Indian Round Table Conference

12th November, 1930—19th January, 1931

PROCEEDINGS OF SUB-COMMITTEES

(Volume VII)

[SUB-COMMITTEE No. VII (Defence)]

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

Proceedings of the Indian Round Table Conference in plenary session, and in Committee of the whole Conference, are contained in a separate volume, the Introductory Note to which explains, briefly, the procedure adopted by the Conference.

Proceedings of Sub-Committees are contained in nine volumes as below:


" II.—Provincial Constitution.

" III.—Minorities.

" IV.—Burma.

" V.—North-West Frontier Province.

" VI.—Franchise.

" VII.—Defence.

" VIII.—Services.

" IX.—Sind.
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INDIAN ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE.

SUB-COMMITTEE No. VII.

(Defence.)

The Sub-Committee was constituted as follows:

Mr. J. H. Thomas (Chairman).
The Earl Peel.
Sir Samuel Hoare.
The Marquess of Reading.
The Marquess of Lothian.
H.H. The Maharaja of Alwar.
H.H. The Nawab of Bhopal.
H.H. The Maharaja of Bikaner.
H.H. The Maharaja of Kashmir.
H.H. The Maharaja of Patiala.
Sir Akbar Hydari.
Sir Mirza M. Ismail.
Colonel K. N. Haksar.
Mr. Srinivasa Sastri.
Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru.

Diwan Bahadur M. Ramachandra Rao.
Diwan Bahadur Rama- swami Mudaliyar.
Sir Phiroze Sethna.
Mr. M. R. Jayakar.
Dr. B. S. Moonje.
Mr. B. V. Jadhav.
Sir B. N. Mitra.
Sardar Sahib Ujjal Singh.
Sir Hubert Carr.
Sir Muhammad Shafi.
Mr. M. A. Jinnah.
Dr. Shafa’at Ahmad Khan.
Nawab Sir Abdul Qaiyum.
Raja Sher Muhammad Khan.

with the following terms of reference:

"On questions of political principle relating to defence, other than strictly constitutional aspects to be considered under heads 6 (Powers of the Executive) and 12 (Relations with the Crown)."

(Note.—The terms of reference are meant to include such questions as Indianisation, but to exclude minor administrative matters such as the number of Sikh Regiments, etc.)

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST MEETING OF SUB-COMMITTEE No. VII (Defence) HELD ON 7TH JANUARY, 1931.

Chairman: Your Highnesses and Gentlemen. I want to relieve your anxiety right away by intimating that I do not think it will be possible for us to finish our business to-night, and therefore we want, so far as this evening’s Conference is concerned, to take a
general review of our terms of reference. You will gather that our terms of reference exclude the Constitutional aspect of the question in the wider sense. A few moments ago reference was made to that. The real object of this Committee's work, I am going to suggest to you not with a view of insisting that there could be no alteration, might, I consider, be classed under four heads; first, what is broadly called the Indianisation of the Indian Army; in short what steps (if any) and how best we can accomplish a common ideal which can be summarised in a sentence that I will use—to give a better opportunity to the Indian soldier to attain the rank and position that he desires and to which his ability entitles him. I would prefer to use that short definition of what is called the Indianisation of the Army. The second matter under that same category would be this. If it was decided, as I personally hope it will be, that more responsibility must be given, what ought to be the necessary steps to be taken to bring that about? Obviously the first question that arises under that head is: ought there to be in India the same opportunity for the training of officers that exists in this country? In other words, whether you are to have in the future a Sandhurst, if I may use that short phrase, in India? Both these questions, I put it to you, come under the first category which I mentioned.

Secondly, there is the question whether any separate force should be raised and maintained outside the Regular Army on the lines discussed in paragraph 211 of the Statutory Commission's Report, and to which the Government of India's Despatch also makes reference.

Now, that would naturally raise in a very concrete form the question of whether you ought to have, and whether it is necessary in connection with any defence force—Army, Navy or Air Force—what I would call for short a unified control. No one who gives two moments' consideration to the matter could assume that you could have an Army separate and with dual authority; therefore the question naturally arises as to what I would call for short unified control.

H.H. The Maharaja of Kashmir: That is No. 4.

Chairman: That would be No. 2. I am summarising it in my own way. For the moment I will call it my No. 1 and my No. 2.

Thirdly, there would arise the question of the establishment of a military council. That, again, would be necessary in order to ensure any form of unified control, and the question would be, to whom that council should be responsible.

Then the next question, which is not the least difficult, would be the financial liability of India for the general cost of defence. That is not a new subject; it is one that has occupied the attention of Indian politicians for a long time and various suggestions have been made with regard to it.

At all events, I put to you that those four questions cover in the main our terms of reference. There may be others, but I put them
in that form because I think it will then avoid the possibility of us getting into a general discussion on a matter that has already been the subject of discussion in another Committee, the general defence of India. All that is work for the other Committees. I put it to you as a general proposition that the terms which I have already indicated cover in the widest possible sense the kind of questions that we, as a Committee, are called upon to consider. I only say that as a layman and not as a soldier, and the virtue of my position may be affected by the fact that I am not a soldier and that you may have an added advantage over me when we are talking about defence questions.

Sir M. Shafi: Which other Committee are you thinking of?
Chairman: The Committee that has just adjourned.
Sir M. Shafi: But that Committee discusses only the constitutional aspect of defence.
Chairman: That is right.
Sir M. Shafi: That is all.
Chairman: That is what I have said; we will not go into the constitutional aspect of defence at all.
Sir M. Shafi: May I make a suggestion?
Chairman: Certainly.
Sir M. Shafi: I should like to suggest that the members of this Committee should be supplied with a copy of the preliminary address that you have just delivered setting out the points of our discussion so that we may have it in front of us when we are dealing with the various matters.

Chairman: Certainly, that shall be done, but I do not want that to be laid down as decision.
Sir M. Shafi: No, No.
Chairman: What I had to do was to apply myself to the problem as I saw it and give a general review of what appeared to me to be our functions; and although we will arrange, of course, for that to be circulated it must not be taken that that lays down the laws of the Medes and Persians.
Sir M. Shafi: That is right.
Mr. Jinnah: Our terms of reference are these, to consider questions of political principle relating to defence other than the strictly constitutional aspect which is being considered by the Federal Committee. Then there is the question of relations with the Crown. When will that come up?
Chairman: Again, I do not dogmatise, but I have thought of it, and I have come to the conclusion in my own mind that they cannot be separated. For instance, when there is talk of dominion status you must keep this in mind. There is a form of Commission that is essentially a Dominion Commission as distinct from the King's Commission. I never disguised from the Imperial Conference that I hated the separation but it is for you to say. Therefore it is
involved in the question of a unified system, so that I think for all practical purposes they should be discussed together. It may be that you would make separate recommendations, and it may be that in a general discussion they may be discussed together.

Mr. Jinnah: In this Committee?

Chairman: In this Committee.

Mr. Jinnah: Therefore except for the strictly constitutional aspect we discuss the rest?

Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Sastrī: Does this classification cover the question of the rate of Indianisation? I am not clear.

Chairman: Obviously it does for this reason. Again, as I have said, I am not speaking as an officer, but when you talk about the rate of Indianisation that is a phrase, but in its practical application what it means is this. What could be the period where training and experience would warrant responsibility being given to a certain person? It is not a question of saying Smith or Brown, or Robinson is entitled to be called General, but it is that Smith, Brown and Robinson have graduated through a period of experience and of training that fits them and makes them competent to be Generals. Therefore that cannot be determined by (I put it to you as it appears to me) a resolution; because you could declare if you like that on and after 5 years every officer should be an Indian. That would be a declaration and a resolution. It might sound popular, but if in practice when it was worked out you knew perfectly well that in five years they would not be competent to take that position, and that no Britisher would be competent to take it in five years, not because they would not be competent because they were Indians but because they would not have the necessary experience, it would be merely (to use a Canadian phrase) "humbug" to say it.

Mr. Sastrī: I understood you to mean that. I was anxious to raise a different point. What I had in mind was the rate at which Indian officers would be recruited to replace the British officers now in command? That was the rate of Indianisation that I meant.

Chairman: I see your point.

Mr. Sastrī: I thought your classification would not include that.

Chairman: Let us see what the position is at the moment. A certain number of Cadets go to Sandhurst—it suits their parents to have them trained, and so on—and opportunities are provided for those Cadets ultimately to take their place in the Indian Army. That is one point. Supposing you were to decide that it would be a good thing to establish a Sandhurst in India. I could conceive of you doing that and not excluding Indian public schoolboys from still attending Sandhurst here if some of them so desired. I am not excluding that, but I can conceive an arrangement being worked out in that way. Therefore what you would have would be this. You would have a number of entrants into Sandhurst here who
would be given their opportunity, but you would have a Sandhurst established in India and you would have the nucleus all the time to take their place in the Indian Army. Therefore, if that were the picture that I could conceive we would agree upon, I cannot conceive of you or anyone else being able to answer the question at what period, so far as years are concerned, could the whole of India be, if you like, controlling the Army; for the simple reason, that at the present time it takes, I think, 24 years to 26 years—some of my military experts will correct me—to become even a Lieutenant-Colonel.

Mr. Sastri: 26 years.

Chairman: Very well; that is why it is difficult for me to answer the questions specifically.

Sir B. N. Mitra: So far as the several Heads formulated by you are concerned, I do not think there will be any trouble about them. We want a real Indianisation of the Army and we want the Indianisation of the Army to go on at a very rapid pace consistent with efficiency and the necessary requirements of military training, and things of that kind.

Similarly, with regard to Sandhurst, I do not think there can be any difficulty. Everyone of us is very keen on having a well equipped Sandhurst in India which will satisfy the highest requirements of military training and education.

The real question to my mind is that: are we at this particular moment to leave the question of the Indian Army being Indianised from top to bottom absolutely in a vague condition, or can we decide upon the time within which we may expect—I am not pinning you down to a timetable, to the date and hour—the Indian Army to be Indianised in the true sense of the word? I know that attempts were made to draw up a scheme during the time of Lord Reading when Lord Rawlinson happened to be the Commander-in-Chief. I served on some of these Committees as a Member of Lord Reading's Government, and I should like to know whether your present advisers think it will take, say, about 40 years, or 25 years, or 50 years, or 60 years for the Indian Army to be Indianised, for an indefinite time. I should like some light to be thrown on that aspect of the question, because I believe there were schemes drawn up not by politicians but by very highly placed military officers which were founded on the assumption that the Indian Army could be Indianised within a reasonable distance of time. Reading the Statutory Commission's Report—I confess I speak with all respect to the authors of that Report—the position to my mind is in a very unsatisfactory state, because as the authors of that Report say they cannot stipulate the time, but that it may be in the near future. By the near future I do not mean a year or two. Then they think that the defence of India should always be an Imperial charge. That is a view from which I very strongly dissent. I believe you will find, if you inquire, that schemes have been prepared by the highest of military authorities which would surprise everyone, that such a thing was possible as to Indianise the Army within a reason-
able distance of time. I do not see any reason why at this distance of time after 10 years we should leave that matter in the air. Personally speaking I think, with all respect to the authors of this scheme in the Report, that they did not go as far as some of the other schemes did go. I should like that question to be taken up and discussed. In other words, what I want really is that the objective should be before us that India has to achieve the status of a Dominion and any scheme of Indianisation of the Army which is drawn up must have a direct relationship to that objective. No scheme which has been drawn up yet to my mind has that objective in view. Now we are here, and we may as well be frank, working to achieve the full and complete status of a Dominion within a reasonable distance of time, and I want to know whether such a scheme could be produced by any Army expert, or whether you would give directions that such a scheme should be prepared, so as to satisfy the legitimate wishes of the people in this matter. I do not care about the practical side; that is a matter for the technical experts, but I believe attempts in that direction have been made in the past. I think they should be made more vigorously now.

Sir M. Shafi: I should like to say a few words to supplement what the last speaker has said. Both he and I were members of what was then known as the Military Requirements Committee. After the examination of a large number of witnesses, both official military experts and others, we submitted a Report.

H.H. Maharaja of Alwar: I should like to know whether we are starting on the discussion of the first subject upon the Agenda.

Chairman: For the moment I rather gather that we are having a sort of general discussion as to whether my broad headings cover our views, and then we shall come to each item later.

Sir M. Shafi: If His Highness the Maharaja had waited for a minute before he interrupted, the point of my preliminary remarks would have become clear in a very short time. The Government when Lord Rawlinson was Commander-in-Chief prepared a complete scheme of Indianisation of the Indian Army within a certain period. Probably that scheme is pigeonholed somewhere either in the India Office or in the archives of the Government of India. I understand that this question of the Indianisation of the Indian Army is one of the questions which you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, when you delivered your address. I am sorry I was not here then.

Chairman: That is so.

Sir M. Shafi: In connection with that question, what we would like to know is will materials be supplied to this Committee for the purpose of expressing its own opinion as to the Indianisation of the Indian Army, and will we be allowed to submit for the consideration of the Committee our views regarding the Indianisation of the Indian Army, whether those views are based upon, perhaps, the very schemes prepared by the Government of India or whether those views are based upon our own independent examination of the whole question. Will those materials be before us or not, and will
we be allowed to submit our own views with regard to a scheme of Indianisation to the Committee?

Chairman: I think I had better answer both those questions right away.

Sir Akbar Hydari: I want to understand what is meant exactly by the Indianisation of the Indian Army. Does it mean merely the officering of the Indian portion of the Army in India by Indians and not by Europeans, or does it also mean the replacing of the European troops by Indian troops?

Sir M. Shafti: It means the Indian Army and not the British Army in India, what is known as the British Garrison. That we have nothing to do with. There can be no Indianisation of the British Garrison: it is the Indianisation of the Indian Army.

Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Jinnah: That is exactly what I was saying in the other Committee when you came in. When you talk of the Indianisation of the Army, at the present time our Army is composed of roughly 170,000 Indians and 60,000 British troops. But I am giving very rough figures.

Chairman: I have the figures here.

Mr. Jinnah: Those entitled to the rank of officer number about 3,000 in the Indian Army proper, and the other is about the same number practically, or a little less. Now, when we talk of Indianisation it is a very vague phrase. You see there is a misunderstanding at once. One party understands merely the Indianisation of the officers of the Indian Army proper. Then what is to happen to the other part of the Army? I should like your ruling on this, Mr. Chairman. Is the whole scheme to be discussed; first of all, the Indianisation of the Officer ranks in the Indian Army proper and the replacement of British troops, because as long as that is not done we cannot increase the Indian troops. Therefore it is part and parcel of the whole issue.

Sir Akbar Hydari: That is quite true.

Mr. Jinnah: If you like you can take them separately.

Chairman: But you must; they are two distinct questions. I understood Sir B. N. Mitra's reference to Indianisation when he raised it was the Indianisation of the Indian Army.

Sir B. N. Mitra: Exactly.

Chairman: I understood that and I applied myself to that. That obviously answers your question.

Sir Akbar Hydari: Thank you.

Chairman: Therefore, again, two points have been made; whether I as the Chairman have been supplied with some schemes in the archives of the India Office or the War Office dealing with this problem, and whether those schemes which are intended to define a date for this Indianisation are available to the Committee. That is the first question. I will answer that by saying that I
have been supplied with no schemes and do not want any schemes. I do not want you to have any schemes because any schemes that were so prepared would be valueless in relation to the position in which we find ourselves to-day. Surely as commonsense men we must apply ourselves to the problem as it is and not as it may have been forecast by anyone. That is my first answer. I have no schemes; but if you want any scheme, certainly it will not be a difficult matter to get one for you. I put it to you that it is far better to face the broad common sense of the problem with a clean slate than to be fettered in any way. If you want schemes, do not worry, we will get you them.

Mr. Jinnah: I am very glad to hear that.

Chairman: That is my answer right away.

Now with regard to the second point which was raised, what have you got in your mind as to whether it is fifty years, sixty years, or twenty-five years, or any other years. My answer is that neither the Government nor myself nor anyone approaching this question has got any period in their mind, and we cannot have a period in our mind because we are dealing with a practical proposition that cannot be determined by resolution. The facts are very simple and I repeat them, that if we here unanimously decided that what is called the Indianisation of the Army should take place five years from now, or ten years from now, or any other period that is mentioned, that declaration would be useless unless it carried with it a certainty and knowledge that that Indianisation which was dependent upon competency and experience would materialise by the experience that would be gained in that time, and that experience could not be gained unless it took the form of a process that you have to lay down. I am sure you do not misunderstand me. That is my difficulty; not because I am reluctant to say a period but because if we apply ourselves to a system that will bring that about, however we bring it about, time and circumstances will determine that by the scheme that we formulate and not by the mere declaration that we make.

Sir B. N. Mitra: My meaning was not that I expect you to declare that the whole Indian Army will be Indianised from top to bottom within a period of, say, ——— years; but assuming that we are to achieve Dominion status within a reasonable distance of time I think we must prepare ourselves for the Indianisation of the Army with that object in view. I should very much regret if the whole thing was left in a perfectly vague condition. I do not expect you could within the time at our disposal produce a scheme which would satisfy everyone, but I do certainly want some sort of direction to be given that a scheme must be prepared so that public opinion may be satisfied that there is a reasonable chance of the Indian Army being Indianised within a reasonable distance of time, and that the responsibility of self-defence being made over to the Indian Parliament at some time or other in the near future should be discussed.
Chairman: Is not that then exactly what we are to consider? But if there is any doubt let me remove it right away. So far as we are concerned, if any one has in his mind any view that we, the Government, are against in principle what is called the Indianisation of the Army let me remove that right away. We are not; but that is a phrase. Do let us apply ourselves to the practical application of the question, and that will be the work of our Committee.

Sir B. N. Mitra: I understand the point, but let me put it in another way. We are thinking of starting a Sandhurst in India.

Chairman: Yes.

Sir B. N. Mitra: On what scale we are to start this Sandhurst, what the enrolment is to be, what the amount of staff is to be, and how the various departments are to be regulated, will all depend upon our objective. How many students do we wish to train every year? That can only be determined by the time during which we wish the 6,000 odd officers to become Indians. The questions are all inter-related and we have to have some definite view. I am not sure that we can say twenty years, or twenty-five years or thirty years; but I think we must have some rough idea in our minds.

Chairman: I understand your point.

Dr. Moonje: If the first place, I think there is no organic relation between the acquisition of Dominion status and the acquisition of responsibility for the defence of India because these are quite different things. Somehow or other for reasons which we will not go into here we have not been trained to be prepared to take the responsibility of defence immediately, but that does not mean that India is not fit for the acquisition of Dominion status. The history of the British Empire will show that there are Dominions in the Empire which acquired Dominion status without being absolutely prepared to take the full responsibility of their self-defence. Their defence was guaranteed by the British Empire through its Navy. It is not the fault of the Indians that they are not in a position to take responsibility for the defence of their country. Therefore, it is the duty of the Empire to guarantee the defence of India until we in the natural course of events are in a position to take full responsibility. Therefore I think when we come to details and when practical propositions are made as regards Indianisation and the methods by which Indianisation is to be achieved that itself will decide the period when we shall be in a position to take complete responsibility for the defence of India. I therefore think when the time comes for practical details of Indianisation that in itself we settle the period when India will be in a position to defend herself.

Chairman: Might I suggest something that will save time? I do not want to hear a word about the competency, the qualification, or the desire of India to defend herself. All that may be taken for granted. I do not want to hear any discussion whatever about the advisability of defence because everyone knows perfectly well that India must be defended and that will be an obligation on the
British Empire. Do let us apply ourselves to this simple proposition, a demand that better and greater facilities shall be given to Indian subjects to participate in the value, for what it is worth, of what is called the Indianisation of the Indian Army—what those facilities are to be, how they are to be brought about, what is the control, and what shall take place in the period leading to the ultimate goal. Now, is not that a fair way of summarising the matter?

Mr. Jinnah: Let us get to grips at once. I beg to differ from my friend Dr. Moonje, because that is a different point. The real point is this. The principle we are agreed—Indianisation; Indianisation as rapidly as possible if you like. Let us see what is to be done. With regard to the Indian Army proper—I am speaking from memory now and I am open to correction—we have to think of what will be the vacancies per year. That is the first thing. You cannot possibly turn out people who are already there. I do not think that is suggested by anyone.

Sir B. N. Mitra: No.

Mr. Jinnah: We have 3,000 odd officers in the Indian Army proper. Out of that I believe there are only 70 Indians who hold the King's Commission—70 or 71; I am giving round figures. The remaining number of the 3,000 are British. Out of this total number of the officer ranks every year there is a certain number of vacancies and we have to recruit for those vacancies. You cannot go beyond that.

Dr. Moonje: That is right.

Mr. Jinnah: That is your highest limit. Having got that number—again I am speaking from memory because my mind is really occupied with the other Committee and I have not got my papers with me—I believe there are vacancies for about 100 per year roughly.

Dr. Moonje: 150.

Chairman: Never mind for the moment.

Mr. Jinnah: It may be a few more or less, but I am almost certain it is 100 in the Indian Army. The whole point is this. In the Skeen Committee we were up against this very question, and the question was how many should be Indians out of the 100 every year. You know as well as I do that it was only in 1918 that for the first time an Indian was declared eligible for a King's Commission. Then the Government of India, or the British Government, decided that there should be 10 vacancies for Indians at Sandhurst per year—that is, reserved—and under the present scheme of the Skeen Committee the suggestion is that the number should be increased from time to time. We started with double the number, 20, but that leaves, again, 18 British to be recruited as against 20 Indians. The question of the acceleration of Indianisation will depend upon what you are prepared to agree should be the number of Indians.

Dr. Moonje: That is right.
Mr. Jinnah: That is the first proposition. Out of the 100, or whatever the number may be, what is the number of Indians?

Chairman: 95 is the actual number.

Mr. Jinnah: Very well. The first question, therefore, is this, what is the number of Indians to be? Speaking for myself, and I believe my colleagues agree with me, I think that that number should be fixed, and I want no qualification of any kind whatsoever. Put them to a thorough test. I do not wish the efficiency of the Army to be in the slightest degree impaired because we shall be putting in their hands the property and the lives of 300,000,000 odd people. Therefore I am very strong for rigorous and if, you like, strict tests of their capacity. The question really before this Committee is what is the number you are prepared to give us out of this 95? That is the whole issue.

Chairman: Perhaps some of Their Highnesses have a view on this, because you have to remember, and I am sure you all do, that in addition to the very pregnant question you raised which is the kernel of the whole thing, is also the question of the position of the States.

Mr. Jinnah: Yes, I am not disregarding that.

Chairman: Therefore I would like at this moment, seeing that we have had a general discussion, to have the views of one of Their Highnesses.

H.H. Maharaja of Bikaner: Our idea is that whatever future arrangements we are making will be for a Federal army, and we would like to hear first what our British Indian friends have to say, and then if we have any special observations to make we will make them.

Chairman: As long as that is understood.

Sir Akbar Hydari: The proposition is that all the British officers in the Indian Army should be replaced by Indian officers in the shortest possible time. What then according to expert opinion is the shortest possible time within which that transformation can be effected, and how is that time determined. What are the real elements? What has to be the maximum rate of recruitment of Indian officers in place of the total number of vacancies in the Indian Regiments in the officer ranks, and what is the period that will be required when the higher ranks of the military service will be so filled with Indians that they will be able to command in the fullest sense of the term in war and in peace the Indian portion of the Army? Upon that will depend the answer to the question: what is the time during which the Indian Army can be Indianised to that particular extent?

Chairman: I am so glad you have put that question because it must be one that as practical people we shall apply ourselves to. This is not a question of the competency of a race or a people; everything that I say would be equally applicable to a British soldier as it would be to an Indian soldier but the test is not
whether he is an Indian or whether he is a Britisher; the test is whether he is competent, whether he is qualified and, above all, whether he has reached that stage which, when we are dealing with discipline in the troops, he can command that support that carries his troops with him, because if that is not kept in mind the rest is valueless.

Then the second question you raise is not alone what is his relationship to India as an Indian soldier, but what is his relationship as a Dominion to the rest of the Empire as a fighting unit. Now, all those things must be considered and therefore that is why I refuse to talk about any period.

Mr. Jinnah: The period —

Chairman: Would be determined by circumstances.

Mr. Jinnah: No.

Dr. Moonje: The period will be determined when the practical suggestions are made as regards recruitment. For instance, if a proposal is made to-day that we require 95 recruits every year and we agree that out of that 95 as many as even the whole of it, if possible, had to be recruited from competent people, then it means —

Mr. Jinnah: The period is to be determined —

Dr. Moonje: Pardon me. Supposing we make a concrete proposal in this way, that 95 is the limit of the yearly recruitment for the officers of the Indian Army, and we come to an agreement that out of the 95 as many as possible who are competent are selected, then of course the period will be about 25 or 30 years. When a man has been in the Army for 25 or 30 years he will come to a position in the Army when he will be able to control a Regiment and he will be raised to the rank of Colonel or Lieutenant-Colonel in that way. Therefore the point is out of the 95 how many, if not all, can be recruited from India if the candidates can be got.

Sir M. Shafi: May I point out that it is quite true that any scheme which can be prepared for the Indianisation of the Indian Army will have to take into account the number of vacancies that occur every year, and also as to how many of the vacancies that occur are to go to Indians. When you have prepared such a scheme the scheme itself will determine the period during which the Indianisation is to take place. It is obvious, Dr. Moonje, that the scheme will do that because as vacancies occur and as they are filled up by the appointment of Indians the number of British officers will go on correspondingly diminishing.

Chairman: That is true only up to a point because what we must keep our minds on is this. Supposing there was an examination now. I will take a hypothetical case. There are about 30 of us here round this table. Suppose there was an examination in oratory everyone of us would get through.

Dr. Moonje: Yes.
Chairman: We would all get through. But supposing some other test was to be applied, God knows we might all fail, and therefore you cannot say 95 would pass because there are 95 vacancies. It is dependent upon competency; but again I emphasise, and I think Mr. Jinnah made it quite clear—he took the view that there must be no interference with the test.

Mr. Jinnah: Of course not.

Chairman: I think you made it quite clear that there was to be no difference in the test.

Mr. Jinnah: May I point out that I have now the figure before me and I am taking it from the Report. I think we were wrong as to figures. The normal strength of the cadre of officers of the Indian Army, cavalry and infantry units, has been taken as 3,200.

It is understood that the wastage in that cadre has never been calculated, but it is assumed to be 160. That was the figure supplied to the Committee.

Dr. Moonje: My impression was that it was 150.

Chairman: I am told that what you have quoted from is an error. I do not know, of course.

Sir P. Sethna: It was the figure given to the Committee by the Government.

Chairman: I am told that that is so, but that it was wrong.

Mr. Jinnah: Sir, we have had great difficulty about this figure before. I should therefore like you to be good enough to ascertain now from the Department a definite figure for the wastage per year.

Chairman: I will certainly do so.

Mr. Jinnah: We will call it X for the moment. We will proceed on the footing of X. I think we are off the point when we talk of fixing the period. The period will automatically be fixed according to the scheme. I do not want you to get frightened about this proposal of mine: I do hope it will not frighten anybody here, but suppose I say that from next year there shall be no British recruitment in the Indian Army proper, but that it should be only Indians who should be recruited. I venture to say that within a very short time the officer ranks of the Indian Army proper will be Indianised to the fullest extent.

Dr. Moonje: Say 30 years.

Mr. Jinnah: Therefore really it is no use saying we will do it in 25 years, 30 years or 50 years; it depends on the basis which is laid down.

Chairman: Plus something else. There is not only the test, but I am wondering whether we have taken clearly into account the fact that the first test is not necessarily the final test. I can quite conceive of any number coming through what we may call the Indian Sandhurst at the first test, but are we to assume that over a period of ten, fifteen and twenty years the same qualifications which brought them through the first examination will necessarily
get them through the examination which must be passed in order to be, say, a General? There is that factor to consider.

Mr. Jinnah: May I answer that question at once. In the ordinary course, either the man is fit to go on in the graded promotion, or else he is not fit.

Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Jinnah: Let us assume he has become a Major, and has got as far as that, and that after that he is no good and can never become a Colonel. What will you do with him?

Chairman: I do not know anything about the Army, but I assume that if he gets far enough to be a Major he will be all right as a Colonel. I think he would be found out much earlier than that.

Mr. Jinnah: It does not matter. He will start as a Lieutenant, and he may get stuck somewhere. What will you do with him if he does? Will you keep him?

Dr. Moonje: If he is inefficient, chuck him out!

Mr. Jinnah: You must chuck him out, and then there will be a vacancy.

Chairman: That is why you calculate dates.

Dr. Moonje: Suppose we fix the number at $x$. The first basic point is, are we prepared to say that if we get all the competent and best qualified material in India all the vacancies will be filled by Indians? That is the first basic point, and that will ascertain the period that will be taken for Indianisation.

Sir M. Shafi: The period will be automatic under the scheme. That is the point I was making, and you said "No"—without understanding my point you said "No".

Chairman: I have not looked at any particular schemes, I have been trying to look at the facts. I have already said "What value would any schemes be in the circumstances we are dealing with to-day, where we have a new situation?" It must not be taken if I do this that I am giving necessarily our last word or our views at all or anything of that sort, but, with the sole object of guiding the sub-Committee, would you like me to get out a memorandum on the problem as it exists, giving you the officers, the time, the training that is necessary and so on? It will not be given as an opinion, but as a statement of the problem with which we have to deal. If you think that will help you, I shall be delighted to do that.

H.H. The Maharaja of Bikaner: In this connection I think a point which was discussed a few minutes ago and which was raised by Mr. Jinnah, might also be dealt with in that memorandum. It is not merely a question of an officer passing Sandhurst; he has to qualify for the different grades. Let us suppose that he is a Major, and has to pass an examination to qualify him for commanding a regiment. There must be cases where even now you pass over British officers.
Chairman: Every day.

H.H. The Maharaja of Bikaner: Perhaps we can be given figures for the percentage that do not pass, and that will help us in arriving at the figures.

Chairman: Yes, I see.

Sir M. Shafi: Any scheme of Indianisation of the Indian Army must be based on two things. First of all on the number of vacancies that occur every year, and whether all those vacancies, or a part of those vacancies, are to be filled up by the appointment of Indian officers. If a scheme has already been prepared by the military experts of Government, and has been considered more than once and sent back more than once to the Army Department for reconsideration, and has been finally sanctioned by the Government of India on those two bases, such a scheme would be very desirable material for this sub-Committee to have to assist us in arriving at a correct conclusion. It seems to me this sub-Committee ought to get hold of such a scheme if there is one, and I know there is one, and I can tell you now the period that was fixed at that time for the complete Indianisation of the Indian Army. I can tell you that from memory.

Duwan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao: This was long before self-government and Dominion status had been conceded?

Sir M. Shafi: Yes, it has nothing to do with it, and if that scheme had been sanctioned long ago, as we had hoped it would be, the process would have begun.

Mr. Jayakar: With reference to the point that was made by Sir Muhammad Shafi, I support his suggestion, Sir, because even assuming that all the vacancies that arise during the year—namely 95, or whatever the number is—are filled by Indians, it is a mere matter of making an arithmetical calculation to see that it will be 35 years before all the vacancies will be filled by Indians. If, therefore, a scheme has been prepared in the past, when Dominion status was a very distant vista, and if that scheme lays down a period of time less than 35 years, as I suppose it does, that scheme would be a most valuable contribution and help to our discussion. I therefore support the suggestion of Sir Muhammad Shafi. If such a scheme was prepared in the past, and I understand it was, and was considered by the military authorities and by the Government of India—

Sir M. Shafi: It was prepared by the military authorities.

Mr. Jayakar: If I am not asking too much, may I know what the period of that scheme was?

Sir M. Shafi: Twenty-eight years.

Mr. Jayakar: Then that scheme would certainly be of most material help to us, if we could peruse it.

Sir M. Shafi: It provided for one-third of the Army in the next fourteen years, the next third in seven years and the final third in another seven years. That means twenty-eight years altogether.
Sir B. N. Mitra: In the first place, I should like to know what we are doing. Are we discussing the terms of reference, or are we discussing the first item in the terms of reference?

Sir M. Shafi: We are discussing what we should have before us.

Sir B. N. Mitra: That is a point which must be cleared up, because I have something to say about the terms of reference. Are we discussing at the present moment the terms of reference, or the first item in the terms of reference?

Chairman: I indicated not only the terms of reference, but what I thought the terms of reference covered, and I said that if it met the convenience of the sub-Committee we could have a general discussion on that this evening. It is quite true the discussion may have ranged over rather different ground, but it is not a disadvantage to have the whole matter ventilated, because I think ultimately it will help us. If you want to raise any question on the wider aspect I should certainly like you to do so.

Sir B. N. Mitra: The first point to which I should like to refer is the point raised by Sir Akbar Hydari, which unfortunately seems to have been overlooked in the course of the general discussion, namely whether the terms of reference include this specific question of a reduction in the number of British troops in India and their replacement by Indian troops or by militia, or by something of that sort. Do the terms of reference to this sub-Committee include a consideration of the question of the reduction of the British troops in India?

Chairman: You cannot talk of Indianisation without keeping in mind that it presupposes a reduction in British troops. That is obviously a part of it.

Mr. Jinnah: I understood you to say that.

Sir B. N. Mitra: But so far I think it is admitted that Indianisation means the Indianisation of the officer ranks.

Mr. Jayakar: It means both questions, but they must be kept distinct from each other. That is all.

Sir B. N. Mitra: I do not think it is clear if you read the heads of discussion.

Sir M. Shafi: It is item No. 1 in the scheme of Indianisation.

Chairman: I do not think there can be any doubt about it; everyone knows what Indianisation means.

Sir B. N. Mitra: Indianisation includes both these matters—the Indianisation of the officers in the Indian Army and secondly the reduction of the British troops in India.

Mr. Jinnah: I think the Chairman said—am I right, Mr. Chairman?—that we should take this question separately first, and then deal with the other. That is what I understood.

Chairman: That is it; I said so.

Sir B. N. Mitra: That clears up my point, for therefore that will be one of the items.
Chairman: I should like to suggest this. We could go on in a
general discussion until your time arrived to leave, and yet get
nowhere. It is generally agreed that our terms of reference are
limited in the sense that the broad question of the defence of India
is not involved in our discussion; we have to deal with the Indianisa-
tion of the Army, how it is to be brought about, training and so
on. Now, it has been intimated that there are in existence some-
where—whether it be in the India Office or in the War Office does
not matter—certain definite schemes that apply to the problem that
we are discussing. It is also possible to supply to you other ma-
terial for a proper consideration of the question. If it will help
you, I am prepared to arrange for a little memorandum to be pro-
duced that will give you any schemes that will bear upon this
matter, and the facts of the situation, and what it is we are trying
to accomplish, and the broad outline of the scheme to that end. It
is not because this will represent the views of the British Govern-
ment, but because this material may be of assistance to you in
forming a decision. Would you like me to do that? (Cries of
"Yes.") Then I will undertake to do it.

Sir P. Sethna: It will help us greatly if we can get the scheme
referred to by Sir Muhammad Shafi, because the Skeen Committee
was appointed in 1926, and according to the recommendations of
that Committee, which are to be found in one of the schedules,
half the strength, namely 1,600 officers, would be Indians at the
end of 25 years, whereas according to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and
Sir Muhammad Shafi, a scheme which was prepared under the
advice of the military experts five years previously Indianised the
whole Army of 3,200 officers within 28 years. I think, therefore,
that if that scheme were placed before us, it would help us greatly
in arriving at a decision.

Chairman: The object is not necessarily to see something that
favours our views, but to have the facts and material which will
enable us to arrive at a right conclusion.

Sir P. Sethna: The facts are there, according to these speakers.

Chairman: I do not know anything about it, but whatever the
facts are I will get them for you. We want them as material for
our guidance. If we can get that out in time I will try and let you
have that sometime to-morrow. Would that enable you to meet on
Friday? (Cries of "Yes.") There would be no point in meeting
to-morrow if you do not get the material till then.

Sir M. Shafi: For Mr. Wedgwood Benn's information, so that
he can get that scheme at once, may I mention the fact that the
orders issued with regard to the Indianisation first of four units,
and ultimately of eight, were orders issued on that scheme. I
think that gives him a clear indication of what scheme I mean.

Lieut.-Colonel Gidney: Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to ask
you, in preparing that memorandum would you give us facts of this
nature: say we accepted 50 years as a limit, for every 5 years what
would be the proportion of British and Indian officers, say at 10, 15 or 20 per cent. recruitment, so that we would know exactly every five years how many Indians and how many British would be in the officer rank.

**Chairman:** That will be a mathematical calculation.

*(The sub-Committee adjourned at 6-45 p.m.)*

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**PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND MEETING OF SUB-COMMITTEE NO. VII (DEFENCE) HELD ON 9TH JANUARY 1931.**

**Chairman:** In accordance with promise, I have had circulated to you the papers which give you the various details asked for about rates of wastage and the various schemes with proposals for rates of Indianisation to which reference has been made.

As I pointed out, it is easy to show a mere mathematical rate of complete Indianisation on paper, but as practical men it is a workable scheme that we desire, and not a mere declaration. It may therefore briefly be stated that if all recruitment for British officers is stopped the day that the output from an Indian Sandhurst starts, and if the output from that Sandhurst is calculated to meet the normal wastage, it will then be roughly 35 years before the last British officer is eliminated from the Indian Army; and if, in accordance with the view which some have expressed, it is not desired immediately to stop entire British officer recruitment, then the period will be 35 years after the last British officer has been recruited.

This is based upon a purely mathematical calculation; but, as was said by several speakers on Wednesday, the complete elimination of the British officer—or, if you prefer to put it so, the complete Indianisation of the Indian Army—is not a preliminary necessary in the nature of things to the full attainment of responsible government. As was so well stated by several delegates on Wednesday all the Dominions are at present still dependent on the British Navy to protect them.

The above statement is a mathematical answer to the question you asked. Those of you who are soldiers and who have had experience of war will realise that the entire new creation of an officer class is not merely a mathematical calculation alone. The question of your defence is too vital a one to take chances with, and I feel sure that the more responsible you are for your own government, the more must this aspect of the Army weigh with you. The question to be worked out, therefore, is what is a safe and a wise rate of progress in substituting the Indian officer for the British officer in the Indian Army, and whether it is necessary to eliminate the British officer completely at the earliest period, always assuming that there is a common object in view, namely the protection and defence of India. So far as I am aware, this claim has not been made in the Services sub-Committee, and I should imagine that if
the retention of a British element is necessary in civil occupations, it is far more so in the sphere of defence.

It will be remembered that the Skeen Committee recommended that the original proposals made in your Legislative Assembly, namely that the majority of Commissions should be given to the martial classes in the proportion in which those races provided recruits for the Army, should be dropped, and that recruitment for officers should be spread on a broader basis. That, shortly, was the recommendation of the Skeen Committee. Recruitment for the Army will presumably still continue to be made from those classes which have been found to provide the best soldiers, if we are to make sure that the defence is adequate.

It is therefore not difficult to realise that no mere mathematical calculation can establish that the future officers of your own, selected as recommended by the Skeen Committee, will be efficient leaders of their men. I repeat that it is not merely a question of that kind; it is a practical question which can be answered only in process of time and by the association both in peace and war; and it will be obvious that while this process is going on your defence must not be jeopardised by making an experiment on too large a scale.

If, therefore, this Conference considers that a training college should be established in India at an early date, the British Government at least see no objection. I would urge that it should start on a sound foundation so that it can be developed in the light of time and experience. Therefore, whilst we would all agree that the Indianisation of the Army is a desirable end and something to work for, it is not one which need necessarily precede fully responsible government.

I make that statement because it summarises the general discussion of two days ago. Attention was drawn to the fact that from time to time there have been recommendations on this question. I have already circulated to you the various recommendations made, but there are two things I desire to emphasise this morning. The first is that when you are dealing with the question of the defence of a country it is an entirely different proposition and must be considered in an entirely different light, from what is usually called merely Law and Order. In the second place, whilst it may be possible—and I see no objections or difficulties—for a declaration to be made on the principle of what is called Indianisation, carrying with it a definite recommendation for the establishment of a Sandhurst in India, in saying this I would also draw attention to the fact that that in itself—the establishment of a Sandhurst in India—need not prevent the existing scheme from continuing whereby a number of students attend Sandhurst in this country. On the contrary, I see advantages in that continuing.

Lord Reading: Yes.

Chairman: I do not want it to be assumed that one is necessarily a substitute for the other; on the contrary they can run con-
currently, and indeed I see advantages in that. I have therefore endeavoured, in order to focus discussion, to deal with the broad principles which we are asked to consider this morning. You have the material in the form of the schemes which have been drawn up, but again I repeat that I am not sure that those schemes help us very much. They do give an emphatic indication of what is possible, but at the same time I do not think we should be too riveted to schemes on paper; we should rather apply ourselves to the practical difficulties and practical propositions that we have got to face.

It is with those general observations that I wish to open this meeting of the sub-Committee.

_Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru_: I am grateful to you, Sir, for the statement which you have just made. So far as the establishment of a Sandhurst in India is concerned, the statement that you have made on behalf of the British Government, that they see no objection to it, will be received with great satisfaction. I will only add one word. I should like it to be put more positively and more emphatically; I should like it to be said that not only do the British Government see no objection to the establishment of a Sandhurst in India, but I would expect the British Government to implement that policy which has just now been declared, by very prompt action.

_Chairman_: Would you not like it much better to feel that you have helped the British Government to do it?

_Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru_: I refer to the British Government because, under the scheme which has been adumbrated by the sub-Committee over which Lord Sankey has presided, the Defence of India is a Crown subject, and therefore there will have to be cooperation undoubtedly between the British Government and the contemplated Federal Government. You may take it from us that everyone of us is extremely keen on having a Sandhurst at the earliest possible opportunity, and we are prepared to find the funds for that purpose. I do not think you will have any trouble about it, so keen is the desire for a Sandhurst. As regards the keenest of Indian opinion on the question of a Sandhurst, I would make a personal appeal to Lord Reading; he knows how strong the feeling is with regard to this matter in India.

But, when I talk of an Indian Sandhurst, I must be understood to mean that we want training and education for our lads in every branch of military education—artillery, engineering and so on. Not only that, but I should like Indians to receive training and definite positions in the Air Force of the country.

_Chairman_: I should like to assure you, so as to shorten the discussion, that when I say "Sandhurst" it is intended to include all the training that takes place in this country. I think it will save discussion if I say that.

_Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru_: All arms, yes. I further welcome the statement that you have made—and I believe that statement carries
the assent of Lord Reading—that we should have a further avenue opened to us of sending our men to Sandhurst in England. I leave it to the military experts and the Government of India to decide what would be the number of men they would send in future to Sandhurst. These are technical questions outside my scope, and which can be settled later on.

As regards the period, you will find from the Report of which you have supplied us with copies, and which was considered by Lord Reading and by Lord Reading's Government, that the military experts at that time were of the opinion that, without committing themselves to any mathematically precise date, the Indianisation of the Army could be effected in thirty years' time—my recollection was twenty-eight years' time. Now we realise that in a matter of defence, in a matter of that kind, we have got to be very careful. It would be impossible for anyone to fix a precise date by which the Indian Army would be Indianised from top to bottom so far as the officers are concerned; but at the same time we are very anxious that the rate of progress should be very substantial and should be rapid, consistently with the safety of the country and the efficiency of the Army.

I beg of you not to be under the impression that we want in any way or to any degree to imperil the safety of the country or to weaken the strength of the Army.

With regard to the question which has just been raised, as to whether the British element should continue or not, I wish in the first place to point out, as has been said, the report of the Services sub-Committee has yet to be considered by the Conference. I beg of you not to misunderstand me when I say that I do not accept the suggestion there that the recruitment in future of the All-India Services should continue through the Secretary of State. That has nothing to do with the question of the British or Indian element. Whether the recruitment shall continue through the Secretary of State or whether it shall continue through the Governor-General, assisted by an independent Civil Service Commission or Public Services Commission, is a question on which opinions have yet to be expressed.

Lord Reading: That is not a matter for us.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: That has nothing to do with Your Lordship, no.

Chairman: I had already intimated on Wednesday, Lord Reading, that that was not a subject for this Committee.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: Therefore what I say is this. No analogy should be drawn from it so far as the recruitment in the Army is concerned. It is not my intention to say or suggest that the British element should be at once eliminated. It is quite obvious that under any scheme for thirty or thirty-five years the British element will be there and will be sufficiently strong there, but what I want to emphasise really is this, that we must have the objective constantly in view, and that the rate of recruitment of
Indian officers in India, or of their training in Sandhurst in England, should be commensurate with the objective, so that within a reasonable distance of time we may find that the Army in India has been substantially Indianised. I am anxious about that, because that has a bearing on the further development of our constitution. Therefore, while I would not say that the British element should be excluded at once I would certainly emphasise the need for greater speed and a more rapid rate of recruitment in India from Indian material.

That is all that I would say at this stage.

Sir Phiroze Sethna: Mr. Chairman, you were good enough to tell us on Wednesday that we should, as far as possible, confine ourselves to the headings that you enumerated and of which we have received copies subsequently from the Secretariat. I will therefore endeavour to speak on two or three items on which I have to offer remarks. I would, however, like to remind the Committee that if the Simon Commission's report did not find favour in India, that was so for many reasons, but the principal one was in regard to the recommendations they made for the Indianisation of the Army. According to that report, the complete Indianisation was postponed to the Greek Kalends, and a proper paraphrase of the recommendations they made would amount to the British domination continuing for ever so long.

Now, Sir, the reason which they advanced for that recommendation was that there was not enough material in the country for the officers. That, Sir, is an incorrect assumption, incorrect for the reason that the material does exist, but it is because of the policy adopted in the country that men were not admitted for officers' rank and to-day the Indian Army is what you call a fighting Army and not a thinking Army, because the officers were drawn, up till 1918, simply from the British side. This development of having British officers in the Army was intensified after the Mutiny, but it was distinct even before the Mutiny. This is not a statement which I make on my own but I will refer the Committee to . . . . "The founders of the native Army had conceived the idea of a force recruited from among the people of the country and commanded for the most part by men of their own race, but of higher social position — men, in a word, of the master class accustomed to exact obedience from their inferiors. But it was the inevitable tendency of our increasing power in India to oust the native functionary from his seat, or to lift him from his saddle, that the white man might fix himself there.

"So it happened, in due course, that the native officers who had exercised real authority in their battalions, who had enjoyed opportunities of personal distinction, who had felt an honourable pride in their position, were pushed aside by an incursion of English gentlemen, who took all substantive power into their hands, and left scarcely more than the shadow of rank to the men who they had supplanted. An English subaltern was appointed to every
company, and the native officer then began to collapse into something little better than name.

"As the degradation of the native officer was thus accomplished, the whole character of the sepoy army was changed. It ceased to be a profession in which men of high position, accustomed to command, might satisfy the aspiration and expand the energies of their lives. Thenceforth, therefore, we dug out the materials of our army from the lower strata of society and the gentry of the land, seeking military service, carried their ambitions beyond the red line of the British Frontier and offered their swords to the Princes of the Native States." That is what an eminent English historian himself says. After the Mutiny, the Peel Commission was set up and made recommendations which formed the basis of re-organisation of the composition of the Indian Army. The recommendations were inspired throughout by a fear of another Mutiny. According to the Peel Commission, the Indian section of the Army should be composed of different nationalities and castes which should, as a general rule, be mixed promiscuously in each regiment; and Europeans alone should, as far as possible, be employed in the scientific branch of the Services.

This was continued up till 1918. In 1918 a difference was made—that is to say, some Commissions were thrown open to Indians; but whilst Indians were excluded from the commissioned ranks there has also been the exclusion of Indians from the scientific branches of the Army, particularly, for example, the artillery. In regard to this, I may be permitted to quote from the evidence given before the Peel Commission by the same authority. Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, said:

"I agree with those who think that it is not judicious to train any natives of India to the use of guns. They make excellent artillerymen, and they attach great value and importance to guns, but these very circumstances make it dangerous to place them in their hands." (Peel Report—Papers, page 45.)

In this opinion Lord Ellenborough concurred. He said:

"It appears to be the concurrent opinion of all men that we should keep the artillery wholly in our hands.

"The natives have a genius for casting and working guns, and we should not afford them means of enjoying it. . . . The natives die at their guns. Their practice in this war"—namely the Mutiny—"is allowed to have been at least as good as our own."

I have quoted these things in order to show that if the Indians have failed to prove that they make good officers it is because the Indians have not been given a chance to work as officers, and that Indians have also been excluded from the scientific branches of the Army.

Now, Sir, that Indians have proved good officers is witnessed by the fact that the commissioned ranks have been opened to a small
extent to them; but even before then, during the War, when there was a dearth of officers, Indians were made officers, trained not at Sandhurst or Woolwich, but at Indore and Wellington in India; and according to a memorandum received from you this morning, 39 of such officers trained at Indore and Wellington are already in the Army. These men distinguished themselves during the War, and they are also rendering very good services as officers to-day, and that without any education at Sandhurst, which goes to prove that with proper training Indians can make as good officers as the British.

Again, Sir, it has been said at another stage of the (Simon Commission) Report that whereas the most virile of the so-called races provide fine fighting material, other communities and areas in India do not furnish a single man for the regular Army. This is a very sweeping statement to make. Evidently the authors of the Simon Commission Report have forgotten that before the Mutiny the Indian Armies consisted not only of the Punjabis and Sikhs, whose numbers before the Mutiny were limited as compared with what they are to-day, but before the Mutiny the Army was drawn from all classes of people. In this connection I should like to quote what a former Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army had said in regard to the Mahrattas. This was General Warre. He observed, 25 years after the Mutiny, as follows:

"History has proved that the whole of the western coast is a military country producing a war-like population. The southern Mahrattas have proved themselves in former days and are still equal to any other race in India as a fighting people. Their power has been broken and their military ardour quenched by almost total disarmament, but they are still a hardy people, in a mountainous district, inured to toil, and especially good in tracing their steps over the rough and impracticable ghats. What more can you require to make soldiers?"

I turn to the Madras soldiers. Another Commander-in-Chief, Sir Federick Haines, has said: "I cannot admit for one moment that anything has occurred to disclose the fact that the Madras sepoy is inferior as a fighting man. The facts of history warrant us in assuming the contrary. In drill, training and discipline the Madras sepoy is inferior to none, while in point of health, as exhibited by returns, he compares favourably with his neighbours."

We have heard it argued sometimes that people coming from the north are more martial and more war-like. May I ask whether for a moment the English would admit that because the Scots come from a more northern climate than the English therefore they are better fighting men than the English?

Sir Phiroze Sethna: What I wanted to point out was that it is wrong to assume that people from other parts of India cannot make good soldiers. I have not the names of the military officers who
have said that during the last Great War the Mahrattas proved as good as and better than any other Indian soldiers.

Now, the demand from the Indians for higher ranks has been persistent, and because of that demand, and also because of what success the Indian soldiers and officers achieved during the War, commissioned ranks were opened to the extent of five every six months, by admitting that number to Sandhurst. Thereafter there was framed what is known as the eight unit system. That scheme was nothing more than a mere sop thrown out to the Indians. Those who were able to foresee did predict that the Indian system was not at all satisfactory, and that it was purely racial. Of course, the then Commander-in-Chief, Lord Rawlinson, announced it with a flourish of trumpets, but it was not then known what his own ideas were on the subject, and those were brought to light by his biographer.

Col. Haksar: Sir Frederick Maurice.

Sir Phiroze Sethna: Yes, Sir Frederick Maurice, who quotes Lord Rawlinson's words as follows: "People here are frightened of this talk of Indianisation of all officers so that they won't send their sons out to serve under natives. I agree to the new system being allowed to take its course, but it will want very careful watching and cannot be hurried. The only way to begin is to have certain regiments with Indian officers only."

Chairman: I am sorry to intervene, but might I ask, does this kind of thing help us after my declaration? I just want to point out this, so to speak, for discussion. That kind of historical discussion cuts no ice. I wrote a book called "Labour Rules", but it is no good my looking there to find the answer to the problem of unemployment, because it is not there; and you have had my statement of the general attitude of the Government, and if we apply ourselves to that principle I think we shall do well.

Sir Phiroze Sethna: Very well, Sir, I will make no more references than those I have already quoted.

Now I return to the Skeen Committee. The Skeen Committee was appointed in 1925, but, as was brought to light on Wednesday last, it appears that the Government of India of their own accord had appointed a Committee of Military Experts in 1922 to enquire within what period the officer ranks of the Indian Army could be completely Indianised. You have sent us a memorandum of that scheme, Sir, according to which in 30 years all the officers may be Indians. That scheme, I am sorry to say, was never laid before the Indian Skeen Committee, nor was any reference made to it either before the Skeen Committee or in the Central Legislature by any officer of Government. It would appear from what has been brought to light that the Government of India were in favour of such a scheme, but it was perhaps Whitehall that turned it down and substituted the eight unit scheme. The Skeen Committee has condemned the eight unit scheme altogether, and that because of the evidence before it not only by every Indian officer but also by the Commanding Officers of the regiments which belonged to these eight
Indian units. It was condemned wholesale, and yet it is not only supported by the Simon Commission’s Report but it is further supported by the Government of India Despatch, who say that if necessary the number of these units might by degrees be increased to 25. The Skeen Committee’s Report was issued in March 1926. The Government of India did not carry out all the recommendations, but in 1928 they did meet us to some little extent. The most important recommendation was, of course, the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst. That was entirely turned down, at any rate for the time being, and that is the question which we are most anxious to revive, and we are glad to hear from you that the Government are quite prepared, not only to open an Indian Sandhurst but also an Indian Woolwich and an Indian Cranwell if necessary.

I now come to the question of the strength of the British and Indian Armies. At the present moment there are 56,327 British troops, 131,190 Indian troops, and about 34,000 reservists. Sir, the purposes of the Army in India were stated by the Eaton Commission appointed in 1879 to be: ‘To prevent and repel foreign aggression; to prevent army rebellion within British India and to watch and overawe the armies of the feudatory native States.’ Those are the words of the Commission’s Report.

Of course now there will be no question of overawing the Armies of the Feudatory States.

H. H. Maharaja of Bikaner: Not the Feudatory States, the Indian States.

Sir P. Sethna: I am sorry. According to the military estimates of 1928-1929, the ratio of British to Indian troops is 1 to 2-26, but in the covering forces—

Chairman: Stop; I can now see where you are going out of order. I want to keep it quite clear that the general defence of India is not a subject for this Committee. As you know quite well that is a matter for the other Committee, and therefore no purpose would be served by discussing it here.

Sir P. Sethna: Very well; but I think in answer to Sir Akbar Hydari as to whether Indianisation also meant the replacement of British troops by Indians you said that question would come within our province. Am I right in assuming that?

Lord Reading: Surely that would not be a question for this Committee, would it? The Indianisation which we are talking of is Indianisation by means of Indian officers being substituted for British. That is what we have always understood. You are not speaking of substituting Indian Regiments for British Regiments, are you?

Sir P. Sethna: I do not think Lord Reading was present when this point was taken up. I think I raised it.

Chairman: You raised it, but I did not interpret it in that way.

Lord Reading: I was not present at the last part of the previous meeting.
Sir P. Sethna: I understood you, Mr. Chairman, to say that it embraced that point also, namely, that Indianisation meant both introducing Indian officers in place of British officers and also replacing British troops by Indian troops. I will take your ruling.

Mr. Jinnah: I should like to take your ruling, Mr. Chairman. I have not a copy of your ruling. I do not know why the full proceedings have not been sent to us, but I expressly stated that the question of the reduction of British troops would have to be considered.

Chairman: That is so.

Mr. Jinnah: And you said "Yes, but we will discuss that separately from the question of Indianisation". I think, if I may refer to the record, that that was your express ruling.

Lord Reading: I was not present then.

I should like to raise this point with regard to what I understood Mr. Jinnah to say just now. I understand a question was raised towards the end of the last day's proceedings and that it was decided that, although this question of substituting Indian Regiments for British Regiments did not arise on this first question of Indianisation which you, Sir, had put to us, that it would arise, nevertheless, within the purview of this Committee.

Lord Peel: What I wish to say arises out of what Mr. Jinnah said. I thought what he said was susceptible of two meanings. Mr. Jinnah talked about the reduction of British troops, and I do not know whether he wishes to raise this question, which is quite a different one, with which we are so familiar, the case, or the charge if you like, that the Army is too large in India. I thought what he meant to say was that he wanted to raise and discuss the question of whether there should be reductions in the Army, irrespective at the moment of whether it is Indian or British, on the question of Imperial troops, and so on, being kept in India. I thought he meant to raise that matter, but I may be wrong.

Mr. Jinnah: Let me make it quite clear to this Committee what I do mean. When you are talking of Indianisation it is not merely a question of Indianising the officer ranks. That is one part of it.

Lord Peel: Yes.

Mr. Jinnah: When you talk of the Indian Army the entire Army is the Indian Army strictly speaking, namely, the British troops and Indian troops. They are the British Army, strictly speaking. They are British troops; they are His Majesty's Forces. They are not really the Indian Army in the sense that one would understand it if it was under the Indian Government. They are His Majesty's Forces stationed in India composed of British and Indian troops, but for certain purposes they are kept separate. When you talk of the Indian Army there is no such thing as the Indian Army strictly speaking or constitutionally speaking. Then for the purpose of convenience we have been using the term "Indian Army proper", and that is always understood to mean that it is
composed of Indian sepoys and the officer ranks which command that portion of the Army. When we have been talking of Indianisation it does not mean merely that we Indianise the officer ranks in that section of the Army. If you are going to Indianise the Army, supposing we go on Indianising the officer ranks——

Chairman: Might I say that the important point is the answer to Lord Reading’s question. The whole thing turns on what I said on this question, and I think we had better have that settled first, Lord Reading, because it is far more important if you do not mind. I am quoting from the shorthand note of the previous meeting. Mr. Jinnah said, “Those entitled to the rank of officer number about 3,000 in the Indian Army proper, and the other is about the same number practically, or a little less. Now, when we talk of Indianisation it is a very vague phrase. You see there is a misunderstanding at once. One party understands merely the Indianisation of the officers of the Indian Army proper. Then what is to happen to the other part of the Army? I should like your ruling on this, Mr. Chairman. Is the whole scheme to be discussed; first of all, the Indianisation of the officer ranks in the Indian Army proper and the replacement of British troops, because as long as that is done we cannot increase the Indian troops? Therefore it is part and parcel of the whole issue.”

Then there was an intervention, and then Mr. Jinnah said, “If you like you can take them separately”. Then I said, “But you must; they are two distinct questions. I understood Sir B. N. Mitra’s reference to Indianisation when he raised it was the Indianisation of the Indian Army”. Then Sir B. N. Mitra said, “Exactly”. Then I said, “I understood that and I applied myself to that. That obviously answers your question.”

But you will remember that I read out the terms of reference which were very clear and distinct, to consider questions of political principle relating to defence other than strictly constitutional aspects to be considered under headings so and so.

Mr. Jinnah: Yes, but you will remember that I asked you, Mr. Chairman, with regard to the question as to the relations with the Crown, I asked whether that was to be discussed.

Sir B. N. Mitra: Might I draw your attention to exactly what was said. I said: “The first point to which I should like to refer is the point raised by Sir Akbar Hydari, which unfortunately seems to have been overlooked in the course of the general discussion, namely, as to whether the terms of reference include this specific question of a reduction in the number of British troops in India and their replacement by Indian troops or by militia, or by something of that sort. Do the terms of reference to this sub-Committee include a consideration of the question of the reduction of the British troops in India?”

Chairman: That is so.

Mr. Jinnah: And, further if you look at the Minutes——

Chairman: That is quite clear.
Mr. Jinnah: Yes, but I want your ruling further. Unfortunately these Minutes have not been sent to us and therefore I cannot put my finger on it at once, but I am absolutely certain that you did give that ruling, and that was with regard to the relationship with the Crown which it was said would be discussed somewhere. I asked you by which committee it would be discussed, and you said that that matter would also be discussed here. Therefore the only question which is precluded from the function of this Committee is the constitutional aspect of defence.

Chairman: Then that statement was followed by Sir B. N. Mitra, who said: "But so far I think it is admitted that Indianisation means the Indianisation of the officers' ranks."

Lord Reading: Yes.

Chairman: Then Mr. Jayakar said: "It means both questions, but they must be kept distinct from each other. That is all."

Lord Reading: That is right.

Chairman: So that that is quite clear; they must be kept distinct.

Dr. Moonje: Both must be considered here.

Lord Reading: I am asking for information in order that we may see where we are, and in order to get some notion of the duration of the proceedings because if we are to go into the other question of the reduction of British troops in the way in which it was put by Lord Peel; and in the way I suggested, by the substitution of Indian troops for British troops, surely we cannot decide that. I should have thought that was a matter which had to be discussed by the Military Committee.

Chairman: I have already intimated—you were present, Lord Reading; but Lord Peel was not—that in my opening speech, and I drew attention to the fact with that specific object this morning, that it would be impossible for that to be done by his Committee with the best will in the world. It is not competent, first, to determine a technical question of that kind; but I did say that the maximum which I thought could be done by this Committee would be to express its views on the general principle, the principle being, first, as I said, the Indianisation of the Army in India; and, secondly, the logical conclusion that that would carry with it; and I expressed on behalf of the Government concurrence in the establishment of a Sandhurst in India, and beyond that that training should continue in the Sandhurst here. Do let us be practical. If you wish to go outside that, of what value would any recommendation be, because you are dealing, as I said earlier on, with the defence of India, and the defence of India must be a matter to be carefully considered by experts so that a proper scheme can be worked out. I understand that forty copies of my opening statement will be circulated. In order to save time those copies will be distributed but we need not interrupt the discussion.

Mr. Jayakar: I take it your ruling stands, Mr. Chairman, that the question of the replacement of British troops by Indian troops
is within the purview of this Committee; but as practical men we all realise that the final details cannot be discussed and finally settled by this Committee. That is a matter of practical expediency to which we are all alive. I take it that your ruling stands that even that question is within the competence of this Committee. That is the position.

Chairman: Obviously a Chairman of a Committee of this kind dealing with a technical matter like defence has to take the advice of experts who are mainly responsible, and if in discussing the whole matter in detail we come to the conclusion that both the subjects mentioned by you were by the very nature of things interwoven, that they were bound to be interwoven, but that it was not a matter for this Committee to go into detail——

Dr. Moonje: Quite right.

Sir P. Sethna: No. Now that you have ruled I need not go into details, but I am sure that every Indian present would prefer that in process of time the British Army might be substituted by Indian troops. The British Army is maintained for different purposes. One principal purpose is for internal security and for doing police work, as it were. The percentage of the covering force and the field force of Indian troops as compared with British is larger. So far as internal security is concerned for every single soldier there are 1.24 British soldiers. I wanted to bring out this point in order to show that it is quite possible to reduce the number of British troops, because although India has a population of 320,000,000, and although we have communal and other riots, the casualties in a year in that country are far less than the number of casualties in Great Britain, which has a population of one-seventh of that of India, from motor car accidents. Therefore I say the British Army can be reduced. My point is that it might be reduced to begin with even by 10,000 men. The cost of an English soldier is four times that of an Indian soldier, and that difference in cost will amply cover the cost of an Indian Sandhurst. That is the reason why I wanted to bring out this point.

So far as the question of finance is concerned, India must certainly bear the cost of its Army. It is, of course, true that the cost of the Army has risen very considerably. In 1910-11 it was only 29 crores, but it jumped to a maximum of 81 3/4 crores in 1920-21, and after the recommendations of the Inchcape Committee it came down to 55 crores, and it is about 52 crores at the present time.

Lord Reading: I think the 81 crores included the Afghan War, did it not, and the expeditions into Waziristan?

Sir P. Sethna: If we deduct the cost of the Afghan War the result would be more than 55 crores.

Lord Reading: Yes.

Sir P. Sethna: What I want to point out is that in this Army expenditure is one item of £2 millions paid for capitation charges. India is paying that because statutorily its revenues to-day are under the Secretary of State for India, and the Government of
India have little say in the matter. If the Government of India had self-government, surely they would dispute the payment of this. They have in fact been disputing it for more than twenty years, and no machinery has been found so far to decide whether that charge is correctly levied or otherwise. If we had control of our finances we should certainly dispute the payment of this capitation charge.

Lord Reading: Sir Phiroze, will you tell me this for information, because I do not know. I thought I heard it stated yesterday,—I think it was by Sir B. N. Mitra—that a Committee had been appointed to determine this very old and vexed question about the capitation grant.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: That was stated in the sub-Committee over which Lord Sankey presided about a week ago, but when I was speaking Sir Bhupendra Nath intervened and said that as a matter of fact that question was under consideration.

Lord Reading: I thought it had been settled.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: No, it was under consideration.

Chairman: I think I can go beyond that, because in looking up the details for this sub-Committee when I came to this very question I found that a Committee was appointed for that purpose.

Lord Reading: That is what I thought.

Lord Peel: I hope, Mr. Chairman, we are not going into this question of the capitation grant. It is one of the most complicated, difficult and intricate questions with which I have ever had to deal.

Mr. Jayakar: It is a question of finance which is not the concern of this sub-Committee at all.

Lord Peel: If we are going to go into that I shall require to look up the details. It is a very complicated question and would take a long time to discuss.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: It will be for the Government of India of the future, as of the present, to discuss.

Chairman: I do not know what purpose is served by discussing this now, because this sub-Committee clearly could not deal with it; it comes into the wider and bigger question entirely, and instead of the discussion on it being of help to us I think it may do harm.

Sir P. Sethna: I want to point out that it is the Secretary of State who decides this point at present; although the matter may be referred to a Committee, payment is made, which would not be done, if India had Dominion Status. That is all I want to point out.

Now, Sir, the Skeen Committee made out that in the course of 25 years by its recommendations half the number of officers of the Indian Army would be Indians, but the report of the Skeen Committee is now out of date; with the present ideas in India, we cannot accept that. We would sooner accept the report which has been brought to light by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Sir
Muhammad Shafi, and which they referred to last Wednesday, according to which all the officers in 30 years time would be Indians. That certainly would find favour with Indian opinion.

Now, Sir, you have enquired from the Chair whether we would like recruiting for the officer ranks to be purely Indian in future, or whether some proportion of British officers should still be recruited.

Chairman: Let me correct you there. I did not enquire whether you wanted that; I gave you a broad statement of what Indianisation would mean in a period of time in the first place if all recruitment was Indian and in the second place if a proportion of it was British; but I made no such enquiry as to which you refer.

Sir P. Sethna: If Britishers are also recruited, it will not be possible to have all the officers Indians within 30 years, but there will not be any necessity for recruiting British officers, because the subalterns who are to-day taken into the Army will take 26 years to become Colonels, so that even if there is no British recruitment from now onwards we shall have British officers in the Indian Army for at least another 26 years.

With regard to obtaining sufficient men, if the recommendations of the Skeen Committee are carried out as to the means to be employed for getting proper material, then I am sure the men will be forthcoming. As the Despatch of the Government of India points out, in 1929, there were more candidates than were required and in 1930 the number was just equal. If proper facilities are given the men will certainly be forthcoming, and therefore I trust that the Government will take steps whereby the ranks of commissioned officers will be filled by Indians as soon as possible.

Dr. Moonje: Having heard all these arguments, I think the practical course would be to take into consideration the scheme information about which was given to us by Sir Muhammad Shafi and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru on Wednesday, and to put it into practice. I therefore suggest the following formula for adoption by this sub-Committee:

"All recruitment to the commissioned ranks of the Army, Navy and Air Force be made in India from amongst the Indians, provided that it shall be open to the Government to provide for recruitment in England to fill up such of the vacancies as cannot be filled up in India."

If a decision of that kind could be arrived at I think the question of the Indianisation of the officer ranks of the Indian Army could be easily settled within the scheme referred to by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and by Sir Muhammad Shafi.

Chairman: I will read this proposal again so that you may have it before you:

"All recruitment to the commissioned ranks of the Army, Navy and Air Force be made in India from amongst the-"
Indians, provided that it shall be open to the Government to provide for recruitment in England to fill up such of the vacancies as cannot be filled up in India."

That is a general declaration which Dr. Moonje submits for discussion.

**Lord Reading:** Are we to do that independently of the Commander-in-Chief?

**Chairman:** We might discuss that.

**Sir M. Shafi:** Mr. Chairman, so far as I can see only two questions are now before this sub-Committee. One question which was ancillary to the first of these two questions has already been settled, I understand, by the declaration which you, Mr. Chairman, made this morning; that is to say, the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst. We need not discuss that question any further.

**Lord Peel:** Why not?

**Sir M. Shafi:** I mean the principle need not be discussed any further, because I understood the Government had made a declaration that an Indian Sandhurst should be created.

**Diwan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao:** For all arms.

**Sir M. Shafi:** Certainly, an Indian Sandhurst for all arms.

**Lord Peel:** I did not know that proposal had been agreed to; I have had no opportunity of saying anything about it.

**Chairman:** I gather he does not mean that it cannot be discussed; I gather he means he does not want to discuss it himself.

**Sir M. Shafi:** Exactly. So far as I am concerned, the question of the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst in India is practically concluded as a result of the declaration which has been made.

**Chairman:** That is, if it is acceptable to the sub-Committee.

**Sir M. Shafi:** Yes, quite. So far as the first of the two questions that are before us is concerned, namely the Indianisation of the officer ranks of the Indian Army, it is now clear that a scheme was framed, after very careful consideration, by the Army Department of the Government of India during the period when Lord Rawlinson was Commander-in-Chief, and was approved of unanimously by the Government of India and was submitted to the Secretary of State. That scheme resulted in the end in what is known as the Eight Units scheme. Why the scheme then prepared was not placed before the Skeen Committee I for one cannot understand, but that scheme is now before this sub-Committee, and, so far as my friend Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and I are concerned, we stand by that scheme. So far as the recommendations of the Skeen Committee are concerned—that is to say, that one half of the officer ranks of the Indian Army be Indianised within a period of 25 years—we are not prepared to accept it.

**Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru:** That is out of date now.

**Sir Mr. Shafi:** Entirely out of date.
H.H. The Maharaja of Bikaner: To what are you referring?

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: To the recommendations of the Skeen Committee.

Sir M. Shafi: Something like eight years has passed since the scheme adopted by the Government of India and sent up to the Secretary of State was produced, in 1922. If the scheme had been sanctioned at that time, by now the Indianisation of the officer ranks of the Indian Army would extend to one-sixth, for, putting aside one year, in seven years according to that scheme one-sixth of the officer ranks of the Indian Army would be Indianised, which means that by this time a great deal would have been accomplished. Nevertheless, even to-day Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and I are ready to accept that scheme as coming into operation from January 1st, 1932; that is to say, from the commencement of next year.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: I entirely associate myself with Sir Muhammad Shafi.

Sir M. Shafi: And we think this sub-Committee should now adopt that scheme.

Dr. Moonje: Quite right.

Sir M. Shafi: And should pass a resolution in favour of that scheme coming into operation as from January 1st, 1932.

Now, the second question which arises in this connection is the gradual elimination of what is known as the British garrison in India; that is to say, the British Army. As has been pointed out by my friend Sir P. Sethna, if a beginning were to be made towards the reduction of that section of our Army in India and the substitution of Indian troops, there would be a considerable economy in the military expenditure of India. As has been pointed out by Sir P. Sethna, the cost of a British soldier in India—the expenditure on a British soldier in India—is equal to the expenditure on from four to five Indians.

Dr. Moonje: Five.

Sir M. Shafi: It is between four and five, to the best of my recollection. The result of such a partial reduction would be an immediate saving in expenditure.

Sir P. Sethna: Forty lakhs.

Sir M. Shafi: That could be utilised towards the cost of an Indian Sandhurst.

There is also in this connection another report to which I wish to invite the attention of the sub-Committee. As I mentioned the other day, the Government of India appointed a Committee, presided over by Lord Rawlinson, of which both my friend Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and myself were members, known as the Military Requirements Committee. The report of that Committee, made after a very careful examination of the whole problem, is also of the utmost value in considering the two questions which are now before this sub-Committee.
Dr. Moonje: Did that Committee suggest a reduction of British troops?

Sir M. Shafi: Yes, and in fact to the best of my recollection some reduction was actually made as a result of the recommendations of that Committee.

Lord Reading: My recollection of it was that it was 10,000 troops.

Sir M. Shafi: I only say that to the best of my recollection some reduction was made.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: That is the case.

Sir M. Shafi: My recollection is very distinct, but some reduction of British troops was made as a result of the recommendations of that Committee. I think that that report would also be of the utmost value in regard to this question, and I think it ought to be before this sub-Committee.

I do not think I need take up the time of the sub-Committee any further. It seems to me that the reforms to which we have invited the attention of the sub-Committee are urgent, and there is a consensus of opinion in India—in so far as Indian political circles are concerned—that immediate steps should be taken towards the two goals which I have just indicated.

Lord Reading: I am speaking from memory and I am not at all sure about this, because a good deal has happened since then, but my recollection of the result is that during a period of a year or two years, or something of that kind, there was a reduction of something like 10,000 British troops altogether. That occurred during my time, and it was accepted at that time as a fulfilment of the recommendations made by that Committee. There may, of course, been have changes since, but that was what happened about it.

Sir M. Shafi: I quite agree; that is my recollection.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: That is my recollection also. The question was gone into at great length.

Lord Reading: Yes.

Mr. Jayakar: Do I understand there has been a scheme prepared by the Government of India, with the assistance of the military authorities, for the purpose of gradually replacing British troops by Indian troops?

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: That is right.

Sir M. Shafi: That is the case.

Mr. Jayakar: If that is so I submit, Mr. Chairman, that just as you were good enough to give us information about schemes for Indianising the officer ranks of the Indian Army so we ought to have the benefit of this scheme too.

Chairman: I think I had better intervene at this stage, because I am afraid we shall get at cross purposes. Any information which has been mentioned you shall have, if it is available. But
do let me remind you of this. If a Government—any Government, British or other—is responsible for the defence of a country, surely a committee of this kind, no matter how we are composed, cannot for one moment say "This is the measure," "This is the limitation," or "This is the maximum." When we are dealing with defence, I put it to you it is not a matter which you can determine; it is a matter on which those responsible for that defence must, with their advisers, be the sole judge.

Sir M. Shafi: Quite right.

Chairman: As long as that is accepted we can go on with the discussion.

Mr. Jayakar: I do not dispute that principe; all I ask is that as one piece of material before this sub-Committee to help us in our consideration of the question we ought to have the benefit of that scheme. It will not be more than one of the materials before us; that is as far as I go at the present moment.

Chairman: Certainly, as I said, if I can get it; but even then I want to warn you against this. I do not know anything about the scheme you are discussing, so I am speaking without prejudice, but whatever that scheme may have contained then, the circumstances and changes that have been brought about or contemplated by this Conference must be factors that will ultimately determine it, and determine it on its present position and not on what it was then.

Sir Mirza Ismail: I cordially welcome the announcement made by you, Sir, this morning, that the Government have no objection to the establishment of a military training college in India. It only remains now to give effect to that decision, and I share the hope expressed by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru that prompt action will be taken and that India will have the satisfaction of having a Sandhurst of its own, where training in all branches of the Army—infantry, artillery, cavalry and air force—will be given.

As regards the replacement of British officers by Indians trained in India or in England, I think that complete elimination of the British element in the Army is not desirable, even if practicable. If the British element is considered necessary and desirable for various reasons in what are called security services, it appears to me to be doubly so in the case of the Army. I should fix a given percentage of Indian officers to begin with, that percentage being increased in the light of experience. As regards the substitution of British units by Indian units, this Committee can only express its approval of the general principle that this should be effected in course of time. How that is to be done, and in what period that process should be completed, are matters that can only be settled as far as it is possible to settle them by a special committee appointed for that purpose. The fixing of the number of the Indian officers for appointment in the various branches of the Army, and the increase of that number according to a time-table, may also be left to be determined by that com-
mittee. It seems to me to be quite impossible for this committee to settle such details here.

**Lord Reading**: Hear, hear.

**Sir Akbar Hydari**: Sir, I want also to support, in the main, what Sir Mirza Ismail has said, and I want to add one more point, as to why it will be impossible entirely to eliminate the British element from either the Indian troops or from the whole Army in India, and that is the discharge of its Treaty obligation by the Crown. If the details of those Treaties are looked into with the several States, it will be observed as to where and why and for what reasons a particular element must be British. It is therefore quite necessary that this subject should be left, as regards details and even with regard to even mere general principles—certain details which may be involved in general principles—only to a Committee on which all the interests are represented.

**Mr. Jinnah**: I would apply my observations to the terms of reference before us in the light of the rulings you have given, Sir. Now the first proposition that I want to place before the Committee is this, that we have got now to give our expression of opinion, as far as there is an agreement in this Committee, either unanimous or such agreement that we can get, and the first proposition on which we have to express our opinion is the question of political principles relating to defence.

Now, what is the political principle on which we have to express our opinion with regard to defence? As I understand it, the political principle is that India should be in a position to take over the defence of India as soon as possible. That, I understand, is the political principle. Within what period, by what methods, is a different question, but that is the principle which we have got to bear in mind—that India must, as soon as possible take over the defence. Now, for that purpose we have to consider what scheme shall be adopted to realise that goal. Proposition number 2: that during the transitional period (which is called the strictly constitutional aspect) who should be the authority? That has got to be decided by the Federal Committee. The question of the strictly constitutional aspect of defence during the transition period is really within the purview of the Federal Committee.

Then we have a third proposition, and that is its relation to the Crown, and I put that question to you, Sir. If you look at the minutes, you will find that I said, "Then there is the question of the relations with the Crown. When will that come up?" And you were good enough, Sir to say: "Again I do not dogmatise, but I have thought of it, and I have come to the conclusion in my own mind that they cannot be separated. For instance, when there is a talk of Dominion status you must keep it in mind that there is a form of commission that is essentially a Dominion commission as distinct from the King's Commission. I never disguised from the Imperial Conference that I hated the separation but it is for you to say. Therefore it is involved in the question of a unified system, so that I think for all practi-
cal purposes they should be discussed together. It may be that you would make separate recommendations, and it may be that in a general discussion they may be discussed together."

Therefore that question is also before this Committee, and the question of the reduction of British troops. I do not say for a moment that we are going to sit down here and lay down a definite scheme as to how the number of British troops should be reduced, to what extent it should be reduced, within what period it should be reduced: those are matters of detail which will have to be considered by some other competent authority, but this Committee must express its opinion on principle that as you go on with the Indianisation the British troops must gradually be reduced. That is the principle on which I would ask this Committee to express their own opinion definitely.

Now, having stated these fundamental propositions that are within the purview of the terms of reference of this Committee, let me take up first of all the question of the Indianisation of the officer ranks of what is called the Indian Army proper. Now, Sir, there is a great deal of misunderstanding, if I may say so. I may tell you, and I can tell this Committee straight away, that the Sandhurst Committee Report is a back number. I have no hesitation in saying that to this Committee: it is a back number. It is very unfortunate that the Government of India did not at once accept it wholeheartedly, and try their best in the meantime to give effect to it. But that is a different question. I grant at once that the Sandhurst Committee Report is a back number; but I want the members of this Committee please to read the Sandhurst Report more carefully than it seems some of them had done when they made these observations. I would like you, Sir, to refer to paragraph 1, page 24. Now, the Sandhurst Committee—

*Lord Peel:* You mean the Skeen Committee.

*Mr. Jinnah:* Yes, it is the same thing. In that Report I want to dispel the impression that is created that only half a cadre was to be Indianised within 25 years. That is not quite correct, and if you will read that paragraph carefully this is what is said in Paragraph 21, page 24, the second paragraph on page 24, and I want specially to draw the attention of the members of this Committee to that paragraph: "By 1944 the senior of the Indian King's Commissioned officers now in the Army will have completed 26 years' service and will therefore be due to be considered for the command of regiments. This is the crucial test, and because of this it has been suggested (in the scheme described in Appendix II) that the number of Indians commissioned should not reach 50 per cent until this stage is passed." Now, that was the opinion that was expressed by some members. "Our colleagues, the Honourable Sir Phiroze Sethna, Mr. M. A. Jinnah, Diwan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao, Major Zorawar Singh and Major Bala Sahib Dafle, while agreeing to the principles upon which the suggested scheme of Indianisation is founded, consider that the
culminating point of the scheme, that is to say, the Indianisation of 50 per cent. of the cadre of officers in the Indian Army, should be reached at an earlier stage, viz., after 15 years."— I am going to read the whole of it, if you will please allow me, because, with very great respect I am going to explain to you with the utmost patience, and I am not in the habit of losing my patience. If you will only have patience, I know perfectly well what I am saying. I say, therefore, that some of us did not give our assent to 25 years, and now I will read on: "— in the case of Mr. Jinnah, Diwan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao and Major Zorawar Singh and after 20 years in the case of the Honourable Sir Phiroze Sethna and Major Bala Sahib Dafle, and that the intermediate stages subsequent to the establishment of the Indian Sandhurst should be correspondingly accelerated." Therefore our position—the position of some of us—was that after the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst the period should be accelerated to 15 years; at least, that was my position. Then this is the unanimous conclusion we came to: "It is, however, unanimously agreed that, whether the slower or the more rapid rate of progression is ultimately adopted, the scheme actually in operation should be reviewed in 1938, that is to say, 5 years after the inauguration of the Indian Sandhurst, with a view to considering whether the success achieved is not sufficiently solid to warrant a further acceleration at the rate of progress." Therefore the unanimous recommendation is this, that after 10 years the scheme should be reviewed, and we were not committed to a period of 25 years. Therefore it is absolutely wrong to say that the Skeen Committee was unanimously committed to a 25 years period.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: That is not what I said. You are imputing to me a wrong interpretation of the recommendation of the Committee.

Mr. Jinnah: Sir Tej does not appreciate the point yet. What I am saying is this, that it is generally taken by everybody that half the cadre was to be obtained within 25 years without any exception. That is not the position. The position is this, that we give the table, but the table was subject to being accelerated after examination, five years after the Sandhurst was established. Therefore our view was—at least, it was the view of some of us—that it ought to be done within 15 years.

Mr. Jayakar: Half the number.

Mr. Jinnah: Half the number, I agree. I only wanted to clear away that impression—that in no circumstances could it be accelerated—that is all.

Chairman: I am sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Jinnah. What I am trying to get is, what contribution does any of this kind of argument make to this simple practical point? If you agree, as everyone agrees, to the phrase "the Indianisation of the Army", which boiled down means the substitution of Indians for the British,
the factors that govern that are not factors that can be merely set down on paper alone by anybody, not even military authorities. You have the practical application of the number of students, how the machine works, the proportion that turns out fit. For instance, I had a simple illustration, which I will give you. There have been 134 Indians admitted to Sandhurst. 69 are now serving, and for numerous reasons that I need not go into some of the others have dropped by the way, if I may use that phrase; and therefore the point that is bothering me is, what do we gain here by saying that in 25 or 15 or 30 or 40 years this complete thing will happen when there may be a hundred and one factors that cannot be calculated here that may upset the whole scheme on paper? Are we not compelled in the end, as practical people, to say "If we agree to this principle, let us at the earliest possible moment set about the necessary steps to give effect to it"? I do appeal to the Committee, that is how the position appeals to me.

Mr. Jinnah: Sir, what do you suggest?

Chairman: I suggest that if we agree to the principle that we have already indicated—

Mr. Jinnah: What is that principle?

Chairman: The principle is the Indianisation of the Indian Army.

Mr. Jinnah: We have agreed to that for the last quarter of a century.

Chairman: So you have to many other resolutions, which you still move.

Mr. Jinnah: I say I agree to that.

Chairman: So you have to many other resolutions which you still move to-day, and will continue to move, like me.

Mr. Jinnah: Let me understand you perfectly well. I do not wish to take up one single moment of this Committee's time unnecessarily. Let me understand. We are all agreed to the principle of Indianisation.

Chairman: Then shall I summarise what I suggest?

Mr. Jinnah: No, Sir; one by one, because I want to be very definite. My mind is a legal mind. We are agreed to the principle of Indianisation. What next?

Chairman: The next is that we should follow it up by a recommendation that to give effect to this there should be established a Sandhurst in India.

Mr. Jinnah: Agreed.

Chairman: Very well; the Sandhurst in India shall be no barrier and shall not interfere with the present arrangements for students coming to our Sandhurst.

Mr. Jinnah: Agreed.
Chairman: Very well. Then follow it up; we urge as a Committee that the necessary steps shall be taken to give effect to the establishment of a Sandhurst in India.

Mr. Jinnah: Agreed.

Chairman: Very well. If that is so what purpose do we serve by arguing as to what will be the period of training, and so on, in Sandhurst? The experts must work that out.

Mr. Jinnah: We are agreed in principle with the question that the Army should be Indianised. The principle of that has been agreed for a quarter of a century. As to Sandhurst, there was no agreement between the Government and us because the Government have not yet decided whether to establish a Sandhurst or not. If this Committee is going to recommend that a Sandhurst should be established as soon as possible, then we get that question out of our discussion.

Then the next question is how effect is to be given to the rate or the pace of Indianisation. That is a question which must be discussed by this Committee and some principle must be laid down.

I am not talking of whether it should be in 5 years, or 10 years, or 20 years. I quite understand that you may lay down very definite resolutions about periods and that you may not be able to do it. I quite follow that. The question is how is this to be given effect to.

Chairman: I will try and apply myself to answering that question. It is no good me suggesting a mode of procedure unless it is one that is going to carry us to definite conclusions.

Now, my answer to the last question, which is the fundamental one, is that there should be as a consequence or as a net result of any recommendation an expert Committee set up to give immediate effect to this. Now I put it to you that no one round this table—and I am not speaking as a military man at all; but common sense tells that the first thing to do is to secure the site of the building, the number of men you are prepared to train, the accommodation, and all those things. The period is all dependent upon that.

Lord Reading: Yes.

Chairman: Because any period that you lay down must be contingent upon those factors. What I want to see is that practical steps are taken to give effect to it.

Mr. Jinnah: I was in possession of the Committee, and I have not finished yet with you, Sir, or with this Committee. Let me complete what I have to say in this Committee.

If you mean to appoint a special Committee for the purpose of considering the question of the pace of Indianisation and the various questions which you have raised here, if that is the idea, that a special expert Committee should be appointed, are you going to give any guide; are you going to lay down any principles for that Committee, or are you going to give them a blank cheque?
and say: "Now, you decide as you think proper." That is the next question which I ask. My experience, Sir, is this, that unless this Committee lays down some definite principles which will guide that Committee to examine the whole situation in the light of those principles which you lay down here it will be futile to have a Committee. What are the principles then? Are you going to lay down here merely a pious expression of opinion that there shall be Indianisation? That policy has been the policy of the Government for a quarter of a century now. You are not doing anything new. If you stop there—if the Committee decides that, of course, I have nothing more to say—it means that you are leaving the whole matter to an expert Commission or an expert Committee to decide as they think proper. I say you must lay down a definite principle as to the pace of Indianisation otherwise it is no use.

Sir M. Shafi: In support of what Mr. Jinnah has said—

Mr. Jinnah: One minute. I want your ruling, Sir. Are we, or are we not, going to lay down some definite formula, some definite principle, which will be guiding principle of reference to that Committee to give effect to it in detail?

Lord Reading: I suggest that is not a matter for ruling. That is a matter for this Committee.

Mr. Jinnah: No, but the Chairman is now asking me what is the good of going into all these matters. I do not wish to go into any of them if that is the ruling. If you tell me that this Committee need not bother about it and that there shall be a blank reference, well I have nothing more to say. I say it will not do.

Chairman: Do let me answer your question, because we may as well clear it up at once; we shall get nowhere if we do not. First I answer that it is not a question of ruling; it is a question of this Committee applying itself to the practical problem. I answer you in this way. When I made that declaration this morning in favour of Sandhurst I did not mean it as a pious declaration, and whatever may have been done in the past, we are speaking here as part of a bigger and a wider scheme.

Lord Reading: Hear, hear.

Chairman: Everyone assumes—at least I do, and I speak for myself—that when this Conference finishes it is not finished with words and resolutions, but that practical steps will be taken to dovetail into the whole the general principles. The logic of it all would be this, that if you pass a resolution such as I have indicated of which we are all in favour, Indianisation and a Sandhurst, and so on, that does not mean, and I want to make it perfectly clear, in so far as I am speaking for the Government, that that is not merely a way of shelving it, but equally the Government would be foolish to say that, having agreed to this principle, this scheme must be carried out in X number of years if there are a number of factors which would upset the whole calculation.
Lord Reading: Hear, hear.

Chairman: That is all I am safeguarding against, and I beg to you to believe that the Government means to have Indianisation of the Army, they mean to establish a Sandhurst, and they mean to give effect to it. If there is going to be a Committee there must be Indians on the Committee and there must be practical experts on the Committee.

Mr. Jinnah: I have understood you perfectly well, but there is one very big factor which still you have not appreciated and which I am impressing upon you. I am impressing upon you, Sir, and this Committee that you must lay down some definite expression of opinion as to the pace. Unless you do that I am not prepared to agree to a Committee. That is my point.

Chairman: I understand that.

Mr. Jinnah: You must decide here as to the pace. Then how is it to be given effect to, by what methods, and through what means or instrument is a different question; but I want this Committee to express its opinion as to the pace. As I have said before, the proposition, if you will allow me to say so, is in a nutshell. If we can only get correct information on one point then I think this Committee will be in a position to deal with it, and that is the question of wastage. What is the wastage.

Sardar Ujjal Singh: A figure of 120 has been given.

Mr. Jinnah: I am quite aware of that. We had great difficulty in the past in getting the number of wastage. I venture to say to this Committee that the highest speed that you can reach is as I put to you the other day—we will call it the X number of wastage—the highest speed that you can get to is to say that from 1930, or 1931, or whatever you like, there shall be no British recruitment. That is the highest speed you can get. The utmost that this Committee can recommend is that there shall be no British recruitment in the future. Beyond that speed you cannot go. It is impossible. Very well; now, in order therefore to understand how fast we can go what shall be the rate of our speed? Let us definitely know what is the wastage per year. On this point we had great difficulty in getting the exact number. At one time we were told 180 officially. I want the Committee to follow me in this critically. At one time we were told 180; subsequently we were told 160; that is to say, when we were engaged in our enquiry in Committee, and we ultimately accepted the figure which was given to us officially as 160; and we proceeded on that basis to determine the pace or the rate of acceleration. It is the same question now before you to-day, and today I am told the wastage is 120.

Divan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao: We were told 90 yesterday.

Mr. Jinnah: I think yesterday we were told it was 95.

Divan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao: I think you, Sir, stated that it was 95.
Mr. Jayakar: In the notes supplied to us overnight it is 120.
Mr. Jinnah: I want, first of all, to get what is the figure of wastage definitely.
Chairman: I am told the information with regard to wastage is in the documents which were supplied to you this morning.
Mr. Jinnah: That is 120.
Chairman: Yes.
Mr. Jinnah: Very well.

Diwan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao: Does it include British officers posted——
Chairman: I will find out. That is the total of the present establishment over the whole of the Indian Army.

Diwan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao: It seems to me that all these difficulties arise because of various calculations. Some are included for some calculations and some are excluded from other calculations.
Mr. Jayakar: In the notes supplied to us last night the total number of officers is 3,141.
Chairman: I am told that that includes all.
Mr. Jinnah: I have not yet finished what I wanted to say.

Diwan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao: I do not think it includes all other arms except cavalry and infantry.
Chairman: I am told the answer is that it includes everyone. I do not know.

Mr. Jinnah: I do not think so. I do not agree with that.

Chairman: This is a challenge on data which has been supplied and we are not going on until it is quite clear. I now put the question to those responsible for supplying this information, are these absolutely accurate facts based upon the whole of the officers in the Indian Army? I am told that those are the estimates we receive of the normal annual wastage on the present establishment of officers of the Indian Army with King’s Commissions.

Mr. Jinnah: Of all arms?
Chairman: Yes. We must not doubt the accuracy of that.

Mr. Jinnah: Do I understand—I am very nervous in accepting this figure—now from you that this is the total wastage in the Indian Army proper with regard to all arms. That is what I want to know.

Chairman: The answer to that is Yes, so I am told.
Mr. Jinnah: Very well.
Chairman: Of the Indian Army.

Mr. Jinnah: The Indian Army proper?
Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Jinnah: All the Arms.
Chairman: All officers with the King's Commission in the Indian Army. It is made quite clear; you know what it is.

Mr. Jinnah: I do not want to proceed any further with that matter. I will leave it there. We will take it that 120 is the wastage.

Now I want this Committee to express its opinion, and the opinion I want from this Committee is this. Let us examine, first of all, what is the number of Indians who ought to be recruited per year. We, on this side, hold—at least, I hold—that you can get all the 120 if you want them.

Dr. Moonje: Yes, quite right.

Mr. Jinnah: We have ample material. Imagine 320,000,000 people with a history behind them. Does any man of common sense believe that we cannot produce 120 boys per year who will be able to stand the most rigorous and strictest test of efficiency before they are granted King's Commissions? That is question number one. We can give you the whole number straight away. Are you prepared to accept it? If you want to Indianise the Army, if you really are in earnest, if you mean to hand over the defence of India as soon as possible to India, you can do it by saying henceforth the total number of the wastage shall be recruited from amongst the Indians, and that will take you 35 years.

Mr. Jayakar: 26 years.

Dr. Moonje: 30 years.

Mr. Jinnah: It will take 35 years. The last General will remain British. It will take you 35 years if you stop all recruitment to-day. I shall welcome it most wholeheartedly if you can do it in 28 years or 25 years. I am not opposed to that but in order to get that result this Committee must express an opinion that henceforth there shall be no British recruitment.

Dr. Moonje: That is the point.

Mr. Jinnah: That is the point on which I want to focus the attention of this Committee, and I say you must express your opinion on the pace of Indianisation.

Now, Sir, I have got to say this. Another difficulty on which I want an expression of opinion from this Committee is this. We are very often told that it cannot be denied that, at any rate, the defence of India must remain with the British Government, and so long as that is the position the degree of responsibility to be transferred must be limited.

I do not want to go into old history, but the scheme with which we are working now, which provides for 20 each year, means that it will take several centuries, I think, before we have even Indianised the Indian Army proper. Then there is the question, when we have Indianised the Indian Army proper, or are going on with the Indianisation of the Indian Army proper, of the reduction of British troops side by side with that. That again is a question of pace.
As you go on reducing the British troops, it may be necessary for the safety of India, both internal and external, that our standing Army of Indian troops, which is about 170,000 at present, should be increased. If that number has to be increased in order to replace the British troops as their numbers are reduced you will have to get more officers; remember that. Therefore, while you go on Indianising the officer ranks of the Indian Army proper, you may have to provide for an increase of troops as well as for additional officers, and there are some 3,000 odd officers—I am not quite sure of the number—with the British troops.

I say, therefore, that this sub-Committee must express a general opinion on the principle of the gradual reduction of British troops. The proportion of that reduction is a matter to be considered hereafter, but I would ask this sub-Committee to express an opinion on the principle, and to lay down that in our opinion British troops must be gradually reduced and replaced, if necessary by Indian troops.

That is all I have to say with regard to Indianisation. The next question is the question of a separate force, such as is suggested by the Simon Commission and which is referred to in the Despatch of the Government of India. I am opposed to that recommendation of the Simon Commission.

Lord Reading: I did not catch what recommendation you are referring to.

Mr. Jinnah: The recommendation which was referred to by the Chairman in the heads that he gave us.

Lord Reading: For a Dominion Army?

Several Members: For a separate Dominion Army.

Mr. Jinnah: I am opposed to that. I do not want to say anything more on that at the present moment unless I hear someone supporting it, because I do not want to take up your time unnecessarily; but if anyone is going to support it I will give my reply.

The next question before us is that of the Military Council. On that my view is that it will be essential to have a Military Council in India, just as you have here, for your purposes, an Imperial Defence Committee. I should like the Indian Princes and States to be represented on that Council, because it will be a question of All-India defence and the development of All-India defence, and therefore I should like the Indian Princes to be represented on that Council, and I am strongly of opinion that that will be necessary.

While we are thinking of the Indianisation of the Indian Army proper and the replacement of British troops, we shall also have to consider, as the replacement of the British troops takes place, another question, and that is not only to what extent we should increase our standing Army in view of the fact that a reduction of British troops has taken place—we may have to do that, or we may not have to make a proportionate increase—but
we must also consider our second line of defence. Our second line of defence at present is in a very nebulous state. It consists of the Auxiliary Force and the Territorial Force, which are referred to in the note which has been supplied to the members of this sub-Committee. That question requires a great deal of attention in India, and has been given a great deal of attention in other countries situated as India is situated. You cannot bear the burden of a huge standing Army.

In the old days whenever countries were in danger on their land frontiers what happened was that if there was a war two armies fought; the people were really not concerned with it very much. The two forces came into conflict with each other; one defeated the other, and the conquerer became the ruler of the conquered State, but the people went on as before; a man tilling his field suddenly came to know that, instead of A, B was the ruler of the country. He was not very much interested, except that a change of rulers had taken place.

But those days have gone; you cannot possibly now-a-days depend upon a standing Army only; you must also have your national army. That was shown by what happened to you in this country during the war. Your standing army would not have sufficed if you had been entirely dependent on it and had had no material behind it of a national character which could be mobilised; otherwise the position would have been serious.

_Raja Sher Muhammad Khan:_ But there is a Territorial Army in India.

_Dr. Moonje:_ Only in name.

_Mr. Jinnah:_ I wish there was a real Territorial Army in India, because in that case I think we could reduce our standing army very much, and use the money which we are now spending on the army for some urgent national requirements of our country.

_Lord Reading:_ There is a Territorial Force of 20,000, I believe, and an Auxiliary Force of 35,000?

_Several Members:_ Yes.

_Raja Sher Muhammad Khan:_ And a Reserve of 34,000.

_Mr. Jinnah:_ Let me tell you, Lord Reading, that in America there is a Territorial Force of nearly a million.

_Lord Reading:_ They have no standing army.

_Mr. Jinnah:_ They have a standing army of over a lakh in America, and they have what is called a Citizen Army, or second line of defence, which is nearly a million strong. We have the figures and facts, and if you want to verify that, Sir, I would beg of you to look at, and let my colleagues here see, a copy of the report of the sub-Committee of the Skeen Committee, which has been suppressed by the Secretary of State for India, up to now, and then you will get the facts. I am asking for materials, and I do beg of you to induce the Secretary of State for India to release that sub-Committee's Report.
Mr. Jayakar: I should like to know a little more of what Mr. Jinnah is saying. What is this sub-Committee's Report?

Mr. Jinnah: The sub-Committee which was appointed by the Skeen Committee to come to England, France, America and Canada, collect materials of the various systems that prevailed in these four countries, and we spent something over 3½ months in travelling round collecting those materials, and those materials will give you all the information as to what is happening to other countries like ours, such as America.

Chairman: But surely it does not help us. What is the hostile land frontier to America? I am not a military expert, but I know America. What is the hostile land frontier to America?

Mr. Jinnah: I was not saying that.

Chairman: Well, America was quoted.

Mr. Jayakar: My question to Mr. Jinnah was, I want to know the details of this Report, Sir.

Sir Phiroze Sethna: Ask the Government to give members a copy of that Report.

Sir Muhammad Shafi: Seeing that the land frontiers of India are much larger than the land frontiers of any other country, it follows that there should be a larger second line of defence in India than in those other countries.

Mr. Jayakar: My question to Jinnah was, I want to know the details of this sub-Committee's Report.

Mr. Jinnah: I say that the sub-Committee has made a Report giving you the various facts and figures with regard to the position of these four countries—France, England, Canada and America—giving you all the materials, and those materials, I say, if they were placed before you would give you a great deal of information which would enable you really to understand the whole problem—with regard to the second line of defence, I am talking.

Now, with reference to your remark, Mr. Chairman, I am very much obliged to you for saying that as far as you are aware America is not threatened with land frontiers. I agree with you; and yet America has a standing Army of nearly a lakh.

Chairman: That is to deal with boot-leggers.

Mr. Jinnah: Well, whether you have boot-leggers within your jurisdiction or whether you have boot-leggers on the frontier, these armaments are necessary. The question is where they are. Therefore I say that you will never get—let me tell you, you will never get—a reduction of military expenditure in India of any appreciable degree until you build up a real second line of defence. All countries placed as India is placed have got to do that.

Now, Sir, I have done with that question, and I conclude by saying this—that this Committee really must, if you are going to contribute anything useful to the question of the political principle of defence, if you are going to make any contribution,
you must make definite recommendations. That is all that I have to say.

Sir Muhammad Shafi: There is one matter which I think requires a little further elucidation, if I may be permitted just to invite the attention of the Committee to it. The paper with which we have been supplied this morning shows that the scheme adopted unanimously by the Government of India in 1922 contemplated complete Indianisation of the officer ranks of the Indian Army in 30 years, and if you turn to Appendix I to that Report you will find that according to that Report the number of commissions granted during each period is given in that Appendix. During the first 14 years, according to that scheme, the number to be granted annually averaged 81.4, the number to be granted during the second period averaged annually 182, and the number to be granted during the third period averaged annually 227—on an increasing scale—and having provided for this average grant of commissions at a certain rate during each of the three periods, the scheme contemplated complete Indianisation within 30 years. On the other hand, the Skeen Committee, you will remember, consisted originally of 14 members. Of these 14 members, Pandit Motilal Nehru resigned, and there remained 13 members. Of these 13 members a majority—that is to say, eight members—approved of the Skeen Committee's scheme which would Indianise 50 per cent. of the officer ranks of the Indian Army in 25 years. Three, including Mr. Jinnah, voted for 15 years, and two for 20 years. It is clear, therefore, that the majority report of the Skeen Committee contemplated Indianisation of one half—that is to say, 50 per cent. of the officer ranks of the Indian Army—in 25 years. That is what I meant when I said that neither Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru nor I, who were party to the Government of India scheme of 1922, are prepared to accept the Skeen Committee's Report. We stand by the original schemes of the Government of India adopted in 1922, and we ask that this Committee should lay down as a political principle regarding Indianisation that the officer ranks of the Indian Army should be completely Indianised within a period of 30 years commencing on the 1st January, 1932.

Lord Reading: Are we to lay that down without consideration of what the head of the Army considers possible? Is it contemplated that we should lay that down as a fixed principle without regard to the Commander-in-Chief or the expert authorities in India or the Government of India?

Sir Muhammad Shafi: May I point out, Lord Reading, that the scheme adopted by the Government of India in 1922 was adopted with the unanimous consent of the Commander-in-Chief, the then Viceroy and the members of the Cabinet, all after having fully considered it in all its aspects and upon the basis of the recommendations made by the Army Department of the Government of India. There is no reason to think that the conditions which existed in 1922 have undergone such a material change that the same principle cannot be adopted now.
Lord Reading: Was this approved by military experts?

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: Yes, by the highest military officer at that time in India.

Sardar Ujjal Singh: I should like to make a few remarks on this matter after the long speech to which we have listened from Mr. Jinnah. I do not wish to say very much on the points which have been already covered. I doubt very much whether any one disputes the capacity of Indians to hold high rank in the Indian Army. I do not want to say anything on that, nor do I want to say anything about any differentiation being made between man and man or between various classes. What is required is to have the best material for the higher ranks in the Indian Army by open competition. There should be a fair field and no favour.

I should like to say that I welcome your declaration, Sir, on behalf of the Government, and I believe that it will be received in India with a great sigh of relief. The establishment of an Indian Sandhurst immediately as soon as conditions permit will certainly be welcomed, but it does not carry the matter any further than what has been recommended in the Sandhurst Committee report. Unless you back up that declaration by a certain declaration of policy with regard to the pace of Indianisation I do not believe that it would create very great enthusiasm. As many of the speakers have already pointed out, the Sandhurst Committee report is already a back number. I think with regard to the establishment of a Sandhurst that you must lay down some definite principle because you will have to determine the capacity of the Sandhurst to be established. The Sandhurst Committee drew up a scheme, and according to that scheme they contemplated the establishment of a Sandhurst in India in 1933 with a capacity of 100 Cadets only. 33 Cadets were to be admitted every year. In that case the pace of Indianisation would be that in 1952 we would have only 50 per cent. of Indians in the higher ranks. That, you know, Sir, is not going to satisfy India now; and if you are going to satisfy Indian public opinion you must lay down some principles, and express some opinions, about the pace of Indianisation, and then leave the details to be worked out by the expert Committee. As has been mentioned, one scheme was drawn up as far back as 1922 for the Indianisation of the higher ranks in 30 years. If that could be true in 1922 it could certainly be true now. If you could draw up a programme of Indianisation in 30 years that might satisfy public opinion. From that point of view, from 1922 we have taken 38 years and not 30 years as was contemplated then. Without determining, or without laying down some principle with regard to the pace of Indianisation, the simple announcement of the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst would not carry us any further.

Then, Sir, with regard to the reduction of British troops in India. Opinion in India is certainly growing strong with regard to the reduction of British troops. Many of us here remember that previous to the Indian Mutiny the strength of the British
troops was very small. I have some figures but I do not know whether they are quite accurate.

_Diwān Bahadur Ramachandra Rao_: The number was 28,000.

_Sardar Ujjal Singh_: The strength of the British troops was 28,000.

_Lord Reading_: Of what date are you speaking?

_Sardar Ujjal Singh_: Previous to the Indian Mutiny in 1857. Of course it was after the Mutiny that the strength of the British troops was raised, and now it stands at about 60,000. When you compare the cost of British troops before the War and what it is now all of us will realise what it means to India to reduce the number of British troops in India. Previous to the War one British soldier cost 1,000 rupees, but at present he costs 2,500 rupees, as against 650 rupees for the cost of an Indian soldier. Now, Sir, if a reduction in the number of British troops is gradually carried out of course with due regard to efficiency in the Army, with due regard to the safety of the country, and with due regard to other interests which have been pointed out already, we must lay down a principle here which has not been laid down before that there is a necessity for the reduction of British troops now, because a Federal Government having been established that suspicion is bound to be removed and the necessity for British troops which are kept there with the object of preserving internal peace, or for Imperial purposes, will certainly be curtailed.

With regard to other matters which have been mentioned by Mr. Jinnah, such as the relationship with the Crown, I should not like to say anything; but I do want to mention these two points particularly, the pace of Indianisation in the higher ranks of the Indian Army and the reduction of British troops. I think some general principle and an expression of opinion must be laid down by this Committee and the details should be worked out by an expert Committee to be set up afterwards.

_H.H. The Maharaja of Alwar_: I should like to ask a question of this Committee. I hope the splendid scheme of a Sandhurst College or school in India will be open to the Indian States also.

_Chairman_: The one thing that we want to avoid is segregation, and I have no hesitation in saying that the answer to His Highness’ question is “Yes, certainly.”

_H.H. The Maharaja of Bikaner_: The Sandhurst will be open to officers of the Indian State Forces as well as to our subjects?

_Chairman_: Certainly.

_Diwān Bahadur Ramachandra Rao_: With regard to the Indian Sandhurst Committee, a circular was sent round to all the Indian States asking them to inform the Committee as to what their requirements would be and whether they would be willing to have their officers trained at the Sandhurst which they proposed. Most of the States replied that they would be willing to take advantage of the Sandhurst when it was established.
Chairman: So that for all practical purposes we are discussing Sandhurst in relation to the whole.

Diwan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao: And the scheme provided for a certain number of candidates from the Indian States.

Chairman: At what time would you like to reassemble.

H.H. The Maharaja of Bikaner: We are seeing the Prime Minister at 3 o'clock this afternoon, so I am afraid we should not be able to be present if you recommence at that hour.

Mr. Jinnah: May I point out to His Highness The Maharaja of Bikaner that paragraph 48 of the Skeen Committee's Report says this, "It seems probable that a number of the Indian States would be glad to avail themselves of the benefits of the training available in the Indian Military College, if one is established, for the purpose of giving higher training to some of the officers of their State Forces. We believe that the participation of the Indian States in the College would be an advantage to India as a whole, as tending to increase the efficiency of the Indian State Forces, and we recommend that a certain number of vacancies be reserved for Indian States at the College over and above the number of vacancies available for candidates who seek Commissions in the Regular Indian Army."

Sir Akbar Hydari: It is only for the officers of the Indian State Forces.

Mr. Jinnah: They will be eligible for admission.

Chairman: To go back for a moment to the question of our next meeting, I understand the Princes cannot be here this afternoon.

H.H. The Maharaja of Bikaner: All the Princes have to see the Prime Minister this afternoon about their own matters.

Chairman: To-morrow morning we cannot meet because the funeral of the King's sister will take place.

Sir Abdul Qaiyum: I have a suggestion to make. I think the Indian Sandhurst should be open to British lads too.

Sardar Ujjal Singh: Yes.

Sir Abdul Qaiyum: We should encourage English lads from England to come, if they would care to come to the Indian Sandhurst.

Colonel Haksan: I quite agree.

Chairman: I do not know if it meets your wishes, but it may save discussion if in the interval I try and summarise the position in some broad general resolutions. That will enable you to have some material before you.

(The sub-Committee adjourned at 1-5 p.m.)

PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD MEETING OF SUB-COMMITTEE NO. VII (DEFENCE) HELD ON 12TH JANUARY, 1931.

Chairman: You will remember, Gentlemen, that when we adjourned on the last occasion I said I would endeavour in the
interval to try and focus the discussion on certain definite resolutions. I think I am interpreting everyone's views when I say that to attempt to set up a definite scheme or a time table in a Committee of this kind and on such a question as we are discussing is next to impossible.

Lord Reading: Hear, hear.

Chairman: I think more harm would be done than good in attempting to do any such thing; but, on the other hand, there are certain definite principles on which there appears to be unanimity existing in the Committee, and instead of a long debate again over the whole subject, I have drafted a few resolutions as I so interpret your feelings which may be the basis of discussion.

I have arranged for copies to be circulated. I will now read them:

"(1) The sub-Committee consider that with the development of the new political structure in India, the defence of India must to an increasing extent be the concern of the Indian people, and not of the British Government alone." That is a first broad general declaration.

Then "(2) In order to give practical effect to this principle, they recommend:

(a) That immediate steps be taken to increase the rate of Indianisation in the Indian Army to make it commensurate with the main object in view, having regard to all relevant considerations such as the maintenance of the requisite standard of efficiency."

Now, that is the first statement following that declaration.

"(b) That in order to give effect to (a), a training college in India be established at the earliest possible moment in order to train candidates for Commissions in all arms of the Indian Defence Services. This College would also train prospective officers of the Indian State Forces. Indian cadets should, however, continue to be eligible for admission as at present to Sandhurst, Woolwich and Cranwell."

That is to give effect to the declaration which I made on Friday.

"(c) That in order to avoid delay the Government of India be instructed to set up a Committee of Experts, both British and Indian, to work out the details of the establishment of such a College.

(3) The Committee also recognise the great importance attached by Indian thought to the reduction of the number of British troops in India to the lowest possible figure and consider that the question should form the subject of early expert investigation."

On that you will also remember I intimated there was a Committee to consider that, and the idea is that that Committee's job
should start immediately our work has finished. Now that document will be circulated. You will see it gives a broad general effect to the discussion as it took place on Friday.

Lord Peel: Do you propose that the discussion now as it were, should start afresh on the basis of this paper which you have laid before us, and rather wipe out, as it were, what was said on the last occasion?

Chairman: Let me put it in this way. I hope there will not be too much discussion; I hope we shall apply ourselves to seeing how far these, what I call for short, resolutions meet the general views of the Committee.

Lord Peel: I see.

Sir Samuel Hoare: Your idea, Mr. Chairman, would be supposing there was agreement upon these resolutions that this would be the report of the Committee?

Chairman: That is so.

Sir Samuel Hoare: I see.

Sir M. Shaft: I take it the object is to focus the discussion on these propositions?

Chairman: Certainly.

Lord Reading: Mr. Chairman, you have by the step you have taken given effect to the propositions that I was about to make which would not have been so well expressed or so carefully thought out, but which would have followed along the same lines, because I was very anxious that we should not as a Committee attempt to lay down principles which would fetter in any way the judgment or the discretion of the military authorities and the Government of India when they came to consider these matters; because frankly it seems to me impossible for us, although we have some distinguished military officers amongst us, and amongst them several of Their Highnesses and others who are here present now whom I need not name, we cannot consider ourselves an expert Committee, and it would be most dangerous for us to lay down any principle, as it seems to me, stating any rate of Indianisation or anything of a precise character of that kind which would or might embarrass those who will have to deal with this subject. You have dealt with it, Mr. Chairman, in a manner that seems to me to satisfy certainly my views, and so far as I can gather, the views of the majority of the Committee. You do affirm that the rate of Indianisation is to be increased, but it must be having regard to all relevant considerations. I quite accept that.

With regard to the Indian Sandhurst, which is in (b) and (c), I do not desire to say anything. I raise no objection to that. The Committee known as the Skeen Committee was appointed by me. It reported after my time, and has been dealt with. Some of its recommendations have been made effective; others, and especially this one, have not yet been accepted by the Government. I quite agree that this is a matter which should receive early attention.
It can be dealt with, I suppose, now by a Committee if it is set up at once which will have to examine it. It has to be borne in mind when the new Government comes into operation that it will have to bear the burden of responsibility for these various matters, and before anything is done one would think that they must be the authority to give the instructions and to come to conclusions in consultation no doubt with the military authorities here and the Viceroy who is in charge of the reserved subjects; but there can be no objection to the setting up of the Committee so that there may be no time lost in examining this whole question; and that it is necessary to have an examination is made very plain by the discussions which have taken place here. I think Sir M. Shafi and also I think Sardar Sahib Ujjal Singh, and I am not sure there were not others, who said that the Skeen Committee's Report is dead; it is out of date. It is true they only say that with reference to the part which deals with the Indianisation of officers, but it serves to illustrate the point I want to make with regard to it, that these Reports very soon become out of date. You cannot help it. The 1922 Committee's Report which is before us and which is preferred by most of those who spoke, including Sir M. Shafi, because it proposed a much more rapid Indianisation than the second Report—the Skeen Report is dead and you go back to 1922.

Sir M. Shafi: Perhaps Your Lordship means a comparatively rapid Indianisation; not much more rapid.

Lord Reading: It seemed to me from what was said much more rapid. It does not matter about the term; it is preferred because it is more rapid. Well that is the 1922 Committee's Report which is even older than the Skeen Committee's Report. I do not suppose anyone would say that you could take those recommendations and accept them without further consideration. I would point out also that there have been a good many changes made since 1922 when the matter was examined with very great care at the time. The whole question was considered, as I have said, in all detail, and I think the one thing at any rate that stands out very clearly in my mind is that this is a subject which no human being, and particularly an Indian who is interested in the defence of India, would ever venture to pronounce a hasty opinion upon. Everyone must assume certainly who is familiar with that Report that the whole question requires most careful examination. I say no more about it; I am content to leave it in that way.

The only other matter with which I want to deal is one which I confess has rather troubled me in the discussions in this Committee, and that is No. (3). Of course I bow to your ruling, Sir, which permits of some, although very limited, discussion with regard to the reduction of British troops. It had never occurred to me when we were talking of Indianisation that we were speaking also of a reduction of British troops. In my time, at any rate, and as I have understood the nomenclature, the debate on Indianisation has always referred to the Indianisation of officers, the question of the substitution of Indian officers for British; it has always been
discussed under the term of "reduction of British troops." I cannot dwell upon that or make more of it, because you have said, Mr. Chairman, that to some extent it is open. All I wish to say with regard to it is that I would hesitate very much indeed to express any opinion with regard to the number of British troops without—

Sir Samuel Hoare: This does not express an opinion.

Lord Peel: It leaves it quite open.

Lord Reading: That seems to emphasise the wisdom of what I am saying, that I would hesitate to express any opinion. All I am saying is that I would hesitate to express any opinion for that reason, and probably no doubt if this is adopted you must remember it is a proposal. It is, "The Committee also recognise the great importance attached by Indian thought to the reduction of the number of British troops in India to the lowest possible figure and consider that the question should form the subject of early expert investigation. Now, that is a proposal. If it is accepted there is nothing more to be said with regard to it. It may make it easier; but as far as I am concerned I want to say this. I think one has to be very careful about it. When you speak of reducing the number of British troops in India to the lowest possible figure, that, I presume, means consistent with the obligations which Britain has undertaken and consistent with the work which the Army has to perform, and also bearing in mind the required efficiency of the troops and especially the numbers that are to be employed if the Army consists only of the number of troops that we have at present. I have in mind particularly in this connection one matter, I have no doubt there are others, which probably Sir Akbar Hydari would be more familiar with than I am, as I am only speaking from a recollection of the time when I was there, under which the British Government is under obligation to keep British troops, or to keep Indian troops with British officers, and in that connection the obligations could not be performed unless you maintained to some extent, at any rate, these troops and British officers. All I wish to say with regard to this, having gone through this question with very great care at one time, when after a great deal of pressure, and legitimate pressure, especially based on the desire for economy in the Committee's Report of 1922 we reduced the number of British troops by something like 15 per cent., that is by about 10,000. That was done only a few years ago. For my part I hesitate very much to express any opinion that a reduction of British troops is desirable at this moment or that it can be achieved. I should not like to say, and I do not want to be committed to any observation of that character, although I quite agree that the Committee is entitled to form the view that as soon as you can consistent with safety and efficiency and all relevant considerations reduce the number of British troops because the cost is much cheaper. It is between four and five times cheaper to have Indian troops than British. But you must not do that until it is safe to do it. I should be very surprised if you could do it to any extent at the present moment, bearing in mind all the considerations that you
must take into account for the defence of India and all possible contingencies. For my part, as I have said, I should hesitate at this moment to give a vote in favour of the reduction of (1). I should like to be satisfied. I hope I am right in thinking that everyone here would take that view. That is all I wish to say with regard to that matter. I do hope that we shall not in the debate get any further than that in considering this question of the reduction of troops.

Sir M. Shafi: Lord Reading has expressed his opinion which of course, coming as it does from him, must carry weight and receive careful consideration with regard to the second and third propositions, which you, Sir, have formulated on this paper. May I venture to ask him what is his opinion as to the principle laid down in paragraph 1? He has not said anything with regard to that. Before any of us express our opinions I should like to know whether His Lordship accepts the principle laid down in paragraph 1.

Lord Reading: Yes, certainly; that is why I did not criticise it.

Sir M. Shafi: If that is so, then bearing the principle laid down in paragraph 1 in mind it seems to me that that necessarily leads to two things.

Firstly, with regard to what is called the Indian Army proper—that is to say, the Indian section of the Army in India—it leads to the Indianisation of the officer ranks of that section of the Army. In the second place, the principle noted in paragraph (1) also leads to this, that the British garrison in India—that is to say, the British Army—should be gradually eliminated, being substituted by Indian regiments to the extent that may be necessary.

Lord Reading: Why do you say that, Sir Muhammad?

Sir M. Shafi: Because of the principle laid down in paragraph (1).

Lord Reading: I do not agree.

Sir M. Shafi: It lays down that "The defence of India must to an increasing extent be the concern of the Indian people." That necessarily, I venture to submit, leads to those two results.

Lord Reading: If you will allow me to say so, Sir Muhammad, I should like to point out that that is not quite right, for what you have referred to is not the whole of it; it goes on to say "and not of the British Government alone." If your question to me had been whether I said the defence of India must be the concern of the Indian people, I should have said I did not agree; but when you add "and not of the British Government alone," then I do agree.

Sir M. Shafi: I quite agree, but the point is this: At present the defence of India is the business of the British Government alone; at present the Indian people do not come into the picture constitutionally so far as the defence of India is concerned. Therefore, if the people of India are to have an increasing share in the defence
of their own country, I venture to submit that two results which I have submitted to you necessarily follow. In the first place there must be the Indianisation of the officer ranks of the Indian Army, and secondly there must be the gradual elimination of the British garrison and the gradual substitution for it of Indians for the purposes of the defence of India. I do not say, of course, that there should be any large elimination of or decrease in the British garrison; I do not say that at all. Lord Reading said that after very careful consideration in 1922 certain conclusions were arrived at, including the reduction of the British garrison. I forget now what was the actual percentage proposed.

Lord Reading: Roughly ten thousand out of seventy thousand.

Sir M. Shafi: I entirely agree that the scheme which was framed in 1922 and the conclusions which were arrived at in 1922 were the result of very careful consideration, and in that lies the value of the conclusions then arrived at; that is the reason why I said that that scheme—having been very carefully considered and revised and, after revision, adopted unanimously by the Government of India, including Lord Reading, the late Lord Rawlinson, and all the members of the Executive Council—is a scheme which is worthy of the serious consideration of this sub-Committee.

I do not say that in every detail that scheme must necessarily be adhered to; all I say is this, that the period of Indianisation which was computed at that time is a period which should be borne in mind by this sub-Committee—within thirty years. I venture to think that the opinion then arrived at holds good even now: I see no material change in the conditions in which those conclusions were arrived at. On the contrary, having been myself one of the representatives of India in the Imperial Conference this year, and knowing what is going on at Geneva and what steps the British Government is taking in order to bring about an agreement between all the great Powers with regard to the reduction of armaments and with regard to arbitration being adopted as the means of settling International disputes, and so on, I say that to my mind there is some prospect of a change for the better coming in the near future, though I do not say there is a change for the better to-day. That being so, it seems to me that the scheme prepared in 1922 is worthy of the consideration of this sub-Committee.

What I say is this. The three principles laid down by the Chairman in the paper that has been placed before us primâ facie appear to me to conform to the principles which are worthy of adoption by this sub-Committee; and, if you adopt the first principle, the second and third seem to me to be the necessary consequences of the first.

Chairman: Before I call on His Highness of Alwar, I want to make one observation which I feel you must all keep in mind. If this conference to-day were composed of representatives of South Africa, Canada, and New Zealand, all enjoying what is called Dominion Status and so on, I want to remind you that by their own
action, claiming as they do to be equal co-partners with this country, the question of the defence of the Empire is not a matter for them. They themselves by their own act—and I hope it will never be departed from—are subject to a body called the Committee of Imperial Defence. Therefore, in view of the fact that you are not discussing law and order but are discussing defence, you must always have at the back of your mind that any scheme, no matter who submits it, whether it be one government or another, must by the very nature of things be subject to the Committee of Imperial Defence, because after all they are the responsible body for the Defence of the Empire as a whole. I make that observation because that must be a governing factor, and I do not want anybody to feel that there is something special for India about this. It is not something that is special to India; it is common to the Empire as a whole.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: Would Your Lordship, consistently with the principles enunciated in these resolutions, recommend the Expert Committee to be appointed to treat the reports of the Committees appointed during your Viceroyalty in India, and also the report of the Skeen Committee, as the basis of their consideration and discussion?

Lord Reading: I should not like to say as a basis. I think they should have those reports before them and consider them. It is too much to say they should regard them as a basis, but I certainly agree that they should have those reports before them and that they should consider them.

H.H. The Maharaja of Alwar: On my own behalf, Sir, I should like sincerely to congratulate you on the brevity of the report which you have put before us, and when I read the various paragraphs in it, firstly saying that the defence of India must to an increasing extent be the concern of the Indian people, secondly that immediate steps be taken to increase the rate of Indianisation commensurate with the main object in view, thirdly that a training college in India should be established at the earliest possible moment, fourthly that the Government of India be instructed to set up a Committee of Experts, both British and Indian, to work out the details of the establishment of such a college, and, fifthly, that this Committee also recognises the importance of the reduction in the number of British troops in India to the lowest possible figure, and considers that the question should form the subject of early expert investigation, speaking for myself I doubt very much if Indians could have drafted a report more suitable to themselves, and I cordially support every word that you have said there. I congratulate you not only on the brevity of this report but on the material that it contains.

No doubt a great deal will depend on the two Expert Committees which will work out the details, and I can only express the hope, in concluding my extremely brief speech, that those committees, when they come to work out the details in accordance with the instructions given to them, will be equally generous in their sentiments and in the working out of the details, as generous as
you, Sir, have been in drawing up the report of the sub-Committee, which I cordially support. I hope my colleagues will do you the justice, after expressing their individual opinions, of helping you in the same direction.

Sir Akbar Hydari: I want to suggest that an additional paragraph be added in the following terms: “The Committee also recognise that no action should be taken so as to prejudice in any way the power of the Crown to fulfil the military obligations undertaken by it in any Treaty it may have entered into within any particular Indian State.” All this will have to be borne in mind. As I have repeatedly said here and elsewhere, we are definitely of opinion that the obligation of the Crown to discharge certain obligations towards the Indian States must emphatically remain within the Province of the Crown and be unaffected by any action that may be taken, unless and until the Crown assures that State that its Treaty obligation will not be thereby affected.

Chairman: I will have a copy of that resolution, but I should like to make it clear that, whether any such resolution as that indicated by you is submitted or not, neither this sub-Committee nor any other Committee can in any way abrogate Treaty obligations that are in operation. I have always acted under the assumption—and I am sure everyone else has—that that stands beyond question, so that if any such declaration as that meets your point you have it from me, and I am sure it must be the clear intention of any committee.

Sir Akbar Hydari: It may be a declaration by you, but as this will go out as the report of the sub-Committee it would be desirable to have the report in that form.

Chairman: Please let me have a copy of that.

Lord Peel: I shall try to emulate the admirable example of His Highness, who has just spoken, as regards brevity, but I should like first of all to quote a sentence from the Skeen Report which seems to me very pertinent and which expresses in many ways my general point of view. I am quoting the words of Sir P. Pattani, who says here that he is not approaching the question “from the point of view of Indianisation against Europeanisation. I am only treating it”, he says, “as an Imperial question. It is in the interests of the Empire itself that every component part, every limb of the Empire, should be equally strong, so that no weak link or organ, no weak part of the body, should be so weak as to hamper the whole of the body in the event of a great danger.” I think that is admirably expressed, if I may say so, by Sir P. Pattani.

I can say very briefly all I want to say on these proposals. I have always held that India, as she advances towards responsible government, must necessarily take the obligations upon her which that great position involves, and therefore that she must take an increasing part in her own defence. I agree with that proposition, and I also agree that—subject of course to the necessary requirements of efficiency—that rate should be increased.
Perhaps I may be allowed to say that, as I think Lord Reading will well remember, I was responsible over here for carrying through the proposals for the Indianisation of the Eight Units. I am quite aware that subsequently those proposals have been considered to be inadequate, but at the same time they were an extremely important commencement, and I think they have had very valuable results.

Then as regards the training college to be set up in India, I quite agree that that college should be set up, and I also agree that that should be coincident with young men also coming over for training at Sandhurst; I lay great stress on that point. Quite apart from the fact that Indian parents may often be unwilling to send their sons over here for training, I think this proposal would enable you to tap a very valuable section of the youth of India—that is to say young men who, whatever the grants may have been at Sandhurst, might consider it rather a heavy responsibility to come over here. A great many sons of families who are most competent to take part in the defence of their country will have an opportunity of getting that training in India itself. I should like to add that they will come over here to be attached to a regiment as well.

I am therefore in general agreement with those proposals, and I think (c) follows from them, so I need say no further word on that point.

I should add in parenthesis that I am only dealing with the question of the Army, because my friend Sir Samuel Hoare, who is an expert on Air matters and who flies a great deal more than I do, will say a few words on that side of the subject.

With regard to the very important question of the reduction of British troops in India, of course the question of the expense of British troops in India has been brought before me constantly, and of course the question has been raised that more are kept as an Imperial Reserve than might otherwise have been kept. I am extremely glad, Mr. Chairman, that you have advised that this sub-Committee should not itself go into the question of what reduction, if any, should be made, whether by way of reduction or substitution, at the present time, because I do not think we are really constituted for that and it is a most difficult and complicated question and one which involves a great many problems of defence which it is quite impossible to state in open committee. It involves all sorts of questions, possibly affecting other countries—questions of mobilisation, questions of support, questions of assistance elsewhere and so on—which it would be extraordinarily undesirable to state publicly.

I also recollect very vividly the fact to which Lord Reading has already referred of the reductions in 1922 as a result of the advice given by the Committee over which Lord Inchcape presided.

I should like to point out with regard to that that India at that time, was in a very difficult financial position, and that financial questions pressed very hard upon us when we arrived at those decisions; but I should like further to say—because I think it is
worth saying—that that subject of the reduction of the British Army by that number of troops was examined after many many days most carefully in the Committee of Imperial Defence. I sat upon it for many days on that subject; it was thoroughly canvassed, and all the great military and air experts and the best military intelligence were brought to bear upon it, and the best military advice, and not only that, but advice of other kinds, from the Foreign Office and other quarters. Therefore, I think, Mr. Chairman, that you are extremely wise in saying that this subject should be the subject of expert investigation. I am not going to say now, of course, what should be the direction to that Committee; that will be considered later; but I feel—and Lord Reading has alluded to some aspects of this matter, that really the question of the reduction of the British Army in India rests upon so many wide considerations that I hope the reference to that Committee will be a wide one, and that they will be able to take into consideration a great many other matters which, as I say, cannot be discussed here publicly but will be thoroughly thrashed out in that Committee. That Mr. Chairman, I think, on those matters, is all I have to say. There are many things that I would have said about the Indianisation of the Army, but I think it becomes unnecessary to say them owing to the decisions at which you have arrived. Generally speaking, I think I should welcome these investigations, because I am not afraid of any investigation of that sort. I think the whole matter can very fairly be looked into, and I do not think there is any objection to it.

Sir Muhammad Shafi: Is it not an accepted theory, both in England and in India—in fact, in all civilised countries—that the greater mechanisation of the Army must necessarily result in the numbers of troops actually employed being decreased?

Chairman: Well, if you put it this way, that if I were going out in the dark would I prefer to have two chaps with me with sticks, I would prefer a revolver myself; but that does not prove anything, except my wisdom.

Lord Peel: That is no doubt a better answer than I could have given, I will only just remind Sir Muhammad of this, that the process of transition to mechanisation is an extremely expensive one, and a great deal of experiment and a great deal of work has got to be done before you settle on the exact form of mechanisation which it is prudent and wise to adopt.

Sir Samuel Hoare: Mr. Chairman, I have only one or two very short sentences to add to what Lord Peel has said, but I was a member of the Committee of Imperial Defence for seven years, which is a long time, and I was head of the Air Force for seven years, which is also a long time for a connection with a Service Department. That experience leads me to say two things. I would say first of all to my friends from India, whatever you do in this matter of Indianisation, keep the Army free of politics. I agree with you that we should proceed with the Indianisation upon the
general lines set out in the first of these resolutions, but I do say, and say it most sincerely, having had a unique experience, perhaps, in starting what was a new fighting service for peace-time purposes—because you will remember that the Air Force was only created during the war, and that in the years immediately after the war, when I was at the Air Ministry we had to build from the very beginning—whatever you do, do keep these Army questions as free as you can from politics. If you once let politics influence you in dealing with such a question as Indianisation I am very much afraid that you will do irreparable damage to what is really one of the most sensitive of all machines—namely, a fighting machine that depends above all things upon *esprit de corps* and a feeling of mutual trust between officers and men in the various units. That is my first word, I will not say of warning, but word of advice to you. I would say, secondly, that when you come to start your Indian Sandhurst, keep up above all things the efficiency of the training. I should be very sorry to see a lower standard adopted for the training of officers in the Indian Sandhurst than the standard adopted in the British Sandhurst.

**Dr. Moonje:** We shall have the same standard of efficiency.

**Sir Samuel Hoare:** I am delighted to hear Dr. Moonje say that. You will pardon me, I am sure, for making these observations, because I had a unique experience of these questions after the war, and it is particularly necessary in connection with the arm with which I was connected—namely the Air Force. It is very wrong to assume that you can train a pilot in a few weeks or a few months, and make him an efficient Air Force officer. It needs a highly specialised training, and I believe that when you come to go into the details you will find it practically very difficult to add to your Indian Sandhurst a small Department for the training of Indian Air Force officers. I believe you will have to adopt other expedients for it. I do not now dogmatise, because they are practical questions and they can only be dealt with in a practical way; but, as Dr. Moonje has just said, keep up your standard of training.

Thirdly, as to the question of economy mentioned in the last of these resolutions—a question which I know is of intense interest to India, as indeed it is of intense interest to us here as well—there again I say, whatever you do, do not press it too far, do not break your military machine in trying to cut down expenditure too quickly; and if your experience in India is in any way like my experience here, the danger is not from the military authorities in opposing their will upon the civilians, but quite the contrary—the civilians imposing their economies, regardless of military considerations, upon the military. Now, Gentlemen, if your experience in India is the same as mine, that is a danger that you have got to have in view.

Let me, lastly, assure you that the last thing in the world we wish to do here is to inflate the number of British troops in India, and to keep more than are actually required. From the point of
view of Great Britain, whatever may be the actual amount of the capitation charges in India, the existence of these many units in India does, in various ways, direct and indirect, place a very heavy financial obligation on the British tax-payer. Neither in the past have we had, nor now have we the least intention of using the excuse of the defence of India for keeping in being more battalions or more Air Force units than are actually required. Having said that, Mr. Chairman, let me end by saying that I see no reason why we should not agree unanimously to these resolutions and I hope that as a result of that certain things that India, I know, has required for many years will be carried into effect at no distant date.

Mr. Jinnah: Did I understand Sir Samuel Hoare to say that he agreed with the resolutions?

Sir Samuel Hoare: Yes, I am prepared to accept these resolutions.

Col. Hakskar: In paragraph 2 (b) you have said, "a training college in India be established at the earliest possible moment in order to train candidates for commissions in all arms of the Indian defence services. This college would also train prospective officers of the Indian State Forces." I would suggest for your consideration that while on this subject, and in consequence of the reference made in sub-paragraph (b) to the Indian States, our recommendation should be that the officers of the Indian States would also be eligible for training at the staff college in Quetta.

Chairman: Well, that is a question of wording. The object of this was to cover, quite clearly and specifically, the question put from the States on Friday: did the Indian Sandhurst, as we call it, include an opportunity for the States? The answer was "Yes," and that was merely to cover that. You need not worry about it.

H.H. The Maharaja of Bikaner: I wish to add another small point, and to say that the States' subjects will be eligible to go to the Indian Sandhurst. I think it is so in the case of the English Sandhurst already.

Chairman: That is so, that is the intention.

H.H. The Maharaja of Bikaner: I have also another verbal suggestion in paragraph (2) (c), where we speak of an expert Committee, both British and Indian. I wish to suggest that it should include, after the words "British and Indian", "including representatives of the Indian States", because we have already made it clear in the Sankey Committee that the States wish to have the same voice in defence and military affairs as the Federal Army in British India.

Lord Reading: I think it covers it as it is.

Chairman: I think it covers it.

H.H. The Maharaja of Bikaner: I only wanted to make it clear, that is all.

Chairman: Quite so.
Mr. Jayakar: Like some of the previous speakers, I also admire the brevity of the formula which you have proposed for the consideration of the Committee. Speaking for myself, I should have preferred—though recognising the inability of this Committee, not being an expert Committee, to go into details—I should have preferred like Mr. Jinnah, who spoke on the previous occasion, that this Committee, without touching any details, should give a direction to the expert committee as regards important principles, including, inter alia, the rate or the pace of Indianisation. But if it is the view of the Committee that we should arrive at some unanimous conclusions, I recognise the wisdom of being content with 14 annas instead of 16, and if that is the wish of the Committee I would not like to go against the united wishes of this Committee. In that case may I submit one consideration for the approval of this Committee—namely, that when you refer to certain investigations, for instance in clause 2 (b) and in clause 3, I am anxious that all the pioneer work that has been done in the matter of such investigations by previous committees appointed by the Government of India, and on which military experts have sat, and which have had the benefit of all the important consideration at the hands of these experts—I am anxious to link up the work of these previous committees in the matter of the two investigations mentioned in clause 2 (b) and in clause 3. I recognise, as Lord Reading has pointed out, that he may not like to make the recommendations of these two previous committees the basis. He objects to the word "basis" there. May I suggest another formula which may be added as an additional paragraph—namely, that in making the investigations mentioned in clause 2 (b) and in clause 3 above, the fullest consideration be accorded to the proposals contained in the Government of India Committee's scheme of 1922 for the Indianisation of the officer ranks, and in the scheme recommended by the Military Preparations Committee of the Government of India. I am anxious that all this work—

Sir Muhammad Shafi: The Military Requirements Committee.

Mr. Jayakar: The Military Requirements Committee, yes. I shall be quite frank. I am anxious that all the great work which has been done during Lord Reading's time by the two committees, on which military experts sat, including the Commander-in-Chief, should be linked up with the work of the Expert Committee, and therefore I desire that this paragraph be added so as to bring that work into line with the work of the expert committee.

Sir S. Hoare: I find some difficulty in isolating one or two Reports. These are two very valuable Reports I quite agree; but looking back over even my own memory I can remember heaps of enquiries into various phases of Indian defence, and I cannot imagine any Committee of this kind being set up that did not take into account these various Reports. I do see objections to picking out one or two of them and trying to say that the other ones are less worthy of consideration.
Chairman: I had that point in my mind with special reference to the two Reports which were mentioned; but you will observe that during the discussion certain members of the Committee went back, if I may use that phrase so as not to be misunderstood, on a later Report to the recommendations of an earlier Report which clearly showed that there were not only differences of opinion but that experience changes the situation. I thought I would put the words in a much wider sense, but what I thought at the end was this, as practical people not only will this recommendation but the notes of our discussion be given to any Committee. Whatever the Committee may be commonsense tells us that before they start they will look at all the Reports.

Lord Peel: Of course.

Chairman: I cannot conceive of any gentleman here being asked to sit on a Committee to investigate this matter without him enquiring in the same way as I did. I was a novice, and when they asked me to take the Chairmanship of this Committee, I said, "Knowing nothing about it show me everything that has been written on it recently." Is not that what will happen?

Sir M. Shafi: Which later Report had you in contemplation when you were pleased to make the remark just now about going back upon previous views.

Chairman: The words I had in mind were that the Committee should be urged to take note of the various Reports on this subject.

Sir M. Shafi: I see.

Chairman: I did not exclude any.

Sir M. Shafi: With reference to the remark that you made just now—

Chairman: I know your point.

Sir M. Shafi: You said they went back on previous views.

Chairman: I did not say they went back, but that some preferred the Report of 1922. That is what I meant to say.

Sir M. Shafi: May I point out so far as the later Report is concerned the only Report that probably you had in contemplation was the Skeen Committee's Report. That was later.

Chairman: Yes.

Sir M. Shafi: But the 1922 Report was never placed before the Skeen Committee at all, and therefore you cannot say that the Skeen Committee arrived at conclusions different from those of the previous Committee after carefully considering them. In fact the previous Report was never placed before the Skeen Committee.

Mr. Jayakar: Replying to the point made by Sir Samuel Hoare, I quite agree with what has been said about an expert Committee being appointed to consider all the material which has been traversed on previous occasions, but the answer to that has been given by Sir M. Shafi, that before the Skeen Committee the Report of the 1922 Committee was never tendered although it is a most
material document. In that connection that Committee had never the chance of looking into it. I am therefore anxious that special attention should be drawn to those two important Reports because they are really very relevant and very material on the question which these two expert Committees would be considering.

The next and last point which I wish to make, and which is merely a matter of drafting, is the difference in language between 2 (c) and 3. Both deal with an expert Committee and a subsequent investigation. The language which you have employed in 2 (c) is, "That in order to avoid delay the Government of India be instructed to set up a Committee of experts, both British and Indian, to work out the details of the establishment of such a College." Compare that with the language in (3). "The Committee also recognise the great importance attached by Indian thought to the reduction of the number of British troops in India to the lowest possible figure and consider that the question should form the subject of early expert investigation." My apprehension is that whatever our intentions here may be that when this document is given effect to, especially in the atmosphere of India, some kind of shelter will be taken under the different phraseology of 2 (c) and (3), and whereas the investigation recommended in 2 (c) will be immediately taken in hand the investigation recommended in (3) may not be taken in hand for another five, six, or a number of years, and for that the difference in phraseology may be held responsible. I am therefore suggesting, Sir, that the phraseology of (3) might be altered. I quite recognise that the urgency of 2 (c) is more than the urgency of (3); I am not blind to that; but I am very anxious that we should do nothing here to encourage the belief in India especially that the enquiry mentioned in (3) is to be held up for any length of time as opposed to the enquiry recommended in 2 (c) which is to be taken up immediately.

Sir M. Shaik: Might I suggest a slight modification of the formula proposed by you, Sir?

Chairman: Shall we settle this one point first?

Sir M. Shaik: It is in connection with this very point. If you add after the comma including those two my friend has mentioned in his Report I think that will serve his purpose and my purpose also.

Mr. Jayakar: No.

Sir M. Shaik: Will you read your formula again?

Chairman: Let Mr. Jayakar finish as he has one other point to submit.

Mr. Jayakar: Therefore I am suggesting without insisting too much on the language that this possibility should be obviated in so far as the difference of language would cause it, and I therefore suggest that changes might be made in (3) so as to correct the impression that it is not our intention to hold up the enquiry for a long time.
Chairman: I can answer that. If we can find words with which to do it we certainly will. We have no intention whatever of using words that can be construed in a different way on this subject. The urgency of the subject is recognised, and certainly it is not the intention to merely camouflage it by different words. I will give you that assurance. I feel I am interpreting the wishes of the Committee. You know the effort we are making to conclude matters this week. I hoped to conclude the meetings of this Committee to-night but I have had an addition, I will not call it an amendment, submitted to me. Is there general agreement on this amendment? I have it on paper and I will read it to you.

The amendment reads as follows. I want everyone to know what it is: "The Committee also recognise that no action should be taken so as to prejudice in any way the power of the Crown to fulfil the military obligations undertaken by it in any Treaty it may have entered into with any particular Indian State." It is suggested not by way of an amendment but merely that that should be an addition to any Report. That is your object I take it, Sir Akbar Hydari.

Sir Akbar Hydari: Yes.

Chairman: I draw your attention to that.

Sir T. Sapru: That obligation does not become wider by being in statement of that character.

Mr. Jinnah: This cannot be taken as an amendment.

Chairman: I have already said it is not an amendment. It could be taken as an addition to the Report.

Mr. Jinnah: I say "No".

Chairman: You may say "No", but that does not preclude me from saying "Yes".

Mr. Jinnah: No.

Chairman: If this Committee felt——

Mr. Jinnah: You were asking my opinion.

Chairman: I am giving you mine so that there shall be no misunderstanding. I have already said that, in my judgment what is contained in this is taken for granted. If this Committee felt——

Mr. Jinnah: You are asking my opinion.

Chairman: Will you let the Chairman finish? I said if the Committee so desired and felt that they liked any such addition as that I would not object to it.

Mr. Jinnah: That is exactly what I was saying. I do not object to your statement. It goes without saying that you have to fulfil your Treaty obligations. No man can ask you not to do so, but the question with which I am concerned, is this, why should this form part of our Report? I object to that.

Sir T. Sapru: I should like to make a very few observations. Like Mr. Jayakar and other of our friends who have spoken this
afternoon, I should also like to express my satisfaction with the manner in which the resolutions have been drafted. I am particularly satisfied with the opening portion, and I would particularly invite the attention of the Committee to the words, "The sub-Committee consider that with the development of the new political structure in India—"

Those words seem to me to be the essence of the whole matter. Let me tell you frankly that whenever the question of the Indianisation of the Army, or any question relating to the defence of India, has arisen in the past the objective of India has never been kept in view. This to my mind is a very satisfactory departure from the old lines on which the question of defence has been considered and discussed. I served on some of the Committees which were appointed by Lord Reading, and although I am free to confess that the recommendations of those Committees, so far as Indianisation was concerned seemed to me to be far more drastic than the recommendations of the later Committee, still I would say that at the time when we were sitting on those Committees there was no question of such a political structure as we have been trying to evolve here. For that reason I attach a great deal of importance to the language of this resolution.

Now, I quite recognise that these questions of a military character cannot be disposed of by a Committee like this, but I do not think that the terms of your resolution, Sir, as they stand preclude us from raising any one of these questions before a Committee of experts, nor do I think shall we be precluded from inviting them to express their opinion on those questions.

I am particularly satisfied with clause (a) which expressly states, "That immediate steps be taken to increase the rate of Indianisation in the Indian Army." Again you come to very important words, "to make it commensurate with the main object in view, having regard to all relevant considerations such as the maintenance of the requisite standard of efficiency."

As regards clause (2) (b) I have nothing to suggest, except that I think the language is comprehensive enough.

As regards clause (3) what I would say is this that the question of the reduction of the number of British troops in India was considered by the Committee appointed in Lord Reading's time.

I quite agree with Mr. Jayakar that when these Expert Committees do sit their attention should be drawn to the reports which were submitted to Lord Reading's government by the Committees appointed by him. I used the word "basis" in the question I put to Lord Reading, but if his Lordship objects to that I would at any rate say that I would emphatically draw their attention to those reports, because those reports suggest a line of progress which to my mind has been ignored in the subsequent treatment of the question. I would not fight about words, but I do certainly hope and trust that the broad policy which was kept in

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view by the framers of those reports will be kept in view by the Expert Committee, and in the light of the new political structure in India which we are building up, and which was not in contemplation at that time, I hope the attitude of these Expert Committees will be even more progressive than that of the committees of 1921 and 1922.

As to the exact number of British troops, or their reduction at this particular moment or any particular moment, these are questions which require to be considered by an Expert Committee, but I venture to think questions of this character will come up for periodic revision and consideration every five or ten years, according to the circumstances existing at the time.

Speaking for myself, subject to the understanding that all these questions shall be taken up and discussed before the Expert Committee, I am prepared generally to give my support to these resolutions.

Dr. Moonje: Sir, I entirely agree with what Sir Samuel Hoare has said with regard to keeping the Army entirely free from politics and with regard to the need for efficiency. I agree from that point of view, but I take exception to the language used in (a) of these resolutions. This says: “That immediate steps be taken to increase the rate of Indianisation in the Indian Army.” I believe that does not carry us any further. To-day we may have twenty or twenty-two vacancies allotted to us at Sandhurst. If these vacancies were increased to twenty-five or thirty, it might be said that effect had been given to the resolution as it is here, but that would not carry us any further. What I say is this. If we are really going to make India responsible for her own defence, along with taking a due share in the defence of the Empire, as the other Dominions are expected to do, where is the harm in taking them if a sufficient number of Indians are available for the commissioned ranks of the Army? Why should they be precluded from having the training or from being recruited for the Army? If India cannot produce a sufficient number of men the recruitment may be made in Britain, but if India can produce a sufficient number of men who can pass all the tests for efficiency which can be produced, why should the number be limited and why should not they be given a chance of serving their country in the Army?

I think, therefore, that the wording of (a) should be changed to read: “That immediate steps be taken to arrange for all recruitment henceforth for the commissioned ranks of the Army, Navy and Air Force to be made in India from amongst Indians, provided that it shall be open to the Government of India to provide for recruitment in England to fill up such of the vacancies as cannot be filled up in India, and that due regard should always be had to the relevant considerations such as the maintenance of the requisite standard of efficiency.”

Lord Peel: I do not know whether this amendment is going to be pressed, for if so I shall have a good deal to say upon it, and I
trust the other one will not be, for I am bound to say that, with all respect to Sir Muhammad Shafi, I do not think his amendment is really necessary either, because all these Commissions always look back to past reports, and the whole matter is brought before them.

But when I said that I agreed generally to this Report, I did so because I did not want to spend the time of the sub-Committee in bringing forward amendments; but, if other amendments are brought in, I must withdraw that assent, and I shall myself ask and claim from the Chairman the right at a later stage to move several amendments. I do not want to do that, however, if it can be avoided.

Sir Samuel Hoare: Dr. Moonje has brought forward a totally new proposition, prejudging all the problems which are to be examined by Expert Committees. I do not want to go into his proposal now, because I do not know, Mr. Chairman, what your ruling will be; but if it is gone into I shall most respectfully ask to have the right of dealing fully with amendments which are raised.

Dr. Moonje: Lord Peel objects on the ground that this is a totally new proposition, but it is not a new proposition. On the very first day I brought this question to the notice of the President, and the President was kind enough to bring the matter to the notice of the whole house. It does not require any Expert Committee to pass an opinion on whether, if efficient Indians are available, they should be given the training or not. I do not think expert advice is wanted to decide that, and I would only add this. Do not put any kind of artificial restriction to the recruitment of efficient Indians for service in their Army. That is the only question I want to put. If efficient Indians are not available, I am not going to say inefficient Indians should be taken, but where is the need for expert advice in this matter?

Sir Samuel Hoare: I ask Dr. Moonje not to press his amendment, but if he is going to press it I shall have to give him an answer which will have nothing to do with politics at all but which will show that his proposal cannot be worked. I do not want to go into that in detail if it can be avoided.

Dr. Moonje: I have not heard any objection to my proposal except the one Lord Peel has advanced, and I do not think my proposal is one on which any expert advice is required. It only says that if efficient Indians are available they should not be precluded from serving in their Army. If efficient Indians are not available, it is not my intention to say that the standard of efficiency should be lowered or inefficient candidates taken. I therefore think I should press for this amendment, namely, that we should amend paragraph (a) to read: "That immediate steps be taken to arrange for all recruitment henceforth for the commissioned ranks of the Army, Navy and Air Force to be made in India from amongst Indians, provided that it shall be open to the Government of India to provide for recruitment in England to fill up such of the vacan-
cies as cannot be filled up in India, and that due regard should always be had to the relevant considerations such as the maintenance of the requisite standard of efficiency."

_H.H. The Maharaja of Bikaner:_ I am very sorry, Mr. Chairman, to have to ask to speak at this stage, but I have to see the Prime Minister on a rather important matter in twenty minutes’ time, and I thought that as I was going away it might help to cut short some of the discussion if I made a little statement presenting my views, which I believe will not be very different from the views of many of the States. I am speaking with particular reference to the point which has been discussed here to some extent to-day and more particularly earlier in our proceedings, with regard to the fact that the States have their Treaties with the British Government. The British Government’s guarantee of protection for our principalities is a fact which is well known to everybody. In addition, as I think Lord Reading pointed out, there are some States which have specific guarantees from the British Government to maintain, in consideration of areas ceded or other considerations, certain contingents of troops, British or Indian as the case may be—I am not well acquainted with the details—for the protection of those States.

Those questions are there, and I can quite understand the anxiety of those particular States in that connection. Nor can anyone wonder at the very natural desire of the States to see that the protection, and especially the protection from external and internal dangers of aggression guaranteed by the Treaties, should be really effective even after federation.

Therefore, as we have repeatedly urged in other committees such as the Federal Structure sub-Committee, the States must be perfectly satisfied that they are safe and that they will have every guarantee of immunity from danger in the future; but to my mind the question does not necessarily hinge upon the maintenance of an exact number of British troops or on their being maintained permanently for this specific purpose, so long as the guarantee of protection can be fulfilled.

I wish particularly to say on this occasion—and I think Sir Akbar Hydari will probably be of the same opinion as myself—that we are not putting forward a view which has been put forward by Sir Leslie Scott. We are very grateful to Sir Leslie Scott for the great efforts he made in putting forward the case of the States before the Butler Committee, but Sir Leslie, in his own personal capacity and in no way on instructions from us and at our desire, put forward the suggestion that British troops could never be withdrawn or Dominion Status granted because of the Treaties with the States. That is a view to which I personally and many others of us do not subscribe; we do not subscribe to that view because we do not want to stand in the way of the advance of our country, which is our Motherland, in regard to these matters. I for one decline to believe that it will be beyond the statesmanship of Great Britain and our ingenuity, combined with the goodwill of British
India and the States, to settle this question, and I feel sure that we shall be capable of devising some scheme which will provide satisfactory and adequate guarantees for the States. Meanwhile as federation progresses and as we see how it is working, it is possible that the States and British India and the Crown may come to some arrangement by which satisfactory guarantees to the States could be given.

As I have to leave in two minutes' time, and as I hope the sub-Committee will finish its Report to-day, I should like to point out that as in other cases so in the Military Council the States will naturally claim their fair share; they will want to have a voice in the management of whatever affairs come under the purview of Federal India. As a keen soldier I should like to say that in addition to the training to be imparted at the Indian Sandhurst, which we hope will be set up very soon, I, in common with many of my brother Princes who are soldiers, attach the greatest importance to the education, training, fitness and efficiency of our cadets.

Finally, if I may be permitted to express my personal view, it is that Indianisation is overdue. That view, I think, is shared by us on this side, and personally I think the Eight Units scheme, however necessary it was to start with, is a scheme which on the face of it has so many demerits that I need not go into details. I hope that when effect is given to Indianisation it will be real Indianisation in the proper sense of the term.

Chairman: There are one or two observations which I should like to make. I cannot rule that I will not accept amendments, because that would be an arbitrary decision that could not be justified, whatever one's views may be; but there are certain things I would ask you to remember.

This is not an unimportant sub-Committee, and the decisions at which we arrive and the recommendations that we make are not only important to India, but are, I believe, looked forward to with more than ordinary interest in India, and they will be looked forward to as what I would call a measure of our sincerity, and that is the test of the whole thing.

First of all, I should like to say this to Dr. Moonje, and I say it as one who has had many years' experience in negotiations. I am indifferent to the wording of a resolution. I have conducted negotiations where, the more it looked as if I was gaining something, from the spirit in which these things were offered me I knew I was losing. I attach infinitely more importance to the spirit behind the declaration than to anything else. That is the first point I want to make. In drawing attention to that fact I want to emphasise that I did not wait for the discussion before clearly declaring; on behalf of the Government, our views, and in doing that I had in mind quite clearly what I said before—the spirit behind the declaration. There is another thing to which I want to draw your attention, and it is this. Above all, in an important subject
like the one we are discussing, you ought to strive to go to the main Plenary Session with a unanimous recommendation. If you do that, you gain two things. You not only help your own position at home—and in helping your position you are helping ours; let us keep that clearly in mind—but the very unanimity of your decision is the best guarantee that whatever committee is set up, or whoever they are, they have got something clear and definite and specific to act upon, whereas if you have a division, and if there are amendments either from one side or the other, the inevitable result of it will be that sides will be taken; and we want to avoid sides being taken. We do not want the Committee that talks about Indianisation to be either pro-British or pro-Indian. We want them to go into the question realising that Indianisation is something practical and something that can be accomplished if there is a spirit and intention behind it; but in doing that we do not want them to go into that question and merely assume that they are serving India by making a declaration that so many more Indian officers should be in the Army if they have done anything that impairs the efficiency of the Indian Army, because that would have retarded Indianisation and not helped it; and that is why I welcome the declaration that when you talk of a Sandhurst in India we are talking about a standard of training in India to be equal to the standard of training in this country. That is the second point.

Now, the only difference really is this. First, there is a suggestion that if we put in the words, sort of giving an indication or an instruction, or whatever it may be, that these particular reports should be examined, you may help it. But do you help it when you accomplish the same thing by drawing attention to it in the Report that will be drafted? I myself will take the responsibility of drafting that Report, and I will draw attention to all the schemes that were mentioned here. I will draw attention to them as being legitimate matters that were discussed by the Committee, and therefore I would beg of you to consider if you could help me now to have a unanimous decision. You have heard the decision of the Princes, you have heard the decision of Lord Reading, you have heard the decision of Lord Peel and Sir Samuel Hoare. If added to that there goes forth a unanimous declaration, that does two things: not only does it accomplish your object, but it enables us to say to the meanest critic, "The practical side of it is safeguarded, because we have not given preference to a mere principle or a declaration to the real efficiency that is fundamental to it." As I say, I cannot rule out your amendments, Dr. Moonje, neither can I rule out yours, Lord Peel; I shall be compelled to accept them if they are pressed; but I would say that I do not think either side would gain anything by pressing their amendments comparable to what they would gain by a unanimous decision. I solemnly tell you, never mind what the words say, the spirit behind these words is a genuine attempt to solve this question. That is the appeal I would make.
Dr. Moonje: I am very pleased and I am very glad to assure you that you have my fullest sympathy for the principle that you have enunciated. I am quite willing to co-operate with you and to bring about the thing which you desire; and what is the thing that you desire to bring about? It is that it should create an anticipation in India, it should create a feeling in India that something really tangible is being done here. If that is the desire I have great pleasure in co-operating with you and responding to your appeal. Now, look at it from the practical point of view. Supposing these resolutions go before the people of India, how will they look at it? There are only a few people from India present in this Conference, and the people in India will not be feeling the intangible spirit that animates us all here; they will read this resolution in cold print, and what will they find? They will find it this way—to increase the rate of Indianisation. Then when I go back to India I shall be asked, "What have you brought, Dr. Moonje, about the Army?" "An increase in the rate of Indianisation." "Yes, but the Skee Committee has also proposed an increase in the rate of Indianisation. They have proposed that each year four men from Sandhurst should be taken; and supposing four or five are taken, we know our Government of India as what they are, and therefore," they will say, "you have brought us this thing; this is nothing new."

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: But you have got the words, "to make it commensurate with the main object in view."

Chairman: I am sorry to interrupt, Dr. Moonje. I was going to draw attention to that, but do let us talk for a moment about the critic in India. If the Lord Himself went back to India from this Conference He would have a rough time, and you will be no exception to that general rule; but, on the other hand, your words would be criticised just as much as these words. But there are declarations in this document that you have never had in a Report before and do let me emphasise this, that the only limit I put on you is the practical one, and the practical one is as much in your interests as it is in ours; and that is all I would say.

Dr. Moonje: Excepting, perhaps, that the training college should be established at the earliest possible moment, nothing tangible seems to have been done here.

Raja Sher Muhammad Khan: You can say that Indian officers will be in all arms.

Dr. Moonje: If you have not understood yet what I want, I will make it perfectly clear in this way. If India can produce all the men efficient and fit to be recruited into the army—

Chairman: And this will give them the chance. This is the very thing that will do it.

Mr. Jadhav: As a matter of fact, I would point out that the college cannot be had with a few students there, and that the object which Dr. Moonje has in view is provided for.
Dr. Moonje: No, no. Our college that has been recommended is to start in 1933 and our yearly recruitment is about 160. If India can produce 160 Indians capable and fit, and considered fit after examination, why should not all the 160 people be recruited in India? That is my point.

Chairman: Dr. Moonje, may I make this appeal to you? You are talking as an Indian—I had intended to finish to-night, but if not we shall have to go to the amendments. I want to put this as a fair proposition to Dr. Moonje. Supposing that all you say is correct—I do not think it is, but supposing it is—and you table your amendments, I have got an intimation of further amendments from this side, and I have also got a fair body of support for the original proposition. Now, do you then, Dr. Moonje, accomplish the object you have in view by a Report going from this body which will then be tantamount to three Reports? It will be so many for one amendment, so many for another, and so many for the other. Do not you, by that means, defeat the very object you have in view?

Mr. Jinnah: May I just say this, Sir. I appreciate the draft which you have placed before us, and I think it forms a very good basis. Now, I do not want to go into outside matters, but the only point that has not been brought out in this draft is the basis of the rate of acceleration, the increasing rate. It has not been brought out. Now, is it not possible for us to appeal to our friends there, the representatives of the British delegations, and cannot we put our heads together so that we can express that idea in your draft? The idea is this. We have got this pace defined by the Skeen Committee—we all know that—and that pace is half the cadre in 25 years, and a certain number of Indian recruits every year increasing. We have also got the other scheme, which of course was not before us. The honourable members, who were members of the Government of India, probably are not liable to be prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act, but they have mentioned the matter here and we have come across it. To tell you very frankly I have not yet been able to understand that scheme from the memorandum.

Sir Muhammad Shafi: Because the scheme is not before you.

Mr. Jinnah: The scheme is not before us, it is only the short memorandum that is given; and the first thing that I do not understand is this—that that scheme contemplates the Indianisation of 6,000 officers. I do not know whether you have noticed that. Well, there are not 6,000 officers in the Indian Army proper, unless they meant both the British troops as well as the Indian Army proper, so I do not know how they get the 6,000. But the scheme is not yet before us, and I do not know what that scheme is, but whatever that scheme may be I do appeal to the British delegations that we must express our idea that this time it means business, that the acceleration will be a real one—that is to say, it will be much more than the Skeen Committee’s recommendations. Now, that is the idea that I want to bring out. In what language, in
what words—that is a matter as to which probably, if you give us time, we may be able to fit it in, but that is the idea, and unless you bring that idea in and if you go and appoint de novo another expert committee, we shall go on again. The Skeen Committee worked for 14 months and examined something like 400 to 500 witnesses in India on all these points. It means starting this thing over again, a controversy which will go on; and I want to point out this to you. I attach the greatest importance to any decision which is arrived at unanimously—I do, very great importance—and I did attach so much importance to it that notwithstanding my very strong opinion in the Skeen Committee I was so anxious for unanimity that I agreed to that scheme of 25 years subject to the revision after 10 years.

What was the result of that unanimity? We made the Report in 1926, and the Government of India and, if I may say so, the British Government, have not up to the time we met in this Committee accepted the main recommendations of that Committee unanimously. Now you are appealing to me in the same way. You say: let us be unanimous. I attach importance to it. You say: when your expert Committee is sitting the whole question will be left open, and if this Committee is going to make any valuable contribution to a political principle you must Indianise the officer rank in the Indian Army as quickly as possible. Then give an indication of the case in some language which will definitely lay down that we mean that.

Chairman: I know you admire frankness because I am always frank. I do not want to cover up my feelings in any way. If I thought that what you have said reflected the general view of all those attending this Round Table Conference I should despair of the result. What I mean is this, that if you are going to base any conclusions arrived at at this Conference on any past experience of sins of omission or commission then it is hopeless. But I do not think that is so. My answer is that any Committee going into this question with these broad, general declarations so clearly and definitely made would be compelled to arrive at decisions as speedily as if you said either the Skeen Report or any other—

Mr. Jinnah: I am not referring to that. I say this declaration is not a clear indication as to the pace, and I want some words so definite that it will convey to your expert Committee that that was the intention of this Conference. It is not there present. I have no doubt everything will be all right.

Chairman: I feel sure. Mr. Jinnah, that if you were in many other capacities you would say now what I am going to say, that if there was a technical matter which I knew other folks were better able to judge than I, I would only be showing myself as a foolish man by giving instructions to people who knew more about it than I did, always providing they had to give effect to the principle.

Mr. Jinnah: There is nothing technical about this at all.
Chairman: Oh, but there is.

Mr. Jinnah: No, I beg your pardon; that is where I fundamentally differ. There is nothing technical about this question upon which I am now addressing you. It is a very simple question really.

Chairman: It is both technical and practical.

Mr. Jinnah: No; do not let us get away from the point. It is neither a technical nor a difficult question; it is a practical question.

Dr. Moonje: Quite right.

Mr. Jinnah: It is a very practical question. As Counsel would say to a jury you should give expression to your opinion on that point, and that point is a very simple one. We have, according to your own statement to-day, one hundred and twenty vacancies per year. The Skeen Committee's Report is that we start with twenty vacancies for Indians and gradually go up, and according to that graduated scale it will take twenty-five years to get half the cadre. Now, we hope to get the full cadre as quickly as possible. You should give some expression of opinion which will convey to every man in India, and I entirely endorse the opinion of Dr. Moonje with regard to what he said about India, I am not disputing your bona fides, sir, or your sincerity; I do not challenge a single word of what you intend to do. You may intend to do a thing, but express it so that India will know here that we have got something in clear language. I would appeal to my friends there to turn it over in their minds. Let us also think it over. Cannot we find some formula which will convey that idea? Surely we can.

Sir Samuel Hoare: We have the formula in paragraph (a), that immediately steps be taken to increase the rate of Indianisation in the Indian Army to make it commensurate with the main object in view. I am prepared to agree to that.

Mr. Jinnah: To increase the rate?

Sir Samuel Hoare: But when it comes to defining what the rate is to be, I am not prepared to agree.

Mr. Jinnah: The present rate is that we have twenty vacancies.

Sir Samuel Hoare: I know that.

Mr. Jinnah: It is open to a Committee to say it is enough to say thirty.

Sir Samuel Hoare: I am not prepared myself to agree to any number. If it is a question of this Committee stating any number then I should have to notify my dissent.

Mr. Jinnah: You did not hear me. I am not saying you should lay down the number. I say if you leave it to a Committee with these words, "increase the rate," the Committee may for their own reasons come to the conclusion that thirty is an increase, or thirty-
five is an increase, or forty is an increase. What I want to emphasise is that it must be conveyed to them that there should be a substantial increase.

Chairman: I will undertake to clear that up if that is what you have in mind, because I come back to the point that if words are merely used to camouflage, do not let us bother about it. They are not so used. I will endeavour in the Report leading up to this to state fairly and accurately the discussion that has taken place here. I would again urge upon you for the last time the advantage of having unanimity, because it has been pointed out that this is a matter for the experts.

I understand it is not customary to take a vote. May I take your assent to these resolutions which will form the basis of a Report?

Mr. Jayakar: Before I give my vote, do I understand you to say that the points which I raised will be incorporated in the Report very clearly so that I need not move, as I did in my speech, that there should be a further addition after clause (3) that the two Committees in making the investigations mentioned in paragraphs (2) (c) and (3) should give the fullest consideration to the proposals contained in those two schemes. I wanted to move that as an addition to clause (3), but if it is your suggestion that in your Report you will make this perfectly clear—

Chairman: I said quite clearly that there is no intention to alter the meaning.

Sir Samuel Hoare: Do I understand you are going to give an historical account as a preface to these resolutions?

Chairman: But make these the findings.

Sir Samuel Hoare: Yes. If you do that by all means put in Mr. Jinnah’s and Mr. Jayakar’s point and anyone else’s points, as you think it, but also put in our point that we do not agree.

Chairman: Exactly; but you see now where you get. I will undertake to give a fair summary pointing out that references were made to these various Reports, but I do submit it is not going to help us if we have to put the points of disagreement when there is almost unanimity existing. But still, I am in your hands. Do you agree then to these general resolutions?

Mr. Jinnah: I cannot agree.

Chairman: I understand that even the Princes thought that the addition was unnecessary.

Sir Akbar Hydari: No.

Sir Samuel Hoare: If the addition was put into the historical—

Chairman: I will meet your point by a reference to it.

Sir Akbar Hydari: Supposing you added here, “for the requisite standard of efficiency”.
Sir Samuel Hoare: I agree entirely with what you say, but I am a little bit reluctant to opening the question of altering the actual resolutions.

Sir Akbar Hydari: I do not mind the way in which it is done.

Chairman: We will make that quite clear.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: I think Sir Akbar Hydari has some fears about the obligations of the Crown towards the States. I do not think we were unmindful of that. I do not think there are any obligations in whatever we are settling here.

Chairman: That is so, I will see that it is quite clear.

Sir Samuel Hoare: I suggest you should say Sir Akbar Hydari raised the point and other members of the Committee accepted this as a question that did not need discussion.

Chairman: I will put it higher than that, that it was raised and I ruled that it was accepted without question.

Sir Akbar Hydari: Thank you.

H.H. The Nawab of Bhopal: I should like to make one suggestion which might help Sir Akbar Hydari. I should like to propose that when the question of the removal of the British troops is being considered by the Committee, in view of the fact that one of the objects for keeping these troops in India is to carry out the Crown’s obligation of giving protection to the Indian States, I think it would not be unfair if the Indian States asked that the same Committee might also examine how far it would be possible and how far it would afford the States the necessary protection if these troops when the time comes are replaced by further additions to the Indian States troops paid for out of the Federal funds but kept under the direct command and control of the States as Federal troops. That might accelerate the pace of Indianisation in the sense in which we are using the word “Indianisation”.

Chairman: It might do, but you would start a hornets rest round here.

H.H. The Nawab of Bhopal: I am only making the suggestion; I do not raise the point.

Chairman: I understand that point, but I am afraid it would start the whole controversy over again.

I am trying to see how I can fit it in.

(The sub-Committee adjourned at 6.35 p.m.)

Proceedings of the Fourth Meeting of Sub-Committee No. VII (Defence) held on 14th January, 1931.

Chairman: You will remember that on the broad principle of the resolution submitted there was no substantial disagreement, but various points were raised. The first point took the form even of
an amendment to safeguard the position of the Treaty obligations of the Indian States. I intimated that my inability to accept that amendment was because that was taken for granted. You will see that all those points are embodied in the Report, and so far as I could accurately interpret what was discussed, I think you will agree that in the Report itself every point is adequately covered. Therefore I am now going to submit to you that this should be the Report which should ultimately be submitted to the full Conference. That is the matter which is now before you.

Diwan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao: In opening the proceedings of the sub-Committee, you mentioned the question of a military council. Is that to be dealt with at all?

Chairman: I did mention it, as you say, but the discussion took a general form; that is to say a wide range, and I gathered that your view—and it must be so in practice—was that there should be a military council. No one could argue against that. Therefore merely to have a discussion that there shall be a military council would be a waste of time. You are quite right and I am accepting that as a general principle. There would be no point in arguing the reasons why there should be a military council. As a matter of fact, I am advised by my Secretary that I had thought of the words "the advisability of establishing a military council including representatives of the Indian States was agreed to", because there was no disagreement on that and there was no point in arguing something which would be obvious.

Mr. Jinnah: It should be in our Report.

Chairman: Yes, I will see that those words are put in.

Diwan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao: I should like to raise another point, namely, with regard to the future control of the Army in India. Proposals have been made that the Commander-in-Chief should not be in charge of the administration of the Army in the Government of India. Is that a matter to be put in the Report?

Chairman: I understand and appreciate your point, but I want this Report to be a practical Report on a practical subject. The first question that would arise would be with what are we dealing? I intimated, and every one agreed, that the ordinary questions of law and order were not involved because that was accepted as something which was outside our province. Therefore it was agreed that we were dealing with the Defence of India. Now, does not it follow from that that you must have someone responsible? That is obvious; and that someone dealing with defence must be the Commander-in-Chief wherever he may be. Therefore, whilst I have not said anything about it in the Report, for obvious reasons it follows.

Diwan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao: I should like to know whether the Commander-in-Chief would be a Member of the Government of India in charge of the administration of the Army.

Chairman: Then you raise a different question.
Lord Reading: Yes.

Chairman: You raise then what I would call for short a purely constitutional question. I do not prejudice that, I express no comment, but that would hardly be a subject for this Committee.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: This question was discussed in the Sankey Committee, and I pointed out that according to the Despatch of the Government of India which has come to the Secretary of State the Commander-in-Chief should no longer be a member of the Executive Council.

Lord Reading: Surely that is not a matter for this Committee.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: No.

Lord Reading: That is a matter for the Sankey Committee.

Chairman: That is the answer. Now, subject to those intimations and the addition of the words I have suggested, do you agree that this Report shall go forward to the Plenary Session as the recommendation of this Committee?

Lt.-Col. Gidney: Unfortunately I was absent on other Committees when you had your previous meeting. The only point which I desire to raise is this. It seems to me that there is no mention whatever made in this Report of the Navy. At present we have one training ship in India which is answering very well indeed. I think we have nearly 80 boys there and this forms the nucleus of a Mercantile Marine Service, and I think it will eventually be used as the nucleus of a Navy. Might I humbly submit to you the inclusion in your Report of some reference to the need of India training its own Navy, which is really a branch of its defence? I submit for your consideration that that might be considered in this Report too.

Lord Reading: That is already established.

Chairman: I am quite sure we do not want to raise a controversy as to the development of that Branch. That Branch is doing useful work and nothing in our recommendations will interfere with that. When you specifically mention what, after all, is a minor matter so far as the Navy is concerned, you may raise a controversy on that aspect which there is no need to do. At least, that is my feeling about the matter.

Lord Reading: It is already done.

Chairman: Nothing that we have done, or do, or recommend, will interfere with that.

Lt.-Col. Gidney: Does not that come into defence?

Chairman: It is there.

Lt.-Col. Gidney: We have no Navy, no nucleus, or anything.

Chairman: I know; but you know perfectly well that the question of the cost of defence is a very controversial and debatable one, and if you at this stage enter into a controversy as to increasing the cost of defence, I can see a number of folk who would be likely-
to take part in the discussion on the other side. Nothing we have done has prejudiced the existing situation.

Lord Reading: Yes, it is just as it was before established.

Chairman: Now, that being so, do you agree that I submit this Report on your behalf to the Committee as a whole?

(Members expressed assent.)

Mr. Jinnah: I only want to make one point. I do not want to take up your time; but with regard to paragraph 4 of the Report, sub-clause 2a, I wish to record my opinion for what it is worth, and I say I am not satisfied with this recommendation unless a clear indication is given as to the pace. As to the rest, I have nothing more to say.

Chairman: I take note of that; but I would not put it so low as you, Mr. Jinnah, when you say it is your opinion "for what it is worth". Your opinion is worth a lot; I take it because it is Mr. Jinnah's opinion. Just as other folk express disagreement on particular points I have noted your particular point. Subject to that are you all agreed?

Mr. Jayakar: May I say one word?

Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Jayakar: With reference to Clause 2a, I should like to find out whether the Committee will agree to add one word: "that immediate steps be taken to increase substantially the rate of Indianisation in the Indian Army to make it commensurate—". I am aware that the words "to make it commensurate" give an indication of the rapidity of pace; but I should like to have some direct statement of that view by the addition, if it is possible to do so by the consent of the whole Committee, after the word "increase" add the word "substantially".

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: I support that suggestion made by Mr. Jayakar; that would meet the point of view of many people.

Chairman: It is covered by the other safeguards, but if it meets your particular Indian point of view, I do not think there is any objection.

Lord Reading: I have no objection.

H.H. The Maharaja of Bikaner: I think it ought to be put in.

Chairman: I agree to the addition of the word "substantially".

Mr. Jinnah: I do not withdraw my objection.

Chairman: No, yours is still a substantial objection.

Divan Bahadur Ramaswami Mudaliyar: I do not know whether it comes within the terms of reference, but we from Madras and other Provinces are very keen that recruitment should be from all classes of India and should not be confined, as it is at present, to classes called the martial classes. You will find that the Report of the Simon Commission has a paragraph on the subject, which
puts forward the point of view of Madras as a whole, official and non-official; they are not satisfied with the treatment accorded to Madrasis as non-martial classes. I do not know whether it should be considered to be a political matter or as a matter affecting the technique of the Army, but I should like to put that forward.

Chairman: I think your point would be covered by the words "having regard to all relevant considerations" I am quite sure your point would be covered by that, because your point would be relevant to the considerations that would govern the Indianisation of the Army; I think that would be a fair interpretation.

H.H. The Maharaja of Bikaner: And Mr. Mudaliyar's views would be noted too.

Chairman: Obviously; they are on the Minutes. That being so, I want to thank you, gentlemen, and I will endeavour in accordance with your decision to do my best to get this Report through the Committee as a whole. I thank you for your patience and consideration, and I hope I have not worked you too hard.

H.H. The Maharaja of Bikaner: Mr. Chairman, may I draw the attention of yourself and this Committee to some remarks that I made in the Federal Structure Committee to the effect that the troops of the Indian States would be maintained as now. This does not mean any modification of that; and that they would still be available as now, for the service of the King and the defence of the country according to the present scheme. That is all I need say. I want to make that clear.

(The proceedings then terminated.)
Sub-Committee No. VII (Defence).

Report presented at the Meeting of the Committee of the Whole Conference held on 16th January, 1931.

1. The terms of reference of this sub-Committee were as follows:

"To consider questions of political principle relating to defence, other than strictly constitutional aspects to be considered under heads 6 (Powers of the Executive) and 12 (Relations with the Crown)."

The following Delegates were selected to serve on the sub-Committee:

Mr. J. H. Thomas (Chairman).
Lord Peel.
Sir S. Hoare.
Lord Reading.
Lord Lothian.
H.H. The Maharaja of Alwar.
H.H. The Nawab of Bhopal.
H.H. The Maharaja of Bikaner.
H.H. The Maharaja of Kashmir.
H.H. The Maharaja of Patiala.
Sir Akbar Hydari.
Sir Mirza Ismail.
Colonel Haksar.
The Rt. Hon. Srinivasa Sastri.

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru.
Diwan Bahadur M. Ramachandra Rao.
Diwan Bahadur Rama-swami Mudaliyar.
Sir Phiroze Sethna.
Mr. M. R. Jayakar.
Dr. B. S. Moonje.
Mr. Jadhav.
Sir B. N. Mitra.
Sardar Sahib Ujjal Singh.
Lieut.-Colonel Gidney.
Sir Hubert Carr.
Sir Muhammad Shafi.
Mr. M. A. Jinnah.
Dr. Shafa‘at Ahmad Khan.
Nawab Sir Abdul Qaiyum.
Raja Sher Muhammad Khan.

2. The sub-Committee met on the 7th, 9th, 12th, and 14th January, 1931, and have authorised me to present this report.

3. The discussion in the sub-Committee centred mainly round the question of Indianisation, and every aspect of this question received thorough attention. It was unanimously agreed that in a matter of such importance as Defence, the utmost care was necessary in expressing opinions, and the sub-Committee as a whole was very anxious not to create the impression that anyone in any way or
to any degree wanted to say anything that could even remotely tend
to imperil the safety of the country or to weaken the strength of
the Army. It was in view of this general feeling that all sections
of the sub-Committee emphasized the importance of maintaining
the same standard of efficiency in training as prevails now in
England. The sub-Committee also recognised that in dealing with
the question of Defence it was not possible to overlook that a factor
that must govern all considerations of the subject was the
responsibility of the Crown through the Committee of Imperial
Defence, which body was ultimately responsible for examining all
these problems. It was realised that the responsibility of the
Committee of Imperial Defence was not something that was special
to India, but was common to the Empire as whole.

Subject to the above matters of agreement, the general discus-
sion regarding Indianisation was on the following lines. The
majority of the sub-Committee considered it impossible for practical
reasons to lay down any definite rate of Indianisation or anything
of a precise character that might in any way embarrass those
responsible for Defence and fetter the judgment or the discretion of
the military authorities. Those that held this view felt that the
principle of the Indianisation of officers of the Indian Army could
not be looked upon as merely a question regarding the efficiency of
a single officer or group of officers, or even of a single unit or group
of units. It was a principle that to the majority appeared to affect
the Army as a whole. It was in consequence the view of this large
section of the sub-Committee that a highly technical question was
involved on which the sub-Committee was not qualified to express
an opinion. One section of the sub-Committee, however, was in
favour of a strong affirmation to the effect that the complete
Indianisation of the officers in the Indian Army should take place
within a specified period, subject of course to the requirements of
efficiency, and further subject to the provision of suitable candidates
for recruitment as officers in India. Those members who were of
this opinion held the view that this was not a technical question
at all, but involved only practical considerations. The difference
in these two views being fundamental, the sub-Committee decided
to incorporate these in its report, and the Chairman further under-
took that, when, in pursuance of the resolutions of this sub-Com-
mittee, expert committees were appointed, those expert committee
would as a matter of course take into consideration the proceedings
of previous Committees and in particular the proceedings of the
Military Requirements Committee of 1921 and the Committee on
the Indianisation of the Indian Army of 1922.

4. Subject to the above the sub-Committee arrived at the follow-
ing definite resolutions:—

(1) The sub-Committee consider that with the development
of the new political structure in India, the Defence of India
must to an increasing extent be the concern of the Indian
people, and not of the British Government alone.
(2) In order to give practical effect to this principle, they recommend——

(a) That immediate steps be taken to increase substantially the rate of Indianisation in the Indian Army to make it commensurate with the main object in view, having regard to all relevant considerations, such as the maintenance of the requisite standard of efficiency. (Mr. Jinnah dissented and desired a clear indication of the pace of Indianisation.)

(b) That in order to give effect to (a) a training college in India be established at the earliest possible moment, in order to train candidates for commissions in all arms of the Indian defence services. This college would also train prospective officers of the Indian States Forces. Indian cadets should, however, continue to be eligible for admission as at present to Sandhurst, Woolwich and Cranwell.

(c) That in order to avoid delay the Government of India be instructed to set up a Committee of Experts, both British and Indian (including representatives of Indian States) to work out the details of the establishment of such a college.

(3) The Committee also recognise the great importance attached by Indian thought to the reduction of the number of British troops in India to the lowest possible figure and consider that the question should form the subject of early expert investigation.

5. A view was expressed that an addition should be made to these resolutions to the effect that the sub-Committee recognised that no action should be taken so as to prejudice in any way the power of the Crown to fulfil military obligations arising out of treaties with particular Indian States. It was ruled, however, and accepted by the sub-Committee that such a specific declaration was unnecessary; the Chairman giving an undertaking that neither this sub-Committee nor any other Committee could in any way abrogate treaty obligations and engagements that were in operation.

6. In agreeing to the foregoing recommendations the sub-Committee were unanimous in their view that the declaration must not be taken as a mere pious expression of opinion, but that immediately the Conference was concluded, steps should be taken to deal effectively with the recommendations made.

7. The advisability of establishing a Military Council including representatives of the Indian States was agreed to.

Signed on behalf of the sub-Committee,

J. H. THOMAS.

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, LONDON,
14th January, 1931.
APPENDIX.

SUB-COMMITTEE No. VII.

(Defence.)

MEMORANDUM CIRCULATED TO THE SUB-COMMITTEE BY DIRECTION OF THE CHAIRMAN (MR. J. H. THOMAS).

Numbers.

The total number of officers with the King’s Commissions in the Indian Army is at present 3,141. Of these 108 are Indians (69 from Sandhurst, 39 direct).

Composition.

These 3,141 are divided among the various ranks as follows:—Field Marshals, 2; Generals, 3; Lieutenant-Generals, 4; Major-Generals, 29; Colonel, 94; Brevet Colonels, 4; Lieutenant-Colonels, 284; Majors, 445; Captains, 1,333; Lieutenants, 356; Second Lieutenants, 74; Quartermasters, 22. These figures do not of course represent the normal distribution. Owing to over-recruitment during the war and under recruitment after the war there is an excess in Captains and a deficiency in Lieutenants and Second Lieutenants.

The Indian officers are divided as follows:—Brevet Major, 1; Captains, 39; Lieutenants, 54; Second Lieutenants, 14.

Promotion.

Up to Lieutenant-Colonel promotion is on a time-scale, i.e., Lieutenant after 24 years’ service, Captain after 9 years’ service, Major after 18 years’ service, Lieutenant-Colonel after 26 years’ service. Above Lieutenant-Colonel promotion is by vacancy on an authorised establishment. Promotion on the time-scale is not automatic, but dependent on the officer’s ability to pass the recognised professional examinations and other tests of efficiency.

Wastage.

In a recent letter from the Government of India the normal annual wastage* has been estimated at 120. The figure of 160 given in the Skeen Committee Report is understood to have been based on evidence given to that Committee by an officer in the War Office which referred to the British Army, the conditions in which are substantially different from those in the Indian Army, e.g., it contains a larger proportion of junior officers who for various reasons do not continue their Army career. It is regretted that no figures are available which show in accordance with the Maharaja of Bikaner’s desire what proportion of this wastage is formed by officers retired on account of inefficiency. It is comparatively small but exists.

* i.e. On the present establishment. On an establishment increased by the substitution for Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers of the new type of Indian Officer the wastage would naturally be greater.

Schemes of Indianisation.

I.

Government of India’s Committee, 1922.

"The Committee have regarded it as axiomatic:—

(a) That the efficiency of the Army as an instrument of war must be maintained."
(b) That a definite standard of efficiency must be laid down.
(c) That the authority to determine this standard of efficiency must be the Commander-in-Chief acting in accordance with the policy of Government.
(d) That the military authorities must be the sole judges of the fitness of candidates for commissioned rank.
(e) That the military authorities must be the sole judges of the progress in efficiency of Indianised units.
(f) That the scheme of Indianisation must be so framed as to ensure that its development shall provide a real and fair test of the fitness of Indians for command in the several ranks and of the fitness of Indianised units for war.

The Committee recommend therefore, that the complete Indianisation of all arms and services (excluding Gurkhas for whom special arrangements will be necessary) of the Indian Army be carried out in three definite stages, each of 14 years, commencing from 1925:—

(a) First period: 1st to 14th year.
(b) Second period: 15th to 28th year.
(c) Third period: 29th to 42nd year.

This was reconsidered and modified to
(a) First period: 1st to 14th year.
(b) Second period: 15th to 23rd year.
(c) Third period: 24th to 30th year.

i.e., a total of 30 years.

But the Committee felt strongly that they would fail in their duty if they did not record their opinion that it is quite impossible at present to guarantee that it will be possible to provide this very large number of educated, trained and experienced officers in a shorter time than that originally recommended by them, i.e., three periods of 14 years each or 42 years in all.

They recommend that during the first period of fourteen years:—
(a) One regiment per group of cavalry, one battalion per group of infantry, and a corresponding proportion of other services be selected for Indianization.
(b) The average number of commissions in fighting formations in the Indian Army to be given to Indians in each year should amount to approximately 81—vide Appendix I.
(c) The establishment of a Cavalry Regiment and Infantry battalion and a Pioneer battalion selected for Indianisation be fixed at 28 officers.
(d) The establishment of a pack battery selected for Indianisation be fixed at 6 officers.
(e) The establishment of Engineer units selected for Indianisation be fixed at under:

| Headquarters Companies | 3 per company. |
| Field Companies       | 6 per company. |
| Field Troops          | 4 per troop.   |
| Railway Companies     | 7 per company. |
| Army Troops Companies | 7 per company. |

(f) The number of officers to be posted to the Quartermaster-General's services be approximately 48.
(g) The number of officers to be posted to the Indian Army Educational Corps be approximately 54.
The officers will be posted to units as follows:

(a) Cavalry, infantry and pioneers. Two Indian officers would enter each such unit yearly displacing one British officer and Indian officer as at present commissioned.

(b) Artillery: One Indian officer would enter each battery biennially (every second year) displacing either one British officer or one Indian officer as at present commissioned.

(c) Engineer units: Indian officers would enter engineer units as follows:
   (i) Headquarters companies: One officer every fourth year.
   (ii) Field companies: One officer every second year.
   (iii) Field troops: One officer every third year.
   (iv) Railway and Army Troops companies: One officer every second year.

This officer would displace either one British or one Indian officer commissioned as at present.

In this way, after twelve years, all British officers in 7 Cavalry regiments, 26 Infantry battalions, 3 Pioneer battalions, 6 Pack batteries, 1 Headquarters Company, engineers, 6 Field Companies, engineers, 2 Field Troops, engineers, 1 Railway Company, and 1 Army Troops Company undergoing Indianisation would have disappeared and such units would be completely officered by Indians.

The Committee further recommend that, with a view to ensuring the necessary supply of military qualified officers for the Quartermaster-General’s and Educational Services, a number—approximately 16—Indian officers should be appointed annually and posted as supernumeraries one to each of certain selected units undergoing Indianisation.

The Committee think that it will be necessary ultimately to post Indian officers to units irrespective of Class, but they are of opinion that the point is not one upon which a definite decision can now be given and that experience gained during the progress of Indianisation will alone indicate the course to be followed with a view to reconciling the requirements of military efficiency and possible class feeling.

It is recommended that during the second period the numbers of commissions to be given annually should be increased to approximately 182, and this should provide for the Indianisation of the following units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cavalry regiments</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry battalions</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pioneer battalions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pack batteries</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Engineer units:

(i) Headquarters companies | 2 |
(ii) Field companies | 6 |
(iii) Field troops | 1 |
(iv) Army troops companies | 2 |

Together with a portion for the Quartermaster-General’s and Educational services, and an allowance for wastage among first period officers.

The remaining units of the Indian Army would be Indianised during the third period—which if justified by experience might be shortened.

The Committee recommend that all ancillary services be Indianised on the same lines as the fighting troops.”
APPENDIX I.

(i) Number of King’s Commissions to be granted, by periods with average number to be granted annually.

(ii) Grand total King’s Commissions.
(i) Number of King’s Commissions granted during each period:

(a) First period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Troops</td>
<td>937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q. M. G. Services</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. A. Educational Corps</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average annually 81.4

(b) Second period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Troops</td>
<td>1,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q. M. G. Services</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. A. Educational Corps</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,547</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average annually 182

(c) Third period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Troops</td>
<td>2,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q. M. G. Services</td>
<td>481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. A. Educational Corps</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average annually 227

(ii) Grand Total: King’s Commissions:

(a) First Period 1,139
(b) Second Period 2,547
(c) Third Period 3,178

Grand Total 6,864
N.B.—Corps of Signals whose numbers are relatively small have not been taken into consideration.

2. The Tank Corps, whose numbers also will probably be small, and which are yet undetermined has not been taken into consideration.

II.

SKEEN COMMITTEE, 1926.

Scheme of Indianisation.

"The details of the suggested scheme of Indianisation of the Indian Army are shown in tabular form in the statement appended. The following notes are explanatory of the statement:

1. The normal strength of the cadre of officers of the Indian Army (Cavalry and Infantry units) has been taken as 3,200. The annual wastage in that cadre has, it is understood, never been actuarially calculated, and it has been assumed to be 160, the only figure of authority supplied to the Committee.

2. It is proposed that an increase of 10 vacancies at Sandhurst should be sanctioned immediately. An interval must be allowed in which to advertise the extra vacancies, etc. To permit of an increase in May, 1928, the additional cadets would have to be ready to pass the examination held in September, 1927, and would have to commence their special preparation for the examination at least six months before that. It is therefore postulated that there would be no increase of actual entrants until the September term of 1928, when ten cadets instead of five should be admitted to Sandhurst, the examination for admission having been held in May, 1928.

3. In 1929 and in successive years, up to and including the year in which the proposed Indian military college is opened (vide note 4 following) it is proposed that there should be an increase of four each year, as a temporary measure, in the number of vacancies allotted to Indians at Sandhurst.

4. In 1933, a military college on the lines of Sandhurst should be opened in India. The capacity of the college should in the first instance be 100 cadets, and the course of training three years. A batch of 33 cadets should join the college in 1933 and in each of the two succeeding years.

5. After the opening of the Indian Military College, the number of vacancies allotted annually to Indians at Sandhurst can be reduced to the former figure of 20. Any vacancies at Sandhurst not actually taken up by Indians should be added to the establishment of the Indian Military College.

6. In 1936, the first cadets trained at the Indian Military College receive their commissions.

7. In 1936, the annual intake at the Indian Military College is increased by 12, this making a total of 45 Indian cadets sent for training, exclusive of the 20 Indian cadets sent to Sandhurst.

8. In 1939, and at intervals of three years thereafter, the annual intake at the Indian Military College is further increased, on each occasion by 12. In 1942, the intake rises to 69, giving, with the 20 Indian cadets sent for training at Sandhurst, a total of 89 Indian cadets to be commissioned.

9. In 1944, the Senior Indian King’s Commissioned officers now in the Army will be due to be considered for command of regiments. After this stage is passed and, it is assumed, passed successfully, the number of commissions granted to Indians rises above 50 per cent. of the total annual recruitment to the Indian Army.

10. In 1952, more than 50 per cent. of the total officer cadre of the Indian Army consists of Indians.
11. The above figures are subject to a percentage correction on account of inevitable wastage and failure. This cannot be calculated precisely and for the present purpose it is not necessary to attempt to do so.

Table showing suggested scheme of Indianisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Numbers sent for training</th>
<th>Numbers Commissioned</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Sandhurst (3 years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Indian Military College (1 year)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Sandhurst</td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Indian Military College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Already Commissioned</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Now at Sandhurst</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927 February</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1928 February</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929 February</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930 February</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>September</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931 February</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932 February</td>
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<td>September</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>1933 February</td>
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<td>38</td>
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<td>September</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>1934 February</td>
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<td>September</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>1935 February</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carried over</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes 3 Cadets who should have been commissioned by now in the ordinary course, but who were kept back as still requiring further training.
### Table showing suggested scheme of Indianisation—contd.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>(a) Sandhurst (11 years)</th>
<th>(b) Indian Military College (3 years)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>(a) Sandhurst</th>
<th>(b) Indian Military College</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total Commissioned</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brought forward.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>53</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>57</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<td>796</td>
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<td>89</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>57</td>
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<td>873</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>81</td>
<td>101</td>
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<td>1961</td>
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<td>125</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>1,663</td>
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| Total | - | - | 2,002 | - | - | 1,663 | - | - |         |

### III. Government decisions following on the Skeen Committee's Report.

Provisional 8 units scheme accompanied by an output of 25 officers a year from Sandhurst. Such an output would, as a matter of fact, eventually provide for 16 units with ancillary departments and staff. (Para. 160 of Government of India's despatch).
IV.

Plan proposed in the Government of India's despatch.

25 unit scheme. The number of 16 would require to be increased to 25 in course of time to absorb an annual output of 33 officers a year from an Indian Sandhurst. (Para. 181 of Government of India's despatch.)

Note.—Schemes 1, 3 and 4 provide for the replacement of Viceroy's Commissioned Officers by the new type of Indian Officer.

The Auxiliary Force (India) has an established strength of some 35,000. The Indian Territorial Force has an established strength of some 20,000 including some 800 officers.

A PLEA FOR ENGLAND'S CONTRIBUTION TO ARMY EXPENDITURE IN INDIA.

Circulated to all Delegates at the request of Sir P. C. Mitter, The Maharaja of Darbhanga, The Raja of Parlakimedi, Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq, Mr. A. H. Ghuznavi, Dr. Narendra Nath Law and Sir Sayed Sultan Ahmed.

(Mr. Barooh, in a letter, dated 20th January, 1931, requested that his support of this Memorandum should be recorded.)

The object of this Note is to draw attention to one factor which, to our mind, is essential to the success of a new Constitution in India; and we are anxious to stress it lest it should be forgotten in a preoccupation with the nature and form of the Constitution. It is our opinion, based largely upon the experience of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, that the success or failure of any Constitution in India would depend in a great measure upon the scope it furnishes for the economic uplift of rural India and the removal of middle-class unemployment. If it should turn out that it cannot stand this test, its satisfactoriness in other ways would be of but little value. The constant complaint of the Ministers that the financial handicap prevented them from promoting "nation-building" activities pointed to a pressing demand which it was not found possible to fulfil; and the failure of the Reforms was due, in no small degree, to financial inadequacy. We are, therefore, emphatic in our view that the new Constitution should start with such an adjustment of India's finances as would enable "nation-building" work to be undertaken without further loss of time. Any constitution aiming at democracy would depart from its own purpose if the rural masses were to remain as poor as they are; and there can be no steady progress if continued middle-class unemployment provided a persistent atmosphere of discontent.

The adjustment of India's finances might take place along various lines; but there is one that has been brought forcefully to our notice by the observations of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in his "Government of India" and of the Indian Statutory Commission in their Report. Both Mr. MacDonald and the Commission urge an equitable distribution of India's military expenditure between England and India, Mr. MacDonald suggesting that England should bear half of the expenditure. We shall give the relevant quotations and references later on; but it is necessary at once to say that if India could be relieved from her admittedly excessive expenditure on Defence, she could immediately take in hand the work of the uplift of the masses which has been more or less neglected in the past. We look for an improvement in India's financial position from this more than from any other source; and we hold that both justice and considerations of self-interest as between England and India require a settlement in the direction pointed out by such weighty authorities as Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and the Indian Statutory Commission. We suggest that England should make over to India annually a substantial proportion of India's total expenditure on Defence; and that provision should be made for making available to the Provinces the financial relief thus afforded, so that the work of nation-building may be
proceeded with without more delay. We are aware that alternative suggestions have been made in other quarters, and we shall deal with them later in this Note; but at this stage we are merely concerned with making our general attitude clear.

We shall now pass on, by means of facts and figures from the Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, to analyse the financial position of India in relation particularly to Defence and the welfare of the rural masses.

Sir Walter Layton points out that the annual income of the British population is about £100 per head, and that of India was Rs. 107 (about £8) per annum, and according to a more cautious estimate it is only about Rs. 80 (about £6). Sir Walter Layton further points out, "The proportion of this annual income which is taken in Britain by the tax gatherer and spent upon military and naval defence is about 2½ per cent., viz., £2 10s. 9d. per head. In the case of India, the expenditure upon the army is 2s. 7d. per head, or, leaving out of account the Indian States and including British India only, 3s. 4d. per head, or about 2 per cent. of the average annual income. But, whereas the amount collected by the Government and spent upon education in Britain is as much as £2 15s. 9d. per head, the amount spent on education in British India is less than 9d. per head.

These simple figures illustrate three of the chief features of the financial situation in India, viz.:

The mass of the people are extremely poor.

She is incurring expenditure on the primary functions of government, such as defence and the maintenance of law and order, as high in proportion to her wealth as Western nations.

Her expenditure on social services such as education, health, sanitation, etc., on the other hand, is far behind Western standards and indeed in many directions it is almost non-existent.

"The insufficiency of India's revenues to provide adequately for the latter classes of expenditure has been a factor of political importance in that it has created dissatisfaction with the very small headway that it has been possible to make in the direction of social amelioration under the Reforms."

Sir Walter Layton on page 215, Vol. 2 of the Report, sets out a balance sheet of India's finances. It will appear from it that the total central revenue is 88-22 crores; it further appears that the cost of Defence is 55-1 crores, or, in other words, it is as high as 62-5 per cent. of the total central income. The total expenditure on social services, such as education, medical and public health, is very inadequate, such expenditure being 12-57 crores on education and 6-38 crores on medical relief and public health, which means a total of 18-95 crores. The population of British India being 247 millions, it works out at an average of 4 annas, or about 4½d. per head on medical relief and public health. The inadequacy of expenditure on agriculture and rural industries is even more striking, the total sum spent for all the Provinces of India on agriculture and industries being only 3-24 crores, i.e., only 2d. per head. Considering that India's rural population is as large as 226 millions, and that the prosperity of India depends so largely upon the improvement of her agriculture and rural industries, the neglect of past Governments, due mainly to inadequacy of funds, is deplorable.

The inadequacy of funds on social services and on agriculture and industries is due in the first place to a large proportion of the income of India, poor as her citizens are, on Defence. It is due also to the comparatively large expenditure by the Provincial Governments on the primary functions of government, such as maintenance of law and order, and the Services: General Administration (15-76 crores), Police (12-23 crores), Jails and Justice (8-31 crores), Pensions (4-05 crores). The total expenditure on General Administration, Police, Jails and Justice, Pensions, together with Civil Works expenditure on these heads, will come up to more than 47-40 crores. Since the total provincial revenue is 88-25 crores, this represents about 53-5 per cent. of the total provincial income. We have already noted that the total expenditure on Defence is 62-5 per cent. of the total central revenue.
It is thus clear that on primary functions of government, India, both at the Centre and in the Provinces, is spending quite a large proportion of her income.

Comparing the Defence expenditure of India with that of the Dominions, we find that India's expenditure is very high as compared with that of the Dominions.


(*Pensions are not included.*)

Figures in thousands of pounds.

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<td>97,000</td>
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* 1926-27.
† Gross.
‡ Appropriations.
§ 62.5 per cent. of total expenditure.

The Indian Statutory Commission has reported that the size and expense of the army serving in India is determined not merely by the purely Indian aspect, but also by the Imperial aspect, and that there are elements which make it inequitable to regard its cost as falling solely upon Indian revenues.** The Commission further points out that it is somewhat difficult to evaluate every factor, and they would not attempt even to evaluate some of the aspects of the question relating to the division of army charges which had been under discussion between the Government of India and the Home Government. Lastly, as they were more concerned with constitutional problems than with the division of army expenditure, they did not feel it necessary to do anything beyond touching upon the Imperial and the Indian aspects of the problem.

*On this point the following extract (page 16) from Mr. Leonard Le Marchant Minty's "Constitutional Laws of the British Empire" (1928) is of interest:—

"In December, 1927, it was announced that a treaty had been made with Iraq acknowledging it to be in every way an independent State. Great Britain, however, still remains responsible to the League during the next twenty-five years for carrying out the mandatory powers entrusted to her. This, in fact, has meant the maintenance in Iraq of armed forces and aeroplanes costing over £4,000,000 a year. The upkeep of Indian troops so employed is included in the Indian budget, and as the future of Iraq is not of direct concern to India, and India has no control of the exercise of the mandate, their presence there is open to strong constitutional objections."
Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in his book "The Government of India" came to more definite conclusions. He expressed it as his deliberate opinion that half the army expenditure of India should be met from Imperial, and not Indian funds. We quote below the following from page 154 of his book:—

"What is the proper charge for India to bear for this occupation? A large part of the army in India—certainly one-half—is an Imperial army which we require for other than purely Indian purposes, and its cost, therefore, should be met from Imperial and not Indian funds. When we stationed troops in other parts of the Empire, we did not charge them upon the Colonies, but in India we have the influence of the dead hand . . . ."

Then, again, he observes:—

"Thus, India is treated as an independent State, which, however, we rule and whose military policy we control, while it 'borrows' from us a certain number of troops for which it pays. The arrangement is most unsatisfactory.

"It may be said that if India were an independent State its military expenditure would be much higher. But then, India is not an independent State, and is entitled to claim some privileges of Empire; its weakness ought not to subject it to a more expensive military arrangement than Canada or Australia.

"A self-governing India would no doubt insist upon bearing some definite share in defence, but like the Dominions it would settle how much it ought to bear: it would adjust the cost to its means, and it would decide in what form it was to make its contribution—perhaps an Indian-recruited army. In any event the present plan, by which India pays for the Imperial army stationed there, without in any way determining policy, is as bad as it can be. If the existing system of military defence is to last, the whole cost of the British army stationed in India should be borne by the Imperial Exchequer."

It would appear from the last-mentioned sentence, that if the whole cost of the British army stationed in India is to be borne by the Imperial Exchequer, perhaps England’s contribution to the total army expenditure borne by the Indian Exchequer will be not less but more than half. However, be that as it may, it is clear from Mr. Ramsay MacDonald’s opinion, as also from the Indian Statutory Commission’s Report (Vol. 2, pages 167—173) that India is equitably entitled to ask for a substantial contribution from England towards the army expenditure. In our opinion, it is not necessary to examine the details of the share payable by England with meticulous care. We should rather aim at coming to an equitable adjustment on a broad basis, after taking into account political factors in both countries which have an important bearing on their future well-being.

There would probably be those who, although impressed by the justice of our proposal, would still be averse to the idea of an annual contribution to India on account of England’s immediate obligations in respect of her domestic problem of unemployment. To them it would not perhaps be wrong to point out that what is asked for in this Note as a contribution to India would be but a small proportion of what England has been annually spending towards unemployment relief. Nor would it be unfair to draw attention to one factor, which is often missed by those whose eyes are fixed upon the hardship of an immediate sacrifice, and who are unable or unwilling to take the longer view. We are convinced that our proposal would be a political gesture of great value, fraught with far-reaching economic consequences to both India and England. The assistance offered by England to the uplift of her rural masses will not be lightly forgotten by India. With new bonds forged between the two countries, the bitterness of the immediate past would be greatly assuaged; and India’s trade relations with England—which have been normally of the friendliest—would visibly improve. An advance in the standard of living in rural India cannot but have its natural effect upon British trade; and unemployment which is so large a result of trade depression is bound at least to diminish, when one of the potent causes is removed.
It is from this point of view, too, that we hold that the contribution we are asking for would have great economic results for England and India, even though these might appear to mature too slowly in the beginning.

We desire that England should contribute to the Indian Government a fixed percentage of India’s total expenditure on Defence. In view of the weighty opinion of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, we suggest that a percentage which would amount to half the total expenditure is prima facie fair. If in spite of the deliberate opinion of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the present head of His Majesty’s Government, it still be desired to examine the question further, we have no objection provided the following factors be taken into consideration:—

1. The fact that no such contribution has hitherto been made, and England has escaped a just liability for many years past.
2. The fact that the employment of British troops and British officers is accountable for a large proportion of the expenditure.
3. The merit of an opinion expressed by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald.
4. The Imperial aspects of the problem.
5. The political aspects.

Such an examination is bound to take some time, it may be several years. We therefore suggest that the payment for the first five years in any case be on the basis of the total expenditure on Defence as estimated by the Indian Statutory Commission, namely, 55-1 crores of rupees; England’s contribution during this period 27-55 crores of rupees annually, that is, on the basis of the allocation suggested by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. This payment should begin from the next Indian official year, that is, 1931-32. After the inquiry has been completed, say, during the next five years, the percentage and the amount of the contribution may be fixed so that it could remain in operation for a period of, say, ten years.

The administration of the Defence of India should remain with the Government of India irrespective of the constitutional position of that Government. We repudiate the suggestion of the Indian Statutory Commission that India should contribute to England for the Defence of India, but we are emphatic in our opinion that the contribution should be from England to the Government of India.

Lastly, we are anxious that the suggested contribution of England should be made immediately available to the Provincial Governments by means of Statutory Rules, so that the long neglected problems of rural India may be taken up without any further delay.