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'Indian Thought.'

Under the above title, the undersigned, in co-operation with several other scholars, intend to bring out a periodical publication devoted in part to the translation into English of important Sanskrit works, and in part to original papers dealing with Indian Literature in its various branches, and antiquities.

The intention of the Editors at first was to limit the scope of their publication to the translation of important philosophical works; and this will indeed, for the present, be the main feature of the new undertaking. The Editors have reason to believe that in this country as well as in Western countries, there are many persons who, while interested in the remarkable ancient philosophical literature of India, are yet unable to consult the original texts; and they know that even the somewhat advanced student of Sanskrit feels himself constantly hampered more or less by the special, frequently formidable, difficulties inherent in the matter and style of Indian philosophical works. They, therefore, think that they will render a service to both these classes of readers by bringing out a series of translations of philosophical works of acknowledged standing and authority. Comparatively few works of this class have so far been translated; and those available in translations are not always of the kind most helpful to the student. In their selection of texts for Indian Thought, the Editors will endeavour to provide for an adequate representation of philosophical works of two classes. They will, in the first place, give translations of works of a more elementary kind which, without being over-concise, as many of the most generally studied treatises are, set forth the doctrines of the several philosophical schools, in a comparatively easy and perspicuous style: they thus hope that in course of time Indian Thought will comprise a series of really helpful manuals of the different systems. And they will in the second place bring versions of works of a more difficult and abstract character, chosen from what the Pandits consider the great books of their philosophical literature,
While the translations of philosophical works will constitute the larger part of the matter of Indian Thought, works belonging to other departments—Dharmashāstra, Rhetorics (Alaṅkāra), Grammar, Astronomy, etc.—will not be excluded. In all cases it will be the aim of the Editors to render their versions fully intelligible to those also who cannot refer to the original texts, and—as far as may be—readable. There will be explanatory notes; an introduction will be given on the completion of each work, as also indices wherever required.

The department of the publication devoted to original papers will, in the first numbers, bring instalments of a work on the history of Indian Astronomy, by one of the undersigned.

It will not be among the objects of the periodical to publish Sanskrit texts: shorter texts of interest, not previously published, will, however, not be excluded, should their publication appear expedient. But in no case will texts be given without an accompanying translation.

Should Indian Thought meet with sufficient encouragement, the Editors would be glad to widen the scope of the publication by devoting a section of it to short reviews and notices of new works bearing on Indian literature and antiquities published in Europe and America, as also of works of similar scope appearing in India. No organ at present exists that makes it its special task to render Indian readers acquainted with what is done in Western countries in the field of Indian research; and on the other hand important Indian publications often remain unknown for a considerable time to Western scholars, owing to the absence of due notification and review.

The following works are in course of preparation:

A translation of the Nyāya-maṇḍari, one of the most important works on the Nyāya system.

A translation of the Mīmāṃsā-nyāya-prakāsha (also called Āpadevī), an elementary treatise on Pūrva Mīmāṃsā.

A new translation, and full commentary, on the Sūrya Siddhānta; founded on an original commentary by Pandit Sudhākara Dvivedin.

An analysis of Kumārila-Bhaṭṭa’s Shloka-Vārttika.
Translations of the following works are contemplated:—

The Mādhyā-siddhānta-sāra.
The Nyāya-bhāṣya-vārttika.
The Dhvanyāloka.
The Bharata-Nātya-shāstra.
The Viramitrodāya.
The Mitākṣara.

*Indian Thought* will, for the present, appear quarterly in parts of pp. 100—120 each, Royal 8vo. Eventual extensions of the periodical, in range of matter, number of parts published within the year, size of parts, etc., will depend on the amount of encouragement with which the undertaking will meet. It is evident that a publication of this kind—which presupposes exceptionally hard and unremitting labour on the part of the contributors—cannot be enlarged, or even maintained in its present shape for a long time, unless securing a somewhat extended patronage.

The annual subscription (for 4 quarterly parts), including postage, will be Rs. 10 for India, and 15 shillings for other countries, payable in advance.

G. THIBAUT.

GANGANATHA JHA.
SHRI-HARŞA’S.
KHAṆḌANAKHAṆḌAKHĀDYA.

Preliminary Note.
The Khāṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya (‘the Sweets of Refutation’) — composed by Shri-Harṣa—who wrote probably before the eighth century—is the most famous and important of those Vedānta treatises which emphasize the negative or sceptical side of the system. As well known, the fundamental tenet of the Vedānta doctrine is that there is one absolutely non-dual or non-differenced Reality the nature of which is constituted by intelligence or knowledge (jñāna). Whatever presents itself as other than this one objectless intelligence, i.e. the entire empirical world with its distinctions of individual thinking subjects and the manifold objects of their thought, is an essentially baseless appearance, something at bottom no more real than the fleeting images which encompass the dreaming soul and melt away into nothingness at the moment of waking; or than the ‘insubstantial pageant’ with which the magician as long as it pleases him deludes the senses of the bystanders.

To this view of things there are opposed in the first place, the ordinary consciousness of mankind which unhesitatingly accepts as fully real all those manifold aspects and distinctions which characterize the world as perceived by the senses and dealt with by the operations of the understanding, and in the second place those philosophical theories which essentially aim at nothing more than a certain systematization of the world of common sense. The main Indian representative of theories
of the latter kind is the Nyāya-Vaišeṣika philosophy which undertakes to set forth in complete and methodic form the system of notions employed in ordinary thought, or—to put it differently—to give a theory of the various means by which truth is ascertained; the tacit pre-supposition being that the system of knowledge which we build up through Perception, Inference and so on, is essentially valid in as much as being an exact ideal equivalent of a system of real things and their relations.

It is against this view of the world and of knowledge that the Vedāntin of the type of Shri-Harṣa directs his attacks. His plan is to submit the definitions which the Naiyāyika gives of the main categories of reality and the main cognitional activities, to a critical investigation—which leads to the result that all those definitions suffer from inner contradictions and hence are untenable. And, since the Naiyāyika himself acknowledges the principle that the reality of things is proved through definitions (lakṣaṇa) and the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa), the inevitable conclusion is that all so-called reality, including all individual thought, is a baseless illusion: nothing is real but the one non-differented light of universal intelligence—Brahman.
THE KHANḍANAKHAṆḌĀKHĀDYA.

[The paragraph numberings are in accordance with the edition published in the “Chaukambhā Sanskrit Series,” Benares. The page numbers refer to the edition published in the “Pandit.”]

INTRODUCTORY VERSES.

(1). [Page 1.] To that universal soul, which is one, changeless, raised above all distinctive knowledge, declared in the Scriptures—to the Lord, not only embraced by Umā, but comprehended by me also, I offer my salutations. (1)

(2). [Page 3.] O Bhavānī, for the purpose of destroying the constantly accumulating evils of mundane existence, I reverently bow to the lotuses of your feet—those lotuses that rightly close when touched by the beams of the moon which Shiva wears as a diadem,—as he inclines his head towards you in the pleasing act of appeasing your anger. (2)

(3). O men of intelligence, may you attain to the joy of universal conquest, even by merely repeating parrot-like this work of mine—rendering ‘speechless’ all your proud opponents by utterly demolishing the possibility of either words or the things denoted by them ‘being set forth in speech’ (i.e. being satisfactorily defined.) (3)

CHAPTER I.

REFUTATION OF THE PRAMĀṆAS. *

SECTION 1.

[In order to start a discussion of any kind it is not required (as the Logician would make us believe) that the essential reality of the categories distinguished by him (such as pramāṇa i.e., means of valid knowledge; prameya, i.e., object of valid knowledge, etc.) should be acknowledged. For the starting of a discussion the only thing required is that both sides should acknowledge certain rules of discussion as binding. The acknowledgment of such rules indeed implies a cognition of the categories, but by no means their reality.]

* The Logician (Naiyāyika) postulates sixteen categories of which the first two are: Pramāṇa, Means of knowledge and Prameya, object of knowledge.

Kh. 3.
(4). Our opponents, the Logicians, hold that in all discussion, it is absolutely necessary that the disputants on both sides should acknowledge the sixteen categories, Pramāṇa and the rest, as real entities fully established by all systems of philosophy.

(5). Others, however (the Vedāntins) do not admit this. For, they ask, what is the reason obliging the disputant to acknowledge the reality of Pramāṇa and the other categories? [A] Is it because for disputants not acknowledging the categories it is not possible to start any discussion, all discussion necessarily depending on the acknowledgment of those categories? [B] Or, because such acknowledgment is the cause of the discussion to be begun by the disputants? [C] Or, because all these categories are well known and accepted by all men? [D] Or, because if they be not accepted the ascertainment of truth and victory—which are the respective results of the two principal kinds of discussion—would extend too far (i.e., would be attained even by altogether unlearned and silly people).*

(6). [A] The first of these reasons is not valid. For we actually find that there are lengthy discussions carried on by people such as the Chārvākas (Materialist-Atheists), the Mādhyamikas (Buddha-Nihilists) and others who do not acknowledge the sixteen categories of the Logician. In fact, if these people were not capable of setting forth their views in literary works, there would be no reason for you to make any efforts towards their refutation. In putting forward the ‘acceptance of the sixteen categories’ as a necessary condition of all discussion, you thus pronounce a most wonderful incantation capable of binding all speech,—an incantation, so strangely powerful as to accomplish the result that the revered Preceptor of the Gods, Brūhaspati, did not produce the Lokāyata-śūtras, that the Tathāgata Buddha did not teach the Mādhyamika scriptures, and that our own revered Teacher, Shaṅkarāchārya did not compose his commentary on the śūtras of Bādarāyana!!

* There are three kinds of discussion—(1) Vāda—Discussion for the purpose of ascertaining truth, (2) Jalpa—Discussion for the purpose of worsting the opponent, and (3) Vītaṇḍā—Sophistical reasonings put forward for the sole purpose of showing off one’s cleverness.

Kh. 4.
(7). Here the Logician will perhaps re-state his argument in a more guarded form: I do not, he says, mean to deny that verbal disquisitions may be carried on by men who do not acknowledge the sixteen categories; but what I mean to deny is that such disquisitions can prove or disprove anything.

(8). In this also, we reply, you are mistaken. What renders verbal disquisitions incapable of proving or disproving anything is not their being put forward by persons who do not acknowledge the sixteen categories; what makes them thus incapable rather is,—as you will have to admit yourself—that they have the character of fallacious or erroneous assertions. We often find that assertions made by persons who, in accordance with their peculiar theoretical views, acknowledge the categories, are rejected as 'incapable of proving or disproving anything' by other persons, who also acknowledge the reality of the categories, but happen to hold a different philosophical theory.

(9). Consequently, so long as you are not able to show that our assertions are 'fallacious' or 'erroneous', we shall pay no regard to you, even if you go on repeating a hundred times—"you have put forward these assertions without acknowledging the sixteen categories." Were such words to be taken seriously, we on our part might, with equal reasonableness, argue against you—'you have put forward these assertions after having acknowledged the sixteen categories, and hence they must be rejected as fallacious'!

(10) But, the Logician objects, if there be no Pramāṇa and the other categories, how can the 'verbal discussion' itself—which is the topic of our present discussion—come about? * And how can there be any rules to determine refutation and the like, in connection with verbal assertions? For all assertions and denials depend upon Pramāṇas (means of valid knowledge).

(11). [Page 10.] You misrepresent the case, we reply. We do not hold that all discussions should begin only after it has been acknowledged by the disputants that 'Pramāṇa and the other categories have no real existence'. All that we mean is that

* As there could be no valid knowledge of it without some 'means of knowledge' (Pramāṇa).

Kh. 5.
discussions may be carried on by those who are indifferent as to the reality or non-reality of those categories, no less than by you who accept their reality. If this were not so, it would not be possible for you to combat our theory in the way you have done, after having imputed to us the view that Pramāṇa and the other categories have no reality.

(12). For on what grounds could the discussion have been started so as to enable you, in the course of the discussion, to combat our view? Was it on the basis of both parties acknowledging the reality of the categories? or on the basis of both denying their reality? or on the basis of one of us acknowledging their reality and the other not acknowledging it? The first of these alternatives is inadmissible; since the objection you urge would not lie against one who acknowledges the reality of the categories. The second alternative would imply that you yourself are open to that objection. Nor again is the third alternative possible. For on it, just as the present discussion is started (even though one of the disputants does not acknowledge the categories), so, in the same manner all other discussions could be started (which would show that the acceptance of the reality of the categories is not necessary for the starting of discussions). And in reality it is absolutely necessary for the discussion to proceed on a common basis accepted by both parties (and so there can be no discussion when one party accepts the categories and the other does not). Were it not so, your opponent also would put forward, in accordance with his own view of things (not accepted by you), certain verbal objections against your assertions; and to which of you two, under these circumstances, would the victory have to be adjudged? In fact, it would be the disputant acknowledging the categories that would be galled by the weight of greater restrictions.

(13). For these reasons it will be right for you to declare that you raise your objections after the discussion has been started between us on the basis of certain rules agreed upon by both of us, irrespective of our views as to the reality or unreality of Pramāṇa and the other categories. And as thus you are

* i.e. If it were not possible for one not acknowledging the reality of the Pramāṇas to enter on a discussion.
unable to ascertain your own meaning, you truly cannot hope
to ascertain the views of others.  

(14) [Page 12.] But, the Logician resumes, I do not mean to
set forth my objections against an unreasonable disputant,
accepting him as my opponent in a controversy; all I mean is to
show to my own pupils that persons not acknowledging the
categories cannot be admitted to any discussion. It is for this
reason that the author of the Nyāya-Bhāṣya (Vātsyāyana, Page 4)
says—'if on being asked his purpose, he should say, &c., &c.
(pratipadyatā, in the Third Person),' and not 'if you should say
(pratipadyasā) [while this latter form would be required if the
objection were addressed to the opponent.]

(15). But this also we cannot allow. For even if addressing
your pupils only, you would have to express yourself as
follows:—'These are the objections lying against the Chārvāka
(materialist) and others'; and how would this be possible? For,
would the objection against these people be put forward after
they had been admitted to the discussion, or before that? In
either case, the objection would not be effective against
them.

(16). [B] Nor is the second alternative (noted in para. 5) ten-
able. For on that view the reality of the categories would have
to be acknowledged only if the causal relation of the categories
towards the discussion to be started were to come to an end on
the non-acknowledgment of the categories. But the latter can-
not be the case; for if it were so, those who do not acknowledge
the categories could make no use of words at all, since the cause
of such use would be absent. And we have already pointed out
above that you cannot deny the existence of the use of words
on the part of the Bādhdha-Nihilists and others who do not
acknowledge the reality of your categories.

* The Logician does not ascertain his own meaning in so far as he urges
an objection against the Vedāntin, only after the discussion has been started
without the Vedāntin admitting the reality of the categories, and yet declares
that one who does not admit that cannot be admitted to a discussion. And he
shows ignorance of the opponent's view inasmuch as he controverts the
opinion that the categories are unreal; while all that the Vedāntin has so far
asserted is that the acknowledgment of the categories is not needed for the
starting of a discussion.

Kh. 7.
(17). Your meaning in setting forth the second alternative (B) may possibly be that Pramāṇa and the other categories are real because they are the cause of the verbal discussion carried on by the disputants; and since they are real they must be acknowledged by all, in agreement with the accepted principle that 'whatever is real is acknowledged as such.'

(18). But this also will not help you. For it is only after some discussion has been started that you can proceed to prove the necessity of accepting the categories, on the ground of their having reality as proved by the fact that they are the cause of the verbal discussions carried on by the disputants.

(19). In fact, we can regard that alone as the necessary antecedent of discussions without which it would be quite impossible for the disputants, aiming either at the ascertainment of truth or at victory over their opponent, to obtain what they desire. And since all that is absolutely necessary for this is that they should agree to lay down certain rules and conditions for the discussion, the disputants, before entering into any discussion, do lay down such rules and conditions.

(20). These rules and conditions are somewhat to the following effect:—(1) The party that starts the discussion should proceed by means of valid arguments in accordance with the recognised means of knowledge; (2) then the other party should point out, in the arguments thus propounded, some invalidating flaw in the shape of 'self-contradiction' and the like, which would show that the person propounding the argument is not possessed of that true knowledge which the discussion aims at; (3) if this second party succeeds in demonstrating some such flaw, the first party must be regarded as 'defeated'; (4) if, however, the second party fails to prove the flaw, it is he who must be taken as 'defeated'; (5) in each case, the party other than the 'defeated' must be held to be 'victorious'; (6) the position, that is ultimately found to be supported by valid proofs must be accepted as 'true';—and so forth.

(21). This leaves no room for an objection on the Logician's part, similar to that which we urged against him when asking him to point out his reasons for accepting the reality of Pramāṇa and the other categories,—viz., "you are bound to point out your reasons for the necessity of laying down rules and conditions for

Kh. 8.
the conducting of discussions; and this pointing out can be done only after a certain discussion has been started [and hence, like the categories, the rules also need not be accepted as necessary for the actual starting of discussions.]" There is no room for this objection, we say, because the rules and conditions for discussions are spontaneously accepted by both disputants; since on that basis only they can realise the two ends which prompt men to start discussions,—*vis*: the ascertainment of truth, and the defeat of the opponent.

(22). Here the following objection may perhaps be raised:—

"From what you say it would appear that the rules and conditions of discussion come to be accepted, not on the ground of valid reasons, but merely on the choice of the disputants; and as thus the foundation is unsound, great confusion and uncertainty will beset the discussion, the subjects of discussion and the results of discussion." But this objection also we refuse to admit. The rules and conditions above specified by us as the basis of discussion are perfectly sound, for they are self-evident,—as proved by the facts that it is impossible to imagine anything contrary to them, that they have come down to us through *immemorial tradition*, and that men have generally agreed to them on the basis of universal practical experience.

(23). Nor can it be asserted that the existence of the categories also must be accepted by the disputants on the same grounds as that of the rules and conditions. For, in order to render it possible for the discussion to be started, nothing further is recognised as necessary than the acceptance of the said rules and conditions. On the other hand, if we acknowledge the reality of the categories, it would be impossible for the disputants, if not accepting the rules and conditions, either to ascertain the truth, or to secure victory,—which are the two purposes for which discussions are started.

(24). [Page 17.] [C] Nor also can we accept the third alternative mentioned above (in para. 5): That is to say, the reality of the categories cannot be acknowledged on the ground of their being practically acknowledged by all men. For, we ask, do you mean that they are practically acknowledged by authoritative

* The reading translated is that adopted by the Vidyāśāgari commentary.

Kh. 9.
and trustworthy persons alone? or, by all men, high and low alike? It cannot be the former; since the fact of anything being supported by the usage of authoritative persons cannot be ascertained without due enquiry and discussion; and it is for the sake of just such enquiry and discussion that we are in search of the necessary basis. Nor the latter; as in that case you will have to admit the validity of the notion of the body being the Self, and so forth (which erroneous notions are generally entertained by common people).

(25). But, the Logician says, notions of this latter kind we do not accept, since we find them to be sublated by subsequent reflexion. If this is so, we reply, then the categories under discussion also cannot be accepted if they are found to be sublated by subsequent reflexion; otherwise they will certainly be acknowledged. But they cannot be accepted for the mere reason that they are practically acknowledged by people in general.

(26). [D] Nor can the fourth alternative (in para 5) be maintained: That is to say, the reality of the categories cannot be accepted for the reason that if it were not accepted, there would be an undue extension of the results of discussion. For, even though we are absolutely indifferent as to the reality or unreality of the categories in question, yet we also acknowledge the same rules and conditions for the conduct of discussions that you accept (and in accordance with which you judge of the results of discussions); and if these rules and conditions were to lead to undesirable judgments in regard to these results, in our case, they would do the same in your case also [and hence what is necessary for the discussion is only the acceptance of these rules and conditions, and not that of the categories].

(27). Here the Logician raises a new objection: If, he says, you start a discussion on the basis of certain rules and conditions to be observed in the carrying on of verbal intercourse, you must at any rate acknowledge the reality of the existence of such verbal intercourse; for unless you do so, you cannot speak of its being carried on or effected; since to effect a thing means to bring it from non-existence into real existence. Then again, the rule laid down by you (in para. 20), that discussions should be carried on by means of arguments founded on the recognised means of valid knowledge, could not be upheld unless you admitted that causal

*Kh. 10.*
Chapter 1.—Section (1).

power of the means of valid knowledge which consists in their having a necessary real existence previous to their effects; for such causal power is implied in that rule. Further, the rules relating to the ascertainment of ‘defeat’ pre-suppose the reality of the Fallacies; and similarly the reality of Invariable Concomitance (Vyāpti) and other elements of Reasoning is implied in the rules bearing on the ascertainment of what constitutes truth in the matter under dispute. It thus appears that in laying down your rules you distinctly admit the reality of those several factors; and hence it is a mere empty assertion of yours to say that ‘discussions can be started without accepting the reality of Pramāṇa and the other categories.’

(28). Your objection is invalid, we reply. For what you seek to prove can be proved only after the discussion on the point has been started; and hence our objections to your position remain in force.

(29). Against this you may not urge that, “inasmuch as the laying down of the rules and conditions accepted by the Vedāntin would at once imply the acknowledgment of the reality of Pramāṇa and the other categories, the Logician is not open to the said objections.” For what is implied in those rules is only the knowledge of Pramāṇa and the rest, and not their reality.

(30). And on this point we put the following question:—Do you mean that the reality of Pramāṇa and the rest should be admitted simply because there is a cognition of their reality? Or because there is such cognition of their reality as is not sublated (by some other more valid cognition)? Not the former truly; since from that view it would follow that we must acknowledge the presence of true water in the mirage (which, at the time, is cognized as water). Then, as regards the second alternative, should the reality of the categories be accepted because the cognition of them is not sublated or rejected by the two disputants and the umpire, at the time of the discussion,—or because it is not rejected by any person at any time? The former view would land us in absurdity, being much too wide in its scope; for it often happens that what is cognized by three persons and at one moment, is sublated by the cognition of a fourth person, and at another moment; and when such sublation actually takes place, the thing cognised as unreal truly is not held to

Kh. 11.
be real, simply on the strength of its having been cognised as such at a previous moment by two or three individuals. Hence the only tenable view is the latter,—viz., that that alone should be regarded as real which is never, and by no person, found to be sublated.

(31). [Page 21.] Thus then, even if it be held that the cognition of the existence of the Fallacies, &c., by the disputants and the umpire, which is not sublated at the time of the discussion, is a necessary factor in the discussion,—in what way does this affect the view that the starting of a discussion does not depend upon the acceptance of the reality of the Fallacies, etc., as proved by such cognition of them as is not sublated in any way (i.e., by any person, at any time)? We have here to remember that ordinary empirical thought and activity are generally found to be based upon the acceptance of certain notions as true by only a few persons and at only certain points of time. And it is only such cognition of the existence of Pramāṇa, &c., that we regard as necessary in the starting of discussions. This is what is meant by the assertion that 'discussions are started on the basis of the supposition that Pramāṇa and the other categories have a practical (and not real) existence.'

(32). We thus arrive at the conclusion that for the starting of a discussion certain rules must be accepted, such as the following—'when the Umpire comes to the decision that a certain disputant has not transgressed the rules of discussion agreed upon, that disputant must be held to have gained the victory; that disputant on the other hand with regard to whose arguments the Umpire does not form that judgment must be regarded as having been defeated; that disputant again in whose arguments the Umpire acknowledges the presence of flaws pointed out by the opponent is to be regarded as vanquished; while a disputant not falling under that category cannot be regarded as vanquished, and so forth.

(33). [Page 23]. For when we say that the disputant must carry on the discussion in accordance with certain rules and conditions, we mean that the fact of the disputant having argued in due accord with all such rules and conditions must be the object of the Umpire's cognition.

(34). Nor must it here be objected that, on the conclusion just arrived at, the real existence of the 'cognition of the Umpire'
will have to be admitted (so that after all we again pre-suppose the reality of a thing other than Brahman). For if we enquire into the reality of that cognition, we again have nothing else to fall back upon than another cognition of the real existence of the same. (So that here again we have only cognition of real existence, not real existence itself.)

(35.) Nor does this necessitate the assumption of a regressus in infinitum (that other cognition again being dependent on another cognition, and so on). For, in accordance with the principle that 'there is no need of any further cognition, beyond the origination of three or four cognitions' (Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s Shlokā-vārttīka, Sūtra II, 61) there is no need to enter on any such regress.

(36.) Perhaps our adversary will here argue as follows:—"If the last term of the series of cognitions has no real existence, this will imply that the whole series of preceding cognitions also has no real existence; you thus do not get out of your difficulty by accepting (as the basis of all discussion) the cognition (of the Umpire)."

This may be so, we reply; but as a matter of fact, when the disputants have satisfied themselves by following the series of cognitions backwards up to three or four stages, they find that it would be undesirable to go any further; and thus by mutual agreement they take the reality of the Umpire’s cognition

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* In the place referred to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa argues in favour of the natural inherent validity or authoritativeness (svataḥ-prāmāṇya) of all cognitions. Every cognition, due to one of the recognised means of true knowledge, is to be considered as valid, as long as there are no special reasons for doubt. Where such reasons exist, as when e. g. we are in doubt as to the true nature of a thing perceived from a distance or in faint light,—we resolve our doubt by a second cognition naturally springing from improved conditions; as when the exact nature of a thing first perceived from a distance reveals itself to us as soon as we approach it more closely. In certain cases this second cognition may again have to be corrected by a third cognition; and sometimes even a fourth one may be required; but in almost all cases it will not be necessary to go beyond this. Having carried our enquiry so far, we acquiesce in the result.—This principle is, in the text, appealed to by the Vedāntin. There, of course, remains the difference between his point of view and that of the Mīmāṃsaka that, according to the latter, a series of cognitions carried on for three or four stages, results in a cognition which is absolutely true, i. e., represents reality as it is; while according to the Vedāntin the final cognition is true in a relative, practical, sense only.

Kh. 13.
for granted, and proceed upon it as a basis of their discussion. If some such explanation be not accepted, then a similar infinite regress of cognitions would result even on your view, i.e., the view which acknowledges the reality of Pramāṇa and the other categories.

(37.) The Logician retorts—"We hold every cognition to have reality by itself; and thus all our proceedings can be carried on on the basis of such cognitions, without tracing any series of cognitions backwards. According to the view of the Vedāntin on the other hand, such tracing backward will be unavoidable; for otherwise, he also would have to admit that every cognition has reality." But, we reply, we are going to show, in the section on the 'Self-apprehension of Cognitions,' that the infinite regress cannot be avoided even by regarding every cognition as having a reality by itself. Then again, just as according to your theory, though the cognition of the jar and the jar both have reality by themselves, you yet hold that all practical proceedings are effected by the reality of the cognition, and not by that of the jar,—so analogously on our view, though the cognition and the jar are both equally unreal, yet all practical proceedings are effected by the unreal cognition, and by nothing else.

SECTION 2.

[The admission that the categories are the cause of philosophical discussions in no way obliges us to acknowledge their reality; for the Unreal no less than the Real may be a cause: to maintain that a cause has real being in fact involves us in contradictions. What is characteristic of a cause is merely that it has an invariable previous existence to its effect; but this relation may hold good in the sphere of mere apparent existence. Empirical thought, speech and action admit of being reconciled with the theory of the Baudhā Nihilist (Śūnyavādin) according to which all things whatever are 'void' i.e. unreal appearances.]

A.—The non-real can have causal efficiency.

(38). "But" the Logician objects, "to assert that a thing is unreal and yet produces an effect involves a self-contradiction!" Why, we retort, should it not be a self-contradiction that a thing
is real and effects something? For it certainly has not been proved to the satisfaction of both of us that the real produces effects while the unreal does not!

(39). "But", our antagonist rejoins, "(if the unreal or non-being were to produce effects, then) since the mere non-existence of the cause would be equally present at all times, its effect would arise also at times other than those when it actually appears." We do not allow this objection. For according to your (the Logician's) doctrine* the causal factors do not exist at the first moment of the existence of the effect; and this non-existence of the cause is exactly the same at all other times; why then should not, on your premises also, the effect arise at any time?

(40). "But", the Naiyāyika resumes, "what, according to us, is necessary for the appearance of the effect at a certain time is not the non-existence of the causal factors at that very time, but the existence of those factors at the preceding moment; for this is what is actually observed." Well then, we reply, (just as you hold that what brings about the effect is the existence of the causal factors at a time other than that of the effect's coming into existence, so) we hold that what brings about the effect is the non-existence of the cause at some time other than the time of the actual appearance of the effect; for this is what is actually observed.

(41). "But", the opponent resumes, "according to me what determines the effect at the particular time when it actually appears is the fact of its immediate sequence to the causal conditions (and this immediate sequence does not present itself at any other moment)." This also is of no avail, we reply. For as the fact of immediate sequence to the cause and the first appearance of the effect are simultaneous, and as moreover, that immediate sequence itself is something indeterminate (which for its determination would require antecedent determining conditions going back ad infinitum†), there is nothing to decide

* The Logician holds that at the moment when the effect comes into existence the causal factors have ceased to operate; as otherwise, he argues, there would be an endless number of effects proceeding from the same cause.

† The 'ōgantukatōt' of the text is explained by the commentators in many ways, none of which appears fully satisfactory. The translation follows the Vidyāśāgarī.
which of the two (the fact of sequence to the cause, and the appearance of the effect) is the determining and which the determined element. It therefore must be admitted that what determines the effect is the presence of the causal factors at some other point of time; for this is what is actually observed. And we have shown above already that, in that case, there is an opening for our view no less than for yours, (for the causal factors present at another point of time may be the non-existence, no less than the existence, of the cause).

(42). "But, what then", the opponent asks, "is the distinguishing feature of the moment at which the effect originates"? Nothing more or less, we reply, than that very origination of the effect. If not satisfied therewith you demand some other distinguishing feature, then that feature also, in its turn, would belong to a point of time, which again would require a further distinguishing feature; and so on and on; there would be no end to the postulating of such features.

(43). "Still", the opponent urges, "you ought to point out some characteristic common to, and present in, all moments in which effects originate"! But this we meet by the counter-question—‘and what would be the characteristic of that characteristic which is common to all those moments’? and this question would have to be repeated ad infinitum. *

B.—Causal efficiency cannot belong to that which has real being.

(44). I. 'If a cause be that into the nature of which real existence (sattā) enters as an essential element, then, for this very reason, the cause has no real being.' II. 'If, on the other hand, real being does not essentially enter into the nature of the cause, then, for this very reason, the cause has not real being.' (4)

(45). The meaning of this stanza is as follows:—

I. If the nature of the cause be such that it implies as an essential element real existence, then to say that the generic

* Unless we stopped somewhere at a characteristic not needing a further characteristic. But then it evidently is preferable to accept at once the characteristic mentioned—vīś: that it is just the origination of the effect which distinguished the moment of origination.
character ‘real existence’ (sattā) belongs to the cause would involve the absurdity of something (real existence) residing partially in itself (i.e. that real existence which goes to constitute the nature of the cause). Even if the thing qualified by real existence (i.e. the cause with such existence as an essential element of itself) were considered as something different from real existence (sattā) (so that the said absurdity would not arise), we could not accept the sattā (in the latter sense, i.e. the sattā which is predicated of the cause) to be the same with the real being that enters into the nature of the cause; for it is a recognised principle that no more than a thing can reside in itself, can it reside in that of which it already is an essential attribute. It would therefore be necessary to assume another existence as residing in the cause qualified by existence; and as this would mean that existence does not enter into the nature of the cause, the cause would have to be regarded as ‘not really existing.’ And if, in order to avoid this, we were to assume a series of existences, one after the other, there would be no end of such assumptions.

(46). Nor will you escape from this predicament by taking the long step of assuming an infinity of different kinds of real existence. For if you assume different kinds of real existence, you relinquish the very foundation on which the generic conception of ‘existence’ rests, and hence lose the idea of even the first existence. Seeking to establish the notion of existence you thus have lost the basis of it, and are worse off than before!†

(47). Nor again would the mere individual existence (svarūpa-sattā) of things suffice for the general conception of those things. For, if to these individual existences, which naturally are different from one another, you assign the exalted position of forming the

*It must be admitted that ‘sattā’ cannot reside in itself; but let us define the cause not simply as sat—that which is—but as that something which has being for its essential attribute. On this view the cause is something different from mere being.

†‘Existence’ as a generic entity is postulated only for the purpose of providing a basis for the generic conception of ‘existence’ as including under it all individual existences. Should it be considered necessary to admit an endless series of existences, there would be no need of either a generic conception, or of a basis for that conception.

Kh. 17.
basis of general conceptions, you politely relegate all generic
entities (Universals: sattā, gotra, &c.) to the realm of the defunct.°
And if you were to say—"well, let us then dispense with a
generic conception of individual existence,"—in what manner
we ask, will you arrive at the generic notion of Cause, which,
according to you, implies the notion of individual existence?

(48). Moreover, so-called 'individual being' (svarūpa-sattā)
really is nothing more or less than the thing (e.g. the jar) itself.
And in the same way the individual being of that which is not
also is nothing but the thing itself. The non-being jar does not
cease to be a jar; if it did, we could have no such notion as
'the jar is not', for, according to the view criticised, that which is
not would not be the jar.†

(49). II. Let us then consider the second alternative stated
in para. 44, viz., that that which really is constitutes the cause,
without 'real being' entering into it as an essential element.—On
this view, we point out, that which has no real being also may
be a cause, since real being and non-being equally do not enter
into the nature of the cause.‡

(50). "Being," the Logician now argues, "may not enter as a
factor into the nature of the cause; the very nature of the cause
rather is constituted by being; for we regard that to be a cause
which has a necessary existence prior to the appearance of the
effect."

Well, we reply, we also hold the cause to be that
which possesses this necessary antecedent existence.

(51). "In that case", the opponent retorts, "you admit the
cause to be something that has real being, and thus fare like the
man who, in order to evade the payment of the toll at the river-

°Let us say that the individual existence (svarūpasattā) which belongs to
each individual thing provides a sufficient basis for the general notion of sattā
('being'). But in that case, the theory of universals, such as sattā, inhering in
the individuals (which is an essential part of the Nyāya view of things) would
become meaningless.

†The individual being or character of a thing is not touched by our
taking the thing to be non-being or non-real. If, therefore, it is this so-called
'individual being' which constitutes a thing's being a cause, the non-being or
non-real also may possess causality.

‡If real being is not an essential constituent of the causality of the cause
(although the cause may be something really being), such things also as have
no real being may be causes—it being understood that this 'non-being' also is
not an essential factor of their causality.

Kh. 18.
crossing, sets out before daybreak, but only arrives at the crossing, when the dawn is just breaking." Not by any means, we reply. You evidently have not grasped our meaning. In so far as admitting in the cause a non-real existence (asatī sattā) I do admit existence; how otherwise could I say that 'that existence is unreal'? Do you, on your part, hold that 'causality' consists in existence (viz. necessary previous existence) which comprises within itself being (in the sense of reality)? This truly cannot be; for as shown above, you (if thus postulating being within being) will either have to relinquish being after a few stages (of the endless series of 'beings' to which the first admission of being within being commits you), or else to admit an endless series.

(52). "But", the opponent goes on to argue, "as mere non-existence would, on your conclusion, be common (to that which is the cause, as well as to all that is not the cause of a given effect), how could there be any certainty as to what is the cause"? The same difficulty, we reply, would present itself on the view of existence or being equally belonging to both.

(53). "But", says the Logician, "in our case, we have as the determining factor positive as well as negative induction in regard to either the individual thing or to something of its kind; while in your case, as all causes would be equally non-being, you would have negative induction only (in the form 'where the cause is not the effect is not'; while you could not say 'where the cause is the effect is'). And even this negative induction would not always be certain. For you cannot say that 'whenever the cause is not, the effect necessarily is not existing'; since on your view, the effect would, after all, be produced in certain cases (as we actually see it to be produced); and as for you the Cause is permanently non-being, this would mean that the effect

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* The cause according to the Vedāntin, no doubt possesses sattā, 'existence' in the sense of vyāsahāriki sattā, i.e., empirical existence, such as belongs to everything that appears to consciousness, but Brahman; but such sattā is asatī, i.e., unreal; true reality belonging to Brahman only.

† If e.g. clay and threads are equal inasmuch as both of them are unreal, what should determine the clay, and not the threads, being the cause of a jar?

‡ The 'something of the kind' is meant to include cases where the cause is not a permanent continuous thing, but a series of closely consecutive momentary existences—such as the successive momentary flashes or flickers which constitute a flame.

Kh. 19.
is produced while the cause does not exist. And as to positive induction this you could never have". Not so, we reply. The conditions really are exactly similar in both cases. Moreover, in asserting that 'there is no positive induction' you admit the existence of such induction (since otherwise there would be no occasion for denying it); and if you were to regard 'being' as a factor entering into the nature of positive induction, your view would at once be open to the objections stated above (in para. 44).

(54). "But", another objection is raised, "from your theory it would follow that those who enjoy mere imaginary sweets and those who eat real sweets, would have exactly the same experiences of flavour, strength, nutritive effects, and so on". He, we reply, who flatters himself with the hope of this objection invalidating our view, truly himself feeds upon imaginary sweets! For, firstly, we have already shown that causal efficiency cannot rightly be claimed for the really existing only, whether real existence be held to enter into the essential nature of the Cause or not (see para. 44); and secondly, it is a fact that mere imaginary sweets (as those tasted in a dream) actually do give rise to experiences of certain flavours and strength, and of nutritive effects.

(55). "But", the opponent further asks, "(if the Cause is unreal, the effect will be the same; and) how can the Unreal be an effect"? If, we reply, you hold reality to enter into the very nature of the effect, the same objection applies to the effect which we have above pointed out with regard to the Cause (para. 44). If, on the other hand, you do not regard reality as entering into the nature of the effect, the latter is unreal, and then there is no difference between your view and mine.

(56). Thus then we are both agreed that being a cause means nothing else than 'having necessary connection with a previous time'; and the dispute about the reality or unreality of the Cause—which both lie altogether outside the true nature of the Cause—is simply futile. (5)

(57). Here the Logician formulates a new attack: "Leave off for a while," he says, "putting forward mere counter-arguments, and directly answer the main question.—'How can the

* i.e. (to adopt one of the possible explanations of this clause) the positive induction can be equally well established if the 'existence' of the cause is considered an unreal, i.e. merely empirical, one.
causal efficiency of that which has no being be ascertained? You will not allow that the cause has the distinguishing feature of being that which necessarily exists prior to the effect; and mere non-existence would belong to all things alike (whether causes or non-causes). Not so, we reply. The Cause has this distinguishing feature that with regard to it we have the idea that it necessarily exists previous to the effect (though this in no way establishes the reality of the Cause).

(58). "But", the Logician objects, "this principle is unduly wide, in so far as it would allow of our accepting as causes, such things also regarding which we may have a mistaken notion of 'necessary previous existence.'" No such thing, we reply. You accept the reality of a thing on the basis of a cognition which may be traced back three or four stages without meeting with sublation; and so we also allow the character of being a Cause to a thing which is the object of a cognition of just that kind. But as the cognition may be liable to sublation as it is traced back beyond those initial stages, and as this would prove the mistaken character of the earlier stages,—we do not, on the basis of those earlier stages, declare the Cause to have real existence; this is the difference between our view and yours. In fact the Logician himself rejects certain theories held by other schools (e.g. the theory, held by the Mimamsakas, of the eternality of the 'word') on the ground that, although certain cognitions do not meet with sublation up to several stages of reasoning, they yet are sublated in the end. Were it not so, (i.e. were theories to be accepted as true when not found subject to sublation up to a few stages only), then there would be only one view with regard to all philosophical matters (as all philosophical theories would be found to be true to a few stages; and thus all being possessed of equal validity, there could be no different systems, based as these are upon varying opinions with regard to the comparative validity or invalidity of the several theories).  

* The sense of this rather obscure argument appears to be that the Logician regards the cause as absolutely real, while the Vedantin, on further inquiry, allows it to be real for practical purposes only. The Logician himself proceeds in this way with regard to certain theories which though prima facie appearing reasonable, turn out, on further enquiry, to be wrong. If no such discrimination were made between what is wrong prima facie and what turns out to be wrong on protracted enquiry only, all theories would be equally true.

*Kh. 21.*
(59). The above arguments also set aside the doubt expressed in the following question:—"As all theories are equally unreal, how are we to ascertain which of them remains non-sublated up to three or four steps of enquiry, and which not?"

(60). "But", a further objection is raised, "at the time when the Cause, as you conceive it, is not the object of that idea (viz., of necessary previous existence), what difference is there (between what is the cause and what is not)?" The difference, we reply, lies therein that the Cause is the object of that idea at some time or other (while the non-causes never are the object of that idea). If this be not admitted, then tell me how such an idea presenting itself with reference to the Cause at one time could prove its reality at some other time? It might be argued that the reality of the Cause at one time may be the object of the notion at some other time (there being no need of the notion of a thing being something existing at the same time with itself). But then, we also may say with equal reasonableness that the fact of the said notion presenting itself with reference to a certain thing at one time indicates that it is the Cause at other times also (just as according to the Logician the notion appearing at one time proves its reality at other times). †It is exactly this kind of reality that has been called (by those who hold all things to be unreal) 'samvṛiti sattva' or 'Illusory Reality.'

(61). The Logician now puts the question—"Is this idea of samvṛiti something real or unreal?",—his purpose being to

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*The Logician himself admits that certain notions—e.g. that of 'silver in the shell'—meet with sublation as soon as we begin to enquire into them; while others—such as the notion of the eternity of words—are shown to be invalid by an investigation carried on through a certain number of stages. An analogous distinction may, without much difficulty, be established between different philosophical theories.

†This is added in anticipation of the objection that to hold the cause to be unreal would be opposed to the Vedāntic conception that it has samvṛitisattva (which is some sort of reality.) The sense of the author is that the reality that the Vedāntin and all other Idealists admit in regard to things is not absolute reality but a qualified reality, merely empirical. This is what has been designated by the Bauddhas 'samvṛiti-sattā' in the kārikā—"the instructions imparted by the Buddhas proceed on the basis of two kinds of reality, the ordinary empirical, and the absolute reality." It corresponds to what the Vedāntin calls 'vyāvahārīkā sattā.'
propose the following dilemma—"if the idea is unreal it cannot differentiate the Cause from non-causes; if it is real, it cannot be accepted by you Vedântins." But we meet him with the following reply:—We both are agreed as to its being cognitions, or ideas, on which all empirical thought, speech and action rest. Now when we proceed to enquire into an idea and, on advancing in our enquiry three or four stages; find it to be real or true, then the particular thought, speech, &c., concerned must be regarded as based upon real or true ideas; while it must be regarded as based upon unreal or false ideas; when the ideas, on enquiry, are found to be unreal. And as for differentiation, unreal ideas can effect this, in the same way as in misconception (bhrama) the (unreal) object of misconception differentiates the idea.†

(62). Thus then, as a matter of fact, the discussion should be begun without taking into any account the reality or unreality of cognitions. Otherwise, if we were to confuse our understanding at the outset (over this side-issue), there would be no chance for the real discussion ever being taken up. In the case of ideas having for their object future things and the like, you also admit that a non-existing object is the basis of individually distinguished thought, speech and action. And what distinguishes the special causal power (of any given cause from that of others) is the effect which is not (yet) in existence.‡

(63). Nor can it be argued against the proving force of this last instance that, "in the case of this thing (i.e., the effect) there is existence at some (future) time, while in the case of cognition and its object, there is, on your view, no existence at any time; and that hence the two cases are altogether different." For, since at the time of actual thought, speech or action related to those things, both are equally non-existent, the existence of your effect at some other time, when such existence

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* All are agreed on the point that our actions are controlled by the ideas that we have of things; for if a person did not cognise or know a thing, it could not in any way affect his action, speech or thought.

† In error or misconception, as when we see silver in the shell, the imagined silver suffices to differentiate the cognition of the moment from other cognitions.

‡ What does really distinguish the causal power possessed by sesame-grains (tila) from the causal power of other things? Nothing else than the not-yet-existing effect, i.e., the sesame oil which can be made out of the grains.
cannot serve any useful purpose, is exactly like the waking up of the watchmen after the house has been cleared out by thieves.\(^6\)

(64). But, the Logician objects, such things as jars and the like (which are to come into existence at some future time) actually do exist at some time, and therefore possess a certain individual form and attributes (such as class-characteristics); and hence the ideas of them, by their very nature (i.e. as representing those things) appropriate to themselves that form and those attributes as their own differentiating characteristics. The same cannot be asserted with regard to absolutely non-existing or unreal things; for, since an absolute non-entity cannot be held to be differentiated by any individual form and attributes, the correlative idea also cannot be defined as related to something definite—as, after all, it should be, owing to its very nature (being an idea of something).

(65). Not so, we reply. Above already (para. 48) we have explained that the non-real has the same form and character as the real: every particular non-existent (unreal) thing is characterized by the non-existence of specific form and attributes. Were it not so, many absurdities would result (we, e.g. should not be able to distinguish between a sky-flower and a hare's horn, which we actually do distinguish as non-entities of different form and character). And we, moreover have already met this objection by what we said as to the object of misconception (or error, bhrānti)—(where, as the Logician himself admits, something non-existing, shell-silver e.g., is the object of cognition). Further discussion of this point therefore is needless.

\(^6\)When the non-existence of the thing and its notion, at the time of thought, speech or action, will have been fully established on the basis of the non-existence of the effect, its existence at some other time will not save the situation.

Kh. 24.
[The view finally to be accepted is one which partially agrees with the theory of the Vijñāna-vādin, according to whom nothing is real but Thought or Idea. The reality of Thought is guaranteed by itself; Thought is 'self-illumined,' proved by itself. It is on this view only that the validity of Thought can be established; while the theory of the Naïyāyikas, according to which each direct cognition requires a secondary cognition (anuvyāvasāya) to establish and guarantee it, finally invalidates all thought. The 'thought' (vijñāna) the reality of which the Vedāntin acknowledges differs essentially, however, from the vijñāna of the Vijñāna-vādin; for it is absolutely non-differented and eternal.]

(66). Others again, finding no satisfaction of mind in the view of Cognitions (Ideas) also being mere nonentities, and not being bold enough to make at once the sweeping assertion that the whole Universe (things and ideas alike) has no real existence, take up the following position:—Cognition (Thought, vijñāna) is self-illumined (svayamprakāśa) and self-proved. For as a matter of fact, whenever Cognition takes place, there never arises, even in the mind of the attentive self-observer, either the doubt 'Do I cognise or do I not cognise,' or the wrong cognition 'I do not cognise,' (when there is cognition), or the right cognition to the contrary 'I do not cognise' (when really there is no cognition).* Hence, if with regard to

*The distinction between the three cases is explained in the Vidyāsāgari as follows:—A 'wrong cognition' is the cognition of a thing as something which it is not; in the case in question, the cognition 'I do not know,' while, actually there is knowledge. A 'doubt' is in the form 'Do I know or do I not know.' A 'right cognition to the contrary' is the cognition in the form 'I do not know the thing' which appears when actually the thing is not present, and hence is not cognised. The idea underlying this threefold division is that these are the only possible alternatives with regard to a thing which though sought to be known, is not rightly cognized.

It may however be pointed out that when the thing is actually known (which is what is meant by cognition taking place), the cognition 'I do not know' cannot be 'right'; and hence the third item in the above is not quite properly introduced. And it appears that the author, wishing to exhaust all cases of non-right cognition, lost sight of this apparent anomaly: the absence of right cognition applies to the first two only; it is the absence of cognition that applies to all three.
anything sought to be known there is an absence of untrue cognition (in the form of either doubt or wrong conception) and of contrary cognition, this absence implies that the thing is rightly cognised,—the absence of wrong cognition being invariably concomitant, in such cases, with right cognition. Were this not so, even that man whose desire to know is not hampered in any way would only have a cognition pertaining to the negation of that thing (i. e., only doubtful or wrong cognition)—a cognition which would have for its invariable concomitant the absence of the cognisability of that thing,—i. e., which would imply that the thing is not known*. For these reasons, the Cognition must be held to be proved by the consciousness of it that all men have (i. e., it is illumined or proved by itself).

(67). To this, the Naiyāyika raises the following objection: — "The fact that Cognitions are free from doubt and error is due (not to their being self-illumined and self-proved, but) to their being regularly followed by a 'representative (or secondary) cognition' (anuvyavasāya)†." This is not so, we reply. For where the existence and cognisability of that 'secondary cognition' are not admitted (and they are actually not admitted by some philosophers, e. g. the Baudhās), there, in case of enquiry, it would be difficult to prevent doubt from attaching itself to the whole cognitional process,—such doubt beginning with the 'secondary cognition' itself which refers to the thinking Self ('I am that which possesses the knowledge of the jar') and extending down to the object of the simple cognition (the jar, for instance) (which cognition itself is the object of the anuvyavasāya or secondary cognition). For where there is a doubt regarding that for which the object is (i. e. the cognition, simple or secondary), there is a doubt with regard to the object also. And if, on the anuvyavasāya-theory, it were assumed that each cognition is invariably followed

* If the absence of Doubt and Contrary Cognition with regard to a thing did not imply that the thing is rightly known, then, even in cases where there are no obstacles to the right knowledge of a thing, we should have only doubts or contrary cognitions, and this would mean that the thing is not rightly known.

† According to the Naiyāyika the cognition 'this is a jar' is regularly followed by a secondary cognition (anuvyavasāya) in the form 'I know the jar'; and it is this latter cognition which proves or establishes the former one.

Kh. 26.
by corroborative 'secondary' cognitions up to three or four stages, the chances of doubt remain all the same (for doubt would attach itself to that corroborative cognition at which we should stop, and that doubt would vitiate the whole series). On the other hand, on the view of Cognition being self-illumined (and self-evidenced), there is no distinction of instrument and object of knowledge (since there is no object apart from the Cognition); and hence there is no opening for any objections based on such distinction (e.g. that one and the same thing cannot be the action and the object of the action at the same time). On any other hypothesis, the very form and character of Cognition could not be established; for if Cognition had to be established through something else, we should have to assume an endless series of corroborative cognitions.

(68). But, the Opponent resumes, we do not hold that the Cognition itself must necessarily be the object of another cognition, but that it is by its mere existence that it accomplishes all practical purposes in connection with itself, —and thus where could there be any necessity of making an endless assumption (of cognitions)†? But this also we disallow. For (in accordance with the Nyāya principle that 'whatever is is to be known through a valid means of knowledge') unless some valid means of knowledge were set forth, what would guarantee the real existence of the Cognition on which all those operations are to rest? What is there to indicate that the Cognition is real? Why should it not be unreal?

(69). To this the Logician makes the following reply:—The general character of the cognition as such having been established (by the anuvyavasāya cognition), while there is no valid means of knowledge to establish the cognition in its specific character, there indeed is nothing to establish the reality (truth) of the cognition in this latter aspect; but, when (as natural) the cognizer desires some such proof, it will subsequently be

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* If we read 'śvārtha vyavahāraḥ,' the meaning would be all practical purposes with regard to its object.

† The opponent might here be understood to admit the self-luminousness of cognitions; but as a matter of fact it is not so; he only regards the mere existence of the cognition enough for all practical purposes, and he does not touch the matter of the pramāṇa of the cognition.

Kh, 27.
supplied either by the reality of the activities (to which the cognition gives rise), or by some other means (e.g. remembrance)⁶. But this also we cannot allow. For there would still remain the unsettled question 'what then guarantees the reality of those activities?'—and this would again lead to an endless series. And if, to avoid this, we were to stop at some link of the series, the reality of that link would remain unestablished, and this would vitiate the reality of the whole series: a general breakdown, extending so far as to disestablish the reality of the very thing which is the object of the simple cognition, thus could not be avoided. This is what is meant by the assertion (made by the Baudhāya writer Dharmakīrti) that, 'for him who does not accept the Cognition as directly cognised by itself, the cognition of the thing cannot be established.'

(70). A person who acknowledges the need of valid means of knowledge is bound, when basing practical thought and action upon the real existence of the jar, to tell us the means of proof of such existence. If he were simply to accept such reality without reference to any proof, why should not the contrary (i.e. the unreality of the jar) be the true fact? It therefore is incumbent on him to show the existence of proofs for the real existence of the jar. But then again, a thorough person cannot accept the reality of these proofs without further proofs for their reality; in agreement with the axiom that the absence of the existence of proofs implies the absence of the existence of the thing (the existence of which would be proved by the existence of the proofs). Otherwise we should have to admit the reality of such things as the 'seventh flavour' (in addition to the six)†

⁶ The Logician pleads that the anurūpañña cognition ('I am cognizing') may not guarantee the truth of the specific cognition 'I cognize the jar,'—it being possible that what is cognised as the jar may not be a jar but something else,—but it at any rate guarantees the reality of this latter cognition as cognition; the object may be right or wrong, but there is no doubt that the Cognition is there. And subsequently the evident reality of the practical activities to which the specific cognition gives rise guarantees the reality of the cognition qua specific cognition. Or else, it may be the remembrance of the thing (the jar e. g.), which supplies the required conviction.

† The six flavours are—Katu (pungent), Amla (acid), Lavāṇa (saltish), Tikta (bitter), Kaṣaya (astringent), and Madhura (sweet).
which alone are known from experience). It thus is evident that he who refuses to accept Cognitions as self-evidenced is in an evil plight indeed. For if he were to accept the reality of proofs, without troubling about the real existence of proofs for the reality of the proofs, we might justly call on him to accept at once the reality of the jar itself; it would in that case be needless to trouble about proofs for such reality.

(71). The Logician now may attempt to present his case in a different way. "We do not," he says, "maintain that in the case of every cognition there is an infinite continuous chain of cognitions and cognitions of cognitions; our theory rather is that somewhere in that chain there is a cognition which is established by a valid means of knowledge; and that through this cognition the entire series of cognitions is validated, (whence there is no need of an endless retrogressus of cognitions)." But this explanation also could be accepted only if, in addition to the cognitions 'this is a jar' and 'I cognise the jar', we ordinary men were conscious of the rise of another cognition, weighted with the burden of numerous objects constituted by the whole series consisting of the jar and its series of cognitions (while as a matter of fact we do not find within ourselves any cognition thus burdened).

(72). And even if some such all-comprehensive cognition should be possible for beings with capacities transcending ours (e.g. men possessing the gift of so-called 'Yoga-perception'), that cognition, which would have for its object the cognition weighted by all those objects, would again have to be viewed as cognised by a further cognition. But for such further cognition there is, in the first place, no proof; and in the second place, no final Release would be possible in that case. For no cognition (even of the Yogin) could apprehend the entire series of cognitions, including itself; since this would mean that the cognition is self-evidenced (which is just what our opponent denies). This reasoning also disposes of the view that, "the last and last but one of the series (of the cognitions of the Yogin) mutually appre-

*The cycle of birth and rebirth of the Soul, according to the Logician, continues so long as the soul remains endowed with any of its specific qualities; and as Cognition is one of such qualities, so long as there would be any cognition, the soul would remain bound within the cycle.

Kh. 29.
bend each other"; for if the last cognition apprehended its predecessor (of which it itself is, ex hypothesi, an object), it would, in apprehending that, at the same time apprehend itself (in other words, it would be self-evidenced).

(73). Nor also have you any proof for the statement that the last cognition will be apprehended (not by the cogniser of the series himself, but) by another person who will not apprehend the absence of that cognition. For on this hypothesis also you will have to assume an endless series of proofs upon proofs.

(74). Nor may you justify the assumption of an endless series of cognitions (each of which has for its object the preceding member of the series) by pointing to the infinite series which presents itself as soon as we enquire into the causal factors of a thing such as a jar, and into the factors of those factors, and so on. For the two cases are not parallel. If there were any break in the series constituted by the jar and its causes, it would follow that the jar is eternal. And it is on the basis of this presumptive reasoning (arthāpatti) that we conclude that in the chain of the jar's causal factors there is no break (i.e., that that chain extends backwards into infinity). If the same was the case with Cognition also, (i.e., if there were some presumptive evidence in the character of the Cognition, as that, if the 'series of cognitions' were to break at any point, then from that point backwards, up to the very beginning of the series, there would be no establishing of any cognition at all, and hence the cognition must be accepted as having all cognitions of the series for its object), then, inasmuch as the particular cognition itself would be included in the 'series' apprehended by it, there would be an apprehension of

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* The cognition of that other man also would ultimately have for its proof the cognition of some other man, and so on and on ad infinitum.

† If there were a break or stop in the endless retrogressive series of causal factors of any thing, e.g., a jar, i.e., if we refused to assume further causal factors for any particular set of such factors, then this latter set would have to be viewed as uncaused, i.e., eternal. As such however it would have exercised its causal power (the power to produce its definite effect) from all eternity, and from this it would follow that the effect itself, the jar e.g., would be eternal.
the cognition by itself; and if (in order to avoid this) the cognition were not included in the 'series,' then for the apprehension of that cognition itself it would be necessary to postulate another cognition, and so on and on ad infinitum; and, if lastly (in order to avoid both these contingencies) it be held that that cognition itself is not apprehended, then the non-apprehension of that one cognition would gradually mean the non-apprehension of every one of the cognitions in the series; and from this tangle of difficulties there would be no escape for you. And further you would be open to all the objections that we are going to point out later on (in kārikā 35, para 359) in connection with the relationship (according to the Logician) among the means of knowledge and their objects.

(75). Nor can it be maintained, on account of the difficulties stated, that cognition does not exist at all; for that which proves itself to every one cannot be denied. And, as we shall show later on, (kārikā 26, para 164) it is just the view of Cognition being self-evidenced which frees it from all objections. And as that only can be self-established or self-proved which is of the nature of prakāśa (light, illumination, intelligence, consciousness), no attributes whatever that are of the nature of non-intelligence (jaññatva), (the essence of which is that it depends upon something other than itself) can adhere to self-accomplished Cognition.

(76). † It is for this reason (viz., of cognition not having any attributes) that Cognition does not form the object of verbal assertions which depend for their functioning on the acknowledgment of attributes. (There, however, are certain attributes which

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* The final cognition not being ‘known,’ the ‘cognition’ preceding it in the ‘series’—i. e. the cognition of which that final cognition would be the object,—would not be possible; as if this cognition existed, the final cognition could not be said to be not known. And similarly tracing the series backwards step by step, we would find each one of the cognitions in the series to be non est.

† This is in answer to the question—“If the Cognition has no attributes, how can we speak of it as ‘self-evidenced’?—as such an assertion presupposes the presence of some attribute?” The sense of the reply is that such assertions are figurative, being based upon an indirect imposition of attributes upon Cognition which, by its nature, is without any.

Kh. 31.
are predicated of Cognition in an indirect way—as follows): Eternality is predicated of it on the ground of its not being limited by time; it is designated as 'all-present' because it is not limited in space; and is spoken of as the 'all-self,' 'non-duality' and so forth, on account of its being absolutely free from the limitation of any specific characteristics. The acceptance of these attributes does not conflict with Cognition being absolutely non-dual; for they imply nothing but absence of certain limitations. Our view on this point is similar to that of the Baudhâ and the Prabhâkara who hold that 'absence or negation is nothing different from the place where it resides,' and also to that of the Logician himself who holds that mutual negation is nothing different from the things between which that relation holds good. Nor can any objection be taken to the negation implied in 'non-duality,' on the ground that the counter-entity of this negation (i.e. the entity denied, i.e. duality) has absolutely no existence. For the negation here is as legitimate as that of the object of a erroneous conception (as when we negate the presence of shell-silver, 'there is no shell-silver in this place,' although that silver has no existence).

(77). This 'Cognition' (or Consciousness or Brahman) is set forth by Scripture which stands to it in the relation of a valid means of knowledge (pramâna). Scripture does not indeed directly denote or express it (for, as stated above, self-proved Cognition or Consciousness lies outside the sphere of what can be declared by words); but it indirectly intimates that it is what is meant to be expressed. Hence, although in reality to Consciousness the relation of thing denoted and words denoting does not apply, it yet is indirectly intimated by the texts of the Veda; and from the point of view of Nescience we therefore may, as others (among them the Naiyâyikas) do, designate the Veda as a valid means of cognizing 'Cognition' (Brahman). We however must keep in mind that in reality Cognition is established or proved by nothing else but itself.

"According to the Logician, mutual negation is co-extensive with the things between which it subsists—and the perception of this negation consists in the perception of the things"—Upaskâra on Vaiśeṣika-sūtras IX—i-4 & 8.

Kh. 32.
[To the doctrine that Cognition apprehends itself, it must not be objected that a thing cannot at the same time be subject and object of action (karman). For of 'object of action' no valid definition can be given.]

(78). Another objection is raised against the self-apprehension of Cognitions. "It is altogether absurd", our opponent says, "to hold that Cognition is self-apprehended; since the relation between an action and its object is not possible, unless the two are different things. For the action, being something to be accomplished, proceeds from the object; and in this sense the object is the cause of the action. A thing truly cannot be accomplished by itself; for what constitutes the relation of cause and effect is the peculiar fact of one thing being the antecedent of the other; and a thing cannot possibly be its own antecedent or consequent; since antecedence, as well as consequence, to a certain thing refers to a point of time that is not determined by that thing. Hence, if we were to assume the existence of the thing at that time, we should lapse into the self-contradiction of one and the same point of time being connected as well as non-connected with the same thing."

(79). This is not so, we reply. We do not acknowledge it as an absolute rule that actions are produced by their objects; for clearly, no such relation is possible in the case of the cognitions of things that are yet to come into existence. That the object is, in grammatical terminology, called a kāraka (i.e. literally, the producer of the action), is due to the fact that in some cases the object of the action is found to be productive of it. Again, we find the Object of an action defined (1) as that which is the sphere of the operation of the instrument, or (2) as that which receives the result of the action,—the action itself inhering (by samavāya) in something else; and on the basis of either of these definitions we may use the word 'object' without any idea of the object being that which produces the action.

(80). Let us however more closely consider these definitions of the Object, the nature of which you say is incompatible with our

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* As e. g. in the case of what is expressed by the sentence 'I know (my) self.'

Kh. 33.
view (of the self-evidencing character of Cognition). The second of the definitions given above,—viz: that the Object is that which receives the result of the action which itself inquires in something else,—is unacceptable, since it applies to the Ablative also (which never is Karman). Should you rejoin that that which stands in the Ablative case is also an 'object'; we demur; since in that case, instead of 'vṛ̱kṣāt parṇam patati' (the leaf falls from the tree, ablative) we might also say vṛ̱kṣam parṇam patati' ('vṛ̱kṣam' being in the objective case) (while as a matter of fact we do not say so). If to this you rejoin that it depends on the wish of the speaker whether one or the other case be used, and that in the sentence quoted the objective case is not used simply because the speaker does not wish to use it,—we reply that if an objective character really belonged to the Ablative, any speaker choosing to use the Accusative (objective) case-ending in place of the Ablative one, would be free to do so. The opponent may rejoin that it is a traditional convention of Grammarians that the Ablative is never to be spoken of as the Objective. But then it comes to this that, even though the Ablative is never to be used or spoken of as the Objective case, yet, in agreement with your definition of the object, you really hold it to be an 'objective;' and this would afford an opening for defining the Object as anything. And whence, we ask, have you acquired that more than human insight that enables you to ascribe to the Ablative the objective character as defined by you, while yet it never can be used or spoken of as 'objective'? The opponent may here restate his definition in the following somewhat qualified form:—"the object is that which, while not being expressed by an Ablative, receives the result of an action inquiring in something else." But this also we cannot accept, for on this definition, we should have to regard as transitive (having an object) the verb 'rises' in the sentence 'the river rises', in as much as the rising would have an object (as defined by you) in the shape of those parts of the river bank which receive the result of the action of rising.

* In the case of what is expressed by the sentence 'vṛ̱kṣāt parṇam patati' 'the leaf falls from the tree' (abl. case) the result of the action of falling—which inquires in the falling leaf—is received by the tree which is deprived of the leaf. Hence, if the definition of 'object' given in the text is valid, the tree also is an object.
in the sense of their being reached by the high water. * If instead of the qualifying clause you should insert the clause 'which is destructive of the action',—i.e. if you define the object as that which receives such a result of the action inhering in something else as puts a stop to the action,—we point out—(1) that the objection we have urged on the ground of the sentence 'the river rises' remains as valid as before; [for the connection of the water with the higher parts of the bank, which is the result of the rising of the river, may be said to put a stop to the rising] ;—(2) that no transitive character could in that case belong to the root vṛjdh 'to cut' †;—(3) that in that case the verb tyaj (as occurring in sentences like 'vṛṣṭhan tyajati pavanam', 'the leaf leaves the tree') could not be regarded as transitive [in as much as the result of the action of leaving, i.e. the separation of the leaf from the tree, does not put a stop to the action of leaving]; —and (4) that in the sentence 'ātmānaṁ-jānāmi', 'I know myself', the ātmānam could not be considered as an Object, since there is in this case no 'something else' (in which the action inheres; the ātman being the object and at the same time that in which the action inheres). It might be said that, "in the case of the Self, 'otherness' or 'diversity' is introduced by the difference of limiting adjuncts (upādhi); so that the Self, in so far as conditioned by those adjuncts,—viz: the qualities of being a doing and enjoying agent, and so on,—would be the object of cognition (while the pure Self is the cognising subject)." But although this may be so in a certain sense‡, yet he who knows the real Self certainly would cognise it as free from limitations; and ex hypothesi the Self free from limitations cannot be the object of cognition. How, further, would you make out the character of the 'object' in sentences such as 'pachyate phalam svayameva', 'the fruit ripens by itself', where the same fruit is both nominative and object, [and the action thus does not inhere in something other than the object]. Then again, the Logician regards God as omniscient (and eternal); and as His cognitions are eternal, they can

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* This emendation will serve to exclude the objective character from the tree from which leaves fall.
† This root is found in such sentences as 'vṛṣṭhan vardhathe vardhakih,' 'the wood-cutter cuts the tree.'
‡ In reality, in this case, the limitations would be the real object.

Kh. 35.
never be put a stop to by their results; and thus your definition of the object is not applicable to things known by God. For all these reasons we conclude that the term 'object' is merely a technical term—similar to terms such as 'nadi,' 'vṛiddhi' and the like,—which the Grammarians have devised to account, in their conventional way, for the formation of words; and we hence need not pursue the search for a comprehensive definition of Object.† We shall deal with further aspects of this question in the chapter on 'Self-apprehension' forming part of our other work 'Īshvarābhisandhi.'

SECTION 5.

[Nor can the theory that Cognition is self-illumined or self-evidenced be objected to on the ground that one and the same thing cannot be 'subject' and 'object' of cognition (viśayin and viśaya). We in the first place do not admit this alleged incompatibility of subject and object; and in the second place theoretical doubts on this point have no force against undeniable facts of consciousness; neither self-consciousness (the 'I-cognition') nor cognition of any object would be possible if viśaya and viśayin were necessarily distinct entities. We therefore, while being at one with the Baudhā as to the undefinability and consequent unreality of all that is not cognition and consciousness, hold that Cognition or Consciousness is completely proved by itself.]

* Pāṇini uses the term 'nadi' (which properly means river) to denote all feminine bases ending in 'i'; and just as there can be no definition of 'nadi' (river) that could apply to all these bases, so in the same there can be no definition of 'objective' that would apply to all cases.

† According to the Vidyāśāgari the text here has the following additional sentence—"Nor can the objective be defined as that which is the sphere of the action of the instrument; because this definition would apply also to cases such as hastena Kāmaṇḍa shareṇa, where the action of the 'hand' falls on the 'arrow'. And further even without a comprehensive definition of the object, we could speak of it as that which, while bringing about an action, is the aim of its operation."

This passage however appears too disjointed to be accepted as part of the original text; and, moreover, it does not appear likely that the author, after having once said that he considers it useless further to pursue the question of definition, should discuss another definition. The passage probably is a marginal gloss which has crept into the text.

Kh. 36.
(81). The Opponent now takes up other ground:—"If", he says, "self-illumined Cognition is absolutely non-dual, then, the relation between 'object' viṣaya and 'subject' viṣayin (i.e., the Cognition) will not be possible. For to be viṣayin—literally, 'that which has an object'—means to be related to an object; and no relation (or connection) can subsist without some kind of difference; for where there is no cognition of difference between the things related, the cognition of relation is something contrary to reason."

(82). This is not so, we reply. That relation which is constituted by 'subject' and 'object' is not something different from the things related; and even if it were such, we—in order to avoid an objectionable infinite regress—would have to admit the fact of that relation ultimately resting in itself.† And as thus it must be admitted that this last cognition of relation is accomplished without assuming any difference between the relation and the things related—and this for the reason that so-called svarūpa (or svabhāva) relation is not bound by the same rules as other kinds of relation‡—so in the same manner the relation of 'subject' and 'object' may be viewed as accomplishing itself without any

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* It is generally held that all cognition implies that relation the two terms of which are called the 'viṣaya' (object) and the 'viṣayin' which may be translated as 'subject,' although this is somewhat misleading; for the viṣayin is not what we understand by the 'knowing subject,' but merely the cognition (jñāna). The objection raised by the Naiyāyika against the Vedāntin is that if 'cognition' is absolutely non-dual, the distinction between viṣaya and viṣayin vanishes, and with it Cognition itself, for which such distinction is essential.

† If the relation were something really different from the terms of the relation, we should have to postulate a further relation connecting the first relation with those terms, and so on, in infinitum; to avoid which infinite regress (—and that such regresses must be avoided is a general principle of Indian philosophical argumentation—) we should have to stop at some place and assume that the last relation at which we have arrived is not something different from the terms it connects.

‡ The meaning is that the case of the viṣaya-viṣayin relation is analogous to that of the svarūpa (natural) relation as conceived by the Logicians themselves. In the case of other relations, as e.g. Samyoga (conjunction of two things in space), the relation is viewed by the Logicians as something additional to, other than, the things conjoined. In the case of the svarūpa-relation, on the other hand,—which exists e.g. between the ground and the absence of the jar, as expressed in the judgment 'there is no jar in this place'—the relation is not held to be anything different from its terms i.e. the jar and the ground.
difference between the things related; and thus the apprehension also of the relation is possible without any apprehension of difference (between subject and object). There surely is nothing incongruous in all this.

(83). Nor must it be argued that if the subject-object-relation in the case of self-apprehending cognition were to differ even in the least from the subject-object-relation in the case of the jar and the cognition of the jar, one of these relations would have to be rejected as false. For the fact is that in the case of the jar and the cognition of it, that relation has to be rejected as false because they both have a merely illusory existence (are figments of Nescience); while in the case of self-evidenced Cognition, which is absolutely real, that relation also is absolutely real. Hence no fault can be found with the view of the two relations not being of the same kind.

(84). It however is not really necessary to assume that the self-apprehension of Cognition demands that cognition should be related to itself either by the relation of action-and-object-of-action, or by that of subject-(viśayin)-and-object-(viṣaya.) According to you Logicians things are being (sat), through their being connected with the 'Universal' Being (sattā) (which inheres in all that is through the so-called samavāya relation); that 'Universal' Being itself however is being through itself; and this resting in itself of Being is not held to constitute an absurdity. In the same way we may regard cognitions as self-accomplished (without either of the aforesaid relations being appealed to).

(85). Or, we may view the matter in the light of another analogous case. Bahuvrhi-compounds of the class called 'tad-guna-samvijñāna,' primarily denote something not directly denoted by any of the component words, while at the same time

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* The objection here anticipated is that if the Vedāntin does not admit both relations to be of the same kind, one of the two must be rejected; and as that subsisting between the jar and the cognition of the jar is found to be real by universal experience, it is the self-apprehension of the cognition that must be rejected. The Vedāntin, on his part, argues that one of the two must no doubt be rejected; but the one so to be rejected is the relation between the jar and the cognition of it.

† An example of this class of compounds is lamba-karna (long-ear) which primarily denotes the ass, while at the same time it suggests what the component words directly denote, viz. long ears.
they secondarily denote what is directly denoted by those words. Analogously Cognition may be conceived as primarily apprehending its object (e.g. a jar), and therein also apprehending itself, which in reality is not its object. This theory however, declaring as it does that self-apprehension belongs to cognitions having objects (e.g. a jar)—properly belongs to the Guru (Prabhākara), and is not the Vedāntic theory of the self-apprehension of Brahman; since in the latter there is no object whatever. We however may reason on the same lines by making use of a different analogy: just as in the case of 'Kuṭādi' (a technical term denoting a number of words among which 'Kuṭa' is the first), the compound (Kuṭādi) applies to what is not its object (i.e. is not directly denoted by the term), so Cognition also, in the state of Nescience* apprehends itself—although this 'Self' is not really its object.

(86). Although therefore our theory of the Self-apprehension of Cognition is on several points in disagreement with ordinary experience (where the relations of action and object of action, and subject and object always imply difference), yet 'Presumption' (anyathānupapattiḥ), being shown fully to prove such apprehension, obliges us to accept the theory together with those discrepancies. This is as follows: We have to give up the notion, suggested by ordinary experience, that the Cogniser is something different from the thing cognised, since otherwise the cognition of the I, (where the subject and the object of cognition are one) could not be accounted for. Similarly we have to abandon the view of the thing cognised being different from the cognition; because otherwise the consciousness 'I know' (where the cognition is also the object cognised) would not be possible. The means of proof relied on in the above instances which is technically called 'presumption', being stronger than any other means of proof, would refute even a hundred arguments based on facts of ordinary experience. We have on this point the following authoritative enunciation (by Kumārilā Bhaṭṭa, Tantra- Vārttika II. 1. 5): 'Ever so many things not directly experienced have to be assumed when there is a valid means of proof for them.'

* This qualifying clause is added to guard against the objection that even such Self-apprehension of the Cognition as here is set forth, involves duality which is not acceptable to the Vedāntin.

Kh. 39.
(87). Thus then, when we have Presumption to prove a certain thing, it crushes under foot all discrepancies with ordinary experience; for it is the strongest of all means of proof. (6)

You then must either provide some other explanation of the fact on which the said 'Presumption' relies, or give up your obstinate clinging to mere facts of experience; for the two can no more abide together than light and shade. (7)

(88). We thus have shown that the self-evidencedness of Cognition is something that you yourselves may easily comprehend and accept,—and we have done so by means of lines of argumentation fulfilling all the rules of correct reasoning as acknowledged by yourselves. As for ourselves, we accept Cognition as self-proved and self-accomplished on the sole strength of our consciousness.

(89). The difference between the Baudhā and the Vedāntin then comes to this:—The Baudhā regards everything, without exception, as anirvachaniya, i.e. indefinable; as Buddha himself has declared in the Lankāvatāra Sūtra (II. 173)—"when we come rationally to examine things, we cannot ascertain the nature of anything; hence all things must be declared to be indefinable and devoid of any assignable nature or character."—The Vedāntins on the other hand declare that this entire Universe, with the exception of Cognition or Consciousness, is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal. It cannot be absolutely real, because this view is beset by difficulties which we shall point out later on; nor can we regard it as absolutely unreal, since this would strike at the root of all empirical thought, speech and action of intelligent men of the world.

(90). Our adversary may here taunt us as follows:—"If you are incapable of defining things, you should at once betake yourself to proper teachers who will teach you definitions." But this taunt would be justified only if we maintained that this undefinability of things depends not on the very nature of things, but on the incapacity of the speaker.

(91). Let our opponent who imagines that he can define things come forward with his definitions. He will fail; for we shall at once point out objections to each definition he attempts. The Logician will perhaps reply that the very objections of

Kh. 40.
VIDYARANYA'S
VIVARANA-PRAMEYA-SAṄGRAHA

PRELIMINARY NOTE.

The work, a translation of which is here begun is entitled 'Vivarana-praméya-saṅgraha,' i.e., "a Summary of the Topics of the 'Elucidation' '. The 'Elucidation,' the contents of which our work claims to exhibit in a comprehensive form, is the commentary, by Prakāshātman, on the so-called Pañchapaḍikā which itself is a commentary on the introductory section of Saṅkarāchārya's Commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras. The latter work, the Pañchapaḍikā and the Vivaraṇa together form the most authoritative exposition of that aspect of Vedānta theory which is associated with Saṅkarāchārya's name. A translation of the Pañchapaḍikā has been begun by Mr. A. Venis in the Benares 'Pandit', and a translation of the Vivaraṇa might, therefore, possibly be considered as what is just now most needed to help us to a full understanding of the 'Saṅkara Mata.' But the Saṅgraha, although a later work, has the very great advantage of not being a formal commentary, and therefore capable of being read and understood by itself; while the Vivaraṇa imposes upon the reader the exceedingly irksome task of constantly referring not to one only but to two previous works, the elucidation of which is its avowed object.

For the convenience of readers who may wish to refer to the Sanskrit text, the numbers of the pages in the edition of the Vivaraṇa-praméya-saṅgraha published in the 'Vizianagram Sanskrit Series' are noted at the due places.

Viv. 1.
VIVARAṆA-PRAMEYA-SAṆGRAHA.

BY
Vidyāranya (Mādhavāchārya).

INTRODUCTORY VERSES.

1. The abode of supreme bliss\(^*\) which shines within the lotus of the heart—delighting all living beings here below by a mere fraction of itself, and, in a higher state of being, by completely absorbing them within itself,—into that holy ascetics devoutly enter!

2. What is undertaken in this work is a concise exposition of the topics treated of in the ‘Elucidation’ (i.e., the Vivaraṇa composed by Prakāshātman) of the Gloss (tīkā, i.e., the Paṅcha-pādikā composed by Padmapādāchārya) on the ‘Commentary’ (i.e., Shaṅkarāchārya’s great commentary on the Vedānta-Sūtras); to the end that the student may be saved the trouble and fatigue connected with the reading of such works as stand to each other in the relation of texts to be explained and formal explanations of such texts.

3. And (if the question be asked to what class of readers systematic works on the Vedānta address themselves,—we reply that) those who, urged by the injunction of the reading of the Veda as an absolute duty, have read the Vedānta-texts (i.e., the Upaniṣads) and thereupon are troubled by doubts as to their purport, are the proper persons to study the Vedānta-sūtras (in which the teaching of the Upaniṣads is systematized), the Commentary thereon and all further subsidiary works.

Sūtra I—Varṇaka. (1)

I.

[It is an absolute duty incumbent on every Brāhmaṇa to study the Veda. He there meets with texts declaring that the cognition of the Highest Self is the means to attain to Immortality (Final Release—which naturally is the highest aim of man). And other texts further declare that, in order to arrive at the cognition of the highest Self, it is needful to hear, reflect and meditate upon, that Self.]

\(^*\) Or ‘the feet of Shaṅkarānanda’ (the teacher of Mādhavāchārya).

Viv. 2.
The injunction 'the Veda is to be read' is an absolute (nitya) injunction of such reading, in agreement with the declaration† 'the Veda with its six auxiliary disciplines is to be read and understood, as a religious duty, independently of any special motive.' For if the injunction of such study were one valid for him only who desires to attain certain objects, the following vicious circle would result—when there is an understanding of the matter of the Veda there arise certain desires (as being capable of being fulfilled through acting in accordance with Vedic injunctions); and, on the other hand, when there are certain desires in a man's mind, he engages in the study of the Veda with its auxiliary disciplines, and thus attains to an understanding of the sense of the Veda. We therefore hold fast to the view that, what prompts men to the study of the Veda together with its auxiliary disciplines is nothing else but the force of that absolutely binding injunction of study, and that they in this way come to comprehend the sense of the Veda. Now, owing to the influence of the maturation of long-accumulated religious merit there springs up, here and there, in the mind of some individual man, the desire to attain to the very highest good of man, and, looking in the Veda for means of realizing that good he comes across the following text—'For the love of the Self everything is dear';‡ and as this text means that everything else is dear only in so far as it subserves the Self, he loses his desire for all things other than the Self, and thus becomes qualified for 'the knowledge of the Self'.

Now a further text, beginning with the words 'when the Self has been seen heard, reflected on and known, then all this is known,' concludes with the words 'this much indeed is Immortality.'§ From this the student learns that the 'seeing' of the Self is a means towards Immortality which itself is the highest

* A Vedic injunction (vidhi) is either absolute, unconditional, permanent (nitya)—i.e., enjoins a duty which is absolutely binding on an individual man or a class of men; or it is kāmya,—i.e., it prescribes a certain course of action for him who is desirous of obtaining a certain wish (kāma) or end. The Jyotiṣṭoma-sacrifice is to be performed by him who desires, on death, to pass into the special heavenly region called Svarga. The study of the Veda, on the other hand, is unconditionally incumbent on every Brāhmana.
† In Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya, I.1.1, page 1 Bombay Sans. Series.
‡ Brīhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad. (II.4.5).
§ Ibid. (IV. 5.15).

Viv. 3.
object of man. But as 'seeing' is something that does not depend on the wish and exertion of man and hence cannot be enjoined or commanded, the student understands that the clause 'the Self is to be seen' (although an injunction in form, is not a genuine injunction, but) is a mere mention of that 'seeing' for the purpose of enjoining the 'hearing' of the texts as the principal means through which 'seeing' is to be attained, along with such useful aids as 'reflecting,' and 'meditating'—the injunction being conveyed by the imperative sentence 'the Self is to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on.' [i.e. what this sentence enjoins, for the accomplishing of the 'seeing of the self,' as the principal matter (āṅgin) is hearing, towards which reflection and meditation stand in the relation of useful subordinate matters (āṅga)]

*Bri-Upanishad II 4.5.*

† The introductory part of the Saṅgraha which deals with vidhi (injunction,) may be passed over by the reader interested in Vedānta philosophy, but not anxious to enter into the details of Indian scholastics. The following remarks, however, will be useful to him who may wish to understand why this book, no less than other systematic Vedānta works, begins with discussions of vidhi (injunction). The Vedāntins consider the fundamental truths of their system to be set forth, or revealed, in one of the two great sections of the Veda. By the 'Veda' itself we have to understand a certain group of literary compositions—or, to use a more genuinely Hindu expression—a certain aggregate of sentences or texts (vākyas)—which are distinguished from all other literary works 'or aggregates of sentences' by two main circumstances—they are not of human nor indeed of divine origin, for they are absolutely self-existent and eternal; and they impart to the hearer truths which cannot be attained by any of the ordinary means of true cognition. The body of the Veda, no doubt, contains numerous texts or passages which are not original, in as much as they merely tell us what is, or may be, known by other means, e.g. Perception; passages of this character indeed make up the bulk of the Veda. But in the midst of these passages of secondary importance there appear a limited number of texts or enunciations of primary importance on which the unique character of the Veda depends. These texts teach man what otherwise he could not know at all. And of texts of this character two different classes have to be distinguished. The first class comprises so-called vidhis or injunctions, i.e. enunciations which, owing to their imperative form, move men to certain courses of action, the injunctions themselves declaring those courses of action to lead to certain desirable results; of this kind is e.g. the well-known text 'Let him who is desirous of the heavenly world perform the Jyotiṣṭoma-sacrifice'. The aggregate of such injunctive passages, together with secondary texts connected with them in some way or other, constitutes

*Viv. 4.*
But, an objection is raised, although he who studies the Veda with its auxiliary disciplines thereby arrives at an understanding of its literal sense, he will not grasp its real purport without further thought; and hence the text quoted can hardly refer to that understanding of the Veda which results from mere hearing! Not so, we reply. There are passages in the so-called Karma-kāṇḍa, i.e., that section of the Veda which is concerned with action, mainly of a ritual kind. The second, and in the opinion of the Vedāntin infinitely more important, class of Vedic texts does not urge man to action, but enunciates certain theoretical truths (more accurately one supreme truth, viz., that the individual soul is identical with the universal principle of intelligence or thought—Brahman), the result of which is illumination of the hearer’s mind—such illumination taking place without any choice orendeavour on the hearer’s part; just as a sound eye perceives without effort, and cannot choose but perceive, an object placed before it in bright day-light. The aggregate of such non-injunctive, purely declaratory or instructive, texts— together with a considerable mass of secondary passages of a character merely explanatory, illustrative, etc.—constitutes the Jñāna-kāṇḍa, i.e., that part of the Veda which is concerned with knowledge. Roughly speaking that part consists of the Upaniṣads.

But now it is a patent fact that even the Jñāna-kāṇḍa of the Veda contains numerous enunciations of an injunctive—imperative or hortatory—form, somehow bearing on the cognition of theoretic truth; and this fact has to be accounted for without an infringement of the general theory that the insight into truth which the Upaniṣads bring about flashes upon the hearer’s mind with a sudden irresistible illumination, and that nobody can be ordered to know. The explanation given is that while knowledge in itself is spontaneous, involuntary, it yet accomplishes itself in the mind of him only who has gone through certain preliminary activities—hearing, studying, pondering and the like—which do depend on the will and energy of man, and therefore may be objects of injunction. Wherever therefore we meet in the Upaniṣads with texts which appear to say that man should endeavour to know Brahman, we have to understand that what is enjoined there is only those preliminary mental operations of which cognition itself is the spontaneous result. It thus remains true that the knowledge of Brahman is something that can be declared, but not enjoined. Nor, in the next place, may it be said that we do not require Vedic texts to tell us that in order to apprehend the truths enounced in the Upaniṣads we must study, and ponder the meaning of, sacred texts. For the possible modes of learning and studying are various, and the originality (the truly Vedic character) of the injunctions in question lies therein that they prescribe one certain definite mode of study of the sacred texts as alone capable of bringing about the desired result, viz., cognition of the identity of the individual with the universal Self, and thereby Final Release.

Viv. 5.
Purāṇas which clearly set forth that the grasping of the purport is included in the hearing.

"Hearing," viz., from scriptural texts, and 'reflecting' with the help of proving arguments, and 'meditating'—these are the causes of the seeing, i.e., the intuition of the Self.

(Page 2). Among these several causes, 'hearing,'—i.e., the hearing of all the Vedānta texts from the beloved mouth of a venerated teacher,—consists in the ascertainment of the true purport of the texts, help being given by the drift of introductory clauses and the like.

By 'reflecting' is meant the repeated turning over in one's mind of arguments supporting the meaning of the texts; and by 'meditating' the steady concentration of the mind in the act of 'hearing' as well as 'reflecting.'

Both meditation and reflection are auxiliary means contributing towards the general result (viz., the intuition of Brahman); through the former, non-knowledge (of Brahman) is put an end to; through the latter, contrary conceptions (such as the view of atoms or the like being the cause of the world) are utterly destroyed. 'Hearing' is superior in importance to both 'reflecting' and 'meditating:' for it stands in a more intimate relation towards the origination of knowledge; further off there stand 'reflection' which excludes other views, and 'meditation'; while calmness of mind, restraint of the senses, &c., fall under the head of 'details of procedure.'

In the mind of a man, then, who is fortified with all these subsidiary helps, there arises through the action of the word of the Veda, a mental modification (vṛtti) of a pure nature which has for its object the oneness of the soul and Brahman; and the manifestation, within that mental modification, of the universal intelligent principle—self-accomplished and divine—that it is which constitutes Brahman-cognition, that it is which destroys Nescience.

Through the instrumentality of the sacred word there arises a modification, perfect and firm, of the internal organ (manas)

*The Purāṇa passages are quoted in the text as proving that the main means of grasping the purport of the Veda is the 'hearing' of the sacred texts. They however extend over other matters also—on which we do not comment in this place, because they will be dealt with much more fully in the body of the work.

Viv. 6.
—which has the form of oneness of soul and Brahman; the
'seer' of that modification is the self-luminous internal Self;
in so far as manifested therein (in that modification of the
manas), in its own being, which is Brahman, that Self is called
'knowledge of Brahman.' Nescience is something merely
illuminated (manifested) by the intelligent Self, and hence exists
in consciousness only; comparable to the darkness which, in
day-time, exists in the consciousness of the owl. This non-real
Nescience and all its effects the serene Self naturally destroys
by itself; so that the Self only remains in its full Brahma-nature.
And that state of cognition which establishes the Self, thus
remaining and being the sole object of its consciousness, is
what we call 'divine cognition.'

II.

[The texts declaring that the highest Self must be heard,
reflected on, etc., are injunctive (vidhi) in character, and belong
to the special class of injunctions (technically called 'defining'
injunctions) the object of which is to restrict the agent to one
of several prima facie possible courses of action.]

[Page 3.] But, our opponent argues, even with these explana-
tions we cannot allow that the hearing of the Veda is something
that can be enjoined. For if there is an injunction at all, it
must be one of the three recognised kinds of injunction—i.e., it
must either be an injunction which, like that of the Jyotiśtoma-

*The nature of the several vidhis cannot be discussed here at length;
the difference between the three kinds may, however, shortly be stated as
follows: An apūrva-vidhi enjoins what, apart from that vidhi, is absolutely
non-established (unknown); it is the Vedic injunction only which moves us to
offer the Jyotiśtoma-sacrifice in order to attain to the heavenly world. A
niyama-vidhi defines the course of action, in cases where several alternatives
are possible—each of which is partially non-established or unknown, in so
far, as without the vidhi, other courses of procedure would be equally likely
to be resorted to, and thus exclude the procedure enjoined by the vidhi.
The function of a parisaikhyā-vidhi is to restrict the agent to certain lines
of action out of a number which are all equally established and are not
mutually exclusive; as when the Veda lays down that the flesh of five kinds
of five-nailed animals only is lawful food; while natural appetite moves man
to eat the flesh of animals of any kind.

Viv. 7.
sacrifice, establishes something not known through any other means of knowledge (apūrva-vidhi); or a 'defining' or 'restrictive' injunction (niyama-vidhi), like that which prescribes that the shelling of the rice-grains required for the sacrificial cake is to be effected by beating the grains in a mortar (not by removing the husks with the finger-nails, which, apart from the special defining injunction, would be the natural way of proceeding); or else an injunction of exclusion (parisākhya-vidhi), such as the injunction 'five five-nailed animals may be eaten' (the purport of which injunction is to exclude from being used as food, all other five-nailed animals). Now the alleged injunction of 'hearing' cannot be of the first kind; for positive and negative experience alike prove that the hearing of, reflecting on, etc., the Vedānta texts is a means towards the cognition of Brahman; which is a result accessible to perception or observation (so that no Vedic text is required to enjoin the hearing of the Veda as a means of cognizing Brahman). For ordinary experience teaches, that in any case the study of a certain branch of knowledge is the means towards understanding the matter concerned; he, e.g., who studies the standard works on medicine apprehends the matters with which that science deals. Nor can an injunction of 'hearing' the Veda be a so-called niyama-vidhi. For there is in this case nothing enabling us to assume a non-perceived (transcendental) result to be effected by action defined by the niyama-injunction. It is otherwise in the case of the beating of the rice grains; for there the general supersensuous result of the sacrifice (the so-called paramāpūrva)

*According to the Mimāṃsā-theory of the sacrifice, the sacrifice as a whole produces a certain supersensuous result, in the form of an energy, which, in due time, brings about that special fruit or result with a view to which the sacrifice was undertaken. When, e.g., the actual Soma sacrifice has come to an end, there survives that unseen energy or force which later on puts the performer of the sacrifice in possession of the heavenly world. And this general supersensuous result again must be held to be the joint outcome of all those minor unseen results which spring from all the particular actions or steps of procedure which together constitute the total sacrifice. Thus the beating of the rice-grains prescribed by the Veda (as the only valid procedure of freeing the grains from their husks) must be supposed to have its own supersensuous result; and it is for this reason that the beating is specially prescribed (to the exclusion of other methods of shelling the grain).\n
Viv. 8.
obliges us to assume a supersensuous result of the beating of rice through which that general result is produced. Nor may you argue that, in an analogous way, the cognition of Brahman also is produced through some such unseen result; for negative experience does not favour this conclusion;—that is to say, we do not observe that where the Vedânta texts are learned, etc., the cognition of Brahman does not arise merely owing to the imperfection consisting in the fact that some unseen result due to some defined course of action is absent. And even if the cognition of Brahman were in some way due to 'unseen results', the interpretation of the text concerning the learning of the Veda as an injunction would be in conflict with Śaṅkara's Great Commentary where, under the 4th Śūtra, this view is forcibly impugned. The chief argument employed there is that if the Vedânta texts were at the same time to enjoin certain activities (e.g., the learning of the Veda) and to set forth the nature of Brahman, there would be an objectionable 'split of the sentence' (vākyabheda)\(^\text{a}\). Nor, again, can the injunction be of the nature of parisaṅkhya-vidhi. For in the case of the injunction of the eating of five kinds of animals possessing five nails, the eating of animals of any kind—whether having, or not having, five nails—is established by some other means (viz., by natural desire which prompts men to use for food animals of any kind); and hence there is an opening for the 'injunction of exclusion' which enjoins that only certain animals should be eaten. The intuition of the Self, on the other hand, cannot possibly be attained by any other means than the Upaniṣads (and hence there would be no sense in excluding other means). The conclusion therefore is that the hearing of the Veda is not something that can be enjoined.

To this we make the following reply: As a matter of fact, defining injunctions (niyama-vidhi) are admitted with regard to the study of the Veda in so far as instrumental towards the comprehension of active religious duty (dharma), although such

\(^{a}\) A 'split' or 'break' of the sentence (vākyabheda) occurs when one sentence is made to express two different matters. According to the canons of interpretation laid down by the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, recourse to the assumption of a vākyabheda should be avoided wherever possible.

Viv. 9.
comprehension has results that can be perceived by the senses. Now if this is so in the case of the knowledge of outward religious duty, which is not of the nature of direct perception and constitutes only a minor good of man, how much more reason is there for niyama-injunctions in the case of that 'hearing' which is the means for accomplishing man's highest good,—viz, the direct intuition of Brahman. And if in the case of the reading of the Veda, that which makes us assume an unseen result due to a niyama is the general unseen result of the sacrifice, which can only be produced through such minor unseen results,—we may with equal right assume that the cognition of Brahman demands us to assume niyama-injunctions with regard to the 'hearing' of the Veda. For the intuition of Brahman is just what is produced through all unseen results whatever (and hence it would not be wrong to say that it is produced by the unseen result produced by the niyama). As Smṛti says—'All work whatever finds its proper termination in knowledge'. For this text, in order to preclude the erroneous notion of the word 'all', referring only to such well-known works as sacrifices, employs the additional word 'whatever' in order to include thereby such activities as 'hearing' also.† On any other interpretation (if 'all' and 'whatever' were supposed to mean the same) there would be redundancy of expression. And if it be said that in the case of active religious duty (such as sacrifices), we are obliged to admit an injunction of study, because misfortune is threatened to him who does not study in the proper way, e. g. in the passage (Manu-Smṛti II. 168).— 'the Brahmaṇa who without having studied the Veda in the proper way, labours after other things, falls, even in his present life, to the condition of a Shūdra, together with his descendants'—we reply that the case under discussion does not differ; for here also we have an authoritative text threatening disaster (to him who does not do the 'hearing' of the Vedānta-texts)—the Sannyāsin

* Bhagavadgītā IV. 33.
† And thus the Smṛti text declares that the intuition of Brahman is produced, not only by such 'unseen results' as spring from sacrificial action, but also by such other 'unseen results' as that due to the 'hearing', etc., of the sacred texts. And this latter 'unseen result' is the ground for assuming the niyama-vidhi of 'hearing'.

Viv. 10.
who, having abandoned all works of permanent obligation, lives without hearing the Vedāṇṭa-texts, doubtless falls into sin.\(^6\)

But, our adversary objects, that ‘hearing,’ ‘reflecting,’ etc., are means towards the cognition of Brahman, can be established neither by positive nor negative instances, since Brahman free from all difference is to be known through the Vedāṇṭa texts only; how then can the text, in question, be proved to be a defining injunction? (the conditions of the case excluding the possibility of defining, for which there is room only when there are more means than one).

This objection also, we reply, is without force. In the case of (the stock-example of defining injunctions, viz.,) ‘he beats the rice-grains,’ there is nothing to establish the use of the finger nails or the like as means of unhusking the rice-grains, which are to bring about the ‘unseen result;’ since such rice-grains are known from Scripture only; and yet we admit of the express defining injunction telling us to beat them. In the same way, there may be a defining injunction of the Hearing of Scripture, although there is no other alternative means of comprehending Scripture. “But,” our adversary resumes, “in the case of the rice-grains there is occasion for the special defining injunction of beating, since the other means of unhusking have a preliminary locus standi with regard to grains in general (of which the sacrificial grains are only a species).” Well, we reply, in the case under discussion also there is room for the injunction of Hearing the Veda, considering that there are many different means towards the knowledge of things in general (of which knowledge the ‘cognition of Brahman’ is only a special case). “Let it then be said that the injunction of the beating of the rice-grains really is an injunction establishing something altogether new (an apūraṇa-vidhi), but is on account of its practical effect spoken of as a defining injunction!” Then, we reply, the same will hold good with regard to the injunction of Hearing! Nor will this imply a contradiction of what the Bhāṣya says (as the opponent had urged above); for what is denied there is only the injunction of the Self being seen, not that of its being heard. According to the principle that the root and the affix of a verb conjointly signify principally what the

\(^{6}\) Sāmka Purāṇa I.

\(\text{37278} \text{ Viv. 11.}\)
affix denotes’, in the sentence ‘the Self is to be seen’ (drāṣṭavyaḥ), the word ‘drāṣṭavyaḥ’ would express principally the injunctive force which belongs to the affix ‘tavya,’ while ‘seeing’—which is denoted by the root-element of ‘drāṣṭavyaḥ’—would occupy a secondary subordinate position; and hence the Self or Brahman—which in the sentence quoted occupies the position of a mere determination of ‘seeing’ (of which it is the object)—would all the more be reduced to a subordinate place. The result of this would be that Brahman could not be viewed as the principal object which the Vedānta texts aim at establishing. This difficulty is removed if—with the Bhāṣya—we view the seeing of Brahman as the principal thing,—i.e., as the final result of what Scripture enjoins,—for the accomplishment of which the Hearing of the Self is enjoined as a mere means.

As to the objection raised above that, if the Vedānta texts were at the same time to set forth Brahman and to convey an injunction, this would imply an objectionable syntactical split—is this objection, we ask, urged by one of ourselves (i.e., the Vedāntins) or by the Mīmāṃsaka? The former has no right to urge this objection; for the Vedāntins also assume that the sentence ‘they desire to know Brahman by means of the sacrifice’ enjoins the sacrifice as a means of knowing Brahman, although this interpretation implies a syntactical split (the sentence thus interpreted meaning ‘cognize Brahman’ and ‘effect this by means of the sacrifice’). Nor, in the second place, can the objection be rightly urged by the Mīmāṃsaka. For in that section of the Veda which treats of the Pretāgniḥotra we have at first the clause ‘he is to walk holding the fuel below (the handle of the sacrificial ladle),’ which enjoins the holding below of the fuel; and after this we have the clause, ‘for he holds it above for the gods.’ Now here the decision of the Mīmāṃsakas* is that this latter clause must be taken as enjoining the holding above of the fuel in the case of oblations made to the gods, although the clause stands in a section not treating of those latter oblations (but concerned with an oblation

* Mīm. Sūtras III-4. This Sūtra is not commented upon by Shabara Svāmin (See Bibl. Ind. edition 1, p. 316); reasons for which omission are given in the Tautra-Vārttika (Benares Sanskrit Series Edition, pp. 920-22).
to the pitrīs). It might be urged that one section of the Mīmāṃsakas, viz., the followers of Prabhākara do not accept this view as to the interpretation of the passage quoted (and that, hence, to them it is open to raise the objection as to 'syntactical split' against the Vedāntins). But in that case we point out another head of discussion where the Prabhākaras also admit a 'syntactical split': In the section on the Darshapūrṇamāsa sacrifice we have the clause 'the observances should be kept up for three nights;' and this clause the Prabhākara also accepts as an injunction of observances for a woman in her courses.† Considering these cases of admitted 'syntactical split' what harm can there be in allowing that the 'hearing' of the Veda is enjoined in a section which mainly treats of the cognition of Brahman?

[Page 5.] You perhaps will deny the analogy, on the ground that in the case of the text referring to the 'observances' there is no possibility of connecting these observances with the matter of the section in which they occur, and that hence we have no choice but to accept a syntactical split; while in the text as to the 'hearing of the Veda' the affix tavya (in shrotavyah, so far translated by 'is to be heard') may very well be taken, in the context in which it stands, as denoting capability (the clause ātmā shrotavyah then meaning 'the Self is capable of being heard'), so that a recourse to 'syntactical split' would not be justified. In that case, we reply, we point to the text‡—'hence the Brāhmaṇa having fully attained learning should seek to stand firm in strength (viz., of reflection); and having fully attained learning and strength he should become a Muni'—as enjoining 'hearing' and the rest—a text which does not stand under any specific heading and therefore is not open to the objections stated above. For although this text does not at first sight convey the idea of 'hearing the Veda' &c., yet on more careful consideration we find that it does enjoin

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*The point of the reasoning is that the Mīmāṃsakas declare the second clause (upari hi deśebhyah, etc.) to be, not an anuvāda, but an injunction, although on this view a vākyabheda has to be admitted.

†And this apparently implies vākyabheda. We are not in a position to give details as to the interpretation of this text according to the Prabhākaras.

‡ Brih. Up. III. 5. 1.
‘hearing’ and the connected mental operations. Nor can this our view of that text be charged with not being the traditional one; for the author of the Vedānta-Sūtras himself (in III. 4.47), taking it for granted that the words ‘pāṇḍītya,’ (‘learning,’) and ‘bālya’ (‘strength’) imply the injunction of ‘hearing’ and ‘reflecting,’ explains the concluding clause ‘atha munīḥ’ as enjoining ‘silence’ i. e. meditation.

But even if this be so, our opponent resumes, my main contention remains valid; viz., that the particular text ‘the Self is to be heard’ with which the student meets in the sacred texts read by him, cannot be an injunction of ‘hearing’! Not so, we reply. An authoritative grammatical rule teaches that the suffix tavyā expresses injunction also (not only capability). Moreover in the case of other Vedic texts also—such as ‘seek to know that’38, which appears along with many other sentences occurring in the same context,—we have necessarily to admit injunctions of ‘hearing,’ in spite of such admission implying ‘syntactical splits’; and hence there really is no reason why you should be dissatisfied with our explanation of the sentence ‘the Self is to be heard.’ Nor may you raise an objection on the ground that there would be a needless repetition if we had two injunctions of ‘hearing’ in one and the same shākhā of the Veda (the two texts ‘the Self is to be heard’ and ‘having fully attained learning’ both occurring in the Bṛhadāranyaka). For the two texts differ in so far as one is a pure injunction, while the other states some details with reference to the injunction. Or else, we may consider the case of the two injunctions of ‘hearing’ as analogous to that of the two Maitreyi-Brāhmaṇas (also met with in one and the same book, viz. the Bṛhadāranyaka) one of which is a recapitulation of the other—so that there is no idle repetition. All which proves that the text ‘the Self is to be heard’ may be taken as an injunction (viz., a defining injunction) of the ‘hearing’ of the Self.

*Taittī. Up. III. 1, 1.

Viv. 14.
III.

[In order fully to carry out what is implied in the texts enjoining the 'hearing,' etc., of the Self, a systematic enquiry into the purport of all the Vedānta texts must be undertaken. And this was the task proposed to himself by Bādarāyaṇa the author of the Vedānta Sūtras. The first sūtra properly interpreted means that in order to attain to final Release a man must make a thorough investigation of the meaning of the Vedānta texts; from this there will result cognition of the highest Self or Brahman, and from that again there will result Release.]

*As declared in the Purāṇa passages quoted above, we have to understand by the 'hearing' of the Vedānta texts in its full sense the determination of the purport of those texts, which results from a ripe consideration of them, with the help of the various means of interpretation such as 'the drift of introductory clauses', etc. We may then otherwise say that he who has

*The exposition of Vedānta doctrine proper may be said to begin at this place; although the reader interested in Philosophy will now find himself hampered by a further complication. The fact is that to the Vedāntin philosophic truth is inextricably bound up, in the first place with that section of the Veda which deals with 'knowledge,' i.e., the Upaniṣads; and in the second place with the so-called Vedānta Sūtras i.e., a body of concise aphorisms, ascribed to the Rīsi Bādarāyaṇa, in which the teaching of the Upaniṣads is systematized. The consequence of this view is that in all Vedānta books genuine philosophical reasoning is constantly interrupted by appeals, firstly to the text of the Upaniṣads, and secondly to the Vedānta-Sūtras—a quotation frequently taking the place of an argument. What the author tries to establish in the present section is that the central tenet of the Vedānta—i.e., that all that prevents the individual soul from realizing its true nature, viz., its identity with Brahman, is a mere unreal fragment of Nescience which may at once be destroyed by true knowledge—is, if not explicitly enounced, at any rate implied in the very first of the Sūtras already. The Sūtras are so concise, and frequently enigmatic, in expression that many of them admit of most diverse interpretations; and it of course is a well-known fact that essentially differing theories appeal to the Sūtras—no less than to the Upaniṣads—in confirmation of their tenets. The unbiased student will, in this place, hardly see his way to accepting our author's view of the implied meaning of the first aphorism. And he may comfort himself with the reflection that, in refusing to follow our author's lead, he is not an 'innovator'; for his attitude in no way differs from that of many Hindu authorities of high standing and competence.

*Viv. 15,
renounced all desire for other things, and thus become preliminarily qualified for the cognition of the Self, should undertake a full consideration of the Vedānta-texts to the end of attaining to that intuition of the Self which is a means of Immortality. But when a man has thus studied the Veda and, in a general way, apprehended its meaning, doubts will begin to present themselves to his mind:—Is the mere absence of desire for worldly objects a sufficient qualification for the cognition of the Self, or are there other qualifications also? What are the means to cognize those qualifications and the nature of him who possesses them? Is the method of the enquiry into the meaning of the Vedānta texts already settled by the method of the enquiry into practical religious duty or not? or, how is the meaning of those texts to be enquired into? What is the true nature of the Self? What means are there to cognise it? Are those means in conflict with something else, or not? Has the knowledge of the true nature of the Self to be combined with meritorious works, in order to act as a means of Immortality; or has it that power by itself? And in the latter case, what proof is there for its having that power? Of what nature is Immortality and what proof is there for it?—All these and other similar questions and doubts demand to be solved by various arguments and lines of reasoning.

[Page 6.] Now it was the intention of the reverend teacher Bādārāyāna, animated as he was by supreme compassion for suffering man, to set forth all those arguments in a body of concise aphorisms. Accordingly, in order rationally to determine the full meaning of the injunction conveyed by the text 'the Self is to be heard'—with its threefold reference to the object of the injunction, its result, and the qualified person to whom it is addressed—he in his first Sūtra, 'now therefore the enquiry into Brahman', declares the need of an enquiry into the meaning of that injunction,—such need being indeed the prompting cause of the setting forth of the entire body of doctrine introduced by that Sūtra. The word 'now' in this first Sūtra points to the person qualified for the enquiry about to be undertaken, i.e., him who, in accordance with the text 'for the love of the Self, &c.', can lay claim to such qualification, in so far as possessing the four preliminary spiritual conditions of success which may

Viv. 16.
be comprised under the term 'absence of desire for wordly objects' (vīrakta). The word therefore intimates the reason of the enquiry about to be made—that reason being what is declared by the text, 'there is no hope of Immortality by wealth,' viz., that Immortality is not to be attained by works of any kind, either wordly or enjoined by the Veda. And the compound word 'enquiry-into-Brahman,' finally, intimates what is expressed by the Vedānta-text 'when the Self has been seen, heard' etc., viz., that to the end of attaining to that intuition of Brahman which is the means of Immortality, 'hearing'—which implies a full consideration of the Vedānta texts—has to be undertaken.

But, our opponent asks, is this first Sūtra to be understood as enjoining something, or merely as making a statement about something already established (i.e., already known through other means of knowledge)? The former alternative cannot be accepted since the Sūtra exhibits none of those verbal forms (imperative, gerundive, etc.), which express command or injunction. And, on the latter alternative, the Sūtra would not possess any motive force, and hence could not be taken as conveying the injunction of 'hearing.' This objection is unfounded, we reply. For, as a matter of fact, we have to supply in the Sūtra a word with injunctive force viz., '(is) to-be-made' (so that the complete Sūtra would run as follows: 'Now therefore the enquiry-into-Brahman is to be made.') And if to this you object that,—since cognition and desire depend on their objects (in the presence of which they spontaneously arise, and hence are not things which a man can be ordered to do)—the word jījñāsā (which so far has been translated 'enquiry' but which literally means 'desire-to-know') does not properly connect itself with the word supplied (viz., 'has-to-be-done.'); we reply that, just for this reason the word 'desire-to-know' must be taken to denote, by implication, consideration or enquiry (vichāra) which is something that can be done (if the agent so wills, and to which therefore he can be urged.) The necessary connexion of enquiry with the desire-to-know can easily be established, the case being one of those where one thing or term is 'grasped tight as with pincers' between two others: Rational consideration or

* Bri. Up. II. 4.1.

Viv. 17.
enquiry is 'grasped tight' between desire and cognition; for at first there is the desire to know; this inevitably leads to enquiry; and from this there originates knowledge. Nor must it be objected to this that, if we take the term 'desire-to-know-Brahman' to denote by implication 'enquiry into Brahma', then the Sūtra would indeed establish that reference to the object which is termed 'enquiry', but not that reference to the result of enquiry which is termed 'knowledge of Brahman'. For the 'implication' (or 'indication', lakṣaṇā) is, in this case, of the kind 'which does not abandon the original sense of the word'; i.e. jīva while indicating 'enquiry', does not cease directly to denote 'knowledge'. It is because otherwise it could not originate the cognition of Brahma that enquiry must be held to have the Vedānta texts for its object; for we do not observe that men enquiring into other matters attain to that supreme cognition. And that the cognition of Brahma is the means of bringing about final release (mokṣa, i.e. that result which hitherto has been spoken up as 'Immortality') is proved thereby that otherwise such cognition would not have the character of the desired result. For what is desired by men qualified for entering on a line of action is the result, and in the case under consideration men qualified by possessing the four spiritual prerequisites desire nothing else but the total destruction of all pain and the enjoyment of supreme bliss, and the means to accomplish those ends. And as the knowledge of the highest Reality (i.e. Brahma) cannot in itself be the destruction of pain and the attainment of bliss, it can only be the means to accomplish those ends.

The full meaning of the first Sūtra therefore is as follows:—
"He who is in possession of the four spiritual prerequisites must, since final Release is not to be attained through works, enter on a full enquiry into the meaning of the Vedānta texts, in order thereby to attain to that which is the means of final release, viz., the cognition of Brahma'. The Sūtra thus expresses in a succinct form the whole purport of the Scriptural text.

[Page 7.] That the need of an enquiry into the meaning of the Vedānta texts is the reason why the system of doctrine set forth in the Vedānta Sūtras is undertaken is proved by positive and negative experience. For we observe in the case of the
Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice and similar activities, that men act when urged by an injunction with its three terms (object, result, person qualified); and, on the other hand, we observe that they do not act when some utterance addressed to them has no injunctive character (but is a mere statement of matter of fact), as when they are told that 'the earth consists of seven dvīpas (continents'). This necessity of undertaking an enquiry into the Vedānta texts—which constitutes the reason for the setting forth of the systematic body of doctrine embodied in the Vedānta Sūtras—the first Sūtra may be viewed as setting forth in the following technical form (implied in the Sūtra):—'The systematic body of doctrine in question must be begun because it has a possible object and a possible aim; just as, for example, the action of ploughing a field.' Nor must it be objected that since the Sūtra does not directly mention such an object and aim, these two factors cannot be considered as established by it. For although not directly named the two are implied in, or suggested by, the Sūtra; and 'suggestion', or implication, so far from being a defect must rather be viewed as constituting a positive beauty of a Sūtra. The 'object' (viśaya) of the Vedānta texts, the meaning of which is investigated from Sū. I. 1. 2 ('that from which there is the origination, etc., of this world') onwards, is the oneness of Brahman and the soul—as known from texts such as 'this Self indeed is Brahman'. And this oneness is suggested in the first Sūtra itself by means of the word 'Brahman' which denotes a Being of absolutely indivisible and homogeneous nature. The 'aim' (prayojana) on the other hand is the cutting short of all pain and the attaining to Brahman—as known from texts such as 'beyond all grief passes he who knows the Self,' † and 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest.' ‡ Now these two matters are suggested in the Sūtra in so far as the latter directly refers (by means of the word 'brahma-jīvān'ā) to that knowledge of Brahman which is the means of the two being accomplished.

* Bri. Up. II. 5.19.
† Chānd. Up. VII. 1. 3
‡ Taitt. Up. II. 1. 1

Viv. 19.
[The systematic enquiry into the meaning of the Vedānta texts which is carried on in the Vedānta-sūtras can have its desired result only on the supposition of bondage—the opposite of Release—being not something real, but a mere figment of Nescience; for knowledge can put an end to non-knowledge only. The unreal nature of bondage is not indeed directly declared but at any rate suggested in the first Sūtra already.]

Nor does the Sūtra-writer only suggest the object and the aim of his enquiry, but he also undertakes implicitly to prove them by the wording of the Sūtra. For the Sūtra implies the following inference—'The body of doctrine in question has that possible object and aim, because it is antagonistic to bondage which is a mere thing of Nescience; in the same way as waking consciousness is antagonistic to dream-experience.' To this it must not be objected that the circumstance of bondage being a mere thing of Nescience is not actually suggested by the Sūtra. For, as a matter of fact this is suggested, in so far, namely, as the Sūtra implies the view of Bondage being something to be put an end to by Knowledge. To explain—In order to prove that the cognition of Brahman is a desirable result, the Sūtra-writer must maintain that such cognition puts an end to all pain whatsoever. Now it is nothing else but Bondage,—with whatever is implied therein, viz., the Self appearing to itself as an individual cognizing subject, as a doer of actions, as experiencing the fruits of those actions and so forth,—which is the seed and root of all pain, and hence pain itself. The point then to be considered is whether this Bondage be something real or unreal. Now on the former alternative, bondage could not be terminated by the cognition of Brahman. There indeed are some of ours (i.e., some Vedāntins) who hold that knowledge may put an end to real things. But to them we address the following question:—Does knowledge of a certain thing produce the effect termed cessation in the object of knowledge, or in its substrate? And, on the former alternative, is the object which it is supposed to put an end to, the Self in so far as implicated in the Samsāra (i.e., the phenomenal individual Self); or only the attributes of that Self; or only those attributes which are opposed to the Self's absolute oneness and

Viv. 20.
homogeneousness—such as the attribute of being an agent; or, lastly, only the attribute of non-knowledge residing in the Self? The three first alternatives are clearly inadmissible; for, to illustrate the matter by an analogous instance, in the case of a diverse-coloured fruit, e.g., a mango, the cognition of the dark green part of it does not put an end either to its object (the dark part of the fruit), or the qualities of that part, its taste and so on; nor to the qualities opposed to those of the dark part, as e.g., the yellow colour of another part of the fruit. The fourth alternative, on the other hand, agrees with our view (for we also hold that knowledge puts an end to non-knowledge; and this is an unreal object).

[Page 8.] If, next, we consider the second main alternative (viz., of knowledge producing the effect termed cessation in its own substrate, i.e., in the knowing Self),—we again must ask whether that substrate itself is supposed to come to an end; or the qualities belonging to it; or certain attributes belonging to the substrate as well as to the object of cognition? The first alternative must be rejected, for it would imply a constant momentary perishing of the Self (in each act of cognition). The second alternative also is impossible; for, as a matter of fact, the qualities belonging to the Self—religious merit, etc.—are not put an end to by the cognition, e.g. of a jar. And the third alternative also is unacceptable; for the cognition, on the part of the Self, of its body does not put an end to the connexion of Self and body. But, the opponent resumes, the Scriptural text 'Having known him he passes beyond death,' (where Bondage is spoken of as 'death,' i.e. something real) directly states that real bondage is put an end to by knowledge. Not so, we reply. The text quoted leaves it an entirely open question whether that bondage be real or unreal.

We on our part proceed in a different way: we assume bondage to be a mere thing of Nescience, i.e., something unreal, in order thus rationally to justify the declarations made by Scripture. And this procedure is not essentially different from one adopted by yourself when you assume the so-called supersensuous result of the Jyotistoma and similar sacrifices in order to explain thereby what Scripture says as to those sacrifices being

* Read र्ष्येवहताननम
† Svet. Up. III. 8.

Viv. 21.
means of attaining to the heavenly world. "But," the opponent will perhaps reply, "what compels us to assume the āpūrva is the undoubted truth that works such as sacrifices which perish as soon as performed cannot by themselves bring about results connected with a later time!" Well then, we reply, what compels us to view bondage as an unreal thing is the undoubted truth that knowledge can put an end to non-knowledge only! Nothing therefore remains but to acknowledge that Bondage is an unreal thing. What the Śūtra suggests then is that bondage, as being something to be terminated by knowledge, is a thing of Nescience.

But, our opponent resumes, if this is so, the truth that bondage is a mere thing of Nescience should have been stated by the Śūtra-writer explicitly; for it is this which establishes the object of the enquiry (viz., the oneness of the individual and the highest Self), and its final end (viz., Release), and thus really is the cause of the entire systematic enquiry being undertaken. As long as this important truth is not directly stated, the entire drift of the enquiry will not be understood!

Well, we reply, the Śūtra-writer has stated that truth explicitly, viz. in the Śūtra II. 3-29. The purport of this Śūtra is as follows: The Śūtras immediately preceding had discussed those scriptural texts in which the Self is spoken of as departing from the body, going to the other world and again returning to this world; and the objection had been raised that with this going and coming the doctrine of the Self's essential omnipresence cannot be reconciled; to this the Śūtra quoted replies that, owing to an erroneous mutual identification of the Self and the so-called internal

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* We here meet in the text for the first time with the term adhyāśa—literally meaning 'super-imposition', and in most cases best rendered by this latter term, heavy and scholastic as it may sound. As in what follows many pages will be devoted to a discussion of this adhyāśa—on which indeed the entire Vedāntic theory as conceived by Śaṅkara and his followers turns—it would be premature to attempt in this place a full explanation. We here say only so much, that adhyāśa, in its subjective aspect, is the wrong or mistaken identification of one thing with another, or else the wrong attribution to one thing of attributes of another; in its objective aspect it is the process of Avidyā or Maya, the principle of cosmic illusion, 'superimposing' itself upon things, and thereby deluding the individual mind. We shall claim the liberty of rendering the term in each place according to the exigencies of the context, and also of retaining the Sanskrit term wherever convenient.
organ (buddhi) there arises in the truly omnipresent Self the wrong conception of going and coming—which are attributes of the internal organ only—belonging to itself. Scripture makes statements based on this wrong conception, in order to guide thereby to insight into the true nature of the Self. But then, our opponent resumes, in as much as this Sūtra speaking of 'erroneous identification' would form a necessary 'introduction' to the whole enquiry, it should have been the first of the whole series of Sūtras; for the purpose of the 'introduction' consists in explaining certain details in connection with the main object of enquiry which is all along kept in view. Not so, we reply. The Sūtra-writer applying himself to the task of proving a certain theory cannot possibly begin with a Sūtra aiming at the refutation of objections. He who has to prove something at first directly states the matter to be proved, and after that sets forth the proving arguments. It therefore is quite in order that the first chapter of the Vedānta Sūtras should show that all the Vedānta texts refer to Brahman, and that only after this the refutation of objections—which tends to prove the writer's own view—should be undertaken. If the details as to the connexion of the Vedānta texts with Brahman were not explained first, the statement of objections and their refutation would be purportless.

But, our opponent once more resumes, if wrong super-imposition thus is not mentioned at the outset, the whole systematic enquiry really cannot be started, since neither an object nor a purpose for it have been established! Not so, we reply. We have shown above that the first Sūtra, although not directly stating wrong super-imposition, at any rate suggests it, and this affords a sufficient starting point for the enquiry.

Viv. 23.
[Against the fundamental Vedāntic tenet—asserting that the
bondage of the Soul is due to the mutual 'superimposition'
(adhyāsa), i.e., erroneous identification, of the Self and the
Not-Self—, the opponent of the Vedāntin raises objections. The
Self and the Not-Self of the Vedāntin are of totally contrary
nature, just as light and darkness are: they hence cannot
be erroneously identified in their full being; nor can even
the attributes of either be ascribed to the other. In the case
of this alleged Adhyāsa of Self and Not-Self none of the con-
ditions which determine the adhyāsas of ordinary experience
are present.]

[Page 9.] But, an objection is raised, this adhyāsa, suggested
though it be by the sūtra, is incapable of rational proof. And
this we show in the following way: (a) The Self and the Not-self
cannot, through adhyāsa, be identified with each other, since
they are absolutely destitute of any kind of identity; just as light
and darkness are. Nor is the 'reason' in this argumentation
(i.e., the fact of the two being devoid of any identity) something
not itself proved (and therefore incapable of functioning as a
'reason'); for we may argue—(b) 'the Self and the Not-self are
destitute of all identity, because they are of contradictory nature;
just as light and darkness are.' And here again the 'reason' is
not itself non-proven; for we may argue—(c) 'the Self and the
Not-self are of contradictory nature; for they fall within the
spheres, respectively, of the ideas of the 'I' and the 'thou'; just
as Devadatta and his opponent.' To this last inference the
following objection might possibly be raised: Devadatta
himself no doubt thinks of the aggregate consisting of his
own body, sense-organs, etc., as 'I'; but his opponent thinks
of the same as 'thou'; and thus there is no contradiction between
'I' and 'thou;' and the reverse holds good of Devadatta's
opponent also (who thinks of himself as 'I' while Devadatta
thinks of him as 'thou.') Hence the proving instance in the
last inference ('just as Devadatta and his opponent') has no
proving power. But this objection is ill-founded. What we
bring forward as a proving instance is not two persons con-
dered as the objects of ideas residing in two different minds,

Viv. 24.
but two persons considered as the objects of two ideas residing in one and the same mind. In other words, the proving instance is constituted not by the two different aspects, (i.e., Devadatta and his opponent, each of whom is 'I' to himself, and at the same time 'thou' to the other; without this giving rise to any contradiction); but by the one combined aspect which is constituted by the thought of Devadatta and the thought of his opponent (both appearing in the mind of Devadatta himself, or in that of the opponent).

Well, the Vedāntin may be supposed to resume, I drop the objection as to the invalidity of the 'reason' in your inference. But I now raise an objection with regard to the 'subject' of your inferences, the Self and the Not-self. Are the Self and the Not-self of your inferences the Self and Not-self of ordinary thought? or the Self and the Not-self as conceived by the followers of Prabhākara? or the Self and the Not-self of the Vedāntins? The first alternative cannot be yours; for in that case the two first inferences would only prove what is proved already; (i.e. admitted by us also); and the third inference again would be in opposition to actual experience. For according to ordinary thought the Self is an aggregate of factors, comprising the gross body etc., and also consciousness; while stones and the like are the Not-self. Now it is not either the oneness, or the wrong imputation of oneness, of these two classes of things which the Vedāntins maintain; and on the other hand, it is not a fact that the two are of totally contrary nature. Nor can you maintain the second alternative. For the followers of Prabhākara and others understand by the Self something in itself non-intelligent which is the substrate of certain attributes or qualities such as knowing, acting, enjoying; while by the Not-self they understand the entire apparent world, including sense-organs, bodies, inanimate things and so on. Now, in the view of the Vedāntins it is the organ of egoity (Ahaṅkāra) which is the substrate of the attributes of being a knowing subject, &c., and this Ahaṅkāra as well as its causal substance, i.e.

*The Prabhākara or Guru (whose followers are the Prabhākaras) is the founder of an important school of Mīmāṃsakas who—apart from the more technical parts of the Mīmāṃsā theory—hold distinctive views of their own as to the nature of the cognizing Self, the processes of cognition, etc.

Viv. 25.
Nescience, fall both under the category ‘Not-self’. Hence your reasoning is encountered by the same two objections as above; for since the ‘Self’ and ‘Not-self’ of the Prābhākaras both fall within what the Vedāntin considers to be ‘Not-self’, it is neither the adhyāsa of the two, nor their identity, which is maintained by the Vedāntin (and hence the two first of the above inferences prove only what the Vedāntin does not call into doubt); and the two are not of contradictory nature (and hence the third inference is inadmissible).* Nor also is the third alternative open to you. For the Vedāntins understand by the ‘Self’ that which is mere knowledge (intelligence, consciousness), free from all fluctuation or instability, and by the ‘Not-Self’ all things other than that. In what sense then do you take the reason in the (3rd) inference set forth above? Does the inference mean that the Self and the Not-self are of contradictory nature either because one of them is the object of both ideas,—

* The Vedāntin objects to the two first alternatives on the same grounds. The Self and the Not-Self of ordinary consciousness as well as of the Prābhākaras are not really distinct; for ordinary thought looks upon the Self as comprising the body, the sense organs, etc. also; and the Prābhākara views the Self as something in itself non-intelligent (just as the body and other material things are) of which thought is an attribute only. According to both views therefore there is absent that contrariety of nature, between Self and Not-self, without which it would have no sense to say that the two are wrongly identified.—According to the Prābhākaras the Self is the knowing, feeling, acting, etc. subject. This view is, of course, rejected by the Vedāntins, whose Self is universal non-personal intelligence (jñāna); all personality—which finds its expression in the self-affirmation of an I—falling within the sphere of the Non-real. The universal Self becomes an individual self only by its connexion with the so-called ‘internal organ’ (antah-karaṇa, manas etc.)—which itself is one of the manifold forms assumed by that unreal illusory principle (termed avidyā or ajñāna) through the association with which there arises the illusion of plurality—of a manifold world constituted by countless individual cognising minds and objects of cognition. Universal knowledge irradiates the internal organ, and thus there arise determinate individual cognitions, which differ according to the special form or modification (prātiṣṭhā) that the organ assumes or undergoes at the time. When assuming the ‘I-modification’, the internal organ is called ‘ahaṅkāra’ (above translated by ‘organ of egoity’). In the text the Vedāntin maintains (and rightly from his point of view) that what the Prābhākara calls the Self, is not the real Self, but only what the Vedāntins call the ahaṅkāra (viz. the ahaṅkāra in so far as irradiated, and thus raised from the sphere of the Unconscious into that of the Conscious, by Universal Intelligence.)
viz., of the idea 'I' and of the idea 'thou'; or because the Self is the object of the 'I-idea' and the Not-self the object of the 'thou-idea'? In the former case you commit the mistake of employing a reason which is not present in the subject of the inference (since neither the Self nor the Not-self is the object of both those ideas, and the reason is not a 'reason' at all). And in the latter case your reasoning is vitiated by the fact that the reason employed is not present in the subject of the inference in its whole extent; for some Not-selfs,—viz., the body, the sense-organs, the internal organ, the vital airs,—are not the object of the 'thou-idea'. "They may not be such in ordinary thought; but they are such according to the philosophic view of the Vedānta which defines the 'thou' as being everything that is (not self-luminous but) illumined by the light of intelligence (and such are the body, the sense-organs etc.)."

You may be right there, the Vedāntins reply; but all the same our objection to your inference remains valid, since according to the Vedāntins the Self is not the object of the 'I-idea'. It thus is evident that your inference cannot be established in whatever sense the Self and the Not-self are understood.

[Page 10.] Against all this the opponent (who controverts the Vedāntic theory of adhyāsa) may now be supposed to argue as follows:—My reasoning is valid as against the Vedāntin. It is not true that according to the Vedānta the Self is not the object of the 'I-idea'; for although the Self is self-luminous (and hence, properly speaking, not the object of any idea), yet since we are most clearly aware of it in the organ of egoity, it may itself, in a secondary or metaphorical sense, be designated as the object of the 'I-idea.' Nor can it be urged against me that two individual consciousnesses, each of which is connected with a body, although standing towards each other in the relation of 'I' and 'thou,' are not really of contradictory nature; and that hence the inference that whatever is denoted by 'I' and 'thou' is of contradictory nature is fallacious. For consciousness can never be a 'thou' in the sense of being that which is illumined by (is the object of) consciousness; and it is only this, philosophical, sense of the term 'thou' with which we are here concerned; not the unphilosophical sense in which the

Vir. 27,
term is understood in ordinary life. But, a further objection is raised, the reasoning by which you thus undertake to prove the essential opposition of the Self and the Not-self proceeds after all by means of ideas only, not by means of the things themselves! Well, we then shall argue as follows:—The Self and the Not-self are of contrary nature because the former is that for which objects exist (viṣayin), while the latter is the object (viṣaya); just as the eye and colour are. But, it is objected to this, we observe that the intelligent Self stands to the non-intelligent Not-self in a certain relation of agreement, in so far, namely, as the Self establishes the Not-self (which is known through the Self only). Now if two things are said to be contrary in nature, this means, either that one of them is destructive of the other, or that the two are incapable of abiding together—in both of which cases they are in complete disagreement or disharmony. The conclusion that the Self and Not-self are contradictory in nature thus would be in conflict with immediate experience; and for the same reason your proving instance also must be declared to be defective (for the eye proves colour, and hence the two cannot be of contradictory nature). There is no force in this objection also (the antagonist of the Vedāntin replies). For what we here understand by ‘contrariety of nature’ is the incapability on the part of two things of either being the Self of (i. e. becoming identical with) the other—such as e. g. the relation is between ‘being’ and ‘not-being.’ “But if you understand ‘contrariety,’ in this sense, how, can you, in the second of of your inferences, employ light and darkness as a proving instance?—considering that those two things are well known to be contrary to each other in the sense of being incapable of abiding together?” Not so, the opponent replies. The fact rather is that in a faintly lighted room darkness does abide together with light; for otherwise things would be seen there as distinctly as in a locality well lit up. Nor may it be said that the terms ‘darkness’ and ‘light’ indicate shade (chhāyā) and sunlight (ātapa), which occupy the same space as light and darkness. For as a matter of fact we observe different degrees of heat in shade which in itself is of one and the same nature; and this conclusively indicates the presence of sunlight of which heat is
a quality; and hence the abiding in one place of brightness and shade cannot be denied. And thus even if, carrying the assumption of implied meanings one step further, we should assume that the terms 'light' and 'darkness' denote heat and coldness—which belong to sunlight and shade as attributes—we should have to admit that heat and coldness abide together; and from that it would follow that light and darkness abide together. The conclusion is that light and darkness are not capable of entering into a relation of identity of the same kind as that relation which connects the class-character (the jāti or Universal) and the individual; it is in this sense that light and darkness are of contrary nature.

But—a further objection is raised against the above reasoning of the opponent of adhyāsa—in the proving instance of light and darkness, what vitiates the proving power of the instance is that the two stand to each other in the relation of 'existence' and 'non-existence' (the one being the mere negation of the other) * For according to the Naiyāyikas darkness is nothing but absence of light; and according to the followers of Prabhākara it is absence of the perception of form and colour. The reply to this is that it is not so. † That which has the characteristic of being of different kinds according as it is more or less cannot possibly be a mere non-existence. And moreover the dark colour of darkness proves it to be a substance. "But if darkness is a positive entity, how is it that in a brightly illumined place a person whose eyes are closed perceives darkness (while there is no real darkness)? What we should expect in this case is that the abundant light would completely discard darkness. That the two abide together there only where there is a limited quantity of light we have remarked above already." The darkness perceived in that case, we reply, is the darkness within the sense-organ. Nor is there anything impossible in a

* Light and Darkness have been put forward as two things of contrary nature, incapable of identification. An objection is here raised on the ground that as Darkness is nothing more than the mere privation or negation of Light, the two cannot be regarded as two things,—at any rate, not in the same way as 'Self' and 'Not-self.' Thus the proving force of the instance is vitiated.

† That darkness (tamas) is not the mere absence of light, but something substantial (dravya) is held not only by the Vedāntins, but also the Mīmāṁsakas of the Bhāṭṭa-School, the Śūkhyas, and even some of the Naiyāyikas.

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man’s apprehending something that is within the organ of sight; for it is a well-known experience that a person whose ears are shut apprehends an inward noise. Nor must it be said that the assumption of a sense-organ being capable of apprehending what is within it would imply that a man whose eyes are shut would perceive such things also as the ointment applied to the eye; for the law for the eye is that with the exception of darkness, it perceives coloured things only when it is assisted by light.

But, a further objection is raised, if darkness were a substance, it would not, on the removal of light, arise instantaneously; for all effected substances originate gradually only by the successive formation of atoms, binary, ternary, and so on. Not so, we reply. Those who hold all origination to be a mere illusory appearance (i.e. the Vedāntins) do not allow any such gradual origination of substances, but recognise only one cause, viz. fundamental Nescience. Nor do we allow the objection that “darkness cannot be a substance which has colour for its quality, for the reason that it is not perceived by touch; just as ether (is not a coloured substance because it is not the object of touch)”. For you might as well argue that air is not perceived by touch because it is devoid of colour; just as ether is. In both cases your argumentation would equally be in conflict with actual perception. Should it be said that the visual perception admits of being accounted for otherwise (than on the ground of darkness being a substance with colour for its quality),—viz., on the ground that what is perceived is the dark blue colour which fictitiously super-imposes itself on the absence of light,—we reply that all the same the above inference (‘darkness is not a coloured substance because it is not the object of touch’) remains inconclusive; for smoke, which decidedly is a coloured substance, is not an object of touch for any part of the body but the eye. And should this be met by the explanation that the quality of touch although actually existing in smoke is not manifested (anudbhūta, and hence not perceived),—we may say

* The material world, as it appears to our senses, originates, according to the Naiyāyikas, by the successive aggregation of the atoms, the ultimate constituents of matter, into larger and larger groups. According to the Vedāntin, any given material body arises by an instantaneous modification of the one fundamental substance of all phenomena—Nescience.

*Viv. 30.*
with equal justification that the quality of touch exists in darkness, but only in a non-manifest form. Nor could it be urged against this that it is impossible that something actually existing should be altogether non-manifest; for we observe that in gold as it comes from the mine the quality of brilliancy—whereby it illuminess both itself and other things,—and the quality of warm touch (which both admittedly belong to gold as consisting of light)—are altogether non-manifest. It thus appears that the view of Darkness being a positive entity is free from all objections. But, the antagonist resumes, the same may be claimed for the view of darkness being a mere non-existence, viz., the privation of light. The circumstance that there are different degrees of darkness may be accounted for as depending on the different degrees in which the counter-entity of darkness, i.e., light, is present; and the dark blue colour actually perceived may be explained as super-imposed on the absence of light. We are unable, we reply, to admit this. For there are special difficulties in the way of Darkness being viewed as a mere negation. Is Darkness to be defined as the absence of light in general, or of some one light, or of all light? On the first and second alternatives it would be difficult to determine whether Darkness is the antecedent non-existence of light, * or the reciprocal non-existence, or the emergent non-existence; for in a place where there is sun-light there is no perception of Darkness either before the lighting of a lamp, or after it, or after the lamp has been extinguished. And the third alternative would imply that Darkness does not depart unless all light whatever be brought to bear on it. Nor can Darkness be defined as the absence of the perception of colour and form. For a person within the dark inner room of a house perceives at the same time the colours and shapes of things outside the room, and the darkness within the room. From all this it follows that Darkness is not a mere non-existence or privation. And it cannot therefore be said that its force as a proving instance (in the inference 'The Self and the Not-self cannot be identified because they are of contrary nature, as light and darkness are') is vitiated by its being a mere negation.

* If Darkness cannot be shown to be any one of the three kinds of non-existence which the Naiyāyikas distinguish, it of course cannot be a non-existence at all.

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All the same, the Vedāntin resumes, (against the opponent), your fundamental reason for rejecting the Vedāntic adhyāsa—viz., the circumstance of the Self and the Not-self being altogether incapable of identification—has no proving force. For in the case of error, as exemplified by the cognition 'this (thing before me) is silver' two distinct things,—viz., a piece of shell present to the sense and silver—although really quite incapable of identity, are nevertheless cognized as identical. Not so, the opponent of the Vedāntin replies. To the case quoted by you the reason (employed by me to prove the impossibility of adhyāsa) does not apply, because the capability of identification actually exists there. This capability follows from the fact that when real silver is perceived, we cognize the real identity of a thing present to the sense and of silver (which fact establishes the possibility of something present to the sense being viewed as silver). Nor may you, the Vedāntin, urge that the Self and the Not-self also may, in certain cases, be identical; and that owing to the possibility of such identity the reason in my inference is not established. For the fact is that a true identity of those two cannot be established in any case. For which of the two following alternatives would you be prepared to maintain—that the subject (draṣṭṛ-Self) identifies itself with the object (dṛṣṭhya)? or that the object identifies itself with the subject? On the former alternative, the identity cannot, in the first place, be one of essential nature; for in the subject which essentially is nothing but pure Intelligence there can be no objective element! If there were such an element, the alleged identity would not be between the agent (i.e. the 'seer' or Self) and the object of the action (the seen, or Not-self) (but only between that objective element, and the object or Not-self). If, in the second place, that identity is (not essential but) only adventitious (i.e. accomplishing itself on certain conditions only)—does, we ask, the subject transform itself into something objective, by itself or owing to some extrinsic cause? Neither alternative is admissible, as the subject is not something made up of parts (and therefore cannot undergo any transformation). To quote an analogous instance, Ether, which is not made up of parts, never transforms itself into something made up of parts, either by itself or owing to some extrinsic cause.

Viv. 32.
Analogous difficulties beset the second alternative:—viz., the object's identifying itself with its counter-entity, the subject. If the alleged subjective aspect belonged to the object essentially, the objective character of the object would be forfeited. And should it be said that the subjective aspect also belongs to the object partially only (so that part of it would be object, part subject), we should have the contradiction of one and the same thing being agent (i.e. seeing or knowing subject) and object of action, i.e. thing seen or known. If, on the other hand, the subjective aspect of the object is adventitious merely, is the object to be viewed as itself transforming itself into something of an intelligent nature, or as receiving within itself the intelligence of the Self? Not the former certainly! for an effect of what is non-intelligent can never be of the nature of intelligence: we in no case observe that jars and such like things, which are shaped out of non-sentient clay, exhibit the characteristics of intelligence. Nor the latter, for the intelligence of the Self is essentially present everywhere*, and hence cannot be imparted to a thing. As thus we have shown that real identity of the Intelligent and the Non-intelligent is quite unproveable, the reason on which our second inference rests (i.e. the non-capability of those two to become identical) is well established, and hence the inference is sound. And as the second inference proves the original (first) one, the adhyāsa of the Vedāntins is proved to have no existence.

Well let it then, the Vedāntin resumes, be granted that the two substrates themselves are incapable of identity. All the same there may be a so-called adhyāsa of connexion (samsargādhyāsa); i.e. the qualities or attributes (dharma) of the Self may super-impose themselves on the Not-self. And against this it may not be urged that the Self as being mere intelligence possesses no attributes; for bliss (ānanda), the consciousness of objects, permanence, etc., are its attributes. These so-called attributes, indeed are at bottom not attributes, but constitute the very being of the Self, but they appear as several owing to the functions of the internal organ which acts as the limiting adjunct (to the universal absolutely non-differenced Self) and hence may, in a metaphorical

* The universal Intelligence is present everywhere: it is the general substrate of whatever appears.

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sense, be termed ‘attributes.’ Nor can it be urged that there can be no adhyāśa of attributes, independently of their substrates. For when, owing to the nearness of the red Hibiscus flower, the crystal appears to us as red, we have an adhyāśa of a mere attribute, (i.e., we hold the crystal to be red without identifying the crystal and the flower). But this theory also is groundless. Attributes cannot possibly be treated as something independent. What we perceive in the crystal is not redness by itself but redness belonging to the flower which is reflected in the crystal. So-called ‘adhyāśa of attributes’ apart from their substrates therefore does not exist. And as we thus have disposed of all adhyāśa of things, whether they be substrates of attributes or attributes, we have also disposed of cognitional adhyāśa which does not arise without the adhyāśa of things. The general conclusion therefore is that adhyāśa is something not capable of rational proof.

VI.

[That of the adhyāśa of the Self and the Not-self no satisfactory rational account can be given, the Vedāntin replies, so far from upsetting our theory, fully confirms it. The phenomenal world is a mass of irrationality: it is throughout inexplicable, non-definable (anirvachaniya). Hence no objection can be taken to the view that that fundamental fact to which the whole phenomenal word is due, viz., the adhyāśa of Self and Not-self, cannot be rationally explained. We however are able to assign a definite causal factor of that adhyāśa, viz. the existence of a principle of illusion, termed ‘Nescience’ (ajñāna, ‘avidyā) which as a matter of fact, though in an unaccountable way, is associated with what constitutes the reality of the world, viz. Universal Intelligence.]

Against this we (Vedāntins) now finally reassert the validity of our adhyāśa theory, as follows:—Do you, our opponent, on the ground of adhyāśa being contrary to reason, maintain that it is something unreal, or do you mean to deny that there is such a thing at all? If the former, there is no cause of disagreement; for we Vedāntins, who hold the theory of the inexplicability (anirvachaniyatā) of the apparent world, ourselves teach that adhyāśa is something unreal and contrary to all reason. We
in fact hold the theory of the world's inexplicability, just because the adhyāsa of Self and Not-self is in contradiction to all reasoning; otherwise we should have to acknowledge it as something real.

But, our opponent here interposes, we altogether deny adhyāsa—there is no such thing as the adhyāsa of Self and Not-self. For there exist no causal or instrumental factors to bring about an adhyāsa in this case. In the adhyāsas of ordinary experience—as when a man mistakenly judges 'this thing before me (which in reality is a shell) is silver'; or 'this thing (which in reality is a piece of rope) is a snake,'—the required causal factor is supplied by the similarity, in point of qualities and constituent parts, between the substrates (i.e. the shell and the rope) on the one hand, and that which super-imposes itself on them (i.e. the silver and the snake) on the other hand. But in the case of the alleged adhyāsa of Self and Not-self there is no such similarity; for the Self has neither qualities nor parts. Nor may you object to this on the ground that adhyāsa exists even in cases where such similarity is absent, as e.g. when redness super-imposes itself upon the crystal. For as in this latter case the error is due to a conditioning adjunct, there is no need of similarity. The adjunct there is the red flower close by, to which the quality of redness really belongs; it is this which is the cause of the appearance of redness in the crystal. But why then, the Vedāntin asks, should not the organ of egoity (ahahkāra) which possesses certain qualities such as activity, etc., and moreover is in close contact with the Self, be acknowledged as that conditioning adjunct owing to which activity and other qualities may be super-imposed upon the Self? Let us allow, the opponent replies, that attributes such as activity may super-impose themselves upon the Self; but for the adhyāsa upon the Self of substrates of attributes—such as the organ of Egoity itself, the body and so on—there is no conditioning adjunct; and hence such adhyāsa is not possible. For similarity also (which otherwise might take the place of an upādhi) is absent.

This also is groundless, the Vedāntin replies. The quality of smell (odour) has neither attributes nor parts, and yet we form judgments—such as 'the smell of a snake is similar to that
of the ketaki-flower—proving that similarity may rest on the mere attribute of odorousness. Analogously similarity between the Self and the Not-self may be established on the basis of the Self possessing the attribute of being a ‘thing’ (‘that which is the meaning of a word’—padārtha, just as the Not-self is). And, if to this argument you object on the ground that the Self which is nothing but mere intelligence in reality has no attributes whatever (not even that of being a padārtha), we finally remark that after all it is not necessary, in cases of error not due to conditioning adjuncts, to insist on similarity as the causal factor of the adhyāsa. For, as a matter of fact, there are instances of such error which do not depend on similarity; consider e.g. the error ‘the shell (which in reality is white) is yellow.’ “But in this case there is present another causal factor through which the error establishes itself,—viz. the effusion in the eye of bile (caused by jaundice), or some other morbid affection of the organ of sight!” Well, we Vedāntins reply, in the case of the erroneous identification of the Self and the Not-self also, there exists a causal factor, viz. Nescience! “But as to this Nescience of yours people are not even agreed, whether it be the mere absence of knowledge (a mere negation), or some positive entity; would it then not be better to deny adhyāsa altogether than to assume Nescience as its basis?” This may not be, we reply. It is simply impossible to deny a beginningless (eternal) entity which immediate intuitive knowledge vouches for as something that, while depending on the existence of the inward Self, hides and obscures the intelligence and bliss of that Self. Were we to deny this, we should have to deny the inward Self as well!

“But adhyāsa being an effect cannot be held to be without a beginning!” Not so, we reply. Adhyāsa, in the case of the Self, means nothing else than the Self’s being connected with the attributes of being an agent, having experiences of pleasure and pain, being liable to imperfections such as passion and desire, and so on. Now the adhyāsa of being a subject experiencing pleasures and pains pre-supposes the adhyāsa of being an agent; for he only who acts enjoys the fruits of his actions. Being an agent, again, pre-supposes the adhyāsa of being subject to passion and desire; for he who has no desire does not act. And desire, in its turn, pre-supposes experiences of pleasure and

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pain; for desire does not spring up in those who have had no such experiences. All these states thus constitute a beginningless chain, comparable to that formed by the seed which pre-supposes a plant, which again pre-supposes a seed, and so on ad infinitum. This reflexion also disposes of the objection that, as adhyāsa pre-supposes the consciousness of the world and that consciousness on its part pre-supposes adhyāsa, we are reasoning in a circle. For if, as we assert, adhyāsa is without beginning, the body, etc., as presented by the retrogressive chain of previous adhyāsas cause the subsequent adhyāsas through persisting in the form of impressions (samskāra; i.e. the impressions left on the cognising Self by previous adhyāsas give rise to the subsequent ones). Nor may it be objected that the body, etc., cannot be superimposed upon the Self because they are unreal. For as super-imposition can be established by mere consciousness, it is not real existence that determines the super-imposition of a thing upon something else. In erroneous judgments of the type of ‘this is silver’ there is adhyāsa of identity between the shell which is real and the silver which is unreal. Nor can it be said that in the case of two trees which seen from a distance appear as one, there is adhyāsa of the identity of two real things. For there also an unreal attribute, viz., oneness, is super-imposed on a real substrate, viz., the two trees. Were this not so (i.e., where it not the unreal only that super-imposes itself), it would follow that that identity also which holds good between a quality and the substrate of the quality—which are two real things—, is something merely ‘super-imposed.’ Although in the case of the Self and Not-self the wrongly imagined identity is the same, viewed from either side (i.e., the Self is erroneously held to be identical with the Not-self, and the Not-self to be identical with the Self); yet there is a certain difference, in as much as the Self super-imposes itself on the Not-Self not directly by itself, but only in the way of (samsarga) (which means that it is only the attributes of the Self which super-impose themselves on the Not-self), and hence is real; while the Not-self super-imposes itself upon the Self in its entire essential nature (so that the entire Not-self is nothing but super-imposition), and hence is

\[\text{As mere subjective super-imposition also is possible, it does not follow that because a certain thing is super-imposed, it must have real existence.}\]

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unreal. Nor can it be argued that, if there were an identification of the Real ('Self') and the Unreal (Not-self) then just as in the case of a quality and the thing to which it belongs we perceive a difference as well as non-difference between them, and hence, have the notion 'the cloth has whiteness,'—so in the same manner, in the case of the real 'Self' and the unreal 'Not-self' (body, &c.) we should have the notion 'I have the body,' 'the body is mine,' and so forth (and not 'I am the body.') This we say cannot be argued; for what constitutes adhyāsa is that either term should be the other in the sense of complete oneness. "But should it then not be said that there is an adhyāsa of oneness rather than of identity?" Not so, we reply. For after all ordinary thought and speech make a distinction expressing itself in forms such as 'the body is mine', analogous to the distinction expressing itself in the form 'the cloth has the quality of whiteness.' "But," it is objected, "adhyāsa must invariably be accompanied by non-apprehension of difference. And now you admit that ordinary thought and speech imply an apprehension of difference between Self and Not-self, and such apprehension destroys the non-apprehension of difference; hence adhyāsa itself is destroyed!" Not so, we reply. That apprehension of difference (which you say destroys adhyāsa) is not really admitted by us. The fact is that ordinary people although verbally acknowledging the difference of Self and Not-self—in using forms of expression such as 'this body of mine'—do not really conceive a Self different from the body unless their minds be illumined by scriptural teaching. To their actual thought (which makes no distinction between the body and the Self) the term 'adhyāsa of oneness' may be applied, but with a view to their forms of speech it may be designated as an 'adhyāsa of identity.' The use of the term 'I' (as applied by ordinary people equally to the Self and the body) really implies non-difference of Self and Not-self; on the other hand, expressions such as 'this body of mine' seem to imply the difference of the two. Nor must it be said that identity (tādātmya) is neither more nor less than oneness. For by 'identity' we have to understand a relation of two things, contradictory to their mutual negation, and at the same time, implying difference as well as non-difference; while 'oneness' is

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simply contradictory to their difference; the two relations thus distinctly differ. The relation of Brahman and the individual soul (jīva) also in reality is that of oneness; but, with a view to the difference fictitiously established by Nescience it may be spoken of as 'identity.' Nor may it be said, that just as Brahman and the individual soul are really one, so the oneness of the Self and the body also—of which ordinary thought is directly conscious—is something real. For two entities which are absolutely distinct, in as much as the one is real and the other unreal, cannot be one in reality. Their 'oneness' therefore is something merely super-imposed.

VII.

[Nescience, which is not mere 'absence of knowledge' but a positive entity, abides in, or has for its substrate, the Self.]

Of this adhyāsa the material cause (upādāna) is Nescience (ajñāna), which has the character of a positive entity (i.e., is not a mere negation or privation), is without beginning and inexplicable (anirvacanīya). For where such Nescience exists, adhyāsa arises; where it does not exist, adhyāsa does not arise. "But," an objection is raised, "(there is no need of assuming Nescience as the cause of adhyāsa; for) the positive and negative instances quoted (viz., the rise of adhyāsa where there is Nescience, and its absence where Nescience is absent) may very well be explained on the ground of the absence of the knowledge of truth, which knowledge prevents adhyāsa." Not so, we reply. The knowledge of truth is not something that can be defined as being a preventive of adhyāsa. By a preventive thing or factor we understand that which arises in antagonism to the production of a certain effect, in cases where there is sufficient cause for the production of the effect. But the knowledge of truth arises where there is an absence of the sufficient causes of adhyāsa—such as morbid affections of the eye and the like (owing to which a white thing appears as yellow, or a piece of shell as silver, and the like.) "But all the same, since the knowledge of truth is no doubt antagonistic to adhyāsa, the positive and negative instances

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above stated may be accounted for on the basis of the absence of that antagonistic factor (i.e., the knowledge of truth)". This also we cannot admit. In the case of any effect the first question that arises is that regarding the cause; after this only there arises the question as to the absence of antagonistic factors. In accordance, therefore, with the principle that what is intimately connected has greater force than what is remotely connected, it is proper to account for the stated positive and negative concomitances on the basis of what is intimately connected with them, i.e., their material cause. "But may it not be said that, as in the case of emergent non-existence, here also there may be no need at all of a material cause?" The cases are not analogous, we reply. We must assign a cause for adhyāśa on account of the following inference—'Adhyāśa has a cause because it is a positive entity and at the same time an effect; just as a jar is.' "But," it is objected, "the reason in this inference has no general proving force, as shown e.g. by the instance of the colour which is a quality of a piece of cloth. That is a positive entity and also an effected thing; but it cannot possibly have a material cause. For what should be that cause? the piece of cloth? or some other substance? Not the former; for of two things that come into being at the same time (as, in the present case, the cloth and its colour), one cannot be the material cause of the other; not any more than one horn of a cow is the cause of the other horn. And on the second alternative the colour would belong to that other substance, and thus cease to be the colour of the cloth." By no means, we reply. Even according to the view of the Naivyāikās a substance when originating abides without qualities for one moment; hence, as the cloth and its colour do not come into being together, there is no reason not to accept the cloth as the material cause of the colour. On the view of the Vedāntins, on the other hand, even if the threads (i.e. a substance other than the cloth) are viewed as the material cause, the colour would not on that account cease to be a quality of the cloth; for the Vedāntins hold cause and effect to be identical. Nor may it be said that, since the adhyāśa

* According to the Naivyāika, the quality of a thing is produced one moment after the production of the thing itself.
INDIAN ASTRONOMY.
A HISTORICAL SURVEY.
PRELIMINARY NOTE.

It is my intention to give, in what follows, an account of Indian Astronomy and its history, that will be representative as far as may be of the present state of our knowledge of the subject. In doing so I shall, in the main, follow the outlines of a previous work of mine on the same subject—written in German and forming part of the ‘Encyclopædia of Indian Research' (‘Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie and Alterthumskunde'—edited initially by the late Professor G. Bühler and at present by Professor F. Kielhorn); but I shall here deal with the whole subject at greater length and with a special view to the requirements of Indian readers. A good deal of research has been done in this field by scholars in Europe and America, as well as in India; certain results have been established and in other cases interesting questions at any rate have been raised; but the discussions have mostly to be looked for in the publications of learned societies not all of which are easily accessible, and have in some cases been carried on in languages other than English. It therefore may appear worth while to attempt a kind of survey of what has been accomplished, and also to direct attention, in due places, to what remains to be done. I shall further make it a special point to give, as opportunities offer, a full appreciation and, wherever it appears to be called for, criticism of the views regarding the development of Indian Astronomy held by the late lamented Pandit Shaṅkar Bālkṛṣṇa Dikṣit of Poona, whose work on the history of Indian Astronomy (Bhāratīya Jyotisā Shāstra, Poona, 1896) is the fullest, and, in many respects most important, work that has hitherto appeared on this subject. Mr. Dikṣit's book has unfortunately so far become little known, probably owing to the fact that it is written in Marathi; but it is a store-house of valuable information and suggestion, and even where we are not in a position to accept them, Mr. Dikṣit's general views are worthy of respect and careful consideration.

I wish it to be understood that what is here begun is not meant as a complete or systematic history of Indian Astronomy, but only as a survey of the field, likely to prove useful as an introduction to the study of the subject.—G. Th.
CHAPTER I.

(INTRODUCTORY.)

It is well known that the Hindus have been in possession of an important body of astronomical knowledge for centuries before they came into effective contact with European nations and, as also undoubtedly is the case, for centuries before the Muhammadans established themselves in India and brought with them their own astronomical knowledge and skill which are generally acknowledged to rest on the basis of Greek science. Broadly characterizing the amount and kind of astronomical knowledge in the possession of which the Hindus were found by the European nations, we may say that the Indian Jyotishi were able to accomplish on the whole as much as the Greek astronomers of Alexandria in the first centuries of the Christian era. They knew that the earth is a sphere freely suspended in space. They had a very accurate knowledge of the lengths of the mean revolutions of the planets. They understood to calculate the true places of the planets (as distinguished from the mean ones), and they were acquainted with the two different inequalities of planetary motion which have to be distinguished to that end. And like the Greek astronomers, and in fact all astronomers previous to Kepler, they employed for the calculation of the true places of the heavenly bodies, the hypotheses of eccentric circles and epicycles. They were in possession of the true theory of lunar and solar eclipses, and hence capable of calculating those phenomena beforehand with an at least fair amount of accuracy. They employed the same sexagesimal division of the sphere and of time which the modern western nations have taken over from the Greeks. They generally carried on their calculations according to certain practical concise rules given in astronomical manuals of comparatively recent date, such as the Grahalahavah (composed in Shaka 1442), and the Tables of Makaranda; but the better informed section of the Jyotishi were also fully acquainted with the theory of the subject as contained in an important group of earlier writings, viz., the so-called astronomical Siddhantas—which three enjoyed the highest
authority and were prevailingy studied, viz, the Sūrya Siddhānta, the Siddhānta Shiromani, and, in Southern India, the Ārya Siddhānta. Of these three fundamental works the second one was known to have been composed by Bhāskarāchārya in the twelfth century; but this astronomer himself acknowledges that the elements of his astronomical system were derived from the Siddhānta composed by Brahmagupta, a writer of much earlier date; and Brahmagupta himself again was held to have established his system on the elements of the Brahma Siddhānta supposed to be not the work of a human writer but a divine revelation made at some indefinitely early period. The Ārya Siddhānta was similarly held to rest ultimately on the teaching of an ancient Rishi; and the Sūrya-Siddhānta finally, the most venerated of these works, was viewed as a revelation made to men by Sūrya, the god of the sun, himself, millions of years ago.

It is evident that to the modern enquirer when first confronted by the phenomenon of a fully developed body of astronomical doctrine claiming to be of Indian growth and to come down from remote antiquity, a double task at once proposed itself. He in the first place had to endeavour fully to comprehend and analyze the Indian system so as to determine its intrinsic and comparative scientific value; and in the second place he had to ask himself the question in what way that system should be conceived as having originated. Waiving the alternative of a divine revelation made an inmeasurably long time before what the modern man views as historical ages, two possible modes of origination presented themselves. The Indian system either had to be accepted as the outcome of long continued observations and theoretical reflection on the part of the Hindus themselves; and if so, the task was, if possible, to ascertain, the steps or stages of this process of scientific development and the period through which it extended. Or, on the other hand, it was essentially nothing more than an adaptation, possibly with more or less important modifications and additions, of the astronomical knowledge possessed by some other ancient nation. In this latter case the problem was to ascertain from what nation, at what period, and under what circumstances, the transference of astronomical knowledge had accomplished itself. To both of these tasks some of the earliest western enquirers into Indian litera-
ture and antiquities at once applied themselves. The former task indeed presented no excessive difficulties. In the first place the great astronomical treatises of the Hindus are written in a comparatively easy style, the difficulties springing here and there from the terseness of the text are to be overcome by the help of many excellent commentaries, and the early investigators were able to secure the assistance of competent Pandits. And in the second place the astronomical system unfolding itself in the pages of the Sūrya Siddhānta and similar works was after all a comparatively simple and primitive one, i.e., immeasurably less complicated than modern European astronomy, and, if once freed from certain peculiarities of exposition which in no way touch the essentials of the doctrine, exhibiting a marked resemblance to the teaching of the great Greek astronomers. Thanks to the labours of such men as Colebrooke, S. Davis, Bentley, J. Warren, Bailly, Delambre and others, the theories and processes of Indian Astronomy thus came to be analyzed and understood about the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century already, with an accuracy and completeness which has left comparatively little to be accomplished by later research.

The second task, the historical one as we may call it, thus became the more prominent one. Various hypotheses on this point were set forth by the earlier enquirers already. The French astronomer Bailly was inclined to view the Indian system as embodying elements established at a very early period, long anterior to the rise of Greek astronomy. J. Bentley, going to the other extreme, maintained that the Siddhāntas are quite recent fabrications, mistakenly, or rather deceitfully, assigned to early periods. Others again, struck by the fundamental similarity, above referred to, of the Hindu methods and theories to those of the Greek astronomers, favoured the view that the Hindu system is at any rate posterior to the developed Greek system as for the first time fully expounded in the great astronomical treatise of Ptolemy (Klaudios Ptolemaios, about 140 A.D.). It is, as may be here mentioned at once, this latter view which has, in the course of the last century, established itself more and more firmly among western scholars. But as a thorough investigation of the legitimacy of this view will be the main topic of a later part of this work, nothing further need be said about it in the present place.
The historical point of view in due course suggested further enquiries into the development of Indian astronomy. The several Siddhāntas although diverging from each other in details, some of which are not unimportant, yet on the whole manifestly exhibit a system fundamentally one and the same; so that we are driven to view them as belonging to one and the same stage or period of development—at whatever point in general history that stage or period may have to be located. But not all Indian works dealing with astronomical matters fall under the Siddhānta category with its sharply marked characteristics. The earlier enquirers, already, were not quite unacquainted with Indian astronomical doctrines of a more primitive and unscientific type; Colebrooke and Bentley, e.g., knew of the so-called Jyotiśa Vedāṅga and its assumption of a solar year of 366 days, five such years containing exactly 62 synodical months; and they naturally assigned such rudimentary doctrines to a period earlier than that of the Siddhāntas with their immeasurably more exact determinations. And as in the course of the 19th century the entire literature of ancient India came to be studied with increasing thoroughness and width of outlook by western Savans as well as Hindu Scholars of the modern type, and in connexion therewith passages of astronomical bearing and interest came to be collected from all the branches of that literature including the large mass of Vedic writings, the ideas as to the distinctive characteristics of the several periods naturally became more clear and definite. There at present is a general consensus as to the need of distinguishing at least three such periods. We have in the first place to allow a distinct position to that period during which the so-called Siddhāntas were composed; without for the present undertaking to date that period in a definite way. We next have to admit as a separate period that stretch of time during which there prevailed in India those views as to things astronomical, cosmographical and calendric of which, among books fully preserved, the small treatise called the Jyotiśa Vedāṅga and the astronomical work of the Jainas (called Sūryaprajñāpī) are the most important representatives. That this latter period is previous to that of the Siddhāntas most persons at all acquainted with the two sets of astronomical works would
probably be ready to admit at once; it however is not at the present point of exposition necessary to urge this priority of time. So much at any rate is evident that we have before us two groups of astronomical works of totally different characteristics, the doctrines set forth in one group being very much more imperfect and primitive (in the qualitative sense of the term) than those set forth in the other. And finally we have to give separate attention, with a view to traces of astronomical knowledge to be discovered there, to the so-called Vedic literature, comprising Samhitās and Brāhmaṇas. Here again we may for the present, if we choose to do so, speak of a group of literary works rather than of a period. For what really matters is that the Vedic writings in their occasional but not unfrequent allusions to astronomical and calendaric things give evidence of ideas different from those represented by works belonging to those other groups which were shortly characterised above. It however will be more practical to take it at once for granted that the mass of writings which is comprised under the term 'Veda' possesses real chronological priority to that group of books which connects itself in spirit and doctrine with the so-called Vedāṅga ('that which is auxiliary to the Veda'), and therefore to assume a Vedic period of astronomy as anterior to the Vedāṅga-period.

In accordance with these views Mr. Sh. B. Dikṣit, in his 'History,' distinguishes a Vaidik Kāl, a Vedāṅga Kāl and a Siddhānta Kāl. A similar plan is followed in my own sketch, above referred to, of the history of Indian astronomy: the period of the Vedāṅga and cognate works there is generally spoken of as the 'middle' Period. It would be easy to introduce further distinctions, we might, e.g. separate the period to which the composition of the fundamental Siddhāntas has to be assigned from the later development of Siddhānta doctrine, and might possibly fix our dividing point at the time of Ārya Bhaṭa; but distinctions of this kind would not be really helpful.

As will appear in the course of the work, there also are certain difficulties in the way of a neat and sharp division of the great periods which we consider it advisable to distinguish. Should e.g. the Vedic group take in the Kalpa and Grihya sūtras (in the former of which the Vedic doctrine and practice
of the great sacrifices are systematized), or should those books be assigned to the middle or Vedaṅga period? Theoretically the latter procedure would appear preferable; for the special task of the Vedaṅga appears to be just that concise formulation of knowledge which, in another field, is also the characteristic task of the Kalpa-sūtras. But on the other hand we shall see that the astronomical views distinctly set forth in some of the Sūtras are by no means identical with those set forth in the Vedaṅga but have a somewhat more primitive colouring. Similarly we shall see that a certain astronomical treatise termed a 'Siddhānta' (viz. the Paitāmahā Siddhānta known to us from Varāha Mihira's Pañchasisiddhāntikā) teaches a system—if we wish to apply this somewhat grand term to a very rudimentary theory—which is in no way related to the teaching of the great Siddhāntas but reproduces the well-known features of the Jyotiṣa Vedaṅga. While therefore holding fast to the great general distinction of these main periods, we shall have to make allowances for those cases where they may appear to intersect or overlap.

Chapter II.

THE VEDIC PERIOD.

[Books to be consulted on astronomical, etc., conceptions, prevailing during the Vedic Period—A. Weber, die vedischen nachrichten von den naxatra, parts I II; various papers by the same author in the 'Indische Studien'; 'Vedische Beiträge' by the same author, published in the Transactions of the Royal Academy, Berlin; the chapter on Vaidik kāl in Mr. B. S. Dikṣit’s book; Wallis, Cosmology of the Rigveda; Zimmer, Altindisches Leben, ch. XIII; MacDonell, Vedic Mythology, § 7; Hillebrandt, Vedic Mythologie, passim; Kaegi, der Rigveda, passim. Much valuable information and interesting speculation on cognate matters is to be met with here and there in most recent books dealing, in some way or other, with Vedic literature, specially the 'Rigveda'; so e.g. in Ludwig’s Commentary on his (German) translation of the Rigveda; in Pischel and Geldner’s 'Vedische Studien,' in Oldenberg’s ‘Religion des Veda’; in Bergaigne’s ‘Religion
vedique'; in Mr. Tilak's 'Orion' and 'Our arctic home in the Veda.'—References to discussions of special questions will be given in their due places.

1. As said before, the Veda in the strict sense does not contain any books which could be claimed as 'astronomical literature.' Mention has been made of the so-called Jyotisha-Vedāṅga; but as its name indicates (Vedāṅga i.e. 'a limb of' i.e. 'something auxiliary to' the Veda), this treatise stands outside the Veda in the proper sense of the term. If therefore we undertake to discuss a 'Vedic' period of Astronomy, our aim cannot extend further than to collect and examine such occasional passages in Vedic literature as in some way or other bear on matters astronomical or calendaric; so as, if possible, to form some notion of the ideas entertained as to the structure of the Universe, the motions of the heavenly bodies, the computation of time, and similar topics, by those Aryan communities in connexion with whose religious worship the hymns and mantras of the Vedic Samhitās, and later on the Brāhmaṇas were composed. In thus grouping the Samhitās and the Brāhmaṇas together we do not overlook the fact that these two classes of books widely differ in general spirit, and manifestly were composed under very different conditions of life; and that therefore it could hardly be expected that they should throughout agree in their views of astronomical things. All the same it does not appear practicable to hold them apart from this latter point of view. A certain primitive naïveté in their conceptions of the structure of the world and the nature and motions of the heavenly bodies is alike characteristic of both sets of writings; and moreover the older parts of the Samhitā literature really give extremely little information on these matters, and what they give is so generally expressed in vague poetic language, that we naturally turn to the later prose-texts—which on the whole so closely connect themselves with the hymns—for help towards a better understanding. And what the Brāhmaṇas have, occasionally, to say on astronomical things is throughout clear and unambiguous.

A considerable part of the hymns of the Rik-samhitā no doubt is 'astronomical' in that sense that it is devoted to the praise of divinities originally representative of certain aspects
or phases of 'heavenly light'. The Sūrya and the Uṣas of the hymns are nothing else but the sun and the dawn, and Soma may possibly be the moon; and there are other divinities for which a physical basis somewhere in the realms of heavenly light may with some amount of confidence be assumed. But on the one hand most of what the hymns tell us about those divine beings naturally is of no scientific interest; and on the other hand even the most competent Vedic scholars are frequently found to disagree so totally as to the original nature of Vedic divinities and the meaning of the texts bearing on them that the historian of Astronomy does not find himself in a position to accept their results as well established. A few special cases of this kind will be mentioned later on.

In what follows, Samhitās and Brāhmaṇas will therefore be dealt with together. The treatment of the subject does not claim to be exhaustive but will touch on the main points only. A complete and systematically arranged collection of all passages from Vedic literature possessing an import which in any sense can be called astronomical is a decided desideratum. The richest collection so far available is contained in the late Professor A. Weber's papers mentioned above—a performance altogether admirable considering the time when it was made but not of course exhaustive. A complete collection should extend not only over Vedic literature in the narrower sense but should take in the Kalpa and Grihya Sūtras also which, in astronomical as well as other matters, closely connect themselves with the Brāhmaṇas. The hymns of the Rīk Samhitā would require to be dealt with apart from the remainder of Vedic literature. The difficulties of interpretation here are infinitely greater than in the case of the remaining Vedic literature, and hence nothing in any sense exhaustive or final could at present be aimed at. But it appears not improbable that the gradual advance in the general interpretation of the Rīk-samhitā will bring to light further facts of astronomical interest.

One important negative assertion may here be made at the outset, viz., that the astronomical, cosmographic and cosmogonic views entertained by the Vedic tribes (in the Samhitā as well as the Brāhmaṇa stage) differed altogether, in general spirit and in
details, from those set forth in works belonging to the second, or Vedaṅga, period. Those latter works expound a system of the world which manifestly lays claim to a certain completeness and is worked out in detail with extraordinary minuteness and precision: its main features (to anticipate in a few words what later on will have to be dealt with at some length) are the division of the flat earth into a central circular continent—at the middle of which Mount Meru is situated—and six other ring shaped continents, separated from each other by ring shaped oceans; and the assumption of the heavenly bodies moving, in orbits parallel to the flat surface of the earth, round Mount Meru—night thus being due to the interception of the sun’s rays by Mount Meru. Neither the Samhitās nor the Brāhmaṇas nor even, it seems, the Sūtras know anything of this system. The old Vedic poet or priest evidently does not claim to possess that minute and comprehensive knowledge of the structure and the laws of the physical Universe which the cosmologist of the Purāṇa period arrogates to himself; his ideas are comparatively naïve, more vague and imaginative, and hence at the same time less fantastic and absurd.

2. We may in the first place note what little the Vedic texts say or suggest with regard to the nature or shape of the earth. The most common terms denoting the earth (prthivī, urvī, mahī) designate it as the ‘broad’ or ‘large’ one, with reference of course to its wide, to the primitive eye boundless, extent. No division of the earth into definite regions is acknowledged; statements such as the one R. S. I. 35,8 ‘He (Savitṛ) has looked over the eight summits (kakubhāḥ), the three desert regions (? dhānva yojanā), the seven streams’ are too isolated and too ambiguous in expression to serve as sources of definite information. If R. S. X. 58-3, the earth is called chaturbhrīṣṭi ‘four-cornered’; we no doubt therein have a reference not to the earth being square or the like in shape, but merely to the four points of the compass. The primitive and natural conception, suggested by the appearance of the line of the horizon, of course is that the earth’s shape is circular; accordingly ‘this world’ (i. e. the earth) is called parimaṇḍala (circular) in Shat. Br. VII. 1, 1, 37. The earth is called samudraparyantā, ‘surrounded by the sea’ in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa.
That the earth is a sphere freely suspended in space—of this advanced view no trace is to be found in the Vedic writings anywhere. We mention this specially because some recent writers have maintained that the doctrine of the earth's sphericity is hinted at or implied in certain Vedic texts. Thus Mr. Diksit interprets R. S. I. 33-8: 'The spies (of Vṛiṣṭra) making the circumference of the earth' as implying that the earth is a sphere. What exactly is meant there by the 'making of the earth's circumference' (we may admit this meaning for pariṇah; although other interpretations have been proposed) I do not know; but in any case the reference to a circumference does not prove more than that the author of the hymn viewed the earth as circular (not as spherical). Equally untenable is Mr. Diksit's interpretation of R. S. IV. 53-3: This verse only says that 'Savitṛ (the sun) has stretched out his arms, driving forth (wakening) and laying to rest, with his rays, the world.' That the rising sun while bringing light to some parts of the world, brings darkness to others, says Mr. Diksit, can be asserted by him only who is acquainted with the sphericity of the earth; if the earth were flat, the rays of the rising sun would at once illuminate the entire earth. Against this we remark, in the first place, that the text as it stands does not appear to say that the sun when rising brings day to some and night to others; it rather says no more than that it is he who wakes and lays to rest the world, in as much, that is to say, as he alternately produces day and night. But even, if we take the verse as specially referring to sunrise, we have only to remember the conception of the Purāṇa writers and the Jainas as to how the sun produces at the same time day for some and night for other parts of the world, in order to realise how little need there is for us to understand the Ṛk passage as implying a recognition of the earth's sphericity.

3. Above the earth there is the air or atmosphere (antariksha i.e. the region between; rajas), the abode of clouds, rain and wind; and above that heaven or the sphere of light (div; vyoman; rochana and various other terms). This division of the entire Universe into three regions is the prevailing one, and referred to in many places. On the other hand we also frequently meet with the simpler view of the world.
consisting of two great regions—heaven and earth (dvāpārthāvī) in which case the antariksha must be understood to be comprised within heaven. Sometimes each of the three regions of the world is spoken of as being itself three-fold. We may without difficulty imagine the atmosphere as well as the upper realm of light to be divided into three parts each; we are familiar with expressions such as 'the highest heaven.' It is less easy to see what the 'three earths' should be (for the idea of the earth beneath our feet consisting of three layers or slices is certainly not an obvious one); and possibly, in accordance with a form of expression not unfrequent in the Veda, the 'three earths' means nothing more than the three regions of the world (viz., earth, atmosphere, heaven) of which the earth is one.

4. An interesting statement in the Jaiminiya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa (belonging to the Sāma Veda and published in the Journal of the American Oriental Society) deserves special mention. According to this the middle of the earth is there where the 'plakṣa prāsravana' is, and the middle of the sky there where the 'seven Rishis are'. What we have to understand by the 'plaksha prāsravana,' we learn from other works comprised within the Sāmaveda, viz., the Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa and the Lātyāyana Shrauta Sūtra. These books describe certain peculiar 'wandering' sacrifices (yāt sattra), which are performed by sacrificers moving upstream from the place where the holy river Sarasvatī loses itself in the desert (called Sarasvatī-vinaśana) to the source of the river; this latter place, evidently marked by a big Plakṣa-tree, is designated as 'plakṣa prāsravana' i.e. the fig tree belonging to the source. This then was, in the opinion of the Sāmavedins at any rate, the central spot of the earth—chosen as such no doubt because in the specially holy district round the Sarasvatī the place where the river breaks from the ground was considered the holiest of all. This determination of the earth's central spot is naïve, but in a way quite natural and intelligible: it reminds us of the Greek idea of the centre of the earth being at Delphi. We also note the contrast of this choice of a well known sacred locality within northern India with the later, Pauranic, idea of the fabulous mountain Meru, situated in unknown regions.
far to the north. To what the Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa says about the middle of the sky we shall revert further on.

5. As to the distance of the heavenly world from the earth we meet in the Brāhmaṇas with several curious estimates. The Tāndya Brāhmaṇa (XXI, 1, 9) makes the naïve statement that 'that world' is distant from this world as far as a thousand cows placed one upon the other. The Ait. Brāhmaṇa (II. 17) says that the distance of the heavenly world (svarga lokaḥ) from this world amounts to a thousand 'āśvina' (a day's journey on horseback). The same idea appears to underlie the statement made in the Atharva Samhitā X., 8, 18 that the two wings of the yellow hamsa which flies to the heavenly world (svarga) are stretched out to the distance of a thousand days (sahasrāṇyam).

6. The references to the sun in Vedic literature of course are very numerous; a few of them are of astronomical interest. ‘The sun revolves round these worlds, without resting, turning towards the right ‘again and again’ (Shat. Br. VIII. 7, 2, 5). He is nearest to the earth at noon (Shat. Br. II. 2, 3, 9). He rises in the morning from the water, and enters into it in the evening (Ait. Br. XI. 20). He has 360 rays, is surrounded by 360 regions (dish; Shat. Br. X. 5, 4, 4, 14). His distance from the earth amounts to one hundred Yojana (Kaushīt. Br. VIII. 3.).—As to what from an astronomical point of view would interest us most to know, viz., how the Vedic people conceived the return of the sun from the west to the east to take place, neither the Samhitās nor the Brāhmaṇas give any definite information. The Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (IV. 20) says ‘In the morning he (the sun) comes out of the water, and in the evening he enters the water.’ Another well known passage of the same Brāhmaṇa (III. 44) attempts an explanation, far from clear in its details, of the fact that the sun is not visible at night—'For that sun never either sets or rises. As to what people think ‘he is setting,’ (the fact is that) having come to the end of the day he turns himself round (ātmānaṁ viparyasyaṁ), and then makes night below (avastāt), day above (parastāt). As to what they think ‘he rises in the morning’ (the fact is that) having come to the end of the night he turns himself round and makes day below, night above. He indeed never sets.'
To explain this passage Sāyaṇāchārya has recourse to the Meru-hypothesis. ‘The sun turns himself round’ means, he says, that he makes himself of a contrary nature (viparyyasta), in as much as moving round Mount Meru he makes night for those regions he has passed through, and day for those before him. This however cannot possibly be the meaning of the Brāhmaṇa which, like the whole of Vedic literature, knows nothing of Mount Meru, and evidently means to say that at the close of day the sun turning himself round presents to the world below his dark side so as to be invisible; while at sunrise he again turns his bright side towards the lower world.  

Wallis (V. C. p. 117) thinks that a similar idea is expressed R. S. VI. 17.14; this however appears more than doubtful. The Ait. Br. does not explain how the sun returns to the east; but as at night time he presents to our world his dark side and hence is invisible, the supposition may be that he returns to the east by the same way he followed to the west.

Prof. Zimmer (Altindisches Leben, p. 357) thinks that some verses of the Rīk Samhitā furnish evidence of the Vedic poets distinguishing from the upper rajas (air, atmosphere) a lower rajas, beneath the earth, through which the sun at night time moves back to the east (the earth thus being viewed as surrounded by air or free space on all sides); and this view though generally rejected by Vedic scholars has recently been advocated by Mr. Tilak (O. A. H. p. 257 ff.) But I fully agree with those who decline this interpretation. The discussion mainly turns on a few passages in which two rajas are mentioned. Of these VII. 80-1 really is altogether clear. It describes the dawn as ‘unrolling (lit. making to go apart) the two rajas and revealing all things.’ The second clause here helps us to interpret the first—the light of the dawn opens out as it were all space and illumines all things. The two rajas are beyond doubt part of what the rising day reveals to man i.e. part of what is above the earth; a reference to a, hypothetical, dark

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*Mr. Tilak (O. A. H., p. 264) objects to the translation of ‘parastāt’ by ‘above,’ and accepts Haug’s translation ‘on the other side.’ But the opposition of ‘parastāt’ to ‘avastāt’ (which means nothing but ‘beneath’) settles the meaning of parastāt in this place: that which is on the other side, compared to what is below, is above.
rajas beneath the earth would here be entirely out of place. And as we know from other passages that a pārthivam rajas (that part of the region of the air which is nearest the earth) is distinguished form a higher heavenly (divyam rajas), the mention in VII. 80-1 of the two rajas in no way justifies us in looking for a rajas below the earth.—The same remark holds good with regard to the other texts also that refer to two rajas.

7. There has been of recent years, a good deal of discussion among Vedic scholars as to what divine beings of the Veda should be considered as originally lunar in character. There are analogous problems with regard to the sun; but they are perhaps of less interest in as much as some at any rate of the Vedic gods are quite unmistakably solar, and distinct references to the sun abound in the hymns. The references to the moon on the other hand are comparatively scarce; which is a somewhat surprising fact considering on the one hand, the importance that belongs to the moon as the regulator of time in general and specially of the proper time for frequently recurring sacrifices and ceremonies, and on the other hand the prominent position which the moon holds in later Indian thought and poetry. And among the Vedic gods there is none which is of an altogether unambiguous lunar character. The theories of some modern scholars as to certain of the most important Vedic divinities having for their natural basis the moon, therefore may claim a particular interest and may be shortly referred to in this place, although they possess no strictly astronomical relevance. One of the most conspicuous Vedic divinities is Soma, and it of course is a well-known fact that from the time of the Brāhmaṇas downwards the word Soma is one of the recognised names of the moon. But that the same meaning belongs to the word as occurring in the hymns of the Rik-samhitā—this has generally been negatived by Vedic mythologists who maintain that the Soma of the Rik-samhitā, at any rate its older parts, is nothing else but the Soma-plant or its intoxicating juice which figure so conspicuously in the old Brahminical sacrifices; and that it is only in those hymns of the Rik-samhitā which there is good reason to assign to a later period than the bulk of the collection, that the identification of the divine plant and the moon accomplishes itself. Against this view Professor A. Hillebrandt (in the first volume of his 'Vedic
Mythology") has attempted to establish the thesis that throughout the Rik-samhitā already, the plant Soma and the lunar deity are one; so that e.g. the entire ninth Mandala which hitherto was supposed to glorify the juice of the Soma plant only, would have to be viewed as consisting of hymns addressed to the moon no less than the Soma plant; and that generally speaking Moon would all at once be if not the entral, at least one of the central figures of the Vedic Pantheon. This theory has been accepted by some, strongly opposed by others (so e.g. by Profs. Oldenberg and MacDonell); the main objection to it being that, if to the minds of the poets of the Rik-samhitā the identity of the Soma plant or juice and the moon had been present, we might justly expect it to have been much more clearly expressed or at any rate more frequently hinted at than actually seems to be the case. On the other hand there is a certain antecedent probability that a view which distinctly appears in some parts of the Samhitā already and quite unmistakably prevails in the Brāhmaṇas and the whole of later literature should not have been foreign to the authors of the older sections of the Samhitā also; and Prof. Hillebrandt has brought together a collection of passages from the older hymns which at any rate afford a plausible basis for the establishment of a 'pūrva paksha' in this question. Adhuc sub judice lis est. As said before, the question has no astronomical bearing in the proper sense of the term; all the same it would be interesting to ascertain whether or no certain later Indian mythico-astronomical conceptions regarding the moon and its phases belong to the Rik-samhitā already; so especially the idea that the waxing moon is, through a certain ray issuing from the sun, gradually repleted with sweet amṛta which afterwards, during the dark half of the month, is gradually drunk up by the thirsty gods. We refer for details to Prof. Hillebrandt's exposition.

Certain others of the great Vedic divinities have of recent years also been brought into connexion with the moon. In the volume referred to, Prof. Hillebrandt tries to show that Yama, the lord of the departed, is an old lunar divinity; and he claims the same original character for Bṛhaspati who in later belief is held to represent the planet Jupiter. And Prof. Hillebrandt as well as Prof. Oldenberg (the latter in his 'Religion des Veda');
REVIEWS.


It may appear rather late in the day to review the above volume which was published no less than four years ago; but as far as we know no detailed notice of it has before this appeared in India—an omission mainly due, we presume, to the fact of Professor Hillebrandt writing in German. This circumstance and, in even a higher degree, the undoubted importance of Professor Hillebrandt's researches induce us to attempt even now, a short estimate of the achievements represented by this volume.

In the course of the last ten or twelve years the literature dealing with Vedic mythology has been enriched by more than one work of sterling merit. Apart from numerous minor treatises and papers published in various learned Periodicals (and not to mention works such as Pischel and Geldner's 'Vedische Studien', which while on the whole devoted to researches of a different kind, occasionally touch on matters mythological), there have appeared within that period three comprehensive works dealing with Vedic Mythology as a whole—Professor MacDonell's 'Vedic Mythology' (forming part of the 'Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie und Alterthumskunde'); Professor Oldenberg's 'Religion des Veda'; and Professor Hillebrandt's 'Vedische Mythologie' in three volumes (1891, 1899 and 1902). Each of these works has a well marked character of its own. In a sense the least ambitious, although by no means least useful, is Professor MacDonell's book which, in accordance with the general plan and scope of the encyclopedic work of which it forms a section, aims less at establishing new results and points of view than at giving a concise and methodical summary of what had so far been achieved in the field of Vedic Mythology by the combined labours of many scholars. Not that Professor MacDonell's book is destitute of interesting aperçus of an original character, such as we indeed were entitled to expect from a writer to whom we had previously been indebted for some
valuable researches regarding difficult points of Vedic Mythology; but the main merit of his work lies in its grouping in a lucid and systematic way the mythological material offered by the Veda, and in passing judgments characterized by great impartiality and sanity on all matters where there is a conflict of opinion among competent enquirers. And that the theory of Vedic Mythology affords ample scope for a discreet exercise of the arbitrating and adjudicating faculty, every one at all familiar with this branch of Indological research will readily admit.

Professor Oldenberg's book (published as early as 1894) is a work of great originality. As its title indicates, it indeed is more than a Vedic Mythology; for it extends over the whole field of beliefs and practices of the ancient Indian Aryan tribes which can be called religious in any sense, Mythology proper forming the topic of one section only. It of course is generally acknowledged that whatever Professor Oldenberg writes on ancient religions and philosophies bears the mark not only of wide scholarship and accurate detailed research but also of a genuine insight, philosophic and sympathetic, into the souls of ancient nations and their peculiar views regarding the nature of the gods and the destiny of man. And we here, as ever, admire his peculiar gift of dealing with abstract matters in a manner which while making no concessions whatever to popularity yet never fails to stimulate the reader's imagination and hold his attention captive. Nor does he in the work in question, fail to open out numerous and interesting new points of view. As well known, the distinguishing feature of the book is that in it, for the first time, the attempt was made to deal with the 'religion of the Veda' in a really comprehensive way; the investigation not confining itself to those bright divine beings, the invocation of which forms the topic of the great mass of the Vedic hymns, but penetrating to and shedding light on what we may call the deeper or lower strata of Vedic religion—ancestor and spirit worship, belief in evil demons, magic in all its different forms, superstitions and superstitious practices, expiatory ceremonies and the like. Professor Oldenberg here frequently achieves striking success in showing how elements of belief and practice which manifestly had originated in ages characterized by a very primitive form of civilization and
culture appear as 'survivals' in Vedic religion; and generally in bringing the investigation into ancient Indian religion into line with that important branch of modern research which deals with early forms of religious faith and practice in a comparative spirit. The more strictly mythological part of Professor Oldenberg's book in which the most prominent of the well known and often discussed divinities of the Vedic Pantheon are passed in review, no doubt also is distinguished by breadth and depth of view—a mere summary of generally accepted results, from Professor Oldenberg's pen never fails to be impressive and suggestive—, and moreover sets forth several striking hypotheses of an original nature; so, e.g. the view of the two Ashvins representing the morning and the evening star (which idea had indeed been suggested, before Professor Oldenberg, by several other scholars but is readvocated by him in a novel and highly ingenious way); and, above all, the interesting attempt to identify the seven Adityas, inclusive of Mitra and Varuna, with the septad consisting of the most conspicuous heavenly lights—sun, moon and the five great planets (a hypothesis about which something more will be said later on). But interesting as these new interpretations are, and plausible as they appear in Professor Oldenberg's treatment, they fail, we are afraid, to carry conviction; and on the whole the mythological part of Professor Oldenberg's work has claims on our attention and indeed admiration, less as embodying well-established new results than as providing us with a brilliant and highly suggestive survey of the entire field.

We do not, in this place, wish to attempt a detailed account of the earlier volumes of Professor Hillebrandt's work; but will confine ourselves to the last volume. A few remarks as to the general character of the entire work, however, may here find a place. Of the mentioned three principal works on Vedic mythology, Professor Hillebrandt's book is, of course, the one that goes most into detail: this at any rate holds good with regard to those divinities as to whose meaning and character the author thinks he is in a position to establish theses new in their entirety or in part, while divine beings, about which the author has little to add to what his predecessors had ascertained, are dealt with more briefly. The first volume thus almost cons-
stitutes a monograph on the Vedic Soma, and much the larger part of the second volume is devoted to Agni and Uṣas. The third volume while treating in some detail of a somewhat larger number of deities, yet is mainly concerned with the Adityas and with Indra. As necessarily in any work dealing with matters for which the hymns of the R̄ṣk-samhitā are the main source of information, a large space in Professor Hillebrandt's work is taken up by the consideration and interpretation of texts: this is the case in this last volume also, which in many places makes important contributions towards the better understanding of the texts. And here also we meet with the same thorough investigation of the ritual and sacrificial system of the Vedic priests, and the same endeavour to utilize it for the correct interpretation of mythological ideas, which form so conspicuous and valuable a characteristic of the earlier volumes and in fact of all Professor Hillebrandt has written on Vedic matters. We may indeed say that this accentuation of the sacrificial and ceremonial aspect of religion forms one of the most marked features of Professor Hillebrandt's individual method.

There has been of recent years a great deal of discussion, among the Vedic Scholars of Europe, as to what constitutes the right method of interpreting the Veda. The controversy extends over a wide field and has many side issues; but the essential point may be shortly stated as follows. According to one view, which we may call the older one, the Veda, and more particularly the R̄ṣk-samhitā occupies, in general Indian Literature, a place of its own, separated by a marked gap from all the later stages of that literature; it should be interpreted mainly through itself, and if any outside help is required, the investigator should view the Veda as connected with a Pre-Indian—Aryan or possibly Indo-European—stage of culture and civilization, rather than with those later purely Indian developments which are reflected in the great Epics, the old Buddhistic books and later works. To this view there opposes itself another, more modern one, according to which the entire Veda, not excluding the oldest sections of the R̄ṣk-samhitā should be considered a pre-eminently 'Indian' product, to be explained in the first place no doubt from itself, but next to this with the help of that abundant
information as to specifically Indian things and modes of thought and belief which is supplied by the whole body of later Indian literature; all reference to hypothetical pre-Indian things being avoided as much as possible. We naturally cannot in this place undertake anything like a full review of the discussions which have been carried on regarding this question by a number of the best Vedic scholars of our time, ever since Profs. Pischel and Geldner (in their 'Vedische Studien') boldly and uncompromisingly proclaimed the latter of the above two views and proceeded to justify it by novel interpretations of Vedic texts. The question manifestly is one of great interest and importance, and it would be impossible to do anything like justice to either side but by a lengthy consideration of the main issue as well as the numerous side-issues. We here only remark that to us some of the controversialists seem to have laid too much stress upon 'method' of investigation. None we think would go so far as absolutely to deny that the roots at any rate of Vedic ways of thought and imagination strike back into a pre-Indian period: the altogether patent and undeniable points of contact between Vedic and old Iranian religious conceptions and practice would at once preclude a one-sided view of that kind. And on the other hand no Vedic scholar we suppose would care to lay it down as an axiom that no help whatever for the interpretation of the Veda is to be looked for from the study of the great epics and later works, or from the comments on the old hymns by Yāska and his followers. From what quarter the light is to come in any given case, will each time depend on special circumstances; and that 'method' will in each case be the right one which leads to results possessing intrinsic probability and convincing power. The highly learned and acute advocates of the view that the Rig-Veda is a purely Indian product no doubt have rendered a conspicuous service to the progress of Vedic studies by emphatically urging the need of greater efforts being made to extract from later Indian literature matter likely to throw light on difficulties in the Veda, and to utilize more largely and intelligently than had previously been done the resources offered to the modern scholar by Indian tradition and scholarship; and their new method has in some cases led them to highly acceptable results. But in directing attention to
important new lines of research they manifestly have come to undervalue the labours and achievements of those scholars who think it a not unprofitable undertaking to investigate the antecedents of the Rig-veda.

We have shortly dwelled on this question of 'method', because as we shall see before long the volume under review contains an important section which we think convincingly proves that however fruitful the new way of dealing with Vedic problems may show itself here and there, the old method is yet far from being played out. On the other hand, no attentive student of Professor Hillebrandt's works will fail to recognise that the author is by no means adverse on principle to the plan of viewing Vedic religions and mythological conceptions in connexion with those ideas and beliefs that prevailed in the India of post-Vedic times. As many chapters of the 'Vedische Mythologie' amply prove, Professor Hillebrandt is quite willing, as well as fully competent, to look for light for the interpretation of Vedic divinities in non-Vedic literature: the main thesis of his first Volume, as well known, is that the Soma of the hymns which previously had been universally considered as neither more or less than a personification of the soma plant and its inspiring juice—which occupy so prominent a place in the old sacrificial ritual—is really one with what later Indian belief and usage of speech understand by Soma, i.e., the moon viewed as a divine being. The method implied in this identification certainly is of the approved modern type: the Vedic god is interpreted on a purely Indian basis. All the same just this theory of Professor Hillebrandt's has by no means met with universal acceptance, not even so far as we know on the part of the most thorough upholders of the new method. And the reason which has made many enquirers unwilling to follow Professor Hillebrandt's guidance in this question is really not connected with considerations of method at all: it simply is that the theory of Soma being the moon does not appear to harmonize with much the greater part of what the hymns have to tell us as to their Soma.

We proceed to take a short survey of the main sections of the volume under review:

The first chapter is devoted to an enquiry into the original meaning of Varuna and Mitra who so frequently appear in the
hymns as a pair of somehow closely related or associated gods (Mitrā-varuṇa). Many years ago Professor Hillebrandt had made this divine pair the subject of a monograph; but in the course of time his opinion as to its original character has essentially changed. First as regards Varuṇa. We all know what a particularly solemn and august character distinguishes Varuṇa from all the other Vedic gods; how intimately he is associated with what we may call an ethical view of the Cosmos—the conception of a universal rule of law and righteousness manifesting itself in the regularities of natural phenomena no less than in the fates of men. This character is indeed, to some extent, shared by a whole class of divinities of which Varuṇa is one only, viz., the Ādityas; but it is much more pronounced in him than in his fellow-gods. And we are all familiar with the old hypothesis as to the natural basis of this impressive divine figure: since almost the beginning of Vedic research, Varuṇa was held to be a personification of the all-embracing and, in a sense, all-overruling expanse of heaven—an interpretation which to the mind of earlier enquirers appeared to be strongly confirmed or even fully proved by the supposed etymological identity of the name Varuṇa with the Greek term Ouranos (Uranus) which beyond doubt denotes Heaven or the God of Heaven. But of recent years the opinion on this latter point has changed. The most competent etymologists of our day see reason to doubt of the etymological connexion of the two words; and some of the most competent enquirers into Vedic Mythology now think that the conception of a God of Heaven furnishes no adequate basis for the understanding of all that the Vedic hymns have to tell us about Varuṇa.

It is of considerable interest to find that Professor Oldenberg and Professor Hillebrandt have, independently of each other, although for reasons in part identical, arrived at one and the same new interpretation of Varuṇa, viz. that he is an ancient moon-god; just as Mitra with whom Varuṇa is so closely associated is an ancient solar divinity. To us this interpretation appears, if not quite convincing, at any rate highly probable. Mitra is, we may assert, beyond doubt a sun-god; his solar character shines out clearly enough in the Veda itself, and even more clearly in the Mithra of the Avesta from whom the Vedic
Mitra cannot of course be separated. Now with this Mitra, Varuṇa indeed appears as closely connected, but, as pointed out by Professors Hillebrandt and Oldenberg alike, the connexion frequently is of the kind which might be classed under the category 'association by contrast' inasmuch as Mitra is represented as specially related to day and light, while Varuṇa appears in connexion with night and darkness. On the other hand the hymns render it evident that Varuṇa may not be considered a mere personification or presiding divinity of night; he, beyond doubt, is one of the heavenly gods, a bright divinity. This fact of simultaneous association and contrast of the two divine beings certainly explains itself more satisfactorily on the hypothesis of their being ancient personifications of the two great heavenly luminaries (the points of similarity and contrast between which are manifest), than on the view of Mitra being the sun and Varuṇa a god of heaven. Varuṇa interpreted as a lunar deity also enables us, as Professor Hillebrandt points out, readily to understand how it came that in later Indian belief Varuṇa is the lord of the Ocean; for the conception of a special relation of the moon to all water, heavenly and earthly, is an Indian one of old standing.

Professor Hillebrandt in a highly interesting way develops his ideas as to how the stern and rather gloomy character which belongs to the Vedic Varuṇa may be reconciled with his originally representing the moon which so generally, and notably by the later Indians, is conceived as a pre-eminently beneficient, benevolent, friendly being. Mitra and Varuṇa, Professor Hillebrandt thinks, were not first conceived on Indian soil, they were parts of that heirloom of mythological and religious conceptions, handed down from a remote past, which the Aryans carried with them into India from more northern regions; Varuṇa as primarily conceived thus is not the beneficent ruler of the nights of southern climes who brings grateful coolness and refreshing dew to plants and living beings tormented by the parching heat and dazzling sunlight of tropical days; his glories rather are those of the stern and awful ruler of the long and bitter winter nights of northern regions. How it came that a lunar deity should in the end have risen to that place of supreme eminence which Varuṇa holds in the Vedic Pantheon is
a question to which we may not be able to give a satisfactory answer; but this inability on our part certainly would not, by itself, justify us in rejecting the equation established. Mythological analysis will always be hampered by certain irrational and unaccountable remainders, and solutions of problems will have to be accepted not as absolutely proved but as highly probable.

Professor Oldenberg also, where undertaking to ascertain the original meaning of Mitra and Varuna, asks us to step outside the borders of India proper, although for reasons other than those urging Professor Hillebrandt in the same direction. He is of opinion that the group of the seven Adityas, including Mitra and Varuna, originally were nothing else but the seven great heavenly lights—sun, moon and the five planets known to the ancient nations. And since the group of the Adityas is marked off by certain common features from the other Vedic divinities of undoubted Aryan or Indian character and origin, and moreover has failed to maintain anything like a conspicuous place in later Indian faith and worship, Professor Oldenberg thinks it likely that the Adityas are not originally Aryan gods, but were taken over by the Aryans at some very early period—before yet the Indian and Iranian branches of the Aryans had separated—from some neighbouring nation among which the worship of that definite group of heavenly bodies or divinities was an old established institution. And this train of thought of course leads us at once to Babylou in all periods of whose history, down from the most remote antiquity, sun, moon and the planets, are well known to have been objects of zealous worship.

It cannot be denied that this theory of Professor Oldenberg's is a highly fascinating one; and we particularly acknowledge that his analysis of the singular character and position among the Vedic gods of the group constituted by the Adityas is as just as it is striking. But although he manages to establish some premisses highly interesting in themselves, they do not after all suffice for the momentous conclusion he draws from them. This at any rate, as far as we know, is the prevailing opinion among competent judges, and in the volume under review Professor Hillebrandt states, or restates, some of the main points
that tell against Professor Oldenberg’s theory, with great force. One of the main pillars of that theory is that the Adityas are neither more nor fewer than just seven, the number thus at once suggesting, or at any rate rendering easy the transition to, the seven luminaries of heaven. But as Professor Hillebrandt shows from a closer and fuller investigation of this point, the number seven is not by any means especially characteristic of the Adityas of the Veda; while seven are referred to in a few places, they are in other passages spoken of as five or six, and it of course is well known that in the Brāhmaṇas and later on they regularly appear as twelve. And in the next place, while there are cogent reasons for seeing in Mitra a solar divinity, and there is some evidence for viewing Varuṇa as an ancient god of the moon, there is absolutely nothing to convince us of the identity of any one of the minor Adityas with some special planet: Professor Oldenberg himself here relies altogether on the, alleged, fact of their being five in number, and being minor deities, compared to Mitra and Varuṇa, just as the five planets are minor luminaries compared to the two great heavenly lights. As things stand at present, we, therefore, see ourselves compelled to assent to Professor Hillebrandt, who considers Professor Oldenberg’s hypothesis as to the origin and primary significance of the Adityas to be non-proven. We confess that we do so not without regret; for the theory is a decidedly fascinating one, opening out a new vista as it were into dim antiquity and suggesting contacts, not previously guessed at, between great ancient nations; and it would moreover, could it be substantiated, account to some extent for a peculiar element in Vedic religion, the contrast of which with the other elements of that religion Professor Oldenberg has so admirably brought out.

Aditi, the great mother of the Adityas—another much interpreted divine figure—Professor Hillebrandt supposes to represent the ‘imperishable’ divine light: and this view no doubt well agrees with the nature of her sons who in any case are bright divinities, celestial beings. The curious connexion, which appears in the books of the Yajurveda between Aditi and the earth, he considers not to be primitive, but due to a modification of view into the causes of which insight is so far denied us.
In the next following chapter, on the Ribhus—that mysterious triad of divine beings which was to drop so completely out of the ken of generations later than the Vedic age—Professor Hillebrandt adduces further evidence to strengthen the view, first mooted by Professor Ludwig, that these three divine brothers were originally representative of, or somehow closely connected with, the three great seasons of the Indian year. This evidence mainly rests thereon that in the Brāhmaṇas and Shrauta Sūtras the Ribhus appear in a certain connexion with the so-called Chāturnāśya sacrifices—the offerings made to certain divinities at the beginnings of the warm season, the rainy season and the cold season. We, however, note that Professor Hillebrandt himself rather weakens this interpretation of the Ribhus by pointing out that certain features of these beings suggest the idea of their having originally been divinities specially honoured and worshipped by a tribe skilled in and devoted to the trade or art of making chariots and cars—a tribe or caste of rathakāras. This would indeed very well agree with what the hymns tell us in so many places as to the wondrous feats of skill and art performed by the Ribhus—among which there are conspicuous the making of a wonderful three-wheeled chariot which traverses all space; and again their making the chariot of the Ashvins. But between this hypothesis of their being the special divinities of a definite tribe of artificers—their feats of art being the heavenly prototypes of the earthly doings of their worshippers, and the hypothesis of their representing the three seasons, it would be difficult to find a natural link. And it appears to us at any rate worthy of consideration whether the connexion between the three Ribhus and the three great seasonal sacrifices which the Brāhmaṇas and Sūtras refer to is not an entirely secondary, artificial one, suggested by the coincidence that the Ribhus are three and that there are three great seasons.

We now turn to the section which Professor Hillebrandt devotes to the consideration of Indra and the myths connected with him—which section is not only the longest of the volume but also the most original and important one. Indra we know is in many ways the most prominent of the gods of the Rgveda; we may call him the Vedic god par excellence. Any attempt
to penetrate to the primary significance of this striking and central divine figure, therefore, possesses a special interest, and we feel tempted to say that Indra's case constitutes a kind of test case for systems or methods of Vedic mythological interpretation.

After having given a preliminary survey of the theories as to the nature of Indra propounded by other scholars, Professor Hillebrandt on his part approaches the problem by first asking the question what may be the meaning of the greatest and most characteristic deed of Indra to which the hymns refer in ever so many places, viz., his killing Vṛśtra and setting free the waters or rivers. Since a long time there has been a pretty general agreement among writers on Vedic Mythology as to the meaning of this ancient myth or story. Vṛśtra was declared to be an evil 'cloud-demon', who somehow puts himself in possession of the heavenly or aerial waters and malignantly withholds them from the thirsting earth, until the strong god Indra attacks and slays him; whereupon the imprisoned waters stream forth and bestow their fertilizing blessings on earth and mankind. And considering that the myth is an Indian one, its closer interpretation in agreement with local conditions seemed sufficiently obvious. What else should the demon Vṛśtra be than a personification of the dreadful heat and drought of the Indian hot season when all moisture seems to have departed from the air and all earthly waters are steadily dwindling and drying up, and what else then should be symbolized by the slaying of Vṛśtra and the deliverance of the waters but that great atmospheric process which marks the beginning of the rainy season—the coming up of dark masses of clouds, the mighty uproar of an aerial battle, marked by flashes of lightning and peals of thunder, when in the end the womb of the dark cloud is torn and torrents of released water stream forth? And this insight of course at once supplies the key to the understanding of the character of him who conquers Vṛśtra: Indra himself is an atmospheric divinity connected with cloud and rain: more particularly he is the god of thunderstorms, viewed in their beneficent aspect.

Such, more or less, is the conception of Indra and his fight with Vṛśtra to which we have been accustomed, and which we have acquiesced in. And in a way it is plausible enough, and
apparently in sufficient agreement with the seasonal phenomena of the Indian year. Certain incongruities no doubt had to be overlooked; so especially that this view of the myth implies a rather strange splitting up of the rain cloud into two elements—on the one hand the water contained within it, and on the other hand the dark cloud demon who encompasses and conceals as it were the waters. Another difficulty, grave or which at any rate should have been felt as grave, was that the texts when mentioning the place where Vṛitra holds the waters captive, prevailingy speak not of clouds, but of mountains (parvata; giri; adri); the traditional mode, suggested by the old Indian commentators already, of getting over this difficulty, was to assume a metaphor—the massive clouds in which the rain water is imprisoned being compared to mountains or rocks. We do not dwell on other defects manifestly besetting the old interpretation of the myth. Professor Hillebrandt's investigations have changed all this. We now have an interpretation of the story which is altogether free from the mentioned defects and is in full harmony with the texts as well as with natural conditions. The method by which Professor Hillebrandt establishes his new thesis is simple enough. He begins by examining the terminology and imagery of all those Vedic passages which refer to the waters being withheld by Vṛitra and set free by Indra, and determining their natural, unforced meaning; and then in the first place compares and contrasts these Vedic texts with passages from later Indian literature which describe the effects of the hot season upon the earth and atmosphere and the coming of the rains. The manifest result of the comparison is that the two sets of texts display absolutely no parallelism of general spirit, imagery or phraseology; it in fact is as evident as possible that the two refer to entirely different natural phenomena. Professor Hillebrandt next proceeds to quote from western literatures (Latin, old Teutonic in its various branches, modern English, German, Swedish, etc.) a number of passages—which as he rightly remarks might with ease be multiplied indefinitely,—descriptive of the effects on rivers and water generally, first of winter and then of spring; and none I think who runs his eye first over this collection and then over the string of Vedic texts above referred to, will fail to be struck by the inti-
mate similarity of the forms of expression and imagery which connects the two sets. The winter, in northern literature, binds, fetters, arrests the rivers and fountains; spring or the sun of spring breaks their fetters and releases them so that they well forth rejoicingly. So in the Veda, Vṛśtra holds back or binds the rivers or waters, lies round them so as to keep them imprisoned; Indra slays Vṛśtra and makes the waters or rivers flow. The parallelism between the two strings of texts indeed is so close that each might be taken as an illustrative commentary on the other.

The conclusion we have to draw from this as to the meaning of the Vedic myth is obvious. Vṛśtra is not a cloud demon or a demon of summerly drought; he is the demon of winter and cold who detains the waters in bonds of frost and ice; and Indra who slays him and sets free the waters is primarily a divinity of spring and sunlight.

But, it will be asked, how can we, if at all admitting the myth in question to have a naturalistic basis, venture on having recourse to natural phenomena which are in no way characteristic of a country such as India? The story of Vṛśtra’s doings and his conquest by Indra is after all an Indian one; while the idea of nature in general, and the waters in particular, being released from the bonds of winter and frost is characteristically and exclusively northern!—In what follows, we will attempt to answer this question, following in the main points but at the same time somewhat amplifying in certain directions, Professor Hillebrandt’s exposition.

It of course is evident that the release of the frost bound earth and waters from the bonds of winter is the great seasonal event of the year in all those regions where the winter is long and severe, completely arrests and in part destroys the growth of vegetation, and largely interferes with the activities and comfort of men. The conquest of winter by spring, the delights of the warm season in contrast with the sufferings of the cold time, hence are topics of which the poets of northern nations have never wearied; and accordingly they also constitute the basis of important elements in ancient northern mythologies. A special feature of the new life of nature in springtime is the release of
the waters, from the fetters of ice and frost—the melting of the snow, the bursting of the icy rind of rivulets and rivers, the often enormously, increased volume of all running waters, and together therewith the softening of the ground and the spreading of water, in some places beneficial, in others destructive, over wide stretches of field and meadow. All these are strongly marked symptoms of the ending of the stern rule of winter in all cold countries which cannot fail to attract the attention and stimulate the imagination and feeling of their inhabitants. But we have to note an important difference with regard to one of those great vernal phenomena. In regions where the fertility of the ground is prevailing or exclusively due to rain, spread more or less evenly over the whole surface of the country and where running waters are not extensively needed for purposes of irrigation, the increase of the volume of water of brooks and rivers due to the melting of the snow will no doubt attract attention, but not be felt as something specially beneficial: it on the contrary is well known that the rise of rivers due to that cause and the floods caused thereby often have a simply devastating character. Quite otherwise are the natural facts and the effects they have on men's minds in places where running water constitutes the main agency, or one of the main agencies, for the fertilization of the country. There the rising of the rivers in spring will be the great fact of the year, and the mythological imagination will naturally tend to personify that agent or power which binds the running waters in winter as a hostile malicious demon who in spring is conquered by a beneficent divinity who sets the imprisoned waters free for the advantage of the earth and men.

Now the home of those tribes among which the hymns of the Rigveda in their actual form originated is generally held to be the Panjub and eastern Afghanistán. In the present so-called Panjub, the cultivation of the ground largely depends on irrigation. East of Lahore indeed, there is in good seasons a sufficient rainfall to render cultivation possible without irrigation; but the latter resource is indispensable in less favourable seasons, and at all the times in certain districts. In the plains to the west of Lahore, on the other hand, the true land of the five rivers, the rainfall is so scanty that no cultivation at all can
be carried on without irrigation, and this has accordingly been the great resource of the country from the most remote ages. In modern times elaborate systems of artificial irrigation, by means of large canals, have been extensively resorted to: in more ancient times (about which detailed information may not be forthcoming) the natural irrigation due to the flooding, at certain seasons, of the ground along the river courses, helped by certain primitive contrivances to arrest the flow of water and facilitate its spread, had to be relied upon. We thus, in the west of the Punjab already, i.e. in the real Punjab, are outside the sphere of the Indian seasons proper: here the annual burst of rain about the time of the summer solstice no longer is the great phenomenon of the year; its place is taken by the rise of the water of the rivers which sets in in spring, when the snow on the hills begins to melt. Consequently, even if we refused to look for a natural basis for myths such as Indra slaying Vṛiṣṭra and releasing the waters outside the limits of the Panjāb, we yet could not possibly see in Vṛiṣṭra the demon of the great Indian summer drought, and in Indra the god who brings the rains of the monsoon; but should quite naturally be led to the interpretation of the myth proposed by Professor Hillebrandt. We ourselves, however, strongly favour the view—the legitimacy of which Professor Hillebrandt himself indeed emphasizes—that there is really no need for us to look for the natural antecedents of the oldest Indian myths exclusively in India itself or even the Punjab only. The theory that the Aryan tribes at some time immigrated into the Punjab and afterwards into further India from somewhere beyond Afghanistan has not yet been abandoned; and hence it remains distinctly open to the Vedic mythologist to search for a basis of Vedic religious and mythical conceptions outside India proper, in some northern or north western region. In Afghanistan itself we are almost outside the sphere of the great Indian monsoon; there indeed is in many parts of the country a good rain-fall, but the most important showers are those of winter and spring; and in addition to this, irrigation from streams is very extensively practised. In the regions adjoining Afghanistan proper—such as Seistan, the districts of Herat and Balkh, etc.—the prosperity of the country depends entirely, or almost entirely, on the rivers: cultivation can be
carried on only where water for irrigation purposes is available, and elaborate systems of canalization have been employed in those regions since the most ancient times. The most fertile parts are those near the hills, where running water is most abundant. A similar state of things prevails further to the north, in Turkestan. In all those regions the physical conditions are such as readily to supply the natural basis for a great myth symbolizing the struggle between winter with its checking and paralyzing influence on nature and more especially the life-giving waters, and the beneficent action of spring when the water again stream forth in abundance. The story of Ṛtītra and the mighty god who overcomes him might of course be imagined to have originated in even more northerly parts of the earth—wherever in fact the great event of the year is the conquest of frost and snow by the sunshine and the winds of spring; and we know that ancient Iranian and Armenian legends speak of deities called Verethragna and Vahagn = Ṛtītrahan; cf. Hillebrandt, vol. III, p. 188). For that special form, however, in which it appears in the hymns of the Rigveda, where an evil demon keeps the waters or rivers captive within a stronghold in the mountains until a conquering god slays him and makes the rivers flow forth, no more suitable place of origin could be conceived than one of the regions mentioned above, situated somewhere at the foot of the mighty mountain-chains which are massed together in the north-western corner of India—Himalaya, Hindukush, and adjoining mountain-chains more towards the west or north—where the mighty rush of waters from the hills in the season of spring is to the inhabitants a patent and living fact and where the rivers are the great, often exclusive, bringers of that moisture on which the fertility of the country and human existence depend. As we have remarked above, the natural features of the Punjab are such that the myth might be conceived as having originated there; and it no doubt is quite possible that the hymns of the Rigveda which allude to the myth may have been actually composed in the Punjab. But the fact of the Iranians and other northern nations having a Verethragna and so on, renders the hypothesis of the Indra and Vṛṭtra story having originated in a more northern country distinctly probable. It of course has been recognised long ago that many of the
references which the hymns make to stories of god and demons and heroes, produce the impression of the poets dealing with matters no longer truly living to them, but rather traditional and conventional, and often not fully understood. But so much certainly may be asserted that, even if the myth of Vṛṣtra being slain by Indra was first conceived in a more northern region, the natural conditions of countries such as Afghanistan and the western Panjab were not opposed to, but rather, favoured its being perpetuated.

It is of interest to see that so learned and ingenious a writer as Mr. Tilak has arrived concerning Vṛṣtra and the waters, at conclusions which in part at any rate agree with those of Professor Hillebrandt (Mr. Tilak's 'Our Arctic home in the Veda' was published in 1903, a year later than the 3rd volume of the 'Vedische Mythologie'. But it is evident that Mr. Tilak formed his opinions quite independently, and they of course may have been matured long before they were published). Mr. Tilak also discerns the incongruities and in fact complete unsuitableness of the earlier interpretations of the myth of Vṛṣtra; he e.g. quite rightly objects to the 'mountains' mentioned so frequently and definitely being interpreted as clouds. We cannot here follow Mr. Tilak in the positive part of his theory, where he thinks it necessary to take us, for the right understanding of the myth, to the Arctic regions; the waters which the demon of darkness holds captive, being according to him the cosmic waters or watery vapours which during the dark and cold part of the year are held captive by Vṛṣtra in some nether world. There is an interesting general resemblance between this theory and that of Professor Hillebrandt; the latter however has the very great advantage of being simple and natural, and while not exactly being 'Indian' in a narrow sense, yet not compelling us to go outside that sphere of physical and geographical surroundings in which the Indian Aryans are proved by very positive evidence to have been placed at one time. Altogether we do not hesitate to characterize Professor Hillebrandt's interpretation of the myth of Vṛṣtra's conquest by Indra as being the most important contribution to the theory of Vedic mythology which has been made since a long time. We hold it to be so, because it undertakes to solve one of the main riddles of old Indian
mythology, and because the solution proposed is unforced and convincing.

We do not for the present follow Professor Hillebrandt in his exposition of the later views concerning Vṛiṣṭra and Indra; and must also, on this occasion refrain from taking a survey of the remaining part of his volume (dealing mainly with Viṣṇu, Pūṣan, and the Ashvinau). We shall have opportunities of touching upon some of the matters treated by him, in subsequent parts of this Quarterly.
the Vedāntin imply certain definitions; and in this way demolishing themselves are (no valid objections but) mere 'nugatory reasons.' But this is not so; for the objections by means of which we impugn the definability of things are themselves undefinable: we in fact make use of undefinable objections only; how then can you tax us with self-contradiction? Moreover you, on your side, are unable to give a valid definition of the 'nugatory character of a Reason,' and to apply that definition to our objections (and reasonings).

(92). The Logician here starts a fresh discussion: "You assert," he says, "that the Universe is undefinable, because difficulties face you whether you regard it as real or as unreal. Now, what do you mean by this? Do you mean that there is a doubt as to the reality or unreality of the Universe? Or that you regard the Universe as something different from both, the Real and the Unreal? In the former case, since of the two mutually contradictory characters, (of Reality and Unreality), one must belong to the Universe, the objections raised against one of the two views must be merely apparent (not valid). And it is the objections raised against the reality of the world that must be regarded as invalid, as necessarily results from the following considerations:—If we accept the theory of Reality, how can the objections to the Reality be valid at the same time? [For truly, Reality is that which precludes all objections or shortcomings]. If, on the other hand, we accepted the theory of Unreality, everything would have to be regarded as unreal; and how then could the objections to, or defects of, that view be real (or valid)? The second alternative again is altogether impossible owing to sheer contradiction. For, we have the authoritative declaration—'In the case of two mutually contradictory terms, or conditions' there is no room for a third term or condition' (c.f. Nyāyakusumāñjali, Bibliotheca Indica, page 424).

(93). All this, we Vedāntins reply, is the argumentation of a man who has failed to grasp the position of his opponent. How can he who holds, as we do, that all things cannot be defined either as real or as unreal, be found fault with on the

* A 'Jñyuttara' or 'Jñati' is a kind of fallacy. If a reason is put forward in such a form as to demolish itself, it is said to be a 'Jñati'. Jñati is of twenty-four kinds—See Nyāyamañjarī, pp. 619 et. seq., and Gautama-sūtra-vājīti I, 58.
ground of his inability to prove or define the character or nature of 'undesifinability'? [Literally, how can he be urged to establish the reality of 'undesifinability'?] Is not this very undesifinability included in 'all things',—which expression comprises the whole phenomenal world? We in fact are prepared to prove the undesifinability of things, on the rules and methods of the logician himself—'since all definitions whatever turn out to be futile, it follows that the thing is undesifnable'; for the Logician himself teaches that, as between affirmation and negation, the rejection of either implies the acceptance of the other. It, therefore, is in accordance with the methods of the Logician that we say, 'the undesifinableness of the Universe is proved'! In reality, however, we Vedäntins turn our backs on all efforts to prove the reality or unreality of the phenomenal world, and take our stand upon the one absolute essence Brahman, whose nature is nothing but pure Consciousness or Cognition,—and in this, which accomplishes all our purposes, we find full satisfaction and peace of mind.

(94). Those on the other hand, who (like the Logicians) undertake to ascertain the Truth by means of argumentations proceeding in strict accordance with the rules of proof and disproof devised by themselves, we address as follows:—This your method of argumentation cannot be right; for as we have shown, it is refuted by arguments complying with all the rules devised by yourselves. For this reason there is no room whatever for criticism directed against the objections set forth by us; for our entire refutation of your rules and methods proceeds in strict accordance with these rules and methods as laid down by yourselves. Nor may you use the very fact of our setting forth those objections as a cause of action against us. For we have told you distinctly that arguments can be set forth only after it has been acknowledged that the argumentation is to be carried on by those who are indifferent as to the reality or unreality of the argumentation [so that our mere entering on the argumentation does not presuppose our acceptance of its reality.]

(95). If against this you maintain that no discussion is possible unless the reality of the argumentation be acknowledged,—we reply that the said reality cannot be acknowledged without

Kh. 42.
our setting in motion one of the valid means of proof; for otherwise anything might be accepted as real. It, therefore, would be necessary to call in the aid of Pramāṇas for the due apprehension of the subject-matter of the argumentation, and so on; we thus should be driven into a vicious infinite regress, and it would become simply impossible to start any discussion.

(96). Nor may you say that, "since argumentations are actually accomplished previously (to the apprehension of the subject-matter), there is no need to look out for another argumentation (and hence an endless regress does not arise)." For if the argumentation is already previously accomplished, then,—since every argumentation is determined by its object (visāya), which is no other than the matter to be argued,—that object also will have been previously argued or considered; and thus (both the argumentation and its object being already accomplished) there would be no need of beginning any argumentation at all. "But, might it not be the case that some special point or aspect of the matter to be discussed has not been established previously, and that a further argumentation is begun on account of that?"

This, we rejoin, implies that the special argumentation (or consideration) of which that special point or aspect is the object has not been accomplished previously. Your efforts by this means to escape from an infinite regress thus are as profitless as the chewing of a dry bone.

(97). If, finally, you were to reject as futile the arguments by which, in full agreement with your own rules and methods, we have shown your theories to be futile,—this would mean neither more nor less than that you reject as futile those very rules and methods of yours. And if you should attempt to refute our objections (formulated in agreement with your rules) by means of the Vedāntic arguments which we employ to refute your theories, the victory in the controversy would clearly rest with us. For you would in this way yourself prove our position, viz., that the arguments put forward by us are really effective in demolishing the position of opponents. Thus then the whole discussion that would be carried on between you and ourselves would be in the form that it will be your business to establish your position and ours to demolish them; and in the course of such a discussion, victory could belong to you only in case you succeeded in

Kh. 43.
establishing your position [and hence you have no ground for the view that no discussion can be started by one who holds all things to be neither real nor unreal.]

(98). For all these reasons, it remains an established conclusion that the whole phenomenon of diversity is totally inexplicable or undefinable; while Brahman alone constitutes absolute reality, free from all diversity.

Section 6.

[Non-duality is in a certain sense proved by the very doubt regarding it which our Adversary sets forth. And it is fully proved by the, inherently authoritative, Vedic texts that declare it.]

(99). [Page 82]. Here the Logician interposes the question—"But what is your proof for Non-duality?" This very question, the Vedántin replies, cannot be asked by one who does not admit Non-duality. Unless one has an idea or conception of Non-duality how could the question as to its proof be asked at all? For what you ask for is not proof in general, but proof which has for its object a particular thing; and such a question is possible only if the questioner has an idea of that thing. For every question is a kind of energy of speech, and all energy of speech is determined by the object of the idea (or cognition) which gives rise to the energy. If there were no cognitions determining the objects of verbal energies, general confusion with regard to those objects would prevail.

(100.) If then you admit that you have a cognition of that Non-duality regarding which you ask a question, we further ask you—Is this cognition of yours a true or a false one? If you hold it to be a true cognition, then the very same means of proof (or true cognition) on which that cognition is based is, at the same time, the means of proof for Non-duality; and as thus the means of proof is already known to you, the question is idle. Nor can we allow you to argue that, "though the proof for Non-duality be already known in a general way, yet what I want to

*This is the explanation given by the Vidyāsāgari. The Shāśākari explains the last sentence to mean that "in this manner there would be no end to these refutations and counter-refutations."

Kh. 44.
know is the particulars of such proof.” For as the proof known in a general way is enough to establish Nonduality, any further enquiry as to particulars would be as futile as an enquiry about the teeth of a crow. *In fact the knowledge of the proof in general will at the same time imply and bring before your mind the particulars required; what need then of a further question? For among the number of the well-understood means of right knowledge that one in which, in the given case, you have no good reason to discern any defect, is the particular means of knowledge in which proof in general will find rest and be completed. If, on the other hand, you on valid grounds trace defects in all the kinds of proof already known to you, the general proof will have to find its resting place and completion in some other means of proof which it may be found to imply. And if, finally, the purport of your question is to enquire as to the individual proof (that might convince you), we reply that it is not possible for us in every case to put our finger upon all the individual proofs (that would convince each and every enquirer); and hence even though we fail to point out such an individual proof, there is no harm done to our position.†

(101). If, on the other hand, you declare the cognition you have of Nonduality not to be true, then your question amounts to this—“what is the proof for that which is the object of wrong cognition?”—and does not this question clearly imply a self-contradiction ‡? You perhaps will rejoin, that the cognition of Nonduality is false according to you, while it is true according to us (the Vedāntins); and that hence it is to us that the question as to the proof of the cognition is addressed (and as the means of this can be called ‘pramāṇa,’ there will be no self-contradiction). But here we demur; we certainly do not consider it our business to point out the right means of proof for the cognition

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* The meaning is that there can be no ‘general’ without the ‘particulars’ constituting it; hence there can be no idea of the former without the latter.
† The Vidyāśāgar says:—“When the Logician is asked—what is your proof for the existence of atoms?—all that he can say is that it is Inference; and he cannot, unless he be omniscient, put forward any particular inferential reasoning that would convince all individual enquirers.”
‡ The ‘self-contradiction’ lying in this that the means of wrong cognition cannot be called ‘pramāṇa’ (means of right cognition).
that you may have of Non-duality (and yet this is what is intended by your question, when it presupposes the wrong character of the cognition of Non-duality). We no doubt hold Non-duality to be ever true; but does this imply that the means of proof, on which your cognition of Non-duality rests, are valid? Let us imagine the case of a man who infers the existence of fire on a mountain, on which a fire is actually burning, from the perception of a fog which he mistakes for smoke,—would this (erroneous) cognition of smoke, which has fog for its real object, have to be regarded as a valid means of knowledge?  

(102). Let your question, however, be allowed to stand in some way or other; we have a reply to it: — *viz.* that the proof of Non-duality is nothing else but the Veda, in which we meet with texts such as ‘one only without a second’, ‘there is no diversity whatsoever’ (*Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* IV—iv—19.) We shall in the *Iśwara-bhisandhi* show that the Veda is a valid means of true knowledge, and specially that it is such a means with regard to (not only things to be accomplished, such as sacrifices, but also) accomplished entities (such as Brahman and its Non-duality). For even if the passages making statements as to accomplished entities really had another import (*viz.*, that of enjoining the *meditating* upon Brahman as one, non-dual), yet that import would rest upon the validity of what the connected words of the text directly express (*i.e.* the validity of the injunction of cognising or meditating on Brahman as one rests on the validity of the fact, directly stated by those texts, of Brahman being one); and thus only those texts would be capable to refute other means of proof (which the Logician might employ against the doctrine of Non-duality). We here must remember that cognitions remain authoritative in themselves until they come to be sublated or invalidated by opposed cognitions (and

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*a* Just as in this case, even though the cognition of fire is right, yet the means by which it is got at is not valid,—so it may be that even though your cognition of a certain thing may be right, yet you might have got at it by some invalid means.

† The position of the opponents to the Vedicnta is that the authority of the Vedic passage consists only in laying down something to be done, and not in describing the real state of things; and that hence what the Vedicntic texts mean is, not that Brahman is really one, but that a person desiring final Release should meditate upon Brahman as such.

Kh. 46.
so unless the conception of Non-duality based on Vedic texts be invalidated by other means of proofs, it remains valid).

SECTION 7.

[There is no force in the objection raised by the Naiyāyika, that the Vedic texts which declare universal Non-duality are refuted by the ordinary means of knowledge, Perception in the first place, which reveal to us a world characterized by diversity. No tenet with a claim to universality can be established by Perception, which never extends to more than a limited number of objects and the difference of these objects from one another. It does not, on the other hand, establish either the difference of those objects from the cognitions of them, or of the several cognitions from each other. In this latter sphere therefore the Vedic declaration of Non-duality at once asserts itself, without being encountered by any valid counter-authority; and if the general non-difference of the object from the cognition, and of cognitions from each other, has once been admitted, we are driven to view the difference of objects of thought from each other as a mere false appearance, which, just as individual false appearances are due to some defect of the individual mind or sensory apparatus, is due to the great cosmic defect (Avidyā or Māyā), which somehow is attached to what alone is real—the principle of universal nondual intelligence. All arguments which the Logician brings forward in order to prove that cognitions differ from each other, and that hence their objects also must be allowed to be different, can be shown to be fallacious.]

(103). The Logician now proceeds to impugn the position that Non-duality is to be known through the Veda. The Vedic texts, he says, cannot be taken as valid sources of knowledge with regard to those matters which they appear directly to express; since such knowledge is sublated by sense-perception and the other valid means of knowledge. Hence we must assume them to have another, altogether different, import.

(104). You are mistaken, we reply. You hold sense-perception &c., to sublate the Vedic texts declaring Non-duality; but as a matter of fact, perceptions, inferences and so on arise with reference to their own limited objects only, such as a particular jar, or

_Kh. 47._
piece of cloth and the like. But there is no sensuous perception or inference etc., acknowledged by both of us, which would apprehend all individual things, past, present and future. Such perception, if it existed, would make of you an omniscient person; but I should believe in this your omniscience only if you gave proof of knowing what is going on in the mind of myself. If then, sense-perception and other kinds of cognition have for their objects a few things only, they have no power to sublate the Vedic texts declaring Non-duality, which refer to other things also; for the rule is that a valid cognition sublates a contrary cognition only with regard to its own particular object. Were it not so, great confusion would arise: for instance, in that case, the Vedic text which enjoins the killing of a goat to be offered to Agni and Soma might set aside the general injunction of not killing any animals, so that the latter injunction would become meaningless.?

(105). [Page 90.] And if this is so, then the Vedic texts (which assert the oneness of all things) are not subject to any sublation (and hence are fully valid) in so far as intimating the non-difference of the so-termed sublating cognition (i.e. the perception of individual difference) and the sublated cognition (i.e. the cognition of general oneness), and hence do intimate the oneness of those cognitions; and do you then mean to say that the perceptual cognition sublates itself? (as it would do if, as you claim, it were to sublate the Vedic cognition with which it is one). On what ground, indeed, could one assert that the Vedic texts which declare the non-duality of all existence, possess no validity with regard to the non-difference of the sublating (perceptual) cognition from its own object, i.e. the jar, the cloth, and the difference of the two? For certainly the cognition of the oneness of all things cannot be sublated (by the cognition of the difference of two particular things—the jar and the cloth); since that latter cognition has for its object neither itself nor its own difference from the jar and the cloth. For the cognition actually presents itself in the form 'the jar and the cloth are different

* One Vedic injunction lays down that an animal should be sacrificed to Agnišoman; another that no animal should be killed. The text argues that the former injunction, as referring to a particular animal only, does not set aside the authority of the latter.

Khr. 48.
from each other'; not in the form 'I am different from the, jar and the cloth,' or 'the jar and the cloth are different from me.'

(106). As to the self-illuminedness (self-apprehension) of Cognition (which we Vedāntins maintain), this means that the cognition bears witness to itself only, not also to the difference of itself from all those several things from which it may differ. If it were not so, (i.e. if all that from which cognition is different were the object of self-illumined cognition), then self-apprehension would take within itself all those things and their differences; and would not this again lead at once to absolute Non-duality?

(107). [Page 91.] 'But if Cognition manifests its own form (itself) as well as the form of its object, it must also manifest the difference (bheda) of the two; for difference is nothing but the individual character of the two things which differ!' If this were so, we reply, then, in the case of the erroneous cognition 'the thing before me is silver' in which the individual character of the this and the individual character of the silver are both manifested, the difference of the two would be apprehended at the same time (and this would mean that there is no error; while such error is a matter of fact). 'Let it then be said that what constitutes the difference of two things is (not their mere individual characters but) their individual existence as comprising certain specific attributes (and that in the case of error these specific attributes are not cognized). But then we may say the same with regard to (not erroneous) cognition also; i.e.,

* This is in reply to the objection raised by the Prābhākara that in apprehending itself the cognition at the same time apprehends its difference from other things.

† If, owing to the light of the cognition itself, everything would appear to it, then everything would be the cognition's 'own'; in this way everything (apparently) different from it would at once become self-illumined cognition, and thus we should be led back to the view of universal Non-duality (Śrīkārī).

‡ The opponent had maintained that Cognition cannot cognize itself and an object, without cognizizing the two as different. This the Vedāntin meets by pointing to erroneous cognition where there is cognition of two things (as e.g. the thing before me and silver) without cognition of their difference. The opponent replies that in erroneous cognition there is absent, not cognition of difference of the things themselves, but of the things as distinguished by certain attributes (if all the attributes of the thing before the onlooker were cognized, the thing would be recognised as a mere shell).

Kh. 49.
Cognition while manifesting itself may not manifest its difference from its object. For on the view of the apprehension of this difference presupposing certain contacts (of the internal organ with the sense-organ, the sense-organ with the object, etc.) (such contacts would have to exist prior to the cognition of which they are the cause, but) such prior existence is not possible (since the contact which is an attribute of the cognition cannot exist prior to that of which it is an attribute.) Should it be argued on the other hand that, just as the Cognition does not depend on contact, etc., for its own apprehension, it is not in need of them for the apprehension of attributes also (such as the attribute of its difference from other things)—we demur on the ground that in that case (all kinds of cognition being alike independent of contact etc.), there would be no distinction between direct apprehension and remembrance, and between valid and erroneous cognition.⁹

(108). [Page 92.] As thus the perceptual cognition (of the jar and the cloth) is proved by the Vedic texts (declaring universal non-duality) to be identical with the jar and the cloth, how should that same cognition be capable of acting as a valid means to cognize any difference of itself (in the form of the jar) from itself (in the form of the cloth)? And as perceptual cognition which you put forward as refuting the cognition of universal non-difference suggested by the Veda thus is found incapable of proving the difference of the jar and the cloth, the Vedic texts—having no contrary authority to meet, and enjoying unimpaired inherent authority, and being further rendered altogether invincible by the aid of 'Presumption'—fully prove the non-difference of those two things, without any possibility of their authority being obstructed.† The conclusion is that, as the scope of the application of the scriptural texts thus is not limited in any direction, they constitute a valid means of proof for the conception of general and absolute Non-duality.

⁹ While it is an acknowledged principle that valid Perception is distinguished from erroneous one thereby that in the former there is an actual contact of the sense-organ with the object cognised, which is not present in the latter.

† Perception intimates no more than that the several objects of perception—jars, pieces of cloth, etc.—are different from each other, not that they are different from the cognitions of them. Here then the Vedic teaching of general

Kh. 50.
(109). The argument that the cognition of difference (as immediately given by perception) cannot be explained otherwise (than on the basis of the reality of such difference) would by no means justify a conclusion contrary to the above. For in the first place perceptual cognition, because rendered doubtful by the Vedic texts which declare non-difference, cannot be proved to be a valid means of knowledge. And in the second place the cognition of difference (plurality) admits, like the cognition of a double moon, of being accounted for otherwise.

(110). [Page 95.] We further must notice that Scripture emphasizes the word 'one' ('one only this was in the beginning, without a second') by adding the word eva (i.e. only, exclusively), and thus declares absolute Unity. The validity of sense-perception and the other sources of knowledge which intimate plurality cannot, therefore, be justified by the assumption of there being both Diversity and Unity (which theory—the so-called 'bhedābheda' theory—might otherwise be held to satisfy the Vedic teaching as well as Perception &c.)

(111). The Logician raises another objection. How, he asks, can the process of Non-duality being established by the Vedic texts—as assumed by you—be the true one, considering the fact that cognitions do not operate by gradual stages? There non-duality steps in directly and asserts itself with regard to the non-difference of objects from their cognitions, and of cognitions from one another. But if the several cognitions are really not different from one another, we must assume (by Arthāpatti) that their objects also are not different. And this last step establishes absolute universal Non-duality.

* The appearance of a double moon is due to some defect of the eye of the spectator. The appearance of Plurality in general is due to Nescience, the great cosmic defect.

† The Vedāntin had, in what precedes, asserted that the establishment of absolute Non-duality proceeds by steps or stages: the Vedic texts at first determine their own non-difference from their objects, and after that the non-difference of the objects from one another. To this the Logician objects that 'words' after having produced a certain cognition, stop in their operation and do not, by themselves, give rise to further cognitions; just as a certain action or effort which gives rise, let us say, to the separation in space of two material objects does not give rise to a further separation. The Vedic text thus, after having at once given rise to a certain cognition, cannot be assumed to continue operating so as finally to establish the non-difference of objects from one another.
is, we reply, no force in this objection also. As a matter of fact, the cognition of the Non-difference of things originates from the Vedic text at once, and form this there follow, developing themselves by a succession of steps of thought as described above, our cognitions regarding the several individual things—all of them, however, being based on the validity of the initial cognition of non-difference (which results immediately from the Vedic text). 

(112). But, the Logician resumes with regard to a previous argument of the Vedāntin, even if the perceptual cognition of the difference between the jar and the cloth does not have for its object the difference between the cognition itself and those two things, how can, on this ground merely, the Vedic text be held authoritatively to establish the non-difference of that cognition and its object? For another cognition, presenting to consciousness the difference of that Cognition on the one and jar and cloth on the other side†, will refute the Vedic text declaring non-duality!

(113). The matter, we reply, is not as you present it. In the case stated, the Vedic text, immediately abandoning its former object, will assert its authoritative force with regard to the non-difference from its object of that other cognition (brought forward by you) which apprehends the difference—from the jar and the cloth,—of the cognition of the difference between the two: and thus establishing the non-difference between that other cognition on the one hand, and the jar and the cloth and their difference on the other hand, it will not rest before having finally established the non-difference of all the things concerned. However far you may go (in constantly bringing forward other cognitions to sublate the Non-duality texts), you will at a

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* The stages may be thus explained:—(1) The Vedic passages afford the cognition of the Unity of all things; (2) then comes the ordinary sensuous cognition of the Jar as different from the Cloth; (3) this sensuous cognition is found to be inconsistent with the previous valid cognition; (4) this cognition of difference, therefore, is rejected as invalid; (5) thus the doubt raised as to the non-difference between the Jar and the Cloth is set aside; (6) the two are regarded as one. And so on with each set of objects. Thus it is not necessary for the verbal cognition itself to come into play with regard to each of these.

† I. e. the cognition 'the perception which apprehends the difference of jar and piece of the cloth is not the jar and the cloth.'

Kh. 52.
certain point have to admit a cessation of the series of sublating cognitions; since otherwise in the first place there would be no room for the appearance in consciousness of any other object, and in the second place there would be an endless regress; and to that very cognition at which you stop, the non-duality text will at once attach itself, and, thus having obtained a footing, reduce the entire series of objects and cognitions to Non-duality. And in this it cannot be arrested anywhere by any means of knowledge. Hence—

As soon as the series of sublating cognitions, tired out as it were by running a long way, comes to a stop, it is overtaken and vanquished by the Non-duality texts catching it up from behind! (8.)

(114). [Page 98.] Nor can we allow an argument which the Logician might possibly here propose, viz., that at the point where the series of cognitions (establishing duality) comes to an end, there would be the cognition of another person which would supply the proof for difference. For in that case you will have to point out some proof for the fact of that other person cognising the last cognition of the preceding series as different from its object. It will not do to say that the proof lies in the cognition of again another person (for this would lead us into an infinite regress). Nor may you say that such a proof may be supposed to exist (even though you be unable actually to point it out). For, firstly, a merely supposed proof would at once be set aside by the well-ascertained cognition afforded by the Vedic texts; and secondly, even if such supposed proof were effective, you would have the same infinite regress.

(115). The Logician may at this point attempt to find a new basis for his view—as follows:—As a matter of fact, he says, the Vedic declaration of Non-duality having been found to be sublated by ordinary cognitions (perceptual and the like), when the series of those cognitions is followed up to a few stages (as the Vedántin also admits in his last reasoning), we may infer, on the strength of that actual sublation, that in further following up the series that cognition also, which itself is not the object of a further 'representative' cognition (anuvyavasāya), possesses sublative force with regard to the Vedic

Kṣ. 53.
declaration. This is to say—having found the declaration to be sublated in some instances we, therefrom, infer its sublation in the case of the last cognition also, on the ground of the latter belonging to the same category (‘cognition’) as the former. To this also we demur. For, we ask, in which of the two following ways do you mean to prove that the Vedic declaration is sublated by that last cognition—is it by means of a cognition constituted by nothing else than the apprehension of the invariable connexion (vyāpti) (between cognitions and the fact of their being different from their objects)—such vyāpti-cognition resting on any cases, among the whole number of cognitions, where the two terms are observed to be connected as more and less extensive terms?—or is it by means of an (inferential) cognition which, having that last cognition for its object, manifests that the probans (the ‘reason’ or middle term on which the inference rests) is present in that last cognition,—that inference being supported by the knowledge of an invariable cognition observed in the case of other cognitions?...

(116). [Page 100.] Neither of these lines of argumentation we can accept. To the former we object that if the cognition of general concomitance were to be accepted as independently (i. e. without a further explicit inferential process) exercising its sublative power with regard to particular cases also,—then the particular cognition also (which is the outcome of the inferential process based on the notion of concomitance) would already be contained in that general cognition; and how then could it be said that there is any inference?† Then as regards the second

* On the former alternative the case of the last cognition is considered proved by immediate reference to the general proposition ‘All cognitions are different from their objects.’ On the latter alternative the following formal inference is made—‘That last cognition is different from its object, because it is a cognition, like the cognition of a jar and the like.’

† The ordinary process of deductive reasoning consists in inferring a particular fact from a general fact. If this general fact were enough to accomplish by itself the particular fact, what would be the use of the process of inference? For instance, if the universal premiss ‘men are mortal’ were to imply, as it stands, the mortality of Socrates, there would be no need for the explicit inferential process comprising another premiss ‘Socrates is a man’, and a conclusion ‘Socrates is mortal’.

Kh. 54.
argumentation. If you regard the inferential cognition as what sublates the Vedic declaration, then, in as much as that inference (which would prove the difference between cognitions and their objects) cannot include itself within its scope (i.e. as the inference while proving that all other cognitions are different from their objects may not prove this with regard to itself), the Vedic declaration of non-difference will at once get a foothold on that inferential cognition, and, as we have shown above, from there extend over the whole series of cognitions and objects.

(117). The Logician then puts forward the following inference:—All the cognitions in question are different from their objects; because they are cognitions; like the cognitions of the jar and the cloth. This, he says, is an inference in a strictly general form, including the cognition itself also, and hence will prove also the difference of itself from its object. You are again mistaken, we reply. For (although the inference may prove the difference of the cognitions from their objects, it does not prove the difference of the objects from the cognitions, and hence) the Vedic declaration of Non-duality which intimates the non-difference of the object from the cognition will allow no room for the above inference. And if, to controvert this, the Logician should maintain that what the inference proves is (not the difference of the cognition from the object but) the mutual difference between cognition and object, we should have to point out the difficulties connected with the probans of that inference.  

(118). And even granting that your inference proves the mutual difference between a cognition and its own object, it proves nothing with regard to the difference of that cognition from other cognitions and their objects; and hence Scripture, encountering no opposition as to this latter point, will at once rush in, declaring the non-difference of one cognition from the object of a second, and of a third cognition from the object of the second and so on, and thus in the end triumphantly establish

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* If the proposition to be proved is 'cognitions and objects are mutually different from each other', what should be the probans? 'Because they are cognitions'?—this would prove nothing as to the objects. 'Because they are objects'?—this would prove nothing regarding the cognitions.

*Kh. 55.*
the Non-difference of all. Nor can you give to your conclusion the following form—'all cognitions are different from the objects of all cognitions'; for this would imply that a cognition which itself is the object of another cognition is different (in its character of 'object') from itself (in its character of 'cognition')—which is an absurdity. Nor may you escape from your difficulties by stating the conclusion in the form—'all cognitions are different from all cognised objects except themselves'; for the Non-dualist who maintains the non-difference of all things refuses to accept the qualification 'excepting themselves' (which implies difference); and as your probandum thus is one not acknowledged by your opponent, your whole inference is invalidated.

(119). The reasons set forth also leave no room for the objection that the Vedic declaration of Non-duality is effectively counteracted by the declaration 'all things are different', which, in the absence of sublation, must be regarded as self-evident. For if this declaration be taken as asserting the difference of all things from some thing, the argument would be needless, since we Vedântins also admit the difference of all unreal things from the one Reality—Brahman. If, on the other hand, it be understood as asserting the difference of all things from all things, this would imply the absurdity of things being different from themselves. And if you should wish to qualify the 'from all things' by the added clause 'but itself', the Non-dualist would refuse to admit that qualification.

(120). Thus then—If you make 'all things' the subject (minor term) of your inference, you lay yourself open to a double criticism—there is nothing left to constitute the 'probans' and the 'instances' of your inference (for the minor term has swallowed up every thing), and you arrogate to yourself omniscience (for none but an omniscient person can make an assertion regarding all things). If, on the other hand, you leave something outside the sphere of your minor term, that something constitutes the doorway through which the scriptural Non-duality texts march in (and disestablish all difference or duality). (9). And for the same reason, even the 'Presumption' based upon the 'difference' cognised by the first (sensuous) apprehension (of the difference between the Jar and Cloth, for instance) cannot

*Kh. 56.*
sublate the Vedic declaration of Non-duality; as that ‘Presumption’ itself will eventually stand in need of being apprehended. (10).*

SECTION 8.

[Further arguments against the position of the Naiyāyika. The latter frequently invalidates his reasoning by making an initial assumption of the reality of difference, which premiss the Vedāntin refuses to accept.]

(121). But, the Logician resumes, we find that everything in this world may be associated, in a positive as well as a negative judgment, with that ‘difference’ the conviction of the existence of which is implanted in our minds by repeated impressions; and this prevents the Vedic declaration of universal non-difference from giving rise to a corresponding cognition.† But in this objection also there is no force. ‘For words (verbal declarations) are capable of giving rise to ideas relating even to absolutely non-existing things (as when the verbal statement ‘on the tip of my finger a hundred elephants are disporting themselves’ gives rise to the corresponding idea),—and also, as long as there is nothing to sublate it, to a true cognition, firmly based on the intrinsic validity, (svataḥ-prāmāṇya) that belongs to all cognitions’ (Shloka-vārttika II. 6). (11)

Again, he also (viz., the Prābhākara) who holds the view that in all cases of verbal cognition there must be absence of the apprehension of non-connection (of the things spoken of), declares that, in the case of a cognition which is not sublated (by another, stronger, cognition) the non-apprehension of a

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*As this Presumption can not establish any difference between itself and its own apprehension, this will supply the necessary basis for the declaration of Non-duality, which having thus got a footing will eventually establish Universal Non-difference.

†We, on the ground of invariable experience, unhesitatingly affirm as well that ‘the jar is different from the cloth’ as that ‘the jar is not the cloth;’ and so of all things. Against the rooted conviction thus expressing itself the Vedic declaration of universal non-difference is unavailing.

Kh. 57.
non-connexion which is absolutely non-existent, is invariably accompanied by the apprehension of a connexion. (12)

(122). Nor can the Vedic declaration of non-duality be sublated by any reasoning as to the impropriety (of accepting the validity of such a declaration in the face of perceptual experience to the contrary); for on account of its substratum being absolutely real the Vedic declaration is stronger than Reasoning, which is not of such nature. (13)

Moreover, reasoning based on impropriety can claim superior force with regard to that only which, when once in operation, does not cut off the very root of such reasoning; in the case in question it has no such force, since the contrary takes place.† (14)

(123). The Logician (taking up the thread of the discussion from para. 118) now reasons as follows:—You, Vedāntin, urge—'Such and such a thing (e. g. the last but one cognition of the series) is not apprehended as different from such and such another thing (e. g. the last cognition); and this non-difference having once been established by the non-duality texts, by this means universal non-duality is established in the end.' But the fact is that that primary difference (the apprehension of which you deny) is apprehended by me at the very time of discussion (so that the Vedic declaration of Non-duality is unable to obtain a foothold). And hence your attempt to disprove difference is futile, whether you bring forward an alleged instance of non-difference, or not. (For in the former case we meet you by affirming our consciousness of difference, and in latter, you, of course, can prove nothing).

* The Mīnāmsaka maintains that in cases of valid cognition due to a verbal statement (as when somebody says ‘bring the cow’) there is absence of any cognition of non-congruity (ayogyata) between the things spoken of, and that together with this non-cognition there goes the cognition of congruity or connexion. The Vedāntin, accepting this, declares that, for the same reasons, there is cognition of congruity in the case of the verbal statement ‘all this is one’—a cognition which, as shown before, is not sublated by any other valid means of knowledge.

† The basis of the reasoning from impropriety is, in the given case, the generally held notion of the practical or relative reality of individual existence; and this the Veda—which insists on the oneness of all existence from the metaphysical or absolute point of view—does not deny. The reasoning from impropriety thus is deprived of its basis.

Khi. 58.
(124). Not so, we reply. You maintain that, when I say, —
'You have no valid cognition of the difference between the final
cognition of the series and the cognition produced by the Vedic
declaration of non-duality as well as other cognitions', — you at
that very time have a valid cognition of that difference. But
that cognition cannot, at that time be obtained through percep-
tion, because at that time the final cognition (of difference) is
not actually present (and there is perception only of what is
actually present). Nor could you arrive at the desired cognition
either by means of a reason (i.e. the proving middle term in an
Inference), or by presumptive reasoning (arthāpatti);* for in
neither case would the reasoning have any force against the
upholder of Non-duality; since in the alleged inference the
Probans would not differ from the Probandum; and similar-
lly in the 'presumptive' reasoning the alleged 'impossibility'
would not differ from that without which that impossibility
cannot be avoided. And how then could any valid cognition
arise from such mere semblances of Reasoning? Nor may
you (the Logician) plead that the difference is known to you
full well, and that hence the Probans is well established for
yourself at any rate. For in that case all speech on your
part will be altogether purportless; since speech is meant
to inform and convince others. And if, on the other hand,
you keep silent, you will not escape the charge of being a
dullard. Nor will it help you to say that you yourself have a
fully valid cognition of the difference, and that you express it
in words merely to make it known to others; for the fact is that
others have no confidence in your words. When two opponents,
each of whom is eager for victory, meet in a discussion, the
words addressed by one of them to the other serve a purpose

* The inference might be in the following form, — 'The last cognition
differs from the cognition produced by the Vedic declaration, because the two
are produced by several agencies.' But this inference the Vedāntin holds to be
fallacious, because the difference of agencies on which it rests is not acknow-
ledged by him. — The 'presumptive' reasoning would be in the following form,
—'If there were no difference between the two cognitions, the fact that persons
having no knowledge of the Veda have no cognition of non-duality could not
be explained.' But here the alleged 'impossibility' is explained by means of
difference, and the difference again is postulated on account of the impossibility
— which constitutes a vicious circle.

Kh. 59.
only if they initially arouse in the latter the desire to hear what the former has to say and eventually produce in his mind a valid cognition. But this the words of the Logician, when addressed to the Vedāntin, fail to accomplish; for as we have already explained, in neither case (i.e. neither by way of inference nor by way of 'presumptive' reasoning) is the point on which the reasoning hinges proved for the Vedāntin. Nor will it avail you to say 'even if my words do no more than produce a doubt in the mind of the Vedāntin, the Vedic declaration will be sublated in so far as regarded as doubtful, and hence you will be unable to prove by it the doctrine of Non-duality.' For as to him who holds the view of general Non-duality all difference is something non-established, the defects of the opponent's reasoning—such as the non-difference of the probans from the probandum and the like—will ever be present to him, and hence there will be no chance of doubt ever arising in his mind.

(125). Thus then for the steadfast warrior who takes up the single mighty ' weapon of Brahman ' and heeds nothing else, there can be no discomfiture in the sport of battle. (15)

(126). Then again, with regard to the object of the cognitions or thoughts of another person (from which you would seek to differentiate your own cognition), we can indeed form a vague general idea of them as 'something that he is thinking of', or 'something that he wishes to say'; but without some special determining circumstance we are unable to apprehend the particular object of which he thinks, or which he wishes to express. You, therefore, never can obtain a valid cognition of the difference of such an object from the last cognition (of the series of cognitions in that person's mind); since for this it would be absolutely required for you (the person other than he to whom the cognition belongs) to have an idea of the particular object thought of by the person (the difference wherefrom, of the cognition, is meant to be cognised by you). For without the idea of that particular thing, the difference from which is meant to be cognised, there can be no cognition of difference; since if

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* The 'Brahmaśstra' was the most powerful of all the missiles used by ancient archers; there is also a play upon the other meaning of the compound — 'the all-powerful weapon in the shape of Brahman' (the one Reality accepted by the Vedāntin.)

Kh. 60.
this were possible, it would be possible for a thing to be cognised as different from itself. And as the declaration of Non-duality thus at once gains a footing, how can you stop it from ultimately establishing the oneness of all that is? Thus then, we ask—

Having but a vague general notion, and never a definite particular one, of things, how can you prevent the texts declaring Non-duality from gaining a foothold? (16).

(127). 'But', the Logician asks, 'does not your refusal to acknowledge any difference or diversity involve you in flat contradiction with empirical thought, speech and action, which are based upon diversity of words and things'? There is no contradiction, we reply, as we shall fully explain later on. Moreover, that contradiction with which you charge us requires to be proved in some way; but since, according to the Non-dualist, there is no difference between that against which the charge is levelled and that which is used to establish the charge, there is no real charge at all. Hence—

'Even though the champion of Non-dualism carry on the discussion on the basis of Diversity (understood to be something non-real), how can the charge of Self-contradiction be established against him by means of arguments which are not proved to be really different from what they are meant to impugn?' (17).

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* The translation follows the interpretation of the commentators. It however appears to be much simpler to take the passage in the following manner:—

"You cannot have any valid cognition of the difference of the other man's cognition from the object he may be thinking of, without knowing the particular object that he is thinking of; for it is just possible that that very same cognition may be the object of his thought; and certainly this cognition cannot be rightly cognised as differing from itself." This interpretation is not altogether unwarranted; as Raghunātha Shiromāni refers to it as the interpretation of 'Shripāda'.
[We, moreover, the Vedántin continues, call upon the Logician to give a valid definition of the difference between things which he says is evidenced by Perception. A thorough examination of the several definitions proposed shows them all to be destructive of the very thing they are meant to define. For if, on the one hand, difference is viewed as entering into the essential nature of the things that differ, the relation between the latter, if duly thought out, is found to be one, not of difference, but of identity. And if, on the other hand, difference is held to be something extraneous to the things that differ, the need of establishing a connection between difference on the one and the things differing on the other hand drives us into the assumption of an endless series of relations—which explains nothing.]

(128). Another aspect of the question here demands consideration. What, we must ask, are we committed to by the view that Preception and the other means of knowledge refute the scriptural declaration of Non-duality, in as much as through them we apprehend the difference from each other of things such as jars and pieces of cloth?

(129). What, we ask, have we to understand by the difference of things which you say is known through Preception? Is this difference constituted by the nature of the very individual things which differ? or is it to be defined as the mutual negation of those things? or as the difference of attributes? or as something else?—The first alternative is inadmissible. For, if what constitutes the difference from each other of the jar and piece of cloth is their very nature, it follows that the two have no individual existence without either implying the other. For where there is a difference, it must be a difference from something; were it not so, to say 'difference constitutes the nature of a thing' would be no more than a statement of two synonymous technical terms. And if what Perception apprehends as the individual nature of the cloth were nothing else than the difference of the cloth from the jar, the jar would enter into the very individual being of the

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*On this view, to say that the, 'jar differs from the cloth' is to say that the 'jar is itself and the cloth is itself'; and thus the 'difference' of a thing is only its own self or nature.

*Kh. 62.*
cloth, and this would mean that Perception which was put forward as revealing difference would operate in an exactly opposite way and establish non-difference!

(130). You, our opponent replies, interpret the Perception of difference as presenting to consciousness non-difference; but please just pay attention to that aspect of it also which presents difference. If the two things were identical, the cognition would be either that of a jar or of a piece of cloth; not that of the difference of the cloth from the jar!

(131). The counter-argument, we reply, would be valid if we, while holding non-difference to be absolutely real, at the same time denied the illusory existence of difference. Hence—

The cognition, which does not present to consciousness non-difference can never present difference; but it is valid with regard to the former only, not to the latter—for this would imply the contradiction (by the apprehension of difference) of that (i.e. the apprehension of non-difference) upon which it is itself dependent. (18) 

(132). Our opponent, changing his ground, now says that what constitutes the individual nature of the cloth, is mere difference (not so far implying difference from any definite thing such as a jar); this abstract difference is, when we add 'from the jar', further defined by the jar which is the 'counterentity of the difference', and as such distinct from it. But this also, we reply, is inadmissible. For of a difference, apart from a definite counter-entity, no valid conception can be formed; as a matter of fact, knowledge of difference always refers to difference

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① The difference of jar and cloth can not be present to consciousness without the apprehension of the jar by itself and the cloth by itself; while the jar and cloth may be present to consciousness without their difference being apprehended; hence the apprehension of difference is dependent on that of non-difference, and hence non-difference alone is real' (Śaṅkara). That is to say, without the apprehension of non-difference there can be no apprehension of difference; hence the latter can never be true; as that would mean the denial of the former upon which it itself depends.

† 'A thing which differs' is the counter-entity (correlative term; pratiyogin) to 'difference'.—On the above, second, form of the theory according to which 'bhedā' is 'svarūpa-bhedā', the jar does not enter into the self of the cloth as an essential attribute or determination (vīśeṣāṇa)—as it did on the first form,—but only as an accidental attribute (upalakṣaṇa).

Kh. 63.
determined by a definite thing from which something else differs. Moreover, what an extraordinary piece of reasoning is it to argue that the essential individual character of a piece of cloth (which by your view is difference and) which, as such, should be independent of everything else, becomes 'difference' from something actually only when coming to be defined by that counter-entity (the thing from which it differs)\(^\ddagger\). Truly, what is blue by its own nature, does not become blue when defined by yellow as a counter-entity!

(133). Also consider what follows. You maintain that 'difference' is constituted by the individual nature of the cloth in so far as determined by a counter-entity, e.g. a jar. Is it then, we ask, the essential nature of the jar which constitutes the jar the counter-entity of the cloth, or some attribute of the jar? On the former alternative, the individual nature of the jar is nothing else than its being the counter-entity of the cloth: the jar thus absorbs the cloth within itself; and the unavoidable result is the identity of the two. Nor can we allow you to assert (in a manner analogous to what you had above asserted with regard to difference) that the nature of the jar consists (not in its being the counter-entity of the same definite thing but) in the mere abstract character of being 'counter-entity', and that its relation to the cloth—'the jar is a counter-entity with regard to the cloth'—is something further, different. For there can be no valid cognition of something having the character of counter-entity, without relation to some definite other thing of which it is the counter-entity. And further, the idea or form of expression 'with regard to the cloth', also will give rise to difficulties, whether this relation be viewed as the essential character or a mere attribute of the jar.\(^\ddagger\)

\(^\ddagger\)The Svarūpa of a thing belongs to itself independently of all things; and it is not dependent upon its specification by any counter-entity. Hence if the difference be the Svarūpa of the cloth, it must be independent of the jar. But this is not possible.

\(^\ddagger\)Does this 'being defined by its relation to the cloth,' constitute the essential character or an attribute of the jar? In the former case, the cloth enters into the essential nature of the jar; in the latter case, it becomes an attribute of the jar; and then the principle applies that an attribute and that to which the attribute belongs are non-different. Both alternatives thus imply identity of jar and cloth.

*Kh. 64.*
(134). Nor is the second of the above alternatives (in para. 133) tenable. For if 'being a counter-entity with regard to the cloth' is an attribute of the jar, then the cloth will enter into the very nature of that attribute; and this establishes non-difference of the cloth with that attribute (and hence on your view the cloth would be the attribute of the jar)! And if the cloth thus is shown to be an attribute of the jar, the jar will, by an analogous argumentation, be shown to be an attribute of the cloth; for the character of being a counter-entity, which belongs to the cloth, being definable only in relation to the jar, no other position could possibly belong to the jar (but that of being an attribute of the cloth). And the result thus would be that each of the two things would abide, or be contained, in the other, and at the same time be that in which the other abides or is contained. But as a matter of fact there is no means of knowledge that gives us a valid cognition of the cloth abiding in the jar and at the same time the jar abiding in the cloth. (Moreover, what view shall we, in this case, take of the attribute and that to which the attribute belongs?) Are the two connected by a definite form of connexion or relation, or are they not so connected? In the latter case, anything might be the attribute of anything. If the former, an endless series of connexions or relations would have to be assumed (for it would be necessary to account for the connexion of that definite relation with its two terms, by the assumption of a further connexion, and so on). And if, in order to avoid this endless regress, the relation, either at the very beginning or at some later stage, were assumed to be dependent on the very nature of the things related (i.e. to be a so-called svabhāva or svarūpa relation, which makes it needless to assume a further relation), then this would lead to absolute Non-duality; inasmuch as just as the attribute in question, being related to one thing, constitutes the very svarūpa or nature of that thing (the relations between the two being of that kind),—so in the same manner, when that same attribute would be related (by that same relation, which is the only one possible according to the view set forth) to another thing, it would constitute the very svarūpa or nature of this latter thing also [and thus the nature of both these things consisting of the attribute in question, there
would be non-difference between the things themselves]. This same reasoning can be applied to all attributes of things (as with regard to these also we can put forward the same alternatives as above). The result is that Perception which according to you is a valid means to cognise difference as constituting the essential nature of things, really proves universal Non-duality.

(135). The Logician here comes forward with another argument. Whenever, he says, we view the jar by itself, without reference to other things, then we cognise it as a jar only; while when we view it with reference to other things, as e. g. a piece of cloth, then we cognise it in the form of 'difference from such objects' (this being only two different ways of viewing one and the same object). This also we cannot admit. For the cognition of difference (of the jar from other objects) is of a totally different nature from the cognition of the jar by itself. And this difference of character would not be imparted to the cognition if the jar only were (in both cases) the object of cognition. Nor may it be argued that the difference of the two cognitions is due to the fact that in the cognition of 'difference' (of the jar as different from the cloth &c.) the cloth, etc., enters as an additional element (so that the cognition in one case would be of the jar, in the other case of the jar plus the cloth). For the cognition of difference is something quite different from the cognition of the jar and the cloth. 'The jar and the cloth,' 'the jar is different from the cloth'—these are two cognitions of which nobody truly ever is conscious as equivalent. Nor is the reason far to seek; for any dispute as to what in each case constitutes the object of cognition is cut short by the fact that in one case the nominative case ('and the cloth') is used, and in the other the ablative case ('from the cloth'); and that with regard to this use there is no possible option. As a matter of fact, we observe that when the notion to be formed is that of the jar and the cloth, nobody ever thinks of the cloth as different from the jar. For all these reasons we conclude that for forming a definite idea of the jar there is no need of the consciousness of the cloth.

(136). Nor is it a fact that where a certain cognition is the cause of another, the thing which is the object of the causal cognition always presents itself to the mind in the ablative

Kh. 66.
case ('from that'), * while the thing which is the object of the caused cognition presents itself in the nominative case ('this'). For if this were so, then in all perceptive cognition the object of the definite or concrete cognition (savikalpaka, which is the second stage in the process of perception) would appear in consciousness in the nominative case, together with the object of the non-definite (or abstract, nirvikalpaka) cognition (which is the first stage in perception) in the ablative case. † And similarly, in all cognition from Analogy, the thing that is remembered (through Analogy) would appear to consciousness in the nominative case, together with the similarity (which is the cause of the cognition) in the ablative case; (i. e. our cognition would be 'on account of its similarity to a cow, this is a gavaya, bos gavaeus); while the cognition only is 'this is a gavaya.' We hence arrive at the conclusion that even though the consciousness of every one testifies to the fact that what presents itself to the mind in the form 'the jar is different from the cloth' is nothing else than the difference of the jar in relation to the other thing cloth;—and this would imply that the form of the jar consists in its difference from the cloth;—yet this view cannot be upheld, merely on the ground that the cognition of the jar is dependent upon that of something else (the cloth, or difference from cloth); for if we admitted this we should be committed to the absurdities mentioned above (of there arising cognitions such as ghatatvāt ghaṭāḥ etc).

* This is meant to meet the argument that the fifth case (Ablative) does not necessarily, in the case under discussion, denote difference; when we say 'dhumāt vahniḥ' ('from the smoke, fire') we mean that fire is inferred from the smoke; analogously the collocation of words 'pataṭ ghaṭāḥ' might indicate that the cognition of the cloth is the cause of the cognition of the jar.—The reply is that causal cognitions, even when actually existing do not appear in consciousness in the form of a term in the ablative case.

† I. e. the complete perception of some individual jar would express itself in thought and speech in the form 'ghatatvād ghaṭāḥ' i. e. " from the class-character (or Universal) 'jar-ness', the (individual) jar." In perception there first arises an indefinite cognition of a certain group of generic characteristics ('This is a thing belonging to the class 'jars'); and from this there springs the cognition of the individual jar, with its definite shape, colour, etc. But as a matter of fact the finished cognition presents itself to consciousness, only in the form '(this is) a jar.'

Kh. 67.
(137). The above reasoning also disposes of the view that the Vedic doctrine of Non-duality is refuted by Perception in as much as revealing to us that difference among things which consists in their mutual negation, anyonyabhāva, (the second alternative noted in para 128). For the arguments already set forth prove, in the case of mutual negation also, that that very thing, difference from which is maintained, enters into the nature of difference itself.

(138). [Page 112] Moreover, the mutual negation between jar and cloth, as indeed between any two things, must be held to have for its counter-entity the identity (tādātmya) of the two. Now if this identity were not admitted in any way (to exist) it would not be possible to form a valid cognition of the negation that is qualified or defined by that identity; for there can be no valid cognition of a negation qualified or defined by something that, as e. g. a hare’s horn, is an absolute non-entity.† The reason of this is that whenever a means of right knowledge operates with regard to something that is qualified or defined by something else (e. g. a counter-entity, as in the given case), it cannot act without presenting to consciousness the latter thing also; and when this latter is an absolute non-entity, no valid cognition can establish itself with regard to the qualified or defined thing itself. ‡ Nor can it be asserted that the negation in question, having for its abode the jar, must be allowed to have for its counter-entity the cloth (not the identity of jar and cloth), and thus is not open to the damaging objection that it has for its counter-entity an absolute non-entity. For if this were so, what difference would there be between the mutual negation under discussion, and that other kind of negation or non-existence which the Logician terms samsarpabhāva (negation or non-existence of connection)? § It

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§ An inseparable or permanent attribute is called the ‘visheṣya,’ and an accidental one ‘upalakṣaṇa.’
† The negation of an absolute non-entity would itself be devoid of existence or meaning.
‡ And this means that there can be no valid cognition of the mutual negation in question.
§ The Logician postulates three kinds of Negation (1) Atyantabhāva or Absolute Negation, (2) Atyantabhāva or Mutual Negation,—i. e. the negation Kh. 68.
will not be right for you to explain the difference between the two negations on the ground that the negation of connection between jar and cloth means that 'the negation of the jar' is in contact with the cloth,—while the mutual negation or negation of Identity of the cloth (in the jar) means that the negation of the jar constitutes the very nature of the cloth; [as you do not hold this view which is held by the Prābhākara only]. For these reasons the difference between mutual negation and negation of connection must be held to lie therein that while the counter-entity of the latter includes mere 'connection,' the counter-entity of the former includes 'identity' between the things concerned. And in this way you cannot escape from the aforesaid absurdity of admitting a negation that has for its counter-entity an absolute non-entity.

(139). Nor may the Logician argue that all that 'mutual negation' between the two things—jar and cloth—means is that the generic character of the cloth does not reside in the jar, nor the generic character of the jar in the cloth. For, according to the Logician, the generic character of the jar and that of the cloth possess no attributes on account of which the two characters could be negativiated with regard to each other (or distinguished); and as from this it follows that the two characters are identical, any means of knowledge, negativiating the generic character of the cloth with regard to the jar and that of the jar with regard to the cloth, would thereby intimate that both the cloth and the jar are devoid of the generic character of cloth as well as of that of the jar. And as thus there could be no possibility of difference (between the jar and the cloth), either in point of attributes or of essential nature, there would be nothing to determine what should be the counter-entity and what the

of one thing in the other and vice versa, and (3) Samsargābhāva or Negation of Connection. The difference between the last two is that in the latter we only deny the connection of one thing with another, while in the former, what we deny is the identity between the two. In the one case the counter-entity of the negation is identity, while in the other it is only the thing of which we deny the connection.

By this explanation the Logician avoids the contingency of having the 'identity' between the two things as the counter-entity of 'mutual negation.'

Kh. 69.
entity in the so-called 'mutual negation,' and hence the latter could never be the object of a valid cognition.  

(140). For the same reasons the Vedic view of Non-duality cannot be refuted by Perception, viewed as manifesting that difference of things which consists in their (alleged) difference of attributes (dharma). For in the case of difference of attributes also, these attributes are nothing else than generic characters—such as ghaṭatva and paṭatva. Now you must maintain either that there is a further difference of attributes in those attributes, and then you involve yourself in either of the following difficulties,—the difference of attributes rests in itself (thus involving the absurdity termed atmāshraya, a thing resting in itself) or (if you base the difference on another difference and so on) there arises an infinite regress; and, in addition to either of the difficulties, we actually are not conscious (of any other differentia of things but their generic characters); and none of these difficulties you can remove;—or, in the second place you hold that there is no difference of those differences (i.e. that the ghaṭatva and the paṭatva are one), then the differences of attributes become one; and how then can they establish difference between their substrates (i.e. the jar and the cloth)?

(141). Then again we ask—Does that difference of attributes which constitutes the difference of the jar (from the cloth, etc.) subsist in a substrate other than the jar, or in a substrate non-different from the jar? The alternatives proposed being contradictory ones, no third alternative is possible.

(142). On the former alternative, the same question would again arise with regard to that difference which differentiates the two substrates of the 'difference of attributes' (i.e. we should again have to ask 'does that difference reside in a substrate different or non-different from the jar' etc.); and as the reply

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* If the mutual negation of jar and cloth is constituted by the mutual negation of the generic characters of the two (the ghaṭatva, jar-ness, residing in the ghata, and the paṭatva, cloth-ness, residing in the pata), then those class-characters themselves cannot be distinguished from each other; since no similar further Universal resides in them (for of ghaṭatva and paṭatva no ghaṭatva-tva and paṭatva-tva can be predicated). And the two class-characters becoming indistinguishable i.e. identical, they can no longer serve to distinguish the cloth and the jar; and it thus becomes impossible to maintain a relation of mutual negation between the two latter.

Kh. 70.
(given in favour of the former alternative) would again give rise to a similar question, an infinite regress would result. Well, the opponent says, let there be an infinity of differences! This cannot be, we reply. For if an infinite number of differences were to connect themselves with their substrate in succession, they could not enter into relation with a thing having an existence limited in time (such as a jar). * Let us then assume that all these differences attach themselves at once to the thing as soon as it enters into existence! But what then, we ask, is there to determine what particular difference subsists in the substrate qualified by what other difference? † Who indeed, in the absence of all distinction, will be able to settle the contest between them all? Moreover, since in each case, the succeeding difference (in the series of differences) would render the full service required by the immediately preceding one (viz. by accounting for, or establishing, it), the series of differences while advancing in front would melt away from behind—like the learning of a student who has a weak memory; and what solid basis (of difference) would then be left for the series?

(143). And thus it is in all other cases also where an 'endless series' is admitted.

The reasoning of him who commits himself to an endless series has three irremediable defects—(1) as each succeeding difference is accepted, each preceding difference lapses as needless; (2) there is nothing to determine what difference subsists in what substrate possessing a certain difference; and (3) there is no evidence for holding that many differences inhere in the single object (the jar). (19).

(144). [Page 124]. If, on the other hand, in order to escape from an infinite regress, we should stop after a few stages and (instead of explaining the difference at which we halt by a further difference) agree to find the difference of the two things in the mutually exclusive characters of the things themselves,—

* The jar exists for a short time only; hence it will not be in existence till eternity, so as to become related to the endless differences coming up in succession.

† The meaning is that if the infinite number of differences were to come down upon the object all at once, there would be no means to ascertain their orderly successive dependence on one another.

Kh. 71.
then in that case it would follow that the two things whose individual characters would be held to consist in being mutually excluded only, are really devoid of all individual character (for the exclusion of the entire character of the jar means nothing positive, and that which has this character will thus have no character at all). Let it then he said that it is not the entire characters of the things which are mutually excluded, but only a particular aspect of those characters. But in that case, as it would be only a particular individual aspect of the character of the jar that is excluded by the cloth, the entire character of the former would remain unexcluded by it; and thus there would be no difference between the jar (in its entire character) and the cloth, the two becoming one and the same!

(145). In reality, however, you are bound to explain what you understand by that particular aspect or character of a thing which, you say, is different from its character as a whole (or its general character). You will perhaps say that you do not acknowledge a general character which extends over all individuals (as e.g. all jars); but that the term 'character' (svarūpa) has many meanings and is applied to individuals which all have their particular characters. But if this reasoning were admissible, we should at once have to abandon all hope of establishing any generic entities, such as 'gotva' (the class-characteristics, or the Universal, 'cow'). Nor, in the second place, can there be an apprehension of the connexion with regard to the application of the term 'character' (form; svarūpa) to each separate individual (which are endless in number).

(146). If, then, the character of things consisted of the individual things themselves (and not in any generic character comprehending all individuals) then, as soon as the thing is perceived, its character would be perceived; and (since this character is ex hypothesi, the particular character which distinguishes it from all other things) there never would be a doubt as to what the thing is (while as a matter of fact on seeing an

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* For Universals such as gotva (cow) rest on the assumption of a generic character which is present in all individuals of a certain class.

† For the apprehension of the denotative power of words also pre-supposes general notions comprising many individuals.

Kh. 72.
object from a distance, etc., we often are in doubt as to what particular thing it is).

(147). There remains the other alternative (proposed in para. 141)—viz., that difference resides in that which is non-different from it. But this would imply that even the individual jar which is apprehended as one, would, owing to that difference (which ex hypothesi is non-different from it) appear as diverse, manifold! We thus could never get at anything that would be one only; and there being no one (no unity), how could we have diversity (which is only the negation of unity; remembering also that there can be no negation of an absolute non-entity)?

(148). The above reasoning also sets aside the view that the difference (of the thing) resides neither in the thing as determined by difference nor in the thing as not so determined, but simply in the thing viewed as neutral with regard to the stated alternative. *

(149). Reasoning of the above kind also enables us to reject the theory that difference is—neither the nature of a thing, nor mutual negation, nor difference of attributes—but an attribute or quality which has an existence by itself, and is also called 'separateness' (prthaktva). For this theory also 'halts', and hence is incapable to escape from the objections set forth above,—viz., on the ground that difference cannot reside either in what is different or what is non-different from it, etc.

(150). If finally, in order to avoid the contingency of difference being identical with that in which it abides (a contingency arising under the theories of mutual negation and of difference of attributes discussed in previous paragraphs), it be held that the Difference (of the Difference from its substrate) abides in itself, then there is 'ātmāshraya'—the absurdity of a thing abiding in itself. If to avoid this, the Difference should abide in another difference, and so on, then there would be an infinite regress. And if, in order to preclude this infinite regress, you were, at any stage, to deny the difference between the difference and that in which it abides, then, availing itself of the opening afforded by the non-difference thus arising,

* On this view also a thing would have to be regarded as different from itself; for it would be neutral as to itself being determined or not determined by the difference.

Kh. 73.
oneness will slip in, and in a moment spread over the whole line of differences (reducing them all to nothing).

(151). We thus have fully shown that the vedic declaration of Non-duality is not to be refuted by Perception. As for Inference and the rest, they cannot, even according to your view, sublate Vedic teaching. (20).

And as for 'Presumptions,' they do splendid service to the Vedic teaching, marching in front of it like valiant soldiers and destroying all enemies and obstacles in its way. (21).

* According to the Logician also, Scriptural Authority is more authoritative than Inference. Otherwise, he would have to accept the human skull as 'pure,' on the ground of the inference—'the skull is pure because it is a part of an animal, like the tail of a cow,'—even in face of scriptural authorities declaring the skull to be something unclean.

Kh. 74.
may be accounted for on the ground of morbid affections of the
eye, etc., there is no need of our assuming an additional general
cause, termed Nescience. For the adhyāsa and its material cause
must have one and the same substrate; while in the instance
adduced by you, the substrate of the adhyāsa is the Self, while the
substrate of the morbid affection is the sense-organ. "But,
it is objected, "the adhyāsa of silver has for its substrate the
shell, while Nescience, which you hold to be the material cause
of the adhyāsa, resides in the Self; it thus appears that even on
your view the oneness of substrate for the adhyāsa and its cause
cannot be established in all cases!" You are mistaken, we
reply. As we shall prove later on, the adhyāsa also abides in the
Self, and is only in contact with the shell.

Let us then say, the antagonist resumes, that Nescience con-
stitutes the material cause of the adhyāsa of things (arthādhyāsa)
only; while the Self and the internal organ constitute the ma-
terial cause of the adhyāsa of cognitions or ideas (jñānādhyāsa).
For in true (non-erroneous) cognitions one or other of these
two, according to different theories, is the substrate of cogni-
tion! This also may not be, we reply. For as to the Self,
it is incapable of change (and hence cannot be the cause of an
effect). And as to the internal organ—this, for giving rise to
cognitions, depends on connexion with the sense-organs (in the
case of perception), or on some inferential sign (liṅga; in the
case of inference). In the case of adhyāsa, however, no such
connexion, etc., is possible. For as the false thing (e.g. the
silver in the shell)—which has its being in the cognition only
—does not exist previously to the cognition, wherewith should
the sense organ enter into contact? The presence and absence
of the sense organ's connexion with the thing are concerned
with something else, viz., the cognition of that which is the
substrate of the erroneous cognition. Nor can it be said that
the erroneous cognition originates just from this contact of
the sense-organ with the real substrate; for in the absence of
contact with a false thing the idea of that false thing (i.e.
erroneous cognition) could not be accounted for. Nor again
can it be said that the case of erroneous cognition is analogous
to that of recognition—as when e.g. the Devadatta, whom we
had seen on a former occasion is suggested to the mind through

Viv. 41.
the impression he had left thereon, and then identified with the Devadatta now before us; for if the erroneous cognition were of this kind it could not be an erroneous one. Nor again can the erroneousness of the cognition be explained as due to the absence of contact of the sense-organ with the real substrate; for if that contact were absent, the false thing super-imposed—which as false is not itself capable of contact with the organ—would not present itself as something immediately perceived.

"But," our opponent argues, "in the case of false objects the internal organ in no way requires the co-operation of the sense; for we observe that dream cognitions arise without such co-operation!" Well, we reply, even if the internal organ were held to modify itself, without the co-operation of the sense-organ, so as to assume the form of the cognition of the false object, it yet would remain destitute of the character of cognizing subject; and hence the cognition of the false object could not accomplish itself (through the internal organ alone)!

"Let us then assume that the internal organ, although not of the nature of intelligence, modifies itself at the time of cognition of the false object, so as to assume the form of cognizing subject; or else that the Self acts as the cognizing subject!" This also may not be, we reply. For as erroneous cognition, true cognition, bondage and release have necessarily to be viewed as abiding in the same substrate, it would follow from your theory that the internal organ, being the subject of erroneous cognition, must also be the subject of true cognition, bondage and release. But we hold that it is the Self that is the subject of erroneous cognition; and this is possible only if we assume that the material cause of error is Nescience abiding in the Self. There thus remains no alternative but to assume Nescience as the material cause of adhyāsa.
VIII.

[That ‘ Nescience ’ (‘ non-knowledge ’) is something positive, not mere negation or absence of knowledge, is proved in the first place by direct intuitive consciousness. Whenever we are conscious of non-knowledge, there is not complete absence of knowledge (for if this were so, there would be no consciousness at all); there rather is cognition of the presence of something which interposes itself between the cognizing mind and the object of which we are conscious as not known—this something is positive ajñāna. The person who thinks or says ‘ I do not know this ’ is conscious of himself, of the this, and of ajñāna owing to which he is conscious of the thing as not known: of this ajñāna he is conscious as directly as e. g. of pleasure or pain. In such a state of non-knowledge the light of impersonal consciousness illumines the cognizing individual Self, the object and Nescience. What takes place when an object previously not cognized comes to be cognized is that the internal organ begins to function (in the form of Perception, Inference and so on) and dispels Nescience.—The positive nature of ajñāna may further be proved in the way of inference:—Cognition is of the nature of light which illumines what previously was obscured by (positive) darkness: it, therefore, must have for its antecedent a positive entity which obstructed cognition.]

Nor can the existence of such Nescience be called into doubt. For when our thought expresses itself in forms such as ‘ I am not-knowing,’ ‘ I know neither myself nor others,’ we are immediately conscious of a certain power of Nescience (avidyā-shakti) which is not of the nature of intelligence, and which, while having the Self for its abode, extends itself over all inward and outward things. “But why should we not hold that the object of that immediate consciousness is (not a positive entity termed Nescience) but mere non-knowledge (i. e., absence of knowledge)?” Because, we reply, we are directly conscious of that Nescience, in the same way as we are directly conscious of pleasure and pain in cognitions such as ‘ I am pleased’ and the like. Mere non-existence or absence of a thing, on the other hand, is known (not through direct, intuitive knowledge but) through the sixth means of knowledge.]

According to the Vedāntin, as also according to the Mīmāṃsāsaka, there are six means of knowledge.—(1) Sense-perception, (2) Inference, (3) Words, (4)

Viv. 43.
You deny that there is immediate intuitive knowledge of a positive ajñāna; but how then do you deal with judgments such as 'there is no knowledge in me' ('I have no knowledge')? If you admit that this judgment implies consciousness of the Self as a substrate of knowledge and of knowledge as an attribute of the Self, it would be absurd to say that there is immediate consciousness of the absence of knowledge. If, on the other hand, the knowledge of those two factors is not implied in that judgment, the immediate knowledge (expressing itself in the judgment) could not arise at all, since there would be no cause of it (i.e., if we were not conscious of the Self and of knowledge, we could not form the judgment, 'there is no knowledge in me').

But [an objection is raised by the advocate of the view that we are, in these cases, conscious of the mere absence of knowledge], as practical activities (viz., efforts either to take possession of something, or to avoid or abandon it) are the result of all knowledge, we accept them in all cases as evidence from which the presence of knowledge is inferred; and, vice versa, we infer from the absence of such evidence the absence of knowledge!

On this explanation also, we reply, there remain the difficulties pointed out above with regard to the case of substrate etc., of knowledge being known and to the case of their not being known. The same difficulties also remain if, with the Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila) we should hold that the absence of knowledge is to be inferred through the sixth means of knowledge (i.e., anupalabdhi, non-perception).†

Analogy, (5) Presumption and (6) Valid non-perception (anupalabdhi). It is this last that is here meant. The absence of a thing cannot be cognised by any of the first five means of knowledge,—it can be known only by the sixth, negation.

† There is no practical activity without an object (for all activity is either towards, or away from, some object). If then the object of a practical activity is not known, its negation or absence (abhāva) also cannot be known; for the cognition of the negation of something pre-supposes the cognition of the counterentity of that negation as well as its substrate. If, on the other hand, the object of the activity is held to be known, it would be self-contradictory to infer therefrom the absence of knowledge of the object.

† For in that case our judgment would have to be formulated as follows—'there is absence of cognition of that of which there is non-perception.' Now,

Viv. 44.
Nescience is not mere negation.

Our view, on the other hand, is that the negation of knowledge in general (i.e., the positive ajñāna of the Vedāntin) is known through ‘witnessing’ (sākṣin) consciousness; while the absence of cognition of particular things (such as a jar) is founded on non-perception (anupalabdhi) in accordance with the view of Bhaṭṭa which is accepted as true for all practical purposes.

If again, following the view of the Purāṇas, we should not allow any such thing as ‘negation’ or ‘non-existence’ (abhāva), explaining the destruction of a jar through a blow not as a case of ‘emergent non-existence’ of the jar, but merely as a new manifestation of the jar in the form of pieces of a jar; these again, if the blows are continued, appearing as a kind of powder, and the latter finally being reduced to atoms—; then of course the question of such negation being inferred from ‘non-perception’ would not arise at all.

But, the opponent resumes, as you also admit that Nescience, although not the mere negation of knowledge, is put an end to by knowledge, how can you account for the immediate consciousness of Nescience, expressing itself in the form ‘I am not-knowing’—into which consciousness there enter as factors the knowledge of the substrate of cognition (the ‘I’), and the object? *

There is no real difficulty here, we reply. The substrate of cognition (the ‘I’), its object and Nescience are all three of them illumined by (i.e., are the objects of) the ‘witnessing’ consciousness (sākṣin). This witnessing consciousness, while proving the substrate and the object, in the same way proves Nescience also; it does not put an end to Nescience. What does put an end to Nescience, is a cognitional energy of the internal organ. And there is no cognition of the latter kind when we are conscious of ‘not-knowing.’ There is, therefore, nothing contradictory in our position.

But, a new objection is raised, in the judgment ‘I do not know the jar’ the jar which here defines Nescience (in so far as

if this that is known, there cannot be non-perception of it. If, on the other hand, it is not known, there again can be no non-perception, for all non-perception must be of something.

* If knowledge puts an end to Nescience, how can Nescience—testified to by judgments such as ‘I do not know such and such a thing’—co-exist with the cognition undoubtedly expressing itself in that judgment?

Viv. 45.
being the special object which is not known) cannot be the object of the witnessing consciousness which has no relation to that jar; for the knowledge of an external object depends on that special means of knowledge with which the object is connected. Nor is the jar, in the case under discussion, cognized by one of the means of valid knowledge; for those means put an end to Nescience (which the judgment asserts).

Quite true, we reply. The jar cannot by itself be the object of the witnessing consciousness. But in so far as possessing the attribute of not being known the jar does enter into relation to that consciousness—Nescience thus being the mediating factor—and in this way becomes its object. But, it may be said, if the jar by itself cannot be the object of the sākṣin-consciousness, the fact of its having the attribute of not being known cannot bring about the relation in question; for—to quote an analogous instance—a taste which by itself cannot be perceived by sight, does not become perceptible through the fact of its belonging to a substance that is visible! This again is inconclusive reasoning, we reply. For others hold that an atom, although not by itself an object of direct internal experience (mānasā pratyakṣa), yet becomes such by entering as a defining element into the cognitional act expressing itself as ‘I know the atom’—which cognitional act itself is an object of internal experience. Ordinary experience supplies analogous instances; Rāhu, e.g., although not perceptible by itself, becomes an object of perception as soon as it comes into contact with the moon which it obscures. And as we have explained above already, the view of others (i.e., the Naiyāyikas) as to the judgment ‘I do not know the jar’ gives rise to insuperable difficulties, whether the jar which is the defining element of the absence of knowledge be said to be the object of consciousness or not. The conclusion therefore is that all things are objects of witnessing consciousness, either as known or as not

* The Naiyāyika holds that there is no knowledge without an object. Are we then to say that, in the case of the state of consciousness expressing itself in the form ‘I do not know the jar,’ the jar is an object of consciousness or not? On the second alternative, we cannot be conscious of the absence of knowledge of the jar; on the former alternative it would be contradictory to speak of absence of the knowledge of the jar.

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known. But, on this view, there will be no difference between objects known and objects not known; and this will imply the uselessness of the means of knowledge (through which things are known), and will allow no room for their positive and negative operation,—(viz., that knowledge arises when the instruments of knowledge, Perception and the rest, are operative and does not arise when they are not operative). By no means, we reply. In the same way as Nescience imparts to its object (i.e., the thing not known) the attribute of not-being-known, and thereby mediates the connexion of the object with witnessing consciousness,—so a means of knowledge imparts to its object the attribute of being-known, and in this way puts it in connexion with consciousness. This view entirely discards the objection raised. And we thus have shown that the immediate cognition 'I am not-knowing' proves the existence of Nescience as a positive entity.

For the sake of those, however, who are not to be pleased by anything but inferential reasoning, we in order to prove the positive nature of Nescience set forth the following argumentation, which in no way depends on the proof resting on immediate perceptive knowledge: 'Cognition (of the kind here under discussion) due to the recognised means of valid cognition must have for its antecedent some other positive entity which abides in the same place as the subsequent cognition; which is put an end to by the cognition; which obscures the object of cognition; and which is something other than the mere antecedent non-existence of cognition;—for cognition possesses the attribute of illumining an object previously non-illumined;—just as that attribute is possessed by the light of the first lamp lit in a dark place.' In this syllogistic argument Cognition is qualified as 'due to the recognised means of valid cognition,' because if the subject of the inference were cognition (or knowledge) in general (not thus qualified), it would comprise so called anuvāda knowledge also (i.e. knowledge not originated by one of the means of knowledge, but a mere repetition or re-statement of knowledge already gained), and with regard to such knowledge the reason in the syllogistic argument would have no proving force. The clause 'of the kind here under discussion' is introduced, in order to exclude so-called 'stream-cognition'

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(dhārāvāhika jñāna, which is constituted by a flow of cognitions each of which exactly reproduces the preceding one; so that each cognition is preceded not by Nescience but by another cognition). If instead of 'some other positive entity' the words 'positive entity' were used, these words might be taken as referring to the Self which is the substrate of all cognition; and then the inference would, superfluously, prove what is proved already (viz., that all cognition pre-supposes the Self). Of the four clauses which qualify 'some other positive entity,' the first—'which abides in the same place etc.'—excludes any causal factors of the cognition which lie outside the substrate of cognition (i.e., the Self). The second clause—'which is put an end to, etc.'—excludes dharma (i.e., religious, or moral, merit) and the like. The third clause—'which obscures the object of cognition'—excludes previous cognitions. The fourth clause—'which is something other, etc.'—excludes previous non-existence of knowledge. By all this together there is established, as the antecedent condition of knowledge, positive Nescience which possesses all the stated qualifications. 'Not previously illumined' is added as a qualification of the object, in order to exclude 'stream-cognition' (where the second cognition illumines what is already illumined by the first); the 'lamp' is qualified as 'first' in order to preclude the 'stream of light,' issuing from the lamp, which is devoid of both (the character of illumining what is not already illumined and that of having for its antecedent some other positive entity, &c., &c.); the clause 'in a dark place' is added in order to preclude the case of the lamp lit in a place which is already lighted.

[Page 18]. That this Nescience which we postulate as the material cause of adhyāsa is inexplicable (anirvachaniya) must necessarily be assumed; since otherwise the two-fold adhyāsa, itself inexplicable, of things and cognitions could not be accounted for. It cannot be accounted for otherwise; for if the material cause were real, it would follow that its effect also is real. Similarly we must assume Nescience, the material cause, to be without a beginning; for otherwise it would not be the fundamental (ultimate) cause. If it had a beginning we should have to assume an endless retrogressive series of material causes, and thus should never reach an ultimate cause.

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We thus have conclusively established that the material cause of adhyāśa is Nescience which is a positive entity, has no beginning, and is of an inexplicable nature; and has the universal Self for its substrate and its object.

IX

[The ‘obscuration’ or ‘concealment’ due to Nescience, however, is an effect produced not upon the Not-Self, but on the Self only. The effect of ajñāna upon the Not-Self is that it throws over it a false appearance, an illusory projection (vikṣepa): upon the shell there superimposes itself the false appearance of silver. ‘Obscured’ in the proper sense of the term can be only that which is of the nature of light; and such of course is not the nature of the Not-Self. When ‘non-knowledge’ of some part of the Not-Self is put an end to by the energizing of the internal organ, the special illusory projection concerned is refunded in its casual substance—general ‘Nescience;’ while in the case of supreme cognition—the cognition of Brahman—general Nescience is put an end to.]

But—our opponent raises a new difficulty—does this Nescience conceal the Not-self in the same way as it conceals the Self? or does it not do so? The former alternative is inadmissible, since there is neither any proof of such concealment, nor any assignable purpose of it. For were there any means of proof for it, the result of that means would have to present itself in the following form—‘this blue thing is concealed by Nescience;’ and that such should be our state of consciousness is clearly impossible, either at the time when we perceive the blue thing (for then it evidently is not concealed); or at the time when we do not perceive it (for then we know nothing whatever about it). You perhaps will say that while concealment of the blue thing through Nescience indeed is impossible at the time when the thing is actually apprehended, such concealment is to be inferred for the previous time. But this we deny, for the reason that no basis for such an inference can be assigned. For, we ask, should the inference be based on the fact that

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the blue thing is apprehended now? [or thereon that it is known now only and not ever before]? or thereon that otherwise the recognition 'this is that very same blue thing I knew before' could not be accounted for? or thereon that otherwise we could not account for the fact that in the interval between the original cognition and the recognition there is no remembrance of the thing cognized? The first alternative cannot be accepted; since in the case of so-called 'stream-cognition' the thing cognized in previous moments is cognized now also—which shows that cognition of something at the present moment does not depend on previous concealment of the thing. Nor can we accept the second alternative; as that would involve a "vicious circle": the idea that the thing is known now only being based upon the idea that it was concealed, and the idea that it was concealed being based upon the notion that it is known now only. The third alternative again is unacceptable; since it is not a general law that that only is recognized which, after having first been cognized, is forgotten during some time. For we observe that recognition takes place with regard to the Self also, of which we have a constant consciousness 'I am the same person I was.' Nor finally can we accept the fourth alternative. For we point out that there may be non-remembrance of such cognitions also as originated in the interval between the original cognition and the recognition, and at the time were clearly not concealed by Nescience. It is not a general law that whatever presents itself to consciousness is afterwards remembered. Nor can it be said that in judgments such as 'I do not know (understand) the matter stated by you' there is direct consciousness of Nescience connected with the object, and that, as the connexion of Nescience is discerned in the case of the Self to consist in concealment, the concealing quality of Nescience cannot be denied. For this case we explain as follows: what is immediately experienced by witnessing consciousness is Nescience, the object, and the relation of the two—all the three

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*In the text here there evidently is a lacuna. In the refutation of these alternatives, we have four alternatives, while here we find only three. The first, third and fourth refutations evidently pertain to the three alternatives found in the text; hence corresponding to the second refutation, there must be some such alternative as has been translated within square brackets.

*Viv. 50.*
being super-imposed upon consciousness. The relation between Nescience and the object does not however consist therein that Nescience conceals and the object is concealed, but therein that Nescience is the cause and the object the effect. For what is super-imposed cannot possibly be something concealed. As long as we are conscious of the thing super-imposed, it would be absurd to speak of it as concealed; and when we are not conscious of it, it does not exist; for a thing super-imposed—such as a double moon—is nothing but thought (idea). If the super-imposed thing also were concealed by Nescience, it would never present itself at all to consciousness; for as it is not an object of the means of true cognition, its concealment would never come to an end. Things which are the objects of the means of true cognition are real (in the relative sense) and as such persist even when not actually objects of consciousness; they therefore may in some way become concealed; a super-imposed thing, on the other hand, is put an end to by the means of true cognition; how then could it be concealed? From all this it follows that there is no means of knowledge to prove that the Not-self is concealed by Nescience.

Nor, in the second place, can any purpose of such concealment be shown to exist. For in all cases where concealment (or obscuration) exists, its purpose can be nothing else but counteraction (obstruction) of possible light or illumination. But how should light be possibly present in the Not-self?—through its own nature?—or owing to the means of true cognition?—or owing to Consciousness? The first alternative is clearly inadmissible; since the Not-self is essentially non-intelligent (non-luminous). Nor can the second alternative be maintained; for, since concealment is put an end to by the means of true cognition, it cannot be viewed as an obstruction to light depending on those very means. Nor can the third alternative be accepted; for, since the obstruction of that light which is shed upon the Not-self by Consciousness is fully accounted for by the concealment of the Self (which is one of the effects of Nescience) it would be useless to postulate a further concealment of the Not-self. At night time when the sun is hidden by Mount Meru nobody uses an umbrella to protect himself from the sun’s rays. But, to quote a counter-instance, even when the sun is veiled by clouds, Viv. 51.
we do use umbrellas and the like in order to ward off those subtle rays which we call heat; and in the same way we may assume a separate concealment of Not-self by Nescience excluding those faint traces of light which may be due to consciousness although obscured by Nescience! This may not be, we reply. For do you mean to say that there is one Nescience only, abiding in the Self and concealing the Not-self? or that there is a special Nescience for each object? The first alternative is inadmissible. For as illumination (consciousness) of any object cannot take place without the destruction of the concealing factor, the cognition of even one thing would imply the total termination of all Nescience—in other words, instantaneous universal Release. Nor is the second alternative acceptable; since there is nothing to justify such an assumption. For we do hold that there is a faint illumination of the object due to consciousness although obscured by Nescience; as otherwise the actual thought 'this thing is not known' could not arise at all. The conclusion is that, since there is nothing to prove concealment of the Not-self, and since no purpose of such concealment can be assigned, the view of the Not-self being concealed by Nescience must be given up.

But, on the other hand, the second alternative (viz. of the Not-self not being concealed by Nescience) is also inadmissible. For if there were no such concealment, there would be permanent consciousness of the Not-self in its entire extent.

To this we make the following reply. The first of the two alternatives discussed above we certainly do not accept. With regard to the second alternative, on the other hand, we ask you what you mean by saying that that alternative would imply permanent consciousness of the Not-self in its entire extent. Do you mean permanent consciousness of all things as known? or as not known? or of individual things as known at some times and not known at other times? We certainly do not hold the first of these alternatives; for the means of true knowledge—the effect of which it is to make things known—function at intervals only. Nor do we hold the second alternative; for there can be no question that that attribute of things which consists in their not being known is at times put an end to by the attribute of 'being known.' The third alternative, on the other hand, is just what we maintain. For

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above already (pp. 46-47) we have said that all things are objects of witnessing consciousness, either as known or as not-known. But it is objected, a thing being not-known means its being the object of Nescience (ajñâna), and being an object means to be the abode of an effect produced by that of which it is the object; but you do not allow that in the Not-self there exists obscurcation (concealment), produced by ajñâna; how then can you say that the Not-self is not-known? That Nescience, we reply, which has for its substratum the consciousness particularized by the 'this' element of the shell causes the superimposition, on the shell, of silver, and thus produces in the shell the effect which is called the appearance to consciousness (avabhâsa) of silver: it is in this way that the shell is not-known. Whenever some part of the Not-self is not-known, we have to understand this 'not-being-known' in the way defined, without acknowledging any 'concealment' of the Not-self. But, it is objected, while the shell is known, the projection (vikṣêpa) called 'silver' does not appear to consciousness; for the silver is put an end to by the shell being cognized as shell. And on the other hand, while the shell is not-known, how can the projection (the silver)—which you say is an effect on the shell,—be apprehended? Both these difficulties, we reply, vanish on a proper view of the case: what is not known (while the silver appears) is the shell-aspect of the thing before us; what is known, is the this-aspect of the thing.

But even if we accept the view that Nescience, abiding in the Self, is one only, and gives rise, in that which is non-intelligent (i.e. the Not-self) to a projection only, not to concealment, we are met by other difficulties. For, the question arises, does the cognition of the shell (first mistaken for silver) as shell merely

\(^{30}\) Obscurcation is the 'effect' that is produced by the ajñâna; and in order that the Not-self may be the 'object' of this ajñâna the former must be the abode of the said 'obscuration'. But as you have already shown that this is not possible, how can the Not-self be spoken of as the object of ajñâna or 'ajñâta', 'unknown'? It may be noted here that the text is not quite correct: Viṣaya (object) is never the ādhāra (abode) of the atishaya (effect) produced by the viṣaya (object) itself; the viṣaya rather is the abode of the effect produced by that of which it is the object;—hence instead of the word 'viṣaya' in the compound 'viṣayakṛtyatishayādhiśrātva,' we should read 'viṣayi &c.'
refund the illusory projection into its causal substance (i. e. universal Nescience),—in the same way as the blow of a stick resolves the jar into its causal substance (i. e. clay)? Or does it put an end to the causal substance as well? On the former alternative even the cognition, by the individual mind, of Brahma, would do no more than resolve the illusory projection (of the phenomenal world) into its causal substance (i. e. general Nescience), and thus no Release could ever take place. On the second alternative general Nescience would be put an end to by the mere cognition of a shell, and thus universal Release would take place at once! And if, in order to escape from this latter consequence, you were to assume a separate Nescience for each object, or to view Adhyasa as not having Nescience for its material cause, this would imply, on the one hand, an objectionable complication of hypothesis, and on the other hand the reality of Adhyasa!

Not so, we reply. The former of the two alternatives is open to no objection. For we reason as follows:—The cognition of Brahma puts an end to the illusory projection and its material cause, because, while being of a nature essentially contradictory to them, it is subsequent to them, just as the cognition of the shell as shell puts an end to its own previous non-existence and to the illusory appearance of Silver.—And even the second alternative is not open to the objection raised by you. For, according to our view, it is merely the special forms of fundamental Nescience—constituting the special causal substances of illusory silver etc.—which are put an end to by the cognition of the shell etc. The view of Nescience not concealing non-intelligent things thus is vindicated from all objections. When, above, stating the formal inference that establishes the existence of positive Nescience we qualified the latter as concealing its object, the object meant was nothing else but the Self. In the case of non-intelligent objects such as shells, the special forms of Nescience which constitute the causal substance of silver etc. virtually conceal the objects, in so far, that is to say, as they interpose themselves between the objects and consciousness, but they do not conceal them in the full sense.

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[How Nescience is capable of obscuring the Self—whose essential nature is to be non-obscurable light of Intelligence,—this is a matter of which no rational account can be given: Nescience and all its doings remain essentially inexplicable. But that the Self is so obscured is a fact guaranteed by everyday experience; men not enlightened by Vedic teaching quite fail to realize the existence of the Self. And even if this latter fact were to be accounted for by mere ‘absence of knowledge’—without the co-operation of a positive ajñana,—the assumption of the latter is required to explain that non-presentation or obscuration of the Self which is characteristic of deep dreamless sleep.]

But to return to the Self, what really do you mean by the so-called concealment of the Self by Nescience? Is it that Nescience destroys the light of the Self? or that Nescience obstructs that effect of the light of the Self which is termed the ‘manifestedness’ (prakatya) of the object? or that it renders that effect dependent on other co-operating factors? The first alternative is not possible, since light constitutes the very nature of Self-consciousness. Nor can we admit the second and third alternatives; for we do not allow that, apart from the light of consciousness as manifested by a special modification (vritti) of the internal organ, there exists in the object such a thing as so-called ‘manifestedness.’ It thus appears that of the alleged concealment of the Self by Nescience no rational account can be given!

[Page 211]. You are perfectly right, we reply! And it is just for this reason that we hold such concealment to be of the nature of inexplicable Nescience. That we are unable to give a satisfactory definition of it does not entitle us to deny it altogether. It in fact is fully proved by the following inference:—Dull-minded people think—that thing termed Self, which learned men believe in as something not subject to desire of food or any other imperfection, neither exists, nor does it shine forth;—now such vulgar thought must have for its cause a concealment of the Self by some positive entity;—since it contradicts another conviction which has good reasons on its side, viz. ‘the self does exist and does shine forth;—where there is no such contradiction, no such cause need be assumed; as

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e. g. in the case of the thought 'the jar exists and shines forth.'
—Nor may it be said that after all there is no good reason for believing in the Self; for truly no other proof is wanted here than eternally established self-illumined consciousness. And the vulgar thought characterized above cannot be accounted for otherwise (than by the concealment of the Self by Nescience); for a concealing factor different in nature from the one we assume—e. g. some material thing—cannot be assumed in the case of the Self which is not made up of parts and is infinite in extension. These considerations also help us to an adequate definition of the 'concealment' of the Self: The Self is concealed by that which renders possible with regard to it those vulgar conceptions above characterized.

But, a new objection is raised, if in a-jñāna (non-knowledge; nescience) the a denotes absence or privation, the word signifies 'absence of knowledge'; if it conveys the idea of something contrary or opposite, the word signifies 'erroneous knowledge' (bhrānti-jñāna); if, lastly, it denotes something other than knowledge or cognition, then the word signifies only the impression left on the mind by erroneous knowledge. The word then denotes 'absence of knowledge,' 'erroneous knowledge' and 'impression left by erroneous knowledge'; and why then should we not hold that it is these which, obstructing the cognition of the true nature of Brahman, give rise to the vulgar thought referred to above? What purpose would it serve to assume a concealment of the Self by a so-called positive entity termed 'Nescience'? There is a purpose, we reply; for without assuming obscuration of the Self by a positive entity, we should be unable to account for that non-presentation of the true Reality, i. e. Brahman, which is characteristic of deep dreamless sleep. For, tell me, how would you account for this non-presentation? Is it due to the nature of Brahman itself? or to Brahman being other than the cognizing individual soul? or to some obstructive agency? The first alternative clearly is inadmissible, since Brahman is self-luminous. Nor can the second alternative be accepted; since texts such as

\[\text{That which is not right knowledge (jñāna) must be either non-knowledge, or a wrong knowledge, or an impression left on the mind by wrong knowledge.}\]

\[\text{Hence the word 'ajñāna' can mean one of these three only.}\]

\[\text{Viv. 56.}\]
'thou art that' teach that Brahman and the individual soul are one. With regard to the third alternative, finally, we ask whether that obstructive agency is to be found in erroneous cognition, or in the impression left by erroneous cognition, or in the absence of cognition, or in 'Karman' (Destiny). The first cannot be; since in deep sleep all cognition, including erroneous cognition, is arrested. Nor the second; for we do not observe that it is not the impression left by the erroneous cognition of silver that prevents the presentation to consciousness of the true nature of the shell. As to the third alternative that absence of essential cognition—which cognition is something eternal—is impossible, while the absence of other cognitions has no power to obstruct the consciousness of the self-luminous Brahman. Were this not so, the alleged obstruction would present itself even in the state of Release. On the fourth alternative, finally, the question would arise whether 'karman' or destiny obstructs consciousness in its whole extent, or the whole with the exception of that part which illumines them? On the former view karman itself would not be established; since that which alone can establish it (i.e. consciousness) would be absent. And the latter view is objectionable, because it implies a 'half-assumption' for which there is no proof. Nor may it be pleaded that the same choice between two unacceptable alternatives presents itself in connexion with the theory of a concealing factor of a positive nature. For on that theory the 'half-assumption' of consciousness being obstructed with the exception of one illuminining part, must necessarily be made; since otherwise the direct consciousness presenting itself in the form 'I am not-knowing' could not be accounted for. On the other hand, there is no such direct consciousness of karman. And even if the mediate consciousness we have of karman were held to justify the assumption in question, yet 'karman' is only an impression or effect (produced by the deeds of the agent); and as such, resembling the impression left by erroneous knowledge, it cannot have any obstructive force with regard to consciousness.

"But may it not then finally be assumed that what obstructs consciousness is the element of darkness (tamo-guṇa),—in agreement with the

© Chhândogya-Upa. VI.

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Smṛiti-text 'Darkness concealing knowledge leads a man on to recklessness' (Bha. Gī. XIV. 9)? This too we cannot admit. If darkness were not put an end to by the cognition of Brahman, no release could take place. If, on the other hand, it is put an end to, then the wrangling is about a mere name; for darkness also is a concealing factor of a positive nature. Hence even he who maintains the view of 'difference plus non-difference' will in the end have to overcome the perverse obstinacy prompting him to cling to the view, that in deep sleep it is the absence of knowledge only which causes the non-appearance to consciousness (Brahman),—and to accept ajñāna as a positive entity.

We now turn to another perverse doctrine held by the same people (i.e., the bhedābheda-vādins = the Naiyāyikas), viz., that what in the waking state and in the state of dream prevents the true nature of Brahman from presenting itself to consciousness is (not the Nescience of the Vedāntins but) merely a certain erroneous cognition, expressing itself in the form 'I am (not Brahman but) a human being.' This view also must be rejected, for it would be difficult for our adversary to show where error, in this case, comes in. You accept, we address him, as valid the relation of simultaneous difference and non-difference in cases such as expressed in the judgments 'the cow is broken-horned,' 'the cow is hornless'—the one class-character (or Universal) cow connecting itself in that way (viz., of difference plus non-difference) with two individual animals. Why then do you not likewise allow that the relation of difference and non-difference is real and well-founded in the case of the two judgments 'I am a man' and 'I am Brahman'—which assert the connexion of one individual soul with a human body on the one, and with Brahman on the other hand? The judgment 'I am a man' which affirms the non-difference of the Self and the body thus must be viewed by you as a valid, not as an erroneous one. When subsequently the view enounced in this judgment is sublated by the negation, founded on Scripture, 'I am not a man but Brahman,' this is analogous to what happens within the sphere of ordinary thought when we form the judgment 'this is not a broken horned cow but a hornless one.' But, our opponent objects, in the same way as the judgment 'this

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is not silver' denies of the substrate this the silver erroneously imputed to it; so the judgment 'I am not a man' denies with regard to the substrate 'Self' ('I') the class-character human being; and hence the previous judgment which predicates human nature of the Self, is an erroneous judgment! By no means, we reply. For this your view would imply that, when we first view the substrate constituted by the class-character cow in its short-horned aspect 'the cow is short-horned', and afterwards form the negative judgment 'that cow is not short-horned,' the idea of the short-horned cow would, on account of the subsequent negative judgment, have to be considered as erroneous (which it clearly is not). Nor may you plead that in this case the subsequent negative judgment denies short-hornedness with regard to an individual hornless cow only, but not with regard to the Universal 'cow.' For in the case of a hornless cow short-hornedness is not a given possibility and, therefore, cannot be denied. But, the opponent resumes, in the given case the substrate is the Universal cow in so far as specialized by a short-horned individual, and it is not of this that short-hornedness is denied: it is denied of the Universal in so far as specialized by a hornless individual! Well, we accept this. But let your reasoning be applied to the case under discussion also. When we form the judgment 'I am not a man,' the substrate to which the denial refers is not the Self as specialized by human nature, but the Self as specialized by Brahman-hood. In the same way as the two individual cows, the short-horned and the hornless one, are connected with the Universal cow which is present in both, the body and Brahman are connected with the Self which is present in both; hence the validity of the judgment 'I am a man' can be denied no more than that of the judgment 'the cow is short-horned.' And if you point out that the latter judgment must be admitted as valid in order not to cut short all practical thought and activity, we reply that, on your theory, the case of the former judgment does not differ. For according to your view there is even in the state of Final Release no cutting short of the practical identification with sense organs and bodies, on the part of the Jīva which in reality (as we Vedāntins prove) is omniscient and non-different from Brahman, the cause of all. But, our

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opponent rejoins, there are five relations only that determine the existence of simultaneous difference and non-difference, viz., that of the Universal and the individual; that of cause and effect; that of quality and substrate of quality; that of distinguishing attribute (vishesana) and thing distinguished thereby; and that of part and whole. And as none of these relations holds good between the Self and the body, the alleged non-difference of the two can after all be error only! Not so, we reply. What determines 'simultaneous difference and non-difference' cannot be those five relations combined; for there are undoubted exceptions from this principle. And if any one of the five by itself possesses that determining power, you yourself thereby acknowledge the needlessness of the assumption of more than one determining cause, and why then should the relation between the body and that which is embodied not possess that power likewise? If you deny the power to this latter relation, it may be denied to the other relations also; the result of which will be that 'bhedabheda' can be established in no case. And even if, unwilling to extend the scope of that power too far, we limited it to the five relations aforementioned, it might be pleaded that the relation between the body and that which is embodied is at bottom identical with the relation between effect and cause; for the causal power of Brahman may in a secondary or metaphorical sense be ascribed to the soul also which, as being of the nature of intelligence, is like Brahman. But it is a real relation only (not a secondary or metaphorical one) that can claim determining power; and as no such relation exists in the case under discussion, the judgment 'I am a man' must after all be erroneous! What then, we ask is your view as to the nature of error? If you reply that it is a certain modification of the internal organ, then Nescience (i.e. error) would not reside in the Self! And if, to escape from this difficulty, you maintain that that modification of the internal organ which constitutes error superimposes itself upon the Self (thus imparting error to the latter) we point out that according to your view of the process

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Footnote: For a modification of the internal organ could never reside in anything except the internal organ itself.

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of superimposition—which view technically is called anyathā-khyāti—there is no connexion whatever between the substrate of a superimposition and the things superimposed, and that hence, on this modified view also, there can be no connexion between the Self and Nescience! And if, on the other hand, you declare error to be a modification of the Self itself (not of the internal organ) we reject this on the ground of the Self being incapable of change. But we Naiyāyikas do not admit the unchangeableness of the Self! True, but you all the same acknowledge a Self in which permanent knowledge inheres as a quality; and thus your view comes to this that, while knowledge persists, there takes place in the Self that modification which is termed ‘error.’ And this is irrational, since in one and the same substance there cannot inhere two several indestructible* specific qualities of the same class. It certainly is not a matter of observation that two several white colours inhere at the same time in one piece of cloth.

The conclusion from all this is that in the waking and dreaming states also that which conceals Brahman is beginningless inexplicable Nescience. But does not the connection of the Self with Nescience interfere with that freedom from all contact or relation which is claimed for the Self? By no means, we reply. That connection, beginningless as it is, is like Nescience itself of an unreal (fictitious; kalpita) nature and hence, like the emanations† or products of that connection itself, does not infringe the Self’s freedom from all relation.

The above discussion then justifies the following conclusion. Positive Nescience does not conceal or obscure the Not-self, it only produces upon it a projection or illusory appearance (vikṣepa); it, on the other hand, does obscure the Self and on it produces those adhyāsas which give rise to empirical thought expressing itself in forms such as ‘I am this or that,’ ‘this is mine’, and the like.

*The Naiyāyika also regards the Atman to be possessed of a quality that is eternal.

†Just as the emanation of the fictitious connexion do not affect the nature of the Self so in the same manner the connection also, being equally fictitious, cannot affect it.

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[Nor can it be maintained that in the case of the Not-self and the Self there can be no adhyāsa comparable to that of the silver on the shell. The body, the sense organs, the internal organ, and in the same way the entire so-called external world are mere fictitious super-impositions upon Universal Consciousness.]

But, another question is raised, by the 'I' we understand the intelligent Self which is not made up of parts and does not comprise within itself two different elements; judgments as above, therefore, differ in nature from the judgment 'this is silver,' and do not express an adhyāsa. The term 'this' again (in 'I am this') denotes the body which is apprehended by the senses that are sources of true knowledge, and, therefore, cannot be something 'fictitiously superimposed'. Moreover, if the body were nothing more than this, it would like Nescience be known by immediate intuition on the part of witnessing consciousness (while, as a matter of fact it is known through the senses). In the judgment 'I (am a) man' we no doubt are conscious of the relation between a substrate and something superimposed, so that a double aspect is present; but that relation is not a necessary one, for when the Self has passed out of the body, the latter is apprehended by itself. The superimposed silver, on the other hand, is not apprehended apart from its substrate, i.e., the shell. Should you rejoin that the means of knowledge through which the body is apprehended lie within the sphere of mere empiric thought and do not impart real knowledge, we set forth another argument, viz.,—if the body were a mere unreal superimposition, it would on death be absorbed into the Self. Scripture, however, gives a different account, viz., that 'the body enters into earth.' The body is not, therefore, something merely superimposed upon the Self. Similarly, in the judgment 'This is mine' we are conscious of some real thing, other than the body, not comprised within the idea of the 'Ego,' but somehow connected with the Ego. Here also there is no trace of adhyāsa, i.e., mere fictitious superimposition.

To all this we Vedāntins reply as follows. We shall show later on that into the idea of the 'I' there does enter a

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Adhyāsa of the Not-self on the Self is possible. 173

non-intelligent (non-subjective element; hence there is adhyāsa in that case. That the body is a mere thing of superimposition is proved by the fact that, like the internal organ and the sense organs, it is an object of cognition (drishyā). As regards the internal organ and the sense organs, from the fact that they are never perceived to have an existence independent of the Self, it follows that they are superimposed upon it so as to be the immediate objects of witnessing consciousness. Nor must it be thought that this superimposition is one of 'contact' only (i. e., one of attributes only) not of the things themselves. For Scripture ('his organs do not depart, they become merged in that itself') declares that, on the rise of the cognition of truth, the sense-organs completely merge themselves in the Self—which proves the adhyāsa to be one of the thing itself. What Scripture says as to the body being merged in earth must be understood to mean that it is merged in the Self through the mediation of earth. And if the individual soul together with the body, the sense organs etc., is a thing of superimposition, it of course follows à fortiori that the sum of external things—which is merely instrumental towards the soul's experiences—is likewise 'superimposed.' For if a person is a king (not in reality but merely) in the world of dreams or of magic, the paraphernalia also of his royal state are of course unreal.

All this clearly proves that the 'I,' the 'this' and the 'this is mine' are three cases of adhyāsa. Nor can there be any doubt as to the existence of an adhyāsa of mere attributes. For what is expressed, e. g., in the judgment 'I am deaf,' is the superimposition on the Self of a mere attribute, viz., deafness.

Having in this way proved the adhyāsa of things (arthādhyāsa) we need not specially prove the adhyāsa of cognitions (jñānādhyāsa), which never takes place apart from adhyāsa of the former kind. And we thus have completely established the conclusion that adhyāsa, guaranteed as it is by immediate consciousness, is an undeniable fact.
XII.

[The preceding discussions make it possible for us to give a full definition of Adhyāsa, in its two aspects. Viewed as something objective (artha), adhyāsa is defined as something, similar to a thing remembered, which presents itself to consciousness as constituting the Self or true character of another thing. The apparent (unreal) silver (which is a special modification of the universal principle of all false appearance—Mayā or Avidyā) is on account of its similarity to previously perceived real silver, held by the observer—predisposed thereto by certain imperfections of his sense-organs and mental disposition—to constitute the true nature of what in reality is only a glittering shell. As a subjective process adhyāsa (to illustrate it at once by the quoted concrete instance) is the presentation to consciousness of silver as constituting the true nature of the thing before the observer (which in reality is a shell only); such presentation being similar in character to Remembrance.]

All scientific investigations are carried on between two sets of people—between the Teacher and the Pupil, or between two disputants. As regards the former the Teacher has, at the very outset, asserted the existence of Adhyāsa, for the benefit of the Pupil (who, confident in the wisdom of his Teacher, accepts it undoubtingly). Then as regards those who dispute the fact of Adhyāsa, we proceed to establish Adhyāsa by putting forward its definition, by showing the possibility of its existence, and by bringing forward proofs of its existence.

[Page 25]. But, a new point is raised, it is in all cases the function of a definition to differentiate the thing to be defined from other things; the function of the demonstration of the thing's possibility (sambhāvanā) to dispel the idea of the thing being impossible with regard to its special conditions of time and place; and the function of the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) to establish the actual existence of the thing. Now in the present case the means of valid knowledge which will be set forth as establishing the existence of adhyāsa—viz. Perception, Inference, the practical demands of life, Presumption and Scriptural authority—while proving adhyāsa, at the same time effect its differentiation from all other things, and discard all suspicion of its intrinsic impossibility; for it clearly would not be feasible

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to prove the existence of an adhyāsa not differing from other things and not possible. The definition and the question of the possibility of the adhyāsa should not, therefore, be treated, separately from the proofs for it! Not so, we reply. Adhyāsa has a double character: it on the one hand consists in one thing presenting itself as another; and on the other hand it is something false (unreal). Now Perception and the other means of knowledge which enable us to establish the existence of adhyāsa in the former sense are incapable of bringing home to the mind its unreality; for in all cases of unreality—as, e.g., in the case of the notion 'this is silver' with regard to a piece of shell,—the unreality is proved only by the fact that, otherwise, we could not explain the subsequent sublation of that notion (by the notion 'this is not silver'); and in the case in question there is no such sublating notion (that would imply unreality).

But there is, our opponent says, for it is impossible to realise the idea of one thing appearing as another (i.e., adhyāsa in the former sense) without discrimination of the one thing from the other, and such discrimination constitutes sublation!

By no means, we reply. There may be in that case sublation founded on reasoning, but that intuitive sublation which dispels erroneous presentation is absent, and hence no definite cognition of the unreality of the adhyāsa arises. It is for the sake of the definite realization of that unreality that the definition of adhyāsa requires to be given. Similarly as regards the possibility of adhyāsa. It happens in ordinary experience that the idea of a thing being impossible arises in spite of the thing being actually vouched for by a cognition of the validity of which there is no reason to doubt, so, e.g., in the case of the portentous appearance of holes in the sun. In the same way there may arise the idea of the impossibility of adhyāsa of the Not-self on the Self, for the reason that we perceive the Self to possess attributes opposed to all adhyāsa, viz., perfect non-objectivity, unrelatedness, non-similarity to any other thing, etc. Nor must you urge against this that as long as the Self is not cognized as non-objective, etc., the idea of the impossibility of adhyāsa does not arise; while after it has been so cognized adhyāsa does not persist (and that hence it is purposeless to

*The reading here apparently should be बाध्यायात्युपस्थिति and not बाध्यायायुपस्थिति

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show that the Self may be the substrate of adhyāsa). For what produces the idea of the impossibility of adhyāsa is mediate consciousness (founded on reasoning), and this does not put an end to the immediately presented adhyāsa. In order, therefore, to dispel the idea of the impossibility of adhyāsa, its possibility requires to be shown apart from the proof of its actual existence. Other teachers also have declared (in the following Kārikās quoted by Vāchaspāti Mishra in Bhāmati, Bibl. Ind. page 67) that the discussion of the proof of adhyāsa should be preceded by that of its definition and of its possibility—

'The establishing of the existence of the object is dependent upon Proofs or Means of knowing it; these latter are established only by means of definitions; and these last again depend upon the fact of the object being such as cannot be precluded, even by the gods, from the range of Perception and other Means of knowledge.'

'Only that position, the possibility of which is apparent, can be established by argument; you cannot save by reasoning that which is killed as soon as it rises from the ground.'

And the possibility again must be preceded by the definition. For it is only after the definition has placed before the mind something of a definite character that a discussion can be started as to the thing's possibility; without the definition the discussion would have no object. The definition, therefore, must be formulated first. We then formulate the definition of adhyāsa as follows. Adhyāsa has a double aspect: it is a thing (artha) particularized by a cognition (jñāna); and a cognition particularized by a thing. Of Adhyāsa viewed as thing the definition is as follows:—'adhyāsa is a thing, similar to some thing remembered, which presents itself to consciousness as constituting the Self of another thing.' And of adhyāsa viewed as cognition the definition is 'adhyāsa is the presentation to consciousness of one thing as constituting the Self of another—such presentation being similar to remembrance.'
Rebutation of the *akhyāti-vāda.*

XIII.

[What we Vedāntins undertake to explain by our adhyyāsa-
theory, cannot be satisfactorily explained by the holders of the
so-called akhyāti-vāda who, denying the existence of erroneous
cognition as a special kind of cognition, maintain that all that
really takes place in cognitions of which that of the shell silver
may be taken as a type, is the non-discrimination of an actual
perception (of the thing, the *this*, before us) from a remem-
brance (of, let us say, previously perceived silver which is
suggested to the mind by the glitter of the shell). This theory
fails to account for the fact that, as long as the mistake or
illusion lasts, there is the actual presentation to consciousness,
not the mere remembrance, of silver. It moreover is impossible
to give a satisfactory account of that so-called *non-discrimina-
tion* on which the theory turns. Nor is the akhyāti-vādin
able to explain the nature of that so-called ‘obscurcation of
remembrance’ (*smṛiti-pramoṣa*) which he has to assume in
order to account for the fact that the person subject to the
illusion is not conscious of remembering silver but rather of
seeing it.]

[Page 26]. Here an objection is raised by the adherents of the
theory called the *akhyāti-vāda* (the theory of non-cognition).
When, they say, we have the erroneous idea ‘this (thing before
me) is silver,’ the sense of sight and the other means of true
knowledge do not operate, and it, therefore, only remains to view
the silver simply as remembered silver, not as ‘similar to re-
membered silver.’ By no means, we reply. For we are con-
scious of the silver as something here and now presented to us
(not as something remembered). Nor can it be held that what
so is presented to us is only *this thing,* not the silver. For the
*this* and the silver are immediately presented to us in mutual
combination; the case does not differ from that of correct judg-
ments, such as ‘this is silver,’ ‘this is a jar,’ where the general
and the particularizing notions present themselves in mutual
combination. Should it be said that (in the case of the erro-
neously surmised silver) the general and the particularizing
thing are viewed as combined because they are presented to
consciousness in immediate succession, not because there is actual
consciousness of their combination; we negative this on the

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ground that the case of erroneously surmised silver does not show any inferiority to that of a true presentation (inasmuch as in both cases the 'this' and the silver present themselves as combined in exactly the same way). But the inferiority of the case under discussion lies therein that the object before us is not really silver!—How, we ask, is the absence of silver ascertained—from the absence of immediate consciousness of silver; or from the (subsequent) sublative cognition 'this is not silver'? The former alternative is excluded; for the absence of immediate consciousness is just what we do not allow. And if the absence of such consciousness were said to follow from the absence of the thing we should reason in a circle. We, therefore, must admit on the ground of the existence of immediate consciousness, that silver exists before us. Nor must it be urged, in reversal of this process, that the ascertainment of the existence of consciousness rather depends on the ascertainment of the existence of the thing; for in that case the ascertainment of the existence of the thing would again depend on another ascertainment and so on and an infinite regress would result. The ascertainment of a state of consciousness rests on itself; while the existence of the thing depends on the existence of a state of consciousness. Nor can we accept the second alternative. For the latter cognition which contradicts the former one has no power to sublate it (for why should not the former cognition as well be held to sublate the latter?) But what then is the position of the latter cognition (if it is not be taken as sublating the former one)?

It is the same, we reply, as that of the former cognition. You assume that in the case of the cognition 'this thing is silver' there is non-discrimination of the this and the silver (not cognition of the connexion of silver and the this); why then should you not similarly hold that also in the case of the negative cognition 'this is not silver', there is mere non-discrimination (of absence of silver and the this) and not cognition of the absence of connexion (between silver and the this)?*

It might be argued that—"from the fact that the negative cognition is found to be corroborated by the practical activity of the person concerned, it is clear that there is cognition.

* From the expression निदेशसंवर्गस्वरस in the next sentence, it is clear that the reading here also is संवर्गस्वरस and not संवर्गस्वरस.

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of the connexion of negation." But this view (which makes the authority of the cognition to depend on something else) contradicts the theory of the self-luminousness of cognitions! We put forward this reasoning, the opponent replies, against those who hold different views from ours; hence (in running counter to the view of Svatah-pramāṇya of cognitions) we do not enter into contradiction with ourselves (for we Naïyāyikas do not hold the Svatah-pramāṇya theory)! But in that case a regressus ad infinitum would be the inevitable result (each cognition in succession requiring a further cognition to validate it).

Nor can it be urged that after all, the non-existence of the silver before us is admitted by everyone. For what we Vedāntins maintain in accordance with what actually appears to consciousness, is the presence of unreal silver, capable of being put an end to by the cognition of the shell. Nor may you object to this that this assumption of unreal silver is contradicted by the absolute negation 'this thing is not silver'; for the object of this negation is (not the unreal silver we assume but) real silver as met with in ordinary normal experience. Nor can it be urged that on this explanation the negation ('this thing is not silver') would refer to something to negate which there is no occasion. For as we observe that a person desirous of real silver stretches out his hand for the unreal one, it must be admitted that the presence of the real silver in the substrate of the characters common (to the shell and the silver) is given (or exists) as a possibility.

Were this not so, it would also be difficult to justify a negation such as 'there is no jar in this place'; for if there were a jar, the negation would be irrational, and if there were none, something would be denied which there is no occasion to deny. What actually is the case is that the presence of the jar,—though indeed not possible directly—is yet possible (or suspected) on the basis of such common factors as that of time and that of place; and exactly analogous would be the case with the presence of the real silver also.

On this view, moreover, there is justification for the two subsequent cognitions which actually do take place, viz., 1. 'There is here no silver,' which refers to real silver and 2. 'Silver was falsely presented to me'—which refers to the unreal

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silver. On any other view either of these two judgments would have to be set aside. But, a further objection is raised, you assume a combined state of consciousness (in which the ‘this’ and the silver are equally present), because otherwise you cannot account for the immediate presentation of silver; and then, in order to justify your assumption, you complicate the matter by the further assumption of unreal silver. Now it certainly is simpler to dispense with that combined state of consciousness, and to account for the immediacy of the cognition of silver through non-discrimination of the cognition of the shell (from the remembrance of silver). Not so, we reply. For on your view such non-discrimination only would form the subject of thought at the time when discriminative knowledge has arisen, that is to say thought would present itself in the following form ‘for such and such a time that silver was not discriminated by me.’ This is not however the reflection which actually arises: it rather is the combined state of consciousness which is recognised in the following form ‘for such and such a time this appeared to me as silver.’ We, therefore, must accept the view of unreal silver being actually present. How otherwise would any one on perceiving a shell, put forth action with regard to silver? The silver thus is not silver remembered but silver similar to remembered silver. Such similarity is proved by the fact that the silver is apprehended through a cognition that depends on previous perception; for the erroneous cognition of silver is seen to take place on the part of those only who previously have actually perceived silver.—The adhyāsa of cognition (jñānādhyāsa) is similarly to be viewed as having the character of remembrance, since it is produced by the mental impression left by previous perception. Nor may you counter-argue this latter assertion in the following way ‘the thing under discussion i.e., the subjective adhyāsa is not due to a mental impression; for it is a cognition other than remembrance, as perception is.’ For the condition to make such reasoning valid is that the cognition in question should be produced by contact of the sense-organ (and this condition is absent in the case of shell-silver).

Against this reasoning of the Vedāntin the upholder of the view of non-discrimination (akhyāti) now re-states his case. 

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The states of consciousness under discussion (such as the cognition of silver in the shell) are true, because they are states of consciousness, just like those states which are generally admitted to be true. And all cognition belongs to either of two classes—it either is knowledge directly resulting from the operation of one of the recognised means of knowledge; or it is remembrance (representative knowledge). And thus the cognition of silver also is not an adhyāsa, as the Vedāntins hold, but nothing else but a remembrance; for like other remembrances it is merely a product of previous impressions. Nor is there any weight in the question why, if the apprehension of silver in the shell is a mere remembrance, we do not instead of silver remember other shells rather to which the shell before us bears a greater resemblance than to silver. For the fact is that in the given case additional causes are at work, viz., the desire for silver on the part of the person who sees the shell, and certain other imperfections: causes which (while suggesting silver) do not suggest other shells. It is these very imperfections which obscure the consciousness of remembrance, so that the remembrance of silver is not recognised as such. And as these imperfections at the same time obstruct the realization in consciousness of the special features of the shell actually seen, its dark colour and other attributes do not present themselves to consciousness. And as in this way apprehension and remembrance are not discriminated, the result is that the man desires of silver stretches out his hand for the shell before him. But, it may be asked, what in the given case is it that moves the man to action, is it the actual apprehension and the remembrance together or either of the two? And do, in the former case, the two elements of consciousness operate together, or in succession? The former of these two latter alternatives is inadmissible since the apprehension and the remembrance (as being distinct mental acts) cannot take place at the same moment. Nor can the latter alternative be accepted; for if the two cognitions are successive, the former can have no causal power with regard to the man's action since the latter interposes itself between the two. Nor also can it be said that either cognition by itself moves the person to action; for the practical action which as a matter of fact results from the cognition is a

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particularized one (i.e., proceeds on the supposition of the thing before us being silver). For these reasons, in order to account for the particularized action, we must after all assume a composite mental state (i.e., an immediate apprehension of this and the silver). Not so, the akhyātīvādin replies, what really moves the person to action is the rise in consciousness, in immediate succession, of direct apprehension and remembrance.

But, we recognise a composite state of consciousness, when later on we judge `this thing appeared to us as silver’! This, the opponent replies, is a mere matter of practical experience (and need not be regarded as strictly true). As to the case of the newborn baby which spits out the (sweet) milk it had sucked from its mother’s breast—wherefrom it may be inferred that the milk appears to it bitter,—here also we have no composite mental state, of the nature of error, but merely the remembrance of bitter tastes experienced in a previous state of existence; as for the sweetness that should be actually experienced now, and the idea of that which ought to be present in reference to the bitterness experienced in previous states of existence, and remembered now,—that these two do not appear in consciousness at the time is due to some bilious disorder.

The statement made by the author of the Bhāshya that `the experiences of previous states of existence are not remembered’ refers only to the generality of cases. For if the baby did not remember by what means desired objects are attained, it would not take to its mother’s breast. And even on the Vedāntin’s error-theory the experiences made in former states of existence have to be admitted as causes determining the experiences of the present state of existence; otherwise, if every experience alike were an entirely new one, there would be no reason why a seventh kind of taste should not erroneously present itself (in addition to the six kinds of taste actually experienced).

And if you say that the propounder of the system himself when saying ‘the cognition of the real in the unreal,’ declares error to depend on a composite state of consciousness; we reply that that declaration refers only to what is found to be the case in ordinary practical experience.

But in all non-erroneous cognitions it invariably is a composite state of consciousness that moves to action; why then should

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this hypothesis be abandoned in the case of error?—Because it introduces a needless complication! Even he who holds the error-theory must needs assume, as the cause of error, a non-distinction of apprehension and remembrance. And as such non-distinction, acknowledged by both parties alike, suffices to account for action, why assume a further composite cognition? The theory of non-discrimination thus evidently is the only rational one.

Against this restatement of the akhyāti-view we Vedāntins now finally argue as follows:—What, we ask, do you understand by a-akhyāti? Absence of cognition in general? Or such cognition as causes a man desirous of one thing to engage in action with regard to another thing? Or the cognition of several things as non-discriminated?—On the first alternative there should be error in the state of deep sleep, not in the waking and dreaming states.—On the second alternative error would be absent in those cases where, owing either to instantaneous sublation of the error or to indolence, action is not actually entered upon.—As to the third alternative, we ask for your definition of 'discrimination'—the counter-entity of 'non-discrimination' (on which term your definition turns). Does it mean 'apprehension of difference,' or non-apprehension of non-difference, or the cognition of the mutual non-existence of things, such cognition being particularized by number such as two and so on? The first definition does not suit your case; for the judgment 'this is silver' causes the remembrance of two separate and non-tautological words, viz., this and silver; there thus is the apprehension of the difference of a general and a particularizing element, and hence no 'non-discrimination' in the sense of the first definition. Nor will the second definition meet your case. For since, in the way explained, there is (in the case of erroneous judgments like 'this is silver') apprehension of difference, there also is non-apprehension of what is contradictorily opposed to difference, viz., non-difference, and how then could it be shown that there is present non-discrimination which negatives such non-apprehension? And as to the third definition we ask whether discrimination as there defined implies immediate cognition of a number, such as two; or whether an eventual cognition suffices. The former alternative would imply that when a person says 'Drive the cow to this place

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with a stick' there is non-discrimination of the cow and the stick, because the person does not at the time explicitly realize that there are two things. And on the latter alternative non-discrimination would be absent in the case of the silver before us; for the two-ness of the this and the silver may of course be cognized eventually. Well then, if non-discrimination cannot be defined on the basis of its counter-notion (discrimination), let us define it by means of the things of which it is an attribute!

This also, we reply, cannot be done. For there can be no non-discrimination of two things presented to consciousness, for (as two) they clearly present themselves as not tautological (i.e., as distinct). And if you say that there is non-discrimination of things not presented to consciousness, there would be error even in the case of deep sleep (in which as a matter of fact error does not arise since there is no cognition at all).

Listen then (the akhyāti-vādin says) to the following definition of non-discrimination. Non-discrimination means non-apprehension of non-connexion (asamsarga). And such non-apprehension is present in the case of the this and the silver being present to consciousness, because at the time there is no consciousness of the following form 'the this and the silver are not combined.' But, we reply, what do you really understand by the non-apprehension of non-connexion? Do you mean the non-connexion of apprehension and remembrance only; or of any two things; or of such things only regarding which there is no cognition of connexion?—The first alternative would imply that the state of consciousness 'I am a man' is not an error, for here both the terms non-discriminated are directly apprehended (i.e., this is not a case where the non-connexion of direct apprehension and remembrance is not apprehended).

On the second alternative judgments such as 'the cow is short-horned,' 'the cloth is white' would be erroneous; since they do not imply a consciousness of non-connexion (between the cloth and the whiteness etc.) And on the third alternative the same difficulty arises. For in the case of the judgments last quoted no cognition of connexion (samsarga) is possible, since the true object of such cognition, viz., oneness, aikya) is absent. And that oneness really is the object of the cognition of connexion (samsarga) we learn from recognition (of the silver, as perceived elsewhere, in the shell).

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Should it be said that the object of the cognition of samsarga is not oneness but relations such as that subsisting between quality and substrate; then, we point out, the relation of similarity also, which is expressed in the judgment ‘this is silver’, may be held to be the object of such cognition of samsarga, and that consciousness of samsarga (as implied in that judgment) cannot be denied. But the cognition in question is sublated by the cognition of non-connexion (asaṁsarga) which is implied in the subsequent judgment ‘this is not silver’, and hence the connexion and the consciousness of it are not possible!

But, we reply, on your view, in the case of quality and substrate also there is cognition of non-connexion which in that case is called cognition of mutual non-existence (we no doubt judge ‘the cloth is white’; but at the same time we cognize the cloth not to be whiteness, and whiteness not to be the cloth); and as thus there is neither connexion nor consciousness of it, it follows that those judgments also (i.e. the judgments affirming relations of quality and substrate) are erroneous! (which you of course do not mean to admit). The conclusion, therefore, is that non-discrimination (which, according to you, constitutes error) cannot be defined as non-apprehension of non-connexion.

But, the holder of the akhyāti-view retorts, if you reject my theory of non-discrimination, you on your part are bound to show what constitutes the discriminating agency in the judgments under discussion. The perception certainly does not discriminate its own object from the thing remembered, since its power to present to consciousness particulars is, at the time, obstructed by imperfections. Nor also is remembrance capable of discriminating its own object from the object of perception; for the consciousness of remembrance as such is obscured at the time. This is not so, we reply. The discriminative power of both may easily be proved.

[Page 30]. And first with regard to perception; if you say that the perception is incapable to distinguish its object from the thing remembered, do you hold the difference between the this-aspect and the silver-aspect to be between those things regarded as individuals belonging to particular classes, or between themselves only (regarded, independently of all other conditions)?

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You cannot hold the first alternative; for as in the given case, the *this*-aspect and *silver*-aspect are not cognised as individuals belonging to particular classes, there is no difference between them; and hence as they are one, what would arise under the circumstances is that combined state of consciousness which you deny.

And as to the second alternative we ask whether you understand the process of cognition to accomplish itself in that way that the first cognition apprehends the thing only, the second apprehends it as possessing characters distinguishing it from the other thing; and the third only the difference; or whether you hold the difference to be apprehended at once, together with the thing. The former alternative would imply that all cognitions whatever are erroneous; for all of them alike would, in the stages previous to the apprehension of difference, imply non-discrimination. On the second alternative, on the other hand, since the apprehension of difference would immediately result from the apprehension of *this-ness*, that particularizing content which is required for the cognition of difference would present itself to consciousness at once; and this of course amounts to the admission that the apprehension (perception) possesses discriminative power.

Analogously remembrance also may be shown to be discriminative. You (the holder of the akhyāti-vāda) are unable to give a satisfactory account of that so-called 'consciousness of remembrance' (smarāṇābhimāṇa) to the obscuration of which you ascribe the want of discrimination on the part of remembrance. What, we ask, do you understand by 'consciousness of remembrance'? Is it, firstly, nothing else than remembrance; or secondly, something other than remembrance; or, thirdly, an attribute of remembrance; or, fourthly, the mental apprehension of something as distinguished by previous perception; or, fifthly, some special feature of remembrance depending on remembrance itself only; or sixthly, a special feature depending on an object different from that of the previous perception; or, in the seventh place, the quality of producing a difference in the resultant activity (due to the two) or, in the eighth place, the immediate consciousness 'I remember'? There is no room for the first alternative; for if remembrance (which,
according to the definition, is the same as 'consciousness of remembrance) is itself obscured, the cognition of silver (which you say is remembrance) cannot rise at all. The second alternative is equally inadmissible; for why should remembrance become non-discriminative on something else being obscured? The third alternative cannot be accepted because no such attribute is known to exist. To the fourth alternative there is the following objection. In the case of errors of recognition—as when we mistakenly think 'This man is that same Devadatta whom I met on a previous occasion'—a previous perception enters into our state of consciousness, and thus there is non-discrimination (as evinced by the mistaken recognition) without that obscuration (on which you say non-discrimination depends). But our definition was meant for simple remembrance only, not for recognition! Even with this limitation we reply, your definition cannot be upheld. For, we ask, does the previous perception constitute as its object itself also (i.e., the perception), or only the thing perceived? The former cannot be; as it is not possible for a thing to operate upon itself. And, on the latter alternative, it is the thing only which in the act of remembrance, is represented in consciousness; not the perception itself which was not the object of perception (and therefore cannot be remembered). But, when our thought has the following form 'the jar was perceived by me,' we clearly remember a thing as qualified by a previous perception! Not so, we reply. The remembrance to which you refer is a different remembrance due to what the Naiyāyikas call 'secondary' or 'supervening' cognition (anuvyavasāya) or to an inference. Such remembrance is other than that which is due to the 'primary' cognition (vyavasāya) which has for its object the jar only (not the perception of the jar). Of remembrance of the former kind you may not even say that its object is that previous cognition, termed anuvyavasāya, which gives rise to it (the remembrance); its object rather is the jar as cognized in the anuvyavasāya cognition and distinguished by the vyavasāya cognition. We, therefore, may argue as follows. 'The remembrance under discussion does not apprehend the thing as characterized by the cognition on which it (the remembrance) rests; for it is a (mere) remembrance; just like the remembrance of

Viv. 77.
things denoted by words.' For words give rise to the remembrance of the things with which they are associated.

[Page 31] At this place, unwilling to admit the proving force of the last instance, the Baudhāya philosopher interposes. It is irrational, he contends, to ascribe to words the power of reminding one, of the things associated with them, since things and words clearly cannot be viewed as connected with each other either in the way of conjunction (sāmyoga) or of any other form of connexion. If it be said that the connexion lies therein that words possess the power of producing knowledge (bodha, viz., of things); we ask what you understand by knowledge—whether immediate intuitive knowledge (anubhava), on remembrance (representative knowledge). The former cannot be the case; for although words combined so as to form a sentence produce an immediate cognition of the sense of the sentence, each by itself does not give rise to an analogous cognition of the thing it denotes. At the time when the meaning of a word is first learned, the thing denoted by it is apprehended by some other means of knowledge (Perception and the rest); as has been declared:—The Word also, not affording the cognition of anything now, cannot be regarded as different from what causes remembrance.'

On the second alternative we shall have to say that the 'power' of the word when producing its effect is either known or unknown. The latter cannot be; for as a matter of fact, Remembrance has its cause always known. Nor is the former alternative possible; for since a power is known through its effects only, we here entangle ourselves in reasoning in a circle—'words give rise to the remembrance of things because they possess the power of doing so'; and 'we infer that power belonging to words from the fact that they do give rise to the remembrance of things.' But, it may be objected, the way in which we come to know the power of words is as follows. The child inferring from the actions of the older people around him the ideas which give rise to the actions ascertains from the fact that those ideas and actions immediately follow on certain words, that the words have the power of originating those ideas: they thus ascertain the power of words, at the very first time when they come to learn their meaning, from actions such as bringing and lifting, and hence the charge of reasoning in a circle is baseless. But even granting this, the Baudhāya resumes, there arises a further question, does that power (of originating

Viv. 78.
ideas; which you say is originally ascertained in the manner described above) belong to the mere words or to the words as connected with certain definite things? To the former alternative there lies the objection that on it it could not be shown at all why each individual word is connected with one definite idea only. On the second alternative, again, we should have to search for a further connexion determining the connexion called 'power' (i.e., the connexion consisting therein that a certain word has the power to express a certain idea), and that connexion again would require a further connexion to explain it, and so on ad infinitum. If against this you were to urge the principle that 'the power establishes itself as well as other things,' we ask the further question, 'Is the thing, at the moment of remembrance, remembered owing to the auditory perception of the mere word; or owing to the perception of the word as possessing 'power' with regard to the thing; or owing to the mental impression due to the cognition of that power together with the perception of the word? The first alternative is unacceptable for the reason that it leaves unexplained why definite words are connected with definite ideas. On the second alternative the thing also would be immediately known at the very time when the word is heard, and it thus would be purposeless to assume a remembrance (of the thing) produced by the word. Nor can we accept the third alternative. For we observe that in other cases of remembrance there are certain other definite relations between the thing remembered and that which suggests the remembrance—such as similarity, contrariety (contrast; virodha), the relation of cause and effect, etc.; while there is no such relation to connect the thing and the word. That words possess reminding (suggestive) power and that the sentence is a means of valid knowledge, we, therefore, hold to be a mere baseless theory of the followers of the Veda.

Against this Baudhāya view we Vedāntins now argue as follows. No valid objection lies against the theory that the remembrance of a thing is produced by the auditory perception of the word together with the impression left on the mind by the cognition of the power of the word. What the Baudhāya asserts on this point ('in other cases etc.') is unfounded. Does he mean that as in other cases so in the case of words also similarity or the

Vir. 79.
like has to be admitted? Or that, as in the case of words, there should be in other cases also power, and not similarity or the like? Or that, since in the case of words there are absent such fundamental relations as similarity and so on, words do not give rise to remembrance in spite of their power to do so? The first alternative is inadmissible; for we do not observe any similarity between words and the things they denote, and we have no right to make assumptions not resting on actual observation. In those other cases, on the other hand, similarity and certain other relations are actually observed and, therefore, need not to be assumed. The second alternative is likewise inadmissible; for what is actually experienced cannot be denied. Nor can the third alternative be accepted; for it is irrational to maintain that a thing possessing a certain power does not produce its effect. Our conclusion, therefore, is that words inasmuch as possessing a specific power do give rise to the remembrance of things. The original perceptions are not remembered together with the thing. For, if they were so remembered, it would follow therefrom that the words denote not only the things but also those original perceptions (and this is clearly not the case).

After this digression we now proceed with the refutation of the remaining definitions of 'consciousness of remembrance' (smaranaabhimaṇa) (noticed on page 76). The fifth definition also is inadmissible. For apart from the special circumstances of cause, object etc. (of cognitions, remembrance), we observe no special characteristics of cognitional states themselves.

Nor can we accept the sixth and seventh definitions; for remembrance has no object and no resulting cognition other than the object of, and the cognition resulting from, the original perception. Nor finally can we accept the eighth definition. If it were by other means that the immediate consciousness expressing itself in the form 'I remember' possesses discriminative power, it might perhaps be said that it loses that discriminative power through obscurcation, for the consciousness in question arises in intimate connexion with the word denoting remembrance ('I remember), the word denoting perception ('I perceive') being shut out from consciousness. How then could such consciousness (which implies discrimination of perception and remembrance) arise at all, unless there were

Viv. 80.
an initial discrimination of perception and remembrance? The acceptance of the definition thus would involve us in circular reasoning 'if there is discrimination, there is consciousness of remembrance,' and, on the other hand, 'if there is consciousness of remembrance, there is discrimination.'

As it thus appears that no rational account can be given of that so called 'consciousness of remembrance' by means of the obscuration of which the akhyāti-vādin undertakes to explain error, it follows that remembrance does possess discriminative power.

But, the opponent objects, if both the perception and the remembrance had for their object nothing but the single thing, it would follow that the two do not differ in any way; and hence you must admit after all that what constitutes the specific object of remembrance is the thing as qualified by the previous perception, and this is what we understand by the 'consciousness of remembrance.' Not so, we reply. A difference between remembrance and perception is established by the difference of their respective causes. On your view, there would be no difference between an act of remembrance, and an act of inference that has for its object a previous perception; since both have the same object. There would be a difference, the opponent replies. What distinguishes an act of remembrance from an act of inference that has for its object a thing previously perceived, is that character or aspect of remembrance which is expressed by the pronoun 'that' (the remembrance expressing itself in the form 'this thing now before my mind is that thing'). But what, we ask in reply, is that aspect or character which is expressed by that? Does that denote what is distinguished by non-present place and time? Or what is connected with a previous perception? Or what is produced by an impression left on the mind by a previous perception? The first alternative does not suit; since from it it would follow that the act of inference also is recollection (for an inference also may be expressed in the form 'this fire which I now infer from smoke is that fire which I perceived on previous occasions.') Nor is the second meaning acceptable; for the inferential cognition also presents itself to the mind as connected with a previous direct apprehension. And the third alternative clearly implies a view the same as ours, viz., that the difference

Viv. 81.
between perception and remembrance is one of *cause* (the remembrance only being caused by a mental impression). Very well, the opponent resumes, let us then say that in the case in question also (i.e., the erroneous cognition of silver) there is *remembrance* of silver, due to an impression left on the mind by the previous perception of silver! Are you not aware, we reply, that of this view we have already disposed by pointing out that the silver presents itself to consciousness as actually present, not as remembered? Nor may you say that such presentation is the effect of non-discrimination; for it is not non-discrimination that determines error. What, indeed, should it be that is non-discriminated—two things perceived? or one perceived and one remembered? or two things remembered? The first alternative is inadmissible; for it would imply that there is no error in the dreaming state. For in that state the only thing immediately apprehended is the Self; hence your condition of error, i.e., the presence of *two* apprehended things which are not discriminated, is absent. From the second alternative it would follow that the dreaming soul has states of consciousness of the following form 'I am something blue or the like.' (For in dream there is erroneous cognition, and according to the definition error consists in the non-discrimination of a thing apprehended and a thing remembered. Now the only thing immediately apprehended in dream is the Self; hence judgments of the above kind would arise). And on the third alternative, anything not directly apprehended (but previously apprehended) should present itself in erroneous cognition; for all such things alike may be remembered. We, therefore, are justified in maintaining that the inference that the silver before us is (not false but merely) remembered silver is invalid; for the condition of its validity, *viz.*, the silver appearing to consciousness as something not directly perceived, is absent. As regards the reasoning in support of reality, we meet that with the following counter-reasoning:—"The cognitions in question are not real, because they are sublated, like all activity due to wrong conception." From all this it follows that you should give up your hankering after the double character of cognitions, and accept the fact that the cognition in question is an *error*.

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the former in the third volume of his 'Mythologie') put forth the view that Varuṇa—who, as is known, occupies in the religion of the Vedic tribes a much more prominent position than in later times—was originally a personification of the moon; so that the Vedic pair Mitra-Varuna would represent the two great heavenly luminaries, sun and moon. We refer for some further details concerning this hypothesis to the review of Professor Hillebrandt's Vedic Mythology, in the first number of Indian Thought. Several other matters connected with the moon will be discussed later on in connection with the Vedic notions as to the measurement of time.

Planets.—It has been recognised since a long time that the Veda—Samhitās and Brāhmaṇas alike—nowhere distinctly refers to the planets; strange though such an omission, or the want of knowledge it seems to imply, may appear to us. We have here to distinguish two separate questions: viz., firstly, whether the Brāhmaṇas and Samhitās anywhere mention, or allude to, the well-known five planets which are distinguishable with the naked eye, and, therefore, were recognised by the majority of the ancient civilized nations, as a special class of heavenly bodies; and secondly, whether at any rate some, possibly one or two only of the planets, are named or unambiguously alluded to in the Vedic writings. As to the first question, it is a fact that a pentad of planets, or in general heavenly bodies, is nowhere mentioned in the Brāhmaṇas. And from this silence we appear justified in drawing the conclusion that the planets as a special class of celestial luminaries were actually not known to the authors of those works. Every one at all familiar with the intellectual tendencies and tastes which manifest themselves in the Brāhmaṇas and the modes of exposition and expression which they favour, knows what stress is laid there on numerical relations and analogies; and more particularly how persistently they endeavour to find for certain numbers or groups of numbers the consideration of which naturally suggests itself in connexion with sacrificial rites, numerical parallels or analogies in the realm of physical or cosmical phenomena. Thus any triad of objects constantly suggests to them the three worlds; any group of five or six things, the seasons of the year (which are prevalingly counted as either five or six); any group of twelve, the months of the year;
and so on. We may go so far as to say with some confidence that if to the minds of the compilers of the Brāhmaṇas the idea of the group constituted by the five planets had been at all a familiar one, they would not have failed to make use of it in a similar allegorizing or symbolizing manner. But the fact is that, although the opportunities for doing so are many, they are nowhere taken advantage of.

The absence, in the Brāhmaṇas, of any mention, and probably knowledge, of the five planets as a group, supplies an a priori argument of some weight against the view that the five planets were known to the Vedic tribes in the Sāṃhitā Period. Attempts to connect with the planets any groups of five things spoken of in the hymns, therefore, require to be received, if not with initial suspicion, at any rate in a critical spirit. There is e. g., no valid reason to explain the 'five oxen which stand in the middle of the sky' (Ṛṣ. Saṁh. I, 105, 10) as meaning the five planets; if heavenly bodies are meant, it would be more natural to think of a constellation comprising five fixed stars. Professor Hillebrandt thinks that the choice of the expression 'which stand in the middle of the sky' points to a constellation that does not set, i. e. a circumpolar one. The same scholar, on the other hand, finds a reference to the five planets in the 'five adhvaryus' mentioned in R. S. III. 7. 7. in connexion with the 'seven wise ones' (adhvaryaubhiḥ pañchabhiḥ sapaṭa vipraḥ priyam rakṣanto nihiṭam padam veḥ etc.) The 'seven vipraḥ,' he thinks, are the stars forming the constellation of the Great Bear which are generally spoken of as the seven Rīśis; and this in its turn makes it likely that by the 'five adhvaryus' also there are meant not the earthly adhvaryus but a heavenly prototype of them, viz., the five planets which are moving about in the sky, just as it is characteristic of the earthly adhvaryus busily to move to and fro during the performance of the sacrifice. The interpretation is at any rate not an impossible one.

There is one further passage in the hymns which possibly implies a knowledge of the five planets as a group. R. Saṁh. X. 55. 4. says with regard to Indra—'He filled the two worlds and what is between in manifold ways; he looks at the five gods, the seven-seven, according to the times (or seasons), with
thirty-four-fold light which is of one colour but has different laws.' What is this thirty-four-fold light? Sāyana explains 'he looks at etc., together with the troop (gaṇa) of the gods, whose number is thirty-four,' understanding by the 34 gods the eight Vasus, the eleven Rudras, the twelve Ādityas, Prajāpati, the Vaṣṭū-kāra and Virāj. But the explanation of jyotiḥ by dečagaṇa is by no means plausible, and the manner in which the total of thirty-four is made up is arbitrary. Now Professor Ludwig (in the notes to his translation of the Rīk-Saṃhitā) suggests that we should understand by 'the thirty-four-fold light which is of one colour but has different laws,' the sun, the moon, the twenty-seven nakṣatras and the five planets (2+27+5); and we cannot, I think, deny to this interpretation a fair degree of plausibility. The statement that the 'lights' have one colour but follow different laws, thus explains itself very satisfactorily, and it is evident that the total 'thirty-four' is arrived at in a natural unforced way. It, of course, is well known that the bulk of the hymns of the tenth Maṇḍala shows peculiarities of thought and language which separate it from what with good reason are considered the older books of the Saṃhitā, and the acceptance of Professor Ludwig's interpretation, therefore, would not compel us to abandon the view that the Rīk-Saṃhitā proper shows no acquaintance with the five planets. With these '34' lights Professor Zimmer (Altin. Leben, p. 355) again is inclined to connect what the Taitt. Saṃh. says as to Prajāpati giving his thirty-three daughters in marriage to king Soma, the moon; understanding by the 33 daughters the 27 nakṣatras, the five planets and a divine being Sūrya, who in other places appears as a wife of the moon. But it is evident that the way in which this total is made up is much less convincing than Professor Ludwig’s idea of accounting for the total thirty-four; and moreover, wherever else—and this is in many places—the story of Prajāpati’s daughters and their husband, the moon, is told, those daughters are spoken of as the Nakṣatras only. The 'thirty-three' of the Taittirīya Saṃhitā thus, for the present, remains unexplained.

There remains the second question, viz., whether, even if the five planets as a group were not known to the Vedic tribes, the hymns and Brāhmaṇas do not contain unmistakeable references
to some, or one or other, of the planets. That the two brightest planets, Jupiter and Venus, should not have attracted the attention of the Vedic people and been singled out by them from the other stars as planets, i.e., heavenly bodies which constantly change their place among the constellations—this indeed seems somewhat difficult to understand. The rapid and conspicuous changes in the position of Venus especially—which at the same time is the most brilliant of all stars—cannot possibly, we should say, escape notice; even on the part of people who may as yet fail to recognise that the evening star and the morning star are one. All the same it is a fact that neither hymns nor Brähmanas contain any passage that can with certainty be interpreted as referring to either of these planets, not to mention the other less conspicuous ones. A further distinction has here to be made. The first questions is—'Do the Vedic books mention any of the planets in an altogether unambiguous way, i.e., in such a way that there can be no doubt as to the poet or writer having in his mind one of this class of heavenly bodies?' And the second question is—'Are there good reasons for our interpreting any of the divine beings recognised in the Veda as originally planetary divinities, even though this natural basis may have become obscured or even totally forgotten later on?' The answer to the former question is an unconditional negative; there is no Vedic passage which refers to any one of the planets as planet in the same unambiguous way as later Indian literature (the astrological Samhitās, the Parāshītras of the Atharvaveda, and so forth). To the second question no such concise and definite answer can be given; for we here again enter the realm of mythological speculation, truly a 'dim realm of shape-confounding possibilities'. Among the more important divinities to whom hymns are addressed we of course have Bṛhaspati who evidently is a god of light, and of whom IV. 50. 4 says that he 'was first born from great light in the highest heaven'; but there is nothing either in the hymns or the Brāhmaṇas to convince us that the Bṛhaspati invoked by the Vedic tribes is identical with the planet Jupiter whose main name, in later times is Bṛhaspati. As far as I know, none of the more important writers on Vedic

*As Epimetheus, in Goethe (Pandora) calls the world of dreams.

20.
mythology are willing to admit the identity of the two beings; the reason being that nothing that the Veda says of Brāhaspati has a distinct, or in fact even remote, planetary character. Professor MacDonell considers the Vedic Brahispati to have been originally 'an aspect of Agni as a divine priest presiding over devotion'; Professor Oldenberg sees in him, with special reference to his other name 'Brahmanaspati' 'the patron of the holy words uttered by the priest'; Professor Hillebrandt, laying stress on those attributes of the god which connect him with light and deeds of light, views him as an originally lunar deity. Even if we were to admit, as a not altogether impossible hypothesis, that the Brahispati of the hymns originally was one with the planet Jupiter, we should have to acknowledge that this physical basis had passed altogether out of the ken of the poets of the Ṛik Samhita. Of the planet Venus also, there is no mention anywhere in the Vedic writings; and, unlike the case of Jupiter, there also is no Vedic divinity which, on account of identity of name, could claim to be considered as an ancient personification of the planet.

Mr. Sh. B. Dikṣit, adopting certain conjectures put forth in Mr. Tilak's Orion, thinks that the Shukra mentioned in certain Brāhmaṇa passages in connexion with the Soma-sacrifice originally represented the planet generally known as Shukra in later times (i. e., Venus), and attempts to strengthen this hypothesis by identifying this Shukra with the Vedic divinity called Vena, and by establishing etymological equations between Vena and Venus, and Skukra and Kypris (one of the Greek names of Aphrodite, the goddess of love). These etymological speculations may be dismissed at once. Any body at all familiar with the elements of the Comparative Philology of the Indo-European languages is aware that (not to mention other points) Vena with its long ē cannot be one with Venus; the latter word etymologically belongs to the Vedic vanas (delight). Moreover the ancient Roman goddess Venus originally had nothing whatever to do with the planet: the name Venus was given to the planet in a later period only when the Roman goddess Venus had, by the learned, been identified with the Greek Aphrodite whose connexion with the planet had previously established itself. As to the alleged
connexion of Shukra with Kypris we here are met not by an absolute etymological impossibility, but again by a historical one. Aphrodite was called Kypris on account of the island Kypros (Cyprus) being an ancient and important seat of her worship. It is at present generally admitted that in the Greek Aphrodite there is, to say the least, a strong element of western-Asiatic origin: some go so far as to consider her as in no sense genuinely Greek. And so much is certain that the connexion of the goddess with the planet is not an originally Greek but a Semitic (Babylonian or Syrian) idea. The hypothesis of the ancient Indo-European nations having acknowledged as one of their divinities the planet Venus (called Vena or Shukra), therefore, is destitute of all foundation.

Turning to the Vedic passages mentioning Shukra we fail to discover any relation of that Shukra to the planet Shukra. 'The bright' or 'shining' one there is the name of one of the cups out of which the priests drink the Soma-juice: the name of course easily lends itself to certain imaginative combinations or identifications, and the Shatapatha-Brāhmaṇa (IV. 2. 1. 1.) accordingly remarks that the Shukra is 'he that burns yonder' (i.e., the sun). We need not hold ourselves bound by the views of the Shatapatha; but there is really nothing in the context either of this, or of other similar passages, to suggest the planet Venus.

We will refer in this place to a few further interesting speculations as to certain Vedic divinities having had a planetary (or astral) origin, although no certain results have been reached and all this lies, strictly speaking, outside the sphere of the history of Indian astronomy. Since the very beginning of the study of Vedic mythology—and this study was really originated in India itself by the ancient authors whom Yāska quotes—the twin-deities, called the Ashvins (Ashvinau), have given rise to attempts to identify them with certain heavenly bodies or phenomena. The special facts which challenged and seemed to favour hypotheses in this direction are, firstly, that they are among the gods 'that come early' and appear in many places as closely associated with the dawn; and in the second place their twin character which gives to the efforts at interpretation a more defined character in so far as
limiting it to natural objects or phenomena distinguished by an obviously dual or alternating aspect and hence suggesting to the mytho-poetic fancy the image or conception of twin divinities. All the same the hypotheses as to the original nature of the Ashvins differ very widely. Some interpreters see in them the sun and moon, others the morning and evening twilight; others the morning and evening star; others a pair of conspicuous fixed stars. Professor A. Weber, holding in view both the mentioned characteristic features of the Ashvins, proposed to identify them with the two brilliant stars in the constellation of the *twins* (Gemini; viewed as twins by the Greeks also) which he imagines to have risen to the definite position of 'gods coming early' *i.e.* of precursors of the rising sun, in some ancient period when these stars actually appeared in the east before sunrise in the spring season (*i.e.* at the time about the vernal Equinox or somewhat later). Prof. Weber returned to this point on several occasions and gave the results of various calculations of the time when the two stars actually were morning stars in the sense stated. These results, of course, vary according to the month of the year which is considered the month of Spring, and to the latitude of the locality whether in northern India, or some more northern country in which the Indian Aryans may be supposed to have resided; and altogether the hypothesis, in any of its forms, makes too many assumptions to be considered more than interesting and suggestive. But over other interpretations of the Ashvins it must be acknowledged to have the undeniable advantage that it attempts to account both for the twin character of these divinities and for their being associated with the dawn and the rising sun.

The view of the Ashvins representing the morning and the evening star—a personification that would have been conceived at the time when these apparently separate stars had not yet been recognized as merely two different aspects of one and the same star—has been upheld by Professor Oldenberg (amplifying a view previously held by certain other scholars). But, acute as his argumentation is, it fails to convince, inasmuch as it does not properly account for what appears most characteristic of the Ashvins, *viz.*, that they are twins, and both appear in the early morning. Similar reasons prevent us from assenting to the theory
of Sh. B. Dīkṣit who would identify those too bright divine beings with the two most brilliant planets—Jupiter and Venus, and considers it a specially satisfactory feature of his theory that it provides for the representation, in the Vedic Pantheon, of the two most brilliant stars in the firmament. It no doubt would be gratifying to know that those two planets—which as Sh. B. Dīkṣit rightly remarks cannot fail to be specially noticed even by casual observers of the nightly sky—actually appear among the Vedic divinities; but unfortunately the Vedic texts in no way suggest or favour this identification. Sh. B. Dīkṣit quotes in proof of his theory R. Saṃh., V. 73. 3. Translating ‘you two have fixed one shining wheel of your chariot at the place of the sun, with the other wheel you wander round the world,’ he finds in the wheel which is fastened to the sun a reference to Venus which never is very far from the sun; and in the other wheel which moves round the world a reference to Jupiter which performs an independent revolution round the sphere and appears at all distances from the sun. This would indeed be plausible enough, if only it were possible to translate ‘īrmā’ by ‘in the sun’; but this interpretation although given by Sāyana is absolutely unjustified; whatever the meaning of the difficult word ‘īrmā’ may be, it certainly does not mean the sun. And there is no other Vedic text which would even remotely countenance the identification of the two Ashvins with Jupiter and Venus. A full discussion of some of the hypotheses as to the nature of the Ashvins, discussed so far, is to be found in the 3rd volume of Prof. Hillebrandt’s Vedic Mythology p. 379, ff. Some other interpretations of a non-astral and non-planetary nature are reviewed by the same author. We share the opinion expressed by Prof. Hillebrandt, that none of the attempted identifications can in any sense be called convincing.

This also would be the place to give an account and criticism of the interesting speculations of Prof. Oldenberg concerning the possible identity of the seven Ādityas with sun, moon and planets, and the hypothetical borrowing of this entire group of gods by the Indian Aryans, from the Babylonians or Protobabylonians. But as we have treated of this theory in our review of Prof. Hillebrandt’s Mythology (First number
of 'Indian Thought,' p. 105 ff.) we need not do more than refer the reader to that place.

*Fixed Stars.* What the Vedic books have to tell us concerning the (fixed) stars connects itself almost exclusively with that band or belt of stars or constellations situated on, or not far from, the Ecliptic, to which the name 'naksatras' applies in a special sense. The Sanshitas and Brahmanaas occasionally, but not frequently, refer to the (fixed) stars in general; and 'naksatra' itself originally is one of the terms the meaning of which is simply 'star', without any special distinction. Apart from that limited number of constellations to which later on the term 'naksatras' was restricted, the Vedic texts refer only to very few stars or constellations. And it may here be remarked at once that this narrowness of knowledge or reference is characteristic of Indian Astronomy in all its periods. While the other great ancient nations which advanced far enough to have astronomies of their own (notably the Babylonians, the Egyptians, the Chinese, later on the Greeks, and probably, although perhaps to a more limited extent, the Arabs also), appear to have been interested in taking a survey of the entire starry sky, and to give names at any rate to all the more conspicuous stars and constellations whether on or near the Ecliptic, or remote from it, the Indian Siddhantas even name only a few of the most brilliant stars in addition to the *naksatras* in the narrower sense. The only constellation, not near the Ecliptic, which is quite unambiguously mentioned in the Veda, is the seven *Rîsis* (constellation of the Great Bear) which appear to be referred to in the R. Samh. and of which the Shatapatha Brâhmaṇa says that they were formerly called 'riksah'. For possible references to other constellations there may be compared Sh. B. Dî., p. 6, and the third volume of Prof. Hillebrandt's Mythology (see the index under 'Sternbilder'). The Brâhmaṇas do not add anything of importance to our knowledge of the constellations; and it is only in some of the presumably later Sûtras that we find references, in addition to the seven *Rîsis*, to Arundhati a star close to the former constellation, and to the polar star (Dhruva).† We shall have to deal with the latter star, in a special connexion, later on.

* Cf. on this point Sh. B. Dî., p. 51. † Compare Hillebrandt, v. m. III. p.
In the more obscure parts of the Sāṃhitās there may be hidden references to stars and constellations, not so far properly understood. Interesting attempts to interpret certain Vedic myths as 'astral' have, among others, been made by Mr. Tilak in his two well-known books. We may mention the myth of Prajāpati changing himself into a 'mrjga' and approaching his own daughter, and being pierced by Rudra with an arrow; the astral references of this story are beyond doubt, we do not, however, wish to analyse them in this place; to certain questions connected with it we shall have to attend later on. An elaborate attempt to find for the strange and uncouth things told in a hymn of the tenth Maṇḍala of a divine or semi-divine being called Vṛṣākapi an astral on astronomical basis, is made by Mr. Tilak in the 7th chapter of his Orion. But the interpretation is absolutely unconvincing.

We now come to the nakṣatras in the narrower sense i.e. to a series of stars and constellations, generally counted as 27 and less frequently as 28, which form a kind of belt extending round the entire sphere on both sides of the Ecliptic, and thus, of course, are largely identical with parts of the constellations of the zodiac as recognised by the Greek astronomers and all nations influenced by the astronomical teaching of the Greeks. We take it for granted that our readers are acquainted in some measure with the important place these nakṣatras have held from the earliest times, and continue to hold at the present day, in the astronomical system of the Hindus, and even to a higher extent in all views, beliefs and practices which may be comprised under the heading Astrology. It would be easy to fill a volume with a discussion of matters connected with the Nakṣatras. We shall in the present work touch on some of the points lightly only, while other more important aspects will be treated at some length. There is a not inconsiderable modern literature devoted to enquiries into the Nakṣatra system of the Hindu and the similar systems developed by other nations.


† We note that Prof. Hillebrandt, while refusing to accept Mr. Tilak's view of Vṛṣākapi, himself considers it not unlikely that Vṛṣākapi may be a constellation (V. M. III p. 278).

26.
The fullest knowledge of the Nakṣatras is to be derived from the astronomical writings of the Saṃhitā period, the details given by which as to the longitude and latitude of the main stars of those constellations enable us to identify them, beyond doubt in almost all cases, with the stars and constellations known to modern western Astronomy. Most of these identifications were effected already in the early days of the western study of Indian literature; there is the fundamental paper of Colebrooke ‘On the Indian and Arabian Divisions of the Zodiac,’ published a hundred years ago. Among later efforts in this direction much the most important is the discussion of Colebrooke’s results by the late Professor Whitney (in the notes to Burgess and Whitney’s translation of the Sūrya Saṃhitā, ch. VIII). A comprehensive discussion of all the previous attempts to identify the Nakṣatras is given in Sh. B. Dīkshīt’s book, p. 450 ff. On the whole Colebrooke’s results have been but little affected by later investigations.

Regarding our zodiac with its twelve signs or constellations there can be no doubt that it was laid down with a view roughly to sub-divide the path which the sun apparently describes in the course of the year among the constellations; the division of that path into just twelve parts being suggested by the circumstance that the solar year roughly comprises twelve repetitions of that natural cycle which is the most striking and easily grasped of all heavenly cycles, viz. the lunar month as extending from new moon to new moon, or full moon to full moon. There are twelve signs of the Zodiac because approximately speaking the sun within one synodical month describes the twelfth part of the Ecliptic. Similarly, the reason for the sub-division of the Ecliptic or heavenly sphere into 27 parts—which is implied in the nakṣatra series comprising 27 constellations—is not far to seek: this is a point which could be decided in a somewhat a priori way, even if the ancient literature of the Hindus, as also that of the Arabs, did not constantly allude to the special connexion of the Nakṣatras (or, as the Arabs call them ‘Menāzils’) with the moon. There are 27 nakṣatras because the moon within 27 days performs a complete revolution among the fixed stars; she is after 27 days and about the third part of a day again seen in the neighbourhood of the same star. The
series of the Nakṣatra-constellations thus has rightly been called a 'lunar Zodiac': it is a series of constellations which lie on or near the track which the moon follows in her sidereal revolution; and which, roughly, comprises as many members as the sidereal month comprises days. As the track of the moon, although not identical with the Ecliptic, is inclined to it at a, comparatively, inconsiderable angle only, and, moreover, owing to the so-called revolution of the moon's nodes is constantly shifting, the constellations selected to constitute the lunar zodiac are most of them eclipitical constellations, i.e., they lie on or not far from the Ecliptic; and hence that zodiac though lunar in its origin could without difficulty be made use of to define the position at any time not only of the moon, but of the sun also; and likewise of the five planets, none of the planes of whose orbits are inclined to the Ecliptic at a considerable angle. In India, at any rate, we accordingly find evidence of the place of the sun having been defined at a very early time already by reference to the circle of the Nakṣatras. The same was done in the case of the planets, although these heavenly bodies definitely appear in Indian literature at a relatively late period only.

The main interest of this lunar zodiac lies therein that it constitutes the chief evidence for the existence in India at an early age—we may roughly say in Vedic times—of some attention of a more than quite primitive nature, being given to astronomical things. There indeed are two points only in Vedic literature which can be appealed to as furnishing evidence of that kind. We should hardly say that the bare knowledge of the distinction and succession of the seasons, or of the most obvious aspects of the heavenly bodies, such as e.g., the phases of the moon, deserves to be designated as astronomical, even in the most rudimentary sense. But we are entitled to speak of the beginnings of Astronomy when we meet with attempts, however imperfect, to determine certain numerical relations holding good with regard to the motions and periods of the heavenly bodies; and further to establish divisions of the sphere which in some way correspond to those periods. Thus any attempt to define the length of the month and of the year, deserves to be called astronomical; and, in a higher degree, any attempt to sub-divide the heavenly sphere
in dependence on those determinations. Attempts of the former kind are pre-supposed by the latter and should, in a strictly methodical treatment of the subject, be dealt with first; there, however, will be no harm in considering the Nakṣatras system, before formally dealing with Vedic notions as to the length of the moon's revolution. We may take it for granted in this place that the establishers of the Nakṣatra system knew that the sidereal (periodical) revolution of the moon accomplishes itself in about 27 days.

The Vedic texts already contain complete enumerations of the members of the Nakṣatra series. Not, indeed, the Rik Samhitā (to which point we shall return later on); but the Taittirīya Samhitā and Brāhmaṇa, and also the Atharva-Samhitā. The names of the several Nakṣatras given in those lists, on the whole, are identical with the names met with in later astronomical works: there, however, are some interesting differences. All the details on this point are given in Prof. Weber's treatise.* Nor is there on the whole reason to doubt that the stars and constellations designated by those Vedic names were the same as those the places of which are defined by the Siddhānta-writers. This is not, however, a matter to be taken for granted at once; and we shall later on, when dealing with the astronomical books belonging to the middle or Vedāṅga period, have to point out that certain statements made there as to the location of some of the Nakṣatras seem difficult to reconcile with the Siddhānta views. Vedic literature itself appears to furnish in one place at least evidence as to the old series not having in all points been identical with the more modern one; as first pointed out with great acuteness by Prof. Weber (p. 306 ff.). It is worth while to give the details. The Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, in a certain place, gives directions for what Prof. Weber calls an astrological artifice viz., the making up of a nakṣatriya praṇāpati i.e., a fanciful representation or outline of the body of Prajāpati, out of stars forming part of several nakṣatras. The nakṣatras contributing to this outline are Hasta (which supplies the hand), Chitrā (which forms the head), the two Vishākhe (which give the thighs), Anurādhā (which supply the feet), and Niṣṭyā

* Cf. on this point Weber, Nakṣatras, part II., p. 368 ff. and in other places; Sh. B. Di., p. 52 ff.
which is said to form the heart. The name Niṣṭyā is an old equivalent for the later Svātī; and Svātī is according to the determinations of the Siddhāntas the star α Bootis (Arcturus). This latter star, however, is situated about 31° north of the Ecliptic, and hence far removed from the other constellations forming the body of Prajāpati, all of which lie close to the Ecliptic and fairly lend themselves to being combined into a kind of outline of a body. Only the heart, if marked by Arcturus, would be entirely displaced. The presumption, therefore, is that the Niṣṭyā of the Brāhmaṇa is not Arcturus but some other star placed closer to the Ecliptic, and this presumption receives some support from the fact that the corresponding star in the lunar Zodiacs of the Arabs as well as of the Chinese, is not Arcturus, but α Virginis. This latter star would indeed supply a suitable heart for the stellar Prajāpati.†

In all speculations on possible divergence between a presumptive original series of Nakṣatras and the series acknowledged

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* The only star-map, in which the details of the Nakṣatra-system (as also of the cognate lunar Zodiacs of the Arabs and the Chinese) can be studied with ease and advantage, is the one given in Burgess and Whitney’s translation of the Sārja Siddhānta (a work originally published in the Journal of the American Oriental Society), and reproduced as an accompaniment to Whitney’s essay ‘On the lunar Zodiac of India, China and Arabia’ (forming part of his ‘Oriental and linguistic studies’). The map has the form of a plane projection, having the ecliptic as its central line. The former work has been out of print for many years; the latter is available as far as we know; but, of course, it is inconvenient to have to look for a map of the Hindu lunar Zodiac in a volume consisting mainly of linguistic essays (even if one knows that such a map is to be found there). We hear a great deal at present about the antiquity and originality of Indian astronomical science; the writer of this note has had the privilege of listening to more than one school-boy eloquently holding forth on this subject. But there is no work published in India which affords any help in the way of accurate and perspicuous special stellar maps, for the study of the intricate and important Nakṣatra-system on the decision as to whose origin the question of the originality of Indian science largely depends. This is a somewhat characteristic fact.

† We shortly state what may be urged against the above view. In the first place it may be said that the delineator of the ‘stellar Prajāpati’ did not trouble himself about correctness of outline and brought in the brilliant Arcturus to form the heart of the figure, in spite of its remote position. Next it has been remarked that the name niṣṭyā seems to point to a star standing aside, an
by later astronomers it, however, must not be forgotten that the Indian series compared to the Arabic and Chinese ones, shows a marked tendency to deviate from the Ecliptic in a somewhat unaccountable fashion; and that such deviations do not by themselves afford a sufficient reason for inferring that the constellations of the older series differed from those of the later.

We do not intend to give in this place a detailed description of the entire belt of constellations which constitutes the Indian lunar Zodiac: the examination of Whitney’s map (by all those to whom it is accessible) will of course afford a much clearer idea of the order and position of the Nakṣatras than any description could do. The following points, however, may be mentioned. The stars and constellations chosen by the Hindus as the constitutive members of their lunar Zodiac lie most of them within the limits of those constellations which were accepted by the Greeks (following the Babylonians) to form the so-called ‘signs’ of the Solar Zodiac. The details, shortly stated, are as follows: (1) Kṛttikās (= the Pleiades; with which we begin because the oldest enumerations of the Nakṣatras begin with this constellation) and (2) Rohini (Aldebaran) lie within Taurus. The two next Nakṣatras, (3) Mrigashiras and (4) Ārdra (= a Orionis) lie within Orion. (5) Punarvasu is constituted by the two bright stars of Gemini. (6) Pushya lies within Cancer. (7) Ashlesha lies within Hydra, close upon the borders of Cancer. (8) Maghas is within Leo; so are (9) and (10), the Two Phalgunis. (11) Hasta is within Corvus, to the south of Virgo. (12) Chitra is Spica, the bright star in Virgo. In (13) Svātī (Arcturus), the series in an extraordinary way (see above) deviates towards the north into Bootes. In (14) Vishākhā, the series returns to the Ecliptic, in Libra. The three next Nakṣatras, (15) Anurādhā, (16) Jyeṣṭhā and (17) Mūla lie within Scorpio. (18) and (19), the two Aṣādhiṣṭhās are stars in Sagittarius. The position of the next three Nakṣatras implies another, even more outcast as it were; and that, hence, after all, the star meant may be the far off Arcturus. Sh. B. Dī. directs attention to the fact that Arcturus has a very considerable proper motion, and, therefore, may in ancient time have been in a place fitting it to form the heart of the imaginary Prajñāpati. But the distance of Arcturus from the other stars concerned is too great for this conjecture appearing acceptable.

31.
extraordinary; deviation towards the north. (20) Abhijit (which has to be omitted from the series when we count 27 Nakṣatras only) is constituted by stars in Lyra; (21) Shravāṇa by stars in Aquila and (22) Shraviṣṭhās by four stars of the Dolphin. In (23) Shatabhishaj the series returns to the Ecliptic (Aquarius). In (24) and (25), the two Bhādrapadas, there is another ascent towards the north; the stars constituting these two Nakṣatras lie within Pegasus and Andromeda. (26) Revāti is ζ Piscium, nearly on the ecliptic. (27) and (28) Ashvinī and Bharani are formed by stars belonging to Aries.

The above short survey shows that the nakṣatras on the whole notwithstanding the deviations mentioned, beyond doubt were chosen so as to constitute a series, eclipical in a wider sense, i.e., a series of constellations belting the sphere in that region in which sun, moon and the planets are moving: that the special reason determining the choice was the reference to the moon, not either the sun or the planets, we have above already said to be proved by the number of the nakṣatras i.e., 27 or 28. What primarily attracted the attention of the framers of the series was that within every period of 27 or 27½ days the moon was near to all those stars or constellations in succession, so that each member of the series might be compared to a new station in the monthly journey of the moon; or else to a new house or mansion in which the moon abides during one night. It is an imaginative view of this relation when, as in several places in the Brāhmaṇas, we are told that Prajāpati gave his daughters, the nakṣatras, in marriage to King Soma (the moon); and that, after the moon had at first refused to live with all of them equally (preferring to stay with Rohini alone; to which point we shall revert later on), and had been punished for this his evil behaviour, he in the end agreed to live with all of them equally in succession.

When dealing with the later periods of Indian astronomy, the question as to the number of the nakṣatras (whether 27 or 28) will repeatedly occupy us at some length. The Vedic writings in almost all places refer to them as 27; and this has remained the prevailing Indian view up to the present day. The Taîttriya Brāhmaṇa already, however, mentions the 28th nakṣatra, Abhijit; specially defining its position ('after the asādhās,
before Shrona, i.e. Shravana) and thereby, probably, indicating that this nakṣatra was not generally acknowledged, or that its admission was felt as a kind of innovation.

As the acknowledgment of a 28th nakṣatra is beyond doubt due to the fact that the periodical revolution of the moon accomplishes itself not within clear 27 days but within 27 days and a third of a day, later astronomical books are wont to assign to Abbijit not the same extent in the sphere as to the other Nakṣatras, but only a fraction of that space. What the ideas of the author of the Taittirīya passage may have been on this detail, we do not know. Where, as generally, the Nakṣatras are 27 only, they are evidently all held to be of equal extent, each Nakṣatra thus extending over one 27th part of the sphere; in other words, there is a tacit identification between the star or group of stars and the 27th part of the sphere or Ecliptic. That the spaces occupied by the several constellations which constitute the Nakṣatras are really of very unequal extent, is not noticed or intentionally overlooked. The moon is held to advance during each twenty-four hours by one 27th part of the circumference of the sphere (nothing being known at that time of the fact that the rate at which the moon moves is in reality constantly changing), and each of these twenty-seven sections of the sphere is somehow marked by some star or a group of stars, which may be actually situated at the beginning or end or any part of the section, or extend over the whole of it, or even engross a part of one or two neighbouring sections. It may be noticed that the Greek plan of carefully delimitating that area of the surface of the sky which belongs to each constellation is foreign to the Hindu astronomers.

As to the number of stars constituting each Nakṣatra there do not appear to be many, or essential, divergences between the views held in the Brāhmaṇa period and those of later times. At no time any of the Nakṣatras was considered to consist of many stars (with the exception of Shatabhiṣaj, the name of which although by no means really implying a hundred stars was later on fancifully interpreted in that way). The fundamental passage giving information on this point as far as Vedic times are concerned is Shatap. Brā. II. 1. 2. 2., 'the other Nakṣatras are one, two, three or four (stars); most
numerous are these Kṛttikās'; wherewith one must combine Taitt. Brā III. 1. 2., where separate names are mentioned for seven stars belonging to Kṛttikās. The Taitt. Brā. further states definitely that Shraviṣṭhās comprises four stars. Availing ourselves of what we know (form sources of all kinds) as to the identity and number of stars going to form the several Nakṣatras, we may form some general conclusions as to what determined the choice of stars to be included in the series. In a small number of cases one particularly brilliant star by itself constitutes the Nakṣatra (Ardrā = α Orionis; Chitā = α Virginis, Svātī = α Bootis); as a look at the stellar map shows the three latter stars are not only brilliant but in a sense solitary stars, no other conspicuous stars with which the eye might readily combine them into groups being in the neighbourhood. Ardrā indeed is not far distant from other conspicuous stars of Orion, but the latter were manifestly combined, in very early times already into independent groups of their own (Mṛigashiras; and 'ishus trikāṇḍā,' the three stars which form what we call the belt of Orion). In these cases the singular form of the name agrees with the 'unity' of the star; we should not on the other hand be justified in assuming that this must be so in all instances: as a matter of fact, the contrary case is the more frequent one. Next we have a number of Nakṣatras constituted by conspicuous pairs of stars—Punarvasū (α and β Geminorum); Pūrva-Phalgunī (δ and θ Leonis); Pūrva-Aśādā (δ and ε Sagittarii); Uttarā-Aśādā (ζ and σ Sagittarii); Pūrva-Bhādrapādā (α and β Pegasi; Uttarā Bhādrapādā (γ Pegasi and α Andromedae). Next we have some groups of three stars which either form well-marked triangles or strike the eye as lying in one line—Bharani = 35, 30, 41 Arietis; Mṛigashiras = λ, ν, ψ Orionis; Pushya = γ, δ, θ Cancri; Anurādhā = β, δ, π Scorpionis; Jyeṣṭhā = α, σ, τ Scorpionis; Abhijit = α, ε, ζ Lyrae; Shravaṇa = α β γ Aquila. Four stars forming well defined quadrilaterals constitute Vishākā (β, ω, γ Librae); and Shraviṣṭhā (α, β, γ, δ Delphini), and we must also mention in this connexion the two Aśādās and two Bhādrapāda: here in each case the two Nakṣatras together form well-marked quadrilaterals, the one in Pegasus being a particularly striking object. In the case of the remaining Nakṣatras which have more than four stars, we mostly have to do
with well-marked groups which at once attract the eye as such, so in the case of Kṛittikās (Pleiades), of the stars in Scorpio which constitute Mūla, and the stars in Hydra which form Ashlesā. In a few further cases the group arrangement although not quite so obvious, yet is by no means unnatural. In one case only (Revati = η Piscium,) the Nakṣatra is constituted by one insignificant star; we shall have later on to consider this case specially. The general conclusion is that in almost all cases the reason for the selection of certain stars to form an independent member of the lunar zodiac is sufficiently obvious to the eye. And it may be noted that the Nakṣatras throughout present themselves as more simple and natural, less pretentious, combinations of stars than those huge and fantastic constellations which were first imagined by the Babylonians or some older nation within the confines of Babylonia, were later on adopted by the Greeks and bequeathed by them as a rather cumbersome heirloom, to modern astronomy.
REVIEWS.

I.

Āryabhaṭa, or the Newton of Indian Astronomy: By T. Rāmaliṅgam Pillai, B. A., Madras, 1905.

This booklet the Editor states to be a somewhat modified translation of a lecture on Āryabhaṭa, in Malayalam, delivered by his father M. R. Ry. T. Sthāṇu Pillai Avergal, under the auspices of the Lecture Committee instituted by the Government of H. H. the Maharaja of Travancore. The lecture is of a popular character and does not claim to deal with its subject in an exhaustive way. Attempts on the part of learned men to impart certain results achieved within the sphere of their special studies to those who, while not possessing any deeper knowledge of the subject, yet take an intelligent interest in it, no doubt are worthy of all praise. But we of course expect the author or lecturer, whose ambition it is to disseminate knowledge, to possess a thorough knowledge of his special topic, to be unbiassed in his judgments, and where he undertakes to criticize others to give proof of having fully mastered and understood their views. If these conditions are not fulfilled, the popular book or lecture is likely to mislead and prejudice the minds of the public.

The joint authors of the lecture under review unfortunately come within the scope of this remark. They apparently have given a good deal of time and labour to the study of Indian Astronomy in general, and of Āryabhaṭa's performance in particular. But neither is their general knowledge of the history of Astronomy, or even the history of Indian Astronomy, wide and accurate enough, nor are their minds sufficiently free from bias, to enable them to form a just appreciation of the position of Āryabhaṭa. We can here refer to the main points only. About twenty or thirty years ago Āryabhaṭa was generally spoken of, by modern writers on Indian Astronomy, as the earliest 'scientific' Indian astronomer. Little was at that time known as to the early history of the scientific system of Indian Astronomy; and at the same time it had rightly been recognised that Āryabhaṭa was earlier than some other of the most
famous Indian astronomers—such as Varāha Mihira, Brahma-gupta, Bhāskara. But since that time our ideas as to the history of Indian Astronomy have been considerably expanded and cleared, mainly by the publication of that work—a work indeed of fundamental importance in this department of enquiry,—in which Varāha Mihira, writing in the sixth century, gives a summary account of the five most important astronomical Siddhāntas, the doctrines of which were in his time current in India. From this account, and occasional references made by Varāha Mihira to Āryabhaṭa himself, it became evident that the so-called scientific system of Indian astronomy was in existence before Āryabhaṭa's time, we may say with some probability for some centuries at least. Āryabhaṭa may have been the first, or one of the first, to expound the principles of that system in a highly condensed and technical form, and he may have improved the general theory in details; but the main body of doctrine existed before him—he did not create it but merely recast it in a different form. It is with regard to this indubitable fact that the editors of the Pañchāsiddhaṅtikā remarked that originality of doctrine cannot on the whole be claimed for Āryabhaṭa. That he was original, at least as far as India is concerned, in maintaining the daily rotation of the earth on its axis, nobody of course has ever denied. The same view had indeed been previously held by certain Greek astronomers; but there is no evidence for Āryabhaṭa having been acquainted with those views; nor indeed is this generally likely. And even if the idea had first been suggested to Āryabhaṭa by those Greek speculations, we should have to give him credit for 'originality,' in the sense that he had the insight and courage to maintain a view which appears utterly paradoxical to the vulgar and had been rejected by the best known, and on the whole most competent, astronomers of the west. That the view of the earth's rotation did not fare better in India also, is well-known: the most famous astronomers subsequent to Āryabhaṭa refer to it only to reject it; and Āryabhaṭa's originality in this one point hence stands out all the brighter.

The author of the lecture under review indeed thinks that there is even stronger reason to insist on Āryabhaṭa's originality. Āryabhaṭa, according to him, not only taught that the earth
revolves on its axis within 24 hours; but also that in the course of a year it performs a revolution round the sun, the latter—and not the earth—thus being the (relatively) stationary body. Āryabhaṭa thus would stand before us as a genuine precursor of Copernicus. But unfortunately the arguments by which the author tries to vindicate this claim are altogether baseless. Āryabhaṭa distinctly says that the sun revolves in the ecliptic, and that the earth is 'khamadhyagata', i.e. not 'moving in space' (which impossible translation of the words is given on p. 31), but 'placed in the middle of space.' The interpretation which the author tries to put on the words 'arkāt tasmin maṇḍalārdḍhe kṣitichchhāyā bhramati' is totally wrong. The words really are as plain as possible: 'the shadow of the earth moves in the ecliptic, at the distance of half the circumference of the circle (from the sun), and away from the sun.' As the sun is moving round the ecliptic, the shadow of the earth is at the same time moving on the opposite side of the ecliptic. That, as the author urges, the cone of the earth's shadow is not long enough to reach as far as the sun's path is altogether irrelevant; what is meant of course is that the shadow revolves in the plane of the ecliptic: it is this which suffices to cause the phenomenon in connexion with which the shadow of the earth is interesting, viz., the eclipses of the moon when she is 180° from the sun and at the same time in, or very near to, the plane of the ecliptic.

What the author says as to the 'ellipticity of the orbits of the earth and the other planets' is equally misleading. The uchchanīcha-vṛttas in which the planets are moving are not ellipses, but eccentric circles—one of the devises early invented by the Greek astronomers in order to explain the unequal motion of the planets in their orbits. That the apparent motion of a heavenly body in an eccentric circle (i.e. a circle, the centre of which is not the earth round which the planet is supposed to move, but a point at some distance from the earth) somewhat approaches the real motion of the planet in an elliptical orbit is of course well known; it is due to this that the hypothesis of eccentric circles maintained itself for so long a time.

We refrain from discussing other points of Āryabhaṭa's doctrine touched upon in this lecture. That a good deal
remains to be done before we can gain a clear insight into the early history of the Indian scientific system, none familiar with the subject will deny. But he who wishes to sit in judgment on what so far has been done must endeavour to learn more about the subject, and to form juster appreciations of the work of others, than the author of this lecture has been at the trouble of doing. Remarks so totally naïve as those expressed on pp. 54—55 on the view of the Romaka (not Romasha!) Siddhānta having been influenced by western science should not, at this time of day, come from men who no doubt are learned in a certain sense. And, to refer to one further point, has the author—who refers to the need of a thorough study of the history of the Greek system of astronomy—any notion of the amount of laborious research which European scholars, for centuries, have devoted to this subject?

The little book contains some novel and useful information on commentaries to Āryabhaṭa's work, and we are fully in sympathy with the author when inviting (p. 52) the attention of the Government of Travancore to the desirability of a thorough search being instituted for 'old manuscripts on Astronomy which are stowed away in cellars or in crumbling lofts to feed the white-ant and the moth.' Labour devoted to research of this kind would be well spent indeed, a great deal better, we venture to say, than in attempts to establish parallels between Āryabhaṭa and Newton.

II.


(The Bhagavadgītā, translated from the Sanskrit, with an introduction treating of its original form, its doctrine, and its age).

The introduction to this new translation of the Bhagavad-Gītā is an interesting piece of 'higher criticism.' It is well known, we may perhaps say, generally recognised, that the Gītā, in its several sections, sets forth views on matters philosophical and theological which, at first sight at any rate, do not appear to be in full harmony; that—to characterize the
difference more closely, although in a way by no means fully adequate—the point of view prevailingingly maintained in the poem is theistic, while certain sections or passages bear the stamp of a pantheistic doctrine—in. e. in more Indian terms, of a monistic or non-dualistic view of things such as held by Śaṅkarāchārya and his school. The great Indian commentators, however widely diverging in their fundamental interpretation of the poem, are at one in so far as holding that the difference of views which cannot fail to attract the attention even of the superficial reader is a mere apparent one. Adherents of the theory, as the typical representative of which we may designate Rāmānujāchārya, put on the non-dualistic utterances met with here and there in the body of the work, interpretations tending to weaken their prima facie force and bringing them into agreement with the prevailing general tendency of the poem. The school of Śaṅkara on the other hand—which represents the view so widely held that it may be termed the Indian view—applies to the understanding of the Gītā also its characteristic distinction of the strictly non-dual absolute Reality, and of a personal Lord or ruler as whom the fundamental Reality presents itself if viewed in relation to the phenomenal world—itself the manifestation of that, unreal or illusory principle (Māyā or Anavidyā) which, as a matter of fact although in an inconceivable way, is associated with that which alone is real. To this doubleness of aspect of what we, in a popular way, may call the divine Being, there corresponds a double attitude on the part of the human soul. The supreme absolute Reality requires to be known; the soul has to realize through an act of cognition—the highest of which it is capable, and in fact the only true one—that it is at bottom identical with the universal principle of Intelligence, and that all the limitations on which its individual being rests are a mere illusive appearance. He, on the other hand, who is not capable of rising to this supreme abstraction or at any rate of holding it steadily before his mind, has the comforting alternative of turning with devout and loving faith towards the 'Lord,' who, all-wise and all-merciful, rules supreme in the sphere of what though metaphysically unreal, is practically real. From the contemplation and worship of Him he draws strength to withstand and
overcome the evils of the Sāṃsāra and gradually prepares his mind to receive the great final intuition which shatters all bonds of individuality and restores the, illusorily broken, unity of the individual with the Universal. It is this latter attitude of mind, the devout belief in and worship of, a self-conscious personal divine being between whom and the devotee there may exist bonds of a personal nature, which is emphasized in the Gītā, is in fact its proper and special object. But as the view of the world on which this attitude of mind rests is not the ultimate one, there is from the orthodox Indian standpoint (as represented by Śaṅkara and his school) no reason to take exception to the occasional intrusion into the exposition of the Gītā of references or allusions to, or even passages formally expounding, that higher doctrine to which any theory implying a personal relation between a supreme soul and human souls is after all no more than a veil or screen, softening and hence more or less obscuring the dazzling light of absolute truth. From time to time a flash of the central radiance will break through the veil, and remind us that while enjoying the delights of communion with a supreme soul and the blissful assurance of his grace we do no more than tarry on the threshold of the sanctuary.

The theory of the aims of the Gītā, shortly set forth in what precedes, no doubt is a possible one. In acknowledging a double philosophic point of view the Śaṅkara Vedānta possesses a powerful instrument of reconciling, or somehow accounting for, apparent contradictions; and in using this instrument with regard to the Bhagavad-Gītā it has, we may say, to conflict with difficulties much less formidable than those which beset attempts at a unitary interpretation of the Upaniṣads.

We, however, must acknowledge that there also is a possibility of a widely different view of the composition of the Gītā. The poem may be looked upon, not as a truly homogeneous whole initially conceived in one spirit and representing a somewhat complex system of thought which admits and even demands apparently conflicting points of view; but rather as a combination of elements fundamentally heterogeneous, and put together in an artificial, and perhaps not always successful, manner.
And remembering what above was said as to the two obvious aspects of the doctrine of the Gītā we may say at once, that on this basis there is room, broadly speaking, for two hypotheses as to the character and composition of the poem. We may either view the Gītā as a work originally meant to set forth a strictly monistic doctrine (in the Vedāntic sense) and hence agreeing in general spirit with the older Upaniṣads, and subsequently recast in the interests of some system of doctrine and belief which emphasizes the personal character of the supreme being and the reality of the distinction between that being and the human soul. Or we may, on the contrary, consider the Gītā to have originally been purely theistic and brought later on, by certain modifications and additions, into, at least superficial, agreement with the doctrine of the Upaniṣads as systematized by Śaṅkara or his predecessors. To both these views we may apply the designations historical and critical: they acknowledge successive stages of religious and philosophical development or possibly the independent evolution of different systems side by side, and undertake, by a critical analysis of the poem, to determine which parts of it constitute the true original work, and which are later additions made in some new interest. Prof. Garbe quotes the views of certain distinguished Sanskritists who favour the former of these hypotheses in different forms. Prof. Hopkins (the American Sanskritist) e.g., is of opinion that the Gītā in its present form is a Kṛṣṇaite version of an older Viṣṇuītic poem which in its turn first was an ‘unsectarian’ work, perhaps a ‘late Upaniṣad.’ Prof. A. Holtzmann (in his important work on the Mahābhārata) expresses the view that the Gītā is a comparatively late Viṣṇava recast of an older poem composed in a distinctly ‘pantheistic’ (advaita) spirit.

In the work under review Prof. Garbe advocates a historical hypothesis of an exactly contrary nature. Emphasising the prevailing character of the poem which beyond doubt is distinctively theistic—he considers the Gītā to have been originally nothing else than an exposition, in poetical form, of the religion of a Kṛṣṇaite sect to which Kṛṣṇa is a distinctly personal being; while he holds all those passages that set forth doctrines of a clearly Vedāntic character to be later interpolations made for the purpose of vindicating the poem for the
monistic Vedântic view. And he considers himself able
definitely to single out all those passages or sections which did
not form part of the original poem: they comprise according to
his calculation 170 out of the 700 Shlokas which constitute the
Gîtâ in its present form. The extrusion of these additional
verses, he feels convinced, so far from giving rise in any place
to a break in the continuity of thought, rather throughout
restores original fully satisfactory connexions which had been
interfered with by the adventitious passages.

He points to III. 9-18; VI. 27-32; VII. 7-11; VIII.
20; IX. 6, as passages strikingly illustrating the gains thus to
be secured by a system of judicious elimination.

Having thus managed to restore an original and genuine
Bhagavad-Gîtâ reflecting a religious and philosophical system
of a strictly coherent character, free from all inner contradic-
tions, Prof. Garbe enquires into the mode in which that system
may have originated. Adopting an hypothesis first broached
by Prof. R. G. Bhandarkar, he holds the Kṛṣṇa whom the
Gîtâ identifies with the supreme deity, to have originally been
a mere man—an ancient hero of the nation, or tribe called
Yādavas or Vṛṣṇis; in fact the same man Kṛṣṇa who in the
most ancient parts of the Mahâbhârata appears as the valiant
ally of the Pândavas. With this Kṛṣṇa we may, he thinks,
identify the Kṛṣṇa Devakîputra who in the Chhândogya Upa-
niṣad is mentioned as a disciple of Ghora Ângirasa. This
Kṛṣṇa was, he presumes, not only a hero and ruler but also
the founder of a religion of a definitely theistic type, and on
that account later on himself came to be deified—identified in
fact with the personal divinity, the belief in which was the
main feature of the religion taught by him. Apart from its
theistic character that religion distinguished itself from the
Brahmanical system of doctrine and worship by the stress it
laid on the ethical aspect of religion, and generally by its inde-
pendence from Vedic priestly tradition; Prof. Garbe, therefore,
characterizes it as a Kṣatriya (non-priestly) religion of pre-
vailingly ethical character. The name by which the followers
of the sect specially loved to designate the divine being was
Bhagavat, and the oldest name of the sect hence may be sup-
posed to have been Bhâgavata; although the oldest name
actually occurring in Sanskrit literature is ‘Vāsudevaka’ (Pāṇini IV. 3-98)—which term, according to Prof. Garbe, signifies ‘a worshipper of Vāsudeva i.e. Kṛṣṇa.’ The reference to this Kṛṣṇa in the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad would probably entitle us to place him, chronologically, some centuries before Buddha’s time; and if we accept, as resting on some historic basis, the participation of the same Kṛṣṇa in the great war of the Pāṇḍavas and Kauravas, we, of course, shall have to refer him to an even more remote antiquity.

As to the several stages of the development of the Bhāgavata religion Prof. Garbe propounds the following hypotheses. The first period, he thinks, comprises the foundation of the religion by Kṛṣṇa, and its further development in mainly three directions—the deification of its founder who now is held to be one with the divinity; the endeavour to give to the religion a kind of philosophical foundation by ideas borrowed from the Sāṅkhya-Yoga; and an intensification of the emotional side of the religion, in the form of bhakti (faith characterized by love and devotion). The second period is marked by the identification of Kṛṣṇa, so far a divinity of a somewhat local character, with the Viṣṇu of the great Brahmancial system: the popular worship of Kṛṣṇa is adopted and utilized by the Brahmans. This identification of Kṛṣṇa with Viṣṇu accomplished itself, Prof. Garbe thinks, about 300 B.C.; not later, because Megasthenes refers to Kṛṣṇa, as an avatāra of Viṣṇu; and also not much earlier, since in the second stage of the development of the Mahābhārata (which Prof. Hopkins, with ‘reasonable probability’ dates from about 400–200 B.C.) Kṛṣṇa appears as a semi-divine being only. The original Bhagavad-Gītā must be assumed to have been composed within this period, because it in several places (occurring in those parts which Prof. Garbe holds to be old and genuine) designates Kṛṣṇa as Viṣṇu; while it does not yet identify him with Brahmā. And there is, Prof. Garbe thinks, a further circumstance which helps us to determine the time of the composition of the original Gītā more definitely. From what (Bha. Gī., IV, 2) is said about the decay of the Yoga doctrine, it may—with some probability—be concluded, that at the time (i.e. at the time when a remark of that kind could be plausibly made) the Yoga-sūtras—in which the doctrine is set forth in a
full and lucid way which could not escape recognition—were not yet in existence. That means, the original Gitā is older than Patañjali, the author of the Yoga sūtras, who—considered as the author of the Mahābhāṣya also—must be assigned to the second century B.C.

The characteristic feat of the third period in the development of the Bhāgavata religion is the identification of Kṛṣṇa with the universal Brahman. It is in the course of this period that all the passages of distinctly Vedāntic colouring were interpolated in the text of the Gitā, and thus the 'traditional' text as we have it now before us, resulted. This entire third period may be viewed as extending down to the time when the Bhāgavata doctrine received its final systematization at the hands of Rāmacandra; but the constitution of the text of the Gitā may with probability be assumed to have been accomplished in the early part of the period when the entire text of the Mahābhārata (in the way explained by Professor Hopkins) underwent a process of re-casting. The Bhagavad-Gītā thus may be supposed to have assumed its present form in the first or second century of the Christian era.

Elaborate tissues of hypotheses such as the above cannot be done justice to unless dealt with at greater length than we here are in a position to do: their strength lies in the convergence of many minor facts and circumstances towards a common issue. Professor Garbe's argumentation is ingenious if not convincing; and the historical point of view once admitted, very much seems to tell in favour of his main thesis,—viz., that the Gitā in its original form was not 'Vedāntic' but Kṛṣṇaite-theistic, and was later on brought into a kind of harmony with the monistic view; as against the opinion that, after having at first been purely Vedāntic a sectarian colouring was imparted to it in a later period.

Professor Garbe's introduction further contains a compact and lucid sketch of the philosophical teaching of the Gitā; in which special stress is laid on the Sāṅkhya-Yoga elements conspicuous in the poem. Like most scholars of the present day Professor Garbe rejects the view of the teaching of the Gitā showing traces of Christian influence.

30.
III

Viramitrodaya—by Mitra Mishra (Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series, Nos. 103 and 108 : Benares. Fasc. 1 and 2)

This is one of the many ‘digests’ of what is known as the ‘Dharmashāstra’ of the Hindus. It is, however, in many respects unique among the number: it deals, not only with Āchāra, Vyavahāra, and Prāyashchitta (subjects which alone most of the well-known digests treat of), but also such subjects as Chikitsā, Bhakti and Mokṣa which have not been dealt with in any nibandha. To each of these subjects or heads—and there are no less than 22 of these—the writer devotes one ‘section’—if we can give this title to works that run sometimes to close upon 50,000 lines—called ‘prakāsha’. The twenty-two ‘prakāshas’ contain about 400,000 lines. In the second fasciculus we find a well-written ‘Preliminary note’ by Mr. Govinda-Dāsa, which gives us all the information available regarding the author and his patron. This latter was Virasiṅha Deva, the enlightened king of Orchha, a contemporary of the Great Akbar. In the words of the ‘Preliminary note’

The great merit of this grand work is that the style is easy and clear, and the author’s meaning is always plain. The texts that have been quoted are always interpreted in the most approved style of Mimāṃsā, and all differences reconciled, and a clear consistent doctrine evolved, unlike another huge digest, the Hemādri, which merely piles up endless Śruti texts, leaving the reader to wander unguided through the labyrinth, with no clue as to what the author wanted to be taken as settled law.

The work is to be regarded more as an ‘Encyclopædia of Sanskrit Learning,’ than a mere ‘Digest of Hindu Law’, as which it has hitherto been considered owing to the fact that the only part of the work known was the ‘Vyavahāra’ portion. And we owe it to the energy of Mr. Govinda-Dāsa, that the other more important and interesting portions of the encyclopædic work have been brought to light, and their publication undertaken by the enterprising publisher of the Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series, Benares. We have had occasion to look into some of the prakāshas in manuscript, and some of them are so unique and contain such interesting matter, that we hope those portions will be printed first; even though the author has established some sort of sequence among the ‘prakāshas.’ One of these 6 is the ‘Lakṣaṇa-prakāsha.’

In what follows we give a brief analysis of the first, ‘Paribhāṣā’ prakāsha.

As in all Dharmashāstranibandhas, so here also we have first of all a discussion as to what is Pramāṇa (means of knowing rightly) of Dharma. This opens with a quotation from Manu which describes in what this pramāṇa consists, viz., (1) the Vedas, (2) the Smṛtis, (3) the practice of men learned in the Vedas, and (4) Conscience. Of these (1) the ‘Veda’ consists of the Injunctive or Exhortatory Passages, the Prohibitive Passages, the Arthavādas, Mantras, Names and Upaṁśads.

Then comes the statement of the various ‘Vidyāsthānas’ or ‘Branches of knowledge’ pertaining to Dharma, this enumerated by Yājñavalkya:—(1) The Purāṇas, (2) Nyāya, (3) Mīmāṁsā, (4) Dharmashāstra, (5—8) the four Vedas, and (9—14) the six Āṅgas or auxiliaries of the Veda.

“Purāṇa” has been defined as that which describes the beginnings of creation, the dissolution, genealogies of kings and sages, the Manvantaras, and the deeds done by the various lines of kings. There are 18 Purāṇas:—Brahma (10,000 verses), Padma (53,000), Viśṇu, (23,000), Shiva (24,000), Bhāgavata (18,000), Nārādīya (25,000), Mārkandeyya :9000), Agni (15,400), Bhāvīṣya (14,500), Brahmavaivarta (18,000), Līṅga (11,000), Varāha (24,000), Skanda (81,100), Viṣṇu (10,000), Kūrma (17,000), Matsya (14,000), Garuḍa (19,000), Brahmāṇḍa (12,000).
We do not find any discussion here as to which ‘Bhāgavata’ is meant. Some people regard the ‘Devi-Bhāgavata’ as the ‘Bhāgavata’ par excellence; others would award the honour to the Shrimadbhāgavata. This has been one of the ‘bones of contention’ between Shaivas and Vaiṣṇavas, and has given rise to much ill-feeling. As our author does not raise the question, we do not enter into that discussion here. In any case the Shrimad-bhāgavata is not the work of Bopadeva as some people imagine.

In addition to the above ‘Purāṇas’, there are 18 ‘Upapurāṇas’:—Sanatkumāra, Nārādiya (this is different from the ‘Nārādiya’ enunciated among the ‘Purāṇas), Narasiṁha, Shaivadharmā, Durvāsas, Kapila, Mānava, Shukra, Varuṇa, Brahmāṇḍa (apparently different from the one mentioned among ‘Purāṇas’) Kāli, Vashīṣṭha, Māhesha, Śāṃba, Saura, Parāśara, Mārīcha, and Bhārgava.

‘Nyāya’ and ‘Mīmāṁsā’ are, curiously enough, left unexplained. Among the ‘Dharmashāstras’ are mentioned the works — ‘smṛitis’—of Manu, Āṅgiras, Vyāsa, Gautama, Atri, Ushanas, Yama, Vashīṣṭha, Dakṣa, Saṁvarta, Śaṭātapa, Parāśara, Viṣṇu, Āpastamba, Hārita, Sāttakha, Kātyāyana, Bhṛigu, Prachetas, Nārada, Yogin Baudhāyana, Pitāmaha, Sumantu, Kashyapa, Babhru, Paitīhīnasi, Vyāghra, Satyavrata, Bhuradvāja, Gārgya, Kārṇājina, Jābāli, Jamadagni, Langākṣi, Brahmagurī. —36 in all. Another authority is quoted which gives their number as 55. But we know that this number high as it is does not exhaust the list. The numbers quoted in the Nīrṇaya Sindhu being……

‘Smṛitis’ have been classified under five heads—(1) those dealing with the perceptible things of the ordinary world, for instance laws relating to practical matters, (2) those treating of things beyond the reach of the senses, for instance those laying down the performance of Sandhyā and such other acts, (3) those treating of both perceptible and imperceptible things, for instance those prescribing the carrying of the stick of Palāsha wood; (4) those based upon pure reasoning, for instance those that lay down that when we have two contradictory instructions, we should regard the two courses prescribed as optional, and (5) those that are merely descriptive,—repeating what has already been laid down in the Veda.
The 'Aṅgas' or 'Auxiliaries' of the Veda are—(1) Shikṣā—including the Prātiṣhākyas, (2) Vyākaraṇa—as constituted by the works of Paṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali (3) Nirukta—by Yāska,—including the Nighaṇṭu also; (4) Chhandas—consisting of the ‘Chhandovichīti’ of Piṅgala; (5) Kalpa—the Śūtras of Bandhāyana and others, and (6) Jyautiṣa—the Saṁhitās of Śūrya, Garga and the like.

The 18 'Vidyās' or 'sciences' constitute the 'Pramāṇa,' or means of rightly knowing Dharma.

An interesting question is here raised as to the authority—on points relating to Dharma—of such works as the scriptures of the Pañcharātra, Pāshupata and the like, and also those relating to the Saṁkhya and Yoga (the above quotation mentioning only the 'Nyāya' and the 'Mīmāṁsā' among the 'Vidyāsthānas'). The opinion of our author is that all these are to be regarded as fully authoritative, in so far as they do not contradict anything laid down in the Veda.

Having discussed the various sources of information, with regard to Dharma, the question is raised as to which one of these should be accepted, in cases where there happens to be a contradiction between any two or more of them. And the conclusion is that when there is a contradiction between two Vedie passages, both are authoritative,—the courses of action being regarded as optional; so also in the cases of contradiction between two Smṛitis or two āchāras, and so forth; when however Smṛiti contradicts the Veda, it has to be rejected in favour of the latter; Smṛiti again has to be given preference over 'sad-āchāra' and so forth, the lowermost position in this respect being allowed to the 'dictates of conscience.'

What now is 'Dharma' and what 'Adharma'?

'Dharma' according to the Naiyāyika is a certain quality produced in the Self by the performance of duties laid down in the scriptures; and 'adharma' also is a quality produced by the performance of such acts as are prohibited. According to the Mīmāṁsaka, 'Dharma' is a name given to (1) the substances used at sacrifices, (2) the sacrifices themselves, and (3) the qualities that must belong to the substances to be employed. Thus then according to the latter, 'Dharma' and 'Adharma' are names applicable respectively to the prescribed and prohibited
actions themselves, and not to the effects produced by those actions in the Self; to which effects the Mīmāṁsaka gives the distinct name of 'apārvā. Our author favours this latter view; defining 'Dharma' and 'Adharma' as that which is learnt from the Veda as bringing about desirable and undesirable effects respectively.

When proceeding to deal with 'Dharma' in detail, he makes some interesting quotations; one from the Mahābhārata, for instance, defines 'Sanātana-Dharma' (a term very much in evidence nowadays) as consisting of 'Satya' &c. of which very interesting explanations are given; for instance—

(1) 'Satya' is defined as that assertion which being true conduces to the welfare of beings,—(2) 'Dama' as thought-control,—(3) 'Tapas' as the performance of one's duty,—(4) 'Shauchā' as the avoiding of impurities of all kinds,—(5) 'Santoṣa' as the renouncing of the objects of sense,—(6) 'Hrī' as the avoiding of improper deeds,—(7) 'Kṣamā' as the capability of bearing the 'pairs of opposite'—pleasure and pain and so forth;—(8) 'Ārjava' as balance of mind.—(9) 'Jñāna' as the comprehension of the true nature of things,—(10) 'Shama' as peace of mind,—(11) 'Dayā' as the desire for doing good to other beings,—(12) 'Dhyāna' as self-centered mind. It is these alone that constitute 'Sanātana-dharma' a term which is explained as that much of 'dharma' which pertains equally to all men, and is not restricted to the few.

On page 36 our author raises the question as to how the knowledge of Self, which is necessary for final Release, can be obtained by the Shūdra and such other people as are debarr'd from the study of the Vedas, of which the Upaniṣads form a part; and the knowledge of Self is explained in these latter alone. The answer is that these people will obtain the requisite knowledge from the Purāṇas, the explanations of 'Self-knowledge' contained wherein are intended solely for such people as cannot obtain it directly from the Vedas.

Having dealt with the 'Dharma' common to all human beings, the author proceeds to enumerate the 'Dharma' peculiar to the Brāhmaṇa and so forth. These 'Dharms' vary with the capacity of men, during the various Yugas or cycles—that which is necessary in the kṛita or golden age, is not so in the kali or Iron Age, and so on.
In the course of the delineation of the 'place' to which the 'Dharma' and 'Adharma' in the Shāstras pertain, we meet with the statement of the boundaries and area of 'Bhārata-Varṣa'. It is bounded on the North by the Himālaya, on the South by the Malay mountains, on the West by the country of the 'Yavana' and on the East by that of the 'Kirātās.' From North to South, it is 1,000 *yojanas* (8,000 miles?). The Viṣṇu Purāṇa gives the Southern boundary as the 'Ocean' and the Northern as 'Himālaya', and asserts that it is only acts performed here that can be regarded as 'dharma' or 'adharma.' The core of Bhāratavarṣa is that called 'Brahmāvarta'—the tract of land situated between the rivers Sarasvatī and Dṛṣṭadvatī. Next in importance is the 'Ṛṣidēśa'—comprising the countries of the Kuru, the Matsya, the Pāñchala and the Shūrasena. Next comes the 'Madhyadesha'—situated between Kurukṣetra and Prayāga, and the Himālaya and the Vindhya. The 'Āryāvarta', mentioned along with the preceding three, would appear to be a part of the Bhāratavarṣa; but it is described as the land situated between the Eastern and Western Oceans.

The 'Mlechchha-dēśa, is defined as that where there is no division into 'four castes.'

On page 51, we meet with a quotation from the Ādipurāṇa which throws some light on the 'seavoyage controversy.' It is stated that the man who goes outside the Āryāvarta (i.e. beyond the Eastern and Western Oceans) should—unless he goes on a pilgrimage or with the consent of his parents—perform the expiatory rite called the 'Aindava'. From this it would seem that if one goes with the consent of his parents—he incurs no 'sin', and so has to perform no *prāyashchitta* which is laid down for those alone who go without such permission. In fact, going beyond Āryāvarta is regarded on the same footing as going to Āṅga, Vaṭīga, Kaliṅga, Saurāṣṭra and Magadha.

By the due performance of his 'Dharma', man leads a happy life, is respected by other people, and after death having enjoyed a happy *post mortem* life in higher regions, is born again in this world, in a superior family and is endowed with better "com-plexion, beauty, strength, memory, intelligence and wealth."

'Dharma' has been divided into three kinds—'nitya', 'of necessary obligation,' 'naimittika' 'of occasional obligation' and
‘kāmya,’ of ‘desire-born obligation’; and the aforesaid results pertain to ‘acts’ of the third class only; as those of the first two classes have their sole result in their own fulfilment; if they also were to be performed with a view to certain desirable results, they would cease to be ‘nitya’ or ‘necessary’. Nor are these acts altogether fruitless, as the ‘fruits’ or ‘result’ of actions is of three kinds—(1) the removal of sin already incurred (the fruit of all expiatory rites and other acts of occasional obligation), (2) positive results in the shape of Heaven and the like (proceed from acts of imperfect obligation), and (3) the avoidance of sin—which last may be regarded as the result of all acts of necessary obligation, as by the neglect of these duties, one incurs sin, which, therefore, can be avoided only by the due performance of those duties. But this is only one of the five different views put forward with regard to the results of ‘Necessary Duties’.

From page 70 onwards we have the paribhāṣās proper. First of all we have a description of ‘adhibhātṛ’, or person entitled to the performance of dharma and the acquiring of its results. The man should be of good conduct, should have perfect confidence in the texts laying down the act to be performed, should be possessed of the full knowledge of all prescribed details of the act, fully convinced of the existence of the superphysical Self; it is only such a man that can obtain all the results of performance of ‘Dharma.’ It is not only the person who performs the act that participates in its fruits; those also have a share who have urged him to do it, or have accorded their permission or agreement. This strikes at the root of the argument of meat-eaters who seek to allay the prickings of conscience by asserting that inasmuch as they do not actually kill the animals, they cannot be guilty of the ‘killing’. Manu is very explicit on this point, declaring—‘He who permits killing, he who kills the animal, he who quarters the body, he who sells the flesh and he who purchases it—are all ‘killers’.’

So long as a man is capable of performing the act in its fullest details, he is not justified in taking to easier ‘substitutes’, which latter are laid down only for those who are really incapable of performing the original act.

It is only after the person has had his full bath on the same day that he can perform any ‘dharma.’ And for purposes of

37.
this rule, the 'day' is defined as the period of time ranging from sunrise to sunrise according to the definition given in the Sārvyāsidhānta. In this connection it is discussed why the night has been called 'Triyāmā' (nine-hours). It has been laid down that an hour and a half before sunrise being the best time for morning meditation and bath, that much of the previous night is regarded as a part of the next day, and similarly an hour and a half after sunset being the best time for the evening meditation, that much of time is regarded as forming part of the day, the 'night' not being a fit time for the performance of daily religious functions. Thus 3 hours of the night being cut off, there remain only 9 hours—3 yāmas.

All religious acts pertaining to the gods should be performed before midday, those pertaining to men—such as the feeding of guests and the like—at midday, and those pertaining to the Pitrīs after midday.

As a rule all acts are to be performed by the right hand, the performer should wear white clothes, should be seated, and should face either the East, the North or the North-East.

Before one makes use of any 'mantra,' he should know its metre, its uses and its 'Ṛṣi'. By the last is meant that Ṛṣi who 'saw' the mantra for the first time (to whom the mantra was revealed), or who made use of it for the first time and utilised it to its fullest extent.

During the act, the performer should not engage in talk of any kind; and absolute silence is enjoined for certain acts, as japa, meditation and the like.

As regards sacrifices, wherever the material is not specified, 'ājya' is the material to be used; and this name is applied to clarified butter, oils, milk and curd,—but only when they have been duly consecrated. Some other articles of offering are also defined towards the end of the Prakāsha—(1) 'Madhuratraya' consists of butter, milk and honey; (2) 'Panchāmpīta' of curd, milk, sugar, honey and butter; (3) 'Saptadhātu' of gold, silver, copper, brass, iron, zinc and lead; (4) 'Arghya' of water, milk, kusha, curd, washed rice, sesameum seeds, barley, and parched grain.

This Paribhāṣāprakāsha extends up to page 116. After this we have the first 74 pages of the Saimskāra-prakāsha,
a study of which we hope to take up when the part is completed.

As regards the edition we notice with great pleasure the fact that the work is singularly free from errors of all kinds, but in places (as on p. 78), the ‘explanations’ have not been separated from the quoted texts. What one misses however is reference to the texts quoted. Most of the quotations are such as could have been easily verified. If the learned editor could supply footnotes, explanatory chiefly of ancient names of places, with reference to their modern equivalents, the study of the work would be more interesting. Then again, we hope that the editor will, in his ‘Bhūmikā,’ go fully into the question of the authorities quoted in these Digests. There are some interesting points to be noted and discussed—for instance—(1) Does ‘Yogiyajñavalkya’ differ from ‘Yājñavalkya’ and ‘Vṛjddhamanu’ from ‘Manu’? (2) Are such smṛitis as those of “Chhāgaleya”, f. i., (quoted on p. 78) available? and so forth. In fact the whole matter of these "Smarītis" deserves to be gone into more fully than it has been hitherto; at the very outset, our author has given widely divergent lists of these; and it would be highly interesting to study the chronology of these lists, and account for the divergences—a study of which would be absolutely necessary for the forming of an idea as to the development of Indian Legal Literature. Then again, what led to one author being discarded and another accepted in his place—and such other points would throw some light on the social conditions of the people also. This has been going on till very late,—in fact till the stratification of Indian Law under British Courts of Justice. To take one solitary instance, in Mithilā, a country which has been very prolific in legal digest-writers, about 400 years ago, ‘the Kalpataru’ of Lakeshīdhara used to be regarded as the supreme authority; this was replaced by the ‘Ratanakaras’ of Chaṇḍeshvara, and these again, in their turn, by the ‘Chintāmanīs’ of Vāchaspati Mishra. Much of this was indeed due to the varying powers of the patrons of these writers; and thus the study of the History of Indian Legal Literature may hold out hopes to the student of the history of ‘king-dynasties’ as well. G. J.
[That the scriptural texts which convey the idea of Non-duality, themselves bear the characteristics of Plurality, does not disprove Non-duality being the absolutely Real. Scripture itself, as well as the process through which it gives rise to the knowledge of Non-duality, lies within the sphere of the Unreal, Illusory. 'Knowledge' in the true sense i.e., universal Consciousness or Brahman, is never produced, it eternally is.]

(152). [Page 128.] The Logician starts a new argument:—The Vedic declarations of non-duality, he says, convey their meaning only in dependence on the differences between letters, words, case-terminations, meanings of words, and so forth; how then can it be maintained that they are not sublated by these manifold notions of difference on which they depend? For it is a recognised principle that what depends upon another thing is weaker than that thing.

(153). But this argument also is without force. For we do not maintain that Difference or Diversity has absolutely no existence. We indeed hold that it has no real being, but we allow to it an illusory existence, and this is enough to account for the causal relationship (between ideas of difference and the Vedic declarations) upon which the Logician bases his argument.

(154). But, our adversary says, in the fundamental non-dualistic texts themselves, there occur certain words and phrases which are not explicable without the admission of Diversity. In the text 'ekam evādvitiyam' the word eva is meant to exclude things other than the one, and the word advitiyam ('without a second') presupposes the existence of a second. Similarly in the text 'neha nānāsti kiñchana'† the phrase 'na nānā' ('no diversity') presupposes diversity, and the word kiñchana (anything; whatsoever) implies the existence of many things.

This apparent contradiction also, we reply, is removed by the explanation just given. What the non-dualistic texts teach is the absolute reality of non-dualism; and the absolutely real cannot be sublated by the conception of what is not absolutely real: the conception of the real shell can truly not be refuted by the conception of the silver (erroneously imagined) in the

* Chāndogya VI. 2. 1. † Brāh. Ar. VI. 4. 10.

Kh. 75.
shell. In cases where one cognition admittedly refutes another as when the (mistaken) inferential cognition 'the fire is not hot' is refuted by the sensuous cognition of the heat of the fire—since the former cognition depends on the latter (the cognition of that which is not-hot presupposing the cognition of its counter-entity i.e., that which is hot), the two cognitions both belong to the sphere of Nescience (i.e., the Unreal or Illusory), and hence there is no objection to one (viz., the dependent one) being sublated by the other (on which it depends).

(155). But, our opponent rejoins, (just as you maintain that the Vedic declaration is irrefutable because it has for its object the absolutely Real), it may be argued that the 'non-heat' of fire also is absolutely real and hence not to be refuted by sensuous cognition! Not so, we reply. For if the so-called 'non-heat' of fire is of the same kind as what is perceived in water and other substances, and hence is not different from coolness, our reasoning cannot but lead to the result that this 'non-heat' also belongs to the sphere of illusion. If, on the other hand, you do not maintain this (but hold 'non-heat' to be something quite different from what is known through ordinary experience, so that the arguments by which the illusory character of the apparent world is proved, would not apply to it), then it would be neither more nor less than another term for Non-duality, (for this alone is altogether different from the empirical world). As a matter of fact, however, we find that the conception of 'non-heat' presupposes diversity in the form of the differentiation of cognitions, objects of cognition and the like; and hence cannot escape from the devouring grasp of the Reasoning which proves the whole Universe to be illusory. The case of Non-duality is different; for as any refutation of it could only be based on Diversity and hence could not be real (Diversity itself being illusory only), there is no possibility whatever of Non-duality ever being shown to be unreal.

(156). But, our adversary resumes, in what sense do you mean that our original objection (urged in para 152) is disposed of by your setting forth the reality of Non-duality? Our contention was that the Vedic declaration cannot afford a valid cognition of Non-duality, for the simple reason that it is in conflict with, and sublated by, that upon which it depends for its very

Kh. 76.
origination (viz., sensuous and other cognitions of diversity)!
(157). This argument also, we reply, does not touch us.
Non-duality, which is absolutely real, could be sublated only by
real Diversity, not by an illusory one; hence the conception of real
Non-duality cannot be sublated by that upon which it depends,
when this latter is no more than diversity, possessing an illusory
existence, and the idea of such Diversity. Even if the conception
of Non-duality to which the Vedic texts give rise were in itself
merely illusory, the object of that conception—i.e., Non-duality
itself—would remain real; (and then again the conception is not
capable of sublation) for a conception is sublated only by the
demolition of its object, and in the present instance the object
(i.e., real Nonduality) is not demolished.

(158). [Page 132.] Hence
'The Vedic declaration taking shelter under the wing of
absolutely real non-duality need not fear in the least that it will
be sublated by what it depends on'. (23).

Scripture itself, indeed, declares this when saying 'it is from
a second only that there is fear.'*

(159). This 'non-duality' when considered along, and
identified with, the teaching of the text 'All this is Brahman
only '† is seen to be nothing else but Brahman; and on
the basis of the text 'Brahman is knowledge (vijñāna) and
bliss,'‡ this Brahman is ascertained to be of the essence of
knowledge (consciousness). And by this we are led to the
conclusion that the knowledge of Non-duality to which the
Vedic texts give rise, resolves itself into the 'non-duality of
knowledge or consciousness.'

(160). But, the Logician objects, if knowledge is one with
Brahman, how can it be held to be produced by Vedic texts?
Your objection would be well founded, we reply, if the fact of
the production of knowledge were something truly real; it,
however, is not such, for it lies within the sphere of illusion,
and hence is in no conflict with what is the absolutely real fact,
viz., that knowledge is essentially 'non-producible,' i.e., eternal.

(161). It is in accordance with this that the Veda declares
'Knowledge' (Brahman) to be one. An adversary might here
argue that oneness must either mean (1) absence of diversity,
or (2) the number one (numerical oneness), or (3) the very self (or essential nature) of knowledge, or (4) some other attribute termed oneness and really meaning the same as absence of difference; and that oneness in any of these senses cannot be proved to belong to 'Non-duality'; for the presence of an attribute of any kind would be in contradiction with 'Non-duality.' All we wish to reply to this is that if the conception of an attribute of Non-duality cannot stand—as we admit it cannot—the attack made upon it, it must be dismissed (as illusory), just as we dismissed the idea of Knowledge being something produced by the Veda. That on the other hand which is validly cognised as the substrate of that attribute of Non-duality (i.e., non-dual Knowledge or Consciousness itself) remains unsublated and hence has to be recognised as absolutely real. We illustrate this by the instance of 'shell-silver': when the real shell is for a time (erroneously) cognized as silver, and subsequently, owing to sublation, the attribute of being of the nature of silver is discarded, the fault of the attribute (i.e., its sublation) does not imply the cessation of the substrate to which the attribute belongs (i.e., the real shell).

(162). This notion of Non-duality then cannot be refuted even by hundreds of arguments that might be set forth by clever men; as Scripture says 'this notion cannot be set aside by reasoning.' Therefore,

'O men of understanding! Apply your intellect to the refutation of this notion only if you really desire to sling into the sea the magical all-bestowing gem that has come to your hand!' (24).

(163). Then again, this notion of Non-duality brings about results of a perceptible nature also (not only Release which transcends all perception); as is said † 'Even a little of this virtue saves from great dangers.'

'It is by the grace of the Lord only that in the minds of a few men there arises that desire to know Non-duality which affords a shelter from all danger.' (25).

(164). And thus—

'Lo! That Non-duality which has been ascertained, in a

*Kaṭha Up. II. 9. † Bhag. Gītā II. 40

Kh. 78.
way,* to be the purport of the texts declaring Non-duality, triumphantly emerges from the discussion, as self-luminous and absolutely real Consciousness!' (26).

(165). [Page 136.] I, therefore, can only call upon you, however much you may hanker after the enticing glamour of illusion, to accept with due faith this Non-duality as it is set before you fully supported by arguments agreeing with your own principles of correct reasoning; and when, thereupon, guided by such faithful acceptance of the purport of the Upaniṣads you seek for knowledge of the Self, you will, after having in due course withdrawn your mind from all its outgoing functions, attain by and within yourself to the direct intuition of that Highest Reality which is witnessed to by its own light and excels honey in sweetness! How the mind, freeing itself from all distractions, merges itself in the Highest Reality constituted by the Self, as in a lake of nectar, and thus attains the highest bliss—this I have already described in my Naśadha-charita, in the canto devoted to the praise of the Supreme Person.

Section 11.

[The 'arguments of refutation' which it is our task to set forth are of universal applicability; they may be used by any philosophical disputant to disestablish the position of his antagonist.]

(166). In what precedes we have by no means disproved the capability of the 'arguments of refutation' to establish any desired result—they thus being comparable to a king's word of command (which has the effect of routing the hostile army at the same time that it preserves the king's own army); why then should you (the Vedāntin) not employ those arguments, in any way you like, against the different philosophic systems? (27).†

* 'In a way,' because to that end we have to accept as valid the relation of texts or words and their meanings, which lies within the sphere of illusion.

† The present section is meant to meet the objection that the 'arguments of refutation' can be used only to establish the Vedāntic position; while yet, in the introductory stanzas, the assertion had been made that they would lead the disputant to victory over all opponents, and in all kinds of discussion.
The fact is that our arguments of refutation freely and fully operate with regard to philosophical tenets of any kind. We introduce the statements of certain particular philosophic doctrines simply with a view to putting forward only such 'arguments of refutation' as cannot be impugned by any counter-argument except by such arbitrary assumptions as that 'the arrangements of the Universe depend on the will of a personal God (and hence their reality cannot be gainsaid)'. (We give some details as to this universal applicability of the 'arguments of refutation'): — If, for instance, the disputant holds the doctrine of (Bauddha) Nihilism or that of (Vedāntic) 'Inexplicability', the general applicability of those arguments against all other doctrines, of course, is beyond all doubt. If, on the other hand, the two disputants be upholders of the view of the reality of pramāṇa and the rest of the categories, the arguments refuting definitions will have their use in disestablishing the special definitions (set forth by the Opponent), and the arguments disproving the things to be defined will have their use in disestablishing those special means of proof, etc., which refer to the things.

Nor must it be objected to this, that the Logician who, in the course of a disputation with another Logician, should reject the definitions given in the Śūtras (which should be authoritative for all Logicians) abandons the fundamental principles of his own doctrine. For what he would aim at disproving, would only be some special interpretation of the definitions in the Śūtras, given by his Opponent. But, it may be objected, if a disputant aims at disestablishing particular definitions, particular means of knowledge whereby the reality of something is proved, and particular interpretations of the Śūtras, he will to that end have to set forth other definitions, other means of proof and other interpretations (all of which, on the view of the universal force of the 'arguments of refutation' would be equally invalid!). Not so, we reply. In the case referred to by you the arguments in question would be put forward as useful for that special kind of disputation which is called 'vītanḍā' (which aims, not at establishing one's own view, but merely at refuting the view of the adversary), and hence the disputant would not lay himself open to any criticism.
bearing on the establishment of his own views.

(169). [Page 140.] Thus then there, also, is no objection to the ‘arguments of refutation’ being employed by a disputant who accepts the fundamental tenets of his opponent; for he may object to the details of the doctrine, in the manner of an ‘Ekadeshin’ (who while accepting the fundamental views of a system holds special views of his own on special points). Just as Grammarians (although agreed as to the correctness of a certain word) may raise and discuss the question as to how the word is formed, in order to ascertain the extent of each other’s knowledge; so in the case of philosophical systems also, disputants although holding the same fundamental views, may engage in a critical discussion in order to test each other.

(170). And then, that enquirer also who (beyond aiming at the discomfiture of an antagonist) is concerned to establish a definite view of Reality, will necessarily have to refute the arguments that may be brought forward against him (and this can only be effected by the ‘arguments of refutation’); for otherwise his own positive view of Reality could not be established. And it thus appears that even in vāda (i.e., bonā fide discussion which aims at the ascertainment of truth), there is room for the employment of the ‘arguments of refutation’.

(171). As to Jalpa finally (the third kind of discussion distinguished by the Logicians), this we declare to be a mere conventional kind of discussion; for in reality so-called jalpa consists of two vitandās. For otherwise (i.e., if we admitted, as an independent class, a discussion which in reality consists of two vitandās only), why should we not also acknowledge, as a further independent class, a discussion consisting of two jalpas? With this matter we have dealt at length, on the occasion of discussing the nature of jalpa (in the work called ‘Ishvarābhisandhi’).

(172). But let us, for the occasion, acknowledge jalpa as a distinct class of discussion. A person engaging in this kind of discussion, would in the first place put forward as right certain views which may be open to objections, after having shown that those objections do not apply, and then would refute him who insists on those objections, by applying some ‘argument of refutation.’ And it thus appears that in jalpa also those arguments are not altogether out of place.

Kh. 82.
[The first ‘argument of refutation’ is that none of the definitions, given by our opponents, of the categories of Reality are valid.]

(173). Now then, of what kind are those ‘arguments of refutation’? They are as follows:—In the first place we enunciate the following principle—‘All determination (proof) of (the reality of) what is to be defined, (i.e., things) depends on definitions; but no satisfactory definitions are possible, because all attempts to define lead us into reasoning of an objectionable or vicious kind, such as ‘reasoning in a circle’ (chakraka); as when the ‘knower’ (the knowing subject) is defined as the ‘substrate of knowledge.’

Section 13.

[In the first place the definition given by the Logician of pramā—right knowledge—is untenable. Pramā cannot be defined as tattva-anubhūti i.e., direct knowledge of a thing’s tattva (lit. this-ness or that-ness), because on none of the explanations which may be given of the meaning of tattva it can be shown how such tattva can be rightly cognized.]

(174). [Page 143.] We will first examine the definition given by the Logicians of ‘Pramā’ (i.e. right or valid cognition; cognition that results from the unimpeded functioning of one of the recognised means of valid cognition, the so-called pramānas). The definition given of this,—viz., that it is “the immediate apprehension (or consciousness—anubhūti) of the true nature (tattva, literally ‘this-ness’ or ‘that-ness’) of a thing,”—is unacceptable; since the Logician is unable to give a satisfactory explanation of what is meant by ‘tattva.’ The term tattva (that-ness) literally means ‘being that’, the that being something that suggests itself as being under consideration. Now on the occasion of defining ‘right cognition,’ no particular thing suggests itself as being under consideration—and to which, therefore, the that could refer. It might be

* While ‘knowledge’ in its turn is defined as an attribute of the knowing subject.

Kh. 82.
said that every state of direct consciousness presents to the mind, in the way of suggestion, the object to which it is related, and that it is this object to which the *that* refers; for what is meant by a thing being 'that which is under consideration' or 'that which suggests itself' is the thing's being present to the mind of the speaker or hearer; and we, therefore, designate as 'this-ness' that which is the being (or character or nature) of that thing. But this explanation we cannot admit. For in certain cases (as when a shell is mistaken for silver) that which is not silver becomes the object of a man's cognition as silver (so that, according to you, the *tattva* of silver is the object of cognition); and thus the definition of 'right cognition' proposed, fails to exclude wrong cognition. Moreover (if only the character of the thing is *tattva*) the thing itself (to which the character belongs) cannot be called *tattva,* and thus the cognition of the thing itself, or of the thing as qualified by the character, will have to be regarded as wrong cognition (for it will not be 'cognition of *tattva*').

(175). But, our opponent may say, leave off levelling against our definition objections merely founded on considerations of the literal meaning of the word ‘*tattva*’. It is well-known that the word ‘*tattva*’ denotes nothing else than the individual character (*svarūpa*) of a thing (and this comprises the thing itself as well as attributes, and so on). This also, we reply, will not help you; for whether you view *svarūpa-tva* 'the having the character of *svarūpa*’ as a *jāti* (class-characteristic; Universal), or as a mere *upādhi*, you cannot make out a satisfactory case for such *svarūpa-tva* either residing in itself or not so residing.

* The argument comes to this:—You say that in right cognition we cognise the *svarūpa* of a thing. Now *svarūpa* is, to argue as the Logician does, that in which *svarūpa-tva* (the 'class-characteristics of *svarūpa*') resides (just as a jar is that in which *ghatātva* 'the being a jar' resides. This *svarūpa-tva* may be viewed either as a *jāti* (in which case the translation 'class-characteristics' holds good); or as a mere *upādhi*—an external limiting or determining condition; this does not change the case. Now shall we say that in that *svarūpa-tva* which resides in *svarūpa*, *svarūpa-tva* is again residing, or not? The former assumption would imply the fault of *ātmāshraya* (the dependence of a thing upon itself, which explains nothing). On the second assumption *svarūpa-tva* cannot be said to have a *svarūpa* of its own, and hence (according to the view of the Logician) there can be no right cognition of it.

Kh. 33.
Moreover, what is denoted by the word 'svarūpa' cannot be one thing; it rather denotes something different in the case of each individual object, and hence a definition of 'right cognition' which implies svarūpa can never take in the right cognitions of all things. How, further, can the word 'tattva' exclude wrong cognition? When a shell is (wrongly) cognised as possessing the character of silver (silver-ness), there is in that case also a cognition of a svarūpa; for it certainly cannot be denied that either the shell or 'the character of silver' is a svarūpa; nor again can it be maintained that the connexion of the two which, in the cognition, presents itself to consciousness, is not a svarūpa. For the connexion that presents itself to consciousness is, according to the system of the Logician himself, so called 'inherence' (samavāya; that connexion which, not to mention other cases, holds good between a 'class-character,' jāti, and that which has that character); and surely samavāya is a svarūpa!

The Logician may retort—'True, samavāya is a svarūpa; but this inherence of the class-character of silver does not really subsist in that particular shell.' This makes no difference, we reply; for though the inherence may not subsist in that shell, this does not deprive it of the character of svarūpa; Devadatta not being in the house does not on that account cease to be a svarūpa.*

(176). [Page 146.] 'Mere svarūpa,' the Logician rejoins, is not called tattva! By tattva we understand that svarūpa of a thing which is cognised as actually connected with that particular point of time and space at which the thing is cognised.'† Not so, we reply. That view of the matter would imply that every right cognition is a wrong cognition, in so far as referring to the place and time of the thing cognised.‡ Let us then say, the Logician rejoins, that in the case of time and place their mere svarūpa (without further connexion with time and place) constitutes their tattva! This also is inadmissible,

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*The point is that so long as svarūpa is before consciousness (and this is the case of 'silver-ness' appearing to inhere in the shell) the cognition is, according to the definition, pramā.

†And hence the cognition of silver-ness which is not actually present in the shell, does not come under the definition of 'right cognition.'

‡For that place and time themselves do not possess that relation to place and time on which, you say, right cognition depends.
we reply. For if the word tattva has several meanings, the definition of right cognition will cease to apply to all cases.

(177). The Logician now offers another definition of tattva:—

'By the tattva of a thing we understand its really existing such as it is apprehended.' But this also is unsatisfactory. For, on this definition, you will have to acknowledge as the tattva of a thing a certain character of it which is cognised, even if that character really belongs to it not at the time of cognition, but at some other time; you would e.g., have to allow that that redness of a jar which will be produced by subsequent baking, constitutes the tattva of the jar even at the time when the jar, as yet unbaked and black, appears red to a man who suffers from the disease called 'Rakta-pitta' (which makes one see all things as red); and will hence have to allow that man's cognition as right cognition. To avoid this objection, the Logician may qualify his definition by bringing in a reference to time:—

'by the tattva of a thing we understand its really existing, at the time of cognition, such as it is then cognised.' But this would again imply that the cognition, in so far as particularized by time, would not be true cognition, for this 'being particularized by time' cannot again be connected with another time.* But why, the Logician resumes, should not time, determined by one determining factor (upādhi), be related to time as determined by another determining factor; (for we observe that e.g., time as determined by the period called a year may be further determined by the period called a month, and so on; so that there appears to be no reason why time determined in one way should not at the same time be further determined in another way). The extension of your reasoning, we reply, (which endeavours to establish that a difference is introduced into time—which is one—by its connexion with different determining conditions) would lead to the conclusion that Devadatta in so far as carrying a

* According to the Logician right cognition implies a definite relation to time: there is right cognition of that which is such as it is cognised, at the moment when it is cognised. But this would imply that there can be no right cognition of that very time-element which enters into right cognition; for while the jar e.g., may be conceived as connected with a definite moment of time, that moment of time itself cannot be viewed as again connected with another moment of time.
stick (which is one determining condition), is different from and, therefore, can mount on the shoulders of, himself in so far as wearing earrings! * And if to this reductio ad absurdum you object that, although Devadatta may have several determining attributes, he—as substrate of those attributes—does not cease to be one; we reply that the case of time is exactly the same (i.e., time also remains one although connecting itself with different determining conditions).

(178). These arguments also serve to discard the definition according to which 'the tattva—the reality—of a thing is its being a cause.' This latter definition is further open to the three following objections:—(1) If everything is such, i.e., if all things are real in so far only as they are causes, there can be no right cognition of such things as are not actually cognised as causes.† (2) There would be an objectionable 'self-dependence' (ātmāshraya; vicious circle.)‡ And (3) on this view each momentary phenomenon (ksāna) of the Universe being regarded as a 'cause' (of that which succeeds it), we would be reduced to the vexatious and ridiculous position of having to take shelter under the wings of the Jainas who hold the being of a thing to consist in its irrefutable capacity to bring about effective action (i.e. to be a cause).

* i.e., absurd consequences are at once seen to flow from the assertion that what is one becomes different by its connexion with several determining or specifying conditions.
† Or (as one commentary explains) If you say that right cognition is of causes only, we point out that a cause is that which is determined by the class-character of a cause (we might say 'causality'); but in 'causality' there does not inherer a further causality (according to the principle that a jāti has no further jāti); hence there can be no right cognition of causality.
‡ If, in order rightly to cognise a cause, it were required to cognise also the cause of that cause, a regressus ad infinitum would arise; if on the other hand this were not required, the right cognition of the cause would depend upon itself—which would be an objectionable ātmāshraya.

Kh. 86.
Section 14.

(A) [And next, it is not possible to accept the so-called anuḥhūti (or anubhāva) of the Logician, which, according to him, is a generic term denoting all primary cognition i.e., cognition not of the nature of remembrance or representation (smṛiti). The tenet that all knowledge is either anuḥhūti or smṛiti cannot be upheld; it in fact is at once seen to be upset by those cognitions which we comprise under the term 'Recognition' (pratijñāna) in which there evidently is an inseparable fusion of a direct presentative, and an indirect representative, element.]

(179). [Page 149.] We next ask what definition you are prepared to give of 'anuḥhūti' * (which term was used by the Logician in defining pramāṇa as tattva-anuḥhūti). Do you define it as a species or sub-class of 'knowledge' (jnāna); or as knowledge other than remembrance (smṛiti); or as knowledge which is destitute of the character of remembrance; or as knowledge which has a specific cause coming into existence just before the knowledge?

* We have so far translated anuḥhūti (or anubhāva) by terms such as 'direct knowledge' 'immediate consciousness,' etc. None of these translations are fully adequate; and there is in fact no English, or western, philosophical term that connotes exactly what anuḥhūti does. The great division of all knowledge (cognition; state of consciousness—jnāna, buddhi, pratyaya) is, according to the general Indian view (as best represented by the Nyāya) into Anubhāva and Smṛiti. The former term comprises all cognitions (including what we would prefer to call states of feeling, experiences of pleasure and pain) which, when presenting themselves to the mind are strictly original, i.e., not reproductions of former cognitions. In this sense—the cognition which we have through sight and touch of a fire burning before us; the idea we have of a fire on a distant hill, owing to an inference based on the perception of smoke rising from the hill; and the knowledge of a fire burning somewhere which we acquire through the statement of a trustworthy person or an authoritative book; are all of them Anubhāva. Such Anubhāva is not necessarily true knowledge; it is Anubhāva also when, in twilight, we see a man where there is only a post, or a snake where there is only a rope. Smṛiti on the other hand comprises all cases of 'representative' cognition, where the cognition before the mind is not at the time originated by one of the 'means of knowledge' (pramāṇa; i.e., Perception, Inference, etc.), but is the mere re-entering into consciousness of a previous cognition.

It of course is evident that neither 'direct apprehension' nor 'immediate cognition' nor 'presentative knowledge,' etc., etc., exactly correspond to Anubhāva.

Kh. 87.
(180). The first of these definitions is not tenable. For on what ground, we ask, do you mean to establish that special kind of knowledge which you call anubhūti? If you reply, that your reason is the universal presence, in all instances of so called anubhūti, of that state of consciousness or cognition which expresses itself in the form "I am immediately or directly conscious of,"—we argue against you as follows:—When a man, towards the close of a January night, bathes at the confluence of the white and the dark rivers (i.e. the Ganga and the Yamuna), he, on the strength of certain scriptural assertions, may have before his mind the idea of future heavenly bliss (promised as the reward for the meritorious action of bathing at that place and time); but all the same, there arises in him no state of consciousness which would express itself as 'I directly apprehend or feel (anubhāvāmi) pleasure'; on the contrary what he is directly conscious of is pain or discomfort due to the coldness of the air and water. Similarly, when a generally religious man is engaged in enjoying the love of another man's wife, he may, owing to his knowledge of what scripture says on this point, have before his mind the idea of future punishment to be experienced in hell, but all the same his actual thought and feeling is not 'I am experiencing pain,' but rather 'I am at the present moment experiencing intense delight.' If the inferential cognition (of bliss in the one, and torment in the other case) which is based upon general principles indicated by scripture (viz., that 'he who bathes, etc., will go to heaven,' and so forth) were of the nature of Anubhava, the former man would apprehend pleasure, and the latter, pain.

(181). If you say that what those two men actually think and say, is due to their taking anubhava in the popular sense of direct or immediate (sensuous and perceptional) apprehension (śākṣātkāra), while the cognitions and forms of expression that depend on inference founded on scriptural statement are present in the minds of the learned and thoughtful,—we reply that in that case, the fact of such direct apprehension being regarded and spoken of as anubhava would be due to its directness and immediacy; and hence there would be neither any valid proof for, nor any purpose of assuming, a special

* Compare the preceding note as to the inadequacy of these renderings.

Kh. 88.
sub-class of cognition called anubhava. Anubhava then would mean one thing in the case of the ordinary man, and another thing in the case of the learned and intelligent; and hence no definition could be given that would apply to all cases of anubhava.

(182). The Logician (making another stand for his anubhava) replies—"the fact is that we have the notion of an anubhava (a certain kind of consciousness or apprehension) which is common to sensuous cognition, inference and so forth, in so far as all these differ from representative cognition (smṛiti). Now this notion cannot be explained as due to the immediacy (sākṣātkaśīvatva) of those cognitions (since inferential cognitions, etc., avowedly are not immediate); we, therefore, must assume some other class-character 'anubhūtītvam' which is to be met with in all those cognitions, whether immediate or not."

(183). This reasoning also we reply, is unsound. That we think and speak of certain things as having that in common that they differ in certain characteristics from other things,—of this the reason is just that particular character of those things; but we do not on that account postulate a special class of things. If classes were to be postulated wherever several things agree in differing from other things, we should have to postulate a special class aksa—comprising all those several things which are denoted by the word 'aksā', viz., dice, the vibhītaka-fruit, the sense-organs, etc.—, for no other reason than that those things have in common that they differ from other things such as jars and the like.

(184). For the following reason also we cannot admit a special class of cognitions other than remembrance termed 'anubhūti': There is the (mental process of) Recognition (pratīyabhijñā), as when we think 'this is the same jar (that we saw on former occasions)'; with regard to this Recognition the question arises whether it comprises two cognitions—viz., one of the nature of anubhūti (of the jar seen), and one of the nature of remembrance (of the jar with which the jar seen is identified);—or one cognition only, which is in part anubhūti and in part remembrance (the view of the Prābhākara);—or pure remembrance only;—or pure anubhūti only (the Nyāya view)? Should you accept the first of these alternatives, we point out that in all
Recognition there is present to consciousness the non-difference of this thing as seen now and here, from the thing as observed in its previous condition. Now this non-difference cannot be included in remembrance; for the simple reason that the said non-difference not having been cognised before cannot be suggested to the mind by any impression (for as it was not known before, it cannot have left any impression on the mind). And we remark at once that for the same reason the third alternative is untenable. Nor can the idea of non-difference be considered as anubhūti; because at the time of recognition the previous condition of the thing is not cognised in the way of anubhava. Were this the case, the alternative now under discussion would be identical with the last alternative, which we shall refute later on. For similar reasons the second alternative also is not tenable. For if that factor of Recognition which consists in the non-difference of the present thing from the thing as qualified by its previous condition were regarded as cognised by anubhava, the qualification by the previous condition also would have to be included under anubhava. And this would bring us back to the alternative first considered.

(B)[None of the other theories given of the nature of Recognition can be upheld. It cannot be regarded (a) as comprising distinct cognitions, one of the nature of anubhūti and the other of the nature of smrīti; for the idea of the non-difference of the this, i.e., the thing actually perceived, and the that, i.e., the thing as which the this is recognised, is neither directly apprehended (by anubhūti) nor remembered.—Nor (b) can it be viewed as one cognition which is in part anubhūti and in part Remembrance; for any attempt to distinguish and characterise in separation these two elements proves futile.—Nor (c) can it be viewed as pure Remembrance, for reasons analogous to those which tell against (a).—Nor (d) can it be conceived as pure anubhūti; for the cognition of non-difference of the past from the present can be based neither on sense-contact which is the direct cause of all anubhava; nor on an impression; since of that non-difference—of which we are conscious not earlier than in the act of recognition itself—there can be no Kh. 90.
previous impression. Nor could we, on this theory, account for cases of doubtful recognition. And finally if Recognition, although due to impression, were to be classed as anubhāti, other kinds of remembrance also would have to be similarly classed, and the distinction of anubhāti and smṛiti thus would be lost altogether. As thus it appears that anubhāti does not denote a truly distinctive kind of cognition, its employment as a factor in the definition of pramāṇa renders that definition nugatory.]

(185). Against this last argumentation the opponent might offer the following explanation:—In Recognition that factor which presents itself in the form, 'this present thing is non-different from itself as qualified by its previous conditions,' itself contains more than one, i.e., two factors; the first of these, viz., the idea of the thing in its previous condition, is pure Remembrance; the second, viz., the cognition of the said non-difference, is anubhava. (And hence the objection raised falls to the ground). But, we reply, were this so, the Recognition would present itself as follows—(a) That thing under its previous conditions, plus (b) 'this thing is non-different'—the former being remembrance and the latter anubhava; and thus there would be nothing to reveal that the non-difference has for its substrate the thing as under its previous conditions. This means that, Recognition would not present itself in the form 'this is the same thing as that which formerly appeared under different conditions' (while yet everyone knows that this latter form is the characteristic form of all Recognition).

(186). The Logician may here attempt the following explanation:—That non-difference which is intimated by anubhava contained in Recognition), as having for its substrate the thing which is apprehended through anubhava, cannot accomplish itself without depending on a 'second term'; for non-difference must be of something from something. Now what immediately suggests itself as the nearest second term is the thing as distinguished by its previous conditions, which is suggested by that remembrance which forms part of recognition. It is this which non-difference takes up as its second term, and thus establishes itself as having that previous thing also for its substrate.

Kh. 91.
(187). But this explanation is even more futile than the previous ones. What, we ask, is the meaning of non-difference leaning upon or taking up the second term? Does this mean that it has the second term for its substrate; or that it is cognised as having it for its substrate? The former alternative is impossible, for it would imply that non-difference originates only now, (i. e., at the time of recognition) as abiding in the thing related to its previous conditions; and this again would imply that, before recognition, there was difference between the thing as it is now and the (same) thing as it was previously (and this clearly is nonsensical). And on the second alternative, there would arise a difficulty that we have already pointed out, for the cognition of the non-difference of the present thing as having for its substrate the 'second term,' (i. e., the past thing) can be included neither under remembrance, nor under anubhava (since it essentially is a cognition in which both these cognitive factors are combined).

(188). Further, if you regard Recognition as a simple cognition which has the character or aspect of remembrance as regards the that, and the aspect of anubhava as regards the this ('this is that jar which' etc.), there will be an unavoidable confusion with regard to the thing itself. For, we ask, what is it that in this case is brought before the mind by the impression (which here, as in all cases, gives rise to remembrance)?—is it a mere that, or is it the thing (e. g., the jar) qualified by the character of that-ness? On the former alternative we could not have the recognition in the form 'this is that thing'; for what the impression would bring before the mind would be mere that-ness (not a thing qualified by that-ness). Nor is the latter alternative tenable. For, on it, it would be necessary to maintain that also in the anubhava-element of recognition—which is expressed as this—there reveals itself the thing; for if it revealed the character of this-ness only and not the thing, it could not have the form 'this thing, etc.' And as thus the impression and the Perception both present themselves as causing the idea of the thing, the question arises whether the idea of the thing is to be viewed as originated by different cognitions; or by a single cognition of non-difference, brought about by the two causes conjointly. The former view is in conflict with the view,
accepted by the Logician himself, that Recognition is a single act of cognition; and moreover is open to the objections urged above (para 184, etc.) against the differentiation (of the objects of remembrance and anubhava, in Recognition). On the latter view, every recognition, as far as the thing is concerned, will have the character of Remembrance as well as that of anubhava; and this would mean a confusion of the two—leading to the undesirable contingency that the two would not be differentiated even on the basis of the difference of their respective objects.

(189). The Logician now argues as follows:—Even though the required differentiation (between remembrance and anubhava) may not be possible on the ground of the difference of their objects, it will be possible on other grounds. The mental act will be distinguished as 'Remembrance' by reference to its being originated by an impression, and as 'Anubhava' by reference to its being originated by the contact of the sense-organ concerned (with the object, the internal organ, etc.); in this way the objectionable confusion will be avoided. But this also, we reply, may not be. As we do not admit that 'the character of being true knowledge' (pramāṇa) is an invariable class-character (jāti), it must be considered as determined by the object; and hence it will not avail to bring in other conditions such as (origination from an impression, etc.) in order to differentiate between anubhava and remembrance; for since both refer to one and the same thing (as you maintain), right cognition (anubhava) and what is not right cognition (i.e. remembrance) will have one and the same object (which is absurd). And further since all the various aspects of a cognition are at once cognised in the Self as either present or not present, both anubhava and remembrance present themselves to consciousness as soon as recognition takes place; and if then we were not to admit that each of the two is determined and distinguished by its object, we should be driven to the absurd conclusion that through remembrance we may be conscious of the this (i.e. the present thing) also, and through anubhava of the that (i.e. past thing)!

* Recognition is pramāṇa in so far as it is anubhava, and apramāṇa in so far as it is remembrance; if, then, the two have one and the same object, the latter is at the same time the object of pramāṇa and of apramāṇa.

Kh. 93.
(190). If again, you should define Remembrance as that which is brought about by impressions (and plead that this cannot connect itself with the this of which we are conscious in Recognition); we reply that what we are now concerned with is the difficulties we experience in ascertaining what factor of Recognition is actually brought about by impressions. If you, in order to remove those difficulties, do no more than put forward the same character (viz., of being produced by impression), this will fail to convince other people (for it simply is reasoning in a circle).† Nor may you say that what determines the 'being due to impressions' is the general character of Remembrance conceived in some way other than being due to impressions. For consider—'being due to Impressions' really means nothing else than 'necessarily, or regularly) coming into existence after impressions.' Now this necessary or regular sequence cannot be realized without pre-supposing a certain uniform character belonging to many individual cognitions which makes us apprehend that regular sequence; and it thus comes to this that it is the character of Remembrance which determines whether or not a cognition is brought about by impressions. This means—having the character of Remembrance is the condition for determining that a cognition is due to impressions; and 'being due to impressions' is the condition for determining that a cognition is of the nature of Remembrance—a flagrant case of reasoning in a circle! Hence, on this hypothesis, confusion of Remembrance and Anubhava is unavoidable.

(191). Moreover, we ask,—do you, or do you not, hold that in the case of Recognition the two sets of causal factors (kāraṇa-sāmagri) which bring about remembrance and anubhava are present? If not, how then can Recognition be in part of the nature of anubhava and in part of the nature of remembrance? And if such is the case (i.e., if, even without the special causal conditions of remembrance and anubhava—such as remem-

† What is it that in the act of Recognition determines what element of the Recognition is due to impressions, and what element to the action of the senses? It will be no answer to this question to say 'being due to impressions' is determined by 'being due to impressions.'

*Kh. 94.*
brance originating from impression, etc.—the two enter into Recognition), the result will again be a confusion of the two. On the former alternative, on the other hand, (viz., of the two sets of causal factors being present), it will follow that each of the two independently brings about its own effect, since each by itself has the power of bringing about its effect; it in fact is a well-ascertained principle that several causal factors bring about several effects.

(192). Against this the opponent may argue as follows:—In cases where two sets of causal factors originate independently of each other, their effects no doubt are distinct. But in the case of Recognition the two originate simultaneously and operate conjointly, and hence naturally give rise to one common effect of a mixed character. Although this is not observed to be the case with such sets of causal factors as produce, let us say, a jar and a piece of cloth respectively, yet the state of things may be such in the case of the two causal sets in question (which in Recognition give rise to remembrance and anubhava respectively); for these sets are quite different in nature from ordinary sets of causal factors. Truly, it cannot be asserted that such as the character of one thing is, such also must be the character of all other things; for were this so all the variety of this world would come to an end!

(193). Not so, we reply. For if the two sets of causal factors act together, are we to assume that they aid each other or not? If not, the peculiar feature which consists therein that they are joined will be useless towards the production of the separate effects; for in the absence of mutual aid it cannot possibly serve any purpose; and hence, the conjunction of the two making no difference, the two effects would be brought about quite separately. If, on the other hand, the two sets of causal factors are held to help each other, the impression would be operative towards the production of the anubhava-element (in Recognition) also, and the sense-organ towards the production of the remembrance-element also; and as thus the two features (viz., being produced by impressions, and being produced by the sense-organ), which were meant to distinguish the one from the other, turn out to be common to both, anubhava will enter into remembrance, and remembrance

Kh. 95.
into anubhava; and thus Recognition will be most indelibly marked with irremediable confusion of Anubhava and Remembrance.

(194). Nor, in the next place, can we accept the view (held by the Naiyāyika) that a Recognition is nothing but anubhava. For with regard to the aspect that the thing recognised is the substrate of non-difference from that which is cognised (remembered) as that, neither impressions nor sense-contact have any causal power (i.e. that aspect cannot be due either to impression or to sense-contact), and hence that aspect ceases to be an object (of any sort of cognition, while yet it is just that aspect which is characteristic of all Recognition).

(195). Nor may the Naiyāyika plead that the element in question is apprehended, through the agency of the impression, by that (indirect) contact which consists in that element (i.e., non-difference of the that from the this) being a qualifying attribute of what is connected with the object. For if this were so, there could be no doubtful recognition—as there actually is when we think ‘Is this thing that thing, (which we knew before), or is it not?’ But, the Logician replies,

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* The fourth alternative noted in para 184. See also para. 206.

† According to the Naiyāyika recognition is a special form of anubhava which is produced by impression and sense-action together. But the Vedāntin objects,—let us admit that the impression is the cause of that element of recognition which consists in its being qualified by that-ness, and the sense-organ of that element which consists in its being qualified by this-ness. Neither of these two causes, however, has the power of giving rise to that element which consists in non-difference characterised by that to which that-ness belongs (i.e., the non-difference of the this from the that); for that does not lie within the sphere of the impression, and the sense-organ is not in contact with it.

‡ The Naiyāyika is supposed to argue as follows:—The non-difference of the this from the that is a qualifying attribute (vishēṣa-ga) of the jar, the jar is a qualifying attribute of the impression, the impression inherec (by samavāya-connexion) in the cognizing Self; the Self is in conjunction (samyoga) with the internal organ, and the internal organ with the sense-organ. In this mediate way the sense-organ apprehends the ‘non-difference.’

§ For contact of the indirect kind described above is present in doubtful recognition also; and the latter, therefore, would not be of the nature of doubt, but true knowledge.

Kh. 96.
doubt arises in such cases owing to the presence of certain imperfections of the cognizer, and not to the fact of its qualifying something in contact with the sense-organ. But if such were the case it would be possible for us to have 'doubtful recognitions' due to imperfections, even in the absence of impressions (which is absurd); and moreover that which manifests (renders cognizable) a certain real thing cannot be called an 'imperfection.' But, (although the imperfection in question manifests a real thing), yet it also may manifest something (the doubtful factor) which is not real, and hence it may be termed an 'imperfection'!

If this were so, we reply, then even the sense-organs and other means of cognition (which in cases of wrong cognition manifest things that are not real) might be spoken of as 'imperfections!' And if it should be argued that it is only when the sense-organs are qualified (i.e., affected by imperfections) that they manifest (unreal) things, and that hence it is the qualification only which can be called an 'imperfection,'—we reply that this may be said with regard to the imperfection under discussion also; for it is never without the aid of some qualification that the imperfection manifests unreal things. And if it be argued that doubt arises, when, owing to an imperfection, something unreal only appears to consciousness, although there is a real thing;—in that case no intelligent person would ever be moved to activity by doubtful cognition.

(196). You will perhaps say that although the doubtful cognition has for its object a real thing, the condition of mental uncertainty is due to the imperfection (so that the 'imperfection' may be defined as that which brings about the uncertainty). But, we remark, as the real thing always is of a non-confused (unambiguous, definite) character—whenever it manifests itself to consciousness (whether in a doubtful or a certain cognition), it will manifest itself in that very character in either of the two alternatives in a doubtful cognition; and how then should it have the character of uncertainty? And if that certain thing which thus constitutes one of the two alternatives in a doubtful cognition is not sublated subsequently, then, although the doubtful cognition makes us apprehend something in addition to the certain thing—viz., the non-existence of that thing—yet its character of certainty remains unchallenged; and what forms the

Kh. 97.
additional element is only the certainty of negation (of the thing) which constitutes the other alternative.  
(197). [Page 165.] The Logician starts another explanation. The character of 'Doubt' which belongs to certain cognitions is a class-character (jāti), and we define an imperfection to be that which brings about that class-character. But, we reply, this also cannot be. Doubt expresses itself in the form—'this is that or not that;' now on your view we could neither have the cognition of, nor use the word 'or' as co-ordinate with the words expressive of the two doubtful alternatives.† And further, if the alternative force of or connected itself with the cognition (and not the objects), we could not make use of forms of alternative expression such as 'bring the post or the man'; for just as the character of certainty (which belongs to the cognition) cannot be connected with the words denoting the objects of cognition, so the alternative sense of or, if it belonged to the cognition, could not be connected with the objects of cognition; (while it is actually so connected in cases such as the one last quoted). If what the word or denotes belonged to the cognition, it could not connect itself with the objects, not any more than the character of 'immediacy' or 'directness' (which belongs to certain cognitions) can belong to their objects.
(198). Nor can it be said that what takes place in the case of Doubt is that, although there is contact of the object with the mind, yet this contact is suppressed by certain imperfections (of the cognizing agency) and that hence the mind does not apprehend the object. For, we ask the Logician, although there be imperfections, how can there be suppression of the contact, when all that you hold to be necessary for the apprehension of the object is that the object should be in contact

* In all Doubt we have two alternatives, e. g., 'this is silver or not-silver.' If the silver is real, the cognition 'this is silver' will remain unsublated and hence show itself a certain cognition. And the alternative cognition also 'this is not-silver' is nischalaya (definite knowledge), although in the form of error. Thus there is nothing 'uncertain' in doubtful cognition.

† While this actually is the meaning we attach to the word or. What the doubt refers to is the objects of cognition: the cognition itself is not affected by it. If what the word or expresses connected itself with the cognitions (not their objects) Doubt would express itself in the following form—'I cognise or I do not cognise.'

Kh. 98.
with the impression, the impression with the cognizing Self, the Self with the internal-organ, and the internal organ with the outward sense-organ (all which contacts are present in the case of Doubt)? If it were possible to have a Doubt (independently of the 'contact of impression') it would also be possible to have doubts with regard to things without having ever perceived them, or without remembering them! [And thus we have shown that on your views also it is necessary to admit the agency of Impression-contact; and hence you cannot free yourself from the objections urged under paras. 195-7, where we pointed out that even if the agency of Impressions be considered sufficient to account for the factor of that-ness, this does not account for Doubt in the form 'is this that jar?']

(199). In reality, however, (your position is not tenable). For there can be no apprehension through the aforesaid contact, since the internal organ does not apprehend the impression; nor do the sense-organs apprehend the Self; as it is an admitted fact that the contact (which is the really effective agent in bringing about an apprehension) is that which has the character of a qualification related to something that is apprehensible by the organ concerned; except in cases where what is apprehended is the negation or absence of some such quality or thing that has for its substratum something that is not apprehensible by that sense-organ. If this were not so (i.e.,

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So far the author has argued that, even if it were admitted that in the doubt 'is this that?' the notion of that-ness is obtained through the impression, yet the doubt could not arise. He now proceeds to argue that the notion cannot be attained in that way.

† The commentators differ as to the construction of this difficult passage. According to the Śāṅkarā the first clause extends up to निवद्वार; while according to the Chītākṣhī and the Vidyāśāṅkara and a second interpretation of the Śāṅkarā also (which the translation follows), that word has to be taken with the next clause. In any case, the conclusion which the two clauses are meant to support has to be supplied.

‡ There can be effective contact of the organ with a thing only where the latter is a qualification of something apprehensible by the organ; in the case in question, however, the impression not being apprehensible by any sense-organ, no effective contact can take place.

§ This clause is added in order to meet cases such as that of the organ of hearing apprehending sound in Ether which itself is not apprehensible by that organ; in such cases the aforesaid contact is not present. The case of Impression does not come within this exception; here, therefore, the aforesaid contact is necessary.

Kh. 99.
if mere $sambaddha-vishéṣavatá$ constituted the necessary contact),
the eye would apprehend the negation (absence) in the water-
atom, of earth, the non-perceptibility of which is disproved
by the fact that it (i.e., earth) is apprehended in other
things (such as jars). Nor can it be held (in conformity
with the Nyāya tenets) that the atoms do not exist in that
portion of space which lies within the sphere of the action
of the sense-organs. As a matter of fact, again, it is not
even necessary to add the above qualification to our general
rule regarding the character of effective contact; (we have
added it only in order to meet the case of the apprehension
of the absence of sound; and) according to those who hold
that the absence of sound is apprehensible by the senses,
the contact that is effective is that in the shape of being
related to the organ of hearing,—a contact which is of an
altogether different kind, and is regarded as the seventh kind
of contact (distinct from the six ordinary contacts); and thus
in this case also the apprehension is not due to contact in the
form of mere $sambaddha-vishéṣavatá$—the mere fact of being
a qualification of something that is related.

(200). Nor may you meet the above argument by asserting
that—"the Impression itself constitutes the contacts of the previ-
ously apprehended object and of the Self with the internal
organ as connected with the Self; and hence it does not matter
that the notion of that-ness should be beyond the reach of the
sense-organ; specially as we hold that the ‘contact’ which
consists in the connexion of the object and the apprehending
sense-organ is not itself perceptible by the sense." For, as
in that case there would be no contact of the eye, or any other
sense-organ, with the that-factor in Recognition, the Recognition
could not be regarded as visual (depending on the eye; sensu-
ous). The this-factor may be perceived by the eye, and the

* The water-atom is in contact with the eye; the absence of earth is a
$vishéṣāṇa$ of the water atom; earth is perceptible elsewhere; the absence of
earth thus is $sambaddha-vishéṣāṇa$, and hence is perceived by the eye. We
escape from this absurd conclusion by adding the qualification that the $vishé-
ṣāṇa$ must be related to something which is perceptible by the organ con-
cerned. The water-atom itself is not perceived by the eye; hence its
$vishéṣāṇa$ also cannot be perceived by that organ.

Kh. 100.
that-factor by the internal organ; but whereby would the non-difference between the this and the that be apprehended? You thus are confronted by the difficulty pointed out on a previous occasion (para. 194).

(201). The same reasoning also serves to refute the following view:—"In all Recognition the impression (of the previously cognised that) is a mere auxiliary factor, serving the purpose of preventing an unduly extensive operation of the sense-organ; and hence the that-factor which appears in Recognition is not in contact with the sense-organ; just as in the case of erroneous cognition (where the erroneously apprehended object, e.g., silver, is not in contact with the sense-organ, and yet appears, owing to the impression left by previously perceived silver). All that is meant by the sense-organ apprehending only such things as are in contact with it, is that the presence of the aid of some contact is necessary; in the case in question this condition is satisfied by the contact of the this-factor: there is no need of the aid of contact of the sense-organ with all the factors of the object recognised (and hence there is no objection to the Recognition being regarded as visual or sensuous)." This view, we say, is unacceptable. For on it, it would firstly be impossible to have any doubt such as (‘is this thing that, or not.’)\(^6\) And, secondly, it would imply that the cognition ‘I saw that thing’ would be of the nature of Direct Cognition (Anubhava), not of the nature of Remembrance; for that cognition, proceeding as it does from the impression which is nothing else than the contact of the thing previously apprehended with the Self—such contact being mediated by the contact of the internal organ (on which the impression really is made) with the Self—would, on your view, proceed from the contact of the thing with the sense-organ (and hence would be, not Remembrance, but Direct Cognition, Anubhava). For the thing remembered would, on that view, not in any way differ from those cognitions etc., which are directly presented to consciousness by the contact, inhering in the Self, of the Self and the internal organ.

(202). The above reasoning also enables us to dispose of the following two views regarding the nature of Recognition:—'What

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\(^6\) For the full cause of recognition being present in the shape of the impression and the sense-contact, there could be no doubt.

\(Kh.\ 101\).
is conceived in Recognition is the this as containing within itself the absence of that mutual negation which has for its counter-entity the that; and 'what is conceived in Recognition is the non-difference of the this and the that.' For the absence of the mutual negation of the this and the that would be nothing else but the this and the that taken together; and this compound idea could not be apprehended by a single agency (viz., either impression, or the sense-organ). And 'non-difference of character between the two' could mean nothing else but identity of the two, and hence could not be apprehended by any agency but that which apprehends that identity (and we have proved above that neither the impression by itself, nor the sense-organ by itself, can apprehend the identity of the this and the that).

(203). Then again, if the cognition of a thing presented to consciousness by an impression were to be regarded as Direct Apprehension, why then should not Remembrance also be regarded as Direct Apprehension? In answer to this our adversary might urge that what makes a cognition Remembrance, is not the mere fact of its being brought about by impressions, but the fact of its being brought about by such impressions as are not in touch with (not aided by) any cause or source of Direct Apprehension; and that hence Recognition which requires the contact of the sense-organ with the thing recognised, must be regarded as Direct Apprehension; while Remembrance (which does not presuppose that contact) is not to be thus regarded.

But this argument we easily meet by the following counter-argument:—Inasmuch as a cognition is a Direct Apprehension only, if brought about by a cause of direct apprehension which is not aided by impression, Recognition, which is brought about by such causes of direct cognition as are aided by impressions, must be classed as Remembrance, and not as Direct Apprehension.

But, our opponent may continue to argue, in no other case (but what we know as Recognition) do we find Remembrance brought about by such causes of direct apprehension as are aided by impressions (and hence Recognition cannot be classed as Remembrance). This also we at once meet by the counter-argument:—In no case (but Recognition) do we find Direct Apprehension brought about by sense-contact aided by.
impressions (and hence Recognition cannot be regarded as Direct Apprehension).

(204). The conclusion then is as follows:—Since there are no means of decisively proving the truth of either view (viz., 'that Recognition is of the character of Remembrance because it is due to impressions'; or 'that it is of the nature of Anubhava because it is due to sense-contact'); and since whichever of the two views you would accept (as this would be without sufficient reason), it would be always possible to put forward the other view (in contradiction to it),—Recognition, as being brought about by both sets of causal factors (i.e., those required for Direct Apprehension as well as those required for Remembrance) must be held to be Remembrance and Direct Apprehension.

This takes away all ground for the hypothesis, that Direct Apprehension (Anubhava) constitutes a particular species of cognition altogether distinct from Remembrance. Nor can a distinction between these two alleged species of knowledge be established on the basis of their objects; for this attempt we have already shown to be futile (para 188). In these circumstances, if no idea of contradiction presents itself to you, although it has turned out that the same cognition is both 'remembrance' and 'direct apprehension' with regard to the same object, there similarly is no reason for you to object to the conclusion that the cognition is, with regard to the object depending on it, both authoritative and non-authoritative cognition (pramā and apramā).

(205). [Page 175.] The above argumentation serves to show that the acceptance of 'Anubhava' as a specific class or species of cognition, leads into contradictions (in so far as implying that 'Recognition' is both 'Anubhava' and Remembrance, and both pramā and apramā), and hence refutes that view; and it also serves to set aside the argument that (if such a special class of cognition were not admitted) we should be in conflict with a universally acknowledged fact—viz., that on the ground of immediate consciousness we must admit that there is such a class-character as Direct Apprehension which excludes Remembrance, but is present in all other cognition whether immediate (sensuous) or mediate (i.e. inferential and the like.)

(206). [The opponent reiterates the position stated in the preceding paragraph.] Our only refuge, he says, lies in viewing

Kh. 103.
Recognition as *Anubhava* or Direct Apprehension, pure and simple. As a matter of fact we are conscious in all Recognition, of the character of Direct Apprehension only, not of that of Remembrance also; it is our actual conscious experience also that justifies us in deciding that although Recognition is due to impressions, yet, inasmuch as it stands in further need of sense- contact, it is nothing else but Direct Apprehension. If this were not so, we should not be conscious of Direct Apprehension in the act of Recognition. We thus oppose you on the ground that you are in conflict with an undoubted fact of conscious experience.

(207). This, we again point out, is just what we deny. As a matter of fact we have, in Recognition, the presentations to consciousness of a *this* and of a *that*, the former of which falls within the sphere of Direct Apprehension, and the latter within that of Remembrance; and you hence are unable to prove that the entire mental process is to be relegated in a one-sided way to the sphere of Direct Apprehension alone.

(208). [Page 177.] We thus arrive at the conclusion that, since in Recognition, Remembrance and Direct Apprehension are mixed up, it must be admitted that the word 'Anubhūti' (in the definition of pramā) does not really exclude anything.†

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* See above, para. 194.

† The Logician had defined *pramā* as *tattva-anubhūti*; the term *anubhūti* being meant to exclude all that is not Direct Apprehension. But our author has now shown that the word does not exclude Recognition which, with Remembrance, is not regarded by the Logician as *pramā* i.e., authoritative knowledge; the conclusion from this being that the said definition is faulty.

It may be noted here—as pointed out by the Shāṅkara—that the orthodox Logician does not mean to exclude Recognition from *pramā*; but the author has discussed the nature of Recognition (which is only one form of Remembrance) simply as leading up to his main contention that the definition cannot exclude any kind of Remembrance.

*Kh*. 104.
(C) [Nor may the Logician plead that the term anubhūti, though not perhaps excluding Recognition, yet does serve to exclude other kinds of Remembrance. The case of 'shell-silver,' e.g., which is supposed to be due to remembered silver, cannot be explained without reference to some sense-element; here also, therefore, there is a mixture of Remembrance and anubhūti.]

(209). Nor may the Logician maintain that the word Anubhūti, though failing to exclude Recognition, at any rate, excludes other kinds of Remembrance. For, as we are going to show, he will have to admit that those other kinds also have the character of Anubhūti. Let us analyse a case of ordinary Remembrance, such as 'the jar formerly was in this place.' Here there appears in consciousness the jar as qualified by past time. Now it will be readily admitted that this its character of being connected with the past was not previously (to the act of remembrance) apprehended directly, and cannot, therefore, be reproduced before the mind through an impression. What on the former occasion was directly apprehended rather was the jar's connexion with the (then) present time. Hence, since we find that in Remembrance the causal agency for apprehending the character of the past is combined (with the impression which gives rise to Remembrance), we must conclude that Remembrance, like Recognition, is of a mixed character, partaking of the nature of Remembrance and of Direct Apprehension as well.1

(210). The objection stated is also applicable to the view we have already combated (para 203 ff.)—viz., that Impression aided by the agencies of Direct Apprehension tends to bring about Direct Apprehension (in the shape of Recognition). For if such were the case there would be no Remembrance at all; for there is no Remembrance where the idea of the past (in the form of that) is not present to consciousness. We thus find that there is nothing (either in the shape of Recognition or that

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1 What, in remembrance, is reproduced before the mind, is only the jar itself which we saw formerly, and which left an impression on the mind; but not the jar as connected with the past (for when we saw it, it was present and hence could not leave on the mind the impression of past time). That element in Remembrance which presents the jar as connected with the past, therefore, cannot be Remembrance but must be Anubhūti—direct, primary cognition.

Kh. 105.
of Remembrance) that can be excluded by the term ‘anubhūti’ in the definition under discussion.

(211). [Page 178.] Some (i.e. the followers of Prabhākara) indeed maintain that there are cases of remembrance in which, owing to some defect of the cognizing agency, the that-element of Remembrance is obscured. But this view is inadmissible; since there is nothing to prove that the cognition in question is of the nature of Remembrance. Against this it cannot be urged that since the causal conditions of Direct Apprehension are absent, nothing remains but to regard the cognition as Remembrance (all cognition being either Anubhava or Smṛiti). For if we were to argue in this way it might be said that nothing remains but to class inferential cognition also and other kinds of cognition as Remembrance, for the reason that owing to the absence of contact between the sense-organ and the object the causal factors of Anubhava are not present.† It will perhaps be argued that it is on account of there being a total absence of the causes of all kinds of Direct Apprehension (that we are driven to regard the cognition in question as a Remembrance). But in reply to this we ask—‘How, my friend, have you ascertained that the cause which gives rise to the idea of silver not comprising the notion of that (i.e., the idea of silver presenting itself not as connected with past time, not as a remembered thing) is nothing else but the cause of Direct Apprehension? Should you reply that you have ascertained this on the ground that the causes of all the five kinds of right knowledge (which alone, according to the Philosophers, give rise to right cognition) are absent;—we further ask—why then do you not also conclude that nothing remains but to regard the

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* So that in such cases there would be remembrance without conscious reference to past time. The Prabhākaras in this way account for erroneous cognition or misconception; we mistake the shell for silver because at the time when we perceive the shell, previously perceived silver presents itself to our mind without our being at the time conscious of the previous experience.

† It must be noted that the Opponent would hardly admit this argument. Inferential cognition does not, according to the Naiyāyika, cease to be anubhava for the reason that it is not brought about by the causes of sensuous perception (contact of the sense-organ with the object etc.). It evidently is on this account that the commentator (Shaṅkara) calls the argumentation of the text ‘gūḍhābhisaṇḍhi’ i.e. unintelligible.

Kh. 106.
fifth kind of right knowledge (viz. Arthāpatti, knowledge founded on presumption) as Remembrance, for the reason that it is not brought about by the causes of the four kinds of right cognition (which alone according to your views, constitute right cognition)? And where, we further ask, have you met with a case in which cognition arising in the absence of the causes of the five kinds of right cognition is regarded by all parties as ‘Remembrance’? Keep in mind that above already we have thrown out the suggestion that the cognition ‘there was a jar in this place’ is of the nature of Direct Apprehension. [So that you have no corroborating instances to prove your general proposition].

(212). The Opponent here will perhaps argue as follows:— ‘In the case under discussion (viz. of the shell being regarded as silver) we regard the impression of silver as the only cause of the cognition and do not assume any other causal agency, for the reason that there is no possibility of the operation of those causal agencies which bring about sensuous and other kinds of cognition, and that as silver had been previously perceived, there is every possibility of the impression of silver being present. The case of inferential cognition and the rest is different. Here also we have cognition arising in the absence of the causes of sensuous perception, but as the object of those cognitions is something not directly experienced before, they cannot be held to originate from impressions, and we hence postulate for them special causal agencies, such as the so-called linga (probans, middle term) on which Inference rests. We then may very well define Remembrance, viz., as either being that which is produced by impressions unaided by any other means of knowledge, or as being a special class of cognition which is characterized by the mentioned feature. This is not so, we reply. For, we ask—what is your reason for not regarding the sense-organ itself as the cause of the cognition in question and, instead, trying to establish the origination of the cognition in question, from an impression? You may reply that you do this for the reason that the cognition cannot be

* When the shell is mistaken for silver, the cause of sensuous perception of silver (viz. contact of the organ of sight with real silver) is absent; similarly there is absence of the causes that would move us to infer the presence of silver, and so on.

Kh. 107.
produced by the sense-organ because at the time there is no contact between the sense-organ and the object (falsely cognized), and because the assumption of the organ bringing about the cognition even in the absence of such contact would involve an undue extension of the organ's operation. But this we meet by the counter-argument that your assumption of impression by itself bringing about the cognition would imply an undue extension of the operation of Impressions.*

To avoid this undue extension you perhaps will say that the cognition is brought about by the impression as aided by the preception of similar properties (common to the Shell perceived and the Silver remembered).

But against this we might maintain with equal force that there would be no undue extension of the operation of the sense-organ if we held that the cognition is brought about by the sense-organ as aided by the same perception. Against this you might argue that 'on this view there might be remembrance of things never cognised before!' But, we point out, a similar objection would lie to your view also. For according to that it would be possible for a man who has the impression of silver to remember it when he merely perceives the object (the shell) which possesses the property common (to silver and the shell viz. glitter), even though he does not cognise it as possessing that property; and the answer by which you would meet this objection would be equally available for us also. †

It might be argued that—'in that case (i.e., if the Remembrance of the silver were sensuous) it would be possible for the man to have the sensuous cognition of the silver possessing the common property, even though there were no impression left on his mind of the previous perception

* If mere impressions could produce cognitions, anything previously experienced might suggest itself to the mind at any moment, irrespective of certain associative conditions such as similarity and the like.

† The Logician meets this contingency by pointing out that when the man sees the shell, even though the impression of silver may be present in his mind, he cannot have the notion of silver in the shell, because this notion is not possible without the man perceiving the presence in the shell of the glitter common to shell and silver. The author says that a similar answer is available for the Vedāntin also: The non-remembrance of the silver is due, not to the absence of the impression of silver, but to the absence of the perception of the property of glitter.

Kh. 108.
of it as possessing that property (and this is not possible).'
But on your view it would also be possible for the same man
(who has no impression of the silver as possessing that common
property) to have the remembrance of silver, if he happens to
have the impression of the silver itself (apart from that property).
[And this would be equally absurd.]

(213). Thus then, as regards your view also, the undue
extension (of the character of 'Remembrance') can be avoided
only by admitting as a necessary factor for Remembrance, the
absence of certain obstacles to the action of impression, such as
length of time and the like. And that same recognition of the
thing (the shell) as similar to the previously perceived thing
(the silver) which according to you is the auxiliary factor finally
awakening the impression, will also serve the purpose (on our
view) of avoiding the 'undue extension' of the sense-organ.
And as for the argument that 'the recognition of a similar
thing is always preceded by the remembrance of the thing that has
to be remembered' (i.e., the silver),—we reply that this condition
holds equally good on both views. *

(214). 'But', the Logician retorts, 'in spite of all this, the
fact remains that nowhere else do we meet with a cognition that
is brought about by a sense-organ without the contact of the
organ with the object (and such contact is not present in the
case of Remembrance). But this objection is invalid; since
we assume such unaided operation of the sense-organ in special
cases only, such as that of Misconception.† Or else, we may
regard the influence of that defect to which the misconception is
due, as constituting the 'contact' (required for sensuous cog-
nition).
And further, as regards Impressions also, we no-
where else (i.e., in no case other than Remembrance) find any
cognition that is brought about by impressions without the aid of
some other means of knowledge; and on what basis then do you

* According to you the impression aided by such a recognition constitutes
the cause of Remembrance; according to us the cause is the sense-organ aided
by such recognition; and thus Remembrance being sense-produced shows itself
to be the same as Direct Apprehension.

† We hold that the sense-organ, without actual contact with the object,
brings about the Remembrance of erroneously imagined silver; not that all
sensuous cognition is brought about in that way.

Kh. 109.
assume such unaided efficiency of them (in the case of Remembrance)? If against this the Opponent should urge that, 'in the case of Recognition it is the impression, and not the sense-organ, that is aided by the perception of similarity and the like (and that hence in other cases—Remembrance e.g.—we may assume Impressions to be aided);—we point out that both impression and the sense-organ are the cause of Recognition, and hence the aid of the perception of similarity etc. may belong to both equally.

(215). 'But,' our opponent retorts, 'if in the case of the false surmise of silver you regard the sense-organ as aided by the perception of similarity etc., you will have to regard it as aided by the impression also; just as in the case of Recognition (where the sense-organ is aided by the impression; and so the Misconception being brought about by the aid of impressions may be regarded as 'Remembrance').' By no means, we reply. If Misconception were of the nature of Remembrance, the notion of 'that would enter into it just as it enters into Remembrance (while as a matter of fact this is not the case). And if you should attempt to prove the presence of the that-idea in Misconception on the ground of its being aided by the perception of similarity etc.,—this inferential reasoning would be vitiated by a qualifying condition (upādhi),—viz. the character of being brought about by impressions. *

Nor may you argue as follows:—'It is due to the fact of Recognition being aided by the perception of similarity that the that-idea enters into it, and hence as regards Misconception we can reject the operation of the perception of similarity, but not that of Impression.' † For as a matter of fact, whenever there is no perception of similarity

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* The reasoning would be as follows:—'Misconception implies the that-idea because it is aided by the Perception of Similarity'. But the character of being brought about by impressions, while being present everywhere where there is the that-idea, is not necessarily present in all cases where there is perception of similarity. The reasoning, therefore, involves the Fallacy of Accident.

† The sense of the argument is—it is true that the that-idea, is not present in Misconception. But what is always concomitant with that idea, is the operation of the perception of similarity etc. We, therefore, in the case of Misconception, can deny the presence of this operation; but we have no grounds for denying the operation of Impression.
[Nor can the solution of the difficulty be found in the so-called anyathā-khyāti theory, according to which the object of the erroneous cognition, let us say of silver, is other silver i.e., real silver, observed at some other time and place, the remembrance of which, due to the glitter of the shell, imparts to the shell before us the character of silver. For of this latter process no intelligible account can be given.]

[Page 33] Another opponent here comes forward. I agree, he says, that the akhyāti theory is not able to account for Error. And instead of it I propose the theory of anyathā-khyāti i.e., 'cognition otherwise'. According to this theory the organ of sight suffering from some defect (which obstructs clear non-erroneous perception), on coming into contact with the shell, apprehends silver which (does not exist where the shell now is, but) exists at some other place or time—as constituting the self of the shell. Nor must you object that on this view of the process anything not actually perceived at the time might be apprehended by the defective organ (i.e., that the shell might be mistaken not only for silver but for any other thing also); for similarity (between the shell and the silver, which both are glittering things), or some other circumstance of the kind, restricts and determines the actual apprehension.

But this theory also we Vedāntins declare to be unsound. For to what does the otherwise-ness you maintain, actually belong?—to the cognitional energy?—or to its result (i.e., the state of consciousness resulting from the cognitional energy)? or to the thing? The first alternative is impossible; for the state of things, on that assumption, would have to be expressed as follows:—'A cognition which has the form of silver has the shell for its basis.' Now the shell's being the basis of the cognition could mean only either that the shell imparts its own form to the cognition, or that the shell is the object of such practical thought, speech and action (vyavahāra), as are caused by the cognition. The former alternative is not possible since the shell cannot impart its own form to a cognition engrossed by the form of silver. And the second alternative is likewise

Viv. 83.
inadmissible; for from it it would follow that swords, spears and darts—which are the objects of energies, cognitional or practical, that are caused by the sight of a tiger or similar wild beast—are the basis of the cognition of the tiger or other wild beast. Nor in the second place, can the otherwise-ness belong to the result of the cognition; for the result i.e., the presentation to consciousness does not essentially differ, whether the case be one of error or one of true cognition. In the third place, in what sense could you speak of the thing as being otherwise? Do you mean that the shell identifies itself with the silver?—or that it transforms itself into the form or shape of silver?

On the former alternative, do you view the shell and the silver as absolutely distinct and different? or as standing to each other in the bheda-bheda relation i.e., as being different and non-different at the same time? You cannot hold the former view, since things absolutely different cannot identify themselves in any real way; and the ‘inexplicability’ of the Vedāntins (which alone could meet such cases) is not acknowledged by you. If, on the other hand, the identity intended by you is of the nature of the void (i.e., a non-entity), we point out that also the relation which exists between a quality and its substrate is identity in that sense, and that hence such relation also would have to be considered erroneous. For the samavāya relation which is acknowledged by one philosophical system only (viz., the Nyāya system, which teaches that a substance is connected with its qualities by the relation termed samavāya) in no way differs from the relation of identity (tadatmya). On the view, on the other hand, of the shell and the silver being different as well as non-different, it would have to be held that also judgments such as ‘the cow is short-horned’ (where admittedly we have a case of such combined difference and non-difference) are erroneous (which of course they are not).

As to the second alternative,—viz., the thing undergoing a transformation (which is the object of cognition),—this would mean that there would be no subsequent sublation of the error by the judgment (‘this thing is not silver but a shell’); the proper reasoning in that case rather would be ‘the cognition of silver

Viv. 84.
is not liable to sublation; for it is the (valid) cognition of a real change, just like the cognition of curds—which are a changed form of milk. Like the milk, the shell would, subsequently to the change, not be perceived again. But, the Naiyáyika retorts, we actually observe that on the departure of the sunlight which had caused the lotus bud to unfold, the bud closes again; analogously we may suppose that the shell may again become a shell as soon as the special defect which had caused it to change into silver is removed. The two cases, we reply, are not analogous. We are conscious of the expanded flower having been a bud; we are not conscious of the silver presenting itself to us having been a shell. And even, if somehow we had that consciousness, the theory of change could not rationally be maintained. For if the shell actually transformed itself, for the time, into silver, the silver would be perceived by those also who do not suffer from any defect. We do not observe that the same milk appears to one person to have turned into curds, and to another person to have remained milk. The anyathā-khyāti theory thus shows itself incapable of being stated in any rational form.

XV.

[Equally unprofitable is the ātma-khyāti theory of the Baudhāyas, according to which the silver seen in the shell is a mere idea which, like other ideas, in due time emerges from one of those individual 'streams of ideas' which constitute all reality. For generally the Baudhāya fails to show how presentative cognitions can arise from mere 'streams of ideas.'

[Page 34.] Let us then accept the theory of ātmakhyāti (consciousness or cognition of the self). The silver in question, it is argued, is of the nature of an idea; since it is something immediately presented to the mind, without any contact of the sense-organ with the object, as ideas generally are. But, the Vedāntins objects, according to the view of the Baudhāyas (who are the supporters of the ātma-khyāti view) mind (chitta) and mental things (chaîtta) originate in dependence

Viv. 85.
on causes of four different kinds. Now the silver in question cannot, in the first place, originate from the cause called sahakāri-pratyaya i.e., co-operating cause, which, in the given case, would be light; for light is the cause of the distinctness of the perception only. Nor can it, in the second place, originate from the so-called adhipati-pratyaya i.e., ruling or defining cause—which in the present case is constituted by the eye; for that cause operates only in so far as to define the object (as a visual one, in the given case). Nor, in the third place, can the silver originate from the samanantarapratyaya, or immediate cause i.e., the immediately preceding cognition; for we observe that the erroneous cognition of silver may arise immediately after a cognition of an entirely different kind, as e.g., that of a jar. Nor, in the fourth place, can it originate from the so-called alambana cause i.e., the external thing; for the Vijñāna-vādin (i.e., the adherent of the theory that ideas only exist, not external things) does not admit the existence of external things. As thus none of your four causes are applicable in the given case, how do you, Bauddhas, account for the cognition of silver? On the basis of a mental impression, the Bauddha replies. But, if impressions are lasting, this contradicts one of your own fundamental tenets, viz., the merely momentary existence of all things. And even if you admit the momentariness of the impression, it is an object of cognition, and this implies an abandonment of your main theory, viz., that there are cognitions (ideas) only. Not so, the Bauddha replies. By the impression (sāmskāra) from which the idea of silver originates, we understand a previous idea of silver which at some time or other, had arisen in the beginningless series of cognitions; such an impression produces, at some time, an idea of the same kind as itself, although many ideas of a different kind may intervene between the impression and the idea. The case is analogous to that of a grain of wheat which in the end gives rise to another grain of the same kind, although the sprout and several other effects of a different kind intervene between the first and the second grain. Should you urge that according to our view of the matter what gives rise to the ultimate grain is not the original grain but the intervening series constituted by the sprout etc., we have no objection: we are ready to define the 'impression,' as the 'series of ideas which were produced by

Viv. 86.
the previous idea of silver.' This previous idea again was in its turn produced by a yet earlier idea. What really exists, therefore, is only an idea having the form or character of silver which is the result of a beginningless series of impressions. And owing to error (bhrānti) this idea appears to consciousness as something external.

Against this Baudhāya theory we Vedāntins argue as follows:—Is that silver (which appears in the shell), on account of its extraordinary nature, devoid of origination?—or does it originate as ordinary silver does? On the former view it would not be of the nature of a rising cognition (which it actually is). On the second view it must originate either from a cognition or a thing. The latter alternative is excluded, since you Baudhās do not admit the existence of external things. On the former alternative it cannot be pure (vishuddha) cognition that originates the idea of silver; for pure cognition constitutes final release. If on the other hand what originates the silver is a cognition (not pure but) itself due to a vitiated cause, is it that same originating cognition which apprehends the silver?—or is it a cognition other than that? The former alternative is not possible; for since the originating and the originated cognition are both 'momentary' and hence occupy different moments of time, the consciousness of immediately presented silver would thus not come about at all. If, in the second place, it is another cognition that apprehends the silver, it cannot be a cognition produced by a non-vitiated cause; for this would be too wide an assumption (inasmuch as there would be no reason why such a cognition should specially apprehend silver). If, on the other hand, the cognition (which apprehends the silver) is produced by a vitiated cause, that cause either is silver or it is not silver. In the former case you ascribe to silver causal efficiency; and this means that the cause is (has being): you thus acknowledge the silver as a real external thing. If the cause is not silver, silver cannot be the object of the cognition; for you admit yourself that the object is the cause which imparts its form to the cognition. It thus is evident that on the ātmakhyāti view the cognition of silver could not come about at all.
XVI.

[We are thus led back to the Vedānta theory which explains cognitions such as that of shell-silver as belonging to a special class of 'erroneous cognition' due to a special cause, viz., Māyā or one of the particular forms of Māyā. In this way only we can account for the presentative character of those cognitions, and for their being put an end to by the cognition of truth.]

But, a final objection is raised against the Vedāntin, you also must after all accept either the akhyāti view, if, namely, the cognition of the shell-silver is of the nature of Remembrance; or either the anyathā-khyāti or the ātmakhyāti view, if that cognition is of the nature of Direct Apprehension (anubhava). And as no third kind of cognition is possible, the cognition of the silver must be either Remembrance or Direct Apprehension.

Not so, we reply. What, we ask, should be the cause of this alleged impossibility of a third kind of cognition? Is it that for such cognition no special causal apparatus can be assigned?—or no special character?—or no special object? The first alternative cannot be admitted; since the contact of the sense-organ with the object, together with a certain mental impression and certain defects, does supply the required causal apparatus. Nor must it be said that those defects, being of a merely obstructive nature, may indeed cause the non-origination of the ordinary effects, but not the origination of altogether new effects (such as the alleged shell-silver). For 'non-origination' really is nothing else but so-called previous non-existence, which is something beginningless (existing from all eternity), and hence cannot be the result of special defects. Moreover, to quote an analogous instance, we do observe that certain bodily defects such as excess of wind and bile do produce altogether extraordinary effects. Nor must it be said that the operation of such defects exhausts itself in resuscitating the mental impression; for such resuscitation is a merely intermediary effect of the defects. What the axe directly effects is indeed no more than the movements of rising and falling; but it cannot be said that on that account it is not, likewise, the cause of the action of cutting the wood.

But, considering that the contact of the sense-organ with the object exhausts itself in giving rise to the mere idea of the this,—
and that although the mental impression (of previously perceived silver) is capable of giving rise to remembrance, you do not in the present case admit the rise of remembrance,—and that the defects cannot by themselves cause cognition,—how do you Vedāntins account for the actual presentation to consciousness of silver? As follows, we reply. In the first place the sense-organ, which (when there arises what is ordinarily called 'erroneous cognition') must be held to be impaired by a certain defect, gives rise (on coming into contact with the shell) to a certain modification (or function, vṛtti) of the internal organ which has for its object this-ness only. Next consciousness manifests or reveals itself with regard to the this-ness and the modification of the internal organ which apprehends it. At the same time that (part of general) Nescience which has for its substrate (or locus) consciousness as manifested or determined in the manner described, is thrown into a state of agitation, owing to the influence of the defect (which, in all cases of so-called error is present). (And a further distinction has here to be noted). On being agitated, that Nescience which has for its abode Consciousness defined by the this-element, owing to the assistance (co-operation) which it receives from the impression left behind by previously perceived silver—which impression on the present occasion is resuscitated by similarity (between silver and the glittering shell)—illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) in the form of silver. That Nescience on the other hand which has for its substrate consciousness as defined by the vṛtti (function) of the internal organ, being co-operated with by the impression left behind by the original vṛtti by which silver was apprehended, illusorily modifies itself into the form of that vṛtti. Finally those two illusory modifications (or projections),—viz., that of silver and that of the vṛtti—are irradiated by witnessing consciousness which constitutes their substrate, and thus there arises the cognition of silver. There indeed really are two cognitions, viz., the vṛtti of the internal organ and the vṛtti of Nescience; but the object of the two becomes one in so far as the real and the unreal element (i.e., the this and the silver)

* I. e., the internal organ which, apart from consciousness, belongs to the sphere of the non-intelligent, material, modifies itself so as to assume the form of a this.  

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mutually identify themselves; and as hence the result determined by the object (i.e., the cognition) also becomes one, oneness of cognition may be allowed in a figurative sense.

Nor again is there any force in the second and third of the objections (above raised, text p. 35, l. 8-9); for we are fully able to give a satisfactory definition of false cognition and a false object. Although, no doubt, the contact of the sense-organ with the object and the mental impression left behind by previous apprehension are capable of giving rise, independently of each other, to true direct cognition on the one and to remembrance on the other hand, yet the mere origination, in immediate succession, of direct true cognition and of remembrance would not result in activity (such as e.g., effort to take possession of the presumed silver); and we, therefore, must assume one false cognition which results from present sense-contact and mental impression combined. The assumption is analogous to one made by yourself (the Logician). The cognitions produced by the several letters of a word pronounced in immediate succession are not simultaneous and hence cannot give rise to the cognition of the sense of the word; yet the latter cognition as a matter of fact arises; and hence to account for it, you assume one cognition of the last letter combined with the impressions left behind by all the preceding letters of the word.

[Page 36.] But, an objection is raised, the cognition under discussion (false cognition) is not one, for the reason that it is the effect of several causes—just as the cognitions of colour and taste are.

This argumentation, we reply, is refuted by the cases of inferential cognition and of Recognition; for in the case of both of these there is acknowledged to be one authoritative cognition only which contains within itself an element of remembrance; while the cause of the cognition is in the case of Inference the mental impression of the Vyāpti (i.e., the invariable concomitance of middle and major terms), and the actual perception of the middle term; and, in the case of Recognition, the contact of the sense-organ with a present object and a mental impression. Nor may it be said that the cause of the inferential cognition is the remembrance of the Vyāpti and the perception of the middle term; not the impression. For two cognitions (of which the remembrance would be one) cannot take place

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simultaneously. And although the same objection would not lie against Remembrance being accepted as a cause of Recognition (in which case the full cause would be contact of the sense-organ with the object, plus remembrance), yet in any case the resuscitation of the impression would have to be admitted as the cause of remembrance; and as such resuscitation suffices to account for Recognition, Remembrance—which does not occur by itself (apart from the revival of the impression) and the introduction of which only complicates the case—need not be assumed as a cause.

"But," it is objected, "we may reason as follows:—'the cognition of silver is not due to several independent causes; for it is a (simple) cognition like the cognition of a jar.'"

This, we reply has no force; for we can easily oppose to it a counter-argument, viz., 'the cognition of silver is due to the mentioned causes, because it is different in nature from simple cognition and valid remembrance; just as recognition is.' Nor will this entitle you to argue in the following way:—'the cognition of silver is a valid cognition; because it is due to a cause which is co-operated with by an impression; just as inferential cognition is'. For there is a special condition for all valid cognition, viz., that it should be direct cognition (anubhava) not due to a defect (a condition not present in your probans or middle term). 'But', it is objected, 'it is contrary to reason to maintain the non-reality of silver which is cognized as real, specially when no incongruity is found in the cognition.' Not so, we reply; what we maintain is the connexion of the real existence of the shell with the (imaginary) silver;—similar to the connexion between the silver and the notion of 'this.' 'Well then, if that connexion is perceived as really existing, it is irrational to maintain its unreality.' Let us then say that there is existence (or being) of three different kinds—real (pāramārthika) existence which belongs to Brahman; empirical (or conventional; vyavahārika) existence which is conditioned by Māyā, and belongs to ether etc., (i.e. to the so-called real things of ordinary normal experience); and apparent (pratibhāṣaṅka) existence which is conditioned by Nescience and belongs to shell-silver and the like.\(^*\) That the

\(^*\) Though in what follows Māya and Avidyā (Nescience) are proved to be one and the same, yet there is some difference between the two recognised in ordinary speech. This difference is pointed out later on (page 11 of this proof).

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latter two kinds of existence which are not real in the true sense (pāramārtika) should be called 'unreal' or 'false,' is in no way irrational. Nor is the hypothesis of such falseness devoid of proof; for the subsequent judgment 'silver falsely appeared to me' expresses the recognition of the unreality of the silver and its cognition. It hence appears that our theory is not, like other theories, open to the charge of contradicting facts of consciousness and of involving baseless assumptions. The akhyāti theory on the other hand is irrational, because it declares something immediately presented to consciousness to be something remembered; and it involves several baseless assumptions;—viz., that of the cognition of silver being not immediate but remembrance, and that of the obscuration of the consciousness of remembrance. Similar objections lie against the other theories also. The general conclusion, therefore, is that our theory (of Error) according to which the silver is the product of Māyā, is the only one that can be accepted.

XVII.

[The objection that what is put an end to by knowledge can be the product of Avidyā only, and not of Māyā, has no force since Māyā and Avidyā are fundamentally one.]

[Page 37]. But, an objection is raised, as you hold the silver to be put an end to by cognition of the truth, it must be the product of Nescience, not of Māyā. Nor can it be said that Nescience is nothing else but Māyā; for the definitions of the two as well as their ordinarily received meanings show them to be different. Māyā is something which does not bewilder the mind in which it abides and is governed by the will of the agent; while Nescience is of a contrary nature. For in everyday speech the term 'Māyā' only is applied to things such as elephants, horses, chariots, etc., if produced by extraordinary (magical) power; not the term 'Nescience.'

To this we reply as follows:—The definition—'that which, while itself of an inexplicable nature, is the cause of the obstruction of the presentation to consciousness of truth, and of the

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presentation of error”—is valid for Māyā and Avidyā alike. Nor must it be said that the term ‘Māyā’ properly denotes real things, such as mantras (formulas of incantation and the like), drugs and the like (through which so called ‘magical’ effects are produced). To such things the term ‘Māyā’ is, as a matter of fact, not applied; the spectators call ‘Māyā’ the magical illusion only which they actually see, not unseen things such as mantras. The presence and absence of mantras constitute instrumental causes only; just like some morbid affection of the eye (which acts as the instrumental cause of the perception of shell-silver and the like). Inexplicable magical things (indrajahala)—which we call ‘Māyā’—cannot have for their material cause real things such as mantras and drugs. We, therefore, must assume for them some inexplicable material cause which is without a beginning; for if it had a beginning, some further cause would have to be postulated, and so on in infinitum. And that this cause also should be called ‘Māyā’ is justified by the non-difference of the material cause from its effects. Now this same Māyā which we have to postulate as the material cause of magical things, may also be assumed to constitute the cause of all adhyāsa—of silver and the like; and hence there is no need of a separate Avidyā. That Māyā is the universal cause, Scripture, moreover, confirms: ‘Know Māyā to be Prakṛiti.’ It thus appears the simpler hypothesis to take Māyā and Avidyā as one. Nor is it an established truth that Māyā possesses no bewildering power with regard to its substrate; Viṣṇu in his avatāra as Rāma, was deluded by the Māyā abiding within himself. Nor again does Avidyā, on its part, necessarily delude the mind in which it abides. For we know that e. g., with regard to trees on the banks of a sheet of water which are ‘superimposed’ (‘illusorily projected’, adhyāsta) on the surface of the water with their tops downwards, the beholder is not bewildered, but knows the tops (really) to be above. Should you object to this that the absence of delusion in this case is due to the discriminative knowledge produced by the sight of the trees on the bank, while Avidyā in itself has a delusive quality;—we reply that the Magician also is not himself deluded (by the magical shows he produces), since he possesses true insight

9 Shvetā. Upa. IV.10.
antagonistic to such delusion; that on the other hand, the magic show (Māyā) in itself is delusive, since we observe that all who behold it are deluded thereby. When however the spectators possess the antagonistic insight they also are not deluded; it, therefore, is not the circumstance of not being the abode of Māyā which determines its delusive power. Nor again is it a fact that Māyā is governed by the will of the agent. For the Magician is free only with regard to the instrumental causes he employs, such as mantras, drugs and the like. And this kind of dependence on the will of the agent is observed to occur in the case of Avidyā also; for by pressing the eyeball with a finger we can at will produce the appearance of a double moon. And if it be said that the agent has no power over Avidyā itself (but only over certain conditions of it), we point out that such is the case of Māyā also. The scriptural use of terms also proves the two not to be different. In the passage 'and in the end there is the cessation of all Māyā,'* the word 'Māyā' denotes Avidyā which is put an end to by perfect knowledge. And the Smṛti passage—'He on whose entrance the Yogin passes beyond the Avidyā stretched out in the heart—the Māyā,—to him who transcends all knowledge, whose self is knowledge, be reverence!'—directly states Māyā and Avidyā to be one. The distinction made in ordinary speech is justified by the principle that different terms may be applied to one and the same thing according to the point of view taken: We speak of 'Māyā' when we have in view its power of producing extraordinary effects and its being subject to the will of the agent; of 'Avidyā,' on the other hand, we speak when having in mind its obscuring power and its independence. We have thus finally established the theory that the shell-silver is the product of Māyā.

XVIII.

[The Nascience and its effects to which the illusion of shell-silver and the like is due, is destroyed by sublative (or destructive) cognition (bādha); of which a fully satisfactory account may be given.]

* Shvetā Upa. I. 10.

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But why all this trouble to prove that the silver is the product of Māyā? Why not rather admit that the silver is just as what it presents itself to consciousness, i.e., a real thing? If it were real, we reply, it would be perceived by those also who do not suffer from any imperfection; just as jars and similar objects are perceived by all men alike. If defects had causal efficiency with regard to the apprehension of real things also, nothing whatever would present itself to those free from defects; while on the Māyā theory it is the defects which account for the limitation of the appearance of silver. It cannot be argued that the silver is apprehended by all, for the reason that it belongs to the this aspect of the shell; just as the white colour of the cloth is perceived by all. For the condition for the validity of this argumentation would be that the silver should belong to the mere this-aspect of the shell. The Māyā-silver, however, surper-imposes itself upon consciousness as determined by the this-aspect of the shell and manifested by a cognition that is due to a defect: this is the reason why it is not perceived by those who are free from defects. For the cognition of one person is not perceived by other persons. Against this the advocate of the reality of the silver will perhaps plead that the thing seen in some way determines and limits the perception of silver (owing to which it is perceived by some men only). But how then, we ask, will he get over the subsequent sublative cognition that expresses itself in the form 'this is not silver', and implies the absolute non-existence of silver in the substrate in which it had been cognized? On the theory of the silver's unreality, on the other hand, that sublative cognition is just what we expect; for the Unreal (mithyā) is defined as that which is the counter-entity to absolute non-existence (i.e., as that which is absolutely non-existent) in the substrate in which it is (erroneously) cognised. That this negation does not pertain to the unreal silver we have proved above (p. 70), on the basis of the Recognition that one has in the case, in the form—'this falsely appeared as silver.' On the anyathākhyāti theory, on the other hand, and on the ātmakhyāti theory, the subsequent reflection should be, not 'this falsely appeared to me as silver,' but 'this is not silver, but that is,' or 'this is (not a thing, but) a mere idea.' Hence for the reason that the silver is not perceived

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by people who are free from defects, and on account of the subsequent sublation and reflection, we must hold to the view that the silver is unreal, not real.

"But what really is that so-called sublation (or refutation, bādhya), on the strength of which you determine the silver to be unreal? Is it (1) the cessation of activity, with regard to a certain thing on the part of a person desirous of another thing? or (2) the destruction of the person's capability of such action? or (3) the discrimination of what was previously cognized as non-discriminated? or (4) the cognition of the mutual difference of things first cognized as identical?, or (5) the destruction of erroneous cognition?, or (6), the destruction of the object of such cognition? or (7) the destruction of defects and the like? The first alternative is inadmissible; for it would imply that there is no sublation in the case of him who, free from all desire, does not act at all."

"Let then the definition be narrowed as follows:— 'Sublation is the cessation of activity preceded by desire!'") Form this, we reply, it would follow that 'sublation' takes place in the case of a man who having seen at a distance (the appearance of) water due to a Fata Morgana has set out towards it but stops halfway because he finds robbers or a snake or some other dangerous thing in his way. But, as a matter of fact, sublative cognition does not arise in that man's mind, since the idea of water remains for him unfurished. The second alternative also is inadmissible; for since at some subsequent time the error and the action due to it may again occur with regard to the very same shell even, the man's capability of such action is not destroyed.

As to the third alternative, we ask whether the difference (which is apprehended on discrimination) is an attribute of the things, and as such is apprehended after the things have been apprehended; or constitutes the essential nature of things, and as such is apprehended in and with them. On the former view all cognition of difference would be sublative of the cognition of things; since the latter would have for its object that which is non-discriminated. On the latter view there never would be non-discrimination of things once

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*I.e.*, the definition would not apply to the case of the man who while mistaking the shell for silver, does not actively exert himself to take possession of the silver.

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apprehended. The fourth alternative would imply—whether we hold the view of absolute difference or the bheda-bheda-view (of simultaneous difference and non-difference)—that the prima facie judgment of identity 'the cloth is white' would be 'sublated' by the subsequent judgment of difference 'whiteness belongs to the cloth.' The fifth definition is purposeless; since all cognition, being in its very nature momentary, perishes of itself. The sixth and seventh definitions finally must be rejected, because objects and defects—both of which are realities—cannot be destroyed by cognitions. On the other hand, we cannot deny the existence of sublation; for it is something full well known from ordinary experience. We hence do not know exactly what to think of 'sublation.'”

We solve the difficulty by the following definition:—“Sublation is the termination, by means of the cognition of truth, of Nescience (non-knowledge) together with its effects whether present or passed away.” It is in this sense, of 'termination of non-knowledge', that the term is generally understood. “But, this being so, the mere cognition of the shell would be 'sublative'; for it puts an end to the unreal silver and its material cause (the ajñāna)!” Such indeed is the wonderful fact. Since however, for him who is moved to action by the idea of real silver, the cognition of the absence of silver (apart from the cognition of the shell) suffices to cut short the impulse to action, the cognition 'this is not silver' is also designated as sublative. It thus appears that the unreality of a thing is ascertained through 'sublation'.

XIX.

[Nor is there any essential difference between the illusory shell-silver, and the illusory things seen in a dream; the difference merely is that in a dream the internal organ functions independently of contact with an external object. Nor finally, is there any essential difference between illusory silver and dream-images on the one hand, and on the other hand, the things perceived in the waking state. In all cases alike Nescience or Māyā effects an illusory projection of unreal things on the substrata of Universal Consciousness.]

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"Well then, let us admit that the cognition of unreal silver is to be classed as error (bhrama). But what about the cognition of things seen in dreams? Such cognition is not true knowledge; for it is sublated (by the cognitions of the waking state). Nor is it remembrance; for it is of the nature of immediate presentation. Nor is it Error; for the characteristic features of error are absent in dreams. To dreams we cannot, in the first place, apply the definition of Error—viz., that it is that which is produced by the triad of causes (contact of the sense-organ with the object; impression left on the mind by previous experiences; defect); for while there no doubt is a defect, viz., the dull drowsy condition of the sleeper's mind; and while there also are previous mental impressions which are resuscitated by the unseen principle (adṛṣṭa); the third cause, viz., contact of the sense-organs with their objects, is absent. Nor does the essential definition of Error, 'the presentation to consciousness of one thing in, or on, another,' suit the case of dreams, in which that abode or substrate which in the above definition is referred to in the words 'in another' is absent. What place then do you assign to dream-cognitions?"

Our theory on this point is as follows:—In the waking state the contact of the sense-organ with the external object produces a modification of the internal organ which has for its object the external this-element of the shell and the like; for the internal organ has no independent energy outside the body. In dreams, on the other hand, the internal organ—which within the body is independent—may function on its own account, and is not, therefore, dependent on contact with external objects. The third cause, i.e., the modification of the internal organ, thus is present in dreams no less than in the waking state. The substrate also is in both cases the same viz., Consciousness circumscribed by the modification of the internal organ. (But in the case of bhrama) the shell and the this-aspect are what bring about the contact of the sense-organ, eye and the rest; as in the absence of these, no contact,—for which an object is always necessary—would be possible; for the simple reason that such contact is the qualifying adjunct to something that circumscribes or characterises the substrate—consciousness. The two cases, therefore, stand as follows:—In

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the waking state that Nescience, which has for its substrate Consciousness as manifested by that modification of the internal organ which is due to the contact of sense-organ and object, and as defined by the this-element of the shell, illusorily projects itself in the form of silver; analogously, in the state of dream, there is concerned that Nescience which has for its substrate Consciousness as defined or circumscribed by a certain modification of the internal organ—which modification originates within the body (independently of external objects) and is influenced by the defect of drowsiness and so on; and as defined by that modification: this Nescience, being at the same time co-operated with by the mental impressions left behind by previous perceptions—which at the time are revived by the unseen principle—illusorily projects itself in the form of the world of things that are seen by the dreaming person.

[Page 40]. "But," it is objected, "if Consciousness, or the Self, is the substrate of the dream-illusion, the consciousness of the dreamer should express itself in a form in which the Self and the dream-image super-imposed upon it would appear grammatically co-ordinated—that is to say, just as in the waking state our thought expresses itself in forms such as 'this is silver,' 'this is a snake,' the dreamer's thought should assume forms such as 'I am blue,' 'I am yellow'; and should not (as it actually does) present blue and yellow colour as belonging to some place outside the dreamer's mind. And as that place also is super-imposed on consciousness, it should likewise appear as something internal, in the form 'I am that place.' Perhaps you will say that this objection of ours does not go far enough and should properly be extended to the waking state also; since in that state also Consciousness is the sole substrate. Well, we reply, let this be done; we are quite ready to urge the point with regard to the waking state also."

To this we reply as follows:—Do you (in urging that on our theory dream-consciousness should express itself in forms such as 'I am blue') mean that those inward ideas (of blue colour, etc.) should appear in co-ordination with (as co-existent with) the 'organ of egoity' (Ahaṅkāra) which is circumscribed by the body, or with Consciousness? The former alternative is impossible, since the organ of egoity can never be the substrate (of any

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cognition). And the latter alternative you need not advocate against us, since it represents our own view. For otherwise, the things super-imposed, which in themselves are of an absolutely non-intelligent nature, would not shine forth to thought at all. The I-consciousness (aham-ullekha) on the other hand, depends on the organ of Egoity (the Ahaṅkāra), and is not produced in mere consciousness. But, it is objected, things (real in the ordinary sense) such as jars and the like, also present themselves only in connection with consciousness, just as (so-called illusory) things, such as shell-silver! Well, we reply, we then have to assume that they also are super-imposed upon Consciousness. Nor must it be said that the manifestation to consciousness of jars and the like is produced by the operation of the so-called means of cognition (pramāṇa), and is not of the nature of the self (Consciousness). For the thing under discussion, i.e., Consciousness as defined by an object, is in reality not different from the consciousness circumscribed by the Ahaṅkāra; since no difference manifests itself apart from reflexion on the respective limiting adjuncts; just as the universal ether is not in reality different from the ether circumscribed by a jar. We, therefore, viewing the distinction of the within and the without as relative to the body, must conceive the correct distinction of the Self and the Not-self—as expressed by the notions and terms 'I' and 'Not-I'—as depending on the limiting adjunct constituted by the Ahaṅkāra. That the one Consciousness should be alike present within and without, explains itself from its infinity. For Consciousness cannot, on the one hand, be of atomic extent (anu); for it is perceived to be present throughout the body. Nor, on the other hand, can that which does not consist of parts, be held, apart from a limiting adjunct, to be of intermediate size (intermediate, that is to say, between atomic size and infinite extension). The entire world of the waking state thus must be viewed as super-imposed on omnipresent Consciousness as its substrate, with the false appearance of reality; and it follows a fortiori that the world of the dreamer also rests on the same substrate. "But," a new objection is raised, "scriptural texts such as* 'He is to meditate on name as Brahman', enjoin the super-imposition

*Chhā. Upa. VII. i. 5.

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of the cognition of Brahman on name and the like. How can, in these cases, the erroneous cognition (of name viewed as Brahman) be accounted for, considering that no defect is present in the cause of such cognitions? What is enjoined in statements of this kind, we reply, is not erroneous knowledge, but only a certain mental activity; for knowledge is something not depending on man's will and, therefore, cannot be enjoined. Nor may you say that since the representation to the mind of e.g., some divinity, and the dismissal from the mind of e.g., the image of a naked woman or the like, depend on the will of man, cognition in general is subject to will. What in the instances adduced really is under the control of man's will, is no more than, on the one hand, that concentration of mind which results in remembrance, and on the other hand that diversion of the mind towards other objects which results in the dismissal of a given idea. If the power of man extended further, he might, on his mere wish and without lengthy study, remember subjects which he has read once only as e.g., the Veda; and on the other hand at once forget what he would be glad to forget, e.g., the death of a son. Erroneous cognition hence cannot be enjoined, and the conclusion is that the definition of Error as that which is produced by the triad of causes holds good. Against the other definition according to which it is the 'presentation to consciousness of one thing in another thing' nobody has anything to say. For the adherent of the akhyāti-theory also in order to account for actual mixed empirical thought, must needs acknowledge a combined cognition or combined misconception. And other theorists, although disagreeing as to the nature, place and time of substrate and thing super-imposed, are at one with us as to the general nature of erroneous cognition.

XX.

[Without this real substrate, on the other hand, no cognition of any kind would be possible; we therefore must reject the view of the Nihilist (Śāṅkyavādīn) who holds that this apparent world has for its substrate, not Universal real Consciousness, but the absolute Void or Nought.]

* For the cause of these cognitions is Scripture.
However, the Śūnyavādin (i.e., he who holds that there is nothing real, but that whatever appears to be is fundamentally void i.e., unsubstantial, unreal) forms an exception. He rejects our view of error, for he will not allow the existence of a real substrate as implied in the ‘in another thing’ of our definition; and he maintains that erroneous cognitions, as of the shell-silver, arise on the void, owing to the power of Samvṛtī. I do not admit, he says, that Error is not possible apart from a real substrate. For according to your view also, the illusion called ‘the tuft of hair’* and the illusion called ‘the town of the Gandharvas’ are of that nature, i.e., have no real substrate. Nor also is it a fact that there can be no non-limited (niravadhika) negation (i.e., negation which does not imply a positive assertion). For when the erroneous conception of a man, who in the dark mistakes a rope for a snake, is sublated by the assertion made by a competent and trustworthy person ‘(there is here) no snake,’ this assertion is a case of pure negation.

All this is baseless reasoning, we reply. The so-called illusion called ‘the tuft of hair’ has a real substrate, viz., the visual rays which, on the corner of the eye being pressed with the finger, become obstructed (and circumscribed); and Ether is the real substrate of the town of the Gandharvas.' Otherwise (i.e., if erroneous cognitions were those which rest on the void) it would follow that your cognition of the void also is an error, and then your whole theory of the void could not be established. And if you should say that the erroneous cognition and the erroneous object of cognition have each other for substrate, you would implicate yourself in a vicious logical interdependence; for the substrate must in each case be viewed as something antecedent. And if you should say that cognitions and objects of cognition succeed one another in an endless series, analogous to the endless succession of seeds and plants,—we point out that in the case of seeds and plants there is a permanent element which persists through the whole series, viz., the earthy matter (of which seeds and plants consist), and that, in order to render the

*On closing the eyes a person sometimes fancies that he sees tufts of hair, and looking at the evening sky, one notices fanciful shapes among the drifting clouds,—sometimes appearing like palaces, &c. This latter is called the 'town of the Gandharvas.' [Vide Nyāyamañjari Vol. I. Page 185.]

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analogy fruitful, a similar persistent element would have to be acknowledged as maintaining itself in the series of cognitions and objects of cognition. Were no such element admitted and, instead, the action of the *unseen* principle (adṛṣṭa) appealed to, we should have a clear case of the blind leading the blind. Nor further, do we allow that the affirmation made by a competent person ‘(there is here) no snake’ is a mere negation; for it leads up to and is defined by the positive affirmation ‘but a rope.’ And even if the affirmation is made in the form ‘There is nothing *there*, your fear is groundless’ the place which is indicated by ‘there’ constitutes a positive limitation. And it also is evident that sublative enunciations such as ‘the Pradhāna which some hold to be the material cause of the world does not exist’ do not sublate *some* general cause of the world, for such a cause is admitted by all. And in other cases also—as of elephants, horses, chariots etc., illusorily projected by the magical power (Māyā) of a magician—which you hold to be cases of error without any substrate and of subsequent limitless (mere) sublation (or negation), there at bottom is a substrate and a limit, *viz.*, witnessing Consciousness which brings about both error and sublation. Nor again may you say that that Consciousness itself is liable to sublation, for there is nothing that could effect such sublation, everything else but Consciousness being of a non-intelligent (jāda) nature. Nor may you say that the Void is the substrate (demanded by me for all erroneous cognition); for it is not the Void that persists (is uniformly present) in the things erroneously super-imposed. If the Void were so present, Consciousness, at the time of error, would deliver itself in the form ‘the Void is the silver’, not ‘*this* is silver’ (which is the actual delivery of Consciousness at the time). And if you say—‘that which we are conscious of as *this* is the Void’—our quarrel is about a mere name. Nor also can the ‘Void’ constitute the positive limit (avadhi) in sublative cognition; for we are not conscious of it in any such case. Or if we are conscious of it, it is nothing else but Consciousness that is denoted by the term ‘the Void.’ Nor again can the Void be that which is erroneously super-imposed upon the substrate. For were it such, it would follow that the thing super-imposed would not be immediately perceived (for it would be =0). But this is just what is acceptable to the

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Shūnyavādin whose aim it is to disestablish all presentations whatever to Consciousness! Then, we reply such disestablishment also would not present itself to consciousness! But, the Nihilist resumes, you Vedāntins also hold the thing super-imposed to be void! By no means, we reply. In order to establish (on the part of the thing super-imposed) that character which is the counter-entity of subsequent sublation, (i. e., is that which subsequently is sublated) we assume that the thing superimposed, as long as it presents itself to Consciousness, is different in character from that which is as well as that which is not (neither truly is nor is absolutely non-being). Subsequently to sublation it indeed is void: nobody will contest that what has perished is nought.

To those again who hold that the silver which is sublated (by the cognition 'there is no silver here') exists elsewhere (i. e. the Naiyāyikas who hold the anyathā-khyāti view) we address the question—'what is it that, as you allege, makes one apprehend the existence of silver elsewhere?—is it the sublative cognition itself, or the impossibility of sublation here (without reference to the existence of silver elsewhere)?'—The former alternative is inadmissible since perception does not deliver itself in the form 'This here is not silver, but there is silver elsewhere, or in the mind.' And the affirmation on the part of a competent person also intimates the absence of silver only, not the existence of silver in some other place. The second alternative again.—vis., the impossibility of sublation with regard to the present place,—is not established by any of the different theories in question. For the Anyathā-khyāti theory assumes (as shown above) sublation of 'Connexion' and the Atmakhyaṭi theory, sublation of the externality of the silver, without reference, in either case, to the existence of silver elsewhere. And on the Akhyāti view also what is negatived (by the sublative cognition) is the false cognition of silver in the shell, in this place only, without assuming the existence of silver elsewhere.

Nor also is such impossibility established by ordinary thought; for when a jar is broken here, we deny its existence without reference to the existence of jars in other places. Let it then be said that as in the case of the jar, so in the case of the shell-silver also there is existence of silver, dependent on difference

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of time! This also is inadmissible. In the case of the jar, no doubt, we judge ‘formerly there was a jar here, now there is none’; but in the case of the silver our denial (of the existence of the silver) is not dependent on difference of time. Non-limited negation, in the case of the silver, is possible because there is voidness, i.e., nought-ness, of real silver at all time. This nought-ness is intimated through the subsequent reflexion ‘The silver falsely appeared to me’: were there no such absolute nought-ness, the form of the reflexion would be ‘real silver was presented to me’. That, at the time of the erroneous cognition, the man was conscious of silver is sufficiently accounted for by the mere false silver. It is this false silver which, together with its material cause, (i.e., Avidyā) is sublated by the cognition of the real nature of the shell. That the sublative cognition should establish the existence of silver elsewhere, cannot enter one’s thought even. Although, therefore, subsequently to sublation, the super-imposed thing is nought, the Nihilist also must admit that before sublation, a false thing presented itself to Consciousness as abiding in a real substrate.

[Page 43]. A new objection is here raised against the view of the Vedāntin. You have, the opponent says, given two definitions of Error (bhrama); the non-essential or accidental

* In Indian Philosophy, there are two kinds of definitions of things; (1) the Tatāstha-lakṣāṇa—that which serves to distinguish the thing defined, though it does not subsist in it always; and (2) the Svarūpa-lakṣāṇa—which is inseparable from the defined thing.

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definition according to which it is that which is produced by the three causes, viz., the apprehension of a substrate, a mental impression and a defect (or group of defects); and the essential definition according to which it is what is produced through the presentation to Consciousness of a real substrate in a false character. Now we are willing to admit Error thus defined in the cases of ‘this thing is silver,’ ‘there are two moons’ and the like. But how will you account for the error which consists in the super-imposition on the Self of the ‘organ of egoity’ and so forth (i.e., the entire aggregate of things constituting the Non-self)? or the error of difference (bheda) which consists in viewing the one Self as differentiated into the individual soul (jīva) and Brahman, and the jīva again into many jīvas? To these cases your definitions do not apply. In the case of the shell-silver we have in the object the defect of similarity, (i.e., the misleading similarity of the shell to the silver), in the sense-organ the defect of a morbid affection (timira— which dulls the discerning power of the eye); and in the seeing person the defect of desire (which renders him apt to mistake the shell for the silver he covets). In those cases, on the other hand, where the Self is concerned, the Self alone occupies the place of object, sense-organ and seeing subject, for everything else belongs to the category of that which is super-imposed. But in the Self, which is without a second (is the only reality), and which is essentially free from all blemish, the mentioned defects cannot possibly exist—neither through itself nor through anything else. The unreal defect, termed ‘Nescience,’ may indeed somehow exist in the Self; but all the same the presentation to Consciousness of what is super-imposed on it, viz., the organ of egoity and the rest, cannot be produced by the triad of causes. For such presentation is of the nature of Consciousness (chaitanya), and that is eternal (and hence non-produced). The presentation to Consciousness of the shell-silver also no doubt at bottom is nothing but Consciousness; but Consciousness in this case has limiting adjuncts (the internal organ etc.), and hence may, in a metaphorical way, be spoken of as originated. In the cases under discussion on the other hand, the limiting adjuncts also fall under the category of the Super-imposed; and how then can that, which is without limiting adjuncts, be

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said to be produced? For these reasons the aforesaid non-essential definition of Error does not fit the cases under discussion. Nor does the so-called essential definition fit them. The Self no doubt is real, but it cannot be the substrate of a false appearance. In order that a thing may constitute the substrate of an error, it must be apprehended in its general character but non-apprehended in its specific character (as when the shell is apprehended as this but not as shell); how then can the Self to which the distinction of general and specific character does not apply constitute a substrate? But why should we not reason as follows.—'The Self is a substrate, because it is a real thing, just as a shell is?' Not so, our antagonist replies. The reason in that inference has proving power only if qualified by the condition of the real thing being one illumined by something else (i.e. being an object of consciousness, not Consciousness itself).

Let us then, with the Siddhaanta-rahasya, argue as follows:—'The Self is the substrate of error, because it is of the nature of intelligence; like the consciousness defined by a shell.' Not so, the opponent replies. The consciousness which is defined by the this-element and the shell-element is made up of parts, and hence capable of being apprehended in its general character, and not apprehended in its specific character; but this is not possible in the case of the Self which is not made up of parts. And if you should retort that the Self, although not made up of parts, does, like ether, not present itself to Consciousness in its entirety;—we reply that that which is self-illumined must present itself to Consciousness to the whole extent of its being. And that the Self is self-illumined is proved by the scriptural text 'That person is self-illumined,....the Self only is its light.'

But a question here presents itself with regard to the meaning of the word 'light' in the Vedic passage just quoted. Does it denote light as a quality, or the substance which is the substrate of the quality? The former alternative is inadmissible, for it would imply that the Self which there is termed 'light' is a quality (and that, of course, is impossible). On the latter alternative, on the other hand, there is nothing to be objected to in what the text says about the Self being light, while at the

*Bri. Upanis. IV. 3. 6-9.
same time cognition (jñāna,—which may be called light in so far as light is a mere quality) may be viewed as something originated (non-eternal; non-permanent). It hence follows that the Self does not necessarily manifest itself to Consciousness in its full extent at all times (but only when cognition of the Self arises).

Not so, the Antagonist replies. The term 'light' denotes Consciousness pure and simple, and the scriptural text means to say neither more nor less than that the Self is of the nature of pure Consciousness. Otherwise the qualifications conveyed by the term 'self' (in svayam-jyotis—self-light, self-luminous), and by the 'only' (eva) in the second clause, would be unmeaning. To explain in detail. Are those two qualifications meant to preclude what, on the analogy of the cognition of jars and the like things, would seem to be prima facie established with regard to the Self also, viz., that the apprehending cognition is different from the apprehended object? or are they meant to preclude the difference (from the 'light,' the 'self') of that which produces cognition? On the former alternative the scriptural text is meant to establish the oneness of the object apprehended and that which apprehends i.e., the Self and its cognition. But this would imply that the Self is a quality and cognition a substance! This does not matter; for the logical distinctions of 'quality,' 'substance' and the rest, which have been invented by the Logicians, do not avail to produce contradictions in the things themselves. The second alternative is inadmissible, because it implies an abandonment of what the scriptural text directly states, and an assumption of what it does not state. For you assume the meaning of the text to be 'it (the light) itself produces cognition; the Self only produces cognition; there is nothing else to produce it'; but what the text actually says is 'It is self-illumined; the Self only is light; there is no other light but that.' Nor can it be pleaded that as some factor producing knowledge is absolutely required, we must construe the words of the text as defining such a factor. For, on the Vedānta view, knowledge is eternal and hence requires no factor to produce it. But is not the following inference valid—'the cognition under discussion is produced, because it is cognition; like the cognition of jars and similar things'? It is not; since the Vedāntins do not allow the validity of the proving.
instances. According to them, in the cognition of a jar also the properly intellectual or conscious element (sphurana-amsha) is nothing else but pure Consciousness; while that element which consists in the modification of the internal organ is (non-intellectual) Nescience to which the term 'knowledge' is applied in a figurative sense only. Nor is your inference a purely negative one (whereby it would be free from the necessity of proving instances); because there are other substrates also where your probandum, (the character of being a product) is present. According to the opinion of others (Non-Vedântins) indeed, the cognition of a jar does constitute a valid proving instance; but even thus the conclusion cannot be established. For is this knowledge of which—as these people hold—the Self is the substrate, a substantial thing of which light (prakâsha) is a quality; or is it the quality 'light'? On the former view the substantial thing Knowledge being light (jyotis), owing to its having light for its quality, the character of light of which Scripture speaks cannot belong to the Self. On the second alternative a question arises—does knowledge, the quality, originate together with the substance in which it abides? or does Knowledge only originate? Clearly not the former; since the substance Self is eternal. Nor the latter; for we have to reason as follows—"the knowledge under discussion is not produced in its substance, apart from the origination of that substance itself; for it is of the nature of 'illumination' or 'light', like the light of the flame of a lamp." In the latter case the light of the flame originates only together with the substance flame, not apart from the latter; the instance, therefore, has proving force. Nor can you quote against the above argumentation the instance of the mirror (in which it might be urged the quality 'light' or 'brightness' is produced, apart from the production of the substance, i.e., the mirror); for in reality the quality brightness, exists already in the mirror: it is not produced, but only manifested, by the polishing of the mirror's surface. Nor again can the reason given by us be said to fail, in regard to the 'light of the internal organ' (which it may be said is produced, even though it is of the nature of 'illumination'). For according to the Parinâmavâda theory of Vedânta, what is produced as the 'cognition of a jar' is, not indeed the light of the internal organ, but the internal organ.
itself which is qualified by that light; and according to the Arambhavāda theory also, 'light' is not a quality of the internal organ at all. The conclusion thus is that, since knowledge is not something that originates, and hence pre-supposes no originating factor, the scriptural text must mean that the Self only is light and that there is no other light beside it. It, of course, has further to be understood that what the text means by light is the light of intelligence, not non-sentient (physical) light; this is proved by other scriptural texts such as 'pre-eminent knowledge (prajñāna) is Brahman.' We cannot allow that, in this latter passage, the term prajñāna denotes the attribute or quality of being a knowing subject (jñātri); for this would be contrary to the received meaning of jñāna as denoting a state. But the term may, in agreement with the rules of grammar, be analysed as 'that the knowledge of which is pre-eminent,' and then it does denote a knowing subject! All the same, it is said in reply, it would be a needlessly complicated hypothesis to view the Self as something in which at each moment a new cognition springs up. But again, if this latter assumption is not made, the shining forth of the Self is not accounted for; and yet as a matter of fact the Self does shine forth constantly. We thus are led back to the tenet that the Self—the nature of which is self-illumined Consciousness—manifests itself in its full extent at all times.

But, it is objected, that in the Self a certain specific character is not apprehended, is a fact of immediate experience; for the Brahman-aspect of the Self is as a matter of fact not apprehended! Not so, the opponent replies. Brahman either is different or non-different from the individual soul. If it is different, the non-manifestation (of things), as also misconception, would have for their substrate Brahman itself, and not the individual soul. As for its being non-different, there can be no proof for it. The proof might be put forward in the following words—"Such scriptural texts as 'this Self is Brahman' must refer to a single undifferentiated thing (Brahman),—because they express co-ordination, but do not speak of substances bearing the relation of cause and effect—like the sentence 'this is Devadatta.'" But in that case, Brahman could never be

* Ait. Upa. V. 3.  † Bri. Upa. II. 5. 19.

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unknown; because any manifestation of knowledge or cognition would be contrary to its nature, and also because there would be absolutely no difference between the 'substrate' and the 'object' (of knowledge). The conclusion, therefore, is that the internal organ, etc., (i.e., the body, and the external world) cannot be viewed as merely super-imposed upon the Self; for as we have shown, the Self cannot form the substrate of a super-imposition, and is free from all imperfections.

XXII.

[The answer to this is that to the Universal Self also a certain permanent 'imperfection' attaches itself, viz., Nescience—which, although of an unreal nature, suffices to bring about those Adhyāyas of which the Self is the substrate.]

[Page 45.] Against all this the Vedantin now states his case as follows:—That even in the Self—though it constitutes the only reality and in itself is free from all blemish—there is a certain defect, of an unreal nature, termed Nescience,—this is the direct teaching of Scripture as well as implied in the teaching of Scripture. 'As men who do not know the place, walk again and again over a gold treasure hidden in the earth and do not find it, thus do all these creatures go day after day into the Brahman-world and yet do not find it, for they are covered by the Untrue'—this scriptural passage teaches that at the time of deep sleep the consciousness of Brahman does not present itself to all these living creatures because they are covered by unreal Nescience. And that this covering by Nescience is unreal in nature, and different from mere false knowledge and the impressions it leaves behind, as well as from mere absence of knowledge, and from Karman, we have shown in the section treating of 'concealment' (āvaraya; Sec., X, p. 55). Nescience in the second place is implied in the teaching of Scripture; for the declaration that the release from bondage is accomplished through the cognition of Brahman implies that, previous to such cognition, there is in Brahman a want of true knowledge which constitutes a defect and is the cause of adhyāsa and bondage. Nor must it be

* Chhā. Upa. VIII. 3. 2.
suspected that Nescience, because apprehended through the legitimate means of right knowledge, is on that account something real. For we avail ourselves of those means of proof only to refute those who maintain that there is no such thing as inexplicable Nescience. Nescience itself is directly proved by witnessing consciousness only.

We now turn to the assertion, above made by our opponent, that the view of the individual soul and Brahman being non-different, implies that Brahman cannot be not-known. Do you mean, we ask, that non-knowledge (ajñāna), because pre-supposing a difference of substrate and object, cannot be related to one thing only? or, secondly, that being so related, it is in contradiction with the oneness of its substrate? or, thirdly, that it is contrary to reason that that the nature of which is light should be the substrate of Avidyā? or, fourthly, that Brahman being the substrate of Avidyā implies its not being omniscient?

The first alternative is untenable. For we argue in the following way:—'the ajñāna under discussion does not pre-suppose the difference of substrate and object; for it is not of the nature of action; just as jars and the like are (not of the nature of action);' or again, we may argue, 'the ajñāna under discussion abides in, and at the same time, obscures one and the same object; for it is of obscuring nature, as e.g., the darkness abiding within the inner room of a house',—arguments which prove that one thing may stand in a two-fold relation, without this implying any difference. But our antagonist objects, a-ajñāna (non-knowledge) actually pre-supposes a difference of substrate and object, just as knowledge does. For just as we say, 'I (substrate) know this (object),' we also say 'I do not know this.' Not so, we reply. This notion (of ajñāna also requiring difference of substrate and object) is due merely to the use of the term ajñāna which (also) denotes the mere absence of knowledge. The latter no doubt demands those two things (viz., substrate and object). When, on the other hand, we employ the term Māyā (instead of ajñāna in the Vedāntic sense), the question does not arise. The case is analogous to that of our using, instead of the word sthiti (standing, rest), the term a-gamana (non-motion); while the

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former term requires no object, the latter immediately suggests the question 'who or what is not moving,' and in relation to what object?

The second alternative is disposed of by the argumentation—'the ajñāna under discussion is not in conflict with the oneness of its substrate; for it has obscuring quality, just as darkness has (which obscures the very space in which it abides).'

Nor can we accept the third alternative. For, we ask, is the alleged irrationality,—viz., of something the nature of which is light being the substrate of ajñāna—a matter of immediate consciousness or of inference? Not the former certainly; for that the witnessing consciousness which proves ajñāna is the substrate of ajñāna is immediately realised in the consciousness 'I am not-knowing.' As regards the latter alternative we should like to hear how you propose to formulate the inference. Is it as follows—'the Self is not the substrate of ajñāna because it appears to consciousness, just like the jar placed before us? '—or as follows—'the Self is of a nature antagonistic to ajñāna; for it is of the nature of light; just as the modifications of the internal organ are? '—or as follows—'the Self is contradictory opposed to all connexion with ajñāna; for it is self-luminous; just as states of consciousness are in the opinion of the followers of Prabhākara'? The first alternative is inadmissible, as it is contradicted by (universally accepted) facts; inasmuch as others (i.e., non-Vedāntins) also, according to whom the Self is presented to consciousness by a cognition which originates (is non-eternal), have to acknowledge that the Self is the substrate of ajñāna; for otherwise omniscience of the Self would result at the moment when the Self is presented to consciousness. The second inference must be rejected; for it goes astray in the case of that act of consciousness which presents ajñāna. Nor may it be said that the existence of such an act is just what is not proved; for others also (who do not hold the Vedāntic view of ajñāna) could not speak of ajñāna—as acknowledged by them—if there were no consciousness of such ajñāna. The third inference also is invalid, because there really are no instances to prove it; the so-called self-luminous states of consciousness (which the Prabhākaras bring forward) are neither more nor less than just the Self.

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Nor finally can we admit the fourth of the original alternatives, (on page 112)—viz., that from the Self being the substrate of ajñāna it would follow that Brahman is not omniscient. Although the thing reflected in the mirror and the reflected image are in reality one, yet the indistinctness of outline, which owing to the mirror’s dimness super-imposes itself on the image, in no way detracts from the distinctness of the object reflected. Analogously we argue that although the individual Self is the substrate of Avidyā, the omniscience of Brahman is not thereby impaired. Moreover, if in order to disprove Avidyā you bring forward either the oneness of Brahman and the individual soul, or Brahman’s self-luminousness, or its omniscience,—each of these facts will merely disprove that Avidyā consists in the absence of apprehension, and on the other hand prove that it is a positive entity. For if there were no obscuring factor of a positive nature, it could not be explained why such attributes as omniscience and the like, and Brahman to which they belong, do not appear to consciousness. Mere absence of apprehension might account for the fact that, among the things different from the individual soul, jars and similar things—which are non-intelligent and not all-knowing—should not appear to consciousness; but not for the fact that Brahman which is of an altogether contrary nature does not so appear.

XXIII.

[The chief of these adhyāsas is the distinction between Brahman and the individual soul (jīva). Nescience at first produces this fictitious distinction and then, somehow clinging more pronouncedly to the individual soul than to the Universal Self, produces for the former the whole phenomenon of a multiple world.]

[Page 47.] But, an objection is raised, if it be held that the individual Self is the substrate of Avidyā while Brahman is omniscient, it follows that the individual Self and Brahman are different entities! Is, we ask in reply, that resulting

*I. e. from the fact of the Self possessing qualities over and above the ‘pure consciousness’ of Brahman.

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difference real or the effect of \textit{Avidyā}? And, on the former view, does the difference result from a limitation due to the internal organ; or from a \textit{redunda ney} or excess (\textit{atireka}) inhering in the very nature of the Self; or from the relation of whole and parts inhering in the nature of the Self?

The first alternative is inadmissible; since the internal organ which is a thing that has a beginning cannot determine a distinction which has existed from all eternity. That the internal organ is not a thing without a beginning is proved by its non-existence in deep sleep and similar states. “But we hold that it \textit{does} exist in deep sleep also, although indeed in a subtle form only!” What, we ask, do you understand by this existence in a subtle form? Does the internal organ pass over into a condition in which it \textit{does} not consist of parts? or do its parts decrease in number only? or does it then exist in its causal condition only? or does there remain nothing of it but an impression (\textit{saṃskāra})? The first alternative is impossible; for that a thing consisting of parts should pass into the condition of having no parts would mean nothing else but that it perishes utterly.

Nor can the second alternative be accepted; as in that case, that \textit{whole} (compounded of parts; left after the decrease of a number of parts, being deprived of the character of an \textit{effect} (as during \textit{sūpta} there is no active efficient cause for it), it could not cease to exist at any time (and thus this subtle form should continue also after the \textit{sūpta}, in the waking state); and if, in order to avoid this difficulty, the \textit{whole} of reduced parts were regarded as the \textit{effect} of the \textit{whole} with all its parts, then its operations during \textit{sūpta} would have to be exactly like those during the \textit{waking} state. On the third alternative, do you mean that the internal organ, at the time of deep sleep, exists in its causal condition only, or also as an \textit{effect}? If the former, it ceases to exist at all. If the latter, the entire empirical world which is present to the waking consciousness should be present to the sleeping soul also.

Nor finally is the fourth alternative possible. For since a mere \textit{impression} cannot be the material cause of limitation, the soul would in deep sleep be altogether non-limited and hence attain to final release.

“Let us then assume that, that which is limited (lit. ‘cut off’) is the material cause of limitation, just as in the case of the cutting

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of wood it is the wood, which is the material cause of the 'cutting'; while the internal organ is merely the efficient (operative) cause; just as the axe is in the act of cutting!"

In this way, we reply, the limitation could not be accomplished at all. For consciousness not being made up of parts cannot, like wood, really constitute the material substrate of any division. According to us, Vedántins, it is Nescience only which is the material cause of all limitation and determination. Division also really belongs to Acidyā and is only falsely super-imposed upon the Self. The internal organ also—which is a product of Nescience—limits and determines the Self through Nescience only, not directly. On this our view nothing remains unexplained.

Nor can we accept the second alternative,—viz., of the distinction of Brahman and individual soul being due to redundancy or excess (atireka). For since that distinction may be accounted for on the basis of Nescience which is something actually given, there is no occasion for the assumption of a redundancy (atireka). Nor may you object that since Nescience must be defined as that which belongs to the individual soul and has Brahman for its object, it rests itself on the distinction of the two and hence cannot be the cause of the distinction. For we observe that, even though the conception of a certain thing being the 'pratiyogin' (the object of distinction, or negation), is due to its being actually so distinct, yet what causes that distinction is that same character of 'pratiyogin.' Were it not so, your assumption of an atireka also would be impossible, for that atireka means something which distinguishes Brahman from the individual soul, and hence pre-supposes the distinction of the two; and how then could it be the cause of that same distinction? Moreover, we have proved above already that Nescience does not demand difference of substrate and object.

Nor finally is the third alternative admissible. For that which is absolutely without parts cannot by itself enter into the condition of a whole consisting of parts.

There thus remains the second main alternative only,—viz., that the distinction of Brahman and the individual soul is due to nothing else but Nescience; and this, of course, is just the view we Vedántins hold. This Nescience indeed is really connected

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with pure Consciousness, and in this way brings about the division between Brahman and the individual soul; yet it may be viewed as somehow disregarding Brahman and leaning towards the individual soul, and thus to produce the phenomenal world; just as a mirror or other reflecting surface which really has a connexion with the face only (i.e., the real face), after having once brought about the distinction of face and reflected face, produces effects (such as dimness of outline and colour) in the reflected face only. But consider the judgment, ‘I am not-knowing’—does not Nescience therein present itself as abiding in the Self as particularised by the ahaṅkāra (i.e., the organ of egoity or self-consciousness), and not in pure (universal non-personal) Consciousness? Not so, we reply. Of a red hot lump of iron we say ‘the iron burns,’ i.e., the iron and the quality of burning present themselves to our mind in co-ordination, since both are connected with the fire (which really is what burns); in the same way Nescience and the internal organ present themselves to our mind as co-ordinated (as they do in the judgment ‘I do not know’), because they are both connected with one and the same Self, and because the internal organ is the real substrate of Nescience. Otherwise our reasoning would move in a vicious circle—‘the internal organ is due to the connexion of the Self with Nescience’ and ‘the Self is connected with Nescience, in so far as it (the Self) is particularized by the internal organ.’ Nor can it be said that the Self is never observed to be connected with Nescience—apart from the internal organ; for such connexion is actually admitted to exist in the state of deep sleep (in which the internal organ ceases to exist).

“But, since Consciousness, which in its very nature is unrelated (asaṁśga), cannot be the substrate of Nescience, we must needs assume that that substrate is to be found in something particularized!” Well, what could that ‘something particularized’ be but the internal organ, Consciousness and the connexion of the two? So in the end Consciousness again will be the substrate! “But the ‘something particularized’ may be a thing different from those just mentioned!” Then, we reply, it could be only something of a non-intelligent (jañña) nature; and such a thing cannot be the substrate of Nescience. For if it were such, it would follow that also erroneous cognition, true cognition and release—

*Vive. 117.*
which necessarily have the same substrate as Nescience—abide in what is non-intelligent, unconscious! (and this of course is absurd). Nor, we remark finally, is there any contradiction implied in our holding that Consciousness is in reality absolutely non-related, and at the same time fictitiously the substrate of Nescience. The final conclusion then is that Nescience has for its substrate pure Consciousness but as it has a leaning towards the individual Self, is spoken of as having the latter for its substrate.

XXIV.

[The theory, held by some Neo-Vedāntins, that Nescience abides not in the Self, but in the internal organ, cannot be accepted. If the Self were free from Nescience, it would be permanently omniscient; for its consciousness could not be limited by Nescience not abiding in itself. Nescience is without beginning, and hence the cause of the beginningless world-process. The power of Nescience, and its relation to the self, are not indeed matters to be rationally accounted for; to be non-rational is just the characteristic feature of Nescience.]

Bhāskara⁰ indeed teaches that it is the internal organ that is the substrate of Nescience. But in that case the Self would be permanently omniscient, and this is contradicted by consciousness. He, on the other hand, who holds the Self not to be omniscient, must admit that there inheres in the Self Nescience expressing itself in the form ‘now and then the Self does not know this or that.’ Let us then say that while non-cognition (i.e., absence of coguition) and false cognition abide in the Self, ajñāna conceived as a positive entity abides in the internal organ!

This also will not avail. For if we understand by ‘ajñāna’ (non-knowledge), that which is other than knowledge, even such diseases of the eye as the ‘kācha’ (an affection of the optic nerve causing dimness of vision) and ‘kāmala’ (jaundice) would have to be regarded as ‘ajñāna.’ Let us then understand by ajñāna that which is contradictorily opposed to knowledge!

⁰ Author of the Bhāskarabhāṣya on the Brahmaṇasūtras; published in the Chaukhambhā Sanskrit Series, Benares.

Viv. 118.
This also will not avail. For to knowledge which admittedly resides in the Self, there cannot be contradictorily opposed a non-knowledge residing in the internal organ. Knowledge of some object that resides in Devadatta does not put an end to non-knowledge, regarding the same object, which resides in Yajñadatta! But although we admit that in other cases there can be no real opposition between knowledge and non-knowledge if abiding in different substrates, yet the ājñāna abiding in the instrument of knowledge may be in opposition to the knowledge abiding in the knowing subject! Not so, we reply. When Devadatta makes the inference,—‘This Yajñadatta does not discern the cause of the resolution (in general Nescience) of his internal organ; owing to that internal organ being resolved in deep sleep,—this cognition on the part of Devadatta does not put an end to the ājñāna abiding in the internal organ of the sleeping Yajñadatta, although that organ is the instrument in the inference made by Devadatta. But an end is put to the ājñāna abiding in the internal organ of the knowing agent (Devadatta)! This reasoning also, we reply, does not avail; for there is no proof to show that ājñāna abides in the internal organ at all! There is such proof. For we may argue—‘the ājñāna under discussion abides in the internal organ; since it is a defect giving rise to error; just like the affection of the eye called kāchaka.’ Then, we reply, the ājñāna should reside in the eye and the other sense-organs! But these, being things that have a beginning, cannot be abodes of the beginningless ājñāna! The internal organ also, we reply, has a beginning. "But, as you hold the satkārya-view, the internal organ cannot be conceived as having a beginning!""

This reasoning holds good with regard to the eye and the other sense-organs also! And the conclusion thus is that Nescience does not reside in the internal organ, but in the Self.

a The ‘Satkārya view’ is that every effect that is brought about by a cause is sat, ever existent; even before it is produced, it exists in its cause, in a latent form; and all that the so-called ‘production’ does is to render manifeest the effect which had hitherto existed only in an unmanifested state in the cause. According to this view then, nothing, whether a cause or an effect, can be said to have a beginning. This is the theory of ‘Cause and Effect’ accepted by the Saṅkhya and the Vedāntin. (Vide Saṅkhya-kārikā, 9, and Brahma-sūtra II-i—14).

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This view is thus set forth, in answer to an objection, by Vishvarūpāchārya:

Q.—'But how does Nescience approach the Self that is self-illumined, absolutely unchanging, the sole reality?' A.—As darkness approaches the sun with his thousand rays!'

‘Nescience cannot be denied! For every one is conscious of it; it does not exist apart from the Self; nor does the Self exist apart from it.'

And that this Nescience is the cause of the distinction of Brahman and the individual soul, the (Viṣṇu) Purāṇa declares—

‘When ajñāna, which gives rise to distinction, has utterly perished, what then will bring about the unreal distinction of the individual Self and Brahman?’

As Nescience is eternal, there is nothing irrational in our viewing it as the cause of a beginningless distinction. And that Nescience is without beginning Smṛiti expressly declares⁰ —'know Prakṛiti and the soul to be both without a beginning.' That Prakṛiti is the same as Māyā follows from the scriptural text—'know Prakṛiti to be Māyā.'† And the identity of Māyā and Avidyā we have already set forth.

But an objection is raised, admitting that the self-illumined Self is the substrate of Nescience, it cannot be its object; for it everlastingly reveals itself to consciousness. A person to whose consciousness a jar clearly presents itself, does not express himself as if the jar were an object of ajñāna, and say ‘I do not cognize the jar.' Nor may you plead against this that, forms of expression, such as ‘I do not know (understand) the matter stated by you,’ show that we do speak even of such things as are present to consciousness as being objects of ajñāna in so far as defining it; for in the instance quoted the object of ajñāna is (not the matter stated in itself) but only some special aspect of the matter which is not comprehended. If it be argued that that which is not comprehended cannot rightly be regarded as defining (or differentiating) anything,—our reply is that, in that case, it is for you to supply us with an explanation of such well-known instances as—'I do not understand the matter stated by you.'


Viv. 120.
Our answer to the above objection is that it is only such matter as is illumined (made cognizable) by a valid means of knowledge that cannot be an object of ajñāna; since it is the very nature and function of those means of knowledge to put an end to ajñāna. On the other hand, there is not any objection to the view that something known by immediate intuition, whether it be a jar and the like or Consciousness, is the object of ajñāna. For, as we have explained before, witnessing consciousness does not put an end to ajñāna; it rather is that which establishes or proves it. By what other means, indeed, could ajñāna be proved or established, considering that it is contradicted and opposed by all means of knowledge and all rational arguments? It has been said—

'This error, devoid of foundation, in conflict with all logical arguments, can stand rational enquiry no more than darkness can stand the light of the sun.'

And this incapability of standing rational enquiry indeed is the characteristic feature and beauty of Avidyā. This also has been declared, in the following stanza:

'That it cannot stand rational enquiry,—it is just this which constitutes the characteristic feature of Avidyā; were it not so, Avidyā would be a reality.'

Nor must it be imagined that Avidyā, the beauty of which consists in its evading all rational enquiry, has no power of obscuring the Self; for on this point also we have the following authoritative saying:

'Nothing truly may surpass the audacity (or impudence) of Avidyā; in contempt of all valid means of knowledge and all reality, it attaches itself to the highest Self!'

Nor can those who put their whole trust in ratiocination (which contradicts Avidyā) set aside intuitive knowledge; for ratiocination itself rests on intuitive knowledge, and without it, it would have no foundation. And intuitive cognition manifests to us the fact that, although the soul is self-luminous, its radical difference and separation from the body and the rest is obscured by ajñāna.
XXV.

[That the Self is the substrate of Error is proved by our ordinary 'I-consciousness,' which by its very nature is a composite cognition in which a real element (the Self) and an unreal one (the body) are confounded.—The Self, though nothing but pure consciousness and free from all diversity, thus has a diversity of aspects superimposed upon itself, owing to false conceit; and to this superimposition both the aforesaid definitions of adhyāsa are applicable.]

But, it is objected, also in that consciousness of the Self which expresses itself in the word 'I' we are conscious of the distinction of the Self from the body and the rest,—this distinction being of the nature of a positive entity (and as such cognisable by direct intuition). Nor may you say that this distinction is again obscured by the false conceit of the Self being identical with the body, which expresses itself in the judgment 'I am a man.' For since this notion of oneness can be explained as being of a metaphorical character—so as not come into real conflict with the consciousness of difference,—there is no occasion to view it as false and thus contradicting the consciousness of difference. If the I-consciousness, on account of the I presenting itself in co-ordination with the body, did not imply the apprehension of the Self as something different from the body, this separation could not be established at all; for there would be no valid means of knowing it, scriptural teaching and inference themselves losing their authoritative power if in conflict with the meaning of the I-consciousness. Nor may it be said that there is no such conflict, since, like the cognition of a double moon and the like, the I-consciousness is something false (unreal). For this would implicate us in circular reasoning—'the I-consciousness is false if scripture and inference are held to be authoritative,' and—'if the I-consciousness is false, scripture and inference are authoritative.' The case of the cognition of a double moon and the like really is not analogous. Cognitions of this latter kind are proved to be false, at once, previously to any formal consideration of the relative strength of the several means of knowledge concerned in each case. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, the relative strength of the means of cognition

\[\text{Viv. } 122.\]
would have to be considered, and by reason of the non-appearance of any contrary cognition (that could sublate it), the I-consciousness would show itself to be the stronger; and hence scriptural teaching and inference which are in conflict with that consciousness would not avail to prove the difference of the Self from the body. As, therefore, the mere I-consciousness does establish the difference of the Self from the body, we hold that the thought which expresses itself in the judgment 'I am a man' is of a metaphorical character (and is not false).

All this, we reply, is devoid of foundation. For, we ask,—do you hold that the I-consciousness has for its object a Self different from the body, on the ground that such difference actually exists? or on the ground that it appears to consciousness? The former is not a tenable view; since it is not the actual existence of difference that causes us to judge that the judgment of non-difference is a merely metaphorical one. For as a matter of fact, it is the mere consciousness of difference that gives to judgments such as 'Devadatta is a lion (i.e., as brave as a lion)' their metaphorical character. Were it otherwise (i.e., if 'gaunatva' depended on the reality of the difference) also judgments such as 'this (shell) is silver', would have to be classed as 'metaphorical', not as erroneous, since in those cases there exists actual difference. As to the second alternative we ask—does the I-consciousness manifest the difference of the Self from the body, before reflexion (vichāra) has taken place, or after that? The first alternative is inadmissible because it would imply the uselessness of philosophical reflexion. And the second alternative is in admissible; because (in that case) what manifests the difference would be the reflexion itself (and not the I-consciousness); as what reflexion does is to distinguish between what is proved (established) and what is not proved. But by reflexion we understand a mental review and examination of arguments (yukti); and arguments do not by themselves produce knowledge, but only in so far as co-operating with one of the recognised means of knowledge. In the case under discussion arguments enable us to discriminate the fact that the I-consciousness which is the true means of knowledge—has for its object the Self so far as distinct from the body. Not so, we reply. Is it, we ask, the function of arguments to

*Viv. 123.*
determine the sphere of a given means of knowledge as comprising certain objects only—'so much only is to be apprehended by thee, neither more nor less!'? Or does their function consist in removing eventual obstacles that may beset the operation of the means of knowledge which has already begun to apprehend a certain object given to it by its own nature? The former alternative cannot be accepted; for—since the minds of men are of the most diverse kind and hence their reasonings follow no definite law—it would imply that there is no fixed rule as to what objects fall within the sphere of each means of knowledge. But this consequence is just what it ought to be; for if the means of knowledge had their fixed several objects, there could be no diversity of opinion between the different philosophical schools! Not so, we reply. Wherever there is a disputed matter, every one clings to his own view as authoritative, and not to any other view. If there was no fixed law as to the objects of the several means of knowledge, every one would have to treat the views of others also as authoritative. Not even many strong arguments combined avail to determine the sphere and scope of a means of knowledge. A thousand arguments even, devised by minds fortified by the knowledge of all śāstras, would be unavailing to constitute sound as the object of the eye, and to break the connexion between the eye and colour. With regard to the second alternative we ask the following question—what constitutes that self-established object of the I-consciousness? is it the distinction of the Self from the body and whatever else is contrary to the Self? or the Self only? From the former alternative it would follow that also materialists and ordinary (non-thinking) people would distinguish between Self and body (which as a matter of fact they do not do). And if against this you urge that in the case of those people discrimination does not emerge because they fail to remove the obstacles to true knowledge by means of philosophic arguments,—we reply that you who do understand the theory of those matters could not on any account ever formulate the judgment 'I am distinct from the body' and so on; for as (on the alternative in question) the mere term I would by itself express that distinction, it would be an idle tautology to form the complete judgment 'I am different from the body.' If, on
the other hand, the I-consciousness (does not by itself imply the distinction of Self and body but) has for its object the Self only,—well then, arguments may possibly do so much as to remove obstacles in the way of the Self being apprehended in the I-consciousness, but they will not avail to get rid of what immediate consciousness suggests, viz., that the body also is the object of the I-consciousness. But on this view the judgment 'I am a man' does neither more nor less than apprehend its own, appropriate, object, and hence cannot be erroneous! Not so, we reply. Our tenet is,—not that such cognitions as apprehend their own object are valid, and such as do not apprehend their objects are invalid,—but that a cognition is valid if it apprehends what is true (real), and invalid if it apprehends the real and unreal together. Now the I-consciousness confounds a real element, viz., the Self, and an unreal one, viz., the body, and apprehends this composit object; it, therefore, must be classed as error. Nor must it be said that no error is possible with regard to the Self which is self-luminous and admits of no distinction of parts, since in the case of a being of this kind it is impossible that some part should not be apprehended (and hence error arises). Consider the case of letters. Letters such as a, i, etc., are without parts, and are on each occasion apprehended in their totality; all the same there are super-imposed upon them certain characters, such as length and shortness, which really belong to the letter-sound. Length and shortness are not attributes of the letters, as appears from the fact that each letter (whether short or long) is always recognised as the same 'this is the letter a,' etc.; all the same even those who are aware of this fundamental identity do not ordinarily give their mind to the arguments proving it, and hence are under the erroneous impression of the letter itself being short or long. Analogously the identity of the Self with the body which is vouched for by the immediate consciousness of all human beings, learned men no less than villagers and children, remains practically unrefuted unless the teaching of scripture produce an insight into the identity of the Self with Brahman, and thus constitutes a universal unavoidable error. The view that the judgment 'I am a man' is a merely metaphorical one will be refuted in our comments on Sūtra 4.

Viv. 125.
The conclusion from what precedes is as follows:—The Self indeed is self-luminous and devoid of parts, but a diversity of aspect is introduced into it thereby that it is obscured by false conceit and hence not apprehended in its Brahman-aspect; owing to this diversity of aspect there arises the possibility of its being apprehended in its general nature only while special features remain non-apprehended, and hence there is nothing irrational in our viewing it as the substrate of error. We, therefore, can in this case also give the essential definition of adhyāsa,—viz., that 'it is the presentation to consciousness of the connexion of an unreal thing with a real substrate', which thus holds good with regard to the great (cosmic) adhyāsa also which has the universal Self for its substrate. And it is equally evident that the secondary or accidental definition also holds good ('adhyāsa is that which is produced by the triad of causes'); for it has been shown that to the Self—which must be viewed as by itself occupying the place of the triad—object, knowing subject and instrument—there clings the great imperfection called Nescience; inasmuch as it is the intelligence of the Self itself which cognises (is the means of cognising) the substrate (of error). And during the beginningless cosmic process (samsāra) an endless chain of previous adhyāsas may be postulated without any difficulty. Although in the case under discussion, owing to the oneness of the substrate and that which is super-imposed upon it, illuminating consciousness is not really originated, yet there is nothing wrong in viewing it as originated in a certain aspect,—viz., in so far as it is affected by a particular object. We further remark that, applying the previous definition of adhyāsa to the present case, we have to understand by the 'similarity (of adhyāsa) to remembrance' the circumstance of its being produced by the mentioned triad of causes. And the 'presentation to consciousness of one thing as constituting the self of another' we have to explain as meaning the presentation of the Real mixed up with the False. We thus have fully proved that to the erroneous identification of the internal organ, body and the rest with the Self, and to the erroneous view of difference as depending on conditioning adjuncts, the general definitions of adhyāsa, previously given, may be applied.
ORIGIN OF THE NAKṣATRA SYSTEM.

From what so far has been said regarding the nature and probable origination of this lunar zodiac it appears that the idea of sub-dividing the Ecliptic, or region of the Ecliptic, into twenty-seven or twenty-eight parts is a sufficiently natural one. It may in fact be called more natural and obvious than the distinction of twelve sections of the Ecliptic in each of which the sun dwells in succession for the twelfth part of a solar year; for while the sun owing to his overpowering radiance can never be directly seen, but only inferred, to be in or near a certain constellation, the progress of the moon with her milder light may be followed from star to star without any difficulty. This latter spectacle, moreover, unrolls itself in full completeness much more frequently than the annual revolution of the sun and by this constant reiteration tends to impress itself more strongly on the minds of men. A lunar zodiac thus may be said to be the first division of the sphere likely to be made by a primitive community to which the idea of the need or convenience of some such division had once presented itself; and hence at first sight there would appear to be no special reason to raise the question whether a lunar zodiac recognised by some ancient nation was originally devised by that nation itself or borrowed by it from some other quarter where a similar zodiac may be met with. Further reflexion, however, may suggest a different conclusion. In the first place the idea of sub-dividing the Ecliptic in accordance with the daily progress of the moon among the constellations, although in a sense a quite natural one, can by no means be characterized as necessary or inevitable—bound to occur to any people which had advanced far enough to think of such devises as sub-dividing the heavenly sphere. Lunar zodiacs were, as we shall see immediately, employed by a very limited number of ancient nations only. No such zodiac was acknowledged by the ancient Egyptians, or by the Greeks and Romans, or the tribes and peoples settled in Asia Minor and Syria, or (which is a point to be discussed fully later on) the Babylonians and Assyrians. Some of these nations in fact by themselves never elaborated any settled sub-division of the
sphere; so e.g., the Greeks and Romans, and apparently also Egyptians, who at a comparatively late period only took over the twelve signs of the solar zodiac from the Babylonians. And this latter fact, in the second place, immediately suggests if not the likelihood, at least the possibility, of the lunar zodiac also having originated among one nation only and been imparted by it to other nations. If, therefore, lunar zodiacs, similar to the Indian one, are actually found from ancient times in the possession of other nations also, the question whether all these several zodiacs should not be traced to one common source, rather than looked upon as independent creations, very naturally suggests itself.

Now the fact is that lunar zodiacs, or—to return to the more guarded designation—zodiacs consisting of 28 stars or groups of stars on the whole manifestly following the tract of the Ecliptic, were and are employed by two other great ancient nations viz., the Chinese and the Arabs—the former acknowledging a series of 28 so-called 'sieu' (mansions; stations), the latter—distinctly referring the stars to the moon—a series of 28 'menâzîl (pl. of manzîl) al yamr' 'stations or mansions of the moon.' The existence of both these series had been known to western scholars from a time earlier than that when the nakṣatra system first became known; the knowledge of the Arabian system dating back to a period which we are not in a position accurately to define; that of the Chinese series being mediated through the labours of Gaubil in the course of the 18th century. The Arabian and the Indian systems were for the first time compared in detail by Colebrooke in the paper mentioned above; and the similarity of the Chinese to the two more western systems was, as far as we know, first definitely dwelled upon by the German astronomer and writer on Chronology, L. Ideler (in his 'Zeitrechnung der Chinesen'). Later on definite testimonies as to the recognition of a zodiac of this kind by other nations also were pointed out. The Bundehesh (one of the sacred or semi-sacred books of the Parsis) enumerates 28 lunar mansions side by side with the twelve signs of the solar zodiac; and two lists of the names by which the 28 lunar mansions were designated by the people of ancient Soghd and Khwarizm are given by Alberúnî (in his 'Chronology of Ancient Nations'). As, however, Parsi literature supplies no
further information whatever about these lunar mansions, and similarly we know nothing as to the systems recognized by the people of Soghd and Khwarizm beyond their bare names (which, moreover, are doubtful in more than one case); and as moreover there is nothing to guarantee a considerable antiquity of either of those zodiacs, any discussion of the origination of the entire system and the possible connexion of its several historical forms, must for the present limit itself to the nakṣatraš of the Hindus, the menāzil of the Arabs and the sieu of the Chinese; about all of which the ancient literatures of the three countries concerned supply a great deal of detailed information.

The lunar zodiacs of all these three nations are of essentially the same character, being composed of 28 (in the case of the Hindu series prevailing) 27) groups of stars or single stars which together form a belt round the entire sphere and, roughly speaking, follow the track of the Ecliptic. A certain number of these asterisms are identical in all the three zodiacs, and in other cases we have a partial agreement; while on the other hand sometimes only two of the zodiacs agree fully or in part, and again in certain other cases each zodiac follows its own individual line in the selection of asterisms. Full and detailed comparisons of the three zodiacs, in tabular form, are to be found in several places; we here refer only to Whitney's 'Lunar zodiac,' and his notes on the 8th chapter of his (and Burgess') translation of the Sūrya Siddhānta; and to Ginzel's Handbook of Chronology (in German, 1906. The discussion given there of the lunar mansions is the most recent one of the subject). As a survey of the constituent members of each of the three zodiacs shows at once, the Arabian series on the whole most closely follows the Ecliptic and thus is best adapted to the purpose of defining the place, at any given time, of not only the sun, but also the moon and the planets—which although not of course moving in the Ecliptic never deviate from it to any large extent. The Chinese series, within a certain section comprising three or four sieu, follows a track of its own, completely separating it from the two other series, far to the south of the Ecliptic; and in the Indian series we meet with four constituent members which lie even further away from the Ecliptic towards the north (Svātī, the peculiar position
of which was discussed above; and the three consecutive nakṣatras Abhijit, Shravana and Shravisthās).

In spite of these considerable discrepancies most of the writers who have investigated the question with some care, incline to the opinion that the general agreement in the choice of stars and groups of stars forcibly suggests the conclusion that the three series are fundamentally identical, are in fact mere variations of one and the same original. Whitney e.g., (to quote only that writer who has discussed this matter with the greatest fulness and insight into the conditions of the problem) sums up his comparison of the three systems in the following words:—

'No one, I am confident, can examine this exposition of the correspondences and differences of the three systems without being convinced that they are actually three derivative forms of the same original.'

On a renewed careful survey and consideration of the question we should be inclined to express ourselves on this latter point with rather less 'confidence.' It must be remembered that the selection of 27 or 28 asterisms on the part of those who on the whole wish to keep close to the Ecliptic—or, for the matter of that, the track of the moon—is limited by certain obvious conditions; the stars selected must not be too far from the central track and of course should, as far as possible, be distinguished either by brightness or some other feature that attracts the eye, as e.g., peculiarity of configuration. Keeping this in mind and carefully scrutinising a stellar map, we shall find that in a considerable number of cases the choice of certain definite asterisms was as good as inevitable: it would be strange indeed if the framer of such a system had left out a (Spica) Virginis (the Indian Chitā); or a Scorpionis (Antares; the Indian Jyeṣṭhā); or the Pleiades (which seem to have attracted the special attention of all early nations); or those stars in Sagittarius which constitute the Indian two Arāḍhās; or even those four stars in Pegasus which together form the two Bhādra-pādas (for these stars although situated at a good distance to the north of the Ecliptic form a striking quadrilateral, and just in that region of the sky only stars of the 3rd and 4th magnitude are closer to the Ecliptic). On the other hand, there are striking disagreements of the several series just in cases where an agreement
might reasonably be expected; Regulus e.g., (a Leonis) a conspicuous star of the second magnitude and moreover situated almost in the Ecliptic, is not included in the Chinese series; nor are those stars in Leo which constitute the two Indian Phalgunī and the Arabian Zubrah and Sarfah. Really proving force for the original identity of the three series can be claimed for those cases only where the three systems agree in passing over conspicuous stars which appear to have every right to be included in the series, or in singling out insignificant stars or groups of stars for the selection of which no good reason is apparent. But cases of this kind are very few indeed. The most striking one (in fact the only really striking one) is the selection, in all the three series, of three faint stars in Orion's head (λ ψ¹ ψ² Orionis) regarding which Whitney says that 'it is not a little strange that the framers of the system (he means 'the hypothetical original system') should have chosen for marking the third station this faint group, to the exclusion of the brilliant and conspicuous pair β and ζ Tauri on the tips of the bull's horns. There is hardly another case where we have so much reason to find fault with their selection.' As to this we may point out that a selection of those faint stars on the part of Indians might have been prompted by the circumstance that they form the 'head of the deer' (mrigashiras), which plays a part in an apparently very ancient astral myth (see above), and hence had a good chance of not being omitted from a regular series, probably devised at a later period, of asterisms. We are not, it must be admitted, able to justify in some similar way an independent selection of this very same group by the Chinese and Arabs. It, however, appears to us that there is no other case where the three systems are at one in making a selection which could justly be called unaccountable and hence would supply a really valid argument for their derivation from one common original from. On the other hand it may, we think, be safely asserted that, provided there was one original series forming the common basis of the three historical systems, the deviations of the several systems from one another and the hypothetical prototype, really appear most of them quite unaccountable. We must leave it to students sufficiently interested in this matter, to ascertain and consider the signification of the details.

41.
The outcome of the above is that on the whole we feel inclined to say that the agreement of the three systems in the choice of asterisms as members of the series is far from being so marked as strongly, not to say inevitably, to suggest the conclusion that they all are copies, more or less modified, of one original prototype. We rather should say that there is no greater agreement than was practically inevitable on the conditions of the problem, viz., of selecting 27 or 28 asterisms which on the one hand were not very remote from the Ecliptic and hence could conveniently be used to mark the daily progress of the moon, and on the other hand were sufficiently conspicuous to rivet the attention and determine the choice on the part of observers in no way concerned to establish a system satisfying rigorous, theoretical or scientific demands. On the other hand we must allow that the differences from one another of the three systems, do not by themselves suffice to negative the hypothesis of their original connexion. For reasons which we may not be able to assign in detail, but the existence of which can easily be imagined, each nation may have effected independent changes in the original series. The case might e.g., have been that the original series, by whomever devised, on the whole followed the Ecliptic more closely than any one of the historical series; and that a certain people while adopting it on the whole modified it in certain details suggested by their previous astronomical notions or fancies—eliminating e.g., faint stars which although near to the Ecliptic had not previously been specially noticed or named by them, and substituting for them others with which they had been familiar in this way. We might, for instance, account in this way for the fact that the Hindus—assuming them to have adopted a series invented by some other people—replaced by the conspicuous asterisms Shravana and Shravishṭhās certain stars less conspicuous but much nearer to the ecliptic which may have formed part of the original system and are actually included in the Chinese and Arabian series. What after all remains in force is the consideration that the formation of a zodiac of 27 or 28 asterisms, although in a way natural enough, is by no means something necessary or inevitable; and that hence attempts to establish some historical connexion between the several zodiacs of that kind actually met with have a good deal of a priori
justification. The question of the possible common origin of the three systems is in fact one which we cannot help raising. Whether a satisfactory solution can be found for it, is another matter.

As far as we are aware, none indeed of the several scholars who have given attention to the lunar zodiacs, appears to favour the view that each of them might have been independently originated by the nation to which it belongs; as said above, the general opinion seems to have been and to be that the several systems exhibit so striking an agreement in detail that the hypothesis of a common origin is the overwhelmingly more probable one. But as to where that origin is to be looked for, opinions differ widely. The *a priori* possible solutions of the problem, of course, are numerous. It might be claimed for any one of the three historical systems that it represents the original one of which the other two are mere copies or adaptations. Then again, the system might either have been communicated by the originating nation independently and directly to each of the other two nations; or it might have been taken over directly by one of the latter only and by them transmitted to the third nation. Or else, it might be held that the original system was not devised by any of the three nations who acknowledged lunar zodiacs; but was primarily elaborated by some other (fourth) people from whom the Hindus and Arabs and Chinese borrowed their systems. And on this supposition again the process of borrowing may either have been a direct one in each case; or else one nation may have borrowed directly, and then imparted its knowledge to the other two. We will, however, not waste time on an examination of general possibilities or probabilities; but at once proceed to give concise accounts of the more important theories regarding the origin and history of the lunar zodiac which have been actually set forth and advocated by scholars of note.

The simplest plan will here be to proceed in historical order, and we may begin with Colebrooke who gave the first scholarly and thorough exposition of the Indian nakṣatra system. Colebrooke does not refer to the sieu system; as to the nakṣatra system, he was of opinion that it was an indigenous Indian product, and was borrowed from India by the Arabs when they, at a comparatively late date, became acquainted
with Hindu Astronomy. The first to undertake a definite discussion of the character and relations of all the three systems was the famous French astronomer and phycisist J. B. Biot who, in 1837, published in the 'Journal des Savans' a series of papers bearing the title 'Recherches sur l'ancienne astronomie Chinoise, publiées à l' occasion d'un mémoire de M. Ludwig Ideler sur la chronologie des Chinois.' L. Ideler, the well-known astronomer and antiquarian (author of a 'Handbook of Mathematical and technical Chronology' which until quite recently maintained its position as the foremost book on this subject) had, in the dissertation named in the title of Biot's papers, given a description of the Chinese sieu system (founded on information derived from Gaubil, the French 18th century Missionary whose several works on Chinese astronomy are even now the main source of our knowledge of that subject), and without entering on a discussion of the question concerning the possible connexion of that system with the lunar zodiacs of other nations referred to the sieu as a series of 'lunar mansions.' The main aim of Biot's papers is to impugn this latter view and to establish, instead, what he considers the true theory, in the first place, of the origination of the sieu system and next its relation to the other so-called lunar zodiacs. There is nothing, he thinks, to connect the sieu with the moon, apart from the comparatively irrelevant circumstance that their number amounts to 28, and that the Arabian and Indian systems indeed suggest a special relation to the moon of their 27 or 28 asterisms. But the Chinese system must be taken altogether by itself and interpreted on the basis of a comprehensive knowledge of the development of astronomical theory and practice on the part of the Chinese. That the sieu could not originally have been intended to mark the progress of the moon in the course of a sidereal month, he considers to be sufficiently proved by the extraordinary inequality of their extent: observers at all interested in sub-dividing the sphere in accordance with the gradual advance of the moon could not have failed to map out equal or nearly equal stellar spaces. And for the actual unequal divisions the true reason admits of being traced. The Chinese were, as we have good evidence to maintain, from very ancient time, in the habit of observing the meridian transits of
certain important stars and to note their time intervals. In the beginning the main objects of observation were the stars of certain circumpolar constellations (theGreater Bear, the Lesser Bear, the Lyre, etc.) which for some reason or other had early attracted attention; later on, it was found more convenient to note the transits of stars situated near the celestial Equator in the case of which observations are more easy and yield more accurate results; but the choice of those equatorial stars was throughout determined by the requirement that they should have the same, or nearly the same, right ascensions—and hence should pass through the meridian at the same or nearly the same time—as the anciently observed and familiar circumpolar stars. This view, Biot thinks, furnishes the clue to a complete and rational interpretation of the origination of the sieu series with its, otherwise unaccountable, inequalities. On the basis of laborious calculations of the co-ordinates of the sieu stars in ancient times he arrives at the conclusion that those stars were selected and the sieu series thus formed about the time of the ancient Chinese emperor Yao who may be designated as the first historical, or at any rate semi-historical, personage in Chinese history, and under whom moreover—as related in the Shu-king, the most ancient Chinese book preserved—attempts were made to determine the places of the solstices and equinoxes with reference to certain stars which are included in the sieu series. The condition of admitting into that series such equatorial stars only as have the same right ascension with certain circumpolar stars, Biot thinks, at once explains the otherwise unintelligible inequality of extent of the several sieu; for it, of course, greatly restricts the selection. Of the 28 stars constituting the entire series, twenty-four only can, however, be referred with good reason to the time of Yao; the four remaining stars, Biot holds, were added about twelve centuries later, under the Emperor Tcheu-Kong, for the reason that they very accurately marked the places of the solstices and the equinoxes at this latter period. The sieu system thus had originally nothing whatever to do with the moon (this, apart from other facts, appears from its having originally 24 members only). Its evident purpose was to supply the Chinese astronomers with a series of stars, conveniently situated, the
co-ordinates of which were well ascertained, and which, therefore, could be advantageously used as points to which to refer the places of solstices and equinoxes, and generally of sun, moon and planets. The whole siege system thus bears from the beginning a decidedly scientific character: the determining stars of the siege are in fact strictly analogous to the fundamental stars of modern astronomers i.e. stars, the position of which is determined with rigorous accuracy and which, therefore, may be used as points of reference for other observations.

For the so-called lunar zodiacs of the Hindus and the Arabs, Biot holds, it can be proved neither that they are the outcome of strictly astronomical or scientific considerations, nor that they existed at so early a time as the Chinese series. We, therefore, may look upon them as adaptations of the latter. The system must be assumed to have been transferred to India at some time later than 1100 B.C. (for it was not before this latter date that the series was raised from 24 to 28 members); when the Hindus, either not recognizing or not interested in its scientific character, arbitrarily substituted new stars or groups of stars for many members of the old series, fancifully brought their series into special relation to the moon and generally misused it for astrological purposes. The Arabian menazil finally must also be viewed as an adaptation of the Chinese system, influenced, however, to some extent by the nakṣatra system of the Hindus. Here also we meet with the secondary idea of bringing a system originally devised for quite different purposes, into special connection with the moon, and generally perverting it from astrological motives.

Biot's theory as to the origin and history of the siege—nakṣatra—menazil system, as shortly sketched above, has been the starting point of all later discussions of this subject and, therefore, possesses a considerable historical interest. But there probably is no one at present inclined to accept his results. As early as 1864 his views concerning the mode of origination of the Chinese system were submitted to an incisive criticism on the part of the late Professor Whitney (the main points of which were later on re-stated by him in the essay referred to above) the entire soundness of which must be evident to every careful student. In the first place, as Professor Whitney points out, there is
absolutely no historical evidence in favour of Biot's account. The Chinese annals tell us only that at the time of the emperor Tchen-Kong the place of the winter solstice was determined as falling within a certain sieu, but not that an original series of 24 asterisms was at that time amplified into one of 28 members, by the intercalation of those stars which happened to mark the solstices and equinoxes of the period; the latter is simply a hypothesis of Biot's. Nor do the old Chinese books anywhere hint at the selection of (Biot's) original 24 asterisms having been determined by regard for circumpolar stars having the same right ascensions; we only learn from them that certain stars of the latter class were early objects of attention. Historical evidence might, however, perhaps, be dispensed with, if Biot's results were in themselves convincing. But on this point also Whitney achieves a complete, and, in fact, very easy victory. One has only to peruse somewhat carefully the comments by which Biot essays to justify the connexion, asserted by him, between the determining stars of the sieu and certain circumpolar stars about 2357 B.C., to discern at once the utter weakness of the argument: the impression produced by a few rather close agreements is utterly destroyed by a majority of glaring disagreements, and Biot's attempts to account for the latter can hardly be characterized otherwise than as futile. Moreover, as also pointed out by Whitney (following Sédillot and Williams), Biot reasons throughout on the assumption of the sieu having been from the beginning single stars, not groups of stars; while an impartial examination of the older documents reveals that, like the Nakṣatrās and Menāzil they originally were most of them groups of stars—the inequality of extent of the stellar divisions thus finding its natural and simple explanation in the unequal extent of the constellations. Biot's theory as to the origination of the sieu system thus has doubtless to be abandoned. Whether, apart from this, it after all must be considered an old indigenous Chinese institution, possibly going back to the time of Yāo—this is an altogether different question which will claim our attention later on. As to the alleged transmission of the system from China to the more western nations, Biot has to offer no evidence whatever; he in fact treats this side of the problem very
superficially, not even e. g., raising the question whether there may not be reason to assign to the Indian Nakṣatra series an earlier date than 1100 B. C.—when, as we saw above, the Chinese system is supposed by him to have assumed that final form in which the Hindus borrowed it.

That a man of such eminent ability as Biot came persistently to advocate a theory so evidently destitute of any solid foundation, affords matter for legitimate wonder. The fact seems to be that he allowed himself to be fascinated by the idea of being able to show that this ancient series of 28 asterisms was established on what might be called a truly scientific basis and for truly scientific purposes; and it is known that he, somewhat unaccountably, was inclined generally to overrate the capacities of the ancient Chinese for exact observations and scientific thought. He, moreover, was right in maintaining that, as far as the older Chinese literature is concerned, there are no traces of any special connexion of the sieu-stars with the moon. And there further were two special circumstances which no doubt tended to blind his eyes to the general unsoundness of this hypothesis; in the first place, the fact that there are at any rate some close agreements between the right ascensions of sieu stars and circumpolar stars at Yao's time; and in the second place, the peculiar circumstance that in a certain region, comprising four sieu, the Chinese series really follows with surprising closeness the Equator of Yao's time; separating itself there completely from the Indian and the Arabian series. This choice, on the part of the Chinese, of stars comparatively dim but close to the equator, to the exclusion of much more conspicuous stars near the Ecliptic—such as the Maghās and Phalgunī of the Hindus (recognised by the Arabs also)—probably more than anything else confirmed Biot in his view of the series in its Chinese form having originally not been an ecliptical one but connected with the Equator of Yao's time. We must admit that the peculiar deviation of the Chinese series, in that place, towards the Equator has not been accounted for by those who reject Biot's general hypothesis. But this local and partial confirmation of Biot's views is, of course, overwhelmingly counter balanced by their general improbability or rather impossibility.

48.
The next attempt to formulate a theory regarding the origin of the lunar Zodiac and the historical connexions of its several forms was made by the late Professor A. Weber in his paper on 'Die Vedischen Nachrichten von den nakṣatra' (published in the Transactions of the Berlin Academy; 1870). This dissertation is specially meant to combat Biot's views, on other grounds however than those on which Whitney proceeded in his criticism. Professor Weber does not examine the intrinsic soundness of Biot's theory: he in fact repeatedly acknowledges what he calls Biot's 'scientific superiority' and declines to meet him on his own ground.

What he undertakes is to challenge the validity of the historical premisses of Biot's conclusions. Biot had, in a way, taken it for granted that the sieu system of the Chinese goes back to a very ancient period: Chinese tradition, he holds, does not allow us to doubt of the existence of a complete sieu series of 28 members at, at any rate, 1100 B.C., and the references to certain sieu stars in the oldest books, such as the Shoking, make it at any rate highly probable that the complete system was in existence at an earlier period already (the legitimacy of this initial assumption being finally fully proved by the 'scientific'

*We may permit ourselves to point out that this deference to superior scientific qualifications, expressed by Professor Weber and others with regard to Biot's speculations, implies a certain want of clear insight into the nature of historico-astronomical researches of this kind. None, of course, but a fully competent Mathematician or Astronomer could, or would, undertake to challenge the result of Biot's calculations of the right ascensions, declinations, etc., of certain circumpolar and equatorial stars 2400 years before the Christian Era (the formulas of which calculations were worked out by Biot himself with great fulness in the 3rd volume of his Treatise on Astronomy). But there is no reason whatever why a Philologist or Antiquarian, provided, of course, he possess clear ideas concerning certain elementary astronomical facts and relations, should hesitate to examine and criticize the conclusions which the astronomer may finally attempt to draw from the results of his calculations. When Biot places before us, in the clearest possible tabular form, a full statement of the positions of the sieu and other stars at Yao's time, it is quite open to the mere 'Philologist' (which incompetent person Biot on more than one occasion attempts to rule out of court) to point out that the few close agreements between the places of the sieu stars and certain circumpolar stars are altogether too weak to support the burden of Biot's general theory. This is what was done, later on, in the most convincing fashion by Professor Whitney.

49.
demonstration of the system having been really formed at the
time of Yao). Against this Professor Weber argues that there is
no positive evidence for the complete sieu series having been
recognised by the Chinese earlier than about 250 B.C. (when
a writer called Lou-pou-ouey mentions the names of all the
28 sieu); that it is more than doubtful whether the book called
Tcheou-li—which refers to the 28 sieu, without however giving
any details about them—can really be dated back to 1100 B.C.,
as Biot had unhappily assumed—; and that finally those
Chinese books which really may claim a high antiquity, e.g.,
the Shouking, mention indeed by name some of the stars which
later on appear as members of the sieu series, but nowhere
allude to the existence of a complete series of that kind at their
time. The only sound conclusion from the historical evidence
Professor Weber holds to be that a zodiac of 28 members was not
known to the Chinese earlier than a few centuries before the
Christian era, at a time when, as other circumstances go to show,
there was some active intercourse and exchange of ideas between
India and China, or at any rate a transference of ideas from
India to China. And as, on the other hand, there can be no
doubt that a lunar zodiac of 27 or 28 members was known to
the Hindus much earlier than let us say 300 B.C.—for we find
such a zodiac clearly recognised in the later Sanskritas as well as
the Brāhmaṇas—it, of course, is altogether impossible to maintain
as Biot did that the Indian series was borrowed from the Chinese.
The reverse process on the other hand cannot be considered as
impossible. On the whole, however, and taking into account the
not unimportant divergences between the Indian and the Chinese
series as well as certain curious agreements between the Chinese
and the Arabian series, Professor Weber thinks it the likeliest
hypothesis that the original home of the entire system is to be
looked for not in India but somewhere in Western Asia; from
where it later on was borrowed by Indians, Chinese and Arabs
alike. This hypothesis would not exclude the possibility of, at a
subsequent period, the three historical systems having influenced
each other in details; the Arabian series, e.g., Professor Weber
thinks, shows decided traces of having assumed its final shape
under the influence of the nakṣatra system. As the seat of the
original system it would for several reasons recommend itself to
50.
look in Babylon, where the study of the starry sky is known to have been cultivated from very ancient times, and whose central position favours the view of elements of culture having been imparted from there to more peripherally situated countries—Arabia, India and China alike. Professor Weber admitted that apart from these speculations as to probability, there are only a few positive facts which, in a way, seem to indicate the recognition of a lunar zodiac by the Babylonians; but he thought it probable that in the course of progress of Babylonian and Assyrian research more cogent evidence for the hypothesis would be forthcoming.

We refrain from analysing the few facts actually adduced by Professor Weber: they indeed are altogether weak and inconclusive; the question of the general probability of the Babylonian theory will claim our attention later on. Professor Weber is generally admitted to have been right in claiming for the Indian system an antiquity which at once precludes its being looked upon as an adaptation of a Chinese series fully elaborated at no earlier date than 1100 B.C. And he further rendered a decided service to the treatment of the question by emphasizing the need of a careful investigation of the age and trustworthiness of the Chinese sources. Whether his scepticism in this direction was not carried too far, we shall consider later on; also whether he was right in looking upon the final Arab series as constituted under the influence of the Nakṣatra system.

While Biot had undertaken to vindicate the original zodiac of 28 stars for China, and while A. Weber had maintained, if not the absolute originality, yet the relative priority of the nakṣatras to the sieu and also the menāzil, the latter had found their champion in Sédillot the younger (chiefly known through his researches in the field of Arabian astronomy). This scholar arrived at the conclusion, mainly formulated in opposition to the theories of Biot, that the three nations must be held to have been from very ancient times in the independent possession of lunar zodiacs of their own: but that among the three zodiacs the Arabian one is much the most rational and suitable and that this zodiac at a comparatively late period penetrated into India and China and there led to a rectification and systematization of the old indigenous series which in the course
of time had become defective and incoherent (cf. Sédillot's 'Matériaux, pour servir à l'histoire comparée des sciences mathématiques chez les Grecs et les Orientaux'; 1849).

Among other scholars, excepting those of quite recent times, who have dealt with the question of the origin of the Nakṣatra system, we finally must mention the late Professor Max Müller and E. Burgess (the joint translator with Whitney of the Sūrya Siddhānta), who agreed in claiming for the Nakṣatra system a purely Indian origin, without in any way exhaustively dealing with the wider question of the relations of the several lunar zodiacs. Professor Max Müller who developed his views at some length in the preface to the fourth volume of his edition of the Rīgveda, did not throw much light on the problem. And of Burgess we can only say that he was a wellmeaning but altogether uncritical advocate of the originality of Indian astronomical science in all its stages and branches.

After the first important papers of Biot, Weber and Whitney, on the origin of the lunar zodiac, the controversy was continued for some length of time by the two latter scholars who, although by no means fundamentally opposed to each other on the main issues, yet disagreed as to many details. Professor Weber in 1862 supplemented his first paper on the 'Vedischen Nachrichten von den nakṣatra' ('Historical Introduction'), by a second paper of very great value in which he, very methodically and with astonishing learning, arranged and discussed all those passages from the Veda (including the Sūtras) which in any way throw light on the Hindu lunar stations; and later on in various papers (mostly published in his 'Indische Studien') defended his views of the origin and history of the lunar zodiac against Whitney, who while not being the equal of his antagonist in Vedic learning was decidedly superior to him in insight into what we may call the astronomical aspects of the problem. In one, and in fact the most important, point, however, the two eminent scholars showed themselves in the end in general agreement; for Whitney also came in course of time to look upon the hypothesis of the lunar zodiac having been first devised by some people of Western Asia and imparted by them to the three nations, as on the whole the most probable one.
It was this latter view also which gradually gained ground in what we may, in contradistinction from the views held by special enquirers, call learned public opinion. All attempts to demonstrate that one of the three historical forms of the lunar zodiac was the direct prototype of the two others had failed; while at the same time there remained the general likelihood of so peculiar an institution not having originated independently in several places but spread from one original centre. And certain considerations, no doubt seemed to point to Western Asia, more definitely Babylon with its ancient special cultivation of astronomical science—the proofs for which, resting on the study of genuine Babylonian documents, were rapidly accumulating—and its conveniently central position. The hypothesis certainly deserved to be entertained and set forth as a by no means improbable one; but as generally happens in such cases the uncritical desire of assuming historical connexions on an insufficient basis widely asserted itself and we consequently find it stated by quite a number of writers on Oriental antiquities, within the last thirty years or so, that the lunar zodiac beyond doubt was invented by the Babylonians and imparted by them to the different other nations. Persons making this assertion did not take account of the adverse circumstance that while owing to continued excavations of documents in the cuneiform character and to the strenuous and highly successful labours of a rapidly increasing band of Assyrian and Babylonian scholars, our knowledge of the history, civilization and culture of the nations anciently settled on the lower Euphrates and Tigris, was constantly advancing in all directions, and among the rest many texts of an astronomical or astrological character were discovered and in at least a superficial way interpreted, not a single definite trace of an ancient Babylonian lunar zodiac was forthcoming. The documentary evidence to the eventual turning up of which Professor Weber had confidently been looking forward, as a matter of fact obstinately refused to present itself. The import of this negative result should have been clear to the unbiassed eye: it should have been discerned that with every further year of Babylonian research which failed to reveal evidence of a Babylonian lunar Zodiac, the hypothesis of a Babylonian origin of the nakṣatras, sieu, and menāzil lost
a further part of its strength. That this actually was not seen, but on the contrary the Babylonian origin of the system came more and more to be spoken of as a matter of course, is a somewhat curious phenomenon.

We now have to notice the courageous attempt made by Professor F. Hommel, the well-known Assyriologist, to prove the Babylonian hypothesis, in spite, so to say, of the absence of all positive evidence. Professor Hommel's speculations on this point directly connect themselves with that important book in which the first successful step was taken to establish a scientific basis for the study of Babylonian astronomy: we, of course, mean Professor Epping's work 'Astronomisches aus Babylon' (1889). We cannot in this place enter into any details as to Epping's 'epochmaking' labours (which since the lamented death of the author have been continued with even more brilliant results by Professor Kugler): it suffices for our purposes to state that the interpretation of certain tablets containing records of planetary positions some centuries before the Christian era, among other things established the fact that the Babylonian astronomers followed the practice of referring the positions of the planets (as of sun and moon also) to a certain number of fixed stars situated near or not far from the track of the ecliptic. The exact number of the stars thus employed is not yet known, but it certainly exceeded thirty, and possibly (we cannot enter into a statement of the reasons for this assumption) amounted to thirty-six. Laborious calculations of the actual places of the planets on the dates recorded on the tablets enabled Professor Epping to identify the fixed stars thus employed by the Babylonians; and the result is just what might be expected, in so far as the list includes all the brilliant stars close to the ecliptic (α and ζ Tauri, α and ζ Geminorum, α Leonis, etc.) and, in those sections of the ecliptic where no brilliant stars are met with, a certain number of less conspicuous ones. Almost all of the Babylonian names of these stars show that they were viewed as forming part of the twelve great zodiacal constellations; we, e.g., find it stated that on a certain night Venus appeared in the eastern sky, and above her the western star of the head of the Ram, at a distance of four yards; or again that on some other night
Mars appeared, and above it the western star of the mouth of the Twins, at the distance of eight inches. It will be observed that there clearly is no obvious connection between these thirty or thirty-six 'normal' stars (as they have appropriately been called) of the Babylonian Astronomers; and the 27 or 28 asterisms which constitute the lunar zodiacs of the Arabs, Hindus and Chinese. But that in spite of this absence of obvious connexion the Babylonian normal stars must be considered the prototype of the three historical forms of the lunar zodiac is the thesis of Professor Hommel. It will be worth while to indicate and criticise concisely the steps of his argumentation; for the opinion seems to prevail in certain quarters that his researches on this point have at last supplied the long felt desideratum of a convincing proof of the nakṣatras and similar systems having been borrowed from Babylon.

What constitutes the first glaring discrepancy between the Babylonian series of stars and the series acknowledged by the other nations, viz., the difference of number—Professor Hommel undertakes to remove in a somewhat heroic fashion. Assuming that wherever two of the Babylonian normal stars appear to be closely connected by their names (as when we meet with 'the eastern' and 'the western' star of the head of the Ram; or 'the western and the eastern star of the mouth of the Twins') the two originally were viewed as constituting one asterism only, he manages to reduce the series of thirty or more normal stars to one comprising twenty-four members only. He next submits the series of the 27 or 28 nakṣatras to a similar process; maintaining in the first place that where the Hindu series exhibits pairs of nakṣatras bearing the same name and distinguished only by the addition of 'former' and 'latter' (as e.g., Pūrva Phalgunī and Uttara Phalgunī) one original asterism was later on split up into two; and extending, in the second place, this argumentation to the Arbian series also, with the result that both those series present themselves in a, supposed earlier, form of twenty-four members. Comparing the reduced

Professor Hommel does not undertake to reduce on the same lines the Chinese series. As stated above, Biot held the opinion that in China an original series of 24 had been expanded into one of 28; but this assumption moves on lines totally different from those of Professor Hommel's argumentation and in no way confirms the latter.
Arab and Indian series with the reduced Babylonian one, Professor Hommel next finds that there is a prevailing agreement between all three as to the special stars selected to form part of the series; and from this finally concludes that the Babylonian series—about whose great antiquity there can be no doubt—was at an early period borrowed by the Hindus who afterwards extended it by the addition of 3 or 4 further asterisms, the motive of the extension being specially to adapt the series to the sidereal revolution of the moon. The Arabs, on the other hand, may be held to have raised their series of 24 (also taken by them from the Babylonians) not independently, but under the influence of Hindu astronomy. As to the relation of the Chinese series to the Babylonian one Professor Hommel does not attempt to give any details.

The weighty objections which lie against Professor Hommel's argumentation are not difficult to discern. We do not wish to criticise the validity of the arguments he supposes to tell in favour of an original Babylonian series of 24 members: we only remark that they are far from convincing. But we must decidedly protest against the assumption of an original Hindu series of 24 nakṣatras and a corresponding Arab series. In Indian literature the nakṣatras appear, most unmistakably, in original connexion with the moon: the whole raison d'être of the system lies just in this connexion. The Hindu Zodiac in fact is nothing if not a lunar one and, therefore, cannot be imagined to have included at any time less than 27 asterisms. That in three cases there are pairs of nakṣatras specially connected by a common name in no way proves that there was an original series of 24; for in each of those cases the two nakṣatras in question, together form a very conspicuous quadrilateral figure naturally suggesting the combination of the two into one figure. It is indeed quite possible that the Hindus had an original 'Phalguni' constellation of large extent which, later on when the idea occurred to them of dividing the sphere in dependence on the revolution of the moon, was differentiated into a a pūrva and an uttara Phalguni but this does not, of course, prove that the old 'Phalguni' was a member of a recognised series of 24 asterisms. Similarly there is no sound reason whatever to postulate an initial Arabian series of 24 asterisms; that there
was such a series and that it was amplified by the Arabs under Hindu influence, simply is a gratuitous assumption on Professor Hommel's part. And if we finally come to examine critically that thoroughgoing agreement of the Babylonian series of stars and the Arab and Indian lunar zodiacs on which Professor Hommel lays such great stress as being the most important, in fact decisive, link in his chain of proof, we have to recall to our minds those considerations on which we above laid stress when scrutinising the alleged prevailing agreement of the three historical forms of the lunar zodiac which, according to some, goes so far as to exclude all doubt of their original identity. A large number of those special cases of agreement prove nothing because they were inevitable; astronomers bent on selecting a series of stars to which the positions of the planets and sun and moon could most suitably be referred, and men simply interested in singling out such stars or groups of stars as might be used to mark the nightly progress of the moon among the constellations, could not but hit upon the same stars in a large number of cases. When, on the other hand, we come to those cases where there was something like a real choice open to the framers of the several series, we find that wherever the historical lunar zodiacs exhibit an agreement which may be called characteristic, there at the same time is a marked disagreement, which also may be called characteristic in its way, between the Babylonian series of normal stars and the Arabian menāţil (to which alone we need attend here, because as pointed out by Professor Hommel, these on the whole more closely agree with the Babylonian stars than either the nakṣstras or the sieu.) We above, following Whitney, referred to the inclusion, within all the three lunar zodiacs, of three faint stars in Orion's head as the most striking coincidence between the three series; but just there the Babylonian series completely separates itself from the zodiacs, taking in—in a way that must, from the point of view of observing astronomers, be called highly sensible—the two stars α and ζ Tauris which in that place form the natural link in an ecliptical series. Again, where the three zodiacs agree in selecting certain stars in the tail of Scorpio which are considerably removed from the Ecliptic towards the south—one of those agreements which though
natural cannot be called inevitable—the Babylonian series prefers a star close to the ecliptic (6 Ophiuchi). And again where all the three zodiacs go to a considerable distance north of the ecliptic in order to take in four stars from Pegasus and Andromeda which form a conspicuous square (appearing in the Hindu series as the two Bhādrapadas), one of the stars of the corresponding Babylonian section is 7 Piscium, close to the track of the ecliptic. And similarly in other cases. There in fact is no single agreement between the Babylonian series and the menāzil for which true proving force as to the original identity of the two series can be claimed. Nor is it difficult to find a reason for this characteristic disagreement, for a definite difference of the motives acting on the framers of the several systems very naturally suggests itself. The framers of the Indian and Arabian series and probably those of the Chinese also—were not actuated by what can properly be called scientific considerations; to them it sufficed to map out a series of asterisms which were not on the whole far removed from the moon's and sun's track, and to which the motions of the former luminary could be referred without much difficulty in a rough way: they consequently had no objection to including within their series certain bright and conspicuous asterisms which lie at some, even some considerable, distance from the Ecliptic. That asterisms of this latter kind, soliciting the eye and stimulating the fancy, should be preferred to dimmer and less interesting stars closer to the Ecliptic, really is what just might be expected. Those men on the other hand who selected the Babylonian normal stars were observing astronomers (regarding this point the nature of the astronomical tablets on which those stars appear leaves no possible doubt) and hence naturally included in their series by preference those stars to which the positions of the planets (as also of the moon and sun) can on the whole be referred with the best chance of accuracy, i.e., stars as close as may be to the Ecliptic. This difference of motive, of course, also explains why the Babylonian series comprises single stars only, while the three zodiacs take in a small number of bright single stars, but prevailingly groups of stars. A further characteristic circumstance differentiating the normal stars of the Babylonians from the asterisms of the lunar zodiac has to
etc., even though the Impression is there, there is no cognition of the nature of Remembrance.

(216). 'All the same,' the opponent resumes, 'we cannot dismiss the fact that sense-organs are operative only with regard to objects they actually get at (are characterized by what is technically called Praṇyā-prākritvam); for this is what we learn from our experience of really existing things (and hence as the falsely surmised non-existent silver cannot be got at by the sense-organ, so that sensuous cognition is impossible, the cognition must be regarded as Remembrance).' Not so, we reply. We have already explained that just as the sense-organs bring about cognitions only when aided by the actual proximity of the object (which thus is got at), Impression (to which alone Remembrance can be due) can bring about cognitions only when it is aided by other means of knowledge: this is a fact (ascertained in the case of Recognition) which also refuses to be dismissed. (And hence the misconception of silver cannot be regarded as due to Impression). And in case Impression itself is regarded as constituting a 'contact' (with the sense-organ of Mind), it becomes all the more patent that 'sense-contact' is not absent (in the case of the idea of silver).

(217). Then again, the view that the false surmial of silver is due to impression alone independently of any other means of knowledge, necessitates the assumption that the that-idea (which is an essential factor in all ordinary remembrance) is somehow obscured or eliminated, and this naturally gives rise to the further question 'whence this elimination'; all the more, since the silver having been cognised on previous occasions as qualified by present time and certain other characteristics, we should naturally expect that, in the case of subsequent cognitions brought about by the impression left by the previous cognition, the silver should again present itself to the mind with those very same characteristics;—for this is the result actually observed in the case of recognition. [And yet this is not found to be the case in the cognition under discussion, which, therefore, cannot be due to impression alone.] It cannot be maintained that the that-element is eliminated from the cognition owing to certain defects; for the relation to the object (the that) constitutes the very nature of the impression, and therefore never can

Kh. III.
be absent from it. But, the reply may be, what we ascribe to defects, is the elimination of the that-element (not from the impression but) from the act of remembrance! What then, we ask, constitutes that defect? The answer will be that 'it is that to which misconception (bhrānti) is due, according to the Logician.' But in that case (i.e., if the absence of the notion of that in all forms of misconception were due to a defect), the notion of that would be absent even from such forms of misconception as 'this silver is not different from that silver'; or, 'this is that same silver'; or 'that same silver has again come before me';—in all of which the silver that comes in is the silver in general referred to by that. If this were not so, the absence of the notion of that would also not be possible in the case of the misconception 'this is silver.' We here close this digression from our main theme.

(218). Nor lastly can it be held that Recognition is a form of cognition totally other than 'Remembrance' and 'Direct Apprehension.' For if not partaking of the character of direct apprehension, it would pass into the category of wrong cognition (since right cognition has been defined as the 'direct apprehension of the real nature of things'). Nor may you reply to this—'Let it be so, we do not mind'; for the Logician when denying the momentary character of things brings forward the fact of the 'recognition' of things as a proof of their permanent character. Moreover if you were to establish your definition by abandoning something (viz., 'recognition') which is universally known to fall under the category to be defined (viz., right cognition) this would imply the absence of all rule regarding the framing of definitions.

(219). The conclusion, therefore, is that you have no good reason to maintain that in the definition of right cognition (pramā), the word 'anubhava' 'direct apprehension'—which denotes a kind of cognition—is included for the purpose of differentiating it from Remembrance.

* One means to test the validity of a definition is the enquiry whether it is applicable to all things to be defined. This canon of definition would have to be given up if, for the sake of upholding our definition, we were to exclude from it things that it admittedly should include.

Kha. 112.
(D) [Direct Apprehension cannot be defined as 'what is other than Remembrance'; for the characteristic features of anubhūti as well as smṛiti are found to co-exist in Recognition; and moreover this difference from Remembrance cannot be shown to be either from all Remembrance or from any individual act of remembrance.]

[Page 187.] (220). Nor* may Direct Apprehension be defined either as 'what is other than Remembrance,' or as 'what is destitute of the character of Remembrance.' For we have already shown that the characteristic features of 'Remembrance' and 'Direct Apprehension' are actually mixed up (viz., in Recognition); and hence the term anubhūti would fail to differentiate (right cognition from all other kinds of cognition).

(221). The former of the above definitions cannot be accepted for the following reason also. What, we ask, do you mean by saying that Direct Apprehension is other than Remembrance? That it is other than some particular remembrance? or other than all remembrance? or that it is destitute of the character of Remembrance?

(222). The first of these alternatives would imply that any particular remembrance also is direct Apprehension, for the reason that it is other than some other particular remembrance; for this latter particular remembrance from which the former differs does not cease to be Remembrance; and hence being other than it, will be equivalent to being other than Remembrance.

(223). Nor can the second alternative be maintained. For in what way can you ascertain that a certain right cognition is other than certain particular remembrances that may be, let us say, in my mind or in the mind of some other person? Of these you evidently can have no idea. For in the first place, ordinary people like ourselves (who do not possess the insight due to Yoga) cannot perceive the thoughts of other people by the senses. Nor, in the next place, can we manage to do so by inferences or by presumption (arthāpatti); since men of limited powers of perception, as we are, cannot in all cases perceive either the

* Here begins the refutation of the second and third alternative definitions of anubhūti, set forth in para 179.

Kha. 113.
probans (on which an inference depends), or the eventual impossibility on which presumptive reasoning depends. Nor can we form, in all cases, ideas of the remembrances in other people's minds on the basis of \textit{words} (\textit{shabda}, verbal information); for we cannot count, in all cases, on suitable words (to express those remembrances) being available. That, lastly, analogical reasoning (\textit{upamāna}) and the rest cannot help us, is evident. How then should it be ascertained that a certain right cognition is other than \textit{all} particular remembrances? And as this cannot be known, the definition under discussion clearly is invalid. You will perhaps meet this conclusion by arguing as follows:—'A man who has a perceptive (intuitive) cognition of a remembrance in his own mind knows it as possessing the generic character of Remembrance; and as all remembrances, arising at any time in the mind of any person, have this same generic character, he knows them also in the same intuitive way (his inner organ which mediates the intuition being, through that generic character, in indirect contact with all individual remembrances wherever taking place). The case is analogous to what takes place in inferential cognition, where at the time when we apprehend the invariable concomitance of two things, we also intuitively apprehend all the individual things belonging to the two classes, through an indirect intuition mediated by the contact of the inner organ with the generic characteristics of the two classes.' But this reasoning is not right. For your conclusion, as well as the instance whereby you endeavour to establish it, are both open to serious objections. Were your arguments valid, it would follow that the man who intuities one thing as knowable, would—through the above mentioned contact with the generic character 'knowability'—have an intuitive knowledge of all that is knowable \textit{i. e.}, the whole universe! If you accept this conclusion also you clearly regard yourself as omniscient; but I shall believe in this your omniscience only if you can tell me what is going on in my mind!
(E) [Direct Apprehension cannot be defined as 'what is destitute of the generic character of Remembrance'; for negation of smṛiti may also be mutual negation, and the latter is present in smṛiti also. Nor can absolute negation be intended, since this also would make the definition too wide. Nor lastly, can it be argued that between two acts of Remembrance there holds good not pure negation, or difference, but difference combined with some kind of non-difference, and that hence the negation of Remembrance cannot subsist in any Remembrance. For there is nothing to show that in anubhūti also there may be difference, as well as some kind of non-difference, from Remembrance.]

(224). Nor, lastly, can we accept the third alternative definition. For what, we ask, do you mean by 'direct Apprehension being destitute of the character of Remembrance'? Do you mean that it implies the negation of the character of Remembrance? or that its essential character (svarūpa) consists therein that it has Smṛiti (the class-character of all remembrance) for its counter-entity? or that it is the cognition of that character of the substratum?

(225). The first of these alternatives is unacceptable. For the mutual negation (anyonyābhava) also of the character of remembrance is 'negation of the character of remembrance'; and as such mutual negation is present in remembrances also (for each individual remembrance implies the negation of other individual remembrances), they also would be included in Direct Apprehension! And the definition thus failing to exclude remembrances, the qualification (i. e., the 'being other than Remembrance,' which in this definition of anubhava qualifies the general term 'jñāna,' 'cognition') becomes futile. And if, in order to avoid this, the term qualified (i. e., jñāna, cognition) were to be left out, (so that the definition of anubhava would be not 'cognition other than remembrance,' but merely 'what is other than remembrance'), the definition would include other mental states also as—e. g., desire.

(226). It might be urged that what is meant by 'negation of the character of remembrance' is (not mutual negation) but 'complete negation of all relationship to the character of remembrance' (which complete negation, of course, can never reside

Kh. 115.
in any remembrance). But this also we cannot allow. For what, we ask, do you mean by 'complete negation of relationship to the character of remembrance'? Is it 'negation of relationship qualified by the character of Remembrance'? or is it 'negation of the character of remembrance qualified by relationship'? or is it something else that you mean by this peculiar expression of yours?

As to the first alternative we point out that as the mutual negation of the character of remembrance is present in each individual remembrance (for in one remembrance there is absent that individual relation to Smṛtittra which is present in others), you lapse into the same absurdity as before (see the preceding paragraph); for remembrance is not 'relationship to the character of remembrance' (and hence there may be, in remembrance, absence of the latter). For the same reason the second alternative also cannot be accepted; for any particular remembrance is not the same as 'character of Remembrance qualified by relationship'; and hence we may maintain that there is mutual negation between any particular remembrance and the character of Remembrance qualified by relationship; and thus the aforesaid objection remains in force. And this objection will remain valid even though you go on adding the qualification of 'relationship to every 'negation''; and moreover your procedure would lead to the reprehensible assumption of an endless series of such qualifications.

(227). Nor may you urge, against this, that there is no need to assume an endless series of relationships, for the reason that the 'relationship to the character of remembrance' is not connected by means of another relationship, but that such relationship constitutes its very nature. For in that case it will be all the more impossible for you to keep clear of the objection brought forward on the ground of the natural negation of the relationship of remembrance; since according to your latest assertion the introduction of a further qualification in the shape of another relationship means nothing more than what is already expressed by the 'relationship to the character of remembrance'.

*If you assert that though there may be mutual negation between the particular remembrance and the 'character of remembrance qualified by relationship', yet there is no Samsāra-jāhāna between the two;—we shall again ask 'what do you mean by this', and so on.

Kh. 116.
Moreover, how can there be an absence of relationship (to the character of Remembrance) in Direct Apprehension—considering that you hold that the relationship between two things is not something apart from them, and that therefore the relationship to the generic character of Remembrance and the individual Remembrance possessing that character are both of the nature of,—i.e., non-different from,—the Relationship? Is it the form or character (svarūpa) of 'Direct Apprehension,' or the form of 'Relation to the generic character of Remembrance' that is not present (in Direct Apprehension)? [And since both these forms are present] what then is it that could be negated (by the negation of 'relation to the generic character of Remembrance' which is held to be identical with the two forms mentioned)? And if that which is negated is a relation quite different (from the 'relation to the generic character of Remembrance'), this negation would apply to an individual remembrance (no less than to Direct Apprehension); for you also hold that in Remembrance there is no such relation as is something different from it,—your theory being that the relation between the individual remembrance and the generic character of Remembrance is nothing else but the very nature (svarūpa) of the two.

The Logician resumes as follows:—"Even though it is possible that the Direct Apprehension and the 'relationship to the class character of Remembrance' may be present in their

Kh. 117.
respective individual forms, yet the two have not the capability of giving rise to mutually connected ideas; it is only where such capability exists that the two individual forms are said to constitute a 'relationship' (so in the case of Smṛiti and Smṛitiva-saṃsarga)." But this also we cannot admit. For that capability of which you speak is not possible unless there is shown to be present some generic character which comprises and determines all special cases of such capability. And if for that purpose you were to put forward some such other generic character, the same difficulties would meet you with regard to the connexion of that also; with the result that you would have to go on searching for one generic character after another, ad infinitum.

(230) [Page 196.] † But even if we were to admit your explanation, what is it, we ask, you mean to deny with regard to Direct Apprehension? What we deny with regard to Direct Apprehension, the Logician replies, is its capability of giving rise to the idea that the 'relationship to the character of remembrance' and Direct Apprehension are connected (related). This also will not do, we reply; for you can not deny the capability, on the part of Anubhūti, of giving rise to the said idea in its erroneous form.‡ What we deny, the Logician replies, is the capability of Anubhūti to give rise to a true idea of that kind! If, we reply, you admit the existence of a true idea of that kind, it follows that Direct Apprehension may have the character of Remembrance!§ If, on the other hand, you do not admit this,

* That is to say, it will be necessary to point out a general character or feature present in all cases where two things have the power of suggesting each other, as is the case, e. g., with any Smṛiti and Smṛitiya-saṃsarga.

† It has so far been shown that there is nothing to determine that 'remembrance' and 'the relationship to the character of Remembrance' have the capability of producing the idea that they are related to each other. It now is proposed to show that even if this were the case, the definition of Direct Apprehension is not established.

‡ There will be nothing to prevent a man from forming the erroneous conception 'Direct Apprehension and the relationship etc., are related'; hence we cannot deny the capability of Anubhūti to produce that idea.

§ If the idea 'Direct Apprehension and relationship to Remembrance are connected' ever is a true one, the character of Remembrance cannot, at least in that case, be denied of Anubhūti.

Kh. 118.
with regard to what then would you assert the absence of the capability of production? If you mean to assert that Direct Apprehension is devoid of the capability of producing that idea which has absolutely no existence, the assertion will have to be extended to Remembrance also; for although there may be some such true ideas produced by Remembrance, there will be non-capability of production on the part of Remembrance also, with regard to that absolutely non-existing (untrue) idea which is other than those true ideas. Nor may you represent the matter as follows:—'the difference which we statute between Direct Apprehension and Recollection is that the former, and not the latter, is incapable of producing all (any) ideas of that kind (no stress being laid on the distinction of true and untrue ideas).'

For in the first place we have no means to form a right notion of all individual ideas of that kind; and, further, we ask, what do you understand by all in this connexion? Do you mean that Anubhūti is incapable of producing all ideas of the kind that exist? or all that do not exist? or all that exist as well as all that do not exist? If you hold the first or second alternative, such incapability belongs to Remembrance also; for no particular remembrance is capable of producing all the ideas—of the form 'Remembrance and relationship to the character of remembrance are related'—which present themselves with regard to all remembrances (the fact being that each individual remembrance produces such an idea with regard to itself only). And as regards the incapability of producing some such idea, we have already refuted it. If, on the other hand, you were to accept the third alternative, then the said incapability would not be present in Anubhūti either; for as to the idea that has true existence, we, just because it does exist, cannot deny to Anubhūti the capability of producing it; and as to the idea that has no true existence, nothing can, for that very reason, be denied of it.

(231). At this stage the Bhāṭṭa-Mimāṃsakas come forward with the following argument:—"You have argued that the definition of Anubhūti (as that which is marked by the absence of Remembrance) is too wide, on the basis of there being present, in particular remembrances also, the mutual negation of the character of Remembrance which belongs to other individual remembrances. This, however, cannot be
admitted; for according to the bheda-bheda-view (i.e., the view of
difference together with non-difference), there is, in any particular
remembrance, difference as well as non-difference, with regard
to the generic character of Remembrance; and where there is
this ‘difference with non-difference,’ there can be no mutual
negation (and hence mutual negation of Smriti is not relative in
any particular Smriti).” This argumentation also is unsound
we reply. For how do you ascertain that Remembrance,
and not Anubhuti, is different as well as non-different from
the generic character of Remembrance? We refuse to accept
the reply that ‘this is ascertained thereby that, as a matter of
fact, we have no valid cognition of Anubhuti as qualified by that
difference-with-non-difference.’ For, we ask, do you base your
assertion on the absence of a cognition that has true existence,
or of one that has no true existence? In either case your
reasoning fails, as shown above, (i.e., if the right cognition has
true existence it cannot be denied; if it has no true existence,
no assertion, including denial, can be made regarding it). Nor
can it be said that the right cognition denied is that which is
the counter-entity of prior non-existence (i.e., that which has had
no previous existence). For if you admit that such right cogni-
tion exists with regard to Direct Apprehension, the latter comes
to be what you seek to deny (i.e., qualified by the character of
Remembrance). And then as regards the absence of mutual
negation between the individual Remembrance and the general
character of Remembrance—which really is nothing but the
two things themselves,—this would belong to Direct Appre-
hension as well; since it would be open to the argument put
forward by us above, viz.,—that Direct Apprehension is not ‘the
mutual negation of the Character of Remembrance’?

* To say that in Direct Apprehension there is a ‘prior non-existence’ of
right cognition, is to admit that though the cognition did not exist before, it
exists now; the right cognition of Direct Apprehension thus is qualified by
the character of Remembrance.
(F) [The Logician now argues that while it may be admitted that the mutual negation of Remembrance is present in individual Remembrances, the presence of absolute negation of Remembrance is quite inadmissible. But this we meet at once by denying that there is any real difference between those two kinds of negation. Every attempt of the Logician to prove such difference upon a difference of the counter-entities of the two kinds of negation lands him in difficulties from which he is unable to extricate himself. He cannot, e.g., argue that while mutual negation has for its counter-entity Identity, absolute negation has for its counter-entity mere connexion or co-existence. For were it so, the destruction of the jar would not be a case of negation of the latter kind.]

(232.) [Page 200.] The Opponent now takes up a different ground. 'We grant,' he says, 'that the objection (based upon the possibility of mutual negation between the 'character of Remembrance' and 'an individual remembrance') cannot be met by postulating that between these two there is difference-with-non-difference (as attempted in para. 231); but you cannot deny the distinction between 'mutual negation' and 'negation of Samsarga' (on which our answer is primarily based); since this distinction is based upon the fact of our having, in ordinary experience, two distinct conceptions,—viz., on the one hand, 'this thing is not that thing' (where there is Anyonyabhava, 'mutual negation'); and 'that thing is not here' (where there is absolute negation of relation, Samsargabhava). [And thus, even though there is mutual negation between Smrititva and Smriti, there can be no absolute negation of relation between them.]

But this also we deny. For, as a matter of fact, there is no difference in the character of the counter-entities of the two kinds of negation; nor is there any difference between the two due to any other characteristics; nor, lastly, is there any difference in kind between the two. As for these reasons, the said conception of difference, although present, does not prove itself to be valid, it must be disregarded, being no more than a 'false witness.'

(233). Against this the Logician may state the difference between the two in the following way:—'Mutual negation is that negation which exists at the same time and place as its

Kh. 121.
counter-entities (i.e., the things each of which implies the negation of the other); while absolute negation of relation is such negation as is something quite apart from the counter-entities. (That is, the mutual negation of the jar and the cloth exists in those things; while the absolute negation of the connexion of the jar with a certain place—'here there is no jar'—cannot co-exist with the jar).

But we cannot accept this distinction; because it is open, in turn, to the following unanswerable objections:—(1) utmāśhraya (vicious circle); (2) anambhava (being contrary to ordinary experience); (3) svabheda-anusamāna (the impossibility of a comprehensive conception of such negation); and (4) tattvadavargamānasabhyupagama (the impossibility of the idea of any individual negation).  

(234.) [Page 203.] The opponent states the distinction in a different form:—Absolute negation of relation is that negation which has relation (Sāmaśraya) for its counter-entity; while mutual negation is that negation which has for its counter-entity "identity" (of two things). In this way the two do not become mixed up; for the negation of the identity of relation is not the negation of relation, since it has identity for its counter-entity.

But this also is unsound; for on this definition, the destructions which substances, qualities and actions undergo on being reduced to their inherent (Samavāyi) causes (as when e.g. the jar on being smashed is reduced to clay) would not be cases of absolute negation of relation; and if this destruction has for its counter-entity 'relation' (as demanded by the definition), then—inaasmuch as in the present case the relation is that of Inference (Samaśraya, which includes the relation of cause and effect),

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* These objections are thus explained by the Shwākāri:—(1) Abhāva (negation) is defined as that which is other than bhāva; and the character of being other than bhāva is defined as consisting in the mutual negation of bhāva; thus Negation is defined in terms of negation:—this constituting Atmāśhraya, 'dependence on self' or 'defining in a circle.' (2) In order to avoid this 'circle,' it will be necessary to assume mutual negations ad infinitum; but no such endless negation is ever cognised in ordinary experience. (3) And as in this case it will not be possible to speak of the 'mutual negation,' no comprehensive notion of the negation or difference of anything will be possible. (4) And lastly, as any such endless series of negations will not be cognisable by any person who is not omniscient, the theory will strike at the root of all conception of individual negations.

Kh. 122.
it will follow that Samavāya is non-eternal (while yet according to the Logician all Samavāya is eternal). Moreover, if we accepted the above definitions, neither of the two abhāvas would ever have for its counterentity things such as jars (since, according to the definitions, the counter-entity is either samsarga or tādāmya); and this would mean that jars and the like would be unlimited (either in time or space) as time and space are. And lastly, on this supposition (viz., of individual things such as the jar and the like, not being factors of the counterentity), you would have for counter-entities of your negations all 'relation' and 'identity,' without any special qualification; and this would amount to the total denial of Relations and Identity; and if (in order to avoid this: you were to include in the counter-entity special things (jars and the like), the negation would be a total negation of those things also (i.e., it would imply that those things have no existence whatever). And if again, in order to avoid this, you were to run after the relation of the relation (i.e., if you were to say that what is denied is only the relation of the relation), this would imply that the relation itself is not touched (by the negation, and therefore has unlimited existence; as was above asserted of the things). And if, in order to avoid this, you were to say that we must assume a series of samsargas in which the negation of each link implies the negation of the preceding link, we reply, that this involves the objectionable assumption of an infinite retrogress. And again, if to avoid this, you were to say that you stop at a certain link of the series, negativing, not the further Samsarga of that Samsarga, but that Samsarga itself;—there would be total denial of that Samsarga; and this would imply the total denial of the preceding link, and so on and on, the retrogressive action resulting in the total destruction of the whole series.

(235). [Page 205.] The Logician may set forth a different view of abhāva. The opposition, he may say, between the counter-entity and its correlative (i.e., between the thing negatived and the negation) is not implied in their very nature (so that the existence of the one would imply the absolute non-existence of the other); it means no more than that the two cannot exist together; what is implied in the Kh. 123.
existence of one, therefore, only is that the other does not co-exist with it,—not that it has absolutely no existence at all. But this also we cannot admit. For (if the opposition between the two means no more than that) then at times the thing negated might become identical with the negation. 'But,' the Logician replies, 'how can that be, considering that a valid cognition to that effect (viz., of the identity of the two) has no existence!' Consider, we rejoin, what this reasoning implies. You admit that the opposition between a thing and its abhāva—which you define as incapability of co-existence—rests on the non-existence of a valid cognition, and hence it is evident that incapability of co-existence cannot on its part, determine that latter non-existence. Nothing, therefore, remains but to conceive the opposition between right cognition and its non-existence as one of essential contradiction.♦

♦ What opposition is there between the right cognition and the absence (abhāva) of the right cognition? Clearly it cannot be mere 'absence of co-existence'; for you have above attempted to base 'absence of co-existence' upon 'absence of valid cognition.' We, therefore, are compelled to allow an opposition of essential nature between pramāṇa and its absence.

† When thinking of air, e.g., we do not cognize the co-existence of colour and touch; and this 'absence of valid cognition' might be imagined to establish a general opposition between colour and touch; while yet the two clearly co-exist in earth or water.

‡ When we say that two things can never co-exist, the statement can only refer to their jāti i.e., generic characters which exist at all times; not to individual things which are transitory, and regarding which a negation referring to all time would have no sense.

Kh. 124.
incapability of being validly cognised as co-existent. But, we ask in return, what should this incapability, said to belong to the things, be, apart from the characters of being just the counter-entity and its correlative? You may not say that it is just the individual character of the two; for he also who holds that there is a relation between the two (as e.g., the relation of counter-entity and its correlation—which relation implies the co-existence of the two) admits the two to have distinctive individual characters (so that the latter cannot constitute opposition in the Logician's sense). Nor may you attempt to improve your definition by explaining 'individual characters' to be those characters which are such—i.e., between which there is no relation. For this imposes on you the task of distinctly explaining what constitutes individual character of that kind (and this you are unable to do).

(237). And further, (if the opposition meant by you were nothing more than incapability of co-existence), what difference would there be between the opposition of the generic character of the cow and the generic character of the horse on one hand, and the opposition between negation and its counter-entity, on the other hand? And moreover, how could opposition thus understood meet cases where there actually is a valid cognition of the co-existence of Negation and its counter-entity (as in the case of a swiftly moving chariot which, at any moment, we cognize as being and as not being in contact with some point of space); and when there is such a valid cognition, why should the Logician seek to establish the opposition by other methods (by the explanation e.g., that the contact is with one point of space, and the non-contact with another),—considering that the actual existence of the valid cognition (viz., in the given instance, of contact and non-contact existing together) proves that the contrary notion (of the two not being capable of co-existing) is not valid (and hence need not be established at all).

(238.) [The Logician now takes up the thread of the argument set forth by the Vedāntin in para. 234, viz., that if the counter-entities of absolute Negation and mutual Negation were Relation (sāmsarga) and Identity (tādātmya) respectively, no negation at all would be possible of jars and the like things. The two negations, he says, are the negations not of mere

Kh. 125.
Relation and Identity, but of those two as qualified by (or along with) the jar and the like; and an affirmation or negation which is thus qualified can never be without taking in the qualification also (as e.g., the jar). This explanation also, we reply, is not open to you. For if the negation of something that has a certain qualification is the negation of that qualification also, the negation of the identity of relation will also be the negation of relation; and thus the objection we urged against you (para. 225) sticks to you all the more tenaciously. But, the Logician will perhaps say, the negation of relation (to the generic character of Remembrance) which I referred to (as characteristic of anubhūti) is such as does not have identity for its counter-entity (and hence even though the negation of the identity of the relation to the generic character of Remembrance might belong to Remembrance, it would not matter), and similarly the negation of identity may be conceived as that which does not have relation for its counter-entity. But this also cannot be admitted; for in that case, in the first place, the negation of the relation of identity, as well as the negation of the identity of relation, would be totally different kinds of negation; and, secondly, your assertion would mean that 'what is to be regarded as the negation of Relation is that negation of Relation which is not the negation of Identity'; and in this the second qualifying samsarga† would be quite superfluous (as this would be the same as saying that the negation of relation is that negation which etc.) and thus while aiming at adding to your definition of Direct Apprehension something further, in the shape of 'negation of Relation', you finally come to lose even the expression 'negation of relation'. Then again, in this explanation of yours, the denial of the negation of identity would apply to the negation of identity also. For [you define the 'negation of Relation' simply

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*It had been argued above (para. 225) by the Vedāntin that if direct apprehension (anubhūti) were defined as that which implies the negation of relation to the generic character of Remembrance, then, inasmuch as Negation of the identity of the relation to the generic character of Remembrance is present in Remembrance also, the above definition would apply to Remembrance also. And now the Logician himself asserts that the negation of the identity of relation is the same as the negation of relation.

†I.e., the qualification which is inserted by the Logician to the end of excluding the definition from Remembrance.

Kh. 126.
as that which is not the negation of identity; but this cannot serve to exclude the negation of Identity, because] we never can have a valid cognition of the form "the negation of Identity is the negation of Identity" [and unless we have this cognition, the definition of 'Negation of Relation' will apply to the negation of Identity also]. The cognition is impossible because the co-ordination of subject and predicate in a judgment has a meaning only when there is some difference of character between the two, as e.g., in the judgment 'the lotus is blue.' But in the case of the judgment in which 'Negation of Identity' is subject as well as Predicate, no co-ordination is possible; and hence your definition of 'Negation of Relation' will unduly extend to the 'Negation of Identity' also. What, moreover, would be that other thing residing in all negations of Identity of which the 'negation of Identity' could be predicated (in the assertion 'Negation of Identity is negation of Identity'? If that thing were mere Negation, the assertion would assume the form 'Negation of Identity is Negation'; and this would be far too wide (as including all kinds of negation); and if any particular 'negation of Identity' were that with regard to which the 'negation of Identity' were meant to be predicated, then all other particular 'negations of Identity' would have to be regarded as 'Negations of Relation.'

(239). The above reasoning applies to all definitions where other things are sought to be excluded by the addition of the clause 'other than the thing to be defined.' For 'Just as you do not predicate of any thing the negation of that thing, so you cannot predicate the thing of itself; for valid co-ordination stands in need of some difference of character' (29).

'And if the thing were predicated of itself in some other form (either of greater or lesser extension), then, on the supposition of that form also, you will be met by the same difficulties as pointed out above' (30).

[If this 'form' is of greater extension than the thing defined, the definition becomes too wide; if it is of less extension, it does not take in all the individual things sought to be defined.]

(240). Again (if the 'negation of relation' is defined as that negation which does not have Identity for its counter-entity), the negation of relation of the 'negation of Identity' would also

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be excluded (i.e., it would not be regarded as a 'negation of relation,' as it would have identity as a factor of its counter-entity). Should the opponent reply that, inasmuch as he does not admit any such further negation as the 'negation of relation' of the 'negation of Identity' (such negation of a negation leading to an infinite regress), the stated objection cannot be brought forward on the basis of any such negation;—we meet this by pointing out that according to this view he could not accept the negation of Identity of the negation of Identity (i.e., he could not speak of anything as not identical with the negation of Identity); and how then could any distinction be made between the 'negation of relation' and the 'negation of Identity,' on the ground of the former not having 'Identity' for its counter-entity; since all distinction implies negation of Identity? The opponent will perhaps reply—'the negation of Identity' of 'the negation of Identity' really is nothing more than the latter itself; and on this we may, in an altogether unexceptionable way, base our conceptions of distinction between the different kinds of negation (without any infinite regress being had recourse to). Well, we reply, if such is the case, we may, with equal validity, make the same assertion with regard to 'the negation of relation' of 'the negation of Identity.'

(241). [Page 214.] Then again, when you say that the negation of relation is that negation which does not have 'Identity' for its counter-entity, you thereby deny all negation that has Identity for its counter-entity; and this would come to mean that the 'negation of relation' is of the nature of 'Identity' itself; for as the two negations destroy each other like Sunda and Upasunda (who slew each other), the result will be the firm establishment of Identity. And in this unqualified 'Identity' the whole world will be included; and as that which you understand by 'negation of relation' is also a part of the world, this your 'negation of relation' will identify itself with the 'negation of Identity'; and thus all your efforts towards the specification of Negations turn out to be entirely futile and ridiculous. It is an astonishing result indeed that the objection urged against your unspecified definition applies with equal force to the definition when specified or qualified.
(242). Let me then, the opponent resumes, propound the following question: When we say 'the pillar is not the negation of the jar,' does this mean that the pillar is identical with the jar? The answer can be a decided negative only, for the following obvious reason. If the whole world were nothing else but either 'jar' or 'not-jar,' then no doubt the denial of the pillar's being the negation of the jar would necessarily mean that the pillar is the jar; but since as a matter of fact there are other things also, e.g., pillars, no such thing follows.

(243). This is not so, we reply. Though besides the jar and the non-jar there are other things, such as pieces of cloth, pillars, etc., yet no things whatever lie outside the sphere of what is covered by 'Identity' and 'the negation of Identity'; for Identity (anyonya) without any qualification includes the whole world; and when this Identity (which includes the whole world) is negatived (by 'negation of Identity'), the negation of this negation—which according to you constitutes the character of the 'Negation of Relation' would come to include the entire world. Specially consider that when it is affirmed that the jar is identical with (is the very Self of) the cloth, the Identity here asserted is not something apart from the very nature of the jar itself. If Identity were held to be a certain property, otherwise termed 'non-difference' (abheda), which (in the judgment 'the jar is not the cloth') would be denied with reference to the two things jar and cloth (so that the 'negation of Identity' would be only a property of the world, and not the world itself)—in that case the negation would be one of 'relation' and not of 'Identity.' We, therefore, conclude that the entire world is included in 'unqualified Identity,' and that there is no room for any other alternative.

(244). [Page 217.] It, further, would, on your view, not be true that, when the jar is denied, its negation is affirmed, and when the negation of the jar is denied, the jar is affirmed; since according to you there exists something further (than jar and non-jar). Or, even if the above were allowed, the assertion 'the pillar is not the non-jar,' would mean nothing else but 'the jar is identical with the pillar,' and thus the difficulty which you put forward against us (para. 242) falls upon your own head. For that difficulty can be overcome only on the basis of a

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distinction between the 'negation of relation' and the 'negation of Identity'; and so far this distinction is not established.

(245). For the above reasons it also cannot be maintained that the difference between the two kinds of negation should be admitted on the ground of experience (or 'consciousness'; pratīti). [For our proof that the things are not distinct at once disposes of the attempt to establish their distinctness on the ground of difference of ideas]. And then again, as the 'negation' and the 'thing negatived' (i.e., the jar and the negation of the jar) are mutually contradictory, and as you are incapable to establish a differentiating specification regarding this law of mutual contradiction (which would make it applicable to one kind of negation and not to another), it remains an unshaken law that the negation of the one correlate implies the affirmation of the other; and thus the negation of the 'negation of Identity' beyond dispute implies the affirmation of 'Identity'.

(246). As to myself the principle of 'non-explicability' ('non-definability') serves as an adamantine armour, easily warding off the 'arrows' of objections based on ideas and the practical requirements of life [consciousness and practical life alike being alleged to demand the recognition of a real difference between absolute and mutual negation]. My theory is that the world, being established by immediate experience, is something other than an absolute non-entity (of which there is no experience at all); but that although on this account being (sattva) must be allowed to it, it yet is sublated (by reflexion), and hence must be held to be (not either real or absolutely non-existent but) 'indefinable' (anirvāchaniya).

(247). The distinction between the two kinds of negation, which is so constantly asserted on the ground of being a fact of consciousness, thus falls to the ground altogether; for the impossibility of giving a rational account of the distinction of the counter-entities of these negations (i.e., the things negated) implies that the distinction as met with in consciousness has to be rejected. And—

'As the distinction of these counter-entities can be established only on the basis of the distinction between the two kinds of negation—mutual negation and absolute negation—, who can remedy the 'vicious circle' here presenting itself?' (31).

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Nescience abiding in Self proved by I-Consciousness. 355

[Page 53.]—But a further difficulty here presents itself. How is it possible that anything should be superimposed upon the inward Self (Pratyagatman)? We observe that in all recognised cases of superimposition the substrate is an object of the same kind of sense-perception as the thing superimposed. But this is not so in the case of the Self into the idea of which nothing whatever of objectivity enters. What alone, we reply, is required for adhyasa is that the substrate and the thing superimposed should present themselves to consciousness as fused in one act of cognition. It is not required that the substrate should be an object; for we cannot point to any negative concomitance proving this (i.e., it is not a rule that the absence of objectivity invariably goes together with the absence of adhyasa). Now in the case under consideration, (viz., of superimposition on the Self) there is one cognition which presents a fusion of the Self and the Not-self viz., the cognition of the I. Of this cognition the Self indeed is not the object, neither in part, nor in its totality; for the Self is without parts, and is essentially not an object. But what presents itself in the form of the Ego-consciousness is the internal organ which is superimposed upon the Self and impregnated with the reflection of the Self—comparable to a mirror which is impregnated with the reflection of the universal ether. This ego-adhyasa possesses a double aspect, just as the adhyasa ‘this thing before me is silver.’ For as in the judgment ‘the iron burns,’ two elements are presented to consciousness,—viz., fire possessing burning quality, and iron; thus also in the judgment ‘I perceive’ or ‘I know,’ two elements are presented,—viz., a Self that possesses perceiving or knowing quality and an internal organ. That element of which we are conscious as liable to pain and change, as non-intelligent and distinguished from other objective existences such as the sense-organs, their objects and so on, is the internal organ. That element, on the other hand, of which we are conscious as the abode of delight, as absolutely unchanging, as a mere witness or spectator, unaffected by what he witnesses, and as consciousness constantly present to all objective existences—sense-organs, their objects and so on—is the Self. The Ego-consciousness thus contains an objective (idam) and a non-objective (an-idam) element.
[The view of the composite character of the I is not indeed admitted by the Prābhākara who holds that the I is nothing else but the cognizing Self, free from any objective element; and that every act of cognition reveals the I or Self to be the substrate of cognition. We may accept as valid the criticisms to which the Prābhākara, on the basis of this his view, subjects the theories of the Self, and the ways in which it is known, held by the Sāṅkhya, the Naiyāyikas, the Sautrāntikas, the Vijñānavādins, and the Bhāṭṭas respectively.]

Now this view of the nature of the Ego the followers of Prabhākara refuse to accept. For, they maintain, the self-luminous cognition 'I know the jar' manifests the jar as the object and the Self as the substrate (subject) of cognition. What appears as the I is the Self only; the I contains no objective element whatever. Nor is there any force in the alleged analogy,—viz., that, as in the cognition 'the iron burns' the quality of burning is something different from the iron, so in the cognition 'I know' the knowing subject is something different from the Ego. For, as to the former case, we sometimes observe the two elements in separation—on the one hand, the cold lump of iron, and on the other hand, apart from the iron, fire; but the Ego and the knowing subject are never cognised apart from each other. The Ego thus is neither more nor less than the Self; of which we are immediately conscious as the substrate (subject) of cognition.

[Page 54.] The Sāṅkhya indeed (denying this immediate consciousness of the Self) claims to arrive at the existence of the Self by means of the following inference:—'the reflexion of consciousness in the non-intelligent internal organ presupposes a thing which is reflected, of a similar nature; for it is a reflexion, like the reflexion of a face in a mirror.' And others also hold the theory, in various forms, of the Self being known through inference only. But all these theories, the Prabhākara holds, are in conflict with the evident fact that in the Ego-consciousness the Self is directly presented. The different forms of inference, however, have a use in so far as they may convince others (materialists and the like) of the existence of the Self.

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Nor is there, the Prābhākara continues, any truth in the doctrine of the Logicians who maintain that the Self is the object of internal perception (the instrument of which is the manas); for there is nothing to prove that view. The presence and absence of the manas constitutes a necessary causal condition with regard to the cognition of objects (which are known when the manas functions, and not known when it does not function). And as the Self is proved through the relation of its being the abode of this cognition of objects (i.e., as the Self, in each cognition of objects, at once presents itself immediately as the abode of that cognition), it is needless to assume another cognition (i.e., the abovementioned mānasa pratyakṣa) through which the Self should be known.

Let us then, it might here be said, accept the view of the followers of Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila.) They argue as follows: The Self is an object of cognition, since it is directly perceived; as a jar is. That (on this view) the Self is both the object of knowledge and the knowing subject, implies no contradiction; for we distinguish in the Self a substantial (dravya) element which is the object of cognition, and a conscious (bodha) element which is the subject of cognition. Nor does any contradiction arise here on the ground that the object of an action is the main factor (pradhāna) and the agent a mere secondary factor (guna) (and that one and the same thing cannot be pradhāna and guna as well). For we may view that element in the Self which is object as pradhāna, and that element which is subject of cognition as guna. This view also the Prābhākara rejoins, is untenable. For what you call the substantial element in the Self is non-intelligent, and hence cannot be a Self at all. There thus remains the conscious element only; and if you view this as an object of cognition, you cannot rid your view of the two contradictions stated. Nor can it be said that that conscious element is capable of undergoing a change so as to have simultaneously the character of object and of subject of knowledge; for it is not made up of parts (and hence cannot undergo any change). And if, to escape from this difficulty, it were assumed somehow to undergo changes, like the fundamental matter (pradhāna) of the Sākhyas, the cognising element would either not be apprehended as self-luminous and the abode

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of knowledge, and this would be contradictory to the Bhātta view of the cognising agent; or it would be apprehended as the object (viśaya) of cognition; and this would imply that it is a Not-self, like the jar. It, therefore, must be held (and this leads us back to the Prābhākara view) that the Self is immediately known (pratyaṅka) as the substrate of cognition, while jars and the like are immediately known as objects of cognition.

The Sautrāntika (Bauddha) will not allow this latter point,—viz., jars and the like being immediately perceived; but proposes the following inference: "the presentation to consciousness, in the several acts of cognition, of the images (pratibimba) of objects has for its antecedent original things (bimba) of the same kind, for it is a presentation of something in something else, just like the presentation of the face in the mirror." But him we meet in the following way: In this cognitional act of inference, the original things either appear to consciousness directly, apart from the images, or they do not. On the former alternative, your probaus would fail in this very case (this being a case of presentation of something in something else, and yet appearing directly, apart from the image). On the second alternative, since the thing to be established,—i.e., that the antecedent of the images is the real objects,—does not present itself to consciousness, the inferential cognition could not arise at all (the appearing to consciousness being non-existent, and this being the subject of your inference). We, therefore, maintain it as an undeniable fact that there is an immediate consciousness of objects (not an inference of them).

Nor can we accept the view of the Vijñānavādin who holds that things are directly known only on account of their being (not external things, but) ideas. For it is a fact that the externality of things—which is not of the nature of an idea—is also immediately known. If this 'externality' were of the nature of idea, then its cognition would not be as liable to sublation as the cognition of silver in a shell [as according to the Vijñānavādin, it is only things other than ideas that are unreal, and as such liable to sublation, like the wrong cognition of silver].

We (the Prābhākaras) therefore hold that whatever is known—such as jars and the like—is immediately perceived, because it is an object. On the other hand, the cognition

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(pramiti) is not perceived, because it is (not an object but) self-luminous.

[Page 55.] We, on this occasion, must declare against the views held by the Logicians and the Bhāṭṭas, respectively, as to the nature of knowledge (pramiti). The former teach that knowledge—inhering through the so-called samavāya relation in the Self which through conjunction (samyoga) is connected with the internal organ (the manas)—is itself immediately cognized (pratyakṣa) through another cognition—the relation between the two being the one of 'Samyuktasamavāya.' The Bhāṭṭas on the other hand hold cognition to be something that abides in the object known—and as such is denoted by the technical term prākātya (manifested-ness) and itself is the object of another cognition.

But both these theories are untenable. For the view that one cognition is the object of another cognition would imply that two moments of time exist together.

To this the Logician might rejoin:—'You also accept the simultaneous existence of the two kinds of results of sacrificial acts—one, the immediate result being in the course of being destroyed, while another, the second result, in the shape of the long-standing āpurva, not being destroyed, but just coming into existence. But there still remains another difficulty. If the cause of something being apprehended consists either in the samavāya (according to the Logician) or in the identity (according to the Bhāṭṭa) of that thing with another thing (the cognising Self)—which is connected (with the internal organ) by the so-called samyoga-relation—it will follow that the cognition which apprehends the cognition would at the same time directly apprehend all the other qualities—such as size, taste, etc.—which reside, through samavāya or rādātmya, in the substrate of right cognition [and it, of course, is evident that such is not the case].

To this it might be rejoined that the reason of this not actually happening is that the cognition which apprehends pramiti does not possess the capability of immediately cognizing either the attributes of the Self—such as extension and so on,—or the attributes of the jar, such as taste and so on.

But even allowing this, we further must point out that as knowledge (pramiti) is in itself nothing but pure light, it cannot possibly be held to be the object of knowledge.
on the part of something else; while jars and the like no doubt are such objects. Nor may it be pleaded that the so-called prākatya is something produced in the object, (e. g., a jar) by a special energy of the Self called pramāṇa, and hence may be known through another cognition, just as colour and the other qualities of the jar. For of what kind should that energy of the Self be—motion, (parispanda)? or change (parināma)? The former is not possible since that which is omnipresent cannot move. And as regards the latter alternative, we point out that, just as the jar which is the result of a transformation of the clay has the clay for its substrate, so the prākatya—if the result of a transformation of the Self—would have the Self for its substrate (and not belong to the object). If you rejoin that, just as from that change of the hair which consists in its turning grey there results old age in the body, so the result prākatya may arise in the object in consequence of a change in the Self; —we ask, what do you understand by an object being the substrate of prākatya. Does it mean being conscious? or producing prākatya ('manifestedness' of the object)? or being the substrate of the energy, termed 'cognition,' which produces prākatya? The first alternative would mean that jars and the like objects are conscious (which is absurd). The second alternative would mean that the sense organs, the eyes and the rest, are conscious (which we know not to be the case). Nor can the third alternative be accepted. For you would in that case have to infer the Self's being the abode of cognitive activity, in the following way:—

'The Self is the substrate of the action of knowing (jñāna-kriyā) because it is connected with the result produced by that action (viz., the prākatya of the object); just as Devadatta is the substrate of the action of eating because he is connected with the result of that action, viz., satiety.' But this inference would be invalid on account of the reason on which it rests being something non-established; for the Self is not connected with the result of the action of knowing.* But such connexion is proved by

* On the third explanation of prākatya-dhārate some inference will have to be formulated as to the cognitional energy (jñāna) of which the prākatya is the result, residing in the Self; but this inference, as given in the text, would not be valid since the proving reason (the connexion of the Self with the result of that energy, i. e., with the pramiti) is one that cannot be used by the Prabhakarās according to whom that pramiti (=prākatya) is connected not with the Self, but the object.
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consciousness which declares 'the jar is perceived by me.'
Well, we rejoin, if you (the Prabhākara) accept this reasoning, then you yourself allow that consciousness contradicts your theory according to which the result of the act of knowing is in the object, not in the Self! For these reasons we must reject the totally perverse theories of the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas, and hold fast to the view that knowledge (pramāti) which is the result of the cognitional energy (pramāṇa) of the knowing subject (pramātrī) is (not the object of another act of knowledge but) self-luminous.

[Page 56]. The Baudhā indeed maintains that one and the same conscious state (samvedana) is pramāṇa, i.e., cognitional energy and result of that energy (i.e., cognition, pramāti) as well. But this involves the absurdity of a thing operating upon itself (the Samvedana being the cognitional energy operating upon itself as the result of that energy). The knowing subject, i.e., the Self, does not indeed really engage in any energy; but we, figuratively, ascribe to the Self the pramāṇa, which in reality is nothing but the combination of four factors, viz., Self, Internal organ, Sense-organ and Object. And since the invariable result of this combination is knowledge (pramāti), we cannot (as some do) accept either definite action towards appropriating an object, or active avoidance of an object, or indifference, as the result of the pramāṇa; for these three so-called results may be or may not be present.

Nor finally, the Prabhākara concludes, is there any proof for the theory of the Vedāntin according to which the Self is self-luminous. For as all empirical thought and speech can be accounted for on the view of the cognitions being self-luminous,

* This sentence may also be taken as addressed to the Bhāṭṭa, and not to the Prabhākara:—'In putting forward this reason you admit that it is the object alone, and not the Self, that is the result of cognitional activity; and this would be contradictory to your theory, on which the Self is the result or object of the cognition of I.' [For an exposition of the Bhāṭṭa view, see Śloka-Vārttika, Ātmavāda, Shl. 107, 126; and Sāstradṛṣṭikā, pp. 98, 99].

† The Prabhākara view is that the Self is perceptible, not indeed by itself, but as the agent of the cognitions of objects, which cognitions are self-luminous; while according to the Vedāntin, the Self is nothing more or less than the cognition itself, and hence is itself self-luminous. (For the Prabhākara view, see Prakaraṇa-paścātikā, Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series, Benares, pp. 152-53.)

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which view is admitted by both of us (the Vedāntins as well as
the Prābhākaras)—it creates a needless complication to ascribe
self-luminousness to the Self also. We thus must finally adhere
to the Prābhākara view; i.e., we maintain that the Ego which in
all judgments, such as ‘I know the jar,’ presents itself as the
substrate of the self-luminous cognition of the object—thus
being comparable to the wick which is the substrate of the self-
luminous flame—is nothing more or less than the Self, and is
not, as the Vedāntins maintain, a composite entity comprising an
objective as well and as a non-objective factor.

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[But we must reject the Prābhākara’s own theory. No dis-
tinction can be made between a Self forming the substrate of
consciousness or knowledge, and consciousness or knowledge
itself: the two are absolutely one, i.e., the Self is nothing else
but the universal ‘light of intelligence or consciousness’ (chit-
prakāśha). The Self is neither a substance nor a quality nor an
action; it is mere consciousness, and becomes an I only when
illusorily associated with the non-intelligent organ of Egoity.]

This position of the Prābhākara we Vedāntins now counter-
argue as follows:—On due consideration we arrive at the result
that the Ego (the organ of Egoity; ahaṅkāra) is of the nature
of the Not-self; since the Self is of the nature of consciousness
(knowledge; anubhava).

In order to prove this we address to you the following ques-
tion—What is it that constitutes the ‘light of intelligence’
(light of consciousness’; chitprakāśha)? * Is it the Self
(ātman) only; or the Self and knowledge (consciousness; anu-
bhava); or knowledge (consciousness; anubhava) alone?

The first alternative implies that knowledge (anubhava) is
of the nature of non-intelligent (jāta; material) light; † and
two possibilities then present themselves: knowledge either, like

* I.e., that ‘light of consciousness’ the existence of which nobody denies;
all schools and sects alike admitting that there is consciousness or knowledge
which illumines ‘makes shine forth’ all objects of knowledge; just as
physical light illumines material objects.

† For if the Self alone constitutes the ‘light of intelligence’ then anubhava
cannot be chit-prakāśha, but can be of the nature of physical light only.

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the eye and the other sense organs—although not itself shining forth—manifests all other things; or, like physical light, it manifests objects while itself shining forth independently of other light of the same kind (i.e., other physical light). But the former alternative cannot be accepted; since the eye gives rise to knowledge different from itself, and knowledge does not do that. And on the second alternative knowledge would possess the characteristic mark of ‘light of intelligence,’ viz., flashing forth of consciousness (sphurāṇa) independent of any knowledge beside itself; and this would mean that ‘knowledge’ and ‘light of intelligence,’ are identical. Knowledge, the eye, and physical light indeed have this in common that they all manifest objects such as jars; but knowledge does this in virtue of its being opposed to the non-knowledge of objects, and thus being known as ‘light of intelligence’; light (in the ordinary sense) manifests objects only by being opposed to the darkness investing the objects, and is non-intelligent (physical) light; and lastly, the eye manifests them as being directly instrumental towards the immediate cognition of things, and is such that its own instrumental character is not known (necessarily). The three thus are of different kinds. But, an objection is raised, it is a mistake to argue that knowledge does not depend upon anything else of the same kind, just as physical light does not depend on anything else of the same kind; for as a matter of fact physical light is illumined (manifested) by the eye which is of the same kind as physical light (viz., non-intelligent, material)!

Not so, we reply. For what, we ask, does the eye do with regard to light? Does it ward off darkness, or does it give rise to knowledge? Not certainly the former; for light is in itself free from all darkness. And the latter alternative can only mean that light is manifested by knowledge to which the eye gives rise and which is of a different kind from light. It, therefore, is an unexceptionable statement that knowledge does not, any more than physical light, depend on anything else of the same kind;

* In the case of other instruments of knowledge—e.g. words—it is necessary that the word should be actually known as denoting a certain meaning; in the case of the Eye, this is not necessary; as even though we do not actually know the Eye to be the organ of vision, we shall see the object that comes before our Eyes.
and we hence must hold it to be light of intelligence. Were it mere physical light, the whole world would remain merged in blindness. Nor may the antagonist (who holds that the Self only is light of intelligence) give to his theory the following turn—'That which really illumines the objects is consciousness in the form of the knowing subject (pramāṇa-chaitanya); but it does this by means of knowledge which itself is non-intelligent.' For if knowledge, in itself non-intelligent, acts only as the cause of the consciousness of the Self entering into connexion with the objects, it really is no more than a modification of the (non-intelligent) internal organ, and the theory then in no way differs from that of the Vedāntins. Let it then be said that knowledge is the cause of the light of the Self also! This is altogether impossible; for the light of that the nature of which is intelligence, cannot depend on what is non-intelligent. Let it then be said that knowledge is that which illumines the objects only. This view will not commit us to the theory of the Vedāntins, for what we now maintain is only that non-intelligent knowledge gives rise to another knowledge (different from the former) which serves the end of manifesting the objects—this other knowledge however being something apart from the consciousness which constitutes the Self. This view, the rejoinder is, would lead us into an infinite regress; for that other knowledge itself again being of non-intelligent nature, would stand in need of a further act of knowledge, and so on without end.

We now advance to the second alternative proposed above; and this also we reject. The Self and knowledge cannot both be 'light of intelligence'; for from this view it would follow that each has a completely settled and finished existence, independently of the other. And if this were so, who or what then would apprehend the connexion of the two—Self and knowledge? You will perhaps try to get over this difficulty by putting the case as follows:—'the Self does not shine forth by itself, since it is of the nature of intelligence; just as the states of consciousness of another person do not shine forth. The Self therefore depends on knowledge for its own accomplishment (i.e., the Self is realised as Self, as consciousness, only through an act of knowledge).

But against this we point out that the
same would follow with regard to knowledge also. Let us then say that knowledge is self-luminous, because it is not hidden or obstructed by anything else. Then, we reply, the Self is in the same case. For the following inference would be valid: 'The Self shines forth by itself; for, while being of the nature of intelligence, it also is not hidden or obstructed; just as knowledge is.'

There remains the third alternative, according to which knowledge only (not the Self) is 'light of intelligence.' But against this we assert the Vedántic view that the Self must necessarily be held to be 'light of intelligence,' since the Self and knowledge are one.

The Logicians and the followers of Prabhākara indeed teach that knowledge is a quality (guṇa) of the Self. The Sāṅkhya maintain, by implication, that it is a substance since it constitutes the very nature of the Self (which they class as a substance). The followers of Bhaṭṭa again hold that knowledge is an action (karmaṇa), for, they say, it is the result of an activity of the nature of change, and the activity and the result should be considered as one.

Against this last view we remark that, if knowledge is a karmaṇa, like the action of moving, it cannot be considered either as light or as a result.

As to knowledge being a substance (the Sāṅkhya view) we observe that, on that hypothesis it must either be of atomic size,—and this would imply that like the feeble glimmer of a tiny glowworm it lights up only a small part of a thing (which actually is not the case);—or, secondly, it might be of infinite extent, and in that case the Self which is of the nature of knowledge, would manifest itself everywhere (which also is not the case); and if (instead of saying that knowledge constitutes the nature of the Self) you were to say that the Self is the abode of knowledge, the very same difficulty would arise;—or, in the third place, knowledge would be of medium size; in that case it would (like all things that are neither of infinite nor atomic size) be made up of parts and depend on those parts; it hence

* If this reasoning were accepted it would follow that knowledge also as being of the nature of intelligence, does not shine forth, and hence cannot be established by itself.
could not depend on the Self. Let us then say that it depends on the Self in the sense in which the jar is said to depend on the ground on which it stands. On that view also, we rejoin, it must be admitted that the Self and knowledge are non-different, no less than are the lamp and its light; for our thought and speech regarding things cognized by us are strictly analogous to what we think and say of things lit up by a lamp—'this is shown by the light of the lamp' 'this is known by me.' If there were a real distinction of Self and knowledge, the expression 'this is known by me' would have to be taken (while it is actually not so taken) in a secondary, metaphorical sense—as we take the phrase 'this thing is lit up by wood' (where the wood stands for the flame of the burning wood.)

[Page 58.]—Finally, as to knowledge being a quality of the Self—the Logician's view. A quality does not originate apart from the origination of the substance,—the brilliancy of the flame, e.g., originates together with the flame; knowledge, therefore, being eternal and invariably present where the Self is, the Self and knowledge are virtually one. You may ask how the Self, whose very proof and existence depend on knowledge, can be one with it; but the fact is that we do not admit such dependence, for it would imply that the Self is a mere Not-self like jars and the like. The further objection may be raised that since the cognition of blue colour, the cognition of yellow colour and so on, evidently are different things, knowledge cannot be one with the Self (which of course is always the same). But to this we reply that we are not conscious of these so-called different states of cognition as differing in themselves (quâ cognition); and that there is no means of proof to establish such difference. Nor may you argue that those states of cognition are different because they originate and pass away; for origination and passing away themselves presuppose difference, and your reasoning thus moves in a circle. But we must admit the origination of the later state of consciousness, in order thus to establish a purport for the operation of the instruments bringing about the new state, such as the eye and so on; and then, in order to preclude the (impossible view of the) simultaneousness of two states of consciousness the passing

* The form of cognition always is the same; the contents only vary.

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away of the earlier state must likewise be admitted! By no
means, we reply. The whole process may be accounted for by
the origination and passing away of successive connexions of
one and the same consciousness with different objects; and it
therefore would be needlessly cumbersome to ascribe origination
and passing away to consciousness also.

The Baudhās indeed assume that, in the same way as
many really separate flames, originating and passing away in
succession, are apprehended as one continuous flame, simply be-
cause they are similar to each other; so the states of conscious-
ness are in reality distinct, but this distinctness does not manifest
itself without some special condition. But this theory is
untenable. The case of the flames indeed may be such as
described, for they are apprehended by something different
from them; but it is impossible that a difference abiding in self-
luminous consciousness itself should not manifest itself. Nor
does it avail to appeal to the non-manifestation of the true
nature of the self-luminous Brahman as a proving instance; for
the concealment of Brahman by Nescience has been established
by valid means of proof.

Consciousness thus is one only and without a beginning.
That it has no beginning follows from its being free from anteced-
ent non-existence. As is said in Sureshvara's Vārttika (on the
Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad—Anandāshrama Series, Poona, Vol. II,
p. 498, shloka 338.)

'Inasmuch as all effects, that are found to have antecedent
non-existence, are objects of consciousness, this Consciousness
itself can have no antecedent non-existence.'

Self-luminous Consciousness thus being eternal, there is
nothing irrational in the theory which identifies it with the
Self. A distinction between the two may however be allowed in
so far as we use the term anubhava (consciousness; knowledge)
to denote the Self in relation to objects; while we speak of the
'Self' simply, when not wishing to emphasize that relation. In
an analogous way we speak of a number of trees as a wood, when
our mind dwells on the fact of their standing close to each
other; while we speak of them as trees when not intending to
bring out that special relation. Having thus established our
point, how, we ask, can the Prābhākara assert that the Self
manifests itself as the mere substrate of consciousness? and how should he prove that the non-intelligent *ahaṅkāra* is identical with the Self?

**XXVIII.**

[We cannot allow the contention of the Prābhākara that 'I-consciousness' is a permanent characteristic of the Self; for such consciousness is absent in deep dreamless sleep during which, as all admit, the Self persists. When a man, on waking from dreamless sleep, reflects 'I slept well, I was not conscious of anything,' he transfers the I-character which belongs to all waking cognition to the state of deep sleep in which the Self, freed for the time of all shackles of Egoity was abiding in its own blissful nature and associated only with general non-particularized Nescience, not with any of its special modifications.]

But, the Prābhākara rejoins, when I think or say 'I see the jar,' it is evidently the I which is referred to as the seeing subject, and the seeing subject is neither more nor less than the Self!

By no means, we reply. If this were so, the Self would present itself in the state of deep sleep also in the form of the Ego (i.e., there would be Ego-consciousness in deep sleep also). But this as we know is not the case. The 'I' therefore is not the Self, for it does not present itself in deep sleep (in which the Self undoubtedly persists).

*[Page 59.]* "Let us then view the matter as follows. The I although present in deep sleep does not shine forth at the time because there is no consciousness of objects." But this view also we cannot accept. For, we ask, is there in deep sleep absence of pure consciousness? or absence of the affection of consciousness by objects? The former alternative is impossible, since consciousness is permanent and eternal. And the second alternative also is excluded, since the consciousness of Self does not depend on affection by objects. But, our opponent rejoins, it is that aspect of the Self which consists in its being a seeing (cognizing) subject, that constitutes the Ego, and the consciousness of that aspect depends on the affection by objects. In reply to this we ask the following question: what have we to understand by this 'aspect
of being a seeing subject? Is the seeing subject that which illumines (constitutes as objects of consciousness) the things seen? or that which is other than the objects seen? or pure consciousness (chit)? On the first and second definitions alike, the quality of being a seeing subject is defined by means of the objects seen, the quality therefore is something extrinsic or adventitious and hence cannot belong to the Self; the Ego therefore cannot be the Self. And on the third definition the Ego would be independent of objects, and hence there would be no reason why it should not present itself in deep sleep also. But there is consciousness of the Ego in deep sleep also! Were this so, we rejoin, the man who wakes from deep sleep would remember his Ego of deep sleep no less than his Ego of the previous day. It is not, we admit, an absolute rule that whatever has been experienced is remembered; but as in the case in question the Self is remembered, why should there not be remembrance of the Ego also, which, as you say, is nothing but pure consciousness? We can account for this: That cognition on the part of eternal consciousness of which the Ego is the object is not transitory (but permanent) and hence no mental impression (samskāra) of it is formed; it is owing to this that remembrance does not arise. For the same reason then, we rejoin, the Ego of the preceding day should not be remembered; while as a matter of fact it is remembered. On our view, on the other hand, the special Ego-consciousness which took place on the preceding day is not permanent; hence a mental impression of it is formed, and this later on gives rise to remembrance.

But all the same, the opponent resumes, we must admit that the man who wakes from sleep does remember the ego of deep sleep; for as a matter of fact he thinks 'I enjoyed a pleasant sleep.' You now talk such random stuff, we rejoin, that even the wretched Naiyāyika may put you to shame; as follows:—If a man thinks 'I enjoyed a pleasant sleep,' there is no direct reference whatever to the Self of deep sleep, or any pleasure enjoyed by it: what actually takes place is an inference, on the part of the man risen from sleep, that the Self of which he, now in the waking state, is conscious, was at the time of deep sleep characterized by absence of pain—such absence of pain being

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metaphorically called 'pleasure,'—'I, when wrapt in deep sleep, was free from all pain, because no pain connected with that state is remembered by me; like a jar.' Implied (secondary or metaphorical) meanings are indeed ordinarily assumed with regard to words only, not with regard to perception, inference and so on; all the same, the primary sense of the word pleasure being impossible in the case under discussion, absence of pain only can be admitted. Nor is it possible to assume the existence of pleasure in the primary sense, merely on the basis of the subsequent reflexion. For if pleasure had actually been experienced in sleep, the remembrance of it would present itself in connection with some particular thing, as e.g., food or drink. And even if this latter difficulty were got over by assuming that the mental impression of the particular object is not resuscitated; yet the reflexion on previous absence of consciousness—which expresses itself in the form 'I enjoyed a pleasant sleep, I was not conscious of anything'—is distinctly opposed to previous consciousness of pleasure, and strengthens our view as to mere absence of pain. But does not the lightness of movement, the placid expression of the countenance and so on, which we observe in a person just risen from sleep, justify the inference that he had during sleep been enjoying positive pleasure?

Not so, we reply. In the moment immediately succeeding the time of direct consciousness, remembrance would be expected to take place; there is no room here for inference. Nor must it be argued that as we observe lightness of limb etc., on the part of persons just risen from sleep, in different degrees, we must assume, as their antecedent, pleasure of corresponding different degrees; since the mere absence of pain is always of one and the same kind. For even in the absence of different degrees of previous pleasure the subsequent differences can be accounted for on the ground of different degrees of rest enjoyed during sleep by the sense-organs and the rest, the activity of which gives rise to pain.

"Very well; but we are not particularly interested in the views of the Naiyāyikas. We rather want to hear how you, the Vedāntin, settle the question!" Listen then, with due attention, to my exposition.

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The one fundamental Reality, Bliss—which essential nature is constituted by self-luminous witnessing Consciousness—although indeed ever shining forth, yet, in the waking state and in the dreaming state, does not shine with full brightness, since then it is agitated by illusive ideas such as 'I am a man'—a condition comparable to that of the flame of a lamp which is shaken by a strong breeze. In deep dreamless sleep on the other hand, where all erroneous cognition has passed away, it shines forth with undimmed brightness. Obscuring Nescience indeed conceals the Brahman-aspect (the 'Bliss'-aspect) of Reality, but it does not conceal its aspect as witnessing Consciousness, by which Nescience itself is illumined. Were it otherwise, Nescience itself would be without a witness and hence not known. When therefore the sleeper wakes from sleep, he reflects on three things—the Bliss experienced in deep sleep, the Self, and positive Nescience; and his thought takes the form 'I slept beautifully, I was not conscious of anything.'

But, an objection is raised, in deep sleep the consciousness of these three things cannot be due to modifications of the internal organ, which, as you yourself hold, do not take place in sleep. And if, on the other hand, there were immediate experience (experience not depending on the internal organ) of these things by primal Consciousness, such experience—being something non-transitory, permanent—could not leave behind an impression, and hence no subsequent reflection on it could take place. The case is otherwise, we reply. In deep sleep Nescience itself illusorily unfolds itself in three modifications which apprehend those three objects: the presentations to consciousness, determined by these modifications, after having mediated the experience of the three objects, pass away at the time of waking; and why then should the impression which they leave behind not produce remembrance? But on this view of the matter it is the Self determined by Nescience which experiences, and the Self determined by the internal organ which remembers; and hence there is no continuity of consciousness!

This objection also is unfounded, we reply. For we hold that at the time of waking also, it is none other but the Self qualified by Nescience which remembers. The function of the internal organ is to bring about the connexion of the thing
remembered with ordinary thought as expressing itself in language. Nor can it be said that the expressions 'pleasant' and 'I was not conscious' (in the phrases meant to express the thought of the waking person) imply a reflexion on previous absence of pain and absence of consciousness. For although these two negations exist in sleep, the sleeper does not cognize them; since their counter-entities—pain and knowledge—are not at the time remembered.

But how then does the waking person apprehend that absence of pain and cognition which is characteristic of deep sleep, but of which, in sleep, there is no consciousness? By so-called presumptive reasoning (arthāpatti), we reply. The waking person remembers, in the manner detailed above, the untroubled bliss of deep sleep, and then immediately infers, as necessarily connected therewith, the absence of what is contrary to bliss, i.e., pain. And in the same way, the remembrance of positive Nescience (which invested him in deep sleep) compels him to assume the absence of what is opposed to Nescience, i.e., knowledge or consciousness.

[Page 61.]—But, a further objection is raised, positive Nescience does not conflict with knowledge; for in the waking state the two co-exist. Not so, we reply. Although Nescience as a whole does not conflict with the cognitions of the empirical world, there is a conflict between those cognitions and Nescience as transmuted into particular forms. Nescience transmuted into the cognition of a jar is opposed to the cognition of a piece of cloth and other things. Were it not so, the entire world with all its objects would present itself to consciousness at the time when the jar is cognized. Hence we conclude that Nescience which has assumed the form of deep sleep is in opposition to all special cognitions. The presumptive reasoning detailed above therefore is well founded.

But, an objection is raised, why have recourse to such presumptive reasoning, while the following simple inference offers itself:—'There was no cognition in the state of deep sleep, since none is remembered'? Not so, we reply. Adopting this style of reasoning you might conclude that there were no herbs by the side of the road on which you walked because you fail to remember them. But how then is it that at noon we
argue as follows:—'There was no elephant within this house early this morning; for we do not remember any such thing.' As a matter of fact, we rejoin, nobody argues in that way. What actually takes place is that having early in the morning perceived the things which fill the space within the house, heaps of grain and the like, and remembering this at noon we know, as an item necessarily implied therein, that no elephant was inside the house. The absence of pain and of cognition in the state of deep sleep is, therefore, known by presumptive reasoning, while the presence of positive Nescience, of bliss and of the Self, is remembered. This is our view of the question.

But what does this conclusion tell us as to the Ego?—That in deep sleep there is no consciousness of the Ego; and that the person who has risen from sleep does not reflect upon the Ego. But how then do you account for that Ego-consciousness which evidently finds its expression in the 'I' in 'I slept well'? As follows, we reply. In deep sleep the organ of egoty was resolved in general Nescience; at the moment of waking it again forms itself; what at that time is reflected upon really is the Self; but the Ego then is thought and spoken of as implying the Self, to the end of rendering empirical thought and speech more definite; this indeed being the only end of the ahaṅkāra. As a matter of fact, the Self is never viewed as represented by any other modifications of the internal organ (but by the ahaṅkāra-modification). This is set forth in the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi (Bombay Sanskrit Series, pp. 80-81) as follows:—

'The Self is implied (by secondary or indirect signification) by the I-modification (of the internal organ), and not by any other modification; for the reason that this modification is something specially inward, extremely subtle, and specially subserving the intuition of the Self.'

'The Self is also denoted (by direct signification) by the I-consciousness (or the word 'I'); for the reason that consciousness must be regarded either as inseparable from the Self, or absolutely non-existent; no other alternative is possible.'

[Page 62.] The conclusion then is that this, in itself non-sentient, ahaṅkāra, although in the waking and dreaming states

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presenting itself as the Self, does not constitute the nature of the Self, since it is non-existent in deep sleep (when yet the Self exists). This indeed all versed in Scripture and Smriti will have to admit. Thus Scripture (Chh. Up. VII. 25) after having—in the clause 'it is below, above, behind, before' etc.,—declared that Brahman, there called 'plenitude' (bhūman) is the Self of all, continues—'Now then the teaching as to the I (ahaṅkāra)—and declares that the I also is the Self of all ('I am below, above' etc.,); and finally—in the clause—'Now then the teaching as to the Self (the Self is below' etc.)—refers to the Self as something different from the I.

But, it is objected, in the same way as the declaration of both the individual soul and of Brahman being the Self of all, is meant to prove the identity of the two, thus the scriptural passage quoted above may also be taken as meant to prove that the I is identical with the Self. Not so, we reply. The cases are not parallel. Since the individual soul and Brahman are, previously, naturally conceived as being different entities, it is appropriate that a declaration made with regard to them (viz., that each of them is the Self of all) should be understood as meant to prove their identity; for two different things cannot be the Self of all. If, on the other hand, the I which previously is naturally understood to be one with the Self, is referred to in the sacred text as something separate, we are justified in concluding that this is done for the purpose of establishing its difference from the Self. Nor must you object to this, that on this interpretation of the text the declaration as to the I being the Self of all has no sense; for it really has the purpose of intimating that the transcendent (parokṣa) Brahman is identical with the I of which we are immediately conscious. But then the meaning is neither more nor less than that the I is the Self, and this brings you back to the same position from which you wished to escape,—your case being like that of the man who started very early in order to escape the payment of toll at the river-crossing—(which was not levied before sunrise), but reached the crossing when the sun had risen already. Not so, we reply. For the text finally sets aside the I (by mentioning the Self), and thereby teaches that Brahman only is the Self in the real sense.

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Moreover another scriptural text—'the I-maker (Ahaṅkāra) and what is made I (Ahaṅ-kurtavyum,' Prashna Up., IV. 8)—distinctly mentions the Ahaṅkāra as included in the group comprising the sense-organs and sense-objects. And Smṛiti .Bha. Gī, XIll. 5) mentions the Ahaṅkāra among other things that belong to the world of 'effects'—'the great elements, the Ahaṅkāra,' etc.

XXIX.

[The Ahaṅkāra of the Vedāntins—which essentially differs from the manas of the Naiyāyikas—is a special modification of the so-called internal organ; which itself is one of the products of Universal Nescience. It is the Ahaṅkāra which through its various functions or energies creates all individual experience; it of course being understood that this experience is conscious experience only owing to the fact that the Ahaṅkāra is irradiated by Universal Intelligence. Universal Intelligence in itself has no specific cognitions or experiences of any kind—all these belong to the Ahaṅkāra only; but as the Self is associated with the Ahaṅkāra, the experiences of the latter are mistakenly ascribed to the former: the I is confounded with the Self. In reality the latter is no more touched by the doings and sufferings of the Ahaṅkāra than the crystal by the reflexion, in it, of the red flower. For these two cases a valid analogy may be claimed; for ordinary reflection (for which some attempt to assign natural, physical, explanations) must be held to be something purely illusory, unreal—a thing of Māya.'—While the Self can never be the object of knowledge, the I can be known; for if we abstract from the subjective element in it (i.e., the reflexion in it of Universal Intelligence), it is of essentially objective character, a thing which exists for Intelligence.]

Well then, what really is this so-called Ahaṅkāra? What is its material cause? What its instrumental cause? What its essential nature? Through what means of knowledge is it known? What are its effects? Why does it not exist in deep sleep? Listen to our explanation. The material cause of the organ of egoity is beginningless, inexplicable Nescience. Its instrumental cause is the circumstance of Nescience being
ruled in all its operations by the Highest Lord. Its essential nature is constituted by the power of cognition and the power of action combined. The source through which it is known is ever unchanging consciousness. Its effects are action and enjoyment. It does not exist in deep sleep, because deep sleep is nothing else than the resolution of the organ of Egoity into universal Nescience. The vital breath (prāṇa)—whose nature is power of action—no doubt persists in deep sleep also, but this does not conflict with the Ahaṅkāra, which is different from the vital breath, then ceasing to exist. And if we should view the two as non-different, we may assume that the Ahaṅkāra ceases to exist in deep sleep, all but that element of it which constitutes the vital breath. If however, we accept the Dṛṣṭi-sriṣṭi-theory,* then for the man in deep sleep everything may be held to cease to exist, in the ordinary sense of the word.

[Page 63.] The theory held by the Sāṅkhya on this matter is that what constitutes the material cause of the world is not Nescience ruled and controlled by the Highest Lord, but the Pradhāna which is a non-intelligent and fully real principle, not depending on any other principle; of this Pradhāna the so-called Mahat and the organ of Egoity are the first products. But this view is untenable. Were things as the Sāṅkhya represent them, the organ of Egoity and all that depends on it, all action, all enjoyment and so on, would present themselves to consciousness in a purely objective form 'This is a doer,' 'This is an enjoyer' and not as something superimposed upon the Self; so that the (actual) forms of consciousness, 'I am a doer,' 'I am an enjoyer,' would never arise. For the theory of superimposition of this kind being due to inexplicable Nescience is not accepted by the Sāṅkhya; and all other theories concerning this problem have been refuted by us (so as not to be open to the Sāṅkhya).

The theory of the Naiyāyikas on this matter is as follows:—There is a peculiar organ, called manas, of atomic size, which is the instrumental cause of pleasure, pain, desire, cognition and so on. If no such organ existed, the merely occasional (not

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* This is the name given to the theory on which a thing is regarded as existing only so long as it is perceived; the whole world therefore ceases to exist for the person who lies in deep sleep and does not perceive anything.

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permanent) cognition which is observed to take place when the Self, the sense-organs and the objects are in contact, could not be accounted for. But we cannot allow what the Vedāntins maintain, viz., that there exists a so-called internal organ which is different from the manas described, is of medium size, undergoes the changes of pleasure, pain and so on, and from a special modification of which the ahaṅkāra arises. The Vedāntins illustrate the functions of this ahaṅkāra by certain comparisons: As a lump of iron when heated superimposes upon the fire (which glows within the iron) its own form and extension—so that the fire is spoken of as big or small or globular, etc.; and as by the mirror the face of a person, although one only, is split up so as to appear in a double form, viz., as thing reflected and as reflexion; and as the water in a pail superimposes upon the moon reflected in it all its own motions; so the ahaṅkāra superimposes upon the Self all its own functions—acting, enjoying and the rest; splits up the one Self so that it appears as Brahman and as individual soul; and superimposes upon the latter its own activities, such as going to another world and the like. Nor must it be said that this internal organ is nothing else but the so-called buddhi (organ of thought), for there is no buddhi apart from cognition, and cognition is nothing but a quality of the Self. The internal organ, imagined by the Vedāntins, therefore, has no existence.

This theory also is unfounded, we reply. For from more than one scriptural text (cp. e. g., 'by the quality of buddhi,' Shvet. Up., V. 8) it is well known that there is an internal organ which undergoes changes, has for its essential properties the powers of cognition and action, builds up for the Self the whole empirical world, and is variously designated as manas, buddhi, etc. Were there no such organ, no world would arise for the Self which in itself is altogether unrelated. But as there is such an organ, through it an unreal world is superimposed upon the Self, just as unreal red colour is superimposed by the China rose on the crystal placed near it.

There indeed are some who refuse to admit the appositeness of this last parallel instance, on the ground, that the red colour of the crystal, is not unreal. But, we ask those opponents, how do you then explain the phenomenon? Do you hold that, the
visual rays of the beholder proceed towards the crystal, are reflected by it, and then proceed towards the red flower? or does the colour of the flower, being reflected in the crystal, appear as if belonging to the latter? or does the light of the flower, analogous to the light proceeding from certain gems such as rubies, permeate the crystal, so that the latter itself appears as red? or is that which appears as red the light of the flower only which permeates the crystal? or does the light of the flower produce in the crystal a new redness? On the first alternative the flower also (no less than its red colour) would present itself to the eye and hence be perceived. And if it were held that owing to some defect of a part of the eye there is no contact between eye and flower, then the red colour also should not be perceived; for there would be absence of the *Samyukta-sama-vāya* relation,—i.e., the colour would not be perceived since that in which it inheres, *viz.*, the flower) would not be in contact with the eye. The second alternative is inadmissible, since we never observe a reflexion of mere colour apart from the substance to which the colour belongs. As to the third alternative, the use of the phrase 'as it were' implies that you yourself admit the connexion of crystal and red colour to be an *unreal* one. On the fourth alternative the white colour of the crystal also should be perceived; there being no cause for its non-perception. It cannot be argued that the whiteness of the crystal is driven out by the radiance of the flower, the colour of which is opposed to that of the flower; for if this were so, the crystal no longer having any colour would cease to be an object of visual perception. Nor again can it be said that the whiteness is (not entirely driven out but) obstructed (lessened); for if this were so the obstruction would extend to the crystal itself. Substances are not visible apart from colour; were it so, we should see the air also (which has no colour). And on the fifth alternative, if the radiance of the flower were the *instrumental cause* of the production of red colour in the crystal, that colour would persist even on the withdrawal of the flower's radiance. Let us then view the radiance of the flower as the *material cause* of the redness of the crystal. This also, we reply, may not be; since we do not perceive in a flower a radiance analogous to that of a gem; and thus this view becomes open to the objections.
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urged against the previous alternative. We thus are led to the conclusion that the redness of the crystal cannot be viewed as anything else but an unreal (illusory) appearance caused (in the instrumental sense) by the flower. And analogous to this superimposition is the superimposition, due to the organ of Egoity, of action, enjoyment, and so on, on the Self.

But, our opponent asks, which of the two following alternatives do you mean to maintain—are certain characteristics belonging to the ahaṅkāra, such as being an agent etc., falsely superimposed upon the Self? or is a second unreal quality of being an agent and so on produced in the Self itself? On the former alternative the redness of the crystal—which you adduce as an analogous instance—would not be analogous (since you said above that an unreal redness is produced in the crystal itself). And on the latter alternative the organ of Egoity would be a real agent, and the Self an unreal one: there thus would be two agents! Not so, we reply. Our former alternative is unexceptionable. For we set forth the analogous instance only in order to prove that the characteristic of being an agent, while not really belonging to the Self, yet appears to belong to it. This view is by no means identical with the so-called Anyathā-khyāti theory. For what we maintain is that the organ of Egoity together with its attribute of being an agent, is merely superimposed upon the Self and hence unreal. According to the Anyathā-khyāti theory, on the other hand, the thing superimposed, e.g., the silver that appears in the shell, is something real. Nor in fact is there any real objection to the second alternative. For as the Self and the ahaṅkāra are really one, the result of there being two agents does not follow. But, it is objected, the ahaṅkāra cannot be the cause of anything evil, such as being an agent, because in such texts as ‘the knot of the heart is torn away, &c.’ [Mundaka Up. 2.2.8] it is the ‘knot of the heart’ that is spoken of as that cause. This is not right, we reply. For what is figuratively spoken of as the ‘knot’ in that passage, is only the ahaṅkāra along with its substrate, the Self, possessing as such, the mixed character of ‘intelligence’ and ‘non-intelligence’ (the Self as the substratum, being the chit or intelligent factor, and the ahaṅkāra by itself the jāda or non-intelligent factor).

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But, another objection is raised, if the ahaṅkāra were something superimposed merely, there would be no consciousness of it. We maintain this on the ground of the following inference:—The Self is not conscious of what is superimposed on it; because the Self is a (mere) substrate; as crystal is (with regard to the red colour superimposed on it, of which it is not conscious).

Not so, we reply. The reason in your inference has proving power only with the special condition added that the substrate be something non-intelligent. But the Self is intelligent. But as the Self is destitute of such cognitional energy as has for its object the thing superimposed, it is virtually non-intelligent. By no means, we reply. For as the presentation to consciousness of the thing superimposed is due to the immediate connexion of the thing with consciousness, it does not depend on cognitional energy. But then you cannot hold that the ahaṅkāra contains an objective element; for it presents itself to consciousness without the mediation of cognitional energy, like the witnessing consciousness itself!

You are wrong again, we reply. In witnessing consciousness, there is absent the characteristic mark of objectivity, viz., being the object of consciousness; with regard to the ahaṅkāra, on the other hand, this characteristic feature is proved by immediate experience.

The Prābhākāras and others indeed, ignorant as they are of the mysteries of Philosophy, and—in agreement with vulgar thought—the characteristic mark of a thing’s objectivity in its being the object (i. e., that which is acted upon; karman) of the activity of cognition, and thus are led to the idle and confused doctrine that the I which does not possess that mark, is the Self. The ahaṅkāra also is the object of such cognition as consists in modifications of the internal organ—for were this not the case, the ahaṅkāra of the previous day could not be remembered [its actually being remembered being due to the impression left behind by the modification of the internal organ]; but as this cognition is a part of the ahaṅkāra and hence not really different from it, the fact of the ahaṅkāra being an object of cognition, is not so evident as the body, the sense-organs and the rest being objects.

But the fact is evident to all men of deeper insight! All the same, we reply,
the characteristic feature of being the object of cognitional energy on the part of the internal organ does not subsist in Nescience, which is set aside by that energy. Hence the only true characteristic feature of objectivity is 'being the object of consciousness.' But how then do you account for the fact that although (as you hold) the characteristic mark of objectivity belongs to the organ of Egoity no less than to the body, the sense-organs and the rest, ordinary thought and speech attribute it to the latter things only, and not to the organ of Egoity? Because, we rejoin, ordinary people have not the true insight. An ant-hill, a stone, a tree—all these things equally consist of the element earth; yet people devoid of discriminative insight think and speak of the ant-hill only as made of earth, not of the stone or tree. Those on the contrary, who possess the requisite insight, view the intelligent element in the ahaṅkāra as subjective, and the non-intelligent element as objective. But although competent persons thus define the ahaṅkāra, carrying within itself the reflexion of universal Intelligence, as being partly of the nature of Self and partly of that of Not-Self, ordinary men, confounding these two elements, are conscious of this composite entity simply as the I.

XXX.

[The reflexion of Universal Consciousness in the Ahaṅkāra constitutes the so-called Jīva (individual soul). Nor can it be argued that the Jīva, if a reflexion, must be something different from Universal Consciousness (Brahman); for so-called 'reflected images' in general are not really different from the things to which they belong; they only appear to be so, owing to Maya.]

But, if the individual Self is a reflexion of universal consciousness in the organ of Egoity, it must be something different from universal consciousness; just as the reflexion of the face in the mirror is something different from the face. That the head on the shoulders of the man and its reflected image are really different, follows from the fact that we perceive the two as facing each other. Not so, we reply. The recognition of identity which finds its expression in the judgment 'This is my face'
negatives the perception of difference. Nor may you retort that it rather is the recognition of identity which is negated by the perception of difference. For if there were difference, there would be no reflexion. To explain: What do you understand by the counter-object (pratibimba, reflected image)? Is it an impression stamped upon the mirror by the face? Or do you mean that the constituent parts of the mirror transform themselves into the counter-object, under the influence of the object's proximity? The former alternative is inadmissible since the face in the mirror is smaller than the real face. And when, in a big mirror, the reflected face also is perceived as big, it yet cannot be an impression stamped on the mirror; since the real face and the mirror are not in contact. Nor can the second alternative be accepted; for from it it would follow that the reflexion persists even when its cause, i.e., the face in proximity to it, is removed. But as a matter of fact it does not persist; and when the person reflected looks at the mirror sideways, or when another person looks at it straight, the reflected image is not perceived. Nor must you plead against this that in some cases an effect vanishes as soon as the operative cause ceases to act; that, e.g., a mat which has been unrolled by the action of the hand is seen to roll itself up again as soon as the cause of the unrolling, i.e., contact of the mat with the hand is removed. For in this latter case the effect does not cease because the cause is removed, but because, through the impression made on the mat by its having remained rolled up for a long time, an effect is produced which is contrary to the effect produced by the unrolling hand. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, the thing may remain close to the mirror for ever so long, but as soon as it is removed, the reflexion also vanishes—which shows that the thing does not produce a change in the substance of the mirror. And should you attempt to prove your case by another instance, viz., that of the lotus-flower, the expansion of which after having lasted for a considerable time ceases as soon as the operative cause, i.e., the sun-light, is withdrawn,—we must contradict you here also. What actually takes place is that the expansion of the flower ceases when, owing to the operation of certain earthy and watery constituent parts of the lotus which were the causes of the original closed, budlike,
condition of the flower, that budlike condition is restored at night-fall, and counteracts the expansion. Were it otherwise, the expansion would cease at night in the case of faded flowers also, which no longer possess the constituents referred to. If certain parts of the mirror really transformed themselves into a face, what should be the cause of the subsequent restitution of the original blank surface? Apart from the activity of an artificer, those parts truly have no capability of producing any effect. For an analogous reason the particles of the mirror-surface cannot be held to transform themselves into a face merely owing to the influence of the proximity of the real face. Truly, if this could happen, any one wishing to have the portrait of a face on a mirror would only have to bring the face to be delineated near the mirror, and there the portrait would be, without the need of any artist! And should you say that the work of an artificer may be needed for imparting to the material of the mirror some other form, and not for the mere production of the reflected image and the subsequent return of the surface to its previous state,—we rejoin that thus also the change of the mirror into the form of the reflected image cannot be rendered plausible. For we fail to perceive in the image that relation of raised and depressed parts which characterizes the real face: in the image the nose does not project, the eyes do not lie deep, and so on; the hand passing over the mirror feels an even surface only. And should you say that the smooth surface of the mirror interposes itself between the hand and the face (produced in the mirror),—we reply that in that case the face should not be visible at all. Our conclusion, therefore, is that there exists no second face in the mirror, since the causes required for the production of such a face are absent; just as the head of a hare is without horns,—because the causes of the production of horns are absent.

[Page 67.] But, if the reflected image is unreal like the silver illusorily appearing on the shell, you cannot say (as you did say above) that it is one with the thing reflected; and the reason for such oneness which you there set forth, viz., recognition, is too wide, since such recognition may take place in the case of shell-silver also, 'this is my silver.' The latter instance, we rejoin, is of a different nature. Since the

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cognition of silver is erroneous—as proved by the subsequent sublative judgment 'this is not silver'—the recognition also of the silver as my silver, must be held to be erroneous. In the case of the mirror, on the other hand, there is no judgment sublating the face itself; we do not say 'this is not a face,' but only 'there is no face there (i.e. in the mirror)'; the negation thus applying only to the connexion of the face with a definite place. The recognition 'this is my face' thus is in no way erroneous. Nor must you object that in the given case there can be no recognition by perception, since nobody knows the parts of his own face by perception. For perception of the whole is possible on the basis of perception of some parts, as e.g., in the case of a jar; and a man actually does see some parts of his own face—e.g., the tip of the nose. That when the mirror is removed the reflected image also vanishes, does not sublate the image; the same conclusion would otherwise hold good with regard to the mirror itself.

But the enunciation 'thou art that' does completely sublate the individual soul—which in this case holds the place of the reflected image; for in its form, i.e., the co-ordination of the members, that enunciation is of exactly the same kind as the judgment 'That (thing mistaken by me for a) post is (in reality) a man (where the post is completely sublated by the cognition of the man). And if the transmigrating individual soul did not pass away completely, there would be no Release.

Not so, we reply. Co-ordination may express oneness also, as e.g., it does in the judgment 'this person is that Devadatta (whom I saw before).’ And Release is effected through the sublation of that part only of the individual Self which is, in its nature, opposed to Release. If the entire individual Self were annihilated, Release truly would not be something beneficial to man.

Some indeed are of opinion that there is no counter-object in the mirror at all, but that the visual rays being repelled by the surface of the mirror turn back to the eye and apprehend (not a counter object but) the object, i.e., the real face itself as non-separated from the mirror. This view, however, is obviously refuted by the clear perception of the counter-object as facing the object. But how, the opponent asks,
can one and the same material thing, viz., the face, at the same time abide, in its totality, in two different places? Because, we reply, its abiding in the mirror is the work of Māyā! To Māyā, truly, nothing is impossible: in dreams it presents to us things of the strangest kind—such as the dreamer cutting off his own head.

But how then is it, on your view of the nature of reflected images, with the following case? You hold that the reflexion of a tree in a pool of water, where the tree appears with its top downward, is one with the reflected tree on the bank: the tree on the bank, therefore, is the substrate, and on this there are superimposed by Māyā characteristics of the reflected tree, viz., being in the water, having its top below, and so on. But in this case there is no true cause of superimposition, since the substrate (the real tree on the bank) is perceived in its totality. How then can this be a case of superimposition? Why, we rejoin, should there be no adhyāsa in this case? Is it because there is nothing to conceal the tree; or because there is no defect; or because there is no material cause; or because the true nature of the substrate is known at the time and such knowledge is opposed to adhyāsa?—The first reason is not valid; for as that which conceals consciousness (i.e., Nescience) is the substrate of all adhyāsa, there is no occasion here for a separate factor concealing a non-intelligent thing.—This remark at once disposes of the third reason also.—The second reason is invalid, since in cases where the error is due to the presence of a certain limiting adjunct (which, in the instance under discussion, is constituted by the water) it is just that adjunct which constitutes the required defect. Nor is the fourth reason valid; for the knowledge of the true nature of the substrate is opposed to such error only as does not depend on the presence of the limiting adjunct. The error, then, of the Self being an agent—which does depend on a limiting adjunct (viz., the ahaṅkāra) is terminated not through the cognition of the true nature of the Self, but through the removal of the limiting adjunct, i.e., the ahaṅkāra! Well, the matter lies as follows:—Real (in the empirical sense) limiting adjuncts, such as mirrors and the like, and the erroneous conceptions due to them are not indeed terminated by true cognition; but limiting adjuncts such as the ahaṅkāra which are products
of Nescience and are of the nature of error not due to an adjunct, are terminated through the cognition of Truth; and this implies that the agency of the Self also comes to an end through the cognition of Truth.*

But how, on this your view, does the cognition of truth take place? Is not the following reasoning valid—the individual Self does not know its oneness with the universal Self; since it is a mere reflexion; just like the reflexion of the face in the mirror? Not so, we reply. That a thing is a mere reflexion does not constitute a reason for its not cognizing; we are only justified in saying that, that which is a mere reflexion and at the same time of non-intelligent nature, cannot cognize.

XXXI

[The individual soul—jīva—is a reflexion of Brahman, the conditioning adjunct (upādhi) which gives rise to the reflexion being in this case the internal organ; just as it is the mirror which, acting as an upādhi, gives rise to the reflexion of the face. More particularly, however, it is in the state of dream only that the internal organ, by itself, constitutes the upādhi; in the waking state the entire body constitutes a further upādhi; and in deep sleep—when the internal organ ceases to exist—it is general Nescience which is in connexion with the jīva.]

Against the Materialist who holds that intelligence (or consciousness) belongs to the body (and who on that account might contest the non-intelligent character of the reflected image) the non-intelligence of the reflected image may easily be established, on the ground that intelligence on the part of the reflected image is obstructed by the admittedly non-intelligent character of the mirror. If the image were intelligent it would move by itself, independently of movement on the part of the body reflected. The case of the individual Self is different; for although it likewise is a mere reflection, its intelligent

* The mirror is called ‘pāramārthika upādhi’ (real adjunct), because it is as real as the reflected substance. The ahankāra, on the other hand, has not the same degree of reality as the ‘Self’ that is reflected in it.

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nature is, as immediate consciousness witnesses, not obstructed by the non-intelligent nature of its limiting adjunct (the ahaṅkāra). Although according to ordinary thought it is Devadatta—who is not a reflexion—that is the substrate of that knowledge of truth which puts an end to error, yet what determines his being a substrate of the kind is not his being reflected, but rather his being the substrate of error. And that the individual soul is the substrate of error, is due to the circumstance that Nescience although, properly speaking, residing in pure consciousness (not in the jīva) yet has a leaning towards the individual soul and hence produces error in it.

But if Brahman does not cognize the identity of the individual soul with itself, it is not omniscient; and if it does cognize it, it must view the error abiding in the individual soul, as abiding within itself! This, we reply, does not follow. As a matter of fact, Devadatta although realizing the oneness of his face and its reflexion in the mirror does not ascribe to his own face the small size and the dimness of the reflected image. Nor is there absence of proof for the individual soul's being a reflexion; for this is amply vouched for by Scripture, Smṛiti and the Sūtras. Scripture says 'It (the universal Self), is the counter-form to every form' (Katha Up. v. 9); and Smṛiti—"He is seen as one and as many, like the moon reflected in water; and the Sūtras—' For this reason comparisons such as that to the image of the sun (in water and the like) (Ve. Sū. iii 2-18)." Nor must it be urged, that Brahman as being without definite form is, on that account, incapable of being reflected. For we see that the ether, although devoid of definite form, is, together with all the clouds, stars and the rest, of which it is the substrate, reflected in water. It cannot be urged that in this case what is the substrate of the reflection of clouds and the rest is only the ether (i.e., space) within the water. For we see a vast expanse of ether in water which is knee deep only. But should we not rather say that, like the ether limited or particularized by a jar, the individual Self is limited or particularized by its limiting adjunct, but is not a reflexion! On this hypothesis, we reply, if Brahman were held to be present within the limiting adjunct also that determines the jīva, consciousness would exist within the jar in a
double form; while we do not observe that a double ether exists within the jar. If, on the other hand, Brahman were not present there, it would cease to be omnipresent and all-ruling. —Let us then say that omnipresence and universal rulership belong not to Brahman but to consciousness (chit) which is common to the individual Self and to Brahman. This may not be, we reply; for the text 'He who rules the Self from within'—which occurs in a section treating of Brahman distinctly declares that it is Brahman only which abides within the soul as ruler. All those texts therefore which speak of the ether within the jar must be understood as setting forth or exemplifying only the non-relatedness of the jiva, not its jiva-character. On the relaxation-theory, on the other hand, no fault can be found with Brahman as well as the individual soul abiding within the ahaṅkāra. For in water there is present at the same time the real ether—knee deep as the water is—and the reflected universal ether. We therefore define the individual Self as a reflection of Brahman, due to the organ of Egoity acting as a limiting adjunct (upādhi).

We have above said that Nescience is the limiting adjunct which particularizes the individual soul: we now have to set forth a further distinction. The individual soul is, in the state of deep dreamless sleep, particularized by Nescience in general. Next, in order to account for the limited degree of clearness with which the world presents itself to a dreaming person, we assume that the soul in that state has the internal organ for its limiting adjunct. And in the waking state, finally, where the world presents itself with full clearness and distinctness, the entire gross body constitutes the limiting adjunct of the soul. Nor does this difference of adjuncts imply a difference of souls: it is the very same soul which, particularized by the antecedent adjuncts, is particularized by the following ones also.

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XXXII

Although a reflexion, the individual soul is not unreal: in itself it is real, for it is Consciousness; it is unreal only qua reflexion. It is in this latter aspect that it undergoes Bondage and Release. Universal Consciousness becomes I-consciousness by its association, as described, with the organ of Egoity.

A further question here arises. Does this particularization of the soul abide in error (bhrama), or in consciousness? On the former view it could not subsist in the states of deep sleep and swoon, in which error does not exist. And from this it would follow that Nescience and its effects—among them the states of deep sleep and swoon—do not lean towards the individual soul. On the latter view the particularization of the jīva would either be an effect, and hence absent in deep sleep and swoon; so that we should again be met by the difficulty just stated. Or it would not be an effect, and then it would not be dependent on Nescience. To this we make the following reply. In the waking and dreaming states the particularization of the individual soul is effected by the gross and subtle bodies, and it is of the nature of error and hence the effect of Nescience. In the states of deep sleep and swoon, on the other hand, the particularization of the soul although having Consciousness for its substrate and being without a beginning yet must be viewed as dependent on Nescience in the same way as the connexion of Self and Nescience is. Although the particularization does not abide in Nescience—while the connexion does so abide—it yet abides in Consciousness inasmuch as qualified by Nescience, and hence it is not irrational to view it as dependent on Nescience; just as we say that the distinction of face and reflected image which really abides in the face as qualified by the mirror depends on the mirror,—so, in the case in question, the distinction depends upon an inexplicable 'sāmśkāra' (impression), which does not necessarily arise from error. Thus then it is quite reasonable to hold that the Self, though essentially pure consciousness entirely subjective in its character, is yet reflected in the ahaṅkāra superimposed upon itself;—the particularization of the jīva (necessary for the

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reflection; being due to Nescience, no less than the connexion of Self and Nescience. But an objection is raised, you hold reflexions to be unreal and hence the individual soul cannot be a reflexion! You misconceive our view, we rejoin. We do not hold either the face which is the 'reality' of the reflexion, or consciousness, to be unreal: what we do hold to be unreal is the face's attribute of being reflected, and the false notion of difference on which that attribute rests. That the recognition of the reflected image (expressing itself as 'this is my face'), and the enunciation 'Thou art that,' prove the reflexion (whether of the face in the mirror or of the self in the ahañkāra) to have its self (its reality) in the real reflected thing, we have already stated. Although the attribute of being reflected is false, yet the substrate of the attribute, i.e. the individual soul, does undergo bondage and attain release. Bondage and release thus on the one hand are not impossible, nor on the other hand do they extend to the 'reflected thing' i.e., Brahman.

But the opponent objects, if the adhyāsa of difference of the thing and its reflected image depends on the ahañkāra and other limiting adjuncts, how is the superimposition of the ahañkāra itself (on the universal self)—for which there is no limiting adjunct—to accomplish itself? Just as the superimposition of the snake on the rope, we reply. But in the latter case, although there be no independent thing to act as the limiting adjunct, there at any rate is the image of previously seen snakes, impressed on the mind of the mistaken person, to supply that adjunct! Why then, in the case under discussion, should not the mental impression of the ahañkāra constitute the required limiting adjunct? For there is no rule that only such mental impressions as are due to sources of true knowledge should function as limiting adjuncts, and not such also as are due to error. We sum up the result of the preceding enquiry in the following words. The self—although in reality nothing else but pure Consciousness and of an altogether non-objective character—, in so far as reflected in the organ of Egoity superimposed upon it (the Self), becomes capable of relating itself to that sphere of thought and speech which is connoted by the word I, and thus presenting itself to consciousness as fused with the organ of Egoity—which is

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superimposed upon the Self in the I-consciousness—itself is thought and spoken of, in a derived or metaphorical sense, as the object of this 'I-consciousness'. It is in this way that the superimposition of the 'I' on the Self shows itself to be possible.

XXXIII

[But, the Baudha objects, the superimposition of the organ of Egoity with all the distinctions it implies, on Consciousness which is essentially free from distinctions, is an impossible assumption. Nor will it avail to say that distinctions belong to Consciousness in so far as it is knowing subject (pramātrī)—a condition itself to be accounted for as due to similar previous conditions due to previous Ahaṅkāras. For no philosophical school is able to give a satisfactory account of the meaning of knowing subject (pramātrī) and the correlate notions (pramāṇa and pramāṇiti).]

[Page 70].—But, an objection is raised, it after all is not possible that on Consciousness which presents itself as free from all distinctions (nirvikalpaka) there should be superimposed the organ of Egoity which is affected with distinctions. For such Adhyāśa is nowhere observed. Nor again can it be said that such Adhyāśa is possible since Consciousness after all does present certain distinctions as e.g., being the subject of knowledge (pramātrī). For that Consciousness should appear as a knowing subject, itself presupposes the presence of the organ of Egoity. Nor will it help you out of this difficulty to say that Consciousness presents distinctions owing to the impressions left behind by previous 'states of being a knowing subject' due to a series of previous Ahaṅkāras. For the fact is that none of the philosophical schools are capable of giving a satisfactory account of what is to be understood by the knowing subject (pramātrī), the means of true knowledge (pramāṇa) and so on. We will show this in detail.

First as concerns the Vedāntins and Sāṅkhyaśas. According to them, is the knowing subject constituted by the organ of Egoity, or by the Self? The former cannot be, since the organ of Egoity is

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of non-intelligent nature. Nor also the latter; for being a knowing subject means being the subject of changes consisting in the activity called pramāṇa i.e. true cognition; and how can such changes be attributed to the Self which is essentially non-changing? And if Consciousness illumined objects without being a knowing subject, all objects would present themselves to it at once—for Consciousness is omnipresent; and hence that distinction of states of consciousness which corresponds to difference of karma could not establish itself.

Next as concerns the Naiyāyikas. According to them knowledge is something that is originated in the infinitely extended Self. What then, we ask, is the substrate of such knowledge—is it the Self in its whole extent? or that part of the Self which is particularized by the body? The former alternative is inadmissible; for it would imply that—as there is no other determining factor—all things would present themselves to Consciousness at once. But there is a determining factor viz. merit and demerit! Not so, we reply. Merit and demerit may be supposed to act as determining factors with regard to objects of experience that give rise to pleasure or pain, but truly not with regard to quite indifferent objects, such as grass, herbs and the like. Let us then assume that the required determination takes place according to the rule that whatever thing gives rise to a cognition that thing alone is illumined by it (is its object)! Not so, we reply. This theory would imply that the eye and the other sense-organs are known through the cognitions to which they give rise (which of course is not the case).

Let us then say that through any cognition that thing is known which gives rise to the cognition and at the same time is its object (viśaya). This theory also we cannot accept; for so far we have not defined what an object is. And even if we accepted the ordinary definition, we cannot acknowledge it as a binding rule that knowledge—whether viewed as a quality or an action—apprehends only those objects which give rise to it. The light of a lamp—which is a quality of the lamp—

*It may be assumed that merit and demerit are the causes of such special experiences of the soul as possess a retributive character, but not of altogether indifferent states of Consciousness as, e.g. the perception of such surrounding objects as grass, trees and the like.

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illuminates the jar, although the latter does not give rise to the light. And similarly the action (motion) of an arrow or a similar thing produces an effect on any things with which the substrate of the action (i.e. the arrow) comes into contact, even if those things were not aimed at (and hence did not cause the action).

Let it then be said that, since the Self which is the substrate of cognition is without parts it is not in contact with things, and that this is the reason why all things are not presented to Consciousness at once. In that case, we rejoin, nothing whatever would appear to Consciousness; for knowledge—whether being a quality or an action—cannot pass outside its substrate and enter into connexion with other things. And if it apprehended what it is not in contact with, there would be no limitation to its scope (and then would apprehend anything and everything). On the latter alternative view—knowledge having for its substrate that part of the Self only which is particularized by the body—that part either would be defined by the essential nature of the Self—whence it would follow that the Self consists of parts;—or else it would be defined by the limiting adjunct (the body). If, in that case, knowledge apprehended only what is in connexion with that place (i.e. the place of the body), things external to the body—such as jars and the like—would not be presented to Consciousness. And if, on the other hand, it also apprehended what is in connexion with that part of the Self that is external to the body, all things would be simultaneously presented to Consciousness. But it is objected, even on those things which are not in contact with it, the action of knowledge can produce an effect only within strict limits; in the same way as a magical rite, even though operative upon people a thousand miles away will strike dead only that person at whom it is aimed. The analogy does not hold good, we reply; for we are obliged to infer some determining factor which is in connexion with both the person striking dead and the person struck—whether it be some inferior deity, or the Lord, or the magical rite itself,—the inference being in the form—'The magical rite produces an effect on something with which it is in connexion; for it is an action, like the action of an arrow.'

Let us then conceive the case as follows: The internal organ (manas) is conjoined with the Self which is

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the substrate of knowledge; with the manas there is conjoined the sense-organ; and with the sense-organ the object. It is this chain of conjunctions which determines the actual origination of knowledge. This explanation also, the opponent replies, we cannot accept. For that entire chain of conjunctions spends itself, before cognition begins to exist, in the origination of cognition. If, even after cognition has come into existence, the object were presented to consciousness by means of that chain of conjunctions, the whole world would be presented to consciousness; for the object is connected with other things, these again with others and so on, the connexions in the end extending to all things whatever. In a similar way we might set forth the difficulties connected with the view of the Self being either of atomic size or of the same size as the body. The conclusion from all this is that no system is capable of giving a satisfactory account of the process of cognition, the cognising subject and so on.

XXXIV

[This objection is met by showing that on the Vedânta theory an intelligible and coherent account of empirical cognition and the distinctions implied in it can be given. In any individual act of cognition the internal organ exhibits itself in various aspects and functions; and according to its several relations to these, Consciousness comes to be viewed and spoken of as being either pramâtru, i.e., subject of knowledge, or pramâna (means of knowledge) or pramitâ (knowledge).

To this we Vedântins make the following reply:—You are right with regard to other systems; but on the Vedânta theory the processes and entities in question admit of being accounted for.—Positive Nescience, hiding the omnipresent intelligent Self, illusorily unfolds itself (vivarttate) in the form of this manifold world. That particular illusory product of Nescience which abides within the body and is termed internal organ, on being stimulated by merit or demerit passes out of the body by way of the eye or some other sense-organ, and completely penetrating some object appropriate to its special

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nature—as e.g., a jar—assumes the form of that object; just as in our ordinary experience the water of a tank, passing out of it by means of an opening in the embankment, flows through several canals into the fields requiring irrigation and assumes the several forms of those fields, whether square or triangular or circular. The internal organ does not however move like water; if it did so it would be incapable of reaching in a moment the most distant objects, such as the moon, the nakṣatras and the pole star; but, being capacitated for this by its fiery nature, transforms itself into a long thread of light. Like a ray of light it is also capable of suddenly contracting itself. That it is capable of undergoing changes of form is due to its consisting of parts; like milk (which thereby is enabled to turn into curds). Thus, changing its form in a suitable way the internal organ on the one hand completely penetrates the body to which it belongs and the object, and on the other hand, lengthening itself out, extends through the space between the two. That part of it which is limited by the body is called organ of Egoity (ahāṅkāra), and agent (kartri). That part of it which stretches itself out between the body and the thing (e.g., the jar) is termed vṛitti (modification; function) or action (kriyā). And that part finally which penetrates the thing and constitutes it an object of knowledge is called ‘that which serves for manifestation’ (abhivyakti-yogya). As the internal organ, made up of these three parts, is of an exceedingly pure and transparent nature, Consciousness is manifested through it. Consciousness thus manifested indeed is one only, but is, according to the three several parts of the internal organ which manifest it, denoted by three different terms. That part of Consciousness which is particularized by the agent-part of the internal organ is called ‘knowing subject’ (pramāṭṛī); that part which is particularized by the action-part is called ‘means of knowledge’ (pramāṇa); and the part particularized by that part of the internal organ which serves for the manifestation of the object is called ‘(right) knowledge’ (pramāti). In this way the ‘knowing subject,’ ‘the means of knowledge’ and ‘knowledge’ are clearly distinguished. In all these three, however, the form of the internal organ is the common factor; and as this form consists only in the relation subsisting between
the knowing subject and the object known, it becomes possible for people to make use of such expressions as 'this is known by me'—wherein all three appear as qualifying one another (this mutual qualification being made possible by the fact that the three have a factor common to them all.) As the manifested factor (i.e., Consciousness) and the manifesting factor (i.e., the internal organ), are, through adhyāsa, erroneously identified, there is no objection to the view that in ordinary thought and speech, the attributes of either are erroneously imputed to the other.

But, if by what you call the 'manifestation of Consciousness' by the internal organ there be meant the destruction of what conceals Consciousness, it would follow that the mere cognition of a jar effects Release; if, on the other hand, there be meant by it some change in the Self itself, the Self then would be subject to change! Not so, we reply. What is meant by the 'manifestation' of consciousness is only the suppression (for the time being, and not entire destruction) of what conceals Consciousness. Nor is there any force in the objection made above that, as the organ of Egoity is non-intelligent and the Self not liable to change, there can be no such thing as a 'knowing subject.' For we have shown just now that the 'knowing subject' is nothing else but the abhāṅkāra, liable to change, in so far as qualified by the manifestation of Consciousness. Nor is there any force in the objection that as Consciousness is present everywhere, there can be no distinction of states of consciousness corresponding to difference of karmāṇ. For, we ask, what do you understand by the absence of such distinction? Do you mean that the consciousness of all men is one, and that hence the pleasures and pangs experienced by one man must be experienced by all? Or, do you mean that the consciousness of any individual man is present everywhere, so that Devadatta when conscious of a jar must at the same time be conscious of the entire world? The former alternative does not touch us. For we certainly do not maintain that Consciousness by itself is the cause of the perception of objects;—this cannot be, since Consciousness is obscured by Nescience. What we maintain rather is that Consciousness is the cause of perception in so far as it is manifested by the internal organ.

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Now there is a different internal organ for each man; how then can you say that our view implies a confusion of the experiences of all men? Nor does the second alternative touch us. For the internal organ of any individual man, being bounded by its limitations, cannot connect itself at the same moment with the entire world; it, therefore, is impossible that it should, through Consciousness which it manifests, perceive all things at once. But may not even a limited thing undergo a certain change so as to become all-pervading, like a solar ray? By no means, we reply. For as for each individual object of Perception the causal apparatus on which the change of the internal organ depends—comprising Merit and Demerit, the several sense-organs and so on—necessarily is a different one, the change also would have to be a different one for each object (and hence there can be no change which would enable the internal organ to perceive all things at once). At the same time we admit that a man who through the assiduous practice of Yoga creates for himself the causal apparatus required for such a change of the internal organ as capacitates it to pervade all space, is able to perceive the totality of things at the same moment.

XXXV.

[To this theory it may be objected that the existence of an internal organ is a mere assumption, which can neither be proved, nor is capable to account for the fact of several individual experiences.]

But, a further question is asked, what is the determining motive for assuming the internal organ as the limiting adjunct of Consciousness? Is it the need to account for the fact that Consciousness which is of an essentially non-related nature and hence incapable of being affected by objects, actually is so affected? or, such affection being presupposed, the need to account for Consciousness illuminating objects? In neither case the assumption would seem to accomplish what it is meant for. For, as regards the former alternative, just because Consciousness is essentially non-related, it cannot be affected by objects even when the internal
organ is present as a limiting adjunct. And as regards the latter alternative, the limiting adjunct is not required for the purpose of illumining objects, since such illumination is due exclusively to their connexion with Consciousness. As the hypothesis of the internal organ thus serves no possible purpose it must be given up; and how then shall we ward off the conclusion that Consciousness, omnipresent and hence connected with all objects whatsoever, illumines them all at the same time?

[Page 73.] The Vedāntin will perhaps attempt to meet this conclusion by establishing the following alternative:—"The 'simultaneous consciousness of all objects' that you urge against us—do you view this consciousness as belonging to the consciousness of the individual soul which is a mere reflexion, or to the Brahman-consciousness which is the thing reflected? The former cannot be, since the jīva-consciousness is something limited. If you mean the latter, your objection loses its force; for that view is just what we accept; and even though the individual soul and Brahman are really one, yet the limited consciousness of the one remains quite distinct from the universal consciousness of the other; just as the darkness of the image reflected (in a stained mirror) is entirely distinct from the brightness of the object reflected."

But this reasoning is unsound; because all consciousness of objects being the consciousness of Brahman, the individual soul could not have even limited consciousness; just as it has no universal consciousness; for the simple reason that universal consciousness can have no connection with the individual soul which is always limited by the organ of Egoity.

"But as the internal organ which is the limiting adjunct of the individual soul is, through the eyes and the other sense-organs, in connexion with the objects, the soul may in this way cognise objects!" Not so, the opponent replies. For if the soul were to cognise all such things as are in contact with the internal organ, it would also permanently cognise Brahman itself which, as being omnipresent, is in contact with (all things and hence with) the internal organ also. Perhaps you will now advance the following view:—"Having Nescience for its limiting adjunct the individual soul,—even though all-pervading (as being one with Brahman)—is yet unable to illumine the entire

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world; for as it is concealed by Nescience it does itself not shine forth, as appears from the Consciousness 'I am not-knowing.' Nescience itself may be limited; but this constitutes no reason why it should not obscure Consciousness although present everywhere; for we observe that even a finger if held close to the eye may conceal big objects, such as the sun. We, therefore, hold that wherever the obscuring effect of Nescience is overpowered by the affection of the internal organ, there consciousness is manifested, and then illumines some thing, but not all things." But this view also has no foundation; for clearly the internal organ, which is a mere product of Nescience, cannot overpower Nescience, its own material cause. The conclusion is that the Vedantin is unable to account in any way for the distinction of different states of Consciousness, on the part of different individual souls.

XXXVI.

[But to this the reply is that without the assumption of internal organs actual individual cognition, in its positive aspects as well as its limitations, could not be accounted for. It is this assumption only which makes it intelligible how there should be the endless illusory play of limited finite minds with limited spheres of objects of cognition. This could not be explained on the mere assumption of a general principle of Nescience. Nor is this view of cognition liable to being confounded with the theory of the Baudhha Idealist (the Vijñānavādin); for according to us (Vedāntins) cognition (or consciousness) is one only, absolutely homogeneous and unchanging and eternal; an element of difference is introduced into it by its objects only, i.e., the innumerable special modifications of that great magic show of Māyā or Nescience which, though existing for Consciousness only, is not of its essence. The Vijñānavādin on the other hand holds that there exist numberless series of individual acts of cognition—or states of consciousness—each of which is momentary and has its own distinctive character: the distinction of these cognitions belongs to them essentially, and is not due to the difference of objects; for objects of thought, in any sense, do not exist.]

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To this reasoning we, Vedântins, make the following reply:—
The consciousness of the individual soul, although on account
of its non-related character it is not affected elsewhere, is
affected through the internal organ, since such is its nature.
In an analogous way, generic character (jâti), as e.g., of cows,
although present everywhere (as being eternal) is affected (so
as to manifest itself) only in certain individual bodies charac-
terized by dewlaps and so on; not in any other place. If
to this analogy it be objected that jâti ('gotva') even though
all-pervading exists in certain individuals only, we refer
you to the light of a lamp as furnishing a fully analogous
instance. The light of a lamp, although penetrating alike
places where there is colour, taste, smell, sound etc., mani-
fests colour only, nothing else. In the same way, we assume,
the limiting adjunct constituted by the internal organ serves
the purpose of bringing about the affection of Consciousness
by objects. Nor is the light of Consciousness capable of
illumining objects, apart from such affection; for like the
light of a lamp, it illuminates only what is in actual contact with
it. Brahman indeed—as being the material cause of all—
illuminates the entire world as belonging to its Self and non-
different from itself, even without the affection due to a limiting
adjunct. The individual soul, on the other hand, is incapable
of doing this, since it is not the material cause of the world.
Nor must it be thought that as the individual soul in itself has no
illuminating power, it is incapable—as a jar would be—of acquir-
ing illuminating power through connexion with something else;
for we observe that while mere fire has no power to burn grass
and the like, it acquires that power when pervading a lump
of iron. Hence even on the supposition of the individual soul
being nothing else but pure witnessing Consciousness, essen-
tially unrelated and not concealed by Nescience, the distinction
of different states of consciousness may be explained as due
to the internal organ. If, on the other hand, the individual
soul is conceived as a reflexion of pure Consciousness in the
internal organ, it of course is something limited, and the
distinction referred to will explain itself all the more easily.
The cognition of objects at bottom no doubt belongs to
Brahma-consciousness; but since that Brahma-consciousness is

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not manifested in the modification of the internal organ, which is the limiting adjunct of the individual soul and which pervades the object,—it may without contradiction, be viewed as Jīva-consciousness also. Brahman again no doubt is connected with the internal organ (for it is connected with all things), but there is no modification of that organ which has the form of Brahman; and this explains why the individual soul does not at all times cognize Brahman. For it is not the mere internal organ as such which manifests a thing, but the change of the organ into the form of the thing. Otherwise merit and demerit etc. also—which abide in the internal organ—would manifest themselves to consciousness. The individual soul itself also is manifested not in the mere internal organ, but in that organ when undergoing a certain Ego-modification which has the form of the soul. In deep sleep where that Ego-modification does not take place, there is no consciousness of the individual Self. It thus appears that also on the view of the individual soul being a reflexion of pure Consciousness in the internal organ, the fact of there being many distinct states of individual conscious experience, in accordance with the many distinct karmās, presents no theoretical difficulties.

If, again, the individual soul is viewed as omnipresent Consciousness having Nescience for its adjunct, then also the distinction in question "viz., of many different states of individual experience) can be accounted for on the ground of the internal organ concealing the concealing factor (i.e. Nescience). For it is by no means impossible that an effect should conceal its material cause; we observe e.g., that such products as scorpions and plants conceal their material causes i.e., cowdung and earth; that is to say, we do not recognise in the body of the scorpion the dung from which it has sprung, nor in the plant the earth out of which it is formed. We thus arrive at a conclusion which disposes completely of the objection raised above (p. 70). The Vedānta system does supply us with the means to account for the current distinctions of subject of knowledge, means of knowledge and so on; we, therefore, are justified in holding that an element of distinction is introduced into Consciousness by the impressions left behind by previous states of knowing subject,
due to previous ahaṅkāras; and that hence the superimposition on such Consciousness of an ahaṅkāra, containing within itself elements of distinction, is something possible.

Nor may it be urged against this view that, as on it all objects of knowledge are mere illusory products (vivartta) of, and have no existence apart from, Consciousness, the theory of the Vedāntin thus becomes identical with that of the Viṅñānavādin. For if doctrines were declared to be identical on account of some partial agreement, a general confusion of all doctrines would be the result. In the case under discussion there certainly is no complete agreement. The Viṅñānavādin holds that there are many momentary cognitions (viṅñāṇa) and that the (so-called) objects are non-different from the cognitions. We, on the other hand, who hold the true doctrine, maintain that there is only one eternal cognition (Consciousness) upon which there are superimposed (through avidyā) objects possessing separate causal powers, and that there is nothing to sublate the permanency of those objects. This Consciousness we hold to be without a second (one only), because it is everywhere recognised (as one and the same). The appearance of difference implied in the several cognitions of a jar, a piece of cloth and so on, depends on the objects; it does not belong to the essential nature of cognition. From this non-duality of consciousness there at once follows its eternity. Nor is it true that cognition and its objects are non-different; the truth rather is that they are of an absolutely different nature, consciousness having the characteristics of inwardness and continuity, objects those of outwardness and discontinuity.

The separate causal efficiency of objects is proved by immediate experience; and their permanence follows from the fact of recognition. Hence although the organ of Egoity and the rest (i.e., the entire objective world) are merely superimposed upon Consciousness, (and hence not real in the true sense) the Vedānta-theory can by no means be confounded with the theory of the Viṅñānavādin.

Vis. 174.
XXXVII.

[Nor can we allow the Vijñānavādin's argument that the so-called consciousness of real objects of thought may be resolved into a mere succession of several momentary cognitions or ideas. For what we actually are conscious of is not a series of discrete momentary cognitions, but cognitions which extend over some time, during which they remain identically the same; identity is immediately recognised by us.]

[Page 75]. At this point, however, the Vijñānavādin comes forward and sets up the following plea for his own theory:—

'As blue colour and the idea of it are necessarily experienced together, the two are identical. If the blue colour were something different from consciousness, it would not present itself to consciousness at all. If it presented itself to consciousness (although different from it) why should not all things present themselves in one act of consciousness? In neither case do we discern a determining connexion of blue colour and the idea of it.'

Should you say that it is just the fact of the thing's producing the idea which constitutes the necessary connexion for which we ask,—we deny this for the reason that from this it would follow that the sense-organ also is an object, since the organ also produces the idea. We hence hold the object and the idea to be identical. "But the judgment 'I know this thing' implies immediate consciousness of the knowing subject, the object known and the act of cognition as three entities essentially different, although related to one another!" I cannot admit this, the Vijñānavādin rejoins, since merely momentary existences cannot be related. If the knowing subject and the object of knowledge were of a permanent nature, they might be connected by the act of knowledge which results from the desire of knowledge; but how can there be a connexion between two momentary entities? We, therefore, must represent to ourselves the process as follows:—At first there arise in succession three different cognitions, the I-cognition, the this-cognition, and the cognition '(I) know,'—each cognition having its own specific character. After this there originates from that third cognition, Vis. 175.
which is coloured as it were by the after-effect (vāsanā) of the first and second cognitions, a new cognition, similar to the third cognition and weighted with the characters of the three preceding cognitions. This being so, it must be admitted that what has the character of an object is nothing else but a momentary cognition. Otherwise (i.e., if there were an independent external object), since no satisfactory definition of the connexion between idea and thing can be given, there could be no consciousness whatever of an object of knowledge. Nor can the momentary nature of cognitions be contested. For just as the cognition of blue colour implies the cognition of the difference of blue colour from yellow and other colours,—so, we conclude, the cognition, which presents itself to consciousness as present, implies the exclusion of any connection of that cognition with either the past or the future. The momentariness of cognition thus is proved by immediate knowledge (pratyakṣa).

This position we Vedāntins counter-argue as follows:—Cognition is not momentary, for (when engaged in some special cognition) we are not conscious of any difference, in successive moments, in the nature of the cognition. Nor do we allow that this absence of consciousness of difference is due to the extremely close resemblance (of the successive momentary cognitions). For we put the following alternative:—Is the difference of cognitions (which you maintain) an attribute of each cognition and to be known through a further cognition? or does it constitute the essential nature of the cognition itself, so as to be cognized by this very cognition? On the former alternative, if the two cognitions pertaining to the object, were not themselves cognised by a third cognition, the difference between them would not be apprehended; and if they were cognised by a third cognition, the cognition of difference (between the two) would apprehend all the three factors—(1) the object, (2) the two cognitions and (3) the difference between the cognitions,—with which trinity it would also have to be identical or non-different. On the latter alternative, your contention, that the difference which constitutes the essential nature of the cognitions does not present itself to consciousness because the several cognitions are so very similar, really comes to this that the cognition itself is not apprehended by consciousness; from which there follows a universal blindness.
of the world (i.e., absence of all consciousness). Nor can we allow you to plead that the difference of the cognitions is assumed in order to account for their similarity; for this alleged similarity is not established by any of the valid means of knowledge and is flatly contradicted by the consciousness of the oneness of cognition. Against this you will perhaps argue as follows:—'Since the appearance of oneness is erroneous, it does not contradict the similarity maintained by us; but as the erroneous appearance of the oneness of different cognitions cannot be accounted for but on the ground of similarity, we are compelled to assume the latter.' But this is clear reasoning in a circle. You at first prove the erroneousness of the appearance of oneness of the cognitions on the ground of their being separate but similar, and then you proceed to prove the latter fact by the former. You will possibly attempt to retaliate by charging us with the same logical mistake—'You prove the validity of the consciousness of the oneness of the cognitions, on the ground of their similarity not being established by any means of knowledge, and being contradicted by some; and at the same time you prove the latter fact by the former!' But there you are mistaken. For we hold that the recognition which assures us of the oneness of cognition constitutes an independent means of true knowledge.

XXXVIII.

[The Vijñānavādin attempts to upset this argument by denying that a non-contradictory conception of so-called Recognition can be formed. But against this we maintain that Recognition may validly be conceived as perceptive cognition with which there combines an impression left behind by a previous perception. On such recognition there also rests the incontestable consciousness of personal identity; for of the Self, in as much as determined by an āhaṇkāra, there may be a mental impression and hence remembrance and recognition. This view also disposes of the Prābhākara theory according to which there is no direct recognition of a permanent identical Self; the latter being proved indirectly only by the fact of the recognition of permanent objects of thought.]

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Here our adversary raises an objection against the use we make of Recognition (pratyabhijñā). "What," he asks, "do you understand by Recognition? Do you define it as immediate perceptive knowledge (pratyakṣa) having for its object the relation of one thing to two points of time, viz., a past one and the present one? This definition we reject; for perceptive knowledge apprehends present things only. 'But recognition is of the nature of Perception; for it is originated by what is the cause of the valid cognition of a present thing—such cause being conjoined with the impression left by a previous perception!'. This definition also does not satisfy us; for it does not meet the case of the recognition of the Self which expresses itself in the form 'I now am the same person I was then.' For your (the Vedāntin's) Self is eternal and self-illumined, and hence there can neither be an impression of it, nor can knowledge be originated in it. Nor again can Recognition be defined as neither more nor less than the cognition of a thing's essential nature. For such cognition, like the light of a lamp, illumines only what is present here and now, and hence does not imply reflexion on what is earlier and later (reflexion of which kind after all is implied in Recognition). On our (the Vijñānavadin's) view, the judgment 'I (am) that one (i.e. the same person I formerly was)' consists of two cognitions each of which has its own specific character, and is not a 'recognition.' As Recognition thus does not admit of a satisfactory definition, you may not use it as a means to prove the oneness of cognition."

To this we Vedāntins make the following reply:—Although knowledge cannot indeed be originated in the pure Self, and there can be no impression of it, yet both these things are possible with regard to the Self qualified by the internal organ; and of this Self, therefore, there can be recognition as defined by us. Nor must you object to this on the ground that, if the Self qualified by the internal organ is the object of recognition, and at the same time the recognising subject also, there arises the contradiction of one and the same thing being object of action and agent. For, the followers of all philosophical schools are agreed that the Self is agent and object of action, in so far as it is the object of certain inferential reasonings as to its

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difference from the body and similar things. Against this the following objection will perhaps be raised:—In inferential reasoning the so-called 'object' (viśaya) is not an object of action (karmaṇ), since when we infer something past or distant or the like, the object (viśaya) not being present cannot give rise to cognition. On the other hand, even what is not present may be an object (viśaya), for cognition has that character. In inference, therefore, the Self is (not a karmaṇ but) agent (kartri) only; in perceptive knowledge, on the other hand, the object of which gives rise to cognition, it is object of action (karmaṇ) also. Hence the contradiction animadverted on above (of the Self being at once karmaṇ and kartri) is not removed (since the instance of anumāna is not analogous).

Your objection, we reply, is invalid, for you overlook the following point. In recognition of the Self, the Self in so far as qualified by the internal organ is the recognising agent, and the Self in so far as qualified by earlier and later time is the object recognised: it is this difference of conditioning adjuncts which renders it possible for the Self to be at the same time agent and object of action.

But, a final objection is raised,—why take all this trouble to prove the validity of Recognition? Let us rather say that there is no such thing as recognition! Impossible, we rejoin. For, recognition expressing itself in the form 'I now am the same person I formerly was' is vouched for by immediate consciousness. And as all men are agreed as to this, it cannot be a case of error. The contention of the Baudhā, that in the judgment 'I (am) that' we have to do with two separate cognitions each of which has its own character, cannot be upheld. For were this so, we should have to conclude that also in the judgment 'cognition is momentary' we have to do with two cognitions, and in that case the theory of the momentariness of cognition (which is the Baudhā's great mainstay) could clearly not be established. And if to this the reply were given that in the view of those who hold that cognitions only exist, all attributes, including momentariness, are unreal, we ask—what then prevents you from admitting also permanency and similar attributes as unreal? This would at any rate be in accordance with such immediate deliverances

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of consciousness as 'I am now the same person as I formerly was.'

We next turn to the view of the nature of recognition, held by the followers of Prabhākara. In their opinion the permanent Self is established, not by the fact of its being the object of recognition expressing itself in the form 'I am the same I was'; but by the fact of its being the substrate of cognitive cognitions such as 'this is that jar (I perceived previously).' This view we must reject. For that which is distinguished by connexion with earlier and later time cannot be the substrate of a cognitive act which is a momentary function only, and hence the permanency of the Self cannot be proved from Recognition.

To this the Prabhākara makes the following reply:—"A previous cognition of a jar or the like object, when remembered at the present moment in the form 'I then had such and such a cognition' establishes as the substrate of that cognition a Self existing at the time of the cognition; and, again, the act of remembrance proves the existence of a present Self as the substrate of that act. It is in this way that the existence of a permanent Self is established, and there is no need of the hypothesis—not resting on any valid means of knowledge—of a recognition—'I am the same person I was'—which has the Self for its object." This, we rejoin, is unsound reasoning. The remembrance and the original perception, being two several acts of cognition, no doubt prove the existence of a Self at those two points of time; but there is nothing to prove the connexion with both those times of one and the same Self. "But it is just that double cognition which proves that connexion also!"

But then in the same way in the case of the jar also the permanence of the object will be established by the two several cognitions and an additional recognition will not be required! The recognition will serve the purpose of strengthening the proof of the object's permanence! Let us then return to the question under discussion (viz., whether there is a direct recognition of the Self or not). Do those two cognitions on which you insist, prove the connexion of the Self with two points of time directly, or by giving rise to recognition? On the former alternative, either cognition by itself cannot prove that connexion, since either by itself cannot have for its substrate the Self.
as related to two points of time. Nor can the two in combination prove that connexion; for a past perception and a present remembrance cannot be simultaneous. And the second alternative implies that you also accept the recognition 'I am the same person I was' as having for its object the permanent Self. Nor must you say that the Self is at no time the object of cognition, and hence cannot be the object of recognition, for in the judgment 'there took place such and such a cognition of mine,' the Self is the object of the cognition of remembrance. In the remembrance the Self, in so far as connected with the time when the remembrance originates, indeed is presented only as the substrate of the cognitional activity, not as its object; but at the same time the Self which was the substrate of, and contemporaneous with, the remembered cognition, becomes the object of the present cognitional activity. But should we not rather say that the remembrance constitutes as its object the original cognition only, and that this remembered cognition suggests to consciousness the Self which was its substrate, as substrate only? Not so, we reply. For at the time of remembrance the original cognition is not present, and therefore incapable of establishing its substrate. Only such states of consciousness as are self-illumined prove their substrate, and not such as are the object of remembrance and hence illumined by something outside themselves. Otherwise it would follow that also merit and the rest which are established by something else have the power of proving the Self which is their substrate. It therefore must be admitted that the Self of past time is the object of remembrance. And this then justifies us in holding that also the cognitive judgment 'I am the same I formerly was' has the Self for its object. Hence the Prābhākaras also have to reject the doctrine of the momentariness of the conscious Self, on the ground of that recognition of which the Self is the object.
XXXIX.

[Nor is there any force in the arguments by which the Bauddha endeavours to prove the momentariness of all that is, i.e., on the Vijñānavāda view of all cognition. Particularly he fails to effect this on the ground that being means having causal power; for he is quite unable to give a satisfactory account of the ‘causal power’ of momentary states of cognition.]

Well, the Bauddha resumes, let us then prove the momentariness of jars and the like (i.e., things generally called external) in the following way. ‘The penultimate and all preceding moments of the existence of the jar are invariably accompanied by the destruction of that jar which will exist in the next following moment (i.e. each moment of the jar’s existence implies the non-existence of the jar of the next following moment), for they all are moments of the existence of the jar; just as the last moment is (which is avowedly followed by the jar’s destruction).’ But this inference is invalid, since it may be met by the equally specious, following inference. ‘The moment of the jar’s destruction implies the existence of the jar; for it is a moment of time, just as those other moments of time, in which the jar is acknowledged to exist.’ And if to this latter inference you object that the conclusion contradicts the actual consciousness of the jar’s non-existence (consequent on destruction), we reply that your inference as to the momentariness of the jar equally contradicts an indubitable fact of experience, viz., the recognition ‘the jar of the present moment is the same jar I perceived in previous moments.’

Well, the Bauddha resumes, we then set forth the following inference:—‘whatever has being (all existent things; bhāvah) is momentary; for it possesses causal power. (The underlying vyāpti being ‘whatever possesses causal power is momentary’); while absence of causal power implies non-being as exemplified by the ‘hare’s horn’ (which is a non-entity). Nor may this be met by the counter-assertion that the capability of producing effects which are preceded by causal activity belongs only to permanent things other than the conjunction of efficient causes, and not to momentary existences.

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For, we ask, does your permanent thing produce one effect only; or several effects simultaneously; or several effects in succession? On the two former alternatives the permanency of the thing lapses; for an effect originating once only can be due to a momentary cause only. And the third alternative is inadmissible; for a thing capable of producing effects is not capable of delay (i.e., no reason can be assigned why the effects which a thing is at all capable of producing should not be produced all at once). The characteristic feature of existences thus is that they produce all their effects in one moment.

To this we Vedāntins make the following reply:—Your reasoning is invalid, since you are unable to give a satisfactory account of causal efficiency. For in what sense can cognitions (samvid; states of consciousness) be causally active? Does this mean that a state of consciousness originates a cognition, the object of which is the originating state of consciousness? or that it originates another momentary existence (cognition)? And in the former case, does the cognition produced belong to its own series (i.e., the series constituting the person to which the originating cognition belongs)? or to the series constituting some other person? or to the series of the All-knowing one? The first alternative is inadmissible; since states of consciousness are self-illumined (and hence require no cognition outside themselves to illumine them).

"Let us then accept the second alternative. For a state of consciousness of Devadatta may, although self-illumined, be the object of, and hence that which produces, a state of consciousness of Yajñadatta." This also is untenable, we reply. For the consciousness of Devadatta cannot be the object of, and hence produce, perceptive cognition on the part of Yajñadatta; for the reason that we never observe that the state of mind of one person is an object of perception on the part of another person. Nor again can Devadatta's consciousness be the object of, and hence produce, inferential cognition on the part of Yajñadatta; for you admit that perceptive cognition only is produced by its object.

"The third alternative then will hold good. For the perceptive (intuitive) cognition of the all-knowing Lord constitutes as its objects the states of consciousness of all men, and hence is produced by them." By no means, we reply. For if this were

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the case, the consciousness of the Lord would be perturbed by the troubled thoughts of the creatures involved in the samsāra. For in your view the cognition and the object of cognition are one.

"But may we not say that the consciousness of the Lord although troubled in this way does not suffer from these troubles, for the reason that they are sublated by the knowledge of truth?"

Not so, we reply. A cognition cannot sublate its own trouble; for the latter cannot in one and the same moment be brought about and also sublated. Nor can a further cognition refer itself to the trouble and sublate it; for the trouble of a previous cognition is not the object of a subsequent one. And if it were that, the subsequent cognition would be perturbed just as the previous one; and how then could it sublate the trouble? Nor finally can the conscious element of the cognition, separating itself from the element of trouble, be the object of—and thus produce—a cognition on the part of the Lord. For if this were so, the Lord would not be aware of the trouble of the creatures, and how then could He impart the instruction required by them?

Nor can we accept the second of the above alternatives, viz., that momentary existences have causal efficiency in so far as originating other momentary existences. For from this it would, on your theory, follow that the last 'moment' (momentary existence) has no being. To explain. You hold that there arise in constant succession cognitions perturbed by the false imaginations of permanency, of the distinction of substance and quality and the like, by desire and other defects, and by objects—each cognition being originated by impressions having the character of former cognitions of the same kind. The true conception 'All this is momentary' puts an end to the imagination of Permanency. The conception 'everything is svatlakṣā; a' destroys the imagination of substances, qualities and the rest. Through the conception 'all this is pain' the troubles caused by desire and other imperfections, by action, by pleasure and pain, pass away. And finally the conception 'all is void' dispels the trouble due to objects. Those four true conceptions, antagonistic to all impressions left by previous cognitions, thus having gradually allayed the fourfold trouble, there originates from the penultimate state of consciousness, which is the last state in which the true conceptions preponderate—one further state of

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consciousness which is free from all trouble. This state, being
the last link of the chain that constitutes the sanśāra, is called
‘the last moment.’ Now, since this last moment does not
originate any effect of its own, it follows (on the view of the
Vijñānavādin) that it has no being; and from this there follows,
by a retrogressive extension of the same reasoning, the non-
being of all the preceding ‘moments.’ But that last moment
being an object of cognition on the part of the Lord produces
cognition in him (and hence does possess causal efficiency).
From this it would follow, we reply, that the ‘last moment’
(of consciousness on the part of the individual being) and the
cognition on the part of the Lord, being both of them absolutely
pure, (free from all perturbation) would be of the same nature,
and hence be constituents of one and the same chain;—for the
relation of cause and effect between two things of the same nature
is just what constitutes the characteristic mark of one chain.
And as thus the chain would not be broken, there would be no
release.

Let it then be assumed that it is just this entering
(of the last link of the chain of individual consciousness) into the
chain of the All-knowing one that constitutes Release! On
this supposition also, we reply, it would be difficult to explain in
what way that last moment should be the object of the Lord’s
cognition, and hence it cannot be shown to possess causal
efficiency. For two states of consciousness can stand in the
relation of object (viṣaya) and that for which the object is
(viṣayin), only if they are different; but in the present case
no difference exists. One state of consciousness (quâ conscious-
ness), does not differ from another state of consciousness;
difference between the two could be established only by denying
the character of consciousness to that other state. Nor can the
former state be said to differ from the latter quâ non-conscious-
ness; for that would imply that a state of consciousness is a
state of non-consciousness (which is absurd). It, therefore,
cannot be proved that the ‘last moment’ possesses causal
efficiency, inasmuch as producing a cognition on the part of the
All-knowing one; and hence that last moment has no being
(in the sense allowed by the Bauddha). Again, if we were
to assume that the last moment produces an effect, the ques-
tion would arise whether the causal efficiency thus manifested

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establishes the *being* of its cause (i.e., the last moment), or the *idea* of it. The former cannot be accepted, since the cause exists before the effect: otherwise it could not be a cause. If the latter were the case, the effect would bring about the idea of the cause only when itself manifested by its cause; and similarly the idea of the cause also, being an effect, would manifest the idea of its own cause, and so on; there thus would be a *regressus ad infinitum*. And should you say that a state of consciousness manifests itself and that hence no such *regressus* takes place, you give up the position that causal efficiency is the cause of the idea of a thing having *being* (as under your last hypothesis the idea would not have causal efficiency). If, in order to avoid this, the idea were to be regarded as its own effect and cause, this would involve an objectionable self-dependence *atmāshraya*). The conclusion from all this is that 'being' (*Sattra*) does not consist in possessing causal energy, but is a certain specific attribute not further to be explained. Hence there is no reason why a permanent thing which after having in one moment produced an effect is at rest (i.e., does not produce effects) in the subsequent moments should not possess *being*. We now turn to the assertion, above made by the *Vijñānavādin*, that a permanent thing cannot produce several effects in succession, since that which is at all capable of producing effects cannot delay doing so. This also is quite unfounded. It is in full accordance with reason that a thing capable of producing certain effects should produce them in succession only, such succession being regulated by the succession in which the different auxiliary factors co-operating towards the production of the effect combine with the causal thing. For that this actually takes place is a matter of common experience.

Against this our view the following objection will possibly be raised. As after all it is irrational to view a thing capable of producing certain effects as standing in need of co-operating factors, let us assume that all things are in themselves destitute of causal power and give rise to the required causal apparatus by their mutual relations, and that the causal apparatus thus produced is what produces the effect. But this theory also is untenable. For if the several things possess the capability of producing the causal apparatus, their mutual relations are not

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required; and if they do not possess that capability and hence do not produce the apparatus, their mutual relations will remain fruitless; so in either case we can do nothing with those mutual relations. Let us then say that nothing ever depends on co-operating factors (for producing an effect). This, we reply, is in conflict with experience. Nor can such experience be held to be erroneous, since there is nothing to refute it. You no doubt have declared that the need of co-operating factors cannot rationally be assumed either for that which in itself has causal power or for that which has no such power; but such need may be assumed in the case of the mere thing, conceived as devoid alike of causal power and its absence. For this is what you also will have to accept: for instance, when you are faced by the following difficulty—'if the effect has being (real existence), you, implicitly, abandon your fundamental theory; if on the other hand, it has no real being, it becomes impossible satisfactorily to account for the connexion of special causes with special effects, and this would imply that anything may spring from anything'—you will have to put aside all connexion or non-connexion (of cause and effect) with being or non-being and simply define a cause as that which has regular previous existence, and an effect as that which has regular subsequent existence. And if, accepting these definitions, you point out that positive and negative experiences determine what actually has regular previous existence and hence is a cause, and what has regular subsequent existence and hence is an effect—we point out that just in the same way positive and negative experiences determine that certain auxiliary factors, co-operating with the causal thing, have regular previous existence. And this conclusively proves that there is the need (for the causal thing in the narrower sense) of co-operative factors.—A further question is in what special way these auxiliary factors affect the causal thing by their action.

On this question a certain school propounds the following view. In the case of the causal thing termed seed certain co-operative factors, such as earth, water, etc.,—the co-operation of which is proved by positive and negative experience—produce in the seed a certain condition termed turgescence, (uchchhunata) and it is thereby that the seed acquires causal power with

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regard to its effect, i.e., the sprout; were it otherwise, earth, water and so on, would not be helpful and hence not required by the seed. But this also is an untenable view. For the question arises, is the seed capable of giving rise to that special condition of itself, or is it not so capable? If it is not capable, it will not give rise to that condition even when a thousand co-operative factors are at hand, and consequently it will not be capable of producing the sprout. If, on the other hand, it is so capable, we ask—is it capable of giving rise to the condition called 'turgescence' only after having passed through another (intermediate) state due to the co-operating factors; or (directly) without having gone through an intermediate state? In the former case that intermediate state will again presuppose another intermediate state, and that again another and so on, in infinitum. And in the latter case, why then, possessing causal power as it does (according to the assumption), should it not give rise to the sprout directly, without any intervening condition? But, the opponent says, the origination of the sprout presupposes the origination of the condition called 'turgescence'; while the origination of this latter condition is effected by the mere presence of the co-operating factors; for this is what is actually observed. If this were so, we reply, the cause, capable of producing certain effects, would require co-operative factors which do not produce any helpful effect upon it; and this is a conclusion that contradicts your original position. This last view, held by a certain school cannot therefore be established.

Well, the advocate of general momentariness now resumes, just from this it follows that our view must be accepted. For we hold not that the co-operating factors have a helpful action on the cause itself; but that the effect springing from the momentary original cause demands co-operating causes, since an effect is brought about by many causes. So much indeed we hold in common with you who maintain the existence of permanent causes. But on your view it is difficult to escape from the conclusion that the effects should originate immediately, as soon as the cause exists; for there is nothing to determine successive production of the effects. Nor may you say that there is something to account for such successive production of effects; viz., the successive connexion and non-connexion of the

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causal thing with auxiliary factors. For this 'connexion' also must persist so long as the correlates of that connexion exist (and hence the contingency of the immediate origination of effects remains). Nor may you say that what determines the connexion is a further connexion; for this leads us into an infinite regress. Nor may you urge against us that, 'on the view of universal momentariness also the effect cannot be conceived as originating in the moment of the existence of the cause, since that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect (and thus contradict the very nature of cause and effect); and that, if we should maintain that the two are not simultaneous but that the effect exists at another moment, there would be nothing to determine that moment.' For there is such a determining circumstance: the moment of the existence of the effect is the moment which immediately succeeds the moment of the cause. All which proves the doctrine of general momentariness to be the only sound one.

But this we, Vedântins, finally re-argue as follows:—In all cases the relation of cause and effect is to be ascertained on the basis of invariable concomitance. Let us take a special instance. Does, in your opinion, the invariable concomitance of cause and effect exist between individual fire-moments and smoke-moments, or between the two entire respective series? The former cannot be, since mere momentary existences cannot persist during the time required by the two cognitions of positive and negative concomitance (through which the Vyâpti is established). And on the latter alternative it would follow that smoke would originate also from fire in the condition of glowing coals; for fire in that state also is a member of the 'fire series,' just as fire in other conditions is. Nor is it open to you to argue that in this latter case the non-production of smoke is accounted for by the absence of wood; for wood also exists at the time,—viz., in its own series. Nor may it be said that there is, in the given case, no connexion between the wood and the fire (and hence no smoke); for as the two series are permanent, such connexion must necessarily be admitted. Nor again can it be said that the connexion is not permanent (eternal), since it depends on another previous connexion; for this would lead us into an infinite regress. But from this latter difficulty we

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escape by accepting the view (generally allowed) that we need not go beyond three or four steps backward (in the series of previous connexions accounting for the present connexion)!

Well, we reply, if you admit this the difficulty of an infinite regress may be avoided with equal ease by those who accept the view of the cause being something permanent, and the objection raised on that ground against the latter view thus falls to the ground. But, our opponent resumes, the upholder of the permanence of causes may perhaps smooth over the difficulties of his theory by the assumption of the helpful action of co-operating factors; but it is just this assumption to which we object! Not so we reply. Positive and negative experiences fully prove that the relation between smoke—the effect—and wood—the co-operative factor—is that of a thing helped and a thing helpful; and that relation, therefore, must necessarily be admitted. And that positive and negative experiences prove the relation of thing helped and thing helpful is observed in the case of the original cause and its effect, viz., fire and smoke. The need of co-operative factors exercising a helpful influence on the cause thus has to be equally admitted on both views. On the theory of the momentariness of causes the one fire is held to produce, owing to difference of co-operative factors and of place, several simultaneous effects—in its own place it produces another fire, (i.e., the next momentary fire of that series of momentary existences which we term fire); in the space above it produces smoke, and in the space below it produces ashes, and in the beholder's mind it produces the idea of fire. On the theory of the permanence of causes, again, one and the same cause produces several effects, in dependence on difference of time and of co-operative factors. What then are the grounds for denying that there may be production of effects, by one cause, in succession? Nor must it be imagined that the two theories thus virtually come to the same (and hence are equally valid). For we have already demolished the former theory at the conclusion of the section on Pratī-karmāvyavastā (pp. 73-74).

The final conclusion to be drawn from all this is that setting

* The supposition being that which is established by three or four links of the retrogressive causal chain is sufficiently established for all purposes. Compare Shlokasaṃti, Sū 2, Shloka 61.

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aside the utterly perverse theory of those who hold cognition to be momentary we must hold fast the absolutely unexceptionable Vedantā view according to which all objects of cognition are mere unreal superimpositions on the one eternal and unchanging Consciousness.

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XL

[It is objected to the Vedāntic view that if consciousness illumines all things superimposed upon itself, there would be equal immediate presentation of things perceived and things inferred, there being nothing to differentiate the two. But the reply to this is that there is a differentiating circumstance inasmuch perceived things, and not inferred ones, are in contact with the organs of perception and thus directly act on the internal organ. The objection that consciousness which is free of all distinctions cannot have superimposed upon itself things marked by distinctions is disposed of by the observation that a manifold world is superimposed upon a consciousness affected by the impressions left by previous states marked by distinction. That, at bottom, non-differenced Consciousness is the ultimate substrate of general avidyā rests on its āparokṣya, the directly presentative character.]

But—an objection to the Vedānta theory is raised on a new ground—this Vedānta view also after all is untenable. For if non-changing consciousness immediately illumines all things superimposed upon itself we are driven to the conclusion that there is immediate presentation also of things inferred (no less than of things directly perceived). If, on the other hand, consciousness be held not to give rise to immediate presentation of things inferred, it will follow that also things directly perceived—such as jars and the like—are not immediately presented. For there is nothing to determine a distinction between the two cases. Against this it must not be said that it is the sense-organ which, in the case of perception, determines immediate presentation. For if it be the external sense-organs that possess that power, it will follow that pleasure, pain and the like (which do not depend on the activity of the external organs, but on that of the internal organ) are not immediately

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presented. And if, on the other hand, it be the internal organ that has such power, it will needs follow that also things inferred are immediately presented.

This objection, we reply, is unfounded. For there is something to determine the distinction you refer to, viz., the instrumental and manifesting power of objects immediately perceived. For jars and similar things are the objects (śarman) of that modification of the internal organ which, passing out by way of the eye or some other sense-organ, completely pervades the thing; the thing thus effects the modification of the internal organ; when the thing is absent that modification does not take place. And again, after that modification has been produced by the thing, consciousness is manifested: the thing thus possesses manifesting power. There thus is a special reason why things perceived should be immediately presented to consciousness. In the case, on the other hand, of things inferred the two attributes—of possessing effective and manifesting power—are not necessarily present; for things inferred frequently are either past or future and things of these two kinds cannot be the substrates of present attributes. But, it is objected, when we infer, e.g., that there has been rain, rain is present to the mind as something that is past, and it hence may be the substrate of those two present attributes! Not so, we reply. Do you mean that, at the time when the inference is made, rain is present, or that the attribute of being past is present? On the former alternative rain would at the same time be past and present; which is a contradiction. Nor is the second alternative admissible. For being past means to be connected with past time which is different from present time: while, therefore, the present time is connected with a jar or the like (when this is perceived) and so defines the thing perceived, this is not the case with regard to the attribute of being past; we can only say that the present time determines (helps in the conception of) that attribute in the same way as the jar determines the non-existence of the jar. The attribute of being past, therefore, is not present in the same sense as the jar—which is now perceived—is present.

But, our opponent objects, if that attribute did not admit of being viewed as present in the full sense of the word, we should have to say that it is an

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absolute non-entity like the horn of a man; we, therefore, must conclude after all that it is simply present! Even thus, we retort, rain as qualified by that attribute does not possess those efficient and manifesting powers which belong to rain actually present. Devadatta when dead cannot produce a jar, and a lamp which has gone out cannot manifest that jar. But, our opponent asks, if things inferred do not possess the efficient and manifesting power of things perceived, how is it that the ideas of them which are produced by the inference have the form of the respective objects? Our reply is that the inferential mark (liṅga), the word and so on, owing to the strength of certain connections,—viz. that of avinābhāva, i.e., invariable connexion between the liṅga and the thing inferred; and that of shakti (‘power’) between the word and the thing denoted by it—impart to the idea the form of the thing. Nor must it be said that as we allow to things inferred, past or present, the attribute of being objects (viśaya), so we must also allow to them the attributes of having effective and manifesting power; and that as in Perception so in Inference also it is only through this relation of their being objects that a definite form is imparted to the ideas. For the ‘being an object’ of a thing inferred is not some positive attribute which could be used to establish the above conclusion; but means only the cessation of that condition in which the thing inferred was previously to the mental act of inference. Nor must it be imagined that this very condition can be used as a proving instance; for it is no more than the antecedent non-existence of the said termination (i.e. it is something entirely negative). It, therefore, is impossible to establish for things inferred, whether past or future, a positive grammatical case character (kārakutva).

But if things inferred do not stand in the karmav-relation (i.e. are not objects of action), how then can we put them in connexion with transitive (sakarmaka) verbs—as we actually do when we say that the person who infers past rain ‘knows the rain’? By a kind of metaphor, we reply. Inference has a result in the same way as ‘sakarmaka’ perceptive cognition has; and on account of that result we speak of it as if it were itself ‘sakarmaka.’ If we allowed to Inference an object (karma) in the primary sense, we could not avoid allowing to it also immediate presentation, Viv. 193.
as we do to Perception. When, therefore, the inference is concerned with a thing that (is not past or future but) exists at the present time—as e.g. a fire burning now—that thing also, because sharing the general nature of being a thing inferred, must be viewed as not holding the position of a karmay; for otherwise we should have to acknowledge that it is presented immediately. In the case of Perception on the other hand where invariable connexion (avinābhāva) and other connexions do not operate, we must hold the thing to be a true object (karma), so as to account for the form of the thing imparting itself to the cognition. And there in fact is no difficulty of attributing that position to the thing perceived, since that thing is necessarily one existing at the time.

The conclusion, therefore, is that although all things are at all times equal in so far as being merely super-imposed on non-changing Consciousness, the quality of being immediately presented belongs to the objects of Perception only; for they only possess efficient case character and manifesting power.

Nor again is there room for the doubt whether it be possible that on Consciousness which in itself is free from all distinction there should be superimposed things marked by distinctions. For—as we have shown in the section treating of the distinctions of consciousness corresponding to karmay—what constitutes the substrate of the adhyāsa of Egoity and so on, is (not consciousness absolutely devoid of distinction but) Consciousness as differentiated by the impressions left behind by previous states in which the Self was (not pure consciousness but) an individual personal knowing subject (pramaṇā). But, our opponent resumes, after all you will have to admit that fundamental Nescience—which is the material cause of the entire phenomenal world including impressions, etc.—is superimposed on pure distinctionless Consciousness. For all other things which impart to Consciousness the character of being something marked by distinction depend for their very existence on this primary adhyāsa of Nescience. And then we are again confronted by the difficulty that something free from all distinction cannot be a substrate; since experience shows that that only which is marked by distinction is a substrate. How then can that

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be noticed. The Indian, Arabian and Chinese series agree therein that each asterism, in each series, manifestly is viewed as an independent star or group of stars; this clearly appears from the general character of the designations of the asterisms. The designations of the normal stars on the other hand (of which some instances have been quoted) clearly show that these were viewed by the Babylonian astronomers as forming parts of those 12 large constellations or signs which constitute what is ordinarily called the zodiac. These names do not give the slightest hint of the existence, at any time, of a zodiac of a different kind; they simply confirm the conclusion, established by excellent evidence of other kind, that the characteristic Babylonian plan was to distinguish along the ecliptic twelve large constellations and to call any individual star within those constellations by a name which at once intimates that larger group of stars of which it is considered to be a member. We, on the ground of the above considerations, must altogether decline to accept Professor Hommel's theory. He has brought forward no new facts proving, or rendering probable, the recognition by the Babylonians of any series of stars resembling the lunar Zodiaces of the three nations, and the speculations he gives us instead of facts are throughout unsound. *

In the preceding survey of theories propounded as to the possible historical connexion of the several lunar Zodiaces we have found occasion to controvert the hypothesis ventured by Biot as to the derivation of the Indian series from the Chinese one; and the view first hazarded by A. Weber and later on advocated in a definite form by Prof. Hommel as to the dependence of the Indian Chinese and Arabian series alike on a hypothetical Babylonian prototype. It remains to offer some remarks on A. Weber's contention that the Chinese Sien-system was probably borrowed by the Chinese from the Hindoos, some centuries before the Christian era; and on some hypotheses as to the relations of the Indian and the Arabian lunar Zodiaces.

As already incidentally referred to above, A. Weber's attack on Biot's theories mainly took the form of an attempt to show

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* For a fuller criticism of Professor Hommel's thesis see a paper, published by the writer of the above, in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1894 ('On the hypothesis of the Babylonian origin of the so-called lunar zodiac').
firstly that the references made in the oldest Chinese literary works to certain stars, later on appearing as members of the Sien series, prove nothing as to the early existence of a complete series of the kind; and secondly that some of the reputed old Chinese books on whose references to the Sien Biot had laid great stress, are not genuine old works, but later fabrications or, if really old in some parts, so largely adulterated with later additions and interpolations that we are not justified in appealing to them with any confidence as reliable witnesses concerning Chinese history and antiquities for any time earlier than let us say that of Confucius (5th century B.C.).

We are not in a position to undertake in this place anything like a full discussion of the very difficult questions raised by Weber’s criticisms; this is really a task for specialists in Chinese literature, and, as cannot fail to be noticed even by outsiders who take the trouble of studying the literature on this subject, there is great disagreement among specialists even concerning some matters of fundamental importance for a successful treatment of the history of Chinese astronomy. It is evident that very much remains to be done in the department of early Chinese history and literature, and that for the present it is unsafe to profess decided opinions on more than one of the points most relevant for the solution of the problems which interest us here. All the same we do not hesitate to make some remarks which at any rate will be helpful to the student wishing to look for himself into the literature bearing on the subject.

One of the main arguments directed against Biot’s theory by A. Weber is that the earliest Chinese work in which something like a full account of a series of 23 stars or constellations is to be met with, is a fragment preserved of a collection of old books made by Lu-pou-ouey, who died 233 B.C. A. Weber remarks, rightly of course, that, considering the undoubtedly much higher antiquity of the Indian nakṣatra system the possibility of the Chinese Sien as appearing in Lu-pou-ouey having been borrowed from India cannot be denied, and points to what he considers other traces of Indian influence upon doctrines of this writer. To complete this part of his argumentation A. Weber proceeds to discuss the alleged antiquity of
the only Chinese work, which at the same time distinctly mentions a series of 28 asterisms, and is generally held to be considerably anterior to the period of Lu-pou-oou-yey, viz. the so-called Tscheou-li—a book, the chief purport of which is to determine and describe the functions of the officials and courtiers at the time of the Tscheou-dynasty, and which, according to tradition, was composed about 1100 B.C. Remarkling that even the Chinese tradition on this latter point is by no means unanimous, and that there are diverse internal reasons by no means favouring the view of the book belonging to so early a period as 1100 B.C., A. Weber denies that the references made in several places of the work to 28 asterisms are valid proofs for any high antiquity of the developed Siou system. He then turns to those Chinese books about the comparatively high antiquity of which there is a fairly general agreement, preeminently the old collection of odes, called Shi-king, and the collection of pieces of historical character comprised under the name Shoo-king. As to the former he emphasises the fact that this work while no doubt mentioning by name some of the stars or groups of stars later on comprised in the Siou-series, nowhere refers to a complete series of 28 asterisms. And as to the latter he endorses the doubts, entertained at an early period by some Chinese authorities already, as to the genuineness of the work (which, according to Chinese accounts was pieced together out of fragments of the old genuine work which had survived the general burning of ancient books that had taken place in 213 B.C., by order of the Emperor Tsin-Hwang-Tishi). He thus (we cannot enter into details here) finally arrives at the conclusion that the entire body of genuine old Chinese literature contains not a single passage unambiguously guaranteeing the existence of a complete series of 28 asterisms at a period earlier than about 300 years B.C., and that hence, keeping in view the great similarity of the nakṣatra and the Siou-systems, the hypothesis of the latter being no more than an adaptation of the former is on the whole the most probable one.

A. Weber's argumentation has met with little approval on the part of those best qualified to judge.* The most competent

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*For a criticism of Weber's views as to the antiquity of the Siou-system we refer the reader to Whitney's Lunar Zodiac; and more particularly to that section of F. Von Richthofen's great work on China which deals with old Chinese Astronomy, more particularly the 'hsiu (Siou) system,' Volume I, p. 404 ff.
Chinese scholars hold to the view that those parts of the Shouking for which a high antiquity is claimed, are either fully genuine as they stand or at any rate embody genuine old traditions; one passage specially important in this connection will be referred to further on. As to the Shi-king (many of the poems contained in which are probably not younger than 1000 B.C.) it has been relevantly remarked that explicit references to an institution of a semi-scientific or technical character such as a complete series of constellations can hardly be looked for in a collection of popular songs; and that on the other hand the mention made in it of some individual stars of the series certainly rather confirms than negaties the existence of the entire series. And as to the Tscheou-li (the most important work in this connexion), Prof. Weber's thorough scepticism appears not to be endorsed by the best Sinologues: their opinion rather is that the work at any rate contains genuine old material, and that even if parts or sections of it should be later interpolations—which might have been made in dynastic or administrative interests—no reason is imaginable why references to the Sieu-system should have been interpolated. In agreement herewith it has remained the prevailing opinion that the Sieu-system was known and used in China a long time before the date of Lu-pou-ouey, and not improbably was recognized at the time of the old Emperor Yao already, i.e., about 2300 B.C.

What specially connects the Sieu-system with Yao's name, of course, is the well-known and much discussed passage in the Shouking which tells us how Yao gave directions to his astronomers to observe the solstices and equinoxes, stating that each of those four epochs of the solar year is marked by a certain star or asterism. The identifications, made by early Chinese scholars, of the four names of stars mentioned by Yao, with those of four members of the Sieu-series has generally been accepted by modern scholars, and the astronomers who have dealt with the passage have pointed out that the positions assigned in it to the solstices and equinoxes agree with the positions which those critical points of the year actually occupied about 2300 B.C.

And as the Chinese at the time when the Shouking in its present form is reported to have been pieced together were not
acquainted with the precession of the equinoxes, owing to which
the positions of the equinoxes and solstices on the sphere slowly
but constantly displace themselves,—and hence incapable of
finding by a retrospective calculation their true places at Yao's
time, the actual agreement mentioned must be taken as a proof
of the statement in the ShooKing resting on a genuine old
tradition. This argumentation appears to us valid; and we
hence should say that there is at least a high probability of the
Chinese having been acquainted at a very early period, anterior
to 2000 B. C., with the subdivision of the sphere into the
Sieu. The ShooKing no doubt mentions only four of the Sieu
viz., those in which at Yao's time the solstices and equinoxes oc-
curred but the impression produced by the passage decidedly
is that then already there was in use a system which allowed
of any celestial phenomenon being referred to a definite place
in the sphere—in other words that the sphere had been definitely
divided into a number of sections marked by certain stars or
constellations; and naturally we assume that division to have
been the same as the one fully known to us from later times,
i.e., that into the 28 Sieu. And this impression appears to be
confirmed by all later statements concerning the location of the
solstices and the like within the constellations: they all appear
tactitly to point to an old established and generally recognised
division of the entire sphere. That we do not meet with a state-
ment of full details as to the 28 Sieu in a time earlier than
that of Lu-pou-ouey therefore would seem to be a circumstance
to which there is no reason to attach decisive weight; and we
may, further, admit the possibility even of the Chinese system
having, in the last centuries before the Christian era, been in-
fluenced to some extent by the Indian Nak-atra-system. But
that the former should, in its whole extent, be nothing more
than an adaptation of the latter—this is, as far as our present

*We here, for the occasion, accept the view generally held by modern
scholars as to the right interpretation of the ShooKing passage, viz., that the
stars mentioned by Yao as marking the epochs of the solar year are stars cul-
minating about the time of sunset on the days of the equinoxes and solstices.
We cannot, in this place, discuss the views set forth by G. Schlegel, in his
"Uranologie Chinoise," which imply that the directions given by Yao must have
originated at a time as early as 18000 B. C.
knowledge of the facts enables us to judge, an hypothesis improbable in the highest degree.

We have remarked before that the Sieu do not, as far as the testimony of the old literature goes, appear to be in any way specially connected with the moon: it is in fact only their number (28), and the fact that the similar systems of the Hindus and the Arabs are undoubtedly lunar in origin and largely so in application, which has prompted scholars to speak of the sieu as stations or mansions of the moon. And we have also referred to the circumstance that the agreement in detail between the different so called lunar zodiacs is far from being so thoroughgoing as some scholars represent it; and more particularly that there are very remarkable divergences between the Chinese and the Indian series: this of course constitutes another weighty argument against Weber’s hypothesis as to the origin of the Chinese system. It also is worth remark that there is an almost absolute dissimilarity between the designations of the Asterisms in the Chinese series on the one and the Indian and Arabian series on the other hand. No single naksatras name, and no idea or image, suggested by such a name, tends to recall to mind the corresponding member of the Chinese series. There are on the other hand a few agreements between the designations of Sieu and the corresponding Asterisms of the Arabian series. The sixteenth station (if we count from the Pleiades as the first; is by the Chinese called Sin i.e., heart, and by the Arabs kalb i.e., also, heart; there however being a difference in so far as the Arabian station is constituted by the one star Antares, which is viewed as the heart of the Scorpion, while the Chinese Sieu consists of three stars which are not viewed with reference to the Scorpion (of which constellation Chinese astronomy knows nothing,) and which receive their name probably from some fancied resemblance of the figure formed by them to a heart. The 17th station again is called by the Arabs shaulah i.e., sting, and comprises two of the stars in the tail of the Scorpion; while the Chinese, taking in all the stars of the tail call it wei i.e., tail. But here also it has to be kept in view that this tail is, to the Chinese, not the tail of the Scorpion; and that the configuration of the asterism really tends to suggest

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the idea of a tail. The 28th station again is by the Arabs called Buttain ‘little belly,’ (apparently of the Ram); while the Chinese name Oei also means belly. Whitney thinks that this, partial, agreement of names in three cases can ‘hardly be fortuitous,’ that is, he looks upon it as a proof of the historical connexion of the systems. But how are we to imagine the historical connexion of the Chinese series on the one and the Arabian series on the other side? The fact is that all those who hint at a connexion of these two systems, avowedly or tacitly assume the existence of some primeval series of lunar stations, devised by some nation holding a sort of central position with regard to China, India and Arabia alike; more definitely, they presuppose an ancient Babylonian series of lunar mansions from which the three positively known systems are equally derived, and on the basis of which equalities or resemblances of nomenclature such as those just mentioned would be easily intelligible. But we have shown above that there is absolutely no evidence for the existence of such a primitive central series: the Babylonians at any rate knew nothing of a lunar Zodiac consisting of 27 or 28 members.

Some authorities (Richthofen, e. g.,) are inclined to think that the Chinese at a very early period migrated into the present China from some more western, Central-Asiatic, region; but as far as we know this hypothesis also has by no means met with general acceptance; and even if it should confirm itself, the absence of all evidence for the existence of an old series of lunar mansions in Central Asia would preclude the view of the Chinese having brought their series from those hypothetical original seats. We cannot, at present, enter into further details concerning the Chinese series. Our general conclusion so far is that while there is no valid argument proving any dependence of the Indian series on the Chinese one, there also is no valid evidence for any loan in the contrary direction: the differences between the two series are so considerable as to render a connexion between them improbable, and there are good reasons for viewing the Sieu series as an old national Chinese institution. Speculations about connexions going back to pre-historic times have no solid foundation whatever.
That an Arabian series of lunar stations should have been the prototype of the Indian one, has never been suggested, the reason being that while traces of the *nakṣatras* appear in the later hymns of the Rigveda already, and the full series is a generally established institution among the Hindus of the Brāhmaṇa period, no very high antiquity can definitely be claimed for the menāzil. The oldest extant Arabic literature of course is very young compared to Vedic literature, and even if we assume the menāzil to have been recognised by the Pre-Islamitc Arabs, we are not in a position to date back such recognition, with confidence, to many centuries before the time of the Prophet. Much has been said as to the likelihood of a regular series of stations of the moon having been early established by people who, like the pagan Arabs, were avowed worshippers of the heavenly bodies, especially the moon, and on whose attention the moon and stars were urged in quite a special manner by their mode of life which implied a great deal of travelling at night in regions where the spectacle of the starry sky is rarely dimmed by clouds. Considerations of this kind no doubt have a certain force; but, as said, really decisive positive evidence for a very early recognition of the menāzil is not forthcoming. Our knowledge of ancient pre-Islamitc Arabia has in recent years, been greatly extended; in particular much light has fallen from the study of inscriptions, on the existence of powerful and highly civilized kingdoms in Southern Arabia, at a period preceding the Christian Era by many hundreds, perhaps some thousands of years; and the people of those realms also appear to have been 'worshippers of the host of heavens,' particularly the moon; but as far as we know, none of the inscriptions so far read and deciphered mentions anything like a definite series of lunar stations. Here also it has to be remembered that worship of the moon by no means implies the formal recognition of a cycle of 27 or 28 asterisms in which the moon dwells in succession; the transition no doubt is an easy one but not by any means necessary. There, however, seems to be after all sufficient reason to consider the menāzil as they appear in Arabic literature as an indigenous institution, not as a loan from Indian astronomy. That the Arabs even before they became acquainted with Greek and Indian astronomy, had been to some
extent observers of the starry sky and had distinguished and named quite a number of asterisms cannot be doubted. And among the names of stars mentioned by the old, among them several pre-Islamitic, poets there are certain names which re-appear in the list of the menāzil. There further is the circumstance that the Arabian system acknowledges 28 menāzil, while those Indian astronomers from whom the Arabs are by some supposed to have borrowed their series recognise 27 nakṣatras only. In addition there are the important differences in the selection of asterisms constituting the members of the series—to which we have referred more than once. Considered from the ecliptical point of view i.e., as a series of stars to which the positions of sun and moon may be referred with ease, the Arabian series is greatly superior to the Hindu one; it exhibits none of those excessive deviations from the central line which are so characteristic of the latter. Moreover, we have early testimony to what we may call a particularly living and practical use made of the menāzil by the Arabs; inasmuch as these asterisms although no doubt referred to very frequently as stations of the moon were also habitually viewed in a connexion quite independent of the moon, viz., as indicating by their successive heliacal risings and settings, the seasonal divisions of the solar year and announcing changes in the weather. As well known, there exist a number of old verses and sayings in rhymed prose, referring to this connexion of the menāzil's risings with seasonal and meteorological phenomena, which are quoted by later writers as traditions of the Arabs. This again supplies a strong argument in favour of the view that the Arabian series was not borrowed by learned astronomers from the astronomy of some other nation, but was an old national institution of a popular character. Hindu Astronomy has nothing to say as to the heliacal risings of the nakṣatras; these asterisms from the beginning connect themselves in a peculiar and

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* We refer on this point to Prof. Hommel’s paper (the main thesis of which we have discussed above) ‘on the origin and antiquity of the Arabian names of stars and lunar stations’ (Z. D M. G. vol. 45), where it is rightly remarked that a number of genuine old Arabic star names can be easily distinguished from the ‘learned’ names of stars and constellations which the Arabic astronomers borrowed from the Greeks.
intimate manner with the lunar calendar and only through the latter—in ways which are often very perplexing and ambiguous—with the phenomena of the solar year.

An argument, in many places pleaded by A. Weber in favour of his view of the menázil series being an adaptation of the nákṣatra-series, viz., that the former like the latter counts as its first member two stars in Aries (Sharatân = Ashvini) has been sufficiently dealt with by Whitney. It is only in the writings of the learned Arabian astronomers that we meet with complete systematic enumerations of the menázil, and at the time when those men wrote, Sharatân marked the vernal equinox, and was no doubt for this reason constituted by them as the first member of the series; the same consideration had evidently determined the choice of Ashvini, by the Indian astronomers, at the time when the Hindu scientific system took shape. The fact that the Arabian series begins with Sharatân thus proves nothing against an earlier recognition by the Arabs, of twenty-eight asterisms as mansions of the moon and regulators of the seasons.

The survey taken in what precedes, of the various hypotheses as to a historical connexion of the three so-called Lunar Zoïces, does not by any means claim to be exhaustive; it only touches on all the more important points requiring to be considered in that connexion. The result at which we arrive for the present, is that there is no valid evidence for any of the hypotheses discussed. We have shown that the agreement of the three series, in the choice of constituent asterisms, is much less close and characteristic than is generally asserted; the individual agreements have little or no proving force, the divergences on the other hand are characteristic and, in part at least, cannot be reconciled with the hypothesis of a common origin of the three systems. The various conjectures as to a comparatively late transmission of the system from some one of the three countries concerned to another country are without any sound historical proof. And the widely favoured theory of the derivation of the three series from some older system—elaborated in a region occupying a central position with regard to Arabia, India and China alike—has lost all ground owing to the fact that, in spite of advancing Babylonian research, no
trace of a Lunar Zodiac, or more generally of a series of
asterisms comprising 27 or 28 members, has been discovered
among the remains of Babylonian literature. It, of course, is
not impossible that new discoveries in this latter field may
impair a new aspect to the question; evidence of the definite
recognition of mansions of the moon may come to light when
some of the sites of the great ancient centres of Lunar worship,
such as Harrān, will be submitted to exploration. But until
this really happens, we must refrain from talking of the 'Babylonian' origin of the Lunar Zodies, and be contented with
studying each system by itself.