THE FIRST NIZĀM

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF NIZĀMU'L-MULK ĀSAF JĀH I
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To

PRINCE MUKARRAM JÄH
Preface

Nizāmu’l-Mulk was the most remarkable personage in the history of the later Mughals. He had been brought up in the traditions of Aurangzib, and had been one of the chief favourites of the Emperor in the latter’s declining years. He was a clever strategist and a far-sighted statesman who clearly envisaged, and truly estimated, the magnitude and extent of the difficulties which arose for the Mughal Government during the inefficient reigns of Aurangzib’s successors, lacking both in military genius and administrative capacity. He saw the danger to which the Mughal Empire was exposed, and realized the evils which had overtaken it. With rare tact and courage he undertook the stupendous task of restoring the Mughal conquests and re-establishing the Imperial authority in the Deccan, where, ultimately, he was destined to found a dynasty. His beneficent administration in that part of the country succeeded in putting down local tyrannies and anarchy and establishing a regular system of law and order.

It is a pity that historians of Mughal India have paid scant attention to this great man. So far as I know, no one has attempted to present events as viewed in relation to the dynamic and outstanding personality of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, although his influence has proved deep and lasting on the course of Indian history. It was in the midst of strife, resulting from the action of disintegrating forces in the Mughal Empire, that Nizāmu’l-Mulk succeeded in effectively restoring the Imperial authority in the Deccan. A critical study of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, based on contemporary histories and records, has long been overdue, valuable as it would obviously be in elucidating and supplementing our information concerning the later period of Mughal history. It is not that there is any dearth or paucity of contemporary documents; on the contrary, there is abundant material for the study of the subject which has never yet been fully utilized by scholars. The present writer has endeavoured, from reliable sources, to compile a
connected story of Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s life and times, as the beginning of the epilogue to the great drama enacted by the Mughals on the stage of Indian history. This sketch is at once a narrative and a critical study. Its object is to enable the reader to form a correct estimate of the career of the ablest and the most clear-sighted general and statesman of the early eighteenth century in India, and also to sketch the history of the conditions under which he succeeded in restoring the Mughal predominance in the Deccan. It is, in effect, impossible to draw a dividing line between history and biography when one attempts to write about such a personality as Nizāmu’l-Mulk Āsaf Jāh I, who played so vital a part in refashioning the political conditions of his time.

During the course of my investigations I have been fortunate to utilize some very valuable and hitherto unpublished material in the Āsafia State Library and Daftar-i-Dīwānī (Records Office of Andhra Pradesh) which illuminates many a dark corner of the later Mughal history.

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CHAPTER I

Ancestry

Khwāja ʿĀbid, grandfather of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, was born in ʿAlī Abād, in the neighbourhood of Samarqand, in the kingdom of Bukhārā. Moving from his native place, he established himself at Bukhārā, where his talent had greater opportunity of recognition. He was the son of ʿĀlam Sheikh, a celebrated man of letters and a well-known Sūfī of his time. The King of Bukhārā had bestowed on the latter the title of Ā’zamū’l-Ulamā, which testifies to his being one of the most learned men of the realm. Khwāja ʿĀbid’s mother was of the family of Mīr Hamdān, a distinguished Sayyid of Samarqand. ʿĀlam Sheikh originally came from Suhraward, a small town in Kurdistan, and traced his descent to Sheikh Shihābu’d-Dīn Suhrawardy, a great spiritual teacher and author of eminent works on Islamic theosophy, and called himself a descendant of Abū Bakr, the First Caliph. 1 ʿĀlam Sheikh was reputed to be endowed with spiritual powers. He had numerous disciples all over the kingdom of Bukhārā to whom he used to prescribe rules of discipline and devotion.

He gave religious education to his son Khwāja ʿĀbid, who after the death of his father moved to Bukhārā. His intelligence and ability soon attracted the attention of men in authority there, and he was offered the post of chief Qāzī, which he accepted. A little later he was made Sheikhul-Islām, a very important office in the realm.

Khwāja ʿĀbid’s first visit to India was in 1065 H. (A. D. 1654-55), while he was on his way to Mecca in the twenty-ninth year of Shāhjahān’s reign. He presented himself at the Imperial court, where he was received with distinction, invested with a

robe of honour and given a purse of six thousand rupees. He was also offered a post in the Imperial service, which he promised to accept after his return from Mecca.

Khwāja 'Ābid returned from the Hajj in 1067 H. (A.D. 1657). He went straight to Aurangzīb in the Deccan, when he heard of the dangerous illness of Shāhjahān and the preparations for war made by his sons to contest the throne. Shujāʿ and Murād had already assumed royal titles, but Aurangzīb conducted himself in a more cautious and diplomatic manner. He moved immediately to his northern frontier, leaving the territory of Bijāpūr to be conquered later on, pretending to act in accordance with the orders received from the Emperor. This abrupt withdrawal had dispirited his Mughal (Tūrānī) troops who considered themselves to have been deprived of the fruits of their long and arduous exertions. Several Mughal officers, dissatisfied with their lot, deserted him.

At this critical moment Khwāja 'Ābid joined the service of Aurangzīb, who, considering him to be an asset, gave him high command over the Tūrānī soldiery, a very important element in the Imperial army. Khwāja 'Ābid, besides being a learned man, was well-versed in the arts of war. His adherence to the cause of Aurangzīb proved extremely useful, in that he succeeded in rallying his countrymen round the latter's standard, during the fateful months that followed.

Aurangzīb reached Burhānpur on 19th February 1658 and remained there for a month, biding his time. Meanwhile, Dārā Shikhūh had acquired virtual supremacy in the State, had taken pledges from Ministers to support his claim for the throne and had closed the roads leading to Bengal, Ahmedābād and the Deccan against messengers and travellers. Aurangzīb succeeded in winning over Murād to his side, who promised definitely to join him at Ujjain before attacking the common foe. During his stay in Burhānpur, Aurangzīb granted to Khwāja 'Ābid the rank of 3,000 zāt, 500 horse, and the title of Khān. On the way towards Ujjain he honoured him with a robe of honour, a steed and a jewelled dagger with pearl-inlaid strap.

On receiving intelligence of the designs of Aurangzib and Murād, Dārā Shikūh directed Maharāja Jaswant Singh of Mārwār and Qāsim Khān to march to Mālwa in order to check their movements. Murād joined Aurangzib at Ujjain. Their combined armies attacked Maharāja Jaswant Singh who drew up his army at Dharmat in the neighbourhood of Ujjain. After a bloody battle the Rājpūts, under the command of the Maharāja, were defeated and dispersed in different directions. The Maharāja fled and retired to Jodhpūr, his capital.

After the successful termination of the battle, Khwāja 'Ābid (Khān) was promoted to the rank of 4,000 zāt, 700 horse, in recognition of his services and the prominent part he played in the campaign.¹ Aurangzib showed his confidence by asking him, along with Hazbar Khān and Zu'l-Qadar Khān, to remain beside him during his march towards the capital.

Khwāja 'Ābid was with Aurangzib when the battle of Samūgarh was fought in June 1658 resulting in the defeat of Dārā Shikūh and the annihilation of his cause. He was one of those on whom Aurangzib had bestowed presents “favouring them with his commendation and eulogy”.² The men who had gained great influence on Aurangzib, by proving their worth during the battle, were Khwāja 'Ābid, Mukhlis Khān and Munīm Khān. They were consulted on every matter concerning the impending operations that Aurangzib had to undertake to achieve his aim.

Khwāja 'Ābid served Aurangzib with distinction, during the first four years of his reign, mainly spent in consolidating and restoring peace in his newly acquired possessions. He took part in the expeditions sent against Dārā, Shujāʿ and Maharāja Jaswant Singh and established his reputation as a soldier.³ In the fourth year Khwāja 'Ābid was entrusted with the office of Faujdār of Behrat, in the neighbourhood of Alwar, inhabited by turbulent tribes of Meos, whose depredations extended at times to the walls of Delhi. He discharged the duties of this office for nearly a year when he was given the post of Sadr-i-kul (head of religious endowments) in place of Sheikh Mīrak, who retired on account of old age. This was an impor-

¹ Ibíd., p. 63; Ma'dīhin-l-Umarā, vol. III, p. 121.
³ 'Alamgīr Nāmah, p. 45.
tant office as the Sadr-i-kul was considered to be one of the members of the King's ministry through whom passed all the proceedings concerning the charitable grants of lands conferred by the State. In 1665 (1075 H.) Khwāja ‘Ābid was raised to the rank of 4,000 zāt, and 1,500 horse, and an elephant was given to him.\(^1\) He held the office of Sadr-i-kul for nearly six years.

In 1668 (1078 H.) he was replaced in this office by Rizwī Khān, son of Sheikh Mīrak, and was sent to Ajmer as governor of the Province.\(^2\) He remained there for nearly three years, and was transferred thence to the governorship of Multān where he remained for four years. During this time he enjoyed the full confidence of the Emperor, as is shown by the fact that in the thirteenth year of his reign (1671), the latter distributed special robes of honour to those in whom he reposed the greatest trust, and Khwāja ‘Ābid was one of the recipients; the others being Asad Khān (later known as Jumdat-ul-Mulk, Prime Minister of Aurangzīb), Murtaza Khān, Hasan ‘Alī Khān, and Tāhir Khān. Early in 1676, Khwāja ‘Ābid was summoned by the Emperor to repair to the capital where he was entrusted with the leadership of the Hajj party going to Mecca. The leader of the Hajj party was appointed every year by the Emperor himself. He used to carry the royal presents to Mecca and Medīna. At the time of his departure, Khwāja ‘Ābid received a special robe of honour from the Emperor. Generally, the persons appointed for this mission were those who enjoyed a high reputation for their learning and piety.\(^3\)

After his return from Mecca, Khwāja ‘Ābid repaired to the court where he remained till August 1679, when the Emperor marched to Rājpūtāna to restore order and establish his authority in that part of the country.

The death of Maharāja Jaswant Singh, who had been reinstated in his rank at the intercession of Mirzā Rāja Jai-Singh and had been appointed to the command of the frontier outpost, occasioned a rising in Rājpūtāna which resulted in a long-drawn-out war. Maharāja Jaswant Singh had left no son, therefore, the Emperor decided to annex the Mārwār State. He refused to recognize Ajit Singh, his posthu-

mous son. But Ajit Singh’s cause was espoused by Durgadās, son of Maharāja Jaswant’s minister Askaran, a Rāthor veteran of great courage and resource. The serious nature of the Rājpūt rebellion could well be realized from the fact that the Emperor called up reinforcements from all parts of the Empire and made Ajmer his headquarters. He summoned Prince A’zam from Bengal, Prince Mu‘azzam from the Deccan and despatched his own army under the command of Prince Akbar to invade the Rājpūt territory from all sides. The Maharānā of Udaipūr, who had actively joined the Rāthor rebels, on hearing of the Imperial advance fled into the mountain fastnesses, with treasure, family and followers. ¹ Jodhpūr was occupied by the Emperor and all the important towns in the plains were captured and the Mughal civil and military posts were established.

When the Maharānā and the followers of Durgadās felt hardpressed, they thought of creating disunity in the ranks of the Mughals, by pretending to offer their allegiance to Prince Mu‘azzam provided the latter was willing to support their cause. But the Prince, made of harder stuff, paid no heed to these tempting messages. When disappointed, they tried the same game with Prince Muhammad Akbar. Durgadās, who was considered to be a very persuasive spokesman, called on the prince, pledging on behalf of his followers as well as the Maharānā of Udaipūr to accept his suzerainty. He succeeded in leading the inexperienced Prince astray, who ascended the throne, struck coins in his own name and advanced on Ajmer to fight a decisive battle with his father. Among his followers, Tahawwar Khān obtained the rank of seven thousand and the title of Amīru’l-Umarā; and Mujāhid Khān, son of Khwāja ‘Ābid, also received distinguished honours, while designing all the time to go over to the Imperial side at a suitable opportunity.² Early in 1680, Khwāja ‘Ābid was appointed to pursue Prince Muhammad Akbar, along with Prince Shāh ‘Ālam (later known as Bahādur Shāh). As he had already lived in Ajmer for some time as governor of the province, he was considered to be in the best position to know the men and affairs of that part of the country. Several Rājpūt chiefs, Inder Singh,

Rām Singh and Subhān Singh also accompanied the party. Fifty thousand gold coins were given to Shāh 'Ālam personally and fifty thousand were given to the party for the expenses of the expedition.¹ In recognition of his services Khwāja 'Ābid was awarded a robe of honour and a horse with golden trappings, and the title of Qilīch Khān.

It seems that Qilīch Khān did not see eye to eye with Prince Shāh 'Ālam on certain religious matters, the latter being inclined towards the Shia sect while he himself was a man of orthodox views. As the latter’s views ran counter to those held by the Prince, he left his party without even asking his permission, and joined the Emperor. When Aurangzīb came to know of this affair, he ordered Ihtimām Khān, Kotwāl, to put Qilīch Khān in custody. He was, however, pardoned and released after a few months. As a strict disciplinarian Aurangzīb did not even spare his own sons if they did anything against his will.

Having regained the confidence of the Emperor, Qilīch Khān was re-appointed to the post of Sadr-i-kul in 1681, after the death of Rizwī Khān. Next year he was directed to accompany prince A‘zam in his campaign in the Deccan where prince Muhammad Akbar had taken refuge at the court of Sambhājī, son of Śivājī. In his place Sharīf Khān was appointed as Sadr-i-kul by royal orders.² When taking leave of the Emperor, Qilīch Khān was given a robe of honour, a horse and the right of playing kettle-drums.³ This latter right was a special favour granted only to the nobility of high rank. It was not to be exercised in the presence of the Emperor, nor within a prescribed distance from the place where he happened to be residing.

In the 29th year of Aurangzīb’s reign Qilīch Khān was appointed to the governorship of Zafarābād (Bīdar), and was awarded a robe of honour, a suit of armour and an elephant. Najābat Khān and Asālat Khān, sons of Sayyid Muzzafar Haiderābādī,⁴ and Ikrām Khān, Nāsir Khān and

¹ *Ma‘ālik-i-‘Alamgīr*, p. 203  
⁴ Najābat Khān and Asālat Khān joined Sheikh Nizām Haiderābādī, deserting the cause of the Emperor, prior to the first siege of Golconda. Qilīch Khān, reposing full trust in them sent them to serve as guides for the forces of Prince Shāh ‘Ālam and Khān Jhān. The roving parties of Quṭb-‘Alī-Mulk’s generals, under the command of Sheikh Nizām, harassed the Imperial forces,
Sayyid Hasan Khān were appointed to work under his command.\(^1\)

When the Emperor resolved to march in person to effect the conquest of Bijāpūr, Qilich Khān joined him at Sholāpūr and accompanied him throughout the campaign in 1685-86. He was in command of the entrenchments and received a bow and a quiver from the Emperor. After the conquest of Bijāpūr he obtained a horse and a dagger as a royal present.\(^2\)

In 1687, Qilich Khān took a conspicuous part in the siege of Golconda. Being the leader of the storming party, he was leading a charge when heavy cannonade from the enemy overtook him. His right shoulder was struck by a musket-ball, inflicting a deadly wound. Lutfu'llāh Khān came to his rescue and took him to the camp. He refused to dismount, riding back all the way to the camp, in spite of the shattered condition of his right arm. Aurangzīb was much grieved to hear of this mishap. He sent down his surgeons to treat him. Next day Asad Khān (Jumdatu'l-Mulk), the Prime Minister, came to inquire after his health, on behalf of the Emperor. On reaching Qilich Khān's camp, he was surprised to see him sitting with perfect composure, taking coffee with the left hand while the surgeons were busy taking out bits of iron and bone from his wound in the right shoulder. With the usual smile on his face, he told the Prime Minister that he soon hoped to be fit and to be able to resume his duties in the service of the Emperor. According to his wont he was all the time amusing the surgeons by admiring the beauty and charm of their looks.\(^3\) But no treatment prevailed against the hand of death. Qilich Khān died after three days and was buried near Himāyatsāgar, about four miles from the Golconda fort. His right arm which was carried away by a cannon ball is said to have been buried in the village of Qismatpūr. It was recognized by his signet-ring and buried where it was found. The anniversary of Qilich Khān is still observed by the Sarf-i-Khāss.

Qilich Khān was held in high esteem by Aurangzīb. Dur-

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ing his three days' illness, the Emperor wrote to his son, Ghāziū'd-Dīn Khān Fīrūz Jang:

I wanted to come down to inquire after the health of that devoted well-wisher of the State. But I said to myself that I might not be able to bear the sight of his painful condition. This is why I sent down Jumdatu'l-Mulk to see him with my eyes and to tell him the secret of my heart. The only fruit now obtainable is grapes but the Īnānī physicians think they will not agree with the condition of that pillar of the State, than whom there is no one who knows the royal disposition better. I have resolved not to eat grapes myself. God willing, we both will eat together, after he is restored completely. A distich:

O God! my desire is so lovely,
Would that I might fulfil it!\(^1\)

Once writing to Prince A'zam, Aurangzīb put forward the name of Qilīch Khān as an example to be followed by other leaders. He says:

I have received information to the effect that Qilīch Khān is extremely considerate towards his soldiery. He offers them coffee, has breakfast served to them at the time of breakfast and meals at the time of meals. When the soldiers leave his place, he offers them scent and betel-leaf. He sends all kinds of food to their houses so that their womenfolk and children may not complain on account of their men eating everything by themselves, and on account of their niggardliness to let them partake of their meals.\(^2\)

Qilīch Khān left five sons. The eldest, Shīhābu'd-Dīn Khān, later known as Ghāziū'd-Dīn Khān Fīrūz Jang, earned the position of highest distinction possible for any Mughal noble. The latter had two real brothers, Mujāhid Khān\(^3\) and

\(^{1}\) Ruq̲ay̲at-i-Ālamgīrī, p. 49.  
\(^{2}\) Ibid., p. 20.  
\(^{3}\) His name was Muhammad 'Ārīf. For some time he was appointed Faujdar of Khārībād. In the 18th year of Aurangzīb's reign 'Īnāyat Khān succeeded him (Ma'āthīr-i-Ālamgīrī, p. 141). In the 24th regnal year he received a robe of honour and an increment of his Mansab (Op. cit., p. 199), in recognition of
Muhāmid Khān¹; the others being, Hāmid Khān² and 'Abdu'r Rahīm.³

Shihābu'd-Dīn was born in Samarqand about the year 1649. After his father left for India, he entered the employ of Subhān Qulī Khān, ruler of Buhārā. He desired to join his father in India, but the latter grew so fond of him that he would not let him depart. One day Subhān Qulī had gone out for recreation; Shihābu'd-Dīn and other two courtiers, Khwāja Y'aqūb and Rustam Bey also accompanied him. Shihābu'd-Dīn succeeded in getting round the two courtiers to persuade the king to give him permission to proceed to India and join his father. It is difficult to guess whether they agreed to do this, because they wanted to please him, or whether feeling jealous of the increasing influence he was acquiring with their patron, they desired to clear the way for their own ambition. Anyhow they mentioned the whole matter to Subhān Qulī Khān at a favourable opportunity when his services in Rājpūtāna by deserting Prince Muhammad Akbar and joining the Imperial party.

¹ He does not seem to have acquired any distinction in his career and led a mediocrite life.

² He was a half-brother of Ghāzi'u'd-Dīn Khān Firūz Jang. In the 29th year of Aurangzib's reign he was complimented by a title and a she-elephant as an Imperial gift. (Ma'uṣir-i-ʿAlamgīrī, p. 263.) He was put in charge of the treasure sent to Mālwa for Prince ʿAzam's army. (Ibid., p. 263.) In the 48th regnal year he was raised to 1,500 zāt, and 500 horse. Next year he quarrelled with Firūz Jang and came to the Imperial presence, and was promoted to 2,000 zāt, 1,000 horse. (Op. cit., p. 495.) In the reign of Farrukhsiyar he was raised to the rank of 5,000 and was considered to be a distinguished person in the Court. He was especially appointed to quell the rebellion of the Jāts living between Agra and Delhi. Later the title Muʿizzu'd-Daulah Salābat Jang was bestowed on him during the reign of Muhammad Shāh. Nizām'u'l-Mulk appointed him his deputy in Gujarāt but later recalled him and made him Sūbēdar of Nānđe in the Deccan. He died at Gulkara on his way to the Carnatic and was buried near the tomb of Syed Muhammad Gisūdarā. Nizām'u'l-Mulk was one of those who carried the coffin all the way to the grave. (Tārīkh-i-Fathiyak, MS.)

³ Later he was known as Nāsīru'd-Daulah Salābat Jang. He obtained the title of Khān in Aurangzīb's reign. Bahādur Shāh conferred on him the title of Chīn Qīlīch Khān and appointed him the faujdar of Jaunpūr. He accompanied Nizām'u'l-Mulk to the Deccan and took active part in the battles against Dilāwar 'Āli Khān and ʿ Alam ʿĀli Khān. He was raised to 5,000 zāt and 5,000 horse, and obtained the title of Nāsīru'd-Daulah Salābat Jang in 1132 H. Nizām'u'l-Mulk appointed him as the Governor of Burhānpūr, superseding Marhamat Khān. After the victory over Mubāriz Khān, he was promoted to the rank of seven thousand. After the death of Aʿizz-ud-Daulah, he was appointed the governor of Aurangābād. When Nizām'u'l-Mulk returned to the Deccan to quell the rebellion of his son, Nāsīr Jang, 'Abdu'r-Rahīm welcomed him at Burhānpūr and received the title of Mubāriz Jang. He died in Aurangābād in 1156 H. He was a distinguished calligraphist and a great patron of arts. His nom-de-plume was Faiyāzragam. His son Mujāhid Khān did not achieve any fame. (Ma'uṣiru'l-Umarā, vol. III, p. 837.)
disposition was in a most agreeable state, for “those who desire to get something done by their lords, have to wait for a suitable occasion”. They, however, succeeded in getting permission for their young friend to go to India. Then the king summoned the young Shihābu’d-Dīn and recited the first sūra of the holy Qur’ān, which is done when some dear one departs, and addressed him thus: “Thou goest to a foreign land, thou shalt become great.” Verily his words came true. Shihābu’d-Dīn acquired such distinction in India as could well be the object of envy for the lords of Balkh and Bukhārā.¹

Shihābu’d-Dīn arrived in India in the 12th year of Aurangzīb’s reign (1669), when he was hardly twenty years of age. He was well received by the Emperor, who conferred the rank of 300 zāt, 70 horse on the promising young man. The Emperor evinced further interest in him by gettuo him married to Safia Khānam, daughter of S’adullāh Khān, the Prime Minister of the Emperor Shāh Jehān.²

For nearly ten years he worked as an apprentice under his father. When the Emperor summoned his highly trusted officials and noblemen from different parts of the country to Rājpūtāna, Shihābu’d-Dīn also joined him at his headquarters at Ajmer. His extraordinary courage and skill as a soldier were first noticed when he took part in the expedition led by Hāmid Khān to chase the Rāthors in their mountain fastnesses. He was complimented for his services by receiving a robe of honour and a she-elephant, from the Emperor.³

After his return from the expedition, Shihābu’d-Dīn was summoned at midnight by the Emperor who asked him to bring speedy information from Hasan ‘Alī Khān, from whom no intelligence had arrived since quite a long time. All communications with the latter had been cut off and he was left isolated in the defiles of north-west of Udaipūr. This had caused great anxiety to the Emperor. Shihābu’d-Dīn, a stranger in that region, full of wild beasts and infested w’th robbers, agreed to undertake the mission. At the risk of his life he started immediately and by forced mar-

¹ *Ma’āthīr-i-‘Alamgīr*, p. 91; *Ma’āthīr-i-Umarā*, vol. II, p. 872.
² *Tārīkh-i-Fathiyah*. According to the author of the *Tārīkh-i-Khurshid Jahān* the name of the daughter of the chief Minister was Waziru’n-Nisā (p. 370). I have not been able to ascertain his source of information.
³ *Ma’āthīr-i-‘Alamgīr*, p. 194.
ches brought back intelligence in two days' time. In recognition of this service, the Emperor bestowed on him the title of 'Khān' and is reported to have foreseen his greatness by saying: "One who, like the ruby, goes through afflictions patiently, becomes the decoration of the wreath of fortune's crown." It was mainly due to the enterprising courage of Shihābu'd-Dīn Khān that the Imperial forces under the command of Hasan 'Alī Khān were saved from complete disaster. The general was reinforced and freshly provisioned, and after a few weeks he was in a position to inflict a severe defeat on the Māhārānā of Udaipūr (22 January 1680), annihilating his power and compelling him to flee to the Aravalli hills.

Soon afterwards Shihābu'd-Dīn Khān was directed to proceed towards Sirohī, to check the movements of Durgadās who contemplated attacking Ajmer to contest the Imperial throne in favour of prince Muhammad Akbar. Shihābu'd-Dīn Khān succeeded in sowing seeds of disaffection in the army of the prince. The first thing he did was to send secret intelligence to his brother, Mujāhid Khān, about his movements. Mujāhid Khān although exalted to a high position by the Prince, waited for an opportunity to escape and join the Imperial forces. He went to Prince Muhammad Akbar and succeeded in persuading the Prince to give him leave to go and bring over his brother, Shihābu'd-Dīn Khān, to his side. With permission from the Prince, he took as much money and valuables as he could carry with him and joined his brother with the intention of never returning. His desertion was followed by that of many others of all ranks, very few remaining with the Prince.¹

When Prince Akbar's army approached Ajmer and made preparations for general action next day, most of his men had already gone over to Shihābu'd-Dīn Khān's side during the night; only a few men under the command of Zīāu'd-Dīn Muhammad Shujā'ī and the Rāthor soldiery remained with him.² The Prince feeling dispirited resolved to take to flight and seek an asylum with Sambhājī. The latter received him with great courtesy, gave him a house to live near the fort of Rāhīrī and fixed an allowance for his maintenance.³

Shihābu’d-Dīn Khān achieved his purpose without any shedding of blood, and repaired to Ajmer. The Emperor was highly pleased and gave him a great welcome. He was anxiously waiting for fresh reinforcements in view of the preparations made by Prince Muhammad Akbar and his Rājpūt coadjutors, and had entrenchments dug around the camp and batteries set up on the hills around. The victorious return of Shihābu’d-Dīn Khān was a matter of great satisfaction to the Emperor, who invested him with a robe of honour for his feat of covering the distance of 120 miles (60 Kuroh) from Sirohī to Ajmer in such a short time, and for his winning over the Prince’s soldiery to his side; and appointed him to the post of ‘Dārogha-i-‘Arz-i-Mukarrar’ which was reserved only for the nobles in whom the Emperor reposed the highest confidence. The occupant of this post was charged with the duty of revising royal orders and placing them for the second time for Imperial sanction. Two hundred men of his party also received honours. Mirak Khān, who had left all his belongings in the camp of the Prince was given a robe of honour, two thousand rupees in cash and the rank of 200 zāt, 50 horse.

Aurangzīb concluded a treaty with the Mahārānā of Udai-pūr in June 1681, through the intermediary of Shiām Singh of Bikāner, to enable him to march towards the Deccan to break the dangerous alliance between Prince Muhammad Akbar and Sambhājī, who intended to set up the former as a rival claimant to his father and also to rally the Rājpūts under his banner. The Emperor, from the very beginning of his operations in Rājpūtāna had tried to win over Mahārānā Raj Singh of Mewār. He sent him a message telling him that the measures he had been compelled to adopt against the Rāthors, were directed by sheer political necessity, no other alternative being left open to him. He had reassured him as to the future of his kingdom and asked him to help the Imperial forces to crush the spirit of revolt in Rājpūtāna. But Durgadās succeeded in gaining the ear of the Mahārānā, who was convinced that after the occupation of the Mārwār territory, the autonomy of Udai-pūr would be threatened, and his territory would be exposed to invasion through the Aravalli passes. After the flight of Muhammad Akbar, the
Mahārānā realised that his best interest lay in coming to terms with the Emperor, whom he could no longer resist. The Emperor also welcomed the opportunity, as he wanted to leave in person for the Deccan to direct the operations there. The Mahārānā promised to refrain from offering any support, moral or material, to the rebellious Rāthors, and sent his Wakils with tribute and a declaration of allegiance to the Imperial authority. The Emperor agreed to withdraw his forces from the territory of Mewār and to give the Mahārānā the rank of five thousand. In return the Mahārānā ceded the subdivisions of Mandal and Bednor to the Emperor.¹

After this the Emperor started from Ajmer for the Deccan and reached Burhānpūr on 13th November 1681; from thence he left for Aurangābād, where he arrived on 22nd March. He organized roving parties of his troops, in order to give battle to the Marathas in different parts of the Deccan. Prince Mu‘azzam, now elevated to the high title of Shāh ‘Ālam, was sent to conquer the Konkan territory, and Prince A‘zam was directed to proceed towards Khāndesh and Baglāna. Shihāb-u’d-Dīn Khān, though quite a young man, was also given the command of a party of troops to proceed in the direction of Junnar and to subdue the Maratha chiefs of that region. During his absence on this expedition, the Emperor was pleased to confer on him the post of the Superintendent of Macebearers, in place of Mukarram Khān. Sayyid Ughlān Khān was made his deputy.² After his successful operations, the Emperor directed him to reduce the fort of Rāmṣej which was situated on the summit of a hill. Here Shihābu’d-Dīn Khān met a severe resistance from the besieged. All his attempts failed to produce any impression on them. The besieged resisted with great perseverance and skill. The Qil‘edār of the fortress was a man of considerable experience. Having no iron cannon, he had wooden ones made. He used leather for missiles and drove back the assailants with showers of stones and burning grass. In the words of Khāfī Khān, “each wooden cannon equalled ten iron ones”.³ After these repulses Shihābu’d-Dīn Khān was recalled and Khān Jehān Bahādur Kokaltāsh was sent to lay siege to the fortress. He,

too, after many attempts to reduce it, failed to achieve any substantial result.

In 1683, Shihâbu’î-Dîn Khân was despatched with a force towards Poona and Sûpâ in order to establish military posts there. Before his departure, the Emperor presented him with a quiver, a bow, ten thousand rupees in cash and two maunds of gold to defray the expenses of the expedition.1 It seems that he came back to the Imperial headquarters and was again, after a few months' stay at the Court, directed to march for the relief of Prince Shâh ‘Âlam in the territory of Konkan. The Emperor recognized his services by sending him a robe of honour, five bridles and food from the royal household, as a token of his favour. He also received the title of Ghâzîu’î-Dîn Khân on this occasion.2

Ghâzîu’î-Dîn Khân (Shihâbu’î-Dîn Khân) encountered a large Maratha force under the command of Sambhâji at Pachad in the neighbourhood of the fortress of Râigarh and inflicted a severe defeat on the enemy who were compelled to seek shelter inside the fortress. In this expedition several Maratha leaders were killed and many were captured, including Biddâji, Akoji Malhar and Râo Subhâanchand, whom he sent to the Court and, as they whole-heartedly identified themselves with the cause of the Emperor, they were given robes and other suitable presents.3 Ghâzîu’î-Dîn Khân collected a vast booty on this occasion. When the news of this victory was sent to the Emperor, he felt extremely delighted. The Emperor conferred the title of Firûz Jang on Shihâbu’î-Dîn Khân and also bestowed the right of playing kettle-drums. One hundred and fifty robes of honour were sent for his companions.4

Anxiously realising that the struggle with the Marathas was going to be a protracted one, Aurangzib undertook the conquest of Bijâpûr. Accordingly he transferred his headquarters to Ahmednagar in November 1683. The excuse for war with Bijâpûr was not far to seek. The Emperor had invited Sikander ‘Âdil Shâh, King of Bijâpûr, to join him in the operations against the Marathas, to supply provisions to his troops from his territory and to allow passage to his armies through his realm

1 Ma’dîhir-i-’Alamîrî, p. 242.  
3 Ma’dîhir-i-’Alamîrî, p. 249.  
4 Ibid., p. 252.
without any restrictions whatsoever. This haughty demand of Aurangzib exasperated Sikander who sent a spirited reply, asking the former to remove the outposts that his generals had established in Bijapur territory without any previous permission. He also demanded from the Emperor to return him the tribute that had been unlawfully exacted from his predecessors, by the Mughal Government. Intelligence was also brought to Aurangzib that Sikander was secretly helping the Marathas. So, he decided to annex his kingdom in order to strengthen the Imperial resources for the impending struggle for supremacy in the Deccan.

Prince A'zam was sent to lay siege to Bijapur in March 1685, and a large army was despatched under his command. Sikander entrusted the defence of his kingdom to Sayyid Makhduum, surnamed Sharzâ Khan, who was a military expert and a man of considerable resource. He also invited his vassal Pem Nâyak, chief of the Berad clan, to harass the Mughal armies. The Mughals routed the Bijapuris under the command of Sharzâ Khan on the bank of the Tungabhadra and inflicted heavy losses. But the Mughal armies under A'zam were constantly kept harassed by the Bijapur contingent. Advancing slowly, they laid siege to Bijapur and established outposts to keep up their communications with the Emperor at Sholapur. These communications were cut off by the armies of Pem Nâyak and Siddî Mas'ûd, who, in response to Sikander's appeal, came to offer help against the Mughal advance which they considered to be dangerous for their own existence as well. Abu'l Hasan of Golconda also sent a contingent under Ambâji Pandit, in spite of the warning sent to him by Aurangzib on this occasion. These forces occupied the country in the neighbourhood of Bijapur and prevented all provisions from reaching the besieging army of Prince A'zam. The Emperor was anxious on account of the famine prevailing in A'zam's camp. Grain became very dear and the hungry soldiers felt too dispirited to continue the siege for long. On hearing this the Emperor advised his son to raise the siege. The Prince considered retreat to be beneath his dignity; he held a council of his experienced officers, seeking their advice what to do. He also showed them the letter he had received from the Emperor. He especially asked the opinion of Hasan
'Ali Khān 'Ālamgīrshāhī who was a veteran and had great experience of warfare. The latter is reported to have said: "In the interest of our men, it is advisable to retire." Others also seconded this view. Then the Prince addressed them thus: "You have had your say, now hear mine. I, with my wife and two sons here, am not going to leave this place so long as breath is left in us.... You are free to do as you like." On hearing this they all agreed to continue the siege and put up with any hardship or calamity that might befall them.\(^1\)

When news was brought to Aurangzīb at Sholāpūr, that Prince A'zam was determined to continue the siege, whatever might happen, he summoned Ghāzīu'd-Dīn Khān Fīrūz Jang, considering him to be the most suitable person to undertake a hazardous task, and directed him to march to A'zam's relief. His brother Mujāhid Khān and others agreed to accompany him. Before Fīrūz Jang started on the expedition, the Emperor presented him with a robe of honour, a Fish Standard (Māhī Marātib), four flags and an elephant. He was also given the rare privilege of touching the feet and hands of the Emperor.\(^2\)

They set out with twenty thousand bullock-loads of grain in the direction of Bījāpūr, "riding on horses of wind and lightning, to bring as quickly as possible succour to the Prince". At Indī they fought a severe action with the forces of Sharzā Khān and 'Abdur 'Ra'ūf, which barred their way to Bījāpūr. The escort under Fīrūz Jang numbered less than one-tenth of the enemy forces but the latter were repulsed and compelled to disperse in different directions. Meanwhile, Pem Nāyak, the Zemindār of Wakinkhera, joined the Bījāpūrīs with six thousand soldiers, swelling their number to about fourteen thousand. Fīrūz Jang, undaunted by the superior numbers, gave them battle, resulting in his final victory and the rout of the enemy. Fīrūz Jang re-established the military outpost of Indī, which was situated on a strategically important site between Sholāpūr and Bījāpūr, and appointed I'tiqād Khān as the Thānedār.\(^3\)

With the arrival of Fīrūz Jang, the whole situation at Bījāpūr underwent a change. The disheartened soldiery revived under the stimulating presence of their hero. When Prince A'zam ap-

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\(^2\) Ibid., p. 265.  
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 266.
proached Firūz Jang, he embraced him. The daring enterprise of Firūz Jang had turned scarcity into plenty. On hearing this, the Emperor felt highly delighted and is reported to have said: "As God Almighty has saved the honour of the house of Timūr through the exertions of Firūz Jang, so may He guard the honour of his descendants till the day of Resurrection."1

After the siege of Bijāpūr had dragged on for fifteen months, the Emperor decided to proceed there in person and conduct the operations under his own leadership. The presence of the Emperor encouraged the besiegers and they set heartily to work at digging trenches and filling up the moat. Ghāzīu’d-Dīn Khān Firūz Jang had drawn up a plan of action to reduce the fortress which was brought to the Emperor’s notice and approved. The Emperor sent him an emerald ring through Sīādat Khān.2

The presence of the Emperor disheartened the besieged who were extremely hard-pressed on account of lack of provisions. Their men and horses had perished in great distress. Meanwhile, the exertions of Firūz Jang and other veterans had brought the besieged to bay and had compelled them to surrender the fortress. On 10th September 1686, ‘Abdur Ra’ūf and Sharzā Khān waited on Firūz Jang and settled the terms of a pact on behalf of Sikander. Next day they were introduced to the Emperor who received them with great consideration and honour.

When Sheikh Hidāyat Kaish, Reporter-general of news (Waqā‘i’savīs-i-kul), showed the Emperor the account of the siege, in order to preserve it in the Imperial records office, the latter with his own pen added this sentence: "Through the efforts of the noble and dear son, (farzand arjumand) Ghāzīu’d-Dīn Khān Firūz Jang, the siege was brought to a successful termination."3 Thus to his other titles Firūz Jang received the rare distinction of being addressed as the "dear son", by the Emperor. The same words were mentioned by the Emperor in his dispatch sent to Amīr Khān, Sūbedār of Kābul.

Aurangzīb had not forgiven Abu’l-Hasan for actively help-

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2 Ibid., p. 322.  
3 Ma‘thir-i-Ālamgīrī, p. 269.
ing the Bijāpūrīs by sending a contingent under the command of Ambājī Pandit. Moreover, the enormous wealth and resources of the Golconda kingdom could not have escaped the notice of the Emperor. During the siege of Bijāpūr, the Mughal police had intercepted a letter of Abu’l-Hasan addressed to his agents in Aurangzib’s camp, telling them that he intended to despatch a force of forty thousand men under Khalīfullāh Khān to reinforce the Bijāpūrīs. The plan was that his force would proceed from the left flank and Sambhāji’s army would come from the right, and give battle to the Imperial armies.¹ On hearing this, Aurangzib sent a large army under the command of Shāh ‘Ālam to effect the conquest of Haiderābād. When the Imperial forces reached Malkhed, Prince Shāh ‘Ālam tried his best to settle terms with Khalīfullāh Khān and to avoid war, but failed. The Prince stayed at Malkhed for two months, waiting for the cessation of the rains. The Emperor, feeling dissatisfied with the progress of Shāh ‘Ālam’s force, wrote him a strong letter of rebuke. On receiving this letter, the Prince advanced in the direction of Haiderābād. The Imperial forces defeated Sheikh Minhāj and Rustam Rāo who offered resistance. After this the Prince continued his march to Haiderābād unopposed. When intelligence of his army’s defeat was brought to Abu’l-Hasan, he was greatly alarmed and fled by night with a few servants to the Golconda fort. Great disorder prevailed in Haiderābād. The Imperial army attacked the city and occupied it. Shāh ‘Ālam appointed officers to prevent plunder and punish miscreants. After a few days’ negotiations, Abu’l-Hasan agreed to pay one crore and twenty lakhs of huns annually, and to dismiss Madanna and Akanna from his service.² The Imperial armies then evacuated the territory of Abu’l-Hasan.

After the capture of Bijāpūr, Aurangzib again directed his attention towards Golconda. On the pretext of paying his respect to the tomb of Gisūdarāz at Gulbarga, he advanced into the territory of the Golconda kingdom, and despatched Firūz Jang to effect the conquest of Udgīr or Ibrāhīmgarh, which was situated on the way to Haiderābād.³ In recognition

¹ Ma‘dāhir-i-‘Alamgīrī, p. 260. ² Khāfi Khān, vol. II, p. 208 ³ This fortress was later known as Firūzgarh (Ma‘dāhir-i-Umarā, vol. II, p. 875).
of his service, Firūz Jang was awarded a robe of honour and an elephant. The men, who were in his escort were all given robes of honour, horses, elephants and titles.¹ Firūz Jang joined the Emperor not very far from Golconda. The latter made him Commander-in-Chief and sent him in advance to take possession of the fortress of Golconda. Firūz Jang, in spite of the resistance offered by the Qutab Shāhī armies, managed to reach the foot of the fortress and wanted to take it by a sudden assault. Qilīkh Khān, under the command of his own son, led the storming party and was struck by a cannon-ball. He expired after three days. Firūz Jang laid a regular siege which turned out to be a long, arduous affair. The besieged, under the direction of Sheikh Nizām and ‘Abdur Razzāq, showed great skill and perseverance. Firūz Jang directed Saf Shikan Khān to carry the trenches towards the moat and erect mounds with high batteries to bombard the fortress. The Emperor’s presence also inspired the soldiery to action. When everything was ready for bombarding the besieged, Saf Shikan Khān feeling jealous of Firūz Jang, who had gained a greater distinction in the eyes of the Emperor by his efficient siege operations, resigned from the post of Chief of the Artillery (Mīr-i-Āūsh). Salābat Khān and, after him, ‘Izzat Khān were appointed to the post. The occasional but daring raids of the besieged succeeded in demolishing the batteries. Meanwhile the heavy rains had destroyed the mound which was made after painful and patient efforts of Firūz Jang and his men. In the words of Khāfī Khān, “they had completed the work of one year in one month and a few days”.²

The mutual jealousy of the Mughal officers was responsible for delay in the reduction of the fortress, which irritated the Emperor. He better consulted the interest of his cause in giving the general command of his forces to Prince Muḥammad A‘zam in order to remove the reason for jealousy among the nobles. Moreover, Firūz Jang had received two arrow wounds, while he was leading the assault in presence of the Emperor himself, who riding a horse accompanied the party right up to gun-shot distance from the walls and bastions of the fortress.³

On 16th May 1687, Firūz Jang resolved to take the fort by an escalade during the night. A ladder was fixed against the bastion and a few of the veterans ascended the ramparts. As chance would have it, a “pariah” dog that was loitering about nearby saw them and started barking loudly. This roused the garrison from sleep. Immediately the assailants were put to sword and others who were mounting up were killed by explosive shells.

When Hāji Mehrāb, a favourite servant of Aurangzīb, came to know of Firūz Jang’s escalade, he went to the Emperor early in the morning, without exactly finding out the upshot of the affair, to report the success of Firūz Jang’s daring enterprise. The Emperor was still sitting on his prayer-carpet, reciting his prayers. Anxiously he asked what brought him so early in the morning. The Emperor on hearing the happy news ordered the drums of victory to be beaten, but he as well as others were sorely disappointed when the truth was known.¹

Mirzā Muhammad Ni‘amat Khān, whose poetical sobriquet was ‘Āli, found this event a fit subject for his cynical writings, both in prose and poetry.²

In September 1687, Rūhullāh Khān managed to open secret negotiations with ‘Abdullāh Khān, a confidential officer of Abu’l-Hasan who was in charge of one of the gates of the fortress. According to their understanding, ‘Abdullāh Khān left the gate open in the last watch of the night of the 21st September 1687, and the Mughal forces entered the fortress. The drums of victory were beaten and the fortress was captured. Abu’l-Hasan was taken captive and sent to Daulatābād to be kept in internment. He was put in charge of Jān Sipār Khān who escorted him to Daulatābād. The captors seized the spoils which amounted to 8,51,000 hun, 2,00,50,000 rupees, besides jewellery, gold and silver plate of great value.³

After the reduction of the fortress, Firūz Jang was raised to the rank of 7,000 zāt, 7,000 horse. He was also awarded a robe of honour, a special suit of armour, and a jewelled staff.⁴

Now, the Emperor directed that roving parties should be sent out to annex the territories of the kingdoms of Golconda

and Bijāpūr. In January 1688, Fīrūz Jang was despatched with twenty-five thousand horse to reduce the fortress of Adonī, situated on the south of the Tungabhadra, which was occupied by Siddī Masʿūd, an Abyssinian general of Sikander ʿĀdil Shāh, who during the operation of the siege of Bijāpūr had managed to carry off with him much jewellery and treasure to the fortress of Adonī.¹

On reaching the neighbourhood of Adonī, Fīrūz Jang sent a message to Siddī Masʿūd, asking him to capitulate without bloodshed. But, as he refused to yield without a trial of strength, Fīrūz Jang started sinking mines, digging trenches and bombarding the fortress. After some time, Siddī Masʿūd, feeling that he would not be able to resist longer and that his fall was near, capitulated. He came out of the fortress, reiterating his pleas for forgiveness. The fort was occupied by the Imperial garrisons and renamed Imtiāzgarh. The Emperor was highly pleased to hear the news of the capture of Adonī. He ordered the royal band to play the notes of victory. Siddī Masʿūd was treated with consideration by Fīrūz Jang, and his sons were brought to Aurangzīb. The Emperor did not want to humiliate Siddī Masʿūd by ordering him to be brought to his presence. In his absence the Emperor granted him the rank of 7,000 zāt, 7,000 horse and further honoured him by granting him the faujdāri and fief of Murādābād. But the responsibilities of this office were to be discharged by a deputy, because the Emperor had ordained that so long as Siddī Masʿūd was alive he was to remain in the service of Fīrūz Jang.² His sons, when they reached the royal presence with the golden keys of the fortress of Adonī, were duly honoured with favours and presents.³

When the Emperor reached Bijāpūr, Fīrūz Jang joined him there after settling the administration of Adonī and its neighbourhood. Intelligence was received that Sambhāji and his lieutenants were creating a great disturbance in the direction of Bahādurgarh and Gulshanābād, the Emperor directed Fīrūz Jang and Sheikh Nizām to proceed with a suitable force to re-establish Mughal supremacy in those districts. While the

³ According to Khāfi Khān, Siddī Masʿūd requested the Emperor through Fīrūz Jang, to be excused from going to his presence and to be allowed to send his sons instead (vol. II, p. 272).
Mughal forces were busy in Golconda, Sambhājī and his famous general Santājī raided the Mughal territory.

When preparations were being made to start a vigorous offensive against the Marathas, the plague epidemic broke out in November 1688, in the royal camp at Bijāpūr. It was so virulent that very few who were infected with it could manage to survive. The queen-consort, Aurangabādī Mahal, Mahārāja Jaswant Singh’s son, who was about ten years old and who was brought up with the Imperial family, and Fāzil Khān, sadr, besides many other nobles and officers had died. Nearly a hundred thousand souls perished in this terrible pestilence. The Emperor had to move his camp from Bijāpūr to Akluj in the Sholāpūr district. Fīrūz Jang also caught the infection at Bijāpūr before his departure for Bahādurgarh and lost his eyesight. On account of his disability he could not undertake the expedition against the Marathas, and the credit of capturing Sambhājī went to Sheikh Nizām who was honoured with the title of Khān-i-Zamān Bahādur, Fateh Jang, a gift of fifty thousand rupees in cash, a special robe of honour, a horse with jewelled trappings, an elephant with gold-mounted trappings, a jewelled poniard and his rank was raised to seven thousand. His eldest son Ikhlās Khān was raised to the rank of 5,000 zāt, 5,000 horse with the title of Khān-i-‘Ālam, and his younger sons, Sheikh Mīrān and Sheikh ‘Abdullāh were given the titles of Munawwar Khān and Ikhtisās Khān respectively.

The Emperor was now determined to reduce all the strongholds of the Marathas. He started his offensive in right earnest. I’tiqād Khān, later known as Zulfiqār Khān Nusrat Jang, invaded the Konkan and reduced the famous fort of Rāigarh in October 1689. On this occasion he received a gift of three thousand rupees cash, a special robe of honour, a jewelled quiver and a bow and his rank was raised to 3,000 zāt, 2,000 horse.

These repulses prompted Rājarām, brother of Sambhājī, to reorganize the military forces of the Marathas and to drive out the Mughals from their territory. The post of Senāpatī or Commander-in-Chief was given to Santājī Ghorpāde who enrolled fresh soldiery to the number of a hundred thousand.

Twenty thousand were kept actively engaged with the Imperial forces in Western Deccan; ten thousand were in the escort of Rājarām; the remainder were divided in three flying columns of twenty thousand each, commanded by Santājī Ghorpāde, Parsojī Bhonsle and Sindōjrāo Nimbalkar respectively. The activity of these columns had begun to cause a great deal of harassment to the Imperial armies. Santājī had seized several fortresses from the Mughals in the neighbourhood of Belgaum, while other Maratha columns were also making themselves felt to the Imperialists. Of these Maratha generals, Santājī had become a terror to the peaceful populace as well as to the Mughal armies. After harassing the Imperial forces under the command of Zulfiqār Khān in the Carnatic, he started his surprise attacks in the Western Deccan. Qāsim Khān was directed to march against him but he was defeated by Santājī and compelled to surrender the fortress of Dodderī. Himmat Khān who was sent by the Emperor to reinforce Qāsim Khān was met by Santājī’s forces on the way and was slain in action.

Santājī had reached the height of his power when he quarrelled with Dhanā Jādav who felt wronged on the promotion of the former to the post of Commander-in-Chief. Dhanā Jādav resolved to decide the issue between himself and his rival at the point of the sword and started raising fresh troops. On his part Santājī could not allow his rival to raise fresh soldiery and thus become a danger to his existence. He followed him into the Maratha land. In March 1697, their armies met in the neighbourhood of Bijāpūr. The Emperor had also given orders to pursue Santājī, whose ravages had wrought havoc in this part of the country. Fīrūz Jang got intelligence that Santājī, at the head of twenty-five thousand horse, was only eighteen miles from Bijāpūr. He thought it advisable to avoid a direct clash with him and proceeded in the direction of Bijāpūr in order to enlist reinforcements. Meanwhile, he was informed by his agents that Dhanā Jādav and Hanumant Rāo had formed a strong combination against Santājī and that they were soon going to be engaged in a battle. He marched in that direction and was informed that Santājī had suffered a severe defeat and had taken to flight.

1 Khāfi Khān, vol. II, p. 446.
The latter's army was corrupted and most of his men joined the opponent's camp. The few who remained loyal to him were dispersed in various directions. He was captured and slain by Nāgoji Māne who had been in the Imperial service for some time but subsequently joined his own people. The latter had a grievance against Santāji who had his brother trampled to death for some offence. Santāji, being a man of overbearing temperament, ready to take the most extreme measure for some small neglect or offence, was unpopular among the Maratha soldiery.

According to Khāfi Khān, Santāji, worn out and tired, was bathing in a stream when he was captured and killed by Nāgoji Māne, who cut off his head and, putting it in a bag, fastened it behind his saddle. On his way back to Dhanā Jādav, the bag got unfastened and fell down without his noticing it. As chance would have it, Firūz Jang's scouts, who were in pursuit of Santāji, passed that way. They picked up the bag and recognized the head of Santāji; they immediately carried it back to Firūz Jang. The head was sent to the Emperor who gave the messenger, Khwāja Bābā-i-Tūrānī, the title of "Kush Khabar Khān" (Lord Good News).1

Now the Emperor, along with his campaigns against the Marathas in the Deccan and the Carnātic, undertook to consolidate the territories that had fallen to him after the dismemberment of the 'Adil Shāhī and the Qutb Shāhī kingdoms. He sent Firūz Jang to Berār to organize the administration there. The latter stayed there for nearly two years. Then he was summoned to court in 1700, when his advice was sought in connection with the revival of the Maratha military activity. Firūz Jang was directed to relieve Jumdat-ul-Mulk Asad Khān, in command of the camp of Islāmpūrī, which was considered to be one of the most important military stations on account of its strategic position.2 The Emperor showed consideration for the disability of Firūz Jang (his blindness) and desired him to stay in one place instead of

1 Ibid., p. 448.
2 The original name of this place was Brahampurī. Aurangzīb gave it the name of Islāmpūrī and made it the base-camp for his armies which were busy checking the Maratha counter-offensive between Brijāpur in the south and the Manjira river in the north. Islāmpūrī served as a point, joining a series of points, from whence the military operations of the Mughals originated.
moving about in different directions like other Imperial generals.

A year after this, the Emperor, on his way back from Bahādurgarh, happened to pass by Islāmpurī. According to his usual practice, he went to inspect Fīrūz Jang’s camp and was surprised to see his retainers in proper trim. The camp was splendidly kept. The soldiery were undergoing the best discipline. He had a huge force of artillery at hand, the like of which no other Imperial general possessed. Fīrūz Jang offered presents to the Emperor who accepted only one small poniard (nimcha) and gave it the name of Ghāzībacha (son of the Ghāzī). The Emperor also took some of the ordnance along with him and issued orders that the nobles and generals should not be allowed to keep more than a fixed quota of artillery. A despatch was immediately sent to Prince Bīdār Bakht saying:

Fīrūz Jang who is only a “haft-hazāri” (master of seven thousand) spends his own money on all manner of armaments, including cannon, matchlocks, and small cannon, and possesses a large quantity of all necessary equipments. For this he does not get anything extra from the Imperial treasury except what is fixed for him. You, who get so much more than he does, squander money needlessly. You spend on things for which you should not.¹

For nearly two years Fīrūz Jang did not move out from Islāmpurī. Then he was asked to join the Imperial camp. It was through his recommendation that the Emperor appointed Rustam Khān, in whom he had complete confidence, as the deputy governor of Berār.² The Emperor again sent Fīrūz Jang to take charge of the governorship of Berār and to check the advance of Nemājī Sindhiā who had defeated and captured Rustam Khān. This general led the Maratha counter-offensive in Berār and Mālwa. He, besides other Maratha chiefs, had enlisted a huge army in order to ravage Mughal territories. He had established himself in Central India during the

¹ Saif Khān was directed not to advance any further sums of money to Bīdār Bakht without the Imperial sanction. See Parāmīn-i-Ālamgīrī, Asafī Lib. Persian MS., No. 1275 (Tārīkh); Ma‘āthīr-i-Ālamgīrī, p. 469.
² Ma‘āthīr-i-Ālamgīrī, p. 493.
regency of Tārābāi, who had taken the reins of power in her hands in the name of her son. The Imperial armies were getting dispirited on account of the repeated reverses they met at the hands of Nemāji Sindhiā and Dhanā Jādav, who had thrown all their energies into the task of marshalling the forces of their people to overthrow the Mughal domination.

Nemāji Sindhiā, after inflicting a crushing defeat on Rustam Khān crossed the Narbada river and carried his raids as far as Mālwa. He negotiated terms with Chatrasāl of Bundelkhand, to join forces against the Mughals. Firūz Jang pursued Nemāji Sindhiā who came out to offer battle in the neighbourhood of Sironj where the latter was defeated. It is said that Firūz Jang forced his way to the elephant on which Nemāji Sindhiā was riding, but the latter leaped down and took to flight. The Imperial armies took back all the baggage and effects which Nemāji Sindhiā had seized from Rustam Khān in Berār. Nemāji Sindhiā was compelled to take refuge in the forests of Bundelkhand with Chatrasāl. As a recognition of these services in the Imperial cause, Firūz Jang was honoured with the title of Sipāh-i-Sālār (Commander-in-Chief), and a reward of one crore dām in cash.1

Firūz Jang, during his campaign against Nemāji Sindhiā in Mālwa, did not get much help from the local Mughal authorities who, terrified by the presence of vast Maratha forces in their territory, hid themselves in their fortresses instead of taking the field against them. When the Emperor was apprised of this state of affairs, he took strict measures by dismissing Nawāzish Khān from the faujdārī of Mandū and transferring him to Khāndesh. Thinking minor official changes to be ineffective, the Emperor appointed Prince Bīdār Bakht as the Governor of the province of Mālwa in place of Abū Nasr Khān, son of Shāista Khān who was transferred to Bengal, then a comparatively peaceful province.2

Firūz Jang, continuing his pursuit of Nemāji, set out

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2. Maʿṣūhir-i-Umarā, vol. I, p. 293. The Emperor wrote the following strong-worded letter to Abū Nasr Khān:

In spite of the operations of Firūz Jang, rightly so named, in pursuit of the Marathas, why were you sitting down in your fortress gazing at the show? If
from Bhāmgār on 10th February 1704, to proceed against Chaturașāl, via Chanderī, and Dhamuni towards Garha. ¹ His general, Khanjar Khān, who was leading the vanguard, succeeded in dispersing the columns of the enemy by his surprise attacks. After this Fīrūz Jang returned to Burhānpūr and from thence to Berār, as his presence was urgently required there.

Nemāji Sindhiā had captured Mughal outposts on the Narbada. For several months, the highways between North India and the Deccan were held up by the Marathas. In the beginning of March 1704, some 355 bags of official correspondence and 55 baskets of fruits sent for the Emperor by the Sūbedārs of Kābul and Kāshmir, were lying on the bank of the Narbada, as the faujdārs on the way could not supply adequate escort to take them to their destination.²

At the time of Aurangzib's death which occurred on the 20th February 1707, Fīrūz Jang was at Ellichpūr as the governor of the Berār province. Almost all the chief nobles of the Deccan made their submission to Prince A'zam. Some espoused his cause because they really liked him, while others from inability to oppose, prudently joined him and submitted to his authority. Chin Qilich Khān (Nizāmu'l-Mulk) and his uncle Muhammad Amin Khān also joined A'zam in his march to Aurangābād. A'zam bestowed the title of Khān-i-Daurān on Chin Qilich Khān, in order to win him over and through him the Tūrānī soldiery. But they soon felt disgusted at the

you wish to remain in my service, then, now that Fīrūz Jang, after defeating Nemā near Sironj, is chasing him and the latter is fleeing towards Bundelkhand and Garha (Mandla), you should issue forth, take the militia, assemble the faujdārs and the captains posted there, and attack, expel, and bind the scattered bands of the enemy, roving without leaders and the rebel Afghans,—who seeing the field empty are molesting the peasantry. Send Nawāzish Khān to Burhānpūr. Take Mandū as your own Jāgīr and entrust Dhār to the new qilīādār.

Nawāzish Khān was addressed thus:

At the request of Nusrat Jang (the Imperial Paymaster) you have been retained in service, but you have not been your own self. What do you mean by vacating Mandū and hiding yourself in Dhār? Come to Burhānpūr and serve under Bidār Bakht. I shall give you jāgīrs in the Deccan or if you prefer an annual stipend of 20,000 (Kalāmāt-i-Tayyībāt, Asafia No. 112. Insha; Sarkar, op. cit., vol. V, pp. 386-87).

¹ Sarkar, vol. V, p. 386. ² Ibid.
haughty and slighting behaviour of the Prince towards his chiefs and nobles. A’zam constantly treated the old veterans with contempt. He removed Tarbiyat Khān from the command of the artillery in a most humiliating manner and conferred that post on a young man of low rank and no experience. The Prince was filled with such an overweening pride and arrogance that Chin Qilich Khān and Muhammad Amīn Khān felt sick of his behaviour and decided to leave him and remain neutral in the impending contest that was going to take place between the sons of Aurangzīb to secure the throne. Both of them, having left the Prince with their troops, took possession of some territory in the neighbourhood of Aurangābād.

A’zam knew that Firūz Jang also did not desire to take any active part in the internecine warfare that was going to ensue after the death of the Emperor. Although displeased with Firūz Jang, he thought it advisable to put him in charge of Burhānpūr, as his nominee, before starting on his march to North India, and thus prevent him from taking any other course which might prove suicidal for his interest in the Deccan on account of the presence of Prince Kām Bakhsh in that part of the country. It was safer to leave Firūz Jang behind as a friend than as a foe.

According to Ma’āthiru’l-Umara, when Zulfiqār Khān joined A’zam, in the neighbourhood of Aurangābād, the latter asked Zulfiqār Khān for advice, who is reported to have said:

It would be wiser and more prudent to leave your family at Daulatābād, as your father, the Emperor Aurangzib, did when he was marching against Dārā Shikūh, in similar circumstances. The soldiers are in great distress. You should pay them for two months in advance from the treasure you possess, in order to conciliate them before they enter into the struggle on your behalf. It is better to advance from the pass of Deval Ghāt instead of Fardāpūr, so that you may pass near the headquarters of Firūz Jang. This will afford him an opportunity to join you.

1 Irādat Khān, p. 12.  
2 Oj. cit., p. 572.
The Prince in his usual overbearing manner replied:

It would certainly have been advisable to leave the family behind at Daulatābād, if the enemy was like Dārā Shikūh. We know what Muʿazzam is? His men are only taught courtesies. They have no idea of warfare, while I expect great things from my men. As for Firūz Jang, I do not deem it advisable to leave the direct route for the sake of a blind man like him.¹

The battle of Jājau, fought in the neighbourhood of Āgra, decided the fate of the Imperial throne in favour of Muʿazzam. Aʿẓam and his son Bīdār Bakht were killed and Muʿazzam proclaimed himself Emperor with the title of Bahādur Shāh. He adopted a policy of general conciliation and forgiveness. All those who had joined Aʿẓam or Kām Bakhsh were treated in a most generous manner. When certain envious persons brought to the notice of the new Emperor that it was dangerous to repose confidence in the followers of Aʿẓam, he replied that if his own sons had been in the Deccan at that time, the exigencies of the situation would have left no other alternative for them but to join their uncle.²

The new Emperor invited the leading nobles of the realm to the Court. A similar invitation was sent to Firūz Jang, who was much in dread of Bahādur Shāh because, during the siege of Golconda, it was on his report that the Emperor disgraced the latter and put him into confinement on the charge of disloyal intentions. But the letters sent by Munʿim Khān, Prime minister of Bahādur Shāh, reassured him. In the words of Irādat Khān:

That experienced statesman, opening his eyes on the vicissitudes of life, saw that it was his interest if his Majesty would forget the past and not molest him in his fortune, to bow his head in submission.... He embraced the promises of the Minister and thankfully accepted the Sūbedārī of Ahmedābād (Gujerāt). He accordingly crossed the

Narbada and left the Deccan without trouble, but his fears prevented him from coming to the court.\(^1\)

Firūz Jang obtained exemption from the duty of waiting on the Emperor in person. He put up the excuse of his disability (being blind for nearly eighteen years), saying that even the Emperor Aurangzib out of regard for his past services had not required him to wait in person.

According to the orders of the Emperor, Firūz Jang undertook the administration of Gujerāt. ‘Abdul Hamīd Khān, Dīwān of the province, Mehr ‘Ali Khān Bakhshī and Muham-mad Beg Khān received the new Sūbedār with due ceremony. The first thing Firūz Jang did was to appoint new faujdārs and thānedārs in different parts of the province. He appointed Sayyid ‘Āqil Khān as the Mutasaddi (collector) of the estates of Prince Jehāndār Shāh. He was also given the Thānedāri of Pethapūr which used to be held by his brother Mir ‘Abdul Wahāb who was killed in war. Muhammad ‘Ali Khān, the father of the author of Mīr‘āt-i-Ahmedī, was confirmed in the post of Waga‘i nigār.\(^2\)

Intelligence was brought to Bahādur Shāh that Rāja Ajit Singh of Jodhpūr was in open rebellion for some time and refused to recognize the authority of the Emperor, and that he, after defeating Ja‘far Qulī, the deputy faujdār of Jodhpūr, had taken possession of Ajmer and other Imperial territory. The Emperor directed Firūz Jang to march against Rāja Ajit Singh and restore order in the disturbed area in Rājpūtāna. Firūz Jang, on receiving the Imperial orders, enlisted three thousand cavalry and five thousand infantry, besides the troops of his old establishment, on the monthly salary of Rs. 35 to the cavalry soldiers and Rs. 4 to infantry troops. This amounted to the monthly expense of 1 lakh 25 thousand rupees. In accordance with Imperial orders, ‘Abdul Hamīd Khān, and Shari‘at Khān, the Provincial Dīwāns, entrusted the sum of eleven lakhs of rupees to Firūz Jang, for payment to the local militia. The Emperor also directed the Dīwāns to provide Firūz Jang with fifty wheeled field-pieces, one hundred and fifty camel-guns, three thousand rockets, one thousand mounds of lead, one thousand mounds of powder and one

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\(^1\) Irādat Khān, p. 52.  \(^2\) Mīr‘āt-i-Ahmedī, vol. I, p. 383.
hundred maunds of squib from the Imperial artillery and to send two hundred diggers, one hundred axe-men and one hundred water-carriers along with the army.¹

On the eve of his departure for the Rājpūtāna expedition, Fīrūz Jang fell ill but recovered after a few days. He celebrated his recovery by treating sumptuously the nobility, the learned and the Sayyids of the place. The celebrations continued for three nights consecutively. There were illuminations on the banks of the Sābarmatī river, and fireworks were displayed.

After this Fīrūz Jang set out from Ahmedābād in the direction of Mārwār. His first halt was at the village of Achār on the Sābarmatī river, where he received presents and tribute from the landholders. His next halt was at Ider. Here Fīrūz Jang received the fifty spies sent by the Emperor at his request in order to keep him well-informed about the movements of Rāja Ajit Singh. The spies also demanded their pay in advance like the soldiery. The matter was represented to the Emperor by special messengers, and the latter directed the Bakshi of Ahmedābād to accede to their demand.

When Fīrūz Jang reached Danta he had a relapse of dropsy. Very soon he grew weak and was compelled to return to Ahmedābād for treatment. After a short illness he expired (1710). On hearing the news of his death, the Emperor sent a firmān to the Dīwān, directing him to escheat the property of the late Fīrūz Jang. The Emperor was informed that 'Iwaz Khān had started distributing large sums to the troops and did not allow the property of the deceased noble to be attached and that Jai Kishan, Dīwān of the Kārkhana had forged several State documents in order to appropriate certain sums in his charge.²

Bahādur Shāh directed Muhammad Beg Khān, the deputy of Fīrūz Jang and the faujdār of Patan and Amānat Khān (later known as Shahāmat Jang) the collector of the port of Sūrat, to attach all the property and effects of the deceased Sūbedār. The latter noted down the detailed description of each article so that everything could be checked at the capital. Jai Kishan, Almās, and Nikrūz were arrested, and responsible men took charge of the treasure and stores. His estate consisted of 1½ lakhs of rupees in bills on bankers, 133,000 gold mohurs, 25,000

huns (gold) and nim-paoli (gold), 17,000 paoli (gold), 400 adheli (half) and 8,000 whole silver paoli, 140 horses, 300 camels, 400 oxen and 38 elephants.¹

The escheat of deceased nobles’ property was in accordance with the time-honoured practice of the Mughal Government. Moreover, this measure was necessary, in this case, in view of the fact that Firūz Jang shortly before his death had taken big sums of money from the State. As the Rājpūtāna expedition was dropped, eleven lakhs of rupees, outstanding against him, were to be refunded to the State, which were given to him for the purpose of the expedition against Rāja Ajit Singh of Mārwār. This measure was meant to ensure the payment of the money drawn from the Government treasury. But certain foreign writers seem to have been misled by the appearance of this custom. The Government could not lay hold on all the possessions and effects of the defunct nobles and officials, as they seem to have conceived.² The firmān of the Emperor Aurangzib, dated 24th July 1666, addressed to the provincial Dīwāns, expressly lays down that only the property and effects of those deceased officials should be attached who owed anything to the Crown.³

Firūz Jang died at the age of sixty-two (lunar) years. His remains were carried to Delhi and buried in a tomb which he had built during his lifetime in the neighbourhood of the Ajmerī gate, not far from the resting place of Shāh Wajihu’d-Dīn.⁴

¹ Irvine’s *Later Mughals*, vol. I, p. 270.
² Manucci’s *Storia do Mogor*, vol. II, p. 417; Bernier’s *Travels*, pp. 163, 211 and 212.
³ The Firmān is worded thus:

_Whereas if a servant of the Emperor dies leaving no heir and owing nothing to the State, all his possessions should be deposited in charge of the storekeeper of the Bāit-ul-Māl. If the deceased owes anything to the Crown then only the amount due should be taken and the rest should be deposited in the Bāit-ul-Māl. If he leaves an heir who has a claim on his property, then in that case the effects of the deceased should be attached after waiting for three days. If the property exceeds the amount of the debt he owes to the State, then in that case only the amount due should be subtracted and the balance delivered to the lawful heir after the latter had legally established his right. If the claims of the State exceed the worth of the property, then everything should be attached. If the deceased owes nothing to the Crown after legal proof, the whole property should be rendered to the heir* (*Mʻtrāt-i-Aḥmed*, vol. I, pp. 266-67; Sarkar’s *Mughal Administration*, p. 168).

Fīrūz Jang was the leader of the Tūrānī Mughals. He was a very able and efficient general. Aurangźīb placed great reliance on his judgment. He had acquired a very powerful influence in the Deccan. This is why his presence there was represented to Bahādur Shāh as dangerous. All his life he remained faithful to the Crown. Envious persons tried to misrepresent him to the Emperor, but the latter always had the greatest confidence in him and remained fond of him, as is shown by his letters addressed to him.¹ His character is well described by Khāfī Khān in the following words: "He was a man born to victory, and a disciplinarian who always prevailed over his enemy. An aristocrat of such rank and power and yet so polite and good-natured has rarely been seen or heard of among the men of Tūrān."²

After the death of his first wife Safia Khānam, who bore him Qamru’d-Dīn (Nizāmu’l-Mulk Āsaf Jāh) he married two daughters of Hifzullāh Khān, son of S‘adullāh Khān, one after the other and left no issue by them.

CHAPTER II

Early Life and Career

Mīr Qamru’d-Dīn was born on 11th August 1671 (14th Rabi‘ 11, 1082 H.), the first year of his parents’ wedlock. The Emperor Aurangzīb gave the child the name of Mīr Qamru’d-Dīn. History is silent as to his birthplace. Most probably he was born at Āgra, the Imperial capital, where his father lived for some time after his arrival in India. We know on good authority that Ghāzīu’d-Dīn Khān Firūz Jang came to India in 1669 and was introduced at the Court by the friends of Qīlich Khān, his father, who was at that time the Sūbedār of Ajmer. The Emperor, it appears, took a fancy to the young man from Turkistān, and showed his favour by getting him married to Sa’dullāh Khān’s daughter. The chronogram of the first-fruit of this union was discovered in the words ‘nik bakhī’ (man of destiny).

At the tender age of six, Mīr Qamru’d-Dīn came to the Court with his father and was awarded a mansab. The Emperor, on seeing him, predicted his future greatness. Asad Khān Jumdatu’l-Mulk, Chief Minister of Aurangzīb, used to say to Firūz Jang: “The star of destiny shines on the forehead of your son.”

Mīr Qamru’d-Dīn, as a young man, used to accompany his father on his military expeditions. After the return of Firūz Jang from the expedition of Poona and Sūpa in 1683-84 (1095 H.) he received the rank of 400 zāt, 100 horse, when he was thirteen years old. Mīr Qamru’d-Dīn distinguished himself in that expedition. After this he joined his father when the latter was going to start his campaign against the Raigarh fortress. In recognition of his services Mīr Qamru’d-Dīn obtained a sword and a robe of honour. After his return to the Court he was honoured with an elephant and was charged to carry a sword and a robe of honour to his father. Next year, when Firūz Jang came to wait on the Emperor,

1 Hadīqatu’l-Ālam, vol. II, p. 49.
Mīr Qamru’d-Dīn was with him. The Emperor was pleased to further honour him with a poniard and a jewelled strap.¹

In 1688, Mīr Qamru’d-Dīn took an active part in the investment of the fortress of Adoni, against Siddī Mas‘ūd, under the command of his father. The Emperor raised him to the rank of 2,000 zāt, 500 horse, and awarded him a steed.²

In 1691, Mīr Qamru’d-Dīn received the title of Chin Qilich Khān and a she-elephant by way of present. The Emperor seems to have begun to show special consideration to him on account of his father’s disability. The leadership of the Tūrānī element in the Mughal army was now gradually passing from the father to the son.

In 1693 a vast Maratha army had surrounded the Mughal besiegers of the fortress of Panhala, who were in great distress. On receiving this intelligence, the Emperor ordered reinforcements under the command of Fīrūz Jang and Khānázād Khān. In the meantime, Dhanā Jādav had retreated towards Satāra. Fīrūz Jang sent Chin Qilich Khān and Rustam Khān to give him a chase. After a skirmish the Marathas were dispersed.

In 1697, Chin Qilich Khān had a quarrel with Fīrūz Jang, his father, and repaired to the court with his men. Although the Emperor was very fond of Chin Qilich Khān, he refused to receive him because he left his father without permission. The Emperor also wanted to show consideration to Fīrūz Jang by treating Chin Qilich Khān in this manner and to make this case serve as an example to others in matters of military discipline. On the recommendation of Asad Khān Jumdatu’l-Mulk, he was brought to the Imperial presence. The Emperor gave him a note for Fīrūz Jang and asked him to take it to his father. He addressed him thus: “Chin Qilich Khān says that if thou wilt not forgive us and be benevolent to us, we shall surely be the losers.”³

On receiving this note of the Emperor, Fīrūz Jang was reconciled with his son and forgave him. Next year the Emperor showed his confidence in Chin Qilich Khān by appointing him to undertake an expedition to punish the rebels of Nagorī near Bījāpūr.⁴ The Emperor was satisfied with his work and

on his return awarded him a poniard, and sent him to Kotha to restore order there.\textsuperscript{1} When he was returning from this expedition, the Emperor issued orders to Mukhlis Khān, pay-master-general, and welcome Chin Qilīch Khān at Islāmpurī and escort him to the Court. The Emperor raised him to the rank of 3,000 zāt, five hundred horse. In the year 1699, the Emperor promoted Chin Qilīch Khān to the rank of 3,500 zāt, 3,000 horse.\textsuperscript{2}

After the fall of Satāra, the fortress of Parālī was invested by the Imperial forces. This fortress, situated on a high hill, was considered to be impregnable. Fathullāh Khān was directed to proceed in advance and lay siege to it. Chin Qilīch Khān was ordered to surround the adjoining villages in order to keep out the armed bands of the Marathas, who were at large in the neighbourhood and wanted to close all the roads by which supplies could reach the besiegers and cut off the Mughal outposts. The fort was captured on 9th June 1700. In recognition of his services the Emperor was pleased to bestow on Chin Qilīch Khān the important post of faujdār of Bījāpūr Carnātic, and an increase of 400 horse was also granted to him. So that now he had the rank of 4,000 zāt, 3,600 horse.\textsuperscript{3}

It is probably on this occasion that Chin Qilīch Khān was awarded a ring by the Emperor, of which the latter speaks in one of his letters to Jumdatu'l-Mulk Asad Khān, his Prime Minister. The letter runs thus: "The ring with an emerald collet which last night I selected for Qilīch Khān is not engraved. Now I remember that his (full) title is Chin Qilīch Khān. You should write to the Dārogha of the jewelry department to call an engraver to get the ring engraved with all his titles and then to send it to the above-mentioned Khān."\textsuperscript{4}

In 1702, Chin Qilīch Khān was raised to the governorship of Bījāpūr and was awarded a head-ornament (sarpiśī) and a steed. A few months later the faujdārī of Tal-Konkan ('Adil-Khānī), A'zamnagar and Belgaum as well as the Thānedārī of Sānpgāon were placed under his charge. Now his rank was

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Ibid.}, p 405; according to \textit{Ma'dthir-i-Nizāmi} he was sent to Nagar Kotha.
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Op. cit.}, p. 441.
\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Rusūl-i-'Ālamgārī}, p. 32.
raised to 4,000 zāt, 4,000 horse and he was given a crore of dam by way of reward. Saif Khān, the former faujdār of Belgaum, was made his deputy. In 1704, as a result of the transfer of Rustam Dil Khān to Haiderābād, the faujdārī of Nusratābād and Mudgal was also placed under his charge.\(^1\)

After reducing almost all the important Maratha forts to submission, the Emperor moved his armies towards Wakin-khera, the famous Berad stronghold. The Berads, besides helping the Marathas against the Mughals, were a constant source of mischief in the Gulbarga district. They carried their destructive inroads into all the surrounding territory. Piryā Nāyak had succeeded Pem Nāyak as chief of the tribe. He had collected a large army, and his daring raids into the Imperial territory became too frequent to be ignored any longer. The Emperor resolved to lay siege to the fort in person. He reached it on the 8th February 1705. Chin Qilich Khān, the Sūbedār of Bijāpūr, in whose jurisdiction the territory of the Berads lay, joined the Emperor. The siege operations began under the command of Chin Qilich Khān and Tarbiyat Khān (the Commander of Artillery). They raised two high mounds and carried their approaches to the walls of the fortress. The siege continued for a considerable time without any substantial result for the besiegers. The besieged had ample provisions for a protracted resistance. The garrison kept up an incessant fire, driving back the attacks of the besiegers. Seeing that the siege was going to be a protracted one, the Emperor in person joined the besiegers. When Dhanā Jādav came to know this, he immediately dashed up to the fort in order to rescue his family who had taken shelter there. He pressed the Mughal army hard, and succeeded in cutting the lines of communication.

Chin Qilich Khān seems to have played a conspicuous part in this siege. He led the assault on Lāl Tikri, a hillock of considerable strategic importance in the neighbourhood of the fortress. But they had no material for digging trenches, nor had they enough men to be able to resist for any length of time the assaults of the enemy. They were soon outnumbered and compelled to retire. As Chin Qilich Khān had not con-

\(^1\) *Mā'āhib-i-'Ālamgīrī*, pp. 494, 496.
sulted other wings of the army, he failed to get any reinforcements in time.\textsuperscript{1}

One day Chin Qilich Khān and Muhammad Amin Khān with their men had gone out to select a suitable site for trenches, when they were overtaken by an intermittent fire from the walls of the fortress. Both the hind legs of the former's horse and one foreleg of the latter's were shattered by cannon-balls. Both fell off their horses, and with great difficulty managed to regain the trenches. On hearing this the Emperor sent two "Arab steeds, with gold trappings, one for each, and a pastille perfumed with ambergris through Amin Khān, one of the confidants of the Emperor".\textsuperscript{2}

Meanwhile, the Emperor had summoned Zulfiqār Khān to join him at Wakinhera. Along with Dā'ūd Khān Pannī, and others, he arrived just in time and brought fresh reinforcements with them. The Emperor reorganized the plan of attack. Chin Qilich Khān was given charge of the line of communication between Lāl Tikrī and the trenches and was directed to guard the rear against the inroads of the enemy. Zulfiqār Khān with his fresh forces began the attacks on the garrison. For four or five days severe fighting took place. Chin Qilich Khān, Jamshed Khān and Dā'ūd Khān exerted themselves most strenuously and thwarted all attempts of the Maratha generals to send men and provisions to the besieged. At last the Berads were compelled to yield and take to flight. Chin Qilich Khān and his Tūrānian soldiery, in the words of the court historian, "chased furiously the crow after it had left the noose and their anxious search sent that broken-winged one into the wilderness of wandering".\textsuperscript{3} This siege was the last undertaken by the old Emperor.

In recognition of his ability and service Chin Qilich Khān was raised to the rank of 5,000 zāt, 5,000 horse, and was awarded one crore and fifty lakhs of dāms, a jewelled sabre and an elephant. Muhammad Amin Khān was promoted to the rank of 4,000 zāt, 1,200 horse and was also given a sabre by way of reward.\textsuperscript{4}

It seems that Chin Qilich Khān, after the capture of Wakinhera, had acquired a great influence over the Emperor who

\textsuperscript{1} Op. cit., p. 499; Khāfī Khān, op. cit., p. 528. \textsuperscript{2} Ibid., p. 499.

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., p. 506. \textsuperscript{4} Ibid., p. 506; Khāfī Khān, op. cit., p. 538.
consulted him on all the important matters of the State. He asked permission from the Emperor to set out for his province and to restore peace and order in the distracted land under his charge, whence many people had fled on account of war and famine. Chin Qilich Khan, after reaching Bijapur, did all he could to call back the frightened peasantry and to induce them to resume their avocations, without which there was no prospect of general prosperity. While he was thus busy in the work of reconstruction, he received orders from the Emperor asking him to select some healthy place where he (the Emperor) and his troops might pass the rainy season. Chin Qilich Khan selected Devapur for this purpose, and joined him there. Here the Emperor was seized with a severe illness with pain in joints and limbs. But he continued to do all his usual business. After some time he began to have fainting fits. On the advice of his court physician, Saddiq Khan, he took China-root (smilax china) which did him good. After his recovery he honoured his physician with the title of Hakimu'l-Mulk, and loaded him with ashrfts by way of reward.¹

Chin Qilich Khan stayed with the Emperor till the latter recovered from illness and was able to undertake his march in the direction of Bahadurgarh.² Then he came back to Bijapur to look after the administration of the province.

From Bahadurgarh, the Emperor proceeded towards Ahmednagar, the place destined to be his "journey's end".³ His was a restless, lonely journey, albeit attended by vast and impressive armies and a busy court.

While the Emperor was in Ahmednagar, he made Chin Qilich Khan responsible for the administration of the faujdari of Firuznagar and Talikota.⁴ Two months before his death Aurangzeb summoned Chin Qilich Khan to Court for some important consultation. Probably he knew that his end was approaching. He wanted him to espouse the cause of Prince Kam Bakhsh, the pet of his old age, for whom he had the strongest affection. He knew also that A'zam had won over to his side Asad Khan Jumdatu'l-Mulk, Zulfiqar Khan and other Amir. On the 9th February 1707, the Emperor gave leave to Kam Bakhsh to go to Bijapur as the Sûbedâr. Probably

¹ Khafi Khan, op. cit., p. 539.  
² Khafi Khan, op. cit., p. 541.  
³ Ma'âlik-i-Âlamgiri, p. 510.  
⁴ Ma'âlik-i-Âlamgiri, p. 513.
the Emperor had already consulted Chin Qilich Khan about this matter, and explained to him the situation. For quite a long while, the Emperor had been endeavouring to bring the Tūrānī party of his Court, which had Firūz Jang, Chin Qilich Khan and Muhammed Amīn Khan as its leaders, to support the claims of Kām Bakhsh as against the pretensions of Aʿzam who enjoyed the backing of the Persian party. At Aurangzib’s death, Chin Qilich Khan was still at Bijāpūr. After giving charge of the province to prince Kām Bakhsh, he joined Muhammad Amīn Khan who was appointed in command of the Prince's escort. The Tūrānīs, for reasons of their own, deserted the Prince in this crisis, though they had been purposely appointed for his protection, by Aurangzib.¹

Both Chin Qilich Khan and Muhammad Amīn Khan, on grounds of prudence, joined Aʿzam Shāh in his march towards Aurangābād. Aʿzam Shāh, to win over Chin Qilich Khan whom he knew to be the most influential person in the Tūrānī party, conferred on him the title of Khān-i-Daurān, which the latter felt constrained to accept. He left Aʿzam Shāh, with his troops, in the neighbourhood of Aurangābād, on the pretext of his presence being required in the Deccan, and made himself master of the adjoining territory.² He, too, like his father Firūz Jang, decided not to take any active part in the imminent wars of succession between the sons of Aurangzib.

Zulfiqār Khān and Tarbiyat Khān joined Aʿzam at Aurangābād. It was chiefly at the suggestion of the former that Sāhū, son of Sambhājī, who was in custody for eighteen years, was set at liberty. This was a move to divert the attention of Tārā Bāī’s generals and to sow dissension among the Maratha chiefs. The plan succeeded beyond expectation. The Maratha chiefs inflamed by mutual jealousy, got involved in a civil war which gave the Mughals some breathing-time. Knowing as he did the growing power of the Marathas, Aʿzam, at the suggestion of Zulfiqār Khān, granted Sāhū the right of realizing Chauth³ and Sardeshmukhi⁴ from the six Sūbahs of the Deccan, on condition that the latter and his half-brother Madan would accept the position of a feuda-

¹ Irādat Khān, p. 12. ² Khāfi Khān, op. cit., p. 572.
³ One-fourth of the whole revenue of the state exacted by freebooters.
⁴ Ten per cent over and above the levy of chauth.
tory and would leave as hostages his wife, his mistress Virū Bāī, his mother Yesū Bāī and his half-brother Madan Singh. On his part Sāhū promised complete cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of order in the Deccan.

When Bahādur Shāh finally emerged triumphant over his brother A'zam Shāh in the battle of Jājau, he on the advice of his Chief Minister Khān-i-Khānān Mun‘im Khān, appointed Chin Qilich Khān as the Sūbedār of the Province of Oudh and Faujdār of Lucknow, and conferred on him the title of Khān-i-Daurān Bahādur. Chin Qilich Khān took charge of the administration of the Province of Oudh on the 9th December, 1707. Mīr ‘Abdu’l-Jalīl, a savant of Oudh, composed a chronogram of this event in the words “Khān-i-Daurān Bahādur” = 1119 A. H. He remained there for a few months. When Bahādur Shāh returned from the Deccan after his successful campaign against Kām Bakhsh, Chin Qilich Khān repaired to the Court. He felt disgusted at the absolute power assumed by his rival Zulfiqār Khān in the affairs of the State, and resigned from the Sūbadārī of Oudh and renounced the title bestowed by the new Emperor. He made up his mind to retire from active life altogether and to assume the garb of a Fāqīr. But his talents were so great that surely this could not have been the end of his career.

After the death of his father Fīrūz Jang, at the end of 1710, Chin Qilich Khān felt still more dejected. During his retirement from the world he had been on intimate terms with Prince ‘Azīmu’š-Shān, son of Bahādur Shāh, who used to come to see him frequently and promised him that, if ever he became Emperor, he would make him his Prime Minister. It seems that the Prince had marked him out as a man whose personality and influence could very well be used against Zulfiqār Khān, whose overweening authority he regarded with intense dislike.

- The period of history under review corresponds with the supremacy acquired by Zulfiqār Khān in the counsels of the State. He owed his rise to the generosity of Mun‘im Khān, who had obtained for him the pardon and favour of the Emperor. Mun‘im Khān had taken pains to persuade his

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3 Ibid., p. 839; Tārikh-i-Fathiyah.
master that the old nobility were the pillars of the State and that the welfare of the Empire depended on those whose ancestors had held high office and acquired influence and respect with the people of the realm. It was at the request of Mun'am Khân that the dignified office of Wakil-i-Mutlaq (Minister-plenipotentiary) was entrusted to Asad Khân Jumdatu'l-Mulk and the important post of Mîr Bakhshî was assigned to his son, Zulfiqâr Khân. Asad Khân was given the title of Nizâm'u'l-Mulk Āsaf-ud-Daulah and his son that of Samsâm-ud-Daulah Amîr-ul-Umarâ Bahâdur Nusrat Jang. To the latter was granted the administration of the Provinces of the Deccan, and he was allowed to leave Dâ'ûd Khân Pannî as his deputy there, while he in person attended the Court and discharged the duties of the office of Amîru'l-Umarâ. Zulfiqâr Khân Nusrat Jang, had acquired absolute authority as Asad Khân, on account of extreme old age, could not take any active part in the affairs of the State. The latter's son acted as his deputy in the office of Wakil-i-Mutlaq.¹

After the death of Mun'am Khân at the end of 1710, there was difference of opinion in the Court as to who should be appointed the Prime Minister in his place. Prince 'Azîmu'sh-Shân and Sa'dullâh Khân, the Diwân, desired that Zulfiqâr Khân should be entrusted with this office, provided Na'im Khân and Khânazâd Khân, the two sons of Mun'am 'Khân, were appointed Bakhshî-ul-Mulk and Sûbedâr of the Deccan, respectively. But Zulfiqâr Khân was not willing to give up his exalted position for the Prime Ministership. Prince 'Azîmu'sh-Shân who always suspected the ambitious motives of Zulfiqâr Khân, raised objection, saying that he (Zulfiqâr Khân) desired to usurp all authority for himself by having his father (Asad Khân) appointed to the vacant post of Prime Minister.²

The Emperor, being a weak man, could not make up his mind to any final decision. First he vacillated and wobbled, then he appointed, as a temporary measure, Sa'dullâh Khân as the Diwân of Person and Khâlsa, to act as deputy under the control of Prince 'Azîmu'sh-Shân.

In spite of these checks to his authority, Zulfiqâr Khân succeeded in giving practical shape to his ambitions. He had

an eye on the Deccan and knew its resources as well as the possibility of its easily becoming independent. He had experience enough to understand the significance of the forces of disintegration that were vitally undermining the Imperial structure. That is why he wanted to retain his control of the Provinces of the Deccan, where he had already gained reputation in the last decade of Aurangzib’s reign, as the captor of Jinni and Wankaner. It was chiefly on his advice and suggestion that practically all the Taurani high officials, whom he regarded as his potential rivals, were removed from the Deccan and dispersed to different and distant parts of the country, so that they might not be in the way of his ambition. The Emperor being a negligent person in so far as the affairs of the State were concerned, Zulfiqar Khan had every chance of extending his power and influence. The former’s complacency had reached the point that a certain wit found the chronogram of his accession to the throne in the words ‘Shah-i-Bekhabar’ (the heedless monarch).¹

When Bahadur Shah was in the Deccan, he was approached by the wakils of both Raja Sahu and Tarabai to seek Imperial favour and recognition. Rabinji Bhonsla, the wakil of Raja Sahu, was introduced to the Emperor by Zulfiqar Khan Nusrat Jang, Suedar of the Deccan. The latter used his best endeavours to get official confirmation of the rights granted to Sahu by Azam Shah before he started his ill-fated march to Northern India to contest the Imperial throne. The wakil petitioned for a firman conferring on Sahu the right of collecting the Chauth and Sardeshmukhi in the six subahs of the Deccan, on the condition of restoring prosperity to the ruined land. Mun‘im Khan Khan-i-Khanan espoused the cause of Tarabai who had sued for peace through the former’s intervention and had asked for a firman in the name of her son. She was willing to conclude an agreement on more favourable terms to the Imperialists. She promised to suppress the insurgents and restore order in the Deccan, provided she was granted the nine rupees of the Sardeshmukhi, without any reference to the Chauth. The Emperor lacked power of decision. He did not want to displease either Zulfiqar Khan or Mun‘im Khan, whose mutual jealousy for predominance in the Court created

great confusion in Imperial politics. "He (the Emperor)," as Khāfir Khān well observes, "in his extreme good nature had resolved in his heart that he would not reject the petition of anyone, whether of low or high degree." In the matter of the Chauth and Sardeshmukhī also, the Emperor directed that firmāns should be given in compliance with the wishes of both Zulfiqār Khān and Munʿim Khān. Thus on account of disagreement of these two nobles, the orders about the Chauth and Sardeshmukhī remained inoperative and the Emperor left for Northern India, never to come back to the Deccan again. According to Sardesāi, Munʿim Khān suggested to the Emperor that the issue should be left to the arbitrament of the sword and that whichever party emerged successful in establishing its political supremacy in the Maharashtra, should get the rights of collecting Chauth and Sardeshmukhī in the six Sūbahs of the Deccan.  

After the death of Munʿim Khān, Zulfiqār Khān became the most powerful person in the Court. In order to consolidate his position in the Deccan, Zulfiqār Khān tried to effect an accommodation with the Marathas. Trial of strength with such a formidable foe would have involved him in difficulties and would have endangered his position in the Central Government. It was in his interest to have peace in the Deccan, and to come to terms with the most influential political party in the Maharashtra. Sāhū had gathered round his banner some of the most powerful Maratha chiefs. Having a rightful claim on the throne, Sāhū’s appeal to their loyalty proved effective. Sajjan Singh, an influential zemindār near Burhānpūr was the first to acknowledge his allegiance. Then Parsoji Bhonsle, Amritrāo Kadam Bande, Chimnājī Dadomdar Moghe, Haiabatrāo Nimbalkar, Nemājī Sindhīā and Dhanājī Jādav espoused his cause. As Zulfiqār Khān had long been interested in Sāhū’s affairs and had been on intimate terms with him during the latter’s captivity, he persuaded Bahādur Shāh, as he had so successfully done with Aʿzam Shāh, to come to an agreement with Sāhū who was willing to render military service to the Emperor. He openly "acknowledged himself a vassal of the throne of Delhi, and whilst styling himself king of the Hindus; he affected in his

2 Sardesāi, Marathi Riyāsāt, vol. V.
transactions with the Mughals to consider himself merely as a zemindār or the head Deshmukh of the Empire". On his own initiative Zulfiqār Khān asked Dā'ūd Khān Pannī, his agent in the Deccan, to enter into an agreement with Sāhū, granting him the right of Chauth and Sardeshmukhī, provided the collection and payment was done directly by the Imperial agents. This agreement which could hardly be called a legal instrument or a treaty, lacking as it did the Imperial sanction, went a long way in helping Sāhū to establish his supreme power in the Maharashtra. According to the stipulations of this agreement Sāhū was not allowed to post his own collectors in the Imperial territory, but as will be shown later it served as a stepping stone for further claims on the part of the Marathas.

At the death of Bahādur Shāh early in 1712, Zulfiqār Khān assumed the role of a king-maker. A struggle for succession to the throne ensued between the sons of Bahādur Shāh. Zulfiqār Khān had a long-standing aversion to ‘Azīmu’sh-Shān, whom he considered to be a man of independent judgment. He succeeded in persuading the other three brothers, Mu‘izzu’d-dīn, Rafī‘u’sh-Shān, and Jehān Shāh to present a common front against ‘Azīmu’sh-Shān. He promised to effect an equal division of the Empire between them after the defeat of the latter. But their agreement did not last long, as is the fate of all such agreements. After the defeat and death of ‘Azīmu’sh-Shān, the soldiery of the latter flocked under the banner of Zulfiqār Khān who contrived so that the three brothers came to an open conflict over the division of the spoils. After the death of Jehān Shāh and Rafī‘u’sh-Shān, Mu‘izzu’d-dīn, with the support of Zulfiqār Khān emerged triumphant and ascended the throne without fear of a rival.

After his accession Mu‘izzu’d-dīn styled himself Jehāndār Shāh and redistributed the high offices of the State. Asad Khān Jumdatu’l-Mulk was confirmed in the dignity of Waktī-i-Mutlaq; Zulfiqār Khān was made Prime Minister, besides holding the offices of Amīru’l-Umarā and Viceroy of the Deccan. The new monarch was totally devoid of both

courage and merit, which well suited the ambition of Zulfiqār Khān.

On the death of the Emperor Bahādur Shāh at Lahore, his sons had appealed to influential people in the realm to take their sides. Chin Qilīch Khān was summoned to Lahore by all the four parties. There was great confusion in Delhi at the news of the struggle between the Princes, while the corpse of Bahādur Shāh awaited burial till the issue of succession should be settled. On hearing these reports from Lahore, a body of three thousand soldiers, mostly Tūrānīs, went to Chin Qilīch Khān in his retirement, and requested him to give them a lead in this crisis. In the meantime Ghulām Muḥammad, agent of 'Azīmu'sh-Shāh, came to Chin Qilīch Khān and delivered the message of his master, who wanted him to go to Lahore. Ghulām Muḥammad also asked him to carry a few loads of gun-powder along with him to the Prince. He agreed to do so and had already made one march from Delhi when news came of the defeat and death of 'Azīmu'sh-Shāh, Jehān Shāh and Rāfī'u'sh-Shāh and the accession of Jehāndār Shāh.

But for the intercession of Asad Khān Jumdatu'l-Mulk and Abdu's-Samad Khān, brother-in-law of Muḥammad Amīn Khān and a right-hand man of Zulfiqār Khān, the latter would have used this opportunity to crush Chin Qilīch Khān for ever. But the importance of Chin Qilīch Khān as the leader of the Tūrānīs was recognized and he was re-instated in his rank of 7,000 zāt, 7,000 horse, with the title of Ghāziu'd-Dīn Khān Bahādur Firūz Jang.1 In fact, Zulfiqār Khān and his father Asad Khān Jumdatu'l-Mulk considered themselves so secure in their position of authority and influence that they had nothing to lose in conciliating a man like Chin Qilīch Khān and bringing him out of his self-imposed retirement.

In the new regime, Zulfiqār Khān continued to exercise his uncontrolled authority. He had become so powerful that even the Emperor avoided opposing him. The nobility were disgusted at his tyranny and arrogance but found themselves unable to do anything against him. In the words of Irādat Khān:

1 Tārīkh-i-Fathiyah, op. cit.
He, creator of Emperors, with such an image of humanity in his hands, became absolute and so proud that Pharaoh and Shaddād could not have obtained admission to his threshold. He studied to ruin the most ancient families, inventing pretexts to put them to death, or disgrace them, that he might plunder their possessions. Unhappy was the person he suspected to be rich, as wealth and vexatious accusations always accompanied each other. He established many exactions and abuses such as no prior age had beheld, and by which alone he is now remembered. He took enormous emoluments and revenues for himself, while he doled out money to others with a hand so sparing, that even his own creatures felt severe poverty with empty titles, for he never allowed jāgīrs to any. The minds of high and low, rich and poor, near or distant, friends or strangers, were turned against him, and wished his destruction. Hindus and Muslims agreed in praying to Heaven for the fall of his power, night and day.¹

Jehāndār Shāh was a drunken scamp, a mediocrity without any gift of intellect or character. On reaching Delhi he gave himself up to dissipation and debauchery, indulging in the lowest pleasures imaginable. He moved in the company of minstrels and singers and left the administration of the State in the hands of Zulfiqār Khān. As Khāfi Khān observes: "... there seemed to be a likelihood that Qāzīs would turn toppers and Muftūs become tipplers."² He gave the title of Imtiyāz Mahal Begum to his mistress Lāl Kunwar and gave her the privilege of riding close to him, on an elephant covered by an umbrella like that of the Emperor himself. Lāl Kunwar had been intimately connected with a herb-woman, called Zuhra. This Zuhra also obtained great influence in the counsels of the Emperor. She used to go out on an elephant to see her friend Lāl Kunwar in the palace, riding right up to the apartments of the ladies, a privilege given only to the princesses of the royal blood. The people of her retinue had grown extremely haughty and used to insult inoffensive people whom they met in the streets. The nobility of the city of Delhi felt indignant at all this, but nobody had the courage to bring

¹Irādat Khān, p. 84. ²Khāfi Khān, vol. II, p. 689.
the matter to the notice of the Emperor or to that of Amiru'l-Umarā Zulfiqār Khān.

One day, as chance would have it, Chin Qilich Khān was passing along a street with a few men of his escort, when he met a large retinue of Zuhra, behaving as if the whole street belonged to them. Chin Qilich Khān made a sign to his people to step aside and let them pass. Zuhra’s people made sarcastic remarks, as they usually did if they happened to come across the retinue of any noble. Chin Qilich Khān’s men did not relish this and wanted to chastise them. Chin Qilich Khān tried his best to keep them under control in spite of the severe provocation, when Zuhra herself, riding on an elephant, approached the place where Chin Qilich Khān’s men were standing. She asked in an overbearing tone whose retinue it was. On being told, she put out her head from the curtain and called out, “Thou Chin Qilich Khān, surely thou must be the son of a blind man”. On hearing this Chin Qilich Khān felt shocked by the indignity of her words. He made a sign to his attendants to punish the people of her retinue. The Tūrānī veterans, already indignant, fell upon Zuhra’s people and, after giving them a thorough beating, dispersed them. They compelled Zuhra herself to quit the elephant and escape barefooted to the palace of the Emperor, which was not far off.¹

After this incident Chin Qilich Khān went straight to the house of Zulfiqār Khān, whom he had not yet visited after his becoming the Prime Minister. The latter was surprised, and desired to know what brought him there, knowing as he did that it must have been something serious. Chin Qilich Khān told him the whole story and made him realize that such undignified treatment of the old nobility by upstarts was simply intolerable.² Zulfiqār Khān, who himself looked with suspicion on the growing influence of Lāl Kunwar’s family, applauded his behaviour and sent a message to the Emperor saying that he himself agreed with Chin Qilich Khān in so far as the honour of the old nobility was concerned. Lāl Kunwar and Zuhra urged the Emperor to take strong measures against Chin Qilich Khān, but he dared not do

² Ibid.; Irādat Khān, part IV, p. 81.
anything on account of Zulfiqār Khān’s attitude in the matter.¹

Zulfiqār Khān had a deeper purpose to serve by his conciliatory attitude towards Chin Qilich Khān. He knew that Farrukhisiyar, son of ‘Azīmu’sh-Shān, who, after the death of Bahādur Shāh, had proclaimed his father’s accession to the throne, was going to march on Delhi. When he heard of his father’s death he had caused coins to be struck and public prayers to be recited in his own name throughout Bengal. He found a ready supporter in Husain ‘Ali Khān Bārha, governor of Bihār, and an old adherent of his father. Being an ambitious man himself, the latter looked askance at the absolute authority assumed by Zulfiqār Khān at the Centre. He managed to borrow large sums of money from the rich bankers of Patna to whom he gave bonds signed by Farrukhisiyar, payable after the latter had subdued his enemies and consolidated his rule. He also wrote to his brother ‘Abdullāh Khān, governor of Allahābād, to seize the convoys carrying tribute from Bengal to the Capital.

By the support of the Sayyid brothers of Bārha, Farrukhisiyar assembled a huge army at Allahābād. Before he reached there, ‘Abdul Ghaffār, deputy of Rājī Muhammad Khān, the new governor of Allahābād appointed by the Emperor, had been defeated and his force dispersed. Before crossing the Jamuna, on his way to Āgra, Farrukhisiyar conferred the post of Prime Minister on ‘Abdullāh Khān and that of Amīru’l-Umarā on Husain ‘Ali Khān. While Farrukhisiyar was gathering strength, Jechāndār Shāh’s advisers, divided amongst themselves, failed to produce a concerted plan of action against him. In the end it was decided to despatch Prince Azzu’d-dīn at the head of an army of fifty thousand horse. Khwāja Ahsan Khān, son-in-law of Kokaltash Khān, to whom the title of Khān-i-Daurān was given, accompanied the Prince. Zulfiqār Khān disapproved of this arrangement. On account of his rivalry with Kokaltash Khān, whose increasing influence he suspected, he wanted Chin Qilich Khān to accompany the Prince. The King accepted his proposal and approved of Chin Qilich Khān accompanying the Prince. The latter, being a clever man, understood the

¹Sīar, op. cit., p. 386.
game. He purposely delayed his departure on account of lack of transport necessaries.¹

After a few days, Chin Qilich Khān started his march from Delhi, following the army of the Prince. He was advanced one lakh of rupees at Delhi, and the sum of two lakhs was to be had from the treasury at Āgra for the expenses of his Tūrānī contingents.²

When Chin Qilich Khān arrived at Āgra, the Prince had already started his march in the direction of Etawah and from thence to Khajwa. Chin Qilich Khān undertook to provide for the safety of the city of Āgra instead of advancing further. In fact, he desired the Prince not to advance further. The Prince stopped at Khajwa and entrenched himself there, although he outnumbered the forces of Farrukhsiyar and possessed artillery vastly superior to that of his enemy. Even here the nobles and the chief officers of Jehāndār Shāh could not decide on a concerted plan of action.

Muhammad Khān Bangash, an Afghān adventurer at the head of 5,000 horse, sent his deputy to Azzu'd-dīn's camp to offer his services but, feeling disgusted at the disorder prevailing there in consequence of the imbecility of the Prince and lack of co-operation among his high officers, he thought it wiser not to run the risk of joining him. ‘Abdullāh Khān Bāṛha, on the contrary, welcomed him into the service of Farrukhsiyar and promised him rewards in case of victory.

The two camps being not far from each other, Sayyid ‘Abdullāh Khān Bāṛha, who commanded the advance-guard of Farrukhsiyar, opened fire. Khān-i-Daurān, being a stranger to warfare, felt alarmed and perplexed. He thought it advisable to save his own life and that of the Prince by taking to flight about midnight in a lady's covered palanquin. Next morning, the officers and soldiers, finding that their chiefs had fled, lost heart and ran away, leaving their tents and munitions to the plunderers. Many went over to the camp of Farrukhsiyar and entered his service.

When Prince Azzu’d-dīn and Khān-i-Daurān came to Āgra, Chin Qilich Khān advised them to re-organize their forces which were returning precipitately towards Āgra, and

not to retreat further. According to Siyarul-Mut’akherin, Chin Qilich Khan made use of force to stop the Prince and Khân-i-Daurân, who, laying aside all thought of offering any further resistance, wanted to fly to Delhi. Chin Qilich Khan compelled both of them to wait in his camp till the arrival of the Emperor’s orders.

On receiving news of the defeat of the Prince’s army, Jehândâr Shâh, in accordance with the advice of Zulfiqâr Khan and Kokaltâsh Khan, started his march towards Agra at the head of 70,000 horse, besides a large force of infantry and artillery, including many big guns.

The two armies met in the neighbourhood of Agra. A bloody and obstinate battle was fought. The divided counsels in Jehândâr’s camp threw every plan into confusion. Zulfiqâr Khan and Kokaltâsh Khan had such a deep aversion for each other that it was impossible for them to co-operate in any matter. Thus unity of command was conspicuously absent in Jehândâr’s camp. Meanwhile, Syed Abdullâh Khan had started secret negotiations with Chin Qilich Khan and Muhammad Amîn Khan who, thinking Jehândâr’s cause to be hopeless, agreed to stand aloof and to prevent their Tûrâni troops from taking any active part in the contest.

The fierce attacks of the Bârha Sayyids and Muhammad Khan Bangash broke the lines of Jehândâr Shâh’s forces and threw them into utter confusion. The latter’s counter-attacks were successfully repulsed and the engagement was finally won by Farrukhsiyar. Kokaltâsh Khan was killed. Jehândâr Shâh, despairing of the success of his cause, thought of providing for his own safety by flight. He mounted the elephant of his mistress, Lâl Kunwar, and in the dusk of the evening started for Agra where he shaved off his beard and changed his dress in order not to be recognized, and then took the road to Delhi. Zulfiqâr Khan fought bravely but, having little hope of success, left the field. The troops, left without leaders, either joined Farrukhsiyar or fled to save their lives.

Jehândâr Shâh reached Delhi a short time before Zulfiqâr Khan and went straight to Asad Khan Jumdat-ul-Mulk for counsel and assistance. Asad Khan, as an experienced

1 Khâfi Khan, op. cit., p. 700.
2 Khâfi Khan, op. cit., p. 700.
4 Ibid., p. 704.
man, knew that Jehāndār Shāh had not the pluck to raise a fresh force and offer further resistance to Farrukhshyar and that it was impossible to raise money for the expenses of a fresh campaign. He put Jehāndār Shāh into confinement in order to gain favour with Farrukhshyar. But his son, Zulfiqār Khān, disapproved of this policy of quiescence. He realized the danger of offering submission to Farrukhshyar whose father’s (Azī-mu’sh-Shān’s) blood was still crying for vengeance. He thought of raising an army by the help of his deputy, Dā’ud Khān Pannī, who had established cordial relations with the Maratha Chiefs in the Deccan.

At last the father prevailed upon his son to give up the futile schemes of continuing resistance to Farrukhshyar and succeeded in making him realize the feebleness of his resources. After that he wrote a petition to Farrukhshyar, recounting his services, and implying that he should be considered as one of his most faithful servants. He also wrote to him saying that he was waiting for his (Farrukhshyar’s) orders regarding Jehāndār Shāh’s fate.

When Farrukhshyar arrived in Delhi, he ordered Asad Khān and Zulfiqār Khān to be brought before him. The former was kindly treated and a robe of honour was accorded to him. He was allowed to go back to his house. Zulfiqār Khān was detained. He was asked several questions regarding the blood of ‘Azīmu’sh-Shān and Abdul-Karīm, Farrukhshyar’s elder brother, and then he was strangled.

After peace and quiet had been re-established in Delhi, new appointments were made and Farrukhshyar’s partisans were elevated to high and responsible positions. Syed ‘Abdullāh Khān was appointed Prime Minister and given the titles of Qutbu’ll-Mulk, Yamīnu’d-Daulah, Zafar Jang, Yār-i-wasādar, and Husain ‘Alī Khān was made the First Bakhshī with the titles of ‘Umdatull-Mulk, Amīru’ll-Umarā

1 All the property of Asad Khān and Zulfiqār Khān was confiscated. Asad Khān was confined for life in Khān-i-Jehān’s palace. Chīn Qilī Khān (Nizāmu’ll-Mulk), before he left for the Deccan, went to see him one day and had great pity on his condition. He went to Qutbu’ll-Mulk, the Chief Minister, and told him that any service done to the old man would be a means of securing a good name in this world. On Nizāmu’ll-Mulk’s suggestion, the Chief Minister used to send to Asad Khān all the necessaries of life from his own house till his death on the 15th June 1716, at the age of 88 years. Amīru’ll-Umarā also used to take presents to him in consideration of his old age, past dignity and service to the State.
Bahādur, Fīrūz Jang and Sipāh-Sālār. Muhammad Amin Khān was created ‘Itimādu’d-Daulah, Nusrat Jang and was appointed the Second Bakhshī. Chin Qilich Khān obtained the title of Nizāmu’l-Mulk Bahādur, Fateh Jang and was appointed viceroy of the six Deccan provinces. Dā’ūd Khān Panni, the deputy of Zulfiqār Khān, was removed from the Deccan and was appointed deputy-governor of Gujerāt.\footnote{Khāfi Khān, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 728.} Shukrullāh Khān was appointed deputy to Nizāmu’l-Mulk in the Deccan.
CHAPTER III

First Viceroyalty of the Deccan

Qutbu’l-Mulk used to say that he considered Nizāmu’l-Mulk as his elder brother. Through the latter’s influence he wanted to win over the Tūrānis to his side. It was on his advice that Farrukhsiyar appointed Nizāmu’l-Mulk to the viceroyalty of the Deccan and the faujdārī of the Carnātic. His presence in the capital was considered dangerous for the consolidation of the Sayyid brothers’ influence. Moreover, the confusion and disorder in the Deccan required the presence of some strong man who would not allow the Marathas to encroach too much on the Imperial territory. Disturbances in this part required special attention of the Central Government. Qutbu’l-Mulk proposed the name of Nizāmu’l-Mulk and obtained the sanction of the Emperor who bestowed on him, before his taking leave for the Deccan, a robe of honour, a head-ornament, an ‘Arab steed with gold-embroidered trappings, a sword and a dagger. Qutbu’l-Mulk came to Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s house with presents of rolls of cloth, two diamonds, a sword, a jewelled poniard, two steeds and an elephant. Nizāmu’l-Mulk returned the visit and offered a present of two diamonds, an ‘Arab steed with gold-trappings, a sword and a jewelled poniard. Nizāmu’l-Mulk left Delhi in May 1713. When he arrived in the vicinity of Sironj, he received a present of fruit from the Emperor. The kahārs and mace-bearers who brought him the present were suitably rewarded. In the neighbourhood of Ujjain he went out hunting, and from thence he proceeded in the direction of Burhānpūr where he arrived at the end of June 1713.¹

Nizāmu’l-Mulk was faced with chaos in the Deccan. When Zulfiqār Khān was the Viceroy of the Deccan, he had entered into an agreement with Sāhū, son of Sambhāji, conferring on him the right of Chauth and Sardeshmukhī of the

¹ Hadīqatul-Ālam, vol. II, p. 68.
whole of the Deccan. After the death of Mun‘im Khán, Zulfiqār Khán had been supreme in the affairs of the State, and had directed Dā’ūd Khán Panni, his deputy in the Deccan, to come to terms with the Marathas on his behalf, allowing them one-fourth of the revenue but reserving its collection and payment to his own agents.\(^1\) Sāhū’s recognition by Zulfiqār Khán and the Imperial Government helped him to establish his own ascendancy over the Maratha Chiefs. Nemājī Sindhiā, who had taken part in the battle against Kām Bakhsh, was raised, through Zulfiqār Khán’s influence, to the rank of 7,000 zāt, 5,000 horse, and was appointed to collect the revenues of the province of Aurangābād. Thus he got an opportunity to extend his authority and influence as far as Mālwa and Central India.

No sooner did Nizāmu’l-Mulk arrive at Aurangābād than he started reorganizing the administrative machinery of the six provinces of the Deccan.\(^2\) The Marathas had appointed

\(^1\) Dā’ūd Khán Panni was the son of Khizr Khán Panni, a tradesman by profession, who was later employed in the service of the Bījāpur Government. Dā’ūd Khán entered the Imperial employ at the suggestion of Khānjehān Koka, Nāzim of the Deccan. By sheer merit he rose to the rank of 4,000 zāt, 4,000 horse and received the title of ‘Khán’. When the Emperor Aurangzib came to the Deccan, Dā’ūd Khán presented himself in the Imperial presence and took an active part in the siege of Jīnjī, under the leadership of Zulfiqār Khán. Henceforward his career, more or less, follows that of the latter. When Zulfiqār Khán became the faujdār of the Carnātic, Dā’ūd Khán was made the Deputy faujdār. Later on, the territories of Carnātic Bījāpur and Carnātic Haiderābād were also put under his control. In the 49th year of Aurangzib’s reign (A. D. 1705) he was especially summoned by the Emperor to take part in the siege of Wākinkhera in which he was destined to play an important part and obtained distinction by his ability and valour. When Zulfiqār Khán became the Sūbedār of the six provinces of the Deccan during the reign of Bāhādur Shāh, Dā’ūd Khán acted as his deputy. Fārrukhsīyār transferred him to the Nizāmat of Gujārāt. In A. D. 1715, he was secretly directed by the Emperor to proceed to the Deccan to offer resistance to Husain ‘Allī Khán. He was killed by a match-lock ball, in the battle fought with the latter, in the neighbourhood of Būrānpūr.

\(^2\) In the time of Aurangzib Deccan was divided into the following provinces (Sūbahs):


During the later years of the Emperor’s reign when the Imperial armies had conquered practically the whole of South India, the last two Sūbahs (Haiderābād and Bījāpur) were made into Carnātic Haiderābād Bālgāhāt and Carnātic Haiderābād Pāmghāt. The former consisted of the Sarkārs of Sidhout, Gunjicota, Gooty, Gurumcunda and Khammam. The first, second and fifth of these Sarkārs afterwards formed the petty state of the Pathān Nawābs of Cuddapah (Kārpa) who within a short time extended their possession along the back of the Eastern Ghats, right up to the Caverī River. The Sūbah of Carnātic Haiderābād Pāmghāt was composed of the country extending from Guntūr to Coleroon, along the sea-coast of Coromandel, later known as the
their gamaishdārs (revenue-collectors) to collect the Chauth and to exact tolls from the merchants and travellers who desired security from plunder, and from every driver of a cart and bullock passing through the territory. These gamaishdārs received military support from the Maratha sūbedārs who had established a sort of parallel government in the Deccan, dividing the Mughal territory among themselves. If there happened to be any difficulty in obtaining their blackmail, they openly defied the Imperial authority. The first thing that Nizāmu’l-Mulk did was to consolidate his position in Aurangābād and to suppress the authority of the local Maratha collectors. He repudiated the obligations created by the agreement entered into by Zulfiqār Khān and Rāja Sāhū, alleging its observance to be impossible and inconsistent with the authority vested in the Viceroy of the Deccan. ¹

Nizāmu’l-Mulk took advantage of the dissensions prevailing between the Kolhāpūr party, which owed allegiance to Tārā Bāī, and that of Sāhū. Several Maratha Chiefs had declared the latter to be a pretender and refused to recognize him as Sambhāji’s legitimate son. After the death of Dhanājī Jādav, whose adherence to the cause of Sāhū had much strengthened the latter’s position, his son Chandrasen Jādav was made Senāpati (Commander-in-Chief) of Sāhū’s forces. Being jealous of the esteem and confidence gained by Bālājī Vishvanāth, originally a petty official under his father, Chandrasen Jādav considered him an obstacle in the way of his ambition. Sāhū directed him to proceed at the head of a huge army towards Malegāon in order to raise Chauth and Sardeshmukhī. After his departure Sāhū despatched Bālājī Vishvanāth to supervise the collection of revenue from that part of the country, and to watch the movements of Chandrasen Jādav who was suspected of intriguing with Tārā Bāī. The latter did not relish this. He found a pretext for quarrelling with Bālājī on account of a dispute that arose between one of the officers of Bālājī and a Brahmin clerk of Chandrasen Jādav. As Bālājī refused to surrender the officer to the

¹ Khāfi Khān, op. cit., p. 743.

Sūbah of Arcot. The Sarkārs of Vellore, Jinjī, Tanjore and Trichinopoly were included in the Carnatic Haiderābād Pāṅghāt. (Wilk’s Historical Sketches of Southern India, vol. I, pp. 134-36.)
Senāpati, the latter ordered his troops to attack Bālāji’s contingent. Bālāji took to flight and found refuge at the court of Sāhū. The Senāpati was forthwith ordered to present himself at the court. When this message reached Chandrasen Jādav, he sent back word that unless Bālāji was handed over to him, he was not prepared to offer his allegiance to Sāhū any longer. On receiving intelligence of the Senāpati’s designs, Sāhū directed Haibat Rāo Nimbalkar to march against him. He defeated Jādav’s troops at Adarki and compelled him to retire to Panhala. Here he openly espoused the cause of Tārā Bāi’s son and opened negotiations with Nizāmu’l-Mulk.

To undermine the growing influence of the party of Kolhāpūr, Bālāji manipulated to create division in the camp of Tārā Bāi. He succeeded in winning over Rājasbāi, the younger widow of Rājarām, to his side. He offered her Sāhū’s support if she cared to bring forward the claim of Sambhājī, her son, in opposition to Sivājī, the son of Tārā Bāi. Rājasbāi, with the help of Bālāji, imprisoned Tārā Bāi and her son. This was a very critical position for Chandrasen Jādav who was afraid of being surrendered to Sāhū. He sent his Lieutenant Appā Rāo to Nizāmu’l-Mulk, offering him his services. Fleeing from Kolhāpūr he took shelter at Aurangābād along with Rambhājī Nimbalkar and Sarje Rāo Ghatge who had deserted Sāhū and joined his standard. The latter was given a Jāgīr by Sambhājī, on the recommendation of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, which still exists in his family and is known as Kagal State. Nizāmu’l-Mulk gave protection to Chandrasen Jādav and bestowed on him a large fief with a revenue of twenty-five lakhs a year for the upkeep of his troops. He was required to keep fifteen thousand well-equipped men, ready for action at any moment. He was raised to the rank of 7,000 zāt, 7,000 horse, with the rights of the Standard and Kettledrum. His fief was scattered over parts of Bhālki, Bahanābād, Ilandū and Chandarghar, where he had built a fortress on an adjoining hill.¹ He was treated like other nobles and his advice was sought on all important matters concerning the Marathas. Through him Nizāmu’l-Mulk opened negotiations with

¹ Maḍāḥīn’l-Umarā, vol. II, p. 337; Māhrāmāh (MS.), by Ghulām Husain Khān Jauhar; Bisātu’l-Ghnāim (MS.), by Lachmi Narāin Ṣafīq.
Sambhaji of Kolhapur whom Chandrasen Jadhav had artfully won over to his views.

Nizamul-Mulk started his work of reform in the devastated regions of the Deccan in order to secure peace and plenty to the peasantry whose lands were lying waste on account of the Maratha inroads. He assured them that they would not be deprived of the fruits of their labour. He stationed troops at vantage-points to keep off the armed bands of the Marathas. Then he had to deal courageously yet skilfully with Balaji, who had, after the withdrawal of Chandrasen Jadhav, risen in the favour of Sahu. When he came to know of the plans of Nizamul-Mulk, he levied a fresh force in order to remove all the obstacles in the way of Maratha unity. He had compelled different Maratha chiefs to acknowledge allegiance to Sahu, who, in recognition of this, honoured him with the title of Sena Kirt (Creator of armies). He succeeded in winning over almost all Maratha musket-masters to his side. Haibat Rao Nimbalkar, the Maratha Governor of the province of Godawari, co-operated with him whole-heartedly in establishing the supremacy of Raja Sahu.\(^1\)

Meanwhile, Nizamul-Mulk had sent a force in the direction of the Godawari to compel Sahu’s officers, who were ravaging the countryside, to withdraw. An encounter took place in which the Marathas were forced to retire to the bank of the Bhima river. On hearing the news of this defeat Sahu directed Balaji to proceed against Nizamul-Mulk. He marched at the head of a huge army in order to re-establish the Maratha authority in the regions whence it had been ousted. A battle was fought in the vicinity of Purandhar in which Balaji suffered a severe defeat. He had to retire and seek refuge in the Ghats. A Mughal contingent under the command of Rao Rambha Nimbalkar occupied the evacuated territory in the neighbourhood of the Poona District. This territory was given as Jagir to Chandrasen Jadhav in recognition of his services. After the termination of hostilities, a treaty was signed by Nizamul-Mulk and Balaji, the exact terms of which are not known; most probably its basis was mutual restoration of prisoners. It was entered into on the conviction that each one of the party was unable to

\(^1\) Kincaid, History of the Maratha People, vol. II, p. 150.
destroy the other. The Mughal forces were directed to evacuate the occupied territory and return to Aurangābad.

For some time after this, Bālājī was engaged in hostilities with different Maratha chiefs and with the Siddīs on the western coast; he could not concentrate his attention and resources on the Deccan. But other Maratha chieftains, at his instigation, continued to raid the Mughal territory. There was a caravan coming from Sūrat to Aurangābād, with which Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Khān Tābrezī, paymaster and news-reporter of Baglāna, was travelling. This caravan was looted and Ibrāhīm Khān Tābrezī, among many others, was killed in the skirmish.¹

In 1714, a rebellion was organized to overthrow the government of Nizāmu’l-Mulk. Secret Maratha agents had spread their network of conspiracy to paralyse the Mughal administration and establish an alternative government. In one of the subdivisions of Gulshanābād, some fifty miles from Aurangābād, a deshmukh named Anbūjī joined in the conspiracy. He, being an influential person, managed to gather round him nearly ten thousand men in a small and out-of-the-way fortress which had been constructed in the time of Dā’ūd Khān Pannī. On receiving intelligence of this insurrection, Anwar Khān, the district officer who resided at Phulmāri, a town sixteen miles north-east of Aurangābād, advanced with an armed force to restore peace and order. A Maratha revenue-collector, Kālū, who pretended to have lost his job, came to Anwar Khān, when he was making preparations to start his march, and sought employment in the Imperial Service. He agreed to accompany Anwar Khān as a guide, knowing as he did, the topography of that part of the country. On the way Anwar Khān found out that he was an agent of the Marathas and had been sent on purpose to mislead him. He ordered his men to arrest him. This happened not very far from the place where the insurgents had gathered to offer resistance to Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s forces. When they received information of this, they attacked Anwar Khān and captured him and all his men. On hearing this, Nizāmu’l-Mulk despatched Ibrāhīm Khān Pannī, the younger brother of Dā’ūd Khān Pannī, with a small army to chastise the enemy. On

account of heavy rains for several days continuously, the arrows, bows and matchlocks of Ibrāhīm Khān’s army were out of order. The Marathas pressed hard on Ibrāhīm Khān’s army in the engagement that took place, and compelled him to retreat. Ibrāhīm Khān at once sent word to Nizāmu’l-Mulk to send reinforcements. On receiving the message, Nizāmu’l-Mulk ordered his own bodyguard to be despatched under the command of his elder son, Ghāziū’d-Dīn Khān, who was barely eight years old. Muhammad Ghiyās Khān and Mirzā Beg Khān Bakhshi, both experienced leaders, were appointed his guardians.¹

When the Marathas received information of the arrival of Ghāziū’d-Dīn Khān’s force, they were afraid and took to flight, taking refuge in the hilly jungle where they hid themselves. They left all their equipment, horses and artillery on the battlefield, and made no further attempt at resistance. The fame and prestige of Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s generals took away all courage from the heart of the enemy. Muhammad Ghiyās Khān directed some of his officers to pursue the Maratha fugitives and ordered the small fortress (garhī) to be demolished completely. He also destroyed several other Maratha strongholds in the neighbourhood where rebels from the Imperial territory used to take shelter. It was clearly impossible to allow the Maratha chiefs to establish themselves comfortably within or in close proximity to the borders of the Imperial territory and use their places of harbourage as the bases for their incursions.

Muhammad Ghiyās Khān’s men had chased the Marathas for 150 miles, driving them to the caverns of the hills. They were proud of having captured two war elephants. When they returned to Aurangābād, Nizāmu’l-Mulk was delighted to hear that the country was resettled, the people reassured and the enemy coerced.²

As Nizāmu’l-Mulk had lately recovered from a severe illness, he took the opportunity to celebrate this victory in a grand manner. For nine days continuously, the capital witnessed gorgeous festivities and celebrations. Those who had taken an active part in the campaign were given increase of

¹ Khāfi Khān, op. cit., p. 745; Hadīgatul’-Ālam, op. cit., p. 74.
² Hadīgatul’-Ālam, op. cit., p. 75.
rank and robes of honour in recognition of their services. Nizám'u-l-Mulk sent the captured elephants to the Emperor, and Mirzâ Beg Khán was directed to carry the message of victory to Delhi.¹

Dâ'ûd Khán Pannî and his agents used to share in the annoying taxes that the Maratha chiefs imposed on the helpless peasantry and merchants. Nizám'u-l-Mulk established a uniform system of assessment in the Sûbah of Aurangâbâd, where he first introduced his reforms and which he intended to extend to other provinces of the Deccan under the watchful control of Sheikh Muhammad A'zam and later of Dîwân Khem Kiran.² He directed them to hold a thorough investigation into the people's grievances in the course of which he was informed that Dâ'ûd Khán Pannî and his subordinates used to appropriate for themselves twenty lakhs of rupees annually from the revenue in accordance with their secret arrangement with the agents of Râja Sâhû. Informed of this, Nizám'u-l-Mulk ordered Khem Kiran and Muhammad Ghiyâs Khán, Dârogha of Artillery, to proceed to Shâhgarh and Amber where great confusion prevailed. The two officers reorganized the system of assessment in these parts of the country to the advantage of the cultivators. Thus Nizám'u-l-Mulk flung himself into the task of setting in order the finances of the Deccan with an energy which nothing could subdue. He did not increase the burden of taxation on the peasantry; in fact he reduced it greatly by his rigid supervision and by relentless punishment of those servants of the State who made dishonest gains by their exactions. He was determined to see to it that the peasantry were left unmolested by petty officials and the collection of revenue was organized in such a manner as to stimulate the production of wealth.

During the second year of his viceroyalty, Nizám'u-l-Mulk undertook several expeditions to effect his administrative reforms in different parts of the Deccan, and to restore order. The local landholders practised all manner of evasions and created disturbances whenever they could. To stop this Nizám'u-l-Mulk set out with an armed force of six thousand horse and five thousand infantry in the direction of Munkípatan where some Maratha leaders from Ahmednagar

¹ Khâfî Khân, op. cit., p. 747. ² Hadîqat'u-l-'Ālam, op. cit., p. 69.
were trying to create mischief. On his way he halted at ten places, cleared the country of miscreants and made suitable arrangements for the realization of revenue.

Next year he despatched an expedition under the command of Ibrahim Khan Pantha against the unruly and turbulent population in the neighbourhood of Jâlna. A little later Nizâmu'l-Mulk himself set out in that direction. Two days after he had started on his march, intelligence arrived that Haider Quâli Khân had been sent by the Emperor and was due to arrive in the capital (Aurangâbâd) after a few days to take charge of the Diwânî of the Deccan. The Sayyid brothers had no hand in this arrangement which was indirectly intended to cripple the power of Nizâmu'l-Mulk. According to the general rumour it was Mir Jumla, himself an aspirant for the viceroyalty of the Deccan, who intrigued against Nizâmu'l-Mulk at the Court and brought about this arrangement.1

Nizâmu'l-Mulk felt irriated at the uncalled-for interference from the Central Government, but did not postpone his march towards Jâlna. He gave orders to Jân Fisâr Khân, his chamberlain, not to give any official reception to Haider Quâli Khân until his return from the expedition. As the latter had obtained his appointment without his approval, he must be made to feel this. Moreover, Haider Quâli Khân was a creature of Mir Jumla who tried his best to undermine the influence of Nizâmu'l-Mulk. Mir Jumla was a great intriguer. He had so managed that the Emperor treated him with the utmost confidence. He had given him the right to sign his name and used to say: "The words of Mir Jumla and the signature of Mir Jumla are my words and my signature." Haider Quâli Khân being his chief favourite, he procured for him the Diwânî of the Deccan in order that he might prepare the ground for himself there. He had an Imperial firmân issued, appointing Haider Quâli Khân to supersede Diyanat Khân, son of Âmanat Khân, in the Diwânî of the six sâbahs, with full authority over appointments and dismissals in his department. Nizâmu'l-Mulk could not be expected to relish this.

After a short time it was brought to the notice of Nizâmu'l-

1 Khâfi Khân, op. cit., p. 740.
Mulk that Haider Quli Khān was showing extreme severity in his treatment of the revenue and custom officials. He summoned him to present himself at the Court in order to explain his conduct. Haider Quli Khān, pretending not to have received the summons, left Aurangābād for a tour of the districts. Nizāmu’l-Mulk, unafraid of Mīr Jumla and his resources at the Imperial Court, sent a message to Haider Quli Khān, through Muhammad Ghiyās Khān and Sa‘du’d-dīn Khān, telling him to behave properly in future with his subordinates, otherwise he would have to bear the consequences of his acts. But the warning fell on deaf ears and Nizāmu’l-Mulk, on his own responsibility, had to order him to go back to Delhi.

In the year 1714, the circumcision ceremony of Mīr Muhammad Fīrūz Jang and Mīr Ahmed Nāsir Jang was performed at Aurangābād with great pomp and festivities. The chief nobles of the Deccan presented themselves to offer gifts on this auspicious occasion. Mubāriz Khān, Sūbedār of Haiderābād, who excused himself for not being able to come, sent presents of brocades, china and glass-vessels to Nizāmu’l-Mulk. The landlord of Deogarh sent a herd of deer which were different, in that they were whiter, from ordinary deer. The Faujdār of Patan sent a huge river-fish, weighing one maund and twenty seers.

Nizāmu’l-Mulk was recalled to the Court in the month of May 1715, in view of the appointment of Husain ‘Ali Khān as the new Viceroy of the Deccan. He immediately left Aurangābād for Burhānpūr where he was apprised of the presence of two Maratha chiefs who were exacting Chauth from the people in the neighbourhood. Nizāmu’l-Mulk marched against them. He chased them into a thick forest which was set on fire by the Marathas. Nizāmu’l-Mulk very skilfully extricated his army and continued to pursue the enemy for eighty miles. Then he returned to Burhānpūr, appointed Zafar Khān to the Government of the Sūbah of Khāndesh and then resumed his journey to the North. On his way he passed within three or four miles of Husain ‘Ali Khān’s route, but did not halt to see the new Viceroy. It might be out of consideration for

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2 Tārikh-i-Fathiyah.  
3 Hadīyatul-‘Ālam, op. cit., p. 71.
the feelings of the Emperor, who was displeased with Husain ʿĀli Khān, that Nizāmu’l-Mulk did not meet him, or it might be owing to his own personal grievance. There is no doubt about the fact that Husain ʿĀli Khān had deprived him of his rightful position in the Deccan when he was busy introducing his reforms in the administration and collection of revenues.

Nizāmu’l-Mulk reached Delhi on 13th June 1715. I’timād-u’d-Daulah (Muhammad Amin Khān) came from Delhi to receive him and escort him to the Imperial presence. The Emperor bestowed on him a dress of honour and a jewelled head-ornament (sarpīch). On the day after his arrival, Nizāmu’l-Mulk deposited eleven lakhs of rupees in the Imperial treasury, which sum he had realized as tribute from the landholders of the Deccan. Qutbu’l-Mulk paid him a visit and is reported to have said apologetically: “You deserve the Vizierate more than anybody else, not to mention the Sūbedāri (of the Deccan). Amīru’l-Umarā’s going to the Deccan had become indispensable in order to quell the uprising there. Now any sūbah you like will be yours for the mere asking.” But Nizāmu’l-Mulk, getting disgusted with the atmosphere of intrigue at the court, preferred to retire to the Faujdāri of Murādābad Sambhal, where he had his Jāgīr.1

During his short stay in the Deccan, Nizāmu’l-Mulk succeeded in abrogating the harmful arrangement made between Zulfiqār Khān and Rāja Sāhū. Its maintenance was not only disgraceful to the Imperial authority, but it also tended to the oppression and impoverishment of the people and the virtual paralysis of the Government. He regarded it as possessing no validity whatsoever. Nizāmu’l-Mulk showed bold initiative in the stupendous task of restoring all the Mughal conquests in the Deccan, and in re-establishing the Imperial authority, although the Emperor himself was evidently not enthusiastic for the same, being afraid lest the attempt should plunge him in a sea of troubles.

Nizāmu’l-Mulk showed a masterly grasp of the situation and an intimate acquaintance with the problems of the Deccan. During his short stay there, he succeeded in effectively checking the encroachments of the Marathas. He crushed com-

1 Ibid., p. 93; Sījar, vol. II, p. 411.
pletely all sporadic attempts at rebellion incited by their secret agents, and restored peace and order. By strict economy and care in the management of the finances, as well as by reorganizing the revenue system, which had become corrupt and iniquitous, he restored the prosperity of the country. He abolished the payment of the large sums which Zulfiqār Khān had engaged himself to pay to the Maratha Court. His untimely recall gave the latter an opportunity to strengthen its hold on the Deccan.
CHAPTER IV

Ascendancy of the Sayyid Brothers

On his death-bed, Asad Khān, the veteran who had so long been the Prime Minister of Aurangzīb, was consulted by Farrukhsiyar as to how to get rid of the Sayyid brothers who had monopolized all power in the State. The dying man is reported to have given the following reply:

You have committed a great error under the impulse of destiny in that you ruined my family. You will reap its consequences. I am afraid ruin and destruction have already crept under the pillars of the Timurid State. Now that the Sayyids have all authority and Empire in their hands, it is advisable to co-operate with them as far as possible lest your dissensions should create discords and disaffection, compelling you to suffer the reins of authority to slip absolutely out of your hands.¹

Asad Khān was right. He was conscious of the fact that internal dissensions between the Emperor and the Sayyid brothers would result in a violent crisis which would shake the very foundations of the Empire. He saw clearly the trend of the situation towards complete political disintegration. In view of these circumstances he advised the Emperor to avoid conflict with the Sayyid brothers at any cost. Doubtless, the Sayyid brothers were not in any way worse than other nobles of the Court who were all unscrupulous enough to sacrifice the good of the country to their private interests. On the contrary, they were both men of considerable ability, superior in character and talents to most of their contemporaries. Qutbu’l-Mulk and Amīru’l-Umarā knew perfectly well that the Emperor had no will or discretion of his own. Being immersed in pleasure, he wanted to leave the administration of the country in the hands of Mīr Jumla—that crafty, self-seeking

villain who exercised an insidious influence over his master. The Sayyid brothers held the highest civil and military posts and desired that no promotions or appointments should be made or ranks conferred without consulting them. They resented the interference of Mīr Jumla in matters that concerned their office. Mīr Jumla, being more wily and intriguing, succeeded in depreciating the two brothers in the eyes of the Emperor and in making him believe that they desired to usurp all authority for themselves and their relatives, leaving him a mere puppet.

To weaken the power of the Sayyid brothers, a scheme was contrived by Mīr Jumla to separate the two brothers. First, it was proposed by the Emperor to send Husain ‘Alī Khān against Rāja Ajit Singh of Jodhpūr, who, after the death of Aurangzīb, had been guilty of many improper acts and encroachments. During the campaign in Rājpūtāna, Husain ‘Alī Khān received messages from his brother urging him to return to the capital without delay. Amīru’l-Umarā (Husain ‘Alī Khān) felt anxious for his brother and patched up a hurried peace with Rāja Ajit Singh who, finding himself unable to resist, agreed to pay tribute.¹

After settling the terms of peace, Amīru’l-Umarā set out and reached the capital on 16th July 1714. The Emperor, being a weak man, failed to achieve any of his schemes. Most of the nobility felt disheartened, not so much because of sympathy with the Sayyid brothers as on account of the capriciousness of the Emperor, who had started favouring men of low origins like Muhammad Murād—a wily Kashmirī and others of his stamp. They tacitly sided with the Sayyid brothers. The name of I’timādu’d-Daulah (Muhammad Amīn Khān) may be cited as one of them. Now Mīr Jumla persuaded the Emperor to appoint Amīru’l-Umarā as Viceroy of the Deccan, in place of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, in order to separate him from his brother, the Prime Minister. Amīru’l-Umarā, knowing as he did the resources of the Deccan, welcomed this opportunity and hoped to use it for the consolidation of his own and his brother’s position. He accepted the offer, but desired to exercise the duties of his office through a deputy appointed by himself, in accordance with the practice established by Zulfiqār Khān,

when the latter enjoyed complete ascendancy in the affairs of the State. He thought of appointing Dā'ūd Khān Panni as his deputy in the Deccan, and himself remaining in the capital, and making an agreement with the latter for the annual payments as Zulfiqār Khān had done before him. The Emperor, under the influence of his advisers, did not approve of this scheme. This difference of opinion caused such a great measure of heart-burning that the Sayyid brothers refrained from attending the Court and adopted an attitude of defiance towards the Imperial authority. The Empress-mother, well known for her prudence and foresight, came to know of the deadlock. She paid a visit to Qutbu’l-Mulk, the Prime Minister, and succeeded in effecting a reconciliation between him and the Emperor. After long negotiations between the two parties, it was finally decided to end the state of continuous friction by sending Husain ‘Alī Khān to the Deccan and Mīr Jumla to the Sūbedārī of Patna.¹

Under these circumstances, Husain ‘Alī Khān set out for the Deccan on 4th April 1715, by way of Ajmer. In his last audience, he is reported to have declared plainly to the Emperor that if anything untoward happened to his brother, or if the agreement was not properly observed, His Majesty might rest assured to find him in the capital within twenty days. Before starting for the Deccan he also took the power to appoint or dismiss civil officials and to transfer Qil‘idārs at his discretion. No sooner did Husain ‘Alī Khān leave the capital than the Emperor and the Court party started intriguing against him. A letter was despatched to Dā’ūd Khān Panni, in the name of the Emperor, directing him to assume charge of the Government of Khāndesh and destroy Husain ‘Alī Khān and his army. Hope was also held out to him that, if he succeeded in destroying the Amīru’l-Umarā, he would be made Sūbedār of the six provinces of the Deccan, a prize worth fighting for. Dā’ūd Khān Panni, being in no way less ambitious than his rival, reached Burhānpūr by forced marches and assumed the function of viceroyalty.

When the Amīru’l-Umarā reached Akbarpūr, he received intelligence of the designs of Dā’ūd Khān Panni. He sent him a message saying that, as the Sūbedārī of the Deccan had

been conferred upon him, it was his (Dā'ūd Khān's) duty not to overstep the bounds of subordination, but to hasten to meet him; else he had better proceed to the Emperor to avoid disturbance and shedding of blood.¹

Dā'ūd Khān Pannī, confident of his power and resources, could not yield so easily to the demands of his rival. He had already enlisted the support of Nemāji Sindhiā and several other Maratha chiefs, who had all encamped in the vicinity of Būrhapūr; and, acting in accordance with the temporising rule, waited to see on whom the gods of chance would confer the prize of the Deccan. Dā'ūd Khān Pannī was over-credulous in believing in the sincerity of these Maratha chiefs. A bloody fight was fought on the plain outside Būrhapūr. Dā'ūd Khān Pannī, famed for his bravery, had gone prepared for personal combat with the Amīru'l-Umarā, but in the course of the battle he was struck by a musket ball which killed him. His followers, as usual in such cases, dispersed and fled in all directions. The policy of Nemāji Sindhiā was mainly responsible for demoralising the nearly victorious armies of Dā'ūd Khān Pannī. The former had better consulted his interest by withdrawing in the heat of the battle and taking to flight.²

Nemāji Sindhiā and his followers were the first to come out to offer congratulations to the Amīru'l-Umarā on his victory. They started plundering the baggage and other effects of their allies and contented themselves with collecting rich booty. This victory gave the Amīru'l-Umarā undisputed authority over the six Sūbahs of the Deccan.

When the news of the defeat and death of Dā'ūd Khān Pannī was reported to the Emperor, he felt much aggrieved and told Qutbu'l-Mulk in the course of conversation that it was a matter of regret that such a noble chief had been killed unjustly. Qutbu'l-Mulk replied: "If my brother had been slain by the hand of the Afghān, it would have been just and would have given your Majesty satisfaction."³

The Amīru'l-Umarā settled down at Aurangābād and busied himself with attending to the administration and suppressing the spirit of revolt shown by the Marathas who were instigated by the Emperor from Delhi to oppose him in

all possible ways. This made the Amīru’l-Umarā furios against the Emperor. He, moreover, resented the interference of Farrukhsiyar concerning the appointments in the Deccan which he considered to be derogatory to his authority as well as in contravention of the terms settled between the Emperor and the two brothers through the intercession of the Empressmother.

At first the Amīru’l-Umarā, confident of his power, undertook to clear the country of the Maratha Chiefs who, after the departure of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, had again started collecting Chauth in the Imperial provinces. He thought of following the vigorous policy of Nizāmu’l-Mulk which had greatly tended to subvert the Maratha influence. The contest between the Marathas and the Mughals was not quite decided, but the balance was turning clearly to the side of the latter when Nizāmu’l-Mulk was recalled before he could complete his work. The Amīru’l-Umarā directed an expedition against Khanderao Dabhade who had held the province of Khāndesh in his charge. The latter had constructed a number of mud forts and military posts along the Sūrat-Burhānpūr road, and usually exacted one-fourth of the value of effects from merchants and travellers. If they paid the required sum, it was all right; otherwise, they were plundered, captured, held up to ransom and kept in captivity for long periods.

The Amīru’l-Umarā despatched a force of four thousand horse and five thousand musketeers under Zulfiqār Beg, his paymaster, in order to punish Khanderao Dabhade, destroy his forts and redress the wrongs caused by his depredations. When Khanderao Dabhade received intelligence of Zulfiqār Beg’s march, he pretended to retire to hilly fastness, suffering himself to be pursued by Zulfiqār Beg, who, being inexperienced in the art of Deccan warfare, fell into the snare, and advanced to chase him. When the Mughals were divided in the defiles, the Marathas fell upon them from their retreats, closing all paths behind them and cutting off a large detachment from their forces inflicted a severe defeat. Zulfiqār Beg and many of his followers were killed in the battle, and their baggage and other effects were looted by the Marathas.

Those who laid down their arms to save their lives were made prisoners.  

On receiving the news of this disaster, Husain 'Ali Khan despatched Raja Muhkam Singh, his Diwan, with a suitable army, to avenge the honour of his arms; and also directed Saifu’d-din 'Ali Khan, his younger brother, who was acting as the Subedar of Burhanpûr, to help him in this campaign. They advanced against the Marathas, but failed to achieve any substantial result. Khanderao Dabhade molested their force by guerilla warfare. His men used to retire when the Mughal army approached, and when they departed, they used to re-occupy their former positions, thus rendering their operations futile. For his successful conduct of warfare against the Mughals, Khanderao Dabhade was raised to the rank of Senapatî, or Commander-in-Chief, when he presented himself at the Court of Raja Sâhû.  

The reverses of the Amîru’l-Umarâ’s army in the Deccan gave satisfaction to the Emperor who, for his part, left no stone unturned to incite the Maratha chiefs and urge the Imperial officers to defy his authority in any way they could. He also sent secret orders to the chief landholders of the Deccan to withhold payment of revenue to his collectors. This encouraged the people to stir up disaffection against the regime of the Amîru’l-Umarâ. The Marathas, pretenting to be acting in the name of the Emperor, realized the revenue, and dismissed the collectors appointed by the Amîru’l-Umarâ. Especially in Bijânpûr and the Carnatic, the Mughal rule existed only in name.  

Realizing his authority thus undermined, the Amîru’l-Umarâ had no alternative but to have recourse to diplomacy. He started negotiating with Raja Sâhû with a view to an agreement with him as regards the administration of the Deccan. Muhammad Anwar Khan, Nazim of Burhanpûr, supported him in this resolve. He, therefore, sent his ambassador Shankrajî Malhar—originally a Brahmin clerk in the service of Sivâji—who rose to eminence after the conquest of Jinji by the Mughals and entered the Imperial service, to the Court of Raja Sâhû. Shankrajî Malhar assured the Amîru’l-Umarâ that if the

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1 Khâfi Khan, op. cit., p. 779.  
2 Siycr, op. cit., p. 409.  
3 Khâfi Khan, op. cit., p. 780.
demands of Rāja Sāhū were conceded, he “would have an interest in the prosperity of the country; that this was the only way to restore tranquillity, and a certain means to obtain powerful allies by whose aid he might rest secure from present intrigues and eventually defy the avowed hostility of the Emperor”.1 Bālājī Vishwanāth and Chimmājī conducted the negotiations on behalf of Rāja Sāhū. They insisted on making the agreement formerly entered into by Zulfiqār Khān and Rāja Sāhū, the basis of their discussion. This agreement expressly gave Rāja Sāhū the right of collecting Chauth and Sardeshmukhi in the Imperial provinces, subject to the condition that the contribution was directly to be realized by the officials of the Imperial Government and then paid to the Maratha agents. Later, Rāja Sāhū had agreed to forego the right of Sardeshmukhi, by means of a settlement to which he and Dā'ūd Khān Pannī, the deputy of Zulfiqār Khān, were the parties. Bālājī Vishwanāth proposed that the right of levying Chauth and Sardeshmukhi in the six Sūbahs of the Deccan should be duly recognised and confirmed by the Amīru'l-Umarā.2 These dues were to be levied directly by the Maratha agents, instead of being contributed to the Maratha Court by the Imperial Government, as stipulated in the agreement arrived at between Rāja Sāhū and Zulfiqār Khān, six years earlier. Secondly, it was proposed that the Maratha Court should also be entitled to a share of 35 per cent in the abwābs (miscellaneous cesses and imports) and the rākdārī (road duties) realized from the ryots, merchants and travellers. Thus they were practically entitled to half the total revenue recorded in the Government rent-roll.3 Thirdly, two Maratha generals were to reside at Aurangābād with a body of troops, as deputies of Rāja Sāhū, in order to safeguard the interests of the Maratha Court. Fourthly, Rāja Sāhū shall be allowed to possess sovereign rights over the territory which formerly belonged to Sivājī (swarājya), including the Carnātic districts, with the exception of Khāndesh, in lieu of which he should get the adjoining

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2 The Deed for the Chauth is dated 22nd Rabī‘u’l Ākhīr, 1131 (A.H.), and grants to Rāja Sāhū the fourth of the whole revenue of the six provinces of the Deccan. The Sardeshmukhi grant is dated 4th Jamādīu’l-Awwal. It was initialled after twelve days’ haggling on the part of both parties. (Grant Duff, vol. I, p. 372).
3 Khāfī Khan, op. cit., p. 784.
districts of Pandharpur and Trimbak. The fort of Shivner was to be evacuated and the conquests lately made in Berar, Gondwana and the Carnatic, were to be confirmed. Sahu's family kept in custody for ransom by A'zam Shah was to be sent back home.

If all the aforesaid conditions were accepted by the Amirul-Umarah, then in that case Balaji Vishwanath agreed to recognize the sovereignty of the Emperor and to pay an annual tribute of ten lakhs of rupees in return for the districts ceded to Raja Sahu. The latter also held himself responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in the territory where he levied Chauth and Sardeshmukhi to suppress depredations, and promised to protect the life and property of the inhabitants against violence and plunder. Moreover, he agreed to keep fifteen thousand horse at the disposal of the Viceroy of the Deccan. Santaji, Parsoji Bhonsla, Udaji Pawar, Visharsao and several other commanders were posted at Aurangabad with their contingents. Balaji Vishwanath also promised, on behalf of Sahu, that the latter would not molest Sambhaji of Kolhapur.

The Amirul-Umarah accepted these humiliating terms without demur and wrote to the Emperor for the confirmation of the agreement entered into by Raja Sahu and himself. In fact, the Amirul-Umarah was compelled to enter into these negotiations because he felt helpless against the rising power of his adversaries, and also in order to procure the help of the Maratha soldiery to defend his own as well as his brother's interests vis-a-vis the Emperor. In accordance with the terms of the treaty, Balaji appointed permanent Maratha officials (Ghumashtedars) in all the districts of the Mughal Deccan to collect Chauth and Sardeshmukhi. He himself and Chimnaji

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The Konkan territory handed over to the Marathas consisted of the following subdivisions: Gandavi, Jowur, Choule, Bimgarh, Bimre, Kaliani, Rajpuri, Dabul, Jowli, Rajpur, Ponda, Akola and Kudal. (Grant Duff, vol. I, p. 377; Sardesai, Marathi Riyasat, vol. V, p. 136-37.)


took up their residence at Aurangābād as Wakīls of Rāja Sāhū.\(^1\)

When Farrukhshiyr was apprised of the terms of the treaty, he repudiated it, refusing to ratify it on the ground that it was at once derogatory and dangerous. He could not possibly allow the new political combination between the Amīru’l-Umarā and Rāja Sāhū to grow and receive official sanction. This attitude of the Emperor precipitated an open rupture between him and the Sayyid brothers. Moreover, the Amīru’l-Umarā had been for some time past constantly receiving letters from his brother, urging him to come to Delhi as soon as possible. The Court intriguers had started to conspire against his authority; and Mīr Jumla, in contravention of the compact that had ended the first rupture between the Emperor and the Sayyid brothers, had returned to the capital.

On receiving this news from his brother, the Amīru’l-Umarā asked to be permitted to go to the capital in order to repair his health. He complained that the Deccan climate did not suit him and that he was in need of a change. To this the Emperor replied: “You may proceed to Ahmedābād for a change. If your health does not recover there you may then come to the capital.”\(^2\)

The Emperor, fully realizing that the Sayyid brothers were contemplating his downfall, attempted a new combination to strengthen his position. Sarbuland Khān, well-known for his valour and wisdom, and considered to be readily accessible to Imperial overtures, was summoned to Court, where he arrived on 8th July 1718, along with a large number of troops. He was promised the office of Prime Minister after the downfall of Qutbu’l-Mulk, and was raised to the rank of 7,000 zāt, 6,000 horse, with the title of Mubārizu’l-Mulk Nāmwar Jung. He was prompted to undertake a contest with Qutbu’l-Mulk. But he soon found out that Muhammad Murād, who had obtained complete ascendance over his Imperial master—to the chagrin of the entire nobility—was playing his own game through him. Therefore, he drew back from active participation in the intrigue against the Sayyid brothers. It did not take him long to realize that he was to be used merely as a tool for the aggrandisement of others.

\(^1\) Khāfi Khān, *op. cit.*, p. 786.
Nizāmu’l-Mulk was another person who enjoyed the reputation of a stout fighter and about whom the Court party thought that he could overthrow the Sayyid brothers. He was summoned from Murādābād where he was acting as the Faujdar after his return from the Deccan, and had been specially appointed to restore peace and security in that part of the country. He preferred to remain at Murādābād, where he held a large sief, than to go to the Court and share the insults offered to the nobility by upstarts of low birth and disreputable character. He, too, was sent for with a promise that after the fall of Qutbu’l-Mulk, he would be exalted to the Ministership of the realm. He was received and escorted to the Court by Nawāb Sa‘ādat Khān.

Nizāmu’l-Mulk was a man of shrewd intelligence. It did not take him long to come to his own assessment of the state of affairs in the capital. He wisely refrained from committing himself to any definite proposal or opinion. He felt extremely disgusted at the levity of the Emperor and his favourites. When Farrukhshiyar failed to employ him for his designs, he estranged him by confiscating all his estates in the neighbourhood of Murādābād and bestowing them upon Muhammad Murād (I‘tiqād Khān). The obstinacy of the Emperor alienated Nizāmu’l-Mulk who found himself unable to defer to men of the type of I‘tiqād Khān.

Now, having failed to gain the goodwill of Sarbuland Khān and Nizāmu’l-Mulk, the Emperor sent a pressing invitation to Rāja Ajit Singh of Jodhpūr, who was then acting as the Sūbedār of Ahmedābād, to come to the capital for urgent consultation. After his arrival at the Court, he was raised to the hereditary title of Mahārāja. He was a close friend of Qutbu’l-Mulk. He knew the Emperor too well to rely upon his promises which were never meant to be kept. He, however, succeeded in effecting a temporary reconciliation between the Emperor and the Prime Minister.

Qutbu’l-Mulk tried to win over Nizāmu’l-Mulk by promising him the Government of Mālwa if he cared to remain neutral in the struggle which he knew full well would not be long in coming. Nizāmu’l-Mulk was extremely dissatisfied with the treatment meted out to him by the Emperor. His
estates had been confiscated and conferred on I'tiqād Khān, the favourite of the Emperor, whom Nizāmu'l-Mulk and the other nobles detested. Qutbu'l-Mulk profited from the mistakes of the Emperor. He paid a visit to Nizāmu'l-Mulk who felt seriously aggrieved against the Emperor, and by his tactful behaviour won him over to his side. Thus he made peace with the most influential nobles at the capital, and well prepared the ground for future contest. Qutbu'l-Mulk also visited Khān-i-Daurān, superintendent of the audience-hall and paymaster of the Emperor’s personal troops, who was also chafing at the increasing influence of I’tiqād Khān, and succeeded in gaining his goodwill also. He thus smoothed away all opposition with tact and treasure.¹

Then Qutbu'l-Mulk started raising troops in the capital. The troops were generally discontented with the Emperor on account of lack of regular pay and subsistence in the Imperial service, and the consequent hardship they had to bear. In fact, Qutbu'l-Mulk had contrived things in such a manner, by his wilful neglect, that nine months’ pay of the soldiery was in arrears. This had caused wide-spread discontent. Qutbu'l-Mulk made the best use of this situation. He started advancing money lavishly out of his own treasury and raised an army of twenty thousand men ready for any emergency. In the meantime, the Emperor had appointed Muhammad Amīn Khān Chin (I’timādu’d-Daula) the Sūbedār of Mālwa in place of Rāja Jai Singh Sawālī, in anticipation of his plans to stop the march of the Amīru’l-Umarā, if the latter dared to proceed to the capital without his permission. Muhammad Amīn Khān obeyed the orders, but he knew that his force of six thousand horse was inadequate to offer a successful resistance to the Amīru’l-Umarā. Moreover, his relations with I’tiqād Khān were by no means cordial. He considered him to be responsible for his removal to Mālwa to bear the brunt of Husain ‘Ali Khān’s (Amīru’l-Umarā’s) attack.² Naturally, he wanted to avoid putting himself in this position. He left Mālwa and repaired to the capital without asking permission from the Emperor. On arrival he was deprived of his rank,

¹ Khāfi Khān, op. cit., p. 802.
² Muhammad Amīn Khān was superseded in the post of Bakhshī by Islām Khān.
and his estates were confiscated. Qutbu’l-Mulk, who waited eagerly for such opportunities, succeeded in winning him over to his side. It was mainly through the intercession of Qutbu’l-Mulk that Muhammad Amin Khan was allowed to live in the capital.\(^1\)

Thus Qutbu’l-Mulk, by his tactful manipulation, succeeded in gaining the general sympathy of the nobility, while the policy and behaviour of the Emperor towards men like Nizāmu’l-Mulk and Sarbuland Khan alienated them and sharpened their antagonism. Sarbuland Khan was reduced to extreme poverty. All his estates were transferred to Mīr Jutnlā. His property, including elephants, horses and household effects, was pawned with his creditors. He had resolved to retire from the world altogether and to become a recluse. To please him, Qutbu’l-Mulk visited him at his place and sent for his creditors to pay them his debts out of his private treasury. He also paid the arrears of his officers’ pay, sent him presents and offered him the Sūbedārī of Kābul which had fallen vacant at that time and thus bound him to his interest by a sense of obligation. Smarting under disappointment he espoused the Sayyids’ cause.\(^2\)

Having received many letters from his brother, warning him of the risks of delay in reaching the capital, the Amīru’l-Umarā, after making necessary arrangements at Aurangābād, despatched Saifu’d-dīn ‘Alī Khān to Burhānpūr, at the head of a vanguard of 5,000 men. The latter was directed to prepare camp-equipage and to collect materials of war. ‘Alam ‘Alī Khān, the nephew of the Amīru’l-Umarā, whom the latter had adopted as his son, was appointed his deputy in charge of the administration of the six sūbahs of the Deccan. The Amīru’l-Umarā began his march in November 1718 in the direction of Delhi. His army was about 8,000 strong. Besides, he was accompanied by sixteen thousand Marathas, under the command of Bālaṅī Vishwanāth, and Khanderao Dabhade, Santāji Jodhāo, Shankarajī Malhar, Santāji Bhonsla, son of Parsoji Bhonsla, the Maratha governor of Berār and the founder of the Bhonsla dynasty of Nāgpūr. The Amīru’l-Umarā promised Bālaṅī Vishwanāth to pay eight annas daily each to his soldiers from the date of their starting on the

\(^1\) Khāfī Khān, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 802.  
\(^2\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 801.
march until their return home. Some big landholders of the Deccan also joined him.¹

On his way he made several new appointments, placing men whom he trusted in charge of the forts of Malher and Salher. After crossing the Narbada at Akbarpur, the Amīru’l-Umarā arrived at Mandū where he met Ikhlās Khān who had been sent by the Emperor, on receiving intelligence of his march, to persuade him to go back to the Deccan. Ikhlās Khān was known to be a very tactful and persuasive person who had great influence with the Sayyid brothers, and chiefly with the Amīru’l-Umarā.² Instead of preventing the latter from pursuing his march he did just the contrary. He warned him that the Emperor was doing his utmost to bring about the downfall of Qutbu’l-Mulk, and that his presence was urgently required in Delhi. The firman carried by Ikhlās Khān, after acknowledging the receipt of Husain ‘Alī Khān’s report of his coming to court, goes on to state that the conditions asked for the release of Rāja Sāḥū’s family were accepted. For such an important business it was right and proper for him (Amīru’l-Umarā) to go to Delhi and His Majesty yearned to see him. At the same time public affairs in the Deccan were not such as to admit of his absence from there. In his reply, Husain ‘Alī Khān admitted that to go to the Court without orders was against all conventions, but he required to represent in person certain very important political matters about the Deccan. In fact, he further added, he would have returned to the Deccan but the officers of Rāja Sāḥū who were with him, would suspect him of treachery, the consequences of which might be harmful for the Imperial as well as his own interests. Moreover, he was longing to see His Majesty for a long time. As he

² He was originally a khatri by caste and his name was Debidda. Under the spiritual influence of Mullā ‘Abdullāh Siālīkotī, he embraced Islam and entered the service of the Emperor Aurangzīb. In the 29th year of Aurangzīb’s reign he was appointed Mushrif and in the 30th year he was made secretary to Rūḥullāh Khān. In the 39th regnal year he was raised to the rank of 400,300 horse, and appointed faujdār of Indīr. In the 50th year he was promoted to be the Wākīl of Prince Shāh ‘Alam (Bahādur Shāh). The latter, after his accession, raised him to the rank of 2,500, 1,000 horse and bestowed upon him the title of Ikhlās Khān. He was a learned man and the Emperor was fond of his company. In the beginning of Farrukhisiyar’s reign he retired from service, but was re-engaged by the Sayyid brothers as the Mīr Munāh. Later, he was raised to the rank of 7,000. He compiled a history of Farrukhisiyar’s reign, called Pādshāhādī. (Ma’āthiru’l-Umarā, vol. I, pp. 351-52.)
had already covered a long distance, the remaining distance to cover was short; he had, therefore, decided to present himself to his Majesty, discuss certain affairs of the Deccan and then return to his Government.¹

When the Amīru’l-Umarā reached Ujjain, it was brought to his notice by Barqandāz Khān, the faujdār of Gwalior, that reconciliation had been brought about between the Emperor and his brother, the Prime Minister. He also received letters from his agents at the Court to this effect. On this the Amīru’l-Umarā is reported to have observed: “If the Emperor no longer retains any animosity or rancour against us and will deal with us kindly and without malice, we have no other desire or intention but to behave as dutiful subjects. My object is only to pay homage to the Emperor, and also to reassure myself about certain matters, after which I shall return to the Deccan.” But after two or three days he is reported to have told some of his confidants that the Emperor’s proceedings were mere snares which he was weaving to catch simpletons. Perhaps the Emperor was not aware of the saying: “Where was a secret kept if it was mentioned in an assembly of people.” By this the Amīru’l-Umarā meant to show that he was fully aware of the secret designs and intentions of the Emperor concerning his brother and himself. He was determined to put an end to this game of hide-and-seek, and to cut short the long drawn-out struggle between his brother and the Emperor which had been waxing and waning spasmodically for a long time. Numerous attempts at reconciliation had served as merely temporary devices, allowing breathing-time to the parties concerned.²

From Ujjain, the Amīru’l-Umarā made forced marches towards Delhi through the territory of Rāja Jai Singh Sawāl, who was considered to be one of the principal agents of the Emperor. At the Amīru’l-Umarā’s instigation the villages were plundered. One of the high officials of the Rāja brought some offerings which were not accepted. On reaching the neighbourhood of Delhi, the Amīru’l-Umarā encamped near the pillar of Firūz Shāh on 16th February 1719. Men of distinction came to pay their respects to him from the capital.

² Khāfi Khān, op. cit., p. 801. ³ Ibid., p. 801.
Against the established practice of the time, he ordered his drums to be beaten in order that everybody in the capital might know about his rebellious designs. He is reported to have said openly that he did not regard himself any longer a subject of the Emperor; this is the reason why he ordered his drums to be beaten within earshot of the Emperor’s residence to declare his independence; loss of rank or Imperial displeasure being immaterial to him.

Rāja Jai Singh Sawāī advised the Emperor to take strong measures to crush the rebellion of the Sayyids, but he was dispirited by the sense of uncertainty prevailing at the Court. The Emperor was just as incapable of reconciliation with the Sayyid brothers as he was undecided as to any definite plan of action to consolidate his authority. Khāfī Khān well observes: “Now raging with anger he rolled up his sleeves; beginning with threatening vengeance against the two brothers, he ended by taking a conciliatory turn. He concealed himself behind the curtain of dissimulation and opened the door of amity upon the face of enmity.”

Now, Qutbu’l-Mulk sent a message to the Emperor, stating his brother’s grievances against him and proposing terms of reconciliation, if the Emperor so desired. He demanded that Rāja Jai Singh Sawāī should forthwith be dismissed from service and ordered to go to Amber. He further asked that the Emperor should have no initiative in so far as the nomination of the officers of the artillery and the Dīwān-i-Khās was concerned, and that the appointment of the Emperor’s personal attendants should be made in favour of Amīru’l-Umarā’s men. “If these conditions are accepted, then the Amīru’l-Umarā will have no objection to come down to pay homage to the Emperor as usual.”

These demands were acceded to by the Emperor without demur. Rāja Jai Singh was ordered to leave the capital immediately for Amber. Qutbu’l-Mulk dismissed I’tiqād Khān and other personal attendants of the Emperor who had intrigued against him, and placed those in their place whom he trusted as his creatures. Two days later, further measures were taken to secure the fort by giving the keys of the gates of the palace, the privy audience and the dormitory to his own men.

After making these arrangements the Amīru’l-Umarā set out to pay a visit to the Emperor. His army and that of the Marathas had surrounded the fort. He presented himself before the Imperial presence with scant ceremony, and then returned to his own palace after receiving the customary robes of honour and presents.

Next morning Qutbu’l-Mulk, accompanied by Rāja Ajit Singh of Jodhpūr and a selected escort, went to the Emperor and frankly opened his whole catalogue of grievances against him in the following words:

In return for services to you and to your ancestors and for risking our own lives for your sake, we have, ungrateful king, received only evil thoughts, suspicions and treacherous designs. We have, as proof of our words, the orders that you sent to Dā’ūd Khān Afghān and other rebels in the Deccan, directing them to oppose and slay your faithful servant (Husain ‘Alī Khān). You have always contrived to act against your promises and agreements. At last your actions have reached a height of perfidy which is unheard of and unseen in this epoch. Our fears and suspicions will not be allayed until we acquire absolute control over all the great offices of the State without any conditions whatever.¹

The Emperor, on hearing the speech of Qutbu’l-Mulk, could not restrain his temper and abused him for his infidelity. During the night the whole city was seething with commotion. At daybreak, certain nobles, including Sa’ādat Khān, the father-in-law of the Emperor, Ghāzīu’d-Dīn Khān and A’zīz Khān, the Turk, advanced towards the castle with their troops for a trial of strength with the Amīru’l-Umarā. Meanwhile, the followers of Khān-i-Daurān shot a few arrows in the direction where the Maratha contingents were encamped which had passed the night under arms, ready for plunder. An exchange of shots followed. Some disbanded Mughal soldiers also joined the followers of Khān-i-Daurān. A regular engagement took place, and the Marathas fled in various directions to seek safety. As Khāfī Khān observes, “this served

¹ Ibid., p. 808.
the Marathas right, otherwise they would have pretended that they deposed the Emperor by the force of their arms and set up another on the throne of Delhi".¹

Kāmrāj has described the incident in the following words:

Only an hour or an hour-and-a-half after daybreak (28th February 1719) a great disturbance arose in the city. Muhammad Amīn Khān Chin Bahādur and Zakariya Khān, at the instance of Husain ‘Alī Khān, were on their way at the head of their Mughals to attend the Sayyids’ darbār. As the crowd of the Marathas in the streets and lanes near the fort impeded their progress, the Mughals began to push them forcibly on one side and open a route for the two Nawābs and their retinue. Having in the Deccan felt for many years the weight of their right arm, the Marathas as soon as they saw the Mughals’ faces, fled like a flock of sheep before a pack of wolves. So overcome with fear were they that with no man pursuing, they allowed the Bazaar idlers to relieve them of their horses and spears. Things came to such a pass that the women attendants, belonging to the public Sarāi in Mughalpūra, seized each the bridle reins of some five of these Rawat horsemen, and by hitting them with sticks or throwing bricks at them, unhorsed them in spite of their lances, stripped them and killed them. In their panic these men lifted neither hand nor foot to defend themselves, but crept like mice into any door-way or passage that they could find. It was enough for a shop-keeper to stand up, and with a sign or a frown to demand the surrender of their arms.²

The disorderly flight of the Maratha troops, on whom the Amīru’l-Umarā was relying so much, created panic in his army. The Maratha generals were also dispirited because nearly fifteen hundred of their followers were slain, including Santāji Bhonsla and Bālājīpant Bhanu. If the Emperor had previously designed a concerted action, this was the time for him to strike. But he had already alienated the sympathies of the nobles by his foolish and capricious actions. None came out to espouse his cause. The general public disliked the idea

of the Marathas encamping within the limits of the Imperial city. But as they had no special cause to fight or die for, they kept silent and sullen.

The tables were turned in favour of the Sayyid brothers when the Tūrāni soldiery were seen carrying the banners of Iʿtimād-ud-Daulah (Muhammad Amin Khan) in the direction of Amīruʿl-Umarāʾ’s camp. Nizāmuʿl-Mulk did not take any active part in the contest. He stood with his men in the enclosure of the fruit-market until he heard that Farrukhsiyar had been seized, and thereupon he withdrew to his house.¹ In the meantime, drums loudly proclaimed the accession of Abul Barakāt Raffīʿuʿd-Darajāt, the youngest son of Rafīʿuʿsh-Shān, to the throne and the imprisonment of Farrukhsiyar. Najmuʿd-dīn ʿAlī Khān, the younger brother of the Prime Minister, and Ratan Chand, entered the palace with an escort of troops, and dragged Farrukhsiyar out of his private apartments where he had concealed himself. They blinded him in a most cruel manner, and imprisoned him in a small, narrow room in the fort in which only those prisoners were kept who were destined to be tortured for their heinous offences. He remained in captivity for two months when he was ordered to be killed in the most brutal manner.²

By setting Raffīʿuʿd-Darajāt, a youth of twenty years of age, on the Imperial throne, the Sayyid brothers reached the climax of their power. The young Emperor was suffering from consumption and was incapable, physically as well as mentally, of taking any initiative. The Sayyid brothers assumed control of all the departments of the Government. They took possession of all the Imperial treasures and other valuable effects in the palace. Qutbuʿl-Mulk, being of an amorous turn of mind, took several beauties of Farrukhsiyar’s zenana to himself. During the four months of Raffīʿuʿd-Darajāt’s reign, the two brothers, in spite of mutual jealousy, exercised all sovereign powers in the State. They retained complete control over the person of the Emperor so long as he lived.

During the short reign of Raffīʿuʿd-Darajāt, Bālājī Vishwanāṭh had obtained the confirmation of the provisions of the treaty entered into by Husain ʿAlī Khān and Rāja Sāhū. A Sanad was issued on the 22nd Rabi ’11, 1131 H.

(3rd March 1719) granting the Marathas the right of collecting Chauth in the six Sūbahs of the Deccan, including the tributary states of Tanjore, Trichinopoly and Mysore. The second Sanad dated the 4th Jamādī 1,1131 H. (14th March 1719) was for conceding Sardeshmukhī (10 per cent of the remaining three-fourths of the same revenue). The third Sanad confirmed Rāja Sāhū in the possession of the territories which came under the Maratha domination (Swarājya) at the time of Sivāji’s death in 1681. The mother and wife of Sāhū and Madan Singh, the natural son of Sambhāji, were released and allowed to accompany Bālāji Vishwanāth to Satāra.1

The confirmation of the treaty served as a great diplomatic and moral victory for Rāja Sāhū over his rival of Kolhāpur and gave him unequivocal leadership of the Maratha people. It marked the weakening of the Imperial rule in the Deccan and a death-blow to Mughal prestige all over the country. This transaction gave the Marathas an imperium in imperio, and secured to them the predominance in the six Sūbahs of the Deccan and the Carnātic, and legal recognition of their demands.

Some writers have tried to give a political justification to the principle of the contribution of Chauth and have likened it to the system of subsidiary alliance established by Lord Wellesley. In the opinion of Rānāde:

...the story of this transference of power from the old Mahomedan rulers to the hands of the Maratha confederacy presents features the like of which were seldom witnessed in the past history of India, and resembles faithfully the history of the success achieved by the Great Marquis of Wellesley when he organized the system of the subsidiary alliances which secured to the British company its sovereignty over the continent of India. The idea of the subsidiary alliances was, in fact, a reproduction on a more organized scale of the plan followed by the Maratha leaders a hundred years in advance when they secured the grant of the Chauth and the Sardeshmukhī from the Imperial authorities at Delhi.2

This is an altogether fallacious analogy. In fact, the under-

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2 Rānāde, Rise of the Maratha Power, p. 220.
lying principle of the system of subsidiary alliance, established by Lord Wellesley, was that the States which accepted this system gave up the control of their external activities, and in exchange for this the paramount power provided troops for defence. This force was generally paid for by assignments of territory. The system of subsidiary alliance deprived the states which accepted it of the essential attributes of sovereignty in that they had to agree to submit all their political disputes to British mediation. On the other hand, Rāja Sāhū recognized the suzerainty of the Emperor and promised to pay him tribute. Contrary to the principle of the system of subsidiary alliance of Lord Wellesley, “the Maratha kings exacted Chauth without undertaking the least responsibility for the country’s welfare, and they never expected the Chauth-paying states to give up their diplomatic independence. Marathas never cared to maintain an extra regiment when they received Chauth from a prince, nor had the amount of tribute any relation to the possible expense that might be incurred in the defence of the Chauth-paying territories.” Moreover, the promise of the maintenance of peace and order on the part of Bālājī Vishwanāth had no resemblance to the underlying idea of offering protection in the system of subsidiary alliance. It was only a promise to suppress depredations of other Maratha chiefs.

Bālājī Vishwanāth is considered the author of the scheme for collecting the Chauth and Sardeshmukhi which was introduced in the Deccan after his return from Delhi. He based his scheme of the appropriation of revenues on the standard assessment of Aurangzib’s time when the annual estimated revenue of the Deccan was calculated to be about 18 crores of rupees. But as a result of war and depredations after the latter’s death, the yield of revenue had considerably diminished, and the resources of the country had been drained to the utmost extent. In these circumstances, “to have collected even one-fourth of the standard assessment would probably at this period have been impossible; but the Marathas, in all situations, endeavoured to secure, in lieu of this Chauth, at least 25 per cent of the real balance. But although they seldom could collect it, they always stated the Chauth as due upon the Tunkha, or standard assessment, because, even should a day

\[1\] Sen, Administrative System of the Marathas, p. 116.
of retribution arrive, no claim of Peshkush could be made by the Mughals on that head, as none was specified on the deed. Thus owing to the general depression in the countryside, the demands of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi absorbed the entire revenue and exhausted the paying capacity of the peasantry. The Imperial agents were unable to recover any amount because the Maratha claims were first to be met, enforced as they were by armed authority. Naturally, the authority of the Imperial agents was gradually paralysed and all power and prestige fell into the hands of the Marathas who had established a quasi-military control in the Deccan. The ingenious scheme of Bālājī Vishwanāth served the double purpose of enriching the Maratha exchequer as well as undermining the Imperial rule in the Deccan. It did more. It furnished a basis for preserving a common interest among the Marathas, and affording pretexts for encroachment on the Imperial territory. In view of these considerations the system of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi could hardly be justified by any objective and dispassionate historian.

Rafī’u’d-Darajāt died on 11th June 1719. His elder brother, Rafī’u’d-Daulah, was then proclaimed Emperor. He, too, was kept in strict control by Qutbu’l-Mulk and the Amīru’l-Umarā. He was not even allowed to attend public prayer on Fridays so that he might not get any opportunity of coming into contact with the nobility and the people.

During the reign of Rafī’u’d-Daulah, certain nobles planned the overthrow of the Sayyid brothers. Shāista Khān, the maternal uncle of Farrukhshiyar, joined Rāja Jai Singh in his designs and raised a considerable body of troops in the capital to help Nekūsiyar, alleged to be a son of Prince Muhammad Akbar (the fourth son of Aurangzīb) whom the Amīru’l-Umarā had brought from the Deccan to play the rôle of royal pretender if occasion arose. This Prince had declared himself Emperor at Āgra at the instigation of Rāja Jai Singh who wanted to

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3 The youth was the son of a Qāzi of one of the towns in the Deccan. He was talented and good-looking and could very well be taken for a Prince of the royal house. The fiction of having found the son of Prince Akbar at Saṭāra, whose name was Mu’inuddīn Husain, was intended to strengthen the position of the Amīru’l-Umarā sir-d-e-sā the Emperor Farrukhshiyar. The Amīru’l-Umarā gave out that this boy was the rightful heir to the throne as he was the grand-son of Emperor Aurangzīb. (Irvine, vol. I, p. 357.)
use him for overthrowing the Sayyid brothers. Some influential zemindārs joined Rāja Jai Singh and it was rumoured that Nizāmu’l-Mulk had started to reinforce them with a big army. When the Amīru’l-Umarā was apprised of this, he attacked at once, defeated the pretender’s troops, seized all his property and effects and took him prisoner.

Among others who openly declared themselves against the Sayyid brothers, Rūhullāh Khān and Tahawwur Khān may be mentioned. Both of them joined Rāja Jai Singh in his march on Āgra to install Nekūsiyar on the throne.¹

The Amīru’l-Umarā resolved to march in person to Āgra in order to quell the rising there which threatened to become dangerous. He marched at the head of thirty thousand horse, and laid siege to the fort on 23rd June 1719. The fort was taken after a struggle of three months. Nekūsiyar and his adherents were captured. All the treasures accumulated there were appropriated by the Amīru’l-Umarā.

When Qutbu’l-Mulk was informed by his agents that treasures amounting to two or three crores of rupees had been appropriated by his brother, he felt much concerned and resolved to advance with the Emperor in the direction of Āgra. The Emperor, who had been ailing for some time from dysentery, died at Bidyapūr, in the vicinity of Fatehpūr Sikrī, on 18th September 1719. Qutbu’l-Mulk did not allow this news to leak out until someone else had been chosen his successor. He sent for Prince Roshan Akhtar, son of the late Jehān Shāh, and proclaimed him Emperor under the title of Abu’l-Muzaffar Nāsiru’d-dīn Muhammad Shāh Badshāh Ghāzī.

The new Emperor was fortunate in having a mother who was well acquainted with State affairs and was a woman of great intelligence and tact. At first she exercised the greatest prudence in her dealing with the Sayyids. But she secretly endeavoured to free her son from the tutelage of Qutbu’l-Mulk and the Amīru’l-Umarā who had over-reached themselves in their lust for power. The next scene in the drama of Indian history shows the downfall of the Sayyid brothers and the rise of Nizāmu’l-Mulk who played a conspicuous and decisive part therein. In fact, the hand of Nizāmu’l-Mulk is clearly discernible in all the successive political events which took

¹ Khāfi Khān, op. cit., p. 832.
place during the reign of Muhammad Shāh. Unlike other nobles, his motives of action invariably remained above board, and his personal conduct beyond reproach.
CHAPTER V

Nizāmu'īl-Mulk Posted to Mālwa: Foundation of the Haiderābād State

Before the accession of Rafi'u'd-Darajāt, Nizāmu'īl-Mulk was offered the sūbedārī of Patna, which he refused to accept because he was led to expect the prize of the Government of Mālwa for his neutrality in the struggle between Farrukhisiyar and the Sayyid brothers. But the presence of Nizāmu'īl-Mulk in the capital, after the death of Farrukhisiyar, was a source of constant anxiety and danger for the Sayyids. Either they had to secure his confidence or to send him away somewhere. They had already won over Muhammad Amin Khān I'timād-ud-Daūlah by confirming him in the office of Second Bakhshī. Sarbuland Khān had been conciliated by the offer of the Government of Kābul. For Nizāmu'īl-Mulk nothing had yet been done. His influence over the Tūrāmī soldiery was considerable. He could, by the force of his personality, impel them to action whenever he liked. That is why the Sayyid brothers thought of sending him away. The Amīru'l-Umarā even proposed to employ violence against him and assassinate him if he refused to quit the capital. But better counsels prevailed, and a compromise was effected between the Sayyid brothers and Nizāmu'īl-Mulk through the intercession of Muhammad Amin Khān. Nizāmu'īl-Mulk agreed to proceed to Mālwa on condition that he should not be recalled on any flimsy pretext.

Nizāmu'īl-Mulk left Delhi on 15th March 1719, (24th Rabi‘ 11, 1131 H.) with his family and whatever property he could carry with him. Many disbanded soldiers who were looking for employment, as well as many of those who did not desire to live under the régime of the Sayyids, including more than a thousand rank-holders and jāgirdārs, accompanied him. After reaching Mālwa Nizāmu'īl-Mulk set to work to consolidate his position there, visualizing intelli-
gently the near future when he would be compelled to come out openly against the Sayyids who had usurped all power in the State. He at once began raising troops and collecting artillery and munitions of war. He gave 500 horses with accoutrements and arms to Muhammad Ghiyās Khān to train and turn his Mughal soldiery into regular cavalry. He borrowed large sums of money from the merchants and bankers of Mālwa, and lent them freely to Sheikh Muhammad Shāh, Abu’l-Kheyr Khān, Ismā’īl Khān, Qizīlchāsh Khān and other musketeers in order to enable them to better organize their troops.¹

Causes of friction between Nizāmu’l-Mulk and the Sayyids were not long in coming. After he left Delhi, his enemies, envious of his influence, had dinned into the ears of Qutbū’l-Mulk and the Amīru’l-Umarā that Nizāmu’l-Mulk was in secret correspondence with Rāja Jai Singh Sawālī of Jaipur, and that he was one of those who prompted the rising of Nekāsiyar at Āgra. Moreover, the Amīru’l-Umarā suspected Nizāmu’l-Mulk of ill-will on account of his favouring Marhamat Khān, son of Amīr Khān, Qil’idār of Mandū, whom the former regarded as his enemy. When the Amīru’l-Umarā, on his way to Delhi, passed through Mālwa, Marhamat Khān, making an excuse of illness, abstained himself from coming and offering homage to his authority. Being faithful to the Emperor and ill-disposed toward the Sayyids, he purposely avoided meeting him. The Amīru’l-Umarā never forgot nor forgave this affront.²

By his haughty and overbearing attitude towards Nizāmu’l-Mulk, the Amīru’l-Umarā precipitated a clash which was destined to overthrow the authority of the Sayyids. He tried to win over Khwājah Qulī Khān, a Tūrānī chief of some influence, and to estrange him from Nizāmu’l-Mulk by appointing him Qil’idār of Mandū, in place of Marhamat Khān. He accordingly sent orders to Nizāmu’l-Mulk to bring this arrangement into effect at once. But Marhamat Khān refused to obey the orders of the Amīru’l-Umarā, knowing full well that the sympathy of Nizāmu’l-Mulk was on his side. The Amīru’l-Umarā again wrote to Nizāmu’l-Mulk to turn out Marhamat Khān from the fortress of

Mandū by force. After a good deal of correspondence between Nizāmu’l-Mulk and Marhamat Khān, the latter agreed to quit the fort. Muhammad Ghiyās Khān played an important rôle in effecting this arrangement and in persuading Marhamat Khān to join the personal service of Nizāmu’l-Mulk. The latter, being in great need of capable men, welcomed him in his service. Marhamat Khān also thought that Nizāmu’l-Mulk was the only man who could save him from the fury of the Amīru’l-Umarā.\(^1\)

A few days after Khwājām Quli Khān took charge of the fortress, Nizāmu’l-Mulk was informed that Jagrūp Singh, brother of Jairūp Singh, Zemindār of Amjada division in the Sarkār of Mandū, had killed his brother who was a faithful ally of the Mughal Government and served as a barrier in the way of the Marathas crossing the Narpada. His son Lāl Singh, a young man of tender years, came to Nizāmu’l-Mulk, and asked for justice. Muhammad Ghiyās Khān was forthwith directed to march against Jagrūp Singh who had, in the meantime, forcibly appropriated all the property and effects of his brother. A few days later Nizāmu’l-Mulk himself reached the spot “quick as a falcon”, and did not even allow him time to take to flight.\(^2\)

Nizāmu’l-Mulk, soon afterwards, employed Marhamat Khān to expel Jai Chand, son of Chatrasāl Bundela, who had seized the Mughal fortress of Rāmagarh in the vicinity of Sironj and Bhilasa. Marhamat Khān invested the fortress with his Afghan and Ruhela soldiers and succeeded in capturing it. In view of this service, Nizāmu’l-Mulk wrote to the Amīru’l-Umarā as well as to the Prime Minister, to grant pardon to Marhamat Khān and reinstate him in his former office. Instead of appreciating his services and granting him pardon, however, the two brothers gave an altogether false interpretation to this letter and took it as a challenge to their authority.\(^3\)

Meanwhile, Nizāmu’l-Mulk had received warning by secret letters from Muhammad Amin Khān, who wrote to him repeatedly, that the Sayyid brothers entertained evil designs against him and that, after quelling the rebellion of

\(^{3}\) *Tārīkh-i-Muzaffar* by Muhammad ‘Ali Khān, (Āsafia Pers. MS No. 450).
Girdhar Bahādur at Allahābād, they proposed marching towards Mālwa, in order to destroy him. There was nothing unexpected in these developments. His sagacious mind had long before anticipated the coming struggle for which he had already started making preparations. Muhammad Amin Khān also forwarded to Nizāmu'l-Mulk a letter bearing the seal of the Emperor, and another from Maryam Makānī, mother of the Emperor. They both complained of the tyranny of the Sayyid brothers, saying that

the constraint was so strict that he (the Emperor) had not even the liberty to go to Friday prayers and to fulfil other religious duties, that they (the Sayyid brothers) in their scheming proposed, after settling the affairs of Girdhar, to get rid of our most faithful friend (Nizāmu'l-Mulk) and thus acquire absolute authority in the State. He (the Emperor) had complete confidence in Nizāmu'l-Mulk, and was sure he would not fail to have regard for the favours bestowed upon his ancestors and that his prudence would never be forgetful of effecting his (the Emperor’s) emancipation.¹

The official news-reporters of Mālwa, evidently being the creatures of the Prime Minister and the Amīru'l-Umarā, started sending alarming reports to the capital as to the intentions of Nizāmu'l-Mulk. It was reported to the Amīru'l-Umarā that Nizāmu'l-Mulk was levying fresh forces and collecting artillery far in excess of his requirements, and that he had made new acquisitions of land in the district of Chanderī after punishing the malcontents in that part of the country. But, as the Amīru'l-Umarā had his hands full with the affair of Girdhar Bahādur at Allahābād, he waited for more favourable conditions in Northern India before dealing with Nizāmu'l-Mulk.

Having made an agreement with Girdhar Bahādur on 3rd May 1720, the Amīru'l-Umarā turned his attention towards Mālwa. He directed Dilāwar 'Ali Khān, his Bakhshi, to march towards Rājpūtāna in order to chastise Salem Singh, the Zemindār of Bundī, who was a partisan of Rāja

¹ Khāfi Khān, op. cit., p. 851.
Jai Singh Sawai of Jaipur. Dilawar Ali Khan was dispatched in the direction of Bundi at the head of six thousand horse, and was instructed to enter into an agreement with Maharan Bhim Singh Hadha, promising him the rank of 7,000 zat, 7,000 horse, and the title of Maharaja with 'Mahi Maratib' (Fish standard, a privilege enjoyed only by Maharaja Ajit Singh in the whole of Rajputana) provided he joined Dilawar Ali Khan against Nizamul-Mulk. After duly chastising the Zemindar of Bundi, Dilawar Ali Khan succeeded in winning over Bhim Singh Hadha to his side, and concluded an agreement with him on the aforesaid conditions. Having achieved this, he waited in the territory of Bhim Singh Hadha for further instructions from the Amirul-Umar. Bhim Singh Hadha brought with him Raja Gaj Singh Narwa to fight for the cause of the Amirul-Umar. The combined forces, under the command of Dilawar Ali Khan, numbered fifteen thousand, and were ready to act according to the orders from Delhi.

The Amirul-Umar now thought that the time had come when he should wait no longer to destroy Nizamul-Mulk. First he wrote to him charging him with breach of faith, ordered him to remove Marhamat Khan from his service and dismiss the extra troops which he had levied without permission and for which there was no occasion. Nizamul-Mulk replied to all the charges brought against him, saying that he could not, in good conscience, remove a man of the moral calibre of Marhamat Khan from his service, and that he had raised fresh troops in order to protect his provinces from the ravages of the Marathas. This reply could not satisfy the Amirul-Umar who sent a royal firman to Nizamul-Mulk, ordering him to resign the suzadari of Maltwa, as the Amirul-Umar wished to hold that subah for himself for better arranging the affairs of the Deccan. Nizamul-Mulk was given the choice of selecting for himself any one of the subahs of Agra, Allahabad, Multan or Burhanpur. This arrangement ill suited the interests of Nizamul-Mulk who was clever and watchful enough to realise that the Amirul-Umar was now bent on destroying him. He employed the interval in making preparations for the imminent contest, and also sent a reply to the Amirul-Umar saying
that he objected to his orders asking him to resign from the governorship of Mālwa, as the payments of Rabi‘ harvest were falling due, and these were the only source of meeting the expenses of the army which he had raised to check the inroads of the Marathas.\(^1\) He reminded the Amīrū’l-Umarā of the agreement which had been entered into by himself and the Sayyid brothers, before he set out for Mālwa. He also stated in his letter that if he had entertained any evil designs against the Sayyid brothers, he could very easily have joined their opponents at Āgra who desired him to espouse the cause of Nekūsiyar and to overthrow their government. He addressed the following couplet to the Amīrū’l-Umarā: “I swear by faith that I am not a faithless one: I swear by you that I am not like you.”\(^2\)

Meanwhile, Nizāmu’l-Mulk received intelligence from the capital through Diyānat Khān, his agent at the court, that the mace-bearers were being sent to enforce his return to the capital, and that Dilāwar ‘Alī Khān had been directed to proceed against him. He knew that if he desired safety there was no time to be lost. He had to decide quickly and act effectively. Knowing well the obstacles athwart his path, he resolved to engage upon his enterprise in the Deccan.

When first apprised of the intentions of the Sayyid brothers, Nizāmu’l-Mulk sent his envoy to Rāja Jai Singh Sawāi of Jaipur, inviting him to form a concerted plan of action against them. But his envoy did not bring a reassuring reply from the Rāja. He now consulted his friends as to their future plans in view of the menacing situation created by the advance of Dilāwar ‘Alī Khān’s forces on the frontier of Mālwa, and the firman of recall ordering him to evacuate the territory. He had formed the design of reconquering the Deccan from the Marathas ever since he had been summoned to the Imperial presence, leaving the viceroyalty of the Deccan to the Amīrū’l-Umarā. Now, there was no alternative open to him except to proceed to the Deccan and seek safety there. He knew the country and its resources, and had spent his youth in bringing this part of the country under the suzerainty of the Mughal Sovereign. He finally

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decided to cross the Narbada and try his luck there. This resolve was further strengthened by the fact that Rānī Rājasbāi, Chandrasen Jādav and Mubāriz Khān, Nāzim of Haiderābād had eagerly implored his aid, promising him their whole-hearted co-operation to oust the agents of the Sayyid brothers from the Deccan. Mubāriz Khān, being dissatisfied with the methods and policy of 'Ālam 'Alī Khān, the deputy of the Amīru'l-Umarā, sent one of his confidants, Muhammad 'Alī, to Mālwa to persuade Nizāmu'l-Mulk to march on the Deccan.¹

Muhammad Qāsim Aurangābādī, the author of Ahwālu'l Khwagin, a contemporary writer, relates that while consulting his most trusted officer, Muhammad Ghiyās Khān, about his future course of action, Nizāmu'l-Mulk made the following observation characteristic of him:

Still, I am in perplexity; that I have done no wrong is plain, nor need I feel ashamed. I have lived respected from the days of the late Emperor 'Ālamgīr until now, and for the few more days that may be vouchsafed me, I trust I may be saved from dishonour. Why do these upstarts try to harm me merely because they are puffed up by their sudden elevation? Such an attitude is becoming in an Emperor; if others gain a little rise in life, why need they lose their heads. Thanks to God on High, who is there that shall not himself receive what he has done to others? But it is not for me to begin. If in spite of my quiescence they attack me, there is no help for it. After all I am human. What man is there holding my high station who would not defend his honour? Victory lies hidden from us, it is the gift of the Most High, and is not gained by the greatness of a host. I swear by the God that made me that they may bring all Hindustān against me, and I will still resist undaunted. If longer life has been decreed me, no harm will arrive; if the hour of departure is at hand, nothing can avail me.²

In spite of heavy rains, Nizāmu'l-Mulk resolved to cross

¹Futūhāt-i-Āsāfī by Muhammad Ashān Ijād (Āsafia Pers. MS. No. 1133).
the Narbada. He set out for Ujjain, and pretending to proceed towards the North, made three marches in the direction of Agra and then abruptly turned southward. He left Mandeswar on 23rd April 1720, attended by Marhamat Khān, ‘Abdu’l-Rahīm Khān, Ri‘ayat Khān, Qādir Dād Khān Rōshanāī, Muhammad Mutawassil Khan, Ināyat Khān and others. Nizāmu’l-Mulk was at the head of six thousand horse when he crossed the Narbada at the ford of Akbarpūr.¹

After fording the river, Nizāmu’l-Mulk was joined by Rustam Beg Khān, Faujdar of Bijāgarh or Kahārgāon, and Fateh Singh, Zemindār of Mankrai. Here he also received the envoy of ‘Osmān Khān Qādri from the fort of Asīr, proposing to surrender that fortress. Nizāmu’l-Mulk first turned his attention towards Asīrgarh which was considered to be one of the most important strongholds in the region. It commanded the highroad between the Deccan and Northern India and had, by its impregnable position, defied the arms of no less a man than Akbar the Great, who was compelled to have resort to gold when the sword failed him. Nizāmu’l-Mulk also, according to the prevailing practice of statecraft, tried to capture this fortress by bribery, considering it to be impossible to reduce it by assault. Moreover, he did not want to lay siege and weaken his force for the possession of this stronghold. He despatched one of his men, Khusrau, in advance towards Asīrgarh, in order to negotiate and come to terms with ‘Osmān Khān Qādri and others. Khusrau happened to know several influential people in the garrison. He offered, on behalf of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, to pay the garrison two years’ arrears of pay which were withheld by Anwaru’llāh Khān, Nāzīm of Burhānpūr, besides other rich rewards. ‘Osmān Khān, Islamu’llāh, Chajjumal and Miān Rām were all won over by the diplomacy of Khusrau. After concluding the terms of surrender, Khusrau went back to Nizāmu’l-Mulk, who again sent him, along with Ghāzīu’d-Dīn Khān Fīrūz Jang, his eldest son and Ḥāfizu’llāh Khān Bakhshī, son of Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s uncle Hāmid Khān (Mu‘izzud-Daulah

¹Khāfi Khān, vol. II, p. 860; according to Tārīkh-i-Muẓaffarī, the number of horses was fourteen thousand and according to Siyaru’l-Mu’takherīn, twelve thousand.
Salābat Jang) to confirm the agreement, so that there might be no room for doubt. Osmān Khān and others went to the garrison, reassured their leaders concerning their rewards and safety, and then came back to Nizāmu’l-Mulk. At first Tālib Khān, the commander of the fortress refused to give in, but later acquiesced, finding himself unable to make payment to the garrison, who were actually starving. Marhamat Khān with Sayyid Habīb called on him and succeeded in persuading him to give up the fortress without needless shedding of blood. As agreed earlier, Marhamat Khān obtained the keys of the fortress on 20th May 1720, and entered it at the appointed time with his forces.  

Nizāmu’l-Mulk visited the fortress and there left his sons, Ghāziu’d-Dīn Khān and Mir Ahmed Nāsir Jang, and the spare baggage. From thence he proceeded towards Burhānpūr, taking with him five big guns and other materials of war collected in the fortress of Asīrgarh. The City of Burhānpūr yielded to him without offering any resistance. It is said that Muhammad Anwaru’l-lāh Khān, Dīwān of Burhānpūr, who at this time was officiating as Nāzim, resolved to measure his strength against Nizāmu’l-Mulk. He posted his men at the gates and on the fortifications of the city to offer resistance. In the meantime, he was informed that ‘Īwaz Khān, Governor of the Province of Bārār,  

reputed for his valour and statesmanship, had joined Nizāmu’l-Mulk, to whom he was nearly related, and had brought with him a large body of troops, which served as vanguard at Lāl Bāgh. This dispirited him and he yielded without any resistance.

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1 Sawānihi-i-Decan by Mun‘im Khān (Asafia, Pers. MS. No. 604); Khāfi Khān, vol. II, p. 865.  
2 His name was Khwāja Kamāl. He was a nephew of Ghaziu’d-Dīn Khān Fīrūz Jang (son of Qilī Khān Khwāja ‘Abīd’s daughter). He came to India during the reign of ‘Alamgīr and obtained the title of ‘Īwaz Khān on the recommendation of Fīrūz Jang to whom he was attached. He was the right-hand man of the latter during his viceroyalty of Gujerāt. In the reign of Farrukhīsīyar he was made the Nāzīm of Bārār and remained there during the Sūbedāri of Husain ‘Ali Khān. When Nizāmu’l-Mulk left Mālwa for the Deccan, ‘Īwaz Khān joined him near Burhānpūr, and played a prominent part in the battles fought against Dīlāwar ‘Ali Khān and ‘Alam ‘Ali Khān. In recognition of his services he was raised to the rank of 7,000 zāt, 7,000 horse, and obtained the title of ‘Īzdu’d-Daulah Bahādūr Quṣṭār Jang. He was an efficient administrator and was greatly fond of the company of the learned and the Sūfis. He died in 1143 Hegira and was buried in Dargāh of Sheikh Burhānu’d-Dīn at Khuldābad (Ma’dikir’i-Umarā, vol. II, p. 834).  
3 Tārīkh-i-Mūzaffarī.
whatever. When the citizens of Burhanpūr received intelligence that Muhammad Ghiyās Khān, Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s commander, had already reached Ādilābād, 24 miles south of Burhanpūr, they protested against any resistance which would entail unnecessary hardship and suffering for them. As they had no sympathy for the cause of Ālam ‘Ali Khān, they welcomed Nizāmu’l-Mulk as their deliverer from the misrule of the Maratha agents of the Sayyids in the Deccan. Now Nizāmu’l-Mulk, through Syed Zainu’d-dīn, Kotwāl, issued orders to prevent scenes of plunder and destruction which generally follow on such occasions. When the nobility of Burhanpūr came out of the fortifications to receive him, he is reported to have addressed them thus: “The only object of my exertions is to free the Emperor from the tyranny of the selfish people who have placed such strict constraints upon his liberty that he cannot even go for Friday prayers, not to speak of his liberty in other matters.”

At Burhanpūr Nizāmu’l-Mulk was joined by the men of Sambhājī, son of Rājarām, who had quarrelled with Rāja Sāhū and whose mother Rājasbāī had overthrown the ascendency of Tārābāī, and had her son crowned at Panhālā as the rightful heir of Rājarām. This contingent from Kolhāpūr included Chandrasen Jādav and several other Maratha leaders of note. She had invoked the help of Nizāmu’l-Mulk when the latter was in Mālwa, offering her support if he cared to come to the Deccan.

When Ālam ‘Ali Khān received intelligence of Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s march towards the Deccan, he directed Muhammad Anwar Khān (Qutbu’d-Daulah) who was on leave at Aurangābād, to proceed to Burhanpūr and keep him engaged till he himself arrived with his large army. Rāo Rambha Nimbalkar accompanied Muhammad Anwar Khān with his Maratha contingents. This Maratha chief was one of those who had joined the Imperial cause, and had held high positions for his services. After the treaty was signed both by the Amīru’l-Umarā and Rāja Sāhū, the latter desired that Rāo Rambha Nimbalkar should be imprisoned. He was still in prison when the news came that Nizāmu’l-Mulk had crossed the Narbada. Muhammad Anwar Khān advised Ālam ‘Ali

1 Hadīqatu’l-Ālam, vol. II, p. 98.  2 Futūḥat-i-Āsafī.
Khān to release him and send him to Burhānpūr with his contingent.¹

When Muhammad Anwar Khān and Rāo Rambha Nimbalkar reached the neighbourhood of Burhānpūr, they were apprised of the fact that 'Iwaz Khān, Governor of Berār, was waiting for them at Lāl Bāgh in order to intercept their march by sending his troops across the river Tāptī. They, however, managed to evade the troops of 'Iwaz Khān in the darkness of the rainy nights and entered the town of Burhānpūr. Rāo Rambha Nimbalkar, who had suffered indignity at the hands of 'Ālam 'Ali Khān, took revenge by opening secret communications with 'Iwaz Khān, and finally joined Nizāmu'l-Mulk. Muhammad Anwar Khān, who from the very beginning was half-hearted in his opposition, also joined him. Most of his officials, namely, 'Abdur Rashīd, Zafarmand Khān and Sheikh Muhammad Sādiq, had become partisans of Nizāmu'l-Mulk. So, although he did not like to desert the cause of the Sayyids, he was compelled to do so by the force of circumstances which were beyond his control.²

Nizāmu'l-Mulk did not advance further south. He waited at Burhānpūr for the pursuing force of Dilāwar 'Āli Khān and collected large provisions and materials of war. In the meantime, he had driven away several Maratha chiefs, adherents of Rāja Sāhū, who had come out to collect their Chauth and Sardeshmukhi in the vicinity of Burhānpūr. He compelled them to leave their military stations and return to Satārā, the capital of Rāja Sāhū. The latter felt offended at this, and started making preparations against Nizāmu'l-Mulk.

Nizāmu'l-Mulk was at Burhānpūr when the mother of Saifu'd-dīn 'Āli Khān, half-brother of the Prime Minister and the Amirul-Umarā, unaware of the recent happenings, passed through this city on her way to Delhi, travelling with the family and children of Saifu'd-dīn 'Āli Khān. She was greatly perturbed to find herself in this situation. She sent her agent named, Muhammad 'Ali, to Nizāmu'l-Mulk, proposing to give up all the jewellery and cash she was carrying with her, provided he allowed her to proceed on her way with honour and safety. Nizāmu'l-Mulk considered it

¹ Ma'dāhiru'l-Umarā, vol. III, p. 806. ² Tārikh-i-Muṣaffarī.
beneath his dignity to take advantage of a woman’s helplessness. He showed great consideration towards Muhammad ‘Ali, her messenger, conferred on him a robe of honour and sent him back with some baskets of fruit for children. The lady was allowed to continue her journey unmolested. Nizāmu’l-Mulk ordered one of his officers to escort her up to the river Narbada with a force of two hundred horsemen. 1

Meanwhile, Dīlāwar ‘Alī Khān was receiving pressing letters from the Amīru’l-Umarā, asking him to keep in touch with the movements of Ālam ‘Alī Khān in order to overwhelm the forces of Nizāmu’l-Mulk by concerted attacks from two directions. But Nizāmu’l-Mulk was far too clever a general to let the two armies unite against him and expose himself to their joint action. He manoeuvred to deal with them separately, one by one. On hearing of Dīlāwar ‘Alī Khān’s march on Bārgānpūr, at the head of seventeen thousand well-armed men, he left his spare baggage in the fortress of Aṣīrgarh and advanced northwards, sending forward his artillery under the command of Ghiyās Khān and Sheikh Muhammad Shāh Fārūqī. He himself, along with ‘Īwaz Khān and others, encamped in the vicinity of Ratanpūr which was within the territory of the estate of Makrai, some sixteen or seventeen miles from Bārgānpūr. The camp of Dīlāwar ‘Alī Khān was not more than four miles from this place. Nizāmu’l-Mulk sent a message of peace to Dīlāwar ‘Alī Khān, proposing to come to some agreement without needless effusion of blood. The latter, sharing the characteristics of the Bārha Sayyids, namely overweening pride and ignorance, refused to listen to any conciliatory advice and chose to try conclusions at the point of the sword. He is reported to have written the following reply to Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s message of peace:

What manly virtue is there, nay is it not a death-blow to honour, thus to flee from death, and for the sake of saving this paltry life, to climb so many mountains and cross so many deserts? Would it not be well to confide in

the All Powerful and come out to meet the writer, so that side by side we might return to the Presence, where exceding exertion will be made for the pardon of the exalted one? Otherwise, be it thoroughly understood, this slave at the head of twenty thousand horsemen thirsting for blood, follows like a wind that brings a destructive tempest; and if imitating a deer of the plains you escape and flee to the mountains, this pursuer will, like a panther, spring on your back and make wet the teeth of desire with the blood of his enemy.1

It would have been much wiser on the part of Dilāwar ‘Āli Khān not to precipitate a battle but to mark time, as long as he could, by negotiations, in order to allow the army of ‘Ālam ‘Āli Khān to come up. But, being of a passionate nature, he failed to make an objective assessment of the situation. On the other hand, Nizāmu’l-Mulk was an intelligent observer of human nature and a very clever strategist. He knew full well that Dilāwar ‘Āli Khān, like others of his tribe, lacked constructive statesmanship, that he was indiscriminate and of a rash temper. He also knew that his suggestion of an amicable arrangement would sting him to fury. And it did. Dilāwar ‘Āli Khān, with extreme contempt of the enemy, hurled his army impetuously against Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s forces. The latter had already planned an order of battle, placing his best men of light and heavy cavalry in the rear as reserve, and sending the rest of the force out to meet Dilāwar ‘Āli Khān’s charge, prepared to take advantage of the latter’s foolish optimism and rashness. He placed Muhammad Ghīyās Khān, the two brothers Sheikh Muhammad Shāh Fārūqī and Sheikh Nurū’llāh Fārūkī, Dārogha of artillery, and other veterans in the vanguard. Muhammad ‘Īwāz Khān, Nāzim of Berār, his son Sayyid Jamālu’llāh Khān, and Hakīm Muhammad Murtazā were in the right centre. The left centre was under the command of Marhamat Khān, who had some war-elephants with him. ‘Abdur Rahīm Khān, uncle of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, was posted in the advance-guard of the centre (Iltnish). Muhammad Mutawassil Khān, grandson of Saʿdullāh Khān,

Isma'il Khān Khaishgī, Sa'du'd-dīn Khān, Mīr Ahsan Khān Bakhshī, Kāmyāb Khān and Dārāb Khān were in the centre. Rī'āyat Khān, brother of Muhammad Amin Khān, was left at Burhānpūr to organize the garrison, while Rustam Beg Khān was serving as rear-guard to Nizāmu'l-Mulk's army. Fathullāh Khān Khostī and Rāo Rambha Nimbalkar, at the head of five hundred men, were posted in such a manner as to be able to harass the enemy by their skirmishes. When Dilāwar 'Alī Khān heard of Nizāmu'l-Mulk's preparations, he is reported to have given expression to certain phrases of silly haughtiness, according to his wont when he was drunk, as he usually was. He expected great things from his picked army of mail-clad Rājpūts, who had come with Rāja Bhīm Singh and Gaj Singh, the Afghān troops of Dost Muhammad Khān who had joined him in Mālwa and the contingents of Farhat Khān and Nāhir Khān. He also counted too much on the valour of Bābar Khān and Shamshār Khān, cousins of the Sayyid brothers who were well-equipped with soldiers, each of whom considered himself to be equal to ten men.¹

Dilāwar 'Alī Khān advanced with his whole army, numbering about eighteen thousand horse, in a bungling and unskilful manner, without suspecting an ambuscade. While he was leading his men to disaster, Muhammad Ghiyās Khān skilfully simulated retreat. Elated and triumphant he gave chase till he was drawn on to the broken ground in the neighbourhood of the village of Husainpūr, about thirty miles north of Burhānpūr in the Sarkār of Handia.² According to Rustam 'Alī, the author of Tārīkh-i-Hindi, the battle was fought near Khandwa, about 32 miles north of Burhānpūr and about 60 miles south-west of Handia.³ Here he was obliged to divide his compact ranks. When he came near the concealed reserves of Nizāmu'l-Mulk, he was met by a discharge of musketry, cannon and rockets. This created panic in his forces. Many fell dead on the field, while others fled in terror to seek safety. Dost Muhammad Khān and his men retreated in dismay. Dilāwar 'Alī Khān was struck by a musket-ball and was killed. Rāja Bhīm Singh and Gaj Singh fought with great valour and were slain. This victory speaks

highly for Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s generalship. Military strategy dictated that the best way to achieve victory over such a powerful enemy was by ambush. He took full advantage of Dilāwar ‘Alī Khān’s headlong impetuosity, and by his cool-headed tactics managed to secure complete victory over his formidable foe.

Khāfī Khān does not mention any ambuscade. According to him, the action between Dilāwar ‘Alī Khān and Nizāmu’l-Mulk took place in a direct manner. In the beginning, ‘Iwaz Khān’s wing was repulsed by the Bārha contingent. His elephant turned round and caused considerable disorder among his troops. Although wounded, he did not lose his head, and continued to conduct the campaign calmly. Qādir Dād Khān, Azīz Beg Khān and ‘Azmat Khān kept the field in spite of heavy odds. The fortune of the day varied from one side to the other, but the entire aspect of the situation was changed when fresh forces under the command of Muhammad Mutawassil Khān joined the retreating army of ‘Iwaz Khān. Sher Khān and Bābar Khān who were leading the vanguard of Dilāwar ‘Alī Khān were slain. Dilāwar ‘Alī Khān himself sitting on an elephant led the assault. Many Bārha Sayyids and Afghāns were killed and Dilāwar ‘Alī Khān received a bullet in the chest which proved fatal. Dost Muhammad Khān took to flight, but Rāja Bhīm Singh and Rāja Gaj Singh, considering it a dishonour for their race to leave the field of battle, dismounted from their elephants and sacrificed their lives. Nearly five thousand men on the side of Dilāwar ‘Alī Khān lost their lives in the battle of Husainpūr.1

On Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s side there were very few casualties. A few men of lesser fame like Tabrīz Khān, Badakhshī Khān, Khwāja Maʿṣūm, Mirzā Naʿīm, and Dīlār Khān al iās ‘Abdullāh Beg, one of the associates of ‘Iwaz Khān, fell on the field of battle. Not a single officer of high rank lost his life. ‘Iwaz Khān and Muhammad Ghiyās Khān received wounds. Both these veterans were honoured with presents of elephants and horses and their ranks were increased. Nizāmu’l-Mulk ordered his surgeons to attend to the wounded. The burial ceremonies of the Muslims, who had fallen on

1 Khāfī Khān, op. cit., p. 880.
the battlefield, were duly performed. Rāja Inder Singh was asked to make the necessary arrangements for burning the corpses of the Rājpūts.3

After the defeat and death of Dilāwar ‘Alī Khān, Nizāmu’l-Mulk went to Burhānpūr, and waited for the movements of ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān. Munawwar Khān, fief-holder of Murtazāpūr and the son of Sheikh Nizām Deccanī, joined him there with his contingent. The horsemen, who had lost their horses, were advanced Rs. 150 each in order to procure new ones. Nizāmu’l-Mulk stayed in Burhānpūr for some time to refresh his soldiery and collect war materials for the impending operations against ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān who was already on his way to Burhānpūr, and had received Imperial firmāns confirming to him the Sūbedārī of the six sūbahs of the Deccan and the faujdārī of the Carnātic and Bijāpūr.4 ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān came to know of the catastrophe through those Bārha soldiers who had escaped from the battlefield and had joined his troops. ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān had reached Fardāpūr, midway between Aurangābād and Burhānpūr, early in May 1720, at the head of 30,000 horse including 12,000 Marathas. By the orders of Rāja Sāhū, a contingent of troops under well-known generals, Santājī Sindhia, Khanderāo Dabhade, Shankraji Malhar, Kanhoji Bhonsla, and others was despatched to join ‘Ālam ‘Alī’s forces. According to instructions from Rāja Sāhū, Bājī Rao who was campaigning in Khāndesh, also joined ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān. The latter despatched his vanguard in the direction of Burhānpūr under the command of Mutahwwar Khān. This was done against the advice of experienced Maratha generals who wanted him to return to Aurangābād or to go to Ahmednagar and wait for the arrival of the Amīru’l-Umarā’s fresh forces from the North. But ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān, in his youthful pride, disdaining retreat and considering prudence to be a confession of timidity, scorned their advice. The Maratha chiefs knew that they had to reckon with a general of great experience who had been brought up in the traditions of Aurangzīb, and against whom much caution was required.5

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3 Hadiqātul-‘Ālam, op. cit., p. 100.
4 Majmu‘ul-Inshā by Muhammad Amin (Āsiaia, Pers. MS. No. 122).
When Nizāmu‘l-Mulk heard of the advance of ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān, he sent him the coffins of Dīlāwar ‘Alī Khān and Sayyid Sher Khān, along with a message of conciliation, asking him not to precipitate a contest which would cost many precious lives. But ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān was determined to try his strength. He advanced from the pass of Fardāpur in the direction of Burhānpūr and reached Hartala tank in the neighbourhood of the river Pūrna. Nizāmu‘l-Mulk also marched from Burhānpūr towards Berār in order to avoid the mire which would have occasioned much delay. The river Pūrna, which flows some thirty-four miles south-west of Burhānpūr, was in a swollen condition. As it was impossible to cross it near Burhānpūr, Nizāmu‘l-Mulk, in accordance with the advice of ‘Īwaz Khān, proceeded upstream in the direction of Malkāpūr in Berār. After about eight marches, ‘Īwaz Khān obtained information from the land-holders of that part of the country that there was a spot where the river was easily fordable. Nizāmu‘l-Mulk crossed the river at the village of Bālāpūr on 20th July 1720. This was looked upon as a happy omen because it was not so easy to extricate the army from the mire and the swollen river in the rainy season. The Tūrānī soldiery and other troops of Nizāmu‘l-Mulk attributed all this to the latter’s spiritual influence. Not a single life was lost, nor any property destroyed in fording the river. Nizāmu‘l-Mulk, after crossing the river, waited for one day in order to allow the rear of his army, the artillery, and the baggage to cross safely. Next day he ordered them to select a favourable position at Siugāon.

The Maratha troops of ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān were directed to ravage the place where Nizāmu‘l-Mulk took up his position. Their skirmishes, combined with incessant heavy rains, caused great scarcity and discomfort to the latter’s army. Prices rose so high in Nizāmu‘l-Mulk’s camp that his men and animals had to undergo great distress. The roads had become muddy and sticky. It was hardly possible to move about. Nizāmu‘l-Mulk was far too clever a general to risk the safety of his men by engaging in a general action until he was on firm ground. He bided his time till the rains abated. Then he ranged his forces in a ruined village not far from Bālāpūr.

1 Khāfi Khān, op. cit., p. 887.
Nizāmu’l-Mulk despatched a column under the command of ‘Iwaz Khān, Muhammad Ghiyās Khān and Rāo Rambha Nimbalkar to chastise the Marathas. The latter were routed and rich spoil fell into the hands of Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s men. For three days Nizāmu’l-Mulk gave rest to his army in order to refresh them after the fatigue of the march. He utilized the time in making preparations for a general action. Then he ordered his men to march five or six miles’ distance in order to be in a position to procure sufficient fodder and grain. The roads were in a wretched condition and the bullocks had grown so weak that several large guns had to be buried on the way, being too heavy and cumbersome for rapid movement. He chose an advantageous position for disposing his troops and erecting his batteries. He drew up his army in the following manner:

Muhammad Ghiyās Khān, Muhammad Shāh, Dārogha of the artillery, Sheikh Nūru’llāh, Yalbruz Khān Aghārī, Anwar Khān and others were placed in the advance-guard. ‘Iwaz Khān, Jamālu’llāh Khān and other veterans were appointed on the right, opposing the wing of the Maratha generals of ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān. Marhamat Khān, ‘Abdur Rahīm Khān, Muhammad Mutawassīl Khān, Qādir Dād Khān, Dārāb Khān, Kamyāb Khān, Ikhtisās Khān (grandson of Khān-i-‘Ālam Deccanī) who came all the way from Aurangābād to join Nizāmu’l-Mulk, were posted with the main body on the left wing. Mutahawwar Khān, with a body of Afghān and Persian troops, formed the advance-guard of the centre (Ilṭīmīsh). Rāo Rambha Nimbalkar and Ambūjī, Desmukh of the Pargana of Sanesar, had taken charge of the rear-guard (chandāwal) and the base camp (bungāh). Nizāmu’l-Mulk placed himself in the centre (qūl) in order to be the better able to give the lead to the wings.

The disposition of ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān’s forces was as follows:

Tahawwur Khān Afghān, Amīr Khān, Muhammad Ashraf Khān Bakhshī, Mitthe Khān, Muhammadī Beg, Rafāhat Talab Khān, and Rahmatu’llāh Khān, Dārogah of artillery,
were placed in the vanguard. Ghālib Khān, son of Rustam Khān Deccani, Apājī Pandit, and Mirzā ‘Alī Khān were given charge of the right wing and ‘Omar Khān Panni, nephew of Dā‘ūd Khān Panni, Amīn Khān, Turktāz Khān Tūrānī and Fidā‘ī Khān were placed on the left wing of the army. The Maratha contingent under Santājī, Nemājī Sindhiā, Khandojī Dabhad, Shankrajī Malhar and Kanojī were also placed on the left wing. The Maratha soldiers numbered eight thousand.\(^1\)

In accordance with the directions received from the Amīru‘l-Umarā, ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān had done his utmost to strengthen his position by buying over as many local leaders of troops and muster-masters as he possibly could. He granted them high ranks and tried to propitiate them by generous gifts. One of them was Muhammadī Beg, who had been Deputy Faujdār of Gulshanābād during the first viceroyalty of Nizāmu‘l-Mulk. He was dismissed from service, and twice imprisoned by the latter on account of his maladministration and his complicity with the Marathas with whom he used to share the money exacted from the peasantry. Being inexperienced himself, ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān used to follow the advice of Shankrajī Malhar, a creature and confidant of the Amīru‘l-Umarā, who had been entrusted with the entire civil administration of the six sūbahs of the Deccan. It was mainly through the influence of Shankrajī Malhar that Muhammadī Beg, Latīf Khān Banwar, Sayyid Wālī Muhammad and Muhammad Ashraf were raised to the rank of five thousand, and received rewards of elephants, horses, etc. This must have created heart-burning among those who felt envious of these newly-risen men. This also accounts for the half-hearted attitude

\(^1\) *Jangāna*: The author of this poem is Ghazanfar Husain, who was contemporary to the events recorded in it. This work is written in the Deccani dialect of Urdu and is a sort of an elegy, lamenting the martyrdom of Sayyid ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān in the bloom of his youth. The latter is described to be in his twentieth year at the time of his death. Being a handsome young man, with many good qualities, his fate aroused the sympathy of the poet, which found expression in the lines of this poem, at once musical and pathetic. The author, evidently, was a staunch partisan of the Bārha Sayyids as against Nizāmu‘l-Mulk. The poem was first published by William Irvine in the *Indian Antiquary* (January and March 1904). But a more complete version, with critical notes, has since been edited by Maulvi ‘Abdul Haq and published by the *Anjuman-i-Taraggī Urdu*, Aurangābād.
of certain nobles of 'Ālam 'Alī Khān during the battle with Nizāmu'l-Mulk. Men like Turktāz Khān Tūrānī, Fīdāī Khān and 'Omar Khān, nephew of Dā'ūd Khān Panni, whose blood was still crying for vengeance, besides many others joined 'Ālam 'Alī Khān simply because they could not do otherwise: the exigencies of the situation having left them no other alternative. In fact, 'Ālam 'Alī Khān himself, after the commencement of the engagement, was full of doubt and apprehension as regards the fidelity of some of his generals.\(^1\)

On the side of Nizāmu'l-Mulk, 'Anwar Khān, Faujdār of Burhānpūr, was trying to play a double game. He sent a letter to 'Ālam 'Alī Khān from Nizāmu'l-Mulk's camp, saying that he had joined the latter only as a matter of policy, otherwise his sympathy was with his cause. He further wrote to say that he ('Ālam 'Alī Khān) should not allow any further time to Nizāmu'l-Mulk to consolidate his strength, but should begin hostilities at once. As the ill luck of Anwar Khān would have it, the letter was intercepted by Nizāmu'l-Mulk's spies, and he was ordered to be put into prison. Excepting this case, all the generals and men of Nizāmu'l-Mulk's army were sincerely interested in the cause of their master.

The movements of the two armies started on 6th Shawwāl, 1132 H. (21st July 1720). The first gunshots came from 'Ālam 'Alī Khān's side, without causing injury to any one. Then Nizāmu'l-Mulk's vanguard was attacked to the accompaniment of a heavy cannonade. Tahawwur Khān, at the head of eight thousand men, fell upon Nizāmu'l-Mulk's forces, and succeeded in creating much confusion in their ranks. Muhammad Ghiyās Khān, who had already lost one of his eyes in some previous battle, had his other eye wounded. Muhammad Shāh Fārūqī, Dārogha of Nizāmu'l-Mulk's artillery, and his younger brother, Nūru'llāh Fārūqī, were also

\(^1\) *Op. cit.*, p. 46. Then turning to Ghālib Alī Khān he ('Ālam 'Alī Khān) spoke in this wise:

I had never put my army to the test,  
Their fakeness of heart I did not know,  
They have deceived me, and at once thrown me over,  
At the resurrection, what will they answer to God?  
They have not even an iota of affection toward me in their hearts,  
See, not a single friend is left around me.
severely wounded; the latter succumbed. On seeing this, Nizāmu‘l-Mulk ordered his other divisions to advance to the rescue of Muhammad Shāh Fārūqī who had exhibited great valor and patience, holding his men together against heavy odds. ‘Īwaz Khān, Marhamat Khān and Qādir Dād Khān came up just in time to stop the rout of their troops. Then the general action began. Great valor was shown on both sides. Muhammad Mutawassil Khān,¹ who was brought up by Ghāziu‘d-Dīn Khān Fīrūz Jang, desired to try conclusions personally with ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān. He managed to drive his elephant close to that of his opponent. But no sooner had he approached the elephant of ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān than he was attacked by ten Bārha veterans riding on their elephants, who fell upon him fiercely and wounded him. By chance, Qādir Dād Khān saw this and dashed forth to save the life of Muhammad Mutawassil Khān. Recklessly he flung himself into the close fight that was going on between Muhammad Mutawassil Khān on the one side and the Bārha veterans on the other, and succeeded in extricating himself skillfully out of the dangerous situation. Muhammad Mutawassil Khān was covered with wounds from head to foot.²

The veterans of Nizāmu‘l-Mulk’s army succeeded in preserving order in their ranks. Muhammad ‘Alī Khān, the author of the Tārīkh-i-Muzaffari observes that Nizāmu‘l-Mulk, in accordance with the maxim that “war is a trick, a stratagem”, feigned retreat in face of the assaulting columns of ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān. On this occasion he adopted the same tactics which had stood him in good stead against Dilāwar ‘Alī Khān. It was mainly due to the able leadership of Nizāmu‘l-Mulk and the skilled mobility of his columns that the enemy was lured towards the body of troops, kept in reserve, consisting mainly of European and Turkish (ahl-i-farang wa rūm) marksmen, highly proficient in aiming guns. The forces of ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān were drawn within shot range, and heavy cannonade produced confusion in their ranks. Nizāmu‘l-Mulk took full advantage of the surprise and demoralization caused in the ranks of the enemy.

¹ He was the son of Hīfīlāh Khān, grandson of Sa‘du’llāh Khān, minister of Shāh Jehān, and was married to Nizāmu‘l-Mulk’s favourite daughter Khairu‘n Nīsā Begam. (Shah-i-Afteṣa, Pas. Ms. Miscellaneous, 596, Āṣafī Library.)
² KhāṬ Khān, op. cit., p. 894.
Din Khan, Shamsher Khan, Muhammad Ashraf Khan, Khwaja Rahmatullah Khan, Mitthe Khan, Muhammad Beg, Sayyid Wali, Syed Alam Bahr, Apaji Pandit and others fell on the battlefield. Alam Ali Khan himself was severely wounded but continued to attack fiercely, regarding retreat as a disgrace. At length his elephant turned tail, but he turned round in his seat in order not to show his back to the enemy. He is reported to have exclaimed on this occasion: "It is the elephant that has turned to flee, not I." Already disabled and wounded, Alam Ali Khan was slain by the sword of Ikhtisas Khan. Nearly eight thousand men fell on the battlefield. Many Marathas were killed, while their remaining contingents took to flight. Shankraji Malhar was found wounded and was taken prisoner. Turkaz Khan Turani, Omar Khan, Amin Khan, with their men, joined the service of Nizamul-Mulk.

On the side of Nizamul-Mulk Sayyid Sulaiman and Nuruullah Faruqi were killed and almost all his generals were wounded. 'Iwaz Khan, Qadir Dad Khan, Muhammad Ghiyas Khan, Muhammad Shah Faruqi, Kamyab Khan and Muhammad Mutawassil Khan had all received body-wounds. After the termination of the battle, drums of victory were beaten by the order of Nizamul-Mulk. The latter also ordered

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2 Alam Ali Khan's bravery is described in the following lines of Jangnwa:

His whole body was pierced like a sieve,
Whatever arrow struck, he drew out and returned it,
From wound after wound he twisted and turned,
The lofty lord was a little weakened,
Coming to his senses, he used his sword,
With great force, with greatest skill.
His friends had left him, all had fled.
None was on the right hand, none on the left,
With both hands he wielded his sword.
He reminded of the scene of Karbala,
There came a bullet and hit him,
It was not a ball, it was fate itself,
He said: 'Is there no one to give me a little water?
Where is the water-carrier, call him to me.'
Nine were gashes of spear and sabre,
He paid not heed to these hurts.
This was one man, they a crowd of thousands,
In the combat his head was severed from its case.

(Indian Antiquary, 1904).

that the elephants, artillery and other effects of the defeated army should be appropriated by persons appointed for that work. This victory established the undisputed supremacy of Nizāmu’l-Mulk in the whole of the Deccan. Mubāriz Khān, Governor of Haiderābād, and Dilāwar Khān, also joined Nizāmu’l-Mulk at Aurangābād, with seven thousand horse, and offered their allegiance.¹

‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān’s family had taken refuge with the Qil‘idār of Daulatābād. After his victory, Nizāmu’l-Mulk directed his secretary, Munshi Rām Singh, to write to him, saying:

You have proved your fidelity and merit by giving shelter to the members of ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān’s family. For this you will be rewarded, whatever you desire. You should console ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān’s people. Whatever happened was in accordance with the will of God. If these people have any desire to live in the Deccan, they may choose any part thereof, and it will be given to them as Jāgīr. But if they want to proceed to Bārha, they will be provided with every facility.²

The Qil‘idār wrote back to say that they desired to go to Bārha. Thereupon Nizāmu’l-Mulk sent an escort of two hundred men to accompany them. They were also advanced ten thousand rupees in cash for the expenses of the journey.³

When apprised of the news of the defeat and death of Dilāwar ‘Alī Khān, the Sayyid brothers (Qutbu’l-Mulk and the Amīru’l-Umarā), had felt apprehensive of the position of ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān in the Deccan. They thought of conciliating Nizāmu’l-Mulk by forwarding him an Imperial patent, appointing him the Viceroy of the Deccan.⁴

According to Shiu Dās, author of the Ahwāl’l-Khwāgīn, the firman issued to Nizāmu’l-Mulk began by expressing His Majesty’s surprise at hearing that the Nawāb had left Mālwa without orders. What could be the cause of this? What apprehensions had he? Why had he not submitted a representa-

¹ Khāfi Khān, op. cit., p. 897.
² Ma’āthir-i-Nizāmī, (MS. Daftar-i-Diwānī).
³ Ibid.
⁴ Tārīkh-i-Muzaffarī.
tion to the Emperor, and acted according to the reply that he might have received? In what manner had his requests ever been refused? If he longed to go to the Deccan, how was it possible that such a request should not be granted, or if he had asked for it, the Government of the Deccan would have been made over to him. A patent would have reached him so that he might not be exposed to censure from evil-speakers. His Majesty was in no way ill-disposed towards him.

As the disorders of the Deccan are frequently reported to him, His Majesty contemplated making over to you all the Sūbahs of that country. Praise be to God: this purpose has to come to pass of itself, and by Almighty's help His Majesty's intention and your desire will both be satisfied. 'Heart finds its way to heart under the vault of heaven. A formal patent is in preparation. When you have taken charge, you will send off Ālam 'Alī Khān and the family of the Bakhshī'ūl-Mulk, Amīru'l-Umarā (Husain 'Alī Khān), from whom he has been long separated.

With the firman was a letter from Husain 'Alī Khān which stated that Dilāwar 'Alī Khān had been sent to Aurangābād to escort his family to Hindustān. The former expressed surprise at the interference of the latter with Nizāmu'l-Mulk. He had, in justice, received what he deserved. The Amiru'l-Umarā further added that certain mischief-mongers had written untruly of several matters in order to sow dissension between them. Alas! that such suspicions should arise between old friends.

Many things had been brought up which might have angered His Majesty, but the writer knowing your loyalty, made a detailed representation in order to remove misunderstanding. By this means, your enemies were cast down and your friends made happy. His Majesty has graciously resolved to issue to you a patent for the Government of the Deccan. Accept my congratulations. Ālam 'Alī Khān, my (adopted) son, and my family propose to

1 Irvine, op. cit., vol. II, p. 36.
return to North India. Kindly furnish them with an escort and see that they are not molested on the way.\(^1\)

Nizāmu'l-Mulk, being a past master in diplomacy, showed all the customary deference in addressing the Emperor and the Amīru'l-Umarā, explaining to them his position and also justifying his march into the Deccan, in view of the increasing inroads of the Marathas and to protect the Amīru'l-Umarā’s family.

Shiu Dās has given the following text of Nizāmu'l-Mulk’s letter sent in reply to that of the Amīru'l-Umarā, Husain ‘Alī Khān:

Nawab Amīru'l-Umarā! May you be preserved! In spite of his knowing your kindness and friendly feeling, and of my writing several times and my sending trusty messengers, the said Khān (Dilāwar ‘Alī Khān) would not listen to reason, and in the end brought on himself what happened to him. My feelings of friendship to you remain unchanged. Praise be to God! All has passed off harmlessly. As soon as my troops arrived, the rebels, making no stand, fled in all directions. The envious have represented the matter contrary to truth and induced His Majesty to be displeased with me. I thank God that truth has been re-established and my word accepted. A report in answer to the firmān is enclosed, and I trust it may be brought forward at a proper moment. By God’s aid I will soon reach Aurangābād whence I will forward your family and your belongings with the greatest care.\(^2\)

The Sayyid brothers were still more distressed by the tragic news of the death of ‘Ālam ‘Alī Khān. It meant the complete frustration of all their designs in the Deccan. They did not know what to do. At length it was decided that the Amīru'l-Umarā should hasten to the Deccan and take the Emperor also with him in order to give an appearance of legitimacy to his cause. Qutbu'l-Mulk was to proceed to Delhi to maintain his authority in Northern India. Muhammad Amīn Khān (I’timādu’d-Daulah), at the head of his Mughal

soldiery, also accompanied the Amīru’l-Umarā in his march to the Deccan. He was too dangerous a man to be left behind. As there was no love lost between the Amīru’l-Umarā and Muhammad Amīn Khan, each tried to checkmate the other. The latter engineered a plot, with the help of Mir Muhammad Amīn, latee known as Sādat Khān, and Haidar Quli Khan in order to get rid of the Amīru’l-Umarā. The secret was shared only by Nawāb Qudsiah Begam, mother of the Emperor. When the Royal army was encamped at Tora, about seventy-five miles from Āgra, the conspirators decided to put their design into action. Mir Haidar Beg Dughlat was asked to draw up a petition complaining of the harsh treatment of Muhammad Amīn Khān. He was to present the petition personally to the Amīru’l-Umarā. When the latter was coming out of the Imperial quarters in his palanquin, Mir Haidar Beg Dughlat approached him and gave him his petition. He, not knowing of the plot against his life, started reading it. While he was doing so, he was stabbed with a dagger by Mir Haidar Beg Dughlat. The latter was cut to pieces by the escort of the Amīru’l-Umarā. On hearing this, the Mughal soldiery assembled under the command of Muhammad Amīn Khān and started killing the partisans of the Amīru’l-Umarā. At length the latter had to surrender and the victory of the Emperor was proclaimed. The Emperor appointed Muhammad Amīn Khān I’timād’-Daulah his Prime Minister, and honoured him with the additional titles of Wazīru’l-Mumālīk Zafar Jung. His rank was raised to 8,000 zāt, 8,000 horse. Samsāmu’d-Daulah was also raised to 7,000 zāt, 7,000 horse and made Mir Bakhshī. Qamru’d-Dīn Khān was made second Bakhshī and Dārogha of the Ghulakhāna, with the rank of 7,000 zāt, 7,000 horse. Mir Muhammad Amīn (the founder of the dynasty of the Nawābs of Oudh) was ennobled with the title of Sa’ādat Khān Bahādur and was promoted to the rank of 5,000 zāt, 5,000 horse.¹

When Qutbu’l-Mulk received intelligence of the murder of his brother, he was perturbed beyond description for he knew well that his own life was in danger. He forthwith set about enlisting fresh troops with the help of the Bārha

¹ Khāfi Khān, op. cit., p. 911.
Sayyids. He raised Muhammad Ibrāhīm to the Imperial throne in order to use him for his designs against Muhammad Amin Khān and the Emperor. After receiving the news of the latter's march towards Delhi, Qutbu’l-Mulk set out in the direction of Faridābād from whence he proceeded to Hasanpūr where he encamped. Muhammad Shāh also pitched his tents some six miles from the place. The battle was joined on 13th November 1720, in which many were slain on both sides. Qutbu’l-Mulk was taken prisoner and confined in the fort of Delhi. Later he was given poison at the instigation of the Emperor. Thus the Emperor obtained freedom from the galling tutelage of the Sayyid brothers and took the reins of government into his own hands. Muhammad Ibrāhīm, who had been constrained by Qutbu’l-Mulk to declare himself King, was pardoned.\(^1\)

Nizāmu’l-Mulk, after his victory, proceeded to organize the administration and pacify the country. On reaching Aurangābād, he was apprised of the murder of the Amīru’l-Umarā and the imprisonment of Qutbu’l-Mulk. He took counsel with Mubāriz Khān on the situation brought about by these unforeseen events. The latter advised him to go to Delhi personally and offer congratulations to the Emperor. Moreover, the Emperor and his mother had repeatedly promised him in their letters that, if ever fortune took a favourable turn, he would be given the post of Prime Minister. In view of this, Nizāmu’l-Mulk set out in the direction of Burhānpūr; but when he reached Fardāpūr he was informed of Muhammad Amin Khān’s appointment to the office of Prime Minister. He marched back to Aurangābād in order to consolidate his authority in the Deccan. Thus he purposely avoided unpleasantness with his uncle who owed his rise to his father’s (Ghāziu’d-Dīn Khān Fīrūz Jang’s) influence and authority.

At Aurangābād, Nizāmu’l-Mulk set about organizing the different departments of government. He sent back Mubāriz Khān to Haiderābād to look after the administration of that Province, and appointed ‘Īzdu’d-Daulah ‘Īwaz Khān Deputy-Governor of Aurangābād. He himself set out in the direction of Bijāpūr to deal with the unruly Afghān landholders, who

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 933.
had acquired power by extortion and highway robbery. On hearing of his march, they all offered submission. Nizāmu’l-Mulk was busy restoring peace and order and chastising rebels in the neighbourhood of Tālikota when he received the news of Muhammad Amīn Khān’s death at Delhi.

Nizāmu’l-Mulk wrote the following letter to Sa’dū’d-dīn Khān (Officer-in-Charge of the Imperial household) putting forward his claim to the vizierate:

During the Sūbedārif of Mālwa, we had the privilege of receiving several personal notes from the Emperor desiring us to engage ourselves to exterminate the malign and the rebellious enemy. The Emperor promised us several times that if we succeeded in this task, the vizierate would be conferred on us and to this effect he already issued a firmān in his own handwriting. Praise be to God, in accordance with his auspicious wishes we devoted our life and our property to the Emperor’s cause and sacrificed the comforts of home to achieve our object. We undertook the most hazardous transactions when nobody was coming forward to offer his services or even to help us in any way. Trusting the Divine Will, whose aid is begged, we prepared for action. The enemy outnumbered our forces and possessed a larger number of guns to cannonade, but our men gave evidence of extreme courage and prowess in the various battles in which they were from time to time engaged. By the grace of God and the prestige of the Emperor we invariably won successes over the enemy. The adversity and the hardships we willingly underwent are beyond human endurance. Battles and their exertions have lost all terror for us now. The forces of the enemy have been scattered in various directions like the constellation of the Bear (kanāt-un-n‘ash) and disunion is rife among them. Meanwhile, Husain ‘Alī Khān (Amīru’l-Umarā) was murdered at the instigation of I’timādu’l-Daulah (Muhammad Amīn Khān) and Qutbu’l-Mulk was left helpless like a bird that has lost its feathers, to be enmeshed in the net. Thus the entire domain was cleared of the ill-wishers of the State. Our intrepidity and sacrifice should bear fruit. We are justly entitled to the vizierate which has not only
been promised to us but which we deem our rightful heritage. In view of the agreement arrived at between ourselves and I’timādu’d-Daulah, the latter would have done better not to claim the vizierate. But human weakness and lack of generous feelings actuated him to put forward his claim and to do what he actually did. He should not have behaved in this manner. Being ignored in this manner was odious to us, but in view of our near relationship with I’timādu’d-Daulah we tolerated this and controlled our feelings. If the vizierate, which is the highest office in the realm to which one can aspire, is conferred on someone else, it will cause us heart-burning and our feelings will be such as cannot lend themselves to description. If such an unwholesome arrangement is brought about, we shall have to resign from the Imperial service. For the present we are busy organizing the administration of the Deccan which is in a very disturbed condition. We are proceeding in the direction of Bijāpūr and have reached Adonī. God willing, we shall soon be free from care and reach the Imperial presence. In the meantime, ‘Ināyatullāh Khān or some other person to whom the Emperor gives preference, may be asked to work as deputy during our absence.1

To show respect to the memory of his deceased kinsman, the Prime Minister, he gave orders to stop drum-beating (naubat) for three days. Now, Nizāmu’l-Mulk started his march towards Aurangābād to form his future plans. Tafākhur Khān, Shāh Nizāmu’d-dīn, a well-known sūfī, and Ruhullāh Khān, Qil’idār of Bijāpūr, welcomed him at Anandī. Ibrāhīm Khān Pannī, Faujdar of Kurnūl, ‘Abdu’l-Nabī Khān, Faujdār of Cudappah, ‘Abdul Ghaffār Khān, son of Diler Khān, and others came to offer their allegiance. They were all awarded robes of honour.2

Nizāmu’l-Mulk, on reaching Aurangābād, received an Imperial firmān, asking him to repair to the capital immediately. There were four candidates for the vacant post of Prime Minister: Haider Quṭ Khān, Sarbuland Khān, Burhānu’l-Mulk and Samsāmu’d-Daulah. But the Emperor desired

1 Insha-i-Musāfi Jûr’at, (Āsafia MS.).
Nizāmu’l-Mulk to fill the post. Ināyatullāh Khān Kashmīrī was directed to perform the duties of Prime Minister till the arrival of Nizāmu’l-Mulk from the Deccan. The latter, after having intimated his willingness to accept the offer, busied himself with arrangements for the administration of the six sūbahs of the Deccan during his absence. He appointed Iʿzduʿd-Daulah ‘Iwaz Khān the Sūbedār of the Deccan and entrusted him with his personal seal of authority.¹ Diyānat Khān was made Diwān in place of Fidāī Khān who took leave to proceed to Mecca and Asadullāh Khān, son of ‘Umdatullāh-Mulk Amīr Khān was raised to the office of the Chief Bakshi, superseding Muhtashim Khān. It was brought to the notice of Nizāmu’l-Mulk that the misconduct of Mirzā ‘Abdu’llāh and Sheikh Haidāyatullāh was causing great suffering and hardship to the people of Burhānpūr. He immediately ordered Marhamat Khān, the Sūbedār of Burhānpūr, to be transferred to the faujdārī of Bālkāna for his negligence and connivance at mischief. Thus, having assured himself of the efficient and honest discharge of public business in the six sūbahs, Nizāmu’l-Mulk set out upon his march to Delhi.

¹ Tārīkh-i-Fathiyah.
Chapter VI

Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s Vizierate

In Mālwa, on his way to Delhi, Nizāmu’l-Mulk was joined by the zemindārs of Datia, Urcha and Chanderī with their troops. He made straight for Āgra through Bundelkhand where Rāja Chatrasal Bundela, who had taken possession of some of the royal territories including the district of Kālpī, surrendered and sent his Wakīls with suitable presents. He became Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s ally and was received into favour. Similarly Rāja Chhatar Singh, (son of Rāja Gaj Singh, zemindār of Narwar who was killed in the battle fought near Burhānpūr, between Dilāwar ‘Alī Khān and Nizāmu’l-Mulk in 1720) joined him. As the late Rāja had taken an active part in organizing the Rājpūts to help the cause of the Sayyid brothers, his son Chhatar Singh could barely conceal his fear of ill-treatment. He presented himself personally to the Nawab, made obeisance and joined him with a body of troops. Nizāmu’l-Mulk, with his usual generosity, treated him with consideration and allowed bygones to be bygones.¹

Nizāmu’l-Mulk reached Āgra on 16th January 1722, and was received by Burhānu’l-Mulk Sa’ādat Khān, the Sūbedār of the Province. The latter invited him to stay at his palace (havelī), arranged a sumptuous feast in his honour, and presented him with several elephants, horses, jewelry and rolls of cloth. Nizāmu’l-Mulk, however, accepted only one Turkish pony, and in return, gave him presents before taking leave, after being his guest for three days. From Āgra he started for Delhi. He followed the river Jamuna and reached Bārahpula, a few miles south of the Imperial capital, on 28th January. The first thing he did was to pay his respects at the shrines of Khwāja Qutbu’Dīn Bakhtīār Kākī and Hazrat Nizāmu’d-Dīn Auliyā for whom he entertained great devotion. The Emperor sent him baskets of fruits and pān

preserved in ice. ‘Azīmu’d-Daulah Khān, son of Zahīru’d-Daulah Ri’āyat Khān, a cousin of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, was directed by the Emperor to receive him there on his behalf. When ‘Azīmu’d-Daulah Khān reached Bārahpula, he was joined by Badru’d-Dīn Khān, son of I’timādu’d-Daulah Qamar’ud-Dīn Khān. Nizāmu’l-Mulk received them with open arms. He embraced Badru’d-Dīn Khān and asked him to tell his (Badru’d-Dīn’s) father that he (Nizāmu’l-Mulk) would pay him a visit of condolence straight from the Imperial palace. Nizāmu’l-Mulk spent a night at Bārahpula in his tent. Next morning, Amīru’l-Umarā Samsāmu’d-Daulah Khān-i-Daurān Bahādur, the chief Bakhshī along with other nobles, was sent in state to receive him. Yūsuf Muhammad Khān, the author of the Tārikh-i-Fathiyah, who had accompanied Nizāmu’l-Mulk in this journey to North India and who held the post of Dārogha of the Diwānkhāna, was directed to receive the guests with due formality. When Amīru’l-Umarā Samsāmu’d-Daulah came to pay a visit to Nizāmu’l-Mulk, he was led by Yūsuf Muhammad Khān to the Diwānkhāna. There were many other lesser noblemen who wanted to pay a visit to Nizāmu’l-Mulk along with the train of the Amīru’l-Umarā. In fact, the latter felt so much harassed at the sight of the crowd that he asked Yūsuf Muhammad Khān to stop people from entering the Diwānkhāna. But the latter apologised and said that his master (Nizāmu’l-Mulk) had given him express orders to allow entrance to everybody who desired to see him. This incident at once shows the extreme popularity of Nizāmu’l-Mulk among the nobles and the citizens of Delhi, as well as his capacity to perceive what is appropriate in dealing with men and situations. Everyone present in the Diwānkhāna offered his ‘nazār’ to Nizāmu’l-Mulk who paid individual attention to everybody and according to the usage of the time treated them with perfumes and pān.

After a bit of chatting, Nizāmu’l-Mulk accompanied Samsāmu’d-Daulah to go to pay his respects to the Emperor in the Lāl Qila‘. The latter received him with every mark of consideration and favour. He was awarded a gold ornament for his turban, inlaid with emeralds and diamonds and an elephant and two horses, one of ‘Irāqī and the other of ‘Arabian
breed. After his visit to the Emperor, Nizāmu’l-Mulk went to the Jāmi’ Masjid to say his (Zuhr) midday prayers, from whence he proceeded to the house of the late I’timādu’d-Daulah for condolence. Qamru’d-Dīn Khān, son of the late I’timādu’d-Daulah, came on foot some distance from his house to receive him. Nizāmu’l-Mulk embraced him and with great emotion advised him to resign himself to the will of the Almighty.

After a few days, the Emperor held a grand Durbar in which Nizāmu’l-Mulk was invested with the office of Prime Minister and was given, by way of presents, a special robe, jewels and an ornamental pen-case. The palace of Sa’dullāh Khān was also given to him for his residence.1

In this new position, Nizāmu’l-Mulk found himself confronted with a solid block of opponents who took delight in putting obstacles in his way and creating difficulties for him. Nor was it long before bitter personal rivalry broke out between him and others. Nizāmu’l-Mulk was anxious to maintain the prestige of the throne. He did not like the Emperor to while away his time in the company of low and profligate persons by whom he was constantly surrounded. But his opponents had too great an influence with the Emperor to be so easily checkmated by the new Wazīr. A somnolent condition had set in in the heart of the State. Every scheme of reform initiated by Nizāmu’l-Mulk was considered an innovation, and it was opposed partly from prejudice and partly from fear. Nizāmu’l-Mulk did his best to change the existing system of administration. First of all he attempted to reform the Court abuses which were casting their malign influence on the entire system of Government.

Kokī Pādshāh, a woman of great charm and cunning, in collusion with Khwāja Khitmatgār Khān, a eunuch of the palace, invited bribes openly from the nobility and others desiring high offices in the State. This practice had undermined the moral prestige of the Emperor who was supposed to be a party to all these fraudulent transactions. In spite of great difficulties in his way, Nizāmu’l-Mulk well knew that the time had come to act resolutely and to undertake the reform of the administration to which the public had long

been looking forward. He spoke to the Emperor about the abuses prevailing at the Court and advised him to devote more time to the affairs of the State. The Emperor, being obstinate and stupid, did not relish all this. Nizāmu’l-Mulk had that model of administration before him and desired to re-establish the same structure of the Empire which had stood the Mughals in good stead for so many centuries in India.

Muhammad Shāh was so stupid as to be unable to choose his own course of action, believing whatever his selfish associates told him about the motives of Nizāmu’l-Mulk whose every word and action was purposely misinterpreted to him. Even his old-fashioned manners and ideas were openly ridiculed by the young and gay courtiers of the Emperor. Harlots and jesters, who were his constant companions, used to greet all great nobles of the realm with lewd gestures and offensive epithets. Nizāmu’l-Mulk, not being used to such treatment, first protested in a dignified manner and then avoided the company of the Emperor as far as possible. Thus, the conditions obtaining at the Court made cordial co-operation between the Emperor and the Wazīr an impossibility. The Wazīr’s proposals for revenue reform precipitated the crisis. The system of land revenue has always been the pivot of civil Government in India, and indeed, good or bad management of the revenue has always been the surest indication of the conduct of Government in this country. During Muhammad Shāh’s effete reign it had become the practice that excessive assignments of revenue-paying lands were freely made to nobles and favourites of the Court. There were also lands of which no assignment of revenues were on record and which were under the control of the courtiers. These lands were assigned on receipt of certain sums as bribes. This mismanagement of the finances had completely exhausted the treasury and considerably diminished the income of the State. Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s proposals of revenue reform cut at the very source of income of most of the influential courtiers who started intrigues to oust him from the Vizierate. Haider Qulī Khān, a very influential person at the Court and head of the Imperial artillery, meddled in civil and revenue matters to spite Nizāmu’l-Mulk. He was one of the richest men in the realm, having amassed great wealth from his jāgīrs and
his Government in Gujerāt. He had the ambition to become the Wazīr. Being disappointed by the coming of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, he started his designs against him in order to undermine his authority. When Nizāmu’l-Mulk complained to the Emperor about the behaviour of Haider Qulī Khān, the latter was advised by the Emperor not to pursue that course openly. Even at this Haider Qulī Khān felt offended and obtained an order to take over charge personally of his Government of Gujerāt. After settling himself in his Sūbah, Haider Qulī Khān openly defied the Central Government and seized upon the Jāgīrs of several royal servants whom he considered to be inimical to his interest at the Court.¹

Nizāmu’l-Mulk, as the head of the civil authority, sent orders to Haider Qulī Khān, prohibiting the appropriation of Jāgīrs without permission of the Central Government. Haider Qulī Khān, in his overweening pride, refused to take any notice of these orders. Nizāmu’l-Mulk was compelled to confiscate his Jāgīrs in the neighbourhood of Delhi in compensation for those which he had seized in Gujerāt. News from Gujerāt showed conclusively that Haider Qulī Khān had the intention to defy the Central authority, raising himself as the Emperor himself by granting the privilege of fringed litters to his favourite officers and by summoning Franks and ‘Arabs into his service to train his troops. He had raised 20,000 soldiers, a number more than he actually required. It was reported to Nizāmu’l-Mulk that Fāris Khān, Dārogha of the Imperial Stables, had purchased ‘Arab horses at Sūrat for the Emperor. On his way to Delhi, the latter stopped at Ahmedābād for some time. When Haider Qulī Khān came to know of these ‘Arab horses and their superior quality, he took them all for himself, keeping some for his own stable and distributing the rest among his nobles. With utter disregard of decency he confiscated the properties of Sayyids and Sheikhs of Gujerāt and gave them away to his own creatures. Bengāli Khān, Faujdār of Godhra, died in Ahmedābād after a prolonged illness, and his effects were escheated without any reference to the Central Government.

Haider Qulī Khān used to go about in his Sūbah, settling revenue matters and receiving peshkash from the zemindārs.

The zemindār of Durgapūr was asked to furnish him with one lakh cash. Similarly the Zemindārs of Lonawara and Hamola were required to pay special contributions. Those who refused to pay were severely punished for their delinquency.¹ He also imposed extra revenues over and above the land assessment, which was vexatious to the land-owning classes of Gujerāt. Instead of conniving at the maladministration of Haider Qulī Khān, the Wazīr took him to task. He wrote to him strongly worded letters on behalf of the Emperor, questioning the conduct of public affairs in his province. On his part, Haider Qulī Khān represented direct to the Emperor, through his agent at the Court, that he would never fail in his duties and would always remain faithful to him, his quarrel being with the Prime Minister. On the other hand, he openly wrote to his friends in Delhi that he had acquired the country of Gujerāt by dint of his sword, and if anyone wanted to deprive him of it, let him come and try conclusions with him.²

In these circumstances, Nīzāmu’l-Mulk did his best to persuade the Emperor to take action against Haider Qulī Khān who had purposely been neglecting the orders of the Prime Minister. At length, the Emperor agreed to confer the province of Gujerāt on Ghāzīu’Dīn Khān Bahādur, eldest son of Nīzāmu’l-Mulk, and allowed the latter to go personally to Gujerāt to coerce Haider Qulī Khān. To defray the expenses of this expedition, the Prime Minister was sanctioned the sum of 10 lakhs from the public treasury.³

After the Jāt rebellion, which had engaged the attention of the Central Government for some time past, was successfully quelled, Nīzāmu’l-Mulk took leave of the Emperor on the 11th of November 1722, and set out for Gujerāt with a large force and artillery, leaving his eldest son Ghāzīu’Dīn Khān Bahādur as his deputy at the Court. He was accompanied in this expedition by ‘Azīmullāh Khān, Muhammad Mutawassil Khān, Shukrullāh Khān, Fatehyāb Khān, Hirzullāh Khān, Hīfzullāh Khān, and Tālib Muhī’Dīn Khān, all being his near relations. He marched to Āgra and thence to Sarangpūr in Mālwa, arriving at Dhār on the 13th February 1723. ‘Iwāz Khān (‘Azdu’d-

¹ Op. cit., p. 47. ² Tārīkh-i-Fāthiyah. ³ Ibid.
Daulah), Muhtashim Khān and his uncle, ‘Abdur Rahim Khān (Nasiru’d-Daulah Salābat Jang) joined him in Mālwa with their troops from the Deccan.

On hearing the news of Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s march, Haider Qulī Khān sent his son Kāzim Khān to Delhi to try to turn the Emperor in his favour and malign Nizāmu’l-Mulk among the nobles of the capital. Nawāb Roshanu’d-Daulah, a man of considerable influence at the Court, introduced him to the Emperor and tried his best to make his mission a success. In the meanwhile, the approach of Nizāmu’l-Mulk made Haider Qulī Khān so nervous that he feigned insanity and set out for Delhi covering two and sometimes three stages a day, by way of Udaipur, the Rāja of which place was favourably inclined towards him. One of the reasons of Haider Qulī Khān’s nervousness must have been the desertion of some of his Tūrāni officers and soldiery who refused to offer any resistance to Nizāmu’l-Mulk whom they considered to be “the son of their spiritual guide” (Murshidzādah), alluding to the latter’s ancestry. Several officers of note in Haider Qulī Khān’s army, such as Mehr ‘Alī Khān, Salābat Khān, Zabardast Khān and Asad Khān had already quitted his camp, and dispersed with their troops in different directions in order to avoid a conflict with the Prime Minister. Probably the desertion of his officers caused great melancholy to Haider Qulī Khān and deranged his mind.

When Nizāmu’l-Mulk was apprised of Haider Qulī Khān’s march to Delhi, he sensed collusion between him and the Emperor. In Mālwa, it was brought to his notice that Haider Qulī Khān was in secret communication with the Emperor who had reassured him and had promised to confer on him the command against Rāja Ajit Singh, who was then at Ajmer. This double-dealing of the Emperor irritated Nizāmu’l-Mulk greatly but, being a prudent person, he refrained from coming to any rash decision. He pondered over the whole situation coolly. From Ujjain he wrote to Safdar Khān Bābī at Ahmedābād, informing him of his inability to go to

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1 Alam Sheik, the great grandfather of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, was a well-known spiritual teacher of Turkistān, who traced his descent to Sheikh Shihāбу’d-Dīn Suhrawardy.


3 Mir’at-i-Ahmed, op. cit., p. 47.
Ahmedādād personally, and asking him to undertake the administration of the Sūbah till the arrival of his uncle Hāmid Khān, who was despatched to Ahmedābād with Fidwī Khān as his assistant. Most of the nobility of Ahmedābād were so tired with the oppressive system of Haider Qulī Khān that they welcomed the advent of the new regime. Some of them, including Mehr ‘Ali Khān, Salābat Muhammad Khān and Jawānmard Khān, came personally to Ujjain to offer their respects.

While in Mālwa, Nizāmu’l-Mulk made certain appointments to important posts in order to facilitate the working of the new administrative machinery in Gujerāt. Shāhpūr Khān was appointed faujdār of the new “parganas” assigned as Khālsa land and Rahmān Qulī Khān, brother of Shāhpūr Khān, was allowed to officiate during the latter’s absence. The “parganas” of Dholka, Bharoach, Jamusar, Maqbūlābād and Bilsar, well-known for their fertility, were marked out as Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s own Jāgīr and Rāi Nandī was appointed as Mutassādī (accountant) of these districts. Mutawassīl Khān, son-in-law of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, was appointed faujdār of Godhra, ‘Ubaid Khān was appointed official Wagā’ī-‘nīgār (news-reporter) and was directed to send his reports to Nizāmu’l-Mulk without any intermediary. Qavidīl Khān was sent to Ahmedābād as the official news-reporter of the province. ‘Abdu’l-Ghaflī Khān was made the Kotwāl of Ahmedābād. After making these arrangements Nizāmu’l-Mulk undertook his journey to Delhi.

On his way to Delhi, Nizāmu’l-Mulk despatched a force against Dost Muhammad Khān of Bhopāl. According to Tārikh-i-Fathiyah, Dost Muhammad Khān paid a visit to Nizāmu’l-Mulk during the latter’s stay in Mālwa. Nizāmu’l-Mulk complained to him of his encroachments on Imperial territory and asked him to hand over several fortresses which he had occupied. He had also to settle an old score against him as he had joined the forces of Dilāwar ‘Alī Khān which were sent by Amīru’l-Umarā Husain ‘Alī Khān to chastise Nizāmu’l-Mulk, three years before. After the decisive victory of the latter near Burhānpūr, Dost Muhammad Khān escaped from the field, where so many others had been slain. Nizāmu’l-Mulk was advised to arrest Dost Muhammad
Khān when the latter called on him and thus cripple him for ever; but considering this as against the recognized principles of chivalry, he allowed him to go to his camp. First, Nizāmu’l-Mulk tried to gain his end by conciliatory means. He sent his Dārogha, Yūsuf-Muhammad Khān, the author of Ṭārīkh-i-Fathiyah, noted for his plausibility, to persuade Dost Muhammad Khān to come to terms with him and to desist from harrying the Imperial territory. Dost Muhammad Khān’s advisers urged him not to give way easily. Their expectation was that Nizāmu’l-Mulk, in view of the need of his immediate presence at the capital, would not be able to stay long enough to lay siege or conduct regular operations in Mālwa. Probably this accounts for Dost Muhammad Khān’s throwing a strong garrison into the fortress of Islāmnagar with plenty of munitions and grain to compel Nizāmu’l-Mulk to relinquish his attempt. But the latter laid siege with his usual resolution for two months and finally reduced the fortress. Dost Muhammad Khān offered his submission and was given the rank of 3,000 zāt, 2,000 horse. His son, Yār Muhammad Khān, accompanied him to Delhi and thence to the Deccan. ‘Azīmullāh Khān, cousin of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, was posted in Ujjain as deputy Governor of Mālwa.

Nizāmu’l-Mulk now turned towards the capital which he reached on the 3rd July 1723. He again made every effort to reform the corrupt Court of Delhi. He tried to rouse the Emperor from his indolence and wean him from the company of his base associates. The Emperor’s mistress, Kokī, the eunuch, Khīmatgār Khān, Zafar Khān and Roshanu’d-Daulah thwarted him at every step and poisoned the mind of the Emperor against him. None among them possessed any discernible virtue except a capacity for intrigue. They all set to work to counteract the measures of Nizāmu’l-Mulk. They had completely failed in their design to set him at variance with a man of such vast resources as Haider Quli Khān and thus get rid of him for some considerable time. Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s victory put the courtiers in a false position. Their calculations proved to be wrong. Now, again they were apprehensive of being eclipsed by his powerful personality.
The indifference of the Emperor towards public matters was such that even remonstrances addressed direct to him proved of no avail; as a contemporary writer says: "What good was there in the Emperor sitting like a woman secluded within four walls? If sovereigns take to women's habits and entangle themselves in their tresses, what can a good Muslim do, but migrate to Mecca or if for that journey funds be wanting, take a dose of poison and leave this for another world?"

After his return to the Court, Nizāmu'l-Mulk put forward the following proposals for consideration of the Emperor. First, farming out of the Khālṣa lands should be discontinued; secondly, bribes and improper gifts under the name of offerings upon appointments to office should cease; thirdly, the number of assigned lands (Jāgīrs) should be reduced and given to really capable and powerful nobles to ensure sound management and regular yielding of revenue; fourthly, the "Jizya" should be re-established as in the time of Aurangzīb; and lastly, the Emperor should help the ruler of Persia in repelling the domination of the Afghāns, who might as well one day turn their attention, after bringing Persia under their sway, towards the fertile plains of North India. Probably Nizāmu'l-Mulk desired to nip in the bud the growing power of the Afghāns as well as to repay the hospitality of Shāh Tahmasp who had given protection to the Emperor Humāyūn when the latter was compelled by Sher Shāh to take to flight in 1539. The last proposal is said to have elicited the following query from otherwise incurious Muhammad Shāh. He is reported to have asked Nizāmu'l-Mulk, "Whom should I send to Persia?" Nizāmu'l-Mulk replied, "Anyone of your officers whom you might select for this enterprise would carry out your orders; or if your Majesty would desire me to undertake this duty, I would strive heart and soul to accomplish it".

Becoming conscious of the fact that Muhammad Shāh was beyond reform and it was impossible for him to give to the

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2 Muhammad Khān Ghilzai, chief of Qandahār, had defeated Sultān Hussain Shāh, the Safavide Sovereign of Persia. The territory from Ispīlhān to Shirāz had passed under this rule and the Persian King was made prisoner.
3 *Tārīkh-i-Rashādī; Khāfī Khān*, vol. II, p. 948.
affairs of the State as much serious attention as they required, Nizāmu’l-Mulk in sheer disgust decided to leave the Court for the Deccan. Being thwarted at every step by Court favourites, he intended to resign the Vizierate. Being a prudent person, however, he temporized and waited for a suitable opportunity to carry out his design. According to the author of the Siyar’l-Mutakkerīn, the Emperor had already guessed this resolution of Nizāmu’l-Mulk and as he himself desired to get rid of him, he heaped on him every conceivable favour.¹ On the excuse of keeping bad health in Delhi and needing change of air, Nizāmu’l-Mulk got a few days leave of absence to proceed on a hunting excursion to his Jāgīr. He went about sixty or seventy miles from the Capital towards the Ganges and from Soron, well-known for its abundance of game, where he stayed for some time, he turned towards Jālesar and Āgra where he got intelligence of the disorders caused by the Marathas in Gujerāt and Mālwa. Nizāmu’l-Mulk wrote to the Emperor asking his permission to go and restore order in his Sūbahs and also explaining to him the need for undertaking this unavoidable expedition. According to Tārikh-i-Fathiyah, after getting a firmān of permission from the Emperor, Nizāmu’l-Mulk started on his journey to the South. The Marathas had already departed from Mālwa when they heard that Nizāmu’l-Mulk had crossed the Narbada. Near Sironj, Nizāmu’l-Mulk received news from the Deccan, warning him of the evil intentions of Mubāriz Khān, whose father-in-law, ‘Inayatu’llāh Khān, was the Khansāmān of the Emperor and held a position of considerable influence at the Court.² Through him Mubāriz Khān had

² He was a native of Buhkāra and his name was Khwāja Muhammad. He came to India with his mother when he was a boy. Being capable and intelligent, he obtained Government employment through Mīrzā Yār Khān, a man of considerable influence at ‘Alamgir’s Court. His rise was assured when he was made deputy to Sardār Khān Kotwāl. He was made Bakhsī to Prince Kāmbaksh and served for long as suajdār in the Deccan and obtained the title of Amānāt Khān. During the reign of Bahādur Shāh he was made chief-accountant of the port of Sūrat by Mun’im Khān, who held very high opinion of him. On the death of Ghāziu’d-Din Khān Firūz Jang he was promoted to the Sūbedārī of Gujerāt in 1710. During Jehandar’s reign he was transferred to Mālwa and was given the title of Shahmāt Jang. He was again sent to Gujerāt where he was superseded by Dā’ūd Khān Panni. Farrukhsiyār sent him to the province of Haiderābād where he was Nizām for nearly twelve years. He co-operated whole-heartedly with Nizāmu’l-Mulk after the latter had established his vice-royalty in the Deccan in 1720. When Nizāmu’l-Mulk became Wazīr, he hin-
received the patent for the Sūbedārī of the Deccan. One of his letters, asking Mubāriz Khān to waste no time in assuming the viceroyalty of the Deccan was intercepted by Nizāmu’l-Mulk.¹ Mubāriz Khān had made great professions of zeal and devotion to Nizāmu’l-Mulk after the defeat of ‘Alam ‘Ali Khān, and had obtained the title of ‘Imādu’l-Mulk and the rank of 7,000 zāt, 7,000 horse and other distinctions for himself as well as for his sons, at the recommendation of Nizāmu’l-Mulk.²

Having received a firmān of the Emperor for the Sūbedārī of the Deccan through his son ‘Abdul Ma‘būd Khān, Mubāriz Khān started raising an army to realise his ambition. The Emperor had also made a grant of five lakhs of Rupees for the expenses of the expedition against Nizāmu’l-Mulk. Orders were sent to ‘Iwaz Khān (deputy of Nizāmu’l-Mulk in the Deccan), Bahādūr Khān, ‘Abdul Nabī Khān, Rāja Sāhū and other chiefs of the Deccan to help Mubāriz Khān in every possible way. In Mālwa Nizāmu’l-Mulk had also received the news from the Capital that his son Ghāzi’ud-Din Khān had been superseded in favour of Qamru’ud-Din Khān, son of I’timādu’ud-Daulah Muhammad Amīn Khān. From Sironj, Nizāmu’l-Mulk proceeded to Burhānpūr by rapid marches and thence to Aurangābād, where he arrived in July 1724.³

Mubāriz Khān, instead of immediately occupying Aurangābād, the capital of Mughal government in the Deccan, wasted much time in raising fresh troops with the help of Afghān officers and zemindārs. This delay enabled Nizāmu’l-Mulk and his generals to mobilise their strength in Aurangābād for the imminent struggle. Nizāmu’l-Mulk kept on temporizing by sending conciliatory messages to Mubāriz Khān, deprecating battle and the shedding of Muslims’ blood needlessly. But Mubāriz Khān and his men understood fully the nature of these pious sentiments. Deluded by the

derived[Mubāriz Khān, his sons and relations from obtaining increased Jāgīrā in the Carnātic at the expense of imperial revenue. His father-in-law ‘Inayatu’llāh Khān incited him to offer resistance to Nizāmu’l-Mulk when the latter left the Court for the Deccan. Mubāriz Khān was slain in the battle of Shākar Khera which established the predominance of Nizāmu’l-Mulk in the Deccan (Ma’ādhira’l-Umarā, vol. III, pp. 729-46).

prospect of becoming the Sūbedār of the Deccan, Mubāriz Khān exerted himself to the utmost to be ready for the fray. Ibrāhīm Khān Panni, brother of Dā’ūd Khān Panni and faujdār of Kurnūl, ‘Abdu’ll-Fatāḥ Khān, son of ‘Abdu’ll-Nabī Khān, faujdār of Cuddapah (Karpa), Sa‘ādatullāh Khān, faujdār of Carnātic, Ghalib Khān, son of Amīr Abū Tālib Badakshi, joined him with considerable body of troops and persuaded him to engage with Nizāmu’l-Mulk as soon as practicable; further delay being inadvisable. They had a grievance against Nizāmu’l-Mulk who had hindered them from obtaining Jāgīrs in the Carnātic, when he succeeded to the office of Wazīr. He did not allow these Afghān leaders to appropriate the collections made from the crown domains. They thought their interest would suffer if Nizāmu’l-Mulk became Sūbedār of the Deccan. This is why they espoused the cause of Mubāriz Khān.¹

On the other side, ‘Iwaz Khān (‘Azdu’d-Daulah) and Ghiyās Khān were doing their best to persuade Nizāmu’l-Mulk to keep on temporizing and avoid a fixed battle until the rains were over. But he over-ruled them on the ground that as Mubāriz Khān had received a royal firmān, further delay would bring all the faujdārs of the Deccan under his banner. In the meantime, Rāja Sāhū had sent a contingent of Maratha troops under the leadership of Bālājī to help Nizāmu’l-Mulk, with whom an agreement was concluded as to future relations. On hearing of Mubāriz Khān’s approach, Nizāmu’l-Mulk marched out of Aurangābād and encamped near Jaswant Talāb, leaving the town itself in an unprotected condition. From Zafarnagar, a fief of Ibrāhīm Khān Panni, Mubāriz Khān marched straight for Aurangābād, avoiding the forces of Nizāmu’l-Mulk. But the latter, a master in strategy, out-matched his enemy, crossed the river Pūrna with his artillery and left no alternative for Mubāriz Khān but to engage in a general action. A furious battle took place at Shakar Khera, some eighty miles from Aurangābād in Berār.² This is surely one of the decisive battles of India,

² Shakar Khera was named Fathkhera by Nizāmu’l-Mulk to commemorate his victory over Mubāriz Khān. Now it is a village in the Mehtar tālūq of Buldāna District, Berār, situated in 20°13’N. and 76°27’E., on river Bhogāwati, an affluent of the Pengangā. (Imperial Gazette of India, p. 135.)
deciding as it did the future of the political domination of the Deccan and laying the foundation of the State of Haiderābād. This battle established the virtual independence of the Nizāms in the Deccan.¹

The disposition of Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s forces in this battle was as follows:

The vanguard was placed under Qādir Dād Khān, a relative of Nizāmu’l-Mulk on his mother’s side. Tālib Muhītu’b-Din Khān, grandson of S’adu’llāh Khān, was put in charge of the right wing and the left wing was given to Ismā’il Khān and Muzzaffar Khān Khaişgī. Kunwar Chand, son of Chatrasāl Bundela, with a troop of Bundela soldiers, was placed under Barqandāz Khān, commander of artillery and ‘Atā Yār Khān. ‘Iwaz Khān was on the left wing of Nizāmu’l-Mulk. Jamāl Khān, Muqarrab Khān Deccanī, Khān-i-‘Ālam Deccanī, Mutahawwar Khān Khaişgī and Azīz Beg Khān Hārisī were placed under ‘Iwaz

¹Nizāmu’l-Mulk never openly claimed severance of the Deccan from the Central Government. But practically since 1724, he carried on the Government of the six Sābahs of the Deccan, without any reference to Delhi, unhindered in the exercise of all the sovereign attributes of a State. He conducted wars, concluded treaties, conferred titles without asking permission from the Imperial Government. But his loyalty to the Emperor remained unshaken. He refrained from the use of the scarlet or imperial umbrella. Coins continued to be struck in the name of the Emperor and his name in the Khutba (Friday Sermon) continued to be read throughout the Deccan. Even in his testament, Nizāmu’l-Mulk advised his successor to keep intact the traditional relations of loyalty with the Imperial Government. The tenth article of the testament runs thus:

That he (whom-so-ever it may concern) should know that the state of the Deccan depends upon the subservience and service and that he should never allow himself to be remiss in respect due to the Emperor. If he did so, he would be the object of contempt of God and man. When the powerful king of Persia (Nādir Shāh) was in Delhi, he offered me one day in his graciousness, the Empire of Hindustan. On this I at once said that I and my ancestors had, from ancient times, been in the service of the King of Delhi and that such impropriety of conduct on my part would make me notorious as one untrue to salt. And the Emperor would call me false and treacherous. Since his (Nādir Shāh’s) elevated mind could appreciate the significance of my words, he liked my reply and praised me.

According to the statement of Taṣkīratu’l-Mulāk (of Muhammad Yahyā Khān) and Abu’l-I-Khaudās (of Muhammad Qāsim Aurangābādī) some astrologer had prophesied that if Nizāmu’l-Mulk so desired he could sit on a throne. But he is reported to have repudiated the suggestion, saying, “May throne and umbrella bring good fortune to him who holds them! My business is to preserve my honour, and if this be mine what need have I of an Imperial throne” (cited by Irvine, op. cit., vol. II, p. 154).
Khān (‘Azdu’d-Daulah). The artillery, which the latter had organized during the absence of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, was under his orders. Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s cousin, Zahīru’d-Dīn, Ri’āyat Khān and Ghiyās Khān were posted between the left and the centre. Nasīru’d-Daulah ‘Abdur Rahīm Khān was posted on the right wing. The advanced reserve (Iltimish) was placed under Hoshdār Khān. In front of the central reserve were placed Khwājam Quli Khān Tūrānī, Gopāl Singh Gaur, Salīm Khān Afghān (deputy of the head-hunters) with his party of skirmishers and Rasūl Khān Afghān, all four mounted on elephants.¹

Nizāmu’l-Mulk himself was in the centre. Khwāja ‘Abdullāh Khān, Ihtīdā Khān, Rūstam Beg Khān, Neknazār Khān (Bakhshī of Nāsir Jang), Himmat Yār Khān and ‘Abdul Rahmān Khān were also with him.

Mubāriz Khān drew up his army in the following manner:

Ghālib Khān, faujdār of Haiderābād Carnatic and Husain Munawwar Khān (son of Sheikh Nizām Deccani) commanded the vanguard. Muhammad Beg Khān, uncle of Mubāriz Khān, was at the head of the advance-guard of the centre. Ibrāhīm Khān Panni (Bahādur Khān), ‘Abdul Fateh Khān and other Afghān musket-masters, were on the right. Khwāja Mahmūd Khān, Khwāja Asad Khān, Khwāja Mas‘u’d Khān and Hāmid Khān (sons of Mubāriz Khān) were posted near the centre. At the head of the centre was Mubāriz Khān with Khān Zamān Khān, son of Khān Khānān Mun‘īm Khān (Wazīr of Bahādur Shāh), Munawwar Khān, Qizilbāsh Khān, Fāiq Khān, ‘Arab Beg Khān Tūrānī, Mīr Yūsuf Khān and others.²

swivel-guns and muskets. Gālib Khān’s death created a panic in Mubāriz Khān’s camp. The death of the latter’s sons made him desperate. In the battle he had shown great prowess and valour. His army was completely overthrown. His elephant-driver received a number of wounds and fell off the elephant. He himself received several wounds and according to Khāfi Khān “the Khān (Mubāriz Khān) then wrapped a garment, like a shroud, soaked with his own blood around him, and drove the animal himself until he fell dead under the many wounds he received”.1 The victory of Nizāmu’l-Mulk was as complete as it could possibly be. The losses on his side were few. Mubāriz Khān was buried in the plain outside the town of Shakar Khera. By the orders of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, the wounded of Mubāriz Khān’s army were carefully tended. After his victory, Nizāmu’l-Mulk went to Aurangābād for a short while.

He wrote the following letter to the Emperor, defending his conduct.

May His Majesty, possessor of dignity and power, fountain of courage and generosity, bestow favour on the devoted servant! Mubāriz Khān, from sheer malignity of disposition and inversion of fate, entertained the ambition of becoming master of the Deccan. He was prompted to act by the advice of his light-headed friends. He broke asunder the thread of gratitude and obligation which bound him to me and which is known to all the nobles and plebeians, and fell down from the pedestal of fidelity and humanity. His action degraded him to the level of beasts; as the holy Qur’ān says: ‘They are like beasts and even more misguided than the beasts.’ By clear argument in writing I used my utmost endeavours to persuade him to give up his designs. But nothing availed. That mean and ignorant one, in spite of repeated advice, refused to hear useful words and stood defiant on the high-way of resistance, persisting in his ignorance and wickedness. The advice to refrain from shedding the blood of Muslims fell on deaf ears. He came forth for battle with a numerous cavalry, infantry, swivel-guns and cannons. His army was led by experienced

1 Khāfi Khān vol. II, p. 958.
officers whom he had gathered under his banner from different places. His forces were led by Bahādur Khān, Diler Khān, Dilāwar Khān, Ghālib Khān, Muhammad Amin Khān, Saiyyid `Abdul Wahāb Khān, Qizilbāsh Khān, 'Izzat Beg Khān, Mu'izzā Muhammad Beg Khān, 'Abdul Khāliq Khān and others. The battle took place at Shakar Khera, eighty miles from Aurangābād. His officers and Carnātic soldiery were compelled to take to flight like the pigs before a lion. The veterans of your servant's army did justice to bravery and the tumult of the battle-field caused consternation to the spectators of heaven. At length, by the grace of Almighty, the breeze of victory set stirring the flags of prestige and scattered the straws of wickedness in different directions. Bahādur Khān, Ghālib Khān, Khān Zamān Khān, Muhammad Beg Khān, Saiyyid `Abdul Wahāb and many others were slain. Verily, untruth is perishable! Heaps upon heaps were collected of the slain. Very few escaped alive. I wrote to `Abdul Fattāh Khān, exhorting him to abstain from battle but nothing availed, as his promised time had come. Assuredly, there will be no falling short, on my part, in the love that I bear to your exalted Majesty. There should be no reason for the noble-minded one (the Emperor) to be apprehensive as regards the fidelity of this devoted servant. What shall I write more? May the course of days be as desired.¹

At Aurangābād, Nizāmu'l-Mulk received intelligence that Khwāja Ahmed Khān, son of Mubāriz Khān, was making preparations for resistance in the fortress of Golconda. He had also sent his emissaries to different parts of the Deccan to stir up a general revolt against Nizāmu'l-Mulk's authority. Nizāmu'l-Mulk realized that Khwāja Ahmed Khān's presence in the fortress of Golconda necessitated prompt action on his part. But before starting on his march towards Haiderābād he went to Aurangābād and conferred honours on those of his associates who had done meritorious service in the battle of Shakar Khera. In recognition of his services Nāsiru'd-Daulah `Abdur Rahīm Khān, Nizāmu'l-Mulk's uncle, was exalted to

¹ Chahār Gulshan (Āsafīa MS.).
the rank of 7,000 zāt, 7,000 horse. Bājī Rāo, son and successor of Bālājī Vishwanāth in the office of Peshwā, who had been especially sent by Rāja Sāhū, was awarded the rank of 7,000 zāt, 7,000 horse, an elephant and jewelry. Rāo Rambha Nimbalkar also received the rank of 7,000 zāt, 7,000 horse.¹

Yūsufl Muhammad Khān, the author of Tārikh-i-Fathiyah, has given the following details about the conferment of ranks:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Ghiyās Khān</td>
<td>5,000 zāt, 5,000 horse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamāl Khān</td>
<td>5,000 zāt, 5,000 horse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutahawwar Khān</td>
<td>5,000 zāt, 5,000 horse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qādīr Dād Khān</td>
<td>5,000 zāt, 5,000 horse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turktāz Khān</td>
<td>4,000 zāt, 4,000 horse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muqarrab Khān</td>
<td>4,000 zāt, 4,000 horse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khān-i-Ālam</td>
<td>4,000 zāt, 4,000 horse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azīz Beg Khān Hārisī</td>
<td>4,000 zāt, 4,000 horse.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hīfzullāh Khān, Tālib Muhiuddīn Khān and Muhammad Saʿīd Khān, who had accompanied Nizāmu’l-Mulk from Delhi and had the rank of one thousand, were given the grade of 3,000 zāt, 2,000 horse with the privilege of standard and kettle-drum. Muhtashim Khān Bakhshī was reinstated in his post and was also given the Dīwānī of the six Sūbahs of the Deccan. Irādat Khān was given the title of Bahādur and his rank increased to 4,000 zāt, 2,000 horse. Jagpat Rāo, Zemindār of Sadhapūr, who had given valuable help, was raised to 3,000 zāt, 2,000 horse.²

Nizāmu’l-Mulk stayed at Aurangābād for a few days to settle sundry affairs of administration. In the pen-case of Mubāriz Khān two letters were found with the signatures and seals of Anwar Khān and Diwānat Khān, offering their whole-hearted support in the event of a struggle with Nizāmu’l-Mulk. The latter asked Yūsufl Muhammad Khān to read out the contents of the letters in presence of everyone so that

¹ Tārikh-i-Fathiyah.
² Op. cit.: The grade of 7,000 zāt, 7,000 horse was in the beginning of Akbār's reign, reserved only for princes of the royal blood, but it was later conferred on high officials of the State. If the rank in zāt and sawārs was equal, it was considered to be first class. But if the number of sawārs was less than the zāt, the rank was considered to be lower. The conferment of rank was one of the privileges of royalty but in later times, when the Central Government had become weak, the Śūbedārs exercised this privilege.
the writers of these letters might be ashamed of their conduct. Yūsuf Muhammad Khān was also asked to announce their dismissal from service. According to Ma‘āthiru’l-Umarā, ‘Iwaz Khān cherished a grudge against Diyānat Khān, who was Dīwān of the six sūbahs of the Deccan, and on this occasion his vindictive feelings went a long way in poisoning the mind of Nizāmu’l-Mulk against him. Nizāmu’l-Mulk wanted to pardon him but ‘Iwaz Khān persuaded him not to do so.1 Ihtidā Khān was appointed Dīwān and Khānsāmān (lord-steward). Similarly, ‘Alī Akbar Khān, Dīwān of Būhānpūr had tried to play a double game by sending gunpowder and lead to Mubāriz Khān before the battle of Shākar Khera. He was also dismissed from service and ‘Āqīl Khān Kamboh appointed in his place.2

On his way to Haiderābād Nizāmu’l-Mulk passed Bīdar. Mīr Kalān Tūrānī, the Qil‘idār of the fortress was honoured with a robe of honour and confirmed in his post. As Mīr Kalān Tūrānī knew Turkish very well, Nizāmu’l-Mulk always addressed him in that language. Here Nizāmu’l-Mulk got intelligence that Kāzim ‘Alī Khān, faujdār of Bhūngir and favourite of Mubāriz Khān, had organized resistance with the help of Appā Rāo, a big zemindār of Telingāna. An army under Ihtidā Khān, Khānsāmān, and another under the command of Saif ‘Alī Khān, second Bakhshi, was despatched to chastise those rebels. Sharīf Muhammad Khān was to officiate as Khānsāmān in Ihtidā Khān’s absence and similarly Yūsuf Muhammad Khān was asked to officiate during the second Bakhshi’s absence.3

Kāzim ‘Alī Khān was killed in a battle with Ihtidā Khān, and all his followers, afraid of the new regime, came over to Nizāmu’l-Mulk. Appā Rāo offered his submission and obtained confirmation of his Jāgīrs. The fortress of Bhūngir and Nojar (later known as Islāmābād) were reduced in about two months’ time and Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s suzerainty established in the vicinity of Haiderābād.4 On hearing of the ill-success of his plans the Emperor Muhammad Shāh issued a firmān to Mubāriz Khān directing him to leave the six Sūbahs of the Deccan for Nizāmu’l-Mulk and proceed

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4 *Tarikh-i-Fathiyah.*
to the Sûbedârî of Patna 'Azîmâbâd. This was a move to conciliate Nizâmû'l-Mulk and accept the inevitable.

Reaching the neighbourhood of Haiderâbâd, Nizâmû'l-Mulk made overtures to his rival in order to avoid bloodshed. He pitched his tent in Gosha Mahal and continued to negotiate and ultimately succeeded in inducing Khwâja Ahmed Khân, by his tact, kindness and courage to give up resistance. In his negotiations he gave much consolation, assurance of favour and friendly advice. When Khwâja Ahmed Khân, deeming his cause lost, came to terms, Nizâmû'l-Mulk in his usual chivalrous manner, treated him with the greatest possible consideration. He was given the title of Shahâmat Jâng, with the rank of 5,000 zât, 2,000 horse, and was given a Jâgîr in the Sûbah of Haiderâbâd without obligation of any service and a free gift of all his father's movable property. His brother Khwâja Mahmûd Khân was also honoured with the title of Mubâriz Khân. Other members of Mubâriz Khân's family were also treated with consideration, and honours were accorded them in order to allay their discontent as far as was humanly possible and politically expedient.

While Nizâmû'l-Mulk was on his way back to the Deccan from the Imperial Court, Sarbuland Khân had been appointed to supersede Hâmîd Khân in Gujerât. Till the arrival of Sarbuland Khân in Gujerât, Shujâ'at Khân, one of the creatures of Haider Qulî Khân, received a royal patent as his deputy governor. Shujâ'at Khân informed Hâmîd Khân of the Imperial patent he had received from Delhi and asked him to quit the fortress of Bhâdar, which he was then occupying. Shujâ'at Khân started making new appointments to key positions of the provincial administration. He filled all the posts of kotwâls, faujdârs and thânedârs with men of his own choice. When Hâmîd Khân realized the gravity of this new political development, he asked permission from the deputy-governor to allow him (Hâmîd Khân) to remain in Gujerât till the termination of the rainy season as it would be highly inconvenient for him to undertake a long journey during that time of the year. But Shujâ'at Khân refused to give him this permission on political grounds and started making military preparations for his forcible ejection from

1 Majma'ull-Insha, (Asafia MS.).
the province. Apprised of this Hāmid Khān also applied himself to preparations. At length the two contending parties met near Ahmedābād. In this battle cannons and matchlocks were freely used and many lost their lives on both sides. While the hostilities were going on, ʿAli Muhammad Khān, father of the author of Mirʿat-i-Ahmēdī, fearing lest the contest might result in the entire ruin of the city of Ahmedābād and its population, went to Safdar Khān Bābī and succeeded in persuading him to arrange some kind of accommodation between the two parties. Salābat Muhammad Khān and Jawānmand Khān also accompanied Safdar Khān Bābī on his peaceful mission. First they visited Shujāʿat Khān in his camp and convinced him of the utter futility of continuing the hostility any longer. Finding him amenable to reason and good sense, they visited Hāmid Khān who in fact welcomed their move, most unwilling as he was from the very beginning to try conclusions with Shujāʿat Khān at that time. At length a compromise was reached that Hāmid Khān should be allowed to proceed to Dohad to pass the rainy season, after which he should quit the country for the Deccan. This gave breathing time to Hāmid Khān, who immediately wrote to Nizāmuʿl-Mulk, informing him of the actual state of affairs in Gujerāt and his comparative resourcelessness in that part of the country. Nizāmuʿl-Mulk advised him to temporize and to seek aid from the Maratha generals to whom he promised to write directly.

Meanwhile Shujāʿat Khān had written to the Emperor at Delhi that if he and his brother (Rustam ʿAli Khān) were provided with funds and 20,000 horse, they were prepared to undertake a contest with Nizāmuʿl-Mulk and his party of Tūrānis who were seeking to dominate the entire government of the country and whose growing power had become a danger to the very existence of the State. The suggestion being after his own heart, the Emperor ordered the grant of three lakhs of rupees for this laudable end from the treasury of the port of Sūrat. Shujāʿat Khān appointed his son, Ahmed Quli Khān, the commander of the cavalry and immediately sent him to Sūrat in order to organise the army there in consultation with Rustam ʿAli Khān.1

When Sarbuland Khân came to know of the whole affair, he wrote to 'Alî Muhammad Khân, a man of high intelligence in whom he had the greatest confidence, saying that his own absence should in no wise stand in the way of Shujâ‘at Khân undertaking his expedition against Nizâmu‘l-Mulk. 'Alî Muhammad Khân, knowing as he did the exact condition of Shujâ‘at Khân’s men, wrote back:

The two brothers (Shujâ‘at Khân and Rustam 'Alî Khân) are second to none in valour and personal courage but it is one thing to be a good soldier and quite another to be a leader of men. Their troops consist mostly of men from the towns of Gujerâât who will not be able to withstand the attacks of the enemy, being totally devoid of military experience. Only the sight of a battle will be sufficient to disconcert them. They will take to flight even before the starting of the campaign. Rustam 'Alî Khân has assembled a force, consisting of 'Arab adventurers and discontented Gujerâât riff-raff. As they have recently been engaged in warfare with Pilâjî, they have picked up some of his tactics, and that is all.¹

In the meantime Hâmid Khân received news from Nizâmu‘l-Mulk, advising the former to come to terms with Kantâjî Kadam Bande and Pilâjî Gaikwâd who were also directly in communication with Nizâmu‘l-Mulk on this subject. The latter had written to several influential people in Ahmedâbâd who were favourably disposed towards him and had also invited Mîr Natthû and Muhammad Salâbat Khân Ruhela, well-known muster-masters of Mâlwa, to be ready for action in Gujerâât.² On receiving Nizâmu‘l-Mulk's letter Hâmid Khân sent his messengers to Kantâjî, one of Sâhû’s officers, to join him against Shujâ‘at Khân. An agreement was arrived at; and Kantâjî, on promise of having his demand of Chauth unreservedly accepted, marched in the direction of Dohad, at the head of a large army, to join Hâmid Khân. Hâmid Khân had already procured intelligence of the movements of Shujâ‘at Khân and it was decided to capture Ahmedâbâd by surprise. When Ibrâhîm Quli Khân was apprised of this situation, he

¹ Ibid., p. 57.
² Ibid., p. 59.
wrote pressing letters to Shujāʿat Khān who was busy, at that time, touring the districts and receiving and assigning tribute in different parts of Gujarāt. On receiving intelligence that Hāmid Khān had taken possession of several villages, he advanced towards Ahmedābād. About eight miles from that city a bloody battle was fought between Hāmid Khān and the Marathas of Kantājī on the one side, and Shujāʿat Khān on the other. The latter’s soldiers, being mostly inexperienced in the art of warfare, got frightened and dispersed in flight. Shujāʿat Khān was killed and many were captured by the Marathas, among the latter being Husain Qušī Khān and Mustafa Qušī Khān, sons of Shujāʿat Khān. Ibrāhīm Qušī Khān managed to save his life, and by the intervention of Safdar Khān Bābī, obtained pardon and was well-received by Hāmid Khān who offered him consolation. Hāmid Khān’s authority was again established and acknowledged in Ahmedābād. Momin Khān, diwān of the Sūbah and Fidwī Khān and other nobles of the city of Ahmedābād, both Hindus and Muslims, came to wait on Hāmid Khān and offered their allegiance. Kantājī appointed his collectors of Chaouth in different parts of Gujarāt. Hāmid Khān also appointed his own men to important posts and confiscated all the Jāgīr lands, in his own favour. He did not conceal his designs upon the property and other effects of Shujāʿat Khān, his brothers and co-workers. Hearing of this, Ibrāhīm Qušī Khān, being a past-master in intrigue, succeeded in winning over Muhammad ‘Alī, one of the most influential officers of Hāmid Khān and tried to kill the latter in the fort in a most treacherous manner. He went to the fort where Hāmid Khān was lodging and tried to force his way by violence to his apartments: The guards, seeing that he and his coadjutors were up to mischief, surrounded them, and when Ibrāhīm Qušī Khān was trying to escape, seized him and cut him to pieces. Many men were killed and wounded in the contest.¹ ‘Alī Muhammad Khān, the father of the author of Mirʿat-i-Ahmedī, and Ashraf ‘Alī Khān, son of Mehr ‘Alī Khān, who happened to be in the fort for some private affairs and were waiting to see Hāmid Khān, were harshly treated by the soldiers who considered them also to

¹ Ibid., p. 64.
be in collusion with Ibrāhīm 'Alī Khān; but they were spared as some of Hāmid Khān's men happened to know them personally. All the property of Shuja'at Khān and Ibrāhīm Qūl Khān was confiscated and their followers were imprisoned.¹

When Rustam 'Alī Khān, collector of the port of Sūrat, heard of the death of his brothers, he immediately prepared to take vengeance. He entered into a pact with Pilāji Gaikwād, inviting him to join him against Hāmid Khān. Although Pilāji Gaikwād had already promised Nizāmu'l-Mulk to help Hāmid Khān, yet as Rustam 'Alī Khān offered him better terms, he felt no scruple in choosing his side. Being apprised of Rustam 'Alī Khān's intentions, Hāmid Khān made haste to prepare his army and artillery for action. He was joined by Kantājī with 12,000 horse. Safdar Khān Bābī was left in Ahmedābād to act as his deputy. Meanwhile, Mīr Natthū and Muhammad Salābat Khān Ruhela from Mālwa joined Hāmid Khān with their contingents in accordance with the instructions they had received from Nizāmu'l-Mulk.

On reaching the banks of the river Māhī, a skirmish took place at Fāzilpūr in which Hāmid Khān's men were routed. Rustam 'Alī Khān, puffed up with the pride of victory, marched towards Ahmedābād, advancing not more than three or four miles a day. Hāmid Khān purposely avoided a conflict and secretly stirred up defection in the army of his adversary. Being a shrewd diplomat he opened secret negotiations with Pilāji. He sent him Nizāmu'l-Mulk's letters in which the latter had given expression to sentiments of confidence and friendship towards Pilāji. At length, an interview between Hāmid Khān and Pilāji was arranged one night and it was agreed that the latter would desert Rustam 'Alī Khān in the midst of the fight. Next day, after winning over Pilāji to his side, Hāmid Khān made preparations for a general action. He drew up his army in the neighbourhood of the village Pitald, about twenty-five miles from Ahmedābād, forcing his adversary to join battle with him. He posted his artillery in front in order to check the offensive of Rustam 'Alī Khān's forces. According to the understanding with Hāmid Khān, Pilāji had advised Rustam 'Alī

¹ Ibid., p. 65.
Khān to leave his guns to the care of a party in the rear and to lead a charge against the opponents. This proved fatal for Rustam 'Ali Khān's cause who charged in a headlong, impetuous manner, regardless of consequences. In the thick of the fight Pilājī deserted his ally, overturned the gun-carriages of Rustam 'Ali Khān and joined Hāmid Khān. After a severe struggle Rustam 'Ali Khān’s forces were compelled to take to flight. He himself was killed in the mêlée, or according to some writers, stabbed himself to death in order to avoid the humiliation of captivity. Hāmid Qulī and Ahmed Qulī Khān, sons of Shujā‘at Khān, and many others were captured. The Marathas looted the tents and baggage of the defeated party to their hearts’ content and plundered the countryside in a most ruthless manner, burning and laying waste wherever they went. They extorted money with every conceivable violence and torture. Hāmid Khān entered the city of Ahmedābād with the help of his Maratha allies, and established his absolute authority all over the province of Gujerāt. Being badly in need of money himself and unable to pay the salaries of his soldiers, he oppressed people to extort money from them. He confiscated the sum of eighty thousand rupees cash which was found in possession of Sheikhu‘l-Islām on the excuse of his being a partisan of Rustam 'Ali Khān and allowed him to proceed to Mecca for pilgrimage. He also exacted large sums of money from the merchants of Sūrat and other rich men of the province to meet the expenses of his large army. Murlidhar Dās, an inhabitant of Gujerāt, well-versed in accountancy was made Dīwān and a robe of honour was conferred on him.¹

The rivalry between Pilājī and Kantājī was responsible for great confusion in Gujerāt. The latter was an agent of Rāja Sāhū while the former was merely an officer of the Maratha commander-in-chief (senāpatī), Trimbak Rāo Dabhade. Their conflicting claims at Cambay led to a crisis resulting in a struggle between the partisans of the two Maratha leaders in which Pilājī was finally discomfited, and was forced to retire to Mahtur, a village near Kaira. The claim of Kantājī on the tribute of Cambay was thus unmistakably established, and even the English factors were compelled to

contribute five thousand rupees as Chauth. After this event Hāmid Khān intervened, and by his influence on both sides, made them sign an agreement according to which Kantājī obtained the right of collecting Chauth on the Ahmedābād side of the Māhī, while Pilājī was given the region on the other side of the river (Baroda territory). Now, as the monsoon had set in, Pilājī retired to Songarh near Sūrat and Kantājī went to his Jāgīr in Khāndesh.1

When the news of the death of Rustam ‘Alī Khān and his brother reached Delhi, the Emperor urged the new Governor, Mubārizu’l-Mulk Sarbuland Khān to proceed to Gujerāt and take charge of his government at the earliest possible date. He was directed to chastise Hāmid Khān and to clear the country of the Marathas. For this purpose he was granted a subsidy of one crore of rupees, of which sum, fifty lakhs were paid to him at Delhi and the balance was to be remitted in monthly instalments of three lakhs each. At the request of Mubārizu’l-Mulk Sarbuland Khān, Najmu’d-Dīn ‘Alī Khān, younger brother of Amīru’l-Umarā Husain ‘Alī Khān was released and appointed Governor of Ajmer. The latter was ordered to join Sarbuland Khān in his operations against Hāmid Khān, with other leaders of the Bārha family. Mahārāja Abhai Singh, ruler of Mārwār, Chhatar Singh of Mārwār, and other Rājpūt veterans also joined the expedition.

Hāmid Khān and his lieutenants, Salābat Muhammad Khān and Jawānmard Khān Bābī, were busy collecting tribute in the countryside when news was brought to them that Sarbuland Khān had already begun his march from Ajmer towards Ahmedābād. When the latter reached the frontier of Gujerāt, many faujdārs of that province, apprehensive of the future, were prudent enough to come and offer their allegiance to him. Sheikh Allāh Yār Khān joined him with his troops in the neighbourhood of Sidhpūr. Hāmid Khān kept himself informed of the movements of Sarbuland Khān, through his secret agents, and accordingly returned to Ahmedābād in time to make his preparations for the imminent contest for the government of Gujerāt. He took promise from his Maratha allies that they would return to Gujerāt after the rainy season to help him against his enemies. Nizāmu’l-

Mulk, realizing the flimsiness of his uncle’s resources and the unreliability of Maratha help, had written to him repeatedly that he would do better to return to the Deccan as he (Hāmid Khān) would find it difficult to withstand the formidable strength of his adversaries. But Hāmid Khān had made up his mind to try his luck, in spite of the great risks involved. At first Hāmid Khān was disappointed as no aid was forthcoming from the Marathas, and Sarbuland Khān was approaching nearer and nearer. But after some time he received intelligence of Kantāji’s march towards the river Mahī. The latter camped on the banks of the river where Hāmid Khān joined him in all haste, leaving the city of Ahmedābād in the hands of a garrison too weak to conduct any defence.

At the news of the approach of Sarbuland Khān, Salābat Muhammad Khān and Jawānmard Khān Bābī forsook Hāmid Khān’s cause and joined the former. This defection further demoralized the partisans of Hāmid Khān in the capital city of Gujerāt. Sarbuland Khān, on his part, appointed his son Khanāzād Khān at the head of 10,000 horse and as many infantry to advance in the direction of Dholka. Jawānmard Khān, Sardār Muhammad Khān and Sayyid Faiyyāz Khān were also despatched at the head of 4,000 horse in order to chastise the Marathas and force Hāmid Khān to quit the province of Gujerāt. An expedition under Allāh Yār Khān gave battle to Imām Khān, Bakhshī of Hāmid Khān, who fared badly in this encounter. The Bakhshī was killed and all his followers dispersed. Allāh Yār Khān, Bakhshī of Mubārizu’l-Mulk Sarbuland Khān, entered the city of Ahmedābād and occupied it without any opposition from the other side. The Marathas, considering the cause of Hāmid Khān a lost one, took interest in his affairs in a half-hearted manner and opened negotiations with Sarbuland Khān for the grant of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi which they eventually succeeded in getting from him. On his part, Hāmid Khān, left hopeless and forlorn, crossed the Mahī river on the advice of Mīr Natthū Khān and Salābat Muhammad Khān of Mālwa on his way to Aurangābād. His troops, for arrears of pay, were deserting him and even his Diwān Murlidhar went over to Sarbuland Khān’s side. All the big bankers, merchants and learned men of the city
of Ahmedābād came out to meet and welcome Sarbuland Khān on the north side of the river Sābarmatī where he had pitched his camp.

As Sarbuland Khān did not receive the promised instalments of subsidy from Delhi, he soon found it impossible to maintain a large army. His soldiery, unable to get their regular pay, started plundering the country. The Marathas took full advantage of this confusion. Armed with the Sūbedār's sanction, they extorted large sums of money from rich merchants and zemindārs. In the confusion that followed the recall of Sarbuland Khān and the appointment of Rāja Abhai Singh to the Sūbedārī, Gujerāt was the scene of conflict between the Maratha leaders representing different claims and authorities. Finally, Pilāji Gaikwād established his authority firmly in Baroda and other big towns of Gujerāt and thus laid the foundation of his dynasty.

To take up the thread of the narrative again, Nizāmu'l-Mulk, after coming to terms with Khwāja Ahmed Khān through the intercession of Dilāwar Khān, maternal uncle and father-in-law of the latter, made Haiderābād his capital and busied himself with the administration of the country. He made new appointments of reliable and capable persons to all important posts of the Government, and they buckled to their task with enthusiasm. Khairullāh Khān was given the Nizāmat of Haiderābād, and Himmat Khān was made Qil'īdār of the fortress of Golconda. His chief care being the establishment of law and order in the countryside, Nizāmu'l-Mulk sent some of his best men in the districts to undertake administrative responsibilities. Hafīzu'd-Dīn Khān and Muhammed Sa'id Khān were appointed faujdārs of the Sarkār of Chicacole. Generally, one faujdār was kept in a Sarkār, but in view of the heavy work of reorganization, two appointments were made in Chicacole to facilitate work there. The faujdārī of Raichūr and Bijāpūr Mahāls was placed under Tālib Muhī'u'd-Dīn Khān and Mirzā 'Alī; the latter had his Jāgīrs in this part of the country and knew the districts thoroughly well. Ihtidā Khān, one of the confidants of Nizāmu'l-Mulk, was directed to proceed to Masulipatam, a port of considerable importance frequented by European merchants. Khwāja Rahmatu'llāh Khān and Khwāja 'Abdullāh Khān, who held
the Diwānī of the Sarkārs of Chicacole and Rajamahundy respectively in Mubāriz Khān's time, and had been on very friendly terms with him, were graciously pardoned when they came to offer their allegiance and were reinstated in their former positions. Khwāja 'Abdullāh Khān was further received into favour by his appointment to the post of Khānsāmān (Lordsteward) during the absence of Ihtidā Khān. 'Ībādullāh Khān was duly confirmed in the faujdārī of the Sarkār of Murtazānagār and was complimented with the title of Abul Wafā Khān. The Sarkārs of Ellore and Mustafānagar were placed under the control of Faizullāh Khān and Āghā Mu'īn Khān respectively, both being honoured with the title of "Khān".¹

After making these administrative arrangements, Nizāmu'l-Mulk started for the Carnātic, which country was still to be brought under control. It was the general principle of Nizāmu'l-Mulk's policy to confirm all the officials appointed by him before his going to Delhi, or afterwards appointed by Mubāriz Khān during his absence, unless some very grave political reasons prevented him from doing so. In accordance with this policy 'Abdul Nabi Khān, faujdār of Čudappah, and Rindaulāh Khān, faujdār of Kurnūl, were confirmed in their posts. The Mahāl of Adonī (Imtiāzgarh) was taken out of the hands of Rindaulāh Khān and placed under Sanaullāh Khān, son-in-law of Mubāriz Khān. As the fortress of Adonī enjoyed considerable strategic importance, Sultān 'Alī Khān was appointed its Qil'īdār and honoured with a robe of honour. Generally Qil'īdārs of important fortresses were allowed to have direct dealing with the Sūbedār instead of through the faujdārs.²

During his administrative tour of the Carnātic, all the big zemindārs came to pay their respects and offer homage to Nizāmu'l-Mulk. Sa'ādatullāh Khān, deputy governor (Nāib) of Arcot and Carnātic, also came to express his sentiments of loyalty to the new regime and secure confirmation for himself in his post.³ The zemindār of Seringapatam came with presents and was duly honoured by Nizāmu'l-Mulk. Tāhir Muhammad Khān and 'Ābid Khān, influential faujdārs in the Carnātic, also came to offer submission to the new

Sübedār of the Deccan. For some time, Nizāmu’l-Mulk stayed in Gulbarga and visited, according to his wont, the sacred shrine of Khwāja Sayyid Muhammad, popularly known as Banda Navāz Gisdarāz, and thence proceeded towards Fatehābād (Dharwar), where he encamped for some time during the violence of the first monsoon. Here he received Rāo Nimbalkar, former commander-in-chief of Rāja Sāhū, who had given up the service of the latter and joined Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s standard. He was given the district of Pāthri in Jāgīr as free gift from the government and was raised to the rank of 7,000 zāt, 7,000 horse. Probably Nizāmu’l-Mulk consulted him as to the course of his policy which he was going to launch in the near future to check the growing demands of Bājī Rāo in the Deccan. Although Rāja Sāhū had come to an understanding with Nizāmu’l-Mulk before the, latter’s struggle with Mubāriz Khān, yet after the defeat and death of Mubāriz Khān, Bājī Rāo, the chief representative of Rāja Sāhū in the Deccan, resorted to his usual methods of extortion which displeased Nizāmu’l-Mulk and forced him to espouse the cause of Sāhū’s rival, Sambhāji of Kolhapūr. This estrangement resulted in very important political developments which will be recorded in a separate chapter.

When the report of the ill-success of his designs and the complete victory of Nizāmu’l-Mulk reached Muhammad Shāh, the latter pretending as if nothing had happened, restored him his property in Northern India, and allowed him to stay in the Deccan as long as he liked and repair to the Court whenever it suited his convenience. Nizāmu’l-Mulk, on his part, sent a supplication to the Emperor in which he expressed his sentiments of obedience and loyalty. The Emperor conferred on him the title of Āsaf Jāh in order to conciliate him. Nizāmu’l-Mulk is reported to have addressed the following letter in receipt of the Imperial firmān:

The forehead of desire became radiant by the ardour of devotion and servitude when the most devoted servant thought of addressing His Excellency who gives honour to

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1 Gulshan-i-'Ajā'ib.

According to the original document of ‘Tawjih-i-Muḥammad’ and ‘Tawjih-i-Jafid’, in the Daftar-i-Diwānī, the following Farganahs were restored and
the throne of the heroic order and elegance to the crown of royalty and who is like Solomon in dignity, conqueror of countries, Khaqān (Emperor of China or Chinese Tartary) of the world, shadow of the holy Caliph of God, the merciful, and giver of leaven to Justice.

The servant begs leave to inform His Majesty of the august arrival of the firmān of elevated dignity, foundation of favour and kindness, conferring the title and the announcement of the increase in ĺāt, sawārs and dāms, by way of favour. It has also been the royal will and pleasure to restore the Jāgīrs in Hindustān (North India) and to announce the joyful news of further favours. The forehead of devotion has now become so high as the bright stars near the pole of the Lesser Bear. The servant begs leave to offer salutation and thanks for the Khil‘at (robe of honour) His Majesty has been kind enough to send to him and which, in fact, is a means of decoration, glory and elevation of the stature of servitude, making it the manifestation of the light of honour and elegance. The sword of His Majesty’s servant has proved to be of excellent water in slaying the enemies of the State and Religion. It is (the sword) the decisive argument and dispels the darkness of useless disputation, the opener of the gates of victory. Its studded hilt in the hand of the most devoted servant (fidvī) has established Imperial sway in seven climes and has raised aloft the banner of sovereignty in the whole world. It has been the cause of the beating of drums of delight. His Majesty’s gift of the ‘Arabi and ‘Iraqi horses of heavenly colours, with fine trappings, has enabled the devoted servant to hold tight the reins of the changing world (ablag-i-aivyām), and has raised (his) stature to the parti-coloured firmament. How splendid these horses are! tall, swift as the east wind, handsome, graceful in gait, incomparable, cause of the burning of hearts for the envious. Even if the pen opens its thousand tongues of gratitude for His Majesty, it would simply be impossible to recount one out of the innumerable favours and benefits
conferred on this servant. The tongue of praise is powerless to give expression to sentiments of gratitude and limitless kindness. God willing the servant will undertake the administration of the Deccan on this side of the Narbada and will exert himself to the utmost to set matters right. By the grace of the Almighty and the auspicious prestige of the Emperor, the endeavours of the devoted servant, to win His Majesty's pleasure, will produce far-reaching results for Religion and State, and will cause happiness to Muslims especially and the public in general. As long as the sun shines on firmament, may the altar of the Caliphate and the asylum of the world remain victorious and blest, causing envy to the assembly of Jam (a great and ancient King of Persia) and the garden of Paradise.¹

¹ Gulshan-i-'Ajā'ib
CHAPTER VII

Relations with the Marathas

Before the battle of Shakar Khera, Nizāmu’l-Mulk had come to an understanding with Rāja Sāhū who had sent a contingent of troops under the command of Bājī Rāo in order to help the former against the pretensions of Mubāriz Khān. After the defeat and death of the latter, Bājī Rāo, in recognition of his services, obtained the rank of 7,000 zāt, 7,000 horse, an elephant and jewelry from Nizāmu’l-Mulk. In fact Rāja Sāhū desired, as much as did Nizāmu’l-Mulk, to have peace in the Deccan; it was in the interest of both to avoid war and ensure consolidation of their respective positions in their States. But the ruthless ambition of Bājī Rāo hindered the realization of this objective. The latter’s foreign policy aimed at the creation of a Maratha Empire. He wanted to take full advantage of the relaxation of authority and general disorder prevailing in the Mughal administration. Bājī Rāo’s other object, in pursuing this policy, was to make his own authority supreme in the Maratha State. His father, Bālājī Vishwanāth, by his ability and tact had greatly increased the status of the Peshwāship. Originally, the holder of this office was considered one of the eight pradhāns or Ministers of State.¹ And according to Rānāde, “the Peshwā was a smaller functionary than the Pant Pratinidhī, whose salary was 15,000 Hons, while for the Peshwā the salary was fixed at 13,000 Hons”². Bājī Rāo, being ambitious by nature, tried to overshadow the authority of the other seven members of the council, and assume a leading position in the Maratha State by advocating the policy of conquest and expansion. Soon after his accession to Peshwāship in 1720, he marched with an army to levy his Mokassa in Khāndesh in order to enrich himself and to give a foretaste of wealth and power to his soldiery. In fact Bājī Rāo was dissatisfied

¹ Sen, Administrative System of the Marathas, p. 197.
² The Miscellaneous Writings, p. 345.
with the small and insignificant part he had to play in domestic politics. He was, therefore, determined to undertake the policy of Maratha expansion, so distasteful to Pratinidhī and others, who thought that this would weaken their position in the Government and lessen their influence. He wanted to divert attention from domestic difficulties by undertaking external adventure.

Shripat Rāo, the Pratinidhī, was opposed to the policy of Maratha expansion towards the north and central India, which, according to him, would bring them into conflict with the Emperor and Nizāmu’l-Mulk. He wanted to consolidate the position of the Maratha rule instead of undertaking imprudent schemes of conquest which would mar their prosperity and involve the State in great difficulties. At first Rāja Sāhū supported Pratinidhī as he was anxious to remain on close terms with Nizāmu’l-Mulk. But Bājī Rāo convinced Sāhū that conflict with Nizāmu’l-Mulk, whose interests were diametrically opposed to those of the Marathas, was inevitable. Gradually, Bājī Rāo acquired great influence over his master by appealing to the latter’s religious sentiments. Henceforward he was destined to exercise a commanding influence over Maratha affairs but at the same time he became an object of unmitigated distrust and jealousy to the Pratinidhī and other Maratha chiefs who suspected the motives of the young Peshwā and thought that he (Bājī Rāo) was anxious to enrich himself by his foreign ventures. The Pratinidhī raised the objection that the financial condition of the Maratha State was not such as to allow them to undertake hazardous schemes. But on this very ground Bājī Rāo ultimately induced Rāja Sāhū to give sanction to his projects of conquest, which, he argued, were the best and surest means to replenish their treasury. He is reported to have stimulated the patriotic feelings of his master by appealing to him to clear the country of the Mughals. He said: “Strike at the trunk and the branches will fall off themselves. Listen but to my counsel and I shall plant the Maratha banner on the walls of Attock.”¹ This appeal proved effective and Sāhū, now a convert to the views of the young Peshwā, allowed him to secure means to give practical shape to his ideas. Now,

Bāji Rāo was master of the situation. He had convinced Rāja Sāhū of his earnestness of purpose. By his dauntless energy he was destined to mould the policy of the Maratha State for nearly two decades to come.

Having thus secured his position, Bāji Rāo opened secret negotiations with Rāja Jai Singh Sawai in order to get his support and sympathy to subvert the Mughal rule in India. He also maintained secret correspondence with Nandlāl Mandloi Chaudhry of Indore, a zamindār of wealth and consequence, who was in the service of the Mughal Government and was in charge of several important fords of the Narbada. Having thus prepared the ground, Bāji Rāo undertook his first Mālwa expedition in 1723-24. He encamped on the plains of Burhānpūr with a force of 12,000 men. The contingents of Malhar Rāo Holkar formed his advance guard. Nandlāl Mandloi Chaudhry sent his Wakīl to Malhar Rāo Holkar, inviting him to invade the territory of Mālwa.¹ He assured him of all possible help. 'Azīmmullāh Khān, cousin of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, who was then the Governor of Mālwa, made preparations to offer resistance to the enemy, but he was defeated and his capital Ujjain was plundered. Bāji Rāo stayed in Mālwa for some time and when he returned to Satāra, where domestic politics required his presence, he left Udāji Puār at Dhār, Ranoji Sindhi at Ujjain, and Malhar Rāo Holkar at Indore, to establish military posts throughout Mālwa and organize the collection of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi.

In 1725, Rāja Girdhar Bahādur was appointed the Governor of Mālwa. He cherished the idea of establishing his dynasty there just as Nizāmu’l-Mulk had done in the Deccan. In this hope he tried his best to oust the Marathas from his territory. The Marathas harassed his forces by repeated attacks. While he had pitched his camp at Sarangpūr, fifty miles to the north-east of Dewās, he was killed in a surprise attack on 8th December, 1728, and his army was dispersed. The late Rāja’s cousin Dayā Narāin was appointed to the Sūbedārship of Mālwa but he also shared the same fate. Now, the Marathas became virtual masters of Mālwa. They turned out the Mughal ‘Āmildārs, replacing them by their own

¹ Malcolm, Central India, p. 84.
collectors. The three Maratha chiefs, left by Bāji Rāo as his agents, established themselves permanently in Mālwa where they were destined to lay the foundation of their respective dynasties.

By his recent triumphs in Mālwa, Bāji Rāo had obtained complete ascendancy in the counsels of his sovereign. Shrīpat Rāo, the Pratinidhī, and Trimbak Rāo, the Senāpatī, especially felt humiliated at the success of their young rival whom they hated like poison. The Pratinidhī opened secret correspondence with Nizāmu’l-Mulk who offered him a Jāgīr in Berār. This inflamed the fire of mutual jealousy between the Pratinidhī and Bāji Rāo. At the suggestion of the former, Nizāmu’l-Mulk wrote to Rāja Sāhū, deprecating the growing influence of Bāji Rāo in his counsels, and urging him to free himself of his galling tutelage. This gave Nizāmu’l-Mulk an opportunity to foment dissension in the Maratha Court. The nature of these dissensions shows conclusively that the Maratha politics of the period under review were totally devoid of the moral idealism which some writers seek to attribute to them.

In 1725 Nizāmu’l-Mulk directed ‘Iwaz Khān to proceed towards the Carnātic and clear the country of the Maratha agents. This officer ousted the Maratha tax-collectors and appointed his own men in every part of the country. He seized the town of Trichinopoly from Sarphoji, son of Sivāji’s brother, Viankoji. Sarphoji appealed to Sāhū to come to his rescue.¹ Sāhū was advised by Fateh Singh Bhonsla to send an expedition to the Carnātic to re-establish the rights of tribute and realize the arrears. He persuaded Sāhū to believe that both Maratha honour and interest required the capture of Trichinopoly. Fateh Singh Bhonsla was directed to march towards the Carnātic at the head of 50,000 troops. He had a special interest in and was also familiar with the country and its people. He held the Jāgīr of Akkalkot on the borders of the Carnātic. Bāji Rāo also accompanied him. The Marathas suffered severe reverses and were obliged to retreat. They were forced to give up resistance by the decisive blows of ‘Iwaz Khān. Thus the first expedition proved unsuccessful.

Under the leadership of Fateh Singh Bhusula, a second expedition was sent to the Carnatic in 1726-27 which also proved a complete failure in spite of the help of Tūlajī, the chief of Tanjore. By this time Sāhū had realised the mistake of trying conclusions with Nizāmu’l-Mulk who was not prepared to surrender an inch of his territory or allow the Marathas to exact tribute from the peasantry of the Carnātic. But these expeditions gave an opportunity to Bājī Rāo to prove to Sāhū the incapacity of Fateh Singh Bhusula and other Maratha chiefs and demonstrate his own earnestness of purpose. He convinced him of the inadvisability of campaigning in the south instead of invading Mālwa and Gujerāt which were in weaker hands and afforded greater chance for Maratha expansion.

Ever since his victory at Shākar Khera, Nizāmu’l-Mulk exerted himself to consolidate his authority in the Deccan and the Carnātic, deprived as he was of the Sūbedārī of Mālwa and Gujerāt. The only means to effect this end was to oust the Maratha tax-collectors from his domains. It was to attain this end that he tried to win over the Pratinidhī to his side, and then purposely affected ignorance of the legal titles of Sāhū and Sambhā in the Deccan. As both professed to be the rightful claimants to Chauth and Sardeshmukhi, Nizāmu’l-Mulk refused to pay the contribution to any in order not to prejudice the claim of either. As the Viceroy of the Deccan, Nizāmu’l-Mulk proposed that both parties should submit their claims for his arbitration in order to settle once for all to whom belonged the right of collecting Chauth and Sardeshmukhi in the six Sūbahs of the Deccan, granted by the Imperial patents. Sāhū was half willing, and the Pratinidhī had no objection to the assumption of the constitutional right by the Viceroy to decide disputes arising between the different landholders of the Deccan. But Bājī Rāo shrewdly guessed the underlying motive of this arrangement. He succeeded in convincing Sāhū of the menacing nature of Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s proposal which cut at the very root of Maratha authority. Instead of feeling offended at the rejection of his proposal by the Court of Satārā, Nizāmu’l-Mulk reviewed the whole political situation in the Deccan in his usual cool-headed

1 Sinha, Rise of the Peshwas, p. 76.
manner. He decided to temporize and avoid war as long as it was possible. He again opened diplomatic negotiations with Sāhū. Bājī Rāo was in favour of immediate military operations against Nizāmu'l-Mulk but the restraining influence of the Pratinidhī served as a check against precipitate action. Nizāmu'l-Mulk, in order to conciliate Sāhū and confuse the whole issue of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi, agreed to grant him Jāgīrs near Baramatī in the neighbourhood of Poona which were originally given to Nimbalkar in recognition of his services. In return Sāhū promised to relinquish the right of levying contribution on Haiderābād, the new capital of Nizāmu'l-Mulk. The latter also promised ready money-payment in lieu of these contributions. This arrangement was against the system of indefinite claims of Bājī Rāo who felt offended at the interference of Nizāmu'l-Mulk in the affairs of the Maratha Government. It further accentuated the discord between Bājī Rāo and the Pratinidhī, the latter being the chief negotiator of the agreement.

Meanwhile Nizāmu'l-Mulk continued to be on close terms with Sambhājī of Kolhāpūr, promising him to get Imperial sanction for his titles. Chandrasen Jādav conducted the negotiations between them in order to present a common front against Bājī Rāo. Sambhājī joined Nizāmu'l-Mulk in September 1726, leaving his Government in the hands of his mother, Rajas Bāi. Bājī Rāo, on his part, endeavoured to persuade Sāhū that the agreement entered into with Nizāmu'l-Mulk was derogatory and harmful to the interests of the Marathas. He explained to him the farreaching nature of the designs of Nizāmu'l-Mulk who revived their internal dissensions to strengthen his own position. At length by the force of his personality and the definiteness of his aim, Bājī Rāo succeeded, as he had done before, in convincing his master of the desirability of undertaking a campaign against Nizāmu'l-Mulk at the earliest possible moment as delay would further strengthen the cause of the enemy. He had long regarded war with Nizāmu'l-Mulk as an inevitable issue for which it behoved the Maratha State to be prepared. On the whole the policy of adventure had, so far, been justified by its results. In spite

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2 Gulshan-i-'Ajāib.
of the opposition from the Pratinidhi, Peshwā Bājī Rāo obtained permission from Sāhū to organize a surprise attack on Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s territory. He was given full powers to conduct the operations. In August 1727, Bājī Rāo led his army towards Aurangābād district and plundered Jālna, laying waste the country wherever he passed. When apprised of this, Nizāmu’l-Mulk directed ‘Izdu’Daulah ‘Iwaz Khān to take immediate action and chastise the enemy.1 ‘Iwaz Khān tried to manoeuvre for a pitched battle but Bājī Rāo did not stay for long at one place. He merely overran the country. ‘Iwaz Khān sent flying columns to chase the enemy who retired to Mahur and thence towards Khāndesh. Nizāmu’l-Mulk, in order to save Burhānpūr from falling into the hands of Bājī Rāo, anticipating his movements, outmarched him. Being thus pursued by two armies, Bājī Rāo marched in the direction of Gujerāt. With grim irony, he is reported to have informed Sarbuland Khān, Governor of Gujerāt, that he was invading the province at the instigation of Nizāmu’l-Mulk who desired him to undertake expeditions in the Imperial territories.2 It was this kind of insidious propaganda which the Marathas constantly employed against Nizāmu’l-Mulk to embroil him with the Emperor. It is absolutely wrong to say that Nizāmu’l-Mulk connived at the schemes of Marathas, undertaking aggression and directing their attacks upon the Imperial territories. Not only is there no positive historical ground for this assertion, but it also militates against the principles of fidelity which guided the entire career of Nizāmu’l-Mulk.

When Nizāmu’l-Mulk received intelligence of Bājī Rāo’s invasion of Gujerāt, he tried to divert his attention by attacking Poona. Before starting on his campaign he made several alterations in the personnel of the administration of Burhānpūr. ‘Āqil Khān Diwān was superseded by ‘Alī Akbar, the former Diwān of Burhānpūr. Hājī Naqī ‘Alī Khān, who held the office for registering the effects of deceased persons, was replaced by Sharfu’d-Dīn Khān.3 On his way to Poona he was informed that Bājī Rāo had turned towards the territory along the banks of the Godavari.4 In the meantime the move-

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1 Hadīqatul-‘Alam, vol. II, p. 140.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid., p. 140.  
ments of Nizāmu’l-Mulk had caused great anxiety to Sāhū, who in great fear wrote ìmportunate letters to Devji Sombanshī, Sabājī Nimbalkar and other Maratha musket-masters to check his march.¹ When Bājī Rāo received news of the determined nature of Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s march towards Poona, he immediately hurried back from Gujerāt in order to compel him to abandon his plan. He crossed the Godavari and started plundering the villages of Baizapūr and Gandapūr.² Nizāmu’l-Mulk was thus compelled to ford the river in order to check Bājī Rāo’s depredations. He encamped at Mungī Shevgāon in the hilly and barren country of Palkhed where he found great difficulty in procuring grain and fodder. The Marathas had completely laid waste the country, leaving nothing but ruin in their train. For some days, according to the Cossack methods of warfare, they harassed Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s men, surrounding them on all sides. The latter were already tired out by their expedition into Maharāṣṭra. Even in this condition they were ready for action in a pitched battle. But Bājī Rāo avoided that and contented himself with harassing Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s troops. He did not dare approach the latter’s camp on account of Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s efficient train of artillery. But his forces were surrounded by the Marathas. Grain could not be had in his camp even at a very high price. Nothing could be had from the neighbouring villages as Bājī Rāo had destroyed all forage in the neighbourhood. Food-supply was so scarce in Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s camp that he decided to come to an agreement with Bājī Rāo who also eagerly welcomed this move. ‘Iwaz Khān was sent to negotiate terms of peace.³

Bājī Rāo thought that Nizāmu’l-Mulk was in a helpless condition and had been compelled to surrender. He wanted to take full advantage of his adversary’s position. He demanded the immediate surrender of Sambhājī as the preliminary condition for further negotiations.⁴ But Nizāmu’l-Mulk considered it against the principles of chivalry to leave his so valued an ally in such dire circumstances. He refused to accede to this demand, happen what might. He would much rather undergo hardship and privation of war

than do anything dishonourable which would tarnish his reputation as a soldier. Bāji Rāo must have been surprised at the determined and uncompromising attitude adopted by Nizāmu’l-Mulk on this point. At length he had to give up this demand at the risk of complete rupture of negotiations. His other demands were acceded to with some modifications. On the 6th of March 1728, an agreement, known as the Convention of Mungī- Shevgāon, was signed between Nizāmu’l-Mulk and Peshwā Bāji Rāo, according to which the former recognized Sāhū as the king of the Marathas, entitled to Chauth and Sardeshmukhī in the six Sūbahs of the Deccan. He further agreed to pay the arrears and to reinstate the Maratha revenue collectors whom he had turned out.\(^1\) Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s guards escorted Sambhājī to Panhala where the Peshwā was at liberty to settle his affairs with him.\(^2\) This treaty is a landmark in the history of the Deccan. It shows that even a man like Nizāmu’l-Mulk was obliged by the force of circumstances to accept the claims of the Marathas although in later years he succeeded in neutralizing the effects of the treaty by his skilful diplomatic manipulations. This treaty infinitely enhanced Bāji Rāo’s power and influence in the Maratha state.

Nizāmu’l-Mulk had given Sambhājī to understand that he would use his best endeavours to get his claims and titles recognized by the Emperor. He actually wrote to the Emperor that he had given him (Sambhājī) hope of His Majesty’s sublime favour.\(^3\)

After the treaty of Mungī- Shevgāon, Sambhājī prepared for final struggle with the Peshwā. His commander-in-chief, Udajī Chauhān, opened secret correspondence with the Senāpatī, Trimbak Rāo Dabhade, and Nizāmu’l-Mulk, in order to overthrow the ascendency of Bāji Rāo who was determined to have the sovereignty of Sāhū recognized by Sambhājī’s party. Udajī Chauhān made preparations to test strength with Bāji Rāo. He led an incursion into Sāhu’s territory, demanding half of the Swarājya for his master. This gave Bāji Rāo an opportunity to persuade Sāhū to crush the power of Sambhājī once for all. Even Pratinidhī was made to ap-

\(^1\) Hadīgatul-‘Ālam, vol. II, p. 140.  
\(^2\) Grant Duff, op. cit., p. 415.  
\(^3\) Gulshan-‘Afarī. 
prove of this scheme. Bāji Rāo and the Pratinidhī led an expedition to check Chauhān's inroads. The latter, not being in a position to fight a general action, entrenched himself in the fortress of Shirole which was subjected to siege operations by Bāji Rāo. When Sambhāji received intelligence of his commander-in-chief's distress, he came to his relief. By undaunted attacks he rescued Chauhān, leaving his own family and treasure chests in the hands of the Pratinidhī. Among those captured were Tārā Bāī, Rājas Bāī and others. At the suggestion of Bāji Rāo, Sāhū did not want to leave matters half done. He was determined to bring Sambhāji to his knees. Fighting continued for some time with varied results but at length Sambhāji's forces were completely routed at Vishalgad in 1730, and he was compelled to sue for peace. An agreement was concluded at Warna according to which Sambhāji recognized the sovereignty of Sāhū. Sāhū, on his part, agreed to forgo his claim in the territory comprising Konkan in favour of his cousin. Sambhāji was also assigned some forts and military outposts. The treaty of Warna settled the differences between Sāhū and Sambhāji once for all. This conciliation gave Bāji Rāo an opportunity to concentrate his attention on his schemes of foreign conquest, having nothing now to fear from Kolhāpūr.

In the meantime, the opposition between Bāji Rāo and Trimbak Rāo Dabhade had grown more intense. The latter had, for some time, been smarting under the humiliating treatment meted out to him by Bāji Rāo who had overrun Gujerāt against his wishes and concluded an agreement with Sarbuland Khān which vitally affected his interests in that part of the country. At the instigation of Bāji Rāo, Trimbak Rāo Dabhade was debarred by Sāhū from entering or undertaking any expedition in Mālwā. He appealed to Sāhū but failed to get any justice or consideration. His past services in Gujerāt were totally ignored and his power and influence crippled by Bāji Rāo. In these circumstances he was compelled to open secret correspondence with Sambhāji and Nizāmu'l-Mulk in order to strengthen his position. This happened before Sambhāji concluded the agreement with Sāhū. Trimbak Rāo Dabhade proclaimed among the Marathas that he was organizing resistance to the growing power of Bāji
Rao in order to deliver Raja Sahu from his thraldom. Some Maratha chiefs joined his banner. When Sambhaji came to terms with Sahu, Dabhade had one ally left from whom he might expect substantial help, and that was Nizamul-Mulk. He pressed the latter to join him to crush Baji Rao. This gave Nizamul-Mulk an excellent opportunity to take advantage of the internal dissensions of the Maratha leaders, each fighting for his own interest. In the meantime Trimbak Rao Dabhade’s agent in Gujerat, Pilaji Gaikwad, and his ally Kanthaji, had raised a large body of troops and invaded Malwa. Nizamul-Mulk wrote back to Dabhade, promising him all possible help, thinking that this would keep Baji Rao busy with the internal difficulties and thus prevent him from undertaking ventures in Mughal territories. It was decided that they both (Nizamul-Mulk and Dabhade) should meet with their respective forces somewhere in the neighbourhood of Ahmednagar. This project was soon discovered by the secret service of Baji Rao who told Sahu of the formidable coalition which was being formed against the safety of the Maratha State. Sahu directed Baji Rao and his younger brother Chimnaji Appa to make ready for immediate military operations to prevent Trimbak Rao Dabhade’s forces from joining Nizamul-Mulk. Baji Rao, by forced marches, encountered Trimbak Rao Dabhade at Dabhai. The latter, after an obstinate battle, was defeated and slain and all his troops were dispersed.¹

Now the authority of Baji Rao became supreme in the Maratha State. His enemies, one after another, had been completely eliminated; Sambhaji had established close relations with his cousin and had shown by his conduct that he would not countenance any scheme aimed against Sahu and his Government. Baji Rao thought that Nizamul-Mulk was left without any ally and was too busy in organizing the administration of his dominion in the Deccan and the Carnatic to be able to offer resistance and stand in the way of fulfilling his (Baji Rao’s) ambition in Malwa. Nizamul-Mulk had been deprived of his Subedari of Malwa in February 1724. His cousin ‘Azimullah Khan, deputy Governor of Malwa, had been recalled to the Deccan and Raja Girdhar was appointed the

SUBEDAR of MALWA. He and his cousin, DAYA BAHADUR, were killed in 1730, and the Marathas had gained complete control of the province. The Peshwa had made the grant of twelve Mahals to Malhar RAO Holkar, and thirty-three to UDAJI PUAR. In 1731 BAJI RAO wrote to Malhar RAO Holkar to take over charge of the whole province of MALWA from which he and RANOJI SINDHIA were directed to collect tribute. They are said to have pledged themselves to the Peshwa to pay one lakh and five thousand rupees in the first year, one lakh and ten thousand in the second, and one lakh and twenty-five thousand in the third and future years to the central Government at Poona, and to divide the remainder equally among themselves.¹

In his great anxiety the Emperor appointed MUHAMMAD KHAN BANGASH, Nawab of FARRUKHABAD and SUBEDAR of ALLAHABAD, to take over charge of MALWA and stay the tide of Maratha aggression.²

MUHAMMAD KHAN BANGASH proceeded towards MALWA via

² MUHAMMAD KHAN BANGASH was the son of MUHAMMAD 'AIN KHAN who quitted his native country on the frontier of India in the reign of Aurangzeb, and came to MAU RASHIDABAD (now known as KAIMANGAN), in the FARRUKHABAD district. He married in MAU and had two sons, HIMMAT KHAN and MUHAMMAD KHAN. The latter made a name in history. He was born in 1665, and died in 1743. At the age of twenty-one he took service with YASIN KHAN BANGASH, a leader of the Pathans of MAU and took part in the campaigns of Bundelkhand. After the death of YASIN KHAN, his maternal uncle SHAHID KHAN BANGASH became the leader of the Pathans of MAU. MUHAMMAD KHAN quarrelled with him and left his service with seventeen followers. He gathered a large number of troops round his banner and started expeditions in Central India. When FARRUKHISIYAR marched from Bengal to contest the throne, he asked for MUHAMMAD KHAN'S help. After FARRUKHISIYAR'S victory, he was raised to the rank of 5,000 ZAT, 5,000 horse. He named his seat of Government after the name of his Imperial Master. Later he became a favourite of the Emperor MUHAMMAD SHAH whom he joined against QUTBU'D-MULK and was raised to 7,000 ZAT, 7,000 horse. He obtained the Government of ALLAHABAD in 1720. As the MUGHAL territories in Bundelkhand lay within the limits of his province, he appointed his disciple (chela) DILER KHAN for the administration of that part of the country. DILER KHAN was slain in a battle in 1721 and CHATTARSAL became the supreme master of Bundelkhand. MUHAMMAD KHAN BANGASH was about to start for an expedition into Bundelkhand when he was recalled to court in 1724. The defeat and death of MUBARIZ KHAN and the establishment of NIZAMU'D-MULK'S sway in the Deccan had alarmed the Emperor beyond measure. He did not want MUHAMMAD KHAN to leave the capital at that time. During MUHAMMAD KHAN'S absence CHATTARSAL renewed his depredations in the MUGHAL territory to the borders of PATNA. In 1726, MUHAMMAD KHAN BANGASH led an expedition into the heart of Bundelkhand and occupied many fortresses. The siege of JAIPUR was prolonged but at length CHATTARSAL offered submission in 1728. The irony of the situation is that instead of getting any help from the Central Government, the AMRU'U-UMAR'S party urged the Bundelas to resume hostilities. In 1729, BAJI RAO, who was campaign-
Agra where he got ammunitions from the fort, and also some new ordnance as the large cannon he had brought from Delhi were all defective at the breach. He had a force of 8,200 horse and 2,500 foot with him under the command of Muqīm Khān, Saʿādat Khān, Bakhatāwar Khān, and Allāh Yār Khān. At Gwalior Muhammad Khān Bangash received a letter from Amīru'l-Umarā Samsāmu’d-Daulah directing him to proceed to Mālwa by forced marches in order to check the advance of the Marathas near the river Narbada. When Muhammad Khān Bangash reached Sadhaurah in December, 1730, in the direction of Ujjain, he received an urgent letter from Nizāmu’l-Mulk, congratulating him on his appointment to the Sūbedārī of Mālwa and asking him for an interview in order to organise concerted measures against the growing power of the Marathas and their expansion in the Mughal territories. Nizāmu’l-Mulk urged him to meet somewhere on the Narbada, which he had already crossed, to quell down a local revolt. Nizāmu’l-Mulk thought that such an opportunity might not recur as he seldom visited that part of the province. To this Muhammad Khān replied that he would do his best to meet him at the earliest possible moment and wrote to say that he would gladly co-operate with Nizāmu’l-Mulk in any attempt to expel the Marathas from the Imperial dominions. Accepting Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s proposal, Muhammad Khān Bangash added that as the Marathas, at the instigation of Rāja Jai Singh and the Zemindārs of Mālwa, intended ravaging the whole of that province, he trusted that Nizāmu’l-Mulk would stop them at the ferries on the Narbada.¹

Muhammad Khān Bangash reached Sarangpūr on the 15th

¹J. A. S., Bengal, 1878.
January, 1731. When apprised of his approach, Malhar Rāo Holkar, who was plundering the country with twenty thousand men, crossed the Narbada and invested Shāhjehānpūr, eleven miles south-west of Sarangpūr. The Marathas started their skirmishing, but faced with the forces of Muhammad Khān "they fled like crows on seeing a bow". Muhammad Khān Bangash proceeded towards Shāhjehānpūr and pitched his camp in the neighbourhood of the village Talodrī. The Marathas, not daring to risk a general action, withdrew beyond the Narbada. Muhammad Khān Bangash left his son Ahmed Khān with 12,000 horse, and 22,000 foot, to check Malhar Rāo Holkar's advance and then proceeded towards Dhār.

Muhammad Khān Bangash anxiously waited for a reply from Nizāmu'l-Mulk, of whose departure for Burhānpūr he had hitherto received no news. At length he received a letter from him on the 25th February 1731, asking him to proceed towards the Narbada. Muhammad Khān Bangash at once set out in the direction of the Narbada. On his way thither, he received another letter from Nizāmu'l-Mulk informing him of his having safely forded the river at Fardāpūr and saying that he was hurrying up to meet him (Muhammad Khān Bangash) in order to discuss plans for 'union with strength'. On his way to meet Muhammad Khān Bangash, Nizāmu'l-Mulk was anxiously expecting news from his Maratha allies, Trimbak Rāo Dabhide and Pilāji Gaikwād, who had promised to join him on the Narbada.

On the 19th February, 1731, Nizāmu'l-Mulk reached Salgāon, about forty-four miles from Burhānpūr and had the intention of marching via Ghargāon to the Narbada. He wrote again to Muhammad Khān Bangash to come by the pass of Nanbahra. The interview between the latter and Nizāmu'l-Mulk took place in the last week of March 1731. For twelve days Muhammad Khān Bangash was the guest of Nizāmu'l-Mulk during which time the two veterans formed plans to re-establish the authority of the Emperor in the territories occupied by the Marathas. Probably the two

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2 *Ibid.*; according to *Hadīsatu'l-ʿAlam*, Muhammad Khān Bangash was guest of Nizāmu'l-Mulk for two or three days.
Sübédārs agreed to present a concerted front to the Peshwā instead of frittering away their energies and resources in separate engagements. Muhammad Khān Bangash, in his report to the Emperor, spoke very highly of Nizāmu'īl-Mulk's sincerity and earnestness of purpose and his devotion to the cause of the Emperor. This was to dispel the rumour, spread by the enemies of Nizāmu'īl-Mulk in the capital, that he had come to an agreement with Bājī Rāo, giving him a free hand in North and Central India at the expense of the integrity of the Empire, provided he himself was left in peace in the Deccan. Most probably Bājī Rāo himself had a hand in spreading this rumour in order to discredit Nizāmu'īl-Mulk in the eyes of the Emperor and make him unpopular among the Mughal chiefs of Northern India. Bājī Rāo and his agents were pastmasters in this sort of propaganda. They had done the same in the case of Sarbuland Khān when Bājī Rāo invaded Gujerāt. Sarbuland Khān was given to understand that the invasion of Gujerāt was undertaken at the instigation of Nizāmu'īl-Mulk. Some time earlier, these rumours were so widely circulated in Northern India that Nizāmu'īl-Mulk had to clear his position in this connection in one of his letters to the Emperor.¹

After their consultations, Nizāmu'īl-Mulk and Muhammad Khān Bangash parted for their respective provinces, promising to keep in touch with each other. Probably Nizāmu'īl-Mulk, on his way back, was informed of the defeat and death of his ally, Trimbak Rāo Dabhade, in the battle of Dabhai. His project of presenting a common front to Bājī Rāo was thus frustrated; the latter being too clever to allow the Senāpatī to join the forces of Nizāmu'īl-Mulk and Muhammad Khān Bangash—a formidable combination, the dangers of which were too obvious to be neglected. Nizāmu'īl-Mulk was now apprehensive lest Bājī Rāo, whose pretensions, after his victory over the Senāpatī, Trimbak Rāo Dabhade, went much beyond those which he had set up previously, should turn towards Aurangābād. But Bājī Rāo was quick to perceive the danger of undertaking such an expedition. Muhammad Khān Bangash also proved himself superior to his Maratha opponents in Mālwa. His son, Ahmad Khān

¹ Gulshan-i-'Ajā'ib; J. A. S., Bengal, 1878.
Bangash, reduced the fortresses of Kālki and Chakaldah on the right bank of the Narbada. These forts were reputed as impregnable, surrounded as they were by deep ditches and thick jungle on three sides, and the Narbada on the fourth. As these fortresses served as strongholds for the Maratha chiefs, their walls and bastions were razed to the ground and their golden keys were sent to the Emperor. Muhammad Khān Bangash captured several forts of Udaji Puār and defeated his troops. When Nizāmu’l-Mulk heard of this he is said to have written to Muhammad Khān Bangash to treat Udaji Puār with consideration, and try to conciliate him on account of the latter’s hostility towards Bāji Rāo. Fear of a rear-attack by Nizāmu’l-Mulk kept Bāji Rāo away from Mālwa for some time, thus giving Muhammad Khān Bangash some respite to consolidate his position.

Nizāmu’l-Mulk, in spite of the slanderous efforts of his enemy to discredit him in the eyes of the Emperor, exerted his best to save the integrity of the Empire and to deliver it from the danger of being dismembered by the Marathas. He kept the Emperor constantly informed about the movements of the Maratha leaders and their projects. He asked the Emperor to give him a subsidy of fifty lakhs in return for which he was prepared to undertake to clear the provinces of Mālwa and Gujerāt of the enemy. This sum could afterwards be reimbursed to the central treasury from the revenues of Gujerāt and Mālwa. He further reminded him of the time of Aurangzīb when all the revenues of Bengāl and other North Indian provinces were employed in the Deccan to crush the growing power of the Marathas. And now he had to resist their onslaughts single-handed, without any kind of help from the Central Government. He also pointed out that as the Marathas did not fight pitched battles, it was impossible to decide the issue in a battle or two. To chastise and to weaken their power required vast armies and resources and co-operation of the various Sūbedārs of the contiguous provinces to organize resistance in each and every district of the Deccan, Gujerāt and Mālwa. This was the only way to preserve the integrity of the Empire. The letter of Nizāmu’l-Mulk to the Emperor runs thus:

1 *J. A. S., Bengal, 1878.* 2 *Gulshan-i-‘Ajāib.*
Your Majesty has done well to have written to the Nâzims of Gujerât and Mâlwa to co-operate with your devoted servant to chastise the marauders (ashqâd). By the Grace of the Almighty God, your servant is hopeful that his great exertion will be productive of good results in the present as well as in future life. If Maharâja Abhai Singh1 does not give protection to Bâji Râo and abstains from treacherous collusion, your servant (Nizâmu’l-Mulk himself) by the help of the Almighty will be able to destroy and capture Bâji Râo. If Abhai Singh acts in accordance with your orders and undertakes to chastise the enemy in his province, the faction of Bâji Râo will be dispersed and he will be absolutely ruined.2

Muhammad Khân Bangash stayed in Ujjain for a week and then started collecting revenue in different parts of Mâlwa, replacing the Maratha collectors by his own men. He made Sironj his headquarters where he passed the rainy season. He defeated Malhar Râo Holkar at Sarangpur and reduced the fortress of Shahâbâd, the stronghold of Râja Chhatar Singh Narvarî. As he was badly in need of money and reinforcement, he wrote to the Emperor who did not care to pay any attention to his remonstrances. In reply Amîru’l-Umarâ Samsâmû’d-Daulah wrote to say that the Emperor was very much disappointed with his achievements in Mâlwa. As the Amîru’l-Umarâ desired his friend, Râja Jai Singh, to get the Sûbedârî of Mâlwa, he found fault with Muhammad Khân Bangash in order to justify his friend’s appointment. This was done in disregard of the fact that Râja Jai Singh was in sympathy and in communication with the Peshwâ. The Amîru’l-Umarâ probably laboured under the futile illusion that Râja Jai Singh’s friendship with Bâji Râo might stay the tide of Maratha aggression in Mâlwa. Soon, Râja Jai Singh received an Imperial rescript informing him of his appointment to the Sûbedârî of Mâlwa. It seems that Muhammad Khân Bangash had become unpopular in the Court circles on account of his cordial relations with Nizâmu’l-Mulk.

1 He was the son of Ajit Singh of Jodhpûr, who superseded Sarbuland Khân in the Sûbedârî of Gujerât.
2 Gâthshân-i-Afzâb.
According to *Akhwālu‘l-Khwāqīn*, the clique in Delhi had made Muhammad Khān Bangash promise before his departure for Mālwa to lead a campaign against Nizāmu‘l-Mulk after subduing the Maratha chiefs. This rumour was prevalent throughout the Deccan,¹ and the soldiery of Nizāmu‘l-Mulk were quite certain, when he ordered them to march towards the Narbada, that he was going to attack Muhammad Khān Bangash.¹ The Court clique must have been disappointed when by direct intercourse friendly relations were re-established between the two nobles. As devoted servants of the Emperor they tried to chalk out a common plan of action against the Maratha invaders.

Rāja Jai Singh’s appointment to the Sūbedārī of Mālwa gave Bājī Rāo full opportunity to establish his sway in that province. Some time previously he had been in secret correspondence with the Rāja. He had tried his best to call forth his religious zeal. Bājī Rāo is said to have commenced his first letter to the Rāja with the following allegorical verse of the Purāṇa which could be interpreted in different ways:

Thou art like the cloud which drinketh the waters of the sea, and returneth them with thunder to fertilize the earth. The mountains, in dread of Indra, fly to thee for protection. Thou art the tree of desires. Thou art the sea whence springeth the tree of desires; who can tell thy depth? I have no power to describe the depth of the ocean, but in all thy actions remember august Munī.²

Even during the Governorship of his predecessors, Rāja Jai Singh had been exerting his most to help the Marathas to establish themselves in Mālwa and procure for them the title of Chauth and Sardeshmukhī. He is reported to have written a letter to Nandlāl Chaudhury after reaching Ujjain in which he congratulated him for helping the Marathas during the Sūbedārī of Muhammad Khān Bangash. The letter runs thus: "Thousand praises to you that at my word alone you and the rest of the Sardārs protected our religion in Mālwa

by driving out the Mughals from there. You have fulfilled my desire. In return for this I have written to the Peshwā to arrange the affairs of all the Sardārs of Mālwa according to your wishes."

The appointment of the Rajput princes to the Sūbedārī of Mālwa and Gujerāt at this critical juncture in Mughal history proved to be extremely inadvisable. No effectual resistance to the Marathas was forthcoming from them. A strong hand was required to save the integrity of the Empire. Nizāmu’l-Mulk, Sarbuland Khān and Muhammad Khān Bangash were the most capable leaders available in Mughal India at that time. No less a person than the Emperor himself was responsible for sowing discord between Nizāmu’l-Mulk and Sarbuland Khān, making their co-operation for a common cause an impossibility. Muhammad Khān Bangash was disheartened by the discouraging treatment meted out to him by the Amīru’l-Umarā and the Emperor. He intended to co-operate with Nizāmu’l-Mulk to check the inroads of the Marathas into the Imperial territory, but, as he was recalled from Mālwa, he could not bring his scheme to fruition. Their union and cordiality was misrepresented to the Emperor by the Court clique. The Emperor, lacking judgment and will, was easily made to believe that there was grave political danger to the Empire from the union of two such powerful persons as Nizāmu’l-Mulk and Muhammad Khān Bangash. The Amīru’l-Umarā had become jealous of the success of Muhammad Khān in Mālwa whom he replaced by Rāja Jai Singh when he was busy reducing the Maratha strongholds and clearing the province of their revenue-collectors. It is needless to repeat here that Muhammad Khān Bangash, with his limited means and resources, did much more to check the aggression of the Marathas than did the combined forces of the Empire under the leadership of the Wazīr and the Amīru’l-Umarā in subsequent years.²

In 1732 Bāji Rāo led an army into Mālwa and laid its different districts under contribution. Every year he made it a rule to set out in the month of October to collect tribute and return home in June before the beginning of the rainy

season. Rāja Jai Singh entered into a secret understanding with Bāji Rāo, granting him the right of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi in the province of Mālwa. In 1734, the Marathas had established their outposts from Gwalior to Ajmer, and right up to the country adjoining the province of Āgra. Rāja Jai Singh offered no resistance although he had an army of 30,000 strong at his disposal, allowing the Marathas to move about from district to district, levying tribute. According to the agreement with Rāja Jai Singh, Bāji Rāo was offered the deputy governorship of Mālwa, implying complete surrender. He further promised to have the agreement confirmed by the Emperor, the Amīru’l-Umarā being already disposed to acknowledge the title of the Peshwā in Mālwa, fancying that diplomacy and not war was the remedy for the ills from which the Empire was suffering. But on the advice of Muzaffar Khān, chief of artillery (Mīr-i-Ātish), the Emperor refused to confirm the agreement, at once dangerous and derogatory to the Empire. Muzaffar Khān was an enterprising man, not inclined to acquiesce in without resistance. The Emperor invested him with full authority to undertake an expedition against the Marathas and to drive them away across the river Narbada. Their persistent aggression had necessitated immediate action on the part of the Imperialists. Muzaffar Khān made preparations for his expedition and marched towards Mālwa. He encountered Bāji Rāo at Sironj. The Marathas, according to their usual guerilla tactics, avoided pitched battle, harassing the Mughals with continual skirmishes and sniping and stalking the advance-guard of the Imperialists whenever it appeared. At length Muzaffar Khān’s army was surrounded and their supplies were straitened. Muzaffar Khān was compelled to retire towards the capital without achieving any substantial result. Nizāmu’l-Mulk had made preparations at Burhānpūr where he waited for news of him. He had an intention of attacking the Marathas from the South, but this scheme fell through when Muzaffar Khān was compelled to return to Delhi. This encouraged the Marathas, increased their pretensions, and incited them to have their demands of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi of Mālwa conceded by the Emperor.

1 Sījar, vol. II, p. 466.  
2 Ibid., p. 466.  
3 Ibid., p. 467.
In July 1736, the Emperor was advised by the Amīru’l-Umarā to send Yadgār Khān Kashmīrī, a man versed in diplomacy, to Dholpūr to negotiate terms of peace with Bājī Rāo through Rāja Jai Singh who had repeatedly suggested to the Emperor that the only way to save the Empire was to come to an understanding with the Peshwā. But the condescension on the part of the Emperor did not produce the desired result. On the contrary, the Marathas, considered it to be due to the helplessness of the Imperialists. Bājī Rāo’s pretensions and demands went much beyond any he had previously advanced. Apart from the control of the administration of the province of Mālwa, Bājī Rāo demanded cession of the sacred cities of Allahābād, Gaya and Mathura in Jāgīr in order to be able to pose as a champion of Hinduism. He also asked for the cession of the forts of Mandū, Dhār and Raisīn which were occupied by Ruhela generals, and claimed the cash payment of fifty lakhs of rupees or an assignment of equal amount in Bengal and a hereditary grant of Sardeshpāṇḍyā of the six Sūbahs of the Deccan. The Emperor and the Amīru’l-Umarā were willing to accept the last condition. They thought this arrangement would keep Bājī Rāo constantly occupied with Nizāmu’l-Mulk and thus neutralise their strength. As the other conditions of Bājī Rāo were not acceptable to the Emperor, the negotiations fell through. When Nizāmu’l-Mulk heard about the proposed arrangement he resented it as a direct blow to his authority in the Deccan. He apprehended that the grant of Sardeshpāṇḍyā of the six Sūbahs of the Deccan to Peshwā Bājī Rāo might in future result in his asking the Emperor to bestow on him the Vice-royalty of the Deccan also. The other terms acceptable to Yadgār Khān Kashmīrī, on behalf of the Emperor, were as follows:

1. An assignment of 13 lakhs of rupees on the revenue of the districts south of the river Chambal.
2. Right of levying a tribute of ten lakhs and sixty thousand rupees from the Rājpūt States of Būndī and Kota

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2 *Sardeshpāṇḍyā* signifies five per cent of the revenues of a district over and above the tributes of Chaṭh and Sardeshmukh; Grant Duff, vol. I, p. 438.
on the west and Bhadawar in the east. This was a subtle move to accentuate differences between the Rājpūt princes and the Marathas.

The negotiations came to nought on account of the exaggerated demands of Bājī Rāo. The Emperor had no other alternative left but to resort to force to prevent the Marathas from overrunning the Imperial territory. The Marathas, just after the failure of negotiations started plundering the country in the neighbourhood of the town of Sānbhar, a hundred Kurohs (two hundred miles) from Delhi.¹ The faujdār of Sānbhar, Fakhrū, was captured and compelled to give three lakhs of rupees and four elephants.² They were determined to invade the Doāb and thus compel the Emperor to come to terms. The Maratha generals made preparations to start their campaigns of devastation in Northern India on a large scale. Their sphere of activity had extended to the vicinity of the Imperial town of Āgra.

Although Amīru’l-Umarā Samsāmu’d-Daulah, the leader of the Court party, was in favour of propitiating the Peshwā by conceding his demands, the Wazīr I’timādu’d-Daulah, Muhammad Khān Bangash and Sa’ādat Khān Burhānu’l-Mulk were against the policy of complete surrender. They appealed to the Emperor not to acquiesce without resistance, offering their services whole-heartedly to preserve the integrity of the Empire. In the meantime, Malhar Rāo Holkar crossed the Jamunā, and plundered Fīrūzabad. To check the advance of the Marathas, I’timādu’d-Daulah and the Amīru’l-Umarā, made preparations on a grand scale. The plains around the capital were covered with tents; but although the preparations were magnificent the operations proved to be feeble. The Amīru’l-Umarā marched towards Ajmer at the head of an army of 40,000, well-equipped with a train of artillery.³ The Wazīr, with his son-in-law Fīrūz Jang (the eldest son of Nizāmu’l-Mulk), advanced towards Āgra. Muhammad Khān Bangash advanced from Farrukhābād to check the aggression of the Marathas in the Doāb. Sa’ādat Khān Burhānu’l-Mulk started from Oudh with Abdul Mansūr Khān Safdar Jang, and encamped in the neighbourhood of

Etawah. Safdar Jang met the Marathas near Jalesar and drew them near the main army of Barhānu’l-Mulk by slow and cautious retreat. In March 1736, Malhar Rāo Holkar suffered a severe defeat. Many of his men were killed and many lost their lives while crossing the Jamunā. Barhānu’l-Mulk’s soldiery chased the Marathas up to I’timādpūr. Those who had survived joined Bājī Rāo at Kotla near Gwālior.¹ Flushed with victory Sa‘ādat Khān sent an exaggerated account to the Emperor:

I have routed the Maratha army that had crossed the Jamunā; two thousand horsemen have been killed and two thousand more drowned in the river. Malhar Rāo Holkar and Vithoba Bole have been wounded. This is the fate of Bājī Rāo’s incursion. I will cross the Jamunā, defeat the Marathas and drive them beyond the Chambal.²

The forces of the Amīru’l-Umarā and Muhammad Khān Bangash joined Sa‘ādat Khān Burhānu’l-Mulk in the vicinity of Mathura on 22nd April 1737. Here the Imperialists celebrated their victory, wasting much time in feasts and thus failing to follow up their initial success. Bājī Rāo, anxious for some feat of arms to mitigate the effect of the recent disaster, took advantage of the lull in Imperial activity, slipped stealthily from near Fatehpūr Sikri and by forced marches reached the suburbs of Delhi. The Hindus of the capital had flocked there to celebrate Ramnavami.³ Although Bājī Rāo pretended to be a champion of Hinduism, yet he showed no scruple in robbing innocent Hindu pilgrims and making a massacre of inoffensive citizens. When I’timādu’d-Daulah came to know of the surprise attack of Bājī Rāo, he began a hasty return in the direction of Delhi. Baji Rāo, having received intelligence of the movements of the Wazīr’s army, fled towards Gwālior by way of Riwārī and Basāda, and thence proceeded in the direction of Satārā. After consulting Sāhū, Bājī Rāo is said to have sent his Wakil to the Amīru’l-Umarā, agreeing to accept the Sūbedāri of

² *Rise of the Peshwas*, p. 136.  
³ *Tārīkh-i-Muzaffari; Siyās, op. cit.*, p. 476.
Mālwa which the Emperor had promised to bestow on him.\(^1\) According to Siyar\'l Mutakherin, the Emperor conceded to Peshwā the right of tribute in Mālwa in order “to extinguish the fire of sedition”.\(^2\) Most probably the Amīru\'l-Umarā had got an inkling that the Emperor was disposed to recall Nizāmu\'l-Mulk to Delhi to set right the affairs of the Empire. The parties of Muhammad Khān Bangash and the Wazīr I\’timād-ud-Daulah Qamrūr\’d-Dīn Khān were in favour of inviting Nizāmu\'l-Mulk to take up the reins of Imperial administration in his hands and devise means to save the Empire from total dismemberment. But his coming to Delhi was obnoxious to the Amīru\'l-Umarā. This is why he hurried the agreement through with Bājī Rāo so that Nizāmu\'l-Mulk, when at the head of the Government, might be faced with an accomplished fact.\(^3\) This treaty conferred on the Peshwā the government of Mālwa.

The Emperor was by this time convinced that the only person who could frustrate the designs of the Marathas was Nizāmu\'l-Mulk. This was indeed a tardy realization of the seriousness of the situation into which the Empire had fallen by the recklessness of the Emperor and the incapacity of his ministers. He summoned him to his aid, writing several pressing letters of conciliation in order to show that he had no ill feeling towards him. He was raised to the rank of 8,000 zāt, 8,000 horse and was made the Wakīl-i-Mutlaq (regent plenipotentiary), the highest distinction to which any Mughal noble could aspire. At length Nizāmu\'l-Mulk resolved to go to Delhi and try to set right the affairs of the Empire. It was not that he hankered after rank and title; on the contrary he sacrificed peace and comfort, inspired by sincere devotion to the cause of the Emperor. He did not hesitate to take up the responsibility of office at this time of immeasurable difficulty and in the face of intense depression in the affairs of the Central Government. By accepting the Imperial offer he threw himself deliberately into a whirlpool of troubles. He had all through been a devoted servant of the Emperor and had always tried to check the aggression of the Marathas on the Imperial territory. This is shown by

\(^{3}\) Ibid., p. 477.
the fact that when Bājī Rāo was campaigning in the northern and Central India, he was very apprehensive on the score of Nizāmu’l-Mulk who had threatened the Maratha line of communication in Khāndesh. In his great anxiety Bājī Rāo wrote to his brother Chimmāji Appā, asking the latter to watch carefully the movements of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, who was threatening their base in the Deccan. He wrote, “if he (Nizāmu’l-Mulk) attempts to cross the Narbada, fall instantly on his rear and put heel-ropes on him”. But Nizāmu’l-Mulk was extremely disappointed by the retirement of Muzaffar Kāhān whom he had promised to help in all possible ways.

Before starting for Delhi, Nizāmu’l-Mulk made necessary arrangements in his dominions in the Deccan. As Bājī Rāo had got the Government of Mālwa, it was necessary to make special arrangements in Khāndesh. Hasifu’d-Dīn Kāhān, Governor of Khāndesh was replaced by his uncle, Nāṣiru’d-Daulah Salābat Jang, and the former was sent to Delhi as his special agent. Mīr Akbar ‘Alī Kāhān was appointed deputy governor. At the end of 1149 Hegira (A.D. 1737) Nizāmu’l-Mulk made his son, Mīr Ahmed Kāhān Bahādur Nāṣir Jang, deputy Sūbedār of the Deccan during his absence. Orders were issued to all the high officials and nobility to offer their allegiance to Nāṣir Jang. To the great regret of Nizāmu’l-Mulk there was nobody to take the place of Salābat Jang (uncle of Nizāmu’l-Mulk) Governor of Nānded and ‘Izu’d-Daulah ‘Iwaz Kāhān (a near relative of his) Governor of Berār, who were removed from the scene of worldly activity by the hand of death in 1731. At the death of ‘Iwaz Kāhān, Nizāmu’l-Mulk is reported to have said: “Now I feel that I have to perform all the duties of a Sūbedār of Deccan.” ‘Iwaz Kāhān was his best counsellor, without consulting whom Nizāmu’l-Mulk never undertook any campaign and even in day to day administration ‘Iwaz Kāhān’s advice was sought by him.

When Bājī Rāo received intelligence that Nizāmu’l-Mulk was proceeding towards Delhi, he directed some of the Maratha Zemindārs to raise the standard of insurrection in his

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3 Ibid.
dominions to compel him to postpone his march to Northern India. But Nizāmu’l-Mulk was not a person to be deterred by such moves. He forthwith sent Sayyid Jamāl Khān, son of the late ‘Izdu’d-Daulah ‘Īwaz Khān, at the head of 1,000 horse and 1,500 foot to chastise those who had risen in arms to subvert the established Government. Jamāl Khān defeated the rebels on the borders of Berār, repulsed their leader Goriyyā and forced him to retire.1 Muhtashim Khān Bhakshī and Mutahawwar Khān were also sent out with armies which followed Nizāmu’l-Mulk as a rearguard up to Burhānpūr.2

Reassured of the security of his dominions in the Deccan, Nizāmu’l-Mulk left Burhānpūr on 17th April 1737, crossed the Narbada and proceeded northward via Sironj. Yār Muhammad Khān, son of Dost Muhammad Khān of Bhopāl, and some other Zemindārs joined his party. They reached Delhi on 12th July 1737. Nizāmu’l-Mulk was welcomed by his son, Ghāziu’d-Dīn Khān Fīrūz Jang, and I’timādū’d-Daulah Qamru’d-Dīn Khān. Ghāziu’d-Dīn Khān Fīrūz Jang presented his newly wedded wife, eldest daughter of the Wazīr, to his father. Nizāmu’l-Mulk and I’timādū’d-Daulah rode on one elephant, followed by the elephant of his son and daughter-in-law. Muhammad Bakhsh Āshob gives a vivid description of the scene of Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s entry into the capital. He says that when Nizāmu’l-Mulk entered the capital crowds thronged the road and impeded progress. Within the city the roofs of the shops and houses were covered with sight-seers; while mendicants thicker than flies at sweetmeat shop gathered round his elephant, paying no heed to sticks and bamboos with which the attendants tried to drive them off. His elephant could no more than creep along and it was not till after mid-day that they reached the Delhi gate of the fort. Here Nizāmu’l-Mulk entered his litter, plainly fitted with broad-cloth, while the Wazīr used one fringed with pearls and covered with cloth of gold. The Wazīr allowed Nizāmu’l-Mulk to be two paces in advance of him to show his respect to him. At the drum-

house they alighted, and hand in hand entered the privy audience-hall. On coming before the Emperor he made his offerings and was honoured in return with a robe from the Emperor’s own wardrobe and a jacket called ‘Chargah’, worn only by the members of the Chaghtâi house, descended from Timur.¹

Fazl ‘Ali Khân, a well known savant and poet of Delhi, wrote the following chronogram (by the letter of Abjad) to commemorate the coming of Nizâmu’l-Mulk to the capital: “Many thanks to God that the protector of faith has come. One who imparts elegance to the realm has come. A voice from heaven (hātīf) suggested to me to say that ‘the sign of Divine Mercy has come’.”²

Nizâmu’l-Mulk awarded the poet the sum of one thousand rupees cash, a steed and a silver harness.³ ‘Allâmah ‘Abdul Jalîl of Delhi, celebrated for his learning throughout the country, came forth with a chronogrammatic poem in praise of Nizâmu’l-Mulk which clearly showed that all classes of the population had a tender corner in their hearts for one who had grown old in the service of the Empire. A few of the distiches of the poem could be rendered thus:

He (i.e. Nizâmu’l-Mulk) is the regulator of faith and Government, and represents the glory of those who excel in generosity of heart. He is the pillar of religion and the State, high and superb like the sun. The administration of the country will be improved by his prudent vizierate. The second attempt of the painter is more successful than the first.⁴ The old sky with its spectacles of sun and moon has not yet seen an Amîr like him, surpassing in refinement, polish and pre-eminence. His purity is such that he may be likened to an angel in the form of a man. In penetration and understanding he is an embodiment of wisdom. His judgment is as clear as the clarity of a mirror; one can see in it what will happen tomorrow. To his hand,

¹ Irvine, op. cit., p. 301.
² Hadiqatul-‘Alam, vol. II, p. 145; Ma‘thîr-i-Nizâmi.
⁴ The allusion is to the second regime of Nizâmu’l-Mulk.
scatterer of gems, even generosity itself is grateful. Victory is in love with his sword. Thousand thanks (to God) that he has obtained the seat of vizierate. The country is like a dead body getting back its soul by the breath of Jesus. To commemorate this occasion my pen has jotted down the chronogram, 'May Āṣaf, the Wazīr of the Indian Empire, live eternally.'

The party of the Amīru'l-Umarā Samsāmu'd-Daulah and Rāja Jai Singh, which had for some time been in power at the Court, gradually lost its influence and ascendancy in the councils of the Emperor. Nizāmu'l-Mulk's pluck and optimism put heart into the efforts of the well wishers of the Empire and gave to their policy a resolution which had long been wanting. In August 1737, he was appointed Governor of Mālwa, superseding Bāji Rāo, and Governor of Āgra, replacing Rāja Jai Singh. In his absence his eldest son Ghāzi-u'd-Dīn Khān Firūz Jang was allowed to officiate as deputy Governor. After the rainy season Nizāmu'l-Mulk started his march from Delhi towards Mālwa to check the inroads of the Marathas in the Doāb and the districts adjoining the capital. He had with him nearly fifty thousand troops and a well-equipped train of artillery. A considerable number of these troops consisted of Rājpūts who were the main support of the party of Amīru'l-Umarā and Rāja Jai Singh. He passed through Etawah and Kālpi and entered the territory of Bundelkhand where some Bundela chiefs also joined him. Abul Mansūr Khān Safdar Jang, son-in-law of Sa'ādat Khān Burhānu'l-Mulk, and the Rāja of Kota, formed his rear line. The heterogeneous elements in the Imperial army proved to be a great hindrance for Nizāmu'l-Mulk to achieve his objective. Most of the Rājpūt and Bundela chiefs were in collusion with the Marathas.

Nizāmu'l-Mulk reached Bhopāl in December 1737. Here he came to know that Malhar Rāo Holkar had defeated and killed Mughānī Khān, an Imperial 'Āmil, who with great bravery resisted a large force of the enemy with only three hundred men. He had sent directions to Nāsir Jang

1 *Ma'āthi'a-y'-Kirdām*, vol. II, p. 188.
through his friend Rāja Jai Singh to create an awkward to divert the attention of the Maratha chiefs and prevent them from proceeding towards Mālwa to help Bāji Rāo who was already on his way thither. Being apprised of Nizāmu'ī-Mulk's movements, Bāji Rāo made straight for Sironj at the head of a huge army of 80,000 men. The armies met in the neighbourhood of Bhopāl. Nizāmu'ī-Mulk, with the great caution that characterised his military operations, waited for the Peshwā to attack first. This gave time to the Marathas to surround the Imperial army. After an indecisive skirmish, in which neither party gained any advantage, the Imperialists formed an entrenchment in the city of Bhopāl, abstaining from attacking the enemy. Delay in battle is invariably in favour of those who carry on their operations according to guerilla tactics. But Nizāmu'ī-Mulk had no other alternative before him. He found that the Rājpūts and the Bundelas could not be relied upon in the event of a general action. They were, in fact, secretly sending information to the enemy as to his plans and intentions. Having traitors in their midst the cause of the Imperialists was obviously doomed. The spirit of defection in a considerable portion of the army undermined its morale. No better evidence of this is to be found than in one of the letters of Bāji Rāo himself which he addressed to his brother, Chimnāji Appā. The letter was written on the field of battle and runs thus: "The Nizām is entrenched in the city of Bhopāl. There is famine in his camp, grain is selling at four seers a rupee. His elephants and horses are starving. The Rājpūts and the Nizām are distrustful of each other. They (the Rājpūts) cannot flee away as he (Nizāmu'ī-Mulk) has kept all their luggage in the city."

Before starting from the capital, Nizāmu'ī-Mulk was totally unaware of this kind of spirit prevailing among the Rājpūts. But during the campaign he seems to have perceived the lack of zeal on the part of the Rājpūt soldiery. It is also quite probable that Amīru'ī-Umarā Samsāmu'd-Daulah, who was jealous of Nizāmu'ī-Mulk and desired his expedition against the Marathas to fail, intrigued with the Rājpūt chiefs

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1 This letter is pointed out by Sir Jādunāth Sarkār in a footnote in Irvine's Later Mughals, vol. II, p. 304.
situation at the time of the battle. He might have thought this would tarnish the reputation of Nizāmu'l-Mulk and discredit him in the eyes of the Emperor. If only the expedition would fail, his policy of conciliating the Marathas would become an evidence of his political perspicacity.

Being superior in numbers, the Marathas surrounded and sorely straitened the supplies of the Imperial army which was totally cut off from the contingents of Safdar Jang who had been left behind to guard the rear. Malhar Rāo Holkar fell upon the army of Safdar Jang, defeated and compelled him to retire. The latter was thus prevented from coming to the succour of the beleaguered camp of Nizāmu'l-Mulk. At the suggestion of Bājī Rāo, his brother, Chimnāji Appā, had already taken up post on the Tāptī in order to prevent any help from Nāsir Jang coming to his father’s rescue, and had also engaged the Governor of Khāndesh, Nasīru'd-Daulah (Salābat Jang) in hostilities.1 Thus Nizāmu'l-Mulk was cut off from all possible reinforcements. Further delay would have created greater complications in view of the attitude adopted by the Rājpūt and the Bundela chiefs who never had their heart in the conflict.

Nizāmu'l-Mulk, therefore, decided to make a retreat as resistance would not have benefited him in any way. In fact, by his sagacity he warded off a crushing defeat and turned his weak position to as good an account as was possible in those circumstances. He would not risk a battle unless he was certain of success. By his timely action of opening overtures of peace, he avoided complete rout of his heterogeneous army, so deficient in zeal for the Imperial cause. It was certainly wise to negotiate before his whole force should become ineffective from sheer exhaustion. Taking advantage of the helplessness of the Imperial army, Bājī Rāo tried to assault and engage in general action. But the swivel guns and the artillery of Nizāmu'l-Mulk repelled his advance, not allowing him even to approach his camp. Bājī Rāo, in one of his letters addressed to Chimnāji Appā as an apology to desist from attacking the besieged army of Nizāmu'l-Mulk, significantly observes: “Appā, you know what kind of an artillery he has.”2 Chimnāji Appā had accompanied Bājī Rāo in the

1 Hadīgatu'l-Ālam, vol. II, p. 147.  
first campaign against Nizāmu'lı-Mulk and knew something about the fire of the latter's batteries. Thus both parties welcomed an arrangement instead of testing their strength in battle. On 16th January, 1738, a convention was signed at Durai Sarāī, sixty-four miles from Sironj. Nizāmu'lı-Mulk agreed to grant to Bājī Rāo the whole of Mālwa and sovereign rights over the territory between the Narbada and the Chambal. He promised to obtain confirmation of the treaty from the Emperor and to use his best endeavours to get fifty lakhs of rupees from the central treasury as reparations.1 "I have tried", observes Bājī Rāo in a letter quoted by Grant Duff, "to get something from the Nawāb himself but this I scarcely expected. I recollected his unwillingness to part with money when I entered in an agreement to assist him." The allusion is to the compact Nizāmu'lı-Mulk concluded with Rāja Sāhū before the battle of Shakar Khera in 1724. According to some historians the rumour of Nādir Shāh's invasion had already for some time been current in the capital. The Emperor wrote pressing letters to Nizāmu'lı-Mulk, asking him to reach Delhi as soon as possible and to conclude an agreement with the Peshwā.2

This was the last time that Nizāmu'lı-Mulk and the Peshwā Bājī Rāo came into conflict. Emboldened by and flushed with his recent success Bājī Rāo thought of bringing the whole of the Deccan under his sway. Nizāmu'lı-Mulk was away at the capital, engrossed in the arrangement of court affairs after Nādir's departure from India. In December 1739, Bājī Rāo started his campaign to subdue the Deccan at the head of 50,000 horse and foot. He had a double purpose in view. He wanted to bring pressure upon Nizāmu'lı-Mulk to issue him the Sanad, conferring the Government of Mālwa with due confirmation by the Emperor, and to give effect to other stipulations of the convention of Durai Sarāī as part of the agreement. Moreover, he thought of levying tribute in the six Sūbahs of the Deccan to replenish his treasury which was exhausted on account of his campaigns against the Portugese. When Nāsir Jang received intelligence of the unpro-

voked aggression of the Marathas on his dominions, he at once made ready for a counter attack. He advanced to meet Bāji Rāo on the banks of the Godavari river. His army numbered only 10,000. After crossing the river, Nāāsir Jang attacked Bāji Rāo, forcing him to a pitched battle which the latter wanted to avoid at all costs. Nāāsir Jang’s army defeated and pursued him in the direction of Ahmednagar and forced him to sue for peace. At length it was decided that in future the parties would abstain from plundering each other’s territory. Bāji Rāo promised to give up all claims on the revenues of the Deccan. The Sārkārs of Khargāon and Handia, formerly promised by Nizāmu’l-Mulk, were conferred on Bāji Rāo as his Ḫāṣb in order to lighten the burden of his debt. This memorable reverse was the closing chapter of Bāji Rāo’s adventurous career. The truth is that his policy had completely broken down. He was beaten in the field; his troops were clamouring for pay and his treasury was empty. The humiliating defeat prevented him from appearing before Rāja Sāhū whom he had assured of establishing Maratha authority in the Deccan. In one of his letters written sometime before his death, Bāji Rāo gives expression to his great sense of despair. It runs thus: “I am involved in difficulties, in debt and in disappointment and am like a man ready to swallow poison; near the Rāja are my enemies and should I at this time go to Satāra, they will put their feet on my breast. I should be thankful if I could meet death.” After promising Nāāsir Jang never to enter his territory any more, Bāji Rāo started towards the Narbada to take possession of his Ḫāṣb where he was taken ill with violent fever and expired on 28th April 1740. His death is an event of great importance in the history of the Maratha people. He was succeeded by his son Bālāji to the Peshwāship of the Maratha confederacy.

It was Bāji Rāo’s ambition to extend the authority of the

2 Ibid., p. 188.  
3 Malcolm, Central India, vol. I. p. 86. This defeat of Bāji Rāo has also been mentioned in the records of the East India Company in the following words: “Bajeroa who has ever had success has lately been defeated by Narsar Jung in a pitched battle.... Narsar Jung designs to cut off his whole army if possible .... Narsar Jung has gained such a victory that it is not known whether ever his father Chickass (Chin Qilich) did the like.” (Records of Fort St. George, Country Correspondence, 1740.)  
Marathas at the expense of the integrity of the Mughal Empire which was in a state of decay and disintegration. But he ignored the fact that mere conquest or authority to levy blackmail is not enough to establish an Empire. From the beginning of their political existence "the contempt of all morality, in their political arrangements, was with the Marathas avowed and shameless".\(^1\) The principles of Government of the founders of the Maratha confederacy were more suited to destroy than to create an Empire. Bājī Rāo tried his utmost to strengthen the central authority by subjecting internal administration and foreign relations to the control of the Peshwā whom he made the most important dignitary in the Maratha State. Even during his life-time and more especially after his death, the system failed to work. For a short time he succeeded in diverting the attention of the Maratha people from their internal squabbles towards foreign conquest. But this was not sufficient in itself to impart the qualities essential for laying the foundation of an Empire which would last for any length of time. Malcolm has made the following judicious observation when describing the nature of the Maratha Government:

The chiefs were, from the first, almost equal; and as the armies they led depended principally on success for pay, the leaders were necessarily invested with their powers for collecting tribute from the provinces into which they were sent. But though a share was claimed by Government the application of the greater part in the payment of his troops and other expenses raised the successful general into a ruler of the countries he had conquered. This everywhere produced the same effects, and the public interest was lost sight of in the desire of individuals to promote their own ambition.... They were impelled by the continued action of that system which had raised them to power to prey upon and destroy each other.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Malcolm, *Central India*, vol. I, p. 90.
CHAPTER VIII

Nādir Shāh’s Invasion

NIZĀMU’L-MULK’S ROLE OF A MEDIATOR

As far back as 1723, during the period of his first vizierate, Nizāmu’l-Mulk had repeatedly brought to the notice of the Emperor the political consequences of the aggrandisement of the Ghilzai tribe at the expense of the Persian Empire. Māh-mūd Khān Ghilzai, chief of Qandahār, had defeated Sultān Husain Shāh, the Saffavide King of Persia. He overran the territory from Isfahān to Shīrāz in 1722. Those who resisted were expelled from the surrounding country and Afgān authority was established in Khorāsān. When the news of these political developments reached India, Nizāmu’l-Mulk recalled to the Emperor the fact that when the Emperor Humāyūn was defeated by Sher Shāh and was compelled to take to flight, he was given protection at the court of Shāh Tāhmāsp. He added that it would be in the fitness of things if Muhammad Shāh rendered some kind of help to the Per- sian Emperor to repel the Afgān domination in Eastern Persia. This act would be recorded in history to the lasting honour of the Mughals in India. The Emperor is reported to have asked: “Whom have I got to send to Persia for this service?” Nizāmu’l-Mulk replied, “Anyone of your officers whom you might select for this enterprise would carry out your orders; or if your Majesty would desire me to undertake this duty, I would strive heart and soul to accomplish it.”

With his true political perspicacity, Nizāmu’l-Mulk had realised the significance of the growing power of the Afgāns at the expense of the neighbouring Empire of Persia. He wanted to strengthen the Persians whose weakness might one day become a danger to the Mughal rule in India. But the Emperor was incapable of appreciating the significance of international political developments which had a direct rela-

1 Khāfī Khān, vol. II, p. 948.
tion to his own Imperial responsibilities. His timid will, used to petty expedients, failed to come to any decision. The consequences of such a policy were not long in declaring themselves.

Persian humiliation had reached its lowest depth when the great conqueror Nādir Qulī, later known in history as Nādir Shāh, appeared on the scene of activity and by his military exploits gained the confidence and respect of the entire Persian people. He defeated the Afgāns, compelled them to evacuate his country and established his rule in 1736. Not content with this achievement, he marched to Qandahār, invested and captured it in 1737. Thus he cleared his way to the frontiers of the Mughal Empire. The capture of Qandahār ought to have been an eye-opener to the authorities at Delhi. External danger grew imminent but no effective measures to meet it were forthcoming. Before Nizāmu'l-Mulk came to Delhi to take up the vizierate for the second time, Nāsir Khān, Mughal governor of Kābul, had already sent repeated solicitations to the Amīru'l-Umarā for the supply of money, warning him of the impending danger, but none of his representations had been attended to. Amīr Khān, governor of Kābul in the time of Aurangzīb, had maintained militia to defend the frontier as well as to provide a means of subsidy to the tribes in order to keep them quiet. Even after Aurangzīb, the governor of Kābul used to receive funds from the Central Government for political purposes. These remittances were withheld by Amīru'l-Umarā Šamsāmu'd-Daulah since some time. Failing to get the usual supplies of money it was no longer possible for the Mughal governor of Kābul to keep up the military stations on the confines of the Empire. This defenceless state of the Mughal frontier would have tempted any ambitious adventurer to invade India. The Mughal governor of Kābul also informed the Delhi Government about the intentions of Nādir Shāh. But in spite of these warnings, the pusillanimous Government of Delhi failed to make any definite plan of action to check the onward march of the Persian conqueror. When the Wakīl of Nāsir Khān made representations to the Amīru'l-Umarā, the latter is reported to have replied thus: "Know you not that I am a man of too great experience to be caught by such stories that are only made
up to extort gold? Tell your employer that my house is in
the plain, and my imagination dwells only on what my eyes
can see. Your house is on the mountain, and perhaps from
its summit you have caught a glimpse of the Persian host.”¹
Nādir Shāh easily entered Afgānistān in May 1738. He
captured Ghaznī and then Kābul, without meeting any
obstruction. The Mughal Governor fled to Peshāwar to save
his life. The frontier militia were five years in arrears of pay.
Nādir treated them well and induced most of their leaders
to join his army, promising them rich rewards and share in
the spoils of India. Thus the way to India lay open. With a
huge army he crossed the Attock and invaded the Punjāb.²

That Nādir Shāh was secretly urged by Nizāmu’l-Mulk
to undertake an expedition to India is a baseless legend
which continued to survive for a long time. There is abso-
lutely no evidence to substantiate the charge against this most
devoted of men whose loyalty to his Imperial master remained
unshaken even in the midst of extremely trying circumstances
up to the last. Most probably the party of Samsāmu’Daulah
and Rāja Jai Singh was responsible for spreading this rumour
in order to discredit Nizāmu’l-Mulk in the eyes of the Em-
peror. It was easy enough for them to attribute their own
incompetence and failure to the so-called machinations of
Nizāmu’l-Mulk! Just as the latter was alleged to have been
responsible for the Maratha incursions in Northern India,
similarly Nādir’s invasion was said to have been due to his
invitation. All this sinister propaganda was directed by the
party of the Amīru’l-Umarā which had personal reasons to
gratify its ill-feeling, over-shadowed as it had been by the
dominating personality of Nizāmu’l-Mulk. The explanation of
Nādir Shāh’s invasion is to be sought elsewhere. A con-
temporary writer Hanway truly observes:

It seems to me to be highly probable that Nādir did not
stand in need of such instruments for the execution of his
ambitious designs. It can hardly be imagined that he was
ignorant of the general state of affairs in that Empire
(India), or of the immeasureable riches possessed by the

¹ Tazkira of Anand Rām Mukhliś (Elliott and Dowson, vol. viii. p. 78).
² Jeḥānkūshī-i-Nādirī, p. 290.
Mogol. He knew also the valour of his own troops, and the effeminacy of the Indians. How easy it is then to believe that a project of this nature might be formed by so ambitious a man whose necessities for the support of his army would tempt him to a "desperate enterprise."

It is self-evident that Nādir Shāh was influenced by pecuniary necessity to invade India. He did not stand in need of anybody urging him to do so. His finances were in a bad way on account of his expeditions against the Turks before invading India. He had also found an excuse to feel justified in cutting off diplomatic relations with the Mughal Government.

After recovering Persia from the usurpation of the Afghān chiefs, Nādir had raised Shāh Tahmasp II to the throne of his ancestors. On this occasion, the Mughal Government did not send any formal congratulations to the Persian Emperor as a mark of recognition of the new regime. Those who seek to justify Nādir's invasion bring forward further argument that the Mughal Emperor, in total disregard of previous usage and courtesy, neglected to send his ambassador to the Persian Court at the former's accession to power. This was considered as tantamount to non-recognition of his sovereign claims on the throne of Persia. Moreover, the Mughal Court had throughout maintained friendly relations with Mir Wāis and other Afghān chiefs who had overrun and established their authority in Eastern Persia. This was an unfriendly act from the diplomatic point of view.

Later when Nādir Shāh had consolidated his position in his country and assumed the title of King of Persia, he sent his envoy ‘Alī Mardān Khān Shamlū to the Delhi Court requesting Muhammad Shāh to direct the governor of Kābul to disallow the Afghān fugitives to get shelter in Mughal territory. Muhammad Shāh is said to have promised to give necessary directions to the Governor of Kābul and do the needful. But the Amīru'l-Umarā did nothing to implement the promise. Another messenger Muhammad ‘Alī Khān was sent with a similar request and came back with the same

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2 Siyar, vol. II.
kind of evasive reply. Then Nādir sent a third envoy, Muhammad Khān Turkomān, in April 1737, by way of Sindh, with an expostulatory letter. The envoy had directions not to stay for more than forty days in Delhi, during which time he was expected to get a definite reply from the Mughal Government. But the Ministers at Delhi detained the envoy, hesitating to acknowledge the titles of Nādir Shāh. They, in fact, waited to see the upshot of the struggle between Nādir Shāh and the Afghāns, believing that the latter were too strong to be easily subdued.¹ A year passed and Nādir received no reply from the Court of Delhi, nor any news of his envoy. This was not the usual manner to receive ambassadors whose diplomatic position demanded courtesy and graciousness. Nādir felt offended at this treatment meted out to his envoy by the Ministers of Muhammad Shāh. Moreover, in the meantime his two fast couriers who were sent to Delhi under escort to bring news of Muhammad Khān Turkomān, were murdered in cold blood on the Mughal side of the frontier. All this prompted Nādir Shāh to avenge himself by invading Northern India. After subduing the frontier tribes, he marched straight into the Punjab without meeting any serious resistance till he appeared in the neighbourhood of the Imperial city.² The Mughal armies awaited him at Karnāl near Pānīpat where so many other decisive battles of India had been fought. The Amīru’l-Umarā counted very much on the support of Rāja Jai Singh and other Rājpūt princes but they failed to come to the rescue of the Emperor at this critical juncture.³ The feeling of loyalty had wholly died down among the Rājpūt princes, but it only counted in the game when it coexisted with their dynastic or personal claims.

When Muhammad Shāh was apprised of the fact that Nādir had crossed the Indus, he summoned Burhānu’l-Mulk Saʿādat Khān from Oudh. Then he decided, after consulting Nizāmu’l-Mulk, Samsāmu’d-Daulah and I’timādu’d-Daulah, that the three nobles should immediately proceed towards Karnāl, encamp there and wait for the enemy. The adjoining plain was defended on the eastern and western sides by a broad river and a thick forest. The Imperial armies reached Pānīpat

² Taṣkīra (Elliott, op. cit., p. 81).
on 18th January 1738. After about three weeks Sa’ādat Khān also joined them with 30,000 horse and a fine train of artillery. At the suggestion of Nizāmu’l-Mulk a council of war was held in which the Emperor also took part, and it decided to entrench instead of precipitating a general action. According to the directions of Nizāmu’l-Mulk the armies were placed all round the Imperial camp in the shape of a ring. Notwithstanding this arrangement the Persian soldiers attacked from all sides and carried off corn, grass and wood from the Indian camp where the price of grain rose enormously high. Nizāmu’l-Mulk was in favour of postponing the battle because he knew that the Persian conqueror “was no ordinary foe against whom they had to contend, no mere plunderer, but a leader of unshakeable resolution who shaped his course with the sword.” He also thought that Sa’ādat Khān’s forces were in need of rest, worn out as they were by one month’s incessant marching. But in the meantime news were brought that the Persian skirmishers had killed some of the camp-followers of Sa’ādat Khān while attacking the latter’s train of baggage. This incensed Sa’ādat Khān beyond measure. In spite of Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s opposition, he took permission from the Emperor to chase the Persian skirmishers. Nizāmu’l-Mulk had warned him that his military experience had been limited to fighting with the zemindārs of India over whom it was easy to obtain victory; but it was difficult to resist successfully the attack of a great conqueror which is a different thing altogether. Being a man of great valour, Sa’ādat Khān pursued the enemy, unmindful of the fact that he was thus being lured away into a vulnerable position. Nādir Shāh, who was ready for action, welcomed the advance of Sa’ādat Khān. The latter, finding himself face to face with a formidable army, sent message to the Emperor to send reinforcements. Samsāmu’d-Daulah Khān-i-Daurān, another believer in the appeal to arms, advanced at the head of a large army to strengthen the hands of Sa’ādat Khān. But the Persians did not allow the two armies to join. Sa’ādat Khān’s vanguard

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1 Tārīkh-i-Nādirshāhī, MS.
2 Tārīkh-i-Hindi (Elliott, vol. VIII, p. 61).
3 Tāzkhā, op. cit., p. 78.
5 Jāhānkūshā-i-Nādir, p. 234.
could not stand the fire of Nādir’s swivel-guns. His ranks were utterly broken. While trying to leave the field, Sa’ādat Khān’s elephant drove into the Persian ranks where he was obliged to submit and was carried a prisoner to the Persian monarch.¹

As a strategist Nādir, was far superior to his opponents. He was resourceful and quick to perceive and to utilize his enemy’s error. By tactical manipulation the Amīru’l-Umarā’s reinforcement was not allowed to offer any help to Sa’ādat Khān. His forces engaged them separately. After overpowering Sa’ādat Khān, Nādir Shāh turned towards the Amīru’l-Umarā with 20,000 troops. The latter’s forces were thrown into the utmost disorder by the terrific fire of his artillery. The Amīru’l-Umarā was severely wounded and carried back senseless to the Imperial camp. ²

The rout of the latter’s army was complete. Nearly 20,000 Indians were killed and their effects and baggage plundered by the Persians. Among the prominent Indians slain were Muzaffar Khān, younger brother of Samsāmu’d-Daulah, Yādgār Khān, Ashraf Khān and others. The ineffectual strategy of the Mughal generals facilitated the victory of the Persian monarch. In view of the menace created by the situation then, the Mughal Emperor and his advisers were greatly dismayed and not a little confused as to the action to be taken.

When back to his camp, Nādir Shāh is reported to have questioned Burhānu’l-Mulk Sa’ādat Khān about the general condition of the Mughal Empire. Sa’ādat Khān answered: “Āsaf Jāh is the key of the Empire of India, Your Majesty may call him and negotiate terms with him.”³ Sa’ādat Khān suggested that it was necessary to invite Nizāmu’l-Mulk to his camp in order to conclude an arrangement with him. He was the only person who could deliver the goods. Next morning an invitation was sent to Nizāmu’l-Mulk to discuss a settlement as a preliminary to general peace. The invitation was sent through a trustworthy person, with a copy of the holy Qurān in order to show good faith. The Emperor Muhammad Shāh regarded the proposal with great apprehension. At that critical juncture Nizāmu’l-Mulk was the only ex-

experienced person left near him who could give him sound advice. In great dread he is reported to have asked Nizāmū'l-Mulk: "If any treachery is done to you, what step should we take?" Like a brave man Nizāmū'l-Mulk replied: "The Qurān is between us. If there is treachery God will answer for it. Then Your Majesty should retreat to Mandū or some other fort, summon Nāsir Jang from the Deccan with a strong force and fight the Persians."¹

Some of the Mughal nobles were against any negotiations with a view to settlement. They advocated war instead of a humiliating peace. But Nizāmū'l-Mulk knew full well that they lacked sufficient spirit and equipment to withstand the onslaughts of the Persians.² He was opposed to any plan of general action. His counsels determined Muhammad Shāh in favour of a pacific policy.

The next day after receiving Nādir's invitation, Nizāmū'l-Mulk set out for the Persian camp along with his nephew 'Azīmullāh Khān Bahādur, with full authority to negotiate an honourable settlement. Nizāmū'l-Mulk was well received by the Persian monarch who addressed him thus: "It is surprising that while there are nobles like you on the Emperor's side, the Marathas can march up to the walls of Delhi and take ransom from him." To this Nizāmū'l-Mulk replied: "Since new nobles rose to influence His Majesty did whatever he liked. My advice was not acceptable to him. Therefore in helplessness, I left him and retired to the Deccan."³ Then Nādir Shāh complained of the indifferent and discourteous attitude adopted by the Delhi Court towards the Sovereign of Persia. Nizāmū'l-Mulk tried to satisfy him by explaining: "Since the death of Farrukhsiyar, the affairs of the Government have gone to rack and ruin owing to quarrels among the nobles, and therefore the ministers did not attend to Your Majesty's letters."⁴ He further alleged that after taking up the vizierate for the second time he had been using his best endeavours to set right the affairs of the Empire. On hearing all this Nādir is said to have smiled and added:

By the treaties of alliance subsisting between the two Em-

pires, they ought reciprocally to support each other. Persia having been long rent with civil wars, I had to borrow large sums for which I pay interest. The neglect of the treaties on your part has been the cause of the misfortunes which have happened to Persia. Who is to repair these injuries? I had intended to put your Emperor and his troops to the sword, but I will favour them; go and tell him to come to me and we will make up our quarrel in a convenient manner.\footnote{Hanway, vol. II, p. 169.}

After some discussion Nizāmu’l-Mulk persuaded Nādir Shāh to agree to the following conditions.\footnote{Irvine, op. cit., p. 354; according to Sīyar the sum of indemnity agreed to was two crores of Rupees (vol. II, p. 464).}

(1) The Persian army would not advance towards Delhi, provided an indemnity of fifty lakhs of rupees was paid to Nādir Shāh.

(2) Twenty lakhs were to be paid immediately; 10 lakhs on reaching Lahore; ten lakhs at Attock, and the remaining sum at Kābul.

(3) No territorial annexations will be made.

Having concluded this arrangement, Nizāmu’l-Mulk returned to his camp where everybody waited anxiously for his arrival. Muhammad Shāh was reassured and agreed to pay a visit to Nādir Shāh as desired by the latter. He started for the Persian camp on 15th February 1739 where he was welcomed by prince Nasrullāh.\footnote{Sīyar, vol. II, p. 464.} Nādir Shāh too came out of his tent to receive him. He took him by the hand, carried him to his own masnad and seated him by his side. The coffee-bearer first presented coffee to Nādir Shāh but he with his own hands courteously presented it to Muhammad Shāh.\footnote{Tārıkẖ-i-Chaghāšī, (Elliott, vol. VIII, p. 23).}

After his visit which lasted for two hours, Muhammad Shāh returned to his camp where he was apprised of Samsāmu’l-Daulah’s death. In view of his services to the cause of the Empire, Muhammad Shāh conferred the office of Amīru’l-Umarā Bakhshī-i-Mumālik (Pay Master of the Em-
pire) on Nizāmu’l-Mulk. This appointment was formerly promised to Sa‘ādat Khān, who on being informed of this, was blinded by rage and jealousy. He set himself to wreak vengeance on Nizāmu’l-Mulk somehow or other. To gratify his resentment he represented to Nādir Shāh that he had made a bad bargain with Nizāmu’l-Mulk who would have agreed to pay more as the price of evacuating the country.¹ He suggested to him to take Muhammad Shāh, Nizāmu’l-Mulk and others into custody and make himself master of the immense riches of Delhi. This suggestion was after Nādir’s heart. He sent a message to Nizāmu’l-Mulk to see him immediately. Trusting fully the agreement entered into by them a few days back, Nizāmu’l-Mulk without suspecting treachery went to the Persian camp where he was immediately placed into custody. Nādir sent him a word, raising his pecuniary demands, to twenty crores of rupees. Nizāmu’l-Mulk was highly surprised to hear this and replied:

From the foundation of the Chaghtāi dynasty up to now, 20 crores of Rupees had never been amassed in the Imperial treasury. Shāh Jehān, with all his efforts, had accumulated only 16 crores; but the whole of it had been spent by the Emperor Aurangzīb in his long wars in the Deccan. At present even 50 lakhs are not left in the Treasury.²

Nizāmu’l-Mulk was put into confinement and constrained to send for the Emperor, writing him a letter under his own hand to the effect that he had settled the final terms of peace and that his coming was required for confirmation.³ On receiving Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s letter, the Emperor set out for the Persian camp where he too was placed into custody. He was asked to write to the Wazir I’timād-ud-Daulah to come to the Persian Court for some important consultation. But the news of the treacherous conduct on the part of the Persian monarch had got abroad and had produced great consternation and not a little terror in the Indian camp. The Mughal soldiery, already out of spirits, finding themselves without any leader, took to flight in

different directions. The Wazir I’timādu’d-Daulah was forcibly brought by the Quzilbash soldiers to the Persian camp and taken into custody. Although Muhammad Shāh was kindly treated he was obliged to do homage to the Persian monarch.

Nādir Shāh ordered Sa’ādat Khān Burhānu’l-Mulk and Tahmāsp Khān to enter Delhi at the head of 4000 horse, take possession of the Imperial property and establish his authority there. The inhabitants of the Mughal capital felt themselves utterly helpless in face of the impending calamity. There was none to lead, none to advise them. Nādir started for Delhi along with Muhammad Shāh and the Mughal nobles whom he had detained in order to collect the riches of the Mughal capital. He was welcomed by Sa’ādat Khān near the Shālāmār gardens. Nādir Shāh chose the Diwān-i-Khāṣ for his residence and his troops were quartered on the bank of the river Jamuna and also in the city. Coins were struck and Friday Khutba read in his name in all the mosques of Delhi.

Sa’ādat Khān Burhānu’l-Mulk rose high in the estimation of the new Sovereign. But he felt distressed to realise that he would not succeed in collecting the large sum of money from Delhi which he had promised to Nādir Shāh. According to Jauhar-i-Samsām, a contemporary authority, when the sum of money and the jewels promised by Sa’ādat Khān were not forthcoming, Nādir in his disappointment, reprimanded and threatened him with corporal punishment. Sa’ādat Khān could not stand this insult. Being already weak and ailing for some time, he decided to end his life. He accordingly went home, took a dose of poison and died during the night.

Nādir openly declared that he had no desire to annex the territory or occupy the throne of Delhi, and he would gladly reinstate Muhammad Shāh, provided he received his contribution. The latter appointed Nizāmu’l-Mulk and I’timādu’d-Daulah to collect money from the rich bankers and merchants of Delhi. Nādir’s agents and soldiery, in spite of his directions to the contrary, heaped

exactions and insults on the citizens of the capital. They started looting their property remorselessly, created tumult and murdered several Persian soldiers. Meanwhile, a false rumour was spread through the town that Nādir was murdered by a Qalmāq woman-guard of the royal palace. The bad characters commenced an indiscriminate massacre. Many of the Qizilbāšes in their various isolated stations throughout the city were slain. When this was brought to Nādir’s notice, he unsheathed his sword and ordered a general massacre of the citizens. The enraged Persian soldiery plundered and demolished the houses, set fire to shops and killed about 30,000 men and women in the most brutal manner. There was scarcely a spot left in Delhi but was stained with human blood. The scourge occasioned by the Persians had been dreadful. Nobody dared approach Nādir Shāh to ask for mercy. At length, amidst this scene of carnage and slaughter, Nizāmu’l-Mulk had the courage to go to him and intercede for the pardon of the inhabitants of Delhi.¹ He is reported to have appealed to his sense of pity by reciting an appropriate Persian couplet on hearing which Nādir’s heart softened and he said: “I pardon in consideration of thy grey beard.”²

The scene of carnage and destruction is vividly described by Anand Rām Mukhlis who was an eye-witness, and as secretary to the Wazir I’timadu’d-Daulah, bore an eminent part in all that he relates:

For a long time the streets remained strewn with corpses, as the walks of a garden with dead flowers and leaves. The town was reduced to ashes and had the appearance of a plain consumed with fire. The ruin in which its beautiful streets and buildings were involved was such that the labour of years could alone restore the town to its former state of grandeur.³

After quiet was restored the agents of Nādir Shāh went about from house to house in order to prepare inventories

² Some Urdu writers have referred to this legend but I have not been able to trace its source in any of the contemporary authorities.
³ Tazkira (Elliott, vol. VIII, pp. 88-89).
of the properties of the citizens of Delhi. Nizāmu’l-Mulk, I’timādu’d-Daulah and Sarbuland Khān were especially appointed to supervise the collection of money. The city was divided into five divisions and lists of different quarters with names of their inhabitants and also the contribution to be levied from each were elaborately prepared and given to different Amīrs. The collections were made in a most systematic and remorseless manner, and the people had to endure great persecution. Many committed suicide. Nizāmu’l-Mulk and I’timādu’d-Daulah paid from their own chests the greater portion of the sum allotted to their quarters instead of trying to exact money from the people as other Amīrs had done. The collections in their quarters were made in the most humane manner.1

After having collected his contribution, Nādir made a treaty with the Mughal Emperor according to which the country west of the river Indus was ceded to him. He placed the crown on the head of Muhammad Shāh with his own hands and decreed that henceforth the firmāns should be issued in his name. His parting advice to Muhammad Shāh was that the latter should be watchful of the Marathas and always act in accordance with the counsels of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, who was a man of great worth.2 The Khutba was recited and coins struck in Nādir’s name for two months in Delhi and in the provinces as a recognition of his suzerainty all over the Mughal Empire.3

The whole Mughal Empire was overawed by the suddenness and extent of the overwhelming calamity; and the consternation of the capital, with its outcome of horrors, spread into the provinces. Rāja Jai Singh had sent his family to Udaipur so that he might easily flee away in the event of Nādir’s invasion of Rājpūtāna. This is well shown by a letter of Dupleix, then governor of Chandernagore, dated the 9th

1 Tazkira, op. cit., p. 91.  
2 Tārīkh-i-Nādirshāhī.  
3 The silver and gold coins were struck at Ahmedābād in the name of Nādir Shāh, on which was inscribed the couplet:

Hast Sultān bar Salātīn-i-jehān,  
Shāhī-Shāhān Nādir-i-Sāhib qirān.

(Nādir, the fortunate and invincible hero is the Sultān of Sultāns and the King of Kings.) Mīr’āz-i-Ahmedī, vol. II, p. 255.
April, 1739, which is addressed to the Supreme Council at Pondichéry. It runs thus:

It has been two days since we received the new rupees struck at Murshidábâd, in the name of Nâdir Shâh. His authority is recognised right up to the extreme eastern limit of the Empire. We are so far unaware as to the intentions of the new Emperor as regards the European nations. Is he going to leave us in peace to enjoy our privileges or is he going to deprive us of them? We are not absolutely sure as to his attitude in this regard. It is on account of this that we are obliged to address you to lay down a definite course of conduct to be pursued by us. It is possible that the new Emperor may desire us to demolish our factory here; or he may appoint a new faujdâr of the villages now under our control, and demand revenues and put us under his jurisdiction. He may pretend to have the right to impose fresh custom duties on our goods or increase the tariff according to the estimate of his officers; he may as well question the validity of our 'dastaks' (passports). If the new faujdâr demands us to pay a large sum for the continuation of our privileges or just for the sake of exacting money from us, what then should be our attitude? If he asks Monsieur Dupleix to go to Delhi to do homage to the new Emperor or send a deputation to wait on him, what are we expected to do? We hope these suppositions will not come true, but to be on sure ground, it is necessary for us to know your intention beforehand so that we may be confident of our position.¹

The reply of the Supreme Council of Pondichéry, dated 26th June 1739, shows even greater anxiety felt in such a distant outskirt of the Empire as the Carnâtic. It runs:

We have received the new rupees struck in the name of Nâdir Shâh. It is really surprising that such a great revolution should have been accomplished with such rapidity.

¹ Correspondance du Conseil Supérieur de Pondichéry avec le Conseil de Chandernagore, Tome II, p. 94.
We hope that Nawāb of Golconda (Nizāmu’l-Mulk) will not have any intention to tender submission to the new Emperor. Anyway, there seems to be no reason to believe that the new Emperor will deprive you of your privileges. But if he has an ill-feeling towards the Europeans you will certainly not be able to hold out in Bengal. Our advice to you is that if you are deprived of the privileges or treated in a humiliating manner, there will be no alternative left but to suspend your commerce which in these circumstances will become more costly than profitable. If it comes to that you will have to shut yourselves in your factories and protect the vessels which will be of service to retire and embark your chests safely. If the commerce ceases, then you may pass on all the funds to us which should not lie idle there. We believe if the new Emperor issues orders to deprive us of our privileges, they will be equally applicable to the English and the Dutch. In such a case, it may be advantageous for the three nations to unite and defend their interests against the Moors. It will be prudent not to risk any action unless we are sure of the attitude of the English and the Dutch. If a new faujdār is sent to the province and he confirms your privileges as well as accords new ones, it will be desirable to make a suitable present to him. But nothing should prompt Monsieur Dupleix to leave the station. As for sending a deputation to the Emperor, we believe it will not serve any purpose unless it is composed of wise and intelligent men. We will let you know our intention about this matter when we are in receipt of reliable intelligence from Delhi as to the result produced by the great event there.¹

After seizing the fabulous riches of the Mughal Capital, Nādir set out on his return journey to Persia. The effect of his expedition proved disastrous for north-western Indiā which was sucked dry of treasure. Industry and trade was so completely paralyzed there that it was not restored to its former prosperity for a long time to come. It would not have been strange at all if the shadowy Empire of the Mughals came to an end. But it had yet to linger on for sometime.

Nizāmu’l-Mulk had foreseen this calamity as early as 1723 when he appealed to the Emperor that the Mughal Government should not be blind to the danger of allowing the political developments of the countries contiguous to India to take their own course. It was of manifest importance that the Government did not neglect to watch the consequences and reactions of those developments on the fortunes of the Empire. But amid the general demoralization nobody paid any attention to the words of the wise man.

It is reported by Munshi Mansā Rām, secretary of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, in his history, Ma’athir-i-Nizāmi, that Nādir Shāh, before his departure, asked Nizāmu’l-Mulk to undertake the responsibility of the Government of the Indian Empire and said: “You deserve the Empire and not Muhammad Shāh. I want to make you the Emperor of India and leave with you ten thousand of my intrepid soldiers who will peel off the skin of those who refuse to acknowledge you.” To this Nizāmu’l-Mulk replied: “To be an Emperor such qualities of greatness are required as I, your humble servant, do not possess.” Nādir asked: “How do you mean by this?” Nizāmu’l-Mulk said: “I and my ancestors have, from ancient times, been in the service of the king of Delhi. Such an impropriety of conduct on my part will make me notorious as one untrue to salt.” Nādir Shāh appreciated the significance of these remarks and praised Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s loyalty and devotion.¹

¹ Ma’athir-i-Nizāmi; Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s Testament (Daftar-i-Diwāni).
CHAPTER IX

Nāsir Jāng in Rebellion

Soon after Nādir’s departure, Nizāmu’l-Mulk had been continually receiving intelligence from his uncle Nasāru’d-Daulah Salābat Jang, Sūbedār of Burhānpūr, that Nāsir Jang, whom he had appointed deputy viceroy of the Deccan, meditated rebellion. Some acts of presumption were committed by him. His slighting behaviour towards the highest nobility had caused an ever-increasing menace to the maintenance of tranquillity in the Deccan. Nizāmu’l-Mulk realised that the placing of extensive authority into his hands was wrong; and the state of affairs required his immediate presence in the Deccan in order not to allow the stability of his Government to be endangered. He obtained permission from the Emperor to leave for his dominions to extinguish the rebellion of his son. He was also given the privilege of transferring his title of Amīru’l-Umarā, which was bestowed on him after Khān-i-Daurān’s death, to his eldest son, Ghāzīu’d-Dīn Khān Fīrūz Jang. He left the capital in August 1740. He was received by Nasīru’d-Daulah Salābat Jang near Burhānpūr where he stayed for about two months.¹

Apprised of his father’s arrival, Nāsir Jang sent him a message to go back to Delhi and leave the Government of the Deccan to him. Weary of ardently waiting for the succession, he conceived the scheme of achieving his object by becoming undutiful to his father. During his stay at Burhānpūr, Nizāmu’l-Mulk opened negotiations with Nāsir Jang in order to induce him to a submission without shedding of blood. He was offered the Sūbedārī of Bījāpūr, and the continuance of all the rights and privileges which he formerly enjoyed.² But he was not prepared to listen to his father’s advice and decided to take up arms against him at the instigation of ‘Abdul ‘Azīz Khān, Fatehyāb Khān and Sayyid

² Tārīkh-i-Fathīpūr.
Jamāl Khān. When Nizāmu'l-Mulk heard of the determination of Nāsir Jang to try conclusions, he was constrained to make preparations to call him to account. During his stay in Burhānpūr many of the partisans of Nāsir Jang had joined him. The desertion of his officers caused a deep melancholy to Nāsir Jang who decided to give up the idea of resistance and assume the garb of a recluse and retire to the Rauza, the tomb of Shāh Burhānu'd-Din Gharīb at Khuldābād. He resolved to cut himself off completely from the world and devote himself to religion. On hearing this Nizāmu'l-Mulk wrote the following letter to the Emperor which gives a vivid description of the state of affairs obtaining in the Deccan at this time:

During four years, when I had the privilege of being in the honour-giving presence of His Majesty, the dominions of the Deccan had been subjected to strange confusion. Those whom I had left with Nāsir Jang, seduced him, from their innate malice, to raise the standard of rebellion. That inexperienced one (Nāsir Jang), not being able to discriminate between good and evil and friend from foe, began to consider himself as the independent sovereign of the Deccan. I was informed in Mālwa that he intended to offer resistance and, for this purpose, had invited self-seeking persons from different regions who exploited him for their own ends. Jamāl Khān, the son of late 'Izdu'd-Daulah, not content with the sūbedārī of Berār, managed to draw forth ten lakhs of Rupees from Nāsir Jang in order to raise troops and eleven lakhs from my private Jāgīrs by false pretences. 'Abdul 'Azīz Khān, Sūbedār of Aurangābād, got twenty-two lakhs worth of Jāgīr and increase in his rank as well as in those of his sons and relatives. Similarly Khān-i-'Ālam, Jānuji and others obtained large Jāgīrs through their manipulations. By creating false hopes in the mind of Nāsir Jang, who was foolish enough to believe in their sincerity, they moved from their respective stations to undertake military operations against the devoted servant of His Majesty, of heaven-like dignity. Thus they opened the gates of disappointment by their own hands.

And that inexperienced one, ignorant of the deceit of this world, considered them to be his loyal friends. In spite of the previous grants of fiefs, he gave them more lands and titles, in order to incite them to action, ignoring the fact that it would be a fatal misfortune, whichever party suffered. Now, supposing if they succeed in their vicious designs, he (Nāṣir Jang) will not be safe in the hands of these corrupt and ungrateful persons. The dominions will be split up; the revenues will decrease; the troops will be clamouring for their pay which they will not get in time; and he (Nāṣir Jang) will be thrown into utter perplexity. Notwithstanding your devoted servant’s advice to the contrary, his eyes of understanding were blinded by the fog of defection and he utterly failed to appreciate the rightness of his counsels. From the path of ignorance he wandered away into the wilderness of error. He advanced with thirty thousand horse and a park of artillery towards Fardāpūr, sixty miles from Burhānpūr. From there he sent Mutahawwar Khān to give message to the devoted servant (Nizāmu’l-Mulk) that he should better go back to the Capital and leave the affairs of the Deccan into his hands. To this an unambiguous reply was sent in order to direct him in the path of rectitude. But in excess of pride he paid no heed to it and again sent ‘Abdul Husain Khān with the same message. When the devoted servant was convinced that no other remedy would prove efficacious, he thought of applying the last cure of branding him with hot iron. Within a short period a large number of troops was raised, and it was decided to advance from Burhānpūr to chastise the short-sighted rebels. On hearing of this intention, the self-seeking wretches were frightened out of their senses and gave up the idea of offering resistance. When Nizāmu’d-Daulah (Nāṣir Jang) saw that the page of evil designs was overturned and all his projects came to nought, he outwardly put on the garb of a recluse and took protection in the tomb of Hazrat Shāh Burhānu’d-Din. Among those who have joined your devoted servant with artillery are Muhtashim Khān, pay-master, Khān-i-‘Ālam and others. Thank Lord, the dust of sedition that had caused discord and anxiety has now been subsided by
the rains of the Almighty’s grace. But even now the strong fortress of Warankada and Khaiber are in the hands of Fatehyāb Khān. The rebels have also succeeded in creating disorders in the Haiderābād province, finding it devoid of authority. Since some time Rāghuji Bhonsla has again taken possession of the region of the Carnātic and intends to proceed towards the province of Haiderābād. Therefore, the devoted servant has resolved to march in that direction in order to set matters right.¹

After fording Tāptī, Nizāmu’l-Mulk encamped on the banks of the river Pūrnā as the rainy season was then at its height. He was joined there by Anwarullāh Khān, Diwān, who had come from Haiderābād. Here Nizāmu’l-Mulk received a message from Peshwā Bālāji Rāo who desired to have an interview with him in connection with the affairs of Mālwa. Bālāji came with his chiefs and stayed for two days in Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s camp at ‘Ādilābād and thence proceeded to the Sūbedāri of Mālwa which he had already obtained by an Imperial firmān according to which this office had been given in trust to the Wazīr to be bestowed upon Bālāji Rāo.² Circumstanced as he then was, Nizāmu’l-Mulk considered it advisable to abstain from interference in the affairs of Mālwa provided Bālāji ruled there as the deputy of the Emperor.³ He crossed the Pūrnā and proceeded towards Gulshanābād whence he turned towards Fardāpūr. From here he marched in the direction of Aurangābād.

In the meantime Fatehyāb Khān had again induced Nāsir Jang to make preparations for offering resistance to his father. He had taken the fortress of Mulhair by stratagem from Muhammad Mutawassil Khān, and succeeded in frightening Nāsir Jang of the strong measures that Nizāmu’l-Mulk would adopt against them if they failed to achieve their objective. Nāsir Jang, afraid of his father’s anger, and being a puppet in the hands of his ambitious courtiers, decided to undertake military operations against him. He assembled

nearly 7,000 troops. According to Fatehyâb Khân’s plan of action it was resolved to give a surprise to Nizâmull-Mulk’s army and then proceed towards Khuldâbâd. On hearing of Nâsicr Jang’s advance, Nizâmull-Mulk made all possible haste to move out of the city and drew up whatever forces he could muster there at that time. The two armies met on 23rd July 1741, near Daulatâbâd. Nizâmull-Mulk tried once more to induce Nâsicr Jang to change his mind by sending him the last message of reconciliation through Shâh Wali who was a great friend of Sayyid Lashkar Khân, but failed to dissuade him from his intention. Now Nizâmull-Mulk felt constrained to draw up his forces in battle array to meet Nâsicr Jang’s attack. Muhammad Mutawassil Khân and Khwâjâ Qulî Khân were placed in the vanguard. To the right wing were posted Mutahawwar Khân Khaishgi and Rahmatullah Khân. Mubâriz Khân and Khwâja Hamid-ullâh Khân, sons of the late ‘Imâdu’l-Mulk Mubâriz Khân, were appointed on the left wing of the army. Salîm Khân was directed to protect the rear. Nizâmull-Mulk checked the advance of Nâsicr Jang’s forces, throwing them into utter confusion. The latter’s army suffered greatly from the well-directed artillery fire and many of his adherents were compelled to take to headlong flight to save their lives. Many were slain whose bodies lay piled on the top of each other. But Nâsicr Jang fought on bravely with the few men left near him amid a rain of arrows and balls and received severe wounds. It is curious to note here that when Muhammad Mutawassil Khân had drawn up an arrow aiming at the head of Nâsicr Jang, his son Hidâyat Muhîddîn Khân, who was sitting on the same elephant as his father, stayed his hand to save the life of his uncle. He is the same young man who later on became the rival of his uncle for the Sûbedârî of the Deccan and claimed to have been named as heir by Nizâmull-Mulk, his maternal grandfather. It was at his instigation that Nâsicr Jang was, later on, done to death. Meanwhile, Sayyid Lashkar Khân pushed his elephant near that of Nâsicr Jang whose strength had begun to fail, and took

1 Hadîqat’l-Álam, op. cit., p. 169; according to Târîkh-i-Fathiyah, he had four thousand troops with him.
2 Hadîqat’l-Álam, op. cit., p. 170.
him safe to Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s camp. The drums of victory were beaten and the banners of victory unfurled.\(^1\) It is reported that Hīrzullāh Khān, who was a great friend of Shāh Nawāz Khān, one of the adherents of Nāsir Jang, addressed him thus on the battlefield: “The son is going to his father’s house and where are you going to? You have done your duty as a friend, now you better step aside from the precipice.”\(^2\) On hearing these words of his friend and well-wisher, Shāh Nawāz Khān retired from the battlefield. For five years he dared not appear before Nizāmu’l-Mulk and lived a life of complete seclusion, during which time he compiled his well-known biographical dictionary of Mughal peerage, Ma’āthiru’l-Umarā. Later he was pardoned and reinstated in his former office and titles.\(^3\)

Nāsir Jang was brought a prisoner to Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s camp where a separate tent was pitched for him. His wounds were attended to by the best surgeons available. Nizāmu’l-Mulk sent him a special robe and the scarf which he was wearing at that moment. He is reported to have given expression to his feelings, on this occasion, in the following words:

Today Almighty, by His grace, has accorded me three reasons to be happy. First, the victory; secondly, the safety of Nāsir Jang; and thirdly, the experience of latter’s valour. Since his childhood I have known him to be courageous; today I have seen with my own eyes how brave he is? There are few who can equal him.\(^4\)

Next morning Nizāmu’l-Mulk entered the city of Aurangābād with military pomp and display. He was advised by his secretary Mūsavi Khān to take harsh measures against those who took up arms against the Government, but Nizāmu’l-Mulk wisely refrained from doing so. He said that those who had taken an active part in the rebellion should be removed from service and deprived of their titles and fiefs; this was quite enough as they had already received ample retribution in the battle for their evil intentions.\(^5\) In view of

\(^1\) Tarīkh-i-Fathiyah.  
\(^2\) Hadīsatu’l-‘Alam, op. cit., p. 170.  
\(^3\) Hadīsatu’l-‘Alam, op. cit., p. 171.  
\(^4\) Fathiyah (MS).  
\(^5\) Fathiyah; Hadīsatu’l-‘Alam, op. cit., p. 171.
his services Syed Lashkar Khan, the chief Bakhshi, was given the title of Násir Jung.\textsuperscript{1}

Násir Jang was kept interned in the new house of 'Abdul 'Aziz Khan and was put in charge of Sayyid Lashkar Khan. When his wounds were healed, he accompanied Nizámū'l-Mulk's camp to Qandahār where he was received in audience for the first time after the battle. At the intercession of some ladies of the palace he was pardoned and brought before Nizámū'l-Mulk. He threw himself at the latter's feet and cried like a child, reciting the couplet: "It would have been better if my mother had not given birth to me; it would have been better if she had given me poison instead of milk."\textsuperscript{2}

On hearing these words Nizámū'l-Mulk as well as those who were present on this occasion were moved to tears. For about a year Násir Jang accompanied the camp of his father, wherever he went. He was set at liberty when the latter proceeded on his administrative tour of Berār. He was given a special robe of honour and a sword; and the right of kettle-drum and the title of Násir Jang were also reconferred on him.

\textsuperscript{1}Ma'āthirī Nizāmī (MS). \textsuperscript{2}Fatḥiyah.
CHAPTER X

The Carnatic Affairs

Nawāb Saʿādatullāh Khān, having no issue, adopted his nephew Dost ‘Alī whom he nominated as his successor to the Nawābship of the Carnatic. For this arrangement he had obtained private consent of the Mughal Emperor, Muhammad Shāh, omitting to secure the approval of his immediate superior, Nizāmu’l-Mulk. After his death in 1732, Dost ‘Alī became the Nawāb of Carnatic without any opposition. Nizāmu’l-Mulk did not like being thus ignored and to allow this to take effect without his approval. Within three years of Dost ‘Alī’s accession to power, the administration of the Carnatic had deteriorated beyond measure. The Nawāb was negligent and inattentive to the affairs of the Government, leaving them in the hands of his son Safdar ‘Alī and his Diwān as well as son-in-law Chandā Sāhib, well-known in the annals of the early struggle for supremacy between the English and the French.

On the death of the Rāja of Trichinopoly, Chandā Sāhib seized the fortress from the widowed Rānī and had himself installed as governor of the newly-annexed territory. Being apprehensive of the Maratha invasion, the alarming rumours about which were afloat for some time, he made preparations for resistance. At last the expected event soon happened. The Marathas under the leadership of Raghuji Bhonsla and Fateh Singh broke into the Carnatic to levy Chauth which had long been withheld. Dost ‘Alī met the enemy at the pass of Damal Cherue and was defeated and slain.¹ His son Safdar ‘Alī, who was coming to the rescue of his father, returned to Vellore; and Chandā Sāhib fortified himself in Trichinopoly. Not being sure of future developments, both of them sent their families with treasures to Monsieur Dumas, the French Governor of Pondichéry. The Marathas, after their initial victory, occupied Arcot, overran

¹ Tuzuk-i-Walījāh (Asafia, MS.).
and plundered the country. They compelled Safdar 'Ali to consent to pay Cauth and make a treaty. The latter, in utter helplessness, considering peace as more advantageous than war, agreed to pay the indemnity of 40 lakhs of rupees by instalments to Raghují Bhonsla, who, on his part, recognized Safdar 'Ali as the lawful Nawáb of Carnátic.¹ On the basis of this treaty, the Marathas promised to retire. It was also secretly agreed that the Marathas would drive away Chandá Sáhib from Trichinopoly,² thus leaving Safdar 'Ali without any rival in the Carnátic.

As agreed upon, the Marathas feigned to quit the Carnátic and retire to their homeland. Chandá Sáhib, feeling reassured, came to Arcot to offer his allegiance to Safdar 'Ali, and from there accompanied him to Pondichéry to thank Monsieur Dumas for his consideration in the time of distress. In recognition of the help offered by Dumas, Safdar 'Ali presented him four villages south of Pondichéry which were later officially confirmed by the Parvánas of 1st and 4th September 1740.³ After staying several days in Pondichéry, Safdar 'Ali returned to Arcot with his mother and wife while Chandá Sáhib left his family and treasure there, having received some inkling from Monsieur Dumas regarding the secret understanding between Safdar 'Ali and the Marathas to attack Trichinopoly. After he had returned to the latter place, Chandá Sáhib was taken by surprise. The Marathas besieged the fortress and made a complete and effective blockade. Chandá Sáhib sought the aid of his brother, Zainu'l-Ábídín Khán, whom he had appointed to administer the districts of Dindigul, Madura and Tinnevelly. The latter marched with a large force to the rescue of his brother, but the Marathas prevented him from joining Chandá Sáhib and came within supporting distance of his army. They gave him a battle in the neighbourhood of Koduttalam, eight miles from Trichinopoly and killed him. Chandá Sáhib resisted the Marathas with courage and resolution for three months but was at last constrained to surrender on the 26th of March 1741.⁵ The city was ruth-

¹ Correspondance du Conseil Supérieur de Pondichéry, Tome 1, 1726-30. According to English records, the sum of indemnity was 32 lakhs. See Vestiges of Old Madras, vol. II, p. 280.
² Malleson, The History of the French in India, p. 85.
³ Correspondance du Conseil Supérieur, op. cit.
⁴ Tazuk-i-Wilajahí.
⁵ Orme, Military Transactions, vol. I, p. 44.
lessly plundered by Raghují and his followers and Chandā Sāhib was carried a prisoner to Satāra. Murārī Rāo Ghorepāde, one of the generals of the Maratha army, was left as Governor of Trichinopoly with a garrison of 14,000 troops.

During the siege-operations of Trichinopoly, Raghují Bhonsla wrote to Monsieur Dumas, Governor of Pondichéry, asking him to pay the sum of 60 lakhs of rupees as arrears of tribute and to surrender him the family of Chandā Sāhib with their treasures. He also sent an envoy to the French Governor to inform him of his intention if the latter did not comply with his demands. The Maratha envoy was received with great politeness, characteristic of the French people, and shown round the fortifications, the guns on the ramparts and the supplies they had stored up. Monsieur Dumas then told him plainly that all the French in India would much rather die than deliver the family of Chandā Sāhib to the Marathas. As for the tribute, he said that the French nation had never consented to pay any tribute to the Marathas. He sent back the following message to Raghují: "Our country, France, produces neither gold nor silver; that which we bring with us to buy merchandise comes to us from foreign countries. Our country produces only iron and soldiers whom we know how to employ against those who molest us unjustly." Along with this message Dumas sent some bottles of French wine as a present to Raghují. As Malleson well observes, "the Nantes cordials had given the French an ally against which he (Raghují) was a child. These cordials were to be obtained by any means and it seemed they could only be secured by friendly communications with Dumas. The determination to possess them led to negotiations which ended finally in a pacification."

The bold and chivalrous attitude of Monsieur Dumas won for him as well as for the French nation a high reputation all over India. Nizāmu'l-Mulk sent him a letter of appreciation accompanied with a dress of honour as a sign of his favour. The letter runs:

This is written under the seal of Nizāmu'l-Mulk who is a

1 Malleson, op. cit., p. 92.  
3 History of the French in India, p. 92.
Minister like Āsaf, who regulates and disposes of everything, and who is brave and victorious in battle, the supreme lord to whom all the officers of the king without any exception are in subservience. To the brave and courageous lord, Monsieur Dumas, Governor of Pondichéry. Salutations: The Governor of Mansulipatam, a person worthy of my favour and protection, Ghulām Imām Sāhib Khān, has sent me a letter in which he speaks about the extraordinary courage you have shown and the preparations you made to resist the attack of Raghujī Bhonsla by furnishing your fortresses with powder, cannon, and other instruments of war necessary to chastise that callous, unhappy fellow (Raghujī). I am pleased to note that you have given asylum in your settlement to officers and servants of the Nawāb. I am further enchanted to hear that you acted in such an exemplary manner in such calamitous circumstances. It is in view of this, and having regard to your fidelity and attachment for my person and the services you have rendered to all the subjects of the Empire, that I herewith send you a dress of honour as a mark of recognition. You are worthy of this favour and I assure that you will always remain so.¹

This letter was received at Pondichéry on 31st July 1741. Monsieur Dumas sent Nizāmu'l-Mulk the following reply:

The Governor of Pondicherry to Nawāb Āsaf Jāh Nizāmu'l-Mulk Bahādur, Chief-minister of the Emperor Muhammad Shāh, of great magnificence. Salutations: I have received the letter and the dress of honour that your Lordship has sent to me. The day when I received them was a day of great demonstration of joy in the whole of Pondichéry. The Emperor Muhammad Shāh, in accordance with the traditions of his ancestors, has always honoured the French nation and has given them special protection. Having also invariably received marks of amity and favour from you and the Nawāb of Arcot, I consider it to be in the fitness of things to express my sense of gratitude at the

first opportunity that presents itself in order to show to the whole of India that we deserve the favour with which you have so often honoured us. The prodigious mass of the Maratha armies did not frighten us in the least, nor could they prevent us from receiving in our city the family of Nawâb Dost 'Ali Khân and other nobles and Officers of the Emperor who came to us to seek refuge after the battle. The threats of the Maratha generals to deliver their families to them have not intimidated us. We resolved to defend them with the last drop of our blood. I am satisfied that on this occasion we have been able to prove to you our zeal and attachment. Be assured most magnificent Lord that we shall always be prepared to execute that which you will demand of us.

This letter is dated the 4th of August 1741, Pondichéry fort.

Nawâb Safdar 'Ali was a man of easy disposition and mediocre talents. During his reign the Carnâtic was completely delivered over to anarchy and the most callous forms of mis-rule. The Nawâb had thrown himself into the hands of the most selfish and unprincipled of his servants. His cousin and brother-in-law, Murtazâ 'Ali, who held the richest fief of Vellore, profited by the inefficiency of Safdar 'Ali and increased his own influence. When he was asked to advance his share of money for the payment of the indemnity to the Marathas, he refused to comply with the orders of the Nawâb who, on his part, threatened to dispossess him of his fief. This incited Murtazâ 'Ali to devise a scheme in consultation with other dissatisfied and refractory zemindârs to set aside Safdar 'Ali from the path of his ambition. He also thought of taking advantage of Nizâmu'l-Mulk's resentment and aversion towards Safdar 'Ali. He knew that Nizâmu'l-Mulk was hostile to him as he had been to his father who had failed to pay due deference to the authority of his liege-lord. In the meantime Safdar 'Ali came to

2 According to the records of the East India Company, Safdar 'Ali had made an arrangement with Nizâmu'l-Mulk to pay the latter the sum of seventy lakhs of rupees to obtain the Sanad. He had actually paid a considerable portion of this sum before he was assassinated (Letters from Fort St. George, 1742).
Arcot to stay with Murtazā ‘Alī without suspecting any foul play. By the treacherous collusion of Murtazā ‘Alī and his wife, sister of Safdar ‘Alī, the Nawāb was at first poisoned and then mercilessly stabbed to death.¹ Murtazā ‘Alī declared himself Nawāb of the Carnātic and his vast riches provided him with means to conciliate the military chiefs with large promises of further favours. But having thus gained his object by an act of treachery, even his lavish distribution of gold did not leave him long in possession of a title so iniquitously obtained. In October 1742, the army rose against him and proclaimed Sa’īd Muhammad Khān, the infant son of Safdar ‘Alī the Nawab of Carnatic. He was then residing at Madras under the protection of the English. Murtazā ‘Alī, unable to withstand the outcry raised against him, was constrained to escape to Vellore with his life, and the young Nawāb was recognized as the rightful successor to his father. He recompensed the English for their hospitality by granting them the gift of five villages adjoining Fort St. George and the right of coining Arcot rupees and pagodas according to the practice of the country mints. Permission was also given to the English to set up their own mint at Chintadri-petta.²

In this manner the affairs of the Carnātic were getting on when Nizāmu’l-Mulk, after restoring complete order in his dominions in the Deccan, marched at the head of 80,000 horse and 200,000 foot, to establish his authority there and remove the abuses of the local administration. During the last two or three years the government of the country had been completely paralyzed.³ The pale and ineffectual pageant of Nawābship awaited its inevitable fate. Change of a radical order was the crying need of the moment. Nizāmu’l-Mulk

³ The distracted State of the Carnatic is described in one of Dumas’ letters to the French Company. The letter is dated 1st October 1741 and runs thus:

Since the departure of the Mahrathas utter confusion prevails everywhere in the Carnatic. Nawāb Safdar ‘Alī has neither money, nor troops nor any authority to make himself obeyed and respected. Each Muslim Lord considers himself to be the master and plays the role of a Sovereign in his fortress or territory; and we do not see any end to this state of disorder until the Mughal sees his way to send some troops to the Nawāb to help re-establish his Government. But there seems to be no immediate prospect of this (*Gaye*, III, p. 331).
could not allow this state of affairs to persist with impunity any longer. Moreover he had also received intelligence of the death of Himmat Yār Khān, son of Alaf Khān Pannī, Sūbedār of Bījāpūr. It was brought to Nizāmu'l-Mulk's notice that Himmat Yār Khān was killed by Himmat Khān, the refractory Afgān Chief of Karnūl. The latter had promised Nizāmu'l-Mulk, before his departure for Delhi, to pay the annual tribute regularly to the Sūbedār of Bījāpūr. But encouraged by Nizāmu'l-Mulk's absence from the Deccan, he withheld its payment. Himmat Yār Khān resolved to force the faujdār of Karnūl to pay up the heavy bill pending against him for arrears of tribute. This brought the two parties to an armed conflict in which Himmat Yār Khān was slain. On account of this misdeed, Himmat Khān, faujdār of Karnūl, was much in dread of Nizāmu'l-Mulk when he heard of his march towards the Carnātic. He sent petitions in advance, expressing his regret and asking for pardon; and at the same time he busily engaged himself in recovering the outstanding arrears from the districts in his charge in order to pay them up to Nizāmu'l-Mulk on the occasion of his visit. In his generosity of heart Nizāmu'l-Mulk treated him with moderation, forgave his past conduct, provided he behaved properly in future.¹ From Karnūl he proceeded towards Arcot where he received allegiance from Sa'īd Muhammad Khān. The latter, on political grounds, was not allowed to return to Wandiwash and was put in charge of some of his trusted officers who were directed to treat him with leniency and respect. Nizāmu'l-Mulk noticed with surprise that

...every commander of a district had assumed the title of Nabob, and had given to the officers of his retinue the same names as distinguished the persons who held the most considerable employment in the court of the Soubah. One day, after having received the homage of several of these little lords, Nizāmu'l-Mulk said, that he had that day seen no less than eighteen Nabobs in the Carnātic, whereas he had always imagined that there was but one in all the Southern provinces. He then turned to his guards,

and ordered them to scourge the first person who, for the future, should in his presence assume the title of Nabob.¹

Nizāmu’l-Mulk did not stay for long in Arcot as he had to recover Trichinopoly from the Marathas. He laid siege to Trichinopoly for six months and compelled Murārī Rāo Ghorepāde to agree to evacuate the fortress and leave the Carnātic. Nizāmu’l-Mulk occupied the fortress on the morning of 29th August 1743, and hoisted on the citadel the flag of the Emperor of Delhi. He left Khwāja ʿAbdullāh Khān in Trichinopoly to establish his authority in the neighbourhood and then marched in the direction of Arcot.²

Nizāmu’l-Mulk stayed in the Carnātic till the end of March 1744 during which time the English and the French vied with each other to gain his as well as his son Nāsir Jang’s favour in order to advance their commercial and political interests on the Coromandel coast. Moreover, the rumours of France and Great Britain becoming involved in the war of Austrian Succession were since some time reaching their respective settlements in India. Naturally the representatives of both these nations were anxious to enlist the support of the Sūbedār of the Deccan in view of the imminent contest which was not long in coming in spite of the neutrality agreement they had made to maintain peace between the two Companies in India. The European nations, trading in India at this time, had become conscious of the fact that if they desired to build up durable and advantageous trade in this country, it was essential for them to have territorial possessions. In view of this, they started negotiations with the country governments whose aid they needed to oust their rivals. Thus the momentous question of the establishment of the English or French influence in India came to the front, the solution of which profoundly affected the European balance of power in later years.

The council of Fort St. George decided in March 1742 to send presents to Nizāmu’l-Mulk, his son Nāsir Jang and Khwāja ʿAbdullāh Khān to the amount of 13,000 pagodas

¹ Orme, op. cit., p. 51; Wilks, Historical Sketch of the South of India, vol. I, p. 158.
or thereabouts. The English Governor was aware that the French had already sent a present to Nizāmu’l-Mulk and the English, he thought, should not fall short in this respect. A list of presents was prepared, the account and the cost of which are mentioned in the records of Fort St. George.\(^1\)

The details are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>P.F.C.</th>
<th>P.F.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nankin Gold and Flowered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk, double pieces</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>at 25</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold and Silver Flowered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>silks, Europe patterns</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velvets flowered with gold</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brocade, white and silver ground</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124(\frac{1}{4}) yds.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>169-27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brocade, purple and silver</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brocade, Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16(\frac{3}{4})</td>
<td>10-13-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia Brocade viz.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 PS.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 yds. long</td>
<td>80—800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>55—110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>60—120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>80—160</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia Carpets viz.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227(\frac{1}{2}) yds. long and 12 yds. broad</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28(\frac{1}{2}) &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>9(\frac{1}{2}) &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>13 &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37(\frac{1}{2}) &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>14(\frac{1}{2}) &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31(\frac{1}{2}) &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>9 &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A gold Mussnud</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filigree Plate, viz.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottardans</td>
<td>3PS.</td>
<td>372(\frac{1}{2})</td>
<td>R.W.T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collumdans</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>297(\frac{1}{2})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pandans</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>565(\frac{9}{16})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An equippage for coffee cups</td>
<td></td>
<td>148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A rose water bottle, in shape a bird</td>
<td></td>
<td>87(\frac{7}{16})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rose water bottles</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>304(\frac{3}{4})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 [Diary and Consultation Book, 1743.](#)
Workmanship 1775
Rupee wt. 3550 at 320 per 100 pagodas 1109-13-40
Large painted looking glass 2 Prs. at 150 300- -
China Ware.
Large China cisterns 1 Pr. 40- -
Corge.
Japan dishes 8.3
" Plates 43.8 700- -
" Button pots 8.8
Plates 2.18 35- -
Sneakers and plates 1000 Pr. at 10 Ps. per 100 Pr. 100- -
Large gold dishes 2
" " Bowels 30
Large gold dishes 2
" " Bowls 80 110- -

Carried forward pagodas 7908- 4-40

Brought forward:

Velvets. Ps. Yds. P.F.
Green 6 qt. 163½ at 2.18 409-24-60
Crimson 3 73½ 3 220-18- 630- 6-60

Embossed cloth.
Aurora 3 at 30 Ps. per P. 90- -
Green 1 35- - 125- -

Broad cloth fine. Yds.
Scarlet and blue 3 qts. 60½ at Ps. 3 182- -

Almonds.
10 Candy at Pags. 26 per candy 260- -
9½ maund at 8 per maund 74- - 334- -

Kishmish 1 candy 22- -
Candles 1 " 110- -

Rose Water.
1 St. 15 chests at Pags. 8 per chest 120- -
2 St. 15 chests at Pags. 6½ per chest 97- -
3 St. 9½ chests at Pags. 6 per chest 58- - 276- -
A silver mounted gun 50- -
A gun and pair of pistols, double barrels 80- -
A fowling piece, silver mounted 35- - 249- 9-
A long gun, silver mounted 20- -
A pair of pistols, silver mounted 20- -
\[ \text{Do.} \]
26- 9-

Crimson velvet cushions 8 at P. 37-18 ea. 300- -
Young Arab Horses 2 800- -
White aniseed water 5 doz. 15- -
Orange water 15 doz. 30- -
Empty bottles, corks etc. 5-11-10 50-11-10

Dram cases.
No. 1 2 cases at 4 Pags. 8- -
" 2 " " 4.18 Pags. 9- -
" 5 1 " " 4.18 Pags. 7- - 24- -

Broad cloth fine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PS.</th>
<th>P.F.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scarlet</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aurora</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12-18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Broad cloth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yds.</th>
<th>P.F.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scarlet fine</td>
<td>4$\frac{1}{2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green fine</td>
<td>4$\frac{1}{2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aurora fine</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green middling</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Carried over pagodas 12738-26-40
Charge of package, etc. 215- 6-37

Pagodas 12953-32-77
Messrs. Thomas Eyre, Samuel Harrison and John Holland were appointed to carry the presents and were directed to inform Ghulâm Imâm Khân (Imâm Sāhib)¹ that they were strangers to the customs and ceremonies to be observed at the Court of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, and that they much needed his advice in those matters. They were asked to find out exactly how many gold mukars it would be proper for Mr. Eyre, leader of the deputation, to present to Nizāmu’l-Mulk, and how many each of the rest should present at the same time.² The President of the council of Fort St. George wrote to the members of the deputation:

If any question should be asked you about our trade and privileges the more general your answers are, the better. As to our trade they know how much money we lay out in the country, and we carry no money out but what we bring in, and should carry away less if we could lay out more in these parts. The privileges we have were granted us by Zulphirker Caune (Zulfigār Khān) and other great men of the country and afterwards confirmed to us by the Great Mogul, Furruckseer (Emperor Farrukhsiyar), and for what more is wanting to enable us to carry on our trade with ease we must depend upon his Excellency’s favour.³

To meet the expenses and charges of the Court, Mr. Eyre was advanced five hundred gold mukars and five hundred pagodas, and a letter of credit was given to him on Boocunjee Canshedoss at Arcot to supply him with extra money which occasion might require. The embassy of the English merchants of Madras was introduced to Nizāmu’l-Mulk by Imâm Sāhib in the public Durbār, where after making obeisance in front at a considerable distance, Mr. Eyre and his party were shown a place on the carpets to sit down. After an hour, when Nizāmu’l-Mulk rose from the Durbār, he sent

¹He was the Faujdār of Ālambari and then of Masulispatam. He left the Carnatic, as Safdar Šāh was hostile to him, and joined Nizāmu’l-Mulk. The English and the French solicited his help as he enjoyed great favour and influence at his court.
²Diary and Consultation Book, 1743.
³Diary and Consultation Book, 1743.
for Mr. Eyre and the party to his private audience-chamber. Mr. Eyre paid the Governor's respects to him. Coffee was served with the honour of the fans, a privilege enjoyed by the most distinguished persons of the realm. The conversation on indifferent matters lasted for about an hour and then the party retired. Nizāmu'l-Mulk honoured the English merchants by sending them special dinner. Next morning their presents were opened in Nizāmu'l-Mulk's camp. The latter observed them very closely and said they were excellent. He much liked the painted looking-glass and said that he would keep some of the presents for himself and send the rest to the Emperor at Delhi.¹ The English Embassy remained in Nizāmu'l-Mulk's camp for about two weeks whence Mr. Eyre wrote the following letter to Richard Benyon, President and Governor of Fort St. George:

We have advised the Hon'ble President of our arrival here and the Delivery of the Presents to Nizāmu'l Muluck, and we are now to inform Your Honour that as Imaum Sahib, whose Directions we are under, has not yet got our Audience of Leave, we have been so detained here longer than we expected: And as 'tis necessary for our return to keep our cooleys in pay with us, We are by that means fallen short of cash, which we shall want also to clear up of the Durbar charges, and for those uses we have been obliged to take up of one Poorcholamdoss Goverdhondoss Two thousand Arcot Rupees, and to give him a Bill upon Your Honour etc. for that amount which, being upon the Hon'ble Company's Account, we desire Your Honour, etc. will please to order payment of to Ravour Virago Chitty of Madrass, and we shall duly account for it in the Particulars of the Expense of the journey hither. Imaum Sahib continues his promises to get us soon dispatched, and has brought them now to Thursday the 14th. but if We may judge from what has hitherto been the Issue of those past we can place little more dependence on them than that it grows more than time they should be fulfilled. We constantly remind him of it, and shall not fail to give Advice when We have obtained it being

Hon'ble Sir and Sirs,
Your most obedient humble servants

THOMAS EYRE
SAML. HARRISON
JOHN HOLLAND

From the camp near Trichinopoly,
12th April 1743.¹

The accounts of Sundry glasses bought to send up to Nizām-u’l-Mulk’s camp are as follows:²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Large concave glass bought of Mr. Solomons</td>
<td></td>
<td>20-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 pictures with black frames gilded</td>
<td></td>
<td>14-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>34-9-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 large concave glass bought of Mr. Savage</td>
<td></td>
<td>20-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 pictures without frames</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 double oval glasses, convex and concave at 4 Pags.</td>
<td></td>
<td>12-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Square Do. sent hither as a muster, new covered with velvet</td>
<td></td>
<td>-18-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green velvet 2 yds. for covering the 2 large, and 3 small glasses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at 3½ per yard</td>
<td></td>
<td>7-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver for Hoops, Rings and Studs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arcot Rupees</td>
<td>93½</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasted in working</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>75-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arcot Rupees</td>
<td>95½</td>
<td>29-9-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silversmith</td>
<td>4-</td>
<td>40-9-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>66-27-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two wooden cases for the large glasses</td>
<td>1-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow perpets for lining to Do.</td>
<td>1-</td>
<td>2-16-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Diary and Consultation Book, 1743. ² Ibid.
In return for these presents, Nizāmu’l-Mulk sent a horse and a Sarpich for the President of Fort St. George which were received with due ceremony.

By gaining favour of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, the authorities of Fort St. George wanted to get confirmation of the right of coining money and the grants of land made by Muhammad Sa’id Khān at the time of his father’s death when he and his mother were living under the protection of the English.

In view of this consideration Governor Benyon entered into negotiations with Imām Sahib and despatched Coja Petrus and Vencatchelam to Arcot to get official recognition of their privileges which would much facilitate their trade on the Coromandel coast. Naturally, Governor Benyon wanted to ensure the position of the English settlement so that it might not be liable to be revoked or disputed in the event of any future political change in the Carnatic.¹

But Nizāmu’l-Mulk objected to the privilege of minting Rupees at the village of Chintadripetta for which the English had obtained permission from Nawāb Muhammad Sa’id Khān, the infant son of Nawāb Safdar ‘Alī. It was explained by Imām Sāhib to the President of the Council of Fort St. George that none had the authority to give the grant of the said villages without Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s previous sanction. As a last resort Vencatchelam was directed to request Imām Sāhib to intercede on behalf of the Governor of Fort St. George for it would be deemed a disgrace for the English to have the villages taken away.² Imām Sāhib promised that he would use his best endeavours to prevent the villages from being reclaimed; but the Governor, in any case, must not coin any more money without getting permission from Nizāmu’l-Mulk. The latter had issued out orders to forbid.

¹ *Diary and Consultation Book, 1743.*  
coinage at different mints except at St. Thomé and Covelong.¹ Probably Imām Sāhib was opposed to the validity of the grant obtained from Muhammad Sa'id Khān for coining Arcot Rupees as his own personal interest was closely involved in it. The first thing he did, after Nizāmu'l-Mulk's coming to Arcot, was to take his permission to open his own private mint at St. Thomé. His interest was better served by getting orders to close the English mint.

When direct diplomacy failed, the Governor of Fort St. George approached the sister of Imām Sāhib who lived permanently in Madras, under the protection of the English, to intercede in this matter. She had an immense influence with her brother. Fortunately for the English she agreed to take upon herself the responsibility of settling the matter with her brother favourably for the English. She succeeded in obtaining an order from Imām Sāhib to the Havildār of St. Thomé directing him to conduct himself in such a manner that it might appear as much as possible that the English were in possession of the villages till such time as he could obtain formal sanction from Nizāmu'l-Mulk.²

After some days Imām Sāhib wrote to his sister that the petition for the villages was duly signed by Nizāmu'l-Mulk and there was nothing wanting except the seal of Khwāja 'Abdullāh Khān which he would get as soon as the latter returned from his tour in the districts. But for the intercession of Imām Sāhib the getting of the Sanad would have entailed a lot of expense for the English.³

As for the mint, no direct answer was given, but at the same time no orders were issued to prohibit the English from coining the Arcot Rupees. The Company continued to coin surreptitiously, imagining that

If they (Nizāmu'l-Mulk's officials) should have any intimation of it, and indeed considering how many must of necessity be employed in it, some will probably be rascals enough to divulge it, we may write them that we are only coining the company's money according to our usual custom of which they need no other proof than the quantity of silver which has been carried from hence and coined in

¹ Ibid. ² Diary and Consultation Book, 1743. ³ Ibid.
their own mints. At worst before they can say much about it, our business may be done, that is what we want to; coin for the company, and when that is over, they will have occasion to say no more, at least for this year.¹

During his stay in the Carnatic, Nizāmu’l-Mulk with characteristic energy, set to restore peace and order and sent touring officers in the country-side to re-organize the administration. Khwāja Ni‘amatullāh Khān, son of Khwāja ‘Abdullāh Khān, was sent to St. Thomé with 1,000 horse and 3,000 foot along with Mīr Asad Khān, the minister of the late Nawāb Safdar ‘Ali. The Council of Fort St. George decided that a suitable present worth seven or eight hundred Pagodas, be given to Khwāja Ni‘amatullāh Khān on the occasion of his visit to the English settlement. In return the Governor of Fort St. George was honoured with a dress of honour.² As Mr. Benyon was shortly leaving for England a dress of honour and a horse was sent as present, by Nizāmu’l-Mulk, to Mr. Morse, the newly appointed Governor. To thank him for this present, Mr. Morse sent the following letter, dated the 30th of March 1744:

To Nabob Nizāmu’l-Mulk Aussif Jawh,

I have had the honour to receive Your Excellency’s most gracious Perwana with a present of Seerpaw. This I esteem a singular mark of Your favour which to me is the greatest happiness I can meet with in this world. I humbly return my most sincere and unfeigned thanks to Your Excellency for the same, and offer my prayers to God to grant Your Excellency a continual state of health and prosperity, prolong your life and increase your riches to the great satisfaction of the whole Empire. As to what Your Excellency has been pleased to send away—the goods belonging to the Surcar by sea to Surat, I shall take great care to assist your people when ships go thither till which time I beg Your Excellency will please to order and appoint some person to take care of the goods, and that he may also be answerable afterwards for the number, measure or weight of the said goods and that he may likewise be

¹ Diary and Consultation Book, 1743. ² Ibid.
accountable for any risque that may accidentally happen to them. I have fully wrote to Ghulam Hussain Cawn about this affair who will communicate it to you. May Your Excellency be always victorious over your enemies.\(^1\)

Through the instrumentality of Diwān Pūrnachand the revenues of the Carnātic were raised to 35, then to 40 lakhs, and finally to 45 lakhs. Kahwāja Niʿamatullāh Khān also contributed much to effecting the settlement of the revenues of the province. Pūrnachand induced some rich merchants of the Carnātic to undertake to stand surety for the payment of the allotted money. As a reward for his services, Nizāmu’l-Mulk invited him to his camp, had a conversation with him for about two hours, presented him with an elephant and a howdah, and raised his salary to 2,000 rupees.\(^2\)

The rival Governments of the European settlements in India, taking a comprehensive view of all the perils confronting them, tried to gain the favour of the country Governments. But the proprietors of these trading companies were naturally more interested in their profits than taking risks for territorial possessions. The Governors of their settlements were continually urged to economize. A Governor of Bombay had been dismissed for fortifying his city, and a leading director said of him that “he was a very honest man, but too expensive a Governor”.\(^3\) The directors of the East India Company, who were never tired of asking their representatives in India to make a point of reducing their expenses as far as possible, objected to spending so much money for presents to Nizāmu’l-Mulk, especially when no immediate advantage was obtained. A despatch addressed to the President of Fort St. George and dated the 6th of June, 1746 runs:

Though the Subahship of the Province is removed from the Old Family, from whom some Favours might reasonably have been expected, yet we observe the new Nabob

\(^1\) Diary and Consultation Book, 1743.
\(^3\) Dodwell, Dupleix and Clive, p. 7.
has not recalled the Grants given us by his predecessor and by the attention of our President and with the assistance of Hodjee Addee we persuade Ourselves as a continuance of them will in process of time repay Us the charge of obtaining them. The letter which the President wrote to Nabob Nizamal Mulluck was not improper, though it had not all the effects which were hoped from it. We doubt not therefore it will be a Rule with you and all others who succeed you to the management of our affairs never again to put us to so great an Expense before we are actually put in possession of some considerable Benefit, neither can it be thought strange by any of the Governing Moors after this instance of their neglect and ingratitude.\footnote{Despatches from England, 1744-47 (Records of Fort St. George).}

Before leaving for Haiderābād, Nizāmu’l-Mulk appointed Khwāja ‘Abdullāh Khān to the Nizāmat of the Carnātic Pāṅghāt. The said Khān, after taking leave from Nizāmu’l-Mulk, was found dead in his bed next morning. According to Ḥadīqatu’l-Ālam\footnote{Vol. II, p. 175.} this was a case of death from joy, but other writers attribute it to foul play on the part of Anwaruddīn Khān and his party who received the most advantage from this wicked deed.\footnote{Orme, op. cit., p. 52; Love, op. cit., p. 286; Waldājāhī is purposely silent on this point.} Now, Anwaruddīn Khān of Gopāmāu, who had distinguished himself in the service of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, was entrusted with the administration of the Carnātic. He was an experienced officer and had also held employments of considerable trust and importance in the service of Ghāziudd Din Khān Firūz Jang, father of Nizāmu’l-Mulk. After Firūz Jang’s death, he attached himself to the person and fortunes of Nizāmu’l-Mulk who appointed him faujdār of Ellore and Rājamahundry after the death and defeat of Mubāriz Khān in 1724. He was familiar with the country and the people of the Carnātic more than any other officer, having lived there for sixteen years. His appointment to the Nawābship of Arcot was resented by the partisans of the family of the old Nawābs of Carnātic who had ruled there for a long time and for whom the people had a tender corner in their hearts. In view of this consideration, Nizāmu’l-Mulk
had, before appointing Anwaruddin Khān, made it known publicly that he intended to confer the Nawābship of Arcot on Muhammad Sa‘īd Khān, son of the late Nawāb Safdar ‘Alī, as soon as he attained the age of manhood. Anwaruddin Khān was particularly directed to educate the young Nawāb and take care of him as his guardian. The young Nawāb had lived with Nizāmu’ll-Mulk now upward of a year and the latter had shown for him “a concern at parting, not usual with that Great Man”.¹ During the minority of the young Nawāb, Anwaruddin Khān was vested with full authority to administer the Carnātic. In April 1744, Anwaruddin Khān reached Arcot and assumed his duties as provisional Nawāb. Muhammad Sa‘īd Khān took up residence in the palace in the fort and was afforded all kinds of comforts and freedom.

In June 1744, Muhammad Sa‘īd Khān was especially invited to take part in the marriage of one of his relations in Arcot. Anwaruddin Khān and Murtaza ‘Alī Khān, the murderer of Muhammad Sa‘īd Khān’s father, were also invited. When Anwaruddin Khān came to the wedding, Muhammad Sa‘īd Khān advanced to pay respects to his guardian in accordance with the rules of courtesy in the East. While he was bowing, an Afghān soldier, who had been in the service of his father, stabbed him to the heart. The murderer and his accomplices were cut to pieces on the spot by the guards of the murdered Nawāb. In the turban of one of these men was found a note signed and sealed by Murtaza ‘Alī Khān with a promise of two hundred thousand Rupees on the accomplishment of the wicked mission.²

The fate of Muhammad Sa‘īd Khān aroused the sympathy of the people of the Carnātic who generally believed that Murtaza ‘Alī Khān and Anwaruddin Khān were the instigators of the foul deed. To lull the suspicion of Nizāmu’ll-Mulk and to demonstrate his own resentment, Anwaruddin Khān removed all the Afghāns from his service. But the people instinctively knew that only those persons could be interested in the murder of the young Nawāb who gained anything by effecting it. Murtaza ‘Alī Khān was sure that when the young man became Nawāb, he would take revenge for the murder of his father. And Anwaruddin Khān wanted to get

rid of him in order to ensure his own future security. But he was afraid to execute his plan all alone, so he induced Murtaza Ali Khan to join him, promising him high favour and position.

When Nizamul-Mulk received intelligence of Muhammad Sa'id Khan's murder, he became furious and severely reproached Anwaruddin Khan for his great negligence towards the young Nawab and upbraided him for failing to perform the promise he had given when he committed him to his charge. Anwaruddin Khan tried his best to exculpate himself from the charge of conniving at the murder. Had not his age and service pleaded strongly in his favour, he certainly would have lost his post. Nizamul-Mulk continued feeling sulky while he was at Aurangabad, but there was none else to whom he could safely entrust the Government of the Carnatic. After long reflection he confirmed Anwaruddin Khan in the Nawabship of that province.

When war was declared between the English and the French in 1744, Nawab Anwaruddin Khan had established his authority in the Carnatic. At this crisis the representatives of both the English and the French sought the aid of the Nawab in order to oust their rival. Through the mediation of Mahfuz Khan, the eldest son of the Nawab, and Raja Sampat Rai, the Nawab was very much inclined to favour the English who sent him presents and tribute of 1,200 pagodas a year for the estates under their control. Moreover, the friendship of the French with the Nawajat was the reason to suspect their loyalty and support for the new regime in the Carnatic. No doubt, he had reasoned justly and had anticipated the subsequent events correctly.

At the request of the English factors at Madras to protect them against the French, the British Ministry had directed Commodore Barnett to immediately set sail for the Eastern Seas. In 1745 he appeared at the Madras Coast and captured many French vessels. Dupleix, governor of the French settlement at Pondichery, felt alarmed at these developments. He induced Nawab Anwaruddin Khan to issue orders, forbidding all hostilities on land between the European powers. This was clearly in the interest of the French as they were ill-

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2 Despatches to England, 1743-46, p. 22.
3 Tasuz-i-Wulądáh.
equipped for any kind of action at that time. In September 1746, a French fleet under the command of La Bourdonnais appeared off the coast of Coromandel and bombarded Madras. After a slight resistance the English had to surrender the town on condition that the European inhabitants should continue to live there unmolested, their property should be protected and that the town should be made over to the English on the payment of a ransom of eleven lakhs of pagodas.

We do not propose here to go into the details of the unseemly contentions that ensued between Dupleix and La Bourdonnais as to the right to dispose of the English settlement which was held under the French until 1749 when it was restored to the English in accordance with the terms of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.

Dupleix dissuaded Nawāb Anwaruddīn Khān from giving protection to the English by promising to transfer Madras to his Government. But when the Nawāb was convinced, by the delay in making over Madras to his agents, that he had been duped, he proposed to attack the French and deprive them, by force of arms, of their newly acquired possession. The English had requested him to interpose his authority in their favour. Thereupon the Nawāb demanded the French to withdraw from the English territory. But the evasion on the part of Dupleix determined him to send his eldest son, Mahfūz Khān, at the head of 10,000 men to expel the French from Fort St. George. Mahfūz Khān closely invested the place. The French forces under Paradis, although small in number, and yet superior in discipline, defeated Mahfūz Khān’s force, and compelled him to take refuge in St. Thomé where he again sustained a heavy loss and his army was completely destroyed. This victory of the French established once for all the superiority of the European technique of warfare over the traditional, out-of-date methods of the irregular and badly armed Indian forces. It was from observing this superiority that the rulers of the country so eagerly sought European aid in their internecine struggles.

At last a settlement between the Nawāb and the French was arranged through Muhammad Tawakkul, the resident agent of the Nawāb at Pondichery. The Nawāb recalled his
troops from the vicinity of Fort St. David. Dupleix agreed to have the Nawâb’s flag hoisted over Fort St. George for eight days. After this Fort St. George was to be graciously made over to the French by a written order from the Nawâb. The French Governor will then be at liberty to hoist his own flag over the citadel of Fort St. George. The Governors promised to give presents to the value of 40,000 rupees to the Nawab.¹

It is foreign to the purpose of this work to enter into the details of the struggle between the French and the English for predominance on the Coromandel coast; suffice it to say that after the commencement of hostilities between the two nations, both strenuously applied themselves to enlist the sympathy of the Sûbedâr of the Deccan. Nizâmu’l-Mulk, under the influence of Ghulâm Imâm Husain Khân (Imâm Sâhib), had a very pronounced pro-French tendency, while his son, Nâsir Jang, was inclined to favour the English. Nizâmu’l-Mulk well knew that Raghuji Bhonsla was already in correspondence with Dupleix. In the meantime, the French Governor of Pondichéry wrote to Nizâmu’l-Mulk, pointing out the indignity to which the French were subjected by the English and the insult offered to the Emperor of Delhi by seizing the ships which bore his flag. The purport of the letter is given by Ananda Ranga Pillai in his diary in the following words:

The King of France has been informed that the English at Madras have unjustly seized French ships, and that they have taken another, bound for Manilla, which bore the name and flag of Muhammad Shâh, the Emperor of Delhi, and was carrying a cargo consigned to him. The insult offered to the Emperor, by thus capturing a ship bearing his name and flag, has exceedingly enraged the King of France, his most faithful friend. He is, therefore, resolved that the city of Madras, which belongs to the English, shall be seized, and that the British flag which now flies there shall be thrown down, and replaced by that of the French. He has accordingly despatched a few men-of-war to take Madras, and to hoist the white flag over it.

¹ The Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai, vol. III, p. 287.
We are carrying out the royal mandate, and you should help in whatever way you can.\(^1\)

The English, on the other hand, sent a lakh of pagodas to Nāsir Jang to procure recommendatory letters for Nawāb Anwaru’ddin Khān, and for the faujdārs and pollygārs of the Carnātic, requiring them to give all possible help to the English to reduce Pondichéry and Madras.\(^2\) Mutyalu Neiyakkān was sent to Nāsir Jang as a representative of the English interests in order to counter-act the machinations of Imām Sāhib, the French agent at Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s court. Mutyalū spent a lot of money for giving presents to influential men and agreed to pay 200 thousand Rupees to Nizāmu’l-Mulk himself and similarly to his officers for sending 1,000 horsemen to Fort St. David to assist the English to recover Madras. He expected, in return, that Nāsir Jang would send a Parwānah to Anwaru’ddin Khān to prevent all kinds of provisions from going to Pondichéry from the country under the domination of Āsaf Jāh, and compel Dupleix to deliver back Madras to the English.\(^3\)

Commodore Griffin, commander of the English naval forces and the Governor of Fort St. David, also despatched a letter to Nizāmu’l-Mulk, dated March 6, 1747, entreats him to interpose his authority to restore what had been unjustly taken away from them. It runs:

I shall not enter into a particular detail of all the robberies, cruelties, and depredations committed on shore upon the King my Master’s subjects, by that insolent, perfidious nation the French, connived at, and abetted by those under your Excellency, (the Nabob of Arcot), whose duty it was to have preserved the peace of your country, instead of selling the interest of a nation with whom you have had the strictest friendship time out of mind; a nation that has been the means not only of enriching this part of the country, but the whole dominions of the grand Mogul; and that to a people who are remarkable all over the world for encroaching upon, and giving disturbances

\(^1\) *Ananda Ranga Pillai’s Diary*, vol. II, p. 291.  
\(^3\) *Country Correspondence*, 1746, p. 4.
and disquiet to all near them; a people who are strangers in your country, in comparison of those who have been robbed by them of that most important fortress and factory, Madras; and now they are possessed of it, have neither money nor credit, to carry on the trade. And now, excellent Sir, we have laid this before you, for your information and consideration; and must entreat you, in the name of the King of Great Britain, my Royal Master, to call the Nabob to an account for his past transactions, and interpose your power to restore, as near as possible in its original state, what has been so unjustly taken from us.¹

This application was favourably received by Nizāmu’l-Mulk who sent the following mandate to Nawāb Anwaru’d-dīn Khān to restore the rights of the English in the Carnatic:

The English nation, from ancient times, are very obedient and serviceable: besides which they always proved to be a set of true people, and it is very hard that they met with these troubles, misfortunes, and destruction. I do therefore write you to protect, aid, and assist them in all respects, and use your best endeavours in such a manner that the French may be severely chastised and rooted off, that His Majesty’s sea-port town may be restored to their right, establish themselves in their former place, as before, and carry on their trade and commerce for the nourishment of the place.²

Nāsir Jang sent the following letter to Nawāb Anwaru’d-dīn Khān:

The violence and Hostility committed against the English Nation by the French in Betraying Madras and all the Goods, Effects and Money belonging to them, and likewise the Merchants represented to Nizamal Mullock and likewise to Me in a particular manner concerning which sometime past Nizamal Mullock had sent you a Perwanah. Now I do send a party of my Troops along with Mootal to punish the French, recover Madras and also Pondichery

to the English and have also sent my Positive Orders to all the Kellydars, Pollygars of that part of the country. I order you to send up your Force to join them and send your Orders to the Kellydars, Pollygars, etc., under Your Government to prevent and stop all manners of Provisions going to the French, and oblige the said Kellydars etc., to deliver whatever Goods etc., the French concealed or kept in their custody up to the English and assist at all time to the English in everything they desire of you.¹

Nāsir Jang also sent a letter to Dupleix asking him to desist from further hostilities on land and thus disturb the peace and order of the country. It runs:

To Mons. Dupleix, Governor of Pondichery.

The English Nation and you were come into the country of our king for to Trade and commerce in these Parts, and I wonder that you should Betray and take Madrass, a Settlement (that) has been enjoyed Peacely by the English from Ancient times, and also deprive and plunder St. Thomé actually belonging to the Circar. If there was a war in Europe between the English and French you should engage them at Sea, but on the contrary without considering what will be done to you in future destroyed the said Settlements in the King’s Country. I have now sent a party of my troops about it and upon the receipt of this Perwanah and Dustock I would have you directly and immediately deliver Fort St. George to the English with all the Goods and whatever you took possession of with all the English people to your custody, and take a receipt of them and sent it up to me by the Suzaval. Take care of it and do not commit any such disturbances or be Guilty of the like in future. On the contrary you shall meet with no good Merits but shall be fallen under a Severe Punishment. Observe it as a strict order and comply punctually according to this Perwanah.²

The following orders were issued to Nawāb Anwar u’ddin

¹ *Country Correspondence*, 1748.
Khān, the Qil‘idārs, Pollygārs and the influential men in Southern India:

You are hereby ordered to deliver whatever Goods, Effects, Money and People the French concealed and kept under your custody to the English. Permitt no Provisions to be sent to the French of Pondichery and Madras from your Country. Take care to assist and aid the English at all times in everything necessary. Observe it as a strict order and comply punctually according to this Perwanah.

To Anverdean Cawn,
To Meerassesdulla Cawn, Kellydar of Chittapetta and Woldore,
To Mahomed Tuky Cawn, Kellydar of Wandesh,
To Moortezally Cawn, Kellydar of Satagudah,
To Vancatrow, Kellydar of Arney,
To Subdar Hossain Cawn, Kellydar of Culvary,
To Hossain Cawn Tayer, Kellydar of Wolgondah,
To Joinadally Cawn, Kellydar of Aumbore,
To Mahomedally Cawn, Kellydar of Trichinopoly,
To Pratap Shing, King (Rājah) of Tanjore,
To Woriar of Wariapolium,
To Ninary, pollygar of Arialore,
To Bundary, pollygar of Vantavolum,
To Damerlavancatapa Naigue,
To Bangar Yatchem Naigue,
To Nabob Abdul Nabee Cawn, Gover. of Chettumberum etc.¹

Translation of the Agreement Bond given to Nizāmu‘l-Mulk by Mutyalū, the Agent of the English.

I do hereby agree to make you and your officers a present of the sum of 200 thousand Rupees for sending 1,000 Horsemen of Your Troops to Defend and Assist the English in taking Pondicherry and Punish the French and also to send Your Perwanahs or Orders to the Kellydars and Pollygars of that part of the Country. Out of the said

¹Country Correspondence, 1748.
sum I am to Pay the Horsemen for the space of 4 months according to Your Orders per mensem and send You the Remainder by the Horsemen at their return back to Fort St. David and I shall make You good the above said sum in the said space of time tho' we take Pondicherry or not without any detention.

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<tr>
<th>To Nizamal Mullock</th>
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<td>To Meerza Irezbeg</td>
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<td>To the Officers</td>
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C. C. 1748 Total 200,000

**Translation of the Agreement Bond given to Nāsir Jang by Mutyalū**

I do agree to make you a present of the sum of one Hundred thousand Rupees for sending 1,000 Horsemen of Your Troops to Assist and Defend the English, for which I promised to give You the Shroffs Bill to pay the same.¹

Mutyalū went back to Fort St. David with an escort of fifty-five Mughals, fifty Maratha horse, and three hundred peons, with Nāsir Jang's presents of two horses and dresses of honour for 'the two chief people' among the English.² He reached Fort St. David in great trouble of mind for having failed to fulfil the expectations entertained of his mission by the English Governor. But it was impossible for him to achieve more at the Court of Nizāmu'l-Mulk on account of the opposition of the French agent, Ghulām Imām Husain Khān, who was trying his best to gain the assent of Nizāmu'l-Mulk to the retention by the French of their conquest. Although sometimes Imām Sāhib negotiated for the English also, in reality he was an agent of the French with whose interests he had genuine sympathy. On the capture of Madras he sent the following letter to Monsieur Dupleix:

God has always helped you by His grace and has always

¹ *Country Correspondence*, 1748, pp. 5-6.
² *Ananda Ranga Pillai's Diary*, vol. IV, p. 420.
given you victory in all your enterprises. He has given you one signal victory by subjecting the city of Madras to Your domination. It is to be hoped that other victories will follow this one. This has spread your reputation in Hindustān, the Deccan and all over the world. Nizāmu’l-Mulk has learnt these news by the gazettes of Arcot. I have always exalted before him, your valour, generosity and great genius. Your victory at Madras has substantiated all I used to tell him about you. He (Nizāmu’l-Mulk) has been greatly impressed by what I told him and he will never forget it. In full Durbar he praised you and all the nobles, who were present, expressed their approval.¹

Imām Sāhib had persuaded Nizāmu’l-Mulk to write to the Emperor at Delhi to show that the English were in the wrong: The letter runs:

The English have captured several French vessels with all the silver and other effects which were in them. Monsieur Dupleix, the French Governor of Pondichery, has suffered a great deal at their hands. He wrote to the English several times and has employed all possible means to maintain peace; but when he saw that they were not, in any way, prepared for the same, and that there was no alternative left to him except resorting to force, he took possession of Madras, where the French flag was set up on the 4th of Ramzan, 1159 Hegira.²

Apart from the presence of Imām Sāhib at the Court of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, Dupleix had sent Monsieur du Bausset to represent and safeguard the French interests there. Monsieur du Bausset was the head of the embassy sent from Pondichéry to Nizāmu’l-Mulk when the latter laid siege to Trichinopoly in 1743.

The English agent at the Court of Nizāmu’l-Mulk tried his utmost to convince him of the superiority of the English nation. He conveyed an exaggerated account of their vast resources and asserted that they had forty war-ships ready

¹ Nazelle, *Pieces Justificatives*, p. 262.
for action against the French. On the contrary, Ghulām Imām Husain Khān pleaded for the greatness of the French people, their bravery and prowess. He persuaded Nizāmu’l-Mulk to believe that "the English were in great embarrassment in Europe, that it was utterly impossible for them to spare so many ships for the Indian seas; that how could the English surrender Madras if they had forty war-ships at their disposal; and that if they did so in spite of these ships it does not speak highly of their valour".¹

The relations of the French with Nizāmu’l-Mulk are further shown by the documents in the archives of Pondichéry.² We give the English translation of some of them in the following appendices.

APPENDIX A

**Firmān of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, granting to the French East India Company a terrain at Masulipatam and permitting the circulation of the Pondichéry Pagodas.**

This firmān is for Monsieur Percher Desoulches, French Captain who belongs to a nation, known for its generosity of heart and steadfastness in friendship. Your requests have been brought to my notice and I have understood them. You remark that your vessels come to this country, laden with gold and silver and all kinds of merchandise which they disembark at Pondichéry, which is situated on the same side of the sea as Madras, in the province of Arcot. From Pondichéry these goods are sent to Masulipatam. You further say that you have established your factory at Masulipatam in accordance with my firmān. Since its establishment the Pagodas of Pondichéry, which are of the same quality as those of Madras, have been minted and circulated. But your Pagodas do not enjoy the same favour at Masulipatam as those of Madras. Therefore, you have requested me to order the officers of the Government of Masulipatam to allow free circulation to the Pondichéry Pagodas, just like those of Madras. You have also requested me to issue an order to Aly Davous Kan (Dost ‘Ali Khān) Nawāb of Arcot, to give you the permission of minting Rupees also just as you have been allowed to mint Pagodas.

You further state that the English and the Dutch have their terrains in the neighbourhood of Masulipatam where they have built up their village and gardens; but the French are not yet accorded this favour. You request me to assign you four cañis of land. I consider your request to be reasonable. I, therefore, grant your request and accord you the means of extending your commerce at Masulipatam. In consequence, I give four cañis of terrain, where you might

¹ Nazelle, op. cit., p. 280.
² See *Lettres et Conventions.*
establish your village. I am, herewith, sending orders to Aghâ Husain, Faujdar of Masulipatam, to measure out this terrain and put you in possession of it. I am directing him to give to the Pondichéry Pagodas the same value as to those of Madras. I am also sending orders to Dost 'Ali Khan, Nawab of Carnatic, who is a man of consideration, to allow you to mint Rupees at Pondichéry also. You should remain assured that your wishes shall be punctually executed in accordance with this firman. Therefore, nothing should prevent you from developing your trade at Masulipatam and to establish there your village. The more commerce you have, the more advantageous it shall be for the King, to whom respect and fidelity are due. All those who read this document must exert themselves to execute it with awe and respect.

_Dated the 21st February 1734_

**APPENDIX B**

_Firmân of Nizâmu'l-Mulk, addressed to Captain Percher Desoulches, according him four canis of terrain at Masulipatam._

To all the present and future Governors of Masulipatam, up to the confines of Golconda, this order is addressed.

Lately we declared to have accorded four canis of terrain (which is equal to forty bigal) to Monsieur Percher Desoulches, French Captain, in the neighbourhood of Masulipatam. This was to allow the French to establish a village there in order to facilitate the furtherance of their trade. You should, therefore, after measuring the said terrain, give it in their possession. They should be at liberty to establish their village there in the manner they deem proper for the development and prosperity of their factory at Masulipatam. You should execute the present firman according to its form and contents and with awe and respect.

_Dated the 24th of July 1734_

**APPENDIX C**

_Letter of Nizâmu'l-Mulk to Ghulâm Imâm Husain Khân, which was sent to Monsieur Dumas on the 5th of September, 1739._

You are a brave noble who merit my appreciation. I wish you good health and assure you royal favour. I have duly received your letters and have understood their contents, and I am satisfied with the information that you have sent to me. I have already written to you to ask Aly Dost Khan (Dost 'Ali Khan) to join my dear son Nizâmu'd-Daulah Nâsir Jang with his army. You should try to persuade him to do so. You have written to say that Monsieur Dumas, Governor of Pondichéry, wishes your prosperity and that it is necessary to send a Parâvânah to Allavet Daoula ('Alâu'd-Daulâh), Sûbedâr of Bengâl and other Sûbedârs, to allow free circulation to Pondichéry Rupees in the length and breadth of their provinces. According to your request, I am herewith sending you three Parâvânahs for three different Sûbedârs with a letter and a Sarpañh
for the Governor of Pondichéry. You should know that I have great regard for you and that you should continue to apprise me of the news of your headquarters. I have nothing more to add.

APPENDIX D

Letter of Nizám-ul-Mulk to Monsieur Dumas.

That Monsieur Dumas, Governor of Pondichéry, who is resplendent with the splendour of his bravery and richness, be enjoying perfect health.

I have duly received the letter that you sent to me and I have perfectly understood its contents. In accordance with your wishes I have already issued orders to 'Aláu'd-Daulah, Núrúd-Dín Bahádur and Dost 'Ali Khán, asking them to allow the Pondichéry Rupees free circulation in their territories. You should know that I wish you perfect health. You should continue to send me news of your headquarters as you have been doing so far. I have nothing else to add. Ghulám Imám Husain Khán has written to me that you desire my prosperity, which has given me great satisfaction. I show my appreciation by sending you a sarphich.

Dated the 5th of September 1739

APPENDIX E

Parwánah of Nizám-ul-Mulk to 'Aláu'd-Daulah, Governor of Bengál.

You are a brave noble, and all-powerful in the territory where you rule; you have the power equal to the ministers of the king and your reputation for being so has spread far and wide. I wish you perfect health.

At Pondichéry the French have been allowed to mint Rupees. I have learnt by the letter of Monsieur Dumas, Governor of Pondichéry, that the bankers of Bengal are bringing forward hindrances to the free circulation of these Rupees. This has obliged me to ask you that if there is any difference between these and the Arcot Rupees, you should better inform about it; but if there is no such difference you might issue an order to the effect that the Pondichéry Rupees should be allowed circulation in the length and breadth of the province of Bengal.

APPENDIX F

Parwánah of Nizám-ul-Mulk to the Faujíárs of Chicacoole Tanass and Masulipatam, a copy of which was also sent to Monsieur Dumas.

Núrúd-Dín Khán is a brave and distinguished noble, deserving the royal favour. The French have been allowed to mint Rupees at Pondichéry. I have learnt by the letter of Monsieur Dumas that the bankers of Bengal are putting forward hindrances in the free circulation of these Rupees. This has obliged me to ask you that if there is any difference between these and the Arcot Rupees, you
THE CARNATIC AFFAIRS

should better inform me about it, but if there is no such difference you might issue an order to the effect that the Pondichéry Rupees should be allowed circulation in your territory.

(Paṟvēṇah of Nizāmu'd-Daulah Nāṣir Jang Bahādur to Anwaruddin Khān Bahādur, Nawāb of Arcot).

You are a brave noble, distinguished, elevated and my friend, deserving the royal favour.

Nizāmu'l-Mulk, who is master of us all, has sent to you, according to the wishes of Monsieur Dumas, Governor of Pondichéry, a Paṟvēṇah, in order to facilitate the circulation of Pondichéry Rupees. You will receive this Paṟvēṇah through Ghulām Imām Husain Khān, who is a distinguished noble. In accordance with the order of Nizāmu'l-Mulk you should allow free circulation to these Rupees.

Dated the 10th of March, 1740

APPENDIX G

Letter of Ghulām Imām Husain Khān to the Governor of Pondichéry.

I have received your letter and have understood its contents. I have particularly noted your explanation concerning the unjust war in which you were involved by Mahsūz Khān. I am glad to learn that you have made him repent his deed. I never doubted its result. Accept my congratulations for the same.

I have presented to Nawāb Nizāmu'l-Mulk Bahādur the request that you communicated to me, which I have translated, word for word, for him. He is extremely satisfied to learn that you have come out victorious in the war in which you were involved. As justice was on your side, the result could not have been different. Nizāmu'l-Mulk is full of admiration for you and assures me that you will soon receive his reply relative to your petition. I am sure that he will accede to your demand. I have also communicated to him the contents of the letter of my deputy at Arcot on the subject of this war. My deputy rightly blames those who had the audacity to attack such a redoubtable enemy as the French.

I hope that Nawāb Anwaruddin Khān will soon receive authoritative censure (from Nizāmu'l-Mulk) for compelling you to take up arms against him and will have to repent for his conduct. I tell you without indulging in flattery that all these affairs, which you have conducted with such exemplary prudence and valour, have won for you high reputation, not only at the court of Nizāmu'l-Mulk but all over the Deccan and Hindustān. Nizāmu'l-Mulk is extremely delighted with your conduct of affairs and it seems to me that he will before long send you his compliments. In anticipation of future events I should like to tell you that if Anwaruddin Khān attacks you at Pondichéry, you should defeat him so that he might repent for his deed and compel him to come to terms with you. You could be sure that from our side no aid will be sent out to him because Nizāmu'l-Mulk is angry with him on account of his recent behaviour.

I should like to inform you beforehand that Sāhū Rāja has sent an army towards the Carnātic, under the command of Chimnāji's son. Nizāmu'l-Mulk
has directed Nasir Jang to chastise the Marathas. But I doubt if Nasir Jang will proceed towards your territory. You could be sure that if you come in contact with him, you will like him, as he is very much inclined to favour your nation. Let me know the news of your head-quarters.1

1 Nazella, Dupleix et la Defense de Pondichéry, pp. 266-67.
CHAPTER XI

Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s Testament

Nizāmu’l-Mulk fell ill while he was at Burhānpūr and passed away peacefully on the 4th of Jamādī II, 1161 Hegira (21st May, 1748), at the age of 78. The chronogram of his death is *Mutawajji̇h-i-Behisht* which means “turned towards paradise”. Nāsir Jang, who had already been authorized by Nizāmu’l-Mulk to sign state-papers for the last several days, was summoned to the bedside. Besides Nāsir Jang, Ziāu’d-Dīn Husain Khān, Sadru’s-Sudūr (Head of religious endowments), Dargāh Qulī Khān, Dārogha-i-Harkārā (Superintendent of Post), and Munshī Mansā Rām, Peshkār-i-Sadārat (Chief Secretary), were present in the death chamber when the tired, frail figure of Nizāmu’l-Mulk, after having dictated the testament, breathed his last.\(^1\)

Apart from the original *Sanad* of the Testament in the Daftar-i-Diwānī, which is probably of later date, its slightly different versions are found in five contemporary authorities.


The following is the English translation of the *Sanad* in the Daftar-i-Diwānī (Records Office, Haiderābād):

First, that it behoves the ruler of the Deccan, in his

\(^1\) He left six sons and five daughters. His sons were: Ghāziu’d-Dīn Khān Firūz Jang, Nizāmu’d-Daulah Nāsir Jang, Salābat Jang, Nizām ‘Alī Khān Bahādur Asad Jang (Nizāmu’l-Mulk Asaf Jāḥ II), Basālat Jang and Mughal ʿAlī Khān. The second, third and fourth eventually became Nizāms. Hidāyat
dealings with the Marathas who are the Zemindârs of this country, to seek peace and agreement with them. But he should maintain pre-eminent the dignity and prestige of Islâm, and never allow them to over-step the bounds; and guard the principles of righteousness and peace; the best principle of all being that conquests in the Deccan must not be allowed to be made by the armies of these freebooters.

Secondly, that in the destruction of the foundations of mankind, which have been laid by providence, you should be sympathetic, and not consider that they are like so many ears of barley, wheat and maize, which grow anew every year, and in this matter you should exercise utmost caution. Commit the criminal who is guilty of grave offence to the Qâzi who is actually there to bear the whole burden of such risky undertaking since he knows his own work best.

Thirdly, that you should pass most of your life in travel, as every day brings you to new destinations and new waters, and you should make a habit of living under tents, as very often the administration of the country and the organisation of all the State affairs lie therein. But you should grant sepoys and camp-followers leave according to their days of service, and post as many of them as is advisable and necessary in such a way that it may not cut short the propagation of their species, and thus make you guilty before God.

Fourthly, that since by the Grace of God, the affairs of your fellow-beings are entrusted to your care, you should, after saying five daily prayers, offer thanks to God for the sovereignty conferred upon you, and paying heed to its transitory nature, not waste your precious time but with a view to the regulation of all the affairs of State, divide it with full care in such a way as to devote your attention to each work proportionately and not dilly-dally over one undertaking so as to hinder the other. Attention must always be paid to the general principles of adminis-
tration; the details form part of the whole and should never be lost sight of as they are the part and parcel of the general principles of conduct.

Fifthly, that as the foundations of the ever enduring Kingdom of our Exalted family were laid by the grant of the high rank and office of Sadārat by the Emperor to our late martyred grand-father, Nawāb ʿAbid Khān (may he rest in peace and may he receive salvation), it has become incumbent on us, above all else, to respect and hold in honour this high office. May God grant you the good fortune of having the holy men and the saints intercede for you in your need, and may you always be the first in greeting others, in accordance with the Saying of the Prophet; this being the source of untold blessing and strengthening of faith in this world and of great recompense and reward in the next!

Sixthly, that the earth and the sky and the human race, all were created by God, and therefore, it behoves the temporal ruler, the Vice-gerent of God upon earth, to meditate deeply on the most perfect and the most magnificent Omnipotence of God, and not arrogate to himself the exclusive ownership of the whole earth. He must also offer thanks to God for making him the trustee of the rights of individuals, and not usurp the inheritance of any one of them, for fear that he may be called to account on the Day of Judgment.

Seventhly, that the Deccan consists of six sūbahs, each of which was once ruled by a king of its own, had its own nobles, ministers, a host of other officials and an army of hundreds of thousands. Since this country was, in the time of Khuld-Makān (the Emperor Aurangzīb), brought under the sway of one ruler, it is right that the ancient families of the realm should be properly looked after, and their members, according to their individual abilities should, without preference, be employed in the service of the Government, but none should have the responsibilities of more than one office at one time lest the work should suffer. Bear this principle in mind, and strongly impress upon your advisers to keep you in close touch with the affairs and the requirements of the people.
Eighthly, that since the State of the Deccan is in a condition of subservience, the respect to the kings, who are indeed the shadow of God, should never be overlooked, lest the offenders should stand condemned in the eyes of God and man. Thus when Nādir Shāh, with an overwhelming force, reached Delhi and, in his extreme graciousness, cast his eye on me, he offered me personally the sovereignty of the Indian Empire. I at once answered, “By this command no benefit will accrue to either of us, except that I, as a servant, will merit the notoriety of not being true to my salt, and your August self the odium of breach of faith”. He was greatly pleased with my reply and honoured me with his praise. On the next day, he marched off with his army and left me as Mukhtār of my Sovereign.¹

Ninthly, that for the execution of the inferior work do not look to the high-born, nor for the execution of the superior work to the low-born, because in both these cases the work of the State will suffer. Wherefore, you may ask, was Pūran Chand who was not of a status to be raised to the office of the Dīwānī, but was in fact of low descent, so raised? The reason for this was that the nobles around me, not appreciating the blessings conferred upon them thereby, refrained from accepting this office because of the troubles and difficulties involved therein, and in order to mortify the ingrate, and punish their egotism, I considered this appointment as expedient and advisable, for after all, when the head that directs is sound, the subordinates, whoever they may be, do not much matter, and Pūran Chand has, in fact, proved himself to be rather an efficient man. He has, for instance, collected considerably more revenue from the Jāgīrs than any of his predecessors. My advice is that he should not be displaced for another three years or so.

Tenthly, that as far as possible, it is better not to take upon yourself the initiative in war whether fought for the sake of conquest or of wealth. Pomp and ostentation and natural warlike talents should not be the basis for fomenting disturbances or declaring war, for, verily God does

¹ The wordings are slightly different in various texts of the Testament.
not approve of it, and "none is our guide except God". As far as in you lies, you must try to avoid disputes and enmities, and settle them as they arise, so as to improve matters. But if you find this futile and the other party inimical and arrogantly defiant, then there is no other way left. You should beseech God for His assistance, and taking the field against the enemy, compel him to obedience. You should save yourself and your men to the utmost of your ability, seek the Divine aid for victory and keep a firm stand in the field.

Eleventhly, that since I reached the age of discretion, this has been my personal experience that of all the people of the Deccan, the inhabitants of Burhānpūr and Bijāpūr are the least trustworthy. In India the inhabitants of Gujerāt and in the Frontier Province, the people of Kāshmīr, are considered a bad lot. It is necessary to avoid them and guard against them, and not believe in what they say in season or out of season.

Twelfthly, that you should take into account the resources of income which I possess with an observant eye, and enquire into their significance, and if you follow in my footsteps, the present expenditure remaining the same, they will suffice for the next seven generations, but if you want to have your own way in this matter, it would not take more than a year or two before everything is squandered away.

Thirteenthly, that do you know why it is necessary to carry about the whole treasury with you and keep it near your person? It is because if, at the time of a tumult or disturbance (may it never occur!) the sepoys demand the arrears of their salaries, although they have not more than three months' arrears to claim, in these circumstances, you may be able to order for the payment of their dues at once.

Fourteenthly, although, in my old age, it was better that no such thing happened and that I had not taken unto myself a wife, yet through human frailty, incidentally this did happen and since it is a question of my honour, I enjoin upon my children and their descendents, above all, to have regard for her and help and support her without fail.
Fifteenthly, that the Brahmins of the Deccan, although able, are fit only to be locked up in prison, on account of their rebellious attitude. It is my own experience and Hazrat Khuld-Makān (the Emperor Aurangzīb) had also observed the same. They have two ring-leaders among them, Morū and Rāmdās, who are the upsetters of this Muslim State. I have confined these two in the fort of Ahmednagar, and it must be clearly realised that in their continued confinement lies our well-being. By Pandit Khāna is meant the prison where all these people are kept. Since the time of Hazrat ‘Alamgīr Pādshāh, the standing order has been that wherever a refractory Brahmin is found, he should be taken away forthwith and imprisoned.

Sixteenthly, that you must treat your younger brothers as your own sons. You must maintain, educate and train them, try your utmost to raise their rank and status, and make them your friends and sympathisers as they are pillars of strength and source of honour for one another. And Hidāyat Muhīuddīn Khān is, after all, our progeny and also a pillar of strength to us. You must win him over with kindness and favour, and not be after him with a view to crush him. You must not lend your ears to tittle-tattle of the back-bitters and slanderers, nor suffer the riff-raff to approach your presence. You must not indulge in what is prohibited by religion.

Seventeenthly, arise now and go quickly; appoint your own men to look after the State concerns, and establish them there.

We leave you in the protection of God; He is your support and may He grant you guidance and light!
CHAPTER XII

Character and Conclusion

Nizāmu’l-Mulk in early life was brought up in the traditions of Aurangzīb. Probably he resembles him more closely than he does any other leader; the similarity consists in their possession of a distinct political aim and their capacity and will to achieve it. To both, welfare of the State was the first consideration in contradistinction to personal ends. Both lived a hard and restless life, prompted by the fierce vitality that could not be quelled and found satisfaction in great deeds. Both believed in living a simple life, abstaining from the slightest indulgence in their personal habits. Both had a certain tenacity of purpose even in the most desperate circumstances, an essential quality of a great leader of men.

Nizāmu’l-Mulk’s early experience in the Deccan warfare had accustomed him to danger and hardship. No wonder that the greater portion of his life was spent on the saddle and under arms. His restless blood, which he had inherited from his Tūrānī ancestors, never allowed him to sit idle. Though always at war he was essentially a lover of peace and all his wars were of a defensive nature. Work was his greatest pleasure. His genius shone forth in action. His love of power was tempered with prudence. No dangers were too threatening for him to face, no obstacles too formidable, no tasks too laborious. And yet his soundness of judgment and great common-sense saved him from recklessness or from rash attempts to achieve the impossible. In fact he was gifted with a pronounced political genius and with an astounding power of foresight. He possessed, to a supreme degree, a deep and lively sense of reality in politics. He was as gifted a tactician in diplomacy as in war, and in both he knew how to profit by experience. Throughout his life Nizāmu’l-Mulk showed himself a born leader of men, a great soldier, a capable administrator and a chivalrous opponent. He was wise, tolerant, generous and capable of seeing far beyond his own
time. Both as a strategist, and as a tactician he proved himself superior to all his opponents, being always resourceful, quick to perceive and utilise his enemy’s error. He is the only statesman in the early eighteenth century in India whose political aims have been completely fulfilled and whose insight was not belied by subsequent events.

Nizâmu’l-Mulk was greatly fond of the company of the learned with whom he used to hold discourses every afternoon. He knew Turkish perfectly well and took delight in speaking this language with his Türkü officers. He was a scholar of Persian and composed poetry in it under the pseudonym of “Shâkir”, which means “the Resigned One”. He has left a “Diwân”,¹ which has since been published by Mirzâ Nasrullah Khân, Daulat Yâr Jang, Fidâi.

Tolerant towards other religions, Nizâmu’l-Mulk was a devout upholder of Islamic principles with which he had been imbued from infancy. He took great pains to the effect that all the religious rites and practices should be performed punctiliously, and with the greatest decorum. He endeavoured to follow the teachings of the Qur’ân and the Sunnat in every detail of his personal conduct. But he was far from being a fanatic. He respected other faiths, and did not hesitate to appoint non-Muslims to high posts of responsibility, a policy which was usefully followed by his descendants. His boundless good temper and unfeigned humanity were such that everyone, irrespective of his religion, who came in contact with him, admired and loved him. At a time when the character of the rulers and other public men of India had sunk to an extremely low level, Nizâmu’l-Mulk stands out as one of the few really good men of the evil time.

Nizâmu’l-Mulk believed, and with reason, that he was destined to bring the Deccan, with whose destiny he had completely identified himself, under his beneficent sway. No sooner did he arrive at Aurângâbâd in 1713 as the Viceroy of the Deccan than he started reorganizing the administrative machinery of the Government in order to undo the bad effects of the treaty entered into by the Marathas and Zulfiquâr Khân. Similarly when he finally established his

¹ A collection of poems in the alphabetical order of the final letters of the various end-rhymes.
sway there in 1720, he consolidated his position by the most masterly management of his power and succeeded in completely ousting the Marathas from this part of the country. The Maratha agents collected Chauth and Sardeshmukhi and exacted heavy tolls from the merchants and travellers throughout the Deccan. Nizāmu’l-Mulk suppressed the authority of the Marathas and openly declared that he was not prepared to tolerate the Imperium in Imperio. He repudiated the obligations created by the treaty entered into by the Amīru’l-Umarā and Rāja Sāhū by alleging that its observance was inconsistent with the authority invested in the Viceroy of the Deccan. Thus he succeeded in abrogating this arrangement the maintenance of which was not only disgraceful to the Imperial authority but which also tended to the oppression and impoverishment of the people. His skilful initiative in this connection is a masterpiece of diplomatic manipulation which resulted in the re-establishment of the Imperial authority in the Deccan. Being against the defeatist policy of abdication of the Deccan to the Marathas, Nizāmu’l-Mulk had realized that the aforementioned treaty was a direct contradiction of the principles on which the authority of any Government, worth the name, subsists.

When he brought the Deccan under his sway, the Mughal ‘Amlis were utterly unable to discharge their duties and the condition of the peasantry was far from satisfactory. There was no justice and no redress of grievances. The authority of the State was treated with contempt and had been perverted into an instrument of oppression. He not only restored the Mughal conquests in the Deccan but also restored peace and order. He rescued the people from their helpless state and replaced the chaotic conditions by an orderly administration. He reorganized the revenue system which had become corrupt and iniquitous. He made it a rule that his ‘Amlis should practise benevolence to the peasantry, inquire into their condition, and exert themselves tactfully to induce them to bring more land under cultivation, assuring them the fruits of their labour. The taxation was reduced by rigid supervision and punishment of those servants of the State who made dishonest gains by their exactions. He made it a consistent aim of his policy that the Government should
exist for the promotion of the security and welfare of the governed. He seems to have been deeply conscious of the sacred character and the solemn responsibilities of a ruler as is shown by the contents of his testament.

His dominions extended all over the Deccan from the river Tāptī to the frontiers of Mysore and the Carnātic, right up to Trichinopoly. There were political advantages for him in getting into touch with the European powers which had established their settlements on the Coromandel coast. He, therefore, consulted his interest to remain on good terms with them, thus preventing the Marathas from seeking an alliance with them against his authority in the South. For their part, the English and French solicited his favour in order to further their commercial interests. The representatives of both the nations were anxious to enlist the support of the Sūbedār of the Deccan to further their own interests. But Nizāmu’l-Mulk purposely declined to take sides in their struggle for commercial ascendancy on grounds of prudence. Although much inclined to favour the French, his position remained so vague up to the last that the representatives of the two European nations at his court failed to know exactly whom he favoured more, a course of action which he deliberately adopted as an obvious political convenience. His policy in this regard has since been abundantly justified by the subsequent political events in which the English and French intervened as allies of one or other of the warring neighbouring States. He had the sagacity to perceive that it was dangerous to get involved in the politics of these foreign settlers who, as he had half suspected, were sure to take full advantage by interfering in the affairs of the Indian rulers. What he avoided, his descendants could not. They, like other rulers of the country, were impelled by the blind force of destiny to eagerly seek European aid in their internecine struggles and thus give an opportunity to the English to establish their Empire in India.
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