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THE
S'AMKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA,

WITH

Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries.

TRANSLATED BY
JAMES R. BALLANTYNE, LL. D.,
LATE PRINCIPAL OF THE BENARES COLLEGE.

THE
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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

Occupying an important place in the six systems of Indian Philosophy, the Samkhya Aphorisms of Kapil and their gloss and commentaries cannot be ignored. Therefore it was quite in the fitness of the things, that an eminent Sanskritist like Dr. Ballantyne translated not only the Aphorisms, but also gave illustrative extracts from the commentaries, without which, being very concise, the aphorisms would have been scarcely intelligible.

Besides the value of the very accurate translation, this edition has an additional value of being the most authoritative, because its text has been edited on the basis of almost all the available manuscripts.

However, it is so unfortunate, that inspite of its importance and a wide interest in its study, not only this translation of Samkhya Aphorisms, but almost all other editions of its text and English translation have been completely out of print. Therefore, in order to make it accessible to the desirous readers, we are now reprinting it under our scheme of publishing rare and out-of-print works of importance.

We have every hope that, like our previous undertakings, this will also be favourably received and encouraged by every one.
PUBLISHER'S NOTE

This is a page containing a note from the publisher. The note discusses the importance of the book, the quality of the printing, and the efforts made to ensure the best possible presentation. The publisher stresses the value of the content and invites the reader to appreciate the work put into creating this publication.
ADVERTISEMENT.

The present work, both in its Sanskrit portion and in its English, is an amended reprint of three volumes,¹ published in India, which have already become very scarce. An abridged form of those volumes,² which subsequently

¹ Their titles here follow:


² Occupying Fasciculi 32 and 81 of the New Series of the Bibliotheca Indica, issued in 1862 and 1865. The proof-sheets of only 32 pages of the whole, from the beginning, were read by Dr. Ballantyne; the rest, by Professor Cowell.

The title of the abridged form runs: "The Sánkhya Aphorisms of Kapila, with Extracts from Vijnána Bhikshu's Commentary," &c. But this is a misrepresentation, as regards Book I., which takes up 63 pages out of the total of 175. The expository matter in that Book is derived, very largely, from other commentators than Vijnána.
appeared, contains nothing of the Sanskrit original but the Aphorisms.

While, in the following pages, all the corrections obtainable from the abridgment have been turned to account, an immense number of improved readings have been taken from another source. Three several times I carefully read Dr. Ballantyne's translation in as many different copies of it; entering suggestions, in the second copy, without reference to those which had been entered in the first, and similarly making independent suggestions in my third copy. All these1 were, on various occasions, submitted to Dr. Ballantyne; and such of them as did not meet his approval were crossed through. The residue, many more than a thousand, have been embodied

Vedánti Mahádeva mainly supplies it at the outset, and, towards the end, well nigh exclusively, Aniruddha. Some share of it, however, will not be traced; it having been furnished by one of Dr. Ballantyne's pandits, whom I have repeatedly seen in the very act, as by his own acknowledgment, of preparing his elucidations.

1 Many of them, especially in Books II.—VI., rest on readings of the original preferable to those which had been accepted.

Though not fully published till 1856, my edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya, its preface alone excepted, was in print as early as 1853; and Dr. Ballantyne had a copy of it. A few arbitrarily chosen words apart, his text, after Book I., is borrowed from it throughout, but with no mention of the fact. My advice was unheeded, that he should profit by the copious emendations which I had amassed and digested from better manuscripts than those to which I at first had access. Greatly to his disservice, he would not be induced even to look at them. It faring the same with my typographical corrections, he has, here and there, reproduced errors, more or less gross, which might easily have been avoided. See, for specimens, pp. 197, 288, 357, 373, 374, 381, 390.
ADVERTISEMET.

in the ensuing sheets, but are not indicated, as successively introduced. The renderings proposed in the footnotes are, for the most part, from among those which have recently occurred to me as eligible.

That Dr. Ballantyne had any thought of reissuing, in whatever form, the volumes mentioned at the beginning of this Advertisement, I was unaware, till some years after he had made over the abridgment of them to Professor Cowell, for publication. Otherwise, I should have placed at his disposal the materials towards improvement of his second edition, which, at the cost of no slight drudgery, are here made available.

The Sānkhya Aphorisms, in all the known commentaries on them, are exhibited word for word. The variants, now given, of the Aphorisms, afforded by accessible productions of that character, have been drawn from the works, of which only one has yet been printed, about to be specified:

I. The Sānkhya-pravachana-bhāshya, by Vijnāna Bhikshu. Revelant particulars I have given elsewhere. My oldest MS. of it was transcribed in 1654.

1 Nor has attention been topically directed to sundry blemishes of idiom which have been removed; as, for example, by the substitution of 'unless' for 'without,' of 'in time' for 'through time,' of 'presently' for 'just,' and of 'between the two' for 'between both.'

2 "At the time of his departure from India, in 1860, Dr. Ballantyne left with me the MS. of his revised translation of the Sānkhya Aphorisms." "Notice," in the Bibliotheca Indica, New Series, No. 81.

3 For details respecting these commentaries and their authors, see my Contribution towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems, or my Preface to the Sānkhya-sāra.
II. The Kapila-sánkhyā-pravachana-sūtra-vṛitti, by Aniruddha. Of this I have consulted, besides a MS. copied in 1818, formerly the property of Dr. Ballantyne, one which I procured to be copied, in 1855, from an old MS. without date.¹

III. The Laghu-sánkhyā-sūtra-vṛitti, by Nāgeśa. Of this I have two MSS., both undated. One of them is entire; but the other is defective by the three first Books.

IV. The Sánkhyā-pravachana-sūtra-vṛitti-sāra, by Vedánti Mahádeva. Here, again, only one of two MSS. which I possess is complete. The other, which breaks off in the midst of the comment on Book II., Aph. 15, is, in places, freely interpolated from No. I. Neither of them has a date.

Nearly all my longer annotations, and some of the shorter, were scrutinized, while in the rough, by the learned Professor Cowell, but for whose searching criticisms, which cannot be valued too highly, they would, in several instances, have been far less accurate than they now are.

F. H.

Marlesford, Suffolk,
Aug. 28, 1884.

¹ I once had a second copy of this very rare work, bearing no date, but most venerable in appearance. Like many of my manuscript treasures, it was lent, and never found its way back to me.
The great body of Hindu Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary, the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible; they being designed, not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity which must needs attach to them, in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits in the Benares Sanskrit College having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Brâhmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve, further, the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East, as regards that of the West.

These pages, now submitted to the criticism of the pandits who read English, are to be regarded as proof-sheets awaiting correction. They invite discussion.

Benares College,
5th January, 1852.

J. R. B.
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THE SÁNHKYA APHORISMS
OF KAPILA.

BOOK I.

a. Salutation to the illustrious sage, Kapila!

b. Well, the great sage, Kapila, desirous of raising the world [from the Slough of Despond in which he found it sunk], perceiving that the knowledge of the excellence of any fruit, through the desire [which this excites] for the fruit, is a cause of people's betaking themselves to the means [adapted to the attainment of the fruit], declares [as follows] the excellence of the fruit [which he would urge our striving to obtain]:

अथ चिनिधुः खायन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यत्नपुरुषांधे: || ७ ||

The subject proposed. Aph. 1. Well, the complete cessation of pain [which is] of three kinds is the complete end of man.

1 श्रीकपिलमुनये नमः: ||
2 अथ जगदुहिंदीयुमेहामुनि: कपिल: फलसौन्दर्यमानस्य फलेच्छादारा साधनप्रवृत्ता कारशालं पश्यन्तफलसौन्दर्यमाह ||
a. The word 'well' serves as a benediction;¹ [the particle atha being regarded as an auspicious one].

b. By saying that the complete cessation of pain, which is of three kinds,—viz., (1) due to one's self (ādhyātmika), (2) due to products of the elements (ādhibhautika), and (3) due to supernatural causes (ādhidaivika),—is the complete end of man, he means to say that it is the chief end of man, among the four human aims, [viz., merit, wealth, pleasure, and liberation (see Sāhitya-darpava,§ 2)];² because the three are transitory, whereas liberation is not transitory: such is the state of the case.

A question whether the end may not be attained by ordinary means.

c. But then, let it be that the above-mentioned cessation [of all the three kinds of pain] is the complete end of man; still, what reason is there for betaking one's self to a doctrinal system which is the cause of a knowledge of the truth, in the shape of the knowledge of the difference between Nature and Soul, when there are easy remedies for bodily pains, viz., drugs, &c., and remedies for mental pains, viz., beautiful women and delicate food, &c., and remedies for pains due to products of the elements, viz., the residing in impregnable localities, &c., as is enjoined in the institutes of polity, and remedies for pains due to supernatural causes, viz., gems [such as possess marvellous prophylactic properties], and spells, and herbs of mighty

¹ अथ शन्ते मञ्जुरार्थ: ॥

² चिन्तित्वाभायत्तिमानितिपादायि:चिन्तैविकहस्यदु:कस्यात्मलनिवृत्तिर्यन्तपुरुषार्थशचतुर्भ: पुरुषार्थं मध्ये श्रेष्ठ: पुरुषार्थं इत्यर्थयांशां भाय-नामोच्चस्याख्यितादिति भावः: ॥
power, &c.; and when [on the other hand], since it is hard to get one to grapple with that very difficult knowledge of truth which can be perfected only by the toil of many successive births, it must be still more hard to get one to betake himself to the doctrinal system [which treats of the knowledge in question]? Therefore [i.e., seeing that this may be asked] he declares [as follows]:

अभ २. थे एक्टियू एवज़्समी अप्समिन्द्रुम्भ्र नुरुप्रतिक्षिति ॥ २ ॥

The effectuation of this [complete cessation of pain] is not [to be expected] by means of the visible [such as wealth, &c.]; for we see [on the loss of wealth, &c.,] the restoration [of the misery and evil] after [its temporary] cessation.

1 नन्वस्तूनन्विनिर्वित्तिक्षुप्पुष्याप्रभृतिधारिप सत्यपुष्यायतायतिहयत्चतन्नहेतुशास्त्रप्रवृत्तोक्त हेतु: शारीरिकोषितकानामैत्रमाध्यायोषितकानाय मानसे खनिवर्तकानां वर्षकीमित्यातिमाध्यायोषितिकु खनिवर्तकानां नीतिशास्त्रोपदिश्तिनिर्वित्तियथायथायायानादीनामाध्यायोषितिकु खनिवर्तकानां मानसेनम्महायायोषितकानां सुकराण्यां सच्चेनानेनकर्म-परंपरायायासाध्यो तत्त्वानेनतुद्दुक्ते प्रवृत्तेद्वैम-भवने शास्त्रप्रवृत्तेद्वैंभवतत्तत्त्वात श्राह ॥

2 Instead of निवृत्ते, the reading of Aniruddha, and of most MSS., Vijnāna has, to the same effect, निवृत्ते. Ed.
a. 'The visible,' in the shape of the drugs, &c., above-mentioned [§ 1. c.].

b. 'The effectuation of this,' i.e., the effectuation of the complete cessation of pain.  

c. Why is it not [to be thus effected]? Because, after the cessation (the cessation of pain is understood), we see its restoration, the springing up again of pain in general, [from whichever of its three sources (§ 1. b.)].

d. The state of the matter is this: not by the expedients above-mentioned is there such a removal of pain, that no pain arises thereafter; for, when, by this or that expedient, this or that pain has been destroyed, we see other pains springing up. Therefore, though it be not easy [§1. c.], the knowledge of truth [as a complete remedy] is to be desired.

e. But then, grant that future pain is not debarred by drugs, &c., [employed to remove present pain], still, by

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1} दृष्टादुक्षिणाष्ठादिरुपात ॥} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{2} तत्सत्त्विन्दुःक्षात्यन्तिनवृत्तिमिश्रितः ॥} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{3} न भवति कुतः। निन्वृत्तेहुःक्षानवृत्तिन्विनिर-मिति शेषोन्नवृत्तिदर्शनाहुःक्षातीयात्यन्तिनिर्धरे-नात्} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{4} ऋयं भावो नात्तिरिधियिदुःक्षानवृत्तिनिरिविशिष्ठा} \]
\[\text{दुःक्षानवृत्तिभेवति तत्रदुपायेत्तत्रहुःकेषु नश्चेष्वः प्रि} \]
\[\text{दुःक्षान्तरोत्यन्तिनिर्धरेिनात्। तस्मादसुकर्लेठिपि त-} \]
\[\text{ल्यान्मेिष्टिभ्यमिति ॥} \]
again and again obviating it [as often as it presents itself], there may be the cessation of future pain, also. This doubt he states [as follows]:

\[\text{Aph. 3. [Let us consider the doubt] that the soul’s desire [the cessation of pain, may result] from exertions for the obviation [of pain], as is the case with the obviation of daily hunger.}\]

\[\text{a. When pain shall arise [let us suppose one to argue] then it is to be obviated; and thus there is the soul’s desire, the cessation of pain; just as one should eat, when there is hunger; and thus there is the soul’s desire of the eater, viz., the cessation of hunger. In regard to this [doubt] he states the recognized decision.}\]

\[\text{The more ordinary reading of MSS., and that of Aniruddha, is सच्चा°, ‘excellence,’ not सच्छा° with Vijnāna. Ed}\]
Aph. 4. This [method of palliatives (§3)] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence; because it is not everywhere possible [to employ it at all], and because, even if this were possible, there would be an impossibility as regards [ensuring] the perfect fitness [of the agents employed].

a. For there are not physicians, &c., in every place and at all times; and [to rely on physicians, &c., would not be advisable], even if there were the possibility,—i.e., even if these were [always at hand], since physicians are not perfect [in their art];—for pain cannot with certainty be got rid of by means of physicians, &c., with their drugs, &c. Moreover, when corporeal pain has departed, there may still be that which is mental, &c.; so that there is not [under such circumstances], in every respect, liberation from pain. For these reasons, such a soul’s aim [as that which contents itself with temporary palliatives] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence,¹ [i.e., who are acquainted with authoritative treatises].

b. He mentions another proof² [of his assertion]:

¹ नहि सर्वसिद्धे सर्वसीधऽकाले वैद्यादय:
सति संभवेद्यप सर्वसीधि वैद्यार्दिनां सत्त्वाभाबात्
चतुर्विभिन्नविश्ववस्माधादिना दुःखं हातुं शक्यते।
किं च शारीराधुःखापमे मानसादेशस्य
संभव हि न सर्वं दुःखाधिमाके।।
तत्साग्नम्
माधुर्कुशलेरीद्रविघधपुपधारणः हेय हि

² युक्त्वल्लरमाह।।
Aph. 5. Also [an inferior method ought not to be adopted,] because of the preeminence of Liberation [as proved] by the text [of Scripture declaratory] of its pre-eminence above all else.

a. One ought not to endeavour after the removal of this or that pain by these and those expedients [§ 1. e.]; since Liberation (moksha), by being eternal, is transcendent as a remover of all pains. Moreover, one ought to endeavour only after the knowledge of truth, which is the means thereof [i.e., of Liberation]; because the Scripture tells its pre-eminence above all [other objects of endeavour], in the text: ‘There is nothing beyond the gaining of Soul, [with the utter exclusion of pain].’

b. But then [it may be suggested], when you say liberation, we understand you to mean from bondage. And is that bondage essential? Or is it adventitious? In the former case, it is incapable of destruction; if it come under the latter head, it will perish of itself, [like any other adventitious and, therefore, transitory thing]. What have we to do with your ‘knowledge of truth,’ then? To this he replies [as follows]:

1 न तत्तत्त्वावैस्तत्तन्नुः: खो खेदे यतितथ्यं मोक्षस्य नित्यनेन सर्वेदुः: खो खेदरूपेनोदक्षरात्। ओतम-लाभात्यरं न विद्यते इति सर्वाक्षर्यं शुतोरिपि तत्साधने तत्स्तान्य एव यतितथ्यम्॥

2 ननु मोक्ष इत्युक्ते वन्नादिति प्रतीयते। स च
An objection met.

Aph. 6. And there is no difference between the two.

a. There is no difference in the applicability of liberation, on either of the suppositions, that the bondage is essential, and that it is adventitious, [supposing it were either (see § 19. b.)]. That is to say, we can tell both how the bondage takes place, and how the liberation takes place.¹

b. Now, with the view of demonstrating [the real nature of] Bondage and Liberation, he declares, exclusively, in the first place, the objections to Bondage's being essential ² [§ 5. b.]:

Liberation must be possible; else the means would not have been enjoined.

Aph. 7. There would be no rule in the enjoining of means for the liberation of one bound essentially.

¹ उभ्षेऽवर्न्धस्य स्वामाविकान्तुकलंकोमाश्म-स्योपादेक्षेवादिविषेषः। यथा वन्ध्येऽपपत्तिःश्च माय्दस्य तथा वर्षं वर्षं श्रूकम इत्यः।

² ऋष्व वन्ध्यमाय्योरूपपत्तिःश्र्येमादितावत्त्व-भाविकले वन्ध्य दूषण्यायाह।
a. Since Liberation has been stated [§ 1] to result from the complete cessation of pain, [it follows that] Bondage is the junction of pain; and this is not essential in man. For, if that were the case, then there would be no rule, i.e., no fitness, in the Scriptural or legal injunction of means for liberation: such is what must be supplied, [to complete the aphorism]. Because, to explain our meaning [by an illustration], fire cannot be liberated from its heat, which is essential to it; since that which is essential exists as long as the substance exists.¹

b. And it has been declared in the Divine Song [the Ṛgveda-gītā]: 'If the soul were essentially foul, or impure, or changeable, then its liberation could not take place even through hundreds of successive births.'²

c. [Since some one may be disposed to say] 'Grant that there is no fitness [in the Scriptural and legal injunctions, (§ 7. a.)], what have we to do with that?' Therefore he declares [as follows]:³

¹ दुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तेवेवरोक्षालब्धेऽदुःखयोगः स च पुरुषे न स्वाभाविकः। तथा सति मोक्षाय साधनोपदेशस्य चैतस्य स्मारत्स्य च विधिरनुष्ठानं न घटत इति शेषः। न हंसने: स्वाभाविकाहै-ख्यामेश्य: संभवति स्वाभाविकस्य यावहृष्ठभाव-विलादिति भावः।

² उवेः चेष्टरगीतायाम। यत्रात्मा मलिनो श्वरो विवारी स्यावस्मावतः। नैह तस्य भवेनुमक्षिणमान्तरश्तैरपीति॥

³ भवननुष्ठानं किमेतावतेत्यत्रा ह॥
Aph. 8. Since an essential nature is imperishable, unauthoritativeness, betokened by impracticableness, [would be chargeable against the Scripture, if pain were essential to humanity].

a. That is to say: since the essential nature of anything is imperishable, i.e., endures as long as the thing itself, it would follow [on the supposition that pain is essential to humanity], that, since Liberation is impossible, the Scripture which enjoins the means for its attainment is a false authority, inasmuch as it is impracticable [in its injunctions. And this is out of the question; Scripture being assumed, here, as in all the others of the six systems, to be an exact measure of truth].

b. But then [some one may say], let it be an injunction [to use means for the attainment of an unattainable object], on the mere strength of Scripture; [and, since Scripture is an unquestionable authority, we may be excused from asking or answering the question, why the injunction is given]. To this he replies [as follows]:

नाशक्षापदेशविधिविद्विश्वातिश्रद्धनुपदेश: || ५ ||

1 स्वभावस्यथानपायिलावह्वभाविलासमा-श्वसंबंधनं तत्ताधनपदेशाशुतेरतनुदानलक्षा श्म-प्रामाण्यं स्वादिश्यथ: ||
2 ननु श्रुतिलादिवानुष्ठानं स्वात्तचाह ||
An impracticable injunction is no rule.

Aph. 9. There is no rule, where something impossible is enjoined: though it be enjoined, it is no injunction.

a. There can be no fitness, or propriety, in an injunction with a view to an impossible fruit; seeing that, though something be enjoined, or ordered [to be effected] by means that are impracticable, this is no injunction at all, but only the semblance of an injunction; because it stands to reason, that not even the Veda can make one see sense in an absurdity: such is the meaning.¹

b. Here he comes upon a doubt:²

शुकपरबधीजवचेत् ॥ १० ॥

A doubt whether the essential be not removable.

Aph. 10. If [some one says] as in the case of white cloth, or of a seed, [something essential may be not irremovable, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

a. But then [the doubter is supposed to argue], the destruction even of what is essential [in spite of what is stated under § 7] is seen; as, for example, the essential whiteness of white cloth is removed by dyeing, and the essential power of germination in a seed is removed by

¹ ऋशक्षाय फलायोपदेशस्य विधिरनुभानं न संभवति यत उपरिद्धे विहितेऽपशक्कोपायेनो- पदेश एव न भवति किं तूपदेशभास एव वाधि- तस्मां ब्रेदोदधि पि न बोधयतीति न्यायादित्यर्थः: ॥

² ऋषभशक्षे ।
fire. Therefore, according to the analogy of the white cloth and the seed, it is possible that there should be the removal of the bondage of the soul, even though it were essential. So, too, there may be [without any impropriety] the enjointment of the means thereof. Well, if [any one argues thus], such is the meaning\(^1\) [of the aphorism, to which he proceeds to reply].

b. He declares\(^2\) [the real state of the case, with reference to the doubt just raised]:

\textit{शक्तियुपबानुजवाभ्या नाशकोपदेश: \(\Pi 99\) \(\Pi\)}

\textit{Aph. 11. Since both perceptibleness and [subsequent] non-perceptibleness may belong to some power [which is indestructible], it is not something \textit{impracticable} that is enjoined, [when one is directed to render some indestructible power imperceptible].}

\small\textit{Decision that an essential property may be hidden, but not removed.}

\textit{a. In regard even to the two examples above-mentioned [§ 10], people do not give an injunction for [the positive destruction of] something essential, which is indestructible [§ 8]. Why [do we say this]? Because, in these two}

\footnote{ननु स्वाभाविकस्याध्यमाय: दृष्टयते यथा शुक्परस्य स्वाभाविकं शेषकृं रागेशापनीय: यथा च वीजस्य स्वाभाविक्षुर्शकिर्मितिनापनीयते । ज्ञ: शुक्परस्यव्रीजवच स्वाभाविकस्यापि वन्यस्मापाय: पूर्वे संभवतीति । तद्वेद्व तत्साधनोपदेशः स्यादितिर चेदित्यर्थः ।}

\footnote{समाधि: ॥}
instances of the perceptibleness and non-perceptibleness of a power [the powers, namely, of appearing white and of germinating (see § 10. a.)], there are merely the manifestation and [afterwards] the hiding of the whiteness, &c., but not the removal of the whiteness, or of the power of germination; because, that is to say, the whiteness of the dyed cloth and the germinating power of the roasted seed can again be brought out by the processes of the bleacher, &c., [in the case of the dyed cloth], and by the will of the Yogi, [the possessor of supernatural powers, in the case of the roasted seed], &c.¹

b. Having thus disproved the notion that bondage is essential [to man], wishing to disprove also the notion that it is the result of some [adherent] cause, he rejects the [various supposable] causes, viz., Time, &c.:²

¹ उक्ष्ट्रुष्टान्तयेषायरणशक्तियोपेण लोकान्यां न भवति। कृतः। शक्त्यश्रवनुभौवन्यूष्रषान्तहायं शुक्लवादेराविभौवतिरोभावावेव भवतो न तु शैक्षुप्तांकुरशैक्षापायः। रज्जििज्जिस्तितादिदित्स्यरुपमुक्ति-बीजयः। पुनः: शैक्षुप्तांकुरशैक्षाविभावादिति भवः॥

² एवं वन्धस्य स्वाभाविकलं निराकृत्य नैमिन्नित्वादि-कलात्मकं निराकारिष्ठितिमित्त्रानि कालादीपि निराकरोति॥
Time, which applies to all, cannot be the cause of the bondage of a part.

Aph. 12. Not from connexion with time [does bondage befall the soul]; because this, all-pervading and eternal, is [eternally] associated with all, [and not with those alone who are in bondage].

a. The bondage of man is not caused by time; because [if that were the case,] there could be no such separation as that of the liberated and unliberated; because time, which applies to everything, and is eternal, is at all times associated with all men, [and must, therefore, bring all into bondage, if any].

Place, for the same reason, cannot be the cause.

Aph. 13. Nor [does bondage arise] from connexion with place, either, for the same [reason]

a. That is to say: bondage does not arise from connexion with place. Why? 'For the same reason,' i.e., for that stated in the preceding aphorism, viz., that, since it [viz., place] is connected with all men, whether liberated

1 न कालनिमित्तकः पुष्पस्य चन्द्रो व्यापिने नित्यस्य कालस्य सवेषः पुष्पः सर्वकालावधे देन संवन्धानुमुक्तः मुक्तव्यवस्थानुपप्तेः।
or not liberated, bondage would [in that case] befall the
liberated, also.\(^1\)

\textbf{नावस्याति देहधर्मेऽवाचस्या:} || 98 ||

\textit{Aph. 14. Nor [does the bondage of the soul arise] from its being conditioned [by its standing among circumstances that clog it by limiting it]; because that is the fact in regard to [not the soul, but] the body.}

\textit{a. By 'condition' we mean the being in the shape of a sort of association. The bondage [of the soul] does not arise from that; because that is the property of the body [and not of the soul]; because, that is to say, bondage might befall even the liberated [which is impossible], if that which is the fact in regard to another could occasion the bondage of one quite different.}\(^2\)

\textit{b. But then [some one might say], let this conditioned state belong to the soul. On this point [to prevent mistakes], he declares:}\(^3\)

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\(^1\) देशयोगतोहारिपि न वचः। कुतः। अस्मातुर्वैकृत्यान्मुक्तसर्वपर्यायसंबन्धान्मुक्तस्यारिपि वन्यापत्तेऽरित्यथः।

\(^2\) अवस्या संधातिविशेषप्रताः। ततो न बन्धस्या देहधर्मेऽवाचस्या साशाद्यवश्यकाः मुक्तस्यापि वन्यापत्तेऽरिति भावः।

\(^3\) ननु पुरुषस्यैववाचस्या स्वात्तचाह
Aph. 15. Because this soul is [unassociated with any conditions or circumstances that could serve as its bonds, it is] absolute.

a. The word iti here shows that it [i.e., the assertion conveyed in the aphorism] is a reason; the construction with the preceding aphorism being this, that, since the soul is unassociated, it belongs only to the body to be conditioned.¹

Aph. 16. Nor [does the bondage of soul arise] from any work; because [works are] the property of another [viz., the mind], and because it [the bondage] would be eternal,² [if the case were as you imagine].

¹ इति इति पुरुषस्यासः ज्ञातवस्माय देहमाच्छर्मेतिमिति पूर्वसूचीणावयः ॥

² The commentator Aniruddha omits the final word, च. Ed.

³ Professor Wilson’s Dictionary erroneously gives ‘uninterrupted continuance’ as one of the definitions of atiprasanga; and that definition, in all probability, suggested ‘eternal’ to the translator, who here had to do with atiprasakti. Near the end of a, in the next page but one, atiprasanga is rendered ‘undue result.’ For the synonymous atiprasakti and atiprasanga, respectively, see Aph. 53, with the comment on it, and the comment on Aph. 151, of this Book. Colebrooke, on various occasions, represents one or other of these terms by ‘wrest,’ ‘straining a rule,’ ‘room for misconception,’ &c. As technicalities, they generally signify ‘illegitimately extended application’ of a canon, notion, or the like. Ed.
a. That is to say: moreover, the bondage of the soul does not arise from any work, whether enjoined or forbidden; because works are the property of another, i.e., not the property of the soul [but of the mind]. And, if, through a property of another, the bondage of one quite distinct could take place, then bondage might befall even the liberated\(^1\), [through some acts of some one else].

b. But then [some one may say], this objection does not apply, if we hold that bondage may arise from the acts of the associate\(^2\) [viz., the mental organ]: so, with allusion to this, he states another reason, 'and because it would be eternal,' i.e., because bondage, in the shape of connexion with pain, would occur [where it does not,] even in such cases as the universal dissolution\(^3\) [of the phenomenal universe, including the mental organ, but not the soul].

c. But then [some one may say], if that be the case, then let the bondage, too, in the shape of connexion with pain, belong [not to the soul, but] to the mind alone, in accordance with the principle that it have the same locus as the works [to which it is due]; and, since it is an established point that pain is an affection

\(^1\) न विहितविविभक्तकर्मेश्वापि पुश्चस्य बन्धः
कर्मणेपन्यथर्मेलादनात्मर्मेलादितिः
\(^2\) Upādhi, for which see p. 53, 1, infra. Ed.

\(^3\) ननु स्वेपाधिकर्मेशा वन्धाकारी नायं दौष्ट
इत्याश्चेन हेलन्तरमाहाति प्रस्तुते श्रेष्ठति प्रलयादा
विप दुःखयोगविष्ठयो पानेषु श्रेष्ठेऽपरि
of the mind, why is bondage [i.e., connexion with pain] assumed of the soul, also? With reference to this doubt, he declares [as follows]:

\[\text{विचित्रभेगानुपपत्तिरन्यथमेवे \| १७ \|}

\[\text{Aph. 17. If it were the property of any other, then there could not be diverse experience.}\]

\[a. \text{If bondage, in the shape of connexion with pain, were the property of another, i.e., a property of the mind, there could be no such thing as diverse experience; there could be no such different experience as one man's experiencing pain, and another man's not: [for, it must be remembered, it is not in point of mind, but of soul, that men are held, by Kapila, to be numerically different]. Therefore, it must be admitted that pain is connected with the soul, also. And this [pain that belongs to the soul] is in the shape merely of a reflection of the pain [that attaches to its attendant organism]; and this reflection is of its own attendant [organism] only; so that there is no undue result}^2 \text{[deducible from our theory].}\]

\[\text{नन्देर्वं दुःख्योगच्छोपायि बन्धः कर्मसामानाधिकरणानुरोधिन चिन्तन्येवतु दुःख्य चिन्तन्यथमेवताया: सिद्धवाच किमर्थं प्रुःखस्यापि कल्यते बन्ध इत्याश्चायामाह् \|}

\[\text{दुःख्योगच्छपवस्यान्यथमेवे चिन्तन्यथमेवे विचित्रभेगानुपपत्तिः कथितेव दुःखभोजकः कथिते विचित्रभेगानुपपत्तिः \| ऋतः पुरवेदिपि}\]
b. He rejects also the notion that Nature (prakriti) is directly the cause of bondage:

Aph. 18. If [you say that the soul’s bondage arises] from Nature, as its cause, [then I say] 'no;’ [because] that, also, is a dependent thing.

a. But then [some one may say], let bondage result from Nature, as its cause. If you say so, I say ‘no;’ because that, also, i.e., Nature, also, is dependent on the conjunction which is to be mentioned in the next aphorism; because, if it [Nature] were to occasion bondage, even without that [conjunction which is next to be mentioned], then bondage would occur even in such cases as the universal dissolution,² [when soul is altogether disconnected from the phenomenal].

² Here and in the comment, I have corrected तस्यापि. Ed.

³ ननु प्रकृतिनिमित्ताय हर्षलितै चेन्द्र यत्स्या ऋषि प्रकृतेमुखङ्गमृते वक्ष्मावषंयोगः पारततः तेन विनापिः वन्यकाव्यप्रलयादावपि वन्यप्रसस्तात्.
b. If the reading [in the aphorism] be nibandhāṇā [in the 1st case, and not in the 5th], then the construction will be as follows: 'If [you say that] the bondage is caused by Nature,' &c.

c. Therefore, since Nature can be the cause of bondage, only as depending on something else [i.e., on the conjunction to be mentioned in the next aphorism], through this very sort of conjunction [it follows that] the bondage is reflexional, like the heat of water due to the conjunction of fire;[3] [water being held to be essentially cold, and to seem hot only while the heat continues in conjunction with it].

d. He establishes his own tenet, while engaged on this point, in the very middle[4] [of his criticisms on erroneous notions in regard to the matter; for there are more to come]:

न नित्यशुद्धव्रद्धस्वभावस्य तत्त्वागत्योगो-गात्रे॥ ९५ ॥

1 This is the lection preferred by Aniruddha and his followers. Ed.

2 निवन्धना चेदिति पाठे प्रकृतिनिवन्धना बडलता चेदिति योज्यम्॥

3 ऋते यत्सरतन्ना प्रकृतिवैशिर्कार्यं भवेन्द्रस्म-देव संयोगविशेषार्थार्थिका कथातिमिन संयोगाज्जयार्थिति॥

4 स्वसिद्धान्तमुनिव्र प्रस्खलनान्तराल एवाव-धारयति॥

5 Here follows, in the first edition, the particle तः, for which no authority has been discovered. The word translating it I have retained, but bracketed. Ed.
Aph. 19. [But] not without the conjunction thereof [i.e., of Nature] is there the connexion of that [i.e., of pain] with that [viz., the soul] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence.

a. Therefore, without the conjunction thereof, i.e., without the connexion of Nature, there is not, to the soul, any connexion with that, i.e., any connexion with bondage; but, moreover, just through that [connexion with Nature] does bondage take place.

b. In order to suggest the fact that the bondage [of the soul] is reflexional [and not inherent in it, either essentially or adventitiously], he makes use of the indirect expression with a double negative, [‘not without’]. For, if bondage were produced by the conjunction [of the soul] with Nature, as colour is produced by heating [in the case of a jar of black clay, which becomes red in the baking], then, just like that, it would continue even after disjunction therefrom; [as the red colour remains in the jar, after the fire of the brick-kiln has been extinguished, whereas the red colour occasioned in a crystal vase by a China-rose, while it occurs not without the China-rose, ceases, on the removal thereof]. Hence, as bondage ceases, on the disjunction [of the soul] from Nature, the bondage is merely reflexional, and neither essential [§ 5. b.] nor adventitious [§ 11. b.].

1 The Sanskrit word thus rendered was inadvertently omitted in the first edition. Vijnāna here supplies the comment. Ed.

2 तस्मान्त्योगावृत्ते प्रकृतिसंयोगं विना न पुरुषस्य तद्योगे वन्यसंपर्केऽर्थितं। ऋषि तु तत एव बन्धः।

3 बन्धस्यापाधिकल्लाभाय नव्यथेन वक्षिक्तः।
c. In order that there may not be such an error as that of the Vaiśeshikas, viz., [the opinion that there is] an absolutely real conjunction [of the soul] with pain, he says 'which is ever,' &c. [§ 19]. That is to say: as the connexion of colour with essentially pure crystal does not take place without the conjunction of the China-rose [the hue of which, seen athwart the crystal, seems to belong to the crystal], just so the connexion of pain with the soul, ever essentially pure, &c., could not take place without the conjunction of some accidental associate; that is to say, pain, &c., cannot arise spontaneously,¹ [any more than a red colour can arise spontaneously in the crystal which is essentially pure].

d. This has been declared, in the Saura, as follows 'As the pure crystal is regarded, by people, as red, in consequence of the proximity of something [as a China-rose]

¹ वैशेषिकाशास्त्रिकव पारमार्थिको दुःखयोग इति भेजे मा कु दित्येतदिष्टं निषेध्यादि। यथा सन्तो- वशिष्ठस्थितिक्ष्य रागो न जपायोगं विगा घटते तथैव निस्युद्धार्थिद्वंत्वमावस्य पुक्ष्योपाधिसंयोगं विना दुःखसंयोगो न घटते स्वतो दुःखयोगसंवेदने दित्यथः॥
that lends its colour, in like manner the supreme soul [is regarded as being affected by pain].

c. In that [aphorism, 19], the perpetual purity means the being ever devoid of merit and demerit; the perpetual intelligence means the consisting of uninterrupted thought; and the perpetual liberatedness means the being ever dissociated from real pain: that is to say, the connexion with pain in the shape of a reflexion is not a real bondage, [any more than the reflexion of the China-rose is a real stain in the crystal].

d. And so the maker of the aphorism means, that the cause of its bondage is just a particular conjunction [§ 19.c.]. And now enough as to that point.

g. Now he rejects [§ 18.d.] certain causes of [the soul's] bondage, preferred by others:

1 तदुच्छ सौरे। यथा हि केवलो रञ्जः स्फोटिको लक्ष्यते जनेः। रञ्जकायुपधानेन तद्वत्सरमयूष्टिः इति।

2 नतं नित्यशुद्धां सदापुरुषपपशून्यां नित्य- बुध्वमलुप। चतुर्पलं नित्यमुक्तां सदापारमार्थिन- कुंदः सायुक्तां प्रतिविष्णुपदुः चेयोगस्वपारमार्थिन- कृष्ण इति भावः।

3 तथा च संयोगविशेष एवाच चन्द्रहेतुततः सूचकृदभिमित्रत इत्यलम्।

4 इदानीमन्यामित्रेतांवन्य getHeightूच्छिरस्पन्ति।
The Samkhya Aphorisms.

Aph. 20. Not from Ignorance, too, [does the soul's bondage arise]; because that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding.

a. The word 'too' is used with reference to the previously mentioned 'Time,' &c., [§ 12, which had been rejected, as causes of the bondage, antecedently to the statement, in §19, of the received cause].

b. Neither, too, does [the soul's] union with bondage result directly from 'Ignorance,' as is the opinion of those who assert non-duality [or the existence of no reality save one (see Vedánta-sára, § 20. b.)]; because, since their 'Ignorance' is not a real thing, it is not fit to bind; because, that is to say, the binding of any one with a rope merely dreamt of was never witnessed. ¹

c. But, if 'Ignorance' be a reality [as some assert], then he declares [as follows]:²

Aph. 21. If it ['Ignorance'] be [asserted, by you, to be] a reality, then there is an abandonment of the [Vedántic] tenet, [by you who profess to follow the Vedánta].

¹ ऋषिपूर्वः पूर्वाच्छिन्नकालाध्येयप्रेक्ष्ययः ॥
² ऋषिव्यारास्थिः न साक्षात्कथास्ये गोधैतवादिनं तेषामविद्या ऋषवस्तुनेन तया वन्धासामविद्याच्छन्निह स्वाभारज्जा वन्धनं दृष्टस्मित्वः ॥
³ ऋषिव्यायया वस्तुने लाह ॥
a. That is to say: and, if you agree that 'Ignorance' is a reality, then you abandon your own implied dogma [see Nyāya Aphorisms I, § 31] of the unreality of 'Ignorance'; [and so you stultify yourself].

b. He states another objection. ²

The , cannot evade the ... without conceding a duality.

Aph. 22. And [if you assume 'Ignorance' to be a reality, then] there would be a duality, through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; which you asserters of non-duality cannot contemplate allowing].

a. That is to say: if 'Ignorance' is real and without a beginning, then it is eternal, and coordinate with Soul: if [therefore] it be not soul, then there is a duality, through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; and this the Vedāntis cannot intend to establish]; because these followers of the Vedānta, asserting non-duality, hold that there is neither a duality through there being something of the same kind [with soul], nor through there being something of a different kind.³

¹ यदि चाविष्याया वस्तुलं स्वीकङ्कयते तदा स्वाभ्युपगतस्याविष्यानृततत्वस्य हानिरित्यथः: ॥
² द्वेष्यानलसरमाह ॥
³ यद्यविष्या वस्तुभूतानादित्वदा नित्यात्मसम्पश्च। ऋणात्मसेविजातीयद्वैततः। ते हि वेदायिनो उद्देशत्वादिनः सजातीयविजातीयद्वैताभावं मन्यति ॥
b. He ponders a doubt:

विस्तृताभयहुय चेत॥ २३ ॥

*Aph. 23.* If [the Vedánti alleges, regarding ‘Ignorance,’ that] it is in the shape of both these opposites, [then we shall say ‘no,’ for the reason to be assigned in the next aphorism].

a. The meaning is: if [the Vedánti says that] ‘Ignorance’ is not real,—else there would be a duality through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul, which a follower of the Vedánta cannot allow],—and, moreover, it is not unreal, because we experience its effects; but it is in the shape of something at once real and unreal,² [like Plato’s δυν καὶ μὴ δυν: (see Vedántasára, § 21)].

न ताद्रक्षपदार्थप्रितीते:॥ २४ ॥

*Aph. 24.* [To the suggestion that ‘Ignorance’ is at once real and unreal, we say] ‘no;’ because no such thing is known [as is at once real and unreal.]

a. That is to say: it is not right to say that ‘Ignorance’ is at once real and unreal. The reason of this he states in the words ‘because no such thing,’ &c.; because any such thing as is at once real and unreal is not known.

¹ श्लूते॥

² अविया न सती चेन विजातीयैतापञ्चि-नायपसति कायोपलभाक्षिं तु सदस्तुपाचेदित्यर्थः॥
For, in the case of a dispute, it is necessary that there should be an example of the thing [i.e. (see Nyāya Aphorisms, I., § 25), a case in which all parties are agreed that the property in dispute is really present]; and, as regards your opinion, such is not to be found; [for, where is there anything in regard to which both parties are agreed that it is at once real and unreal, as they are agreed that fire is to be met with on the culinary hearth?]: such is the import.

b. Again he ponders a doubt:

न वयं बद्ददार्थवादिना वैशेषिकादिविवत् || २५ ||

A question whether the Vedánti is bound to avoid self-contradiction.

Aph. 25. [Possibly the Vedánti may remonstrate] 'We are not asserters of any Six Categories, like the Vaiśeshikas and others.'

a. 'We are not asserters of a definite set of categories [like the Vaiśeshikas, who arrange all things under six heads, and the Naiyāyikas, who arrange them under sixteen]. Therefore, we hold that there is such a thing, unknown though it be [to people in general], as 'Ignorance' which is at once real and unreal, or [if you prefer it], which differs at once from the real and the unreal [see

\[\text{1 सदस्तूपारविग्रहितं न युक्तमित्वर्षं: । तत् हेतु- माह ताट्तिगिति सदस्तूपस्य कस्यचिदपं पदार्थ- स्याप्रतिते: । विवादास्यदे हि कत्सुनि दृष्टान्त आ- वशयक: स च भवनचेयम्यसिद्ध इति भावः ||}

\[\text{2 पुन: शक्ते ||}

3
Vedánta-sára, § 21]; because this is established by proofs,¹ [Scriptural or otherwise, which are satisfactory to us, although they may not comply with all the technical requisitions of Gotama's scheme of argumentative exposition (see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 35)].

b. By the expression [in the aphorism] 'and others' are meant the Naiyáyikas; for the Naiyáyika is an asserter of sixteen categories² [see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 1].

c. He confutes³ [this pretense of evading the objection, by disallowing the categories of the Nyáya]:

अनियतवेषिप नायैक्षिकस्य संप्रहेत्यथा वालोन्मत्तदिस्तमतम् ॥ २६ ॥

Aph. 26. Even although this be not compulsory [that the categories be six, or sixteen], there is no acceptance of the inconsistent; else we come to the level of children, and madmen, and the like.

a. Let there be [accepted] no system of categories [such as that of the Vaiśešika, § 25]; still, since being and not-being are contradictory, it is impossible for disciples to

¹ न वयं नियतपदार्थवादिन: । चतोऽप्रतीतो उप सदस्दात्मात: सदस्सहिलक्षणो वाचिवापदार्थे इत्यजीविन्मानसिद्धवात् ॥
² चादिपदानैवियायिकः स हि घोषपदार्थवा- दीति ॥
³ परिहरति ॥
admit, merely on Your Worship’s assertion, a thing at once real and unreal, which is inconsistent, contrary to all fitness: otherwise, we might as well accept also the self-contradictory assertions of children and the like: such is the meaning.¹

b. Certain heretics [deniers of the authority of the Vedas] assert that there exist external objects of momentary duration [individually; each being, however, replaced by its facsimile the next instant, so that the uninterrupted series of productions becomes something equivalent to continuous duration], and that by the influence² of these the bondage of the soul [is occasioned]. This he objects to, [as follows]:³

¹ पदार्थविनियमं मात्रु तथापि भावाभावविरूपयोगमतिकत्र सत्सदार्थकालं दार्थित्वं संयत्त्र भविष्यनागचार्याशां न संभवति। अन्वयः वालकायुक्तस्याध्यायमतिकत्र संयत: स्यादित्यर्थः।

² Vāsand, a term which Dr. Ballantyne has rendered variously, in divers passages of the present work, and also elsewhere. It is well defined, in Prof. Benley’s Sanskrit-English Dictionary: ‘An impression remaining unconsciously in the mind, from past actions, etc., and, by the resulting merit or demerit, producing pleasure or pain.’ Ed.

³ केचिन्तालिका ज्ञाहु: सति वास्यविनिययः 
क्षणिकालेयां वासनयां जीवस्य वन्ध इति तद्दृष्ट यति।
The heretical theory of a succession of momentary objects from all eternity, as causing the soul's bondage, rejected.

Aph. 27. [The bondage] thereof, moreover, is not caused by any influence of objects from all eternity.

a. 'Thereof,' i.e., of the soul. An eternal influence of objects, an influence of objects the effect of which, in the shape of a continued stream, has had no commencement,—not by this, either, is it possible that the bondage of the soul has been occasioned: such is the meaning.

b. He states the reason of this impossibility: 

1 Instead of -निमित्तकः, Aniruddha has the substantially equivalent -निमित्तः. Ed.

2 अस्यात्मनः। अनादिविषयोपरागः प्रवाहेऽहुःप्राकातिकायाः विषयवासना तच्चिनित्तकानिर्गति वच्चा न संभवतीत्तथः॥

3 अच्छ हतुमाह॥

4 Dr. Ballantyne had, most probably by mere oversight, the unauthorized वाङ्गान्तरः, which I have corrected. The reading उपराज्यः, here followed, is, perhaps, that of Aniruddha. उपराज्यः is the form of the word recognized by Vijnāna; and I know of no manuscript warrant for the alteration of it seen in the following page, 1,—an extract from his commentary. It is, further, a regular derivative, which the other is not, if it is not even unjustified by grammatical prescription. Ed.

5 Aniruddha has -भेदः, 'division,' in place of -ववधानः, 'separation.' Ed.
Aph. 28. Also [in my opinion, as well as in yours, apparently], between the external and the internal there is not the relation of influenced and influencer; because there is a local separation; as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him that stays at Pāṭaliputra.

a. In the opinion of these [persons whose theory we are at present objecting to], the soul is circumscribed, residing entirely within the body; and that which is thus within cannot stand in the relation of the influenced and the influencer, as regards an external object. Why? Because they are separated in regard to place; like two persons the one of whom remains in Srughna and the other in Pāṭaliputra; such is the meaning. Because the affection which we call 'influence' (vāsanā) is seen only when there is conjunction, such as that of madder and the cloth to which it gives its colour], or that of flowers and the flower-basket\(^1\) [to which they impart their odour.]

b. By the word 'also' the absence of conjunction [between the soul and objects (see § 15)], &c., which he himself holds, is connected\(^2\) [with the matter of the present aphorism].

\(^1\) तम्मते परिंचिच्छे देहान्तरस्य एवात्मा तथ्यान्तरस्य न वापाविषयेऽण सहापर्न्योपपरं भावायणे यो संबंधति। कुतं:। सुभास्यपाटलिपुर्व-स्योरित्रेत देशश्ववधानादिन्त्यथ।। संयोगे स्नेनं हि वासनाक्ष्य उपरागो दृष्ट यथा मन्निष्ठावस्य-योर्यथा वा पुष्पपुष्पकयोरिति॥

\(^2\) ऋपिष्यप्रेत स्वर्यते संयोगाभावादिः समु-चीयते॥
c. Srughna and Pātaliputra [Palibothra, or Patna] are two several places far apart.¹

d. But then [these heretics may reply], 'The influence of objects [on the soul] may be asserted, because there is a contact with the object; inasmuch as the soul, according to us, goes to the place of the object, just as the senses, according to Your Worship.' Therefore he declares [as follows]:

हयोरेक्षलब्धोपरागाः व्यवस्था || २५ ||

Aph. 29. [It is impossible that the soul's bondage should arise] from an influence received in the same place [where the object is; because, in that case], there would be no distinction between the two, [the bond and the free].

a. To complete the sense, we must supply as follows: 'It is impossible that the bondage should arise from an influence received in one and the same place with the object.' Why? Because there would be no distinction between the two, the soul bound and the soul free; because bondage would [in that case] befall the liberated soul, also; [the free soul, according to this hypothesis, being just as likely to come across objects as any other]: such is the meaning.³

¹ सुभपाटलिपुि विप्रकृंदेशविशेषैः
² ननु भवतामिनियािशामिवास्माकमात्मने विषयदेशगामनादिह्वस्यसंयोगेन विषयोपरागो ब्रूमः || तत्ताः ||
³ एकास्मिनिविषयदेशे लघादुपरागाक्षेऽन
b. Here he ponders a doubt:

सदृढ्यवशाचत् \| 30 \|  

Aph. 30. If [the heretic, wishing to save his theory, suggests that a difference between the two cases (see § 29) does exist] in virtue of the unseen, [i.e., of merit and demerit, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

a. That is to say, [the heretic may argue]: 'But then, granting that they [the free soul and the bound] are alike in respect of their coming into contact with objects, when they become conjoined with them in one and the same locality; yet the reception of the influence may result merely from the force of the unseen, [i.e., from the merit and demerit of this or that soul; the soul that is liberated alike from merit and demerit being able to encounter, with impunity, the object that would enchain one differently circumsized]': if² [this be urged, then we look forward].

a. This he disputes,² [as follows]:

न दयेरीककालायेगादुपकारयोपकारक-  
भाव: \| 39 \|  

संभवतीति शेषः। कुनः। यरमाहृयोर्वेद्मुक्तात्मनो  
न व्यवस्था मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापलवारिस्य:।  

¹ ऋच शश्कुः।  
² नन्वेदेभिःसंबन्धश्च विभवयस्योगसाम्येवपृष्ठ-  
वशादेवापरागलाभ इति चेदित्विर:।  
³ परिहरिति।
Aph. 31. They cannot stand in the relation of deserver and bestower, since the two do not belong to one and the same time.

a. Since, in thy opinion, the agent and the patient are distinct, and do not belong to the same time [believing, as thou heretically dost, not only that objects (see § 26. b.) momentarily perish and are replaced, but that the duration of souls, also, is of a like description], there is positively no such relation [between the soul at one time and its successor at another] as that of deserver and bestower [or transmitter of its merits or demerits]; because it is impossible that there should be an influence of objects [§ 27] taking effect on a patient [say, the soul of to-day], occasioned by the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] belonging to an agent [say, the soul of yesterday, which, on the hypothesis in question, is a numerically different individual]: such is the meaning.¹

b. He ponders a doubt:²

पुष्करणेवदिति चेत् || 32 ||

Aph. 32. If [the heretic suggests that] the case is like that of the ceremonies in regard to a son, [then he will find his reply by looking forward].

a. But then [the heretic, admitting the principle that

¹ तव मते कर्त्तेऽभोक्तेऽर्दावरंकलासंवन्धाच्य नवापकार्णायापरंकरमावें नाहि कर्त्तेऽनिष्ठादृष्टेन भृजनिष्ठेऽविषयायरागः संभवतीत्यथः: ||

² श्रद्धा स्तोः ||
the merit or demerit of an act belongs entirely to the agent, may urge that, as the son is benefited by ceremonies in regard to a son, such as that [ceremony (see Colebrooke's 'Hindu Law,' Vol. III., p. 104) celebrated] in anticipation of conception, which [no doubt] belongs to the father [who performs the ceremonies, to propitiate the gods], in like manner there may be an influence of objects on the experiencer [say, the soul of to-day], through the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] that belongs even to a different subject [say, the soul of yesterday]: such is the meaning¹ of the heretic.

b. He refutes this, by showing that the illustration is not a fact:²

नासिक्षि हि तत्र सिम्र एक ज्ञात्मा ये गर्भाधानादि-
ना। संस्क्रियत ॥ ३३ ॥

*Aph. 33. [Your illustration proves nothing;] for, in that case, there is no one permanent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c.*

a. 'In that case,' i.e., on thy theory, too, the benefit of

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¹ ननु यथा पितृनिषेध गर्भाधानादिना पुत्रक-
मेषा पुत्रस्योपकारा भवति तद्यथिकर्षेनान्वा-
टृप्तेन भौतिकविष्योपराग: स्मादित्यथः: ॥

² दृष्टान्तासिद्धा परिहरति ॥

³ Aniruddha has गर्भाधानादिनिकमेषा; and Dr. Ballan-
tyne's rendering suits it. *Ed.*

⁴ A common reading, but inferior, is संस्क्रियते. *Ed.*
the son, by [means of the performance of] 1 the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c., could not take place; 'for,' i.e., because, on that theory, there is not one [self-identical] soul, continuing from the [time of] conception to birth, which could be consecrated [by the ceremonies in question], so as to be a fit subject for the duties that pertain to the time subsequent to birth [such as the investiture with the sacred thread, for which the young Brāhmaṇ would not be a fit subject, if the ceremonies in anticipation of his conception had been omitted]: and thus your illustration is not a real one, 2 [on your own theory: it is not a thing that you can assert as a fact].

b. And, according to my theory, also, your illustration is not a fact; seeing that it is possible that the benefit to the son should arise from the 'unseen' [merit] deposited in the son by means of the ceremony regarding the son: for it is an implied tenet [of my school], that it [the soul] is permanent [in its self-identity]; and there is the injunction 3 [of Manu, (Ch. II., v. 26), with regard to the ceremonies in question, which proceeds on the same grounds].

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1 The brackets are of my inserting. Ed.

2 ततः लन्मते गभोधानादिकर्मेण युक्तयो-पकरो न घटते हि यस्मात्तर गभोधानमार्थ जनमस्यतः स्यात्मा नाति यो जन्मात्तरकालीनकर्माधिकाराः संस्कृतेति तथा च त्रुष्टान्तासिद्धः।

3 अस्माते तेषां स्थेर्याभ्युपमाहचनाश पुचकर्मेण पुचिष्ठादृष्टिक्यते: पुचपकारसब्धान्तस्यासिद्धिरियत्वेऽः।
c. Some other heretic may encounter us, on the strength of [the argument here next stated, viz.], 'But then, since bondage, also, [like everything else] is momentary, let this bondage have nothing determinate for its cause, or nothing at all for its cause,' \(^1\) [which view of matters is propounded in the next aphorism]:

स्थिरकार्योसिद्धः ध्याणाकलम् \(^2\) 38 \(\|$\)

Aph. 34. Since there is no such thing as a permanent result [on the heretical view], the momentariness [of bondage, also, is to be admitted].

a. 'Of bondage': this must be supplied, [to complete the aphorism].\(^3\)

b. And thus the point relied on is, that it [i.e., bondage] have no cause at all. And so this is the application [of the argument, viz.]:

1. Bondage, &c., is momentary;
2. Because it exists,
3. [Everything that exists is momentary,] as the apex of the lamp-flame, or the like.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) ननु वन्धस्यापि ध्याणाकालिनयत्कारणको-भावकारणको वा वन्धोशक्तित्याश्येनापरो नास्तिकः प्रत्यविषयते \(\|$\)

\(^2\) वन्धस्येति शेषः \(\|$\)

\(^3\) तथा चाकारणक एवास्तित्याश्यः। तथा चायं प्रयोगो वन्धादिकं ध्याणं सत्त्वाहीपशिश्वादिवदिति \(\|$\)
c. And [continues the heretic] this [reason, viz., 'existence'] does not extend unduly¹ [as you may object,] to the case of a jar, or the like; because that, also [in my opinion], is like the subject in dispute, [in being momentary]. This [in fact] is precisely what is asserted in the expression, 'since there is no such thing as a permanent result'² [§34].

d. He objects³ [to this heretical view]:

न प्रत्यभिज्ञावाधात् ॥ ३५ ॥

Aph. 35. No, [things are not momentary in their duration]; for the absurdity of this is proved by recognition.

α. That is to say: nothing is momentary; because the absurdity of its being momentary follows from the opposite argument [to that under §34. b.], taken from such facts of recognition as, 'what I saw, that same do I touch,' [an argument which may be stated as follows], viz.:

(1) Bondage, &c., is permanent;
(2) Because it exists.

¹ Vyabhichāra is the expression here paraphrased. In this work and others, the translator has given it many meanings; and so has Colebrooke, who renders it, in various contexts, by 'contradiction,' 'derogation,' 'failure,' 'impossibility,' 'unoperativeness,' &c. As a logical technicality, it denotes the presentation of the reason, or middle term, unaccompanied by the major term. Ed.

² न च घटादै वेमितावत्यापि पद्धसम्बलात् ।
एतदेवादं स्थिरकार्याः सिद्धिन्तित्वनेन ॥

³ दूषयति ॥
(3) [Everything that exists is permanent,] as a jar, or the like.

That things are momentary is contradicted by Scripture and reasoning.

Aph. 36. And [things are not momentary;] because this is contradicted by Scripture and by reasoning.

a. That is to say: nothing is momentary; because the general principle, that the whole world, consisting of effects and causes, is momentary, is contradicted by such texts as this, viz., 'All this, O ingenuous one, was antecedently existing,' and by such Scriptural and other arguments as this, viz., 'How should what exists proceed from the non-existent?'

The heretic's illustration is not a truth.

Aph. 37. And [we reject the argument of this heretic;] because his instance is not a fact.
a. That is to say: the general principle of the momentariness [of all things] is denied; because this momentary character does not [in fact] belong to the apex of the lamp-flame, &c., the instance [on which thou, heretic, dost ground thy generalization, (§ 34. b.)]. Moreover, thou quite errest in regard to momentariness, in that instance, from not taking account of the minute and numerous instants [really included in a duration which seems to thee momentary]: such is the import.¹

If things were momentary, there could be no relation of cause and effect.

b. Moreover, if the momentary duration, &c., [of things] be asserted, then there can be no such thing as the relation of cause and effect, in the case of the earth and the jar, and the like. And you must not say that there is no such thing as that [relation of cause and effect]; because it is proved to be a reality by the fact that, otherwise, there would be no such thing as the efforts of him who desires an effect, [and who, therefore, sets in operation the causes adapted to its production]. With reference to this, he declares [as follows]:²

युगप्रज्ञायमानयोऽन काय्यकारणभावः ॥ ३५ ॥

¹ दृष्टान् दीपशिखादी शरीरिकाक्ष्यास्मिदेन्ना-शरीरवानुमानमित्यष्ट: । किं च सृष्टिनाग्रेष्या-नाकलनेन शरीरिकावेयम एव तच्च तवेवति भावः।

² किं च शरीरिकवान्दे मृदुटादिस्थले कार्यकार-णभावो नापपयते। न च नास्त्येव स इति वाच्य कार्योर्थिनः प्रवृत्तिन्यानुपपद्या तस्मादिदेव-रित्यभिमेयः॥
Aph. 38. It is not between two things coming simultaneously into existence, that the relation of cause and effect exists.

a. Let us ask, does the relation of product and [material] cause exist between the earth and the jar, as simultaneously coming into [their supposed momentary] existence, or as successive? Not the first; because there is nothing to lead to such an inference, and because we should not [in that case] find the man, who wants a jar, operating with earth, &c., [with a view to the jar's subsequent production]. Neither is it the last; in regard to which he declares [as follows]:

पूर्वापय उत्तरायोगात॥३९॥

Aph. 39. Because, when the antecedent departs, the consequent is unfit [to arise, and survive it].

a. The relation of cause and effect is, further, inconsistent with the theory of the momentary duration of things; because, at the time when the antecedent, i.e., the cause, departs, the consequent, i.e., the product, is 'unfit,' i.e., is not competent to arise; because, that is to say, a product is cognized only by its inhering in [and being substantially identical with, however formally different from] its

¹ किं मृदूस्तेर्युतुष्पज्ञायमानयः कार्यकारण-भावः किं वा क्रिमिकायः || नायो विनिगमकाभवाइताधिनो मृदादिप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्वेऽः। नान्य इत्याह॥
substantial cause,\(^1\) [and is incapable, therefore, of surviving it].

b. With reference to this same [topic, viz., the] substantial cause, he mentions another [the converse] objection [to the theory of the momentary duration of things]:

\[\text{तत्त्वांचे तद्योगादुभयथ्यभिचारादिपि न} \quad \text{॥ ४० ॥}\]

\begin{align*}
\text{Aph. 40. Moreover, not [on the} & \text{theory of the momentary duration of things, can there be such a relation as} \\
& \text{that of cause and effect]; because, while} \\
& \text{the one [the antecedent] exists, the} \\
& \text{other [the consequent] is incompatible, because the two} \\
& \text{keep always asunder.}\(^3\)
\end{align*}

a. To complete [the aphorism], we must say, 'moreover, [on the theory objected to], there can be no such relation a, that of cause and effect; because, at the time when the antecedent exists, the consequent cannot coexist with it, the two being mutually exclusive.'\(^4\) The two suggesters of the relation of cause and effect, in product and sub

\begin{itemize}
\item[\(1\)] पूर्ववस्य कार्यस्यास्याध्यायां उत्तरस्य कार्यस्या-\[\text{योगादुभयथ्यभिचारादिपि न क्षणिकवादि संभ-}\]
\item[\(2\)] उपादानकार्यानुगतत्तथेऽव वादिविधियथ: \quad \text{॥}
\item[\(3\)] For \text{vyabhichāra}, the word used in the original, see I, at p. 38, \text{supra.} \quad \text{Ed.}
\item[\(4\)] Here again occurs, in the Sanskrit, the term \text{vyabhichāra.} \quad \text{Ed.}
\end{itemize}
stance,¹ are (1) this concomitancy of affirmatives, that, while the product exists, the substance thereof exists, and (2) this concomitancy of negatives,² that, when the substance no longer exists, the product no longer exists: and these two [conditions, on your theory] cannot be; because, since things [in your opinion] are momentary in their duration, the two [viz., the substance and the product], inasmuch as they are antecedent and consequent,³ belong to opposite times,⁴ [and cannot, therefore, coexist; for the product, according to you, does not come into existence until its substance has perished, which is contrary to the nature of the causal relation just defined].

b. But then, [the heretic may say, do not let the co-existence of substance and product be insisted upon, as indispensable to the causal relation between the two, but] 'let the nature of a cause belong to the substantial cause,  

¹ I have inserted the words 'in product and substance.' Ed.  
² The original dual of 'concomitancy of affirmatives' and 'concomitancy of negatives' is anwayavatirekau. For other English equivalents of this term, occurring in the singular number, see Book VI., Aph. 15 and 63. Ed.  
³ 'Antecedent and consequent' renders kramika, translated 'successive' in Aph. 38, a, at p. 41, supra. Ed.  
⁴ ‘पूर्वकाल उत्तरसंबंधितान्तरिक्षियम्’ is कार्यकारणभाव हिंदू शेष: | यदै-पादेयं तदोपादानं यदोपादानाभावन्तोपादेयाभाव इत्यवयविविक्तिरेका उपादेयोपादानयोः कार्यकारणभावप्रयाहके तै च छाशिकवेन रूमक-.chainyayarbhikalkalalāṃ संभवतः ||
as it belongs to the *instrumental* cause, in respect merely of its *antecedence.* To this he replies:

**पूर्वभावमाचे न नियमः II 81 II**

_Aph. 41._ If there were merely _antecedence_, then there would be no determination [of a substantial or material cause, as distinguished from an _instrumental_ cause].

*a.* And it could not be determined that this was the _substance_ [of this or that product], on the granting of nothing more than its _antecedence_ [to the product]; because _antecedence_ constitutes no distinction between it and the _instrumental_ causes; for, [as we need scarcely remind you], that there is a distinction between _instrumental_ and _substantial_ causes, the whole world is agreed: such is the meaning.

*b.* Other heretics say: ‘Since nothing [really] exists, except _Thought_, neither does _Bondage_; just as the things of a dream [have no real exist-

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1 ननु निमित्तकारणस्येवोपादानस्यापि पूर्वभावमाचेन्न्म कारणतास्तिविति तच्चाह ||

2 पूर्वभावमाचार्यपुरहमे चेद्वेपादानमिति नियमोऽन स्यायनिमित्तकारणानामपि पूर्वभावाविशेषार्द्धवेव इत्यह निमित्तोपादानयोगविभागः सर्वलोकसिद्ध इत्यथः ||
ence]. Therefore it has no cause; for it is absolutely false.' He rejects the opinion of these [heretics]:

अ विज्ञानमाचं वात्तप्रतीति: || ४२ ||

We have the evidence of Intuition for the External, as well as for the Internal.

a. That is to say: the reality is not Thought alone; because external objects, also, are proved to exist, just as Thought is, by intuition.¹

b. But then [these heretics may rejoin], 'From the example of intuitive perception in dreams [see Butler's 'Analogy,' Part I., Ch. I.], we find this [your supposed evidence of objective reality] to exist, even in the absence of objects.' To this he replies:²

तद्भवे तद्भवाच्छून्यं तत्हिं || ४३ ||

The denial of the external amounts to Nihilism.

¹ अपरे नास्तिका आदः: विज्ञानातिरिक्तस्तभावेन बनोधायिप स्वभपद्यव्यवह। अतोर्थायण्यभूलालेन न तच कार्यस्मलिति तन्मतिमपञ्चकर्तिः ||

² न विज्ञानमाचं तत् वात्तप्रतीतिसिद्धवादित्यथः: ||

³ ननु स्वभप्रतीतिदृष्टालेन विषयाभावेड्यि तदुपयत्तिरिति । तत्राः ||
That is to say: if external things do not exist, then a mere void offers itself. Why? Because, if the external does not exist, then thought does not exist; for it is intuition that proves the objective: and, if the intuition of the external did not establish the objective, then the intuition of thought, also, would not establish [the existence of] thought.¹

Then let the reality be a mere void; and, therefore, the searching for the cause of Bondage is unfitting, just because a void is all;¹' with such a proposal [as recorded in the next aphorism] does [some one who may claim the title of] the very crest-gem of the heretics rise up in opposition:²

The heretic goes the length of asserting sheer Nihilism.

The reality is a void: what is perishes; because to perish is the habit of things.

The void alone [says this prince of heretics, or the fact that nothing exists at all] is the reality, [or the only
truth]. Since everything that exists perishes, and that which is perishable is false, as is a dream, therefore, as of all things the beginnings and endings are merely nonentities, Bondage, &c., in the midst [of any beginning and ending], has merely a momentary existence,—is phenomenal, and not real. Therefore, who can be bound by what? This [question] is what we rest upon. The reason assigned for the perishableness of whatever exists is, 'because to perish is the habit of things;' because to perish is the very nature of things: but nothing continues, after quitting its own nature; [so that nothing could continue, if it ceased to perish]: such is the meaning.  

b. He rejects² [this heretical view]

ऋपवादमाचमबुढानाम् ॥ ४५ ॥

Nihilism denied; as the indescribable is indestructible.  

Aph. 45. This is a mere counter-assertion of unintelligent persons.

a. 'Of unintelligent persons,' i.e., of blockheads, this is 'a mere counter-assertion,' i.e., a mere idle counter-assertion, that a thing must needs be perishable, because it

¹ शून्यमेव तत्त्वम्। यत् सर्वा दिपं भावे विनश्यति यथा विनाशी स मिथ्या स्वप्नवदत् सर्वे-वल्लनामाध्यत्येऽर्भावमाचलान्मध्ये क्षणिकस्तत्र सांवृत्तिनिम न पारमार्थिनिम वन्यादि। तत् किं केन बघेत्त इत्याशयः। भावानां विनाशिने हेतुवस्तु-धर्ममलाहिनाशस्येति विनाशस्य वल्लस्त्वभाववल्लस्त्वभावं तु विहाय न पदार्थश्चिह्वतीतिवचः॥

² परिहरति॥
exists; [and such an assertion is idle,] because things that are not made up of parts, since there is no cause of the destruction of such things, cannot perish.¹

b. [But] what need of many words? It is not the fact, that even products perish; [for] just as, by the cognition that 'the jar is old,' [we mean that it has passed from the condition of new to that of old], so, too, by such a cognition as this, that 'the jar has passed away,' it is settled only that the jar, or the like, is in the condition of having passed away.²

c. He states another objection³ [to the heretical view]:

अभयपद्धमानक्षमलादयमपिः || ६६ ||

Nihilism is open to the same objections as both the Momentary and the Ideal theories.

Aph 46. Moreover, this [nihilistic theory is not a right one]; because it has the same fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before].

¹ अवृद्धाना मृदानांपवादायां भाववाहिनाशिलमिति मिथ्यापवाद एव नाशकारकाराभवेन निरवयवद्यायां नाशसंभवात् ||

² किं बहुन। कार्त्ताकामपिः न विनाशसिद्धः। घटो जीवं इति प्रत्येकेऽव घटास्तित इत्यादिप्रत्येकापि घटर्देतीताऽवप्रत्येकार्थमाय एव सिद्धः ||

³ दूरपाण्तरमाह ||

⁴ Aniruddha, according to the MSS. which I have seen, reads -छेमाद°. Ed.
a. This view, moreover [§ 44], is not a good one; because it has the same fortune as, i.e., is open to similar reasons for rejection as, the theory that external things are momentary [§ 26. b.], and as the theory that nothing exists besides Thought [§ 41. b]. The reason for the rejection of the theory that things are momentary in their duration, viz. [as stated in § 35], the fact of recognition, &c., [which is, at least, as little consistent with Nihilism as it is with the momentary duration of things], and the reason for the rejection of the theory that nothing exists besides Thought, viz. [as stated in § 42], the intuition of the external, &c., apply equally here [in the case of Nihilism]: such is the import.¹

b. Moreover, as for the opinion which is accepted by these [heretics], viz., ‘Let the mere void [of absolute nonentity] be the soul’s aim [and sumnum bonum], since herein consist at once the cessation of pain [which cannot continue, when there is absolutely nothing] and also the means thereof [since there can be no further means required for the removal of anything, if it be settled that the thing positively does not exist],’ this too, can hardly be: so he declares [as follows].²

¹ श्रीश्चिकवाचपक्षश्च विज्ञानमाचपक्षश्च सह
समानश्चमलान्थ्यनिरस्तनहेतुकलवात्यमपि पक्षा
न सम्यक। श्रीश्चिकपक्षनिरास्तेतु प्रत्यभिज्ञा-
दिरिनिज्ञानपक्षनिरास्तेतु बौद्धप्रतीत्यादिद्वाचायपि
समान इति भावः॥

² यददि दुःखिनवृत्तिहृद्यतया तत्साधनतया च
शून्यस्वैवातु पुरुषार्थनिमिति तैर्मन्यते तददि दुर्घ-
ठमित्याह॥
Aph. 47. In neither way [whether as a means, or as an end,] is this [annihilation] the soul's aim.

a. 'Let the void [of mere nonentity] be the soul's aim, whether as consisting in the cessation of pain, or as presenting the means for the cessation of pain,' [says the heretic. And this cannot be; because the [whole] world agrees, that the aim of the soul consists in the joys, &c., that shall abide in it; that is to say, because [they hold, while] you do not hold, that there is a permanent soul, [(see § 33) in respect of which the liberation or beatification would be possible, or even predicable].¹

b. Now [certain] other things, also, entertained, as causes of [the soul's] bondage, by [imperfectly instructed] believers, remaining over and above those [proposed by unbelievers, and] already rejected, are to be set aside:²

Aph. 48. Not from any kind of motion [such as its entrance into a body, does the soul's bondage result].

¹ दुःखनिवृत्तिःपत्याः दुःखनिवृत्तिराधानतया वा शून्यस्य पुरुषार्थं स्यात् । तत्र न घटते श्वरुषिपर्वेव सुखदीनां लोके पुरुषार्थलावगमातिस्य-रस्य पुरुषस्यानहीकारार्थाय: ॥

² इदानीं पूर्वरूपाविशिष्टाविशिष्टा दर्पणवादित्वकोषमाथ्वा-न्यथानिनि बल्करणात्मिनि निरस्करते ॥
a. 'Bondage' [required to complete the aphorism] is understood from the topic¹ [of discussion].

b. The meaning is, that the soul's bondage, moreover, does not result from any sort of motion, in the shape, for instance, of its entrance into a body.²

c. He states a reason for this:³

निष्क्रियस्य तदसंभवात् II ४९ II

_Aph. 49._ Because this is impossible for what is inactive, [or, in other words, without motion]

a. That is to say: because this is impossible, i.e., motion is impossible, in the case of the soul, which is inactive, [because] all-pervading, [and, therefore, incapable of changing its place].⁴

b. But then [the objector may say], 'Since, in the books of Scripture and of law, we hear of its going and coming into this world and the other world, let soul be [not all-pervading, as you allege, but] merely limited [in its extent]: and to this effect, also, is the text, 'Of the size

¹ प्रकरणाति लभ्यते II
² गतिविशेषायार्थप्रवेशादिदृश्यादि पुरुषस्य न बल्च इत्यथ: II
³ झट हेतुमाह II
⁴ निष्क्रियस्य विभेन: पुरुषस्य तदसंभवात्मकसंभवादिविश: II

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of the thumb is the soul, the inner spirit,' and the like: 'but this conjecture he repels.'

Aph. 50. [We cannot admit that the soul is other than all-pervading; because] by its being limited, since it would come under the same conditions as jars, &c., there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishability].

a. That is to say: and, if the soul were admitted to be, like a jar, or the like, limited, i.e. circumscribed [in dimension], then, since it would resemble a jar, or the like, in being made up of parts, and [hence] in being perishable, &c., this would be contrary to our settled principle, [that the soul is imperishable].

b. He now justifies the text [see § 49. b.] referring to the motion [of the soul, by showing that the motion is not really of the soul, but of an accessory]:

1 Śvetāsvatara Upanishad, iii., 13. Ed.

2 ननु स्वतिसमृद्धिर्देवाभिलोक्ताकरणनागमनस्यविष्णुस्य परिश्चिन्तलमेवातु तथा च स्वतिरप्रकृतमां: पुरुषोत्तरामेत्यादिरिवियाश-झन्मपाक्रोति

3 यदि च घटादिवस्मानमूत्रेः परिश्चिन्त: स्वी-क्रियते तदा साववेलविनाशिलादिना घटादि-मानथमापत्रध्वस्यिश्व: स्वादिस्यथर्थः

4 'गतिष्ठतिमुपपादयति'
Aph. 51. The text regarding the motion [of the soul], moreover, is applicable, only] because of the junction of an attendant;¹ as in the case of the Ether [or Space, which moves not, though we talk of the space enclosed in a jar, as moving with the jar].

a. Since there are such proofs of the soul's unlimitedness, as the declaration that 'It is eternal, omnipresent, permanent,'² the text² regarding its motion is to be explained as having reference to a movement pertaining [not to the soul, but] to an attendant; for there is the text, 'As the Ether [or space] included in a jar, when the jar is removed, [in this case] the jar may be removed, but not the space; and in like manner is the soul, which is like the sky, incapable of being moved';³ and because we may conclude that the motion [erroneously supposed to belong to the soul (49. 6.)], belongs to Nature [see Vedánta Aphorisms, Part I., § 4. 1.] from such maxims⁴ as this, that 'Nature does the works the fruits of which are blissful or baneful;

¹ Upáddhi; often, below, 'investment' and 'adjunct.' Ed.
² Bhagavad-gitá, ii., 24. Ed.
³ 'Text' and 'maxim' are here meant to represent śruti and smṛiti, taken in their more limited senses. Elsewhere the translator has, for the same terms, in wider acceptations, 'books of Scripture and of law,' &c. The first is 'revealed law,' the Vedas; the second, 'memorial law,' or a code of such law, as the Mánava, and also any composition of a man reputed to be inspired. Both are held to have originated from a superhuman source; but only the former is regarded as preserving the very words of revelation. Ed.
⁴ The anacoluthism observable in the translation follows that of the original, with reference to which see the Indische Studien, vol. ii., p. 61.
and it is wilful *Nature* that, in the three worlds, reaps these': such is the import.\(^1\)

b. It has already been denied [§16] that the bondage [of the soul] is occasioned by works, in the shape either of enjoined or of forbidden actions. Now he declares that the bondage, moreover, does not arise from the ‘unseen’ [merit or demerit] resulting therefrom.\(^3\)

\[\text{न कर्मशापतथमेवात्} \| 52 \|

_Aph. 52._ Nor, moreover, [does the bondage of the soul result from the merit or demerit arising] from works; because these belong not thereto.

\[\text{a. That is to say: the bondage of the soul does not arise directly from the ‘unseen’ [merit or demerit] occa-} \]

\(^1\) नियः सर्वाद्यः स्याः प्रियाः दिना प्रमाणेनान्तः परिच्छिन्नवेगात गतिस्वते त्रिप्राचार्याधिक्वातिपरा व्याक्येया। घटसंवृतमकारः नीयमाने घटे यथा। घटे नीयेत सालकर तढ़जीवो नभापम्। इति छुते। प्रकृति: कृतहृत कर्म शुभभंभफलातत्मकां। प्रकृतिश्च तद्भ्राति चिपु लोकेजु कामगा। इत्यादितैसत्य गते: प्रकृतिनिधारणानांभव्य:।

\(^2\) For another rendering, see my translation of the _Rational Refutation, &c._, p. 57. Ed.

\(^3\) ऐते विहिततिनिध्वायापरुपेश कर्मशा वन्धेन निराकृति:। इदतां तत्ज्ञातादृष्टनािः न वन्ध इत्याह।
sioned by works.\(^1\) Why? Because this is no property thereof, i.e., because this [merit or demerit (see \(\S\) 16. \(a\).)] is no property of the soul.\(^2\)

\(b\). But then [some one may say], ‘Let it be that the bondage resulting from the ‘unseen,’ i.e., the merit [or demerit] even of another, should attach to a different person;’ whereupon he declares [as follows]:\(^3\)

\[\text{सत्यप्रसंकिरन्त्रयध्रमः॥} 53 ॥\]

\(Aph. 53.\) If the case were otherwise [than as I say], then it [the bondage of the soul] might extend unduly, [even to the emancipated].

\(a.\) That is to say: if the case were otherwise, if bondage and its cause were under other conditions [than we have declared them to be], then there might be an undue extension; bondage would befall even the emancipated,\(^4\) [for the same reasons as those stated under \(\S\) 16. \(a\).].

\(^1\) Dr. Ballantyne should have taken ‘unseen’ and ‘works’ as in apposition, and should have made the former explanatory of the latter. Clearer than his original, and yielding substantially his sense, is the gloss of Vedánti Mahádeva: कर्मण्यं तत्ज्ञानात्सृष्टिनापि न पुमः साक्षात्: । \(Ed.\)

\(^2\) कर्मेणापि साक्षात् पुष्पस्य बन्धः: । कुलः । ऋत्तरमैवात्पुष्पवधर्मेनलाभावादित्यथः: ॥

\(^3\) नन्न्यधर्मेणापि साक्षात्सृष्टिनात्यस्य बन्धः: स्यात्चराह ॥

\(^4\) Aniruddha transposes Aphorisms 53 and 54. \(Ed.\)

\(^5\) ऋत्यधर्मः वन्यतकारणायान्यधर्मः । सत्यप्रसंकिरन्त्रयध्रमः॥
b. What need of so much [prolixity]? He states a general objection why the bondage of soul cannot result from any one or other [of these causes], beginning with its essence [see § 6. b.], and ending with its [supposed] works [see § 16]; inasmuch as it is contrary to Scripture,¹ [that any one of these should be the cause]:

निर्गुणाभित्विरोधश्रेष्ठि ॥ ५४ ॥

_Aph. 54._ And this [opinion, that the bondage of the soul arises from any of these causes alleged by the heretics,] is contrary to such texts as the one that declares it [the soul] to be without qualities: and so much for that point.

a. And, if the bondage of the soul arose from any one or other of those [supposed causes already treated of,] among which its essential character [§ 6. b.] is the first, this would be contradictory to such texts as, 'Witness, intelligent, alone, and without the [three] qualities [is the soul].'² such is the meaning.³

b. The expression 'and so much for that point' means,

¹ किं बहुना। स्वभावादिकमान्तरत्नोऽविनात्र केनापि पुरुषस्य बन्धोत्पत्तिः घटते श्रुतिविरोधादिती साधारणे वाधकमाह ॥

² Swet.dswatara Upanishad, vi., 11. Ed.

³ स्वभावाध्यत्नमेव पुरुषस्य बन्धोत्पत्तिः साक्षी चैता केवलो निर्गुणाभित्विरोधश्रेष्ठे। ॥
that the investigation of the cause of the bondage [of the soul] here closes.\textsuperscript{1}

c. The case, then, stands thus: since [all] other [theories] are overthrown by the declaratory aphorisms, 'There would be no fitness in the enjoining' [see § 7], \&c., it is ascertained that the immediate cause of the bondage [of the soul] is just the conjunction of Nature and of the soul.\textsuperscript{2}

d. But then, in that case, [some one may say], this conjunction of Nature and of the soul [§ 54. c.], whether it be essential, or adventitiously caused by Time or something else [§ 5. 6.], must occasion the bondage even of the emancipated. Having pondered this doubt, he dispenses of it [as follows].\textsuperscript{3}

\textbf{Tathāgataśrīvibhākānāṃ \textit{Samānānām} \textit{II} 55 \textit{II}}

Aph. 55. Moreover, the conjunction thereof does not, through non-discrimination, take place [in the case of the emancipated]; nor is there a parity,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Iśitābhūṣaṇa \textit{vanahetuparikāśasamāṇa}} \textit{II}
\item \textit{Tadeva \textit{n śābhāvato \textit{vadhysēyādina \textit{pradārṣekeṇe-\textit{tarpramaṇādhaṇāḥ: \textit{prakṛti-puṇḍrasambhāya \textit{eva \textit{sākṣātābhāyat} \textit{heturvadhāratat}}}} \textit{II}}}
\item \textit{Nīnu \textit{tathā \textit{prakṛti-puṇḍrasambhāya \textit{tathābhārvibhākānāṃ kāla\textit{dīnānāyatanakāla vā muṣṭikāya \textit{baṇḍhakāl patāk \textit{iśāśāyānāḥ samādhāt}}}} \textit{II}}}
\item \textit{Tathāgata, the reading which I find in MSS. of Aniruddha, seems to be indefensible. \textit{Ed.}}
\end{itemize}
[in this respect, between the emancipated and the unemancipated].

a. 'The conjunction thereof,' i.e., the conjunction of Nature and of the soul; this conjunction, moreover, does not take place again 'through non-discrimination,' i.e., through the want of a discrimination [between Nature and soul] in the emancipated, [who do discriminate, and who thus avoid the conjunction which others, failing to discriminate, incur, and thus fall into bondage]: such is the meaning. And thus the emancipated and the bound are not on a level, [under the circumstances stated at § 54. c.]: such is the import.¹

\[\text{विपर्ययादन्यः} \ | \ \text{प्रेरे} \ | \ \text{प्रेरे} \ | \ \text{प्रेरे} \]

Aph. 56. Bondage arises from the error [of not discriminating between Nature and soul].

a. Having thus declared the cause of that [bondage]

¹ These words, a bad reading of the 24th Aphorism of Book III., were pointed out, by me, as having, with the sentence of comment attached to them, no place here; and Dr. Ballantyne, when he re-published the Sāṅkhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica, omitted them. Hence the brackets now inserted, and my alteration of the numbering of the Aphorisms throughout the remainder of Book I. Ed.
which is to be got rid of, he declares the means of getting
rid of it:

नियतकार्यात्मकदुस्चितिनिधिवान्तचतु ॥ ५६ ॥

Non-discrimination is removable by discrimina-
tion alone.

Aph. 56. The removal of it is to be
effected by the necessary means, just
like darkness.

a. The necessary means, established throughout the world,
in such cases as 'shell-silver' [i.e., a pearl-oyster-shell mis-
taken for silver], viz., the immediacy of discrimination, by
this alone is 'its removal,' i.e., the removal of the non-dis-
crimination [between Nature and soul], to be effected, and
not by works, or the like: such is the meaning: just as
darkness, the dark, is removed by light alone,² [and by no
other means].

b. 'But then [some one may say], if merely the non-
discrimination of Nature and soul be, through the conjunc-
tion [of the two, consequent on the want of discrimination],
the cause of bondage, and if merely the discrimination of
the two be the cause of liberation, then there would be
liberation, even while there remained the conceit of [one's
possessing] a body, &c.; and this is contrary to Scripture,

[¹ एवं हेयहेतुं प्रतिपाल्यायण प्रतिपा-
द्यति ॥]

² शुक्तिरज्जतादिस्य्य प्रजासिदं यथियतं कारणं
विशेषांकाशालात्कारतं एवं तदुच्छितिरविशेषको-
विशिष्टं कर्मादिभियत्वं एवं ध्वन्तमन्त्वकारः
प्रकाशेनेत्र दश्यति ॥
to the institutes of law, and to sound reasoning.' To this he replies: ¹

Aph. 57. Since the non-discrimination of other things [from soul] results from the non-discrimination of Nature [from soul], the cessation of this will take place, on the cessation of that [from which it results].

a. By reason of the non-discrimination of Nature from the soul, what non-discrimination of other things there is, such as the non-discrimination of the understanding [as something other than the soul], this necessarily ceases, on the cessation of the non-discrimination of Nature; because, when the non-discrimination of the understanding, for example, [as something other than soul,] does occur, it is based on the non-discrimination [from soul] of that cause to which there is none antecedent [viz., Nature]; since the non-discrimination of an effect [and the 'understanding' is an effect or product of Nature,] is, itself, an effect, ² and will, of course, cease, with the cessation of its cause.

¹ प्रकृतिपुणा‌विबेक एव चेतनायागहरा

² पुष्पे प्रधानाविबेकात्तकारणाद्याविबेको

बुद्धायाविबेको बुद्धायाविबेकेके जाते कार्यावि-
b. The state of the case is this: as, when the soul has been discriminated from the body, it is impossible but that it should be discriminated from the colour and other [properties], the effects of the body, [which is the substantial cause of its own properties]; so, by parity of reasoning, from the departure of the cause, when soul, in its character of unalterableness, &c., has been discriminated from Nature, it is impossible that there should remain a conceit of [the soul's being any of] the products thereof [i.e., of Nature], such as the 'understanding,' and the like, which have the character of being modifications [of primal Nature, while the soul, on the other hand, is a thing unalterable].

c. But then [some one may say], 'What proof is there that there is a conceit [entertained by people in general,] of a Nature [or primal principle] different from the conceit of an 'understanding,' &c., [which, you tell us, are products of this supposed first principle]? For all the various conceits [that the soul falls into], such as, 'I am ignorant,' and so on, can be accounted for on the ground simply of an 'understanding,' &c., [without postulating a primal Nature which is to assume the shape of an 'understanding,' &c.].'

वेकस्य कार्येत्यानादिकारशाविवेकमूलकवाचत्स्य प्रधानाविवेकहाने सत्यवशयं हानिमित्यर्थे: ॥

1 यथा गरीरादात्मनिन्त विविल्ले गरीर्कार्येषु रूपादिश्वविवेको न संभवति तथा वृत्त्वाचिदाधिद्धैं: प्रधानात्युस्य विविल्ले तत्तार्येषु परिशामादधमंकेषु बुद्धादिश्वविवेकानो न स्थातुमुखसहेतु सत्यवाचिकारशाविवेकावैति भावः: ॥
well, if any one says this, I reply, ‘no;’ because, unless there were such a thing as Nature, we could not account for such conceits as the following, viz., ‘Having died, having died, again, when there is a creation, let me be a denizen of Paradise, and not of hell;’ because no products, such as the ‘understanding,’ when they have perished, can be created anew,1 [any more than a gold-bracelet, melted down, can be reproduced, though another like it may be produced from the materials],

\[\text{The soul’s confounding itself with Nature is logically antecedent to its confounding itself with anything else.}\]

d. Moreover, it is inadmissible to say that men’s conceit of [the identity of themselves with their] ‘understanding,’ &c., is [the primary cause of the soul’s bondage, and is] not preceded by anything; because ‘understanding’ and the rest [as you will not deny] are effects. Now, while it is to be expected that there should be some predetermining agency to establish a conceit of [ownership in, or of one’s identity with,] any effects, it is clear that it is a conceit of [ownership, &c.,] in respect of the cause, and nothing else, that must be the predetermining agency: for we see this in ordinary life; and our theories are bound to conform [deferentially] to experience. For [to explain,] we see, in ordinary life, that the conceit of [the ownership of] the grain, &c., pro-

1 ननु बुधाद्विकारानातिर्भज्जय भाजाभिभाजनानां बुधानुपयोगविषयविषयम् विनानुपयोगविषयविषयं भाजाक्षेत्रम् पुनः सृष्टिकर्षन्यां भाजान च नारकाविभाजनानां प्रधानाविशेषाय विनानुपयोगविषयविषयं भाजाक्षेत्रम् पुनः सृष्टिभवतः।
duced by a field, results from the conceit of [the ownership of] the field; and, from the conceit of [the ownership of] gold, the conceit of [the ownership of] the bracelets, or other things, formed of that gold; and, by the removal of these [i.e., the removal of the logically antecedent conceits, that the field, or the gold, is one’s property], there is the removal of those, i.e., the removal of the conceits that the grain, &c., and that the bracelets, &c., the corresponding products or effects of the field and of the gold, are one’s property; and so the soul will cease to confound itself with the ‘understanding,’ when it ceases to confound itself with Nature, of which the ‘understanding’ is held to be a product.

a. [And, if it be supposed that we thus lay ourselves open to the charge of a regressus in infinitum, seeing that, whatever we may assign as the first cause, we may, on our own principles, be asked what was the ‘determining agency,’ in regard to it; or if it be supposed that we are chargeable with reasoning in a circle, when we hold that the soul’s confounding itself with Nature is the cause of

1 किं च बुधार्धान्तु पुह्वार्षामभिमानोत्तनाः
दिवः स हंश्यते बुध्यांदकी नां कार्यचायत।
कार्यवेक्ष्यात्मवेक्ष्यार्थि नियामकाकाद्याः
कारणात्मभिमान एव नियामकात्या सिद्धशति लोके प्रश्वाते
कल्पनायात् दृष्टात्मानुस्सरस्वत।
दृश्ये हि लोके क्षणात्मािनात्काजन्यायादियबिमानः
सूक्ष्माभिमानात्काजन्यायकादियबिमानान्तैत्यानिक्षेपः
या च तत्योपन्नश्रृतिति॥
its continuing so to confound itself, and its continuing so to confound itself is, reciprocally, the cause why it confounds itself; we reply, that there is no occasion to look for any other ‘predetermining agency,’ in the case of the conceit of [the identity of the soul with] Nature, or in the case of the self-continuance\(^1\) thereof, [i.e., of that error of confounding one’s self with Nature]; because [these two are alike] without antecedent, like seed and sprout,\(^2\) [of which it is needless to ask which is the first; the old puzzle, ‘which was first, the acorn, or the oak?’ being a frivolous question].

But then [some one may say], if we admit the soul’s bondage [at one time], and its freedom [at another], and its discrimination [at one time], and its non-discrimination [at another], then this is in contradiction to the assertion [in § 19], that it is ‘ever essentially a pure and free intelligence;’ and it is in contradiction to such texts as this, viz., ‘The absolute truth is this, that neither is there destruction [of the soul], nor production [of it]; nor is it bound, nor is it an effecter [of any work], nor is it desirous of liberation, nor is it, indeed, liberated; [seeing that that cannot desire or obtain liberation, which was never bound].’\(^3\) This [charge of inconsistency] he repels:\(^4\)

\(^1\) To render vásáña, on which see 2, at p. 29, supra. Ed.

\(^2\) प्रधानाभिमानतद्वासनयोऽव बीजाकुरवदन- 

\(^3\) आमृतांतुं उपनिषद, v. 10. See Dr. Albrecht Weber’s 

\(^4\) ननु पुष्पस्य चेदन्यमेक्षा विबेकाविवेको च 

\(^5\) स्वीकृती तत्हि नित्येनुष्मुक्तमुक्तोक्तिविरोधस्तथा
वाग्नार्थ न तु ॥ तत्त्वं चिन्तनस्थिते: ॥ ५५ ॥

_Aph. 58. It is merely verbal, and not a reality [this so-called bondage of the soul]; since it [the bondage] resides in the mind, [and not in the soul].

a. That is to say: since bondage, &c., all reside only in the mind [and not in the soul], all this, as regards the soul, is merely verbal, i.e., it is _vox et praeterea nihil_; because is is merely a _reflection_, like the redness of [pellucid] crystal [when a China-rose is near it], but not a reality, with no false imputation, like the redness of the China-rose itself. Hence there is _no_ contradiction to what had been said before, [as the objector (under § 57. f.) would insinuate]: such is the state of the case._

च न निरोधो न चाल्लल्लिन्नं बझा न च साधकं।
न मुसुभुन्ने वै मुख इत्येव परमार्थ्यादिभिष्टुति-विरोधिश्वेति तत्त परिहर्वति ॥

                      1 Aniruddha has, instead of न तु, तु न. Hence: 'But it is merely verbal, not a reality,' &c. _Ed._

   2 वन्धादीनां सर्वंशं चिन्त एवावस्थानानानस्तित्वं
   पुर्वे वाग्नार्थ इष्टमाहां स्फुर्णकलाहित्यावप्रति-
   विषमात्रतान्त्र तु तत्वमनारोपितं जवलाहित्य-वदित्वं: । अते नात्त्विरोध इति भाव: ॥

   3
b. But then, if bondage, &c., as regards the soul, be merely verbal, let them be set aside by hearing [that they are merely verbal], or by argument [establishing that they are so]. Why, in the Scripture and the Law, is there enjoined, as the cause of liberation, a discriminative knowledge [of Soul, as distinguished from Non-soul], going the length of immediate cognition? To this he replies:

युक्तिरेषिपि न वाध्यते दिक्कुदवद्वपरोक्षान्वते ॥ ५९ ॥

Aph. 59. Moreover, it [the non-discrimination of Soul from Nature] is not to be removed by argument; as that of the person perplexed about the points of the compass [is not to be removed] without immediate cognition.

a. By 'argument' we mean thinking. The word 'moreover' is intended to aggregate [or take in, along with 'argument'] 'testimony,' [or verbal authority, which, no more than 'argument,' or inference, can remove the evil, which can be removed by nothing short of direct intuitive perception of the real state of the case].

1 ननु बन्धादिकं चेत्युत्थे बाङ्कान्त तहिं श्रवणेन युक्ता वा तत्स्य वाधे भवतु । किमश्च श्रुतिसमृयोः साक्षाकारपर्यन्तं विवेकज्ञानमुपदिश्यते मोक्षे-हेतुत्तपति । तच्चाह ॥

2 युक्तिसमनन्तम । ऋपिष्टः श्रवणसमुव्रयार्थः ।
b. That is to say: the bondage, &c., of the soul though [granted to be] merely verbal, are not to be removed by merely hearing, or inferring, without immediate cognition, without directly perceiving; just as the contrariety in regard to the [proper] direction, though merely verbal [as resulting from misdirection], in the case of a person who is mistaken as to the points of the compass [and hence as to his own bearings], is not removed by testimony, or by inference, without immediate cognition, i.e., without [his] directly perceiving [how the points of the compass really lie, to which immediate perception 'testimony,' or 'inference,' may conduce, but the necessity of which these media, or instruments of knowledge, cannot supersede].

c. Or it [Aph. 59] may be explained as follows, viz.: But then, [seeing that] it is declared, by the assertion [in Aph. 56], viz., that 'The removal of it is to be effected by the necessary means,' that knowledge, in the shape of discrimination [between Soul and Nature], is the remover of non-discrimination [in regard to the matter in question], tell us, is that knowledge of a like nature with the hearing

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1 Here I have had to make several insertions and other alterations. Dr. Ballantyne had: 'That is to say, the bondage, &c., [of the soul] is not to be removed by merely hearing, or inferring, without perceiving; just as the contrariety in regard to the proper direction, in the case,' &c. Ed.

2 वाङ्गचमपि पुष्पस्य वन्थादिकं श्रवणमन- 
नमाच्छेन न बाध्यतेषपरोशाहृते साक्षाकारं 
विना यथा दिक्षनस्य वाङ्गचमपि दिप्चैप- 
रैवं श्रवणमुक्षिभ्यं न वाध्यते साक्षाकारं वि- 
नेत्यर्थः॥
[of Testimony], &c.? Or is it something peculiar? A reply to this being looked for, he enunciates the aphorism [§ 59]: ‘Moreover, it is not to be removed by argument,’ &c. That is to say: non-discrimination is not excluded, is not cut off, by argument, or by testimony, unless there be discrimination as an immediate perception; just as is the case with one who is bewildered in regard to [his] direction; because the only thing to remove an immediate error is an immediate individual perception¹ [of the truth. For example, a man with the jaundice perceives white objects as if they were yellow. He may infer that the piece of chalk which he looks at is really white; or he may believe the testimony of a friend, that it is white; but still nothing will remove his erroneous perception of yellowness in the chalk, except a direct perception of its whiteness].

d. Having thus, then, set forth the fact that Liberation results from the immediate discrimination [of Soul from

¹ अथवेवै व्याख्यायं ननु नित्यतकारणात्रात्यन्तरतुष्टि-तिरित्यनेन विवेकज्ञानमविवेकात्मकःटकु मुं त-ज्ञानं किं अवज्ञादिसाधारणामतात्त्विकोत्करिणीष्य इत्याकालायामाह युक्तिभोजपीयादिसौचम्। अव-विवेको युक्तिः अवज्ञात्व न वायते नामखिभेव विवेकारोग्यं विना दिधोहवद्यवर्त्यं। मात्राकार-भृमे सात्माकारविशेषद्वारस्येव विरोधिता-दिति।
Nature], the next thing to be set forth is the 'discrimination' [here referred to].

e. This being the topic, in the first place, since only if Soul and Nature exist, liberation can result from the discrimination of the one from the other, therefore that 'instrument of right knowledge' (pramāṇa) which establishes the existence of these [two imperceptible realities] is [first] to be set forth:

तदेव विवेकसाङ्कारान्मोक्षं प्रतिपादात: परं विवेकः प्रतिपादनीयः ॥

तच्छदी प्रकृतिपुस्तसिद्धा हि तद्विवेकान्मोक्षः स्वादतत्तत्सिद्धा प्रमाणभुपन्यस्यं ॥
perceive it,) is brought about by the "recognition of a Sign," occasioned by smoke, &c.  

b. Moreover, it is to be understood that that which is [true, but yet is] not established by "Inference," is established by Revelation. But, since "Inference" is the chief [among the instruments of knowledge], in this [the Sānkhya] System, "Inference" only is laid down [in the aphorism], as the chief thing; but Revelation is not disregarded [in the Sānkhya system; as will be seen from Aph. 88 of this Book].

c. He [next] exhibits the order of creation of those things among which Nature is the first, and the relation of cause and effect [among these, severally], preparatorily to the argument that will be [afterwards] stated:

\[1\] अन्यानुमानासिद्धमण्डलमालिकातीतियथपि बोधम्। अस्य शास्त्रस्यानुमानप्राधान्यात् शेषलामनस्य मुख्यतेवैवपन्याते स लागमस्यानपेक्षेऽत्।

\[2\] प्रकृत्यादीनां सृष्टिक्रमं वश्यमात्यानुमानाया-योगिकायेकारस्यास्बं च दर्शयति।
Aph. 61. Nature (prakriti) is the state of equipoise of Goodness (sattva),
Passion (rajas), and Darkness (tamas):
from Nature [proceeds] Mind (mahat); from Mind, Self-
consciousness (ahankara); from Self-consciousness, the five
Subtile Elements (tan-matra), and both sets [external and
internal,] of Organs (indriya); and, from the Subtile
Elements, the Gross Elements (sthula-bhuta). [Then there is]
Soul (purusha). Such is the class of twenty-five.

a. 'The state of equipoise' of the [three] things called
'Goodness,' &c., is their being neither less nor more
[one than another]; that is to say, the state of not being
[developed into] an effect [in which one or other of
them predominates]. And thus 'Nature' is the triad of
'Qualities' (guna), distinct from the products [to which
this triad gives rise]: such is the complete meaning. 2

b. These things, viz., 'Goodness,' &c., [though spoken
of as the three Qualities], are not 'Qualities' (guna) in the
Vaiseshika sense of the word; because [the 'Qualities' of

1 My MSS. of Aniruddha omit นันทมชำชัย: Ed.

2 สมัคคีศวานุยานุปำะนันติ-
รินัคีชวานุยานุปำะนันติ:
ณวัต ท ค ำธิปนิย
ภูตฉัชผ นุ นุ ปำะนันติ

3 For a translation of a slightly different text, see the Rational
Refutation, &c., p. 43. Ed.
the Vaiśeshika system have, themselves, no qualities (see Kanāda's 16th Aph.); while these have the qualities of Conjunction, Disjunction, Lightness, Force, Weight, &c.

In this [Sānkhya] system, and in Scripture, &c., the word 'Quality' (guna) is employed [as the name of the three things in question], because they are subservient to Soul [and, therefore, hold a secondary rank in the scale of being], and because they form the cords [which the word guna also signifies], viz., 'Mind,' &c., which consist of the three [so-called] 'Qualities,' and which bind, as a [cow, or other] brute-beast, the Soul.

Of this [Nature] the principle called 'the great one' (mahat), viz., the principle of 'Understanding' (buddhi), is the product. 'Self-consciousness' is a conceit [of separate personality]. Of this there are two products, (1) the

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1 Balavatwa; for which I find the variant chalatwa, 'mobility.' Ed.

2 Read: 'Goodness and the rest are substances, not specific qualities; for they [themselves] possess [qualities, viz., those of] contact and separation, and also have the properties of levity, mobility, gravity, &c.' Vaiśeshikā gunāḥ is equivalent to the viśeṣa-gunāḥ in the original of Book V., 25. a. For the 'specific qualities,' see the Bhāshā-parichchheda, st. 90. Ed.

3 For 'is employed,' &c., read, 'is applied to these (teṣu), [namely, goodness, passion, and darkness].' Ed.

4 सत्त्वादीनि दृष्यारिषप न वैशेषिका गुणाः संयोग-गतिभागवत्सालायुनलवालवत्सगुणालदिर्मणकलाच। तेष्वच शास्त्रे गुणादृको च गुणशब्दः पुरुषोपकरणाभावायुनावन्तयिकगुणात्मकमहदादिर्ज्ञानीमु-तृतीय प्रयोज्यते ||

5 For a different translation, see the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 43, 44. Ed.
'Subtile Elements' and (2) the two sets of 'Organs.' The 'Subtile Elements' are [those of] Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste, and Smell. The two sets of 'Organs,' through their division into the external and the internal, are of eleven kinds. The products of the 'Subtile Elements' are the five 'Gross Elements.' But 'Soul' is something distinct from either product or cause. Such is the class of twenty-five, the aggregate of things. That is to say, besides these there is nothing.¹

d. He [next], in [several] aphorisms, declares the order of the inferring² [of the existence of these principles, the one from the other:

स्खलाद्युंचतन्माच्य ॥ ६२ ॥

Aph. 62. [The knowledge of the existence of the five 'Subtile Elements' is [by inference,] from the 'Gross Elements.'

¹ तस्या कार्यं महत्रत्र वहितत्र वम। चाहेन्कारो
भिमान।। तस्य कार्येऽवं तन्माचारियुभायमिनिद्रियं च। तन्माचारिण्य शच्चस्त्येण्यपरसंगत्वः।
भायमिनिद्रियं बालाभ्यंतररेद्दैवकाद्यविधम।
तन्माचार्य मायेण्य पञ्च स्खलभूतानि। पुरुषतः
कार्येऽवं विलक्ष्ण इति। इत्येवं पञ्चविंशतिगैः। पदार्थेऽवूहः। एतद्विंशतिन्भिः। पदार्थाः नास्तिलयः।।

² अनुमानक्रममाह सते: |
a. 'The knowledge, by inference,' so much is supplied,' [to complete the aphorism, from Aph. 60].

b. Earth, &c., the 'Gross Elements,' are proved to exist, by Perception; [and] thereby [i.e., from that Perception; for Perception must precede Inference, as stated in Go
tama's 5th Aphorism,] are the 'Subtle Elements' inferred, [the στοιχεία στοιχείων of Empedocles]. And so the application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows:

(1) The Gross Elements, or those which have not reached the absolute limit [of simplification, or of the atomic], consist of things [Subtle Elements, or Atoms,] which have distinct qualities; [the earthy element having the distinctive quality of Odour; and so of the others]:

(2) Because they are gross;

(3) [And everything that is gross is formed of something less gross, or, in other words, more subtile,] as jars, webs, &c.;² [the gross web being formed of the less gross threads; and so of the others].

बाहाभ्यन्तराभ्यां तैष्ठाइंकारस्य ॥ ६३ ॥

And thence that of Self-consciousness.

Aph. 63. [The knowledge of the existence] of Self-consciousness is [by inference,] from the external and inter-

¹ अनुमाननेन बोध इत्यनुवर्तते ॥

² स्थूलं पृथिव्यादि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं तेन तत्तांगा

शास्त्रानितम् । तथा चापकर्पकारापंड्यानि स्थू

लभृतानि सविशेषमुद्वद्धीपापातानकानि स्थूल

वाराहतपरिविद्धितं प्रयोगः ॥

³ In my MSS. of Aniruddha there is no च after तैः. Ed.
nal [organs], and from these ['Subtile Elements,' mentioned in Aph. 62].

a. By inference from [the existence of] the external and internal organs, and from [that of] these 'Subtile Elements,' there is the knowledge of [the existence of such a principle as] Self-consciousness.¹

b. The application [of the process of inference to the case] is in the following [somewhat circular] manner:

(1) The Subtile Elements and the Organs are made up of things consisting of Self-consciousness:

(2) Because they are products of Self-consciousness:

(3) Whatever is not so [i.e., whatever is not made out of Self-consciousness] is not thus [i.e., is not a product of Self-consciousness]; as the Soul, [which, not being made up thereof, is not a product of it].²

c. But then, if it be thus [i.e., if it be, as the Sánkhya declare, that all objects, such as jars, are made up of Self-consciousness, while Self-consciousness depends on 'Understanding,' or 'Intellec,' or 'Mind,' the first product of 'Nature' (see Aph. 61)], then [some may object, that], since it would be the case that the Self-consciousness of the potter is the material of the jar, the jar made by him would disappear, on the beatification of the potter, whose internal organ [or 'Understanding'] then surceases.

¹ वाहायथ्यन्तराभायामिन्द्रियाभ्यं तेलस्थायिष्ज्वां कारस्थायानुमानेन वेधः।

² तन्माचैंद्रियामिकमानवह्रोपादानकान्यक्षीमानकायेद्रव्यालात्। यत्रिं तत्रिं यथा पुरुष

इति प्रयोगः।
And this [the objector may go on to say,] is not the case; because another man [after the beatification of the potter,] recognizes that 'This is that same jar' [which, you may remember, was fabricated by our deceased acquaintance].

d. [In reply to this we say,] it is not thus; because, on one's beatification, there is an end of only those modifications of his internal organ [or 'Intelect'] which could be causes [as the jar no longer can be,] of the emancipated soul's experiencing [either good or ill], but not an end of the modifications of intellect in general, nor [an end] of intellect altogether: [so that we might spare ourselves the trouble of further argument, so far as concerns the objection grounded on the assumption that the intellect of the potter surceases, on his beatification: but we may go further, and admit, for the sake of argument, the surcease of the 'intelect' of the beatified potter, without conceding any necessity for the surcease of his pottery. This alternative theory of the case may be stated as follows]:

e. Or [as Berkeley suggests, in his Principles of Human knowledge, Ch. vi.,] let the Self-consciousness of the Deity be the cause why jars and the like [continue to exist], and

1 नव्येव पुलानां कारस्यापि घटापादानात्म-पत्या कुलालमुक्तीं तदलं सर्वानाशेति तत्वतं धर्मनाशं स्थानं। न च वै विपुल्यो पुरस्थान्तरेण स एवायं घट इति प्रत्यभिव्याघ्यायमानवादिति।

2 मैयं सुम्भ्रुवहोगहेतुपरिवर्तामय्येव तदलं:-कर्षणे मैक्त्रास्तरमुक्ताद्वृत्तं तु परिवर्तामतामय्यस्थानं कर्षणं रूपस्यं वो चौँदि।
not the Self-consciousness of the potter, &c., [who may lose their Self-consciousness, whereas the Deity, the sum of all life, Hiranyagarbha (see Vedánta-sūtra, § 62), never loses his Self-consciousness, while aught living continues]

तेनान्तः करणस्य || ६६ ||

Aph. 64. [The knowledge of the existence] of Intellect is [by inference,] from that [Self-consciousness, § 63]

a. That is to say: by inference from [the existence of] 'that,' viz., Self-consciousness, which is a product, there comes the knowledge of 'Inte1lect' (buddhi), the great 'inner organ' (antahkarana), [hence] called 'the great one' (mahat), [the existence of which is recognized] under the character of the cause of this [product, viz., Self-consciousness]

b. And so the application [again rather circular, of the process of inference to the case,] is as follows:

(1) The thing called Self-consciousness is made out of the things that consist of the moods of judgment [or mind];

(2) Because it is a thing which is a product of judgment [proceeding in the Cartesian order of cogito, ergo sum; and]

1 अथवा घटादिवर्गी हिरण्यगर्भाहंकार एव कारणस्यतु न कुलालायाहंकारः ||

2 तेनान्तः करणेऽर्ष कारणेऽर्षतत्त्वतया महयस्यान्तः करणस्य महद्यस्य बुद्धिनन्तरत्माने वेयाध इत्यर्थ: ||
(3) Whatever is not so [i.e., whatever is not made out of judgment, or mental assurance], is not thus [i.e., is not a product of mental assurance]; as the Soul, [which is not made out of this or of anything antecedent], &c.¹

c. Here the following reasoning is to be understood: Everyone, having first determined anything under a concept [i.e., under such a form of thought as is expressed by a general term; for example, that this which presents itself is a jar, or a human body, or a possible action of one kind or other], after that makes the judgment, ‘This is I,’ or ‘This ought to be done by me,’ and so forth: so much is quite settled; [and there is no dispute that the fact is as here stated]. Now, having, in the present instance, to look for some cause of the thing called ‘Self-consciousness’ [which manifests itself in the various judgments just referred to], since the relation of cause and effect subsists between the two functions [the occasional conception, and the subsequent occasional judgment, which is a function of Self-consciousness], it is assumed, for simplicity, merely that the relation of cause and effect exists between the two substrata to which the [two sets of] functions belong; [and this is sufficient,] because it follows, as a matter of course, that the occurrence of a function of the effect must result from the occurrence of a function of the cause;² [nothing, according to the Sánkhya, being in any

¹ तथा चार्य प्रयोगः। अहंकारद्वायं निश्चयवृत्तिमहृद्योपादानं निश्चयकार्यंद्रव्यनात्। यथा च तत्स्वर यथा पुरुषवादिरिति॥

² अन्यत्र तर्क वेद्यः। सर्वोषिपि लोकं पदा-शैलादाहि स्वरूपते निश्चित्य पद्धादभिमन्यतेऽयमहं
product, except so far, and in such wise, as it preexisted in
the cause of that product].

तत्तः प्रकृतेः ॥ एव ॥

And thence that of
Nature.

_Aph. 65. [The knowledge of the exis-
tence] of Nature is [by inference,] from
that [‘Intelleqt,’ § 64].

a. By inference from [the existence of] ‘that,’ viz., the
principle [of Intellect, termed], ‘the Great one,’ which is
a product, there comes the knowledge of [the existence of]
Nature, as [its] cause.

b. The application [of the process of inference to the case]
is as follows:

(1) Intellect, the affections whereof are Pleasure, Pain,
and Dullness, is produced from something which has these
affections, [those of] Pleasure, Pain, and Dullness:

(2) Because, whilst it is a product [and must, therefore,
have arisen from something consisting of that which
itself now consists of], it consists of Pleasure, Pain, and
Dullness; [and]
(3) [Every product that has the affections of, or that occasions, Pleasure, Pain, or Dulness, takes its rise in something which consists of these]; as lovely women, &c.¹

c. For an agreeable woman gives pleasure to her husband, and, therefore, [is known to be mainly made up of, or] partakes of the quality of 'Goodness;' the indiscreet one gives pain to him, and, therefore, partakes of the quality of 'Foulness;' and she who is separated [and perhaps forgotten,] occasions indifference, and so partakes of the quality of 'Darkness.'²

d. And the appropriate refutation [of any objection], in this case, is [the principle], that it is fitting that the qualities of the effect should be [in every case,] in conformity with the qualities of the cause.³

e. Now he states how, in a different way, we have [the evidence of] inference for [the existence of] Soul, which is void of the relation of cause and effect that has been men-

¹ ऋयं प्रशोगः । सुखदः समोपहर्षिती बुद्धि: सुखदः समोहर्षितकद्रव्यजन्या कार्यले सति सुखदः समोहात्मकवात्कालान्तादिविदिति ॥

² काँता हि भर्तुः सुखदेति सात्त्विकी । अविनया दुःखदेति राजसी । विरहिषी मोहदेति तामसी भवति ॥

³ कार्यानुसारेऽविर कार्यगुणादिचित्यं चाचानुकू-लक्ष्यः ॥
tioned,¹ [in the four preceding aphorisms, as existing between Nature and its various products]:

**संहतपरार्थार्थालुस्वस्य II ६६ II**

*The argument for the existence of Soul.*

Aph. 66. [The existence] of Soul [is inferred] from the fact that the combination [of the principles of Nature into their various effects] is for the sake of another [than unintelligent Nature, or any of its similarly unintelligent products]

* a. 'Combination,' i.e., conjunction, which is the cause [of all products; these resulting from the conjunction of their constituent parts]. Since whatever has this quality, as Nature, Mind, and so on [unlike Soul, which is not made up of parts], is for the sake of some other; for this reason it is understood that Soul exists: such is the remainder, [required to complete the aphorism].

b. But the application [of the argument, in this particular case, is as follows]:

(1) The thing in question, viz., Nature the 'Great one, with the rest [of the aggregate of the unintelligent], has, as its fruit [or end], the [mundane] experiences and the [eventual] Liberation of some other than itself:

¹ अष्टयक्षार्थकारणभावशृङ्ख्लस्य पुरुषस्य प्रकारान्तरेषाणुभानमानमाह II

² Here indicated by the adjective *avyakta,* the indiscrete. See Aph. 136 of this Book. *Ed.*

³ संहतः कार्यभूतसंयोगः। तद्भवत्वङ्कम-हदादेः परार्थालाभेता: पुरुषस्य बोध इति श्रेष्ठः।
(2) Because it is a combination [or compages];

(3) [And every combination,] as a couch, or a seat, or the like, [is for another's use, not for its own; and its several component parts render no mutual service].

c. Now, in order to establish that it is the cause of all [products], he establishes the eternity of Nature (prakriti):  

मूले मूलाभावादमूलं मूलम् \[67\]

*Argument for the eternity of Nature.*  

Aph. 67. Since the root has no root, the root [of all] is rootless.

a. Since 'the root' (mūla), i.e., the cause of the twenty-three principles, [which, with Soul and the root itself, make up the twenty-five realities recognized in the Sāṅkhya,] 'has no root,' i.e., has no cause, the 'root,' viz., Nature (pradhāna), is 'rootless,' i.e., void of root. That is to say, there is no other cause of Nature; because there would be

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\[1\] प्रयोगातू विवादास्यं प्रकृतिमहदादिकं स्वेत- 

रस्य भोगापवर्गफलं संहतलाभ्यासनाददिव- 

दिति \[1\]

\[2\] इदानिं सवैकारशलेपपन्ने प्रकृतेनिन्यालम- 

पपात्यति \[2\]

\[3\] This seems to mean: 'There being no root to a root, the root [or radical principle, in the Sāṅkhya,] is rootless.'

In several MSS. which I consulted in India I found the strange reading: मूलं मूलाभावादमूलं मूलानाम। 'The root of roots, since it has no root, is rootless.' This is very like saying that \(A = \overline{A}\). Ed.
a regressus in infinitum,¹ [if we were to suppose another cause, which, by parity of reasoning, would require another cause; and so on without end].

6. He states the argument [just mentioned] in regard to this, [as follows]:²

पारम्परिक्षेपक परिनिश्चिति संज्ञामात्रम् ॥ ६४ ॥

¹ मूले चयोविविषिततत्त्वानं कारणे मूलाभावार्तकार्याभावान्मूलं प्रधानममूलं मूलशून्यम्। अनवस्थापन्त्य प्रधानस्य न कारणातरमस्ती-लयथः॥

The source of the preceding exposition I have not ascertained.

Vijnāna has: चयोविविषितत्त्वानं मूलमुपादानं प्रधानं मूलशून्यमनवस्थापन्त्या तत्र मूलान्तरास्मभवादिलयथः। Nāgeśa: मूलं सर्वंमुपादानं प्रधानं मूलशून्यमनवस्थापन्त्या मूलभूते तत्र मूलान्तरास्मभवादिलयथः। Aniruddha: मूलप्रकृतेमूलाभावार्तकार्याभावादमूलं यत्कारणं तन्मूलम्। सा प्रकृति:। Vedānti Mahādeva: चयोविविषिततत्त्वानं मूले प्रधानेतनवस्थापन्त्या कारणाभावावादकारणं प्रधानमिनित्यथः। Ed.

² तत्र युक्तिमाह॥
Aph. 68. Even if there be a succession, there is a halt at some one point; and so it is merely a name [that we give to the point in question, when we speak of the root of things, under the name of 'Nature'].

a. Since there would be the fault of regressus in infinitum, if there were a succession of causes,—another cause of Nature, and another [cause] of that one, again,—there must be, at last, a halt, or conclusion, at some one point, somewhere or other, at some one, uncaused, eternal thing. Therefore, that at which we stop is the Primal Agency (pra-kriti); for this [word prakriti, usually and conveniently rendered by the term Nature,] is nothing more than a sign to denote the cause which is the root: such is the meaning.¹

b. But then [some Vedántí may object, according to this view of matters], the position that there are just twenty-five realities is not made out; for, in addition to² the 'Indiscrete' [or primal Nature], which [according to you,] is the cause of Mind,³ another unintelligent principle, named 'Ignorance' [see Vedánta-sútra, § 21], presents

¹ प्रकृतन्यत्नकरणं तस्याध्ययिति कारणार्थप्रयोजनवस्थादेवादत्ततोत्सकरणं एकेकस्मिन्यथकुचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचिचि
itself: Having pondered this doubt, he declares [as follows]:

"समानः प्रकृतेष्योः II ६५ II"

Nature and Soul alike. Aph. 69. Alike, in respect of Nature, and of both [Soul and Nature, is the argument for the uncreated existence].

а. In the discussion of the Primal Agent [Nature], the cause which is the root [of all products], the same side is taken by us both, the asserter [of the Sāṅkhya doctrine] and the opponent [Vedânti]. This may be thus stated: As there is mention, in Scripture, of the production of Nature, so, too, is there of that of Ignorance, in such texts as this, viz.: 'This Ignorance, which has five divisions, was produced from the great Spirit.' Hence it must needs be that a figurative production is intended to be asserted, in respect of one of these [and not the literal production of both; else we should have no root at all]; and, of the two, it is with Nature only that a figurative production, in the shape of a manifestation through conjunction with Soul, &c., is congruous. A production [such as that metaphorical one here spoken of], the characteristic of which is conjunction is mentioned; for there is mention

1 ननु पञ्चविन्दितल्वानीति नानपपत्ते मह-तत्त्वकारणाय क्षालपिक्षोविद्याविधानतत्त्वान्तराप-चिरियाश्चाह ||

2 This is Dr. Ballantyne's revised translation, suggested by a remark of Vijnána, quoted and translated below, in 6. The rendering now replaced runs: 'Alike [is the opinion] of both [of us], in respect of Nature.' The side-note was formerly correspondent to a., viz.: 'He meets a Vedântic objection.' Ed.
of [such] a figurative origination of Soul and Nature, in a passage of the Kaurma [Purāṇa], beginning, 'Of action [or the Primal Agency], and knowledge [or Soul],', and so on. And, as there is no mention, in Scripture, of the origin of Ignorance, as figurative, it is not from eternity. And Ignorance, which consists of false knowledge, has been declared, in an aphorism of the Yoga, to be [not a separate entity, but] 'an affection of the mind.' Hence there is no increase to the [list of the twenty-five] Realities,¹ [in the shape of a twenty-sixth principle, to be styled Ignorance].

b. Or [according to another, and more probable, inter-
pretation of the aphorism,] the meaning is this, that the argument is the same in support of both, i.e., of both Soul and Nature: such is the meaning.\footnote{1}

c. But then, there being [as has been shown,] a mode of arriving, by inference, at [a knowledge of the saving truth in regard to] Nature, Soul, &c., whence is it that reflection, in the shape of discrimination [between Soul and Nature], does not take place in the case of all [men]? In regard to this point, he states [as follows]:\footnote{2}

**अधिकारित्रेविध्यार्य नियमः || 90 ||**

\textit{All do not profit by the saving truth; because it is only the best kind of people that are fully amenable to reason.}

\textit{Aph. 70. There is no rule [or necessity, that all should arrive at the truth]; because those who are privileged [to engage in the inquiry] are of three descriptions.}

\textit{a. For those privileged [to engage in the inquiry] are of three descriptions, through their distinction into those who, in reflecting, are dull, mediocre, and best. Of these, by the dull the [Sānkhya] arguments are frustrated [and altogether set aside], by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the Baudhāyas, &c. By the mediocre they [are brought into doubt, or, in other words,] are made to appear as if there were equally strong arguments on the other side, by means of arguments which really prove the reverse [of what these people employ them to prove], or by}

\footnote{1} ऋष्य वा द्वयोः प्रकृतिपुष्पोऽरः समान एव न्याय इत्यथे: ||

\footnote{2} ननु प्रकृतिपुष्पायानुमानप्रकारसमृद्धिसंवेषां विवेकमननं कुलो न जायते || तत्त्राह ||
arguments which are not true: [see the section on Fallacies in the *Turka-saṃgraha*]. But it is only the best of those privileged, that reflect in the manner that has been set forth [in our exposition of the process of reflexion which leads to the discriminating of Soul from Nature]: such is the import. But there is no rule that all must needs reflect in the manner so set forth: such is the literal meaning.¹

b. He now, through two aphorisms, defines ‘the Great one’ and ‘Self-consciousness’;² [the reader being presumed to remember that Nature consists of the three ‘Qualities’ in equipoise, and to be familiar with the other principles, such as the ‘Subtile elements’ (see § 61)):

**महद्वाक्यमालयं कार्यं तन्मनः** || ७१ ||

*By the Great one* is meant *Mind.*

_Aph. 71._ The first product [of the Primal Agent, Nature], which is called ‘the Great one,’ is Mind.

a. ‘Mind’ (*manas*). ‘Mind’ [is so called], because its function is ‘thinking’ (*manana*). By ‘thinking’ is here meant ‘judging’ (*nimchaya*). That of which this is the func-

¹ मनने हि मद्मध्मामात्रमेण चिरविधा अधिकारिणः। तत्र मद्मद्वैधायुक्तकुतकैरनुप्रमानानि वाध्यने। मध्ममैविचारसाधिनः साध्यतिप्रक्षतानि क्रियने। उत्तमाधिकारिणामेव तूऽकरीया मननामाति भावः। सर्वधामेव तूऽकरीया मनननिमयो नेत्यक्षराच्छः।

² महद्वाक्यरः स्वप्नस्माह सूचाभयांम् ||
tion is 'intellect' (buddhi); and that is the first product, that called 'the Great one' (mahat): such is the meaning.¹

The relation of Self-consciousness to Mind.

Aph. 72. 'Self-consciousness' is that which is subsequent [to Mind.]

a. 'Self-consciousness,' the function of which is a conceit [that 'I exist,' 'I do this,' 'that, and the other thing'], is that which is subsequent: that is to say, 'Self-consciousness' is the next after 'the Great one' [§ 71].

b. Since 'Self-consciousness' is that whose function is a conceit [which brings out the Ego, in every case of cognition, the matter of which cognition would, else, have lain dormant in the bosom of Nature, the formless Objective], it therefore follows that the others [among the phenomena of mundane existence,] are effects of this [Self-consciousness]; and so he declares [as follows]:²

¹ मन इति। मन्नवृत्तिकं मनः। मन्नमच्चन
निष्ठयः। तद्वृत्तिका बुद्धिः। तन्महरास्यमात्रं
कार्यमित्वमेऽ॥

² अहंकारोहिमात्रमानवृत्तिकं पदार्थविवर्णो महा
तालन्तरोहिमां इत्यथां।

³ यते सर्वभिमानवृत्तिको अहंकारोहिस्तितस्तत्त्वकार्यविवेतां
तर्तियमुपपानमित्वाह॥
All products, save Mind, result from Self-consciousness.

Aph. 73. To the others it belongs to be products thereof, [i.e., of Self-consciousness].

a. 'To be products thereof,' i.e., to be products of Self-consciousness: that is to say, the fact of being products thereof belongs to the others, the eleven 'Organs' (indriya), the five 'Subtile elements,' and, mediately, to the [gross] Elements, also, the products of the Subtile elements.

b. But then, if it be thus [some one may say], you relinquish your dogma, that Nature is the cause of the whole world. Therefore he declares [as follows]:

Instead of उत्तरेषां, which seems to be peculiar to Vijñāna, Aniruddha and others have the preferable lection अन्येषां. Ed.

To render अन्येषां. Paragraph a is taken, with slight alterations at the beginning and at the end, from Aniruddha. Ed.

Instead of तत्कार्येतमहं कार्येतमन्येषामेकादशेषिद्रियां पञ्च तन्माचार्यां पारस्पर्येष तन्माचकार्योऽमपि भूतानां तत्कार्यविमिल्यर्थः।

'ननु यथेवं तथहि प्रधानं सर्वजगत्कारशामिति सिद्धान्तहानिर्गतः चाह।
Aph. 74. Moreover, mediately, through that [i.e., the ‘Great one’ (§ 71)], the first [cause, viz., Nature,] is the cause [of all products]; as is the case with the Atoms, [the causes, though not the immediate causes, of jars, &c.].

a. ‘Moreover, mediately,’ i.e., moreover, not in the character of the immediate cause, ‘the first,’ i.e., Nature, is the cause of ‘Self-consciousness’and the rest, [mediately,] through ‘the Great one’ and the rest; as, in the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, the Atoms are the cause of a jar, or the like, only [mediately,] through combinations of two atoms, and so on: such is the meaning.¹

b. But then, since, also, both Nature and Soul are eternal, which of them is [really] the cause of the creation’s commencing? In regard to this, he declares [as follows]:²

पूर्वभाविले हयोरेकतरस्य हानेन्यतरयोगः।।95॥

¹ पारम्पर्यस्यमि सामादहेतुतैतेवधाराया: प्रकृ- तेहतुतात्तारायाम् महादिविवारालि यथा वैशेषि- कमतेः ऋषिनां ठटादिहेतुता भ्रष्टुदिविन्तैवेवर्यवेयं: ॥

² ननु प्रकृतिपुरुषयोहियोरिपि नित्यालालसूच्यादिक्ष्य कस्य कारणाल्पितं श्राह ॥

² Slightly better, perhaps, than this reading is that of Aniruddha: पूर्वभाविले हयोरेकतरहानेनायतयोगः।। Ani- ruddha’s explanation here follows: न पूर्वभाविलमाचेष्ट कारणालं जिं नवंयव्यतिरेकायं हयोमेष्य एकस्म
Aph. 75. While both [Soul and Nature] are antecedent [to all products], since the one [viz., Soul] is [of this character of being a cause], it is applicable [only] to the other of the two, [viz., Nature]

a. That is to say: 'while both,' viz., Soul and Nature, are preexistent to every product, still, 'since the one,' viz., Soul, from the fact of its not being modified [into anything else, as clay is modified into a jar], must be 'devoid,' or lack the nature of a cause, 'it is applicable,' i.e., the nature of a cause must belong, to the other of the two. ¹

b. But then [some one may say], let Atoms alone be causes; since there is no dispute [that these are causal] In reply to this, he says: ²

परिच्छेन ने सर्वोपादानम् ॥ ५६ ॥

पुरुषस्य कारणलयोग्यताहासनिरविकारित्वादुः ।
अतोद्वितमस्य प्रधानस्य कारणलयोगः ।  Ed.

¹ इत्यादि पुरुषकृत्यारंभिकार्यपूर्वभाविकेष्योजनस्य पुरुषस्यापरिश्रामितवेन हाने कारणताहान्यामन्यतरस्य योगः कारणतासंभव इत्यथः ॥

² नन्वविवादात्यरमामासूनामेव कारणलम्बितव्यत ज्ञात ज्ञाह ॥

² Aniruddha has, according to both my MSS., परिच्छेन

लाच.  Ed.
Why the theory of a plastic Nature is preferable to that of Atoms.

Aph. 76. What is limited cannot be the substance of all [things].

a. That which is limited cannot be the substance of all [things]; as yarn cannot be the [material] cause of a jar. Therefore it would [on the theory suggested,] be necessary to mention separate causes of [all] things severally; and it is simpler to assume a single cause. Therefore Nature alone is the cause. Such is the meaning.¹

b. He alleges Scripture in support of this:²

Scripture declares in favour of the theory.

Aph. 77. And [the proposition that Nature is the cause of all is proved] from the text of Scripture, that the origin [of the world] is therefrom, [i.e., from Nature].

a. An argument, in the first instance, has been set forth [in § 76; for, till argument fails him, no one falls back upon authority] Scripture, moreover, declares that Nature is the cause of the world, in such terms as, 'From Nature the world arises,' &c.³

¹ यतसिद्धासं न तत्स्वर्णालां यथा न ततु- प्रयोग कारणः। तत्स्मात्स्वर्णानां पृथक्कृत्वाकारणां वक्तव्यमेकाकारणां च लाघवम्। तत्स्मात्प्रधान- स्यैव कारणान्यथ:॥

² च च चुतिं दर्शयति॥

³ युक्तितावप्रमाणः। चुतिरिप्र्यम्बह न जग- त्याग कारणामाह प्रथानाज्ञाज्ञायत इति॥
6. But then [some one may say], a jar which antecedently did not exist is seen to come into existence. Let, then, antecedent non-existence be the cause [of each product]; since this is an invariable antecedent, [and, hence, a cause; 'the invariable antecedent being denominated a cause,' if Dr. Brown, in his 6th lecture, is to be trusted]. To this he replies:

\[ \text{नावस्तुनो वस्तुसिद्ध:} \] ॥ ९४ ॥

\[ \text{Aph. 78. A thing is not made out of nothing.} \]

a. That is to say: it is not possible that out of nothing, i.e., out of a nonentity, a thing should be made, i.e., an entity should arise. If an entity were to arise out of a nonentity, then, since the character of a cause is visible in its product, the world, also, would be unreal: such is the meaning.⁴

b. Let the world, too, be unreal: what harm is that to us? [If any ask this,] he, therefore, declares [as follows]:³

\[ \text{ज्यादादृढ़कारुण्यवाच नावस्तुनम्} \] ॥ ९५ ॥

¹ ननु प्रागसतो घटस्य भवनं दृश्यते । नियत्
पूर्वभाविविवाप्रागभावः कारणमस्तिवित्यत् ज्ञाह ॥

² नावस्तुनोःभावायस्तुसिद्धिभीवेत्यवस्तिः संन्वतित्वं: । यद्भावायवेत्यसिद्धिः कारणऽरुपं
कार्यं दृश्यते इति जगतोऽपवस्तुनं स्वादित्वं: ॥

³ भवतु जगद्यवस्तु का नो हानिरितित ज्ञाह ॥
Reasons why the world is not to be supposed unreal.

_Aph. 79._ It [the world] is not unreal; because there is no fact contradictory [to its reality], and because it is not the [false] result of depraved causes, [leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed].

_a._ When there is the notion, in regard to a shell [of a pearl-oyster, which sometimes glitters like silver], that it is silver, its being silver is contradicted by the [subsequent and more correct] cognition, that this is not silver. But, in the case in question [that of the world regarded as a reality], no one ever has the cognition, 'This world is not in the shape of an entity,' by which [cognition, if any one ever really had such,] its being an entity might be opposed.¹

_δ._ And it is held that that is false which is the result of a depraved cause; e.g., some one's cognition of a [white] conch-shell as yellow, through such a fault as the jaundice, [which depraves his eye-sight]. But, in the case in question, [that of the world regarded as a reality], there is no such [temporary or occasional] depravation [of the senses]; because all, at all times, cognize the world as a reality. Therefore the world is not an unreality.²

¹ शुक्ल रज्जतमिति ज्ञाने नेदं रज्जतमिति ज्ञानादृज्जतवाधः। न च चाच नेदं भावह्यं जगदिति कस्यापि ज्ञानं येन भावह्यवाधः: स्त्यात्॥

² दुष्कारं जन्यवाच मिथ्येत्यवगम्यते गच्छ कामादिदैवतित्वात्मकं ज्ञानं कस्यचितं। ऋगच च जगज्ञानस्य सर्वेन्द्र सर्वदा सच्चाच देवेशस्ति। तस्माचाचावल्तु जगदिति॥
c. But then [some one may suggest], let a nonentity be the [substantial] cause of the world; still the world will not [necessarily, therefore,] be unreal. In regard to this, he declares [as follows]:

भावे तथ्योगेन तत्सिद्धियावज्जेत् तदभावाव्यक्ततरं
तत्सिद्धि: ॥ २० ॥

Aph. 80. If it [the substantial cause,] be an entity, then this would be the case, [that the product would be an entity], from its union [or identity] therewith; [but] if [the cause be] a nonentity, then how could it possibly be the case [that the product would be real], since it is a nonentity, [like the cause with which it is united, in the relation of identity]?

a. If an entity were the substantial cause [of the world], then, since [it is a maxim that] the qualities of the cause present themselves in the product, 'this would be the case,' i.e., it would be the case that the product was real, 'because of union therewith,' i.e., because of the union [of the product] with the reality [which is its substratum]. [But,] since, [by parity of reasoning], if a nonentity [were the substantial cause], the world would be a nonentity, then, by reason of its being a nonentity, i.e., by reason of the world's being [on that supposition], necessarily a nonentity, [like its supposed cause], how could this be the case; [that it would be real]?

1 नन्दभाव: कारणसंस्तु तथापरभावं न जगते भविष्यतीति । ततचः ॥

2 भाव उपादानकारणे कारणगुणाः कार्यं इति
b. But then [a follower of the *Mimansa* may say], since [it would appear that] nonentity can take no shape but that of nonentity, let *works* alone be the cause of the world. What need have we of the hypothesis of 'Nature'? To this he replies:  

**न कर्मेऽष् उपादानन्योगात् II ५७ II**

*Action cannot serve as a substratum.*

*Aph. 81.* No; for *works* are not adapted to be the *substantial* cause [of any product].

*a.* Granting that 'the unseen' [merit or demerit arising from actions] may be an *instrumental* cause, [in bringing about the mundane condition of the agent], yet we never see merit or demerit in the character of the *substantial* cause [of any product]: and our theories ought to show deference to our experience. 'Nature' is to be accepted; because Liberation arises [see § 56, and § 83.] from discerning the distinction between Nature and the Soul.  

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तथ्रोगेन भावयोगेन तत्। जैक्षयस्य वस्तुनिषीद्धि: ||
श्रावणे जगलोभाववले तदभावावजगदभावस्यावस्यभावाभाबाकुलसत्तिसिद्धिरिति ||

1 नन्नभावस्याभाववस्तुपलवालिकांतेव जगलकारशय-सतुऽ किं प्रधानकल्यनेत्यत भाह ||

2 उपादानन्योगात् is the lection accepted by Vijnana, and by him only. *Ed.*

3 It is the bracketed Aph. 86, at p. 38, *supra*, that is here referred to. *Ed.*

4 निमित्तं कारणमृष्ट्मातृत्वम् धर्माधमेयोस्तुणध: -
b. But then [some one may say], since Liberation can be attained by undertaking the things directed by the Veda, what occasion is there for [our troubling ourselves about] Nature? To this he replies:

उपरुपाधारितः पतितिंशः साध्यवेनावृत्तियोगाकर
दपुरुषवाष्टिनम् ॥५२ ॥

_Aph. 82._ The accomplishment thereof [i.e., of Liberation] is not, moreover, through Scriptural rites: the chief end of man does not consist in this [which is gained through such means]; because, since this consists of what is accomplished through acts, [and is, therefore, a product, and not eternal], there is [still left impending over the ritualist,] the liability to repetition of births.

a. 'Scriptural means,' such as sacrifices, [are so called], because they are heard from [the mouth of the instructor in] Scripture. Not thereby, moreover, is 'the accomplishment thereof,' i.e., the accomplishment of Liberation; 'because one is liable to repetition of births, by reason of the fact that it [the supposed Liberation,] was accomplished by means,' i.e., because the [thus far] liberated

दानकारणं न कविषृष्टं कल्यना हि दुष्टानुसारे
रक्षितं भवति। प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकद्वेषनान्मुक्ति-
रितिश्रवीकरः ॥

'ननु वेदोक्षारिनुष्ठानादेव मुक्तिसंभवानि
प्रक्षेप्यत स्वाह ॥'

_Scriptural means,' such as sacrifices, [are so called], because they are heard from [the mouth of the instructor in] Scripture. Not thereby, moreover, is 'the accomplishment thereof,' i.e., the accomplishment of Liberation; 'because one is liable to repetition of births, by reason of the fact that it [the supposed Liberation,] was accomplished by means,' i.e., because the [thus far] liberated
[soul] is still liable to repetition of births,¹ inasmuch as this [its supposed Liberation,] is not eternal, [just] because it is [the result of] acts. For this reason, the chief end of man does not consist in this,² [which is gained through ritual observances].

b. He shows what does constitute the chief end of man:³

In regard to the attainment of the chief end of man, the Scripture concurs with the Sûnkhyas.

Aph. 83. There is Scripture for it, that he who has attained to discrimination, in regard to these [i.e., Nature and Soul], has no repetition of births.

a. 'In regard to these,' i.e., in regard to Nature and Soul, of him who has attained to discrimination, there is a text declaring, that, in consequence of his knowledge of the distinction, there will be no repetition of births; the text, viz., 'He does not return again,'⁴ &c.⁵

¹ Literally, 'liable to return to mundane existence.' Ed.

² चेदार्दनुष्ठ्रयत इवानुष्ठ्रविको यज्ञादि।।
तस्मादपि न तत्सिद्धिमौद्यसिद्धि: साध्यलेनावृत्ति-
योगालक्षमेनानिपत्तान्मुक्तस्य पुनः संसारवृ-
सियोगः।। तस्मादपुरुषार्थेन्द्रम्

³ पुरुषार्थेन दर्शयति

⁴ Compare the Chhândogya Upanisad, viii., xv. Ed.

⁵ तत्र प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः प्रामाण्यस्व चिन्देन-
ज्ञानात्मावृत्तिः।। न स पुनरावतति नमि
श्रुति:।।
b. He states an objection to the opposite view:

दुःखादुःखं जलाभिषेकवच जायचविमेकं \| 84 \|

Pain can lead only to pain, not to liberation from it.

Aph. 84. From pain [occasioned, e.g., to victims in sacrifice] must come pain [to the sacrificer, and not liberation from pain]; as there is not relief from chilliness, by affusion of water.

a. If Liberation were to be effected by acts, [such as sacrifices], then, since the acts involve a variety of pains, Liberation itself [on the principle that every effect includes the qualities of its cause,] would include a variety of pains; and it would be a grief, from the fact that it must eventually end: for, to one who is distressed by chilliness the affusion of water does not bring liberation from his chilliness, but, rather, [additional] chilliness.²

b. But then [some one may say], the fact that the act is productive of pain is not the motive [to the performance of sacrifice]; but the [real] reason is this, that the act is productive of things desirable. And, in accordance with this, there is the text, 'By means of acts [of sacrifice] they may partake of immortality,' &c. To this he replies:³

¹ विपिणे द्राष्ट्राह कृष्ण

² यदि कर्मसाध्यो मोखो भवेकमें दुःखवहलवाभिभाष्य दुःखदुःख: स्यादस्तत्त: छायिनीनामि दुःख स्याचाहि जायचविमेकं जलाभिषेकत्रत्व जायचविमेकः प्राप्तिः\| ।

³ तनु दुःखस्य कर्मसाध्यत्वमप्रयोजनं किं तु का-
The character of the end contemplated makes no difference in regard to the transitoriness of what is effected by works. Aph. 85. [Liberation cannot arise from acts]; because, whether the end be something desirable, or undesirable, [and we admit that the motive of the sacrifice is not the giving pain to the victim], this makes no difference in regard to its being the result of acts, [and, therefore, not eternal, but transitory].

a. Grant that pain is not what is [intended] to be accomplished by works done without desire, [on the part of the virtuous sacrificer], still, though there is a difference [as you contend,] between [an act done to secure] something enjoyable and an act done without reference to enjoyment, this makes no difference with respect to the fact of the Liberation's being produced by acts, [which, I repeat, permanent Liberation cannot be]: there must still again be pain; for it [the Liberation supposed to have been attained through works,] must be perishable, because it is a production. The text which declares that works done without desire are instruments of Liberation has reference to knowledge, [which, I grant, may be gained by such means]; and Liberation comes through knowledge; so that these [works] are instruments of Liberation.

1 The reading of Aniruddha, according to my MSS., is का-म्याकामेंशिप. Ed.
mediately: [but you will recollect that the present inquiry regards the immediate cause].

b. [But then, some one may say], supposing that Liberation may take place [as you Sāṅkhyaśas contend,] through the knowledge of the distinction between Nature and Soul, still, since, from the perishableness [of the Liberation effected by this means, as well as any other means], mundane life may return, we are both on an equality, [we, whose Liberation you Sāṅkhyaśas look upon as transitory, and you Sāṅkhyaśas, whose Liberation we, again, look upon as being, by parity of reasoning, in much the same predicament]. To this he replies:

निन्जमुचक्ष्य वन्ध्यांसमाधेः परं न समानान्म्॥ १५॥

1. Ma bhūtvijnānakarmāsādhya duṣkha tathāpi kāmā- 

niñjāma jñānasaṁyogān Kāmāsāya karmāsāya pavā-

śūda śāyālayaśāvataḥ puchari duṣkha śvāt. |

niñjāmakaṁśāya mokṣasāyādavāhityābhyām: jñānaṁ jñā-

naśa mokṣa iti parasmāyān mokṣasāyādavām. ॥

2. Yadi prakṛti-prabodhita-śāttānāmāmokṣa bhavet-

śāpitarṣāya śāyālayaśāyāraṇī śanāta svāyāvāsitāsvā-

nāyaśāh. ॥

3. Dr. Ballantyne, on republishing the Sāṅkhya Aphorisms in the

Bibliotheca Indian, adopted the genuine reading, 'वन्ध्यांसमाधेः,'

instead of that given above, which I find, indeed, in the Scamperle

edition of the Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāṣya, but in no MS. He

ought, however, at the same time, to have altered his translation,
Aph. 86. Of him who is essentially liberated, his bonds having absolutely perished, it [i.e., the fruit of his saving knowledge,] is absolute: there is no parity [between his case and that of him who relies on works, and who may thereby secure a temporary sojourn in Paradise, only to return again to earth].

a. Of him 'who is essentially liberated,' who, in his very essence, is free, there is the destruction of bondage. The bond [see § 56,1] is Non-discrimination [between Nature and Soul]. By the removal thereof there is the destruction, the annihilation, of Non-discrimination: and how is it possible that there should again be a return of the mundane state, when the destruction of Non-discrimination is absolute? Thus there is no [such] similarity,² [between the two cases, as is imagined, by the objector, under § 85. b.].

b. It has been asserted [in § 61,] that there is a class of twenty-five [things which are realities]; and, since these cannot be ascertained [or made out to be true], except by

which, in conformity with the unadulterated text, might have run somewhat as follows: 'Of him who is, in himself, liberated all extinction of bondage is final, ' &c. Such is the interpretation which, on comparison of the various commentaries, seems to be the most eligible. Ed.

1 This is the Aphorism bracketed at p. 58, supra. Ed.

2 निजमुक्तस्य स्वभावमुक्तस्य बन्ध्यभ्रंसः। बन्धो उविवेकः। तद्हरोधिनाबिवेकवंसो नाशः। ऋविवेक-क्नाशस्य च प्रवेशस्वालक्षुः संसारस्य पुनरावर्त-नमिति न समलम्॥
proof, therefore he displays this; [i.e., he shows what he means by proof]:

What is meant by evidence.

Aph. 87. The determination of something not [previously] lodged in both [the Soul and the Intellect], nor in one or other of them, is 'right notion' (pramāṇa). What is, in the highest degree, productive thereof [i.e., of any given 'right notion'], is that; [i.e., is what we mean by proof, or evidence, (pramāṇa)].

a. 'Not lodged,' i.e., not deposited in 'one rightly cognizing' (pramātri); in short, not previously known. The 'determination,' i.e., the ascertainment [or right apprehension] of such a thing, or reality, is 'right notion'; and, whether this be an affection 'of both,' i.e., of Intellect, and also of Soul [as some hold that it is], or of only one or other of the two, [as others hold,] either way, 'what is, in the highest degree, productive' of this 'right notion' is [what we term proof, or] evidence, (pramāṇa): such is the definition of evidence in general; [the definition of its several species falling to be considered hereafter]: such is the meaning. 4

1 पञ्चविंशतिगृहणे इत्युक्तं तत्सिद्धिः न प्रमाणस्य विनेति तह्यश्चयति II

2 Nāgęśa has चासः. Ed.

3 Some MSS. have the inferior reading -साधकं. Ed.

4 ओसंनिकृष्ट: प्रमात्येनानाहोवेसहींदिधिताव इति
b. It is with a view to the exclusion of Memory, Error, and Doubt, in their order, that we employ [when speaking of the result of evidence,] the expressions 'not previously known' [which excludes things remembered], and 'reality' [which excludes mistakes and fancies], and 'discrimination,'¹ [which excludes doubt].

c. In regard to this [topic of knowledge and the sources of knowledge], if 'right notion,' is spoken of as located in the Soul [see § 87. a.], then the [proof, or] evidence is an affection of the Intellect. If [on the other hand, the 'right notion' is spoken of as] located in the Intellect, in the shape of an affection [of that the affections of which are mirrored by the Soul], then it [the proof, or evidence, or whatever we may choose to call that from which 'right notion' results,] is just the conjunction of an organ [with its appropriate object; such conjunction giving rise to sense-perception], &c. But, if both the Soul's cognition and the affections of the Intellect are spoken of as [cases of] 'right notion,' then both of these aforesaid [the affection of the Intellect, in the first case, and the conjunction of an organ with its appropriate object, &c., in the other

यावत्। एवंभूतस्यार्थस्य वस्तुः परिद्दितिनिर्व- धारां प्रमा सा च द्वयोऽर्जुननिष्ठयो मेय धर्मी भवतु किं वैक्तरमाच्यस्योमयः तत्स्या: प्रमाया यत्साधकतमं तत्तत्त्वाभिमानि त्रिप्रायसमामाय्यलच्च- शामिलयथः।

¹ स्मृतिभ्रमसंशयःयुद्दासाय क्रमेशानधिगत इति वस्तुः इत्यवधाराभिमानि।
case,] are [to receive the name of] proof (pramána). You are to understand, that, when the organ of vision, &c., are spoken of as 'evidence,' it is only as being mediately [the sources of right knowledge].

*d. How many [kinds of] proofs [then,] are there? To this he replies: *

विविध प्रमाणं तत्तिथिः सर्वसिद्धनाधिक्यसिद्धि: || ॥ ॥

*Aph. 88. Proof is of three kinds:
there is no establishment of more;
because, if these be established, then
all [that is true] can be established [by one or other of
these three proofs].

*a 'Proof is of three kinds;’ that is to say, ‘perception’

1 अत यदि प्रमाणमृ फलं पुर्वानिश्चमुচ्चते
तदार बुद्धिवृत्तिरेव प्रमाणम्। यदि बुद्धिनिष्ठ
बृत्तिः प्रमाणम्। तदार तदेनियस्मन्निविवेष्टिरेव
यदि तु पौराण्यथा बुद्धिवृत्तिस्यभयमग्राहिपुर्वयुक्ते
तदानुसारम्भयमेव प्रमाणम् भवति। चतुरारदिष्टो
प्रमाणम् ॥

2 काति प्रमाणानीयत्वं श्राह ॥

* So reads Aniruddha; but Vijnána, Nágeśa, and Vedánti Mahádeva end the eighty-seventh Aphorism with these two words. Hence: ‘That which is, in the highest degree, productive thereof it proof, of three kinds.’ *Ed.*
(pratyakṣa), 'the recognition of signs' (anumāna), and 'testimony' (sabda), are the [three kinds of] proofs.¹

b. But then [some one may incline to say], let 'comparison' [which is reckoned, in the Nyāya, a specifically distinct source of knowledge], and the others [such as 'Conjecture,' &c., which are reckoned, in like manner, in the Mīmāṁsā], also be instruments of right knowledge, [as well as these three], in [the matter of] the discriminating of Nature and Soul: he therefore says, 'because, if these [three] be established,' &c. And, since, if there be the three kinds of proof established,' everything [that is really true] can be established [by means of them], there is no establishment of more;' no addition to the proofs can be fairly made out; because of the cumbersomeness [that sins against the philosophical maxim, that we are not to assume more than is necessary to account for the case]: such is the meaning.²

c. For the same reason, Manu, also, has laid down only a triad of proofs, where he says [see the Institutes, Ch. xii., v. 105]: 'By that man who seeks a distinct knowledge of his duty, [these] three [sources of right knowledge] must be well understood, viz., Perception, Inference, and Scriptural authority in its various shapes [of legal institute,

¹ चिविधं प्रमाणादमिति प्रत्यक्षानुपमानानश्चः: प्रमाणानीत्यथः: ॥

² ननौपमानायथपिप्रकृतिपुरुषविवेवकप्रमाणान- स्थिति: अत ज्ञात तत्‌स्मादाविति । चिविधप्र- माणसिद्धी च सर्वस्यार्थस्य सिद्धेनाधिक्यसिद्धिः प्रमाणाधिकं सिद्धवति गौरवादित्यथः: ॥
\[a\]. ‘Being in conjunction,’ [literally.] ‘existing in con-\n
\[b\] तथा एव मनुनाथि प्रमाणश्रवयमेवोपयतम्। प्रायःमनुमानां च शास्त्रं च विविधागमम्। चयं सुचिरित्वा कायं धर्मशुजुड़िमभीपतेति। उपमानैः-

\[c\] त्तिष्ठादीनां चानुमानशस्त्रयोः प्रवेशोऽनुपलब्ध्या-

\[d\] दीनां च प्रत्येके प्रवेशः इति॥

\[e\] विशेषव्युत्पत्तिमाह॥

\[f\] Aniruddha has यल्लनच्छिद्द तदात्, yielding ‘determined by,’ &c., instead of ‘being in,’ &c. Ed.

\[g\] Vedānti Mahādeva has यल्लनच्छेन (♀). Ed.
juncture;' 'portrays the form thereof,' i.e., assumes the form of the thing with which it is in conjunction [as water assumes the form of the vessel into which it is poured]; what 'discernment,' or affection of the Intellect, [does this], that [affection of the Intellect (see Yoga Aphorisms, I., § 5 and § 8. 6.)] is the evidence [called] Perception: such is the meaning.¹

b. But then, [some one may say,] this [definition of Perception (§ 89)] does not extend [as we conceive it ought, and presume it is intended, to do,] to the perception, by adepts in the Yoga, of things past, future, or concealed [by stone walls, or such intervening things as interrupt ordinary perception]; because there is, here, no 'form of the thing, in conjunction' [with the mind of him who perceives it, while absent]: having pondered this doubt, he corrects it by [stating, as follows,] the fact, that this [supernatural sort of perception] is not what he intends to define.²

¹ संवद्ध मर्मं सतं सद्भवं भवत्वदाकारोधेक्षि संवद्धस्त्वाकारधारि भवति यविज्ञानं वुढ़ियुज्ञितन्त्रयं प्रमाणमिथ्यथः.

² ननु योगिनामतीतानागत्ववहितवस्तुप्रत्येके स्वाद्यापि संवद्धस्त्वाकारभावादित्याशु तस्मि-लक्ष्येन समाधेः.
Aph. 90. It is not a fault [in the definition, that it does not apply to the perceptions of adepts in the Yoga]; because that of the adepts in the Yoga is not an external perception.

a. That is to say: it is only sense-perception that is to be here defined; and the adepts of the Yoga do not perceive through the external [organs of sense]. Therefore there is no fault [in our definition]; i.e., there is no failure to include the perceptions of these; [because there is no intention to include them].

b. [But, although this reply is as much as the objector has any right to expect,] he states the real justification [of the definition in question]:

লীনবতস্তুলব্ধাতিশয়সংবন্ধাহারাদাষ্ট:। ৮৭।

Aph. 91. Or, there is no fault [in the definition], because of the conjunction, with causal things, of that [mystical mind] which has attained exaltation.  

1 एन्द्रियक्प्रत्यक्षमेवाच लक्ष्यं योगिनिःशाब- हाप्रत्यक्षकः। छते न दृष्टे न तत्प्रत्यक्षाःक्षामिश्रित्ययः।

2 वास्तवं समाधानमाह।

Thus Vijnāna and Vedānti Mahādeva. Aniruddha has -सं- 
बन्धान दोषः. The reading of Nāgēśa is -संबन्धान न दोषः: Ed.

4 For the term atiśaya, again rendered, in the next page, by 'exaltation,' vide infra, p. 115, note 4. Ed.
a. Or, be it so that the perception of the \textit{Yogi}, also, shall be the thing to be defined; still there is no fault [in our definition, § 89]; it does not fail to extend [to this, also]; since the mind of the \textit{Yogi}, in the exaltation gained from the habitude produced by concentration, \textit{does} come into conjunction with things [as existent] in their causes,\(^1\) [whether or not with the things as developed into products perceptible by the external senses].

b. Here the word rendered \textit{‘causal’} (\textit{lina}) denotes the things, \textit{not} in conjunction [with the senses], alluded to by the objector [in § 89.\(b\).]; for \textit{we}, who assert that effects \textit{exist} [from eternity, in their causes, before taking the shape of effects, and, likewise, in these same causes, when again resolved into their causes], hold that even what is past, \&c., still essentially exists, and that, hence, its conjunction [with the mind of the mystic, or the clairvoyant,] is possible.\(^2\)

\textit{Objection, that the definition does not apply to the perceptions of the \textit{Lord}.}

c. But then, [some one may say,] still this [definition] does not extend to the \textit{Lord’s} perceptions; because, since these are from everlasting, they can-

\begin{verse}
\textit{A}\textit{श्रेय वास्त्व योगिन्यथ्रापित्ति लक्ष्यं तथापि न देयो नायासनिर्न्तेऽलीनवस्त्तु लक्ष्येर्गजधर्मजन्यातिशयस्य योगिचित्तस्य संवत्थे घटते।}

\textit{A}\textit{श्रेय लीनश्च्यं पराभिष्टासुनित्कृष्ठ्वाची स त्वार्थवादिनां हतीताधिकामिपि स्वहृत्तेऽत्त्तति तत्त्त्वं संम्बेदिति।}
\end{verse}
not result from [emergent] conjunction. To this he replies:¹

\[Иешварасидхи: II 52 II\]

Aph. 92. [This objection to the definition of Perception has no force]; because it is not proved that there is a Lord (Iśwara).

a. That there is no fault [in the definition of Perception], because there is no proof that there is a Lord, is supplied ² [from § 90].

b. And this demurring to there being any 'Lord' is merely in accordance with the arrogant dictum of [certain] partisans [who hold an opinion not recognized by the majority]. Therefore, it is to be understood, the expression employed is, 'because it is not proved that there is a Lord,' but not the expression, 'because there is no Lord.'

¹ ननु तथापीश्वरप्रत्यक्षन्यासार्यस्य नियतेनासंनिकार्यास्य जन्यवात् | तथाह ||

² इश्वरे प्रमाणाभावावद्दोष इत्यनुवत्तेत् ||

³ Rather, 'And this [mere] taking exception to a Lord is expressly owing to,' &c. The aphorist would not be confounded with those who denied what he waited to see evidenced. The attitude which he assumed is that of suspension of judgment on the point of theism, as against the positiveness of the professed atheist. Vijñāna, here followed, 'then goes on to say: अन्यथा इश्वराभावावद्ये वोषेत् | For, otherwise [i.e., if the aphorist had been atheistic], it would have been explicitly declared, Because of the non-existence of a Lord.' Ed.

⁴ अयं इश्वरप्रत्यक्ष्य एकदेशिनां प्राहवाघठनेऽवेकः
c. But, on the implication that there is a ‘Lord,’ what we mean to speak of [in our definition of Perception, (§89),] is merely the being of the [same] kind with what is produced by conjunction [of a sense-organ with its object; and the perceptions of the ‘Lord’ may be of the same kind with such perceptions, though they were not to come from the same source].

d. Having pondered the doubt, ‘How should the Lord not be proved [to exist] by the Scripture and the Law, [which declare his existence]?’ he states a dilemma which excludes [this].:

मुक्तबंध्योर्यतराभावाच तत्तिथिदि: || ९३ ||

Aph. 93. [And, further,] it is not proved that he [the ‘Lord,’] exists; because [whoever exists must be either free or bound; and], of free and bound, he can be neither the one nor the other.

a. The ‘Lord’ whom you imagine, tell us, is he free from troubles, &c.? Or is he in bondage through these?

ति || त्ते एवेश्वरसिद्धेनित्युक्तं न चीश्वराभावादिति बाध्यम् ||

1 Rather, ‘the view being accepted’ (abhyaupagame).

2 इश्वराभ्युपगमे तु संनिकर्षज्ञातीयतायतमेव विवक्षितम् ||

3 चुदास्मृततिब्यं कथमीशे न सिध्येदित्यागाधिक तत्त्वबिरोधं वाधकमाह ||
Since he is not, cannot be, either the one or the other, it is not proved that there is a 'Lord:' such is the meaning.¹

b. He explains this very point:²

उभयशापथसकरत्वम् ॥ ५४ ॥

The force of the Aph. 94. [Because,] either way, he would be inefficient.

a. Since, if he were free, he would have no desires, &c., which [as compulsory motives,] would instigate him to create; and, if he were bound, he would be under delusion; he must be [on either alternative,] unequal to the creation, &c.⁴ [of this world].

b. But then, [it may be asked,] if such be the case, what becomes of the Scripture-texts which declare the 'Lord?' To this he replies:⁵

¹ इत्येऽरागभिमतः किं क्रेशादिविभिः को तैबेदः वा। ऋषियस्याञ्जावाचाद्म्मवान्नेष्वरसिद्धिरिधिः।

² तदेवधः।

³ The reading, in a later handwriting, of one of my MSS. of Aniruddha is सकरायुक्तम्. Ed.

⁴ मुक्तास्म जन्मिर्योजकरागाधभावात्वर्ते च मू- दवान्नुस्त्रहादिस्मर्द्वमिथ्यः।

⁵ नैवेवविष्णुप्रतिपादकश्रुतीनां का गति।

तदेवधः।
The import of the text which speak of the Lord.

Aph. 95. [The Scriptural texts which make mention of the Lord] are either glorifications of the liberated Soul, or homages to the recognized [deities of the Hindu pantheon].

a. That is to say: accordingly as the case may be, some text [among those in which the term Lord occurs] is intended, in the shape of a glorification [of Soul], as the Lord, [as Soul is held to be], merely in virtue of junction [with Nature], to incite [to still deeper contemplation], to exhibit, as what is to be known, the liberated Soul, i.e., absolute Soul in general; and some other text, declaratory, for example, of creatorship, &c., preceded by resolution [to create, is intended] to extol [and to purify the mind of the contemplator, by enabling him to take a part in extolling] the eternity, &c., of the familiarly known Brahma,

1 Another reading, that of Nāgeśa and of Vedánti Mahādeva, प्रशंसोपक, makes this word of the singular number. Ed.

2 उपासासिद्धश्च, a compound, is the reading of Aniruddha, followed by Vedánti Mahādeva. See 4, below. Ed.

3 In both places, siddha, 'possessor of supernatural powers.' Ed.

4 Aniruddha's exposition of this Aphorism is as follows: रागायथभावान्मुक्तासन इव मुक्तासनो न तु मुक्तस्य तस्य संकल्पकर्त्तव्यायभावात्। तप्रशंसा विदिबाब्बकोत्त्वभावाय। उपासासिद्धश्च उपासनया लब्धातिशयस्य योगिनोजसिद्धसिद्धश्च प्रशंसा-
Vishnu, Siva, or other non-eternal 'Lord;' since these, though possessed of the conceit [of individuality], &c., [and, in so far, liable to perish], have immortality, &c., in a secondary sense; [seeing that the Soul, in every combination, is immortal, though the combination itself is not so].

b. But then, [some one may say], even if it were thus [as alleged under § 95], what is heard in Scripture, [viz.], the fact that it [viz., Soul] is the governor of Nature, &c., would not be the case; for, in the world, we speak of government in reference only to modifications [preceded and determined] by resolutions [that so and so shall take place], &c. To this he replies:*

\*\*\*\*

According to this, the term ûvara, 'mighty one,' 'lord,' is applied, by way of eulogy, either to a soul as it were liberated, or to a person who, through devotion, has acquired transcendent faculties, that is to say, the Yogi. Resolution, agency, and the like, are impredicable of one absolutely liberated; and such a one, being inert and impassive, cannot be intended by ûvara, 'a power.' Hence the expression, 'as it were liberated.' Also see, for atisâya,—translated, above, 'transcendent faculties,'—Book IV., Aph. 24. Ed.

1 Yathâyogâ kâchichchûritimukhâtmânâ kevalâtm-samânyâstâ bhaâyaâdânaâya sansârâdharmaialiasâ bhûtisâya praraçchanaârthâ kâchich sansâryupârâsuhkâh-rûdrâdhipratipadika priti: Sûtrasya bhâvanâsûraya-dvârâśarâyâbhâmânaâdimitâdayip gîyânîtyâbhâdûmanâbhirâbhirapêryarthâ. II

2 Nunu tathâpì prakûtyâyâdhipatîtvam bhûyamânañì.
Aph. 96. The governorship [thereof, i.e., of Soul over Nature] is from [its] proximity thereto, [not from its resolving to act thereon]; as is the case with the gem, [the lodestone, in regard to iron].

a. If it were alleged that [its, Soul’s] creativeness, or [its] governorship, was through a resolve [to create, or to govern], then this objection [brought forward under § 95, b.] would apply. But [it is not so; for,] by us [Sāṅkhya,] it is held that the Soul’s governorship, in the shape of creatorship, or the like, is merely from [its] proximity [to Nature]; ‘as is the case with the [lodestone] gem.’

b. As the gem, the lodestone, is attracted by iron merely by proximity, without resolving [either to act or to be acted on], &c., so, by the mere conjunction of the primal Soul, Nature is changed into the principle [called] the ‘Great one,’ [or Mind, (see § 61, c.)]. And in this alone consists [what we speak of as] its acting as creator towards that which is superadded to it: such is the meaning.  

पपयते लाल्के संक्य्यादिनार्थरागदिनार्थरागदिना श्वेतमन्स्वेताधि-धान्यवहारारापित | तचाह ||

1 यदि संक्य्यान सश्शृधांशतर्लृत्तमचिते तदायं द्‌यष्टि स्वाति। ओऽम्यामितु पुत्रुष्य संज्ञानाद्वादिव- 

1 यथायस्कान्तमय: मानविभमाचेपण्डत्वाक- 

2 यथायस्कान्तमयः मानविभमाचेपण्डत्वाक-
c. And thus it is declared, [in some one of the Purānas]:

'As the iron acts, whilst the gem [the lodestone,] stands void of volition, just so this world is created by a deity who is mere Existence. Thus it is, that there are, in the Soul, both agency [seemingly,] and non-agency, [really]. It is not an agent, inasmuch as it is void of volition; [and it is] an agent, merely through approximation [to Nature].'

d. In respect of worldly products, also, animal souls overrule, merely through their approximation [to Nature]: so he declares [as follows]:

विशेषकार्यविपि जीवानाम् ॥ ५७ ॥

गमाचेष्व प्रकृतेमेवहत्वपरिश्रामनम् । इत्येव च स्वापाधिसन्नृतमित्यथः ॥

1 The Translator's authority for this attribution has not been discovered. Ed.

2 तथाचेष्व । निरिष्क्रेष्म संस्थिते रले यथा लोहः प्रवत्तिते । सच्चाचेष्व देवेन तथैवेयं जगज्ञाति । अत ज्ञातस्य कर्तृत्वमकृत्वं च संस्थितम् । निरिष्क्रान्तात्कत्सैं कर्ता सनिधिमात्रत इति ॥

3 लौकिककार्यविपि जीवानां सनिधिमात्राचैवाधिष्ठातृत्वमित्यह ॥

4 Aniruddha has विशेषकार्यविपि Ed.
In like manner, embodied souls do not energize.

**Aph. 97.** In the case of individual products, also, [the apparent agency] of animal souls [is solely through proximity].

a. 'The agency is solely through proximity:' so much is supplied¹ [from § 96].

b. The meaning is this, that, in the case, also, of particular productions,—the creation, &c., of things individual [as contradistinguished from that of all things in the lump, (see Vedánta-sára, § 67)],—animal souls, i.e., souls in which the intellects [of individuals] reflect themselves [see § 99. a.], overrule, merely through proximity, but not through any effort; seeing that these [animal souls] are none other than the motionless Thought.²

c. But then, [some one may say], if there were no eternal and omniscient 'Lord,' through the doubt of a blind tradition, [in the absence of an intelligently effective guardianship], the Vedas would cease to be an authority; [a possibility which, of course, cannot be entertained for an instant]. To this he replies:³

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¹ अधिशातृं सांनिधानादेववेत्यनुष्ठयते ॥

² विशेषकारं बुधस्मृत्यादिशवपि जीवानामतः कर्मप्रतिविन्दितचेतनानां सांनिधानादेववाधिशातृं न तु केनापि व्यवहारेऽकृत्यस्वचिन्मा: चतादित्यर्थः ॥

³ ननु नित्यसर्वस्येष्वराभावेऽवत्यपरंपराश्रयया वेदार्थामालियं स्वात्त् इत्याह ॥
**Aph. 98.** The declaration of the texts or sense [of the Veda, by Brahmá, for example], since he knows the truth, [is authoritative evidence].

a. To complete [the aphorism, we must say], 'since Hiranyagarbha [i.e., Brahmá,] and others [viz., Vishnu and Śiva], are knowers of what is certain, i.e., of what is true, the declaration of the texts or sense of the Vedas, where these are the speakers, is evidence' [altogether indisputable].

b. But then, if Soul, by its simple proximity [to Nature (§ 96)], is an overruler in a secondary sense [only of the term,—as the magnet may be said, in a secondary sense, to draw the iron, while the conviction is entertained, that, actually and literally, the iron draws the magnet],—who is the primary [or actual,] overruler? In reference to this, he says: ²

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1 हिरण्यगभोजीनां सिद्धरहस्य यथार्थस्य बेहुङ्गात् कृतवाक्यार्थापदेशः प्रमाणार्थिति शेषः ॥

2 ननु पुरुषस्य चेत्सांनिधिमाचेस्य गौर्णमधिश्चातृतं ततहिं मुख्यमधिदिशातृतं कस्येकाधारायामाह ॥
Aph. 99. The internal organ, through its being enlightened thereby [i.e., by Soul], is the overruler; as is the iron, [in respect of the magnet].

a. The internal organ, i.e., the understanding, is the overruler, through its fancying itself to be Soul, [as it does fancy,] by reason of its being enlightened by the Soul, through its happening to reflect itself in [and contemplate itself in,] Soul; "just as the iron," that is to say, as the attracting iron, though inactive, draws [the magnet], in consequence of [its] mere proximity, 2 [and so acquires magnetism by magnetic induction].

b. He [now, having discussed the evidence that consists in direct perception,] states the definition of inference 3 (anumāna):

1 Aniruddha has महतोज्जनं करणस्य; prefixing to 'the internal organ' the synonymous 'the Great One.' Ed.

2 अन्तःकरणश्च बुधेः पुस्तवधायाप्त्या तेन चैतप्येनाज्ञ्विलितवाचेतननवभिमानादधिदिः स्तुत्वं लोहवदिति यथाकर्षको लोहो निष्क्रियार्थिं सतनिधिमाचित्तं कर्तवतीति.

3 अनुमानलक्ष्मेश्माह
Pratītiṇḍuḥ: Pratītiṃṇaṃnāmaṃ ॥ 100 ॥

Inference defined.

Apoha. 100. The knowledge of the connected [e.g., fire], through perception of the connexion [e.g., of fire with smoke], is inference.

a. That is to say: inference [or conviction of a general truth,] is [a kind of] evidence consisting in a [mental] modification, [which is none other than] the knowledge of the connected, i.e., of the constant accompanier, through the knowledge of the constant accompaniment: by ‘connexion’ (pratibandha) here being meant ‘constant attendeedness’ (vyāpti); and through the perception thereof [it being that the mind has possession of any general principle].

b. But a conclusion (anumiti) is knowledge of the soul;[whilst an Inference, so far forth as it is an instrument in the establishment of knowledge deducible from it, is an affection of the internal organ, or understanding (see § 87. c.).]

c. He [next] defines testimony 4 (śabda):

1 Pratītiṇḍuḥ: is the reading of Nāgēśa and of Vedānti Mahādeva. Ed.

2 Pratītiṇyāṃ Vyaśtiṃśhāṃ Vyaśtiṃśaṃ Pratītiṃśaṃ Vyaśtiṃśaṃ Bhānāṃ Vrañciḥpamnāman Pramāṇaṃ Mitāyaṃ: ॥

3 Ānumiṃtiśhū Pāruṣeśyā Bādha Iti ॥

4 Śabda Lāṇḍayati ॥
Aph. 101. Testimony [such as is entitled to the name of evidence,] is a declaration by one worthy [to be believed].

a. Here 'fitness' means 'suitableness,' and so the evidence which is called 'Testimony' is the knowledge arising from a suitable declaration: such is the meaning. And [while this belongs to the understanding, or internal organ (see § 100. b.)] the result is that [knowledge] in the Soul, [which is called] 'knowledge by hearing' (sabda-bodha).

b. He [next] volunteers to tell us what is the use of his setting forth [the various divisions of] evidence:

Aph. 102. Since the establishment of [the existence of] both [soul and non-soul] is by means of evidence, the declaration thereof [i.e., of the kinds of evidence, has been here made].

a. It is only by means of evidence that both Soul and non-soul are established as being distinct, [the one from the

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1 अप्रियच योग्यता तथा च योग्य: श्चत्त-ज्ञानं ज्ञानं शस्त्रस्थं प्रमाणार्थार्थं:्। फलं च प्रधवेयः: शाष्ट्रवाह इति ||

2 प्रमाणप्रत्यायाद्नस्य स्वग्येव फलमाह ||
other: therefore has this, viz., evidence, been here declared: such is the meaning.¹

b. Among these [several kinds of proof], he [now] describes that one by which, especially, viz., by a proof which is one kind of inference, Nature and Soul are here to be established discriminatively:²

सामान्यते दृष्टादृष्ट्यसिद्धः ॥ १०३ ॥

Aph. 103. The establishment of both [Nature and Soul] is by analogy.

a. [Analogy (sāmānyato dṛṣṭa) is that kind of evidence which is employed in the case] where, by the force [as an argument,] which the residence of any property in the subject derives from a knowledge of its being constantly accompanied [by something which it may therefore be-token], when we have had recourse to [as the means of determining this constant accompaniment,] what is, for instance, generically of a perceptible kind, [where, under such circumstances, we repeat,] anything of a different kind, i.e., not cognizable by the senses, is established; as when,

¹ उभ्योरात्मानात्मनेनार्थेको सिद्धः प्रमात्रादेव भवति । अतत्क्षय प्रमाणस्योपदेशः कृत इत्यथे: ॥

² तत्र येनानुमानविशेषेः प्रमाणोन मुख्यतोश्च प्रकृतिपुरुषं विविध साधनीयं तदशं-गति ॥

³ My MS. of Nāgāra has दृष्टासिद्धः. Ed.
for example, having apprehended a constant accompani-
ment, [e.g., that an act implies an instrument], by taking
into consideration such instruments as axes, &c., which are
of earthy and other kinds, a quite heterogeneous, imper-
ceptible, instrument of knowledge, viz., [the instrument
named] Sense, is established [or inferred to exist]; such is
what we mean by Analogy; and it is by this [species of
inference], that both, [viz.,] Nature and Soul, are proved [to
exist]: such is the meaning.¹

6. Of these [viz., Nature and Soul,] the argument from
analogy for [the existence of] Nature is as follows: the
Great Principle [viz., Understanding (see § 61. c.)] is
formed out of the things [called] Pleasure, Pain, and
Delusion, [to the aggregate of which three in equipoise
(see § 61) the name of Nature is given]; because, whilst it
is [undeniably,] a production, it has the characters of Plea-
sure, Pain, and Delusion; just as a bracelet, or the like,
formed of gold, or the like,² [has the characteristic pro-

¹ यदि सामान्यत: प्रत्यक्षार्थिज्ञातियोऽयमादाय याप्रियहलथाधर्ममेतावलेन तत्त्वज्ञातीयोऽप्रत्यक्षार्थः
सिध्ध्यति यथा पृथ्वीविद्याज्ञातियोऽ कुटारादिके
रक्षामादाय यथापि गृहीता तत्त्वज्ञातीययमतीन्द्रियं
ज्ञानकर्षणमिद्रियं साधत इति तत्सामान्येता तृप्तेऽ
तत्समाधुर्योऽप्रकृतिरूपस्योऽसिद्धिरिल्पः॥

² तत्र प्रकृते: सामान्येता तृप्तेऽसमनुसारं यथा
महत्तं सुखदुःखमोहद्वयायापदानं जारिले सति
सुखदुःखमोहद्वयायार्थादित्वकृत्तादित्व
दिति॥
properties of the gold, or the like, and is thereby known to have been formed out of gold, or the like].

c. But, [as regards the argument from analogy, in proof of the existence] of Soul, [it is, as stated before, under § 66, to the following effect]: Nature is for the sake of another; because it is something that acts as a combination; as a house, for instance, [which is a combination of various parts combined for the benefit of the tenant]. In this instance, having gathered, in regard to houses, &c., the fact established on sense-perception, that they exist for the sake of [organized] bodies, for example, something of a different kind therefrom, [i.e., from Nature, viz.]. Soul, is inferred [by analogy,] as something other than Nature, &c., [which, as being a compound thing, is not designed for itself]: such is the meaning.1

d. But then [some one may say], since Nature is eternal, and exertion is habitual to her, [and the result of her action is the bondage of the Soul], there should constantly be experience [whether of pleasure or of pain], and, hence, no such thing as thorough emancipation. To this he replies:2

चिदवसाने भाग: § १०४ §

1 पूण्यस्य तु प्रधानं परार्थं संहस्यकारिनिश्चृत: रिपिदित। दुः प्रैणसिद्धं देहाक्रिष्कलं गुहादिबु गृहीलं तद्विज्ञातीय: पुरुष: प्रधानादिपरतश्चतनामु: मीयत दृष्टः

2 ननु प्रकृतेनित्यायाम्यस्यनिशीलिवाच सर्वदा भाग इत्यनिमेहाय: स्यादिद्वत उँहः
Aph. 104. Experience [whether of pain or pleasure] ends with [the discernment of] Thought, [or Soul, as contradistinguished from Nature].

a. By 'Thought' [we mean] Soul. Experience [whether of pain or pleasure] ceases, on the discerning thereof. As antecedent non-existence,' though devoid of a beginning, [see Tarka-sangraha, § 92], surcedes [when the thing antecedently non-existent begins to be], so, eternal Nature [eternal, as regards the absence of any beginning] continues [no further than] till the discernment of the difference [between Nature and Soul]; so that experience whether of pain or pleasure,] does not at all times occur: such is the state of the case.¹

b. [But some one say], if Nature be agent, and Soul experiencer, then it must follow [which seems unreasonable,] that another is the experiencer of [the results of] the acts done by one different. To this he replies:²

Aph. 105. The experience of the fruit may belong even to another than the agent; as in the case of food, &c.

¹ चिदात्मा तद्विवेकावसानो भेगः। यथा-नादिर्गी प्रागभावा नश्यति तथा नित्याया: प्रकृतिविवेकासानपर्यन्त: प्रसर इति न सर्वदा भेगानित्रिति भावः।

² यदि कतं प्रथानं भेगाका पुरुषसल्लं व्यक्तस्य कस्तदृशायं भेगानिति स्यादिद्वयः।
a. As it belongs to the cook to prepare the food, &c., and to one who was not the agent, viz., the master, to enjoy the fruit [thereof, i.e., the fruit of the cook's actions], so is the case here, also.

b. Having stated an exoteric principle [which may serve, in practice, to silence, by the argumentum ad hominem, him on whose principles it may be valid], he [next] declares his own doctrine,* [in regard to the doubt started under § 104. 6.]:

\[\text{अविवेकाचा तत्सिद्ध: कर्तुः: फलावगम:} \| 106 \|\]

To suppose that Soul acts and experiences is an error.

Aph. 106. Or, [to give a better account of the matter than that given in § 105], since it is from non-discrimination that it is derived, the notion that the agent [soul being mistaken for an agent,] has the fruit [of the act is a wrong notion].

a. The soul is neither an agent nor a patient; but, from the fact that the Great Principle [the actual agent (see § 97. 6.)] is reflected in it, there arises the conceit of its being an agent. 'Or, since it is from non-discrimination;' that is to say, because it is from the failure to discriminate between Nature and Soul, that this takes place, i.e., that conceit takes place, that it is the agent that experiences the fruit;* [whereas the actual agent is Nature, which, being unintelligent, can experience neither pain nor pleasure].

1 यष्टा सूपकारस्याचार्यादिगुणमकिरिष्ण्य पर
लोपभोज्जः तथाचापीति \|

2 व्यवहारसिद्धान्तमुक्ता स्वसिद्धान्तमाह \|

3 न पुरुष: कर्ता न वा भोज्जः किं तु महत्र्‌ प्र-
6. The opposite of this [wrong view, referred to in § 106,]
he states [as follows]:

नैभवृं च तत्त्वार्थायाम् ॥ १०७ ॥

Soul is really neither agent nor experiencer.

Aph. 107. And, when the truth is told, there is [seen to be] neither [agency, in Soul, nor experience].

a. ‘When the truth is told’ [and discerned], i.e., when, by means of evidence, Nature and Soul are perceived [in their entire distinctness, one from the other], ‘there is neither,’ i.e., neither the condition [as regards soul] of an agent nor that of a patient.

6. Having discussed [the topic of] evidence, he [now] states the distribution of the subject-matter of evidence:

विषयार्थविषयोपपत्तिदूरादेहानोपादानभया-
मिन्द्रियस्य ॥ १०८ ॥

तितिविशिश्वतवाक्तवृत्तवभिमानः। चर्यवेकाहरित प्र-
कृतिपुरुषयोर्विवेकायाम्यहानसिद्धैः कतृः प्रलोभो-
गाभिमानसिद्धेरिति ॥

1 एतद्यतिरिक्तमाह ॥

2 तत्त्वार्थायाम् प्रमाणेन प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः सार्वा-
ल्कारेन नैभवृं न कर्तृवं न भोज्यमिति ॥

3 प्रमाणामुक्ता प्रमेयव्यवस्थामाह ॥

x
Aph. 108. [A thing may be] an object [perceivable], and also [at another time,] not an object, through there being, in consequence of great distance, &c., a want of [conjunction of the sense with the thing], or [on the other hand,] an appliance of the sense [to the thing].

a. An object [is a perceived object], through the proximity, or conjunction, of the sense [with the object]. [A thing may be] not an object [perceived], through the want of the sense, i.e., through the want of conjunction [between the sense and what would otherwise be its object]. And [this] want of conjunction [may result] from the junction’s being prevented by great distance, &c.¹

b. [To explain the ‘&c.,’ and to exemplify the causes that may prevent the conjunction, required in order to perception, between the thing and the sense, we may remark, that] it is in consequence of great distance, that a bird [flying very high up] in the sky is not perceived; [then again,] in consequence of extreme proximity, the collyrium located in the eye [is not perceived by the eye itself]; a thing placed in [the inside of, or on the opposite side of,] a wall [is not perceived], in consequence of the obstruction; from distraction of mind, the unhappy, or other [agituated person], does not perceive the thing that is at his side [or under his very nose]; through its subtlety,

¹ इन्द्रियस्योपादानार्थां संबंधाधिक्षियः। इन्द्रियस्य हानार्थक्षाभावाधिक्षियः। ओसंबंधाधिक्षात्तुरागः
द्वियोऽग्यलात्॥
an atom [is not perceived]; nor is a very small sound, when overpowered by the sound of a drum; and so on.¹

c. How [or, for which of the possible reasons just enumerated,] comes the imperceptibleness of Nature? In regard to this, he declares:²

सैक्ष्म्यात्रदनुपलब्धि:³ ॥ १०५ ॥

Aph. 109. Her imperceptibleness arises from [her] subtilty.

a. 'Her,' i.e., Nature's, imperceptibleness is from subtilty. By subtilty is meant the fact of being difficult to investigate; not [as a Naiyáyika might, perhaps, here prefer understanding the term,] the consisting of atoms; for Nature is [not atomic, in the opinion of the Sánkhyas, but] all-pervasive.⁴

¹ ऋतुराहितैत्व न्यापलभ्यते। ऋति-सामीपाहोष्चन्दस्याः। ब्यवधानाकुदकुक्तं बस्तु। मनोन्यास्यान्योषांकायोत्तस्य पार्श्वस्य-वस्तः-हिश्च। सैक्ष्म्यादस्योऽश्च। ऋभिभवान्नर्तील-धृतिना खल्पध्वनेरित्यादि ॥

² प्रकृते: कथमनुपलब्धिरित्यत जाह ॥

³ Aniruddha, according to the MSS. seen by me, has सैक्ष्म्यात्रदनुपलब्धि: Ed.

⁴ तस्य: प्रकृतेरनुपलब्धि: सैक्ष्म्यात्। दुरहष्टं सौक्ष्म्यं नवशुरं प्रकृतेतिविभुवादिति ॥
b. How, then, [it may be asked,] is [the existence of] Nature determined? To this he replies:¹

Aph. 110. [Nature exists;] because her existence is gathered from the beholding of productions.

a. As the knowledge of [there being such things as] atoms comes from the beholding of jars, &c., [which are agglomerations], so the knowledge of Nature comes from the beholding of products which have the three Qualities;² [(see § 62. a.) and the existence of which implies a cause, to which the name of Nature is given, in which these constituents exist from eternity].

b. Some [the Vedántis,] say that the world has Brahma as its cause; others [the Naiyáyikas], that it has atoms as its cause; but our seniors [the transmitters of the Sánkhya doctrine], that it has Nature as its cause. So he sets forth a doubt [which might naturally found itself] thereon:³

¹ कथं तर्थं प्रकृतियथवस्थेत्यथ चाह \n² यथा घटादिद्वेश्वनात्यरमाण्यसानं तथा चित्त-\n\n² ब्रह्मकालं जगदिति कृत्यरमाण्यवर्णादि-\nमित्ये प्रधानकारणक्षणमिति वृद्धा इति \ntच संशयमाह
Aph. 111. If you throw out the doubt that it [viz., the existence of Nature,] is not established, because of the contradiction of asserters [of other views, then you will find an answer in the next aphorism].

a. 'Because of the contradiction of asserters [of the Vedánta or Nyáya], it is not established,' i.e., Nature [as asserted by the Sáňkhyas] is not established.¹

b. But then, [to set forth the objection of these counter-asserters], if a product existed antecedently to its production [as that product], then an eternal Nature [such as you Sáňkhyas contend for,] would be proved to exist as the [necessary] substratum thereof; since you will declare that a cause is inferred only as the [invariable] companion of an effect; but it is denied, by us asserters [of the Vedánta, &c.], that the effect does exist [antecedently to its production; well.] if [this doubt be thrown out]: such is the meaning² [of the aphorism].

c. He states [his] doctrine [on this point]:³

तथापेक्षितर्दृष्ट्यैकतरसिद्धेनापलायः ॥ १७२ ॥

¹ वादिनां विप्रतिपत्तेः सत्सिद्धि: प्रधानासिद्धि: ॥

² ननु कार्यं चेदुप्येति: प्राक्षिदं स्वाभवदा तदा-धारतत्वा नित्या प्रक्षिति: कार्येताहित्यवेदः कारणाः-नुमानवस्यमाणवादादिविप्रतिपत्तेः कार्येय्यवासिद्धिरिति यदीयथः: ॥

³ सिद्धास्वात्माः ॥
Mutual denials settle nothing.

Aph. 112. Still, since each [doctrine]
is established in the opinion of each,
a [mere unsupported] denial is not [decisive].

a. If one side were disproved merely by the dissent of the opponent, then [look you,] there is dissent against the other side, too: so how could it be established? If the one side is established by there being inevitably attendant the recognition of the constant companion, on the recognition of that which is constantly accompanied [by it], it is the same with my [side], also: therefore [my] inference from effect [to cause] is not to be denied [in this peremptory fashion].

b. Well, then, [the opponent may say], let [the inference of] cause from effect be granted; how is it that this [cause] is Nature, and nothing else, [such as Atoms, for instance]? To this he replies:

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1 I have corrected the translator's 'But, since thus,' which rendered the unwarranted reading तथा तु, now replaced by तथापि, the correlative of चेत at the end of the preceding Aphorism. Ed.

2 यदि वादिविप्रतिपत्तिमाचेश्च पक्षासिद्धानि
विपक्षोपि विप्रतिपत्तिरस्तीति कथं तत्सिद्धः।
यदि व्याप्तज्ञानाध्यायकर्तव्याविनाभाविविवायाय-
क्षसिद्धित्तर्थ ममाम्येवभिमति न कार्यादनुमाना-पलायः \।

3 ननु कार्यादक्षामस्मि तथा प्रकृतिरेवेति कथ- नित्यत झाह \।
Aph. 113. Because [if we were to infer any other cause than Nature,] we should have a contradiction to the threefold [aspect which things really exhibit].

a. Quality is threefold [see § 61. a.], viz., Goodness Passion, and Darkness: there would be a contradiction to these: such is the meaning. 3

b. The drift here is as follows: If the character of cause [of all things around us] belonged to Atoms, or the like, then there would be a contradiction to the fact of being an aggregate of pleasure, pain, and delusion, which is recognizable in the world; 3 [because nothing, we hold, can exist in the effect, which did not exist in the cause and pleasure, pain, &c., are no properties of Atoms].

c. He now repels the doubt as to whether the production of an effect is that of what existed [anteecedently], or of what did not exist: 4

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1 Vedánti Mahádava ends this Aphorism with the word ॐ; and so does Vijnána, according to some MSS.  Ed.

2 चिनिन्धा गुणं सत्रक्षत्तमांसि तविरोध

3 इदमचाकृतं यदि परमाक्षादीनां कार्यानं

4 इदानी कार्येष्य सत चल्लिसर्वतो वेति संगवर

निरस्थति ॥
Aph. 114. The production of what is no entity, as a man's horn, does not take place.

a. Of that which, like the horn of a man, is not an entity, even the production is impossible: such is the meaning. And so the import is, that that effect alone which [antecedently] exists is [at any time] produced.¹

b. He states an argument why an effect must be some [previously existent] entity:²

Aph. 115. Because of the rule, that there must be some material [of which the product may consist].

a. And only when both are extant is there, from the presence of the cause, the presence of the effect. Otherwise, everywhere and always, every [effect] might be produced; [the presence of the cause being, on the supposition, superfluous]. This he insists upon [as follows]:³

¹ नरशृङ्खलत्यस्यासत्व उत्साहदारिः न संभवति-स्यथेः: ॥ तथा च सदैव कार्यमूल्यगत इत्यादाशयः: ॥
² सत्कारेव न्यायमाह ॥
³ कारासमवत्स्यासंबन्ध्य विद्यमानवयोरे वः अन्यथा सर्वच सर्वदा सर्वात्मान्यत्वः स्यात्। एतदेव-वाहः।
Aph. 116. Because everything is not possible everywhere and always, [which might be the case, if materials could be dispensed with].

a. That is to say: because, in the world, we see that everything is not possible, i.e., that everything is not produced; ‘everywhere,’ i.e., in every place; ‘always,’ i.e., at all times.¹

b. For the following reason, also, he declares, there is no production of what existed not² [antecedently]:

**शक्तिस्य शक्तिकरणात् II ९९9 II**

Aph. 117. Because it is that which is competent [to the making of anything] that makes what is possible, [as a product of it].

a. Because the being the material [of any future product] is nothing else than the fact of [being it, potentially, i.e., of] having the competency to be the product; and [this] competency is nothing else than the product’s condition as that of what has not yet come to pass: therefore, since ‘that which is competent,’ viz., the cause, makes the product which is ‘possible’ [to be made out of it], it is not of any nonentity that the production takes

¹ सर्वेच सर्वसिद्धेण सर्वदा सर्वसिद्धालेसर्वसंबंधवास्तवभावानुपत्तेलीनकद्विनादिस्वायम्: !!
² इति नासदद्याद इत्याह!!
place, [but of an entity, whose esse, antecedently, was possibility]: such is the meaning.¹

b. He states another argument:²

कारणभावान्वयः || ७७८ ||

Aph. 118. And because it [the product,] is [nothing else than] the cause, [in the shape of the product].

a. It is declared, in Scripture, that, previously to production, moreover, there is no difference between the cause and its effect; and, since it is thereby settled that a product is an entity, production is not of what [previously] existed not: such is the meaning.²

b. He ponders a doubt:³

न भावे भावोग्रहणं || ७७९ ||

Aph. 119. If [it be alleged that] there is no possibility of that's becoming which already is, [then the answer will be found in the next aphorism.]

¹ कार्येशिक्षस्य मेव हुपादानश्च शक्तिः कार्येशिक्षकार्यानावशिष्टवित्ति शक्तिः कार्यानावशिष्टकार्यानावशिष्टकार्यादि पोषतं ज्ञातं ज्ञातं इत्यर्यः: ||
² क्युरू व्यासा: ||
³ उपर्येकं मानं मानं कार्यः कार्यादिनेतं: खूबदेः तस्य तस्याय स्वार्थास्फलकिर्मिः नात्सुधाय इत्यर्यः: ||
⁴ शक्त्ति: ||
a. That is to say: but then, if it be thus [that every effect exists antecedently to its production], since the effect [every effect,] must be eternal [without beginning], there is no possibility of [or room for] the adjunction of becoming, the adjunction of arising, in the case of a product which is [already, by hypothesis,] in the shape of an entity; because the employment of [the term] ‘arising’ [or the fact of being produced] has reference solely to what did not exist [previously]; if this be urged: such is the meaning.¹

b. He declares the doctrine [in regard to this point]:²

नाभिव्यक्तिनिवन्धने ब्यवहारायवहारात् || १२० ||

Aph. 120. No; [do not argue that what is cannot become; for] the employment and the non-employment [of the term ‘production’] are occasioned by the manifestation [and the non-manifestation of what is spoken of as produced, or not].

a. ‘No;’ the view stated [in § 119] is not the right one: such is the meaning.³

b. As the whiteness of white cloth [which has become] dirty is brought manifestly out by means of washing, &c.,

¹ नन्येवं सति कार्यस्य नित्येऽसति भावहुपे कार्यं भावयोग उत्सर्ग्योगे न संभवत्यसत एवं-लक्षिष्ठवहारार्थिति चेदित्यर्थः: ||
² सिद्धान्तमाह ||
³ न नात्कपक्षे युक्त इत्यर्थः: ||
so, by the operation of the potter, is the pot brought into manifestation; [whereas], on the blow of a mallet, it becomes hidden,¹ and no longer appears as a pot.

c. And manifestation [is no fiction of ours; for it] is seen; for example, that of oil, from sesamum-seeds, by pressure; of milk, from the cow, by milking; of the statue, which resided in the midst of the stone, by the operation of the sculptor; of husked rice, from rice in the husk, by threshing; &c.²

d. Therefore, the employment and the non-employment of the [term] 'the production of an effect' are dependent on manifestation, dependent on the manifestation of the effect: that is to say, the employment of [the term] 'production' is in consequence of the manifestation [of what is spoken of as produced]; and the non-employment of [the term] 'production' is in consequence of there being no manifestation [of that which is, therefore, not spoken of as produced]; but [the employment of the term 'production' is] not in consequence of that's becoming an entity which was not an entity.³

¹ यथा शुकुपतस्य मलिनस्य ध्वालनादिना
रुपान्तरणमभिव्यज्ञते तथा कुलालस्य व्यापाराइते
उभिभ्यज्ञते मुक्तरामधिइतात्सरेरोभूयते।

² दृष्टा चाभियत्वः पीडनेन तिले तैस्य
दोहनेन गवि पयस् शिलामध्यस्मप्रतिमाया लै-
प्रज्ञापारेष्यावधातेन धाने तण्डुलस्येत्यादि।

³ तस्मान्तकायोत्त्यंतर्यवहारायववहार ऋभिय-
e. But if [the employment of the term] 'production' is occasioned by [the fact of] manifestation, by what is occasioned [the employment of the term] destruction? To this he replies:

नाश: कारणलय: ॥ १२७ ॥

Aph. 121. Destruction [of anything] is the resolution [of the thing spoken of as destroyed] into the cause [from which it was produced].

a. The resolution, by the blow of a mallet, of a jar into its cause [i.e., into the particles of clay which constituted the jar], to this are due both [the employment of] the term 'destruction,' and the kind of action [or behaviour] belonging to anything [which is termed its destruction].

कित उत्तरतिब्रह्मणवहारो भिन्नमित्रक्ष्यकरावाटाएँतिष्ठ- वहाराभावो नसत: सहायत्थ: ॥

1 'If production is occasioned by manifestation, by what is destruction occasioned?' Aniruddha, here quoted, has, in my MSS.:

अभिभित्तिक्ष्यबन्धनोत्ति: Ed.

2 अभिभित्तिक्ष्यबन्धनाभीत्ति: किंशिवन्धनो विनाश इत्यत्त शाह ॥

3 मुद्राभिभित्तिक्ष्यद्वारकास्य कारणे यो लय: तच्छि-बन्धनो नाश इति शब्दार्थज्ञायेक्षेत्रे ॥

4 'From the blow of a mallet [results] the resolution of a jar into its material cause: by this the destruction [of it] is occasioned. Such is the meaning of the word [निया], and [such is] the particular action [which]
b. [But some one may say], if there were [only] a resolution [of a product into that from which it arose], a resurrection [or παλυγγενεσία] of it might be seen; and this is not seen: well [we reply], it is not seen by blockheads; but it is seen by those who can discriminate. For example, when thread is destroyed, it is changed into the shape of earth [as when burned to ashes]; and the earth is changed into the shape of a cotton-tree; and this [successively] changes into the shape of flower, fruit, and thread [spun again from the fruit of the cotton-plant]. So is it with all entities.  

c. Pray [some one may ask], is [this] manifestation [that you speak of under § 120] something real, or something not real? If it be something real [and which, therefore, never anywhere ceases to be], then [all] effects [during this constant manifestation] ought constantly to be perceived; and, if it be not real, then there would be the absence of [all] products, [in the absence of all manifestation. Manifestation, therefore, must be something real; and] there must be [in order to give rise to it,] another manifestation of it, and of this another; [seeing that a manifestation can be the result of nothing else than a manifes-

it expresses.' This is from Aniruddha, who, in the MSS. to which I have access, has no यो before लयः. Ed.
tation, on the principle that an effect consists of neither more nor less than its cause]; and thus we have a *regressus in infinitum*. To this he replies:

Aph. 122. Because they seek each other reciprocally, as is the case with seed and plant, [manifestation may generate manifestation, from eternity to eternity].

a. Be it so, that there are thousands of manifestations; still there is no fault; for there is no starting-point; as is the case with seed and plant, [which people may suppose to have served, from eternity, as sources, one to another, reciprocally].

1 किमभिव्यक्ति: सत्यसत्ती वा। सती चेतित्य-
कार्ययोपलब्धि: स्यात्। असती चेतस-कार्यहानिता-
स्या अष्टभिव्यक्तिरन्या तस्या अष्टये स्यन्वस्येत्यत
ञ्जाह॥

2 अन्वेषणः, the reading here given, is that of Aniruddha and Vedānti Mahādeva. Vijnāna has अन्वेषणः Ed.

3 Translating the Sāṅkhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica, Dr. Ballantyne, adopting the lection *anveshanā*, inconsiderately rendered: 'You are to understand, that, successively,' instead of 'There is a continual following of one after the other.' Vijnāna explains *anveshanā* by *anudhāvana*; and Vedānti Mahādeva has, in definition of it, the synonymous *anusarana*. Ed.

4 भवतिभिव्यक्तिसहस्रं तथापि न देशानादि-
लाङ्कीजाङ्कुच्छवदित्॥
b. He states another argument:

उत्पत्तिविद्यार्थीः || ९२३ ||

Aph. 123. Or, [at all events, our theory of 'manifestation' is as] blameless as [your theory of] 'production.'

a. Pray [let us ask], is production produced, or is it not? If it is produced, then of this [production of production] there must be production; so that there is a regressus in infinitum, [such as you allege against our theory, under § 121. c.]. If it be not produced, then, pray, is this because it is unreal, or because it is eternal? If because it is unreal, then production never is at all; so that it would never be perceived, [as you allege that it is]. Again, if [production is not something produced,] because it is eternal, then there would be at, all times, the production of [all possible] effects, [which you will scarcely pretend is the case]. Again, if you say, since 'production' itself consists of production, what need of supposing an ulterior production [of production]? then, in like manner, [I ask,] since 'manifestation' itself consists of manifestation, what need of supposing an ulterior manifestation [of manifestation]? The view which you hold on this point is ours, also;" [and

1 युक्त्यत्सरमाह ||
2 किमुल्यनन्त्याते न वा। उत्पत्तिः चेदश्या उत्पतिरित्यनवस्या। नेत्याते चेन्त्कन्त्यात्वाचिन्यचिन्यचिन्यन्तरविन्य प्रत्यक्षयोग्यस्तिः सः तददानुपलम्बः स्यात्। अथ नियन्त्राविचरथर्वता का-
thus every objection stated or hinted under § 121. c., is capable of being retorted].

b. He [now] states the community of properties [that exists] among the products of Nature, mutually:

\[ \text{हेतुमदनिन्यमव्यापिः सक्रियमनेकमाध्यातं} \\]
\[ \text{निम्नम्} \quad \text{१२४} \quad \text{॥} \]

The characters common to all products. Aph. 124. [A product of Nature is] caused, uneternal, not all-pervading, mutable, multitudinous, dependent, mergent.

\[ a. \quad \text{‘Caused,’ i.e., having a cause. ‘Uneternal,’ i.e., destructible. ‘Not all-pervading,’ i.e., not present everywhere. ‘Mutable,’ i.e., distinguished by the acts of leaving [one form], and assuming [another form], &c. It [the soul,] leaves the body it has assumed, [and, probably, takes another] ; and bodies, &c., move [and are mutable, as is notorious]. ‘Multitudinous,’ i.e., in consequence of the distinction of souls; [every man, e.g., having a separate body]. ‘Dependent,’ [i.e.,] on its cause. ‘Mergent,’ that is to say, it [i.e., every product, in due time,] is resolved into that from which it originated.} \]

\[ \text{रूपस्यः स्यात्} \quad \text{ऋषीयान्ते: स्यायेयान्ते: स्यायेमेवायायात्तिचिन्हपुस्ताक्षिक्यन्ति} \quad \text{स्मरययः तत्र मार्गायुष्य्यज्ञनोक्तेषां ततः समास्मारकमपि} \quad \text{॥} \]

\[ 1 \quad \text{प्रकृतिकार्यांश्चां} \quad \text{सम्बन्धस्यां साध्यम्येवमह} \quad \text{॥} \]

\[ 2 \quad \text{Aniruddha omits अव्यापिः. Ed.} \]

\[ 3 \quad \text{हेतुमत्कारश्ववत्} \quad \text{ऋषिनिं विनाशाः} \quad \text{ऋव्या-} \]
b. [But, some one may say], if realities be the twenty-five [which the Sánkhya enumerates (see §61), and no more], pray, are such common operations as knowing, enjoying, &c., absolutely nothing; you accordingly giving up what you see, [in order to save an hypothesis with which what you see is irreconcilable]? To this he replies:¹

The qualities of the Nyáya are implied in the term Nature.

Aph. 125. There is the establishment of these [twenty-four 'Qualities' of the Nyáya, which you fancy that we do not recognize, because we do not explicitly enumerate them], either by reason that these ordinary qualities [as contradistinguished from the three Qualities of the Sánkhya], &c., are, in reality, nothing different; or [to put it in another point of view,] because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, [in which, like our own three Qualities, they are implied].

¹ यदि पञ्चविंशतितत्तवं किं ज्ञानसुखादोनां सामान्यमोक्षामभाव एव तथा च दृष्टपरिर्याग इत्यत्र छाह
a. Either from their being nothing different from the twenty-four principles, 'in reality,' truly, quite evidently,—since the character of these [twenty-four] fits the ordinary qualities, &c., [which you fancy are neglected in our enumeration of things],—'there is the establishment of these,' i.e., there is their establishment [as realities] through their being implied just in those [twenty-four principles which are explicitly specified in the Sānkhyā].

b. The word 'or' shows that there is another alternative [reply, in the aphorism, to the objection in question]. 'Or because they are hinted by [the term] Nature;' that is to say, the qualities, &c. [such as Knowledge], are established [as realities], just because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, by reason that [these] qualities are, mediately, products of Nature; for there is no difference between product and cause. But the omission to mention them [explicitly] is not by reason of their not being at all.

c. He [next] mentions the points in which Nature and [her] products agree:

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1 अवास्यास्वहुप्तः प्रत्यक्षत एव वा चतुर्भिः-शतितस्थादेवकल्पेऽयोगार्धसामान्यादिनां तत्तस्यिद्वैवान्नभावालिसिद्धि: ॥

2 वाश्च: पश्चान्तर सूचयति। प्रधानवेयपदे-शाचा गुणानां पारम्पर्येऽष्ट प्रधानकार्यलेन कार्य-कार्यणयोरभूतम् प्रधानवेयपदे-शाचा गुणादिसिद्धि:। नत्तभावादननुकीर्तनमिति ॥

3 प्रकृतिकार्येः साध्यायोमाह ॥
Aph. 126. Of both [Nature and her products] the fact that they consist of the three Qualities [§ 61. a.], and that they are irrational, &c., [is the common property].

a. Consisting of the three qualities, and being irrational, [such in the meaning of the compound term with which the aphorism commences]. By the expression ' &c.' is meant [their] being intended for another, [see § 66]. ‘Of both,’ i.e., of the cause [viz., Nature], and of the effects [viz., all natural products]. Such is the meaning.¹

b. He [next] states the mutual differences of character among the three Qualities which [see § 61] are the [constituent] parts of Nature.²

Aph. 127. The Qualities [§ 62] differ in character, mutually, by pleasantness, unpleasantness, lassitude, &c., [in which forms, severally, the Qualities present themselves].

a. ‘Pleasantness,’ i.e., Pleasure. By the expression

¹ चिन्गुस्याचेतनलस्यादि इत्यथि चाक्षुश्चत्वारिष्ठ-लस्य इत्यादि कार्यकार्यशीर्षिपथेनातः ॥

² प्रकृतिविभागस्य चिन्गुस्याच्यूतोल्लत्वेऽवधाये-मांह ॥
'&c.' is meant Goodness (sattwa), which is light [i.e., not heavy,] and illuminating. 'Unpleasantness,' i.e., Pain. By the expression ' &c.' [in reference to this,] is meant Passion (rajas), which is urgent and restless. 'Lassitude,' i.e., stupefaction. By the expression ' &c.' is meant Darkness (tamas), which is heavy and enveloping. It is by these habits that the Qualities, viz., Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, differ: such is the remainder, [required to complete the aphorism].

b. At the time of telling their differences, he tells in what respects they agree: 

लघुअदिशमयोऽवली चाध्मयं वाध्मयं गुणानाम्

Aph. 128. Through Lightness and other habits the Qualities mutually agree and differ

a. The meaning is as follows: the enunciation [in the

1 श्रीति: मुखम्। श्रीदिशमयालतु प्रकाशकं सच्चम्। श्रीप्रति: खलम्। श्रीदिशमयादुपक्षमकं

2 तेषां विधम्यकथनावसरे साध्मयंमाहू।

3 So reads Aniruddha only. Vijñāna, Nāgēśa, and Vedānti Mahādeva have: लघुअदिशमेः साध्मयं वाध्मयं च गुणानाम्। Ed.
shape of the term *laghu*, 'light,' is not one intended to call
attention to the concrete, viz., what things are light, but is one where the abstract [the nature of light things, viz.,
'lightness' (*laghutca*)] is the prominent thing. ‘Through Lightness and other habits,’ i. e., through the characters of Lightness, Restlessness, and Heavity, the Qualities differ. Their *agreement* is through what is hinted by the expression ‘and other.’ And this consists in their mutually predominating [one over another, from time to time], producing one another, consorting together, and being reciprocally present, [one in another], for the sake of Soul.3

b. By [the expressions, in § 124,] ‘caused,’ &c., it is declared that the ‘Great one’ [or Mind], &c., are *products*. He states the proof of this:4.

उभयान्यत्वाकार्यवं महद्देर्घ्यादिवर्तः ॥ ९२५ ॥

*Aph. 129.* Since they are other than both [Soul and Nature, the only two uncaused entities], Mind and the rest are products; as is the case with a jar, or the like.

a. That is to say: like a jar, or the like, Mind and the

1 भयमथि: I भावप्रधानो निर्देशः I लघुदिविधः
मैलपघुचलनगुल्विगुंशानां वैधम्यम् I चाइपदसू-
तितिन साधम्यम् I तत्त पुष्पार्थमन्यामहिभव-
जननमिथुनवृत्तिवम् ॥

2 हेतुमदिस्यादिनः महददेर्घ्यानां कार्यवमुक्तम् ॥
तत्र प्रमाणमाह ॥

---

1 This is a reference to the Shastras that deal with the nature of things.
2 This is a reference to the scriptural verses that establish the proof of the statement.
rest are products; because they are something other than
the two which [alone] are eternal, viz., Nature and Soul.¹

b. He states another reason:³

परिमाणात् ॥ १३० ॥

A second proof.

Aph. 130. Because of [their] measure,
[which is a limited one].

a. That is to say: [Mind and the rest are products]; be-
cause they are limited in measure;³ [whereas the only two
that are uncaused, viz., Nature and Soul, are unlimited].

b. He states another argument:⁴

समन्वयात् ॥ १३१ ॥

A third proof

Aph. 131. Because they conform [to
Nature].

a. [Mind and the rest are products]; because they well
[follow and] correspond with Nature; i. e., because the
Qualities of Nature [§ 61] are seen in all things:⁶ [and it

¹ नियाभ्यां प्रकृतिप्रवृत्ताभ्यामन्यत्वाद्विदेविधिर
महद्वादेः कार्यतामित्यथे; ॥
² हेतुतरसाह ॥
³ परिमितवादित्यथे; ॥
⁴ अङ्गरां युक्तिमाह ॥
⁵ प्रधानेन सह सम्भवानवान्धानगुणां सर्वे-
पदार्थेऽध दर्शनात् ॥
⁶
is a maxim, that what is in the effect was derived from
the cause and implies the cause.

b. He states the same thing, [in the next aphorism]:

शक्तित्वेषित् || १३२ ||

A fourth proof.

Aph. 132. And, finally, because it is
through the power [of the cause alone,
that the product can do aught].

a. It is by the power of its cause, that a product ener-
gizes, [as a chain restrains an elephant, only by the force
of the iron which it is made of]; so that Mind and the rest,
being [except through the strength of Nature,] powerless,
produce their products in subservience to Nature. Other-
wise, since it is their habit to energize, they would at all
times produce their products, [which it will not be alleged
that they do].

b. And the word uti, in this place, is intended to notify
the completion of the set of [positive] reasons [why Mind
and the others should be regarded as products].

c. He [next] states [in support of the same assertion,]
the argument from negatives, [i.e., the argument drawn

1 एतदेववह ||
2 कारणशक्त्या कार्यः प्रवर्तत इति महादात्यः
शक्तिः सत्य: प्रकृत्यनुसारेण कार्यं जनयति ।
न्यथा प्रवृत्तिशीलवालत्वं कार्यं जनयेयः ॥
3 इतिशन्देधाच हेतुवर्गे सामाप्प्रियवचनावे ॥
4 अतिरेकमाह ॥
from the consideration as to what becomes of Mind and the others, when they are not products] :

तद्दाने प्रकृति: पुष्वे वा \; १३३ \; }

Aph. 133. On the quitting thereof [quitting the condition of product], there is Nature, or Soul, [into one or other of which the product must needs have resolved itself].

a. Product and non-product; such is the pair or alternatives. 'On the quitting thereof;' i.e., when Mind and the rest quit the condition of product, Mind and the rest [of necessity] enter into Nature, or Soul;¹ [these two alone being non-products].

b. [But perhaps some one may say, that] Mind and the rest may exist quite independently of the pair of alternatives [just mentioned]. In regard to this, he declares [as follows]:²

तयोरन्येते तुञ्जलस् \; १३४ \; }

¹ कार्यमकायं चैति कोटिध्रयम् \; तद्दाने महदादेः कार्यताहाने प्रकृतै पुष्वे वा महदादीनां प्रवेश इति \; }

² उभयकोटिचिनिनमुखा एव महदादयो भविष्यन्तित्याह \; }

³ Nāgęśa has तुञ्जता. Ed.
Mind and the rest would not be at all, if neither product nor non-product.

Aph. 134. If they were other than these two, they would be void; [seeing that there is nothing self-existent, besides Soul and Nature].

a. If Mind and the rest were 'other than these two,' i. e., than product or non-product [§ 133], they would be in the shape of what is 'void,' i. e., in the shape of nonentity.¹

b. Well now, [some one may say,] why should it be under the character of a product, that Mind and the rest are a sign of [there being such a principle as] Nature? They may be [more properly said to be] a sign, merely in virtue of their not occurring apart from it. To this he replies:²

कार्येकार्यानुमानं तत्ताहित्यात् ॥ १३५ ॥

What kind of causes can be inferred from the effect, [in the case of Nature and her products]; because it accompanies it.

a. That [other relation, other than that of material and product, which you would make out to exist between Nature and Mind,] exists, indeed, where the nature [or

¹ तथा: कार्याकार्यानुमानं महादीना तुञ्जपतमभावहृपतशम् ॥

² ऋष दिक्षम महदायं: कार्यं विकृते-लिङ्कम् । अविनाभावादेव लिङ्क भविष्यवतः-तच्छाह ॥
essence] of the cause is not seen in the effect; as [is the case with] the inference, from the rising of the moon, that the sea is swollen [into full tide; rising, with maternal affection, towards her son who was produced from her bosom on the occasion of the celebrated Churning of the Ocean. Though the swelling of the tide does not occur apart from the rising of the moon, yet here the cause, moon-rise, is not seen in the effect, tide; and, consequently, though we infer the effect from the cause, the cause could not have been inferred from the effect. But, in the present case, since we see, in Mind and the rest, the characters of Nature, the cause is inferred from the effect. 'Because it accompanies it,' i. e., because, in Mind and the rest, we see the properties of Nature, [i. e., Nature herself actually present; as we see the clay which is the cause of a jar, actually present in the jar].

6. [But it may still be objected,] if it be thus, then let that principle itself, the 'Great one' [or Mind], be the cause of the world: what need of Nature? To this he replies: ²

\[
\text{अन्यतः चिन्तुकालिद्विजीवएुत्} \text{ १३६} \text{ एु}
\]

\[1\text{ भवयेवं यथ कारणसूतप कायं न दृश्यते यथा} \text{ चन्द्रोदयालन्त्रमुद्वृणानुमानम्} \text{। चच तु प्रधान-} \text{रूपस्य महदादैं दशनात्कार्यात्कारणानुमानमेव} \text{।} \text{तत्साहित्यप्रकृतिरूपस्य महदादैं दशनात्} \text{।}
\]

\[2\text{ एवं चेन्महत्त्वमेव जगत्कारणंमल्लु किं प्रधा-} \text{नेनेन्द्रत ज्ञाह} \text{।}
\]
Aph. 136. The indiscrete, [Nature, must be inferred] from its [discrete and resolvable] effect, [Mind], in which are the three Qualities, [which constitute Nature].

a. 'It is resolved;' such is the import of [the term] linga, [here rendered] 'effect.' From that [resolvable effect], viz., the 'Great principle' [or Mind], in which are the three Qualities, Nature must be inferred. And that the 'Great principle,' in the shape of ascertainment [or distinct intellection], is discrete [or limited] and perishable, is established by direct observation. Therefore [i.e., since Mind, being perishable, must be resolvable into something else,] we infer that into which it is resolvable, [in other words, its 'cause,' here analogously termed līgīn, since 'effect' has been termed linga].

b. But then, [some one may say], still something quite different may be the cause [of all things]: what need of [this] Nature [of yours]? In regard to this, he remarks [as follows]:

तत्कार्यतत्तत्ततत्कार्यतत्ततस्ततिपापाय: || ९३९ ||

'लयं गच्छतीति लिङ्गं कार्यम् | तस्माच्चिन्नुः
खान्महत्त्वान्वधानमनुमात्त्वम् | महत्त्वं चाचाच्छायस्य
थ्यवसायस्य व्यक्तं विनाशि प्रत्यक्षासिद्धम् | तेन
लिङ्गमुनानम् ||

'ननु तथायन्यदेव कार्यं भविष्यति किं
प्रकृत्येत्यचाह ||

1 लयं गच्छतीति लिङ्गं कार्यम् | तस्माच्चिन्नुः
खान्महत्त्वान्वधानमनुमात्त्वम् | महत्त्वं चाचाच्छायस्य
थ्यवसायस्य व्यक्तं विनाशि प्रत्यक्षासिद्धम् | तेन
लिङ्गमुनानम् ||

2 ननु तथायन्यदेव कार्यं भविष्यति किं
प्रकृत्येत्यचाह ||
Aph. 137. There is no denying that it [Nature] is; because of its effects, [which will be in vain attributed to any other source].

a. Is the cause of this [world] a product, or not a product? If it were a product, then, the same being [with equal propriety to be assumed to be] the case with its cause, there would be a regressus in infinitum. If effects be from any root [to which there is nothing antecedent], then this is that [to which we give the name of Nature]. "Because of its effects," that is to say, because of the effects of Nature. There is no denying "that it is," i.e., that Nature is.

b. Be it so, [let us grant,] that Nature is; yet [the opponent may contend,] Soul positively cannot be; for [if the existence of causes is to be inferred from their products, Soul cannot be thus demonstrated to exist, seeing that] it has no products. In regard to this, he remarks [as follows]:

1. तत्कारणं कार्येमकार्यं वा। कार्येचे तत्कारणे रशस्यापि तथाये सत्यनवस्था। मूलकार्येचे तदेव सेति। तत्कारणं इति प्रकृतिकार्यं इत्यं। तत्सिद्धं प्रकृतिसिद्धेनापलापः।

3. भवतु प्रकृतिसिद्धं पुरुषस्य सिद्धिः न स्यादेव नहि तस्य कार्यमलिप्त्वचाहः।
Aph. 138. [The relation of cause and effect is] not [alleged as] the means of establishing [the existence of Soul]; because, as is the case with [the disputed term] 'merit,' there is no dispute about there being such a kind of thing; [though what kind of thing is matter of dispute].

a. There is no dispute about 'there being such a kind of thing,' i.e., as to there being Soul, simply; [since everybody who does not talk stark nonsense must admit a Soul, or self, of some kind]; for the dispute is [not as to its being, but] as to its peculiarity [of being], as [whether it be] multitudinous, or sole, all-pervading, or not all-pervading, and so forth; just as, in every [philosophical system, or] theory, there is no dispute as to [there being something to which may be applied the term] 'merit' (dharma); for the difference of opinion has regard to the particular kind of [thing,—such as sacrifices, according to the Mīmāṃsa creed, or good works, according to the Nyāya,—which shall be held to involve] 'merit.'

b. 'Not the means of establishing' that [viz., the existence of soul]; i.e., the relation of cause and effect is not the means of establishing it. This intends, 'I will mention another means of establishing it.'

1 सामान्येन तावदात्मनं विवादी नास्ति विवेचिते हि विवादोऽस्तने एको व्यापकोऽव्यापक इत्यादि यथा सर्वसम्मिश्रेणे धर्मं इत्यविवादो धर्मे-विवेचिते हि विप्रतिपन्नः ||

2 न तत्साधनं न तत्व कार्यकारणशानवः साधनम्। अन्यत्साधनं भक्त्यामीत्यभिमिस्तथिः। ||
b. [But some one may say.] Souls are nothing else than the body, and its organs, &c.: what need of imagining anything else? To this he replies:

\[ शरीरादिभ्यतिरिन्तः पुमान् \| १३९ \| \]

Materialism scouted. \[ Aph. 139. \] Soul is something else than the body, &c.

a. [The meaning of the aphorism is] plain.²

b. He propounds an argument in support of this:³

\[ संहतपरार्थवात् \| १४० \| \]

\[ Aph. 140. \] Because that which is combined [and is, therefore, discerptible,] is for the sake of some other, [not discerptible].

a. That which is discerptible is intended for something else that is indiscerptible. If it were intended for something else that is discerptible, there would be a regressus in infinitum.⁴

b. And combinedness [involving (see § 67) discerptible-

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¹ देहेन्द्रियाद्य एवात्मनः किमन्यक्लपन्येयत

² व्यक्तम्

³ अच न्यायमाह

⁴ यत्संहतं तदसंहतपरार्थम्। संहतपरार्थवे

उत्तरस्य स्वात्
ness,] consists in the Qualities' making some product by
their state of mutual commixture; or [to express it oth-
wise,] combinedness is the state of the soft and the hard,
[which distinguishes matter from spirit]. And this exists
occultly in Nature, as well as the rest; because, other-
wise, discreetibleness would not prove discoverable in the
products thereof, viz., the 'Great one,' &c.

c. He elucidates this same point.²

चिंगुआदिविपथंयात् || १७७ ||

Aph. 141. [And Soul is something
else than the body, &c.]; because there
is [in Soul.] the reverse of the three
Qualities, &c.

a. Because there is, in Soul, 'the reverse of the three
Qualities,' &c., i. e., because they are not seen [in it]. By
the expression ' &c.' is meant, because the other characters
of Nature, also, are not seen³ [in Soul].

b. He states another argument :⁴

¹ संहतलं च गुशानन्यायत्स्मियमिषुभावन कार्यकर्षम् || ऋष्टि वा द्रवकटितता संहतलम् || तच्च प्रकृत्यादन्त तिरोभूतमति || अन्यथा तत्कार्येषु महदादिदेशु संहततादेश्नप्रस्वातः ॥
² तदेव स्माहयति ||
³ पुस्के चिंगुआदिदिविपथंयात्वदेशेनादतः || चार्दिशुद्राद्येषां प्रकृतिधमोगशमणदेशेनादिति ||
⁴ न्यायान्तरमाह ||
अधिष्ठानास्ति || १४२ ||

Another proof that Soul is not material.

अभ. १४२. और [Soul is not material;] because of [its] superintendence [over Nature].

a. For a superintendent is an intelligent being; and Nature is unintelligent: such is the meaning.¹

b. He states another argument:²

भोज्यभावः || १४३ ||

Another proof.

अभ. १४३. [And Soul is not material;] because of [its] being the experiencer.

a. It is Nature that is experienced; the experiencer is Soul. Although Soul, from its being unchangeably the same, is not [really] an experiencer, still the assertion [in the aphorism,] is made, because of the fact that the reflexion of the Intellect befalls it,³ [and thus makes it seem as if it experienced (see § ५८. a.).]

b. Efforts are engaged in for the sake of Liberation. Pray, is this [for the benefit] of the Soul, or of Nature;

¹ चेतनो द्यधिष्ठाता भवति प्रकृतिन्द्र जडेत्यथे: ||
² युक्तन्तरमाह ||
³ भेग्या प्रकृतिभौखा पुष्पः। यदापि कृत्यस्य-

चादात्मनो भौलतं नाल्लि तथापि बुद्धिज्ञायाः-

पत्येन्युक्रम् ||

M
[since Nature, in the shape of Mind, is, it seems, the experiencer]? To this he replies: ¹

कैवल्यार्थेः प्रवृत्तेः ² || १८४ ||

Aph. 144. [It is for Soul, and not for Nature;] because the exertions are with a view to isolation [from all qualities; a condition to which Soul is competent, but Nature is not].

a. The very essence of Nature cannot depart from it [so as to leave it in the state of absolute, solitary isolation contemplated]; because the three Qualities are its very essence, [the departure of which from it would leave nothing behind], and because it would thus prove to be not eternal, [whereas, in reality, it is eternal]. The isolation (kaivalya) of that alone is possible of which the qualities are reflexional, [and not constitutive (see § 58. a.)]; and that is Soul.³

b. Of what nature is this [Soul]? To this he replies:⁴

¹ मोक्षार्थेः प्रवृत्तिः || सा किमातमन: प्रकृतेऽवर्यत ज्ञात च ज्ञात ||

² This lection is that of Aniruddha alone. Vijnāna, Nāgacā, and Vedānti Mahādeva end the Aphorism with च, necessitating 'and because,' &c. Ed.

³ चिंगुशास्त्रभावालाच्यकृतेऽनस्रावच्यवादनिल्यप्रसक्षणः || यस्या पापाधिकगुणालत्स्य कैवल्यं संभवति स चात्मेति ||

⁴ स बंडुप इत्यत ज्ञात ज्ञात ||
The nature of the Soul.

Aph. 145. Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent, light, [which must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the Soul, which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest].

a. It is a settled point, that the unintelligent is not light; [it is not self-manifesting]. If Soul, also, were unintelligent [as the Naiyáyikas hold it to be, in substance; knowledge being, by them, regarded not as its essence or substratum, but as one of its qualities], then there would need to be another light for it; and, as the simple theory, let Soul itself consist, essentially, of light.¹

b. And there is Scripture [in support of this view; for example, the two following texts from the Bréhadáranuyaka Upanishad²]: 'Wherewith shall one distinguish that wherewith one distinguishes all this world?' 'Wherewith shall one take cognizance of the cognizer?'³

c. [But the Naiyáyika may urge,] let Soul be unintelligent [in its substance], but have Intelligence as its

¹ जड़े न प्रकाशत इति सिद्धम् । यथात्मापि जडः स्थात्स्यापयेन प्रकाशेन भवितयें लायव्यात-चाल्मैव प्रकाशस्तैःस्तु॥

² II., 4, 14; or Satapatha-bráhmaṇa, xiv., 5, 4, 16. The two sentences quoted are continuous. Ed.

³ छडित्व वेनेदं सवं विज्ञानाति तं केन विज्ञानीयात् । विज्ञातार्मरे केन विज्ञानीयादिति॥
attribute. *Thereby* it manifests all things; but it is not, essentially, Intelligence. To this he replies:  

**निगुणवाच चिद्मो| ॥ १४६ ॥**

*Aph. 146. It [Soul,] has not Intel
ligence as its attribute; because it is
without quality.

a. If soul were associated with attributes, it would be [as we hold everything to be, that is associated with attributes,] liable to alteration; and, therefore, there would be no Liberation; ² [its attributes, or susceptibilities, always keeping it liable to be affected by something or other; or, the absolutely simple being the only unalterable].

b. He declares that there is a contradiction to Scripture in this, ³ [i.e., in the view which he is contending against]:

**छुत्या सिद्धस्य नापलापस्तप्रवयङ्क्षवाधात् ॥ १४७ ॥**

*Scripture is higher evidence than supposed intuition.*

*Aph. 147. There is no denial [to be allowed] of what is established by Scripture; because the [supposed] evidence of intuition for this [i.e., for the existence of qualities in the Soul,] is confuted [by the Scriptural declaration of the contrary].

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¹ जडाव्यात्मालु चिद्मो। तेन जगात्मकाशयति
नतु चिद्वृय इत्यत छाह ॥

² ब्यात्ममो धर्मियोः स्वात्मरिषामिव व्यात्मा-
त्त्वात्मानिमाणि इति ॥

³ छच्च छुतिविरोधवाहः ॥
a. The text, "For this Soul is unaccompanied," &c., would be confuted, if there were any annexation of qualities [to Soul: and the notion of confuting Scripture is not to be entertained for a moment]

b. But the literal meaning [of the aphorism] is this, that the fact, established by Scripture, of its [i.e., soul’s,] being devoid of qualities, &c., cannot be denied; because the Scripture itself confutes the [supposed] intuitive perception thereof, i.e., the [supposed] intuitive perception of qualities, &c., [in the soul].

अभ्रत्ताः यथोऽपि साक्षितम्। १४८।

Argument against the soul’s being unintelligent.

Aph. 148. [If soul were unintelligent,] it would not be witness [of its own comfort.] in profound [and dreamless] sleep, &c.

a. If soul were unintelligent, then, in deep sleep, &c., it would not be a witness, a knower. But that this is not

1 Brihadâranyaka Upanishad, iv., 3, 16; or Satapatha-brâhmaṇa, xiv., 7, 1, 17. Ed.

2 असहान्ते ब्रह्म पुनः सत्यद्वृत्तिः गुरुवातपमेत्यावस्थने स साधिता स्यात्।

3 असृष्ट्यं विद्या सिद्धस्य गुरुवातपमेत्यावस्थने स साधिता स्यात्।

4 सुभ्रत्ताः यथोऽपि साक्षितम्। Nâgâsa. सुभ्रत्ताः यथोऽपि साक्षितम्। Vedânti Mahâdeva. Ed.
the case [may be inferred] from the phenomenon, that 'I slept pleasantly.' By the expression ' &c.' [in the aphorism,] dreaming is included.¹

b. The Vedántis say that 'soul is one only'; and so, again, 'For Soul is eternal, omnipresent, changeless, void of blemish.' 'Being one [only], it is divided [into a seeming multitude] by Nature (śakti), i.e., Illusion (máyá), but not through its own essence, [to which there does not belong multiplicity].' In regard to this, he says [as follows].²

जन्मादिवर्थव्याहः पुरुषवन्दत्वम् ॥ १४२ ॥

There is a multiplicity of souls.

Aph. 149. From the several allotment of birth, &c., a multiplicity of souls [is to be inferred].

a. 'Birth, &c.' By the ' &c.,' growth, death, &c., are included. 'From the several allotment of these, i.e., from their being appointed; [birth to one, death to another, and so on]. 'A multiplicity of souls;' that is to say, souls

¹ यथावत्मा जडः स्वात्सुप्रभावात्साक्षित्वम्भातः

तृंबं स्यात्। न चैवं सुखम्भवस्याल्पमिति प्रत्येको

भासनात्। ऋषिद्विदन्त्वस्यवर्ज्ञम् ॥

² एक एवात्मेवि वेदालिन:। तथा च। नित्यः

सवेगते यथावतु कृत्तथा दृष्टविजितः। एकः स

भियाते शक्यं मायिण न स्वभावतः। ऋषचाह ॥

³ Vedánti Mahádeva has, agreeably to some copies of his work, पुरुषस्य वहन्तम् Ed.
are many. If soul were one only, then, when one is born, all must be born, &c.1

b. He ponders, as a doubt, the opinion of the others; [viz., of the Vedántis]:

उपाधिभेदायेक्ष्य नानायोग ऋक्षयेव घटादिनि: || १५०

Aph. 150. [The Vedántis say, that,] there being a difference in its investments, moreover, multiplicity attaches [seemingly,] to the one [Soul]; as is the case with Space, by reason of jars, &c., [which mark out the spaces that they occupy].

a. As Space is one,—[and yet], in consequence of the difference of adjuncts, [as] jars, &c., when a jar is destroyed, it is [familiarly] said, ‘the jar’s space is destroyed’ [for then there no longer exists a space marked out by the jar];2—so, also, on the hypothesis of there being but one Soul, since there is a difference of corporeal limitation, on the destruction thereof, [i.e., of the limitation occasioned by any particular human body], it is merely a way of talking [to say], ‘The soul has perished.’ [This, indeed, is so far true, that there is really no perishing of Soul; but

1 जन्मादीति। ऋद्विनोपचयमरकादि गृह्यते। तद्यवस्यातस्तत्तत्नियमात। पुरुषवहनं बहव ऋद्व-त्तमान इत्यथः। यद्येक एवत्मैकस्मिन्ज्ञायमाने सर्वेऽजायेरक्षिति॥

2 परमस्तमाधुर्भः॥

then it is true,] also on the hypothesis that there are many souls. [And it must be true:] otherwise, since Soul is eternal, [without beginning or end, as both parties agree], how could there be the appointment of birth and death?

b. He states [what may serve for] the removal of doubt6 [as to the point in question]:

उपाधिभिर्भृते नतु तद्वान् || १५७ ||

Refutation of the Vedānta on this point.

Aph. 151. The investment is different, [according to the Vedāntīs], but not that to which this belongs; [and the absurd consequences of such an opinion will be seen].

a. 'The investment is different,' [there are diverse bodies of John, Thomas, &c.]; 'that to which this belongs,' i.e. that [Soul] to which this investment [of body, in all its multiplicity,] belongs, is not different, [but is one only]: such is the meaning. And, [now consider], in consequence of the destruction of one thing, we are not to speak as if there were the destruction of something else; because this [if it were evidence of a thing’s being destroyed,] would present itself where it ought not; [the destruction of De-

1 यचैकमाकाशं घटायुपाधिभेदादििे नरण घटाकाशं नष्टमिति अ्यपदिष्यते तत्बाकृत्य अक्षयकार्यक्षेपिः देहाक्षेत्रेदेशात्तचाश्र आत्मा नष्ट इति अ्यपदेश-माचाम् || नानात्मकार्यक्षेपिः अन्यायात्मनो निय- लाल्कवं जन्मसमर्शयवस्थेति ||

2 समाधानमांह ||

3 Vide supra, p. 16, note 3. Ed.
vadatta, e.g., presenting itself, as a fact, when we are considering the case of Yajnadatta, who is not, for that reason, to be assumed to be dead]: and, on the hypothesis that Soul is one, the [fact that the Vedánta makes an] imputation of inconsistent conditions is quite evident; since Bondage and Liberation do not [and cannot,] belong [simultaneously] to one. But the conjunction and [simultaneous] non-conjunction of the sky [or space] with smoke, &c., [of which the Vedánta may seek to avail himself, as an illustration,) are not contradictory; for Conjunction is not pervasion;' [whereas, on the other hand, it would be nonsense to speak of Bondage as affecting one portion of a monad, and Liberation as affecting another portion; as a monkey may be in conjunction with a branch of a tree, without being in conjunction with the stem].

b. What may be [proved] by this? To this he replies:

एवमेकाचेन परिवर्तमानस्य न विरुध्धमण्डलायासः || १५२ ||

The Sāṅkhya is free from the charge of absurdity to which the Vedánta is open.

Aph. 152. Thus, [i.e., by taking the Sāṅkhya view,] there is no imputation of contradictory conditions to [a Soul

1 उपाधिभिमुखः तद्वानुपाधिमाच स्मृतं हि: । न च चाल्यनाशादन्त्व नाशव्यवहारोगित्रिप्रस-

झाड़कातामपि च व्यक्त एव विरुध्धमण्डलायास एकस्य वन्धोक्षाभावात् । श्राकाशस्य तु धूमादियोगान-

योगाविरृंह्वैं संयोगस्यायायवृत्तितात् ॥

2 एतन पिं स्यादिति । ज्ञत ज्ञाह ॥
supposed to be] everywhere present as one [infinitely extended monad].

a. 'Thus,' i.e., [if you regard the matter rightly,] according to the manner here set forth, there is no 'imputation,' or attribution, 'of incompatible conditions,' Bondage, Liberation, &c., to a soul 'existing everywhere,' throughout all, as one,\(^1\) [i.e., as a monad].

b. [But, the Vedântî may contend,) we see the condition of another attributed even to one quite different; as, e.g., Nature's character as an agent [is attributed] to Soul, which is another [than Nature]. To this he replies:\(^2\)

अन्यथर्मेवेपि नारोपात्तत्त्विनिरिक्षवति \(153\)

\(Aph. 153.\) Even though there be imputation is not [imputed to Soul] the possession of the condition of another, this [i.e., that it really possesses such,] is not established by the imputation; because it [Soul,] is one [absolutely simple, unqualified entity].

a. [The notion] that Soul is an agent is a mistake; because, that Soul is not an agent is true, and the imputation [of agency to Soul] is not true, and the combination of the true and the untrue is not real. Neither birth nor

\(^1\) एवमुक्तितिवैकल्पन परितः सर्वतो वर्तमानस्यात्मानोऽन्यमोक्षार्थविविधविदमानमश्चारापि न भवतीतिवर्ष: \(\)।

\(^2\) अन्यथर्मेवायन्यचारापि दृष्टा यथा प्रकृते: कार्त्तौ सुरुषेन्यचेति च चचाह \(\)।
death or the like is compatible with Soul; because it is unaccompanied,¹ [i.e., unattended either by qualities or by actions].

b. [But the Vedánti may say:] and thus there will be an opposition to the Scripture. For, according to that, 'Brahma is one without a second.'² 'There is nothing here diverse; death after death does he [deluded man,] obtain, who here sees, as it were, a multiplicity.'³ To this he replies:⁴

नात्स्थाण्तविनिरोधो जातिपरस्वात् ॥ ७५४ ॥

Aph. 154. There is no opposition to the Scriptures [declaratory] of the non-duality [of Soul]; because the reference [in such texts,] is to the genus, [or to Soul in general].

a. But there is no opposition [in our Sánkhya view of the matter,] to the Scriptures [which speak] of the oneness of Soul; because those [Scriptural texts] refer to the genus.

¹ पुस्करक्तर्थं भान्तं पुरुषाकर्तृत्वस्य साधवारो-पवासायतान म सवास्ययोः: न पञ्चस्तम्भिको
ब्यवति । असमन्तवादात्मना न ज्ञममर्णादि
सम्बवति ॥

² Chhândogya Upanishad, vi., 1. But the word ब्रह्म does not occur there. Ed.

³ Kaṭha Upanishad, iv., 11. Instead of लाभित्व, however, the correct reading is ग्रंधित्व. Ed.

⁴ एवं च श्रुतिनिरोधः स्वात् । तथा चैकमेवा-
By genus we mean sameness, the fact of being of the same nature: and it is to this alone that the texts about the non-duality [of Soul] have reference. It is not the indivisibleness [of Soul,—meaning, by its indivisibleness, the impossibility that there should be more souls than one,—that is meant in such texts]; because there is no motive [for viewing Soul as thus indivisible]: such is the meaning.

b. But then, [the Vedánti may join,] Bondage and Liberation are just as incompatible in any single soul, on the theory of him who asserts that souls are many, [and that each is at once bound and free]. To this he replies:

1 ज्ञातमैकायत्वुतानं विरोधस्तु नास्ति तासां जातिपरमात्। जाति: सामान्यमेकापतं तत्वावृहितशृवतीनां तत्त्वयत्। नाखशब्दं प्रयोजनाभावादित्यः॥

2 नन्दनेकाळवादिनाः अधिकाश्यात्मनो बन्धमोक्ष्या विरूद्धावित्। ज्ञातां॥

3 All the commentators but Aniruddha read दृष्ट्यात्दूपम; and they differ widely from him, as they often do, in their elucidations of the Aphorism. Nágéśa's explanation of it is as follows: विदितं प्रसिद्ध बन्धकारणमविवेको यत्र तद्ग्राहान्तपुष्प-
Aph. 155. Of him [i.e., of that soul,] by whom the cause of Bondage is known, there is that condition [of isolation, or entire liberation], by the perception [of the fact, that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he, really, was not bound, even when he seemed to be so].

a. By whom is known 'the cause of bondage,' viz., the non-perception that Nature and soul are distinct, of him, 'by the perception' [of it], i.e., by cognizing the distinction, there is 'that condition,' viz., the condition of isolation, [the condition (see § 144] after which the soul aspires. The soul in Bondage which is no real bondage may be typified by Don Quixote, hanging, in the dark, from the ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and holding on for life, as he thought, from not knowing that his toes were within six inches of the ground].

The substance of this is, that, only in the eyes of the mistaken man who is influenced by the notorious cause of bondage, or in other words, who is unable to discriminate, is the essential condition of souls multicity, a condition the reverse of the one before referred to, unity; and that is inconclusive. The Aphorism, thus understood, must be assumed to proceed from a Vedântic disputant against the Sâûkhyâ. Whether as read by Aniruddha, or as read by others, it is susceptible, with reference to the previous context, of a variety of renderings. Ed.

विदितं वन्द्यकारणं प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकाद्येवं
यस्य तस्य दृष्या विवेकक्षानेन तद्दूषं कौवल्य-
हृदम् ॥
b. [Well, rejoins the Vedānti,] Bondage [as you justly observe,] is dependent on non-perception [of the truth], and is not real. It is a maxim, that non-perception is removed by perception; and, on this showing, we recognize as correct the theory that Soul is one, but not that of Soul's being multitudinous. To this he replies:

नास्थादृष्या चक्षुष्मतामनुपलब्धः: II १५६: II

Aph. 156. No: because the blind do not see, can those who have their eyesight not perceive?

a. What! because a blind man does not see, does also one who has his eyesight not perceive? There are many arguments [in support of the view] of those who assert that souls are many, [though you do not see them]: such is the meaning.

b. He declares, for the following reason. also, that Souls are many.

1 विवेकादर्शननिमित्ते बन्धो न तास्सिकः।
दर्शनादर्शनं निवर्तित इति युक्तः। एवं चैव चिकि
त्तमपश्च एव व्यायं पद्ययमे न नानात्मकं इति।
ञ्चाह॥

2 ऊनो न पश्यतीति चक्षुष्मानपिकिं नेपलभते।
नानात्मब्राह्मादिनामनेके व्यायः सत्तीत्त्वयः॥

3 इतेरिपिनानात्मानं इत्याह॥
BOOK I., APH. 157.

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वामदेवादिमुक्तः नाहैतम् || १५९ ||

Aph. 157. Vāmadeva, as well as others, has been liberated, [if we are to believe the Scriptures; therefore] non-duality is not [asserted, in the same Scriptures, in the Vedantic sense].

a. In the Puranas, &c., we hear, ‘Vāmadeva has been liberated,’ ‘Śuka has been liberated,’ and so on. If Soul were one, since the liberation of all would take place, on the liberation of one, the Scriptural mention of a diversity [of separate and successive liberations] would be self-contradictory. ¹

b. [But the Vedánti may rejoin:] on the theory that Souls are many, since the world has been from eternity, and from time to time some one or other is liberated, so, by degrees, all having been liberated, there would be a universal void. But, on the theory that Soul is one, Liberation is merely the departure of an adjunct, [which, the Vedánti flatters himself, does not involve the inconsistancy which he objects to the Sánkhyā]. To this he replies;³

¹ Aniruddha, perhaps has वामदेवादिमुक्तेनाहैतम्.

² पुराणादि भूतं वामदेवा मुक्तं शुको मुक्तं इत्यादि। यदेऽवेदार्थकमुक्तं सर्वस्मुक्तंभेद्युतिवाध्यं स्यात्॥

³ नात्यत्मपक्षेननादि संसारे कदापि कोशिप मुच्यते इति कपेष्ठा सर्वसमूहात्मा स्यात्॥
Aph. 158. Though it [the world,] has been from eternity, since, up to this day, there has not been [an entire emptying of the world], the future, also, [may be inferentially expected to be] thus [as it has been heretofore].

a. Though the world has been from eternity, since, up to this day, we have not seen it become a void, there is no proof [in support] of the view that there will be Liberation [of all Soul{s, so as to leave a void}.]

b. He states another solution [of the difficulty]:

Aph. 159. As now [things are, so], everywhere [will they continue to go on: hence there will be] no absolute cutting short [of the course of mundane things]

a. Since souls are [in number,] without end, though Liberation successively take place, there will not be [as a necessary consequence,] a cutting short of the world. As now, so everywhere,—i.e., in time to come, also,—there

एकात्मपक्षे तूपाधिरिगम एव मेक्ष इति। अचाह।

1 अनादी संसारेष्य यावचून्यताया अद्वेनाज्ञविषयति मुक्तिरिति पक्षे नास्ति प्रमाशम।

2 समाधानान्तरमाह।
will be Liberation, but not, therefore, an absolute cutting short [of the world]; since of this the on-flowing is eternal.\footnote{1}

6. On the theory, also, that Liberation is the departure of an adjunct \([\S\ 157.\ b.]\), we should find a universal void; so that the doubt\footnote{2} is alike, [in its application to either view]. Just as there might be an end of all things, on the successive liberation of many souls, so, since all adjuncts would cease, when [the fruit of] works [this fruit being in the shape of Soul's association with body, as its adjunct,] came to an end, the world would become void,\footnote{3} [on the Vedánta theory, as well as on the Sánkhya].

c. Now, [if the Vedánti says,] there will not be a void, because adjuncts are [in number,] endless, then it is the same, on the theory that Souls are many. And thus [it has been declared];\footnote{4} 'For this very reason, indeed, though those who are knowing [in regard to the fact that Nature}

\begin{quote}
\textit{अनन्तलाबादात्मनं क्रमेन मुक्तीरपि स्यातं- सारोऽत्रेयःपि न स्यात्। इदमेव मिव सवेंच भविष्यत्कालेष्ठपि मुक्तिभविष्यतीति नात्यन्तोऽदेः}
\textit{स्य प्रवाहिनियवलात्॥}
\end{quote}

\footnote{2} Anuyoga, here rendered 'doubt,' rather signifies 'difficulty raised,' 'question.' \textit{Ed.}

\begin{quote}
\textit{उपाधिविगमेव मोक्ष इति पश्चात्पि सवेंच- तामसः इति तुत्येवसनुययः। यथा नानात्मनं}
\textit{क्रमेन मुक्तिः सर्वाचेदतथा कर्मोऽदेः सवेंचाधिन-}
\textit{नाशाजगच्छूत्यं स्यात्॥}
\end{quote}

\footnote{3} The source of the stanza here translated I have not ascertained. \textit{Ed.}
and Soul are different], are continually being liberated, there will not be a void, inasmuch as there is no end of multitudes of souls in the universe.'

\textit{d. Pray, [some one may ask,] is Soul [essentially] bound? Or free? If [essentially] bound, then, since its essence cannot depart, there is no Liberation; for, if it [the essence,] departed, then it [Soul,] would [cease, with the cessation of its essence, and] not be eternal. If [on the other hand, you reply that it is essentially] free, then meditation and the like [which you prescribe for the attainment of liberation,] are meaningless. To this he replies:}

\begin{quote}
\textbf{व्यावृत्ते भूयःहृपः। ॥ १६० ॥}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
1 अभयापापीनामनंतरतालाल शून्यता नानात्म-पक्षे तुष्यलम्। तथा ्च। अत एव हि विद्वे
मुच्यमानेषु संततम्। ब्रह्मेण्डीवलोकानामन-नतालादशून्यता। ॥

2 किमात्मा वदेन मुन्नो वा। वदलेव\textit{स्वरूपस्या-}
प्रचबादनिमित्तक: प्रचवेष्टितत्त्वलम्। मुन्नले वर्षों
भ्यानादिरिति। अत अह। ॥
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
3 This reading I find nowhere, but, instead of it, व्यावृत्ते-
भूयःहृपः, 'Clear of both conditions [i.e., that of being bound and
that of being freed, is Soul, which is eternally free].'

Messrs. Böhtlingk and Roth call Dr. Ballantyne's भूयःहृपः;
'Fehlerhaft für भूयःहृपः.' Their substitute is, so far as I know,
conjectural.

According to most interpreters, however, the preceding Aphorism
has reference to the question whether it be only after Soul is
Soul is ever free. Aph. 160. It [Soul] is altogether free. [but seemingly] multiform, [or different, in appearance, from a free thing, through a delusive semblance of being bound].

a. It is not bound; nor is it liberated; but it is ever free, [see § 19]. But the destruction of ignorance [as to its actual freedom] is effected by meditation, &c.,¹ [which are, therefore, not unmeaning, as alleged in § 159. d.].

b. It has been declared that Soul is a witness.² Since it is a witness [some one may object], even when it has attained to discriminating [between Nature and Soul], there

liberated, or, on the other hand, at all times, that simplicity, or unchanging fixedness, of essential condition (ekārtapāra) is predictable of it.

Introductions to the Aphorism, with expositions of it, here follow.

Vedānti Mahādeva: पुरुषस्य चक्रे पत्तति मोक्षकाल उत्त सर्वदेश्याकाव्यायामाह। Nagesa: पुरुषाः चक्रे पत्तति मोक्षकाल इव सर्वदेश्याय। Vedānti Mahādeva: श्रुतिः मृत्युर्यायेभो ह्यावृत्ते नित्यनिन्वृत्ते उभयरूपे उभे रूपं रूपभेदं इति यात्वद्यास्मात्तथा। Nagesa: पुरुषो व्यावृत्रो नित्यनिन्वृत्तं उभयरूपं भेदं यस्मात् देश्यायः। Also see the commentaries on the Sāṅkhya-kārikā, st. 19; and § 144. a., at p. 162, supra. Ed.

¹ न वर्दे नायं मुष्टे किं तु नित्यमुखः। ऋग्भाष्यनाथस्तु ध्यानादिना क्रियते इति॥

² Vide supra, p. 56, § 54. a., and p. 165, § 148. Ed.
is no Liberation; [Soul, on this showing, being not an absolutely simple entity, but something combined with the character of a spectator or witness]. To this he replies: ¹

\[ ऋषवसंबन्धात्साक्षितम् \ | \ १६१ \]

\[ \text{Aph. 161. It [Soul,] is a witness, through its connexion with sense-organs, [which quit it, on liberation].} \]

\[ a. \text{ A sense-organ is an organ of sense. Through its connexion therewith, it [Soul,] is a witness. And where is [its] connexion with sense-organs, [these products of Nature (see § 61)], when discrimination [between Nature and Soul] has taken place?} \]

\[ b. \text{[Well, some one may ask], at all times of what nature is Soul? To this he replies:} \]

\[ नित्यमुक्तम् \ | \ १६२ \]

\[ ¹ 
\]
The real condition of Soul.

Aph. 162. [The nature of Soul is] constant freedom.

a. 'Constant freedom:' that is to say; Soul is, positively, always devoid of the Bondage called Pain [see §§ 1 and 19]; because Pain and the rest are modifications of Understanding,¹ [which (see § 61) is a modification of Nature, from which Soul is really distinct].

Aph. 163. And, finally, [the nature of Soul is] indifference [to Pain and Pleasure, alike].

a. By 'indifference' is meant non-agency. The word iti [rendered 'finally,'] implies that the exposition of the Nature of Soul is completed.²

b. [Some one may say, the fact of] Soul's being an agent is declared in Scripture. How is this, [if, as you say, it be not an agent]? To this he replies:³

---

¹ नित्यमुख्यां सदेव पुरुषस्य हुः साक्ष्यवन्ध-शृङ्गां हुः सार्वेन्द्रियपरिशासिनामवादित्वार्थः: ||

² चादासीन्यमकर्तव्यम्। इतिशङ्कः पुरुषवर्धेन्त्रतिपादसः मात्रा: ||

³ अत्मनः कर्तृवेष्यते। तत्कथ्यमिति। अत चाह ||
Aph. 164. [Soul’s fancy of] being an agent is, through the influence [of Nature], from the proximity of Intellect, from the proximity of Intellect.

a. [Its] ‘being an agent,’ i.e., Soul’s fancy of being an agent, is ‘from the proximity of Intellect,’ ‘through the influence’ of Nature, [(see § 19),] of which Intellect (see § 61) is a modification.

b. The repetition of the expression ‘from the proximity of Intellect’ is meant to show that we have reached the conclusion: for thus do we see [practised] in the Scriptures, [e.g., where it is said, in the Veda: ‘Soul is to be known; it is to be discriminated from Nature; thus it does not come again, it does not come again’].

1 The translator inadvertently omitted the words ‘through,’ &c.

Ed.

2 चिन्ताचिन्धेन प्रकृत्युपरागादात्मन: कर्तृवं कल्पताभिमानः ||

3 चिन्ताचिन्ध्यादिति वीपसा परिसमानी बुता तथा दृष्टवादिति ||

4 These words are taken from Colebrooke: see his Miscellaneous Essays (Prof. Cowell’s edition), vol. i., p. 249. The original is found, as a quotation, &c., in Vāchāpati Misra’s Tatvā-kaumudi, near the beginning of the comment on st. 3 of the Sāṅkhya-kārikā: 

‘आत्मा वा अरे ज्ञातव: ’ प्रकृतितो विवेकृथः: ’
c. So much, in this Commentary on the illustrious Kapila’s Aphorisms declaratory of the Sānkhya, for the First Book, that on the [topics or] subject-matter [of the Sānkhya system].

न स युनरावर्तते न स युनरावर्ततेऽः Of श्रात्व: there is a variant, दृष्टवः, in one of my MSS. The words प्रमो विं are obviously a gloss; and I have punctuated accordingly. They are preceded, I take it, by one text, and are followed by another. The source of the first has not been discovered. For what is very similar to the second, see the conclusion of the Chādāgga Upanishad. Colebrooke’s ‘thus’ is unrepresented in the Sanskrit as I find it. Ed.

¹ Aniruddha’s is intended, though many passages in the preceding pages are from other commentaries. Ed.

² इति चीकापिलसाध्वतप्रवचनसूचवृत्ती विष-बाध्यायः प्रथमः ||

END OF BOOK I.
BOOK II.

a. The subject-matter [of the Institute] has been set forth [in Book I.]. Now, in order to prove that it is not the Soul that undergoes the alterations [observable in the course of things], he will tell, very diffusely, in the Second Book, how the creation is formed out of the Primal Principle. There, too, the nature of the products of Nature is to be declared fully, with a view to the very clear discrimination of Soul from these. Therefore, according to [the verses], ¹

b. 'Whoso rightly knows its changes, and the Primal Agent [Nature], and Soul, the eternal, he, thirsting no more, is emancipated,'

c. we remark, that, with reference to the character, &c., of Emancipation, all the three [things mentioned in these verses] require to be known. And here, in the first place, with advertence to the consideration, that, if Nature, which is unintelligent, were to create without a motive, we should find even the emancipated one bound, he states the motive for the creation of the world:²

¹ Here add, 'in the Moksha-dharma, &c.; and read, instead of 'we remark . . . . Emancipation;' 'there is the declaration that.'

² The verses quoted are from the Mahâbhârata, xii., 7879, and occur in Chap. cxxvi., in the Section entitled Moksha-dharma. Ed.

शास्त्रस्य विषयोऽनिहृपितः। सामप्रतं पुर्वः
स्थापिताशास्त्रमिलापादनाय प्रकृतिः सूक्ष्मप्रकृति
यामतिविस्तरेण दितीयाध्याये वस्यति। तचैव
The motive for creation. Aph. 1. Of Nature [the agency, or the being a maker, is] for the emancipation of what is [really, though not apparently,] emancipated, or else for [the removal of] itself.

a. The expression 'the being a maker' is borrowed from the last aphorism of the preceding Book. Nature makes the world for the sake of removing the pain, which is [really] a shadow [Book I., § 58], belonging to the Soul, which is, in its very nature, free from the bonds of pain; or [to explain it otherwise,] for the sake of removing pain [connected] by means of but a shadowy link; or [on the other hand,] it is 'for the sake of itself,' that is to say, for the sake of removing the actually real pain [which consists] of itself.¹

¹ कर्तृविविधतेऽपूर्वोऽथायशेषसृष्टादनुष्ठयते। स्व-भावते दुःखवत्साहित्मुक्तस्य पुरुषस्य प्रतिविधि-
b. Although experience [of good and ill], also, as well as Emancipation, is a motive for creation, yet Emancipation alone is mentioned, inasmuch as it is the principal one.

c. But then, if creation were for the sake of Emancipation, then, since Emancipation might take place through creation once for all, there would not be creation again and again; to which he replies:

Successive creation why.  
Aph. 2. Because this [Emancipation] is [only] of him that is void of passion.

a. Emancipation does not take place through creation once for all; but it is [the lot only] of him that has been extremely tormented many times by the various pain of birth, death, sickness, &c.; and, therefore, [successive creation goes on] because Emancipation actually occurs in the case only of him in whom complete dispassion has

1 यथापि मोक्षविद्वागोर्षिपि सूप्तः प्रयोजनं तथापि मुख्यतामोक्ष एवेऽकः ॥

2 ननु मोक्षायं चेतुषुपिति सकृत्तृष्णेऽव मोक्ष-संभवे पुनः पुनः सृष्टिः स्यादिति तथाह ॥

3 For another rendering of the original of a., b., and c., see my translation of the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 62. Ed.
arisen through the knowledge of the distinctness of Nature and Soul: such is the meaning.¹

b. He tells the reason why dispassion does not take place through creation once for all:³

न श्रवणामात्रतिसिद्धिरनादिवासनाय वलव-स्वातः" || 3 ||

\textit{Aph. 3. It is not effected by the mere hearing; because of the forcibleness of the impressions}⁴ \textit{from eternity.}

\begin{itemize}
\item a. Even the hearing \textit{[of Scripture, in which the distinctness of Nature from Soul is enounced,] comes \textit{[not to all alike, but only] through the merit of acts done in many births, [or successive lives]. Even then dispassion is not established through the mere hearing, but through direct cognition; and direct cognition does not take place suddenly, because of the forcibleness of false impressions that}
\end{itemize}

¹ नैकदा सृष्टेमायः सिं तु वहशा जन्ममरण-व्यायामविविधतुः केवलं भृंगं तत्रस्य तत्तत्र प्रकृति-पुरुषेऽविवेकविचारात्मकपरवैराग्यवेच मौक्षो-तत्त्विसिद्धिरित्यथः: "

² सकृत्सृष्णा वैराग्यासिद्धि हेतुमाह "

³ This reading is peculiar to Vijnána, but seems to have some countenance from Nágésa. Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva have

-वासनापद्वलातः. \textit{Ed.}

⁴ \textit{Vásand. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.}
have existed from eternity, but [the required direct cognition takes place] through the completion of Concentration; and there is an abundance of obstacles to Concentration [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book II]: therefore, only after many births do dispassion and Emancipation take place at any time of any one at all: such is the meaning.¹

b. He states another reason for the continuous flow of creation:²

बहुभृत्यवचन प्रत्यक्षम ॥ ७ ॥

Another reason for continuous creation.  
Aph. 4. Or as people have, severally, many dependants.

a. As householders have, severally, many who are dependent upon them, according to the distinctions of wife, children, &c., so, also, the Qualities, viz., Goodness, &c., [Book I., § 61. b.] have to emancipate innumerable Souls, severally. Therefore, however many Souls may have been emancipated, the onflow of creation takes place for the emancipation of other Souls; for Souls are [in number,] without end: such is the meaning. And so the Yoga aphorism [Book II., § 22] says: 'Though it have ceased

¹ अववर्धिनि हस्तजनमहतप्रायेन भवति। ते चापि अववर्धिनामाचारे वैराग्यसिद्धि। किं तु साध्याकारालसाहिकारण्य भूतित न भवाक्यानादिमिथ्या-वासनाय बलवस्यानि तु योगनिध्यया योगे च प्रतिवन्धवाहिन्यमिति। भाटे हस्तजनमभिरेव वै-रागं मौद्रत्व कदाचित्कन्यचिदेव सिद्धतीतियर्थः ॥
² सृष्टिप्रवाहे हेवलरमाह ॥
to be, in respect of him that has done the work, it has not [absolutely] ceased to be; because it is common to others besides him.\(^1\)

\(b\). But then why is it asserted that Nature alone creates, when, by the text, 'From that or this Soul proceeded the Ether,'\(^2\) &c., it is proved that Soul, also, creates? To this he replies:\(^3\)

\[\text{प्रृक्तिवास्तवे क पुरुषवस्याध्यासससिद्धः II 5 II} \]

\(\text{Aph. 5. And, since it [the character of creator,] belongs, really, to Nature, it follows that it is fictitiously attributed to Soul.}\)

\(^1\) यथा गृहस्थानं प्रयोक्तं बहुवा भर्तवी भवति स्वीपुचालिते भ्रं वस्तुस्चार्तिगुणानामापि प्रयोक्ति-संस्यपुरुष विमृणार्थीया भवति। अति: किं-पुरुषार्थक्षेत्रपि पुरुषांतरमौचनार्थं सूर्यप्रवाहे घटते पुरुषाःशास्मानव्यादिविश्वं। तथा च योग-सूत्र कृतां प्रति नद्यमणतं तद्यथासाधारणविद्वृति।

\(^2\) Taittiriya Upanishad, ii., 1. But read: 'From this, from this same self,' &c. Ed.

\(^3\) ननु प्रकृतेरेष्व सन्नुष्टल कथमुच्चते तस्मादा एतस्मादास्तम्न आकाशं संभूत इति शुल्या पुरु-प्लस्वार्थापि सन्नुष्टलसिद्धेरिति तत्तथाः।
a. And, since Nature's character of creator is decided to be real, there is, really, in the Scriptures, only a fictitious [or figurative] attribution of creativeness to Soul.  

b. But then, if it be thus, how is it laid down that Nature's creativeness, moreover, is real; since we are told [in Scripture,] that creation, moreover, is on a level with a dream? To this he replies:  

कार्यंतत्सत्तित्वः। इ० ए।।  

*The reality of Nature's creativeness.*  
*Aph. 6.* Since it is proved from the products.

a. That is to say: because the real creative character of Nature is established just 'from the products,' viz., by that evidence [see Book I., § 110.] which acquaints us with the subject [in which the creative character inheres]; for products are real, inasmuch as they produce impressions and exhibit acts.  

[The reality of eternal things is established here, just as it is by Locke, who says: ‘I think

1 प्रकृत्ता सत्त्वास्य वसुः च सिद्धे पुरुषस्य सत्त्वाध्यायास एव भूतिस्य सिद्धयति।

2 नवपुर प्रकृतावपि सत्त्वं वास्तवमिति कुतोत्सवधृतं सृष्टिः स्वभावितस्वयं भाविक अभावतानि तथाह।

3 Aniruddha alone has कार्यंतत्सत्तित्वः, which reading Dr. Ballantyne at first accepted. *Ed.*

4 कार्यार्थामयं किमं कार्यत्या वास्तववलन का-
God has given me assurance enough as to the existence of things without me; since, by their different application, I can produce, in myself, both pleasure and pain (artha), which is one great concernment of my present state.' These existing products being admitted, the Sánkhya argues that they must have a cause; and, as this cause means neither more nor less than something creative, whatever proves the existence of the cause proves, at the same time, its creative character.]

b. But then [it may be said], on the alternative [see § 1] that Nature works for herself, she must energize with reference to the emancipated Soul, also. To this he replies: 1

चेतनेहेशाश्चिनियम् कस्तकामोशवत् || 9 ||

Aph. 7. The rule is with reference to one knowing; just as escape from a thorn.

Who escape nature.

a. The word chetana here means 'one knowing;' because the derivation is from chit, 'to be conscious'. As one and the same thorn is not a cause of pain to him who, being 'one knowing,' i.e., aware of it, escapes from that same, but actually is so in respect of others; so Nature, also, is escaped by 'one knowing,' one aware, one who has accomplished the matter: to him it does not consist of pain; but to others, who are not knowing, it actually is a cause of pain: such is

रूप स्वरूप कठोरतर अधिकतर स्वरूपोऽन्तः समयं प्रत्ययं सा प्रवर्तत || तत्तवाः ||

1 नन् प्रकृते स्वार्थतवभे मुक्तपुरुषः प्रत्ययं सा प्रवर्तत || तत्तवाः ||
the 'rule,' meaning, the distribution. Hence, also, of
Nature, which is, by its own nature, bound [inasmuch as it
consists of bonds], the self-emancipation is possible; so
that it does not energize with reference to the emancipated
Soul \([§ 6. \text{b}.]\).

b. But then [suggests some one], what was said [at § 5],
that, in respect of Soul, the creative character is only
fictitiously attributed, this is not proper; because it is
fitting, that, by the conjunction of Nature, Soul, also, should
be modified into Mind, &c.; for a modification of wood,
&c., resembling earth, &c., through the conjunction of
earth, &c., is seen: to which he replies:\footnote{1}

\footnote{1} चिति संज्ञान इति व्यत्त्या चेतनायांचारिजः।
यशंकमेव कार्तकं यशेतनासिन्धस्तस्मादेव मुच्चते
तं प्रयेव दुःखात्मकं न भवत्यन्यान्याति तु भवचेव
तथा प्रकृतिरपि चेतनासिन्धाक्षेतार्थादेव मुच्चते
तं प्रयेव दुःखात्मिका न भवत्यन्याननभिज्ञान्याति
तु दुःखात्मिका भवचेवेवति नियमं व्यवस्थेयव्यः।
एतेन स्वभावतो चद्या चेति प्रकृते: स्वेशोऽ
घटत इति। चेति न मूर्खपुष्पं प्रति प्रवर्तति
इति॥

\footnote{2} ननु पुर्वये सर्वत्रसम्भस्माच्यात् यदुक्तं तच
युक्त प्रकृतिसंयोगेन पुर्वस्थापित महदादिपरिश्चा-
माचियाहृद्वी हि पृथिव्यादियोगेन काष्ठादे: पृथि-
व्यादिस्मृत: परिश्राम इति। तचाह॥

2
Aph. 8. Even though there be conjunction [of Soul] with the other [viz., Nature], this [power of giving rise to products] does not exist in it immediately; just like the burning action of iron.

a. Even though there be conjunction with Nature, there belongs to Soul no creativeness, 'immediately,' i.e., directly. An illustration of this is, 'like the burning action of iron': as iron does not possess, directly, a burning power; but this is only fictitiously attributed to it, being through the fire conjoined with it: such is the meaning. But, in the example just mentioned, it is admitted that there is an alteration of both; for this is proved by sense-evidence: but, in the instance under doubt, since the case is accounted for by the modification of one only, there is cumbrousness in postulating the modification of both; because, otherwise, by the conjunction of the China-rose, it might be held that the colour of the crystal was changed.\(^1\)

\(^1\) प्रकृतियोगेश्वरी पुरुषस्य न स्त्रियाः सिद्धिराध्याः साक्षात्। तत्र दृष्टान्तोऽध्यादाहवत्। यथा स्वयं न दर्शनं साक्षाददति विं तु स्वस्युक्ता-गितिवारकमध्यत्मेवेयथः॥ उक्तं दृष्टान्ते तूर्मयोः परिशम: प्रत्यक्षसिद्धवादित्यते संदिग्धस्य लेक्ष्येत् परिशमवने साक्षः परिशमवने गौरवम्। अन्यथा जपासंयोगात्स्फलिकस्य रागपरिशमापन्तेरिति॥
b. It has already been stated [§ 1] that the fruit of creation is emancipation. Now he states the principal occasional cause of creation:

रागविरागयोगः सृष्टि: ॥ ५ ॥

Creation when.

Aph. 9. When there is passion, or dispassion, there is concentration, [in the latter case, and] creation, [in the former].

a. When there is passion, there is creation; and, when there is dispassion, there is ‘concentration,’ i.e., the abiding [of Soul] in its own nature [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 32]; in short, emancipation, or the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle [Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 25]: such is the meaning. And so the import is, that Passion is the cause of creation; because of their being simultaneously present or absent.

b. After this he begins to state the manner of creation:

1 सृष्टि: फलं मेअछ इति प्रागुक्तम् । इदानी

ृष्टेमुख्यं निमित्तकारणमाह ॥

2 Vide infra, p. 211, note 6. Ed.
3 'Simultaneously,' &c., is to render anwayanyatirekau, on which vide supra, p. 43, note 2. Ed.

'रागे सृष्टिवैराग्ये च योगः स्वरूपेऽवस्थानं

मुक्तिरिति यावदय वा चित्रवृक्षिनिरोधं इत्यष्ठे: ॥

तथा चान्वयथातिरिक्तायं रागं सृष्टिकारणमित्याशय: ॥

5 इत: परं सृष्टिप्रक्रियां वच्चुमारभते ॥
Aph. 10. In the order [see § 12. b.] of Mind, &c., [is the creation] of the five elements, [or of the material world].

a. 'Creation' is supplied from the preceding aphorism.

b. He mentions a distinction [between these successively creative energies and the primal one]:

Aph. 11. Since creation is for the sake of Soul, the origination of these [products of Nature] is not for their own sake.

a. 'Of these,' i.e., of Mind, &c., since the creativeness is for the sake of Soul, i.e., for the sake of the emancipation of Soul, the 'origination,' i.e., the creativeness, is not for the sake of themselves; since, inasmuch as they are perishable, they [unlike Nature, (see § 1)] are not susceptible of emancipation: such is the meaning.

b. He declares the creation of limited space and time.

1 Nagesa has, instead of पञ्जः, च. Ed.

3 सृष्टिरिति पूर्वे सृष्टादनुवर्तिते ॥

3 विशेषमाह ॥

4 एषां महदादीनां सष्ट्टस्यात्मार्थवात्युपस्त्र-मोक्षार्थवाच स्वार्थे शारम्भ: सष्ट्टवं विनाशितेन मोक्षायोगागाधिक्यधे: ॥

5 खर्दद्रिक्षालये: सृष्टिमाह ॥

a. The Space and Time which are eternal [and absolute], being the source of the Ether, are, really, sorts of qualities of Nature: therefore it is consistent that Space and Time should be all-pervading. But the Space and Time which are limited arise from the Ether, through the conjunction of this or that limiting object: such is the meaning. By the expression ' &c. ' [in the aphorism,] is meant 'from the apprehending of this or that limiting object.'

b. Now he exhibits, in their order, through their nature and their habits, the things mentioned [in § 10] as 'in the order of Mind, &c.'

Mind or Intellect defined.

Aph. 13. Intellect is judgment.

a. 'Intelect' is a synonym of 'the Great Principle' [or Mind (see Book I., § 71)]; and 'judgment,' called [also] ascertainment, is its

1 निलौ यो दिक्षालो ताबाकाशप्रकृतिभूतै प्रकृतेनुग्रहिविशेषायै। इत्तु दिक्षालो भूतै तत्तदुपाधिक- संयोगादाकाशादृश्येंते इत्यथे। ऋदिशेषनो- पाठियमह्यहार्दिती।

2 इदानी भदादिक्षेत्रेषुकाठास्मृत्ततो धर्म- तथा क्रमेश दश्यायति।
peculiar modification: such is the meaning. But they are set forth as identical, because a property and that of which it is the property are indivisible.\(^1\) And it is to be understood, that this Intellect is 'Great,' because it pervades all effects other than itself, and because it is of great power.\(^2\)

\[b.\] He mentions other properties, also, of the Great Principle:\(^3\)

\[\text{तत्कार्यं धर्मादिः} \quad || ९४ ||\]

_Aph. 14. Merit, &c., are products of it._

\[a.\] The meaning is, that Merit, Knowledge, Dispassion, and Supernatural Power, moreover, are formed out of intellect, not formed of self-consciousness (ahankúra), &c.; because intellect alone [and not self-consciousness,] is a product of superlative Purity,\(^4\) [without admixture of Passion and Darkness].

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\(^1\) See, for a different rendering, the _Rational Refutation_, &c., p. 46. _Ed._

\(^2\) महत्त्वस्य पत्यायं बुद्धिरिति। ऋधवसायसः निष्ठायायक्षलस्यासाधारणी वृत्तिरिल्यथ्यः। समेता
निर्देशस्तु धर्मधम्मेनेदात्। अस्याश्च बुद्धमेहस्वेतरसकलकार्यापकालान्महेश्याच्छ मल्लवाम्।

\(^3\) महत्त्वस्यापरानापि धर्मानाह।

\(^4\) From copying a typographical error, Dr. Ballantyne had, in both his editions, धर्मादिः. _Ed._

\(^5\) धर्मंश्चान्वैराग्येष्यालेष्यिपि बुद्धपादाननकानि
6. But then, if it be thus, how can the prevalence of demerit, in the portions of intellect lodged in men, cattle, &c., be accounted for? To this he replies:¹

अपने प्रयास गार्ग्य पीरि तम् ॥ १५ ॥

Opposite products of intellect.

Aph. 15. The Great one [intellect] becomes reversed through tincture.²

a. That same 'Great one,' i.e., the Great Principle [or intellect], through being tinged with Passion and Darkness, also becomes 'reversed' [see § 14. a.], i.e., vile, with the properties of Demerit, Ignorance, Non-dispassion, and want of Supernatural Power: such is the meaning.³

b. Having characterized the Great Principle, he defines its product, Self-consciousness: ⁴

नाहंकारायुपादानकानि वुढ़ेरेव निरतिशयसत्तकार्यवादित्यर्थ: ॥

¹ नन्वें वर्ण नरपश्चादिगतानां वुढ़ंशानामध्यमावलितम् मुष्यया तत्तताम् । तवाह ॥

² i.e., 'influence.' Ed.

³ तद्वेव महमहतत्त्वं रजस्तमोध्यामुपरागाविपरीतं श्रुतमध्यमाज्ञानविराग्यानेत्र्यमध्यमक्षमध्यमक्षिरोधितां भवतीत्यर्थः: ॥

⁴ महतत्त्वं लक्षयित्वा तत्प्रायमहंकारं लक्ष-यति ॥
Self-consciousness.

Aph. 16. Self-consciousness is a conceit.

a. 'Self-consciousness' is what makes the Ego, as a potter [makes a pot]; the thing [called] the internal instrument (antah-karaṇa): and this, inasmuch as a property and that of which it is the property are indivisible, is spoken of as 'a conceit,' [viz., of personality], in order to acquaint us that this is its peculiar modification. Only when a thing has been determined by intellect [i.e., by an act of judgment (see § 13. a.)], do the making of an Ego and the making of a Meum take place.

b. He mentions the product of Self-consciousness, which has arrived in order:

एकादशपच्चतन्मां तत्कार्यम् ॥ १९ ॥

Product of Self-consciousness.

Aph. 17. The product of it [viz., of Self-consciousness,] is the eleven [organs], and the five Subtile Elements.

a. The meaning is, that the eleven organs, with the

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1 For another version, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 45.

2 ज्ञान वैश्वविज्ञानः कुमारकारवदन्तः करण- द्रव्यं स च धर्मधम्मेष्यदात्मानं इत्युत्साधार- शब्दितासूचनाय। वुधा निनिक्षित एवार्थेशंहंका- रममकारै जायेते ॥

3 क्रमागतमहंकारस्य कार्यमाह ॥

---
five Subtile Elements, viz., Sound, &c., are the product of Self-consciousness.¹

b. Among these, moreover, he mentions a distinction.²

The Mind whence.

Aph. 18. The eleventh, consisting of [the principle of] Purity, proceeds from modified Self-consciousness.

a. The 'eleventh,' i.e., the completer of the eleven, viz., Mind, [or the 'internal organ,'—which is not to be con-

founded with 'the Great one,' called also Intellect and Mind,—alone,] among the set consisting of sixteen [§ 17],

consists of Purity; therefore it is produced from Self-

consciousness 'modified,' i.e., pure: such is the meaning. And hence, too, it is to be reckoned that the ten organs

are from the Passionate Self-consciousness; and the Sub-

tile Elements, from the Dark Self-consciousness.³

b. He exhibits the eleven organs:⁴

¹ एकादःशेषन्द्रियार्थं शब्दादिपञ्चतन्माचं चाहृ

कार्यस्य कार्यमितिः॥

² अभायं विशेषमाह॥

³ एकादशानां पूर्णमेकादशं मनः षोडशा-

त्त्वंगणमध्ये सात्त्विकमतलहैकृतात्सात्त्विकाकार्या

राज्यायतं इत्यथे:। अतः राजसाहंकाराः सेषन्द्रियार्थं

तमसाहंकाराच तन्माचार्थीवनगतव्यम्॥

⁴ एकादशेण्द्रियार्थं दर्शयति॥
Aph. 19. Along with the organs of action and the organs of understanding another is the eleventh.

a. The organs of action are five, viz., the vocal organ, the hands, the feet, the anus, and the generative organ; and, the organs of understanding are five, those called the organs of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. Along with these ten, 'another,' viz., Mind, is 'the eleventh,' i.e., is the eleventh organ: such is the meaning.¹

b. He refutes the opinion that the Organs are formed of the Elements:²

The Nyāya view rejected. Aph. 20. They [the organs,] are not formed of the Elements; because there is Scripture for [their] being formed of Self-consciousness.

a. Supply 'the organs.'³

b. Pondering a doubt, he says:

¹ कर्मनिर्याशि वाक्याशिपादपायणस्थानिः पञ्च ज्ञानिनिर्याशि च चक्षुः शृङ्खलयसनम्यांग्याशिः पञ्च। एते देशामि: सहान्तरं मन एकादशक्मेकादशेनिर्यामिति: ॥

² इद्धियाशिः भृतिभवमतं निरंकरौति ॥

³ इद्धियाशिः शेषोऽः ॥

⁴ ऋशक्तः ॥
Aph. 21. The Scripture regarding absorption into deities is not [declaratory] of an originator.

a. That Scripture which there is about absorption into deities is not 'of an originator,' that is to say, it does not refer to an originator; because [although a thing, e.g., a jar, when it ceases to be a jar, is usually spoken of as being resolved into its originator, viz., into earth, yet] we see the absorption of a drop of water into what, nevertheless, is not its originator, viz., the ground; [and such is the absorption into a deity from whom the Mind absorbed did not originally emanate].

b. Some say that the Mind, included among the organs, is eternal. He repels this:

1 Aniruddha has, instead of -श्रूति:, -श्रुते:. His comment is as follows: कारणे कार्यलय इति स्थितम्। ज्ञादिव्यं च चक्षुग्रं ज्ञातीति देवे लयः श्रूतेः। तस्माचारभक्ष्य नारभकाभिभिमतस्य भूतस्य कारण-लवमिति। Ed

2 देवतासु या लयश्रुतिः सा नारभक्ष्य ना-रभकाविज्ञायिणीथर्गत्यानारभक्ष्येश्वरे भूतले जल-विन्दालेयवर्धनात्।

3 इद्द्रियावलंगं मनो नित्यमिति केचित्।

तत्त्वार्थ हरि।
Aph. 22. [None of the organs is eternal, as some hold the Mind to be; ] because we have Scripture for their beginning to be, and because we see their destruction.

a. All these organs, without exception, have a beginning; for the Scripture says, 'From this are produced the vital air, the mind, and all the organs;' &c., and because we are certified of their destruction by the fact that, in the conditions of being aged, &c., the mind, also, like the sight and the rest, decays, &c.: such is the meaning.

b. He rebuts the atheistical opinion that the sense [for example,] is merely the set of eye-balls, [&c.]:

\[\text{अतीतद्रियमित्रिय भाळानामधिष्ठाने} \]

1 Aniruddha's reading is तदुत्त्यति: चूर्यते विनाश।
2 Mundaka Upanishad, ii., i., 3. Ed.
3 तेषां सचेष्टामेवेविद्रियाशामुपवित्तस्येतस्मावजायते प्राणो मनः सचेष्टामिद्रियाशिवेवेवहावस्यामु चच्चुरा दीनामिव मनसोपपचयादिना विनाशनिषिद्याविद्यतः।
4 गोलकजातमेवेविद्रियस्मिति नालिकमतमपा-करौति।
5 This is taken from my edition, where, however, it is corrected in the corrigenda. See the next two notes. Ed.
Aph. 23. The Sense is supersensuous; [it being the notion] of mistaken persons [that the Sense exists] in [identity with] its site.

a. Every Sense is supersensuous, and not perceptible; but only in the opinion of mistaken persons does the Sense exist 'in its site,' e.g., [Sight,] in the eye-ball, in the condition of identity [with the eye-ball]: such is the meaning. The correct reading is: ['The sense is something supersensuous; to confound it with] the site, [is a mistake].'

b. He rebuts the opinion that one single Sense, through diversity of powers, performs various offices:

शक्तिमेदेदिपि भेदसिद्धा नैकलम् ॥ २४ ॥

Aph. 24. Moreover, a difference being established if a difference of powers be [conceded], there is not a oneness [of the organs].

1 इन्द्रियं सर्वेंसतीन्द्रियं नतु प्रत्यक्षं भान्तानामेव लधिशानं गोलकं तादान्येनन्द्रियोन्मिथ्यर्षः।
लधिशानामिथ्येव पाठः ॥

2 The original of this shows that Vijñāna emphasizes लधिशानं as the true reading. He seems to point to लधिशाने, which Aniruddha has, and, after him, Vedánti Mahádeva. Ed.

3 एकमेवेन्द्रियं शक्तिमेददावहिलक्षणकार्यकार्योमिथ्यति
मततप्याकरोऽति ॥
a. Even by the admission that a diversity of powers belongs to one single organ, the diversity of organs is established; because the powers are, assuredly, organs; therefore, there is not a singleness of organ: such is the meaning.¹

b. But then [it may be said], there is something unphilosophical in supposing various kinds of organs to arise from one single Self-consciousness. To this he replies:²

न कल्पनाविरोधः प्रमाणादृश्यम् ॥ २५ ॥

Aph. 25. A theoretical discordance is not [of any weight,] in the case of what is matter of ocular evidence.

a. This is simple.³

b. He tells us that, of the single leading organ, the Mind, the other ten are kinds of powers:⁴

¹ एकस्येवेन्द्रियस्य शक्तिरेद्वीकारस्यपीन्द्रिययङ्गेद्वेदं सिद्धति शक्तीनामपीन्द्रियवाद्वते नैकाव्यिन्द्रियस्यगृह्ये ॥
² नन्वेक्षाद्वं कारायामिन्द्रियवट्पति कल्पनाय न्यायविरोधः ॥ तथाह ॥
³ Nāgāsa is peculiar in having प्रमाणादृश्यम् Ed.
⁴ सुगमम् ॥
⁵ एकस्येव मुख्येन्द्रियस्य मनसाः स्वयं तथा शक्तिरेद्वेदा इत्याह ॥
Aph. 26. The Mind identifies itself with both

a. That is to say: the Mind identifies itself with the organs of intellect and of action.²

b. Of his own accord, he explains the meaning of the expression 'identifies itself with both.'³

Aph. 27. By reason of the varieties of transformation of [which] the Qualities [are susceptible], there is a diversity [of their product, the Mind] according to circumstances.

a. As one single man supports a variety of characters, through the force of association,—being, through association with his beloved, a lover; through association with one indifferent, indifferent; and, through association with some other, something other,—so the Mind, also, through association with the organ of vision, or any other, becomes various, from its becoming one with the organ of vision, or any other; by its being [thereby] distinguished by the modification of seeing, or the like. The argument in support of this is, 'of the Qualities,' &c.; the meaning being, because of the adaptability of the Qualities, Goodness, &c., to varieties of transformation.⁴

¹ All the commentators but Vijnána here insert े. Ed.
² ज्ञानकेमन्द्रियात्मकम् मन्द: इत्यादि: ॥
³ उभयात्मकमित्यस्यात् स्वयं विवृते ॥
⁴ यथेक एव नरं सङ्क्वशाचारानां भजते का-
b. He mentions the object of the organs of intellection and of action:

हृदादिरममलान्तं उभया: ॥ २५ ॥

Aph. 28. Of both [sets of organs the object is that list of things], beginning with Colour, and ending with the dirt of Taste.

a. The 'dirt' of the tastes of food, &c., means ordure, &c.,3 into which the food, consisting of the quality Taste, &c., is partly transformed.

b. Of what Soul (indra), through what service, these are termed Organs (indriya), both these things he tells us.4

दृष्टवादिरात्मनः कर्णवमिद्रियाणाम् ॥ २५ ॥

मैनीसज्ञात्काम्यकै विरक्तसज्ञातिकौनवसज्ञानय एवं मनाइपि चक्षरादिर्माच्छायादेकी-भावेन दर्शनादिवृत्तिबिशिष्टत्या नाना भवित ।
तथ हेतुगुरुस्वायते गुणानं सत्वादीनां परिशाम-भूतेषु सामथर्यादिविधेऽः ॥

1 ज्ञानकर्मद्रिययोविषयमाह ॥
2 Aniruddha reads, in lieu of -मलः, -गर्गः Ed
3 चारसानां मलः पुरीषादिः ॥
4 यस्येत्रदेय चेनायापकारेितानीन्द्रियाभियुच्यते तदर्भयमाह ॥
The Organs and their possessors.

Aph. 29. The being the seer, &c., belongs to the Soul; the instrumentality belongs to the Organs

a. For, as a king, even without himself energizing, becomes a warrior through his instrument, his army, by directing this by orders simply, so the Soul, though quiescent, through all the organs, of vision, &c., becomes a seer, a speaker, and a judge, and the like, merely through the proximity called 'Conjunction,' because it moves these, as the lodestone [does the iron, without exerting any effort].

b. Now he mentions the special modifications of the triad of internal organs:

चयां स्वालक्षयम् || 30 ||

Differences in the internal organs.

Aph. 30. Of the three [internal organs] there is a diversity among themselves.

1 यथा हि महाराजः स्वयमव्याप्रियमाणागृपि सैन्येन करोणं योगं भवत्याज्ञामाचेर्य प्रेक्षकलन्तः कूटस्थीलपि पुरुषक्षुराद्विन्यलकरणैर्देशः वक्ता संक्षयिता चेलेवमादिभिवति संयोगाल्क्यसाधिधमाचेर्य तेषां प्रेक्षकलादयस्कान्तमाक्षिकविकृति ||

2 इदानीमन्तः करणचयस्त्यासाधारणवृत्तिराह ||
BOOK II., APH. 31.

a. The aspect of Intellect is attention¹; of Self-consciousness, conceit [of personality]; of the Mind, decision and doubt.²

b. He mentions, also, a common aspect of the three:³

सामान्यकरणवृत्ति: प्राणायाम वायुव: पञ्च || 31 ||

A character common to the three.

Aph. 31. The five airs, viz., Breath, &c., are the modification, in common, of the [three internal] instruments.

a. That is to say: the five, in the shape of Breath, &c., which are familiarly known as 'airs', because of their circulating as the air does, these [animal spirits] are the joint or common 'modification,' or kinds of altered form, 'of the instruments,' i.e., of the triad of internal instruments.⁴

b. The opinion is not ours, as it is that of the Vaiseshiki-

¹ Adhyavasayya, rendered 'ascertainment' and 'judgment' at pp. 156 and 196, supra. Also see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 46. Ed.

² बुझेव्यवसायस्यभिमानोर्कारस्य संकल्पविकल्पे मनस इति।

³ चयाखः साधारणिः वृत्तिमयाः।

⁴ प्राणादेहः पञ्च वायुवल्लस्चारताहायवो येप्रसिद्धाति सामान्यासाधारणिः करस्यान्त्यान्तः करणयत्वृत्ति: परिश्रामनेदा इत्यथः।
kas, that the modifications of the organs take place successively only, and not simultaneously. So he says:  

\[ क्षमशोक्षमश्चेदिन्त्रियवृत्ति: \| 32 \| \]

Sensory-impressions, &c., not exclusively successive.

\textit{Aph. 32. The modifications of the organs take place both successively and simultaneously.}

\textit{a. This is simple.}

\textit{b. Lumpiing the modifications of the understanding, with a view to showing how they are the cause of the world, he, in the first place, exhibits [them]:}

\[ चृत्यः पल्चतमः क्षिन्दाकः: \| 33 \| \]

The ideas which constitute the world.

\textit{Aph. 33. The modifications [of the understanding, which are to be shown to be the cause of the world, and] which are of five kinds, are [some of them,] painful and [others,] not painful.}

\textsuperscript{1} वैशेषिकाशास्त्रार्थः नायत नियमा यदिन्त्रियवृत्ति: क्रमशैव भवति नैकेदेत्याह \| 

\textsuperscript{2} सुगमम् \| 

\textsuperscript{3} पिन्दकृत्य वृद्धवृत्ति: संसारनिदानतामृतिपादनाध्यक्तिदेह दशयति \| 

\textsuperscript{4} Literally the same words are found in the Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 5. \textit{Ed.}
a. That the modifications are of five sorts is declared by Patanjali’s aphorism, [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 6 2] 

b. He acquaints [us] with the nature of Soul:

$\text{तत्त्वृत्तावुपशान्तेपरागः स्वस्य: } II 38 II$

* Aph. 34. On the cessation thereof [viz., of mundane influences], its tincture ceasing, it [Soul,] abides in itself.

a. That is to say: during the state of repose of these modifications, it [the Soul], the reflexion of these having ceased, is abiding in itself; being, at other times, also, as it were, in isolation, [though seemingly not so]. And to this effect there is a triad of Aphorisms of the Yoga, [viz., Book I., §§ 2, 3, and 4 6].

1 वृत्तीनां पञ्चप्रकारल पातजलसूचेशेक्रानम् II

3 पुरुषस्य स्वरूपं परिचाययति II


5 तासां वृत्तीनां विरामद्वयं शान्ततप्रम्परिविष्कः स्वस्या भवति कैवल्यं इत्वावत्रापीत्यस्त: ।

6 योगश्रव्यावृत्तिनिरोधः । ‘Concentration (yoga) is the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle.’ तदा

$\text{द्रष्टः स्वरूपेऽस्यानम् } I \quad ‘\text{Then [i.e., at the time of Con-}$
b. He explains this by an illustration:

कुसमवच मणि: ॥ ३५ ॥

Aph. 35. And as [by] a flower, the gem.

a. The 'and' implies that this is the reason [of what was asserted in the preceding aphorism]; the meaning being, as the gem [is tinged, apparently,] by a flower. As the gem called rock-crystal, by reason of a flower of the Hibiscus, becomes red, not abiding in its own state, and, on the removal thereof, becomes colourless, abiding in its own state, in like manner [is the Soul apparently tinged by the adjunction of the Qualities].

b. But then [it may be asked], by whose effort does the aggregate of the organs come into operation; since Soul is motionless, and since it is denied that there is any Lord [or Demiurgus]? To this he replies:

...


Aph. 36. The Organs also arise, for the sake of Soul, from the development of desert.

a. The meaning is, that, just as Nature energizes 'for the sake of Soul,' so 'the Organs also arise;' i.e., the energizing of the Organs is just in consequence of the development of the deserts of the Soul: [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book II., § 13. b.]. And the desert belongs entirely to the investment;¹ [the Soul not really possessing either merit or demerit].

b. He mentions an instance of a thing's spontaneously energizing for the sake of another:²

An illustration. Aph. 37. As the cow for the calf.

a. As the cow, for the sake of the calf, quite spontaneously secretes milk, and awaits no other effort, just so, for the sake of the master, Soul, the Organs energize quite spontaneously: such is the meaning. And it is seen, that,

¹ प्रथानप्रवृत्तिवन्ययुत्तथार्थेः करणोत्त्वद्यां प्रवृत्तिरिंपुरूषेऽर्थाभिन्नथक्षरेऽव भवतीत्वण्डः । चतुष्रेण सापाधेशव ॥

² परार्थं स्वतं प्रवृत्ती ुर द्रष्टान्तमाह ॥
out of profound sleep, the understanding of its own accord wakes up.¹

b. With reference to the question, how many Organs there are, external and internal combined, he says:²

करणेः ³चयोदशविधमवान्तरभेदात् ॥ ३८ ॥

The number of the Organs.

Aph. 38. Organ is of thirteen sorts, through division of the subordinates.

a. The triad of internal organs, and the ten external organs, combined, are thirteen. He says 'sorts,' in order to declare that, of these, moreover, there is an infinity, through [their] distinction into individuals. He says 'through division of the subordinates,' with a reference to the fact, that it is understanding which is the principal organ; the meaning being, because the organs [or functions,] of the single organ, called understanding, are more than one.⁴

¹ यथा वल्सार्थं धैनुः स्वयमेव क्षीरं सक्ति नान्यं यममपेश्ते तथैव स्वामिनं पुरुषस्य कृते स्वयमेव करणानि प्रवर्त्तत्त्व इत्यर्थं। तु दृष्टि च मुष्टान्तस्यमेव बुद्धिलयान्विति।

² वाह्याभ्यातिरिमिलिता कियति करणानीत्याकाशायामाह।

³ The reading of Vedánti Mahádeva, and of him alone, is चयोदशविध वाह्यान्तरभेदात् Ed.

⁴ अन्तःकरणेः दश वाह्यकरणानि मिलिता
b. But then, since understanding [it seems,] alone is the principal instrument in furnishing its object [of emancipation] to Soul, and the instrumentality of the others is secondary, in this case what is [meant by] secondariness?¹ [Why are they said to be instrumental at all?] In regard to this he says:²

इन्द्रियेषु साधकतमादवन्वेयोगाक्तारवत् ॥ ३९ ॥

Efficiency of the Organs whence.

Aph. 39. Because the quality of being most efficient is conjoined with the organs; as in the case of an axe.

a. The quality of the [principal] organ, the understanding, in the shape of being most efficient on behalf of soul, exists, derivatively, in the [other derivative] organs. Therefore it is made out that an organ is of thirteen kinds: such is the connexion with the preceding aphorism.³

चर्यादशः। तेष्वपि व्यक्तिभेदेनानन्यं प्रतिपाद्यितुं विधिमित्युक्तम्। बुद्धिरेव मुख्यं कार्यामित्याश-येनाक्तमवालभेदाक्तिवेद्यव बुध्याक्ष्यकारणस्य कारणानामनेकाविदित्यथः। ॥

¹ Instead of 'in this case,' &c., read, 'what is the character of these [i.e., organs]?' Ed.

² ननु बुद्धिरेव पुरुषार्थसप्तखान्नमुख्यं कारणमन्येषां च कारणां गीत्य तच को गुण इत्याकालह्। ॥

³ इन्द्रियेषु पुरुषार्थसाधकतमलहूपः कारणस्य
b. 'As in the case of an axe.' As, although the blow itself, since it is this that puts an end to our non-posses-sion of the result, is the principal efficient in the cutting, yet the axe, also, is an efficient, because of its close prox-imity to the quality of being the principal efficient, so [here, also]: such is the meaning. He does not here say that Self-consciousness is secondarily efficient, meaning to imply that it is one with the internal organ.

c. Specifying the precise state of the case in regard to the condition of secondary and principal, he says: 

हयोः प्रधानं मनो लोकव्यवहर्षिशु || ८० ||

Aph. 40. Among the two [the external and the internal organs], the principal is Mind; just as, in the world, among troops of dependants.

a. 'Among the two,' viz., the external and the internal, Mind,' i.e., understanding, simply, is 'the principal,' i.e.,

बुद्धगुणः परंपरायाति। अतत्सत्योदस्यविधं करण-मुन्यक्षत्त्र इति पूर्वेष्मूच्छे गुणवयः।

1 कुठारवटिति। यथा फलायोगव्यवस्थितवः प्रहास्यविवच्छिन्तया मुख्यकरणवेदिपि प्रकृ-व्यवस्थानेव गुणानकुठारस्यायः करणं तत्त्व-वस्त्रः। अन्तः करणस्यायंवस्त्रमभिप्रेयांकारस्य गौ-शाकारणवस्त्रमेनान्तः।

2 गौशाकारणवस्त्रमेनान्तः विवास्यं विविष्ठायाः।
chief; in short, is the immediate cause; because it is that which furnishes Soul with its end; just as, among troops of dependants, some one single person is the prime minister of the king; and the others, governors of towns, &c., are his subordinates: such is the meaning. ¹

b. Here the word 'Mind' does not mean the third internal organ;² [(§ 30. a.) but Intellect, or 'the Great One.]

c. He tells, in three aphorisms, the reasons why Intellect [or understanding] is the principal:³

\[ अच्यभिचारात् ॥ ८७ ॥ \]

A reason why Understanding is the principal.

\[ A p h . 4 1 . [ A n d I n t e l l e c t i s t h e p r i n c i p a l , o r i m m e d i a t e a n d d i r e c t , e f f i c i e n t i n S o u l ' s e m a n c i p a t i o n ; ] b e c a u s e t h e r e i s n o w a n d e r i n g a w a y. \]

\[ a . T h a t i s t o s a y : b e c a u s e i t [ u n d e r s t a n d i n g , ] p e r- \]

\[ ¹ इयायोब्हाष्यान्तरोपेन्देये मनो वृड्धिरेव प्रधानं मुख्यं साक्षात् करणमिति यावत्युपेतथमसमपेक्षाबद्धशा भृतयवेलि मध्ये काश्चिदेव लोको राज्यः प्राधान्यो भवतिः च तदुपरस्मजनिभूता प्रामाण्यक्षादयत्वादित्येः। \]

\[ ² छत्र मनोशये न तृतियान्तः करणवाची। \]

\[ ³ बदे: प्रधानान्ते हेतृनाह चिन्मा: सूची। \]
vades all the organs; or because there is no result apart from it.¹

तथाशेषसंस्काराधारवात् ॥ ४२ ॥

Another reason.

Aph. 42. So, too, because it [the understanding,] is the depository of all self-continuance impressions.

a. Understanding alone is the depository of all self-continuance impressions, and not the Sight, &c., or Self-consciousness, or the Mind; else it could not happen that things formerly seen, and heard, &c., would be remembered by the blind, and deaf, &c.²

स्मृत्यानुमानानाच् ॥ ४३ ॥

Another reason.

Aph. 43. And because we infer this [its preeminence] by reason of its meditating.

a. That is to say: and because we infer its preeminence, 'by reason of its meditating,' i.e., its modification in the shape of meditation. For the modification of thought called 'meditation' is the noblest of all the modifications [incident to Soul, or pure Thought, whose blessedness, or state of emancipation, it is to have no modification at all]; and the Understanding itself, which, as being the depository thereof, is, further, named Thought [chittā, from the

¹ सर्वकारायामपकाप्यक्षलाव्यभिचारचेत्यस्य: ॥

² बुधविशिष्कसंस्काराधाराता नतु चतुरादे-रहकारमनस्वार्थो भूष्ट्रादश्याणामसंतबधिराद- 
दिमि: स्मरणानुपपत्ति: ॥
same root as chintā⁷], is nobler than the organs whose modifications are other than this: such is the meaning.⁸

b. But then, suppose that the modification 'meditation' belongs only to the Soul, [suggests some one]. To this he replies:⁹

सूक्ष्म नृत्यि: || ॥ ४४ ॥

Meditation not essential to Soul.

Aph. 44. It cannot be of its own nature.

a. That is to say: meditation cannot belong to Soul essentially; because of the immobility⁴ of Soul; whereas 'meditation' is an effort.

b. But then, if thus the preeminence belongs to understanding alone, how was it said before [at §26,] that it is the Mind that takes the nature of both [sets of organs, in

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⁷ The two words are, respectively, from chit and chint, which are cognate. Ed.

⁸ The two words are, respectively, from chit and chint, which are cognate. Ed.

⁹ The two words are, respectively, from chit and chint, which are cognate. Ed.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
apparent contradiction to the view propounded at § 39]?
To this he replies: ¹

अण्यापेश्यको गुणप्रधानभावः क्रियाविशेषात् \| ॥४५ ॥

Aph. 45. The condition [as regards Soul's instruments,] of secondary and principal is relative; because of the difference of function.

a. In respect to the difference of function, the condition, as secondary, or principal, of the instruments [of Soul] is relative. In the operations of the Sight, &c., the Mind is principal; and, in the operation of the Mind, Self-consciousness, and, in the operation of Self-consciousness, Intellect, is principal² [or precedent]

b. But then, what is the cause of this arrangement; viz., that, of this [or that] Soul, this [or that] Intellect, alone, and not another Intellect, is the instrument? With reference to this, he says:³

¹ नन्वेंबुझरेवप्राथायेकप्रसन्सुभयात्मकल्प्यागुणक्तम्।ततः।

² क्रियाविशेषंप्रतिकर्षणानामापेश्यको गुणप्रधानभावः।चक्षुरा०दिथ्यापारेषु मनः प्रधानं मनोनाथायारं चाहंकारोऽस्तकारायारं च बुझि: प्रधानम्।

³ नन्वस्यपुजस्यायं बुझिरेवकरणंनवद्यंतरविशेषंववस्यातिनिनित्तिकेयाकालंतायमाह।

An organ may be, relatively, principal, or secondary.
Aph. 46. The energizing [of this or that Intellect] is for the sake of this [or that Soul]; because of [its] having been purchased by the works [or deserts] of this [or that Soul]; just as in the world.

a. The meaning is, that, 'the energizing,' i.e., all operation, of the instrument is for the sake of this [or that] Soul; because of [its] having been purchased by this [or that] Soul's works [or deserts]; just as in the world. As, in the world [or in ordinary affairs], whatever axe, or the like, has been purchased by the act, e.g., of buying, by whatever man, the operation of that [axe, or the like], such as cleaving, is only for the sake of that man [who purchased it]: such is the meaning. The import is, that therefore from is the distributive allotment of instruments1 [inquired about under § 45. b.]

b. Although there is no act in Soul, because it is im-

1 Nāgēśa differs from all the other commentators in reading चेष्टा. Ed.
movable, still, since it is the means of Soul's experience, it is called the act of Soul; just like the victories, &c., of a king [which are, really, the acts of his servants]; because of Soul's being the owner [of the results of acts; as the king is of the results of the actions of his troops].

c. In order to make clear the chiefship of Intellect, he sums up,* [as follows]:

**समानकर्मयोगे बुद्धः प्राधान्यं लोकवह्ने-**

कवल ॥ ८९ ॥

**Summing up.**

Aph. 47. Admitting that they [the various instruments of Soul, all] equally act, the preeminence belongs to Intellect; just as in the world, just as in the world.

a. Although the action of all the instruments is the same, in being for the sake of Soul, still the preeminence belongs to Intellect alone: just as in the world. The meaning is, because it is just as the preeminence, in the world, belongs to the prime minister, among the rulers of towns, and the rest, even although there be no difference so far as regards their being [all alike workers] for the sake of the king. Therefore, in all the Institutes, Intellect alone is celebrated as 'the Great One.' The repetition

1. यद्यपि कृत्यतया पुरुषे कर्म नासिति तथा पुरुषमेगदाधनतया पुरुषस्वामिकलेन राज्यं जार्तितेव पुरुषस्य कर्माच्छयते ॥

2. बुद्धः प्राधान्यं प्रकटीकर्तमुष्मं श्रुतिः ॥
[viz., 'just as in the world, just as in the world,'] implies the completion of the Book.  

b. So much for [this abstract of] the Second Book, on the Products of Nature, in the commentary, on Kapila's Declaration of the Sāṅkhya, composed by the venerable Vijnāna Achārya.  

1. यद्यपि प्रस्वार्थेन समान एव सर्वेषां करणा अपारस्तथापि बुद्धिरेव प्राधान्यं लोकवत्। लोके हि राजार्थकंवाविवेषेषपि यामाध्यक्षादिति मध्ये मन्त्रम् प्राधान्यं तदििवत्। ऋत एव बुद्धिरेव महानिति सर्वेशाखिद्धु गीयते इति। वी-पाध्यायसमाप्ति।  

2. इति श्रीविज्ञानाचार्यविनिमित्तिकापिलसाह्य-प्रवचनस्य भाषे प्राधानकांवाध्यायाय हितीति।
BOOK III.

a. In the next place, the gross product of Nature, viz., the great elements and the dyad of bodies, is to be described; and, after that, the going into various wombs, and the like; [this description being given] with a view to that less perfect degree of dispassionateness which is the cause of one's engaging upon the means of knowledge; and, after that, with a view to perfect freedom from passion, all the means of knowledge are to be told: so the Third [Book] commences:

अविशेषाधिशेषारम्भः || 9 ||

The elements whence. Aph. 1. The origination of the diversified [world of sense] is from that which has no difference.

a. 'Which] has no difference,' i.e., that in which there exists not a distinction, in the shape of calmness, fierceness, dulness, &c., viz., the Subtile Elements, called 'the five somethings, simply;' from this [set of five] is the origina-

1 इतः परं प्रधानस्य स्थलकायं महाभूतानि शरीरह्नं च वक्रयं तत्तथं विविधयोनिग्नयादयो ज्ञानसाधनानुपल्लेिपरब्राम्यार्थं तत्तथं परवेिराग्याय ज्ञानसाधनान्यखिल्लानि वक्र्यानीति तृतीयारम्भः ||
tion of 'the diversified,' [so called] from their possessing a difference, in the shape of the calm, &c., viz., the gross, the great Elements: such is the meaning. For, the fact of consisting of pleasure, or the like, in the shape of the calm, and the rest, is manifested, in the degrees of greater, and less, &c., in the gross Elements only, not in the Subtile; because these, since they have but the one form of the calm, are manifest to the concentrated,¹ [practitioners of meditation, but to no others].

b. So then, having stated, by composing the preceding Book, the origin of the twenty-three Principles, he states the origination, therefrom, of the dyad of bodies:²

\textit{The Body whence. }

\textit{Aph. 2. Therefrom, of the Body. }

\textit{a. 'Therefrom,' i.e., from the twenty-three Principles,}

¹ नाति विशेषः शान्तधारमृद्विदिन्यपूर्वः यथा-

\textit{व्यावहारिक भतस्मृतं मृदुत्माधारिकं तस्मात्ताना-

\textit{न्तादिर्पविशेषविहे विशेषाश्च स्तूलानां महा-

\textit{भूतानामार्गम इत्यर्थः। सुखादात्मकं हि शा-

\textit{न्तादिर्पुर्व स्तूलभूतेष्वव तारतम्यादिनिरिनिधय-

\textit{ज्यते न सूक्ष्मसतु तेषां शाल्लक्षणपत्येव योगिज्ञविनि-

\textit{व्यक्तिरिति॥}

² तदेवं पूर्वाध्यायमार्गं चयोविविषितितत्त्वानामुत्तक्षिमुक्ता तस्मात्तानारीरहयोत्पत्तिमाह॥

\textit{The Body whence. }

\textit{Aph. 2. Therefrom, of the Body. }

\textit{a. 'Therefrom,' i.e., from the twenty-three Principles,}
there is the origination of the pair of Bodies, the Gross
[Body] and the Subtile: such is the meaning.¹

6. Now he proves that mundane existence could not be
accounted for otherwise than on the ground of the twenty-
three Principles.²

अभीजान्त्रिक: || 3 ||

Aph. 3. From the seed thereof is
mundane existence.

a. 'Thereof,' i.e., of the Body;
'from the seed,' i.e., from the Subtile one, as its cause, in
the shape of the twenty-three Principles, is 'mundane
existence,' i.e., do the going and coming of Soul take
place; for it is impossible that, of itself, there should be a
going, &c., of that which, in virtue of [its] all-pervading-
ness, is immovable: such is the meaning. For Soul,
being conditioned by the twenty-three Principles, only by
means of that investment migrates from Body to Body,
with a view to experiencing the fruits of previous works.³

¹ तस्मान्येऽविंशितत्वान्त: सूक्ष्मशरीररुपः
स्यार्थः इत्यर्थः: ||

² संप्रेषित कथे विंशितत्त्रवं संसारान्यथा नुपपत्तिः
प्रमाणायेति: ||

³ तस्म मशरीरस्य वीजान्येऽविंशितत्त्वान्यपूर्णान्तः
स्माभिंते: पुरुषस्य संस्तुतिर्गतागते भवत: कूट-
स्यं विभत्या स्वि: गल्यायादसभवादित्यर्थः: ||
b. He states, also, the limit of mundane existence:

अष्टाधविवेकाचः प्रवत्तेनमविशेषाशाखा ॥ ८ ॥

Mundane existence till
when.

 Aph. 4. And, till there is discrimina-
tion, there is the energizing of these,
which have no differences.

a. The meaning is, that, of all Souls whatever, void of
the differences of being Lord, or not Lord, &c., [though,
seemingly, possessed of such differences,] 'energizing,'
i.e., mundane existence, is inevitable, even till there is
discrimination [of Soul from its seeming investments];
and it does not continue after that.

b. He states the reason of this:

उपभोगादितरस्य ॥ ५ ॥

The reason of this.

 Aph. 5. Because of [the necessity of]
the other's experiencing.

a. The meaning is: because of the necessity that the

ब्रह्माविशेषायताः वस्तुतः ति पुनः समस्ते न विवेकपर्यत्नमेव

प्रस्तुतेन विवेकपर्यत्नमेव प्रवत्तेन संस्तिरावश्यकी

विवेकात्त्वम् च न सेव्यः ॥

1 संस्तिरविधिमपाँह ॥

2 इष्टरानोष्ठवतादिविशेषारहितानां सर्ववामेव

पुंसां विवेकपर्यत्नमेव प्रवत्तेन संस्तिरावश्यकी

विवेकात्त्वम् च न सेव्यः ॥

3 तत्र हेतुपांह ॥
other, i.e., that that very [Soul], which does not discriminate, should experience the fruit of its own [reputed] acts.¹

b. He states, that, even while there is a Body, during the time of mundane existence, fruition [really] is not.²

संप्रति परिमुक्तः हाभ्याम् || ७ ||

Soul's bondage only seeming.  

Aph. 6. It [Soul,] is now quite free from both.

a. 'Now,' i.e., during the time of mundane existence, Soul is quite free 'from both,' i.e., from the pairs, viz., cold and heat, pleasure and pain, &c.: such is the meaning.⁴

b. He next proceeds to describe, separately, the dyad of Bodies:⁵

मातापितृतं स्थूलं प्रायश्च इतरच तथा || ८ ||

The Gross and the Subtile Bodies distinguished.  

Aph. 7. The Gross [Body] usually arises from father and mother; the other one is not so.

¹ इतरस्याविवेकिन एव स्वीयकर्मफलभोगाव-शयंभावादित्यर्थः: ||

² देहसशेषपि संसृतिकाले भेगो नास्तीत्तथाह ||

³ Aniruddha has परिष्वज्जो, and comments accordingly. Ed.

⁴ संप्रति संसृतिकाले पुरुषो हाभ्यां शीताशः-मुखद्वारदिनः परिमुक्तः भवतीत्यर्थः: ||

⁵ अतः परं शरीरद्वयं विशिष्य वज्रमुक्तः: ||
a. The Gross one arises from father and mother, 'usually,' i.e., for the most part; for there is mention also of a Gross Body not born of a womb: and 'the other,' i.e., the Subtle Body, is 'not so,' i.e., does not arise from a father and mother; because it arises from creation, &c.: such is the meaning.1

b. He decides [the question], through disguise by which one of the Bodies, Gross and Subtile, the conjunction of the pairs [pleasure and pain, &c.,] with Soul takes place.2

पूर्वालयेत्तकार्येनं भगादेवक्ष्य नेतरस्य || ८ ||

Aph. 8. To that which arose antecedently it belongs to be that whose result is this; because it is to the one that there belongs fruition, not to the other.

a. 'To be that whose result is this,' i.e., to have pleasure and pain as its effect [reflected in Soul], belongs to that Subtile Body alone whose origin was 'antecedent,' i.e., at the commencement of the creation [or annus magnus]. Why? Because the fruition of what is called pleasure and pain belongs only to 'the one,' i.e., the Subtile Body, but not to 'the other,' i.e., the Gross Body; because all are

1 स्यलं मातापितृजं प्रायश्चिति भावल्येनायोनि-जस्यापि स्यलंशरीरस्य स्मरणादितरं सूक्ष्मश-रीरं न तथा न मातापितृजं सर्गाद्वेयस्यन्तव-दिन्यर्षी: ||

2 स्यलसूक्ष्मशरीरायोमध्ये किमुपाधिकं पुरुषस्य बन्धुयोगस्यद्वधारयति ||
agreed that there is neither pleasure nor pain, &c., in aody of earth; such is the meaning.¹

b. He tells the nature of the Subtile Body just mentioned:²

अपि १०. The seventeen, as one, are the
Subtile Body.

a. The Subtile Body, further, through its being container
and contained, is twofold. Here the seventeen, [presently
mentioned,] mingled, are the Subtile Body; and that, at
the beginning of a creation, is but one, in the shape of an
aggregate; [as the forest, the aggregate of many trees, is
but one]: such is the meaning. The seventeen are the
eleven organs, the five Subtile Elements, and Understand-
ing. Self-consciousness is included under Understanding.³

¹ पूर्वः सागृहातुलात्रिवेद्युलिङ्गशारीरस्य तस्यैव
tतत्कार्यां सुखदः सकार्यांकलम् । कतः । एकस्य
लिङ्गदेहस्व तस्य सुखदः साहस्मोगाबालितवस्य श्वाल
शारीरस्य मृतशारीरेः सुखदः साहभावस्य सर्वसंस्मात
तत्त्वादिवर्षः ॥

² उक्तमस्य सृष्टि शारीरस्य स्वप्नपाले ॥

³ सृष्टिशारीरमण्डाधाराधारभावेऽति विविधं भवति। तत्र सम्प्रदाश मिलिता लिङ्गशारीरं तत्वा
सागृही समविरुद्धमकस्मिन् भवतीचर्यः । एकादशेषंट्याधिपः पञ्च तत्त्वारथेऽ वृद्धिकर्ष्यति सम्प्रदाश।
शहंकारस्य वुद्धावेणाभोवः ॥
6. But [one may ask,] if the Subtile Body be one, how can there be diverse experiences accordingly as Souls are [numerically] distinct, [one from another]? To this he replies:

**ब्यक्तिभेदः कर्मविशेषात्། ॥ १० ॥**

_How there come to be individuals._

_Aph. 10. There is distinction of individuals, through diversity of desert._

a. Although, at the beginning of the creation [or annus magnus], there was but one Subtile Body, in the shape of that investment [of Soul (see _Vedānta-sūtra_, § 62.) named] Hiranyagarbhā, still, subsequently, moreover, there becomes a division of it into individuals,—a plurality, partitively, in the shape of individuals;—as, at present, there is, of the one Subtile Body of a father, a plurality, partitively, in the shape of the Subtile Body of son, daughter, &c. He tells the cause of this, saying, 'through diversity of desert;' meaning, through actions, &c., which are causes of the experiences of other animal souls.

4 नानं निल्जं तथापि तस्मात् पुरुषभेदेन विलक्षणा भोगा; स्मुः। तत्वात॥

2 यह यहां तथापि तस्मात् पश्चात्किंभेदाः व्यक्तिपेक्षां-शेताः नानालमपि भवति यथेतदातीमेकस्य पितृ-लिङ्गेदेहस्य नानालम्बंशतो भवति पुष्करणार्दिलिङ्गेदेहपेक्षा। तत् कारणमाह कर्मविशेषादि 'तत् जीवान्तरायां भोगेतुकर्मीदिरित्यथ:॥

3 See, for another rendering, the _Rational Refutation_, &c., p.36. Ed.
b. But then, on this showing, since the Subtile one alone, from its being the site of fruition, is [what ought to be denoted by the term] Body, how is the term Body applied to the Gross one? To this he replies: ¹

Aph. 11. From its being applied to it, [viz., to the Subtile one], it is applied to the Body, which is the tabernacle of the abiding thereof.

a. But then, what proof is there of another body,—other than the one consisting of the six sheaths,—serving as a tabernacle for the Subtile Body? With reference to this, he says: ²

Aph. 12. Not independently [can the Subtile Body exist], without that [Gross Body]; just like a shadow and a picture.

a. That is to say: the Subtile Body does not stand independently, 'without that,' i.e., without a support; as a shadow, or as a picture, does not stand without a support. And so, having abandoned a Gross Body, in order to go

¹ नन्वेव भेगायतनतया लिङ्गस्यैव शरीरले स्थले कथ शरीरव्यवहारः । तथाः ॥
² नन्तु गायितिरिक्षी लिङ्गशरीराधिष्ठानभूते शरीरान्तरे किं प्रमास्मित्या काह्यायामाह ॥
to another world, it is settled that the Subtile Body takes another body, to serve as its tabernacle: such is the import.¹

b. But then [it may be said], of the Subtile Body, since it is limited substance, as the Air, or the like, let the Ether [or Space], without [its] being attached [to anything], be the site: it is purposeless to suppose [its] attachment to anything else. To this he replies:²

मूर्त्तिष्वपि न समातयैगा चररशित् ॥ ९३ ॥

For it must have a material support.

Aph. 13. No, even though it be limited; because of [its] association with masses; just like the sun.

a. Though it be limited, it does not abide independently, without association; for, since, just like the sun, it consists of light, it is inferred to be associated with a mass: such is the meaning. All lights, the sun and the rest, are seen only under the circumstances of association [of the luminiferous imponderable] with earthy substances; and the Subtile Body

¹ तत्तत्त्वश्रीरेण तदृत्तेदधिश्वान बिना स्वातन्त्र तत्त्वत यथा घाया निराधारा न तत्त्वत यथा वा चिन्चमित्यथः: । तथा च स्तूपलेक्ष्य म्युख्य लोकान्तरगमनाय लिङ्गदेहस्त्याधारभूतं श्रीरात्तरं सिध्यतीति भावः ॥

² ननु मूर्त्तिष्वयत्या वायुददिरिव लिङ्गस्त्याकाशमभवास्त्यनाधारारस्तु वषममेयच सध्यकल्पन-भिति । तन्नाह ॥
consists of 'Purity,' which is Light: therefore it must be associated with the Elements.¹

b. He determines the magnitude of the Subtile Body:²

\[ \text{अशुपरिमाणं तत्कृतित्तुरुः:} \] II 14 II

Size of the Subtile Body.

\[ \text{Aph. 14. It is of atomic magnitude; for there is a Scripture for its acting.} \]

a. 'It,' the Subtile Body, is 'of atomic magnitude,' i.e., limited, but not absolutely an atom; because it is declared to have parts. Wherefore? 'For there is Scripture for its acting;' i.e., because there is Scripture about its acting. When a thing is all-prevading, it cannot act; [action being motion]. But the proper reading is, 'because there is Scripture for its moving.'³

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¹ मृत्त्वं रूपं न क्षात्तत्त्वादसङ्कात्त्त्वावस्थानं प्रकाश्यर्प्लेन सर्यस्येव संक्षात्तसङ्कात्त्वादित्ययय:।
   सूर्यादिति संवैश्य तेजासि पार्थिववृत्त्वमीश्नेवा-विश्वितानि दृश्यनि लिङ्गेः च सत्त्वप्रकाशमयम्।
   छत्रो भूतसङ्कात्त्तमिति॥

² लिङ्गेः परिमाणामवधारण्यति॥

³ The reading तद्नतित्तुरुः, on which Vijnána remarks, is accepted by Nágáśa.

Aniruddha is singular in here inserting, as an Aphorism:

\[ \text{न्यायश्चाल्यम प्रपशित इति। Ed.} \]

'तत्त्वाशुपरिमाणं परिशङ्खं नवाल्यलमेण-'
b. He states another argument for its being limited:

\[2\text{तद्वन्नमयःक्षुतिस्व} \parallel \text{सू} \parallel\]

Another proof of this. Aph. 15. And because there is Scripture for its being formed of food

a. That is to say: it, viz., the Subtile Body, cannot be all-pervading; because there is a Scripture for its being partially formed of food; for, if it were all-pervading, it would be eternal. Although Mind, &c., are not formed of the Elements, still it is to be understood that they are spoken of as formed of food, &c.; because they are filled with homogeneous particles, through contact with food;¹ [as the light of a lamp is supplied by contact with the oil].

b. For what purpose is the mundane existence, the migrating from one body to another [Gross] body, of Sub-

¹ Nāgęśa has the reading अच्चो. Ed.
² Aniruddha and Nāgęśa omit the word च. Ed.
³ तत्स्य लिङ्गर्यक्षेपणेऽस्मिन्नमयःक्षुतिस्वेन वि-भुतं संभवतीति विभुते सति नित्यताप्तप्रत्ययः। यद्यपि मन्त्रात्तीते न भैरितकानि तथापाण्यसंसृ- हस्तजातीयाःपूर्वकाद्चमयःक्षुतिवहः वेदां:।
tile Bodies, which are unintelligent? With reference to this, he says:  

पुष्वार्थं सम्पृतिनिर्विधानं सूपकारवद्राजः II ७६ II

Aph. 16. The mundane existence of Subtile Bodies is for the sake of Soul; just like a king's cooks.

a. That is to say: as the cooks of a king frequent the kitchens for the sake of the king, so the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul.

b. The Subtile Body has been discussed in respect of all its peculiarities. He now likewise discusses the Gross Body, also:

पाञ्जभौतिको देहः II ७९ II

Aph. 17. The Body consists of the five elements.

1 अचेतनानां लिङ्गानां किमर्थं सम्पृतिर्देहादेहान तिन्तरं संचार इत्यायायामाह॥

2 यथा राज्ञ: सूपकाराश्चां पाकशालासु संचारो राजार्थं तथा लिङ्गश्रीराश्चां संसृतिः पुष्वार्थं

3 लिङ्गश्रीररमणेिविशेषते వिचारितమ । ఇందులి స్థులశరిరంపితమయిత విచారయిత ॥

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1 The Sankhya Aphorisms.
a. That is to say: the Body is a modification of the five elements mingled.¹

b. He mentions another opinion:²

चातुर्मैतिकमित्येके || १८ ||

Another opinion. Aph. 18. Some say it consists of four elements.

a. This [is alleged] with the import that the Ether does not originate³ [anything].

एकमैतिकमित्यपरे` || १९ ||

Another opinion. Aph. 19. Others say that it consists of one element.

a. The import is, that the body is of Earth only, and the other elements are merely supporters. Or 'of one element' means, of one or other element:⁴ [see the Rosicrucian doctrine in the Tarka-sangraha, § 13., &c].

¹ पञ्चानां भूतानां मिलितानां परिष्रामेन देह इत्यर्थः ||
² मतान्तरमाह ||
³ आकाश्यानार्मभक्तमभिभ्रेत्येदम् ||
⁴ One of my MSS. of Aniruddha omits the word इति Ed.
⁵ पाषिवेद्व शरीरमन्यानि च भूतायपुष्पभ-कमाचारणीति भाव: || ऋषि वैकामैतिककेरुक्नाश- तिकमित्यर्थः ||
b. He tells us what is proved by the fact that the Body consists of the Elements:

\[ \text{न सांसिद्धिकं चैतन्य प्रत्येकादृष्टे: II २० II} \]

\text{Aph. 20. Intellect is not natural \text{[a natural result of organization]; because it is not found in them severally.}}

\text{a. That is to say: since we do not find intellect in the separated Elements, intellect is not natural to the Body,—which consists of the Elements,—but is adventitious.\(^3\)}

\b. He states another refutation\(^2\) \text{[of the notion that Intellect is a property of the Body]}:

\[ \text{प्रपञ्चमरण्यांभावश || २१ ||} \]

\text{A further argument. \text{Aph. 21. And \text{[if the Body had intellect natural to it,] there would not be the death, &c., of anything.}}}

\text{a. That is to say: and, if the Body had intellect natural to it, there would not be the death, the profound sleep, &c., \text{‘of anything,’ of all things. For death, profound sleep, &c., imply the body’s being non-intelligent; and this, if it were, by its own nature, intelligent, would not take}}

\text{\begin{itemize}
\item 1 देहस्य भौतिकवेन यत्सिद्धति तदाह ||
\item 2 भूतेषु पृथक्क्रेतेषु चैतन्यादशेनान्तीतिकस्य देहस्य न स्वाभाविकं चैतन्यं किं लोपाधिक-मित्ययः: ||
\item 3 वाधकान्तरामह ||
\end{itemize}}
place; because the essential nature of a thing remains as long as the thing remains.¹

b. Pondering a doubt, as to the assertion [in § 20], viz., 'because it is not found in them severally,' he repels it:²

मद्यःकिर्रचे प्रक्येकपरितृष्णा सांह्ये तदुद्धःः || २२ ||

An illustrative objection disposed of:

Aph. 22. If [you say that Intellect results from organization, and that] it is like the power of something intoxicating, [the ingredients of which, separately, have no intoxicating power, we reply, that] this might arise, on conjunction, if we had seen, in each [element, something conducive to the result].

a. But then, as an intoxicating power, though not residing in the substances severally, resides in the mixed substance, so may Intellect, also, be; if any one say this, it is not so. If it had been seen in each [constituent], its appearance in the compound might have had place; but, in the case in question, it is not the case that it is seen in each.

¹ प्रपञ्चस्य स्वविभेषा मरणमुष्कचायभावशे देहस्य स्वाभाविकचैतन्येऽसति स्यादिवर्षेः। मरणमुष्कचाच्च देहस्याचेतनता सा च स्वाभाविकचैतन्येऽसति नापपद्यते स्वाभावस्य यायाह्यर्भो विलादिति: ||

² प्रयेकादृष्णे रिति यथाः तचाशक्षुष्प परिहरिति: ||

³ Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahadeva read सङ्क्यालसांह्ये

Ed.
Therefore, in the illustration [of something intoxicating resulting from mixture], it being established, by the Institutes, &c., that there is, in each ingredient, a subtle tendency to intoxicate, it is settled only that, at the time when these combine, there will be a manifestation of the [latent] power of intoxicating; but, in the thing illustrated, it is not established, by any proof whatsoever, that there is intelligence, in a subtle [or undeveloped] state, in the elements separately: such is the meaning.  

b. It was stated [§ 16,] that the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul. In regard to this, he tells, in two aphorisms, by what operation, dependent on the birth of the Subtile Bodies, which means their transmigrations into Gross Bodies, what aims of Soul are accomplished:  

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1 ननु यथा मादकता शक्ति: प्रत्येकद्रायावृत्तिरिपि भिमितद्रये वर्तत एवं चैतन्यमपि स्वादिति चेतन। प्रत्येकपरिद्रूढः सति सांह्ये तदुद्वच: संभवेंप्रकृते तु प्रत्येकपरिद्रूढः नाति। जोते दृष्टान्ते प्रत्येक शास्त्रादिभि: सूक्ष्मतया मादकले सिद्धे सहभावभाष्काते मादकार्थिनाविभावमां सिद्धांत दार्शालिनि: तु प्रत्येकभूतेषु सूक्ष्मतया न केनापि प्रमाणोऽन्निचतन्य सिद्धांतमित्यथः ॥

2 पुष्पार्थं संस्तुतिर्लिङ्गानामित्युक्तम्। तत् लिङ्गानां स्थूलदेहसंचारायुक्तमनो यो य: पुष्पार्थं येन येन येन आपारेऽि सिद्धांति तदाह सूचाभ्यां ॥
BOOK III., APH. 24.

श्लोकमुक्ति: ॥ २३ ॥

Purpose of the Subtile Body's taking a gross one.

 Aph. 23. From knowledge [acquired during mundane existence, comes] salvation, [Soul's chief end].

a. That is to say: by the transmigration of the Subtile Body, through birth, there takes place the direct operation of discrimination [between Soul and Non-Soul]; [and] thence, in the shape of emancipation, Soul's [chief] End.¹

बन्धो विद्यायात् ॥ २४ ॥

Bondage whence.

 Aph. 24. Bondage [which may be viewed as one of the ends which Soul could arrive at only through the Subtile Body,] is from Misconception.

a. Through the transmigration of the subtile body, from misconception, there is that [less worthy] end of soul, in the shape of bondage, consisting of pleasure and pain: such is the meaning.²

b. Liberation and Bondage, [resulting] from knowledge and misconception [respectively], have been mentioned. Of these, in the first place, he explains Liberation [arising] from knowledge :³

¹ लिङ्कसंसृतितो जन्मदारा विवेकायाकारकस्मान्मुक्तिरुपः पुरुषार्थी भवतीत्वर्थैः ॥

² विद्यायात्सूक्तुः खातर्को वन्धंरूपः पुरुषार्थी लिङ्कसंसृतिती भवतीत्वर्थे: ॥

³ ज्ञानविद्यायाभ्यां मुक्तिबन्धावुच्यैः तत्काद ज्ञानमुक्तिः विचारयति ॥
Aph. 25. Since this [viz., knowledge,] is the precise cause [of liberation], there is neither association [of anything else with it, e.g., good works,] nor alternativeness, [e.g., of good works, in its stead].

a. In respect of there being neither association nor alternativeness, he states an illustration:¹

Aph. 26. The emancipation of Soul does not depend on both [knowledge and works, or the like]; as [any end that one aims at is not obtained] from dreams and from the waking state, [together, or alternatively, which are, severally,] illusory and not illusory.

a. But, even if it be so, [some one may say,] there may be association, or alternativeness, of knowledge of the truth with that knowledge which is termed Worship of [the One, all-constitutive, divine] Soul; since there is no illusoriness in this object of Worship. To this he replies:²

¹ समुद्रयविकल्पयोरभावे दृष्टान्तमाह ॥

² नन्वेवमपात्मापासनात्मायज्ञानेन सह तत्स-ज्ञानस्य समुद्रयविकल्पया चातामुपास्यायामार्यि-कवादिति ततचाह ॥
Book III., Aph. 28.

अतरस्यापि नायमन्तिकम् II 27 II

Aph. 27. Even of that other it is not complete.

a. Even of 'that other,' i.e., of the [just-mentioned] object of worship, the non-illusoriness is not complete; because imaginary things, also, enter into [our conception of, and overlie, and disguise,] the object of worship, the [One, all-constitutive] Soul: such is the meaning.¹

b. He states in what part [of it] is the illusoriness of the [object of] Worship;² [just referred to]:

संकल्पयतेऽपेशवम् II 28 II

Aph. 28. Moreover, it is in what is fancied that it is thus [illusory].

a. That is to say: 'moreover, it is thus,' i.e., moreover, there is illusoriness, in that portion of the thing meditated which [portion of it] is fancied by the Mind, [while it does not exist in reality]; for, the object of worship having been declared in such texts as, 'All this, indeed, is Brahma,'³ the illusoriness belongs entirely to that portion [of the impure conception of 'the All' which presents itself, to the undiscriminating, under the aspect] of the world.⁴

¹ इतरस्यापुपास्यस्य नायमन्तिकमाविष्कारे
² पास्यात्मन्यत्तपदाथोरामापि प्रवेशादिवृः II
³ Chhandogya Upanishad, iii., xiv., 1. Ed.
⁴ मनःसंकल्पिते ध्रेयांश एवमपि मायिकल-
b. Then what profit is there in Worship? With reference to this, he declares [as follows]:

Aph. 29. From the achievement of [the worship termed] meditation there is, to the pure [Soul], all [power]; like Nature.

a. Through the effecting of the worship which is termed meditation, there becomes, to the 'pure,' i.e., the sinless, Soul, all power; as belongs to Nature: such is the meaning. That is to say: as Nature creates, sustains, and destroys, so also the Purity of the understanding of the worshipper, by instigating Nature, creates, &c. [But this is not Liberation, or Soul's chief end.]

b. It has been settled that Knowledge alone is the means of Liberation. Now he mentions the means of Knowledge:

1 तद्धुपासनस्य किं फलिमित्याकाठवायामाह II
2 भावनायोपासनानिष्पत्त्या शुद्धस्य निष्पपस्य पुरुषस्य प्रकृतेरिव सर्वस्मृयां भवतीत्वच्छः।
प्रकृतिप्रेरणेन सृष्टिप्रकृतिः करोऽवेचमुपासकस्य वुःसत्त्वमपिः प्रकृतिप्रेरणेन सृष्टिप्रकृतिः भवतीत्त॥
3 ज्ञानेव मोक्षसाधननिमित्त्या व्याप्तिम्। इदानीन्द्रासाधननायाः॥
BOOK III., APH. 32.

रागोपहंतिध्यानम् II 30 II

Removal of obstacles to knowledge.

Aph. 30. Meditation is [the cause of] the removal of Desire.

a. That is to say: Meditation is the cause of the removal of that affection of the mind by objects, which is a hinderer of knowledge.¹

b. With advertence to the fact that knowledge arises from the effectuation of Meditation, and not from merely commencing upon it, he characterizes the effectuation of Meditation:²

चृत्तिनिरोधायतत्तितिद्वः II 31 II

Meditation at what point perfected.

Aph. 31. It [Meditation,] is perfected by the repelling of the modifications [of the Mind, which ought to be abstracted from all thoughts of anything].

a. He mentions also the means of Meditation:³

धारणासनस्वकर्मणा तत्तितिद्वः II 32 II

Practices conducive to meditation.

Aph. 32. This [Meditation,] is perfected by Restraint, Postures, and one's Duties.

¹ ज्ञानप्रतिवन्धक० या विषयोपरागाभ्यात्मक तदुपाधातेतुध्यानमित्यथ: II
² ज्ञाननिध्यपथ्यव ज्ञानोत्तर्विनारभमार्माचेश्या-शयन ज्ञाननिध्यपतेल्लेशैष्माह II
³ ज्ञानस्यापि साधनान्याह II
a. That is to say: Meditation results from the triad, which shall be mentioned, viz., Restraint, &c.¹

b. By means of a triad of aphorisms he characterizes, in order, Restraint, &c.:²

निररोधिन्द्रियविधारणवध्याम् ॥ ३३ ॥³


a. That it is 'of the breath' is gathered from the notoriousness⁴ [of its being so].

b. He characterizes Postures, which come next in order:⁵

स्वर्मसुलभमासनं ॥ ३४ ॥

Postures. Aph. 34. Steady and [promoting] ease is a [suitable] Posture.

a. That is to say: that is a Posture which, being steady, is a cause of pleasure; such as the crossing of the arms.⁶

² वस्माशेन धारणादिच्येष ध्यानं भव-तीत्यर्थः: ॥
³ धारणादिच्यं क्रमासूचवच्येष लक्ष्ययति ॥
⁴ Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahádeva transpose Aphorisms 33 and 34. Ed.
⁵ प्राणस्येति प्रसिद्धा लभ्यते ॥
⁶ क्रमप्राप्तमासं लक्ष्ययति ॥
⁷ यत्स्यं सत्यसाधनं भवति वल्लिकादि तदासनमित्यर्थः: ॥
b. He characterizes one's Duty:

स्वकम स्वास्थमविहितकर्मानुविनाम् ॥ ३५ ॥

One's duty.

*Aph. 35.* One's Duty is the performance of the actions prescribed for one's religious order.

a. Simple.

वैराग्याद्भ्यासाच ॥ ३६ ॥

Knowledge by Concentration here attained.

*Aph. 36.* Through Dispassion and Practice.

a. Simply through mere Practice, in the shape of Meditation, accompanied by Dispassion, Knowledge, with its instrument, Concentration, takes place in the case of those who are most competent [to engage in the matter]: such is the meaning. Thus has liberation through knowledge been expounded.

b. After this, the cause of Bondage, viz., Misconception, declared in [the assertion,] 'Bondage is from Misconception,' [*§ 24*], is to be expounded. Here he first states the nature of Misconception:

1 स्वकम लक्षयिति ॥
2 सुगमम् ॥
3 कवलाभ्यसाध्यानह्यादेव वैराग्यसहिताज्ञानं तस्ताधनयोगश्र भवत्युत्साधिकारिषामित्यथः ॥ तदेव ज्ञानाभ्यासाय प्राक्ष्यातः ॥

'ऋत: परं बन्धे विपर्ययादित्युक्तः बन्धकारः'
विपर्ययभेदः पञ्च || 39 ||

Misconception divided. 

Aph. 37. The kinds of Misconception are five.

a. That is to say: the subdivisions of Misconception, which is the cause of Bondage, are Ignorance, Egoism, Desire, Aversion, and Fear of Dissolution; the five mentioned in the Yoga,¹ [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book II., § 3'.]

b. Having stated the nature of Misconception, he states also the nature of its cause, viz., Disability:²

अश्राविन्दाविन्दित्व तु || 38 ||

The varieties of Disability. 

Aph. 38. But Disability is of twenty-eight sorts.⁵

a. Simple;⁶ [as explained in the Yoga].”

विपर्ययेऽवाहायास्ये तन्त्रादिविपर्ययस्य स्वरुपमाह ||

1 अविद्यासितारागशेषाभिनिवेशा: पञ्च योङो-गोक्षा वन्धेन्तुविपर्ययस्यावान्तरभेदा इत्यर्थः ||

2 The five are there called ‘afflictions’ (klesa). Ed.

2 विपर्ययस्य स्वरुपमुन्द्रा तकाराम्याश्चेत्रेरिप स्वरुपमाह ||

⁴ This word is omitted by Aniruddha and by Vedānti Mahadeva. Ed.

⁶ See, for these, Dr. Ballantyne’s edition of the Tattwa-samdon, § 63. Ed.

⁶ सुगमम् ||
b. In a couple of aphorisms he mentions [those] two, Acquiescence and Perfection, on the prevention of which come two sorts of Disability of the Understanding:¹

तुषिरिन्वथा II ३९ II

Acquiescence.

Aph. 39. Acquiescence is of nine sorts.

a. He will, himself, explain how it is of nine sorts.²

सिद्धिरष्ट्था II ४० II

Perfections.

Aph. 40. Perfection is of eight sorts.

a. This, also, he will, himself, explain.³

b. Of the aforesaid, viz., Misconception, Disability, Acquiescence, and Perfection, since there may be a desire to know the particulars, there is, in order, a quaternion of aphorisms:⁴

ऋवान्तरभेदः पृव्ववत् II ४१ II

¹ यथोविघ्ते बुद्धरश्च ते तुषिरिम्ब्रो मूचः
हयेनाह II

² स्वयमेव नवधायं बहस्यति II

³ एतदपि स्वयं बहस्यति II

⁴ उक्तानां विपर्ययायाः सक्तुषिरिम्ब्रो विशेषज्ञासायां क्रमेयं सूचचतुष्टयं प्रवत्तते II
Aph. 41. The subdivisions [of Misconception] are as [declared] aforetime.

a. The subdivisions of Misconception, which, in a general way, have been stated as five, are to be understood to be particularized 'as aforetime,' i.e., just as they have been declared by preceding teachers: they are not explained here, for fear of prolixity: such is the meaning.

एवमितरस्या: || ४२ ||

Aph. 42. So of the other [viz., Disability].

a. That is to say: 'so,' i.e., just as aforetime [§ 41], the divisions 'of the other,' viz., of Disability, also, which are twenty-eight, are to be understood, as regards their particularities.

Aph. 43. Acquiescence is ninefold, through the distinctions of 'the internal and the rest.'

1 विषयस्यावान्तरभेदे ये सामान्यत: पञ्चो- 
ङ्कालते पूर्वविषयोऽचार्य्येकाङ्क्षातिशेषं विशिष्याव- 
धार्या विस्तरभयानिशोवच्यतं इत्यर्थः: ||

2 एवं पूर्वविषयेकालस्य अन्तःअन्तरभेदे 
अन्तःविशिष्यावतोस्वगत्या इत्यर्थः: ||
1. This aphorism is explained by a memorial verse,\(^1\) [No. 50\(^a\)].

\textit{Jhārāmbi: siddhi: || 88 ||}

Perfection divided. \textit{Aph. 44. Through Reasoning, &c., [which are its subdivisions,] Perfection [is eightfold].}

\(a.\) That is to say: Perfection is of eight kinds, through its divisions, viz., Reasoning, &c. This aphorism, also, has been explained in a memorial verse,\(^2\) [No 51\(^a\)].

\(1\) इदं सूचं कारिक्या व्याख्यातम् ||

2. Quoted below, from the \textit{Sānkhyā-kārikā}. with Mr. John Davies’s translation:

\textit{Sādhyāstikāścataś: prakṛtyupadānanākāla-}\n\textit{bhāgyābhya: ||}
\textit{bāhya viṣayoparamātmaḥ nava tūṣṭyodāmi-}\n\textit{mata: ||}

'Nine varieties of acquiescence are set forth; four internal, named from Nature, means, time, and fortune; five external, relating to abstinance from objects of sense.' \textit{Ed.}

\(3\) ज्ञारिभेदेऽ: सिद्धिद्धथा भवतीत्यथे: || इत-\n\textit{मध्यपि सूचं कारिक्या व्याख्यातम् ||}

4. Here appended, with Mr. Davies’s translation:

\textit{Jah: śabdaśyayān du: śabdaśaśraya: sūṭamārāṇि: ||}
\textit{dānān cha śabdaścaryāścaryā siddha: pūrvokukṣaścaryāścaryā: ||}

'\(1\) The eight perfections (or means of acquiring perfection) are reasoning (\textit{sīha}), word or oral instruction (\textit{sābda}), study or reading (\textit{adhyā-}
b. But then, how is it said that Perfection consists only of 'Reasoning, &c.,' seeing that it is determined, in all the Institutes, that the eight Perfections, viz., [the capacity of assuming] atomic bulk, &c., result from recitations, austerity, meditation, &c.? To this he replies:¹

The enumeration defended.

**Aph. 45.** Not from any other [than what we have just stated does real Perfection arise; because what does arise therefrom, e.g., from austerities, is] without abandonment of something else, [viz., Misconception].

a. 'From any other,' i.e., from anything different from the pentad, 'Reasoning, &c.,' e.g., from Austerity, &c., there is no real Perfection. Why? 'Without abandonment of something else;' i.e., because *that* Perfection [which you choose to call such] takes place positively without abandonment of something else, i.e., of Misconception: therefore [that Perception], since it is no antagonist to mundane existence, is only a semblance of a Perfection, and not a real Perfection: such is the meaning.²

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¹ ननूहादिभिरेव कथं सिद्धिप्रयते मन्त्रसंस्कारं अर्यादिभिरपरिवर्तितादितित पद्धतिः । कृतं इतरहानेन विना यत् सा

² इतरादुहादिपुष्वकानित्याद्वितीयमत्तातिहीनसिद्धि । कृतं इतरहानेन विना यत् सा
b. Now the individuated creation, which was mentioned concisely in the assertion, 'There is distinction of individuals through diversity of desert;' [§ 10], is set forth diffusely:

देवादिप्रभेदः ॥ ४६ ॥

The creation viewed in its parts.

Aph. 46. [The creation is that] of which the subdivisions are the demons, &c.

a. Supply, such is that creation, of which 'the subdivisions,' the included divisions, are the demons, &c. This is explained in a memorial verse, [No. 53].

सिद्धिरितरस्य विपर्ययस्य हानं विनेत्र भवत्तः
संसारापरिपल्लितान्ति सिद्धाभास एव नतु ताक्षिकी सिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

1 साम्प्रतं वर्षक्षेतद्र : कर्मविशेषादिति संक्षेपादुक्ता व्यवहृतिक्रियानि : प्रतिपाद्यते ॥

2 देवादिः प्रभेदादिवाण्तरभेदाः यस्या : सा तथा सृतिरिति गृहं : तदेतकारिकया व्याख्याताम् ॥

3 It here follows, with the translation of Mr. Davies:

अश्वविकस्यो देवलीग्योऽयोहः पञ्चधा भर्वाति ।
मानुष्येकविधः समासतो भौतिकः सर्वः ॥

'The divine class has eight varieties; the animal, five. Mankind is single in its class. This is, in summary, the world (sarga, emanation,) of living things.' Ed.
b. He states that the aforesaid subdivided creation, also, is for the sake of Soul:

अञ्जनह्यसत्त्वपर्यन्तं तत्कृते मृद्धिराविवेकात् \ ॥ ४७ ॥

This creation, also, for Soul’s sake.

Aph. 47. From Brahmá down to a post, for its [Soul’s,] sake is creation, till there be discrimination [between Soul and Nature].

a. He mentions, further, the division of the subdivided creation, in three aphorisms:

ञं तत्कृते सत्त्वविशेषः \ ॥ ४८ ॥

The celestial world.

Aph. 48. Aloft, it [the creation,] abounds in [the quality of] Purity.

a. That is to say: ‘aloft,’ above the world of mortals, the creation has chiefly [the Quality of] Purity.

तमोविशेषः मूलतः \ ॥ ४९ ॥

The infernal world.

Aph. 49. Beneath, it [the creation,] abounds in Darkness.

a. ‘Beneath,’ that is to say, under the world of mortals.

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¹ अञ्जनह्यसत्त्वपर्यन्तं पुष्पवर्षेचमाह ॥
² अञ्जनह्यसत्त्वपर्यन्तं पुष्पवर्षेचमाह ॥
³ अञ्जनह्यसत्त्वपर्यन्तं पुष्पवर्षेचमाह ॥

'मूलतः मूल्याकादाधिक इत्यस्यः ॥'
The world of mortals.

Aph. 50. In the midst, it [the creation,] abounds in Passion.

a. 'In the midst,' that is to say, in the world of mortals.'

b. But then, for what reason are there, from one single Nature, creations diverse in having, affluently, purity and the rest? With reference to this, he says:

Why Nature operates diversely.

Aph. 51. By reason of diversity of desert is Nature’s [diverse] behaviour; like a born-slave.

a. Just by reason of diverse desert is the behaviour of Nature, as asserted, in the shape of diversity of operation. An illustration of the diversity is [offered in the example], ‘like a born-slave.’ That is to say: as, of him who is a slave from the embryo-state upwards, there are, through the aptitude arising from the habit of being a dependant, various sorts of behaviour, i.e., of service, for the sake of his master, so [does Nature serve Soul in various ways].

1 मध्ये भूलैक इत्यर्थः: ||

2 नवेकस्या एव प्रकृते: केन निमित्तेन सत्ता-दिविशालतया विचित्रः सृष्टय इत्याकाद्वाया-माह ||

3 Vásaná. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.

4 विचित्रकर्मीनिमित्तादेव यथेऽला प्रधानस्य
b. But then, if the creation aloft is abundant in Purity [the element of joy], since Soul's object is really thereby effected, what need is there of Liberation? To this he replies:

\[\text{न्यायित्वत्‌ च चैत्यायुचरात्‌ त्वात्‌ यो निधोगास्थेः} \| 52 \|\]

*Why Heaven is to be shunned.*

Aph. 52. Even there there is return [to miserable states of existence]: it is to be shunned, by reason of the successive subjections to birth, [from which the inhabitants of Heaven enjoy no immunity].

a. Moreover:

\[\text{समानं जरामर्यादिः दुःखम्‌} \| 53 \|\]

*Transitoriness of heavenly bliss.*

Aph. 53. Alike [belongs to all] the sorrow produced by decay and death.

चेष्टा कार्ये वैचिबिच्युतपा भवति। वैचिब्रे तृष्णातो गर्भदात्रबिद्धित। यथा गर्भावस्थामार्ब्ये यो दासलस्य भूत्वभासनापाविन नानानाद्वकारा चेष्टा परिचर्थये स्वाम्यें भवति तत्तदित्ययः।

1 ननु चेष्टे सत्सविश्वासा सृष्टिति तर्थि तत्त
एव कृतार्थालयुथमृतम्‌ किं मात्रेवेशिति।

2 किं च।

3 Vedánti Mahádeva has, instead of समानं, सर्वं। *Ed.*

4 Nágę́śa, according to my sole MS., has जरामर्यादिदुः

खम्‌। *Ed.*
a. Common to all alike, those that are aloft and those beneath, beginning with Brahmá and ending with a stock, is the 'sorrow produced by decay and death'; therefore, moreover, it [heaven,] is to be shunned: such is the meaning.\(^1\)

b. What need of more? The end is not effected by absorption into the cause, either; as he tells us:\(^2\)

\[\text{न कारणलयान्तकृतकृत्यता मगनवदुन्यानात्} \] || 54 ||

Absorption into Nature ineffectual. \(\text{Aph. 54.} \) Not by absorption into the cause is there accomplishment of the end; because, as in the case of one who has dived, there is a rising again.

\(a.\) In the absence of knowledge of the distinction [between Soul and Nature], when indifference towards Mind, &c., has resulted from worship of Nature, then absorption into Nature takes place; for it is declared: 'Through Dispassion there is absorption into Nature.' Even through this, i.e., the absorption into the cause, the end is not gained; 'because there is a rising again; as in the case of one who has dived.' As a man who has dived under water rises again, exactly so do Souls which have been absorbed into Nature reappear, [at the commencement of a new annus magnus], in the condition of Lords; because it is

\(1\) ऊँध्यायोगागतानं वह्नादित्सावरान्तानं सर्वे-
\(\text{षामेव जरामरणादिएं दुःख साधारणमभावधिप हैय}
\(\text{इत्यर्थेत्} \) ||

\(2\) किं वहना \(\text{कारणलयादिपि न कृतकृत्यते-}
\(\text{याह} \) ||

impossible that one's Faults should be consumed, without a familiarity with the distinction [between Soul and Nature], in consequence of the reappearance of Passion, by reason of the non-destruction of habits,¹ &c.: such is the meaning.²

6. But then, the cause is not by any one caused to act. Being independent, then, why does she [Nature] make that grief-occasioning resurrection of her own worshipper? To this he replies:³

हृदार्थलेले पत्तोगः पारवशयात् II ⁵⁵ II

Nature free to act, yet guided by an end. Aph. 55. Though she be not constrained to act, yet this is fitting; because of her being devoted to another.

¹ To render sanskāra. Ed.
² विवेकचिदानाभावे यदा महदार्थिशु वैराग्यं प्रकटवासनया भवति तदा प्रकृतिः लोणा भवति वैराग्यात्प्रकृतिलय इति वचनात्। तस्मात्कार्यलयाद्यि न कृत्यतात्सिद्ध भगवदनुभाणात। तथा जले महणः पुरुषः पुनर्हस्तिष्ठ्येवमेव प्रकृतिलीना: पुरुषा इश्वरभावेन पुनर्रविभेवलिनि संस्कृ-रादेरस्येश पुनः रागाभिषेकस्ववेकस्याति विना दृष्टदाहानुपक्षारितमः।

³ ननु तारसं केनापि न कार्यते। स्वतः सा स्वतंत्र कथं भवोपासकस्य हुः भनिदानमुरुषान्य पुनः करोति। तत्रा ह।
a. Though Nature is 'not constrained to act,' not instigated, not subject to the will of another, yet 'this is fitting;' it is proper that he who is absorbed in her should rise again. Why? 'Because of her being devoted to another:' i.e., because she seeks Soul's end. The meaning is, that he who is absorbed in her is again raised up, by Nature, for the sake of Soul's end, which consists in knowledge of the distinction [between Nature and Soul]. And Soul's end, and the like, are not constrainers of Nature, but occasions for the energizing of her whose very being is to energize; so that there is nothing detracted from her independence.¹

b. He mentions, further, a proof that Soul rises from absorption into Nature:²

स हि सर्वविविष्कर्ता || ५५ ||

The gain of absorption into Nature. Aph. 56. [He who is absorbed into Nature must rise again:] for he becomes omniscient and omnipotent [in a subsequent creation].

¹ प्रकृतिर्कार्यविद्यमानेश्वर्यविद्यमानेश्वर्यान्धीनवेशिपि
	तद्योगः पुनर्द्वातिनौचित्यं तदृशीनस्य। कुः।
	पाराबहुपूर्वार्थंतन्वलात्। विवेकश्यात्मित्वं-
	पूर्वार्थवेशेण प्रकृत्या पुनर्द्वायप्तेः स्वलिन द-

tyeyः। पूर्वार्थाद्येव प्रकृतेन्नेत्रकः किं तु
	प्रवृत्तिस्वभावायं: प्रवृत्ता निमित्तानीति न स्तान्तत्त्वाद्यति: ||

² प्रकृतिज्ञात्युत्प्रयवेशयमाने प्रमाणेमकाह ||
a. For 'he,' viz., he who, in a previous creation, was absorbed into the Cause, in a subsequent creation becomes 'omniscient and omnipotent;' the Lord, the First Spirit. ¹

b. But then, if that be so, it is impossible to deny a Lord, [which, nevertheless, the Sāṅkhya seem to do]. To this he replies: ²

इद्देशम्भरसिद्धि: सिद्धा ॥ ५७ ॥

In what sense then is a Lord.

Aph. 57. The existence of such a Lord is a settled point.

a. It is quite agreed, by all, that there is an emergent Lord, he who had been absorbed into Nature; for the ground of dispute [between Sāṅkhya and the rest,] is altogether about an eternal Lord: such is the meaning. ³

b. He expounds diffusely the motive for Nature's creating, which was mentioned only indicatory in the first aphorism of the Second Book: ⁴

¹ स हि पूर्वसंगे कारकालीन: समानते सर्वंवर्तरतंश्च ादिपुरुषो भवति ॥

² Pratisheedha, on which vide supra, p. 112, note 3. Ed.

³ नन्वेदमीतां प्रतिषेधानुपपत्ति: | तत्राह ॥

⁴ प्रकृतिलीनस्य जनाश्वरस्य सिद्धि: सर्वंमंत्रत्र नित्याश्वरस्थैव विवादास्पदादिवयथे: ॥

⁵ प्रधानसूचे: प्रयोजनः हितियाध्यायस्यादिमूचे दिङ्गाचे शोकं विस्तरत: प्रतिपाद्यति ॥
Aph. 58. Nature's creating is for the sake of another, though it be spontaneous; — for she is not the experiencer; — like a cart's carrying saffron [for the sake of its master].

a. But then, it is quite impossible that Nature, being unintelligent, should be, spontaneously, a creator; for we see that a cart, or the like, operates only by reason of the efforts of another. To this he replies:¹

Aph. 59. Though she be unintelligent, yet Nature acts; as is the case with milk.

a. That is to say: as milk, without reference to men's efforts, quite of itself changes into the form of curd, so Nature, although she be unintelligent, changes into the form of Mind, &c., even without the efforts of any other.⁴

¹ ननु प्रधानस्याचेतनस्य स्वतः सत्तवायेव ना-पपद्यते रथादेः परप्रयङ्गेनेव प्रवृत्तिदर्शनादिति ।

तत्रा ह ॥

² यथा शीरं पुरुषप्रयङ्गेन रेपेश्वर स्वयमेव

दधिक्षेत्परिशिमते एवमचेतनवेदिपि परप्रयङ्ग
b. This is not rendered tautological by this aphorism, 'As the cow for the calf,' [Book II., § 37]; because there the question was only of the operation of instruments, and because cows are intelligent.  

Cāmapaḥ  

Aph. 60. Or as is the case with the acts [or on-goings]—for we see them—of Time, &c.

a. Or as is the case with the acts [or on-goings] of Time, &c., the spontaneous action of Nature is proved from what is seen. The action of Time, for example, takes place quite spontaneously, in the shape of one season's now departing and another's coming on: let the behaviour of Nature, also, be thus; for the supposition conforms to observed facts: such is the meaning.  

विनापि महदादिस्थपिरिकाम् प्रधानस्य भवती- 

विचारितवालामान्नता चेतन- 

वाचैति  

'धनुवहल्कायथनेन सूर्येनास्य न पूर्वनुस्तं 

तथ करणप्रवृत्ते रेव विचारितवालारूपां चेतनवाचैति ' 

3 दृष्टान्तान्तरप्रदर्शनपूर्वकमुकार्ष्येहेतुमाह ' 

3 One of my MSS. of Aniruddha has कालादेव Ed. 

'कालादेव कर्मबहा स्वतः प्रधानस्य चेत्तिं
book III, aph. 61.

6. But, still, a senseless Nature would never energize, or would energize the wrong way; because of there being [in her case,] no such communing as, 'This is my means of producing experience, &c.' To this he replies:

स्वभावावृत्तिमनन्मतिः संधानानाज्ञ्यवत् || 67 ||

Nature acts from habit.

aph. 61. From her own nature she acts, not from thought; like a servant.

a. That is to say: as, in the case of an excellent servant, naturally, just from habit, the appointed and necessary service of the master is engaged in, and not with a view to his own enjoyment, just so does Nature energize from habit alone.

सिद्धिति दृष्टिवात्। अथैको गच्चत्तितिर्यां प्रवर्तत इत्यादिहृपं कालादिकमें स्वतं एव भवत्तेवं प्रधानस्थापि चेष्टा स्वाक्षयनाया दृष्टान्तमारितविद्ययः।

1 नन्तु तथापि ममेदं भोगादिसाधनसमिति प्रतिसंधानाभावानुमृहाया: प्रकृते: कदाचित्रप्रवृत्तिरिपि न स्याहिपिरीता च प्रवृत्तिः: स्यात। तबाह।

As here, so again just below, this word renders sanskūra. Ed.

2 यथा प्रकृतभृत्यस्य स्वभावावनस्तक्षरादेव प्रतिनियतावशयको च स्वामिसेवा प्रवर्तते नन्तु स्वभोगाभिमान्येष तथेषव प्रकृतेब्रह्मितं संस्कारादेवेत्यः।

3 यथा प्रकृतभृत्यस्य स्वभावावनस्तक्षरादेव प्रतिनियतावशयको च स्वामिसेवा प्रवर्तते नन्तु स्वभोगाभिमान्येष तथेषव प्रकृतेब्रह्मितं संस्कारादेवेत्यः।
Through the influence of Desert.

Aph. 62. Or from attraction by Deserts, which have been from eternity.

a. Here the word 'or' is for connecting [this aphorism with the preceding one]. Since Desert has been from eternity, therefore, moreover, through attraction by Deserts, the energizing of Nature is necessary and rightly distributed: such is the meaning.

b. It being thus settled, then, that Nature is creative for the sake of another, he tells us, in the following section, that, on the completion of that other's purpose, Liberation takes place through Nature's quite spontaneously ceasing to act:

विविक्तवोधाल्पृत्तिनिवृत्ति: प्रधानस्य सूदव-स्माके || ६३ ||

1 Aniruddha inserts यां after वा. Ed.

2 वाशन्द्रोध समुचवः। यत् कमेनाधातः कमेनिराकर्षणाः प्रधानस्यावशयकी व्यवस्थिता च प्रवृत्तिरत्नयथाः।||

3 See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 36. Ed.

4 Read, instead of 'in the following section,' 'by an enunciation.' Ed.

5 तदेव प्रधानस्य पराप्रयजनसमाभः स्वतं एव प्रधानान्वृत्या मोक्ष: सिद्धितीलायह प्रघट्टेकेन।||
Nature desires when the end is gained.

Aph. 63. From discriminative knowledge there is a cessation of Nature’s creating; as is the case with a cook, when the cooking has been performed.

a. When Soul’s aim has been accomplished, by means of indifference to all else, through discriminative knowledge of Soul, Nature’s creating ceases; as, when the cooking is completed, the labour of the cook ceases: such is the meaning.¹

b. But, at that rate, since Nature’s creating ceases through the production of discriminative knowledge in the case of a single Soul, we should find all liberated. To this he replies:²

इत्यः इतरवचनोक्षातः ॥ ६४ ॥

Liberation of one involves not that of all.

Aph. 64. Another remains like another, through her fault.

a. But ‘another,’ i.e., one devoid of discriminative knowledge, remains ‘like another,’ i.e., just like one bound by

¹ विविक्कपुष्पज्ञानात्मरैराग्येष पुष्पार्थ्येंस-मानी प्रधानस्य सद्दिनिर्वर्त्तितं यथा पाले निर्धने पार्श्वकथ्य य्यापरां निर्वर्त्तं इत्यथः: ॥

² नन्वेत्वमेकपुष्पस्योपाधी विवेकज्ञानोत्सवऽ प्रकृते सद्दिनिर्वृत्ती सर्वेमुक्तिप्रस्थत्तैत्यत: तचाह ॥

³ Aniruddha’s lection of this Aphorism is: इतर इतरतहो-पात्। Ed.
Nature. Why? ‘Through her fault,’ i.e., through the fault which may be described as her not accomplishing that soul’s aim: such is the meaning.  

b. He mentions the fruit of Nature’s ceasing to act:

इयोरेकतरस्य वैदासीन्यमपवर्गे: II ई५ II

Liberation consists of what.

Aph. 65. [The fruit of Nature’s ceasing to act], the solitariness of both [Nature and Soul], or [which comes to the same thing,] of either, is liberation.

a. ‘Of both,’ i.e., of Nature and Soul, the ‘solitariness,’ i.e., the being alone, the mutual disjunction, in short, this is liberation.

b. But then, how would Nature, having attained indifference, through the mood in the shape of discrimination, on the liberation of a single Soul, again engage in creation, for the sake of another Soul? And you are not to say that this is no objection, because Nature consists of different portions, [it is not another Nature, but the same]; because we see, that, even out of the [mortal] constituents of the

1 इतरस्तु विविधवाधरहित इतरवबचवदेव प्रकृत्या तिरहति। कुलः। तद्भावातस्य प्रधानस्येव तत्सुव्यायामसमायमाख्यदािदित्यथे:।

2 सृष्टिनिवृत्ते: फलमाह।

3 हयो: प्रधानपुरुषोरेवैदासीन्यमेकाकिता परस्परविभय इति यावस्तोधपवर्गे:।
liberated person, viz., his dust, &c., things are created for the experience of another. To this he replies:

**व्यर्थते प्रबुद्धज्ञतं स्थविरोगः**

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1. नन्वेकपुस्वावैव विवेकाकारणवस्या विरक्तति: कथमन्यप्रसाधं पुनः सृष्टि प्रवर्तताम्। न च प्रकृततंशंभेदानीषैः देश इति वाच्यं मुक्तपुष्पोपकर्षारिपि पृथिवयादिभिरन्यम्य भेग्यसृष्टिदर्श्यानिदिति। तत्ताह।

2. नागेशा has अन्यसृष्ट्वपरागानम्. Ed.

3. Vijnāna's genuine reading seems to be विरटोत्स. His comment, however, recognizes also विरज्ञतेः, the reading of Aniruddha. One MS. of his work which has been consulted has, like Vedānti Mahādeva, विरमतेः. Nāgēśa has निवर्तेत्तस. Ed.

4. -स्यो, instead of -स्यो, appears to have very little good warrant; and Dr. Ballantyne, indeed, translates इव, not एव. Ed.

5. Of this Aphorism, and of the comment on it, MSS. of Vijnāna's treatise afford a much better text than that here reprinted. In one of its more approved forms, that which Vijnāna seems to elect, the original enunciation runs thus: अन्यसृष्ट्वपरागानम् न विरटोप्रबुद्धज्ञतस्यस्योगः। Furthermore, she [Nature] does not give over effecting creation, with reference to another, [i.e., another soul than that of the spiritual sage, though she creates for such a sage no longer; and she acts, in so doing,] analogously to a snake, with reference to him who is unenlightened as to the real
Aph. 66. Moreover, [when Nature has left off distressing the emancipated,] she does not desist, in regard to her creative influence on another; as is the case with the snake, [which ceases to be a terror,] in respect of him who is aware of the truth in regard to the rope [which another mistakes for a snake].

a. Nature, though, in respect of one Soul, she have desisted, in consequence of discriminative knowledge, does not desist as regards her creative influence on another Soul, but does create in respect of that one; as the snake [so to speak,] does not produce fear, &c., in the case of him who is aware of the truth in regard to the rope, but does produce it, in respect of him who is ignorant [that what

character of the rope' [which is mistaken for it; this illusory snake keeping him constantly in a state of alarm, though it ceases to affect him who has discovered that it is nothing more formidable than a yard or two of twisted hemp]. More closely, so far as regards the construction of the original: 'Furthermore, in like manner as a snake goes on influencing him who . . . . . . [Nature persists] in effecting creation,' &c.

That uparāga, as embodied in the expression ārthikyuparāga, signifies 'causing,' 'effecting,' is the view of both Aniruddha and Vedānti Mahādeva, who define it by karāṇa.

The Aphorism in question, mainly, as just exhibited, together with preferable deviations from the comment as given by Dr. Ballantyne, will be found at p. 13 of the variants appended to my edition of the Sānkhya-pravachana-bhadāhyā. Nāgāsa, following Vijnāna very closely, explains the Aphorism as follows: यथा प्रवृत्तज्ञज्ञचन्तिः प्रति निवृत्तो भयप्रवृत्तज्ञज्ञचन्तिः स्वयम्भियिन्ययथापि परागान्त निरूपत्ति तथा ज्ञातिः प्रति निवृत्तापि प्रकृतिरपयः प्रति सृष्टि प्रवृत्ततियं विद्ययः। Ed.
he looks upon is a rope, and not a snake]: such is the meaning. And Nature is likened to a snake, because of her disguising Soul, which is likened to a rope. Certain unintelligent persons, calling themselves Vedántas, having quite failed to understand that such is the drift of such examples as those of the rope, the snake, &c., suppose that Nature is an absolute nothing, or something merely imaginary. The matters of Scripture and of the legal institutes are to be elucidated by means of this [or that] example offered by the Sánkhyas, who assert the reality of Nature: it is not the case that the matter is simply established to be as is the example;¹ [the analogy of which is not to be overstrained, as if the cases were parallel throughout].

¹ एकसिम्मपुश्चे विविक्तदेवाधाहिरकेमयं प्रधानं
 नायासिम्मपुश्चे सृष्टिपरागाय विरं भवति किं
 तु तं प्रति सृष्टिलय यथा प्रबुद्धज्ञुतस्यप्रेमार्गा
 भयादिकं न जनयति मूहं प्रति तु जनयतेर्वेद्यथः।
 उरगतुत्त्वलं च प्रधानस्य रज्जुजूत्त्वे पृथ्वे समारो-
 पश्चार्दित। एवंविधं रज्जुसपौर्णितृष्णानासामाः
 यमबुझ्वाबुधा: कोचिधसपौर्णुपुष्पं प्रकृतेतप्तस्तु
 तुखलं मनोमाचलं वा तुलयति। एतन प्रकृति-
 सत्यतावदिसाह्यौऽृत्तिज्ञानेन युतिस्मृत्यथा बाध-नीयं
 न केवलं दृश्यतात्वविनायनस्य: सिद्धति॥
Another consideration why Nature should act.

Aph. 67. And from connexion with Desert, which is the cause.

a. ‘Desert,’ which is the cause of creation, in consequence of the conjunction of this, also, she creates, for the sake of another Soul [than the emancipated one]: such is the meaning.¹

b. But then, since all Souls are alike indifferent, inasmuch as they do not desire [Nature’s interference], what is it that here determines Nature to act only in regard to this one, and to desist in regard to that one? And Desert is not the determiner; because here, too, there is nothing to determine of which Soul what is the Desert; [Desert being inferrible only from, and, therefore, not cognizable antecedently to, its fruits]. To this he replies:²

नैरपेश्चेदपि प्रकृत्युपकारेऽविवेकेऽनिमित्तम् \| 68 ||

Nature’s selection how determined.

Aph. 68. Though there is [on Soul’s part, this] indifference, yet want of discrimination is the cause of Nature’s service.

¹ मुख्या निमित्तं यक्षमद स्त्रय कृत्याद्यायपुरुषवृत्ते सृजतीत्यतः \| ।

² नन्द सर्वाय पुरुषाशास्माताय नैरपेश्चेदपिकांचित्रण्येव प्रधानां प्रवर्तेते कांचित्रणिकः च निबर्ततै इत्यच किं नियामकम्। न च करङ्ग नियामकं कस्य पुरुषस्व फिं करेत्यत्रापि नियाम-कामकावादित। तत्राह \| ।
a. That is to say: although Souls are indifferent, yet Nature, just through [her own] non-discrimination, saying, 'This is my master,' 'This is I myself,' serves Souls, towards their eventual emancipation, by creation, &c. And so, to what Soul, not having discriminated herself [there from], she has the habit\(^1\) of showing herself, in respect just of that one does Nature energize; and this it is that determines her: such is the import.\(^2\)

b. Since it is her nature to energize, how can she desist, even when discrimination has taken place? To this he replies:\(^3\)

\[\text{नर्तकीवन्यप्रवृत्तस्थापि निवृत्तिस्वारितारिष्योत्} \text{ II ६९ II}\]

\(\text{Nature energises only till the end is attained.} \quad \text{Aph. 69. Like a dancer does she, though she had been energizing, desist; because of the end's having been attained.}\)

a. Nature's disposition to energize is only for the sake of Soul, and not universally. Therefore is it fitting that

\(^1\) \text{Vāsānā. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.}\n
\(^2\) \text{पुरुषाण्त नैरपेद्यस्ययम् में स्वामयमेवाहमित्यविवेकादेव प्रकृति: सूचादिभिः पुरुषानुप-करोतीत्वथः। तथा च यस्मेव पुरुषायात्मानमविनिविच्च दर्शिति वासना वर्तते त ब्र्येव प्रधानं प्रवर्तत्य इन्द्रेव निर्ममकामिति भावः ॥}\n
\(^3\) \text{प्रवृत्तिस्वभाववत्ताकथय विवेकं कार्यान्ति निवृत्तिर्प्र-पद्धताम् । तत्राह ॥}\n
Nature should desist, though she has been energizing, when the end has been attained, in the shape of the effectuation of Soul’s aim; as a dancer, who has been performing, with the view of exhibiting a dance to the spectators, desists, on the accomplishment of this: such is the meaning: ¹

b. He states another reason for the cessation: ²

दोषवोधेििच्यिन्नोपसर्थिि प्रधानस्य कुलवधुभ- वत् ॥ ५० ॥

This illustrates. Aph. 70. Moreover, when her fault is known, Nature does not approach [Soul]; like a woman of good family.

a. That is to say: Nature, moreover, ashamed at Soul’s having seen her fault,—in her transformations, and her taking the shape of pain, &c.,—does not again approach Soul; ‘like a woman of good family,’ i.e.; as a [frail] woman of good family, ashamed at ascertaining that her fault

¹ पुरुषार्थेमेव प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिस्वभावे नरु सामान्येन। अतः प्रवृत्तिस्वार्थः प्रधानस्य पुरुषा- र्षेऽसमाप्रिकृप्यं चरितार्थे सति निवृत्तिर्युक्ता यथा परिष्ठी! नृत्यदृश्नार्थे प्रवृत्ताया नर्तक्या:स्तलिङ्गा निवृत्तिर्युक्ताय: ॥

² निवृत्ताहेत्यल्लरमाह ॥
has been seen by her husband, does not approach her husband.¹

b. But then, if Nature's energizing be for the sake of Soul, Soul must be altered by Bondage and Liberation, [and not remain the unalterable entity which you allege it to be]. To this he replies:²

नैकान्त्तेऽवन्धमोक्षी पुरुषस्याविवेकादृते ॥ ७१ ॥

Soul's relation to Bondage.

Aph. 71. Bondage and Liberation do not actually belong to Soul, [and would not even appear to do so,] but for non-discrimination.

a. Bondage and Liberation, consisting in the conjunction of Pain, and its disjunction, do not 'actually,' i. e., really, belong to Soul; but, in the way mentioned in the fourth aphorism, they result only from non-discrimination: such is the meaning.³

¹ पुरुषेऽऽरिषाक्षामितबुः सामकलाविदादशदेश-नादिपि लोकसत्ता: प्रकृते: पुनर्न पुरुषं प्रत्यु-सर्पेऽण कुलभूतवद्यथा स्वामिना में देशा दृष्ट इत्यवधारणेन लोकसत्ता कुलभूतं स्वामिनमु-सर्पेऽण तद्वदिश्च: ॥

² See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 61.

³ ननु पुरुषार्थं चेत्त्रान्त्ववृत्तिस्तर्हि वन्धमो-क्षाभ्यं पुरुषस्य परिषाभारतिरिति तत्चाह ॥

⁴ दृ: सुध्यौगवियोगहरूः पुरुस्त्र सत्ता पै-
b. But, in reality, Bondage and Liberation, as declared, belong to Nature alone: so he asserts:

प्रकृतेराज्ञीस्वातसङ्कलात्मक्षुवत् ॥ ७२ ॥

Bondage is really Nature's.

Aph. 72. They really belong to Nature, through consociation; like a beast.

a. Bondage and Liberation, through Pain, really belong to Nature, through consociation, i.e., through her being hampered by the habits, &c., which are the causes of Pain; as a beast, through its being hampered by a rope, experiences Bondage and Liberation: such is the meaning.

b. Here, by what causes is there Bondage? Or by what is there Liberation? To this he replies:

कान्तततसत्वत्: किं तु चतुर्थःसृष्टवस्मानाश्वप्रकारेशाविबेकादेवित्यर्थे: ॥

1 परमार्थतत्त्वू यथेऽकै वन्धमाक्षिन् प्रकृतेरेव-याह ॥

2 Read: 'Bondage and Liberation belong to Nature alone; because to it, in truth, belongs misery.' Ed.

प्रकृतेरेव तत्त्वतो दुःखेन वन्धमाक्षिन् समाद-बादू:स्थाधिनेवर्मात्रिर्भिन्नताय पशु रज्ज्वा लिन्तत्या वन्धमाक्ष्मागी तद्विद्विष्येष: ॥

3 तत् कै: साधनार्वत्म: कैवेस्माच्छ इत्याकाध्य-यामाह ॥

4 तच कै: साधनार्वत्म: कैवेस्माच्छ इत्याकाध्य-यामाह ॥
Aph. i3. In seven ways does Nature bind herself; like the silk-worm: in one way does she liberate herself.

a. By Merit, Dispassion, Supernatural Power, Demerit, Ignorance, Non-dispassion, and Want of Power, viz., by habits, causes of Pain, in the shape of these seven, 'does Nature bind herself' with Pain; 'like the silk-worm;' i.e., as the worm that makes the cocoon binds itself by means of the dwelling which itself constructs. And that same Nature liberates herself from Pain 'in one way,' i.e., by Knowledge alone: such is the meaning.  

b. But then, that which you assert, viz., that Bondage and Liberation result from Non-discrimination alone, is improper; because Non-discrimination can neither be

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1 Nagesa has कोशकारवन्मो Ed.

2 Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva have मोचया येकै द्रुप्तेण Ed.

3 धर्मवैराग्याद्वारा वैराग्यानेत्रेयं: स-प्रभृति श्रव्यामेंद्रुः सुहेतुम: प्रकृतिरत्मानं दुःखेन विभावति कोशकारवकुशकारकृमियेषा स्तनिमिति-नावासेनात्मानं विभावति तद्द्वतः । सैव च प्रकृति-रेक्षेपे ज्ञानेनैवात्मानं दुःखाभ्याच्यतीत्यथः।
quitted nor assumed, and because, in the world, Pain, and its negative, Pleasure, &c., can, themselves, be neither quitted nor assumed: otherwise, [if you still insist on retaining the opinion objected to], there is disparagement of sense-evidence. Having pondered this, he himself [not leaving it to a commentator,] explains what was asserted in the fourth aphorism:¹

निमित्तमविवेकस्य न दृष्ट्यानि: II ७४ II

An objection met. Aph. 74. Non-discrimination is the cause [not the thing itself]; [so that] there is no disparagement of sense-evidence.

a. What was asserted before was this, that Non-discrimination is only the occasion of Bondage and Liberation in souls, and not that Non-discrimination itself is these two; therefore 'there is no disparagement of sense-evidence'; [for, though we see that Pain and Pleasure cannot be directly assumed or quitted, yet we also see that causes of them can be assumed or quitted]: such is the meaning.²

¹ ननु वन्धमुक्तः अविवेकान्तिति यदृः तदप्रभुक्तमविवेकस्याहानुपादेयवाियोवे कुःखस्य तद-भावसुखादेव च स्वतं हेयोपादेयवादम्यः दृष्ट्यानि निरित्याश्रयं चतुर्थसूचित्तं स्वयं निवृताति II

² अविवेकस्य पुश्येषु वन्ध्मोक्तनिमित्तमवेथ पुनः न नववेक एव ताविति नातो दृष्ट्यानि-रित्यथे: II
5. He mentions, among the means conducive to Discrimination, Study, which is the essence of them:  

तत्त्वाभ्यासाचेति नेतीति त्यागासनिवेकसिधः॥ ७५ ॥

Means of Discrimination.

Aph. 75. Discrimination is perfected through abandonment [of everything], expressed by a 'No, No,' through study of the [twenty-five] Principles.

a. Discrimination is effected through study of the Principles, in the shape of abandoning, by a 'No, No,' in regard to things unintelligent, ending with Nature, the conceit [that Nature, or any of her products, is Soul]. All the others [enumerated in the list of means] are only supplemental to Study: such is the meaning.

b. He states a speciality in regard to the perfecting of Discrimination:

अधिकारिप्रभेदाचः नियमः॥ ७६ ॥

1 विवेकम्य निध्यप्रयुपायेषु सारभूतमभ्यासमाह॥
2 प्रकृतियन्त्रेषु जडेषु नेति नेतीत्वाभिमानस्यागस्याभ्यासादिवेकनिध्यपरिभेवति। इतरसारभ्यासस्याद्भामाचमितः॥
3 विवेकसिद्धा विशेषमाह॥
4 Vedánti Mahádeva has अधिकारिप्रभेदाच्. Ed.
Aph. 76. Through the difference of those competent [to engage in the matter at all], there is no necessity [that each and every one should at once be successful].

a. Since there is a division, among those competent, into the sluggish, &c., though study be made, there is no certainty that, in this very birth, Discrimination will be accomplished: such is the meaning. Therefore, every one should, by strenuousness in study, acquire for himself the highest degree of competency: such is the import.¹

b. He states that Liberation takes place solely through the effecting of Discrimination, and not otherwise:²

Aph. 77. Since what [Pain] has been repelled returns again, there comes, even from medium [but imperfect,] Discrimination, experience, [which it is desired to get entirely rid of].

a. But sluggish Discrimination [lower even than the

¹ मन्दाद्धिकारिभेदस्त्राद्भ्यासे क्षयमार्गोन्य-स्मिथेव जन्मनि विवेकनिध्यतिभवतीति नियमो नास्तीत्यर्थः: । ऋत उत्तमाधिकारमध्यासपाटवे-नात्मनः संपाददेशिति भावः: ॥
² विवेकनिध्यस्येव निस्तारो नान्यथेत्याह ॥

² The reading of Aniruddha is नाधितानुवृत्तेमध्यः Ed.
middling variety], antecedently to direct intuition, consists only of Hearing, Pondering, and Meditating: such is the division¹ [of Discrimination].

जीवनमुक्तिः ॥ ७८ ॥

Of Liberation during life. Aph. 78. And he who, living, is liberated.

a. That is to say: he, also, who, while living, is liberated is just in the condition of medium Discrimination.²

b. He adduces evidence for there being some one liberated, though still living:³

उपदेश्योपदेश्यानवात्मसिद्धि: ॥ ७५ ॥

Proof that this may be. Aph. 79. It is proved by the fact of instructed and instructor.

a. That is to say: it is proved that there are such as are liberated during life, by the mention, in the Institutes, on the subject of Discrimination,⁴ of the relation of preceptor

¹ मद्दिविवेकक्तु साधकाकारावधूबं श्रवणमनन्यानमाचर्यप इति विभागः ॥

² The च is omitted by Vedánti Mahádeva. Ed.

³ जीवनमुक्तापि मध्यविवेकावस्था एव भवती-स्वर्यः ॥

⁴ जीवनमुक्ते प्रमाणार्थां ॥

⁵ This I have substituted for 'Liberation,' a mere oversight. Ed.
and pupil; i. e., because it is only one liberated during life that can be an instructor[^1] [in this matter].

**Further proof.**

*Aph. 80.* And there is Scripture.

a. There is also Scripture for there being persons liberated during life.[^2]

b. But then, merely through hearing, too, one might become [qualified to be] an instructor. To this he replies:[^4]

**A suggestion repelled.**

*Aph. 81.* [And not through merely hearing is one qualified to become an instructor]: otherwise, there were blind tradition.

a. That is to say: otherwise, since even a person of sluggish Discrimination [but who, yet, had heard.] would be an instructor, we should have a blind handing down[^5] [of doctrines which would speedily become corrupted or lost].

[^1]: शास्त्रेशु विवेकविषये गृहुशिष्यभावः,वास्त्रा-ज्ञीवनमुक्तसिद्धिरित्यर्जीवनमुक्तविवेकार्त्तिवसं-भवादिति ||

[^2]: None of the commentators but Vijñāna recognizes an Aphorism in these words; and it is very doubtful whether even he does so. *Ed.*

[^3]: च्यूतिरिप्र जीवनमुक्तसिद्धिति ||

[^4]: ननु श्रवणमाचिताध्यायमें स्वयत् । तत्ताह ||

[^5]: इतरथम् मद्विवेकस्यायपदेष्टवेवचन्यपरंतपरार-पतिष्ठितिः ||
6. But then, when, through Knowledge, one's works [which are the cause of mundane existence,] have perished, how can there [still] be life? To this he replies: ¹

चक्रभ्रेणवषृतशरीरः II ॥ ८२ ॥

Aph. 82. Possessed of a body, [the emancipated sage goes on living]; like the whirling of a wheel.

a. Even on the cessation of the action of the potter, the wheel, of itself, revolves for some time, in consequence of the mortal inertia resulting from the previous action. So, after knowledge, though actions do not arise, yet, through the [self-continuant] action of antecedent acts, possessing an energizing body, he remains living, yet liberated;² [and, if he did not, but if every one who gained true knowledge were, on gaining it, to disappear, true knowledge would cease to be handed down orally; and Kapila, probably, did not contemplate books, or did not think these a secure depository of the doctrine]: such is the meaning.³

¹ ननु ज्ञातेन कर्मक्षये सति कथं जीवनं स्वातः।
तत्ताह ॥

² For another rendering, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 31. Ed.

³ कुलालकर्मनिवृत्तावपि पूर्वकर्मबेगास्वयं-
मेव कियंलां च भक्ति। एवं ज्ञातेत्तरं कर्मि-
नुष्ठानावपि प्रारम्भकर्मेगेन चेत्तमानं शरीरं धृता 
जीवनमुक्तिस्वतीत्तथः। ॥
b. But then, since the continuance of experience, &c., is put an end to by that 'Meditation with distinct recognition of the object,' which [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 17,] is the cause of knowledge, how can one retain a body? To this he replies:

Aph. 83. This [retention of a body] is occasioned by the least vestige of impression.

a. That is to say: the retention of a body is caused by even the least remains of those impressions of objects which are the causes of having a body.

b. He recapitulates the sense of the declarations of the Institute:

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1 Védánta. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.

2 Which here follows, with Dr. Ballantyne's translation: वितर्कविचारान्नासितावतुगमालसङ्ग्रामः । ['Meditation, of the kind called] that in which there is distinct recognition [arises, in its fourfold shape,] from the attendance of (1) argumentation (vittarka), (2) deliberation (vichāra), (3) beatitude (ānanda), and (4) egotism (asmita). Ed.

3 ननु ज्ञानेषुसंप्राप्तयोगेन भेगादिवासनायः कथं शरीरधारायम् । तत्तच ॥

4 This is to render the technicality sanskāra. Ed.

5 शरीरधारायणेष्वा च विचारस्कारात्लेष्वामः

6 यास्तवान्वार्यंमुपसंहरति ॥

śaścārāyāṃ mūparthaś.
Recapitulation. Aph. 84. That which was to be done has been done, when entire Cessation of Pain has resulted from Discrimination; not otherwise, not otherwise.

a. So much for the Third Book, on Dispassion.  

1 Vijnana, according to some copies of his work, has कृतकृत्यो, the preferable reading, and that of all the other commentators known to me. Ed.

2 इति वैराग्याध्यायस्तृतीयः ॥

END OF BOOK III.
BOOK IV.

Now, by means of a collection of narratives, recognized in the Institutes, the means of discriminative knowledge are to be displayed: so, for this purpose the Fourth Book is commenced.

राजपुचबवनस्योपदेशात् ॥ १ ॥

Aph. 1. As in the case of the king's son, from instruction as to the truth [comes discrimination between Soul and Nature].

a. 'Discrimination' is supplied from the concluding aphorism of the preceding section. The meaning is: as, in the case of the king's son, discrimination is produced by instruction as to the truth. The story, here, is as follows: A certain king's son, in consequence of his being born under the [unlucky] star of the tenth portion [of the twenty-seven portions into which the ecliptic is divided], having been expelled from his city, and reared by a certain forester, remains under the idea, that 'I am a forester.' Having learned that he is alive, a certain minister informs him: 'Thou art not a forester; thou art a king's son.'

शास्त्रसिद्धांख्यायिकाजातमुखेनेदानीं विवेकानन्दानां प्रदर्शनीयानीये चतुर्थम्य भास्ये ॥

2 The Sanskrit yields 'under the star [named] Ganda.' Ed.
As he, immediately, having abandoned the idea of his being an outcast, betakes himself to his true royal state, saying, 'I am a king,' so, too, it [the Soul], in consequence of the instruction of some kind person, to the effect that 'Thou, who didst originate from the First Soul, which manifests itself merely as pure Thought, art [thyself,] a portion thereof,' having abandoned the idea of its being Nature [or of being something material or phenomenal], rests simply upon its own nature, saying, 'Since I am the son of Brahmá, I am, myself, Brahmá, and not something mundane, different therefrom:' such is the meaning.¹

b. He exhibits another story, to prove that even women,

¹ पूर्वपादोपाद्यूक्तस्मृति राजपुरञ्चरस्येव तत्स्थोपदेशाविवेको जायत इत्यर्थः। ययमायायायिकः काछिद्राजुपुरो गराइकृजनमना पुराणिः सारितः शब्रेश केनचित्योषितोस्तंश शब्र इत्यभिमन्यमान चाले। तं जीवलं ज्ञातं काछि दमाय्यः प्रविभयति न तं शब्रो राजपुरुषीति। स यषा भृत्येव चारालाभिमां त्यञ्जा तात्स्तिकं राजभावमेवालचते राजाहस्मीत्येव- मेवा दिपुष्पात्यिरपृष्टिं चिन्तित्वाचवेनाभिभव्याकृत्य- शब्रं तस्यायं इति कारणिको पदेशाः प्रकृत्यभिमां त्यञ्जा ब्रह्मपुरुषालाभमि ब्रह्मव नतु तद्विलक्ष्यः। संसारित्येव श्वस्त्रहुपमेवालचत इत्यर्थः॥
Sudras, &c., may gain the [one desirable] end, through a Brâhman, by hearing the instructions of a Brâhman:  

Aph. 2. As in the case of the goblin, even when the instruction was for the sake of another, [the chance hearer may be benefited].

a. That is to say: though the instruction in regard to the truth was being delivered, by the venerable Krishna, for Arjuna's benefit, knowledge of the distinction [between Soul and Nature] was produced in the case of a goblin standing near [and overhearing the discourse]: and so it may happen in the case of others, too.

b. And, if knowledge is not produced from once instructing, then a repetition of the instruction is to be made; to which effect he adduces another story:

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1 स्लीष्ट्रादयोशीप ब्राह्मणे ब्राह्मणस्योपदेशं 

2 अर्जुनाधि भ्रीकृष्णो तत्त्वोपदेशो ज्ञानमापरी

3 यदि च सक्रत्पदेशाज्ञानं न जायते तदोपदेशाः

4 शाख्वृत्तिरिपि कर्त्येतीतिहासान्तरमाहः
Aph. 3. Repetition [is to be made], if not, from once instructing, [the end be gained].

a. That is to say: a repetition of instruction, also, is to be made; because, in the Chhândogya [Upanishad],¹ and the like, there is mention of Aruni, and others, as having more than once instructed Śvetaketu and others.²

b. With a view to the removal of desire, he sets forth, with an illustration, the fragility, &c., of Soul’s accompaniments:³

Aph. 4. As in the case of father and son; since both are seen; [the one, to die, and the other, to be born].

a. That is to say: Discrimination takes place, through dispassion, in consequence of its being inferred, in respect of one’s own self, also, that there is death and birth; since these are seen in the case of father and son. This has

¹ VI., i., &c. Ed.
² उपदेशारूढिरिप कर्तव्या झान्दोग्यादी शेत-केलादिकं प्रत्यासिष्यभूतिनामसकृदुपदेशेतिहासादियथः: ||
³ वैराग्यार्थं निदर्शनपूर्वकमात्मसंघातस्य भक्त-लादिकं प्रतिपाद्यति ||
been stated as follows: 'The coming into being, and the departure, of Soul [entangled in Nature],¹ may be inferred from [the case of] father and son.²

b. He next explains, by illustrative stories, the subservients to the perfecting of knowledge in him in whom knowledge has arisen, and who is devoid of passion:³

श्वेनवत्सुखदृष्टि त्यागविरोधाभायम् ॥ ५ ॥

Aph. 5. One experiences pleasure or pain [alternatively], from [voluntary] abandonment or [forcible] separation; as in the case of a hawk.

a. That is to say: since people become happy by the abandonment of things, and unhappy by [forcible] separation from them, acceptance of them ought not to be made; 'as in the case of a hawk.'⁴ For a hawk, when he has food [before him], if he be driven away ⁵ by any one, is grieved

¹ Read, instead of ' of Soul,' &c., ' of one's self.' Ed.
² स्त्रयं पितापुत्रगृहीतात्मनोक्षिपि मरणोत्तर-स्थोर्तवत्तवनुमितवाहैराग्येश विवेको भवती-न्यथः। तदुक्तम्। ज्ञात्मनः पितृपुपाभ्यामनुमंचेयाभवायाविवित ॥
³ इतः परमुप्तचतुर्स्व विरूक्तत्व च ज्ञान-निष्प्रस्थे ज्ञानाभ्यायायिक्षकद्वालेदेश्वरे ॥
⁴ See the Mahābhārata, xii., 6648. Ed.
⁵ Read, ' molested ' (upahatya). Dr. Ballantyne followed an error of the press, apahatya, which he did not observe that I had pointed
at being separated from the food; [but] if, of his own accord, he leaves it, then he is free from grief.¹

Śrīnिर्वैयनीवत् ॥ ६ ॥

_How Soul ought to abandon Nature._  _Aph. 6. As in the case of a snake and its skin._

_a. That is to say: as a snake readily abandons its old skin, from knowing that it ought to be quitted, just so he who desires liberation should abandon Nature, experienced through a long period, and effete, when he knows that it ought to be quitted. Thus it has been said: 'As a snake... its old skin,' &c._²

out in the corrigenda to my edition of the _Śāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāṣya._ _Ed._

¹ परिमहो न कर्तेभो यतो द्रव्याशां त्यागेन लोकः सुखी वियोगेन च दुःखी भवति श्येनव-दिल्यम्। श्येमो हि सामिषः केनापूपह्यामिषाहिंगोऽि दुःखी क्रियते स्वयं चेत्यजति तदा दुःखा-हिमयन्ते ॥

² Two of my MSS. have _निर्वैयनीः_; the rest, _नि-\_न्यनीः_. I have restored the etymological form of the word. _Ed_

³ यथाहितीश्च तयं परित्यज्यन्यायासेन हेर्य-वुध्या तथेव मुमुक्षुः प्रकृतिः वहकालोपभुज्ञं जी-शां हेर्यवुধ्यम व्यर्तिदिल्यम्। तदुक्तम् । जीशां लच्चिनिवोरग इति ॥
b. And, when abandoned, he should not again accept Nature and the rest. So, in regard to this, he says:

\[ \text{छिन्नहस्तवल्ला II ७ II} \]

\text{Aph. 7. Or as an amputated hand.}

\text{a. As no one takes back again an amputated hand, just so this [Nature], when abandoned, he should not readmit: such is the meaning. The word 'Or' is used in the sense of 'moreover;' [the import of the conjunction being superadditive, not alternative].}

\[ \text{असाधनानुचिन्तनं बन्धय भरतवत् II ८ II} \]

\text{Aph. 8. What is not a means [of liberation is] not to be thought about, [as this conduces only] to bondage; as in the case of Bharata.}

\text{a. That which is not an immediate cause of Discrimination, even though it may be a duty, still is 'not to be thought about;' i.e., intention of the mind towards the performance thereof is not to be made; since it tends to Bondage, from its making us forget Discrimination. 'As in the case of Bharata:' that is to say, as was the case}

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\[ \text{१ लक्ष्मी च प्रकृतियार्दिकं पुनर्न्स्वीकृतिधियत्राहं II} \]

\[ \text{२ यथा छिन्न हस्तं पुनं केस्रपिनादभे तथैव-} \]

\text{तस्य च पुननोभिन्मयेततेव्यथ: । वाश्च्छोर्ष्यथं II}
with the royal sage Bharata's cherishing Dinánátha's fawn, though [this was] in accordance with duty.

चहुमियोंगे विरोधो रागादिभि: कुमारीर-हस्वत् ॥ ५ ॥

Company to be avoided. Aph. 9. From [association with] many there is obstruction to concentration, through passion, &c.; as in the case of a girl's shells.

a. Association is not to be made with many; because, when there is association with many, there is disturbance, through the manifestation of Passion, &c., which destroys concentration; as a jingling is produced by the mutual

1 The original, dinánátha, compounded of dina and anátha, 'miserable and having no master,' is an epithet of 'fawn.'

For the story of Bharata and the fawn, see the Vishnu-purāṇa, Book ii., Chap. xiii. Ed.

2 विवेकस्य यद्तत्रज्ञसमाधनं न भवति स चेंड-मंडपि स्वात्सर्यापि तदनुचिन्तनं तदनुमाने वि-वस्य तात्पर्यं न कर्त्थं यत्स्तवाय भवति वि-वेकविस्मारकतया। भर्तवत् । यथा भरतस्य राजस्यधैर्यस्मपि दीनानाथहरिषशावकस्य पोषण-मित्यर्थं। ॥

3 चहुमियोंगाविरोधी is the reading of Aniruddha. Ed.

4 See the Mahabharata, xii., 6652. Ed.
contact of the shells on a girl's wrist: such is the meaning.¹

ब्यायमपि तथैव ॥ १० ॥

Even that of one.  
*Aph. 10.* Just so, from [the company of] two, also.

a. Just so, even from two there is obstruction to concentration; therefore one ought to abide quite alone: such is the meaning.²

निराशः सुखी पिज़लावत ॥ ११ ॥

*Blessedness of those who expect nothing.*  
*Aph. 11.* He who is without hope is happy; like Pingalá.³

a. Having abandoned hope, let a man become possessed of the happiness called contentment; 'like Pingalá;' that is to say, as the courtesan called Pingalá, desiring a lover, having found no lover, being despondent, became happy, when she had left off hoping.⁴

¹ बहुमि: सज्जः न कायौ बहुमि: सज्जः हि रागाद्भिभ्युक्तः कलहो भवति योगान्तरः यथा कुमारीसहस्त्रङ्गानामन्योन्यसज्जः भृणकारो भव-तीत्वर्थः: ॥

² हाम्यां योगेन्द्रियां तथैव विरोधो भवति एकाकिनेन स्थात्वमित्वर्थः: ॥

³ See the *Mahābhārata*, xii., 6447. *Ed.*

⁴ 'ञ्जाण लक्ष्म्यकुरुषः संतोषाद्यसुखवान्धुया-
b. But then, granting that Pain may cease, on the cessation of hope, yet how can there be happiness, in the absence of causes thereof? It is replied: That natural happiness, resulting from the predominance of Purity in the mind, which remains obscured by hope, itself resumes its influence, on the departure of hope; as is the case with the coolness of water which [supposed natural coolness] had been hindered [from manifesting itself,] by heat: there is not, in this case, any need of means. And it is laid down that precisely this is happiness of Soul.¹

c. Since it is an obstructor of Concentration, exertion with a view to experience is not to be made, since this will be effected quite otherwise; as he states:²

शिङ्गलावधया पिङ्कला नाम वेश्या कान्तार्थिनी
कान्तमलबुधा निर्विशेषः सती विहायाण्या सुखिनी
बभूव तत्रदिक्षाः: ॥

¹ नन्वाशानिनिवृत्या दुःखनिवृत्ति: स्वार्थुं तु
कुतः साधनाभावादिति। उच्यते। चिन्ताय सच्चः
प्राधान्येन स्वाभाविकं यत्सुखमाशया पितितं
तितिति तदेवशाबिभिमेष सत्पूवृतिकं भवति तेजः
प्रतिबंधजलशैल्यवदिति न तच साधनापेशा ॥
एतदेव चातमसुखमित्युव्यत इति ॥

² योगप्रतिविन्ध्यकारदारभोगशिपि भोगार्थं न
कर्तव्योत्यथेष्व तदुपपञ्चरित्याः ॥
Aph 12. [One may be happy,] even without exertion; like a serpent happy in another’s house.

a. Supply, ‘he may be happy.’ The rest is simple. So it has been said:¹ ‘The building of a house is, assuredly, painful, and in no way pleasant. A serpent, having entered the dwelling made by another [e.g., a rat], does find comfort.’²

b. From Institutes, and from preceptors, only the essence is to be accepted; since, otherwise, it may be impossible to concentrate the attention, from there being, by reason of implications,³ discussions, &c., discrepancies in declared unessential parts, and from the multiplicity of topics. So he says:⁴

₁ Quoted from the Mahābhārata, xii., 6649. Ed.
₂ सुखी भवेदिति शेषः। शेषं सुगमस्। तदुक्तम्। गृहारभो हि दुःखाय न मुखाय कर्त्य चन। सप्तं परकृतं वेशम् प्रविशय मुखस्मेते॥
³ Abhyupagama, ‘acceptings’ (of positions, &c.). Ed.
⁴ शास्त्रभो गृह्ययय सार एव याहोऽन्यया-भृपगमवादादिमित्रसारमागेश्योविरोधेनाधः।वाहल्येन चैकायताया असंभववादिवाह॥
Aph. 13. Though he devote himself to many Institutes and teachers, a taking of the essence [is to be made]; as is the case with the bee.

a. Supply 'is to be made.' The rest is simple. Thus it has been said: 'From small Institutes, and from great, the intelligent man should take, from all quarters, the essence; as the bee does from the flowers.'

b. Be the other means what they may, the direct possession of Discrimination is to be effected only by intentness, through maintaining Meditation; as he tells us:

इष्कारवेच्चितस्य समाधिहानि: ॥ ९४ ॥

Intenness on one object.

Aph. 14. The Meditation is not interrupted of him whose mind is intent on one object; like the maker of arrows.

a. As, in the case of a maker of arrows, with his mind intent solely on the making of an arrow, the exclusion of

1 कर्त्तव्यमिति शेषः। अन्यत्रुगमम्। तदुक्तम्।
अणुभ्यां महत्त्रां शास्त्रेभेः कुशलो नरः। सर्वेऽः
सारमाद्याल्पुर्धेभेः इव षट्कः ॥

2 साधनान्तरं यथा तथा भवनेकायमत्येश्व समाधिपालनन्द्वर विवेकासृष्ट्रकारो निष्पादनीय
इत्याद ॥

3 See the Mahābhārata, xii., 6651. Ed.
other thoughts is not interrupted even by a king’s passing at his side, so, too, of him whose mind is intent on one point there is in no way an ‘interruption of meditation,’ i.e., a failure to exclude other thoughts.  

2 कृत्तनियमलङ्गनादानं लोकवर्त् ॥ १५ ॥

Aph. 15. Through transgression of the enjoined rules there is failure in the aim; as in the world.

a. Whatever rule, for the practisers of Concentration, has been laid down in the Institutes, if it be transgressed, then the end, viz., the effecting of knowledge, is not attained. ‘As in the world.’ That is to say: just as, in ordinary life, if the enjoined procedures, &c., in regard to a medicine, or the like, be neglected, this or that effect thereof will not be obtained.

1 यथा शरानिमसायणेर्चित्रस्येकुरकारस्य पार्शे राज्यो गमनेनापि न वृत्त्तास्तरनिरोधे हीयत एवमेकाृतिचित्रस्य सर्वशापि न समाधिहानिवृत्तस्य तरिकायथा।

Aniruddha reads व्रतत्तत्तमृ. Ed.

3 नागेरा is singular in here, apparently, adding, as an aphorism: ऋषिका ज्ञानर्थास्तथा वा लक्षने तु न ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धः। These words occur in the midst of Vijnāna’s comment, and there introduce a quotation from the Mahābhārata. Ed.

4 यः शास्केशु कृतो योगिनां नियमस्योष्टिन्यन्ते
b. He states, further, that, if the rules be forgotten, the end will not be gained: ¹

Rules must not be forgotten.

Aph. 16. Moreover, if they be forgotten; as in the case of the female frog.

a. This is plain. And the story of the female frog is this: A certain king, having gone to hunt, saw a beautiful damsel in the forest. And she, being solicited in marriage by the king, made this stipulation: 'When water shall be shown to me by thee, then I must depart.' But, on one occasion, when wearied with sport, she asked the king, 'Where is water?' The king, too, forgetting his agreement, showed her the water. Then she, having become the she-frog Kāmarūpinī,² daughter of the king of the frogs, entered the water. And then the king, though he sought her with nets, &c., did not regain her.³

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¹ नियमविस्तरणेष्यान्यथेःक्षमाहेः

² Probably this is an epithet, 'changing one's form at will,' not a proper name. Ed.

³ सुगमसम । भेक्काथेमाथायायिका । कथिका-द्राजा मूर्गयां गतो बिपिने मुदरिं कन्यां ददृशं । सा च राजा भार्याभावाय प्रार्थिता नियमं चक्रे यदा महां लया जलं प्रदश्यं तदा मया गतया-
b. He mentions a story with reference to the necessity of reflecting on the words of the teacher, as well as hearing them:  

नोपदेशश्रवणेष्टापू कृतकृत्यता परामर्शादृते विरोचनवत् ॥ १७ ॥

Aph. 17. Not even though instruction be heard is the end gained, without reflection; as in the case of Virochana.  

a. By ‘reflection’ is meant such consideration as determines the import of the teacher’s words. Without this, though the instruction be heard, knowledge of the truth does not necessarily follow; for it is written, that, though hearing the instruction of Prajāpati, Virochana, as

मिति। एकदा तु कङ्गिया प्रियालं राजानं प्रस्थं कुं च जलमिति। राजापि समयं विस्मृतं जलमदर्शयत्। तत: सा मेकराजदुहिता कामस्त-पिल्ली मेकी भूला जलं विवेश। तत्थ राजा जालादिभिरकृतापि न तामविन्ददिति। ॥

1 श्रवणवहुःवास्तुमतामांसाया ऋणवश्यकाल इतिहासमाह॥

2 Vedánti Mahádeva has simply नोपदेशेष्टापिः. Ed.

3 The reading of Aniruddha is कृतकृत्य:। Ed.

4 See the Chhândogya Upanishad, viii., viii., 4. Ed.
between Indra and Virochana, wanted discrimination, from want of reflexion:¹

आङ्कण्योरिन्द्रस्य ॥ ९५ ॥

Of this further. Aph. 18. Of those two, it [reflexion,] was seen in the case of Indra [only].

a. Of those two who are mentioned, [indicated] by the expression ‘of those two,’ reflexion [was seen, &c.]. And, as between those two, viz., Indra and Virochana, reflexion was seen in the case of Indra: such is the meaning.²

b. And he tells us, that, by him who desires to understand thoroughly, attendance on the teacher should be practised for a long time:³

प्रणातिब्रह्मचर्यपर्यण्णाति कृत्वा सिद्धिवैकृत्यकालात् ॥ ९५ ॥

¹ परामर्शे गुह्वाक्षतात्मस्यनिर्णयो विचारः। तन्तु विनोपदेशवाच्यश्रवणेऽपि तत्त्वज्ञाननियमो नान्ति प्रजापतेषुपदेशश्रवणेऽपि निद्रविरोचनयोभेद्ये विरोचनस्य परामर्शेभावेन विवेकाभावशुष्टिरित्यः॥

² तत्त्वदेशोपचर्यमानयोः परामर्शे। तत्त्वोरिन्द्र विरोचनयोभेद्ये परामर्शं इद्य द्रुत्त्वशेषयः॥

³ सम्यक्ष्मानार्थिना च गुरुस्वामी बहुकालं कर्तव्यात्॥
The process requires time.

Aph. 19. Having performed reverence, the duties of a student, and attendance, one has success after a long time; as in his case.

a. ‘As in his case.’ That is to say: as in the case of Indra, so in the case of another, too, only after having practised, under a preceptor, reverence, study of the Vedas, service, &c., is there ‘success,’ i.e., the revelation of truth; not otherwise.

न कालनियमो वामदेववत् ॥ २ ० ॥

Aph. 20. There is no determination of the time; as in the case of Vāmadeva.

a. In the arising of knowledge, there is ‘no determination of the time,’ as, for instance, in its taking place only from causes dependent on the senses. ‘As in the case of Vāmadeva.’ That is to say: as, in consequence of causes pertaining to a previous life, knowledge arose, in the case of Vāmadeva, even when in embryo, so it may in the case of another.

1 ततुः इद्द्वे वामदेवयापि गुरूः प्राङ्गति-दाधयनसेवादीन्तिकृतिविधिनित्वार्थस्फूतिर्मेरवति नान्यर्षेत्यर्थः ॥

2 Aniruddha seems to intend, as an aphorism, after No. 20, these words: वामदेवस्य तत्त्वानानामिक्षिं मुक्तिदिक्रियानात् ॥. But perhaps there has been tampering with the text, on the part of copyists. Ed.

3 See the Aitareya Upanishad, ii., iv., 6. Ed.

4 एद्विद्यवाधनातेव भवतीत्यादिदिनादिनोदिये कारः
6. But then, since it is written, that the means of knowledge need be nothing other than devotion to those [viz., Brahmá, &c.,] who [unlike the Absolute,] have Qualities, knowledge may result from this. Why, then, a hard and subtle process of Concentration? To this he replies:¹

 tendrá ṣākṣātyāyaṇam sānā patantuḥ. 21 2

Aph. 21. Through devotion to something under a superinduced form, [attainment to, or approach towards, knowledge takes place] by degrees; as in the case of those who devote themselves to sacrifices.

a. Supply 'there is attainment.' Through devotion to Souls, e.g., Brahmá, Vishnu, Śiva, under the forms superinduced on them, the effecting of knowledge takes place 'by degrees,' i.e., by the successive attainment of

ननु समुपोपासना भागमण्डुक्षक्रमम् ज्ञानं भविष्यति निर्माणं दुष्कर्मम्

¹ Here the aphorism ends, in my copies of Nágáśi's commentary, and also in some copies of Vijnána's commentary which I examined in India. Ed.
the worlds of Brahmá, &c., or else through the purification of the Good principle, &c., but not directly; as is the case with sacrificers [whose slaughter of animals, requiring to be expiated, throws them back, so far, in the road to emancipation]: such is the meaning.¹

b. He tells us, that, moreover, there is no certainty that successive rise to the worlds of Brahmá, &c., would effect knowledge:

"\textit{Ianram}\textit{pāvai}\textit{a}\textit{vṛti: ph\textit{a}\textit{rīn}\textit{yogat}\textit{a} j\textit{nma}\textit{ṣ}\textit{ūtē}: }\| 22\||

Aph. 22. Moreover, after the attainment of what [like the world of Brahmá,] is other [than the state of emancipated soul], there is return [to mundane existence]; because it is written [in the 5th Prapáthaka of the \textit{Chhāndogya Upanishad}⁴]: "From conjunction with the five fires there is birth," &c.

\begin{quote}
'\textit{Saṁdirīt\text{ī}n\text{ū}ṣa\text{ṇ}ywātē }\| \textit{Ah\text{ḍ}ya\text{t}\text{ṛ\text{̄}}pē: pu\text{ṛ}ṣ\text{a}ṣ\text{a}̄n ba\text{ḥ}ṣa\text{ṇ}a\text{ḥ}\text{rādīn\text{ā}m\text{ū}p\text{a\text{̄}s\text{a\text{̄}}nāṭ\text{a\text{̄}}r\text{m}p\text{e}\text{ṣ\text{̄}}\text{ṇ}a\text{ḥ} }\text{ba\text{ḥ}ṣa\text{ṭ}d\text{̀}lōka\text{̄}\text{ṇa\text{̄}p\text{̄}ś\text{̄}k\text{̄}\text{̄}m\text{̄}e\text{ṣ\text{̄}ḥ }\text{s\text{̄}t\text{̄}v\text{̄}g\text{̄}d\text{̀}h\text{̀}ch\text{̀}r\text{̀}a\text{ḥ} }\text{va }\text{ṃd\text{ā}n\text{īdīp\text{̄}}n\text{īn\text{ī }}\text{s\text{̀}t\text{̄}v\text{̄}ā\text{́}d\text{̀}\text{y\text{̄}}\text{ḥ }\text{yād\text{̄}k}\text{̀}n\text{́}nā\text{́}m\text{́}t\text{́}y\text{́}y\text{́}r\text{́}\text{́}hē: }\|’
\end{quote}

"\textit{Baḥṣaṭdīḷōk\text{̀}p\text{̀}ṃ\text{̀}ra\text{́}r\text{́}ṃ\text{̀}y\text{́}p\text{́}y\text{́} }\text{ṃ\text{́}d\text{̀}n\text{́}n\text{́}dīp\text{̀}n\text{́}n\text{́}t\text{́ }\text{nā\text{́}m }\text{ṃd\text{́}h}\text{̀} \text{h\text{́}ya\text{́}h }\|’

² One of my copies of Aniruddha omits \textit{ḥṣ} after \textit{Ianram}.

\textit{Ed.}

² This reference is taken from Vijñāna, who, however, does not
a. He exhibits an illustration, to the effect that the effecting of knowledge takes place only in the case of him who is free from passion:

\[\text{विरूःप्य हैयहानमुपादेयोपादानं हंसक्षीरवत्}\]

\[\| 23 \|

\text{Discrimination illustrated.}

Aph. 23. By him who is free from passion what is to be left is left, and what is to be taken is taken; as in the case of the swan and the milk.

a. That is to say: only by him who is free from passion is there a quitting 'of what is to be left,' i.e., of Nature, &c., and a taking 'of what is to be taken,' i.e., of Soul; as it is only the swan,—and not the crow, or the like,—that, out of milk and water mingled, by means of leaving the unimportant water, takes the valuable milk, as the Hindus insist that it does.

represent that the original of the words 'From conjunction,' &c., is found, literally, in the Chhandogya Upanishad. Ed.

1 ज्ञाननिष्पितिविरूःप्यवैवचन निदर्जनमाह

2 Vijñāna, according to some MSS., has, peculiarly, हैयहान-मुपादेयोपादानं; and his comment, in those MSS., follows, this reading. Ed.

3 विरूःप्यैव हैयानां प्रकृतियादीनां हानमुपादेयस्य चात्मन उपादानं भवतिर्यथा दुग्धजल-योरेकीभावावपन्योमेघेःसारजलियागेन सारभूत-क्षीरोपादानं हृस्यैव नतु काकादेरित्यथं.

\[\|\]
b. He tells us that both of these also take place in consequence of association with a perfect man. 

लभ्यातिशयोगां तत्त्वं || २४ ||

Benefit of good society. Aph. 24. Or through association with one who has obtained excellence; as in the case thereof.

a. That is to say: moreover, from association with him by whom ‘excellence,’ i.e., excellence in knowledge, has been obtained, the aforesaid [discrimination] takes place; just as in the case of the swan, [§ 28]; as, in the case of Alarka, Discrimination manifested itself spontaneously, merely through simple association with Dattātreya.

b. He tells us that we ought not to associate with those who are infected with desire.

न कामचारिवं रागोपहते शुकवत् || २५ ||

1 Siddha. Vide supra, p. 115, note 3. For the cognate siddhi, vide infra, p. 310, note 4. Ed.

3 सिद्धपुरुषस्मार्द्धेतुभं भवतीत्वाः ||

3 Nāgeśa omits वा. Ed.

4 See the Mārkandeya-purāṇa, ch. xvi. Ed.

5 लभ्योशतिशयो ज्ञानकाण्डे येन तत्स्मार्द्धेतुभं भवति हंसवदेवेश्वर्यं यथालक्ष्यात् दत्ताचेयसिद्धं माचार्येव स्वयं विवेके प्रादुर्भूदिति ||

6 रागसंधो न कार्यं इत्याद ||

7 Aniruddha has न शुकवकामचारिवं रागोपहते:।

Ed.
Aph. 25. Not of his own accord should he go near one who is infected with desire; like the parrot.

a. Association is not to be made, voluntarily, with a person infected with desire. 'Like the parrot.' That is to say: just as the bird [called a] parrot, by reason of its being exceedingly beautiful, does not [by going near people,] act in a rash manner, through fear of being imprisoned by those who covet it for its beauty.

b. And he states the harm of association with those who labour under desire:

दुःखयोगावहः शुकवत् || २६ ||

Of this further. Aph. 26. [Else he may become] bound, by conjunction with the cords; as in the case of the parrot.

a. And, in the case of associating with those persons, he may become bound, 'by conjunction with the cords,' i.e., by conjunction with their Desire, &c., [the Qualities, punningly compared to cords]; just 'as in the case of the

1 रागोपहते पुश्पे कामत: सानां न करते: || शुकवत् || यथा शुकपक्षी प्रकृतिः इति कृता कामचारं न करोति रुपलोकुपर्वयाथनभयायथ-दिश्यथिः: ||

2 रागिसक्रेण तु दोषमाह ||

All the commentators but Vijnāna read वास्यः, instead of बदः. Ed.
parrot; that is to say, just as the bird [called a] parrot becomes bound by the cords, i.e., the ropes, of the hunter.  

b. He determines, by two [aphorisms], the means of [effecting] dispassion:²

न भोगाद्रागशालातिमृतः | न ||

Means of dispassion. 

Aph. 27. Not by enjoyment is desire appeased; as in the case of the saint.

a. That is to say: as, in the case of the saint, Saubhari,³ desire was not appeased by enjoyment, so, also in the case of others, it is not.⁴

b. But, further:⁵

दोषदर्शनादुभयोऽऽ | न ||

Of this further. 

Aph. 28. From seeing the fault of both.

¹ तेषां सङ्गे तु गुणयोगात्यायरागादियोगा-वृद्ध: स्वाच्छूत्वर्देव यष्ठा सुकुपक्री व्याधस्य गुणे रक्षुभिवेद्वो भवति तहदिल्यर्थे: ||

² चैगणयस्वायुष्कामशाभायर्यति हाभ्याम् ||

³ See the Vīshṇu-purāṇa, Book iv, Ch. ii. and iii. Ed.

⁴ यष्ठा भुने: सामभर्मनोगाच रागशालातिरिवृद्ध-मन्येषामिप न भवतीतियर्थे: ||

⁵ भ्रोप्य तु ||
a. That is to say: only 'from seeing the fault,' e.g., of being changeable, of consisting of pain, &c., 'of both,' i.e., of Nature and her productions, does the appeasing of desire take place; just as in the case of the saint [§ 27]. For it is written, that Saubhāri, just from seeing the evil of society, was afterwards dispassionate.¹

b. He tells us that incompetency even to accept instruction attaches to him who is infected with the fault of desire, &c.:²

न ³ मलिनचेतनस्युपदेशबीजप्रेषोहासजवत् ॥ २५ ॥

अगि० अप. २९. Not in the case of him whose mind is disturbed does the seed of instruction sprout; as in the case of Aja.

a. In him whose mind is disturbed by desire, &c., not even does a sprout spring up from that seed of the tree of knowledge which is in the shape of instruction. '⁴ As in the case of Aja.' That is to say: as not a sprout from

¹ उभयोः प्रकृतितकार्योः परिश्रानिलुः खातः कलवारिद्वयोः नानादेव रागशालिनिभवति मलिन-वदेश्यते•। सोभरैः सक्षोषितस्यनादेव पक्षां-हैराग्यं छूते॥

² रागादिद्रष्णो पहतस्योपदेशमहेश्वरनिधिका-रमाह॥

³ Vijñāna, according to some MSS., has मलिनचेतनस्य-पुपदेशः. One of my MSS. of Aniruddha has मलिने. Ed.
the seed of instruction, though delivered to him by Va-
sishṭha, sprang up in the king named Aja, whose mind
was disturbed by grief for his wife.\textsuperscript{1,2}

6. What need of more?\textsuperscript{3}

नाभासमाचरमपि मलिनद्वेशावत् \textsuperscript{॥} 30 ॥

Of this further. \textit{Aph. 30}. Not even a mere semblance
[of this true knowledge arises in him
whose mind is disturbed]; as in the case of a foul mirror.

\textit{a.} Even superficial knowledge does not arise, from
instruction, in one whose mind is disturbed, through the
obstruction caused by its wandering away, e.g., to other
objects; as an object is not reflected in a foul mirror,
through the obstruction caused by the impurities: such is
the meaning.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item उपदेशःर्पणः यज्ञानवृक्षस्य बीजं तत्स्याकुरो-
\textsuperscript{धिप} रागारूपमलिनचित्रे नोत्स्यद्यते। ऋज्वत्।
यथाजनांभि नूपे भायोशोकमलिनचित्रे वसि-
धनोक्त्स्यायुपदेशवीजस्य नाङ्कुर उत्पन्न इत्यर्थं: ॥
\item See Kālidāsa’s \textit{Raghuvanśa}, Book viii. \textit{Ed.}
\item किं बहुः ॥
\item ऋपायाष्कमपि मलिनचेतस्युपदेशान्तः जायते विष्णुनालंतसंचारादिभिः प्रतिवन्धाध्या मलैः:
प्रतिवचनेन्मलिनद्वेशावस्य न प्रतिविष्ठति तद-
द्वित्यर्थं: ॥
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
b. Or, if knowledge should spring up in any kind of way, still it may not, he tells us, be in accordance with the instruction:*

न तजज्ञयापि तदोपता पद्मजवत् \| 39 \|

Aph. 31. Nor, even though sprung therefrom, is that [knowledge, necessarily,] in accordance therewith; like the lotus.

a. Though sprung 'therefrom,' i.e., from instruction, knowledge is not [necessarily,] in accordance with the instruction, in case this has not been entirely understood. 'Like the lotus.' That is to say: just as the lotus, though the seed be of the best, is not in accordance with the seed, when the mud is faulty. The mind of the student is compared to the mud 4 [in which the lotus-seed was sown].

\[1\] यदि वा यथाकथं चिन्त्यानं जायत तथापु- पदेशानुष्पं न भवेदिवाही \|

3 Vedánti Mahádeva reads तजज्ञयापि. Ed.

3 Aniruddha has पद्मजानििवत्. Ed.

‘तस्मादुपदेशाज्ञात्स्यापि ज्ञानस्योपदेशानु- रूपता न भवति सामग्रेषानवोधात् । पद्मज- वत् । यथा विज्ञ्यायवेत्तापि पद्मोपेशाधीजानु- रूपतापद्मज्ञत्य न भवति तददिक्षणः । पद्म- स्थानीयं शिष्यचित्तम् \|
b. But then, since the Soul’s end is, indeed, gained by [the attainment of] supernatural power in the worlds [§ 21. a.] of Brahmá, &c., to what purpose is the effecting of knowledge, with so much toil, for liberation? To this he replies:

न "भूतिेयोगेऽसि  कृतकृयतोपास्यसिद्धिवदुपास्यसिद्धिवत् II 32 II

Aph. 32. Not even on the attainment of glorification has that been done which was to be done; as is the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped, as is the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped.

a. Even though one attain to supernatural power, ‘that has not been done which was to be done,’ i.e., the end has not been gained; because it is attended by the grief of deficiency and excess. ‘As is the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped.’ That is to say: as, though the possession of perfection [so called,] belongs to ‘the objects

1 ननु ब्रम्हलोकादिवुभ्येभ्येव पुष्पवार्षसिद्धा किमर्थेतावता प्रयासेन मोक्षाय ज्ञाननिध्यापदनम् । तद् च ताहा II

3 According to Nágeśa and Vedánti Mahádeva, भूति°; and this bhúta, a synonym of bhúti, the former explains by aiśwarya. See note 4, below. Ed.

3 One of my MSS. of Aniruddha omits अधिरे एद।

4 Nágeśa, commenting on this aphorism, explains siddhi, here rendered ‘perfection,’ by aiśwarya, ‘supernatural power.’ Ed.
worshipped, i.e., to Brahmá, &c., [still] that has not been done which was to be done; since it is written, that even these, while in the sleep of Concentration, &c., [still] practice Concentration, [from fear of losing what they have attained to]. Just in like manner is the case with him who, by the worship of these, has attained to their supernatural power. Such is the meaning.¹

6. So much for the Fourth Book, that of Tales, in the Commentary, composed by Vijnána Bhikshu, on Kapila’s Declaration of the Sánkhyá.²

¹ एद्धर्थयोगेश्वरी कृतकृत्यता कृतार्थता नास्ति 
क्ष्यातिशयदुः किरुगमात्। उपास्यसिद्धिवत्। 
यथोपास्यानं ब्रह्मादिन्नं सिद्धियोगेश्वरी न कृतकृत्यता 
तेषां मृत्युभयाऽयोगनिन्त्रादौ योगाभ्यासङ्गेश्वरात्। 
तथेव तद्युपासनया प्राप्तदैवद्धर्थव्यापीत्यर्थः॥

² इति विज्ञानभिक्षुनिमिते कापिलसाह्यप्रव- 
चनस्य भाष्य चाक्ष्यायिकाध्यायश्चतुथः॥

END OF BOOK IV.
BOOK V.

a. The tenets of his Institute are completed. Next is begun a Fifth Book, in order to set aside the prima facie notions of others in regard to his Institute. Among those, in the first place he disposes of the objection that the Benediction implied by the expression 'Well,' in the first Aphorism [of Book I.], is purposeless:

भञ्जलागिरिष्ठिष्ठिष्ठारांगिरिष्ठिष्ठारानिष्ठिष्ठानिष्ठिष्ठानिष्ठनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्वनापूर्व

Reasons for a Benedictory Opening.

Aph. 1. The [use of a] Benediction [is justified] by the practice of the good, by our seeing its fruit, and by Scripture.

a. The [use of a] Benediction, which we made, is proved to be proper to be made, by these proofs: such is the

1 स्वशास्त्रसिद्धान्त: पर्याप्त। इति: परो स्वशास्त्रे परेषा पूर्वपश्चानपार्थैं पञ्चमाध्याय ज्ञारभगे। तत्रादावादिसूचीपश्चाद्वेषशच्चेन यन्मक्खलं कृतं तदवर्षेनमित्याश्रेष्ठं समाधिे।

2 Aniruddha has, instead of च्युति, भूति Vide supra, p. 310, note 2, for bhūti. Ed.
meaning. The word iti is intended to preclude the expectation of any other reasons.¹

b. He repels those who entertain the primâ facie view, that what was asserted in the expression, ‘because it is not proved that there is a Lord’ [see Book I., Aph. 92], is not made out; because [forsooth,] his existence is proved by his being the giver of the fruits of works.² ³

नेष्ठराधिष्ठिते फलनिष्पत्ति: कर्मशा तलिष्ठिः॥ ॥

Needlessness of a Lord. Aph. 2. Not from its [the world’s,] being governed by a Lord is there the effectuation of fruit: for it is by works [i.e., by merit and demerit,] that this is accomplished.

a. That is to say: it is not proper [to suppose] the effectuation of the change [of the elements] into the shape of the [appropriate] fruit of works, on the ground that the cause is ‘governed by a Lord’; because it is possible for

¹ स मङ्लाचरणं यकृतं तस्यैत: प्रमाणः कर्त्-वतासिद्धिरित्यथे:। इतिश्रव्ये हेलन्तराकाशः-निरासार्थे॥

² इष्ठरासिद्धिरिति ययुः तन्नोपपद्यते कर्मफळदुःतृतया तलिष्ठिरिति ये पूर्वपक्षाःस्तान्तिरिता-करोति॥

³ For another rendering, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 78. Ed.

⁴ Aniruddha’s reading is फलसंपत्ति:, and Vedânti Mahadeva has सदाफलसंपत्ति:. Ed.
the fruit to be effected by the works [i.e., the merit and demerit,] alone, which are indispensable; [and, if we do make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord, he cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works].

b. He declares, further, in [several] aphorisms, that it is not the case that the Lord is the giver of fruit:

स्योकारारद्धिष्ठानं लोकवत् \textsuperscript{2} || 3 ||

The supposed Lord \textit{Aph. 3.} [If a Lord were governor, then] from intending his own benefit, his government [would be selfish], as is the case [with ordinary governors] in the world.

\textit{a.} If the Lord were the governor, then his government would be only for his own benefit; as is the case [with ordinary rulers] in the world: such is the meaning.

\textsuperscript{1} इश्वराधिष्ठिते कारणे कर्मफलपरिष्कारणमस्य
निष्पत्तिः युक्तावशयकेन कर्मशैव फलनिष्पत्ति-
संभवादित्ययः: ||

\textsuperscript{2} See, for a somewhat different translation, the \textit{Rational Refutation, &c., p. 78.} Ed.

\textsuperscript{3} इश्वरस्य फलदातृत्वं न घटतेद्यथाह शूचः: ||

\textsuperscript{4} इश्वरस्याधिष्ठितृत्वे स्योपकारार्थमेव लोकव-
दिशिन्ते स्यादित्ययः: ||
b. In reply to the doubt, 'grant that the Lord, also, be benefited: what harm?' he says: ¹

लौकिकेश्वरवदितरथा || ॥

And, therefore, not the Lord spoken of.  
Aph. 4. [He must, then, be] just like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise [than you desire that we should conceive of him].

a. If we agree that the Lord, also, is benefited, he, also, must be something mundane, 'just like a worldly lord;' because, since his desires are [on that supposition.] not [previously] satisfied, he must be liable to grief, &c.: such is the meaning.²

b. In reply to the doubt, 'be it even so,' he says:³

पारिभाषिको वा || ॥

The difficulty perhaps originates in a mistaken expression.  
Aph. 5. Or [let the name of Lord be] technical.

a. If, whilst there exists also a world, there be a Lord, then let yours, like ours, be merely a technical term for

¹ भवविश्वस्यायुपकारः का छत्तिरित्याश-ञ्ज्याह ||

² इश्वरस्यायुपकारस्त्रीकारे लौकिकेश्वरवदेव सोढ़पि संसारी स्यादपूर्णकामतया दुःखातिक-ञ्ज्यातिवधे: ॥

³ तथैव भववित्याशञ्ज्याह ॥
that soul which emerged at the commencement of the creation; since there cannot be an eternal lordship, because of the contradiction between mundaneness and the having an unobstructed will: such is the meaning.\(^1\)

\(b.\) He states another objection to the Lord's being the governor:\(^2\)

\(\text{न रागादृते}^3 \text{तत्सिद्धि: प्रतिनियतकारशवात्} \\ \| \ 6 \| \)

\(\text{Objection to there} \ A\text{ph. 6. This [position, viz., that}}
\(\text{there is a Lord,] cannot be established}
\(\text{without [assuming that he is affected by] Passion; because}
\(\text{that is the determinate cause [of all energizing].}
\(\text{a. That is to say: moreover, it cannot be proved that he}
\(\text{is a governor, unless there be Passion; because Passion is}
\(\text{the determinate cause of activity.}^4\)

\(^1\) संसारस्त्रेदिपि चदीश्वरस्त्राहि सग्नाध्युतमपुहे
\(\text{परिभाषामाचम्माकमिव भवतामिपि स्थासा}
\(\text{रित्राप्रतिहतेथ्वलयीर्वर्धान्तिल्ल्यानुपपरतेरिव}
\(\text{लयर्थः} \ | | \)

\(^2\) ईश्वरस्याधिश्रायेन बाधकान्तरमाह \ | | 

\(^3\) जग्नसिद्धि: is the lection of Vedánti Mahádeva, in the
\(\text{text, and also in the comment. Ed.}

\(^4\) किं च रागं विना नाधिश्रात्तुले सिध्यति
\(\text{प्रवृत्तौ रागस्य प्रतिनियतकारशवादिवर्थः} \ | | 

b. But then, be it so, that there is Passion in the Lord, even. To this he replies:

**तद्योगेञ्जपि न नित्यमुक्तः॥ ७ ॥**

_Aph. 7._ Moreover, were that [Passion] conjoined with him, he could not be eternally free.

_a._ That is to say: moreover, if it be agreed that there is conjunction [of the Lord] with Passion, he cannot be eternally free; and, therefore, thy tenet [of his eternal freedom] is invalidated.

_b._ Pray [let us ask], does lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to be properties of Nature, [not properties of Soul]? Or from an influence by reason of the mere existence of proximity, as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative.

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1 नन्वेबमल्लु रागोरणीरे || तचाह ॥

2 रागयोगेपि स्वीक्षियमाचे स नित्यमुक्तो न स्वात्तत्त्वे ते सिद्धान्तानानिरिच्छे: ॥

3 ऐक्षणं किं प्रधानधर्मेनामत्तमतानामि-च्छादीनां सात्तादेव चेतनसंबन्धात। किं वायु-स्थान्त्रमाणि सत्तिनिधिसत्तामाचे। प्रेक्षाप्रद्विति || तचाच्छं पद्मं दूष्ययति ॥
Aph. 8. If it were from the conjunction of the properties of Nature, it would turn out that there is association, [which Scripture denies of Soul].

a. From the conjunction, with Soul, of 'the properties of Nature,' i.e., Desire, &c., Soul, also, would turn out [contrary to Scripture,] to be associated with properties.

b. But, in regard to the latter [alternative], he says:

Aph. 9. If it were from the mere existence [of Nature, not in association, but simply in proximity], then lordship would belong to every one.

1. -योगावेदमसञ्ज्ञापति: is the reading of Vijnāna, in some MSS., and, in some, that of Nāgèśa, who, however, in others, omits चेत Ed.

2. प्रधानशेषेरित्यादे: पुरुषे योगावेदायुष्यापि धर्मसञ्ज्ञापति: II

3. चन्द्रे ताह II

4. Some MSS. of Vijnāna exhibit, instead of सत्तामाचात्, सत्तामाचैः Ed.
a. That is to say: if lordship is by reason of the mere existence of proximity, as in the case of the magnet [which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron], then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that even all men, indifferently, experiencers in this or that [cycle of] creation, [may] have lordship; because it is only by conjunction with all experiencers, that Nature produces Mind, &c. And, therefore, your tenet of there being only one Lord is invalidated.¹

b. Be it as you allege; yet these are false reasonings; because they contradict the evidence which establishes [the existence of] a Lord. Otherwise, Nature, also, could be disproved by thousands of false reasonings of the like sort. He therefore says:²

प्रमाणाभावाच तत्सिद्धः १० ॥

Denial that there is any evidence of a Lord.  
Aph. 10. It is not established [that there is an eternal Lord]; because there is no evidence of it.

¹ अयस्काण्तवल्कनिधिसत्रामचेषा चैदेवयं त-  
हृं सर्वप्राप्त तत्तत्सर्गश्च भोक्तुष्णाः पुंसामविशेष-  
वेशस्यमस्मद्भिर्मित्रसेव भिन्नमखिलभोक्तृसायो-  
गारावेध प्रधानानामहदादिसंजयनादिति। तत्तथिक  
अवेश्यर इति भवसिद्धात्तहार्निरिवर्षः॥

² स्मादेतदीनरसाधकप्रमाणाविचारेनेतेदसन्तका  
एव। अन्यथैवविधासन्तकसहस्रं प्रधानमपि वा-  
धितुं शक्यत इत्यत म्याह॥
a. Its establishment, i.e., the establishing that there is an eternal Lord. Of the Lord, in the first place, there is not sense-evidence; so that only the evidences of inference and of testimony can be offered; and these are inapplicable: such is the meaning.

b. The inapplicability he sets forth in two aphorisms:

संबन्धाभावावचारनुमानम् ॥९९ ॥

\(\text{Aph. 11. There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord]; because there is [here] no [case of invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken].}\)

\(\text{a. 'Association,' i.e., invariable concomitancy. 'There is none,' i.e., none exists, [in this case]. And so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord; because, in such arguments as, 'Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is a product,' [the fact of] invariable concomitancy is not established; since there is no compulsion [that every product should have had an intelligent maker]. Such is the meaning.}\)

\(\text{तत्त्वज्ञानिनित्येऽवर्तमानिः। इत्यरे तवप्रत्यक्षं \nनास्तित्यनुमानश्च विचारं प्रमाणे वक्तृत्वे ते च न \nसंभवत इत्यर्थे।॥}

\(\text{स्मृतिभवमेव प्रतिपाद्यति सूचाभ्याम्।॥}

\(\text{3 Vyāpyatwa, here rendered, is regarded as a synonym of vyāpti, by which sambandha, 'association,' is interpreted just above. Hence I have bracketed the words 'the fact of.' Ed.}\)

\(\text{संबन्धो व्याप्तिः। अभावोपसिद्धि:। तथा च}

\(\text{1 तत्सत्तज्ञानिनित्येऽवर्तमानिः। इत्यरे तवप्रत्यक्षं \nनास्तित्यनुमानश्च विचारं प्रमाणे वक्तृत्वे ते च न \nसंभवत इत्यर्थे।॥}

\(\text{2 अभावोपसिद्धि:। तथा च}

\(\text{3 Vyāpyatwa, here rendered, is regarded as a synonym of vyāpti, by which sambandha, 'association,' is interpreted just above. Hence I have bracketed the words 'the fact of.' Ed.}\)
b. Nor, moreover, he tells us, is there [the evidence of] Testimony¹ [to there being a Lord]:

**श्रुतिरिप् प्रधानकार्यलस्य ॥ ९२ ॥**

Denial that there is Scripture for it. Aph. 12. Moreover, there is Scripture for [this world’s] being the product of Nature, [not of a Lord].

a. Scripture asserts, exclusively, that the world is the product of Nature, not that it has Soul for its cause.²

b. He refutes, diffusely, by a cluster [of seven aphorisms],³ the opinion of an opponent in regard to that which was established in the first Section,⁴ viz., ‘Bondage does not arise from Ignorance,’ [conjoined with Soul].⁵

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¹ नापि शब्द इत्यादः ॥
² प्रपञ्च प्रधानकार्यलस्यैव श्रुतिति न चेतनकार्यले ॥
⁴ Pada, here used for adhāya, which the translator renders by ‘Book.’ For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed.
⁵ नाविद्यातो वन्धे इति यक्षिणान्तिं प्रथमपादेतत्स परमतिविलस्ततः प्रज्ञात्कैन्दृष्ट्यति ॥
Conjunction, in the case of the solitary, would be a contradiction.

Aph. 13. With that which is solitary there cannot be conjunction of the property of Ignorance.

a. Since Soul has no association [with anything whatever], it is plainly impossible for it to be united with the property of Ignorance.\(^1\)

b. But then, [it may be replied,] what is to be asserted is, that the conjunction of Ignorance is simply through force of Ignorance [which is a negation, or nonentity]; and so, since this is no reality, there is no association occasioned thereby. To this he replies:\(^2\)

A suggestion repelled.

Aph. 14. Since the existence of this [alleged negative Ignorance] is established [only] on the ground of its [pretended] conjunction, there is a vicious circle.\(^3\)

a. And, if it is by the conjunction of Ignorance that Ignorance is established, there is 'a vicious circle,' [lit-

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1 निःस्मात्या चेतनस्याविद्याशक्तियोगः साक्ष्मात्र संभवतीति \(\|\)

2 नन्विद्यावशदेवाविद्यायोगो वत्कथ्यतथा 

चापार्मार्थिनङ्काच तया सङ्कृते तिः \(\|\) तत्तत्

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\(^1\) For a different translation of this Aphorism, and of what introduces and succeeds it, see the *Rational Rejection*, &c., p. 257. *Ed.*
rally, a resting of each on the other, alternately], a rest-
ing a thing on itself; or, in short, a regressus in infinitum.¹

b. In reply to the doubt [suggested by the Naiyáyika],
‘but then, as in the case of seed and sprout, the regressus
in infinitum is no objection,’ he replies:²

न बीजाकृतवत्सारदिसारामसारश्चु:। १५।।

The world has a be-

Aph. 15. It is not as in the case of
seed and sprout; for Scripture teaches
that the world has a beginning.

a. There cannot belong to it such a regressus in infinitum as that of seed and sprout; because there is Scripture
for the fact that the mundane state of souls, consisting of
all undesirable things, viz., Ignorance, &c., had a begin-
ing. For we hear, in Scripture, that these cease to exist
at the dissolution of all things, in profound sleep, &c.
Such is the meaning.³

b. But then, [you Vedantis will say], according to us,
Ignorance is technically so termed, and is not, e.g., in

¹ श्रविद्यायोगाद्विद्यासिद्धी चान्योन्यार्थनयमा
मात्मार्थनयनमनवस्या वैव सिद्धः॥

² ननु बीजाकृतवदनवस्या न दैवायेवाश-
ह्याह॥

³ बीजाकृतवदनवस्या न सभ्याति युध्याना
संसारस्याद्विद्याद्विविधद्रष्टादस्य सार्वदिसाराः।
प्रलयसमे पुष्पादावभावार्थवस्यादि
त्वेः॥
the shape, specified by the *Yoga*, of supposing what is not soul to be soul; and so, just like your 'Nature,' since this [Ignorance] of ours has an unbroken eternity, though it be lodged in Soul, there is no disparagement of the solitariness thereof: in regard to this doubt, having deliberated on this artificial sense of the word 'Ignorance,' he objects to it:¹

\[\text{बिद्यातोऽन्ये ब्रह्माध्यप्रसङ्गः}^3 \parallel 16 \parallel\]

*Soul and knowledge not identical.*

Aph. 16. Then Brahma would be found to be excluded [from existence]; because he is something else than knowledge.

a. If the meaning of the word 'Ignorance' (*avidya*) be only 'otherness than knowledge,' then *Brahma*, soul itself, would be found to be excluded, to perish, through his being annihilable by knowledge; since he is other than knowledge: such is the meaning.⁴ [Further]:

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¹ नन्वस्माकमविद्या पारिभाषिकी नतु योगी-क्षान्तम्यात्मवुद्यादिदृश्य तथा च भवतां प्रधान-नवदेववस्माकमपि तस्या अन्यणातानादितया पुरुष-निधन्वेवधिपि नासक्तताहाजनिर्दिप्याशक्तियां परिक-तित्तमविद्याश्वत्तां विकल्प दूषयति \parallel

² One of my MSS. of Nagesa has विद्यायन्ये. *Ed.*

³ -प्रसङ्गः: found in some MSS. of Vijnāna, is the reading of Aniruddha and of Nāgēśa. *Ed.*

⁴ 'यदि विद्यायन्यलेखाविद्याश्वत्तां र्वेष्ठां हि तस्य
शब्दाधिकार नाण्यवास्त्रम् ॥ १७ ॥

Knowledge, not excluding ignorance, would be resultless.

Aph. 17. Were there not exclusion, then there would be resultlessness.

a. But, if the existence of ignorance were really not excluded by knowledge, then there would be resultlessness of knowledge, because of its not debarring Ignorance, [which is the only result competent to knowledge]: such is the meaning.¹

b. He censures the other alternative,² [viz., that knowledge might exclude Soul]:

विद्यावास्त्रेण जगान् भवेत्र्यम् ॥ १८ ॥

On the Vedanta theory, the world ought to vanish.

Aph. 18. If it [Ignorance,] meant the being excludible by Knowledge, it would be [predicable], in like manner, of the world, also.

a. H, on the other hand, the being excludible by Knowledge, in the case of the soul, which possesses properties,

श्यानानाशयत्वा व्रहण श्यात्मनोधिपि वाधो नाशः
प्रस्त्यते विद्याभिनितिवादित्यष्ट: ॥

¹ यद्य लविद्याश्चेति विद्यया न वाधोते
तत्रहृ विद्याविद्याश्चेति विद्यानिव्यते
कालाभावादीत्यष्ट: ॥

² पष्कान्तरं दृष्यति ॥
be, indeed, what is meant by the being Ignorance, in that case 'the world,' the whole mundane system, viz., Nature, Mind, &c., would, also, in like manner, be Ignorance. And so, the whole mundane system being merely Ignorance, since the Ignorance would be annihilated by one man's knowledge, the mundane system would become invisible to others, also. Such is the import.¹

तदूपनेष सादिवम् ॥ १५ ॥

Aph. 19. If it [Ignorance.] were of that nature, it would be something that had a commencement.

a. Or suppose it to be the case, that to be Ignorance means simply the being excludible by Knowledge, still such a thing could not have had an eternal existence in souls [as held by Vedántás (see § 15, b.)], but must have had a commencement. For it is proved, by such re-

¹ यदि पुनर्विद्या चेतने धर्मिष्ठाः वाध्यत्म-वामाविद्यामुच्यते तथा सति जगतः प्रकृति-हरायिना विद्याप्रवस्थायेवाविद्यान स्यात्। तथा च प्रवस्थायेवाविद्यार्य सत्येक्ष्य म्यानना-विद्यानाश्याद्गीरिप सत्यो न दृष्येतति भावः॥

² Owing to a clerical defect, both my MSS. of Nágeśa’s work omit this Aphorism, and also much of the comment preceding and following it. Ed.
cited texts as, 'Consisting of knowledge alone,' \(^1\) &c., that, at the time of the universal dissolution, &c., the soul consists of Knowledge alone. Such is the meaning. Therefore, it is settled that there is no other Ignorance, annihilable by Knowledge, than that stated in the Yoga system; and this is a property of the understanding only, not a property of the soul.\(^2\)

\(\delta\). By a cluster of [six] aphorisms,\(^3\) he clears up the prima facie view of an opponent, in regard to that which was stated in the same Book [Book V., § 2], that Nature's energizing is due to Merit: \(^5\)

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\(^1\) Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad, ii. 4, 12; or Satapatha-brāhmaṇa, xiv., 5, 4, 12. \(\text{Ed.}\)

\(^2\) Professor Gough has, 'a pure indifference of thought.' Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 153. \(\text{Ed.}\)

\(^3\) भवतु वा यथा कथंचिदिवावायुध्मेववा- 
विद्यावं तथा पि तादृशवस्तुन: सारिलमेव पुरुषेषु 
नलनादिति संभवति। विज्ञानघन एवेऽख्यातु- 
क्षणतिंभ: प्रलयादी पुरुषस्य चिन्माचतसिद्ध- 
रित्यथः। तस्मादोगद्धोकादन्या नास्त्यविद्या 
ज्ञानानाथ्या सा च चुबिधमैव न पुरुषमेव हृति 
सिद्धम\(\text{।}\)

\(^4\) Read, instead of 'by a cluster,' &c., 'by enunciations.' \(\text{Ed.}\)

\(^5\) ऋषेघ्रायायं कर्मनिमित्तः प्रधानप्रवृत्तिरिति 
यदुस्तं तत् परपूर्वपभं समाधेत्व प्रघट्टेन\(\text{।}\)
Merit is undeniable.

Aph. 20. There is no denying Merit; because of the diversity in the operations of Nature.

a. Merit is not to be denied on the ground of its being no object of sense; because it is inferred; since, otherwise, 'the diversity in the operations of Nature' [accommodating one person, and inconveniencing another.] would be unaccounted for: such is the meaning.

b. He states further proof, also:

Proofs of this.

Aph. 21. It [the existence of Merit] is established by Scripture, by tokens, &c.

a. He shows to be a fallacy the argument of the opponent, that Merit exists not, because of there being no sense-evidence of it:

\[\text{न नियमः प्रमाणान्तरावकाशात्} \ || \ 22 ||\]

\[\text{अप्रत्याश्चत्या धर्मपालायो न संभवति प्रकृतिकार्यथैव वैचित्यान्यानुपपत्त्या तदनुमानादित्यर्थ्;} \ ||\]

\[\text{प्रमाणान्तरचन्द्रायां} \ ||\]

\[\text{प्रत्याशाभावादिर्मालिनिद्रित्ति परस्य हेतुमाभासीकरोति} \ ||\]
Aph. 22. There is, here, no necessity; for there is room for other proofs.

a. That is to say: there is no necessity that a thing of which there is no mundane sense-evidence must be non-existent; because things are subject to other proofs.¹

b. He proves that there exists Demerit, as well as Merit:²

उभयचारण्यम् ॥ २३ ॥

Demerit as certain as Merit.

Aph. 23. It is thus, moreover, in both cases.

a. That is to say: the proofs apply to Demerit, just as they do to Merit.³

अष्टाद्वितिव्येष्ठेतत्सामानमुभयोः ॥ २४ ॥

The proof of each the same.

Aph. 24. If the existence [of Merit] be as of course, [because, otherwise, something would be unaccounted for], the same is the case in respect of both.

a. But then, merit is proved to exist by a natural consequence in this shape, viz., that, otherwise, an injunction

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¹ लौकिकप्रत्यक्षाभावाधृतभाव इति नियमो
नास्ति प्रमाणान्तरेणापि वस्तूनां विषयीकरणा-
दित्यथ: ॥

² धर्मवद्धर्ममापि साधयति ॥

³ धर्मवद्धर्मवेंव श्रमाणानीत्यथ: ॥
would be unaccounted for; but there is none such in respect of demerit: so how can Scriptural or logical argument be extended to demerit? If any one says this, it is not so; since there is proof, in the shape of natural consequence, 'it is alike, in respect of both,' i.e., of both merit and demerit; because, otherwise, a prohibitory injunction, such as, 'He should not approach another's wife,' would be unaccounted for. Such is the meaning.¹

6. He repels the doubt, that, if Merit, &c., be acknowledged [to exist], then, in consequence of souls' having properties, &c., they must be liable to modification, &c.²

अन्तःकरणधर्मेन्दर्थमादिनाम् \( \| 25 \| \)

\textit{Aph. 25. It is of the internal organ}⁴ [not of soul,] that Merit, &c., are the properties.

¹ ननु विध्यन्यशानुपपत्तिः पपपार्थाप्या धर्मं सिद्धः सा च नास्त्यधर्मं इति कथं श्रीतिमञ्जतिदेशोधर्मं इति चेष्य यत्: समानमुभोर्धमियोधर्मं धर्मंयोर्धापपत्तिः प्रमाशामसि परदाराच गज्जेदिति निषेधविध्यन्यशानुपप्पेरित्यथः: \( \| \)
² ननु धर्मादिकं चेत्त्वीकृतं तत्रं युष्माण्ड्रम धर्मादिष्मच्छन परिशामवधापप्पेरित्याश्रकं परिहरति \( \| \)
³ The 'great internal organ' (\textit{mahat}), called also \textit{buddhi}, is here referred to. See Book I., Aph. 64, a. Aniruddha's comment runs:
a. In the expression ' &c.' are included all those that are stated, in the Vaiśeṣika Institute, as peculiar qualities of soul.¹⁴

b. [To the objection, that the existence of an internal organ, as well as of the Qualities from which such might arise, is debarred by Scripture, he replies]:

\[ गुणादीनां च नात्यन्तवाधः \] \[ \textit{Aph. 26. And of the Qualities, &c., there is not absolute debarment.} \]

a. The Qualities, viz., Purity, &c., and their properties, viz., happiness, &c., and their products, also, viz., Mind, &c., are not denied essentially, but are denied only adjunctively in respect of soul; just as we deny that heat [in red-hot iron] belongs to the iron. ³

b. In regard to the doubt, 'Why, again, do we not deny

\[ बुद्धिधर्मवेव । चात्मधर्मवेव निःस्मल्नश्वश्विति- क्षेरः \] \[ \textit{Ed.} \]

¹ \[ अदिशन्त्र्वें वैशेषिकश्चारस्कः सर्वे चात्म- विशेषगुण्णः गृह्नले \]

² \textit{Vide supra}, p. 71, Aph. 61, b. \[ \textit{Ed.} \]

³ \[ गुणानां सत्त्वादीनां तद्भवानां च सुखादीनां तत्कायािश्चापि महादीनां सहहृतो नास्ति बाधः किं तु संसर्गते एव चेतने वाधीश्योष्माय- बाधवत् \]
them an essence, as we do to what is meant by the words sleep, wish, &c.? he says: ¹

³पञ्जावयवयोगात्मकसञ्चिति: II २७ II

The above thesis argued. Aph. 27. By a conjunction of the five members [of an argumentative statement] we discern [that] Happiness [exists].

a. Here, in order to get a particular subject of his assertion, he takes happiness alone, one portion of the matter in dispute, as a representative of the entire matter. But the better reading is, 'we discern [that] Happiness, &c., [exist].' The five members of an argumentative statement are the Proposition, Reason, Example, Synthesis [of the two premises], and Conclusion; and, by the 'conjunction,' i.e., the combination, of these, all things, viz., Happiness, &c., are proved to exist. Such is the meaning. ²

¹ कुत: पुन: स्वरूपत एव वाधो न भवति स्वभामनोरयादिपदार्थविद्यातिकाश्चायामाह II

² One of my MSS. of Aniruddha has -संयोगात Ed.

³ Nagesa has सुखादिसञ्चिति:, the lection which, according to Vijnána, is to be preferred. Ed.

⁴ अथ विनिषय पक्षीकरणाय विवादविषये-कटेगस्य सुखमाचस्य यहं सर्वविषयोपलक्षकम्। सुखादिसञ्चितिरिति पाठस्तु समीचिनः। पञ्जावयवाच्य न्यायस्य प्रतिज्ञाहतदाहरणोपनयनिनग-
b. And the employment [of the argument] is this:

(1) Pleasure is real;
(2) Because it produces motion in something.
(3) Whatever produces motion in anything is real, as are sentient beings;
(4) And pleasure produces motion in things, in the way of horripilation, &c.:
(5) Therefore, it is real.¹

c. But then the Chārvāka, next, doubts whether there be any evidence other than sense-evidence; since [he contends,] there is no truth in the assertion [of an inductive conclusion], that such and such is pervaded by such and such, &c.²³

न सकृद्रह्यात्मानस्यसिद्धिः \[25\] ॥

मनानि तेषां शोगान्मेलनालसुखाद्धिकलपाध्ये-
सिद्धिरित्यययः \[2\] ॥

¹ प्रयोगश्चायम् \ | सुलभः सत् | ऋषिक्रियाकार-
रिल् \ | यद्यद्धिक्रियाकारित तत्स्याय चेतनाः | पुलकादिरिपार्थिक्रियाकारित च सुखम् \ | तस्मात्-
दिति \ ॥

² नन्तु प्रत्यक्षातिरिति रुपः प्रमाणमेव न भवति
वैधात्मान्यायसिद्धिरिति चार्वाकः पुनः शास्त्रे \[2\] ॥

³ For the Charvakas' rejection of the authority of inference, see pp. 5, et seq., of the translation of the Sarva-dariana-sangraha by Professors Cowell and Gough. Ed.
Aph. 28. Not from once apprehending is a connexion established.

a. That is to say: from once apprehending concomitance [of a supposed token and the thing betokened], a 'connexion,' i.e., a pervadedness [or invariable attendedness of the token by the betokened], is not established; and frequency [of the same apprehension] follows [the rule of the single apprehension; just as a thousand times nothing amount to nothing]. Therefore [argues the sceptic,] since the apprehending of an invariable attendedness is impossible, nothing can be established by Inference. [This] he clears up. ²

Aph. 29. Pervadedness is a constant consociation of characters, in the case of both, or of one of them.

a. 'Consociation of characters,' i.e., consociation in the fact of being characters [or properties of something]; in short, concomitancy. And so we mean, that that concomitancy is 'pervadedness,' [furnishing solid ground for infer-

1 As suggestive of the correction here required, see Professor Cowell's Aphorisms of Śaṅkūṭa, &c., p. 8, text and foot-note.  Ed.

2 'कृत्यहरियास्फलवयुवाचतो व्याप्तिः सिद्धति भूयस्थं चातनुगतम्। चतो व्याप्तियहास्फलवा-चातनुमालनार्थसिद्धिरिवथः। समास्थि॥

3 Nagesa has, instead of नियतं, नियतं  Ed.
ence], which is invariably non-errant, whether in the case of 'both,' the predicate and the reason, or in the case of 'one of them,' the reason only. 'Of both' is mentioned with reference to the case of 'equal pervadedness': [e. g., every equilateral triangle is equiangular, and, conversely, every equiangular triangle is equilateral]. And the invariableness may be apprehended through an appropriate confusion [or reductio ad absurdum of the denial of it]; so that there is no impossibility in apprehending 'pervadedness,' [and of inferring on the strength of it]. Such is the import.¹

b. He declares that Pervadedness is not an additional principle, consisting, e. g., of some such power as is to be mentioned² [in § 31]:

न तत्त्वान्तरं वस्तुकल्पनाप्रतिबन्धः! ! 30 !

Aph. 30. It [Pervadedness,] is not
[as some think (see § 31),] an addi-
tional principle [over and above the
twenty-five (Book I, § 61)]; for it is unsuitable to postulate
entities [praeter rationem].

¹ धर्मसाहित्यं धर्मं तत्त्वान्तरं साहित्यं सहचार इति यावत्। तथा चोभयो: साध्यसाधनं यो रेमकतरस्य
साधनमाषस्य वा नियतोऽवभिचरितो यः सह-
चारं: स व्याप्तिस्वत्वः। उभयोऽरिति नम्बर-प्रिपः प्रोक्तम्। नियमश्चादनुकूलतर्कं याद्यः
इति न व्याप्तियहासंभव इति भवः॥

² व्याप्तिबल्यमाषस्य शक्यादिन्धुम पदार्थान्तरं न
भवतिल्याह॥
a. 'Pervadedness' is not an entity other than a fixed con-
sociation of characters; because it is unsuitable to suppose,
further, some entity as the residence of what constitutes
'pervadedness.' But we consider that what constitutes
'pervadedness' belongs to extant things simply. Such is
the meaning.¹

b. He states the opinion of others:²

निन्जश्चक्तुद्धवमित्याचार्यः: || ३१ ||

A heterodox opinion
regarding 'Pervaded-
ness.' Aph. 31. [But certain] teachers say
that it [Pervadedness] is [another prin-
ciple, in addition to the twenty-five,]
resulting from the power of the thing itself.

a. But other teachers assert that 'Pervadedness' is,
positively, a separate principle, in the shape of a species of
power, generated by the native power of the 'pervaded.'
But [they continue,] 'Pervadedness' is not simply a power
of the [pervaded] thing itself; else it would exist wherever
the thing is, [which 'pervadedness' does not do]. For
smoke, when it has gone to another place [than the point
of its origination], is not attended by fire; and, by going
into another place, that power is put an end to. Therefore
[contend these teachers,] there is no over-extension in the

¹ नियतमेज्जाहितायांतिरित्तुष्टु भव्याप्निन्यं भवति व्याप्तिवाल्यस्य वस्तुनोषिपण कस्मनामस्य्ज्ञात्त। ऋष्मामिन्तु सिद्धकल्युं एव व्याप्तिमार्गं
कस्मितास्यत्मः ||

² परमतमाह ||
above-stated definition; for, according to our doctrine, the smoke [which betokens fire] is to be specialized as that which is at the time of origination. Such is the import.¹

अधियायशक्त्रियोग इति पञ्चशिखः। ॥ ३२ ॥

Aph. 32. Panchasikha² says that it ['Pervadedness,'] is the possession of the power of the sustained.

a. That is to say: Panchasikha holds that percadingness is the power which consists in being the sustainer, and that 'Pervadedness'² is the having the power which consists in being the sustained; for Intellect, and the rest, are treated as being pervaded [or invariably attended,] by Nature, &c.;³

¹ अप्रे लाचाया व्यासस्य स्वर्गशक्त्रिजपं शक्तः-

विशेषब्रह्म तत्वान्तरमेव व्यास्वर्णिर्त्याहुः। निःशक्तिमायं तु याच्छव्यस्याव्ययतः न व्यास्यः। देशान्तरगतिः धूमस्य वृह्वच्च्वायाप्चलाहेशान्तरगमनेन

च सा शक्तिनाश्यत इति नोज्जलक्ष्यान्तरस्वर्णिः

स्मते त्रिपतिकालाविशेषविश्लेषविशेषाय इति भावः। ॥

² The translator's 'the Panchasikha' I have everywhere corrected. Ed.

³ This is to render vyāpyatva, on which vide supra, p. 320, note 3. Ed.

⁴ वृद्धार्दिषु प्रकृत्यादिवैष्ठायत्यवहारादाधार-
[and this means that each product, in succession, is sustained by what precedes it in the series].

b. But then, why is a 'power of the sustained' postulated? Let 'Pervadedness' be simply an essential power of the thing pervaded. To this he [Panchaśikha,] replies:

न ॥\textsuperscript{2}स्वरूपशक्तिनियमः पुनर्वादप्रसतः ॥ ३३ ॥

Panchaśikha's reply to an objection.

Aph. 33. The relation is not an essential power; for we should have [in that case,] a tautology.

a. But 'the relation,' viz., 'Pervadedness,' is not an essential power; for we should [thus] have a tautology; because, just as there is no difference between 'water-jar' and 'jar for water,' so, also, there is none in the case of 'Intelect' and 'what is Pervaded' [by Nature, of which Intellect consists]. Such is the meaning.

ताशक्तिवीपकापकाधेयताशक्तिमल्यं च व्यापलिनि
ति पञ्चशिस्क इत्यथः ॥

1 नवाधेयशक्तिः किमथं कस्यंते। व्यापस्य वस्तुन् स्वरूपशक्तिरेव व्याप्सिरले। तच्छाह ॥

Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva read स्वरूपशक्तिनि-

यमः. Ed.

2 स्वरूपशक्तिस्तु नियमो व्याप्सिनेन भवति पौ
नस्त्यप्रस्मज्ञातः कलश इतिविद्विद्विष्णूपेत्यचाप
षोभेदेनेतर्यः ॥
b. He himself explains the 'Tautology' [1]

विशेषान्तर्णक्यम्रास्ति: ॥ ३४ ॥

*The reason why.*

*Aph. 34. Because we should find the distinction unmeaning; [as Intellect does not differ from Nature at all, except as does the sustained from the sustainer]*

a. This is almost explained by the preceding aphorism. [2]

b. He [Panchasikha] mentions another objection: [3]

पञ्चवादिष्क्यनुपपलेश्वर ॥ ३५ ॥

*Aph. 35. And because it [Pervadedness] would not be reconcilable in shoots, &c.*

a. Because shoots, &c., are invariably attended [at their origination,] by trees, &c. But this cannot be called simply an essential power [in the shoot]; because, since the essential power [that which belongs to the shoot as being a shoot,] does not depart, even in the case of an amputated shoot, we should, even then, find it attended [by the tree, which, however, no longer accompanies it]. Such is the sense. But the power [(see § 32), which consists in having the

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1 पौनरुक्तम् स्वयमेव विवृतीति ॥
2 पूर्वसूच एव व्याख्यात्प्रायमिद्धि ॥
3 दूषिशान्तरमाह ॥
4 Aniruddha omits च. Ed.
character] of the ‘sustained’ is destroyed at the time of amputation; so that there is no ‘Pervadedness’ then. Such is the import.¹

6. But then what? Panchasikha says that ‘Pervadedness’ is not a result of any essential power. Then, since smoke is not sustained by fire [see § 32, where he contends that ‘sustainedness’ is what really expresses pervasion], it would turn out that it [viz., smoke,] is not [as token of something that is betokened,] accompanied by fire. To this he says:²

Answer: शास्त्रस्कत्तिसिद्धी निन्दश्चक्तियोगः समानमयायात् ॥ ३६ ॥

Aph. 36. Were it [thus] settled that it is a power of the ‘sustained,’ then, by the like argument, its dependence on an essential power, [as pretended by the heterodox teachers

1 पञ्चवादिदु चृद्धादिव्याणताति । स्वरूपश्चक्तिमात्र तु तत्स्य लक्षणं न संभवति चिन्नचक्तिन्वेदपि स्वरूपश्चक्तिन्वेदपि व्याप्तात्पत्तेः रितिः । शास्त्रस्कत्तिसिद्धु चौदकाले विनेत्रति न तदानीव व्यास्निरिति मावः ॥

2 ननु किं पञ्चशिक्ते निन्दश्चक्तुयुक्तो व्यास्निरेव नोच्चते। ततः धृतस्थिती बृहाधिक्यवाचाभावावृत्तिव्याप्तात्पत्तिरिति । ततः ॥
referred to in § 31, might be proved, also; and thus the argument proves nothing, since it proves too much].

a. That is to say: 'were it settled' that 'a power of the sustained' constitutes the fact of 'Pervadedness,' it would be really settled 'by the like argument,' i.e., by parity of reasoning, that the fact of 'Pervadedness' results from essential power, also, [§ 31, a.].

b. It was with a view to substantiate what was stated [in § 27], viz., that the Qualities, and the rest, are established [as realities,] by the employment of the five-membered [form of argumentative exposition], that he has repelled, by an exposition of 'Pervadedness,' the objection to Inference as evidence, [or as a means of attaining right notions].

c. Now, in order to establish the fact that words, of which the five-membered [exposition] consists, are generators of knowledge, the objection of others to a word's being a means of right knowledge, in the shape of [the objection

1 अधिष्ठायश्चेत्याप्रिनितसिद्धि निजशक्तियुक्ते विद्या
व्यासितवेत्त एव समानन्यायधुत्किसाम्यादिल्यः: ||

2 पञ्चावयवयोगानुपादितसिद्धितिरिति यदुःतदु
पपाताय व्यासिनिर्विचननानूमानप्रामालये वा-
धकमपञ्चाः: ||

3 'Being a means of right knowledge' here renders pramanya, represented, just before, by 'as evidence.' Ed.
of] its being inadequate, is disposed of, by means of an exposition of the powers, &c., of words: ¹

वाच्यवाचकभावः संबन्धः ² शब्दार्थयोः ॥ ३७ ॥

Sound and sense. Aph. 37. The connexion between word and meaning is the relation of expressed and expresser.

a. To the 'meaning' belongs the power termed expre-
sibleness; to the 'word,' the power termed expression: sim-
ply this is their 'connexion;' their interrelation, as it were.³

¹ इदानीं पञ्चवाचववहुपञ्चववट्टस्य झानजनकालो-पपत्त्ये शब्दशक्त्यादिनिर्वचनेन तदनुपपत्तिः प्रश्रुप्ताये परिषां वाधकपपास्यते ॥

² वाच्यवाचकसंबन्धः is the reading of Aniruddha. Ed.

³ Instead of 'simply,' &c., read, 'this itself is their connexion, such [a connexion] as [is seen] in anatheticity.'

The 'connexion' in question is the swarūpa-sambandha, for which see Professor Cowell's translation of the Kusumāṇjali, p. 13, note †.

A better reading than the one which Dr. Ballantyne accepted from me is, certainly, that which omits the clause rendered, 'to the word, the power termed expression.' According to Nagesa, 'the expressibility inherent in the meaning is the connexion [intended]':

अर्थगतं वाच्यवाचमनुगोतितात्वसंबन्धः ।

Anuyogin and anuyogita, as Professor Cowell informs me, are the opposites of pratiyogin and pratiyogita, which latter I would represent, provisionally, by 'antithetic' and 'antitheticity.'

Pratiyogin, a very much commoner technicality than anuyogin, occurs in the comment on Aph. 95 of this Book. It must suffice, here, to add, that, as I learn from Professor Cowell, the anuyogin,
From one's knowing this [connexion between a given word and meaning], the meaning is suggested [or raised in the mind,] by the word. Such is the import.¹

b. He mentions what things cause one to apprehend the powers² [in question]:

चिन्ता: संवन्धिसिद्धः || 38 ||

Sense of words how learned.

Aph. 38. The connexion [between a word and its sense] is determined by three [means]

a. That is to say: the connexion [just] mentioned [in § 37.] is apprehended by means of these three, viz., information from one competent [to tell us the meaning], the usage of the old man [whose orders to his sons we hear, and then observe what actions ensue, in consequence (see the Sāhitya-darpaṇa, § 11)], and application to the same thing which has a familiar name,⁴ [whence we gather the sense of the less familiar synonym].

or 'anathetic,' of ghatābhāva, 'non-existence of a jar,' is ghaṭābhāva itself, and the pratiyogin, or 'antithetic,' of ghaṭābhāva is ghaṭa, 'jar.' Ed.

¹ चर्च्य वाच्यातां शक्ति: शब्दे वाचकतां शक्तिरस्य सैव तथार्थान तत्रोत्सवयोगितावैत। तत्त्वानां च भौतिकत्वायां परस्परस्वतिरिलिप्यथ: ||

² शक्त�याहकारं याह ||

³ Aniruddha has संवन्धिसिद्धे. Ed.

⁴ आन्तोपदेशो वृद्भयवह: प्रसिद्धपदसामानाधिकरणमितेतिरिलिपिन्तः संबन्धो गृहत्व इत्येद: ||
Aph. 39. There is no restriction to what is to be done; because we see it both ways.

a. That is to say: and there is no necessity that this apprehension of the powers [§ 37,] should occur only in the case of 'something [directed] to be done;' because, in [the secular life and dealings of] the world, we see the usage of the old man, &c., [§ 38,] in regard to what is not to be done [being something already extant], also, as well as in regard to what is to be done.1

Aph. 40. He who is accomplished in the secular [connexion of words with meanings] can understand the sense of the Veda.

a. Here he entertains a doubt:4

1 स च शक्तियहः कार्य एव भवतीति नियमो नासि लोके कार्यवद्कार्येष्वपि वृह्यवहारादिदर्शनादिनित्यथ:।

2 Aniruddha reads लोकयुत्पञ्चस्य. Ed.

3 Vijnana is singular as regards the lection -प्रतीति:, instead of -प्रतीति: Ed.

4 छ छ श्रद्धते।
Aph. 41. Not by the three [means mentioned in § 38, objects some one, can the sense of the Veda be gathered]; because the Veda is superhuman, and what it means transcends the senses.

a. Of these he first repels the assertion, that what is meant [by the Veda] is something transcending the senses.

This cleared up.

Aph. 42. Not so [i.e., what is meant by the Veda is not something transcending the senses]; because sacrificings, &c., are, in themselves, what constitutes merit, preeminently.

a. What is asserted [in § 41.] is not the case; since sacrificings, gifts, &c., in the shape, e.g., of the relinquishment of some thing for the sake of the gods, are really, in themselves, 'what constitutes merit,' i.e., what is enjoined by the Veda, 'preeminently,' i.e., because of their having preeminent fruit. And sacrificings, &c., since they are in the shape of wishings, &c., [of which we are perfectly conscious], are not something transcending intuition. But 'what constitutes merit' [which the objector supposes to transcend intuition] does not belong to something mysterious that resides in sacri-
ficings, &c., whence what is enjoined in the Veda must be
beyond intuition. Such is the meaning.¹

b. He repels also what was asserted [in § 41], viz., that,
inasmuch as it [the Veda,] is superhuman, there can be no
instruction by any competent person,² [in regard to its
import]:

निरजशक्तिपूर्वल्प्या व्यवस्थितव्यते || ४३ ||

Aph. 43. The natural force [of the
Knowledge of the Veda
terms in the Veda] is ascertained
traditional.
through the conversancy [therewith of
those who successively transmit the knowledge].

a. But then, still, how can there be apprehension of the
sense of Vaidic terms, in the case of gods, fruits [of ac-
tions], &c., which transcend sense? To this he replies:³

¹ यदुःं तत्र यतो देवतोहृत्यकद्वयत्यागादिदृष्टी
पस्य यज्ञदानाते: स्वरूपत एव धर्मवेदवि-
हितवं वैशिष्ट्याल्पक्रृष्ठवकालात् । यज्ञादिकं
चेष्टादिदृष्टीपवाचतातीतिद्रियम् । नतु यज्ञादिवि-
वयकापुर्वस्य धर्मवेदः नेन वेदविहितस्यातीतिद्रियता
स्यादित्यर्यः: ||

² यशोक्षमपैथकस्यसोयेरवामापदेशायाय इति त-
द्रिपि निराकरोति: ||

³ नतु तथायतीतिद्रियतेवतापलादिदुष कथं शाक्षियीहो वैदिकपदानां स्यात् । तदाह ||
Aph. 44. This really takes place; because they [viz., the words] give rise to knowledge, in the case both of things adapted [to sense] and of things not [so] adapted.

a. He defines the peculiarities which belong to words, just because this matter is connected with the question of the power of words to cause right knowledge:

Aph. 45. The Vedas are not from eternity; for there is Scripture for their being a production.

a. Then are the Vedas the work of [the Supreme] Man? To this he replies, 'No':

1 Aniruddha, according to one of my MSS., has तलिनेिः. Ed.

2 शक्तिमात्रांवयप्रस्त्रेनेव शक्ति गत विशेषमव-धारणयति।

3 'Power to cause right knowledge' is to render pramāṇya. Ed.

4 One of my MSS., of Aniruddha originally had कार्येषु. Ed.

5 तत्रीिं व्रिमति वैष्णव वेदा:। नेत्याह॥
The Lord not the author.

Aph. 46. They [the Vedas] are not the work of [the Supreme] Man; because there is no such thing as the [Supreme] Man, [whom you allude to as being, possibly,] their maker.

a. Supply, 'because we deny that there is a Lord.'

[This is] simple.  

b. Adverting to the anticipation that there may be some other author, he says:

मुक्तामुक्तोर्योगयुक्तम् || 87 ||

Who are not authors of the Vedas.

Aph. 47. Since the liberated is unsuited [to the work, by his indifference], and the unliberated is so; [by his want of power, neither of these can be author of the Vedas].

a. But then, in that case, since they are not the work of [the Supreme] Man, it follows that they are eternal. To this he replies:

नापौष्पेयवाचिनित्यलमहृदार्द्वित || 88 ||

1 Vide supra, p. 112, note 3.  Ed.

2 इश्वरप्रतिष्ठादिति शेषः । सुगमम ||

3 ऋपरः कर्ता भवित्याकाश्चायामाह ||

4 See Book I., Aph. 93 and 94, at pp. 113, 114, supra.  Ed.

5 नन्वेवमपौष्पेयवाचिनित्यलमेवागतम । तचाः ||
An illustration. Aph. 48. As in the case of sprouts, &c., their eternity does not follow from their not being the work of [any Supreme] Man.

a. [This is] plain.¹

b. But then, since sprouts, &c., also, just like jars, &c., are productions, we must infer that they are the work of [the Supreme] Man. To this he replies:²

तेषामपि तद्योगे दृष्ट्वा धारादिरिस्तिः ४५॥

Aph. 49. Were this the case with these, also, [i.e., if it were the case that vegetables were works], we should find a contradiction to experience, &c.

a. It is seen, in the world, as an invariable fact,³ that whatever is the work of Man is produced by a body. This would be debarred, &c., were the case as you contend; [for we see no embodied Supreme Man to whose handiwork the sprouts of the earth can be referred]. Such is the meaning.⁴

b. But then, since they were uttered by the Primal

¹ स्पष्टम् ॥
² नन्दव्याराधिप्रियः कार्यवेचन घटादिविव्यौहर्वे-यत्समुमेयम् । तत्राह ॥
³ 'Invariable fact' is to translate nyápti. Ed.
⁴ यथौः चेयं तत्कारीरजन्यमिति व्याप्तिपीयांके दृष्टा । तस्या धारादिरिस्तिः सति स्यादित्यवं: ॥
Man, the Vedas, moreover, are, really, the work of [the Supreme] Man. To this he replies:

मस्मरेदिपि कृतबुद्धिसृष्टिते तत्यथवे-
यम || 50 ||

Only what is voluntary

Aph. 50. That [only] is Man's work, in respect of which, even be it something invisible, an effort of understanding takes place.

a. As in the case of what is visible, so, too, in the case of what is invisible, in respect of what thing there takes place 'an effort of understanding,' i.e., a consciousness that Thought preceded, that thing alone is spoken of as Man's work: such is the meaning. Thus it has been re-

² नन्दादिपुश्वोचरितनागेषदा अधिप धौवेया
एवेलाह ||

² Read: 'Even where an invisible [originator] is in question, that [thing] in respect of which there arises the idea of [its] being made is [what is meant by] a production by a person.' Aniruddha, Nāgęśa, and Vedānti Mahādeva agree in supplying kartari after adrishte. Ed.

³ Instead of Vijñāna's expression, 'the idea of [its] being preceded by consciousness,' Nāgęśa has: बुद्धिपूर्वक्षृततवुद्धि:, 'the idea that [its] being made was preceded by consciousness,' i.e., the notion that it was produced aforesought.

Vedānti Mahādeva impliedly contrasts with a jar, as being a production of an intelligent and self-conscious maker, a sprout, which originates as a factor of a series of causes and effects alternating from the time when vegetation was first evolved. Also see the two aphorisms preceding the one commented on. Ed.
marked that a thing is not Man's work merely through its having been uttered by Man; for no one speaks of the respiration during profound sleep as being Man's work; [or voluntary act]. But what need to speak of antecedence of Understanding? The Vedas, just like an expiration, proceed, of themselves, from the Self-existent, through the force of fate, wholly unpremeditated by thought. Therefore, they are not [a 'Supreme'] Man's work.¹²

¹ Drś Ṣvāṭēṣṭrīḥ Ṛg&mūrka&uacute;pāryaṁ vāsīnampūrṇa kṛtāṅgāṅgānāṁ bhūṃkālaḥ kāśīpanaḥ ānāyate tataḥ pūrṇaṁ vikāryānāṁ vā vikāryānāṁ dhv̄iṣyate ityevam. Ī rūdusmabhavant. N pūrṇaṁ bhavantitā mātarmān prāśāyaḥ prāśāyaḥ sūpyāśaḥ sannidhāmānaḥ pūrṇaṁ abhāvān vāyavahārābhāvān ī mā tū bhūṃkālaḥ. Vedaṣṭu nāḥ śāsavēdevaṭāṭeṣṭaḥ sādbhāvaḥ sādvēdevaṭāṭeṣṭaḥ eva svayambhūv: svākṣa śvākṣaṁ bhavant. "

² Instead of 'a thing is not Man's work,' &c., I have translated, in the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 65: 'Not from the mere fact of [its] being uttered by a person [can one say there is] producedness [of a thing] by [that] person; since it is not the wont to speak of the respiration of deep sleep as the production of a person: but, by [reason of its] production consciously, [a thing is said to be produced by a person]. The Vedas, however, just like an expiration, and by virtue of desert [of souls], issue, spontaneously, from Brahmā, without ever being consciously produced [by him]. Hence they are not productions of a person.'

Dr. Ballantyne was misled by the ruš stop mistakenly put, in my edition of the Śāṅkhyā-pravacanā-bhāṣya, before kīṁ tu. Ed.
5. But then, in that case, since they are not preceded by a correct knowledge of the sense of the sentences,\textsuperscript{1} the Vedas, moreover, like the speech of a parrot, can convey no right knowledge.\textsuperscript{2} To this he replies:\textsuperscript{3}

\textit{निजशक्तिभिभिष्यते: स्वतः प्रामाण्यम् ॥ ५१ ॥}

\textit{The Vedas their own evidence.} \textit{Aph. 51. They are, spontaneously, conveyers of right knowledge, from the patentness of their own power [to instruct rightly].}

\textit{a. That is to say: the authoritativeness\textsuperscript{4} of the very whole of the Vedas is established, not by such a thing as its being based on the enouncer's knowledge of the truth, but quite 'spontaneously;' because, as for the Vedas' 'own,' i.e., natural, power of generating right knowledge, thereof we perceive the manifestation in the invocations\textsuperscript{5} [which produce the result promised], and in the Medical}

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\textsuperscript{1} Read, instead of 'since they are,' &c., 'since the true sense of their sentences was not originated consciously.' \textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{2} The implied 'power to convey right knowledge' represents \textit{prāmdnya}. \textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{3} तन्वेव यथार्थवाक्यार्थवान्यापूर्वकवाच्चकवा-कास्येव बेदानामापि प्रामाण्यं न स्यात् । तबाह ॥

\textsuperscript{4} Vedānti Mahadeva has the reading निजशक्तिभाविभिष्यते:, and comments accordingly: निजशक्तियेव ज्ञानजननिज-शक्तिभाविभिष्यते: प्रमाणस्येति शेषः । \textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{5} As in the aphorism, \textit{prāmdnya}, which, soon after, is rendered by 'validity.' \textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Mantra}, a word of various meanings. \textit{Ed.}
Scripture, [the following of which leads to cures], &c. And so there is the aphorism of the Nyāya [Book II., § 68]: 'And [the fact of] its being a cause of right knowledge, like the validity of invocations, and the Medical Scripture,' &c.  

b. In regard to the proposition [laid down in § 26, viz.], 'And of the [existence of the] Qualities, &c., there is not absolute debarment,' there was duly alleged, and developed [under § 27], one argument, viz., by the establishing the existence of Happiness, &c. Now he states another argument in respect of that [same proposition]:

नासतः क्ष्यानं नूष्कुवत् ॥ ५२ ॥

Cognition is evidence of existence. Aph. 52. There is no Cognition of what is no entity, as a man's horn.

1 The correct reading of the aphorism is मन्द्रयुवेदवच तत्प्रामाण्यमाप्प्रामाण्यति. Ed.

2 वेदानां निजा स्वाभाविकी या यथार्थ्यज्ञान-जननशक्तिप्रक्ष्या मन्द्रयुवेददाविभविलयंहृपल-भ्रमादिकिलवेदानामेव स्वत एव प्रामाण्यं सिद्धति न वक्रवयायेश्चानमूलकवादन्तयथं:। तथा च न्यायस्त्रम। मन्द्रयुवेदप्रामाण्यवचः तत्प्रामाण्यमिति॥

3 गृहादीनां च नात्यन्वाध इति प्रतिज्ञायां न्यायेन सुखादिसिद्धिरिज्ञ्यको हेतुपन्यल: प्रप-ज्ञितमभ। साम्प्रदत्तं तस्यामेव हेतुरत्माह ॥

2 a
a. Be it, moreover, that the existence of pleasure, &c., is proved by the reasoning [under § 27]; it is proved by mere consciousness, also. Of pleasure, &c., were they absolutely nonentities, even the consciousness could not be accounted for; because there is no cognition of a man's horn, and the like. Such is the meaning.¹

b. But then, [interposes the Naiyāyika,] if such be the case, let the Qualities, &c., be quite absolutely real; and then, in the expression 'not absolute debarment' [in § 26], the word 'absolute' is [superfluous, and, hence,] unmeaning. To this he replies:²

न सतो बाध्यते नात् ॥ ५३ ॥

Aph. 53. It is not of the real [that there is here cognizance]; because exclusion is seen [of the Qualities].

a. It is not proper [to say], moreover, that the cognizance of the Qualities, &c., is that of the absolutely real; because we see that they are excluded [and not admitted

¹ अस्तं तावल्पत्वावृवेन सुखादिसिद्धिज्ञानसाचार्दिपि तस्मिनः। अत्यन्तास्त्रेव सुखादीनां ज्ञानमेव नोपपच्छेते नरशुद्धादीनामभानादित्यर्थः॥

² न्यूथवें सुखादिरत्त्वलं सचेव भवतु तथा च नात्यन्तवाधै इत्यतन्तवपद्वैयथ्यांमिति। तत्तत॥
to exist,] at the time of destruction [of the mundane system], &c.¹

b. But then, even on that showing, let the world be different both from real and from unreal; nevertheless, the demurring to absolute debarment [in § 26.] is untenable. To this he replies:²

\[
\text{नानिवैवचन्नीयस्य तद्भावात्} \text{ II ५४ II}
\]

\textit{A Veddantic advance}  \textit{Aph. 54. It is not of what cannot be rejected.}  [intelligibly] expressed [that there is cognizance]; because there exists no such thing.

a. And there takes place, moreover, no cognizance of such [a thing] as is not to be expressed as either existing or not existing; 'because there exists no such thing,' i.e., because nothing is known other than what exists or what does not exist: such is the meaning. The import is, because it is proper to form suppositions only in accordance with what is seen.³

¹ अन्तसतोर्विपुरुण्याणि गुणार्धभाई न युक्तं विना-  
          श्रवंकाले वाधवभेनात् II

² नन्चत्वान्वित सदसंहां भिन्निवेश जगान्वतु ते-  
          धार्यत्वलाभप्रतिषयं नुयपर्यत्तरित । तत्त्राह ।

³ सच्चेनास्थवेन चानिवैवचन्नीयं तान्तश्चापि  
          भान्त न घर्ताते तदभावावतः सदस्मिचवस्यप्रसिद्धे-  
          रितय: । \text{दृष्टःनुमारेशैवं कल्पनाया चौचित्तया-} \textit{diti} भावः।
6. But then, on that showing, do you really approve of [the Nyāya notion of] 'cognizing otherwise,' [or our fancying that nature to belong to one, which belongs to another]? He replies, 'No':

नान्ययार्थ्यातिः स्वच्छोभाघातात् ॥ ५५ ॥

A Nyāya view rejected.  

Aph. 55. There is no such thing as cognizing otherwise [or cognizing that as belonging to one, which belongs to another]; because your own proposition is self-destructive.

a. This, also, is not proper [to be said], viz., that one thing appears under the character of another thing [e.g., a rope, under the character of a serpent, for which it may be mistaken, in the dusk]; 'because your own proposition is self-destructive.' Of another nature [e.g., snakehood], in a different thing [e.g., a rope], *equivalence to a man's horn*, is [what is virtually] expressed by the word 'otherwise' [than the truth; both a man's horn, and the presence of snakehood in a rope mistaken for a snake, being, alike, otherwise than real]; and [yet] its cognition [thus] otherwise is asserted, [as if that could be cognized which is equivalent to what can not be cognized]: hence your own

1 नन्मेवं किमन्ययार्थ्यातिरेवेद्धा नेत्याय ॥

2 Dr. Goldstücker, in his Sanskrit Dictionary, erroneously speaks of *anyathā-khyāti* as if it were a technicality of the Sankhya philosophy, and quotes, by way of proof, the aphorism to which this note is appended. Ed.

3 In one of my MSS. of Aniruddha was, originally, -बाधात्, instead of -वाधातात्. Ed.

4 See Book III., Aphorism 66, at p. 267, supra. Ed.
proposition is self-destructive. For even those who contend for ‘cognizing otherwise’ [as one mode of cognition,] declare that the cognition of what does not exist is impossible. Such is the meaning.¹

b. Expounding what he had said above, [in § 26,] ‘not absolute debarment,’ he sums up his doctrine:²

सदस्यातिवैधानाधात् || प० ५६ ||

**Summing up.**

Aph. 56. They [the Qualities,] are cognized rightly or wrongly, through their being denied and not denied [appropriately or otherwise].

a. All the Qualities, &c., ‘are cognized rightly and

¹ अन्यायहस्तव्यप्ते भासतः इत्यपि न युक्त स्वच्छोधायाता त। अन्यायव्यप्तस्य नृशृङ्खलतुल्यालमण्यायाश्चेनोधतेज्ञयश च तस्य भानमुच्यते इति स्वच्छ एव धार्मवस्तुः। अस्तो भानासंवभ्यायाच्छायातिवादीतिरिपु वचनादिवर्धेः॥

² The text followed, in this paragraph is, throughout, very inferior; and the rendering of it also calls for some alteration. Especially, as to the original, अन्याय च copies an error of the press, my correction of which to अथ च was not heeded. See, for the purer text, pp. 23, 24, of the Appendix to my edition of the Sankhya-pravachana-bhashya. Ed.

³ नात्मनवाध इति पूर्वाः स्ववृत्तान्त: स्वसिद्धानमुपसंहरति॥
wrongly.' How? 'Through their being denied and not denied.' There is non-denial, as far as regards their existing at all; because all things [and things are made up of the Qualities,] are eternal. But there is denial, relatively, in Soul, of all things; just as is the case with the imaginary silver, for example, in a pearl-oyster, &c., or with the redness, &c., in crystal, &c.,[which has no redness, without its following that redness, altogether and everywhere, is non-existent].

b. This investigation is concluded. Now the consideration of Words, it having presented itself in this connexion, is taken in hand incidentally, at the end;[the Sánkhya not allowing to Testimony a coordinate rank with Sense and Inference]:

प्रतीयप्रतीतिभ्यां न स्पोटात्मकः शब्दः॥ ५९ ॥

Aph. 57. A word does not consist of [what the Yogas call] the ‘expresser’ (śphota); by reason both of cognizance [which would disprove the existence of such imaginary

सदसन्यासितरेव सर्वेषां गुष्णादीनामः। कुतः।
वाधाबाधात्। तत् स्थर्पे पेशाबाधः सर्ववस्तूनां
निन्यत्वात्। संस्कृतत्त्वात् बाधः सर्ववस्तूनां चैतन्ये
सिल्य यथा शुक्मादी बुद्धिस्थरज्जातादेः। स्फोटिकादिपु वा लोहितादेशलितः॥

अर्थं विचारं पर्याप्तः। इदानीं शब्दविचारं
प्रसग्राहं चागतं चागतंत्यां च प्रसूयते॥
thing.] and of non-cognizance, [which would, in like manner, disprove it].

a. It is held, by the followers of the Yoga, that there exists, in distinction from the several letters, an indivisible [unit, the] word, such as 'jar,' &c., [which they call] the 'expression;' just as there is a jar, or the like, possessing parts, which is something else than the parts, viz., the shell-shaped neck, &c.; and that particular sound, termed a word, is called the 'expresser,' because of its making apparent the meaning: such a word [we Sánkhyaas assert, in opposition to the Yogas] is without evidence [of its existence]. Why? 'By reason both of cognizance and of non-cognizance,' [as thus]: Pray, is that word [which you choose to call the 'expression,'] cognized, or not? On the former alternative, what need of that idle thing, [the supposed 'expression'? For,] by what collection of letters, distinguished by a particular succession, this ['expression'] is manifested, let that be what acquaints us with the meaning. But, on the latter alternative, [viz., that it is not cognized], the power of acquainting us with a meaning does not belong to an 'expression' which is not cognized. Therefore, the hypothesis of an 'expresser' is useless. Such is the meaning. ¹

¹ For sphota, 'eternal word,' which the translator renders by 'expresser,' and also by 'expression,' see Professor Cowell's edition of Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i., p. 331, foot-notes 2 and 3; and the translation of the Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha by Professors Cowell and Gough, pp. 209, et seq.

It is likewise observable that, in what precedes and follows, śabda is variously rendered, besides that śabda and pada are not discriminated. Ed.

² प्रत्येकवर्गोऽभिरतिरिति कलश इत्यादिह्पम-खङ्कमेकपरं स्फोट इति योगेत्युपगस्यते कब्बुपी-
b. The eternity of the Vedas was contradicted\(^1\) before, [under § 45]. Now he contradicts also the eternity of letters:\(^2\)

नाश्चनित्यलं कार्यताप्रतीति: \(\|\) ५५ \(\|\)

The eternity of letters denied.

Aph. 58. Sound is not eternal; because we perceive it to be made.

\(a.\) It is not proper [to say, as the Mimansakas say], that letters are eternal, on the strength of our recognizing, e.g., that ‘This is that same \(G\)’; for they are proved to be non-eternal, by the cognition, e.g., that ‘[the sound of] \(G\) has been produced’: such is the meaning. And the recog-

\(1\) Pratishiddha, ‘demurred to.’ \(\text{Ed.}\)

\(2\) पूर्वं वेदानं नित्यलं प्रतिष्ठितम् \(\|\) इदानीं वर्षेनित्यल्वमपि प्रतिष्ठितां \(\|\)

\(3\) Nagesa has वर्षेनित्यलं \(\text{Ed.}\)
nition has reference to the homogeneousness with that [one which had been previously heard]; for, otherwise, it would turn out that a jar, or the like, is eternal, inasmuch as it is recognized.¹

b. He ponders a doubt.²

 пу́рвси́ддхस्थ्याभिन्यक्तिदीपैनेव घटस्य ॥ ५५ ॥

A doubt. Aph. 59. [Suppose that] there is [in the case of sounds] the manifestation of something whose existence was previously settled; as [the manifestation] of a [preexistent] jar by a lamp.

a. But then [some one may say], of Sound, whose existence was ‘previously settled,’ the manifestation, through noise, &c., that alone is the object in the cognition of its production, [which you speak of in § 58]. An example of manifestation [of a thing previously existing] is, ‘as of a jar by a lamp.’³

¹ स एवाः गकार इत्यादिप्रत्यभिन्यक्तिदीपावलाइकर्षण-नित्यतस्तन्यक्तिदीपावलाइकर्षण-नित्यतवसिद्दरित्यथेः। प्रत्यभिन्यया च तत्कातीयता-विशमियिणी। अन्यतः घटदेवरपि प्रत्यभिन्यया नित्यतापवर्तित।

² शास्तृते।

³ नन्तु पुर्वसीहसमाकृत्येव शत्स्य इत्यादिप्रभाविन्यक्तिनिभाविन्यक्तिनामाधुर्यस्तिप्रतीतिविश्वयः। अभिभव्यक्तन्न्तः दीपविनेव घटस्येत।
b. He repels this.

\[ सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तवैतितिहासाधनम् \| ६० \| \]

\[ अपह. ६०. If the dogma of products’ being real [is accepted by you], then this is a proving of the already proved. \]

a. If you say that ‘manifestation’ means the taking of a present condition by means of rejecting an unarrived [or future.] condition, then this is our dogma of the reality of products [Book I., § 115]; and such an eternity belongs to all products, [not specially to Sound]; so that you are proving the already proved [or conceded]: such is the meaning. And, if ‘manifestation’ is asserted to be just in the shape of the cognition of what is presently real, then we should find [on your theory.] that jars, &c., also, are eternal; because it would be proper [on that theory.] that the object in the perception of production, by the operation of the causes [the potter, &c.], should be that of knowledge only, as in the case of words, &c., and also in the case of jars, &c.; [for the jar is shown by the lamp, not made by it]. Such is the import.²

¹ परिहरति ॥

² ऋभिव्यञ्जयानागातावथायागोन वर्तमानावस्थालाभ इत्युच्यते तदा सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तस्तादुपशुनित्यानं च सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तस्तादुपशुनित्यानं च सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तस्तादुपशुनित्यानं च सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तस्तादुपशुनित्यानं च सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तस्तादुपशुनित्यानं च सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तस्तादुपशुनित्यानं च सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तस्तादुपशुनित्यानं च सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तस्तादुपशुनित्यानं च सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तस्तादुपशुनित्यानं च सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तस्तादुपशुनित्यानं च सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तस्तादुपशुनित्यानं च सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तस्तादुपशुनित्यानं

² Vide supra, p. 142, c. Ed.
b. An objection to the non-duality of Soul, not previously mentioned, is to be adduced; therefore the refutation of the non-duality of Soul is recommenced,¹ [having been already handled under Book I., § 149].

'नावैत्तमात्मनो लिङ्काविन्द्रप्रतीति: † ६९ †

Non-duality of Soul denied on grounds of Inference. Aph. 61. Non-duality of Soul is not; for its distinctions are cognized through signs.

a. That is to say: because it is proved to be really different [in different persons], by the sign that one quits Nature [or escapes from the mundane condition], while another not does quit it, &c.²

b. But, he tells us, there is even sense-evidence destructive of the non-distinction of Soul from things [that are] non-Soul, asserted in the Scriptural texts, 'All this is Soul only,'⁴ 'All this is Brahma only.'⁵

'नानासमापि प्रत्यक्षवाधात् † ६२ †

¹ एतहार्दिते पर्वतेनुकृतमपि वाधकमपुप्पयसनीय-पितृदर्शभावाभितिनिरास: पुनरार्थ्यते †

² Nagesa, as also some copies of Vijnana's work, has नावैत्त-मात्मनों, 'non-duality of Souls.' Ed.

³ प्रकृतियागायागायादिलिङ्केरंद्वेय सिद्धिरिव-लय्यथे: †

⁴ Chhândogya Upanishad, vii., xxv., 2. Ed.

⁵ एतवेदं सर्वं वैवेदं सर्वसमाति जनात्मनो-जनात्मभिर्हिैतु प्रत्यक्षमिपि वाधकमस्तीवाह †

⁶ For a very similar passage, vide supra, p. 243, near the foot. Ed.
Aph. 62. Moreover, there is not [non-distinction of Soul] from non-Soul: because this is disproved by sense-evidence.

a. That is to say: moreover, there is not a non-distinction between the non-Soul, i.e., the aggregate of the experienceable, and Soul; because this is excluded also by sense-evidence, [as well as by signs, (§ 61)]; because, if Soul were not other than the whole perceptible, it would also not be different from a jar and a web; since the jar, e.g., would not be other than the web, which [by hypothesis] is not other than the Soul: and this is excluded by sense-evidence, which constrains us to apprehend a distinction [between a jar and a web].

b. In order to clear the minds of learners, he illustrates this point, though already established:²

नोभाय्यां तेनैव II ६३ II

The reasons combined.

Aph. 63. Not between the two [Soul and non-Soul, is there non-difference]; for that same [couple of reasons].

a. 'Between the two,' i.e., between Soul and non-Soul, the two together, also, there is not an absolute non-difference;

¹ ऋनात्मनापि भोगप्रपचेतनात्मनो नाहिंत प्रत्येक्षापि वाधात्। ऋत्तमन: सर्वभोगाभेदे गर्गदयोरण्यभेद: स्यात्। घटाते: पताधिवनतमामेदात्। स च भेदयाभक्ष्यक्षवाधित इत्यथे:॥
² शिष्णुवृद्धविशारदीय प्राप्तमय्येव विषाद्यति॥
for the couple of reasons [given in § 61 and § 62]: such is the meaning.¹

6. But then, in that case, what is the drift of such Scriptural texts as, ‘[All] this is Soul only?’ To this he replies:²

अन्यपरालमब्धेकाना तथा II ६४ II

Aph. 64. There it is for the sake of something else, in respect of the undiscriminating.

a. That is to say: ‘in respect of the undiscriminating,’ with reference to undiscriminating persons, in the case of non-difference [between Soul and non-Soul, apparently asserted in Scripture], it is ‘there for the sake of something else;’ i.e., the observation³ is [designed to be] provocative of worship. For, in the secular world, through want of discrimination, body and the embodied, the experienced and the experience, are regarded as indifferent;⁴

¹ उभाप्यां समन्तित्यामप्यात्मानात्मां नात्मन्त्रिते भेदैः स्वेत्येनेत्यथः II

² नन्वेवमात्मा वनेविधियं भविष्यतीत अं गतिरिति I चताह II

³ To render अनुवद्या, which, as defined by Professor Cowell, signifies ‘the reiteration or reinculcation of an injunction, it may be with further details, but without dwelling on the purpose of the injunction itself.’ Aphorisms of Śāṅkīya, &c., p. 75, foot-note. At pp. 24 and 26, he translates अनुवद्या by ‘confirmatory repetition’ and ‘illustrative repetition.’ Ed.

⁴ अववेकानामवेचिपुरुषानंतरित तत्राहिते-
[and Scripture humours the worldling's delusion, with a view to eventually getting him out of it].

b. He declares, that, according to the asserters of Nonduality [of Soul], there can be no material cause of the world, either:

नात्माविद्या नोभयं जगदुपादानकारणं निःसंक्षेपनात्। ॥ ६५ ॥

The Veddanta system supplies no material for the world. Adbhuta is qualified as 'beginningless,' or 'eternal a parte ante.'

Aph. 65. Neither Soul, nor Ignorance, nor both, can be the material cause of the world; because of the solitariness of [Soul].

a. The soul alone, or Ignorance lodged in the soul, or both together, like a pair of jar-halves [conjoined in the formation of a jar], cannot be the material of the world; 'because of the solitariness' of Soul. For things undergo alteration only through that particular conjunction

उत्त्पत्तिभूतं नात्मानाविद्या, भर्जीरकारकारणमणितं न संभवतीत्याह। ॥

¹ According to Nagesa's reading, नात्मानाविद्या, 'Ignorance' is qualified as 'beginningless,' or 'eternal a parte ante.'

Vedánti Mahádeva reads, as do some MSS. of Vijñana, नात्मानाविद्या. Ed.
which is called 'association;' hence the [ever] solitary Soul, without a second, since it is not associated, cannot serve as a material cause. Nor can it do so by means of [association with] Ignorance, either; because the conjunction of Ignorance has been already excluded by the fact of solitariness. Moreover, that the two together should be the material is impossible, even as it is that either, severally, should be the material; simply 'because of the solitariness.' Such is the meaning. And, if you choose that Ignorance should subsist as a substance located in the soul, as the air in the heavens, then there is an abandonment of the non-duality of Soul,¹ [for which you Vedantis contend].

b. He himself [in Book I, § 145] decided that the soul consists of light, [or knowledge]. In regard to this, he repels the primâ facie view, founded on the text, 'Brahma

¹ केन्द्रल अत्मात्मायिति वाचिभा समुचित वा कपालहयवदुभयं न जगदुपादानं संभव्यात्मनोपमझलात् । सज्ञात्यो हि यः संयो-गावशेषस्तेनेव द्रव्याणां विकारो भवति । श्रद्धस्ज्ञालाकेदवलस्यात्मनोक्षितीयस्य नोपादान-लम् । नाविकदाहारारापि संभव्यस्ज्ञालनाविकदाय-योगस्य प्रागेव निरस्तलात् । प्रत्येकोपादानवब-देवोभयोपादाननवमणस्ज्ञालदेवासंभवीयः । य-दि चाविकदा द्रव्यहृद युपशाशिता गगने वायुव-दिष्ठ्यं तदात्मायैतहार्निः ॥
is reality, knowledge, and joy,¹ that the essence of the soul is joy, also.²

नैकस्यानन्दचित्रपले वश्येमेवेदात् ॥ ६६ ॥

Aph. 66. The two natures, joy and knowledge, do not belong to one; because the two are different.

a. A single subject has not the nature both of joy and of intelligence; because, since pleasure is not experienced at the time of knowing pain, pleasure and knowledge are different: such is the meaning.³

b. But then, in that case, what becomes of the Scripture, that it [Soul,] consists of joy? To this he replies:⁴

दुःखनिवृत्तेणामः ॥ ६७ ॥

¹ The passage thus rendered looks as if it were taken, with the addition of its opening word, from the Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad, iii., 9, 28; or Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa, xiv., 6, 9, 34. Ed.

² प्रकाशस्वरूप आत्मेति स्वयं सिद्धान्तितम् ।
तच सत्यं विज्ञानमानं बह्सेति शुतेरानन्दोपेयसा-
त्तन: स्वरूपार्थवति पूर्वपशि निराकरीति ॥

³ एकधर्मिष्ण आनन्दचैतयोभयस्वरूपवं न भवति
दुःखज्ञानकाले सुखानुभवेन सुखज्ञानयोधेनदा-
दित्यर्थः ॥

⁴ नन्येवमानन्दरूपताषुपते का गति: । तत्ताह ।
Aph. 67. Metaphorical [is the word joy, in the sense] of the cessation of pain.

a. That is to say: the word 'joy,' in the Scriptural expression which means, really, the cessation of pain, is metaphorical. This is stated in [the maxim], 'Pleasure is the departure of both pain and pleasure.'

b. He states the cause of this metaphorical employment:

विमुक्तिप्रश्नसं मन्दानाम् || ६८ ||

Aph. 68. It is [as] a laudation of emancipation, for the sake of the dull.

a. That is to say: the Scripture, as an incitement to 'the dull,' i.e., the ignorant, lauds, as if it were joy, the emancipation consisting in the cessation of pain, which [cessation] is the essence of the soul;[1][for the soul is such joy as consists of the absence of pain]

b. In order to manifest immediately the origin, already

1 दुःखिनिर्वृत्तात्मनि श्रौत श्यानंदश्चतो गौँश इति: || तदुस्व मुखं दुःखमुखालयम इति: ||

2 गौँशप्रयोगे वीजमाह ||

3 मन्दानन्दन्तिते दुःखिनिर्वृत्तिह्यात्मस्वस्त्रुत-पमुक्तिः सुखवेन श्रूति: स्तौति प्रवृत्तनाथार्थायित्यथ:||

4 For another translation, beginning with the introduction to Aphorism 67, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 34. Ed.
declared, of the internal organ, he repels the prima facie view, that the Mind is all-pervading:

Aph. 69. The Mind is not all-pervading; because it is an instrument, and because it is, moreover, an organ.

a. The Mind, meaning the totality of the internal instruments, is not all-pervading; for it is an instrument, as an axe, or the like, is. The word 'and' [literally, 'or,' in the Aphorism.] implies a distributive alternative, [not an optional one]. The meaning is this, that, [while the whole of the internal instruments are instruments,] the particular internal instrument, the third [the Mind, manas],

1 Dr. Ballantyne, under the misapprehension that 'the subtile body' was pointed to, here added, in brackets, 'in B. III., §§ 14, 15, &c.' Ed.

2 अन्तःकर्णोत्तन्ते पूर्वोक्ताया व्याख्यानोप-पत्रैं मनोवैभवपूर्वभिपक्षमपाकरोति ||

3 Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahadeva seem to add the words वास्यान्तिविव्रुद्धराविवन्ध. See the passage immediately following the aphorism. Ed.

4 The term manas, the translator's 'Mind,' denotes not only one of the three internal organs, but, sometimes, as here, all three taken together. See the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 45, 46, text and foot-notes. Ed.

5 See Book II., Aph. 30, at p. 208, supra. Ed.

6 The words here bracketed I have substituted for 'the subtile body, mentioned under B. III., § 12, a.' Ed.
is not all-pervading; because it is, moreover, an organ.

But knowledge, &c., pervading the body, are demonstrable as only of medium extent,\(^3\) [neither infinite nor atomic].

b. Here, there being a doubt whether this be convincing, he propounds an appropriate confutation:\(^4\)

\[\text{सक्रियत्वाचित्तशु: II 70 II}\]

**Proof of this.**

*Aph. 70. [The Mind is not all-pervading]; for it is movable; since there is Scripture regarding the motion.*

a. That is to say; since, inasmuch as there is Scripture regarding the *going* of the Soul [which, being all-pervading, cannot *go*] into another world, it being settled that it is its adjunct, the internal organ, that is movable, [see Book I., § 51], it cannot be all-pervading.\(^4\)

---

1 See Book II., Aph. 26, at p. 206, *supra.*  *Ed.*

2 मनसोणः करणात्सामान्यस्य न विभवं करणात्मायादिवत्। वाशयेऽववास्थितिविकल्पे।

इद्द्रियात्मादिवत्: करणाविशेषस्य तृतीयस्य न विभूतसमिर्थः।

देहव्रापिज्ञानातिर्ख तु मध्यमर्यात्माशेनेवोपपद्यत ईति।

3 ऋच्चाप्रमोगक्षणश्चायामनुकूलतकामाह।

4 ऋतुमो लोकाल्पमामन्यवन तथेनदुपाधिभूतस्यान्तः करणस्य सक्रियम्भि सिद्धि न विभवां संभवतीत्यथः।
6. In order to prove that it is a product, he repels also the opinion that the Mind is without parts:

न निभेञागलं तत्त्वगाह्नंतवत्

Aph. 71. Like a jar, it [the Mind,] is not without parts; because it comes in contact therewith, [i.e., with several Senses, simultaneously].

n. The word ‘therewith’ refers to ‘organ,’ which occurs in a preceding aphorism, [§ 69]. The Mind is not without parts; ‘because it comes in contact,’ simultaneously, with several sense-organs. But, ‘like a jar,’ it is of medium size, [neither infinite nor atomic], and consists of parts. Such is the meaning. And it is to be understood that the internal organ, when in the state of a cause, [and not modified and expanded, e.g., into knowledge, which is its product,] is, indeed, atomic.3

1 कार्तिकोपन्तन्ये मनसो निरवयवलमपि नि-

राकरोति

2 घरवत्, in both my MSS. of Aniruddha, is changed, by a later hand, to घरादिवत्, the reading of Vedánti Mahádeva. Ed.

3 तत्त्वद्: पूर्वसूचस्वदिनिं परामृशासित। मन-

सो न निरवयवलमनेकेन्द्रीयेष्वेकदा योगात्।

किं तु घवव्यमध्यमपरिमाण्य साध्यविमित्यथः:।

कारणात्वस्य चाल्त: करणमेवेकति वोधयम्।
b. He denies to the eternity of Mind, Time, &c.:

एतर्गति पुनः चिन्तामणि नित्यम्

\( \text{Aph. 72. Everything except Nature and Soul is uneternal.} \)

\( \text{a. [This is] plain. And the Mind, the Ether, &c., when in the state of cause, [not developed into product], are called Nature, and not Intellect, &c., by reason of the absence of the special properties, viz., judgment, &c.} \)

\( b. \text{But then, according to such Scriptural texts as, 'He should know Illusion to be Nature, and him in whom is Illusion to be the great Lord, and this whole world to be pervaded by portions of him,'} \)

\( \text{since Soul and Nature,} \)

1 मनः कालादीनां नित्यं प्रतिष्ठनति

2 Intended to represent antakharaṇa, 'internal organ.' Vide supra, p. 370, note 4. Ed.

3 The very inferior, because ambiguous, reading, in the original, manas, I have changed to buddhi, and have displaced Dr. Ballantyne's corresponding 'Mind.' Ed.

4 Vyavāsāya. For its synonym, adhyavāsāya, vide supra, p. 209, note 1. Ed.

5 सुगमम्। कार्याघात् चाचि: कार्याका-\( \text{dikāḥ}\) प्रकृतिर्भवत्ते नतु बुद्धांदिकां व्यवसाया-\( \text{द्वसद्धार्गधर्ममभवावत्} \)

6 Śvetāsvatara Upanishad, iv., 10. Professor Gough translates, differently: 'Let the sage know that Prakriti is Māyā, and that Mahēśwara is the Māya, or arch-illusionist. All this shifting world is filled with portions of him.' A footnote explains 'Mahēśwara' as intending 'Īśvara, Rudra, Hara, or Śiva.' Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 224. Ed.
also, are made up of parts, they must be uneternal. To this he replies:

न भागलाभो भोगिनो निभोगत्वाभुते: ॥ ७३ ॥

1 ननु । मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरस । तत्स्याव्यवहृतस्तु व्याप्ति सत्तिते जगत् । इत्यादियुतिभिः पुप्रकृतोरिपि सावनवला-

dनि जन्तुत्वाभुते ।

2 This reading is peculiar; many MSS. of Vijnāna, with which agree Aniruddha, Nagesa, and Vedanti Mahadeva, having भागिनः. Their elucidations of the aphorism here follow. Aniruddha: न कारणालभो भागिनो जगकारणास्य प्रधानस्य न

निभोगत्वाभुते । मूलकारणवाचास्य कारणान्त-

रमिति छृते । Nagesa: पुप्रकृतितिविषये भागिनो भागलाभोवयवा वविभावो न युज्यते । Then follows the quotation as in Vijnāna. Vedanti Mahadeva: भागि:

कारणानि स्य स्य कार्यते न साति तस्य प्रधानस्य न कारणालभो निभोगत्वाभुते:। Some MSS. of Vijnana have precisely the words of Nagesa, transcribed above, barring the quite immaterial substitution of प्रकृतिपूस्तविषये at the beginning.

भागिनः is, without doubt, the correct reading. Vijnana and Nagesa take it to denote 'Soul and Nature'; Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahadeva, 'Nature' only. Bhagis means, literally, 'that which is made up of parts,' or 'the Whole.' Hence, 'Whole' is to take the place of Dr. Ballantyne's 'Experiencer.' It occurs again in Aph. 81 of this Book, at p. 379, infra. Ed.
Soul and Nature not made up of parts.

Aph. 73. No parts [from the presence of which in the discerptible, one might infer destructibility.] are found in the Experiencer; for there is Scripture for its being without parts.

a. Parts are not appropriate to 'the Experiencer,' i. e., to Soul, or to Nature; for there is Scripture for their being without parts; that is to say, because of such [texts] as, 'Without parts, motionless, quiescent, unobjectionable, passionless.'

b. It has been stated [in Book I., § 1.] that Emancipation is the cessation of pain. In order to corroborate this, he then repels the doctrines of others, in regard to Emancipation:

नान्दा भिन्नत्वाक्षरमुक्तिविद्ये निधित्वायते || ७४ ||

A view of Emancipation disputed. Apn. 74. Emancipation is not a manifestation of joy; because there

भोगिणु पुरुषस्य प्रधानस्य चाववन्यो न युज्यते निरववक्त्रवच्छुते। निधकलं निन्दित्त्रयं शान्तं निरवधि निरक्षनृम। इत्यादिनेत्यथे।

1 Swetáswatara Upanishad, vi., 19. Professor Gough renders as follows: 'Without parts, without action, and without change; blameless and unsullied.' Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 232, 233. Ed.

2 तुः बिनिवृत्तिमौक्ष्य इत्युक्तम्। तदवधारणाय तत् मोक्षे परं पायं मतानि निर्राकरोति।

3 Vedánti Mahadeva omits मुक्ति, according to my sole MS. Most probably, however, there is, here, a mistake of the copyist. Ed.
are no properties [in Soul, as, e.g., in the shape of joy].

\[a.\] There belongs to Soul no property in the shape of joy, or in the shape of manifestation; and the essence [of Soul] is quite eternal, and, therefore, not something to be produced by means; therefore, Emancipation is not a manifestation of joy: such is the meaning.\(^1\)

\[न विशेषगुणोन्नित्तिन्तिस्तहत् \| ७५ \|

Aph. 75. Nor, in like manner, is it [Emancipation,] the destruction of special qualities.

\[a.\] Emancipation is, moreover, not the destruction of all special qualities, 'In like manner.' Because there are absolutely no properties [in Soul, (see § 74)]. Such is the meaning.\(^2\)

\[न विशेषगतिनिनिद्धिक्यस्य \| ७६ \|

Aph. 76. Nor is it [Emancipation,] any particular going of that [Soul,] which is motionless.

\[a.\] Moreover, emancipation is not a going to the world

\(^1\) आत्मन्यानन्दद्धोभिभव्यत्रश्च धर्मो नानक्ति स्वार्त्यं च नित्यमेवेति न साधनसाध्यम्।
\(\) अतो नानन्दाभिभव्यत्रोत्तमस्य इत्यर्थ:।

\(^2\) अशोकविशेषगुणोऽकेदोरपि न मुक्ति:। तद्हर्तः
\(\) निधर्महत्वादेवेवेत्यर्थ:।
of Brahmā;¹ because the Soul, since it is motionless, does not go.²

A fourth view disputed. Aph. 77. Nor is it [Emancipation,] the destruction of the influence of [intellectual] forms, by reason of the faults of momentariness, &c.

a. The meaning is, that also the doctrine of the Nihilist, that the Soul consists merely of momentary knowledge, that Bondage is, the modifying thereof by objects, and that emancipation is the destruction of the influence thereof called Memory,³ is inadmissible; because, by reason of the faults of momentariness, &c., [such] emancipation is not the Soul’s aim.⁴

b. He censures another [conception of] emancipation of the Nihilist’s:⁵

¹ See Book IV., Aph. 21, a., and Aph. 31, b., at pp. 301 and 310, supra. Ed.

² बसलोकगतिरपि न मोक्ष ज्ञात्मनो निष्क्र-यवेन गत्वभावात्

³ वदसंद; for which vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.

⁴ ज्ञात्माने विषयाकारता च-व्यक्तिवास्तवादेव नाशो मोक्ष इति युक्तः-कमतं तदपि न ज्ञात्मक्वादिशेष मोक्षस्यापुरुषार्थवादित्यथः।

⁵ नात्तिक्ष्येव मुक्तान्तरं दूषयति।
A fifth view disputed.   Aph. 78. Nor is it [Emancipation,] destruction of all; for this has, among other things, the fault of not being the Soul’s aim.

a. Likewise, the entire destruction of the Soul, which consists of knowledge, is not emancipation; because, among other things, we do not see, in the world, that the annihilation of the soul is the soul’s aim: such is the meaning.¹

एवं शून्यमयपि || ५५ ||

A sixth view disputed.   Aph. 79. So, too, the Void.

a. The annihilation of the whole universe, consisting of cognition and the cognizable, is, thus, also, not emancipation; because Soul’s aim is not affected by Soul’s annihilation: such is the meaning.²

संयोगाश्च वियोगान्ता इति न देशादिलाभो- 
   रिप || ५० ||

A seventh view disputed.   Aph. 80. And conjunctions terminate in separations; therefore, it [Emancipation,] is not the acquisition of lands, &c., either.

¹ ज्ञानस्यप्यन्त्यन: सामग्येऽवोर्बित्तिरिपि न 
   मोक्ष ज्ञात्मकाश्च्य लोके पुरुषार्थवादश्चाद्यनादिभ्य 
   इत्यर्थ: ||

² ज्ञानायत्मकाविकलप्यन्त्याशोहिष्वेवमात्म- 
   नाशेनापुरुषार्थवाच्च मोक्ष इत्यर्थ: ||
a. From its perishableness, possessorship is not Emancipation.  


\[ \text{An eighth view disputed.} \]

\[ \text{Aph. 81. Nor is it [Emancipation,] conjunction of a Part with the Whole.} \]

a. Emancipation is not absorption of 'a Part,' i.e., the Soul, into 'the Whole,' i.e., that of which it is [on the view in question,] a part, viz., the Supreme Soul; for the reason assigned [in § 80], viz., 'conjunctions terminate in separations,' and because we do not admit a Lord [Book I., § 92], and because, thus, self-dissolution is not Soul's aim: such is the meaning.  

\[ 1 \text{ vibhāṣitaśvāstvāmī \text{ n } mūcchirītī} \]

\[ 2 \text{ Aniruddha writes as follows, in his elucidation of the eighty-first Aphorism: } \]

\[ \text{N bṛhaśāṅgo bhāgo jīvātma bṛhaśāṅgo bhāga-bhāvāt. } \]

\[ \text{Yogastha vin yogāntvātātyunānyutvam-paksāh. } \]

\[ \text{His introduction to the Aphorism runs: } \]

\[ \text{Bhagastha jīvātmya bhāginī bṛhaśāṅgo mūcchirītī tathāvartī. } \]

\[ \text{Ed.} \]

\[ 3 \text{ Bhagasthānastha jīvastha bhāginīyaśṭhitam pramamānānī layo na mokṣaḥ sanyogaḥ hi vin yogānta itukhe-toteśvaranadhyuktamāt vaya śvamayastha-पुर्वार्त्तवाच्छेत्यथः ि } \]

25
A ninth view disputed. Aph. 82. Nor is it [Emancipation], moreover, conjunction with the [power of] becoming as small as an atom, &c.; since, as is the case with other conjunctions, the destruction of this must necessarily take place.

a. Moreover, conjunction with superhuman power, e.g., the assuming the size of an atom, is not Emancipation; because, just as is the case with connexions with other superhuman powers, the destruction of this, also, follows, of necessity: such is the meaning.

A tenth view disputed. Aph. 83. Nor, just as in that case, is it [Emancipation], moreover, conjunction with the rank of Indra, &c.

a. Nor is the attainment of the superhuman power of Indra, &c., Emancipation,—just as is the case with other superhuman powers [such as assuming atomic bulk];—by reason of perishableness: such is the meaning.

1 Both my MSS. of Aniruddha exhibit the questionable reading वियोगवत्. Ed.

2 अधिमानिक्षरस्यसंवधोगोशपि न मुक्तिरेव श्रीसंबोधनस्वसंवधेव तस्याया छेदनियमादित्ययेष्यः: ॥

3 इत्यद्वियायेनामोहोशपि न मुक्तिरित्राश्चर्ङ्गक्ष- यिष्णुवादित्ययेष्यः: ॥
6. He repels the objection of an opponent to what has been stated [in Book I., § 61], that the Organs are products of Self-consciousness:

\[ \text{नं भूतप्रकृतिविद्यामाहाधिकारिकव-} \]
\[ \text{श्रुते}^2 \parallel 84 \parallel \]

The organs whence. Aph. 84. The Organs are not formed of the Elements [as the Naiyayikas assert]; because there is Scripture for their being derived from Self-consciousness.

a. With advertence to the opinion that Power, &c., also, are principles, he repels the determination of categories [insisted upon by the various sects] of his opponents, and the notion that Emancipation comes through a knowledge of these [categories] merely:

\[ \text{नं यदृदार्थनियमस्थवधानमुखिः}^1 \parallel 85 \parallel \]

\[ 1 \text{दन्त्रियाक्षामाहाठारिकवं यदुःं तच परविप्र-} \]
\[ \text{तिपत्तिः निराकरोति} \parallel \]

2 Vedánti Mahádeva has, instead of शाहंदारिकवं, शाहंकारतवं Ed.

3 शाक्यादिकमपि तस्ब्रमतीत्याश्येन परेरं पदाब्धिप्रतिनियमं तम्मच्छानान्मुखिः च निराक- 
\[ \text{रोति} \parallel \]

4 Nagesa and Vedánti Mahádeva add च, as does Vijnana, according to the best MSs. Ed.
Aph. 85. The rule of six categories is not [the correct one]; nor does Emancipation result from acquaintance therewith, [as the *Vaiśeshikas* maintain].

Aph. 86. So, too, is it in the case of the sixteen [categories of the *Nyāya*], &c.

a. In order to establish, what has been already stated [in Book I., § 62], that the five Elements are *products*, he rejects the eternity of the Earthy and other Atoms, which is held by the *Vaiśeshikas* and others:¹

Aph. 87. [The five Elements being *products*, as declared in Book I., § 61], Atoms are not eternal, [as alleged in the *Nyāya*]; for there is Scripture for their being products.

a. Although that text of Scripture is not seen by us, because it has disappeared, in the lapse of time, &c., yet it is to be inferred from the words of teachers, and from the tradition of Manu,² [Ch. I., v. 27].

¹ पञ्चभूतानां पूर्वाकार्य्योपपत्त्यस्ते वैशेषिकाद्यभयुपगतः पार्शिराद्यानुष्ठितमस्मपाकरोति ॥

² यद्ययस्माभि: सा भूतिनेन दृष्टयते काललु-
But then, how can an Atom, which is without parts, be a product? To this he replies:

न निब्भोगलः कार्येकारतः ॥ ५४ ॥

The Scripture decisive of the question. Aph. 88. Since it is a product, it is not without parts.

a. That is to say: since the fact, established by Scripture, of their being products, cannot be otherwise accounted for, the [so-called] Atoms of Earth, &c., are not without parts.²

b. He repels the objection of the Nihilist, that direct cognition of Nature, or of Soul, is impossible; because [forsooth,] the cause of a thing's being directly cognizable is colour:³

प्रवादिना तथाप्रायार्ययाक्षान्मनुस्मन्रणादानु-मेया ॥

¹ ननु निर्वखवस्य परमाष्नोऽ कथं कार्येन घटते। तच्छाह ॥

² Aniruddha reads न नित्वभोगलः. Ed.

³ चूतिसिद्धार्ययान्यपांित्या पृथियाध-शृणां न निर्वखवल्लभमित्यर्थः ॥

⁴ प्रकृतिपुरुषसाक्षात्कारो न संभवति रूपस्य द्रव्यसाक्षात्कारे तुलवादिति नास्तिकाश्रेयं निर- करोति ॥
Aph. 89. There is no necessity that direct cognition should have colour as its cause.

a. It is no rule, that to be directly cognizable should result from colour only, [or other object of sense], as the cause; because direct cognition may result from Merit, &c., [viz., mystical practices, and so forth], also: such is the meaning.3

b. Well, if that be the case, pray is the dimension of an Atom a reality, or not? With reference to this, he decides the question of dimension,4 [as follows]:

1 A marginal note in one of my MSS. of Aniruddha mentions तद्ध्रप as a variant. Both my MSS. of Nagesa have, erroneously, -निर्वेखात्, instead of -निर्वेखनात्. Ed.
2 Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahādeva have प्रत्यक्षाविनियम:.. Ed.
3 न्यादेव निर्मित्तात्मप्रयक्तातिन नियमो नाति धर्मादिनाथि सामान्यासंभवादित्यर्थ: II
4 नन्त्वेवं किमशुपरिमाणं वस्तवति न वेयाकान्त्वातः हायं परिमाणानिष्ठैं करोति II
5 One of my MSS. of Aniruddha has परिमाणे Ed.
Aph. 90. There are not four varieties of dimension; because those can be accounted for by two.

a. There are not four kinds of dimension, viz., small, great, long, and short; but there are only two sorts. 'Because those can be accounted for by two:' that is to say, the four varieties can be accounted for by merely two, the atomic [or positively small,] and the great. Such is the meaning. For the short and the long are merely subordinate kinds of the dimension called great; else we should have, e.g., no end of dimensions, in the shape of the crooked, &c.

b. He rebuts the Nihilist's denial of genera,[2] as follows:

\[ \text{ज्ञानित्यन्तर् ज्ञातायोगात्मक्यायिन्यान् सामान्य} \]

\[ \text{न्याय} \ \| \ ५९ \ \|
\]

Aph. 91. Though these [individuals] be uneternal, recognition, as being associated with constancy, is of genus.

---

1 ज्ञानु महदीर्धं हृद्धातिअतिरित्यं नास्ति दैविक्यं तु वर्ततं एव। द्वाब्यं तद्योगात्। द्वाब्यामिववाणमहत्तत्रिमाशायं चातुरित्ययाणं शंभवान्तिर्दिल्यथे। महत्तत्रिमाशायावाणसतर्मीमहावेव हि हृद्धातिअथ। अन्यथा वञ्चारिद्युः परिमाशायान्यः प्रसङ्कादिभिः।

2 सामान्येषु नास्तिकविद्यान्त्यपक्षिं निराकरोति।

3 Nagesa, according to one of my MSS. omits अपि. Ed.
a. Hence, he says, it is not proper to deny [the existence of] genus:¹

न तदपलाप्स्मात् ॥ ५२ ॥

And not to be denied. Aph. 92. Therefore it [genus] is not to be denied.

a. But then [it may be said], recognition is to be accounted for simply by a non-existence, in the shape of the exclusion of what is not the thing [recognized]; and let this be what is meant by the word 'genus.' To this he replies:²

नान्यनिवृत्तिरुपत्" भावम्पति: ॥ ५३ ॥

Genus positive, not negative. Aph. 93. It [genus] does not consist in exclusion of something else; because it is cognized as an entity.

a. That is to say: genus does not consist in exclusion [of something else]; because 'This is that same' is the cognition of something positive; for, otherwise, the only thing cognized would be: 'This is not a non-jar.'³

¹ तस्मात् सामान्यापलापो युक्त इत्याह ॥
² नन्वत्त्ववृत्तिरुपेशाभावेनैव प्रत्यभिज्जोपपदनीया सैव च सामान्याद्वार्त्सार्थिष्ठत । तचाह ॥
³ One of my MSS. of Nāgārjuna has, pretty obviously by mere error, नान्यवृत्तिरुपत्. Ed.

'स एवायमिति भावप्रत्यवृत्तिरुपमां न सामान्यस्येक्यर्थं:। श्रन्यशा हि नायमययद्इत्वेव प्रतियेत् ॥
b. But still, recognition may be caused by likeness. To this he replies:

\[ न तत्त्वान्तरं सादृश्यं प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धि: \| ५४ \| \]

Likeness not a distinct principle. \( \text{Aph. 94. Likeness is not a separate principle; for it is directly apprehended, [as one manifestation of Community].} \)

a. That is to say: likeness is nothing other than sameness in many parts, &c.; for it is directly apprehended as consisting in sameness; \[ [\text{the likeness of a fair face to the moon, e.g., consisting in the sameness of the pleasurable feeling, &c., occasioned by the sight of either.} \]

b. The conjecture, 'But then, let likeness be really an inherent power, and not [a modified aspect of] Community,' he repels:

\[ 'निजशक्तिभिन्नकिर्भी वैशिष्ठ्यात्तदृश्यः। \| ५५ \| \]

\[ १ ननु सादृश्यचिन्वन्यन्ति प्रत्यभिष्का भविष्यति। \| तचाह \| \]

\[ २ भूयोऽयवादिसामान्यादितिरित्रं न सादृश्य-मक्ति प्रत्यक्षत एव सामान्यहृपत्योपलभा-दिक्यथः। \| \]

\[ ३ ननु स्वाभाविकी शक्तिरेव सादृश्यमस्तु ननु तत्सामान्यभिव्याख्यांतपाकरोति। \]

\[ ' \text{Aniruddha has निजधभमानि} \quad \text{Ed.} \]
Nor a peculiar power. *Aph. 95. Nor is it [likeness,] a manifestation of [something’s] own power; because the apprehension of it is different.

a. Moreover, likeness is not the manifestation of a particular natural power of a thing; because the apprehension of likeness is different from the apprehension of power. For the cognition of a power is not dependent on the cognition of another thing; the cognition of likeness, on the other hand, is dependent on the cognition of a correlative, as is the case with the cognition of a non-existence; so that the two conceptions are heterogeneous. Such is the meaning.

b. But still, let the likeness among individual jars, &c., be merely that they have [all alike,] the name, e.g., of jar. To this he replies:

\[
\text{न संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धोऽधिपः} \text{ II एक्ष} \text{ II}
\]

1 Pratiyogin; on which vide supra, p. 342, note 3. *Ed.*

2 वलुः स्वाभाविकशक्तिविशेषोत्सादोऽधिपः न सार्थ्यं शक्तुपलबिंतः सार्थ्योपपलबिंतसाग्रामक-शत्रुताः. शक्तिज्ञानं हि नान्यर्धिमिज्ञानसापेक्षा सार्थश्यामां पुन: प्रतियोगिज्ञानसपेक्षस्वायत्वानवर्धिति ज्ञानयोगविलक्ष्यमित्वेऽभावः।

3 ननु तथापि घटादिसंबन्धक्वमेव घटादिव-क्लोपां सार्थश्यमस्तु। तत्राह।

4 The reading of Nāgęsa is न संज्ञासंज्ञिनोः संबन्धोऽधिपः. *Ed.*
Aph. 96. Nor, moreover, is it [ likeness,] the connexion between name and named.

a. Because even he who does not know the connexion between a name and the thing named may cognize a likeness,¹ [e.g., between two jars].

b. Moreover:²

न संवन्धन्यतोभव्यानिस्यतात् ॥ ८७ ॥

How it cannot be so. Aph. 97. That connexion [viz., between name and named,] is not eternal; since both [the correlatives] are uneternal.

a. Since both the name and the named are uneternal, the relation between them, also, is not eternal. How, then, can there be, through that, the likeness of a departed thing in a thing present? Such is the meaning.³

b. But then, though the correlatives be uneternal, let

¹ संज्ञासंज्ञाभ्यवमज्ञानतोरपि सादृश्यज्ञानादिति ॥
² तथा ॥
³ संज्ञासंज्ञानोरनिःव्यात्संवन्धस्यापि न निल्यता। ऋत: कथं तेनातीतवस्तुसादृश्यं वर्तमानवस्तुनि स्यादित्ययः। ॥

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the relation be eternal. What is to hinder this? To this he replies:—

नातः संबन्धो धर्मिक्याहकमानवाधात् || ६८ ||

Aph. 98. The connexion is not so [not eternal], for this reason, viz., because this is debarred by the evidence which acquaints us with the thing; [i.e., the supposition is inconsistent with the definition of the term].

a. Connexion is proved only where disjunction incidentally subsists; because, otherwise, there is no room for the supposition of connexion; the case being accounted for,—as will be explained,—simply by the natural state of the matter. And this incidental disjunction is impossible, if connexion be eternal. Therefore, connexion is not eternal; for this is debarred by the very evidence that acquaints us with Connexion. Such is the meaning.

1 ननु संबन्धानितिन्तुखेशः संबन्धो नित्यः स्वातः किमच वाधकम् । तत्राह ॥

2 Read नाजः, 'not unoriginated,' i.e., 'not eternal,' qualifying 'connexion.' 'For this reason' renders चातः. The reading नातः, the manuscript authority for which is of the slightest, is treated as if no better than a typographical error, in the corrigenda to my edition of Vijnāna's work. Ed.

3 Aniruddha has, instead of मान°, प्रमाण°. In the margin of one of my MSS. of his commentary is the variant मानाभावात्. Ed.

4 कादाचिकविभागे सत्येष संबन्धः सिध्यति।
b. But, on this showing, there could be no such thing as the eternal [connexion called] Coinherence\(^1\) between those two eternals, a Quality and the thing qualified; [which Coinherence, or intimate relation, is one of the categories of the Nyāya]. To this he replies:\(^2\)

\[3\text{न समवायोऽस्ति प्रमाणाभावात्} \| ५५ \|

The Category of Intimate Relation rejected. \(\text{Aph. 99. There is no [such thing as] Coinherence, [such as the Naiyāyikas insist upon]; for there is no evidence [for it].}\)

a. But then [it may be said], the evidence of it is, the perception that something is qualified [or conjoined with a quality which inhere\(s\) in it], and the unaccountableness, otherwise, of the cognition of something as qualified. To this he replies:\(^3\)

\[\text{ञ्जन्यथा वक्ष्यमार्थरीत्या स्वरुपैश्चैवोपपष्टी संबन्ध-क्रमनानावर्धाशात्} \| \text{स च कादाचिको विभागो न संबन्धनित्यवे संभवति} \| \text{अतः संबन्धवाहकप्रमाणोनेव बाधात् नित्यः संबन्ध इत्यर्थः} \|

\(^1\) Samavāya; of which the preferable rendering, proposed by Professor Cowell, is ‘interpenetration.’ \(\text{Ed.}\)

\(^2\) नन्वेवं नित्ययोगेःवर्गुणिनोनीतिः समवायो नोपपष्टः \| \text{तचाह} \|

\(^3\) The reading of Nāgāraja is तचापश्चि. His gloss runs:

\[\text{समवाये प्रमाणाभाव इत्यर्थः} \| \text{Ed}\]

\[\text{‘ननु वैशिष्ट्यप्रत्ययं विशिष्टवुद्धिन्यायानुपप-} \]

\[\text{विष्णु प्रमाणम्} \| \text{तचाह} \|

\[\text{BOOK V., APH. 99.} \quad 391\]
अभयचारणयायासिद्धेनः प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं
वा ॥ १०० ॥

This argued. Aph. 100. Neither perception nor inference [is evidence for the existence of Coinherence]; since, as regards both alike, the case is otherwise disposed of.

a. Since, 'as regards both alike,' i.e., the perception of qualifiedness, and the inferring of it, 'the case is otherwise disposed of;" viz., simply by the natural state [of the thing and its qualities], neither of the two is evidence for [the imaginary category called] Coinherence: such is the meaning.

b. It is a tenet, that, from the agitation of Nature the conjunction of Nature and Soul takes place, and thence results creation. In regard to that, there is this objection of the atheists, that 'Nothing whatever possesses the action called agitation; everything is momentary; where

1 One of my MSS. of Aniruddha simply omits न; while the other has अभयचारणयायासिद्धे: Ed.

2 Nāgosa gives प्रत्यक्षमनुमाने. Ed.

3 Read, instead of 'the case is otherwise disposed of,' 'the establishment [which they lead to] is otherwise.' Ed.

4 See the preceding note. Ed.

5 अभयचारि वैश्विष्प्रत्यक्षं तदनानं च
स्वरूपेणेवायणयायासिद्धेन तदुभयं समवाये प्रमाख-मित्यर्घः ॥
it arises, even there it perishes; therefore, no motion is proved to be inferrible from conjunction [of anything] with another place; [the fruit, for instance, which appears to reach the ground not being that fruit, any longer existent, which appeared to drop from the tree]. To this he replies: ¹

नानुमेयलमेवः क्रियाया नेदिष्क्य तत्त्वद्वतोरेवा-²
परोक्षाप्रतीते: || १०७ ||

Motion is matter of perception. Aph. 101. Motion is not a matter of inference; for he who stands very near has, indeed, direct cognition both of it and of what it belongs to.

a. In Book Second the different opinions were merely mentioned, that the Body is formed of five elements, and so forth; but no particular one was considered. In regard to this question, he denies the view of an opponent: ²

¹ प्रकृतेः चक्षुप्रकृतियुवसंयोगलस्मातेन्द्रियोऽरिति सिद्धान्तः। तत्त्वायं नालिकानामाध्यमपो नालिति चक्षुभाष्या कस्यापि क्रिया सत्तु चक्षिकं यथोऽत्पति तत्त्वाति विनिष्ठात्तीतियो न देशान्तरसंयोगोऽन्त्रेया क्रिया सिद्धातीति। तत्राह।

² Some MSS. of Vijñāna omit एव, as does Nagesa. Ed.

² Nāgēsa omits एव. Ed.

‘द्वितीयाध्याये शरीरस्य पाश्चन्तिकलादि-रूपमेतेन्द्र एवोऽक्षो नतु विशेषेष्वकः। ध्वाता-परपण्ड्र मितिषेष्वति॥

Itarāṇi.
The Body is of earth

Aph. 102. The Body does not consist of five elements; because many heterogeneous things are unsuitable as the material.

a. He will mention, that, whilst there is but one material, the material of every Body is earth.¹

There is a Subtile as well as a Gross, Body.

Aph. 103. It [the Body,] is not, necessarily, the Gross one; for there is, also, the vehicular [transmigrating or Subtile] one.

a. Senses, [the organ of vision, for example,] distinct from the eye-balls, have been already mentioned. In order to substantiate this [point], he refutes the opinion, that the senses reveal what they do not reach to.²

¹ एकोपादानकेवलं पृष्ठिभिषोपादानं सर्वशरीरस्येति वक्ष्यति

² गोलकेश्योरितिरित्तिनां निद्रियाणि प्राणुन्द्रानि।
	तदुपपादानाये निद्रियाणामप्राप्तकाशकं निराकरोति
Aph. 104. The senses do not reveal what they do not reach to; because of their not reaching, or because [else,] they might reach everything.

a. The senses do not reveal things unconnected with them. 'Because of their not reaching.' For we do not see that lamps, or the like, reveal what they do not reach to; and because, if they were to reveal what they do not reach to, we should find them revealing all things, viz., those intercepted, and the like. Such is the meaning. Therefore there is an organ, other than the eye-ball, for the sake of connexion with the distant sun, &c. Such is the import. And the instruments reveal the objects simply by delivering the object to the soul,—for they are, themselves, unintelligent;—as a mirror reveals the face. Or [in other words], their revealing an object is simply their taking up an image of the object.¹

b. He repels the conjecture: But then, in that case, the opinion [of the Naiyáyikas,] that the sight is luminous

¹ स्वासंवज्ञार्थार्थीनीदियाशि न प्रकाशिति।
श्रेणे: प्रदीपद्विनामप्राविष्काशकलोद्धनातः
प्राविष्काशकले व्यवहितादिसेवसि प्रकाशिति प्राविष्काशकलो
सज्जासेव्यथे। चतो टूरस्बसूयीर्दिसंवज्ञाष्ट्रो गो
लकार्तिरितिक्षिमिन्द्रियमिति भावः। कर्षणां चार
प्रकाशकलं पुष्पेदेवि समप्रेक्षाविद्वां चतो जडधार
श्रेणास्वय मुलप्रकाशकलवत। अथ वाष्प्रतिभिक
षोधकामेवार्षिकप्रकाशकलमिति॥
is quite right; for we see Light alone glide rapidly to a distance, in the form of rays:

न तेजोपसर्पणातिजं चक्रवृत्तितत- पिम िे: \| 105 \|”

*The Sight not formed of Light.*

*Aph. 105. Not because Light glides [and the Sight does so, too,] is the Sight luminous [or formed of Light]; because the thing is accounted for by [the theory of] modifications, [to be now explained].

a. The Sight is not to be asserted to be luminous, on the ground that light is seen to glide. Why? Because, just as in the case of the vital air, where there is no luminosity, the gliding forth can be accounted for through a kind of modification. Such is the meaning. For, as the vital air, without having at all parted from the body, glides out ever so far from the end of the nose, under the modification called breathing, [and thus smells a distant flower], just so the Sight, though a non-luminous substance, without, indeed, quitting [connexion with] the body, all in a moment will dart off [like the protruded feeler of a polyp,] to a distant object, such as the sun, by means of the species of change called modification.  

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1 नन्वेव चक्रुष्ठलैजसलामेव युक्तं तेजस एव किरश्वपेषाशुद्दोरपसर्पणाशर्मनार्दिति शश्वं निर- राकरोऽति \| 106 \|”

2 तेजोपसर्पणां दृष्टिमिति कृतः तेजसं चक्रुर्नं वाच्यम् \| 107 \|”
8. But what is the proof that there is any such modification? To this he replies:

मार्थमण्डलीश्वराहणृत्तिसिद्धः || १०६ ||

Aph. 106. By the sign of the display of the attained object the existence of the modification [which could alone account for that display] is proved.

a. He shows [us] the nature of the modification, to account for the going, though without parting from the Body:

भागुशाम्यां तत्वान्तरं कृत्ति: संवन्धार्थं सर्प-तीति || १०६ ||

Of the theory, further.

Aph. 107. The 'modification' is another principle than a fragment, or

भंदेयुपपर्य-पप्पर्य-चरित्र्ये: । यथा हि प्राण: श-रीरसंस्तुल्य्यैव नासायाब्धि: कियहूँ प्राणनाशक-वृत्तिपरसलेवभेदावतीजस्त्रुत्यमापि चस्त्वूरभंसंत्य-ज्ञापि वृत्तिपरिशिष्टविष्णुवेश्वेषाणं भूतित्येव दूरस्थं सर्यादिकं प्रत्यपसरेदिति ।

1 नन्वेदवभूतवृत्ति किं प्रमाणम । तद्यात् ॥

2 देहपरिशिष्टज्ञापि गमनोपपप्पर्य वृत्ति: स्वरूपं दर्शिन्ति ॥
a quality, [of the Sight, or other sense]; because it is for the sake of connexion that it glides forth.

a. The modification is not a fragment of the Sight, or other sense, [serving as] the cause of the revealing of objects,—a part disjoined like a spark,—or a quality, like, e.g., Colour; but the modification, whilst a portion thereof, is something else than a fragment, or a quality. For, if there were disruption, connexion of the sun, &c., with the Sight would not, through it, take place; and, if it were a quality, the motion called 'gliding forth' would be unaccountable; [for a quality cannot move by itself]. Such is the meaning.¹

b. But, if, thus, the 'modifications' are substances, how is [the term] 'modification' applied to the qualities of intellect, in the shape of Desire, &c.? To this he replies:²

न ²दृष्टिनियमलत्योगात् ॥ १०४ ॥

¹ अर्थप्रकाशेन्हतोषाध्यक्षुद्रदेवभागो विस्कुलिन्धु-हिमज्ञांशो व्याधिनिर्माणवन्य न वृत्तिः तिः तु तदेक-दशभूतान्त भागंगुणाभ्यां भिन्ना वृत्तिः। विभागे र्हसति तद्वारा चच्चुष: सूर्यामिस्तब्यो न घटाते गुणाने च सर्पंशा हर्कियानुपपपत्तिरित्यर्थः:।
² नंवेवं वृत्तिनां दृष्ट्यं तदाधिकस्यित्यन्नुमित्तः-गुणोऽधर्म्ब्रह्मवर्तारः। तत्तत्राः।
³ Aniruddha and Vedānti Mahādeva have the reading दृष्ट्यः.

Ed.
Aph. 108. It [the term ‘modification,'] is not confined to substances; because it is etymological, [not technical, and applies, etymologically, to a quality, as well].

a. Since it is also stated, in Scripture, that the sense-organs are formed of the Elements, the doubt may occur, whether the Scriptural texts are, perhaps, to be applied distributively, according to the difference of particular worlds. In regard to this, he says:

अ देशंदेश्योपाधान्तास्मदादिविचिन्यः ॥ १०५ ॥

Aph. 109. Not though there be a difference of locality, is there a difference in the material [of which the organs are formed]: the rule is as with the like of us.

a. Not through ‘difference of locality,’ as the world of Brahmá, and the like, is it, again, the fact, that the organs have any other material than self-consciousness; but the rule is, that those of all alike are formed of self-consciousness; as is the case, e. g., with us who live in this terrestrial world. For we hear, in Scripture, of only one Subtile Body.

1 इन्द्रियाःं भौतिकवस्यापि अवशालक्षदाचिन्नोकविशेषभेदेन मुतिव्यवस्या गंध्रेत । तथा ॥

2 Some MSS. of Vijnána exhibit अस्मदादाविव नियम:, the lection of Nágéṣa. Ed.
made up of the organs], transmigrating generally through the different localities. Such is the meaning.\(^1\)

\(b\). But then, in that case, how is the Scripture relating to the materiality [of the organs] to be accounted for? To this he replies:\(^2\)

\(निमित्तव्यपदेशार्थव्यपदेशः\) \(॥ ११० ॥\)

Ap\(h\). 110. The mention thereof [viz., of materiality, as if it belonged to the organs,] is because there is [intended to be made, thereby, a more emphatic] mention of the concomitant cause.\(^4\)

\(a\). There is designation as the material cause, in the case even where the cause is [but] concomitant, with a

\(\text{न व्रह्मलोकादितेशभेदतोपीन्दुयाशामहंकारातिरिक्तोपादानकलं किं तस्मादादीनां भूलोक-स्थानामिव सर्वेऽसेवाहस्त्रारिकव्यविधिम:। देश-भेदेनेषुक्षेव लिङ्क्षरीरस्य संचारामचायव्यादित्यथः॥}

\(\text{नन्वेवं भौतिकव्युत्ति: कथमुपपद्यताम्। तच्छाह॥}

\(\text{3 Probably from mere oversight, my MS. of Vedánti Mahádeva's work omits तद्. Ed.}

\(\text{4 Nimitta, 'instrumental cause.' Nimitta-kāraṇa is rendered 'occasional cause' at p. 194, supra. Colebrooke's representatives are 'chief or especial cause' and 'efficient cause.' Ed.}

\(\text{1 न व्रह्मलोकादितेशभेदतोपीन्दुयाशामहंकारातिरिक्तोपादानकलं किं तस्मादादीनां भूलोकस्थानामिव सर्वेऽसेवाहस्त्रारिकव्यविधिमः। देशभेदेनेषुक्षेव लिङ्क्षरीरस्य संचारामचायव्यादित्यथः॥}

\(\text{नन्वेवं भौतिकव्युत्ति: कथमुपपद्यताम्। तच्छाह॥}
view to indicating its importance; just as fire is [spoken of as arising] from fuel, [which fuel is a necessary concomitant of, though not really the substance of, the fire]. Hence are they [the organs,] spoken of as being formed of the Elements. Such is the meaning. For, only in reliance on the support of Light, or other Element, do the Organs, viz., the Sight, &c., [formed] from the accompanying Self-consciousness, come to exist; as fire, in reliance on the support of earthly fuel, results from the attendant Light,¹ [or Heat, which cannot manifest itself alone].

b. As the subject presents itself, he determines the variety that belongs to Gross Body:²

अध्मजाविजजयुजोल्ज्ञासाध्वित्यिक्मांसिद्विकं
चेति न नियमं: \( \text{II 999 II} \)

Varieties of Gross Bodies.

Aph. 111. The heat-born, egg-born, womb-born, vegetable, thought-born, and spell-born; such is not an exhaustive division [of Gross Body, though a rough and customary one].

¹ निमित्तेषिप्राधान्यविवचक्योपादानलीप्यचेषोभवितयथेत्यनादिरिति। जतोभूतादानलीप्यपदेशः इत्यथः। तेजस्वार्तमूलोपपन्धमेचेषो पौल तदनुगतांहकराच्छुरादीदिति भवति यथा पार्थिवेत्त्वनोपपन्धमेचेषो तदनुगतांत्वे जो दििरिति।

² स्मूलशिररिगतं विशेषं प्रसङ्घादवधारयति।
a. It was stated, before, that Body has only one Element as its material. In this same connexion, he observes discriminatively, as follows:—

सर्वेषु पृथिव्यपादानमसाधारयात्रापदेशः
पूवबच्वत् ॥ १९२ ॥

The material of Bodies.   Aph. 112. In all [Bodies] Earth is the material: in consideration [however,] of some speciality, there is designation as this [or that other element than earth, as entering into the constitution of some given body], as in the preceding case [treated under § 110].

a. In all Bodies the material is Earth only. 'In consideration of some speciality'; i.e., in consequence of intensity through excess, &c., in the case of Body, as before [in the case of the Organs], there is, however, designation as consisting of Elements, five, or four, &c., on the ground only of there being a support, as in the case of the materiality of the Organs. Such is the meaning.  

5. But then, since the vital air is the principal thing in

1 शरीरस्येक्षमाचष्टतोपादानकर्म पूवातः ।
रानेनैव प्रसाधनं विषिष्टः ॥

2 सर्वेषु शरीरेषु पृथिव्येक्षमपादानम ।
साधारणायात् ।
अधिकादिमित्स्काचार्यी पञ्चचतुरादिभौतिकालव्याप्तेशस्तु
पूवविदिन्द्रियाणां भौतिकालबद्धभौतिकालमाचरणाः ॥
the Body, let the vital air itself be the originant of the Body. To this he replies:

न देहारभ्मकस्य प्राणालिमिन्दियशक्तितत्तत्तिसिद्धे ॥ ९९३ ॥

*The vital air is not the source of the Body.*

Aph. 113. The vital air is not [on the allegation that it is the principal thing in the Body, to be considered] the originant of the Body; because it [the vital air, or spirit,] subsists through the power of the organs.

a. The vital air, consisting in the function of the organs, does not subsist in the absence of the organs. Therefore, since, in a dead Body, in consequence of the absence of the organs, there is the absence of the vital air, the vital air is not the originant of the Body.

b. But then, in that case, since the vital air is not the cause of the Body, the Body might come into existence even without the vital air. To this he replies:

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1 ननु प्राणस्य शरीरे प्राधान्यात्रप्राण: एव देहारभ्मकोश्चतु । तच्चाह ॥

2 Instead of तत्सिद्धे, Vedánti Mahádeva has तत्सिद्धि: Ed.

3 कर्णवृत्तिरूपः प्राणः कर्णवियोगे न तिष्ठति । ज्ञतो मृतेऽवे कर्णाभावेन प्राणाभावक प्राणे देहारभ्मक इति ॥

‘नन्वेवं प्राणस्य देहाकारश्च श्राणं विनापि देह उत्पच्यते । तच्चाह ॥
Soul essential to a living Body.

Aph. 114. The site of experience [viz., the Body] is constructed [only] through the superintendence of the experiencer [Soul]: otherwise, we should find putrefaction.

a. 'Through the superintendence,' i.e., only through the operation, 'of the experiencer,' i.e., Soul [literally, that which has the vital airs], is 'the construction of the site of experience,' i.e., the Body; because, 'otherwise,' i.e., if the operation of the vital airs were absent, we should find putrefaction in the semen and blood, just as in a dead body. Such is the meaning. And thus, by the several operations of circulating the juices, &c., the vital air is a concomitant cause of the Body, through the sustaining of it: such is the import.

b. But then [it may be said], it is only the vital air, itself, that can be the superintender; because it is this which

1 Aniruddha reads -प्रसिद्धः; Vedánti Mahádeva, -प्रसिद्धः.
3 भोक्त: प्राश्चिनोदधिश्चानाध्यापारादेव भोगायतनस्य शरीरस्य निर्माणं भवति। ऋष्याय प्राश्चायापाराभावे शुक्लोष्णितयोः पूतिभावप्रसिद्धा-न्मतदेहवस्तिर्यथः। तथा च रससंचारादिध्यापार-विशेषः प्रायश्च देहस्य निर्मित्तकार्यां धारकाव-दिति भावः॥
operates, not the Soul, since it is motionless, and since there is no use in the superintendence of what does not operate. To this he replies:

The Soul 'acting by another's actions.'

\textit{Aph. 115. Through a servant, not directly, is superintendence [exercised] by the master.}

\textit{a. In the construction of the Body, 'superintendence,' in the shape of energizing, is not 'directly,' i. e., immediately, [exercised] 'by the master,' i. e., by Soul, but 'through its servant,' in the shape of the vital airs; as in the case of a king's building a city: such is the meaning.}

\textit{b. It was stated before [Book II., § 1,] that Nature's [agency] is 'for the emancipation of what is [really, though not apparently,] emancipated.' In reference to the objection of opponents in regard to this, viz., 'How can the

\begin{quote}
\textbf{1} ननु प्राणस्यैवाधिक्षान्तः संभवति व्यापारव-्नम् प्राणिनः: कूटस्थलाच्योपास्याधिक्षाने प्रयोजनाभावायेति। तदाह।
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textbf{2} According to one of my MSS., the lection of Aniruddha is भृणवर्गीरहर। \textit{Ed.}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textbf{3} देहनिर्माणे व्यापारहृपमधिषानं स्वामिन्नश्च-तन्त्रष्टान्तसाध्यायाति किं तु प्राणहृपभृणवर्गीरहरा यष्ठा राजः: परनिर्माणं इत्यर्थं।
\end{quote}
soul be eternally free, when we see it bound? with a view
to demonstrating its eternal freedom, he says:

Aph. 116. In Concentration, profound sleep, and emancipation, it [Soul, consists of Brahma.3

a. Then what is the difference of emancipation from profound sleep and concentration? To this he replies:

Aph. 117. In the case of the two, it
is with a seed; in the case of the other,
this is wanting.

a. 'In the case of the two,' viz., concentration and profound sleep, the identity with Brahma is 'with a seed,' i.e., associated with some cause of Bondage, [or reappearance in the mundane state]; 'in the case of the other,' i.e.,

See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 33. Ed.

3 तत्तथेः कः सूप्रिसमाधिभिः मोक्षस्य विशेषः। तत्तथाः II

4 Aniruddha has सवीजलमन्यस्य; and so has Vedánti Mahádeva, according to some copies. Ed.

5 Brahmatsu, the abstract of Brahma. Ed.
in emancipation, this cause is absent: this is the distinction. Such is the meaning.¹

b. But then, Concentration and profound sleep are evident: but what evidence is there of Emancipation? This objection of the atheist he repels:²

The reality of Emancipation.

 Aph. 118. But there are not the two [only]; because the triad, also [Emancipation inclusive], is evident; as are the two.

a. The meaning is, that, since Emancipation, also, is 'evident,' i.e., is inferrible, through the example of Concentration and profound sleep, there are not the two, viz., profound sleep and Concentration, only; but Emancipation, also, really is. And the argument is: thus. The quitting of that identity with Brahma⁴ which [identity] exists during profound sleep, &c., takes place only through a fault, viz., Desire, or the like, lodged in the mind; and, if this fault be annihilated by knowledge, then there results

¹ द्वयसारिच दृष्टवाचतु है॥ ११८॥

² ननु समाधिसमुपुर्णः तस्वीरो भौषो वीरस्याभावाय इति विशेष इत्यथः॥

³ ननु समाधिसमुपुर्णी दृष्टे स्व मोक्षे तु वि प्रमाणामिति नातिकाळायं परिहरति॥

⁴ Vedânti Mahâdeva omits खप्प। Ed.

⁵ Brahma-bhâva, the same as brahmâtwa. Ed.
a permanent condition, quite similar to profound sleep, &c.; and it is precisely this that is Emancipation.\(^2\)

b. But then [suggests some one, with reference to § 117], granting, that, even notwithstanding the existence of the 'seed' [or source of return to the mundane state,] called Memory,\(^2\) a mental modification after the form of any object does not arise during concentration, inasmuch as Memory is [then] dulled [or deadened] by apathy, &c., yet, in the case of a person in profound sleep, since Memory prevails, there will really be cognition of objects; consequently, it is not proper to say that there is identity with Brahma during profound sleep. To this he replies:4

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1 समाधिमुखुप्रित्यान्तेन मोक्षस्मापि दृष्ट्वा-  
दनुमितवाचतु हौ सुषुप्रिसमाधिः एव किं तु मो-  
क्षोऽयस्तीत्यथःः। जनुमानं चेत्यम। सुषुप्यादी  
यो ब्रह्मावतस्यागधिबिन्दुगतायागार्दोषादेव भ  
वति सं चेत्यो ज्ञानेन नाशितस्ति हि सुषुप्यादिस-  
दृष्ट्ये वास्या स्यिरा भवति सैव मोक्ष इति ॥

2 See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 33. Ed.

3 Here and below, this renders vāsand, on which vide supra. p. 29, note 2. Ed.

4 ननु वासनात्यक्ष्योज्यस्येषपि विराग्यादिना  
वासनाकोशाद्याद्याकारा वृन्तिः समाधीमा भवतु  
सुक्ष्मे तु वासनाप्राप्त्याद्याद्यात्मा भविष्यते  
न सुक्ष्मे ब्रह्मस्यप्रति युक्तेति । तवाह ॥
Aph. 119. There is not the revelation, by memory, of an object likewise during the conjunction of a [more potent] fault [such as sleep]: the secondary cause does not debar the principal.²

a. As in the case of apathy, so, also when there is the conjunction of the fault of sleep, Memory does not reveal its own objects, does not remind us of its objects; for the 'secondary,' the subordinate, Memory,³ cannot defeat the

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¹ This I find nowhere; and I believe it to be without warrant. I have printed, agreeably to the reading of Aniruddha, Vedánti Mahádeva, and the best MSS. of Vijnána, वासनयानर्थशःश्यापन्, and have noticed, in some copies of the last-named commentator, the variant वासनयान न स्थार्थेश्यापन नाेकेशा has the latter reading, followed by दोषगोगात, with omission of सूप. The Serampore edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya has वासनाय न स्थार्थेश्यापन, for which I find no authority. Ed.

² The rendering given above is susceptible of improvement; and so, very probably, is that which follows: 'Where, moreover, there is influence from an obstruction [like that offered by sleep], mental impression does not inform one of objects [and, hence, one is then exempt from desires, &c., and in a state identical with that of emancipation]: a cause [of desires, &c.; and such is mental impression.] does not countervail what is predominant, [e.g., sleep, which is, as it were, temporary Brahmahood or emancipation].'

Aniruddha's interpretation of this obscure aphorism, possibly by reason of his elliptical mode of expression, is far from clear. His view of its sense is, certainly, peculiar. Ed.

³ Sanskrita, here used as synonymous with vdsand. Ed.
more potent fault of Sleep: such is the meaning. For the really more potent fault makes the memory powerless, incompetent to produce its effects; [and so there is nothing, in this, to prevent identification of Soul with Brahma, during profound sleep, any more than during apathetic Concentration] such is the import.¹

b. It was stated, in the Third Book [§ 83], that the retention of a Body by him who is emancipated while still living, is ‘in consequence of a mere vestige of impression.’² To this it is objected as follows. Experience is observed, in the case of the [alleged person] emancipated during life, just as in the case of the like of us, [and this experience continuous,] even though it may be constantly in respect of a single object: now, this is unaccountable [on the hypothesis of his really being emancipated]; because the antecedent impression is annihilated, exactly on its having produced the first [instant of] experience, and because no subsequent impression arises, inasmuch as knowledge debars it; just as is the case with Merit. To this he replies:³

¹ यथा वैराग्ये तथा निद्रादीपोंर्गेदीप स्ति
वासनया न स्वार्थ्ययापनं स्वविष्णुस्माराः भव- 
ति यतो न निनिर्हस्य गुणीभूतस्य संस्कारस्य
बलवत्तलर्निद्रादीपवाधकां सम्भवतीत्यर्थः । बल-
बच्छर एव हि दोषो वासनान्द दुर्बलां स्वकार्यकुरुतां
करोतीति भावः ॥

² Here, and often below, ‘impression’ is to render sanskāra. Ed.

³ संस्कारलेष्ती जीवनमुक्तस्य शरीरभाराः-
मिति तुतीयाध्याये प्रोक्तम् । तचायमास्येऽः ।
BOOK V., APH. 120.

एकः संस्कार: ज्ञानिनवेत्तेकोः न तु प्रतिक्रिय
संस्कारभेदा वहुकल्पनाप्रसङ्कोः || १२० ||

An objection met to the possibility of emancipation in one single living.

Aph. 120. A single impression [suffices to generate, and] lasts out the experience: but there are not different impressions, one to each [instant of] experience; else, we should have a postulation of many, [where a single one may suffice].

a. In like manner, in the case of the whirling of the potter's wheel, the self-continuant principle, called motal inertia, is to be regarded as only one, continuing till the completion of the whirling.

b. It has been stated [§ 111.] that there are vegetable Bodies. He repels the objection of the atheist, that, in the case in question, there is not a Body, inasmuch as there is no knowledge of the external:

जीवन्मुक्तस्य श्रवदेवकस्मिच्चपर्येष्यस्मदादतीनामिव
भोगो हृद्यते सोऽस्मुपपत्त: प्रथमं भोगमुल्याधव
पर्वसंस्कारनाशाशासंस्कारान्तरस्य च ज्ञानप्रतिवर्धेन कर्मेवदनुद्रयादिति । तचाह ॥

1 The reading निवर्त, found in several MSS., is a gross error. Ed.
2 Read, instead of 'lasts out,' 'brings about.' Ed.
3 This phrase is meant to translate sanskāra. Ed.

कुलालचक्रभमशास्येवेव वेंगालयः संस्कार
एक एव भमशास्मापिमप्रयंतस्यायी वोधः ॥

उक्तमां शरीरमल्लकर्मः । तत्र वाहाबु-
The Vegetable organism really a Body.

Aph. 121. Knowledge of the external is not indispensable [to constitute a Body]: trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, trees with invisible flowers, grasses, creepers, &c., [which have internal consciousness], are, also, sites of experiencer and experience; as in the former case.

a. There is no necessity that that only should be a Body, in which there is knowledge of the external; but it is to be held that the being a Body, in the form of being the site of experiencer and experience, belongs also to trees, &c., which have internal consciousness; because, 'as in the former case,' meaning the putrescence already mentioned [see §114], of the Bodies of men, &c., [which takes place] in the absence of the superintendence of an experiencer [the living soul], even in the same way do withering, &c., take place in the Bodies of trees, &c., also: such is the meaning. And to this effect there is Scripture.¹

¹ Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva here end one aphorism, and treat what follows as a second. Vijnána formally defends the reading to which he gives the preference. Ed.

² न वायव्यानं यत्रासि तदेत शरीरमिति नियमः किं तु वृद्धादीनास्मि संज्ञानामिप हो-

[Dharmāvāda-vādačchārīraṃ nāstītī nāstikābhisekapāk-roveś iti]

[Dharmāvāda-vāda-bhāṣya]

Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva here end one aphorism, and treat what follows as a second. Vijnána formally defends the reading to which he gives the preference. Ed.

[Dharmāvāda-vāda-bhāṣya]

न वायव्यानं यत्रासि तदेत शरीरमिति नियमः किं तु वृद्धादीनास्मि संज्ञानामिप हो-
Law, as well as Scripture, is authority for this.

Aph. 122. And from the Legal Institutes [the same fact may be inferred, viz., that vegetables have bodies and are conscious].

a. But then, from the fact that trees, &c., also, are thus conscious, we should find merit and demerit accruing to them. To this he replies:

Vegetables not moral agents.

Aph. 123. Not merely through a Body is there susceptiblity of Merit and Demerit; for Scripture tells us the distinction.

a. The vital spirit is not liable to the production of Merit and Demerit through a Body merely. Why? 'For Scripture tells us the distinction:' because we are told, in Scripture, that the liability results just from the being

1 Nāgośa pretty ov. He does not regard these words as an aphorism. Ed

2 Dānu vṛūṣādīśvaroḥ eva chetanāvēdāḥ bhāmāṁśānāṁ
śīpaḥ śūts ā"
distinguished by a Brahmanical Body, or the like [animal body, not vegetable]. Such is the meaning.  

b. Showing that the liability to Merit and Demerit is solely through the kind of Body, he mentions how Body is of three kinds:  

चिथां चयागां व्यवस्था कमेदेहापभोगदेहोभय-  

dेहा: || ९२४ ||  

Aph. 124. Among the three there is a threefold distribution; the Body of merit, the Body of experience, and the Body of both.  

a. There is a threefold distribution of Body ‘among the three,’ i.e., among those highest, lowest, and intermediate,—all living beings,—viz., the Body of merit, the Body of experience, and the Body of both: such is the meaning. Of these, a Body of merit belongs to the preeminent sages; a Body of experience, to Indra and others, and to things immovable, &c.; and a Body of both, to the royal sages. Here the division is [not exhaustive, but] into three, because of the preeminence [of these]; for,  

¹ न देहमातस्य धर्माधर्मायत्तियोम्यवां जीवस्य ।  
कुत: । वैशिष्ट्यायुते:। ब्राह्मणादेहापभोगदेहोभय-  
वाधिकारण्यवासादित्यथे: ||  

² देहमेवेनव कर्माधिकारं दर्शयन्देहाचित्यमाह ||  

Vedânti Mahâdeva, if my single copy of his work may be relied on, omits this word. Ed.
otherwise, we should have all alike possessed of a Body of experience,¹ [like Indra].

b. He mentions also a fourth Body:²

न किं चिद्ययुशयेण: || १२५ ||

A fourth kind of Body. Aph. 125. Not any one [of these], moreover, is that of the apathetic.

a. That is to say: the Body which belongs to the ascetics is different from all these three; such as was that of Dattātreya, Jaḍabharata, and others; for, they possessed bodies consisting of mere knowledge.³

b. In order to establish the non-existence of a Lord, which was stated before, he disproves the eternity of

¹ चथायामुत्सद्माधममध्यमानं सर्वंप्राशिन्यं चि-प्रकारो देवविभाग: कर्मदेहः प्रोगदेहोभयदेहा इति-स्यं: || तत् कर्मदेह: परम्परिश्च भोगदेह इन्द्रादीनां स्थावरादीनां चोभयदेहश्च राजवीरामिति। अन्य प्राधान्येन चिथा विभागोस्ययं सर्वंस्वेच भोगदेहवापन्नं: ||

² चतुर्थेन शरीरमाह ||

³ विज्ञानं शरीरमेतत्तत्त्वविलक्षणामिति: || यथा द्वादशैयज्ञभरतादीनां तेषां ज्ञानमात्रप्रधाने नदेहवादिति ||
knowledge, desire, action, &c., which is accepted by others¹
[as existing in the case of the Lord]:

न बुध्दादिनिश्चलमाण्यविशेषेष्बिप वहि-
चत् ॥ ९२६ ॥

Aph. 126. Eternity does not [as is
alleged by those who wish to esta-
blish the existence of a Lord,] belong
to knowledge,² &c., even in the case of the particular
site, [viz., that of the supposed Lord]; as is the case
with fire.

a. That is to say: just as we infer, from the example of
ordinary fire, that the empyrean fire,³ also, is not eternal.⁴

ञायणयासिद्धेश् ॥ ९२७ ॥

¹ उक्स्येय्यरामार्क्ष्य स्थापनाय पराभुपगतं
ञानेक्ष्याकृत्यदिनित्यां प्रतिषेष्ठति ॥

² Buddhi, rendered 'intellect' at pp. 196, &c., supra. Much as
at p. 209, supra, Vijnāna hereupon remarks: बुधिरचार्यवसाय
वार्थ्य्त वृत्ति: । Ed.

³ The world, viewed as Brahmā's egg, is fabled to be surrounded
by seven envelopes. One of these is the dearana-tejas, Dr. Ballan-
tyne's 'empyrean fire.' See Professor Wilson's translation of the
Vishnu-purāṇa (ed. 1864, &c.), vol. i., p. 40. I have to thank Prof.
Cowell for this reference. Ed.

⁴ यथा लॉक्सिकवहृट्ष्यक्षान्त्रविशेषाणस्य-
नित्यवानुमानामिलयष: ॥
Aph. 127. And, because the site [viz., the supposed Lord,] is unreal, [it matters not, in the present instance, whether knowledge, &c., may be eternal, or not].

a. But then, in that case, how can it, indeed, be possible that there should arise Omniscience, &c., adequate to the creation of the universe; since we do not behold, in mundane life, such superhuman powers [though we do see some,] arising from penance and the rest [of the alleged means of acquiring superhuman powers]. To this he replies:

योगासिद्ध्योन्योषधातिसिद्धिविवचनापलपनीया:

|| ९२४ ||

Aph. 128. The superhuman powers of concentration, just like the effects of drugs, &c., are not to be gainsaid.

a. That is to say: by the example of the effects of drugs, &c., even the superhuman powers of assuming atomic magnitude, &c., which result from concentration, and are adapted to the work of creation, &c., are established.

1 नन्वेवं ब्रह्मासिद्धसर्वज्ञसमर्थं सर्वेष्वाधिकं कथं जनं संभाव्येतां पि लोकं तत्प्रसिद्धिभिरेवमैः

वर्षादशेनादिति || तथाह ||

2 Vide supra, p. 310, note 4. Ed.

3 ऋषधातिसिद्धिकृष्टकाण्डं योगजा ऋषिकुमारिना

दिसिद्धय: सृष्टा द्रुपयोगिन्य: सिद्धालिप्रय: ||
6. He refutes him who asserts that Thought belongs to the Elements; since this is hostile to the establishment [of the existence] of Soul:¹

न भूतचेतन्यं प्रत्येकारूढ्यः सांहल्येपिः च ३सांहल्येपिः च " ९२९ "

Argument against Materialism.

Aph. 129. Thought does not belong to the Elements; for it is not found in them separately, or, moreover, in the state of combination,—or, moreover, in the state of combination.

a. That is to say: Thought does not exist in the five Elements, even when in the state of combination; because we do not find Thought in them, severally, at the time of disjunction;⁴ [and there can be nothing in the product which does not preexist in the cause].

¹ पुरुषसिद्धिप्रतिकूलतया भूतचेतन्यवादिन्यं प्र- त्याचेत् "

² Aniruddha has प्रत्येकानुपलब्धेः; Nāgēśa, प्रत्येकारूढः.

Ed.

³ Both here and just before, Nāgēśa reads स्वसां, as does Vijñāna, also, according to some MSS. Ed.

⁴ संहतभावावस्थायामपि पञ्चभूतेषु चेतन्यं ना- ल्लिन्ति विभागकऽल्प प्रत्येकं चेतन्यारूढ़ोरित्यथः "

END OF BOOK V.
HAVING explained, in four Books, all the matter of the
Institute; and having, in the Fifth Book, thoroughly
established it, by refuting the opinions of opponents, now,
in a Sixth Book, he recapitulates the same matter, which
is the essence of the Institute, while condensing it. For,
in addition [to what has preceded], an enumeration of the
matters before mentioned, namely, a summary, having
been composed, learners acquire an undoubting, accurate,
and more solid knowledge; so that, therefore, reiteration
is not here to be imputed as a fault; because the method
is that of fixing a stake, [viz., by repeated blows], and
because arguments, &c., not previously stated, are adduced.

सत्यात्मा 2नासितिलसाधनाभावात् 3 II 9 II

1 अध्यायचतुष्कृिद समतशास्त्रां प्रतिष्ठाय
पञ्चमाध्याये परपञ्ञनिराकरणेन प्रसाध्येदानि
tमेव सारभूतशास्त्रां पष्ठाध्यायेन संकलयन्युप-
संहरति। उक्तार्थानां हि पुनस्तन्त्वाख्ये विषये
कृते शिष्याखामसंदिग्धाविपर्यस्तो दृढ़तरो बोध
उत्सचित्त इत्यतः स्थिरानिधननन्यायादनुकूल्युक्तः
द्विपप्नयासाधु नाच गौनक्ष्यो दोषाय।

2 Vedânti Mahâdeva, in my single accessible MS., reads
नासितिले. Ed.

3 -साधकाभावात्, agreeably to Nâgâsa. Ed.
Aph. 1. Soul is; for there is no proof that it is not.

a. Soul really is existent, generically; since we are aware of this, that 'I think;' because there is no evidence to defeat this. Therefore, all that is to be done is to discriminate it [from things in general]. Such is the meaning.¹

b. The discrimination of it he establishes by means of two proofs:²

इनहादिव्यतिरिक्तसौँ वैचिच्यात् ॥ २ ॥

Soul is not Body, &c.

Aph. 2. This [Soul,] is different from the Body, &c.; because of heterogeneousness, [or complete difference between the two].

पद्धतिवादद्विः ॥ ३ ॥

The usage of language is evidence for this.

Aph. 3. Also because it [Soul,] is expressed by means of the sixth [or possessive,] case.

a. That is to say: Soul is different from Body, &c., also because the learned express it by the possessive case, in

¹ जानामीत्येवं प्रतीयमानतया पुरुषं समामयत् सिद्ध एवासिति बाधकप्रमाणाभावाद्यः। अन्तस्तविवेकमात्रं कर्त्यायमित्यथः ॥

² तत्र विवेकं हेतुद्वेयं साधयति ॥

³ Some copies of Vedánti Mahádeva's work omit असैः. Ed.
such examples as, 'This [is] my body,' 'This [is] my understanding; for the possessive case would be unaccountable, if there were absolute non-difference [between the Body, or the like, and the Soul, to which it is thus attributed as a possession].

6. But then, suppose that this, also, is like the expressions, 'The Soul's Thought' [Soul and Thought being identical], 'Rāhu's head' [the trunkless Rāhu being all head], 'The statue's body,' &c. To this he replies:

\[ न शिलापुच्छवदभिमियाहकमानवाधात् ॥ 8 ॥ \]

*Aph. 4. It is not as in the case of the statue; because there is [there] a contradiction to the evidence which acquaints us with the thing.

a. This expression by means of the possessive case,

1 ममेदं शरीरं ममेयं बुद्धिरियादेविसुंदरां यदी-व्यपदेशादिपि देहादिभ्यं च्यत्मा भिन्नास्तन्ता-भेदे दशचनुपपत्तेरित्यर्थ: ॥

2 ननु पुश्कर्षय चैतन्यं राहों शिरं शिलापुच्छस्य शरीरमियाःदियपदेशवदयमपि भवतु ।

\[ स्त्राह ॥ \]

3 Aniruddha and Vedānti Mahādeva have शिलापुच्छकृ

Silāputra is 'grindstone,' according to the dictionaries; silāpu-traka, in the few places where I have seen it, may well signify 'torso.' *Ed.*

4 With reference to the word thus rendered, see the preceding note. *Ed.*
[viz., 'My body' (§ 3)] is not like 'The statue's body,' &c. In such a case as 'The statue's body,' there is a mere fiction; 'for it is contradicted by the evidence which acquaints us with the thing;' [sense being the evidence that there is here no body other than the statue]. But, in such an expression as 'My body,' there is no contradiction by evidence; for the contradiction, by Scripture and other evidences, is only in supposing the Body to be the Soul. Such is the meaning.

b. Having settled that Soul is different from Body, &c., he settles its emancipation:  

अत्यन्तदेहार्पितवर्षा कृतकृत्यता || 5 ||  

Aph. 5. Through the entire cessation of pain, there is done what was to be done.

a. But then, since there is an equality of gain and loss, inasmuch as, through the cessation of Pain there is the

1 शिलापुच्छय शरीरमिन्त्यादिवदं षड्षीवयप- 

देहो न भवति। शिलापुच्छादिस्यो धर्मिन्याहक- 

प्रमाणेन वाधाहिकत्यमाच्छ। मम शरीरमिति 

व्ययदेहे तु प्रमाणवाधी नासि देहात्मताया एव 

शुचिप्रमाणाशीवाधादिवर्ष्यः। || 

¹ तेहादिव्यतिरिज्जितया पुनर्यथमवधायं तन्मुक्तः- 

मवधार्यतिः।||
ceasing of Pleasure, also, that cannot be Soul's aim. To this he replies:"

**पथ दुःखाक्रेष्टः पुरुषस्य न तथा मुखाभिलाप: || ६ ||**

*Aph. 6. Not such desire for pleasure is there to Soul, as there is annoyance from Pain.*

a. And so the aversion to Pain, having excluded also the desire for Pleasure, gives rise to a wish for the cessation of Pain simply; so that there is not an equality of gain and loss,² [but a clear gain, in the desired release].

b. He declares that Soul’s aim is simply the cessation of Pain; because Pain is, indeed, abundant, in comparison of Pleasure:³

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¹ ननु दुःखिवृत्तया सुखस्यापि निवर्तेनाशुख्या-यथायतेन न सा पुरुषार्थ हि || तत्वाह ||

² Instead of क्रेष्टे, some MSS. of Vijnāna’s commentary, as also Nāgēśa and Vedānti Mahādeva, have क्रेष्ये; and a marginal note in one of my copies of Aniruddha states this to be the true reading. *Ed.*

³ तथा च मुखाभिलापि वाधिवापि दुःखेवो दुःखिवृत्तवेवेत्यां जनयतीति न तुत्स्मायत्वयत्-मिति ||

⁴ मुखापेत्याया दुःखस्य चक्षुलावादपि दुःखिव्वः-निरेव पुरुषार्थः इत्याह ||
Aph. 7. For [only] some one, somewhere, is happy.

. a. Among innumerable grasses, trees, brutes, birds, men, &c., very few,—a man, a god, or the like,—are happy: such is the meaning.²

Aph. 8. It [Pleasure] is also mixed with Pain; therefore the discriminating throw it to the side of [and reckon it as so much,] Pain.

a. He rejects the opinion that Soul’s aim is not the simple cessation of Pain, but this [cessation] tinted with Pleasure.⁴

⁰ Vedánti Mahádeva prefixes न. Ed.
"अनन्ततःकृप्यपुष्पमिस्यमनुष्यादिमयं सब्जी मनोष्टंवादिरव सुखी भवतीति"।
"केवला दृ:खनिरामने पुरुषार्थम्: किं तु सुखो-परलैः-परिोति मतमयाकरोति।"

⁴ Aniruddha has चैवैव. Ed.
⁶ One of my MSS. of Aniruddha has चैविच्यात् Ed.
Aph. 9. If you say that this [cessation of suffering is a joy] is not Soul's aim, inasmuch as there is no acquisition of Pleasure, then it is not as you say; for there are two kinds [of things desired].

a. For we see, amongst men, quite a distinct aspiration: [the first,] 'May I be happy;' [the second,] 'May I not be miserable;' [and the latter is our conception of beatitude].

b. He ponders a doubt:

निर्गुण्यात्मानोऽसंकल्पादिदेशतेः ॥ १० ॥

A doubt.

Aph. 10. The Soul [some one may suggest,] has no quality; for there is Scripture for its being unaccompanied, &c.

a. Therefore the cessation of Pain, indeed, [a property which does not belong to it,] cannot be Soul's aim: such is the meaning.

b. He clears up this [doubt]:

1 सुखी स्वां दुःखी न स्यामिति हि पृथगैव लोकानां प्रार्थना दृष्ट्यते इति ॥
2 शक्ते ॥
3 Aniruddha has असंकल्पादिदेशते । नागेशु, असंकल्पादिदेशते । Ed.
4 अतो न दुःखनिविस्तिरारयं हुहावार्तो घटतं हृद्यथः ॥
5 तमाध्येऽ॥
Aph. 11. Though it [the Pain] be the property of something else, yet it exists in it [the Soul] through non-discrimination.

a. Though qualities, viz., pleasure, pain, &c., belong [only] to the Mind, they exist, i.e., they abide, in the shape of a reflexion, in it, viz., in Soul, 'through non-discrimination,' as the cause, owing to the conjunction of Nature with Soul: such is the meaning. And this has been set forth in the First Book.¹

b. The binding of Soul by the qualities [or fetters] arises from non-discrimination: but from what does non-discrimination arise? With reference to this, he says:²

Aph. 12. Non-discrimination [of Soul from Nature] is beginningless; because, otherwise, two objections would present themselves.

a. For, had it a beginning, then, if [first] it arose quite spontaneously, bondage might befall even the liberated;

¹ सुखदुःखार्थवृद्धि चिन्तनं तचात्मनि सिद्धेऽपि प्रतिविर्देश्यति विवेकाचिन्मित्वात्
प्रकृतिपुनःसंयोगद्वारारूपः। एतत् प्रथमाध्याये
प्रतिपादितम् ॥

² चिन्तनं चिन्तनं चिन्तनं चिन्तनं चिन्तनं चिन्तनं चिन्तनं
मुलक इत्याकालायामाह ॥
and, if [secondly,] it were produced by Desert, &c., there would be a *regressus in infinitum*, inasmuch as we should have to search for another [previous instance of] non-discrimination, to stand as the cause of [that] Desert, &c., also: such is the meaning.¹

6. And then, if it be without beginning, it must be everlasting. To this he replies:²

\[ न नित्यः स्यादात्मवदन्यशानुच्छसितः \] ¹³ ¹³

*Non-discrimination, though from eternity, may be cut short.*

Aph. 13. It [non-discrimination,] cannot be everlasting [in the same manner] as the soul is; else, it could not be cut short, [as we affirm that it can be].

a. It is not everlasting, indivisible, and beginningless, in the same way as the soul is; but it is beginningless, in the shape of an *on-flow* [which may be stopped]. For, otherwise, the cutting short of a beginningless entity would, as is established by Scripture, be unfeasible, [though the beginningless antecedent *non-entity* of a given jar may be readily understood to terminate, on the production of the jar]. Such is the meaning.⁴

¹ सादिने हि स्वत एवोत्यादे मुक्तस्थायि वन्यापति: कर्मादिजन्यस्वे च कर्मादिकं प्रत्यपि कारणे-लेनाविवेकान्तरान्विषेषोद्वस्यः तथः।

² ननु चेदनादिस्तिन्हि नित्यः स्यादिति। त-चाह॥

³ Nāgēsa has स्यादात्मवदुच्छिन्नेः. *Ed.*

⁴ अत्मविद्योक्षयागदानादिनेभवति किं तु
b. Having stated the cause of [Soul's] Bondage, he states the cause of Liberation:

Bondage now destructible.

Aph. 14. It [Bondage,] is annihilable by the allotted cause, [viz., discrimination of Soul from Nature]; as darkness is [annihilable by the allotted cause, viz., Light].

This enforced.

Aph. 15. Here, also, [viz., in the case of Bondage and Discrimination, as in the case of Darkness and Light,] there is allotment, [as is proved] both by positive and negative conso- ciation; [Liberation taking place where Discrimination is, and not where it is not].

σ. He reminds [us] of what was mentioned in the first Book, viz., that Bondage cannot be innate, &c.: ²

1 वन्धकारणामुक्ता मोक्षकारणसमाह ॥


3 Vide supra, p. 8. Ed.

4 वन्धस्य स्वाभाविकाविदिकं न संभवतीति प्रथमाध्यायोऽस्मायम् स्मारयति ॥
Aph. 16. Since it cannot be accounted for in any other way, it is non-discrimination alone that is the cause of Bondage, which cannot be innate.

a. 'Bondage' here means the cause of Bondage, named the conjunction of pain. The rest is plain.

b. But then, since liberation, also, from its being a product, is liable to destruction, Bondage should take place over again. To this he replies:

\[ न मुक्तस्य पुनर्वेद्योगोगोर्वावृत्तिः \] ॥ १७ ॥

Aph. 17. Further, Bondage does not again attach to the liberated; because there is Scripture for its non-recurrence.

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1 Vedánti Mahádeva has प्रकारान्तराभावात्. Ed.
2 वन्योऽच्छ दुःख्योगाक्ष्यवन्धकारणम् । शेषं सुगमसेः
3 ननु मुक्तरित्य कार्यतया विनाशपत्या पुनः। बेन्धः स्वादिति । तत्राह इ
4 Vijnána and Nágésa quote the text: न स पुनरावर्तते।
Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva cite the longer passage: अथ ज्ञात्मा ज्ञात्यथ: प्रकृतितो विवेकतः न पुनरावर्तते।
See note 4, at p. 182, supra. Since that note was written, I have observed the words अथ ज्ञात्मा वा उग्रे दृष्टव्यः in the Brihadd-
Aph. 18. Else, it [liberation] would not be Soul's aim, [which it is].

a. He states the reason why this is not Soul's aim: *

Aph. 19. What happened to both would be alike, [if liberation were perishable].

a. That is to say: there would be no difference between the two, the liberated and the bound; because of their being alike liable to future bondage; and, therefore, such [perishable emancipation] is not Soul's aim, [but emancipation final and complete].

b. But then, in that case, if you acknowledge that there is a distinction between the bond and the free, how is it

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ranyaka Upanishad, ii., 4, 5, and Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa, xiv., 5, 4, 5. Aniruddha, in his comment on an Aphorism which soon follows, the twenty-third, quotes them correctly, with their ensuing context; a fact which suggests that my criticism on Vāchāspati Miśra's quotation, ventured in the note above referred to, may be hasty. **Ed.**

1 Aniruddha, in one of my MSS., and Vedānti Mahādeva have अन्यथापुष्पायार्थम्. *Ed.*

4 अपुष्पार्थमेहेतुमाह॥

5 भाविविच्छेदसाम्येनोपमयोर्मुक्तवद्योगिर्शेष्यो न स्यात्तथापुष्पार्थविभं:॥
that you have asserted [Book I., § 19,] the eternal freedom
[of all souls alike]? To this he replies:\footnote{1}

मुक्तिन्तरायव्यस्ते नरः \ || २० \ ||

The nature of liberation. \ Aphi. 20. Liberation is nothing other
than the removal\footnote{3} of the obstacle [to
the Soul's recognition of itself as free].

a. But then, in that case, since Bondage and Liberation
are unreal, Liberation must be contradictory to the texts,
&c., which set forth what is Soul's aim, [as some positive
and real acquisition, not merely the removal of a screen];
to which he replies:\footnote{4}

तत्त्वापिविरोधः \ || २१ \ ||

An objection repelled. \ Aphi. 21. Even in that case, there is
no contradiction.

a. That is to say: 'even in that case,' i.e., even if
Liberation consists [only] in the removal of an obstacle,
there is no contradiction in its being Soul's aim.\footnote{4}

\footnote{1} नन्वेवं बच्चमुक्तियोविन्देषाभ्युपगमे नित्यमुक्तां
कधमुच्यते \ तत्त्वाह ||

\footnote{3} Nāgēśa reads पराः. \ Ed.

\footnote{4} The rare word द्वस्त, thus rendered, Vijnāna and Vedānti
Mahādeva explain by द्वस्त. \ Ed.

\footnote{4} नन्वेवं बन्धमोक्षमोक्षिंध्याति मोक्षस्य पुरुषार्थ
विन्यासपूर्वकामयादिविरोध इत्याह ||

\footnote{5} तत्त्वापितरायव्यस्तवस्य मोक्षस्य नित्यः पुरुषार्थविरोध
ित्यथः: ||
b. But then, if Liberation be merely the removal of an obstacle, then it should be accomplished through mere hearing [of the error which stands in the way]; just as a piece of gold on one's neck, [which one has sought for in vain, while it was] withheld from one by ignorance [of the fact that it has been tied round one's neck with a string], is attained, [on one's hearing where it is]. To this he replies: 1

Another objection repelled.

Aph. 22. This [attainment of Liberation, on the mere hearing of the truth,] is no necessity; for there are three sorts of those competent [to apprehend the truth; but not all are qualified to appropriate it, on merely hearing it].

a. He mentions that not mere hearing alone is seen to be the cause of knowledge, but that there are others, also: 3

2 अधिकारिचविध्याच नियमः: || २२ ||

दार्शीर्षकमिथारेवाम् || २३ ||

1 नवनिरायध्यांसमाचं चेत्नुकित्वहि अवशमांचे चेत् चैव तत्सति: स्याद्वजाणप्रतििवशकं चामीकर-सिद्धिविदिति || तथाह ||

2 Nāgarjuna, in some copies, and, according to some copies, Vijnāna read अधिकारः. Ed.

3 This Aphorism, as given, is a literal repetition of Book I., 70, at p. 87, supra. Ed.

4 न केवलं अवशमांचं ज्ञाने उपकारणमन्य- दस्यथाह ||
Aph. 23. Of others [viz., other means besides hearing], for the sake of confirmation, [there is need].

a. He speaks of these same other means:

स्थिरसुखमासनमिति न नियम: \( \text{II 24 II} \)

Aph. 24. There is no [absolute] necessity that what is steady and promoting ease should be a [particular] posture, [such as any of those referred to in Book III., § 34].

a. That is to say: there is no necessity that a ‘posture’ should be the ‘lotus-posture,’ or the like; because whatever is steady and promotes ease is a [suitable] ‘posture.’

b. He states the principal means [of Concentration]:

ध्यानं निर्विषयं मन्: \( \text{II 25 II} \)

Aph. 25. Mind without an object is Meditation.

a. That is to say: what Internal Organ is void of any modification, that is ‘Meditation,’ i.e., Concentration, in the shape of exclusion of the modifications of Intellect: by reason of the identity [here,] of effect and cause, the word ‘cause’ is employed for ‘effect.’ For it will be

\[1 \text{ उपरायेय साधनान्याह II} \]
\[2 \text{ आसने पद्मासनादिनियमो नालि यत: स्थिर सुखं च क यत्तेवासनमित्यथः II} \]
\[3 \text{ मुख्यं साधनमाह II} \]
declared how Meditation effects this' [exclusion of the modifications of Intellect].

6. But then, since Soul is alike, whether there be Concentration or Non-concentration, what have we to do with Concentration? Having pondered this doubt, he clears it up: 2

उभयथायाथविशेषस्थैन्यमुपरारगनिरोधाधिशेषः

II 26 II

A distinction not without a difference.

Aph. 26. If you say that even both ways there is no difference, it is not so: there is a difference, through the exclusion [in the one case] of the tinge [of reflected pain which exists in the other case].

a. But how can there exist a tinge in that which is unassociated [with anything whatever, as Soul is alleged to be]? To this he replies: 3

निनःसङ्क्षेपुपरागोऽविवेकात् II 27 II

1 वृत्तिशून्यं यदन्तः कर्षणं भवति तदेतव ध्यानं योगशिष्ठवृत्तिनिरोधधुप इत्यथे:। कार्यवाकार्या-
भेदेन कार्यशब्दः कार्यं प्रयुक्तं। एतत्साधनबनेन
ध्यानस्य वक्ष्यमालाशिलादिति॥

2 ननु योगायोगयो: पुरुषस्येकधृष्ट्या योगे-
नेत्याशब्दम् समाधिते॥

3 ननु निनःसङ्क्षेपमुपरागः। तत्चाह॥
Aph. 27. Though it [Soul] be un-associated, still there is a tingeing [reflexionally] through Non-discrimination.

a. That is to say: though there is not a real tinge in that which is un-associated [with tincture, or anything else], still there is, as it were, a tinge; hence the tinge is treated as simply a reflection, by those who discriminate the tinge [from the Soul, which it delusively seems to belong to].

b. He explains this same:

Aph. 28. As is the case with the Hibiscus and the crystal [Book I., § 19, c.], there is not a tinge, but a fancy [that there is such].

a. He states the means of excluding the aforesaid tinge:

How to be got rid of.

Aph. 29. It [viz., the aforesaid tinge,] is debарred by Meditation, Restraint, Practice, Apathy, &c.

\[1\] निःसङ्गे यद्यपि पारमार्थिक उपरागो नासित तथापुराग इव भवतीति कृत्य प्रतिविष्ण एवो-पराग इति व्यवहृति उपरागविवेकिनितियत्वं।

\[2\] एतदेव विवृश्चिति।

\[3\] यथोक्तपरागस्य निरोधोपायमाह।
a. He shows the means settled by the ancient teachers, in regard to the exclusion—through Meditation, &c., lodged in the Mind,—of the tingeing of Soul.\footnote{1}

লয়বিচ্ছেপ্যেত্বারুচ্ছেত্যাচার্যা: \(\text{II 30 II}\)

The ancient dogma on this point.

Aph. 30. It is by the exclusion of dissolution\footnote{2} and distraction, say the teachers.

\(a\). That is to say: through the removal, by means of Meditation, &c., of the Mind’s condition of [being dissolved in] Sleep, and condition of [waking] Certainty, &c., there takes place also the exclusion of the tingeing of Soul by the condition; because, on the exclusion of any [real] object, there is the exclusion also of its reflexion: so say the ancient teachers.\footnote{3}

\(b\). He states that there is no compulsion that Meditation, &c., should take place in caves and such places: \footnote{4}

न स्थाननियमस्थितप्रसादात् \(\text{II 31 II}\)

\footnote{1} চিত্তনিহধ্যানাদিনা পুরুষস্যোপরাগানিরোধে পূর্বাচার্য্যসিদ্ধ হার্দশেষ্যতি \(\text{II}\)

\footnote{2} \text{Inertness [of mind]}' is a better rendering of \text{laya}. \text{Ed.}

\footnote{3} ধ্যানাদিনা চিত্তস্য নিদ্রাবৃত্তাঃ প্রমাণাদি-বৃত্তক নিবৃত্তা পুরুষস্যাপি বৃত্তানেত্যাগানীরোথি ভবতি বিশ্বনিগৃহে প্রতিশিষ্যাপি নিরোধাদিতি পূর্বাচার্য্যা চাহসির্য্যাঃ \(\text{II}\)

\footnote{4} ধ্যানাদাতে গুহাদিস্থাননিয়মো নাস্তিত্যাহ \(\text{II}\)

\footnote{5} Aniruddha has, to a very different effect, \text{-প্রসাদাভাবাত}.\text{.}
Aph. 31. There is no rule about localities; for it is from tranquillity of Mind.

a. That is to say: Meditation, or the like, results simply from tranquillity of Mind. Therefore, such a place as a cave is not indispensable for it.¹

b. The discussion of Liberation is completed. Now, with an eye to the unchangeableness of Soul, he handles compendiously the cause of the world.²

प्रकृतेरायोपादानतामृत्युषं कार्यनिषुते: || 32 ||

Aph. 32. Nature is the primal material of the world; for there is Scripture [to the effect] that the others are products.

a. That is to say: since we learn, from Scripture, that Mind, &c., are products, Nature is established under the character of the radical cause of these.³

b. But then, let Soul be the material. To this he replies:⁴

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His comment runs: यच चिन्त्रमिश्रादेव ध्यानादिकम् || अततत्र न गुहादिश्यानन्तिम इत्ययः: ||

¹ चिन्त्रमिश्रादेव ध्यानादिकम् || अततत्र न गुहादिश्यानन्तिम इत्ययः: ||

² समाश्रो मोक्षविचारः || इदानी पुरुषापरिशालिवाय जगकारशमुसंहरति: ||

³ महदारीनां कार्यनिषुतांत्रिषु मूलकारशतत्तया प्रकृति: सिध्यतीत्यथः: ||

⁴ ननु पुरुष एवोपादानं भवतु || तचाह: ||
Aph. 33. Not to Soul does this [viz., to be the material of the world,) belong, though it be eternal; because of its want of suitableness.

a. That is to say: suitableness to act as material implies the possession of qualities, and the being associable: [and,] by reason of the absence of both of these, Soul, though eternal, [and, therefore, no product,) cannot serve as material.

b. But then, since, from such Scriptural texts as, 'Many creatures have been produced from Soul,' we may gather the fact that Soul is a cause, the assertions of an illusory creation, &c., ought to be accepted. Having pondered this adverse suggestion, he replies:

Aph. 34. The despicable sophist does not gain [a correct apprehension of] Soul; because of the contradictoriness [of his notions] to Scripture.

1 गुरुवच्चः सहिन्त चोपादानयोग्यता तयोर-भावात्सुरुषस्य नित्यवेदिष्पय नोपादानलस्मित्वर्थः ||

2 Mundaka Upanishad, ii., i., 5. Ed.

3 ननु वहः प्रजा: पुरुषार्थसङ्गता इत्यादिः इत्यादिः पुरुषस्य कार्यानावगमाखिवित्तादिव्रद्वदा आचर्य-वीय इत्याम्षब्रह्म ||

4 Here I have offered a substitute for 'illogical outcaste.' Ed.
a. That is to say: the various views, in regard to Soul's being a cause, which are conceivable are, all, opposed to Scripture; therefore, the lowest of the bad reasoners, and others, who are accepters thereof, have no knowledge of the nature of Soul. Hence it is to be understood that those, also, [e.g., the Naiyāyikas,] who assert that Soul is the substance of the qualities Pleasure, Pain, &c., are quite illogical; these, also, have no correct knowledge of Soul. And, if it be asserted that Soul is a cause [of the world], just as the sky is the recipient cause of the clouds, &c., [and stands, towards it, in the relation of a cause, in so far as, without the room afforded by it, these could not exist], then we do not object to that; for, what we deny is only that there is transformation [of Soul, as material, into the world, as product].

b. Since we see, that, in the case of things motionless, locomotive, &c., the material cause is nothing else than

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\(^1\) 'Lowest . . . thereof' I have put instead of 'base illogical holders of these.' *Ed.*

\(^2\) पुष्पकारणतायां ये वेय पद्धा: संभाव्यति सर्वेऽहृत्विवृद्धः इत्यतलद्वुगगन्त्यां कुतार्किकेः

काछ्यमनामातस्मस्त्वहयपज्ञानं न भवतीत्यथा।

एतेनात्मनि सुखेऽखदिगुणोपादानमवादिनोः

दण्डी कुतार्किका एव तेषामपक्षायथार्यज्ञानं नास्तीतःवग्नं

यदि चाकारणस्याभावाधिष्ठानकारणतवदालमनः कारणमुच्यते तदा तच्च

निराकुर्मः परिक्षामस्यैव प्रतिष्ठार्थिदिति।
earth, &c., how can Nature be the material of all? To this
he replies:

पारम्परिकप्रधानानुवृत्तिरखुत्वः ॥ ३५ ॥

Aph. 35. Though but mediately [the
cause of products], Nature is inferred
[as the ultimate cause of the inter-
mediate causes,]; just as are Atoms, [by the Vaiseshikas].

सार्वेच्छायेदलेखनाहिभुवम् ॥ ३६ ॥

Aph. 36. It [Nature,] is all-per-
vading; because [its] products are seen
everywhere.

a. But then, only if it be limited, can it be said that,
‘Wherever a product arises, there does it [Nature,] go [or
act];’ [for what is unlimited, and fills all space, can find
no other space to move into]. To this he replies:

गतियोगेश्याय्यकारणवत्तानानिरखुत्वः ॥ ३९ ॥

Aph. 37. Though motion may attach
to it, this does not destroy its cha-
racter as ultimate cause; just as is the case with Atoms.

a. ‘Motion’ means action. Though it be present,
this does not prevent its [Nature’s,] being the radical
cause; just as is the case with the earthy and other
Atoms, according to the opinion of the Vaiseshikas: such is the meaning.\footnote{গতি: কিয়া। তত্ত্বভৈর্বপি মূলকারকধাতায়া অহ্নিয়েত্যা বৈশেষিকসমতे পারিতিবাদোনামান্যঃ।}

\textit{प्रतिद्वाधिक्यम प्रधानस्य न नियमः} \textit{|| 38 ||}

\textit{Aph. 38. Nature is something in addition to the notorious [nine Substances of the Naiyāyikas]: it is no matter of necessity [that there should be precisely nine].}

\textit{a. And the argument, here, is the Scriptural declaration, that eight [of the pretended primitive substances] are products: such is the import.\footnote{অষ্টানামেব কার্যেবচ্যঃ চাচ তর্ক ইতি ভাবঃ।}}

\textit{सत्त्वादीनामतद्वर्त्य तद्वृपवात्} \textit{|| 39 ||}

\textit{Aph. 39. Purity and the others are not properties of it [viz., Nature]; because they are its essence.}

\textit{a. That is to say: Purity and the other Qualities are not properties of Nature; because they are what constitutes Nature.\footnote{সত্ত্বাদিগুণানাং प्रकृतिधर्मवर्त्य नास्ति प्रकृतिस्तिथ्यपञचादित्यथः।}}}

\textit{b. He determines the motive of Nature's energizing;}
since, if we held the energizing to be without a motive, Emancipation would be inexplicable.⁴

\[ \text{अनुभोगेति पुमाय सृष्टि: प्रधानस्योपत्त्तकुकुम-} \]
\[ \text{वहनवत्}^2 \parallel 80 \parallel \]

\text{nature's disinterestedness.}

\text{Aph. 40. Nature, though it does not enjoy [the results of its own energizing], creates for the sake of Soul; like a cart's carrying saffron, [for the use of its master. See Book III., § 58].}

\text{a. He states the concomitant cause of diversified creation:⁴}

\[ \text{कभर्मेवचिच्छालसृष्ट्वचिच्यम्} \parallel 81 \parallel \]

\text{Nature treats every one according to his deserts.}

\text{Aph. 41. The diversity of creation is in consequence of the diversity of Desert.}

\[ ^1 \text{प्रधानप्रवृत्ते: प्रयोजनमवधारर्वते निष्प्रयो-} \]
\[ \text{जनप्रवृत्त्वभुगमे मोक्षानुपपत्त्वरिति} \parallel \]

\text{Nägäna is peculiar in giving, as an Aphorism, in substitution for these words, the clause from the introduction to it, printed just above, viz., निष्प्रयो, &c., but ending with the nominative case -अनुपपत्तिː. The Serampore edition of the Sānkhyā-pracac-}
\[ \text{भाना-भाष्या has, as the Aphorism, very corruptly, in part: प्रयोजनप्रवृत्त्वभुगमे मोक्षानुपपत्त्वः} \parallel \text{Ed.} \]

\[ ^2 \text{Nimitta, on which vide supra, p. 400, note 4. Ed.} \]

\[ ^3 \text{विचिच्छति निमित्तकारणामाह} \parallel \]
a. But then, granting that creation is due to Nature, yet whence is destruction? For a couple of opposite results cannot belong to one and the same cause. To this he replies:

साम्यवेषम्याभ्यां कार्येकम्यं ॥ ४२ ॥

Aph. 42. The two results are through equipoise and the reverse of equipoise.

a. Nature is the triad of Qualities, viz., Purity, &c.; and their 'reverse of equipoise' is their aggregation in excess or defect; the absence of this [reverse of equipoise] is 'equipoise': through these two causes two opposite results, in the shape of creation and destruction, arise from one and the same: such is the meaning.

b. But then, since it is Nature's attribute to create, there should be the mundane state, even after [the discriminative] knowledge, [which, it is alleged, puts an end to it]. To this he replies:

1 ननु भवतु प्रधानानालन्त्रिति: प्रज्ञावल्लु कस्मात् ।
न हेकस्माकारणाहिततुष्कार्यकेहस्य घटते। तत्वाहं ॥

2 Compare Book I., Aph. 61, a, at p. 71, supra. Ed.

3 सचादिगुणकं प्रधानं तेषां च वैष्णवं ज्ञृनतिरिच्छावेन संहनं तद्भावः: साम्यं ताप्यां हेतुभ्यामेकस्मादेव सृष्टिमलयरुपं विश्वकार्येवं भवतीवेधः ॥

'ननु प्रधानस्य सृष्टिवाभाब्यास्मानोत्तरमिपि
संसारं स्वात्। तत्वाहं ॥

29
Aph. 43. Since [or when] the emancipated has understood [that he never was really otherwise], Nature does not create; just as, in the world, [a minister does not toil, when the king's purpose has been accomplished].

a. But then, Nature does not rest from creating; for we see the mundane condition of the ignorant: and so, since Nature goes on creating, to the emancipated, also, Bondage may come again. To this he replies:

No reason why Nature should invade the emancipated.

Aph. 44. Even though it [Nature,] may invade others [with its creative influences], the emancipated does not experience, in consequence of the absence of a concurrent cause, [e.g., Non-discrimination, in the absence of which there is no reason why the emancipated should be subjected to Nature's invasion].

1 Compare Aph. 66 of Book III., at p. 267, supra. Ed.

2 ननु प्रधानस्य सृष्टुपरमो नास्त्यज्ञानां सं-सारदर्शनानां च प्रधानसृष्ट्या मुक्तस्यांस्य पुन-बेवः स्यात् । तचाह॥

3 Some copies of Vijnána here introduce भवति; and Nágeśa has the lection विमुक्तोगो भवति. Ed.

4 Nimitta, on which vide supra, p. 400, note 4. Ed.
a. But then, this arrangement could be possible then, [only] if there were a multiplicity of souls: but that is quite excluded by the text of the non-duality of Soul. Having pondered this doubt, he says:¹

पुरुषवहलें व्यवस्थात्: || ॥ ॥

Aph. 45. The multitude of Soul [is proved] by the distribution [announced by the Veda itself].

a. That is to say: the multitude of Soul is proved, absolutely, by the distribution of Bondage and Emancipation mentioned in such Scriptural texts as, 'Whoso understand this, these are immortal, while others experience only sorrow.'² ³

b. But then, the distribution of Bondage and Liberation may be through the difference of adjunct. To this he replies:⁴

¹ नन्वियं व्यवस्था तदा घटेत यदि पुरुषवहलें व्यवस्थात्। तदेव व्याया०वित्रु०तवादित्वमित्वायास्मागः॥

² ये तहिदुरृसृतास्य भवन्यश्चेतरे दुःखमेवोपयोगीत्यादिरूप्यक्षवनधोषव्यवस्थात् एव पुरुषवहलें सिद्धतीयाय:॥

³ सातपथब्राह्मण सार्व, ७, २, १५. Ed.

⁴ नन्वाधिमेदादि०वनधोषव्यवस्था व्यवस्थात्। त-चाह॥
Aph. 46. If [you acknowledge] an adjunct [of Soul], then, on its being established, there is duality, [upsetting the dogma founded on in § 44].

a. But then, the adjuncts, moreover, consist of ‘Ignorance,’ [which, according to the Vedánta, is no reality]; so that by these there is no detriment to [the Vedántic dogma of] non-duality. With reference to this doubt, he says:

Aph. 47. Even by the two the authority is contradicted.

a. That is to say: even by acknowledging the two, viz., Soul and Ignorance, a contradiction is constituted to the text, [which is alleged as] the authority for non-duality.

b. He states another couple of objections, also:

1 Nāgęśa has उपाधिसिद्धिक्षेत्रसिद्धि. Ed.
2 ननूपाधियोपखविद्या इति न नैतेरबेतभः इत्याश्चायामाह्.
3 पुस्तकविचारे चाह्यासपप्प्पीकृताभ्याम्बेदित-प्रमाणस्य चुतेविरोधङ्गतदाव्यः एवेऽपि.
4 अपरमिपि दृष्टान्यमाह्.
Aph. 48. The primâ facie view [of the Vedânta] is not [to be allowed any force, as an objection]; because, by [admitting] two, [viz., Soul and Ignorance], there is no opposition [to our own dualistic theory of Soul and Nature]: and the subsequent [dogma, viz., that one single Soul is the only reality, is not to be allowed]; because of the non-existence of a proof, [which, if it did exist, would, along with Soul, constitute a duality].

a. But then, Soul will be demonstrated by its self-manifestation. To this he replies:

प्रकाशत्स्तिनिधि कर्मकर्तृविरोधः II ४५ II

Self-manifestation contradictory.

Aph. 49. [And.] in its [Soul's,] being demonstrated by the light [of itself, as you Vedântis say it is], there is the [unreconciled] opposition of patient and agent [in one, which is a contradiction].

a. That is to say: if Soul be demonstrated by the light which Soul consists of, there is the 'opposition of patient and agent' [in one].

b. But then, there is no contradiction [here,] between patient and agent; because it [the Soul], through the property of light which is lodged in it, can, itself, furnish

1 ननु स्त्रप्रकाशत्सत्मा सेन्यतिः तत्राह II
2 Aniruddha has कर्मकर्तृविरोधः; Nágcâś, कर्तृकार्तिविरोधः. Ea.
3 चेतन्यह्यप्रकाशत्सत्त्वत्सिद्धि कर्मकर्तृविरोध इत्यथः II
the relation to itself; just as the Vaiśeṣikas declare, that, through the intelligence lodged in it, it is, itself, an object to itself. To this he replies:

Aph. 50. This [Soul], in the shape of Thought, discrepant from the non-intelligent, reveals the non-intelligent.

a. But then, in that case, if duality be established in accordance with proofs, &c., what becomes of the Scriptural text declaring non-duality? To this he replies:

Aph. 51. There is no contradiction to Scripture [in our view]; because that [text of Scripture which seems to

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1 ननु नासति कर्मेकर्तृविरोधः स्वनिध्वप्रकाश-धर्मंहारा स्वस्त्य स्वसंवन्यसंभवत्। यथा वैशेषिकानां स्वनिध्वजानहारा स्वस्त्य स्वयं विषय इति।

तत्राह ||

2 Aniruddha has -वृत्ती। Ed.

3 From this point, Vedānti Mahādeva, according to my one poor MS. of his work, has a very different reading, which, however, owing to the carelessness of the copyist, I am unable to reproduce. Ed.

4 नन्वेवं प्रमाणाद्यनुरोधेन दैत्तिज्ञवैद्वैतश्रुते: का गाति:। तत्राह ||
assert absolute non-duality] is [intended] to produce apathy in those who have desires, [and who would be better for believing in 'the nothingness of the things of time'.]

a. He tells us that the assertors of non-duality are to be shunned, not only for the reason above mentioned, but, also, because of the non-existence of evidence to convince us that the world is unreal.

**Jagatatyaalambudhakararajathasthadhakabhavaat**

**II 52 II**

Aph. 52. The world is real; because it results from an unobjectionable cause, and because there is [in Scripture.] no debarrer [of this view of the matter].

a. We see, in the world, that no reality belongs to dream-objects, or to the [fancied] yellowness of [invariably white] conch-shells, and the like; inasmuch as these are results of the internal organ, &c., when [not normal, but] injured by [i.e., under the injurious influence of] Sleep,² &c.: and this is not [the state of things] in the [waking] Universe, in which Mind is the first,³ [according to Book I., § 71].

¹ न केवलमुद्युक्तवाहितवादिनो हेया अपि
तु जगदसत्यतायायकप्रमाणार्थभवनापीत्याः

² For 'injured,' &c., read, 'impeded by the obstruction [offered] by Sleep.' Ed.

³ Instead of 'in which,' &c., read, '[consisting of] the Great One, &c.' Ed.

⁴ निद्रादिरीढकुट्टहारं यान्यादिजन्यलेन स्वप्न-
किष्कोट्यापित्मादीनामस्त्यत्वं लोके दृष्टं तथ
महदादिप्रपणे नासि
b. He declares that the Universe is real, not merely in its existent state [at any given instant], but, also, always.

अन्तःसंभवात्तुद्यति: \(\text{अभ. 53}\)

Creation excluded.

Ap. 53. Since it cannot be [accounted for] in any other way, manifestation [of whatever is manifested] is of what is real, [i.e., of what previously existed].

a. That is to say: since, through the aforesaid reasons, it is impossible that the unreal should come into existence, what does come into existence, or is manifested, is what really existed [previously,] in a subtile form.

b. Though [it is declared that] the being the agent and the being the experiencer belong to diverse subjects, he asserts the distribution [of agency to Self-consciousness, and of experience to Soul,] by two aphorisms:

आहंकार: कर्ता न पुर: \(\text{विनो 54}\)

The real agent who.

Ap. 54. Self-consciousness, not Soul, is the agent.

1 न कंवलं वर्तमानद्वायमेव प्रपञ्चः सधपि
तु सदैवेयाह \(\text{नवी 55}\)

2 पूर्वाक्ष्यविनिमित्तादासभवात्तुद्यति स
देवोत्सव पारते \(\text{नवी 56}\)

3 कर्तृवाक्ष्यवाच्चित्रिकश्चैव व्यवस्थमु
पपाद्यः सूत्रभेदः \(\text{नवी 57}\)
Aph. 55. Experience ceases at [discrimination of] Soul, [as being quite distinct from Nature]; since it arises from its [Soul's,] Desert, [which is not, really, Soul's, but which, while Non-discrimination lasts, is made over to Soul; just as the fruits of the acts of a king's ministers are made over to the king].

a. He shows the reason for what was stated before, viz., that cessation of action does not result from enterings into the world of Brahmā:

Aph. 56. Even in the world of the moon, &c., there is return [to mundane existence]; because of there really being a cause [of such return].

a. 'A cause,' viz., Non-discrimination, Desert, &c.

b. But then, through the counsels of the persons dwelling in these various [supermundane] worlds, there ought to be no return [to mundane existence]. To this he replies:

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1 ब्रह्मलोकान्तर्गतिभिन्नतिमि निर्दृष्टिरिति पूर्वाओऽसेवकारां दर्शिताम्
2 इत्यादि देवायम् अनिरुध्द्हा छान्त्याम् । वा दिशान्ति करुणाय विनायकायम्।
3 निर्मित्रमविवेककर्मांदिकम्
4 ननु तत्त्वज्ञानसिद्धेशाद्यात्मावतिसः स्यात्। तचाह।
This point enforced. Aph. 57. Not by the counsel of [supermundane] people is there effectuation [of Emancipation]; just as in the former case, [the case, viz., of counsel given by mundane instructors].

a. But, in that case, what becomes of the text that there is no return from the world of Brahmá? To this he replies:" गतिफुलं व्यापकवेदयुपाधियोगाद्गदेशका ललाभो योमवत् II ५४ II

Another. Aph. 59. And, in accordance with the text of its 'going,' though it [Soul,]

1 Auiruddha has, instead of सिद्धि: तसिद्धि: Ed.
2 तन्वेवं ब्रह्मलोकादनावृतिमयते: का गति:। तत्तवाह।
3 परिपरिस्वरूपानामी गतिश्रुतिमुपपाद्यति ल
is all-pervading, yet, in time, it reaches its place of experience [or body], through conjunction with an adjunct; as in the case of Space.

a. For, as Space, though it is all-pervading, is spoken of as moving to some particular place, in consequence of its conjunction with an adjunct, such as a jar, [when we say 'the space occupied by the jar is moved to the place to which the jar is carried'], just so is it [here].

b. He expounds the statement, that the site of experience [the body] is formed through the superintendence of the experiencer;² [Soul]:

अनन्धिलितस्य पूर्तिभावप्रसब्दग्राघं तत्सिदं

II 60 II

The Body's existence dependent on Soul.

Aph. 60. This [constitution of a body] is not accomplished in the case of what is [organic matter] not superintended [by Soul]; because we find putrefaction [in organic matter where Soul is absent].

a. But then, let the construction of a site of experience [or a body] for Experiencers [i.e., Souls] take place

¹ यथा ह्याकाशस्य पूर्वात्वं सिप देवविशेषगतिष्ठाणायपाधियोगाक्रमहियते तथैवेति

²भक्कुरधिश्वानाण्याग्राजायतननिर्माणमिति युद्धं तन्मात्रबन्धिति

³ The reading of Aniruddha is पूर्तिभावयोगान्त. Ed.
without any superintendence at all, through Desert. To this he replies: ¹

श्लोकनावर चेद्वानवस्यः तदसंववक्ष्मानंदिव
दृष्टे || ६१ ||

Desert not the maker of the Body.

Aph. 61. If you say that [independently of any superintendence,] it is through Desert [that a Body is formed, it is not so]; since what is unconnected [with the matter to be operated upon] is incompetent thereto; as is the case with [unapplied] water, &c., in respect of a plant.

a. That is to say: because it is impossible that Desert, which is not directly conjoined with the semen and other [elements of the Body], should operate through Soul, in the construction of the Body, &c.; just as it is for water, &c., unconnected with the seed, to operate through tillage, &c., in the production of a plant. ²

b. According to the system of the Vaiseshikas and others, it is settled that Soul is the superintendent, [in the construction of the Body], in virtue of its being conjoined with Desert. But he tells us, that, in his own doc-

¹ नन्विधिद्वार विनैवादोत्वार भोक्ष्मृयो भो-
गायतनप्रतिमा० भवतु || तचाह ||

² Nágeśa reads चेदसंवङ्ग। Ed.

³ प्रकाशिद्वसंववस्य गारिरादिनिना-
क्षिक्षिणी भोक्ष्मृवार्तवांसंववक्ष्मानं जला-
दीनामकुत्ते थोरे खुरिकारपदित्वर्थः ||
trine, since Desert, &c., are not properties of Soul, the Soul cannot, through these, be the cause1 [of the Body]:

\[ निर्गुणवाचात् संभवात्कारधम्मः हैते ॥ ६२ ॥ \]

**Aph. 62.** For this is impossible [viz., that the Soul should, through its Desert, &c., be the cause of Body]; because it has no qualities for these [viz., Desert, &c.,] are properties of Self-consciousness, [not of Soul].

a. And so, in our opinion, it is settled that Soul superintends [in the causing of the Body,] quite directly, by conjunction simply, without reference to anything intermediate: such is the import.²

b. But, if Soul be all-pervading, then the limitedness of the living soul, which is set forth in Scripture, is unfounded. To repel this doubt, he says:³

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1 वैशेषिकादिनियेनादृश्य संवन्यघटकत्यात्म- 
नोरधिष्ठायुः स्थापितम् । स्वसिद्धान्ते नरःतदी- 
नामात्मधिभौ भावबात्तह्या भोक्तृतुत्तमेव न सं- 
भवतीत्याह ॥

2 तथा चास्मन्ते हार्दिनेयेश्व संयोगमाशेयं 
सांर्थतां भोक्तृतिद्वां सिध्यतीति भावः ॥

3 ननु चेत्युष्णो व्यापकस्तहिं चुतिष्ठितपादितं 
जीवपरिलिखित्वमनुपपचम । तामिमामाश्च ना 
परिहतुमाह ॥
Aph. 63. The nature of a living soul belongs to that which is qualified, [not to Soul devoid of qualities, as is proved] by direct and indirect arguments.¹

a. To be a living soul is the being possessed of the vital airs; and this is the character of the soul distinguished by personality, not of pure Soul,² [which is unlimited].

b. Desiring, now, to set forth the difference between the products of Mind [or the Great Principle,] and of Self-consciousness, he first states the products of Self-consciousness:³

Aph. 64. The effectuation of works is dependent on the agent Self-consciousness, not dependent on a Lord, [such as is feigned by the Vaiśeshikas]; because there is no proof [of the reality of such].⁴

a. By this aphorism are set forth, as are also established

¹ On anwāya-vyatireka, vide supra, p. 428, note 2. Ed.
² जीवलं प्राणिलं तद्वांकारविशिष्टपुरुषस्य धर्मो नतु केवलपुरुषस्य "
³ इदानी महद्दर्शकारो: कार्य्येि द्विपिपा-दयियुरादावहंकारकार्यमाह"
⁴ See Book I., Aph. 92, at p. 112, supra. Ed.
by Scripture and the Legal Institutes, the creative and the
destructive agencies of Brahmá and Rudra¹ [respectively],
owning to their adjunct, Self-consciousness,² [or per-
sonality].

b. But then, grant that Self-consciousness is the maker
of the others, still who is the maker of Self-consciousness?
To this he replies:³

श्रुतीश्वूर्तिवालसमानवम् ॥ ६५ ॥

Aph. 65. It is the same as in the
arising of Desert.

a. Just as, at the creations, &c., the manifestation of
Desert, which sets Nature energizing, results solely from
the particular time,—since, if we were to suppose other
Desert as the instigator of this, we should have an infinite
regress,—just so Self-consciousness arises from time alone,
as the cause; but there is not another maker thereof,
also: thus, the two [cases] are alike: such is the meaning.⁴

¹ This is an appellation of Śiva. Ed.
² श्रनेन सूचेशांकारोपाधिकं बह्यर्नुत्त्वोः सू-
ष्टिसंहारकर्तृलं गृहितस्मृतिसिद्धमणि प्रतिपा-
दितम् ॥
³ ननु भवविकारोपाधिपयं करोांकारस्य तु कः
करे । तचाह ॥
⁴ यथा सर्गादिषु प्रकृतिश्रोभक्षकमोभिवचनिः
कालविशेषमाणांवति तदुद्दाधक्षकमान्तरस्य क
Aph. 66. The rest is from Mind, [the Great Principle].

a. What is other than the products of Self-consciousness [or personality], viz., Creation, &c., that, viz., Preservation, &c., results from the Great Principle alone; because, inasmuch as it consists of pure Goodness, having no Conceit, Passion, &c., it is moved solely by benevolence towards others: such is the meaning. And by this aphorism is established the character, as Preserver, of Vishnu, owing to the Great Principle, as adjunct [of the soul, which, without adjunct, would neither create, preserve, nor destroy (see § 64)].

b. It has been stated, before, that the relation of Nature and Soul, as experienced and experiencer, is caused by Non-discrimination [of the one from the other]. Here, what is Non-discrimination, itself, caused by?

1 छहकारकार्यंतृष्णाद्यद्विद्यालणादिवं तज्ञहनक्षवादिवेव भवति विशुद्धसच्यत्याभিমानरागाधमशेण परानुभमाच्योजनक्षवादिव्यर्थः।

2 The text here followed is very inferior. Ed.
With reference to this doubt, he states that all philosophers reject, in common, the doubt whether we should have an infinite regress, on the supposition of a stream of Non-discrimination; because this regress is valid; [since an infinite regress which is in conformity with the truth is no sound cause of objection]:

कर्मनिमित्तः प्रकृते: स्वस्वामिभावोषयनादिद्विक जातकरवत् ॥ ६७ ॥

A theory which may be acquiesced in without detriment to the argument.

Aph. 67. The relation of possession and possessor, also, if attributed [as it is by some] to Desert, in the case of Nature [and Soul], like [the relation of] seed and plant, [which takes the shape of an infinite regress of alternants], is beginningless.

अविवेकनिमित्तो वा पञ्चशिशः ॥ ६८ ॥

A second.

Aph. 68. Or [the case is, likewise, one of an infinite regress,] if it [the relation between Nature and Soul,] be attributed to Non-discrimination [of Soul from Nature], as Panchasikha [holds].

1 अविवेकनिमित्तकः प्रकृतिपुष्पयोभेयोगभो-कृत्वा इति प्रागुक्तम्। तत्वाविवेक एव लिनिमित्तकः इत्याकातायामविवेकधाराक्यपनेतनव-स्थायपतिरित्यायायः प्रामाणिकवें परिहारः सर्ववादाद्वारणश इत्यह ॥

2 -निमित्तकः is the reading of Aniruddha. Ed.
A third

Aph. 69. [The case is the same,] if, as the teacher Sanandana does, we attribute it [the relation between Nature and Soul,] to the Subtile Body, [which, in the shape of its elemental causes, attends Soul, even during the periodical annihilations of the world].

a. He sums up the import of the declarations of the Institute:

Aph. 70. Be that the one way, or the other, the cutting short thereof [viz., of the relation between Nature and Soul,] is Soul’s aim; the cutting short thereof is Soul’s aim.

THE END.
CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS.

IN THE BODY OF THE PAGE.

P. 12, l. 19. Instead of ‘indestructible,’ read ‘impracticable.’

P. 23, l. 7. ‘That is to say,’ &c. See, for a more correct rendering, the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 63.

P. 25, l. 2. Read, instead of ‘your own implied dogma,’ ‘the dogma which you accept.’

P. 32, l. 8. The reference to the second note is omitted.

P. 35, l. 14. एक ज्ञात्मा is the reading of Aniruddha and Nágeśa; एकात्मा, that of Vijnána and Vedánti Mahádeva.

P. 44, l. 3. Aniruddha has पूर्वभाविमाचे.


P. 52, l. 10. ‘That is to say,’ &c. For another version, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 118.

P. 56, l. 7. Read निगुणां.

P. 58, l. 13. Almost certainly, this interpolation was taken from the Serampore edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bhāshya. My copy of that work was lent, in 1851, to Pandit Hfránanda Chaube, who prepared, for Dr. Ballantyne, the Sanskrit portion of what corresponds to pp. 1—183, supra, in which, additions, compressions, interpolations, and other alterations lawlessly made by him, and scholia of his own devising, were introduced with regrettable frequency.

P. 59, l. 15—p. 61, l. 13. For another rendering, from a text here and there somewhat different, see the Rational Refutation, &c. pp. 12, 18.

P. 69, l. 10. Read बहुः.

P. 85, l. 13. ‘This Ignorance,’ &c. The original of this is i., v., 4, of the Vishnu-purāṇa.

P. 143, l. 4. Read -हुरवत्.

P. 149, l. 1. Read ‘is meant.’
P. 199, l. 5. ‘An internal’ is better.
P. 216, l. 8. Instead of ‘it is one with the internal organ,’ read ‘the internal organ is really one.’ The implication is, that buddhi, ahankára, and manas really make one whole, called manas, in the wider sense of that term.

P. 233, l. 8. Read मूर्तीवेदिदिः.
P. 246, l. 12. Remove the brackets which enclose ‘promoting.’
Compare p. 433, l. 7.
P. 272, l. 16. Read ‘family;’ i.e., as.
P. 292, l. 9. Read पितुलावत.
P. 437, l. 10. Read कार्यविलक्ताः.

IN THE NOTES.

P. 13, l. 1. Read स्त्रावाभाविकायायक्रयो, and remove, in p. 12, a., the brackets enclosing the words ‘the positive destruction of.’ Dr. Ballantyne’s maimed expression I find nowhere but in the Serampore edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya.

P. 18, l. 2. Read विष्णुस्वातु.

P. 39, l. 1. Nágeśa has निमित्तः, which Vijnána and Vedánti Mahádeva recognize as a reading.
P. 35, l. 5. Read ‘Aniruddha and Nágeśa have.’
P. 39, l. 5, 6. See, for the true reading of what is here given corruptly, the Chhándogya Upanishad, vi., ii., 1, 2.

P. 47, l. 5. Read बधेतेयाश्चयः.

P. 54, l. 3. In the Serampore edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya, the reading is घटसंवृतः स्माकाः, which obviates the anaeolathism spoken of in p. 53, note 4.
P. 54, l. 4. From the Indische Studien, where referred to at the foot of p. 53, it appears that Professor Weber found, in the Āmṛita-bindu Upanishad, v. 13, here quoted, घटोपमः, instead of नभोपमः. Compare, further, Gaudiapáda’s Māṇḍūkyopanishat-kárkiká, iii., 4, et seq.
P. 55, l. 4. Read, instead of ‘Vedáti Mahádeva,’ ‘Nágeśa.’
CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS.

P. 63, l. 4. Read सत्यतिः, and so in p. 70, l. 5, and p. 107, l. 6.
P. 64, l. 1. Read vāsanā.
P. 64, l. 4. The verses in question also occur as ii., 32, of Gauḍapāda’s Māndūkyopanishat-kārika. They are quoted and translated in the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 189, 190, where they are professedly taken, I cannot now say how tenably, from the Viśeṣa-
chūdāmaṇi, which is credulously affiliated on Śankara Āchārya.

P. 68, l. 6. Read साध्यात्मका–.
P. 77, l. 1. Read ऋषय वा.
P. 102, l. 4. Read -खुतित्तत्त्वायः.
P. 118, l. 3. The quotation in question is xvi., 3, 4, of the Yoga-
vāsishtha. For a more correct translation of it, see the Rational
Refutation, &c., p. 214.
P. 182, l. 7. For emendations of sundry matters in note 4,
see p. 429, note 4.
P. 204, ll. 2, 3. The Serampore edition of the Sāṅkhya-pravachana-
bhāṣya has बधिष्ठाने, answering to its ऋधिष्ठाने in the
Aphorism; also, ऋधिष्ठानमित्येव वा पाठः.
P. 326, l. 6. Read 'clerical.'

In the foregoing pages, reference has been made, again and again,
to the Serampore edition of the Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāṣya published in 1821. Of the imperfections of that edition some notion
may be formed from the facts, that it gives, as if they were com-
mentary, no fewer than twenty-six of the Aphorisms, that it wholly
omits six others, repeats two, courtals or mangles several, and, more
than once, represents, as Aphorisms, fragments of Vijnāna’s ex-
position. Still, if great liberties have not been taken with his
materials by the pandit who prepared it for the press, it may be
considered as possessing the value of an inferior manuscript. Hence
it has been thought worth while to extract from it, as below, its
principal peculiar readings of the Aphorisms, over and above those
already remarked on. The pages and notes referred to are those of
the present work.
CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS.

Book I. Aph. 2. निवृत्ते: । Aph. 24. तावदप० । Aph. 41. पूर्वभावमाचेयानियम: । Aph. 43. ताहि is omitted. Aph. 67. As in the MSS. spoken of in p. 82, note 3. Aph. 73. ओणेयां। Aph. 81. न कर्मोपादानयोगात्। Aph. 97. विशेषकाययकिमि।


Book VI. Aph. 11. पराधमापि। Aph. 13. ओणेयामाचेयानियमिद्। instead of ओणेयामाचेयानियमिद्। Aph. 26. उभयोपप्यः।