CULTURE
TO

HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY

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Preface

The present treatise is philosophical in character. The philosophy here is, however, of the 'traditional and systematic' kind, and not of the 'linguistic analytical' species. The purpose of the treatise is rather social-philosophical. And the method employed here is the method of factual, conceptual and verbal analyses in ordinary language, the method of descriptive metaphysics.

A synthesis of three standpoints—that of philosophy of religion giving the end and those of philosophy of education and philosophy of history giving the means, this treatise fulfils the needs of a syllabus in general education, especially of a syllabus in problem-integrated education.

One reason why I have taken pains to reword the older view of culture may be noted. It is the impact of Communism on the under-developed countries, especially the oriental ones. The great need for industrialization there makes them blind to the dangers of the communist way and to the fact that economic development takes its own time. Yet this is not the sufficient cause why Communism has been gaining ground there. The sufficient reason is to be found in the decline of the total yet open and dynamic view of culture which held sway during the first half of the century. Most western thinkers of to-day in the field of philosophy have been specializing in mathematical logic and logical empiricist analyses, whereas most older thinkers in the East (the oriental world) have been influenced by the marxist ‘diamat’. The older view of culture can counter the effect of this marxist influence better than the modern art of sprachspiel, of saying more and more on less and less. For ‘diamat’ itself is an older view and way.

In other words, the reason why the older view is still useful is that practical politics, whether of the West, or of the East, or of the
'East', still falls within the categories of the older view and not yet within those of the language games which are based on the fixation of feeling for experience on the level of commonsense perception. The present treatise is written with the hope that it may bring about a 'kronstadt' in the minds of those who by their brinkmanship in cold peace only act as liaison officers of the expanding communist empire; and their number is legion among the thinkers and academicians, practical politicians and everyday makers of history of the underdeveloped yet free world.

Furthermore, the hard core of the treatise, which is a conceptual analysis and gradation of culture and a criterion of progress deduced from that, might prove useful to writers, teachers and everyday makers of history even in the developed continents. The analysis reveals an unshakable structure of experience: only this can form the nucleus or framework of a total yet open and dynamic system of culture, which alone in its turn can be identified as the emergent world liberal culture.

The treatise is thus useful in two different spheres. It is therefore not meant for a summary rejection by contemporary writers of philosophy who have been building an esoteric cult around Wittgenstein's incipiently valid criteria of meaning. For them, I have to offer only the Introduction and the Appendix.

In writing this treatise, I have drawn upon the many Gifford Lectures and some of the thoughts and ideas of (i) empiricist-humanists: John Wisdom and his Indian disciple Prof. G. N. Mathrani; (ii) radical humanists: M. N. Roy, Ralph Borsodi and G.D Parikh; (iii) libertarian Hindus: R. B. Lotvala, M. A. Venkata Rao and Swami Agehananda Bharati; and (iv) romanticist-rationalists: Dr. S.K. Moitra and Dr. N. V. Joshi.

For help in seeing it through press in India while I was abroad, my grateful thanks go to my brothers, Ribasu Sanyal and Tarasankar Sanyal, and to my friend, Mr. Alexander Mathew.

Bombay, August 15, 1957
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B. S. S.
Contents

THE PROBLEM OF END

INTRODUCTION

1. AN ANALYSIS OF 'INDIVIDUAL'

'Individual' Is Not 'Particular' 12—'Individual' in the General Sense 14—'Individual' in the Special Sense 24—The Highest Individuals in Fixational Systems 29—The Highest Individuals in the Historic Cultural Systems 37—The Developing Individual 39—Individualism 41

2. NON-FIXATIONAL CULTURE

'Culture' Is 'Realization of Values' 44—Values Are Subject's Attitudes to Objects 45—The Hedonic Feeling Constitutes Value 46—The Component of Value Has a Regulative Function 46—The Meaning Statement and Criteria Statements Give the Form 47—The Subjective Determinant Makes Up the Gradation 49—Tertiary Characteristics Occasion the Use of Value-Adjectives 50—Realization Is Turning the Possible into the Actual 53—Realization Is either Theoretical or Practical 54—Feeling Realizes while Reason Regulates 57—Fixational Methods of Reason Fail to Realize Values 60—Feeling as the Metaphysical Principle 64—Cultural Systems May Be Fixational or Non-Fixational 67

3. CULTURE AND RELIGION

Religion Lends Individuality to Culture 72—Religion as the Realization of the Highest Value in Theory 73—In Perception Parts Appear as Discrete Wholes 74—Sciences Are Functional but Hypothetical Interrelation of Parts 74—Philosophy Brings the Parts Interrelated in Systematic Relation to the Whole 75—Gradations of Philosophical Experience 77—Natural Philosophy Relates the Totality of Facts to the Attitudes of the Material Self Subordinated to the Spiritual Self 77—Social Philosophy Relates the Totality of Facts to the Attitudes of the Social Self Subordinated to the Spiritual Self 78—Moral Philosophy Relates the Totality of Facts to the Attitudes of

4. GOD 102


5. FIXATIONAL CULTURE 130

Evil Lies in Fixation of Feeling for the Part Taken as a Whole 130—Evil Can Be Overcome by the Feeling for the Highest 132—The Dialectical Method as the Law of Transition from the Lower to the Higher Stages of Experience 134—Philosophy of Religion and History of Religion 135—The Three Moments of Materialism 138—Epicurus: (Atomistic Materialism) 138—The Material Particle Taken in and by Itself 138—The World Is Related to the Attitudes of the Material Self Taken in and by Itself 139—Herbert Spencer (Mechanistic Materialism): The Material Part Taken in Mechanical Relation to Other Material Parts 140—Moral Evolution of Man To Be Wrought by Natural Mechanism 141—A Natural Mechanistic Theory of Religion 143—Bertrand Russell (Mathematical Materialism): The
Material Parts Organically Related to a Metrical Whole 143—Rejection of Human and Spiritual Categories Is a Pointer to a Fixation on Materialism 145—The Three Moments of Humanism 147—Frederic Nietzsche (Egoistic Humanism): The Particular Man Taken in and by Himself 148—The Superman Is neither the Man-in-the-particular-Group nor the Universal Man 149—The Cult of Egoistic Man Leads only to Chaos or Despotic Order 150—William James (Pragmatic Humanism): The Particular Man Taken in Relation to Other Particular Men 150—A Proposition or Belief Is True if It Works 151—Materialism Is Not a Workable Proposition 153—Practical Social Propositions Are Workably True 153—Morality Lies in Satisfying as Many Demands as We Can 153—Religion Is a Live Hypothesis and a Practical Proposition 154—Pragmatic Humanism Cannot Bring about Human Unity 157—Auguste Comte (Radical Humanism): The Particular Man Taken in Organic Relation to Humanity 158—Positivism Unifies the Sciences into a Sociology in Order to Realize the Social Whole in Theory 158—Humanity Apothosized 161—Radical Humanism Fails to Realize the Unity Underlying Nature and Man 162—The Three Moments of Idealism 163—The Cynics (Monadistic Idealism): The Spiritual Self Taken in and by Itself 163—Virtue Alone Is Good 164—The Cynic Realizes the Universal Reason in His Own Self 165—Cynicism Breeds a Spiritual Pride and an Escapist Attitude 166—Fixation on a Dualistic Interpretation of Spiritual Life 167—Spinoza (Ethical Idealism): The Spiritual Self Taken in Relation to Other Spiritual Selves and Its Own Lower Selves 168—From Bondage of Passion to Freedom of Reason 170—The Part-Whole Relation and the Whole Conceived in an Inchoate Manner 172—A. Seth Pringle-Pattison (Absolute Idealism): The Spiritual Self Taken in Relation to the Absolute 175—The Spiritual Self Is an Individual: A Unique Centre or Focus of Immediate Experience 175—The Absolute and God Cannot Be Identified with the Sublime 178

THE PROBLEM OF MEANS

6. CULTURE AND EDUCATION 182

Gradation of Education 182—Education on the Prelogical Level 182—Education on the Primary Logical Level 183—Education on the Secondary Logical Level 184—Education on the Tertiary Logical Level 186—Education Aims at Individualization 186—Individualization in the Non-Fixational System 188—Individualization and Relativism 191—Acculturation is the Aim in Vogue 193—All Fixational Systems Aim at Individualization but Only Acculturate 195—General Education Aims at Humanization 196—Problem-Integrated Education Can Humanize 197—Special Methods of General Education 199—A Syllabus for Problem-Integrated Education 200—Problems of the Prelogical Level 201—Problems of
7. CULTURE AND HISTORY

History in Theory and Practice 206—History on the Level of Perception or Pure Objectivity 207—History on the Level of Science or Relational Objectivity 208—History on the Level of Philosophy or of Subjective Attitudes to Object 212—Fixational Attitudes to History 213—The Philosophy of History 219

8. AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIETY

Society Is a Community 226—Classification on the Prelogical Level 226—Classification on the Perceptual Level 226—Classification on the Level of Science 227—Classifying according to Closeness of Human Relations 228—Classification on the Principle of Organization 229—Classification according to Historic Culture 230—Philosophical Gradation of Societies or Cultures 232—The Social Self as the Subject 233—Society Is a Systematic Unity 234—The Criteria of an Open and Dynamic Society 236—Higher Individuality 238—The Highest Level Control of the Lower Level Life 239—More Scientists and Philosophers 240—Useful Goods and Beautiful Artifacts 241—Tertiary Vocations 242—Tertiary Education and Vocations 243—The Open Society in Relation to Nature 244—The Open Society in Relation to Its Economic and Political Sectors 245—The Open Society in Relation to Spirit 249

9. HISTORICAL CULTURES


10. GREGATIONAL ETHICS

History and Gregational Ethics 282—Nature and Scope of Gregational
CONTENTS

Ethics 282—Gregational Behaviour in History 284—Genocide or Destruction of Other Cultures 286—Genocide as a Revolutionary Method of Alienation and Conversion 286—Passive and Active Escape as Victims' Response 292—Various Forms of Resistance 296

APPENDIX A 301

APPENDIX B 304

INDEX 305
Footnotes are numbered in sequence chapter by chapter. References are not repeated but are indicated in the text by an appropriate superior figure corresponding to the number of the footnote in the chapter which may appear a page or two earlier.
Introduction

The Third Method of Verification

The Method Here Is the Method of the Synthetic a priori. The present treatise is a philosophical analysis of non-fixational culture. The method employed here is the method of descriptive metaphysics, behind which lies the sanction of the ultimate method of verification, that of realization.

I have followed the method deliberately, for I do not believe that the empiricists have succeeded in eschewing metaphysical or synthetic a priori statements. One way of showing this would be to quote from their writings sentences which are neither empirical nor analytic, and these are numerous. The other and more positive way would be to take their arguments seriously and give our arguments.

How the Empiricist Eliminates the Synthetic A Priori. The empiricist seems to eliminate metaphysical or synthetic a priori propositions by way of the following argument:

1. All empirical statements are verifiable or falsifiable by observation or experiment. No metaphysical statements are either verifiable or falsifiable by observation or experiment. (In other words, all empirical statements are statements of which we can know the intension by knowing whether they are F-true or F-false; no metaphysical statements are such statements). Therefore, no metaphysical statements are empirical.

2. All analytic statements are verifiable or falsifiable by the test of denial or affirmation and consequent self-contradiction. No metaphysical statements are statements whose denials or affirmations are self-contradictory. (In other words, all analytic statements are statements which we can know to be either L-true or L-false by analyzing their intension; no metaphysical statements are such statements.) Therefore, no metaphysical statements are analytic.
3. All empirical and all analytic statements are statements of which we can know both the intension (proposition) and the extension (truth-values). No metaphysical statements are statements of which we can know both the intension and the extension: if we seem to know the intension (as, for example, of the rationalist statement 'God exists'), we cannot know the extension; and if we seem to know the extension (as, for example, in mystic experience 'This is God') we fail to know the intension. Therefore, metaphysical statements are neither empirical nor analytic.

4. All meaningful statements are those of which we can know both the intension and the extension; and all statements of which we can know both are either analytic or empirical ones. (In other words, all statements whose extensions can be determined, whether as a result of analyzing, or resulting in the conception of, their intensions, are meaningful. And all statements whose extensions can be ascertained are either analytic or empirical. The truth or falsity of an empirical statement can be found by experiment or observation; an analytic statement is found to be true or false according as its denial or affirmation is a contradiction in terms. There is no third method of verification.) Therefore, all meaningful statements are either analytic or empirical.

5. All meaningful statements are either empirical or analytic. No metaphysical statements are either empirical or analytic. Therefore, no metaphysical statements are meaningful: they do not express propositions and truth-values at all.

*Pointer to the Third Method of Verification.* This is in short the empiricist conclusion which I do not hold. I do believe that synthetic a priori propositions though neither logically necessary like analytic propositions nor both intensionally and extensionally informative like empirical propositions can yet be meaningful in a wider and different sense. The difference is the difference of modality, which has been sidetracked by empiricist logicians. The analytic is L-determinate and the empirical though L-indeterminate is F-determinate. The synthetic a prioris represent the logically possible: although both L-indeterminate and F-indeterminate, some of them are considered either conventionally necessary or axiologically necessary, which can be verified only by way of realization.

To elucidate this point, I think it necessary to give (in order to help the reader through the maze of fluid symbolic expressions)
the different divisions and definitions of propositions by Kant, the empiricists and by myself (modifying Kant).

1. Kant

i. principles of division and definitions: (a) the method of knowing the intension—if we can know the intension without knowing the extension, it is a priori; if we cannot, it is a posteriori; (b) the method of knowing the extension—if we can know the extension by analyzing the intension, it is analytic; if not, synthetic.

ii. a priori: logically independent of experience, do not entail any empirical judgements or negations thereof; all a prioris are not analytic; but all analytic judgements are a priori.

iii. a posteriori: depend logically on other empirical judgements; there can be no analytic a posteriori judgements.

iv. analytic: the predicate is contained in the subject as either a genus or differentia in relation to the subject; all analytic judgements are a priori.

v. synthetic: the predicate is not contained in the subject, being either a proprium or accident in relation to the subject; if a priori, formally informative; if empirical, factually informative.

vi. synthetic a priori: intensionally discovered by critical analyses, they acquire extension by being applied as regulative principles; axiomatically necessary in the sense that their denial would make impossible all factual and valuational account of the world and life.

2. Empiricists

i. principle of division: method of verification, i.e. of ascertaining truth-values; this gives the pair iii & iv which have absorbed v & ii respectively.

ii. a priori: merged into the class of the analytic, thus ceased to be a genus in relation to the analytic.

iii. empirical: either T-true or T-false, hence L-indeterminate; all synthetic propositions are empirical; there can be no analytic empirical propositions.

iv. analytic: we know them to be either L-true or L-false by analyzing their intension—by the test of denial or affirmation and consequent self-contradiction; all analytic propositions are a priori.

v. synthetic: merged into the class of the empirical, thus ceased to be a species of both the a priori and the empirical; their denials are not self-contradictory; informative both intensionally and extensionally.

vi. synthetic a priori: (a) naturalistic empiricists take these as meaningless, since their extensions cannot be known by their intensions being known and applied, since their extensions cannot be tested either empirically or analytically; (b) humanistic empiricists take these as conventionally necessary in the sense that their denials require change of conventions for better ones.
3. Modified Kantian

i. principles of division and definitions: (a) the method of knowing the intension—(pro-rationalist definitions) if we can know the intension without knowing the extension, the proposition is a priori; if we cannot, it is empirical; (pro-empiricist definitions) if we can know the intension only by knowing the F-extension (by the test of empirical observation and experiment), it is empirical; if we cannot (i.e. if the same test fails), it is a priori; (b) the method of knowing the extension—(pro-rationalist definitions) if we can know the extension without knowing the intension, it is synthetic; if we cannot, it is analytic; (pro-empiricist definitions) if we can know the L-extension only by knowing the intension (by the test of denial or affirmation and consequent self-contradiction), it is analytic; if we cannot (i.e. if the same dual test fails), it is synthetic.

ii. a priori analytic: true 'A ⊃ B ⊃ (A ⊃ B); false '¬(A ⊃ B) = (A ⊃ ¬B).

iii. empirical synthetic: true 'Some wives are jealous of their husbands'; false 'All wives are jealous of their husbands'.

iv. analytic empirical: true 'All wives are female'; false 'All wives are male'.

v. synthetic a priori: true 'Some synthetic propositions are a priori'; false 'No synthetic propositions are a priori'; synthetic a prioris are neither L-true nor L-false; neither F-true nor F-false; in critical sections of natural, social and moral philosophy they are conventionally necessary in the sense that their denials require change of conventions for better ones and that their extensions can be 'workably' verified by our knowing and applying their intensions; in speculative sections of philosophy they are axiologically necessary in the sense that their denial would make impossible all factual and valuational account of the world and life.

To refute the empiricist conclusion, we have got to show that some synthetic a priori statements (in the modified Kantian sense) are meaningful. If we show that they are meaningful in the sense that their extension or truth-values can be determined by observation or experiment or by the test of self-contradiction or by both, they cease to be synthetic a priori and become either synthetic-empirical or a priori-analytic or empirical-analytic. And if we show that they are meaningful in the sense that only their intensions can be conceived (though critically) but their extensions cannot be verified, they remain only a priori.

We have got to show that they are meaningful also in the sense that their extensions can be ascertained in some other way: this third way alone can save their a priori synthetic character. Usually, they become meaningful in the Kantian way—the way of knowing their intensions first and then their extensions as we apply them.
They become meaningful in the sense that their intensions (propositions) are first critically conceived and then they are 'verified' either (a) in the conventional way, as in humanistic empiricism, or (b) in the axiomatic way, as in rationalism; or (c) in the sense of being realized by way of ontological feeling, as in romantic-rationalism.

I accept the method of realization as the method of verification of the synthetic a priori, as the third method of verification. Once we have verified in the sense of realized some of the synthetic a priori propositions, we can construct an axiomatic system—whether same-level postulational or different-level axiological. And if the method seems to yield different degrees of 'necessity', the differences can be eliminated by a logical grading which operates on the principle of inclusion and supersession. A kind of conventional necessity seems at the first instance to validate the criteria statements for the truth-values of the analytic and the empirical; the conventionally necessary gets included and superseded by the axiologically necessary, which gets verified by the ontological method of realization. Then the arguments which validate this method.

The Method of Empirical Verification Is Based on the Synthetic A Priori. Empirical propositions, even on the level of perception, are notoriously problematic and contingent. All the philosophical refinement of the notion of perception has not made much difference in the F-extension of perceptual propositions and in the utility of their application which do not go beyond crude arts. This weakness of the empirical however does not validate the synthetic a priori. But if we find that the criterion statement of an empirically true proposition is a synthetic a priori statement, this very fact becomes an argument in favour of the synthetic a priori. 'If a given proposition is verifiable by experiment or observation, it is F-true': this statement is a priori synthetic; its intension is conceived a priori and its extension is verified in its application as a rule to many particular instances of empirical statements. In other words, the genesis of this rule can be traced to a critical analysis (in the synthetic a priori fashion) in the domain of logical individuals which form the class of synthetic propositions.

The same is the case with the F-extension of the empirical generalizations and universal generic causal or functional propositions of science. Yet the superior utility which their application in useful arts (engineering, medicine, psychiatry, etc.) has shown has been
the result of the fact that they have grown under the shadow of the synthetic *a priori*. The empirical *systems* are based on postulates which are synthetic *a prioris*. Not only the presuppositions of science but the general inside theories of sciences themselves are conceived and verified in the manner of the synthetic *a priori*. The theories of science (such as Newton’s theory of gravitation, Maxwell’s theory of electro-dynamics, Dalton’s atomic theory, Einstein’s two theories of relativity, Schroedinger’s wave-equation, Keynes’s theory of investments, Freud’s theory of motivation, ...) are not simply empirical in the sense that their factual truth-values can be ascertained by observation and experiment. Apart from the fact that in some of these theories lengthy deductions have to be made before they can be connected to observation and experiment, the crucial point here is that the theories were not reached as a result of experiment and observation; their F-extension was not known before their intension could be conceived. Their intension was first critically conceived before the F-extension could be tested in application to observation and experiment in many fields. The Kantian synthetic *a priori* is their prototype. In the words of J. O. Wisdom (Philosophy, Oct. 1959, pp. 344-45):

“...The principle of verifiability conveys that by considering familiar sorts of experiences we can pass from these in the direction of the theory and the terms in it. Now this is just what is not the case. We can pass only from the theory to experience (though to new as well as to familiar sorts)—that is in the reverse direction. We can pass (deductively) from the wave-equation or quantum hypothesis to the spectroscope observation, and also to other things, perhaps unlimited in number, but there is no way of getting the wave-equation from any of these observations. And the fact that the directions of the process are not reversible is highly significant. Likewise no consideration of expressions in our ordinary experience can lead us to the terms of the theory. (R. von Mises brought this out in his *Probability, Statistics, and Truth*, but his comments fell on ears that were deaf to scientific contexts.) Again the direction is the other way.”

*The Method of Analytic Verification Is Based on the Synthetic A Priori*. The *logical necessity* of the analytic propositions though giving certainty gives only trivial knowledge, that about a species
of logical individuals, viz. analytic propositions (mostly schemata or formulas). The triviality of the analytic is however no good argument for the validity of the synthetic a priori. But if we find that the criterion statement of a logically necessary proposition is synthetic a priori, this very fact becomes an argument in its favour. 'If the negation or affirmation of a given proposition leads to self-contradiction, the given proposition is L-true or L-false.' This statement is a priori synthetic: its intension is conceived a priori and its extension is verified in its application as a rule to many instances of analytic statements.

Besides, the genesis of the inside rules of an analytic system can be traced to a critical analyses in the domain of individuals which form the class of a priori propositions. In short, the system of deductive logic (whether metalingual or symbolic in expression) is axiomatic in character. This can be exposed by presenting a part of it by means of an extended truth-table and deriving therefrom most of the important truth-functions and some of the theorems of symbolic logic. (Vide Appendix). Thus, the critical and axiomatic method of the synthetic a priori seems to establish the validity of the system of analytic propositions. In the words of W. V. Quine:

"... the laws of mathematics and logic are true simply by virtue of our conceptual scheme.... the laws of mathematics and logic may, despite all 'necessity', be abrogated. But this is not to deny that such laws are true by virtue of the conceptual scheme, or by virtue of meanings." (Methods of Logic, p. xiv).

The Axiomatic or Postulational Method is an Incomplete Method. One may argue that both the empirical and the analytic (methods as well as systems) ultimately resting on postulates and axioms, their methods of verification get included and superseded by the method of verification of axioms and postulates. What passes however as the axiomatic method is not a method of verification: it is an incomplete articulation and functioning of the third method of verification, that of realization. For it is to be noted here that we no longer mean by axiomatic what is self-evident or what is clear to the intuition and hence needs no proof.

In an axiomatic system, arbitrary sentences may be selected as axioms or postulates (Cf. Rudolf Carnap, Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, 1958, p. 171). The attempt to validate
them by calling them conventionally necessary is simply to state that one's feeling has got fixated on the level of experience which we have described as pragmatic and radical humanist. And to go further and call them axiologically (whether epistemologically or praxiologically) necessary is to state that one's feeling has got fixated on the level of experience which we have described as idealist (of the rationalist as opposed to rationalist-romanticist kind).

The synthetic a priori postulates remain postulates, often with alternative possibilities on the same level of experience. To grade them on the principle of inclusion and supersession (between two postulates, that which includes and supersedes the other is higher than the other) leads us to the highest or most fundamental principle to which no alternatives appear; yet even the highest principle remains only a logical possibility, unless and until it is 'realized' by the ontological method of feeling.

**The Third Method of Verification Is Realization.** I have explicated this third method of verification as an integral part of the non-fixational concept of culture. Yet I had better sketch a rough AS of the method at the outset.

1. The axiomatic primitive constant of the method is one individual assimilating or getting assimilated into another by way of feeling or reason (as respectively the constitutive or regulative principle of experience), 'or' being non-exclusive.

2. The other axiomatic constants, which can be defined in terms of the above, are: object and subject; theory and practice; values; gradation of subjects, objects and values; realization of values, fixational and nonfixational realization.

**Subject and Object:** In modern logic, individuals are conceived as individual concepts or particulars, which are expressed in ordinary language by means of logically or ordinary proper names and individual descriptions. The reason for this restricted use is that this logic (with all its great achievement) is vitiated by a fixational metaphysic, according to which particularity (and not individuality) is the criterion of reality. We may however point out that an individual is not always a particular: it is a systematic unity of particular and universals; it is either a particular or a universal or both; some individuals (individual concepts) are mere particulars (e.g. August 15, 1947; this point-instant, here and now); some others are mere universals (e.g. red, worried); still others are both (e.g. 'Socrates').
We may however concede that individuals need not be regarded as substances or things-in-themselves (such as physical objects, selves, God). But we cannot but still use these inapplicable and a priori ideas as regulative principles. And we may also point out that an individual is not always an actualized fact or value: it is a systematic unity of the realized and the unrealized; some individuals are realized facts and values (e.g. Socrates); some others are unrealized (e.g. the leader of the liberated democratic Russia); still others are partly realized and partly unrealized (e.g. Nehru, the founder of Communist India).

Similarly, axiologically, the individual is not always an object: some individuals are mere objects (e.g. mountains, stars); some others are mere subjects (e.g. those dead thinkers whose ideas are still alive); still others are both (e.g. ‘you’ and ‘I’). It is axiologically impossible to conceive of individuals without taking them as belonging either to (i) the class of individuals which are capable of assimilating or getting assimilated into other individuals, or to (ii) the class of this latter, other individuals. For these we have the hackneyed but still useful expressions ‘subject’ and ‘object’: in metaphysics these are used for both intensions and extensions.

This division of individuals is dichotomous in a systematically fluid manner. In such a division, subject and object become correlates. As the subject at a certain position grows self-conscious and knows the position, it becomes an object; the object grows in extent; the subject grows in intent or goes ‘deeper’ or takes up a ‘higher’ position. (A lower level partial analogy is the pair ‘past’ and ‘future’.) The process is repeated and individuals as objects and subjects pass through stages of individuation.

*Theory and Practice*: When we want to know, the direction is from object to subject, from the lower subject to the higher, from the thing to be known to the knower: the subject (knower) assimilates the outer experience in the form of an inner experience. When we want to make, the direction is from subject to object, from the higher subject to the lower, from the maker to the thing to be made: the inner experience in the subject (maker) is projected into and realized through an objective medium or outer experience.

Thus, we can have (1) theoretical realization, which consists either (i) in the lower subject’s attaining the status of a higher subject in course of knowing itself reflexively, or (ii) in the acquisition of objective knowledge by the subject on whatever level it may happen
to be; and (2) practical realization, which consists either (i) in the higher subject's control of the lower selves in fulfilling their urge in a harmonious manner, or (ii) in making (and having a just share of) artefacts and goods of various degrees of utility and beauty.

Feeling and Reason: Feeling constitutes experience; reason regulates it. Experience is a systematic unity of the two: the two are partly independent of and partly dependent on each other. Feeling may be independent of reason, as, for example, in prelogical experience (reflex active and instinctual). Reason may be independent of feeling, as in all explanation, whether a factual or valutational account. Feeling and reason are interdependent, as in all realization, whether theoretical or practical.

Feeling is efficient or material constituent of experience: efficient feeling realizes values in a fixational or non-fixational manner; material feeling is pleasure or pain. Reason is formal or final regulator of experience: formal reason is subjective or objective; final reason is theoretical or practical. ('Or' here has been used in the non-exclusive sense as symbolized by 'v'.)

Fixational and Non-fixational Realization: Efficient feeling gets fixated on a particular level of experience, higher or lower, and turns the realization of values into a static and repetitive affair. A stronger feeling for ever higher experience alone can prevent or break such fixation and thus sustain a progressive realization of values in theory and practice.

Logical and Pre-logical Experience: So long as theory and practice have not differentiated in our experience, our experience may be said to be pre-logical or involuntary. When theory and practice get clearly differentiated, we reach the level of logical or voluntary experience. Logical experience can be graded into three levels—perception, science and philosophy according as the object is taken in and by itself, in relation to other objects or in relation to the subject.

Values: We can distinguish two constituents and one component that go to make up the structure of any experience. The constituents are the subject and the object, and the component is the subject's (theoretical or practical) attitude to the object. For this component or relation the usual one word is 'value'. But then, as a different-level relation between the subject and the object, it is partly rooted in both so that it has itself a subjective constituent and an objective constituent and a component uniting the two. The subjective
constituent may be identified with the subject's relational characteristic of satisfaction. The objective constituent of value may be identified with the object's relational characteristic of satisfactoriness. The component of value may be identified with the subject's disposition to regulate the response to the object. The form of value is given by the all-level meaning statement of the word 'value' (viz. 'value is the subject's attitude to the object') and the different level criteria statements of it. Besides these, we may have to distinguish what may be called the subjective determinant and the objective determinant of value. The level of the subject is the subjective determinant and the tertiary characteristics of the object are the objective determinant of value.

And lastly, efficient feeling is the realizer and the ground of values.
An Analysis of 'Individual'

There is a good deal of confusion about the meaning of the word 'individual'. The reason is that most people find it a strain to carry the analysis of a word to its logical end. Great thinkers have done the job for us. But their language bewilders us and they seem to have used the word in a very wide and technical sense. While doing that they have of course made explicit what is implicit in the thought and speech of everyday life.

The most important points they have made are to distinguish (a) the individual from the particular, and (b) the individual in the general sense from the individual in the special sense. 'Individual' and 'particular' are not synonymous. 'Individual' in the general sense means any and every systematic experience. (This does not make the word vacuous, at any rate, no more so than the word 'fact': what is fact on the scientific level is individual on the level of philosophy.) In the special sense, it is the human individual, which is a more or less systematic unity of experience: as such it is an instance of the individual in the general sense.

'Individual' is not 'particular'. The word 'individual' is quite often used as synonymous with 'particular'. Instead of saying 'a particular case, man or thing' we often say 'an individual case, man or thing'. The sense in which the two words are used synonymously is the sense of 'singular'—numerically one or distinct.

Metaphysicians have however used the word 'individual' in the wide sense of any and every systematic experience as well as in the narrow sense of the human individual. And they have also used the word 'particular' variously in the senses of 'here's and now's, or there's and then's', 'numerically less than all', 'numerically distinct' and 'special' in polar opposition to the word 'universal' used in the senses of 'irrespective of time and place', 'numerically all', 'qualita-
tive distinctions' and 'generic'. And traditional logicians have also regarded singular propositions as universal ones.

The individual is an experience. An experience is a systematic unity of the particular and the universal. Individuality is therefore a systematic unity of the numerically distinct and the qualitatively distinct. The two distinctions, together in some cases and severally in other cases, make for a uniqueness in the individual. An individual is unique in the sense that it is numerically and-or qualitatively distinct from another individual.

As examples of two qualitatively distinct individuals, we may take the area (say, 0.000\text{r} \text{ sq. in.}) and the colour (black) of this black dot '.'. Its area and its colour are unique only in so far as they are qualitatively distinct from each other, but not unique in the sense of numerically distinct, since they belong to the same particular (in the sense of 'here and now') and since it would be meaningless to say that this case of 0.000\text{r} \text{ sq. in} is numerically distinct from this case of black colour, although it is still sense to say that this case of 0.000\text{r} \text{ sq. in} is numerically distinct from another such area.

As examples of two numerically distinct individuals, let us take two black dots, '.' and '...', which are identical in shape, size and colour. They are thus only numerically distinct individuals, for, they are not qualitatively distinct. It is to be noted however that they are not qualitatively distinct, only if the relative position of each (one is to the left of the other, which is to the right of the first) is not considered a qualitative distinction but a relational property of its particularity (in the sense of 'here and now') which is indistinguishable from its numerical distinctness.

Two dots, one black and one red, '.' and '...', illustrate two individuals which are distinct both numerically and qualitatively. They are unique in both respects—numerically, because they are separate; qualitatively, in colour.

When we take experience as the criterion of reality, we mean the discovery and construction of this individuality. Neither particularity nor universality (in any of its variants) by itself is a sufficient general test of reality. All cases of mere particulars are cases of individuals, but all cases of individuals are not cases of mere particulars. All cases of mere universals are cases of individuals, but all cases of individuals are not cases of mere universals. Some individuals are mere particulars; some others are mere universals;
still others are interdependent unities of both. Therefore, individuality (which is a systematic unity of particular and universal) alone can be a sufficient general test of reality. In other words, the criterion of reality is mere particularity in some cases, mere universality in some other cases, and both in interdependent unity in still other cases.

‘INDIVIDUAL’ IN THE GENERAL SENSE. ‘Individual’ is one word for ‘systematic experience’.

Different philosophers have given different analyses of experience. Here it would be sufficient to take note of some of the pairs of polar opposites (or correlatives), into which experience has been analysed, and of which each pair, experience can be shown to be a systematic unity.

Feeling and reason make up the first pair. Feeling constitutes experience; reason regulates it. Experience is a systematic unity of the two: the two are partly independent of and partly dependent on each other. Feeling may be independent of reason, as, for example, in pre-logical experience (reflex action and instincts). Reason may be independent of feeling, as in all explanation, whether a factual or a valuational account. Feeling and reason are interdependent as in all realization, whether theoretical or practical.

Feeling is the efficient and/or material constituent of experience: efficient feeling realizes values in a fixational and-or non-fixational manner; material feeling is pleasure and-or pain. Reason is formal and-or final regulator of experience: formal reason is subjective and-or objective; final reason is theoretical and-or practical.

As the constitutive principle of experience, feeling is a systematic unity of the efficient and the material constituents of experience. The hormic element in it may be called efficient, and the hedonic element, material. And in some instances one or the other is independent and in other instances the two are interdependent. When a value is just desired, it is only the efficient feeling which is present; in a situation of satisfaction or fulfilment there is only the hedonic feeling; in between these two ends, the two feelings are present in an interdependent unity though in different degrees.

Feeling is the efficient or creative principle of experience. It realizes: directly, on the pre-logical level; and by bringing reason into operation, on the logical level. It is the driving force behind all realization of values. Desire is the other word for this horman feeling. In theoretical realization, it is the feeling for assimilating
the object that brings about knowledge and a rise in our subjective status. And in practical realization too, it is the feeling for getting assimilated into the object that sustains our creation of artefacts and control of the lower selves. It functions as the ground that sustains the series of means to the end: it realizes by uniting the subject with the object (which includes the lower subject). Feeling is thus the ontological criterion of reality.

The efficient feeling often gets fixated on a particular level of experience, higher or lower, and turns the realization of values into a static and repetitive affair. A stronger feeling for ever higher experience alone can prevent or break such fixation and thus sustain a progressive realization of values in theory and practice. Feeling as the creative principle is therefore a systematic unity of fixational and non-fixational realizations. In some cultural systems, it gets fixated (e.g. communism has it fixated on the level of social theory and practice). Other cultural systems suffer no such fixation and remain open (e.g. the world liberal system). In still others (like the liberal Hindu, Christian or Islamic) there is interdependence between the two kinds of realization fixational and non-fixational.

Feeling is also the material constituent. As such it is the same as immediate (not to be confused with directly describable)1 ex-

1 The notion of existence is vague, yet it is embedded in the thought and speech of the commonsense man. Our experience of ourselves and other facts is intermittent. During the intervals of our unawareness, things and we must have existed. ‘Existence’ is thus partly dependent on and partly independent of ‘experience’.

‘Experience’ is not the meaning of ‘existence’: the two terms are not synonymous. Experience is the test or criterion of existence. Whatever is experienceable exists, but whatever exists may not be experienceable. This does not imply that existence is objective. The polarity of subject and object arises in experience. But the relation between experience and existence is partly immanent and partly transcendental. In other words, the subject-object polarity is axiological; whereas the experience-existence polarity belongs to a metaphysical category.

Whatever is experienceable exists. We may however distinguish three stages of the experienceable — immediate, direct and indirect.

The immediately experienceable cannot be described; but this does not imply that it cannot be the criterion of existence. It can. Describability is the criterion of meaning and not of existence. A grown up man can, in principle, assert the existence of what is immediately experienced, though he cannot describe it; for, the moment he describes it, it ceases to be immediate: the report would not tell another man the exact nature of the experience; one cannot have an immediate experience in tact in its described form. Even a
perience and becomes a test of reality: whatever is felt is real. This is a criterion, not the meaning, of existence, since the reciprocal statement is not true: the whole of reality may not be felt in one or many units of immediate experience. Material feeling is the same as the hedonic feeling: as such it is a systematic unity of pleasure and pain. Some experiences are pleasurable; some others are painful; still others are partly pleasurable and partly painful.  

Reason is the regulative principle of experience. As such it is a systematic unity of the formal regulator and the final regulator of experience. For examples: in the communist theory and practice, formal reason is subordinated to the final reason; the opposite

newly born babe has an immediate experience and can assert the existence of what is immediately experienced by crudely symbolic ways of crying, kicking and frolicking, etc.

Once removed from the immediately experienced is the directly described experience. The slight time lag between the two involving a description which unites perceptions with conceptions or particulars with universals makes it indirect. It has become a convention to call the directly describable a direct experience, since this cannot be helped and since a continual though not simultaneous verification can be done while describing the immediate experience.

The second criterion of existence may therefore be stated thus: whatever is directly experienceable exists. On this criterion we can assert the existence of only the characteristics of physical objects and selves (e.g. the green of the tree, the unpleasant state of mind). And of course physical objects and selves can be logically constructed out of these characteristics.

Twice removed from the immediately experienceable is the indirectly experienceable. On the criterion of indirect experienceability we may assert the existence of things behind the characteristics, viz. the physical objects and selves and the common denominator of the two modes of existence, the ultimate existence.

If we don’t take these three forms of experience as the criteria of existence but only as the criteria of facts, then also difficulties remain. On the basis of these criteria we can distinguish between material facts and mental facts: a fact which is directly experienceable by more than one at a time is material; a numerically distinct fact which is directly experienceable by one and indirectly experienceable by more than one is a mental fact. ‘One’ and ‘experience’ presuppose existence. If we purge these words of their ontological and epistemological independence respectively, they become meaningless; these cannot be made logically neutral like ‘fact’.

Once we agree to the proposition that selves exist, we must accept the natural, social and spiritual aspects of selves.

2 Feeling is also a systematic unity of sense-feelings and emotions, that is, of peripherally and centrally excited feelings. And in both sense-feelings and emotions, we can discern the hormic and the hedonic feelings. In sense-feeling, the hormic element is theoretical or cognitive; in emotions, it is practical or
is the case in the theory and practice of the government of India (15-8-59) in relation to communism (the final reason of India's remaining a sovereign democratic state is subordinated to the formal reasons of a neutral foreign policy and a state-interventionist economic policy, both of which are subversive of its sovereign and democratic character); the two reasons are interdependent in the practice and theory of the Western democracies.

As the formal regulator, reason is the same as mediate experience (either directly or indirectly describable experience)\(^1\) and becomes other tests of reality. In perception, pure objectivity becomes the test; in science, relational objectivity; in philosophy, subjectivity. Formally viewed, rational experience is a systematic unity of the *subject* and the *object*: in some experiences, the subject is independent (in pure ratiocination, for example); in some others, the object is independent (in factual investigations, for example); in still others, the two are interdependent (in valuational accounts, for example).

As the final regulator, reason becomes another test of reality: What is realizable (as an individual) is real. (A variation: the real is purposive.) But the whole of reality (or for the other criterion, all conceivable purposes, whether merely psychologically or logically possible) may not be realizable. Realization can be either theoretical or practical. Purposive voluntary experience is therefore a systematic unity of *theory* and *practice*. In some experiences, practice is subordinated to theory: for example, in science, laboratory practices are the means while the end is to know the natural laws; or in religion, serving fellow humans or yogic practices are means to realization of the highest subject. In some others, theory is subordinated to practice: in all fine arts, for example, much theoretical knowledge about nature, man or God becomes the means of creating an artifact extolling nature, man or God; or in practising a virtuous life, the moral self can control the behaviour of the lower selves, if only it has full knowledge of them. In still other experiences, the two purposes, theoretical and practical, are interdependent: the purpose of the messiah or prophet, for example, is neither merely theoretical nor merely practical; he must know the ultimate truth and must also employ the knowledge in redeeming sinners and sufferers; he must build up a spiritual system in both theory and practice.

conative. And in both, the hedonic feeling is a systematic unity of pleasure and pain.
A system is a kind of a whole. A whole may be either an aggregate, a dependent unity, an independent unity, an interdependent unity, an organic unity, or a systematic unity.

By an aggregate of parts or elements, we mean the parts simply put together. In a whole which is an aggregate, parts are independent of each other. For example, a newspaper may be viewed as an aggregate of loose sheets. By a dependent unity, we mean a whole which completely depends on the parts: if one part is removed, the whole disappears. For example, in an arithmetical number, if one digit is removed, the number given is lost. By an independent unity, we mean that the whole is so independent of the parts and the parts are so completely subordinated to the whole that the parts disappear if the whole disappears or wills the parts' disappearance but not vice versa. For example, the Muslim conceives of Allah as an independent unity, independent in relation to the creation or created individuals. By an interdependent unity, we mean that the whole and the parts are so interdependent that if any one part disappears the whole disappears and vice versa. For example, we may take the arithmetical number again: one digit missing, the number is lost; and the number missing, the digits cannot be there. This unity is often called organic unity too. But more often, by organic unity we mean a unity in which the whole containing the parts is dependent on (= existing in, feeling for and realizing itself through) the parts taken together as interrelated but independent of the parts taken severally while each part containing the principle and stuff of the whole is completely dependent on (= existing in, feeling for and realizing itself through) the whole: The whole may shed some parts and yet retain its individuality; but no part can survive separation from the whole. For example, the communist conceives of society, state or party as such an organic unity (of parts which are the human individuals).

It may be noted however that no finite individual can be called an organic unity in the above sense. And to my mind it is doubtful whether even the absolute individual, the abstract and dynamic creative principle, can be called an organic unity: as the creative principle, its logical dependence on each individual creation is obvious; and the independence of each finite individual as a focus of ultimate realization, though a gift of it, is necessary if the absolute individual is to avoid the eternally static state of abstract existence,
which would make it unworthy of the name of creative principle and hence of absolute individual. Even the absolute individual is therefore a systematic unity.

By a systematic unity, we mean that the whole and the parts are partly independent of, and partly dependent on, each other. No doubt, the whole may shed some parts and yet retain its individuality. But also, each part has its individuality which is in some respect or other independent, and in finite systems some parts (which are lesser systems) may even survive the separation from the whole. The interdependence too is democratic: The parts exist in the whole and the whole exists in the parts (taken both collectively and severally); the parts feel for the whole and the whole feels for the parts (taken collectively and severally); the parts realize themselves through the whole and the whole realizes itself through the parts (taken collectively and severally).

An individual is a whole of this kind; it is a systematic unity of experience. We may take five examples of individuality: any fact whatsoever, a triangle divided in two, the living body of man, society, and the human individual. Each of these has been alternatively believed to be an aggregate, or a dependent, independent or an organic unity of constituents or parts; but each is an instance of systematic unity.

(i) A fact howsoever simple (a fundamental particle, for example) or howsoever complex (the universe, for example) can be analysed into several constituents (parts), a component (interrelation of parts) and a form (the whole as distinct from parts). The fact can however be identified with none of the three; it is a systematic unity involving all the three.

Take the fact 'I love you', for example. 'I love you' is not merely an aggregate of the constituents 'I' and 'you': your being with me does not necessarily imply I love you. 'I love you' is not merely a whole completely depending on you and me: you may die or may not return my love, yet I may go on loving you. 'I love you' is not merely an independent unity of you and me who as constituents are completely subordinated to the love: I may die and then the love vanishes. 'I love you' is not merely an organic unity in interdependence with you and me: my love may not depend on you; you may not depend on my love. 'I love you' is a systematic unity. 'You' and 'I' (the parts) and 'I love you' (the whole) are
partly independent of each other and partly dependent on each other. You may cease to be; yet I may continue to love you. The fact may cease to be, that is, the love may be lost; yet we may exist. This shows the independence. The interdependence may be shown as follows. You and I depend on the fact ‘I love you’ because if the fact would not be there, you and I would not be there as constituents of the fact: the loving part of myself would not be there, and so too the reciprocating or indifferent part of your self. The fact in its turn depends on us, because if we would not be there, there would be no such fact as ‘I love you’. (The use of the expression ‘not merely’ is justifiable on the ground that systematic unity includes and supersedes the positive principles of the other kinds of unity and excludes their negative principles, on which they go wrong, and thus is the highest kind of unity.)

(ii) Take another fact: the triangle ACD divided by the line AB as in the figure given below.

![Diagram of triangle ACD with line AB](image)

The triangle ACD is an aggregate of the constituent triangles ABC and ABD. Its area is the sum of the areas of the constituent triangles; one of its sides is the sum of two sides one from each of the constituent triangles; one of its angles is the sum of two angles one from each of the constituents; each of its remaining sides (angles) is the same as one side (angle) of one of the constituent triangles.

But it is not merely an aggregate. It is a distinct whole with different values for its sides, angles and area from those of its constituents, although it seems to be a dependent whole, for it cannot be there if the two triangles ABC, ABD be not there.

But it is not merely a dependent whole. It is also an independent whole. It can exist even when the other two do not exist. Remove the common side AB; the two triangles ABC and ABD vanish, but the triangle ACD still remains.
It is not merely an independent unity. It exists in interdependence with the other two. Remove any one of them, the other two cease to exist. Remove the triangle ABC: only the angle ADB remains. Remove the triangle ABD: only the angle ACB remains. Remove the triangle ACD: only the side AB remains.

But it is not merely an interdependent unity. It is thus partly dependent on and partly independent of the other two. In other words, it is a systematic unity.

(iii) The human organism is a system of lesser systems—bony, muscular, respiratory, nervous, etc. As a system it is an aggregate (i.e. just a heap) of parts, which are the lesser systems. But it is not merely an aggregate of parts; for, in that case, it will have no identity of its own but many identities—those of the parts severally. This is not the case. It is a dependent unity: the lesser systems (bony, muscular, circulatory, etc.) are connected with and act upon one another and thus make up its identity. But it is not merely a dependent unity; for, in that case, it would be merely dependent on parts: let even a single part be abstracted from the whole and the identity of the organism would be lost; while as a whole it would not exist apart from the parts, the parts could exist independent of it. This is not the case. The human living body can survive a certain amount of bleeding or amputation of a limb. It is an independent unity. But it is not merely an independent unity; for, in that case, there could be no such parts as the heart which when defunct would put an end to the unity; the parts would then be completely subordinated to the whole; the whole would be more real as a unity than as a diversity; it would then have a doubtful existence for the parts, which, in their turn, would have a precarious existence of their own. It is an interdependent unity. But it is not merely an interdependent unity; for, in that case, the skeleton would not survive the death of a man and the whole body would not survive some bleeding or amputation. It is an organic unity; but it is not merely that; for, in that case, the skeleton would not survive the death of a man.

The living human body is a systematic unity of lesser systems—bony, muscular, etc. (a) That they are partly independent is proved by the facts that the skeleton may exist after the death of a man and that a man may survive the amputation of a limb. The parts are partly independent of the whole; they have their individualities though lesser in point of value than that of the whole.
The whole is partly independent of the parts; it has its individuality higher than those of its parts. (b) That they are dependent on each other is also quite evident. The parts (bones, muscles, blood, nerves, etc.) go into the making of the whole; the whole thus depends upon the parts: if the heart, for example, stops beating, the living body dies. The form of the whole, that is, life, in its turn, permeates the constitution of the parts, holds them together, looks after them; the parts thus depend on the whole.

(iv) Similarly, society is another example of systematic unity, not that of a mere aggregate, or of a unity dependent, independent, interdependent or organic. Democrats, who hold the view that society (whether a nation-state, a civilization, a cultural system or the world federation and world culture) is a systematic unity, are therefore right as against the communists, who hold the wrong view that society (or state, or civilisation, or the world state) is an organic unity.

A society is a systematic unity of (institutions—buildings and) individuals. It is not merely an aggregate of particular men; for, in that case, the society would have no identity of its own and one particular man might feel justified in dominating all others. It is not merely a unity that depends on the parts; for, in that case, the removal of one criminal or a group of criminals would do away with the society. It is not merely an independent unity, independent of the particular men; for, in that case, it would be justified in sacrificing them indiscriminately. It is not merely an interdependent unity; for, in that case, individuals would not be independent enough to remake society and society would not be independent enough to sacrifice criminals and soldiers. It is not merely an organic unity; for, in that case, individuals would not be independent enough to reform society but society would be independent enough to sacrifice criminals and soldiers.

Society is a systematic unity in which individuals and society are partly independent of and partly dependent on each other. The spiritual selves of individuals are independent of society and reform society. Society is independent of the criminals and may either punish or reform them. Society and individuals are also interdependent and express themselves through each other: the life, liberty and estate of citizens are protected by the organized physical force of society; and the best minds among the citizens represent the esprit de corps, ideal or value-system which goes
to make up the individuality of the society. Each of the historical cultural systems (which are the units of intelligible history) has its ideal of the highest individual: this makes up its final protocol and to this it feels a total commitment. Hinduism, for example, aims at the harmonious man; Christianity, at the messianic man; Islam, at the half messianic half heroic man; Communism, at the social heroic man.

(v) The human individual is another instance of individual, and is the special sense of the word ‘individual’. In this sense, it is not an equivalent of ‘a particular man’. ‘A particular man’ (e.g. of the Nietzschean humanist conception) is a special case of the human individual.

Pending a detailed analysis in the following section, I may give here a brief analysis of the developed human individual. The human individual is a body, a living body, a thinking body. As a body, he is a part of nature. As a living body, he is a part of nature and society. As a thinking body, he is a part of nature and society, and also, partly above both: this part moulds matter and reforms society; this part is the spiritual (moral and religious) self.

The human individual is thus a system of natural, social and moral selves. As a system it is an aggregate of parts, which are the lesser selves. But it is not merely an aggregate of parts; for, in that case, it would have no identity of its own but many identities— those of the parts severally. This is not the case. It is a unity: the lesser selves are connected with and act upon one another and thus make up the identity of the human individual. The three selves do not exclude one another: they are internally related and can be graded in an ascending order in such a manner that the material self gets partially subordinated to the social self, as a means to an end, and so does the social self to the moral. But it is not merely a unity of this kind; for, in that case, it would be dependent on parts: let even a single part be abstracted from the whole, and the identity of the individual would be lost; while as a unity it cannot exist apart from the parts, the parts could be independent of it. This is not the case. There are cynics and ascetics who do not bother about their body and their society. Human individuality is an independent unity: the spiritual self as the end of the totality of experience becomes the supreme regulator and may completely subordinate the lower selves. But it is not merely an independent unity; for, in that case, the parts would be
completely subordinated to the whole: the whole would be more real as a unity than as a diversity; it would then have a doubtful existence for the material and social selves, which, in their turn, would have a precarious existence of their own. But this is not the case: it is not only undesirable but impossible to suppress the lower selves totally; they demand a periodic intermittent gratification of their urges. In a developed individual they are preserved and superseded by the spiritual self which help them in fulfilling their urges in a harmonious manner. (From all this it follows it is also not merely an interdependent or organic unity.)

The human individual is a systematic unity, in which the parts and the whole are partly independent and partly interdependent. (a) That they are partly independent is proved by the facts that there are hedonists and materialists, socialists and humanists, ascetics and idealists. The parts are partly independent of the whole; they have their individualities though lesser in point of value than that of the whole. The whole is partly independent of the parts; it has its individuality higher than those of the parts. (b) That they are interdependent is also quite evident. The parts (material self, social self, moral self) go into the making of the whole: the whole thus depends on the parts. The individuality of the whole, in its turn, permeates the constitution of the parts, holds them together, looks after them: the parts thus depend on the whole.

'INDIVIDUAL' IN THE SPECIAL SENSE. The human individual is a system. In order to show this more clearly than we did in the previous section, our analysis will have to lay bare the parts (constituents), interrelation of parts (or the component) giving the whole as a depending unity, the independent unity (or form), and thus the systematic unity—of the human individual.

(i) Constituents of the Human Individual.
Experiences are of two kinds—knowing and making, theory and practice. This difference in kind arises because there is a difference in the direction or purpose of one kind from that of the other kind. When we want to know, the direction is from object to subject, from the lower subject to the higher, from the thing to be known to the knower: the subject (knower) assimilates the outer experience in the form of an inner experience. When we want to make, the direction is from subject to object, from the higher subject to the lower, from the maker to the thing to be made: the inner experience in the subject (maker) is projected into and realized through an objective medium or outer experience. As examples we may take the scientist and the artist. For the scientist, the world is given as an object; he assimilates it in the form of a theory or logical construction. For the artist, there is an idea or inner experience in his mind; he gives an outer form to it through a suitable medium.

In theoretical realization, the subject’s assimilating the object denotes not only the cases of the given subject’s acquiring the knowledge of object but also the cases of rise in subjective status as a result of the given subject’s attempt to know itself and in the process turning into the object of a higher subject to be explored later. Similarly, in practical realization, the subject’s getting assimilated into the object denotes not only the cases of the given subject’s making of artefacts but also the cases where it controls the lower selves of its own or other lower subjects in order to fulfill their urges in a harmonious manner.

So long as theory and practice have not differentiated in our experience, our experience may be said to be pre-logical or involuntary. When theory and practice get clearly differentiated, we reach the level of logical or voluntary experience.

Pre-logical experience can be roughly divided into two levels—that of reflex actions and that of instincts.

On the level of reflex actions, we just feel; we hardly know and make things consciously. There is very little gap between knowing and making or between making and knowing. For example, while crossing a street, we hear a honk from behind and leap into the air. Reflex actions involuntarily aim at bodily survival. Animism and magic make up the culture on the level of reflex actions in theory and practice.

On the instinctual level, our experience is more extensive, the survival of the particular biography being the scope. We feel more
intensely and extensively, know with some awareness, and there is a slight gap between knowing and making. Traditional beliefs (like the transmigration of souls and the last day of judgment) and customary practices (like religious ritual on the occasions of wedding, birth of a baby or the death of a person) are the realization of values in theory and practice on the level of instincts.

On the level of voluntary action, our experience is still more extensive in scope: the survival of mankind is the scope. We feel still more intensely and extensively; we know and make things with deeper and greater awareness; there is a clear difference between theory and practice so that we may logically distinguish between theory and practice on this level. It is only on this level that we can talk of 'logical' and 'illogical'.

Theoretical experience or realization can be graded into three levels—perception, science and philosophy. (i) In perception, the object is taken in and by itself; and the object is either a material body, an organic sensation or a mental image (sensed, dreamed, imagined, recollected, etc.). Here we follow the method of empirical reason. (ii) In science, the object is taken in relation to other objects. Here we employ the method of scientific reason. We have three broad groups of sciences—physics (which presupposes matter), biology (which presupposes life) and psychology (which presupposes mind). (iii) In philosophy, the object is taken in relation to the subject. Although once on the philosophical level we may talk of values on all levels, we can properly evaluate only on this level. Here we employ (i) for evaluation and explanation, the axiological method (epistemological and praxeological, that is, methods of theoretical and practical reason) and (ii) for realization, the ontological method (the method of feeling which includes and supersedes the methods of reason). Here again we may distinguish three philosophies in a gradation: natural-mathematical philosophy dealing with the material aspect of the universe; social-political philosophy (dealing with the human aspect); moral-religious philosophy (dealing with the spiritual aspect). The generating principle for such gradation is quite evident: between two experiences the one which includes and supersedes the other is higher than the other. Without such gradation, no evaluation is possible.

Practical experience or realization can, corresponding to the three theoretical divisions, be graded into three again, viz. primary practices, secondary practices and tertiary practices. They may,
if synonymously used, also be called crude arts, useful arts and fine arts respectively. (The choice of expressions has been discussed in Chapter 2.) Crude arts denote all those cases of practical realization which employ commonsense or perceptual theories (as for example in all primary vocations—those of workers, artisans, craftsmen, farmers, clerks, folkartists, primary educators, ...). Useful arts denote practical realization that employs scientific theories (as in all secondary vocations, those of engineers, medicos, psychiatrists, popular artists, writers of applied literature, secondary educators, ...). Fine arts denote practical realization that makes use of philosophical theories (as in all tertiary vocations, vocations of creators of artefacts extolling nature, man or God, or of regulators of lower level life from the tertiary level).

We have put under the category of practical realization the experiences of educators on all levels. These, corresponding to the three divisions in theory and practice, may be called the primary, the secondary and the tertiary. In education, the subject is related to the subject. Education is thus a communication of theory or practice from one subject (teacher or trainer) to another subject (learner or trainee). The pupil is taken as an end, although on the primary and secondary levels the pupil himself may not be aware of the fact. In a democracy (which all older liberalized cultural systems are), one would treat one's pupils, people or laity as ends and not as means; in a totalitarian state (which all communist countries are), they are used as means. It may also be noted that because the learner is usually a lower level subject, the educator's task of communication (whether of theory or practice) is an art, a practical realization: we may call it subjective-practical realization.

Similarly, in vocations we have three levels of the institution of work—the primary, the secondary and the tertiary. When the pursuit of any theory, practice or education becomes a social labour and acquires value-in-exchange, it turns into a vocation. Here again, the subject is related to the subject. Of course, in all vocations, for the workers to produce artefacts is a practical realization; so also is it for higher rung workers to control lower level ones. Yet the lower level workers cannot be used as means or objects wholly at the disposal of the higher level workers. The co-worker on the lower rung is taken as an end, a subject. Again, the institution of work given has a specific purpose or end of its own to which the workers are subordinated according to certain rules; the worker,
however, remains a subject in relation to his employer and co-workers: he subordinates himself freely as a means to the end of the institution of work; he can change his employer, demand better conditions of work etc. If it is a higher level purpose, the worker's subordination becomes a self-imposed duty. All this is the case in a democracy; hence the situation that prevails is moral. In a totalitarian state, the subordinate workers are treated as means or objects by the superior ones and hence there prevail an immoral condition for the employer (the leader of the state) and an amoral condition for the employees. A total-cultural test of progress in terms of vocations may be worded as follows: an increasing number of individuals in tertiary vocations and a decreasing number of working hours in the primary and secondary vocations.

(ii) The Component of the Human Individual. The component is the interrelation which holds the constituent experiences together. The chain of continuity may have many weak links; but there is no doubt that it does make up a sort of a whole, which is a dependent unity. In the case of the human individual, the component is to be sought in his being a conscious being. By a conscious being we mean that, later on (in the case of a baby) and if you shook him (in the case of an adult), one would become conscious or 'conscious'. By conscious we mean the state of change from sleep or chloroform. By 'conscious' we mean conscious of either environment or self (Cf. John Wisdom: Problems of Mind and Matter). The component of human individuality is the personal identity—a chain of states, conscious being, 'conscious' or conscious, made continuous whenever necessary by being made self-conscious, whatever be the level of subject.

(iii) The Form of the Human Individual. The independence of the human individual as a whole may be sought in the position of the subject (knower, maker). Object and subject are correlative terms. As the subject at a certain position grows self-conscious and knows about it, it becomes an object; the object grows in extent; the subject goes 'deeper' or takes up a higher position. (The words 'higher' and 'lower' are validly used in the context of non-spatial relations. Grade X is higher than Grade V, for example, in the sense that Grade X curriculum includes and supersedes that of Grade V, not in the sense that the class-rooms used for Grade X are situated above those for Grade V. That the same words are used also in the context of spatial relations does not imply that they may be meaningfully used only in that context.)
The following chart draws the corresponding objects and subjects in a graded manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Outer world (including real estate)</td>
<td>1. Living body (pre-logical self)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Outer world, living body</td>
<td>2. Perceiving mind (empirical self)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Outer world, ..., perceiving mind</td>
<td>3. Scientific mind (scientific self)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Outer world, ..., scientific mind</td>
<td>4. Philosophical mind (material self)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Outer world, ..., material self</td>
<td>5. Philosophical mind (social self)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Outer world, ..., social self</td>
<td>6. Philosophical mind (spiritual self)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Outer world, ..., spiritual self</td>
<td>7. Ultimate existential self</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(iv) The Human Individual as a Systematic Unity. The systematic character of the human individual has been partially analysed in section 2(v) ante. It varies from experience to experience, from one series to another series, from one individual to another individual, from one stage or moment of an individual biography to another stage, from one ideal man to another ideal man. The human individual is thus a developing system of experience.

He is a systematic unity of reflex actions, instincts, percepts (material, organic, psychical), scientific categories (physical, biological, psychological), philosophical valuation and realization (natural, human, ideal), practical activities or realization (crude arts, useful arts, fine arts), educational and vocational activities (primary, secondary, tertiary). He is all these and, therefore, is never nothing but any one of these. He is Analysable in terms of these but not reducible to any of these. He is these things in parts and aspects. He is a systematic unity of all these. A systematic unity of these makes up the harmonious man: this is the ideal. Any fixation of feeling at a lower level of experience (that is, finding the greatest satisfaction in it) checks the development of the human individual.

THE HIGHEST INDIVIDUALS IN FIXATIONAL SYSTEMS. The logical gradation of fixational systems and the respective ideal men (in an ascending order) is given below:

1. Animism                     | The magician
2. Traditionalism             | The priest
3. Empiricism                 | The commonsense man
4. Scientism                   | The productive man
5. Naturalism
   i. Atomistic materialism
   ii. Mechanistic
   iii. Mathematical
6. Humanism
   i. Egoistic humanism
   ii. Pragmatic
   iii. Radical
7. Theism
   i. Monadistic idealism
   ii. Ethical idealism
   iii. Absolute idealism

The natural creative man
   The egoistic hedonist
   The utilitarian
   The universal
The social creative man
   The egoistic hero
   The national hero
   The universal hero
The spiritual creative man
   The ascetic man (—god)
   The messianic man (—god)
   The universal man (—god)

In the non-fixational system of culture, the philosophy part may be called the philosophy of the free individual or ‘individualism’: it prescribes the harmonious man as the highest individual. The harmonious man (līlāmaya purusha, in Hindu parlance) plays whenever necessary the roles of the universal god-man (avatar), the messiah (patiṇa-pāvana), the ascetic man-god (sannyāsin) and the universal and national hero (veera-purusha).

There is one physics or one biology. There can be only one non-fixational philosophy and hence one philosophy of man and the highest individual. But there are many fixational philosophies and hence as many fixational philosophies of man and the highest individual.8 We have already distinguished several logical joints in our experience; there may occur fixation of feeling at each joint which gives a partial, but correct if taken as a partial, view. The fixation of feeling to it, however, makes the partial view appear as the whole view. The fixation makes either the part, the interrelation of parts, or the form of the whole appear as the whole; in other words, it makes the whole appear as either an aggregate, a dependent unity, an independent unity or an organic unity, while it is a systematic unity, of parts. We may thus distinguish the above generic

8 This leads to an ad hoc relativism. This is nothing but short-circuiting the philosophy of the Individual. Relativism holds that there is no ultimate distinction between the higher and the lower, that all individual opinions are of equal value. They are equally right or equally wrong. Clearly it suffers from a humanistic fixation. And it is untenable. The reason is simple. In order to be valid it must cease to be one of the opinions and then it contradicts its own affirmation. Secondly, between two opinions, one that includes and supersedes the affirmation of the other is graded higher.
and sub-generic systems of fixational attitudes. Each has its fixed view of man and the highest individual. From the non-fixational standpoint, each view is right in its affirming an aspect of reality; each is wrong in its negation or exclusion and hence in its claim to finality.

Thus, man is not merely an erratic curve of reflex acts, as would be the case if animism holds good. From the animistic standpoint, the magician binding the wind or making rain is felt to be in possession of an extraordinary power by virtue of which he can cast a spell on the deity: as such he is the highest individual.

Man is not merely an instinctive pattern of customary behaviour. But this would be the case if traditionalism would be the final truth. Traditionalism is a fixated attitude on the level of instincts based on an integration of traditional beliefs and customary practices. The highest individual is the priest who guides the acts of ritual (on the occasions of birth, death, wedding, etc.) and is felt to possess the power of propitiating the deity.

Man is not merely an aggregate of momentary single percepts. This would however be the case, were empiricism the sole truth. It is a fixation of feeling for the commonsense or perceptive view of things. It denies the possibility of any valid generalization. According to it, the highest individual is the man of sound common-sense who is also skilled in some crude arts or others.

The human individual is not merely a series of causally connected facts, as would be the case if science were the only truth. Scientism, fixation of feeling for the scientific attitude as the final attitude, denies the possibility of valuational judgment but misses the point that this would preclude the value judgment that the scientific attitude is the best. The highest individual is the productive man who can employ scientific knowledge in producing all kinds of useful goods.

The human individual is not merely an aggregate of atoms—as would be the case if atomistic materialism were ultimately true. Atomistic materialism is a fixation of feeling at the first moment of natural philosophy. The material particle is the absolute. Epicurus’ theory is an instance. According to it, the world is relatable to the attitudes of the material self taken in and by itself: the highest individual is thus an egoistic hedonist capable of prudential friendship with another of his kind. The highest virtue lies in prudence in the sense of minimising pain, in the fear of a valetudinarian.
The human individual is not merely a natural mechanism—as would be the case if mechanistic materialism (like that of Herbert Spencer) were the final truth. A fixation on the second moment of natural philosophy (when the category of causation is absolutized) leads to this attitude. It tries to interpret the moral evolution of man in terms of nature’s mechanism, in terms of the capacity for adaptation of the human organism to outer mechanism. The highest individual accordingly is the utilitarian hedonist, an organism which has developed the greatest mechanical adaptation to the world, has proved to be the fittest in the game of survival.

The human individual is not merely a mathematical structure as would be the case if mathematical materialism were finally true. Mathematical materialism (of Bertrand Russell for example) results from a fixation of feeling to the final moment of natural philosophy (which absolutizes the metrical whole). It rejects all evolution and teleology. Man is in nature which is a strictly determined mathematical structure. The highest value recommended is the pursuit of theoretical knowledge which ends in mathematical materialism. This is what he calls the cult of truth. The highpriests of the cult have been those early men of physical science who had intermittently incurred the inquisitorial wrath of the ecclesiastical pride (of power, knowledge, virtue) and fanaticism. Freedom means freedom to pursue this truth of mathematical materialism. Freedom of thought lies in an unhampered realization of nature as the mathematical absolute. History is a realization of this freedom: the realization has of course been intermittent. Freedom of thought in this sense alone can purge man’s mind of dogmas and superstitions, which are the root causes of wars in history. As George Orwell puts it: ‘Once we accept $2 + 2 = 4$, all else follows’, including universal happiness. The highest individual is therefore the universal hedonist, or the mathematical materialist who holds the key to universal happiness.

The human individual is not merely a particular man to dominate other particular men or to be dominated by another particular man. But this would be the case, or at any rate prescribed, if egoistic humanism (like that of Nietzsche) were the ultimate truth. It is a fact that some individuals would like to be like Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Mao, Nehru, … and some others would suffer themselves to be dominated for a mess of pottage. But this cannot be recommended as the universal ideal. This attitude is the outcome of fixation of feeling at the first moment of social philosophy, which
moment takes the particular man in and by himself. It apotheosizes the particular man. Its regulative principle is the reason of the egoistic man; and the vital principle of ‘will to power’ operative in him is identified as the creative principle. He grows and develops from within by means of this will to power which is ‘the wisdom of the body’—the vitality of physical impulse. The whole of living nature, which includes history, is an arena of conflict among conflicting wills. In the conflict, ‘the lovers of psychological nudity’—strong and aggressive, adventurous and morally unscrupulous, make up the ruling class or the dominant minority of masters. The rest become slaves; they are the timid and submissive, weak and defenceless. They seek solace and false security in moral laws and religious dogma, in all kinds of myths and high-sounding blabs like equality and fraternity, in all types of universality including the relative universality of a particular society like a nation-state, an historical civilized society or a cultural system. The highest individual is thus the Übermensch who is neither the man-in-the-particular-mass nor the universal hero: he is the dominating natural particular man in and by himself, the egoistic hero.

The human individual is not merely a particular man of a particular society (partial cultural—linguistic, racial, economic, political, etc. or total cultural), as would be the case if pragmatic humanism, like that of William James, were the final truth. (I, for example, am not merely a Bengalee astro-mongolo-arryo-dravidian petit-bourgeois Indian Hindu: I do keep my mind open and wish my society to remain open to the world federation and world culture, which is to come as a systematic unity of the existing states and cultural systems and not as an organic unity by way of military conquest and genocide on the part of any one of them.) Pragmatic humanism is fixated social philosophy in its second moment. It finds the regulative principle in workability or utility in the sense of whatever satisfies the demands of the particular man in relation to other particular men, that is, of a particular society. The constitutive principle lies in the feeling behind such demands. The truth of philosophies is to be tested by referring them not only to nature but to human nature, by looking into the human conditions of their acceptability, by their capacity to fulfil both theoretical and practical needs, to generate in us the sentiment of rationality or will to believe on evidence which is incomplete but strong enough to move us to act. In the realm of human action, we are concerned
with making rather than discovering facts: truth here depends on our will to believe, on our faith which is based on desire. Practical social propositions required for making history are thus workably true. The highest good lies in satisfying as many demands as we can: this coincides with the conventional highest ideal. The pragmatist therefore recommends the moral code of the community which is usually a cultural supersystem or historic civilized society. The highest individual is the national hero—a founder of the system or its saviour in times of troubles.

The human individual is not merely a member of the human race—as would be the case if radical humanism (like that of Comte) were the final truth. Radical humanism is a fixation on the final moment of social philosophy. It has its regulative principle in the reason of the universal man, in man as the root of mankind. Its constitutive principle lies in the feeling for the human race. It apotheosizes humanity, and unifies the sciences into a sociology in order to realize the social whole in theory. The natural progress of society consists in the growth of our human attributes as against our animal ones. The main agent in this progress is intellectual development. There has been a progress from the theological to the metaphysical and from this to the scientific or positive stage of theory. In other words, the positivist sees progress in the gradation—god, nature, Man. There has been progress in the gradual decline of the military mode of life yielding place to the industrial. The progress of science and progress of industry are correlated; man's power to conquer nature and adapt nature to his needs depending on the knowledge of the laws of nature. The highest individual is the universal hero. The great men who belong to mankind, who have served mankind in the past, taught us of the unity of mankind through the ages, are the universal heroes. They make up the Grand Être, which is the object of worship.  

The individual is not merely a moral self, as would be the case if egoistic or monadistic or cynical or ascetic idealism (like that of the Greek Cynics or of the ascetics of all historic religious societies) were the ultimate truth. According to egoistic idealism, the highest individual is the ascetic man-god—one who renounces the natural and social life, withdraws into the shell of his inner life, discovers

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*All these six fixational attitudes described so far are epitomized in two ethical movements: utilitarianism and relativism. The first is fixated on materialism; the second, on humanism.*
and possesses the ultimate self, which is identified with the moral self taken in and by itself. He eschews the doubtful course of further realization as well as the values of natural and social life. The 'universal' reason is focussed at each centre-point of individual moral self which realizes the whole in the free determination of itself by its own law. Having discovered the moral law within, he has no need of the law of the state. The cynical sage would admit of no political responsibility. He feels himself to be a citizen of the world at large—completely indifferent to the petty affairs of the state. He feels free in detachment and self-sufficiency. This attitude is clearly the outcome of a fixation of feeling for the first stage of spiritual philosophy. No doubt, on the discovery of the ultimate position of the subject, we may look upon the previous positions as objective, outer or lower; but this does not justify the total rejection of the lower selves or of the possibility of still higher position of the subject. Intermittent periodic functioning or gratification of the lower selves remains necessary and desirable. Total suppression of the bodily self, for example, is not only impossible but if seriously attempted leads to neurosis and psychosis. The ideal of the ascetic man-god may be good as a passing phase, especially in the cases of excessive acquisition of power and wealth and excessive attachment to nature and society. But a fixation at this point is an evil. We have got to withdraw from natural and social life for a time or from time to time, but we must return to nature and history: in other words, the moral self while superseding natural and social selves must not exclude them. Furthermore, there is the next higher realization—relating the moral self with other moral selves.

The individual is not merely an ethical self (socio-moral being) doing the duties of his station in life and society or becoming a messianic man-god doing good to the people, redeeming them of their sins or liberating them from their suffering. This would be the view of man and the highest individual if ethical idealism (like that conceived by Plato and Spinoza and practically realized by Buddha and Jesus) were the final truth. Ethical idealism seeks to realize a moral organism by taking the spiritual self in relation to other spiritual selves and its own lower selves. In Spinoza's Ethics, for example, the stress shifts from one self centred vision to many-sided moral action embracing all individuals. He condemns egoistic escape and ascetic renunciation. Passion without reason is blind
and reason without passion is dead. The spiritual self must therefore comprehend and control, and not renounce, while transcending the lower selves. Under the form of eternity, one can live one's life by taking up into one's life the lives of other members of the social organism. The moral organism thus holds within it the social organism and reinforces it. The lives and deeds of messianic prophets like Buddha, Christ and Mohammed illustrate this attitude. Clearly, this shows a fixation of feeling at the second moment of spiritual philosophy. Not that the prophets suffered from fixation; they played the role of the messiah as harmonious men: the theoreticians like Spinoza recommending this as the final position suffer from the fixation. A return from ascetic withdrawal does not mean a moralistic bondage for the messianic man, the redeemer, and by implication for the redeemed: the ideal remains the harmonious man. The messiah is much too seriously involved in history not to suffer along with the sufferers and not to make them suffer all the more for him to play the messiah. And then there is no knowing whether he is really worthy. The messiah may perpetuate the double standard—one for himself and the other for his flock—as the final protocol. With the ideal of the harmonious man, the sinners or sufferers would redeem or liberate themselves quicker and better. Furthermore, human history is full of 'do-gooders' (Stalin, Mao, Nehru) who aspired to be messiahs but could become only egoistic heroes, thus causing immense suffering and misery and degradation to their people.

The human individual is not merely an adjectival element dependent on or a substantival element in interdependence with the absolute individual that is the universe. But this would be the case if absolute idealism (like that of some Vedantins and Hegelians) were finally true. The absolute individual is spiritual or divine in character: it is an independent or organic unity of the many finite individuals—human and natural. The highest human individual is the highest individuation of the absolute in theory and practice. He feels himself to be identical with the creative principle and divinely perfect and declares himself as the prophet or avatar or universal man-god. The nearest examples in human history are Srikrishna, Buddha, Jesus Christ and Mohammed. Absolute idealism suffers from a fixation of feeling at the final stage of spiritual philosophy where the finite spirit is related to the whole. The feeling attaches to the spiritual whole, the highest ideal of reason (= the
AN ANALYSIS OF 'INDIVIDUAL'

sublime) in which is sought the whole of reality as well as the
vindication of the highest aspirations of spiritual life. In other
words, it identifies the sublime as the absolute of metaphysics
as well as the God of religion. It lays stress on the argument that the
rational is real and vice versa, that the perfect being is the necessary
being and vice versa. A failure of this argument, it says, would
mean a surrender to scepticism. Many absolute idealists admit
however that (in spite of historical individuations like Christ and
Mohammed, Moses and Zoroaster, Krishna and Buddha), it is an
untested postulate or venture of faith to hold that the rational is
real (the perfect being is the necessary being) and that reality is
spiritual or divine (the necessary being is the perfect being).
The fixation of feeling for this last moment of idealism lends a
dogmatic character to it; it leaves no residue of scepticism (or
agnosticism) as to the 'spiritual' character of the absolute individual
(spiritual in the sense in which the highest human reason realizes it).

In the non-fixational philosophy, the human individual is an
individuation of the absolute at all levels of experience. The many
individuations can certainly be logically graded in a hierarchy—
as we have tried to do in this treatise. At the highest level, man
becomes harmonious (perfect or godly) as the creative principle
(whi" ch works in man as efficient feeling) drives him to the realiza-
tion in theory and practice of the highest value or ideal of reason.
But the highest is ever receding though never eluding; our
individuality thus can at best be said to be rising higher and higher
and ought to remain open and dynamic by avoiding a fixation of
feeling at any stage. The absolute individual remains abstract
and dynamic while 'God' is a concrete and determinate realization
of the sublime by man. Furthermore, the absolute individual is a
systematic unity of finite individuals.

THE HIGHEST INDIVIDUALS IN THE HISTORIC CULTURAL SYSTEMS.
Each historic cultural system is based on some major premise.
The major premise or final 'protocol' is made up of a philosophical
presupposition. A fixation of feeling on this makes the system
different from other systems. Each system articulates, develops
and realizes this prime symbol or ultimate value in the process of
its history. In other words, each system consists of a set of attitudes
with some characteristic emphases. These attitudes have been
realized in some great men or man. From them or him we get the
highest individual of each system.
This individual becomes the prototype for the creative minority of each system. While evaluating or grading an historic culture, it is sufficient to take this ideal of the creative minority: the uncreative majority in each system (though more or less productive) are equally good or bad in their omissions and commissions. It is the creative minority which makes history. It is their lapses in creativity which makes a society closed and its culture static. Then the creative minority derogates into a dominant minority. (This has, for example, already happened in Russia and China and is going to happen in India too.)

 Islam is a partly non-fixational cultural system being partly fixated on ethical idealism. The highest individual is the one supreme prophet. The social and historical situation of his life made him play the role of a half-heroic half-messianic man. Many Christian writers on Mohammed therefore underrate his individuality. But a closer study reveals that he is a harmonious man. The harmonious man becomes a 'god' by realizing his identity with, as well as difference from, the creative principle and by prescribing the same realization for others. The prophet of Islam while himself having this realization seems to recommend for his followers the realization of the independence or otherness of God as well as his status as the seal of prophets.

 Christianity too is partly non-fixational and partly fixated on ethical idealism. The highest individual is Christ or the messianic man imitating Christ. Among the latest and best imitations of Christ may be mentioned Albert Schweitzer and Mahatma Gandhi. Christianity has directly inspired the development of the world liberal culture, in which the highest individual is the harmonious man. Christ himself was a harmonious man who played a predominantly messianic role. Most liberals of the West derive their individualism from Christianity. Before the advent of historical Christ, it was the good of a particular mass, the national good, which was the ultimate concern; after Christ, the good of the individual became the ultimate concern (Cf. Boris Pasternak: Dr. Zhivago). Its ethical idealism has however derogated into one of the main factors in the birth and growth of communism.

 Communism is fixated on the level of radical humanism, which includes and supersedes egoistic and pragmatic humanism and all three stages of materialism. The social hero—egoistic, national, universal—is the highest individual. Men like Marx, Lenin, Stalin,
Khrushchev, Mao and Nehru are all heroic; they are out to make history for the sake of helping History. The communist characters described in Dr. Zhivago, for example, include all grades of humanists —egoistic Nietzschean (e.g. Komarovsky), pragmatic Jamesian (e.g. Samdeviatov) and radical Comtean (e.g. Strelnikov). Marx forged his theory of history in order to make history. The most basic prediction is that communism is sure to become the world culture and world state. And since culture is the function of economy in his view, it can be brought about by changing some of the economic factors. And in order to change the economy it may be necessary to employ political and military methods. Communists therefore freely use the argumentum ad hominem and ad baculum and freely practise genocide. The highest individual is thus the most successful politician who can manage to come to the topmost, retain his position there and be the sole ‘do-goofer’ and maker of history.

Hinduism prescribes the harmonious man as the highest individual. But there has been in it a good deal of fixation of feeling on ascetic and absolute idealism. The prime symbol is mystical self-realization or direct spiritual perception. This is attained by stages of self-realization. Each individual is free to develop his self to a point of perfection. Absolute perfection belongs to the absolute individual or Brahman. The next grade of perfection that is unsurpassable by others but not by self belongs to Ishvara (God) and his avatars. The incarnations may however be graded in an ascending order as follows: heroes (veeras), ascetics (sannyāsins), messiahs (patita-pāvanas) and harmonious men (līlāmaya purushas). All are harmonious men but they can be graded according to the predominant roles they play, as in a non-fixational system. The discipline for mystical realization involves an attitude of ascetic negation, to begin with. This has prevented a healthy attitude to nature and history. Liberalism has corrected this to a great extent. But the reactionary and dangerous rebound to nature and history is indicated by the growing number of communists and fellow travellers in the Hindudom.

The developing individual. In the harmonious man, experience reaches a perfectly systematic character: the lower and the higher express in and through each other and yet retain their independence in their respective limited spheres. The unity in such an experience, the equilibrium and harmony in it, contributes to the inner satisfac-
tion of the self. If, however, we keep in abeyance the awareness of this systematic unity between the lower and the higher, the part and the whole, a part would be a pretender for, and may even usurp, the highest status.

This gives us an insight into the very source of evil. This does not imply that in order to be immune from the imperfection of evil, every experience of ours must be given as a perfect whole; it is sufficient for it to show a nisus towards the whole, a disposition to the next higher individuality. Evil lies in believing that the lower stage itself is the highest, in the finding of highest satisfaction in it. Psychologists call it a fixation.

Evil is thus grounded in the fixation of feeling for some erroneous, that is, partial perspective. Such a fixation can be overcome only by feeling. A true conversion cannot be brought about by a process of mere reasoning. The higher idea must be felt first, and felt with such intensity as will effect a change in one’s personality and its attitudes.

Feeling constitutes the real; logic regulates the feeling: logic introduces order and system tout court. The driving force in all developmental movement belongs to feeling. There can be no external control over feeling. This does not rule out the possibility of our being able to offset and overpower one feeling situation by another of opposing kind. (Many communists, for example, have turned anti-communists: Cf. The God That Failed.) As a result, an inner tension grows and ultimately the two conflicting principles get fused into one, a higher principle with the former as an element.

Thus, while the law of contradiction makes up the very essence of reason in its natural function of regulating our movement from less to more systematic experience, it is the feeling of the urge to find more and more inward coherence and ultimately freedom from all contradictions that remains the driving force of reason.

Whatever is experienced or felt is real. But all experiences are not felt with equal feeling of satisfaction. The more satisfactory the feeling in an experience, the higher is the grading of the experience. Logical gradation of experience therefore varies as the satisfactoriness of feeling. The transition from the lower to the higher level in the logical order is the direct outcome of feeling.

Feeling is therefore the creative principle of experience. As such it sets the regulative principle of logical analysis and gradation in operation. By virtue of its creative character, feeling unites object
and subject in both theoretical and practical realizations and thus actualizes experience. And by virtue of its satisfactoriness, it introduces a difference of logical quality in the experience.

INDIVIDUALISM. There is a kind of effete liberalism which wants us to respect all ideologies, as if all are evenly true! The attitude tries to reach out even to an ideology that is manifestly illiberal in principle. Licit liberalism must nevertheless owe its fealty to the highest system which includes and supersedes the partial systems. It respects all multifid ideologies only in this sense—in the sense of giving equal consideration to all and putting each in its right place in the highest (total yet open and dynamic) system, not in the sense of taking them on a par one with another, equal in the final manner, whether open or closed.

This must be so, because whenever there arises a difference of opinion, one can be graded as lower and the other higher, one as a stipule of the other. The two cannot be simultaneous in a biography, and if so in history, can have no even logical status. And of course neither of them may be the highest.

The maudlin liberal may take exception to 'higher and lower'. The objection is manifestly 'maladroit'; for he thinks his attitude is the highest. And of course that the same words are used also in the context of spatial relations does not imply that they may be validly used only in that context.

The need for logical gradation modifies the effete attitude. But even in its revised lineament, the attitude holds good only within the framework of liberalism, among those who agree to disagree in principle, where all ideation and action that occur adhere to the liberal substratum: it cannot extend to an ideology (like communism) which is illiberal in principle, which does not rest on the liberal cantilever. For, the latter opens a plenary hiatus in the realm of practice and ushers the liberal into the world of gregational ethics, where, at any rate, liberalism cannot afford to be that naive as merely 'to counsel abstention from the politics of the rebound' and let the world go to hell. Liberalism is not that unsystematic and that inefficient as the 'effete' in the liberal corpus would have us believe.

The liberal takes no exception to feeling or experience as the

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8 M. G. Bailur, an Indian journalist, writing in the first issue of the Hyphen, 1958, Bombay. The last section of the chapter was the writer's rejoinder to Mr. Bailur's affirmation of relativistic liberalism.
criterion of the real; systematic experience then rightly becomes the liberal's general criterion of value. Our experience revealing natural joints shows the disposition to edify greater systems in direct proportion to our feeling for the highest. In the liberal's view, therefore, there emerge a natural science and a natural philosophy—but materialism is a fixation, an error; a social science and a social philosophy—but socialism or humanism is a fixation, an error; a psychological science and a moral philosophy—but idealism is a fixation, an error.

A part of the individual is embedded in matter; a part goes into the making of society; a part is above both, which tries to mould matter and reform society. This part commits and involves the individual. Even the refusal to do so is a commitment and involvement. Only the unawareness of this creative part, as is the case with the undeveloped individual, may imply neither.

These natural joints mould into a logical gradation of higher and lower according as one principle includes and supersedes another. A living body, for example, includes and supersedes the principle of a material body; and a thinking body, that of a living body.

Similarly, material and physical well-being is undoubtedly a good; but it is not good that a handful of men should enjoy it. There ought to be an adequate development of well-being and an adequate production of material goods for universal and equitable distribution. This latter is the social value, a higher value, and as such includes and supersedes material value. Any and every method, however, does not bid fair to make good the social value. The heroic methods of communism or state-interventionism usually debauch the social good. Communism, for example, mars equity by denying equality to citizens and liberty to consumers and entrepreneurs, to theoreticians and artists, to educators and workers, by intromitting into the body politic two classes—one, the ruling class of 'do-gooders', and the other, the ruled, made up of the 'done-good-to's'. It despoils the material well-being by becoming the sole employer and producer and supplying the people with what it produces and not what they want. It blights the physical well-being and even physical existence of dissenters. It turns the educators into propagandists and indoctrinators; it turns the workers into means or tools. Such self-stultifying methods are bad or immoral for the rulers and pre-moral for the ruled. Those methods which do realize the social value, methods of free enterprise (private enterprise, natural monopolies, voluntary co-operation) are good or moral. Thus moral value includes and
supersedes social value. Morality implies freedom ('one may or may not'), existential limitations ('one can'), and the categorical imperative ('one ought to'). 'One ought to' presupposes 'because everybody ought to': this again presupposes 'because everybody is partly identical with the absolute individual'.

Without freedom, a situation remains non-moral. With freedom, it may be either moral or immoral. Prostitutes and beggars, for example, are children of this freedom. But both involuntary and concealed unemployment, both private and state 'exploitation', both business cycles and cycles of party crisis, and all wars are results of curtailing this freedom. More freedom alone can do away with these evils. One cannot therefore recommend the abolition of this freedom and reduce all human action to the non-moral or pre-moral status, relegate them to the purely political and military order.

The liberal recommends an unremitting search for the perennial concordat of values which is a systematic unity of the graded values—moral, social, physical. In a systematic unity, the lower and the higher depend upon and penetrate through each other; the lower value is not discarded or suppressed; neither is the higher just an aggregate or a dependent whole. In practice, therefore, on the level of creative social act, the liberal's commitment is unmistakable, and the involvement unavoidable.

This is the liberal philosophy of the individual which is popularly known as individualism. And this is held by the Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and other older cultures. They must therefore unite against the socialist world in an adequately organized defence system by way of a world federation and international police force.
'Culture' is 'realization of values'. 'Culture' is one word for 'realization of values in theory and practice'. In this expression again, each of the terms 'value', 'realization', 'theory' and 'practice' is a one-word which can be significantly analyzed into a phrase. Significant analysability as the criterion of meaning is of three kinds: experiential or factual, ideational or conceptual, and purely verbal. Significant propositions of science should be analysable into factual categories; and those of philosophy, into the basic ideas and concepts which are grounded in or born of experience.

'Value' is thus one word for 'subject's attitude to object'; 'realization', for 'the turning of a possible experience into an actual one'; 'theory' is 'assimilation of object by subject'; 'practice' is one word for 'subject's getting assimilated into object'.

All cases of realization of values in theory and practice can be called culture. And all cases of culture can be analyzed as cases of realization of values either in theory or practice or in both. Hence the longer expression states the meaning, in the sense of a synonymous paraphrase, of the word 'culture'. This may be a verbal analysis; but it is a significant verbal analysis, for this can be further analyzed first conceptually and then factually. All significant ideas may not be reducible to, but they are all analysable into, experiential categories.

The meaning statements of allied words like 'philosophy', 'fine arts' and 'religion' can be given in similar terms. Thus, philosophy is the realization of values in theory. Fine arts are the realization of values in practice. Religion is the realization of the highest value in theory. Religion is thus a part of philosophy; and philosophy and fine arts are parts of culture. 'Culture' is therefore the most comprehensive term.
Values are many; so they must be put in the right order and graded. That which is the highest is the religious value. Religion, being the highest constituent of culture, regulates the other constituents of culture and unifies them into a cultural system. This is the function of the highest value.

**Values are subject's attitudes to objects.** 'Value' is one word for 'subject's attitude to object'. Instead of taking 'value' as synonymous with 'attitude', we take it as synonymous with the phrase 'subject's attitude to object', that is, attitude as qualified by the expressions 'subject's' and 'to object'.

We can distinguish two constituents and one component that go to make up the structure of any experience. The constituents are the subject and the object; and the component is the subject's (theoretical or practical) attitude to the object. For this component or relation the usual one word is value. But then as a relation between the subject and the object, it is partly rooted in both so that it has itself a subjective constituent and an objective constituent and a component uniting the two. The *subjective constituent* of value may be identified with the subject's relational characteristic of satisfaction. The *objective constituent* of value may be identified with the object's relational characteristic of satisfactoriness. The *component* of value may be identified with the subject's attitude, that is, disposition to regulate the response, to the object. The *form* of value is given by the meaning statement of the word 'value', which we began with, and the different level criteria statements of it.

Besides these, we may have to distinguish what may be called the *subjective determinant* and the *objective determinant* of value. The reasons for distinguishing the two 'causal' factors of value are given below.

A value is a relation between the subject and the object. As such it is partly rooted in the subject and partly rooted in the object. We have called these relational characteristics the subjective and the objective constituents of value. The relational characteristics are however 'causally' connected with some essential characteristics of the subject and the object. The referent of the relation here is the level of experience or individuality of the subject. The relata of the relation are the object's tertiary characteristics. The relation varies as the referent or the relatum varies. Values vary as the subject varies and the object varies. Therefore, the constituents and the component of value severally vary as the individuality
of the subject and as the tertiary characteristics of the object.

Whether or not a subject would find satisfaction in, or respond to, an object, or an object would be found satisfactory, depends on the subject's status and the tertiary characteristics of the object. The individuality of the subject and the tertiary characteristics of the object are thus 'causal' factors of the constituents and component of value. The subject's level and the object's tertiary characteristics are independent variables, of which the dependent functional variables are the subjective constituent, component and objective constituent of value.

The relation between the subjective status and the value is so very close that the 'causal' factor is usually taken as a constituent of the value itself. We may however call it the subjective determinant of the value to distinguish it from the subjective constituent of it. Similarly the relation between the object's tertiary characteristics and the value it occasions is so close that the 'causal' factor is usually taken as a constituent of value itself. We may however call it the objective determinant of value.

**The Hedonic Feeling Constitutes Value.** The subjective constituent of value is the subject's relational characteristic of satisfaction. This is what we have called the hedonic feeling. This is not the efficient feeling. Psychologically speaking, the hedonic feeling is present in the peripherally excited sense-feeling as well as in the centrally excited emotions. (The hormic feeling present in both sense-feelings and emotions make up the efficient feeling.)

Bentham had the hedonic feeling in view and rightly called it homogeneous varying in intensity, duration, etc. The qualitative distinctions arise because of the change in the subjective determinant.

In theoretical realization, the true knowledge of a situation or of the subjective status gives us satisfaction; in practical realization, we find satisfaction in the making of a useful or beautiful artefact or in successfully controlling or satisfying the urges of the lower selves.

The object's satisfactoriness is not a sensible quality like 'brown' or 'blue' or 'a brown book' or 'a blue book'. It is a relational characteristic and it is not to be identified with the tertiary characteristic. The tertiary characteristic may be present, yet it may fail to occasion the object's satisfactoriness (if, for example, the subjective determinant is missing).

**The Component of Value Has a Regulative Function.** The component of value is (subject's) *disposition to regulate the response*
(to object). The subjective constituent of the component is the subject's disposition; the objective constituent of the component is the response to object; the component of the component is to regulate. The function of the component of value is regulative.

Value is therefore partly feeling and partly reason. The feeling part is hedonic or material in character; it is not efficient or dynamic. The reason part is regulative both formally and finally, varying in degrees of formality and finality. A value is therefore the meeting-ground of the regulative principle and a part of the constitutive principle. The creative or efficient feeling comes into the picture as the ground and realizer of value: this is the absolute of metaphysics working within us.

THE MEANING STATEMENT AND CRITERIA STATEMENTS GIVE THE FORM. The form of value we have identified with the meaning statement of the word 'value', viz. 'subject's attitude to object.' The meaning statement is not the criterion statement. But the meaning statement holds good on all levels for which different criteria statements become necessary. The meaning statement is presupposed by all these different level criteria statements. The meaning has therefore been regarded as a universal and necessary (but not sufficient) criterion. On each level, the criterion statement in conformity with the meaning statement makes for a sufficient criterion. So the different level criteria become parts of the form of value. We may say the form of value is a systematic unity made up of the meaning (which is the whole) and the different level criteria (which are the parts). ¹

¹ The failure to grasp this systematic relation between meaning and criterion (of value in general or of a specific value-adjective) has been a great source of confusion in traditional philosophy, and the confusion still lingers.

On any level, the criterion statement on that level presupposing the necessary statement of meaning becomes the sufficient criterion. For example, the accordance theory of truth gives the meaning of truth which holds good for all levels; whereas the pragmatic theory of truth, which presupposes the meaning of truth, gives the sufficient criterion of truth only on the level of social philosophy (second moment). It goes wrong in claiming to be universal; if it claims to be universal, then we can put it in the fixational system called pragmatic humanism.

The accordance of propositions to facts is the meaning and therefore a universal and necessary but not a sufficient 'test' of truth; not sufficient, because the accordance may not be explicit but only suggested by some signs, which vary from level to level. The word 'test' or 'criterion' here is misleading, since 'truth' and 'accordance with facts' are synonymous, whereas 'workable'
The meaning statement of value can be paraphrased as follows: Values are grounded in our felt urges, and things and experiences are valued in so far as they afford satisfaction of these urges. This holding good for all levels contains the different level criteria. The criterion of value on each level is the satisfaction of the selves on that level. Here we are presupposing the meaning of value (for example) and 'true' are not synonymous. All true propositions accord with facts, and all propositions that accord with facts are true. But while most workable propositions are true, many true propositions are not workable, or even all workable propositions are not true. For example, 'I heard a donkey braying at 6 P.M. on January 1, 1957' is a true but useless proposition. And the many cases of false promise and propaganda by the communists have been eminently workable.

The empiricist, for example, passes off the empiricist criterion of meaning, which is valid on the level of perception, as the meaning of meaning which has got to be valid for all levels. Similarly, the two rationalist statements—'the real is rational' and 'the rational is real'—make up the meaning statement of reality. This becomes clear at the subjective pole. But on the lower levels, taken as criteria, neither the real seems rational nor the rational real.

For examples, on the level of perception, perceptual knowledge and crude artefacts are valued, since they afford satisfaction to the commonsense man; on the level of science, scientific knowledge and useful artefacts are valued as they afford satisfaction to the scientific minds; on the level of philosophy, philosophical realization and fine arts are valued because they afford satisfaction to the philosophical minds.

We have given the meaning statement and the criteria statements of value in general. Similarly, each specific value, whether theoretical like 'meaning' or 'truth' or practical like 'utility' or 'beauty' can have its meaning statement (only one) and different level criteria (one on each level). However, philosophers usually recommend one criterion for the use of the value adjective for all levels. As they choose different level criteria, different philosophers seem to recommend different criteria for the same value. Secondly, they usually seek the meaning which is valid for all levels but discovering only the criterion on the particular level on which their feeling is fixated, pass it off as the meaning.

The empiricist, for example, passes off the empiricist criterion of meaning which is valid on the level of perception as the meaning of meaning which has got to be valid for all levels and which cannot be identified with the empiricist criterion.

Similarly, the two rationalist statements—'the real is rational' and 'the rational is real'—make up the meaning statement for the real. This becomes clear on the highest level of experience. But on the lower levels (of moral, social, natural philosophy, of science and perception) neither the real seems rational nor the rational real: the difference between 'is' and 'ought' grows wider and wider as the level goes lower. The rationalists suffering from fixation on the idea that reason which is the regulative principle is also the cons-
and giving the test of value only in terms of the subjective determinant and the subjective constituent of value. ‘Objectively’ stated, the criterion of value on each level is the satisfactoriness of objects (in relation to the selves on that level). For example, on the level of perception, perceptual knowledge and crude artefacts are valued, since they afford satisfaction to the commonsense man.

Similarly, each specific value, like ‘meaning’ or ‘truth’ and ‘utility’ or ‘beauty’ can have its meaning statement (only one) and different level criteria (one on each level). Thus, for example, ‘accordance with facts’ remains the meaning of the word ‘truth’ on all levels; but the criterion of truth differs (must differ) from one level to another. On the pre-logical level, feeling is the only available test of truth. On the commonsense level, observation is the test. The scientific test becomes complex and reads as follows: propositions are true if they work in the sense that (i) they are verified by observation or experiment either directly or indirectly; (ii) they explain certain classes of facts adequately; (iii) they predict certain facts correctly; or that (iv) they help in further investigation which leads us nearer truth. On the level of philosophy, the tests of formal coherence, workability and even philosophical coherence are only necessary but not sufficient tests: the sufficient test is individual realization.

The subjective determinant makes up the gradation. The subjective determinant of value is the existential status or individuality of the subject. The subject as an individual passes through a progressive elevation. We have already noted this in Chapter 1. The natural or logical joints in our experience (differentiation between theory and practice and between subject and object reveals them) give us a gradation of human individuality. This gradation makes up the first structure or anatomy of the value system.

As the subject (knower and maker) grows self-conscious and knows facts about itself, it becomes an object; the object grows in extent; the subject goes deeper or takes up a higher position. Thus, on the prelogical level of experience, the outer world is the object and the living body is the subject. As this subject becomes conscious of itself and begins to know facts about itself, it becomes an object and the perceiving mind (primary logical subject) becomes the constitutive principle fail to reconcile the two statements into one meaning statement for the real: they become criteria statements, too bad to be useful on the lower levels. Yet it can be shown that all lower level criteria of reality presuppose this meaning statement of the value word ‘real’.
subject. When this in its turn becomes self-conscious and turns into an object, the subject emerges as the scientific mind (secondary logical subject). When this too becomes an object, the subject is the philosophical mind (tertiary logical subject). We have distinguished nine grades in the philosophical mind.

It is the philosophical mind which is capable of evaluating. But although it is on the philosophical level that values emerge, that the subject can relate objects to its attitudes, we can distinguish (from the philosophical level) the commonsense attitude of perception as that attitude which would like to take things in and by themselves and the scientific attitude as that which would like to take factual relations as unrelated to the scientist as an individual. Furthermore, there can be precarious acts of evaluation or realization of values on lower levels: the lower ‘subject’ relates objects to its attitudes and realizes values in theory and practice. Thus, a commonsense man may find truth in commonsense propositions only and beauty in crude arts. Strictly speaking, on the level of perception, there is no scope for discussing truth and beauty. It is on the level of philosophy that we do it and it is on this level that some philosophical minds suffering from a fixation of feeling for commonsense perception may try to justify the commonsense criteria of truth and beauty and so refine the arguments for these as to make up a philosophical system or school or movement called primary logical empiricism. And all this, while the commonsense man may be employing a particular criterion without being aware of that criterion, not to speak of the philosophical arguments in favour of it. Of these the main argument seems to be that the criterion is ‘the criterion in practice’ because the majority of people are at the present stage of cultural development on the level of perception. This however is a guess, not the result of any statistical survey; I suspect the majority are on the level of instincts and reflex acts.

TERTIARY CHARACTERISTICS OCCASION THE USE OF VALUE-ADJECTIVES. The objective determinant of value, viz. the tertiary characteristics of object, is an independent variable in relation to value. The object passes through a progressive change. It develops as the subject turns into object and also as the higher subject discovers new tertiary characteristics of the same object.

Tertiary characteristics are not sensible characteristics, sensible in the sense of being sensibly apprehended. The primary and secondary characteristics of things are, on Locke’s definition of them, in some
sense all sensibly cognizable, but tertiary characteristics of things and experiences are felt as being there and yet are not sensibly apprehended. They occasion the subject's taking up certain attitudes. They are analysable in terms of primary and secondary characteristics but not reducible to them. Sensibly they appear made up of primary and secondary characteristics but are felt to be something more.

A point of verbal reform: the words 'primary' and 'secondary' as adjectives of characteristics may be used in the respective cases of the perceivable characteristics of things and scientific characteristics of facts, and not in the traditional Lockean senses. Then, we may say tertiary characteristics denote the valutional characteristics of individuals—objects and subjects. Then, all sensible characteristics would be primary; all scientific characteristics would be secondary and, as such, systems of primary characteristics, analysable in terms of them but not reducible to them; and all tertiary characteristics would be systems of primary and secondary characteristics analysable in terms of them but not reducible to them. As systematic unities, they can be apprehended only by what John Wisdom calls 'the connecting technique'.

"To use Susan Stebbing's example: Nathan brought out for David certain features of what David had done in the matter of Uriah the Hittite by telling him a story about two sheep-owners."^3

The tertiary characteristics of the subject together with those of the object determine the values and thus occasion the use of value-words. But the tertiary characteristics of objects are often mistaken as values. The reason is that the same expressions—'meaning' and 'truth', 'utility' and 'beauty', 'reality' and 'good', for examples—are used for tertiary characteristics of objects as well as for values; while the adjectives—'meaningful' and 'true', etc.—are used to describe the objects which possess the tertiary attributes. The grammatical difference thus seems to express the logical difference that the noun words refer to the intensions (tertiary characteristics) while the adjectives refer to the extensions (objects). All this is misleading. The difference which ought to be maintained here is that between the tertiary characteristics of objects and the values. Whether we use the noun words or adjectives, they are value words: they stand for

values, and not for tertiary characteristics of objects. Tertiary characteristics of objects are, far from being values, only objective determinants of values, not even objective constituents of values.

Yet we do use the same value words for tertiary characteristics of objects. In such cases, however, the words still stand for values. They are one-words for descriptive phrases the significance of which is dependent on the individuals—(i) to which they may apply (objects) and (ii) by whom they may be discerned (subjects), dependent in the sense that the juxtaposition of the two might occasion the use of the value words. To think that a value word stands for the objective determinant is therefore misleading. The objective determinant along with the subjective determinant occasion the use of a value word in certain situations.

The main question that can arise about value adjectives are why and when we should use them to describe certain things, situations or individuals. Why and when, for examples, do we say that this sentence is meaningful, that this proposition is true, that this thing is useful, that this picture is beautiful, that the world is real, or that the democratic way of life is good? These questions entail or presuppose criteria questions, that is, questions about the criteria which fix the use of the value-adjectives. Thus, before we can answer the question ‘what is the meaning of this sentence?’ we must fix a criterion of meaning. And any criterion statement of meaning must specify the conditions which when fulfilled make a sentence meaningful. This leads us to the form of the value, which has been discussed above. The value words therefore stand for the values as wholes.

To sum up, we have distinguished the following factors of value:

i. The subjective determinant of value: The level of the subject.
ii. The objective determinant of value: The tertiary characteristics of the object.
iii. The subjective constituent of value: The satisfaction of the subject.
iv. The objective constituent of value: The satisfactoriness of the object.
v. The component of value: (subject’s) disposition to regulate the response (to the object).
vi. The form of the value: The meaning statement and the different level criteria statements.

vii. The ground and realizer of values: The efficient or hormic feeling.

REALIZATION IS TURNING THE POSSIBLE INTO THE ACTUAL. Realization of values is a process. It may be viewed as a succession of value, purpose, planning, decision, will, action, and satisfaction. The genesis of value may be traced to every actual experience which elicits from us and develops in us either a positive or negative attitude. Values emerge as a series of possible repeatable desirable experiences (desirable because of the hedonic feeling of satisfaction but actually desired by the hormic feeling) to which we develop a positive attitude. The end of the process is the hedonic feeling again. The whole process is grounded in and sustained by hormic or efficient feeling, which is the realizer. Reason enters into the process as value, purpose, planning, decision, will and action. Reason is thus a function of efficient feeling. A value (which is a positive disposition to regulate the response) becomes purpose when it stands in the mind as the contrast between the present situation and the valued situation. The process of selecting and ordering the means of altering the present situation into the valued situation is the planning. Planning passes into decision when the means are specifically fixed. In transition to action, and just before the first act in a planned series, is will. At the end of the series of action is the individual's relation to another individual (not necessarily human) in a more or less intimate union which is enjoyed as the specific satisfaction. The realization of values of all kinds is culture; and the repeated realization of preferred values makes for happiness.5

Realization means turning possible experiences into actual ones. Values are a species of possible experience. A value as a psychological attitude is an actual experience but logically it is a possible experience in relation to the situation in which the value is realized. 'Possible' and 'actual' being correlative, an experience may be called 'possible' in relation to another which is actual, which in its turn may be called possible in relation to a third actual one, and so on. In the above series, value is possible while purpose is actual, purpose is possible while decision is actual, decision is possible, while will is actual, and so on.

The polarity between possible and actual experiences is not dichotomous but systematic. Possibility and actuality are partly dependent on and partly independent of each other. There can be purely possible experiences (e.g. merely psychologically possible facts like ‘space and time take tea without sugar’, provided of course we do not take the symbolic statement of it for the present purpose as the actual aspect). There can be purely actual experience (e.g. ‘I heard a donkey braying at 6 a.m. on January 1, 1957’, provided of course we do not take the negative attitude to hearing a bray as a disvalue and hence a possible experience). There can be experiences which are partly possible and partly actual (e.g. the communist state as a realized empire in action is an actual experience but as a still unfulfilled world culture and state is a possible experience).

In the situation wherein the value is realized, the subject unites with the object, either assimilating the object as in theoretical realization, or getting assimilated into the object as in practical realization.

REALIZATION IS EITHER THEORETICAL OR PRACTICAL. We can classify realization according to the direction of the relation between the correlatives, subject and object. One direction is from object to subject; the other is from subject to object. Thus we get two kinds of experience—knowing and making, theory and practice. This difference in kind arises because there is a difference between the direction or purpose of one kind and that of the other kind.

When we want to know, the direction is from the knowable to the knower. It is either from object to subject, or from the lower subject to the higher: the subject (knower) assimilates the outer experience in the form of an inner experience, or in course of knowing itself turns it into an object of a higher subject, which higher subject is to be known later on. For example, in scientific pursuits the world is considered given as a system of objective relations; the scientist seeks it in the form of a theory or logical construction. (All practicals or experiments he holds are means to the end, which is theoretical.) Similarly, in moral pursuits, the moral self tries to discover itself; it does so only by attaining to a higher subjective status, which assimilates, that is, includes and supersedes, the present status. (All practice and discipline he undergoes are of course means to the end which is clearly theoretical.)

When we want to make (facts or artefacts), the direction is from
the maker to the thing to be made. It is either from the subject to object, or from the higher subject to the lower: the inner experience in the subject (maker) is projected into and expressed through an outer experience—an objective or lower subjective medium. This is the case in all pursuits of useful arts, that is, arts in which scientific knowledge is applied to the making of certain facts or artefacts. The engineer, the medico or the psychiatrist, for example, all try to give an outer reality to an inner idea. The same is the case with all fine arts. For the fine artist, there is an idea or inner experience in his highest subjective status: he gives an outer (lower subjective and objective) form to it through a suitable medium, in controlling lower selves or making beautiful artefacts.

I have here used the term ‘theory’ in the sense of cognition (end of the cognitive process) on all levels of experience. The word ‘knowledge’ as used in literary parlance may well be a synonym for the word ‘theory’. But then, as the subject matter of epistemology, ‘knowledge’ acquires a specific connotation. Again the word ‘cognition’ would be synonymous, but it is restricted to the sphere of psychology which is a science and which therefore gives a scientific treatment to the cognitive process on prelogical and logical levels of experience: as a result ‘cognition’ tends to be a hard symbol with a specific connotation again.

The word ‘science’ is sometimes widely used to cover the whole range of the cognitive process, but the word must obviously be chosen for that particular level of theoretical realization where we look for objective relations. The term ‘theory’ itself may have some misleadingly restricted connotation: by ‘theory’ we may mean only ‘a scientific hypothesis’ or ‘an ideological ism’. But if we remember the context of its use in the longer expression ‘theoretical realization’, the word ‘theory’ would denote scientific theories and ideologies only as some of its specific instances.

Similarly, ‘practice’ has been taken in the sense of conative process on all levels of experience again. The word ‘arts’ would seem a happier choice. And in fact I have described the respective practical realizations on the logical levels of perception, science and philosophy as crude arts, useful arts and fine arts. Each of these expressions is to be used in a wide sense. Fine arts, for example, would denote not only poetry, music, etc. which extol nature, man or God but also other instances of tertiary practice (in which philosophical theory is applied) like conquering nature,
controlling lower selves, ruling men and guiding spiritual selves. In short, the alternative expressions 'primary practices', 'secondary practices' and 'tertiary practices' would seem to do better than those chosen. But in that case, their counterparts in theory ought to be called primary theory, secondary theory and tertiary theory. These would prove too unfamiliar. Hence the choice of familiar expressions for the three logical levels.

But the word 'arts' could not be happily used for practice on the prelogical level like magical and customary rites. And the resulting pair 'theory' and 'arts' would be as bad as 'science' and 'arts'. The word 'arts' in the context of arts or humanities subjects do not stand for practical realization at all: except literature, they are all sciences and philosophies. Even literature is not taught as a training in an art, to make the pupil a creative artist, but mostly as literary criticism, which is a theoretical study on the level of philosophy. 'Arts' thus cannot be the choice for the generic term.

The word 'conation' would, like 'cognition', smack too much of psychology. The term 'practice' itself may suggest some restrictive use: by 'practice' we may mean only those activities (vocational or otherwise) which come under crude arts and useful arts involving applications of commonsense and scientific theories and also practical economics and politics involving pragmatic valuation. But if we remember the context of its use in the expression 'practical realization', the word 'practice' would denote vocational and political activities as some of its specific instances. 'Practical' is sometimes used in the vague senses of utilitarian, pragmatic, human and even moral. But utilitarianism, pragmatism, humanism, and moralism are all theoretical realizations (of the fixational kind) and the practical counterparts of all these are arts of one kind or another extolling or controlling nature and man.

Hence we choose 'theory' and 'practice' as the generic terms. 'Theory' and 'practice' in the wide senses (which we recommend here) have been used by Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza. Indian philosophy uses the terms 'jnāna' and 'karma' in the same senses respectively. Aristotle's words are theoria and praxis.

Following Kant, we may have another twofold division. One is subjective realization (virtue) and the other is objective realization (happiness). This division may be made in each of the previous divisions. Thus, we may have the following four kinds of realization:
FEELING REALIZES WHILE REASON REGULATES. Feeling as the efficient 'cause' realizes values. It functions as the ground that sustains the series of means to the end. In all realization, the subject unites with the object, either assimilating the object as in theoretical realization, or getting assimilated into the object as in practical realization. Feeling realizes by uniting the subject with the object: it is the component of realization. Material or hedonic feeling constitutes value, which is the static component of experience; efficient feeling is the dynamic component of experience.

Theoretical realization is more than conception, explanation and evaluation; practical realization is more than expression, representation and communication. For realization, the feeling for the theory or practice must be there to make it a part of our life. One may, for example, fail to communicate communism correctly, yet one's having a feeling for it makes one a communist. Conversely, I may correctly communicate communist doctrines yet my feeling against it makes my realization anticommmunist in character. In theoretical realization, it is the feeling for higher experience that brings about a rise in our subjective status. And in practical realization too, it is the feeling for lower experience and selves that sustains our creation of artefacts or our helping the lower selves in fulfilling their urges in a harmonious manner.

Different levels of experience have different modes of formal and final reason. Feeling is however the common component of realization on all levels. In metaphysics, therefore, feeling is the constitutive (both efficient and material) principle of reality. Whatever is felt or felt for is real. Feeling goes to make up or make for the real. Reason is immanent in experience; feeling is
immanent and transcendental: it connects experience with existence; it is the metaphysical principle.

Realization, however, is not all feeling; it involves reason too. True, unless we feel for the ideal or desire the desirable, we shall not turn it into the actual. True again, feeling realizes directly on the prelogical level. But on the logical level, as we feel for the ideal, the feeling brings into operation and sustains the regulative principle, which is reason.

Reason regulates experience by distinguishing several grades of it. The criterion of higher and lower is given by it in the principle of systematic experience. Experience becomes more and more systematic by the 'feeling'-operation of reason upon it. It grades experience into the prelogical and the logical by distinguishing between theory and practice. It grades logical experience into the primary, secondary and the tertiary by distinguishing between objects, then objective relations and then subjects: the primary logical stage has the mode of pure objective reason; the secondary, that of relational objective reason; the tertiary, that of subjective reason.

In grading experience, it operates by the method of inclusion and supersession. Reason operates naturally more or less as follows. On a given level of experience, we begin to feel the limitations thereof. These require to be transcended. We meet with some paradoxes; these require to be resolved. We become aware of certain presuppositions; these require to be validated logically, and if antithetical, to be reconciled. Our feeling against the situation grows more and more intense. This ultimately rouses our critical disposition from 'dogmatic' slumber. We look for a new standpoint which can eliminate the 'contradictions', either dissolve or supersede them. Reason starts dealing with the presuppositions and oppositions—to validate the former and to reconcile the latter. This at length leads to a higher level of systematic experience. And this, in its turn, begins to appear as a part of a still more systematic experience. And so on.

Reason operates in this way naturally, and thus, by what is known as the method of contradiction. The law of contradiction thus represents a basic fact about the thinking mind. 'A self-contradictory theory conveys—nothing,' as Karl Popper puts it. 6 The law makes up the very essence of reason in its natural movement

6 Karl Popper, "What Is Dialectic?", Mind, October 1940, p. 408.
from less to more systematic experience. Yet this law is not sufficient for realization. The urge to find more and more complete inward coherence and ultimately freedom from all contradictions remains the driving force of reason. This urge is the feeling which is efficient feeling. And this feeling is the desire for the ever receding but never eluding highest.

Different levels seem to have different modes of realization: these are the fixational modes. But there is only one method of non-fixational realization: we may call it the ontological method. This is the method of feeling. This divides into prelogical feeling and logical feeling. Prelogical feeling divides into reflex active and instinctive feelings. And logical feeling divides into the primary logical, the secondary logical and the tertiary logical feelings. Each of these again divides into the theoretical and the practical feeling. On the prelogical level the two do not get differentiated and remain latent in the same feeling realization. The feeling in reflex action is both theory and practice. The feeling which is instinct is again both theory and practice.

On the level of perception and primary arts, we realize by the methods of primary logical feeling, that is, the methods of empirical reason grounded in and sustained by feeling, which is the method of ontology. This is not to be confused with empiricism. Empiricism results from a 'fixation' of feeling for the primary logical method of reason, which is mistaken as the ontological method. Or else, there is nothing wrong in the refining on the philosophical level of the criteria of reality and values which are embedded in the thought and speech of men on the primary logical level.

On the level of science and secondary arts, we realize by way of secondary logical feeling—by the methods of scientific reason grounded in and sustained by feeling, which is the method of ontology. This is not to be confused with scientism. Scientism results from a 'fixation' of feeling for the secondary logical method of reason, which is mistaken as the ontological method. Or else, there is nothing wrong in refining on the philosophical level the criteria of reality and values which are embedded in the thought and speech of men on the secondary logical level.

On the level of philosophy and tertiary arts, we realize by means of tertiary logical feeling—by the methods of axiological reason again grounded in and sustained by feeling, which is the method of ontology. This is not to be confused with transcendental ration-
alism. This rationalism results from a ‘fixation’ of feeling for the tertiary logical method of reason, which is mistaken as the ontological method. Or else, there is no harm in refining the criteria that are implicit and explicit in the thought and speech of the men who think and talk on the tertiary logical level.

Thus, we may have the following grades in the non-fixational system of realization, in which the method of feeling systematically includes all the graded methods of reason:

Feeling: The Ontological Method of Realization

- Prelogical Feeling
  - Reflex Act
  - Instincts

- Logical Feeling
  - Objective Reason:
    - Pre-axiological Feeling
  - Subjective Reason:
    - Axiological Feeling

- Pure Objective
- Relational Objective
- Epistemological
- Praxiological


Fixational methods of reason fail to realize values. In the history of philosophy, the two fixational methods of empirical and scientific reasoning have been tried by the empiricist school, and the fixational method of transcendental rationalism has been tried by the rationalist school. The empiricists have been employing on the philosophical level the pre-axiological method of objective reason (perceptual and scientific) as if it were the ontological method. The rationalists have been using the method of axiology or subjective reason as if it were the ontological method. (See the genealogical tree above.)

The main contention of the empiricists has been that without a clear distinction between facts and values, between a factual proposition and a valuational judgement, we cannot hope to get a glimpse of truth. Factual propositions reveal the objective truth; judgements of value lead us away from that to a world of subjective make-believe and relativism. Factual propositions are therefore superior to valuational verbalism. Value jargons say nothing more about the world than the factual propositions do. The empiricist therefore draws his conclusions from a wide survey of facts; even when he goes beyond the observational field he builds up theories which are suggested by his observational analysis.7 His method

7 For example, we may take Locke’s refutation of the doctrine of innate ideas.
is based on experience and reasoning of a scientific character, that is, a reasoning which is based on and also checked by facts.

The main contention of the rationalists has been that without a clear distinction between facts and values, between a judgement of fact and a judgement of value, we cannot hope to get a glimpse of the real. Factual propositions reveal only a superficial aspect of existence. The internal aspect can be revealed only through judgements of value, since these judgements put the facts in systematic relation to the subject. Value-judgements are, therefore, superior to, or a kind of superior, factual propositions. They include what factual propositions reveal, and besides, expose the inward significance of the facts in relation to us. The rationalist therefore draws his conclusions from a wide survey of values. Even when he surveys the observation field, he builds up theories which are suggested by valutational analysis. His method is based on experience and on reasoning of a valuational character, that is, reasoning which is based on and checked by considerations of values.

The empiricist critique of rationalism may be briefly stated as follows: The theories of the rationalists are not grounded in and suggested by facts. The ideal method of the rationalist philosophers would be to deduce the truth about the nature of reality by the operation of non-empirical pure reason. This ideal, though cherished by all the rationalist philosophers, could not be fully realized by them. Spinoza and Hegel are the most nearly perfect examples of a rationalist philosophy. In their philosophical system, consideration and examination of facts are wilfully excluded and all their conclusions are the work of a priori reason. Even when the rationalist philosophers combine their ratiocination with some sort of empirical observation, they do it only to reinforce their purely rational constructions by making the facts fit into their theories rather than the theories fit into the facts. Hegel, for example, is notorious for coercing facts into his pet theories (born of speculative reason). And Spinoza has built up a system of tautologies deduced from a set of axioms and symbolic definitions.

The rationalist critique of empiricism may be briefly stated as follows: the theories of empiricists are not grounded in and suggested by values. The ideal method of empiricist philosophers would be to deduce truth about the world and life by the operation of empirical reasoning. This ideal though cherished by all the empiricist

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8 For example, we may take Kant’s moral proof of the existence of God.
philosophers could not be fully realized by them. In their philosophical analyses consideration and examination of values are wilfully excluded and all their conclusions are the work of factual reasoning. Even when the empiricist philosophers combine their empirical observation with some sort of valuational ratiocination they do it only to reinforce their purely factual account by making the values fit into their theories rather than the theories fit into the value system.

From the standpoint of non-fixational realization, both the methods of philosophy are incompetent to realize values. The cause is not far to seek. They have both employed the fixational methods of reason or logical analysis. Hence the failure. Reason does not realize: it does not unite subject with object into the realization of values. Empiricists and rationalists have employed the methods of objective and subjective reason and not the method of the union of subject and object.

Logical analysis has no more than a methodological significance. It exposes a hierarchical gradation of means and ends. Some experiences are characterized by a vague consciousness of the end: whatever they present seems to have encysted value. But other experiences we have with the deepening of our logical insight. These have a clearer view of the end. So they absorb the partial experience by putting them in their proper place. They introduce better system and order in the various parts. Thus we get a process of shifting means and end. Each end becomes a means to the successive end, even as each subject becomes an object to the successive subject. The process reaches its logical end in the most systematic experience.

Logical analysis thus meets with a polarity in our experience. One pole consists in utterly partial and fragmentary experiences: these are means awaiting their subordination to some end. The other pole consists in an ideal or whole experience: this constitutes the supreme end to which all else is but a means. The first may be said to be the objective pole; the second, the subjective pole. Logical analysis primarily lays bare, between the two poles, the value of one experience in relation to another, as a part to a whole, a means to an end, an object to a subject. But it does not unite the two.

The possibility of logical analysis however depends on such actual part-whole or subject-object union. That one experience actually
gets itself subordinated to another as its part is the *sine qua non* of all logical analysis. Logical analysis does not realize the synthesis of the subject with the object. It is feeling which actualizes such a synthesis.

History of philosophy, however, shows a whole array of thinkers who have been obsessed by a fixation that such a synthesis is realized by the methods of logical analysis itself. They have belonged to both the schools—empiricism and rationalism. And both empiricists and rationalists have tried the methods of theoretical reason and practical reason: on the level of philosophy these are the epistemological method and the praxiological method.

The epistemological method has been tried by both in giving the criterion of reality. 'The particular is real' gives the empiricist's perspective. With this criterion of reality the empiricists start from the parts and believe that it is possible to construct, and hence, realize the whole. 'The whole is real' gives the rationalist's perspective. With this criterion of reality the rationalists maintain that the logical whole lends meaning and reality to all the parts.

From the empiricist's point of view, the parts exist independently. The whole is a composite structure and function of parts. As such it depends on and derives its reality from the parts. As the resultant aggregation of parts, it is an arbitrary and accidental derivative. The parts being real, the whole is accidental: it loses its substantial character and has no claim to ultimate reality.

The rationalists, on the other hand, hold that the subject, usually the highest or most inward self, alone is real. Hence, all those experiences that fall short of it are fragmentary. These do not represent the whole truth; hence they possess less reality than the ultimate subject. The parts are relegated to a secondary existence, condemned either as appearances or sheer illusory superimpositions.

The epistemological method as a species of logical method failed to solve the problem of the relation between the part and the whole, to show how to realize the unity of the subject and object, how the subject assimilates the object. We can trace the root cause of the tussle between empiricism and rationalism and their failure to their common belief that it is through logical methods that the subject-object synthesis can be realized.

Similarly, those who followed the praxiological method fared no better than the epistemologists. They too failed in showing how to realize the unity of the subject and object, how the subject
gets assimilated into the object. Here again both empiricists and rationalists tried the method.

According to the empiricists, the ‘ought’ of practical realization must be traceable to the factual constitution of some existing consciousness: this consciousness must decide right from wrong by its feeling and be the universal law-giver. In effect, it would allow lower level control of higher level life and lead to relativism.

According to the rationalists, the lower selves or lower level life may be controlled only from the highest level. There can be and must be an absolute norm for practice. The norm controlled by the supreme regulative principle of reason has an absolute value and as such it is apotheosized as the infinite, while the various stages in the realization of this norm are looked upon as finite. In the theistic version, this implies that unless the universal law-giver be manifestly divine, the ‘ought’ laid down will never dissolve the conflicts in the realm of practice.

Here again, we can trace the root cause of the tussle between the two schools and of their failure to their common belief that it is through the logical method that the synthesis of subject and object can be realized. This conclusion together with the conclusion we arrived at in regard to the epistemological method gives us a clue to the true principle of realization. The logical principle is not such a principle.

FEELING AS THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLE. Aristotle, Kant and the neo-romanticists (especially William James, Henri Bergson and Soren Kierkegaard) show the right direction in discovering what it is that determines the realization of values.

In his conception of the efficient cause, Aristotle seems to suggest that feeling is the realizer, the common sustaining and creative force of all individual experience. He distinguishes four causes—material, formal, final and efficient. The material cause is the same as the particular, objective or perceptual. (We have identified it with the hedonic element in both peripherally excited sense-feelings and centrally excited emotions: vide Ch. r.) The formal cause (identified by us as reason) stands for the universal essence or conceptual or subjective aspect of our experience. The correlative of material cause, it gives a determinate meaning to indeterminate matter, admits of a hierarchical gradation, and conceived in a dynamic teleological process, becomes in the final phase identical with the final cause as the highest form (or, to be
exact, each final cause becomes a formal cause to the successive final cause). It is capable of receiving essence, that is, the object of thought, but incapable of possessing it. We have seen that experience is a systematic unity of the two; and efficient cause unites them into a realized experience. This efficient cause is the creative principle; it possesses the object. (We have identified it with efficient feeling.) It realizes experience by uniting matter with form and leads it towards the highest form. The individuality of such an experience cannot be comprehended either by perception or by conception: it can be comprehended only by intuitive thinking.⁹ (This must be a function of feeling; we may call it feeling-thinking.) Elsewhere Aristotle identifies the efficient cause as God or the metaphysical principle of creation.

Kant points out that experience is the outcome of the joint activity of perception and conception, and that such a conjoining force belongs to neither of them. It belongs to the faculty of transcendental imagination or schematism. This imagination raises the particular perception to the level of universal conception and also brings down the universal conception to the level of particular perception. This imagination may be ignored by epistemology but its ontological significance is unmistakable. It suggests the dynamic force which creates concrete experience.¹⁰ Kant's attempt might have failed because of his doctrine of absolutely transcendent thing-in-itself based on an alternation between metaphysical agnosticism and metaphysical assertability. Yet it is manifest that had he fully realized the implications of his doctrine of transcendental imagination he might have solved the problem of realizing the unity of the logical and the metaphysical.

William James has thrown a powerful light on the problem of realization. We may refer to his Varieties of Religious Experience, for example. There he says that logical methods do not create experience: the function of creating experience belongs to a different process. The process which informs our experience with existence has an alogical character.¹¹ Religious conversion is a case in point. It involves a dramatic metastasis of our experience: a transition takes place from one level to another higher one in which the lower level experience finds room as a part. The inward feeling of our

⁹ Aristotle, Metaphysica, Book Z., 1036.
¹⁰ Kant in his third Critique began to feel the force of this creative principle.
self constitutes and sustains the process of such conversions. James has stressed the creative character of feeling, especially of violent emotions. They explode and bring about spiritual mutations. Feeling not only creates, but also conserves: it sustains the new higher level of experience against all kinds of hazards. It is thus both a creative and conservative force. A feeling accompanying the attitude of self-surrender to God, for example, sustains our spirit even in extremely trying conditions or situations.

On Bergson’s view, the metaphysical principle, which he calls *élan vital* and which operates in us as intuition, spontaneously brings about the inward synthesis of the various elements of the mystic’s personality: the religious experience at its highest is determined by no other than this principle. Such an experience characterizes the dynamic religion, and sustains its dynamic character against the ballasts of traditional religions.

In Kierkegaard’s philosophy, the principle of realization is called ‘indirect communication’. Indirect communication simply means that the object to be known has to be brought in direct relation to one’s self, with the existential feeling of one’s own personality. It is this relation of the objective to one’s self which invests it with reality.

We may therefore safely conclude that feeling (variously called efficient cause, intuitive thinking, transcendental imagination, schematism, *élan vital*, intuition, indirect communication, ...) alone has the power to actualize an experience in which all polarities (whether valuational or categorial) get fused into a hedonic feeling of satisfaction.

Our conceptual imagination can hold the object apart from the subject—not only by analyzing an actual experience but, which is more relevant here, without having an actual experience, as only a possible experience in which the two may be united. In both cases, each by itself, the subject or the object, holds the bare potentiality or possibility of an experience. In the first case, it is an empirical possibility; in the second, a logical possibility, for which the question of realizability and not of simple verifiability arises. For a *real* experience, we must realize or create an experience: the polarities (whether valuational or categorial) must fuse into a unity by way of feeling.

Feeling is the metaphysical principle which invests our experience

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with existence; it may therefore be said to be alogical in character. This however does not imply that feeling bears a relation of absolute opposition to the logical character of an experience. The reason is simple. The very act of feeling through which feeling subordinates a part to a logical whole creates a valutational gradation in the experiences, which has thus made logical analysis operative within itself. Theory and practice cannot do without a distinction between the subject and object: unless they presuppose the distinction, they cannot get going about their task. Without feeling, subject and object would remain just logically possible, and values in theory and practice, otiose and ineffective.

CULTURAL SYSTEMS MAY BE FIXATIONAL OR NON-FIXATIONAL. Values are many: so they must be put in right order and graded. That which is the highest among them is the religious value. Religion being the highest constituent of culture regulates the other constituents of culture and unifies them into a cultural system. This is the function of the highest value.

But then, in any developing human individual, whatever he deems as the highest value does this regulative function. And for any given system (whether logical like empiricism, humanism, etc. or historical like Christianity, Communism, etc.) the highest value is that ideal experience for which a fixation of feeling is recommended and to which all other values are subordinated. We have noted that the efficient feeling often gets fixated on a particular level of experience, higher or lower, and turns the realization of values into a static and repetitive affair. A stronger feeling for ever higher experience alone can prevent or break such fixation and thus sustain a progressive realization of values in theory and practice. We may thus have three broad kinds of cultural systems—fixational, partly fixational (that is partly non-fixational too), and non-fixational.

The Communist Culture, for example, is fixational in character: it has the efficient feeling fixated on the level of social theory and practice (vide Ch. IX).

Liberal Hinduism and Buddhism, Christianity and Islam, Judaism and other fossilized relics of older cultures, even anthropological cultures (animism and traditionalism)—are all only partly fixational. Each of these cultural systems is centred in one religion or another. The religion however takes a certain level of experience as the highest. Each has, in other words, a fixed idea of the highest individual,
to which the feeling of the members of the society is directed. Hinduism, for example, aims at the \textit{hilāmaya purusha} (the harmonious man); Christianity, at the messianic man; Islam, at the messianic half-heroic man; the primitive societies, at the magician and the priest. These systems though turned fixational this way have liberalized under the impact of \textit{world} liberal culture (miscalled western liberal by westerners) to which the contributions of each is not little. They have become partly non-fixational: for the high level cultures, in their functioning on the lower levels, natural and social; for the low level cultures, in the spheres of higher values, to which they are now rising gradually.

Communism as the latest historical system has yet to undergo the process: it is in its prime youth and in the first flush of victorious expansion; it has been riding roughshod over the many higher (moral and religious, and even some natural and social) values of life.

As an instance of \textit{non-fixational} culture, we can name only one system—the world liberal system, still in the making, especially in the universities of the \textit{free} world. It is total yet non-fixational, that is, open and dynamic. It covers the total sphere of experience graded as follows: (1) Pre-logical—(a) reflex action (animism and magic), and (b) instincts (tradition and custom); (2) Logical—(a) primary (perception and crude arts); (b) secondary (science and useful arts); and (c) tertiary (philosophy natural-social-spiritual and fine arts extolling nature-man-God). It is open, since, for a developing individual in this system, no fixation of feeling on any particular level (which is taken as the highest) is recommended; yet \textit{the highest} is always sought. It is dynamic, since the liberal test of progress is: an increasing number of individuals in tertiary vocations and a decreasing number of working hours in the primary and secondary vocations.

The historical cultural systems like communism are not the only cases of fixational cultures; there can also be cases of fixational cultures which are logical but trying to be historical as against the existing historical ones. The reason is obvious. There may occur a fixation of feeling for culture on any of the levels mentioned above. Thus arise fixational systems like animism, traditionalism, empiricism, scientism, materialism (egoistic, mechanical, mathematical), humanism (egoistic, pragmatic, radical), and idealism (egoistic or ascetic, ethical or messianic, absolute). Thus, for some time past an ideological movement, which is a blend of empiricism
and humanism (fixation on the levels from primary logical to tertiary social), has been trying to dislodge the older historical systems, which are partly fixational in character but on a higher level than empiricist-humanism.

This empiricist-humanist movement has not yet become historical; for, a logical cultural system becomes historical when it is adopted by or imposed on a nation-state and that nation-state becomes the organized vehicle of that system. This movement seems liberal in its profession and historical practice. It is not as destructive as communism in the sphere of the making of history but equally so, if not more, in the sphere of theory. It is out to destroy the older systematic philosophies. It thus indirectly helps the communists by creating a cultural vacuum in the older societies. At any rate this has been the total effect of this movement in the non-western older societies.

There is even a widespread presumption that any ill-digested 'ism' is superior to the older cultures. This is however not the case, in spite of the absolutists like marxians and relativists like wittgensteinians in the body of older cultures. Non-fixational culture does not imply any final relativism. It implies that all systems—whether old historical or new logical, must be tested and graded; they are to be given equal critical consideration; they are not to be recommended as of equal value. All this makes a universal standard necessary: this must be a kind of non-fixational, total yet open and dynamic, cultural system, which we have summarily stated above and elaborated in this treatise.

Experience may occur on all levels in the life of the highest individual in the body of a developed cultural system: the evil does not lie in that. Evil lies in the fixation of feeling for experience on a lower level to such an extent as to put the highest value on that experience. Thus, reflex act, instinct, perception, science, natural philosophy, social philosophy, and spiritual (moral and religious) philosophy are all right in their proper places in the total yet open and dynamic system of culture: what is wrong is to get stuck on any one of the lower and to call it the highest, or even to get stuck on the highest and to exclude the lower ones altogether.

The aim of the non-fixational liberal culture of the Universities (the world culture in the making) is to individualize the particular man in the process of acculturation—the man acquiring the traits of one or more particular cultures, historical or logical. Individu-
alization includes such acculturation but supersedes it by eschewing a fixation of feeling for such cultures by way of humanization. For, this kind of fixation may not only atrophy the development of the individual, it may grow into a disposition for genocide—total or partial destruction of other cultures. The communists, for example, aim at the total destruction of spiritual cultures.

The problem of modern education is to devise positive means of individualization—an educational process by which the particular man may acquire (i) without fixation, the partial universality of many natural and historical gregations to which he belongs, which supersedes his biological particularity; and then, (ii) the universality of the non-fixational total cultural system, which supersedes the partial universalities; and then, (iii) the partial particularity of his creative self, which supersedes his universality; and thus, the uniqueness of his identity.

The problem of modern history is to devise effective means to check all tendencies to acculturation by way of genocide on the part of any cultural system or nation-state or empire.

In some periods of their history, Christians and Muslims practised genocide to a lesser or greater extent. Now they have adopted liberal methods of acculturation. As a result, much of the Afro-Asian people's borrowing of cultural characteristics from the liberal Christian imperialist peoples seems voluntary. And they still have to acquire from them a good deal of culture on the logical secondary level (that is, science and useful arts like engineering, medicine and psychiatry) and also on the logical tertiary level, if not of moral and religious philosophy and fine arts extolling God, of natural and social philosophy (that is, for example, the methods of natural and social sciences, the arts of democratic administration and of developing a free economy involving private enterprise, natural monopolies and voluntary co-operatives).

To-day it is only communism, a total-cultural system fixated on the level of social theory and practice, that is out to destroy all older cultures, all of which have adopted liberalism, at least in education. Afro-Asian cultural systems (Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Animism, etc.) cannot be carried to that extreme point of hostility to western 'imperialism' (western Christendom) as to fall a victim to communist imperialism and genocide.

To sum up, the end is the realization of the highest value in theory—the taking up of the position of the highest subject and
putting up the right attitudes to all lower level experiences, lives or individuals from there. Thus, religion is the end.

Philosophy of education draws upon the philosophy of religion and takes up the same end and thus seeks ways and means to gear all individual development to that end. Philosophy of history has to avert major disasters to this grand adventure of the human spirit.
Religion lends individuality to culture. A detailed analysis of religion is necessary for the clarification of the non-fixational culture. I have therefore given several chapters to it. In what follows I have tried to salvage what the traditional systematic philosophy had to say about religion.

There have been two main trends to validate religion—by the transcendental rationalist method, and by the transcendental mystical (rationalist-romanticist) method. From the first we get an unmistakable method of gradation which makes up the anatomy of a non-fixational system. From the second we get an experimental method. One shows the subjective pole; the other tells how to reach there.

Yet the ultimate result of sifting both may not be a logical conclusion which is knowledge in the Kantian sense, that is, both objectively and subjectively certain. It may only be a sort of 'juridical' decision for or against the proposition 'God exists' or an agnostic suspension of judgement. 'It is a matter of the cumulative effect of severally inconclusive premises'—as John Wisdom puts it.¹ I prefer to make the ultimate theory a kind of systematic unity of dogma and scepticism: some statements (like 'an individual is an individuation of the absolute') may be affirmed dogmatically; some others (e.g. those on miracles, providence, holy books, immortality, etc.) may be doubted; in regard to others (e.g. 'God exists') we may remain noncommittal.

I am trying to outline a non-fixational system: it is open to criticism and revision. An empiricist would give it the bad name of 'theology' or 'ideology' and summarily dissolve it. These names

in the bad sense can however apply only to fixational systems: these we shall deal with in a later chapter.

The core of the non-fixational system is the gradation of values leading to the highest value. The highest value can be synonymously called the religious value. As such it includes and supersedes the lower ones. As it is realized it becomes the highest experience. This is a theoretical realization: hence religious experience yields the highest ‘knowledge’. After the realization in theory, religion has a practical programme: it functions as the regulator of the life on the lower levels in order to build up a spiritual system. Religion thus lends individuality to culture.

RELIGION AS THE REALIZATION OF THE HIGHEST VALUE IN THEORY. ‘Religion’ is one word for ‘realization of the highest value in theory’. This is a meaning statement. This meaning is presupposed, either implicitly or explicitly, in the thought and speech of the commonsense man as well as by the scientists and philosophical writers who deal with religion.

With this meaning statement, whatever gets the highest status in the total sphere of experience may be called religion. As such it is the focus of all the highest principles in the different divisions of philosophy. (i) Ontologically, that is, from the background of both prelogical and logical levels, it is the highest individuation of the absolute. From the logical level, (ii) psychologically, it is experienced as the highest on whatever level it may occur; (iii) axiologically, it is the highest value (possible experience)—(a) epistemologically, it is the highest knowledge (realization in theory); (b) praxiologically, it is the highest systematic control of our lower selves. (iv) Even in cases of fixational systems (like communism), a lower level principle seems the highest in all the aspects mentioned above. And in cases of lower level but non-fixational systems (like the natural religion of the Vedas or Pythagoras or the social religion of Plato), the highest is manifested in the lower level of nature or society.

Philosophy of religion determines the possibility of the supreme individual experience. In and through this the subject and the object unite in a perfect harmony. Philosophy of religion is therefore the last stage of theoretical development, which we can logically grade as follows: Perception (the object taken in and by itself), scientific knowledge (the objects taken in relation to one another), philosophy (the objects taken in relation to the subject)—natural philosophy culminating in mathematical philosophy relates the
objects to the attitudes of the material self; social philosophy culminating in political philosophy relates them to the attitudes of the social self; moral philosophy culminating in philosophy of religion relates them to the attitudes of the spiritual self. Philosophy of religion as the end, however, comprehends all others as means and supersedes them. As such it represents the highest possible systematic experience.

In perception parts appear as discrete wholes. In perception things which are parts of experience appear as discrete, independent existents. A thing does appear as a unity of some qualities and properties but also as an existent discrete from other things. Only this much unity is achieved by perceptual intuition. And perceptual reason can only subsume certain elementary facts under a class concept, like the proposition, ‘this is brown’, or ‘this is a book’.

On this level, in some cases we believe that a thing is what it appears to be (e.g. this is a blue book); in other cases we believe that things are not what they appear to be (e.g. the blades of a fan moving fast make a transparent field of vision). Commonsense tries to explain the paradoxes variously—by appealing to many senses, by repeated experiments, especially by resorting to instruments, of observation and experiment. As a result we discover analogical and causal connections between the seemingly discrete objects. Commonsense turns into intellect and our experience attains the level of scientific system.

Sciences are functional but hypothetical interrelation of parts. Science achieves a qualitative difference from perception: it explains facts by bringing them in causal or functional relation to one another.

All scientific explanations have a common form. The fact to be explained must be syllogistically deducible from the premises. Secondly, the major premise must state a general law constructed by the method of scientific reason. ‘A law is a causal, universal, generic and exact proposition’—as John Wisdom puts it in a nutshell. By the law’s being generic we mean that it represents

2 Archie Bahm, Philosophy—An Introduction.
3 John Wisdom, Problems of Matter and Mind. On the limitations of science: (i) ‘It murders to dissect’—as Bosanquet puts it. (ii) The scientist is not the subject in the philosophical sense; and the ‘subject’ in the scientific proposition is no subject proper in the logical sense. Taylor’s Elements, p. 32.
a class of facts (which constitute the effects). By its being universal we mean that it has no reference to any particular place and time, to any particular case of the class; we mean that it holds good at all places and all times for all cases of the class. By causal we mean that it states the causal connections between one class of facts which make up the effects and another class of facts which make up the causes. (A scientific cause is not an historical cause, logical reason or philosophical ground.) And by exact we mean that it states the relation in the form of a mathematical variation or equation, as a law of functional dependence. Thirdly, the minor premise must state the causal conditions—other prior or concurrent facts which bear a causal or functional relation to the fact to be explained (which is the effect and is represented by the conclusion of the syllogism). The minor premise, however, may not state all the relevant causal facts but only the significant ones.

In this way, sciences turn the medley of percepts into a few pockets of orderly experience. But then, the several sciences themselves remain disparate; each has a basic presupposition of its own: thus, physics presupposes matter; biology, life; psychology, mind. Scientific intellect fails to connect them by the usual method. It naturally turns to reflective thinking: this begins with a reflection on the scientific method. As a result the self-conscious scientist emerges as a philosopher and our experience reaches the level of philosophy.

**PHILOSOPHY BRINGS THE PARTS INTERRELATED IN SYSTEMATIC RELATION TO THE WHOLE.** As we reach the level of philosophical experience, the object is related to the attitudes of the subject. The parts thus get transfigured from mere facts of observation and understanding to objects of evaluation and realization. Experience attains individuality in the proper sense. The lower level experiences reveal their full meaning. A deliberate attempt can now be made to give a valuational account and to realize the value of all things—taken both severally and as a whole. Experience on this level must therefore be assigned a higher status than perception and science.

But paradoxes persist even on this level. The world, for example, may be believed to be made up of matter, life or mind solely. The three beliefs though rational contradict one another; and worse, they may all be wrong: the world as a whole may not be made up of material, vital or mental stuff alone, or of any stuff at all. The reason is not far to seek. The attitudes themselves vary from one
logical mind to another; and logical minds vary as the inwardsness of reason and intensity of feeling vary.

Philosophy therefore seeks to discover the ultimate principle—the principle which can perfectly organize the attitudes of the logical mind. Such a principle dissolves all contradictions in our experience. It determines the possibility of our ever reaching the status of the ultimate subject, the possibility of the most systematic experience. Such an experience may be said to be the individual: every other experience has a lesser individuality. It is only within this most systematic experience that the true value of every fact or experience can be made out or realized. In history, the 'philosophic goodness' of Socrates is the first attempt at conceiving such a principle. It seeks to present the permanent and perfect idea of goodness. So does Plato's idea of good or Kant's ideal of reason. We may call it the value or the highest value.

The problem however still persists. The supreme principle of reason turns out to be a formal and static principle-synthetic and regulative in character. It lays down the universal and necessary condition of only the possibility of the most systematic experience. This condition is not sufficient: it does not constitute the experience; it does not bring the experience into existence; it does not realize itself.

That our experiences are severally static and totally a flux is a patent intuition. The world of experience thus presents a kaleidoscopic continuity and unity. It is therefore neither self-subsistent nor dynamic, that is, containing the source of flux. Hence the conception of the absolute, from the standpoint of existence, as a self-subsistent and dynamic principle—the source of all individuality. Ultimately, therefore, philosophy seeks to connect the highest possible systematic experience with the absolute, the creative principle, which is abstract per se, which is incapable of being given to us through knowledge but can be identified with feeling.

Many thinkers have sought to identify the formal principle as the absolute. But the metaphysical principle cannot be subordinated to the logical principle. Neither can a simple relation of identity validly connect them. Yet the two must be related and this cannot be done by the logical principle of systematic experience itself. It must be the creative principle of feeling which can realize the supreme principle of reason. Philosophy at the highest stage; that is, philosophy of religion, makes such a connection: it is the meeting-ground of the highest value and the absolute.
Gradations of Philosophical Experience. While looking into the presuppositions of the major sciences, philosophy discovers a hierarchical gradation in these presuppositions according as one is nearer the subjective pole than the other. Thus, corresponding to the category of matter, we have philosophy of nature culminating in philosophy of mathematics; corresponding to life, philosophy of society culminating in political philosophy; corresponding to mind, philosophy of morals culminating in philosophy of religion.

The gradation cannot be otherwise. The reason is simple. Between two principles, the one that includes and supersedes the other is higher than the other. A living organism includes all that matter means and means something more. Similarly, mind is higher in relation to life. In schools, grades are higher or lower according as syllabuses are inclusive or included.

In each pair made above, the two are partly independent and partly interdependent: Each has its sphere of autonomy but the two are also interdependent: in so far as they depend on each other, the former includes the latter in extension; the latter includes the former in intension. The latter is the speculative nucleus of the former and being more organized regulates the former; and the former as the body of the latter constitutes the latter.

Natural Philosophy relates the totality of facts to the attitudes of the material self subordinated to the spiritual self. In the first stage philosophy seeks to justify the methodology and categories presupposed by the natural sciences and then to construct a philosophy of nature out of them. The universe as related to or realized by the natural self appears as nature. The modes of individuality that emerge are, of course, material—atomistic, mechanistic, or mathematical. Natural philosophy shows the possibility of a greater systematic experience than the sciences do severally. It does this in two distinct ways—one critical, the other speculative.

The critical part may be called the philosophy of natural sciences. It reflects on the whole process of scientific thinking. It clarifies the methodological presuppositions of natural sciences, viz. the postulates of uniformity and causality. It looks into the source of our belief in these, in their being universal and necessary, and then tries to connect the two postulates of science under a single concept of natural law.

The speculative part of it may be called the philosophy of nature.
This deals with the actual course of natural events. It singles out matter, the category presupposed by the physical sciences and then constructs an account of the universe in the material aspect.

In its critical assignment, however, natural philosophy fails, or rather, is not competent, to explain the source of our belief in the natural law. There is only one way to explain the unity of nature and that is to admit that the true ground of this belief is the demand of the spiritual self over nature and natural self; and this demand can be fully met in religious philosophy.

The speculative constructive assignment develops through three logical moments according as the principle of reason is found in the part (here the material particle) taken in and by itself, in the parts interrelated as a material mechanism, and in the whole of the physical universe as a metrical or mathematical structure. Mathematical philosophy is thus the most organized form of philosophy at the first stage. In the last moment of this stage, the universal material self expresses itself as our mathematical reason. The limitation which is manifest here in singling out matter and a possible materialistic fixation can be overcome only by admitting the regulation of the material by the social and spiritual selves. A genuine natural philosophy is a part of the philosophy of religion: without becoming materialistic it deals with the material aspect of the universe.

Social philosophy relates the totality of facts to the attitudes of the social self subordinated to the spiritual self. In the second stage philosophy seeks to justify the methodology and categories presupposed by the social sciences and then to construct a social philosophy out of them. The universe as related to or realized by the social self appears as society: it becomes more homely (with freedom, security and sovereignty for man) than the material universe. The modes of individuality that emerge are human—egoistic, pragmatic, or radical. Social philosophy thus represents the possibility of a greater systematic experience than natural philosophy. Here too, we discern the critical and the speculative parts.

The critical part may be called the philosophy of social sciences. It reflects on the process of social scientific thinking: it clarifies the methodological presuppositions of social sciences, and then seeks to justify them. It looks into the nature of social laws (which are closed-generic universal correlational or causal propositions).
The speculative part of it may be called the philosophy of society. This deals with the actual course of social events. It singles out life, the category presupposed by the biological sciences, and then, constructs an account of the universe in the vital aspect. It considers the ideal conditions which may bring about the voluntary co-operation of all members of society towards universal happiness or well-being, towards the best satisfaction of the needs of our biological life. It thus aims at a deeper understanding of social life than sociology or social sciences. It deals with social ideals.

In its critical assignment, social philosophy fails or rather is not competent to reconcile natural causation and determinism with human self-determination and teleology. It cannot explain the source of free will of man (as a maker of society and history) or justify human unity as the goal of history. This is the task of spiritual philosophy. There is only one way to explain the freedom of man and unity of mankind and that is to admit that the true ground of the belief in these is the demand of the spiritual self over society and social self; and this demand can be fully met in the philosophy of religion.

Here again, the speculative assignment passes through three moments of development according as the principle of reason is found in the particular man taken in and by himself, in a group of particular men, and in the universal man or humanity. Political philosophy, which seeks to unite mankind into a world federation, is thus the most organized form of philosophy at the second stage. At the last moment of this stage the universal social self manifests as our political reason. The limitation which is obvious here in singling out the principle of life and a possible humanist fixation can be overcome only by admitting the regulation of the social self by the religious self. A genuine social philosophy is a part of the philosophy of religion: without becoming humanistic it deals with the human aspect of the universe.

Moral philosophy relates the totality of facts to the attitudes of the spiritual self. In the third and final stage, philosophy seeks to justify the methodology and categories presupposed by the moral sciences and then to construct a philosophy of spirit (of morals and religion) out of them. The universe as related to or realized by the spiritual self appears as spirit. Under its treatment the universe becomes more self-like than the natural and social universe. The modes of individuality that emerge are
ideal in character—ascetic, ethical or systematic. Moral philosophy thus represents the possibility of a greater systematic experience than social philosophy.

The critical part may be called the philosophy of moral sciences. It reflects on the process of normative scientific thinking; it clarifies and then seeks to justify them. It looks into the nature of moral law in which natural determinism and human freedom get reconciled with the categorical imperative ('one can, may or may not, but ought to, because everybody ought to'). The ultimate postulate of identity between the real and the rational is set up as the final regulative principle. In a universe at its heart irrational or valueless, no significant value-pursuits would be possible: even as in a universe chaotic at its core no scientific activity would be possible.4

The speculative part is concerned with the actual course of spiritual life. It singles out mind, the category presupposed by the psychological sciences, and then constructs an account of the universe in its ideal aspect. It considers the ideal conditions which may bring about the refinement of theory and practice towards the realization of the ultimate ideal and destiny of human nature. On its constructive side, moral philosophy is thus concerned with the validity of spiritual ideals, with the problems of spiritual organization and development. The problem of the realization of the highest value, for example, is one which involves both psychology and moral philosophy, since in dealing with it we require to know not only what realization is in point of fact but also how far it is in accord with our ultimate standard or criterion of value. (These lead us to further studies in the later section.)

In its critical assignment, however, moral philosophy fails to explain the ground of the moral law, that is, the identity between the real and the rational. The identity cannot be realized by the regulative principle of logical contradiction: only the metaphysical principle of feeling can realize it.

Here again, the speculative assignment passes through three logical moments according as the part (here the spiritual self) is taken in and by itself, in relation to other spiritual selves and the lower selves of its own, and in systematic relation to the whole, that is, the universal spiritual system. Religious philosophy which seeks to realize the universal spiritual system is thus the most organized form of philosophy in the final stage. It determines the

possibility of the highest individual experience in and through which the subject and the object get united in a harmonious wedlock. Such an experience constitutes the supreme value of our entire experience.

The possible limitations of this stage lie in singling out the principle of mind and a possible idealistic fixation. These can be overcome only by admitting the subordination of the spiritual self to the absolute which is abstract per se but dynamic, that is, individuating itself in lesser individuals. The idealist may forget that even the religious experience falls short of the absolute experience, that it is a partial manifestation of the metaphysical whole, that God is an individuation of the absolute.

RELIGIOUS VALUE AS THE HIGHEST VALUE. Religious value as the highest value supersedes the lower values. It reconciles their paradoxes, unites the distinctions they make, puts them in a hierarchical order, but never does away with them. It contains and preserves them as both ends and means. It coexists with them and adds meaning to them. As the highest it represents the possibility of an experience in which the subject reaches the greatest degree of depth or height, feeling reaches the highest degree of intensity and satisfactoriness, and the intimacy of union between the higher and the lower reaches the point of systematic unity, that is, independence in interdependence. The religious experience thus supersedes yet includes the distinction of the object from the subject, of the lower selves from the higher, contents from existence, and the distinctions between other categorial and valuational polarities.

All this does not imply that the religious value is completely independent. As the highest value it is a systematic unity. Therefore, the lower values are also partly independent. They are as real as the highest value, both being individuations of the same metaphysical principle. They have their individualities though lesser than that of the religious value. The highest does not come to the lower ab extra. They contain the highest, though only potentially, and they seek to realize the highest by developing into the higher and higher.

The interdependence between the lower values and the highest is also patent. The religious value depends on the lower in so far as it is an aggregate and dependent unity of the lower values, which in their turn as means and constituents depend on the religious value. The highest value can be theoretically realized only by our assimi-
lating the lower ones. This is amply proved by the negative charac-
ter of most of the disciplinary practices to suppress the lower
values in the process of mystical realization. Similarly, the highest
value can be practically realized only by getting assimilated into
the lower values. This is evident again by the splitting up of the
religious value into lower level ideals of purity, honesty and right-
eousness, in the practical programme.

Another implication of interdependence may be noted. It is only
in systematic unity that experience of the lower value becomes a
genuine, though imperfect, experience, that the experience of the
highest value on the lower levels becomes a genuine, though again
imperfect, experience of the whole. The values of the lower levels
have their independence but this is only partial; these are valid
not by themselves but in systematic unity with the religious value.
If they claim to be valid in complete independence, they turn into
evils. Thus, animism and magic, religious tradition and custom,
natural religion of the Vedic or Pythagorean kind, or the social re-
ligion of Plato are not real evils because they are parts of the sys-
tematic unity. Materialism, humanism and asceticism, for examples,
become evils because of their claiming total independence.

RELIGION AS AN EXPERIENCE. The foregoing study has been an
exposition of the most exalted status of religion in the valuational
scale of our experience. It has made manifest religious value’s
claim to the function of that supreme principle in and through
which the totality of experience is organized into the highest
system—as against the claims of other values which operate in our
experience but lack in the profundity and far-reaching character
of the religious principle.

Yet religion thereby did not assume the character of more than
a regulative principle. The assignment of logical validity to the
religious principle lends it merely a regulative significance. Any
principle taken in and by itself lays down the universal and neces-
sary condition of, only the possibility of, an experience. This condi-
tion is not sufficient: it does not constitute the experience unless it
is actualized in an individual.

Religious experience is characterized specifically (as religious)
by its highest status in the hierarchy of experience as well as generi-
cally (as experience) by its concreteness. In so far as it claims to
be the highest experience, it must necessarily show in itself a pre-
dominance of the attitudes of the logical mind. And in so far as it
claims to be an experience, the logical mind must in actual psychological development reach the subjective pole.

The logical mind or personality as the focus of the mind as such. That the logical mind is not the same as the mind of psychology is a commonplace. The expressions used by William James, viz. the logical I and the empirical me, clearly suggest the distinction. This may be explicitly brought out by characterizing the logical mind as the highly organized form of the mind as such. The logical mind is that part of the mind which shows perfect system and order in it—just as, if an analogy of image thinking be allowed, in a field of light the focus is made up of highly concentrated points of light whereas it gets diffused towards the periphery.

We usually employ the expression ‘personality’ to represent the last stage of development of the psyche. Starting from innate dispositions, the structural development passes through engrams, complexes, sentiments and character to personality; the functional development passes from reflex actions, through instincts, to the stage of voluntary actions of the personality again. By the logical mind we mean this personality. This may be misleading. But once we understand the right meaning, there is no harm if the psychological term be used as the equivalent of ‘the logical mind’.

This does not imply that psychology can do the function of logic. While analysing the various elements and processes involved in the mental facts, psychology also exposes the various constituent elements of our personality. But its limitations as an empirical science are manifest in its failure to explain how these constituent factors are organized in forming an integral personality.

The various normative disciplines of philosophy alone can help us in this matter. They deal with the many standards, norms or values which function as operational directives of our experience. It is these disciplines therefore which can bring a given content of mind in direct conformity with the norms and tells us how it can be organized into a certain pattern.

It is clear therefore that both Psychology and Philosophy have got to say something about our personality formation: psychology reveals the constituents; philosophy offers the ideal components or the ideal manner of organizing the constituents. Without considering the verdicts of both, we cannot hope to have a full view of the logical mind and its attitudes.

Mind is essentially teleological. Psychology as a positive
science takes a functional view of the mind, as opposed to a substantial view. The concept of mind as a simple, indivisible and permanent substance eludes the grasp of the scientific method. Indeed, following Hume, we may look within our own 'self' and discover nothing static or unchanging. And following James, we may feel its presence as the fountain-head of many a desire, need, want, propensity, impulse, urge, drive, interest, attention, aim, purpose, or any other telic factor. All these make for a perpetual flux and lend it a dynamic character.

The telic pattern consists of a psychical tendency which originates in the mind and terminates with some objective end. The impulse is directed to the object. The propensity of self-preservation, for example, may drive one to look for food, shelter, protection from dangerous agents, and so on. The sex impulse has similarly its own appropriate objects. Any thwarting of it may spur it on to find ways and means to overcome the obstacles and reach the goal. This lays bare the teleological or goal-seeking character of the mind.

This view gets ample support in several researches in psychology, especially in the works of William James and McDougall. One stresses the dynamic character; the other, the teleological; both take the functional view.

James likens psychical consciousness to a stream; perpetual flux characterizes each element in it; no element seems static or permanent; we can talk of no entity or faculty. Mind is what it does. This reminds us of the Hindu scriptural description of the mind: 'mind is like a drunken monkey who has been bit by a scorpion'.

McDougall's hormic psychology brings out more clearly the teleological implications of the functional view. Psychology is rooted in biology. The constituents of mind are vital impulses and propensities, that is, telic in character. Man inherits these as the legacy of the species. The objective goals may vary from the natural or intrinsic to the artificial or instrumental (e.g. money) which though a means is accepted as an end. This goal-seeking disposition of the mind finds further confirmation in abnormal and depth psychologies. These have however a negative significance: their stress lies on pointing out that the central part of the psychical process, viz. feeling, cannot be uprooted and any serious attempt at that leads to perversions and fixations, manias and neuroses.

THE CONSTITUENTS OF THE HUMAN MIND. A newborn child has
in its mental frame the racial and hereditary characteristics or innate dispositions given to it. All complex constituents grow out of these simple ones in interaction with the environment. Innate dispositions are thus the root-cause of all behaviour. The telic pattern of stimulus-feeling-response is sustained by and grounded in them.

McDougall has enumerated fairly exhaustively as many as eighteen such tendencies. These may be grouped under three main tendencies and in the order of their natural sequence in the development of the mind:

i. Self-preservation—food-seeking, escape, constructiveness, curiosity, combat, repulsion, acquisitiveness, etc.
ii. Sex—mating.
iii. Parental—gregarious, self-assertion, submission, appeal, laughter, etc.

The three also give the natural joints in the development, both temporal and logical, of the propensities. The self-preservative propensities develop and mature at the stage of adolescence in the temporal development and mark the level of natural self in the logical development of the mind. The sex propensities mature in youth and make up the social self; the parental, in manhood, and the spiritual self.

MIND DEVELOPS FROM APPETITES AND INSTINCTS TO REASON. The formal organization or logical development of mind closely follows the natural: only, here the same matter is internally systematized. Evolution makes explicit into the higher what is implicit in the lower. It is thus a continuous creative process. The matter or contents of life remaining the same among all animals, man differs from others by virtue of a high degree of organization of the material. In this logical organization, we can distinguish two attitudes of the mind (theoretical and practical) and three levels (reflex action, instinct and reason).

The formal organization of the mind can be fully comprehended if mind is considered in relation to the outer world. Naturally, the relation can have two directions, to and from the mind, from and to the outer world. The telic arc may thus be of two kinds. In one, it starts from the objective situation and ends in the mind: this describes the theoretical or cognitive attitude of the mind. In the
other; the mind affected by the stimuli reacts on the objective situation to modify it according to its desires: this describes the practical or conative attitude. The two attitudes get differentiated from near-simultaneity on the reflex action level to a deliberately planned separation on the level of voluntary action. In man, scientific and artistic pursuits illustrate the two attitudes.

Reflex action or appetites take place on the lowest level of consciousness. As organic wants, appetites may be identified with the involuntary functions of the various organs of the body. A child behaves mostly on this level. The purpose of these is to preserve the body and protect it from sudden and heavy impacts. In a reflex action, vague perception of stimulus is quickly followed by an organic sensation and then by a quick dramatic response. The three are telescoped into near-simultaneity. Some psychologists therefore, call it mechanical; but that is not the case: it involves consciousness, both cognitive and conative. The reflex actions being disconnected and sporadic, localized and momentary, experience at this level is confused.

An instinct reveals some intelligence in perceiving the stimuli and some foresight in its response to them. The instinctual consciousness gains in clarity as it feels some resistance or feels threatened to get thwarted. It realizes a high degree of intelligent adaptation to the environment. Animal behaviour such as birds’ building nests at more secure places if the old ones are found damaged is a good example. It involves the whole organism and has a longer lease of life. Some instincts endure as long as the individual organism lives. The instincts aim at preserving and perpetuating the biological life. It carries a cognitive predisposition to notice the significant stimuli and also a conative predisposition to reach a goal.

Yet the contradictions on the level remain supernumerary. One primary propensity may dominate the others. Cats, for example, devour their newly born offspring. Male seals in the mating season abandon themselves ‘to the sexual function in its two aspects of battling with other males and impregnating the females’ (McDougall). They do not eat and sleep during the period. Minds of men in the grip of one dominant passion or of conflicting passions lose their balance and develop fixations and neuroses and sometimes insanity. This disaster can be checked only by a deliberate effort of reason.

On the level of reason or voluntary action, consciousness reaches
its most organized form. An exclusive privilege of the mature human mind, it finds its best expression in the universe of desires of such minds. By means of desire and voluntary action one seeks to weld all the elements of one’s experience into a system. It involves a selection of objects, a point of view that determines the proper selection, of compatible wants to the exclusion of incompatible ones—a higher degree of consciousness that determines the point of view or the universe of desires. The universe of desires of a statesman, for example, consists of those voluntary acts which preserve the culture and strengthen the defence of the state.

However, desires vary according to self-consciousness and may conflict with one another: the goal may elude the consciousness because of the complexity of objective conditions; or the desires may be pursued simultaneously. The conflict of desires can however be resolved by a progressive sublimation leading to an integral personality. Depth psychology has made it clear that conflicts in our mind quite often unhinge and derange it and paralyze its normal functions. It has also suggested sublimation as a cure—as the result of psycho-therapeutic experiments. Sublimation means directing energies into desirable channels.

There are three possible ways of dealing with our conflicting desires. All of them (the desires) may be allowed an equal and free scope: this can only make confusion worse confounded. The second method is to suppress them: suppression adds to the conflict and tension and develops psychopathic condition. The third method that remains is to sublimate them. Sublimation is the mean between the extremes of unlimited freedom and ascetic suppression. It means the expenditure of energy in socially and morally approvable directions. The propensity of sex, for example, may be sublimated from weakness for the opposite sex to artistic activity; of pugnacity, or combat, from fighting with neighbours to becoming a soldier or a pugilist; of curiosity, from behaving as a peeping Tom to journalistic or scientific pursuits; and so on.

*Personality* represents the highest degree of organization. Reason develops order and system and gives the constituent parts their proper stations. It thus builds up a systematic whole. Each one of the primary propensities is organized by reason and becomes a

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6 William James, *The Text Book of Psychology*, p. 186: “Not that I would not if I could, be both handsome and fat and well-dressed, and a great athlete, ....”
constituent part of the personality. Thus, the functions of the
propensity of self-preservation on all the three levels are integrated
into a system on the level of reason. This is what we call the natural
self. The sex impulse organized becomes the social self; the parental
impulse, the spiritual self.

The three selves are then graded with the ‘bodily me’ at the
bottom and the spiritual self at the top. A fully integrated person
will be the spiritual self to which the lower selves are subordinated
as means to an end, or as parts to the whole. As such it remains
an ideal. We approach the ideal as we succeed in removing contra-
dictions from our experience and build up a harmonious universe
of desires which is the highest possible within the limitations of
our experience. A person who shows such a disposition has a good
character: one who does not is bad. The integral personality thus
functions as the ultimate standard or norm with reference to which
the goodness of a character is tested.

RELIGIOUS VALUE ORGANIZES THE PSYCHICAL MATERIAL INTO RE-
LIGIOUS EXPERIENCE. We have traced the evolution of mind as such.
It exposes the material the mind gets from reflex actions, instincts
and reason. It also reveals that the three kinds of experience
represent three ‘natural joints’ in the evolution of mind. They
may well stand for three different levels in an hierarchical order.

Religious value may organize the same material. And the same
material so organized may acquire the character of religious expe-
rience. Religious value is a synthetic principle. It asserts itself
in introducing order into the manifold of psychical life. It does
not represent blank and featureless identity. It stands for a concrete
and rich experience, an experience which is indeed a unity in
difference. The different levels of the mind are found, in point of
fact, reflected in the religious consciousness. The scope for an
analogical interpretation is unmistakable even to a superficial
observer. Reflex actions, instincts and reason represent the different
levels of the human mind in an ascending order. So do religious
reflexes, religious instincts and rational religion represent the
different levels of religious consciousness. Animism and magic,
religious tradition and custom, and prophetism and monkery illustrate
these levels in theory and practice respectively.

THE COUNTERPART OF REFLEX ACTION IN RELIGION: ANIMISM
AND MAGIC. Before generalizing we may cite two examples of
religious reflexes. The readers may refer to Leaves from the Golden
Bough culled by Lady Frazer. One illustrates how a Zulu magician binds the wind (pp. 68-69); the other sketches how the Chinese magician used to make rain (pp. 63-64). These two instances tell, by implication, all the characteristics of magic and animism.

We may first look into how they are occasioned, into the situations in which they are felt to be real. That animism and magic characterize not only the primitive religion can be made manifest by a simple fact. Severe impacts of the natural forces threaten our existence with utter destruction. This threat rouses the religious feeling of fear, wonder and submission. With this religious experience animism and magic have close associations. A little bit of scientific imaginativeness, and we may have no difficulty in accepting as a fact the tremendous awe, with which the elemental furies of nature would strike a primitive man of the prehistoric times. Storms and droughts, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, floods and conflagrations would work havoc, would sometimes do away with the lives and property of entire tribes. All this would naturally have made man conscious of his powerlessness in their presence. Similar situations even today occasion similar response.

From this we may generalize: whenever and wherever awful situations threaten man’s existence, man cannot help feeling the fear and his impotence, and with that, the presence of some unknown spiritual agent. Such situations as thus affect or hold in fee the destiny of man acquire a religious significance: the feelings induce in our mind the idea of a supreme power having a direct effect upon, or control over, our life and destiny.

The objective situations simply occasion, and do not cause, the feeling. Yet as we feel for the idea more and more intensely it grows in concreteness. There arises the attitude of asserting the reality of the deity and giving him some concrete form by investing the thing, which affects our physical existence, with a power similar to that with which we ourselves are endowed. Animism consists in this ‘theoretical’ realization.

Having obtained the idea, which need not be anthropomorphic, men feel like propitiating it. Feeling of fear, wonder, awe, submission admiration and-or tenderness drives them to express it in ritual. Magic consists in this ‘practical’ realization. They make images, idols or effigies as the ‘symbol’ of the ideal. These need not bear any resemblance to the outer objects which occasion the feeling; for, the objective stimuli never become the direct objects of the
religious feeling: they are not apotheosized. The symbols may change in form, shape and size. Their presence, however, is essential for magical acts. Magic invokes the help of the deity through the images. The magic character of the ritual lies in the belief of their efficacy in controlling the deity either by overpowering him, or by placating him, or by identifying ourselves with him.

We may now detect in animism and magic such characteristic as belong to reflex actions: they manifest the partial and fragmentary character—sporadic and explosive, desultory and localized, discrete and momentary. Secondly, they have a bearing on the propensity of self-preservation. Anything that affects this impulse induces in us the feeling of divine presence. Thirdly, there is an unmistakable simultaneity of persistence between the stimuli and the feeling. Lastly, during the spell of such a feeling, which induces the belief in the presence of some deity, a series of spontaneous actions issue as a control technique—directed towards the deity but aiming at a desirable change in the situation.

On occasions, several persons may share the feeling and take part in the acts of propitiation held in public. The entire ritual may be guided and controlled by a dominating personality of one person. He is believed to be in possession of an extraordinary power by virtue of which he can cast a spell on the deity. Quite often he himself is looked upon as being possessed by the deity and hence held in special reverence.

Many thinkers have sought the origin of religion in animism and magic. This has led to a long and furious and as yet unresolved controversy. The origin of religion, however, does not in any way affect the validity of the religious experience itself. What is of importance is the existence or persistence of situations under which we have such feeling and the attitudes it occasions. Such situations do exist and have persisted.

Religion on the reflex action level is to be found not only in prelogical societies but also in logical or civilized societies. Corporate religion on this level assumes the form of amorphous ‘aggregations’, sporadic and short-lived, varying in personnel, images, rites and determined spontaneously in the heat of the feeling for the religious idea. The grouping or massing persists as long as the physical stimulus persists. A common feeling is roused and that holds them

* Schmidt has given a list of such thinkers in his *Origin and Growth of Religion*. 
together for a time. The association itself predisposes their minds to get moulded in a common pattern. Their ideas, emotions and actions show a tendency to conform to the common feeling for the idea of deity cherished by them. In the absence of the stimulus, the feeling dwindles and then disappears altogether. The association also vanishes. A group of fanatics resorting to some direct political action may be cited as an example of such corporate religious reflex. The mass migrations (for political reasons) during the past few decades in many parts of the world must have proved to be situations of the religious reflex to many of the emigres.

THE COUNTERPART OF INSTINCTS IN RELIGION: RELIGIOUS TRADITION AND CUSTOM. Corporate religion finds a surer and more enduring foundation on the level of instincts. Religious tradition and custom represent the cognitive and conative aspects of religious instincts. Religious beliefs and associated myths and ideas as expressed in mythologies and theologies make up the tradition (vichāra in Hinduism, for example). Religious piety and morality as expressed in some ritual and social code make up the custom (āchāra in Hinduism, for example).

Occasions such as birth, death, marriage, acquisition of wealth, power and fame, move us to the depths of feeling on account of certain mystery about them. While having a direct bearing on the biological welfare of homo sapiens, these events in our life seem given to us and as such beyond our control. As receiver of gifts we are overwhelmed by the same feeling of impotence; again we feel the presence of some supreme power controlling our destiny.

This explains the excitement of mind we invariably feel on such occasions. The birth of a baby, the death of a person, as well as the union of two persons of opposite sexes in holy wedlock to live the love life and perpetuate the race by contributing their mite—cause stir in the minds of the people directly or indirectly concerned. From times immemorial they have looked upon these occasions as extraordinary. And they have celebrated them in a religious fashion. And they have celebrated them in all countries.

The members of a religious community feel it an obligation to flock together to cherish a religious belief and perform a religious ritual. The chosen occasions afford them the opportunity to do so. These help them to build up a tradition. Cherishing a common religious feeling they establish a common belief in a common deity. Their piety is then habitually directed to this common object of
belief and expressed by means of customary ritual. Their morality again is so directed to their fellow humans and fellow creatures and expressed by means of customary social duties. They thus execute the tradition by a certain number of religious customs requiring the performance of certain rituals. Once perpetuated for generations, the tradition and custom may be said to be the expressions of religious instincts.  

The instinctual basis accounts for the raising of temples, the anthropomorphic idolatry and priesthood. The traditions based on instincts thus seek to secure the survival and revival of the spiritual ideas found beneficial to the community, through religious habits called religious custom. The religious tradition and custom thus represent the cognitive and conative aspects of religious instincts.

The tradition and custom constitute the spiritual heritage of each of the organized historical communities. Transmitted from generation to generation, in some cases for millenia, they make up the essential part of the communal heritage. They sustain the silken bonds in the members of a religious community. They exert the greatest influence in moulding the minds and character of the members. The community derives its cultural tone and individuality from them. They develop most of the common modes of behaviour, worship, prayer, etiquette and manners. A more organized form of religious experience, a more stable spiritual organism is thus raised on the foundation of religious tradition and custom.

Yet, they are the principal source of conservatism in religion, which, when carried beyond limits, derogate into dogmatism and fanaticism. Then they fail to release forces of unity. They may then create dead walls among the various communities and lead them to holy wars, jehads and crusades. In their decadence, they turn the mind into a closed mind and the religion into a static religion. There is thus in them an element of blindness and disposition to derogate.

THE COUNTERPART OF REASON IN RELIGION: PROPHETISM AND MONKERY. The blindness of instinctual religion can be overcome only when the religious consciousness reaches the level of reason. Prophetism and the institution of monkery represent the rational

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7 As instances may be cited ancestor worship, hero worship, worship of gods and goddesses of the many pantheons—Egyptiac, Indic, Sumeric Hellenic, Babylonic, etc.
religion in its cognitive and conative aspects. Socrates and the founders of historical prophetic religions (Buddha, Zoroaster, Moses, Christ, Mohammed and others) conceived of a dynamic universal religion each as against the static traditional religion of his time and clime. The prophetic reason finds fault with the superstitious dogma and fanatical feuds among the warring groups of traditional religions. It creates new forces of human unity; it demolishes the dead walls of old static religions.

The prophets have always kept their minds open to receive, absorb and reflect as much light of reason as they could in the historical and biographical circumstances. All of them have preached the gospel of universal kinship or love or brotherhood. This is an experience free from all conflicts: reason alone can deliver such an experience. They have aimed at a cultural organism of the spiritual kind: hence their opposition to all caste and class—priestly caste and ruling class. These have been the stumbling block in the way of general spiritual progress of the people. In its practical aspect, therefore, prophetism has assumed the form of the order of monks and devotees. The principle of organization shifts from priesthood to monkery.

Priests constitute a class of holy persons trained in the art of performing ritual: they preserve the religious tradition and custom; they belong to religion on the level of instincts. (The Brahmin gurus initiating chelas and priests performing rites among the Hindus, for example, make up such a class.) Monkery, on the contrary, is an institution which seeks to provide opportunities to the religious devotees, to mould and discipline their character, to bring them into an intimate and direct communion with God. It may be noted that all prophetic religions are more or less monotheistic: as religions of reason they seek and achieve a greater unity than poly- and heno-theism.

The rationality of prophetism has its proper test in the spiritual tenacity of the prophets. They have been persons of extraordinary susceptibility to the voices of reason. This they have combined with a tenacity of purpose and courage of conviction. They have wanted to affirm and to realize what they look upon as rational, in the teeth of severe opposition of the followers of the traditional static religion holding the field. They behave as though they have been intoxicated by the supreme idea of reason. It is this creative attitude to reason, and not the rightness of each and every dogma
they have uttered, which characterizes the rational religion. Under the inspiration of reason they assail the pharisaical and the inquisitorial elements of traditional religions. As they move, they scatter sweetness and light, peace and harmony, inspire the people with noble and lofty sentiments, bring them out of sectarian folds and shells of superstitions, and make them breathe the serene air of the universal life of truth and reason.

The prophets build up a new pattern of religious life. The sole test is devotion to God and service of His creatures. True, there is a code of rules to guide them; but it is just a means to holiness by way of imitation of the prophet. The spiritual well-being of entire mankind is the guiding idea. The institution of religion of reason therefore achieves a higher degree of order and organization in its membership. The sense of unity and discipline grows from within: it is not imposed from outside; it has its source in the reasoned will of the adherents. Dogmatic blindness or fanaticism can have no room in an institutional religion of reason. Every member is supposed to have cultivated the sense of having supreme respect for all that is rational, and of voluntarily submitting to every discipline that strengthens the sense. It encourages free thinking and honest criticism (of course within certain limits). We may thus conclude that religious consciousness attains the highest level when it gets organized in an institutional form under the sublimating influence of some prophetic and mystical vision which sustains its open and dynamic character.

THE PROPHETIC RELIGION AIMS AT A SPIRITUAL SYSTEM. The religion of reason aims at a spiritual organism. This is the same as a community of rational beings. A member of such a community devotes himself to the practical realization of the spiritual well-being of man.

To begin with, he must organize the three main elements of experience—reflex action, instincts as well as various rational desires. Of unequal value, any one element can be ignored or suppressed only at the peril of other elements. Since this has not been properly grasped, faulty religions have sprung up. We shall consider such religions as fixational systems in a later chapter. Here it may be pointed out that in an integral personality all elements are indispensable; only, they should be put, and made to function, in their proper places. What we require is to weld them all into a systematic experience by giving each its proper
status. In its practical realization, the higher life far from destroying the lower life regulates it and helps it in fulfilling its urges in a harmonious manner. We thus get a clue to the possibility of an ideal for each level.

We may here deal with three of such religious ideals regulating respectively the religious reflexes, religious instincts and rational religion. We cannot do without material weal; only, if pursued freely, it derogates into hedonistic indulgence in pleasures with many ills and woes in their wake; hence the ideal of purity in material life. Purity alone can make us truly happy. Let us likewise have social well-being without fail; only, in an unregulated pursuit of it, we may have, instead of justice, an inquisitorial dispensation of socialist retribution; hence the ideal of honesty in social life. Honesty alone can deliver true justice. And 'nous' is not always 'logos'; even the pursuit of moral well-being, when unregulated, derogates into self-righteousness, pride of virtue and fanaticism; righteousness alone yields true virtue.

PURITY IS THE IDEAL OF RELIGIOUS REFLEXES. Reflex actions

The historic religions, extinct or still living, might have failed to realize such a spiritual system for the whole species. Good historical reasons account for their failures. The main reason may be traced to the gradual alienation of the adherents from the spirit of the prophets and the growing fancy or love for the letter. Paradoxically put, they developed a fixation of feeling on their respective particular patterns of universality and made claims for it in an exclusive, possessive manner. This created the barrier of group-egos and prevented the all too desirable systematic unity from coming into existence. This kind of derogation seems to be the nemesis of all organized religions. At a certain stage, the pride of spirit infects them—the pride of knowledge infallible, the pride of virtue, that is, self-righteousness, and the supreme pride of spirit—a final organic form of all these evils, giving us a fanaticism of the deadliest type. Yet we need not despair of realizing a spiritual system of mankind.

Again, the historic religions might have failed to make of each individual a spiritual system made up of natural, social and spiritual selves. It still remains a valid religious ideal. We may seek evidence for the trichotomy of the self and the supremacy of the spiritual in the theory of evolution, in modern psychology and in the history of philosophy. They confirm a spiritual system.

The theory of evolution has often been pressed into the service of a materialistic interpretation of human nature. We need not agree on that. But we must take note of its unmistakable pointer to the fact that man is not entirely spiritual. The process of man's emergence has been a long-drawn affair. Several parts in his constitution expose his animal heritage. The reflex and involuntary actions tend to the bodily preservation. The biological instincts of self-preservation, sex and reproduction when adequately developed lead him to organize a social life. He manifests his spiritual character only
maintain our physical equilibrium. Our bodily organism is subject to impacts and pressures and shocks from the outer world (e.g. jerks, joltings, stumblings, contusions, shrill sounds, powerful light, extreme inclemencies of weather, etc.). Reflex actions guard us from the adverse effects of these impacts on our body.

Animism and magic seek to do the same in the life of all members of the community. Animism has a bearing on our reactions to the outer world. Much of the animistic character of these reactions must be laid at the door of sheer ignorance of the primitive man. It is often reckoned as anachronistic. But that does not take away the truth, the permanent elements, in it. That nature in certain aspects, both objects and events, still inspires awe is a patent fact. Secondly, our body still requires protection: a conformity to natural law alone can realize material well-being. Thirdly, material well-being must remain an element of spiritual well being.

Many diseases afflict our body. These may be said to be caused by our transgressing the law of nature. We may break the laws often unwittingly. This does not affect the tenor of our argument. We wish to avoid pain and realize our physical well-being. We must therefore look out and remain vigilant. The medical therapy, whether ancient or modern, has the same lesson to teach. The difference in degree of factual knowledge and technical skill has not changed the pattern of truth and purpose. There has been no when he begins to control his reflex actions and instincts and does it effectively enough to keep them within their proper limits.

Psychology has fathomed the unconscious and the subconscious parts of our mind and brought to light the manifold facts in and about them. The waking life is only the focus of organic life. The rest of the mind contains a store of desires: though inhibited, these are not totally inactive and extinct. These inner impulses force themselves up in the form of chequered and complex psychical patterns. Literature and arts often bear the signs of these. Our powers of intellect and reason must control them for the sake of effective adaptation to the environment.

History of philosophy further confirms the trichotomy and the system. It presents a gradually more and more intimate realization of the sublime through nature, society and spirit—culminating in the spiritual realization. The sublime was thus first identified with nature in theory and bodily well-being in practice (e.g. the Vedic realization of Rta and the Pythagorean philosophy). Then it was identified with state in theory and social well-being in practice, the latter including the bodily well-being of the citizens (e.g. Protagoras' humanism culminating in Plato's Republic). Further on, it was identified with spirit in theory and spiritual well-being in practice which included both physical and social well-being (e.g. Stoicism).
divergence from the old notions of proper equilibrium and avoidance of excess and deficiency.

The law of nature conditions the material well-being of man. As long as the law prevails, it must govern the conditions of the human body. And as long as man has a body, he cannot escape the law. Nature is not a fortuitous concourse of material things. It is another name for the experience of the physical world. This experience does reveal a very good system. All the progress in science has confirmed this truth. Conformity to nature is, for human beings, a spiritual value. It is rooted in our nature as human beings. A part of man, the body, is embedded in nature. As long as man has a body, he cannot ignore the conformity. Besides, his conscious effort in this direction results in a blessed state of health and comfort. Each quantum of progress in scientific theory has produced its corresponding inventions towards human comfort and happiness.

In order to realize material well-being, therefore, we must live a life in conformity with nature. This is a far cry from hedonistic indulgence in bodily pleasures. This is what Kant called the objective realization of good and conceived as a part of the sumnum bonum. Religion as a quest eternal for the perfect experience must take happiness into account. Our harmonious relation with nature is the first essential means to the life divine, which is the end.⁹

In order to achieve this conformity, we must develop an attitude of our mind. This we may call purity. The ideal sustains our efforts at a perfect bodily hygiene. 'Cleanliness is next to godliness' is a proverbial rendering of the same ideal. It goes deeper than clothes and skin and takes account of our entire physical existence. Indian theologians have called it brahmacharya or sātwikatā. By this we mean a disposition by means of which we can possibly keep each and every part of the body in an efficient and healthy state. Some Indian thinkers also call it yoga.¹⁰ There is no proper English rendering for these Sanskrit expressions. Purity, if not made to carry the sense of puritanic prudery, the sense of ritualistic cleanliness, the associations of untouchability, etc., comes very near these old expressions. Properly understood, it may be made to stand for the attitude whereby one realizes perfect balance of

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⁹ 'Physical weal is the primary means of reaching God'—Kalidasa.

¹⁰ The Bhagavad Geeta at one place describes yoga as temperance in eating, sleeping, coitus, etc.
physiological functions by bringing oneself in conformity with the law of nature. The American praxiologist, Ralph Borsodi, calls it the problem of physical and mental health.

Honesty is the ideal of religious instincts. The biological principle works through instincts. All organic life possesses three of them in common, viz. the instincts of self-preservation, sex and reproduction. Man is the last in the descent of species. He shows a developed state of these. He usually does not indulge in these with a gay abandon. He aims at the best possible biological existence.

So he must regulate these instincts. The institutions of work, family and education seek to fulfil the three basic urges. Every well-organized community tries to keep these institutions in an efficient order. Tradition and custom make up the apparatus of control. Over and above these, the state backed by the organized physical force of the community ensures the order effectively by making and executing laws in a just manner. It is clear, therefore, that conformity to the law of the state is necessary for man; for, he desires his biological well-being. Without this conformity, the well-being remains unfulfilled.

Justice or rule of law makes up the very essence of the state. Without this no stable community is ever possible: the relations between its various members must be determined through the principle of equity. There must be a correspondence and harmony between the objective and subjective realization of the political good, between the rights and obligations of the citizens. The duty of the state lies in keeping such a reciprocity in all the aspects and spheres of political life which fall within its jurisdiction.

Such a state is only an ideal one. No historical state has been able to realize perfect justice. Yet history testifies to the fact that man is progressively seeking to realize it. We may look into the political revolutions in particular. These have sharpened the political consciousness of man. These have founded new tradition and custom; these in their turn are calculated to overthrow unjust and irrational elements. For this ideal man has passed through fiery ordeals, bloodbaths, mass starvation, and privations for generations together. But with all this he has won slowly though steadily. Revolutions seem to fizzle out. Every historic society has of course to its credit a set of august tradition and custom. These have ensured fairplay and justice to the members. These have thus firmly secured their biological well-being.
Conformity to the law of the state is therefore another, and very important, means of investing our experience with validity. As long as we live in society, we cannot escape it. Religion must take cognizance of this as constituting an element in the total well-being of man. Religion need not bother about the day-to-day problems of political life: that is the vocation of statesmen and diplomats. It would however be wrong to think that religion has nothing to do with the political aspirations at all.

Social well-being is the concern not only of statesmen but of the people as a whole. As such it ought to be determined through the general will of the people. It is this general will, which has the sovereign authority to sanction and justify any political measure. The general will, however, is the will of the social self which is subordinate to the spiritual self and which aims at the best possible fulfilment of the biological needs of individuals (Vide Ch. 8). It is the consummation of the material self; it is by no means a superimposition on the spiritual self; on the contrary, it is subordinated to the spiritual self.

Citizens must take a proper attitude to their respective nations and towards humanity. Unless they do so, social well-being cannot be realized. It cannot be realized by a handful of their representatives. It is necessary that every citizen should love justice and fairplay: he must see that these are given the supreme importance in the political life. This is possible only when such a citizen is first and foremost honest in his own mind. Whatever be the arrangements made to make justice prevail, their proper maintenance and control ultimately depends upon the sense of honesty of the citizens.

Justice, as it is practised by the state, is only an outward manifestation of the inner sense of honesty. Honesty thus becomes another ideal of religion. It is only through honesty that man can bring himself in direct conformity to the law of the state and realize the biological well-being for himself.

**Righteousness Is the Ideal of Rational Religion.** We may now seek to clarify the principle which governs the spiritual well-being of man. This cannot be warped and encysted to a section of humanity: it must embrace in a sweep the aspirations of the entire mankind. Such aspirations find expression in the scientific and artistic, moral and religious acts.

In all these, one has to think and act in conformity with universal reason: one has to make an appeal to the rational mind wherever
found. A scientist, for example, has to construct only such hypothe-
ses as can find confirmation from any men of science irrespective
of caste, creed and colour. A genuine artist has to seek and feel
and represent universal human values. A Shakespeare may belong
to any people, yet he belongs to all peoples. Prophets and saints,
mystics and great thinkers address their messages to man.
Socrates had no local or sectional axe to grind. Buddha and Moses,
Jesus and Mohammed founded ways of life for all men.

For these men it is all unbounded freedom in reason. There is no
restriction other than the fullest conformity to the principle of
reason. Here there is only one way to assert oneself: that is by
being righteous. Righteousness is the disposition to bring one’s
self in direct conformity with the innermost self. The ideals of purity
and honesty do conform to the principle of reason but in their
restricted spheres and modes. They are parts of this supreme
ideal of spiritual life. Prescribed by reason as ideals for lower levels
of life they do conform to righteousness; but left by themselves
they may be quite often compromised with. In the pursuit of these
lesser ideals there is room for extraneous or irrational pressures.
These may foil our best efforts to sustain purity in body and honesty
in mind. For example, to maintain an ideal health, we must take
account of many factors, intra-, and extra-, -organic, and yet may
fail to cope with all of them. Similarly, a state with all its wisdom
and love for justice may be called upon to be expedient. In spiritual
life there is no yielding to outer pressures. Righteousness brooks
no compromise. In the realm of spirit, command of reason is
absolute and unconditional.

Kant calls it the categorical imperative; and the commonsense
man, the golden rule. In the Kantian form it reads as follows:
'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time
will that it should become a universal law.' Despite philosophical
criticism, it does give expression to the uncompromising attitude
of the rational being. A righteous man can defy the whole world if
need be. The theologian's criticism is more relevant here: in the
Kantian form it may derogate into self-righteousness and breed
spiritual pride and fanaticism. Such fears are unfounded. Socrates
was not in a fit of frenzy when he drank the cup of hemlock. Neither
did Jesus show his pride in crucifixion. Nor could the lesser men
who fell as martyrs before the inquisitorial wrath of ecclesiastical
pride be called self-righteous fanatics.
These great souls were aware of the fatal consequences of what they were doing. Yet undaunted they pursued what they thought to be reasonable. This spirit has made the history of man. This spirit faced all evil with the unshaken faith that truth triumphs. The righteous spirit alone can march ahead against all hazards. An inward faith moves these men, the faith that whatever is reasonable has the supreme validity and must be adhered to without fear of consequences. Religious mythology tries to say the same when it tells tales of God’s having fought and killed terrible demons. It is in righteousness that we see the supreme manifestation of divinity. Righteousness, therefore, is the highest ideal of religion.
Evidence from Two Sources. We have noted that there have been two main trends to validate religion. The transcendental rationalist method gives a gradation of experience which is a pointer to the subjective pole. The transcendental mystical (rationalist-romanticist) method seems to show how to reach there. Let us look into the explorations by both the methods. We shall first sift the rationalist evidence and then the evidence from mysticism.

The Distinctive Character of Religious Experience. Religious experience as an experience must be the confluence of the logical and the metaphysical principles. As religious, however, it must differ from other experiences: it does so in so far as it represents the subjective pole; it claims to possess the highest meaning and value in the total experience. This lends the religious experience its distinctive character; we may call it sublimity. Religious experience is therefore the meeting-ground of the sublime and the absolute.

God Is Not Identical with the Absolute. Religious experience or God represents the subjective pole. As such it must comprehend all in a perfect system. Yet this all-comprehensive and perfectly systematic character of the experience does not warrant the identifying of it with the absolute, that is, the metaphysical reality.

A little reflection on the Aristotelian four causes points to the efficient cause as the absolute. The absolute of metaphysics cannot presuppose anything. It comprehends but transcends, supersedes but includes everything—including the religious experience. It creates everything out of itself. The creative character of the absolute precludes its being either concrete or static.

It cannot be concrete: for were it concrete, (i) it must either be an aggregate of all the concrete finite things—in which case 'it possesses no characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished from
anything else and discerned as an object of consciousness,' as Dean Mansel puts it; or (ii) it must not contain them—in which case it ceases to be all-comprehensive; and in both cases, it loses its ultimate individuality, in other words, it ceases to be the absolute.

It cannot be static: for, were it static, the world with all its changes would remain unexplained or be explained away by self-contradictory doctrines like illusionism. The expediency of illusionism, for example, involves a petitio principii. 'The finite intellect distorts the real nature of the absolute and makes it appear as the manyness of the world': this argument presupposes the very proposition which is required to be proved. The intellect as a finite mode of the absolute is presupposed to be illusory: it is not in a position to declare whether the world is real; but then, neither is it competent to declare that the world is illusory unless its own reality is sufficiently proved, in which case, of course, there is no reason why other finite modes must not also be real. It is therefore clear that the ultimate principle of metaphysics must be neither static nor concrete: it must positively be abstract and dynamic.

The God of religion, on the contrary, is concrete and determinate. Religion seeks the highest synthetic unity of the subject and the object in our experience; a synthetic principle cannot be creative; it does not create out of itself the material on which it operates. Religious value is regulative in character; it presupposes the creative principle. Religious experience or God is therefore an individuation of the absolute. As such it is concrete and static.¹

PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. The traditional proofs of God's existence may find better justification in our analysis of religion. These are three in number—the ontological, the cosmological, and the teleological. All the three proofs are based on theoretical reason. The ontological proof is based on a priori or pure theoretical reason. The cosmological proof and the teleological proof are partly based on empirical theoretical reason and partly on the ontological proof.

Kant shows that, of the three proofs given by the schoolmen, two are corollaries to the ontological: the three proofs can therefore be reduced to one—the ontological; and since the other two covertly presuppose the ontological argument, they are wrecked by the failure of the latter. And the latter does founder on the rock of

¹ Dr. N. V. Joshi, *Metaphysics of Individuation*, pp. 176-81; also the section on Aristotle in Dr. Joshi's *History of Western Philosophy*. 
unverifiability. Kant himself gives a fourth proof which is based on practical reason and which is known as the moral argument. The moral argument too does not prove very helpful. All this requires a little elaboration before we give our proof.

The idea of perfection includes only the idea of existence. The ontological ‘argument is that because the idea of God includes existence, therefore He necessarily exists.’ God being ens realissimum or omnitudo realitatis, that is, the sum of all positive attributes, and existence being a positive attribute (according to the argument) or ‘positive’ meaning ‘affirmative of existence’, God exists.

Kant denies that existence is a positive attribute. The argument asserts an ultimate unity of idea and existence: Kant opposes to it simply the idea of their difference. The image of a hundred thalers in my mind is not a hundred thalers in my pocket. Without perception a conception is empty, even as without conception a perception is blind. The idea of God is no exception.

In this rejection, Kant had been anticipated by others including Locke. In a paper entitled ‘Deus’, Locke makes out that even if we have the idea of a perfect Being, that idea by itself does not carry with it the certainty of the real existence of that perfect being. The idea of the perfect being is no proof of the existence of this perfect being. The sum of real constituents may not be real unless the component or connecting unity be also real. ‘Any idea, simple or complex, barely by being in our minds, is no evidence of the real existence of anything out of our minds, answering that idea.’

Gilbert Ryle argues that in the proposition ‘God exists’, the grammatical predicate ‘exists’ is not a logical predicate and therefore the grammatical subject ‘God’ also is not a logical subject: ‘God’ therefore must be a predicative expression and ‘God exists’ can be explicated as ‘Something, and one thing only, is omniscient, omnipotent, etc.’

A necessary being is not necessarily perfect. The cosmological argument may be stated as follows: (i) If anything

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exists, then, an absolutely necessary being must exist; (ii) I know that I exist; (iii) therefore, an absolutely necessary being exists, and this must be the perfect or most real being, since such a being alone rests on itself and has all the conditions of its existence in itself.

The cosmological argument may be said to have proved the existence of a necessary being. But we cannot form any conception of such a being. This is the burden of Kant's rejection of the argument. The argument does not prove that the necessary being is the perfect being.

Contingent existents do not imply self-contradiction. As Hume argues: 'There is no being, ..., whose non-existence implies a contradiction.' There is nothing wrong in supposing a finite being to be necessary. Kant too takes an exception to the conception of a necessary being but feels constrained 'to think something necessary as a condition of existing things'; he therefore meets the difficulty by taking it as a regulative principle.

We may sum up the criticism of the proof in the words of Edward Caird:

"It is, indeed, a 'nest of dialectical assumptions.' In the first place, it makes a transition from the things of experience to things in themselves and that by means of the category of cause, which applies only in relation to the former. In the second place, it takes an idea of absolute necessity, which is merely an ideal for empirical synthesis (though an ideal which empirical synthesis can never reach), as itself an object of knowledge. And, lastly, it involves or presupposes the ontological argument; for we cannot argue from the conception of the necessary Being to that of the ens realissimum, unless the two conceptions are convertible; and if they are convertible, the cosmological argument becomes unnecessary; for, the Being of God is already proved from the definition of God."

THE ORDER IN NATURE POINTS ONLY TO A GREAT ARCHITECT. The teleological proof starts from the particular experience of the order and system manifest in nature. This purposeful order looks accidental and external to the world, that is, as imposed upon it. The great variety of things could not be there in an orderly manner,

had there been no rational principle working behind them. There must be a will behind them to realize a desired state of affairs. So it must be a free and intelligent being rather than the blind energies of nature. This being must be one, since the world looks like a single systematic process.  

This argument does not disprove that the order and system manifest in nature are not the result of the very same laws of nature which work in the constitution of elements and forces. This proof does not lead us further than a great architect to whom the material is given and whose greatness may simply indicate the lowness of the standard rather than the sublimity of his own. It does not prove the existence of an infinite absolute creator. We can never reach totality by an empirical process, though it is only from totality that we get any definite idea of God.

In order to prove, therefore, the existence of God, the argument must presuppose the two logically prior arguments or the ontological proof alone. It can take a jump from empirical multiplicity to totality only by taking for granted that the contingent being implies the necessary being and that the necessary being as such comprehends all reality actual or possible. In so doing, however, the teleological argument loses its independent value. And those on which it depends being defective, the teleological proof becomes trebly defective.

The failure of these arguments results from the failure in showing the connection between the perfect and the necessary beings as a really necessary connection. On the one hand, the idea of a perfect being is no proof of the existence of God; on the other hand, the existence of a necessary being does not help us in forming the idea of a perfect being. The failure of the proofs results from the partial fulfilment of the conditions which when fulfilled together may be said to prove the existence of God. The ontological argument conforms to the idea of God and thus meets the conceptual demand; the other two arguments could prove the existence and thus meet the perceptual demand; neither however fulfils both the demands; and unless both the demands are fulfilled, God’s existential status remains precarious. ‘Either, therefore, God must be thought as existing, and then he is not known as ens realissimum, i.e. as God; or he must be thought as ens realissimum, and then he cannot be proved to exist.’

4 Ibid., p. 105.  
7 Ibid., p. 107.
THE HIGHEST ORIGINAL GOOD IS ONLY A POSTULATE. Thus, according to Kant, God cannot be known, that is, as both subjectively and objectively certain. The failure of the arguments, however, is the failure of theoretical reason—both empirical and *a priori*. Kant, therefore, looks into the case whether the perfect being can be known by the method of practical reason. This is often called the 'moral' argument.

The moral argument shows the necessity of postulating God the highest original good as the ground of the highest derived good or *sumnum bonum*. The *sumnum bonum* means the complete good and is conceived by Kant as a dialectical synthesis of the antinomies of practical reason, of the objective and the subjective realizations of good, of the ethical polar opposites of happiness and virtue. Plainly stated it means the distribution of happiness in exact proportion of virtue, which is worthiness to be happy.

Happiness and virtue, however, cannot be said to be related *analytically* by way of logical entailment. The two are too disparate for one to imply the other. Stoic 'virtue' does not necessarily involve happiness; epicurean 'happiness' does not necessarily imply 'virtue'. Similarly, the two goods cannot be said to be related *synthetically* by way of causal connection. We cannot look upon the desire for happiness as the cause of virtue or upon virtue as the cause of happiness.

That virtue is the necessary consequence of happiness or pleasure may be rejected as false. But that happiness should be the necessary consequence of virtue cannot be summarily disposed of. In the world of phenomena, this may not be the case. In the world of noumena, however, virtue 'if not immediately, yet mediately (through an intelligible author of nature) may be necessarily combined with happiness as an effect in the world of sense'.

Thus, the two polar opposites become dialectically relatable. Distribution of happiness in exact proportion to morality constitutes the perfect good of a possible world. This Kant calls the highest derived good. This world must have its highest cause of such a character as to comprehend in itself both natural law and moral law (the categorical imperative) and also the consciousness of the law. As such the cause must be a rational being. The natural system of causes and effects does not ensure the equitable distribution; but with such a rational being as the cause of the world, it will. Thus, it is morally necessary to postulate the highest original
good, that is, the existence of God as the dispenser of happiness according to virtue.

Yet Kant refers to the insights of practical reason as postulates, not as knowledge. A moral God may be as much a necessary presupposition of moral action as the ideal of pure reason is a necessary presupposition of theoretical reason. But Kant rejects the reality of the latter. God as the postulate of practical reason must therefore be accorded a similar status.

The moral argument thus gives only a postulate or an ideal, valid and worthy of strongest belief, but for ever unverifiable. It is an idea of reason, a regulative idea: partly because even the best efforts of any moral agent may fail to realize it; partly because it is not established by a completely satisfactory logical proof; and partly because we can never conceive what God can be like in himself. True, we know and do not merely believe in the validity of the moral law and freedom; true again, that the moral argument deduces a theoretical conclusion by way of practical reason, from premises one of which is ethical, does not affect the strict validity of the proof. Yet we must deny the status of knowledge to the theistic conclusion, mainly because we can obtain no clear conception of the nature of what is proved.

The post-Kantian rationalists have therefore fallen back upon the ontological argument. And the post-Kantian empiricists have carried on the Humean tradition reinforced by Kant. We may here consider both in brief.

THE DEMAND FOR LOGICAL REASON BEHIND THE WORLD OF FACTS IS INVALID. Let us first consider the empiricist refutation of the hypothesis of God as a logical reason behind the world of facts. Following Prof. A. J. Ayer we may state it as follows:

We cannot but accept the facts (that include ourselves and that come within our experience), aside from any explanation we may give of them. After accepting the facts we may or may not demand a logical reason (substance, cause, purpose, ground, meaning, ...) for facts as they are. If we do not, we are empiricists. There could not be any such meaning or logical reason; for, even if it be there and discovered to be there behind the world or all over and through the world, the result is merely an extension of the totality of facts: it does not explain itself—no better than the empirical reasoning explains the world. Hence the demand for logical reason is invalid.
Furthermore, the rationalist raises the question of logical reason thinking that it is a valid question. On accepting the validity of the rationalist demand for meaning behind the world, (i) one may look for it and finding none may dramatise its absence and the consequent feelings of worry, nausea, anguish, frustration, destitution, alienation, etc.—as do the atheistic existentialists; or (ii) one may convince oneself by way of pure reason that it is to be found in the logical articulation of some transcendental categories of being. The transcendentalists, however, while claiming the validity of the demand for logical reason behind the world, invent the reason and convince themselves that they have found it. There must be a reason; here may be the reason; here is the reason. The transition is made possible by suggestive verbalism. "What may be, if it also must be, assuredly is"—does not convince the empiricist.

The rationalist refutation of the empiricist argument would be more or less like this: The question 'what is the logical reason behind the world of facts?' does not involve any indefinite regress; but the question 'what is the logical reason behind the logical reason behind the world?' does. The latter is certainly invalid but the former is not. Secondly, the empiricist argument holds the untenable view that the world is an aggregate and not a systematic unity, that the aggregate of facts includes the logical reason of the occurrence of facts as a part to be included in the aggregate. The rationalist would concede that if empirical reasoning does not explain the world and if the logical reason which claims to explain it does not explain itself (it does not if it is a part), the two together do not explain the world (which includes the unexplained logical reason). But he would like to point out that it is the logical reason which includes and supersedes the world of facts. Then it explains the world and itself too. If the empiricist is not satisfied with this answer, it is because he is suffering from a fixation of feeling for the level of perception, for the method of empirical reasoning which would insist that the part is real and the whole is an aggregate. Thirdly, the meaning of the word 'explanation' must be the same for both empiricists and rationalists, while the criteria differ from level to level. The empiricist is taking the empiricist criterion of explanation as the meaning of the word 'explanation'. He then finds that the rationalist explanation is no explanation. The rationalist would point out that the meaning of 'explanation'
remaining the same, the empiricist is simply saying that the rationalist criterion is no empiricist criterion. If the empiricist finds that there can be no explanation of the world of facts on empiricist grounds, he should only say that there can be no explanation of the world of facts on empiricist grounds; but he cannot deduce from this that there can be no explanation on rationalist grounds. Fourthly, the empiricist argument that the transcendentalist invents rather than discovers the reason would like to have a monopoly of discovery and invention. How did the empiricist discover the empiricist principle? Not by the empiricist method. He must have ‘invented’ it, if discovering by reason is invention. And with the fixation of his desire to remain an empiricist, all his inventions seem to be discoveries. And so on.

GOD REMAINS A POSTULATE. Yet the rationalists fail to prove God. In the neo-hegelian form of the ontological argument, God appears as both, a unity of both, the ideal of pure reason and the postulate of practical reason. The neo-hegelians feel that Kant’s critique has not deflated the value of the proof to a nullity. Kant’s illustration of a hundred dollars is misleading: no supporter of the proof would hold that the existence of anything else than God alone follows from its idea.

Pringle-Pattison points out that the argument stresses the truth of self-consistent thought. John Caird holds that a kind of objective certainty is conveyed by the proof to the notion of God. And Edward Caird, after having tried to salvage it from the Kantian debris, says: ‘The ontological argument... is simply the expression of that highest unity of thought and being, which all knowledge presupposes as its beginning and seeks as its end.’

Kant’s refutation of the argument, Edward Caird says, involves an imperfect consciousness of the results of his own deduction. His transcendental deduction stresses the interdependence between thought and being; whereas in his rejection of the argument, he recurs to an opposition between them. Caird therefore asserts the rationalist statement: the idea of God as an idea of a perceptive understanding carries the proof of God’s existence in itself.

What these rationalists are trying to say may be made explicit as follows: Experience is the criterion of existence. Experience is a systematic unity of conception and perception. (a) In the cases of immediate experience (which is not even directly describable,
for, the moment it is described, it ceases to be immediate), either
pure perception or pure conception can be the sufficient criterion
of reality. (i) In some cases of immediate experience (e.g. at the
subjective pole, as in mystical realization), pure conception, which
is independent of perception, is realization and hence the criterion
of reality. This criterion holds good only in proving God's existence.
The ontological proof is a valid proof on this test. (ii) In other
cases of immediate experience (e.g. at the objective pole, as in pure
sense-experience), pure perception, which is independent of concep-
tion, is the criterion of reality. This criterion holds good only in
proving the existence of pleasure and pain and indescribable sensa
and dispositions. (b) In the cases of mediate experience (which is
either directly or indirectly describable), perception and conception
together in interdependence become the sufficient criterion of
reality. In science, for example, this is the criterion of reality. (The
empiricist would reject immediate experience, at any rate, pure
conception at the subjective pole, as a mythical criterion.)

The ontological argument has a greater hold than other arguments
on the minds of some great thinkers in religious theory. At the same
time the sponsors of the argument have also realized its far-reaching
implications: these do not agree with their philosophical creed
of absolute idealism. The God of the ontological argument may
be a perfect being but may not be the necessary being; the absolute
of absolute idealism may be the necessary being but may not be a
perfect being. The discrepancy is sought to be made good in
different ways. Bradley, for example, has relegated God to the
realm of appearance. And he bears an unmistakably agnostic
attitude to the absolute experience:

"We have no basis on which to doubt that all content comes to-
gether harmoniously in the Absolute. ... All this detail is not
made one in any way we know, but how, in particular, is hid
from us."\(^9\)

And Pringle-Pattison, who discusses the pros and cons of the argu-
ment, concludes with the con: That the existence of an idea in
the mind implies the existence of the content of the idea outside
the mind is 'an unproved belief', 'a venture of faith', 'a postulate
of reason' and 'a supreme hypothesis'.

\(^9\) F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality.
Thus, the rationalist fails, while the empiricist rejects.

ROMANTICIST-RATIONALIST SUPPORT FOR THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF. At this point the doctrine of individuation as expounded by some romanticist-rationalists may be resorted to as a support for the argument. This is the logical articulation of the transcendental mystical method: as such it is the connecting link between the two main sources of theistic evidence—rationalist and mystical.

The mere discovery of the supreme, rational idea does not end the theoretical venture, does not realize the highest value, does not prove God. The endeavour must extend to verification of the idea. This is similar to but not identical with verification of a scientific hypothesis. The supreme idea is to be verified, tested or proved true but by being realized directly in our life. The scientist has to construct a hypothesis, keeping in view that it must be possible for one to bring it in relation to facts and see whether it is in accordance with facts. A set of sound logical principles determines the procedure of construction and verification of a hypothesis. The scientist must go through all the steps of the procedure before he can confirm the hypothesis into a scientific truth. Similarly, religion which aims at the supreme rational experience must satisfy all the demands of a theoretical endeavour. It must verify the idea, must find out whether the supreme idea of reason is true or not. Only, one has to verify it by realizing it directly in one's life.

No amount of scepticism in regard to the proofs of God can do away with the existence of religious experience. Religious experience, however great be its variety, cannot but occur as long as man remains endowed with reason. True, it cannot escape gradation; this is but natural: the full realization of the implications of reason may not dawn upon any one at any time. But even this all too human situation does not shut out something of the highest value in the experience of a right-minded person; he will never have an occasion to miss it. He carries about himself the scale of values; a reference to this always determines that which is the highest, as a matter of course. The rational evaluation cannot proceed but by creating two poles, the objective pole and the subjective pole; and this guarantees the religious experience which represents the highest subject. The religious experience then

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10 I have drawn upon the version given by Dr. N. V. Joshi and Dr. S. K. Moitra.
requires no further justification than the one that is needed by any other significant experience.

We plead not guilty of equivocation on the expression 'highest'. That the range of the subjective varies from person to person according to the existential limitations of each and may be assigned an all human highest does not rule out the highest which is ever receding but never eluding and hence available at the moment for each of us.

Every experience, we have noted, is the meeting-ground of the two principles—the logical and the metaphysical. The former principle, being purely regulative, seeks to bring about order, system and gradation in our experience. A consequent of experience and never the ground of it, the logical principle cannot by itself explain the existential aspect of our experience; in order that the process of ordering may set in, the entities to be set in order must be presupposed.

Neither can the regulative principle operate independently of the existential aspect. The reason is not far to seek. Variation in the intensity of feeling for the highest generates the grades of regulative process. The regulative principle itself is embedded in an experience, in which the parts represent the whole in the ideal or potential form; and the more intense the feeling with which the parts apprehend the whole, the more orderly and systematic becomes the experience. Thus, the transition from the more confused to the less confused stage presupposes the feeling of the part for the logical whole. The experience simply does not occur if the feeling does not occur.

Feeling invests in an experience its existential character. As such feeling should be identified as the metaphysical or creative principle. And since without feeling an experience does not occur at all, every experience may be said to be a manifestation of the process of individuation. Furthermore, individuation varies in degree according to the intensity of the feeling for an ever-receding but never-eluding highest. The more powerful the feeling for the highest, the higher is the individuality. An example may make this clear. In the corpus of a political community, we come across people of all types ranging from criminals (who would like to thrive at the cost of others) to statesmen and martyrs (who stand for and try to realize the logical aspirations of the community in the most pronounced manner). The former we condemn and punish; the
latter we love and admire. In between come various assortments of men, law-abiding and peace-loving, who severally represent the political idea to a greater or lesser extent.

Individuality thus must not be taken to mean something static and rigid like numerical identity or particularity. Intensive and dynamic, it shares the nature of a process and is capable of growing by degrees and passing through stages. The inward feeling of those who realize it sustains the various modes of its expression and determines the logical evaluation of the modes in a graduated scale. On the scale of individuality, to take the above examples again, the criminal’s is below zero-level; whereas martyrs and statesmen are on a high grade.

God is of course the highest of such individuations within the bounds of human experience. Others falling short of it are not God: as representing the highest level, God must be so distinguished. Such a distinction the logical principle alone can make, as it acquires the character of sublimity at the subjective pole. But God is also an individuation: in other words, an experience seeking to realize the subject-object synthesis. In this respect, God embodies the ontological principle which we have detected in feeling and which by virtue of its creative impulse brings into being all experience, whether high or low. God is thus the realization of the sublime in our experience.

The above account dissolves the absolute idealist’s fixation on the belief in the metaphysical status of the logical principle. Along with this, it corrects the defect in the proof of God’s existence.

The rationalists recognize only one principle as the basis of our experience: this is the logical principle of non-contradiction. They carry it far—even to postulate a perfect identity of the real and the rational. In other words, they hold that the above principle serves equally well as both the regulative and the constitutive principles. Our analysis has exposed the weakness of this view, and cleared the grounds for a better proof of God.

The above-mentioned fixation of the rationalist has foiled all the attempts to find an adequate justification for the ontological proof of God’s existence given by the schoolmen. It is patent that the logical principle by itself being purely formal and empty cannot create experience. Feeling for an idea creates an experience and thus realizes the idea. The principle of individuation (as we have briefly stated above) unifies the two penultimate principles. The
ontological argument seeking a synthesis of the rational with existence but failing to attain it finds a support from the principle of individuation. It can find no better justification than this elsewhere and otherwise.

BERGSØN AND KIERKEGAARD ON RELIGION. We may seek approval of our account partially in Bergson and fully in Kierkegaard. These two thinkers are among a few who have made an attempt to overcome the rationalist predicament.

On Bergson's view, the metaphysical principle spontaneously brings about the inward and organic synthesis of the various elements of the mystic's personality: the religious experience at its highest is determined by no other than this principle. Such an experience characterizes the dynamic religion, and sustains its dynamic character against the ballasts of traditional religions. Its deadly impact on the static religion dissolves the corpse-like, fossilized existence of the latter with all its empty ritual, pharisaical formality and mechanical modes of worship and service. The dynamic religion then creates the holy heart which throbs with a loving and willing service of God and sometimes finds an intimate communion with Him without a single item of the paraphernalia of static religiosity.

The point of agreement between our view and Bergson's thus rests on the stress on the creative character of the metaphysical principle: only, we identify it with feeling; he discovers it in intuition. There is however a divergence in the two views. Bergson is right in decrying the religion which is solely conditioned by the logical principles. For, mere logical principles give us the travesty of religiosity—a bloodless, lifeless ghost of religion. Where he goes wrong is the assumption of a necessary opposition between logic and religion. A true religion need not be opposed to all logic whatsoever. Bergson however seems to hold the opposite view. By a dichotomous division between intelligence and intuition, Bergson exposes religion to a precarious existence. The dynamic religion which he glorifies may have all the creative force in it, but none of the sublime character of religion. It may have life and blood, but no spine.

Kierkegaard, on the contrary, recommends a closer contact between life and logic. In recognizing the category of 'the individual' as the supreme category of interpretation of religious experience, he gives what is due to the logical principle which is an element of
the same category and embedded in it. He uses the expression 'indirect communication' for the constitutive principle or the principle of realization. All individuality needs indirect communication. This is an entirely subjective and inward process. God cannot be brought to light objectively: God is subject and exists only for subjectivity. All this must not be construed as entailing loss of objectivity. Indirect communication simply means that the object to be known has to be brought in direct relation to one's own self, with the existential feeling of one's own personality. It is this relation of the objective knowledge to one's self which invests it with reality.

The role of indirect communication bears a close resemblance to the role we have assigned to feeling in our theory. The doctrine of indirect communication gains in significance as it seems quite competent in developing a religious outlook. For example, on this doctrine, a person cannot become a true Christian by simply observing some rites and ceremonies. Neither can he be one by means of priestly logomachies and academic logic chopping towards the vindication of the revealed dogma. There is only one way, the way of imitation of Christ, in identifying one's self entirely with Christ.

Kierkegaard's view of religious experience thus bears a very close resemblance to our view. What is logically the highest must be experienced, and experienced with such an intensity as to get one's existence transfigured, so to say. The implication of this view is the same as that of our characterization of religion as the realization of the highest value, as the meeting ground of the sublime and the absolute.

**Is Mysticism Purely Pathological?** The romanticist-rationalists draw directly upon the realization of the mystics. The mystics claim to have reached the subjective pole and they also claim that it is possible to reach there by way of a certain discipline. We may now try to sift the evidence for the realization of the highest value from the mystical quarters.

Religious life reaches its culminating phase in mysticism. Ecstasy or intense joy characterizes the direct spiritual perception. Some psychologists, however, look upon the phenomena of mysticism as cases of pathological conditions of the brain. The reasons are not far to seek. Mystics do behave in abnormal ways. Quite often they manifest certain physiological symptoms which bear a close

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11 Thomte, Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion, p. 171.
resemblance with hysterical and epileptic fits. In some extreme cases
of intense experience, the persons show definite signs of trance or
absence of normal nervous function and such a state sometimes
lasts for hours or even days together at a stretch. Secondly, those
psychologists are guided by external symptoms and the findings of
general psychology.

A closer observation, however, reveals a striking contrast between
mysticism and psychopathic state. The resemblance between the
two vanishes if we look beyond external symptoms and into the
total behaviour of the mystic, in particular, his behaviour after
the experience. This latter behaviour shows a wide divergence from
the after-effects of epileptic or hysterical fits. The mystic and the
psychopathic thus stand poles apart from each other. The latter
is gripped by pain and passivity, weakness and decreased vitality.
A man suffering from fits of unconsciousness on account of some
disorder in the nervous system is overpowered by physical weakness
and regains his mental composure and activity after a lapse of
time. The mystic's experience, on the contrary, has an exhilarating
effect; it illuminates and satisfies the mind, strengthens and trans-
forms the character. The mystic's behaviour is characterized by
increased vitality and activity, general consistency between theory
and practice, sense of validity of the idea and the operation of a
rational plan.

Instead of the symptom of physical weakness, the mystic's beha-
viour quite often shows an invigoration and overflowing of mental
energy. Instead of a depressed mind, the mystic attains to an inward
illumination and satisfaction. Far from showing a dependence
on others, he shows a high degree of self-confidence in what he says
and of self-dependence in what he does. The psychopathic loss of
control is conspicuous by its absence in the mystic's behaviour:
he brings under strict control of the overpowering influence of his
vision all his lower desires and passions and thus enjoys the fresh
vigour of a transfigured personality. Instead of the psychopathic
disposition to derogate from the rational level, the mystic shows the
tendency to greater rationality. His practice becomes highly con-
sistent with what he claims to know and profess. Such a consistent
behaviour may be construed as an instance of monoideism. We
need not raise the controversy whether this (the logical consistency
between the mystic's profession and practice) is at all such a case
or not. There is, however, no denying the fact that the mystic's
monoideism carries the sense of validity of the idea and also the disposition and capacity to adhere to it against all hazards. The idea takes complete possession of his mind, he identifies himself with it, and no amount of suffering and sacrifice can swerve him from it.

**Both feeling and sublimity characterize the mystic experience.** The mystical experience is thus not a pathological phenomenon. The operation of a rational plan distinguishes the mystic’s experience and his later biography which is subordinated to it. The mental decrepit can never claim to have such a plan operative in his life. True, we may detect different grades of rational planning in the lives of different mystics. The degree varies as the intellectual endowment and strength of will of the person. The intenser forms occur rarely but leave their indelible stamp on the history of human culture. The Buddha, Socrates and Christ may be mentioned among the most conspicuous of them: they have changed the entire course of spiritual life by following the rational plan of their mystical vision.

In short, we detect both feeling and sublimity as the two distinguishing traits of mystic’s experience. Firstly, an exuberance of feeling accompanies the experience; this makes for the inward satisfaction of the mystic’s mind. Secondly, the experience reveals greater comprehensive and better internal system, and therefore, a rational organization operative in it; this makes for the supreme validity and authority of the experience.

Different writers on religion have used different names for these characteristics. Tauler, for example, holds that the ‘inner kingdom’ is characterized by the ‘sweetness of God’ and ‘pure truth’. The expressions used by William James in his *Varieties* seem more familiar though scholastic: ‘ineffability’ stands for the feeling aspect; ‘noetic quality’, the valuational aspect.

These characteristics belong to no other experiences than the mystical. The exuberance of feeling, or ineffability, for example, has very little in common with any emotional state. One is ontological; the other, psychological. The emotional state is a psychological phenomenon; so are the various sentiments and moods it induces. All emotions have their physiological reverberations, their behaviour expressions: hence they can be observed empirically. Not so the feeling of the mystic. It may or may not have any emotional behaviouristic counter-points. It is felt by the mystic in the

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depths of his being as it brings about an inner transformation of the personality. This feeling realizes the mystic's idea; it gives existential status to the total principle. Spontaneous and creative, it is inaccessible to empirical observation, or as James calls it, ineffable.

It is ineffable but neither indefinite nor non-existent. On the contrary, this ineffable feeling possesses the most positive existential character. Only, it is incapable of being communicated; incommunicability does not detract from its experienceability or its positive existence. It is presented immediately. According to the Indian thinkers, it may be called swasamvedya.

A similar confusion pursues the second characteristic of mysticism. The rational plan which operates in it is not to be construed as in the context of psychological cognition. One is logical; the other psychological. Psychologists of religion, however, make such confusions between ideational aspect of our mind and mystical rationalism. All psychological cognitions do not stand the test of logical validity. They include cases of cognitions which have no logical value at all, viz. cases of phantastic imagination, illusions, hallucinations.

Mystical experience can stand the test of logic fully well. The noetic quality or disposition to organize experience rationally distinguishes it from mere psychological cognition. Hence it cannot be classed with hallucinations, illusions, etc. The mystic experience makes an appeal to reason, aims at logical validity and claims to be theoretically authoritative. And indeed, it acquires the authority as the best expression of human reason under the circumstances in which it manifests itself.13

The sublimity we have in view is precisely this noetic quality. Sublimity characterizes an experience which is not only rational but supremely rational. The supremely rational character distinguishes the highest value from perception and intellect. Both perception and intellect fall short of that experience which seeks to be fully systematic—a logical whole, in which the various elements go harmoniously together. An experience which does become fully systematic alone can claim the rank and title of the divine experience. The sublime represents this experience and becomes the regulative principle: it guides us in the hierarchical gradation of the various experiences, and thus helps us to find out which one is the highest among them.

Thus, the mystical experience is the result of the simultaneous operation of and ultimate convergence of the two principles—the metaphysical principle of feeling and the logical principle of the sublime. The feeling lends the religious experience an intensely personal character: it demands that what is the highest be felt and lived by someone and thus be an experience and as such real. Even distinguished writers in religious theory do not keep in mind this condition of realization to be fulfilled by the religious idea. Höffding, for example, in his characterization of religion as ‘conservation of values’ depersonalizes reason and gives it a purely regulative significance. Stated thus, religion may be construed as simply standing for an abstract possibility. Many of us can visualize a possibility with none of us having anything religious about us at all; we may have a notion of the supreme idea of reason, yet lack that living and dynamic force which moulds and remakes the entire personality.

Let the supreme idea of reason be united in a holy wedlock with feeling; and one then has the mystical experience repeatedly and then acquires the disposition towards it. The experience becomes the source of his life’s inspiration and the supreme value with reference to which he orders and organizes his passions and desires. The expression ‘spiritual marriage’ describes this union between the metaphysical and logical principles in the mystic experience.

**DOES THE MYSTIC ‘KNOW’ GOD?** We may here meet the criticism of the logical empiricist. He argues that no knowledge occurs in mystical experience. He makes his point on the basis of the meaning of the word ‘knowledge’ and on the factual analysis of the mystical situation, which is taken on the mystic’s own lower level description of it.

The mystical seeker usually takes it for granted that to be godlike is to know God and that to know God makes one godly. The empiricist concedes the point that the mystical seer becomes godly, that he does acquire some measure of moral perfection or holiness. But he refuses to concede that this is the same as the attainment of the knowledge of God. For, by knowledge, he says, we mean (i) psychologically, a mental state, and (ii) logically, a judgement. Knowledge as a mental state presupposes some introspective awareness of the distinction between the subject and the object of knowledge, between the knower and the known. If this distinction

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be not there, there can be no cognitive situation, for, then, the question 'who knows what?' remains unanswerable. Knowledge as a judgement entails the logical distinction between subject and predicate or between relata and relations that make up the judgement. Logically, no experience can be said to yield knowledge, to be a theoretical realization, unless it is describable, that is, expressible in the form of a proposition.

On the basis of this empirical logical analysis of 'knowledge', the empiricist argues that in neither sense of the word 'knowledge' the mystic can claim to have known God. For, the empiricist argues, the alleged knowledge of God is attained in a state of silence when all distinctions vanish, so the experience which does not involve any awareness of logical and psychological distinctions may be a source of delightful emotion but it cannot be a state of knowledge. Secondly, the mystics of different historic cultures and times have only their holiness as the common trait, not their metaphysical or theological protocols. Thirdly, the mystical seeker usually starts with a postulate of his own or of his culture: this turns into knowledge by way of contemplation. But a factual analysis reveals that the contemplation involves auto-suggestion: the initial belief comes as a revelation by way of auto-suggestion voicing in silence. There have been mystics like Buddha who did not start with any belief; they attained silence but no revelations about reality.\(^{15}\)

The transcendentalist may meet the empiricist's points with the following counterepoints: Translated into rationalist language, 'to be godlike is to know God' means 'to attain the highest subjective status is to know that status reflexively without rising higher'. Read in this language, the empiricist's first objection is: in his experience, the mystic attains to the highest subjective status for which all else is object; is God this object—the mystic's lower selves and the world? If, in his experience, he realizes the identity between the highest subject and the rest which is the object, then, the awareness of distinction between the two vanishes and there would be no knowledge. The rationalist answer is as follows: in his experience, the mystic attains to the highest subjective status, for which not only all else is object, but for which self-knowledge is the knowledge of God. God is thus not his lower selves including

\(^{15}\) G. N. Mathrani, "A Positivist Critique of Religion", *The Philosophical Quarterly*. 
the world; God is the subjective pole, at which the mystic's lower
selves become the object and at which being aware of the new sub-
jective status he feels identical with God. 'But what is oneness with-
out otherness?'—to quote John Wisdom again. Besides, when the
mystic comes down to his lower station again, the highest subject
clings to him as the object of his memory and as certain traits of
his holy behaviour.

To avoid indefinite regress, the progressive elevation of the sub-
jective status must have a stop at some experience where the subject
in knowing itself does not turn into an object of a new unknown
subject, but simply becomes an object of its self-knowledge. The
distinctions necessary for a cognitive situation are still there:
the realization of the identity does not take place in a cognitive
vacuum or darkness. Identity is not absence of distinctions but
equation of distincts. (Even in A = A, the two A's are distinct.)
The ineffability of the feeling content does not do away with the
noetic quality, the awareness that the highest subjective status
has been attained which cannot be the object of any higher subject
but which can be only its own object. Furthermore, the feeling
part is ineffable in any and every experience. The mystical ex-
perience if described on the lower level becomes a more or less 'dis-
torted' report just as in the case of every other experience.

As to the other points of the empiricist, it is not correct to say that
mystics of different lands and times have had no common theoretical
realization: all asserted the existence of God in their direct spiritual
perception; their differences bear on inessentials. And Buddha's
silence about the existence of God has been the result of his wish
to avoid verbalism and logomachy.

The mystic does know God and become a man-God. We may
try to sum up in the language of to-day's linguistic philosophy.
'God' is a word. It is a symbol used by theists to refer to an indi-
vidual. There are three kinds of symbols used to refer to indi-
viduals. Is the word 'God' a logically proper name, an ordinary
proper name or a descriptive phrase?

Mystics are usually represented as claiming that God can be
directly experienced but cannot be described. Therefore, 'God'
according to them is a logically proper name that applies to an
individual, which can be experienced only as a particular. As a
result of a certain process of discipline, they have an experience

16 Susan Langer, Philosophy in a New Key.
(an individual), about which they can use the demonstrative symbol 'this' but about which they use the symbol 'God'. They should not use the word 'God' if it is a descriptive phrase. The experience is alleged to be indescribable; so they can use no descriptive phrases about it. Hence, 'God' = 'this', according to mystics. But why do they use the word 'God' for 'this'? Because, they already carry the idea of God, that is, a descriptive phrase for which 'God' is one word. And the mystic experience (an individual) occurs as the individual to which they find the descriptive phrase applies. Hence, they say 'this is God'. But then, one should not say the experience is indescribable. And the mystics do describe it as they come down to the lower level.

Rationalists claim that God can only be conceived or described, that is, can be experienced only as a universal. 'God', therefore, according to them is an ordinary proper name, which is used descriptively but which is primarily intended to stand for the individual called by the name. The descriptive phrase or phrases for which 'God' is one word can be understood (howsoever vaguely) but the individual to which it may apply can never be experienced as a particular.

In effect, 'God' seems to remain a mere descriptive phrase. The two essential descriptive phrases for which 'God' stands are (i) the creative principle or necessary being, for which the word 'absolute' is used in metaphysics, and (ii) the perfect being or the highest good or the sublime, for which the word 'God' is used in philosophy of religion. The descriptive phrase 'creative principle' or 'necessary being' applies to the ultimate reality or individual. Here the question whether God exists or not does not arise. For, the God of religion is not the same as the absolute of metaphysics, and the absolute of metaphysics is the necessary being, which may be said to have been adequately proved by way of the cosmological argument. And that this is abstract and dynamic can also be proved: we have done that.

The other descriptive phrase is 'perfect being' or 'sublime'. Here the most perfect beings among the human beings—the prophets, the avatars, the universal men-gods—are the nearest examples of individuals who can be experienced as both particulars and universals, as particulars to which the descriptive phrases can roughly apply. Roughly, because divine perfection surpasses any human perfectibility by definition.
The mystics certainly claim that both the descriptive phrases 'creative' and 'sublime' apply to their experience. If this is the case, they do experience God. How to know this is the case? By actually realizing the experience in our life.

THE METHODS EMPLOYED BY THE RELIGIOUS SEEKERS TO ATTAIN MYSTIC VISION. We may now look into the various methods employed by aspirants to realize an intimate communion or 'atonement' with God. These methods of religious discipline have no other aim than to bring about a change in the aspirant's personality so as to put him at the subjective pole, at the most inward and intense centre of his existence. An analysis of the religious discipline will, therefore, confirm our view that the religious attitude is theoretical in character, that religion is realization of the highest in theory. Whether it is an adequate means to the end in view can only be found out by actually trying it.

The aspirant undergoes a course of training and discipline towards inner purification and acquisition of spiritual power: he does it in the belief that thereby he will overcome the defects of his lower selves and reach the level of divine self.

To begin with, the aspirant tries to develop within himself an unusual power of mental concentration. He learns how to fix up his total attention only on the divine idea day and night and over a long period of his life. He sets his heart on the values of the supreme experience and contrasts it constantly with his existing set of values. Thereby he hopes to bring about some modification in his character and scheme of values. This involves a total suppression of certain interests of the lower levels, especially those which are found to come into conflict with the spirit of divine experience. Quite often he has to cultivate and develop a passion or feeling for new interests, especially those which directly aid and assist in developing the characteristics of the life divine. Such a course of sublimation, inhibition or even total suppression of one's interests involves a long and arduous training of one's personality. More often than not, in order to check the erratic passions and impulses, one has to impose on one's self severe austerities, abstentions and even tortures. Furthermore, he has to find out several methods of auto-suggestion. Auto-suggestion infuses a spirit of divinity into his lower self.

We may thus discern a twofold character of religious discipline: negative and positive. The negative aspect with its predominance
of practice gives the wrong impression that religion is primarily a practical realization. The positive aspect corrects this false impression and confirms the theoretical character of religious realization.

THE NEGATIVE ASPECT OF RELIGIOUS DISCIPLINE CONFIRMS THAT RELIGION IS NOT A PRACTICAL REALIZATION. Religious mystics have been found to be great ascetics. It is quite common for them to take the aid of drastic measures towards the suppression of dispositions which seem erratic and undesirable. What is called hathayoga by the Indian thinkers is an elaborate scheme of such drastic methods. These are all methods of inflicting pain and torture on one’s self. Fasting for months at a stretch, emaciating the flesh, uncomfortable postures, sleeplessness for days together, exposure to inclemencies of weather—may be mentioned as some among many such methods.

Such methods have been used by aspirants almost without exception. These have also produced results in some cases. It would, nevertheless, be wrong to suppose that without these aids no divine experience could be had. Besides, the methods have proved useful only in the cases of persons with an absolutely intractable will, persons who have ‘sick souls’—in the words of William James. For the ‘healthy souls’ the methods are to be used with caution. For them an indiscriminate use of such methods is not only a sheer folly but is disastrous: far from proving helpful it may prove suicidal. The Bhagawad-Geeta condemns the use of such methods, which, according to it, are sponsored by the demon. Western theologians take the same view of the matter.17

There are milder methods prescribed for purging the soul of its dross. The Yoga system of Indian philosophy, for example, recommends a mild form of religious discipline to aspirants. The yoga discipline primarily aims at inhibiting the functions of the mind: Yogashchittavrttinirdhah, as Patanjali words it in his second aphorism. This is the end; the means prescribed are eightfold (restraint, observances, posture, regulation of breath, abstraction, concentration, meditation, communion).18 The eightfold ‘means to yoga’ comprehends most of what goes to make up the negative aspect of religious discipline. It includes at once the methods of two stages, the ‘purgative’ and the ‘meditative’ or ‘illuminative’ as outlined by the long tradition of Christian mystics.

17 J. B. Pratt, op. cit., p. 386.
18 Dr. Ganganath Jha, The Yoga Darshana, pp. xxiv-v.
Some of the methods do remove distractions of the mind, tame it and add to the power of concentration. Psychologists of religion too agree on this point.\(^\text{19}\) We need not therefore deny the methods their due. Their partial effectiveness in curbing the refractory will and developing the power of concentration is unmistakable. Yet they remain, on the whole, negative in character. Besides, with too much stress laid on them, with too much importance given to the detail of the procedures involved, they may turn into formality—empty, mechanical and stereo-typed. And this may lead to deviation from the main goal which is to feel the presence of God within one’s self and thus have the theoretical confirmation of the supreme idea of reason. Even the specific purpose of subordinating the lower self may be forgotten. In India, those who follow the Bhakti cult have denounced these methods. Of course, considering the value of the methods as negative aids, one need not agree on discarding them altogether. One must, however, see that they are used judiciously and with caution, that they are harnessed to the attainment of the positive religious attitude.

**THE POSITIVE METHODS OF RELIGIOUS DISCIPLINE CONFIRM THE THEORETICAL CHARACTER OF THE RELIGIOUS REALIZATION.** In its positive aspect, religious discipline leads the spiritual self into a direct and intimate communion with the spirit. Inner purification and developed power of concentration may simply prepare the stage for the final act of the divine comedy. Christian theologians call it the ‘unitive’ stage of the religious life.

To feel the presence of God within one’s self—this is what the mystic primarily aims at. This is possible provided he makes a deliberate effort to identify his self fully with God and persists in such effort. He has to surrender and adapt himself totally to the divine will and thus bring about a complete metastasis within the self. He has to give to the idea of God a nodal position in his life, and then to mould all the elements of his personality and find meaning and significance of everything only with reference to that idea. It is not a child’s play to produce such an attitude. On the contrary, this is the most difficult venture—like balancing oneself and walking on the razor’s edge, as the Upanishadic seer puts it. The reason is not far to seek. At the final stage the aspirant has no external means to depend upon; and to fall back upon any such means will be a retrograde step. He must either transform the inward

attitudes of his own self or step back into the groove of familiar drabness.

One need not despair. Two effective ways have been prescribed: the one is worship; the other is prayer. These are positive: they lead to the realization sought after and incidentally bear testimony to the fact that religion is a realization of the sublime in theory.

Let us look into the nature of worship. There are two types of it. One aims at making 'some kind of effect upon the Deity or in some way communicating with him, while the other seeks only to induce some desired mood or belief or attitude in the mind of the worshipper'. The former is called objective worship, and the latter, the subjective worship. This classification roughly corresponds with that into kinds of devotion described or prescribed by Hindu theology, namely, the saguna upāsanā and the nirguna upāsanā.

This distinction gains in importance as we detect a valuational gradation in it. This can be traced to the basic conviction of the theologians that the religious attitude has to pass through stages before it can assume the final and right form. In the earlier stages, the aspirant cannot altogether do without an external means; yet even then, the means used is used as a symbol. He has to hold some objective image or idol of deity before his mind. This image or idol he invests with all the divine attributes and then he has to train his mind to identify itself with all these attributes. The nine-fold path of saguna upāsanā seems a positive aid to the realization of this identity of attributes.

Objective worship thus helps the aspirant in bringing about the desired spiritual metastasis. He can then afford to dispense with idols and objective images. No objective aid is now needed for him to commune with God. He reaches the stage of nirguna upāsanā. The transition from one stage to the other thus depends on the development of the disposition of self-surrender or self-submission to the divine will, of the feeling of piety which is a composite of the primary feelings of wonder, fear, tenderness and self-submission.

It is not necessary that all should start with the saguna upāsanā, develop the pietistic disposition, effect the transition to the next stage and then take up the nirguna upāsanā for a direct communion

20 Ibid., p. 290, p. 327.
21 'Hear the names and attributes of Lord Vishnu, sing them, remember them, serve Him, worship Him, sing His praise, feel like His slave, look upon Him as your companion, and surrender to Him.'
with God. This is necessary where the subject lacks education and self-culture and his mind has not developed the susceptibility to the rational implications of divine existence. But an aspirant with the proper mental equipment—capacity for rationality and piety—may directly take recourse to nirguna upāsanā.

J. B. Pratt who draws a similar distinction between objective and subjective worship also disparages and depreciates the objective worship. He does not however depreciate worship as such. Worship is natural to a person who has developed the religious attitude. Pratt also believes that it is bound to be cherished at all times; especially, the subjective worship cannot be given up.

Prayer puts us at the very heart of religious attitude. The main efficacy of prayer lies in auto-suggestion. In praying, the aspirant's mind opens itself and receives the full influx of the divine spirit within itself. This is what happens in devotional prayers which must be sharply contrasted with petitional prayers. (Petitional prayers are those by means of which some objective result such as rainfall, acquisition of fame, wealth, progeny, etc. is sought. They are quite common but they are no better than relics of magic. We have put them in their proper place: they belong to religion on the levels of prelogical experience. In contrast with devotional prayers, petitional ones seem devoid of significance.) Prayer in piety is never meant to produce any objective effect at all. It is meant to induce a change in the subjective attitude and attune the aspirant's mind to the needs of the final communion with the supreme self. Prayer of communion is thus the only significant refined ritual: it reminds us of our identity-in-difference, our 'atonement' as well as our creatureliness with the divine.²⁰

RELIGION IS A THEORETICAL REALIZATION. The above analysis of mysticism and its methods, ascetic or otherwise, lays bare the purpose of the religious seeker. He manifestly aims at a transition from the lower self to the highest. The aspirant seeks to subordinate the lower selves in order to reach the highest, to assimilate the partial experiences into the logical whole. Indeed, he seeks to realize an ever-ascending series of experiences approaching the most inward self, the subjective pole. The direction of the religious attitude is thus unmistakably from the object to the subject. And our attitude is said to be theoretical when our aim is to pass from the objective to the subjective pole.

Of course, the realization of the sublime in practice is quite pos-
sible; but then, that is the function of fine arts, not of religion. And if after the realization, which is theoretical, the mystic comes back to nature and history as a prophet, well, that is the role of an educator, a moral and social reformer. The task of a religious seeker is to have a vision in which the lower self is brought to the subjective pole.
Fixational Cultures

Evil lies in fixation of feeling for the part taken as a whole. In religion we have repeatedly noted that experience reaches a perfectly systematic character. This implies among other things that the three constituents of experience, viz. the material self, the social self and the spiritual self are partly independent. In so far as they are independent, the parts play a dominant role; it is they that lend reality to the whole by representing it within themselves. The whole is in the parts. 'God is thinking in and as our thought'—this is how Spinoza puts it. As Leibniz puts it: the parts perceive the whole; the whole expresses itself through the parts.

But the independence of the parts is not complete. The whole being a systematic unity, the parts and the whole have an aspect of interdependence too: while every part is given its proper status and worth, none is allowed to transcend its limitations. In religious experience, no part seeks to assert its complete independence from the whole. Neither the natural self nor the social self claims to have an absolute, supreme value for itself, or refuses to take part in the life of the whole. Nor can the spiritual self deny the lower selves the fulfilment of their legitimate urges. The error, the evil and the unreality of the parts are thus overcome and superseded finally in the religious experience.

If, however, we remain blissfully unaware of this systematic relation between the parts and the whole, a part will appear to have the status of the whole and checkmate the spiritual progress. And there will be a retardation in our spiritual life, if we keep in abeyance the awareness of the integral relation between the parts and the whole. A part will then illegitimately seek to assert its independence from the whole: it will refuse to take up its proper position in the whole experience and will put up a false claim to the
supreme value for itself. It will be a pretender for and may even usurp the highest status. Then it will not only cease to move towards the higher, but will show a disposition either to expand on the same level with its error and evil, or derogate and degenerate.

Once a part thus usurps the status of the highest, it creates nothing but chaos and confusion in the total experience. Order, system and hierarchy come into existence as a result of the disposition of the parts to go together and get themselves co-ordinated with one another in subordination to the whole. Lacking this inner affinity and submission among the elements in relation to the whole, the whole will be a travesty of a system. There will be no coherence and harmony, no synaesthesia in the experience. It will be infested with discord, dissatisfaction and misery.

All this gives us an insight into the very source of evil. The genesis of evil may be traced to the assuming of an absolute character by a single element of the ideal experience. This last statement does not imply that every experience of ours must be given as a perfect whole in order to be free from evil. Our experience in that case loses its dynamic character and gets congealed into a static structure: we can talk of no process of growth in value from the lower to the higher; all individual biography turns into a sordid story of spiritual stagnation.

These misgivings, however, arise from the lack of a proper understanding of the systematic relationship. An experience in which a part *tends* to realize and represent the whole within itself cannot be properly characterized as partial. It is not necessary for the part to have actually realized the whole in and through itself; in order for an experience to be immune from the infection of evil, it is sufficient for it to show a *nitusus* towards the whole, a disposition for the next higher individuality. The awareness of its incompleteness is only the *necessary* condition: for, this may or may not urge us to go forward. But the desire or urge to move in the direction of the whole is the *sufficient* condition: for this is positive and dynamic as well as necessarily involves the consciousness of imperfection.

An example may clarify the point at issue. Let us take the case of an educator. In educating a child, a teacher is conscious of its imperfection. The deficient knowledge of the taught is the very *raison d'être* of the teacher's existence, and far from being a deterrent, makes it a pleasurable task for him to teach. The situation becomes alarming and gets out of control when the pupil displays
a positive disposition of defiance and claims his knowledge to be perfect when it is really not so.

To be imperfect or at the lower stage, by itself, therefore, has nothing to do with evil. This is an indispensable step or stage in the slow evolution towards the good and true—as Sri Aurobindo points out. Evil lies in believing that the lower itself is the highest. Or to be exact, since imperfect logic alone does not produce evil, we may say that the feeling for such belief—both the finding of satisfaction in it and the efficient feeling behind it sustaining it—is the source of evil.

Psychologists have a word for such a phenomenon: they call it a *fixation* of ideas. Monomaniacs, jilted lovers, megalomaniacs—to take a few instances—suffer from fixations. The obsessions of those who develop feeling or mania for certain stray ideas and refuse to think of other things are abnormal cases. Tendencies of fixation may also be found in frustrated sex-love or in the experience of unexpected failure in some grandiose or ambitious plan. Such fixations un hinge men's minds.

Evil is thus grounded in the fixation of feeling for some erroneous, that is, partial, perspective. Partial perspectives thus 'fixed' produce the disvalues or imbalance of values and in conflict with one another pile up miseries and sufferings for the entire humanity.

**EVEl CAN BE OVERCOME BY THE FEELING FOR THE HIGHEST.** There are several solutions of the problem of the eradication of evil. The rationalist idealist's solution looks quite simple: it is the outcome of their monistic theory of coherence which claims to present one single criterion of truth, value and reality. According to them, evil is an appearance, but a vanishing quantity; it arises in a psychological fixation for a fragmentary point of view; it persists as long as the partial aspects of the ideal experience claim to have a monopolistic possession of the whole truth. A. E. Taylor, for example, says: 'For a proposition is never untrue simply because it is not the whole truth, but only when, not being the whole truth, it is mistakenly taken to be so.' When we become aware of the fragmentary character of the experience on which the fixation is based, and get an insight into the nature of the absolute or ideal whole of the experience, the partial experience is assigned its proper status in relation to the other elements; then, there is no contradic-

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tion left, and the evil fostered by the previously held error of the partial point of view is overcome and transcended.

This rationalist view is usually criticized on the ground that it misses the actual 'sting' of the evil. No amount of entre nous laboratorial treatment of philosophical categories does away with the sting. As long as the evil based on the absolutized error works, it remains the source of misery and degradation. There is nothing wrong in holding that evil can be done away with by our having an insight into the highest systematic experience. The problem however remains as to how precisely such an insight can be developed. The rationalist's view of the question may be stated as Joachim puts it in connection with coherence:

"It must show, e.g. how the complete coherence, which is perfect truth, involves as a necessary 'moment' in its self-maintenance the self-assertion of the finite modal minds: a self-assertion, which in its extreme form is Error (Evil). It must reconcile this self-assertive independence with the modal dependence of the self-asserting minds; and the reconciliation must be clearly manifest as an essential moment in the coherence, which is the life of the one significant whole."2

The rationalists viewing the problem from the standpoint of the absolute and believing in the principle of contradiction as the constitutive principle of experience fail to explain the fact of fixation. If the principle of contradiction held good in the very constitution of experience, there need be no fixation of error and evil. The entire polemic revolving round Māyāvāda bears testimony to the failure of the rationalists in solving the problem.

The fact is that the principle of contradiction is a regulative one, and the transition from the lower to the higher stage is not brought about by the regulative principle all alone. It requires the feeling for what is higher. The cases of conversion clearly confirm this view. A true conversion cannot be brought about by a process of mere reasoning. The idea must be felt for, first, as realizable and to be realized, and felt with that much intensity as will effect a change in one's personality and its attitudes. As examples of such conversions we may mention the cases of Vālmiki and Jean Valjean. Their being mythical or fictitious characters does not detract from

the great truth about how conversions take place: it is always by
the smashing of the fixation of our feeling at the lower stage of
experience and by fixing it upon the highest.

THE DIALECTICAL METHOD AS THE LAW OF TRANSITION FROM THE
LOWER TO THE HIGHER STAGES OF EXPERIENCE. Feeling, we have
already noted, is the constitutive principle of our life. This being
the case there can be no external control over feeling. This does
not rule out the possibility of our being able to offset and over-power
one feeling-situation by another of the opposing kind. We can do
that by putting one into direct conflict with the other. Such a move
on our part develops an inner tension in the total life. As the tension
gains in intensity, it ultimately reaches a climax. A new situation
comes into existence. The two conflicting principles get fused into
one, a higher principle. The former then become elements of the
latter and reappear as partial expressions of the latter which is
the whole.

Hegel’s dialectic has a similar triadic pattern. He conceives of
it in the attempt to expose the constant pattern of all process of
development from the lower to the higher stages in our experience.
(Karl Popper while rejecting dialectic reads it as a law of develop-
ment.)\(^3\) The initial partial experience is called the thesis. An equally
partial experience then begins to develop in opposition to the first.
This second is called the antithesis or negation. The opposition
results in a shock. The conflict grows and ultimately dissolves
into a higher stage called the synthesis and characterized as the
negation of negation. This does not come off until and unless the
fixed feeling at the lower level is completely smashed and the
implicit and potential drive of the lower experience to represent
the whole finds an outlet for adequate actualization.

Hegel’s method does help us in understanding the mode of
transition from the lower to the higher. He however mistakenly

\(^3\) 'Dialectic . . . is therefore an empirical theory for describing development,
comparable, for instance, with a theory which maintains that most living
organisms increase their size during some stage of their development, then
remain constant, and lastly decrease until they die, or with the theory which
maintains that opinions are usually held first in a dogmatic attitude, then
in a somewhat sceptical attitude, and only afterwards, in a critical attitude.
Like those theories, dialectic is rather vague. And like those theories, dialectic
has nothing of the nature of logic.' It ceases to be vague if we use it in the
sense of developing from the lower to the higher grade (as in educational
institutions) by including and superseding the lower.
believes that it is only the logical principle of contradiction that determines the dialectical method, that the process is purely a logical moment. Croce sought to improve upon Hegel's account of dialectic by recommending the law of contrary negation in place of the law of contradiction. It is obvious, however, that both are necessary and neither of the two by itself is sufficient to meet the requirements of a logic of development. Bosanquet has clearly distinguished between the two and 'maintained that as we pass from the lower to the higher, contradiction goes on vanishing, while contrary negation assumes more and more importance.' While accepting this relation of inverse variation between the two principles' functioning, we may point out that Bosanquet, in his turn, has failed to relate the two to their common presupposition, viz. the principle of individuation, which is at the root of all development.

The principle of individuation involves the operation of feeling as the basic ontological principle. Hegel's mistake issues from his ill-conceived postulate that the real is rational. In our view the real, though not opposed to the rational, is yet not constituted through it. Feeling constitutes the real; logic regulates the feeling: it introduces order, system and hierarchy tout court.

Once we have an insight into this crucial role of feeling in the process of individuation, it is plain sailing with the task of evaluating the true character of the dialectical method. The driving force in all developmental movement belongs to feeling. It is only when the feeling is activized that it requires the guidance of the logical principle in order to continue to move in the desired direction; then only the conditions set up by the law of contradiction must be fulfilled.

Coming back to the problem of evil, therefore, we can safely assert that the dialectical method by itself cannot eradicate the evil. This in no way detracts from its instrumental character, in relation to our feeling life, as an aid to the understanding of the problem of overcoming error and evil in course of realizing the highest truth.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AND HISTORY OF RELIGION. A slight acquaintance with the history of religion tells us that there has been a gradual development of religious consciousness. To be convinced of this, we may just look into the spirit of the primitive religions and compare it with the religions of Buddha, Christ or Mohammed.

4 Dr. N. V. Joshi, Political Philosophy, p. 14.
We do not mean to say that later religions are better ones. Chronology of development (mere growth or change) does not coincide with the logical development.

The history of religion or of a religion is no guide if we are out to determine its validity. Not history but logical analysis alone can give us the proper criterion of validity of religious consciousness. Logical analysis, guided by the supreme principle of contradiction applicable to all aspects of experience, can validate religion, compare religions and introduce hierarchy. The three aspects of our experience—nature, society and mind, are amenable to such analysis in accordance with the condition of the logical principle of contradiction. The three main disciplines of philosophy, namely the philosophy of nature, philosophy of society and the philosophy of religion, aim at the detailed study of the three aspects of our existence respectively. The dialectical method applies to each sphere and can explain the systematic interrelation of elements in each sphere. Our present concern is total culture: here too the dialectical method is competent enough to introduce system and gradation and point out the fixational systems.

Culture as a system consists of the natural self, the social self and the spiritual self. The passage from the natural to the spiritual characterizes the logical development of cultural consciousness. The historical transition is not smooth and does not show a linear progress. History of Culture presents many cases of arrested cultural consciousness. There have been historical epochs during which exclusive emphasis was laid either on the material well-being or the social well-being or on the spiritual well-being. These are instances of partial assertions of culture.

Philosophical systems have been quite often constructed or put forward with the specific purpose of lending a theoretical justification to such partial manifestations of culture. Thus, naturalistic cultures have support from the various forms of philosophical naturalism or materialism. So have social cultures been reinforced by humanistic systems of thought; and spiritual cultures, by philosophical idealism in its many forms. This close accordance or correlation between a culture (the whole) and its philosophical system (the theoretical part) justifies our rejection of the one if the other is found to be inadequate.

Thus, on the one hand, the philosophy which functions as the theoretical prop to a fragmentary cultural perspective loses its claim
to be a sound philosophy. It must share with the practical counterpart of the culture all the accusation of sanctifying the error of the partial cultural system and of releasing the evil forces which follow in the wake of the faulty culture. Thus, materialism, humanism and idealism in so far as they have been invoked by the corresponding cultures in their partial and fragmentary character themselves stand condemned as the latter’s accomplices.

On the other hand, in order to lay bare the faulty character of a culture, it is necessary to expose the inadequacy of the logic of the philosophical theory which supports it. Furthermore, any direct attack, on an existing culture, may not only be misleading in theory but may produce actual conflicts. The conflicts may assume dangerous proportions if the culture attacked has an organized group of fanatical members. We may, therefore, meet the demands of an expedient secularism and toleration and yet do justice to our critical urge by restricting our criticism to the basic philosophies of the cultural systems. But to forbear the critical urge altogether on sentimental grounds is by no means the right thing to do.

It is here that the dialectical method comes handy. It can help us in shattering the backbone of the corpus of a defective culture by exposing the faulty logic and by putting it in its proper value-category and grading it at the specific phase or moment it represents within the category.

If a certain culture represents nature, then it is bound to ignore the higher social and spiritual values and to that extent it is bound to be partial and fragmentary. If a certain culture represents society, it may or may not ignore the natural values but it ignores the spiritual values, and to that extent, is fragmentary. If a certain culture represents spirit, it may or may not ignore the natural and social values: if it does, to that extent it is faulty; if it does not, it is the best conceivable system.

Besides this grading, we may distinguish three logical moments in each of these three main forms of culture, according as the cultural consciousness itself passes through the phases of the dialectical development in the triadic pattern of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. This helps us in grading historic cultures better and in gauging more closely the satisfactory character of each culture. We may, therefore, lay down the following schemata: Materialist Culture—(1) Atomistic (Epicurus), (2) Mechanistic (Spencer), and (3) Mathematical (Russell). Humanist Culture—(1) Egoistic (Nietzsche),
(2) Pragmatic (James), and (3) Radical (Comte). *Idealist* Culture—
(1) Monadistic (The Cynics), (2) Ethical (Spinoza), and (3) Absolute
(Pringle-Pattison). The systems of the philosophers mentioned
in the brackets are only fairly good instances of fixational cultures.
We may now give a brief account of each.

**THE THREE MOMENTS OF MATERIALISM.** Materialism results from
the fixation of feeling on the level of natural philosophy. The
totality of facts is related to the attitudes of the material self which
is not subordinated to the spiritual self. The material self is taken
as the highest status of the subject and the efficient feeling gets
bogged there.

We may distinguish three logical moments in the development
of materialism according as the part (here, the material particle)
is taken in and by itself, in relation to one another, and in relation
to the whole. These may be respectively called atomistic material-
ism, mechanistic materialism and mathematical materialism. As
examples, we may take Epicurus, Herbert Spencer and Bertrand
Russell. Our concern here is not to reproduce their systems fully
or correctly but to show how materialism occurs in point of fact
and how it is fixational.

*Epicurus* (359—267 B.C.)

**THE MATERIAL PARTICLE TAKEN IN AND BY ITSELF.** Epicurus had
studied Democritus’ cosmology, the doctrine of atoms. He was
familiar with Aristippus’ ethical system, or rudiment of system,
of egoistic hedonism. The emphasis here is laid on the parts and
not on their relations. He consistently applies the principle of the
natural ‘material cause’ to the interpretation of nature, society
and spirit. Hence the only good recognized in society is friendship
(as opposed to citizenship) and that in the realm of spirit is tranquil-
ity in detachment based on a sublimated fear of absolute death
(as opposed to creative activity).

Extension is the criterion of existence. Only material bodies
and empty space exist; all else is but a fancy of opinion. If the
universe were literally full, there would be a total block and loco-
motion of atoms would be impossible. The ultimately real are atoms.
These are indivisible, indestructible bodies—smaller than any
measurable size. These are characterized by duration, position,
size, figure, weight (all of these are of indefinite variety) and constant
motion and external combination and severance. Atoms of a limited number and variety make up a finite body: hence there arises no infinite regress involved in an infinite divisibility.

The soul is a subtle material substance permeating the whole body. It is an organic constituent of the body and not a ghost-in-the-machine capable of existing in the disembodied state. The body conducts sensations to the soul and imperfectly shares in them by means of the soul. The soul dissolves with the death of the body. Mental images are material particles, copies of things they represent.

With this world-view goes the recommendation of a hedonistic way of life and a sensate pattern of culture based on a theory of value which gives a fragmentary balance of natural values but drawing almost a blank in regard to social and spiritual values.

THE WORLD IS RELATED TO THE ATTITUDES OF THE MATERIAL SELF TAKEN IN AND BY ITSELF. Pleasure is the beginning and end of the blessed life. The test of good is pleasure, and that of evil is pain. And the pleasure is basically the pleasure of the body and the pain to be avoided is the pain of the body again. Prudence which consists in realizing a maximum of pleasure with a minimum of pain is the highest virtue. All value-words are analyzed in terms of the pleasures of the senses. 'The pleasure of the mind, we are told, is the contemplation of pleasures of the body.'

Epicurean pleasure is however not exhausted by 'pleasure in motion' momentary, physical, egoistic—as Aristippus recommends. Epicurus distinguishes between dynamic and static pleasures. Dynamic pleasures are actively desired and realized through pain. Static pleasures are passively idealized in a state of equilibrium (zero-level on the hedonic scale) resulting from the absence of an undesirable or painful state of affairs. Pleasures of gluttony, sexual love, desire for wealth and honour and power are all dynamic: the painful consequences which follow in seeking them outweigh the pleasures of their fulfilment. The highest virtue therefore lies in prudence in the sense of minimizing of pain, in the fear of a valetudinarian.

It is natural that the material self should strike an escapist attitude to social and political life. Epicurus once even asked one of his disciples to 'flee from every form of culture'. One shall laugh over those who aspire to be mentioned along with Solon and

5 Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, p. 266.
Lycurgus. One ought to eschew even patriotism and martyrdom. In short, one should sever one's umbilical cord that binds him with the indigenous culture and city or nation state. For politics Epicurus substitutes friendship. In the acquisition of friendship lies the wisest choice of means to happiness. But here too, the relation is superficial and extremely loose. Friendship must be mutually beneficial or pleasure-giving, to be cultivated in the spirit of give and take, to be carried in the manner of a business transaction, in the manner of the impact of two Epicurean atoms. It involves no moral and social obligations in the sense we understand them.

It is natural again that the highest spiritual good he could conceive of is tranquillity or peace of mind of an atomized individual who has withdrawn into the fortress of his soul. This is claimed by him to be born of knowledge about the true nature of change. The motion of heavenly bodies is sui generis and shows an eternal order which is sustained in a rhythmic mode of origination and destruction. Mere historical knowledge of natural events does not do away with fear and superstition. We can shed the fear of change, of death and of hell only by way of an insight into the nature of change. The greater the insight into the ground of change, the more we realize the calmness of contemplation.

*Herbert Spencer (A. D. 1820—1903)*

**THE MATERIAL PART TAKEN IN MECHANICAL RELATION TO OTHER MATERIAL PARTS.** In mechanistic materialism, the emphasis shifts from atoms to force, from the ultimate constituents to their causal components. Spencer may be taken to have consistently applied the principle of natural 'efficient cause', the principle of interrelation of material parts, to the interpretation of nature, society and spirit.

Spencer sees the world as a process of mechanistic evolution. The world began as a homogeneous force of which the source is the unconditioned absolute. The evolution follows the triadic pattern involving concentration, differentiation and determination. Spencer then tries to expose a single continuous system in the world linking up the fields of cosmology, biology, psychology, sociology and ethics. Thus, cosmic evolution (genesis of heavenly bodies on the

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lines of Laplace’s nebular hypothesis which is mechanistic) was
followed by organic evolution (again, on the lines of Lamarckian
and Darwinian biology which is mechanistic). This goes on in the
realm of living bodies leading to the genesis of mind and then into
the realm of society.

The unconditioned cause is unknowable, yet its existence is a
datum of consciousness, because of the effects of force produced
by it. Our basic experience is this experience of force. Force is
something that resists or produces change, and is usually conceived
by us ‘in analogy with our feeling of exertion.’ Force is the rock-
bottom of all our experience. Spencer therefore makes this the
first principle of his world view.

Spencer regards the principle of conservation of energy as coexten-
sive with the principle of causality, and the principle of causality,
with the principle of ground. All experimental attempts to prove
the first principle in a sense presupposes it. When taking measure-
ments we take for granted that the units of measurements remain
unchanged during the process. If the force of gravity varies when
the chemist determines the weight of a thing, his reading will go
wrong. The existing quantity of energy must therefore be constant.
Every experiment presupposes the validity of the principle of the
conservation of energy. All scientific investigations are based
on this postulate.

From this principle he derives the secondary principles of evolu-
tion: (i) from diffusion to integration, or evolution as concentration;
(ii) from homogeneity to heterogeneity, or evolution as differentia-
tion; and (iii) from incoherence to coherence, or evolution as deter-
mination. The first takes place when homogeneous parts are sub-
jected to homogeneous force; the second, when homogeneous
parts are subjected to heterogeneous forces; the third, when hetero-
genous parts are subjected to homogeneous forces.

Since matter and motion are nothing more than symbolic expres-
sions of the unknowable force which underlies all things, the relation
between the material and the mental can be apprehended in analogy
with the relation between any two material forms of energy, between
heat energy and kinetic energy, or between light and electricity,
for example. Later on, he found the limitations of this view of the
thing.

MORAL EVOLUTION OF MAN TO BE WROUGHT BY NATURAL MECHA-
NISM. This material mechanism or incomplete natural organism
is paired off with an incomplete social organism. Every individual of the species carries an aboriginal racial substratum in his character which can be traced to the prehistory of our species. No reforms in the realm of spirit can therefore bring about a radical change in social life; the vital nature of the individual has got to be transmuted. Society in his view is no 'organism'—it is all 'social environment'—an integral part of natural mechanism. In an organism there is a central organ of conscious control over the limbs, while a society is made up of conscious units co-operating in various groups. Spencer therefore recommends the investment of least power in the state. For example, land monopoly must go but there should be no collectivisation. The social organism should come the biological evolutionary way.

The Spencerian social typology is quite simple, the militant society (the same as the feudal society in marxian typology), the industrial society (corresponding to Marx's bourgeois society) and the third type which is yet to be in which work will be not merely 'a means to existence' but like play. It is the task of ethics to realize this final stage of social existence. Until this is realized, absolute morality cannot be recommended and practised. In the perfect type of life, there will be perfect adaptation between man and the 'social' environment. There will be an 'organic morality' with a sentiment of duty which will make the doing of one's duty spontaneous and immediately satisfying.

Spencer deals with ethics as a natural science: instead of prescribing, he describes. Yet the recommendations presupposed or entailed can easily be discerned. The two aspects are clarified briefly.

Pleasure is the sole criterion of good. It varies directly as the adjustment of the human organism to the conditions of outer environment. The task of moral science is to deduce 'from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kind to produce unhappiness.' Happiness is the result of a 'balanced combination of internal actions in face of external forces tending to overthrow it', 'a balance of organic functions', in adaptation of inner related motivations to outer related actions, an adaptation of one's behaviour to socially approved conduct. Morality thus becomes relative, changing from time to time and from place to place, from one cultural system to

7 H. Spencer, The Data of Ethics, p. 48.
another. Spencer has thus treated morality in its factual aspect, moral values as natural facts.

Yet the prescriptive aspect is unmistakable when he recommends that the moral evolution of the individual should be left to nature rather than entrusted into the hands of the state or educational institutions. The present welfare or paternalistic state is 'a kind of social ophiaphy'. While family ethic may aim at the education of helpless posterity, social ethic must restrict itself to the ordering of mutual relations of adults. In short, he recommends that the moral evolution of man should be left to natural mechanism.

A NATURAL MECHANISTIC THEORY OF RELIGION. Spencer's theory of religion too bears the characteristics of his mechanistic principle. The absolute is the unconditioned cause which is unknowable, yet its existence is a datum of consciousness, because of the effects of force produced by it. Thus, the 'force' of Newtonian physics is the touchstone of the absolute. He, therefore, rejects the view that the infinite is unthinkable. Such a view issues from the error, he says, of subordinating ontology to epistemology. Do away with the consciousness of finiteness and let the consciousness of the object alone remain. This gives us the indefinite something which is the unrelated absolute. This indefinite is the prius of all positive knowledge, the affirmative basis of the finite.

Edward Caird has exposed the mechanistic mode of thinking behind this conception of the absolute. Spencer had taken the idea of the infinite at a particular stage of its development. And that is the mechanistic materialist stage. To this absolute we should direct our piety—recommends Spencer. We may therefore enjoy Mr. Frederic Harrison's parody on it: 'O x\textsuperscript{3} love us, help us, make us one with thee.'

Bertrand Russell (A. D. 1872—)

THE MATERIAL PARTS ORGANICALLY RELATED TO A METRICAL

\footnote{H. Hoffding, *A History of Modern Philosophy*, p. 484. 'Spencer is right in his main idea that sympathy with suffering ought not to be allowed to exclude the education gained by interaction with the real conditions of life and which is necessary for the healthy development of both the individual and of the race.'}


WHOLE. The philosophical consequences of modern science disturbed the prejudices of Newtonian materialism. Materialism could be buttressed only by means of a logico-mathematical refinement of the basic concepts of science. Bertrand Russell may be considered an exponent of this developed form of materialism. His many rejections are a clear pointer to a fixation on materialism. Otherwise, it would have been a philosophy of nature which is an integral part of the philosophy of religion.

The sole reliable method of knowledge, he holds, is that of empirical analysis. In so far as it restricts itself to the facts of experience it is empirical; and in so far as it employs the rules of deductive and mathematical reasoning it is analytical. This analytical empiricism alone can give such knowledge as may be called scientifically valid.

Philosophical problems are mainly syntactical; and when errors in syntax are avoided the problems are either resolved or dissolved as pseudo-problems. ‘Existence’ can only be asserted of descriptions. In other words, describability is the sole criterion of meaningful propositions.

The contributions of the mathematical philosophers in refining some of the key-concepts have made some of the idealistic thoughts based on mysticism obsolete. ‘Continuity’, for example, had been, until Georg Cantor defined it, ‘a vague word, convenient for philosophers like Hegel, who wished to introduce metaphysical muddles into mathematics’.\(^\text{11}\)

Now it has rendered antiquated a great deal of mysticism such as that of Bergson.

Frege’s work has made it clear that pure mathematics is nothing but an extension of deductive logic. This has done away with Kant’s theory about mathematical propositions: these are now found to be neither synthetic nor \(a\) \textit{priori}, but analytical ones. Einstein substituted space-time for space and time, events for particles, and thus, a functional world-view for a substantival one. Quantum physicists think of physical phenomena as possibly discontinuous: continuity of motion seems a mere prejudice.

That the external or physical world exists is a simpler hypothesis than the hypothesis that there is no external world. It explains the causation of our sensations more simply. Sensation is as much a natural event as the object sensed. A physical object is a group of sensa which present real but partial views of the object.

\(^{11}\) Bertrand Russell, \textit{History of Western Philosophy}, p. 857.
from different perspectives actual and possible. 'Perception must be in some degree an effect of the object perceived.' Views of the world as are actually perceived are private worlds; these along with possible unperceived ones make up what he calls the system of perspectives. What we can know of the physical world is only certain logical and mathematical properties of structure. The world is a construction rather than an inference. Mind and matter are merely convenient ways of grouping events, rather than two different existential modes. There is a third group of events which are at once mental and material.

Russell meets the various attempts at undermining the basis of materialism on the grounds of materialism itself by men of science and religion alike who point out that the principle of indeterminacy in the quantum theory affects the postulate of determinism. There is nothing in the process of evolution that requires the postulate of a purpose whether immanent or transcendent. There is nothing in the theory of heredity which ought to make us bow down before a mystery. Besides, if nature is not subject to causal laws, no inference is possible in regard to the course of events in nature including the existence of other people and even our own past. Living bodies can be explained in terms of physical and chemical causation. In short, all that can be affirmed in the case of the behaviour of subatomic entities is that the laws of their behaviour have not yet been discovered, not that they are not subject to laws.

REJECTION OF HUMAN AND SPIRITUAL CATEGORIES IS A POINTER TO A FIXATION ON MATERIALISM. In one of his essays, viz. 'Cosmic Purpose', Russell considers three teleological doctrines—theistic Christian, idealistic Hegelian, and emergent evolutionist, and rejects them all on naturalist grounds. (a) The theistic doctrine is the same as the argument from design. Russell tries to demolish it by positing the problem of evil: 'An omnipotent being who created a world containing evil not due to sin must himself be at least partially evil.' (b) The Hegelian doctrine of cosmic purpose suffers from the difficulty of explaining the necessity of a temporal evolution. (c) The emergentists, creationists and creative evolutionists (as opposed to mechanistic evolutionists) hold that novelties appear in course of evolution, that there is a mysterious creative force which urges everything to evolve. The world is creating

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God. Facts do not confirm this belief, says Russell.

Human life is an accidental and unimportant by-product. Values are matters of feeling. The failure on the part of both humanists and idealists to separate the question of values from that of facts has led to a great deal of confused thinking. They allowed their opinions about the constitution of the world to be influenced by their desire for edification:

Knowing, as they supposed, what beliefs would make men virtuous, they have invented arguments, often very sophistical to prove that these beliefs are true. . . . In order to make their proofs seem valid, they have had to falsify logic, to make mathematics mystical, and to pretend that deep-seated prejudices were heaven-sent intuitions. All this is rejected by the philosophers who make logical analysis the main business of philosophy. They confess frankly that human intellect is unable to find conclusive answers to any questions of profound importance to mankind, but they refuse to believe that there is some 'higher' way of thinking.  

The latter part of the assertion shows unmistakable signs of an incipient humanism—negative and aware of the limitations of materialism; and it is quite natural for humanism to be in an embryonic stage in the last phase of the previous philosophy.

The highest value recommended, however, still remains naturalistic in character: it is the scientific pursuit of theoretical knowledge. 'The value of science as metaphysic . . . is a value that is religious, not political, or even moral.' 15 This is what he calls the cult of truth, the high-priests of which were those early men of science who had intermittently incurred the inquisitorial wrath of the ecclesiastical pride of power, knowledge and virtue and fanaticism. Truth is the god of this religion but truth here is not truth as theologians in conflict understand it, i.e. as the subject matter of interminable logomachies among warring dogmas, but 'truth as a quest, a vision faintly appearing and again vanishing, a hoped-for sun to meet the Heraclitean fire in the soul.' 16

14 Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, pp. 863-64.
In his critique of mysticism he refutes the four cardinal doctrines of it: its method based on intuition, its belief in a unity of the world, illusoriness of time, and of evil. He shows that the opposition of intuition to reason is illusory; that particular events are what they are and do not become different by absorption into a whole; that if time were unreal, then, to say that we are born and then grow and then die must be just as false as to say that we die, then grow small and finally are born; or that if we find a corpse with a dagger in it, it makes no difference whether the man died of the wound or the dagger was plunged in after death; or that whether evil is a vanishing quality or not, its sting remains unmistakably. And as to mystic intuition, it is a case of auto-suggestion voicing itself in silence.

To Russell, the rigid impersonality and objectivity of mathematics qualifies it to carry eternal truth and absolute knowledge. The ambition of this new Pythagoras, as Will Durant calls him, was to reduce all philosophy to the rigid logical form of mathematics. It is quite natural for him to put mathematics in place of the holy book. As a social philosopher, however, he is an incipient humanist. Freedom is the supreme social value. We thus find in him the high watermark of natural religion as well as the overflowing of the level on to a religion of humanity.

THE THREE MOMENTS OF HUMANISM. The fixation for materialism breaks as man feels the urge to subdue and adapt nature to himself instead of simply submitting and adapting himself to nature. This change of feeling makes him growingly aware of the gap between the reason in nature and the reason in man. The reason in man seems to include and supersede the reason in nature. The social self asserts itself. The totality of facts is then related to the attitudes of the social self, which is not systematically subordinated to the spiritual self. The social self is taken as the highest status of the subject and the efficient feeling fixes itself upon it. The humanist culture comes to exist.

We may distinguish three logical moments in the development of humanism, according as the particular man is taken in and by himself, in relation to one another, and in relation to humanity. To illustrate these fixational attitudes, we may take Nietzsche, William James and Auguste Comte respectively. Our purpose here is not to represent their systems fully but to indicate how these fixational systems do occur in point of fact.
Nietzsche (A.D. 1844 - 1900)

The particular man taken in and by himself. Nietzsche rejects materialism and idealism. He apotheosizes the particular man. The regulative principle is the reason of the egoistic man; and the vital principle of 'will to power' operative in him is identified as the creative principle.

Empedocles had anticipated the idea of natural selection. Heracleitus conceived of evolution as such for the first time in the history of human thought. Nietzsche, a disciple of both, does not distinguish clearly between evolution and natural selection. While accepting the Darwinian gradation in the ascent of species, he holds a different view of the driving force of organic evolution. In Darwin's view, the driving force is material, external, mechanistic. Nietzsche rejects this materialist view.

The driving force of evolution, in his view, is internal in the sense of vital: an organism grows and develops from within. The outer influences are there, but, unless the organism possesses something that will grow, there will be very little enduring change worth the name of progress. Nietzsche calls this force the will to power. The will to power is 'the wisdom of the body'—the vitality of physical impulse. This is a natural impulse; but he interprets the whole of living nature as an arena of conflict among competing wills: thus, nature gets humanized. The impulse of survival is not the basic drive of life; it is a consequence of the will to power. 'All life desires above all to express its power. Life is itself will-to-power.'

The world is ethically neutral: it is neither good nor evil. Good is whatever adds to the vitality, the feeling of power and will to power, of the particular man. Whatever reduces vitality, whatever, for example, proceeds from the feeling of weakness, envy and revenge, is evil. The particular man is thus a living body taken in and by itself:

I am body through and through and nothing else besides. Soul is only a word for something in the body. ... In the body he dwelleth, thy body he is. There is more intelligence in thy body than in thy best wisdom. ... The creative body created for itself the Spirit to be the instrument of its will.'

16 Nietzsche, Kritik Und Zukunft Der Kultur, Chapter IV, para 13.
17 Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, Everyman's Library, pp. 26-27.
Thus spake Nietzsche's Zarathustra. We may easily detect the absolute here in the vital principle of the will to power operative in _man_: hence this is humanism. The regulative principle here is the reason of the particular _man_: hence this is egoistic.

**The Superman Is Neither the Man-in-the-particular-Group Nor the Universal Man.** The will to power drove the subhuman species to a rapid ascent till it bogged down in _homo sapiens_. The cause of the retardation of the force in _man_ is pinpointed by Nietzsche in the influence of the goody goody preachers of morality and prophets of peace and love. With Spencer he observes the serious checkmate that the process of elimination by natural selection has received amongst men at the hands of 'the men of God' in particular.

Love, righteousness and other exhortations have led to an emasculation of the race. The strong and healthy are controlled for the good of the weak and effeminate. To break the suspense in the process, Nietzsche proposes a transvaluation of values of the existing cultures of the species: the main burden of this is to be borne by the lower rung of the ladder in the hierarchy of values, the physical values, almost the values of eugenics.

He distinguishes a simplified cultural polarity in the moral sphere: slave morality (Herden-moral) and master morality (Herren-moral). The masters are those who make up the dominant and creative minority. They are 'the lovers of psychological nudity'—strong and aggressive, adventurous and morally unscrupulous. On the other hand, they can make a bid for 'creative' activities which may lead to mutation of _man_ into _superman_. And the slaves are the timid and submissive, weak and defenceless. As a defensive reaction, they seek solace and false security in moral laws and religious dogmas, in all kinds of myths and high-sounding 'blabs' like equality and fraternity. The highest ideals of religion, morality and politly are invented for them, to prevent them from being naturally eliminated.

Nietzsche believes that the worst impediment to elimination was, and still is, Christianity: it is a capital crime against Life, a pious falsehood; it has made an ideal out of antagonism against all the self-transcending instincts of strong life. The process of natural selection requires the sacrifice of the weaklings of nature: Christianity would like to thwart the process in favour of them as against the healthy pagans. Christianity kills this natural will to power
and stimulates the 'mob egotism' of the weak and degenerate. Hence the anti-Christian invocation of the Übermensch. 'Dead are all gods; now we will that superman live.'

Nietzsche thus maintains a resolute particularism and bravely asserts the egoistic man as against every type of universality including the relative universality of a particular cultural system. That this thus becomes humanism of the first moment is unmistakable on two points: the superman is sought neither in men-in-the-particular-group (as in the second moment) nor in the universal man or humanity (as in the third); he is invoked through the particular man, man taken in and by himself. The humanist character is manifest: the superman invoked is neither a spiritual nor a supernatural being.

The Cult of Egoistic Man Leads Only to Chaos or Despotic Order. The cult of superman too readily reveals its evil and error. True, the masters make up not only the dominant but also the creative minority: they can make a bid for creative activities which may lead to the mutation of man into superman. The error obviously lies in identifying the dominant with the creative, or at any rate, in not having made a clear distinction between the two.

Pursuit of power in the sense of domination lets loose the egoistic impulse of the superman: this can bring about only chaos or a despotic order. Pursuit of power in the sense of constructive power, of self-development, alone can bring about greater system and order into our life or experience. This demands a sympathetic interrelation with fellow-humans.

William James (A.D. 1842—1910)

The Particular Man Taken in Relation to Other Particular Men. In the second moment the humanistic attitude assumes a pragmatic character. The regulative principle is found in workability in the sense of whatever satisfies the demands of the particular man taken in relation to other particular men. The constitutive principle lies in the feeling behind such demands.

18 Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra. In The Anti Christ, he describes the death of God: '... and one day he suffocated of his all-too-great-pity.' Reinhold Niebuhr sizes him up by saying that he understands the dishonest pretensions of rationality very well but he carries the romantic protest to nihilistic proportions.
William James consistently employs the pragmatic principle in all his interpretations, especially, those of truth, morality and religion. We detect the same principle in his rejection of both lower and higher naturalism. He would defend the sciences against all obscurantism, and, at the same time, chastise all 'scientism' that would deny man's right to believe in God, freedom and immortality. Similarly, he rejects the absolute of idealism and the God of Schoolmen and at the same time offers the hypothesis of a finite God in a multiverse. Neither the particular man nor mankind but any given particular society is apotheosized: he humanizes the world by looking upon it as an extended society of selves with God as a friend, guide and philosopher.

A proposition or a belief is true if it works. James' pragmatic humanism stresses the dependence of theory on practice. The truth of philosophies is to be tested by referring them not only to nature but to human nature, by looking into the human conditions of their acceptability, by their capacity to fulfill both theoretical and practical needs, to generate in us the sentiment of rationality or will to believe on evidence which is incomplete but strong enough to move us to act.

In order to combat a moribund idealism, James forged his theory of truth following Charles Peirce's theory of meaning. Peirce's doctrine is simple: an idea is what it does; it is to be tested by the consequences which it leads to in action; otherwise dispute about it may be interminable and fruitless. The pragmatic theory goes beyond the naturalist theory. Correspondence to facts still remains the meaning (as distinct from test or criterion) of truth; formal coherence still remains one of the necessary (as distinct from sufficient) criteria; only, the other criterion, viz. verification, is extended to workability. Thus, formal consistency and workability (that includes verification) together make up the sufficient pragmatic criterion of truth.

All true propositions accord with facts; and all propositions according with facts are true; but while all true propositions must also be formally coherent, all formally coherent propositions may not be true, unless they are found workable too. If a proposition works, it may be suspected that it may be proved to be true in the sense of according with facts; we may take it as highly probable and even believe for all practical purposes that it accords with facts. Workability is dynamic, practical agreement. An empirical
hypothesis or a rational belief is true (meaning that it agrees with reality), if it works well, that is, if it satisfies some of the demands of men in society, men who are engaged in practical realization of values. This reference to social and practical relationship among men constitutes the very essence of workability.

Pragmatism proposes workability not as the meaning of truth but as the criterion of truth. 'Truth is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their agreement ... with reality.' Here James is giving the meaning of truth. And he is obviously talking of the criterion of truth when he analyzes it in terms of expediency: 'The true, ... is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, ...'

Pragmatists distinguish various kinds of workability. In the realm of science, propositions work in the sense that they are verified either directly or indirectly, that they explain certain classes of facts adequately, that they predict certain facts correctly, or that they help in further investigation which leads us nearer truth. In the realm of philosophy (natural, social, moral, religious) James recommends workability in the forms of 'satisfactoriness', 'emotional satisfaction', 'will to believe', etc. Some of our philosophical beliefs are held to be true because they are either emotionally satisfying or voluntarily adopted. Our satisfaction or our willingness may be supposed as a sign that the beliefs are true.

In his famous essay 'The Will to Believe', James defends 'the lawfulness of voluntarily adopted faith'. The empiricist may say that it is wrong to hold a belief on insufficient evidence; and the rationalist may find it silly to believe by way of will. But James says that if we look into the actual psychology of human opinion, we find that our willing or non-intellectual nature does influence our convictions. By 'willing nature' is meant 'all such factors of belief as fear and hope, prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship, the circumpressure of our caste and set'. Quite often this influence leaves us but a Hobson's choice between two opinions. Hence our willing nature is a lawful determinant of our choice.

He illustrates this thesis by citing the instances of the value presuppositions of the scientist's search for truth and the instances of our practical beliefs in the realms of social relationship, morality and religion. From these instances, James generalizes the thesis into a full-fledged pragmatic theory of truth: 'We have the right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will.' This is not a concession to the schoolboyish concep-
tion of faith: 'Faith is when you believe something that you know ain't true.' For, in real life, the freedom to believe arises only in the context of living genuine options which cannot be resolved by intellect, and to counsel suspension of belief in such a case is itself 'a passional decision...attended with the same risk of losing the truth'.

Materialism is not a workable proposition. Materialism does not satisfy the high aspirations of man. Secondly, its concern for truth, which is carried to an extreme limit of self-stultification, presupposes a pragmatic choice by the willing nature. We must know the truth and we must avoid error. Both are cases of our passion's influencing our beliefs. The naturalist however treats the avoidance of error or dupery as more imperative and lets truth take its chance: he says: 'Better go without belief for ever than believe a lie.' Thereby he only shows his private horror of becoming a dupe. For the pragmatist, the pursuit of truth is more important than avoidance of error: he is ready to be duped rather than put off indefinitely the chance of guessing true.

Practical social propositions are workably true. All social action and cooperation involve mutual trust and faith. Propositions having a bearing on personal relations, states of mind between persons, friendship and love—are true in the pragmatic sense. Their truth is determined by our 'desire for a certain kind of truth bringing about the special truth's existence'. In the realm of human action, we are concerned with making rather than discovering facts: truth here depends on our will to believe, our faith based on desire. Here it is indispensable and lawful therefore to hold workable propositions as true.

Morality lies in satisfying as many demands as we can. Like Nietzsche, James also points out the ethical neutrality of nature. A purely insentient world can lend no existential status to good and evil. Yet they being facts of our experience cannot be believed to be just hanging in the air. Their only conceivable habitat is the human mind which can feel them. They begin to exist the moment a sentient being begins to exist. We cannot however question validly the truth or falsity of the solitary thinker's moral or value judgments. We can only talk of coherence among his several judgments.

19 William James, Essays in Pragmatism, p. 95.
20 William James, Essays in Pragmatism, pp. 100, 105.
21 Ibid., pp. 104, 105.
A second thinker joining him, the moral situation grows complex: the two may either agree to have a common set of rules or ignore each other’s attitudes. With the number of thinkers multiplied, we have both a multitude of subjective opinions and of communities having their respective moral codes. Moral philosophers then refine these into various ideals. Some of them must have greater truth and authority to which others must be subordinated. The question of ‘ought’ arises and this ‘ought’ must be traceable to the factual constitution of some existing consciousness. This consciousness must decide right from wrong by its feeling and be the universal law-giver. Were one of the thinkers manifestly divine, the universal criterion will be laid down and will dissolve the practical aspect of the moral problem. Yet the theoretical problem as to the ground of obligation hangs up.

As we look closely into the matter, we find that while obligation does not arise unless there be an actual personal claim, it must arise whenever there is such a claim. Thus we do have morality on humanist grounds. The problem of many objective or universal criteria still remains. The only path of escape is the utilitarian principle of good; good is that which satisfies as many demands as possible. And this must coincide with the conventionally highest ideal.

The reasons are not far to seek. The influence of the cultural milieu of the society in which we are born is unmistakable. Besides, it is hazardous to follow an individual moralist who can begin to behave as the Nietzschean superman. The right act must be the best act and the best act must make for an order which awakens ‘the least sum of dissatisfactions’. The pragmatist would therefore recommend the moral code of the community which is usually a cultural supersystem or historic civilized society. Yet, ‘rules are made for man, not man for rules’: James quotes Green to stress the dynamic character of the ‘actually given equilibrium of human ideals’. In cases of conflict, the best universe of desires can be brought about ‘only through the aid of the experience of other men’. Pragmatic morality thus obviously relates the good of one man with that of other men but does not relate these to the good of the whole of humanity.

RELIGION IS A LIVE HYPOTHESIS AND A PRACTICAL PROPOSITION. Religion, according to James, is a live hypothesis; and a live hypo-

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22 Ibid., pp. 77, 79.
thesis being one which 'appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed', it may be true, or at any rate, may be willed to be true. Its assertion that perfection is eternal may not be true, but there is nothing wrong in its saying that we are better off even now if we believe in the truth of the first assertion. Religion offers a momentous option: if we refuse to decide, the opportunity is lost for ever. It offers a forced option: either accept its truth, or go without it. Scepticism or suspension of belief provides no tertium quid: does it not obviously prefer avoidance of error to acquisition of truth?  

This last consideration makes the pragmatist criterion as against the naturalist criterion of truth eminently applicable to religion. On the pragmatist test, however, James finds both absolute idealism and scholastic theism unverifiable and unsatisfactory propositions.

Absolute idealism is manifestly too pedantic and remote, too jejune and strait-laced to be true. Its optimism and moral complacency make it oblivious of the perils of human freedom. It induces the belief that evil is a vanishing quality, and thus, cripples our sense of responsibility which, under any circumstances, is never very highly developed. Finally, the idealist talk of truth as harmony of certitude and objectivity remains a fine ideal: there has never been a concrete test that is really true, universally agreed upon, and made available for everyday use. The categorial and valuational polarities that arise lead to a 'contradictory array of opinions': these baffle all our search for an objective standard. Besides, there remains the case of absolute scepticism hanging fire all the time. This does not mean giving up the quest or hope for truth itself: it means that we may 'gain an ever better position towards it by systematically continuing to roll up experiences and think.'

Similarly, the God of Schoolmen does not stand the scrutiny of the pragmatic test. God is, according to them, 'Ens a se extra et supra omne genus, necessarium, unum, infinitum, perfectum, simplex, immutabile, immensum, eternum, intelligens.' A belief in such a God practically implies that we are mere marionettes in the hands of God who pulls the strings: we can do nothing to change the course of our destiny. The inexorable law of nature yields place to the inexorable will of God: 'it is not that knife that cuts or fire that

24 William James, Pragmatism, p. 121.
burns; it is Allah's will that makes the knife cut and the fire burn.' Besides, on the pragmatic test, we find God's metaphysical attributes to be just meaningless: they make no definite connection with our life or experience. 'Pray, what specific act can I perform in order to adapt myself the better to God's simplicity?' Not so with moral attributes. Being holy, He can will nothing but good; being all-powerful, he can secure its triumph; being all-knowing, he can see us in the dark; and so on. Scholastic theology however fails to prove that God has these moral attributes; it says that He has these since He has metaphysical ones. 'To prove God's goodness by the scholastic argument that there is no nonbeing in his essence would sound to such a witness (pragmatist—B.S.) simply silly.'

James virtually offers the hypothesis of a finite God in a multiverse as 'one helper, primus inter pares, in the midst of all the shapers of the great world's fate'. So long as men can use their God, His identity, whereabouts and even existence are matters of no importance. God is for man; not man for God. Man's life is a field of moral struggle: it will cease to be so if the absolute be substituted for God; the absolute is 'the great derealizer of the only life we are at home in'. Hence, God is sharply distinguished from the absolute of idealism. James thus humanizes the world into a society of selves with God the superhuman person as a friend, guide and philosopher. 'He works in an external environment, has limits and has enemies.' Thus, James seems to have taken the autonomous man of Kantian theory as his postulate and drawn out the consequences.

To test the reality of such a finite God in a multiverse of free-wills, two criteria are suggested by James: the reality of effects of mystical experience, and the desirability of the effects. Both are eminently pragmatic tests. In the first, the effects are admittedly psychological and would therefore remain the same whether the object of experience exists or is simply believed to exist because the feeling of the presence lends its existential status to the presence. In the second, it is patently non-cognitive. The two together, however, give us an 'overbelief' which is beneficial to life.

To sum up, James' views of truth and good, of the world and

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26 William James, Pragmatism, p. 298.
God proceed from the facts of human nature—'human' in any particular social and cultural milieu, especially the fact of human freedom or man's need for freedom. The theoretical evidence for free will, multiverse and finite God may be as lacking as for any other theory. Even the practical proof may vary from person to person: some may enjoy better life on a belief in determinism (natural or ideal) than in libertarianism. But where the evidence is indecisive, our vital and moral interests should make the choice. Yet James firmly disbelieves that 'our human experience is the highest form of experience extant in the universe'.

Pragmatic Humanism cannot bring about human unity. It cannot unite nation states, historic civilized societies and cultural supersystems into a world state and world culture. It fails to realize universal human good. Its conception of utility or workability is manifestly too narrow to realize the logical whole on the social level.

The workability criterion has been summarily disposed of by idealist thinkers. The criticism of some non-idealists like G. E. Moore and John Wisdom\(^\text{29}\) boils down to this: if pragmatism is true, then, all useful propositions are true and all true propositions are useful; but that is not the case: there can be useless true propositions and useful false propositions. For examples: (i) 'At 6.35 A.M. on January 1, 1957, I heard a donkey braying'—this is a useless but true proposition; (ii) all false propaganda resorted to by the communists is useful to them. Moore, therefore, concludes that most useful propositions are true and most true propositions are useful. And Wisdom says that workability is a criterion of truth. Moore and Wisdom take utility in the widest sense, that is, in the sense of usefulness to the particular man, to a particular group, to mankind. Taking utility in the restricted sense of universal human good we can meet the above criticism; but then that will be radical humanism: on pragmatic humanist ground, utility is to be constructed as utility to particular men in relation to one another; besides, whatever is good for mankind need not always be true. James however does give workability as a criterion, not as a meaning of truth. And of course, as admittedly intended by him, his view reduces truth to a species of good so that before we can apply this

\(\text{28 W. James, Pragmatism, p. 299.}\)

\(\text{29 G. E. Moore, Philosophical Essays, 'Refutation of Pragmatism'; John Wisdom, Matter and Mind.}\)
criterion to any given statement of belief, we must not only know but know for certain what is good and what are the consequences of the given belief. But then, if 'good' and 'value' are synonymous, 'truth' is 'theoretical good', and hence there is nothing wrong if truth is taken as a species of good. Only, the right synthesis would be a pointer to philosophical coherence theory of value and truth. And here one must admit James did not work out the full implications of his theory.

He understands the moral attitude rightly but does not draw all the postulates except freedom clearly enough to carry him beyond pragmatism. This bogs down into a humanistic moralism which does not think it necessary to have an assurance of victory in the moral struggle—the kind of assurance which idealism offers and which by no means fosters complacency. The universe cannot be the aggregate of several ideas of men about the universe. Lastly, the pragmatic attitude to God of spiritual religion and the absolute of metaphysics is too facile to be the right one.

*Auguste Comte (A.D. 1798—1857)*

**The particular man taken in organic relation to humanity.** In Comte the idea of positivity grew up together with the idea of humanity. The regulative principle here lies in the reason of the universal man, in man as the root of mankind and the constitutive principle, in the feeling for the human race.

We may look into Comte's system in two phases—the positivist and the humanistic phases. In the first phase the gap between natural theory and social theory is bridged by him on the level of society: as a founder of the science of sociology (based on the positive sciences), he realizes in theory a social organism. Positivism thus completely assimilates the naturalistic spirit and then supersedes it by establishing a full-fledged humanism. In the second phase, he sets up a deity in humanity and thus presents a religion which may be rightly called the religion of humanity.

**Positivism unifies the sciences into a sociology in order to realize the social whole in theory.** Positive philosophy, according to Comte, has got to be a unified science of sciences and to direct us to a world society and culture. It is only by a consistent application of positivism to our belief and conduct that we hope to regain or realize that unity and harmony in the life of mankind.
which the critical method in theory and revolutionary method in practice tend to destroy.

Mankind can develop into one social organism only gradually. The first thing required for this is a common mode of thought and sentiment. The old societies had their common ground in theology. The new society must be grounded in the positive science of society. And such a science is possible, because, like natural relations, human relations are subject to laws. There is a close connection between social organization and total culture, between social order and development in the realms of science, art and industry. The driving force of progress in culture is intellectual, that is, scientific logical. This leads us nearer and ever nearer the universal human standpoint and standard and thus to one world society and culture.

Comte distinguishes three stages of intellectual development according as the reason in man becomes self-sufficient and universal human—developing from theonomy to heteronomy and from heteronomy to autonomy, from theology to metaphysics and from metaphysics to science, from God to nature and from nature to man.

The first stage is the theological stage, during which knowledge is based primarily on imagination. Ideas of supernatural and superhuman beings with man-like volitions operate as explanatory categories. Thus, invented facts like wills of animated fetishes and personal gods or God are supposed to govern the observed facts. The search for one single principle leads from fetishism to polytheism and from polytheism to monotheism. The theological mode allows no doubts about the possibility of absolute knowledge; hence it provides a firm basis to moral and social life. In the political aspect, the stage is characterized by monarchy or despotism. In short, this is the age of authority in both the spheres, the authority of gods and of kings.

Monotheism which is the third moment of the theological stage brings about the transition from the theological to the metaphysical stage. A transitional style of thinking based mainly on argumentation characterizes this stage of culture. It operates in terms of ideas which are personified or realized abstractions. ‘The realization of abstractions was not the embodiment of a word, but the gradual disembodiment of fetish.’ These are either the mystical names of some superhuman cause or the abstract statements of simple

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series of facts, according as the transition is nearer to the theological or the positive stage. During this stage too there is the tendency to seek highly generalized absolute solutions. The monistic tendency seeks consummation in one primal force, one single primal being, and that is nature (matter, life or mind). This is the stage of dissolution and transformation with the critical spirit of sceptic individualism prevalent in theory and in practice. The individual gets loosened from the social organism: democracy with sovereignty of the people characterizes the political order.

The positive stage is the final mode to be assumed by science and culture, during which empirical observation becomes the source of knowledge. This mode of thinking represents facts in terms of the smallest possible number of categories or general laws. These laws are suggested or confirmed by the facts themselves and never reckoned as anything but means of stating facts in the form of general propositions. Of course, the laws governing certain species of facts have still to be discovered. And since there is no room for unverifiable hypotheses, it is impossible to reach a highly generalized single principle. The philosophical principle of immutability of natural laws however continues to operate. And also, our knowledge can reach a subjective unity as the scientific or positivist method becomes universal: 'thus positive philosophy becomes the intellectual foundation of the brotherhood of man.'

For human knowledge as a whole, all the three modes of thought began before recorded history, have been down the ages and still co-exist. But every distinct class of our ideas pass through these stages successively. The different sciences have been developing unequally; the historical order of their growth follows largely the logical order of their gradation (in an ascending order of complexity) which Comte puts as follows: Algebra, Geometry, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology and Sociology. Each science while having its own peculiar truths and method depends on the truths and methods of all those which precede it in the order given above. That one science precedes another does not mean that the first must reach its perfection before the second can have its humblest beginning. The positive stage of an earlier science has often co-existed with the metaphysical stage of the next one and a purely theological stage of those further on; the prior sciences also derive help from the posterior ones lending empirical but unscientific or extremely

81 Hoffding, History of Modern Philosophy, p. 333.
elementary scientific truths co-existing with more developed ones of their own.

After considering the degree of positivism reached by all other sciences, Comte concludes that the last in the series, Sociology, which includes ethics and politics, has remained the subject of a futile wrangling between the theological and metaphysical modes of thought: most of the theories of ethics and politics have been so far formulated in terms of divine ordinance or metaphysical abstractions like 'natural rights' or 'social contract'. He therefore proposes to make the social science positive and complete the positivization of human knowledge. In the radical humanist scheme, thus, Sociology is the epitome of all human theory, even as man is the epitome of the universe.

In the *Outline of Social Dynamics*, he shows that the natural progress of society consists in the growth of our human attributes as against our animal ones. The main agent in this progress, as we have already noted, is the intellectual development. There has been a progress in the gradual decline of the military mode of life yielding place to the industrial. The progress of science and the progress of industry are correlated, man's power to conquer nature and adapt nature to his needs depending on his knowledge of the laws of nature.

**HUMANITY APOTHEOSIZED.** In his later speculations, Comte 'came forth transfigured as the high priest of the religion of humanity'. He now sees that religion has been the hub of man's individual biography and racial history. But the outer world as it is cannot command our piety. Humanity may very well be less extensive than nature yet it inspires our worshipful love. Humanity, which in science is conceived as a biological species, is conceived of by Comte as a cultural organism. It is the greatest of all organisms. In other organisms, the parts cut off from the whole cease to exist; in humanity, the individuals are separable yet they do not derogate to particulars. Man as a particular can exist, only as the social whole, the universal man or humanity, expresses itself in and through him: 'The individual cannot be said to exist properly except in the exaggerated abstractions of modern metaphysicians. Existence in the true sense can be predicated only of Humanity...'

While maintaining a negative attitude to theology and God, Comte sets up the humanist creed with the human race conceived

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culturated as the deity, as 'the Providence which mediates between its members and the system of external necessity...'. And he recommends that we direct our thoughts, feelings and actions to this goddess. As an object of worship, she is more real than the God of older religions. The Grand Étre is the special object of worship: it consists of those who have served mankind in the past, taught us of the unity of mankind through the ages, made us feel and work for all sentient beings not only human but all those animal species which make friends with and serve us. The new creed fulfills the conditions necessary for a religion. It can claim authority over the whole of human life, all our sentiments of devotion and obligation. An elaborate ritual or cultus bearing a close resemblance with the forms of Roman Catholic Christianity is also set up by Comte.

The human evolute, although a finite fact, bears a suggestion of the infinite: it has no definite beginning or end; it satisfies our deeply rooted craving for the infinite. It thus inspires piety. It is also a source of moral inspiration and motives to noble deeds. The good of the human race is the criterion of right and wrong. The good of others alone should be the motive of all our acts. We should therefore try to get ourselves progressively detached from and non-attached to our bodily hunger and lust, to our craving for power and position, wealth and fame, to our passions and exclusive loves, in fact, deny ourselves all personal gratification which are not strictly required by bare physical necessities. (This clearly shows the disposition towards the idealism of the first moment). All education should aim at this altruism (Comte's own coinage) against egoism. It is not sufficient that in case of conflict we should sacrifice self-interest for general happiness; it is necessary we should regard the pursuit of self-interest as irreligious and immoral.

RADICAL HUMANISM FAILS TO REALIZE THE UNITY UNDERLYING NATURE AND MAN. Comte carries the universal human subjective attitude to a point of fixation. As a result, the naturalist's objectivity is lost while the idealist's organicism is not gained. By 'man is the measure of all things' he means that we cannot rise above the subjectivity of our species, that we know phenomena, whereas in fact phenomena are what we know about the things themselves. This positivist fixation leads him to see progress in the gradation—God, nature, man.

33 Pringle-Pattison, Idea of God, p. 139.
While apotheosizing humanity, he relegates nature to a secondary existence. True, in his later elaboration, he has stressed the organic relation between the two and man’s partial dependence on nature so as to add space and the earth as objects of worship. Yet this neither reaches the level of spiritual organism nor conserves the value of naturalism fully well. In his zeal for setting up a Church, he recommends an inquisitorial institution. The pursuit of truth or scientific researches and knowledge (the highest value according to naturalists) is to be adjusted to the exigencies of social utility: the naturalist’s highest value is to be done away with for the sake of the socialist’s highest value.  

Had Comte worked out his correlation of man and nature, he would have seen through the limitations of his subjective synthesis and found out that the true synthesis is to be posited in God. The truth is the whole. The fact of man in nature leads neither to nature nor to man but to God. Radical humanism thus fails to realize the underlying unity between nature and man: it suffers from an irreconcilable dualism.

**The Three Moments of Idealism.** The fixation of feeling for the social self as the highest subject dissolves as we begin to feel for the spiritual self. We then seek to realize the supreme principle of reason at the subjective pole. A new fixation develops for the reason in spirit which includes and supersedes the reason in nature and in society. The resultant fixational culture may be called idealistic.

Here too we may distinguish three logical moments according as the part (here, the spiritual self) is taken in and by itself, in relation to other parts (other spiritual selves as also its own lower selves which it tries to repress in the first moment), and in relation to the whole, the absolute. We may name the moments respectively as monadistic idealism, ethical idealism, and absolute idealism. As representative instances from history we may respectively consider the Cynics, Spinoza and Pringle-Pattison. Here again our purpose is not to represent their systems as such but to show how idealism occurs as fixational systems of culture.

*The Cynics* (Fl. 400 B.C.)

The spiritual self taken in and by itself. The Cynics aim at the discovery and possession of the ultimate self. They eschew
the doubtful object of transcendental speculation as well as the values of natural and social life like pleasures of the senses, wealth and honour, power and position. Life in conformity with reason alone is natural. But nature revealing a rational plan all over, reason may be said to inhere the entire universe. This universal reason is focussed at the centre-point of individual spiritual self which realizes the whole in the free determination of itself by its own law.

To know this is wisdom: to strive for it is virtue. The wise or virtuous man alone is at home in every clime at any time: having discovered the universal reason and moral law within, he has no need for the law of the state. The Cynic thus realizes the sublime in the spiritual self which feels free in detachment (adiaforia) and self-sufficiency (autarkeia).

VIRTUE ALONE IS GOOD. Antisthenes, the disciple of Socrates, is the founder; and Diogenes dubbed 'Socrates gone mad' is the chief exponent of the Cynic way of life or culture. Later Cynics and their successors Stoics developed the Cynic view of life. Antisthenes sought inspiration in the moral as opposed to the intellectual aspect of Socrates' personality. The logic chopping and metaphysical logomachy associated with Socratic dialogues left him cold. The moral qualities of the master—the independence of character, strength of will and power of self-assertion, led him to this self-centred cult of self-realization.

Virtue alone is good and makes one free. So Heracles, as against 'the vain quibbler' Prometheus, is the right type of hero—the primeval pattern of Cynic strength and thoroughness. Virtue is knowledge but it is knowledge that all else is vanity, that pain may be good as instrumental to virtue, and that pleasure sought as an end defeats its purpose and is an evil. Knowledge is virtue for Antisthenes as well as for Socrates, but with a difference. Theoretical knowledge is only an instrumental value, a means to spiritual well-being. Virtue is practical wisdom which consists in the cultivation of contempt for pleasure (natural and social well-being) and of the power to endure pain (natural and social evils).

Sensual pleasures are ephemeral and treacherous; they cannot be recommended as worth pursuing seriously. A virtuous or wise man is he who has developed an inner strength: he can control his lower selves. The wise man can assert his free will and enjoy an independence of all external trappings of life. He alone attains the peace of mind which remains undisturbed by the ups and downs
of life. He is at home in every clime at any time and for ever enjoys the blessedness of a heavenly life on the earth. The cynical sage would not admit any political responsibility. He feels himself to be a citizen of the world at large—completely indifferent to the petty affairs of the state. Having discovered the moral law within, he has no need for the law of the state.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{The Cynic realizes the universal reason in his own self.} To develop the power of enduring evils and defying goods both natural and social—is the only way to the state of calm possession and independence. To know this is wisdom; to strive for it is virtue. All this implies that real happiness lies in a rational way of life. Reason alone can regulate the course of life. It alone can control the passions and hold us from pursuing the sensual pleasures of life with a gay abandon. Reason alone can develop an integrity of character and purpose. The rigorous discipline it imposes may require the aspirant to live a life of hardship and poverty; yet it becomes a source of perennial pleasantness to the votary.

The Cynics recommend a natural life; but the natural life is another name for a life in conformity with reason. Later on, the Stoics laid stress on this identity between reason and nature. The most inward self is found to be the universal and eternal reason present in every human being. Reason is operative not only in human nature but also found to inhere the outer nature. In man it controls his impulses and appetites; in nature, it manifests as the system and order—the law-governedness of the universe. All these are signs of a purposiveness, of a rational plan in nature. Nature and reason are thus identical. This rationalist view of nature (both human and non-human) puts cynicism-cum-stoicism among the idealistic doctrines which make spiritual value not only the ultimate end of life but identify it as the ultimate reality.

The first moment of idealism is thus 'a revolt of the spirit against matter'—as Sri Aurobindo describes the ascetic attitude. Virtue or moral value may not be the sole good; and vice may not be the sole evil. Yet ascetic spirit does lead to 'a truth of existence, a state of conscious realization which stands at the very summit of our responsibility'.\textsuperscript{36} It is an indispensable element in human perfection: its conscious affirmation alone can give us a lift from the natural and

social levels. Once up there we may have fuller spiritual life in which there is room for social and natural values and need not continue to strike the negative attitude. The ideal of fuller spiritual life, however, need not blind us to the great service rendered by asceticism.

Without the Cynic’s attitude it is not possible to break into the spiritual life at all. The Cynic has a profound sensitiveness to the ills of natural and social life: this starts the revolt of the spirit. He has the insatiable urge for freedom: this must sustain the revolt. He has ‘an unshakable faith in the majesty and all-sufficiency of reason,’ against the static tradition and convention: this reason must regulate the revolt of spirit. The Cynics ‘introduced new standards of value, and upheld an ideal of plain, simple, and natural living, which soon purged itself of its original dross and remained an enduring possession of the civilized world’.

CYNICISM BREEDS A SPIRITUAL PRIDE AND AN ESCAPIST ATTITUDE. The ascetic self-control expresses itself as indifference to, denunciation and renunciation of, and withdrawal from a full natural and social life, and as an adventure into a primitive spiritual life. Sometimes it was carried to such an extent that ‘Antisthenes was told that his vanity might be seen through the holes of his own coat.’ And Diogenes had adopted as a title of honour the opprobrious epithet of “dog” (Greek kwan, hence “Cynic”), which had been applied to him, and perhaps to his teacher before him.

The Cynic or ascetic has discovered the last position of the finite self by detaching it from the natural and social selves; but he has not yet been able to break the barrier which isolates it from other finite beings. He is interested in his own redemption, in the discovery of his spiritual self. Hence the spiritual egoism. It is the spiritual pride which explains the Cynic’s attitude of contempt for sanctities of family life, ties of social life, and for responsibilities of political life. This also accounts for their disposition to suicide and martyrdom, their bold effrontery and insolent self-assertion, their preaching counsels of perfection to the proud and profane, and finally, their negative attitude to the ideals of intellectual and artistic life.

It is wrong, however, to compare the Cynic’s protest against sensualism with that of a pessimistic hedonist who recommends

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88 Gomperz cites several instances, pp. 152, 157.
self-control because little of pleasure can be had in this world which is full of pain. The egoism is underlined since cynicism prescribes as the end individual self-dependence or liberation rather than the loving service of fellow-beings after one attains liberation of one’s own self. In the light of this egoism ‘their cosmopolitanism seems to have been rather a contempt (real or affected) for their fellow-countrymen than a regard for humanity’.39

**FIXATION ON A DUALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF SPIRITUAL LIFE.** Virtue in the sense of withdrawal from nature and history, in the sense of renunciation of fuller life of art and learning, cannot be the sole good. It ceases to be a good in isolation from other goods.

Asceticism tends to destroy the balance of natural life. Modern psychology has made it clear that the uprooting of all desires is neither possible nor desirable. Only a progressive purification punctuated by intermittent gratification of desires is within our power. The ascetic endeavour at inner purification by uprooting all the natural desires frequently turns him into a neurotic. One has only to look into the blasphemous words of Antisthenes about the goddess of Love: ‘If I could but lay hands on Aphrodite, I would shoot her.’

Asceticism also tends to destroy the balance of social life, for the individual and the family, for the community and humanity. In the individual it fosters a kind of spiritual pride, not of knowledge or power, but of virtue, and deforms the ideals of theoretical knowledge. The Cynics carry the Socratic disparagement of other kinds of knowledge than the moral to an extreme where ‘ignorance and boorishness become virtues as against art and learning.’

Obviously, a dualistic interpretation of life is the point of fixation here. The opposition between the stage of imperfection and the stage of perfection is carried to an extreme where the two become manifestations of two disparate metaphysical principles. The acceptance of one necessarily eschews the other. The disparity asserts itself existentially between God and Satan, Spirit and Matter, Mind and Body, Good and Evil, etc. The realization of the spiritual well-being is then believed to be possible only if the demands of the flesh are totally mortified. The ascetic man feels the opposition between the lower and the higher so strongly as to give it a metaphysical status. Here precisely lies the error of ascetic idealism.

The opposition cannot be metaphysical at all. Both the higher

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and the lower exist as actual facts—capable of being really experienced. The existence of the higher does not make the lower self cease to exist. The distinction between the two arises only when we want to grade our experience: it is thus a preserve of the logical sphere. The dualism thus loses its ontological status. The higher comes to exist not by negating the lower but by subordinating it to itself and thus taking out its sting as evil. A complete uprooting of the lower with a view to realizing the higher defeats its own end. The attempt usually results in neurosis. The belief that complete uprooting is necessary, that the lower self is evil in the sense that its very existence is evil, gets fixated during the first moment and itself becomes the source of an evil.

Ascetics have used drastic methods like exposure to weather, fasting, emaciating the flesh, etc.; these have proved to be fruitful in some cases where the persons are sick souls and have an absolutely intractable will. Other methods like the eightfold means to yoga in Hinduism and the purgative and meditative methods in Christianity may also prove useful—when practised with moderation and in milder forms. Such methods are neither sufficient nor even necessary for realization of the spiritual self, inner purification or moral perfection. True, some of the techniques do remove distractions of the mind, tame it and add to the power of concentration. Yet they remain negative in character, and with too much importance given to them, may turn into mechanical, stereotyped, inane formality. And this may lead the aspirant away from the goal.

**Spinoza (A.D. 1634—1677)**

**The Spiritual Self Taken in Relation to Other Spiritual Selves and Its Own Lower Selves.** In Spinoza’s *Ethics*, the stress shifts from one self-centred vision to many-sided moral action embracing all individuals. He condemns egoistic escape and ascetic renunciation. In order to realize the moral organism, the theoretical realization of the identity of the spiritual self with the universal idea is not sufficient: there must be a practical realization in society. The spiritual self has got to comprehend the lower selves and yet to transcend its particularity by relating itself in theory and practice to other spiritual selves.

(r) Following the old philosophic distinction between reason and passion, Spinoza goes beyond the Cynics in holding that passion
without reason is blind and reason without passion is dead. In order, therefore, to be a constituent member of the organism, the spiritual self has got to comprehend and control, and not to renounce, while transcending, the lower selves. There must be a return (after withdrawal) to nature and history for practical realization of the highest value.

(2) Idealism in general realizes that the spiritual self is *nous* and not *physis*. Yet it identifies *nous* with *logos*, spirit with reason. It believes that the spiritual self enjoys a kind of immunity from the perils of its freedom by virtue of its own law-making or law-giving rationality. That not only outer nature but also human nature is a source of evil is recognized; but, it is not the spiritual self but the natural self, *passio* and *imaginatio*, that is the source of evil. Spinoza shares this general belief.

According to him, therefore, in order to be a member of the moral organism, the spiritual self has got to transcend, if not renounce, the lower selves. In theory, reason perceives law in the chaotic flux of facts; in practice, reason establishes law in the chaotic flux of desires. Reason does it *sub specie aeternitatis*, that is, under the form of eternity. And under the form of eternity, one can live one's theoretical life and one's practical life by taking up into one's life the life of the other members of the social organism.  

(3) The moral organism Spinoza conceives thus holds within it the social organism as its practical realization. He does not, like the Cynic, conceive of the good of which he is in search as an individual possession. He aims at the creation of a society. Yet he conceives of the moral society in egoistic terms. The reason is not far to seek.

The knowledge of good or evil is the same as the emotion of pleasure or pain in so far as we are conscious of it. Pleasure is the consciousness of a transition to increased vitality; pain, to lowered vitality. Active emotions may be classified into two: *animositatis* or rational self-love and *generositatis* or rational benevolence. The latter, however, is a function of the former.

Each finite thing or being has the disposition to maintain its essence or unity. Man responds to stimuli in such a way as to

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40 John Caird, *Spinoza*, pp. 306-07. On egoistic grounds Spinoza constructs the propositions of utilitarianism (Ethics, IV, LXV), Kantian type of rationalism (Ibid., IV, XXXVII), Christian righteousness (Ibid., IV, XLVI) and perfectionism (Ibid., V, XL.)
maintain the unity and balance disturbed by the stimuli. Spinoza identifies the human spirit with this natural impulse of organism to self-preservation. This disposition to self-maintenance makes up the essential impulse of our life: it rules out self-sacrifice.

On the level of reason, we can pursue deliberately the same end for which we strive on the instinctual level. The so-called altruistic acts are clearly those which are essential for one’s own interests. The one essential activity of man is to develop the power of clear thinking and rational understanding. Hence self-preservation at the rational level is the same as the development of the rational self.

It is only at the instinctual level that there is confusion or conflict, error or evil; the goods here diminish by division; hence the conflicts over equitable distribution. Rational insight and all the values depending on it remain unaffected on distribution. These however cannot reach a high degree in one person unless they reach a degree of perfection in many or all. Hence the ideal of an ethical organism in spite of the fact that the free men wish to live in a society on egoistic grounds and would have other members equally free on grounds of egoism again.

FROM BONDAGE OF PASSION TO FREEDOM OF REASON. Ethical idealism achieves an organic unity between theory and practice and marks a clear development on the first moment.41 Practical reason goes hand in hand with theoretical reason. The three kinds of knowledge (empirical, rational, intuitive) have the corresponding kinds of action; to be exact, it is not simply a correspondence between theory and practice: there is an identity, the two being aspects of the same individuality. The two together give us three grades of life: the life of ignorance and bondage, the life of science and freedom, and the life of philosophy and intellectual love of God.

On the level of the first kind of knowledge, it is all confused opinion or imagination which does not contain ideas of the causes of our bodily modifications. Our emotions are passive; we do not understand their causes. They are thrust on us and we become their slaves. Life is a conflict of instincts, impulses, popular opinions, conventions and superstitions. Most experience has its cause outside the mind’s own activity: appetitus has little scope. As a result our vitality diminishes and we feel pained and depressed. This is the state of human bondage. 'The true self is repressed by what is foreign to it,' as John Caird puts it. There is no standard for

41 H. H. Joachim, Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, pp. 304-05.
truth or conduct. Personal prejudices are blindly universalized. We are not only at war with others but also with ourselves; there is not only no society; there are no real individuals either; we are all particular organisms. Our actions are not ours at all. 'The conatus has no free play'—as Caird annotates Spinoza again. We are slaves.

To realize freedom is not an easy task. As parts of Natura Natvra we are not only at the mercy of the outer but also under the overpowering influence of passive emotions which may hang on fixated confused-and-inadequate idea. A clear and adequate idea cannot do away with the fixation. The knowledge that some emotions are irrational and harmful does not sublimate them; another emotion stronger than they alone can.

We may, however, exercise the power of the mind to subdue passive emotions. We may look into the nature of emotions and form clear ideas of them. This develops the detached attitude of introspection: we feel less involved in our passive emotions. The dissociation of the emotions from their outer causes and the substituting for them of the emotion of scientific curiosity help us in moving from the hapless position of nature's object to the superior position of the subject. We may also develop and cultivate emotions towards the ideal and impersonal. These may be less intense but in the long run they are more satisfying than and at an advantage over the more intense emotions towards the concrete and personal. Furthermore, a rational contemplation of the higher determinism wears the bitter emotions and their obsessiveness. Finally, we may cultivate the art of joining and disjoining ideas: this strengthens the disposition to check passive emotions at the time of their occurrence. This technique of sublimation or strategy of redemption leads us from bondage to freedom.42

On the next level, that is, of the second kind of knowledge, which Spinoza calls ratio, we form adequate ideas of the properties of things and universal notions. Mind’s 'experience becomes the expression of its own self-originated energy'.43 Our emotions become active, that is, depend on mind's own characteristic activities. Our pleasures and desires become active; and since painful emotion is always passive, pain is eliminated to the extent active emotions replace passive ones. Active pleasure being that kind of pleasure which we feel when we by our own efforts introduce order

42 C. D. Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, Section on Spinoza.
and system into our experience, and active desire being that feeling which we have when we succeed in maintaining the existing level of adequacy across distractions and difficulties, the state of ratio and active emotions is the state of human freedom. 'The mind ceases to be the slave of external and accidental impulse.'\textsuperscript{43} The laws of nature emerge into view as eternal laws but only under a certain aspect of eternity.

The consummation is reached on the level of the third kind of knowledge, scientia intuitiva. Here we begin to see and regard things as necessary consequences of the sole ground that is God. Knowledge proceeds 'from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.'\textsuperscript{44} The desire for this knowledge arises from scientific knowledge. This third kind gives adequate ideas of the eternal and infinite essence of God, and is the greatest good and greatest virtue. It is not discursive but an internal or inward acquaintance with the inmost constitution of the world. It is a concrete appreciation of the concrete system of self-directing individualities and hence more exhilarating than the recognition of abstract universals in the second kind of knowledge. The emotion aroused by it is more intense than the second kind. It gives us the greatest possible satisfaction and leads us to the intellectual love of God. The love is called intellectual since it springs from knowledge. Its object is the whole universe, God or Nature; hence it is love of God.

\textbf{THE PART-WHOLE RELATION AND THE WHOLE CONCEIVED IN AN INCHOATE MANNER.} Spinoza conceives of the whole and of the relation between the parts and the whole rather in an inchoate manner. The whole is the negation of the part, yet it expresses itself in the part which, \textit{sub specie aeternitatis}, constitutes an element of the whole. The whole is an all-absorbing lifeless substance, yet it knows and loves itself and parts with an infinite intellectual love. Similarly, the part is an illusory mode of the whole capable of realizing the whole only by absorption; yet it has an indestructible individuality capable of realizing both itself and the whole, and thereby, of attaining to its own conscious perfection and blessedness.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{43} John Caird, \textit{Spinoza}, p. 225.

\textsuperscript{44} Spinoza, \textit{op. cit.} II, Prop. XL, note 11.

\textsuperscript{45} John Caird, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 303, p. 4.
(1) The whole alone is real: the parts are unreal. Spinoza conceives of the infinite by doing away with the lines of division between finite modes. He regards these lines as due to our imperfect ways of apprehension. He reduces all finite things to indeterminate being, and from this passes to the idea of the infinite substance as a self-determining principle which is the ground of all the manifold determinations. The infinite is thus the presupposition of all finite determinations of being and knowledge. But then 'all determination is or involves negation', says Spinoza. Negation corresponds to unreality. It is by negating this negation that we reach the absolute which is without determinations. 'Spinoza thus reaches the supreme reality of God by denying the reality of everything else'—as Edward Caird puts it.46

On the other hand, God the creator or Natura Naturans cannot be conceived as existentially separate from nature, the creation or Natura Naturata. And this very separation is implied by the popular theological and deistic philosophical notion of the act of creation: God is the external, transient (transseunt) cause, the prime mover, the first cause, or deus ex machina; the act of creation is an event at a certain point of time, or several such intermittent events. This clearly makes for two finite substances and hence is self-contradictory. 'The point is that to speak of a creative Nature apart from God is either to set up a second God or to introduce a superfluous and complicating entity.'47 Spinoza therefore proposes: 'God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.'48 He is the enduring ground, eternal creator, immanent cause of the world of determinate things and beings; the latter are consequences grounded in the very nature of God from which they follow as a matter of necessity. They are the modes of God. The modes may be viewed as infinite and as finite. The infinite modes in Extension, for example, are motion-and-rest and the face of the Universe as a whole. The former makes up the changes in the universe, while the latter, its individuality. This individuality involves many lesser individuals each of which is an individual of still lesser individuals and so on, ad infinitum. Every finite mode must appear in a coordinate manner in each of the attributes, since they are infinite, that is, express the whole.

47 Leon Roth, Spinoza, p. 62. fn.
48 Spinoza, op. cit., I, prop. 17.
The Spinozistic whole is both the substance or necessary being of metaphysics and God or perfect being of theology. It is the synthesis of the three primary notions of thought—those of stuff, structure and origin and hence identical with the abstract absolute, a synthesis of Aristotelian material cause, formal cause and efficient cause. It is also the most perfect being loving itself and all finite things and beings. It is interesting to take note of Hegel’s criticism on this point. He criticises Spinoza’s conception of God-as-substance as an imperfect idea of the absolute: it is God the absolute Thing and not God the absolute Person of Christianity. Thus, in Spinoza’s system as also in other systems of idealistic monism (including that of Hegel) God is not distinguished from the absolute. As a result the problem of evil disappears leaving the realization of the highest value as a problematic venture.

(2) Similarly, the finite is ex parte negatio—in part negation. On the one hand, all finite individuals as modes or accidents of the absolute substance are determined in their existence and function. All determination is negation. Hence they are illusory aspects of God which is the negation of all determinations. On the other hand, Spinoza asserts that the individual is the real; he ascribes to each finite thing a conatus in suo esse perseverandi; he rejects the general ideas as mere entia rationis; he rejects teleology; he uses the term ‘Nature’ as a synonym for ‘God’; all these seem to give to the finite an independent reality so that the infinite reduces to an expression for the aggregate of finite things. A synthesis of the two extreme views is also to be found in Spinoza. The finite individual in so far as it is finite is unreal; but in so far as it is individual (that is, must appear in a co-ordinate manner in each of the infinite attributes and thus express the whole), it is real. Sub specie aeternitatis, the true individuality becomes manifest. The finite self realizes its consummation and blessedness as it becomes aware, as per scientia intuitiva, of this indestructible individuality of its own.

Spinoza’s failure to conceive of the part-whole relation in a systematic manner is generally traced to his attempt to put his ideas in and through the strait-jackets of his geometrical syllogistic method. Besides, he does not distinguish between spirit and rationality on the one hand, and God and the absolute on the other.

50 Spinoza, op. cit. V, XXIX Schol., ii. 45 and Schol.
These latter two defects he of course shares with other idealists, even of the next moment.

A. Seth Pringle-Pattison (A. D. 1856—1931)

The spiritual self taken in relation to the absolute. Pringle-Pattison gives a satisfactory account of the part-whole relation but fails with the account of the whole.

Finite selves are not as illusory in character as they would be if reckoned as merely 'adjectival' on the absolute. Neither are they as 'substantive' in character as the Spinozistic substance. Pringle-Pattison concedes to them a reality which is substantive in character in the Aristotelian sense, in other words, the reality of a logical subject. Each spiritual self is an individual, a unique focus of immediate experience, of which we can predicate the universals which constitute its nature. It is a unique centre—distinct but not separate from the whole, and discrete but not necessarily distinct from other centres. We may not be the supreme end the absolute has in view. Neither need we realize ourselves by an absorption into the absolute. We are already in the absolute; and a union through religious experience is more intimate than the substantial fusion or adjectival subsistence. Our uniqueness enriches the life of the absolute expressing itself in and through each centre, and at the same time, by an alternation of difference with identity, enriches ours. Pringle-Pattison thus conceives of a spiritual universe which is a systematic unity.

Coming to the account of the whole, he poses the problem as one of interpreting reality in terms of the highest spiritual value. He lays stress on the ontological argument which tries to prove the existence of God by proving that the notion of perfect being entails the notion of necessary being. A failure of this argument, he says, means a surrender to scepticism. Yet he admits that it is an untested postulate. Virtually, he identifies the highest value, the supreme regulative principle of reason, as both the absolute and God.

The spiritual self is an individual: a unique centre or focus of immediate experience. A member of the spiritual system, the individual is a unique focus of immediate experience, a discrete whole of contents. The individual is not a metaphysical atom, 'an abstract particular in the shape of a point of existence', having only an external and unnecessary relation with other things.
He is not a fundamentally isolated self-subsistent, self-possessed being inaccessible to other parts as well as to the whole. This extreme pluralistic view would make him totally unfit for membership of a spiritual system.

Neither is he just an element. The individual is not 'a complex of qualities or abstract universals' which as adjectives can be predicated only of the absolute and never of the finite individual himself.

'Why or how the absolute divides into centres and how so divided it remains one'—is a question which can be better answered in terms of individuation as the principle of creation and which therefore need not be answered in terms of illusion and unreality. Yet the extreme monists show a disposition to illusionistic account. Bradley, for example, says: 'To gain consistency and truth it must be merged, and recompensed in a result in which its speciality must vanish.' Bosanquet too lays stress on the moral independence of the finite self only to crush it into an existential non-entity. 'A true self is something to be made one, to be held together with pains and labour, not something to be enjoyed.' Yet our individuality has no existence in reality but only in our impotence which hides the eternal reality. Value does not lie in the preservation of the individuality of the finite selves but in their contributions to the whole. The contribution lies 'in the gift of himself' (as Pringle-Pattison says following the style of Royce's parable), in getting himself merged and thus contributing a modification to the experiences which together make up the whole experience. In short, finite selves possess no value for the absolute. Pringle-Pattison points out the self-contradictory character of such monistic pronouncements; he argues that we cannot talk of the illusory character of the seat of illusion.

There is no denying the fact that there is something deeper and more real which underlies the individual finite selves; one cannot but stress the element of universal in the individual's constitution. Pringle-Pattison, therefore, wants us to reject only the suggestion that this requires the view of finite selfhood as a vanishing distinction. The distinctness of the self (implying a real difference and a measure of independence) is also to be stressed—for the sake of its uniqueness, and not for the sake of bare self-identity which is just numerical identity or abstract particularity, as if it were in the

51 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 306.
52 Bosanquet, Individuality and Value, p. 338.
assertion of its bare self-identity and discreteness from others that the self realized its true being! The uniqueness of the individual lies in its being a focus of immediate experience which is a systematic unity of particulars and universals. The discreteness from other selves in no way prevents one self from sharing the common universal life with other selves. The contents of each self are essentially universals and hence sharable. Similarly, the distinctness from the whole does not make the finite self closed to all communication from the being in which its existence is embedded; the distinctness does not condemn it to a cynical self-realization or membership of only an ethical organism.

"It must remain open and accessible—it must enter into the divine experience in a way for which our mode of knowing hardly furnishes us with an analogy. ... But ... it by no means follows that such creation is impossible for the Absolute."

In short, with Individuation as the principle of creation, the finite selves may very well be considered unique centres, really distinct and relatively independent, yet open to constant creation by the absolute.

Thus, Pringle-Pattison comes very near our view of the individual and spiritual system. The individual is not a compound of abstract particular and abstract universals: this will give us an object of experience rather than a subject or focus of immediate experience. The unity of the subject belongs to the peculiar systematization of the content done by or for itself and not as it might possess as an object.

The principle of individuation does not imply that we should look upon finite selves 'as merely the channels through which a single universal consciousness thinks and acts—masks, as it were, of the one actor who takes all the parts in the cosmic drama.' Pringle-Pattison insists on the partial independence of finite selves: this independence we experience in our self-conscious moral efforts at 'moulding our souls' in this 'vale of soul-making'. That this may be embedded in the creative act of the absolute which passes our full comprehension and may always give us the feeling of creaturely dependence does not do away with the exhilarating feeling of the development of an identical individual even at the moments of

feeling of absorption and identity. Besides, this independence does not imply externality in the material or spatial sense. This is plainly logical or ideal independence which is implied in systematic unity.

True, we cannot hold that we are the *raison d'être* of the absolute, 'that the supreme end of the Absolute is to give rise to beings such as I experience myself to be,' as Bosanquet puts it. True, our unity is 'a puzzle and an unsatisfied aspiration' (Bosanquet). But, Pringle-Pattison says, this does not suggest that we instinctively desire the eternal reality of the absolute as our self-realization and that too, by an absorption and extinction: '... absorption means only the extinction of one centre of intelligence and love, without any conceivable gain ... to the content of the universe as a whole.'

We are already in the absolute; and a union based on efficient distinction is more intimate than material extinction. Our distinctness enriches the absolute and at the same time, by an alternation of difference with identity, enriches ours: '... for the Absolute such communion must possess a living value which no solitary perfection or contemplative felicity could yield.' This systematic part-whole relationship results in a spiritual universe—the supreme end for the religious consciousness to realize.

**The Absolute and God Cannot Be Identified with the Sublime.** Coming to the whole, Pringle-Pattison conceives of it as a systematic unity. The finite individuals are not, *from the side of the absolute*, mere appearances or illusions; and, in order to be real, their individualities need not be transmuted and absorbed. In short, Pringle-Pattison rejects the monistic disposition to make an *organic* rather than a *systematic* unity of the whole. In an organic unity, the unity though interdependent tends to be the sole reality at the cost of diversity. In a systematic unity there is perfect interdependence and interpenetration, which preserves the partial independence of the diverse parts as well as of the whole. And the Bradleyan mystery about 'why and how the Absolute divides itself into centres or the way in which, so divided, it still remains one' can be solved *from the side of the absolute*.

The principle of individuation of the absolute solves the mystery and gives a systematic view which is logically a superior solution to the organic view. The finite foci are as real as the infinite indi-

vidual since they are individuations of the absolute. 'The plurality of the finite centres is, therefore, a true appearance; ... the Absolute really does appear, or differentiate itself, in that way ... this differentiation or creation ... constitutes the very essence and open secret of the Absolute Life.' Pringle-Pattison rightly conceives of the absolute as a systematic unity of individuals. And he rightly meets the Bradleyan why and how by referring to the creative principle or principle of individuation of the absolute.

But he fails to point out unmistakably how and in what form the principle works in our experience. He has come very near the solution when he says 'The existence of an individual centre of knowledge and feeling [italics mine] is in itself an enrichment of the universe, and the clearer and intenser the flame of the individual life, the greater proportionally the enrichment.' That feeling is the creative principle and that it is feeling which makes of individual a series of individuation approaching perfection have escaped his scrutiny. Indeed, this escaped the scrutiny of most other idealists.

Taylor, for example, has seized upon the idea of purpose, teleology or Aristotelian final cause. His fixation lies on the same logical principle as Pringle-Pattison's and many other idealists' fixation does; only, in some of the latter cases the form of the logical principle may be identified with Aristotelian formal cause. But neither the final cause nor the formal cause explains the act of individuation or creation. Neither can claim to be the metaphysical principle. Feeling alone can claim to be the efficient cause, in the Aristotelian sense again. And the absolute must have the character of the efficient cause, whereas God as religious experience is themeeting-ground of the formal, final and the efficient causes. In his History of Western Philosophy, while discussing the four Aristotelian causes, Dr. N. V. Joshi says, inter alia:

"The entire created world ... ultimately owes its being to the efficient cause. As we pass from the lower to the highest stage, we come across experiences representing the synthesis of matter and form in higher and higher degrees of individuation.... This finds its culmination in the personality of God ... the meeting-ground of the formal, final and efficient causes."
In other words, God as a concrete being is brought into existence, as the sublime or supreme form is realized through feeling the efficient cause or metaphysical principle.

Pringle-Pattison rightly recognizes the sublime in the logical principle of contradiction; but he wrongly identifies the absolute as well as God with the unrealized sublime. Like most other absolute idealists he fails to distinguish God clearly from the absolute, and like most other rationalists, to show how the theistic proposition is realizable.

The God of religion is neither the sublime nor the absolute: it is the realization of the sublime, in other words, the meeting-ground of the sublime and the absolute, in our experience. The idealists, irrespective of whether they follow the method of theoretical reason or practical reason, show a disposition to look upon the absolute of metaphysics and the God of religion as identical. They rightly recognize the sublime in the regulative principle of reason, yet wrongly identify the absolute as well as God with the unrealized sublime. They lay stress on the argument that the rational is real, that the perfect being is the necessary being. A failure of this argument, they say, means a surrender to scepticism. Yet they admit that it is an untested postulate or venture of faith to hold that the rational is real, that reality is spiritual or divine. Thus, they fail to distinguish God from the absolute which is abstract per se. They fail to prove the existence of God, in other words, to show how to realize God.

Their failure may be traced to the rationalist fixation on the principle of reason—whether in the form of the method of the theoretical reason or of practical reason. This is a regulative principle; but they look upon it as the constitutive principle. They do not make a clear distinction between the two principles at all. As a result, the supreme regulative principle of reason is both apotheosized and absolutized.

The absolute may be abstract but it is dynamic so that the absolute individuates itself in and through our experience. In us the finite individuals the absolute is operative as our feeling which is the constitutive or metaphysical principle. Reason which is the regulative or logical principle is a result of the individuation of the absolute. Feeling as the creative principle not only invests our experience with existence but sets in operation the regulative principle of reason. The very act of feeling through which feeling
subordinates a part to a logical whole creates a valuational gradation in the experiences and thus makes logical analysis operative within itself. All cases of conversions—and these involve overcoming fixations—are instances of the creative character of feeling. Similarly, all cases of progress in the biography of the individual or the history of the race again illustrate the same point. Feeling has created and sustained the process.

Thus, it is only by making a clear distinction between the regulative principle and the constitutive principle that we can prove the reality of God or the realizability of the idea of God, which is the supreme ideal of reason.
BOOK II: THE PROBLEM OF MEANS

6 Culture and Education

Gradation of Education. A natural and logical gradation of education would follow the natural and logical gradation of experience.

Education

- Prelogical
- Logical
  - Primary
  - Secondary
  - Tertiary
    - Theo.
    - Prac.
    - Theo.
    - Prac.
    - Theo.
    - Prac.

Education on the Prelogical Level. This is education on the level of reflex acts and instincts, on which theory and practice do not get differentiated. As such it is concerned with the development of only motor-skills; and the training in any of these cannot separate theory from practice. The theory part of it is acquired by reflex active and instinctive feeling-cognition.

Any and every kind of motor skill is not the concern of prelogical education. On each higher level of education, some motor skills or others are to be developed. All practical training in higher levels (whether crude, useful or fine arts) require greater development of motor skills. But all prelogical education is concerned with the development of motor skills: because, on the prelogical level theory and practice have not differentiated. This gives us the scope of prelogical education: only those motor skills fall under its scope in which the theory part is not separable because the trainee has not yet developed the proper symbolic apparatus.

Most education in primitive societies where modern education...
has not yet stepped in is on this level. In civilized societies, pre-
primary and a part of primary education (in elementary schools)
make up education on this level. The purpose of pre-logical education
is twofold: (i) to develop motor skills which are appropoite to
trainees' lives on the present level in the given society, and (ii) in
course of this to effect the differentiation of perceptual experience
as a distinct form of learning and thus a transition to the next
higher level, that of primary logical experience. Thus, in Montessori's
system of prelogical education, for example, all three classes of
exercises—exercises of practical life, exercises in sensory training and
the didactic exercises—are concerned with developing motor
habits and skills. At the same time the exercises in sensory training
aim at transition to the level of perception.

EDUCATION ON THE PRIMARY LOGICAL LEVEL. The development
of motor skills on the prelogical level reaches a point of mutation:
there it gets differentiated as some practice in crude arts from its
perceptual theoretical part, which can now be studied in symbols,
both verbal and mathematical. A time gap begins to separate the
two. Experience reaches the logical level of perception and crude arts.

Education on this level may be properly called primary education.
Primary education concerns itself with the teaching and learning
(or the two together called organized learning) of primary theories
and practices, that is, commonsense knowledge and crude arts.
What we have classified as primary vocations are these primary
practices or crude arts which can become social labour and acquire
value-in-exchange. Thus, vocational training for primary vocations
too is an integral part of primary education.

A note on verbal reform. Part of the education in the elementary
schools which passes as primary education to-day is education on
the prelogical level. The rest of it is primary education on our use
of the expression. And much of the education which passes as
secondary education is, on our gradation, education on the primary
level. A recommendation for verbal reform may therefore be
relevant here. All theoretical education up to the high school
standard and all practical training in technical high schools may be
called primary education instead of secondary. These impart
knowledge in primary theories and training in primary arts and
vocations. The pupils do not yet have a grasp of sciences proper and
do not yet start on a course of humanization across acculturation.

Primary education is concerned with the development of percep-
tions and of those motor skills which are necessary for this development as well as for primary practices, that is, crude arts. In acquiring primary knowledge, some further development of motor skills and habits are necessary. In learning how to make crude artefacts, a lot of perceptual knowledge has to be applied.

Primary education, however, cannot stop with the teaching and learning (or, organized learning) of commonsense theories and crude arts. It must have a 'nusis' towards the next higher level; it must contain an element of progress. In the course of developing perception and motor skills appropriate to primary knowledge and vocations, primary education must effect the transition to the higher level of science. The courses in general science are intended to effect the transition.

The subject matter course or subject curriculum may aim at realizing the first purpose of primary education. A suitable problem course at this level as well as the subject of general science may aim at realizing the other purpose. Problem-integrated education on the primary level may introduce the problem of the nature of science in general. We need not try to give here the detail of the curriculum. But the outline may be suggested: 1. Sense organs. 2. What are the classes of facts we can perceive with our sense organs? 3. How do scopes and meters help our observations and measurements? 4. How do perceptions gradually develop into science? 5. What are the sciences? 6. What are their respective subject matters, entities and scopes? 7. How are the entities related? 8. Causal relation and functional dependence; simple examples. 9. Variations and equations. 10. Facts and data. 11. Scientific propositions, hypotheses, laws, explanations. 12. Methods. 13. Enumeration of secondary arts and vocations. 14. Biographies of great discoverers and inventors.

EDUCATION ON THE SECONDARY LOGICAL LEVEL. We have seen how perceptual experience seeking to resolve its contradictions gradually reaches the level of science. Education on the level of science may be properly called secondary education. Secondary education concerns itself with the teaching and learning (organized learning) of secondary logical theories and practices, that is, sciences and technologies and other useful arts. What we have classified as secondary vocations are those secondary practices or useful arts which become social labour and acquire value-in-exchange. Thus, vocational training for secondary vocations (in Engineering,
Medical, Commerce, Law, Teachers’ Training and Military Training Colleges) too is an integral part of secondary education.

Much of the education in Colleges and Universities which passes as higher education to-day is education on the secondary level. That part which deals with subjective attitudes is education on the tertiary level. This distinction must be maintained. A verbal reform here and a clearcut hierarchy putting the sciences and technologies (and other useful arts) lower than the philosophies and fine arts (arts which apply valuational knowledge) may by itself have a liberating influence.

All the sciences at present studied for the B.Sc. and M.Sc. degrees and all courses in Engineering, Medicine, Psychiatry, etc. are to be included in secondary education on our grading. Only original and inventive studies (that is, research work meant for Ph.D. and D.Sc. degrees) may be put in the tertiary category: here a lot of critical evaluation—a philosophical activity, is necessary.

The various arts or humanities subjects in Colleges and Universities are either sciences or philosophies or partly scientific and partly philosophical. An effort should be made towards a clearer differentiation between natural sciences and natural philosophy, social sciences and social philosophy, moral sciences and moral philosophy, between economics as a science and economics as a part of social philosophy, between political science and political philosophy, between sociology and social philosophy, between technical logic and philosophical logic, between history on the level of science and history on the level of philosophy, between . . . and so on. Then, social and moral sciences may have room in the curricula of secondary education. And the degrees conferred may be B.Sc.’s and M.Sc.’s instead of B.A.’s and M.A.’s.

Secondary education, however, cannot stop with the organized learning of sciences and secondary practices. It must have a nisus towards the next higher level; it must contain an element of progress. In course of developing understanding and problem-thinking appropriate to secondary knowledge and vocations, secondary education must effect the transition to the higher level of philosophy and fine arts. The courses in general education are intended to effect the transition. Among the various kinds of general education in vogue, or suggested, we find a problem-integrated curriculum the most suitable to humanize the secondary student and to pull him up to the tertiary level.
We have drawn in the latter part of this chapter a tentative syllabus for such a course in problem-integrated education. This may be recommended for the secondary level students.

**Education on the Tertiary Logical Level.** Education on this level is concerned with modifying and developing attitudes and ideals, with philosophical theories (natural, mathematical; social, political; moral, religious), with fine arts and tertiary vocations. All research work may be put on this level; for, aiming at discoveries and inventions and critical evaluation, it is philosophical and fine-artistic in character. All learning of evaluative theories and practices is tertiary logical.

There may be many schools which give training in some fine art or other; for examples, schools of music, painting, architecture, etc. In such schools, the whole course of training from beginning to end cannot be called tertiary. Teen-agers may go to such schools. Here a gradation of stages into primary, secondary and tertiary may be done, according as the training involves only perceptual theories, scientific theories or philosophical theories.

**Education Aims at Individualization.** From the total cultural standpoint, the aim of education is to individualize the particular man.

By the particular man we mean a man in his pre-logical animal particularity or, at best, logical perceptual particularity. The particular man is born into a particular cultural system and caught in the process of acculturation. He, of course, acquires the traits of more than one particular culture, historical or logical; but he usually acquires the largest number of traits of one cultural system: he may thus be said to belong to that system. Thus, for example, there are many empiricists, egoistic hedonists, humanists and cynics, atheists and agnostics in the body of Western Christendom or Hindudom; yet they may be said to belong to that cultural system since they possess the largest number of traits of that system. (It is only the communists in the body of noncommunist systems who cannot be said to belong there.)

**Acculturation** is the educational process which equips the particular man with some theory and practice (either primary or secondary or tertiary) of the cultural system or congeries in which he is born and bred. To acculturate is to equip him with the partial universality of the many natural and historical gregations, of the
cultural supersystem, to which he belongs. This supersedes his animal and perceptual particularity.

*Humanization* is the educational process which seeks to prevent any fixation of feeling for the partial cultural systems, which seeks to give the acculturated man the universality of a non-fixational total cultural system. Humanization includes and supersedes the earlier process; it does not nullify the partial universalities acquired at the first stage; it takes away the pinch of evil that may follow a possible fixation of feeling for the partial universalities.

*Individualization* includes and supersedes humanization. It equips the humanized man with the partial particularity of his creative self. This supersedes his universality and gives him the uniqueness of his identity or individuality. It is an educational process through which the particular man acquires (i) without fixation, the partial universality of the many gregations to which he belongs, which does away with his particularity, animal and perceptual; and then, (ii) the universality of a non-fixational total cultural system, which supersedes the partial universalities; and then, (iii) the uniqueness of his creative self, which supersedes his universality.

The aims of education are therefore (i) acculturation in the first stage, (ii) humanization in the second stage, and (iii) individualization in the third stage. Acculturation is a means to humanization, and humanization is a means to individualization. These may be respectively called the immediate aim, the intermediate aim and the ultimate aim of education.

We have graded education into the primary, the secondary and the tertiary according as it respectively deals with the perceptual theories and crude arts, sciences and useful arts, and philosophies and fine arts. This involves a verbal reform or recommendation. Whether this is accepted or not, we are using the expressions in the senses we have given them. Then, primary education (on our grading and use) aims only at acculturation. Secondary education while furthering the process of acculturation aims at humanization. Tertiary education while furthering the processes of both acculturation and humanization aims at individualization.

If secondary and tertiary education everywhere still seek to acculturate, or fail to humanize and individualize, we may change the above statements about them into recommendations: secondary education ought to aim at humanization, and tertiary education, at individualization.
Each cultural system gives its aim in the form of a highest individual. The educational system as a part of the total cultural system also aims at that. But then, the whole of education (including the aim of education) is a means to that aim, and the whole of it is a process. So the aim of education had better be conceived as an aim in process: the various means it tries are means to realize the aim in process; whether the end product is always the desired highest individual or not (usually it is not) is the concern of the total cultural system and not of the educational system directly. Only, even the aim of education, which is to be realized in process continually, must be made an integral part of the ultimate aim of the cultural system. Hence, instead of using the term for the end product (viz. the 'individual') as the aim of education, we choose the process term 'individualization' as the aim of education.

INDIVIDUALIZATION IN THE NON-FIXATIONAL SYSTEM. Each cultural system gives its highest ideal in the form of a highest individual. That is the ultimate aim of that system. The educational system as an integral part of the cultural system also aims at the highest individual of the system. Education in all cultural systems, whether fixational or non-fixational, may thus be said to aim at individualization.

Similarly, most total cultural systems have their respective ideals of human unity. That is the intermediate aim of that system. To humanize is to induce a feeling for that ideal. The educational system as an integral part of the cultural system also aims at humanization. But each cultural system has its own special idea of human unity. The Christian ideal of 'love thine enemy' would like to realize human unity in Christianity. In order to realize human unity, they would christianize humanity rather than humanize the Christians. So would Islamic 'universal brotherhood' realize itself by turning *Dar-ul-Harb* into *Dar-ul-Islam*. The Communists' 'workers of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your chains' can become a reality if only they could realize the 'obverse' of the ideal, viz. 'intellectuals of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your brains.' The Hindu's 'vasudhaiva-kutumbakam' (the world is my kith and kin) has implied a suicidal zeal to fall in for every intruding religion and ideology: for him humanization means ceasing to be a Hindu, that is, becoming a Muslim, a Christian, a communist, a humanist, etc.

The three expressions, therefore, can be used in the educational
system for all fixational cultures as well as for the non-fixational culture we have in view. This wide use of the term ‘individualization’ or ‘humanization’ would fail to serve the purpose we have in view when we make the distinction between it and acculturation. We would like to keep the distinction by construing individualization and humanization in the context of any fixational system as nothing but acculturation from the standpoint of the non-fixational system. In other words, by individualization here we would mean a reference to the gradation of individualities of the non-fixational cultural system, and by humanization we would mean a reference to the ideal of human unity as conceived in the non-fixational culture and not in any of the fixational ones. This would leave only acculturation as the aim of education in all fixational systems. This would not preclude the use of the term in non-fixational system.

But since the older liberalized cultures are only partly fixational, for them acculturation would mean acculturation, but humanization and individualization would not mean acculturation if as liberalized systems they mean the terms in their liberal senses. (It is only for fixational systems like communism that all the three would mean acculturation.) ‘Humanize Christians’ would not mean ‘Christianize humanity’; to humanize Muslims would not mean Islamizing the Dar-ul-Harb; ‘humanize Hindus’ would not mean ‘communize or socialize Hindus’: it would mean becoming members of the world liberal system. Similarly, for them ‘individualization’ would not have to be capped by imitation of a prophet or a messiah or an avatar but a whole hierarchy of individualities including those of the messiahs and avatars in their proper places—which may or may not be the highest; for this will remain an open question to be discussed and rediscussed; for, in the non-fixational system, the highest individuality will always be sought for and sought to be verified in all kinds of cultural activities.

As a Hindu member of the world liberal system, the present writer would like to prescribe a fixed meaning of ‘individualization’. By individualization, as the aim of education, we mean that education must, especially in the tertiary stage, make us a creative self, make us conscious of our being a unique focus of immediate experience, of our nature as an individuation of the absolute, our identity, however partial, with the creative principle, of our distinctness as a focus of immediate experience which is as
real as the infinite individual since it is his individuation. To individualize is to make us aware of our identity with and distinction from the absolute which is a systematic unity of finite individuals human and nonhuman. It is only in this possible realization of our highest subjective status that all human individuals can be ultimately regarded as subjects or ends, as equal in principle, as truly free to realize their selves within this wide range of logical possibility. Any lesser meaning of individualization would lead to contradictions and there would be double standards creeping in, one for the recommender himself, the other for all others. Even avatars and messiahs (on the level of ethical idealism) had to take recourse to 'doublespeak' and prescribe one standard for them while keeping a second for themselves: they are the redeemer; the fellow-humans are to be redeemed. There can be no true equality and freedom, true morality and creativity, true individuality, without the theoretical realization of the highest individuality.

Education as a slow and massive process, however, is not expected to lead all of us to a mystical realization of this identity-in-difference with the creative principle, and turn all of us into the highest individual. It must then induce in each of us a feeling for the highest and make us seek and see the reasons for that. It must, at any rate, give us a glimpse of the meaning of the highest individuality, sustain in us a faith in it as at least a bare intellectual proposition.

Every human individual is an individuation of the absolute or universal creative principle: the same creative principle is working in each of us; yet all of us are separate from one another and each of us is distinct from the universal principle—as a unique focus of immediate experience. The whole life is to be a sort of verification of this proposition in all kinds of theoretical and practical realization adding to its truth.

Modern philosophers engaged in different verbal games would call this verbalism. And if this is recommending a typically absolute idealist (to be exact, rationalist-romanticist) position in the garb of a non-fixational system, well, it is open to criticism and revision. To incorporate it into the world liberal system, what is required is to give philosophical arguments in favour of it. One has only to give counter-arguments to prevent this and give further arguments to instal another highest.

Thus, there are those who would recommend individualization
but would prescribe only the highest individual of a fixational system. The present writer may seem to be one of them, though it must be admitted in all fairness to him that it would be difficult to conceive of a still higher individuality than what he describes.

And there are those who would recommend humanization as the ultimate aim: they (at their best) suffer from fixation of feeling for the radical humanist attitude. Humanization as the ultimate aim is 'individualization' in the radical humanist culture; this being a fixational culture, its humanization is nothing but acculturation in our eyes. By individualization we mean the realization of any higher or lower level individuality but within the system of the highest individual, the harmonious man. The highest individual we have in view is the ultimate aim of the total yet open and dynamic system, the world liberal culture in the making. If it is not to be exactly the same as that of any historical culture, neither can it be radical humanist.

Furthermore, there are those who would recommend acculturation as the ultimate aim; they too (again at their best) must be pragmatic humanists.

**INDIVIDUALIZATION AND RELATIVISM.** 'Individualization' thus acquires a definite meaning in the context of the non-fixational system. And we know this system alone is open yet total and dynamic. There is a loose kind of liberal inindividualism which in order to claim to be open ceases to be total and dynamic. Individualization must not be construed in the context of such a relativistic system.

Thus, one may in the open but total system choose to integrate and realize one's self as a magician, a priest, a commonsense man, a scientist, an egoistic hedonist, a utilitarian hedonist, a universal hedonist, an egoistic hero, a national hero, a universal hero, an ascetic holy man, a prophet, an avatar—but one becomes so as a bit of the highest individual, the harmonious man or *lilāmaya purusha* (sportively creative individual). In each case the awareness of one's being an individuation of the creative principle and one's status in the gradation of individualities will make it an instance of individualization. If this awareness is absent, if the individuality is felt as alienated from the creative principle, if the feeling of alienation is rationalized, it cannot be called an instance of individualization. Education will then only acculturate.
Construed thus the aim of individualization can well claim to be the ultimate aim. It is not necessary for individualism to be relativistic; in order to remain open it is not necessary for the liberal system to be partial; it can be total yet it may remain open and dynamic. The education in such a cultural system can aim at individualization as the goal.

The relativistic predicament, which is not a part of true liberalism, that is, individualism, has been well stated by Sir Percy Nunn:

"The purpose of education, one says, is to form character; another, to prepare for complete living; a third, to produce a sound mind in a sound body; ... All of them seem satisfactory until, pursuing the matter farther, we ask what kind of character it is desirable to ‘form’, what activities ‘complete living’ includes, or what are the marks of a healthy mind. ... For A’s idea of a fine character turns out to be either ridiculous or rankly offensive to B; what C regards as complete living would be a spiritual death for D; while the mens sana in corpore sano that E reveres, F loathes as the soul of a prig housed in the body of a barbarian."\(^1\)

The difficulty posed here is mostly imaginary. It is a fact that different persons hold different attitudes and hence ideals differ and sometimes the same word may be used in different senses; for example, ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ have different meanings in the communist world from those in the free and democratic world. But a valuational gradation of the attitudes and ideals is always possible by way of the regulative principle of inclusion and supersession: between two ideals, that one which includes and supersedes the other is higher.

Once we grade the attitudes on this principle, ‘ought’ becomes meaningful in the sense that in case of conflicts between the higher and the lower, we ought to aim at the higher. If one fails to realize the higher or does not feel like pursuing it, one ought to recognize it as the higher. (By recognition here we mean some sort of intellectual acceptance.) Take, for example, a student who stops with high school education: he has every right to do that, but he cannot recommend that all ought to stop with that much of education or that one need not and ought not to acquire higher theory and practice.

\(^1\) Sir Percy Nunn, Education, Its Data and First Principles, pp. 5-9.
CULTURE AND EDUCATION

A radical humanist, for example, may not like that anybody should turn an ascetic or ethical idealist; but it still remains a fact that the ascetic or ethical idealist attitude includes and supersedes the radical humanist attitude and hence it is higher. Similarly, an ascetic idealist who withdraws from nature and history may not like to return; but that does not disprove the superiority of the ethical idealist who does return after withdrawal. The communist hates that one should aim at human unity outside the communist state and culture, in the form of a world liberal culture and a democratic federation; but that does not do away with the human unity in the second system, or with the higher gradation for the liberal system in the scale of cultural systems. The welfare statist thinks that he alone can deliver the goods of universal happiness; but that does not undo the fact that his methods are self-stultifying and that a welfare society can be realized only by way of an individualist state.

ACCUltURATION IS THE AIM IN VOGUE. Educationists have distinguished many aims of education; for examples, the cultural aim, the social aim, the utilitarian or vocational aim, the knowledge aim, the character formation aim, the harmonious development aim, etc. Acculturation includes all of them.

The cultural aim is the same as what we have called acculturation. By culture here we mean the given cultural system or cultural congeries into which one is born and in which one is brought up. And the cultural aim of education involves learning to live in this given human environment. In its cultural aim education equips individuals with the tradition and custom, the language and the mores, the basic habits and skills, the techniques and vocations, the beliefs and attitudes of the given culture.

By the social aim of education we mean that education should make one an efficient and useful member of the given society. Education must make him not only fit for livelihood but a socially well-adjusted person. An educated person ought to pull his own weight, to fulfil obligations to his fellowmen and to acquire a certain standard of knowledge about his society. He must have a certain amount of workable knowledge about the institutions of society—the government, the institutions of work, the church, the school and the family. His education ought to make for a successful and happy living along with his fellow citizens. This is acculturation with an emphasis on the social aspect.
By the utilitarian aim we mean the 'bread and butter' or vocational aim of education. We have noted that there are three levels of work—the primary, the secondary and the tertiary. When the pursuit of any theory, practice or education becomes a social labour and acquires economic value, it turns into a vocation. It is clear therefore that primary education (organized learning of commonsense theories and crude arts) makes one fit for one or other among the many primary vocations, that is, vocations of partly skilled manual workers, artisans, sportsmen, all kinds of farmers, clerks, primary school teachers, folk artists, etc. Similarly, secondary education (systematic learning of sciences and useful arts) makes one fit for one of the many secondary vocations—those of engineers, medics, psychiatrists, secondary teachers, popular artists, writers of applied literature, etc. Similarly, tertiary education (systematic and creative learning of philosophies and fine arts) makes one fit for one of the many tertiary vocations, those of fine artists and tertiary teachers. In all cultural systems which are developed there is scope for all grades of vocations. In underdeveloped societies, the scope for secondary and tertiary vocations is less than that for the primary ones. In the communist society the scope for tertiary vocations is much less than in the free countries. In U.S.A. alone, for example, there are about four million writers in the field of pure literature. This leads to the problem of phasing development of education with the development of vocations. We need not discuss this problem here. Here it is sufficient to note that education creates new demands and thus new vocations, in addition to training people for older vocations. What is relevant here is to note that educating them in the theories and practices of all levels fulfils the vocational aim as a corollary. The vocational aim is thus included and superseded by the aim of acculturation.

Similarly, the knowledge aim or character formation aim is covered by the aim of acculturation in the theoretical aspect. We have seen that to know or to rise to a higher subjective status is the essence of theoretical realization. Education aims not merely at the theoretical realization by the individual, it aims at acculturation of the particular man. Whether as an individual he would engage in theoretical or practical realization of values or in both is not the concern of the educational system.

Furthermore, acculturation includes the personal development aim of education and is not identical with it. By this we mean
education should aim at developing motor-skills, perception, memory, comprehension, problem-thinking, attitudes and ideals, etc. Pestalozzi defines education as 'the natural, progressive and harmonious development of all the powers and capacities of the human being'. And Sir Percy Nunn repeats it in his words: 'the primary aim of all educational effort should be to help boys and girls to achieve the highest degree of individual development of which they are capable.'

Acculturation on the level of ethical idealism may denote all these by connoting simply the theoretical realization that the moral self is higher than the social and natural self, that other selves though lower are never to be treated as means or objects but as ends or subjects. This is of course individualization in the sense most ethical idealists would like to take it. But we have seen that even ethical idealism is a fixational system. The personal development aim or the harmonious development aim as a direct corollary to the ethical idealist attitude may imply some metaphysical contradictions which when resolved changes the meaning of individualization. 'One can but may or may not yet ought to because all ought to' can be superseded by 'all ought to because all are partly identical with the creative principle'.

ALL FIXATIONAL SYSTEMS AIM AT INDIVIDUALIZATION BUT ONLY ACCULTURATE. Education in all fixational systems of culture, logical or historical, only acculturate, although it may aim at individualization as the ultimate goal. It trains the particular men and women in realizing the theoretical and practical values recognized by the given cultural system. If it would ultimately aim at producing the respective highest individuals, these falling short of the highest of course would mean only many grades of lower individuals. These lower individuals may or may not accept the highest in principle; some of them may be too weak to realize the highest; others may defy and say their lower ideal is the highest. The weaklings and even hypocrites accept the standard intellectually: those who defy are the real source of evil.

Thus, education in societies fixated on the prelogical level would aim at the magician and the priest while concerning itself with teaching and learning of (i) animistic and traditionalist theories and (ii) of magical rites and customary practices and vocations.

Empiricist education would acculturate by teaching commonsense theories and crude arts and aim at the man of sound commonsense.
Education in a hypothetical *scientistic* society would acculturate by teaching the sciences and useful arts and trying to produce *scientists* and technologists, to produce the productive man who can make useful goods and give useful services.

In an atomistic materialist society of epicureans, education would aim at the egoistic hedonist (a prudential valetudinarian, at the best), while concerning itself with the learning and teaching of atomistic materialist theories and fine arts extolling the fundamental particles of physics and the attitudes of the material self taken in and by itself.

In a mechanistic materialist culture, the utilitarian hedonistic aim of education would be to teach mechanistic theories and their applications to realize the most efficient adaptation to nature. Similarly, the other systems would only acculturate while aiming at their respective highest individuals.

**GENERAL EDUCATION AIMS AT HUMANIZATION.** Education aims at individualization. In the first stage it only acculturates. Then it humanizes. Then comes individualization. Humanization is thus the intermediate aim: it comes in between the immediate aim of acculturation and the ultimate aim of individualization. General education aims at this intermediate goal.

To humanize, it must equip the particular man with the universality of a non-fixational total-cultural system. This has to supersede while including his partial universalities which he has acquired during the stage of acculturation. This does not imply he must rid himself of his past loyalties. This implies he must subordinate these to a higher loyalty so that in case of a conflict between the two it would be his duty to be loyal to the higher.

Humanization ought to be the aim of what we have marked as secondary education, that is, courses in sciences and useful arts. But, as we have noted in the earlier section, this is seldom realized even in tertiary education as it is organized to-day in most countries. The present system of education produces mostly specialists. They have full knowledge of some particular sphere of facts or the other. Quite often they develop and suffer from a fixation of feeling for a partial system of values connected or not connected with their respective subjects. This presents before the educationist the problem of general education and culture. How to produce specialists minus fixation?

It is necessary therefore to have a short course in general educa-
tion as a part of all courses in special sciences and technologies. This will help a greater number of educated men pass from a fixation for their own cultures and gregations (historical or logical) to a membership of the world liberal culture.

This general education cannot aim at producing charlatans and dilettantes—jacks of all trades but masters of none. It cannot afford to fizzle out in some kind of experimental eclecticism. It must aim at a positive system of culture—the total yet open and dynamic culture. The outline of this must be made clear to everyone. Just as all lay members of the Christian world, for example, need not excel in Christian theology or imitate Christ in their day to day living but ought to be familiar with an outline of the Christian world view and way of life, or at any rate, accept the highest individual of the system as the standard while themselves falling far short of it, so should general education aim at preparing the ground for a general feeling for the world culture and some awareness of its full, open and dynamic character.

General education ought to give us a common standard to measure all theories and practice, especially the partial and fixational ones, so that we may not develop feelings for them. Ideologies are partial and fixational systems. 'The determination of the optimum combination of natural and human elements based on the knowledge of the natural and social history for a specific set of social values is the formation of an ideology. One ideology differs from another (a) in the major human values they recognize as worthwhile, (b) in the relative importance given to the recognized values, i.e. in grading them, and (c) in the institutions and methods of implementation (i.e. practical realization) recommended as necessary. Therefore the short cut test of an ideology is to ask these questions: (i) Are all the known values covered by the value-system (values as well as the gradation of them) of the recommender's scheme? (ii) Does it recognize the importance of maintaining the conditions necessary for further and continual realization of values? (iii) Can the recommended institutions and methods of implementation do the function they are intended to do? Ideologies can be graded according to the number of positive answers to our scrutiny'.

PROBLEM-INTEGRATED EDUCATION CAN HUMANIZE. There have

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been methods tried to realize the aim of general education. Mention may be made here of the great books method, survey of human knowledge method, humanities survey method, survey of civilizations method, the literature in relation to arts and sciences method, etc. All these methods have a common defect: they go by default on the arbitrary selection of material and the superficiality of the survey. They also miss the point about general education. General education does not aim at giving factual information or technical knowledge: it aims at changing the attitude developed during acculturation, at preventing or removing the fixation of feeling one might develop for a partial system of culture or values or attitudes during secondary education, at humanizing him.

Problem-integrated education can both be adequate and relevant enough to do the function of general education. It implies a course of study in which the gradation of experience and the basic problems (of theory and practice) of each level have been clearly traced. It can therefore humanize: it can induce a new efficient feeling in one for human culture which is total yet open and dynamic. This new feeling supersedes the old feeling, the feeling for his parochial culture or refractory ideology. He may still love his native culture or his pet brain-child; but whenever there will be a conflict between the two, he will feel for the higher system.

Integration of human knowledge from every special field cannot be said to be feasible. But integration of the basic problems belonging to many sciences and philosophies, useful and fine arts, is a practical proposition. On each problem the major questions can be clearly formulated and alternative answers collected from many sciences and philosophies, from many cultural systems, logical or historical, living or dead, fixational or nonfixational. And then they can be comparatively judged and graded. The method of symposium rather than that of encyclopaedia can do this.

For example, in dealing with the problem of truth, it is not necessary to survey the whole field of philosophy, epistemology and logic and enter into an interminable sprachspiel or logomachy. It is however necessary to get the same meaning of 'truth' for all levels of experience. For this it is only necessary to select the specific insights which the various theories of truth (whether about the meaning of truth or criteria of truth or about both) furnish on this problem. (And of course, in order to become a member of the elite, it is also necessary to develop a love for truth as a good or
value and live a truthful life to one's best ability).

A clear grasp of the many problems of man's life and existence itself has a liberating influence. If the problems are clearly understood, whether we get the answer or not, we begin to know how to fit in every bit of new learning in the universal system of culture.

The problems chosen are those which are the perennial problems of human life. Their answers might have changed from culture to culture, from age to age. Some problems of yesterday might seem pseudo-problems today or even bad semantics or grammar; but a closer study may reveal that they arise in different forms. Some of them may be dissolved hurriedly but may be raised again in a more refined form. This does not mean that some questions might not disappear altogether. This means that at any rate there can always be a body of basic problems, there can always be a subject which integrates these problems, and like any other subject this subject too may have to be revised and refined from time to time.

Such a course in basic and perennial problems of life cannot make us mere eclectics. It has to look into the problem of purpose of life and of motivation towards the realization of the purpose. The course of integrated problems eminently does this: it solves the problem of purpose of life and motivation towards the realization of the purpose. The existing ideals are tested and graded by it so that the ultimate ideal includes and supersedes the immediate and intermediate ideals. And by inducing the feeling for world liberal culture it can make many of us commit and involve ourselves in realizing our lives in the making of history.

Problem-integrated education will make us eminently fit for the act of critical testing of ideologies. It implies a course of study in which the gradation of experience and the basic problems (of theory and practice) of each level have been traced. The adult who has taken this course would then be able to compare the worth of all theories and arts, all theologies and ideologies, all cultural systems, historical and logical. He would be in a position to discover the basic postulates of proposed solutions, to raise doubts about them or to appreciate their real worth. He will have an open and critical mind which can make a judicious selection among many alternative solutions of problems.

SPECIAL METHODS OF GENERAL EDUCATION. General education has to follow the method of panel discussions or seminar presentation to small groups of students. And those who will have been moti-
vated by it in the various walks of life will have to be staunch believers in individual action and in the methods of discussion. The aim of general education being humanization, the method of imparting it must be the method of rational discussion.

Rational discussion demands an unemotional dispassionate approach to all problems. The leaders of the seminar forming the panel must have the capacity of thinking dispassionately undisturbed by emotional agitation. They should try to appeal to the reason of the audience and not their baser passions. The best reasons are to be presented and not those that simply rouse anger and hatred.

This does not imply that the leaders of the panel discussions should not feel for their system. On the contrary, they must. If there be five of them taking part, then it would be best to have one empiricist by conviction, another scientist, a third a materialist, a fourth a humanist and a fifth an idealist. The chairman of the panel would present the problem and guide the discussion by putting questions to fellow panel members: he ought to be a trained teacher in problem-integrated education.

The sessions should have practically no time limit. The members should not cut short any elaborate reasoning necessary for the sake of a given time limit. This one factor, more often than not and more than any other factor, frustrates the purpose of our discussions in daily life. We have no time to argue in a leisurely manner, to listen to arguments and to be listened to when we meet them point by point. The discussion, however, cannot be interminable. The day's session must end for things like tea and dinner. But it may continue for days together at a stretch. The point is that they must not have to attend their duty for livelihood and social appointments.¹

A SYLLABUS FOR PROBLEM-INTEGRATED EDUCATION. The present treatise can very well be a part of the matter for such a course of study—especially in the portions which deal with the gradation of experience and fixational systems. This gradation is the anatomy of universal valuation and hence of the total yet open cultural system. Without such gradation, one would not even recognize that one is suffering from a fixation.

The outline of a tentative detailed syllabus is given below. The problems enumerated here are all conceived on the scientific and philosophical levels, and from the special standpoint of problem-

integrated general education. The syllabus is however intended for the students of science and technology, that is, students on the secondary level on our gradation.

PROBLEMS OF THE PRELOGICAL LEVEL. Anthropological communities are predominantly on the prelogical level of reflex acts and instincts. So are children of civilized societies. Adults too (of civilized societies) have some experiences on the prelogical level. Here we are not directly concerned with their problems as they view them and solve them on their level in their life. Our subject, viz. problem-integrated education, has a standpoint of its own. From that standpoint the problems of the prelogical level are certain selected problems of the level. These are conceived on the higher levels of science and philosophy but selected and enumerated from the standpoint of problem-integrated education. We shall have to draw upon the sciences of psychology, sociology and anthropology and on moral and educational philosophy.


The philosophical problems are: (1) The problem of education of children on the prelogical level. The problem of the attitude of the educator. (2) The problem of education of prelogical societies and the allied problem of purpose and motivation. (3) The problem of gregational ethics. Civilized societies have come into contact with prelogical societies and a process of change has set in. This has begun a process of acculturation from the peaceful (religious) to the genocidal (political). The change ought to be brought about more on the lines of child-educationists than on the lines of empire-builders. Should it be brought about by the revolutionary method—by way of communistic genocide? Or, by a peaceful process of education? (4) This leads to the problems of truth and beauty on this level: how much of animism and magic, of tradition and custom (a) can be validated, (b) must be respected by civilized societies, and (c) must be tolerated by civilized societies?

PROBLEMS OF THE PRIMARY LOGICAL LEVEL. There are no societies on this level. But in every society there are many adolescents and adults who live their life on this level. And for some time
past this level of experience has taken the fancy of many a philosopher. A kind of commonsense ideology has begun its career as a movement. It has not gained much ground; and it still oscillates freely from the primary logical through secondary logical to the tertiary social levels.

The scientific problems of the level are: 1. What is perception? 2. What are the classes of facts we can perceive? 3. What are the various crude arts? What are the various primary vocations? (4) How far can perception be modified and developed?

The philosophical problems are: (1) Perceptions as parts of higher level theory and practice. (2) What are the criteria of the real and the good (the true and the meaningful, the useful and the beautiful) on the level of perception? (3) How are they to be included and superseded by higher level criteria? Or, are they to be recommended as universal criteria (that is, as meanings) on the ground that majority of human beings are for most of the time occupied on this level? (4) In what ways ought perception to be modified and developed through learning? (5) Which of the many crude arts must not be discontinued and given over to science and technology and turned into secondary arts? (6) Is it advisable to decrease the number of working hours in primary vocations and thus release many people for higher level theory and practice? If so, arguments from what level of experience justify this? (7) Problems of correlating phases of progress in primary education with employment in primary vocations.

PROBLEMS OF THE SECONDARY LOGICAL LEVEL. Again there are no societies on this level. But in all societies, a big chunk of life is lived on this level. And each seems to take pride in its achievements on this level. Each society vies with the other in claiming to be more ‘progressive’, that is, scientific. The communist society in particular, though it is fixated on the level of social philosophy, lies or lives more on this level than on the level of philosophy and fine arts. Its achievements are mostly in science and technology and its basic social philosophy it still calls scientific socialism.

For the older liberalized societies, especially of the Orient, culture on this level has a great attraction. They would like to make good the void which had been there between the primary and the tertiary levels in their age-old cultural life. In their zeal for science and technology, they may fall in for any ill-conceived but ‘successful’ ideologies (like communism, welfare statism, etc.) which claim to
be scientific. Problems of this level must therefore be sifted with great care and the answers rightly evaluated and graded in any scheme for problem-integrated education.

The scientific problems of this level are: (1) What is science? (2) What are the sciences? What are their respective scopes and subject matters? (3) What are the general methods of each generic science? (4) What are the various secondary arts? (5) What are the main features of their special methods? (6) What are the many secondary vocations? Employment statistics of these in many countries. (7) How far can scientific understanding be modified and developed by learning?

The philosophical problems of the level may be stated more or less as follows: (1) What is the nature of—a scientific proposition, hypothesis, law, explanation? (2) Are the necessary perceptual level criteria sufficient for this level? (3) What are the main presuppositions of each science? (4) Sciences as parts of higher level theory and practice. (5) What are the scientific criteria of the real and the good (the meaningful and the true, the useful and the beautiful)? (5a) How are they to be included and superseded by higher level criteria? Or, are they to be recommended as universal criteria (or meanings) on the ground that they are more workable and useful? (6) In what ways ought scientific understanding and thinking to be modified and developed through learning? (7) Which of the secondary arts must not be discontinued and given over to philosophy and fine arts? (8) Is it advisable to decrease the number of working hours in secondary vocations and thus release many people for higher level theory and practice? If so, arguments from what level of experience justify this? (9) Problems of correlating phases of progress in secondary education with employment in secondary vocations.

PROBLEMS OF THE TERTIARY LOGICAL LEVEL. All the historical or logical cultural systems (we have dealt with) are on this level. But we have distinguished nine sub-levels of fixation and seen that each system is fixated on one or another such level. Thus, Christianity and Islam are on the eighth level of ethical idealism; Hinduism is partly on the seventh and partly on the ninth; Communism is fixated on many levels from scientism to radical humanism. The empiricist-humanist movement likewise oscillates between perception and moral philosophy.

There have been many sincere attempts to dissolve many problems
on this level as pseudo-problems, why, even philosophy itself, of course after giving it the bad name of ‘metaphysics’. But the nett result has been more and more of philosophy and none the less verbalistic or obscure. To-day’s sprachspiel or saying more and more on less and less is mostly verbalistic. It seems one man’s perspicacity is another man’s obscurity. Problems of this level are many and can never be summarily disposed of. The present treatise is a feeble attempt to raise and barely discuss some of them. Let me state some of them again.

The scientific problems of this level are mostly sociological and partly psychological: (1) What are the sub-divisions of non-fixational philosophy? (2) Enumeration of fixational philosophies. (3) Enumeration and classification of philosophical problems from the sociological standpoint. Ralph Borsodi, for example, has done this kind of study. He has distinguished nine basic problems of theory and six basic problems of practice. His failure to distinguish clearly between theory and practice and between science and philosophy has led to a somewhat arbitrary classification. Yet it has the merit of having clarified some problems. The nine problems of theory (or thought as he calls it) are—the problem of the nature of nature, the nature of human nature, of events and their causation, of pretersocial ethics, of correlational ethics, of gregational ethics, of beauty vs. ugliness, of truth vs. error, of purpose and motivation. The problems of practice (he calls it implementation) are that of mental and physical health, of occupation, of possessions, of enterprise and organization, of civic harmony, and of humanization in education. Under each problem he has raised a certain number of problems—again the field covered is wide but the formulation betrays the bias in favour of to-day’s humanism which claims to be ‘scientific’. And we have noted that one purpose of our problem-integrated education is to save us from all kinds of fixational philosophies. The main defect of Borsodi’s enumeration of problems is that we shall never know how to grade the answers; his comparative method fizzes out in juxtaposing the many answers to single questions but it does not give any principle of choosing among them and any justification of the principle. It is all sociologizing philosophy and presupposing one’s philosophy which remains hidden and implicit. (4) What are the various methods followed by philosophers? (5) What are the many tertiary arts and vocations? Methods for the arts and statistics for the vocations are to be stated. (6) How
far can attitudes and ideals be modified and developed by learning?

The philosophical problems of the level are many. We may here
cite only a few: (1) The nature of the material universe. (2) The
concept of natural law and the concept of matter. (3) Materialism
(atomistic, mechanistic, mathematical) as fixational philosophies.
(4) The nature of the fine arts and vocations of naturalists, explorers
of nature, discoverers of nature's laws, inventors of useful artefacts
and of artists extolling nature. (5) The nature of the social universe.
(8) The concept of life. (9) Humanism (egoistic, pragmatic, radical) as
fixational philosophies. (10) The nature of the fine arts extolling man
and society and mankind. (11) The nature of vocations of entrepre-
neurs and statesmen and generals. (12) The nature of the moral
universe. (13) The nature of spirit and God. (14) The concept of
moral law. (15) The concept of mind. (16) Idealism (egoistic, ethical,
absolute as fixational philosophies). (17) The nature of vocations of
ascetics, prophets or messiahs, and avatars. (18) What are the
philosophical criteria of the real and the good and how can these
include and supersede the lower level criteria? (19) In what ways
ought attitudes and ideals to be modified and developed through
learning? (20) Problems of correlating phases of progress in tertiary
education with employment in tertiary vocations; in other words,
the problem of turning the pursuits of tertiary theory and practice
into social labour with value-in-exchange.
Culture and History

History in Theory and Practice. There is a difference between the writing of history and the making of history.

On the prelogical level of experience, where it is all reflex actions and instincts, where theory and practice have not differentiated, history is neither made nor written. Primitive societies therefore have no history and no historians. On the level of experience which is logical and voluntary, where theory and practice get differentiated, we begin to have both makers and writers of history. The purpose of the historian or writer of history is theoretical; that of the hero or maker of history is practical.

The writing of history involves two things: the statement of a class of facts, viz. the activities of human societies, and the explanation, both factual and valuational account, of them. The factual account of them is a kind of scientific theorizing. The valuational account of them is a kind of philosophical theorizing. The historian or writer of history is primarily a theoretician: his main purpose is to know facts; his secondary purpose is to make a certain kind of artefacts—a work of applied literature.

The making of history involves two things again: the choosing of one’s group or society from among the existing ones, or creating a new one; and the making of facts favourable to the society one chooses or creates. The society chosen or created may be a partial-cultural gregation (a party, a nation-state, a race, a linguistic mass, an economic class, ...) or a total-cultural system (like the Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, Christian, Communist, World Liberal, ... systems). The maker of history is primarily an artist: his main purpose is to make a certain kind of facts—facts favourable to his society. This requires the knowledge of history in both factual and valuational aspects.
HISTORY ON THE LEVEL OF PERCEPTION OR PURE OBJECTIVITY.
An elementary proposition of history is a perceptual proposition.
Retrodiction, that is, propositions about past facts, like 'Socrates drank hemlock' and predictions, that is, propositions about future facts, like 'World War III will destroy mankind' are only indirectly verifiable. Propositions of present facts, however, may be both directly and indirectly verifiable: for examples, 'Non-communists of Tibet are migrating to India' is directly verifiable; 'Russia has ICBM's' is indirectly verifiable. Indirectly verifiable propositions are based on the direct perception of different kinds of data or evidence—documents, monuments, announcements, pronouncements, etc.

This indirect verifiability raises the problem of 'objectivity' in the sense of universal acceptability, on the level of perception. Historians want to know facts on the basis of available historical evidence. The problem here is to settle the technical questions of precisely what conclusion can be drawn from this or that piece of evidence. Once we succeed in doing that, the objectivity is attained.

If differences of opinion still persist, they are not differences about the primary facts themselves but either about the generalizations which are necessary (and usually presupposed) as major premises for proof by syllogism or about the valuational accounts which vary according to the historians' own respective cultural systems. The problem of universal acceptance thus recurs on the levels of science and philosophy.

Let us take, for example, the case of the saints of mediaeval India like Nānak, Chaitanya, Tukārām and others. On the available evidence, all historians can come to agreed conclusions about some facts of their lives and deeds. Coming to the explanation part of it however, a Hindu historian may interpret them as saviours of the Hindu cultural system from the destructive impact of Islam; an Indian nationalist historian may interpret them as cases of cultural fusion between Hinduism and Islam; a Muslim historian may look down upon them as cases of cultural mimesis of Islam by the Hindu creative minority—a glorious episode in the triumphant march of Islam; a British historian may call it a politically subjugated people's adaptation to the conqueror's culture; and so on.

We may take another example, one from present history, the case of the effete liberals among the statesmen of the world. They
believe that noncommunist nations can not only co-exist but collaborate for the good of mankind with the Communist Powers. The historical acts of these statesmen have been interpreted by their supporters as successful pacifist endeavour in averting a world war; by critics, as favourable to the building up of the communist empire.

These differences in interpretation can be accounted for in the light of the historians’ presupposed generalizations and cultural systems. The differences can even be dissolved in theory by way of a logical gradation of the systems. This comparative study of historians is the job of social philosophers (or philosophers of history). If differences still persist, they can be settled by makers of history in the battlefields where the Absolute of history seems to lie.

HISTORY ON THE LEVEL OF SCIENCE OR RELATIONAL OBJECTIVITY.

(x) A perceptual proposition subsumes a given fact under a class concept; it is just a particular proposition representing an elementary fact taken in and by itself. For example, ‘Here is a table’ or ‘This table is brown’ or ‘Socrates is a man’ or ‘Brutus killed Caesar’ is a perceptual proposition. The historian however tries not only to find facts but also to explain them. The next higher grade historical propositions are thus particular causal propositions (cf. John Wisdom: Problems of Mind and Matter) like (a) Mohenjo-Daro was destroyed by either the Aryan invasion or the flood of the Indus or by both; (b) The Hindus of East Pakistan have been migrating to India because there is no guarantee of protection of life, liberty and estate there; or (c) The nuclear war is ruled out because the aggressor will have to destroy the other party completely, for even a modest retaliatory force surviving can work havoc on the aggressor.

The historian aims at the interrelating of facts. He tries to explain, in the first instance, by exposing the order and causes of particular facts. The historical proposition as a particular causal proposition presents the causal connection between facts. The historian aims at such propositions and not laws like the laws of science.

The typical historical proposition is a particular causal proposition. As such it is more complex than a perceptual proposition but less complex than a scientific law. A scientific law (which is not identical with, but of which the prototype is, the law of physics) is an exact universal generic and causal proposition. Both the historical proposition and the physical law are causal but the
historical proposition is neither exact nor universal nor generic.

As examples of scientific law we may take (a) the law of gravitation: 'Two bodies pull each other with a force which varies directly as the mass and inversely as the square of the distance'; or (b) Ohm's law: 'Electromotive force varies jointly as the current and the resistance.'

By the law's being generic we mean that it represents a class of facts (which constitute the effects). By its being universal we mean that it has no reference to any particular place and time, to any particular case of the class; we mean that it holds good at all places and all times for all the cases of the class. By causal we mean that it states the causal connections between one class of facts which make up the effects and another class of facts which make up the causes. And by exact we mean that it states the relation in the form of a mathematical variation or equation, as a law of functional dependence. (Here I am taking as causal factors both concomitants and antecedents, whether quantitative or nonquantitative. Laws of functional dependence involve quantitative concomitants; such laws however prevail only in physical sciences.)

(2) The typical historical proposition may not be a scientific law. But an historical explanation involves 'laws' of history as major premises of the syllogism which makes up the explanation. The historian may not seek to establish these laws but he presupposes them. On the level of scientific experience, the explanation and hence the laws are only factual and not valuational.

The attempt to discover the factors of history and construct laws of history is a legitimate theoretical activity. Such laws may claim a scientific status. The relevant science here is sociology. Historians do not aim at analyzing or constructing those generalizations. The task is left to the social (historical) scientists.

We can however formulate only closed generic causal propositions about social facts. We cannot claim them to be universal. Neither can we make them exact, that is, express them in the form of a mathematical law of functional dependence. Nor can we claim them to be open-generic. These limitations of historical laws arise from the very nature of historical facts themselves.

The generalizations that are historical laws cannot be universal because uniformity which is a pragmatic postulate even in the sphere of facts of nature is still more pragmatic and postulational in the sphere of human facts where self-determinism prevails.
An historical generalization may be more easily doubted whether it would hold good at all places and all times for all the particular would-be members of the class.

The historical laws cannot but remain closed-generic as opposed to open-generic propositions. For the number of individual cases constituting the class is too few. The class of facts is closed since the members can in principle be enumerated. This is not the case in physics where an infinite number of members or particular cases is involved.

The historical laws cannot be made exact. All the categories involved are not reducible to quantities and their relations as in the case of the categories of physics. True, the statistical method is applied in social sciences; but the quantitative aspect thus recorded is merely correlational and cannot be said to be as meaningful as a law of functional dependence.

Let us take an example of an historical law: 'It is only when two states become more or less equally powerful that wars break out' (Emery Reves: The Anatomy of Peace). This is a sociological generalization. It is a causal proposition. But it is not universal; for, given a sufficiently long period of human history, exceptions to this law may conceivably occur; why, even within the limits of given history, the law may not be called unexceptionable: wars might have been fought between disproportionately unequal powers. It is not an open-generic proposition; for the number of wars and states that have been considered for arriving at this generalization can be counted on the fingers. It is not exact, since the terms involved are not all properly measurable. We may, if we like, state the law in the form of a mathematical variation, viz. 'The warlike behaviour of two states varies directly as the tendency to equality of their striking power.' But both the dependent and the independent variables here can only be roughly and statistically estimated. The warlike behaviour may be estimated by the number of 'incidents' of cold and hot war; and the striking power, by means of the statistics on destructive goods produced and organized armed forces.

The generalizations which constitute the major premises of historical syllogisms do not however cease to be useful or workable. The utility of a generalization does not depend on its being universal, open-generic and exact. Its function is to guide historians in looking for something towards fairly accurate retrodictions, observations,
or predictions and to guide heroes of history towards fairly correct attitudes and moves.

To sum up, historians, like scientists, do interrelate facts (effects with causes). But, unlike scientists, they do not seek to establish or construct laws of history (connect dependent variables with independent variables). Furthermore, they do not even state the laws explicitly. But then, no statement about the occurrence of a fact can be logically deduced from statements about other facts except by way of laws. Every causal explanation implies an explanation by scientific laws which when stated complete the syllogism and proof. Therefore, historians may be said to presuppose them leaving their construction to social scientists. But the social sciences have not established any ‘natural’ laws: much of what they have accomplished has been the result of statistical methods. These methods do not reveal any kind of exact relations; in the sphere of social facts, they yield only some measurable correlations.

(3) We may now see how far historical explanations are like scientific explanations. All scientific explanations have a common form. The fact to be explained must be syllogistically deducible from the premises. This is also the case with an historical explanation. Secondly, the major premise must state a general law constructed by the method of scientific reason. This is also the case with an historical explanation; only, the major premise here is a law-like generalization. Thirdly, the minor premise must state the causal conditions—other prior or concurrent facts which bear a causal or functional relation to the fact to be explained (which is the effect and is represented by the conclusion of the syllogism). The minor premise however may not state all the relevant causal facts but only the significant ones. In the historical syllogism too, the minor premise states only some significant, but not all, antecedent and concomitant facts. Besides, these facts do not bear exact relations to the effect represented by the conclusion. Let us take examples, one of each:

(a) Scientific Syllogism: (vide Appendix B)
Temperature varies directly as the Sun’s altitude;
The Sun’s altitude at 12 noon is higher than at 7 A.M.;
Therefore, the temperature at 12 noon is higher than that at 7 A.M.

(b) Historical Syllogism: (vide Appendix B)
Populations tend to migrate to states which offer greater security of life, liberty and property; East Germany offers no such security; Therefore, the people of East Germany are migrating to West Germany.

Here the major premise is not a universal law but only a law-like generalization. The minor premise does not state all the relevant causal factors, viz. the noncommunists are not in power in East Germany; East Germany is a communist state; communists are an intolerant lot, that is, they possess the cultural trait of intolerance towards members of other cultural systems and commit genocide; West Germany being a noncommunist state offers security to non-communists; and so on. Furthermore, the major premise contains too many non-quantitative terms to be amenable to an exact statement.

**HISTORY ON THE LEVEL OF PHILOSOPHY OR OF SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDES TO OBJECT.** An historical explanation is more than a bare factual account. It is more often than not carried on to the level of philosophy and turned into a valuational account. The historian tries to explain, in the second instance, by exposing the valuational reasons of historical facts, and sometimes even the very 'existential' significance of history.

The typical historical proposition which is explicitly stated may still remain a particular proposition; it however becomes a valuational proposition. Let us take examples: (i) "In truth the real India, . . . continued to live its own life in the villages. . . . The old religion of the Aryan village had a recuperative power stronger than all the armies of Islam. . . . In the deeper sense India was never conquered." (Havell: *Aryan Rule in India*, pp. 407, 408). (ii) President Camille Chamoun invited the U. S. armed forces for the defence of the Lebanon, a noncommunist state where the majority of the people are Christians. (iii) Communist China could make bold to swallow Tibet because of the effete liberal attitude and policy of the Government of India in relation to the expanding communist empire. (iv) The expansion of communism by means of organized thrusts and systematic genocide ought to be checked even if this requires the use of armed forces.

Furthermore, these propositions can be put in the syllogistic form, if only the major premises implied are explicitly stated. Thus,
the last one may be elaborated as follows: No cultural system ought to be allowed to expand by means of organized physical force and systematic genocide; the communist cultural system has expanded by such means; therefore, the expansion of communism by such means ought to be checked even if this requires the use of armed forces.

The historian may presuppose some value-criteria or others; but he cannot give a valuational account unless he employs such value-criteria. A theoretician of history in the widest sense not only wants to know the factual what and why but also the valuational what and why. He has thus to do historical thinking on the level of subjective attitudes to facts, that is, on the level of philosophy. This is undoubtedly the case when he feels for one of the historical cultures involved as his own, or when neutral among the systems involved he has a system of values of his own in the light of which he passes valuational judgments. But this is also the case when he treats values as facts (cultural systems as objects and their contacts as objective relations), that is, when he is theorizing about historical cultural systems on the empirical and scientific levels; for he has to explain many situations of cultural contacts where a comparative study must determine a gradation and this cannot be done without philosophical theorizing.

Here again, whether it is an explanation or recommendation, the valuational account takes the form of (one or more than one) syllogism. The major premise now is a kind of philosophical generalization implied or explicitly stated. The conclusion is either a recommendation or statement containing some value word or words. The minor premise states some antecedent or concomitant or would-be causal facts the statement of which involves some value-words.

**Fixational Attitudes to History.** There is one physics or one biology. There can be one nonfixational philosophy and hence one philosophy of history. But there are many fixational philosophies and hence as many fixational philosophies of history. We can distinguish several logical joints in our experience; and there may occur a fixation of feeling at each joint. Prelogical experience has two joints: reflex action (animism and magic) and instincts (tradition and custom). Logical level has three joints: perception and primary arts, science and secondary arts, and philosophy (natural, social, spiritual) and tertiary arts (extolling nature, man,
God). We may thus distinguish the following generic systems of fixational attitudes (to world and life and hence to history): animism, traditionalism, empiricism, scientism, materialism (atomistic, mechanistic, mathematical), humanism (egoistic, pragmatic, radical), idealism (cynical or ascetic, ethical or messianic, absolute).

A fixation of feeling for the prelogical experience leads to animistic and traditionalist attitudes: such attitudes to history are passive and fatalistic. The primitive or anthropological communities strike these attitudes to history.

Empiricism (fixation for the commonsense or perceptual attitude) denies the possibility of any valid historical generalizations and predictions or anticipations on the basis of such generalizations. According to it, history can be made only as a crude art of commonsense and history is an aggregate of single momentary acts. As an example of this attitude, we may take the translation (by Stuart Chase in his *Tyranny of Words*) of the proposition "The Aryan fatherland which has nursed the souls of heroes, calls upon for the supreme sacrifice which you, in whom flows heroic blood, will not fail, and which will echo for ever down the corridors of history" into "The blab blab which has nursed the blabs of blabs, calls upon for the blab blab which you, in whom flows blab blood, will not fail, and which will echo blab down the blabs of blab."

Scientism (fixation for the scientific attitude as the final attitude) denies the possibility of valuational judgments in history; it can only try to record and explain what has happened and to predict what may happen only in the factual aspect: all valuational gradations and judgments are meaningless.

Atomistic materialism (fixation of feeling on the first moment of natural philosophy) can offer no theory of history at all; it can offer only a negative attitude to history. Epicurus’s theory, for example, opposes friendship to citizenship; it rejects the heroic making of history.

Mechanistic materialism (of Spencer, for example), fixation on the second moment of natural philosophy, tries to interpret progress and moral evolution of man in terms of nature’s mechanism, in terms of the capacity for adaptation of the human organism to outer conditions. Thomas Buckle’s study of civilizations is an instance of the mechanistic materialist attitude to history.

Mathematical materialism (of Russell, for example), fixation

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on the final moment of natural philosophy, rejects all evolution and teleology and stoutly defends determinism. Man is in nature which is a strictly determined mathematical structure. The highest value recommended is the pursuit of theoretical knowledge which ends in mathematical materialism. This is what he calls the cult of truth. The high-priests of the cult have been those early men of science who had intermittently incurred the inquisitorial wrath of the ecclesiastical pride (of power, knowledge, virtue) and fanaticism. Freedom means freedom to pursue this truth of mathematical materialism. Freedom of thought lies in an unhampered realization of nature as the mathematical absolute. History is a realization of this freedom: the realization is of course intermittent. Freedom of thought in this sense alone can purge man's mind of dogmas and superstitions which cause wars in history. As George Orwell puts it: 'Once we accept $2+2=4$, all else follows.' His 1984 is an instance of the mathematical materialist attitude to history.

Egoistic humanism (of Nietzsche, for example), fixation at the first moment of social philosophy, apotheosizes the particular man. The regulative principle is the reason of the egoistic man; and the vital principle of 'will to power' working in him is identified as the creative principle. He grows and develops from within by means of this will to power which is 'the wisdom of the body'—the vitality of physical impulse. The whole of the living nature, which includes history, is an arena of conflict among conflicting wills. In the conflict, 'the lovers of psychological nudity'—strong and aggressive, adventurous and morally unscrupulous, make up the dominant minority of masters or the ruling class. The rest become slaves; they are the timid and submissive, weak and defenceless. They seek solace and false security in moral laws and religious dogma, in all kinds of myths and high-sounding 'blabs' like equality and fraternity, in all types of universality including the relative universality of a particular society like a nation, a state, and an historical civilized society or a cultural system. The Übermensch is neither the man-in-the-particular-mass nor the universal man: he is the natural particular man in and by himself. This man makes history. Many great 'heroes' of history illustrate this attitude.

Pragmatic humanism (of William James, for example, which is fixated social philosophy in its second moment) finds the regulative principle in workability or utility in the sense of whatever satisfies the demands of the particular man in relation to other particular
men, that is, of a particular society. The constitutive principle lies in the feeling behind such demands. The truth of philosophies is to be tested by referring them not only to nature but to human nature, by looking into the human conditions of their acceptability, by their capacity to fulfil both theoretical and practical needs, to generate in us the sentiment of rationality or will to believe on evidence which is incomplete but strong enough to move us to act. In the realm of human action, we are concerned with making rather than discovering facts: truth here depends on our will to believe, on our faith which is based on desire. Practical social propositions required for making history are thus workably true. The highest good lies in satisfying as many demands as we can. And this must coincide with the conventionally highest ideal. The pragmatist therefore recommends the moral code of the community which is usually a cultural supersystem or historic civilized society. This is the predominant attitude to history: most writers and makers of history strike this attitude.

Radical humanism (of Comte, for example, a fixation on the final moment of social philosophy) has its regulative principle in the reason of the universal man, in man as the root of mankind. Its constitutive principle lies in the feeling for the human race. It apotheosizes humanity, and unifies the sciences into a sociology in order to realize the social whole in theory. The natural progress of society consists in the growth of our human attributes as against our animal ones. The main agent in this progress is intellectual development. There has been a progress from the theological to the metaphysical and from this to the scientific or positive stage of theory. There has been a progress in the gradual decline of the military mode of life yielding place to the industrial. The progress of science and the progress of industry are correlated, man's power to conquer nature and adapt nature to his needs depending on his knowledge of the laws of nature.

The Marxian attitude to history is a blend of the egoistic, the pragmatic and the radical humanist attitudes with the materialistic attitudes. The communist characters described in Dr. Zhivago, for example, include all grades of humanists—egoistic (e.g. Komarovsky), pragmatic (e.g. Samdeviatov), and radical (e.g. Strelnikov). The fixation of feeling on society is evident: the communist apotheosizes society in the State which combines in itself the market, the citadel and the altar. The radical humanist element lies in commu-
nism's aspiration to become the world state and culture. The materialist element can be discerned in the final dogma that mind is a function of matter even as culture is a function of economy. Marx however forged his theory of nature and society in order to make history. He needed the theory not so much for its truth but for its retrodictive capacity for the immediate past and predictive capacity for the immediate future. The capitalist present which followed the feudalist past is sure to be followed by a socialist future. Not because Marx simply says so but because Marx and marxists are ready to bring it about. The prediction would come true because in the meantime they would work for it. By turning the logical ideal into a factual prediction, Marx wanted to bolster up practice towards the quicker realization of the ideal. This makes up the pragmatic humanist attitude in marxism (Cf. W. H. Walsh, Introduction to Philosophy of History on this point). Marxist historicism is thus more practical than theoretical. The most basic prediction of communist makers of history is that socialism is sure to come all over the world. And since social evolution is the result of economic factors, they can bring about socialism by changing some of these factors. And in order to change the economy it may be necessary to apply political and military, legal and illegal, amoral and immoral methods. Communists therefore freely practise genocide.

Suffering from fixation of feeling at the first moment of moral philosophy, the Cynics or ascetic idealists take up an escapist attitude to history. They aim at the discovery and possession of the ultimate self which is identified with the moral self taken in and by itself. They eschew the doubtful object of further speculation as well as the values of natural and social life like pleasures of the senses, wealth and honour, power and position. Life in conformity with reason alone is natural. The Cynic however realizes the universal reason in his own self. The universal reason is focussed at each centre-point of individual spiritual self which realizes the whole in the free determination of itself by its own law. To know this is wisdom: to strive for it is virtue. The wise or virtuous man alone is at home in every clime at any time: having discovered the universal reason and moral law within, he has no need for the law of the state. The Cynical sage would not admit any political responsibility. He feels himself to be a citizen of the world at large—completely indifferent to the petty affairs of the state. He feels
free in detachment and self-sufficiency. Diogenes interviewing Alexander the Great represents this attitude (Cf. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*).

Ethical idealism (of Spinoza, for example) seeks to realize a moral organism by taking the spiritual self in relation to other spiritual selves and its own lower selves. In Spinoza's *Ethics*, for example, the stress shifts from one self-centred vision to many-sided moral action embracing all individuals. He condemns egoistic escape and ascetic renunciation. A social eschatology marks out the steps of progress from bondage of passions to freedom of reason, and from this freedom to the love of God. We thus become a member of an ethical organism. Passion without reason is blind and reason without passion is dead. The spiritual self must therefore comprehend and control, and not renounce, while transcending, the lower selves. Again, not only outer nature but also human nature is a source of evil; but, it is not the spiritual self but the natural self: *passio* and *imaginatio*, that is the source of evil. (Christianity which is a species of ethical idealism, or Hinduism in its ethical idealist aspect holds that the spiritual self too can be a source of evil, of the sin of pride of power, knowledge and virtue.) In order therefore to be a member of the moral organism, the spiritual self has got to transcend, though not renounce, the lower selves. Under the form of eternity, one can live one's life by forbearing all thought or act that has a bearing on one's self as a particular self and by taking up into one's life the life of the other members of the social organism. The moral organism thus holds within it the social organism and reinforces it. The lives and deeds of messianic heroes like Buddha and Christ illustrate this attitude.

Absolute idealism (of the hegelians, for example) suffers from a fixation of feeling for the supreme principle of reason in which it seeks the whole as well as the vindication of the highest aspirations of spiritual life. Through this principle each and every element of our experience gets fused into an organic system wherein the parts and the whole interpenetrate. In such an experience the part cannot have meaning and existence apart from its being an element of the whole, and the whole cannot exist and have meaning apart from its being contained in and represented by parts. They are thus *interdependent* in the fullest sense of the term. The absolute is an organic unity of the many finite selves and bodies. Likewise society or state and hence history are conceived in the image of
the absolute as organic unities. (We have seen, however, they are systematic unities.) The nation-state or cultural system is a spiritual organism, an individuation of the absolute. Makers of history aim at a practical realization of this spiritual organism. From the standpoint of the absolute, this process is the absolute self-fulfilling itself. Human history is thus absolutized as an aspect of the dynamic absolute, as one of its individuations. ‘World history’, in the words of Hegel, ‘exhibits the development of the consciousness of freedom on the part of Spirit, and of the consequent realization of that freedom.’

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. We can however steer clear of these fixational attitudes and have a Philosophy of History which while being total remains nonfixational, that is, open and dynamic. For we can have a natural, social and spiritual philosophy without ourselves turning into materialists, humanists or idealists. We may call it the philosophy of history. This philosophy remains open and dynamic by undergoing continual refinement at the universities of all those countries which form integral parts of those cultural systems which accept the universal liberal criteria of values and of total cultural progress. The function of this philosophy of history is two-fold: one critical, the other speculative.

(1) The critical part analyzes the methods of writing and making history. A modern text-book of historical methodology (for example, that by Langlois and Seignobos: *An Introduction to the Study of History*) deals with the problems of historical method. This is however restricted to theory, to be exact, to retrodictive theory—to the problem of how to know past facts with the greatest possible measure of certainty. The successive steps of the method are search for documents, preparation of an indexed catalogue, and critical examination of MSS. External criticism aims at establishing the text. It involves collation and emendation of texts, comparison of errors, conjecture of right texts. It deals with ‘the calligraphy, the language, the form and the source of the document’. Internal criticism aims at establishing the authenticity of the author by looking into possible subjective aberrations. It therefore deals with ‘the conditions under which it was written, with the nature and circumstances of the author’ (Cf. Stebbing: *A Modern Introduction to Logic*).

The problem of predictive theory has led to what has been denounced by empiricists as the *historicist* method. Historicism
suggests predictions or anticipations. Valid predictions about
the moves of leaders of historical cultural systems are possible.
(Predictions about founders of new cultural systems are, of course,
difficult.) For example, it is not difficult to predict the behaviour
of a Dulles or a Khrushchev, of a Chiang or a Dalai Lama. The
making of history involves the use of this method: all makers of
history must anticipate.

The methods of making history raise the problems of gregational
ethics, which is yet an undeveloped (almost an unborn) branch of
human knowledge. (The Bhagawad Geeta among the ancient
scriptures is a serious attempt in this direction.) The general direc-
tion in which problems of gregational ethics can be solved lies in
the extension of the sphere of freedom and morality as against the
sphere of legality and in the extension of the sphere of legality as
against the sphere of purely political act which includes military
operations. (Prof. Braithwaite's Theory of Games as a Tool for
the Moral Philosopher and Prof. J. R. Lucas' review of it in Philo-
sophy may be cited as a pointer to one kind of solution of the problem
of gregational ethics.)

How would and should units of intelligible history, whether
partial-cultural gregations (like empires, nations, business corpora-
tions, labour unions, castes, classes, political parties, races, etc.)
or total-cultural systems (like the communist, the Islamic, the
Christian, the Hindu, . . . systems) treat one another? In the words
Borsodi: '... how should individuals, acting as members, leaders
or representatives of a group, when engaged in doing—or refusing
to do—anything for, to or with another group and the individuals
who belong to it (a) strive to have their own group and members
treat other groups and their members; (b) actually treat other
groups and those who belong to them, and how should (c) the other
group involved and its members reciprocally strive to have their
own group and its members act; (d) actually treat the other group
and its members?'

A physically more organized society, whether superior or not in
other respects, usually tries to force upon a weaker society its
decisions, its various cultural traits, its way of life, if possible its
whole cultural system. Christianity and Islam, for examples,
have practised genocide in some periods of their history.

with impunity. The weaker society, whether inferior or not in other respects, usually tries ways of escape and resistance—mass suicide, secession through flight, self-humiliation to spite the conqueror, terrorism, sabotage violent and nonviolent, purist segregation, archaistic revival, promiscuous mimesis, partial osmosis, etc. (Cf. Toynbee: *The Study of History*). Gregational ethics would generally recommend a peaceful mutual give-and-take on the basis of a comparison of the two cultural systems with reference to the ideal liberal cultural system, which alone can function as the common standard.

It is only when two groups become more or less equally powerful that wars break out (Cf. Emery Reves: *The Anatomy of Peace*). The differences and conflict can then be settled in the battlefields where the absolute of history seems to lie. In theory, however, we can still find out which of the warring nations stands for a superior system. But if the equally powerful but inferior system goes on expanding its dominion by organized physical force and genocide and refuses to accept the peaceful functioning of the common standard, the other party cannot act upon the rule of 'preter-social' or 'inter-personal' ethics. An adherence to the Yudhisthrian, Christian or Gandhian formula, viz. 'Resist not the Evil' in such a situation would be a more destructive dogmatism and a worse fanaticism than going to war. The Geeta, for example, enjoins going to war in such a situation as a moral duty. It is interesting to note that in the context of present communist expansion, the U. S. A. (or the West in general) has been employing the gregational ethics of the Geeta while the leading statesmen of India have been applying the Christian or Yudhisthirian formula.

The problem of comprehensive theory and practice of history has led to the development of what is known as the dialectical method. All making of history which requires a fuller understanding of history (past, present, future) does require the employing of this method. It is a systematic unity, firstly, of all the methods of predictive and retrodictive theory; secondly, of all the methods of gregational practice—political, legal and moral; and finally, of all the theoretical and practical methods of effective making of history. The historical actual at any moment is the outcome of the moves of many logical ideals operative in the field seeking many ultimate goals. A knowledge of these many ends and their many means is essential for writing and making history. Most
statesmen of the world in the thick of making history employ the
dialectical method. This is the case even with the statesmen of
countries like Great Britain, for example, where the theoreticians
of history are mostly empiricists firing broadsides against the
dialectical method. And this is not the case with countries like
India, for example, where the theoreticians of history emphasize
the dialectical method but the statesmen are hopelessly empirical
and nondialectically ideal or moral.

(2) *Speculative* philosophy of history deals with the actual course
of historical events. It seeks (a) to find out the units of intelligible
history; (b) to discover the 'laws' of, and predict, their birth, growth,
decay and death; (c) to develop and refine the ideal existential
system of culture which being total yet open and dynamic can
function as the measure of all actual systems; (d) to grade the
existing systems in a logical hierarchy by applying the test; and
finally, (e) to trace the 'dialectical' pattern of interaction between the
logical ideal and the historical actual for each system.

Such a speculative philosophy must steer clear of the pitfalls of
fixation of feeling for some kind or other of an incomplete
system of culture, whether historical or logical. This does not imply
that a philosopher of history ought not to feel for his historic
cultural system: it means that he should recommend ways and
means for his society's moving towards the total yet open and
dynamic world liberal culture.

(a) Most modern social philosophers of repute (Toynbee, Sorokin,
Berdayev, Northrop, Schubart, Kroeber, Spengler, Danilevsky)
agree that the historical total cultural systems are the units of
intelligible history. Any kind of partial cultural systems (merely
political, merely economic, merely ethnic, etc.) taken as units fails
to make history wholly meaningful. Neither does the whole human
species as conceived by empiricists, 'scientists', materialists,
humanists and idealists make it so. The historical total-cultural
systems have each its ideal of human unity. These systems alone
taken as units can save history from the procrustean beds—national-
ism, class-struggle, racism as well as universalism of fixational
systems. Of the total systems Hinduism, Christianity, Buddhism,
Islam, Judaism (including the monocommunist heretics in their
folds) and even the prelogical cultural systems have accepted the
common liberal standard: Communism alone has not.

(b) The 'laws' of development of these cultural systems are
closed generic causal propositions. The pattern of development is not made up of one unrepeatable 'childhood, maturity, old age and death'; it consists of many kinds of links, some of which are linear, others being cyclical and recurrent, and still others irregular fluctuations and oscillations.

(c) The open and dynamic character of each system varies as its capacity to create and sustain the urge for higher individuality (i) in the individuals who constitute it, (ii) in the other systems with which it comes into contact, and (iii) for itself in so far as it approaches the ideal world culture. The criterion stated gives three tests—internal, external and final. The three tests may be re-stated respectively as follows: (i) sustained production of useful goods and creation of beautiful artefacts; in other words, an increasing number of individuals in the tertiary vocations and a decreasing number of working hours in the primary and secondary vocations; (ii) sustained exchange of, and co-operation in production and creation of, such goods and artifacts, of cultural traits, with other cultural systems; and (iii) gradually developing so as to merge into the world cultural system without falling, in the process, into the pitfalls of fixational systems of culture.

The ideal cultural system is a nonfixational (open and dynamic) system of culture covering the total sphere of experience graded as follows: (i) prelogical—reflex action (animism and magic) and instincts (tradition and custom); (ii) logical—primary (perception and crude arts), secondary (science and useful arts), and tertiary (philosophy—natural social and spiritual and fine arts extolling nature, man and God). A system is a whole in which the constituent parts and the component and formal whole are partly independent and partly interdependent. Culture is the realization of values in theory and practice. Philosophy is the realization of values in theory; fine arts, that in practice. Religion is the realization of the highest value in theory.

An historical cultural system is a society of individuals wedded to a final dogma, to a fixed ideal of the highest individual. The stronger the fixation of feeling for the dogma, the more static is the system of culture. The lower the level of experience on which the fixation takes place, the more closed is the system. The stronger the group-feeling, the more communal is the society. The greater the rigidity and inclusiveness of lower level control of higher level life, the more totalitarian is the system. All these criteria are given
by the liberal cultural system. This is the ideal cultural system expounded and continually refined by the universities of the world from the dawn of history. Historically, this is also the world culture in the making. With these criteria, we can compare and grade the historical cultural systems.

(d) Islam is an open culture, though fixated on ethical idealism. The protocol or major premise of Islam is a revealed presence. The Islamic world has not made much progress in tertiary vocations. Islam is impervious to cultural give-and-take with other systems: Dar-ul-Islam and Dar-ul-Harb is a cultural dichotomy. Its borrowing of liberal science and philosophy and useful and fine arts has been pragmatic in character. The self-righteousness in it is to be traced to the fixation of feeling for the historically revealed dogma; and a very strong group-feeling born of this accounts for its failure to have developed into world culture.

Christianity is a dynamic cultural system though fixated on the level of ethical idealism. The highest individual is the messianic man. The prime symbol is incarnated love. The Christian world has made tremendous progress on all levels. Though guilty of genocide now and then, it has not only accepted but directly inspired the development of the world liberal culture. Most liberals of the West derive their individualism from Christianity. Before the advent of the historical Christ, it was the good of a particular group, the national good, which was the ultimate concern; after Christ, the good of the individual became the ultimate concern. Its ethical messianic idealism has however been one of the main factors in the birth and growth of communism.

Hinduism is an open but static culture. Hinduism prescribes the ideal of the harmonious man as the highest individual. But there is a good deal of fixation of feeling on ascetic and absolute idealism. The major premise is mystical self-realization; this involves an attitude of ascetic negation, to begin with. This has prevented the development of a healthy attitude to nature and history, to natural and social life. Its recent assimilation of the liberal world culture (to which its contribution is not small) has corrected this aberration to a great extent. Its main weakness lies in its escapist response to the new communist challenge, a result of very weak gregational feeling and low vitality.

Communism is a closed and static culture fixated on the level of radical humanism. The communist protocol is a social philo-
sophical dogma, a theory of history. The emphases are on the dogma and on the strong group-feeling. Communism fails to sustain productivity in the secondary vocations and creativity in the tertiary vocations: it has produced very few philosophers and fine-artists in the true sense. It has been using self-stultifying methods of concealed unemployment (employment in the armed forces) and of denying secondary and tertiary education to many aspirants. The very first condition of tertiary vocations, viz. freedom, is conspicuous by its absence in the communist empire. The communist system can acquire new members only by the power of armed forces effecting genocide, the ground for which is prepared by the wily machinations of ambitious politicians in underdeveloped countries. In short, the kind of gain expected by way of communism is to put an end to some occasional unemployment (in the primary and secondary vocations) only; but in order to achieve this end it would enslave and kill ten times the number. So the bargain is not worthwhile. Besides, the cost is less in free enterprising and voluntarily co-operating democracies.

(c) Logic bears no relation of identity with history. History is no carbon copy of logic; neither does logic bend its steps with history. The two sequences of development—logical and chronological, do not correspond as parallels. (Present) history is a systematic unity of the logical ideal and the (past) historical actual: the two are partly independent of and partly dependent on each other. That for a given biography feeling brings logic into operation and sustains it accounts for the lapses of individual biographies, and in its cumulative effect, for lapses in history. This does not warrant a refraction of logic in historical medium. (Communism, for example, casts a strong illusion by dipping logic in history and thus distorting it.) The liberal must judge history and make history in accordance with the logical-existential ideal that avoids fixation of feeling for any lower level experience, for any partial and closed cultural system.

The remaining chapters elaborate some of the points made above.
SOCIETY IS A COMMUNITY. A society is made up of two or more persons associating directly, or indirectly, voluntarily or involuntarily. Society is thus a pattern of interpersonal behaviour. In other words, it is a more or less systematic unity of human action with a common purpose. The purpose can be the pursuit of any one or more of the many values of life— theoretical and practical. It is not the purpose or value which makes for society. It is the community or sameness of the purpose, it is the working together in pursuit of it that makes for a society.

There can be different classifications of societies according as the classification is made on the different levels of experience and made on different principles of classification on the same level.

CLASSIFICATION ON THE PRE-LOGICAL LEVEL. To a tribal people, there can be only two societies by way of a single dichotomy—we who make up the tribe and they the rest of mankind. The attitudes struck are usually reflex active and instinctive attitudes of fear, hostility, distrust, submission, wonder, etc. This tribal social psychology persists even on higher levels. For example, the communist society which is on the level of social philosophy and fine arts extolling State follows the tribal dichotomy: 'Either you are with us, or you are against us.'

CLASSIFICATION ON THE PERCEPTUAL LEVEL. On the level of perception, there can be innumerable principles of classification and hence innumerable divisions of mankind. Each sensibly apprehended cultural trait may give a dichotomy of mankind. We may take, for example, (i) the wearing of spectacles or moustache as a principle of classification and divide mankind into two societies—those who wear spectacles or moustache and those who do not; (ii) the speaking of English as the principle of classification and
divide mankind into two societies—the English-speaking people and the rest. Many social philosophers of to-day recommend this empiricism as a solvent of conflicts among higher level societies. This has taken the fancy of many theoreticians but has not yet become a force to reckon with in the field of making history.

CLASSIFICATION ON THE LEVEL OF SCIENCE. Sociologists as scientists have usually chosen principles of classification keeping the 'causal', 'genetic', 'functional' or some other 'factual relational' factor in view. But many of them as social philosophers have slipped into choosing 'valuational' factors as principles of classification: the saving grace is that they have mostly treated values as facts.

Here the number of principles of classification is necessarily fewer than on the perceptual level; and on each principle a still fewer basic typologies have been distinguished. Only some of the classifications are given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle of Classification</th>
<th>Typologies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Technological progress</td>
<td>palaeolithic, neolithic, copper, bronze, iron, machine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Occupation</td>
<td>hunter, pastoral, agricultural industrial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ecology</td>
<td>rural, urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Closeness of human relationship</td>
<td>primary, non-primary (Cooley &amp; others)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Economic mode of production</td>
<td>ancient, feudal, bourgeois, socialist (Marx)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Form of solidarity</td>
<td>mechanical, organic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Family system</td>
<td>matriarchal, patriarchal, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Form of government</td>
<td>Best state, monarchy, aristocracy, democracy (legal), democracy (il-legal), oligarchy, tyranny (Plato &amp; Aristotle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Formal organization</td>
<td>organized gregations, unorganized gregations, pseudogregations (Ralph Borsodi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Total culture</td>
<td>Hindu, Christian, Islamic, etc. (Toynbee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Historical culture</td>
<td>aesthetic, theoretic (Northrop)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Nature of realization</td>
<td>harmonious, heroic, ascetic, messianic. (Schubart)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Highest individual</td>
<td>ideational, idealistic, sensate (Sorokin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Philosophy</td>
<td>pre-logical, logical (primary, secondary, tertiary) (B. S. Sanyal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Level of experience</td>
<td>religious, secular (Kroebel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Theism</td>
<td>barbaric, mediaeval, humanist-secular (Berdyaev)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Chronology</td>
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</table>
CLASSIFYING ACCORDING TO CLOSENESS OF HUMAN RELATION.

Cooley makes a distinction between primary and non-primary societies. The principle of classification is twofold: size and consequent closeness of human relation and contact.

Primary societies are small. Their membership is made up of what Ralph Borsodi calls a group: it is not a mass. A group is made up of a number of persons small enough to let them 'meet face-to-face at the same place and time.' A mass is a number of persons who cannot meet thus. Naturally, primary societies are intimate associations. The members can develop closer relationship and have intensive interactions than is possible for a mass. The whole society (nation state or cultural system) has the system of values which individuals develop in these groups. The attitudes and ideals developed in these groups become the value-system for the greater society.

Primary political units are such groups. Modern political thinkers would like these to be autonomous. Ultimate political power must vest in them and they would delegate power for specific purposes to regional federations.

Non-primary societies have massive membership. A mass is made up of a large number of persons, so large that it is physically impossible for them 'to meet face-to-face at one place and time'. Hence the relations here are formal legalistic, and contacts or interactions are partial and casual. Race, nation, state, mankind, world market, world government, etc. are examples of nonprimary societies. They have grown out of primary groups but now include and supersede the primary societies.

Nonprimary societies are characterized by impersonality, specialization, reach and continuity. They are impersonal: our behaviour in such groups tends to be legal and formal. Certain laws and rules are laid down to standardize our contacts, to regulate our interactions. Our contacts in secondary groups raise no problems of continual adjustment whether moral or human. Interactions become habitual and automatic. Sometimes they develop into the illegal and political and further into the impolitic and warlike. Specialization means division of labour. This results in a greater variety of vocations, in the production or creation of greater variety and quantity of useful or beautiful artifacts (goods or services). Continuity refers to the relatively permanent character of the non-

primary societies. This is achieved by means of institutions. The institutions tend to conserve for generations the values they embody by repeating the same functions. Reach implies the realization in our feelings of a world community. Distant peoples enjoy one another’s fruits of labour and feel at home in the world at large by virtue of membership of secondary societies. These have thus the humanizing effect across the process of acculturation.

It is however easy for nonprimary societies to derogate from the special to the partial, from the impersonal to the inhuman. It is a commonplace now how in the name of building up a welfare society, a welfare state turns into a totalitarian state. Also how in the name of building up a world state, a nation state turns into an empire.

Classification on the Principle of Organization. In the first step of Borsodi’s classification, the principle is the number ‘two’. Partnership is a society of two persons (e.g. a couple, or a business partnership). A gregation is made up of three or more. The largest gregation is mankind which includes all the dead men and all of them yet to be born.

Borsodi then classifies gregations according to two principles. One is size, according to which gregations are of two kinds—group and mass. We have already noted the difference between the two.

The second principle of classifying is the formal organization—form and degree of social organization itself. This is logically an inner principle for sociology, derived from the very nature of society, which is community or togetherness. The essential characteristic of society itself becomes the principle of classification. Borsodi distinguishes three kinds of gregations: organized gregations, unorganized gregations and pseudo-gregations.

Gregations

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{Organized Gg.} & \text{Pseudo-Gg.} & \text{Unorganized Gg.} \\
(\text{All Classifications for theory})
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{Civic Gg.} & \text{Congregations} & \text{Epi-Gg. Aggregations Segregations} \\
(\text{Comp.}) & (\text{Volun.}) & (\text{Perm.}) (\text{Temp.}) \text{ Volun. Comp.}
\end{array}
\]

Organized gregations have more or less well-defined formal organizations: they have (i) constitutions stating and correlating the ends and means, and (ii) institutions (a hierarchy of buildings and
persons) for realizing the ends. They are of two kinds according as membership of each is either compulsory or voluntary. Civic gregations like states enforce compulsory membership; congregations like institutions of families, work and education offer voluntary membership. In a communist state, civic gregations grow at the cost of congregations. In an individualist state, there are any number of congregations: civic gregations are fewer.

Unorganized gregations have no constitutions and institutions: they are not formally organized. They are of two kinds again according as the unorganized character is positive or negative. The positive ones are in their turn classified on the principle of duration: the permanent ones are called epigregations; they are mostly spiritual gregations; the various cultural systems and movements are instances. The temporary unorganized gregations called aggregations are exemplified by mob, crowd, audience, etc. The negative unorganized gregations are called segregations, which in their turn may be subdivided into two classes—voluntary and compulsory. The castes among the Hindus illustrate a voluntary segregation, while the apartheid in South Africa and the erstwhile ghetto in Nazi Germany and the concentration camps in the Soviet Union are examples of compulsory segregations.

Pseudo-gregations are made up of congeries of individuals: we bring them into theoretical existence when we want to make classifications on the levels of perception and science and philosophy according to some fixed principles of classification. Most typologies in the above list are examples of pseudo-gregations. Those who wear spectacles and those who do not, males and females, married and unmarried, fly weights, feather weights, light weights, bantam weights and heavy weights, etc. are examples. Races like mongolians and negroes and classes like bourgeoisie and proletariat are on this definition pseudo-gregations.

Classification according to historic culture. The total cultural principle of classification followed by Toynbee, Sorokin, Schubart and others is partly scientific and partly valutational in character. This is so because their perspective is historical and history attempts both factual and valuational account.

Northrop has taken the direction in the realization of values as the principle and enumerated only two typologies—aesthetic and theoretic cultures. Schubart takes the highest individual as the principle and distinguishes four types of societies having respectively
the harmonious man, the heroic man, the ascetic man and the messianic man as the highest ideal. Sorokin takes philosophy as the measure and derives three grades of society—sensate, ideational and idealistic. Toynbee chooses historic civilizations as the principle of division and enumerates twenty-one of them in his study. Most of them are dead and gone. The surviving ones are:

1. The Hindu.
2. The Islamic.
3. The Western Christian.
4. The Orthodox Christian
5. The Far Eastern (Chinese).
7. The Fossilized Relics of The Indic Society (viz. the Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhists, the Hinayana Buddhists and the Jains), and of the Syriac Society (viz. the Jewish Community, the Parsee Community and the Monophysite and Nestorian Christians).

Of these, the Far Eastern (Chinese), a major portion of the Orthodox Christian Society, and a minor portion of each of the Islamic, Western Christian, Far Eastern (Japanese-Korean), and of the Fossilized Relics of the Indic and the Syriac Societies have been swallowed by the emergent communist society by way of military conquest and genocide.

Different social philosophers have employed the same generic principle of classification: the specific principle chosen being different, they have given different denotation to and used different names for the total cultural systems. Sorokin lists them in his ‘Social Philosophies’ as follows:

Danilevsky : Culture-historical types or Civilizations.
Spengler : ‘High Cultures’ and their later-phase degenerate forms ‘Civilizations’.
Toynbee : Civilized societies.
Kroeber : High-value culture patterns.
Schubart : Prototypes of culture.
Northrop : Cultural systems or world-cultures.
Berdyaev : Great cultures.
Sorokin : Cultural supersystems.
Each of these cultural systems is based upon some major premise or final protocol: this makes it different from others. The given system articulates, develops and realizes this prime symbol or ultimate value in the process of history. This ultimate or highest value constitutes its religion. In other words, each system is a system of values with its own characteristic ordering or gradation. This gives its own peculiar highest value or religion. That is why not only each of the older cultures (like Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, etc.) but also communism can be considered a religious system.

Each system is characterized by a wholeness or individuality that includes and supersedes its constituent regional parts. There is a tendency on the part of each system to preserve its individuality in spite of a change in the parts. The change is a change in togetherness. There are limits to its variations and if and when the change goes beyond the limits it loses its individuality and disintegrates.

During an impact or contact between two cultures, the congenial elements pass over from one to the other, but the uncongenial ones can only be imposed by pressure and force. This has been proved again and again in course of the imperialistic expansion of Islamic and Christian cultures in the past and in the communist culture to-day. This raises the problem of gregational ethics, which we discuss in the last chapter.

All sociologists presuppose the philosophical gradation of societies and philosophical concept of society. We may therefore give both in brief.

**PHILOSOPHICAL GRADATION OF SOCIETIES OR CULTURES.** Societies may be graded according to the gradation of experience. The two broad divisions are primitive and civilized societies according as experience (of the elite of the society) is at the prelogical and logical stages respectively. In each there are sub-divisions. Thus, we have:

A. Primitive (Pre-logical or involuntary) Societies:
   i. Reflex action level  .. Based on an integration of animism and magic.
   ii. Instinctual level  .. "  "  "  "  tradition and custom.

B. Civilized (Logical or Voluntary) Societies:
   i. Primary  .. Based on an integration of perception and crude arts.
   ii. Secondary  .. "  "  "  "  science and useful arts.
   iii. Tertiary  .. "  "  "  "  philosophy and fine arts.
Each higher grade society may include the lower grade ones as constituents. Thus, a society on the tertiary logical level has many members or groups living on the lower levels.

All anthropological cultures or tribes are predominantly on the prelogical level but they are partly also on the primary logical level. Now that everywhere civilized societies have come into contact with them and made an impact on them, they have started clampering on to the secondary and tertiary levels.

Among the older civilized societies, most were having a gap on the secondary logical level. It has however filled up by the impact on all of them of the western civilization. These are all on the tertiary level but they can be graded as higher and lower according to the respective sub-levels of experience on which they are fixated.

**The Social Self as the Subject.** On each level or experience, there is a social aspect and a social awareness. But the social self as the subject, whether in theory or in practice, is not the ultimate position in the gradation of subjects. We have noted that social philosophy relates the totality of facts to the attitudes of the social self which is subordinated to the spiritual self.

A fixation of feeling on this level may however occur. This occurs if one takes the social self as the final position of the subject and finds satisfaction in it. Then we get humanism (egoistic, pragmatic or radical). Without such fixation, the social self naturally gets subordinated to the spiritual (moral and religious) self as the subject. True, on the spiritual level, there is a social aspect of experience; but that is a part of the practical realization of the spiritual self. The social self can never be superimposed on the spiritual self.

The social self is a subjective-theoretical realization by the material self, and a subjective-practical realization by the spiritual self. The material self cannot control the social self; the spiritual self can.

The social self is the consummation of the material self. There may be opposition between the two selves of the same individual till the social self subordinates the material self. But in so doing the social self must not stifle or kill the material self: it cannot do that. The social self can and ought to include the material self while superseding it. This is what is recommended in universal hedonism which unites egoism with altruism in a systematic manner. Sociology is the objective-theoretical realization by the social self, and sustained production and just distribution of goods are the
objective practical realization by it: both are meant for the well-being of the material self.

The social self thus contains the material self as one of its constituents. It is, in its turn, contained by the spiritual self as one of the latter's constituents. The social self as the subject is thus higher than the material and lower than the spiritual. It can use the material self as its means just as it can itself be so used by the spiritual self.

The moral self is the subjective-theoretical realization by the social self. There may be opposition between the two selves of the same individual till the moral subordinates the social. But in doing so the spiritual self must not stifle and kill the social self. It does not. Social philosophy is the objective theoretical realization by the spiritual self. And creation of fine arts extolling society or control of the social self for a harmonious satisfaction of social urges or building up a beautiful social order—is the practical realization of the spiritual self: these are meant for the well-being of the social self.

This is what is recommended by Kantian rationalism, which unifies universal hedonism with the categorical imperative in a systematic manner. It is in this sense that Kant's liberal doctrine that the individual is an end is to be understood. The social self is a means to an end which is the spiritual self.

The social self, therefore, cannot use the spiritual self as a means. It is only when there occurs a fixation on the social self as the subjective pole that it may try to override and subordinate the spiritual self (of the same individual as well as of other individuals). This fixation of feeling and error leads to many evils. Most social evils can be avoided by the social self's getting subordinated to the spiritual. Similarly, most natural evils can be avoided by the efficient controlling of the material self by the social self.

There can be three distinct phases of fixation on the social self as the highest subject. Opposed to nature and spirit, the social self in fixation realizes the highest value in man's reason. It apotheosizes the particular man, the particular society or humanity. These we have called egoistic humanism, pragmatic humanism and radical humanism and described in a previous chapter.

SOCIETY IS A SYSTEMATIC UNITY. Society is a systematic unity of the social selves of individuals. It is the happy home of man in nature. In it, a free creation of his spirit, he feels secure and satisfied
The social universe is meant to be more homely with freedom, happiness and security than the natural universe. In society alone, we may work together towards the best possible fulfilment of our life. It is only in society, again, we may realize the ideal conditions of universal well-being. But on that account it is not necessary to make a god of society. Full-fledged socialists do this: but this is the result of a fixation, an error and hence, a source of evil.

Society is a half-way house between nature and spirit. It seeks to secure protection against the destructive aspects of nature and relations of harmony with its productive aspects. It thus includes and supersedes nature. In this sense it is above nature. Society in its turn is included and superseded by spirit. Spirit seeks to secure protection against the destructive aspects of society and relations of harmony with its productive aspects.

There is a general tendency to emphasize the interdependence between society and individuals. An analysis of the relationship between individuals and society makes it quite clear that they are partly independent of each other and partly interdependent. Extreme individualism (that is, anarchism) and extreme collectivism (that is, communism) are both false doctrines.

Society shapes our rationality and morality. It induces in us a group-unconscious and a political super-ego. It lays us in a cultural system and instils a group-feeling for it. Without accepting social determinism, we cannot fully account for the acquired part of our theory and practice. Society develops our instinctive apparatus into the logical level. These need not mean only acculturation, or worse, an uncritical acceptance of the accepted code: we may either accept or try to modify them in the light of reason and feeling.

The reason in its turn develops in course of the adaptation to and the reforming of the social environment.

On the other hand, society is dependent on individuals for its very existence. It exists for the sake of meeting the vital needs of individuals. Only parts (the social selves) of individuals go into the making of society. The spiritual self of the individual is above the social self. Men of genius make new societies or keep the existing societies open and dynamic. Men of evil genius make it closed and totalitarian. The distinction between an open society and a closed society can be maintained only if we view individuals as makers of societies. The conditions for sustaining the urge for higher individuality are created by individual men and women. The
social institutions which help or hinder this creative activity are made and unmade by individuals. Human history, says Sartre, is made by individual decision and act.

A society is a systematic unity of institutions—a hierarchy of buildings and individuals. (We may here ignore the man-made material aspect of institutions and take only the individuals.) Society is not merely an aggregate of particular men; for, in that case, the society will have no identity of its own and one particular man may feel justified in dominating all others. It is not merely a dependent unity; for, in that case, the removal of one criminal or a group of criminals will do away with the society. It is not merely an independent unity in which the society dominates the individuals; for, in that case, the individuals will not be in a position to remake society. It is not merely an organic unity in which society and individuals are only interdependent; for, in that case, society will not be independent enough to punish criminals and individuals will not be independent enough to remake society.

Society is a systematic unity, in which individuals and society are partly independent of and partly dependent on each other. The creative spiritual selves of individuals being independent of society remake society. Society is independent of the criminals and either punish or reform them. Society and individuals are also interdependent and express themselves through each other: the life, liberty and estate of citizens are protected by the organized physical force of society; and the best minds among the citizens represent the esprit de corps, culture, or value-system which goes to make up the individuality of the society.

THE CRITERIA OF AN OPEN AND DYNAMIC SOCIETY. An individual may suffer from a fixation of feeling on a particular level of experience deemed by him the highest. This gives him his final dogma and closes his mind. Likewise, a cultural system may also be in a state of fixation if a majority in its creative minority are in such a state.

A society may be called non-fixational if it is open, dynamic, noncommunal, and nontotalitarian. (i) The lower the level of experience on which fixation takes place, the more closed is the system. In an open culture, the feeling is fixated on an ever receding but never eluding highest. (ii) The stronger the fixation of feeling for the final dogma, the more static is the culture. In a dynamic culture, even the final dogma that lends individuality to it merges into
a systematic unity with an equally final scepticism. (iii) The stronger the prelogical gregational (tribal, dichotomous, 'we-they') feeling, the more communal is the society. In a noncommunal society, the feeling for regional culture is made a part of the feeling for human culture. (iv) The greater the inclusiveness of the lower level control of the higher level life, the more totalitarian is the system. In a non-totalitarian system, there is the higher-level control of the lower level life for a harmonious satisfaction of the wants of the lower level life: the highest self does the duty of practical realization, that of a harmonious fulfilment of the urges of the lower selves.

In all liberalized older cultures the fixation happens to lie on a very high level; hence they are more open than new cultures like communism and even empiricist-humanist movement in which the fixation occurs on a lower level. Most of the criticism of the old by the new is no refinement; it either proves pointless going off tangentially or destructive by hitting ignorantly.

In older systems, the members do have a feeling for their final protocol; but in the new systems, the feeling is stronger. A communist or a humanist feels for his communism or humanism with a prophetic zeal; whereas a Hindu or Christian has a maturer feeling (somewhat sceptical) for his final dogma. The older systems are more dynamic than the new. It is easier for a Hindu, Christian, Muslim, etc. to appreciate and accept critically new theories—in science or philosophy, new experiments in useful or fine arts; easier than for a communist or even an empiricist humanist.²

The stronger tribal feeling is to be met with among the modern ideologists, whether welfare statist or communists or humanists. They will make one feel they are different, that one does not belong to their enlightened brotherhood, that if one is not with them, one is a fool or their enemy, and so on. The members of older societies have a maturer feeling (somewhat ambivalent) for their system; they behave as a tribe only in self-defence, when threatened with aggression. The Christians in flight from Hungary, the Buddhists in flight from Tibet, were made to feel before their flight that they

² As a liberal Hindu, for example, the present writer could learn from humanists like Ralph Borsodi and M. N. Roy, empiricists like John Wisdom and spiritualists like Sri Aurobindo. A Communist would not touch any of them; and a modern humanist would look askance at Sri Aurobindo and may not wholly like Wisdom or Borsodi.
were aliens and unwanted. On the other hand, the communists and welfarists are tolerated by us as our own kith and kin.

In older societies, the total cultural system is regulated from the highest level of religious value: all values are given their right status; there is thus a higher level control of lower level life. In new systems, a lower level principle is recommended to control activities of the higher level. Communism, a fixated social theory and practice, would govern spiritual activity. Humanism, another such fixation, would refine morality. Hence these are more or less totalitarian. A truly total system is not totalitarian; a partial system claiming to be total becomes totalitarian, because it has got to control from its level the higher level acts which go beyond its comprehension.

All these criteria are given by the liberal culture. This is the ideal system expounded and refined continually by the universities of the world from the dawn of history. Historically, this is also the world culture in the making. With these criteria we can compare and grade the historical cultural systems and ideological movements trying to capture our minds—some by way of conviction, some others by way of force, still others by way of fashion.

The open and dynamic character of society varies as its capacity for full culture, to realize values (all and in right gradation) in theory and practice. Such a society creates and sustains the urge for higher individuality. It increases the highest level control of the lower level life, that is, it extends the field of morality. It acquires more and more scientific knowledge and philosophical refinement. It produces useful goods and creates beautiful artifacts in a sustained manner and in sufficient quantities. There is in it a continual increase in higher level vocations, in the number going in for higher education. It can correctly phase the development in education with that in vocations.

We have stated the same criterion in different perspectives. These may now be elaborated in their different relational implications.

**Higher Individuality.** Higher individuality is the criterion from the standpoint of theoretical-subjective realization of values. The openness of a society varies as its capacity to create and sustain the urge for higher and higher individuality (i) in the individuals who constitute it, (ii) in the other societies or cultural systems with which it comes into contact, and (iii) for itself in so far as it approaches the ideal world culture.

To realize higher individuality for ever growing number, the
society must keep its educational system open and dynamic, autono-
mous and free from ideological control, especially of any domi-
nant minority, ruling class or party. (This is the task of the creative
minority.) An increasing number must come out of it humanized
and individualized. This will strengthen the creative minority.

The approach of one country (whether developed or under-
developed) to another (whether underdeveloped or developed)
must be partly that of a learner. Even the most underdeveloped
country may have something or other to teach the most develo-
ped country (e.g. motor skills and ideas of deity of some primitive
peoples). This would make for the noncommunal character of the
society. And each society ought to think out a short cut and honour-
able way to develop into the world culture, which is to come as a
systematic unity of all older cultures. This would strengthen the
noncommunal character.

THE HIGHEST LEVEL CONTROL OF THE LOWER LEVEL LIFE. From
the standpoint of practical-subjective realization of values, the
criterion may be worded as follows: The nontotalitarian character
of a society varies as its capacity to increase the highest level
systematic control of life on the lower level (i) in the individuals
who constitute it; (ii) in the other societies or cultural systems with
which it comes into contact; and (iii) for itself in so far as it ap-
proaches the ideal world culture.

In a nontotalitarian society an increasing number of humanized
and individualized persons come forward to give a lead to society.
Such persons have disciplined their lower selves and formed a stable
and high-principled character. They lead by exercising an influence
and discharging their responsibility conscientiously. Toynbee calls
them the creative minority. Ralph Borsodi calls them the elite and finds
a synonym of it in the word 'yogi' as used in the Bhagawad Geeta.

"The yogi, in the original Sanskrit, was not a mere mystic who
had renounced the world for meditation; he was a self-dedicated
soul who had both knowledge and wisdom, who had both
concern and compassion, above all, who acted. He was a man
of deeds and not of mere sentiment, who had engaged himself
not only to lead a good life but to help and to make possible a
good life for all mankind."3

3 Ralph Borsodi, The Libertarian Manifesto, Libertarian Social Institute,
Bombay 4, p. 7, p. 24
In other words, after withdrawal, the yogi returns to nature and history and engages in making history.

In the totalitarian society, a dominant minority usurps the leadership and becomes the ruling class. This is made up of politicians—propagandists, agitators, conspirators, revolutionists, commissars, planners and bureaucrats. They try political level control of the spiritual life of the people. In consequence, though they start as an elite, yet they degenerate into a power-loving oligarchy. This is the case in to-day’s underdeveloped states turning welfarist in character. There the creative minority must oust the dominant minority. This is a difficult historical role; but unless the elite of every society takes up this role, mankind has a bleak future. In the words of Borsodi again:

“The leadership which the priests lost to the warriors, the warriors to the kings, the kings to the businessmen, the businessmen to the financiers, and which the financiers are now losing to the politicians, must be assumed by a New Elite which sharply distinguishes between the exercise of influence and the exercise of power. They must not only seek and create, they must also teach; they must motivate those whom they influence to live morally, intellectually and culturally like superior persons.”

The approach of the developed country to the underdeveloped ones ought to be from the highest level. Each regional culture whether developed or underdeveloped has to freely adapt its culture to the process of humanization. The contact between the developed and underdeveloped cultures must not lead to shameful mimesis by the underdeveloped or to dreadful imposition by the developed culture. The regional cultures must not grow a parochial or imperial attitude but try to set up the world standard of refinement on each level within its regional form and content. The communist imperialists impose communist culture with the formula ‘nationalist in form, socialist in content’: this is euphemism for genocide. The milder and decadent imperialism of the West does acculturate and the underdeveloped countries which have been bearing its impact do imitate. These trends must be purified and humanized and a healthy inter-societal behaviour developed.

MORE SCIENTISTS AND PHILOSOPHERS. In terms of theoretical-
objective realization of values, the criterion may be worded a little
differently: the dynamic character of a society varies directly as (i) the variety and number of scientists and philosophers, (ii)
sharing the scientific knowledge and philosophical refinement with
other societies, and as (iii) the clear grasp of the need of the world
state in all its scientific and philosophical implications.

Universalize secondary and tertiary education. ‘Universalize’
means ‘let in as many qualified aspirants as would apply for getting
themselves admitted’. This may require, especially in underdevel-
oped countries, the setting up of many rural universities with low
production costs for building. Thatched cottages may house resident
teachers and learners as well as the classes; only laboratories and
libraries, museums and theatres, and hospitals and offices may be in
concrete buildings. Send many scholars to universities of developed
countries. Recruit low-salaried teachers from partly developed
countries. And so on.

Here again, it will be a kind of one way traffic—a free flow of
knowledge and refinement from developed to underdeveloped
countries. Cheaper books and teachers will be greatly welcome.
The politicians in power ought not to, in the name of nationalism,
play the dog in the manger. Let in the foreign missions and foreign
enterprise.

Each state ought to feel the need of regional autonomy within
a world federation. The world state to come is to come as a system-
atic unity, and not as an organic unity, of all regional autonomous
states. Hence it must be federal in character with concurrent
jurisdiction in member states. All large units of government cannot
but be representative in character: representation calls for delega-
tion, separation and balance of specific powers in many vertical
and horizontal strata.

USEFUL GOODS AND BEAUTIFUL ARTIFACTS. In terms of practical-
objective realization of values, the dynamic character of societies
may be said to vary directly as (i) sustained production of useful
goods and creation of beautiful artifacts, (ii) sustained exchange
and co-operation in production and creation—of such goods and
artifacts, with other cultures, and (iii) using foreign goods if better
and cheaper, and appreciating foreign artifacts if beautiful.

Sustained production and distribution of useful goods can be
made possible and maximized if economic justice and not economic
equality be the aim of the economic order. Justice as the ideal of
the social order is a subordinate ideal of the moral order, for which
the ideal is righteousness (which in its turn we have seen is a subordi-
nate ideal of the religious order, of which the ideal is the realization
of our identity-in-difference with the creative principle).

Prosperity varies (almost with mathematical precision) inversely
as political tyranny and economic injustice. Economic justice
can be ensured by way of free enterprise. And this involves free
market (with fraternal competition replacing predatory competi-
tion), mutualization, of natural monopolies, free banking, honest
currency, stable money, free access to the possession of land, and
freedom of possession.3

These together with free trade (based on abolition of protective
tariffs, national barriers, even national boundaries) can ensure and
sustain exchange and co-operation in production of goods among
nations. Foreign aid must come in the form of private investments
and not as loan or gift on the governmental level: the latter adds
fuel to the fire of the merry game of the new ruling class in under-
developed countries. All national markets must merge into the
world market:

"It is a basic human right for individuals of all nations, all
creeds, all races to trade freely with one another. The cold
war now conducted across national boundaries by customs guard
must be ended, and the fact that all mankind belongs to one
human race recognized if a free and just economic order is to
replace the capitalistic and socialistic economies of to-day."3

TERTIARY VOCATIONS. The vocational test of an open and dyna-
mic society may be worded thus: an increasing number of indi-
viduals in the tertiary vocations and a decreasing number of working
hours in the primary and secondary vocations. In this statement
of the criterion, the independent variables can be statistically
surveyed and enumerated. This can also be taken as the total-
cultural test of economic progress.

Vocation is a part, to be exact, one-third of occupation. The
occupational problem can be analyzed as the problem of work,
play and rest. The occupational test of an open society is the same
as the vocational test with an addendum: all individuals must
enjoy eight hours' sleep and eight hours' play (which he need not
but may employ in gainful activities).
We have already graded vocations into the primary, the secondary and the tertiary. This corresponds with the gradation of practical activities into crude arts, useful arts and fine arts and with the gradation of theoretical activities into perception, science and philosophy. Here we may enumerate the many vocations under each grade:

(1) Primary Vocations: (i) (Matter)—vocations of all kinds of artisans and craftsmen making material artifacts. (ii) (Life)—vocations of all kinds of farmers making live artifacts: the raising of plant life (crops, vegetables, flowers, fruits, trees, . . .) and of livestock (cattle, sheep, poultry, . . .); vocations of all kinds of sportsmen; . . . (iii) (Mind)—vocations of all kinds of clerks, of teachers and trainers in perceptual or commonsense theories and primary arts and vocations.

(2) Secondary Vocations: (i) (Matter)—vocations of all kinds of engineers and technologists producing material goods. (ii) (Life)—vocations of medics, entrepreneurs, administrators, . . . (iii) (Mind)—vocations of psychiatrists, writers of applied literature, teachers of sciences and trainers in secondary arts and vocations.

(3) Tertiary Vocations: (i) (Nature)—vocations of fine artists extolling nature and of explorers and conquerors of nature. (ii) (Society)—vocations of fine artists extolling man and of reformers and makers of societies. (iii) (Spirit)—vocations of fine artists extolling God and of regulators of natural and social life from the spiritual level.

TERTIARY EDUCATION AND VOCATIONS. The educational test is simple: an increasing number of individuals in the tertiary education. This will swell the number of humanized and individualized men and women.

We can have progress by co-ordinating the phases of progress in education with those in vocations. Universalize primary education, rationalize primary vocations; universalize secondary education, rationalize secondary vocations; universalize tertiary education, which will lead to the creation of tertiary vocations. To universalize is to let in all aspirants; to rationalize is to strike an optimum between efficiency and working hours (which can never exceed eight hours a day) to meet human demands turned effective demands.

State-interventionist planning does not realize progress. It employs self-stultifying methods and regressive policies. Welfare-statists employ these and turn the older societies which are basically
welfare societies into totalitarian states, that is, states which though on the lower level, that of society, would control higher level life and thus create havoc.

The communist pattern of economy is the culmination of the welfare statist experiment. It has rationalized the primary sectors of work and education and expanded the secondary sectors. But it has failed to rationalize the secondary sector of work and also to universalize secondary education. In consequence, it has utterly failed to expand the tertiary sectors of work and education. The new ruling class finds itself unwilling to expand the tertiary sectors. The dominant minority of politicians has developed vested interests in power both political and economic. It has fallen back on the self-stultifying methods of concealed unemployment in the armed forces engaged in predatory activities and of denying secondary and tertiary education to many aspirants. The free world is still in a position to expand the tertiary sectors of work and education in spite of the various drawbacks of monopolistic or predatory capitalism. A reform on the lines suggested by us will liberate the communist world as well as the partially free democratic world.

THE OPEN SOCIETY IN RELATION TO NATURE. Nature is the source of both good and evil. The good things given by nature are the useful things we collect from or grow in nature (crops, minerals, timber, fish, waterpower, etc.) and the agreeable things about our body (like strength, skill and health) and our mind (like powers of observation, imagination, memory, symbolization, reasoning, feeling, etc). The evils visiting us from outer nature are floods, pestilence, earthquakes, famines etc. and those of the body and mind are the various weaknesses and diseases.

An open society is in harmony with the productive and beneficial aspects of nature. It develops and employs the social power to collect and grow or develop the gifts of nature, keeping in mind that the resources of both outer and human nature are limited.

As to the outer nature, the fertility of the soil, the mineral deposits, the fallow lands, the untapped forests, etc. are not inexhaustible and we must think of the generations to come. The Hindu tradition recommends this obligation: the present generation must 'conserve the resources of nature and pass them on undiminished to its successors'. The Christian tradition also recommends this. In the words of Reinhold Niebuhr:

“Sometimes this lust for power expresses itself in terms of man’s conquest of nature, in which the legitimate freedom and mastery of man in the world of nature are corrupted into a mere exploitation of nature. Man’s sense of dependence upon nature and her abundance are destroyed by his arrogant sense of independence and his greedy effort to overcome the insecurity of nature’s rhythms and seasons by garnering her stores with excessive zeal and beyond natural requirements. Greed is in short the expression of man’s inordinate ambition to hide his insecurity in nature.”

Ralph Borsodi, a humanist with a prophetic zeal, considers this obligation as a part of ‘pretersocial ethics’: ‘All natural resources are by their nature trusterty, not property.’ And by trusterty he means possessions, of which only the usufruct can be enjoyed by their holders, ‘possessions which cannot properly be owned, like a child or a woman, or a forest or lake, (which) differ not in form but in kind from possessions which can properly be owned, from possessions like food or clothing, and furniture and housing, which the owner can not only use but can consume and enjoy.’

Similarly, as to the exploitation of the resources of human nature, vital and psychical, a society to remain open must go slow. Human bodies and minds are not to be overworked for greater production (of both productive and destructive goods) even for the workers’ own greater material prosperity and greater supply of man-power to be used for both productive and destructive purposes. Both forced labour and overpopulation are to be reckoned as evils. The open society aims at an optimum prosperity of an optimum population. It tackles the psychophysiological problem of health and disease in both its eugenic and euthenic aspects so that ‘the present generation may pay its debt to its forbears by leaving a healthy, strong and gifted progeny with a smaller proportion of the unfit than its own’.

THE OPEN SOCIETY IN RELATION TO ITS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SECTORS. We have noted that sustained production and just distribution of goods can be made possible and an optimum reached if economic justice (and not economic equality) be made the aim of economic order. Justice (a systematic unity of freedom and

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7 Prof. M. A. Venkata Rao, op. cit.
equality) as the ideal of the economic order is a subordinate ideal of the moral order, for which the ideal is righteousness. Economic justice cannot be taken as the ultimate; the economic order cannot be torn out of the moral order; the moral includes and supersedes the economic and political which make up the social order.

Economic justice lies in the just distribution of rewards to the various factors of production. Justice for wage-earners means wages according to efficiency (the kind of work and working hours being equal). Justice for the many vocations must imply that reward may vary according to the quantity and quality of the services given. A job of higher responsibility involving greater skill and higher education must get higher reward. Justice for entrepreneurs means profit according to enterprise—to thrift, savings, investments, taking risks, etc. All this is justice for the suppliers. For the suppliers therefore justice implies, in short, equal opportunity for enterprise and equal consideration in the distribution of rewards. The demand side, that is, consumers, must have justice in the form of fair prices for all kinds of goods and services.

This justice can be ensured and sustained if there be the free market and a neutral and incorruptible judge. The free market means the market where prices of goods and services are determined by the operation of the law of demand and supply, and not arbitrarily fixed by a fiat of the government. The operation of the law can be humanized by way of co-operation between buyers and sellers. This is feasible only if there be no state-intervention to back one party or the other in the transaction, only if the state remains neutral as the judge.

The market can remain free if it is built up as a systematic unity of private and public enterprise. This implies a tripartite division of the market:

1. The first is the sector of political economy, or purely public enterprise. The government has certain functions to do: it has got to govern, that is, protect the citizens from criminals among them and from armed aggression by outsiders. For this purpose its function should be limited to defence (for the world federal government) and to transportation, currency, foreign relations and law and order (for regional governments). This is what is called the principle of limited government or right government. To do this function efficiently, the government may have to do some economic functions (building strategic roads, manufacturing special kinds of arms,
printing currency notes, levying taxes, etc.). This is the public sector of economy.

(2) The second is the sector of natural monopolies. All railroads, power companies, water services, gas companies and other public utility services 'which by their nature have to be granted the power of eminent domain or furnished other monopolistic powers' are examples. It is not necessary for the government to run these enterprises. But it is necessary to run them as non-profit-making enterprises without hampering the operation of the free market. They must operate within the free market and yet must not make profit. They must therefore be mutualized—'by rebating all surplus earnings pro rata to users, and ensuring that their services are furnished at cost, and no profits appropriated by private interests nor exploited by the government.'

(3) The residuary economic enterprise must go to make up the private sector. Here the role of the government called for is negative. The government must abolish 'all special privileges, differential (so-called protective) tariffs, subsidies, quotas, licenses, limited liability corporations, and all cartels and monopolies (particularly in banking)'. The government's function here is to increase free enterprise, to create and maintain conditions of free enterprise.

Free enterprise implies economic justice because it requires doing away with the state-granted privileges and monopolies in land and money. This creates conditions of equal opportunity for enterprise, incentive to enterprise, freedom to launch upon enterprise, freedom to sell and buy labour. All these subjective conditions lead to full employment of capital and labour and justice in distribution of reward among the factors, divisions and classes of the economy.

Land, money and credit ought to be freely available to prospective entrepreneurs. While distributing due care should be taken as to the probity and honesty of persons taking credit and as to righteous land-tenancy. Banks should be freed from government control. Land is a trusterty; its beneficiary must be the society which inhabits the areas. To avoid state collectivization and to end the class of landless farmers, a new system of land tenure must be enforced. It should still be privately possessed and used and no ceiling should be imposed. Given the equality of access to land, the bargaining power of employers and employees will be equalized.

The unearned increment, the ground rent and the mineral royalties, instead of being privately appropriated, should be used in lieu of taxes to pay for the necessary services provided by the government. With limited government and with world federation entrusted with defence, the costs of all regional and local governments will come down to such a low that it will be possible to end all taxation on what is distinguished as property from trusterty. This will increase enormously the prosperity of the people.

In order that an open society have the conditions which sustain the urge for freedom and higher individuality, the state in an open society must function by the balancing of power and not on the theory of sovereignty. The basic problem of politics is not to determine who shall rule the state. The reasons why it is not are many. It is not easy to find reliably good and wise people to be placed in power in order to govern us. Secondly, 'government . . . however necessary it may be, is itself the most violent and terrible of all aggressors, . . . ' The basic problem is, in the words of Karl Popper: 'How can we organize political institutions so that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?'

Popper criticizes the theory of sovereignty and then suggests the alternative theory of balance of power between the ruler and the ruled by means of institutional control. The main point of his critique of the theory of sovereignty lies in the fact that even the most powerful potentate has got to rely upon 'his secret police, his henchmen and his hangmen'. This shows that sovereignty is a myth, that even the extreme cases of sovereignty are cases of limited power. If so, the balance theory involving institutional control of the rulers is more realistic.

In the political sphere of an open society, therefore, there must be a systematic balance of power between the rulers and the ruled, between the parties, and in the government, among the three sections of the government. In the economic life, there must be a balance between the rural and urban industries; in the urban sector, between labour and capital; in labour, between the organized and the unorganized sector; in capital, between finance and industry; and so on.

Besides this legalized balance, moral relationships are to be encouraged and developed by the elite. The moral qualities of the

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people in an open society should be indicated by the capacity to think dispassionately undisturbed by emotional agitations, by the tendency to think and decide in terms of the general will and the largest good, by decentralization of the administrative functions, by democratization of administrative relationship, etc.

In an open society, the individual is looked upon as an end in himself. He can pursue any values of life without any state restriction. Each person is given equal opportunities for self-development, with the proviso that his attempts at self-development will be in harmony with such attempts of his fellow humans. The freedom being given however, there may be the down-grading tendencies on a large scale. And that is why liberal society with its naturalistic rationalism, its utilitarian ethics and its bourgeois democracy failed to remain open in many parts of the world and degenerated into either fascist or marxist variety of collectivism and tyranny. Freedom for self-development, i.e., the urge for the highest individuality, must be stressed: not that this was not meant by the thinkers of the liberal phase of the older cultural systems. This was meant; but in their growing pre-occupations with the natural and social values, the spiritual values were ignored.

THE OPEN SOCIETY IN RELATION TO SPIRIT. Spirit too is a source of both good and evil. The good things are truth and beauty, happiness and virtue, holiness and freedom. And evil is a wilful and perverse refusal to recognize these good things and a deliberate recommendation of vulgarity and falsehood, suffering and vice, sin and bondage. That man is free yet limited, limited yet free—ought to make us feel humble yet noble. This humility in nobility must be cultivated in order to have an open society.

In a closed society, the soul of the members of the dominant minority is infected with the sin of pride and self-righteousness. The six enemies in the Hindu lores are kāma (lust), krodha (anger), lobha (greed), moha (infatuation), mada (pride) and mātsarya (envy). Of these mada or pride has been given the pride of place in the Christian list of sins. The four deadly prides are the pride of power and glory, the pride of knowledge and virtue, and the supreme pride of spirit, that of self-righteousness, a final organic form of all these evils, giving us a fanaticism of the deadliest type. In order to have open society, this fanaticism must be perpetually controlled.

The ensuing struggle between the two minorities, the creative and the dominant, usually puts the creative minority at a disadvan-
tage in a fixational society. The dominant minority put in positions of power for a practical realization of spiritual values on the social level is not competent to do the job; so it tries to control the theoretical realization on the spiritual level, to a point of nullity. In a non-fixational society, the creative minority does the job properly.

In the partly fixational societies, the tug of war assumes the form of human rights vs. property rights. The creative minority tries to realize all human rights in the social level forms of property rights. The dominant minority abolishes more and more of the property rights in the name of human rights.

All human rights are theoretical realization of certain values. They can be practically realized on the social level only as property rights. We have seen that practical realization always involves a downgrade movement from the subject to the object: it is always a lower level materialization of a higher level idea. Human rights as morally and religiously conceived values and ideals exist as ideas and attitudes of the moral self. In order to be enjoyed on the social level, they must become more concrete in the legal form of property rights. Then the enjoyment of human rights can be guaranteed by the organized physical force of society and also any violation of the property rights can be easily detected and penalized and justice can be ensured.

There are no human rights of which the practical realization does not become property rights. Let us take the human right of free speech, for example. Practically realized it is 'the property right to hire an assembly hall from the owners, to speak to those who are willing to listen, to buy materials and then print leaflets or books and sell them to those who are willing to buy'. All cases of conflicting human rights can be resolved by finding out the corresponding property rights, which being legally precise seldom conflict with each other and when they do can be juridically dissolved.

Property rights are the practical realization of the three generic rights, the right to life, liberty and property, to put them in Lockean enumeration. But the most generic is the property right. Each individual is the owner of his own life, his body and soul. This self-ownership must be sustained if he has to determine and realize his self from lower to higher level of experience. The human rights of the person are in effect a recognition of each man's inalienable property right over his own being. From this property right issues

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his right to the goods he produces by his labour. The human right to personal freedom is a corollary to his property right to himself.  

The dominant minority alienates the individual from his property right to himself. It divests the citizens of all their property rights as a logical consequence of the first act of alienation. It invests itself with those rights including the right of using the organized physical force of society. And all this in the name of human rights which pass its comprehension or which it deliberately ignores. Ultimately, only two rights are left: the right of the dominant minority of 'do-gooders' to do 'good' to the masses of 'done-good-to's' who, in their turn, have the right to work as the 'do-gooders' bid them do.

Any society, whether developed or underdeveloped, which can avoid this alienation of the individual from himself can be said to be open.
A CRITIQUE OF HISTORIC CULTURES. We are now in a position to apply the tests of a nonfixational culture to the major cultural systems in history. It will be sufficient for our purposes to test only four of them—Islam, Hinduism, Christianity and Communism. Since the empiricist-humanist movement is growing in all directions out of the recent philosophical clarifications and since it claims to be a sort of world liberal culture, though it is not, I am adding a small section on this movement too.

We have noted that each cultural system is based on some major premise. The premise is made up of a theoretical realization—a philosophical, a metaphysical or theological postulate, which makes it different from others. Any cultural system articulates, develops and realizes its prime symbol or ultimate value in the process of its history. This is, in other words, a set of values with some characteristic emphasis, its ideal of the highest individual. We have called this the highest value or religious value. To this final protocol each system is totally committed. The Islamic or the Christian protocol is a theological dogma. Hinduism has a metaphysical major premise. And Communism is based on the superstructure of a half-scientific, half-valuational theory of history.

In the foregoing chapter there have been listed the several tests of a nonfixational system of culture. Such a system is open and dynamic, noncommunal and nontotalitarian. (i) In an open culture, the feeling is fixated on an ever-receding but never-eluding highest. Therefore, the lower the level of experience on which the fixation takes place, the more closed is the system. (ii) In a dynamic culture, even the final dogma that lends individuality to it merges into a systematic unity with an equally final scepticism. Therefore,
the stronger the fixation of feeling for the final dogma, the more static is the culture. (iii) In a noncommunal society, the feeling for regional culture is made a part of the feeling for human culture. Therefore, the stronger the prelogical gregational (or tribal) feeling, the more communal it is. (iv) In a nontotalitarian system, there is the higher level control of the lower level life for a harmonious satisfaction of the wants of the lower level life: the highest self does the duty of practical realization, that of a harmonious fulfilment of the urges of the lower selves. Therefore, the greater the inclusiveness of the lower level control of the higher level life, the more totalitarian is the system. On these criteria:

1. The world liberal system in the making is open and dynamic, noncommunal and nontotalitarian.

2. The Christian system may be called open and dynamic, nontotalitarian but communal.

3. The Hindu system may be called open but static, noncommunal and nontotalitarian.

4. The Islamic system may be called open but static, nontotalitarian but communal.

5. The communist system is closed and static, communal and totalitarian.

On these criteria, the primitive societies are closed and communal but potentially dynamic and nontotalitarian. And our precious empiricist-humanist movement seems closed and static, communal and totalitarian—with a great difference from Communism, a difference of degree. This seems to take away the evil from it. But the movement does create a kind of cultural vacuum by alienating more and more people from the older cultures, who then easily fall victims to Communism.

There will be very little disagreement on my assessment of world liberal culture or of Communism. But there is bound to be disagreement on my judgments about the other systems. All comparisons tend to be odious and invidious. My views are open not only to criticism but to correction. In what follows, I shall restrict my account of each to (i) a bare statement of the final dogma, (ii) a description of the highest individual, and (iii) a brief evaluation of each on the basis of correlation of these two with the criteria of a nonfixational system.
THE ISLAMIC PROTOCOL IS A REVEALED PRESENCE. The prophet is the nucleus round which the Islamic culture has revolved. We may therefore begin with a brief account of the highest realization in Islam as reached in Mohammed.

The highest realization of Islam is the mystical realization of the presence of Allah by the prophet. The prophet then prescribes Iman and Ihsan. In theory a Muslim ought to aim at a state of mind which may be called freedom from fear and presence of peace rooted in a complete trust in Allah, his prophet and his book. In practice, the Muslim ought to aim at works (serving God) as though He were before one's eyes.¹

Islam preaches monotheism and the universal brotherhood of mankind. The theological argument for belief in God is the same as in any other theistic religion. The argument is based on the belief in the genuineness of the life and experience of the prophet to whom the dogma has been revealed. The faith in the prophet and the book is the major premise of the argument: what the prophet says is true; what the prophet says is 'God exists'; therefore 'God exists' is true.

The metaphysical argument used by Muslim divines centres round the creation of the world. This question leads to an argument either by circle, al Dawr, or by infinite regress, al Tasalsul. To avoid these, we must accept, they argue, the hypothesis of creation out of nothing, and that by God who is transcendental in character. Allah is thus the absolute of metaphysics but He is an independent unity instead of a systematic unity: the world with all created individuals human and nonhuman are completely dependent on His will.

There is also the ethical argument involving the questions of justice and character. The necessity of belief in God arises in the human demand for justice. He remains the only source of security, justice and consolation for the weak and the oppressed and the frustrated. The other major ethical argument in favour of theism proceeds from the good effect of the belief on human character. To believe sincerely in God and His attributes inspires one to mould one's character according to the divine attributes.

As to the oneness of God, the holy Quran argues from design and orderliness: 'If there were therein gods besides God, then verily both (the heavens and the earth) had been disordered.'

The first corollary to this monotheism is the universal brotherhood of mankind. A Muslim cultivates this brotherhood by means of profession of faith, congregational prayer, fast, alms-giving, and pilgrimage.

Islam enjoins abstract prayer. It vehemently disclaims ritualism, especially of the kind we call objective worship, which may involve idols and images of God and the prophet. Nevertheless it enjoins ritual like circumcision, kalma and reverential attitude to mosques and graves of saints and mystics. The cry against the playing of music outside the mosque is a negative form of ritual.

One of the main commandments prescribes mutual help: 'Help one another in goodness and piety and do not help one another in sin and aggression.' This is objectively realized in many acts of charity and almsgiving: it is doubtful if other great societies can compare favourably with the Islamic society in philanthropic endowments, in spending or investing for pious purposes. Islam prescribes social equality and disapproves of all caste distinctions. The Islamic society is a homogeneous whole free from complicated divisions and subdivisions.

We read in the Quran: (a) The noblest of you in the sight of God is the best of you in conduct. (b) And do good to your parents... Make thyself submissively gentle to them with compassion. (c) And they—the women—have rights similar to those (men have) over them in a just manner. (d) Let not a people deride another people... nor let women deride women... Neither defame one another, nor call one another by nicknames... Shun much suspicion... And spy not, nor backbite another. (e) And fulfil promise, for the promise shall be questioned about. (f) And give full measure when you measure out, and weigh with a true balance. (g) And do not kill anyone whom God has forbidden except for a just cause. (h) And the servants of the Beneficent are they who walk on earth in humbleness. (i) And go not nigh to fornication, for it is an indecency and evil is the way. (j) Say to the believing men that they cast down their looks and guard their private parts. Say to the believing women that they cast down their looks and guard their private parts, and not display their beauty except what appears thereof; and let them draw their head-coverings over their bosoms. (k) Do not enter houses
other than your own houses without permission and saluting their inmates... and if it is said to you, Go back, then go back.

Islam is a clear articulation of the supreme good. Mohammed's definition of righteousness is the proof of it:

"It is not righteousness or religion, that ye turn your faces in prayer towards the east and the west; but righteousness is of him who believeth in God, and the last day, and the angels, and the scriptures and the prophets; who giveth money, for God's sake, unto his kindred, and unto orphans, and the needy, and the stranger, and those who ask, and for redemption of captives; who is constant at prayer, and giveth alms; and of those who perform their covenant, when they have covenanted; and who behave themselves patiently in adversity, and in time of violence: these are they who are true; and these are they who fear God."1

Here is a right recognition of the relations between belief, piety and morality. That belief is the source of piety, and piety, that of morality, and that the three together go to make up the supreme good have been clearly stated. Emphasis on piety and morality has kept Islam open and nontotalitarian; whereas the emphasis on belief whether one theoretically realizes it or not has strengthened the group-feeling the common belief induces: these have tended to make it static and communal. And there has been an alternation between the emphases in the history of Islam.

**ISLAM IS AN OPEN AND NONTOTALITARIAN SYSTEM.** In the history of mankind there have been no absolutely closed systems, nor any perfectly open ones. Each system has however tended to be predominantly of one kind or the other. The Islamic culture has tended to be open. True, it is partly fixated on ethical idealism. But it is a very high level of experience, the level of prophets and messiahs.

The highest individual is the one supreme prophet. The social and historical situation of his life made him play the role of a half-heroic half-messianic man. Many Christian writers on Mohammed therefore underrate his individuality. But a closer study reveals that he is a harmonious man. The harmonious man becomes a 'god' by realizing his identity with as well as his difference from the creative principle and by prescribing the same realization for others. The prophet of Islam had this realization.

1 Sale's *Koran*, Ch. II, Vol. 1, p. 31.
One may then, especially from the Hindu point of view, say that the prophet of Islam while having this realization seems to recommend for his followers the realization of the difference or independence of God as well as his special status as the seal of prophets. True, he modestly claims to be an ordinary human being; but being the supreme prophet, he becomes the sole ego-ideal of the creative minority in the Islamic brotherhood. And on the Christian view, one may add: the messianic man is inspired by the feeling of love and reconciliation; the heroic man is inspired by the lust for power. The prophet of Islam seems to have inspired in his followers the lust for power or domination (both spiritual and political) far more than the mood of love and reconciliation. On both the reading the conclusion would be: the imitation of the prophet has thus led to a preponderance of half-political half-religious statesmen wherever Islam had its sway.

All this however does not detract from our evaluation that Islam is predominantly an open system and that the prophet is essentially a harmonious man. There is fixation but it is on a very high level. The impact of world liberal culture (to which Islam’s contribution has not been little) has brought about a change. Even cynics cannot deny the possibility of its shedding the fixation. An enlightened Muslim can now make bold to say: ‘I believe in Allah because I don’t believe in the Book, or the Prophet, or in the theocratic state, or in the cultural dichotomy of the Dar-ul-Islam and the Dar-ul-Harb.’ He may find humanizing Islam a worthier task than Islamizing humanity.

The Islamic system has also been nontotalitarian. There has been very little attempt at the lower level control of the higher level life. Some powerful mediaeval potentates tried to assume the role of the spiritual head but always some advisers or others asked them not to venture on it. The stress has been on freedom and sublimation—canalizing creative energy in healthy lower level activities rather than on inner purification and ascetic repression. This does not make a totalitarian system of it.

In Ethics, a distinction is drawn between character and conduct, between inner virtue and external observance of moral principles. The law and society expect of man right patterns of conduct; but religions very much emphasize the inner nobility of the soul. Islam does not explicitly harp on the ideal of internal purity in spite of Al Ghazzali and the sufis. This fact accounts for the absence of moral
neurotics in its fold: they are more common in the folds of Bud-
dhism, Christianity and Hinduism. The stress in Islam is thus on
‘one can, may or may not’ more than on ‘one ought to because
everybody else ought to’: but this ‘humanistic’ ethics is still en-
joined as a practical realization of the higher level theoretical
realization. It builds up an ethical organism (which successfully
contains a social organism) better than a system of impractically
high ideal. Islam has been effective in realizing subordinate ideals
like equality, charity, justice, etc.

There has been no systematic attempt at lower level (economic
and political) control of the moral and religious life, as it is happening
in Communism or Welfare-statism to-day. True, there are on record
genocidal acts by Islam but these have mostly been a part of tem-
porary political strategy. Also, the conception of God as an indepen-
dent unity has made Islamic culture a kind of independent unity:
the highest individual in society tends to be an autocrat; but the
autocrat on the higher level (moral and religious) can never be a
totalitarian. Compare Akbar with Stalin.

ISLAM’S FAILURE TO DEVELOP INTO OR ATTAIN TO WORLD CULTURE.
Islam started as a universal religion but failed to develop into the
world cultural system. Aside from many outer historical reasons for
this, the main reason can be traced in its own individuality. Its open
and nontotalitarian character has been one reason why it did not
impose itself by way of genocide: most mass conversions (in India
and Indonesia, for example) were brought about by preaching.
The other reason is its static and communal character. The fixation
of feeling for the final dogma and the ‘we-they’ feeling which it
induces turned it into a static and communal system. Whether or
not one realizes the final protocol, one has to accept it on faith:
this in effect intensifies the feeling for the commandment and the
regation.

Furthermore, the Islamic tradition explicitly bans cultural
osmosis. The Shariah divides the world into two: one, the muslim
world, called Dar-ul-Islam, abode of Islam; and the other, the outside
world, called Dar-ul-Harb, abode of war. In the first are all the
Muslims; they are at peace. In the second are all outside Islam, and
Islam is at war with them. In the end, Dar-ul-Harb must disappear
into Dar-ul-Islam. This cultural dichotomy on the basis of theo-
logical dogma prevented Islam from influencing other cultures
and from itself being influenced by other cultures.
This thesis however explains (only partly) its past failure to develop into the world culture. It does not hold good to-day. As it is to-day, Islam has accepted the world liberal culture with its universities, world market and world federation in the making.

2. Christianity

THE PRIME SYMBOL OF CHRISTIANITY IS INCARNATED LOVE. The highest realization of Christianity is the mystical realization of Christ as man-god. Christianity revolves round Jesus and the dogma of his Christhood and godhead. Man’s relation to God is twofold: his relation to Christ and Christ’s relation to God. This is theologically expressed in the doctrine of the Trinity of God and the view of man as the image of God and as creature and sinner.

The Council of Nicaea in A. D. 325 laid down the doctrine in the following words:

"We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, the maker of heaven and earth, and of all things, visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, begotten of the Father, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God begotten not made, being of one substance with the Father; by whom all things were made, who for the sake of us men and for our salvation came down from the heavens; was made flesh, and became man by the Holy Spirit of the Virgin Mary; that he was crucified for us under Pontius Pilate, suffered and was buried, and rose again the third day according to the Scriptures, and ascended into the heavens, and sits at the right hand of the Father, is coming again with glory to judge the living and dead; and we believe also in the Holy Spirit."

This has been parodied as follows: 'We must do the Father’s will... with the companionship of the Son, by the guidance and strength of the spirit.' The unfrivolous interpretation would point to a systematic unity between man (man-god) and God.

Christian morality finds its expression in the Sermon on the Mount and in the Plain. Jesus improves upon the Mosaic commandments to a point of perfection where they become almost unrealiz-

able. Or in other words, he shifted the emphasis from a programme of practical realization on the lower levels to the theoretical realization itself which occurs at the subjective pole.

In the Old Testament we come across simple, eminently realizable commandments:

"... Honour thy father and thy mother... Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt not steal. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house; neither shalt thou desire his wife, nor his servant, nor his handmaid, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is his."

The New Testament turns the old code outside into an extreme righteousness and subjectivity; it prescribes Jesus' own realization of the highest value in theory as a programme of practical realization.

"Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill; and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgement: But I say unto you, That ... ... whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire. Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery: But I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.

"Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.

"Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you; That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven. . . .

"Be ye perfect therefore, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect."

Jesus's claim to godhead is, in popular belief, based on three things: the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary
without the agency of any human male, his sayings and doings, and his resurrection. It is by way of surrender to or imitation of Christ alone that a Christian can hope to get redemption or salvation. Verse-16-Mark-16 records Jesus as saying: 'Those who believe in me and be baptized shall be saved, and those who believe not shall be damned.' The elect are those who gave food, drink, and clothing to needy people and visited the sick-bed and prison-room. The non-elect are those who did none of these things. The believers and the baptized will be saved through Christ. He is the final judge of mankind on the last day of judgment.

The Christian view of man is a corollary to this. Man as the image of God is spirit in the sense of 'nous' or mind and not of 'logos' or reason. As spirit man is free, can transcend his self, can reason and belongs nowhere. This means that the spiritual self as the subject cannot understand itself except from beyond itself and the world. It looks for the ultimate logical reason of life and the world, does not find it in nature or man, finds it in an unconditioned ground of existence, God.

Man as made in the image of God presupposes that the ground of existence must be a person and that the faith in God as person must depend on the faith in His power to reveal Himself. And this self disclosure of God culminates in the revelation of Christ. In terms of this faith man can understand himself as a unity of will which finds its end in the will of God. His finiteness then makes it possible for him to relate himself to God without pretending to be God.

This finiteness, however, is not the source of the evil in his nature. His finiteness can be affirmed as in natural and social life. Yet the uniqueness of man as spirit is unmistakable. He is distinct from nature because he is made in the image of God; from God, because he is a creature. The wilful denial of his creaturely status occasions evil. His sin lies in his rebellion against God. The source of his sin is his own will, his freedom. The freedom of his spirit causes him to break the harmonies of nature and commit the sin of sensuality; the pride of his spirit prevents him from establishing a new harmony and makes him commit the sin of pride. He sins by pretending to be more than he is. He is a sinner because he is betrayed by his very ability to survey the whole and imagine himself to be the whole. The redemption can come only by way of conformity to the law of his spiritual nature and this is love. This love demands a harmonious
relation of life to life in obedience to the divine centre and source of his life. Christ is the person in whom divinity and humanity combined in a community of essence: this essence is Love. God is accessible to man because the divine nature shares this capacity for love with human nature.

CHRISTIANITY IS OPEN, DYNAMIC AND NONTOTALITARIAN. The highest individual in Christianity is plainly a harmonious man, a universal man-god. It is Christ or lesser messianic men imitating Christ. Among the latest and best imitations may be mentioned Mahatma Gandhi and Albert Schweitzer.

Christianity has directly inspired the development of the world liberal culture, in which the highest individual is the harmonious man. Christ himself was a harmonious man. Most liberals of the West derive their individualism from Christianity. Before the advent of historical Christ it was the good of a particular mass, the national good, which was the ultimate concern; after Christ, the good of the individual became the ultimate concern (Cf. Boris Pasternak: Dr. Zhivago). Christianity is therefore an open system. Though a harmonious man, Christ played a predominantly messianic role. The messianic man as the highest implies a fixation of feeling on the level of ethical idealism. Ethical idealist position, we have noted, goes further than egoistic idealism: there is return after withdrawal, return to nature and history after the ultimate realization in theory. So the messianic programme is essentially one of practical realization—higher level ordering of the lower level life. But here there is a possibility of a double standard creeping in. The contradiction may come in the form of a dichotomy. The messiah redeems mankind; mankind gets redeemed through the messiah. In Christianity, Jesus is the Christ. A Christian gets redemption either by imitation of Christ or complete surrender to him.

Christ himself was a harmonious man. He took upon himself the task of redeeming mankind. But for the aspirant in the Christian fold, the ideal of the harmonious man freely realizing his self is not recommended. For them, man is less the image of God; he is more a sinner and a creature. The double standard is maintained especially in imitations of Christ. Hence Christianity is a fixational system though on a very high level of experience. This is the burden of Hindu criticism of Christianity.

The Eastern Orthodox view that Russian Sovietism cannot be

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accounted for without Russian Orthodoxy⁵ seems to confirm the Hindu critique:

"At the present moment we clearly see the contribution, often intangible and undefinable, offered by 'kenotic' Orthodoxy to the national community. Its emphasis upon self-sacrifice, simplicity, and poverty, its deep compassion for wretched human beings, was in the background of the revolutionary movement of the Russian intelligentsia. And the emphasis upon the organic unity between personal life and the mystical body of Christ has fostered the collectivistic tendency of the Soviet order. What we call Russian Sovietism is unexplainable without Russian Orthodoxy."⁵

The implication of the Orthodox view is that the ethical messianic idealism has derogated into one of the main factors in the birth and growth of Communism, not only in Russia but also in the ranks of 'the internal proletariat' of Western Christendom the world over. The 'messianic' fervour has seized all political 'heroes' in the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. The Gandhian Nehru is an example. So is the Marxian Sekou Toure.

All this however does not depreciate our judgment that Christianity is an open system and that Christ is a harmonious man. Or else, he would not exhort 'Be ye perfect etc.' He does recommend the same realization as he had himself for all of us. The rest is all part of that highest realization. It is the theologizing Church and the messianic monkeyry which maintain the double standard. Besides, liberalism has removed the fixation to a great extent. Though it failed to make a fully nonfixational system of Christianity, it succeeded in making it dynamic. It minimized the feeling for the final dogma. Let us take a modern example: this is the Rev. Duncan Howlett speaking in the Hibbert Journal, LVII-4:

"I believe in God because I don't believe in miracles... because I don't believe in Providence—... because I don't believe in the devil.... because I don't believe in Trinity.... because I don't believe the Bible is the word of God.... because I don't believe in the Incarnation, the Atonement and all the other

doctrines which have been developed in connection with the
title of Jesus of Nazareth and his relationship to God.”

The Christian world has made tremendous progress on all levels.
Though guilty of genocide now and then, it has not only accepted
but directly inspired the development of the world liberal culture.
The genesis and major part of the development of the liberal culture
with its sciences and useful arts and free philosophies and fine
arts took place in the Christian system. A Western Christian
usually looks upon the liberal system as a phase of the Western
Christian Culture. Historically, this would not, though a hasty
hypothesis, be completely wrong. Logically, the liberal culture is
the world culture in the making and must include and supersedе
all older cultures including the Christian. If it does not do so as
yet, it has to be made to do so. Or else, there is no hope for noncom-
munist unity and survival. Communism, for example, had its genesis
and early growth in the Christian body and soul. It has inherited, as
we have noted above, many of the traits of the Christian culture,
especially its messianic attitude, esoteric collectivism and the
apocalyptic vision of human destiny. Yet on that account we
cannot forbear considering it a distinct culture.

The Christian system has also been nontotalitarian. There has
been very little attempt at the lower level control of the higher
level life. (a) Eastern Orthodoxy has concentrated on theoretical
realization away from natural and social life. It being exclusively
spiritual, there has been no scope for secular control of spiritual
life. And its view of the Church or Christ as an organic mystical
whole might have made it a kind of totalitarian spiritual order, but
only internally, esoterically. The general cultural system did not
turn totalitarian by imposing lower level control of higher level
life. Its ascetic bifurcation of life might have resulted in a reac-
tionary rebound to nature and history by the communists. But
the legacy of ‘collectivism’ it left to Soviet Order turned totalitarian
because of Communisms’s low level control of the high level
life in the society at large. Furthermore, Orthodoxy realizes the
relation between man and God as a systematic unity: it is the
Church which is an organism. (b) Roman Catholicism aims at
both theoretical and practical realization. It asserts the kingdom
of heaven as an inclusive spiritual organism made up of natural,
social and spiritual organisms based on the mystical realization
(which culminated in the being of an avatar, Christ). The Church is the historical system. The code is transcendent and is to be accepted as commandment. Roman Catholicism has to its credit a systematic rational theology. It takes the whole world and life in a wide sweep and claims to have put everything in its place. It is opposed to all kinds of partial realization. All this may lend it a look of a totalitarian system. But a total cultural system is not to be confused with a totalitarian system. Any total system may be defective: it is subject to refinement; but it is not necessarily totalitarian. In order to be truly open and dynamic, it must rise as high as possible and be a total system; it should remain a systematic unity and must not derogate to an organic unity in which there may be an excess of lower level control of higher level life or in which the highest may behave too independently. A close scrutiny into the Roman Catholic order would reveal that it is communal rather than totalitarian.

(c) Classical protestantism is 'individualistic': it holds that Christianity is not 'Churchianity', that we ought to aim at spiritual system as opposed to spiritual organism. But the spiritual system it realizes does not include the secular (the natural and the social system): thus a dualistic confusion prevails. The radical protestants differ from the above and from one another in their views of the Church: they view it as essentially a voluntary aggregation, temporary congregation, a movement or epigregation, etc. The humanists among them look upon religion as a social fact and deals with Christian Culture from the sociological standpoint.

As a whole, therefore, the Christian cultural system is open, dynamic and nontotalitarian. But it is undoubtedly communal. This has made it respond to the communist challenge in an adequate manner. All the heretics and dissidents in its body behave as members of the body for practical purposes. But this communalism has a reactionary effect on Islamic world, Hindudom, etc. It is because of the unwillingness of the great Christian powers that a noncommunist world federation is being delayed. The Christians would still call the liberal movement a phase of the Western Christian culture. Toynbee has coined the abominable term 'internal proletariat of western society' for a large section of people in the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. Of course, there are very good historical reasons

for that. But that is one of the invisible barriers on the way to world federation and world culture. The thinkers of the West should give the lead in the right kind of thinking for those peoples who may easily be won over by the communists.

3. Communism

THE COMMUNIST POSTULATE IS A SOCIAL THEORY OF PRAXIS. The major premise of Communism is social philosophical, to be exact, a theory of history. The marxian theory of history is the hub round which the communist culture revolves. It is not even a proper theory of history but a theory designed for making history. Marx himself practised it; for, in his own words: 'Hitherto philosophers have only given different interpretations of the world; what matters is to transform it.' That he and his followers have practised it with a vengeance is manifest in the world situation today. More than a half of the human species officially believe that culture is a function of economy even as mind is a function of matter.

True, Marx has also given a world-view under the label of dialectical materialism: in short, it holds that mind is a function of matter. But the materialist theory of the world he proposes is included and superseded by his theory of history. True again, this theory of history has been labelled historical materialism. But economy is plainly a fact of the social level. And a social level theory can include as much fact and value as it would need from the lower levels of natural philosophy, science, perception, etc. and yet remain a theory on the social level provided it supersedes all of them.

Communism is not a materialist culture. It is humanistic in character. It may be considered a humanistic religion or cultural system because the fixation on the level of society is unmistakably clear: the communist apotheosizes society in the state which combines in itself the market, the citadel and the altar. The economy is the absolute and the polity is the sublime which fuse in society (a political economy) as God. We have taken Auguste Comte to illustrate the radical humanist attitude (Ch. 5.). But Comte is now hardly remembered. Marx on the contrary is furiously alive. To the communist, he is the father of Communism, more of a prophet than a mere theoretician. To the anti-communist, he is one of the

*Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach.*
enemies of the open society—as Karl Popper would have it.

Marx draws two doctrines upon Hegel. One is the dialectical view of development; the other is the view of society as an organic unity.\(^8\)

Marx rejects Hegel’s idealist view. But he insists on dialectic as much as Hegel does. Hegel needs it because it traces the development of thought or the changing relations between thought and reality; Marx needs it because it answers to the nature of changing things.

Hegel looks upon the state or society as a spiritual organism. There is a functional interdependence between the social (political and economic) and the spiritual (moral and religious) life of a nation. But in this interaction the spiritual subordinates the social. Hegel thus postulates a national spirit or genius (as a part of cultural supersystem) as the creative principle. It is this spirit that works out its course in every sphere of cultural life including the political and economic.

Here again Marx adopts Hegel’s conclusion while rejecting his premises. He admits the organic connection between the substructure and the superstructure. There is however no need to postulate a mysterious national spirit to account for it. A much more ‘empirical’ category, viz. the economic system, could finally explain all the facts of cultural life: the economic system lends individuality to the total cultural system. The economy permeates the total body cultural and thus enjoys the status of the whole of which the rest are parts. Society or state or culture as a whole is thus an economic organism, in Marx’s view. It is a whole of the kind of organic unity, in which the unity is sustained by the economic mode of production, which mode is the creative principle or efficient cause.

These two hegelian doctrines as adopted and modified by Marx make up the marxist theory of history. To make out the cultural situation in any aspect at any time, one must look into the economic conditions prevailing at the time; and to make out why these conditions obtain, one must consider their dialectical development. Hegelian dialectic views history as a progressive realization of freedom. The intelligible units of history are the different nations, now coming up and now going down, but each making its contribu-

\(^8\) W. H. Walsh, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Section on Marx).
tion to the final goal. Marxian dialectic views history as a progress towards the classless communist system. Here the makers of history are the economic classes (which in our view are pseudo-registrations).

Marx forged his theory of nature and society to make history. He needed the theory not so much for its truth but for its retrodictive capacity for the immediate past and its predictive capacity for the immediate future. The capitalist present which followed the feudalist past is sure to be followed by a socialist future. Not because Marx simply says so but Marx and marxists are ready to bring it about, by hook or crook. The prediction would come true because in the meantime they would work for it. By turning the logical ideal into a factual prediction, Marx wanted to bolster up practice towards the quicker and more efficient realization of the ideal. The most basic prediction of communist makers of history is that socialism is sure to come all over the world. And since social evolution is the result of economic factors, they can bring about socialism by changing some of those factors. And in order to change the economy it may be necessary to employ political and military, legal and illegal, amoral and immoral methods. Communists therefore freely use the *argumentum ad hominem* and the *argumentum ad baculum* and freely practise genocide.

**COMMUNISM IS A CLOSED AND STATIC, COMMUNAL AND TOTALITARIAN SYSTEM.** The liberal culture has been the world cultural system in the making. Communism started its course to realize the liberal system. But in the process it has grown into the worst fixational system in history. The creative minority of its early phase has disappeared. To-day, we see only a dominant minority in the communist system.

The main defect of Communism lies in its idea of the highest individual. The harmonious man is not the communist ideal. It is the heroic man. The social hero, egoistic, national, universal, is the highest individual. The heroic ideal inspires the lust for power, at any rate, above everything else. The heroic leader rules life and determines the purposes of life. Men like Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Mao and Nehru are all heroic; they are out to make history for the sake of helping history. The communist characters described in *Dr. Zhivago*, for example, include all grades of humanists—egoistic Nietzschean (e.g. Komarovsky), pragmatic Jamesian (e.g. Samdeviatov) and radical Comtean (e.g. Strelnikov). All are
social heroes differing only in the stages of attitude within the broad attitude of humanism.

The fixation of feeling on society is evident: the communist apotheosizes society in the state which combines in itself economic and political and other cultural functions. The highest level reached is that of radical humanism. This includes and supersedes egoistic and pragmatic humanism and all the three stages of materialism and of course the still lower levels of science, perception and pre-logical experience. The elements of all these levels are to be discerned in communism.

The radical humanist element lies in communism's aspiration to become the world state and world culture, the theory and practice of each individual human being. The pragmatic humanist element lies in its turning the ideal into a factual prediction and working for it. The egoistic humanist element is to be discerned in its highest individual—the most successful politician of the moment who has managed to come to the topmost and become the sole 'do-gooder' and maker of history. The materialism lies in its world-view. The emphasis on science and technology is unmistakable. And the pre-logical element can be seen in its strong tribal 'we-they' feeling.

And the absence of the moral level is conspicuous in its use of the revolutionary method in principle. It would in principle use organized physical force (army, police, etc.) and would compromise upwards as a matter of expediency to the political, the legal and, last of all, the moral method. Communism thus loses itself into a premoral venture. The heroic method has, in the course of redeeming the proles of a class-ridden society, led to a moral division, which is worse. The communist society has now two rigid classes—the ruling class of 'do gooders' and the class of the 'done-good-to's'.

In consequence, communism fails to create and sustain the urge for the highest—in the individuals who constitute its body, in the other cultural systems with which it comes into contact, and for itself in so far as it approaches the world culture. It is therefore closed. And its fixation on the social level is so strong that it has grown static. Moral and religious theory and fine arts extolling morality and God are missing in the communist culture. And even in the spheres of natural and social theory and fine arts extolling nature and man, it has failed to show much creativity. The very first condition of tertiary vocations, viz. freedom, is conspicuous by its absence in it. It has grown into a totalitarian state by a
control of the spiritual life of the people from the lower level of political economy.

A powerful 'we-they' feeling makes it communal in character. In consequence, it can now acquire new members only by the power of organized armed forces effecting genocide, the ground for which is prepared by the wily machinations of ambitious politicians in underdeveloped countries. Blind faith is the badge of communist culture. The communist faith is permeated by a sense of the autonomy of the party, state or society. Some passages in marxist literature do talk of freedom. But the communist praxis affirms above all things the utter independence and omnipotence of party or state and the utter dependence and powerlessness of the ordinary citizens. Yet the tribal feeling maintains an organic unity between the two.

The will of the party is free—absolutely. What it wills to-day, it can undo to-morrow. If the party were to reverse its decision to declare good or true what it had always declared evil or false, and evil and false what it has always declared good or true, nothing can stop this. In other words, there is no law of contradiction for the party. The good is good, not because it conforms to a law of nature and of human reason, but because the party decrees it to be good. The will of the party is the will of History. And History has revealed its will through its prophets, especially through Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Ho, Nehru, or whoever happens to be the most successful politician at the top.

To sum up, communism is a closed and static culture. The major premise is a social philosophical dogma. It fails to sustain productivity in the secondary vocations and creativity in the tertiary ones. Communist conceptions of man and nature are unsystematic. The communist state is an organic unity of the politico-economic kind. The image of the revolutionary hero inspires purely political acts as against morality and legality. A concentration of powers (economic, political, military) in the hands of a few has done away with progress in tertiary education and vocations. The new ruling class has developed its own vested interests. Communism is impervious to humanization and individualization and also to acculturation in relation to older liberal cultures and the world liberal culture. Communism started as a universal ideology and praxiology but failed to develop into the universal; yet it claims to be the universal culture. This self-righteousness kills all tolerance and turns it into a terrible fanaticism.
4. The Empiricist-Humanist Movement

The final protocol is a theory of meaning. The empirical analytical method which has been the basis of Locke’s rejection of innate ideas, Berkeley’s refutation of abstract ideas and of Hume’s impressionism, has been developed into a theory of meaning. This has become the major premise of the empiricist-humanist movement. A version of the theory given by some logical positivists of the Wittgensteinian school may be briefly stated here.

This theory confines itself to the sphere of the propositional forms of expression, or to be exact, that of synthetic propositions only. According to this theory, synthetic propositions have meaning if they can be used in reference to situations, actual or possible.

A proposition cannot be said to be used, if it is merely uttered or written; for in that sense, any nonsense can be used. A proposition is significant, if it can be used in a situation, actual or possible; in other words, if it describes a situation. Aside from the situation of which it is a picture, it has no meaning. A situation is a group of objects, events and activities and their relations; and in order to make a proposition significant, the meaning-giving situation must be an experiential one, external or mental, as opposed to a merely conceptual situation.

Possibilities are of two kinds: empirical possibility and logical possibility. Empirical possibility implies a situation which at the moment is not actual but which is not impossible of becoming actual; there is no scientific law which in principle may prevent it from being actual. Logical possibility implies a situation which is not actual at the moment and which need not ever be actual but which is describable in terms of experiential situations. For examples, ‘Sailing in a starship, he landed on Alpha-Centaurus’ is a logical possibility but empirically impossible; ‘The third world war will destroy mankind’ is possible both empirically and logically.

Wittgenstein insists that a meaning-giving situation should be describable not merely in respect of its constituents but also in respect of its components. For examples, in ‘Time and Space take tea without sugar’ the constituents can be described in terms of true situations but the component cannot; whereas in ‘The Devil and I sat at the same table’, one of the constituents, ‘the Devil’, cannot be described in terms of actual situations. Hence both the statements are meaningless.
Describability, and not verifiability, of the meaning-giving situations is the essence of this theory. According to this theory, the unverifiable is not meaningless, if it is describable in the above sense. Fictitious propositions, for example, are unverifiable and yet not meaningless, because their meaning-giving situations are describable.

The application of this theory enables the analyst to evaluate philosophical doctrines. In the light of this theory, he finds four types of philosophical propositions: (i) poetically delightful but logically wanting in significance; (ii) verbal recommendations (suggestions to use philosophical terms more accurately); (iii) rules of philosophical grammar making explicit the current usages of philosophical terms; and (iv) symbolic definitions (as symbolic definitions some philosophical propositions are found to be verbal or conceptual implications from certain basic definitions or presuppositions of thought).

This criterion of meaning is empiricist because it is embedded in the thought and speech of the commonsense man, because it is based on experience on the level of perception and crude arts. The criterion is humanistic, because its exponents believe that the true criterion which would be acceptable to any democratic mind would be the one which already exists and plays an active part in the life and thought of the largest number of men. And the connection between the two, the level of perception and the level of social values, is made by the belief that the largest number of men are at any given moment on the level of commonsense perception.

The main postulate of humanism can be given in the words of Protagoras: man is the measure of all things. Historically, this is interpreted as a revolt against the decadent religion, an attempt at redeeming man from the domination of the worthless gods of Greek religion. Logically however (that is, from the primary logical level), this is analyzed as 'man is the measure of all facts and values'.

'Man is the measure of facts' implies that the meaning and truth of propositions depend upon human experience. Every proposition depends for its meaning on experience. Similarly, what cannot be experienced by the senses or believed by way of empirical reasoning cannot be true. We have already seen how the meaning of a proposition depends on experience. The empiricist-humanist sifts the traditional theories of truth more or less as follows.

The correspondence theory of truth gives the meaning of truth,
whereas the coherence theory and the pragmatic theory give the
criteria of truth. In applying the test of coherence in the sense
of general consistency, we presuppose the truth of existing beliefs;
it is thus a provisional criterion of truth. Coherence in the sense
of self-consistency is a necessary condition, but not the sole or
sufficient condition, to be fulfilled for a proposition to be true. The
pragmatic theory gives 'workability' as the test of truth. The
pragmatists distinguish various kinds of workability. 'Emotional
satisfaction' is one of them and is a test of religious beliefs. In
science, workable propositions imply that they are verified either
directly or indirectly, they explain certain classes of facts ade-
quately, they predict certain facts correctly, or that they help in
further investigation which leads us nearer truth.

The empiricist-humanist criteria of meaning and truth eschew
all forms of transcendentalism. Much of theology and metaphysics
is thereby precluded. In history of philosophy, the empiricists
have used the empirical analytical method. What they reject is the
result of empirical-deductive ratiocination and what they believe
in is the work of scientific reasoning. Following the empirical-
deductive method Locke rejects innate ideas and applying the
scientific method of reasoning he justifies the beliefs in matter,
mind and God. Berkeley pushes the deduction further to reject
abstract ideas and matter and applying the method of scientific
hypothesis retains the beliefs in self and God. Hume carries the
empirical-deductive method to its logical extreme and rejects all
the hypothetical substances and causality and necessity and thus
unawares proves that pure empiricism is not an adequate basis for
the higher level experience of science. The later empiricists there-
fore hold that scientific reasoning is an integral part of scientific
investigation and that science cannot be reduced to a mere collec-
tion of facts perceptually observed. Auguste Comte continues the
empiricist-humanist tradition. He makes an historical survey of
facts about human knowledge. Logical positivism or empiricism
is a continuation of the same tradition. It takes its stand on human
experience—experience that is common to all human beings, that
is, experience on the level of perception.

The empiricist-humanist character of logical positivism is evident
in their logical theory of fact and their language role theory of mean-
ing. The ontological standpoint of Locke insists on the independence
of facts; whereas, according to the epistemological standpoint of
Berkeley, 'fact' is that which is directly perceived, the implication being that what is beyond the possibility of being perceived is not a fact. The logical standpoint neither presupposes nor rejects the independence of 'facts' and defines 'fact' as that which gives meaning and significance to a proposition and that is the meaning-giving situation, actual or possible. According to the language role theory of meaning, there is no inherent causal relation between a symbol and its referent; the relation is indirect and external in the sense conventionally fixed by us. The convention is no doubt the product of some mind, but the symbol has the reference as the meaning according to the convention whether it is actually used by any one or not.

The empiricist-humanists also discard the transcendental theories of values. Values as attributes of the transcendental divine or as transcendental forms are much too transcendental to be felt or realized on the level of human experience and thought. Values as satisfactoriness or utility are not reducible to but analyzable in terms of experience, here, felt wants. Of the many naturalistic theories, utilitarianism seems to be the most generally held view.

Empiricist-humanist ethics is based on empirical reasoning, not on revelation. This implies that the moral reasoning should take into account the felt wants and the limited capacities of the moral agent (generally overlooked by rationalist ethics). Religious ethics cannot be regarded as a science of ethics; the moral ideal set up by it is humanly impossible. It demands inner purification by way of uprooting all the natural desires and propensities. Rationalist ethics is grounded in the concept of a transcendental self. The moral ideal set up is too obscure and vague to be clearly understood and too difficult of realization. Utilitarianism may be considered empirical-humanistic; for, while rejecting exclusive egoism and exclusive altruism, it holds universal hedonism, which takes into account both self-love and parental love as the motivating forces and is thus in tune with the facts of human nature; it also considers the felt wants and the humanity of the moral agent as well as the need of self-subordination for the sake of social harmony.

The utilitarians have refined the concept of pleasure and clarified the ideal of universal happiness or well-being. Bentham takes an atomistic and sentient view of pleasure and holds in effect egoistic hedonism. Mill supplements Bentham's view by his qualitative view of pleasure and by adequately formulating utilitarianism on
the basis of universal happiness. Sidgwick gives a firmer basis to universal hedonism. Moore and Rashdall refine the concept of pleasure still further: pleasure becomes well-being; it becomes a total experience. And utilitarianism becomes ideal utilitarianism.

**The perceptual level criterion of meaning cannot be the meaning of meaning.** The empiricist-humanists fix on 'empiricist' criteria and argue on this point as follows. There are, they say, only two ways to proceed in this matter. The first is to give an arbitrary criterion of a value and then employ it to judge or state which things may claim the adjective and which may not. This method, they say, has little value. The second way is to discover and employ the criterion which is embedded in the thought and speech of the commonsense man. The true criterion which will be acceptable to any democratic mind is the one which already exists and plays an active part in the life and thought of the people.

But this latter method too seems arbitrary. First of all, a statistical survey alone can reveal who are the commonsense men or what criterion is embedded in the thought and speech of these men; and it can do so if we know *a priori* the criterion or the men respectively. Wittgenstein, for example, in trying to discover the criterion in practice, proposes to find out how we learn and teach language. The early part of his *Brown Book* inquires how the child learns his language, how the grown-up man learns a foreign language and how the teacher teaches his pupils the meanings of new expressions. But, are all of us on the level of perception and is the survey exhaustive? Charles Peirce discovered 59049 different uses of the word 'meaning'.

Secondly, the criterion he seems to discover is usability by way of arbitrary rule making (this is humanistic); and the criterion he seems to recommend is describability according to which an expression is *reducible to* or *analyzable in terms of* (?) ostensive demonstration (this is empiricist). Hence our second point of criticism is that the so-called 'criterion in practice' presupposes that the majority of the human species are on the level of perception and primary logic only. And thirdly, this presupposition in its turn presupposes that the criterion implicit in the thought and speech of the majority ought to be *the* (i.e. universal necessary and sufficient) criterion. If this is a valid argument, then, if we can prove that the majority of

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10 Susan Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*, p. 43 (paperback ed.).
mankind are on the level of prelogical experience, the prelogical criterion ought to be *the* criterion. 'Majority' does not mean all: yet unless it does, a one level criterion used by the majority cannot be factually called universal, not to talk of its being a sufficient criterion. The perceptual level criterion of meaning can only be a procrustean bed for meaning on other levels. Or was Wittgenstein trying to find out the *meaning* of meaning? In that case, one statement would be all right, but then, is it necessary to insist that it ought to be the same as the *criterion of meaning* on the perceptual level?

Some Wittgensteinians think that there should be one universal criterion of meaning which can be applied to all significant statements—whether of common speech, of science, of philosophy or of religion. Different types of philosophy may have different methods of proof; but propositions of all types should be amenable to the universal criterion of meaning. The 'verifiability' of Prof. A. J. Ayer cannot be such a criterion, since it applies only in the sphere of science. The 'significant analysability' of some Wittgensteinians can well claim to be the universal criterion. But in that case, it becomes a meaning statement of the value word 'meaning'. And if we insist that analyzability in terms of existential categories should not mean reducibility to them, the meaning statement ceases to be empiricist in the narrow sense, that of fixated on the level of commonsense perception.

We have noted in Chapter 2 that it is necessary to state different criteria of the same value for different levels of experience, keeping its meaning unaltered. Thus, for example, the meaning of the word 'truth' remains the same on all levels but the criterion of truth differs (must differ) from one level of experience to another.

The question 'What is truth?', for example, involves two questions: (i) What is the meaning of truth? That is, what do we mean when we say that a given proposition is true? (ii) What is the sign, test or criterion of truth? In other words, what are the conditions which when fulfilled make a proposition true? The two are closely allied but distinct questions. Philosophers (with exceptions like G. E. Moore and John Wisdom) have always mixed up the two questions; they have failed to draw a clear distinction between the meaning of truth and the criterion of truth. While giving a criterion (for a certain level of experience) they seem to claim it as a meaning and therefore valid for all levels; and while criticising
a proposed criterion of truth, they criticise it as the meaning of truth by showing that it fails on certain levels of experience.

The confusion has resulted from the ambiguous use of the word 'meaning'. Thus, in 'smoke means fire', the word 'means' does not mean the same as it does in 'agni means fire'. When we talk about the meaning of truth, we should take 'meaning' in the sense of meaning in the latter sentence. In the first sentence, 'means' is equivalent of 'signifies', or 'is a sign of'; in the second, to 'synonymous with, or is a verbal definition or descriptive paraphrase of', which is the proper sense in the context of meanings of value words.

If traditional philosophers were confused, the present ones who have found out the distinction between meaning and criterion of a value word seem confused in a different way: they recommend a certain level criterion (usually the perceptual level criterion) of a value word as valid for all levels as if the criterion statement is the meaning statement; of course, they don't differ from traditional philosophers by doing this; they differ from them by denying the other level experiences than the perceptual one. But can they?

5 Hinduism

THE MAJOR PREMISE OF HINDUISM IS MYSTICAL BLISS. Hinduism has had different theologies, ritualism and social codes at different periods of history. It presents a mosaic pattern of religion at various levels or stages—from the prelogical to the philosophical-religious. It has conserved all these. The overall pattern of Hinduism is, however, that of a spiritual religion with invariable stress on direct spiritual perception, on Moksha.

The Hindus believe that moksha is the ultimate end of life; the pursuit of other ends—dharma, artha and kama—are to be subordinated and directed to it. Kama or physical well-being and artha or economic well-being are the immediate ends or values on the level of nature. Dharma or social well-being is the intermediate aim or value on the level of history. Moksha is the ultimate end or the spiritual value.

Moksha lies in the realization of the highest value in theory. This may be sought by the manifold yogic way, by the continual refinement of theoretical and practical realization. Pursuit of any theory, any art, any vocation may lead one to moksha. Three generic ways are distinguished—that of jnana (refinement of knowledge),
of *bhakti* (refinement of worshipful feelings) and of *karma* (refinement of works by doing the duties of one’s station in life and society). Another yogic method is controlling the organic functions of the body and thus bringing it to a highly sensitive stage.

The individual devotee when initiated into religious life enters upon a course of spiritual discipline towards direct perception. He starts with the belief that the world and the self depend on God in some intimate systematic manner. He contemplates the image of the personal god while silently muttering the ‘*ishta-mantra*’. He tries to lead a virtuous life, to purify the inner self by conquering the passions like lust, anger, greed, folly, pride and envy, by doing the duties according to his ‘varna’ and ‘ashrama’ and by serving his fellow creatures—relatives, friends, community, country, mankind and all living creatures. The discipline refines his theoretical and practical realization.

The mystical seeker usually takes it for granted that to be godlike is to know God, that to attain the highest subjective status is to know that status reflexively without rising higher, and that to know God makes one godly. The argument is as follows. To avoid infinite regression, the progressive elevation in the subjective status\textsuperscript{11} must have a stop at some experience where the subject in knowing itself does not turn into an object of a new unknown subject but simply becomes the object of its self-knowledge. The distinctions necessary for a cognitive situation are still there in direct spiritual perception: the realization of identity (difference and identity-in-difference) does not take place in a cognitive vacuum; identity is not absence of distinctions but equation of distincts.

‘What is oneness without otherness?’—says John Wisdom. The ineffability of the feeling of bliss does not do away with the noetic quality, the awareness that the highest subjective status has been attained which cannot be the object of any higher subject but which can be its own object. The state of direct spiritual perception is usually described by the mystics in ordinary states of mind as the state of existence, awareness of existence and bliss.

This mystical realization is recommended for all. And no fixed method is prescribed for all. There is infinite variation in the pattern of realization. A musician may have it and a cook may have it. A coolie may directly perceive God when a university professor may be changing fashions in philosophical verbiage. A king may

\textsuperscript{11} Vide Chapter IV.
turn a saint and yet remain on the throne; a prince may renounce life (natural and social) and go to wilderness to seek it (spiritual life). The realization may come to a logic chopper when the monk may be sermonizing on the beauty of his religion to foreigners, or to a monk when the logic chopper is busy deducing the implications of some incipiently valid postulates.

HINDUISM IS OPEN, NONTOTALITARIAN AND NONCOMMUNAL BUT STATIC. Hinduism prescribes the harmonious man as the highest individual. The cultural system has been built up round the existentialist idea of the perfect individual. The ideal is attained by stages of self-realization. Each individual is free to develop his self to a point of perfection, to a point where he cannot surpass himself but which may be surpassed by others. Absolute perfection, which has been conceived as ‘unsurpassability by self as well as by others’, belongs to nothing but the absolute individual or Brahman. The next grade which has been conceived as perfection that is unsurpassable by others but not by self belongs to Ishwara (God) and his avatars. The incarnations may however be graded in an ascending order as follows: heroes (veeras), ascetics (sannyāsins), messiahs (putitapāwanas) and harmonious men (lilāmaya purushas). All are harmonious men but they can be graded according to the predominant roles they play, as in a nonfixational system.

For lesser human beings, perfection has meant unsurpassability by self but not necessarily by others; and imperfection has meant surpassability by both self and others. In the Hindu system, one’s own perfection implies one’s existential limitations and can never be recommended for others. This keeps the pursuit of self-realization an open process. The highest ideal recommended is the harmonious man—realization in theory and practice of the identity with and difference from the creative principle; lower ideals like the messianic man, the ascetic man and the social heroic man have been realized without their ever becoming the (one and only) ideal. This has done away with mass fixations on any particular level, which are the source of evils like self-righteousness, pride of knowledge and virtue, and fanaticism. As a result the Hindu cultural system has remained an open cultural system readily relatable with the world liberal culture.

The Hindu heroic, ascetic and messianic men have been primarily all harmonious men: their differences followed from the differences in the fields of action they had chosen. The Hindu heroes like
Arjuna, Karna and Bhishma, Samudra Gupta, Rana Pratap and Shivaji, Subhas Bose, M. N. Roy and Vir Savarkar are not like Chenghiz Khan and Tamerlane or like Khrushchev and Mao. The Hindu ascetics like Shankara and Rāmānuja, Dayānanda and Vivekānanda, Sri Aurobindo and Ramana Maharshi are not like the Greek Cynics Antisthenes and Diogenes. The Hindu messiahs like Rama, Krishna and Ramakrishna are not like messianic founders of prophetic religions—Buddha and Zoroaster, Moses and Christ, Mohammed and Marx. They are all greater or lesser harmonious men.

The Hindu society has never tried lower level control of the highest level life. So it has never been totalitarian. And it has remained non-communal by eschewing a strong gregational feeling, by maintaining a caste division and cultural federation, and by encouraging absolute individualism. The caste division based on birth must, of course, go; but it is not necessary that there should be a confusion of vocations, and that the creative minority (viz. the Brahmins) should be displaced by a dominant minority (viz. anti-Brahmin Kshatriyas and Vaishyas). It is also not necessary to do away with regional cultures within the Hindu supersystem. These may even be politically reorganized as states and directly related to world federation. The basic spiritual individualism being there, what is needed is a little more gregational feeling: this feeling at present is so weak that it makes the individual Hindu fall an easy prey to any and every imported fixational ideology claiming one’s highest loyalty. We may take one example of the effect of this weak communal feeling. The Hindu society has thrown up a most un-Hindu hero in Nehru; the influence of Communism cut him off from the Hindu harmonious man and turned him into a fixational type of social hero. This has been the greatest tragedy of Indian history to-day; for his procommunist foreign, defence and economic policies have been subverting the sovereign democratic character of the only ‘Hindu’ state in the world. His so-called secularism would, far from making the Hindu system dynamic, turn it into a closed, totalitarian and more static system.

**Human Unity Must Be Systematic Spiritual and Never Organic Social.** A workable unity among the Islamic, Christian, Hindu and Buddhist worlds has already been achieved in what may be called the world liberal culture of the universities of the free world and in collective defence systems like NATO, CENTO, etc. The
communist world has thrown a serious challenge to the unity: it
aspires to be the world state and world culture and has been trying
without respite to drag down the liberal world to its own level.

Human unity is to emerge as a systematic unity, and not as an
organic unity, of the lesser epigregations: the lesser societies must
each retain its individuality and get rid of its fixation by a stronger
feeling for the highest system. This means its highest ideal may
have to be included and superseded by the higher ideal of the world
liberal culture. And in case of conflicts between the communist
world and any one of the systems of the free world, we have got to
choose the more open system, that is, the older and spiritual system.
The test of openness in relation to mankind lies in the acceptance
of human unity as a systematic unity, and not as the organic unity
imposed by a particular society's organized physical force.

Thus, for example, if communists try to realize human unity by
imposing Communism on all older cultural systems (which whether
more or less open have all accepted liberal criteria), we as liberal
Hindus and Buddhists, Muslims and Christians, empiricists and
humanists must put up a unified resistance. An effete liberal
or statist experiment like the Nehruvian experiment would be
suicidal.
HISTORY AND GREGATIONAL ETHICS. We have noted that the making of history involves two things: the choosing of one's society from among the existing ones, or creating a new one; and the making of facts favourable to the society one chooses or creates. The society chosen or created may be a partial-cultural gregation (a party, a nation-state, a race, a linguistic group, an economic class, ...) or a total-cultural system (like the Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, Christian, Communist, World Liberal, ...). The maker of history is primarily an artist: his main purpose is to make facts of a certain kind—facts favourable to his society. In realizing this purpose he may use all kinds of means—moral, legal (which may be either moral or immoral), political (which may be either legal or illegal), and military (which may be either political or impolitic).

The methods of making history therefore raise the problem of gregational ethics. This is yet an undeveloped (almost an unborn) branch of human knowledge. Here I propose to draw a bare outline of it and illustrate it by drawing on the facts of to-day's historical situation.

NATURE AND SCOPE OF GREGATIONAL ETHICS. I owe the name to Ralph Borsodi. He made an interesting analysis of the ethical problem in his Journal of Praxiology (Sept. 1955). There he breaks down the ethical problem into three distinct problems according as the human individual is related to non-human individuals—whether natural (animals, plants, land) or spiritual (himself and the divine), to other human individuals as individuals, or as a member of a gregation to other gregations. He calls them problems of pretersocial ethics, correlational ethics and of gregational ethics respectively.

Our treatment of the definition of science calls for a slightly
modified statement. Moral Philosophy while being included and superseded by religious philosophy itself includes and supersedes social and natural philosophies. It is therefore competent to deal with the question: what ought to be the relations between societies? This would inevitably raise the empirical or factual counterpart: what are the relations between societies? The two together would make up the scope of (the general problem that is) gregational ethics:. How would and should units of intelligible history, whether partial cultural gregations (like empires, nations, nationalities, business corporations, labour unions, castes, classes, political parties, factions, races, etc.) or total-cultural systems (like the Communist, the Islamic, the Christian, the Buddhist, the Hindu, the World Liberal, ... systems) treat one another?

The general direction in which the problem of gregational ethics can be solved lies (i) in the extension of the sphere of morality as against the sphere of freedom in which there is room for the immoral; (ii) in the extension of the sphere of freedom as against the sphere of legality in which there is room for unfreedom; (iii) in the extension of the sphere of legality as against the sphere of political act in which there is room for the illegal; (iv) in the extension of the sphere of the political act as against the sphere of military action in which there is room for impolitic act; (v) in the extension of the sphere of defensive military action as against the sphere of aggressive military action in which there is room for predatory act; (vi) in the extension of preventive aggressive military action as against the sphere of curative aggressive military action in which there is room for a global and nuclear war.

The conflict between 'ought' and 'is' can thus be resolved by introducing a valuational gradation in the factual order of things. The problem of gregational ethics can be solved by introducing a valuational gradation into the actual intersocietal behaviour. Thus, moral behaviour works when the other party is moral; if the other party is not moral in principle, we may have to behave legally. The legal behaviour works only if the other party is also legal; if not, we may have to behave politically; the political behaviour works only when the other party is politic; if not, we may have to take recourse to military means. We cannot behave morally when the other party behaves militarily in principle and politically as an expediency, or politically as a principle and legally only as an expedient, or legally in principle and morally in policy.
The revolutionary method of the communists is the exact opposite of the democratic method. The method of democracy starts with the moral in principle and compromises downwards as a matter of policy to the military act. The revolutionary method starts with the armed forces in principle and compromises upwards as a matter of expediency to the moral method.

**Gregational Behaviour in History.** A physically more organized society, whether superior or not in other respects, usually tries to force upon a weaker society its decisions, its various cultural traits, its way of life, if possible, its whole cultural system. Christianity and Islam, for example, have practised genocide in some periods of their history. Communism has now been committing genocide on a big scale and with impunity.

The weaker society, whether inferior or not in other respects, usually tries ways of escape and resistance.¹ Ways of escape may be passive or active. Examples of passive escape are sense of drift and of truancy. Ways of active escape are mass suicide, secession through flights, self-humiliation to spite the conqueror, purist segregation, archaistic revival, promiscuous mimesis, partial osmosis, sense of sin, vulgar hedonism, egoistic humanism, cynical idealism, futurism, martyrdom. Ways of resistance by the weaker fizzle out in acts of sabotage and terrorism and unsuccessful uprising. Ways by almost equally powerful society are adequate defence measures, containment of the expanding power, and sometimes timely intervention or preventive aggression.

Gregational ethics would generally recommend a peaceful mutual give-and-take on the basis of a comparison of the two cultural systems with reference to the ideal liberal cultural system, which alone can function as the common standard. The congenial traits or elements may thus pass from one to the other and thus enrich both the societies.

It is only when two groups become more or less equally powerful that wars break out.² The differences and conflicts can then be settled in the battlefield. In theory, however, we can still find out which of the warring nations stands for a superior system. But if the equally powerful but inferior system goes on expanding its dominion by means of organized physical force and genocide and refuses to accept the peaceful functioning of the

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¹ Toynbee, *Study of History.*
common standard, the other party cannot act upon the rule of 'preter-social' or 'correlational' ethics. And an adherence to the Yudhisthirian, Christian or Gandhian formula, viz. 'resist not the evil', in such a situation would be a more destructive dogmatism and worse fanaticism than going to war. The Geeta, for example, enjoins going to war in such a situation as a moral duty. It is interesting to note that in the context of the present communist expansion, the U. S. A. or the West in general has been employing the gregational ethics of the Geeta while the leading statesmen of India have been applying the Sermon on the Mount.

The application of gregational ethics requires, to begin with, a clear statement of the criterion of an open society or cultural system with which to test and compare the existing major societies or cultural systems. This onerous task cannot be shirked on the plea of bad taste, the plea that to compare one cultural system with another is odious and invidious.

The openness of a cultural system is to be tested by its capacity for creating and sustaining the urge for higher individuality and a ever higher one in the individuals who constitute it, in the other societies with which it comes into contact, and for itself in so far as it approaches the ideal world society or culture.

For a society to remain open is to approach, as a cultural system, the ideal of one world culture and to behave, as a state, in such a manner, by alignments with other open societies, and resistance to closed and aggressive societies, as to come nearer and nearer the ideal of one democratic world federation. The specific rules of gregational ethics may not be formulated once for all; such an attempt may result in casuistry. Yet with our clear test of higher individuality, specific means like free trade, world federation for defence and cultural crossfertilization may be prescribed to sustain the urge for higher individuality on the part of a given society in relation to another society—provided, of course, the second society is equally interested in remaining open and behaves accordingly. This is the crux of the problem of gregational ethics.

Or else, it is easy to show that on ultimate analysis gregational behaviour is individual action; it is also easy therefore to recommend the rule of interpersonal or correlational ethics in the field of gregational behaviour. So long as there is a gregation aiming at the destruction of other cultural systems, the rules of gregational ethics cannot but be flexible, multiple and graded: yet as a whole it
may remain moral if starting with the highest in principle it comes
down to the method of force only when there is no choice. Given
the facts of military conquests and genocide as the means of com-
munist expansion, gregational ethics cannot be reduced to inter-
personal morality.

**GENOCIDE OR DESTRUCTION OF OTHER CULTURES.** The expression
originally meant a total destruction of one nation by another.
The present usage extends to all attempts to destroy, in whole or
in part, certain kinds of organized or unorganized gregation.
A UNESCO Convention in 1948 defined genocide as follows:

“In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

It is not the kind of gregation that makes for a genocide. It is the
fact that the destructive act is directed to a gregation, to persons as
members of a certain society, and not to persons in their individual
capacities, that makes up the essence of genocide.

In 1946, the UN had declared genocide as ‘a crime under inter-
national law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations
and condemned by the civilized world’.

The Soviet Union ratified the Convention. The Soviet Encyclopaedia gives the meaning of
the word in similar terms. Russia even proposed an addendum to
the definition when it was under discussion in the UN. All this, not
because she disapproves of it or would not practise it, but because
all this would be a camouflage for her own genocidal acts and at
the same time would be a good stick with which to beat the free
world on the occasion of her slightest lapses.

**GENOCIDE AS A REVOLUTIONARY METHOD OF ALIENATION AND**

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The Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, pp. 1 and 2.*
CONVERSION. Communism rejects both democracy and nationalism as bourgeois sentiments. Genocide is an undemocratic and antinational method. Hence genocide is a natural concomitant of Communism. Communists use it for liquidating resistance and for mass alienation and conversion within a short time.

Communists do not believe in the democratic methods of social change. Democracy as a method implies the methods of peaceful discussion and piecemeal social engineering: a democrat believes in these methods in principle and not as a matter of policy. Democracy always prefers moral methods. When moral methods do not work, it tries legal methods. When legal methods fail, it tries political methods. Where these too don’t work, it tries military methods in the last resort and that too, only in a defensive manner.

For the communist it is just the opposite. Communism aims at the communist world state and world culture. It can build this up only on the ruins of all nation states and noncommunist cultural systems. It would in principle conquer nations by armed forces and turn them into communist masses by way of genocide. Whenever there has been a power vacuum in the sense of inadequate military preparedness, communists have employed these two methods. The methods have paid heavy dividends and they would gladly repeat the use of these means. It is only when they cannot help forbearing these methods that they would use political methods; when political methods are not available to them, they would employ legal and constitutional methods; when these too are not available, they would try moral methods. Theirs is thus a hierarchy of expediency; ours is a hierarchy of moral methods. On their principle all morality is ‘bourgeois morality’: there is no common human morality. Communism is the highest good and all means to reach that goal are good. No amount of sacrifice of human lives on the altar of the state or party or Leader would make them recoil and turn to ‘bourgeois’ morality.

Similarly, communists are no lovers of national cultures with all their concern for ‘folk’ cultures. They do not believe in national self-determination and world federation. There is no room for nationalism in it except as a part of revolutionary expediency.

"For the communist dictatorship the nationality problem in the usual sense, that is, the problem of finding the best method
of assuring freedom for national development does not and cannot exist. In communist theory the problem concerns rather the proper nationality policy to be applied at any given time, that is, it is a tactical problem to be solved in various ways at various stages in the development of the communist state."^{4}

Communists would demand national self-determination on behalf of the remaining colonies of doddering western empires; for it is always easier to deal with the inexperienced leaders of free and backward nations of Asia and Africa than with the veterans of the West. Before revolution in Russia too, they favoured national separatism that would subvert the Czarist empire. But once their empire was founded, they denounced dismemberment.

During World War II, there was a 'revival' of nationalism. But it was primarily a Russian nationalism and the revival was controlled. Furthermore, Russian linguistic formal nationalism does not conflict with communist imperialism and its undemocratic anti-nationalist means of genocide in many forms and degrees. The communist theory and practice aim at making the communist culture and state the world culture and state: this is not visualized as a federal democratic system of many nations, but as an organic unity with one culture, the communist culture, and one language, the Russian language. This has to be raised on the liquidation of capitalism and its political concomitants democracy and nationalism.

Why then have they developed the many vernaculars of many backward Asian nations? There are two reasons for it. Language is the only national cultural characteristic which is more natural than historical: it becomes easier to mollify nationalist sentiments (or their vestige) by keeping the language when removing or destroying other and deeper contents of culture in the name of a new culture socialist in content and national in form (linguistic form only). The national form of the homogeneous socialist culture is provided by the language. But then, in the words of Stalin:

"It is necessary to give national cultures (languages) the opportunity to develop and expand and to bring to light their entire

^{4} Andrei Lebed, "Genocide as a Means of Creating a Unified Socialist Nation", The Bulletin, 1958, the Issue on Genocide, p. 3.
potential, in order to create the conditions of merging them into one common culture, with one common language.\textsuperscript{5}

Russian has already been playing the role of this one common language. It has become an ‘international language’, and the vernaculars in the USSR have been partially russianized. For example, we are quite familiar with russianized Muslim names: the names are spelt with genitive case-ending of Russian declension. It is quite clear therefore that the development of vernaculars is only a transitional stage on the way to their complete destruction. The cheap Soviet publications in many languages of free nations of the world are the first step in the process.

There are liberals who from time to time try to delude themselves and their people by declaring that Soviet Communism is going to be liberal, is turning democratic or nationalist or world federalist. They are either themselves cryptocommunists or victims of communist propaganda because of their gullibility and wishful thinking. The wishful thinking takes new forms and in effect help the communists by creating new situations favourable to them. For example, the situation which led to the fall of China is not going to recur in the case of India or Indonesia. India’s fall for example will come in a novel way.

Genocide is not to be correlated with this or that regime, the Stalin regime or NKVD. It is an integral part of communist theory and practice: whatever regime be there, it will be a part of the communist method, till its world mission materializes. In creating a new socialist state, it cannot even tolerate communist nationalism (like Tito’s or Nehru’s) or socialist democracy (like Gomulka’s). Here is what Khrushchev says on the point:

“A one-sided approach in the direction of overemphasis of national characteristics of ‘special paths’ of movements toward socialism in any particular country, will cause harm both to the cause of building socialism in the given country and to the entire mutual friendship among socialist countries. It is a problem of increasing resoluteness in searching out the enemies of socialism”.\textsuperscript{6}


\textsuperscript{6} Khrushchev, Pravda, January 1, 1957, quoted by Arkadiy Gaev in the Bulletin on Genocide, pp. 16-17.
In the communist empire, there can be no room for many nations. There can be only an illusion of the coexistence of many nationalities in it. The illusion is kept as a part of the expansionist policy. While developing the vernaculars as media of instruction and of literature and putting them to use in the academies, in the press, on the theatre, the communist regime at the same time ‘relentlessly deforms the language, destroys the national culture, liquidates the self-consciousness of the nation, forcibly injects into it a communist content foreign to its nature.’ The destruction of national culture in the name of remaking the national ideology (i.e. communism) is the first task of the communist party. (In India, a brief rule of communists in Kerala and the communistic planning by the Centre have proved it amply. In Tibet genocide in the sense of total destruction of Tibetan Buddhist culture has already become an accomplished fact.)

The wartime concession to Russian nationalism has not been a genuine revival of Russian culture, its orthodox Christianity and its literary traditions. It was a temporary tactical manoeuvre to get the best out of the patriotic spirit (de corps) to minimize the hostile feelings of the people to the communist regime. And we have already noted that the pride of place given to Russian is no Russian nationalism; it is the natural choice for the homogeneous monolithic communist state and culture of to-morrow. The Russian language is being groomed for the role of the literary vehicle of that state and culture. This is by no means a concession to Russian nationalism. Or else, Boris Pasternak would not be called ‘a hermit crab’ by Sholokhov.

The point we want to make is that Communism shows no partisanship to the Russian nation. All nationalisms are in its eyes partial cultures to be liquidated, to be transformed and absorbed into Communism. The difference lies in the degree and manner of genocidal practice and this is a matter of circumstances and tactical adjustments. If Soviet genocide has been less pronouncedly ruthless toward certain cultural masses, it is only because circumstances did not demand it. There is no inherent disposition to favour Russian nationalism or Polish nationalism, for example, as against Hungarian or Tibetan nationalism. Had it been in its power to crush Titoism or control Nehruvianism, for example, it would have done that. Whenever the hostility to Communism has become

* Ibid., p. 17.
active and it has been possible to crush it, the communist regime has crushed it. Wherever there is a power vacuum, Communism would step in and impose the communist system by way of genocide.

Another factor in the differential treatment, another factor determining the degree and manner of genocide has been the size or strength of the nation. Stalin would have liked to destroy all Ukrainians but for their large number. Khrushchev would have liquidated all Hungarians; and Mao, all Tibetans; but their number has been prohibitive. Here some optimists in the democratic camp would like to add that Khrushchev would now like to have liquidated all Chinese; but here precisely we make our point: China with all her strength, her racial distinction and industrial potential can never hope to turn against the Russians; the worst she can do is to expand into Siberia and make some independent moves here and there, but it would never develop into Chinese nationalism weakening the communist empire or bringing about a fissure or schism in the body and soul of the communist cultural system.

In these cases communist genocide takes some devious forms and ways. Here the communist regime would systematically destroy the elite, the creative minority or leaders of the nation. Let us take a hypothetical case. Suppose the power vacuum in India is filled in by the communists. Then the communists in power will first liquidate the leaders of the democratic political parties whether capitalist or nationalist, and then the leaders of the socialist parties, and then some obstinate individual writers and thinkers who would still favour democracy and older liberalized cultures. They will spare those individuals who did yeoman's service to Communism unless they later on try some form of Titoism.

Those who argue that Communism is at the cross-roads where it is going to take the liberal (either nationalistic or democratic) path, have not yet had their 'kronstadt'. These gullible liberals have done a great harm to the cause of democracy and non-fixational world culture. Their repeated sentiments have always favoured the communist cause. Their falling in for the 'leopard changing its spots' argument, which has been periodically floated whenever the communists have been put into a tight corner, has made them do some fatal mistakes leading to the fall of their country under the iron heels of the communist leviathan.
Take Khrushchev’s words spoken on April 1, 1956, to an All Union Conference of Young Builders:

“Our enemies hope that we will weaken our convictions, weaken our organs of state security. No, this will never be. The proletarian sword must always be kept sharp, the accomplishments of this revolution, the conquests of the working class, the conquests of the labouring people must always, at the cost of great effort, be preserved.”

This reiterates the permanent principle and aim. The occasional signs of change are not real change; they are dictated by the exigencies of the situation.

We may thus conclude with Arkadiy Gaev that genocide with all its undemocratic and anti-nationalist implications is one of the inevitable concomitants of Communism. It may change its form according to situations but the practice cannot be dropped. Changes in the leadership may only change the degree and method of genocide but genocide itself remains unchanged. It cannot be given up until the system itself meets its end.

**Passive and Active Escape as Victims’ Response.** If genocide is the chief gregational behaviour of the communist society, escape or resistance is the chief mode of response to the communist challenge and threat. Resistance is the response of the more powerful nations of the free world; escape in various passive or active forms is the chief mode of response of the underdeveloped countries in the free world, especially the non-Christian sector of it, and in it again, of the procommunist neutralist Hindu-Buddhist sector in particular.

We have already listed some forms of escapist response in the words of Toynbee. Here we may illustrate all these by drawing upon the present historical behaviour of countries like India, Ceylon, Burma, Egypt, Iraq, Ghana, Guinea, etc. India is a sort of prototype of all underdeveloped countries where the leaders have chosen the escapist path under cover of high falutin verbiage.

The escapist response is symptomatic of the breakdown of the older cultures. In the light of Toynbee’s theory of history it seems that the breakdown of the older societies (except Western Christendom) has already set in. The schism in the social body and soul can be seen unmistakably.

*Khrushchev quoted, *ibid.*, p. 18.*
The body has disintegrated into three sections: (i) *The dominant minority*. The ruling class, or politicians, makes up this section. They have now taken the place of the creative minority, who, in a democracy, regulate the state without being in the government. The dominant minority has lost its creativeness; but it still dominates through the state it has created and has been pretending to consolidate. In the name of a welfare state, they are destroying the actualities and possibilities of a welfare society. The enormous increase in the tribe of statist politicians in all backward countries (in the image of those in Soviet Russia) spells the doom of all older individualist cultures. Some disinterested prophet-like nonpolitical leaders alone can save the older societies from the doom. (ii) *The internal proletariat*. This is made up of the people who are mostly illiterate and half literate. They are the uncreative, but by no means unproductive, majority which may be alienated from the older societies. The communists are out to possess them all; and a small section led by them is already tending to an explosive act of mimesis of the external proletariat (the Sino-Russian communists). The other section led by non-but pro-communist secularists (followers of all kinds of anti-individualistic statist ideologies) is tending to a similar act of mimesis of the creative leaders of its own. Among these ideologies may be mentioned democratic socialism, humanism, 'rationalism' of different popular shades and even logical empiricism. All of these in the West are integral parts of the older liberalized 'Christian' culture; at any rate in a time of trouble they would behave like that. With all their atheism and anti-individualism, they are convinced anti-communists and would not make any mistake on the adequacy of self-defence, that is, adequate military preparedness. But these very movements in culturally backward countries have one supreme effect—the effect of denuding the hold of the older spiritual cultures and creating a spiritual vacuum, of which the natural consequence is the emergence of a military vacuum; and all this under the banner of the fashionable cult of modernity! They have learned nothing from the downfall of the Chinese liberals and East European democrats. (iii) *The external proletariat*. This is made up of the Chinese and Russian communists who are working for the expansion of the communist empire in collusion with their fifth columns in all the older societies.

The schism in the soul also has shown its symptoms. Various forms of passive and active escape have made themselves manifest.
The upper ruling and managerial class have developed a vulgar hedonistic way of life. Among the topmost are to be found some egoistic humanists and cynical idealists, who while enjoying the glories of their positions are not very serious about the defence of the state and preservation of the cultural systems. They pretend to be original social engineers when they are nothing but pale imitations of western communists and socialists.

The communists and near communists (socialists, radical humanists, etc.) may be cited as instances of truants and martyrs from the standpoint of older cultures. They are convinced that the old society is not worth saving from the impending doom; they find in Communism and other brands of humanism a way of escape from the onerous task of defending the disintegrating society. Their common ground is a kind of secularism, which as an ill-digested ideology is worse than a theology yet is proudly held by half-baked intellectuals. This truancy and martyrdom are shared by the sections of the internal proletariat they lead.

There are many archaists among conservatives in politics. But the proper archaists are to be found in the ranks of nationalist supporters of the present ruling classes, some intellectuals who try to escape from the intolerable present by reconstructing (in art and in life) an earlier phase of the disintegrating society.

The communists are the futurists of yesterday: the futurist of to-day are those who are building up a welfare state on the ruins of a welfare society. They are very right when they say Communism is obsolete; they are dangerously self-deluded when they think that their welfare statism will create a welfare society. Aside from the fact that Great Britain set up a department for nationalization and converted it into a department for denationalization in the course of a decade, serious students of economics know that state-interventionist brand of economy is the surest way to a totalitarian order that is chaos. The nett result of their experiment is this: some bureaucrats and politicians are feeding fat on the consumption of the accumulated capital of the nation; they are liquidating the creative minority and making up the dominant minority.

The sense of sin is rare nowadays. But the easy conscience of the modern man and the rise of vulgar hedonism and egoistic humanism have almost done away with it. Yet when we come across communists in some unexpected quarters—among the well-to-do and
cultured, millionaires, university professors, high executives—we may detect the working of the sense of sin.

Escape by way of promiscuity manifests itself in two distinct species of cultural activities—in imitation of the West and in imitation of the communist East. The whole series of synchronistic reformist attempts in religion (in the oriental countries), the so-called modernism in literature, the barbaric adoption of a foreign language and some western manners and mannerisms at home by the people of higher income groups as signs of higher culture, the Hollywoodish films, the crude adoption of latin music and dances, etc. are some instances of promiscuity in imitation of the western way of life. It is because of this that Toynbee has included us in the internal proletariat of the Western Society. According to him, the man-power of the primitive societies and disintegrating non-western civilizations has swelled the ranks of the internal proletariat of the Western Society. The intelligentsia of these societies is a class of liaison officers between their respective societies and the Western Society. They have learned the tricks of the Western Civilization’s trade and they help their community to hold its own in a social environment of ever-growing mimesis of the intrusive civilization replacing the age-old cultures. This judgment is not all a white man’s arrogance. For Toynbee has not failed to distinguish between promiscuity and cultural cross-fertilization; and all social philosophers of repute (Sorokin, Kroeber, Schweitzer and others) do give a high rating for the Oriental Cultural systems and their characteristic creativeness.

More dangerous cases of promiscuous mimesis verging on partial osmosis is experiments like the Nehruvian experiment in state-interventionist near-communist economy. It is dangerous because it puts the supreme value on economic goods, because it chooses the wrong or self-stultifying means to the end, because for the sake of a mess of pottage it ignores the higher values of life. Most underdeveloped countries trying statist methods will turn communist sooner or later.

The sense of unity expressed in the creation of what Toynbee calls ‘the universal state’ (meaning the state for the given cultural system) is a thing stressed by the secular nationalists of the newly born Afro-Asian states. They forget that pure political nationalism cannot bring about the desirable emotional integration. And a complete control of economic life (as envisaged by the ruling class)
by the government can bring about an integration of only the slave-like emotions.

Gregational ethics requires saviours of and not from the older societies. In Toynbee's ideograms, the older culture is a castle; when there is no trouble, we may venture to wander far away from it; in a time of troubles, when the castle is stormed, all must rally in and around to save it. The communists and near-communists are going to storm it and capture it. That will be the final rout of all individualist cultures.

**VARIous FORMS OF RESISTANCE.** If escape is the chief mode of response to Communism by the older cultures of the East (the Oriental 'neutralist' East, for there are exceptions like Turkey and Pakistan, Thailand and Japan, . . .) resistance in various forms is the chief response by the older cultures of the West, that is, Western Christianity and Western Liberalism.

The statesmen of the western states have entered into what may be called expedient collective defence. I call it expedient, because the collective defence has been built up on the principles of pragmatic humanism (i.e. nationalism) and not on the principles of ethical idealism (i.e. survival of humanity and freedom). They have built up a seemingly adequate military defence system. And in the field of day-to-day diplomacy and conflict they have tried policies of containment and non-intervention.

I call it seemingly adequate; because none of the nation states in the free world can defend itself against the communist thrust all alone. Net even the U.S.A. The partial collective defence systems made up of NATO, CENTO, SEATO, DEW, BMews, etc. are adequate for some nations working together, but not for all; neither for each severally. A member state if invaded may fall and other members may refuse to risk a world war for her sake.

There have been many sentimental liberals who in the name of realism have advocated a policy of disengagement, especially where the nations concerned have been unfriendly. But fortunately, the statesmen of the West turned a deaf ear to their advocacy. They have however followed a pitiable policy of diplomatic non-intervention or non-enterprise in regard to policies of 'neutrality' of the Nehruvian brand, which has in effect been pro-communist. In comparison the statesman of the communist empire has been highly enterprising and successful with the 'neutral' countries. It was within the resources of western diplomats to counteract and nullify
the communist’s exploiting of the ‘neutral’ brand of nationalism.

The Nehruvian brinkmanship in cold peace could have been possibly countered by brinkmanship in cold war. There ought to have been positive intervention wherever there were signs of collapse. It was possible, for example, to intervene in Tibet defying India and to intervene in Hungary defying the Soviet Army. After all, the communists do not want war as we too do not. Then, why let the communists alone enjoy all the advantage of a bugbear of nuclear war? I do not mean the U.S.A ought to have intervened. What I mean is that it was (and it still is) possible to organize an effective world federation out of the present U.N. with an International Police Force and an Army of Liberation made up of emigres and refugees of many nations. To begin with, as Nobel Laureate Lester Pearson suggested, expand the Security Council by letting in some Afro-Asian nations.

True, there will always be some statesmen who would like to throw western aid on governmental level into the bottomless pit of crypto-communist state-planned economy, to remain neutral between their own countries and aggressors, to contrive to destroy the buffer states between their own and the enemy countries, and to carry the communist programme of expansion with a dialectical subtlety. To foil this what is needed is a shift from expedient and seemingly adequate defence system to a high-principled and truly adequate one. A western bid to form a world federation out of U.N. would certainly foil such statesmen and save the old world of welfare societies from the eclipse by the welfare state. The resistance of the free world to further communist expansion can thus be made truly adequate.

There must be a legally constituted world authority and it must be made strong enough to prevent and resist any aggression. Such an authority is the greatest need of the day. It is quite within our resources to constitute it. Yet certain innocent nationalists rather than ‘predatory’ capitalists or crypto-communists have been preventing it from coming into existence. The mental barrier must be broken.

This world authority must be constituted on the principles of federation with concurrent jurisdiction in every nation. The present United Nations is not organized on these principles. It cannot prevent armed aggression, because it has not been delegated the power to function as the world government with an International
Police Force and jurisdiction in every member nation in the sphere of defence. Let the principles of regional autonomy and world federation with concurrent jurisdiction take the place of national sovereignty with exclusive national jurisdiction in matters of defence. The UN will then be a live body competent to do its job.*

This primary resistance can then be strengthened by certain reforms in the political and economic spheres. Here the creative minority among all the nations on this side of the Curtain must take the lead in a positive and constructive manner.

Regional self-determination is to remain. Regional cultures must flourish. Primary political units must be made autonomous. Huge nation states made out of cultural congeries should be broken down into many regional federations. The homogeneous regional cultural systems are to be organized politically into regional federations by way of delegation of specific powers from local autonomous bodies. The regional federations in their turn would delegate specific concurrent jurisdiction to the UN turned world government in the field of defence.

Such a system of autonomous local bodies and regional and world federations has the following implications: (i) The world federation becomes a systematic unity and not an independent or organic unity. The concurrent jurisdiction allows effective federal action in every nation which is a member. Yet it is restricted to a specific function. Hence it cannot be totalitarian. It cannot try political level control of the spiritual lives of the regional cultures. Its function will be a military defence of such cultures against genocidal extinction. (ii) Each of the regional governments has some specified functions; each has delegated power to discharge only these. The constituent local units bring it into existence. The residuary powers are all reserved and exercised by the local bodies. (iii) In a federation there is room for separation of powers and balance of powers: hence, there is no fear of concentration and abuse of power; there will be no scope for ‘gigantomania’ and ‘façadism’ as in big states like India and China. (iv) The principle of limited government is implied in it. Each government (whether regional or world federal) would have some specific function or functions to perform. This would prevent any confusion of vocations. The present governments (national, communist or

welfarist) usurp most powers and do all kinds of functions—
political, economic and other cultural too. If individualism is to
flourish, the principle of limited government must be made to
work.

This political set-up must be supplemented by a new economic
set-up involving free market and free trade. This we have discussed
in a previous chapter (Chapter VIII). With limited government of
the world entrusted with defence and with free world market
entrusted with prosperity, the resistance of the free world would
be truly adequate and may be hoped to liberalize the communist
world in the near or distant future.
### Appendix A

**The A Priori Genesis of Analytic Truth-Functions**

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ra. **TTTT:**

1. \((AB)\lor(\neg A \land B)\lor(\neg A \land \neg B)\); 
   - ‘A’ and ‘B’ are both propositions
2. (i) ‘A’ is either true or false;
3. (ii) and so is ‘B’;
4. (iii) It is not the case that neither ‘A’ nor ‘B’ is either true or false;
5. (iv) ‘A’ and ‘B’ are logically independent or barely compatible.

2a. **TTTF:**

1. \((AB)\lor(\neg A \land B)\lor(\neg A \land B)\).
   - normal schemata;
2. (i) Either ‘A’ is true, or ‘B’ is true, or both are true: disjunction of ‘A’ and ‘B’
3. (ii) ‘AvB’
4. (iii) If not ‘A’, then ‘B’: ‘A’ and ‘B’ are sub-contraries
5. ‘A⇒B’
6. (iv) It is not the case that both ‘A’ and ‘B’ are false: negation of conjunction 3a below
7. ‘¬(A∧B)’
8. (v) Not ‘A’, if and only if ‘B’ and not ‘A’
9. ‘¬A⇒¬B’

2b. **TTFT:**

1. \((AB)\lor(\neg A \land B)\lor(\neg A \land B)\).
   - normal schemata;
2. (i) Either ‘A’ is true, or else ‘B’ is false, or both: disjunction of ‘A’ and ‘B’
3. ‘Av-B’
4. (ii) If ‘B’, then ‘A’: ‘A’ is sub-implicant or subaltern to ‘B’
5. ‘A⇒B’; ‘B⇒A’

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301
(iv) It is not the case that 'A' is false and 'B' is true: negation of conjunction 3b below \(\neg(A \land B)\)

(v) 'B', if and only if 'B' and 'A' \(\equiv B \equiv A, B \lor A \equiv A\),

2c TFTT: 
(i) \((A \land B) \lor (A \land \neg B)\) normal schemata;
(ii) Either 'A' is false, or else 'B' is true, or both: disjunction of 'A' and 'B' \(-A \lor B\)
(iii) If 'A', then 'B': 'A' is super-implicant or superaltern to 'B' \(A \supset B\)
(iv) It is not the case that 'A' is true and 'B' is false: negation of conjunction 3c below \(-A \lor B\)
(v) 'A', if and only if both 'A' and 'B' \(A \equiv B, A \lor B \equiv B\)

2d TFTT: 
(i) \((A \land B) \lor (A \land \neg B)\) normal schemata;
(ii) Either 'A' is false, or 'B' is false, or both: disjunction of 'A' and 'B' \(-A \lor B\)
(iii) If 'A', then 'B': 'A' and 'B' are contraries \(A \supset B\)
(iv) It is not the case that both 'A' and 'B' are true: negation of conjunction 3d below \(-A \lor B\)
(v) 'A', if and only if both 'A' and 'B' \(A \equiv B, A \lor B \equiv B\)

1b FFFF: 
(i) Neither 'A' nor 'B' is either true or false \(A \) and 'B' are not propositions at all

(ii) Negation of 1a above.

3a FFFF: 
(i) 'A' is false and 'B' is false: 'A' and 'B' are conjunctively false \(-A \land B\)
(ii) It is not the case that either 'A' is true, or 'B' is true, or both: negation of 2a above \(-A \equiv B\), etc.

3b FFFF: 
(i) 'A' is false and 'B' is true: 'A' is sub-contradictory to 'B' \(A \equiv B\)
(ii) It is not the case that either 'A' is true, or 'B' is false, or both: negation of 2b above \(-B \equiv A\), etc.

3c. FFFF: 
(i) 'A' is true and 'B' is false: 'A' is supercontradictory to 'B' \(A \equiv B\)
(ii) It is not the case that either 'A' is false, or 'B' is true, or both: negation of 2c above \(-A \equiv B\)
3d TFFF : (i) Both 'A' and 'B' are true: 'A' and 'B' are conjunctively true
      ...............................................
               'A.B'

      (ii) It is not the case that either
               'A' is false, or 'B' is false, or
      both: negation of 2d above
               '-(A\lor\neg B)
               '-(A\implies\neg B)
               '-(A\equiv A\lor\neg B)' etc.

4a. TFFF : (i) 'A' is true no matter whether 'B' is true or false: normal
      schemata
      ...............................................
               '(A.B)\lor(A.B)'

      (ii) It is not the case that 'A' is
      false: conjunction of 2a and 2b
      above; 'A' is sub-subaltern
to 'B'
      ...............................................
               '(AvB).(AvB)'
               '(-A\lor B).(B\lor A)'
               'A\equiv B\lor B'

4b TFTF : (i) 'B' is true no matter whether 'A' is true or false: normal
      schemata
      ...............................................
               '(A.B)\lor(-A.B)'

      (ii) It is not the case that 'B' is
      false:
      ...............................................
      conjunction of 2a and 2c above;
      'A' is sub-superaltern to 'B'
      ...............................................
               '(AvB).(-AvB)'
               '(-A\lor B).(A\lor -B)'
               'B\equiv Av-A'

4c FFFF : (i) Between 'A' and 'B', if one is true, the other is false: normal
      schemata
      ...............................................
               '(A.B)\lor(-A.B)'

      (ii) It is not the case that both
      'A' and 'B' are either true or
      false: 'A' and 'B' are contradic-
tories (exclusive 'or'); 2a. 2d
      ...............................................
               '(AvB).(-AvB)'
               '(-A\lor B).(A\lor -B)'
               '-A\equiv B', 'A\equiv B', etc.

4d TFFT : (i) 'A' and 'B' are both true or both false: 'A' and 'B' are
      equivalents
      ...............................................
               '(A.B)\lor(-A.B)'

      (ii) It is not the case that 'A' is
      true and 'B' is false, or 'B' is true
      and 'A' is false, conjunction of
      2b & 2c
      ...............................................
               '(Av-B).(-AvB)'
               '(B\lor A).(A\lor -B)'
               'A\equiv B'

4e FFTF : (i) 'B' is false no matter whether 'A' is true or false: normal
      schemata
      ...............................................
               '(A.B)\lor(-A.B)'

      (ii) It is not the case that 'B' is
      true conjunction of 2b and 2d
      above; 'A' is con-subaltern
to 'B'
      ...............................................
               '(Av-B).(-Av-B)'
               '(B\lor A).(A\lor -B)'
               '-B\equiv Av-A', etc.

4f FFFT : (i) 'A' is false no matter whether 'B' is true or false: normal
      schemata
      ...............................................
               '(-A.B)\lor(-A.-B)'

      (ii) It is not the case that 'A'
      is true: conjunction of 2c and
      2d above; 'A' is con-superaltern
to 'B'
      ...............................................
               '(-AvB).(-Av-B)'
               '(A\lor B).(A\lor -B)'
               '-A\equiv B\lor B', etc.
Appendix B

In Ch. VII, Section 3, we have taken two examples of syllogism—one scientific, the other historical. It may be noted that they are given in the forms which we come across in everyday scientific and historical explanations, that they are strictly speaking condensed polysyllogisms.

Thus, the given instance of scientific syllogism can be broken up into two: (i) If the sun is higher, the temperature is higher; the sun is higher; therefore, the temperature is higher. (ii) If the sun is higher at 12 than at 7, the temperature is higher at 12 than at 7; the sun is higher at 12 than at 7; therefore, the temperature is higher at 12 than at 7.

Similarly, the given instance of historical syllogism can be split up into many: (i) If a state offers security, the people tend to migrate there; a state offers security; therefore, the people migrate there. (ii) If a state offers no security, the people tend to migrate from there; a state offers no security; therefore, the people migrate from there. (iii) If West Germany offers security the people would migrate there; West Germany offers security; therefore, the people would migrate there. (iv) If East Germany offers no security, the people would migrate from there; East Germany offers no security; therefore, the people would migrate from there. (v) If West Germany offers security and East Germany does not, the people of East Germany would migrate to West Germany; West Germany offers security and East Germany does not; therefore, the people of East Germany would migrate to West Germany.
INDEX

ACCUcULTURATION, 69, 70, 186, 193, 195
Agnosticism, 37, 72, 186
Al Ghazzali, 257
Alienation, 286
Altruism, 163, 232, 274
Analogical method, 88
Anism and magic, 24, 25, 29, 67, 70, 82, 88-91, 195, 201, 213
Antisthenes, 164, 165, 166, 167, 280
Aphrodite, 167
Archaists, 294
Aristippus, 138, 139
Aristotle, on four causes 64, 102, 179; on God 65; on gradation of state 227; on individual 175; on intuition 65; on theory & practice 56
Arjuna, 280
Army of Liberation, 297
Arts and Artefacts, crude, 24, 27, 49, 56, fine, 24, 27, 44, 46, 55, 59, 241; useful, 24, 27, 46, 55, 56, 70, 241
Asceticism, 34, 82, 123, 128, 166-68, 217
Atheists, 186
Auto-suggestion, 121, 124
Avatar, 39, 39, 190, 279
Axiological method, 59, 60, 63
Ayer, Prof. A.J., 108, 276

BEAUTY, 49, 50, 51, 57, 249
Bentham J., 46, 274
Berdyaev, 222, 227, 231
Bergson, H., 64, 66, 115
Berkeley, 271, 273
Bhagwad Geeta, 97n, 125, 220, 221, 285
Bhakti, 278
Bhishma, 280
Bible, The Holy, 260
Biology, 75, 79, 140, 160
Borsodi, Ralph, on classification of society, 227; on general education, 204-05; on government, 248; on gregational ethics, 220; on yogis and elite, 239; on natural resources, 245; on libertarian economy, 242, 246; on psycho-physiological problem, 98; on world federation, 297, 298
Bosanquet, B., 135, 176, 177
Bose, Subhash, 280
Bradley, III, 176, 178
Brahmacharya, 97
Brahman, 39, 279
Braithwaite, Prof., 220
Brown Book, 275
Buddha, 35, 36, 37, 93, 100, 118, 121, 135, 218, 280
Buddhism, 43, 67, 70, 206, 222, 231, 258
CAIRD, JOHN, on ontological proof, 110; on Spinoza, 171
Caird, Edward, on cosmological argument, 105; on ontological argument, 110; on Kant, 110; on Spencer, 143; on Spinoza, 173
Cantor, G., 144
Categorical imperative 43, 50, 109, 107, 233, 234
Cause, scientific, 75, 209; efficient, 64, 102, 174; final, 64, 174; formal, 64, 174; material, 64, 174
Chaitanya, 209
Characteristics, primary, 50, 51; secondary, 50, 51; tertiary, 46, 50, 51, 52; relational, 45, 46
Chase, Stuart, 214
Chiang Kaishek, 220
INDEX

Christ, Jesus, 35, 36, 37, 38, 93, 100, 118, 135, 197, 218, 259, 280
Christianity, and individualism, 38, 262; and mysticism, 168, 259; and humanization, 188, 197; as a system, 15, 38, 43, 67, 70, 203, 206, 218, 220, 222, 224, 231, 258, 265, 285; Kierkegaard’s assertion of, 116; Niebuhr’s statement of, 261; Nietzsche’s rejection of, 149, 150; Pasternak on, 38, 262; Eastern Orthodox, 262, 264; Roman Catholic, 162, 186, 264-65; Protestant, 186, 265; the highest individual in, 38; the open character of, 262; the prime symbol of, 259
Circumcision, 255
Closed society, 236, 252
Collective defence system expedient, 296; high-principled and adequate, 297, 298
Communal society, 237, 253
Communism, and genocide, 70, 225, 286, 287; and social heroes, 38, 216; as a system, 15, 38, 41, 54, 57, 67, 68, 186, 188, 202, 203, 206, 208, 212, 216, 224, 225, 231, 237, 238; closed character of, 268; highest individual in, 39; postulate of, 266; totalitarian character of, 268
Comte, Auguste, 34, 158-63, 216
Contradiction, law of, 40, 58, 80, 133
Conversion, 40, 133, 179, 287
Cooley, 227, 228
Cosmological proof of God, 105, 254
Creationism, 145
Creative evolutionism, 145
Creative principle, 178
Criteria of meaning, 151, 271, 276; of nonfixational culture, 223, 236, 252; of reality, 15, 16, 59, 111; of truth, 49, 151, 152; of value (good), 49, 81, 140, 142, 148, 152
Croce, B., 135
Culture, ch. II; analysis of, 44, 53; and education, 69, 71, ch. VI; and history, 67-71, ch. VII, ch. IX; and religion, 67, 72, ch. III; dynamic, 236, 253; fixational and nonfixational systems of, 67-70; logical and historical systems of, 68; noncommunal, 237, 253; nonfixational system of, 68, 187, 197, 223, 236; nontotalitarian, 237, 253; open, 236, 252
Custom, religious, 92
Cycles, business, 43; of party, crisis, 43
Cynics and cynicism, 34, 164-68, 186, 217

DALAI LAMA, 220
Danilevsky, 222, 231
Dar-ul-Hurb, 188, 189, 224, 257, 258
Dar-ul-Islam, 188, 224, 257, 258
Darwin, 140, 148
Dayananda, 280
Dean Mansel, 103
Democritus, 138
Despotism, 150, 159
Detachment, 164
Determinism, natural, 80, 145, 157, 215; self, 80; spiritual, 157
Dharma, 277
Dialectic, 137; Hegel on, 134; and history, 222; Bosanquet on, 135; Croce on, 135; Dr. Joshi on, 135; Popper on, 135
Diogenes, 164, 166, 280
Distinctness, numerical, 12, 13; qualitative, 12, 13
Dogmatism, 72, 92, 94, 146, 147, 221
Dualism, 163, 167
Dulles, J.F., 220
Durant, Will, 147
Dynamic culture, 236, 253
INDEX

ECLECTICISM, 197
Education, 27, 69, 71, ch. VI; aims of, 186; cultural aim of, 193; in fixational systems, 195, 196; knowledge, aim and character formation, aim of, 194, 195; problem-integrated general 196-98; personal development aim of, 194; prelogical, 182; primary logical, 183; secondary logical, 184; tertiary logical, 186, 243; special method of general, 199, 200; social aim of, 193; utilitarian aim of, 194

Einstein, 144
Emergentists, 145
Empedocles, 148
Empiricist (Empiricism), 29, 31, 59, 61, 63, 68, 186, 200, 214; method, 59, 60; criterion of reality, 63; critique of mysticism, 120, 121; critique of rationalism, 61, 273; criteria of truth and beauty, 50; failure to realize values, 61; rejection of God, 106-108

Empiricist-humanist movement, 202, 237; its theory of facts, 273, 274; its theory of meaning, 271; its theory of values, 274; fixational character of, 69, 275
Enterprise, free, 42, 70, 246, 247, 299; private 42, 70
Epicurus, 31, 138-40, 214
Epistemological method, 60, 63
Escape, 221, 284, 292
Ethics, 140, 161, 220, 274, 275
Eugenics, 149
Evil, 245, 246, 249; Christian theory of, 82; eradication of, 132; genesis of, 40, 130; Russell on, 145; rationalist view of, 133
Evolution, creative character of, 81; theory of, 95n; Spencer's account of, 141
Experience possible and actual, 53, 54; mediate and immediate, 15, 16; inner and outer, 25, 55; prelogical and logical, 24, 25, 55; mystical, 118; as a systematic unity of categorial and valuational polarities, 14; systematic, 12, 38, 40, 62, 76
Exploitation, private, 43; state, 43

FANATICISM, 94, 96, 146, 222, 270; and religious reflex, 91; and religious tradition, 92; and spirit, 96, 249, 279; and spiritual religion, 100
Feeling, 14, 46, 57; hedonic, material or axiological, 14, 46, 53, 57, 65, 66, 131; hordic, efficient or ontological, 14, 40, 46, 53, 57, 59, 64-67, 80, 113, 131, 180; method of, 59; peripherally and centrally excited, 46
Fixation 14, 40, 42, 59, 60, 62, 67, 78, 79, 81, 87, 114, 130, 131, 133, 163, 180, 181, 196, 197
Fixational Cultures, ch. V, 197; highest individuals in, 29-37; materialist, 137, 138-47; humanist, 137, 147-63; idealist 138, 163-80; logical, 68; historic (partly), 67, 68
Force, 141, 142, 143
Frazer, 89
Frege, 144
Friendship, 140, 214

Gandhi, 38, 221, 261, 285
General will, 99, 249
Genocide, 70, 201, 217, 220, 240; as a method of alienation, 286; and democracy, 286; and nationalism, 287; as a method of communist imperialism, 70, 213, 224, 286-92
God, 27, 36, 38, 65, 66, Ch.IV; and the absolute, 36, 37, 39, 72, 76, 81, 102, 123, 173, 178-81; and sublime, 37, 76, 102, 123; and the mystics, 120; as a des-
criptive phrase, 123; as the highest individuation of the absolute, 114; as the meetingground of the sublime and the absolute, 114; atonement with, 124, 128; empiricist rejection of, 108, 120, 121; failure of rationalist proofs of, 110, 111; James on, 156; mystical evidence on, 102, 116-124; Pringle-Pattison on, 110, 111, 180; proofs of the existence of, 103-115; rationalist evidence on, 102-161; rationalist refutation of, empiricist rejection of, 109-110, 121-122; romanticist-rationalist support for the ontological proof, 112; Spinoza on, 172-174.

Gomperz, 166n

Good, 51

Grand Etre, 34, 162

Greek religion, 274

Gregational, behaviour, escape and resistance, 284; escape, 292; genocide, 286; resistance, 296

Gregational ethics, 41, 201, 220, 221, 232, Ch. X; and history, 282; nature and scope of, 282; solution of the problem of, 283, 296

Gregational feeling, 236, 253, 258, 270

Happiness, 53, 57, 78, 107, 142, 162, 193, 250

Harrison, F., 143

Hatha yoga, 125

Havell, E., 212

Hegel, 36, 61, 134, 135, 144, 174, 219, 267

Hedonists, egoistic, 31, 137, 138, 187, 293; utilitarian, 32; universal, 32, 233, 275

Heraclides, 163

Heraclitus, 147, 148

Heroes, egoistic, 33, 38, 216; national, 34, 38, 216; universal, 34, 38, 216

Hinduism, as a system, 15, 39, 43, 67, 70, 91, 203, 206, 207, 212, 218, 222, 224, 231, 258; major premise of, 277; open character of, 279; the highest individual in, 39, 279; weak gregational feeling in, 280; and humanization, 188

Historic Cultures, Ch. IX, enumeration of, 233; breakdown of, 293; Christianity, 259; Communism, 266; Empiricist-humanist movement, 271; Hinduism, 277; Islam, 254

History, Ch. VII, and logic, 225; critical philosophy of, 219; fixational attitudes to, 213; in theory and practice, 206; on the level of perception, 207; on the level of science, 208; on the level of philosophy, 212; speculative philosophy of, 222; the philosophy of, 219; units of intelligible, 222

Historicism, 217, 219, 268

Höfifding, 119

Holiness, 250

Honesty, 82, 98, 99

Howlett, Rev. Duncan, 259n, 263


Humanization, 70, 187, 188, 196, 270

Hume, 84, 105, 271

Idealism, 42, 68, 136, 163-81, 200, 204; ascetic or monadistic, 30, 34, 80, 163-68, 216, 223, 293; ethical or messianic, 30, 35, 38, 39, 80, 168-75, 193, 194, 217, 224, 256; absolute, 30, 36, 80,
INDEX

175-81, 218, 223; failure of, 179
Ideologies, 41; test of, 199, 200
Idolatry, 92
Illusionism (Māyāvāda), 103, 132, 175
Imperialism, 70, 291
Indirect communication, in Kierkegaard's philosophy, 66, 116
Individual, 1, Ch. 1; as a systematic unity, 29; as the subjective determinant of value, 49, 52; constituents of human, 24; component of human, 28; form of human, 28, 29; in the general sense, 14-24; in the special sense, 24-43; Kierkegaard's category of the, 116; Pringle-Pattison on, 175; the developing, 39; the highest, 28-39, 76, 238, 278
Individualism, 41, 43, 280, 281
Individualization, 69, 70, 186-91
Individuation, 177, 178, 270
Inquisition, 146, 147, 162, 163
Instincts, 59, 83, 86; level of, 24, 25, 169; material for religion from, 91
International Police Force, 43, 300
Intuition, 170
Islam, as a system, 15, 43, 67, 70, 203, 206, 207, 212, 220, 222, 224, 231, 254; failure to become the world culture, 258; open character of, 256; protocol of, 254; the highest individual in, 38, 256; and humanization, 188
James, William, on mind, 83, 84; on morality, 154; on mysticism, 118, 119, 124, 125; on materialism, 153; on God, 156; on idealism, 155; on religion, 155; on desires, 87; on feeling, 64, 65; pragmatism, 33, 150-58, 215; on schoolmen's theism, 155 Joachim, H. H., on evil, 133; on Spinoza, 170n
Joshi, Dr. N. V., on dialectic, 135; on ontological proof, 110 (112n) on individuation, 179, 180
Judaism, 67, 223, 232
Justice, 98, 99, 241, 246
Kalidasa, 97
Kant, 156; on individual, 235; on happiness and virtue, 56, 108; on knowledge, 72; on proofs of God's existence, 104, 106, 107; categorical imperative, 100; transcendental imagination, 65; ideal of reason, 76, 180; kinds of judgments, Introduction 2, 3
Karna, 280
Khrushchev, 39, 220, 280, 291, 292
Kierkegaard, S. 64, 66, 115
Kroeber, 222, 227, 231
Lamarck, 141
Langer, Susan, 122n
Langlois, 219
Laplace, 141
Law (Laws), moral, 78, 79, 80, 100, 107; of development of cultures, 223; of functional dependence, 75, 208, 209; of nature, 77, 97, 160, 204, 215; of state, 35, 98, 165; social, 78, 204, 209, 210; scientific, 74, 202, 208, 210
Leibniz, 130
Lenin, 38
Levels of experience, 24, 85, 227
Liberalism, effete, 41, 281; world, 15, 38, 39, 41, 68, 69, 70, 189, 193, 205, 218, 257, 280, 292
Libertarianism, 156, 243, 246
Locke, 104, 270, 273
Logical, analysis, 62, 135; methods, 57; mind, 83; primary, 58, 59, 182, 201; secondary, 58, 59, 70, 185, 202; tertiary, 58, 59, 186, 203; experience, 24, 25, 55, 57
Logomachy, 146, 164, 199
Lucas, J. R., 220

MAN, magician, 29, 89; priest, 29; commonsense, 29, 31; productive, 29, 31; hedonistic, 30, 31, 32; heroic, 30, 39, 280; ascetic, 30, 34, 39, 280; messianic, 30, 35, 36, 38, 39, 189, 262, 263, 280; harmonious, 29, 30, 36, 37, 38, 39, 193, 256, 262, 280

Mao, 39, 280, 292

Martyrdom, 294

Marx, 38, 216, 228, 266, 280


Mathrani, G. N., 52n. 121n

McDougall, on mind, 84; on propensities, 85, 86

Meaning, 48, 49; of culture, 44; of fine arts, 44; of meaning, 276; of philosophy, 44; of religion, 44, 72, 73; of truth, 49; of value, 47, 48

Method, analogical, 88; axiological, 60; dialectical, 134, 136, 223; epistemological, 60, 63; fixational (methods), 59, 62; genocidal, 70, 201, 212, 217, 220, 240; historicist, 219; nonfixational, 59; of logical analysis, 62; of logical feeling, 60; of moral sciences, 80; of natural sciences, 77; of prelogical feeling, 59; of social sciences, 78; of symposia, 151; of theoretical history, 220; praxiological, 60, 63; preaxiological, 60; revolutionary or immoral, 268; statistical, 210, 211

Mill, 274

Mind, logical, 83; constituents of, 85; James on, 83, 84; Hume on, 84; McDougall on, 84; teleological character of, 84

Minority, creative, 150, 151, 239, 249, 250, 292; dominant, 150, 151, 240, 244, 250, 251, 269, 292

Mohammed, 36, 37, 38, 93, 100, 135, 254, 256, 280

Moitra, Dr. S. K., 112n

Moksha, 277

Monoideism, 118

Monotheism, 93, 159, 254

Montessori, 184

Moore, G. E., 156, 275, 276

Moral, freedom, 43; philosophy, 79, 282; proof of God, 108, 254; law, 35, 78, 80, 108, 164, 165; pursuits, 54; value, 42; self, 54, 79, 233

Moses, 37, 93, 100, 260, 280

Mystical experience, and godliness, 122; bliss in, 277; characteristics of, 118; ineffability of, 118; noetic quality of, 118; mea.s to, 125-28; Russell's rejection of, 147

Mystics and mysticism, 39, 66, 82, 115-24

NANAK, 207

Natural monopolies, 42, 70, 246

Nehru, Pt., 39, 263, 281, 297

Newton, 144

Niebuhr, Reinhold, on attitude to nature, 245; on Christianity, 262 on evil, 169

Nietzsche, 32, 148-50, 215

Nisus, 40, 131, 184, 186

Non-fixational culture, 223, 236, 253

Noncommunal society, 237, 253

Nontotalitarian culture, 237, 253

Northrop, 222, 227, 231

Nunn, Sir Percy, 192, 195

ONTLOGICAL, method, 59, 60; proof of God, 103

Open society, criterion of, 236, 252; in relation to nature, 244; in relation to itself, 245; in relation to spirit, 249
Organism, biological, 77, 147; human, 21; moral, 169, 218, 258; physical, 96; spiritual, 96; social, 142, 157, 169, 218, 257
Orwell, George, 215

PASTERNAK, BORIS, on Christ, 38; on communist characters, 39, 217, 268; on individualism, 38
Pearson, Lester, 297
Peirce, C., 151, 275
Perception, 24, 26, 49, 74, 226, 274
Personality, 83, 87, 88, 94; philosophy, 24, 26, 44, 75, 241; gradation of, 73, 74, 77; Indian, 56, 97, 118, 125, 126, 127; level of, 24, 59, 75; of education, 71, 204; of history, 71, 208; of mathematics, 73, 77, 78; of morals, 42, 74, 77, 79, 201; of nature, 42, 73, 77, 135, 215; of religion, 74, 77, 80, 137; of society, 42, 74, 77, 78, 136, 207, 215; political, 74, 77, 79
Physics, 75, 140, 160
Plato, 35, 56, 73, 76, 227
Polar opposites, 14, 62, 66
Policy, of containment, 296; of disengagement, 296; of intervention, 296; of 'neutrality', 296
Polytheism, 93, 158
Popper, Karl, on balance of power, 248; on dialectic 134; on law of contradiction, 58; on theory of sovereignty, 248
Positivism, 159
Positivists, logical, 271
Possibility, empirical, 271; logical, 271; psychological, 54
Pratt, J. B., 128
Praxiological method, 60, 63, 64
Prayer, 92, 128
Prelogical, level, 25, 55, 226; culture, 88-92; education, 182
Priesthood, 92
Principle, creative, constitutive or metaphysical, 14, 76, 102, 112, 180; logical, synthetic, regu-}

lative or formal, 16, 63, 64, 76, 80, 112, 135, 181
Pringle-Pattison, A. S., on Comte, 163; on idealism, 175-180; on individual, 175-179; on ontological proof, 110, 111
Problems of prelogical level, 201; of primary logical level, 201; of secondary logical level, 202; of tertiary logical level, 203
Prometheus, 163
Promiscuity, 294
Prophetism and Monky, 88, 92-96, 263
Protagoras, 272
Prudence, 139, 195
Psychology, 75, 80, 83, 84, 139, 201; abnormal, 116; depth, 87; general, 80, 83-88, 117; of religion, 88-94, 117, 118
Purity, 82, 96, 97
Pythagoras, 73, 82

QUINE, W. V., 7
Quran, The holy, 255

RĀMA, 280
Rāmakrishna, 280
Rāmānuja, 280
Rao, M. V. Balakrishna, 53n
197n
Rao, Prof. M. A.; Venkata, 244n
Rashdall, 275
Rationalist (transcendental), critique of empiricism, 61; criterion of reality, 63; ethics, 274, 275; evidence on God, 102; failure to prove God, 111; fixation of the logical principle, 114; method of subjective reason or axiology, 60; postulate of God, 109; validation of religion, 72; view of evil, 132
Reality, 51; criterion of, 16, 17, 138
Realization, 53, 57, 73; component of, 57; fixational and nonfixa-
tional, 15, 59, 60, 62; mystical, 115-24, 253, 258, 279; objective and subjective, 17, 57, 233; theoretical and practical, 17, 26, 27, 46, 54, 55, 56, 57, 63, 89, 90, 124, 169, 233

Reason, 14, 47, 58; as mediate experience, 17; a priori, nonempirical, 61; empirical, 60, 61; fixational methods of, 60; formal and final, 16, 57; level of, 24, 26; material of religion from, 92; methods of, 58, 59; principle of, 40; religion of, 92, 93, 94; theoretical and practical, 63, 104, 169, 180; valutational, 61, 212

Reflex action, 59, 83, 86; level of, 24, 25; material of religion from, 88

Relativism, 60, 64, 69, 191

Religion, Ch. III, 44, 73; as an experience, 82; as the highest value, 81, 82; a theoretical realization, 124-29; Bergson on, 115; corporate, 90; distinctive character of, 102; dynamic, 66, 93, 115; holy wars of, 92; James on, 155; John Wisdom on, 72; Kierkegaard on, 115; meaning of, 73; of reason, 92-94; on the instinctual level, 91-92; on the reflex action level, 88-90; origin of, 90; philosophy of, 73, 80, 81, 135; practical programme of, 94-96; spiritual, 94; static, 93; traditional, 66, 114; validation of, 72

Religious discipline, 82, 94, 123-29; mythology, 101; value, 81-82, 88, 103

Resistance, 220, 280, 284, 296

Reves, Emery, 210, 221, 284n

Righteousness, 82, 96, 99, 257, 261

Rights, human and property, 250, 251

Romanticist-Rationalist, articulation of mystical method, 112; evidence on God, 102; sifting of mystical experience, 116; support for the ontological proof, 112; validation of religion, 72; view of the individual, 191; view of feeling, 64, 65

Roy, M. N., 280

Ruling class, 42, 93

Russell, B., 32, 143-47, 214

Ryle, G., 104

SARTE, J. P., 236

Scepticism, 37, 72

Schmidt, 90n

Schoolmen, 104

Schubert, 222, 227, 230, 231

Schweitzer, 38, 262

Science, 24, 26, 54, 55, 59, 70, 73-75

151, 183, 202, 241

Scientia intuitiva, 172

Scientism, 29, 31, 59, 68, 150, 196, 203, 214

Secularism, 136, 280

Seignobos, 219

Self, lower and higher, 35, 41, 56, 57, 58, 64, 80, 82, 127, 131, 134, 168, 191, 237, 239; material, 73, 77, 88, 92, 130, 136, 233; social, 78, 88, 99, 130, 136, 232, 233; spiritual, 78, 88, 99, 131, 137, 163, 175, 233; systematic unity of selves, 95n; trichotomy of, 95n

Shakespeare, 99

Shankara, 282

Shivaji, 282

Sidgwick, 275

Significant analysability, 44, 276

Society, Ch. VIII, as a community, 226; as a systematic unity, 234; classification and typologies of, 227; criteria of open and dynamic, 236; gradation of, 233; noncommunal, 237; nontotalitarian, 237; open, 236, 244; organized and unorganized (gregations), 229; primary and nonprimary, 228
INDEX

Sociology, 78, 140, 157, 158, 160, 201, 210
Solon and Lycurgus, 140
Sorokin, 221, 227, 231
Spencer, 32, 140-43, 214
Spengler, 221, 231
Spinoza, 35, 56, 61, 130, 168-74
Spiritual pride, 95, 168, 252, 280
Sprachspiel, 198
Sri Aurobindo, 132, 165, 280
Sri Krishna, 36, 37, 280
Stalin, 38, 288, 292
State, individualistic, 249; interventionism, 17, 243, 290; wel-
farist, 237, 240, 258, 294
Static culture, 236, 253
Stebbing, S., 51, 219
Stoics, 107, 163
Subject and object, 17, 25, 26, 29,
44, 45, 49, 52, 54, 56, 57, 62,
63, 64
Sublimation, 87, 88, 93, 125, 257
Sublime, 37, 75, 117, 123, 128
Sufis, 257
Summun Bonum, 97, 107
Systematic, experience, 12, 40, 57,
58, 62, 75; unity, 14, 19, 21-24, 43, 47, 54, 72, 81, 82,
87, 174, 279, 280

TAYLOR, A. E., 132, 179
Teleological proof of God, 105
Teleology, final, 179, 180; human,
79, 80; pattern of, 84; process
of, 85; Russell on, 145
Theism, 30
Theory and practice, 17, 24, 26, 27,
44, 49, 54, 55, 56, 57, 85, 186,
199, 277
Tolerance, 136
Totalitarian culture, 236, 237,
252, 253
Toure, Sekou, 263
Toynbee, A., 221, 222, 227, 230,
231, 295
Traditionalism, 29, 68, 195, 196
Tradition and custom, 88, 91-92,
201, 202
Tranquillity, 138
Trinity of God, 259
Truancy, 294
Truth, 50, 51, 249, 250; com-
monsense criterion of, 49; cor-
respondence theory of, 49, 272,
273; criterion of, 49, 151, 198,
276; cult of, 146; formal
coherence theory of, 49; philo-
sophical coherence theory of,
49; pragmatic theory of, 49,
152, 272; meaning of, 49, 151,
198, 275; scientific criterion of,
49, 152
Tukārām, 207
ÜBERMENSCH, 33, 150, 215
UN, 286, 297
Unemployment, concealed, 43; involuntary, 43
Unity, aggregate, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
43; dependent, 18, 19, 20, 21,
22, 43; independent, 18, 19, 20,
21, 22, 76, 80, 236, 254, 257;
interdependent, 18, 19, 20, 21,
22, 77, 80, 81, 236; organic,
18, 19, 20, 21, 22; systematic,
12, 14, 19, 22, 24, 43, 47, 54, 72,
80, 81, 88, 236; human, 280
Utilitarianism, 56, 248, 274
Utility, 51, 56

VALETUDINARIAN, 139, 148
Value, 43, 44, 75, 76; constituents
of, 45, 46, 52; component of,
45, 46, 52; form (meaning
statement and criteria state-
ments) of, 45, 47, 52; deter-
minants of, 45, 47, 49, 50, 51,
52; realization of, 44; realizer
of, 47, 53
Value-adjectives, 50, 51, 52
Vedic religion, 73, 74, 81, 82
Verbalism, 60
Verifiability, 277, 278
Verification, 112, 151, 152
INDEX

Virtue, 32, 57, 107, 163, 249, 250
Vivekananda, 280
Vocations, 56, 194; primary, 27, 183, 194, 225, 243; secondary, 27, 184, 194, 225, 243; tertiary, 27, 186, 194, 224, 225, 243, 244
Voluntary, cooperation, 42, 70, 78, 79; experience or action, 26, 86, 87

WALSH, W. H., 217
Welfare society, 192, 193, 194
Well-being, 42, 78, 93, 95, 99, 100, 149, 165

Wisdom, J. O., 6
Wisdom, John, 28, 51, 72, 74, 120, 157, 209, 276, 278
Withdrawal, 34
Wittgenstein, L., 271, 275
World Federation, 43, 193, 281, 297
Worship, 92, 127, 128

YOGA, 97, 125, 168, 277
Yogi, 239
Yudhisthira, 221, 222, 285

ZOROASTER, 37, 93, 236, 280
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