idea appears to be that action must be guided by a sense of duty (kārtyayatā) regardless of the results of such action. Or, in psychological terms, action must not be goal-oriented but subjectively determined; the motivation must operate from within, in conformity to one’s temperament and genius (pratibhā).

Arjuna’s conflict between his temperamental inclination and situational requirements involves this problem. And Kṛṣṇa does not seem well disposed towards the notion of the Vedic command, being a categorical imperative, overriding reason. Rāmacūrṇa, however, in his interpretation of the Bhagavadgītā emphasises the obligatory and compulsive nature of caste-duties, being an instance of scriptural insistence. Arjuna, being a kṣatriya had to fight: he had to do it as a command (ekāśāstrārthatayā anuṣṭheyām), without reasoning and regardless of results. But nowhere in the text is Kṛṣṇa so dogmatic: indeed, he leaves the decision in regard to fighting to Arjuna himself: “Do as you please!”²⁰ Saṅkara suggests that the main theme of Bhagavadgītā is to prove the superiority of wisdom to duty. He argues that no action can possibly be done without a motive or desire: and this applies to sacred as well as secular action, and holds true for Vedic injunctions as well as legal regulations. Non-performance of an action insisted upon by scriptures or convention leads to no evil result whatever, although its performance may help one attain purity of mind (sattvāsuddhi), or community approval. “The wise man has no duties.”²¹ That is why Kṛṣṇa only counsels, and is not in a position to command. And while counselling he indicates the social and personal involvements and embarrassment in his refusal to discharge the responsibilities of the rôle he has already assumed. But he lays emphasis on the fact that this problem of caste duty and injury to the kith and kin does not disturb the deeper and fundamental meaning of life.
Counselling on The Battle-Field

REFERENCES

1 Šaṅkara’s authorship of the Gitabhāṣya has been disputed
2 Cf. R.D. Ranade: Bhagavadgītā as a Philosophy of God-realisation.
   Nagpur University 1959. The author suggests that the doctrine of
   activism and non-attachment which we find in the Gītā is borrowed
   from Īṣṭa Upaniṣad, the asvattha simile from Kaṭha-,
   the idea of Viśvarūpa as well as the antinomy between ritualism and
   non-ritualism from Muṇḍaka-, the concept of five virtues in the
   sixteenth chapter from Chāndogya-and the Yogic teachings from Śvetāśvatara-
   Bhāgavata-purāṇa, 10.70
4 ‘Śāntiparvan’, 55, 2-3
5 Amarnath Ray: “Sri Krishna and the Source of Bhagāvadgītā”
   Indian Historical Quarterly, 1953, 9 (No.1) 188-196
6 Bhagavadgītā, 1.20
7 Ibid., 1.28-31
8 Ibid., 2.7
9 Ibid., 2.17 f
10 Ibid., 2.32
11 Ibid., 2.34
12 For a description of this state cf. Irving Bieber: “Pathologica
   Boredom and Inertia”, American Journal of Psychotherapy, 1951, 5,
   215-225
13 Bhagavadgītā, 2.31
14 Ibid., 2.55-71
15 Ibid., Chap. 11
16 Ibid., 11, 49
17 Ibid., 18.63
18 Ibid., 18.73
19 Cf. Maṇḍana’s Vidhviveka with Vācaspati’s Nyāyakaṇḍa on it, pp.
   243 f
20 Bhagavadgītā, 18-63
21 Ibid., 18.49
CHAPTER X

A BIRD'S EYE-VIEW

I

It was not the purpose of any school or speculation in India to develop an independent psychological theory. But from the earliest of times we do find an interest in man, his mind and its processes. And this interest naturally engendered in course of time numerous significant contributions which should now be styled as psychological.

Cogitation over the mystery of life started in India about 5,000 years ago with the Indo-Aryan immigrants who became the patriarchal saints of the later Indian society. Among these pioneer thinkers there were poets, priests and philosophers; and accordingly the mass of their literary productions styled as the Veda, was classified as hymnology (mantra), ritualistic tracts (brāhmaṇa) and philosophical essays (āraṇyaka and upaniṣad). We find here the birth of thought, of symbolism, of aesthetic expression and of ethical codes. The general orientation was of course religious, but in the intervals of poetic fancy and religious fervour, there were occasions for reflection, for the turn of Indian mind was naturally contemplative.

The Vedas being essentially a work of poetic imagination and emotion, it is improper to expect therein a scientific inquiry into psychological problems. Nevertheless, there are surprising flashes of intuitive conjectures, as for instance, the apprehension of order (ṛta) in the universe and organisation within man. Man was not the main concern of the Vedic poets, but some thought has been bestowed on him. He is recognised as an animal—a biped: but he is ‘first of beasts’ and ‘king of animals’. There is a clear analytical approach to human constitution in asmuchas rūpa (shape, form, body) and nāma (name, the agent in action, self) are mentioned as the two constituent categories; and prāṇa (breath, the essential vital principle) is described as welding the
two into a unity. The term prāṇa is also employed to indicate sense-organs, six in number.  

The principle responsible for mental activities was isolated and designated as manas (mind): it is described figuratively as 'the light implanted in the heart'.  

Head consisting of skin, bone and brain (mastiṣka) is the seat of certain mental processes. Remarkable is the suggestion that desire (kāma) is the germ of mind (manaso retāḥ). Sometimes mind is identified with breath. The Vedic literature is aware of the three-fold states of mind: waking, sleep and dream. Dream is described as a stage of being neither alive nor dead, and its origin is traced to the 'heated mind'. Senses too are mentioned as capacities (indriyas), and together with mind they are enumerated as six.

The brahmana literature, while of little significance to orderly thought, marks an improvement in the conception of mind. Mind here is viewed as an instrument, a tool, which man siezes hold of so as to make the senses function. And the senses, which work at the behest of mind, are distinguished by their ordered function (vrata). In the S'atapatha-brāhmaṇa (vi.2. 2.9) we find emerging the notion of puruṣa as a person constituted by bodily parts and organs. Here, seventeen parts are mentioned: the ten vital functions, hands and feet, trunk, joints, and head. The conception of man as a psychophysical organisation is already definitely formed during this stage, and this provided the ground for the later upaniṣadic theory of Self. Man's behaviour (karmāṇi) is classified under three heads: bodily, vocal and mental. This classification has survived in India through the ages.

II

The Upaniṣads are products of brilliant minds and academic discussions are more orderly in their presentation of ideas; and we find here a truly marvellous mine of interesting speculations. While the Upaniṣads are largely interested in deeper metaphysical and religious problems, there is evident a definite emphasis on man as the central frame of reference: his experiences, intellectual and emotional, are called up frequently for discussion
and analysis. As aids to inquiry are pressed introspection and observation. The expression *puruṣa* is frequently employed in these ancient dissertations dating from 1009 B.C. to denote man, and this word signifies something ‘more’ than the visible and tangible structure of man. As the ‘subject’ of experience, he is equated with Self (ātmā). In the entire expanse of the *Ṛg Veda* the latter expression has been used, according to the calculation of Bloomfield, only fourteen times; and invariably in the sense of ‘breath.’ In fact, the etymological speculations in regard to this word suggest the involvement of the root *an*, ‘to breathe.’

The sage Pippalāda in *Praśna Upaniṣad* expounds the doctrine that ‘breath’ is born out of Self, and ‘spreads over Self like a shadow.’ In the *Kauśitaki* we read that breath, speech and mind are three aspects of the Self. But the concept assumes a remarkable importance in the Upaniṣadic tracts, with the result that we find here a mature and profound theory of Self, which exerted an enormous influence over the later currents of thought.

Concealed within the material body but pervading it through and through, like fire in the āraṇī-sticks, is this invisible Self, serving as the ‘inner guide’ (*antaryāmin*): it organises the disparate elements into a functioning whole. The essential nature of Self is consciousséss (*vijñānamayah*), the shining light within man. It expresses itself as the individuating principle of self-consciousness, as the psychological subject. Its presence is axiomatic, and its only possible evidence is intuition: but it may be perceived with effort, with wisdom, with practice. In its ultimate nature it is identical with *brahman* or the universal Self. It is interesting that the latter word is connected with the Latin *flago*, meaning fire: it connotes, as J. Hertel pointed out, ‘the internal fire in man as well as the cosmic fire.’ The *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* has developed the concept of Self to comprehend four distinct stages, *viz.*, ‘the bodily self,’ ‘the empirical self,’ ‘the transcendental self’ and ‘the absolute self.’ The most eloquent of the Upaniṣads, *Brhadāraṇyaka,* describes the Self as loaded with consciousness and as ‘master of the house.’ Elsewhere, ‘will’ (*kratu*) becomes the essence of man, or ‘desire’ (*kāma*), or ‘action’ (*karma*). There is an early suggestion that man’s
function is cognitive as well as conative. And man’s constitution has been analysed into the physical body made up of food, the vital principle, mind, consciousness and bliss. There is also, in some Upaniṣads, an enumeration, albeit primitive, of bodily parts. The organisation of an organic being is held to be due to the potentiality of prāṇa.

A late Upaniṣad, Māṇḍūkya, attempts to determine the nature of Self after a review of man’s behaviour in the three states—waking, dream and deep sleep. The consideration of states is a favourite theme in some of the Upaniṣads, and regarding sleep and dream there have been stimulating speculations. Dream as an intermediary state between the other two is generated and conditioned by desire, and ‘projected.’ Its material is derived from the waking states, but there is much of ‘tearing apart’ and ‘building up’; freed from the limitations of the waking world, the dream creates from its own light a new world of forms. Imagination, however, works under restraint, for the ‘soul fancies in dream only that fear which it sees in waking.’ Sleep is consequent on fatigue and is a state of perfect rest, when the Self becomes whole (samasta) and serene (samprasanna): in this marvellous state there is a transient immersion of organs and hence differential consciousness ceases.

Man is said to consist of mind (manas), with life as body and light as form. Mind, for the Aitareya-Āranyaka, is a mere senseorgan but with the faculty of knowing, feeling and willing. Its constitution is physical, the intake of food contributing to its quality and efficiency. Its numerous psychological processes have indeed been isolated and defined, such as understanding (viṣṇāna), retention (medhā), intuition (dṛṣṭi), opinion (mati), resolve (dhṛti), memory (sṁṛti), reflection (maniṣā), will (samkalpa) and desire (kāma): but they are modes of consciousness (prajñāna) rather than of mind. Mind is an organ, like eye or ear, but it is the psychical organ of conception and will; its association and direction are indispensable for the functions of other senseorgans. It is in the nature of a central organ for the entire conscious life, shaping
the sense-impressions into ideas, and stamping them with the resolves of will (samkalpa). Besides the functions in regard to sense perceptions and thought, mind also discharges ‘the functions of heart.’

The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad describes mind as the primary root of the five faculties of knowledge, namely senseorgans. The expression ‘indriya’, vaguely employed in the Vedic literature, has here assumed considerable precision: it is the name of an organ, a physical force in man. They are ‘graspers’ (graha), because they grasp their respective objects; and they are ‘bonds’, for they bind the Self to the objects of the world. Their function is to appraise man of the details and events (cognitive) and to enable him to act appropriately (active). But they are subordinated to mind; in fact, ‘every sensible perception is a work of the mind.’

Besides these major trends of psychological thought, there is a wealth of suggestive conjectures in the Upaniṣads concerning physiological, epistemological and ontological problems. The thought invariably is marked by earnestness and independence: the patriarchal saints are no longer poets as in the Vedic age, but thinkers bold and brilliant. The speculations, however, are not organically knit into any coherent system; they were products of discussions in different conferences (pariṣads), and they have remained as such.

III

The Upaniṣadic period which began round about 1,200 B.C. continued till about 600 B.C., when ideological systems evolved. The most important of these systems was the Śāṁkhyā, the exact origin of which is obscure. The oldest extant text-book, Śāṁkhyakārikā does not seem to be earlier than the fifth century of our era; but its author, Iśvarakṛṣṇa, is reckoned as the fourth in the series of traditional teachers: and the first teacher, Kapila, is associated with a late Rg Vedic sukta. The germs of the Śāṁkhyā are indeed to be traced in the early Upaniṣads, but its formulation underwent systematic change
till the late epic period. This ancient school which began its career as atheistic and unorthodox, applied itself to an evolutionary analysis of the phenomenal world; and arrived at an enumeration of twenty-four operative categories (tattva), comprehending the subjective aspects of man as well as the objective presentations of the universe. Evolution manifests change, and change implies energy (rajas).

It proposed a fundamental dichotomy between the spirit of man (purusa) and phenomenal factors (prakrti). The former accounts for the subjective aspect, it is the unchanging source of consciousness; it is the luminous background. And the latter is the primary source of all existence, a condition in nature prior to the evolutionary course. It is utterly inert and incapable of action independent of the purusa. The universe and its processes are the result of a peculiar association (sa.myoga-vi'esha) between these two dissimilar principles. Man evidences the same principles at work: his experience and behaviour illustrate the union between the spirit and the material adjuncts.

The evolutionary process emerged when the equilibrium of the three functions of illumination (sattva), energy (rajas) and inertia (toms) in prakrti was disturbed due to karmic stress. The first as well as the fundamental evolute to proceed was consciousness (mahat, buddhi), rudimentary and undifferentiated, as is the awareness of the new-born babe: it reveals and assimilates the objective presentations. Subsequent to this develops the ego (aha`nkara), supplying the subjective frame of reference to experience; and the process of individuation is afoot. The aha`nkara which literally signifies the organ which forms the conception of ego is technically 'erroneous self-projection'; and its modification brings into being the 'mind' (manas), which crystallises the experience by supplying it an objective context. Mind is outward in its direction, and its function is to determine and grasp the distinctive details of whatever is objectively presented. This principle of cognition exhibits ten 'capacities' (indriyas), five to cognise and five to act. The former (jnanendriyas) are the abstract capacities to see, to
hear, to feel, to taste and to smell, while the latter (karmendriya) are the abstract capacities to speak, to grasp objects, to move, to eliminate waste and to procreate. Mind is the inner organ engaged in ‘the careful consideration of objective presentations’ through all these ten faculties: it selectively attends. These three factors—consciousness, ego and mind—function together, and the expression citta (the internal organ, antaḥkaraṇa) connotes this. It is this that mediates between the spirit and the objective world and makes experience as well as behaviour possible. The ten external faculties apprehend their respective objects merely by selection and localisation; it is the task of the internal organ to relate the objects, determine their nature and make judgments in regard to them. The internal organ, material in constitution, consists of incessant processes such as assumption of form of the perceived object, arousal of latent impressions (memory), excitation of will and experience of emotions. The institution thus of an internal atmosphere in man has been discussed in the doctrine of bhāva.

The Sāṁkhya school marks a significant stage in the development of psychological ideas in India, for it facilitated the growth of two major intellectual tendencies represented by Buddhism and Vedānta. It also offered the basic theoretical structure on which the Yoga system constructed its methodological approach.

IV

The Yoga as a practical discipline appears to be of immense antiquity, definite evidence being there of a yogic school as early as the Upaniṣadic period. It is probable that the origins of Yoga are traceable to the prehistoric ascetic practices and magic beliefs; there may indeed be more than a casual connection between the ‘internal heat’ produced by the primitive autohypnotic devices of shamans and tapas as penance and ascetic practices. But Patañjali, its first systematic exponent, is said to have lived during the first century before our era. This school which like the Sāṁkhya began its career as unorthodox was distinguished by a practical interest, and although at first resented it was later absorbed in the orthodox
fold. While the expression ‘yoga’ has diverse meanings, ‘union,’ ‘skill,’ ‘exercise,’ ‘propriety,’ ‘protection,’ ‘absorption’ and so on, it was essentially a doctrine of absorption consequent on the repression of natural unwholesome predispositions and proclivities that bind man to states of dissatisfaction and misery. The prime purpose of Yoga was to increase the efficiency of man by way of bettering his psychological constitution. As a prelude to this intent, there is naturally an elaborate inquiry into the forces and factors of human nature.

As a working hypothesis the Yoga schools accept the presence of forces within man, which are cultivable; which normally bind man to infirmities but which may also, with effort, be pressed to obtain peace and power. The Yoga theory holds the mind-stuff (citta) as the most important single factor in the human individual; and all experience is the result of interaction of this mind-stuff with the objective realities of the external world or with the impressions derived from them. This mind-stuff which is of the nature of finely organised matter is an unceasing succession of cognitive states (vṛttiṣ) which reflect the Self in the form of ego. Vācaspati in fact describes ego as a peculiar and dynamic transformation of the mind-stuff; it develops uniquely for every individual. Its identification together with its involvement in various conceptual and perceptual representations is what we style as consciousness. Vyāsa, the celebrated commentator on the Yogasūtras, suggests an analysis of consciousness into ‘the changing aspect’ (the form assumed according to the contents of a particular situation) and ‘the unchanging aspect’ (the apparent reflection of Self in the mind-stuff). The notion of a pure, contentless and actionless consciousness developed in this school contributed much to the later Vedāntic theory of Self.

There obtains in the Yoga texts an elaborate discussion of vṛttiṣ as operative mental processes: perception, illusion, imagination, memory and so on. When a process is no longer operative, it lapses into a dormant residual condition, ready, however, to function under favourable conditions again. Such an inoperative but potential mental process is characterised as
an ‘impression’ (samskāra), which is recognised as dynamic. Each impression is a force (śakti) in a latent and unconscious condition; and when such impressions are unorganised and without a unifying influence, man is subjected to misery, confusion and ignorance.

Most of our normal states of consciousness are said to be ‘afflicted’ (kliṣṭa), that is, tainted with extraneous and unwholesome influences. Resulting from the identification of Self with the phenomenal processes, ego comes into being with the notion of ‘I-am’ (asmitā); and this is reinforced by three evolutes therefrom: attachment (rāga), inclining towards pleasure and inciting action to attain it; aversion (dveṣa) for displeasure with anxiety and anger as its concomitants; and love-of-life (abhinivesa) expressed as fear of death and danger.

The ‘thinking faculty’ (citta) is confined to ‘the living beings that breathe’; in man it reaches its fullest expression. Its manifestation in the individual life commences with the very first breath. The Yoga psychologists emphasise the intimate relationship between breath and mind: when respiration is agitated thoughts are disturbed. And every mental process has its corresponding respiration, and if one can control the breath, he can control the mental activities. The function of mind is to ‘know and influence the environment’; it is described as ‘the organised totality of conscious experience.’ Two causes are recognised in mental activity: desires and the vital current. The psychological aspect of the individual is composed of mind, speech and breath; they are closely interrelated and interdependent.

Under normal conditions, mind works passively and in an uncontrolled way. Nevertheless it is a power, the proper cultivation of which would endow on the individual great capacities. Accordingly the Yoga school has developed methodical exercises for the control and cultivation of psychological processes. In fact, the very definition of Yoga is ‘the restraint over the modifications of mind’; and the Yoga praxis composed of the ‘eight limbs,’ including the well-known prāṇāyāma, has been the theme of numerous excellent treatises. The value of
the Yoga discipline has been recognised by all the diverse systems of thought in India, and in Buddhism it recurs with special emphasis.

V

Mahāvīra,⁴⁰ the sage who systematised the Jaina religion, was a senior contemporary of the Buddha, and although they are not recorded to have met, there is evidence for exchange of ideas between them. If we may rely on a Jaina tract,⁴¹ the Buddha before his enlightenmenstudied for a while under a Jaina teacher, Pihitaśrava, in the Pañcāla town, on the banks of the river Sarayū. There is nothing improbable in the account (although its certainty is doubtful), for Jainism is indeed of hoary antiquity. Its influence is evident on most of the later intellectual systems; its contribution to logical methodology in particular is immense. While the major orientation of the Jaina texts is ethical, the atheist standpoint has necessitated an inquiry into man’s nature and quite frequently we meet with psychological speculations.

Conceiving the world as dichotomously composed of organisms (jīva) and matter (ajīva) the Jainas define the former as essentially conscious and animated: the principle responsible for this is formless and hence imperceptible, but is evident on introspection and inference. The jīva is directly cognised, even when we are casting doubt on its existence; and further all our thoughts and actions have invariably an ego-reference and are also organised into a whole.⁴² The defining characteristic of the jīva is consciousness (cetanā, bodha) and it possesses five faculties: thinking (manas), physical strength (kāyabala), respiration (svāsacchvāsa), speech (vacanabala), and span of life (āyus). It employs the body as its instrument or vesture; and actions (karma) performed modify the consciousness by way of communication of multitudinous fine matter with the vital aspect. This communication is said to ‘colour’ the individual soul; and six ‘colourings’ (leśyas) representing character types are recognised; white (śukla), rose (padma), flaming red (tejas), dovegrey (kapota), dark blue (nila) and black (kṛṣṇa).⁴³
The first two are comparable to the 'good' type (sattva), the next two to the 'dynamic' type (rajas) and the last two to the 'ignorant' type (tamas). This archaic conception of prototypes led in course of time to the guṇa theory of personality types.

Senses as instruments of apprehension are five in the case of human beings: touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing. Each has a characteristic capacity of its own to apprehend a particular category of objects. Further, a sense has two distinct aspects, viz., the physical, consisting of the organs of apprehension, and the psychical, functioning in two stages: attainment (labdhi) of the capacity of manifestations of sense activity, and conscious activity (upayoga) by way of actual modification of the organism as a result of experience.44 The sensation has been defined as the mere awareness of sense-data,45 a passive registering consequent on the contact of organ with the object. After the stage of this generalised awareness of the presence of an object the apprehension of the class to which the object belongs dawns: here the object is lifted out of its objective setting and made ready for mental comprehension. A distinction is thus drawn between two aspects of sensation: contact-awareness and object-awareness. It is interesting to note that the latter is suggested to be a function of maturation.46 The object thus apprehended is the datum for mental comprehension, the preliminary process of which is styled 'speculation,' a striving for the determination of the characteristics of the object. The striving reaches its fulfilment in the stage of perception, which is the specific function of mind. Mind is the instrument which apprehends internal objects as well as objects of the senses, and it is variously described as 'internal organ' (Pāyapāda), 'subtle organ,' 'not-organ' (Vidyānanda). Even this, like other senses, has the same two aspects. The physical aspect in this case is a material aggregate capable of forming mind (manovarga), whereas the psychical aspect consists of 'awareness' (cetanā), functionally differentiated as intuitive perception (darsana) and full cognition (jñāna). An object that is thus perceived along with its perception is retained. In works like Sarvarthasiddhi there occur elaborate discussions concerning
retention, memory, recollection and recognition.

The nature of emotion also comes up for discussion in the Jaina texts. The feeling depends on sensation (vedaniya) whereas emotion is a purely mental experience. The origin of emotion is ascribed to excitement caused by 'confounding conduct' (cāritramohaniya). While some psychological significance may be attached to this formulation, the classification of emotions under anger, pride, deceit and greed betrays an ethical bias.

Jainism marked the stage of transition from a purely biological conception of man to a psychological conception of his nature; and this trend achieved its fruition in Buddhism.

VI

During the early days of the Buddha, the intellectual atmosphere of the country was muddled by a variety of conflicting viewpoints. There were numerous theorists not belonging to any recognised school who formulated unorthodox and independent speculations; and the class of 'wandering renunciants' (paribhājaka-samānās) specialised in this. They discussed problems of all types such as the nature of soul, (Poṭṭhapāda), the five hundred states of consciousness (Ajīta), the phenomenal data of consciousness (Moliyasivaka), and the rôle of volition in action (Potaliputta). Many of these thinkers find mention in the Jaina and Buddhist works, and it has been possible to reconstruct to an extent the philosophies of at least the most prominent of them. Makkhali Gosāla, for instance, was the leader of a host of naked ajīvaka ascetics, and also a contemporary and sometime friend of Mahāvīra. He propounded the theory that the universe was a rational system of self-evolving activity, exhibiting species or classes (saṅgati), the individuals of which were subject to evolutionary transformation. He also suggested a classification of human beings into six types (chalaḥbijañjītiyo), and a division of individual life into eight developmental stages (aṭṭhapurisabhūmiyo). Another outstanding thinker of the age, Ajita Kesakambalin, enunciated the theory that the development of the phenomenal world was like the unwrapping of a ball of thread dropped in space. According
to him, there was little distinction between the physical and the psychical; they were but different manifestations of the same process. He emphasised on the wholeness of experience, the subject and the objective presentations occurring in a unity.

There was free exchange of views amongst these thinkers and each collected a following to propound and expand his ideology. Six of them were marked out by their intellectual eminence and they were senior contemporaries of the Buddha, who indeed started his career as one like them. It is improbable that the Buddha was ignorant of these numerous doctrines, or that he was not influenced by them.

VII

With Buddhism, psychology in India may be said to have come to its own. As a gospel it was ethical and as a creed it was atheist: its major frame of reference was the human individual, his powers and frailties, his constitution and emancipation. Buddhism has thus justly been characterised as pragmatism with a psychological turn. The psychological suggestions that came from the Buddha in the 5th Century B.C. were elaborated and systematised by a succession of eminent thinkers for nearly a thousand years; and, as a result, we have a carefully planned Abhidhamma ideology comprehending the contributions of the Buddha, his immediate disciples like Sāriputta and Maha-köṭṭhita, mediaeval scholiasts like Buddhaghosa, Buddhaddatta and Anuruddha, and a host of unknown monks. Within the amazing expanse of this school every conceivable psychological problem has been discussed with an academic rigour and profundity. I have elsewhere presented in considerable detail the major psychological speculations of early Buddhism, and here therefore I shall sketch in brief an outline of the same.

The early Buddhists rejected the notion of Self as an extra-organic principle of integration and consciousness; they adequately accommodated the old rūpa and nāma in the functioning factors of personality. These factors occur in five 'complexes' (khandas), each of which is integrated with the other and all organised to result in the behaving 'individual'—
a succession of psychophysical processes (nāmarūpasantati). The factors, complexes and the individual are all events under continuous transformation, and no substantiability of any sort obtains; the apparent experience of an invariant is due to the conventional egoity (attabhāva). The outlook is preeminently configurational and dynamic. The concept of complexes, however, did not originate with the Buddhists, but was elaborated and systematised by them. The material aggregate represented by the body (rūpa); the complex of sensations and feelings (vedanā); perceptions, concepts and images (saññā); consciousness (viññāna); and organising tendencies (saṅkhāra)—these five are sufficient and necessary to explain the individual and his behaviour. In a later terminology, however, they are reduced to three categories: body (rūpa), mind (citta) and mental states (cetasika). An elaborate analysis of these three groups of factors has been attempted in numerous abhidhamma tracts. Of profound psychological significance is the theory of saṅkhāra as a gestalting factor with an action-orientation. Of interest too is the formulation of two stages in every act of perception: sensory organisation and psychological organisation by ‘labelling’ (adhimacana).

The problem of perception is intimately bound up with the hypothesis of bhavaṅga, which is peculiar to mediaeval Buddhist thought. Bhavaṅga is viewed as a passive stream of potential subliminal consciousness, which is interrupted by a stimulus (object or idea), whereupon consciousness actively assumes a ‘process’ (vithi) in relation to the stimulus. The Pāli Atthasālini explains in great detail the various stages preliminary to the perceptual act. In the perceptual process itself four phases are recognised: sense-stimulation; assimilation; apprehension of the sign; and comprehension of meaning. Perception, in fact, is regarded as one aspect of ‘attention’ which determines the object and directs towards it the cognitive states. Cognition and consciousness come up frequently for detailed analysis in the abhidhamma books.

Barring perhaps bhavaṅga, the most significant contribution of the Buddhist thinkers is the attempt at a classification of
individual's according to temperaments. Considering an individual's habitual posture, actions, eating habits, outlook and frequently recurring mental states, it is possible to class him in one of the six types: confident (rāgacarita), rigid (dosacarita), confused (mohacarita), credulous (saddhācarita), clever (buddhicarita), and speculative (vitakkacarita). Each has a characteristic manner of conduct and communication with the world, but a provision is made in the scheme of classification for combination of these typologies. The purpose of this classification is to assist the meditational master to size up the student that comes to him for guidance: meditational exercises are prescribed with due consideration to his mental leanings. Meditation forms one of the major themes of Buddhist treatises; and Buddhaghosa, in particular, devotes his remarkable and encyclopaedic volume Visuddhimagga to an account of forty meditational exercises. Valuable psychological material is strewn in this exposition. In many respects analogous to this work is Asanga's Srāvaka-bhūmi, discovered by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in Tibet: it deals with personality types, mental concentration and subjective orientations.

The psychological theories of early Buddhists survived, with minor modifications, in the later Mahāyāna schools; the Mahāyāna does not, however seem to have attached much importance to psychological speculations. An exception, however, is the Viññānavāda school of subjective idealism, which takes up consciousness for discussion at a metaphysical level. In its way of thinking, the perceptual world lacks objective data; it is essentially a case of projection of consciousness (viññāna). This projected world with conventional meanings is phenomenological; but its groundwork is a stream of pure consciousness, styled ālayavijñāna. This notion of undifferentiated consciousness is in some respects a restatement of the bhavaṅga theory, but largely a reversion to the old doctrine of Self. The Vaibhāṣika school, on the other hand, explains veredical perception as correspondence between objective data and mental images; sensation, in this school, is the core of perception. The most scientific view of perception,
however, is that of the Sautrāntika school, which holds that objective data are no doubt the sources of perception, but objects are never directly apprehended: in consciousness are reflected these data as in a mirror, and the objective character of the world is what we educe from impressions; perception is thus a variety of inference and involves interpretation. The *prajñāpāramitā* literature57 discusses the problems of illusory perception in relation to the nature of consciousness.

**VIII**

Kumārila, whose death is supposed to have occurred about 650 A.D., was a contemporary of the celebrated Buddhist thinkers Dharmakīrti and Prajñākaragupta; he was himself a student of Buddhist masters, and his thought represents a synthesis of the Upaniṣads, Sāmkhya, Buddhism and Jainism. He postulated an inner world constituted of ‘subjects’ or souls whose functions include the systematisation of sensations. The soul is looked upon by him as an organised totality comprehending both the stream and the substrata of consciousness. Kumārila’s doctrine of *apūrva*58 that actions leave their impressions on the soul merits a careful consideration. The exact identity of another celebrated thinker of the period, Gauḍapāda, is unknown: his famous *Kārikā* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* indicates his Buddhist leanings, especially in the fourth section, but there is also an unmistakable effort to accommodate them within the Upaniṣadic framework. In this only extant work of his, there is an excellent analysis of dream phenomena: the dream is an instance of subjective projection onto an objectless screen; although it is supplanted by waking, in itself and for the time being, it is an integrated, continuous and meaningful presentation. The essential similarity between dream and waking experience is elaborately worked out. Gauḍapāda’s thoughts are reflected in theories, known to the world as *advaitavāda*, of his grand student Śaṅkara.

Śaṅkara (b. 655 A.D.) was undoubtedly the most eminent thinker of this country: notwithstanding the brief span of his
life (—he died when he was 32—), he has exerted an immortal influence over the intellectual development of India. He founded a system of monistic idealism which in time attracted a galaxy of brilliant minds: Śūreśvara, Ṛadmapāda, Vācaspati, Citsukha, Madhusūdana, Dharmarāja and others. Although his system is preeminently metaphysical, valuable psychological speculations are to be found in its numerous expositions. I have dealt elsewhere at great length with these speculations, and here I shall recount them in brief.

The basic psychological ideas concerning senses and mind have been borrowed directly from the Śāṅkhya school. But the emphasis is on Self as the principle of unbroken and background consciousness: the passive awareness as conditioned and individuated by the internal organ (mind, ego and intellect) is styled as the ‘self’ (jīva). The internal organ is continuously active, except in deep sleep, and relates the objects with conscience: its activities are in the nature of subtle psychic processes (vṛttis). The three conditions of the self, waking, dream and sleep, are considered in detail as regards their biological and psychological import: the nature and functions of mind in waking and dreaming are explained with reference to perception and projection. Veredical perception has an objective origination with minimum of subjective involvement: there obtains a coincidence between the percipient processes and the object processes. Projection on the other hand works with impressions, imagination and desires. The mind is described in terms of the reflective function of urging sense-organs towards objective presentations. Mind as the primary cognitive apparatus comprehends in scope the past (memory), the present (sensory perception) and the future (anticipation). The sense-functions are discrete, transient, discontinuous and incomplete: it is mind that organises them into a meaningful, enduring whole. Śāṅkara also argues in favour of purposiveness of all processes and motivation in all behaviour: and mind is made responsible for both. The constitutional determinants (svarasata eva) of behaviour prompt the individual to act impulsively and irrationally, and here the role of mind is limited. Mind’s func-
tion in the past depends on the permanent impressions inevitably made by all passing experiences; and it is interesting to note that impressions are described as ‘full of tendencies’. The absolute passivity of recall is rejected; there is, even in memory, a dynamic ‘restructuring’, and illustrations are dreams and illusions. The phenomenon of perceptual illusions (bhrānti) forms a favourite theme for the later Śaṅkarite writers like Maṅḍanamiśra, Vācaspati, Śrīharṣa, Madhusūdana, Vidyāraṇya and Appayyadīkṣita.

IX

The intellectual movement that originated in Kashmir during the latter part of eighth century was a variety of Śaivism with considerable psychological bias. Of the three groups of texts that form the basis of this movement, the third (Pratyabhijñāsāstra) is essentially psychological in content as in treatment. Somānanda, the pupil of Vasugupta, who laid the foundation of Kashmir Śaivism, belonged to the ninth century; and his work Śivadrśṭi stimulated the interest and thought of a succession of eminent thinkers like Utpala, Abhinavagupta, Ādamarāja, and Śivopādhyāya (18th Cent.), with the result that there is extant today an intricate system of metaphysical, psychological and esoteric doctrines. However, it is only recently that this system was retrieved from obscurity; and I have not been able to make an intensive study of the numerous treatises of this system, and for the most part I depend on the information supplied by J. C. Chatterjee and K. C. Pandey in their excellent works.

The basic framework of this system is taken directly from the Śaṅkhya, although the trend of thought is monistic. The three-fold aspects of the internal instrument of experience are accepted with a slightly different significance: the buddhi is judgment in regard to the presented datum, the ahamkṛt is the construction of a personal ego as the subjective frame of reference, and manas is of the nature of desire and resolution. The psychological subject is essentially consciousness (caitanya), and the Kashmir Śaivites emphasise the conational aspect of it;
the Sanskrit expression is traced to the word cetanā which is formed by the affix lyaṭ signifying 'doer.' This 'subject' has five fundamental capacities (ṣakti): revelation (illumination), satisfaction, volition, cognition and action by way of assuming forms according to the presented data. Perception is a process where by the objects are manifested (ābhāsa) outside: but this manifestation is really internal. It is a function that organises the different cognitions such that even in the world of external objects mutual connections obtain. Different manifestations having a common substratum also occur in a higher configuration (pratibhāsa). Conditioned by the residual traces of an experience together with the organisation of different cognitions related to it, there occurs remembrance as a continued existence of experience. A variety thereof, recognition (pratyabhijñā), is the most important topic discussed in the philosophical literature of this school, especially in the works of Abhinavagupta (born about 954 A.D.). Recognition is defined as the union of direct apprehension and remembrance, the latter depending on the mental impressions: an object present in the immediate environment evoking the effects of previous experience in regard to the same object or similar to it.

X

A theory that was developed with special reference to linguistics in this country is remarkable for its affinity to the Gestalt school in modern psychology: Sphoṭavāda. The celebrated Sanskrit grammarian Pāṇini, who lived, probably in the third century B.C., mentions a 'sphoṭa-theorist', but it is that gigantic intellect, Patañjali who makes a direct reference to this theory during the course of his great commentary on Pāṇini's sutras. Patañjali hinted that the internal processes of experience remain as subtle speech, which in order to become manifest assume the form of articulate words. This suggestion was elaborated by a school of grammarians, the most prominent exponents of which were Bhartṛhari, who lived before the middle of the seventh century A.D., and Maṇḍana who was probably a junior contemporary of his. A huge controversy raged on this doctrine.
for centuries, eminent minds participating in it. Towards the end of 17th century A.D., Nāgęśa systematised this theory.

The expression sphaṭa is derived from the root sphut, ‘to burst out.’ The meaning that bursts out of a spoken word is an illustration: not contained in the word severally or in a collection, it is an emergent of the totality of the word, having the characters of indivisibility and unity. The sphaṭa (it does not admit of an adequate rendering into English) is essentially a psychological process; it is hidden in mind like all the later potentialities of growth in the fluid of an egg. In a word, the moment the first letter is perceived, the sphaṭa begins to emerge and as the successive letters are apprehended, it grows and develops, until the final letter sees the sphaṭa completely crystallised.

While this doctrine was expressly developed as a philosophy of grammar, its significance for psychology is obviously immense. At least a couple of centuries before the Christian era, the notion of configuration as a dynamic psychological process suggested itself to the Indian mind. In any presented datum, there are aspects but the aspects all alike imply a ‘whole’, in other words, is present in every part. The unitary character of the perceived object is consequent on the psychological configuration underlying it. The sphaṭa is not a mere aggregation of aspects or individuals, but a transcendental phenomenon, projected from the percipient mind. Bhārtṛhari, in his grammatical treatise, Vākyapadīya, raises this problem to a philosophical level: sphaṭa came to be recognised as an inherent phenomenal tendency. As one of the most important applications of this theory we find Ānandavardhana (IX Cent.) explaining poetic appreciation in terms of the flash of suggestion (rasadhvani). Indeed the very opponents of the sphaṭa doctrine, the most eloquent of whom were Kumārila and Jayanta (about 900 A.D.), elucidated many a detail of this doctrine, and contributed to its systematisation. The latter, in particular, points out the plurality of perceptive processes, the rôle of association and memory images as factors in a total cognition.
In the field of literary criticism the contribution of Indian thinkers is significant; and necessarily the psychological problems of imagination, emotion, appreciation and artistic creation come up for discussion therein. Epigraphical evidence suggests that as early as the 2nd century of our era speculation in this field was rife. It was about this time, if not a century earlier, that Bharata compiled the first extant work on poetics and dramaturgy, Nāṭyaśāstra, formulating the theory of ‘relish’ or ‘aesthetic delight’ (rasa). His speculations were defended and controverted with great zeal by a succession of talented writers; the problems he set were solved in different ways by profound minds; schools of thought sprang up and inquiry into this branch of knowledge continued with vigour and brilliance till the seventeenth century, when Jagannātha wrote his Rasagaṅgādhuara.

The problem of what constitutes a poet and what his equipments are has interested the Indian thinkers for over a thousand years now. Rājaśekhara classified mental activities into memory, reflection and intuition, the last occurring in two types: creative and appreciative. Rudrāta distinguished between the natural intuition and the intuition that admits of cultivation. The intuition involving an aesthetic vision and also an effective communication was spoken of as ‘poetic imagination’ (pratibha), the rôle of which in artistic productions was emphasised by Bhāmaha, Vāgbhaṭa, Daṇḍin, and Ānanda-vardhana. Defined as “that mental faculty which presents ever fresh flashes or coruscations of ideas,” it is characterised by the capacity to create novel ideas. Hemacandra, among others, pointed out that ‘culture’ derived from maturity (vyutpatti) and constant practice (abhyāsa) or application augment ‘poetic imagination.’ There occur in numerous dissertations interesting speculations concerning this aspect.

Bharata’s theory of rasa as ‘relish’ has formed the major theme of several treatises of deep psychological import. The problem refers to the fundamental and secondary emotional inclinations, productive of ‘moods’, as responses to appropriate
excitants; the moods are constitutionally ingrained in the intelligent and sympathetic human being, and prevail when involved in situations. There are enumerated eight dominant emotional tendencies: love, laughter, sorrow, anger, energy, fear, repulsion and wonder. Bhoja points out that the feelings involved in these moods are either pleasurable or painful. And Mammaṭa observes that when a mood prevails it occupies the individual entirely, all other cognitions disappearing for the moment. That the emergence of mood as a total effect of several accessory and exciting conditions is similar to the arousal of meaning from a spoken word has been brought out by Abhinavagupta: rasa-emergence is a śphoṭa-phenomenon. The composite nature of an emotional experience, its unitary effect, the rôle of excitement, the primary and blended emotions, and sympathy have been emphasised by different writers who have followed in the wake of Bharata. Ānandavardhana formulated his theory of 'suggestion' (dhvani) as an extension of the rasa doctrine: he recognised the importance of the intellectual element in the affective experience of aesthetic delight. Creative imagination concerns itself with how best to convey an idea without directly expressing it; and appreciative imagination must arrive at the idea thus suggested through an expressed form. A tenth century critic of this theory, Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka, emphasised the impersonal nature of aesthetic stimulation and outlined the development of aesthetic experience in three successive processes: the preliminary cognitive apprehension of the stimulus, sympathetic identification with it and 'enjoyment' of the same devoid of practical considerations. Viśvanātha, a writer of the fourteenth century, held that surprise was the core of all emotional experience.

Analysis of expression is another problem which has merited elaborate consideration in numerous works on poetics. Attention has been focussed on literary lapses (doṣas) which prevent appreciation or enjoyment. They are classified in terms of grammar, logic and expression, and long lists of such lapses have been given by different writers: obscurity, inaccuracy, inadequacy, ambiguity, conflict, redundancy,
absurdity and so on. I have utilised with profit this classification for the analysis of verbal responses from the mentally ill and I shall report my inquiry elsewhere shortly.

It will thus be seen that although psychology was never pursued in India as an independent discipline, valuable contribution to the subject has been made in the course of pursuit of different disciplines. Besides the fields of study mentioned here—the art of the medicine (āyurveda) and the religious discipline known as Tantras also contain interesting psychological material. A proper appraisal of the speculations enumerated above is likely to facilitate the resolution of many a tangle in modern psychology and also help in the construction of comprehensive and workable hypotheses concerning man and his personality.

REFERENCES

1. *Rg Veda*, 2.27.3; 8.18 25
2. *Taittiriya-Saṃhitā*, IV, 2.10.1-2
3. *Satapatha-brāhmaṇa*, VI, 2.1.18
4. Ibid., IV, 5.5.7
5. Ibid., XII, 2.4, 9-14; XIV, 1.3.32
6. *Rg Veda*, 6.9.6; 7.33.8; 3.2.68; 10.191.4
7. Ibid., 2.16.2; 8.96.3; 5.57.6
8. Ibid.,
9. *Satapatha-brāḥ*, VII. 5.26
10. *Rg Veda*, 10.164; *Athrava Veda*, 19, 56-.57
11. *Athrava Veda*, 6.46.1
12. Ibid., 19.56.5
13. Ibid., 19.9.5
15. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4, 4, 56
17. 8. 3. 12
18. 4. 4. 22
19. *Aitareya Aranyaka*, 2.1.3
20. *Taittiriya Upaniṣad*
Devasena’s Darśanasāra (ed. A.N. Upadhye: Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, XV, iii-iv.)
Viśeśāvāsyakabhisāya, 1554-6
Uttarādhyayanasūtra, 34,21-23
Pramāṇamiṃśa, 1,1,23
Tattvārthabhisāya, 1,15
Viśeśāvāsyakabhisāya, 268-9
cf. The Essentials of Early Buddhist Psychology, Kāvyalaya, Mysore, 1957; “Personality According to Buddhaghosa”, Bosat (Ceylon), Vesak Special Number, 1957
Majjhima Nikāya, 2,32
Mahāvedallasutta (Majjhima Nikāya, 1,43)
Vibhaṅga (Ref Mrs. Rhys Davids)
Visuddhimagga, 3,74 f.
Reported by Alex Wayman in the J. of Bihar Research Society, 1956, XLII. 3 & 4
Viṃśaptimatratasiddhi, 3.4.7
Vācaspati’s Bhāmati, 2.2.18
For an interesting exposition of this view, cf. Jayanta’s Nyāyamaññiṭī
Aṣṭasāhasrikā, 1 15 f
Jñānavallabh Śāṅkhyaṭīrtha: Phil. Quart. 1930, 6.1
Samkara: A Psychological Study, Kāvyalaya, Mysore, The Psycholo-
gical Standpoint of Śamkara” *Bharatiya Vidyā, 1949, X, 88-103;*
“Psychological Speculations of Śamkara”, *Scientia* (Italy) 1953,
47, (May), 6

60 Vedaṭaparibhāṣā, 1-63
61 Māṇḍūkyakārikābhāṣya, 1.4
62 Brahmāṣṭrābhāṣya, 2.2.28 f
63 Chhāndogyaabhāṣya, 3. 18, I
64 Brahmāṣṭrābhāṣya, 2. 1. 32
65 Brhadāraṇyakabhāṣya, 1. 4. 16
66 Praśnabhāṣya, 4. 5
67 Tantrāloka, 9
68 Iśvarapratyabhijñāvimarsini, 7. 2
69 Vyākaraṇabhāṣya, 1. 4. 29
70 Vākyapadiya, 1. 49
71 cf. Nyāyamanjāri
72 cf. Kāvyamimāṁsā
73 Bhāṭṭatauta: Kāvyakaustubha, cf. Ānandavardhana (Kane. P. V.: *History of Sanskrit Poetics, 1951, p. 335*)
74 cf. Vāgbhāṣṭalakāra, Kāvyādarśa, Alankāratilaka, Dhvanyāloka, etc.
75 cf. Abhinavabhārati, Sarasvatikaṇṭhābharaṇa, Śṛṅgāraprakāśa, Daśarūpaka, etc.
76 Kāvyaprakāśa, ch. 4
77 cf. Dhvanyāloka
SUPPLEMENT
AN EIGHTH CENTURY MANUAL OF BUDDHIST PSYCHOLOGY

I

The essentially psychological doctrines of Buddhism, formulated in broad outline by the Buddha himself in the 5th cent. B.C., have found able exponents from time to time, and a rich and complex psychological literature has thus come into being. The first systematic text-book of Buddhist psychological theories was prepared in the 5th century of the Christian era by Buddhaghosa: his Path of Purification (Visuddhimaggam) is a bulky treatise in Pali, remarkable alike for profundity and erudition. This has been popularly employed as a guide book for several centuries now, and its only rival in devoted attention is a curious little tract entitled Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha. This latter tract deals exclusively with psychological problems, and it is the purpose of this paper to present an account of it.

This psychological manual belongs probably to the eighth century and was written by a South Indian monk, Anuruddha, who is said to have hailed from the Pāṇḍya province and settled down at Kāśicīpuram as the abbot of the Mālasoma-Vihāra monastery. He is also the author of another philosophical work, Nāmarūpapariccheda, which was written at the request of monks Buddhāmitta and Mahākassapa, described in the Ceylonese chronicles as ‘the elderly monks of the Coḷa Country.’ Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, intended to serve as a textbook for advanced students and accepted as such, is in Pali, the Māgadhī dialect of Saṃskrit and the canonical language of early Buddhism. It comprises nine short sections in prose, sprinkled occasionally with mnemonic and summary verses. The style is extremely terse and in the preliminary sections there is little more than a rigorous and cold classification of mental processes: it presupposes on the part of its
student an acquaintance with definitions and explanations of all the Buddhist psychological concepts. Except in stray instances, illustrative examples are never given, and there is hardly any attempt at elucidation. Indeed it is impossible to follow the treatise without the help of commentaries on it; and commentaries there are many. The most celebrated of them however, is the *Vibhāvanī-tikā*, of the twelfth century Ceylonese monk Sumaṅgala, which is a remarkably lucid exposition of the cryptic formulations contained in Anuruddha’s tract. An important contribution to the study of this manual was made nearly fifty years ago by Shwe Zan Aung through his brilliant introductory essay in the *Compendium of Philosophy* (Pali Text Society, London, 1910).

The author analyses the subject-matter in the opening verse: mind, mental states, matter, nibbāna. The last topic, however, has not been treated *in extenso*, for it is largely philosophical in scope and in import practical. The other three have merited elaborate consideration. The arrangement of the chapters (*vibhāga*) is as follows: classes of consciousness (*citta*); conscious concomitants (*cetasikā*); cognitive processes (*vīthī*); process-free consciousness (*vīthimutta*); matter; the theory of dependent origination (*paccaya*); and meditative exercises (*kammaṭṭhāna*). Every chapter contains mnemonic and summary verses to facilitate the retention of contents in memory; the bulk of the chapter, however, is devoted to enumerations and classifications. Although the treatment throughout is dreary, it must be admitted that enumerations are exhaustive and classifications careful. The book bears the unmistakable mark of an extremely tidy mind, adept in analysis; and the author reveals a definite bias in favour of the psychological rather than metaphysical approach, although there is often an inevitable involvement of ethical considerations.

II

Anuruddha formulates the general abhidhamma ideology of comprehension of all existential categories, within and around us, under four major heads designated as ‘abstract ultimates’ (*param'attha*): mind¹, mental states², matter³, and the final
freedom from all infelicity. The first three are 'worldly', in the sense that they enter into and determine all the normal conditions of everyday life, whereas the fourth is 'beyond-the-world'; it is the state of emancipation to be attained as the outcome of intense effort in the direction of meditation. These are phenomenal as they are all without an exception events. The conception of reality is dynamic: change is universal and incessant, in the physical world as in the psychological. What we know as the world is essentially a process of becoming: men and matter alike become. If the world 'out there' is a 'flow of becoming' within man is the 'flow of conditions of this becoming'.

In order to demonstrate the spread of these four phenomenal categories the conception of 'fields of consciousness' has been introduced at the very commencement of the Manual. The 'field' is where processes of consciousness obtain and operate. And consciousness is the act of relating the subjective aspects with the objective: 'to think of an object—this is citta'. The import is the subjective awareness of an objective presentation. The most familiar of the 'fields' is that comprising 'desires' (kāma)—comprehending the world of human and animal wants and struggles: the field includes the subjective wants and as well as the goals. The processes of consciousness that operate (avacarati, lit. 'roams, moves') here are characterised by an impulse for satisfaction of desires. The bulk of our normal life falls within the confines of this field. Exceptional individuals who, by a systematic effort, have freed themselves from the instinctive bonds of this field, develop the facility of letting the processes of their consciousness roam in the more abstract and 'evolved' fields of meditative ecstasy.

In the field that is composed of desires, two major types of processes of consciousness are recognised: 'involuntary' and 'volitional'. This division is psychologically significant: the latter is premeditated and deliberate activity, prompted by the consideration of some outside stimulus, or brought into being as a continuation of some subjective state already there, whereas the former is impulsive, automatic, reflexive. The
illustrative explanation given in an old commentary is equally significant; the 'involuntary' process is like cutting an object with a sharp blade, whereas the 'volitional' is like cutting the object with a blunt blade that has been re-sharpened. The mediæval commentators, however, mix up ethical considerations with the psychological: the problem of 'wholesomeness' (kusala) or otherwise is introduced to explain the 'nature' of consciousness in these fields. And it is difficult to find psychological significance in their classification of consciousness in terms of 'resultant' and 'inoperative.'

The 'unwholesome' processes of consciousness are further classified from the viewpoint of three predisposing factors, viz., appetite\(^9\) aversion\(^9\) and confusion\(^7\). These are technically styled as 'radical conditions' (hetu), and explained by the Sinhalese commentator as "those by which effects are established"\(^10\). A predisposing factor is analogous to the root of a tree; which is capable of bringing about and supporting the tree of a particular type but depending on other 'accessory conditions' (paccaya) such as water, soil and manure. Thus the three aforesaid factors may be described as tendencies, inborn or acquired but certainly pre-existent, which occasion certain processes of consciousness, provided there are favourable situational conditions. The oriental word for appetite is derived from the root lubh, meaning 'to crave', 'to cling to', 'to attach oneself to': it generally signifies an urge for satisfaction, a longing for the obtaining of pleasure. There is an association of pleasureable feeling\(^9\). Processes of consciousness generated by this urge are characterised by approach tendencies. Aversion on the other hand, involves withdrawal or aggressive tendencies. The Pali word for it etymologically signifies 'striking (root ghā) against (pati) something unpleasant or disliked; this tendency, is accompanied by a feeling of displeasure or pain,\(^9\) occasioned by the presence, actual or imagined, of an unpleasant object. The psychological pain and the tendency of aversion always coexist: they induce repugnance, hate and anger. The third factor, confusion, is described as basic to these two: neither appetite nor aversion springs up without the involvement of
confusion. The original for confusion is the intensification of the verb *muhəyatī*, ‘to be stupefied’, ‘to be deluded’, ‘to be muddled’. This factor is associated with two states of mind: extreme perplexity\(^1\) and excitement.\(^2\) Together they contribute to general restlessness and vitiate concentration or sustained effort. And confusion need not necessarily produce appetite or aversion, although usually it tends to.

The processes generated from these predisposing factors are described as ‘unwholesome’ and there is a peculiar merit in this usage. The Pali word *akusala* connotes ‘unhealthy’, ‘faulty’ ‘dull’, ‘producing pain.’ It is interesting in this context to observe that the author of *Atthasālini* suggests ‘accomplishing with wisdom’ as a meaning of ‘wholesome’.\(^3\) The underlying idea seems to be that where discrimination is absent or careful judgment impossible the processes of consciousness are unwholesome in so far as they are unsatisfactory, disturbing, impulsive and not calculated to produce the right result. The opposites of the three factors enumerated above predispose ‘wholesome’ processes of consciousness: the opposite of appetite is indifference or disinterestedness; of aversion friendliness or amity; of confusion, wisdom or discrimination. All these processes of consciousness, whether wholesome or otherwise, are termed ‘active’ (kamma) in contradistinction to other processes which are either ‘resultant’\(^4\) or ‘inoperative’\(^5\).

The abhidhamma ideology envisages also the processes that are not predisposed thus at all. The Manual (1.7-10) enumerates eighteen such processes and an examination of them suggests that they are objectively elicited as responses to sense or thought-stimulations. The visual consciousness of an object, the retention of sense impression, adventing to the object presentation and ‘apperception’ are examples. It is natural therefore that they are in nature neutral,\(^6\) neither wholesome nor unwholesome. How can we regard the act of seeing a tree out there as ‘good’ or ‘bad’? All these processes are said to be accompanied by a feeling of ‘indifference’, except the consciousness of bodily sensations which goes with a certain painful feeling (due probably to the pressure), and the consciousness
in investigating the details of the presented object (santirāṇa) which is accompanied by a certain pleasurable feeling. It is interesting to note that all these are perceptual processes.

III

A process of consciousness is constituted by discrete conscious states; and it is theoretically possible to identify the rôle played by each of them. Such mental states are named cetasikā, which word is an adjectival form of cetā, ‘consciousness.’ If consciousness is like a drug, the conscious states are like the properties of that drug. They all alike direct consciousness toward an object, but they are distinguishable on account of their modalities. Fifty-two of such conscious modalities are recognised and they occur in three groups: the feelings, perception and volitional activities. Of them seven are described as ‘universal’ in the sense that they invariably occur whenever any process of consciousness arises: all experience has them as common content. They are impression, feeling, perception, volition, one-pointedness, the psychic life and attention.

Impression involves both ‘contact’ and ‘impact’. When, for instance, the visual apparatus comes into contact with an objective form that is presented, the coincidence of the two is manifested as an impact on consciousness. This is the most primary of all conscious states: it is described as the pillar which supports the entire edifice. Impression it is that marks the conjunction of the subjective world of man with the objective world. Subsequent to this state is feeling, the world being used in its general connotation. The Pali word is derived from the root vid meaning ‘to know’, ‘to be aware of’; it signifies an awareness on the part of the subject of the impression as well as the subject’s affective response to such impact. It includes sensation together with its hedonic association: pleasure, pain or indifference. And it may be bodily or mental. This preliminary experience gains definition by ‘perception’, which relates the feeling-sensation complex with the appropriate sensory apparatus. Besides the localisation of sensation, this
modality of consciousness functions by way of recognition. The Pali word for perception signifies a ‘mark’; even as a carpenter makes various marks on the pieces of wood to serve as aids of recognition later when he must use them in various ways, so consciousness too attaches labels or abbreviated specifications to percepts for future recognition. This includes the process of conceptualisation and the mechanism of memory. The word for volition (cetanā) is etymologically akin to consciousness itself (ceto) : but it specifies two connotations—those of coordination and direction. The locus of conscious coordination is the presented object and the coordinated processes are other concomitant conscious states. And direction involves an active import : the Ceylonese commentator suggests that by this conscious state one ‘arrives at action’. Volition is the prime determiner of mental activities. The next conscious state is compared to water that collects into one lump several discrete substances; it is the focussing of consciousness on a particular object to the exclusion of others and with an effort to prevent distractions. Here consciousness is fully individuated with respect to an objective presentation : it is selective attention. The ‘psychic life’ as a conscious state is an organisation of physical aspects in man and functions as foundation for all conscious activities ; it is compared to water that supports and helps grow the lotus flowers. The relation in which this life of mental phenomena stands with the psycho-physical complex has been likened to that between the boatman and the boat. The Pali word for attention signifies etymologically ‘making in mind’ : it is the conscious effort in turning mind—in the direction of an object or idea. But the effort is not deliberate ; it spontaneously lifts the object to the level of consciousness. Without this native tendency of selective, coordinating attention, the process of consciousness is impossible.

It may be seen that in the above list of seven states that are necessarily involved in a process of consciousness, we pass from the bare impact of the objective presentation to the full-fledged perception thereof. The first three viz., impression, feeling and perception, although subjective as states have an
objective reference to a considerable extent: they are almost in the nature of passive responses to the presentational stimulation. The other three, viz., volition, onepointedness and attention are entirely internal, and they indicate an active subjective orientation with reference to the presented data. The 'psychic life' is the psychophysical prerequisite for the rest to function.

Six conscious states are described as 'scattered', 'particular' or 'variable'. In a process of consciousness they occur optionally, not necessarily. They are: inquiry, investigation, decision, effort, interest and intention. Inquiry is the preliminary application of consciousness to the object: even as the bee alights on a flower. Investigation is the subsequent examination of the object: even as the bee gyrates around the flower. The distinction between these two conscious processes is illustrated thus: the former is like the beating of a drum—the stick coming into contact with the drum, while the latter is comparable to the reverberations of sound that follow the beating. Decision etymologically signifies 'the releasing' of consciousness on to the object: the nature of the subject is determined by a selective process. It is taken as the exact opposite of 'doubt', 'indecision'. Effort is to mind what pillars are to a building: without it consciousness lapses. Often the Pali word for this function is translated as 'energy'. Interest keeps up the contact between consciousness and the object: it involves, etymologically, a pleasurable element. Intention is defined as 'desire to do'; an old commentary compares this function to the stretching of the hand to grasp an object. It has a conative import, and it does not occur in states of confusion.

There are other processes of consciousness, some indicating and constituting 'wholesome states', and others 'unwholesome'. Confidence, mindfulness, modesty, discretion, disinterestedness, amity, equanimity, composure of mind and the mental states, buoyancy, pliancy, adaptability, proficiency and rectitude belong to the former group. The last six mentioned in this list are interesting: they refer to consciousness as a whole (citta) as well as to the aggregate (kāya) of three conscious processes, viz. feeling, perception and volition. Composure is in nature
opposed to excitement. Buoyance is what overcomes heaviness: it counteracts sloth-torpor. Pliancy avoids stiffness and resistance. Adaptability is compared to the heated metal that is thus rendered fit for being worked upon. Proficiency concerns the health aspect: it suppresses mental sickness. And rectitude is an ethical concept, being straight and just. These processes enable mind to attain efficiency. But the unwholesome processes, on the other hand, lead not only to inefficiency but to ill-health: confusion, impudence, recklessness, distraction, avarice, erroneous ideas, conceit, hate, envy, selfishness, worry, sloth-torpor and perplexity. The efficient mind overcomes the hindrances and 'grows big',\(^{47}\) i.e. exalted.

Thus conscious processes are classified according to their planes (bhūmi) and types (jāti). They are also classified according to their functions (kicca). Each conscious process has a specific cognitive function; some processes, however, exhibit several of such functions under different conditions. The text enumerates fourteen functions: re-linking,\(^{48}\) bhavāṅga, apprehension\(^{49}\), senseperception\(^{50}\) (vision, audition, olfaction, gustation, touch), reception,\(^{51}\) and investigation,\(^{52}\) determination,\(^{53}\) apperception,\(^{54}\) retention,\(^{55}\) lapse.\(^{56}\) All conscious processes (there are 89 types of these processes) are classified under the above fourteen heads: a modern writer has suggested the analogy of division of functions among the employees of a factory.

IV

This leads us on to the important problem of perception, which is raised and discussed in the third and fourth chapters of the Manual. Perception is the act of relating an object with a subject; it is a cognitive process whereby consciousness transacts with a presentational object. This is fundamental to all cognitive processes, of which only two classes are recognised: the initial process that occurs at the moment of birth,\(^{57}\) and the subsequent processes during the life-time.\(^{58}\) All the processes of the latter class arise on the presentation of objects through the five sense-doors or through the door of the mind: in other words
through sensations or ideas. A process that is thus directed towards an object (or idea) is distinguishably specific, and is figuratively spoken of as the cognitive ‘course’ or ‘avenue’. Every process is a sequence of distinct moments of consciousness; this unalterable sequence is in the nature of a law (niyāma). When, for instance, the eye perceives a cat, the cognitive course involved would consist of (a) vision; (b) reproductive mental sequel; (c) conceptualization by name, and (d) the emergence of meaning associated with the name. These processes occur invariably in this order.

The ‘moment of consciousness’ is a concept peculiar to Buddhism. It is an ultimate unit of measurement, the duration of which is estimated to be between a billionth and two billionth part of time taken to wink an eye, and each moment has three aspects: genetic, static, and cessant. In cognitive processes such as perception, seventeen such moments are involved. Prior to the arousal of this cognitive ‘course’, consciousness will be passive and in a state of rest: it is likened to a still stream of water, undifferentiated and inactive for all practical purposes. This state is signified by the word ‘bhavaṅga’, which, although familiar to the author of the Manual, dose not occur in the Pali canon and makes its appearance for the first time (and in just one context) in the Milindapañho. The Ceylonese commentator observes that it is ‘the indispensable condition of our being subjectively regarded as continuous’. It is entirely divorced from all presentational subjects, and functions only in deep sleep, in a new-born child, and in between two cognitive processes.

When, however, an object is presented to any sense-faculty (or to mind), the still passive condition of bhavaṅga is transgressed. Consequently, the ‘stream’ of bhavaṅga is disturbed and set into vibration; and immediately thereafter the stream is arrested. These three operations constitute the preparatory stage of a perceptual process. The subsequent stage starts with the operation of ‘apprehension’ or ‘adverting’: a conscious course is already on the scene. This is followed by the uprising of a sensation appropriate to the sense-door through which the
object is presented. The sense-impression thus obtained attains preliminary clarity in the next operation which is described as ‘recipient’, and is further determined in the subsequent ‘investigating’ operation. The second stage comes to a close with the full determination of the characteristics of the presentational object, which operation is styled as determination. Each of these foregoing operations is said to consume one ‘moment of consciousness’. With the determining operation, we pass on to the third stage, wherein seven ‘moments’ occur in quick succession, enabling a full recognition of the object: this operation is termed ‘appereception’, the Pāli word for which has the etymological signification of ‘running’. In the final stage, the object thus completely grasped is registered and identified by an operation known as ‘retention’ consuming two ‘moments’. Altogether, in a process like this, there are seventeen ‘moments of consciousness’.

After the seventeenth moment, consciousness again lapses into passivity: the bhavaṅga is regained. The process that continues uninterrupted for all the ‘moments’ as detailed above is responsible for great clarity in the objective presentation. If however, it continues till after the apperceptive operation (i.e. fourteen ‘moments’), the object is clear but not so much as in the former. In a process that goes on for just seven moments and breaks at the operation of ‘determination’, the objective presentation is regarded as ‘slight’ or obscure. And in instances where the object presented merely sets the bhavaṅga into vibration and nothing more is accomplished, the presentation is very obscure.

REFERENCES

1 Citta; 2 Cetasikā; 3 Rūpa; 4 Nibbāna; 5 Bhava; 6 Bhavasota; 7 Bhavaṅgasota; 8 Cittabhūmi; 9 ārammaṇam cinteti ti cittah (from the root citi to think) 10 kāmattī; 11 kāmiyattī; 12 Jhāna; 13 Asaṅkhārika; 14 Sasaṅkhārika; 15 Lobha; 16 Paṭigga; 17 Mūla; 18 hinoti pattiḥhat- etenāti (Vibhāvani) 19 Somanassa; 20 Domanassa; 21 Vicikiccha;
Development of Psychological Thought in India

220 Uddhacca; 225 kosallasaṁbhūtaṇaḥ; kosallam uccati paññā. 224 Vipāka;
225 Kiriya; 226 Avyākata; 227 Vedanākkhanda; 228 Saṁākkhanda;
229 Saṁkhārakkhanda; 230 Phassa; 231 Vedanā; 232 Saṁññā; 233 Saṁkhe;
234 Ekaggata; 235 Jīvitindriya: 236 Manasikāra; 237 Abhisandhaṇa; 238 Ayāhana;
239 'vyāpāram āpajjatī' (Vibhāvanī) 240 Pakiñña; 241 Vitakka; 242 Vicāra;
243 Adhimokkha; 244 Viriya; 245 Piti; 246 Chanda; 247 Mahaggatācitta;
248 Paṭisandhi; 249 Āvajjana 250 Dassana-savana-ghāvana-sāyana-phusana;
251 Saṁpaṭicchana; 252 Santiraṇa; 253 Voṭṭhapanā; 254 Javana; 255 Tadārammaṇa;
256 Cuti; 257 Paṭisandhi; 258 Pavatti; 259 Vīthicitta; 260 Cittakkhaṇa;
261 Cakkhudvāravīthī; 262 Tadanuvattakamanodvāravīthī; 263 Nāmapaññāt-
vīthī; 264 Atthapaññattīvīthī; 265 Attitabhaṃga; 266 Bhavaṅgapatana
267 Bhavaṅgapaccheda; 268 Āvajjana; 269 Sampaticchana; 270 Santiraṇa;
271 Voṭṭhapanā; 272 Javana; 273 Tadārammaṇa; 274 Atimahanta; 275 Mahanta;
276 Paritta; 277 Atiparitta.
APPENDIX

MILESTONES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THOUGHT IN INDIA

Circa

B.C. 3000-1000 The Ṛgveda, Yajurveda and Sāmaveda
1200 The early Upaniṣads
1000 The Mahābhārata; Kṛṣṇa-Vāsudeva and Yājñavalkya

817 Pārśvanātha

669-550 The late Upaniṣads
599-527 Vardhamāna Mahāvīra; Makkhali Gosāla
563-483 Gotama Buddha
457 Bhadrabāhu-Śrutakevalin
450 Pāṇini

400 The Bhagavadgītā in its present form

150 Patañjali: Yogasūtra and Mahābhāṣyā

100 Milindapāṇiham

A.D.

85 Āryadeva and Nāgārjuna

135-219 Umāsvāmin

250 Īśvarakṛṣṇa (Sāmkhyakārikā); Devanandin (Pūjyapāda)

300 Vyāsabhāṣya on Yogasūtra; Śabarasvāmin

375-450 Āsaṅga

390-470 Vasubandhu

350-400 The Brahmasūtra

420 Buddhaghosa (Visuddhimagga)

590-650 Kumārilā-bhaṭṭā; Prabhākara

600 Dharmapāla (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi commentary) Gauḍapāda (Māṇḍūkya Kārikā)

Bhārtṛhari (Vākyapadiya)

633-690 Māṇḍana-miśra; Kamalāsilā; Dharmakīrti

655-687 Śaṅkara-ācārya

705-775 Haribhadra-sūri

1000 Abhinavagupta; Anuruddha (Abhidhammatthasāṅgāha)

1027-1137 Rāmānuja-ācārya

1089-1172 Hemacandra

1197-1274 Madhva-ācārya; Vimuktatman (Vivarāpa); Sṛharṣa (Khanḍanakhanḍakhādyā)

1500 Nṛśimhāsṛāmin
INDEX

abhidhamma, 94f
Abhidhammatthaśāṅgaha, 97, 102
Abhidharmaśāṅga, 104
Abhidharmasamuccaya, 103f
abhimāna, 41
ABHINAVAGUPTA, 202
action, analysis of, 181
—orientation, 197
aesthetic delight (rasa), 204
afflictions (kleśa), 49f
ahaṅkāra, 41, 189. See ego
AJITA-KESAKAMBALA, 65
AKALANÇA, 84
ALBERUNI, 33
ālaya-vijñāna, 198
ĀÑANDAGIRI, 6
ĀÑANDAVARDHANA, 203f
antahkaraṇa, 43
ANURUDDHA, 97, 98
anuṣṭhāna, 46
apperception, 85, 119
application, 27
Arthaśāstra, 33
ASAŃGA, 103
aśāṅga, 53f
aspiration, 27
asū, 5
ĀŚURI, 30
ātman, 6, 20, 35
Atharva-veda, 1f, 29, 23
attention, 84
BĀDARĀYANA, 132
bahiṣyendriya, 42
BHADRABĀHU, 72
Bhagavadgītā, 173f
BHARĀTA, 204f
BHARTṪHARĪ, 159f, 163f, 203
bhavaṅga, 101, 108, 117f, 198
BHOJA, 205
BRĀHASPAṬI, 58f
BUDDHA, 94f, 195
BUDDHAGHOSA, 96, 98, 100f, 198
buddhi, 40
CANDRAKĪRTI, 105
cārvaka, 60f
character-colours (leśya), 86, 193
citta, 43, 46, 47, 109, 111, 191, 192
classification of human types, 66, 87
cognition, 47, 79, 129, 168
cognitive comprehension (jñāna), 79, 194
cognitive structure, expressions of, 51
cognitive states, 191
conjunction (samyoga), 45
communication, 121
consciousness, 18, 19f, 43f, 62f, 78, 113, 164, 169, 189, 193, 198, 201
—conditions of, 24f
constructions, 44
content-reception, 84
counselling, 177
creative imagination, 205
curiosity, 46
DARA-SHU KOH, 13
DASGUPTA, S. N., 33
desire, 8, 17
detachment (vairāgya), 52
DEVANANDIN, 73f, 84f, 91
developmental stages, 67
Dhammasaṅgani, 99
DIGNAGA, 105
dimension (kośa), 18
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>doubt</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dream</td>
<td>25, 151, 185, 187, 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ego</td>
<td>41f, 109, 179, 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ego-involvement</td>
<td>45, 137, 179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>egoity</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emotion</td>
<td>194, 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emotional stability</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>energy (citiśakti)</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erlebnis</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evolution</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>experience, analysis of</td>
<td>34f, 36, 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feeling</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>field</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fitness (yogyata)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>form</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>form-reception</td>
<td>83f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>function</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>functional field (kṣetra)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAUDAPĀDA</td>
<td>32, 131, 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gestalt</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gommaṭasāra</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOSĀLA</td>
<td>65, 66f, 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOTAMA</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOUGH</td>
<td>13, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guṇa</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUÑARATNA</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hallucinations</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARIBHADRA</td>
<td>33, 59, 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heart (hr̥)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEMACANDRA</td>
<td>83, 86, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>illusion</td>
<td>139, 142f, 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>image</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impression, See saṃskāra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indriya</td>
<td>42, 82, 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>introspection</td>
<td>14, 78, 129, 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intuition</td>
<td>83, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intuitive apprehension (darśana)</td>
<td>79, 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IŚVĀRAKRŚṆA</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JACOBI</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAYANTA-BHĀṬTA</td>
<td>60, 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAYARĀŚI</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For other terms, see the index on page 223:

- jīvānā, 46
- jiva, 42, 78f, 193, 199
- jivasamāśa, 5a, 75f
- judgment, 4

- KACCAYANA, 65
- KAMALAŚILA, 60, 62
- kṣma, 8, 17
- KAPILA, 30, 31
- Kashmir Śaivism, 201
- KAUṬILYA, 33, 59
- khandā, 107f, 196
- king's Tax-collection, 43
- kleśa, 49f
- knowledge, 89, 135f,
- KṚṢṆĀMĪṢRA, 60
- KṚṢṆA-VĀSUDEVA, 173f
- KUMĀRILA, 58f, 130f, 160, 167, 199
- KUNDAKUNDA, 73

Lalitavistara, 33
literary lapses, 205
lokāyata, 60

- MĀDHAVA, 59, 60
- MADHVA, 134
- mahābhārata, 30, 174f
- mahat, 40
- MAHĀVIRA, 70f, 193
- man, analysis of, 5
- MAṆḌANA, 153, 182
- MĀṆIKYANANDIN, 82
- materialism, 60f
- MĀṬHARA, 32
- MAX-MÜLLER, 11
- meaning, 162f
- memory, 27
- mental actions, 47, 49f
- mentation, modes of, 26, 27
- Mīlindaśapakham, 96, 100f
- mind (manas), 7f, 23, 24, 43f, 185, 187f, 194, 200
- modes of awareness, 114
- mood, 205
reasoning, 86
testing, 83
recollection, 86
recognition (pratyabhijña), 202
retention, 85
RgVeda, 1,8,9,14,16
rôle-conflict, 178
RUDRAṬA, 204
SABARASVĀMIN, 129,135,158,167
Saḍdarśanasamuccaya, 33,59
SāmaVeda, 1
Samaṇṇaphalasutta, 64
saṁkalpa, 42f
SĀMKARA, 23,60,132f,148f,169,172,199f
Saṁkhya, 35,36
Saṁkhya-Yoga, 30f
Sāṁkhyakārikā, 32,188
saṁskāra, 45,48,167,192
sankhāra, 113,197
ŚANTARAKŚITTA, 60
Sarvadarśanasamgraha, 59
Śaṭṭhatra, 32
Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa, 4,8
sattva, 36f
savikalpa, 44
SĀYANA, 6,7,20
self, 21,35,186
self-assertion, 41
sense (indriya), 22f,82,110f,194
sensation (vedana), 11
sleep, 26,48,187
sphoṭa, 157,161f,203
ŚRIHARŚA, 152
Syādvāda, 88f
suggestive stimulus, 48
subliminal impression, 167
tamas, 36
tapas, 14f,33
Tattvakaumudi, 34
Tattvasamāsā, 32
theravāda, 94

NĀGEṢA-BHAṬṬA, 160,170,203
tasking, 4
nirvikāla, 44
niyamaṇa, 39
Nyāṇa-Mahāthera, 106
Orders of reality, 149
outward-organs, 42
PANCASIKHA, 30f,35
PĀNINI, 60,158f,202
PARAMĀRTHA, 32
pariṇāma, See evolution
PĀRŚVA, 71
PATAṆJALI, 34,159f,162,190
perception, 43,79,80,81f,112,116f,137f,141f,198
perceptual errors, 166
person, see puruṣa
personality, 35,40f,52,122
person-complex (sakkaya), 109
PRABHĀKARA, 130f, 140f
practice (abhyaśa), 52
prāṇa, 5,18,21,22,26,184
prakāśa, 39
prakṛti, 37f,189
prāṇāyāma, 192
pratibhā, 204
Pravacanabhāṣya, 32
pravṛtti, 39
pre-constructional stage, 44
projection, 150,200
proximity (samnīdhi), 45
psychic life, 114f
psychodynamics, 46
puggala, 108f
PURAṆA-KASSAPA, 65
purpose, 17
puruṣa, 16f,35f,45,185
RADHAKRISNAN, S, 38
rajās, 36f
RĀJASEKHARA, 204
RĀMĀNUJA, 134,182
RANADE, R. D., 12
Index

thinking, 26
thought-moment, 120
transmigration, 7
ubhāya, 39
UMĀŚVĀMIN, 73,85
understanding, 79,162
Upaniṣad, 11f,35,185
VĀCASPATI-MIśRA, 34,38,43,47,
  48, 149,168
Vākyapadiya, 160
VALLABHA, 135
vāsanā, 49
VASUBANDHU, 104
VĀTSYĀYANA, 60
Vedas, 1f, 184
Vedānta, 36

Vibhanga, 112,
vijñānavāda, 103
VIJNĀNABHIKSU, 32,34
Vishuddhimagga, 97,102,198
VIŚVANĀTHA, 205
volition, 114,141
vṛtti, 42,149,191
VYĀSA, 48,51
waking, 25
will, 8
YĀJNAVALKYA, 15,30
YajurVeda, 1
yoga, 32f,46,191f
YĀSKA, 31
Yogācāra, 103
"A book that is shut is but a block"

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL LIBRARY

GOVT. OF INDIA
Department of Archaeology
NEW DELHI.

Please help us to keep the book clean and moving.