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(Retrospect of British Policy from the period of the first Establishment of Penang 17th July 1786-1839.)

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A Retrospect of British Policy in the Straits of Malacca, from the period of the first Establishment of Penang (17 July 1786) up to 1839, and combining Historical Details respecting the Straits Settlements and the neighbouring Native States.

Introduction
Chapter I.

The following account was written by me several years ago and before I was aware of the nature of a pamphlet which had been published by Mr. Anderson and which, from having been distributed at the time and privately to a few individuals only, did not become public until its republication in the Singapore Chronicle. My intentions appeared therefore to have been somewhat anticipated. But on reflection it has occurred to me that this account may prove acceptable to the Supreme Government not only because I have treated the points it embraces in a different and more copious manner than Mr. Anderson has done, but as I have been able to advance some new matter, having an important bearing on the political relations of Kedah and Siam. I have introduced, in chronological succession most of all of the occurrences during the period alluded to which are of historical interest or value. I trust also that I have succeeded in condensing the subjects treated of as far as consistent with perspicuity.

a. A good deal has since been added to it.
b. Anderson's Malayan Peninsula.
Writers on Kedah Affairs.

Nearly the whole of Mr. Anderson's reasonings rest on the assumed position that Siam never possessed any right to control the Malacca Peninsula generally, and the state of Kedah particularly; and that there were no historical documents regarding the latter which could be consulted. He observes that "he had been unable to trace in a satisfactory way the history of the Country of Kedah beyond the grandfather of the present King," and adds: "The King, who was possessed of various historical records, lost them all upon the Siamese invasion." Yet with this acknowledged paucity of information he describes the Kedah race as having emigrated from Malacca, and that it flourished under a race of Mahometan "Sovereigns for many centuries, and never was under Siam, except as the transmitter of gold and silver flowers." I by no means wish it to be inferred that I believe Mr. Anderson to have been aware of the existence in Penang of any such historical record, but it has always appeared to me singular that with his admitted knowledge of the Malayan language, and after the daily intercourse he had with the Rajah of Kedah and his Chiefs, he was not better informed on the subject, and of the real relations which had existed betwixt Siam and Kedah during about 500 years.

With respect to the two first of that gentleman's positions above alluded to, it might probably not be difficult to show that he has cited passages from authors which go near to contradict, if not to invalidate them, and in regard to the third position, I trust that the evidence which will be adduced in this paper will show that he laid it down rather unadvisedly.

The Political calm which has, to the eastward, followed the Burman War, and the definitive Treaty with Siam, are favourable to taking a dispassionate view of British and Indo-Chinese politics in connection with
each other. I will confess that when the Siamese invaded Kedah I was impressed in some measure with the general feeling of sympathy for the Ex Rajah's misfortunes, although I trust that my judgment has not been thereby warped when the nature of his position became a political question. I had the honour of being for a considerable period employed by the Penang Government in an endeavour to persuade the Ex-Rajah to proceed to Malacca, and it is well known to the Government how he was persuaded by others to retract his promise made to me that he would go to that settlement.

Although thus employed in a negotiation highly disagreeable to the unfortunate Chief, and one in which my personal feelings were superseded by considerations of duty, I was yet enabled to continue on the most friendly terms with him. During a confidential conversation I had with him regarding the ancient condition of the Kedah country he produced a written historical account of it, that one which Mr. Anderson has described as having been lost, and after I had inspected it in his presence, he ordered his secretary to make a copy of it for me, which copy I soon after received from the Rajah. It is in the Malay language, and from it I have made those extracts which bear on Kedah politics with relation to Siam.

Accounts of Kedah.

It appeared to me very strange at the time that the Rajah was not aware of the obvious bearing of the work in question on the value of his political rights. But his conversation afterwards proved to me that if he had ever read the book he must have forgotten much of its contents. This history I have ever since kept amongst my private papers, for as the Rajah had irretrievably lost all hold on the Kedah country, and all political negotiations regarding it with Siam had long ceased, its production would not have altered matters in any way. Even had the case been otherwise, I
would not have betrayed the confidence placed in me by the Rajah by using the documents to his disadvantage. It may be however remarked, that if the Rajah did conceal his history from Mr. Anderson, he must have been in some degree aware of the doubts which several passages in it were calculated to create respecting his claim to perfect independence.

It is rather singular that the Rajah or Chau Phriya of Ligor had endeavoured to suppress the history. When in a visit to him he never mentioned to me its existence, but I was confidentially informed by Siamese, that he had obtained a copy when Keddah was occupied by his troops in 1821, and that he had got it re-written, the new version being free from all that part of the original which describes the 2d Colony or race of Keddah as derived from a western people. It could be no valid argument however against the claims of Siam that she allowed colonists to settle in her territories. If this be true it is just as well that he should consider the history, ab origine, at least, not absolutely, although it really be so, in favor of Siam, and that he will never found arguments upon it. If he had produced it, however, while negotiations were pending, it is to be inferred that the cause of the Ex Rajah would have lost by it in a great degree. In fact it quite nullifies his pretensions to reign.

British Rights—Treaties.

The greatest inconvenience which arose from the political discussion as to the Rajah of Keddah's rights was, that they seemed to involve to a certain extent the nature of the British tenure of Penang and Province Wellesley. But whatever opinions may have been entertained on this point, and whatever doubts may have been expressed regarding it, the whole have been since fully set at rest, not only by the right to occupancy allowed by the Siamese and admitted by them without cavil or question in the Treaty of
Bankok, but by the subsidiary treaty founded on the 3rd clause of this original one, which finally fixed the boundary of the British possessions on the Peninsula opposite to Penang (a).

Writers on Keddaah.

The Supreme Government of British India has from the first establishment of Penang, invariably declined interference in Keddaah affairs on the ground of the vassalage of the country to Siam, yet much has been written (b) in the attempt to show that the Keddaah Dynasty was always and up to the time of Siamese usurpation, as it was termed, independent of Siam. It will be a source of gratification to me if I have succeeded in adding historical arguments derived from unwilling witnesses in favor of the sound views adopted by the Supreme Government in opposition to such arguments. The subject will be adverted to hereafter; meantime I shall only observe that the opponents of these views seem to me to have been so far misled by their feelings that they have almost blended together two questions which ought to have been kept quite distinct, the one, the actually existing or previously existing relations between Siam and Keddaah, and the second the political expediency of supporting or of not supporting Keddaah against Siam without reference to such relations. The chief error into which these writers have been betrayed has been owing to the necessity which their individual mode of proceeding imposed on them of making out a case which should at the least have a semblance to reality and serve for a season.

(a.) If this treaty should ever therefore be abrogated by the contracting parties by mutual consent, or by the British alone, the bearing of these treaties on the tenure by which Penang and Province Wellesley are held will require to be kept in view.

(b.) Prince of Wales Island Records—Mr. Anderson's Memoir.
Mr. Anderson sets out with an endeavour to promote two things—First, that when Pulo Penang was settled by the British the Siamese claims were not noticed. Secondly, that the cession of the Island was made on the express condition that the British should afford their protection to the Raja of Kedah against Siam. I shall have occasion to enter more fully on these points in the sequel. But it seems to me that in order to avoid too frequent references the most eligible plan will be to analyze this writer's statements briefly and consecutively.

To the first of the above arguments it may be replied that as the Siamese were not invited to be parties to the Treaty of Cession they could not have known its purport. That they would not have become parties to it as it stood, is plainly to be inferred from the great displeasure they expressed at the cession when it became known to them. Their fear of the British power, and other views, even then deterred them from the endeavour to drive out the British, and their overtures on several occasions for establishing a friendly intercourse with Penang still further veiled their feelings.

There can be no doubt that Mr. Light made some vague verbal promises of protection to the Rajah of Kedah, and it is equally clear that he had no authority for thus committing himself, while the Raja, by concealing the truth, subjected himself to all the penalties following his duplicity.

Penang Records. The subsequent conduct of the Raja too, joined to his correspondence with the chief authorities at Penang, sufficiently evinces that had the protection he wanted been conceded by treaty his first act would have been to have defied the Siamese, and thereby to have brought on a war betwixt the British and that nation.
The next argument adduced for the necessity of supporting the Raja at the period alluded to is the philanthropy of the measure. It is needless to insist on the irrelevancy of mixing up such an argument with a question of mere political right or expediency. We are next told that the supplies of Penang would be cut off. This evil would have been a partial and short-lived one, and as has been proved since, would have been obviated by the event then the most dreaded, and which afterwards happened, the total absorption of Kedah by Siam. The writer then tries to show that by not snatching the Rajah out of the hand of Siam piracy would increase. The Kedah people were never really addicted to piracy, as they have ever been more attached to agricultural than to maritime pursuits. But as in the foregoing case this argument has been upset by subsequent events.

From the time of Mr. Scott and Mr. Light up to that of Mr. Anderson (a) the Siamese are represented as a powerful, a proud and presumptuous people, ferocious, treacherous, ambitious. On these and other terms of similar import changes have never ceased to be rung, until those who used them began to be tired of them, and to forget that there was a possibility of their applicability being controverted, and all this vituperation arose from the circumstance that the Siamese laid claim to what they considered as a rightful possession. In such a case these last were better justified than the writers alluded to were in their endeavours to impugn it with such weak arguments as they used. At any rate the barbarity of the Siamese nation was no reason why the British should have gone to war with it, unless that barbarity had been exerted against the settlement of Penang or against the general tranquillity of India.

(a.) Prince of Wales Island Record.
Not only has the power of the Siamese as a nation been extravagantly extolled, but Mr. Anderson has compared his Siamese Majesty with "the ambitious ruler of France," Napoleon. How are such lavish encomiums to be reconciled with Mr. Light's own statement which has been reiterated up to the period at which Mr. Anderson wrote, that two companies of sepoys and four six lb. field pieces, with a supply of arms, would effectually defend Kedah against the Siamese, because although a destructive enemy they are not formidable in battle. What bathos we have here—a powerful and grasping nation yet liable to be baffled and opposed by two hundred men.

It was also argued by the above writer that we could not afford to lose the trade of Kedah and its supplies, and that the eyes of the Malayan States were on us. Now a country which like Kedah never had a clear revenue exceeding perhaps one lac of rupees, and the bulk of which was the fruit of oppression, could not be one the possession of whose commerce would be a sine quä non in mercantile policy, and as to the latter argument, although the good opinion or respect of the Malayan tribes was desirable, it did not follow that to secure this the British should become their chivalric champions in the Straits.

It is further observed that it is doubtful whether the Kedah Rajas transmitted the Boonga Mas to Siam before the Portuguese conquered Malacca. The quotations from the Kedah History will remove his doubt. The next argument is from Vaulltel, that provided a nation secures to itself its own sovereignty it must be deemed independent. But as it can be shown that there was no sovereignty in this case, but that the Government of Kedah was conferred on each successive Prince, including the present Ex Rajah Chau Pangeram (a), by the Siamese Court, so the retention

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(a.) Chau the Siamese word for "Lord," equivalent to the Malayan Tuankoo.
of the power of creating a Governor or Ruler or of exercising the authority of one, did not rest with the Kedda race or any individual of it.

After having before assured us that he could not trace the Kedda history beyond the grandfather of the Rajah (the Ex Raja) the author is yet undeterred from stating as a further argument that history does not record the concession of any thing further than mere tribute by the Kedda Rajah to the Siamese(a)

It will be seen in the sequel that history does record something more than this. On this point, continues the author, Captain Light was best qualified to judge because he obtained the grant. If this argument were reversed it would be nearer the truth.

That gentleman, intelligent as he was, had committed himself both with the Supreme Government and the then Rajah of Kedda. He could not have expected that the latter should have made political disclosures striking at the foundation of his own assumed title to govern Kedda.

It comported best therefore with the position in which he had placed himself that he should believe what the Rajah told him, and declare that "it did not appear either by writing or tradition that Kedda was ever governed by the Siamese laws or customs, and that there would have been some remains had there been any affinity between them, their respective languages and letters." The Kedda history explains a few of these points, and my own researches into the remains of antiquity in ancient Kedda will elucidate others.

Looking at the whole question as a matter of mere speculation it did not necessarily follow, even allowing the Siamese once to sway the Peninsula, that their rights had never been impaired or shaken.


(a.) This fact is admitted by the Rajah of Kedda's letter to Mr. Bruce dated 23d April 1810 *
Chapter 2nd.

The Malayan Annals (a).

I shall now advert to such portions of these annals as tend to disclose the extent and nature of the Siamese influence in the Peninsula.

The annals commence with a portion of the history of Hindoostan which becomes insensibly blended with the account of the Peninsula of Malacca. The annalist (a) describes the invasion of this country by Rajah Saran of Amdam Nagara, who had previously been at Gunga Nagara (b), and his arrival at Klang Keo or Kooee, which is expressly stated to be a Siamese appellation. But as the Malayan letters express but very imperfectly Siamese words and as this name so written would imply a Treasury, I prefer writing it Kalang Keo, the Diamond river, which better accords with the text.

The Prince of this territory, by name Raja Chohun (which is a Siamese title), went out to oppose Suram and as the annals record gave his orders in the Siamese language to call Suram to come and meet him. Chohun's troops were Siamese, while those of Suram were Kilings (c). Raja Chohun was defeated and his daughter O Nang Keo (Nang Keo*) the Siamese Princess was captured.

Suram then advanced to Tamsack where his expedition terminated. This appears to have happened about the year A. D. 1130 and certainly before

(a). The "Sala Sila peratoran Segula Raja Praya" is the title of the book or chronological account of all the Rajas (Malayan). My copy does not in matter materially differ from the translation of these annals by Leyden, which last has been extensively used by several writers.

(b). Gunga Nugar.

(c). Natives of the Malabar coast.
1160, for it is related in the 3d Annal that Sang Nild retamaa, grandson of Suram, subsequently known by the title of Sri Turi Buhana, emigrated from Bentan where he had settled, consequent on his marriage with the daughter of the Queen of that place, and arriving at Tanjong Bemban saw from the top of a rock the white sands of Tamsak. I do not know if such sand be now visible from the Sumatran shore. It is plain however that the name Tamsack had been bestowed on the place before the first recorded or traditionally reported emigration from Sumatra. Suram then sailed across to that place and formed a settlement. This was in A. D. 1160. The natives of India were well acquainted with the Eastward at this period, for their intercourse with the Eastern Islands began about the beginning of the 2d century of our era(a). Tamsak seems to have been the ancient name of Ishore embracing the extremity of the Peninsula and Singhapura or Singapore, for in the same annal by Tamsak is evidently meant "the Country," the title of Singhapura having been bestowed on the place first occupied by the Rajah after a fanciful animal representing a lion.(b) The difficulties which probably had hitherto existed in forming a settlement at Singhapura, or on the Peninsula, had been removed by the conquest and settlement by Raja Suram of the territory of Raja Chohan at Khlong Keo, which was most probably the Johore River. The plain terms in which this unjust invasion is recorded to have taken place, and this by

(a). Arabs visited the Eastern Islands in the 9th century and an intercourse existed betwixt India and China B. C. 126. In 800 B. C. China became an Empire in 30° N. L. 5 W. of Ligan. The religion introduced B. C. 65. The Buddhist dispersion took place also about the commencement of the 2d century A. D. The oldest temple in Java bears date 1188 of Salivahana.

(b). Tamsak is a Tartar appellation and it seems to be known and applied at the present day. I think the word occurs in Captn. Burnes narrative "Overland Route." It seems to have been a corruption of the Damasoka Raja of India.
Malayan annalists too, leave little room to doubt that Siam held at that period the supremacy over the southern portion at least of the Peninsula, and independent of other evidence would warrant the inference that she embraced the whole under her sway, Mr. Anderson has not been able to deny or to successfully combat these inferences. Tamsak is a corruption of Dhammasoka, the country (a) of a Raja of Hindostan, and derived to the Siamese through their Bali and other records obtained from Ceylon and other parts of India. This I have ascertained by the perusal of a History of that King written in the Siamese language and which has been used by this man's people to give an air of antiquity to the annals of Ligor.

The present Governor of this Province, amongst his other titles assumes that of Sri Dhammasoka Rat. It is probable therefore that at the period alluded to, just before the expulsion of Raja Chohan, the whole Peninsula was denominated Tamasak or Tamasoka. By omitting the aspirate and the vowel o, a common practice amongst Malays in writing, the latter word would become Tamsak (b). It is obvious also that this name was applied to that portion of the Peninsula visited by Suran before its invasion by him, and before the Malayan race had ventured to settle on the Peninsula, at least the southern part of it.

Raja Suran commemorated his expedition by leaving an inscription in the language of Hindostan on a stone at Tamsak. He then returned to Bejanagar in the Kling Country. There is an inscription on a stone

(a). Dammosaka Raja of Mangir. His son went to Orjui (sic) to make an Arakan (1) of his mother. He afterwards visited Ceylon (Maha Minda was his name), in company with five Arabans in order to instruct the people in religion. This was 236 years subsequent to Buddha.

(b). Tamsak is also a Tartar title and I think Capt'n. Burnes mentions it in his overland journey to Europe.
or rock at Singapore which has baffled all attempts which have hitherto been made to decipher it, but from what I can learn, for I have not seen it, there is little doubt that the character is rather Indian than Indo-Chinese (a) and seems to partake of the nature of the characters of an inscription on stone found by me in Province Wellesley. This latter has likewise baffled the acuteness of the literate of Calcutta (b). I strongly apprehend that both are obsolete characters derived either from Ceylon or some parts of Hindostan. It is not improbable that the Island ofSinghapura was part of Tamak.

In the twelfth annal it is mentioned that an expedition which sailed under a son of Nizam Ul Mulie Akbar Shah Mani Firendan, King of Pahali (c) in the Kling (d) country was dispersed in its passage to Malacca.

In the thirteenth annal we have Siam described under the title of Sehore or Shuhre Nani (e), which is here stated to have had all the regions under the wind (i.e., to the Southward of it) dependent on it. Its King Pho Soonyang attacked Malacca because it would not own his allegiance. The Siamese army came by way of Pahang, but it was defeated and obliged to return home. The annalist therefore here admits the fact that the whole Peninsula was subject to Siam when Singhapura was settled by the intruding Malays.

(a). I am convinced on late personal inspection that it is of Indian origin (1841).
(b). It has since been partly deciphered by the late Mr. Feisep.
(c). Palibothra.
(d). Kling, Kalingara, part of the Coromandel coast.
(e). The nine cities.
It does not appear that the coast of Malacca was inhabited when the Singapureans settled there. But their occupation was viewed by the Siamese as an invasion of their territory, and therefore resented accordingly. It is probable that the attacks of, or wars with, the Burmans prevented the Siamese from effectually opposing the encroachers. They seem to have been gradually obliged to withdraw to the northward. Pahang in Lat. about 3° 47' N. was one of the Provinces which, according to the annalist, was under the authority of Malacca, although it formerly belonged to Siam. At this period it was called Pura and the Raja, or the Government rather, was entitled Maha Raja Danee Sura, who was of the Royal family of Siam and of the Boon Yaung or Boonyahan Dynasty(a).

But the Malacca Rajas did not feel secure in their position, and we find accordingly that Sultan Mansur Shah, the Raja of Malacca about A. D. 1376, wrote to the Emperor of Siam in these terms. "It is desirable that wars should cease and that no more blood should be shed, and Boon yuang phra Chau Udiya is to be dreaded in battle but there are hopes of his favour and forgiveness." The Emperor took full advantage of this humility by treating the ambassadors who conveyed the letter to him as if they were, and we may believe with truth, his liege subjects, for the annalist acquaints us further that the King of Siam took both them and their followers on an expedition against a neighbouring state and placed them in the van of the battle. The forlorn hope amongst barbarous nations receives generally a high meed of honor, but the duty was here forcibly imposed.

(a) This title Boonyang does not occur on any list of Siamese Kings I have seen. It is probably some corruption of another term. In 1359, A. D., the Siamese capital Ayoodia was built by the 16th King in succession.
Phra Chao Oodiya (the Mighty Lord of Oodh) replied and we may believe in that condescending and protecting style which Siam has exercised in its diplomatic intercourse with inferior and vassal states; and that she was justified in so doing is pretty evident from the manner in which this reply was received by Sultan Mansur Shah. The annalist has omitted the full purport of the letter but it was addressed "to the "Amei of Malacca, who on hearing it read was highly "gratified and said, now my heart is at rest for my "enemy is converted into my friend," and all who were present admitted that it was a singular instance of the favour of God towards him.

But we find that a good while after this happened, and in the reign of Sultan Mahomed, the fear of Siam had so far abated that the latter Raja sent an expedition against Calantan, then governed by a Prince, a descendant of Raja Calantan and of Siamese lineage. This Province, then under Siam, was reduced, and the family of its Prince, Sultan Mansur Shah, were conveyed to Malacca.

It would seem, owing probably to the causes before stated, [that Siam] had lost in a great degree her influence over the Peninsula States, and that a considerable period elapsed before she endeavoured in earnest to regain them. Malacca, for the Siamese, was an inconvenient place to attack, not only because it required a land expedition after debarkation of troops, but as we may readily admit from the imposing position of a seaport of such resort as Malacca was in those days and the facility with which the Rajas there could obtain fire-arms and aid from shipping. It is expressly stated by the annalist that the Siamese were inferior to the Malacca men in the use of fire arms.

13th Annal. The Siamese at length attacked

(a). The Siamese have adopted many Hindoo titles and this amongst the rest.
Pahang but were defeated owing to the aid afforded to its chief from Malacca. Ligor was yet under the Siamese sway, for it is related that the Rajah of Ligor, named Maha Raja Deman Sura, was ordered by the King of Siam to attack Pahang.

The Siamese subdued Patana in this reign, although its annals assert that its Prince, Okhoon Phoon, afterwards embraced Islamism and became subject to Malacca.

A. D. 1509. The advent of the Portuguese, which took place during Sultan Mahomed's life\(^{(a)}\), no doubt gave to the Siamese a considerable advantage in prosecuting their task of regaining the Peninsula, and they have continued their endeavours up the present day with various success. So long as the Treaty of Bangkok shall continue binding, their rule southward will be marked by Patani, inclusive, on the east coast, and Kedah, inclusive, on the west coast of the Peninsula, and there can scarcely remain a doubt that were European influence to be withdrawn from the latter coast, this last would speedily revert to the Siamese.

It would seem that the States on the Peninsula northward of Johore, the rallying point of the Malays after their expulsion from Malacca, were either actually governed by Siamese Chiefs or were tributary to Siam, and that those who were in the predicament of tributaries found it advisable to conciliate the Rajah of Johore by acknowledging themselves dependent upon him. Also Gervaise says that in 1673 Sangora (a state adjoining Ligor and south of it) rebelled against Siam. Daloong, a central province or district now under Siam, is not mentioned in the Annals. Salangore was not then in existence. Perak was attacked and conquered by the Malacca forces and the

\(^{(a)}\) He had resigned his throne to Sultan Ahmed.
Rajah (a) of Kedda (probably Sultan Ma Alum Shah) went during Sultan Mahmud's reign to obtain the nobuts or drums of ceremony from that Prince, who was then the head of the islands. No mention is made of any country to the northward of Kedda. Floris states that Patani was under Siam in 1603 A.D. and was tributary in 1703. In 1786 it was again brought under perfect subjection by them.

I now proceed to the notice of those portions of the Kedda History termed Maram Maha Wanga which relate to the power exercised by its Rajas.

I shall not stop here to investigate the question who Marang Maha Wanga was. From the name and other circumstances I should incline to give him a Hindoo origin, and to fix Ceylon as his birthplace. Be this as it may he is described in the History or Annal which goes by his name, as having reached Kedda from Room, the latter term implying some part of the Byzantine Empire. He came in the train and as the chief follower of a Prince of Room [Rūm] who was proceeding to China to negotiate a marriage with a princess of the Emperor of that country. The fleet was dispersed and many ships were lost, if not all, except the one in which was Marang Maha Wangsa, and which reached the country now called Kedda.

The original name is not specially mentioned. But this Chief's party settled at Pulo Srai on the Island of Srai, as the term implies, and Srai is the name given by the Siamese to the whole country, although amongst the Malays it is the Kedda mountain and peak alone which retains the name.

This Peak, with a considerable tract around, is the Pulo Srai above alluded to, only it has ceased to be an island.

(a). Phra Oong Maha Wangsa was the first Kedda Rajah who was converted to Islamism. He then assumed the title of Sultan Mahmud.
This colony, if a small body of men who seem to have arrived involuntarily may be so termed, found the country inhabited by a race which they deemed to be savage, but which reproach it does not appear to have deserved, for it is stated that the Chief, Phra Chahan, escorted a son of the Rajah Bodisat on a colonizing expedition, and that he was the son of a Malay man by one of the tribe in question, and had a very handsome son. These aborigines, if not actually of the Siamese stock, were followers at least of some sect of Hindoos, or Buddhists. Their names declare this fact. The new settlers were evidently Buddhists also, and this no doubt rendered their position less dangerous than it would otherwise have been, and hastened their amalgamation with the natives. We find the following names in the Kedah History, which are chiefly of Bali origin and known to the Siamese(a).

The History is silent as to the period when temples were first erected in Kedah or Srai, but my own researches have proved that the Siamese were concerned in building them. I have also been able most clearly to identify almost every spot, and particularly the most remarkable sites mentioned in the history, the general authenticity of which I might perhaps have else doubted.

Rajah Bodisat sent his eldest son towards Siam Lanchang, when he settled near the mouth of a small river, and built a fort and where he continued to rule, having several dependent provinces also under him. Unfortunately these provinces are not specified, so we are left in the dark as to the true position of the country thus occupied. It could hardly however have been

(a). Nang Sooam (dhamma) the wife of Phra Chahan Parap (Tharap) their son. Nang Meri the daughter of a man of rank and wife to Phra Rajanuraks.
Siam proper, for this last is watered by a *large* river. But my object here is only to show to what this alleged emigration led (a). The second son took possession of Perak, and Bodisat's daughter, whose name is not mentioned, formed a settlement at Patani, which country continued long afterwards as we find from Floris to be governed by Queens, thus far corroborating the Malayan account.

Bodisat died and was succeeded by his youngest son who assumed the title of Sri Mahawangsa. About the same time his elder brother Parap sent from Siam to acquaint him that he had then a son seven years old. Gifts were also sent. Sri Mahawangsa sent an ambassador bearing a reply to his brother's letter, also presents of gold and silver flowers and spears, swords and other arms inlaid with gold. The King of Siam in return requested that similar gifts should be presented yearly to amuse his children.

This last assigned reason, or rather apology, for a concession of inferiority, if not of vassalage by the Keddahe Rajah, is easily comprehended. It is only surprising that the history now quoted from, has not long ago been weeded of every passage obnoxious to Keddahe independence, seeing that it was known for several centuries orally, if not in its written state, to the Mahomedan Chiefs of Kedda, and that many paragraphs in it show that the existing copies have been made by Mussulman pens. One quotation will

(a). These colonies, if such they were, diverged about the year A. D. 1350, just about the period when the Siamese capital Ayoodiya was built. If these migrations had been stated to have gone forth from Ayoodiya the case would have been clearer, yet the near coincidence in the two periods is deserving of attention. If Marong Mahawangsa, the immediate predecessor of Bodisat, was a Buddhist, the latter would have had no difficulty in settling in any part of Siam or placing colonies in it. That he was an image worshipper is plain from the acknowledgment of his successor.
suffice. "The Queen Shureen went to repose in her palace in the west, and the King of the World, seated on his throne, gave audience on the edge of the horizon."

Maha Phrit Durya, the successor of Sri Mahawangsa, was an atrocious tyrant according to the history, and was driven from the country.

The Ministers after this event, being at a loss how to act as they had no master, sent to the King of Siam to acquaint him with the predicament in which the country had been placed—meantime they continued to "administer the Government." The King of Siam allowed the young son of Rajah Bersiyong to govern Kedah. A good deal of mummery is here introduced by the annalist to break the effect of this exercise of His Siamese Majesty's prerogative and which it would be superfluous to detail.

It may as well be remarked that although much may be inferred from this circumstance as to the previous political relations of Kedah, it is the first instance actually noticed in the history of the direct assumption of power by Siam to give away the government of that country to any one it might choose to patronize. The young Chief having been discovered by the quackery alluded to, the King of Siam sent Kalahom (this title is given to a Minister of State) who was an old courtier, and who ruled the eastern provinces on a mission to Kedah. His instructions were to instal the young chief in the government, and to make other amicable arrangements consistent with this act.

If the power of making Princes or Governors to rule over Kedah was then acceded to by Kedah, and exercised by the Siamese, it follows almost as a matter of course that the latter had the power to unmake them when they fell off from their allegiance. When Kalahom reached Kedah the young Rajah and the four muntrees went out to meet him, and were
received by him outside of his encampment at Sungei Sala with every mark of respect. The letter of the King of Siam was then read and (agreeably to it) proclamation was made that the young chief had become Raja under the title of Raja Phra Ong Maha Photoeesat. The Envoy returned to Siam five months after this event. The Rajah of Kedah sent gold and silver flowers by him to the great Raja of Siam in token of his having been installed in the government and of ever enduring amity.

After this period the King of Siam never omitted to send ambassadors annually to Kedah (to demand tribute it may be supposed) nor the Kedah Rajah to send in return gold and silver flowers as mark of friendship (or rather vassalage).

Phra Ong Maha Wangsa, who succeeded his father Photoeesat in the government, was the first Kedah Rajah who was converted to Islamism, and as Kedah was then a place of considerable resort to strangers we may suppose that the attachment to Siam became every day weaker. This conversion took place in the year of Hegira 879 or A. D. 1666, according to the Chinese Annals, for I cannot here follow the Kedah Annals, as they do not assign any date.

The History, as might have been expected, gives no account of the relations which existed betwixt Kedah and Siam subsequent to the introduction of Islamism into the former. Indeed the whole of the narrative after that time is only a meagre list of Rajas without any record of their actions (a).

(a). It is stated in the Sigara Malayoo or Malayan Annals that a Rajah of Kedah arrived at Malacca in the reign of Sultan Mahomed to request to have the ribbon. This must have been previous to the year A. D. 1509, when the Portuguese had conquered Malacca. The Kedah Annals are silent on this head. The Ked-
The most curious part of these annals is the account of a Dynasty of Siamese Kings proceeding from a western stock. The original Siamese stock came from the north, and Siam became a nation as early as A.D. 757 according to their own chronicles, afforded to us by M. De La Loubère. But their city of Siam was not founded until A.D. 1351-2 or 1894 of the Buddhist era. Now Loubère also states expressly that all the Siamese Kings were not of the Siamese race and it is not improbable that they may have accepted Buddhist emigrants from India for their rulers. The era which I have assigned, A.D. 1340 (after collating the Achinese, the Kedah and Malayan Annals) for the first settlement of Kedah, so closely corresponds with that of the building of Ayodhya, as thus described by the impartial Loubère, that it is impossible to withhold assent to the fidelity of the details of the principal events in the Kedah History. The chronologies however of Siamese Rulers given both by M. De La Loubère and Mr. Crawfurd throw scarcely any light on this subject. The first of these authors acquaints us that the first King reigned in 960 of the Siamese era or A.D. 419, and that there were successively fifty-two kings on the throne up to 1894 of their era, when the capital of Ayoodia was built. Some further particulars on the subject will appear under the head of Ligor.

The present Ex Rajah of Kedah undoubtedly precipitated his fate by an unconciliating and uncompromising behaviour towards the Siamese, totally at variance with his position. It was [to] the good wishes of the Court of Bangkok that he had owed the Government of Kedah.

dah people were not fully converted until A.D. 1612, when according to the Achinese Annals Ishan Pahlaman subdued Kedah and took Rajah Supaka a prisoner. The Portuguese historian De Faria acquaints us (vol. 3 p. 197) that Kedah was destroyed by the Portuguese under James de Mendes Furtado in 1614.
Can his impudence then be palliated or his fate be deeply sympathised with? Whenever a dependent province of Siam denies its allegiance the latter nation exerts its right to dispossess the local ruler, and either to replace him by another of its own choice or else where it has been merely tributary to annex the refractory province more firmly to the Empire.

In the case of Kedah we find a list of Chau Phiyas or Governors styled (by themselves only) Rajas, nearly allied, if we believe [them], to the reigning dynasty of Siam, speaking the Siamese language (until the influx of Malays from Acheen, Menang Kabou and other Malayan States had introduced the Malayan language and caused it nearly to supersede in a great measure the Siamese tongue) bearing Siamese titles, and enjoying Siamese dignities and delegated authority, and until their conversion to Mahomedanism, about 1464, zealous adherents to Buddhism.
I now proceed to offer in addition to the foregoing proofs and arguments such other facts as have been elicited by me during my researches (on the spot) into the antiquities of Kedddah in former times. As it is my intention to publish a separate account of the latter, I shall only here advert to the facts which bear on the political question under discussion.

The first Rajah of Kedddah Marrong Mahawangsa did not certainly arrive there before the the year 1300, but I have assigned 1340 as the probable period. Now I trust it has been proved that the Siamese race extended south to Johore or some place near the extremity of the Peninsula before A. D. 1160, while it is obvious that since they were then powerful in this Peninsula they had been a good while settled on it before they were expelled in part by the transient expedition from India and by the Malays.

It has also been shown from the Kedddah Annals that the country was peopled and probably densely so by a race of Buddhists who, under the name of Rakshas or Raksasas, applied to them afterwards by the Malays, when they became Mahometans, were truly Siamese.

The first mention of these inhabitants refers to the period of Mahawangsa's first arrival in Kedddah, when "many of the Rakshas came down to visit the strangers and were greatly afraid." That the chief of these people was selected by the Kedddah Raja "to escort his son to Siam" is an additional proof of the former having been a Siamese.

The numerous Buddhist and Hindoo temples on both banks of the Muda River and now in ruins, were probably built by the aid of the Siamese, although there are sufficient proofs extant, and which I shall notice in another paper, that the Hindoos frequented Pulo Nai or Kedddah while these temples yet remained entire, and that they erected temples
to Maha Deo and other Hindoo Gods. In a square compartment formed in a square of granite which composed part of the foundation of one of these temples, I discovered a thin plate of gold on which are the following words, written in old Siamese characters "Ka tham thong" which is apparently an enigmatical phrase, for a Siamese priest who was present when it was found could not explain it further than by rendering it literally thus—Ka (a particle used to signify I—he—it) make gold.

There are also several thin leaves of the same metal containing Bali writing in a character rather obsolete but which the Siamese can read. The metal or bronze images and ornaments found appear to have been brought from Ceylon or some part of continental India, so that if Marrong Mahawangsa was not a Buddhist priest himself he seems to have been soon followed by many.

I have traced the ruins of upwards of 20 temples, and in some of these I have found images, not only of Buddha, but of other well known Hindoo Deities.

Amongst the many proofs existing that the Siamese race peopled Kedda before the Malas reached it, it may be observed that there are descendents called Sammans of the pure Siamese stock, and which race has continued in Kedda during the whole period of the Malayan rule, i.e., since the chiefs under Kedda became Islamites.

People of this race are still numerous at the following places in Kedda:
- Wat Looohoh Wallei
- Oojang Sinna
- Padang Kharhae or Thong Khiahe
- Padang Phiteng
- Lammun
- Lampam
- Bengka and Wat Pado and in Prov. Wellesley (500 persons). These people speak still the Siamese language and are still attached to the religion of Buddha.
But the Siamese race must have extended to Ked- dah subsequently to the annexation of Ligor, as before noticed, to Siam, apparently about A. D. 758. In the Annal recording that event Kedah is not mentioned amongst the Provinces dependent on Ligor. Indeed it was probably not then inhabited or in so trilling a degree as not to have merited notice.

The Ex King himself bore the Siamese title of of Chau Pangeram, and from the Undung Undang or "Malayan Laws and Customs" of Kedah I extract the following paragraph.

"The Raja of Kedah will thus address the Raja of Ligor, Chow Phya Ratana Songkran Rambhakdi Sri Sultan Mahamad Rana Raja Boliding Besaorin Terina Wangsa Phya Srai Buree.

To

"Chow Phya Sri Thammasoorkaraj Jatti Dejo jai Mahai savariya apai phiriya Krom Bahu Chow Phya Nakorn Sri Dhammaraj," which may be freely rendered "The Chau Phriya(a), who is pure in mind, the chief in battle, virtuous as Rama, the pre-eminent Sultan Mahmood Rana, the guardian Raja, resplendent and of the illustrious lineage of (Marrong Maha) Wangsa, the Chau Phriya of the country of Chrai (or Kedah).

(a) Chau Phriya is a title given by the Siamese to the Governor of a Province of the EK or first rank (Moo-ung-ek). In the above title there is a strange mixture of Hindoo, Mahometan and Siamese words.

Thus all the objections of Mr. Anderson and his followers to the title of Governor as being given to the last Kedah Chief are upset by an undoubted Kedah document of long standing: the Raja of Kedah and the Raja of Ligor were governors of equal rank. EK is not a Siamese word. It is the Hindostanee yek (one) and as the Hindoostani numeral is also applied to the succeeding classes of Provinces, the supposition therefore before made that some of the Siamese Kings were originally from India is rendered more probable.
To
Chan Phriya Sree Tam Sookrat (Damasoka the name of the first alleged Prince of Ligor) of an illustrious lineage, unconquerable in battle, glorious as the sun, preternaturally endowed, the voice of Majesty and Vice-gerent, the Chan Phriya of Ligor, renowned for virtue." (a)

In describing the policy which has hitherto been observed to the eastward a few reflections still remain to be offered, and it appears to me better to insert them in this place, although they apply to different periods, some of which are recent, than to scatter them throughout this narrative. The British alliance was courted by most of the petty states on the Malayan Peninsula, with the avowed intention of obtaining shelter under her flag from the alleged ambitions assaults of Siam. Had therefore the desire of extending the British Power in this quarter existed it might not have been difficult of accomplishment even then. Now the practicability of such an extension could not be doubted. But a state of neutrality was essential to the speedy growth of the colony, established as it was on broad commercial principles: and it combined the double advantage of embracing the trade of all parties, and of reserving for emergencies the strength of the state. It has been argued by the advocates for Malayan emancipation(b) that were the British to declare the independence of the Peninsula States not a soldier of the Company would be required to defend them against the Siamese.

This appears to be a bold assumption and it involves another, that no provision would be required

(a). The Rajah of Ligor said in Durbar to Mr. Tbbetson where I was present, I am a great man here, have sounding titles and am called Raja, but at Court I must grovel on my knees and elbows like that man before you, pointing to his secretary.

(b). Mr. Anderson and others.
against the wars of these States amongst themselves, in which some one party might invite the Siamese to assist it. This actually happened in Perak at the very time when the negotiations which established its independence were hardly concluded, several turbulent Chiefs having called on the Siamese to assist them against their lawful Rajah. But, say the advocates for an interfering policy, the British nation, by declining to take the Malayan States under its protection, removed thereby the natural outposts of its Straits possessions. This is mere conjecture. All that has been left undone amounts to no more than a refusal to prop up a barrier chain composed of most unequal links, and ready at all times to snap asunder of itself. Such a declaration of the independence of the Malayan States would in the early stages of British occupancy in the Straits have probably led directly to a war with Siam.—And now, although she might not, from the insight she has got into our power, venture to go to war, she would feel that a blow was aimed at her individually. It seems very doubtful how far the British nation would be justified in any dictation, which this would be, to Siam, and if so what right would the former possess to repel or attack the Siamese should they invade the emancipated states without any strong provocation on the part of the latter, or even after provocation.

It would besides be quite impossible to free these states and at the same time to prevent them, in the pride of anticipated support, giving umbrage to Siam.

But the difficulty and expense which would unavoidably attend the supporting of weak allies would assuredly not be repaid in commercial or other advantages. It would be indispensable, both externally and with reference to their individuality, that they should be subsidized. The Siamese could never be so far driven off by offensive and defensive alliances betwixt
the British and the Malays as to prevent the former, if so inclined and possessed of the power, from molesting either, nor could such a hold be obtained of that nation by these means as is now afforded by their responsible proximity to a long line of British Frontier. If the British are destined ever to war with Siam it will be at a period (and it is to be hoped far in futurity) when she shall be led to aggression by an exhibition of diminished British power, both maritime and with reference to India generally.

But the advocates for war, for such those undoubtedly are who urged an armed support of the Malays against Siam, however their reasons may be shrouded in the deceitful garb of philanthropy, lose sight of the fact that about one half of the whole population of 150,000 persons, have emigrated from the surrounding regions, and enjoy at this moment protection under the British flag in the Straits(a) and that the most fitting arguments against the emancipating or in plain terms the subsidizing system are, that a large portion of these Malays still vacillate between the enjoyment of restrained freedom under the British rule with political and social security, and the unrestrained life but occasionally disturbed by invasion and oppression, which they led in their native countries; that the benefits of British rule should long ere this have drawn off a far larger portion than they have done of the population of these countries; that some of these states have occasionally confederated with the Siamese

(a).  

Penang ... 38,000 Inhabitants
Province Wellesley... 47,000
Singapore .... 30,000
Malacca and Nanned ... 34,329

Total 149,329

The Malayan population of the whole Peninsula, exclusive of the British and Siamese possessions may be estimated as follows.
against each other; and that their system of piracy has been directed chiefly against the trade of British posts at the very time they were accusing the British of not supporting them, and when they were humbly sueing for aid from the latter.

Since the Burmese war threw into the British scale the Tenasserim Provinces, and Province Wellesley has been successfully cultivated, the necessity which before existed at Penang of relying on Kedah for supplies of grain and poultry &c. has entirely vanished, cattle being the only kind of supply not yet raised in these settlements in sufficient number to meet the consumption. The cause of cattle not being bred here at Penang to any great extent is that whatever the feelings of the Siamese may have been cattle have always found their way into Province Wellesley.

Instead then of wasting British capital in giving an undue importance to Malayan Chieftainships the strength of the state is reserved for great emergencies.

Independent of every other consideration the character of [the] Malayan population of the States alluded to is so unstable that nothing certain could be predicated of or built on it. Willingly bending his

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perak</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salangore</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johore and its dependencies not including Islands but including Pahang (50,000)</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tringanoo</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calantan Sri Meekins</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>152,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Malayan States under Siam:
- Patani: 70,000
- Kedddah: 20,000

90,000

I have on revision been induced to assign a somewhat larger population to the Peninsula than that stated in my late dissertation.
neck beneath the yoke of slavery imposed on him by his Liege Lord or Chief, the Malay seems to cringe before any other where a choice remains. But having been trained to servitude he feels it when imposed on him by a foreign nation chiefly, and in so far only, as it insults his clannish principles. It is a curious fact that the Siamese have constantly employed Malays in fighting their battles against Malays, which refinement they effect partly by fear and partly by retaining the families of the levies as hostages for their fidelity.

It seems to have been considered by the Malays, at the first establishment of the British in the Straits, that the latter would as a matter of course shield them against the ambition of Siam, and the delusion has not to this day been quite dispelled, partly owing to [the] silent moral check which the known power of the British has given to the progress southward of the Siamese, and partly to the constant outcry, aided by the press, against the Government for not assisting the Islams against the infidels, forgetting in this war cry, that Christians are included by the intolerant Hadgis and religionists in the anathema against the Kafrs; and that the Hadgis, who form a large portion of the Malayan population in every petty state, have amongst other acquirements derived from the Haj, imbibed all the repulsive bigotry and intolerance of Islamism without its virtues. It would be satisfactory to have it explained who should open his purse in such a crusade.

Should the Siamese ever become so infatuated as to insult the British nation while in the zenith of its power, the Malays would then be sure allies, and might be made serviceable for all the purposes of desultory warfare. Siam is eminently vulnerable by a great naval power like the British. A slight effort in conjunction with the Malays could cut off Lower Siam southward of Chaiya; Kedda, Poonga and Junkcylon
would surrender to small detachments. A force from Tenasserim could penetrate at any one of the passes into the heart of Siam, in which an irregular body of the disaffected, or of emigrant Peguers, might possibly be enrolled, while two men of war with transports, and a steamer with a regiment of troops might at once take possession of the capital.

The following opinion which experience has taught me to entertain of the Siamese character may, if correct, serve as a criterion to a certain extent of the probable conduct of that people under any given circumstances. They are proud, vain, ignorant and vaunting. Justly suspecting their own weakness and therefore constantly trying to conceal it by a shallow show of strength. Less manly in their minds, and in their outward bearing than the Burmese, but compensating for the deficiency by superior cunning. They are more easily alarmed than the Burmese, yet exhibit a bravery, the result chiefly of the terror inspired into them by a barbarous and rigorous discipline, and the force of habit; yet they do not want physical courage in the main. Slaves to their superiors, they become, when masters, harsh and cruel to their inferiors. The crouching slave of to-day may become to-morrow the master over thousands, and the most favoured man in power has always before his mental eye, the rack, the sack and the executioner’s sword. The Siamese are for an eastern people very national. Indeed the Indo-Chinese nations in general evince a degree of national feeling which it would be in vain to seek for amongst the population of the majority of the states of Hindostan, and which has kept them distinct from each other. The Burmese and Siamese hate each other most cordially. A reciprocity of hatred also exists betwixt the Siamese and their neighbours the Cambojans and Laos. Cochin China and Siam are now contending for the mastery, and the Chinese are only too distant, and their Emperor
is too well occupied in keeping his turbulent subjects quiet, to admit of China entering the lists against the whole of these nations.

The Siamese are practised dissemblers, and state secrets are rarely disclosed where it does not suit the rulers that they should be so.

In private intercourse with each other the Siamese are hospitable, jovial, joyous and inclined to exaggerated epithets of regard and sentimentalism. They are not very fond of strangers but treat them politely when not interfered with by Government officers. As enemies, like all half polished people, they are ruthless and devastating,—to conquer and to destroy being almost synonymous terms in their war vocabulary, so that a country seldom recovers itself after having been subdued by them. In politics the Siamese are cautious, cool and deliberative; but although sometimes ambitious beyond the bounds of reason, they rarely allow themselves, either while under the immediate excitement of real or supposed wrong, or when nourishing the most deeply rooted hatred or prejudice, to hurry them into sudden, intemperate acts, however ill-judged the result of their councils on the whole may be regarding any given political measure.

But although thus slow to act, yet their perseverance afterwards more than repays in face of an enemy (within the line of Indo-Chinese civilization) the mischief of delay.

It will be apparent from what has been noticed that there are no real grades of Siamese society. Below the degrees of public office all are nearly on an equality, excepting the priesthood, and thus in one of the most arbitrary Governments in the world any one may aspire to the highest offices of the state—that precise condition of things at which democracy aims, only arriving at it through another channel. The literature of the Siamese, which is
from its western origin rather than a refined caste and which is accessible to all—the religion which is based on humane dogmas and is highly retributive—all serve to render the Siamese a nation deserving to be studied.

Since Mr. Anderson wrote his pamphlet on the Malayan Peninsula there have been several anonymous supporters of his arguments who have addressed the public through the Press. With these writers arguments would be useless. But I cannot avoid commenting in this place on two works which have been published respectively by Captain Begbie and Lieut. Newbolt(a).

The partisan like and dogmatical style of the writers, who seem to have come to their task without any personal knowledge of the subject to be discussed, the sneering manner in which the existing British politics are described, and numerous errors in matters of fact which occur in their pages render them very indifferent guides.

Captain Begbie’s work is professedly a compilation, and he sets out with a claim to the merit of impartiality in what he himself states(b).

(a). Captain Begbie’s Malayan Peninsula.
Lieut. Newbolt’s Sketch of Moar &ca. published in the Asiatic Researches, September 1836.

(b). His impartiality he displays by taking solely one side of the question of Straits policy, and Mr. Anderson for his guide in elucidating it. Thus in rapid succession he has these expressions: “The Raja of Ligor is an imperious despot.” “Mr. Anderson’s lucid argument by which he proves that Kedah was essentially an independent state.” “The absurdity is apparent enough of arguing from a peculiar idiomatical Malayan expression meaning no more than a unanimity of feeling, namely that the countries of Kedah and Pulo Penang shall be as one country, that the British were bound at all hazards to fight for Kedah again.” “Up to the Treaty of Bangkok Siam never claimed Kedah as a Province and the country undoubtedly never was Siamese.”
It is indeed a mere unmethodical compilation from obsolete works, from Crawfurd's Archipelago, Mr. Anderson's Malayan States and considerations on Ked-dah Policy, my account of Penang and Province Wellesley and such other works as may have fallen in his way.

So closely has he copied Mr. Anderson's writings that he has not omitted any of his errors. He has also so blended his own remarks with the statements of the authors he has copied from, that a common reader has no chance of being able to discriminate betwixt what is original and what is borrowed. He cannot even be complimented for any attempt at classification.

Lieut. Newbolt chiefly confines himself to an account of the district of Moar and some adjacent places. It may here be remarked that he has copied from Mr. Anderson his description of places on the Malayan Coasts.

"Captain Burney gives up Province Wellesley as an integral portion of Keddah to Siam and consequently declares it not to be a British possession." How could Province Wellesley be an integral portion of Keddah when it had been separated from it for 24 years by a distinct treaty and afterwards by a separate one with special reference to its eastern boundary, and made thereby an integral part of the settlement of Penang. The most that could be predicated of the omission to have Province Wellesley in the 10th article of the Treaty, if omission it was or could be deemed to be, is that the Siamese would be debarred trading with Province Wellesley. But the mooting such a point displays a literal or logical spirit.

The policy of Siam is admired which employed "one of her tributaries, Ligor, to subject Keddah" as if Ligor had not for centuries been, as she now is to all intents and purposes, an integral Siamese province. Such views used to be the stumbling blocks of early navigators. When they happened to touch at an Indo-Chinese port and found the Chief exercising apparently unchecked power, they set him down at once as a Rajah or a King.
It would have saved much writing had all these authors constructed maps, instead of little better than meagre details of names.

The whole of the places described by them already exist in maps and most of them did exist before they wrote (a).

The account of the last revolt in Kedah, when the Wolf and Crocodile were stationed off the mouth of Kedah River, is replete with errors.

The "Malayan fleet" was a few small boats. The "fleet sunk" about 15 piratical Siac boats which were driven off "with damage." "Tuanku Soliman the King's brother, residing on the confines of Province Wellesley, made a demonstration with three thousand men in favour of Kudin."

This force numbered 300 men. For "from six to ten thousand Malays and Siamese killed in Kedah" read 2217.

Captain Begbie's account of the Nannung War and its causes is rather tedious, but I believe faithful. He had recourse for the latter to the records supplied by Mr Ibbetson.

The summary of the population of Johore and other piratical states and islands is loosely given and probably overstated.

(a) Map presented by the writer to the Court of Directors in 1822.

NOTE.
The genealogies of Petty Chiefs and Panghulus cannot excite any interest in the general reader, and which occupy so large a portion of the work, excepting perhaps that of the Johore State only which might have been given, if at all, in a tabular form in a note.

Captain Begbie's book might have been with equal advantage to himself and his readers reduced to one third of its present dimensions. He has pressed into his service accounts centuries old, along with recent ones, yet has contrived so to jumble them together that nothing satisfactory can be obtained, except here and there a few well authenticated facts, which have been before known.

He in reality describes rather how things were than how they are, leaving us to guess if the condition of the countries described is not applicable to a period of two centuries back instead of applying to the present day. Had he trusted more to himself, and been more brief and methodical his work would have been much more useful than it now is.
Lieut. Newbolt observes: "Quedah, Ligor, Patani, Merdilo (Daloong), Junkceylon are considered in the treaty concluded by Major Burney with Siam in 1826 as Provinces of that Empire, a concession to that arrogant power scarcely just or polite." Now Lieut. Newbolt should have known that the whole of these Provinces belong as much of right to Siam as Ireland or Singapore does to the British, and that therefore the supposed concession is absurd. Under the same delusion he proceeds to say that the rightful Raja of Patani is a prisoner in Siam, when everybody knows that Patani never had a Rajah, but it has, ever since it was under a female Government, centuries ago, been divided amongst petty chiefs subordinate to Siam, and its subjects. The Ex Rajah of Kedah has not "gone

NOTE.

It is high time that writers on Indo-Chinese countries should abandon the ambiguous and protean like terms commonly employed to impress the reader with ideas which many of these writers themselves are too indolent to elucidate by a diligent analysis of established customs, of feelings and of the peculiar moral and physical influences acting through a long course of ages. It is easy, in order to account for unlooked for energy of Government or apparent weakness, to ring unmeaning changes on such terms as civilization and barbarism, and despotism, ignorance, slavery, superstition, bigotry, intolerance, demoralization, and many others applicable in a thousand ways, and conveying no definite meaning. But it is not so easy to describe laws and institutions, whether written or merely sanctioned, or felt, and recognized by long use, the secret springs of action resting on or arising from traditional feelings, habits and customs; the contempt fostered for their* nations, or the national pride which is ever strongest amongst people the least civilized, and which is a stronger bond of union there, than amongst people further advanced, the quality which the Eastern dispositions give birth to thus ending in the same result, so far, as a democracy does, having power as a bait, to all the pomp of ceremonies gilding the most galling yoke; the influence of popular feeling and character on the governing, and the toleration of the latter to the governed; the social accessories observable in the rudest states of humanity; the social compacts existing independent of any governing power, and the true extent and influence of the professed religion,
to Delhi” and he has not “many friends there.” It would require no less than British co-operation to persuade “the whole of the Malayan States to take up arms against their haughty oppressor the Siamese,” instead of little persuasion to do so as he states, being a consummation which however it may suit the aspirations of the pugnaciously disposed, Mr. Newbolt will not [be] likely [to] see realized. Mr. Newbolt is a strenuous advocate for the direct interference of the British in supressing the feuds of the Native Chiefs and for assuming a preponderating attitude in the midst of them.

Our moral preponderance is sufficiently established already, and if the Malays, at the extremity of the Peninsula, seek British arbitration they will probably receive it if it can be afforded under a practicable form.

The balance of power amongst the Indo-Chinese nations is not maintained, as in Europe, by the force of opinion and international laws. Nature in her physical or material capacity holds the scales.

NOTE.

whether glazing over the surface of life, or deeply sinking into and enthralling the reason and imagination.

No nation ever existed, despotic or otherwise, which did not improve in the course of ages on the original social groundwork, slow in some instances, quick in others, but still progressive to the point where decay commenced. The inevitable social institutions of India is an expression to be received with caution. However slow the progress, do not facts show that the Indian mind is not what it was in the days of Alexander or Auringzebe. There is an under mental current in life which flows on so noiselessly that even those within its influence are hardly aware of its effects; feelings, my opinions, occupy unbetrayed the conscious minds of millions for centuries, until the slow work of reason is ripe, when touched suddenly by the electric force of some master spirit, the whole expands into a new existence, the old shell of prejudice and of error being cast off without an effort. There is no such thing in nature as a sudden and perfect
Mountains and deserts are the only obstacles to national aggrandizement amongst nations all thirsty for supremacy. Cochin China presses on Camboja and Siam, and but for such obstacles would probably ere this have swallowed up the nearest one of these; and unless the power of the Chinese shall be interposed may yet absorb that country. Siam bears hard on the Laos race, and has in its turn probably alone been saved from ultimate subjection to Ava by the ranges of mountains and the jungles which separate the two countries. Siam and Ava are perhaps alone prevented by the powerful arm of the British from being in perpetual collision.

But all these natural obstacles may at some future time give way before some dominant power. The Chinese are already stretching away behind these secondary states and rolling on the scattered tribes of Shans and others to the British frontier; and unwar-

NOTE.

change in morals, politics and religion. Has Christianity modelled all its votaries by one invariable mental or social scale? Has it even greatly changed the habits it found existing? What dissimilar nations profess Islamish. Habits and feeling, however originally strong, are in the long run, more likely to react on religion and politics than the latter are on the former.

There is as wide a difference betwixt the political and social relations of what are classed as barbarous and despotic Eastern Kingdoms as there is betwixt the wildest despotism of the East and the patriarchal and enlightened yet absolute rule of Russia.

Talk to a Burmese of his being a slave and he will tell you that he is one of the warrior nation which gave birth to an Alompra, the conqueror of Pegu. Tell a Siamese that he is a mere tool and abject drudge of his prince. He will answer that Siam is the circuit of the gods, the country chosen of Buddha, the great, the incomparable region of Ayodia, the region coveted by every neighbouring country.

Tell a Malay that his Chief is his Demi-God, however imperative and cruel he may be. He will reply that it is the custom of Malays to honor their Chief and obey them under all circumstances or as the Malayan
like as China is believed to be her very numbers would render opposition to her systematic approach by any Indo-Chinese people quite impossible. China has also a marine—at least means for transporting an army by sea to Siam or to Rangoon. Could solid improvement in navigation, architecture, in military tactics and commercial policy gain a footing in China, it would be impossible to assign limits to her empire. The drain which would ensue when she should begin to throw off colonies would still further stimulate the principle of population until at least the Chinese race had filled all the space betwixt China and Hindoostan and until perhaps it had come into direct collision with these western regions.

Compared with any one of the Chief former or old Governments of Hindoostan, the Indo-Chinese nations must lose not only on the score of Physical resources and strength, but of moral and social and commercial capabilities.

China must rank at least above the very best native Indian Governments and nations which have existed since the palmy days of the Mogul Emperors.

NOTE.

Raja Tuam Bijata(a) observed when in the power of a man whose wife he had dishonoured “He is a true Malay and will do no treason to his Lord,” that it is further their duty to resignedly accept his death at his hand and at his will, and that in compensation for all this he is free to follow his own inclinations to move as a pirate, gamble away his wife and children, stake his enemies and plant paddies wherever he pleases. Say to the Chinese that he is the serf, the football of his Emperor and Mandarins, and he will answer that he is a son of the Celestial Empire, and that all the unheaven born barbarous eyes of other countries are Fangui or Foreign Devils, beneath his notice.

Pride is the instinct given to nations for self preservation and a gift of heaven to make the human race, under every condition, content with its position, until its day of enlightenment shall arrive. A sligher feeling would not support them.
while the Indo-Chinese States can scarcely be placed higher than as third or at least second rate in the scale.

The people of India within the Ganges have from distant times been holding intercourse with or been smarting under the swords of the hardier races of the West, and have learned to estimate their real rank in the list of nations with some degree of precision. On the contrary (with one late exception, the effect of the Burmese war) the Indo-Chinese people have been all but secluded from intercourse with these more energetic races, and even from the more warlike (as regards them) races of India. Their knowledge of the European character has been chiefly derived from casual intercourse with scattered traders to their ports, who being in their power and depending for success on holding up the palm branch under every kind of usage, have been but weak supporters of national honour.

Education being, amongst the Indo-Chinese people, confined to reading writing, and casting accounts, hardly excepting from this statement the priests of Buddha, and there being no popular works in the various departments of art and science, it follows that no subject conceives it either expedient or advantageous to learn how he is governed. The governing party stretches despotism as far as he finds it can be carried without endangering his own position, while he feels quite unchecked by any restraint such as that which in European countries arises from the necessity of consulting a standard, however fluctuating that may be, of political morality.

A European power, when allied by treaty with an Indo-Chinese one, however justly reciprocal the terms of that treaty may seem, must yet be deemed to come under serious disadvantages in the intercourse which will ensue. The first enjoys only the advantages which are open and specified, the other will be apt to look upon it as merely giving him opportunity of
husbanding his strength until it shall come into play with every chance of success. A breach of treaty in the one would be felt as a national stigma and would reverberate throughout the civilized world. The same offence in the other would be looked on by the individual Government and its people as a master move of overreaching policy, would be applauded by neighbouring nations, and would probably in the civilized world be attributed to insidious conduct on the part of the other contracting party; and where is an international empire to be sought for.

The native Government builds all its hope of advantage, whether these are to be peaceable and mercantile, or warlike and aggressive, in the known good faith of its ally, while that ally finds his greatest political virtues to be his most serious obstacles to self defence. His opponent goes on from step to step, warily avoiding to infringe on what is absolutely prohibited, while he must wait patiently for some positive infraction of terms before he can oppose force to force or intimidation to ambition or treachery. He may be as certain that this opponent will use to the utmost, either secretly or openly, any power he may have, when time shall prove, as that might, since the world began, has ever been right, when kindred nations have not compacted to modify that great law of nature, and to balance its energy when brought to bear on their artificial state. Dominion is nature's watchword throughout all the gradations of existence up to man, and this last, while he domineers unchecked but by physical danger (to be avoided generally with ease) over the inferior creation, is stimulated by the same natural impulse where superior moral, mental and physical energies, combined with accidental situations will admit, to exert dominion over his fellows. Nature has given the latter too the impulse of resistance, but this can never equal in energy the dominant principle, because each individual of the resisting mass feels that
his own mind is deeply imbued with it, and that the struggle ever must be for might—the question ever, who shall obey. It is this feeling which makes excess of liberty speedily end in arbitrary rule. Had the British not succeeded in Ava this last question might, and no doubt would have arisen amongst the Indo-Chinese, but first another would have a chance of agitating the two principal ones, Ava and Siam, whether they should not join against the British. At any rate had Siam wished for peace with Ava, she must have, in such an event, avoided a friendly alliance with the British, and what a great loss of moral power would failure have entailed. Aurungzebe's power sustained a shock from his failure to subdue Arracan and Assam, but the mightier the power the severer the political and moral declension, the greater the dangers attending on both. British prowess is already embodied in song throughout the widely scattered tribes of Indo-China, and pregnant perhaps in this garb with future events. The pillar of national vanity having amongst them been shaken to the foundation, new props may happily be sought for from more enlightened quarters.

A high road, if report speaks true, will ere long be opened from the confines of India extra Ganges to China, and by the Chinese themselves. Already Burmah deigns to bestow to the whole, whisperings of a milder condition of humanity(a).

Siam has a pretty extensive commerce with Europeans, and with access to the products of European labour may gradually imbibe a taste for improved science and art, and China in the centre of her vast and transmitted population has mani-

(a). Since the above was written the Burmese seem to have forgotten some of the lessons so well taught them.
tested occasional throes which would tempt us to anticipate improvement there. The last war has no doubt already enlightened the Burmese to a certain extent. It has exhibited for their imitation civilized warfare, which fights only with the Government of an enemy and ravages not the fields nor sacks the houses of the peaceful subject. It has shown to them good faith in the conqueror's humanity in battle, and generosity after victory.

The Siamese, whether wisely or through fear it matters not, standing aloof from the field of battle, have maintained intact their extensive country, and have gained strength in proportion as the British have been successful. They have gained knowledge too without dear bought experience and they profit by it.

The contest with Ava has dispelled the mirage which prevailed on the geography of that and the neighbouring countries and has opened doors to the resources of the Indochinese(a) States.

And are Britons, strong as they may be in arms, to disdain the lessons which even a barbarous warfare is capable of giving. Had such vague descriptions of the want of spirit and contemptible capabilities which we find alleged by old writers against the Burmese been credited to the fullest extent, a severe lesson might have been read to the British Generals not to despise an enemy, however unworthy of his steel that foe may seem. And a warlike nation could not be contemptible when it required such a large force during two campaigns.

(a). In my report on the Tenasserim Provinces at the close of the Burman war I had occasion to mention the caravans, one of which I saw from the Shan country. This prospect held out of intercourse being established with the interior countries has not been fully realized.
of some of the best disciplined troops in the world to teach her the wisdom of submission.

High and inborn courage may be wanting in an enemy but a rigorous despotism, such as that displayed in a time of war by Ava, renders cowardice more dangerous to its entertainers than the exposing of his person in battle. To fly is certain death from his Commander in the rear, to advance is having a chance of surviving and of escaping in a general rout. Then again, nature interposes for him, betwixt him and the sterner enemy, her tangled shield of forests, rivers and hills, to level artificial distinctions.

Had Ava lost Pegu her whole body politic would have been permanently paralyzed. They did not become a nation of any note until Alompra opened a passage for her to the sea and to the commerce of the world. Like the Siamese race, she felt her insignificance until that was accomplished. She has indeed lost a few of her cutfeellers, but this perhaps has only concentrated her strength.

If the Siamese could ever have made, or shall ever have the power to make, a successful aggression on the power of the Burmese, it would have been, and probably will be, by setting up a Peguan Prince and ruling in his name over Pegu at last. They have always kept a large body of Peguers at Siam, and while the Ava war yet pended the Court of Bangkok had recognised the claims (real or pretended it is useless to enquire) of a Peguer to the throne of Bagoo or Pegu, intending to have set him up had their troops got a footing in the Burmese territory. They had luckily no opportunity of meddling and of thereby establishing claims for a share not only in the ceded territories but in the glory of the campaigns; and no doubt they would have assumed the right to the largest share of the latter whether granted or not. Their cupidity and caution, mere ignorance, being
carried too far, defeated all the grand schemes which they meditated.

However favourably the generosity which gave up Pegu for less valuable provinces may be received by European nations, it cannot be doubted that its retention would have been looked on by the Indo-Chinese people as a thing of course, and as a procedure no more betraying an uncalled for thirst for acquisition than the retention of the Coast Provinces does. It would seem a stretch of the reasoning faculty could these nations appreciate such magnanimity or believe that the power which had grasped an Empire had willingly, after a sacrifice of blood and treasure, relinquished its hold.

But should either of the two Indo-Chinese powers lying closest to the British possessions ever act so as to make it necessary to assail their sea ports, the terminations generally of the vital arteries of these fluvial countries, such ports would naturally and readily, if subdued and retained, connect themselves with those great mercantile zones with which the enterprise of the British nation has already nearly girded the world, and which add elasticity and stability to its rule.

Siam may not exactly perceive that with reference to the native powers that were or that now exist in Hindoostan she hardly merits being placed in the 2d grade, or that amidst the Indo-Chinese her military pretensions do not rank above those of her native neighbours. Indeed it may be questioned if they do not fall short of those advanced by the Burmese, since the latter nation has on more than one occasion overrun Siam, whilst the Siamese have rarely, since they lost Tensserim, ventured beyond a strict border warfare. But Siam cannot fall through the veil of her self-love and the mist of her prejudices to see that it would be aiming a mortal blow at her independence were the British ever
to find it necessary for their security to support and aid both, or one only of the nations alluded to, namely the Burmese and Cochin-Chinese.

Her fears on the side of Ava are for the present in abeyance, but she has on several occasions manifested considerable uneasiness and suspicions regarding the visits of the Cochin-Chinese vessels to Calcutta, Penang and Singapore. About the time of the breaking out of the Burmese war several Cochin-Chinese Ambassadors to Ava visited Penang, and from the minute enquiries which they made about Junkceylon, it was conjectured that their Government then entertained some design against it. They might easily take it by a coup de main. They have armed war square rigged vessels and are better sailors than the Siamese, who in reality are no sailors; but that they could afford to retain it is very doubtful unless they were masters also of the Siamese ports on the east coast of the Peninsula. Instructed as the Cochin Chinese have been by the French in European military tactics, at least to that extent to which their prejudices would permit them to go, it does not however appear that they have exhibited much improvement in their actual movements in the field.

Had any commensurate improvement really been made, Siam would have long since felt fatally the effects of it. It is only surprising that nautically superior as the Cochin Chinese are to the Siamese, and with a population greatly, it is believed, exceeding that of the latter, the former nation has never invaded Lower Siam.

Here, if the Rajah of Ligor did not think it his interest to join them, they would find all the conquered Malayan States ready to embrace their cause, were such an attempt to prove successful and which considering the almost constant state of hostility in which these rival countries have been involved, is
neither improbable nor impracticable. The British in the Straits of Malacca would then come into immediate contact with a nation of a more bustling and energetic character than the Siamese and certainly with one which in the mass stands several steps higher on the ladder of civilisation than the latter have yet reached.

It has ever seemed to me that the Chau Phriya or Siamese Governor of Ligor, who is by courtesy designated Raja, would be glad of an opportunity of shaking off his fetters and asserting independence. The Court of Siam has evidently tried to guard against such a contingency by retaining about it a number of Chau Phriya's relatives, and by keeping spies in the shape of councillors about his person. His four daughters were give to the Zennana of his king; one of his sons is Governor of Kedda and another of Daleong(a).

It is not improbable that a party to the Treaty of Bankok he had hoped that a war with the British would have facilitated his views.

At present he might well pause before joining the Cochlin-Chinese in case they should invade Lower Siam, since it would likely be only changing one hard master for an equally hard one, perchance a harder. The Chau Phriya is a very clever barbarian, a Mahomed Ali in a small way, of persevering and unremitting habits of business and therefore never pardoning remissness in others—a consummate dissembler but apt to defeat his own purposes by carrying dissimulation too far; of a most inquisitive disposition, and appreciating perhaps beyond any of his countrymen the advantages of European science and art, yet restrained by

(a). 1841. The Raja has died since the above was written and the jealousy of the Court of Bankok will hedge in his successor so that he will be a mere executive officer.
by political trammels from following out the bent of his mind; cautious in his councils, decided in his military operations, and brave agreeably to the Indo-Chinese acceptance of that term, although wary in not exposing his person in battle; a most severe disciplinarian and relentless punisher.

To aid these qualities he possesses a very robust constitution. When the Honble. Mr. Ibbetson visited his camp in Keddah in 1831 an opportunity was given to me of judging his capacity.

He was in his Durbar or Sala the whole day and seldom retired to rest until past midnight, being chiefly engaged in dictating to his secretaries, few of whom could long support the constant labour they were subjected to. His conversation was easy, animated and jocular though abrupt, and he displayed a very capacious memory.

When the Chow Phriya dies or is deprived of his Government (terms almost synonymous in Siam)\(^{(a)}\), it is highly improbable that any man of equal ability and determination will be found who may succeed him. None of his many sons evince more than very ordinary abilities, although they have all the cunning which the semi barbarians substitute for sound judgment. They are amenable to the rod of correction like the other subjects of Siam and it is inflicted in no very decorous manner\(^{(b)}\). One of his sons, a youth of upwards of 20, was smarting under the effects of this domestic punishment when Mr. Ibbetson visited the Raja's camp, as before noticed. He is now governing the Province of Daloong. Can any true feelings of

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\(^{(a)}\) This has actually happened since the above was written. The Phriya was called to Bankok to give an account of his government, was there detained two years or longer, when he died from vexation of mind, it is said. Perhaps there were other causes (1841).

\(^{(b)}\) The nether extremity.
manhood have place when such a punishment is inflicted on the élite of the land. It is however pretended by the sufferers that there is no disgrace attached to a sound whipping. So may the chosen of the land in some European countries have said of this sort of patriarchal correction. The care which the Chau Phriya took to conceal from us the punishment his son had received by his orders disproves the assertion. The secret of the Chau Phriya’s aptitude for business and decision of character, may perhaps be in his being the son of the famous Chinese usurper of Siam, Phriya Tak. When the latter was slain his widow, a Siamese, who was then pregnant, was given to the then Governor of Ligor, and on the death of the latter the Chau Phriya succeeded to the Government.

It is not easy to discover what revenue he pays to the Siamese Exchequer. It is not fixed. But independent of the boats which he is constantly building and sending to Siam he occasionally transmits considerable sums in cash and plate. To make the latter, which is chiefly of silver and finished with gold flowerings, he retains a large establishment of goldsmiths constantly in his service. The manufacture is called Chartan and does credit to the Siamese workmen.

Chapter 3rd.

Srai
Sai

This Province of Siam lies between the parallels of 5.10 and 6.35 N. L. Its breadth varies from twenty five to forty miles. It was originally peopled by the Siamese race, and was then as it now is termed by them Muang Sai or Srai. About the year A. D. 1342 (a) a colony arrived from the westward under a

(a). I have fixed this date after comparing together the Keddah, the Chinese and Malayan Annals.

The Keddah Annals will be translated perhaps hereafter by me.
Chief named Marrong Maha Wangsa. The Kedah Annals point out Room as the country from which he came, implying thereby some part of the Byzantine Empire, and the object of the voyage is stated to have been the forming of a matrimonial alliance betwixt the son of the Rajah of Room and a daughter of the Emperor of China. But the name of the Chief is evidently a Hindoo or Buddhist one, and as he was an idol-worshipper too, it will be more consistent with probability if we assign Ceylon or some part of Hindoostan as his birth place (a). The Mussulman Annalist intentionally perhaps confounded the leader of this colony with the ambassador sent (b) about A.D. 1290 by the King of Persia to China to solicit from the Emperor Kublai a Princess as a wife.

Be this as it may the Kedah Annalist has minutely described the voyage from Room and the destruction on the Eastern Coasts of the Bay of Bengal of all the vessels excepting one which composed the fleet. In Marco Polo’s account of the Persian Embassy just alluded to no such disaster is mentioned.

1 Marrong Maha Wangsa reached Pulo Srai First Chief, in the vessel which escaped, which last was moored near the Point of Pulo Srai. He then went on shore with his wife and family(c), and built a small town which “was secured by a wall and other defences. He called the town Lancasuga”(d).

This Pulo Srai (or the Island Srai) is afterwards described by the annalist as having many years subsequently to the settlement “become attached to the

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(a). Mahawansa is one of the titles of some early Rajahs in Ceylon, and also of a Ceylonese Historical work.

(b). Marco Polo

(c) It is not likely that any one but a colonist would have brought his family with him.

(d). This term is purely of Hindoo origin.
mainland" and having then received the name of Goonong Jerrie or the Keddaht Peak, a conspicuous mountain, and the present appearance of the country surrounding it confirms the above account.

When Marrong Maha Wangsa had established himself on shore many of the Rakhirshas came down to visit him.

These were the aborigines of the country of the Siamese race, to whom their more polished visitors applied a term implying contempt. But by the annalist's own showing those Rakhirshas were sufficiently civilised to amalgamate in some degree with the new colonists. That these aborigines were Siamese is proved, as I have before observed, by their names, and by the fact that their descendants under the denomination of Samsams are found in considerable numbers at the present day in Keddaht and Province Wellesley. These people speak the Siamese language and adhere to the religion and customs of Siam. As Marrong Maha Wangsa was a follower of some Hindoo system of worship and the Siamese were Buddhists, the former could have had little difficulty in conciliating the natives, and he no doubt obtained permission from the Chief "of the Rakhirsha" as the annalist calls him, to form a settlement in this part of the Siamese Empire.

My own researches in Province Wellesley elucidate these remarks, for amidst the ruins of the ancient temples there I have discovered in juxtaposition (in one and the same temple) various images of some of the principal Hindoo deities and of Buddha and also writings and inscriptions in the Sanscrit and the Siamese languages, and one in an obsolete character supposed to be Pali or Bali (a).

(a) A facsimile of this inscription was forwarded to the Asiatic Society of Calcutta and the late lamented Mr. Prinsep, its secretary, acquainted me shortly before
It is obvious that the new settlers must have been too few to have occupied the Srai country. Even had the inhabitants been unable to expel them, the then flourishing adjacent Siamese Province of Ligor could have easily afforded the means for so doing.

Marrong Maha Wangsa established a trade with the countries of Achi and Pulo Percha (Achin) and Golunggee (Pegu) (a) and his port became soon a great trading mart. "In process of time," the annalist proceeds to state, the Sultan of Room recalled Maha Wangsa, of whose existence he had been [made] aware by the commander of one of his vessels who had met with one of the Marrongs at Pegu. The Srai Chief therefore returned home, leaving in his room a son who married a princess. It does not appear who this lady was, although it is probable she was either a Siamese or a Peguer, as these natives were Buddhists. The new Chief assumed the title of Raja Marrong. The Second Raja, Maha Bodisat. Marrong Maha Wangsa took with him his old followers, but the children of the latter remained behind. "Before his departure he assembled all the principal people who had arrived with him, and it was there resolved that the Country of Srai should be thence forward called Koedda, meaning thereby Zameen Soram, because it had been settled after many difficulties and dangers had been surmounted."

As this new name is of Persian or Arabic derivation it is most likely that it was bestowed when Marrong’s descendants became Mussulmans than at the period here stated. Raja Photeesat (b) had three his death, that he had he thought succeeded in deciphering it, and that it was in an almost obsolete character formerly used in Upper Hindeostani.

(a) In the country itself the natives call it Bagoo. The Siamese term it Hangsawaddy - the goose or Hangsa Country.

(b) Bodhi Satma.
sons and a daughter born to him at Pulo Srai. When they grew up the Raja determined to fulfill the desire of his father that he should form establishments in the neighbouring regions, which last were then in a wild condition. He accordingly sent for Phrai Cheehan, the Chief of the Rakhsas. This man was the son of a Malay (a). He had a son named Parap, whose mother was a Rakhsa. This lady was named Nang Soothamune (b).

Photisat's eldest son journeyed towards the northward, (c) accompanied by the family just mentioned and many Malayan followers with their attendants.

After a journey of two hundred days by easy stages, and with numerous halts, the party reached the mouth of a fine river which flowed through a rich country. The young chief here established himself and his followers. This country is named Siam Lanchang(d).

The Raja's second son went in a southerly direction until he came to a river which fell into the sea. This country was named Neegri Perak or the silver country, because, according to custom, a silver arrow had previously been shot in the direction of the river.

Finally the Raja sent forth his daughter in quest

(a). The annalist does not condescend to inform us who the Malays were, or whence they came. Cheehan was doubtless the son of a native with an individual of another tribe, whether Malayan or otherwise.

(b). These are partly Siamese and partly Bali names.

(e). It is "north-west" in the MS. but as the sea lies in this direction there is probably a clerical error.

(d). Lanchang lies in South Laos, a very improbable direction for such a colony to take. But the word Siam being prefixed it would seem to indicate that this place was somewhere in Siam, and indeed in subsequent parts of the annals the Colony is expressly declared to have been established in "Nigri tiga huah." The country is composed of three divisions or Siam Upper, Central and Lower, while it is also expressly stated that the elder brother alluded to was King of Siam.
of a new country. She journeyed with numerous followers, and over mountains and plains towards the east. She rode on an elephant, the name of which was Lella Joharee. At length the colony reached the sea shore (a) and a fort was constructed at the embouchure of the river. Four of the Kedah chiefs had escorted the princess. They remained with her during a few years and before they returned to Kedah the newly settled country was called Patani, with reference to the famous Lela Masari Kris which the princess had brought with her (as an heirloom) (b).

Raja Photesat became old, and left the administration of affairs to his Chiefs, he busyng himself with field sports. When he died his third son III acquainted his brothers and sister of the Third Chief event. He then took the title of Sri Mahawangsa.

Soon after this assumption he changed the seat of the government from Lankasuga to Srokame (c). The Raja had one only daughter by a Malayan woman of rank. About the time of this removal to Srokam the Raja received a letter from Siam intimating that his elder brother, the King of that country, had a son whose age was seven years. Accompanying the letter were valuable gifts. Sri Mahawangsa replied to this letter and sent it by a special messenger, who conveyed likewise presents of gold and silver flowers and ornamented arms for his brother. "The King of Siam was much gratified with these presents and requested through the messenger, that similar gifts

(a). The Gulf of Siam.
(b). The inference here is obscure.
(c). This place lies on the N. bank of the Muda river, and there are still the remains of an extensive fortification to be seen there. Part of the former district of Srokam lies within Province Wellesley on the opposite bank of the river and the name is still retained.
might be annually sent (a) to amuse his children. The messenger also preferred a request of his master that the King of Siam would protect Kedah from danger." To this his Majesty replied that as far as regarded amicable relations Siam and Kedah were one country (b). When the messenger returned to Kedah Sri Mahawangsa ordained that in all future time the relations existing with Siam should be upheld.

The son of Sri Mahawangsa became enamoured of the daughter of Nang Maree, a Rahksha, who was an inmate of the palace. The girl had a fair complexion and lovely features (c). The youth married her without the knowledge of his father, who soon after died of vexation at the event, and of old age combined.

IV

Sri Mahawangsa was succeeded by the son Fourth Chief, above alluded to, who took the title of Rajah Wong Maha Phrit Dooriya. This Chief became tyrannical—as the annalist observes, a cannibal. His subjects used on this account to prefer their complaints to his second wife, who was the daughter of a Malay and of a benevolent disposition.

This Chief was known to his subjects, as he now is to the natives of Kedah and Province Wellesley, by the sobriquet of Raja Borsiyong, the tusked Raja, because some of his teeth were so long that they

(a). This claiming of tribute and marks of vassalage has been smoothed down by the Mussulman annalist as much as possible, and this is rendered more apparent by the puerile reason here assigned for sending the annual revenue or compensation to Court.

(b). This is quite a Malayan expression and may mean much or nothing according to circumstances. Here the context shows that it did mean a great deal, and more even is admitted than might have been expected from a Mussulman author.

(c). Here the superiority in point of fairness of the skin of the generality of the Indo-Chinese people over other nations of India is admitted. The Chief no doubt wished a bright alliance for his daughter.
resembled the tusks of, or as the Malays believed, really belonged to a Girgassee(a). At length the tyranny of this at the least moral monster became so intolerable that he was expelled from Kedah by the people.

The Chief men were, after this proceeding, at a loss how to act. They accordingly sent to the King of Siam to acquaint him with the state of affairs(b). His Majesty subsequently dispatched one of his courtiers named Kalahom, who ruled the Provinces to the eastward(c) to Kedah to place the government in the hands of a son of Raja Bersiyong. Kalahom was interrupted in his progress near the confines of Ligor by an army of the whole tribes inhabiting the surrounding countries. This place was commanded by Kalam Hetam, who informed Kalahom that the Kalanga people would not obey the Southern region (Siam) and that the Kalama A. was on his march to take possession of Kedah (d). Kalahom, by the aid of the forces of Ligor and of those of five or six other provinces, defeated the troops of Kalama Hetam, took the latter prisoner and sent him to Siam. He then

(a) The Girgassee is the Rakhahee of Hindoo mythology.
(b) It is clear from this that the direct interference of Siam as superior over Kedah had been freely exercised before the period we are arrived at.
(c) It is not clear whether the annalist here means the Provinces eastward of the Siamese capital or of Kedah. But as he elsewhere states "Kalahom speedily obtained assistance from all the Rajas around the country where he had his camp," it is evident that the Provinces alluded to lay on the Gulf of Siam, and on the Peninsula. Kalama Hetam came from near the country of Kalungee or Pegu. The Peguans had thus declared war against Siam and although the people of Kedah had kept up a friendly intercourse with Pegu, still it became one of the first objects of attack as a conveniently out-lying Province of Siam.
(d) The inference is plain from the speech of Kalama Hetam that the Kalungee people considered Kedah to be part of Siam. The text also shows that the Peninsula was in Siamese possession.
pursued his march with one thousand men to Keddah. He lost three or four hundred men in battle, the enemy many thousands. It may be observed here that the annalist makes no mention of firearms. Bombs were the principal weapons used in the fight. Indeed it appears from the Malayan annals that when the Portuguese took Malacca the natives were ignorant of the application of gunpowder to war and this was about 150 years later than the period here described.

When Kalahom reached Sungei Sala(a) he encamped at its mouth and then required the young chief and his followers to come and visit him and partake of field sports.

It happened that the youth was just then engaged in digging the channel called Sungei Qualla Muda, in order to form a direct communication betwixt Kota Aur and the sea. This Kota Aur (Bamboo Fort from the prevalence here of Bamboos) was Raja Bersiyong's Fort and before the channel was cut the river is described as having winded in a very inconvenient manner for navigation(b).

"The young Chief and his followers were received by Kalahom outside of the camp of the latter with all due respect. The letter of the King of Siam was then read (and agreeably to it) proclamation was made

There is a good deal of jumbling of names and titles in the description of the Chiefs of the Forces and tribes here opposed to Kalahom. But the majority are of the Buddhist or Siamese origin. The rest were wild tribes under the designations of Samang, Bila and Sakai.

(a). A small stream near Keddah.

(b). The correctness of this account is amply verified by the present aspect of this new channel, and the remains of the old one. The Muda River bounds Province Wellesley on the north. Kota Aur can still be traced by the remains of a mud wall.
that the King had exalted the young Fifth Chief Raja (a) to the Government of Keddaah and had conferred on him the dignified title of Raja Phraoung Maha Photisat."

Kalahom resided five months in Keddaah, and then left it on his return to Siam. "He carried with him a letter from the Raja together with gold and silver flowers in acknowledgment that the Maha Raja Nagree Siam had installed him in the government of Keddaah. The Raja also observed in his letter to the Emperor that he had sent presents for his Brother the young Prince. After this period the King of Siam never omitted to send yearly to Keddaah for, nor the Keddaah Rajah to return gold and silver flowers as tokens of friendship." (b).

The annalist observes in this place that in those days trade had increased in the Port of Srai, and that many strangers had settled there. The Fort of Kota Aur was given over as a residence to one of his Chiefs and the Raja built a new Fort at Soongee Didd up at the old mouth of the Muda River (c).

The Rajah had a son named Phra Ong Mahawangsa, to whom he made over his Government. The Raja's advanced age urged him to this measure (d).

(a). Raja was a title d'étiquette which every petty chief assumed amongst his own people.

(b). If the annals did not afford other positive proof of the fact still this admission of the Mussulman historian would have given good cause for inference that the relation in which Keddaah stood to Siam was far more complete and close than he has represented it. It is only to be admired that the admission was made at all in the annals.

(c). Traces of it yet remain and the country round bears marks of having been densely peopled and of having been covered with Hindoo and Buddhist temples.

(d). The Siamese consent is not mentioned, but must be supposed to have been obtained.
Phra Ong Maha Wangsa was the first
Sixth Chief Kednah Raja who was converted to Islamism. "He was in the habit of drinking ardent spirits to excess to cure some disease with which he was afflicted. Jars of spirit distilled from rice stood always ready in the Palace. When he arose in the morning, even before he had washed his face or eaten betel he used to call for a cup of spirits. But neither this habit nor the pleasures of the table, which he took freely along with his Chiefs, ever led him to become inebriated, and unconscious of what was passing around him. Phra Ong Maha Wangsa was converted to the true faith by a celebrated theologian named Sheik Abdullah, who arrived from Bagdad."

The annalist assigns no date to this event, indeed the MS. is very deficient in dates. But in my copy of the Achinese annals, written in the Malayan language, the time of Sheik Abdullah's visit to Kednah is stated to have been A. Hegira 879 or A. D. 1464 (b).

The Kednah annalist, unlike the more explicit Achinese one, tries to give a dignity to this event by getting up a miracle to account for it. Abdullah by his account was invisible on his arrival and the arch enemy Ibles was his companion and tempter on the occasion. "On Abdullah becoming visible Ibles vanished and he enquired of the Raja if he had ever heard of Islamism, which had descended from God to Mahomed. The Raja replied that he was an image worshipper but he would be glad to be instructed."

"The first sign of the Rajah's conversion (c) was the order he gave to break all the spirit jars. Then he directed that his people should burn and destroy all

(a) The Mussulman excuse when he runs counter to the Koran.
(b) The Chief or Raja was contemporary with Sultan Mahomed of Malacca.
(c) This conversion, however, was incomplete, and was not perfected until 148 years afterwards.
the golden, silver and brazen images, as also those made of pottery, with all their robes and decorations. This was accordingly done. The Raja now assumed the title of Sultan Ma Alum Shah (a).

The annalist now confines his account to a meagre list of the names of the Rajahs who he states followed for a while the new convert in regular succession. It is probable that the history of their lives may have existed in Keddah and may have been lost during the disturbances there. The remaining Chiefs or Rajahs were:

2. Sultan Ma Biffool Shah, son of the Alim Shah—after him the descent was regular to(b)
3. Sultan or Raja Mahmood Shah.
5. Sultan Soliman Shah who died at Achin.
6. Sultan Raja Looden Shah of Nuza where he died.
7. His son Sultan Mahiyedn Mansur Shah who died at Sinna.
8. Sultan Lea Oodin Makurram Shah who died at Purlis.
9. Sultan or Raja Kannali or Kahali governed a few days.
10. Sultan Ata Allah Mahomed Shah or Murhom Bukit Penang.
11. Sultan Mahomed Jiva Zein Aladin Ma Alum Shah who died at Kayang.
12. Sultan Abdullah Mokurram Shah or Morkoom Muda Bukit Pinang, A.D. 1778.
13. Sultan Abdullah (brother to the preceding Raja.) He held the Regency for a short time.

(a). Every petty chieftain of the Malayau or other race to the eastward of India took the title of Sultan on entering the pale of Mahometanism
(b). This would imply that there are some names left out.
14. Sultan Ahmed Tajudin, the present Ex Raja, otherwise called Chaace Pangheram, son of Sultan Abdullah Mukurram Shah.

On the demise of the latter the chief authority was disputed. Chau Ibrahim (the Ex Raja’s younger brother) was patronized by the Raja of Ligor, who endeavoured to obtain the government for him from the Emperor of Siam. But the latter espoused the cause of the elder brother, who had proceeded to the capital, Buiukok, to prefer his suit in person, and gave him the government of Kedah with the title of Chaure Pangeram, literally “Feudal Lord” (a), a compound of Siamese and Javanese. The fact of the King of Kedah having proceeded to Siam on the death of his father in order to do homage to the Sovereign of that state, and to submit his right of succession to the confirmation of that haughty Court appeared to me fatal to his claims of independence. The line of conduct pursued by the British Government for the last 20 or 30 years as well the enquiries of two eminent Malayan Scholars, Lt. Col. Melungeons and Mr. Crawfurd, have unhappily placed beyond the deliberations of this Board the question of the King of Siam’s being the Lord Superior of the Raja of Kedah(b).

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(a). Pangiran or Pangeran. The title of certain feudal Chiefs in Java and the southern parts of Sumatra (formerly under the dominion of Bantam) who in many places are now independent Princes. It appears to be also given to other persons of rank independent of territory. (Marsden’s Dictionary.)

(b). May 1837. As it is understood that the Ex-Raja intends by the help of the movement party* in Penang to petition the British Government for a restoration to his supposed lost rights, it may be here mentioned, in addition to what I have already urged on the subject, that when in 1818 an application was made to him by the Honorable Colonel Bannerman, then Governor of Prince of Wales Island, for a small accession of territory up to the Marbow River, he evaded the request by openly stating in reply that “as Kedah belonged to Siam he could not grant it.” This fact was not-
Thus if the Annals are faithful there were six Kedannah Chiefs who were Buddhists and who governed in succession, and fourteen who were Mussulmans. Giving for each a period of about 20 years the total period from Marrong Maha Wangsa, up to the expulsion of the present Ex-King, being about 479 years.

It would appear a very solid and satisfactory argument, as likewise a sufficient moral, legal and political reason for all that has taken place since the cession of Penang, including of course the Treaty of Bangkok, that the Kedannah Chief who made that cession designedly falsified to Captain Light his position with regard to Siam, by assuring the latter that oriously known to the natives then, and is yet well remembered by many who were present when the Raja so committed himself. Mr. Phillips subsequently acquainted him that the Siamese intended to attack him. To this intimation he replied that he had indeed neglected to send the usual tribute of gold and silver flowers, although with the knowledge of the Raja of Ligor. He had before confessed his tributary state in a letter he had addressed to Mr. Bruce. On the same grounds the Raja stopped an expedition which Colonel Bannerman had fitted out for passing (through a part of Kedannah) to the Patani tin mines.

The Sultan Dhadin Makurram Shah, uncle to the Ex Raja, addressed a letter from Purlis to the Honble. Mr. Phillips stating “that the country of Kedannah has been feudally subject to the Empire of Siam from former times down to those of my grandfather, my father, myself, and my nephew, Sultan Ahmed Tajuddin (the Ex Raja). Whoever became Raja of Kedannah all of them had letters of appointment from the Emperor of Siam.”

In some respects it is unfortunate that the Ex Raja had not at once been taken to Malacca from Brantas (a). His return to Penang and retention there until again sent to Malacca, although it had the good effect of showing to the Malays that the British Government acted consistently and determinedly, yet gave a renewed life to feelings which were rapidly becoming extinct.

It also gave the handle which has been used for buoying up the Malays with the idea that on the in-
any respect which he showed to Siam was solely owing to a feeling of its power. The Chief and his Kling and Malayan Councillors knew full well that had the truth been told to Captain Light, and had that History of Keddah which was then amongst the records of the Raja (and of which his successor, the present Ex Raja, gave me a copy) been laid before him, that officer could not with reference to the repeated and cautious instructions he had received on this point from the Supreme Government, have negotiated at all with any Keddah authority for the cession of Penang. The then Chief or Raja must have been thrown entirely out of the question, and if any negotiation for the cession of Penang had issued, that must have been made directly with the Court of Bangkok. That this plan would have saved much political bickering and animosity, and would have been easy of accomplishment, can scarcely be doubted, because the Siamese cared little or nothing

stigation of the disaffected, a few interested persons joined to the Ex Rajas’s adherents, the British Government will at once change a line of policy which it had adhered to for fifty years, and which it is bound by treaty still to adhere to, that it will either take Keddah under its protection by wrestling it from Siam, and thus raising up an implacable enemy to be opposed perhaps within the British line, or allow the Ex Rajah to attack Keddah backed by half the population of the Penang Station, and aided by Penang merchants with arms and ammunition, thereby urging the Malays and Siamese to a protracted contest, which would not only unsettle and demoralize our own subjects, but convulse the whole Peninsula, would injure trade, and severely affect the revenue. The progress towards settled habits, which is civilization, would be arrested and thrown back indefinitely, much blood would be shed, and at length the Siamese would assuredly, if British troops did not oppose them, retain the Keddah country, and the Malays would find their last state worse than the first.

It is a suicidal act of the Penang settlers the trying to send back the Malays to Keddah. One might imagine that they were not sufficiently satisfied with the diminution of their trade, but were aiming to undermine the agricultural interests of the settlement by depriving it of its labouring and now settled population: But passion and party spirit are blind.
about Penang, which was all but a desert Island and as they were very anxious at the time to have some convenient European port, where they might quickly procure arms and ammunition for their wars with the Burmese; and also as in this case the Kedah Chief would have firmly adhered to his allegiance to Siam. Vexed and incensed as the Siamese Court was at the, by it, unauthorized cession of Penang, it still hailed the occupation of the island by a Power which might be useful both directly and indirectly—directly as above noticed, and indirectly as it restrained the Burmese in their progress south.

When it was subsequently discovered that at the least Kedah was a vassal Province, although the full extent of its dependency was still merely a surmise, it was too late to remedy the error into which Captain Light had been studiously betrayed by the Rajah. Had the Siamese either at the period of the cession or within a reasonable period afterwards openly protested against it, the possession of the British would have been still more anomalous than it was. Happily the Siamese Emperor finding that he derived temporary advantages from the vicinity of the new settlement, connived at its occupation, denouncing vengeance only against the Rajah of Kedah, and the Court of Siam since that period has appeared to be aware that this failure to protest publicly at first against British occupation amounted to a tacit acknowledgment of its assent thereto. Such at least was the apparent feeling of the Court when the Treaty of Bankok was negotiated—occupancy being then admitted as a sufficient claim to possess, and here again the same political foresight instigated them as at the original cession, to gain a further bulwark against the Burmese power at the slight cost of not advancing claims to Penang.

If the Rajah’s insincerity had been discovered at the outset he would probably have paid very dearly
for it, since he would have likely been then left to himself, and his double crime (of first denying his allegiance and then of offering part of Kedah province to foreigners) would have sealed his fate at Bankok. The English could have had no alternative supposing they had not negotiated directly with Siam, betwixt supporting per fas nefasque the Chief in his usurpation and thus giving the Siamese a just cause for going to war, or of quitting the Coast altogether. If this latter course had been adopted before even the Rajah had fully committed himself to the English, still he had otherwise paved the way to his own ruin by intriguing with both the Dutch and the French. The latter people were prepared to step in with invidious aid. But they could not have stayed long while England had fleets in the Indian Seas, and occupied, as must have been the case, some other station in the Straits. The fate of the Raja would only therefore have been delayed, not averted. Most probably the Malays would have been driven by Dutch rule to join with the Siamese in expelling them from Kedah. On a false plea therefore the Raja not only secured that shelter from Siamese domination which he had been willing to gain at any price, but he involved the British, although unknowingly on their part, in his attempt to throw off his just allegiance. He and his advisers knew perfectly well that once fixed at Penang the English could hardly retreat, and when he had got them so fixed he got gradually rid of his apprehensions of Siam and raised his demands on the British. Afterwards feeling strongly Dutch promises, Burman promises and piratical aid he tried to expel the British from the Island, hoping to make a better bargain with one of the powers for what was not his own to give.

The British were not, it may be supposed, after this under any moral obligation to the Kedah Rajah. If there could have existed any political obligation, that must have been incurred by the sacri-
fice of a portion of national credit and honor by
the abetting of the treason of the subject Chief.
Further if any thing were wanting to bear out these
statements such would be found in the fact that the
Ex Raja had gone to Siam in person and obtained as a
favor from the Emperor the Government of Kedah in
life rent and dependent on his good behaviour, and
also in his avowal during Col. Bannerman's Govern-
ment, made in open Durbar to Messrs. Cracraft and
Caunter, the Government Agents, who were sent
to negotiate for a better northern boundary, that
Kedah belonged to Siam and that he could not treat.
It seems plain, politically considered, that by the first
of these acts, he for his own selfish ends broke off
the British connection and virtually nullified the
treaty made with Sir G. Leith for his own selfish ends,
because others of his family had prior and much better
claims than he to the Government, and in breach of
the Treaty, because he thereby proved and admitted
his inability, as a subject of Siam, to fulfil the condi-
tions which his predecessor, on the false ground how-
ever of independence, had pledged himself to perform.

And if this reasoning be just it will follow, that
as the treaty of cession was made by a subject of Siam
without the participation or sanction of Siam, so it was
invalid from the beginning, and that the British rights
rest on occupancy, confirmed by the Treaty of Bankok,
and the subsidiary Treaty with the Rajah of Ligor
which settled boundaries,

The population of Kedah might about fifty years
ago have been from 80,000 to one hundred thousand per-
sons. But wars, emigration and misgovernment have
reduced the number to 20,000 (a). In 1786 Captain
Gloss estimated it at 40,000 persons only—a mistake.
The Malays did not begin to emigrate to Penang

(a). Making allowance for increase after emigra-
tion the case may stand thus (increase inclusive)
until long after. The Raja, to check the movement, imposed a fine of one hundred dollars on each emigrating family. Since the final occupation of Kedah by the Siamese the Court of Bangkok has relied more on its moral than its physical force to retain it in subjection. There have been seldom more than from two hundred to three hundred Siamese troops in the country. There can be little doubt that their rule has been much overblamed and that whatever the relatives and mercenary adherents of the Ex Raja may assert, the Malays of Kedah are little disposed to see him again amongst them.

This country has a few natural defences such as mountains and jungles, but these are easily overcome by the Siamese. It can hardly be said to have artificial ones, the Kedah Fort at the mouth of the river is paltry in the extreme. The old brick walls are from eight to ten feet high and enclose an area of about eighty yards by fifty. A few large shot well directed would crumble down any part of the wall in a few minutes. Any force could penetrate from the sea by the rivers to the central parts of the country. At spring tides a vessel of 300 tons burden can enter the Kedah river over the bar. Troops cannot easily reach it from Ligor under a journey of seventeen days, but they could reach it from Daloong in about 10 days.

The Raja of Ligor has been accused of misgoverning Kedah. It should however be recollected that so long as the Ex Raja and his friends have the means to intrigue, as they have already so frequently done with the Kedah inhabitants, to drive out the Siamese,

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<th>Emigrated to Penang</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Do. to Province Wellesley</td>
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<td>Remained in Kedah</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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the latter will be compelled to act the part of conquerors as their only safe policy. These frequent rebellions release the Siamese from any charge of having broken their engagements.

Keddah was never a rich country. Its chief products were grain, cattle, tin and rattans. The Chiefs or Rajahs increased their scanty legitimate revenues by exactions of various kinds, and by a monopoly of trade—consequently the bulk of the people were mere slaves dependent on the will of their despotic rulers. Forced services were perhaps one of the most grievous impositions, the individual receiving no pay. The service might be compounded for by a grain payment, equivalent to about three rupees per head. The Raja bought the grain from his subjects at his own price. There was a house tax also paid partly in grain and partly in cash, averaging about a rupee for each domicile. The tax to support the Raja's band and drums of state was from one rupee up to two according to the ability and wealth of the inmates. House timber and thatching were supplied by the people to the Chiefs. The Ryots were bound to supply gunpowder of their own manufacture to the Chiefs. Betel leaf [was] also supplied gratis. The Rajah's elephants were kept and fed at the ryots' expense. Debtors were dragged along with their families by the creditors at once to their houses, and if unable to pay they were kept as slaves and a fee of two dollars was paid to the Raja. If any of the Raja's slaves killed a ryot nothing was said. If a ryot, on the contrary, killed one of the Raja's slaves, he and his family became slaves to the Raja. Fines were fertile sources of oppression. Persons stealing the Raja's cattle were made slaves, as were persons indebted to the Raja's mercantile agent. The ryots had to supply provisions to the Raja or any of his officers and their followers who were attending the mosque on particular occasions. Sireh or betel growers paid a monthly tax of produce to the Chiefs.
The people had to perform warlike services by sea and by land, both on account of the Rajah and as Siamese subjects in the armies of Siam. On these occasions each ryot had to carry ten guntongs of rice along with him, and when that was expended the Raja supplied provisions, but no pay. If any one resisted the order to serve he was killed.

End of Part I.

(Signed) James Low.

Province Wellesley.
20th April 1837.

N.B.—Several amendments and corrections of the original have been now made by me.
To the Honble S. G. Bonham Esquire
Governor of Prince of Wales Island
Singapore and Malacca.

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a letter requiring for the Right Honble. the Governor General in council a second copy of my Retrospect of British Policy in the Straits of Malacca &ca.

I request now to forward to you another copy, and at the same time to mention that I have availed myself of this occasion and have brought up the narrative to the present day.

In my reply to your letter respecting Twanku Mahomed Saad, and also the Political Account I have noticed the acts of that person subsequently as well as previous to his expulsion from his usurped authority and position in Keddah.

I should hope that the disputed point of the entire political dependence of Keddah on Siam, on which the whole of the Keddah question hinges, will have been satisfactorily proved by the Malayan History of Keddah alone, which I quoted largely in the 1st part of my Political Account. Of this History there are I believe only two copies extant, owing to the disturbances in that country. The one is in the possession of the Ex Rajah and the other is in my possession, having been given to me as I formerly stated by the Ex Rajah himself.

This last fact is the best proof of the authenticity of that History and of its being considered by the parties the most interested in its tendency as the Expositor of the Political Condition of Keddah.

I have &ca.

(Signed) James Low, Major.

Singapore,
26th April 1842.
NOTE.

On pages 72, 73 and 74 originally appeared the Contents of Part II., but this index was found to be very incomplete and these pages have consequently been omitted. An Index to the whole publication will be issued later on.
Part II.
A Retrospect of British Policy
in
The Straits of Malacca
from the period of the First Establishment
of Penang on the 17th of July 1786 up to
April 1842
Combining Historical Details Respecting the
Straits Settlements
and the
Neighbouring Native States.
By Major James Low
46th Regt. Madras N. I.

Chapter 1st.

In 1785 Captain James Scott of the country
Merchant Service suggested to the Supreme Government
the expediency of securing some favourable position
to the Eastward for the purpose of counteracting
the exclusive contract system of the Dutch, and giving
to the British trade a chance of participating in the
commerce of the Archipelago (a).

(a). In 1783 the Dutch sent all their disposable forces
to attack the Rajah of Rhio because he favoured all the
numerous British merchants who resorted to his port for
the purchase of pepper and gold dust. But they found it
no easy task to punish the Raja for "this great crime".
After having blockaded the place for several months they
attempted to force their way into the river, but were repulsed
and forced to return to Malacca, with the loss of their
Commodore, a Civilian, and a ship of 500 tons burden,
which blew up, killing 500 men on board of her. Other
vessels were also damaged.

The Bugis Prahuus under the command of Raja Haji,
who had settled at Rhio, having been joined by the Rajah of
Salengore went by sea and blockaded Malacca and forced the
Dutch within their lines, but fresh troops arrived in 1784
from Batavia who stormed the Raja’s compound, killed about
400 of the Rhio people, the remainder fled. The Dutch
then proceeded to Salengore which they found deserted.
The Dutch had some time previously requested assistance
from the Rajas of Kedah and Tringanoo. The former
excused himself on account of a war in Patani, the latter
Martaban Coast.

But other advantages which will be noted hereafter were expected to be derived from the measure. Mr. Scott proposed Salang (Junkceylon) as a good station, but this was impolitic. At this period the Burmans held the Tenasserim Coast from Martaban to Mergui. Thus the Siamese were shut out from the coast and were forced to find an outlet through Junk Ceylon. The exports of [? Siam] were then about 5,000 piculs of tin, some amber, wax and ivory.

Indo-Chinese.

But Mr. Scott advanced a very untenable reason for occupying the territory of a country without the permission of its governor. He observed that waste countries are to them, the Indo-Chinese nations, of no value, and as they have plenty [of] waste land and jungle, as improvements do not enter into their calculations, they have no inducement therefore to dispute possession. Now the fact is that these people are most tenacious of territorial boundaries.

joined them. In 1784 the Dutch sent a ship to the Raja of Kedah for a supply of rice and to deliver a letter to the Raja. The officers who delivered the letter, peremptorily, at the first audience, told the king "to give him two young women, and strange to say this demand was immediately complied with," through fear. In the same year the Raja of Selangor sent a party to Perak to massacre the Dutch garrison, but the attempt did not fully succeed, only the Commander and a sentinel having been wounded on the side of the Dutch, the latter (the Dutch) having fled after an engagement in which they killed some Bugis men and retreated to Malacca with the loss of all their stores and ammunition. Soon after, the Dutch having established a footing at Rho, they built a fort there. This occupation was felt as a bar to the English trade with the people from Borneo, the Moluccas and Celebes, and even the Philippines, since all these had then no established emporium to revert to for the purpose. From May to October the passage from the Coromandel Coast to Penang is made in ten days and the return passage in about 15 days to 20 days in the same season. From November to April the passage from Penang to the Coromandel Coast takes about ten days and the return from any part of the Coast to the Northward of Masulipatam is made in about the same time.
The Birds Nest Islands in the vicinity of Junk Ceylon yielded about 16,000 Dollars worth of produce and the tax was 5,000 Dollars. A rich pearl fishery was worked about 1785 at Pulo Matra near Pulo Tellibon by a Chulliah from the Gulf of Mawar, but was given up owing to the oppression of the Native Chiefs.

1786. The Raja of Kednah wrote to the Governor General in this year stating that he had conferred the honorary title of Deva Raja on Captain Light(a), who had informed him that the English wished to possess Penang,(b) adding that "he had directed that "the flag of the Honorable Company should be hoisted on the Island in order that it might become a "trading port, and one where Ships of War might "obtain refreshments."(c) He conveyed also the Raja's sentiments regarding Siam, and he observed that he understood that his alliance with the Company was to prove also a shield to him against the attacks or demands of that power. Captain Light undoubtedly committed himself by unauthorizedly leading the Raja then to consider that his alliance with the Company was in some measure at least both offensive and defensive.

(a). Captain Light was also complimented by the Siamese King with the title of "Phra."

(b). Penang, long before its cession to the British, was famed for the quantities of fish in its vicinity. The fisheries attracted Malays from a distance. The inhabitants about 1750 were pirates, and it is said amounted to 3000 people. There were therefore no antiquities to boast of there. Fish are abundant enough now to confirm this statement.

(c). The popular belief and [ one ] which has been followed by Captain Begbie and Lieut. Newbold and the authors of Gazettes is that Captain Light received the Island as a dower from the Raja when he bestowed his daughter on the former in marriage. Such was not the fact, and anyhow the case would have been a very improbable one, since the Kednah Raja was a Mussulman. Captain Light was presented by the Raja with one of the female Maids of Honor of his wife, Tong Dee, a Siamese by birth.
From many circumstances it should seem that the Raja at first was eager for the alliance under almost any form, as he felt that it would at least be a check on the Siamese (a), and events confirm this judgment, for up to the expulsion of the present Ex-Raja from Kednah in 1829, the Siamese had evidently found that alliance to be a restraint on their plans, and had the Raja not presumed too far on its moral influence by leagueing with the Burmese and giving unnecessary umbrage in other matters to the latter nation since, he might still have been in possession as Governor of Kednah. It is even probable that had offence not been given until the termination of the Burmese War the impression made on the Siamese Court by this last event would have caused it to pause before it directed an invasion of Kednah.

In 1784/5 the Siamese sent an army of 15,000 and 150 Prahus and junks to attack Cambodla, but were surprised and defeated, and only one third of the number returned to Siam. Ava joined the Cochinchinese against Siam. A French Bishop went to Siam to try and get up a rebellion there. In January 1826 the Burmans assembled 10,000 men at Kra in Lat: 9.40° North, and on the 8th February following it attacked Salang (Junk Ceylon).

It is singular that the Burmese still tolerate a French Bishop, with subordinates, in Siam, and it is a favorable item in their character.

(a). The Rajah probably thought that once in alliance with the British every thing else he had in prospect would follow, of course. He was aware of the loss which the trade of Kednah would sustain by the cession of Kednah and stipulated accordingly, although in the treaties which secured to him an equivalent for this loss, the footing on which it was given is differently stated.

It was urged as a plea for occupation that a fleet cannot leave the Coromandel Coast station and go to Bombay and be again at its station before the beginning of April, so that an enemy which may have refitted (refitted) at Achin or elsewhere to the eastward will have the bay free to them.
Original Propositions of the then Rajah of Kedda made to the Supreme Government.

1st.

The Company to guard the seas and to be the enemy by sea of the Rajah’s enemies.

Reply.

This Government will always keep an Armed Vessel stationed to guard the Island of Penang and the adjacent Coast of Kedda.

2d.

The Company not to stop any vessel or prah bound to Kedda to trade. Such may proceed either to Penang or Kedda as the traders please.

2d.

Agreed to.

3d.

Opium, tin and rattans to remain monopolies unless the Company agree to pay an equivalent of 30,000 Drs., their average value per annum, for the abolition.

3d.

The Governor General in Council on the part of the English Company will take care that the King of Kedda shall not be a sufferer by an English Settlement being formed on the Island of Penang.

4th.

The Rajah will not be liable for the debts of his Chiefs or people to the Honble. Company’s Agent.

4th.

The King ought to be liable for the debts of his relatives or officers and the creditor of his subjects should have power to seize the persons and property of debtors in Kedda.
5th. Any person in Kedah becoming an enemy to the Rajah to be considered also as an enemy of the Company.

5th. The King's enemies and also capital offenders will not be protected by the Company.

6th. If an enemy comes to attack us by land and we receive assistance from the Honble Company of men, arms or ammunition, the expenses of these will be defrayed by us.

6th. Referred to the Honble. Court of Directors, along with other requests which cannot now be complied with.

It will be seen below* that opium, tin and rattans were the monopoly articles on which the Rajah anticipated loss, and valued these at thirty thousand dollars, which was perhaps an exaggerated amount.

The reply of the Supreme Government to the 3d proposition of the Kedah Rajah, namely that care would be taken that he should not be a loser by the English occupying Penang has by some writers been unaccountably construed to include a guarantee of protection to him against foreign aggression!

That such was not the construction put upon it at the time, either by the Supreme Government or the Rajah himself, is evident from the reply to the demand for protection being in the negative.

But the internal trade and monopolies of Kedah were only "considerably reduced" in value by the cession, not annihilated, so that the equivalent given to the Rajah for them, and which his successor enjoys at this day, or may enjoy, was perhaps far beyond the actual loss. The whole internal Revenue of Kedah in
its most prosperous time did not exceed one lac of rupees, (a) drawn from a population of about 150,000. In several respects the Rajah was a manifest gainer—in the outlet which Penang afforded for agricultural produce, and stock for which he had no ready market before. His external trade suffered indeed considerably, but when it is considered that the British Government were resolved to have a settlement to the eastward in the northern extremity of the Straits, the loss to the trade of Kedah would have been inevitable, should the new Settlement even have not been on any part of the Kedah territory. The Dingdings, for instance, could easily have been obtained from Perak.

The Kedah Rajahs, however, notwithstanding the payment alluded to, had always their profits on tin and rice exported, and of trade at their ports.

1786. At this period the Dutch influence extended from Point Ramania South up to 5° N: Lat: at the Krean, the then boundary betwixt Perak and Kedah, and had the British broken off negotiations with the Rajah that influence would not only have soon pervaded Kedah, but the Rajah might have found that he had, by calling the Dutch to his aid, exchanged that protection which must to a certain extent have followed an alliance with the British, for the subjection into which every Malayan State which had courted Dutch favour has fallen. The French too were at the period alluded to quite prepared to intrigue with the Kedah Rajah for the annoyance of the English. Ava also, as will be afterwards adverted to, had an eye on Kedah with the view of making it a means of annoyance to the Siamese. Setting therefore aside the political question of the mode in which Penang was acquired, it may fairly be urged that amidst so many conflicting and ambitious nations, it was happy for Kedah that she allied herself with

(a). No doubt the revenue under proper management might have been much increased.
the English, and that it would have been so had the terms of that alliance been far less favorable to her. But if there be such a thing as political necessity it was felt then that such might perhaps alone have justified the occupation of Penang.

It will have been seen that the reply of the Supreme Government to the Rajah’s Sixth Proposition was by no means of such a nature as to convince him that the solicited protection against foreign enemies would be afforded.

The Rajah after this reply could not fairly urge any argument against the occupation of Penang.

It was about this period that Captain Light, who had always waived, if he had not quite denied all Siamese claims on Kedah, felt himself constrained to confess thus far, that “the Rajahs of Kedah had ever acknowledged the Siamese as Lords Paramount.” At the same time, having been called upon by the Supreme Government to clearly ascertain that no nation or power beyond Kedah* Kings came originally from Menangkabow in Sumatra, and always had through fear paid homage to the rival nations of Ava and Siam by sending gold and silver trees to each.

When Captain Light went to Kedah to finally arrange about the cession, he found that a change had taken place in the bearing of the Rajah, and that he did not appear to be so satisfied regarding it as he (Captain Light) had expected.

This alteration he ascribed to the Dutch influence which had extended so far as to bribe the Kedah Ministers, and the known request of that nation to be allowed to hoist its flag in Kedah. When a petty Malayan Chief like the Kedah Rajah thus found his friendship and alliance courted by the only three European nations possessing powers on the Coast, at any rate naval powers, and by Ava, the great rival of
Siam, it is not surprising that he should have increased his demands. Captain Light described this Rajah as having been a mere puppet in the hands of his Chiefs. His father was that Mahomed Siva, when Mr. Monckton from Bengal first visited Kedah on a political Mission, and his mother was a slave girl. His illegitimacy was against his accession to the Government, and excited his uncles to dispute his claims.

They leagued with the Rajahs of Perak and Selangore but were unsuccessful, probably through the interference of the Siamese Emperor, who ever gained in power by laying the weaker party under obligations to him. Captain Light represents this Prince as being weak, timid, avaricious and oppressive, and devoid of faith: and that he would not scruple perhaps to sacrifice Penang to Siamese intrigues.

The Rajah in fact was then under the guidance of a Chuliah(a) or Coromandel Coast man, bearing the title of Dattoo Sri Raja, who was interested in having the alliance cemented, but who with the characteristic cunning and cupidity of his class endeavoured to conclude a Jew’s bargain for his master and himself. On a previous occasion when his powers were more stable and he did not anticipate the advantage of having a place of refuge at hand when the evil day should arrive, he scrupled not to cause the Rajah to decline receiving a letter which Captain Forrest had brought for him from the then Governor General, Mr. Hastings. Malayan Princes are in general at this day dependent on these Chuliahis or Jawi Pakans for advice on affairs both of state and of commerce, and the Rajah of Ligor even, has been long in the habit of employing these people as under secretaries, but without trusting them to any great extent.

(a). The Chuliahis are Coromandel men. But most of the people so called and residing at Malayan Courts are the offspring of Coromandel men and Malayan women, and are there called Jawi Pakans.
Before the final arrangements took effect the Rajah asked Captain Light if, in the event of the decision of the Home Government proving unfavorable, he would return to Bengal. To this politic query the latter gentleman did not reply—for an obvious enough reason. But the mere putting of the question shows that the Rajah did not expect that the British force would return whatever the result might be.

Captain Light took possession of Penang on the 17th July 1786. The expedition landed at Point Penaga. A spot of ground was cleared and a flag staff erected. On the 11th of August following a party assembled consisting of the following gentlemen, Captain Wall Honble. Company's Ship Vansittart, Captain Lewin H. C. S. Valantyne with his passengers, besides local government servants. The British flag was then hoisted and the Island was finally and formally taken possession of in the name of His Majesty and for the use of the Honble. the East India Company.

The point of land on which the town and suburbs now stand was, together with the interior, then covered with jungle.

5th Octr. 1786. Captain Light recommended that a force should be sent to defend Kedah against the Siamese and to consist of 3 Native Companies—50 Europeans, 50 Lascars, 1 Bombay cruiser and 2 Calivats. The Kedah Revenue was at this period only 100,000 Rupees, so that the Rajah could not have afforded to pay even a moiety of the expenses of such protection.

The Lancavi Islands had been possessed for a Settlement, but they are steep, rocky and mountainous with little land available for cultivation. Gunong Lava is in parts, it is said, covered with lava, and hot springs abound, so that there was danger from
a volcano again bursting forth. The Islands are also of doubtful salubrity. Besides they also appertain to Keddah. The Andaman Islands, although they had been during seven years under the direction of able men, did not exhibit at the end of that period any thing like colonization, cultivation or commerce.

The climate is a deadly one. Penang had just been occupied when the Dutch invested Salangore with a large Marine force and compelled the Rajah to sign an agreement that he would send all his tin to Malacca.

Novr. 1786. About this time the Siamese overran the Patani Country which had refused to pay the usual homage. The Kedah Rajah was at the same time interdicted by the Siamese from sheltering Patani refugees. Patani was at this period a much more populous province than it is now. From frequent rebellions of its people it has fully experienced the weight of Siamese rule, and it perhaps does not now contain more than 60,000 persons, or about a third of its former population.

The Patani Malays are devoted Mahometans and numbers yearly go on the pilgrimage to Mecca. The natives do not fail to observe with foreigners, that the Haj is a convenient cloak for a hypocrite—a remark the truth of which is confirmed by the generally lax character borne by the Hajis of the Peninsula (a). Patani, it should seem, was early peopled by the Siamese race. If the Kedah Annals are to be relied on, it was settled by a colony from this latter country under a princess, the daughter of Rajah Bodisat, about the year A.D. 1350. This account is confirmed in some measure by the writer Floris, who observes that Patani was governed by Queens, and was

(a). I have found them generally the most forward in every political moment which has occurred in the vicinity of Penang and in Province Wellesley.
conquered by Raja Api or the Black King of Siam in A.D. 1603. The fact is curious as being rather an uncommon one in the history of the Indo-Chinese nations which reject almost invariably female dominion and succession. Ava furnishes an exception or two.

1786. The Rajah of Rhio during this year supplicated the Supreme Government to assist him in regaining his country from the Dutch, and to place him and his people under the British flag. The Rajah of Selangore also sent to make a similar tender.

The Malayan Annals describe the conquest of the Patani country by the Siamese during the reign of the Sultan Mahomed of Malacca, or about A.D. 1460. Before the year 1509, the period of the first advent of the Portuguese at Malacca, it is stated that the Prince who governed was named Raja Soliman or Moslem, and that his capital was called Kotah Meligei.

The conqueror this time was Chow Sri Bangsa a son of the King of Siam. The English had once a factory at Patani which does not appear to have been of much mercantile importance. It is a fruitful grain country, abounds in cattle which it often supplies to Penang, and contains inexhaustible Mines of tin(a).

There are gold mines likewise in the hills which separate it from Kedah and Perak on the West. They are worked at present (1837) to a considerable extent but the produce has not been ascertained.

I found that the direct route to Patani from Province Wellesley would be impracticable to a regular force, which should not be preceded by a large body of pioneers. Up to the mountains, within a day's

(a). In 1833 I visited these mines and perhaps it was the first time that they had been so [visited] by any European, no one having ever before attempted to penetrate into the interior.

J. L.
march of the tin mines of Krah in Patani, the com-
communication is entirely by water (a), although in the
dry season a passage might be effected with difficulty
by cutting down the jungle or clearing the under-
wood. A branch of the Mudah River was ascended
by me with much difficulty in boats not carrying
more than half a cayan. In the season* the smallest
canoes only can ascend. The ascent in the rains is
attended with great danger owing to the rapidity of
the stream, its tortuous course and the impediments
of sunken trees and rocks.

1786. The Burmese who had been instigated by
the French and Cochin Chinese broke into Siam at
several places—one division of their forces entered
Upper Siam, and the other penetrated into the Lower
Provinces of Ligor, Chaiya, Choomphon, Daloong and
Banhae burning and destroying all before them and
murdering the unprepared inhabitants. But these
columns retreated suddenly without any assignable
cause.

The Siamese rallied and put to death a party of
2,000 Burmans who had occupied Ligor. The Siamese
Court then called to account the Rajahs of Kedda,
Pahang and Wingaunoo, for their not having aided
in repelling the Burmans from the dominions of their
Liege Lord. Scarcely had the year passed over before
Captain Light found it politic on the foregoing account
to fortify his position.

The Rajah of Kedda made a timely submission
to the Court of Bangkok, yet it can hardly be doubted
that he had only been making a trial how far his new
alliance would restrain the Siamese. The experiment
however was kept in mind by the latter nation.

22 Jan'y. 1787. The Supreme Government now
acquainted Captain Light in the instructions sent to

(a). The stream for the most of the way is shallow
and narrow, admitting only canoes to pass.
him that a pecuniary compensation would be allowed to the Rajah of Kedah but that the latter must not expect that the British Government would enter into or become a party in his disputes with other Malayan Princes, since such if given would involve the British in disputes with the Burmese and Siamese. "Assistance should therefore be refused to either party and the security of the Island be made the sole object, endeavouring to acquire the respect and secure the good will of the neighbouring States." Captain Light had by the same authority been previously informed that "the countenance of the Company might be offered to the Rajah of Kedah where it would not compromise the honor, credit or troops of the Company." But the Rajah of Kedah, repenting it should seem of his negotiation with the British, represented his case to the very enemy he had been constantly guarding against, the King of Siam, and the latter would probably have leagued with [his] vassal to drive the English out, had he not caught, as we believe, a distant glimpse of British power and felt that the Burmans might coalesce. That the Siamese were aware even then of the strength of the British in a degree at least, is evident from the request they made at this time to Captain Light, that the English should take possession of Mergui, a Province which had been wrested from them by the Burmans. This would, had it been effected, have covered a weak point of the Siamese (?) frontier, and they have since reaped the full advantage they expected from this measure—and much more, for their frontier up to Phra Song Choo (a) is flanked by the friendly British Province of Tenasserim. The treaty which ensued in the war betwixt the British with the Burmese has likewise secured since that event to the Siamese a freedom from Burmese inroad or invasion and promised to ensure the security of her frontier so long as that Treaty

(a). "The Three Pagodas."
shall exist. Siam, therefore, not only without any exertion of her own, but even in spite of a very suspicious policy on her part, towards the British during that war, has gained an immense accession of force. Relieved from the necessity of constant warfare and expensive expeditions, her population has more time to improve her numerous resources, financial and political. Had it not been for this, to her, result of the war—all unmerited as it was by her—Siam would probably ere now have been partitioned out betwixt the Cochin Chinese and Burmese, her two natural enemies, and to one of whom or both she will most likely become in the end a prey. Her neighbours too on the north, the Laos of Che-ung Mai and Lanchang, are ever ready to assert independence. It is impossible that the Court of Bankok should be blind to the nature of her political position.

It will be apparent from what has been noticed that there are no real grades of Siamese society. Below the line of Public Office all are nearly on an equality, and thus under one of the most despotic governments in the world every man may aspire to the highest office of the State. The literature of the Siamese, which is accessible to every rank, and their religion which is based on humanity and is not devoid of sublimity, serve to raise them above the medium ranks of civilization (a).

1797.* At the period of which we are treating the British alliance was courted by most of the Malay Peninsula States, the primary object being to gain protection against the insidious, if not open aims, of Siam. Had the extension of the British power been then desirable a slight effort might have secured it, but neither trade or concealed hostilities of the Dutch (then very influential in the Straits) would

(a). The Asiatic Society of Calcutta did me the honor to print two papers of mine in their Researches, one on the Government and the other on the Literature of the Siamese.
[have] embarrassed or suspended the former, while expensive civil and military establishments would have swallowed up much more than the paltry revenues of the subsidised States.

Achin.

14 Octr. 1787. Among the rest Achin proffered her alliance and friendship, and offered to discard the French. But this alliance would have been accompanied then by inconveniences similar to those just noticed.

The population of Achin was then estimated at about 1,398,000 persons. The Malays have been generally considered to entertain a particular dislike of the French, although this is the nation which has the least interference with them. In other parts of the East the French are sometimes liked because they mix more than other Europeans with the people. The remark does not seem however to apply to Algiers. Perhaps the French character has altered since they were in the Straits. In a subsequent chapter I will describe the British relations which existed with Achin.

Keddah Politics.

The proposition which was made at this period by Captain Light that protection should be publicly promised to the Rajah of Keddah was not complied with by the Supreme Government. Keddah then paid to Siam the yearly tribute of gold and silver flowers, besides feudal services, including supplies for troops, and Captain Light was apprehensive that if the Rajah's wishes were not complied with he might call in the aid of his Liege Lord (the Emperor of Siam) to expel the British.

1788. The Supreme Government in this year empowered Captain Light to arrange with the Rajah for an annual payment to him of a sum not exceeding 10,000 Sp: Drs.* No direct protection was to be offered but such countenance as should not involve the the Company in military operations against any Eastern Prince, or compromise the honor or credit of the Company.”
The Rajah of Kedddah was called upon about this time by the Siamese for a contingent of troops to aid in attacking the Burmese at Pegue, and Kedddah was threatened with destruction in case of a refusal to comply with the requisition. Compliance was indeed a duty on the part of the province (a), and they applied very modestly to Captain Light for 200 barrels of gunpowder 2,000 muskets and 500 blunderbusses, offering to pay for them, when it should suit him of course. The request was denied.

I cannot help here noticing that at the period alluded to, and up to one much later, the distresses of Kedddah did not call to her rescue any of the kindred tribes of the Straits. It was not until bigoted Arabs, lying and cowardly Chuliah and Hadjis, and interested Chinese, backed by an ill informed and radical local press had sounded the tocsin of war against the infidel, that the right of Siam to interfere in Kedddah affairs was questioned.

1788. The Rajah of Tringanoo, a country lying on the eastern coast of the Peninsula of Malacca, solicited an alliance with the British. His envoys offered to deliver 6,000 piculs of pepper yearly in exchange for opium at 25 piculs the chest, which might have been equivalent then to perhaps 250 Dollars per chest. The Rajah in reply was told by the Supreme Government to submit quietly to the Dutch, and a similar reply was given to the application of the Rajah of Rhio.

The Malays were at this period bent on expelling the Dutch from the Straits. They had eighty war prahu in the Straits of Singapore and Lahore, and another large fleet in the Straits of Dryou, but single handed they could not cope with the Dutch, and the British did not enter the lists on either side.

(a). Such feudal and other services, with supplies for troops, being the great revenue paid to Siam by Kedddah.
1788. It may be deemed to be rather a singular fact that the Siamese had never in any shape publicly protested against the occupancy of Penang by the English, but in the above year the French Padre at Siam reported that they were much annoyed at the cession and had willingly received an overture from the Rajah of Kedah to obtain aid from them in an endeavour to expel the English. They, however, but long subsequently to this period and during the Government of Mr. Phillips, advanced a claim to the sum which had been annually paid to the Rajah before his expulsion from Kedah.

The Rajah at this time (1788) too, and while actually it should seem intriguing with the Siamese for the purpose alluded to, proposed through his Ministers to Captain Light that the British should attack the Siamese Province of Ligor, while that people were on a distant expedition. The proposition was at once rejected. As a proof that whatever the Siamese might have felt they were duly impressed with a sense of British power, it may be remarked that in the same year the Emperor of Siam sent a flowery and most adulatory letter, couched in the most amicable style, to the Superintendent of Penang.

It was perhaps however imprudent, under the then existing state of Indian politics, in Captain Light to accept the honorary title of Sri Deva Rajah bestowed on him by the then Emperor, since it might possibly have been brought up afterwards as an acknowledgment of Siamese supremacy, or considered or construed as a pretty direct admission on the part of Siam that the occupation of Penang by the British was not inconsistent with her position in regard to Kedah. It amounted at least to a tacit recognition of the occupancy, and might have been fairly used afterwards as an argument against any objections which the Siamese might have chosen to urge on that point.
The Island had been ceded and taken final possession of, yet no compensation to the Rajah had yet been agreed on. The latter still hoping to overcome the aversion of the British to forming an offensive and defensive alliance with him, refused two offers made to him by Captain Light, the one of 10,000 dollars for seven or eight years, the other of 4,000 Spanish Dollars for so long as the Company should retain possession of Penang, and he continued deaf to the parrying, although to a certain extent good argument, that the mere fact of his being in alliance with the British would, when publicly known, prove a safeguard to him against his enemies. The Rajah nevertheless insisted that Captain Light had promised him assistance in arms and men. It is true that this gentleman did on his own responsibility assert in a letter addressed to the Rajah several years before (5th October 1785) that he would assist him if distressed in his expected troubles with the Siamese and Burmese, but the kind of aid was not specified, and the coupling of the two nations together shews plainly that he thereby meant mediation. The Rajah finding that no direct aid would be given to him hoped to stimulate the latter (Captain Light) by courting the alliance of some other but less scrupulous European power, and he accordingly made separate overtures to the French authorities at Pondicherry, and to the Dutch. It does not appear that the former met his advances with alacrity, but the latter permitted them with avidity, received the Rajah's letter with great pomp, and no doubt hoped by a grand stroke of policy to exclude the British for ever from the Straits of Malacca.

A Dutch frigate was dispatched to Kedah, and two other cruisers of the same nature actually anchored off Penang harbour, and there interfered with the trade of the infant settlement.

The visit of the frigate was followed immediately by the Rajah laying an embargo on rice and
supplies exported to Penang. The experiment of the Rajah did not change the resolution of the Superintendent of Penang. The Dutch found most likely that the benefits to be expected would be more than counterbalanced by the trouble and expense of sustaining the attacks of Siam on Kedah, and their visits were no doubt marked by their usual grasping spirit, for the Rajah removed the embargo, and broke off negotiations with them. The Rajah had now in fact thrown off the mask and Captain Light was obliged to report that "he had not sent for any money or opium and was very much irritated against him for not complying with his (the Rajah's) demands."(a)*

The position of the Rajah was thus altered—he had finally ceded the Island and allowed it to be occupied, and he had placed himself in a hostile attitude in respect to its occupiers on the ground that Captain Light had not fulfilled his promises of assisting him against the Siamese. But the Rajah knew well that such promises, vague as they must have been, had not been ratified by the Supreme Government, or even recognized by it, and it can scarcely be doubted that he made an improvident cession, and then repenting of it took hold of any plea for recovering lost ground.

His next attempt betrayed the rashness of the Malay, and gave to the English a strong plea for treating him afterwards as a concealed enemy. This was the Malayan League.

In December 1790 a Malayan fleet arrived at Penang. It consisted of four hundred large and small prahus carrying one hundred and twenty pieces of Ordnance of from 6 to 12 lbs. calibre, besides small arms, and the number of men was estimated at 8,000. Besides this force there was one sent from Kedah by land of nearly the same strength.

(a). Sangora was plundered during the year by the Taloon fleet.
The fleet of prahus had been fitted out by the Rajahs and Chiefs of Tringanoo, Rambow, Siae, Sooloo, Lingii, Johore, Indragiri, Cota Carang and Siantan. With this armament the Malays vainly imagined they could expel both the English and Dutch from the Straits, but it will be seen that Malayan prowess had woefully degenerated since the era when the Portuguese held Malacca.

It does not appear from the records of Penang at the period when these events took place, that the Rajah of Kedhah had summoned the forces described to his aid, but there can be little doubt that he did so, and at any rate he took full advantage of their presence.

When however the combined flotilla had been beaten off from Perak in an attack they had made on the Dutch Settlement there, and had been refused permission by the Superintendent at Penang to pass northward through the harbour, the Rajah of Kedhah sent an officer to the Commander, who was a Lamoon man, with instructions to offer twenty thousand dollars to him if he would attack and destroy Penang during the night. At the same time the Rajah pledged himself that should he prove unsuccessful, he would cooperate with the fleet in besieging Penang. (a)

It would appear that the offer was accepted, but that the attack which was to have taken place on the night of the 25th had been frustrated by a difference of opinion as to the mode of it having arisen amongst the Chiefs of the fleet. The latter now sailed to Kedhah and all communication with that port was cut off and Mr. Scott, who was dispatched to Kedhah to gain intelligence, learned that the Malays avowed their intention to destroy Penang.

(a). Eighteen large piratical prahus having large guns and 30 boats came to Pulo Kra but were forced off by a schooner.
Things continued in this state during nearly two months, the Rajah evidently trusting to gain his objects by intimidation, and Captain Light continuing to express to the Supreme Government that he saw no danger from the Company avowing him (the Rajah) to be under its protection. The Rajah also seized about 30,000 Dollars worth of property belonging to merchants in Penang, and he asked of Captain Light that ten thousand Dollars should be paid him yearly by the Company, that the Company should defend the sea coast at their own expense, and furnish to him men and the munitions of war and the loan of cash when required. The men and warlike stores were to be paid for. Provisions, he conditioned, would be supplied to Penang at a fair price. The Island of Penang at this times depended on Kedah chiefly for supplies of cattle, rice and poultry. Considerable distress therefore prevailed on account of the deprivation alluded to. The Malays hovered about in prahus carrying a six or nine lb. gun each, while the French were suspected of aiming at the establishing a factory in Kedah. Specie was exhausted and a war seemed pending betwixt Britain and France. Such being, in Captain Light’s opinion, a critical state of affairs, he advanced ten thousand dollars to the Kedah Rajah, which it will be seen, and as might have been expected, only served to convince the latter that his plan of intimidation was the one best calculated to gain his object. The future existence therefore of the British in the Straits was to depend not on the boasted and long handed generosity and friendship of the Raja, which had been better expressed by the terms sordid, mis-calculating self interest, but on sheer physical and political strength.

The Supreme Government again acquainted Captain Light that if indeed, as he wished to make it appear, it were absolutely necessary to concede to the Rajah’s third demand even to the extent recommended
by Captain Light (namely reasonable assistance when proper application should have been made and the necessity of the case made apparent) in order to come to a final adjustment with him, then such an adjustment cannot now be made, whatever be the consequences.

'Captain Light was authorized to offer 10,000 dollars per annum for so long as the English retained possession of the Island. The Rajah's conduct did not deserve the epithet bestowed on it by Captain Light of perjurious because he (the Rajah) had as yet been a sufferer by the cession of the Island: and he might have been strongly tempted from other quarters to attempt its recovery. Captain Light was not therefore to distress the Rajah by war or otherwise.'

This human forbearance was however requited by the Rajah in a manner which to some minds would have furnished a plea for a less scrupulous behaviour towards him.

On the 19th day of April 1791 a fleet of twenty Lanoon boats entered the Pry, which is a deep creek or River in Province Wellesley, lying on the mainland nearly opposite to the town of Penang. The width of the channel from the Island to the opposite beach is about 2½ miles. About 9 O'Clock of the same day the Bandahara or General of Kedah joined with 90 boats, while a land force was also collected. Entrenchments (still visible) were immediately thrown up [on] Pry point. On the 23rd. most of the merchant vessels which were lying in Penang harbour set sail, and the inhabitants asked leave to attack the enemy.

Captain Light, still following up his former policy, sent 5,000 Spanish dollars to the Kedah General, intimating that it was part of the yearly payment, but this offer produced no effect. The enemy now intrigued with the Malays in Penang,
betwixt Captain Light on the part of the British and the Rajah. As if to show the justness of the estimate which had been formed of Kedah politics, the Rajah in 1792 wantonly involved himself in a quarrel with Siam, by aiding and countenancing an attack which was made on the Siamese Provinces of Daloang and Sangora by the Malay Sheikh Abdullah Sainat. This man had collected 400 Hajis of Kedah, and 3,000 Patani Malays and had plundered and destroyed several villages in these districts, but the force was surrounded and defeated by the troops of Siam. The consequence of this quarrel was that the Island of Penang lost the advantage for a while of the stipulations of the 2d Article of the Treaty. Her position in regard to the British, rather than the timely concessions made by her, probably saved Kedah this time. But the circumstance shows [to] what lengths the Rajah would certainly have [gone] had the British support against the Siamese power been guaranteed to him.

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The Home Government in the mean time had resolved that no offensive and defensive alliance should be made with the Rajah of Keddah.

Affairs at Penang now advanced in a smoother current. Captain Light died about the latter part of 1794 and was succeeded by Major Kyd temporarily.

Although the acts of Captain Light did not evince apprehensive and forecasting views, there can be no doubt that he was a man of sound sense and judgment, and that he was cool, practical, moderate and active. His choice of Penang in preference to the Andaman Islands, which had been strongly recommended in other quarters for a settlement, evinces his local knowledge and tact. The Andamans had been placed, during seven successive years, under the direction of able men, and no expense had been spared to strengthen them in their infancy, yet none of the advantages expected from them had been realized, and they were abandoned. Penang on the contrary, as Singapore has since done, and as other positions for entrepôts of trade may perhaps yet do in the China Seas and the Eastern Islands, rose rapidly and almost of its own accord into importance(a). Mr. Manningston

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promising them their lives and a share of the plunder if they would assist in its capture.

On the 9th the enemy sent a declaration of war, in which it was stated that in regard to Kedah the English had promised much but had performed nothing. The head Malay was at the same time ordered to drive the English out of Penang.

The strong arm now took the place of fruitless negotiation. Captains Light and Glass fitted out some gun boats to act along with three small vessels, one of which was a Chinese.

At 4 O’Clock A.M. on the 12th Captain Glass landed on the opposite coast (now Province Wellesley) with one Company of Golundaza, two Companies of Bengal Sepoys and twenty Europeans—and four gunboats kept close along the shore. The enemy were taken by surprise and after some show of resistance were driven out of their stockades. The vessels and gunboats under Lieutts. Raban and Milne attacked at daybreak the enemy’s fleet now mustering about two hundred prahns, and after sustaining a heavy fire for some time, compelled it to retire out of sight to the southward of the Island.

On the 14th the fleet again appeared. The gunboats and a punt, having an 18 lb. gun in its bow, were again sent against the enemy who were beaten off with great loss and followed up for four miles. Thus the steady discipline of about four hundred troops of all arms enabled them speedily to triumph over a force estimated at betwixt eight thousand and ten thousand men. The lesson has not been thrown away for no expedition of the sort has since been got up by the Malayan States, which have generally contended themselves by resisting the aggressions of the Dutch and this with no despicable degree of vigour, and by encouraging the growth of piracy. The late Naning war will not be an exception, being a local defection merely, in
which the nearest States hardly took any, and that but a feeble share. In the whole of this attack on Penang only four men were killed on the British side, and twenty one were wounded.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Rajah of Ked-dah's own orders for the attack was in the hands of the Superintendent, His Highness deemed it the only course left to him to deny all participation in the affair.

Yet his own prahu remained blocked up in the Pry River as a proof of his insincerity! Captain Light did not push matters to further extremity but tacitly admitted the Raja's plea in order that a final arrangement might be more speedily effected.

But the Supreme Government having seen the danger of allowing the Malays to rendezvous at Pry "prohibited the Rajah from building any Fort there," and it was thus the recollection of the annoyance Penang had sustained, joined to the desire to render that Island independent of Ked-dah for supplies, which eventually led to the obtaining the Pry District with some adjoining ones, as a cession from the Rajah, and had the tract in question, now comprised in Province Wellesley, been properly settled when it had been ceded the advantages now derived from it might have been available to a considerable extent twenty years ago, if not before. The Ked-dah Rajah now asked an annual compensation of 10,000 Dollars, which the Supreme Government afterwards complied with, at the same time declaring it to be the ultimatum under any circumstances. But 6,000 Dollars were given in the first instance annually.

On the 1st May 1791 a Treaty (a) was concluded

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succeeded Major Kyd (October 1794), and soon after (November 1795) Mr. Pigou took the place of the former.

We have now to notice an occurrence on which the conduct of the Raja of Kedah was such as to have justified the British in not only withdrawing from him their friendship but in holding possession of the Island without paying one dollar in compensation.

In 1796 the French fleets were cruizing in the Indian Seas. When the Raja of Kedah learned that they were approaching the Straits, his hope revived of making them his instruments for expelling the English. So eager was he to effect his object that before he could have arranged any thing with the French Admiral he shut the Port of Kedah against Penang. The Rajah was calmly remonstrated with regarding this sudden breach of a treaty which had now existed for five years. The Rajah replied that the terms were too hard, but he would send a vakeel to explain the 2d Article, and to arrange about a new treaty. The Superintendent termed this conduct “Artillery,” yet if it be fairly viewed the epithet would seem to be overstrained. The Rajah’s former behaviour ought to have made it plain that he entered into the treaty because he could not well avoid doing so, after having in advantage to the revenue and the general prosperity. Short tenures, modified tenures with arbitrary clauses, leases of grants in perpetuity, have all been resorted to. Major McDonald and others would have restricted the descent of lands, belonging to Europeans, to their lineal descendants and have debarrèd them the privilege of leaving it by will. It does appear that whatever prosperity may now be apparent in the Island and Province Wellesley has been almost solely owing to the largest portion of the lands having been in perpetuity

(a). It may seem strange that the relations betwixt the British and the Kedah country, bearing reference to Siam, should be the most absorbing subjects for chronology, with the exception of tr. ds which this paper does not embrace. Such is the fact.
a manner pledged himself to it; that he did so with the full intention of breaking the treaty at the first convenient occasion; and that instead of being villainous or treacherous, he had only done that which the British Government might have expected of him, and which in fact under similar circumstances any Native Prince would be ever ready to do when he should think he had made a bad bargain. The Raja certainly merited the negative praise of having taken few pains to conceal his enmity. Necessity, that arbiter to whom nations as well as individuals must bow, rendered it impossible with safety to the British who were then fast gaining ascendency in the Indian Ocean to enter into territorial wars in support of the Rajah of Kedah, while the latter was not enlightened enough [? to perceive] that an insecure and hasty league with the French or Dutch would have hastened his ruin by leaving him in the end in the hands of the enraged Siamese or that the mere absence of the British would have led to the same result, while the Dutch would have occupied Kedah without remunerating him for it.

The Rajah's pretensions now rose rapidly and a faction in Penang, headed it should seem by two English merchants (Messrs Roebuck and Young) then intrigued with Kedah by reports of dark designs.* One of these last singularly enough, combined with a circumstance which was found on enquiry to be correct, that no two European gentlemen slept in one house.*

1797. In the midst of these reports the Khug Minister arrived from Kedah bearing a letter from the Rajah to the Superintendent which he was to deliver on the following conditions only.

The principal servants of the Company were to go down to receive it and it was to be carried on a silver salver under an umbrella. The bearer of it was to
be conveyed in a carriage and the same honors were required to be paid to him as the High Admiral of Keddah was entitled to. The Arms of the deputation were not to be deposited as usual at the Custom House but to be worn publicly.

Such novel demands were resisted. The Chuliah or Khug would not disarm his party and it became requisite to humble him by placing a guard boat alongside of his prahu. This man then exhibited the prominent trait of his tribe, abjectness following arrogance. He carried the letter himself to the Superintendent, his followers being unaccused.*

This mighty packet contained merely a request to be paid an instalment of the compensation due to the Raja. The payment was refused until the Rajah should have adequately explained the cause of such unusual behaviour in his deputies. Messrs. Roebuck and Young meanwhile, being supported by the countenance of Messrs. Lindsay, Scott and others, screenend from justice another Chuliah, who had defied Port Regulations and who had been found intriguing at Keddah. The example of insubordination being thus set by the European settlers, it was speedily imitated by the Chinese and other classes of natives in Penang, while to crown all the harbour was infested by pirates.

The Chinese are generally considered to be a peaceable race in the countries to which they have emigrated, yet several examples to the contrary are not wanting in the History of European settlements to the Eastward.

In their country they are notoriously prone to turbulence and probably they have good cause to be so. But they find such ample room in foreign colonies for the exercise of their industrious habits that the more congenial pursuit of gain serves greatly to check ambitious impulse.
They are a time-serving people, and unlike the Indo-Chinese tribes around them, they seem to be very deficient in imagination, and therefore less disposed than these are to give way to theoretical political impulses. Their understandings are pretty sure guides to their true interests, and they perceive at a glance that the latter and any assumption of political power in the countries where they have settled are things quite at variance with each other. But unwilling as they may be to turn Rulers, where nothing could be obtained to be put in competition with their mercantile gains, they do not seem at all averse to intrigue with one of two contending parties, or even with both, so that whatever be the result their interests may continue unaffected. It need not be added that the real leaning in such a case will be to the stronger party, although the weaker will be cajoled by promises and awed by supplies and arms, the sale of which at high profits they can easily effect. I have had personal opportunities of knowing this to be true. Keeping these traits in view as checks to an over confidence in Chinese political fidelity, it may be safely pronounced that as settlers they are sometimes eminently valuable in new countries on account of their unceasing and well directed industry, their enterprise as traders, their luxurious habits which swell the revenue by the consumption of taxable commodities, and lastly perhaps because their physical powers of endurance exceed those possessed by the Malays and other Indo-Chinese people.

5th Sept. 1799. The Rajah of Kedah died in the summer of this year, and was succeeded by his brother (Chow Wang)\(^{(a)}\) of Purlis who, two years subsequently, gave up the Government to his nephew Chow Pangeram\(^{(b)}\).

\(^{(a)}\) A Siamese title signifying Lord of the Fort.

\(^{(b)}\) The present Ex-Raja, who received the above title from the Emperor of Siam when the latter bestowed on him the Government of Kedah.
The deceased Rajah's conduct having been such as to prevent the Superintendent sending him any compensation for the two years preceding this period up to 1800, the European Settlers at Penang had exhibited much turbulence of character.

The Earl of Mornington in this year appointed Sir George Leith to be Lieutenant Governor of Penang and Mr. Phillips was nominated to be his secretary. Mr. Dickens was appointed Judge.

Up to this period there seems to have been little or no intercourse betwixt Penang and the Tenasserim Coast. This last was then frequented by French privateers and frigates for the purpose of refitting, and not being there molested by British vessels of war it was found convenient by the French Commanders to carry in to that coast such English prizes as they made in the Bay. Mergui, from its sheltered and secluded harbour, was preferred to Tavoy River.

But the whole of that coast had, from time immemorial, been contended for by the Siamese and Burmans, and the latter, although in possession, did not feel quite secure in it. The Chief of Mergui was not long in appreciating the true position of the British, and very sagaciously tried to penetrate into the Lieutenant Governor's future views by speciously offering to put the "Company in possession of Kednah and the Lancavy Islands if it was desired?" The Burmans would long before this time have taken both, had they been able, for themselves, and their object was to have the British as allies against Siam. This polite and rather absurd offer was of course rejected.

In July 1800 Sir George Leith obtained from the then Rajah of Kednah for the sum of two thousand Spanish dollars a cession of a tract of land lying on the continent opposite to Penang. It was taken possession of, and the British colours were hoisted in it
after a regular salute on the 17th July of the same year and it received the name of Point Wellesley, which was subsequently changed to Province Wellesley, both names having been given in honour of the Marquess Wellesley. The motives for this acquisition were these. It strengthened the position of Penang on its flanks, and gave the English the entire command of the harbour. It also checked the resort of pirates to the harbour, and prevented the coast being a safe asylum to every offender who might escape from Penang.

It held out the prospect, since realized, of rendering Penang independent of Kedah for supplies, and it offered a place of refuge to any oppressed races in the vicinity.

As I have fully described the present condition of this fertile tract of country in a late work (a) it would be unnecessary to enlarge further regarding it in this place. But a few observations are required regarding its boundaries.

The Honble. Colonel Bannerman when Governor, and just before the Rajah was expelled from his country in 1821, sent to the latter to try and obtain an advanced boundary up to the north bank of Marbow River on the north, but without effect.

The Honble. Mr. Fullerton, contemplating the retention of Kedah by the Siamese, was of opinion that an accession of territory as stated by Mr. Crawford might be advantageous (up to the mountains) by interposing a greater portion of hill and forest between us and the Siamese. Great no doubt would be the advantage of some extension. The experience of twenty years however has shown that while our relations with Siam continue as they are, extension

(a). A Dissertation on Penang and Province Wellesley, Singapore and Malacca by Captain James Low.
would not be so advantageous as above stated. It would only remove the evils which exist, and which would under any circumstances exist, to a greater distance. But to countervail this advantage, there would be the positive mischiefs of a dispersing locomotive population, requiring larger civil and judicial establishments and a wider frontier to look after. When by the increase of population in Penang and Province Wellesley a large body of the inhabitants will be prepared, if not forced, to emigrate to other countries, it will then become a matter for consideration whether an accession of territory can be obtained. There can be no doubt as to the tract which should be obtained. The boundaries of the Province might then be as follow, North and including Goonong Jerrie, and then East in a direct line to the Patani Pass, from the sea South by the Korow River, or if not, by the Krean, and from the sea by either of these rivers up to the Patani Hills and on the East by the Patani Hills.

[Four pages are here omitted as having no reference to Siam.]

Sir George Leith entered into a new treaty with the Raja, which the Supreme Government ratified after remarking "that it should have been submitted in the first instance for approval." An examination of the articles will show that this animadversion was well merited.*

All discussion having thus been brought to a close, the affairs of the new settlement went on more regularly and nothing of deep moment seems to have occurred until the year 1810, when Lord Minto reached Penang with part of the force destined to capture Java from the Dutch. This was the first time

[* The articles of this treaty and Low's comments thereon are here omitted.]
that the advantages of the new position became particularly apparent, not only as regarded supplies but in respect to political and hostile movements in a direction when we had any advanced posts at which to rendezvous troops destined for an attack, or on which such troops, unsuccessful, could easily fall back. The expedition to China has since been the second great event of the same kind to the furtherance of which the Straits Settlements have greatly aided.

The then Rajah of Ked dah did not neglect the opportunity thus offered to inflict on his Lordship a very long recapitulation in writing of all his own former demands, grievances, and alleged Siamese oppressions.

He had in the preceding April addressed a long letter of a similar nature to Mr. Bruce, in which he remarked that the "Ked dah Country being small and situated in the vicinity of the extensive kingdom of Siam it has been the custom from time immemorial to send the tributary presents of golden and silver flowers to Siam once in three years."

The expedition to the Moluccas and Banda took place at this time.

In January 1811 the Ked dah Rajah was required by the Siamese to furnish a contingent of one hundred perfectly equipped and manned boats to assist them against the Barmese. On this occasion he addressed the Government of Prince of Wales Island and observed that "submission to the Siamese is the only mode left to me for preserving peace." He asked also for an advance of 10,000 Spanish Dollars.

About the same period the Emperor of Ava wrote to the Governor stating that in former times the Rajahs of "Puriis and Ked dah did homage to him by presentation of gold and silver flowers and that these countries were considered dependencies of Ava," and
he further requested that the English would assist the Rajah of Keddaah against the Siamese.

This claim on Keddaah was evidently got up through the instrumentality of the Rajah himself, and it does not apper to have had any foundation by right or precedent, yet it is as well that it should be recorded, for the Indo-Chinese nations never absolutely forego claims which they have made, unless by treaty. The Rajah, finding that this ruse failed, tried to work on the feelings and apprehensions of the Governor of Penang by observing that the Siamese are numerous and consider themselves superior to every other people, should they even not attack Penang.* Yet had Keddaah been fairly absorbed into the Siamese Empire at the period or soon after the period at which the Rajah thus expressed himself, the Province would no doubt have been distressed for some ordinary supplies for a season or two, but it is evident that the advantages of increase [of] population and cultivation derived to Penang and Province Wellesley by the subjugation of Keddaah long after, would have been in the case supposed, much earlier realized.

It can scarcely be doubted also that the Siamese would have behaved intemperately after their conquest, owing to the slight knowledge they then had of British power, and that it would have been requisite to have given them a wholesome practical experience of its effects. Such a lesson might have have been a bar to their progress southward. In 1812 Mr. Petrie was appointed Governor. On the 29th July of the same year a great fire destroyed property estimated at five lacs of dollars. In the same month the naval station at Penang was broken up.

In 1813 the Siamese obliged the Rajah of Keddaah to assist them in attacking Perak. This was an un-
provoked and unprincipled aggression, and the Perak people have not forgiven the people of Kedah the part they took in it, although the latter pretended that their co-operation was compulsory. But where plunder was to be had we may doubt of this moderation of sentiment.

At this period the extension of the Siamese power to the southward of Penang was considered by the Supreme Government to be an evil, for it was recorded by the Governor General in Council that "he was by no means indifferent to the Welfare of the territory of Kedah, and would perceive with great regret their subjugation to the Siamese power. His Excellency in Council is no less impressed with the conviction of the undesirable consequences likely to result from the extension of that power to the vicinity of Malacca by the conquest of Perak. The King of Kedah should not renounce his vassalage to Siam. The British Government may mediate in so far as no compromise of its character may be made or any ambitious motive betrayed. The nature and extent of the Rajah's services to Siam may be adjusted by British mediation." Sir George Cooper became Recorder in 1817.

The Perak Chiefs signify about this time [their] desire to be free of Siamese interference.* The population of this territory was then estimated at 10,000 persons.

Colonel Bannerman was appointed Governor.

Colonel Farquhar proposed to settle the Cannion Islands in the Straits.

After a long cessation of intercourse with Siam a communication was at length opened* and the Siamese Court professed its readiness to permit English vessels to trade either at Bankok or Ligor.

Malacca was now transferred to the Dutch under the distinct intimation to them by Major Farquhar that
Nanning was its only dependency. But soon after this they forced the Rajahs of Rhio and Lingin to admit their troops into the former settlement and to permit their colours to fly at Lingin, Pahang and Johore, places where they were never before hoisted. They landed 500 men at Rhio. The Rajah was forced to surrender 1/3rd of his revenue and to give up the management of his trade into their hands. [The Dutch] thus virtually commanded the Straits.

From what has just been quoted it does not appear very obvious on what defensible grounds a request of the Rajah of Kedah was granted by the Penang authorities to the extent of supplying him 100 muskets and twenty barrels of gun powder to prosecute the attack on Perak. The Rajah of Perak, unconscious that any disposition to assist his enemies existed at Penang, addressed the chief authority there.* The letter upheld the character for ignorance which [the] Perak people then had, and which still, although less in degree, attaches itself to them. It contained a request for two ships of war, and two thousand Troops, one half to be Europeans!!

The Raja, a Chief of 20,000 subjects, described himself as “he who holds the Royal Sword, and the dragon stand and the shell fish which come out of the sea which flowed from the Hill of Le Gumtong.” He offered also to sell the Dingding Islands for 2,000 Spanish dollars to any one or to let the Company have them for nothing. The same offer was made to the Envoy, Captain Low, [who] was deputed on a Political Mission to Perak in 1827. These Islands have not been inhabited since the Dutch left or were expelled from Perak, and as the Rajah and his successors have never ventured to occupy them, owing to their being infested by pirates, it is plain that it would be a most beneficial thing for Perak should any English station be formed there, while greater security would be given to the native trade in general.
The Raja likewise offered the monopoly of all the tin and rattans in his country for a yearly sum of 2,000 dollars, which supposing that he considered this a fair equivalent for the tax (of 6 drs. per bhar generally) on tin would admit of a yearly produce of 333 Bhars only. Yet the mines of Perak are very rich, almost inexhaustible.

Reverting to the Perak Rajah, he offered elephants in exchange for gun powder, the former to be valued by the cubit, namely 60 dollars for one 6 feet high or one long cubit, and a large one from 600 to 900 dollars.

These requests were not then attended to, but the Supreme Government subsequently sanctioned the occupation of the Dingding Islands, which however never took place, nor does it appear why the intention to do so was not followed up.

The Fort of Penang was in want of repair and the sum of 50,000 drs. was estimated as the probable cost of repairs.

By an inscription found on the Fort of Malacca before it was demolished it appeared to have been built in 1743. In the beginning of 1819 the Dutch tried to establish a station on the Islands of Pankour or Dingding where they once had settled, but they were now unsuccessful.

The Dutch now prosecuted operations at Perak and Salengore with the view to control these petty States, pretending that the English were their staunch friends. But on their failing to gain their ends the offer of the Rajah of Perak to give up the Island of Pankour to the British was accepted conditionally, but it was never occupied and continued annexed to Perak. The Cholera raged in the Settlement of Prince of Wales Island during about six weeks and the deaths were computed at not less than 1500.
Bishop Middleton visited Penang, he being the first Bishop.

In 1818 the Burmans attacked the Siamese dependency of Junk Ceylon, from which they were shortly after expelled with great slaughter. The Burmese force (if the account given to me by the Tavoy Chiefs soon after the British conquest of Tenasserim be correct) consisted of 10,000 men. The Siamese called on Rajah of Kedah for his contingent of troops on this occasion, and 100 boats manned by about 2,500 men were supplied.

The Raja just before this happened had been asked by the Governor, the Honble. Colonel Bannerman, to cede, for an adequate consideration, a small addition of territory on the Coast and bounding Province Wellesley, in order to secure a better frontier. This request he refused although it would have strengthened his position.

But although I cannot find the letter, it is not the less notorious, that [he] assigned as his reason to the deputation for non-compliance, that Kedah formed part of Siam. Messrs. Cracroft and Caunter were the persons sent to negotiate, and so offensive was the way in which the reply was couched that they left Kedah without waiting for the usual formalities or taking leave of the Rajah. But when he was pressed, as above noticed, by the Siamese, he expressed his fear to the Penang Government, and the latter [? replied that in case he found himself] in danger he would find an asylum in Penang. But this Rajah (the present Ex-King) seems never to have acted on any fixed plan, and at the very moment when only submission could have saved him his conduct was so vacillating as to give umbrage to the Court of Siam. There is every reason to suppose also that he entered secretly into a confederacy headed by the Patani Chiefs for the purpose of ravaging Lower Siam, while
the Siamese troops should be engaged at a distance in operations against the Burmans, for about this time the Raja advanced to the Me Nam or River of Siam and the rivers of Ligor and Chainga. After these movements the confederate troops would be joined by the Burmese. The Cambojan added that his own force (it was no doubt exaggerated) would be forty thousand men, besides Malayan Rajas, his relatives and their followers. He concluded by avowing his inability to contend with Siam.

As this Chief's wishes could not be acceded to, no more was heard of his intentions. Mr. Phillips proposed at this time a Political and Commercial Mission to the Ports of the Burmese Empire.

Mr. Sartorius was deputed in this year to Achin to report on affairs there. He died on his way back of the deadly fever of the Sumatra coast, deeply regretted.

This Mission was undertaken with the view of forming alliances of a commercial nature with the petty Rajas on the east coast of Sumatra, and for the suppression of piracy. The main objects however failed, but as the Honble. Mr. Phillips expressed, not from any deficiency in the means provided for the accomplishment of these objects, nor from any fault of the gentlemen entrusted with the duty. . . .

At length, in January 1821, the Honble. the Governor of Penang acquainted the Raja of Kedah that the Emperor of Siam was preparing to attack him with 6,000 (a) men and that [the] Burmans had declared war with Siam. The Raja was aware of the intended

(a). From the Districts or Provinces of Ligor, Dalong, Chaiva and Sangor, the supplies received by Penang from Kedah at this period were—

- 1,000 Covans of l'addy
- 60,000 Fowls
- 20,000 Ducks

Valued at 80,000 dollars.
attack for he readily replied by the subterfuge that "an epidemic had delayed the tender of the usual gold and silver flowers to Siam," although with the sanction of the Raja of Ligor, and that the Siamese were glad of any pretext to revenge themselves for the occupation of Penang by the English by attacking him. He did not, notwithstanding all this, prepare for the impending event by arming his subjects, and it is probable that he deluded himself with the hope that the Burmese would assist them, while the latter, it may be presumed, had only made promises with the view of creating some diversion of the Siamese forces.

On the 12th November 1821 the Raja of Ligor burst into Kedah with a force of seven thousand men. The Fort at the mouth of the Kedah River was taken on the 18th after a feeble defence, in which the Raja did not participate. He fled on an elephant accompanied by a part of his family, and a few adherents, towards that part of the coast opposite to Penang.

The Raja of Ligor soon acquainted Mr. Phillips with this event, and laid the blame on the Raja who had, he stated, misgoverned Kedah and had been contumacious, that he meditated flight to Siam, and that as a subject [of the] Siamese Government he had behaved in opposition to all former custom. He observed that on a former occasion, when the Raja's father had acted contumaciously, he had been forgiven, because he had repented of his conduct, and had presented himself at Court. Those who know the character of this Chief, now called the Ex-Raja, will be ready to admit that he was just as likely as otherwise to have doggedly and obstinately slighted the Court of Bangkok to his own ruin, although he had been invested with his Government by the Emperor himself.

The Honble. the Governor, Mr. Phillips, dispatched a civil officer, Mr. Cracroft, to assure the Raja
that pending directions from the Supreme Government an asylum was open to him at Penang, as also to his dependents, should he choose to avail himself of it, but under certain conditions. These terms were that neither he or any of his followers should intrigue or commit any political act without the approval of the British Government and that it would be exclusively optional with the Government to regulate the number of persons who should compose his family and suite.

The Raja gladly accepted the offered protection, subject to these conditions. Indeed, had he not done so he must have fallen in a few days after the offer was made into the hands of the Siamese.

The Ex-Rajah's difficulty was afterwards displayed. It is of some importance to note these conditions, for they were not only broken in defiance of the Government by the Raja himself, but seem to have been unaccountably forgotten when they might have been brought forward as good grounds for circumscribing the Raja's limits, instead of resorting to the plea of politic necessity, which last might have been kept in reserve. No sooner did the Raja feel himself safe than he wrote to the Governor claiming protection in all his affairs. He was, it may be remarked, lodged in the old Government House on the beach and was guarded by nearly the whole of the local Corps of Bengal Sepoys (a). This letter of the Raja was the commencement of a series of written requests, demands and petulant remonstrances or appeals (refiled* too commonly in general terms) which have been reiterated periodically up to the present day. Mr. Phillips notwithstanding considerable opposition in his Council decided on neutral measures as consistent with the policy enjoined by the Supreme Government, namely not to encourage the Kedah Raja to

(a). Being in command of this Corps I had daily opportunities of studying the Raja's character.
attempt to release his country from its state of vassalage to Siam. On this occasion the term banditti was by some applied to the Siamese troops, although it was admitted that they had a right to enforce obedience on the Raja.

The Chow Phraya or Rajah of Ligor now addressed the Honble. the Governor by a letter in which he stated that he in conformity with the Emperor's order, had assumed the Government of Kedda, as the Raja had no confidence in Siam and had fled in the consciousness of having committed many faults. "I have (observed the Ligorian) "sent troops in quest of him: if it should be ascertained that the Raja of any country whatever has received and harboured the Raja (a) of Kedda, a large army will be sent to attack it and carry the Raja away by all possible means. He is no longer a Rajah or Governor and the Emperor will appoint a Siamese to be Raja of Kedda. If the Raja flies to Penang let no one hold intercourse with him, let him be seized by the Governor and delivered up to me, for I am now at Kedda which is near to Penang with a large force, and should my friend refuse to deliver up the Raja to me, then friendly relations will be broken and commercial intercourse will cease." He invited Mr. Phillips to go and settle matters amicably at Kedda.

To this vaunting and insolent declaration a firm reply was made which prevented a repetition of it, yet had the British taken the vain-glorious but clever semi-barbarian at his word, and forthwith marched a force against him, he would have had ample cause to repent of his temerity. The Governor calmly replied that it was not customary for the British Government to deny hospitality to an ally and friend, and that confident in its own strength and power it never was in the habit of receiving or using, in its correspon-

(a). Chow Phraya in the original, viz. "Governor."
dence with neighbouring States, any unavailing threats or expressions.

This reply was objected to by the Council as not being strong enough when opposed to direct declaration of war, but it was certainly a dignified and perfectly effective one in the end.

The Rajah had been only a few days in Penang when fifteen Siamese boats stealthily reached the mouth of the Pry river in Province Wellesley. The Ligorian, supposing that the fugitive Rajah was at Kotah up this river, thought to surprise him.

A Jemadar's party, however, of Local Corps, stationed at the Pry mouth turned out to oppose their progress and the Armed Vessel Nautilus then quietly led them out of the harbour and dismissed them. Nearly at the same time a marauding party of Siamese passed the northern boundary of the Province and committed some irregularities, but a Company of Sepoys under Captain Crook forced them back without bloodshed. The Ligorian was warned that such conduct by his people in future would be decidedly noticed.

The Chow Phraya of Ligor, while the terror inspired by his sudden conquest was being spread among the countries to the southward, sent an expedition to Perak (a), which made no resistance to his occupation of it.

Mr. Timmerman Typen, one of the most enlightened official men ever sent out by the Dutch Government, obligingly offered to the Penang Government every aid he could afford for checking Siamese ambition. No doubt, as Malacca was then a Dutch possession, His Excellency did not view the approach of

(a). The Malayan State which is separated from the British territory by the Krean River.
the Siamese to his frontier as an event devoid of danger to that Settlement. The tide of emigration from Kedah now rolled rapidly into Province Wellesley and steps were immediately taken to locate the refugees.

In 1821 (a) Mr. Crawfurd was deputed by the Right Honble. the Governor General to negotiate with Siam for certain commercial arrangements and collaterally to endeavour to effect the restoration of the Rajah of Kedah to his Government. Mr. Phillips, on the arrival of Mr. Crawfurd at Penang, recorded his opinion of the advantages which would be gained by opening the whole trade of the Peninsula; keeping the Siamese at a proper distance and securing supplies from Kedah for Penang, all of which advantages excepting the second (if it really now be one of much moment) have been gained since without Kedah being restored.

Mr. Phillips suggested the good which might be derived by extending Province Wellesley to the limits proposed by Colonel Bannerman.

I have already discussed this subject. With the then scanty population of Province Wellesley, extension was not to be desired to any considerable degree, yet looking to the present condition of the Province, which I have elsewhere described at length, and to the events which the future will inevitably call forth, it is perhaps to be regretted that these proposed.* The Siamese are so tenacious that it might be very difficult, perhaps impossible, without giving a most unequal return for it, to obtain now any further cession of territory.

The Supreme Government in a dispatch to the Penang Government pointed out the future policy to be used towards the Siamese.

(a). In 1821 the Southern Hills of Penang were cleared to a great extent and planted with [coffee], since then, the coffee not proving remunerative, spice trees were substituted.
"The former instructions of this Government regarding the limited degree in which it appeared to be desirable to interfere in favor of the Rajah of Kedah whose dependence on Siam we have recognized, are considered to be still applicable to the present state of affairs, and are to be a rule of conduct for the government of Penang in any political transactions with these States (Kedah and Siam)" and again, "the Ex Rajah will have an Allowance (in place of the gratuity) of 10,000 Spanish dollars."

The uncle of the Ex-King, the Rajah of Purlis, Sultan Sleadin Mokurrum Shah, instigated and deceived, no doubt, if not forced by the Siamese addressed a letter to the Governor of Penang* in which he urged him to advise his nephew to return to Kedah, alleging that the Siamese had forgiven his numerous offences and that he himself (the Rajah of Purlis) was in the mean time exercising the powers of the Kedah Government. This last expression was alone sufficient to excite strong suspicion of the intentions of the Siamese, and the letter was therefore not attended to. This suspicion was turned into certainty, for this same Siamese Pageant soon after wrote to the Governor requesting to have the rent of 10,000 dollars payable by the English for Penang. The Ligorian at the same time wrote to back this demand, and forgetting that he had before affirmed that a Siamese Governor "would be placed over Kedah" he asserted that the old Rajah of Purlis had been installed in the Government. He added that having the Emperor's Orders to arrange every subject connected with Kedah he could not, were he willing to, refrain from this demand. About this time it was reported that the Ligorian had prepared 7,000 men to attack Penang, but the project, if ever it had been seriously entertained, was abandoned. The demand was rejected.

The Honble. Mr. Phillips, the Governor, now gave a guarantee to the Ligorian that so long as the
Ex Raja of Keddah should continue at Penang he
would not be permitted to wage war on the Siamese
nor stores be allowed to go to people fighting against
the Siamese in Keddah.

This promise afterwards became part of one of the
Articles in the Treaty of Bankok. If the Ex Rajah
had been personally enterprizing, this stipulation
might have been attended with vexatious or even
embarrassing results. Vexatious ones only have for-
tunately been experienced. Placed in security he
commenced intriguing with the Burmese, and finding
them willing auxiliaries, in professions at least, he
imagined that the knowledge of this fact would induce
the British Government to espouse his cause. The
Mycoowoon at Tavoy had written to the Rajah to
dispatch envoys to the Emperor to request of him
the assistance of a Burmese Army for the purpose of
recovering his (the Rajah's) lost power. He added
that five thousand men could immediately march from
Tavoy. The Ex Rajah was dissuaded by his own
party, it is supposed, from his rash determination to
enter will* plat. The circumstance is chiefly deserv-
ing of notice here, as it fully discloses the ambitious
aims of the Court of Ava at a time when there can be
hardly a doubt that it meditated that aggression on
the British Power which not long after led to the
Burmese War. The correspondence alluded to, if
known to the Siamese which it probably was(a), could
not fail to make the Ex Rajah's case almost hopeless,
yet with the duplicity so congenial to his disposition,
the Ligorian soon after told Captain Burney, who was
sent to confer with him at Keddah, that he was ready
to receive back the Ex Chief in a manner favorable to
him, and to take him to the Court of Bankok and at
the same time be engaged that no harm should befall
him. The Ex Rajah wisely perhaps distrusted and

(a) His previous intrigues with Ava were known
to that nation (the Siamese).
rejected this proposition and remained in Penang. He could not fail to recollect that the Court of Bangkok never forgets disrespectful conduct shown towards it by any of its Governors, Tributaries or subordinate Chiefs. Much less perhaps could he expect it [to] forgive his own conduct which was tinged with ingratitude. He could not have forgotten that upon the decease of his father, the former Raja, his succession had been disputed by [a] younger brother Bosnou, the latter having been taken to the Siamese Court and presented to the Emperor by the Rajah of Sangora; that much blood had been shed on the occasion(a), and that Tuankee Ibrahim, a Chief of Kedah, had also gone to the Court to solicit the Government and had been warmly seconded by the Rajah of Ligor. He should have remembered that notwithstanding all his intrigues the Emperor installed him in his father’s dignities, but under a solemn pledge that he, the Pangeram(b), should bury all the animosity he might feel against those who had disputed his claims, and he must have remembered that he forfeited this pledge by persecuting these his former opponents; that he gave much trouble in consequence to the Siamese, and finally that by his cruel tyranny, folly and misrule he had given to the Emperor abundant cause to regret his selection of him to be the Chow Phraya Srai or Lord Governor over Kedah. And it would have been well had he considered that these his own acts and the consenting to receive his power from the Siamese Court were fatal to his own claims of independence.

When the Phraya of Ligor heard that Mr. Crawford was on his way to Siam he told Captain Burney that "the Governor of Penang would find that his best course for negotiating with the Court of Siam would

(a). The Siamese alleged that the population of Kedah had lost nearly 20,000 souls.

(b). Chaw Pangeram—the title he received from the Emperor of Siam when installed in the Kedah Government.
be through him, as many of the offices at Court were held by his relatives."

This speech turned out to be vain boast, for the negotiations which afterwards took place both by Mr. Crawford and Captain Burney only rendered the Rajah of Kedda'h's cause more desperate. The truth was, the Chow Phraya of Ligor knew well that the temper of the Court was so adverse to the Raja's claims, that even without him these would be rejected. But he was too practised a dissembler to let it appear that he himself would use whatever influence he might possess, and much he undoubtedly had at Court, to thwart the Rajah of Kedda'h's views, and to get that country into his own management and for the advantage of his own family.

As commonly happens amongst the unthinking part of a community the crimes and faults of an Ex Chief are underlaid by a false compassion and it has even been asked why the private character of a Native Chief should be considered in negotiating with him. It might not be difficult to show that negotiations with Malayan or Indo-Chinese Princes, can only be entered into with a full persuasion on their part of the superior power of the British, accompanied by a determination to stand aloof from its direct effects by exertion of cunning, while the British negotiator cannot fail to be aware that independent of the barbarism of the individual State, and its attendant treachery and cruelty, the only security he has for the performance of obligations must rest principally upon the private character of the then Ruler, and that in despotic countries there is hardly room to draw any distinction between the private and public character of such Ruler. The Burmese and Siamese are unwilling slaves of unflinching and hereditary despotisms [which] are well planned, cautiously worked according to the feelings, fears and superstitions of the mass of the people, so as to just strike the line betwixt
discontent and rebellion, and they are in their way effective for all the ends of Government except one, the happiness, including full security of life and property, of the subject, as opposed to the mere will of the Ruler. The Malays on the other hand are willing slaves under their own despotic Rajahs, and they patiently if not unrepiningly endure every species of tyranny and degradation from them, one half of which oppressions only, were they inflicted upon them by an European Government, would drive them into rebellion, or cause them to emigrate. In fine no preconceived opinions or knowledge of European policy will enable us to gauge and analyse that of an Indo-Chinese region, where manners, feelings, hereditary disposition, physical and moral, are all at variance with such knowledge, where these various wants, either real, or which are the offspring of civilization, and which in colder climes come under or exert but a feeble influence, and where an apparently insuperable chasm is opposed to the advance of humanizing arts and sciences, by the absence of that same necessity.

On this date Mr. Phillips' Minute was written regarding the Sooloo Islands, quoting Sir Stamford Raffles' opinion that the ceded territory in Borneo should be occupied. (a) The Rajah of Calantan a small [?district] on the Gulf of Siam wrote about this time to the Honble. Mr. Phillips the Governor stating that as he could no longer endure the oppressions of the Siamese he wished to give up his country to the Governor of Bengal, and to receive in return one half of the revenues.

But the Supreme Government declined interfering with this State, because it was, like Keaddah, tributary to Siam. Were the revenue of Calantan to be analysed it might perhaps appear that the Raja would have made a good bargain had his offer been accepted,

(a) This proposition was owing to an attack made on the Sea Flower by Pirates.
for it is greatly to be doubted if the whole of the revenues would have defrayed one half of the expense which the occupation, subsidiarily or otherwise, would have entailed."

About this period the Raja of Ligor acquainted the Court of Bangkok that the English and Siamese were at peace and that the Governor General of Bengal had directed the Penang Government to recognise Keddah as a tributary of Siam. Without doubt the Siamese considered this a vital point gained. About this period also a curious circumstance occurred at Siam, which showed at least that the Siamese had not as yet betrayed any want of confidence in their hitherto vaunted importance. Two merchants, Messrs. Storm and Smith, had, it seemed, presented a white horse to the Emperor which was at the time accepted, but shortly afterwards the animal was sent back to them because astrologers had pronounced it an unlucky one, and as it was otherwise of little value.* Feeling themselves, as they thought, insulted, they very unwisely, inconsiderately, and it may be thought culpably, killed the horse and threw it into the boat in presence of the messengers (of some rank) who had brought it, and at a spot which was within the precincts or purlieus of the Palace.

They were both soon seized, put in irons and incarcerated for several days, during which they were inhumanly treated to the length it was alleged of being partially scalped. There could, rightly considered, have been no insult in royalty returning a horse so circumstanced. On the other hand their asserted insult, which policy should have prevented, was a palpable one, not only to the Emperor but to the national religion, which forbids the shedding of blood anywhere. That the Siamese did not inflict the full penalty of the

* * *

(a) About this time piracies were reported to have taken place in the vicinity of the Nicobars.
law on those gentlemen, which to a Siamese of the highest rank would have been death, was owing to the remonstrances of the British Envoy and the merchants, who represented that the parties were ignorant of Siamese customs.

When the Ex Raja learned the unsuccessful result as regarded himself of Mr. Crawfurd's Mission, he intimated that he would remove to Salengore, but the Governor dissuaded him from this measure, which however was left optional with the Raja. Shortly afterwards an insurrection of the Malays of Purlis in the Kedah [district] having placed the former district again in the hands of the Malays, the Ex Raja made a request that he might be allowed to go there. In reply he was informed that he resided under the British protection* to act in any manner in hostility towards the Siamese; that he might go to Purlis, but if he did go he could never again be recognised in any other light than as a private individual.

The Supreme Government sanctioned this decision and directed that should the Ex Raja persist in his hostile schemes he would not be allowed "to return, the British protection would be withdrawn from him, and his allowance stopped and never be restored." The Ex Raja was too pusillanimous to have headed such an expedition himself. But he soon showed how little he regarded the consequence [of] his opposition as above stated, by following up his original plans. Had the Ex Raja, by thus defying the British Government, been removed at once to Malacca, much of the evils which [were] caused from his attacks on Kedah might have been prevented. Undoubtedly the forbearance shown towards him was more than is generally awarded any where to persons in his political situation. Yet have the newspapers and the press otherwise teemed with invectives against what has been designated the harsh treatment of the Ex Raja.
28 April 1823.

(See Factory Records, Straits Sett. vol. 90.)

But to have placed any dependence on the Ex Rajah after the explicit declaration which follows and which was repeated in June 1830, would have been to say the least, only encouraging him in his proceedings. In return for the communication made to him, as above noticed, he declared he had suffered such exceeding disgrace that so long as he should live he could not be at rest [but] must persist in his endeavours to obtain the means of requiting the deeds of the Siamese, an evil race, having no regard for the servants of God. No doubt the Rajah would have felt less had "Islams" and not "Kafirs" invaded and taken Kedah. That he has kept his word will appear in the sequel.

28 April 1823.

(See as above.)

* sic.? stated.

Malayan attack on Kedah.

In the same month of April Tuanku Abdullah, one of the Rajah's sons, attacked Kedah by land with a force of three thousand men, chiefly subjects of the British Government. This ill-conducted enterprise was speedily baffled and defeated by a handful of Siamese. Abdullah's troops on this occasion plundered both friends and foes! The Ligorian remonstrated, and at that the Ex Rajah had also urged his nephew Tuankee Din to invade Purlis (a). The reply to this communication was to this effect that it would be impossible "to put a stop to the Ex Rajah's proceedings unless the British Government were to use measures equally severe with those employed by the Siamese in like emergencies, and which it never can or will do." Such sentiments were not calculated to remove the suspicions of the Siamese that the Penang Authorities were encouraging the Ex King in his attempts to molest them, and these sentiments certainly deviated in a slight degree from those so repeatedly

(a). The Siamese while remonstrating in such strains were themselves at the very time harbouring a notorious pirate "Pakirsa" who up to the present day (1836) has been protected by them in spite of constant representations to them by the local authority of Penang of his piracies and murders.
expressed by the Supreme Government. The cause of the discrepancy may be traced to the minority in the Council on this subject, in which Mr. Phillips found himself placed.

The Supreme Government, in alluding to a false alarm which had been industriously fomented at Penang that the Siamese were coming to attack it, observed that the former policy respecting Kedah should be strictly adhered to, that the occurrence of a state of hostility with the Siamese nation was to be deprecated as an evil of very serious magnitude, which, far from seeking by undertaking operations for the restoration of the unfortunate King of Kedah, should be averted by their exercise of every degree of temper, address, forbearance and moderation compatible with the honour and character of the British Government; and perseverance in this line of policy was declared to be not the less incumbent on the Penang Government under very strong circumstances of aggression and provocation. In such extreme cases a blockade or even punishment by landing a party of men might be adopted.

The Burmese war was now close at hand and however inveterate that people might be against the Siamese there can be no doubt that the Court of Ava made strong overtures to that of Bankok to bury their mutual animosities for a while in oblivion, and to join with it in arresting the growing power of the British. The Siamese Court wisely avoided the tempting bait, no doubt under the belief that a cautious neutrality would extract benefit from both the belligerents. I of course assume that the Siamese refusal to co-operate had been given previous to the intrigues which the Burmese again carried on with the Ex Rajah and others, as now to be noticed.

The Court of Ava finding itself on the brink of a war with the British employed the Myoowoon or Governor of Tavoy as its secret agent in negotiating
a league in the Malayan Peninsula against the Siamese Power. The Court hoped doubtless by this manoeuvre to prevent the Siamese from joining the British in attacking Ava, by rendering it necessary for them to send their forces southward, and if possible to bring the British and Siamese into collision, and thus weaken the aggressive means of the former; or if these objects should fail to gain the neutrality of the Siamese by arousing their suspicions of the intentions of the British towards them.

The Myoowoon accordingly wrote letters to the old Raja of Purlis in Keddaah, to the Ex Raja of Keddaah, and to the Rajahs of Perak, Salengore and Patani, urging them to co-operate with the Burmese against the Siamese for the purpose of re-instating the Ex Rajah. The letters were accompanied by presents of gold umbrellas and horse trappings.

In the letter to the Ex Rajah the Myoowoon declared that "the Emperor of Ava would, when the proposed scheme had been matured, restore him to his Government, and take the other liberated States under his protection." The receipt at Court of a clock, which the Ex Rajah had sent as a present, was also acknowledged in this letter, and it was concluded in these words how the King of Keddaah with a candid mind desires to become tributary to the golden palace; the great Emperor will therefore protect and cherish him, his children and descendants to the remotest degree.

It is doubtful if the Burmese Court intended anything by these intrigues but merely to create a diversion of the two powers alluded to, yet, had she got possession of Junk Ceylon—the distance from thence to the Keddaah territory being only a day's run—no obstacle would have been opposed to the descent on it. In such an event the Ex Rajah would have joined the invaders with half the population of Penang and Province Wellesley!!!
The Penang Government forwarded a copy of this (the Emperor of Ava's) letter to the Ligorean, in the hope that it would intimidate him into a recognition of the Ex King's claims. It may be fairly questioned if this perhaps premature measure did not tend to fully convince that Chief, that the British were abetting the whole intrigue. It was also attended with other evil consequences, for the Malyan States who had been tampered with were thereby betrayed to the Siamese, and marked accordingly for a full measure of vengeance, when the opportunity should arise. It also irritated the Siamese still more against the Ex Rajah. The only good effect it could have had, and probably really had, was to exasperate the Siamese still more against their ancient enemies the Burmans, thereby securing at least, although unconsciously to the British Local Government at the time, their neutrality in the approaching contest, but not their co-operation.

So long as the Ex Rajah was living under British protection there could have been no excuse for these intrigues with Ava. The Supreme Government pronounced them to be improper and unjustifiable. Had not the Burmese War quickly interposed itself (a) the vicinity of Penang might have been made the field of a most barbarous contest betwixt two implacable races, and in which neither the British nor the Malayas would have found it an easy thing to have remained neutral.

CHAPTER II.

Achin.

[This chapter deals exclusively with Achin, and has no connection with Siam. It is therefore here omitted.]

(a). Tavoy fell on the 9th September 1824, Mergui on the 6th October 1824.
CHAPTER III.

Burmese War.

and

Events connected with it.

In 1824 war was declared by the British against Ava. Just before this happened several envoys from the Myoowoon or Burman Governor of Tavoy reached Penang under the pretext of negotiating some commercial arrangements with the Government there. That these men were also commissioned to tamper with the Ex Rajah of Keddah and the Malayan Rajahs on the Peninsula can hardly be questioned. But they came rather too late and might have been detained as prisoners. They were however sent back with a convoy to Tavoy and it is believed that this treatment, combined with what they had seen at a review of the troops at Penang, hastened the delivering up of Tavoy to the British detachment which went against it.

Burmese War.

The Supreme Government had directed the Local Government at Penang to endeavour to obtain the co-operation of the Siamese in the Burman War to the extent of supplying elephants, draft cattle and boats. A public envoy was therefore dispatched to the Rajah of Ligor, the then Governor of the principal southern provinces of Siam (a). He was however after a tedious negotiation of three months compelled to return without effecting the main object, although an opportunity was afforded for explaining to the Siamese the cause and probable results of the war.

It was found impossible to remove the suspicions, which haunted the Siamese of the sincerity of the British and which did not leave them till the war had terminated.

The self-love of the Court of Bankok was piqued at the confidence of success in the approaching war manifested by the British Government, and that too in a contest with a nation which had ever proved a vigorous if not dreaded rival of the Siamese.

The Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, when notifying to the Penang Government that war had been declared against Ava, signified that it was in contemplation to take possession of Junk Ceylon, it being a Burman island. The mistake as to the ownership of this island arose from the repeated suggestions which had been made both by Government servants and traders, of the advantage which the British would derive by the acquisition of this island, while at the same time the fact that it was a Siamese possession was, it should seem, kept out of view by the suggestors (a).

CHAPTER IV.

Mission to the Ligor Rajah in 1824.

In September a letter reached the Prince of Wales Island Government from Major Cumming, the Agent at Rangoon of the Right Honble. the Governor General, stating that it was wished that the cooperation of a Siamese army should be obtained, as numerous as they might be disposed to furnish, to

(a). The Honble. Mr. Phillips, the Governor, was assured by Lieut. Low, the envoy, that the latter was the fact and [? the Governor] immediately reported it to Bengal and when the mission proceeded to Junk Ceylon [on] its way to Phoonga that fact was fully confirmed.
join in invading the Burmese territory but to be subject to the general disposal of the British Commander. Tenasserim, when taken, to be held by the Siamese, but to be evacuated by them on the termination of the war. No dismemberment of the Burmese Government to be stated as in contemplation. Elephants and draft cattle would be, if possible, obtained.

A letter was addressed to the Rajah of Ligor by the Governor and soon after forwarded by me to him, informing him that an English officer had been deputed to him by the Governor of Penang, to make some very important communications.

On reaching Kedah the Siamese Chief there was apprized of the important subject to be communicated by me to the Rajah of Ligor. He was presented with a copy of my credentials and the original was shown to him and he was requested to furnish a passport and carriage to Ligor. He replied that compliance with this last request was quite beyond his power, but he would submit it for the Phraya's (his father) consideration.

A letter was immediately prepared and sent off to Ligor, along with the dispatch of the Chief to the Phraya informing him of my destination and requesting a passport.

I then proceeded to Trang from which place another letter was sent off to the Phraya, nearly to the same purport as the first, stating that I should await a reply there, but that it was indispensable that he should afford me a personal conference with himself. The interval was employed in an endeavour to ascertain the actual extent, state and resources of the other Siamese provinces lying north of Trang. We returned to Trang on the 7th June and on the 8th a letter from the Phraya was delivered to me by the senior of four of his officers whom he had forwarded with it.
This letter stated that it had never been customary for Furmys [sic. Farang] (Europeans) to travel through the country and that he (the Phraya) wished to conform to ancient usages, besides, when the envoy's two letters reached Ligor, and they arrived on the same day, it happened that two Siamese officers of high rank, Surasena and Phraya Chaisong Kram accompanied by forty Khoon Navy (inferior Navy) had just entered Ligor from Bankok, commissioned by the Mighty Emperor of Siam, who is exalted like God above the prostrate heads of his subjects, to assist the Phraya in governing his provinces. As the envoy's letters did not detail particulars and as these are wanted by the Phraya in the first instance, he has therefore deputed Chom Ram Decha of Bankok, Khoon Akson, Nai Nienm, and Nai Koong, three Ligor officers, to confer with the envoy and hear what he has to communicate, also to obtain a written explanation of particulars for himself. When this has been done the Phraya, as he may find it most convenient, "will either receive the envoy at Ligor or meet him at Trang. There is a route through the forest which conducts in four days to Ligor, so that no delay will ensue. Let not the envoy feel vexed, and he is entreated to continue at Trang." Dated 3d night of moon's increase in the 7th month, year Wok.

These officers exerted all their diplomatic faculties (which are not marked with the effrontery and want of tact observable amongst the Burmese) to obtain from me all that their [?] master] desired, but the result of a five hours' conference with them convinced me that the Phraya would, if possible, waive a personal conference. I therefore urged on the minds of these men that, as the Governor of Penang had deemed it requisite to depute an agent to their master, he could not consistently with his professions refuse to grant a conference, either at Trang or Ligor, which places were equally convenient. But I added that if
they would give me a positive assurance (in writing) that the Mission would be afterwards allowed to proceed to Ligor I would at once comply [with] the Rajah's wish to learn the intent of it, but that nothing satisfactory could result from a written correspondence with the Phraya or from intangible conversation with his agents. The officers then left me to return to Ligor [carrying] a letter from me to the Phraya, urging him to admit of the proposed conference, regretting the delay which had taken place, informing him that it would be improper to detail except to himself all the affairs respecting which I had been sent, and concluding by shortly hinting that I had much to state about the Ava war and its probable consequences, also regarding Kedah affairs, the Southern or Tenasserim Provinces [and] the employment of Sepoys in them.

I remained ten days longer at Trang when, as no reply from the Phraya had reached me, I prepared to depart.

In case, however, the Phraya might have transmitted an erroneous account of the Mission to Bankok I forwarded a letter to the Phra Khlang or Minister at the Siamese capital accompanied by literal translations in the Siamese language of the Governor General's proclamation of war against the Ava State. A private letter was also addressed by me to the Phraya of Ligor, requesting him to forward the dispatch and (in case he might have declined doing so) he was told that a duplicate would be sent by the first opportunity by sea to Siam. I likewise wrote to His Highness a private letter, cautioning [him] against listening to the reports brought to him by evil designing persons from Penang, and informing him that the object with which I had arrived in his country was of the most amicable tendency, of which time would convince him. As however His Highness had declined giving me an audience I could not deliver to him the presents I had
brought but I begged to present to him a map of India and other Eastern Countries, on which I had written down the names of the Chief regions and places in the Siamese Character. The conduct of the messenger who went to Penang was commented on in the above letter, yet these very officers are always sent to Penang in political negotiations. The letter to the Phra Khlang contained a recapitulation of all that had taken place since my appointment to the Mission and [mentioned] that one of its principal objects was to apprise the Court of Bankok of the nature of the war with Ava. It was stated that I could not possibly hold conferences with officers or explain to them what I had been deputed to communicate to the Phrya in person.

The substance of the letter of the secretary to the Penang Government to me of the 9th July regarding the Burmese War and inviting the Siamese to co-operate, was engrossed also in the letter to the Phra Klang and he was told that I had been obliged by the circumstances of the Phrya declining to reply to my letter or to grant me an audience thus to correspond with him direct. Copies of the proclamations of war against Ava were therefore now forwarded and I concluded by apprising the Minister that the Governor General entertained the most amicable feelings toward his Siamese Majesty and deprecated whatever might have the remotest tendency to interrupt their exercise.

The Mission accordingly left Trang and returned to Penang.

From the feelings which appeared to me to actuate the Siamese on this occasion, gathered more from unguarded conversations than public discussions, I had the honor to express to the Penang Government my opinion that there were but slender hopes of co-operation in the Burmese War, and that they would
in all probability await the issue, since should it prove fortunate to our arms they would thereby gain both in strength and confidence, and should we fail they would not then be exposed to the sure and implacable vengeance of the Ava Court for having joined us. I further stated that it seemed to me even doubtful whether this war would not serve to estrange the Siamese from us to a greater distance than hitherto and instil suspicions into their minds that it was only a prelude to an attack on their country. With respect to the Phraya of Ligor, my residence of three months in his country, information obtained from his subjects, and my own experience of his character, all went to persuade me that he was an active and very ambitious Prince, and a stern, relentless and rapacious master; that he was grasping at all the Governments of Lower Siam and that there was little chance of his resigning Keddah to the Ex Rajah. I expressed the hope that the knowledge which had now been obtained of his principles would serve in some degree to counterbalance the otherwise unsatisfactory result of the Mission.

When the Ligorian’s messengers returned to him he was, it is reported, rather ashamed of himself, and would have instantly gone down to Trang had I not left it.

The instructions of the Penang Government were carried into effect with the exception of the procuring of boats. To have got any the sanction of the Court of Bangkok would have been required, and this would have caused a delay sufficient to have done away with any expected benefit to have been derived by an employment of them. But my enquiries on the coast confirmed me in the belief that there were no boats in the rivers there fit to go to sea, as they had been built chiefly for river or coasting services.
CHAPTER V.

War in Kedah and Tuanku Din's Proceedings.

In 1828 Tuanku Long Puteh, the brother in law, and Tuanku Din or Kudin, the nephew of the Ex Rajah, settled themselves in Province Wellesley without permission, and commenced intriguing with the inhabitants, with the view of recovering Kedah. The same reasons which prevented the Ex Rajah from being sent to Malacca operated also in the Province, and these obnoxious individuals were allowed to remain unmolested.

In 1829 Kudin or Tuanku Din attacked Kedah aided by certain other influential Malays and by ryots of the Honble. Company, but he was driven back (a).

The Ex King had no sooner ascertained that the Government declined arresting him than he exhibited his contempt by settling himself in Province Wellesley and gathering about him all his old adherents should [sic. ? including] the Panghula Mullins, the Hajis and Libies, the Panglimas and the Waus. All that could be done was to keep a watch over his conduct. Having ascertained on whom he could depend and his coffers getting empty he returned to Penang and his pension was restored to him without any acknowledgment by him of his error or promises of amendment—a generosity he scarcely deserved to have shown to him.

The Rajah of Ligor was apprized by the Local Authority in Province Wellesley that [the] Ex Rajah was meditating an attack on Kedah. But the Ligorian neglected making the necessary dispositions for the defence of Kedah.

(a). These men were Tuanku Jaffier and Tuanku Dangang, sons of Tuanku Long Puteh, Panglima Marwar, Che Man, Panglima tan, Imam Saunahan, Che Haji, Panglima Hossain and Mim and Che Blioc, Awang Lahal and Che Akili.
About this time a double commission was appointed (a) to try and persuade the Ex Rajah to remove with his family to Malacca. He promised after some time, to the first of these officers, that he would go. How he changed his mind has been already shown. He declared however that he would try to regain his lost dominions.

Pirates becoming very numerous in the direction of Kedah, the Honble. Mr. Ibbetson, Governor, directed his agent (b), to proceed to that place and persuade the Siamese to send out a fleet of boats to co-operate in driving the pirates off. The Agent went in the Southampton Ship of War and having obtained the fleet of Siamese boats proceeded with them to join the boats of that ship. The search proved unsuccessful. The Commander of the Siamese boats turned out to be the notorious pirate, Pakirsa, who however, owing to his situation, could not be noticed publicly and punished as such, although he had been outlawed from Penang. This man will be hereafter introduced, but the position he held exhibits the Siamese [?] very clearly which takes advantage of the services of energetic characters like Pakirsa, although well aware that their fidelity is not to be much depended [on].

The Siamese continued in fancied security because, although warned, they could not bring themselves to believe that, with the will, the British had not the power to prevent an invasion of Kedah by the Ex Rajah or his adherents, especially as the Rajah of Ligor was informed, by the Penang Government that means would be [taken] to prevent the Ex King and his followers from disturbing the territory of Siam by seizing and delivering up to the Chief of Kedah any persons guilty of such conduct.

(a). Messrs. Low and Nairne.
(b). Captain Low.
This promise was unfortunate in two respects because it tended to prevent the Siamese adopting vigorous measures for defence, and because it neither was or perhaps could have been fulfilled to the letter, for at the same time nearly the Superintendent of Province Wellesley was informed that the exercise of actual force against the Ex Rajah and his adherents might, in case of bloodshed, be productive of very serious consequences to those employed. The interference of the Court of Judicature, or rather the Records in the politics of Kedah will explain the case. But force was afterwards employed, as will be seen.

Tuanku Soliman, a younger brother of the Ex Rajah of Kedah, who was allowed by the Siamese to live at Kota, a place close on the eastern boundary of Province Wellesley and situated on the Pry (a) River began to excite the ryots of the Pry district to disaffection, and he had the audacity to send one or two of his agents, who in concert with certain low hangers-on about the Court of Judicature, proceeded secretly to measure out what they called the boundary of the Province, cutting off from the latter a large tract of country which had been under English rule since the cession, and of which for thirty years the British had held undisputed possession, and over which the Court of Judicature had ever exercised immediate jurisdiction. The ryots hoped that they might thus escape payment of quit rents for land, and their example was rapidly acting on the rest of the inhabitants. As regards the latter, the feeling was not thoroughly exhibited, and as respects the former, the tendency to rebel would have perhaps been surmounted had they been permitted to listen to reason. But unfortunately their case was taken up.

(a). Pry so named because the winds of its mouth are supposed to be baffling, or because it has a very winding course. The name will admit of either interpretation.
with the usual precipitancy of ignorance and cupidity by persons in Penang, including pettyfogging and other agents in the Courts, native merchants and Hajis. The radical press also teemed with gross abuse of the local authority in the Province Wellesley, which although too contemptible to be noticed by him had the bad effect of urging them to overt acts.

It might surprise a settler of land revenue in Hindostan to be told that the various classes of the native population enjoying British protection at their own seeking (for they were emigrants) should for the most part pay only a nominal quit rent, not exceeding in a large section of them 17 per cent, [sic? 7] scarcely on the average exceeding 5 per cent, and never as yet exceeding 10 per cent the gross value—to help to defray the expenses of protection. The mischief arising from Tuanku Soliman's abetted movement continued for three years to retard the land settlement.

There is not, it may safely be asserted, a peasantry in India, perhaps not in Europe, so comfortable according to its own ideas of comfort as that of this settlement of Penang.

It is probable that the Raja of Ligor had favoured Tuanku Soliman hoping that he might establish him as a spy on the frontier of the English territory, for on being apprized of the conduct of that Chief the Raja replied in a very evasive manner, not seeming to be aware that the Ex Rajah and his adherents were playing a double game, endeavouring on the one hand to detach Tuanku Solimam from the Siamese interests so as to have his co-operation against Keddah, and on the other hand to make him the unconscious agent in bringing on a misunderstanding betwixt the British and Siamese.

Tuanku Soliman was professing to Captain Low, Superintendent of Province Wellesley, in the mean while, that although living in the Siamese territory
his heart was devoted to the British. But when he visited him at Kota to endeavour to bring the Tuanku to a better mind his behaviour was so wanting in the usual forms of Malayan etiquette, and his conversation was so suspiciously evasive, that no doubt could remain of his estrangement from his professions.

Soon after, the constable of Pry district with a party of police and three Sepoys was proceeding to issue some Government orders there. Their path lay in one spot through jungle. It was narrow and the party was carefully proceeding in single file when it was waylaid by a body of Malays. The constable and 3 Sepoys and several peons were killed, and the remainder, who were in the rear, consisting of ryots, fled back.

A party of Sepoys had been stationed on the Pry River on the requisition of the Resident Councillor for the protection of the district. Party spirit ran high in favour of the Malays and rebellion in the eyes of their advocates seemed now almost a virtue. The Coroner of Penang, instead of holding an inquest on the bodies of the murdered men and issuing his warrants for apprehending the murderers, sided, it is to be hoped through ignorance, with the faction which absurdly pretended to doubt the extent of the jurisdiction (thirty years having elapsed without such a doubt having ever been mooted) and thus left Soliman to act as he might choose. The military force which was stationed on the Pry River was without the knowledge or sanction of the Resident Councillor suddenly removed by military authority before he could reverse such a strange procedure. A requisition arrived for more troops to carry on the Nanning War, and none could be spared for Province Wellesley. As Superintendent of the Province and deeming that delay to punish such a rebellious movement would tend to a more serious revolt, Captain Low assembled all the disposable armed peons and about 100 Malays on whom reliance could be placed, and drove the insurgents from their position in the Upper part of the
Pry District in a thick jungle, and here having stockaded a post in its vicinity the spirit of opposition was checked.

The ring leaders of the movement fled to Tuanku Soliman's Head Quarters at Kota, but many of the ryots who had been at first induced to join them returned to their homes. The jungle was now quickly cleared away up to the frontier by a body of new and quiet settlers in room of the banditti who had harboured in it.

Tuanku Soliman was now unmasked and his fate was sealed. He had chosen to offend the power to which alone in adverse circumstances he must have looked for protection. If he sided with the Malays and was unsuccessful where could he retreat to?

It is usual for the Malayan petty traders of Penang and Province Wellesley to visit the birds nest islands about the beginning of the year. Their boats are always well armed as a defence against pirates and consequently no suspicion arises on that point. The Ex Rajah and his adherents took advantage of the yearly fleet to fit out an expedition against Keddah. It may be safely affirmed that the Government and its officers were the only parties interested, except a few Chinese in preventing this attack, one which no doubt contravened in some measure the Treaty of Bangkok. The good people of Penang seemed to have forgotten their frequent panics on reported Siamese invasions of that island, which had on one occasion urged a large party, with Mr Secretary John Anderson at their head, to send their property into the Fort for safety.

The Chinese, who in many respects occupy the same position in the Straits that the Jews do in Europe were staunch abettors of the attempt. Valuable as these settlers are in the countries to the eastward it should not be forgotten that they are mercenary strangers and intensely selfish, fond of
intrigue and almost secure in its exercise from the veil which their secret associations cast over them, ready but concealed abettors of every political strife which is likely to be followed by pecuniary advantage to themselves, and less interested in the stability of the Government under whose protection they may happen during their migration to be living than almost any other class of natives because they enjoy both toleration and immunities in all the countries to the eastward not accorded to the proper subjects of those countries, thus making it easy for them to change their residence and without sacrificing much.

On the present occasion the Chinese were divided in their politics, just as their own interests pointed: the Hajis, who form a numerous portion of the population, preached a crusade against the infidel Siamese, and did more mischief than all other classes combined. The eastern Hajis are rather a disreputable set generally considered, miserably ignorant when they embark for the Holy Kallah and Haji Asehat. The short collision they afterwards sustain there with the world only serves to teach them the art of overreaching their neighbours. The white frock and turban which they are then privileged to wear, while it renders their faults and views more glaring still, helps to make it difficult to assail them amongst a bigoted people. Under the mask of religion they are, with but few exceptions, ever ready to range themselves in the ranks against the Kalif. Whether they honor the British by applying to them this epithet amongst themselves may not be a doubtful question. But as the latter are not idolaters they are in some measure exempted from the anathemas pronounced by the Koran against image worshippers. The mental political superiority of Europeans too has a potent effect in modifying the feelings with which the unfaithful of the Far East are viewed by Mahometans. Hatred they may and often do entertain for their British rulers, but contempt they cannot really feel if they would.
The boats alluded to slipped away by degrees from Penang and Province Wellesley and were concealed near the Boonting Island. When all were ready Tuanku Mahomed escaped in a dark night in a skiff and joined them. Betwixt two and three thousand men are supposed to have gone by land but as they crossed the frontier of the Province in small parties under cover of the night (and slunk back in the same way to their homes) the number could not be exactly ascertained. Eighty Bengal men who had formerly been Sepoys also joined Kudin. A very few only of these ever returned.

When the fleet entered the Kedah river the Siamese Chief, a son of the Rajah of Ligor, was panic struck. He had not a hundred Siamese to defend the Fort. The Malays he could not trust and as Kudin had dressed out many of his men in old jackets of Sepoys (the Sepoys always sell their old jackets here) the Chief believed that the Penang Government had sent a force with him. Nuther and Ahmed wore uniforms of British form. The Siamese gave the enemy one discharge of all the guns on the water face, perhaps a dozen of large calibre, and then evacuated the place. But Kudin’s men were so close on them that thirty were made prisoners and the Chief received a wound after no Spartan fashion. The prisoners were kept for some time, and then most cruelly tortured and butchered in cold blood.

The Kedah Fort, if it deserves the name, is an oblong square of about*—yards by fifty. The wall is of brick and about eleven feet high on an average. It has no regular ditch, the river washes a small latus (sic) on its south side, a narrow creek runs along the east face, leaving a path betwixt it and the wall. The other three sides are protected by mud swamps and mangroves. Altogether it is a most untenable place for a single day or even hour against a regular force, and less defensible than a well constructed stockade; which sort of work the Indo-Chinese had better adhere to if
they should contemplate ever provoking Europeans to a contest with them.

The Raja received a present of muskets and ammunition. The native officers of the escort at his request put the Sepoys through the manual and platoon exercises, and although he did not say much at the time the impression made on his mind was such that he afterwards procured some old disbanded soldiers to instruct his men in drill, but it should seem with little success.

When the Resident left this fortified camp the Ligorian attended him with a large retinue of spearmen and swordsmen to the bank of the Kedah river. The conveyances were handsome litters and carried by means of poles on men's shoulders.

The Ligorian's age at the time of this visit was fifty or nearly so. He is however a stout man and not decapitated (sic), which is an event which may happen, [? though ] he may govern for many years longer.

CHAPTER VI.

Affairs of Perak South of Penang.

In 1825 Mr. Anderson was deputed by the Penang Government to the State of Perak to negotiate for the evacuation of that State by the Salengore Rajah's troops. The latter had been sent there by the Rajah [to] insure some pecuniary claims. The mission was successful. Salengore is a much smaller state than Perak but its people are bolder than those of Perak.

In 1826 it was found that the Raja or Phryya of Ligor had sent a party of troops into the Perak State, thereby committing a breach of the obligations imposed upon him by Treaty. He was accordingly warned that his conduct would render it impossible for the Penang Government to preserve relations of amity
with him, however anxious it might be to do so, unless he adhered to his engagements.

Adverting to the instructions I had the honor to receive when dispatched to Perak I will merely relate as briefly as possible the general results of the Mission.

The Raja of Perak did not require to be convinced that it would be necessary for him to adopt a firmness and decision of conduct so as to free himself from the influence of the Ligor Chief and the Salangore Rajah, and to assert that independence which had been guaranteed to him by the treaty alluded to. But situated as he was in the midst both of open and concealed enemies, he distinctly required that British interposition should be vouched safed until he could render his position secure.

He was decidedly averse to the measure of transmitting the gold and silver flowers hitherto so pertinaciously demanded from him by the Siamese Court or of paying tribute or homage in any shape to it and he observed that Perak had always been independent previous to the late interference of the Ligor and Salengore Rajahs. He had indeed been twice induced, through fear of threatened invasion, to send golden flowers to Bankok.

The Rajah desired it might be understood as his firm resolve that no communication or intercourse, not purely commercial, should take place or exist betwixt his country and Siam or Salengore.

The Rajah expressed himself very grateful for the care which had been taken of his interests by the Penang Government. He said that the Siamese were utterly faithless and that he hoped a party of Sepoys would be left with him to protect him from their intrigues. This of course could not be complied with. He then expressed his wish that I would at least guarantee the preferred aid in case of necessity, by a formal agreement, since in this event the Siamese
would be cautious of breaking with the British. The same was desired with reference to Salengore. This guarantee could not be avoided from the following considerations. The Ligorians had openly infringed a solemn Treaty, had usurped the power and authority of the Raja, had corrupted and gained over many of his officers and had placed him in personal danger. The Rajah then delivered to me a letter to the Governor of Penang, the substance of which might be communicated to the Ligorian, expressive of his desire to keep himself independent of Siam and other States. When it was considered that several of the Rajah's own Ministers were intriguing with the Siamese and that these men must according to usage become parties to any Treaty which I might have to enter into, the negotiations appeared likely to terminate unfavorably. It was quite obvious that engagements which should be [entered into] under such circumstances could not be relied on, however well disposed the Raja might be. These considerations, to which the Rajah was painfully alive, roused into some degree of activity his faculties, which had been nearly subdued by the domineering conduct of the Siamese. He earnestly prayed that I would not leave him a prey to Siamese rapacity, but that I would remain for a few weeks until he had, as suggested to him by me, remodelled his Government, and rid himself of the disaffected by expelling them from office.

I did not hesitate to prolong my stay since it was apparent that had I gone away before he had established his authority, he might have been led to distrust the offers of assistance made to him through me, and to throw himself into the exclusive power of the Ligor Chief, who could then have easily destroyed the Rajah and have placed the Rajah Muda, a creature of the Siamese, in the Government of Perak.

The Raja now issued a proclamation to his subjects, warning them against intriguing with the Ligorians or Salengorians. The chief men in the
country were summoned to his presence along with the Rajah Muda or Heir Apparent, who in the hope perhaps of a quicker succession to power than the age and the constitution of the Rajah warranted, had taken the oath of allegiance to the Siamese. So perplexed, however, did the Rajah find himself when affairs came to a crisis that he made a formal tender to me of his country for the British. He was promptly told that his independence alone was desired or contemplated by the British. When all the Chiefs had assembled at Allahan, the Rajah ordered them to proceed to the Balei or Hall of Audience. I went there at the Rajah's request accompanied by Captain Elwan of the Bombay Naval Service, and Mr. Frith, Assistant Surgeon on the Bombay Establishment, who did me the favour to remain with me at Allahan to witness what should take place. The proclamation before alluded to was again read before [the] assembly, also the list of new Ministers and officers, and to each of these last classes the oath of allegiance was tendered separately.

The Rajah Muda having committed treason by siding with the Siamese against his country had his claim to the succession formally annulled, and a nearer relative of the Rajah was declared Heir Apparent.

These important measures were happily effected without resistance on the part of Raja Muda and his adherents.

The change was made so quickly that no time was left to them to organise means of annoyance.

Means were then taken by the Raja for seizing several persons holding small commands on the sea coast and who had declined obeying his summons. These officers were known to have aided and abetted the pirates who were daily molesting the native traders to Penang.

The oath of allegiance having been administered to the new Chiefs, the Raja directed his engagement
with me to be read aloud. It was then signed and sealed, when the assembly broke up under a salute of eleven guns, intended, the Raja said, for the Mission. I therefore returned it with three volleys of musketry from the detachment of troops.

The Raja promised to protect traders, to discountenance slavery, and to promote agriculture and general education amongst his subjects.

The Raja of Ligor disclaimed having broken the Treaty, but the Mission had the means of proving his want of faith beyond a doubt. The conduct of his troops in Perak, who fled on learning of our approach is just what we might have looked for from any semi-civilised people.

They obliged the Raja to supply them gratis with rations and whatever else they coveted, they forcibly seized the produce of gardens, levied contributions at pleasure on the impoverished peasantry, and abducted and seized on women and conveyed them from their families. The Raja stated that within a very few months the expense and loss incurred by the country, owing to Siamese occupancy, amounted to about half a lac of rupees.

The Raja of Ligor's letters and those written by his orders to the Raja of Perak are useful instances of Siamese diplomacy.

Several arrangements were made with the Raja for facilitating the mercantile and friendly intercourse betwixt Penang and Perak by land and water, and for the dispersion of pirates.

The Pankour or Dinding Islands lying off the Perak coast are well known to be the private haunts of piratical boats which annually sweep the coast up to Junk Ceylon.

The Raja entirely of his free will executed a deed assigning over these Islands to the E. I. Company.
This I could only accept conditionally, observing to the Raja that I would submit his offer for the consideration of the Penang Government.

The direct control, which owing to the Mission the Perak Raja obtained over the sea coast soon enabled him to drive out those officers who had leagued with the pirates. But it was not until their head quarters at Korow had been destroyed that the native petty traders were relieved from their fears.

Having made, as directed, every requisite enquiry regarding the piracies which had been committed in our neighbourhood, I felt authorized in reporting [to] the Prince of Wales Island Government that the nature of the Perak and other adjacent coasts was such that no piratical prahu or boats could be pursued, with hopes of success, unless by others similarly constructed and well manned. With such boats, well armed and defended by bulwarks and netting, it seemed to me that the pirates might be decoyed and overtaken. Subsequent to my return from Perak in January 1827 I was directed by the Prince of Wales Island Government to attack the pirates who had established their Head Quarters at the Korow River about thirty miles to the southward of the Island. It becomes requisite to introduce the subject in this place because the result showed that the Raja of Ligor not only slighted the obligations of treaties, but actually upheld, within the Perak territory, a notorious piratical Chief called Nakodah Oodin.

I was not aware of this circumstance until the papers of the latter fell into my hand subsequent to the attack, and I had examined individuals who had been carried off from Penang and enslaved by him.

To such a pitch of audacity had Oodin’s gang arrived that it had become a regular trade to carry off British subjects from Penang and Province Wellesley
to Korow. Notices were then conveyed to their relatives, who fearful for their safety, rarely returned to acquaint the police, but secretly redeemed them at the average rate of twenty dollars for each person. Pirated property was regularly sold to them and a good deal was there found and traced by me on the spot.

The Raja of Ligor had hoped that as Korow was a place too notorious to be frequented by the Perak or Penang people, his underhand design in that quarter would escape detection. When, however, his motives were exposed he acted the bold part and even ventured to assert that Korow formed a part of his dependency of Kedah.

The Perak Chief or Penguha of Korow had several years before the period here adverted to been attacked by the noted pirate Tuanku Long put,* a Seaman, who settled himself there. But about the time when the Siamese invaded Kedah, the equally celebrated pirate Odin expelled him and occupied the position. He was then found by the Ligor Phraya to be a very convenient person to assist him in annoying his neighbours and this convenience was mutual.

The Phraya had never before publicly acknowledged Odin as a servant of his, well knowing that he would, in so doing, be required by the Penang Government to explain his reasons for forcibly retaining possession of a district of Perak and for abetting piracies of the most atrocious description.

The Phraya took no notice of the exposure until about three months after it happened, and then all on a sudden he adopted a very unadvised step in claiming the territory so nefariously seized. His Councils must have been of the most imbecile and despicable description, since they exposed his duplicity so very soon after he had signed a solemn treaty to refrain from interfering in Perak affairs. But it is just as well that he has afforded us the means of appreciating the Siamese political character.
The Phraya was soon informed that "the Krean River and not Korow is the boundary betwixt Perak and Kedah" and Captain Burney, in whose chart (a) of that part of the coast these rivers are so laid down, and who was with the Phraya when he accused the English of infringing his boundary by attacking Korow, informed him but when too late to save his honor, that he was wrong, and then referring to what Mr. Light had reported and to the chart which Mr. Lindsay had made of the neighbouring coast, soon after our first occupation of Penang, assured him that "the river Krean and not Korow was always and must now be considered the true boundary betwixt Kedah and Perak." The Raja was not however prevented from insisting on his unwarrantable claims. His Highness therefore sank still deeper in his own toils, and was at length effectually silenced by the production of a letter of his own addressed in 1822 by him to the then Governor of Penang, the Honble. Mr. Phillips, describing Nakodah Oodin (his subsequent protégé) as a notorious pirate and requesting that he might be seized.

At the period when these occurrences happened the British troops were actively engaged in prosecuting the war in Ava. That persevering people the Burmans had not yet been humbled, and the Siamese throughout the contest had assumed a suspicious position of neutrality which left them the option, after the issue, to side with the stronger party. Had our success been only partial the Siamese Court would probably have adopted a haughty line of policy which would have been the result of contempt for our power.

The measures therefore so promptly adopted by the Penang Government embraced the present exigency, and provided for the future. They were in accordance with the views which were entertained by the Supreme Government, the checking of the Siamese

(a). Dated 10th April 1825.
in their habitual encroachment on the Malayan States of the Peninsula and the upholding the Malayan States in their independence, as the surest pledges for the security of the native trade in the Straits. Had the Penang Government not acted in so decisive a manner the whole Peninsula except Malacca might at this moment have been under Siamese sway.

Since the Mission left Perak that State and other territories to the southward of it have enjoyed uninterrupted quiet and the Siamese appear aware of the necessity of setting bounds to their ambition for the present at least if not for the future. Any general system of interference on the part of the British with the native States to the eastward would prove unprofitable and uncalled for. But particular interference may perhaps occasionally become indispensable and perhaps unavoidable as in the present case, where it counteracted the projects of the Raja of Ligor, secured the independence of the Perak Chief and fulfilled the most urgent article of the Treaty of Bangkok (the 14th) the stipulations of which were made to prevent any interference of the Siamese with that country. To anticipate is often both more politic and safe than to await an issue which shall surely demand a desperate remedy. In so far as pirates are concerned we ought never to be at a loss how to act. They are common enemies and as such ought to be run down wherever they shelter themselves, provided the State under which they seek refuge declines or is unable to drive them out.

The rivers on the coast require some protecting State to save them from pirates in concert with the native princes and we are bound by the Dutch Treaty of 17 March 1824 to co-operate with them in destroying pirates. This work could not have been commenced at a better place than Korow, which for so long a period has been full of pirates, [an 1] which is only thirty miles from Penang.
The Honble. the Court of Directors have enjoined that piracy should be eradicated in concert with native States, but alone if they should scheme in so laudable a measure.

Military Expedition and Political Mission to Perak in 1826.

Shortly before the invasion of Kedah by the Siamese the troops of the latter nation had overawed the State of Perak, but had afterwards retired. In 1826, however, the Raja of Ligor conceived the scheme of endeavouring to forestall the 14th article of the Treaty of Bankok by sending a large party of Siamese under friendly pretences to Perak. Having corrupted the chief men in this country the Raja became a mere cypher and his independence seemed on the point of being lost, for it was believed that fear would make him consent to acknowledge vassalage to the Court of Siam. His critical position having been with difficulty made known to the Penang Government, it determined to render the above quoted article of the Treaty effective if possible and accordingly deputed to that Malayan State a political agent who should at the same time act as Commandant of a military force. The Antelope of Bombay, crater, Captain Elwan, and the Hon. Company's crater Zephyr were directed to accompany him and be guided by his orders. A detachment of the Local Corps composed the above military force. A gun boat was also attached to the cruisers.

26 Oct. 1826.

The expedition or mission reached the Perak River and the Antelope worked her way into it with considerable difficulty. She was perhaps the first English vessel of war which had ever ascended it. After proceeding about 10 miles up the stream a rapid forced her Commander to cast anchor. The detachment of troops commanded by Captain Low as before noticed and accompanied by Lieut. Elwan, Commander of the crater and Dr. Frith pushed up the river in
boats. The Siamese troops which were encamped on the north bank of the river fled speedily towards the frontier, without standing the attack, and when the detachment reached Allahan, the residence of the Raja (*), His Highness [was] found deserted by many of his influential Chiefs and overjoyed at the prospect of being delivered from Siamese thraldom.

The real condition of the Raja had not been known to the Government, so that Captain Low’s instructions hardly embraced the existing affairs. Keeping however in view the recent Treaty with Siam, the mischiefs likely to arise from tacitly allowing a breach of it, and the desire before expressed by the Supreme Government to throw obstacles in the way of Siamese aggrandisement to the Southward, and being aware also that did the Mission immediately return the Raja would succumb of necessity to Siamese dictation he took on himself, heavy as it afterwards appeared* to be, the responsibility of instantly adopting the only course which in his opinion could secure His Highness’s independence.

His Highness was recommended to remodel his Government. To this end the influential men, including the disaffected Chiefs, were summoned by him to his presence. The whole of them arrived in a few days, when a solemn oath of allegiance was tendered to them by their priest in presence of the Raja and the Mission. A new arrangement of officers took place. The disaffected Raja Muda was displaced, and in the course of a month the independence of Perak was secured to the mortification of the Ligorian, who had tried to persuade the Penang Government, through Captain Burney the agent of the Right Honorable the Governor General then with the Ligorian at Kedah, that the Kedah Rajah was desirous of his protection!

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(a). In 40°11’ N. L., 101°10’ long., and two days’ pulling from the vessel.
It was afterwards a source of much regret to Captain Low to find that Captain Burney had taken this erroneous view of Perak affairs in his communications to Government, one which was not however allowed by the Supreme Government to have any weight, in the face of the Raja’s declarations to the contrary. Since the above period up to the present time the Siamese have not attempted to gain a footing in Perak. Some time before this expulsion of the Siamese from Perak the Rajah of Salangore, a small Malayan State adjoining the former, with 40 boats and 800 men, had driven the Siamese out of Perak, which they had usurped, and had occupied part of its territory on the South. Mr. Anderson was deputed to Perak and Salengore to adjust matters and the result was that the Salengorians evacuated Perak and the southern boundary of Perak was fixed on the River Birnam. Treaties were also entered into with these Rajas respectively.

The Raja of Perak delivered to me a paper on my departure which proved to be a formal cession of the Dinding and* Pankour Islands near the mouth of Perak River to the British. These islands had been long before offered and accepted, but they were never occupied.

CHAPTER VII.

[First part omitted as previously done, or not bearing directly on Siamese affairs.]

Pirates, Muda River.

The
Honorable J. W. Salmond, Esqre.
Resident Councillor,

Sir,
I have the honor to report to you for the information of the Honble. the Governor, that the notorious
pirate, Pakirsa, has again visited the Muda River, and has forcibly seized and detained a girl named Menap, who had crossed with her family to the opposite or Siamese side of the Muda River on a temporary visit to some of her relatives. The girl has been by Pakirsa given over to the Siamese Chief at the Muda, who refuses on my requisition here on the spot to give her back until he reports to Kedah, because as he says Pakirsa is the servant of the Siamese Governor of Kedah. It would hence appear that the Siamese have not paid the slightest attention to the late remonstrances of the Honble. the Governor regarding this noted pirate, who is now under Siamese protection and shelters himself from blame under their name. I cannot allow myself to think that such behaviour on their part is not cognizable, with reference to the Treaty of Bangkok. The Siamese Chief of Kedah may have become careless on finding that the numerous remonstrances which have been made on this subject have been hitherto evaded without any penalty having been incurred. I beg to quote one of the first remonstrances I believe which was made, and to express my impression that the threats it contained were not enforced as the Siamese prevented their being put into execution by (apparent) acquiescence for the time.

The Honble. Mr. Phillips thus addressed the Siamese Chief at Kedah regarding a piracy of Pakirsa: "If therefore the Siamese Chiefs cannot or will not administer justice in the Kedah Country so as to punish pirates and wicked men domiciled within its boundaries, who injure and oppress British subjects and others, the Governor of Prince of Wales Island must and will take on himself to do so. He therefore demands, on behalf of the British Government, that the Siamese Chiefs shall inflict exemplary punishment upon Pakirsa and his nephew Hamid and not suffer pirates to reside under their jurisdiction or in any dependency of Kedah to which they [lay] claim, else
all intercourse will be put a stop to, and the Governor will adopt measures accordingly."

The Siamese replied that they would seize Pakirsa and punish him for his murder of Sibbee Ghanney and Bawasa.

In conclusion I beg to remark that the murderers and robbers who have fled from justice here are now followers of Pakirsa at Ean, a village betwixt [the] Muda and Kedah rivers.

I have &ca.

( Signed ) James Low.

Province Wellesley
25th July 1836.

[ A number of other documents appear with the above, but have been omitted as being unnecessary, or on account of having been sent previously.]

CHAPTER VIII.

[Omitted as dealing only with Malacca].

CHAPTER IX.

An Account of the War betwixt the Malays and Siamese in 1838, Commonly called the War of Tuanku Mahomed Saad.

The last attack by the Malays in Kedah bears very general resemblance to that by Kudin. I would not have detailed these wars at such length as I have done, had I not felt assured that it was the best mode of displaying the character and resources of the contending parties.
In 1836 the Ex Raja of Kedah left Malacca and proceeded to Bruas, which is a small river in the Perak country. As the Treaty of Bankok had provided against such a movement, the Ex Raja gave out before he left Malacca that he intended.* The Raja Muda or Heir Apparent of Perak, instead of declining participation, as he should have done with reference to the Treaty just mentioned, went accompanied by a fleet of boats and visited this rather untoward guest, and although the latter had, while in power in Kedah, leagued with the Siamese against Perak, still the Raja Muda appeared inclined to espouse his cause.

As the independence of Perak, which had been secured by the expedition and Mission of 1826 and by the subsequent Treaty of Bankok, could only be permanently maintained by the strict neutrality of that State as regarded the affairs of Kedah, the Honble. the Governor, Mr. Murchison, directed Captain Low to meet the Raja Muda on the Perak Frontier, and after that officer had strongly exposed to him the dangerous position into which he had foolishly cast himself, he consented to return to the seat of the Perak Government.

The Ex Raja settled himself and his adherents on the banks of the Bruas River in Perak, and then began a systematic course of intrigue with his old friends in Penang and Province Wellesley exactly in the same manner and obviously tending to the same results as his intrigues in the former war.

About this time Mat Ali, one of the Ex Raja's adherents who had been pirating along the Kedah coast for some time before, and had been distinguished by the Ex Raja with the title of Sri Kirniajaya (a), made a sudden descent on, and took possession of the Pulo Lancavi, which are rocky and, with slight exceptions, barren islands lying off the Kedah coast and under the Siamese jurisdiction. Here he continued

(a). This title appertained to his father who was Governor of the Lancavys under the Malayan rule.
until the middle of April employing himself in pressing into the Raja's service, as he called it, all the Malayan boats he could command; many of these were trading boats from Penang. Those which were suspected to belong to persons well affected towards the Siamese were taken and plundered.

The Honble. the Governor of the Straits sent to inform Mat Ali that if he did not forthwith remove to a distance force would be used to drive him away.

Agreeably to the instructions of the Government Captain McCrae proceeded to Brunas with H. M. sloop of war Zebra in order to persuade or to oblige, if persuasion should not suffice, the Ex Raja to return to Malacca.

On the 19th April Captain McCrae took five of his boats well manned and armed up the Brunas River to the Ex Raja's residence. He was found in a house defended by a slight stockade and surrounded by some hundreds of Malays armed with spears, krises and arms of all kinds. Every possible argument was used by Captain McCrae to induce the Ex Raja to go to Malacca, but this old Chief, who had ever been noted for obstinacy when it was most to his disadvantage, doggedly replied that he had made up his mind to go to Kedah, that it was beneath his dignity to be so removed, and that he might be taken but not alive. During this conversation it would appear from all accounts that Captain McCrae had in a persuasive manner, but which was doubtless considered as a much too familiar one, put his hand on the Ex Rajah's shoulder. Krises all around were instantly half drawn from their scabbards, but luckily a motion of the Ex Raja's hand checked the murderers' impulse. Captain McCrae, finding all his arguments rejected, told the Ex Raja that as he had requested it, he would give him the ensuing night for deliberation and return in the morning. The interview of the 20th when Captain McCrae proceeded in his gig was equally unsatisfac-
tory. On returning down the river, the rest of the boats were met coming up. The Ex Rajah’s Chief, who had followed in a boat, was sent back to say that upon his, Captain McCrae’s, coming within sight of the village and Ex Raja’s brig (then lying at anchor close to his house) he would fire a blank cartridge, when, if a white flag should appear on the brig he would consider it as a signal that he, the Ex Raja, intended to submit.

It is probable that both the Ex Raja and his adherents did not believe that force would be used to get him out, for if they did they would undoubtedly have taken the easy precaution of impeding the narrow stream, or creek, by felling trees across it, and then annoying the boats by firing at them out of the thick jungle which here reaches the water edge on the banks and meets overhead.

Having thus met his boats Captain McCrae again ascended until within about a hundred yards of the Ex Raja’s house. No white flag appeared and the blank cartridge was returned by a shot from the brig. Soon after this the boats kept advancing when they were met with a fire from the stockade, and a line of about three hundred Malays. The brig was soon swept clear by the grape of the boats and the guns were than turned towards the people on shore, aided by the fire of a party of marines. The engagement lasted about half an hour, when the Malays disappeared and the Ex Raja came out of the jungle, where he had concealed himself with his family, and giving himself up, embarked on the brig. The loss on the part of the Malays was considerable although not ascertained. In the boats one man was killed on the spot, one was mortally wounded, two most severely, and one slightly wounded.

The brig was towed to Penang to be fitted with sails and then conveyed the Ex Raja to his former quarters at Malacca. Tuanku Abdulla, the eldest son
of the Ex Raja, took an active part in this affair, and received a slight wound in his foot. Kuntil Mohamed Ali, a man who had fled for rebellion and murder from Province Wellesley in 1831, was also conspicuous. The separate men who had collected round the Ex Raja had expected to reap a rich harvest of plunder under the cloak of zeal for his cause, and it is probable that they would have resisted the boats of the frigate even had the Ex Raja forbidden them. But the removal of the Ex Raja to Malacca did not damp the ardor of his adherents who kept up a constant correspondence with him. Active and secret preparations were made by those both in Penang and Province Wellesley for an attack on Kedah and although these preparations were known to be in progress long before the outbreak, still, as no ostensible illegal acts were committed such could not be easily prevented. In the mean time Wan Mat (or Mahomed Ali) continued to increase his fleet of boats and to plunder every boat he met with whose owners could in any way be considered as belonging to or connected with the Siamese, even although they were British subjects. It was now that the editors of the Penang Gazette (a) recommenced that reckless system of mendacity and low bred and violent scurrility which it had persevered in through Kudin's war and up to the present hour. Their sole aim, as if actuated by the bloodthirsty revenge of the savage, has been to urge two demibarbarous races to an exterminating contest, and it may be safely affirmed that much of the blood which has been shed in the provinces of Kedah, Sangora and Chana, may be laid to their charge. Blinded by passion, hating the government and its

(a). Nothing more clearly proves that fact that a newspaper is the bane, the deadly nightshade, of a small colony, than the result which has followed the editing of this Gazette. It is only surprising that the community can submit to be insulted by an editorial oligarchy notoriously known to be composed of some of the least respectable portion of its members. It is impossible to fix with legal certainty upon any one as the editor.
officers, and vaunting themselves as champions of right against might, they have materially if not chiefly been the means of goading on the infuriated Malays to their own [?] undoing], as is usual with agitators. Vilifications of the executive authorities were unsparingly asserted to nullify every precautionary or preventive measure taken by them to arrest the hostile movement.

If the names of those vain because ignorant self-elected redressers of wrongs, real or imagined, were made known, they would doubtless excite a smile of pity or contempt.

The mercantile portion of the Penang community (if not the latter generally) lives in a political horizon which is confined to a small circumference by the selfish interest of the hour. It is not many years ago since they used to tremble at the thoughts of the Siamese attacking Penang and it might not be difficult again to put them into a similar panic. One might have thought that peace would have been the watchword of the Straits merchant. But here they do not see where their true interest lies, and unhappily the native merchants at least, who are mostly temporary residents, [and] care little either about the internal welfare of the settlement or its external politics, make money in any way that offers itself to them.

At one time we hear of nothing but ferocious, blood-thirsty and treacherous Malays, but the wind of profit shifting, the ear is saluted with the twaddle of poor oppressed ryots, unfortunate, helpless, ignorant Malays and so forth.

The contents of the Gazette were dispatched weekly to the Malayan Chiefs in Kedda, and as several influential gentlemen of this Island (not Government officers) kept up a correspondence with these men, and they heard themselves applauded by every class of natives, these last were inclined to
believe that their cause was secretly approved of by the British authorities—nor could after Proclamation do away with this belief, more particularly as the law has not attached specific penalties to the political offences therein denounced.

The Siamese had been frequently warned to be on their guard against the Malays. But six years having elapsed since the attack of Kudin the Governor of Kedah paid no attention to the advice given to him by Captain Low. Instead of sending to Ligor for a reinforcement of troops, he relied on the small dispersed Siamese parties he had in Kedah, not exceeding 300 men in all, vainly confiding in those Malays who had sworn fidelity to the Government of Siam for assistance in case of an attack. A general laxity in fact prevailed in the local Government. The garrison of Kedah consisted of about 800 men only, and fell therefore easily before the invaders.

In 1828 Tuanku Mohamed Saad, son of Tuanku Daad, who was half brother to the Ex Rajah’s father, and Wan Mahommed (or Mat Ally) acting in concert with the Ex Raja’s adherents, circulated a paper throughout Province Wellesley inviting the ryots to take up arms against the Siamese. The appeal was effectual, and although every endeavour by proclamation and otherwise was made to prevent a movement, still the people flocked to join the standard of the insurgents at the Muda [and] Marbow Rivers. A partial reaction took place in May (1838) but Tuanku Mahommed Saad Puteh, a brother of Tuanku Mahommed Saad, still kept his footing at Kota on the Pry River, and became the centre of the insurgents in that part of Kedah.

The Siamese now felt the evil they had brought on themselves by allowing the separate characters who had fled from justice in Penang, to harbour on their boundary at Muda River. It was deserved because
they had neglected the remonstrances made to them on this point.

Tuanku Mahomed Saad, with about seven or eight hundred men, now possessed himself of the whole frontier line on the Siamese side of the British Territory, and prepared to penetrate to the heart of Kedah by an attack from seaward. Tuanku Mahomed Saad and Wan Mat Ali arrived with a fleet of boats at the Marbow. The Siamese sent a force to oppose them, which was driven back with loss.

About this period, Wan Mat Ali had full possession of the Lancavy Islands. It is however probable that the attack upon Kedah would have been delayed if the Raja of Ligor had been at Ligor, instead of Bangkok.

Tuanku Mahomed Saad attacked the Kedah Fort by sea on the 3rd August but was beaten back. Next day the force under Tuanku Mahomed Taip (or Payeh) approached on the land side. (a) The port at this

(a). Tuanku Mahomed Saad went with five hundred men as his escort under Che Teh to negotiate in the first instance with the Sangorean. In this way he waited forty days and returned unsuccessful to Kedah.

Tuanku Mahomed Taip then took the command of the Malayian forces and advanced to the frontier of Phoong Po or Tong Po, where, after much delay and very little fighting he pushed on towards the sea port of Sangora. The Sangorians gradually falling back as he advanced another force under Wan Ha and Wan Mat pulaw was detached to support the detachment employed in the Siamese district of Chana, and there to form a junction with the disaffected Patan people. It was intended that after having accomplished these objects this force should embark at the mouth of the Patan river in boats and proceed by sea to assist Taip’s army in reducing Sangora. This detachment was successful excepting in the last mentioned attempt, but it did not get any accession of Patan men as these people were afraid to join.

Meanwhile Tuanku Mahomed Taip’s force had invested Sangora at the distance of six or seven miles from its walls. But the Sangorians and Chinese made their position rather uneasy by frequently assaulting it, nor could they gain an inch of ground beyond their line of stockades.

Tuanku Mahomed Taip was about this time obliged to
time had a garrison of seventy Siamese troops only and three hundred Malays. The latter did not at first show any sign of defection nor until assailed by the strongest possible motives for it. Unfortunately the families of those auxiliaries were residing at Thubang Ratan, a little way up the river, where they fell into the hands of Taip. As the latter approached the fort he placed all these people in front of his advanced party, so as to expose them to the shot of the garrison. By this means and before the Malays had become aware of this detestable and inhuman measure, three of the old men and to* women had been killed, and many wounded. When the Malays became aware of it they left the fort and joined Tuanku Mahomed

return to Kedah to detail a supply of ammunition.

The force from Chana under Echee having joined Taip’s at Sangora, the whole now consisted of about 4,500 men. Still they were ultimately, after 2½ months of futile warfare, compelled to break up and retreat precipitately, owing to the Siamese army of Ligor having intercepted this retreat on Kedah.

I have entered above into the details of the Malayan campaigns as these may serve to show up and refute the gross misrepresentations which, for party purposes, the Penang Gazette has indulged in when advertising to Kedah affairs.

The Chiefs in Kedah, congratulating themselves on the expected speedy fall of Sangora, being quite unaware that the Ligorian’s troops had already crossed the Kedah frontier, dispatched Seyd Hoassein with three hundred men to augment the Sangorian’s army. But he had only reached the distance of a march from the Ganoo, close to Kedah fort, when he encountered the Siamese advance of one thousand strong.

After a short resistance he and Wan Soo Hahmim, an inferior Chief, with thirty men were killed and the party was dispersed.

The Siamese immediately attacked Aler Ganoo, the central post in Kedah which, lying on the north bank of the river, commands the chief communication with the interior. This post was carried after a contest of six hours. The loss of this occasion was considerable on both sides.

The Chiefs Tuanku Mahomed Saat, Tuanku Abdul, Tuanku Tunamee and Tuanku Taip Puteh retreated and shut themselves up with a few men in the Kedah Fort. The Siamese advanced and carried the intrenchment of Sungei Bharu and soon after became masters of the fort.
Taip. The Siamese left the fort during the ensuing night, retreating in the direction of Purlis. The Malays then took quiet possession. Chawing, the Siamese Governor, pushed into Satool and from thence to Daloong (the Bandelon of the maps). He however established a small party of about 250 Siamese and also 200 Malays who had not joined the insurgents. Near the north boundary of Keddah, by concealing themselves in the jungles, these men were able to sally forth occasionally and to annoy the force under Wan Wait Tap, consisting of about 500 men, which had been sent to keep them in check.

The Malayan insurgents had been led to believe that the Siamese were much stronger here than they were; the Siamese officers too did not scruple to keep up the deception, and when brought by the Ligorian's agents to confer with the Honble. the Governor, Mr. Bonham, they boldly affirmed that the Siamese force in the vicinity of Trauy* was not under six thousand strong and they could only account for their inactivity by the evasion that they were waiting for the arrival of the Raja of Ligor before attempting to retake Keddah.

The population of the Province of Keddah when the Fort fell may be rated at about twenty thousand persons (a) of all ages, but of this the insurgents drew betwixt four and five thousand fighting men, and the Siamese betwixt two and three hundred. To these first were added the contingent from Penang and Province Wellesley so that the rebel force consisted of seven thousand men at the outset, but of this army there were eight hundred men employed in the carriage of stores and otherwise as coolies and servants. Perak sent five boats.

(a). This rate is the highest assigned by my native informants. I am however inclined to rate the population there at 16,000 only.
This force was disposed of as follows:

Keddaah Fort under Tuanku Mahomed Saad .... .... .... 400
Alar Gano Tuanku Mahomed Taip Puteh .... .... .... 200
Purlis 150 Wan Mat Ally and Fleet ... 350
(Purlis and Trang were taken possession of ten days after Keddaah Fort had fallen.)
Sattooal Taip and Lungoo-Wan Keip
(or Mat Taip or Payeip) .... .... 500
Scattered parties at Muda River,
&ca., &ca. .... .... 300

Total troops in Keddaah .... 1,750
Puteh also Panglima Behar and Tuanku Jaffar Sangora Detachment .... 8,000
Chana (Akil Echi) Do. .... 700
Patain Do. .... .... 550
Watching the Ligorian at Jangam close [to] the Keddaah frontier .... 1,000

Total .... 5,250

Perak contingent sent by Panglima Bukit Gantang to Keddaah 100 men in five boats under Rajah Saman and Mat Tuanku Bar and—

Do. sent to Patan from Perak 300 under Tuanku Muda Mer, father-in-law of the Orang Raja Besar Patain insurgents—Not ascertained.

The grand total of the insurgent forces would, including those of Patan and Perak perhaps be about .... .... .... 10,000
The Siamese force which re-took Keddah consisted of—

Advance

- The advance under Chow Phiom Malak which took [blank] consisted of 500 men, was at the frontier with 1000 men...

- ... 1,500

Reserve

- Reserve beyond Pho on the East frontier never engaged...

- ... 3,500

- Do. of Bankok troops at Sangora never employed are rated at...

- 6,000

Total Siamese Force 11,000

About this period the Malays were or pretended to be buoyed up by the hope that the Court of Siam would allow the Malayan Government of Keddah to be restored upon payment of an annual tribute. If in earnest in this hope they adopted the very line of conduct best calculated to dissipate it, by sending emissaries to invite Patan people to rebellion against Siam and the arraying of a large force on the Force* of Sangora.

*Sic. ? frontier.

The Raja of Sangora had to gain time by pretending to intercede with the Chief of Siam for the Ex Raja's restoration.

The Raja of Sangora when he found that his own province was thus unexpectedly invaded by the insurgents, endeavoured to gain time by encouraging overtures from the Malays and holding out some vague hopes of the nature alluded to. He confidently expected too, that by so doing the Malayan Chiefs would fall into his power while thrown off their guard,
But the Raja had reason to repent of his stratagem (*) for the Malayan Chiefs sent a party with the intention of negotiating, and when they at length discovered that they had little or no chance of succeeding in this way they took advantage of their position to attack Sangora.

It is highly improbable that the Siamese will ever relinquish their sovereignty over Keddah unless compelled [to] it by superior force. Should the Court of Bankok ever be induced to deviate from the line of policy it has so tenaciously preserved for the past eighteen years it hardly can be doubted that it will never while so doing place any bar in the way to an after resumption of its delegated authority, when jealousy of its neighbours, or cupidity may impel it. Had the Malays confined their operations to Keddah the Siamese might not have laid much stress on these, however mischievous the result.

If that proud Court should retrace [its] policy so far as to restore the Ex Raja or some one of his family to the Government of Keddah it would certainly not be out of any regard for either, and the insult put upon the Siamese by the presumptuous invasion of their integral Province of Sangora and also of Chana and Patan will not, it may be believed, be soon forgotten. Neither will the atrocities committed by Tuanku Mahomed Saad on the Siamese prisoners be left unrequited at some future period, while the rash intermeddling of the Perak Malays in the contest may help to increase their implacability.

The Siamese have not as yet remonstrated on this invasion of Lower Siam by the Malays of Penang. It must be, however, a sore subject with them.

Had the Malays confined their operations to Keddah the indignation of the Siamese Court would not have been by any means excessive.

(a). It is believed that the Rajah of Sangora did submit that case to Siam but not as the Malays desired,
Keddah has been nearly ruined by these invasions which she has sustained, and the frequent drains on her population which have succeeded them. For Siam, therefore, her deepest policy and the one she is likely to adopt would be to restore the Malayan rule until such time as that population should have returned or have been recruited and the resources of the country, so injured by the late ravages, should have been reestablished, and then suddenly to resume the direct control, on one of the numerous pleas or pretences which it would take care to have ever ready at hand, or by taking advantage of one of the many openings which Malayan ignorance and presumption could not fail to afford in course of time, so that the last condition of the Malays would be worse than the first unless indeed, and this seems to be very improbable, it should league with them against the British. If Keddah should be restored in concert with the British Government the latter can only mediate for the best conditions which a tributary can make with its real superior and master.

Were the above not the policy which should actuate the Siamese, it can hardly however be expected that while the British hold their Straits possession the Court of Bankok will feel disposed to treat with the Malays singly. A guarantee would doubtless be required or asked of the former for the performance by the Malays of such conditions as might be stipulated for, while the Keddah Malays might expect a similar guarantee for their being allowed to retain peaceable possession of that country.

Were such to be acceded it might be doubtful if the British Government would not at some future period be obliged to take a more direct interest, and interfere more openly in Siamese affairs, as regarded Keddah, than had ever before been forced on it by circumstances or at least might be convenient.
It is not easy for any one who has studied the Malayan character to help entertaining the belief that no dependence can be put on it for the preservation of the external peace of that province were it returned to the Malays. Even admitting that Kedah, if returned to the Ex Rajah's family, might not involve itself with the Siamese, yet what security could be given for its internal peace. The Ex Raja must probably pay the debt of nature. His eldest son, Abdulla, is weak and addicted to opium, and the other base, although less weak, would still be the tool were he to succeed, in the hands of his Chiefs.

The other branches of that family are numerous, and they mostly all [have] been educated in dissipated, if not piratical habits.

When these jealous or ambitious schemes should have distracted Kedah it might be no easy matter to prevent their giving umbrage in a thousand ways to the Siamese nation, which would still closely hem them in upon the north and east. The Malays of [the] present Malayan States are fit for little else than plunder. Fond too of strong, yet shortened excitement, they are too often the children of caprice and passion; devoid of steady purposes and of confidence

Further Abstract Account of the Kedah War.

Tuanku Mahomed Saat being induced to believe that he might be able to persuade the Siamese to let the Ex Raja return to Kedah went with Che Teh to negotiate with the Sangora Raja.

He had five hundred men with him. On reaching the frontier of that Province he sent on Che Teh to prepare for his reception, but the former was not permitted to pass beyond Mam Nae. Tuanku Mahomed Saad remained forty days at Jamgam in that province in fruitless attempts to gain his point. Raja Sai and Blat Chai, who came on the part of the Sangora Chief, were too practised diplomats not to take advantage of the disregard which the Malays showed for a time to gain so valuable an accessory to the ulterior operations of the Ligorians.

Tuanku Mahomed Saad therefore returned to Kedah and Tuanku Mahomed Taip advanced from that place to the Sangora frontier at Phoong-Pho with a force of three thou-
in themselves, the general mass of the people is ever apt to become a ready but temporary instrument or tool in the hands of some reckless plotter or frenzied fanatic.

It is to be feared too, if we may judge from experience, that any quarrel which the Malays might get up with the Siamese or vice versa would find plenty of supporters, as they have ever found, in the Straits Settlements on the Malayan side—who would rejoice to see a break betwixt the Siamese and English.

The Court of Bankok, should it yield so far as to recall the Ex Rajah, might as a matter of right claim the ten thousand dollars per annum now paid to him by the British Government, by virtue of the original Malayan treaty, the Siamese being *de jure* the rulers of Ked dah.

Their right to Ked dah has been recognised by the English Government and it is based on a supremacy exerted over that country before Ked dah was taken completely under direct management by the Siamese. Subsequently to the Ex Raja’s expulsion the sum alluded to was paid to the Ex Raja (then Raja) by the British Government, without alluding to or acknowledging his relations with Siam. For as I have before noticed, when the Treaty just alluded to was made the then Raja studiously kept the fact out of sight or rather denied it. But the Treaty of Bankok tacitly admits the right of the British to hold Penang and its dependency on the opposite coast, and this without any advertence to the treaty of Sir George Leith.

sand Malays (*a*). The Sangora force soon after arrived at Sidda, East or *a* short way from Phoong-Pho, where the chiefs of the two parties reciprocated civilities and had several conferences, which ended in mutual distrust. Phang-lima Berar was then in charge of the advance. The Sangora troops were nearly equal in numerical strength to the Malays.

(*a*). These remain in Ked dah, Tuanku Mahomed Saad, Tuanku Ablulla, Mahomed Taip and Tuanku Mahomed Sinawi.
But the case would be now altered. The Kedah tribute would virtually be paid by the British Government either directly or indirectly. The Ex Raja, if so reinstated could have no legal claim to such tribute, for this was stipulated for when he professed himself independent of Siam and was given under the belief that he was so, by the British Government, when Sir George Leith made the Treaty with him. But that Treaty has been annulled by the Treaty of Bankok, in as much as the latter recognised the right of the Emperor of Siam to possess Kedah, and if this be the case, and the Siamese do not give up that right, then the British Government could not negotiate directly with the Ex Raja, or any other Malayan [or] other Chief who might be placed in authority in Kedah by the firman of the Court of Bankok.

It is not easy to foretell what stress that haughty Court, notwithstanding all the lessons it has had, might put at some future day on the fact of tribute, or quit rent being paid in the manner alluded to. This would not certainly (with reference merely to the relative strength of the British and Siamese), be a matter of much moment, and the Treaty of Bankok and subsequent agreement with the Raja of Ligor which is based on that Treaty, may be thought sufficient acknowledgment of the right of the British to

But as about one hundred Patan men, whose fidelity could not be depended upon, were against the number, the Sangora Commanders prepared to retreat. It appears that on the insurrection breaking out in Kedah the Patan Chiefs subject to and holding offices of Siam, were called to Sangora, which gave the old and disaffected Chiefs an opportunity of which several availed themselves of aiding the Kedah rebels.

Rajah Mnda and Me Kong joined the Siamese with one thousand men, but the latter soon deserted and left these Chiefs behind them.

The two hostile forces now stockaded themselves opposite each other and made warlike demonstrations for several days.

The Siamese at length, under their General Chom
possess Penang and Province Wellesley. But the Siamese, although they may appear to moderate their pretensions, may not be supposed on that account to have altogether abandoned them.

It can scarcely be expected that the Malays and Siamese will ever be friends at heart. Religion, were there nothing else, will always be a stumbling block in the way of this unless, which is highly improbable, the Siamese should become Mussulman. The feeling of the Siamese towards the Malays is one of mixed distrust and contempt, while the feelings of the latter towards the former are chiefly those of fear and hatred, tempered with a distrust of themselves.

The whole history of Kedah since the British occupation of Penang sufficiently proves these positions, and points moreover to the fact that to bring on a war betwixt the British and the Siamese was always a primary object with its rulers and perhaps nothing but the reiterated injunctions of the Siamese Government to the former Straits Government, averted that event.

It might not be difficult to anticipate the results to the Settlement of Prince of Wales Island which might or would be induced by the restoration of the Malayan rule in Kedah. It can be hardly doubted that the former would lose a portion of its population,

Soorin, attacked the Malays who where them headed by Panglima Besar. But the Patan troops declining to fight with vigor the Siamese were forced back. The Malays lost nine men killed and had five wounded by one account but by another account, which seems most correct, 17 Malays were killed and ten wounded, and three Siamese were killed.

The Malays at this juncture had been reinforced by the parties which were in the rear under Tuanku Mahomed Taip, Tuanku Mahomed Jaffer and Tuanku Mahomed Sriva, amounting to two thousand one hundred men, so that the united force was about 3,000 Malays of Kedah and a few irregulars of Patan, of little account.

When the Siamese were retreating they fell into an ambush laid by the Malays by which they lost thirty men.
not merely Malayan, the worst part of which might well be spared, but Chinese, the most industrious class and the best payers of revenue. The population of the Settlement is yet far from having reached to the point when a drain to it would be advantageous, on the contrary it could well admit a large access to its numbers. A diminution therefore of the population would likely affect to a certain degree the prosperity of the colony and the revenue of the State.

The trade of Kedah was never deserving of mention after the cession of Penang, and it is not likely to be ever revived to such an extent as to render it an object to the merchant. The trade of that country, which was never much, has centred in Penang ever since the act of cession and will there continue to centre. The concentrated and protected population too of a British Settlement is much more likely to gain a taste for, and to consume more British manufactures than one which is dispersed over a wide space, which looks not beyond securing the barest supply of food and clothing and whose slavish subjection to despotic rule blocks up every avenue to improvement in taste, arts or morals.

The present population raises supplies for the station and shipping and renders them independent of the neighbouring petty States.

A reduction in the quantity and enhanced price of such supplies might be expected to follow a diminution

Chom Soorin stockaded himself at Langavi where he continued twenty days, contesting the advance of the Malayan force. At the end of that time Raja Tai arrived with a force of three thousand Patan men and informed the Malayan Chiefs that the Raja of Sangora desired to negotiate. Chom Soorin being thus relieved instantly retreated, leaving Sai in charge of the stockade.

The Malayan Chiefs now detached a force to the Siamese district of Uthana in order to co-operate with a detachment which had been sent there from Kedah a month previous under the command of one of their Chiefs in order to gain further delay.
in the number of the working classes, and the deficiency would require to be drawn from Keddah, thus rendering Penang again in a measure dependent as in former times on that country, supposing always that the latter had recovered herself, and making it liable to have its supplies cut off by any disturbance there, or political misunderstandings elsewhere.

It would be strange if the Malays should not have been improved by their long residence under British rule. Any advantages therefore which superior civilisation may have conferred would be lost, and the Malay would revert to his former lawless condition, and Penang would be infested with a roving, vagrant population, vacillating between it and Keddah. Thus it would have to begin its education anew, while crime would have increased.

Keddah too would be a convenient asylum for desperate men, and for the piratical boats which come up the Straits in search of bird nests.

It seems very probable if not certain that the Court of Bankok considers that [the] British Government is more inclined to favour the Malays than Siam. It could hardly fail to be of this opinion when pressed on its notice by the Straits Journals, which find their way to Siam and are read to the Courtiers or explained to them by others.

Raja Sai now opened a negotiation with Tuanku Mamed Taip with the view of further delaying his advance, but the latter only took so far the advantage of it as to endeavour to surprise the Siamese garrison. He accordingly sent Haji Tomalli with a flag of truce and three hundred men on pretence of holding a conference with Raja Sai. Much rain fell which defeated the plot this time. But soon after the Ligorian sent a second time. This excited Sai's suspicions who threatened to stab Haji Tomalli. The latter arose from the conference and striking down with his elbow Mekan Sibber, a man of influence with Sai's party, departed quickly from the stockade.

Raja Sai fled on the ensuing night to Bindong Dilong and joined Juvin's force. The Malayas pursued in two
The Siamese have not yet been able through the despotic atmosphere which envelopes them to foresee any just conception of the licence or liberty of the subject as opposed to the wishes of his Government. It is to be feared therefore, that the licence of the press may be confounded, in the untought mind of the Siamese politicians, with the spirit of the counsels of the British Government in India.

Were any proposition for the restoration of the Ex Raja to be made to it, therefore, by the British Government that suspicious and wary Court might expect concessions [in] return.

It is well known that any concessions which have been yielded to the British by that Court have been granted with an ill dissembled reluctance, while the Americans, who have had no difficulties arising from proximity of territorial boundaries to contend with, have been enabled to conclude a mercantile treaty on more favourable terms than those which have been conceded to the British nation.

The Court of Bankok it may by supposed will not readily forego the advantages it derives from the Treaty of 1826.

parties, which seems to have been their usual order of march or pursuit. Each was a considerable way apart. The first consisting of 1,500 men was led by Tuanku Mahomed Jiva, Tuanku Jaffer, and the second of similar strength by Tuanku Mahomed Taip. The first column reached Pri, while Raja Sai retreated on Thia Ta abat, a ferry on a river of that name.

The Malays pushed on to Campong Nior where they destroyed a small brick Buddhist temple. In this they found some small gold and silver images and the model of a ship in silver, but all of little value.

At Pangla the Malays were arrested in their march for six weeks by the Siamese, but there was little or no fighting and only casualties by death on the Malayan side. The Malayan troops then broke ground and tried to out-flank the Siamese position. But the latter gave ground.

At Thia Too Oobat the Siamese army made a stand. Tuanku Mahomed Taip obliged them to take up a position
The times have so altered since then that much which the Treaty contains could be now spared. Were the Ex Raja to be restored by the Siamese the obligations of the Treaty as regards that Chief would probably cease.

It is these obligations alone which cause the distractions in Kedah to be at all felt in Penang, as they have been by creating opposition in the minds of the people.

But even if the Treaty just spoken of did not exist still there would be difficulty in securing the public peace arising from other sources.

There is international law to be considered. For if armies of three or four thousand men or upwards should periodically march from the British territory to invade the Siamese Provinces, the right of retaliation could hardly be denied to the Siamese. Fear with them might for a time prevent open war betwixt them and the British but they would nevertheless annoy the trader to these parts and bring on a restless position of affairs along the extensive mutual frontiers.

The Siamese have regained Kedah and if they hold it, it will* we may believe be retained as a point of honor. The Malays will doubtless continue to make periodical attacks on that country.

* A word illegible here.

on the south bank of the river. Here after skirmishing for some days the Siamese again retreated. The Malays lost three men only at this ferry; the ardour of both parties therefore could not have been great. Their great champion in all these affairs was Tuanku Saad who was subsequently killed in Kedah and but for whose prowess there would have been no fighting by the Malays except in self defence.

The Too Oobat is the chief ford or ferry on the route betwixt Sangora and Kedah. In the dry season the river is fordable to foot passengers. Boats of about four coyans burden can pass up to Kapanu.

The Siamese having retreated the Malays descended along the banks of the river Too Oobat. Tuanku Mahomed Taip took the north and Panglima Proce and To Druman the south bank. Tuanku Mahomed Iriva brought up the
and if the Siamese do not either keep a strong garrison there, which it is rather doubtful if they will, or colonize it by several thousand of their own race, which they perhaps cannot do without a sacrifice incommensurate with the hoped for advantage, they will be liable to reverses such as they have hitherto experienced. If Sian is determined to prevent them, then the Malays can never be strong enough to permanently regain Kedddah. Their Chiefs too by their impolitic harshness towards the Malays who followed them in their late enterprise have in a great measure quenched the zeal of the latter, and might not find so many flock to aid them again in attacking the Siamese. They still give out however that they intend again attacking Kedddah and that they are remaining in Perak for the purpose. If the Perak people were not justly suspected of pusillanimity they might be incited to hostility against the Siamese in Kedddah and thus a double war would ensue which would only end by extending the Siamese possessions to the north boundary of Salengore. This small chieftainship would soon fall also, and leave the Siamese contiguous with the Malacca territory on the northern boundary of the country.

The Perak Raja or his chief men rather, since they are the real soldiers of authority, has or have committed the country with the Siamese, for in the rear. The Siamese having reformed at a place called Ban Kachai, Tuanku Mahomed Taip followed and had an affair with the former in which he lost twelve men, while the Siamese had only three wounded. The Siamese finally fell back to Pukit Arrak Gajar, a hill lying about several miles from Sangora. The Malayan force was now about 1,500 able-bodied men. But ammunition began to fail the troops and this compelled Tuanku Mahomed Taip to return to Kedddah for a supply, but he did not return.

The Malays now established a line of nine stockades stretching from near the shore of Me Nam Nor on their left, to Bukit Arrak Gajar. Beyond this Panglima Eehee, who had arrived from Oama, entrenched his Malays consisting of 1,200 men. This investing did not embrace operations by water which their means did not admit of.
first instance as before noticed, the Chief on the coast, Panglima Paukit Gantong sent five armed boats to join Tuanku Mahomed Saad in Kedah. These boats were placed in charge of Raja Soman Mat To Boo and Che Meen and the Tuanku Mahomed Muder Mer, the father in law of the Orang Raja Besar, one of the Ministers of Perak, marched into the Patan country and joined the insurgents, who were under the command of Wan Satulak and Wan Mat Malow.

The Siamese are highly offended at the asylum which the rebel chiefs have formed in Penang for their persons and for the plunder of Kedah; and it can hardly be denied that when this fact is added to those facts just related and advertence is had to the Treaty of Bangkok they have good reasons for being so. They have, too, manifested a coldness since the recovery of Kedah quite the reverse of that displayed after the discomfiture of Kudin in 1831, and I feel persuaded that nothing can prevent them taking speedy vengeance on the Perak Country but the fear of offending the British Government, which they consider to be on the side of the Malays. The Siamese could take Perak at any time with one thousand men, or even much fewer, for they can always rely on internal treachery there as in former days.

These stockades or rather breastworks were about five to eight feet high and composed of felled fruit and other trees and materials of demolished houses. The arrangement was thus—

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| Patan, Malay and Siamese      | 2,000 |

| Total                             | 2,500 |

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1. Panglima Besar
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| Patan, Malay and Siamese      | 2,000 |

| Total                             | 2,500 |
The chief, if not the only palpable advantage, to counterbalance the disadvantage of the measure which the British could gain from the restoration of the Ex Raja's family would probably be the getting rid of the obligations contained in the 13th article of the Treaty of Bangkok.Were it not for these, the distractions in Kedah would hardly be felt in Penang. It would indeed be most desirable that the public peace in the vicinity of this trading position should be preserved, but the difficulty of finding sufficient security for this would be considerable.

If the obligations alluded to could be got rid of in any way, leaving the Malays and Siamese to settle their own disputes as they best might, there would still remain the perplexing task of preventing British subjects engaging in the wars or politics of Kedah and Siam and so leading to misunderstandings with the latter.

Kedah has now again reverted to the Siamese rule, but if the Emperor does not encourage a Siamese population which perhaps cannot be spared from Siam, or does not keep an adequate military force in the country, a matter involving some but no great expense, it hardly can be doubted that the Malays will make periodical plundering attacks on Kedah. That they will ever hold permanent possession of that tract by

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The Chinese of Sangora having formed counter works sent a party and manfully stormed the entrenchments of Panglima Peosee in the left of the line with five hundred men. They had but few muskets and they advanced with their long pikes or Tat in hand covered by high moveable shields or screens of plank. They here drove back the Malays with some loss. But the latter regained the position soon after. They had arrived in toyes by the Me Mam Naé from Sangora. These returned and remained entrenched opposite to the Malayan line. The Malays here stood on the offensive and repulsed several other attempts to break their line. So close did the Chinese (who were about 500 men) approach, that they actually spiked some of the Malayan wall pieces. During these and other minor affairs the Chinese lost thirty men and the Malays about a hundred.
force of arms in face of the power of Siam seems to be impossible. It is even to be supposed that the Malays of Penang will not be so eager to enter into the views of their chiefs, who can only have, if any, a moral authority over them, because they have been greatly distressed by the extreme severities practised towards them by their chiefs.

But to return to the operations in Sangora, the whole column (if such term can be applied to a rabble Malayan army) pursued the Sangorians to Tharam, where they had stockaded themselves, and having driven them out of that place, they pushed onwards to Ta Oobat where the Sangorians kept them at bay for a month.

The Siamese force was here joined by a Patan one of 1000 men under Raja Sai but it was still forced to Nam Noe. The party under Wan Tha and Wan Mat Pulowe now marched to Chana, the villages of which they first plundered and next the town which lies on the Chana river, about a tide up from the sea. The Chinese and Siamese inhabitants fled to Sangora, and the Buddhist priests took refuge in the hills. The Malays

The Malayan had no cannon and the Sangorians only fired occasionally from three guns of different calibre. Tuanku Iriva's party suffered most. The Malays kept on the defensive during the whole of his siege, when their only chance of success, if indeed they had even a chance, depended on the most prompt and forward movements. But the mass of the Malays desired plunder without having to fight for it, and finding that none was likely to be had on such terms they were only kept in the ranks by a dread of the cruelty of their chiefs. Their chiefs claimed the lion's share of plunder, leaving little or nothing to their humble followers.

The Malayan force during its route through the Sangora country sacked and burned down the villages and destroyed the temples. Tuanku Mahomed Taip destroyed about thirty of the latter and promised the plunder of the two great pagodas of Anak Gaja to his men, but they could not be reached but through the Sangorian lines. Very little plunder was obtained. Several large idols formed of tin were melted down and carried off. Some buried property belonging to a Chinese at Wat Mai Nor, the extreme left of the position
having sacked and burnt the town and pagodas (about ten in number) left the vicinity; the images which they found in the temples and carried off were formed of tin—these they melted down into bars. Thence they proceeded to Ootah Bharoo and finally reached Kwalla Buka the mouth of the Patan River. Here the leaders hoped to be able to get boats to convey their force to the attack of Sangora, in which expectation they were disappointed.

Tuan ku Mahomed Taip's force of 4,200 men advanced and invested the town of Sangora, which is a thriving mercantile Siamese port peopled chiefly by Chinese. This town being open to the sea the Malays could only partially invest it. For this purpose they built eleven small stockades within a mile of the town, which they vainly hoped to plunder. After they had been about 2½ months in this inactive state, the Sangorians, who had purposely abstained from interrupting their invaders until they should have been better prepared, went out against them with a force of five hundred Chinese and two thousand Siamese and Malays and drove the enemy from their vaunted frontier with considerable loss.

The Malays lost about 150 men during the whole operations in the Sangora country. The loss on the Siamese side was probably less, although the Malays rated it, as might be expected, very high.

was got by Tuan ku Mahomed Taip, the eyes of a large image of Buddha which sat between a tree directing, as the Malays affirm, to the spot. Thus then, deprecating as he does, idol worship and disbelieving as he does, or avers, the agency of idols, the Malay here superstitiously gives them credit for intrusion. Some Musselmans believe that such idols are animated by devils to deceive mankind. The above statement was taken from the mouth of a Malay who was present. Amongst other things the Malays carried off thirty elephants from the Sangora Province and sent two hundred Siamese prisoners to Kedah besides women and children. The former were massacred in cold blood, the two latter were carried away as slaves by the Chiefs.
Tuanku Mahomed Taip Puteh, and Syed Hoossein left the camp on a visit to Kedddah to attend a festival, leaving Tuanku Mahomed Iriva in command. All this time it should seem that these chiefs had no correct intelligence of the movements of the Raja of Ligor. That wily chief saw his advantage, for by this mad expedition to Sangora the Malays had left Kedddah with a slender force for its defence, and had exposed the Sangora one to have its retreat cut off.

Before either force therefore was aware of it the **Sangorian** troops were pouring into Kedddah.

Syed Hossein was on his march back to Sangora with a party of 300 men when he encountered, most unexpectedly, the Siamese advance at a place a day's march east of Alor Gaud. That Chief and an inferior one named Wan Soo Hashim with thirty Malays were killed and the rest fled.

The Siamese immediately attacked Alor Gaud on the Kedddah river, which from its favourable and commanding position on the river is deemed the next post to that Fort in consequence, and after a contest of about six hours, got possession of it.

The walls of Sangora, which are made of brick and are 12 feet high, were within view of some parts of the Malayan line. Thirty elephants were taken by the Malays. Tuanku Mahomed Iriva's column suffered most.

The Raja of Sangora had now fully accomplished his part of the manoeuvres for the recovery of Kedddah. He had found that the Malays were not even eager to fight and that the bulk were only kept together by fear of their overbearing chiefs. It is reported that the latter urged them on not only with the lash but steel. The Malays sent about 200 Siamese prisoners to Kedddah.

The Raja of Ligor sent a party to create an alarm in the rear of the Malayan line, and it immediately proceeded towards Kedddah, leaving all confusion and dismay within their lines. Having thus fully completed his arrangements the vanning Malays found that Kedddah had been almost regained from Tuanku Mahomed Saad and that a body of 2,000 Siamese was on their line of retreat. All was, now confusion and rout, each chief trying to escape as he best could, so that after losing a number of men in the retreat the
The Siamese now pressed on towards the Fort into which had gone the chiefs, Tuanku Mahomed Saat Abdullah, Tuanku Mahomed Timnawi and Tuanku Mahomed Taip Pateh. The day after they had so shut themselves up the Siamese attacked the breastwork at the watering place at Soongie Bharoo and carried it, and Panghula Setam, who defended it, fell back to the Fort. By this blow the Malays were deprived of fresh water, as the wells within the Fort are very brackish and the river is here mixed with salt water, while a salt marsh and mangroves extend around.

The facility with which the Siamese gained all these advantages supplies the best possible commentary on [the] alleged ability of the Malays to contend with Siam.

The Siamese next advanced to Kotah Janah, an earthen breastwork within a few hundred yards of the Fort. The Malayan Chiefs had by this time ordered all the women, old men and children to fly to Penang, which they did in small boats and by land. But many whole force dwindled down to a few hundred men who got into Kedddah; the rest fled into Penang and Province Wellesley.

Each returned by Chana and reached Province Wellesley.

Chana Patan.

Chana is a Siamese District adjoining on the south the province of Sangora. The population may be about five thousand persons scattered about in hamlets. The Chief resides at Chandong, where there are about a dozen houses, which is distant about one tide from the sea. In the first instance the Chiefs Echi and Akil went from Kedddah to Chana with 180 picked men, and attacking the small villages or hamlets in detail soon forced the inhabitants to retreat to Sangora. The houses were burned down and the pagodas of Nawa Cheng and Takea Thap were destroyed in a fit of religious zeal.

At Chindong the Siamese Chief with a few followers made a show of resistance for the sake of escaping in the night which he effected.

The Malays had been here about a month when they were joined by seven hundred more men from the Kedddah force under Che Mim and *
were so weak by the cruel detention they had met with, and the scarcity of proper food that they died by the way. The Siamese had previously proclaimed that these people would be protected, and doubtless had they been left to their own choice they might have remained. But humanity made no part of Mahomed Saat's policy. His object was not the happiness of these poor people but to leave to the Siamese a depopulated country.

Tuanku Mahomed Abdullah and the other Chiefs allowed their men to disperse, and sending a sampan or canoe with two fishermen in it out of the river, which easily evaded the frigate, they got into it at a neighbouring creek, and soon after reached Purlis.

It was now resolved to make one more attempt to regain the Fort. Intelligence was therefore quickly sent to the Sangora force to return to Alor Ganoo.

It should seem that the Patan column had dispersed even although it had been reinforced by 300 Perak Malays under To Muda Mer, the father in law of the Orang Kya Besar, a Minister of the Perak State.

The latter by this act, and by having also allowed Jaffer, a desperate character, to join Tuanku Mahomed Saad with five boats at Keledah, has, it is to be feared, given to the Siamese the means if they choose to avail themselves of it of again asserting their influence in Perak.

The Sangora column of 6,000 men, before it had well entered Keledah had melted away to a few hundred men. This party marched to Jiram, a place lying betwixt Keledah and Purlis, where it was soon after joined by the detachment under Tuanku Mahomed Saad and Wai Ally who brought up that portion of the Malayan force which had been left to protect Keledah and keep the Siamese parties at Sangora in check. The force was thus now again increased to 1000 men. It quickly advanced on Alor Ganoo, where
it was foolishly divided into two parties. Mahomed Ally with his men invested that post on the north bank, while Tuanku Mahomed Saad, seconded by Tuanku Mahomed Taip and Tuanku Mahomed Sinnawi and Panglima Pooree and Tuanku Dieva with his men occupied posts on the opposite bank of the Kedda river.

The Siamese speedily attacked both columns consecutively but chiefly the latter position, and forced the Malays of both to disperse, the Chiefs flying in the direction of Province Wellesley.

Mat Ali did not fight much as his object was to let Tuanku Mahomed Saad get time to escape. He kept therefore at a little distance gradually drawing off the Siamese.

The next day the Siamese continued the attack on Mat Ali first, which was defended until night by that Chief, as he was not aware of what had taken place on the opposite bank of the river. He then retreated during the night en route to Purlis, a district of Kedda, north of the Fort. In his progress he devastated the face of the country, forced the unhappy population out of their houses and then burned them to the ground, and this before time had been given them to save all their property, and then ordered them to leave Kedda and proceed to Penang.

The same scenes were repeated at Purlis, which was reduced to ashes. Thus the people who were living quietly and who were ready and willing to submit to the Siamese rule were cruelly driven from their houses and exposed, not only to a further loss of property, but of life, in effecting or trying to effect a journey or passage to Penang. It may here be asked [whether] the Siamese in their utmost wantonness ever visited these unfortunate people with a severer infliction. Certainly not. It seems that many of these oppressed people have fled to Batter Bhara as well as to Penang.

Tuanku Abdullah was now conveyed from a concealed creek called Qualla Pooryah beyond the blockading vessels and placed in safety in the Lancavy
Islands. He delivered himself up to the Honble. Mr. Bonham soon after. *  

Tuanku Mahomed Saad was believed to have got 10,000 dollars in goods and cash.  

It is believed that much plunder was conveyed in this Chief's vessels besides captive Siamese women and children. The country now remained fully in the possession of the Siamese.  

The Malayan Chiefs fled to Perak and other distant places.  

Thus after all the silly vaunting of the Ex Raja's Chiefs, and the echoing to it of their allies in Penang, the Malays may be said to have scarcely made a single stand after the Siamese entered Kedah, and to have scarcely exhibited any pugnacious symptoms excepting on occasions were they for the Siamese*. By their own admission they had eight thousand men in all under arms, yet they have allowed a thousand Siamese to drive them like a flock of sheep out of Kedah. This would not probably have been the case had not plunder been the only object of the Malayan invasion of Kedah. Pro patria mori was the boast of the Chiefs at the outset, the cover to cowardice and every atrocity in the end.  

Tuanku Mahomed Saad, when he fled from Alor Ganoo, occupied the north frontier of Province Wellesley for about a fortnight and until the Siamese approached. Here he seized the cattle which the emigrants were bringing from Kedah, and although he had levied a duty on them at Kedah he forced them again to give up 20 per cent of the cattle, which he immediately sold to people of Penang. He also seized all the arms belonging to these refugees. He ended by flying to Perak with his plunder.  

Tuanku Mahomed Saad during this rebellion put several hundred prisoners to death in cold blood and in some instances in the most inhuman modes, and he cut off, on slight suspicions, the heads of many of his
own people, besides being the cause of 2,000 Malays having been killed in the contest. He has since given out that he has repented of his behaviour to his followers and that he will adopt a mild line of conduct in future expeditions. So fickle is the Malay that he may probably forget his present disgust should the standard of rebellion be again hoisted in Keddah.

The atrocities which the veracious Penang Gazette proclaimed had been committed by the Siamese on the Malays during the war, have [been] fully and satisfactorily refuted by evidence before the Grand Jury at Penang, not that such a Jury had any right to enter into such a subject, but it was as well it did to satisfy the public for and other* evidence. But the cry of the * was intended to distract the public mind from the true track and to drown the voices which were ready to denounce the villainies and atrocious acts of the Malayan Chiefs in Keddah, not only towards their prisoners but towards their own people. The Chief Tuanku Mahomed Saat killed in cold blood the following prisoners—

Blat Chi, a Siamese Chief of Sangora, who, fell by accident into his hands* of Patan Yokkabat the late Siamese Chief officer at Muda River and his two young children. These children were about six or seven years old; they [came] to visit me and behaved with great propriety. They had previously forced him to become by the usual rites a Mussulman and put him as driver of a gang of ironed Siamese prisoners, who were working on the road near the Keddah Fort.

The whole of this gang of 120 Siamese were put to death at the same time and the cries and noise attendant on this most savage massacre was heard, I have been informed by an officer of His Majesty's Ship Hyacinth, on board of that vessel.

Khoon Seet, another Siamese Chief of Trang (a place which, although never a part of Keddah, the
Malays took) and many inferior Siamese prisoners who were captured at various times at Trang, Sangora, Chana and Patan, were all inhumanly slaughtered in cold blood.

A Bengal man named Hassan Ally, formerly a Sepoy in the Penang Local Corps, having foolishly joined the Malays, was latterly accused, falsely it is said, of some treasonable intent, and when the Siamese were approaching the Fort, Tuanku Mahomed Saad called him and said that as his heart was false it should be exposed. They ripped him down from hence to the abdomen and then threw him out behind the Fort where he lay in torture until death relieved him in about eight hours after.

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<th>Malayan Statements</th>
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<td>Malays Killed</td>
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<td>.. Margono and other places</td>
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<td>Desultory—vizt.—Deaths at sea, in camp &amp;ca. including women and children</td>
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<th>Malayan Accounts of Siamese losses</th>
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<td>At Muda River, Marbow and Keddah</td>
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<td>Prisoners put to death in cold blood</td>
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It is satisfactory to reflect that during the whole of this foolish, yet barbarous contest, the mass of Malays did not exhibit any symptoms of discontent towards the British Government, and it is creditable to them when it is known that their chiefs had the weekly aid, for more than a year, of the British Press, towards exciting their minds to revolt against their rulers. The Chiefs are hardly exceptions, for some of them left their families in security under the British flag at Penang, as did all the common men who followed them from that Settlement. Indeed the Malays were too well aware of the value of the only asylum remaining to them from the ambition of the Siamese, a people who in their sober periods they fear, and who all confess they can never hope to contend with single handed. But whatever the result might have been these ryots knew full well the incalculable benefits such asylums as Penang and Province Wellesley afford from the oppression of the Native Rulers, and the latter district, containing nearly 50,000 persons, continued as quiet internally the whole time as if no war had been going on. Nor did that population require to be watched by one armed policeman beyond the common and very moderate complement. The guard of sepoys which was sent occasionally to the north extremity at the Muda River was intended to protect the population from lawless gangs from beyond the boundary.

The Penang Press made several insane attempts to instil into the mind of the Malays that the policy of the English Government regarding Kedah would justify discontent and even something more. And if these failed of effect it argues that the mass of our Malayan subjects are quite satisfied with their position.

Of these men 533 are said to have been Siamese, the rest Malays with 1 Bengalee, 2 Chinese.

It is probable that the Malays have exaggerated the numbers included on the Siamese side.
and that the war of Kedah was to them at first one of pastime and plunder, however disagreeable it afterwards became, and that not one tenth of the whole had any other or ulterior object than plunder.

[ The remaining portion of this chapter deals almost exclusively with piracy, and has therefore been omitted. It contains an account of the expedition organised by the Honble. Mr. Bonham and Captain Chaddes, R. N. ]

CHAPTER X.

Condition of Kedah.

The war at Kedah which had terminated so much to the disadvantage of the Malays left that country, as might have been anticipated, in a state of great disorder, and as its population has since then been much reduced by immigration to Penang and Province Wellesley, the formerly cultivated tracts have, in many places, reverted to jungle.

The Court of Bankok considered it expedient to place the Kedah Malayan Chief, Tuanku Anoon, who had adhered to its interests during the war, in authority in Kedah, and gave to him as his co-adjutor Tuanku Hossain, a merchant of Penang and a connexion of the Ex Raja. But it was found and confessed by the Malays who remained in Kedah that the rule of these men was more severe and exacting than that even of the Siamese, so that but very few of the Malays who had fairly settled under British rule returned to Kedah although invited to do so by flattering promises.

The Chow Phriya of Ligor was recalled to Siam (and as has been reported) on some charges preferred against him by the Siamese Governor of Sangora, one of which it has been hinted was that he was over attached to the English.
This Chief who was one of the ablest men Siam has ever been possessed [of] died at Bankok, and was succeeded by one of his sons.

When Tuanku Mahomed Saad had lost Kedda he took refuge with a few armed boats in a winding narrow creek in the Perak Country, which communicated with the Krean River near to its mouth and opposite to the English territory. He was leaving this position with an intention of flying to Sumatra when he was seized by a gunboat sent for the purpose by the chief authority at Penang, and he was subsequently sent up before the Court of Judicature there to be tried for piracy. The case was however thrown out on the plea of "no Jurisdiction" and because it was considered by the Court that this man had been lawfully fighting to regain from the Siamese a country (Kedda) to which the latter nation had no right. So that this tree booter who had taken care to fill his purse with the plunder both of friends and foes while he held sway in Kedda, and who had robbed the native traders of Penang, not only before and during that period but after he had been expelled and his power had ceased, was sent out of H. M.'s Court of Justice as an injured man and a martyr to English policy? He was however forthwith sent up to Calcutta by order of the Supreme Government and after strenuous opposition from the Court of Judicature there, no doubt the result of want of due information as to the merits of the case, and torrents of invective from the equally misinformed periodicals, he was conveyed up the country and placed in safe custody.

At Penang, party spirit ran so high that the affairs of Kedda had no chance at any time, far less then, of being calmly discussed.

For some years the state of the land revenue of the Straits Settlement had come under the review of the Supreme Government, and a Legislative Act had been passed regarding it.
It would require a space much larger than the limits of this memoir can spare for an elucidation of this important subject. However it is understood that arrangements are now in progress for a final settlement of landed interests, which will give to the occupiers a permanent interest in the soil. At the beginning of this paper reference has been given to the various documents regarding it.

The Honble. the Governor, Mr. Bonham, had been for some time endeavouring to soften the feelings of the Court of Siam towards the Ex Raja of Kedolah. Accordingly the younger son of that Chief, Tuanku Daee, was dispatched by his father to the Court, bearing letters from his father and from Mr. Bonham. The time seemed propitious for such an intercession, for since the Burmese war the Siamese had been greatly enlightened as to the extent of the British power and had been manifest gainers by the Treaty which followed that war. They had therefore, one may feel assured, every disposition to hold fast the Treaty of Bankok. Lastly, the British operations in China and the success with which these had been crowned had not, we may believe, been lost on Siam.

Tuanku Daee was favourably received at Court and the Ex Rajah has been allowed by it to return to Kedolah.

That Court addressed a letter to the Honble. Mr. Bonham for the information of the Right Honble. The Governor General of British India, of which the following is a summary——

1. The Court enters into a long detail of the events which led to the expulsion of the Chow Phriya or Governor of Kedolah, commonly called the Ex Raja by the English, and also of the events subsequently to the period of his expulsion, in order fully to develop the real situation of that Chief with relation to Siam.
The principal points insisted on under this head are—

1. That the Chow Phriya withheld the gold and silver flowers, as marks of vassalage, which had always been paid before that time.

2. That he added to this disrespectful conduct a disobedience of the orders he received from the Court.

3. That he had invited His Majesty of Ava to invade the lower Provinces of Siam and offered to cooperate with the Keddah people against him.

4. That the Chow Phriya and his people refused to assist as in duty bound, they being lieges of Siam, the troops of the Emperor of Siam in repelling the expected invasion.

5. That this contumacy and rebellious behaviour of Keddah was at the time highly detrimental to the interest of the Siamese because the ports of Keddah lie along the western sea and are therefore exposed to Burmese hostile fleets, while the unfettered possession of them by Siam enables her to build and fit out fleets of armed boats and prahus for the defence of her lower provinces.

6. That the Chow Phriya's sons and adherents had thrice invaded Keddah after he had fled from it.

7. That he had intrigued with the Rajahs of Perak and Salangore to invade Keddah.

8. That he had never ceased to try all he could to expel the Siamese from Keddah and this notwithstanding the pledge given to the Ligor Raja of Keddah by Captain Burney who was sent by the Penang Government to treat with his Highness there that the Chow Phriya would not be allowed to molest Keddah.

9. That the Emperor was of opinion that since the religion, the laws and the customs of the Siamese [and the Malays] are quite distinct from each other,
it would be needless to expect that they would live peaceably together. Like oil and water they refused to mix.

Therefore His Majesty had resolved to govern Kedda in future by means of such Malayan Chiefs as might be found trustworthy and that with this object he had directed that this country should be divided into three Governments.

That as the Chow Phriya had supplicated at Court for forgiveness of all his past errors and rebellions, and had sent his son to prove at the royal feet his contrition and to express his desire to be hence forward an obedient servant to His Majesty, the latter had, on the representation of his Council, graciously permitted the Chow Phriya to go and reside at Kedda.

Finally that as the 13th Article of the Treaty of Bankok would, in the event of the Chow Phriya returning to Kedda, be rendered useless, His Majesty desired that it might be expunged.

The whole of this lengthy document betrays a determination in the Court of Bankok to hold fast its supremacy over the country of Kedda, and the right to treat it as one of the Lower Provinces of Siam.

The Ex Raja is merely styled Chow Phriya, which is equivalent to "Governor" and which is a title chiefly appertaining to a Governor of the first grade (a).

The Emperor here makes no promises. The Ex Raja is allowed to go and reside in Kedda, and when he shall have shown his obedience by proceeding there, the office of Governor will doubtless be bestowed upon him. His Majesty of Siam, if we may judge from the

(a). In a paper on the Government of Siam, published in the Transactions of the Calcutta Asiatic Society (for 1836) I have [described] the various functionaries of the Empire.
general tenor of the document before us, makes the continuance of the Ex Raja or any of his family in authority in Keddah, to depend on his or their own conduct and continued fealty to Siam.

The Ex Raja will make a bad exchange of the security and independence he now enjoys under British rule for a distracted and subservient sway in Keddah. Should he however go there he will find himself placed in the same position with relation to Siam which he held when he left it, with this difference as to power only (and it is a considerable one) that instead of his having the Government of the whole country his share will not much exceed one-fourth part of it. (a) He will have to transmit annually to the Court of Bankok, through Ligor, the gold and silver flowers with their accompaniments, in acknowledgment of his direct dependence on Siam, such being required from all Governors of frontier provinces.

This mark of subjection costs but a small sum. The real revenue payable to Siam consists in the obligation, which has been imposed on the Governors of Keddah from time immemorial, and which will not be dispensed with we may believe hereafter, of supplying boats, men, munitions of war and rice for Siamese armaments, and in the performance of other feudal services in times of peace.

It was the enforcement of these services which formerly induced the Ex Raja to revolt from Siam.

(a). The Ex Raja will have the government of the coast stretching from the River Muda to Puriis, which may form an oblong square of 35 miles by * and which embraces the River Ligor [and] Fort of Kedda. She will be subject to Ligor.

Tuanku Diva will be Lieut. Governor of the adjoining district of Suttoo and will be [subject to] Sangora. Tuanku Anum will have the upper country consisting of 24 parishes, and will be under Ligor.

The Raja of Sangora will settle the boundaries of these divisions.
The present policy of Siam is the best which she could have adopted for her own future interests. Kedddah may gradually recover itself to a moderate extent, and the Court will always be able, without the trouble of direct interference in its internal affairs, to control its resources and apply them to the advantage of Siam.

Perhaps too that Court may contemplate the possibility of the British giving up the Tenasserim Coast at some future time and thus leaving them again in contiguity with Ava throughout a long line of frontier.

Siam possesses an unbroken line of seacoast from the southern boundary of Province Wellesley at the River Muda, together with all the islands, including Junkceylon, which lie along that coast. It can be no matter for surprise therefore, that the Siamese Court is so jealously tenacious of its authority over that tract, as all its previous acts have shown, and the document now before us shows it to be. The value of Kedddah to the Siamese in their wars with Ava was fully appreciated and proved by them about twenty years ago when the Burmese had seized on Junk Ceylon and had fortified a position at the mouth of the Trang River, close upon the northern boundary of Kedddah, and which river is a Siamese territory.

It may be true that the Treaty of Ava and the occupation by the British of the Tenasserim Coast have arrested or barred any hostile attempts of the Burmese on the Siamese frontier there, but the Siamese have no pledge that the British may not at some future period change their policy in this direction, and they will act upon the belief that such a change is probable. Independent however of these views and motives, leading to a cautious policy on their part, the Siamese are doubtless very desirous of holding firm possession of the outlets which the Kedddah rivers afford for the
produce of the interior, and also [it] is to be apprehended that the class which could best be spared, the worthless one, will prefer the productive fields of Province Wellesley and Penang to depredating amongst the impoverished inhabitants of Kedda.

The old Panghuloos districts may, or some of them may, again try their fortunes under their old master in Kedda. But most of their men are at this moment substantial landed proprietors under the British Flag and should they return to Kedda they will probably leave portions of their families behind them, unless indeed they should be so improvident to as sell their estates, which last is a contingency which, as I have heard, some speculators have been long calculating upon, while loud in their cry for their restoration to the Ex Raja.

The Ex Raja is now far advanced in life. His eldest son, Abdullah, has but a slender capacity and his brother Tuanku Dace, although more prudent, would it is to be suspected become an easy tool in the hands of his officers should he succeed to his father.

If the four Malayan Chiefs, including the Ex Raja, who are now to be placed by the Court of Bankok in charge of distinct Divisions of the Kedda Country, shall remain at peace amongst themselves it will be more than past experience of the Malayan character might warrant us in predicting.

(Signed) JAMES LOW.

Major.

Singapore
26th April 1842.