A SHORT HISTORY OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

BY

RAMSAY MUIR

Sometime Professor of Modern History in the University of Manchester

IN TWO VOLUMES: VOLUME II
THE MODERN COMMONWEALTH
(1763 to 1933)

EIGHTH EDITION WITH EPILOGUE (1933-1939)

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PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION

It is two years since the first volume of this book was published. The delay in issuing the second volume has been mainly due to the difficulty I have experienced in compressing the narrative within the allotted space. At a late stage, indeed, I had to rewrite almost the whole volume, in order to reduce it by about forty per cent.; and I fear that this drastic process of abridgment may have impaired the clarity of the narrative at some points. Perhaps Book IX.—the keystone of the volume—has suffered most. A chapter on the intellectual development of the British peoples during the last generation has been very reluctantly excised from Book XI.; I had to abandon the intention of writing a chapter on the development of the United States since the Civil War; and the reduction of Book XII. (1905–1919) to the dimensions of a mere epilogue was dictated partly by the tyranny of space, though mainly by my unwillingness to embark upon the discussion of questions of current controversy.

Some critics of the first volume expressed surprise that the line of division between the two halves of the book should have been drawn at so late a date as 1763, and suggested that this would involve a disproportionately full treatment of the later period. They did not reflect that the theme of the book is the history, not of England, but of the British Commonwealth. Almost the whole history of the British connexion with India and with Canada, and the whole history of the British connexion with South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, lie within the period covered by this volume. It includes also the American Revolution and the development of the United States, which no rational treatment of British history can disregard; it includes the Industrial Revolution and all the gigantic changes, social and political, which have flowed from it; it includes the partition of Africa, and the establishment of the ascendancy of European civilisation over the non-European world; it includes the whole movement of democracy from the French Revolution to the Great War. In view of the magnitude, the variety, and the range of these themes, I
do not think that the proportion of the total available space allotted to them is excessive.

But, in truth, the line of division between the two volumes was quite deliberately chosen, not on these grounds only, but because there is a real difference of character between the periods covered by the two volumes. In the main, the events recorded in the first volume are primarily of historical interest: their bearing upon the problems of to-day, though real, is neither obvious nor direct. But the principal events dealt with in this volume, almost from its opening pages, are still of living interest, in the sense that they bear directly and obviously upon the problems of our own time. The revolt of the American colonies, and the misunderstandings which it created; the organisation of the British power in India; the adoption of new principles in colonial policy; the origins, development and consequences of the Industrial Revolution; the creation of the machinery of democratic government; the rise of the labour movement; the rapid growth of Irish nationalism—these are themes (and the list is anything but exhaustive) in studying which the reader is bound to feel that he is probing to the roots of the political problems of to-day.

It is indeed impossible, in dealing with questions so living as these, for either the writer or the reader to avoid constant mental reference to contemporary conditions. And this increases the difficulty as well as the interest of the writer’s task. His plain duty of impartiality becomes at once more important and harder to fulfil; he has to be constantly on guard against his own natural bias. In truth no historian of the immediate background of our own time can be absolutely impartial. He cannot avoid framing judgments: even if he abstains from expressing them in words, he expresses them more subtly in the selection and arrangement of his facts. I claim no more than that I have honestly tried to keep always in mind a dictum which is laid down in the text,—that no man has a right to express a definite judgment upon a controverted question unless he can understand why men as able and honest as himself have come to quite different conclusions.

Nor is this the only difficulty which the writing of recent history presents. The task of writing the first volume was greatly simplified by the fact that, in the main, I had to follow a beaten track, trodden by many previous writers, who had established what may be called an orthodox view as to the significance and the relative importance of events.
PREFACE

In the present volume I have lacked this aid; for though a vast deal has been written about almost every aspect of the subject, the results have not yet been digested into a received and coherent view. Indeed, so far as I am aware, there is no book in which an attempt has been made to draw together, in their just relations, all the subjects which have seemed to me to be essential parts of my theme.

In dealing with a range of subject matter so enormous and so complex, and in trying to bring it within manageable compass, my main problems have naturally been those of structure, proportion, and arrangement. To place both the masses and the details in the right juxtaposition, so that their value and significance may stand forth of themselves, has been my chief preoccupation. I have thought far more of this than of felicity of phrase: I have striven after a direct, concise, and unadorned style, hoping to make the facts eloquent by putting them in the right order rather than to be eloquent about them.

The lists of books at the end of each chapter (mainly books in English) are not intended as scientific bibliographies, which would, in my judgment, be out of place in a broad survey such as this. They are merely intended to direct the reader's attention to the books in which he can easily follow up the subjects.

I owe my warmest thanks to Miss Harriet Davies, who has not only compiled the index, but has read all the proofs with meticulous care, and saved me from many errors of detail; to Dr. G. S. Veitch, who has read nearly all the proofs, and made many valuable suggestions; to Professor Arthur Smithells, who gave me the benefit of his criticism on the chapter dealing with the progress of science; and to Mr. George Philip, who afforded me similar help in the chapters on the exploration and colonisation of Africa.

RAMSAY MUIR

Buxton, September 1922.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

The second edition of this volume has followed so closely upon the first that I have not attempted any serious revision. But one curious omission (which escaped the notice of all the reviewers) has been corrected near the middle of the volume.

R. M.

April 1923.
In this edition I have brought the narrative up to 1933—overcoming the unwillingness to embark upon current controversies to which I referred in the preface to the first edition. It is manifestly impossible to narrate the events of the last few years, and to deal with controversies that are still glowing, in the purely objective spirit proper to history. But there is no period of history upon which it is more necessary to form a balanced judgment, if we can, than the years immediately preceding to-day, especially as in these years problems of vital moment for the future of humanity were being raised. For this reason, I have thought it right to tackle the difficulty boldly. I can only say that I am aware of my own bias, and have tried to allow for it.

R.M.

Gerrards Cross, Bucks.
June, 1934

PUBLISHERS' NOTE TO THE EIGHTH EDITION

In this edition of the second volume of the late Ramsay Muir's "Short History of the British Commonwealth," the Publishers have deemed it proper to make only such changes to the author's text as might avoid any possible confusion between his references to the war of 1914-1918 and to the second conflict which began in 1939.

Ramsay Muir's untimely death occurred in 1941, shortly after he had written his "Epilogue, 1933-1939" which is included in this volume with its special index. Had he lived to see the victorious conclusion of the Second World War he would doubtless have re-written this epilogue and made changes to earlier passages in his text.

At a later date the Publishers hope to make available a further edition of the present volume, revised by competent historians, whose task it will be to take up the story where Ramsay Muir left it and to tell more of the great ordeal of the Commonwealth.

For this Eighth Edition the bibliographies appearing at the ends of chapters have been revised, and the Publishers desire to express their grateful thanks to those historians who have given them the benefit of their advice in this revision.

September, 1953.
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THE DISRUPTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE BIRTH OF NEW FORCES AND IDEAS

(A.D. 1760-1793)
The footnote references in the text to atlas plates are to Philips' New School Atlas of Universal History and Philips' Historical Atlas, Mediæval and Modern, Sixth Edition.
INTRODUCTION

The resounding triumphs of the Seven Years' War, with which we closed our first volume, were not merely the culmination of the history of the first British Empire; they were almost its conclusion. For within twenty years of the victorious Peace of Paris the British Empire had been shattered by the successful revolt of the American colonies, and there were many who thought that the days of British greatness were at an end.

But it is wrong to think of the generation in which this dissolution of the partnership of freedom took place as merely a time of disaster. It was not a period of endings; it was rather a period of beginnings, during which the conditions and problems of our modern world began to take shape. That is why this forms the appropriate point at which to open our second volume: henceforth there is present in our story a sense of actuality which could not be so strongly felt in its earlier course. We are watching the emergence of problems which are still alive.

The American Revolution itself was obviously a beginning rather than an ending. It was the beginning of the history of a great new nation of English speech, dedicated to the ideal of political liberty; the beginning also of the proclamation of democracy as a system of government based not merely upon expediency but upon theoretic right. And with the disruption of the first British Empire was associated the birth of the second British Empire, in the organisation of the Canadian group of colonies and the first settlement of Australia. In India also this was a period of beginnings. The power which Clive had established was but an insecure and fortuitous dominion: it was the work of Warren Hastings which laid the real foundations of the British Empire in India, by organising for the first time a just and efficient system of government, and by cleansing the British name from the disrepute of corruption and oppression.

Not less definitely was the period one of beginnings in the
political development of the British homeland. The Whig oligarchy, having served its turn, was overthrown by George III. In its place, after an interval when royal authority seemed to be partially re-established, the system of cabinet government resting upon organised parties came into being, almost in the form in which we know it to-day; and the systematic corruption of Walpole’s day was brought to an end. At the same time the demand for parliamentary reform took its rise, though it was not to win its triumph until the nineteenth century. In Ireland, again, we have to trace to these years the beginning of that organised nationalist movement which was thenceforward to play so momentous a part in British politics.

But it is in the economic sphere more than anywhere else that the student is compelled to recognise in this period the seed-plot of the modern age. For it was in these years that the Industrial Revolution took its rise, and that the potent forces of Mechanism, of Steam, of Coal, and of Iron began to transform the whole structure of economic society; while alongside of the emergence of these new forces, an agrarian revolution came to help in reshaping the social order which had seemed so stable and settled in the middle of the eighteenth century.

In the realm of ideas also the generation which was first stirred by the doctrines of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, and which was taught to think historically by Edward Gibbon and Edmund Burke, may justly be regarded as a time of new beginnings in political and economic thought. Now, too, a powerful and many-sided humanitarian movement began to exercise a potent influence in politics: it was to be one of the main moulding forces in the shaping of the new British Commonwealth whose development is the theme of this volume.

In short, to whatever aspect of the period the student may devote his attention, whether to politics or to economic development, whether to the realm of ideas or the realm of action, whether to Britain or Ireland, America or India, Canada or Australia, he finds himself in the presence of new forces and new ideas. The second era of the British Commonwealth has begun.
CHAPTER 1
THE DOWNFALL OF THE WHIGS
(A.D. 1760-1775)

§ I. The Political Problem in Britain.

After the triumphs and achievements of the Seven Years' War, the story of British politics during the early years of George III. presents, on the surface, a sad anti-climax; for it seems to be concerned almost wholly with the sordid intrigues of groups of office-seeking politicians. Great problems, it is true, emerge and insist upon being considered: the problem of Ireland, the problem of the American colonies, the problem of the French in Canada, the problem of India—problems as varied and challenging as any people has ever had to solve. But they all seem to be blurred and thrust into the background by the sordid rivalries of factions; the taxation of America and the misgovernment of India appear to be regarded as important chiefly in so far as they affect the political fortunes of this or that political group. This is not a wholly just view of the period, for a great deal of honest thinking was devoted to these problems, and the differences of opinion to which they gave rise partly account for the complication of British politics. But this is the view conveyed by the memoir-writers and pamphleteers of the time. And beyond a doubt the confused faction-fight of British politics during the first ten years of George III. was largely responsible for the unsatisfactory way in which these vast and inspiring problems were treated.

For this reason it is necessary to trace in outline the course of British politics during these years; without some appreciation of these matters the development of the other great problems of the period cannot be made intelligible. But there is a better reason. However much obscured, great principles were involved in the strife of factions; and the form which the British system of government was to assume was under debate. The Whig oligarchy which had
ruled Britain for fifty years was breaking down: that was the main cause of the confusion. Was its dissolution also to involve the disappearance of the system of cabinet government based upon the support of an organised party in Parliament, which had been the main political achievement of the Whigs? Was this system to be replaced by one in which the Crown would regain effective control of the executive government, withdrawing it from the influence of political parties, as in nineteenth-century Prussia? That was the real issue which was under debate during these years of confusion, though it was obscured by the intrigues of factions. And with it were combined two other questions, not less important. Could the supremacy of Parliament be reconciled with coherent and efficient government by any other means than the use of organised corruption, such as every Government had employed since Parliament became dominant? Could the House of Commons be made more effectively representative of the nation without dislocating the whole traditional machinery of government? These were questions as important as any of the imperial problems which had been raised by the conquests of the war. And although they were never very definitely formulated, they were implicit in the controversies of this time.

The Whig oligarchy had rendered real services to self-government. It had reduced the monarchy to a sort of crowned presidency in a free State. It had shown that a great nation could be governed without entrusting discretionary powers to a monarch, by leaving the conduct of affairs to a compact group of ministers jointly responsible to Parliament, and capable of being replaced without any serious upheaval. It had secured a degree of freedom in belief, in speech, and in writing, such as had scarcely ever been enjoyed by any community in the world’s history. But the power of the Whigs had always rested upon the lavish use of Crown patronage for the purchase of support, and upon the exclusion from the public service of every man who differed from the ruling group. These features of their system had always been the objects of angry criticism. They had become more marked than ever since Walpole’s time, and meanwhile government had become more inefficient. The Whig party had broken up into cliques, competing for patronage and power; and the nation had finally lost patience with them when, at the crisis of the war, their exclusiveness threatened to shut
out the great Pitt from the conduct of national affairs.\footnote{Vol. 1. pp. 729, 738.} The Whig oligarchy had served its turn, and the time had come for its overthrow.

The only clear view as to an alternative to party government after the Whig pattern was the view which Bolingbroke had expounded in \textit{The Patriot King}: the view that the Crown must be restored to the position designed for it in the Revolution Settlement, as the real head of the executive, free to choose the best men for ministerial posts, irrespective of party. This view was widely held. It was held by Pitt, the national hero, who hated the Whig oligarchy. It was held by the opposition group who gathered round Leicester House, the home of the Dowager Princess of Wales. Most important, it was held by the young Prince who ascended the throne as George III. in 1760, and by his friend and tutor, Lord Bute.

George III. had cast himself for the part of Bolingbroke’s Patriot King, and in many ways he was well fitted for the part. Though almost every drop of blood in his veins was German, he had been born and bred in England, thought of himself as an Englishman, and was, in truth, typically English in many traits. Honest, hard-working, brave, obstinate, and self-confident, he had a sound practical intelligence, but a very limited imagination, and he distrusted long views and sweeping theories. He was sincerely patriotic, and loyal to the British constitution as he understood it. The Whig tradition has charged him with aiming at a sort of despotism. There is no justification for the charge. His aim was simply to restore the Crown to the position designed for it in the Revolution Settlement, and to use its powers in the spirit of Bolingbroke’s famous tract. He thought himself justified in employing all the customary methods of patronage and corruption, which long usage had established. But he was so loyal to tradition that he did not even attempt to preside over his own cabinet, as William III. and Anne had done, though only a recent practice stood in the way.

If the Bolingbroke plan was to be carried into effect, the Whigs had to be deprived of their monopoly of power and patronage. This was easy: all patronage legally belonged to the King, and he could (and promptly did) resume control of it. But this was not enough. It was also necessary that the King should choose his individual ministers, without respect to party or ‘connexion’: and he found that the
various groups hung together, and insisted upon stipulating for a number of offices, to be given in the way they laid down. It was further necessary that the King should have the determining voice upon broad questions of national policy, and that he and not the cabinet should decide whether a recalcitrant minister should be dismissed or not. This involved the destruction of the conjoint responsibility of the cabinet; and George III. found that the groups of ministers whom he was compelled to employ insisted upon acting as a cabinet, and sometimes upon dictating to himself. He could dismiss them; but the next group to whom he applied were apt to adopt the same attitude. In truth only one among the leading political figures of the time fully shared the King’s theory of government. This was Pitt, whose co-operation George was from the first eager to obtain. But Pitt was alienated by the Peace of Paris, and refused his help until 1766. When at length he did give it, the King’s game was won. We have to trace in this chapter the stages in the King’s struggle, until his final triumph in 1770, and the political problems which arose in the course of the controversy.

§ 2. First Stages in the Attack upon the Whigs.

When George III. succeeded to the throne the ministry in power was the coalition of Pitt and Newcastle, which had won such triumphs in the war. But there was no love lost between Pitt and Newcastle’s Whig gang, who resented the dictatorial methods of the great minister, and would have been glad to be rid of him. It was the Whig gang that George III. wanted to overthrow; and he was anxious to obtain Pitt’s co-operation. His first step was to require that his friend, Lord Bute, should be admitted to the cabinet; and ere long Bute was promoted to the Secretaryship of State, thus becoming Pitt’s closest colleague. Bute’s appointment was a sign that the nomination of ministers was no longer to be in the hands of Newcastle. For a time Bute gave steady support to Pitt against the murmurings of his colleagues; for he knew that Pitt would be the King’s best ally. But when Pitt insisted that war must be declared against Spain—a course which seemed to most men unjustifiable—Bute reluctantly deserted him; for he and his master were loth to prolong the war, desiring the restoration of peace in order that they might devote them-

1 Vol. I. p. 754.
selves to domestic problems. Thereupon the great man resigned in high dudgeon (1761), so deeply offended that five years passed before the King was able to obtain his co-operation.

This was a bad beginning for the King’s great design. The only people who were pleased were Newcastle and his friends. But if they hoped that their old ascendancy was about to be restored, they were soon disillusioned. Already an alarming thing had happened. There had to be a general election in 1761; and the King, instead of allowing Newcastle to use the royal patronage and the royal purse to make a majority, had announced that he proposed to deal with these matters himself. The result was that the Parliament of 1761 was the first for nearly fifty years in which the Whigs could not count upon a sure majority, and in which the placemen, who formed one-fourth of the House of Commons, did not look to the Whig leader for instructions as to how they should vote, but to agents of the King. Next year (1762) Newcastle was driven to resign. In a sense his resignation marked the end of the long Whig ascendancy; having lost control of patronage the Whigs were reduced to impotence, and had sunk to the level of being merely one among a number of groups of borough-owners. It was no longer in their power to make it impossible for any ministry of which they disapproved to hold office: henceforth any ministry which had the King’s support could command a majority, provided that it was sufficiently competent to obtain the support of the independent country gentlemen; but no ministry which the King disliked could retain office for a week.

But it was not enough for a Patriot King that he should be able to dismiss powerful ministers whom he disliked. He must also be able to enlist the services of the best men without respect to party. In the meanwhile Lord Bute took charge of affairs, working in intimate relations with the King. Bute was a wealthy and cultivated Scottish nobleman, but he lacked both experience of and capacity for public affairs, and his tenure of office was anything but successful. His main task was to bring the war to an end; and he did so by concluding, rather hurriedly, the Peace of Paris, which, though it was a reasonable settlement,¹ could be represented as a betrayal of national interests, because it did not secure for Britain all the advantages which her victories might have enabled her to insist upon.

¹ Vol. i. p. 756.
On this ground it was bitterly attacked by Pitt; and it was only by wholesale corruption that it was forced through the House of Commons. The independent country gentlemen, under Pitt’s influence, were very restive.

From the first Bute was exposed to the most virulent criticism. All the office-hunting groups were in full cry. He was denounced as a ‘favourite’—a fatal charge. He was the object of a vile and scurrilous newspaper campaign, in which he was sneered at as a Scotsman, and shameful innuendoes were thrown out regarding his relations with the King’s mother. The worst of the slanderers was John Wilkes, a bankrupt libertine and member of Parliament who published a weekly paper under the ironical name of the North Briton. George III. would have been more than human if he had not longed to punish Wilkes. Bute endured the storm in silence; but it made public life intolerable to him, and as soon as the peace was concluded he resigned his office. The whole episode had given a serious set-back to the King’s design.

George III. would now have liked to call in Pitt to the direction of affairs; but Pitt’s anger at the peace made this impossible. He therefore chose the great man’s brother-in-law, George Grenville, who was probably the best man then available. An honest, able, industrious, and rather pedantic lawyer, Grenville had a high reputation in the House of Commons, because, in a greater degree than most of his contemporaries, he made a point of studying the subjects with which he dealt. Grenville had only a small personal following in Parliament. Even when, after a year, he was joined by the Duke of Bedford and his group, he was far from being able to command a majority of pledged followers. Yet he held office for two years, and the Whigs, even though helped by Pitt, were unable to overthrow him; because so long as he had the King’s support he could count upon the votes of the placemen, and upon those of the independent country gentlemen. Nevertheless Grenville and Bedford insisted upon acting as if they were party chiefs instead of being dependent upon the King: and from the outset their dictatorial methods, and their obvious desire to strengthen their own ‘connexions,’ aroused the King’s resentment. This was not the kind of ministry for a Patriot King.

Grenville is chiefly remembered for his American policy, with which we shall deal in a later chapter.¹ But in

¹ Below, Chap. iv. p. 42.
England and in Parliament the American question attracted very little attention until the last months of his ministry, when Englishmen were startled by the vehemence of the American opposition to the Stamp Act. What engrossed most attention during Grenville's ministry was the prosecution of Wilkes for having suggested, in No. 45 of his paper, that the King's speech on the peace contained a lie. He was charged with 'seditious libel' and arrested on a 'general warrant' (that is, a warrant giving no names) directed against the 'authors, printers, and publishers' of the North Briton. Such warrants had often been used by Governments; they had been used by Pitt. But in this case they were declared illegal by Chief Justice Pratt. This judicial decision is important because it deprived Government of a mode of legal procedure not open to private citizens. In Britain, as in no other European country, the ordinary machinery of the law was alone to be available for Government.

Wilkes suddenly became a popular hero; especially when the House of Commons expelled him, and the House of Lords charged him with breach of privilege for having attributed indecencies to a bishop in a blasphemous jeu d'esprit intended for private circulation. Without, however, awaiting his trial on the main charge of libel, Wilkes fled to France, being so deep in debt that he was not safe once he had lost his parliamentary privilege of freedom from arrest. The episode was an unsavoury one. Yet it filled the public mind, and contributed to create for a time an atmosphere of hostility to the King and his policy.

George III. had no quarrel with the principal measures with which Grenville and his colleague Bedford were associated. But he found the ministers dictatorial, and far too independent. Already, after Grenville had held office for a year, the King had in vain opened negotiations with Pitt. In 1765, having resolved to get rid of Grenville, he tried Pitt once more; and, failing again, fell back with great reluctance upon the Old Whigs, now led by the Marquis of Rockingham. The Whigs also wanted Pitt: with his help they hoped to re-establish their own power and put a stop once for all to the King's meddling. But Pitt would have none of them; and they never forgave him. They formed a short-lived and troubled ministry, which succeeded in achieving only one important measure—the repeal of the Stamp Act, which had produced such an outcry in America. The Whig ministry of 1765-1766 was indeed
a sad revelation of the weakness of that once omnipotent party. It consisted of a group of amiable magnates without vigour or ability. Only one man of brains was among them—Edmund Burke, an Irish man of letters whom Lord Rockingham had engaged as his private secretary. In that humble capacity Burke wielded no power; nor did the proud Whigs ever admit him to the inner circle of their group—his origin was too humble. Yet Burke's genius has thrown about the group a glamour which they never possessed in reality. Their expulsion from power had largely purified them from the corruption which had been the shame of their predecessors. But their merely negative virtues did not save them from impotence. The King's obedient army of placemen hampered and worried the ministry during its brief tenure of office; and when the right moment came it was turned out without hesitation or difficulty.

§ 3. The Experiment of Non-Party Government, 1766-1770.

It was turned out because at last the great Pitt had been persuaded to lend his immense prestige for the formation of a genuine non-party government, consisting of the best men from all sides. The ideal of a non-party ministry was at last to be given a fair trial. Pitt threw himself into the task with enthusiasm, and got together a ministry, drawn from many different groups, which for varied capacity surpassed all its predecessors and most of its successors.

He hoped to achieve great things. He was to solve the American problem; he was to regain for Britain the leadership in European politics which she had lost in the last few years. But none of these great hopes was fulfilled; and the reason for their non-fulfilment was simply that the ministry was a non-party ministry, whose members had no principles in common, and no habitue of acting together, so that they were constantly at cross-purposes, and could not achieve that unity of aim which is necessary for successful government. Pitt himself soon realised how great was the blunder into which he had drifted. He withdrew to his country house, and refused even to see or give counsel to his distracted colleagues. He was supposed to be suffering from gout; he was probably suffering still more from disillusionment and the loss of belief in himself. When he returned from his seclusion,
in 1769, it was to throw himself into violent opposition to the ministry which he himself had formed, but which had outraged all the ideas he held most dear. For this non-party ministry of able and honest men had meanwhile drifted, under Pitt’s loyal henchman, the well-meaning young Duke of Grafton, into a series of the most extraordinary and tragic follies and blunders. It had failed to do anything with India. It had started a new and fatal scheme for the taxation of America. It had given to John Wilkes a new and much better plea for posing as a martyr, and had aroused passionate indignation throughout the country, by its treatment of the Middlesex election. It had seemed to threaten the freedom of the Press, and had convinced the country that Parliament was an unrepresentative and tyrannical body. And all this was the work of a ministry which Pitt had formed, of a non-party ministry which was to realise the dreams of Bolingbroke! This result shed a new light upon the subject of party-government, which most men had been ready to condemn; and Edmund Burke, the apologist of the Whigs, seized the occasion to write, in his pamphlet on The Causes of the Present Discontents, a very cogent demonstration of the necessity of party as a means of giving consistency to government. The experience of Pitt’s ministry did indeed demonstrate the impracticability of non-party government under the British system.

Two great questions were especially raised by this ill-starred ministry during the years 1766-1770. On its disastrous revival of the attempt to tax the American colonies more will be said in a later chapter. But, among British contemporaries, it aroused yet greater excitement by its handling of the Middlesex election. At the general election of 1768 John Wilkes, who had returned from France, became a candidate for the populous constituency of Middlesex, and was triumphantly elected. The House of Commons declared the return invalid on the ground of Wilkes’s condemnation for seditious libel. A second election was held, and Wilkes was again returned, and again refused admission; a third election produced the same result; at a fourth election a Government candidate was put up, and (although he obtained only 296 votes against Wilkes’s 1143) was declared duly returned. In effect, the constituency of Middlesex was disfranchised; and the House of Commons, by declaring the minority candidate elected, assumed to itself a very dangerous power.
This episode filled the next years with uproar. The ministry was deeply discredited. All the elements of opposition—the Old Whigs, the followers of Chatham, even the followers of Grenville—were drawn together, and for a time hoped to overwhelm the Government, from which the Whig and the Chathamite members had now nearly all withdrawn. A violent press campaign, in which the hard, brilliant, vitriolic letters of the mysterious Junius played a principal part, stimulated public interest in politics; and the attempts of the House to prohibit newspaper reports of its debates, and the conflicts which followed this, intensified the popular feeling, and showed that Government and Parliament alike were, for the moment at any rate, out of touch with the sentiment of the nation.

But the excitement of 1769 and 1770 died down almost as quickly as it had arisen. The settlement of disputed elections was transferred from the whole House (which had always decided such questions on party lines) to a select Committee (1770). Wilkes, after his brief period of stormy prominence, was permitted to take his place in Parliament at the election of 1774, and soon subsided into an extinct volcano. But although the ministry had to be reconstructed in 1770, the Whigs, even with the support of Chatham, found themselves as far from the restoration of their old ascendancy as ever. George III., with obstinate courage, had held on his way through the storm; and he was rewarded by complete victory. The fortunes of the great Whig party were never at a lower ebb than in 1770 and the following years.

But the brief fury of the Middlesex election was not without lasting results. It had drawn attention to the unrepresentative character of Parliament, and it gave birth to a demand for parliamentary reform. The Whigs (who had no desire to see the abolition of pocket boroughs) were content to urge that the means of corruption possessed by the Crown should be reduced, in order to make the struggle more equal between the King and themselves. Chatham and the unknown Junius went no further than to advocate general elections every three instead of every seven years, and an increase in the number of county members. But outside the circle of the parliamentary politicians bolder demands began to be raised. During the Middlesex election a body called the Society of Supporters of the Bill of Rights had been formed. It was the first public organisation for a political end; and it advocated equal political rights and
annual Parliaments. The same demand was put forward in a pamphlet of 1776 by Major Cartwright, who came to be known as the Father of Parliamentary Reform; and in the same year John Wilkes courted publicity for the last time by introducing a bill 'for a just and equal representation of the people of England in Parliament.' Wilkes's Bill was rejected without a voice being raised in its support; but the idea of constitutional reconstruction had been brought to birth, and it was not to die.


There was as yet, however, no large body of public opinion anxious for such changes; and George III. was right in believing that the excitement over the Middlesex election was only a temporary and evanescent frenzy. He had, indeed, at last won complete victory in his conflict with the Whigs. The ministry of 1770 was a ministry after his own heart. For though it is known to history as the ministry of Lord North, it was in truth the King's ministry. George was in reality his own Prime Minister, in spite of the fact that he did not preside over cabinet meetings; North always repudiated the title of Prime Minister, regarding himself only as the King's principal agent in the distribution of patronage and the management of the House of Commons; and as a matter of principle, he deliberately subordinated his own judgment to that of his master. The other ministers were no more than heads of departments, directly responsible to the King; and it was the King who mainly determined the broad lines of national policy, and who gave unity and co-ordination to the various departments. Once more, as in the time of William III., the King was the real head of the executive government, and the theory of the joint responsibility of the cabinet, which had grown up during the period of Whig rule, was broken down.

But George had not destroyed the party system. On the contrary, he had created a new party of which he was himself the leader, a revived Tory party, which had ousted the Whigs by employing their own methods of electoral corruption and the skilful use of patronage. And over against this new Tory party stood an organised opposition, unceasingly critical, consisting of the purified remnant of the Whigs and the small group of Lord Chatham's followers. They were weak, disheartened, and divided among themselves. But they were an organised opposition, standing for
principles sharply contrasted with those of the King’s party; and the contrast became sharper and more clear as the great American conflict developed and expanded. The party system, instead of being destroyed, had in fact been made clearer and more definite by George III.’s victory over the Whigs: the shifting groups of the early years of the reign were coalescing into two clearly marked bodies, and from 1770 onwards it was more nearly true than it had ever been that the members of the House of Commons could be divided into supporters and opponents of the Government, Tories and Whigs, each with their recognised leaders. Thus, paradoxical as it may appear, the definite division of Parliament into two opposing political armies was the main outcome of George III.’s attempt to destroy party.

Meanwhile, however, the opposition in Parliament was helpless. All the Government proposals were carried by overwhelming majorities. And this was due not merely to the fact that corruption was employed on a wholesale scale—on a scale far more lavish than Walpole ever dreamed of—but still more to the fact that most of the independent country gentlemen in the House of Commons were quite content that the King should control the Government, and had no quarrel with his policy. In the House of Lords the Whig majority vanished, partly by reason of creations of new peers, partly because many peers who had earlier counted as Whigs were ready to transfer their allegiance. And there is no reason to suppose that in thus accepting the new régime the two Houses of Parliament ran counter to public feeling in the country at large. The King himself and the policy he pursued were by no means unpopular. All the evidence goes to show that even his American policy was almost universally accepted or acquiesced in—until things began to go badly wrong in 1777 and the following years. If an election on quite democratic lines could have taken place at any time between 1770 and 1777 it is probable that the party which supported the King’s policy would have obtained a majority quite as large as that which it enjoyed under the anomalies of the old representative system.

What is more, it must be recognised that the Government of George III. and Lord North showed itself competent enough, until it had to stand the strain of a great war. It carried through constructive measures of real importance, in many fields of national policy. In the Quebec Act (1774) it found a wise solution for the difficult problem of the
government of French Canada, which had been neglected since the conquest of that colony in 1759-1760.¹ Its India Act of 1773,² if it proved in practice to be unworkable, at least represented a bold assumption of responsibility for the welfare of the Indian peoples, and was, in spite of its inevitable deficiencies, a far more courageous and statesman-like measure than anything that had been earlier attempted or even proposed.

Royal control of the executive seemed to be working well. But for the disasters of the American War it might have got itself established; the fluid and unfixed institutions of Britain might have been set in a mould like that of nineteenth-century Prussia; the system of government by a cabinet jointly responsible to Parliament might have passed out of memory, as a discredited device of the defeated Whig oligarchy; and the infant movement for parliamentary reform might have been still longer delayed. Thus the colonial controversy reacted upon, and in the end determined, the course of political development in the old country, and perhaps saved Parliament from a gradual diminution of its powers.

[Lecky, History of England in the 18th Century; Robertson, England under the Hanoverians; Hunt, England from 1760 to 1801; Winstanley, Personal and Party Government, and Lord Chatham and the Whigs; Williams, William Pitt; Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne; Veitch, Genesis of Parliamentary Reform; Trevelyan, Early Life of C. J. Fox; Burke, Present Discontents; Grafton, Autobiography; H. Walpole, Memoirs of George III.; Letters of Junius; Donne, Correspondence of George III. and Lord North.; L. B. Namier, Structure of English Politics at the Accession of George III. 2 vols.; R. Pares, King George III. and the Politicians (Ford Lectures, 1952).]

¹ See below, Chap. xi. p. 136.
² See below, Chap. vi. p. 79.
CHAPTER II
EUROPE UNDER BENEVOLENT DESPOTISM
(A.D. 1763-1789)

§ 1. Britain and France.

One of the most marked contrasts between the first five-and-twenty years of the reign of George III. and the half century of Whig oligarchy which preceded it was that, while under the Whigs foreign affairs seemed to be the most important part of politics, and ministers were continually preoccupied by the making of treaties and alliances for the maintenance of the Balance of Power, under George III. foreign affairs sank into the background, and Britain made no important treaties and entered into no alliances. The reason for this striking change was not that any policy of non-intervention in European affairs had been deliberately adopted, but partly that domestic questions engrossed attention, and partly that the constant changes of ministry were fatal to continuity of policy. In the eyes of continental rulers Britain seemed to have fallen a prey to civil confusion. 'England,' said Frederick the Great in 1769, 'has become a sort of island-Poland.' British influence in continental affairs has perhaps never in modern history been less than during the quarter of a century which followed the resounding triumphs of the Seven Years' War.

There was only one problem of foreign politics which intermittently aroused the interest of British politicians—the fear of a revival of the strength of the Bourbon Powers, France and Spain, and of a future attempt to avenge their catastrophic defeat. These fears were by no means groundless; for though France had been deeply discredited by her humiliation in the last war, and was nearly bankrupt, she had not given up the hope of revenge; and under the guidance of the able minister Choiseul she was preparing for it, especially by the creation of a formidable navy. Her opportunity came with the revolt of the American Colonies, and she was ready to use it. When the long conflict
between the two old rivals was thus renewed, Britain paid dearly for her isolation. Chatham was almost the only British statesman of the period who foresaw this danger. When he formed his non-party ministry of 1766 he strove to draw together a European alliance against the Bourbon Powers. But he was wholly unsuccessful. Frederick of Prussia, to whom he first applied, would have nothing to say to a British alliance, partly because all his attention was now given to the affairs of Eastern Europe, where Britain could be of no use to him, but mainly because he thought that Britain was a decaying Power, and that no confidence could be placed in a State whose governments were so transient and insecure as those of Britain now seemed to be; nor had he forgiven what he regarded as the desertion of himself in 1763.

There were, however, only two moments, before the American War, when any actual friction took place between Britain and the Bourbon Powers. One was in 1768-9, after Chatham had withdrawn into his strange seclusion. The island of Corsica was in revolt against the city of Genoa, to which it had long been subject; the Genoese, unable to conquer their revolting subjects, proposed to sell the island to France; and the Corsicans asked to be taken under the protection of the British Crown. Shelburne, Secretary of State in 1768, who was a disciple of Chatham, was anxious to accept this offer, and Chatham, had he been in active politics, would certainly have taken the same line. France was not yet ready for a new war, and would not have resisted. But one section of the divided British cabinet was against taking action, and actually sent word to France that Britain would not in any case go to war about Corsica. The result was that Corsica was annexed by France (1769); and Napoleon Buonaparte, born in that very year, became a French subject. It is strange to reflect that but for Lord Chatham's illness Napoleon might have been a British subject. In the next year, 1770, there was a new alarm, when a British garrison in the Falkland Islands was expelled by the Spaniards, who claimed the islands. But North's Government acted with more firmness than its predecessor, and the cloud blew over.

In spite of these events, and the general fear of French designs, one of the outstanding features of this period was the intimacy of the social relations between England and France. Members of the English governing class were almost as much at home in Paris as in London. In France
admiration for British institutions and British ways of life had reached a curiously high pitch; and this Anglomania, which deeply affected the political thought of France, contributed to prepare the way for the French Revolution.

The Government of France, bent upon reversing the decisions of the Seven Years' War in the spheres of naval and colonial power, was tempted, like the British Government, to pay little attention to the general politics of Europe, especially after the fall of Choiseul in 1770. Thus the two richest and most highly civilised of the European States were concentrating their thoughts upon one another, partly in mutual fear, partly in mutual admiration. And the consequence was that at least one terrible event took place which could scarcely have happened had France and Britain maintained their old leadership, even in rivalry, in the affairs of Europe. This terrible event was the dismemberment of the living body of the Polish nation in the First Partition of Poland, 1772.

§ 2. The Eastern Powers and the Partition of Poland.

The diplomatic history of Europe during the thirty years between the Peace of Paris and the outbreak of the French Revolutionary War was dominated by the relations of the three great military despotisms of the East—Russia, Austria and Prussia.¹

Of these Russia had but recently begun to play the part of a European Power, and she had only half emerged from barbarism. But she had played a decisive part in recent events; in particular her friendship had saved Prussia from destruction at the end of the Seven Years' War. Russia had just passed under the sway of an extraordinarily able and unscrupulous German woman, Catherine II., who had in 1762 deposed her husband, the Tsar Peter III., and had been a consenting party to his murder. This amazing woman was to be the second founder of the greatness of Russia; during her long reign, which extended from 1762 to 1796, Russia's territories were greatly extended, and she became one of the dominating factors in the politics of Europe.

Austria, who had long had the controlling voice in Eastern European politics, and had hitherto shown to Russia a sort of condescending patronage, was perturbed

by the vigour and independence of Catherine's policy, especially when Catherine began to win victories over the Turks; for Austria was ambitious of extending her territory at the expense of the decaying Turkish Empire. But she was also very jealous of Prussia, the upstart Power which had wrested from her the rich province of Silesia, and which now threatened her traditional leadership among the petty States of Germany.

Prussia, on her part, being much the weakest of these three Powers, and having been bled white by the desperate struggle of the Seven Years' War, watched with anxiety the ambitions of her powerful neighbours. Frederick the Great feared lest Austria should take advantage of his weakness to wreak vengeance for the loss of Silesia; and as a safeguard against this danger he clung to his alliance with Russia, which had been formally concluded in 1764. For more than a century to come the maintenance of an alliance with Russia was one of the keynotes of Prussian policy. But Frederick did not wish to be drawn by this alliance into a war against Austria, which might easily result from Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans. He therefore devoted his ingenious and unscrupulous intelligence to guiding the policy of his great neighbours into channels which might be turned to the profit of Prussia; and the partition of Poland was the result.

The huge kingdom of Poland lay almost enclosed by the territories of these three formidable and sinister Powers. It was reduced to impotence by its absurd and unworkable system of government, and by the dissensions of its nobles. Ever since 1735 Poland had been falling more and more under the influence of Russia; and it was the deliberate policy of Catherine to keep Poland weak and helpless. When the Poles, realising at last that the futility of their system was ruining their country, tried to initiate reforms, Catherine, with Frederick's support, intervened to forbid the proposed changes, posing as the protector of the 'ancient liberties of Poland' because these 'liberties' left the country at her mercy. Some of the Polish nobles formed a confederation to resist the Russian domination, and at first won some success; Catherine, whose armies were ill organised, had to get help from Frederick of Prussia.

In the hope of preventing the complete domination of Poland by Russia, which would be threatening to themselves, the Turks (largely at the instigation of France) declared war upon Russia in 1768. But this only gave to
Catherine the opportunity of fresh and easier conquests. She drove the Turks from the northern shore of the Black Sea. Her armies overran Moldavia and Wallachia, and threatened to cross the Danube and march on Constantinople (1769). A Greek rebellion against Turkey was talked of; and it seemed as if the last days of the Turkish Empire were at hand. But Austria was not willing to allow Russia to conquer European Turkey; and in 1771 she announced that if the Russians crossed the Danube she would declare war. Frederick of Prussia had no wish to be drawn into a war about Turkish questions when his State was only beginning to recover from the strain of the last great conflict; so he set himself to persuade the two rivals to indemnify themselves at the expense of Poland. His cunning and persistent diplomacy was successful; and in 1772 the three robber-States took each a great slice of the Polish kingdom, and compelled the Polish Diet to ratify their plunder. In all they took from the unhappy kingdom one-third of its territory and more than one-third of its population. Russia's share was the largest in extent, and Austria's in wealth; but Prussia acquired the province of West Prussia, which linked up her detached duchy of East Prussia with the main block of her dominions; and she retained this Polish region until she was compelled to disgorge it by the Treaty of Versailles in 1719.

Two years later, in 1774, Catherine ended her Turkish war by the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, which forms a landmark in the history of the Eastern Question. In accordance with the bargain made at the time of the partition she abandoned the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia. But she got control of the north coast of the Black Sea; her fleets henceforward threatened Constantinople; and she also acquired a claim, vague and undefined, but capable of being turned to advantage, to interfere in the Balkans as the protector of the Christian subjects of the Turk.

The rivalry of Russia and Austria for the inheritance of the Turkish Empire, which for the first time took shape in these years, was to be the chief cause of the difficulty of the Eastern Question, and one of the principal sources of disturbance and alarm in Europe, for a century and a half to come; and the British Commonwealth, though at first it seemed to be quite unconcerned, was in the future to be deeply involved in this inextricable tangle.
§ 3. The Benevolent Despots.

The development of the Eastern Question and the iniquitous partition of Poland were the only events of first-rate importance in the political history of Europe during these years. In one sense the partition was characteristic of the period, since it showed that the ruling personages of this despotic age paid no regard to the desires and sentiments of the peoples whom they ruled, and had no sense of the strength and value of the national spirit. But it would be a mistake to conclude from this that the politics of the period were unenlightened, or uninfluenced by ideals. Very much the reverse. There had never been a period in modern history when the problems of government and the duties of Governments to their subjects were more earnestly or more seriously discussed. It was the age of the philosophers, whose criticism of existing institutions was preparing the way for the French Revolution. But most of these thinkers, whilst they maintained that government existed for the advantage of the governed, were very far from holding that it ought to be conducted in accordance with the ideas of the governed, or under their control. They mostly believed that wise reforms were rather to be expected from the wisdom of a monarch or his advisers than from the ignorance of the mob. And this belief seemed to be justified by what was going on in Europe.

For while in the countries where some semblance of popular government existed, as in Britain, very little active work of reform was carried on, the despots of the continent were competing with one another in their zeal for constructive reform, and were eagerly endeavouring to follow the precepts of the philosophers. This was not only the age of the philosophers, it was the age of the benevolent despots or philosopher-kings. In almost every European State, great or small, despotic princes or trusted ministers were labouring with untiring assiduity to give effect to the principles of the philosophers. The most outstanding of these hard-working and zealous rulers were Joseph II. of Austria, Catherine II. of Russia, and Frederick the Great of Prussia; but some of the minor princes, such as the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Margrave of Baden, showed an even greater courage and intelligence. Everywhere the same features recur. There were legal and judicial reforms—the codification of laws, and the abolition of torture and of barbarous punishments. There were attacks upon the
surviving abuses of feudalism, and in some cases bold attempts to emancipate the labouring class from serfdom. There were great public works carried out by the State, the making of roads and canals, the construction of harbours, the draining of marshes. There were systematic attempts to improve and develop agriculture, and to foster industry and foreign commerce. Everywhere there was generous patronage for learning: new universities were founded; academies of scholars were established; in some cases State systems of education were initiated. Restrictions on the publication of books were greatly diminished, and criticism and discussion by scholars (though not by ordinary men) were encouraged. In almost every case complete freedom of worship was allowed to all religious bodies, even in those States which had hitherto been most rigidly orthodox. One of the most striking events of the period was the expulsion of the powerful Jesuit order from nearly every European State; and this was a sign of the rationalist spirit which pre-eminently marked the age.

Never, in truth, have the European peoples witnessed a more strenuous outburst of reforming zeal than during the generation which preceded the French Revolution. The reforms were in every case due to the enlightenment of absolute rulers; they went in many cases far beyond the wishes of the peoples concerned; and they seemed to justify the view that benevolent despotism was the most progressive form of government. In truth the benevolent despot might well feel that his subjects did not know what was good for them, and that in their own interests it was right that their irrational sentiments and prejudices should be overridden. To the enlightened despot, the sentiment of nationality inevitably appeared irrational. Even in the case of Poland it could be plausibly argued that the attachment of the Poles to their separate national existence was mere sentimentalism; and that the peoples of the annexed regions obtained from their vigorous and progressive new masters practical and material boons which the absurd system of free Poland could never have yielded. Probably they did.

The theory that despotism could provide the most enlightened and progressive form of government thus obtained, during these years, a very fair trial. And, on the surface, it must be recognised that the strenuous and intelligent labours of the despots stand in favourable contrast with the factious intrigues of British politicians, and
with their squabbles over Middlesex elections and duties on tea. In the comparison which was challenged during this generation between absolute monarchy and parliamentary government all the advantage seemed to lie on the side of the former; political liberty appeared to lead only to ineffectiveness and confusion. Yet the labours of the despots led to little or no permanent result; their work was all swept away either by the Revolution or by the reaction which followed it. On the other hand the apparently futile arguments of British politics, and the acrimonious disputes between the mother-country and her daughter-States, were part of the great process of educating whole peoples to think about the problems of their common welfare, and to co-operate in realising it.

'I am only the first servant of my people,' Frederick the Great once claimed; but this claim did not truly represent the facts. Frederick was the architect of a rising State, the builder of its future greatness; his people were only the bricks of which it was built, not encouraged, not even permitted, to have any opinions as to the plan on which it should be built, or to co-operate actively in the building. The State was everything, in the eyes of these despot-princes, the people only the means to the State's greatness. This was the accepted view as to the meaning and aims of the State in most of the countries of Europe during the generation which preceded the French Revolution; the conception against which that vast upheaval was a protest. But it was fundamentally opposed to the conception which was implicit in the system of self-government characteristic of every part of the British Commonwealth.

To every British citizen it was axiomatic that the prime duty of the State was to protect the liberties which his ancestors had acquired for him, and to ensure him freedom to think and say and do what he liked, so long as he did not injure his neighbours. He regarded the laws not as the edicts of his masters, alterable at their will, but as the protection of his own security, binding upon his rulers, and alterable only by an assembly which (whatever its defects) did genuinely represent the national mind. It was these beliefs, and the perhaps unreasonable fear that George III. was ready to disregard them, which led to the political controversies in Britain during the first ten years of the reign. It was these beliefs, and the perhaps unreasonable fear that the British Parliament intended to override them, which led the American colonists first into
opposition and then into rebellion. Vaguely and imperfectly, but still really, the British peoples had adopted the view of the State as a partnership of free men; and this gives to their sometimes factious and often futile arguments a dignity and a permanent interest which are lacking in the zealous reforming labours of the despots. Two rival conceptions of the meaning and aims of the State thus stood forth in clear contrast; and it was the British communities which stood for the conception that has ultimately been adopted by the mind of humanity.

CHAPTER III
MISGOVERNMENT IN INDIA
(A.D. 1760-1772)

The eclipse of British influence on the continent of Europe was not the only, or the worst, consequence of the chaos which reigned in British politics during the first ten years of George III. While the conflict between the King and the Whigs was reducing Britain to 'a sort of island-Poland,' not only foreign affairs but imperial affairs were neglected or mishandled. This was the more dangerous because, both in the East and in the West, problems of the most crucial importance, which directly arose from the victories of the late war, were presenting themselves for solution. It was in these years of faction-fighting that the American question drifted into an acute stage, without ever receiving the serious attention it deserved. In these years, also, with still less attention from the politicians, the amazing dominion which Clive's victories had won in India was disappointing every hope, and rapidly drifting towards ruin. From about 1770 onwards the American question and the Indian question, refusing to be denied, became the dominating issues in British politics. We have next to trace the stages by which these questions reached the degree of acuteness which startled the British public out of its indifference; and it will be convenient to deal first with the problem of India, the more bewildering and unfamiliar of the two.

§ I. Anarchy and Oppression in Bengal, 1760-1765.

When Clive left India in 1760 1 the East India Company had been firmly established as the controlling power in Bengal; but it had not begun to think of assuming the government of the country. It, and its agents in the East, enjoyed power without responsibility; for the responsibility of government remained with the Nawab, who was in theory merely a viceroy for the Great Mogul at Delhi; and the traditional Indian methods of administration still went on. The Nawab was wholly dependent for the security of

1 Vol. i. p. 778.
his throne upon the Company and its troops; he was powerless without the Company, and powerless against it; he dared not deny its servants anything they asked. And just for that reason his authority over his subjects was gravely undermined, and his government lost all vigour and efficiency. It took twelve years to convince the Company at home that this state of things was unhealthy, and bad even for trade. During these twelve years political controversy was so acute at home that nobody paid much attention to Indian affairs. In these circumstances the servants of the Company in Bengal were left uncontrolled, and, having no sense of responsibility for the well-being of the country (for that was the Nawab's business), most of them shamefully abused their influence to make huge fortunes for themselves. They insisted that no dues should be exacted, not merely on the Company's export cargoes—the Company had enjoyed this right for fifty years—but on their own private and local trade: they overrode and disregarded the authorities of the country; and, acting through a horde of Indian agents, they entered into a grossly unfair competition with native traders.

Clive's firm hand had kept these abuses more or less in check; but after his departure in 1760 they burst out in full vigour. Even before the arrival of his successor, Vansittart, the Bengal servants resolved to displace the shiftless and untrustworthy old Nawab, Mir Jafar, whom Clive had set up after Plassey. The ease with which this change was made showed how complete was the mastery of these irresponsible tyrants of Bengal. In Mir Jafar's place his son-in-law, Mir Kasim, was made Nawab; but not until he had emptied his treasury in gifts to the leading members of Council. He was also forced to transfer to the Company's administration three of the richest districts in Bengal, in order that their revenues might be used to defray the cost of the Company's army. This arrangement was not in itself unfair, because the cost of maintaining an army strong enough to defend Bengal was ruinously heavy, and was bringing the Company towards bankruptcy. These districts were the first large areas to be brought directly under British administration; and it is worth noting that during the next ten years they were the best governed districts in Bengal. When direct responsibility was thrown upon them, the servants of the Company were not in-
capable of rising to it. The greatest evil of the position as a whole was just that they were not responsible for the government of Bengal, though they were all-powerful.

Mir Kasim turned out to be a much abler and more vigorous prince than his predecessor. He greatly reduced the waste and extravagance of the court; he improved the administration, and in so doing increased the revenue; and he reorganised his army on more efficient lines. Governor Vansittart, an honest but rather weak man, supported and encouraged him in these measures of reform; so did young Warren Hastings, who was at first Resident at the Nawab’s capital and later a member of the Company’s Council. But Vansittart and Hastings were alone among the leading servants of the Company in giving support to the reforming Nawab. The rest (who counted ten votes out of twelve at the Council) were alarmed by Mir Kasim’s activity; they feared his military measures; they wanted to keep the native government weak and dependent; and they especially resented the Nawab’s attempts to check their illegitimate trading activities. These had now reached such a height that Indian traders in Bengal were almost driven out of the market by the unfair competition of the English servants and their Indian agents, who refused to pay any dues. Mir Kasim made bitter complaints. Vansittart and Hastings tried to make a reasonable arrangement with him; but the majority in Council would not agree. Finally Mir Kasim decided to abolish all dues, in order to give his subjects a chance. Thereupon the majority, despite the protests of Vansittart and Hastings, simply ordered him to re-establish the dues for all traders save themselves. Mir Kasim could stand no more, and broke into revolt (1763), unhappily staining his reputation, at the end, by the brutal murder of a number of Englishmen who fell into his hands. His new army was twice defeated; but it fought with a gallantry and skill to which the British troops were unaccustomed. Defeated and hopeless, Mir Kasim fled across the borders into the neighbouring State of Oudh; the triumphant king-makers haled out old Mir Jafar, and restored him to the throne; and Vansittart and Hastings returned to England in disgust.

The Nawab of Oudh saw in the confusion of Bengal an opportunity of extending his power, and invaded the province with a large army. With him came the Mogul Emperor, who was now an exile from Delhi, and had taken refuge with his nominal vassal. In theory the Mogul had
the right to appoint whom he would to the throne of Bengal; and his presence, and that of Mir Kasim, with the army of Oudh made the invasion doubly formidable. But a small British army under Major Munro met and utterly defeated the invaders at the battle of Buxar (1764); and both the Nawab of Oudh and his nominal master the Mogul were at the mercy of the Company.

These episodes showed that the power of the Company in Bengal, as hitherto exercised, was a mere curse. The Company was an Old Man of the Sea; and, like Sinbad's Old Man of the Sea, it could not be shaken off. The battle of Buxar, more clearly even than the battle of Plassey, marked the definite establishment of British supremacy in Bengal. What is more, it placed Oudh also at the disposal of the Company; and the irresponsible group of servants who represented it were quite prepared to partition that country and to take the Mogul himself under their protection.

§ 2. Clive's Reform Scheme of 1765 and its Failure.

Meanwhile the Company at home, indignant at the misbehaviour of its servants, had determined, as soon as the news of Mir Kasim's revolt reached England, that drastic changes must be made; and to carry them out Clive, now Lord Clive, was appointed to the Governorship. He arrived in Bengal in 1765 to find that in the meanwhile Buxar had been fought, and that he had therefore to settle not only the affairs of Bengal, but also those of the Mogul and of Oudh. The field was clear for a large policy of reconstruction, and for a new definition of the relations between the Company and the Indian Powers; moreover the fact that the Mogul himself was now in British hands made it possible to give an air of legitimacy to the new arrangements.

The arrangements made by Clive in 1765 have always been regarded as marking a turning-point in the history of the British power in India; but they did so in form rather than in fact. In the first place, Clive took the penniless and wandering Mogul Emperor under the protection of the Company, promised him an annual tribute of £260,000 from Bengal, and provided him with a territory of his own by cutting off Allahabad and other lands from Oudh; at Allahabad the Mogul would be within easy reach of Bengal. In the second place he made an alliance with the Nawab of

1 See the map, Atlas School Edition Plate 53 (a), 6th Edition Plate 65 (a).
Oudh, to whom he restored the rest of his lands; Oudh remained a dependent ally of the Company for nearly a hundred years, until the separate existence of the State was suppressed in 1856. In the third place he legitimised the position of the Company in Bengal by obtaining from the Mogul a grant to the Company of the diwani, or right of collecting the revenues in that province. Under the Mogul system of government, in its best days, each great province had had two heads, the Nawab being responsible for military and police affairs, while the Diwan was responsible for the collection of revenue. This system had broken down during the years of confusion. In theory it was now restored, and a system of 'dual government,' divided between the Nawab and the Company, was established: the Company, as Diwan, undertaking to pay, out of the revenues it collected, a fixed annual sum to the Nawab for the expenses of government, in addition to the tribute to the Mogul. Finally Clive tried to restrict the abuses of private trading, and sought a compensation for the Company's servants by establishing a monopoly of salt, the profits of which were to be divided among them; but the Company refused to accept the arrangement. He had grave trouble both with the civil servants and with the military officers in the Company's employ. Even his immense prestige and courage could not wholly keep them in check.

Clive's scheme of dual government lasted for only seven years. But it was a failure from the first. The spheres of the Nawab and the Company were not clearly enough marked out, and perhaps could not have been exactly defined. The Nawab did not, in practice, exercise the military power which theoretically belonged to him, because real military power necessarily remained with the Company; and, for this reason, it was almost impossible for him to maintain order. Mir Jafar had died, and as his successor was a minor, the powers of the Nawab were in fact exercised by a deputy, Mohammed Reza Khan, who was nominated by the Company. Moreover the Company did not itself attempt to exercise the functions of the diwani, because it did not wish its servants to be diverted from commercial business. It was content to transfer all these functions to Mohammed Reza Khan, with the title of Naib (or deputy) Diwan. This Indian noble was therefore at once deputy for the Nawab and deputy for the Company; and the nominal duality of the system was thus made unreal from
the outset; Bengal was governed by Mohammed Reza Khan, subject to the dictation of the Company.

Under these circumstances the new arrangements were not a whit better than the old. Indeed, they were worse. For the Nawab, now a mere puppet, lost all authority in the eyes of his subjects; Mohammed Reza Khan knew that his position was insecure, and that he depended upon the favour of the Company's servants, and therefore dared not act with vigour; whilst the Company's servants had as little sense of responsibility as before for the good government of Bengal. The only differences were, first that £260,000 a year had to be sent to the Mogul, which had not been sent before; and secondly that the Company, having acquired control of the revenues of Bengal, expected to make large profits from this source, though these revenues were all needed, and ought to have been used, for the provision of good government in Bengal. So great were the expectations of profit from this source that the shareholders of the Company at home insisted upon having their dividends increased; whilst the home Government also insisted upon having a share. In 1767 Charles Townshend, Chancellor of the Exchequer in Lord Chatham's Government, obtained an Act of Parliament requiring the Company to pay £400,000 per annum to the British Government. This was the first interference of Parliament in the affairs of the East India Company. It showed that Parliament had as yet no idea of the magnitude and difficulty of the problem presented by the situation in Bengal, and that it had reached no loftier ideal than that of sharing in the plunder of a conquered province.

The seven years from 1765 to 1772 form, indeed, the darkest period in the history of the British power in India, and Clive's attempt to invent a device for regularising the Company's ascendency without thrusting administrative duties upon its servants only made bad worse. Clive's successor, Verelst, though an honest and well-meaning man, could not keep his subordinates under control. The evils of private trade were as bad as ever. Mohammed Reza Khan, as Deputy Nawab, was unable to maintain order, and the system of local administration and justice, never efficient, fell into chaos. Nor was he much more successful in revenue administration, in his capacity as Deputy Diwan for the Company; the Company found that the revenue from which it had expected so much was steadily shrinking, while the country was becoming more and more impoverished.
In 1769, in a desperate attempt to improve matters, the Company appointed English supervisors to each of the thirty-six districts, to see that the collections of revenue were properly made. This is important as the first direct interference of English officers in local administration. But the supervisors (who were mostly junior and inexperienced men) had no direct responsibility, and they were tempted to abuse their authority for their own advantage.

§ 3. The Threatened Collapse of the Company’s Power.

In 1770 there came a culmination to all this misery in the most appalling famine that had ever visited the country. At least one-third of the population died of starvation. It was nobody’s business to organise relief: that was not in the Indian tradition of government. But the callousness with which, in the midst of this hideous suffering, the land revenue was still exacted from the starving peasantry, and the horrible rumour that Englishmen were using the opportunity to make huge profits by hoarding corn, aroused anger and indignation at home, and made it clear both to the Company and to the British Government that drastic and sweeping reforms were necessary.

Meanwhile alarming events had been happening in Southern India. The Governor and Council of Madras, who were in no way under the control of the Governor of Calcutta, had got themselves into an inextricable tangle with the Indian Powers of the South.¹ They had allowed themselves to be drawn by the Nizam of Hyderabad into a wholly unnecessary war with Hyder Ali, a formidable Mussulman adventurer who had recently established himself on the throne of Mysore, whence he commanded all the passes leading to the low-lying and defenceless coast land of the Carnatic. In 1769 Hyder Ali burst down into the low country, slaying and devastating. Expecting an easy victory, Madras had made no preparations and possessed no adequate forces. It had to draw upon Bengal; and the supply of troops and money for this dreary and disastrous war completed the disorganisation of the Company’s finances.

In addition to these difficulties the great confederacy of the Mahrattas, whose territories spread from West to East across India, was again becoming dangerous. Their power had been temporarily broken by their defeat at the hands of the Afghans in 1761,² and this had perhaps alone ren-

² Vol. 1, p. 766.
dered possible the establishment of British power in Bengal. But they were once more becoming active and aggressive. They had made themselves masters of Delhi, and in 1771 they invited the exiled Mogul, who had remained at Allahabad under the protection of the Company since 1765, to return to the capital of his ancestors. The Mogul had accepted the invitation, only to find himself a prisoner, and a puppet in the hands of the Mahrattas. Possession of the person of the Mogul had become, as it were, the symbol of sovereignty in India: he could give to his gaolers firman and edicts which would cover their usurpations with a semblance of legitimacy. In the name of the Mogul the Mahrattas were soon (1772) to demand that the tribute from Bengal should be paid to them, and that Allahabad and the rich adjoining lands should be placed in their hands. From Delhi they were also (1771) threatening Rohilkhand, a country immediately to the north-west of Oudh, which had been conquered by the Rohillas, a tribe of Afghan raiders, during the confusion of the last half-century. The Rohillas appealed to the Nawab of Oudh for aid, promising large sums in return; and the threat of an advance by the Nawab's army, supported by a British brigade under the terms of Clive's alliance with Oudh, caused the Mahrattas to withdraw for the moment. But it was only for the moment. And if they overran Rohilkhand, and at the same time got possession of Allahabad, Oudh would lie absolutely at their mercy. Unless the Company were prepared to defend it—and how could this be possible in the then state of its affairs?—Oudh would become a vassal to the Mahrattas instead of to the Company; and the most formidable and aggressive of all the Indian Powers would be brought into immediate neighbourhood with Bengal. This Mahratta danger, which was scarcely at all understood in England, formed the most serious threat to the Company's position. Taken in conjunction with the peril from Hyder Ali in the South, it seemed to promise that their recently established territorial power would be overthrown as swiftly as it had been created.

But it was not these political dangers which most weighed upon the Company, but rather the ugly misgovernment of Bengal, and the threatened collapse of its finances, within seven years of the glowing prospects raised by Clive in 1765. In 1772 bankruptcy was in sight. Far from being able to pay to Government the £400,000 which had been exacted in

1 See the map, Atlas, School Edition Plate 53 (a), 6th Edition Plate 65 (a).
2 Ibid.
1767, the Company had to borrow £1,000,000 from Government in order to maintain solvency. Its shares fell in a most alarming way. And, what was more serious, everybody in England had by this time realised that the growth of British power, as the Company had wielded it, had not only brought disaster to the Company itself, but had brought nothing but misery and oppression to the regions over which its influence extended. Thus in twelve years the glowing hopes which had been raised by Clive’s victories had disappeared in gloom and shame. Power without responsibility had been proved to be ruinous to the rulers as well as to the ruled; and it had become plain that the British people must face seriously the new and strange responsibility which events had thrust upon them in the East.

In these desperate circumstances the Company came at last to the decision that it must assume direct responsibility for the administration of Bengal, at any rate in regard to the functions of the diwani, or collection of revenue. To carry out this change it appointed to the Governorship the one man who had come out of the earlier troubles of Bengal with clean hands; the one man who had shown sympathy with the needs of the Indian peoples, and had resisted the oppression of his colleagues. This man was Warren Hastings. He had come home with Vansittart in 1764, a comparatively poor man. For five years, though he had lost such money as he had saved, the Company had refused to give him employment; but since 1769 he had been at work in Madras, reorganising with remarkable success the Company’s trading system. He had thus had no share in the misrule of the period of dual government. In January 1772 Warren Hastings arrived in Bengal to undertake his herculean task—a task even more difficult than the Company supposed. With his arrival began a new era in the history of the British power in India: an era in which that power was to be turned from a curse into a blessing.

[Muir, Making of British India; Roberts, Hist. Geography of India; V. A. Smith, Oxford History of India; Lyall, Rise and Expansion of the British Power in India; Forrest, Life of Clive; Gleig, Life of Hastings; Vansittart, Narrative of Events in Bengal; Monckton Jones, Hastings in Bengal; Thompson and Garratt, Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India; Cambridge History of India.]
CHAPTER IV
THE CONTROVERSY WITH THE AMERICAN COLONIES
(A.D. 1763-1775)

§ 1. The Factors of the Problem.

The difficulty and complexity of the problem of government in India dawned but slowly upon the minds of British statesmen, and reached an acute stage with unexpected suddenness. The yet more difficult problem of colonial government in America developed more gradually; but even to the end its full significance was never realised. For the question was one which had never emerged in human history before. It was the question whether a family of free communities could find a mode of attaining a real unity without impairing the freedom of any member. Britain and the American colonies formed the only linked group of free communities that had ever existed in the world on such a scale; and the necessity of recasting their relationships emerged so suddenly that the character of the problem was not clearly realised on either side of the Atlantic. There was prolonged controversy, which grew more acrimonious, and led in the end to a tragic disruption of the fellowship of freedom.

What made the tragedy more remarkable was that it followed so closely upon the intoxicating triumphs of the Seven Years' War. Indeed, it was in several ways directly due to these triumphs. Until 1763 the danger from France had held the members of the Commonwealth together; and more than one observer had predicted that if ever this danger were removed, the colonies would strive for independence. Again, the immense new area, stretching from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi, which had been transferred to Britain by the Peace of Paris,¹ presented problems of real difficulty. This area lay outside the limits of the existing colonies. It was inhabited by Indian tribes, who had to be at once protected and held in check. This function, which naturally fell to the imperial Government, necessitated a greater degree of interference in American

¹ See the map, Atlas, School Edition Plate 50, 6th Edition Plate 63.
affairs than had hitherto been usual, and involved a considerable new expense which the mother-country was unwilling to bear. Finally, the French danger had kept in the background the defects and difficulties of the imperial system under which the Commonwealth had been directed since 1660. Not that these defects were not earlier apparent. They had been very clearly exhibited during the first half of the century. But the Whigs, who might have reorganised the system, had been content to shut their eyes and let things drift—an attitude for which their successors took credit as if it had been a device of profound political wisdom. When the war came to an end in 1763 the bad working of the system was so obvious that whoever had been in power would have been bound to deal with it, and could not have dealt with it without arousing friction and controversy. It was to George Grenville, an honest, unimaginative, hard-working and rather pedantic man, that this difficult task of reconstruction in the first instance fell.

There were difficulties of three kinds: difficulties arising from the system of government, difficulties arising from the regulation of imperial trade, and difficulties arising from the problem of colonial defence and from the organisation of the new territories with their Indian tribes. In regard to all these questions both the colonies and the mother-country had their grievances.

The system of government generally characteristic of the colonies was that while the executive was in the hands of a Governor appointed by the Crown and a nominated Executive Council, a representative assembly elected by the colonists had control over legislation and taxation; and this was held to be as nearly as possible a reproduction of the system prevailing at home. Now, although no Governor dared defy his assembly, this system did in fact deny to the colonists complete responsibility for the management of their own affairs; and as it is the natural tendency of liberty to strive for its own fulfilment, it was inevitable that the colonists should desire to gain control over their executive government. A body which is denied responsibility is apt to become irresponsible; and the form which the struggle of the colonial legislatures for an increase of their power had assumed, in several colonies, had been a refusal of fixed regular salaries to the Governor and to the judges as a means of bringing them under control. This was felt by the home Government to impair the dignity and freedom of
action of these officers: in the case of the judges it dangerously threatened judicial independence, especially as the judges often had to decide upon smuggling cases on which popular opinion was hostile to the laws. Thus there was some soreness on both sides. But the main point was that just because the colonies were, by the gift of the mother-country, almost the freest societies in the world, they were bound to strive for the completion of their own political liberties. The question of official salaries did not overtly play any prominent part in the controversy, but the demand for greater independence and responsibility which was implied by it underlay the whole dispute.

Closely connected with this question was the further question whether the British Parliament had the right to legislate for or to tax the colonies over the heads of their assemblies. In formal constitutional law there could be little doubt that such a right existed; if it did not exist, there was no common legislative authority for the whole empire. But except in regard to the regulation of foreign trade (where it was never seriously questioned) the issue had never been definitely raised on either side. If and when such a power was seriously asserted it was certain that the colonists would be up in arms. But it is essential to remember that apart from the British Government and Parliament there was no common authority for the thirteen colonies. They were so much attached to their local independence that they had refused to have anything to do with the scheme of federation which had been drawn up by their own representatives in 1754. Yet they had many interests in common; and the only way in which these common interests could be attended to was that the home Government should co-ordinate the action of the colonies through its control over their Governors. Thus the possibility of common action, which was necessary for many purposes and notably for the management of the new territories, depended upon the exercise of the authority of the Crown, of which the colonists were very jealous. Evidently the problem of colonial government was no easy one.

The problem of trade relationships was not less difficult. Ever since 1660 the unity of the British Empire had mainly depended upon the ties of trade, and upon the maintenance of a uniform system of trading regulations. The main principles of the system were: (1) that inter-imperial trade should be carried only in British or colonial ships; (2) that

some of the most important products of the colonies should be exported only to Britain, which thus became, for these goods, the market for the rest of the world; (3) that goods from other countries should only be imported to the colonies through Britain, where dues were levied upon them; and (4) that colonial produce should have a monopoly or a strong preference in British markets.

It has often been said that this system was conceived wholly in the interests of the mother-country. But that is not a just view. The aim of the system was to promote the prosperity of all the members of the Commonwealth by encouraging them to play their parts in a carefully planned economic system. It is certain that the colonies had derived great advantages from the system in some ways, though they may have suffered in others. The limitation of imperial trade to British and colonial ships had fostered the growth of a very active shipping trade in New England. The dues levied on foreign goods destined for the colonies were generally refunded, except in the case of goods which directly competed with British goods. The facts that colonial tobacco, coffee, sugar and rice had a monopoly of the British market, and that other colonial products enjoyed very substantial preferences, and in many cases received bounties from the British treasury, formed a solid compensation for the limitation of the export of certain articles to Britain. Though exact computation is impossible, the advantages and disadvantages of the system were about equally felt on both sides.

On the other hand the trade regulations were imposed by the authority of the British Parliament, the only common legislative authority for the whole Commonwealth; and while no serious protest had yet been made against the exercise of this authority, it manifestly formed a restriction of the self-government of the colonies. The British Parliament was naturally more awake to the economic needs of Britain than to those of the colonies. Its powers might be used for purposes of exploitation; and in some of the legislation of the Whig period—notably the attempt to prohibit certain colonial manufactures—this spirit had been ominously present. These prohibitions were not, and could not be, effectively enforced; but the mere fact that they had been thought of made it possible to assert that the trade system was devised in the interests of the mother-country. Taken as a whole, however, the system

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worked reasonably well, and was accepted without resentment by the colonists; though of course there was a considerable amount of illicit trade.

But there was one great exception to this acceptance. A very active trade had sprung up between the New England colonies and the French West Indian Islands, to which corn, cattle, and other produce were exported in exchange for molasses and sugar. This trade, which was entirely legal until 1733, provided an outlet for some of the principal products of the northern colonies. In the interests of the British West Indian Islands, Walpole had endeavoured to put an end to it by the Molasses Act of 1733, which imposed prohibitive duties on foreign sugar imported into any of the British lands—a prohibition which of course applied to Britain equally with the colonies. From the first the New Englanders had defied this law, and had carried on so vigorous a smuggling trade with the French West Indies that the Act had been almost a dead letter. To maintain laws that cannot be enforced is always unwise, because it encourages the habit of disrespect for law: yet Walpole and his successors had kept the Molasses Act in existence without seriously endeavouring to enforce it. The Act itself was felt as a grievance by the colonists; their open defiance of it was felt as a grievance by the home Government. And grievance became indignation when, during the war with France, the colonists insisted upon keeping up this traffic. Pitt's generals complained bitterly that while they could not buy adequate supplies for their troops, the stores they needed were being openly exported to the enemy, who would have collapsed without them. Pitt himself had been compelled to take strong measures against this illicit trade; and the anger which it had excited in England still survived when, at the close of the war, Grenville took up the colonial question, of which the enforcement of the trade regulations formed a very important aspect.

But it was the problem of colonial defence that seemed most urgent in 1763. The war just ended had left Britain burdened with a debt so colossal in the eyes of that generation that many financiers, and among them George Grenville, believed that there was an imminent danger of national bankruptcy. This debt had been mainly incurred in defending the colonies from a very grave peril; and in the struggle against this peril the colonists themselves had, in the judgment of most Englishmen, been extraordinarily backward. They had refused to take common action.
Most of the individual colonies had been strangely reluctant to provide either men or money, even when the enemy was pressing on their borders. It had only been when Pitt had undertaken to defray out of the British exchequer almost the whole burden of equipping them that anything like adequate contingents had been raised in most of the colonies, some of which were meanwhile making large profits by trading with the enemy. Moreover, the continued security of the colonies against the real danger of a renewed French attack depended wholly upon the supremacy of the British fleet, which formed a heavy burden on Britain, and towards which the colonies made no contribution whatsoever.

Finally there was still need for local defence, even though the French danger had been removed. The vast regions between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, full of warlike Indian tribes, had to be policed, and the Indians had to be protected against unfair treatment by traders and land-speculators. Much attention was given to this question by every British Government from 1763 to 1775. In 1763 a proclamation was issued forbidding the purchase of lands from Indians except under stringent conditions, and the greater part of the new territories west of the Alleghanies were marked off as an Indian reserve. A clear and consistent Indian policy was very necessary; for the Indians were in a dangerous state of excitement, having been stirred up by the war, and in 1763-4 an alarming rising broke out, which is known as the Conspiracy of Pontiac. The border districts of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia were devastated; and these States were only saved from a worse fate by the presence of British forces. This alarming episode had once more shown that, while the colonies had no means of common action, they were individually unorganised, and unwilling to organise themselves, for their own defence. For the safety of the whole group, and for the policing of the new territory, it seemed to be necessary to maintain a small permanent British force, the annual cost of which was estimated at £350,000. Even if the colonists were not to be asked to make any contribution to the burden of debt which had largely been incurred on their behalf, or to the cost of the fleet which safeguarded them from a possible French attack (and nobody proposed that they should be asked for money for these purposes), it seemed reasonable that they should be called upon to defray the cost of the small force maintained for their pro-
tection, and rendered necessary in part by their own refusal to adopt any adequate means for self-defence.

This at any rate was how the situation appeared to George Grenville and his colleagues when, on the conclusion of peace, they addressed themselves to the colonial problem. In the forefront of their minds were two questions: first, colonial defence and the organisation of the new territories; secondly, the notorious and wholesale evasion of the trade laws, more particularly of the Molasses Act. They cannot fairly be blamed for their failure to see, what none of their contemporaries either in England or in America perceived, that the old colonial system had in fact broken down, and needed to be radically reconstructed on the basis of a great enlargement of colonial autonomy, combined with some system of co-operation for common needs.


While, therefore, the Board of Trade took in hand the working out of a plan for dealing with the new territories, which involved a substantial new outlay, Grenville undertook a careful revision of the whole system of trade regulations. Embodied in over a hundred Acts of Parliament, these regulations had grown up piecemeal, and had never been systematically overhauled. Grenville revised many of the duties with a view to giving the maximum possible encouragement to colonial production; he increased the number of bounties offered from the British exchequer on the export of various colonial products; he added some new items to the list of enumerated articles which could only be exported to Britain; he practically destroyed a profitable British trade with the Danish wharfishers of Greenland, in order to stimulate the infant whale fisheries of New England. And he altered the character of the Molasses Act. In place of the prohibitive duties imposed by that Act, which would, if the Act had been observed, have destroyed the trade between New England and the French West Indies, he substituted moderate duties, which allowed the trade to be carried on legitimately, and might be expected to yield some revenue towards the cost of colonial defence. Grenville, in short, made an honest and intelligent attempt to revise and improve the old trade system, having in view the prosperity of the colonies as well as that of Britain; and unless he had been prepared to propose a complete abandonment of the system, which nobody either in Britain or America advo-
cated, it is difficult to see how he could have done better. In order to make the trade regulations effective, he followed the methods which Pitt had begun, of employing the navy to prevent smuggling; and as the juries of the ordinary courts in America usually refused to find a verdict in smuggling cases, he established a Court of Admiralty for America, where such cases could be tried.

The stricter enforcement of the trade laws, and the revised scale of dues, were expected to bring in some revenue, which would form a contribution towards the cost of colonial defence and the administration of the new territories. But the total yield (of which a large part would be paid by the West Indies) would be only sufficient to supply about one-seventh of the estimated outlay. How was the balance to be got? The colonists generally recognised that it was fair that this outlay should be met by themselves. But the colonies would not combine to tax themselves in common; and they had always failed to make fair contributions individually. The only alternative was that a tax should be imposed by the authority of the imperial Parliament, and this course had been urged by some of the colonial Governors, and by some of the agents appointed by the colonists to represent them in England. Grenville accordingly proposed that stamps should be required for certain legal documents—a form of taxation as unoppressive and as easily levied as could readily be devised. He made this proposal in 1764, but allowed a year for the colonists to put forward any alternative proposals. None were suggested. Accordingly, in 1765, the famous Stamp Act was passed, practically without opposition, through the British Parliament; neither Chatham nor the Whigs nor the colonial agents in London raising any objections. The Act provided that every penny so raised should be spent on colonial defence. Its yield was only estimated at £100,000, part of which would be paid by the West Indies, so that more than half the cost of the local defence of the colonies, as well as the whole cost of the navy and the whole burden of the debt, would still fall upon the British exchequer. It cannot be pretended that there was anything tyrannical or oppressive in these proposals, or that £100,000 would form an unreasonably heavy burden upon the thirteen thriving settlements. The very moderation of the proposals made it plain that any opposition to them would be an opposition to the principle of the Act, rather than to the burden which it imposed.
The passage of the Stamp Act produced a wholly unexpected outcry in America—an outcry which was certainly intensified, and perhaps mainly caused, by the unpopularity of the strict enforcement of the trade laws. The colonial leaders everywhere repudiated the right of the British Parliament to impose direct taxation upon them: 'no taxation without representation' became their cry, and the same doctrine was proclaimed by Chatham and others in England. Yet the trade regulations, whose validity the colonists had never denied, involved taxation; and to get out of this dilemma they and their British friends were forced to draw an untenable distinction between 'external' taxation, which was in their view legitimate, and 'internal' taxation, which was tyrannical. In truth, the colonists had, in mere logic and law, a difficult case to uphold, despite the ingenuity and learning with which they maintained it. But mere logic and law are dangerous guides. They felt, and rightly felt, that they were defending one of the essentials of self-government, for the whole constitutional history of England taught the lesson that the control of the purse is the foundation of political liberty.

While, however, the colonists were determined not to have the Stamp Act, nobody had any suggestions to make as to what alternative course Grenville ought to have pursued, or how the money could be raised for the cost of colonial defence. The lawyers devoted themselves to ingenious and wire-drawn arguments; the orators confined themselves to impassioned speeches about tyranny and slavery and chains; and their hearers, wrought up to a high pitch of excitement, broke into rioting and mob violence. The Act simply could not be enforced. What was more, the colonists began to enter into agreements to boycott British goods; and British merchants at home, seeing their trade threatened, began to clamour for the repeal of the Act.

Evidently the Act had to be repealed. Evidently the British taxpayer would have to go on bearing the whole burden of colonial defence. The weak and short-lived Whig ministry which succeeded Grenville repealed the Act (1766). The systematic plan for policing the new territories was dropped. And the clamour in America died down. But with the repeal was coupled a Declaratory Act, asserting the power of the British Parliament to impose laws or taxes on the colonies. This unqualified assertion of principle played into the hands of that section of colonial opinion, as yet small, but full of vigour, which was aiming at complete
independence, though it did not yet venture to say so. It also showed that the Whigs at all events had no conception of the necessity for a thorough-going reconsideration and recast of British colonial policy. It was not yet too late; a conference of representative colonists, discussing the problem with a group of British leaders, might have arrived at some solution. But alas! this idea occurred to no one. The problem was left to be decided by the wisdom of Westminster; and the country gentlemen of England, who had not forgotten things that had happened during the late war, and who were indignant at the violence and misrepresentation of the opposition to the Stamp Act, were beginning to lose their patience.

§ 3. The Second Project of Taxation: the Boston Tea Riot.

The Whig ministry was succeeded by Lord Chatham's ministry; and Lord Chatham was the proclaimed friend of the colonies, their idol during the late war. Surely his Government might be expected to face the issue? It set out with the intention of doing so; and Lord Shelburne worked out a new and ambitious scheme for developing the Western Territories. Unhappily Lord Chatham's was a non-party ministry; that is to say, its members had no principles in common. The most brilliant and irresponsible among them, Charles Townshend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, delighted the House of Commons by promising to find a way of taxing the colonies to which the colonists could not object. They repudiated internal taxation, but admitted the legality of external taxation. They should therefore have external taxation; and in 1767 Townshend proposed, and Parliament readily accepted, a series of new duties on tea and other goods imported into America.

The colonial protest was as vigorous as before. According to the words of the Act itself, the new duties were imposed for the purpose of raising revenue, not for the purpose of regulating trade; and it was precisely the assertion of a power to raise revenue to which they objected. In most of the colonies non-importation agreements for the boycotting of British trade were widely adhered to. Massachusetts, as always, took the lead in resistance; its Assembly sent out a letter inviting all the other colonies to combine; and being thereupon dissolved by the Governor, it continued to sit as a convention, and to organise and guide public feeling, in open defiance of the regular Government. So dangerous was the temper of Boston that in 1768 two regiments were sent
from Halifax to be quartered in the town. But the townsmen refused to find quarters for them; and a town’s meeting, on the transparent pretext of a possible French invasion, requested all citizens to equip themselves with arms. The inevitable friction which followed between the excited townspeople and the harassed troops led, not unnaturally, to an affray (1770), in which three people were killed. The episode was denounced as the Boston Massacre, and became the theme of anniversary orations on the brutal tyranny of the mother-country.

In face of these difficulties, and lest worse should come, the British Government decided that it was necessary to give way. In March, 1770, all the duties were withdrawn except that on tea; and the retention of the duty on tea was only decided by a majority of one in the cabinet. This was an obvious, if clumsy, attempt at conciliation. Had it been met by any sort of advance from the other side there might still have been a solution of the controversy. But the leaders in the colonies, at any rate in Massachusetts, were not only determined to have no compromise, they were becoming daily bolder in the assertion of principles which were essentially inconsistent with the maintenance of any part of the old ties. ‘We know of no Commissioners of His Majesty’s Customs,’ said the Massachusetts Assembly in 1771; and this was equivalent to a complete repudiation of the whole trade system. On the other hand, the great majority of members of the British Parliament were on their side rapidly losing all patience. To them it appeared that what the colonists demanded was that they should enjoy all the advantages, and bear no part of the burdens, of the imperial connexion; that they should enjoy bounties and preferences in the British market, and be left free to evade all restrictions on their own trade; that they should enjoy imperial protection, but throw all the cost on the British taxpayer. Such a state of things seemed to them intolerable; and this view was probably shared by the great majority of the British public. There can be no reasonable doubt that public opinion acquiesced in the policy of the King and his Government. On both sides a sense of injustice and resentment was embittering the great debate; and the possibility of a sober and reasonable adjustment was waning.

Nevertheless the resistance in America, and even in Massachusetts, its chief centre, showed signs of becoming weaker. The colonists were finding it hard to do without
imported British goods, and their boycott of these goods was becoming less effective. During the five years from 1769 to 1773 there was comparative quiescence, and the leaders of the resistance found it impossible to keep popular excitement at the pitch which it had reached in 1765 and in 1768: for when all was said, an addition of 3d. in the pound to the duty on tea (which formed the whole of the British oppression) was not in itself a very obvious sign of slavery, and it was hard for the ordinary man to keep himself in a passion, year after year, on such a matter. But in 1773 an event happened which quite unexpectedly fanned the flames again.

Partly in the hope of relieving the distress of the East India Company, and partly with the idea of finally breaking down the non-importation agreements, and persuading the Americans to drink even the obnoxious taxed tea, Lord North introduced an Act permitting the East India Company to export its tea direct to America. Hitherto it had been sent through England, where it had paid a duty of £5, the additional Townshend duty of 3d. being levied at the American customs-houses. Now it would pay the 3d. only; the Americans would get their tea cheaper than before Townshend's time, and cheaper than it could be got in England. In reality this marked a complete victory for the Americans. But their leaders did not so regard it. They looked upon it as an insidious trick to persuade their followers to buy the taxed article; and they feared that many would do so. Consignments of tea were sent under the new rules to four American ports. At three of them the vendors were peaceably persuaded to withdraw the tea from sale. But at Boston a town-meeting was summoned, to declare that this was 'the last, worst, and most destructive measure of Government,' and that those who landed the tea would be 'treated as wretches unworthy to live.' No one proposed to force the people of Boston to buy the tea; they were free to let it rot in the warehouses, as the people of Charleston did. But this was not enough. On December 16, 1773, a band of men, in the darkness of night, and carefully disguised as Red Indians, boarded the ships, and threw the property of the East India Company into the harbour.

The Boston tea riot was a deliberate defiance of the laws; it was a proof that the regular Government was powerless in the city. When the news reached England it produced a fierce outburst of anger. It made reconciliation almost impossible, as perhaps it was intended to do; for it is significant that in this same autumn of 1773 Samuel Adams, the
real leader of the Bostonians, had published three letters in a Boston paper openly advocating independence. In March 1774 Lord North introduced a series of penal measures. One of these closed the port of Boston, and removed the custom-house to Salem until compensation should have been paid for the tea. Another, having in view the difficulty of enforcing obedience to the laws, vested in the Crown the appointment of all judicial officers, and made it possible to bring offenders to England for trial. But the most important of these enactments was one which cancelled the charter of Massachusetts and revised its system of government. This strange folly had the most dire effects. It was the first act of the British Government which seemed to afford real and solid evidence that its aim was the destruction of American liberty. It drove the colonists to unite. It played into the hands of those, hitherto a small minority, who desired, and had been working for, independence. In Massachusetts the Assembly, being declared dissolved, refused to disperse, and sat at Concord, practically constituting itself a rebel government; while General Gage, commander of the troops in Boston, who had been appointed Governor, began to fortify the town.

Meanwhile a Congress of all the colonies except Georgia had met at Philadelphia; the union of the States, which the needs of common defence had hitherto failed to bring about, was welded by common opposition to the motherland. The Congress sent a petition to the King in which, while protesting its loyalty, it demanded the withdrawal of all the recent acts of Government, and placed upon them an interpretation which few people in England would be likely to accept. It also drew up a strongly worded Declaration of Rights. But it made no proposals for dealing with the actual problems out of which all these troubles had arisen, and gave no indication of what it would regard as a satisfactory readjustment of relations if the unity of the Commonwealth was still to be maintained. When John Galloway proposed a scheme of federal organisation which would be able to deal with common problems, raise a common revenue, and therefore dispense with the necessity for the intervention of the British Parliament, his proposal, which would almost certainly have been welcomed in Britain, was rejected by a substantial majority. The attitude of Congress was in fact entirely negative and critical, not constructive. On the other hand the British Parliament had, with its penal legislation, now taken up a position to which the colonies
could never be expected to assent. It had asserted, in
effect, that the representative institutions of the colonies
lay at its mercy. A position of deadlock had been reached.

§ 4. Attempts at Conciliation.

In Britain the immediate result was a revival of the vigour
of the opposition; and the two most powerful political
intelligences then existing in England, Chatham and
Burke, feeling the gravity of the crisis, and shocked at the
prospect of a violent disruption of the commonwealth of
freedom, threw themselves into the attempt to find, even at
the last moment, some way out of the impasse. Chatham
drafted a scheme of conciliation in consultation with Benja-
emin Franklin; but it had no chance of acceptance on either
side, now that tempers were high. Burke delivered two
noble orations in the House of Commons, the second of
which advocated a series of reconciling resolutions. These
speeches showed the profound political wisdom, the insight,
and the imagination of the greatest of English political
thinkers at their highest; and as an analysis of the condi-
tions which had produced the controversy they were unsur-
passable. Burke implored his hearers to sweep away all
formulae and theories of abstract right from their minds,
and to remember only that the common enjoyment of
political liberty was the true bond which linked together the
members of the Commonwealth, and that the colonists were
standing for what they believed to be essential to their
liberties. With profound and noble eloquence he appealed
to the spirit of freedom as the guardian spirit of the British
Commonwealth; and because his inspiration gave the first
clear and open exposition of a great ideal that had hitherto
been unconsciously followed, his speech was itself a great
event in the history of the Commonwealth, even though it
failed of its immediate purpose.

'My hold of the colonies,' he proclaimed, 'is in the close affec-
tion which grows from common names, from kindred blood, from
similar privileges and equal protection. These are ties which,
though light as air, are as strong as links of iron. Let the
colonists always keep the idea of their civil rights as associated
with your government;—they will cling and grapple to you; and
no force under heaven will be of power to tear them from their
allegiance. . . . As long as you have the wisdom to keep the
sovereign authority of this country as the sanctuary of liberty,
the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith, wherever
the chosen race and sons of England worship freedom, they will
turn their faces towards you. . . . Deny them this participation of freedom, and you break that sole bond, which originally made, and must still preserve, the unity of the Empire. . . . Do not dream that your letters of office, and your instructions, and your suspending clauses are the things that hold together the great contexture of the mysterious whole. These things do not make your government. Dead instruments, passive tools as they are, it is the spirit of the English communion that gives all their life and efficacy to them. It is the spirit of the English constitution which, infused through the mighty mass, pervades, feeds, unites, invigorates, vivifies every part of the empire, even down to the minutest member."

These are noble and prophetic words. But they provided no solution, nor did the resolutions which they advocated provide any solution, for the actual problems out of which all the trouble had arisen. Lord North also, with the King's approval, tried his hand at conciliation, proposing that any colony which should make a contribution towards the cost of defence which Parliament thought adequate should be exempted from all taxes and duties. But it was too late. Some of the Americans, and these the most active and aggressive, had already made up their minds that they wanted independence. Others had convinced themselves that the British Government harboured deep designs of oppression. In Britain the great majority of men believed that the colonists had been unfair, that they were shirking reasonable obligations, and that their high words about tyranny and slavery were an intolerable and insulting perversion of the facts. Believing so, they listened with impatience to Burke, not rejecting his ideals, but regarding him as a dreamer; they were impatient even of Lord North's efforts at conciliation. And with such a temper reigning on both sides of the Atlantic, only one end to the dispute was possible: a decision by brute force.

On April 19, 1775, the first shots were fired in a skirmish at Lexington, between the British troops in Boston, and the militiamen who had long been drilling under the orders of the Massachusetts Assembly. The dismemberment of the Commonwealth by civil war had begun.

[Channing, History of the United States; Winsor, Narrative and Critical History of America; Alvord, Mississippi Valley in British Politics; Van Toyne, American Revolution; Burke, speeches on American Taxation and on Conciliation with America; Butterfield, George III., Lord North and the People; Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution; J. C. Miller, Origins of the American Revolution; C. M. Andrews, The Colonial Background of the American Revolution; Pares, King George III. and the Politicians; Cambridge History of the British Empire.]
CHAPTER V

THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(A.D. 1775-1783)

§ 1. The Conditions of the Conflict.

The eight years' war which opened with the skirmish of Lexington forms one of the saddest episodes in the history of the British Commonwealth. It was a very cruel civil war, not only because Britons and Americans came from the same stock and cherished the same ideals, but because both Britons and Americans were painfully divided among themselves. In Britain, indeed, a majority had no doubts about the justice of the British cause; but the minority included some of the noblest living Englishmen, such as Chatham, Burke, and Charles Fox, who regarded the revolting colonists not as enemies, but as fellow-citizens upholding a cause dear to themselves. In America, on the other hand, there were thousands of loyalists in every colony, even in New England; and among these were included many who had strongly opposed the Stamp Act and the tea duty, but who shrank from the prospect of breaking up the unity of the empire.

It is impossible to estimate the number of the loyalists. John Adams, who had no motive for exaggeration, put them at one-third of the total population of the colonies; the loyalists themselves claimed to be in a majority, and they included many of the best elements in the population. What is certain is that they supplied more than 20,000 recruits to the British forces, and that when the war was ended more than 60,000 deserted their homes and the careers they had made for themselves, and started life afresh in the unpeopled wastes of Canada and elsewhere, in order that they might remain citizens of the British Commonwealth. The loyalists were most numerous in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, the Carolinas, and Georgia; while the most vigorous leadership of the inde-
pendence party came from democratic New England and from aristocratic Virginia.

The fact that the war was a civil war, marked by all the heart-breaking hesitations and divisions which civil war involves, explains many aspects of it which would otherwise be unintelligible. It explains in part the half-heartedness and vacillation with which the struggle was conducted on the British side, by generals who hated the work they had to do, and were tempted to twine the olive branch round the cutting edge of their swords. It explains the inadequate support of which Washington bitterly complained, and the constant difficulty of recruiting and provisioning the American armies. It explains the cruelty shown to loyalists and to the British forces which surrendered at Saratoga; these things were due to the fears and misgivings of the American leaders, who had made up their own minds, but knew that they were not followed by a united people. A long comradeship of nearly two centuries, recently sealed by the efforts and triumphs of a great war, could not be broken up without terrible suffering and grave doubts on both sides.

The fact that so many of the colonists were either half-hearted or favoured the British cause ought of itself almost to have ensured the success of British arms, and would have done so if this advantage had been skillfully used. Indeed, at the outset all the advantages seemed to be on the British side, and there was a general expectation that victory would be quickly and easily secured. The colonies were mutually jealous, and had not learnt to act together. Their Congress, hastily improvised, had no effective control over the country as a whole, and no efficient administrative system; its members spent their time in arguing and quarrelling, and gave no steady support to their commanders in the field. Communications between the long straggling line of colonies were extremely bad; they had in the past been mainly conducted by sea, and the British fleet held the seas. These conditions were never fully utilised by the British leaders; but they placed great difficulties in the way of their opponents.

Two things alone gave any hope of success to the colonial cause. The first was the fighting quality of the colonial troops. Though the men were undisciplined, and prone to leave the standards on the least provocation, they showed themselves to be splendid fighting men, staunch, cool, and courageous; and though they were at a disadvantage in
regular operations, they were very skilful in irregular warfare. But the second and the greatest factor of success was the personality of the great leader, George Washington, who was appointed to the chief command at the opening of the struggle, and held it to the end in face of infinite difficulty and misrepresentation. He was not a man of brilliant inspirations or dazzling adventures; perhaps he was not even a general of the first rank. But he was a Man; *vir tenax propositi*; resolute in action, patient in adversity, sound in judgment, endowed with a masculine intelligence which could grasp the real essentials of a situation and could look at even the most unpleasant facts squarely and honestly, without blinking what he did not like, utterly trustworthy, completely devoted to the cause he had adopted, undismayed when things were darkest. To him alone it was due that against all the odds, and in face of infinite difficulties, the American cause tided over the interval until the power of France was ready to come to its aid.

On the British side there was no man of this quality, or of anything like this quality. There was no Pitt or Hastings at the direction of affairs: the real control of policy was wielded by the King, and though he was brave, tenacious, and industrious, George III. had no touch of genius. There was no Wolfe or Clive to lead the armies in the field: it was only on the seas, and against the old enemies, France and Spain, that Britain produced, during this war, men worthy to rank with the heroes of the last great struggle. The plans of campaign were always ill thought out, and the rosiest chances of success were thrown away time after time. But it is fair to add that the resources available for the conflict were extremely inadequate, especially at first. The total number of troops which Britain had under arms when the war began was 38,000, and this included the garrisons of Minorca and Gibraltar, and all the reserves which it was necessary to maintain in England and Ireland. For that reason George III. had to hire troops from some of the petty German princes. He has been bitterly attacked for this. At least it is significant that what made it necessary was the smallness of the force maintained for all the needs of a great empire; for this showed that Britain was far from being a military power, and had not looked to brute force for the maintenance of her authority. None of the great Powers of Europe maintained so small an army.

1 There is a good short life of Washington by H. C. Lodge.
§ 2. The First Campaign and the Declaration of Independence.

When the war began, the available British forces in North America consisted of 3000 troops holding Boston, under General Gage, and a few hundreds in the alien and recently conquered province of French Canada, under the Governor, Sir Guy Carleton. Gage in Boston 1 was beset by some 20,000 militiamen from Massachusetts and the neighbouring colonies; and in June Washington was appointed by Congress to take command of this loosely organised and undisciplined force. Even when his numbers were brought up to 10,000 by reinforcements from England, Gage did not venture to take the offensive. The colonists, growing bold, seized the height of Bunkers Hill (June 1775) which overlooked the town; and Gage had to drive them out by a costly frontal attack, to prevent his position from being made untenable. There was no advantage in clinging to Boston unless it was to be made a base for the subjugation of Massachusetts; failing that, it would have been better to evacuate the town. Yet neither Gage nor his successor Howe made any attempt to take the aggressive. They did not even occupy the heights which surrounded and commanded the harbour and the town; and when, in March 1776, Washington occupied the commanding position of the Dorchester Heights, there was nothing to be done but to withdraw the troops by sea to Halifax. An earlier withdrawal would have been a safe and strategic move: now, withdrawal was defeat.

Meanwhile, during the winter of 1775-1776, a small colonial army made a bold attack on Canada. For a moment they occupied Montreal and laid siege to Quebec. But the French Canadians remained loyal; and when substantial reinforcements arrived under General Burgoyne in the spring of 1776, the invaders were easily disposed of. Canada was safe, and could be used for a future attack on the New England colonies. Yet the boldness of the attack on Canada had raised the spirits and the prestige of the colonists. Finally, after the evacuation of Boston, an attempt was made to win success for the British cause in the South, and to help the loyalists, who had taken the field in South Carolina. But an attack from the sea upon Charleston, the chief port of the South, was a complete failure. Thus,

1 See the map of Boston Harbour, Atlas, 6th Edition Plate 63 (b).
up to the summer of 1776, almost everything seemed to be going well for the rebels.

These successes encouraged the thorough-going party of independence, which had hitherto gone cautiously. Successful as they had hitherto been, the leaders of Congress were too shrewd not to know that they needed foreign aid, and they were already in negotiation with France. But negotiations would be much easier if they had the standing of an independent and recognised Government. On July 4, 1776, they issued a Declaration of Independence, in which they renounced their allegiance to the British Crown, and proclaimed to the world the separate existence of the United States of America as a sovereign Power.

The Declaration of Independence was one of the most momentous documents in the history of the world. It not only broke into fragments the British Commonwealth as it had hitherto existed; it not only launched upon history a very great new State of unlimited potentialities; it began a new era in human history, the era of democratic revolution. For in the forefront of the Declaration stood a pronouncement couched in the very language of the French philosophers whose writings were even now preparing the great upheaval of 1789 in the Old World. The new State began its history with a declaration that all men are born equal, and have an inalienable right to liberty. This was, indeed, only a general statement, with no practical effects. It did not make any difference to the rights or to the laws of the American people, which remained in all essentials the rights and the laws which they had derived from Britain; nor did those among the signatories of this pronouncement who were slave-owners, as many of them were, even think of applying their principles by giving to their slaves the 'inalienable right' of liberty; neither the Declaration nor any subsequent act required them to do so. But it was a new thing

1 It is a curious fact that four years earlier Lord Mansfield, as Chief Justice of the King's Bench, had decided, in the famous Somerset case, that the laws of England did not permit of the existence of slavery, though these laws did not include any such sweeping statement as appeared in the Declaration of Independence. Somerset was a negro slave who had been brought to England, and in whose behalf a writ of Habeas Corpus was obtained. A passage of Lord Mansfield's judgment is worth quoting:

'The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive law.... It is so odious that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law. Whatever inconvenience, therefore, may follow from this decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by the law of England; and therefore the black must be discharged.' Thenceforth any slave who set foot on English soil was free; not so in America, where, for nearly a century
in human history that a great State should thus choose as the motto of the first chapter in its history a proclamation of universal human rights as the ideal to be aimed at.

This preamble was followed by eighteen articles of charge against Britain and her King, to justify the renunciation of allegiance. Not one of them would to-day be accepted, without large qualifications, as a statement of historical fact; they were drawn up in the spirit of the advocate, not of the judge. But even so, it was a new and great thing in the world’s history that a group of communities should claim, as a matter of right, the power to sever ancient ties and cast off their allegiance solely on the grounds of alleged breaches of right and justice. We may feel that in the heat of a great crisis the indictment was unfairly laid, and yet also feel that it was a fine thing that it should have been laid at all; just as, in another sphere, we may believe that Warren Hastings was wrongly impeached, and yet hold that it was a fine thing that he should be impeached.

§ 3. The Campaigns of 1776 and 1777 and the Capitulation of Saratoga.

The ink was scarcely dry upon the Declaration of Independence when things began to look black for the Americans—henceforth no longer to be described as ‘colonists.’ General Howe collected his forces at Halifax, and descended upon New York (August 1776). He caught a large part of Washington’s army in Long Island, out-maneuuvred it, and was only prevented from forcing its surrender by his own slowness and the intervention of a fog. He occupied New York, and was received by its population with every sign of rejoicing. He now held the lower end of the great Hudson waterway,¹ which linked up New York with Lake Champlain and Canada, now in the control of Burgoyne’s army. Washington was compelled to fall back into New Jersey; and it seemed within the power of the British forces to isolate New England and to cut it off wholly from the main American army and the seat of Congress at Philadelphia.

The outlook was black for the Americans as winter drew on, especially when the British troops were welcomed in New Jersey as they had been in New York, and found no difficulty in obtaining ample supplies. Washington relieved to come, ‘positive law’ overrode the sweeping assertions of the Declaration, and fugitive slaves had to cross the frontier of Canada in order to find freedom under the British flag.

the situation a little by a brilliant surprise attack on a detached force of Hessians at Trenton, which enabled him to regain for the moment a good part of New Jersey. But his prospects for the coming campaign were gloomy indeed. On any calculation of military chances, the campaign of 1777 ought to have broken the backbone of the American resistance. That it did not do so was due to two things: the mistakes of the British command, and the heroic staunchness of Washington.

The main object of the campaign of 1777, as it was laid down by the War Office at home, was to secure control of the line of the Hudson, and thus completely isolate New England, the heart of the resistance. For this purpose an army of nearly 8000 men, under Burgoyne, was to advance from Lake Champlain to Albany;¹ while another army from New York was to secure the line of the Hudson. But it was essential that this co-operative campaign should be carefully planned, and carried out by adequate forces from both ends of the line. The Commander-in-Chief, General Howe, had accepted this plan. But he seems to have underestimated the forces that would be required to ensure success, and he was himself anxious to strike a vigorous blow at the main American force under Washington, and to get full control of the Middle States. There was a great deal to be said in favour of such a course: to strike hard at the main enemy force is one of the first principles of strategy, and effective control of the Middle States would in fact have isolated New England just as certainly as control of the Hudson Valley. But it would be fatal to waver between two plans.

Howe believed that he could dispose of Washington, capture Philadelphia, and secure the mastery of the Middle States, in time to give full support to the Hudson campaign. Carrying his army round by sea to the Delaware River,² and thus threatening to cut off Washington from Virginia, Howe defeated the main American army at Brandywine (October 1777) and occupied Philadelphia; Congress had already taken flight, and the advent of the British forces was welcomed by the numerous loyalists of Pennsylvania. Washington tried to redeem the situation by attacking at Germantown, just outside Philadelphia; but he was again defeated, and had to withdraw his troops into winter quarters at Valley Forge. Here his army suffered the extreme of

misery and disheartenment throughout a terrible winter. If Howe had struck it swiftly and hard, he must have destroyed it; he failed to do so, misled by the gallant front which his opponent did his best to maintain.

But it was October before Philadelphia was won; it ought to have been won in June if the programme was to be successfully carried out. And in order to win his victories, Howe had found it necessary to draw upon even the inadequate forces which he had left under the command of Clinton in New York; so that Clinton was quite unable to get control of the Hudson line, or to be ready to meet and support the northern army advancing towards Albany. Burgoyne had started from Canada in June. He had secured the forts on Lake Champlain and Lake George. But he had then to advance through a thickly wooded country, admirably suited for delaying tactics; he had great difficulties with his supplies; he had to deal with all the levies of New England, at their best in the irregular fighting of the backwoods. He lost the support of his Indian allies, partly by forbidding them to use their atrocious modes of warfare. Finally, in October, just when Howe was winning success in the South, he found himself hemmed in at Saratoga, unable either to advance or to retreat, and was compelled to surrender with his whole force.

This was the turning point of the war. In itself the capitulation of Saratoga was by no means a decisive defeat. The advantage still lay heavily on the British side, and (apart from foreign intervention) another campaign, vigorously conducted, might still have broken the back of the resistance. The real importance of Saratoga was that it decided the French Government to join in the war. The news reached France on December 2. Within a fortnight the French Government had informed the American agents in Paris that they were prepared to make an alliance; a formal treaty was completed on February 6, 1778, and on March 13 France declared war against Britain. Behind France stood Spain, joined to her by the Family Compact, and already resolved to come in at the right moment, when her preparations were complete. The two Powers, and more especially France, had long given secret help to the Americans. They had advanced money; they had supplied munitions of war; they had allowed American privateers to use their harbours as their bases in the war against British trade. They had both been preparing for revenge ever since the Peace of Paris, in particular building up their
fleets so that they should be able to cope with the British navy. Now the moment seemed to have come to assure the downfall of Britain.

There is something of high comedy in the spectacle of two absolute monarchies, two colonial Powers which had never allowed the slightest semblance of self-governing rights to their own colonies, coming forward to protect the British colonies against the tyranny of the mother-country which had granted them, as a matter of course, self-governing rights wider than any other country in the world enjoyed. But it was not the freedom of the colonies which France or Spain desired; it was the downfall and ruin of Britain. And therefore from the moment of the French declaration of war, the struggle changed its character. It became no longer a civil strife among the divided peoples of a group of free communities; it became, for Britain, a struggle of life and death against ancient enemies, now for the first time effectively combined: a struggle in which no aid was to be looked for in any quarter; a struggle, therefore, which called, and did not call in vain, for the dogged and obstinate courage which refuses to admit defeat or to be disheartened by failure.

§ 4. The Changed Conditions of the War after 1777.

In face of these new and grave perils, Lord North would fain have resigned the conduct of affairs to a national ministry, of which the great Chatham would have been the obvious head. But Chatham was resolved not to separate from the Whigs, with whom he had been acting in opposition; and the King was determined not to readmit the Whigs to power, or to sacrifice his hard-earned victory. Yet Chatham and the Whigs differed profoundly; for the Whigs had made up their minds that America was definitely lost, and were for at once recognising the independence of the colonies; while Chatham, though willing to make almost any concession, could not endure the thought of submitting to the permanent disruption of the Empire. In this he was at one with the King, and with the feeling of the nation as a whole; and it is probable that if he had not been a wreck of his former self, and had had a few more years to live, he would sooner or later have returned to his old post. In that event his resolute and inspiring vigour might have wrought as great a change as it had done in 1757, when the outlook seemed quite as black; though it is doubtful
whether even Chatham could have brought about a recon-
ciliation with America after all that had happened. But
his days were numbered. In April of this very year, 1778,
he made his last dramatic speech in the House of Lords :
a faltering appeal, spoken in physical agony, against the
policy of his Whig allies, and a protest against ' the dis-
memberment of this ancient and most glorious monarchy.'
The hand of death interrupted him. He was helped from
the House only to die a few weeks later; and in the moment
of its greatest crisis the British Commonwealth lost the one
man who might perhaps even yet have saved it.

The conduct of the war, therefore, still remained in the
King's hands and in those of his now discredited and divided
ministers. But if George III. lacked Chatham's fire and
vision and boldness of conception, he was at least a brave
man; he did not quail before disaster. And in this he
represented the spirit of the nation far better than his Whig
critics. For the nation rose superbly to meet the crisis.
As in the days of 1758 and 1759, though without Pitt's
clarion voice to inspire it, it faced the emergency undis-
mayed; it bore the burden of taxation, the ruin of its over-
sea trade, the spectacle of a growing concourse of enemies
such as would have terrified the men of an earlier generation;
one more its chief towns raised regiments at their own
expense, and volunteers began to drill.

Fortunately the struggle had to be fought mainly on the
seas. But the navy had been gravely neglected of recent
years. Of the 120 battleships which it comprised, scarcely
half were ready to put to sea at the opening of the struggle,
against the 80 of France, which were soon to be joined by
the 60 of Spain. What was yet more serious, the policy
of the Admiralty, under the direction of Lord Sandwich, was
faulty and ill-conceived. Forgetting the lessons of the
Seven Years' War, Sandwich allowed the fleets of the enemy
to leave their harbours freely, instead of blockading them,
or fighting them just outside, as Pitt had done; and this
compelled him to break up the British fleet into scattered
detachments, each fighting its own campaign, in home
waters, in the West Indies, on the American coast, and in
the Indian Ocean. Some of the best naval commanders
threw up their commissions in disgust. Yet even over these
disabilities the spirit of the navy rose triumphant. Some
of its greatest achievements belong to these dark days;
and before the war ended it had almost re-established all
its old ascendancy, against odds such as it had never had to
face before. And it was superbly supported by the mercantile marine, which now had to run the gauntlet of American, French, Spanish and later Dutch warships and privateers, and found every sea unsafe, and could not use most of the harbours to which it had been accustomed to resort. Every merchantman became a fighting vessel; and if many hundreds of ships fell captive to the omnipresent enemies, the captures made from these enemies by British privateers were even more numerous. All the seas of the world became the scene of innumerable fights of which no adequate record survives.

§ 5. The Campaigns of 1778 and 1779.

The first effect of the entry of France into the war was that in America the British forces evacuated Philadelphia and fell back upon New York, thus abandoning all that had been gained in the previous year, and giving up the hope of isolating New England. Until almost the end of the year 1778 there was, in fact, no serious fighting upon the American continent. The reason for this was that a French expedition, either to America or to the West Indies, was anticipated, and it was thought wise to concentrate forces.

The whole interest of the year turned upon the question whether France would succeed in making use of the temporary naval superiority which the negligence of Sandwich had allowed her. An indecisive naval fight off Ushant sufficed to send the main Atlantic fleet of the French back into Brest. But the Mediterranean fleet got out safely under Count d'Estaing, and appeared on the coast of America with forces far superior to the British squadron in these waters. Yet Lord Howe, who commanded the outnumbered British fleet, so completely out-maneuvred the French that d'Estaing sailed away without achieving anything, leaving his American allies disappointed and indignant. He betook himself to the West Indies, where France hoped to make substantial conquests. Here again he had a great superiority of numbers; but the British admirals Barrington and Byron fenced with him as skilfully as Howe had done in the North; and although the French were able to capture the two small islands of Dominica and Grenada they were not able to prevent the British from occupying the more valuable island of St. Lucia, with its splendid harbour, which became the principal British naval base in these waters throughout the war.
than contraband of war) carried by neutral ships, even if they belonged to a belligerent, must be free from seizure; (3) that contraband must be regarded as covering only the actual munitions of war, so that the export of naval stores to France could not be interrupted; and (4) that no blockade could be recognised which was not effective. France, Spain and America at once accepted these propositions, which were of course highly advantageous to themselves. Britain refused, holding that to accept them would be to deprive herself of her most efficient weapon. Thereupon Catherine formed a League of Armed Neutrality including (besides Russia) Denmark, Sweden, Prussia and the Emperor. Thus practically the whole of Europe was arrayed against Britain; and the utmost caution had to be shown in dealing with neutral ships.

Of all the neutral powers the one which had made the most profit out of the war was Britain’s ancient ally, Holland. She had supplied the Americans with vast quantities of naval and military stores; she had allowed American privateers to refit and to sell their prizes in her harbours; she had turned her West Indian island of St. Eustatius into a great smuggling base for the supply of the Americans, and this barren rock had become the richest bit of land in the world; she was driving a heavy traffic with France and Spain, keeping them in naval supplies. Many of her ships had been stopped and seized—some quite legitimately on every view, since they were carrying contraband; others merely because they were trading with Britain’s enemies. In October 1780 the draft of a treaty between Holland and the Americans, which had been drawn up in 1778, was captured on an American prize. The British Government made this the occasion for a declaration of war (October 1780); and Holland was added to the already terrible list of Britain’s foes. At least her ships carrying supplies to France and to America could now be legitimately intercepted.

The use which Britain had made of her strength at sea had thus dangerously added to her difficulties. Yet it cannot be said that she had definitely violated any rule of international law hitherto accepted. But the laws of war at sea were vague; and undoubtedly they had been strained. On the other hand, the demands of the Armed Neutrality would have stripped naval power of half its weapons; and in a crisis of the nation’s destiny it was natural that old and accustomed weapons should be fully employed. The
question remained undetermined. Britain never accepted the rigid doctrines of the Armed Neutrality: if she had done so she could not, later, have held her own against Napoleon. But she moderated her practice; and though Holland was added to the list of her enemies, the Northern Powers maintained an uneasy peace.

While these discussions were proceeding, the campaigns of 1780 had brought, on the whole, encouraging successes to the hard-pressed British people. In America, following up the earlier successes in the Southern States, Clinton had captured Charleston, the capital of South Carolina and the chief trading centre of the South, after a three-months' siege; and his prisoners included 5000 soldiers and 1000 sailors with 400 guns. Having achieved this striking success, Clinton left to his lieutenant, Cornwallis—perhaps the ablest British leader in the war—the task of establishing British control over the Carolinas. At first he was highly successful, thanks to the aid of the numerous loyalists of this region. At the battle of Camden he inflicted a crushing blow upon the main American army of the South, and North Carolina lay open before him. His success was qualified by the defeat of a force of loyalists at King's Mountain, which endangered his communications, and forced him to withdraw into South Carolina. But upon the whole the campaign brought a welcome success to the British arms, and a still more welcome promise of future victories.

Even better news came from the fleets. Rodney,² perhaps the greatest British sailor of this time, had been sent at the beginning of the year with a convoy of supply-ships for the relief of Gibraltar. He had fallen in with a Spanish convoy taking supplies to the besiegers, and had captured the battleship that guarded it, and carried off the convoy for the help of the besieged. He had met and crushed a Spanish fleet off Cape St. Vincent, capturing six of its best ships. He had thrown abundant supplies into Gibraltar. Then, sailing straight for the West Indies, he had met the French fleet off Dominica, and had only failed to cripple it because some of his captains misunderstood his daring and original plan of attack, which marked a new departure in naval tactics. The French admiral, even though joined by a Spanish contingent which gave him a great superiority of numbers, gave up the conflict and sailed home. Britain was left, for the time, with full command of the American

² There is a short life of Rodney, by David Hannay, in the 'English Men of Action' Series.
waters. And meanwhile Gibraltar was still holding out with splendid gallantry, repelling every attack. Against her ring of foes, and despite the incompetent direction of her affairs at headquarters, Britain was holding her own.

§ 7. The Decisive Campaign: the Capitulation of Yorktown.

At no point during the war had the Americans been more depressed than at the close of the campaign of 1780; they were almost bankrupt, many of their troops were mutinous, one of their best generals, Arnold, had deserted to the British side, and they seemed to be losing all the South. The French also were disheartened, and in sore straits for money. Hitherto they had taken scarcely any part in the fighting on the American continent, for they had not joined in the war to help the Americans, but for their own ends. But this had made the Americans distrustful of them; and they had therefore, in the autumn of 1780, sent a small army of 6000 men across the Atlantic, to join the handful of French volunteers who had been serving with the American forces. But this force (which ought never to have been allowed to cross the Atlantic in safety) had as yet achieved nothing; nor had any profitable results arisen from the fighting in the West Indies. The Spaniards were not less dissatisfied. They could make no impression on Gibraltar, and had hinted that if only Britain would cede to them that rock, they would willingly withdraw from the war. The proposal was scouted. Thus at the end of 1780, after five years of war, the position of affairs seemed highly promising from the British point of view. Had the resources of British power been wisely handled, victory seemed still possible.

Yet the next and critical year of the war was to see the downfall of these hopes; and the chief cause of this disappointment was to be found in the folly with which the navy was handled by the home Government. One French fleet after another had already been allowed to escape from its ports instead of being intercepted in European waters; and no disastrous results had followed, though the last of these fleets had brought a French army to American soil. But the same blunder could not with impunity be too often repeated. Its next repetition was to be fatal; and the navy, which had fought so gallantly against so many difficulties, was to have the humiliation of finding that its failure at a crucial moment, through no fault of its own, but solely
through the folly of Lord Sandwich, was to bring ruin to its country's cause.

Yet in many aspects the campaign of 1781 was scarcely less successful than its predecessors. Gibraltar—relieved for a second time early in the year—held out splendidly throughout the year, though the Spanish attacks were more prolonged and desperate than ever. Jersey, once more attacked by the French, defended itself yet more gallantly than before. In the East, Warren Hastings was achieving miracles. A combined French and Spanish fleet, indeed, once more swept the English Channel for a time; but it did no serious damage, and dared not even attack an inferior British squadron shut up in Torbay. Off the Dogger Bank, in the waters of the North Sea, Hyde Parker fought a dogged battle with the Dutch, as fierce as the old battles of the seventeenth century; and though the result was indecisive, the Dutch henceforth took no active part in the war; the danger of a junction of their fleets with those of France and Spain was at an end.

But the chief interest of 1781 lay on the other side of the Atlantic, where the fighting by land and sea, now inextricably intertwined, went through strange vicissitudes, and was to lead to grave results. It opened well; for at the beginning of the year Rodney captured the Dutch island of St. Eustatius, with immense plunder. But meanwhile a powerful French fleet under de Grasse had, like its predecessors in previous years, been allowed unchallenged exit from Brest. Rodney, loth to abandon the plunder of St. Eustatius, left his second-in-command, Hood—a seaman as brilliant as himself—to resist de Grasse with a far inferior force; and though Hood did wonders, he could not do the impossible. He could not boldly challenge the French to battle. He could not prevent them sailing off to the American coast, where their arrival was to have momentous consequences.

For meanwhile the fighting in the Southern States had reached a crisis. Cornwallis had boldly advanced northwards into North Carolina, hoping to press on into Virginia, and to crush the main American army, by penning it between his own forces and those of Clinton in New York. As Cornwallis moved northwards, guerilla warfare sprang up behind him in South Carolina, and the British forces in that State were hard put to it to maintain their control over the district round Charleston. Moreover, Cornwallis was

now faced by Greene, the ablest of the American generals next to Washington; a flying column told off to guard his flank was badly defeated at Cowpens; and though Cornwallis himself defeated Greene in the hard-fought battle of Guilford Court-house, where the enemy outnumbered him by two to one, the victory was dearly bought, for his losses were so heavy as to make the continuance of the campaign difficult. He resolved upon a bold dash into Virginia, risking the danger that threatened the little force left behind in South Carolina. The venture met at first with a considerable degree of success: if Clinton had supported it vigorously from New York, or sent strong reinforcements by sea, it might have led to great results, for while Greene in the South was reconquering South Carolina, Virginia was almost defenceless, and the main American army under Washington, watching New York from across the Hudson, was in a dangerous position. But instead of supporting Cornwallis, Clinton withdrew forces from him to resist a possible attack by Washington, now reinforced by the French army; and Cornwallis was ordered to take up a defensive position by the sea, a safe base so long as British fleets maintained the upper hand. He chose the peninsula of Yorktown on Chesapeake Bay. Thereupon Washington, having kept Clinton tied up at New York in anticipation of an attack, marched rapidly southwards against Cornwallis by land, while the French fleet under de Grasse, just arrived from the West Indies, was instructed to beset him from the sea.

At this moment of crisis the British navy lost command of the American waters. Thanks to the blunders of the Admiralty at home—thanks to Rodney's delays at St. Eustatius—thanks to a whole series of mistakes and misadventures, it was a French fleet, not a British fleet, that the anxious eyes of Cornwallis saw sailing up Chesapeake Bay at the beginning of September 1781. Too late, a British fleet arrived off the entrance of the great inlet. It was outnumbered; and its commander, Graves, had not the genius that could deal successfully with a superior enemy, or the desperate valour that could run all risks in a great crisis. He fought, handled his ships badly, was knocked about, and put back tamely to New York, leaving Cornwallis without succour. On October 19 Cornwallis was forced, after a gallant resistance, to capitulate. On the same day Clinton started from New York with naval and military reinforcements for his relief. By so narrow a margin, by
such a chapter of blunders and accidents, was the final event of the American struggle determined.

§ 8. The Last Phases of the War.

For the capitulation of Yorktown was final and decisive. Though British forces still held out in New York and in Charleston till peace was signed, they were in effect beleaguered in both places; the élan of success had passed from them to their opponents; and no one any longer entertained any hope of victory or planned aggressive campaigns. When the news reached London, its fatal character was at once recognised. 'O God! it is all over—it is all over,' North exclaimed repeatedly when the message reached him. The King remained indomitable; but no one shared his resolution. The opposition in Parliament gathered strength; and by March 1782 North's long ministry had come to an end, and the distressed and reluctant King was forced to hand over the reins to the hated Whigs, and leave to them the making of the peace. The Whigs had long since committed themselves to the recognition of American independence; and though the remnants of Lord Chatham's following, under Shelburne, who had combined with the Whigs to form the new ministry, struggled to maintain their dead chief's ideal, and hoped against hope that some mode of reconciliation might even yet be possible, the crushing blow of Yorktown made all such hopes no more than vain fancies. The independence of America was secured; the unity of the Commonwealth was finally shattered; and it remained only to fix the formal terms of the dissolution. But the negotiations for peace took long; and in the meanwhile the war against France and Spain continued.

The chief scenes of fighting in this last stage of the war were the West Indies, Gibraltar, and Minorca; and the story was one of mixed success and failure, illuminated by two outstanding episodes of splendid valour and skill, which closed in glory the most unhappy war in the modern history of the Commonwealth. In the West Indies, the French fleet, fresh from Yorktown, and enjoying a superiority of three to two against the British fleet under Hood, succeeded in capturing the islands of St. Kitts and Nevis, despite Hood's brilliant and daring manœuvres; they were seriously threatening Jamaica when Rodney arrived with reinforcements. Meanwhile the Spaniards had taken pos-
session of the Bahama Islands, and it seemed as if the British possessions in the West Indies were to be lost as completely as the North American colonies. But this danger was removed, and the supremacy of the British navy was triumphantly reasserted, by a great victory won by Rodney in April 1782.

The navy had not lost heart, but was eager to make good the disasters of the last year. Its personnel had never been larger, or more full of fighting spirit; its commanders were assured of their ability to defeat anything like equal numbers of the enemy; and now, at the end of the war, ships and guns and equipment of all kinds were being produced in an abundance that would have changed the course of events a year or two earlier. And the navy rejoiced to seize the opportunity of meeting the fleet of de Grasse on something like equal terms, and under Rodney’s skilful leadership, and of exacting a tardy revenge for Yorktown. The battle of the Saints (so called from a group of little islands between Dominica and Martinique) was one of the most memorable in the history of the British navy, because in it Rodney abandoned the traditional method of fighting in long lines, ship to ship, and (perhaps by accident) reintroduced the old method which had been employed in the Dutch wars, of breaking the enemy’s line, and concentrating the whole attack upon the severed segment of it. The French line was broken into three parts; and the central section was annihilated, de Grasse himself surrendering with his flagship. This battle saved Jamaica, fully re-established the ascendancy of the British navy, and compelled France to concede better terms than she would otherwise have yielded, in order to end a war from which she could hope for no further success.

Meanwhile, in the Mediterranean, Minorca had been compelled to surrender to a combined French and Spanish army, after a siege gallantly maintained for six months; the garrison being reduced to 600 men fit to bear arms. But Gibraltar still heroically maintained its defence during the third year of the siege. In September 1782 it had to withstand a final desperate onslaught by the combined naval and military forces of France and Spain, eager to reduce it before peace was signed. The garrison numbered not more than 7000 men. It was faced by a land army of 40,000, and by a combined fleet of 49 ships of the line. There were also ten great floating-batteries moored off the Rock, which were believed to be unsinkable and safe from fire. Amid a
terrible bombardment from land and sea, which lasted for
days, the defenders concentrated their attack upon the
floating-batteries. Attacked by red-hot shot from
the fortress, and simultaneously by a raking fire from a group
of small British gunboats which boldly ventured out from
the harbour, all the floating-batteries blew up or were
burnt. Of their crews only 400 were saved; and these
were rescued by British sailors who dared the hail of shot
to pick them up in open boats. This final and desperate
attack having failed, the besiegers fell back once more
upon a blockade. But the blockade was broken, with great
courage and skill, by a fleet under Lord Howe, which threw
a fresh supply of stores into the beleaguered fortress; and
when the news that peace had been concluded arrived on
February 6, 1783, the flag was still flying. Thus the war
against a world in arms ended gloriously; if it had brought
disaster, it brought no shame.


During the long negotiations for peace, which had lasted
through the greater part of 1782, one of the main points at
issue was the question whether the recognition of American
independence should be part of the treaty with France, or
should be separately negotiated. The Government of France
apparently desired not only to make independence appear
a gift to America from herself, but also to limit the new
State within the Alleghany Mountains, reclaiming for
herself, or for her ally Spain, the rich valley of the Mississippi.
But the British negotiators, having made up their minds to
the recognition of independence, preferred to do the thing
frankly and directly; and in November 1782 a treaty was
signed whereby the independence of the United States of
America was formally recognised by the motherland from
which they had sprung. The westward boundary of the
new State was defined as the line of the Mississippi River;
it was thus to include all that Britain had acquired from
France in 1763, save only Canada, which remained, and
remained by its own choice, a member of the truncated
British Commonwealth.

The treaties with France, Spain and Holland were
longer delayed, and were not finally agreed upon till early
in 1783. Thanks to the brilliant military exploits of the
last year, which showed that Britain's power of resistance
was by no means exhausted, they almost represented a return
to the _status quo ante bellum_. France gained the West Indian island of St. Lucia, and the West African district of Senegal, which had been British since 1763; otherwise she made no gains from the long war upon which she had spent her substance. Spain acquired the island of Minorca, after eighty years of British occupation; but she had to forgo her hopes of Gibraltar. In the New World she regained Florida, which she had lost in 1763, and thus became the nearest neighbour of the United States. Otherwise she also had won no advantage from her exertions and her sacrifices.

In the eyes of many men of that generation, the treaties of 1782 and 1783 marked the close of the period of British greatness. They might rather have concluded that the nation which could show, even under incompetent leadership, such gallant resistance to so great a combination was far indeed from being a ruined Power. In truth Britain and the communities which still remained under her flag were about to enter upon a period of great prosperity and of very fruitful development; and, as we shall see, a second British Empire came into being within the generation following the loss of the first.

As for France, what had she gained from her intervention in the war? She had not ruined her ancient rival. But she had very nearly ruined herself. The strain on her finances, already gravely disorganised before the war, brought her to the verge of bankruptcy, and so formed the immediate cause of the great revolution which broke out less than seven years after the conclusion of peace. Moreover her people, upon whose minds the dreams and visions of Rousseau and the large and captivating hopes of democracy were already working, had been brought by the war into sympathy and comradeship with the democratic societies of the New World; and the conditions which they found existing in that happy land seemed to demonstrate the practicability of Rousseau's dreams, and to prove that democracy brought well-being. Thus the American struggle not only contributed to open a new era in the development of the British Commonwealth, it gave an immense impetus to that world-shaking upheaval which was soon to begin in France.

§ 10. The Organisation of the United States.

Having won independence, the United States of America had still to work out for themselves a system of government.
The individual States had all, during the war, adopted 'constitutions,' to replace the 'charters' under which their government had hitherto been conducted. But the constitutions did not in any case embody any material change of system, apart from the fact that the Governor and his Council, previously nominated, were henceforth to be elected. In the main the British system continued, and British common law was the basis of the legal system in all the States.

To revise the constitutions of the individual States was an easy matter; to create an efficient federal system for the United States was far more difficult. In undertaking this task the Americans found themselves faced by all the difficulties arising from the mutual jealousies of the various States, which had stood in the way of effective co-operation during the colonial period, and which had ultimately forced the British Government and Parliament to impose the taxes that the colonists themselves would not vote. On this difficulty, which had been the real cause of the revolution, the infant federation almost broke down, and six years of active discussion passed before a solution was attained. Perhaps it would not have been attained even then had it not been that the absence of any single commercial policy, such as the authority of the British Parliament had hitherto imposed, led to great confusion and to great injustice between State and State, the chief trading States taking advantage of their position to levy dues on the trade of their neighbours as it passed through their ports. Some substitute had to be found for the common organisation of defence and the common regulation of trade which the mother-country had hitherto provided, and which had been the principal cause of resentment against her.

The Congress of 1774 and its successors had been content to make 'requisitions' upon the individual States, and to trust to their public spirit to fulfil them: that was the method which, it had always been argued, ought to have been followed by Britain. But it turned out to be as unsatisfactory as the mother-country had always found it; it was the principal cause of the ineffectiveness with which the armies of the revolution were supported; and during the six years which followed the peace it manifestly and utterly broke down. The need for an effective 'national' organisation for common government was the theme of long discussions, in which the principal part was played by that
great statesman, Alexander Hamilton; but the lesser States continued to feel acute jealousy of the establishment of any effective controlling power, against which some contended almost as bitterly as they had resisted the claims of the British Parliament. In the end, under the mere pressure of necessity (for there was now no mother-country to shoulder the common burden) a Convention was summoned in 1787 to draft a new constitution; and the result of its work was adopted by all the individual States between 1788 and 1790.

This constitution necessarily bore the marks of the circumstances under which it was drawn up. It was of the nature of a treaty between thirteen independent States, and could therefore only be altered by the common agreement of a majority among them; it is consequently the most rigid constitution, and the most difficult to alter, that has ever existed in any great human society. In effect it gave to the common government only certain defined powers, reserving all others for the State governments. But the wisdom and foresight of its authors have been shown by the fact that it has, for a century and a half, served the needs of a very progressive and rapidly growing community. In its main features, it was modelled, like the constitutions of the individual States, upon the system of Britain—the only system then existing in the world which could afford a model. It set up a legislature of two Houses, and an executive headed by a President who was endowed with just the powers that George III. was supposed to possess; but, like the State constitutions, it deprived the legislature of any power of controlling the executive, and thus rendered possible acute friction or deadlock between these powers, such as the British system learnt how to avoid. But the statesmen who drew up this great monument of political wisdom were addressing themselves for the first time in human history to the task of framing a democratic system of government for a large State; they were shaping also a system which could unite thirteen distinct and jealous, if closely kindred States; and their work has remained in all essentials stable and unchanged, while almost every subsequent experiment in constitution-making has had to be repeatedly recast. They could not have succeeded had they not been able to draw upon a long tradition and a long experience. But, guided by this tradition and by this

1 There is a short life of Hamilton by F. S. Oliver.
experience, the eldest-born of the family of free nations that has sprung from Britain was enabled to show a political capacity and a political wisdom that can scarcely be too highly esteemed.

CHAPTER VI

WARREN HASTINGS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF GOOD GOVERNMENT IN BENGAL
(A.D. 1772-1785)


While an empire was being lost in America, in India the British power was being saved from the destruction which seemed to threaten it in 1771, and was being turned into the means of bringing good government to the Indian peoples, by the genius, courage, and patience of one man. The work of Warren Hastings, carried on in the face of extraordinary difficulties of every kind, formed in truth the turning-point in the history of British India, and the foundation of all the good work which was subsequently done.

Faced by bankruptcy, the Directors of the Company had resolved that they must not longer leave in the hands of a powerless Indian the function of collecting the revenues of Bengal, which had been conferred upon them by the Mogul’s grant in 1765, but must undertake this function themselves. It was to carry out this change that Hastings was sent to Bengal in 1772. But he saw from the first that this was not enough, and that corruption and oppression would not cease unless the Company undertook the responsibility for the whole system of government, which had fallen into complete confusion. In assuming this gigantic task, he had to carry the Directors along with him, and he had to convince the nine members of his Council, all of whom had equal voting powers with himself. Moreover, he had to do his work with such instruments as were at hand, and to use men who had for years been profiting by the very misgovernment and corruption which he asked them to help in destroying. Only a man of marvellous powers could have achieved anything at all in such conditions. Yet in two and a half years, by herculean labour, Hastings succeeded in con-

1 Above, Chap. iii. p. 55.
juring the rudiments of an orderly system out of the 'confused heap, as wild as the chaos itself,' which lay before him when he landed in Calcutta.

He swept aside Clive's ill-conceived dual system, whereby the Nawab (acting through Mohammed Reza Khan) was responsible for law and order, while the Company (also acting through Mohammed Reza Khan) was responsible for the collection of the revenues. He brought the treasury and the centre of administration to Calcutta, where everything was under the supervision of the Governor and Council. He set up a complete new system of justice, with a criminal court and a civil court in each of the thirty-six districts into which Bengal was divided, and courts of appeal at headquarters. In each district he set one of the Company's servants, with the title of Collector, to supervise these courts and to see to the collection of the revenue; and he forbade these officers to engage in trade, compensating them by other allowances. At his own expense he engaged groups of Hindu pandits and Mohammedan maulvis to draw up summaries of Hindu and Mohammedan law, for the guidance of British magistrates; for he was clear that Bengal ought to be governed according to Indian customs. He could not forbid private trade among the Company's servants altogether. But he swept away its worst iniquities by imposing an equal low rate of dues which everybody had to pay, English or Indian, including the Company itself, those who were entitled by usage being allowed to claim a refund. At once the complaints of unfair trading which had hitherto bulked so large came to an end.

Hastings also undertook a new assessment of the land revenue; and this was the most difficult of all his tasks. From time immemorial the chief item in the public revenues of India has been, as it still is, a share of the produce of lands, which is regarded as belonging to the State: according to Indian usage, the State, the cultivator, and the zemindar (or hereditary collector of land revenues) may be regarded as being in some sense joint proprietors of the land. But it has always been difficult to assess the State's share fairly, and to make sure that the cultivator is not unjustly treated. Both the State and the cultivator had suffered under Clive's dual system; the revenue had been shrinking while the cultivator was impoverished; and it was essential that a new assessment or 'settlement' of the revenue should be carried out. These 'settlements' are familiar features of government work in modern India; they are
carried out by bodies of experts, who have plenty of time for their work, and are helped by the detailed records of previous settlements. Hastings had to carry out the first assessment without expert aid, or any adequate records, and he had to do it in a few months, for a whole province as big as a European State. It could only be done roughly. But it was done; and though the results were unsatisfactory, Hastings hoped that during the five years for which the 'settlement' was made new and better machinery might be developed. His principal care was that while Government received its due, the cultivator should not be oppressed; and besides devising safeguards for this end, he swept away many oppressive dues which had come into existence during the anarchy.

Thus by two years' hard work Hastings had created the outlines of an efficient and workable system of law and government in Bengal. It was not perfect, as none knew better than its author; it was only a clearing of the ground. But already it had given to Bengal a better and a juster system than any other part of India possessed; and with the zest of a great constructive statesman, Hastings looked forward to amending the system, and to training a school of administrators to work it, Indians and Englishmen side by side. He strongly held that Indians should play a principal part in the administration of an Indian province.

Meanwhile, during these same wonderful years, he had done much to clarify the relations between Bengal and the neighbouring Indian Powers. As we have seen,¹ the greatest danger by which Bengal was faced came from the aggressive and spreading power of the Mahrattas, who had recently (1771) got possession of the Mogul, and were now claiming, in his name, the payment of the tribute from Bengal which Clive had promised, and the occupation of the lands which Clive had cut off from Oudh for the Mogul's use. The Mahrattas were also seriously threatening Oudh, from two sides; and Oudh was the only ally of the Company in this part of India. Hastings showed no fear of the Mahrattas, and his firm attitude, instead of angering them, won their respect. He flatly refused to pay any more tribute. He handed back to Oudh the lands which Clive had transferred to the Mogul. And he made with the Vizier of Oudh a new and definite treaty, whereby the Vizier was entitled to retain a brigade of British troops for the defence of Oudh, so long as he paid the cost of their maintenance—an arrangement

¹ Above, Chap. iii. p. 33.
highly advantageous to both sides. He also allowed the Vizier to employ this brigade in conquering the Rohillas—a tribe of Afghan raiders who had recently mastered the country north of Oudh, and whose shifting policy seriously endangered that State. The result was that Oudh was turned into a staunch ally and a bulwark for Bengal against the Mahrattas; it was also made so strong that the Mahrattas never ventured to attack it. Hastings made no conquests; he wanted none. But he dreamed of bringing peace to India by making the British power the pivot of a system of alliances with the chief Indian States; and the treaty with Oudh (1773) was the first step towards the realisation of this policy.

At the end of two years' work Bengal, which had seemed to be threatened with bankruptcy and ruin, was more secure, better organised, and more prosperous than it had been at any time since the battle of Plassey. The change was the measure of Hastings' achievement. But he hoped that his work had only begun.


Meanwhile, in England, two committees (1772) had been disclosing the iniquities by which the Company's government had been defiled during the previous decade; and on the basis of their report an Act for regulating the Company had been introduced by Lord North and adopted by Parliament in 1773. This Act was the beginning of Government interference in Indian affairs. It did not take political power out of the hands of the Company; but it required the Directors to communicate to Government their despatches on political subjects, which was the first step towards control; and it ordained certain important changes in the system of government in the Company's Indian territories.

In the first place a Supreme Court was set up in Bengal. Its judges were to be English lawyers appointed by the Crown; they were to administer English law; they were to be entirely independent of the Company; and everybody was to have the right of resorting to them for redress against any oppression by an agent or servant of the Company. This was a well-meant safeguard against misgovernment. But nobody asked how the new court, with its English law, would fit in with the Indian system of jurisdiction; and out of this great difficulties arose.

1 See the map, Atlas, School Edition Plate 53 (a), 6th Edition Plate 65 (a).
In the second place the Governor of Bengal became Governor-General, and he, with his Council, was given authority over the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay so far as concerned their relations with Indian States. This was a very real improvement, though it did not go far enough.

In the third place the Council was cut down to five members, including the Governor-General, and all were to have equal votes, so that the Governor-General might be outvoted. The members of the first Council were named in the Act. Hastings, of course, became Governor-General. But of the other four only one, Barwell, had had any Indian experience. Two of the others, Clavering and Monson, were soldiers; the third, Philip Francis, was a very clever young man, but, as he had no influence and no political experience, his appointment is difficult to understand except on one assumption:—he was almost certainly the author of the venomous \textit{Letters of Junius}, and it may very well have seemed desirable to send the author of these letters to the other side of the world. Certainly Francis's character was very like that of Junius. He was a brilliant writer, and a master of the arts of misrepresentation; he was a man of boundless self-assurance and devouring ambition; and he was a rancorous egotist.

The new members of Council and the new judges arrived in Calcutta in October 1774. Having read many tales of oppression, they came out convinced that the Company's servants must all be scoundrels; and Francis had persuaded himself and his two colleagues (whom he completely dominated and despised) that Hastings, since he had risen to eminence amongst these men, must be a very paragon of iniquity. In his letters home Francis made it plain that he intended to be Governor-General himself; and the first step towards this end must be the ruin of Hastings' reputation.

From the moment of their landing the new councillors set themselves to override Hastings and to undo his work; and, having a majority of three to two, they could wreak their will. Hastings and Barwell had to keep the machinery of government at work as best they could, while the majority ransacked the minutes to find grounds of attack, bombarded the Directors and the home Government with accusations against the Governor-General, and set themselves to reverse all that Hastings had done. Though they could not destroy his judicial reforms, they restored Mohammed Reza Khan
as deputy Nawab, and tried to re-establish the old dual system. When the Vizier of Oudh died (1775) they allowed the new Vizier's mother and grandmother (the Begums of Oudh) to seize the contents of the treasury on the pretext of a will which was never produced; they cancelled Hastings' treaty, which they condemned as corrupt; and they imposed upon the unfortunate Vizier a new treaty whereby his richest province was transferred to the Company, and burdens were imposed upon him so heavy as to reduce him to bankruptcy and impotence. They invited charges from all and sundry against the Governor-General, and eagerly accepted every accusation, however monstrous. The worst charges were brought by an unscrupulous Brahmin, Nuncomar, whom Hastings had refused to employ. While the controversy was proceeding, a charge of forgery against Nuncomar, which had been laid by an Indian before the new Council came out, was tried by the Supreme Court. Nuncomar was unanimously found guilty, after a long trial, by the four judges and a jury; and in due course hanged, as English law ordained. Francis and his colleagues refused to intercede for Nuncomar; they even ordered a letter which he sent to them to be burnt by the common hangman. But afterwards Francis stooped to make this episode the foundation of a monstrous charge that Hastings had suborned the Chief Justice, Impey, to commit a judicial murder. This infamous accusation is repeated in Macaulay's famous essay on Hastings; which shows how the remorseless vendetta was pursued even beyond the grave.

For two years—two irrecoverable years when the work of reform might have made great progress—Hastings was reduced to impotence: pride and duty alone kept him at his post. Then (1776) Monson, one of the triumvirate, died; and Hastings was able, by the use of his casting-vote, to regain his authority and to resume his work, though only under great difficulties. Francis remained in India till 1780, when he returned to England. His baffled malignity found a vent in feeding Burke and others with distorted views about Hastings. Indian affairs were so complex and so difficult to understand that this was an easy task; and long afterwards the impeachment of Hastings was the result.

Before Francis's return another controversy had broken out. A dangerous conflict of jurisdiction had arisen (as was inevitable) between the new Supreme Court and the Indian courts; the Supreme Court was claiming jurisdiction over zemindars and other Indians on the ground that
they were agents of the Company; and the whole system was nearly brought to a deadlock. In this conflict Hastings and Francis were ranged on the same side; but while Francis poured his venom on the judges, Hastings, being a statesman, not only recognised that the difficulty had arisen quite naturally, but found a remedy for it which had the happiest fruits. In 1780 he proposed that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court should also be President of the Indian appeal court, and should draw up the rules to be followed by the lower courts. Impey accepted, and did admirable work, which helped Hastings to carry out a valuable revision and improvement of the whole system. But Francis saw in this an instance of corrupt collusion; on his representations Impey was recalled, and his work was interrupted; and ultimately the arrangement was made an article of charge against both the Governor-General and the Chief Justice.

Such were the incredible obstacles against which Hastings had to carry on his beneficent labours. It is not surprising that he was never able to achieve the work of reconstruction which he had designed; nor that the prestige of the British power was lowered in the eyes of the Indian States by the spectacle of these acrid disputes. Yet even amid these difficulties, from 1776 onwards, Hastings was able to do much to improve the system; and he preserved for Bengal the repute which he had won for it, of being the most peaceful and the best governed region in India.

§ 3. The Fight for Existence, 1779-1784.

It was well that Hastings had regained his authority; for in 1779 the Company's power was threatened by a combination of Indian Powers so dangerous that none but he could have combated it. At no period of its history has the British power in India been faced by a more formidable conjunction of perils than in 1779 and the following years; and the fact that it emerged from the struggle without loss, and with greatly enhanced prestige, was wholly due to the courage, resolution and resourcefulness of Warren Hastings.

It is not possible, in the space at our disposal, to give any account of the complex and tortuous events which led up to this crisis. Enough to say that in the period when they were still free from the control of Calcutta, the two minor Presidencies of Madras and Bombay had involved themselves in serious difficulties with their neighbours; and that
the hostile majority had been too busy in pursuing their vendetta against Hastings to rectify these blunders. Madras had alienated the terrible Hyder Ali by first making an alliance with him (1769), and then failing to help him in his need (1771); it had also needlessly quarrelled with the Nizam of Hyderabad. Bombay had plunged recklessly into the succession disputes which had broken out among the Mahrattas (1774), taking up the cause of the weaker candidate for the Peshwa’s throne. Its action had been overridden by the majority at Calcutta, but they had shown such timorous deference to the reigning faction at Poona (who hated the British power) that they had only won its contempt (1776).

Meanwhile the war in America had begun; France was expected to intervene, and if she did so, it was certain that she would try to re-establish her position in India. In 1777 a French adventurer appeared at Poona, the Mahratta capital, with the offer of an alliance, and he was eagerly welcomed. Next year (1778) the French declared war, and it was known that a fleet and an army were to be sent to India. No help could be looked for from Britain: Hastings knew that the Company must fend for itself. He promptly seized the French posts in India; with the result that when the French fleet arrived (1782), it had no base of operations, and was able to achieve almost nothing. Meanwhile a new feud had broken out amongst the Mahrattas; and knowing that he must in any case count upon Mahratta hostility, Hastings allowed Bombay once more to intervene in the dispute. But this gave the signal to the other alienated princes. In 1779 the Nizam of Hyderabad formed a confederation with Hyder Ali and with all the Mahratta chieftains to drive the British into the sea; and Hastings found himself faced with a war against all the greatest Powers in India in combination, backed by a naval and military attack by France, while he knew that no help would be forthcoming from Britain, and could not count upon a single ally save Oudh, which had been reduced to impotence by the policy of Francis.

Ten years earlier such a combination would infallibly have involved utter and irretrievable ruin to the British power. Hastings’ earlier work had alone made it possible to resist; but only his superb intrepidity and resourcefulness could have won success. He sent an army marching across the breadth of India to help Bombay; he sent another army by land from Calcutta to Madras. Both of the minor
Presidencies were wholly dependent upon his support. And throughout the desperate conflict, which lasted for five years (1779-1784), no hostile army ever crossed the frontiers of Bengal, or of the allied State of Oudh; they were almost the only regions of India unravaged by the tide of war. Meanwhile, by patient and skilful negotiation, he gradually broke up the hostile confederacy. By remedying his legitimate grievance, he persuaded the Nizam to make peace. Bhonsla, one of the five great Mahratta chieftains, was persuaded to remain idle; Sindhia, the most powerful among them, was flattered by a request that he should act as mediator in arranging the terms of peace. But while he negotiated, Hastings also struck; and the dazzling feat of arms by which Sindhia’s rock fortress of Gwalior, reputed to be impregnable, was captured by a tiny force under Captain Popham in 1780, had much to do with persuading that prince to play the part of mediator. By 1782 peace had been made with the Mahrattas on the basis of the status quo ante bellum. Meanwhile the terrible Hyder Ali had been defeated at Porto Novo (1781) by the veteran Eyre Coote; he also would have made peace but for the tardy arrival of the French (1782), with a fleet under Suffren, the greatest of French admirals, and a small land-force under the re-doubtable Bussy, once the arbiter of Southern India. The arrival of the French prolonged the war with Mysore, but it had no other effect. For even Suffren could achieve little without adequate bases; and the great confederacy which Bussy might have led had been broken up by Hastings’ indomitable energy before he reached India.

But these heroic efforts involved a terrible strain upon the resources of Bengal. In the struggle to meet this strain, Hastings had to require from Oudh the fulfilment of its engagements to the Company. Oudh could not meet its engagements because it had been made bankrupt; and Hastings therefore authorised the Vizier to reclaim from the Begums the treasure which Francis and the majority had allowed them, without a shadow of right, to appropriate. Hastings also demanded from the rich vassal-Raja of Benares, subsidies in money and a contingent of troops. This was entirely in accordance with Indian usage. But the Raja was recalcitrant; he was suspected of intriguing against his suzerain. Hastings boldly went to Benares with a tiny body-guard and put him under arrest. The Raja thereupon revolted, his men killed Hastings’ body-

1 Vol. i. pp. 771 ff.
guard, and the Governor-General had to flee for a time to a neighbouring fortress. But even in this emergency he maintained his superb self-possession. He found troops to suppress the rising; from his place of refuge he directed the military operations elsewhere, and carried on complex negotiations with the Mahrattas; he even found time to write a detailed narrative of the episode, so calm and judicial in tone that any uninformed reader would be tempted to suppose that it had been penned in leisured peace. The affair of the Begums of Oudh, and the affair of the Raja of Benares, were later to be the main counts in the indictment against Hastings.

In the end the British power in India emerged (1784) from a desperate ordeal without gain, but also without loss, of territory; and because it had held its own against tremendous odds, against the massed strength of the greatest Indian Powers, and without being able to draw upon aid from home, it emerged with a vastly heightened prestige, stronger than it had ever been. India was, indeed, the only part of the world where the British Commonwealth passed through the fiery ordeal of these years not merely without loss, but with an increase of repute.


At the end of thirteen continuous years of effort and strain under the Indian sun, unbroken by even the shortest interval, Warren Hastings might well feel that he deserved thanks and recognition. The honour which he would have esteemed most highly would have been the opportunity of rendering further service. He longed to turn once more, with greater freedom and enlarged experience, to the interrupted task of creating a system of just and efficient government in Bengal. He was still in the prime of life, and at the height of his unmatched powers. But the opportunity was denied to him.

Since 1780 Francis had been assiduously at work in London. He had imposed on the imagination of Burke a nightmare picture of Hastings as an inhuman monster, and the Whigs had committed themselves to the condemnation of Hastings. Even amid the excitements of the American War, India had become a subject of first-rate political importance in Britain; after the war it became a question on which ministries were made and unmade; and there was fierce controversy between the admirers and the enemies of Hastings.
But all parties were agreed that there must be substantial changes in the system of government in British India; for North’s Regulating Act of 1773 was plainly unworkable. In 1783 Fox and Burke put forward their solution, in a bill which would have transferred the whole of the Company’s political authority to Commissioners acting on behalf of the Crown. The bill was rejected by the House of Lords, and brought about the fall of the coalition ministry which introduced it.  

1 If it had passed, the first use which the Whigs would have made of their power would have been to recall Hastings.

Next year (1784) Pitt took up the problem, and an India Act was passed which, in its main lines, continued to be the foundation of Indian government until 1858. It was a well designed measure, which retained the practical experience of the Board of Directors, but set up alongside of the Directors a Government Board of Control. All political orders and despatches had to be submitted to the Board of Control, which could amend or recast them; and this meant that the controlling voice in the government of India was henceforth to be exercised by the responsible Government of Britain. Hastings would willingly have worked under such a system: he had always desired that the authority of the British Crown should make itself more effectively felt in Indian affairs.

But other features of the Act showed that the influence of Francis had counted for a good deal in the shaping of the new policy; indeed, Dundas, who was Pitt’s most intimate colleague, was almost as much under the influence of Francis as Burke. The Act included two clauses which definitely embodied two of Francis’s most mischievous doctrines: the doctrine that the British power ought to take no part in Indian politics, but should abstain from treaty relations with Indian princes; and the doctrine that the zemindars or hereditary collectors of land revenue should be regarded as the true landowners, and that a ‘permanent settlement’ should be made with them. These doctrines continued for a generation, as we shall see, to exercise a pernicious influence upon the course of Indian affairs. If Hastings had been consulted, he would assuredly have pointed out the evil results which must follow from these principles. But it is significant that the man who understood India better than any other Englishman had ever done, who had rescued the British power in

1 See below, Chap. viii. p. 107.
India from corruption and saved it from military destruction, was never consulted on the proposed changes in its government. He could not fail to recognise that there was no chance of his receiving the confidence and support without which his work could not be done. He resigned his post and said farewell to India in 1785.

Both before and after his departure he received unmistakable evidence that he had won the trust and affection not only of nearly all the British in India, but of the Indian peoples and princes with whom he had had dealings. But when he returned to England he received neither honour nor recognition: the greatest of the long line of British statesmen who have laboured in India, he was the only one of the series who received no honour from his sovereign.

But another reward was soon to come. The stored-up venom of Francis and the Whigs was to burst upon him; and in 1788 he was formally impeached before the House of Lords for gross misgovernment and corruption. His trial lasted for no less than seven years. During all that time he had to stand in the pillory, exposed to an extraordinary outpouring of unbridled invective and distortion of facts. His judges were befogged by the voluminousness and complexity of the material put before them; yet even so, they acquitted him on every point. But seven years of the prime of a great man’s life were wasted. His savings were swallowed up by the costs of his defence; he was almost reduced to bankruptcy when in 1795 he was allowed to retire into obscurity, finding his only reward ‘in the conscious applause of my own mind brightening the decline of my existence.’ Britain, although she had already entered upon the severest ordeal of her history, had no further use for the greatest governing mind whom she had produced during the eighteenth century.

Yet, unjust and cruel as the impeachment of Hastings unquestionably was, the mere fact that it was possible was a sign that a new era was dawning in the history of the British Commonwealth. Burke, Fox, and their colleagues disgraced their cause by the rancour and virulence with which they pursued their noble and patient victim. But, when all is said, they were inspired by a passionate resolve that the British name should be freed from the suspicion of injustice or oppression in the government of dependent peoples. And it was a noble thing that a man whose greatness none denied, whose splendour of courage and resource had by universal consent faced and conquered terrible
odds, and who had laid deep for Britain the foundations of a mighty empire, should be held to strict account on the suspicion that his achievements had been stained by injustice. The work that Hastings did, and the long ordeal he had to endure, were alike auguries of a new spirit in the treatment of dependent peoples.

CHAPTER VII

THE BEGINNING OF OPPOSITION IN IRELAND, AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LEGISLATIVE
INDEPENDENCE

(A.D. 1760-1782)

§ 1. The Beginning of Organised Opposition, 1760-1770.

Among the many new beginnings which distinguished the generation following the Seven Years’ War, not the least important was the rise of opposition in Ireland to the ugly system of racial domination which had been established after the Revolution. It is not too much to say that in these years the Irish question took its rise in the form in which it has baffled British statesmanship ever since; the form of a demand for national emancipation. The movement was quickened and stimulated by the American controversy. But it was not a mere by-product of that great issue. It began in the first years of the reign, before the American question had aroused any acute interest in either England or Ireland; and it had won its first victory before Irish public opinion began to be excited or encouraged by the agitation in America.

At the very opening of George III.’s reign Irish discontent, long quiescent, began to express itself in two agitations, the one economic, the other political, which were entirely unconnected one with the other. The economic agitation took the form of a series of organised agrarian outrages carried out by bands of men who called themselves ‘Whiteboys’ in Munster and Leinster, where their disorders began in 1761 and lasted for ten years; while in the Protestant North ‘Oakboys’ in 1763 and ‘Steelboys’ in 1771 caused similar but less violent disturbance. These movements seem to have had no political or religious character. They were the blind protest of a miserable and impoverished peasantry against what seemed to them the more immediate causes of their misery. But

1 Vol. i. pp. 586 ff.
they were the beginning of a long series of sporadic agrarian outbreaks which lasted for a century and a half, and pointed to the need for a radical reform in the economic system. No immediate result of any kind followed from them.

Meanwhile a demand for political emancipation had begun in the Irish Parliament. Ireland had a Parliament of her own, an executive of her own, a distinct system of finance, and a separate army, paid for wholly by Irish taxation. But the Parliament was subordinated to the British Parliament, which could legislate over its head; even within these limits, its powers of legislation were subject, under Poyning's Acts, to the approval of the English and Irish Privy Councils, and the most it could do was to propose heads of bills, which had to have the approval of the two Privy Councils before they could be passed through their stages and submitted for the royal assent. It represented only the Protestant minority of the population; and as its electoral system was even more anomalous than that of England or Scotland, a handful of magnates (known as the Undertakers) controlled an even larger proportion of seats than the Whigs did in England. Moreover there was no limit to the duration of an Irish Parliament save the life of the King; a single Parliament had sat throughout the thirty-three years of George II.'s reign. The Irish executive (with the Privy Council and the Lord-Lieutenant at its head) was under the control of the Crown, which disposed of all offices, and used them partly to reward political services in England, and partly as a means of making a majority in the Irish Parliament. The Irish army, which was proportionately much larger than that of England, was effectively at the disposal of the Crown; because there was no Mutiny Act in Ireland requiring regular renewal by the Irish Parliament, which thus lacked one of the essential means of control acquired at the Revolution by the English Parliament.

These conditions had been accepted without much protest during the first half of the eighteenth century, largely, no doubt, because the dominant minority in Ireland regarded their own power as depending upon the English supremacy, and because the old fear of the Catholics still survived. But that fear had now died down: and at the beginning of the reign of George III. a considerable party amongst the Protestant landowners who controlled the Irish Parliament began to agitate seriously for an enlargement of their own political privileges. The primary aim of this party was a

1 Vol. i. p. 219.
limitation of the duration of Parliament by a Septennial Act like that of England; but they also desired a Mutiny Act which would establish parliamentary control over the army, an Act giving security of tenure to judges, and a Habeas Corpus Act; for all these fundamental safeguards of liberty, long established in England, were lacking in Ireland. Thus the movement of opposition in Ireland began among the dominant minority, and was at first limited to an attempt to reproduce in Ireland some of the characteristic features of the English Revolution settlement. Except on one point, no success was attained during the first ten years of the reign by this constitutional opposition. The one achievement of the period was the passing of the Octennial Act in 1768, whereby the duration of Irish Parliaments was limited to eight years. But during the long and all but fruitless discussions which led to this result, the National party (if it may be so described) was drawn on to question, more and more openly, the supremacy over Irish affairs claimed by the English Parliament. That wider question would certainly have been raised even if the American revolt had not forced it on.

And another factor was contributing to change the political situation in Ireland. Having overthrown the Whig oligarchy in England, George III. was anxious also to overthrow the corresponding oligarchy of the Irish 'Undertakers'—the group of borough-owners who normally controlled a majority in the Irish Parliament, and who had long been left to manage Irish affairs and to divide among themselves the spoils of office. Hitherto the Lords-Lieutenant had only visited Ireland for parliamentary sessions, held once in two years. Now they were required to remain in residence during their term of office, and to take the distribution of patronage into their own hands. as a means of building up a King's party and undermining the power of the 'Undertakers.' The results of this change were important. Government became more ready to make concessions in order to win support, and the passing of the Octennial Act (which the 'Undertakers' disliked) was in part due to this cause. Again, corruption had to be lavishly employed, with the result that the hereditary revenues of the Crown became inadequate, and Government became more dependent upon parliamentary grants. Finally the increased activity of the Lord-Lieutenant, and the fact that he received his orders from London, brought into high relief the subordination of Ireland to Britain. When all was said,
the 'Undertakers,' who had earlier been chiefly responsible for government, had been a group of leading Irishmen. Now the growing discontent, the growing resentment against the evils of the existing system, were brought into direct conflict with the British Government. Thus in several ways the problem of Irish government was becoming difficult even before the American question had begun seriously to occupy the minds of Irishmen.

§ 2. The Influence of the American Controversy, and the Volunteer Movement.

But the American controversy immensely intensified and accelerated the movement of opposition in Ireland. No one could fail to see the resemblance between the grievances of which the American colonists complained and those from which Ireland suffered. Ireland felt her political subordination to the British Parliament even more acutely than the colonies; while the trade system which was the ultimate source of American discontent pressed still more hardly upon Ireland. It was not surprising that the development of the American question was followed with the keenest interest. But there was no sign of any Irish revolutionary movement. Sympathy with the Americans was strongest among the Presbyterians of Ulster. The Catholics remained throughout quiescent; and the Catholic gentry sent in addresses of loyalty, and condemned the violence of the Americans. Among the Anglican minority the result of the American trouble was to strengthen the demands of the constitutional opposition in Parliament.

In 1776, when the first election under the Octennial Act took place, the numbers of the reformers were substantially increased; and they found an inspiring leader in Henry Grattan, a Protestant gentleman of the highest integrity, of the broadest sympathies, and of a lofty eloquence unsurpassed by any British orator even in that age of eloquence. Under Grattan’s leadership the opposition concentrated its attention upon two main aims—the removal of trade disabilities (the argument for which was strengthened by the distress caused by the interruption of American trade) and the establishment of legislative independence for the Irish Parliament.

With these main aims they combined a growing readiness

1 There is a good short life of Grattan by R. Dunlop.
to forward measures for the relief of the Catholics; and the appearance of this spirit in the Irish Parliament, which had invented the iniquities of the Penal Code, marked a noteworthy and very hopeful advance. Grattan was the chief advocate of Catholic relief; 'the Irish Protestant,' he said, 'can never be free till the Irish Catholic has ceased to be a slave.' The Government of Lord North was not unfavourable to the Catholic claims; and in 1778 its support ensured the passage of an Act which allowed Catholics to lease land for 999 years, and removed many of the degrading conditions hitherto imposed on landholders who were Catholics. Thus real reform in Ireland began with a measure for the relief of the Catholics; a timid and partial measure, but one of good augury.

Lord North was willing also to make a large breach in the commercial restrictions hitherto imposed upon Ireland; and in 1778 a bill was introduced into the British Parliament which would practically have established freedom of trade between Ireland and all the other members of the British Commonwealth in everything save wool and tobacco. But the selfishness of the English and Scottish trading houses was so much alarmed by these proposals, and such a storm of protest was raised, that North thought it necessary to give way. Little was left of the bill save a provision that Irish ships should be considered as British-built for the purposes of the Navigation Acts. So violent was the opposition of the chief trading centres that Burke lost his seat at Bristol because he had given his support to the bill.

Meanwhile the crisis of the war had come. France and Spain had entered the conflict against Britain. Ireland had to be denuded of troops to meet the dangers elsewhere. The French and Spanish fleets for a time controlled even the waters of the English Channel. There was real danger of a landing in Ireland, all the more since the French Government hoped to be assisted by an Irish rebellion. But these hopes were baseless. Ireland, Catholic as well as Protestant, remained staunchly loyal, as the agents of the French Government ruefully reported. Not only that, but Irishmen were eager to organise themselves for defence against a possible invasion, and fervent appeals for grants of arms to equip bodies of volunteers poured in to Government from all quarters, more especially from the seaboard counties. Government was loth to accept these proposals, or to put arms in private hands in a land where dreadful feuds had raged, and might easily break out afresh. But in view of
the undefended condition of the country, there was no alternative.

In any case, whether Government liked it or no, the volunteers, mostly under the command of peers and gentry, grew in numbers rapidly, and it was impossible to refuse to distribute among them the available arms. In the year 1779 the numbers of the volunteers had already risen to 42,000. They were nearly all Protestants, because Catholic enlistment was not encouraged; but the Catholics contributed voluntarily and generously to their equipment and upkeep. The enthusiasm and energy with which the volunteer movement was conducted were without doubt primarily due to the fear of a French invasion, and there was no sub-current of hostility to the British connexion, no sign of any plan to use force for severing it. But the mere fact of the formation of volunteer companies, and of their constant meetings for drill, transformed the whole political situation. The companies became, insensibly and naturally, political organisations; and a ferment of political discussion and political activity, to which Ireland was wholly unaccustomed, sprang into being.

The volunteers demanded, in particular, freedom of trade, as the only means of remedying the distress from which Ireland was suffering; and their resolutions on this head were backed by similar resolutions from grand juries, corporations, and other public bodies. But they did not stop at resolutions. They began to make 'non-importation agreements,' in imitation of the Americans, threatening a boycott of British goods until their grievances were redressed. The trading interests in Britain were brought to their senses by these threats; and at the end of 1779 and the beginning of 1780, Lord North secured the adoption of measures for the freeing of Irish trade which were much more liberal than the emasculated Act of 1778. In effect Ireland had now, thanks to the volunteers, complete equality with England and Scotland in imperial and foreign trade. And what is noteworthy is that she had won this boon without giving up her separate Parliament, which was the price Scotland had had to pay. The valuable rights which had made bargaining possible in the case of the Scottish union were in the Irish case conceded without any quid pro quo; and this very fact put difficulties, henceforth, in the way of any project of legislative union with Ireland.

The solution of a union was, indeed, discussed during these years in Government circles in England; but the
Lord-Lieutenant warned his colleagues not to put forward any such proposal, because it was certain to raise a storm of opposition. 'National feeling,' he said, 'would not hear of it.' The phrase is striking. National feeling had at last come awake in Ireland. And it was not limited to one section of the population. It affected the Anglican gentry, and the Scottish Presbyterians of the North, even more strongly than the Catholics. Seventy years earlier, in the generation following the Revolution, the project of union had been suggested from Ireland, but England would not listen; now it was suggested from England, and Ireland would not listen.

§ 3. The National Spirit and Legislative Independence.

Ireland would not listen because her people of all classes, and notably the dominant class of Anglican landowners, had made up their minds that the time had come to demand political as well as economic freedom, and the abrogation of the superior powers claimed by the British Parliament over the Irish Parliament. On April 19, 1780, Grattan introduced in the Irish Parliament what was ominously described as a Declaration of Independence. It seemed that the American model was being followed to an alarming extent. But there was a difference. Grattan's resolutions asserted that the Crown of Ireland was inseparably annexed to that of Great Britain, and that the two nations, under one sovereign, were indissolubly connected by a multitude of ties. They went on, however, to proclaim that no power on earth but the King, Lords and Commons of Ireland had any right to make laws for Ireland. The resolutions were shelved, but scarcely a voice was raised in defence of the legislative power of the British Parliament, even in the unrepresentative and corrupt Irish House of Commons. Then followed a direct attack on Poyning's Acts, which was defeated only by a narrow majority. And later in the same session an Irish Mutiny Act was introduced, on the plea that the British Act—hitherto always extended to Ireland—was not valid. Magistrates, indeed, were refusing to enforce it on this ground, and military discipline was threatened. A Mutiny Act had to be passed, though the very fact of its passing implied a denial of the legislative power of the British Parliament. Government succeeded in getting it made perpetual. But even so, the triumph was noteworthy.
The Irish Parliament, always hitherto the organ of an ascendancy, was becoming national in character, and was showing a vigour and an independence never hitherto displayed. These qualities were unquestionably due to the stimulus given by the nation-wide movement of the volunteers. And meanwhile the volunteers themselves were entering upon a new stage in their development. At first they had arisen as spontaneous and disconnected local companies. At the beginning of 1780 their leaders began to plan a national organisation; and a number of reviews were arranged, in which many corps took part. This went on through 1781, while the numbers of the volunteers still increased; towards the end of 1781 they had risen to 80,000 men. The national organisation of the volunteers intensified the political agitation, which became so formidable, and was now so obviously backed by a threat of force, that some who had hitherto strongly supported the movement drew away from it, on the ground that it was tending to become unconstitutional. It was, indeed, *pessimi exempli* that great changes should not only be advocated but triumphantly carried by the pressure of armed force; an unhappy lesson was being taught, even though the proceedings of the volunteers were strictly orderly, and their sentiments thoroughly loyal.

Parliament was now showing too little zeal and vigour for the volunteers, who were annoyed that it should submit to the continuance of Poynings' Acts. Led by Grattan and Lord Charlemont, the volunteers of Ulster, always the most vigorous, decided to hold a general congress at Dungannon, at which all the corps of that province should be represented. This remarkable assemblage, which met in a Protestant church in February 1782, framed a series of resolutions, in which they formally denied the right of anybody save the Irish Parliament to legislate for Ireland, pledged themselves to oppose any parliamentary candidate who did not undertake to support this view, and appointed a committee to act for the body of volunteers and to summon similar congresses at intervals. Perhaps the most significant of the resolutions, considering that it was passed with only one dissentient by a purely Protestant assembly of Ulstermen meeting in a Protestant church, was a declaration in favour of freedom of conscience and of sympathy with the Roman Catholics.

A few days after the Dungannon meeting Grattan moved in the Irish House of Commons an address to the King
asserting the legislative independence of Ireland; and although Government was able to obtain a postponement of the question, there was no doubt as to the feeling either of the House or of the nation. 'The principle of Ireland not being bound by the laws of another legislature,' wrote the Lord-Lieutenant to the Government in London, 'is universally insisted upon with an enthusiasm and steady determination which leave no reason to imagine that it will be abandoned,' and it had become clearly impossible to maintain the old system. Grand juries were, in fact, on all hands refusing to enforce British laws, recognising only the statutes of the Irish Parliament. Even Lord North's Lord-Lieutenant, the Earl of Carlisle, insisted that these facts must be recognised and accepted.

Meanwhile a change had come about in the government of Great Britain. In March 1782 Lord North's Government resigned, and the Whigs came into power. A month later their Lord-Lieutenant arrived in Dublin; and two days after his arrival Grattan, in the greatest of all his orations, moved in the Irish Parliament a Declaration of Rights and Grievances. He described the unanimity of the Irish people of all sects and classes in the demand for legislative independence, which 'united the Protestant with the Catholic, and the landed proprietor with the people.' What they demanded, he said, was neither more nor less than 'liberty according to the frame of the British constitution,' to be enjoyed in perpetual connexion with the British Empire. He emphasised the fact that, even though the apparent conflict lay between Ireland and Great Britain, yet it was from Britain that Ireland had learned the nature of the political liberties she desired. The tone of the speech bears a remarkable resemblance to Burke's great vision of a fellowship of free peoples bound by the ties of a common enjoyment of liberty; and with Burke's noble utterance it may be linked, as a proclamation of the ideal of a commonwealth of nations, put forth at the dark moment which saw the ruin of the first British Empire, but which also saw the beginning of a new era.

There was no resisting a demand so clear and so unanimous as that which Grattan expressed. The Whigs, who had vaguely hoped to find some via media, accepted the inevitable; and, to their credit, did what had to be done with generous completeness. The Declaratory Act of George I. was repealed; the control over the Irish Parliament

wielded by the two Privy Councils under Poyning's Acts was done away with; in short, as Grattan summarised it, 'Great Britain gives up in toto every claim to authority over Ireland.' The Whigs had intended that part of the new settlement should be an agreement or treaty between the two kingdoms whereby 'the connexion between them should be established by mutual consent upon a solid and permanent footing.' But no treaty was made. Ireland was left with no formal connexion with Great Britain other than the Crown; she was in the same position which Scotland had occupied between the Revolution and the Act of Union—with full control over all her own affairs, and with a Parliament so free and unfettered that it could, if it chose, pursue a policy wholly incompatible with that of Great Britain.

[Lecky, History of Ireland in the 18th Century, and Leaders of Irish Public Opinion (for Flood and Grattan); Swift Macneill, Constitutional and Parliamentary History of Ireland till the Union; Dunlop, Henry Grattan; Barry O'Brien (ed), Two Centuries of Irish History; E. Curtis, History of Ireland; S. Gwynn, History of Ireland.]
CHAPTER VIII

THE BEGINNING OF POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN BRITAIN

(A.D. 1775-1793)

§ 1. The Significance of the Period: some Dominant Personalities.

As in Ireland, so in Britain, the American Revolution brought about great political changes. The failure of the war discredited the King's system of government, which had seemed to be firmly established in 1775, and led to its downfall. In its place, after a sharp tussle between George III. and the Whigs, in which neither side was successful, the system of government by a cabinet jointly responsible to Parliament, which had existed under Walpole but had never been fully accepted as part of the working British constitution, was definitely re-established under the leadership of the younger Pitt. That is perhaps the main political result of these years. It was an important result, because this method of government—which differs widely from the form of popular government adopted during these very years in the United States—was to become characteristic of all the self-governing members of the British Commonwealth, and was to be imitated in most of the civilised countries of the world.

But the cabinet system depends upon the existence of organised political parties. During the period with which we are concerned in this chapter, the groups of the earlier part of the reign disappeared, and were replaced by the two solid organised parties of Whigs and Tories, perpetually in opposition to each other. The solidity of parties depends very largely upon whether or no they possess leaders capable of inspiring loyalty and zeal in their followers. In Charles Fox and the younger Pitt these years saw the emergence of the first of the long series of pairs of rival leaders who have dominated the course of British politics since that date.

But the importance of the period does not lie only in the
reorganisation of the system of government. A strenuous attempt was also made to purify and liberalise it. The machinery of organised corruption was attacked and largely destroyed. A great attempt was also made to get rid of the worst anomalies of the electoral system, and to make Parliament more genuinely representative of the nation. The attempt was nearly successful. If it had succeeded before the storm of the French Revolution burst, it would have saved Britain from many ills. But even though it failed, it formed the beginning of the movement towards democracy which was to win its triumph in the nineteenth century.

But these large issues emerged only gradually. During the first years of the American War, and down to the intervention of France in 1778, the King’s system appeared to be triumphant and beyond challenge. The opposition was so disheartened that its leaders almost ceased to attend to their parliamentary duties. What is more, there were deep differences of opinion between the two wings of the opposition, the main body of the Whigs and the followers of Lord Chatham. How real these differences were may best be illustrated by a brief analysis of the three outstanding political figures of the time—Shelburne, Burke, and Fox.

Lord Shelburne, who was Chatham’s first lieutenant, and succeeded to the leadership of his party on Chatham’s death in 1778, had a contemporary reputation for untrustworthiness which is not substantiated by any single episode in his career, but which gravely damaged his public work. He was one of the most thoughtful and well-informed men of his time, and in sentiment a Radical. The friend and patron of Bentham, Adam Smith and Priestley, he was a free trader and something of a democrat. He advocated parliamentary reform, which the Whigs loathed; he understood and admired the work of Warren Hastings, whom the Whigs reviled; he feared the power of the Whig oligarchy even more than that of the Crown; and in America, while he was willing to encourage a great expansion of self-government, extending even to the election of Governors by the colonists, he could not reconcile himself to the dissolution of the Empire, which the Whigs contemplated with equanimity. Shelburne was, in brief, the forerunner of the free-trade Radical Imperialists of the nineteenth century.¹

On almost every point there was a fundamental difference

¹ See below, Bk. IX. chap. x. p. 421.
of outlook between Shelburne and Burke, the philosophic
guide of the orthodox Whigs. For Burke was the apologist
of the Whig tradition, which Shelburne detested; and it
was Burke's instinct to distrust, and Shelburne's to welcome,
new ideas and sweeping doctrines. Like all good Whigs,
Burke genuinely loved liberty and hated oppression: he
had shown it by his attitude on Ireland, on India, on
America. But he thought of liberty as something that was
perpetually endangered by unchecked power, and best
safeguarded by traditional rights and by the entrenched
social and political privileges of a public-spirited aristocracy.
He idealised the Whig régime of the past; he equally
idealised the Whig magnates of his own day, to whose
service he devoted his glorious gifts of intellect and imagina-
tion, 'giving up to party what was meant for mankind.'
In the great constitutional controversy of the day his primary
aim was to bridle the Crown by stripping it of the patronage
by means of which it had overthrown the Whigs. But he
trembled at the thought of any great change in the parlia-
mentary system, precisely because this would undermine the
power of the aristocracy.

In these years Burke was being put into the shade, as the
inspirer of the Whig party, by a brilliant young recruit who
had crossed over from the Government benches in 1774.
At the moment of his conversion Charles Fox was best
known as the most reckless spendthrift and gambler in
English society; and he remained a gambler to the end of
his days, and even carried into politics something of the
gambler's devil-may-care abandon. It was reckless high
spirits, rather than principles, which caused him in 1774 to
fling away his chances of political promotion when his foot
was fairly planted on the ladder; for at first he had entered
politics as a game. But then he came under the influence
of Burke; and his natural frankness and generosity of mind
were enriched from that deep well of political wisdom. He
never acquired any solid political knowledge, nor was he ever
strong in balance of judgment. But the gambler's reckless-
ness was transmuted into an uncultivating ardour and
generosity in the advocacy of great causes, which made him
a magnificent leader, especially in a losing cause. Beyond
all things he hated anything that savoured of oppression:
when he smelt oppression, his impetuous burst all bounds.

1 There is a classical short life of Burke by Lord Morley.
2 There is a good short life of Fox by J. L. Hammond; and Trevelyan's
   Early Life of C. J. Fox is a brilliant and vivid study.
This is why he pursued Warren Hastings with such fury; and why he carried his advocacy of the American cause so far as to rejoice openly at the reports of American victories, and even to come down to the House of Commons dressed in the American colours.

In Fox's view the King was the source of all his country's ills; and the overthrow of the King's power became the object of his life. From 1775 onwards British politics consisted largely of a duel between George III. and the brilliant, generous-hearted, reckless gambler who had become the genius of the Whig party, and who was transforming its timid and tepid respectability into something much more vehement and fiery.

§ 2. The Renewed Conflict between George III. and the Whigs, 1778-1782.

The declaration of war by France in 1778 and by Spain in 1779 revived the spirits and the vigour of the opposition. Blaming the Government for the accumulating misfortunes of the country, they began to direct against the King's system a sustained and vigorous attack. The main grounds of the attack were the costliness and mismanagement of the war, and the need for drastic economies. By insisting upon economy the Whigs hoped to destroy the foundations of the King's power, by depriving him of the means of corruption. In 1778 they introduced a bill for the exclusion of contractors from the House of Commons—the granting of lucrative contracts to members having been one of North's methods of influencing votes. In 1779 Burke gave notice of a yet more important measure, a bill for economical reform, the object of which was to abolish a large number of offices which were of no value except for purposes of corruption. It was introduced in full detail in 1780, and supported by one of Burke's greatest oratorical efforts. In the same year a third bill, for disfranchising revenue officers, was introduced: these officers, who were habitually required to vote for Government on pain of losing their places, themselves desired to be released from this humiliating position; and it was said that their votes were enough to turn the election in no less than seventy constituencies. Taken together, these three bills would go far to root out the corrupt influences which had defiled Parliament ever since the Revolution, and indeed earlier.

But it was useless to introduce resolutions and bills in
Parliament against North's standing majority, unless they were supported by a powerful demand outside Parliament. The organisation of this demand was the work of Christopher Wyvill, a wealthy parson who never visited his parish, but lived on his estate in Yorkshire. Wyvill persuaded the Sheriff of Yorkshire to summon a county meeting, which was held at York on December 30, 1779; and the nobles, gentry, and freeholders who attended unanimously adopted a petition to Parliament in favour of 'economical reform,' which was subsequently signed by nearly 9000 freeholders. The example of Yorkshire was followed by twenty-eight counties, and a large number of cities and boroughs. No such nation-wide demonstration had ever before been seen. It was, indeed, the beginning of the use of public meetings for political ends.

The county meetings were not enough for Wyvill; he got them to elect standing committees, and to send representatives to attend a conference in London—the first of its kind. Nor was he satisfied with mere 'economical reform.' The movement for parliamentary reform, started in 1769, was not dead; and Wyvill resolved to use his organisation to forward this kindred cause. This was early in 1780. In April of the same year an influential group of peers and gentlemen started a Society for Constitutional Information, which devoted considerable funds to the free distribution of tracts, sermons, and pamphlets advocating reform—some of them going so far as to demand annual parliaments, universal suffrage, and vote by ballot. Thus systematic propaganda also came into use for the political education of the British people; and the demand for a democratic order was put forward, a decade before the French Revolution.

These developments went much further than most of the Whig leaders desired. For the Whigs as a whole, including Burke, were strongly opposed to a reform of the franchise; though Charles Fox was not unready to do something, and one Whig duke, the Duke of Richmond, was even an extreme reformer. It was only among the Chathamite group that franchise reform had real support: the Whigs were eager to destroy the foundations of the King's power, but not the foundations of their own. But they were not slow to use the wave of public feeling which the agitation had raised. Their three bills did much better in Parliament in 1780 because of it, though they were still unsuccessful. What was more striking, a Whig resolution, 'that the influence of
the Crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished,' was actually carried by a majority in the House of Commons. Evidently the Parliament of 1780 was wavering in its steadfastness; the independent country gentlemen were deserting the Government. In the hope of getting a more amenable House, the King dissolved Parliament; and in the election which followed the new methods of agitation were fully employed. For the first time in English history the electors were asked to send representatives with a definite 'mandate.' The results were a little disappointing to the reformers, for Government obtained a solid majority. But there was a new public interest in the contest. 'Hitherto I have been elected in Lord Rockingham's drawing-room,' said Sir George Savile, member for Yorkshire; 'now I am returned by my constituents.'

The new Parliament was to take part in a real, if silent, political revolution during the four years of its existence. And it included some new members, two in particular, who were to play noteworthy parts. One was Sheridan, the dazzling wit and playwright, who added his brilliant oratory to the strength of the Whigs. The other was young Pitt,^1 second son of Lord Chatham, who came in at a bye-election at Appleby during the first year, being then just of age; and naturally took his place among the followers of his father and of Shelburne.

If victory had gone to oratory the side which included Burke, Fox, Pitt, and Sheridan ought to have won. But the King and Lord North still commanded the votes. Something more powerful than county associations was needed to overthrow them. The blow came from America. In October 1781 Yorktown capitulated, and the disaster brought down Lord North. He resigned in March 1782; and at last opportunity was open to the opposition. The King had to call in the Whigs and allow them to use the prestige and power of Government for the overthrow of the system he had built up with such pains.

§ 3. George III., Charles Fox, William Pitt, 1782-1784.

The two wings of the opposition entered office in partnership, Fox and Shelburne acting as Secretaries of State with Lord Rockingham as Prime Minister. But from the first

^1 There is an admirable short life of Pitt by Lord Rosebery, in the 'Twelve English Statesmen' Series.
there was friction between the two groups among the victors: Shelburne and Fox, who had charge of the peace negotiations, could not see eye to eye; and the King waited confidently for a breach between them. But there was one question on which all were agreed. The programme of economical reform was at once put into operation. Contractors were excluded from the House of Commons; revenue officers were disfranchised; and Burke's immense and complicated plan for cutting down the vast list of offices was carried. One of the offices which disappeared was the Secretaryship of State for the Colonies, which had been set up in 1768: most of its work had gone. Taken as a whole these Acts marked a real constitutional advance. They put an end to the direct corruption of the House of Commons. They imposed upon Government the necessity of getting the required support in Parliament by other means. But the only other means available was organised party loyalty. And there was no such loyalty between the two groups who now divided power.

The victory of the reformers had been won, so far as economical reform was concerned. But the greater question of electoral reform was still untouched; because the Whigs would have nothing to do with it. This gave an opening to young Pitt. Eager to make his name, he came forward as the leader of the reform party, and moved in Parliament that a committee of inquiry be appointed. The motion was lost, but only by twenty votes. Greatly encouraged, the reformers summoned a meeting at the Thatched House Tavern, which Pitt attended, and which, for that reason, was later to be famous. It was decided that the national agitation should be stimulated as much as possible. The county meetings started again, and a rain of petitions poured in upon the House of Commons, demanding reform, and proclaiming that the House no longer represented the nation. A real national movement was afoot.

Meanwhile the feud between the two sections of the ministry had resulted in a cleavage. Rockingham, the Prime Minister, died (July 1782). Shelburne and Fox had quarrelled fatally, and neither would serve under the other. The King, having to choose between them, naturally chose Shelburne rather than the hated Whigs; whereupon Fox and Burke and all their phalanx went into opposition, and young Pitt, at the age of twenty-three, entered the ministry as Chancellor of the Exchequer. These changes augured well for the cause of reform. The group in power was the
most generally favourable to that cause of any group in politics; and the accepted leader of the reformers was in office. The hopes of the reformers rose high.

Shelburne had, indeed, no secure majority. Even including all those who normally voted with Government, and all the Whigs who had not followed Fox, he could only count upon 140 votes. Fox had 90; and 120 members still looked to North as their leader. Any two of these groups could defeat the third. But it seemed unthinkable that Fox and North should combine. Could North go back upon his whole career by lending himself to an attack upon the King? Could Fox join hands with North, upon whom he had so long been pouring unbridled denunciation, and from whom, if his speeches went for anything, he differed on every point of principle and policy? But the dominating purpose of the Whigs was to overthrow the King, and to put him in manacles; and to Charles Fox, the gambler, it seemed legitimate to use any cards that came into his hands in order to win the game. The unholy compact was made. Shelburne's ministry was defeated; and the King was compelled to accept a coalition ministry.

In the eyes of most of the nation, as in the King's eyes, the coalition of Fox and North was an unpardonable exhibition of lack of principle in politics. The dire punishment which was soon to follow it gave rise to the saying that England does not love coalitions. It ruined the career of Charles Fox, who never quite recovered from the reputation for insincerity with which it branded him. To reformers, especially, from whom it seemed to have snatched away their chance of success, it appeared an unforgivable crime; and, though Fox had advocated reform, he lost all the confidence of the reformers. Henceforward Fox and Pitt stood forth before the nation in sharp rivalry; and all the advantage seemed to lie on the side of the boy statesman.

At the moment, however, the coalition seemed to have fully attained its purpose. The King was beaten; and Charles Fox was free to organise his victory so as to reduce the Crown for ever to its old subjection. But the triumph was short-lived. The only important measure which the coalition was able to undertake was a bill for the better government of India. It proposed that all the political authority, and all the patronage, of the Company should be transferred to a Commission, to be appointed in the first instance by Parliament, and later by the Crown. But these
proposals, though they were honestly meant as an attempt to remedy the defects of the existing government in India, were manifestly open to misinterpretation. The vast patronage of the East India Company was to be transferred to a purely Whig body; for all the commissioners proposed were Whigs. This might be represented as a cunning device to win for the Whigs a mass of patronage which would enable them to buy all the support they needed. They had just destroyed the royal patronage which formed the traditional means of corrupting the House of Commons, in order to weaken the King. Was this a hypocritical trick to get a new means of corruption with which the King could not meddle, and so re-establish the oligarchy? Brought against the authors of the coalition, the accusation had some plausibility. George III. saw that the enemy had delivered himself into his hands. He stimulated the House of Lords to reject the bill. Then he contemptuously dismissed the coalition from power, knowing that he would have public feeling behind him; and invited young Pitt, the bearer of a splendid name and the hope of the reformers, to form a ministry (December 1783).

Pitt had already given a further proof of his zeal for reform by introducing three resolutions on the subject into Parliament, and the coalition majority had refused even to discuss them. His accession to power was welcomed with enthusiasm, especially by the reformers. But his position was extremely difficult. An almost untired youth of twenty-four, he had to bear alone the burden of debate in the House of Commons against a large hostile majority which included all the most brilliant speakers. For three months he carried on the struggle with wonderful courage and self-confidence, until, in March 1784, Parliament was dissolved. Fox stormed against the unconstitutional action of the King, and sent up addresses demanding the removal of ministers not supported by a majority in Parliament, which was sound constitutional doctrine. Pitt replied by promising that as soon as the necessary formal business had been done, there should be a dissolution and an appeal to the people; to which Fox answered by protesting that the King had no right to dissolve Parliament in the middle of the session, and by obstructing necessary public business. He thus put himself in the wrong, and enabled reformers to say that the Whigs, bent on oligarchy, would not even submit to the judgment of the nation. The election which followed showed that, unrepresentative as the electoral system was, an excited
nation could still use it as a means of expressing strong feeling. The reformers worked with enthusiasm for Pitt. Fox’s followers were simply swept away; 160 of them lost their seats. The downfall of the Whigs was irreparable and complete. The hopes of a restoration of the oligarchy followed into limbo the system built up by the King and Lord North; and the youthful Prime Minister entered upon his real tenure of power with an extraordinary hold upon the public imagination.


It was expected by the reformers, who had contributed effectively to secure Pitt’s sweeping victory, that its first result would be the realisation of their hopes; and when Pitt announced that he would introduce a Reform Bill in 1785 their triumph seemed to be assured. But they did not know their leader. All that he did to fulfil the expectations he had aroused was to ask leave to introduce a bill, the terms of which he did not even define; they seem to have been limited to a vicious scheme for buying out pocket-boroughs, thus recognising them as property. He left the House free to vote as it thought fit; the House refused him leave; and it would appear that Pitt was neither surprised nor much disappointed. From that day onwards he never raised a hand for reform, never tried to convert his followers, or to stimulate the demand in the country. The reformers were deeply disappointed, and their enthusiasm was chilled. Before another general election took place, the French Revolution had broken out, and the passions it aroused made such changes more difficult than ever. After using it for his own purposes, Pitt had, in truth, effectually damped down a very healthy and promising national movement; and in doing so he had done a great disservice to his country. For a scheme of reform carried through before the French Revolution would have saved the country from many ills.

Pitt’s treatment of the reform movement, which had given him his chance in high politics, illustrates in a striking way the distinctive limitations and qualities of a very remarkable man. Like Walpole before him, he was anxious to avoid creating public excitement, because he was persuaded that what the country needed after the strain of recent years was a period of quiescence and of restorative statesmanship, especially in the sphere of finance. A great
excitement, such as a reform campaign would arouse, might endanger this; and Pitt’s intense love of power, and unwillingness to risk losing it, reinforced this consideration. In the same way, and for the same reasons, while he declared his support of the movement for the abolition of the slave-trade, and spoke and voted in favour of Wilberforce’s motions on the subject, he never risked his own political fortunes on this cause. The abolition of the slave-trade was therefore delayed until after Pitt’s death, when his old rival Fox, then a dying man enjoying a short spell of power with a precarious majority, forced the question through with characteristic vigour.

As these instances show, the young minister, great man as he was, was incapable of the self-forgetful if sometimes unbalanced ardour of his generous rival. He could appreciate intellectually the importance of great causes such as parliamentary reform or the abolition of the slave-trade; but he could not be impassioned by them. But to say this is not to say that he was not a very great man indeed, and if he was eaten up by ambition, his ambition was the noble one of spending laborious days and anxious nights in the service of his country. He shared with his father a superb self-confidence, a serene contempt for money which was even more marked in him than in the elder statesman, and an undeviating and whole-hearted patriotism. Like his father he was a solitary man, cultivating an Olympian aloofness and enjoying few intimacies; and there was something almost inhuman in his utter absorption in public affairs. No doubt he suffered from his premature immersion in politics. He came to them so young, before he had seen the world as a man among his fellows. But there was in this lonely man, who was never young, a steely firmness, a serene assurance of power, which was an immense strength in times of crisis, and justified the admiring though rather distant devotion with which he was regarded by his followers. When the world reeled and empires crashed, this man could stand unshaken.

Though he was a man of much loftier aims and far greater intellectual power than Walpole, yet Walpole is of all English statesmen the one whom he most nearly resembled in the character and direction of the work which he preferred to do. Like Walpole, his chief interest lay in the sphere of finance; like Walpole, he did his country the real and solid service of using an interval of peace for healing and restoring

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1 See below, Chap. x. p. 135.
work which enabled it to pass through a crisis when it came. And the work which he did bears a striking resemblance to Walpole's.

In the first place he restored to full efficiency the system of cabinet government in dependence upon Parliament; a system which Walpole had first fully wrought out, but which had never been quite satisfactorily handled since his time. George III. may have hoped, when the Whigs were defeated, that the personal authority he had enjoyed in North's time would be restored. But Pitt was no North, content to be the mere agent of his master's will, and to allow his colleagues to deal separately with that master. He was as definitely the head of his own cabinet as Walpole had been, and insisted upon cabinet discipline and joint cabinet responsibility. After Pitt's time the theory of cabinet government, with the Prime Minister as its keystone, was never again challenged or misunderstood.

In the second place Pitt, like Walpole, emphasised the supremacy of the House of Commons by remaining a member of that body throughout his career, and making its opinion the test of his policy. But the House of Commons was now a different body from what it had been in Walpole's time. The great body of placemen, upon whom governments had relied, had largely disappeared, thanks to economical reform; and Government had to depend upon the steady support of an organised party. The groups and cliques which had long competed for office had practically disappeared, and the House was definitely divided between the two great parties, Whigs and Tories, perpetually embattled one against the other. The strong personalities of the two leaders emphasised this cleavage, which was to be, for a long time to come, distinctive of the British system. Pitt was, in effect, the creator of a new Tory party, unhindered by obsolete theories about divine right, and not by any means committed to opposition to all change, but acting on the principle that large changes should never be made unless and until they are unmistakably needed and demanded, and that the main function of Government is to govern.

Next to Pitt's contribution to the settlement of the British system of government, and in his own view at least as important, was his work in dealing with the urgent problems left by a period of war and of maladministration. We have already seen how, in the India Act of 1784, he found an

1 Chap. vi. p. 86.
eminently sane and workable solution of one great imperial problem. We shall see in a later chapter how, in the Canada Act of 1791, he dealt with another imperial problem of quite a different kind, on sound traditional lines. He tried, also, in 1785 to find a solution for the difficult relations between Britain and Ireland set up by the grant of legislative independence. His plan was to turn Great Britain and Ireland into a fiscal unit by agreement between the two Parliaments. The Irish Parliament was ready to agree; but the scheme was defeated by the jealousy of English commercial interests, and, having burnt his fingers, Pitt dropped the subject, as he had dropped parliamentary reform, not to return to it until the pressure of circumstances forced him to do so.

But the part of his work upon which Pitt himself placed the highest value was the reorganisation of national finance. When he took office the permanent debt had risen to the unprecedented figure of £224,000,000; there was also a large floating or unfunded debt; there was an annual deficit of many millions; national credit was seriously impaired; and the whole system of taxation was in a state of incredible confusion and complexity. By unremitting labour, especially during the years 1785-1787, he evolved order out of chaos. He overhauled the whole system of taxation. Many commodities were burdened with a number of separate duties, assigned to different purposes, which involved needless expense in administration. Pitt made a whole new book of rates, with a single duty on each article. In many cases the duties were so heavy that wholesale smuggling was encouraged: scientific treatment of the tariff, and in some cases a considerable reduction of duty, at once increased the revenue, reduced prices, and diminished smuggling. In the case of tea, for example, the duty was reduced from 119 to 12½ per cent. The floating debt was funded. The annual deficit disappeared. And in 1786 a sinking fund for the redemption of the debt was established; £1,000,000 per annum being set aside to accumulate at compound interest, a provision which should have extinguished the debt in twenty-eight years. So long as the £1,000,000 was provided by a real surplus of income over expenditure, these calculations were sound enough. Unfortunately this state of things only lasted seven years; for the outbreak of the French war substituted deficits for surpluses. Pitt, however, imagining that there was some-

1 Chap. xi. p. 138.
thing magical in the working of compound interest, insisted upon keeping his sinking fund going even when this involved borrowing money at a higher rate of interest to pay off debt at a lower rate of interest. This strange blunder not only cost the nation very dear, but forms a serious blot on Pitt's reputation as a financier. Nevertheless his work in this field was a real and great service to the community. It restored national credit, helped Britain to recover with surprising rapidity from the strain of the last war, and made her ready to face the more terrible strain which was soon to fall upon her.

Though the organisation of national finance was a great public service, it involved no novel principle. But in 1786 Pitt concluded a commercial treaty with France, whereby the goods of each country were to be admitted on more favourable terms to the other; and this constituted a definite breach with the traditions of Whig policy which had governed the regulation of foreign trade ever since the Revolution. It was the teaching of Adam Smith, whose disciple he was, that led Pitt to the adoption of this policy. From Adam Smith he derived the belief that the exchange of trade is profitable to both sides, and that France could not send goods to Britain without directly or indirectly taking British goods in exchange. In the debates on the treaty Fox denounced it in accordance with traditional Whig principles, on the ground that trade policy ought to be conceived with the view of doing damage to France, since every increase in the prosperity of France increased her power to injure Britain. Here, at any rate, Pitt spoke the language of enlightenment, Fox of obscurantism. But Fate did not permit of any development of the new policy thus inaugurated. Within seven years Britain was at war with France, and the treaty became a dead letter. In this, as in other spheres, the work of Pitt is seen by the modern reader overshadowed by the coming cloud of the French Revolution, which made his wisdom seem futile, and doubled the evil effects of his limitations.


If the nearness of the coming storm makes a just estimate difficult in regard to the work of these years even in domestic affairs, it seems still more to reduce to insignificance the diplomacy of the period, which appears curiously unreal and
futile under that menacing shadow. But it is important to note that, before the Revolution began, Pitt had brought Britain back into the diplomatic discussions of the Powers, in which she had practically taken no share during the period of political confusion we have been surveying. Pitt had no large or imaginative conceptions in foreign policy. He conceived no plans for the welfare of Europe. He was not a European statesman, but purely a British statesman; and his sole concern, as it was the concern of Walpole before him, was to avoid war, and to save his country from the danger of being friendless in a great crisis as she had been during the last war.

The peace of Europe seemed to be endangered by three factors in the European situation. The first of these was the ambition of France, and her close connexion with Spain; and this naturally seemed, after recent experiences, to be the most menacing to Britain. The second was the still acute jealousy of Austria and Prussia, and their competition for the leadership of Germany; they had been at war in 1778 and 1779; they were constantly fighting a diplomatic battle; and though the old rivals had died, Maria Theresa in 1780 and Frederick the Great in 1786, the mutual hostility of their successors was never more than veiled. The third factor was the rapid and alarming growth of the power of Russia under Catherine the Great, who dominated Poland, and seemed likely to overthrow and conquer the Turkish Empire. With all these three factors Pitt made some attempt to deal; he dealt with none of them very successfully.

He came in conflict with France over the question of Holland, where a republican party was trying to overthrow the house of Orange, with the moral support of France. Instead of insisting that the Dutch must settle their own problems of government, Pitt joined hands with Prussia to re-establish the Orange party; and in the end a Triple Alliance of Britain, Prussia, and Holland was formed (1788). This was regarded as a great diplomatic victory, because it was supposed to give Britain support and security against the French danger. In fact it taught the republicans of Holland to regard Britain as their enemy and France as their friend, and this had its influence during the coming wars. There was a conflict also with Spain when in 1789 Spain expelled a British settlement from Nootka Sound (Vancouver Island). War seemed near; the fleet was mobilised; and Spain appealed to France for aid. But
France was already in the throes of revolution, and could do nothing. Nootka Sound (which meant the Northern Pacific coast of America) remained British.

In 1790 the long-standing rivalry of Austria and Prussia threatened to break out in a violent war. The impatient reforming zeal of the Emperor Joseph II. had brought about such unrest in his dominions that there seemed to be real danger of the Habsburg power breaking up. Belgium was in open revolt, and had declared a republic; there was a widespread revolt in Hungary; and meanwhile a war, carried on in alliance with Russia, was raging against the Turks. Prussia was anxious to use this opportunity to attack Austria, and she hoped to draw in Britain under the Triple Alliance. Pitt refused to take part in this design, and helped in the restoration of amicable relations between the two German powers, which was later to make possible their combined attack on France. But his refusal to join with Prussia reduced the vaunted Triple Alliance to a nullity.

The third problem of the period was the inability of the Turks to resist Catherine of Russia, whose generals were winning startling victories; there seemed to be a possibility that the Turkish power would collapse, and that Russia would reach Constantinople. This seemed to Pitt a grave danger; and he even went so far as to issue an ultimatum to Catherine. But the ultimatum was contemptuously disregarded; and Pitt had to accept the slight before the eyes of Europe. The importance of the episode was not only that it undermined British influence in Europe at a critical moment on the eve of the revolutionary war, but still more that it marked the beginning of the hostility to Russia which was, with few and brief intervals, to have a dominating influence in British policy for a century to come. The debates in the House of Commons on this question had a startlingly modern air; they might almost have been spoken a century later, in the duel between Disraeli and Gladstone. Pitt, the founder of the new Toryism, like his distant successor, laid stress on the necessity of protecting the 'integrity of the Turkish Empire'; Burke and Fox almost anticipated the language of Gladstone in their protests against using the power of Britain to bolster up the tyranny of the Turk over Christian peoples, and against the folly of unreasoning dread of Russia.

It was thus with the discredit of a rather humiliating failure that Pitt turned to deal with the terrible problem of
rampant Revolution. His nine years of peaceful power had been an unconscious preparation for this ordeal. And if it is impossible to feel an unalloyed admiration for the work of these nine years, at least it must be recognised that it had helped to heal the wounds of the last conflict, and restored the Commonwealth in strength.

[Lecky, History of England in the 18th Century; Robertson, England under the Hanoverians; Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne; Hammond, Life of Fox; Holland Rose, William Pitt and National Revival; Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy; Veitch, Genesis of Parliamentary Reform; Burke, Speech on Economical Reform; Pares, King George III. and the Politicians; Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution; Butterfield, George III., Lord North and the People; Hobhouse, Fox; Erich Eyck, Pitt versus Fox, Father and Son; P. Magnus, Edmund Burke; Cobb, Edmund Burke; D. L. Keir, Constitutional History of Modern Britain.]
CHAPTER IX

THE BEGINNING OF ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN BRITAIN

Important as were the new political movements which we have been surveying, they were not so vital in their ultimate significance as a series of economic developments which were concurrently taking place, almost silently, in Britain. Economic society was beginning to undergo a transformation which, starting in Britain, was in the not distant future to modify profoundly the social and political structure of the whole Western World, and to give birth to the complex problems which engrossed men's attention throughout the nineteenth century, and are still engrossing it to-day. The changes of the period affected both agriculture and manufacturing industry.

§ 1. Agricultural Progress and Enclosures.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century British agriculture was less advanced than that of some other countries. It still clung to traditional methods, because these were sufficient to provide an adequate and even a generous sustenance for the population, which grew very slowly; the population of England and Wales was only about 5,000,000 in 1700, and had not risen to more than 6,000,000 by 1750. But during the first half of the century a series of agricultural reformers introduced new and more scientific methods, which promised a rapid increase of production, if only they could be generally applied. Jethro Tull, a gentleman farmer of Berkshire, studied the conditions favourable to plant-life, and invented new modes of drilling and hoeing. Lord Townshend, a Norfolk landowner, worked on the rotation of crops, and showed how a crop of turnips restored the land after a wheat crop, besides providing winter-feed for cattle. Robert Bakewell, a Leicestershire farmer, brought about great improvements in the breed of sheep and cattle. And the example of these
and other pioneers made scientific farming a fashionable hobby during the second half of the century. It was at once interesting, profitable and patriotic. The King himself was a keen farmer; and rich magnates like the Duke of Bedford and Thomas Coke of Holkham (later Earl of Leicester) threw themselves into the work with immense enthusiasm and admirable results. A school of agricultural writers, among whom the vivid and eager Arthur Young was the most distinguished, helped to spread the gospel of scientific farming; and the arts of husbandry advanced more rapidly than ever before. Indeed, in this field Britain took the lead of the world.

But the zeal of the agricultural reformers was everywhere checked by one great obstacle—the old-fashioned system of open-field cultivation, which still persisted over more than half of England. Under this system the lands of a township were divided into great arable fields, cultivated according to a fixed rotation, wherein many large or small holders held a number of scattered strips; while beyond the arable fields stretched an expanse of uncultivated waste, on which all enjoyed fixed rights of pasture. No one was free to cultivate his own land as he thought fit; all had to follow the same practice; and a great deal of good land was compulsorily left unused, either as fallow or as waste.

In theory, of course, there was no reason why a township as a whole should not introduce a new rotation, or fresh crops, or improved methods of tillage. In practice it was almost impossible to bring about such a change, because everybody had to agree; and if it was tried, one obstinate man might ruin everything by insisting upon turning his cattle among the growing corn in a field which by custom ought to be fallow. Lord North tried to get over this difficulty by an Act (1773) empowering a majority to make such changes, but it was of no avail. The only remedy was to sweep away the old system by enclosing the lands—that is, by giving to each holder a solid block equal to his total holding, and letting him do what he liked with it. All the agricultural reformers were enthusiasts for enclosure both of arable fields and of waste lands. They were so keen that they failed to realise one virtue which the old system had possessed: if it penalised enterprise, it encouraged the community-spirit and protected the small man.

Enclosures had been going on quietly for centuries, both enclosures of the arable fields and enclosures of the waste. But they could only be effected by agreement, which it
was often impossible to get. The eighteenth century, in its zeal, adopted another method: enclosure by private Act of Parliament, which overcame all difficulties. During the reign of George III. Enclosure Acts were introduced by scores in every parliamentary session, and they were passed as a matter of course, practically without discussion, because everybody believed that every enclosure of a township meant an increase of the country's prosperity. And, broadly speaking, this was true. As the movement progressed the produce of English soil increased very rapidly, and with it grew the power of the country to maintain a large and industrious population.

But the small man suffered by the change. As Enclosure Acts were nearly always promoted by the large proprietors, the small holders did not always get fair treatment. Even if they did, a little patch of land in full property could not be a real equivalent for the right of pasture on the waste. The cost of fencing the new holdings was often ruinous. And as the small man never had enough capital to be able to employ the new scientific methods, even if he understood them, he was apt to be beaten by the competition of his richer neighbours. The result was that he commonly had to sell his land to the big man, who was always ready to buy; and then he dropped inevitably into the ranks of the landless labourers, working for a wage, or drifted into some town to work at a trade. This process was the inevitable consequence of enclosure. But it only took place gradually, and was not yet very marked during this period. Even at the end of the century, though thousands of Enclosure Acts had been passed, half of the townships of England were still unenclosed.

Thus an agricultural development which in itself was sound and healthy was bringing about great social changes. The big landowners were adding field to field; the small holders were slowly disappearing. English rural society was ceasing to be the homogeneous society, without sharp cleavages between class and class, which in the main it had still been in the middle of the century; a gulf was gradually opening between a mass of landless labourers on the one hand, and on the other a small group of great landowners and a class of capitalist farmers. This gulf was to become very apparent during the next generation. And this meant that the landowning magnates were ceasing to be the natural leaders of a homogeneous society; and the justification for their political predominance was diminishing.

§ 2. The Beginning of the Industrial Revolution.

Meanwhile a still more important change was coming about in some spheres of manufacturing industry. New mechanical devices were being applied to the processes of manufacture. The change was most notable in the cotton industry of Lancashire, which had hitherto been one of the less important of English counties, but was now about to enter upon its career as the greatest industrial centre of England. Lancashire had not yet learnt how to make pure cotton goods; because her spinners could not spin a sufficiently firm thread from the brittle fibre of cotton to make the warp of a durable cloth, and the nimble-fingered Indians still controlled the world’s markets in fine cotton goods. But Lancashire had long made mixed stuffs in which a cotton weft was woven upon a linen or woollen warp. These goods were especially used in the tropical trade, for the tropics did not want woollens; and the predominance of Liverpool in the traffic of the West Indies and West Africa was largely due to the near neighbourhood of this Lancashire industry. But the tropical trade had grown so rapidly that it was overtaking the productive power of Lancashire. Lancashire’s greatest need was for an increase of cotton yarn. It took five spinners to keep one weaver at work; and this difficulty was felt far more in the cotton trade than in the woollen trade, because cotton could not be spun, as wool was, in almost every rural cottage. The difficulty was overcome by a series of inventions, all due to Lancashire men. James Hargreaves, a Blackburn blacksmith, invented about 1764 the ‘spinning-jenny,’ which enabled one man or woman to attend to a large number of spindles at once; but the yarn which it produced was too soft to form a warp. Richard Arkwright, a Bolton barber, patented in 1769 the ‘water-frame,’ which spun (by means of rollers worked by horse-power or water-power) a hard and firm yarn which could be used as a warp. And Samuel Crompton, a Bolton spinner, invented in 1779 a cross between the spinning-jenny and the water-frame which was called the ‘mule,’ and which produced a yarn firm enough to be used as a warp, and fine enough to be woven into the most delicate fabrics.

The results of these inventions were that Lancashire began to produce fine stuffs of pure cotton which beat the Indian products; and that the weavers obtained a supply of yarn so abundant and so cheap that they were kept fully at work, at greatly increased wages. With its new machines
Lancashire could now pay higher wages, yield immense profits to the organisers of the industry, and still produce cotton stuffs more abundantly and more cheaply than they could be got anywhere else in the world. The import of raw cotton increased fourfold in the fifteen years from 1775 to 1790; and the foreign trade of Britain received a stimulus which in itself more than balanced the economic losses caused by the American War.

The new inventions brought about a great change in the organisation of the spinning side of the cotton industry. The machines were costly, and they could be most economically worked in groups, especially when water-power began to be employed. Hence home-spinning rapidly died out; and factories, owned and worked by substantial capitalists, sprang up in the valleys where water-power was available, while beside them mushroom townlets came into being. The workers in these factories were at first paid very fair wages. But their position had changed. In some ways they were better off; but they were no longer their own masters, working at their own homes; they were 'hands,' cogs in a machine. Moreover, much of the work of machine-tending was quite unskilled. It could be done by quite young children; and the enormity of child-labour in factories came into being.

These new methods of organisation were but beginning in our period. They had almost completely captured the spinning branch of the cotton industry; they were gradually being introduced into the spinning of wool. But they had not affected the weaving side of the textile trades, save that the weavers were no longer short of yarn, and were enjoying great prosperity. The weavers' turn was soon to come: in 1785 Edmund Cartwright, brother of the parliamentary reformer, invented the power-loom, which promised to bring weaving also under the system of large-scale production in factories. But more than a decade passed before the power-loom began to be at all widely used. Till then, the golden age of the hand-loom weavers continued.

The same years which saw the invention of these textile machines saw also a great advance in the steam-engine, which was soon to be employed for working them. Pumping engines, worked by steam, had been invented by Savory and Newcomen at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century; but the Newcomen engine was cumbersome, wasteful, and expensive. In 1764 a man of real scientific genius, James Watt of Glasgow, turned
his attention to this problem, and so transformed the steam-engine that it could be used for many purposes. From 1768 the works of Boulton and Watt at Birmingham were supplying on an increasing scale the engines which Watt went on persistently improving. A new and immeasurable power, which was to be the most potent instrument in the shaping of a new civilisation, had been placed at the service of man. Before the French Revolution, indeed, Watt's engines had not begun to be used for any purpose other than the pumping of mines. But they were transforming the conditions of the mining industry, and enabling it to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by other inventions of these remarkable years.

The British iron industries had long been prosperous. But they were being handicapped by the exhaustion of the woods whence the charcoal necessary for smelting the iron was drawn, for no alternative to charcoal had yet been discovered for smelting; and it was only by importing iron from Spain and Sweden that the iron manufactures were kept going. In 1760, however, a new method of smelting iron with coal was for the first time successfully applied at the Carron works in Scotland. This discovery gave a new lease of life to the British iron-fields. It very greatly cheapened the production of iron: the first iron bridge, for example, was built in 1779, across the Severn. And it made available for industrial purposes the enormous wealth of the British coal-fields, hitherto used almost solely for domestic fires. Coal, as the fuel for the steam-engine, and as the foundation of the rapidly expanding iron industries, quickly became the main pillar of a new industrial order. The age of coal, of iron and of steam had begun; and these forces were to transform the conditions of human life. At a stroke these discoveries multiplied many fold the potential wealth of Britain, her power of maintaining an increased population, and the services she could render to the world.

Other inventions contributed. Cort of Gosport invented methods of rolling and 'puddling'; Huntsman of Sheffield found the means of casting hard steel; the catalogue of inventions is endless, and intelligible only to experts. Nor were they limited to the major industries, the textiles and iron and steel. This was a period of very rapid progress in the art of pottery; and new processes, due to many inventive brains, among whom the greatest was Josiah Wedgwood, produced work distinguished by artistic beauty
as well as technical skill. Staffordshire became the centre of the greatest pottery industry in the world.

§ 3. The Improvement of Communications.

The new powers of wealth-production with which all these inventions endowed the British people could not be utilised to the full without a great improvement in the means of communication. For coal and raw materials had to be moved about the country on a large scale, the spinners' yarn had to be transferred from the factory to the weavers' homes, the machines themselves had to be transported, the armies of work-people coming into the new industries had to be enabled to travel easily, the food-supplies of the new towns had to be brought in. New problems of transport arose: transport had become the key of progressive industry.

In this first generation of the new era, attention was still concentrated upon the most ancient methods of transport, the road and the waterway. When the period opened Britain was in both of these far behind her chief European rivals, France and Holland. Her roads were inconceivably badly kept, so that travelling was excessively slow, toilsome, and costly; and the transport of goods had to be carried on chiefly by packhorses, which could not possibly meet the new demands. Britain was poor in natural waterways, especially in the regions of the Midlands and the North where the new industries found their chief centres; and, apart from a few projects for deepening shallow streams, carried out in the first half of the eighteenth century, she had done nothing to make good her deficiencies.

The badness of the roads was mainly due to the fact that they were under the management of local authorities, which shrank from levying rates. Improvements began with the creation of turnpike trusts, which were authorised to levy tolls from the users of the roads which they maintained. There was a great deal of activity along these lines during this period: no less than 450 Acts of Parliament relating to public roads were passed during the first fourteen years of George III.'s reign. But it was not until the next generation that the great engineers, Telford, Macadam and others, endowed Britain with the best roads in the world.

It was by means of waterways that this generation mainly met its transport problem; and here its activity was remarkable. In 1759 the Duke of Bridgewater engaged an able, uneducated pioneer, Brindley, to design a canal from
his collieries at Worsley to Manchester. This was the first artificial canal in Britain. It was successful from the first, and was soon extended to the Mersey at Runcorn. How greatly this enterprise contributed to the prosperity of Lancashire (which depended on the import of raw cotton from Liverpool, and the distribution of the finished product by way of Liverpool) may be illustrated by a single figure. It had cost 40s. a ton to transport goods from Manchester to Liverpool by road. Even in the early days it cost 6s. a ton by the Bridgewater Canal.

The success of the Bridgewater Canal led to an immense expenditure of energy in the construction of ‘inland navigations’; and gangs of ‘navigators’ or ‘navvies’ became for the first time a common feature in England. Within the next fifty years 2600 miles of canals were constructed in England, and some of the biggest projects had been carried out before the French Revolution began. In particular such waterways as the Leeds and Liverpool and the Mersey and Calder Canals opened up the industrial area of the Lancashire and Yorkshire coal-fields, whose development had been checked by the hilly character of the country and the absence of good roads and navigable rivers. Thus alone were rendered possible the rapid concentration of a new population in regions that had hitherto been among the most backward in England, and the extraordinary shifting of the main centres of wealth and population which was one of the outstanding features of the next generation.

It was not merely an economic change that was thus beginning; it was a social revolution. The old, settled, stable order which we described as existing in Britain in the middle of the eighteenth century was being wholly transformed. The most momentous change in the conditions of human life which history records was fairly afoot; and Britain was the country of its origin. But the full significance of this change was as yet quite unrealised. Securely enthroned, the old governing classes were wholly blind to the forces that were at work beneath their feet, undermining the very foundations of their power, and making it inevitable that sooner or later the political system should be readjusted to accord with the change in the social order. It will be a large part of our business, in later Books, to observe the development of this mighty and silent upheaval.

In the meantime, one comment may be permitted. After the disasters of the American War there were many who

\[1\] Vol. i. pp. 782 ff.
believed that the days of British greatness were over. What an answer to these vain and shallow prognostications was afforded by the boundless energy and inventiveness which were revealed in the activities we have just summarised! The days of British greatness were not over: they were about to begin.

[Cunningham, Growth of English Industry and Commerce; Mantoux, Révolution Industrielle en Angleterre; Prothero, English Farming, Past and Present; Gonner, Common Land and Inclosure; Slater, English Peasantry and Enclosures; Hasbach, History of the English Agricultural Labourer; Daniels, Early History of the Lancashire Cotton Industry; T. S. Ashton, Industrial Revolution; C. R. Fay, Great Britain from Adam Smith to the Present day; E. Lipson, Economic History of England; A.S. Turberville, Life in Johnson’s England.]
CHAPTER X
THE MOVEMENT OF IDEAS

§ 1. Literary Activity.

It was not only in the field of industry that this age saw the development of new and fertile ideas. Not less important was the activity of the period in all those intellectual pursuits which lead to a better understanding of man’s life and of the problems of social organisation.

It was a period of fruitful energy in all the creative arts. In painting it saw the beginning of the great English period, with Reynolds’, Gainsborough’s, and Romney’s lovely renderings of the grace and beauty of English aristocracy, and with Hogarth’s rich realism in the portrayal of humbler forms of English life. It was the greatest age of the English theatre, next to that of Shakespeare; for David Garrick and Sarah Siddons were raising the art of acting to its highest level, and Sheridan and Goldsmith were recreating English comedy. In poetry it saw the dawning of a new and great era; the grave beauty of Gray struck a deeper note than the first half of the century had known; Cowper, Crabbe and Goldsmith were suffusing with the glow of poetry the life of common men; the ‘enthusiasm of humanity’ was taking English poetry into its service.

Perhaps the chief literary distinction of the age was its richness in the Novel, that intimate and adaptable commentary on human life which, more easily than any other literary form, can give to its readers an imaginative realisation of the modes of life, the difficulties, the moral strength and weakness, of their fellows. If a sympathetic understanding of conditions beyond our own experience is the foundation of a healthy social life, then surely the inventors and practitioners of this mode of picturing human life rendered a real service not only to letters but to politics.

The Novel was, in effect, almost invented by the English writers of the generation preceding and the generation succeeding the accession of George III. The work of Richardson and Fielding belongs to the first part of this period; the work of Sterne and of Smollett falls on both sides of the line; the work of Goldsmith and the best work
of Fanny Burney were done in the generation preceding the French Revolution. The great series of imaginative, and for the most part tender and kindly, pictures of the life of ordinary men, which included Pamela, Tom Jones and Tristram Shandy, Humphry Clinker, The Vicar of Wakefield and Evelina, not only added a new glory to English literature, they led their readers to think more humanely and more sympathetically of their fellows. It would have been a strange thing if a generation which read with delight these pictures of the life of their own people had not shown an increased humanity in their social life, and a growing desire to remove the obstacles to good will and happiness. The humanitarian spirit which was one of the glories of this age assuredly drew no small part of its inspiration from the atmosphere of kindliness which the great novelists diffused.

§ 2. Adam Smith, Bentham, and Gibbon.

Of equal value with the great imaginative works of the time, and of more immediate significance for our study of the growth of organised human fellowship in the British Commonwealth, were the remarkable studies of the working of human society which illustrated this period. By a strange coincidence the year 1776—the year of the Declaration of American Independence—saw the publication of three great books, each, in its own sphere, of epoch-marking significance: Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, Jeremy Bentham’s Fragment on Government, and the first volume of Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.

Adam Smith has been called the ‘founder of political economy.’ This does not mean that all, or even most, of his ideas were original. He drew much upon his predecessors who had been at work for a century past, and especially upon the French group of economic thinkers who were known as the ‘Physiocrats.’ But he drew together the scattered and piecemeal speculations of his predecessors, added much of his own, and constructed a coherent and systematic view of the working of society in its economic aspect which definitely formed a new starting-point for all inquiry in this field. The most striking aspect of his doctrine was the principle, which he supported with very cogent argument, that national prosperity is best served when the operation of private enterprise, and the working of natural economic forces, are least interfered with by Government. It was a conclusion which seemed especially
convincing to a generation in which private enterprise was producing the results we have surveyed in the last chapter. One consequence of Adam Smith's teaching was to be, in course of time, of especial importance in influencing the relations between Britain and other countries, and also between the homeland and other members of the Commonwealth. Smith cogently refuted the long-accepted view that one nation could only thrive in trade at the expense of others, and that, therefore, national policy should aim at inflicting the maximum damage upon trading rivals. That had been the dominating idea of Whig trade policy. Smith urged the contrary view—that the more widely prosperity is diffused, the better it is for all nations; that trading exchange is beneficial to both sides; and that therefore a wise policy will, so far as possible, cast down barriers and permit trade to move freely in its natural channels, between nations as well as within their limits. These were revolutionary ideas. They were inconsistent with the continued maintenance of an exclusive trade policy in the government of colonies, which had been the accepted principle of the British Commonwealth ever since 1660; and they therefore prepared the way for the creation of a new colonial system, the character of which was to be due far more to the teachings of Adam Smith than to the lessons learnt from the American struggle.

Jeremy Bentham's *Fragment on Government* does not, in itself, deserve to rank with *The Wealth of Nations*. But it was the first clear exposition of the thought of its author, which was to be developed in a long series of writings, often crabbed and obscure. Bentham's political theories were to have a deep and practical influence, and we shall see more of them in a later chapter.¹ He was the founder of the 'utilitarian' school of philosophy, and the inspirer of the 'philosophic radicals' of the early nineteenth century, whose ideas for two generations deeply affected the policy of British governments. He was the first political thinker to get cleanly away from the idea of a 'social contract,' and the abstract and quasi-legal rights which were supposed to be derived from the contract. With all the barren arguments as to what 'rights' men had in a 'state of nature,' and how far they lost them or qualified them when they passed under the 'social contract,' Bentham had no patience at all; and in this respect he was the scornful critic of Rousseau and the revolutionary thinkers. But he was himself as

¹ See below, Book ix. chap. ii. p. 320.
revolutionary as any of them. For Bentham the one supreme fact was that all men desire happiness, and that this desire is ultimately the motive of all their actions—a disputable conclusion. The creation of happiness must therefore be the purpose for which men set up States; and the aim which every State ought to set before itself must be 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number.' This famous phrase, which swept away all theories of abstract rights, all claims to enjoy privileges of class and sect, all traditional obligations, if they did not contribute to the one supreme end, was to have a very potent influence in the coming time. It made its first appearance in the Fragment on Government, though its implications were not to be worked out until later. But the queer, shy, pedantic philosopher was busily engaged during the years following 1776 upon the bold attempt to work out a whole system of law and government on the basis of his formula. Few read his works; but some of those who did became powerful advocates of a sweeping transformation of society.

Bentham's greatest weakness was that he spun his theories in the air, without much relation to facts. Like most of his predecessors in the realm of political philosophy, he never learnt to think of human societies as the result of evolution, or realised to how great an extent men's thoughts, and their relations with one another, are determined by the character of the community in which they live, by the modes of life which they have inherited from the past, and to which they cling just because they are used to them. The true corrective to bald and abstract thinking like Bentham's or like Rousseau's is to be found in historical studies; and this generation produced, in Gibbon, one of the few supreme historians, the real founder of modern historical science.

Gibbon's Decline and Fall is (apart from the Greek and Latin historians) the one great historical work written before the nineteenth century which is still alive, still a real factor in shaping men's thoughts; and there are few historical books of the nineteenth century as secure of a long future life. The reason for this is not to be found solely in its rich and brocaded style, nor in the wide learning on which it was based, but mainly in the majestic perspective which it gives of the growth, the gradual transformation, and the decay of a great human society. Gibbon makes his reader feel the innumerable factors that have contributed to this mighty process; how ideas and theories have arisen, exercised their influence, and been forgotten; how modes of
life and modes of thought have insensibly undergone profound changes; and yet how, in all ages, the life of the individual has been shaped and moulded by the character of the society of which he is a member. It is difficult for the thoughtful reader of such a story to think of a human society as something that can be fixed in a final form according to the limited and fragile theories of thinkers whose own very thoughts are shaped by the past and the present of the society in which they live. That is the great contribution of historical studies, worthily pursued, to sound thinking on political questions: and this corrective was never more powerfully given than by Gibbon, nor was it ever more needed than by an age which was full of theories and plans for the reconstruction of human society according to predetermined patterns woven from the brain-stuff of philosophers.

The historical way of thinking was to be one of the moulding factors in the development of human affairs during the nineteenth century. It had already one great exponent in British politics during these years, in Edmund Burke, the deepest mind that has ever devoted itself to politics in the British Commonwealth. The richness and depth of Burke's thought were indeed mainly due to his ever-present sense of the immense influence exercised by the past in the moulding of the future, his conviction of the folly of acting as if there were no past, as if men could start de novo in the organisation of their concerns, and his deep belief that every human society is a living and growing thing, not a mere artificial mechanism. But Burke had already illustrated, in his attitude towards parliamentary reform, and was to illustrate more fully in his attitude towards the French Revolution, the danger of an exaggerated reverence for the past. The danger of allowing the past to be a mere incubus upon one's mind is as great as the danger of disregarding it.

§ 3. The Religious Revival.

Alongside of this serious work in the realms of political and economic thought, there went a religious revival. Both the Church of England and the Nonconformist Churches felt a new breath of life; and what is known as the 'Evangelical' Movement became very powerful, influencing not only the actual work of the Churches, but the whole tone of large sections of society, and producing definite and significant political results. The stimulus of the Evangelical Movement came, no doubt, largely from the Wesleys. But it was in
some ways definitely distinguished from the Wesleyan movement. For one thing, its theology was Calvinist, which Wesley's never was. It was, in truth, largely a revival of the dormant Puritanism of England, a return to the conceptions of the seventeenth century. The movement obtained a very strong hold upon the middle classes, those classes which were playing the main part in the industrial transformation. But it had great influence upon the upper classes also; the King himself was a sincerely religious man, as were many (of the secondary figures at any rate) among the political leaders of the time.

The Evangelicals laid especial stress upon personal salvation, and upon the immediate responsibility of every individual soul to its Maker; and this individualist character of their religious teaching was in accord with the political and economic tendencies of the time. They cared little about the Church as such, its ordinances and its common life. They gave much thought and labour to spreading religious teaching among the masses of the people. But although the equality of all human souls in the sight of God was an essential article of their creed, they were by no means democrats; and though they were philanthropists, few among them thought it their business to take political action for the relief of the growing evils from which the masses of men were suffering. Their message to the poor was too much limited to the preaching of contentment with the lot which God had assigned to them. Let a man be assured of his personal salvation, and he could console himself for the sufferings of this life by the prospect of bliss in the next.

For all that, the Evangelicals, though their view of life was often limited and uninspiring, did much for the elevation of their countrymen. They diffused widely a sense of personal responsibility for the right use of life; they had a high if rather narrow sense of duty; they brought back a genuine religious emotion, a care for things beyond self, into the life of their generation; and the hymns which they composed in very large numbers became an inspiration for generations to come to many thousands of British folk. The poems of this kind composed by the gentle Cowper and by his friend Newton, ex-slave-trader turned parson, became part of the heritage of the British peoples. Moreover, the religious revival of the age gave an immense stimulus to the humanitarian and philanthropic activities which were one of the glories of the age, and which contributed in no small degree to transform the character of the British Common-
wealth. The spirit of men like William Wilberforce, Zachary Macaulay, John Howard and Robert Raikes was a real enrichment of the society to which they belonged.

Because the Evangelical Movement was essentially a revival of Puritanism, it brought about a softening of the bitterness between Anglicans and Nonconformists. This in part contributed to the first step towards a relaxation of the disabilities still imposed upon Nonconformists, which was taken when in 1779 an Act was passed excusing Nonconformist ministers from subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles. That was not a great step, but it was something. And the growing spirit of tolerance extended even to the Roman Catholics, the laws against them being seldom enforced. We have seen the growth of this tolerance in Ireland, and the happy effects which it there produced. In 1778 an Act was passed allowing Roman priests to exercise their office in England, and a corresponding measure was proposed for Scotland. But fanaticism was not yet dead. Riots in Edinburgh and elsewhere in Scotland frightened the Government, and the Scottish Bill was withdrawn. This led to an outbreak of tumult in London also (1780). A monster petition for the repeal of the English Act was presented by Lord George Gordon, backed by a vast 'No Popery' procession, which behaved so insolently that the military had to be called out to protect Parliament. The mob took to burning Catholic chapels. Then the submerged underworld of London seethed up, and for five days the greater part of the city was in their hands. Only the courage of the King put a stop to the disgraceful orgy, and it was not until over 300 rioters had been killed that order was restored.


The Gordon Riots showed that toleration is a plant of slow growth. But, what was even more important, they brought home to the minds of comfortable and well-to-do people a vivid glimpse of the terrible underworld upon which their civilisation uneasy rested: a glimpse of misery and ignorance as the sources of brutality. And this revelation (which was reinforced by similar riots, provoked by the distresses of the American War, in other towns) contributed very powerfully to that remarkable outburst of philanthropic and humanitarian activity which began in this period, and which was to be one of the main factors in the making of a new Commonwealth.
Organised charitable work, indeed, on any large scale, began during this period; though, as we have seen, there had been some movements in this direction in the first half of the century. Hospitals and dispensaries, supported by private benevolence, sprang up in every part of the country. All the Churches undertook charitable activities of various kinds as part of their duty, and it was the steady insistence of the Churches that kept the movement active and growing. There were three aspects of the humanitarian movement that deserve special note.

The first of these was the reform of the prison system, which was inconceivably cruel and harmful. This was the work mainly of one man, John Howard. Being appointed High Sheriff of Bedfordshire in 1773, he made it his business to examine the prisons under his jurisdiction, and was so shocked by what he saw that he proceeded to visit all the prisons of England and of almost every country in Europe. His whole life, till his death in 1790, was devoted to this cause; and his books, and other methods of advocacy, did much to awaken the public conscience. It is a striking evidence of the temper of the period that Lord North's Parliament very promptly took action to remove the worst of the evils which he had described, and accepted his guidance in the creation of a more humane and enlightened system. There have been few more selfless or beneficent lives than that of John Howard; and his beneficence extended far beyond his own country, covering the whole of Europe.

The provision of education for the children of the poor was the second distinctive feature of this generation's philanthropic work. Here the leadership fell to Robert Raikes, a Gloucester newspaper proprietor, who in 1780 started a school on Sunday—the only free day—for children engaged in industry, and used all the influence he could wield to get the new idea adopted elsewhere. It was taken up very rapidly by all the Churches, and the conduct of Sunday Schools for children and adults (which were not concentrated upon religious teaching, but mainly instructed their pupils in reading and writing) became an almost essential part of the work of every Church, Anglican, Nonconformist or Roman Catholic. Within a few years some of the Churches began to open schools on week-days also, and during nearly a century the provision of elementary education mainly fell to the religious bodies. If a substantial proportion of the English people were able to read and

1 Vol. i. p. 704.
write, and therefore to follow with intelligence great political events, during the nineteenth century, the credit mainly belongs to the combined religious and philanthropic movement which began in the generation preceding the French Revolution.

The third great philanthropic movement of this era was the movement for the abolition of the slave-trade. This was indeed a heroic adventure. For it must be remembered that the slave-trade formed an essential element in the most lucrative of all the branches of overseas commerce,¹ and that while every European country had been eager to share in it, Britain had been proud of her success in acquiring the lion’s share of the trade. To persuade the nation to abandon in cold blood so vast a source of profit, which hitherto had been universally regarded as legitimate, was no easy undertaking. There can be no clearer indication of the change in the moral outlook of the British people which the religious revival had brought than the fact that such a movement should have been started at all. It began in 1787 with the foundation of a Society for the Abolition of the Slave-trade, whose members were mainly Evangelicals and Quakers. Their accepted leader was William Wilberforce, already active in many good works. It took them twenty years of untiring propaganda to win their way. But twenty years was not a very long time for so great an end; especially as these years were mostly filled by the effort and strain of a gigantic war. The nation which could produce such a movement, and, still more, the nation which could be converted by it to a measure which apparently involved an immense sacrifice at a time of great strain, was obviously not a nation wholly given over to material ends.

The beginning of the attack on the slave-trade marks the emergence of a new attitude towards backward peoples, a new sense of responsibility for their welfare; and the birth and growth of this attitude of mind were among the facts which were to affect the character of the new overseas empire that was, with amazing rapidity, to be created in place of that which had just been lost.

[Leslie Stephen, English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, and The English Utilitarians (vol. i., Bentham); S. and R. Wilberforce, Life of W. Wilberforce; Cambridge History of English Literature; Willey, The Eighteenth Century Background; Halévy, Growth of Philosophical Radicalism; Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians; Wolf, History of Science, Technology and Philosophy in the 18th century; Cobban, Edmund Burke.]
CHAPTER XI

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SECOND BRITISH EMPIRE

In the long history of the British Commonwealth there are few things more impressive than the promptitude with which, immediately after the tragic disruption of the older Commonwealth in 1776, the foundations of a new overseas empire began to be laid. Even in the ten years between the recognition of American independence and the outbreak of the French Revolutionary War great things were achieved in this direction, not of set purpose (for men were beginning to be sceptical as to the value of colonial possessions) but under the mere pressure of events.

§ 1. The Canadian Group of Colonies.

When the Peace of Paris transferred the French dominions in North America to the British Crown, there were two distinct groups of settlements, widely different in character, whose needs had to be considered.¹ On the one hand there were the maritime colonies, as yet thinly peopled. These included Newfoundland, the oldest of British overseas settlements, though it had only been finally recognised as British territory in 1713; and Nova Scotia, with its dependencies of Cape Breton Island and Ile de St. Jean (later known as Prince Edward Island), and with an ill-defined claim over the continental region later known as New Brunswick, where settlement had scarcely begun. Nova Scotia had got rid of most of its French inhabitants by the deportation of 1755;² and as there had been a substantial immigration of British settlers since that date, the maritime colonies, though still weak and undeveloped, were predominantly British in character. Nova Scotia had received representative institutions of the familiar colonial type, as a matter of course. In 1769 Prince Edward Island was organised as a separate government, with an assembly of its own, which met for the first time in 1773. Thus, when the conflict with the other colonies broke out, there were already three British

¹ See the map, Atlas, School Edition Plate 51, 6th Edition Plates 78 and 79.
² Vol. 1, p. 721.
maritime colonies in the North, which remained loyal throughout the conflict, and formed the nucleus of a new self-governing group.

Far different were the conditions existing in the riverine settlements on the St. Lawrence, with Quebec as their capital. Here the whole population, over 60,000 in number, was French, with the exception of a handful of traders, mainly New Englanders, who established themselves in Quebec and Montreal after the conquest. The French colonists were wholly strange to any ideas of self-government. With the exception of the small ruling classes of seigneurs and priests, they were illiterate peasants or habitants, quite unconcerned with politics; and they were to a man devoted Roman Catholics. It was not to be expected that they should feel any loyalty to their conquerors. But what they chiefly feared was the possibility of interference with their religion or with their modes of land-tenure. The problem of government thus presented had no parallel in the earlier history of the Commonwealth.

Until peace was signed, the government naturally lay in the hands of the military. It was exercised with wisdom and moderation. The French inhabitants found that the laws and customs of the country were respected, and that there was no interference with their religion; while compulsory military service and forced labour, which had been features of the French system, came to an end. In 1763 George Grenville's Government issued a proclamation promising the establishment of representative assemblies and the introduction of English law—the normal features of all earlier British colonies. At the same time just treatment of the Indians was required; and it was laid down that private persons must not purchase lands from Indians, who were to sell only to the Crown 'at some public meeting of the said Indians, to be held for that purpose.' This provision was the first sign of a determination on the part of the supreme Government to protect the rights of primitive peoples. It became a standing rule in the administration of Canada, and marks the opening of a new era in the history of the Commonwealth. But it aroused violent protests among those of the American colonists whose dealings it was designed to check.

The other promises of the proclamation of 1763 could not be carried out. The French settlers neither understood nor desired representative institutions; and if the Roman Catholics had been given power by these means, the result
would have been violent indignation among the New
Englanders. The handful of Protestant (mainly New
England) settlers in Quebec, who numbered less than 300,
were loud in their demands for the setting up of a repre-
sentative system limited to themselves; but this would
have been ruinously unjust. As for the introduction of
English law, that would cause great confusion in the deter-
mination of the rights of the French landowners, while it
would have threatened the application of the English laws
against Roman Catholics. Evidently the old rules that
every British colony should have representative assemblies
and be under English law could not safely be applied in
the peculiar conditions of Canada. Sir Guy Carleton, the
strong and wise Governor who assumed power in 1766,
forcibly urged the unwisdom of attempting such measures;
and the leading British lawyers took the same view.

The problem was no easy one; and there were ten years
of discussion before Lord North's Government found a
solution in the Quebec Act of 1774. This Act annulled the
erlier proclamation, gave complete freedom to the Roman
Catholic religion, allowed tithes to be collected by the priests,
and ordained that French law and custom should remain in
force in all civil matters. English criminal law, on the
other hand, with the jury as an essential part of it, was
definitely established. Finally a small Council, to be ap-
pointed by the Crown, was empowered to make ordinances;
but no ordinances affecting religion or imposing any severe
penalties were to come into force without royal consent.

Beyond question the Quebec Act was a wise and states-
manlike solution of the immediate problem, though it could
only be a temporary solution. It gave complete security
to the French inhabitants, by whom it was received with
gratitude. On the other hand, it was violently attacked by
the American colonists and by the opposition in the British
Parliament. The Colonial Congress, sitting in Philadelphia,
passed an address to the British people in which they
expressed their 'astonishment that a British Parliament
should ever consent to establish in that country a religion
that has deluged your island in blood, and dispersed impiety,
bigotry, persecution, murder and rebellion through every
part of the world.' Five days later, with a view to the
coming conflict, Congress addressed a letter to the province
of Quebec, in which, after complimenting the Canadians on
the 'gallant and glorious resistance' they had offered to
the British attack, they urged that liberty of conscience
ought not to be regarded as a consequence of the Quebec Act, because it was the gift of God.

The Quebec Act helped to alienate the American colonists. But its provisions reconciled the Canadians to British rule, while the American protest against it destroyed any chance that they would join hands with the revolting colonists. The priests and the seigneurs became cordial supporters of the British side in the conflict; and the habitants, while they refused to enlist in British armies, turned an equally deaf ear to the invitations of the Americans. Their steadiness, and the military skill of Sir Guy Carleton, saved Canada when the Americans attacked it in 1775.

In another way, however, the American Revolution produced a very great change in Canada. As we have seen, there had been many thousands of loyalists in all the revolting colonies. They had suffered during the war; they suffered still more bitterly when it was over, and though the British Government did its best to secure fair treatment for them in the treaty of peace, its efforts were in vain. Life was made so intolerable for them that many thousands of them fled, abandoning their property, to take refuge under the British flag. Some 45,000 betook themselves to Canada, others to the West Indies and to Britain. They were generously treated by the British Government. Each family was given a grant of 200 acres of land, with a promise of as much more for every son when he grew up and for every daughter when she married; provisions, tools, stock and seeds were also supplied to them. The coming of the United Empire Loyalists, as they proudly called themselves, transformed the situation in Canada: taking the Canadian provinces as a whole, they raised the British population to a numerical equality with the French.

The majority of the Loyalists naturally turned at first to the maritime provinces, where British institutions and British laws already existed. They settled in such large numbers in the valley of the St. John River that this region was, as early as 1784, cut off from Nova Scotia and organised as a separate colony under the name of New Brunswick, with a representative system of its own. But many of them found their way into the fertile wilderness north of the Great Lakes, and west of the French district. Here they laid the foundations of a great new colony, in what later became the province of Ontario.

But the coming of the Loyalists changed the whole political outlook in Canada. They were all believers in
self-government, and all accustomed to the practice of it. In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick they enjoyed from the first the traditional British methods. It was impossible that the settlers in Ontario should be expected to accept the system established by the Quebec Act, solely with a view to the needs of the French settlers. This was one of the imperial problems with which Pitt had to deal. His solution was found in the Canada Act of 1791.

The Canada Act created two distinct provinces, separated by the river Ottawa: an English province of Upper Canada or Ontario to the west, a French province of Lower Canada or Quebec to the east. Each was endowed with a constitution intended to be 'the very image and transcript of that of Great Britain,' with an elected Legislative Assembly having control over legislation and taxation, and a nominated Legislative Council. Thus within thirty years of its conquest French Canada, which in all its history had never been allowed even the shadow of autonomy, was given a system of self-government on the most ample scale then practised in the world outside the now independent United States; and the French Canadians were assured of the means of preserving their own type of civilisation. Within ten years of the close of the American War a new group of self-governing States, six in number,¹ had been organised on the American continent as members of the British Commonwealth.

Two features of this story deserve comment. The continued loyalty of British statesmanship to the idea of self-government, even after the recent experience of its possible consequences, was a highly remarkable fact. But no less remarkable was the absence of any attempt to force a conquered people into the mould of the conquerors. French Canada was not only left with her own Church and her own laws, but was given power to develop in her own way. The treatment of the Canadian problem showed that in the new era the British Commonwealth was to welcome and encourage widely varying types of civilisation within its hospitable limits, and to abstain from interference with their development.

§ 2. The Philanthropic Motive in Colonisation.

We have seen that the provision of 1763 in regard to the acquisition of lands from North American Indians had

marked the adoption of a new attitude of regard for the rights and claims of primitive peoples. A still more remarkable illustration of the growing strength of this idea was provided in these years by the foundation of the colony of Sierra Leone on the West Coast of Africa.

British settlements on this coast, like those of all other countries, had hitherto been merely factories or trading-stations for the conduct of the slave-trade. In 1787 one Henry Smeathman conceived the generous idea of planting on their native soil a band of freed slaves, who were becoming numerous in London; and in the following year a strip of land was purchased from a native chief for the purposes of the novel settlement. The enterprise was supported and financed by the Evangelical leaders of the anti-slave-trade movement, Wilberforce, Granville Sharp and their fellows, and in 1791 they obtained a charter of incorporation as the Sierra Leone Company, and organised a new town with the significant name of Freetown. From the first the enterprise was governed by religious and philanthropic motives. It was hoped that it would be the beginning of a free Christian civilisation in Africa. The Evangelical leaders gave much thought and money to it; and Zachary Macaulay, the historian's father, went out to the pestilent climate to serve as Governor. Unhappily the colony did not thrive. The freed slaves did not know how to use their freedom, and they were a mixed lot of divergent races; moreover the French war brought a good deal of suffering. But the foundation of Sierra Leone deserves emphasis as a sign of the new spirit that was coming into British imperial policy; a spirit which desired to give freedom rather than slavery to the backward peoples, and to protect them rather than to exploit them. The growth of this conception was to be mainly due to the missionary activity which, in the next generation, became the greatest product of the Evangelical Movement.

§ 3. Cook's Explorations and the first Settlement in Australia.

While the American War was raging the greatest of British explorers, Captain Cook, was, under commission from Lord North's ministry, mapping out the whole of the Pacific, and disclosing vast and fertile lands suitable for European settlement which had hitherto been only dimly known, and wholly neglected.
James Cook ¹ was the son of a Yorkshire agricultural labourer who, after serving as a shop-boy and a merchant-sailor, joined the Royal Navy and rose from the forecastle to the quarterdeck by sheer merit. Having shown great ability in navigation, in astronomy, and in surveying, he was commissioned in 1768 to lead a scientific expedition to observe the transit of Venus. In this first voyage, two years long (1768-1770), he circumnavigated and charted with care the coast of New Zealand and the east coast of Australia. In two further voyages (1772-1775 and 1776-1779) he completed the exploration of the Australian and New Zealand coasts, mapped out most of the island groups of the Pacific, finally shattered the old theory that there was a great continuous continent at the south of the globe, began the exploration of the Antarctic seas, surveyed the whole western coast of North America as far as the Bering Straits, and finally met his death in the Sandwich Islands, which he had named in honour of the First Lord of the Admiralty in North’s ministry. The great explorer had not only made an addition to the world’s geographical knowledge unequalled since the days of Columbus and Magellan; he had opened to the abounding energy of his countrymen new fields of enterprise of unsurpassable richness, lands as fertile, and as well suited for the habitation of white men, as America itself. Even in the midst of the strain of the American War British opinion was excited by the new knowledge and the new opportunities thus opened.

Throughout their history the southern American colonies had been used as a place of export for convicts sentenced to transportation. American independence put an end to this, and a new convict settlement had to be found. Botany Bay, of which Cook had given a glowing account, was chosen for the purpose; and in January 1788 Captain Arthur Phillips with the warship Sirius, three storeships full of seeds, implements and cattle, and six transports carrying 750 male and female convicts, arrived off the Australian coast, and established a penal settlement at Port Jackson near the modern Sydney. Further contingents of convicts followed; and in 1793, at the very close of our period, the first emigrant ship arrived with free settlers, to whom grants of land were made. The settlement of Australia had fairly begun. But it had begun in very unfavourable circumstances. Though convicts sentenced to

¹ There is a short life of Cook by Sir Walter Besant in the 'English Men of Action' Series.
transportation were not necessarily very desperate criminals, in that period of ferocious laws which imposed the death sentence for such offences as sheep-stealing, yet they were convicts. The establishment of the characteristic institutions of self-government was in these circumstances out of the question; and what was to become a great free commonwealth began with the system of government appropriate for the administration of a gaol.

§ 4. The New Régime in India.

In India no less than in Canada the decade preceding the French Revolutionary War saw the establishment of a new order. The genius and steadfast courage of Warren Hastings had laid the foundations of a system of just and efficient government. But he had been hampered by every kind of difficulty; he had never wielded a sufficiently clear authority either within his own province of Bengal, or over the other Presidencies; and he had been subject to a confused and variable authority at home, where the Directors and the Proprietors of the Company were constantly at variance, while the Government exercised no direct control. For these reasons Hastings had never been able fully to carry into effect the great schemes of reform which his insight and knowledge had planned.

The India Act of 1784 had put an end to this division of authority, by making the Governor-General supreme over the lesser Presidencies, and the home Government supreme over the Governor-General. It was now the British State, and no longer merely a trading company, which was responsible for the good government of the British territories in India. The authority of the supreme Government was made more clear when, in 1786, the Governor-Generalship was conferred upon the Earl of Cornwallis,¹ a soldier and publicist of distinction, and a personal friend of Pitt. The prestige of a man of his rank and experience raised him high above the jealousies of the Company’s service; while the certainty that he would be supported by Government saved him from constant meddling by the Directors. What might not Hastings have achieved had he been clothed with such prestige!

Cornwallis was able to carry on with ease the work of improving and organising the system of justice and of local

¹ There is a short life of Cornwallis by W. S. Seton-Kerr in the 'Rulers of India' Series.
administration which Hastings had begun. With him the system became clear and definite. Judicial functions were separated from administrative work; the reorganisation of the Company’s service was completed; and the British power assumed the air of a stable and enduring dominion administered on clear and just principles, and able to inspire confidence and the sense of security; it was unmistakably the strongest among the Indian Powers.

Two outstanding events especially distinguished the seven years of Cornwallis’s Government (1786-1793); the final settlement of the land revenue question in Bengal, and the outbreak of a new war with Tipu Sahib of Mysore. Both were the results of principles laid down in the Act of 1784; and both served to show how much more soundly and clearly the problems of Indian government had been understood by Hastings than by his critics, who were mainly responsible for the provisions of the Act.

The Act had required that ‘permanent rules’ should be laid down for determining the rents and other payments due from landholders in the Company’s territories. This had been a subject of controversy between Hastings and his vitriolic critic Francis, who had insisted that the zemindars, or hereditary collectors of land revenue, ought to be regarded as landowners, and required to pay only a fixed and unchanging annual sum, in order that they might be encouraged to develop their ‘property’ to the maximum extent. It was under the influence of these ideas that Cornwallis carried out, in 1793, a Permanent Settlement of the land revenue of Bengal, which practically turned the zemindars into landowners, swept aside the claims of the ryots and left them largely at the mercy of their superiors, and at the same time deprived the Government of the prospect of an increased revenue as the cultivation of the land increased. The Permanent Settlement was a gigantic blunder, and a needless departure from the sound traditions of India. Yet it was honestly meant; it put an end to a long controversy; and it destroyed the possibility of oppression by Government agents, though at the same time it greatly increased the possibility of oppression by the new class of landlords.

Again, Hastings had always urged that, once established in India, the British power should behave as an Indian power, should establish clearly defined relations with the chief native States and abide faithfully by them, and should strive, by such means, to maintain peace throughout the Indian continent. The Act of 1784, again largely inspired
by Francis, had laid it down as a first principle that there should be no permanent treaties with native States, no guarantees of their possessions—in short, no intervention in Indian politics. Cornwallis did his best to act on these principles. But he found that, instead of being a safeguard for peace, they were actually a fruitful cause of war. The formidable tyrant, Tipu Sahib, whom Hastings had been compelled to fight, was still untamed. He was making alliances with France and with the Sultan of Turkey. He was threatening not only the British power but still more the neighbouring native States. These States appealed to Cornwallis in vain for defensive alliances; the Act constrained him to refuse, though it was plain that an alliance of this kind would be the best way of keeping Tipu quiet. In the end Tipu’s deliberate and unprovoked aggression forced on a war, in which Cornwallis, making common cause with the Maharrattas and the Nizam of Hyderabad, overpowered Tipu, captured his capital, and, as the only means of keeping him in check, stripped him of half his territory, the acquisitions being divided between the three partners in the alliance. Such was the result of the attempt to pursue a policy of non-intervention in Indian politics. It was to produce yet graver consequences after Cornwallis’s return to England.

In the meanwhile, despite its defects, the new régime established in 1784 had unquestionably helped forward the purification of the British system, and aided in establishing the British power as a solidly-founded and well-organised dominion, capable of resisting even the tempest that was soon to burst upon it.

Thus, when the long ordeal of the French Revolutionary War began, the British Commonwealth had marvellously recovered from the ruin which seemed to have fallen upon it in 1782. Its domestic discords were healed. Its system of government in the homeland was working efficiently. It was laying the firm foundations of new daughter States, the germs of a new and greater commonwealth. The boundless energy of its people was discovering extraordinary new means of increasing the wealth of nations and the power

1 There is a short life of Tipu Sahib by L. B. Bowring in the ‘Rulers of India’ Series.
2 See the map, Atlas, School Edition Plate 53 (c), 6th Edition Plate 65 (c).
of man over nature, and at the same time striking out new ideas in the realms of political and economic thought.

The people which could point, in a single generation, to Warren Hastings, Burke, Pitt and Fox in politics; Rodney, Hood and Cook for the labours of the seas in war or peace; Adam Smith, Bentham and Gibbon in the field of political thought; Watt, Hargreaves and Crompton in practical invention; Wilberforce, Howard and Raikes in philanthropy; Bakewell, Coke and Arthur Young in agriculture; Gray, Cowper and Crabbe in poetry; Sterne, Goldsmith and Smollett in imaginative literature; Reynolds, Gainsborough and Hogarth in the fine arts; and even in the dramatic art David Garrick and Sarah Siddons—such a people had in it an immeasurable potency of future achievement for the enrichment of its own life and the enlargement of civilisation. The British peoples had not reached the end of their greatness, as some prophets thought, in 1782: they were at the opening of a new era of effort and achievement.

[Grant, History of Canada; Lucas, Historical Geography of Canada and Historical Geography of West Africa; Kingsford, History of Canada; Kitson, Captain James Cook; Muir, Making of British India; Roberts, Historical Geography of India; Seton-Kerr, Cornwallis; Bowring, Hyder Ali and Tipu Sahib; Egerton and Grant, Constitutional Development in Canada; Jenks, History of the Australasian Colonies; Cambridge History of the British Empire; Cambridge History of India; Weitzman, Warren Hastings and Philip Francis; Thompson and Garratt, Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India; Manning, British Colonial Government after the American Revolution; Lloyd, Voyages of Captain Cook; Williamson, Cook and the Opening of the Pacific.]
BOOK VIII

REVOLUTION AND WAR: THE GROWTH OF THE SECOND EMPIRE

(A.D. 1789-1815)
INTRODUCTION

THE period covered by this Book is entirely dominated by the gigantic upheaval of the French Revolution and the long wars to which it gave rise. In these wars Britain was at one time or another engaged not only with the European Powers which accepted the lead of the revolutionary Government in France or of Napoleon, but also with the chief native Powers in India (1765-1805) and with the United States of America (1812-1815). The only Power which never for a moment submitted to French domination, Britain found herself, during four periods, standing alone against a world in arms, and fighting not only for her own national existence, but for the survival of national freedom in Europe.

These long wars established the position of Britain as not merely the first, but practically the only, great naval power in the world. They gave to her an extraordinary control over the world's ocean trade. They immensely accelerated the creation of the new British Empire, which had begun during the previous period. In Canada and Australia this new empire already included two of the great regions suitable for European settlement; the conquest of the Cape of Good Hope added a third. In the West Indies British ascendancy became even more complete than it had been in 1763; and two new continental colonies, British Guiana and British Honduras, were acquired in this region. The needs of naval warfare led to the acquisition of posts of vantage scattered over the seas of the world, some of which were to become links in the new imperial system: Heligoland, Malta, the Ionian Islands, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Penang, Malacca. But the most astonishing achievement of the period was the rapid transformation of the British power in India into the paramount Power over almost the whole of that vast land; and with that may be linked the conquest of Ceylon.

So far as concerned the external structure of power, the wars of the Revolution thus led to a very remarkable expansion of British dominion. But in all other respects
the influence of the Revolution upon the British Commonwealth was wholly disastrous. It killed a promising movement of reconciliation which was at work in Ireland during the years 1783-1795, and led to the tragedy of 1798. It put a stop to the movement for parliamentary reform. It gravely intensified the sufferings which must in any case have resulted from the industrial and agrarian revolutions; while at the same time it not only prevented the adoption of remedial measures, but led to repressive legislation which forbade workpeople to combine for their mutual protection. With a well-meaning desire to alleviate the distresses of the period, a new system of poor relief was wrought out, which had the effect of reducing a large proportion of the population of Britain to a condition of abject dependence and ruined self-respect. The result of this combination of misfortunes was that at the end of the period large sections of the British people had been reduced to a pitiable condition; the widely diffused liberty and well-being which had characterised Britain in 1750 had disappeared; there was real danger of a violent and destructive revolutionary upheaval; and even if that were avoided, it had become obvious that a great work of social and political reconstruction must be undertaken.

Whatever may be the case in other countries, the British Commonwealth owes very little—directly, at all events—to the inspiration of the French Revolution. The revolution brought to Britain not advance but reaction, not amendment but bitter suffering. And when the period of reconstruction began, it was not from the vague and abstract speculations of revolutionary philosophy that guidance was drawn, but from British sources; from the work and schemes of the pre-revolutionary reformers, from the teaching of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, from the practical experiments of trade unionists and co-operators.
CHAPTER I

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION


The course of human history was now to be deflected by the gigantic upheaval which began with the meeting of the States-General of France on May 4, 1789, and which led to the most wide-ranging and prolonged series of wars that human history had yet witnessed. For the best part of a generation, British affairs were more intimately intertwined with those of Europe than they had ever been before; and the course of events in France as directly concerned the fortunes of the Commonwealth as the course of events in London or in Ireland or in India.

It was a world-revolution which began in May 1789, and not merely a French revolution: a protest against the outworn social order of feudalism, against the privileges of caste, against the political system of despotism and bureaucracy; an assertion of the equal value of all human personalities; a bold attempt to reconstruct human society in accordance with theories of right. This inspiring and heroic enterprise began in France rather than in any other country, because France was the most prosperous and enlightened of the continental States, and the most deeply influenced by vague speculations about a happier social order; while her political system had fallen into decrepitude and had lost the confidence of her people.

Serfdom had more nearly disappeared in France than in any other European country save Britain and Holland; but many vexatious and humiliating feudal usages survived which had long since vanished from Britain. Unlike the peasants of Germany and Hungary, the peasants of France were free enough to have the spirit to resent these evils; and their demand for the destruction of feudal usages was one of the driving forces of the Revolution. Again, France had a larger, a more prosperous and a better-educated middle class than any other European country save Britain
and Holland; but, unlike the middle class in Britain, they were denied any share in the control of their own affairs, and their enterprise was hampered by irritating bureaucratic regulations, and by an unfair burden of taxation due to the exemptions enjoyed by the privileged classes. It was this dissatisfied and enterprising middle class which was to direct and guide the Revolution. Yet again, France was burdened by large privileged classes, who engrossed a very high proportion of the nation’s wealth, but rendered no corresponding services. The nobles, who numbered 170,000, were in the most definite sense an exclusive hereditary caste. They had been stripped by the monarchy of their old political powers, and had become a merely useless and decorative class; but they had been allowed to retain many of the social and legal powers of feudalism, and they enjoyed the invidious privilege of exemption from the most burdensome taxes. The Church, which owned one-fifth of the land of France and claimed one-tenth of the produce of the rest, jealously preserved its exclusive rights. But most of its wealth was enjoyed by court-haunting prelates, while the parish priests were neglected; and the Church had almost ceased to perform the function of protecting the weak against abuses of power.¹

Such, in the baldest outline, was the social system—not by any means peculiar to France—which the Revolution was to overthrow: a system of cumbrous, burdensome and antiquated caste privilege, with which every section of French society, even the privileged castes themselves, were deeply dissatisfied. But behind the social system was the political system which supported and maintained it. The despotism which had reached its apogee under Louis XIV, had reduced every factor in the social life of France to dependence upon itself. Its power was irresponsible and unlimited; it was above the law. But it had not used its power to redress abuses; it had not even created a single uniform system of law; it seemed to be the source and buttress of all the evils from which France suffered. Once it had at least given to her military glory and a sense of power, but even that had vanished in the disasters of the Seven Years’ War. The bureaucracy by which this despotism was served, though it included many able and honest men, was too omnipotent and irresponsible, and it had been reduced to inefficiency by a maddening elaboration of red tape. In spite of the burden of taxation under which the productive classes groaned, incompetent financial

¹ See the map, Atlas. 6th Edition Plate 60.
administration had brought the wealthiest country in Europe to the verge of bankruptcy, and the lavish outlay on the American War of Independence had brought a crisis. Even before the American War the French monarchy had tried to reform itself, calling in the aid of the philosopher, Turgot (1774-1776). But entrenched privilege was too strong for Turgot; and his failure was the final condemnation of the despotic system. The monarchy was discredited, and with it were discredited all the other institutions of the country, which it had reduced to impotence; there was no independent factor in the life of France to which men could look with hope; all were vitiated by the strangling domination of absolutism and bureaucracy. Bad government seemed to be the source of every ill; and hence men were encouraged to believe that the millennium could be readily attained by a simple change of political machinery.

Having no hope in any of the existing institutions of their country, men turned for consolation to the speculations of the philosophers. For two generations France had been the centre of a ferment of political thought, which had prepared the way for a drastic upheaval. We cannot here pause to analyse the acid criticism of Voltaire, which had torn the veil of traditional reverence from every existing institution; or the labours of Diderot and his colleagues on the great Encyclopedia, which had made every problem seem soluble by human reason; or the teachings of Montesquieu, who assumed that liberty was the highest good of human society, and showed in an analysis of British institutions how it could be secured by political devices. The general outcome of this movement of thought was to suggest that wholesale destruction must be the first step towards a better state of things; and that an ideal order of society might be attained by logic, without regard to the deep-rooted habits of life and thought of the people.

But the greatest constructive and inspiring force in the coming revolution was provided by the teachings of Rousseau, or, rather, by the popular interpretation put upon Rousseau's somewhat vague and self-contradictory speculations. What most men drew from his nervous and glowing pages may be summed up in five fallaciously simple propositions: that the miseries of humanity were due to the defects of governments; that the root defect was the denial of individual liberty; that liberty could only be attained through the absolute sovereignty of the whole people; that the will of the sovereign people, the 'general will,' when rightly
declared, could never be mistaken; and that, therefore, all that was necessary for the restoration of social health was the complete enthronement of democracy, and the sweeping away of every law, custom, or institution which was inconsistent with it. This was not the real teaching of Rousseau, who held that democracy was impossible in a large State. But it was a doctrine capable of arousing an exalted fervour of belief, capable of inspiring men to a great common effort for the realisation of freedom, justice and brotherhood.

Just at the moment when the institutions of France were most discredited, came the American Revolution to give an apparent demonstration that the Rousseau gospel was practicable. The Frenchmen who fought in America saw widely diffused prosperity, and a liberty such as the Old World had never known. What more natural than to attribute these blessings to the successful revolt which had been carried out under the banner of Rousseau’s doctrines? America made the path of revolution seem easy and profitable; and at the same time it completed the ruin of French finance. The strain of the war brought bankruptcy in sight; and in 1788 the King of France, after trying many devices, decided to take the nation into counsel, and summoned a meeting of the States-General, which had not met since 1614.

§ 2. The Rapid Development of the Revolution, 1789-1793.

In the spring of 1789 all France was astir, preparing for the fullest representation of a nation’s manhood which Europe had ever seen; for the Third Estate was to be elected upon a very democratic basis. All classes, clergy and nobles, townsmen and peasants, were drawing up cahiers, or statements of grievances and demands for reform. The grievances covered every aspect of the existing order; the proposals of reform were mostly vague and theoretical. France presented the spectacle of a great nation dissatisfied with her whole social and political system, full of ardour for change, inspired by a touching faith that a better order could easily be organised, but very hazy about the methods to be adopted.

Nevertheless there was something noble and moving in this great national resolve. For it was all but unanimous. The King himself, many of the nobles, most of the lower and many of the higher clergy, were ready for large changes. Never before had the world seen a great community thus
setting to work to win happiness and justice by a wholehearted co-operative effort. And when the States-General met in Louis XIV.'s gorgeous palace at Versailles on May 4, 1789, it seemed, not only to Frenchmen, but to generoushearted men in all the Western countries, that a new era in human history was dawning, an era of freedom, justice, brotherhood and peace. 'Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, but to be young was very Heaven': thus the poet Wordsworth recalled the emotion of the time, as he looked back from the dark storms which followed this rosy dawn. Who could have dreamed of the horrors and cruelties that were to come?

From May 4 onwards the days were so crowded with dramatic and tragic events that no bald summary can do any sort of justice to them. We must be content with marking the stages whereby these glowing hopes were transmuted into the horrors of the Reign of Terror and the desolation of universal war.

During the summer of 1789 it still seemed possible that a reconstruction might be effected without violence, by peaceful agreement; and, indeed, the most lasting achievements of the Revolution belonged to these first months, before mob-violence had got the upper hand. The Third Estate, refusing to act as merely one of three Houses, declared itself a National Assembly, invited the other Estates to join it, and swore an oath not to break up until it had made a new constitution. The King yielded, but was persuaded to gather forces wherewith to guard against disorder, and possibly to dominate the Assembly. Thereupon the Paris mob burst its bonds, captured the frowning fortress of the Bastille, and put an end to the possibility of repression.

The fall of the Bastille (July 14) was fixed upon, by the common assent of the civilised world, as marking the definite downfall of the old régime. This was a sound judgment; but the event also marked the ominous beginning of mob-rule. And during the following weeks peasant risings broke out in the East and in the West; chateaux were burnt and the records of feudal services destroyed; while in all the bigger towns autonomous municipalities were set up. France was getting out of hand; and this fact overshadowed the work which the National Assembly was doing, good as in many ways it was. In October the Paris mob boiled out to Versailles, and compelled the weak, well-meaning King to promise that he and the Assembly would take up their quarters in Paris. Hence-
forth they were dominated by the mob, which in its turn was controlled by the orators of the more extreme clubs, windy fanatics who were swayed by gusts of opinion, not by measured and steady thinking. The possibility of reform by calm discussion was at an end; it was with this in mind that in October 1789 Burke sat down to write the gloomy and accurate prognostications of his *Reflections on the French Revolution*.

The second phase of the Revolution (which overlaps the first) extended from the summer of 1789 to September 1791, and two main series of events distinguished it; on the one hand the framing of the new constitution, on the other a rapid increase of anarchy in every part of France. The Assembly had begun by drawing up, in noble and inspiring phrases, a Declaration of the Rights of Man; but it had spent six weeks upon this task, while France was falling into chaos. It abolished the worst of the feudal customs, in an emotional session (August 4), in which great nobles vied in the sacrifice of profitable abuses; this was perhaps its most lasting and valuable achievement, and it was this which secured for the Revolution the steady loyalty of the nation. It abolished the old provinces and their varied customs. It broke down the powers of the bureaucracy, and set up in every village, canton and department elected governing bodies, which were mostly filled with inexperienced men whom nobody obeyed. It reorganised the Church by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (1790), which no orthodox Catholic could accept, and thus added religious strife to the other elements of disorder. It vested supreme political authority in a single representative democratic body, and reduced the executive authority of the Crown to a shadow. These and other vast labours of destruction and reconstruction filled two years of incredible industry; and the new system was completed by September 1791.

But it was a system devised by theorists without practical experience, and was unworkable from the beginning. While it was being applied piecemeal, anarchy and confusion grew. The new authorities were not obeyed; they could not even collect the taxes. Discipline broke down in both the army and the navy. The mobs and the clubs were the controlling powers in the towns; and in the countryside peasant risings grew more and more violent. Trade and industry were dislocated. So menacing was this increasing chaos that Mirabeau, the greatest of the early revolutionary statesmen, tried to persuade the King to take a firm stand and rally
the forces of order in defence of a liberal but workable system, even at the cost of bloodshed. But the unhappy King hated the idea of bloodshed; and when Mirabeau died (April 1791) the last chance of vigorous action for the restoration of order vanished. Losing heart, the King and Queen tried to escape to Germany, whither hundreds of noble émigrés had been pouring ever since the fall of the Bastille. But the King’s flight (June) only had the effect of discrediting the monarchy. He was arrested and brought back to Paris; and it was practically as a prisoner that he gave his assent to the completed constitution in September 1791.

The third phase of the Revolution began with the acceptance of the constitution of 1791, and covered the year from September 1791 to September 1792, during which the new constitution was at work. Many hoped that revolution was now at an end, and that France would be able to settle down. But the Legislative Assembly, elected under the new constitution, was filled with inexperienced and wavering men, and, though most of them were of moderate temper, they were terrorised and dominated by the extremists of the clubs, who had made up their minds to get rid of monarchy. The anarchy of France grew steadily worse; Government, stripped of all effective power, was impotent to maintain order. Many held that the only hope of welding the nation into unity lay in the prospect of a foreign war. Hence the outstanding features of this third phase were the growing violence of the extremists and of the Paris mob, and the steady trend of events towards war.

There was no reason why war should have broken out, if it had not been deliberately invited by the revolutionary leaders. Britain was resolutely bent on peace; so were Holland and Spain. Austria and Prussia were being bombarded by requests for intervention by the émigrés, and in August 1791 these Powers had issued a joint manifesto from Pillnitz warning the revolutionary leaders to do no harm to the King. But neither Power desired war: when Louis XVI. accepted the constitution a month after the Pillnitz declaration, this was accepted as satisfactory.

In truth both Austria and Prussia were much more deeply interested in the Polish revolution than in the French. For the Poles, realising their weakness, had revised and strengthened their constitution in 1791; and if the new system had been given time to establish itself, Poland might have been saved from ruin. Russia, under Catherine II., wanted
the new system to fail, because she hoped to devour Poland, and therefore wished to keep it weak; Austria, under the wise Emperor Leopold, wanted the new system to succeed; Prussia wavered, but had promised her protection to the Poles. If Austria and Prussia were to go to war with France, Russia was certain to invade Poland: she did so, in fact, the moment war began. And in view of these conditions neither Austria nor Prussia had any desire for war with France: they wished to watch the Polish situation.

Unhappily, the wise Emperor Leopold died in March 1792, and his successor lacked his patience. Three weeks later Louis XVI. had to form a ministry from among the Girondist group, who were bent upon war; even if Leopold had lived, it is doubtful if he could have resisted the bellicose temper of the Girondist ministers. Nothing can be less true than the often repeated statement that France was gratuitously attacked by the military monarchies of Europe. She deliberately precipitated the war, as a means of consolidating the Revolution.

With their eyes cast over their shoulders at the Russian invasion of Poland, Austria and Prussia made a very half-hearted attack upon France: Prussia, in particular, seized upon a slight check which her army received at Valmy (September 1792) as an excuse for withdrawing, in order that she might share with Russia in the second partition (1793) of Poland, which she had promised to protect. In spite of the hopeless disorganisation of the French armies, they were able to hold their own, and, very soon, to take the offensive and overrun Belgium.

But the mere fact of war changed the political situation in France, and opened the fourth phase of the Revolution. It was used by the extremists as a means of stirring up panic in Paris, and turning the sentiment of the mob against the helpless King. A hideous and cold-blooded massacre of the inmates of the Paris prisons was organised; and these September Massacres formed the first real indication to the world of the character of the men whom the Revolution had brought to power in Paris. Meanwhile an onslaught on the royal palace of the Tuileries and a massacre of the King’s Swiss Guard (August) were followed by the imprisonment of the royal family, the suspension of the royal office, and the election of a new representative assembly, the Convention, to draw up a new constitution. As soon as the Convention met, it declared France a republic (September 21, 1792).

1 See the map, Atlas, School Edition Plate 29 (b), 6th Edition Plates 57 and 68.
Even in the Convention, though every possible device had been used by the clubs to influence the elections, there was a majority of moderate-minded men. But they were carried off their feet by the stormy emotions of the time; and they were dominated, yet more completely than the two earlier assemblies, by the extremists of the clubs and by the city mob.

In the autumn of 1792 the war took an extraordinarily favourable turn for the infant republic. Its ill-equipped and undisciplined armies, welcomed by the disaffected peoples of the provinces nearest to France, overran Belgium, Western Germany as far as the Rhine, and the province of Savoy; and at the end of 1792 the republic might have been made safe from all attack. But these intoxicating victories carried the republican leaders off their feet. They convinced themselves that the armies of liberty were invincible. In November 1792 they declared war 'against all kings and on behalf of all peoples'; and, resolving 'to throw a gage at the feet of the tyrants,' they brought the unhappy King Louis XVI. to trial, sentenced him to death, and sent him to the guillotine (January 1793). Between September 1792 and January 1793 Europe had been terribly awakened to the significance of the later developments of the Revolution. The declaration of November 1792, and the execution of Louis XVI., brought all Europe into the war in self-defence. Yet it was France, in the exaltation of her frenzy, that declared war—against Britain and Holland in February 1793, against Spain in March. A world in arms was challenged to crush the republic, or imitate its methods. And with that, the fourth phase of the wild story ends. It had been a story of steadily growing frenzy; but a yet worse pitch of frenzy was still to be attained.

§ 3. The Reign of Terror, the War, and the Reaction.

With the strange vicissitudes of the war thus begun, as it affected the British peoples, we shall have to deal in later chapters. Here we are concerned to note its effect upon the progress of the Revolution in France.

In the spring of 1793 the armies of the republic were driven headlong out of all the provinces they had so easily overrun; hostile armies crossed the frontiers on every side; Paris itself was in danger; and the revolutionary leaders realised for the first time how completely the military system of France had been dislocated by the Revolution. At the same time there was a formidable rebellion at home;
and the royalist peasants of La Vendée for a time defeated every force sent against them. In Paris fierce controversy raged between the Girondins, who had leanings towards moderation, and the more merciless fanatics who had forced on the execution of the King. The downfall of the republic seemed to be imminent.

But in this perilous crisis the revolutionary leaders acted with extraordinary vigour and resolution. They set up a Committee of Public Safety, which overrode all other authorities and assumed to itself an absolute power more complete than even Louis xiv. had ever wielded. A revolutionary tribunal was created, with summary jurisdiction over all suspected persons, whom it sent in droves to the guillotine; and by its means a Reign of Terror was established which drowned all opposition in blood. Beginning in March 1793, when the Austrians were threatening Paris, it rose in a crescendo of delirium until it reached its climax in July 1794. Not royalists only, but all who dared opposition to the reigning group of fanatics, went to the scaffold: the eloquent Girondins, who had driven France into war, being among the early victims (June). This ferocity raised rebellions in the provinces, at Lyons, at Bordeaux, in Normandy; and the naval arsenal of Toulon even surrendered to the British and Spanish fleets. But the methods of the Terror were unflinchingly applied in the provinces as in Paris; the impotent local authorities were swept aside, and replaced by Commissioners from Paris with absolute powers, some of whom even outdid the ferocity of their frantic chiefs. France was bludgeoned into unity, and risings and disorders were mercilessly repressed.

Meanwhile the manhood of France was called upon to repel her ring of foes; first among European peoples, the free republic established compulsory military service. And among the members of the Committee of Public Safety was found a man of genius, Carnot, the 'organiser of victory,' to hammer the myriads of eager recruits into a conquering army. France became an armed camp. All her resources were turned to war. And her sons, fired at once by revolutionary fervour and the passion of patriotism, achieved miracles of valour and endurance, under the leadership of a series of daring captains, sprung from the ranks of the old army, who wrought out new methods of attack and revolutionised the art of war. The rising of liberated France in 1793, under the unflinching and audacious leadership of the
bloodstained captains of the Terror, is one of the most
inspiring events in history. Before the end of the year
which had begun so ominously, all the invading armies of
France's innumerable enemies had been driven over the
borders. During 1794 the exultant armies of the republic
were pursuing their beaten foes beyond the frontier;
Belgium was reconquered, the Rhine frontier was regained,
and before the end of the year Holland was undergoing
invasion, and her republican party was preparing to imitate
the example of France, and to make alliance with her.
The armies of the Revolution appeared to be irresistible;
and by 1795 the great coalition of the European Powers
had crumbled into fragments.
Meanwhile the Reign of Terror, having served its purpose,
had been brought to an end: the ruthless doctrinaire,
Robespierre, who had been its figurehead, had followed his
victims to the scaffold (July 1794); and the way seemed
once more to be open for the creation of a rational system of
free government. But the orgy of blood and cruelty through
which France had passed had almost destroyed the pure
idealism of 1789. The men who had steered a safe course
through the delirium of the Terror, and who now took in
hand the task of framing a new scheme of government,
were no idealists; they were corrupt and self-seeking
intriguers. In 1795 they drew up a new constitution, which
is known as the Constitution of the Year III.: it abolished
the democratic system of 1791, set up a legislative body of
two Houses, but vested the reality of power in a Directory
of five members, who were endowed with almost all the
immense powers of the Committee of Public Safety. What
is more, they did not even allow the legislature to be freely
elected; but, fearing a nation's vengeance, ordained that all
the members of the Convention should be members of the
new legislature. So bitterly were the engineers of this new
revolution hated that Paris revolted against their rule;
and the revolt had to be crushed by military force, under the
direction of a rising young soldier, Napoleon Buonaparte.
With the establishment of the Directory in 1795, the
purely revolutionary period came to an end. Under the
rule of this knot of corrupt politicians France had receded
far indeed from the complete democracy of 1791; and their
licentious and tyrannical government was a poor fulfilment
of the glowing hopes of 1789. The first long step had been
taken in that political reaction which was to culminate,
five years later, in the military despotism of Napoleon.
What had France gained from all the fury and bloodshed of these years? She had gained the abolition of feudal usages and of caste privileges, and the equality of all citizens before the law; but these things had been already peacefully won in the summer of 1789, with the assent of the King and the nobles; and she might have kept them, and political liberty as well, if she could have avoided the resort to violence. Political liberty, which had been the primary aim of her leaders, France had definitely lost, though it was not yet apparent how completely she had lost it. And in the four dreadful years since 1791, bitternesses had been implanted which were to burden her with a heritage of strife that denied her orderly peace for nearly a century. Such are the results of violent revolution.

But there was one seductive and dangerous compensation which violence had brought in exchange for liberty. France had tasted of military glory—such an intoxicating draught of it as the most splendid despots of her past had never offered to her. She saw before her visions of profitable conquest. The temptation was too strong; and the Revolution which began with the promise of justice, brotherhood and peace, developed into the most terrible menace of tyranny and plunder that Europe had ever known.

[The literature of the French Revolution is so vast that any brief selections from it must be misleading. Holland Rose, Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, and Morse Stephens, Revolutionary Europe, are good short text-books. The best modern account in one volume is Madelin's French Revolution (Eng. trans.), which is both scholarly and vivid; Aulard's Political History of the French Revolution (Eng. trans.) represents a modern scientific treatment with a revolutionary bias; Sorel, L'Europe et la Révolution Française, is invaluable for the external history of the Revolution; Carlyle, French Revolution (ed. Fletcher or Rose), remains a poetic classic; Michelet's glowing Histoire de la Révolution Française (9 vols.), for an enthusiastic view, and Taine's Origins of Contemporary France (4 vols., Eng. trans.) for a critical view, are still valuable. See also Fisher's Revolutionary Tradition in Europe. S. Herbert's Fall of Feudalism in France is a useful summary of recent work on the agrarian side. J. M. Thompson, The French Revolution, Leaders in the French Revolution and French Revolution: Documents; E. L. Woodward, French Revolutions.]
CHAPTER II

THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION IN BRITAIN

§ I. The First Effects of the Revolution.

Coming at a moment when the demand for political reform was already strong, the French Revolution, with its idealist enthusiasm, might have led to a great quickening of political life in Britain. And at first it seemed likely that this would be its result. The great majority of the British peoples, of all classes, watched with warm sympathy the first events of the Revolution. To the young, especially, the glowing hopes of the French, and the noble sentiments of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, had an irresistible appeal. The group of young poets who were soon to lend a new glory to English literature, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Southey, Landor, all drew inspiration from the emotion of humanity to which the Revolution gave birth. Burns, the supreme poet of Scotland, the Æolian harp through which the hopes and joys and sorrows of common folk were turned into music, was in the zenith of his powers when the Revolution broke out; and he responded with enthusiasm to the assertion of the equal worth of all honest manhood. In spite of all that afterwards happened, the thrill and the glow of the first three years of hope had a lasting power of inspiration; and in the next generation, when the horrors of the Reign of Terror had been forgotten, it was revived in the work of Shelley and Byron. The Revolution turned the love of liberty from a respectable and tepid emotion into a passion.

Its most immediate and obvious effect was to stimulate the flagging ardour of the parliamentary reformers, whose hopes had been so bitterly disappointed by Pitt. The old societies for the advocacy of reform, such as the Society for Constitutional Information, recommenced their activity, and a host of new societies, having the same ends in view, sprang into being. Two of these deserve mention. The Society of Friends of the People, founded in April 1792, was an aristocratic body of Whigs, who had taken up the cause
of parliamentary reform; one of its first members was Charles Grey, who, forty years later, was, as Prime Minister, to carry the first Reform Act. The London Corresponding Society, on the other hand, was the first democratic propagandist body ever started in England (January 1792). Its initiator, Thomas Hardy, was a shoemaker in Piccadilly; he conceived the idea of enrolling members at a penny weekly subscription; and the number of branches grew with such rapidity that the total membership rose within a few months to something like 10,000. Societies formed in imitation of these sprang into being in almost every considerable town throughout the country; and there was a genuine awakening of popular interest in politics, the like of which Britain had never known before.

These societies early entered into correspondence with the political clubs which were contemporaneously springing up in every part of France, and most notably with the Jacobin Club of Paris. The correspondence began in November 1789, when the London Revolution Society—a body which existed to celebrate the anniversaries of the Revolution of 1688—sent an address of congratulation to the National Assembly. This began a prolific interchange of enthusiastic letters and addresses, in which the Revolution Society at first played the principal part, but in which most of the other societies joined; while French clubs in every part of the country, from Aix to Calais and from Dijon to Bayonne, sent exuberant addresses of comradeship to their British brothers. This correspondence later aroused acute alarm in England; and it was held that the activities of the political societies portended the existence in Britain of a widespread conspiracy for a violent overthrow of the constitution. In reality the whole correspondence, with the exception of one or two indiscreet letters towards its close, was entirely harmless. It came to an end, for the most part, with the September Massacres of 1792. There were, indeed, three or four later addresses of sympathy to the French Convention in the autumn of 1792, protesting against the Austro-Prussian attack upon France; but all correspondence ceased some time before the trial and execution of Louis XVI. One of the last addresses, from the London Corresponding Society, contained an indiscreet phrase to the effect that France was already free, and that Britain was preparing to become so; but apart from this the whole series of letters and addresses contain nothing but exuberant platitudes about liberty, and the coming reign of peace to be
brought about by the friendship of two great peoples. There is not a particle of evidence that any of the societies ever contemplated the use of violence, or desired anything beyond a measure of parliamentary reform; their minutes are full of expressions of loyalty to the Crown and the constitution, and of condemnations of violence.


But while this correspondence with the French societies was going on, a reaction had begun among the mass of the British peoples. It was due to two things: first to the spectacle of the growing anarchy of France, and the growing violence of the Paris mob; and, secondly, to the profound influence upon men's thoughts exercised by one of the most powerful and momentous pieces of political writing ever issued from the press: Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution, which was published at the end of 1790.

Burke had at first felt a good deal of sympathy with the Revolution. But his feeling had begun to change as soon as he saw, in October 1789, that mob-violence was getting the upper hand. He foresaw, with uncanny sureness, the anarchy that was coming, the violence and bloodshed that would follow, the danger to the stability of every organised Government in Europe, the wars and the tumults, the ultimate enthronement of a new military despotism; and he wrote, with all the passionate splendour of his eloquence, to put his fellow-countrymen on guard against these perils. As was his way, he forgot all restraints, just as he had done in his attack on Hastings. He was grossly unjust to the leaders of the Revolution in its first two years; he magnified their errors; he paid no regard to the magnanimity and sincerity of their aims; he refused to recognise the rottenness of the ancien régime in France, and wrote as if France had possessed the most admirable institutions, which needed only reverent repair, not wholesale reconstruction. These exaggerations did not strengthen his case, but gave a handle to his critics, which they knew how to use.

But Burke felt, with a mystical fervour as great as that with which the revolutionary leaders preached the Rights of Man, an aspect of human society to which they were almost wholly blind. He thought of an organised human society, with its laws and institutions, its inherited traditions and outlook upon life, as something organic, something that had grown to its present condition by a slow process
of natural evolution; and the notion that a thing so marvellous, a living thing that was the product of centuries of thought and effort, could with impunity be carved about and remodelled according to the theories of philosophers, was in his eyes nothing less than a horrible blasphemy. He knew that in any human society men are held together not so much by formal laws as by an infinite number of delicate interlacing filaments of habit and tradition which defy analysis; to tear these recklessly asunder must lead to the mere dissolution of the organism, or, failing that, to the ruthless employment of force and terror as the only means of avoiding dissolution.

Burke thus gave an emotional and intellectual basis to conservatism. He made it possible for men to feel the same fervour of conviction in defending ancient and venerable institutions that the revolutionaries felt in attacking them. That is why the publication of his book was a great historical event, an event comparable in importance with the fall of the Bastille itself. For Burke's book had an immense circulation, produced an instantaneous effect, and shaped the dominant political thought of Britain for a long time to come.

There were many answers to Burke's great pamphlet; the British people found themselves engaged in a discussion of some of the deepest questions on which men's minds can be exercised; and this had its effect in producing the wonderful intellectual fertility which distinguishes the period. Some of these essays, though now forgotten, were able and thought-compelling performances. But the most important of them was contributed by Tom Paine, who had already played a large part in the American Revolution, and who had now thrown himself heart and soul into the more drastic revolution in France. Paine's Rights of Man, published in 1791, became, for English readers, the very text-book of the revolutionary creed. Written in a clear and trenchant style, it dealt very effectively with Burke's extravagances; but Paine was congenitally incapable of appreciating what was greatest in Burke's thought. Paine had, in truth, all the cocksure shallow omniscience of the revolutionary, who fondly believes that the marvellous structure of human society has no mysteries, but can easily be reconstructed in accordance with formulae. Throughout his work runs the assumption that while France now possessed a constitution, because she had deliberately set to work and made one, Britain possessed no constitution at all, but only a set of
bad usages inherited from William the Conqueror. The implication was that Britain ought, like France, to sweep aside all existing institutions and start afresh to create a brand-new system, according to the fashionable notions of the moment. It is not surprising that such suggestions should have awakened a profound alarm. Even more potently than Burke's *Reflections*, Paine's *Rights of Man* contributed to hasten reaction, and to bring about a panic-struck policy of repression. And as the reform societies did everything they could to assist the wide distribution of Paine's book, which was circulated by the hundred thousand, these societies, though they had themselves no revolutionary intentions, necessarily became the first objects of these mounting fears.

Two years later (1793) a far more searching and uncompromising book was published by William Godwin, under the title of *Political Justice*. This was, in truth, the pure milk of the word of revolutionary thought. But it was too austere in style to arouse much alarm; and, as Pitt shrewdly observed, there was very little danger in a three-guinea book.

§ 3. The Policy of Repression.

The publication of Burke's *Reflections* was almost immediately followed by a cleavage in the Whig party, and by a painful severance of the long friendship between Burke and Fox. For the generous ardour of Fox's temperament made him an eager sympathiser with the aims of the revolutionaries; and, though he deplored their later excesses, his sympathies were never wholly alienated. He could not share, or even understand, Burke's profound fears. The younger and more vehement Whigs clave to Fox. Some of them became ardent reformers and members of the Friends of the People, though Fox himself never went so far as this; and in 1792 Charles Grey introduced a motion in favour of parliamentary reform into the House of Commons; it was, as a matter of course, rejected by an overwhelming majority. But the bulk of the Whig party followed Burke. The cleavage began as early as 1791. In 1794 the leading Whigs of Burke's section actually joined the Government; and Fox was left with a mere fragment of a party, which never numbered more than about fifty in the House of Commons. But from the date of this disruption the Whig party, weak as it was, was identified with the ideas of liberalism, and with resistance to the policy of refusing all
change, which now came to be, increasingly, the policy of Pitt and his Tory following.

Meanwhile not the Government only, but the bulk of the nation, had swung round to an attitude of violent hatred of French ideas, and a vehement, exaggerated fear of all reformers. This new temper was first displayed by the masses, and its first expression took the form of tumults in several towns in July 1791, in protest against the intention of the reformers to celebrate the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille. At Birmingham a mob sacked the house of Joseph Priestley, the venerable Nonconformist divine, philosopher and man of science, and destroyed his scientific instruments. Henceforward it demanded courage to take part in the meetings of the reforming societies, so great was the violence of the mob in proclaiming their disbelief in mob-violence. In truth, the opinion of the country was overwhelmingly opposed to the Revolution and all its deeds; and the horrors of the September Massacres of 1792, followed by the November declaration of the French Convention, which undertook to aid all peoples in overthrowing all kings, completed the conversion of nearly all those who had hesitated.

Nevertheless Government had convinced itself that there was a real and widespread revolutionary conspiracy in Britain; and it resolved that the conspiracy must be crushed by stern measures. The persecution was fiercest in Scotland. A series of prosecutions for sedition was set on foot, some of which were conducted with inconceivable brutality by Lord Braxfield, whom Stevenson has immortalised in Weir of Hermiston. Thomas Muir, a young lawyer of sincerity, moderation and ability, was sentenced to fourteen years' transportation because he had started reform societies and (like Wordsworth) had visited France. Thomas Palmer, a Unitarian minister, who had been a fellow of his college at Cambridge, was sentenced to seven years' transportation for writing an address advocating parliamentary reform, in which it was urged that liberty was decaying in Britain. In spite of these fierce sentences, the reforming societies had the temerity to hold a 'convention' in Edinburgh at the end of 1793, for the purpose of forwarding parliamentary reform 'by rational and lawful means.' Fifty societies were represented; and the delegates had spent a fortnight in harmless discussions as to the best methods of propaganda, when they were disbanded by the authorities. In January 1794 the leading
delegates were prosecuted for treason or sedition, on the ground that they had established a convention in imitation of France, and were preparing to overthrow the constitution; and William Skirving, Maurice Margarot, and Joseph Gerrald were all sentenced to fourteen years' transportation. These victims were able and honourable men and good citizens. With them was linked Robert Watt, who had made a plot to manufacture some arms and seize Edinburgh Castle. This was the only project of violence ever brought before the courts; and Watt had been a Government spy and *agent provocateur*, in the pay of the Lord Advocate. Panic fear produces strange results. 'We were all mad,' said one of the jurymen, looking back on these events in later years. Long afterwards, in 1844, the martyrs of this madness were commemorated by a monument on the Calton Hill in Edinburgh.

The victims in Scotland were few; but they were enough, in conjunction with the growing hostility of public opinion, to put an end for a time to the open and public organisation of a demand for reform. In England the persecution was less outrageous, because no judge was found to rival the partisanship of Braxfield, and no jury to share the blind panic of the Edinburgh jurymen. A few minor offenders were prosecuted during 1793, some of them being acquitted by the juries, while others were sentenced to short terms of imprisonment or to fines. But in May 1794 Government determined to attack the leaders of the two main societies, the Society for Constitutional Information and the London Corresponding Society. Thomas Hardy, the founder of the Corresponding Society, Horne Tooke, the chief man in the Constitutional Society, and John Thelwall, whom his friend Coleridge described as 'intrepid, eloquent and honest,' together with nine others, were first brought before the Privy Council and then before the Court of King's Bench, to answer for their lives on a charge of high treason. Hardy was tried first; and after all the minutes and publications of the Corresponding Society had been ransacked to disclose anything that could be described as treason, he was acquitted by the jury. Then the doughty old warrior, Horne Tooke, was put on his defence. But in him Government had caught a tartar; for the prisoner actually called Pitt as a witness to prove that the Prime Minister himself had, ten years earlier, said just such things about the need for parliamentary reform as were now being treated as high treason. Horne Tooke also was acquitted; and when the
same verdict was given in the case of Thelwall, Government gave up the attempt, and the other prisoners were discharged. In these trials English juries, surrounded as they were by every sort of prejudice, struck a manly blow for the preservation of English freedom.

The trials of 1794, unsuccessful as they were, ended most of the reform societies, though the London Corresponding Society struggled on, against great difficulties, for a few more years. Having failed in the law courts, Government had recourse to legislation; and in 1795 two Acts were passed, one of which made spoken or written words, even if not followed by action, liable to the penalties of treason, while the second forbade all public meetings unless due notice of them had been given by resident householders. The repression reached its height in 1797 and the following years. In 1799 Acts were passed for the suppression of such of the societies as still existed; and at the same time debating societies were subjected to restrictions, and printers were required to obtain certificates. The law against combinations among workmen, which was passed in 1799, was a part of the same code of repression; we shall have to consider its effects in another place.¹

The story of this repression of free speech and free thought, this panic fear of a revolution of which there was never any danger, forms a dark shadow upon a heroic age. But it is fair to remember that these were years of terrible trial, when the very existence of the nation seemed to be threatened by the militant and merciless republicans; in 1797, when the persecution was most severe, Britain seemed to stand alone in a reeling and ruined world, Ireland was on the verge of open revolt, and the exaggerated fear of internal danger was by no means unnatural in face of the boasts of the French leaders that there were thousands in England ready to rise at a word. Moreover, public opinion was behind the Government; Francis Place, who was a member of the Corresponding Society, testified that 'the mass of the shopkeepers and working people' approved the action of Government, 'such was their terror of the French regicides and democrats.' But there was one group of public men who never failed to protest against the suppression of public liberties, and never lacked the courage to stand up against the overwhelming force of public opinion. These were the Whigs, led by the fearless and generous Charles Fox; and there is nothing in all his career which is more

¹ Below, p. 220.
to his credit than his gallant stand of these years. Nor did the Whig reformers flinch from the cause they had adopted. Even in the dark year 1797, Charles Grey introduced into the House of Commons a bill for the reform of Parliament. And this meant that when the inevitable reaction should come, it would be not merely a revolt of the disfranchised against the privileged, but a demand for national reorganisation that would find leaders among the privileged themselves.

The main immediate result of the French Revolution in Britain was thus to bring to nought a promising movement of political reform, and to diminish the traditional liberty of thought and speech which was the most precious inheritance of the British Commonwealth. But alongside of that it awoke a new fervour which not even official persecution and public misunderstanding could destroy. And it gave to numberless obscure men the chance of proving that they could work for an idea, and suffer injustice in its defence, without ever allowing themselves to be betrayed into violence. The men of the societies, the Muirs and the Gerralds, the Hardys and the Thelwalls, obstinately idealist and not less obstinately moderate, patient under misrepresentation, enduring persecution with dignified courage, deserve a place among the makers of the Commonwealth alongside of the statesmen, the soldiers and the mass of the people who misunderstood and persecuted them, but who also bore themselves manfully in a crisis of their country’s fate.

[Veitch, Genesis of Parliamentary Reform; Brown, England and the French Revolution; Holland Rose, William Pitt and the Great War; Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution; Paine, Rights of Man; Hunt, England from 1760 to 1801; Hammond, Life of Fox; Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party; Morley, Burke; Conway, Life of Thomas Paine; Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne; Cockburn, Trials for Sedition in Scotland; Erich Eyck, Pitt versus Fox, Father and Son; Magnus, Edmund Burke; Cobban, Edmund Burke; Temperley and Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy.]
CHAPTER III

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WAR

(A.D. 1793-1801)

§ 1. The Futilities of the First Coalition, 1793-1795.

It was with extreme reluctance that Pitt allowed Britain to be drawn into the war against the French Revolution. So obstinately did he believe in the possibility of maintaining peace that he had actually reduced the military and naval estimates as late as 1792; the number of men in the navy had been cut down from 34,000 to 16,000. But the revolutionary leaders themselves forced his hand. In the autumn of 1792, having overrun Belgium, they declared the river Scheldt open to trade in defiance of treaties to which both France and Britain were pledged, and sent ships of war to Antwerp by that route. Then, though Holland had remained neutral by Pitt's advice, they threatened to invade and conquer that country. To all this was added the alarm caused by the proclamation of November 1792, threatening war against all kings, and finally, in January 1793, came the execution of Louis XVI., which set even the city crowds clamouring for war against France. Even then, though the French ambassador was expelled, and war had become inevitable, Pitt still hesitated to take the plunge, and it was France which declared war, in February 1793.

Pitt had hesitated because he hated war; and, as he was soon to show, he had not a vestige of his father's commanding genius in the conduct of it. He made every possible miscalculation. He thought the war would be over in a couple of campaigns, whereas it was to last for twenty-two years. He showed no sort of capacity to play the part which Marlborough had played in the war of the Spanish Succession—the part of co-ordinating the efforts of the allies, which Britain's position as pay-mistress might have enabled her to do. Nor did he succeed in discovering any soldier or diplomat who could play it for him. He had nothing of
his father's judgment of men. The leaders whom he chose for the British armies in the field were uniformly incompetent. Even the high naval commands were, until 1795, mostly bestowed upon second-rate men like Bridport, Hotham, and Colpoys, though admirals like Howe, Hood, and Duncan were available. Pitt was still less successful in the choice of the men whom he placed at the head of the fighting departments of Government. The Admiralty was at first under the control of his incompetent elder brother, the Earl of Chatham; and it was not until the junction of Burke's followers with the Government in 1794 that naval policy was brought under vigorous direction, with the accession of Earl Spencer to the Admiralty.

When the war began, the army and navy were anything but ready for their task; they had been starved and neglected during the years of peace. The army numbered only 17,000 men; and although these numbers were, of course, rapidly increased, no systematic method of recruitment or organisation was ever wrought out so long as Pitt remained in power. The navy also had been neglected. The men were badly paid, badly fed, recruited largely by the brutal methods of the pressgang, and often treated with an abominable severity. Many of the ships were in bad condition, and only ninety ships of the line were ready to be commissioned when the war began. If the French navy had not been in a terrible state of indiscipline and disorganisation, British supremacy on the seas might have been endangered during the first years.

Even in the sphere of finance, upon which he most prided himself, Pitt's good genius deserted him as soon as he came under the shadow of war. He financed the war from the first mainly by means of loans, instead of raising as much as possible in the form of taxation; and the result was that, before the war ended, the nation was paying in interest on these loans every year as much as would have defrayed the annual outlay at the beginning, and it was saddled with this burden for an indefinite period. But Pitt's failure as a war minister was in nothing so clearly displayed as in his failure to form and to carry out a consistent and coherent plan of campaign. What soldiers call the 'higher direction,' the general-staff work of the war, was on the British side inconceivably inefficient.

The foundation of British war policy ought to have been the efficient use of the power of the navy. No attempt was made to use the overwhelming preponderance of naval
power which the allies enjoyed at the beginning of the war. More extraordinary still, the son of Chatham neglected to blockade the French ports. There was only one great naval battle during the first four years of the war; and it ought to have been unnecessary. The main French fleet had come out from Brest (May 1794) to meet and protect a big squadron of corn-ships coming under convoy from America. Lord Howe, with the British Channel fleet, intercepted the French fleet on June 1, 1794, and defeated it in a well-fought battle, which came to be known as the Glorious First of June. But while the battle was raging the corn-ships got safely into harbour, so that the main purpose of the battle was not achieved. If the French squadrons had been sealed up in port by a strict blockade, either the corn-ships would never have sailed, or they would have been intercepted. Thus the chief naval exploit of these years was really the proof of a failure in naval policy.

Again, being in command of the sea, it should have been easy for Britain to give aid to the rebels in France. Two outstanding opportunities for such action presented themselves. One was the revolt of the naval arsenal of Toulon, which in August 1793 admitted the British and Spanish fleets. But no adequate precautions were taken to defend this vitally important place. It was attacked and captured by a revolutionary army, in which Napoleon, commanding the French artillery, won his earliest fame; and the Anglo-Spanish forces did not even destroy all the French warships in the harbour before withdrawing. A second opportunity was offered by the revolt of La Vendée, which, being on the coast of the Bay of Biscay, could easily have been succoured from the sea. The Vendéans fought with extraordinary gallantry. But no aid was sent to them till the end of 1793; and it arrived only to find that the Vendéans had been defeated, and ignominiously returned home without doing anything.

Even more humiliating was the management of the main campaign on land. At the beginning of the campaign of 1793 the allies rapidly drove the French out of Belgium; and when the British forces, under the King's son, the Duke of York, entered the field, it only remained to capture the border fortresses, and a clear road would be open to Paris. One after another the fortresses fell. But instead of driving home their success, the allies began to squabble among themselves. York, under the orders of the home Government, withdrew from the main Austrian force under Coburg,
in order to lay siege to Dunkirk. Meanwhile the panic of defeat had aroused the French people, and the genius of Carnot had recreated their armies. In September York was severely defeated at Hondschoote, and forced to raise the siege of Dunkirk; he only saved himself by a hasty retreat. A month later the turning-point battle of Wattignies drove back Coburg's main army, and France was saved from invasion. By the end of 1793 the tide had definitely turned; the internal troubles of France had been overcome; the armies of the republic were already pressing over the frontier in every direction.

In the campaign of 1794, French armies, fighting with irresistible élan, drove the allies out of Belgium. Coburg and his Austrians were driven across the Rhine. The British army fell back upon Holland. But it was promptly followed by the French, who, in alliance with the Dutch republicans, overran the whole country; the French cavalry actually captured the Dutch fleet by riding across the frozen sea; and the British force, after terrible sufferings, succeeded only in retreating into Germany, whence it was withdrawn by way of Bremen.

This was an ignominious conclusion for two years' fighting by the greatest coalition of European States that had ever been formed. Meanwhile the Reign of Terror had been brought to an end; and the new Government of France, though it was corrupt and ambitious of conquest, had abandoned the idea of waging endless war for the republican idea. The result of these events was a rapid dissolution of the great coalition of 1793. Holland had become a subject ally of France, and declared war against Britain in 1795. Prussia, eager to devote her strength to the acquisition of territory in Poland, made haste to withdraw from the war, and in April 1795 concluded an ignominious peace at Basle, recognising the French claim to the Rhine frontier; in the same year she joined with Russia and Austria in the third partition of Poland, which wiped that unhappy nation off the map of Europe. Spain concluded, in July 1795 a treaty of peace with France, which was to be turned in the next year into an offensive and defensive alliance aimed at Britain. These secessions broke the back of the great coalition. There were now left only Austria, the Italian Powers, and Portugal; but among these only Austria and Sardinia counted for anything as military Powers, and both were almost exhausted.

1 See the map, Atlas, School Edition Plate 29 (b), 6th Edition Plates 57 and 68 (c).
Even in Britain itself there was an insistent demand for peace. Despite the opposition of Burke and other un-bending foes of the Revolution, Pitt resolved to make an attempt at a settlement. He proposed to Austria a scheme for the general pacification of Europe, and Austria was not unwilling; he also opened direct negotiations with France. But the French Government refused to make terms. They were bent upon further conquests. Their recent victories had been turned to advantage by the plunder of the conquered countries, and, as the industrial life of France had been gravely dislocated, they dared not abandon the lucrative trade of war. So Pitt's overtures were rejected. The chance of a general peace, which was within reach in 1796, was sacrificed to the new ambitions of the republican Government; and the civilised world was sentenced to a terrible prolongation of conflict.

§ 2. The Dark Years, 1795-1798.

From 1795 onwards, the war took on a new character. The Revolution was now securely established. France no longer entertained the aim of overthrowing monarchy everywhere in favour of democracy. Though her politicians and her soldiers still used the language of liberty, it was no longer the ambition of extending the range of freedom, but the ambitions of conquest and of glory, that moved them. On the other hand, the remaining enemies of France no longer hoped to overthrow the Revolution. They had not, indeed, lost their fear and hatred of it: an era of panic-struck repression had begun, in almost every European country, which was to last for two generations. But while the rulers of Europe strove to crush out revolutionary ideas in their own dominions, they no longer dreamed of crushing them in France. They were willing, even eager, to make peace with the terrible republic. But the republic, intoxicated with victory, made peace with some, but only in order to concentrate her resources for a war of conquest against the others. And these others—Britain, Austria, and the Italian States—knew that they had to defend their very existence against a terrible menace.

Britain, in particular, realised that she must fight for her very life; and during the next three years, 1795-1798, she passed through the most anxious moments of her long history. Twice in 1796, and once in 1797, Pitt brought himself to sue for peace, offering, on the last occasion, to
restore all the lands that had been conquered from France in the West Indies,¹ and to recognise the republic's continental conquests. His overtures were always refused. They were refused because France's appetite for conquest was fed by an intoxicating series of victories, and because there had flamed into her sky the most marvellous military genius of all history; for these were the years of the emergence of Napoleon Buonaparte. And as the nature of the danger was realised in Britain, the temper with which she faced the ordeal of war was changed. At first she had been somewhat half-hearted, finding herself in the unwanted position of fighting against a people who were struggling (with whatever extravagances) to attain freedom. But as the character of the struggle became more clear, as the dread figure of Napoleon, like the genie in the Arabian tale, swelled and grew till its shadow seemed to blot out the sun, the temper of the nation became more set. It was not merely the repressive policy of government, but the growing dread of the French menace, which brought about a rapid decline in the vigour of the reform movement in Britain after 1794; and even the poets began to waver in the fervour of their devotion to the gospel of Liberty.

In the campaign of 1795, which followed the break-up of the coalition, there were no very decisive events. Pitt tried the experiment of landing a large force of émigrés in Brittany, where there had been royalist risings. But the expedition came too late; it was a humiliating fiasco; and this was for some years the last British attempt to do anything on the continent. The fighting on land was left to Austria and Sardinia. And though they had the worst of the fighting on the Alpine frontier of Italy, there was still good reason to hope, when the year ended, that they would be able to hold their own.

For the year 1796, however, the French Government had planned a vigorous series of attacks against both of France's principal enemies. An intensive campaign against British merchant shipping was carried on with alarming success by warships and privateers; and a formidable army was placed under the command of Lazare Hoche, the ablest of the republican generals, for an invasion of Ireland. The incompetent handling of the Channel fleet allowed this force to set forth, and even to reach Ireland unattacked (December 1796).² It was by luck, rather than by skill, that Britain was saved on this occasion from a very terrible disaster. In February 1797 a small French force was

² See below, p. 208.
actually landed in South Wales; and though it was easily overwhelmed, the mere fact that it was able to land was an ominous beginning for what was to be a year of dread. When the navy failed to check invasion, men might well fear what was to come.

But the main French attacks of 1796 were aimed against Austria; Britain's turn was to come later. Two great armies were to march across Southern Germany, the one by the Main Valley, the other by the Danube Valley; and a third army was, meanwhile, to invade Northern Italy, and strike at the Austrian power there. The command of the Italian army was given to Napoleon Buonaparte, a young Corsican of twenty-seven. It was his first important command, though he had done well as an artillery officer at Toulon and on the Italian frontier, and had won the favour of the Directors by the skill with which he had suppressed the revolt of Paris in 1795. The arrival of Napoleon at Nice, in March 1796, to take command of the army of Italy marks the beginning of a new era in the war. By a strange coincidence, in the British fleet, which was hanging off the coast of the Riviera and striving to hamper the movements of the French armies, there was a young post-captain, chafing at the inactivity of his chiefs: Nelson, the supreme genius of sea warfare, appears at the very opening of the new era over against Napoleon, whom he was to baffle time and again during the next ten years.

The Italian campaign of 1796, which was the foundation of Napoleon's extraordinary career, was dazzling in its rapidity and brilliance. The young general first isolated the Sardinians, and forced them to make peace; then, driving the Austrians before him, he overran the rich plain of Lombardy, and turned it into a republic in dependent alliance with France. The minor States of Italy were compelled to make peace and to close their ports to British ships. And these dazzling achievements helped to persuade Spain to make an alliance with France, and to declare war against Britain (October). In these circumstances the British fleet could no longer maintain itself in the Mediterranean: it evacuated that sea (November), which for eighteen months remained closed to British shipping. The evacuation of the Mediterranean marked almost the lowest ebb of British fortunes during the war.

At the end of 1796 it was already evident that Austria was beaten. In the spring of 1797, after defeating new Austrian armies, Napoleon boldly struck towards Vienna,
and had got within one hundred miles of the city when the Austrian Government accepted at Leoben the terms of a humiliating peace, which was later embodied in the Treaty of Campo Formio. Austria recognised all the French conquests, and left France practically mistress of Italy, receiving in return most of the territories of the republic of Venice. When the French Government thus cynically assented to the suppression of an ancient free State, it was guilty of a crime comparable with the partition of Poland; and nothing could have demonstrated more clearly how completely the rulers of France were now dominated by the spirit of conquest.

The downfall of Austria meant that Britain was left to stand alone against a militant French power infinitely more formidable than that of Louis XIV. had ever been. France not only had great armies inspired by the confidence of victory and led by commanders of genius; she had annexed Belgium and Western Germany; she had turned Holland and Northern Italy into dependent States; she controlled the Mediterranean; she had a close alliance with Spain; and there was no Power on the continent of Europe prepared to enter the field against her. Against this terrible Power Britain could strike no effective blow. Even the shield of the navy, her only defence, seemed no longer sure. It had not availed to prevent two French expeditions in the winter of 1796-7. Another and greater force for the invasion of the islands, consisting of the unconquered veterans of the revolutionary wars, was now preparing. There was no force in Britain capable of resisting a French army, if once it could be safely ferried over. Still less would it be possible to defend Ireland, which was on the verge of rebellion, with 200,000 men secretly drilling. The most perturbing fact of all was that France could now dispose not only of her own fleets, but of the fleets of Holland and Spain. Taken in combination they materially outnumbered the British navy. If they could join forces, they must almost infallibly obtain command of the Channel, and the doom of Britain would be sealed. To bring about such a combination was the aim of French policy during 1797.

Everything depended upon the navy. Happily, at this moment of crisis, the supreme naval genius of Nelson at last got its chance. Nelson was serving as second-in-command of a squadron of fifteen ships under Sir John

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1 Southeby's *Life of Nelson* is a classic. Sir J. K. Laughton's *Nelson in the 'English Men of Action' Series is an admirable short study.
Jervis, which had been engaged, since the evacuation of the Mediterranean, in watching the outlet of that sea. In February 1797 the Mediterranean fleet of Spain came out through the Straits; this was the first step towards the great combination. The Spaniards had twenty-five battleships. But at Cape St. Vincent Jervis came up with them, and without hesitation threw his fifteen ships at the enemy, breaking through a gap in the Spanish line, and then veering round to concentrate on the main body. The manœuvre would have been fruitless if Nelson, who was in command of the British rear, had not disregarded orders and thrown himself at the head of the Spanish line, thus preventing its escape. Four ships were captured. The rest tamely withdrew into Cadiz harbour, where Jervis kept them under strict blockade. This victory not only raised the spirits of the British peoples; it prevented the junction of the Spanish fleet with the French; and, what was even more important, it disclosed the genius and courage of Nelson.

But the danger was by no means averted by the victory of Cape St. Vincent. There was a strong Dutch fleet in the Texel, at the mouth of the Zuyder Zee, and a French fleet at Brest.¹ And the main French plan for the year was that the Dutch fleet should convey an army to Ireland, and be followed by the Brest fleet with Lazare Hoche and a second army. Admiral Duncan, with the North Sea fleet, was watching the Dutch; Lord Bridport, with the Channel fleet, was keeping guard over Brest. The safety of Britain depended upon these two fleets. And at this awful moment both mutinied.

The seamen had good ground for discontent. They were badly paid, badly tended, and often treated with inconceivable brutality. In the Channel fleet at Spithead, where the mutiny first broke out in April, they put forward reasonable demands, and behaved themselves in an orderly way. The Admiralty gave way to their demands, but not without futile delays and evasions, which prolonged the mutiny for over three weeks. It was no sooner ended than a new mutiny broke out in the North Sea fleet at the Nore. This was a much graver affair than the mutiny at Spithead. The reasonable demands of the sailors had already been conceded; yet the men at the Nore, led by an ex-midshipman, Parker, actually blockaded the mouth of the Thames, and Sheerness had to be fortified against them. Government rightly refused to consider demands put forward in such

¹ See the map of the Narrow Seas, Atlas, School Edition Plate 28, 6th Edition Plate 62.
a way, and, after an anxious month, the men returned shame-facedly to their duty. Eighteen of the ringleaders were hanged; the rest were pardoned, after the mutinous fleet had won one of the most glorious of British naval victories.

Britain has never lived through a more anxious time than the two months covered by these successive mutinies. It was only by sheer luck that the Dutch and French fleets made no use of the opportunity thus offered to them. And, meanwhile, out in the North Sea, Duncan, off the Texel, had been deserted by all but two of his ships. With a splendid bravado he kept up the semblance of a blockade, sending signals from one of his ships to the other, as if to be transmitted to an invisible squadron below the horizon; and he had arranged, if the worst should come and the Dutch should set sail, to sink both of his vessels in the fairway so as to impede navigation. Happily westerly winds kept the Dutch penned into harbour. It was not till October that they came forth; and by that time the fleet had returned to its duty, and the men were determined to prove their patriotism. They did so nobly, in the hard-fought battle of Camperdown, when Duncan cut the Dutch line in two places, captured nine ships, and drove the shattered remnant back into the Texel, whence it never emerged again.

The victory of Camperdown was of incalculable importance. Taken in conjunction with Cape St. Vincent it destroyed the possibility of an overwhelming enemy combination, and securely re-established British naval supremacy. From this date onwards the British navy held the upper hand, and kept the scattered fleets of the enemy penned into harbour.

§ 3. First Phase of the Duel between Napoleon and Nelson.

The naval checks of 1797 did not put an end to the project of an invasion of Britain, which seemed to be the only way of overthrowing the one undefeated enemy of France. Even after Camperdown, boats were still being built in the Channel ports, and armies organised on the French side of the Straits. To command the army of England the Directors had fixed upon Napoleon, who returned from his dazzling triumphs in Italy at the end of 1797. But a very brief survey of the situation satisfied Napoleon that there was no prospect of success for an invasion until the French fleet had been reorganised and strengthened. Instead, he urged that the best way to strike at Britain was
to attack the foundations of British oversea trade, and that this could best be done by seizing Egypt. 'The power that holds Egypt is ultimately the master of India,' was one of Napoleon's axioms. Thankful to get the too popular young general out of the way, and hoping for rich plunder from the East wherewith to repair their shattered finances, the Directors accepted the project; and in May 1798 an army of 35,000 soldiers, escorted by the French Mediterranean fleet, set sail from Toulon.

This was a pure filibustering expedition. Its first exploit (June) was to seize and garrison the island of Malta, though France had no quarrel with the Knights of St. John, who had held the island since the sixteenth century. Then the army was landed in Egypt, though France had no quarrel with the Sultan of Turkey, who was the suzerain of Egypt, or with the Mamelukes (mercenary soldiers), who were its effective masters. Alexandria was occupied; the Mamelukes were easily defeated in the neighbourhood of Cairo (July); and Napoleon set to work to organise his conquest. He had conceived mighty projects. He was to make a canal across the isthmus; he was to get control of the Red Sea; he was to prepare the way for a future attack on India. But before he had even fully secured his hold on Cairo, he received startling news, which altered the whole complexion of the great adventure. His communications with France had been cut.

After the naval victories of the previous year, the British Government had decided to send a strong squadron once more into the Mediterranean. To the command of this squadron—which was slightly weaker, on paper, than the French Mediterranean fleet—Nelson was appointed. It was his first important independent command. And thus the supreme genius of sea warfare entered upon his long duel with the supreme genius of land warfare. Nelson entered the Mediterranean before the French expedition sailed from Toulon. But bad luck and the lack of scouting frigates prevented him from intercepting it. Ignorant of its destination, he went off on a wild-goose chase, first to Sicily and then to the Levant. Twice over, in this eager hunt, he missed the French fleet by a hair's-breadth. But the French army had been safely landed, and was at Cairo, before Nelson learned what had happened. Then he came swiftly down upon the French fleet, which lay at anchor in the Bay of Aboukir (August 1). Sailing boldly into the

bay, he concentrated the whole strength of his fleet upon the van of the anchored French line, destroyed it, and passed on to the rear. Never, in all the records of naval warfare, had any fleet suffered such utter destruction; it was not defeat, but annihilation. Only two of the French battleships and one frigate escaped; and the two battleships were subsequently captured.

The battle of the Nile established British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean; and the island of Malta, which was reduced after a long siege, became the principal naval base by means of which this supremacy was maintained. It also helped to bring about a new coalition against France, and thus to rescue Britain from her dangerous isolation. In the meanwhile it had locked up Napoleon and his army in Egypt with no chance of escape, and given to the young conqueror his first lesson on the formidable character of sea-power.

Imprisoned in Egypt, Napoleon found little opportunity for his restless energy. Nothing could be done against India without a fleet. Moreover, the raid into Egypt had inevitably roused the Turks. In order to forestall a Turkish attack, Napoleon undertook the conquest of Palestine with a part of his army. But, once again, the British navy checked him. Sir Sidney Smith, who had been left by Nelson with a small squadron to police the Eastern Mediterranean, threw into Acre a force of sailors and marines to stiffen the resistance of the Turkish garrison, and at the same time supported them by the fire of his ships from the sea, and captured the vessels that were bringing the siege guns with which Napoleon hoped to reduce the fortress. The conqueror had to fall back, baffled, and only with the greatest difficulty returned to Egypt (May 1799). Soon after his return he had to deal with a considerable Turkish army brought by sea for the reconquest of Egypt (July 1799). He inflicted upon it at Aboukir a crushing defeat, and for the moment secured his hold upon his conquest. But his position was unsafe, and he was reduced to impotence. Sea-power had baffled him. Meanwhile, news came of great events in Europe; and, chafing at being thus penned up far from the scene of action, he slipped away (August), leaving the army behind him, and landed on the coast of France in October 1799, to open a new chapter in his marvellous career.

He was able to boast that he had made a romantic conquest, and he brought with him the halo of his final victory over the Turks. But he had left a fine army im-
prisoned and without the means of escape. In 1801 Britain, in conjunction with the Turks, organised a triple attack upon the dwindling French army in Egypt. While Sir David Baird, with a force from India, landed on the Red Sea Coast and advanced across the desert towards Cairo, and while the Turks invaded from the North-east, General Abercromby landed with a British army in Aboukir Bay and won a victory which sealed the fate of the French army of occupation. The great expedition to Egypt had ended in unrelieved disaster. It was the first complete and irremediable failure to which the French had been forced to submit since the victories of 1793; and the cause of it was British sea-power, now at last being wielded with energy and vision.

§ 4. The Second Coalition and the Peace of Amiens.

While Napoleon was engaged upon the Egyptian adventure, the government of the Directory, corrupt, inefficient and almost bankrupt, was earning the hatred of France; and beyond the borders of France its aggressive and tyrannical policy was alarming Europe, and making possible the formation of a new coalition. French armies had come as liberators into Belgium, into Western Germany, into Italy; but they behaved as tyrants, exacting an extortionate tribute of money and valuables to relieve the distresses of the Paris treasury. The dependent republics which they established found that they were allowed no freedom, but were treated as conquered subjects. And during 1798 the French Government carried out a series of insolent aggressions which showed that there was no hope of stable peace with the militarist republic. Switzerland was occupied without a shadow of justification, was plundered to the extent of 23,000,000 francs, and had to accept a dictated constitution on the French model in subordination to France. French troops entered Rome, and, after heaping indignities upon the aged Pope, set up a Roman Republic and plundered the city of its treasures. The King of Naples, encouraged by Nelson’s victory, attacked the Roman Republic with momentary success; but the French armies closed upon Naples, plundered it, and set up a Parthenopœan Republic, driving the King to take refuge in Sicily, where he was protected by the British fleet. At the end of the year France rounded off her Italian conquests by occupying Piedmont, a province of the kingdom of Sardinia, with which she had made peace in 1796.
These high-handed acts brought about the formation of the second coalition, whose aim was to set a limit to French aggressions. But it would scarcely have been formed (so great was the terror which the republic now inspired) if Britain’s successful resistance on the seas had not encouraged other Powers to resist, and if the terrible Napoleon had not been locked up in Egypt. Russia had already entered the war in 1798, in protest against the French seizure of Malta, but she had not yet put any armies into the field. Prussia stood aloof, because she found neutrality profitable. But Austria declared war against France in March 1799; and Britain assumed the familiar rôle of pay-mistress of the coalition. A double attack was planned: Italy and Switzerland were to be reconquered by a combined Russian and Austrian force; Holland by a combined British and Russian force. The Dutch campaign was a disastrous failure; for the Duke of York, placed in command, was compelled to capitulate at Alkmaar, and the Russian contingent was withdrawn in disgust. At first the Italian campaign was brilliantly successful. Under Suworov, the greatest of Russian soldiers, the Austro-Russian forces swept the French out of Italy, and forced their way through the Alpine passes into Switzerland. But in September the Russians were defeated at Zurich by the brilliant French general Masséna; and the Tsar, attributing the failure to Austrian jealousy, withdrew his troops, leaving Britain and Austria once more alone to face the French power.

This was the situation when Napoleon returned from Egypt, only about ten days after the battle of Zurich was fought. Already the coalition had broken down. But Italy had been lost; the hated Directory was discredited; and Napoleon saw the chance of establishing his own mastery over France. A cleverly planned coup d'état in November 1799 overthrew the Directory; and Napoleon became the first of three Consuls, who were to wield all the powers of the Directory, and also to draw up a new constitution. The young general, little more than thirty years old, was now in effect master of France. There still lay before him the vast labours of reconstruction by which his power was to be made real; we shall see something of these in a later chapter.¹ But in the meanwhile he had to end the war. France was longing for peace, and it was by promising peace that he had won a welcome for the new régime; but for this conqueror the only way to peace was through victory.

¹ See below, Chap. vii. p. 225.
He struck first at Austria, two crushing blows. Napoleon himself crossed the St. Bernard Pass into Italy, won (May 1800) the lucky victory of Marengo, and swiftly re-established French supremacy in Italy; while after a brilliant campaign in Southern Germany, Moreau won the crowning victory of Hohenlinden (December 1800), which opened the road to Vienna itself. Beaten to her knees, Austria accepted the peace of Lunéville (February 1801); and once more Britain was left alone to bear the brunt of the French attack. The second coalition had collapsed even more rapidly than the first.

But Britain was now far stronger than in 1796 and 1797. Her supremacy on the seas was unshakable; and everywhere the power of the conqueror ended at the seashore. Napoleon was faced by the baffling problem of overcoming sea-power, which was to occupy his mind throughout the remainder of his career. Like the Directory, he made plans for an invasion, and set the Channel ports at work building boats for transport. But he knew that invasion without a fleet was impossible. The French and Spanish fleets were locked into their harbours; what remained of the Dutch fleet had been destroyed during the British invasion of Holland in 1799. Other plans flitted before his mind; notably the project of excluding British trade from Europe, which he was later to attempt.

A gleam of hope, both for the execution of this commercial project and for the acquisition of naval strength, came from the North. The neutral Powers had suffered severely from the interruption of their commerce during the war; and though there was little to choose between the restrictions imposed by the two sides, Britain’s naval power made her interferences far more effective. The Northern Powers, Sweden, Denmark and Prussia, talked of reviving the Armed Neutrality of 1780; and in December 1800 the Tsar of Russia, though still nominally an ally of Britain, agreed to join this league. Angered by the failure of the coalition and by the British occupation of Malta, and fascinated by the genius of Napoleon, Tsar Paul had resolved to change sides; and in January 1801 he made peace with France, and proposed an alliance against Britain and a combined Franco-Russian expedition against India. This was the first hint of Russian designs against India, which were to haunt the imagination of British statesmen for a century to come.

1 See above, Bk. vii. chap. v. p. 64.
Naturally Napoleon welcomed these advances with eagerness. Though he did not take the Indian project seriously, he believed that a Russian alliance would 'overcome England and preserve to us Egypt'—which was to be lost in this same year. Still more he hoped to get the cooperation of the Northern Powers in excluding British trade from the continent, and to bring their fleets into the arena against the British navy; they might be enough to decide the issue.

But these hopes were shattered by two events. The British Government demanded an explanation from Denmark, and, receiving no satisfactory reply, decided to treat the formation of the Armed Neutrality as a hostile act, and despatched a fleet under Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson second-in-command, to the Baltic. Parker first negotiated with Denmark; and when negotiations failed, sent Nelson in to attack Copenhagen, where a formidable flotilla was moored under the guns of the forts.1 With twelve ships Nelson boldly attacked this dangerous combination; and, disregarding a timorous signal from Parker ordering him to break off the action, battered the Danish fleet into surrender. Meanwhile the Tsar Paul had fallen a victim to a court conspiracy, and had been succeeded by his son Alexander, who readily came to an agreement with Britain, whereby in return for certain concessions he agreed to the abandonment of the more extreme claims of the Armed Neutrality.

The death of Paul and the victory of Copenhagen dissipated Napoleon's hopes of drawing naval aid from the North; once again Nelson had baffled him. To continue the struggle seemed futile. Moreover he needed an interval of quiet for the great work of reorganisation upon which he was engaged. The British Government, on its side, was ready for peace, as it had always been, provided that peace could be obtained on honourable terms. So negotiations were opened; and in October 1801 the preliminaries of peace were signed in London, though the Treaty of Amiens which was based upon them was not concluded until March 1802.

The terms of the treaty afforded evidence of the sincerity of the British desire for a settlement; for Britain, though she was undefeated, restored to France and her allies all the conquests which her sea-power had enabled her to make, with the exceptions of Ceylon and Trinidad; she even promised to give up Malta. France, on the other hand,

gave up nothing; because in all these eight years she had made no conquests at the expense of Britain. The settlement was eagerly welcomed in both countries. 'This is no ordinary peace,' said Addington, the Prime Minister who negotiated it, 'but a genuine reconciliation between the two first nations of the world.' That was the view taken by many in Britain. They thought that the ugly fever of the Revolution had burnt itself out in France, and that Napoleon would be content with the empire he already possessed.

But there were others who took a less hopeful view, and feared that the peace would be no more than 'a frail and deceptive truce.' Time was to show that this was the sounder view. It was the sounder view because the permanence of peace depended upon the good-will of a man who lived by war and rejoiced in it, who was turning in his mind grandiose schemes of domination, and who had accepted peace merely because it suited his interests for the moment, and gave him a needed opportunity for consolidating his resources and preparing to win the mastery of the world.

[Fortescue, British Statesmen of the Great War and History of the British Army; Mahan, Influence of Sea-Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, Life of Nelson and Types of Naval Officers; Hunt, England from 1760 to 1801; Holland Rose, William Pitt and the Great War, Life of Napoleon and Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era; Fyffe, History of Modern Europe; Morse Stephens, Revolutionary Europe; Gill, Naval Mutinies of 1797; G. Ferrero, The Gamble: Napoleon in Italy; Thompson, The French Revolution, and Leaders in the French Revolution; Temperley and Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy.]
CHAPTER IV

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE
DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Although the war of the French Revolution was an almost purely European struggle, it had very important reactions in the non-European world; and the result of these was that the second British Empire was immensely increased in extent and variety. But the influence of the war was felt in very different degrees in different parts of the empire. Canada and Australia were practically unaffected by it. In spite of their French speech and origin, the seigneurs, priests and habitants of Quebec had no sympathy with the ideas of the Revolution; and for them the years of war were (until 1812) years of unruffled calm, almost of stagnation. The convict settlements of Australia were equally unperturbed; and the most important event in their history during these exciting years was the introduction of sheep-breeding in 1799. But in the West Indies, in India, and in the lands on the ocean route to India (notably South Africa) the war in Europe led to great events. In all these regions the revolutionary war was a turning-point of the first importance in the history of the British Commonwealth.

§ 1. The Influence of the Revolution in the West Indies.

Even before the outbreak of war the news of the Revolution, and the heady doctrines of the Rights of Man, aroused a dangerous excitement among the negroes and half-castes of the French West Indian possessions. In the lovely and prosperous land of San Domingo this excitement led, in 1791, to the outbreak of a hideous race-war between the French settlers on the one side, and the half-castes and slaves on the other; a war which was conducted, on both sides, with pitiless cruelty. For a time the anarchy was moderated by the emergence of a negro of genius, Toussaint L'Ouverture, who held his race-fellows in restraint, and led them to victory, establishing an independent negro republic which included both the French territory of San Domingo and the Spanish half of the island, Haiti. But Toussaint
had no successor: after his fall in 1802 the anarchy deepened; and it has lasted to this day.

Anarchy was desolating San Domingo when in 1793 Britain was drawn into the war against France. One of Pitt’s first acts was to despatch an expedition against the French West Indies, to prevent their being used as bases for an attack upon the British colonies. Martinique was captured in 1793; Guadeloupe, St. Lucia and Tobago in 1794. Then an army was sent against San Domingo, where it was drawn into the hideous black and white war. For five years British troops were wasted in this futile and ugly struggle; and, in the end, Toussaint succeeded (1798) in expelling them. This fighting, and the fevers from which the troops suffered, cost the British army heavier losses than the war in Europe.

There were troubles also in the Windward Islands. At the end of 1794 Victor Hugues, a disciple of Robespierre, arrived from France; and, proclaiming the abolition of slavery, raised a negro army with which he recaptured Guadeloupe and St. Lucia. He also succeeded in stirring up insurrections among the French settlers in Grenada and St. Vincent. And in 1795 a rebellion broke out in Jamaica, where the Maroons—Spanish half-castes who enjoyed a practical independence in the interior of the island—attacked the settlers. There was a real danger that the anarchy of San Domingo would extend throughout the West Indies. To deal with these troubles large military forces had to be sent out in 1796; and it was only after hard fighting that order was restored. Pitt has often been condemned for squandering on the West Indies armies that were needed in Europe; but it is right to remember that he probably saved Jamaica and other islands from the ugly fate of San Domingo.

The fight against anarchy was still raging when the news came that Holland and Spain had both been drawn by France into the war against Britain. Thereupon an expedition was sent to Dutch Guiana (1796), where the Dutch settlers in Demerara and Berbice submitted without resistance, glad to be safeguarded against the spread of revolutionary ideas among their slaves. This was the real beginning of the colony of British Guiana; for though these lands were restored to Holland at the Peace of Amiens, they were to be reconquered as soon as that short-lived peace came to an end.

Next year (1797) the large Spanish island of Trinidad was occupied, almost without resistance, by a force under
General Abercromby. The Spanish government of Trinidad had been lax and inefficient, and the island had become a place of refuge for outlaws and law-breakers of many races from South America and the other islands. The first British Governor, Picton, therefore had a very hard task in establishing order. He seems to have used rough methods, and on his return he was subjected to a criminal prosecution and a Privy Council inquiry, both of which ended in his acquittal. But his methods, if irregular, were successful; and it was no small tribute to the harassed Governor that the Spanish inhabitants petitioned not to be handed back to Spain, and subscribed £4000 towards the expenses of Picton's defence. The fact of his prosecution was, however, a sign that conscience was awakened in regard to the government of dependencies.

No attempt was made to attack the Spanish possessions other than Trinidad. But in a remote and neglected corner the entry of Spain into the war brought on a romantic struggle. Ever since the early seventeenth century bands of Englishmen had haunted the Bay of Campeachy on the coast of Honduras, in order to cut logwood. Spain had always objected to their presence on this coast, and in 1798 she resolved to clear them out once for all, and sent for that purpose a fleet and an army of 2000 men. But the 'Baymen,' as they were called, aided only by one British ship and a handful of soldiers, carried on a skilful fight among the islets and lagoons of the coast, and beat off the Spanish attack. This was the real beginning of British Honduras, although its formal and official recognition as a British colony did not come until 1862.

In spite of these troubles, however, the years of war were a time of very great prosperity for the British West Indies. Most of the British islands were quite untouched by the fighting; and under the secure protection of British naval supremacy the planters enjoyed almost a monopoly of the world's markets. Their trade and their population rapidly increased, and formed a real contribution to the strength of the Commonwealth during the great ordeal.

§ 2. The Conquest of the Dutch Colonies: Cape Colony and Ceylon.

The most important outcome of the war in the field of colonisation was the occupation of the Dutch settlement at
the Cape of Good Hope, the half-way house to India. In 1795 Holland, under the name of the ‘Batavian Republic,’ became a vassal of France. To leave in hostile hands a strategic point so important as the Cape appeared to be extremely dangerous, especially as France was notoriously making plans for an attack on India. When, therefore, the Batavian Republic passed under French influence, a fleet and a small army were promptly despatched to the Cape (1796). Little resistance was offered at Cape Town; and though some of the up-country farmers held out for a time, they soon submitted. Thus the first contact was established between the British Commonwealth and the virile Dutch people, who had developed on African soil a distinctive civilisation of their own.

Ever since its first plantation in 1652, the settlement at the Cape had been subjected by the Dutch East India Company to a régime of the most rigid autocracy, which allowed no shadow of self-government to the settlers. The Company had prohibited free immigration, because it wished the settlement to be no more than a calling-station for the supply of fresh food to ships on the way to the East. It had also reserved to itself a strict monopoly of trade; and this had prevented contact with the outer world. The result was that the colony had preserved in a remarkable degree the character of its first settlers. These had been Dutchmen imbued with the stern Calvinistic Protestantism of the seventeenth century; and after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) they had been reinforced by many French Huguenots who shared their religious beliefs. Unaffected by the movements of thought of the eighteenth century, these remote and isolated settlers retained the ideas of the age of religious wars, and knew and cared little about the more modern world and its theories.

It had been the policy of the Dutch Company to prevent the settlers from spreading beyond the immediate neighbourhood of Cape Town. But it was impossible to enforce such restrictions upon a people so virile and independent. They had trekked far afield, beyond the reach of the arm of Government; when the British occupation took place they had already got as far as Graaff Reinet, beyond the Great Karoo;¹ and the more widely they spread, the more independent and resentful of control they became. As they spread outwards they came in contact with the native races, towards whom they entertained the sentiments of the

¹See the map, Atlas, School Edition Plate 56 (b), 6th Edition Plate 89 (b).
seventeenth century. The Hottentots, whom they found in the south-east corner of the continent, were subjugated and enslaved; the wilder and more primitive Bushmen were hunted down and almost exterminated. Farther east, they came in contact with the more vigorous tribes of the Kaffirs, the advance-guard of the prolific Bantu stock which was pressing down into South Africa from the north-east. Already the long series of Kaffir wars, which fill the early part of South African history, was beginning; a struggle in which there was no quarter on either side, and in which these virile farmers trained themselves for war.

The task of governing such a people was no easy one. But all that concerned the British representatives during this first occupation was to secure the strategic point of Table Bay; and the farmers were left, in the main, to themselves. The chief changes were that there was no further attempt to restrict their expansion, and that they were allowed freedom of trade.

Away in the Indian Ocean another Dutch possession, the lovely island of Ceylon, threatened the security of India still more directly than the Cape. Since the middle of the seventeenth century the Dutch had dominated the coastal region of Ceylon, though they had never overcome the kingdom of Kandy in the mountainous centre of the island. The depth of the mark which they left is shown by the fact that Roman-Dutch law is still administered in the courts of Ceylon, as in South Africa. In 1795, on orders from home, a detachment of the East India Company's troops was sent to effect the conquest of the island. There was little resistance, and for a time Ceylon was administered under the Presidency of Madras. Madras was at this time the most corrupt and inefficient of the British governments in India; the behaviour of its agents aroused revolts; and when these were suppressed, the home Government decided (1798) that Ceylon should not remain under the East India Company, but should be separately administered under the direct authority of the British Crown. It became, therefore, and has since remained, a Crown colony, not owning any dependence upon the Government of India. It has had, on the whole, a tranquil history of steadily increasing prosperity, and will not much engage our attention.

§ 3. The Crisis of 1798 in India.

Immeasurably the greatest result of the Revolutionary war for the British Commonwealth was the change which it
brought about in the position of the British power in India, a change which turned Britain into the paramount Power in India.

The news that Britain was involved in the war against revolutionary France reached India almost at the moment when Lord Cornwallis sailed for England at the conclusion of his governorship (October 1793). As we have seen, Cornwallis had been forced to depart from the principle of non-intervention in Indian politics, upon which the home authorities had insisted ever since the close of Warren Hastings' governorship. He had made an alliance with the Mahrattas and with the Nizam of Hyderabad, and in conjunction with them had defeated Tipu Sahib of Mysore. Cornwallis would have liked to give permanence to this Triple Alliance, and to make it a means for the preservation of Indian peace. But the principle of non-intervention would not permit of any permanent commitment of this kind. Cornwallis’s successor, Sir John Shore (1793-1798), felt himself bound to abstain from all definite treaty obligations with native Powers. These Powers were therefore driven to the conclusion that it was dangerous to place any reliance upon the Company; they must protect themselves. And, as they had learned the potency of European military methods, they borrowed French officers to organise their armies for them.

When Cornwallis sailed for England, Indian politics were in a very unsettled condition. Apart from the Company, there were only four Indian Powers that counted for anything in a military sense. Of these Oudh had long been a dependent vassal of the Company. But its government was corrupt and incompetent, and its forces were undisciplined. It could offer no resistance to an attack either from the Mahrattas, or from the Afghans under Zeman Shah, who were threatening a new invasion of India. Even Sir John Shore felt that he must intervene to remedy the chaos of Oudh, especially as, by several treaties, the Company was bound to defend that State. But when he did so he was threatened with impeachment, so resolute was the home Government to abstain from all interference with the Indian States. In the South, Tipu Sahib, recently defeated but still very powerful, was nursing projects of revenge; he was conducting secret negotiations with the French in Mauritius, and engaging French officers to reorganise his army. This

1 See above, Bk. vii. chap. xi. p. 143.
ruthless and arbitrary despot even pretended to sympathise with the ideas of the revolution; and he was known in Paris as *citoyen Tipou*, and looked to as a future helper of France in an attack on the British power. In the centre and West the formidable power of the Mahratta confederacy was at its height when Cornwallis left India. For some years its dominating personality had been the great fighting chieftain, Mahdaji Sindhia, with whom, for a time, Warren Hastings had made friends. Sindhia had obtained control of Delhi and of the person of the nominal Mogul Emperor. His strength rested upon his possession of a large army, trained in the European fashion and well equipped with artillery; and the command of this army was in the hands of French officers. If he had lived it is possible that he might have made himself master of almost the whole of India. But his death in 1794 brought about a new period of confusion and civil war among the Mahratta princes; and it was perhaps only this sudden change in the Mahratta fortunes that saved the British power from a very great danger.

The last of the greater Indian Powers was the Nizam of Hyderabad. His lands lay between Tipu on the one hand and the Mahrattas on the other; and he lived in constant dread of both his neighbours. He would have eagerly welcomed the protection of a British alliance, the mere assurance of which might have been enough to ward off the danger of war. But the doctrine of non-intervention forbade. For his own safety, therefore, the Nizam engaged French officers to organise and lead his army. In 1795 the whole Mahratta confederacy combined in an onslaught upon the Nizam. He appealed to Shore for protection; Shore refused; and at the battle of Kurdla the Nizam was overwhelmed, and only saved from complete destruction by the disputes which broke out among the Mahratta chiefs almost immediately after their victory. His French-trained force had not saved him. But it had fought gallantly; it was his only defence; and he had finally abandoned all confidence in the British power.

Thus the three greatest Indian States were all more or less alienated from the Company, and had learned to despise it. What was more serious, they were all under the influence of French officers, who hoped to use this influence to reverse the results of the earlier conflicts between France and Britain in India. This was the situation in India when Napoleon's Egyptian expedition was planned in the winter of 1797-1798, for the express purpose of finding in Egypt a
base for an attack upon India. Tipu Sahib had concluded an alliance with the French in Mauritius. He was secretly negotiating also with the Nawab of the Carnatic, nominally a vassal of the Company. Once Tipu began the war, it might be anticipated that the influence of the French officers at the courts of the Nizam and the Mahrattas would lead these Powers also to attack the Company’s dominions; and in that event there was small chance that the British power would survive, especially if Napoleon should succeed in sending even a small force from Egypt. The British power in India had thus reached a very grave crisis in 1798; and the main cause of this crisis was the well-meant doctrine of non-intervention.


In April 1798—three months before Napoleon’s landing in Egypt—a new Governor-General had arrived in India; Richard Wellesley,¹ Earl of Mornington and later Marquis Wellesley, elder brother of the young soldier Arthur, whom he brought with him, and who was to become Duke of Wellington. Lord Mornington was, in his own way, as remarkable a man as his younger brother: able, forceful, not afraid of responsibility, a man of prompt decision and resolute in action, he ranks second only to Warren Hastings in the long roll of British rulers of India. His first survey showed him the dangers of the Indian situation. If they were to be dealt with, a bold departure from the policy of non-intervention was necessary. Wellesley swung back to the policy of Warren Hastings; he resolved to fix the shifting politics of India by a series of definite treaties with all the main Indian Powers. But he went further than Hastings ever dreamed of going: he definitely aimed at making the Company not merely the pivot of a system of alliances which should maintain the peace, but the actual paramount power. Only so, he believed, could security be attained; and only so could peace be guaranteed in India.

The most immediate danger plainly came from Tipu Sahib; and the best chance of preventing a great hostile combination lay in detaching the Nizam by an appeal to his fears and his sense of weakness. On the one hand, therefore, the Governor-General opened negotiations with Tipu to

¹ There is a good short life of Wellesley, by W. H. Hutton, in the ‘Rulers of India’ Series.
make him unmask, while at the same time vigorous military preparations were set on foot. On the other hand, the Nizam was offered the protection of a British force and a practical guarantee of his territories, on condition that he would disband his French-officered army, and that he would combine forces against Tipu should war break out. The Nizam readily fell in with this arrangement (September 1798), which gave him a security both against Tipu and the Mahrattas that he could get in no other way. At the same time the Peshwa (head of the Mahratta confederacy) was invited to renew the alliance against Tipu which had been made in Cornwallis's time.

The result of these arrangements was that Tipu was isolated; and when his formal alliance with the French was announced at the beginning of 1799, the Governor-General was able to launch against him a campaign, every detail of which had been thoroughly thought out beforehand. In a month Tipu was overwhelmed; his capital, Seringapatam, was taken by storm (May), and Tipu himself fell in the thick of the fighting. His dominions awaited Wellesley's disposal. One block of territory was given to the Nizam; a second was offered to, but refused by, the Mahrattas. The Company itself took the lands on the west coast which Tipu and his father had conquered, and also a broad belt of territory linking up these lands with Madras. In what remained of the kingdom of Mysore, Wellesley restored the ancient Hindu dynasty whose throne Tipu's father had usurped a generation earlier. But the restored prince received his State under the terms of a treaty which definitely reduced him to subordination. He undertook to pay the cost of a British force which would protect him, but at the same time keep him obedient; and he pledged himself not to have any relations with any external Power without the assent of the Company. This was the model of the 'subsidiary alliances' which formed Wellesley's chief instrument in the establishment of British supremacy. It guaranteed the dependent prince in the possession of his territories, and left him free to govern them in his own way. But it deprived him of the means of stirring up war; and, therefore, in proportion as these treaties were extended, the reign of peace was extended in a degree which India had never known.

Having banished the danger from Tipu, Wellesley proceeded to carry out a readjustment of Southern India.

1 See the map, Atlas, School Edition Plate 53 (c), 6th Edition Plate 65 (c).
The Nizam was readily persuaded (1800) to accept a permanent subsidiary alliance, not so stringent as that imposed upon Mysore, but conceived on the same lines. The Nawabs of the Carnatic, who had been intriguing with Tipu, and whose lands were shamefully misgoverned, was pensioned off; and the Carnatic was brought under British administration (1801). The Raja of Tanjore also was persuaded, not unwillingly, to accept a handsome pension and hand over his lands to be administered by British officers. These acquisitions of territory created the Presidency of Madras as it exists to-day. A new system of revenue, of justice and of local administration had to be wrought out for this extensive province. One of Wellesley's greatest gifts was his judgment of men; and for these constructive labours he picked out a group of extremely able and enlightened men, some of whom, such as Sir Thomas Munro, were to win eminence by the insight, the uprightness, and the sympathy with Indian ways which their work displayed. Thus by 1801, within three years of his landing in India, Wellesley had made the East India Company the paramount Power throughout Southern India. The territory under direct British rule had been multiplied many fold; the native States had been brought into a clearly defined position of vassalage; and the only regions not subject to British supremacy in Southern India were those which were ruled by the Mahrattas.

Meanwhile, Wellesley had also transformed the situation in the North, by making a new arrangement with Oudh. The misgovernment and confusion of Oudh were such as to make it no longer a protection, but a danger, to Bengal; Shore's attempted reform had led to no good results. If it were attacked, Oudh must inevitably collapse; and its collapse would open Bengal to invasion. To be committed to the defence of a State which by its misgovernment and disorganisation positively invited attack, was to Wellesley intolerable. With a good deal of difficulty, he persuaded the Vizier of Oudh to accept a new treaty on the familiar lines, whereby he gave up the right of dealing independently with other States, and in return for a guarantee of protection ceded to the Company about half of his territories (1801). The ceded lands curved round his diminished realm, which was now surrounded by British territory everywhere save on the North, where it was guarded by the impassable Himalayas. Instead of using Oudh as a rampart against

1 See the map, Atlas, School Edition Plate 53 (c), 6th Edition Plate 65 (c), where these territories are indicated.
the Company's enemies (which had been the accepted policy ever since the days of Clive) Wellesley had thus interposed a belt of British territory between Oudh and any possible foe. These new annexations brought the British power nearly to the gates of Delhi, gave it control of almost the whole of the rich Gangetic plain, and made it, along a very extensive frontier, the next neighbour of the Mahrrattas. The Company was now definitely supreme over almost the whole of Southern India, and over nearly all the Gangetic plain. Between these two great blocks of territory, separating them and almost surrounded by them, lay the Mahratta Empire.\(^1\) India was in effect now divided between two great empires, the British and the Mahratta, of which the former held all the richest and most populous areas. In the midst of their intestine feuds, the Mahratta chieftains were suddenly awakened to the fact that the British power, which had seemed all but negligible five years earlier, had grown like Jonah's gourd, and threatened them from two sides. If the Mahrattas were not to abandon tamely the supremacy which had seemed within their grasp, it was inevitable that a duel should be fought between them and this suddenly created Power.

\section*{§ 5. Wellesley's War with the Mahrattas, 1803-1805.}

During the years when Wellesley was at work upon the reorganisation of Southern India and of the Ganges Valley, a bewildering feud had been raging among the principal Mahratta chieftains. We need not attempt to follow it. But in October 1802, it came to a crisis. The chief Holkar defeated, near Poona, the combined forces of his nominal superior, the Peshwa, and of his rival Sindhia, and set up a puppet Peshwa of his own. Thereupon the defeated and fugitive Peshwa, Baji Rao, asked for British aid. Wellesley would only give it on condition that Baji Rao would sign a treaty of subsidiary alliance, pledging himself to have no independent dealings with other Powers, and to accept and pay for a subsidiary force. Having no other hope of restoration to his throne, Baji Rao submitted to these terms in the Treaty of Bassein (December 1802); and in May 1803 was escorted back to Poona by a British force under Arthur Wellesley. The head of the Mahratta confederacy reascended his throne as a vassal of the East India Company.

\(^1\) See the map, Atlas, School Edition Plate 53 (c), 6th Edition Plate 65 (c).
The Treaty of Bassein was a thunderbolt. Wellesley's action in making use of the distress of the Peshwa to obtain such a treaty was strongly criticised at home, on the ground that it must almost inevitably involve the Company in a Mahratta war. Wellesley knew well enough that this consequence was likely to follow. He was not afraid of it, having come to the conclusion that the only chance of lasting peace in India lay in the establishment of an effective British supremacy. The Directors and the British Government were both deeply averse from the adoption of any such bold and ambitious policy. But they could not interfere. No news of events in India could reach them until at least six months after the events took place; and by the time their instructions on this late information could reach India, another six months or more must pass. Before their condemnation of the Treaty of Bassein reached India, the second Mahratta war had broken out (August 1803).

It was indeed plain that the Mahratta chiefs could not assent to the Treaty of Bassein without definitely abandoning all hope of a Mahratta supremacy in India. But so deep were the divisions among them that, even in face of this menace, they could not unite. The two greatest of the chieftains, Sindhia and Bhonsla (Raja of Nagpur and Berar), joined forces to resist the British supremacy; but Holkar stood jealously aloof.

In a short but hard-fought campaign the power of Sindhia and Bhonsla was broken. The attack upon them was twofold. In the Deccan (the South) Arthur Wellesley was given command of an army which had to deal with the southern forces of Sindhia, and with Bhonsla. With half his army he attacked at Assaye a French-trained army of Sindhia's, outnumbering his own by eight to one, and after a desperate struggle won a complete victory (September 1803). Then at Argaon (November) he shattered the power of Bhonsla, and forced him to submit to a subsidiary alliance, and to cede the coast province of Cuttack (Orissa), which linked up Bengal with Madras. Meanwhile, in the North, General Lake, advancing from the lands recently ceded by Oudh, had dealt with Sindhia's main French-trained armies. He had carried by storm the strong fort of Aligarh, constructed by French engineers according to the accepted principles of Western military engineering; he had defeated, below the walls of Delhi, Sindhia's main army under the French officer Bourquin, though it outnumbered the British force by four to one; he had occupied Delhi itself,
and taken under British protection the poor old blind Mogul Emperor, Shah Alam, who had been for over thirty years under Mahratta control; he had captured the great fortress of Agra; and finally he had destroyed Sindhia’s last army at the hard-fought battle of Laswari. Sindhia also was forced (December 1803) to accept a subsidiary alliance.

The campaign of 1803, which had lasted for only five months, but had seen fiercer fighting than the British had yet experienced in India, seemed to have broken the Mahratta power. It had finally destroyed French influence in India; the French-trained armies had been shattered, and the treaties of peace demanded the expulsion of all citizens of States at war with Britain. The Mogul, who was the symbol of supremacy over India, had passed from the control of the Mahrattas into the control of the Company. The Company seemed to have become the paramount Power over the whole of India, or at any rate of all India south-east of the Sutlej and the Indus; for most of the Rajput princes of the North-West, who had long resented the exactions of the Mahrattas, were ready, even eager, to enter into direct treaty relations with the British power.

But one Mahratta prince still remained unconquered. This was Holkar, whose jealousy of Sindhia had led him to hold aloof from the recent war. Now, suddenly realising his danger, he prepared for war. Unlike Sindhia, Holkar had not remodelled his army on European lines, but had clung to the old Mahratta method of employing, in the main, rapidly moving bodies of light horse. His methods enabled him to inflict a crushing blow upon a strong column under Colonel Monson, which had rashly advanced too far into hostile territory without securing its communications. The defeat of Monson (May 1804) was a grave blow to British prestige, and stimulated every element of discontent, and all who feared the approaching rule of peace. Though Holkar’s capital (Indore) was captured, and he was severely defeated at Deeg (December 1804), his irregular horsemen still held the field. Early in 1805 British arms received another check when General Lake failed to capture the fortress of Bharatpur, whose Raja had joined Holkar. It was, indeed, more difficult to achieve decisive results against Holkar’s irregular and elusive forces than against the solidly organised armies which Sindhia had put into the field. Yet his resistance was being gradually worn down
during 1805, and if Wellesley had been left free to complete his plans, there is no room for doubt that Holkar would have been subjugated like his rivals, and that the complete ascendency of the British power would have been established throughout India. With that would have come the reign of peace.

But the defeat of Monson and the check at Bharatpur gave an excuse to the Directors and to the home Government for bringing to a close the aggressive policy of the masterful Governor-General. They had never approved of this policy, though at each stage their hands had been forced by accomplished facts. They shrank from the tremendous responsibility which Wellesley was assuming in their name—the responsibility of guaranteeing peace and order throughout the whole of India; they honestly felt, moreover, that these immense conquests were contrary to the whole spirit of British policy. They did not realise that the only hope of peace in India lay in the establishment of a single suzerain power capable of enforcing it. So Wellesley was recalled, and even threatened with impeachment; and Lord Cornwallis was sent out in his place, with instructions to end the war as rapidly as possible, to make no new acquisitions of territory, and to return as completely as might be to the old policy of non-intervention.

Cornwallis, now an old man, was a wreck when he reached India (1805), and died two months after landing. The business of ending the war and making a political settlement was left to Sir George Barlow. Meanwhile Lake had pursued Holkar into the Punjab, and had him so completely at his mercy that he must have accepted whatever terms were dictated to him. To Lake’s disgust, Barlow, acting on his instructions from home, insisted that Holkar must be restored to all his territories. He insisted also that no protection must be offered to the Rajput princes upon whom the Mahrattas had long preyed, and who had, for that reason, thrown their strength on the British side in the conflict. The treaty with Holkar actually stipulated that no assistance should be given by the British power to any of these States; and for ten years to come a large part of Central India was sentenced to an indescribable state of anarchy, in the midst of which the Mahrattas prepared for a future renewal of their old ambitions.

Thus the work of Wellesley was left incomplete. Yet in seven years he had brought about an extraordinary transformation of the Company’s position. Whatever the
non-interventionists might say or do, the British power had become the supreme power in India, and it could no more shake off the responsibilities attaching to that position than, forty years earlier, it could shake off the responsibility for the government of Bengal which Plassey and Buxar had thrown upon it. The British Empire in India had become the British Empire of India, less than half a century after the rout of Plassey; and the responsibility of giving peace and justice to a realm wider and more populous than all the lands which Napoleon conquered had become an obligation resting upon the British people.

Wellesley was not only a great conqueror, he was a great administrative reformer. The work of organising the wide new provinces brought under British rule was an immense task, and it was well and honestly done. The men whom Wellesley chose for this work were the founders of a new tradition of administration which was to show great results during the next generation; while the men who served as Residents at the courts of the dependent States set the model for a new kind of public service, not less valuable and even more difficult. In the actual machinery of justice and of government in the older provinces the Governor's reforming zeal equally displayed itself. He carried into effect a separation of judicial and administrative work which was of the highest value; and although his bold proposals were never accepted, he had formed schemes for the reorganisation of every part of the system. But his schemes frightened the Directors, and nothing came of them.

In truth, the Directors and the home Government, while they took credit for moderation of aim and for a dislike of aggression and conquest, were far less generous in their conception of Indian policy, far less penetrated by a sense of obligation for the welfare of the Indian peoples, than the bold and haughty proconsul whom they criticised. It was he, 'the Akbar of the Company's dynasty,' the creator of the British Empire of India, and not they, who held the nobler view of the function which Fate had so strangely thrust upon Britain in the East.

[Lucas, Historical Geography of the West Indies; Theal, History of South Africa and South Africa (in the 'Story of the Nations' Series); Muir, Making of British India; Roberts, Historical Geography of India; Owen, Selection from Wellesley's Despatches and Selections from Wellington's Indian Despatches, with good introductions; Malcolm, Political History of India (1784-1823); Mill and Wilson, History of British India; Cambridge History of India; Cambridge History of the British Empire; Thompson and Garratt, Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India.]
CHAPTER V

THE TRAGEDY OF IRELAND: THE REBELLION OF 1798 AND THE UNION

(A.D. 1782-1801)

§ 1. The Problem of Reform, 1782-1791.

There was no country in which the French Revolution had more profound or more disastrous consequences than in Ireland. For it came at a moment when a healthy national spirit was beginning to unite the divided parties; and by substituting brute force for persuasion it violently interrupted the process of reconciliation, and created new and bitter hatreds to poison the life of the Irish people.

A happier era than Ireland had yet known seemed to be dawning during the decade following the concession of legislative independence in 1782. The old trade restrictions had gone, and Ireland was enjoying an unwonted prosperity. Most of the social disabilities of the Catholics (though not their political disabilities) had disappeared, and among the educated classes the spirit of tolerance was so widespread that the removal of the political disabilities seemed to be only a question of time. Among the peasantry of both faiths, indeed, religious animosities were still easily stirred, and in 1784 and later years there were ominous faction fights in Ulster between the (Protestant) Peep-o’-Day Boys and the (Catholic) Defenders. Agrarian outrages also were still frequent: they showed the need for economic reforms. But these things were deplored by the educated classes of both faiths. It was reasonable to hope that the growing sense of national unity, which was healing the ancient religious feud, would find remedies for these ills.

In the view of Catholics and Protestants alike, the chief symbol of Irish nationhood was the Parliament, whose legislative independence had been won in 1782. But this Parliament was very unrepresentative, and stood in need of drastic reform. Catholics took no part in its election.
THE TRAGEDY OF IRELAND

Even Ulster Presbyterians could not be elected to it. A majority of its 300 members sat for pocket-boroughs, controlled by a small group of great borough-owners. More than one-third of the members held Government posts or pensions, and voted as Government prescribed; and the Irish executive was still nominated by the British Crown. So long as Government and the borough-owners were in harmony, British control over the Irish Parliament was almost as effective as it had been before 1782; and by a judicious distribution of favours, Government was in fact almost always able to make sure of a majority. It was, indeed, by these means that the British Government contrived to ensure that Irish and British policy should not be at cross-purposes; and as unity of purpose between the two islands was of vital importance, especially in time of war, it was unlikely that the British Government would sacrifice its hold over the Irish Parliament. Any large measure of reform, by making the Irish Parliament really independent, would involve the danger of a conflict of policy between the two Governments. It would reproduce the unworkable system which had caused such difficulty in Scotland between 1689 and 1707: hence both the British Government and the reigning oligarchy in Ireland were hostile to the idea of any substantial reform. The chief representative of the ruling oligarchy throughout this period, and the dominating figure in the Irish Government, was the Lord Chancellor, Fitzgibbon, afterwards Earl of Clare. A man of strong intellect and firm will, he held that the first duty of the party which he led was to maintain British power in Ireland; and while he was willing to make concessions on other points, he was resolutely opposed to any proposals which threatened the British supremacy—as any real scheme of reform must necessarily do. Fitzgibbon's masterful, clear-sighted and uncompromising temper made him one of the protagonists throughout the tragic story which we have to narrate in this chapter.

Unhappily there was no unity of opinion among the advocates of reform. Some, like the Whigs in England, thought that no more was necessary than a reduction of the means of corruption at the disposal of Government. A group led by Flood and Lord Charlemont would have given a widened franchise to Protestants, but excluded the Catholics; and in 1783 Flood tried, fortunately in vain, to make use of the volunteers in support of this programme.

Among the Ulster Presbyterians there were extreme democrats who advocated manhood suffrage for Catholics and Protestants on equal terms. But the wisest and most healing policy was that advocated by Grattan, who would have given equal rights in all respects to Catholics and Protestants, but on a limited franchise; for Grattan recognised the danger of entrusting political power to an ignorant peasantry inflamed by religious animosities. A reform on Grattan's lines would assuredly have averted the horrors that were to come. It would have satisfied the Catholics. It would have been accepted even by the Ulster Presbyterians. But, undeniably, it would have complicated the relations between Britain and Ireland, and made the co-ordination of their policy very difficult. For that reason it was certain to be resisted not only by the Irish borough-owners, but by the British Government. Britain was condemned not only to appear, but actually to be, the chief obstacle to the solution of this fundamental Irish problem.

§ 2. The United Irishmen and the Demand for Catholic Emancipation, 1791-1795.

Into these discussions on parliamentary reform a new fervour and greater bitterness were imported by the influence of the French Revolution. The ideas of the Revolution found a ready welcome among the Presbyterians of Ulster, who early opened a correspondence with the French clubs, like the reform societies in England and Scotland. In 1791 an able young Belfast lawyer, Wolfe Tone, published a trenchant pamphlet, in which he argued bitterly that British influence made it futile to hope for reform from the Irish Parliament, and urged that Irishmen of both faiths should unite to secure their own freedom. Tone was vehemently anti-British in sentiment, and held that a complete severance of the connexion with Britain ought to be effected with French aid. Most of his Ulster compatriots did not go so far. But they sympathised with his general ideas; and when he founded in Belfast a Society of United Irishmen whose object was to combine Protestants and Catholics in a demand for complete democracy, branch organisations rapidly sprang up in every part of Protestant Ulster.

It is significant that the revolutionary and anti-British movement should have been begun in Ulster; it is not less significant that for some years it was practically confined to
Ulster. For the Catholics of the South had no sympathy with the Revolution, which had begun by attacking their Church; and apart from a few adherents in Dublin, the United Irish movement obtained scarcely any recruits among them until 1795. The educated Catholics were, indeed, beginning to agitate for parliamentary privileges; but what they wanted was a measure of reform such as Grattan advocated, not a revolutionary upheaval. On the other hand the ignorant Catholic peasantry, stirred perhaps by the unrest that was in the air, were being captured in these years by the Defender movement, which had at first no political ends, but was aimed at purely economic grievances, notably the exaction of tithe. The Defenders organised themselves in secret societies for the conduct of midnight outrages; and they were easily stirred to religious fanaticism, especially in Ulster, where the homes of Protestants were burnt, magistrates were murdered, and there were many affrays between Protestants and Catholics. From 1791 onwards this formless movement of blind violence steadily extended its range, until in 1795 it was raging in more than half of the Irish counties. Defenderism was an ugly and menacing thing; but it appeared to have no connexion whatever with the movement of the United Irishmen, whose object was to destroy those sectarian bitternesses by which the Defenders were inspired. It seemed impossible that these hostile agitations should ever coalesce.

Alarming as was the spread of the Defender movement, it was unhappily of a kind familiar in Ireland; and Government was less perturbed by it than by the activities of the United Irishmen. They were believed to be in negotiation with the French; and this belief was confirmed in 1794, when a French agent was arrested and tried in Dublin. Because of the revelations made in this trial, Wolfe Tone and others had to flee to France, where they strove to bring about a French invasion of Ireland. Henceforth the United Irish movement was labelled as a definitely treasonable conspiracy.

Against this danger from the Ulster Protestants, Pitt held that the greatest safeguard would be found in winning the support of the Catholics, who had every reason to hate the Revolution, and who were as yet untouched by the movement of revolt. In 1793, the first year of the war, he overbore the opposition of Fitzgibbon and other ascendency leaders, and compelled them to carry through the Irish
Parliament a remarkable measure, which at one stroke conferred the franchise upon Catholics on equal terms with Protestants. This Act was meant to win the loyalty of the Catholics, and for a moment it earned their gratitude. But its effect was spoiled in two ways. While it gave to Catholics the right of voting, it did not make them eligible to Parliament, or to the most important offices; a stigma still rested upon every Catholic; and the more loyal and conservative leaders among the Catholic gentry were prevented from exercising their influence. This was a disastrous blunder. Its effect was deepened when Fitzgibbon publicly admitted that the measure had been forced upon the majority in the Irish Parliament by the British Government. This implied that the legislative independence of the Irish Parliament was unreal; and that, if necessary legislation was not passed, the British Government was probably to blame.

The Act of 1793 had, in truth, done more harm than good. But it was not too late to remedy the blunder: the Catholics were still quiet, still loyal. At the end of 1794 the Whigs of Burke’s group joined Pitt’s ministry; and one of the ministerial changes which this involved was the appointment of a Whig, Lord Fitzwilliam, to the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland. Fitzwilliam was a friend of Grattan, and was known to be an advocate of Grattan’s programme of complete Catholic emancipation and parliamentary reform. Pitt knew this when he made the appointment; and his instructions to Fitzwilliam were that, while Catholic Emancipation must not be introduced as a Government measure, it need not be opposed. Fitzwilliam’s appointment was hailed with delight by Catholics and by Protestant reformers. When it was learned that he had encouraged Grattan to introduce an Emancipation Bill, and that he had dismissed from office the leading representative of the borough-owning oligarchy, hopes were raised to the highest pitch.

They were raised only to be disappointed; for six weeks after Fitzwilliam’s arrival in Dublin he was suddenly recalled, and replaced by a Lord-Lieutenant who completely reversed his policy. The only possible explanation of this disastrous action on Pitt’s part is that he had been frightened by the ascendancy party into changing his policy. But nothing could have had a worse effect, in the tense and excited condition of public opinion, than to raise great hopes and then suddenly to disappoint them. The
Irish people lost faith in the honesty and good intent of the British Government. Lord Charlemont predicted that the result must be to drive the mass of the people into the arms of the revolutionaries; the United Irish leaders themselves later testified that their cause had made no progress, except among the Presbyterians, 'until the recall of Earl Fitzwilliam.' Their cause progressed with a vengeance during the next three years. For Fitzwilliam's recall was the turning-point in a tragic history. It was the rejection of an opportunity that could never recur.

§ 3. Growing Anarchy and the Rebellion of 1798.

Over the next three years hangs the gradually deepening shadow of an approaching tragedy.

In 1795, after Fitzwilliam's recall, the United Irishmen began to organise for a general rebellion, which was to be supported by a French invasion. They worked out an elaborate secret organisation, which was gradually spread over the country, with small local 'lodges' at the base, grouped under a hierarchy of barony committees, county committees, provincial committees, and at the head a small directory whose membership was known only to a few.

But if a general rebellion was to take place, the mass of the Catholic peasantry must be brought in, and the peasantry cared nothing about political democracy. To win them over, the United Irish leaders set themselves to capture the Defender movement, with the promise that tithes should be abolished. Defenderism spread with alarming rapidity, and as it spread religious animosity was intensified. In Ulster there was open fighting between Catholics and Protestants—a pitched battle took place at Armagh in the spring of 1795; and the Protestants in self-defence began to organise themselves in Orange lodges, and to harry their Catholic neighbours out of the countryside. In their eagerness to stir up rebellion, the United Irish leaders were playing with fire. All but the more fanatical democrats among the Ulster Presbyterians were gradually frightened away from the movement. It had begun as an attempt to obliterate the hateful religious feud which had so long torn Ireland asunder; it was being turned into the means of bringing it to a pitch of bitterness without parallel even in the dark past. Catholic peasants, driven out of Ulster, spread the story that the Orangemen had vowed to exterminate all Catholics; and some of the United Irish leaders
did not hesitate to encourage this story, using the ignorance and the ancient hatreds of the wretched peasantry for their own purposes. United Irish lodges were rapidly increasing in Southern Ireland during 1795 and 1796; but they no longer preached reconciliation. And the Catholic gentry and priests, alienated and embittered, had almost ceased to exercise any restraining influence.

In 1796 the conspirators began to drill and arm their ignorant and misguided flocks. Muskets were smuggled into the country in large numbers. Blacksmiths were everywhere kept busy in the manufacture of long pikes. The country was rapidly reaching a state of anarchy. Government passed an Insurrection Act, imposing crushing penalties upon those who took seditious oaths, and Habeas Corpus was suspended; but even these severe measures were of little avail. Meanwhile the project of a French invasion was being worked out. In December 1796 a great French fleet, with an army of 15,000 men, under the famous Lazare Hoche, succeeded in evading the British fleet and in reaching Irish waters. Had this army been landed, Ireland would almost certainly have been lost. But a fog scattered the French fleet; and a storm blew out to sea the 15 vessels which reached Bantry Bay. Luck, not skill, had saved Britain from a disaster.

Yet it is significant that, when the invasion threatened, the Catholic population of the South-west proved to be staunchly loyal. They were not yet much affected by the United Irish movement. But the movement was spreading; there were 200,000 men drilling in 1797. And for that year a still greater French expedition, supported by the French, Spanish and Dutch fleets, was projected. This was the peril which made 1797 a year of wearing anxiety in Britain, and which doubled the horror of the naval mutinies. This was the nightmare which the naval victories of St. Vincent and Camperdown dispelled.1

Faced by these dangers, the Irish Government resolved on more drastic measures; and in 1797 General Lake was ordered to disarm Ulster, where the United Irish movement was most dangerous. The disarmament of a whole countryside is in any case a difficult task, open to many abuses. Lacking a sufficiency of regular troops, Lake had to entrust much of the work to Protestant yeomanry, recruited in the district, who were almost frantic with fear and hate, the cruellest of passions; and grim and cruel deeds were done.

1 See above, pp. 178, 179.
The news of what was happening in Ulster spread to the rest of Ireland: it seemed to confirm the ugly story of the threatened Orange Fury. And the United Irish leaders, seeing their organisation undermined, came to the decision that the rebellion must be precipitated before it was too late. They still hoped for, and promised, a French invasion for 1798. The hope was a vain one; for since Camperdown the British fleet commanded the seas, and Napoleon himself had reported that invasion was impossible.

But the United Irish leaders had neither vigour nor resolution; and Government was kept in touch, by spies, with all their plans. In March 1798 all but one of the Leinster executive were suddenly arrested, and for a time this dislocated their schemes. Martial law was proclaimed in Leinster, and soldiers and yeomanry were sent to disarm the population. The cruelties of the Ulster disarmament of 1797 were repeated in a more dreadful form. There were wholesale floggings, burnings of houses, indiscriminate shootings—a real Reign of Terror, inspired by terror. But instead of averting rebellion, these savageries precipitated it. The United Irishmen hastily reconstructed their directory, and sent out orders for a general insurrection (May).

Once more, however, Government was too prompt, and the leaders were seized. Among them was Lord Edward Fitzgerald, son of the premier peer of Ireland, one of the noblest of those generous-minded and reckless visionaries of whom Ireland has been so prolific; like his comrades, and like the leaders of the Revolution in France, he was blinded by a vague ideal to the sordid horrors of internecine strife, into which he had helped to plunge his country. These arrests destroyed any chance there might have been that the rebellion would be formidable. It was only in the south-east of Leinster that it was at all dangerous, and only in Wexford that it attained even a momentary success. Here a mob of ignorant and terrified peasants for a time dominated the countryside, burning and slaying. Their success was short-lived; troops were poured in from England, yeomanry were rushed down from Ulster, and in June, at Vinegar Hill, the hapless and bewildered rebel host was scattered and decimated. Then followed an ugly spell of savage repression; but by August all resistance was at an end. Ireland relapsed into a sullen quiescence.

When all was over, and they could achieve nothing, two French forces at last reached Ireland, a little army of 1000
men landing at Killala, on the wild west coast, in August; a fleet with 5000 men reaching Lough Swilly in September. Both were easily disposed of. With the second came Wolfe Tone, who was captured and condemned to death, but anticipated his fate by suicide.

So ended the most grim and sordid tragedy in even the terrible records of Irish history. It had brought cruel sufferings upon the Irish people; but the worst of all its results were the bitter memories and hatreds which it aroused. They were to poison the life of Ireland for a century to come; and they were the more bitter because they had been stirred at a time when Ireland seemed to be on the verge of becoming at last a united nation, and a reconciled member of the Commonwealth. The blame for this unhappy result rests in part upon the reactionary party in Ireland, in part upon the vacillations of Pitt; but the chief blame must be laid upon the revolutionary spirit, with its appeal to violence, with its wilful destruction of the forces that were working for reconciliation, with its reckless stirring of old hatreds in order that they might be used for its own ends. In other lands, the French Revolution wrought blended good and ill; in Ireland, nothing but ill.


The rebellion was at an end: but the task of healing and settlement remained, and the fierce passions which had been aroused made it an all but impossible task. There was now no hope that the Irish Parliament would admit the Catholics to an equality of treatment, for all the old fears and hatreds of 1690 had been reawakened. But to leave the Catholics at the mercy of the Protestant ascendancy was equally out of the question. In the view of most British statesmen the only solution was a legislative union, such as they had long desired, but never had an opportunity of carrying. This view was strongly held not only by Pitt, but by the wise old statesman Cornwallis, who had been appointed Lord-Lieutenant when the rebellion began, and by the young statesman Castlereagh, who was, as Chief Secretary, beginning his brilliant career. But both Cornwallis and Castlereagh were convinced that a Union would only be possible or defensible if it were associated, as part of the settlement, with a measure of complete Catholic emancipation. This would reconcile the Catholics, and make them feel that Union had brought them a boon which
they could not otherwise have obtained. Pitt refused to permit emancipation to be linked with the Union; but he allowed it to be understood that it would be the first undertaking of the united Parliament. On that understanding the project of Union received, if not the active support, at any rate the concurrence, of a large proportion of the Catholics.

But the Catholics were not represented in the Irish Parliament; and the Irish Parliament had to be persuaded to consent to its own extinction. The project of Union was as bitterly opposed by reformers of Grattan's school as by the oligarchy of borough-owners. There was only one way in which it could be forced through—by organised corruption; and even corruption on the most lavish scale scarcely availed. £1,200,000 were spent in the purchase of pocket boroughs; peerages and places were scattered with profusion. 'I despise and hate myself every hour, for engaging in such dirty work,' Cornwallis wrote, 'and am supported only by the reflection that without a Union the British Empire must be dissolved.' Corruption did its work; it swamped even the moving and lofty eloquence of Grattan, who saw the work of his life undone; and the Irish Parliament came to an end.

The Act of Union was a well-meant measure. It gave Ireland generous representation in the United Parliament, 102 members in the House of Commons, 45 peers in the House of Lords; and at the moment its financial adjustments between the two countries were not ungenerous, though in the long run they proved to be unfair to the smaller country. But it imposed upon Ireland the sacrifice of what even the unrepresented Catholics regarded as the symbol of Irish nationhood. That sacrifice could only be justified if the price paid for it was a worthy price. The price which had been offered was Catholic emancipation, and the healing of the ancient religious conflict. But it was not paid.

George III. had convinced himself that he could not assent to Catholic emancipation without violating his coronation oath. It is incredible that Pitt should not have known this was the King's attitude, or even made inquiries, before he gave the understanding which was as binding in honour as the most solemn pledge. Yet he accepted the King's negative without a struggle, on the ground that George's mental balance was precarious—as if the reconciliation of two sister nations, and the fulfilment
of an honourable undertaking, were not more important than even the sanity of a king. Pitt resigned his post, to save his personal honour; but he secured the possibility of a return to office by giving a voluntary pledge that he would not raise the question during the King's lifetime. This is the deepest of the blots on Pitt's reputation as a statesman. For the history of the united Parliament began with a broken pledge; the symbol of Irish nationhood had been sacrificed, and the price had not been paid; the Irish people (with the Fitzwilliam episode in their memories) had once more been convinced that the promises of a British Government could not be trusted. It was under these unhappy auspices that the great experiment of the Union was undertaken.

[Lecky, History of Ireland in the 18th Century, the best, most solid, and most judicial of Lecky's books; also his Leaders of Irish Public Opinion: Dunlop, Henry Grattan; Swift Macneill, Constitutional and Parliamentary History of Ireland till the Union; Moore, Memoirs of Lord E. Fitzgerald; Gordon, History of the Irish Rebellion; Autobiography of Wolfe Tone; Escande, Hoche en Irlande; E. Curtis, History of Ireland; S. Gwynn, History of Ireland.]
CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

§ 1. Rapid Progress of the Agrarian Revolution.

Great wars always deeply affect the social organisation of the peoples who engage in them; but few wars that have ever been waged can have exercised a more potent or a more unhappy influence upon the social condition of a country than the French Revolutionary War exercised upon the social condition of Britain. Coming at a moment when a vast economic transformation was at work, it intensified the sufferings which this transformation was bound to cause; it distracted men’s minds from the need for remedial measures; and it plunged a large proportion of the population into such an abyss of misery that for a generation after the conclusion of peace violent revolution, dictated by despair, seemed always to be at hand. The full effects of the war were not displayed until its second phase, when Napoleon used his power over Europe to attempt the total ruin of Britain by excluding her trade from European markets. But already, before 1801, the chief sources of difficulty were being made plain.

The outstanding fact of Britain’s situation when she entered upon the most gigantic conflict in which she had ever engaged was that, for the first time in her history, she was unable to support her population from the produce of her own soil. No other great State had ever found itself in such a situation. This was due to the rapid growth of population. Between 1700 and 1750 the population of England and Wales had risen from about 5,000,000 to about 6,000,000, an increase of 20 per cent.; between 1750 and 1801 it rose from about 6,000,000 to about 9,000,000, an increase of 50 per cent. For this growing population home supplies were insufficient, and from about 1773 imports of foreign corn were generally necessary. In the first half of the century Britain had been a corn-exporting country; by the end of the century something like 20 per
cent. of her total requirements had to be imported. These imports had to come from Europe—mainly from the Baltic, for the new world had not yet begun to feed the old; and the war put difficulties in the way of importation. In years when the home harvests failed, as in 1795 and 1797, there was a shortage of food, almost approaching to famine. The price of corn steadily mounted, even in normal years; and by the end of the century a loaf of bread cost three times as much as it had cost fifty years before. This rise in the price of the prime necessities of life was cruelly felt by the mass of the people; for though wages also rose, they did not rise in proportion to the cost of living.

In these circumstances it was essential that every possible means should be adopted of stimulating home production. In 1791 an attempt was made to encourage the farmer by means of a Corn Law, which practically prohibited importation when the home price was below 50s. a quarter; but as the home price never sank to anything like so low a figure as 50s., the Act had no effect, and it certainly did nothing to raise the price of corn. Indeed, in 1795 Government was actually offering bounties on the importation of foreign corn, so grave was the shortage. The Corn Laws were, in fact, useless during this period. A far more important means of increasing production was the stimulation of scientific farming. From 1793 a semi-official Board of Agriculture, with Arthur Young as its secretary, was doing everything in its power to encourage the farmers to employ more intensive methods. But the old open-field system, and the wide extent of uncultivated commons, stood in the way; as late as 1801, in spite of the activity of the previous generation in enclosures,¹ the old system still survived in half the parishes of England. In that year, therefore, a general Enclosure Act was passed, to facilitate and cheapen the process, which went on thenceforward with accelerating speed.

Thus the agrarian revolution was forced on by the war. Beyond a doubt, these changes led to a great increase in home production, which was enabled to keep pace with the increase of population; and perhaps this alone prevented Britain from being starved into surrender during the later stages of the war. But the social results of the change were anything but good. The skilful farmer, indeed, profited enormously; the landlord's rents rapidly increased; and these classes had every reason to be satisfied. But the small-holder, who had little or no capital and no exceptional

¹ See above, pp. 116-118.
skill or enterprise, found it impossible to hold his own after enclosure, and nearly always had to sell his land to his big neighbour. With terrible rapidity the mass of the rural population of Britain was reduced to the position of a proletariat, having no means of livelihood but the sale of their labour. Agricultural wages rose, indeed, by about 40 per cent. between 1790 and 1804; but the price of bread rose 60 per cent. in the same period, and every commodity of common use rose in proportion. What was worse, the labourer was losing the means of supplementing his wages which he had once enjoyed. Enclosure deprived him of the right of turning a pig on to the commons; while the factories of the North were depriving his wife and daughters of the chance of adding to the family income by spinning yarn for the weavers. With a dreadful swiftness the widely diffused comfort which had marked English rural life in the middle of the century disappeared; and the English peasant, who had enjoyed a solid diet with plenty of meat and ale, was reduced to bread and tea. Often enough he could not obtain milk for his children. And even so, he could not make ends meet; however hard he might work, mere necessity often drove him to accept poor relief.

§ 2. The Poor Law and the Game Laws.

The governing class, which was profiting by the change that was so ruinous to the labourers, was not indifferent to these sufferings. There was a great outpouring of charity, and bounty to the village poor became an accepted duty of the ladies in every manor house. But charity is no substitute for justice; it set up a false relationship between two classes of the community, and ultimately deepened the cleavage between them. The Whig, Samuel Whitbread, proposed in Parliament, in 1795, that a minimum wage should be fixed, varying with the cost of living; but orthodox economic theory would have nothing to say to this device. Lord Winchilsea, and the Society for Bettering the Condition of the Poor (founded in 1795), urged that every labourer ought to be given an allotment; but theirs were voices in the wilderness. Even the agricultural reformers, notably Arthur Young, began to wonder whether they had not been too sweeping in their advocacy of large farms, and to press for small holdings; but the movement was too strong to be checked.

The only important attempt which was made to relieve
the distress of the agricultural labourer was the adoption of a new poor law policy; and this, though it was inspired by the most humane motives, did nothing but harm. In 1795 the Berkshire Justices of the Peace, meeting at Speenhamland, decided that in all cases where a labourer's wage was insufficient to provide an adequate subsistence for his family, they would add to it from the rates in proportion to the number of children in the family. Similar devices had been tentatively adopted elsewhere; but the Berkshire scheme was so carefully worked out that it was widely adopted. It became so nearly universal in the next generation that it came to be known as the Speenhamland Act of Parliament; and in 1796 its main idea was embodied in a real Act of Parliament. The result was that, by 1802, 28 per cent. of the population were in receipt of poor relief.

The Berkshire magistrates meant well, but their scheme, like other instances of misdirected benevolence, produced results far more mischievous than the most ingenious and ruthless tyranny could have devised. They were destroying the farmer's motive for paying a living wage, since whatever he paid would be made up out of the rates. They were imposing a crushing burden upon the ratepayers, and, with cruel irony, were compelling the small-holder to contribute through the rates towards the wages-bill of his powerful competitors, and thus hastening his ruin. They were depriving the labourer of his self-respect; however industrious and thrifty he might be, he must submit to the degradation of charitable relief; and if he tried to do without it, he was punished by starvation. They were encouraging early and improvident marriages and the rapid increase of a pauperised population.

But the worst of all the results of this terrible system was that it reduced a large part of the working population to a sort of slavery. Under an Act of 1782 (known as Gilbert's Act) Guardians of the Poor were empowered to find work for unemployed men; and a practice grew up whereby gangs of paupers, men, women and children, were hired out to private employers, who paid a very low wage, the balance necessary for bare subsistence being made up from the rates. And out of this system, combined with the power of binding pauper children as apprentices, there grew up a practice yet more abominable, whereby children were sent in thousands, often at a very tender age, to the factories of the North, there to labour, uncared-for, during long hours: pitiful little friendless slaves, torn from their poor homes.
Wherever it was fully applied, the Speenhamland system reduced the labouring population to misery and degradation, robbed them of their self-respect, and gravely undermined their physical vitality. But these results were only gradually made apparent; and in some parts of the country the system never came into operation. Indeed it was not until the last years of the long war and the first years of the peace that its evils were fully displayed. If the development of the system had not been gradual, it is incredible that there would not have been more lively protest. But familiarity can reconcile men to terrible things. It reconciled the men of the heroic age of Nelson and Wellington to a state of things in which the British peasantry—the fathers and mothers of the men who fought at Trafalgar and Waterloo—were being reduced to a condition of misery comparable with that of the negro slave in the West Indies; while the upper and middle classes were enjoying an abounding prosperity. The old homogeneity of English rural society had vanished. Between the fortunate few and the wretched many there was now no community of interest. The few, though they did not realise the fact, trove upon the misery of the many; and, being obsessed by the dread of revolution, they were more concerned to stifle the expression of discontent than to remove its causes.

Nothing more clearly shows the abyss which was opening between the possessing class and the labouring class in English rural society than the extraordinary severity of the Game Laws. The English squirearchy had always been fond of sport, and had long visited with disproportionate severity the offence of poaching their game. While the peasantry were still reasonably well off this had mattered comparatively little. But now, with purses swollen by war-profits, the gentry were beginning to take their sports very seriously; they were breeding and preserving game, introducing pheasants, maintaining large numbers of keepers. The half-starved labourer was not only driven to contrast the treatment of his own family with the treatment of game and those who tended it, he had a real temptation flaunted before his penury. Poaching inevitably grew. It was one of the means whereby the labourer kept himself alive; it added a spark of interest and adventure to his life of starvation and drudgery; he would have been a poor-spirited creature if he had regarded it as a crime.

But the rapid increase of poaching alarmed the governing class. In 1770 Parliament had imposed a penalty of three
months' imprisonment for taking game between sunset and sunrise, with flogging and a longer spell of gaol for a second offence. In 1800 imprisonment with hard labour was made the penalty for being found with one or more companions in circumstances that suggested poaching. The only result of this severity was that poachers began to work in armed gangs, so as to be able to resist capture, and battles between poachers and keepers became a common feature of English country life. In 1803 the penalty of death was provided for even a threat of resistance in arms. Henceforward there was a state of simmering war in the English countryside; and the country gentlemen and the Justices of the Peace had come to appear no longer the protectors of the poor, but their enemies and oppressors.

The brutality of the Game Laws, like the ruinous cruelty of the Poor Law System, had not reached its worst during the period with which we are now concerned. But it was bad enough, when the nineteenth century opened, to show how bitter and how deep was the social cleavage which had resulted from the agrarian revolution, complicated by the stress of the war, and by the exaggerated dread of revolution to which it gave birth.

§ 3. Effects of the War upon Industry.

In the manufacturing industries, even more than in agriculture, it was not until the second stage of the war that the unhappy influence which it exercised upon the economic transformation was fully displayed. In some industries, indeed, war brought, as it always does, a factitious prosperity. In the textile trades, where the industrial revolution had begun, no very perceptible worsening of conditions took place before the turn of the century. Machine-power was still almost limited to the spinning side of these trades. The weavers, still working at hand-loom in their own cottages, had not yet exhausted the boom of prosperity which an increased supply of yarn had brought to them, and their 'golden age' lasted into the nineteenth century.

Yet already there were signs that war conditions were hostile to a reasonable adjustment of industrial life to its new methods. For one thing, the war, and the hesitation about making political changes to which it gave rise, prevented any attempt to provide decent organisation or government for the new towns which were springing up in the North and the Midlands. Villages were growing into
towns with mushroom rapidity. They had to be content with the traditional village organisation, under manor courts and parish vestries, which were hopelessly unsuited for their new functions; and the result was that they grew up without regulation, ugly, insanitary, unlighted, unpaved, unpolicied. This state of things, which was due to the political stagnation and the resistance to all change caused by reaction against the Revolution, lasted for half a generation after the war had reached its close. Many British towns are still struggling with the unhealthy conditions produced during this period. The new generation of industrial Britain was sentenced to be bred in inconceivably ugly and degrading surroundings.

Again, wages in many industries showed a downward tendency, or at least failed to rise in proportion to the alarming increase in the cost of living. This was directly traceable to the war, and need not have happened in normal conditions. For the war prevented that rapid expansion of foreign markets which was necessary if the new methods of mechanical production were to be developed without inflicting suffering upon the workers; and at the same time the growing distress of the agricultural population led to a shrinkage of the home market. If the farm-labourer had been better paid, he would have had more to spend on woollen and cotton goods. In another way, also, the degradation of the agricultural labourer affected the industrial worker. At the end of the century surplus labour from the country was beginning to pour into the towns and mining villages; and this competition enabled employers to beat down wages, especially as the farm labourer was accustomed to very low wage-rates. Finally, child-labour could be utilised on a large scale in the spinning factories. Its employment inevitably kept down wage-rates. And the enormity of child-labour in factories was already assuming monstrous dimensions, thanks to the wholesale apprenticing of pauper children. It had gone so far by 1802 that Sir Robert Peel, himself a great cotton manufacturer, obtained from Parliament an Act to regulate the conditions of work of poor-law apprentices in cotton factories. This was the first of the long series of Factory Acts. But it had no effect, because its execution was left to the Justices of the Peace, who knew nothing about the business.

Although, therefore, the conditions in the manufacturing industries were not yet very bad, the operatives were
beginning to feel the need of protection for the maintenance of their standard of life. There were repeated requests to Government, from one trade or another, for some system of wage-regulation by authority, such as had been applied, with some success, among the Spitalfields silk-weavers in 1773; there were also demands for the definition of a minimum wage; there were appeals to the Justices of the Peace to use their powers of fixing wages, which had long fallen into desuetude. But the Justices of the Peace were quite incompetent to deal with the complex piece-rates of the new industry. And the orthodox economics of the time looked askance at any such interference. Nothing, therefore, was done. The industrial workers, beginning to be distressed, were turning to the State for protection and aid; and the State was refusing to give it.

Since the State would do nothing, the only resource seemed to lie in combination for mutual aid; and indeed freedom to combine might have seemed a logical corollary of the refusal of the State to take action. Embryonic organisations for mutual aid began to spring into being in large numbers. On the one hand these years saw the establishment of a multitude of small friendly societies which did not meddle with industrial questions, but provided sick-benefit and other advantages to their members. On the other hand many small trade clubs, or rudimentary Trade Unions, purely local in character, came into being; and in many cases proved to be of real use in bargaining with employers. Government adopted very different attitudes towards these two types of organisations. It welcomed and assisted the friendly societies, by passing a Friendly Societies Act in 1793. Trade clubs, on the other hand, were regarded as mischievous and dangerous, because they tried to interfere with the wages and conditions of labour. They were held, also, to have a dangerously revolutionary character: they might enable the servant to dictate to his master; they might be used for political purposes. In 1799, therefore, Pitt introduced into Parliament an Anti-Combination Act, which absolutely prohibited all combinations to deal with wages, and imposed severe penalties. Earlier Acts had prohibited combination in a particular industry, but always in conjunction with some provision for the protection of the workers. This Act—which was passed practically without discussion—applied to all industries, and included no provisions for the protection of the workers. In the next year (1800) a second
Act, which stiffened the provisions of the first, included a clause authorising arbitration in industrial disputes; but the clause remained a dead letter; the employers refused to work it; and, indeed, arbitration was out of the question when the parties to the dispute were forbidden to act in combination.

Thus the State refused to do anything for the protection of the workers in a time of trial, and at the same time prohibited them from combining to protect themselves. It was in these conditions that the operatives had to face the terrible strain and suffering of the second stage of the war. The Combination Acts did not put an end to Trade Unions; but they drove them underground, gave them a conspiratorial character, and made it impossible for them to deal frankly and openly with the employers. If the first period of the war did not produce, among the industrial workers, as acute distress as among the agricultural labourers, it helped to create the conditions which were to produce the sufferings of the next period.


But the social results of the war were not all evil. The grimness and danger of the times made men take life more seriously. This showed itself on the one hand in an increased simplicity of dress and manners; it showed itself also in an increased earnestness of religious life, and in an intense philanthropy. The great religious revival whose beginnings we have traced in the previous period reached its height in the dark days of the war; and it was accompanied by a remarkable and varied humanitarian activity. Except in a few dissolute sets, like that which surrounded the Prince Regent, there was a revival of something like the stern Puritanism of the seventeenth century. The Evangelical Movement had become one of the most powerful factors in the life of Britain; and the little group of wealthy and influential Evangelicals who clustered round William Wilberforce at Clapham, and were known as the Clapham Sect, exercised a high degree of political authority, and were able to achieve great things. Sober, self-complacent and narrow-minded, they were also full of a sincere zeal for good causes.

Space does not permit of any description of the multifarious philanthropic activities of the time, the hospitals,

* See above, pp. 131-133.
the dispensaries, the schools, the institutions for the afflicted of all kinds, which were springing up in every part of Britain. In view of the deepening shadow of misery which was darkening the lives of the mass of British people, these efforts were apt to appear futile and ineffective; yet they nurtured a spirit which was to help towards better things in the future. But there were two of the religious and humanitarian undertakings of the war period which deserve more than a passing mention. One was the great campaign against the slave-trade, in which Wilberforce and his Clapham friends were deeply concerned. It won its triumph in 1807, when an Act of Parliament made the traffic in slaves illegal for British subjects. And when it is remembered how vast had been the wealth earned by this nefarious traffic, and how grave were the anxieties which beset British commerce in these years, the victory of this campaign of abnegation provides a heartening proof that human sympathy and pity were not dead in Britain, despite all the cruelties of the time. The abolition of the slave-trade struck the note of a new era in the history of the British Commonwealth, an era in which ruthless exploitation of primitive peoples would be no longer regarded as permissible.

Even more important, both in itself and in the influence which it was to exercise upon the future development of the Commonwealth, was the beginning of the immense and wide-ranging activities of Christian missionaries which belongs to these years. It was in 1792 that William Carey, the learned Baptist cobbler, published his plea for the conversion of the heathen which gave the first impetus to this vast movement. Next year Carey went out to India, and began a work which was to have the most profound effects not only upon the religious life of India, but still more upon its intellectual outlook.1 The Baptist Missionary Society, founded as a result of Carey's zeal, was followed in 1795 by the London Missionary Society, which in the next year despatched 29 missionaries to the Pacific, and by the Scottish Missionary Society, which took Africa for its first field. In 1799 the Church Missionary Society began its work; and in 1804 the British and Foreign Bible Society. All were supported by voluntary subscriptions in Britain. The world-wide activities which were thus begun not merely showed that there was real vitality in the religious and humanitarian movements of the time; they were to have

1 See below, Bk. IX. chap. iv. p. 351.
a profound influence upon the future development of the British Commonwealth, and many pages of this volume will have to be devoted to tracing their political consequences. For it was the influence of the missionaries which was to establish the principle that, in the backward regions of the world, it was the duty of the British power to prevent the ruthless exploitation of primitive peoples, and to lead them gently into civilised ways of life. And the application of this principle in many fields was to be one of the highest achievements of British statesmanship during the nineteenth century, which opened with the foundation of the great missionary organisations.

§ 5. The Romantic Revival.

A yet greater glory than the zeal of humanitarian endeavour lightened these dark days of war. The muses of poetry had again fixed their abode in Britain; and the greatest outburst of inspired song that England had known since the time of Shakespeare was beginning—evoked, beyond a doubt, by the deep emotions and reflections which were born of the revolution and the war. The smooth complacency of the eighteenth century, its certainty that all the mysteries of life lay within the compass of human reason, were shrivelled up by the fierce passions of the time, and by the challenge which it gave to every received idea and accepted convention. Wonder, reverence and humility were born again in a reeling world; and those profound emotions were stirred from which great poetry springs—compassion for the sufferings and valour of common men, admiration for the deeds of heroes, the thrill of a great dim hope for the future of humanity, the pride of country and the love of liberty. Even the quiet beauties of the countryside, and the customary kindliness of daily life, took on a fresh poignancy when they seemed to be threatened by the grim menace of war; the beauty of nature and the mystery of life were seen with a sharper vision.

The new inspiration of the age had begun to show itself even before the outbreak of the Revolution: Blake’s simple and sublime Songs of Innocence were published in 1789; the slim Kilmarnock volume of Burns’s Poems appeared in 1786. But both poets were deeply affected by the great upheaval: its influence surely had something to do with the cloudy grandeur of Blake’s prophetic writings, which were published during the years of war; and Burns, who
died in 1796, wrote many of his later songs under the influence of its first inspiration. Yet more direct was the effect of the revolutionary spirit upon the two great poets who were the highest glory of the age, Wordsworth and Coleridge. They were still under the emotional influence of the new gospel of humanity when they published *Lyrical Ballads* in 1798; both of them were later to be as powerfully inspired by indignation against the tyranny of Napoleon. The genius of both was at its highest during the second phase of the war; and Wordsworth’s patriotic sonnets were the noblest expression of the spirit in which Britain braced herself to resist the tyrant of Europe. The four names of Blake, Burns, Wordsworth and Coleridge would be enough by themselves to make an age famous. But they were the harbingers of an extraordinary outburst of imaginative literature. Landor, Southey and Campbell were already at their best during the years of war. Scott published the *Lay of the Last Minstrel* in 1805, and all his poetical work belongs to the war period. Byron’s dazzling career was soon to begin—*Childe Harold* was published in 1812; and the ethereal genius of Shelley made itself known with the issue of *Queen Mab* in 1813. The novel, too, took a new birth: the Irish tales of Maria Edgeworth and the fine irony of Jane Austen led the way to the great sequence of the Waverley Novels, which began in 1814. And in essays and criticism no period in the whole range of English literature can surpass the years which were illuminated by the work of Coleridge, Lamb, Hazlitt and De Quincey. As truly as the Elizabethan age, the age of the Revolution, and especially its second half, produced a splendour of thought and imagination that matched the splendour of its deeds.

CHAPTER VII

THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE AND BRITISH SEA-POWER:
TRAFALGAR, AUSTERLITZ, AND JENA

The strain and suffering caused by the first, or revolutionary,
phase of the great war had been serious enough; but they
were insignificant in comparison with the miseries which
flowed from the second, or Napoleonic, phase, which was
wholly due to the insatiable ambition of the most tremendous
military and organising genius whom the world has ever
known. 'I am not a man, but a force,' Napoleon once said
of himself. With volcanic energy he was now to sweep
away, in the course of a few years, every obstacle which
withstood him upon the mainland of Europe, as he strode
towards the domination of the world. Only one barrier
held against his onset, and saved the world from an all-
embracing military despotism. This ultimate bulwark of
freedom was the sea-power of Britain, who, in Pitt's words,
'saved herself by her exertions,' and after long endurance
was to 'save Europe by her example.' But the long agony
of the struggle racked and strained the very structure of the
Commonwealth, almost brought it to ruin, and left it, when
victory was won, faced by problems of reconstruction so
grave that for a whole generation anarchy and ruin seemed
always to be at hand.

§ 1. The Organisation of Napoleon's Power.

Napoleon had made himself the master of France by the
coup d'état of November 1799. Before the end of the year
his government was defined by a new constitution, known
as the Constitution of the Year VIII., which was submitted
to a plebiscite vote of the French nation, and accepted by
an overwhelming majority. Avoiding a semblance of a
return to monarchy, the constitution set at the head of the
State three Consuls, who were to hold office for ten years.
But Napoleon as First Consul wielded the whole executive
power, and could appoint and dismiss all public officials.
There was an elaborate apparatus of consultative and
legislative bodies, a Council of State, a Senate, a Tribunate, a Legislative Assembly; but these bodies were allowed no real power. And in the sphere of local administration all authority was concentrated in the Prefects and Sub-Prefects—bureaucratic officials appointed by the central Government. Thus, within ten years of the beginning of the Revolution, France had swayed back again to a system of government almost as despotic in form, and far more absolute in fact, than that of the Bourbon monarchy had been. The dream of Democracy had vanished.

Even the great powers vested in the First Consul by the constitution of 1799 did not satisfy Napoleon's lust for domination. Every stage in his subsequent progress was marked by a weakening of the checks upon his absolute authority, unreal as they were. In 1802, he used the enthusiasm created by the conclusion of peace to obtain the approval of the nation, through another plebiscite, for his assumption of the Consulate for life. In 1804, amid the excitement of renewed war, a new plebiscite ratified his adoption of the title of Emperor, which was made hereditary. During the greater part of his period of power, Napoleon's rule was an undisguised despotism. It was a despotism which rested on national consent, as repeated plebiscites proved. But its main buttress was the devoted loyalty of a huge army, proud of its victories; and this fundamental fact made it a menace to the world. Even if the despot himself had not been avid of power, the army must be fed with conquests.

The Napoleonic régime, whatever its author might pretend, was thus a negation of all the dreams of political liberty which had given birth to the Revolution. It was equally hostile to freedom of thought, at least in the political sphere. A fortnight after the publication of the Constitution of 1799 the autocrat suppressed, by a single edict, 60 of the 73 newspapers issued in Paris, and forbade the publication of any new ones. Henceforward the press was subject to a rigid and highly efficient censorship; and the theatres were submitted to as strict a control as the press. In a series of laws and edicts between 1802 and 1808, Napoleon undertook the regulation of the educational system, bringing it under the centralised control of what he called the Université de France, a huge corporation under the almost absolute direction of a Grand Master, who was appointed and dismissed by the Emperor. The supreme object of the system was to drill the whole nation to think
alike, at the orders of its master. This was the shrewdest and most penetrating of his attacks upon liberty. Finally the fabric of despotism was cemented by an elaborately organised system of secret police, perfected from the methods of the Reign of Terror, and directed by the astute Fouché, an inheritance from those days. In the later days of the Napoleonic régime the arbitrary imprisonment of dangerous persons practically reproduced the *lettres de cachet* of the Old Régime.

Thus her great Revolution had brought France to a system of despotism, and to a negation of liberty, far more severe because far more efficient than the Old Régime had ever known. She had come to this because she had pursued liberty by the path of violence rather than by the path of persuasion and consent. And she accepted the result because she was sick of anarchy, and the new régime gave her, at the least, order, stability and internal peace. There is no question but that the Napoleonic despotism was immeasurably the most efficient government that France had ever known. For a time it almost healed the discords to which the Revolution had given birth. The quarrel with the Catholic Church, which had lasted since 1790, was ended by a Concordat with the Papacy in 1801, and in 1804 the Pope (very reluctantly) came to France to crown Napoleon Emperor—or rather, to be present at the coronation, for Napoleon placed the crown on his own head. France gained also very greatly from the codification of the laws which Napoleon, using the work of the revolutionary jurists, pushed through with astonishing rapidity. The five Codes which were drawn up between 1800 and 1810 formed the clearest and most orderly system of law which any country had enjoyed since the fall of the Roman Empire; their merits were so shining that they greatly helped in establishing French influence and authority in the conquered countries. Napoleon was a despot; but he was the most intelligent and enlightened despot of whom history has any record.

The swiftness, competence and skill with which France was reorganised during the years following 1799 form the most triumphant and conclusive proof of Napoleon’s genius; his achievements as a ruler were even more dazzling than his achievements as a captain in war. But their result was to leave all the resources of the greatest country in Europe absolutely at the mercy of a man of insatiable ambition; and thus to threaten the liberty of the whole world.

The full significance of Napoleon’s despotism was shown
in the lands which France had conquered even more clearly than in France herself.\(^1\) Belgium, the whole of Germany west of the Rhine, and the province of Savoy had been completely incorporated in France during the republican period. In 1802 the province of Piedmont—the northwestern part of the North Italian plain—was also forcibly annexed to France. The two republics which had been established in Northern Italy were both ordered to accept new constitutions, modelled on the new system in France. Soon followed the establishment of a Kingdom of Italy, attached to the French Empire; and in 1805 Napoleon assumed the Iron Crown of Italy in the Cathedral of Milan.

But still more alarming was the despot’s behaviour in Holland and in Switzerland. Holland was ordered (1801) to accept a new dictated constitution modelled on that of France. In Switzerland Napoleon played cunningly upon the division of parties; and when the new constitution which he dictated (1802) was resisted, he sent in an army of 30,000 men to ‘crush all opposition.’ These high-handed and outrageous actions were taking place during the Peace of Amiens. The independence of Holland, and the independence and neutrality of Switzerland, had been guaranteed by the Peace of Lunéville between France and Austria (1801); and, though they had not been definitely mentioned in the Peace of Amiens, the British Government naturally held that they were implied. The subjugation of Holland and Switzerland were among the main causes of the renewal of war. They proved that the hope that France was going to settle down as a peaceable member of the European society of nations was a false hope.

During the same years Napoleon was busying himself in the affairs of Germany. The new arrangements which he dictated in 1802 brought about a great simplification of German political geography;\(^2\) a few strong States now stood forth in Western Germany, in place of the earlier chaos. But they were all dependents of Napoleon; he had laid the foundations of a new grouping of German States, which was to give him the mastery over Germany.

Meanwhile France was showing an unwonted activity in the colonial sphere. During the peace, an army and a small fleet were despatched to India, on the pretext of garrisoning Pondicherry and Chandernagore; but the obvious purpose of the expedition was to provide the nucleus for a new

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\(^1\) See the map, Atlas, School Edition Plate 18, 6th Edition Plate 69.
attack on the British power. There were indications, also, that Napoleon intended to renew his attack on Egypt, which was visited, during the peace, by a French mission under Colonel Sebastiani. These events were naturally alarming to the British Government: in face of them it delayed the evacuation of Malta, which had been promised at the peace. Nor were events in the West less perturbing. As soon as peace was declared, Napoleon despatched an army of 25,000 men to reconquer the island of San Domingo, and to re-establish slavery there. The presence of a large French army in the West Indies was highly alarming to the British power. At the same time, by a bargain with Spain, Napoleon regained for France the vast lands of Louisiana, west of the Mississippi, which had been nominally Spanish since 1763. Evidently he was revolving great schemes of activity.

Thus on all hands, during the brief interval of peace, the dreadful menace of military despotism was visibly overshadowing the world. France, now more formidable than she had ever been in her history, was absolutely in the hands of a supremely able and ruthless man of limitless ambition. She had abandoned her dreams of liberty, and was submitting to be organised into a terribly efficient engine of conquest. Holland, Switzerland, and Northern Italy were dependent vassals, at the mercy of their master. Western Germany was rapidly being reduced to a similar state of dependence. Spain, nominally an equal ally, knew that she dared not resist the demands of the despot. Almost the whole resources of Western Europe were at Napoleon's disposal. Austria, recently defeated, was incapable of resistance. Prussia thought she drew profit from neutrality. Russia was, for the moment, in alliance with France. There was in all Europe no Power capable of resisting the conqueror. And meanwhile he was casting his keen eyes to East and to West across the seas, which had hitherto alone presented an impassable barrier. He hoped to use for his own purposes the young nation of the United States, where an ill-informed sympathy with the French Revolution combined with memories of the war of independence to play into his hands. If he could but have an interval of a few years in which to recreate the naval power of France, and establish military bases in the West Indies and in the Indian Ocean, the British Commonwealth, which formed the sole effective obstacle to the establishment of universal dominion, might be brought down in ruins.
§ 2. British Politics and the War.

The Peace of Amiens was concluded in March 1802. Just a year later, in March 1803, the British Government found it necessary to ask Parliament to take immediate steps for the protection of the country, in view of aggressive preparations which were being made in the ports of France and Holland. Government was in fact convinced that Napoleon intended a sudden attack, and that he was maintaining peace mainly as a cover for his preparations. Ever since September 1802 a special ambassador, Lord Whitworth, had been negotiating in Paris, complaining of the French aggressions in Italy, in Switzerland, in Holland. He could get no redress. The tenor of the French answers to these complaints was always the same: 'the Treaty of Amiens says nothing about Italy, Switzerland, and Holland: they are no concern of yours; but the treaty does provide that you shall evacuate Malta, and you have not evacuated it: evacuate Malta at once; there is no more to be said.' In form, Malta was the issue on which the war was renewed; and technically Britain was in the wrong. In fact the issue was far wider; and Britain had every justification for holding that Napoleon had outraged the spirit of the treaty of peace even if he had observed the letter, and that in view of this fact the retention of Malta was justified. In May, 1803, Whitworth left Paris after delivering an ultimatum. A few days later Napoleon ordered the arrest of the thousands of British subjects who had flocked to France under the shelter of peace.

In the desperate struggle which opened thus, Britain stood for a time alone. But she was a far more united nation than she had been during the previous war. There was none of that sympathy with the enemy which had been felt by a strong minority during the revolutionary period. The British people knew that they must fight for their national existence. They faced the issue not without dread, for the fear of invasion was real and strong; but they faced it without panic. Only in Ireland was there any movement of sympathy with the enemy. Here the gallant and romantic young student, Robert Emmet, whose brother had been one of the leaders of the United Irishmen in 1798, made in July 1803 a forlorn attempt at an insurrection in Dublin. Emmet seems to have been acting in collusion with Napoleon. But his followers only succeeded in murdering the Chief Justice and a few others, and their hopeless venture was
easily suppressed. Ireland remained quiet, and throughout the war supplied many recruits both for the army and for the navy.

Not only was the nation united, it was better prepared for self-defence than it had ever been before. The navy, upon which everything depended, was at the acme of its strength. It had Nelson for a fighting leader; and with Nelson that glorious 'band of brothers' whom only Nelson's splendour could reduce to second rank. And its administration was far more competent than it had been in the previous war; for Lord St. Vincent, the victor of 1797, was at the Admiralty, and he was soon to be succeeded by Lord Barham, an even greater naval administrator. Behind the shield of the navy stood almost the whole nation in arms, ill-drilled, indeed, but full of spirit. The militia had been embodied; the formation of companies of volunteers began in every part of the country immediately after the declaration of war; and in three months 300,000 volunteers had been enrolled, and were drilling hard, gentlemen and their grooms, lawyers, shopkeepers, and work-people, all inspired by a common resolution.¹

There was no doubt about the spirit and temper of the nation. But even the most united nation needs inspiring leadership. When the war began Government was in the hands of Addington, afterwards Lord Sidmouth, a second-rate respectable person, whom Pitt had recommended as his successor when he retired in 1801 on the Catholic Emancipation question. The abler young Tories, such as George Canning, had mostly followed Pitt; Addington's cabinet consisted mainly of dull reactionaries; apart from St. Vincent it included only two men of ability—the Chancellor, Lord Eldon, who was to be for nearly a generation the supreme example of stolid resistance to all change, and the young Lord Castlereagh, who was as yet an almost untried man; and it was generally felt that Addington's Government was wholly unfit to guide the nation through the coming ordeal. Many held that the unity of the nation ought to be reflected in a national Government; for there was now no difference between Whigs and Tories as to the necessity of waging the war with vigour.

But Addington showed no eagerness to give way; and Pitt's friends, who longed to see the great man back in

¹ Scott's Antiquary contains a stirring and humorous description of the volunteering enthusiasm of these years.
power, began to be venomous in their attacks upon the ministry. At length, in May 1804—a year after the opening of the war—Addington gave way, and Pitt became Prime Minister for the second time. He was anxious to make his ministry a national one, including Fox and the leading Whigs. But the King had not forgotten his personal detestation of Fox; Pitt could not override the royal objections; the Whigs, and even some of Pitt’s old followers such as his cousin Lord Grenville, refused to serve if Fox were to be excluded. Hence Pitt was driven to form a weak ministry, which included scarcely any members of first-rate ability save himself. It was still further weakened when in May 1805 Pitt’s most intimate colleague and close friend, Dundas (now Lord Melville), was impeached for financial irregularities in the administration of the navy during Pitt’s earlier ministry, and compelled to resign. Melville was personally exonerated as a result of the inquiry. But the episode discredited the ministry and added to the burden of anxiety and responsibility which was already too great for Pitt’s failing health. The strain was too much for him, and he died in January 1806, at a moment when the prospects of the war showed nothing but unrelieved gloom.

After Pitt’s death a new attempt was made (February 1806) to form a national ministry. George iii.’s objections to Fox were overridden; and with Grenville as Prime Minister a composite cabinet of Whigs and Tories was formed. But Fox’s tenure of power, after so many years of opposition, was brief indeed. In September he followed his long-time rival to the grave. And the coalition was no more successful in carrying on the war than its predecessors; when it came to an end, Napoleon was practically master of Europe, and Britain was once more left in complete isolation. The credit of this ministry rests mainly upon the fact that it forced through Parliament an Act for the abolition of the slave-trade (1807) and, that it made an attempt to raise again the question of Catholic Emancipation. But this attempt threw the Tories into opposition, and brought about the defeat of the ministry. And hence it came about that the most desperate phase of the war, which began in 1806, was fought under exclusively Tory ministries.

It was thus under the direction of weak and distracted cabinets that Britain passed through the first stage of the war. Yet there is no reason to believe that this materially affected the course of events. The war in these years had two main aspects. The first of these was the complete
establishment of British supremacy on the seas, and the removal of all danger of invasion; and the weakness of Government did not prevent this. The second was the formation of a third coalition of European Powers to resist Napoleon, and its swift and dramatic downfall, which left Napoleon master of Europe; and nothing that Britain could do would have prevented this result. At the end of the conflict, in 1807, irresistible land-power faced irresistible sea-power in an apparent deadlock.

§ 3. The Project of Invasion and the Crowning Victory of Trafalgar.

Napoleon's plan for ending the war was an invasion of England in force; and for that purpose, having no other enemies to deal with, he was able to concentrate on the coast, with its headquarters at Boulogne, the finest army that France, or indeed any European Power, had ever put into the field. At first he seems to have believed that the army might be rowed across the Narrows during a fog or a calm when the British fleet was unable to move. But by the end of 1803 he had realised the impracticability of this device. Apart from other difficulties, it would take six days for his flotilla to be manned and brought out of harbour; and it was scarcely probable that fog or calm would last long enough for this, or that the British fleet would be so complacent as to leave the operation unimpeded. It was therefore necessary that the Narrows should be held, for a period of at least six days, by a superior naval force. During 1804 Napoleon's powerful and inventive brain was at work upon this problem.

The French navy was scattered in a number of ports round the coast; the main squadron at Brest, the next largest at Toulon, and others at Rochefort, Lorient, and the Texel. And each of these squadrons was blockaded by a British fleet, not often superior in numbers, but always superior in discipline and efficiency. This tedious and wearing service occupied the attention of a large proportion of the British navy; it had to be carried on, with unrelaxed wakefulness, in all weathers; and there could not have been a more severe test of dogged patience. But the longer it lasted, the more complete became the ascendancy of the blockaders. For their seamanship was put to the hardest of tests, while their opponents, penned up in harbour, progressively lost

1 For all this section see the maps, Atlas, 6th Edition Plate 62.
their 'sea-sense,' and were inevitably imbued with a feeling of their own inferiority to the forces from which they skulked in harbour.

Even the most competent blockade, however, could be evaded. It was impossible for the ships to stand close inshore in all weathers. It was necessary for them at intervals to return to their own bases for supplies, or to be refitted. A watchful blockaded squadron could always find opportunities for evading the blockade if it thought fit to do so; and, once it had escaped, the blockaders might guess in vain at its destination. This was what Napoleon counted upon. The essence of all the successive plans which he struck out during 1804 was the idea that one or more of the blockaded squadrons should give the slip to the blockaders, put them on a false track, then double back and relieve one of the other squadrons, and so appear suddenly and unexpectedly in the Narrows with overwhelming force.

All the plans of 1804, however, came to naught, until, in December, Spain was forced into the war against Britain, and her fleets became available for the great chess-game. There were Spanish squadrons in Carthagena, Cadiz, and Ferrol.\(^1\) The British navy, which (in European waters) was scarcely superior in number to the combined French and Spanish fleets, could not supply adequate squadrons to blockade all these ports; and at the same time the number of alternative moves possible in the game of blockade-evasion was proportionately increased.

At the beginning of 1805 Napoleon's great project at last assumed its final shape. Two, or possibly three, of the blockaded squadrons were to escape simultaneously, one of them being the Toulon fleet, which was to be joined by a Spanish squadron from Cadiz. They were to make straight for the West Indies, because these islands formed so vitally important an element in the British trading system that any threat of attack on them was bound to bring British fleets scurrying in pursuit. It seemed safe to assume that the British fleets, once drawn out to the West Indies, would not readily suppose that the enemy had sailed so far only to go straight home again. In January 1805 the first attempt was made. The Toulon fleet got out while Nelson was watering his ships in Corsica; but rough weather sent it back to port. Almost at the same time a small squadron got out from Rochefort and made its way to the West Indies; but finding no colleagues there, it also returned,

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\(^1\) For what follows, see the maps, Atlas, 6th Edition Plate 62.
after creating a panic in the British West Indian Islands. The failure of this attempt showed how difficult it was to time joint action by squadrons far separated from one another.

In March the Toulon fleet under Villeneuve once more ventured out, this time with better fortune. Nelson missed them; and as he was short of scouting frigates, he spent a month in scouring the Mediterranean before he heard that Villeneuve had got through the Straits of Gibraltar, and had raised his force to eighteen ships of the line by making a junction with a Spanish squadron at Cadiz. Whither had he gone? He might be bound for Ireland; he might be gathering up the scattered squadrons for an onset in the Channel. But later news, and his intuition, convinced Nelson that the West Indies were the true destination. Trusting his own judgment, he set forth hotfoot, with his little fleet of ten ships, in pursuit of an enemy of nearly twice his strength, resolved to attack, if he could but overtake the enemy; he might himself be crushed, but not until he had destroyed all chance of the enemy's fleet achieving anything of importance.

Villeneuve reached the West Indies early in May, and was preparing to attack Barbados when he heard of Nelson's arrival. At once he resolved to return to European waters, hoping that at any rate the terrible Nelson would be left behind. News came to Nelson that the French had been seen making for the open sea. But that might be false news, or it might only be a blind; the authorities in the West Indies were convinced that it was a blind, and implored Nelson to stay and protect them. He, on the other hand, saw, as by a sudden revelation, the nature of Napoleon's great stratagem; and sending his swiftest vessel home to warn the Admiralty, he set sail with his main squadron for Cadiz. His courier passed the French fleet in the Atlantic, and was able to bring home clear news of its whereabouts, which enabled the Admiralty to take the necessary precautions. Villeneuve safely reached Ferrol, and joined the small Spanish squadron in that port. But Nelson was back in European waters almost as soon; and after reinforcing Collingwood, who was guarding the entrance to the Mediterranean, he made his way to the Channel, where he added the remainder of his squadron to Cornwallis's fleet off Brest, and returned to England for a well-earned rest. The mere fact of his return had baffled Napoleon's stratagem.

Yet the rush to the West Indies and back had not been
without result from Napoleon's point of view. At the least Villeneuve had now gathered together a large fleet—twenty ships of the line. If he could brush aside opposition, and sweep northwards to the jaws of the Channel, he might even yet be able, with the aid of the fleet in Brest, to overwhelm Cornwallis and hold the Narrows long enough to let the army of invasion step across. Off Ferrol, thanks to Nelson's warning, lay a fleet of sixteen sail under Sir Robert Calder. By Napoleon's orders Villeneuve, with his twenty, came out and offered battle. How Nelson would have welcomed such a chance! But Calder was a man of different kidney. He feared to be overwhelmed, and drew off, after an indecisive fight. Villeneuve on his side failed to take the heroic course of making a dash for the Channel, fell back upon Ferrol, and, a little later, being left undisturbed, sailed southwards to Cadiz (August), where he joined up with the Spanish squadron in that harbour, thus raising his total force to thirty-three ships of the line.

Napoleon's clever stratagem had been checkmated. And meanwhile the project of invasion had been perforce abandoned, for now Austria and Russia were in the field, and the army of England had to be withdrawn from its camp at Boulogne to deal with the new peril. But the main naval forces of France and Spain were now united in a single formidable fleet. It was not enough to have defeated the ingenious device of Napoleon; his fertile brain might still invent fresh stratagems. Before Britain's security could be made absolute the enemy fleets must be swept from the seas. And for that task there was one obvious commander marked out by destiny.

On September 28, having sailed from Portsmouth for the last time, Nelson, in the Victory, joined the British fleet off Cadiz, a fleet of twenty-seven sail of the line. He knew just how he intended to deal with the enemy when he should have lured him to battle; immediately after joining the fleet, he assembled his captains and explained to them the plan of battle upon which he had resolved. It was in all essentials the plan actually carried out more than three weeks later. Never was a leader more trusted and beloved than Nelson. The whole fleet thrilled with pride in his leadership. And all knew, with a certainty very rare among men, that they were privileged to play a part in one of the great events of history. All through the next days there was a sort of leisurely assured preparation for an absolutely certain event.
Why did Villeneuve come out at all from Cadiz harbour? He had thirty-three ships against twenty-seven; but his ships were ill-found and undermanned; the sense of doom, the spell of Nelson's great name, were upon captains and men. None knew better than Villeneuve himself that he was destined to suffer defeat if he challenged battle. He was driven forth by the orders of Napoleon, who was ignorant of sea warfare, chafing under the knowledge that his plans had been shattered, and determined to get some fighting out of the fleets on which he had spent so much effort. On October 19, after three miserable weeks, Villeneuve came out of port and sailed towards the Straits of Gibraltar. Nelson, perfectly aware of his intentions, fell back before him, to let him get well out of port; and it was in sight of the Rock that the last council of war was held.

Then, on October 21—a day which he had fixed upon beforehand—Nelson turned for the destruction of the enemy. It was a grey and cloudy morning, with some promise of the storm that broke later in the day, though only a light breeze blew from the north-west; through the morning mist the Atlantic rollers could be seen breaking on the cliffs of Cape Trafalgar. The Franco-Spanish fleet was drawn up in a long curving line, with the horns pointing towards the British, who came on, under their mountains of white sails, in two columns, the right led by Collingwood, the left by Nelson himself. It took some hours for the columns to come up with the enemy; Nelson had time to write a codicil to his will; and to pen his final prayer, in which he asked that he should be granted a complete victory, and that the fleet should not misconduct itself. The bands played; Nelson paced the deck of the Victory in a mood of exaltation. At eleven o'clock the great signal fluttered from the Victory: 'England expects every man to do his duty.' About noon, Collingwood's fifteen ships, now roughly in line abreast, were bearing down upon the last thirteen ships of the enemy's line, and for an interval Nelson watched with admiring envy the gallant onset of his comrade. Then, at 12.20, after feinting at the enemy's van, the Victory, at the head of its column of twelve ships, broke through the enemy line ten ships from the van; thus severing the centre from the van. With the successful achievement of this manoeuvre, the victory was in effect won. The rest of the battle was left to the individual initiative of the captains, who picked out each his victim; and Trafalgar is distinguished among naval battles as much
by the brilliance with which this individual initiative was used as by the clarity and boldness of its main plan. At one o’clock the first French ship struck, and thereafter there was a steady succession of surrenders. One of the earliest fell to the Victory, which, leading the line, had to bear the brunt of the fighting. Just before this, Nelson was mortally wounded by a musket-ball fired from the rigging of the Redoutable. He was carried below, but retained full consciousness for two hours, long enough to learn that a decisive victory had been won, and that fifteen enemy ships had surrendered. By five o’clock the last spasmodic firing had ended. Wild weather was rising; and fifteen of the enemy ships were allowed to escape in a shattered condition, because Collingwood failed, as Nelson would never have done, to order a pursuit. But eighteen of the enemy’s fleet had been lost—one blown up, the rest captured; and four more were subsequently taken. So closed the greatest and the most decisive naval battle in history; and the wounded ships of the victorious fleet turned homewards to England, bearing with them the body of the nation’s hero.

With Trafalgar every menace to the sea-power of Britain, and every possibility of an invasion of her shores, disappeared; however dazzling the triumphs of Napoleon might be, they stopped at the seashore.


Land-power could not overcome sea-power; but neither could sea-power, by itself, overthrow land-power. It was only by means of a combination of European States that Napoleon could be checked. During the long-drawn naval fencing of 1803-1805 Pitt had been steadily at work, striving to build up a new European coalition. He found the readiest hearing in Russia, now under the rule of Alexander I., a magnanimous but somewhat unbalanced young prince, who somehow managed to combine a sentimental affection for the ideals of Rousseau with a strong conviction of the sanctity of monarchy, and saw in Napoleon the foe both of liberty and of legitimism. In April 1805, after protracted negotiations which had lasted for nearly a year, a secret alliance was concluded between Russia and Britain; and this was the foundation of the third coalition. Austria was persuaded to join the alliance by the action of Napoleon in Italy, when he was crowned King of Italy in May, 1805, and in June annexed the Ligurian Republic to France.
Sweden also joined; her king, Gustavus IV., was a sort of crusader for legitimist monarchy. And Britain undertook to supply the sinews of war, paying a subsidy of £1,250,000 for every 100,000 men raised by the allies. To complete the alliance it was only necessary that Prussia should join. But Prussia, who had taken no part in the war since 1795, was incapable of taking a broad view of the European situation, because all her thoughts were concentrated on her own immediate territorial interests. She hoped to get, as the price of neutrality, the kingdom of Hanover, which Napoleon had occupied immediately after the outbreak of war with Britain. Napoleon, though he had no exact knowledge of the negotiations which were building up the coalition against him, was very much on the alert. He knew that Prussia was the key of the situation; but he had a boundless contempt for this shiftless and treacherous Power which he believed he could secure at any time by giving her 'a bone to gnaw.' The bone was held out in August 1805, at the moment when Napoleon realised that he was faced by a new European war. Hanover was offered in return for an alliance; and, though Prussia did not at once swallow the bait, it kept her quiet during the critical campaign in the autumn of that year.  

The alliance between Russia and Britain was concluded while Villeneuve and Nelson were in the West Indies. The coalition was completed just when Nelson's return to European waters had baffled Napoleon's scheme for the invasion of England. With the swift resolution which was the secret of his success, Napoleon changed his plans; and hurled the Grand Army—the finest which he had ever controlled, or was ever again to control—across Europe to shatter the Austrian menace before it could mature. The army was marching over South Germany when Nelson set out to join the fleet off Cadiz. Its rapidity of movement caught the Austrians unready; and on October 17, four days before Trafalgar, a large Austrian army was compelled to capitulate at Ulm. Driving home his advantage, Napoleon occupied Vienna itself (November); and on December 2, the first anniversary of his coronation as Emperor, he won, at Austerlitz in Moravia, the most dazzling of all his victories, over a combined Austrian and Russian army. In one short campaign the resistance of Austria was broken. Before the end of the year she was compelled to accept the Treaty of Pressburg, whereby she withdrew from the war, and ceded Venetia to France and the Tyrol to Bavaria.

1 See the maps, Atlas, 6th Edition Plate 72 (a) and (b).
The results of this thunderbolt victory were immediately felt in all parts of Europe. Russia, though she did not make peace, withdrew within her own borders. A mixed Russian and British force which had been landed in Southern Italy was broken up by the withdrawal of the Russian troops, and Italy was left at Napoleon's mercy. A combined movement of Russian, Swedish and British forces, which was to have undertaken the reconquest of Hanover, was brought to an inglorious end. Prussia, which had been wavering, came down on Napoleon's side, agreed to exclude all British trade from her ports, and accepted Hanover as her reward.

Austerlitz left Napoleon so completely the master of Western Europe that he was able, during the early months of 1806, to remould the European system after his own desire. He annexed Venetia and Dalmatia to his kingdom of Italy. He sent an army to overrun the kingdom of Naples, and set his brother Joseph on its throne. He overthrew the nominally republican constitution of Holland, and made his brother Louis King of Holland. He showered principalities and duchies upon his leading marshals and statesmen. But above all he set himself to reconstruct the political system of Germany, and to bring it under his control. The Holy Roman Empire was abolished, after an existence of a thousand years since the coronation of Charlemagne; and in its place the new Charlemagne created the Confederation of the Rhine, with the French Emperor as its protector, and a Diet of kings and princes. Apart from Austria and Prussia, practically the whole of Germany had now passed into a state of definite vassalage to France. The Confederation of the Rhine was pledged to permanent alliance with the French Empire, and bound to provide a contingent of 68,000 men for any war in which France should be engaged.

Master of France, Holland, Italy and Western Germany, with Spain a helpless ally, Austria humiliated and defeated, and Prussia reduced to abject and servile neutrality by her own greed, Napoleon now enjoyed such a position of supremacy in Europe as no sovereign in modern history had ever dreamed of; and though Britain, guarded by her inviolate seas, and Russia, protected by her vast spaces, were still unconquered, neither Power seemed able to do anything that would impair this tremendous domination. With a contemptuous gesture, Napoleon offered peace to Britain.

1 See the map, Atlas, School Edition Plate 18, 6th Edition Plate 69.
His inflexible foe, Pitt, had been killed by the magnitude of the disaster which had befallen his combinations; and the dominating personality of the new ministry was Fox, who had always been an advocate of peace. Fox was willing to treat; he was willing to make vast concessions, such as Pitt would have refused to consider. But even Fox could not stomach the high-handed and insincere methods of Napoleon, and the negotiations broke down. In truth, Napoleon had no desire for settled peace; he wanted only an interval in which to digest his new conquests, a period of free access to the lands beyond the seas, towards which his ambitions still turned, and a chance of preparing a new and more effective blow against the baffling sea-power.

There was one instructive feature of these futile negotiations; Napoleon expressed his readiness to return Hanover to George III., paying no regard to the fact that he had already ceded that province to Prussia. In truth he felt for that treacherous State nothing but the most unqualified contempt, and now that the danger was over he had no fear of anything that she could do. His behaviour to Prussia during 1806 was so contemptuous and so high-handed that at last, when it was too late, even the Prussian worm turned. In October Prussia declared war against France, and with a blind confidence in the unconquerable strength of the armies which Frederick the Great had moulded, did not even wait for the support which Russia was ready to afford.

But the army of Prussia had lost its efficiency during the long years of inglorious peace. And it now had to deal with a very different foe from any that had faced Frederick the Great. Since Austerlitz, the Grand Army had been cantoned in Germany, living on the plunder of the country. Its various corps were located with a view to the possibility of a Prussian war. Instantaneously, on the declaration of war, they closed in upon the doomed Prussians. A week's campaign was enough for a decision: and in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstadt (October 1806) the main Prussian armies were routed. Berlin was occupied; and the King of Prussia, protected by very exiguous forces, was driven to fall back upon the protection of Russia.

Russia had taken no part in the actual fighting since Austerlitz. But she was still at war with France and had promised full support to Prussia. Russia, therefore, must be forced to withdraw from the war before Napoleon could feel free to complete his reorganisation of Central Europe.
With characteristic promptitude he threw his armies immediately against the Russian army, which had advanced into East Prussia. At the battle of Eylau, fought among the snows in February 1807, he received the first serious check in his victorious career; and his domination depended so much upon prestige that it seemed for a time likely to have serious effects. But in June 1807 this danger disappeared; for Napoleon won a decisive victory over the Russians at Friedland.

Disgusted by the failure of Britain and Austria to come to his aid, and anxious to devote his strength to the national object of overthrowing the Turks, the Tsar resolved to bring the war to an end, and to make friends with Napoleon, whose dazzling achievements had begun to fascinate him. At the end of June 1807 the two Emperors, who between them controlled almost the whole of Europe, met at Tilsit on a raft moored in the river Niemen, and discussed the fate of Europe for three hours, while the wretched King of Prussia waited in the rain on the river-bank, to learn his fate. His fate was to sign a treaty with France (July) whereby Prussia was at one stroke reduced to a negligible Power.\(^1\) She was forced to cede all her lands west of the Elbe; they were added to Hesse to form a kingdom of Westphalia for Napoleon’s youngest brother Jerome. She was forced to disgorge all the lands which she had torn from Poland in the second and third partitions; they were turned into a Grand Duchy of Warsaw under the protectorate of France. These cessions amounted to two-thirds of the area of Prussia as it was in 1806. But this was not all. Prussia was compelled to undertake to pay a heavy indemnity, and to maintain 100,000 French troops on her soil and at her expense. She was forbidden to maintain an army of more than 43,000 men, and thus reduced to military insignificance. And she was compelled to declare war upon Britain, and to accept an alliance with France. Prussia had become a helpless vassal.

The treaty with Russia was even more important. Alexander recognised all Napoleon’s conquests; and, by a supplementary secret treaty of alliance, he undertook not only to make war against Britain, in common with Napoleon and all his vassals, but to join with him in forcing the few surviving independent States, Sweden, Denmark and Portugal, to declare war against Britain. There were plans also (though no formal agreement) for a joint

Franco-Russian advance through Central Asia against India.

Thus, at the end of two short years of incessant campaigning and hectoring diplomacy, Napoleon found himself undisputed master of the continent of Europe, wielding a plenitude of power such as no ruler in history had ever wielded. There was now no Power in the world capable of resisting him, save only the inflexible sea-power of Britain. Against her he could now turn all the force of Europe; every State, great or small, was either pledged to take part in the campaign, or threatened with extinction if it refused to do so. But even all Europe in combination could not cross that narrow ribbon of sea; and since Trafalgar, Britain’s mastery of the sea was impregnable. Some new mode of attack was necessary. The plans were already shaped; they had begun to be put into execution; and they were to initiate a very distinctive and important stage in the great duel.

[For Chaps. vii., viii., and x., Holland Rose, Life of Napoleon and Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era; Fortescue, British Statesmen of the Great War and History of the British Army; Mahan, Influence of Sea-Power upon the French Revolution and Empire; Laird Clowes, History of the British Navy; Morse Stephens, Revolutionary Europe; Fyffe, History of Modern Europe; Fournier, Napoleon; Martineau, History of England, 1800-1815. For this chapter only, Mahan, Life of Nelson; Corbett, Campaign of Trafalgar; Holland Rose, William Pitt and the Great War; Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party; Hammond, Charles Fox; Browning, England and Napoleon in 1803.]
CHAPTER VIII

THE WAR OF COMMERCE: THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM
AND ITS RESULTS

(a.d. 1806-1815)

§ I. The New Phase of the Struggle between Napoleon
and Britain.

Master of Europe, but with a mastery that everywhere stopped at high-water mark, Napoleon was now free to turn the whole power of the Continent against Britain and her baffling dominion of the seas. All his ingenuity and all his vast resources were devoted to the task of crushing the last obstacle which still stood between him and a world-dominion such as neither Cæsar nor Charlemagne had ever known. He did not doubt of success; and during the next half-dozen years the British Commonwealth was involved in perils of a new kind, and threatened by novel and dangerous attacks upon the very foundations of its power.

Throughout these anxious years the control of the destinies of the Commonwealth rested with a series of Tory ministries, which commanded overwhelming majorities in Parliament; after the fall of the Grenville ministry in March 1807, the Whigs were no more than a weak and petulant opposition. It was a Tory oligarchy of landed gentry that carried Britain through the last and most intense phases of the war; and, owing to the rapidity with which the economic transformation was proceeding, the Parliament through which this oligarchy worked was far less representative of the mind of the nation than it had ever been. Yet there was one important respect in which the ruling oligarchy truly expressed the mind of the nation. Its dogged, unbending, courageous resolve to resist the tyrant of Europe at all costs to the end was a genuine echo of national feeling. On the main issue of the war, the nation, much as it suffered, was united; and even in Ireland there was no movement of a rebellious character.
There was during this period no single dominating personality like that of Pitt; and it is needless to discuss the differences between the ministries of Portland (1807), Perceval (1809) and Liverpool (1812). All were alike Tory ministries, filled mostly with second-rate men whose one claim to respect lies in the inflexible resolution with which they carried on the war. Yet these ministries unquestionably found means of countering Napoleon which were far more effective than Pitt ever discovered. Three men in the main deserve the credit for this success—George Canning, Lord Castlereagh, and the Marquis Wellesley. Canning and Castlereagh were both disciples of Pitt. Canning,\(^1\) who was an orator and a wit, was incomparably the more brilliant of the pair, especially in Parliament; but Castlereagh,\(^2\) though a miserable speaker, was probably a better administrator and a man of sounder judgment than his rival, and it was he, not Canning, who was to play the chief part in the overthrow of Napoleon. In the first years of the period (1807-9) Canning was Foreign Secretary, Castlereagh Secretary for War; and at this stage it was Canning who dominated the Cabinet and dictated its policy. The rivalry between the two men was, however, so keen that in 1809 they fought a duel, which broke up the Portland ministry, and for a time excluded both rivals from power (1809-12). During this interval the Marquis Wellesley, back from his triumphs in India, served as Foreign Secretary; and this was fortunate for his country, since Wellesley gave his whole-hearted support to the Peninsular War during the critical years when his brother Arthur was finding so much difficulty in holding his own that many men in England thought the struggle in Spain ought to be abandoned. In 1812 Castlereagh returned to power as Foreign Secretary in Lord Liverpool's ministry; and he controlled the foreign policy of Britain with marked success during the critical years 1812-15 and during the negotiation of the peace.

Such were the men who were called to pit their brains against the supreme genius of Napoleon, and to lead their country through one of the gravest crises in its history. Because they were identified with political reaction, their work has been undervalued. Mere justice demands that we should recognise the greatness of their achievement. It was this group of Tory gentlemen, limited and unimaginative, but obstinate, tenacious and unconquerable, who

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1 There is a short life of Canning by H. W. V. Temperley.
2 There is a short life of Castlereagh by J. A. R. Marriott.
found the means of baffling all Napoleon’s power, and of turning back against himself the weapons which he had designed for the ruin of the last bulwark of the world’s freedom.

§ 2. The Checkmating of Napoleon’s Naval Plans.

Two designs for the overthrow of British power concurrently occupied Napoleon’s mind.

On the one hand, he still clung to the project of an invasion, which was not finally abandoned until 1809. On the other hand, he proposed to use his mastery of the Continent for the purpose of excluding all British goods from European markets. This seemed to be a very promising method of attack. For Britain had now ceased to be a self-supporting country; and in order to pay for the imported food which she needed and to find occupation for her great industrial population, it was indispensable that she should find markets for her manufactures and for the colonial produce which she controlled. Such a state of things had never existed before; and never before had any single Power been in a position to close simultaneously every market in Europe. Napoleon, with swift recognition of a new set of facts, proposed to make unflinching use of this situation.

The two parts of his great project—the naval attack and the commercial attack—were closely connected in his mind; and down to 1809 they were pursued concurrently. But it will be convenient to survey the naval conflict first, before analysing the new method of commercial war.

Trafalgar had not annihilated the French navy. The Brest fleet remained intact, and it was strengthened during the following years. But Napoleon hoped to combine with the French fleet in the centre two other naval wings, one in the north, the other in the south. The northern wing was to be provided by the Danish fleet, behind which would lie the Baltic fleet of Russia. It was for this among other reasons that the Emperor and the Tsar had agreed to force Denmark, hitherto neutral, to join the combination against Britain. But this plan was forestalled by the prompt and high-handed action of Canning. Having learnt from his secret service the purport of the secret Treaty of Tilsit (July 1807), Canning promptly (August) despatched to Denmark an ambassador, backed by a fleet and an army. Denmark was warned what was in store for her, offered a British alliance, and invited to deposit her navy in British harbours.
until the end of the war. When Denmark refused to accept this sudden challenge, Copenhagen was bombarded, and the fleet was forced to surrender and carried off to Britain. This action, which seemed like mere piracy, outraged the public opinion of Europe, and was violently attacked by many in England; Canning’s defence was that he had broken a weapon which Napoleon meant to use, before he could seize it.

The southern wing of the intended naval combination was to consist of the remnants of the Spanish fleet, together with the small navy of Portugal. In 1807 a peremptory demand was issued to Portugal, requiring her to join the anti-British coalition; and to enforce this order a French army under Junot was ordered to march without further delay upon Lisbon. Portugal at once yielded, since resistance seemed hopeless. Nevertheless Junot was ordered to advance by forced marches; and the reason of this haste was the necessity of capturing the Portuguese fleet. Meanwhile a Russian naval squadron, which had been in the Mediterranean at the time of the Treaty of Tilsit, was ordered to proceed to Lisbon: it could prevent the Portuguese fleet from escaping, and join forces with it after its surrender. But this pretty plan was spoilt by the promptitude of a British squadron under Sir Sidney Smith, which kept off the Russians, and escorted the Portuguese fleet to sea, carrying the Portuguese royal family to Brazil, there to maintain the standard of Portuguese independence. By the time Junot arrived, the birds had flown; and though the Russian fleet had got into the Tagus, it was safely blockaded there by Sidney Smith’s squadron. Next year (1808), when a British force under Arthur Wellesley landed in Portugal and compelled Junot to surrender after the battle of Vimeiro, the most valuable result of the victory was that the Russian squadron was forced to surrender, and was removed to Britain.

Thus both wings of Napoleon’s naval combination had been shattered before they could be brought into action. The ruin of his scheme was completed when in 1808 Spain broke into revolt against his usurpation, and the remnants of the Spanish navy were also enrolled on the British side. In 1809 the coup de grâce was administered to Napoleon’s naval projects. The Brest fleet escaped from harbour; but it was penned into Aix roads, disorganised by an attack of fireships which drove several of its vessels ashore, and severely bombarded. The last possibility of any challenge
to British supremacy on the seas had been removed. Henceforward Napoleon must pin all his hopes upon his other weapon, the war of commerce; and it is no mere coincidence that it was in 1809 and 1810 that the pressure of the continental system became most severe. Happily, by that time, Britain had organised her counter-measures; and therefore, though hard-pressed, she was able to survive the terrible strain of these years.

§ 3. The Continental System and the Orders in Council.

The idea of attacking Britain by restricting the outlets for her trade was no invention of Napoleon’s. The Directory had initiated this mode of attack by a decree of 1796 which ordained that any ship bringing British goods to a French port should be liable to confiscation. This was, of course, a flagrant disregard of neutral rights, and a repudiation of the principle that ‘neutral ships make neutral goods,’ which France had accepted in 1780. It led to bitter neutral complaints, and almost brought about open war between France and the United States, which severed diplomatic relations in 1798. Britain had replied by prohibiting neutral trade between France and the French colonies, and by declaring a blockade of the coast from the Seine to the Elbe—a blockade too extensive to be made effective.

In 1801, hoping to win the support of the Northern Powers and the United States, Napoleon had suddenly modified the French restrictions, and had declared his zealous adhesion to the ‘sacred principles’ of neutral freedom of trade. But Napoleon’s devotion to these ‘sacred principles’ lasted only as long as they suited his convenience. He longed to wield freely the weapon of commercial war; and when, in 1806, his dazzling victories had made him master of Europe, he used this weapon unflinchingly. Immediately after Jena, he launched from the Prussian capital (November 1806) the thunderbolt of the Berlin Decree. By this decree he declared the whole of the British Islands to be in a state of blockade—surely the most fictitious blockade ever ordered! He prohibited all commerce with British ports, and ordained that all ships which entered any French or allied port with a cargo wholly or partly of British origin should be liable to seizure. This was the most outrageous violation of neutral rights which had ever been perpetrated. Its pretext was the British blockade of the

1 See below, p. 267.  2 See above, p. 184.
coast from the Seine to the Elbe; but the British blockade could, in fact, be made to mean something, because ships attempting to break it could be stopped and brought before a prize court; the Napoleonic blockade was no more than a pretext for the seizure of trading vessels entering French or allied harbours with British goods.

If the neutrals accepted this monstrous invasion of their rights (and, except in words, they showed little sign of any intention to resist it) they would be lending themselves to Napoleon's designs, and co-operating in the destruction of British trade. What reply was Britain to make? Her most useful weapon lay in the fact that she could control the supply of two classes of goods, vitally important to Europe—the produce of the tropics, and the products of the new industry. She could damage Napoleon in the eyes of his subjects by making them realise that his commercial war was cutting them off from necessary supplies, and inflicting upon them grievous hardships. Was she to sacrifice this chance by allowing the neutrals, while they boycotted Britain at Napoleon's command, to import all the tropical produce which Europe needed? Was she to permit the import of raw cotton into Europe, and thus encourage the fostering of industries that would compete with and ruin her own? She must either do so, or run the risk of alienating the neutrals by imposing on them fresh restrictions, which, even if they were less severe than Napoleon's, would be more felt because they would be enforced by the pressure of sea-power.

At first she proceeded cautiously. An Order in Council issued in January 1807 pointed out that as Napoleon had prohibited all trade with Britain, it would be reasonable for Britain to prohibit all trade with France; but she limited herself to forbidding trade between any two ports from which British ships were excluded. This left open to neutral ships the conduct of trade between Britain and the Continent, or between any other part of the world and any enemy port.

Before long the Treaty of Tilsit, followed by the breach with Denmark, brought Russia and Denmark into the ranks of Britain's enemies. To this stroke Britain replied by a new Order in Council (November 1807), whereby she declared a blockade of all ports from which British goods were excluded. This practically prohibited neutral trade with the Napoleonic Empire, except where a special license was given; such licenses were freely given to merchants who were prepared to carry
British goods. The neutrals had in effect to choose between Napoleon's prohibition of trade with Britain, and Britain's prohibition of trade with Napoleon's subjects. They were between the devil and the deep sea. It became in fact impossible for them to be really neutral. The new Order also provided that neutral ships which were unaware of the Order would be warned, and required to proceed to British ports. At the same time, by a relaxation of the Navigation Acts, substantial concessions were made to all neutrals trading with British ports. The general purpose of these Orders was to encourage neutral trade with Britain, and give special encouragements to any neutrals who were willing to take the risk of disregarding Napoleon's arbitrary decrees.

The next move lay with Napoleon. In the Milan Decree of December 1807 he replied to the Order in Council of the previous month. Announcing, in defiance of the facts, that Britain had required every neutral vessel to call at a British port (this requirement only applied to vessels which were unaware of the November Order, and therefore affected only a few ships for a short time), he proclaimed that any neutral vessel calling at a British port was liable to seizure. The neutrals—a term which now covered practically only the United States of America—were thus reduced to a desperate situation. If their ships traded with any British ports they were liable to seizure by French privateers, or to subsequent confiscation if they entered a French or allied port. On the other hand, if they made for any French or allied port they were liable to the much more serious danger of seizure by the omnipresent British fleet, unless they had obtained a British license, which was readily granted to those who undertook to carry British goods.

In 1809 Britain modified her policy by limiting her blockade to the coasts of Holland, France and Italy, thus leaving open traffic with Spain and Portugal (now in revolt against Napoleon) and with Germany and the Baltic lands. Napoleon, on the other hand, stiffened his policy. He had found that, despite all his objurations, his vassals were disregarding his edicts as much as they dared; and having now realised that his naval projects were utterly ruined, he resolved to drive home his commercial war with the utmost stringency. Both of the two great classes of commodities which Britain controlled—tropical produce and manufactured goods—were coming into Europe in large quantities, tropical produce often on the transparent pretext that it came from the Dutch or Spanish dominions, manufactured
goods by means of organised smuggling. In 1810 Napoleon struck at these two lines of trade. By the Trianon Tariff he imposed duties averaging 50 per cent. *ad valorem* on the principal colonial or tropical products, whencesoever derived. By the Decrees of Fontainebleau he ordained the seizure and destruction of British manufactured goods wherever found, and set up special tribunals to enforce this order. These monstrous enactments brought ruin and suffering wherever they were applied; and nothing did more to convince Napoleon's subjects that his rule was intolerable than the spectacle of the wanton destruction of great stores of desperately needed supplies.

Such were, in outline, the measures of attack and reprisal by means of which the fierce commercial war of these years was carried on. As the later sections of this chapter will show, Napoleon's Continental System inflicted terrible distress upon Britain; but it failed of its purpose, and in the end played a very great part in arousing that revolt of the nations of Europe which brought down the proud fabric of the Napoleonic Empire in ruins. It was a ruinously false policy, just because it was fundamentally unjust.

Is the policy of the British Orders in Council open to the same condemnation? That is a much more difficult question to answer. The Orders in Council were strongly condemned at the time, not only by the neutrals, but by important bodies of opinion in Britain. The main ground of attack, both at the time and since, was that the Orders in Council constituted an intolerable invasion of neutral freedom of trade, which could not be justified even by the fact that they were an answer to the still more outrageous invasions of neutral rights perpetrated by Napoleon. To this contention there is only one tenable answer. If neutral traders had been allowed, without restraint, to accept the conditions laid down by Napoleon, and to make great profits by co-operating with him (as in effect they would have done) in the ruin of Britain, they would in reality have ceased to be neutrals. And if, by so acting, they had ensured the success of Napoleon's great design, they would have directly helped to bring about the destruction of the last effective bulwark against the establishment of a universal military despotism. Whether this result would or would not have followed if Britain had abstained from making any direct reply to Napoleon's challenge, is a difficult question to which no one can give a dogmatic answer. But, at the least, the answer is sufficiently doubtful
to make a just man hesitate before condemning outright the policy pursued by men who knew that they were defending not only the freedom of their country, but the freedom of the world.

§ 4. British Counter-Stroke against the Continental System.

It was not only by Orders in Council, and by forbidding neutrals to become Napoleon’s tools, that Britain fought against the Continental System. She used also more direct methods of attack, all of which were effective, and some of which had lasting results.

In the first place, she did all that was possible to facilitate the ingress of British goods into Europe. She encouraged direct trade with those among Napoleon’s vassals who, like the Dutch and the Danes, rendered only a perfunctory and unwilling obedience to his decrees. She also organised a highly efficient system of smuggling on a colossal scale; and, though the remarkable success of this system was due mainly to the ingenuity and energy of individual merchants and sailors, it received all the support that Government could give it. In Northern Europe an excellent base for all this traffic was provided by the annexation of Heligoland in 1807, whence both the German and the Danish coasts could be quickly reached. By this route an immense stream of British manufactures and colonial produce passed into Western Germany, and was disseminated thence over Central Europe and even into France itself. Between 1806 and 1810 this was perhaps the most serious puncture in the Continental System. The necessity of stopping it drove Napoleon in 1810 to some of his most high-handed annexations.

In the Mediterranean the ‘punctures’ in the Continental System, and the bases for contraband trade, were more numerous. Gibraltar formed an excellent base for traffic with Spain; but as soon as the Spanish revolt began, in 1808, the whole of Spain became one huge puncture in the system. Malta provided a similar base for trade with Italy, and the island of Sicily (which was protected by a British fleet and army throughout the period) was even more valuable. In 1809 Britain occupied the Ionian Islands; they had been taken by Russia in 1799, and transferred to France by the Treaty of Tilsit. From the Ionian Islands a smuggling trade could be carried on with the Dalmatian coast and the Austrian Empire. Through Turkey and up the Danube,
also, a stream of British imports passed into Central Europe. On all hands Napoleon found that, though he could hamper and restrict the ingress of British trade, it was impossible to seal hermetically a whole continent with a coastline so indented as that of Europe, against a people of fertile ingenuity and irrepressible energy.

The second form which was assumed by British action against the Continental System was the conquest of the oversea possessions of France and her allies, or the opening of new markets in those which were not conquered. By this means a double purpose was served: Britain's control over the sources of supply of colonial produce was confirmed, so that Europe either had to draw these goods from British sources or do without them; and at the same time new markets were found for the cotton goods of Lancashire and the other products of British industry. In this way an expansion of the territory of the British Empire was brought about which would probably never have taken place but for the pressure of the Continental System.

A brief catalogue must suffice for these acquisitions. In 1806 Cape Colony, which had been restored to Holland by the Peace of Amiens, was reoccupied; and this time the occupation was to be permanent. In the Indian Ocean the French islands of Bourbon, Mauritius, Rodriguez and the Seychelles were taken in 1810; with the exception of Bourbon, these were to be permanent additions to the British Empire. In 1811 an expedition was despatched from India to occupy Java, the richest part of the Dutch Empire. The British occupation of Java was only to last for five years; but it was distinguished by the reforming administration of Sir Stamford Raffles, who did much to remedy the grievances from which the native population had suffered under Dutch rule. In the West Indies every flag save the British and the Spanish disappeared during these years; not only Martinique, Guadeloupe, St. Lucia, Tobago and Dutch Guiana, which had been handed back at the Peace of Amiens, but the Dutch island of Curacao and the Danish islands of St. Thomas and St. Croix were taken. Most of these conquests were restored at the end of the war; but in the meanwhile all their trade fell into British hands, and helped to save Britain from the destruction which Napoleon had planned for her.

Yet more important than these acquisitions was the admission of British trade to the markets of South America, which had been rigidly closed ever since the foundation of
the Spanish Empire. There were already signs in the Spanish colonies of a readiness to revolt against the deadening control of the home Government; and so long as Spain remained a dependent ally of Napoleon, it seemed to be in the interests of Britain to stimulate this movement of revolt. In 1806, misled by exaggerated accounts of unrest in the Argentine, Sir Home Popham, without orders from home, set out from Cape Colony with a small force, and made an ill-managed attack on Buenos Ayres. Meanwhile the home Government had decided to attempt the reduction of Chile. The force destined for this purpose had to be diverted to Buenos Ayres, where Popham had got himself into difficulties. But it achieved no success, and was withdrawn; the ill-devised attempt to conquer Spanish South America thus ended in failure.

But this result was almost immediately redressed by the consequences of the Peninsular War in Europe. Both Brazil and the Spanish lands threw open their ports to the ships of Britain, the Power that was supporting the patriotic cause at home. This great opportunity for British trade came at a moment when the pressure of the Continental System was being very severely felt in Britain, and the result was that huge accumulations of goods were poured into South America, which bought them eagerly, having been almost shut off from European trade during the years of the war. In spite of the distress caused by the over-trading of the first years, it is not impossible that the opening of the South American market saved the situation, coming as it did at a moment when the United States had closed their ports to British ships.¹

At the end of the period yet another vast market was thrown open to the enterprise of private traders. All European competition had now come to an end in India, thanks to Napoleon; but the trading monopoly of the East India Company still survived. In 1813 the charter of the Company fell to be renewed, and the occasion was seized to give free access to the trade of India to all British merchants. One very important result of this change was that British manufactures began to pour into India on a vastly increased scale; and the Indian hand-loom weaver of cotton goods, whose products had long commanded the markets of the world, found himself beaten in his own bazaars by the products of the Lancashire factories.

It remains to consider the third group of measures

¹ See below, Chap. ix. p. 269.
adopted by Britain in the struggle against Napoleon: the affording of encouragement and help to every movement of resistance offered by any of the peoples of Europe. In pursuing this policy Britain at last discovered the true mode of using her national strength. With an omnipotent navy, which made it possible for her to deliver sudden and unexpected blows against any point in the long European coastline, and with a small but mobile army, unable by itself to withstand the Napoleonic legions, but possessing, thanks to the navy, a freedom of movement which these could never rival, she could afford a backbone to resistance whenever it might arise, provided that it was in a region accessible from the sea; or she could make unexpected descents which would divert the forces of the master of Europe, and so give help even to those whom she could not directly aid.

As early as 1806 there had been a brilliant little illustration of what could be done in this way. While Napoleon was engaged in the Austerlitz campaign, the peasants of Calabria rose in revolt against the French forces which were over-running Southern Italy. A British force of 5000 men under Sir John Stuart was promptly thrown into Calabria from Sicily; and at the battle of Maida it inflicted a sharp defeat upon an equal number of French troops—the first occasion on which the unconquerable French had been beaten on anything like equal terms. Nothing came of this victory, because the thunderbolt of Austerlitz made further resistance futile. The British force evaded pursuit by retreating across the sea, where it could not be touched. But in Sicily, because it was an island, Britain was able through all these years to maintain a European State independent of Napoleon. A naval squadron, an army of 10,000 men, and a regular subsidy protected Sicily and made it a source of perpetual unrest in Southern Italy.

In the North, the Danish expedition of 1807, though its aims were primarily naval, provided an object lesson in the use of a sea-borne army. The army was landed, did its work, and was withdrawn, before Napoleon could do anything to interfere. In 1808 an army of 10,000 men under Sir John Moore was sent to Sweden to aid its resistance against France and Russia. The erratic behaviour of the King of Sweden made it necessary to withdraw this force; but the ease with which it was landed and withdrawn was instructive.

The greatest, and also the most unfortunate, of these
oversea expeditions was designed for the year 1809. In the spring of that year Austria, encouraged by the success of the Spanish revolt in 1808, had taken up arms, singlehanded, against the ever-encroaching tyranny of Napoleon. It was impossible for Britain to give her direct aid, otherwise than by the grant of subsidies; but a great expedition was planned to distract the attention of the enemy and to divide his forces. It was resolved to attack the coast of the Netherlands, and if possible to occupy Antwerp, where Napoleon was building great dockyards. An army of 40,000, the largest hitherto sent abroad by Britain, was landed on the island of Walcheren. Badly led by the incompetent Lord Chatham, it achieved nothing; and for a time this failure discouraged continental adventures. Yet the ease with which it was landed, and the security with which it was withdrawn, showed how dangerous the command of the sea could be to a land-power.

And meanwhile an ideal opportunity had been opened for the use of a sea-borned army when, in 1808, the Spanish people rose in revolt against Napoleon. We shall deal with this more fully in a later chapter, because it was to be the turning-point of the long conflict, and the beginning of the conqueror's downfall. It opened to Britain the true mode of employing her resources, and of draining away the strength of her formidable enemy; and it gave to her soldiers, who had hitherto achieved nothing of great importance in the long wars, the means of proving their fighting quality, and of winning for their country a military prestige only less than the splendour of her naval fame. It is significant that the British army did not begin to play an important part in the great conflict until the navy had finally achieved its supremacy; and it was the navy's secure control of the seas which, by making communications and supplies absolutely safe, made the triumph of the army possible.

The counter-strokes of Britain against the Continental System—her organised system of contraband, her conquest of oversea markets, and her stimulation of resistance in Europe—were thus, on the whole, well-designed and successful. They enabled her to stand the terrible strain which the Continental System inflicted upon her. They prepared the way for the great events which were to ruin the imposing fabric of Napoleon's power. And, in particular, they forced upon Napoleon, in his desperate endeavour

See below, Chap. x. p 278.
to make his system water-tight, a series of aggressions and annexations which aroused against him the burning resentment of half of Europe.

§ 5. Effects of the Continental System upon Napoleon's Policy.

During the first three years of his commercial struggle with Britain, Napoleon seems to have imagined that it would be enough to issue his edicts to his submissive vassals. But he soon found that it was one thing to issue edicts, and quite another to ensure that they were effectively enforced. The exclusion of colonial produce and of manufactured goods was against the interests of merchants and consumers everywhere, and no Government could enforce it without endangering its authority over its subjects. The vassal States therefore disregarded Napoleon's edicts as much as they dared. He could not be sure of obedience except in the lands directly under his own control; and he was gradually forced into a series of high-handed annexations of sea-board territories.

Even during the first three years this inevitable consequence of his policy was becoming apparent. The Pope had courageously refused in 1806 to close the ports of the Papal States against British shipping, on the ground that he was not at war with Britain: so dangerous a puncture could not be tolerated, and Napoleon forcibly occupied the Papal ports (1808), while an army of occupation practically reduced the Pope's power in his own dominions to a nullity. This was the beginning of an alienation from the head of the Catholic Church which largely undid the work achieved by the Concordat of 1801. Again, it was largely the necessity of getting effective control over the Spanish ports which led Napoleon in 1808 to depose the Spanish king and his son: and this not only led to the ruinous Spanish war, but the cynical treachery with which the change was effected alarmed every ruling prince in Europe.

In 1809, however, Napoleon was driven to adopt a more drastic policy; and he entered upon that career of reckless and high-handed violence which frightened the shrewdest of his advisers, such as Talleyrand and Fouché, and convinced them that sooner or later a crash must come. Indeed, the situation in 1809 was such as to demand vigorous action if the Continental System was not to break down. The neutrals, on whom Napoleon had counted, had either been driven from the seas, or were trading under British
licenses. British goods were pouring into Europe through Holland and Germany, through Italy and Turkey. At all costs, and whatever opposition might have to be faced, the trade restrictions must be enforced; for there was now no other hope of reducing the resistance of Britain.

In 1809 the breach with the Papacy was made final and irreparable. An insolent decree revoked 'the donation of Charlemagne, our august predecessor,' and annexed the Papal States to France; while the brave old Pope was sent into captivity at Avignon. In the same year, after the defeat of Austria, the Dalmatian coast, and the lands behind it, were annexed to France under the name of the 'Illyrian Province,' as the only means of stopping the ingress of British goods.

But the annexations of 1810 were yet more striking and high-handed. Holland had been turned into a dependent kingdom, with Napoleon's own brother Louis as king. But Louis knew that the enforcement of the exclusion of British trade would mean ruin to a trading nation such as the Dutch, and he had allowed an almost open trade to be carried on. From 1806 to 1810 he received a long series of rebukes and protest, of increasing asperity, from his autocratic brother; finally, in 1810, he was swept from his throne, and Holland was directly annexed to France. Beyond Holland lay the German coastline, where the smuggling trade, based on Heligoland, was carried on upon a colossal scale. Without regard to the rights of the existing rulers (one of whom, the Duke of Oldenburg, was a cousin of the Tsar), all this coast-land, together with a belt of territory extending across the base of the Danish peninsula, was directly annexed to France.

It was in 1810 that the pressure of the Continental System was most severe, and that its effects were most cruelly felt in Britain. But it was also in 1810 that the breakdown of the system began to be visible, and that the danger which it threatened to Napoleon's power began to be displayed. This was especially demonstrated by the attitude of Sweden and Russia. Sweden had accepted the Continental System in 1809; and, as if to complete the triumph of Napoleon, one of his marshals, Bernadotte, was invited to become Crown Prince of Sweden, the King having no heir. But Bernadotte, who had no love for Napoleon, did not wish to alienate his future subjects; he made no serious attempt to enforce the edicts, and Sweden's co-operation in the system was from the first merely nominal. Bernadotte
would scarcely have ventured to follow so independent a line if he had not known that his great neighbour, Russia, whose adhesion to the Continental System had formed one of its chief supports, was already growing tired of it. The Tsar had realised that the exclusion of colonial produce and British manufactures was seriously impairing the prosperity of his subjects. In 1810 he issued an ukase which practically brought to an end the exclusion of colonial produce; during 1811 he gradually relaxed the restrictions on British imports; and in 1812 the trade between Russia and Britain almost returned to normal conditions. This was the death-blow of the Continental System. It was in 1812 that Britain found it possible to withdraw her Orders in Council, just too late to prevent the outbreak of war with the United States; and during 1813 the course of international trade had begun to return to normal conditions. The Tsar's practical withdrawal from the Continental System brought about a definite breach between the two great Empires which had dominated Europe in 1807; and with that breach the final act in the Napoleonic drama began.¹

Two broad causes combined to bring about the rapid collapse of Napoleon's gigantic power in the years 1812-1814. One of these was the rising tide of national sentiment in most of the countries of Europe, which will be discussed in the next chapter. The other was the resentment and the suffering caused by the Continental System. But the national spirit would scarcely have been goaded to the point of effective resistance but for the anger aroused by the restraint of trade. If the neutrals had been permitted to co-operate with Napoleon by supplying Europe with the goods she needed and by destroying the trade-ascendancy of Britain, this discontent might never have been brought to the sticking-point. If, by these means, Britain had been defeated in 1807 or 1808, as Napoleon confidently expected, the national risings, when they came, would have lacked the support which they received in money and men and ships from the unresting Power that ruled the seas. And without that help their success might have been long delayed.

§ 6. The Effect of the Continental System in Britain.

Although Britain held out against the pressure of Napoleon's blockade, it was only at the cost of great suffering.

¹ See below, p. 285.
The years 1806-1815 were for the mass of the British people a period not only of misery but of degradation; and the circumstances were such as to render effective remedial measures very difficult, even if the fear of revolution had not caused the governing class to be dominated by a blind and dogged resolve to resist all change.

The first cause of the sufferings of these years was a shortage of food supplies. The population was increasing more rapidly than ever; it rose by a million and a quarter in England and Wales alone between 1801 and 1811; and it was not possible for the production of food to keep pace with the growth of the population. In normal years about one-fifth of the corn supply had to be imported, and there were several bad harvests when the supply fell so far short as almost to lead to famine. The New World had not yet begun to send food-stuffs to Britain on any large scale; she was dependent in the main upon imports from Europe, and especially from Poland. If Napoleon had chosen to forbid the export of corn, he might perhaps have brought Britain to her knees. Fortunately he had persuaded himself that the best way to ruin her was to encourage her to buy while preventing her from selling; and he therefore freely issued licenses for the export of corn. Nevertheless, the Continental System, by placing obstacles in the way of interchange, added greatly to the difficulty of obtaining sufficient imports, and was therefore largely responsible for the food-shortage which marked these years.

Even when the food supply was adequate in amount, prices were terribly high. But wages did not rise in proportion to the increase in the cost of living; in some trades they actually declined. The result was that a rapidly increasing proportion of the working classes had to accept supplementary grants from the Poor Law authorities in order to keep themselves alive. The system of making such supplementary grants to families in full work—the 'Speenhamland' system—was consequently rapidly extended during these years over the greater part of the country. Mischievous as were the results which flowed from this system, it is probably true that, in the unnatural conditions into which the country had been forced by the commercial war, this system alone saved large masses of the British people from utter ruin and starvation.

The second main cause of the suffering of these years was the restriction of exports, and therefore of output, which

1 See above, p. 216.
necessarily resulted from the Continental System. Thanks to the ingenuity and enterprise displayed in discovering methods of circumventing Napoleon's prohibitions, the average quantity of British goods exported seems to have been fairly steady. But it was not enough that the volume of exports should be maintained. If employment was to be found for the growing industrial population of Britain, there had to be a rapid expansion. For the commercial war coincided with the second stage of the industrial revolution in the textile trades: the power-loom (invented as long before as 1790) only began to come into use after 1801, and it was not employed on a large scale until the years of the Continental Blockade. The introduction of the power-loom made it possible for the British trader to face the cost and risk of smuggling his goods into Europe, and still to sell them at a price which beat foreign competitors. But it brought disaster to the weavers. It displaced a large amount of labour; and as the Continental System prevented the increase of sales which would normally have resulted from increased cheapness, there was a large surplus of labour competing for the available employment. In these conditions the workers were at the mercy of their employers, and wages fell. It was only gradually that the power-loom captured the whole of the weaving industry; down to almost the middle of the nineteenth century a very large proportion of the work—especially the more complicated work—was still done on hand-looms in the workers' own cottages. But the weavers were paid, as they always had been paid, by the piece, and the amount paid for the weaving of a piece of cloth was now fixed by the cost of weaving it on a power-loom. In 1795 the amount paid for a 'piece' of cotton cloth was just under 40s.; in 1810 it had fallen to 15s.; and, as the restriction on exports made employment irregular, very large numbers of weavers could earn no more than about 6s. per week—and this at a time when the cost of living was soaring.

It was in the weaving of cotton and woollens that the distress was most felt. The metal industries found some compensation for restriction of export in the demands of the army and navy. In 1810 and the following years there was also much distress among the framework hosiery knitters of Leicester and Nottingham. The employers were striving to cheapen production by making stuff on wide frames and cutting it up into hose, instead of weaving the hose as a whole; and this meant a reduction of labour. Costs had
to be cut down if the risk and expense of export in the face of the Continental System were to be met.

In the hope of finding a remedy for their sufferings the operatives (especially the weavers) made repeated application to Parliament, asking it to fix regular rates of wages, or to find some other mode of redress. But Parliament was helpless. The problem was unexampled, not only in British history, but in the history of the world. The accepted economic theories of the time condemned State intervention in industrial questions. But the negative attitude of Parliament quite naturally tended to undermine the loyalty of the suffering classes to the institutions of their country. They had begun to look to great political changes as the necessary preliminary to any improvement in their lot; and the growth of this feeling is one of the most significant features of the period.

Since Parliament would not or could not help them, the operatives tried to combine for self-defence. But Pitt's Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800 stood in the way. These Acts threatened those who combined to force up wages with crushing penalties for conspiracy; and this provided another ground for complaint against the existing political order. In spite of the Combination Acts, however, Trade Unions were becoming active. The first systematic attempts at industrial strikes on a large scale belong to these years. There were extensive strikes among the Lancashire weavers in 1808, among the Durham miners and the Lancashire spinners in 1810, among the Scottish weavers in 1811. But none of these led to any useful result; the economic situation was too unfavourable. Finally, in 1811 and 1812, some of the operatives began to resort to blind violence. In Nottingham bands of men, known as Luddites, took to destroying the broad frames on which 'cut-up' hosiery was made. Many hundreds of frames were destroyed, and troops had to be brought in to restore order. In 1812 the 'Luddite Riots' extended to Lancashire and Yorkshire, where they assumed a more dangerous form. Machinery was destroyed; some murders were committed.

In the last years of the war these troubles died down. They died down because the Continental System had failed, and foreign trade was beginning to resume its normal course. But the evil consequences of the Continental System did not end with its breakdown. It had complicated the already difficult problems of the industrial transformation; it had, at a very critical stage in this
transformation, forced down wages to an unnaturally low level; and a generation of anxiety and trouble was to pass before these evil consequences of the system could be nullified.

One of the most significant features of this period of the war was a revival of the demand for political reconstruction which had been crushed out by Pitt's repressive policy in the years following 1794. The earlier reform movement had never obtained any secure hold over the masses of the people. The new movement drew most of its strength from them, just because political change had come to seem a necessary step towards social amelioration. The main schools of thought which were to play a part in the long political discussion of the next generation were emerging during these years. A group of intellectual Whigs had, by the foundation of the Edinburgh Review (1802), given a public organ to their party; and though the Whigs were by no means hearty advocates of large political changes, they were at least critics of Toryism and of the negation of all change. The radical philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, had gathered round him that remarkable group of disciples and interpreters who were, in the next period, to exercise an influence over the process of reconstruction out of all proportion to their numbers. Major Cartwright had revived the radicalism of the old pre-revolutionary school, and had founded in 1812 the first of his Hampden Clubs to advocate manhood suffrage and shorter Parliaments. In 1807 Westminster, one of the few democratic constituencies in England, elected Sir Francis Burdett to the House of Commons as a Radical Reformer; and from that date there were always one or two Radical members in Parliament. The Westminster election of 1807 was one of the first in which modern electioneering methods were pursued. And the organiser of victory was no less a person than Francis Place, the Charing Cross tailor, who was to play a vastly important part in the agitations of the next thirty years.

But perhaps the most doughty champion of political reform enlisted during these years was William Cobbett, one of the most effective sledge-hammer journalists who have ever wielded a pen. We shall have to estimate his work and influence in a later chapter. Here it is enough to note the significant development of his opinions, which reflects the change which was going on in the country. In 1802 Cobbett had started his weekly Political Register to support

2 See below, Bk. ix. chap. ii. p. 319.
Pitt and denounce Napoleon. In 1806, without abandoning his hatred of 'the Corsican ogre,' he had suddenly swung round and begun to advocate radical reform. His trenchant, lucid and picturesque denunciations of the borough-mongers and place-hunters whom he described as sucking the nation's blood, his lurid if often wrong-headed descriptions of the evils from which the body politic was suffering, found readers everywhere. The stagnation of political life which had resulted from the French Revolution in the greater part of the nation had come to an end.

[See list at end of chap. VII.; also Temperley, Life of Canning; Marriott, Castlereagh; Porter, Progress of the Nation; Holland Rose, Napoleonic Studies; Hammond, Village Labourer, Town Labourer, Skilled Labourer; Brougham, Life and Times; The Creevey Papers; The Croker Papers; Wallas, Life of Place; Cornwall Lewis, Administrations of Great Britain; Traill, Social England; Carlile, Cobbett; Halévy, Growth of Philosophical Radicalism; Ashton, Industrial Revolution; M. D. George, England in Transition; Aspinall, Politicians and the Press and Lord Brougham and the Whig Party.]
CHAPTER IX

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND THE UNITED STATES: THE WAR OF 1812

§ I. The Attitude of America towards the War.

Next to the miseries which Napoleon’s Continental System inflicted upon the working people of Britain, its most important result, for the British Commonwealth, was that it prevented the healing over of friction with the United States, and led to a miserable war, which left behind it a heritage of ill-feeling between the two great divisions of the English-speaking world.

The Treaty of 1783 had not solved all difficulties between Britain and the United States. The States had refused to carry out the terms of the treaty in regard to the compensation to be paid to Loyalists; and until these terms were fulfilled Britain had refused to hand over eight fortified posts which she held on the American side of the Great Lakes. These causes of friction were not removed until 1796; and, indeed, the individual States never consented to compensate the Loyalists. Thus bad feeling already existed, when the French Revolution came to exacerbate it.

Yet, apart from the French Revolution, these difficulties would have been removed without much difficulty. The natural affinities between two peoples who shared the same laws, the same language, and the same traditions were too deep to be permanently severed even by the shock of war. And the course of events was making them more and more necessary to one another. The growing population of the States, which rose from 4,000,000 in 1783 to over 7,000,000 in 1810, was now beginning to people the central plain, where the new States of Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio were organised during this period; and this population, mainly engaged in agriculture, afforded a magnificent opening for British trade. Meanwhile, the Southern States were becoming the main source of supply for the raw material of the greatest of the new British industries, cotton. The
British supply of raw cotton had hitherto come mainly from the West Indies and from India, but these sources of supply were beginning to be exhausted. In 1793 the invention of a gin for extracting seeds from the short-stapled cotton which could be grown on the American mainland transformed the situation. As late as 1790 practically no American cotton came to England. By 1810 America had already become the chief source of supply. And the influence of this mutually advantageous traffic, had peace and a return of good-will made it possible, must have brought about friendly co-operation and mutual understanding in other spheres besides that of commerce. In this as in other respects the violent upheaval of the French Revolution brought nothing but ill to the British Commonwealth. It postponed for more than a generation the restoration of friendly relations, and led to events which have in some degree poisoned these relations ever since.

The States-General met in Paris only two months after Washington assumed the chair as first President of the United States. It was natural that the Revolution in France should be hailed with enthusiasm in America. Across three thousand miles of ocean the discords and the horrors that soon began to defile the movement in France made little impression, though they alarmed some of the wiser and more moderate men. When the war began in 1792 sympathy was all but unanimous on the side of France; when Britain was drawn in, in 1793, this sympathy was, in many quarters, even intensified: the republic of France seemed to be fighting for her existence against the same foe from whom France had helped the American republic to win its freedom. No American could forget that France had been his ally. Indeed, it became a question whether the States were not bound (as French envoys strongly urged) to make common cause with France under the Treaty of 1778, by which the United States had guaranteed the security of the French possessions in America; and Britain expected and feared that this course would be taken. Washington, however, made haste to issue a declaration of neutrality, and thus proclaimed what was to become the traditional American policy of non-intervention in European affairs. But the general sentiment was on the side of France; and this sentiment was strengthened when the British navy began to interfere with American foreign trade, stopping the carriage of goods in American ships from the French colonies to France. Another factor also contributed to intensify
anti-British feeling. Deserters from the British navy, or mercantile sailors afraid of impressment, could readily take refuge in American ships. But when naval vessels began to stop American ships and forcibly remove British sailors, or men claimed to be British sailors, American opinion took fire. From the beginning to the end of the war this was the most acute cause of friction.

Two political parties had already appeared in America, and their differences led them to take different attitudes on the European war. The Federalist party, which included some of the wisest statesmen of the Revolution, notably Washington and Alexander Hamilton, were anxious to strengthen the central Government as against the individual States; they were also distrustful of the more extreme forms of democracy; and this distrust made them view with distaste the extravagances of the French Revolution, and inclined them to friendship with Britain. The Republican party, whose inspirer was Thomas Jefferson, were distrustful of the central government, and were doctrinaire democrats. Their sympathies were passionately with France and strongly anti-British. Fortunately for Britain, Washington and the Federalists were in power when the war began, and held office until 1801.

In the hope of getting rid of the friction with Britain, Washington sent John Jay to London to negotiate a treaty (1794). But the Jay Treaty, though it greatly eased the situation for American traders, was badly received, mainly because Britain had refused to abandon her practice of seizing British seamen on American ships. It is significant that this treaty contained a clause providing that the dispute about the boundary between Canada and the States should be settled by a joint commission; this was the beginning of the modern arbitration movement.

Meanwhile France had, as we have seen,\(^1\) taken up an attitude towards neutral trade far more oppressive than that of Britain: she had not only threatened (1796) the seizure of all neutral vessels carrying British goods into French harbours, but had actually seized and confiscated a number of American ships. When an American envoy was sent to protest, he was ignominiously dismissed, and the Directory later had the insolence to propose that the States should pay a sort of tribute for the right of carrying on their trade. This aroused indignation in America: the States began to arm, and during the three years 1798-1801 there

\(^1\) Above, p. 248.
was 'a sort of war' between them and France. It was only brought to an end when, in 1801, Napoleon was trying to ingratiate himself with the neutrals.\footnote{Above, p. 251.} If a settlement with France had not then been made, America might have found herself exposed to the full power of Napoleon, without the protection which the British fleet had hitherto afforded her; for the Peace of Amiens soon followed. That this was not a wholly illusory fear was shown by Napoleon's busy projects during the interval of peace. He was taking up again the dream of a colonial empire. He was reconquering San Domingo. He had compelled Spain to transfer to him the vast province of Louisiana, and was preparing an army to despatch to this province. Had the Peace of Amiens been prolonged for a year, or had Britain been defeated, the States might have found themselves faced by a militant French power on the lower Mississippi.

Meanwhile the Federalists had fallen from power in America, and the Republican Jefferson had become President (1801). Even Jefferson, despite his French sympathies, had no liking for the prospect of a revived French Empire beyond the Mississippi. But a way out of the difficulty soon presented itself. Napoleon recognised that while the war with Britain lasted, he could do nothing in Louisiana; and he therefore agreed to sell this vast tract and all its inhabitants to the States, hoping thus to prevent co-operation between them and Britain. Jefferson eagerly closed the bargain, though it was a flagrant departure from his democratic doctrine that peoples have a right to choose their own rulers. Not even the 60,000 French and Spanish inhabitants, still less the Indians, were consulted.

During the first three years of the renewed war American trade increased by leaps and bounds. But in 1806, as we have seen,\footnote{Ibid.} the situation changed: the British blockade of the coast from the Seine to the Elbe, the Berlin Decree, the Orders in Council, the Milan Decree came in turn; and the American sailor found himself exposed to tremendous risks in carrying on the traffic he had found so lucrative. He cursed both sides alike. But he was inclined to lay the heaviest weight of blame upon Britain, because, although the restrictions imposed by Britain were less severe than those imposed by Napoleon, it was with British ships that he most often came in conflict. The coast of America was practically blockaded during these years, and some of the actions of the blockading vessels, notably the attack on the
American ship *Chesapeake* in 1807, were intolerably high-handed. The intense resentment aroused by these proceedings blinded most Americans to the magnitude of the issues about which the world-conflict was being fought. They were concerned to defend their own rights and the freedom of the seas. They did not concern themselves with the questions whether Napoleon's power was a menace to the freedom of the world and in the long run to their own, whether this menace could be resisted by any other means than the pressure of sea-power, or whether the effective exercise of this pressure was compatible with the maintenance of complete freedom for neutral trade.

Negotiations went on unceasingly, but they were in vain. For Britain would not assent to the two fundamental points on which the States insisted: she would not consent to raise the blockade of Napoleon's ports; she would not abandon her claim to search for British deserters in American ships. Jefferson tried to bring the combatants to reason by laying an embargo on all American exports (1807). This blow, though nominally aimed at both belligerents, was felt only by Britain, but it did not make her yield. If it had been effectual, it would have involved the total ruin of American trade, which was only saved by the wholesale evasion of the Act, and by the ingenuity with which smuggling was carried on through Canada, the Bermudas, and the islands on the coast of Florida. In 1809 the embargo was withdrawn, having totally failed of its purpose. In its place a Non-intercourse Act was adopted, which prohibited all direct intercourse with Britain or France or their immediate dependencies. But this also failed of its purpose. Britain did not withdraw her Orders in Council. Napoleon, on his side, ordered the seizure and sale of every American ship and cargo in every port under French control. And America, in despair, changed her tactics and threw open her trade to all the world (1810), with a proviso that if one of the belligerents should withdraw its restrictions and the other remain obdurate, the President should be empowered to reimpose non-intercourse against the latter.

Napoleon saw in this situation a chance of enlisting the United States on his side. So he announced that his Decrees would be withdrawn on November 1, 1810, provided that, before that date, the British Orders in Council had been cancelled, or America had forced Britain to 'respect her rights.' His Decrees were only to be withdrawn so far as concerned America; the exclusion of British goods from
the Continent was still to continue. But the cancellation of
the Orders in Council, on which his concession was con-
ditional, was to be complete. President Madison (who had
succeeded Jefferson in 1809) fell into the trap. He accepted
Napoleon’s withdrawal as definite. He gave Britain three
months’ notice, and when she had failed to cancel her
Orders by the appointed date, he prohibited all intercourse
with her. Finally, on June 18, 1812, with the approval of
Congress, he declared war against Britain.

In the same month Napoleon’s fateful march on Moscow
began. This meant the downfall of the Continental Sys-
tem, and before the end of the month the British Orders
in Council were suspended. Thus, within five days of the
opening of war, the primary cause of the war had disappeared.
Yet the war itself continued, for two main reasons. The
first was that Britain still refused to abandon her claim to
seize British deserters on American ships. The second
was that America had been fired by the ambition of con-
quering Canada, at a time when the main British forces were
necessarily engaged elsewhere in the final death-grapple for
the freedom of the world.

§ 2. The War of 1812-1815.

The war thus miserably begun lasted for three years,
and had no result save the alienation of the two peoples
whom it embroiled, and the awakening in Canada of a proud
national sentiment, born of successful resistance to invasion.
We may therefore content ourselves with the broadest sur-
vey of the main features of the fighting on sea and on land.

The American navy was too weak to be able to fight any
fleet actions with the British. It could not prevent a
blockade of the coast, which became more severe as the war
proceeded, and almost put an end to American trade. But
individual ships fought many single-ship actions with the
utmost skill and gallantry. In the first year of the war, in-
deed, their successes in such actions were so striking as
to cause grave perturbation in Britain. In 1813 the
Admiralty had to forbid British ships to engage American
ships of superior size. Thenceforward the results of these
contests were more even; the most famous of these sea-
duels, fought between the Chesapeake and the Shannon,
vessels of equal strength, was a British victory. In the
war on commerce also the Americans showed infinite daring
and resource. Using French ports as their bases, in the
years when Napoleon's power was being shattered, they wrought extraordinary havoc in the English Channel and the Irish Sea, such as the French had never rivalled. But though the number of British ships exposed to attack was immeasurably greater than the number of American ships, the American loss in captured ships during the three years was 1400 against the British loss of under 1700.

The main feature of the war on land was a systematic and persistent American attempt to conquer Canada. This enterprise was undertaken with every prospect of success. The total population of all the Canadian colonies was little over 300,000; the number of regular troops available for the defence of a frontier over 1000 miles long was less than 5000; and Britain, engaged in the final throes of the struggle with Napoleon, could spare no more until 1814. The Americans, on the other hand, raised during the war about 500,000 troops—a larger number than the total British forces engaged in all fields; and though most of them were employed in guarding against possible British descents from the sea, they could always supply a far greater force for the attack than was available for the defence. Moreover, persuaded that monarchy spelt tyranny, they hoped to be aided by a revolt of the Canadian settlers. When the first invading army entered Upper Canada in 1812, its general issued a florid proclamation inviting the inhabitants to throw off their chains and join the free States. But except for a few recent American immigrants, none answered this appeal; and the sons of the United Empire Loyalists rallied with such spirit to the flag for which their fathers had sacrificed so much that before the end of the campaign the author of the proclamation and his army were compelled to surrender. Nor were the French settlers of Lower Canada less staunch. Though there was some resistance to the raising of the militia, they fought with splendid élan, and perhaps the most brilliant episode of the whole war was the fight of Chateauguay, in which 300 French Canadians routed an army of 3000 which was attempting to advance against Montreal. Finally, the defence received invaluable assistance from a force of Shawnee Indians led by Tecumseh, perhaps the greatest statesman whom the Red Indian race had produced. He regarded the British Government as the natural protector of the Red Man, because of the regulations for the protection of the Indians which had been issued after the conquest of Canada and since systematically observed. In 1811 one of Tecumseh's settlements had been
destroyed in his absence by a body of American pioneers; in 1812 therefore he was quick to range himself on the British side. Time and again he and his braves gave valuable assistance in the defence; and Tecumseh himself died fighting gallantly at the battle of Moraviantown (1813), in which the British force was rather shamefully beaten.

It is needless to follow the confused course of the struggle. There was fighting between squadrons of lake-boats, both on Lake Erie, where the Americans won the upper hand in 1813 and kept it, and on Lake Ontario, where the superiority passed from one side to the other. There was fighting by land at both ends of Lake Erie and on the line of Lake Champlain and the river Richelieu; the chief battle-ground being the Niagara peninsula between the two great lakes, which saw the hard-fought and indecisive battle of Lundy’s Lane in 1814, as well as many lesser tussles. But the net result of all was that the American armies failed to make any serious impression upon the Canadian frontier; and the result of this long, swaying strife was the birth of a sentiment of national pride among the Canadians.

In 1814, after Napoleon’s abdication, Britain was able to send to America some of the veterans of the Peninsular war; and their advent was followed by a more aggressive conduct of the war. Some of them were sent to Canada; but with others it was decided to make a series of attacks upon the American coast. A fleet carried a substantial force up the Potomac, and landed it near Washington; the American army of defence was defeated under the eyes of the President; and the Capitol and the President’s house were burned. This act of vandalism was defended as a retaliation for the action of the Americans in burning down York (Toronto) and the village of Newark. But two blacks do not make a white, and the burning of Washington did much to embitter still further the relations of the two kindred peoples. At the beginning of 1815 a similar attack on New Orleans was needlessly delayed and badly conducted; the defence was skilfully managed by the American commander Jackson; and 2000 men were sacrificed in a vain attempt to storm, under withering fire, a rampart built of cotton-bales. The sacrifice was thrown away; for before the battle was fought peace had been already signed by the negotiators who had for some time been sitting at Ghent in Belgium.

The Treaty of Ghent, which closed the second (and, it is to be hoped, the last) war between the two great divisions
of the English-speaking peoples, served to illustrate the futility of the war. For it made no change whatsoever. So far as any definite result was concerned—apart from the stimulation of Canadian patriotism—all the lives and all the treasure which had been expended had merely been wasted. The war had not even helped Napoleon to stave off his downfall, which had been completed (to all appearances) before peace was signed. But it had rekindled the animosities which unhappily divided the two great commonwealths of freedom.

[Channing, History of the United States; Walker, The Making of the Nation; Lucas, The War of 1812; Roosevelt, Naval War of 1812; Kingsford, History of Canada (10 vols.); Grant, Short History of Canada; Mahan, Sea-Power in Relation to the War of 1812; Mowat, Diplomatic Relations between Great Britain and the U.S.A.; Morison, History of the United States.]
CHAPTER X

THE PENINSULAR WAR AND THE RISING OF THE NATIONS

(A.D. 1808-1815)

§ 1. The Opening of the Peninsular War: the Victories of 1808.

There is poetic justice in the fact that the most cynical of all Napoleon's acts of aggression brought about the beginning of his decline. Without a shadow of right he destroyed the freedom of the Spanish nation, and annexed their historic land to his empire; and behold! he had raised against himself the unconquerable force of national sentiment, he had opened to his unrelenting foe an ideal opportunity of piercing his armour, he had committed himself to a Sisyphean task which strained all his resources. The Peninsular War was, in Napoleon's own phrase, the 'running sore' which so weakened him as to make his overthrow possible. That it did so was due to two things: the fiery patriotism of the Spanish people, and the fighting power of the British army, resting on the sea. Gallant as it was, the resistance of the Spaniards would probably have been crushed in 1809 or 1810 but for the intervention of the British forces. On the other hand, even the genius of Wellington and the imperturbable valour of his little army could have done nothing had they not been backed by a nation in arms.

When, after Tilsit, Napoleon resolved to force Portugal into the Continental System, he obtained the concurrence of Spain to the transport of a French army across her territory by promising to partition Portugal, to the advantage of the Spanish monarchy and of the able but untrustworthy minister of Spain, Godoy. He had no intention of fulfilling these promises; on the contrary, he was already designing the ruin of his ally. Junot's army, destined for Portugal, was followed by a series of others, which planted themselves on the main roads to Madrid, seizing fortresses
by treacherous coups de main (November 1807—February 1808). The Spanish court suddenly realised its danger, and thought of flight. A rising in Madrid prevented it, and forced the old King Charles IV. to abdicate in favour of his son Ferdinand (March). But Napoleon inveigled both Charles and Ferdinand on to French soil at Bayonne, forced both to give up their claims (May), contemptuously pensioned off Charles, threw Ferdinand into prison, and bestowed the crown of Spain upon his own brother, Joseph Buonaparte (June). Meanwhile a French force occupied Madrid, and the French armies held down all the north of the country, while Junot had safely fulfilled his task in Portugal, and was master of that country. A shameless and cynical act of treachery was apparently completely successful.

But the tyrant had to count with the pride of a historic people. In every part of the country there was (May, June) an outburst of patriotic rage. Local 'Juntas' formed themselves, and called out all the strength of their provinces for a holy war; and the French found that they held nothing beyond the ground occupied by their armies.\(^1\) Napoleon did not take this insurrectionary fury very seriously; he believed that two or three expeditionary armies, despatched into the chief provinces, would soon shatter all organised resistance, and that the rest would be merely a matter of police. But these expectations were dramatically disappointed. Before the city of Saragossa, in the north, a French army of 15,000 men was held at bay for months by a horde of peasants and townsfolk under the heroic young adventurer Palafox. An army sent to subjugate the eastern province of Valencia had to withdraw with a loss of 1000 men. Worst of all, an army of 20,000 men, sent southwards to beat down the resistance of Andalusia, was actually forced to capitulate at Baylen (June). This was the most shattering blow which the prestige of the French armies had yet received. It aroused intense excitement throughout Europe. The Spanish patriots became the heroes of a world's admiration. Men began to realise the immense potency of national feeling. Indeed, they overestimated it. They hoped that the Spaniards, unaided, would be able to free themselves from the despot.

The Juntas however, sanguine as they were, did not share these wild hopes. They despatched urgent appeals for aid to Britain, their only possible source of help; and it was

\(^1\) See the map, Atlas, School Edition Plate 26, 6th Edition Plate 70.
from Britain that they drew henceforward most of the money and supplies which enabled them to keep their armies on foot. But they got more from Britain than guns and money. The British Government resolved to strike promptly in support of the Spanish national rising. In August a British army landed in Portugal; and British forces were to continue to play their part henceforward until the last Frenchman had been driven out of the Iberian Peninsula.

The arrival of this army marks a turning-point in the history of the Napoleonic wars. Small as it was (it numbered only 16,000 men), it was soon to prove its quality. And its commander was Arthur Wellesley,¹ the first great master of the art of war whom Britain had produced since Marlborough. Though only thirty-nine years old, Wellesley had already won his spurs in the Indian wars. He had shown in India that he possessed the gifts of a statesman as well as those of a general, and had the power of inspiring confidence. He was always master of himself; neither the elation of success nor the presence of danger could disturb his balance of mind. Infinitely patient, he could await his opportunities; and though he could take great risks, his most daring acts were always founded on calculation. He valued precision and accuracy of statement; he never allowed himself to be cozened by hopes or fears; he never doctored the facts to produce an effect; and there is no greater contrast than this between himself and the great imaginative genius whom he was to overthrow. By untiring industry he had made himself master of all the tedious minutiae affecting the organisation of armies: to this he attributed his success; he knew exactly what an army could do. Up to these limits he was as exacting in his demands upon his men as he was unsparing in his demands upon himself. To these qualities he added a very sure military judgment, a quick eye for opportunities, and a fearlessness in assuming responsibilities, which made him always a dangerous foe. These were qualities which perhaps fell short of the highest genius; but they were unvarying, always to be depended upon. They inspired implicit trust rather than affection; for Wellesley never won from his men the passionate devotion which the magnetic personality of Napoleon aroused.

Within three weeks of his landing, Wellesley had broken Junot’s army at Vimeiro (August) and forced it to sue for

¹ There is a short life of the Duke of Wellington by George Hooper, in the ‘English Men of Action’ Series.
terms; for the Spanish rising had cut off its retreat. But unfortunately two elderly incompetents had been placed in superior command over the young general. They had luckily arrived just too late to prevent the winning of victory; but they arrived in time to forbid its being driven home by a prompt pursuit, and to grant Junot the foolish Convention of Cintra, whereby he was allowed to withdraw his army intact, with all its plunder. For this disgraceful transaction these commanders were rightly recalled; but Wellesley had to return and stand a court-martial alongside of the superiors who had spoilt his brilliant success, and the command of the army fell, for the remainder of the campaign, to Sir John Moore.

§ 2. Napoleon in Spain, and the Retreat to Corunna.

Baylen and Vimeiro between them seemed, to superficial observers, to have broken the French attack on Spain. The French armies fell back towards the frontier, while from all the provinces Spanish armies, full of self-confidence, hurried into position in a long line north of Madrid, to repel a new attack. The British army in Portugal was ordered to take its place in this line. Moore therefore advanced into Spain as far as Salamanca.

It was not to be expected that Napoleon would submit to the disasters of 1808. He resolved to crush resistance at once by a swift and heavy blow. A great host of 200,000 men was collected by the end of October, and Napoleon himself took command. He fell like a thunderbolt upon one Spanish army after another, swept them from his path in a series of shattering victories, and by December 3 had occupied Madrid: he seems to have been unaware of the very existence of Moore's little army on his flank, as he swept superbly on. Three weeks he spent in Madrid, drafting projects for the reorganisation of Spain, and defining the moves on the chessboard by which his Marshals were to complete the victory. Meanwhile Moore had found himself suspended in the air, far into Spain, while the armies with which he was to co-operate were broken into fugitive mobs. His first thought was to beat a retreat to Portugal. But then a more daring project occurred to him; he might threaten Napoleon's communications, and perhaps tempt him to loose his talons from his prey. So, with 27,000 men, he set out eastwards; and was on the point of striking at a French army under Soult, when he heard that Napoleon had turned to pursue him.
The bait had proved too tempting. Napoleon thirsted to capture a whole British army, and gave orders for pursuit, withdrawing for the purpose the forces that might have completed the subjugation of Southern Spain. Moore turned to retreat not a moment too soon. It was impossible to get back to Portugal; instead, he turned towards Corunna. But it was only by forced marches that he succeeded in distancing his pursuers; and his little army suffered terrible hardships, and lost heavily during the retreat. Yet the retreat had achieved more than many victories. It had drawn off Napoleon and his main forces from the south; and when the Emperor himself abandoned the pursuit (January 1, 1809), handing it over to his Marshal, Soult, it was too late to return. He was needed at home. Soon the revolt of Austria, which the Spanish rising had stimulated, was to occupy all his attention, and he never returned in person to Spain.

Soult continued the pursuit. He came up with the British army at Corunna, as the embarkation was beginning. But though the guns and cavalry were already aboard, the infantry turned and inflicted upon him a bloody repulse (January 16, 1809). The gallant Moore was killed in the action, and hurriedly buried in the city of his glory before his comrades withdrew over the sea, where no pursuit was possible. But he had saved Spain and Portugal for the moment, and made it possible for the heroic struggle to continue.

§ 3. Holding the Fort: 1809, 1810, 1811.

After the retreat to Corunna the war changed its character. During 1809 Napoleon was unable to devote his main strength to the Spanish campaign, because he had the war with Austria on his hands, and at Aspern and Wagram the Austrians fought with a desperate gallantry previously unknown. He had also to deal with a British landing at Walcheren; but that was, on the whole, an advantage, because it drew off 40,000 good British troops who might have been of inestimable value in the Peninsula. In spite of these drains upon his resources, he maintained in Spain armies totalling about 300,000 men. These huge numbers were necessary because they had to deal with two nations in arms, and to carry on a whole series of more or less distinct campaigns for the subjugation of various regions—Catalonia, Valencia, Andalusia, Galicia and Portugal. We
need not follow these campaigns. In general the French were successful against Spanish armies in the field; but as they advanced fresh insurrections sprang up behind them, which made them relax their hold upon their conquests.

Meanwhile Wellesley had resumed command of the army in Portugal; he had also been given control over the Portuguese army, which, under Marshal Beresford, was gradually turned into an efficient fighting force. His position was threatened from two sides—by Soult in Galicia, whom Napoleon had ordered to reconquer Portugal, and by Victor with the army of Andalusia. Wellesley first struck hard at Soult, who had occupied Oporto; by a daring exploit he crossed the Douro and hunted the enemy out of Portugal, compelling him to abandon his baggage and escape by devious mountain tracks. Then, hurrying swiftly southwards, he undertook a bold march into Spain, to co-operate with the Spanish armies in an attempt to strike at Madrid. He won a brilliant victory over Victor at Talavera, for which he was rewarded by a peerage. But new French armies were coming up, and he found the Spanish generals impracticable and untrustworthy. He was dangerously far from his base; and when Soult, advancing from the north, threatened his communications, he only saved himself by a rapid retreat. Thus, during 1809, Portugal had been cleared; but the sanguine hopes of great successes in Spain had come to nothing. The Spanish armies were everywhere hard-pressed, and could be no longer counted upon for any big effort. The Spaniards could defend cities, could carry on gallant partisan warfare, could make the situation of the French armies very difficult by imperilling their communications; but they could not win victories, or drive the French out of the country. If that task was to be achieved, it must be achieved by Britain.

And now the Austrian war was over, and Napoleon could turn his whole strength once more against Spain. In the winter of 1809-1810 Soult, with a great army, was given the task of conquering Andalusia, where alone large Spanish armies still held the field. He was all but completely successful. By the beginning of February the whole province had been subjugated, and the remnants of the Spanish army were penned into Cadiz. The conquest of Andalusia was a crushing blow. Many observers thought that the end of the Spanish resistance was at hand.

For the campaign of 1810 Napoleon had reserved the final and decisive stroke—the reconquest of Portugal, and the
driving of the British army into the sea. The ablest of Napoleon's Marshals, Masséna, was chosen for this task; and he was given a great army of the finest quality, nearly 130,000 men, against whom Wellington could count upon only 30,000 British troops, and an equal number of Portuguese, as yet untried in serious fighting. Wellington had anticipated the coming storm, and had made preparation for it. Knowing that the French counted upon living on the country through which they passed, he had prepared to fight them with the weapons of starvation. He had cleared the whole centre of the country, along the line of the French advance, of all its population and all its food supplies, sending the people to take refuge among the hills. Across the peninsula at the mouth of the Tagus he had constructed the impregnable lines of Torres Vedras, with 126 formidable redoubts and 427 guns. The lines were between 20 and 30 miles across; they could be defended by the whole British and Portuguese armies. In front of them would lie an empty and foodless land; behind them the population of the surrounding country, who would be fed from the sea.

Having made these dispositions, Wellington took post with his army across the line of Masséna's advance. At Busaco he inflicted a sharp defeat upon the advancing host. Then he withdrew; and left Masséna to lead his starving army up against the impregnable barrier of Torres Vedras. Masséna saw that his task was hopeless, and fell back. By the time he recrossed the frontier, he had lost 25,000 men, mainly from sickness and starvation. And Portugal was still unconquered. After the campaign of 1810, no French army again ventured to cross the Portuguese frontier.

Torres Vedras was in truth the turning-point of the war. But it seemed to contemporaries that the stone had rolled down to the bottom of the hill again, and that the whole work was yet to be done. The Spanish forces were nearly exhausted. In the north-east, indeed, they were giving serious trouble, and the irregular warfare of partisans was more active than ever. But there were no large armies in the field. In Andalusia Cadiz alone held out; and though a brilliant sally by an Anglo-Spanish force won the battle of Barrosa, it led to no result.

In 1811 Wellington set himself to clear the main roads from Portugal into Spain. They were guarded by great fortresses; in the north Ciudad Rodrigo, faced by the
Portuguese fortress of Almeida, and in the south Badajoz. Wellington took Almeida, and beat off a French attempt to relieve it at Fuentes d’Onoro. Meanwhile Beresford had been watching Badajoz, and had fought, with a mixed British, Spanish and Portuguese force, the bloody battle of Albuera, in which the brunt of the fighting fell upon the British contingent, who lost half of their number killed, and yet won the day. But Badajoz still held out. Thus little apparent progress had been made; and but for the desperate valour of the Spanish guerilla bands (who were at their most active in this year) the prospects of an ultimate French victory would still have been bright. At home men were beginning to be tired of the war; no real progress seemed ever to be made.

§ 4. The Expulsion of the French from Spain, 1812-1814.

But the tide turned definitely in 1812. The dangerous years 1810 and 1811, when there was no other call upon Napoleon’s resources, had been safely passed. Now, in 1812, he was driven to undertake the Russian campaign. He began to withdraw troops from Spain, though not yet in large numbers. And at the same time Wellington again undertook a vigorous aggressive. By bold storming attacks, wasteful of life but saving in time, he captured the two great fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz; and the main roads into Spain lay open to him. Then he struck boldly into Central Spain, towards Salamanca. Here he met an equal force under Marmont, and won a dazzling victory, which shook the French power in Spain to its foundations. King Joseph had to flee once more from Madrid, which British troops occupied. To save the situation, the French had to give up the attempt to hold down the south and centre of the country, in order to gather together sufficient forces to regain Madrid. They regained it; they even forced Wellington to retreat once more to the frontiers of Portugal. But they had lost all the south, and this they were never to regain. The clearing of Spain had begun, following on the clearing of Portugal. It was to be rapidly achieved during the next campaign, that of 1813.

As we shall see later, in 1813 Napoleon, back from the disasters of the Russian campaign, had to fight for his control over Germany, against the armies of Russia, Prussia, Austria and Sweden. For this reason he was compelled to recall large forces from Spain, and the French armies in
Spain were therefore driven to abandon more and more of the country in order to concentrate for the defence of the North. But they still outnumbered their opponents; and the mere fact of their concentration made them more formidable in manœuvre and in battle. The Spanish war had regained unity. It was unified on the other side also; for in 1812 all the armies of Spain had been placed under Wellington's supreme command, and he had made his control effective in time for the beginning of the 1813 campaign.

This was to be one of the most brilliant of Wellington's campaigns. Had he advanced with all his forces directly upon the enemy from Ciudad Rodrigo, the enemy could have concentrated upon him with superior forces. He therefore divided his army, and ordered the larger half, under Graham, to advance from the far north of Portugal by a difficult and little-used route, while he himself took the expected course from Ciudad Rodrigo. The result was that whenever the enemy prepared to concentrate against Wellington, they found themselves threatened with outflanking by Graham, and were forced to fall back. Thus, with inferior forces, Wellington manœuvred the French backwards until they were against the Pyrenees. Then he struck hard, and won at Vittoria (June) one of the most brilliant of his victories. The result was practically to compel the French to evacuate Spain. Soult, now in supreme command, delayed the retreat by a brilliant series of actions in the Pyrenees, while the French garrisons of San Sebastian and Pampeluna held out doggedly. But by October this resistance had been beaten down, and Wellington's armies had forced the passage of the frontier river Bidassoa, and begun the invasion of France. Before the year ended, two successive lines of defence, on the Nivelle and the Nive, had also been forced; and allied armies were well planted on the soil of France, which had not seen an invader since 1793.

In 1814 the European allies also were to invade France; and while Napoleon was fighting the desperate battles of Champagne which ended in his abdication, Soult was enduring blow after blow in the South, at Orthez (February) and at Toulouse (April). It was in the North that the issue was decided: Napoleon had already abdicated before the battle of Toulouse was fought. And it is also plain that it was the pressure of the campaign of Central Europe in 1813 which had made possible the rapid collapse of the French power in Spain in that year. But if this is true, it is equally
true that the Spanish campaign made the northern victories possible. If in 1813 Napoleon had been able to dispose freely of all the great armies that were locked up in Spain, there can be little doubt that the conflict in Germany would have been decided in his favour. Even in 1814 the armies of Spain would have made a world of difference, could they have been transplanted to Champagne. And what had kept these armies locked up in Spain was the dogged resolution and resource with which Wellington had clung on during the years 1809, 1810, 1811, when all the vast power of the Napoleonic empire was available. If the Spanish resistance had been crushed during any of these years, it is likely that the downfall of Napoleon’s empire would have been long delayed. The unconquerable ardour of Spanish patriotism and the dogged tenacity of Britain had not, indeed, by themselves saved Europe; but they had made it possible for Europe to save herself.


While the long struggle swayed backwards and forwards in Spain, while the British fleets maintained their eternal vigil, and the enterprise of British traders and sailors unflaggingly sought out new modes of penetrating the continental blockade, popular sentiment in Europe, which had at first been not unfavourable to Napoleon because his dominion brought the boons of social equality and equal laws, was steadily turning against him; the rising of the nations, which was to bring about his downfall, was preparing. Two things combined to cause this change of sentiment. The first was resentment against the hardships caused by the blockade: this was especially intense from 1810 onwards. The second was the growth of national sentiment, which had hitherto been very weak in most of Europe, and especially in Germany and Italy. It was stimulated by the inspiring example of Spain and by the stubborn and unbending resistance of Britain. How potent a force national sentiment can be had been shown by France in 1793: soon France was to feel its strength in opposition to herself.

There was an impressive demonstration of the fighting strength which the new spirit could give in the Austrian war of 1809: though Austria had to fight alone, her soldiers fought far more desperately than in any earlier campaign;
and the gallant resistance of the Tyrolese mountaineers under the heroic innkeeper, Andreas Hofer, gave an earnest of the fire and valour which patriotism on the defensive could inspire.

It was in Germany, however, that the change of temper found its most remarkable expressions. National sentiment had hitherto been weak in Germany, because of her division into a multitude of petty States. In the eighteenth century her poets and philosophers had even prided themselves upon rising above the narrow emotion of patriotism; and in that spirit Germany had welcomed first the French Revolution and then the world-empire of Napoleon. But Napoleon's tyranny rapidly brought a change, and the nationalist movement in Germany was born in resistance to him. Its centre was the ruined State of Prussia, which had been so terribly humbled after Jena. That drastic punishment was the beginning of a new life for Prussia. Calling in the aid of men from all parts of Germany, she undertook a noble labour of reconstruction, which drew to her the sympathy of all Germany, and made her the destined nucleus of a future united German nation. In 1807 and the following years, Fichte the philosopher was preaching the duty of patriotism in a series of noble Addresses to the German Nation, which were read wherever the German tongue was spoken; Humboldt was creating a new educational system to serve as the foundation of a better social order; Stein, the greatest of the group, was abolishing serfdom and establishing a system of local self-government; Scharnhorst was organising a new army, based upon the obligation of military service as a primary civic duty. The Prussian army had been limited by Napoleon to 43,000 men; but by taking in new levies every year and dismissing them after a short period of training, Scharnhorst turned this disability into an advantage: by 1812 Prussia had 130,000 men trained to arms.

Thus, during the years of Napoleon's greatest power, the national spirit which was to destroy him was being evoked; and the ground was beginning to quake beneath the feet of the despot of Europe when in 1812 the threatened breakdown of his Continental System forced him to embark upon a war with Russia.

Yet, despite the growing strength of national feeling and the growing resentment of Napoleon's tyranny, all Europe still lay under his spell in the spring of 1812—fascinated by the prestige of a conqueror who had never failed in anything
which he had undertaken. Nobody felt the spell more than Napoleon himself. He had come to believe in his own infallibility. He had lost touch with the traditions of the Revolution, and had become a pure despot, maddenèd by opposition. His outlook was clouded by egotism; he was losing that sure grasp of realities which had been so large an element in his strength; and his marvellous physical and mental powers were beginning to deteriorate under the influence of self-worship, and the terrific strain to which he had long subjected himself. The Russian campaign illustrated the temper which now governed Napoleon. It was intended to rivet his ascendancy upon Europe by a grandiose display of his irresistible power. Russia had dared to break away from the Continental System. She must be so terribly punished as to make Europe tremble, and abandon her restless dreams of freedom. Russia's downfall and the co-operation of the United States would ensure the ruin of Britain; and without Britain Spain would be no longer troublesome.

The great expedition which was to achieve these ends had been in preparation since early in 1811; and when its component armies, led by famous marshals whose names were only less terrible than that of Napoleon himself, began to deploy along the Russian frontier in the spring of 1812, such a representation of all the historic civilisations of Europe was displayed as had never been seen since the gathering of the hosts for the First Crusade in 1095. The armies numbered over 600,000—the greatest array that had ever been gathered in Europe. Only half of the host was French; the rest was drawn from all Napoleon's subject peoples, while auxiliary armies from Prussia and from Austria marched on either flank.

Against this superb host Russia could only oppose far inferior forces. But she could trust to the patriotic spirit of her people. A proclamation issued by the Tsar, wherein he announced that he would make no peace so long as a single foreign soldier remained on Russian soil, answered to the spirit of the people; and Napoleon found that his task was no longer the comparatively easy one of overthrowing organised armies and imposing terms upon their masters. He had to deal, as in Spain, with the opposition of a whole people, who harassed his troops in every possible way, and left him sure of nothing beyond the ground actually occupied by his armies. This was what defeated him; this and the vast spaces of Russia.
At the end of June 1812 the huge glittering host crossed the river Niemen, and disappeared among the forests of Russia, while Europe waited breathlessly for the event. News came that the Russians had been defeated on the Borodino (September); but it was not told that Napoleon had failed to isolate or crush any of the Russian armies. News came that the Emperor had made a triumphant entry into Moscow (September); but it was not told that he had entered an almost empty city, and that a great part of it had subsequently been burnt; it was not told that the Tsar had refused even to discuss peace; it was not told that Moscow, so far from the French base, could not be held during the severities of a Russian winter, in face of intact and growing armies; it was not told that, knowing this, Napoleon nevertheless held on irresolutely almost till the grip of winter began, rather than confess failure, and that by doing so he condemned his soldiers to the awful tragedy of a retreat through a deserted, icebound, and foodless country under incessant harassment from an active and exultant foe.

After the news of the capture of Moscow a curtain hid the doings of the Grand Army from Europe. But there were rumours, which grew and swelled. And at length the full extent of the disaster was revealed, when from the frost-bound forests there emerged a few thousand gaunt and starving men, the remnants of the Grand Army. At their head came the Emperor, hurrying back to Paris with a fragment of his Imperial Guard, to take precautions against the consequences which must follow from this disaster. But he had left behind him in Russia the superb self-confidence which had hitherto borne him up. It was not the same Napoleon who turned at bay to face the growing revolt of his vassals; and his marshals and his men had lost something of that absolute assurance of victory, and that adoring reliance upon their chief, which had been half their strength.

§ 6. The Battle of the Nations and the Fall of Napoleon.

But Napoleon's cause was not yet lost, even after the Russian disaster. The Russian armies alone could not have made any serious impression upon his empire; and the spell which he had cast upon Europe was still so strong that other Powers hesitated to come to Russia's aid. Even
Prussia hesitated; it was only the passionate eagerness of her people that drove her King into making a formal alliance with Russia in February 1813. No other Power was yet prepared to enter the fray; and Britain, whose forces were engaged in Spain and America, but who supplied the subsidies without which the struggle could not have been carried on, was the only Power whose help was sure. On the other hand, Napoleon could still draw upon all the resources not only of France, but of Holland, Western Germany, Switzerland and Italy. His armies held the line of the Elbe from Hamburg to Saxony; by herculean efforts he was able to put into the field nearly 250,000 men, a total which outnumbered the combined forces of Russia and Prussia; and new levies increased the number as the campaign went on.

The German campaign of 1813 falls into two clearly marked stages. In the first, which lasted until June, Napoleon held the upper hand, and inflicted many blows upon his opponents. But he found that they were no longer so ready as of yore to admit defeat. The Prussians especially fought without thought of yielding; and the gaps in their ranks were more than filled by the eager rush of recruits. Moreover, Napoleon himself had lost his old sureness of inspiration. He missed opportunities of driving home his successes; and in June, when the game seemed to be in his hands, he asked for a month's armistice and began to talk about terms. That sealed his fate. During the armistice came the news of the battle of Vittoria—the news that the French had been driven out of Spain. New enemies, Austria and Sweden, joined the alliance against him; and in the second phase of the campaign (July-October) a ring of armies slowly closed in upon him. On October 16, Napoleon found himself half-surrounded at Leipsic by greatly superior numbers, and after a desperate battle of three days, well called the Battle of the Nations, had to admit irretrievable defeat.

He escaped to France with only about 70,000 men, out of the half-million he had raised that year. He escaped through vassal lands that threw off his yoke the moment the news of the defeat reached them. France was suddenly reduced once more to the Rhine frontier, the frontier of 1797; while in the South Wellington had already crossed the frontier. After losing two large armies within twelve months, she had to prepare to defend herself against united Europe.
When Napoleon returned to Paris in the autumn of 1814, he had to raise fresh armies for the third time within a single year; and he could not now draw upon any vassal States. His veterans were gone, hundreds of thousands of them dead in Spain and Russia and Germany; thousands more captives in the hands of his enemies, or beleaguered in German garrison towns; he had to make new armies of boys and old men. The magic of his name brought them to the standards, and against the invaders of France they were to fight with a valour equal to that of 1793. But they were now hopelessly outnumbered, and the élan of victory was on the side of their enemies.

The allies did not forget how Frenchmen could fight on their own soil; they were, moreover, divided among themselves, and at cross-purposes as to the future arrangement of Europe. Before beginning the invasion of France they offered to Napoleon terms more generous than he had any right to expect; he might keep the Rhine frontier, thus permanently adding Belgium and Western Germany to France. But even now Napoleon could not bring himself to abandon his vaulting ambitions. He refused the terms; and before the year 1813 was at an end the armies were crossing the frontier.

Then began one of the most marvellous of Napoleon’s campaigns, on those fields of Northern France which were to be the scene of a yet greater struggle a hundred years later. Fighting against overwhelming odds, he seemed to regain all his old verve and rapidity of action. He struck on this side and on that, fending off the converging advance of the allied armies. The allies began once more to quarrel and to work at cross-purposes; and it was not until a conference had been held at Chatillon (February), (when Castlereagh, as the spokesman of Britain, showed great tact and skill in smoothing over difficulties) that they succeeded in adjusting their differences. Once more they offered terms to Napoleon (March); but this time it was the frontier of 1791, before the beginning of the revolutionary war. Napoleon had won some military success at the moment, and with blind infatuation he refused. Before the end of the month mere weight of numbers, and the desperate eagerness of Blücher’s Prussians, had borne him down. The last battle, on the outskirts of Paris, was fought on March 30, 1814, and on April 11, at Fontainebleau, Napoleon signed his abdication. After much discussion as to his fate the allies bestowed upon him the little Italian island
of Elba, whither he betook himself two days after his abdication. He was even now only forty-six years old.

A long nightmare seemed to have been lifted from the world. In every town and village of Europe illuminations celebrated the return of peace. The fighting men came back to their homes, Germans with still unsatisfied ardour for the freedom and unity of their nation, Spaniards hopeful of reward for their long self-sacrifice, thousands of French veterans from the prisons of England and the beleaguered garrisons of Germany, full of memories of the magic of the banished Emperor. Among them all only the British veterans of the Peninsula had no rest, for they must cross the Atlantic to face a new war. The Bourbons returned to France, followed by a train of émigrés. And the diplomats of all the nations assembled in Vienna, to draw the new map of Europe. But there was no such harmony among them as the magnitude of their task demanded; no agreement of principles, but a turmoil of conflicting interests. Already, in the first year of the peace, the Great Powers, who had found it difficult enough to combine in resistance to a common danger, were on the point of coming to blows over the distribution of the spoils of victory.

Meanwhile, in France, the source of all Europe's troubles, there was relief at the return of peace, but there was also a sense that a glory had departed. The Emperor demanding unceasing toll of the nation's manhood had been a burden and a terror; but the Emperor, banished, renewed his old fascination. The Bourbon King, Louis XVIII., was an honest man, doing his best. He granted a charter which conferred wider political liberties than ever Napoleon allowed. In plain prose, France had every reason to be content. But France had grown used to the poetry of life. She could not readily submit to the spectacle of Louis XVIII. on the throne of Napoleon; a barn-door fowl on the perch of an eagle.

Eleven months passed, months of unrest and growing disillusionment. Napoleon was watching and reading the signs of the times from Elba. Suddenly, in March 1815, Europe was startled by the news that he had landed on the coast of France; that his veterans were flocking to join him; that no one dared offer him resistance; that, without striking a blow, he had made a royal progress northwards; and, finally, that the Bourbons had fled helplessly, and left the Man of Destiny once more master of France. The masters of Europe at Vienna patched up their quarrels in alarm, and closed their ranks. They declared Napoleon an
outlaw, with whom there could be no parley. The four Great Powers (Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia) renewed their solemn compact that there should be no peace with France until the power of Napoleon was utterly eradicated, and undertook each to maintain an army of 150,000 until that end should have been secured. But the armies had for the most part to be re-formed and brought into the field; and with Napoleon at large, and France in the exalted mood of 1793, anything might be expected.

§ 7. The Hundred Days.

Napoleon landed on French soil on March 4, 1815; he was master of Paris by March 20; he was defeated at Waterloo on June 18; he abdicated for the second time on June 22; and on July 15 he surrendered himself to the captain of the Bellerophon, the representative of the British navy which he had never been able to defeat or to evade, and whose impregnable resistance was the ultimate cause of his downfall.

If he had at first cherished some hope that the Great Powers would permit him to resume the throne of France rather than undertake the labour of expelling him, or that their dissensions would give him a chance of establishing himself, he was soon disabused by the firm and unbending attitude adopted by the potentates of Vienna. The few weeks of leisure for preparation which the swift surprise of his return allowed to him were mainly devoted to the organisation of all his available forces. The army which he took over from the fugitive Government numbered only 200,000; and though the returned veterans eagerly rejoined his standards, he could count less than 300,000 regular troops in June, together with less than 250,000 National Guards and other auxiliaries of little military value. With these he had to provide for the defence of the long frontier against the inevitable attacks of Austrian, Russian, Prussian and other armies.

But it would take time for the Russians and the Austrians to be brought into the field. In the meanwhile he might, by swift action, win some dramatic success which would bewilder the enemy and perhaps break up their coalition. Here lay his only hope. The two nearest enemy armies were a mixed force under the Duke of Wellington, which occupied Western Belgium, and a Prussian army in the Rhine
Province and Eastern Belgium. Wellington's army at first consisted of only 10,000 British troops. Reinforcements were poured in which raised this number to 30,000 by the middle of June, but unfortunately few of the veterans of Spain had yet returned from America. Various contingents of German, Dutch, and Belgian troops more than doubled this total; but it was a very composite force, and parts of it were quite untrustworthy. The Prussian army was also rapidly reinforced; by the middle of June it had risen to 117,000, and was under the command of Blücher, who had borne the brunt of the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. Napoleon's plan was to prevent these two armies from making a junction, and to annihilate each in turn by swift blows. One advantage he possessed: the two opposing armies rested on bases in opposite directions. The British could not afford to lose touch with the sea; the Prussians would be loth to endanger their communications with the East and the Rhine. To carry out this project the Emperor could spare only 125,000 men—a force greater than that of either of his enemies singly, but substantially inferior to them if they were allowed to combine.

He started for the front on June 12. He found both Wellington and Blücher in Southern Belgium, not far apart; Wellington's advanced troops at Quatre Bras, Blücher with the bulk of his force at Ligny. On June 16, ordering Marshal Ney to contain the British at Quatre Bras, Napoleon threw his main weight against the Prussians, hoping either to annihilate them, or to drive them back to the east upon their base, and thus be left free to destroy the British army. The plan nearly succeeded. After hard fighting he drove back the Prussians; and if, as Napoleon had intended, Ney could have spared a corps to turn the western flank of the Prussians, the success would have been complete. But Ney was hard pressed: after repelling his onslaught, the British, reinforced, had taken the offensive, and he had to recall the needed corps to restore the situation.

Blücher therefore was able to fall back without being intercepted or headed off to the east; and instead of marching eastwards he marched northwards towards Wavre, while Wellington drew back his troops to a position he had chosen on low rising ground across the roads to Brussels, near the village of Waterloo. With his 67,000 men, many of them of uncertain quality, it would have been

1 See the map of the Waterloo Campaign, Atlas, School Edition Plate 22 (b), 6th Edition Plate 53 (b).
folly to risk a pitched battle against Napoleon's whole army, unless he could count upon support from the Prussians. But he got into touch with Blücher, who promised that he would be on the field by mid-day on the 18th; and on this understanding Wellington prepared to resist attack. Meanwhile Napoleon had, owing to delays for which he was himself to blame, lost touch with the Prussian retreat. But he despatched some 30,000 men under Grouchy to follow them.

On Sunday morning, June 18, Napoleon drew out his last army for his last battle. It consisted of 74,000 men. All were veterans; and in the rear were the splendid Imperial Guards, 20,000 strong. Every man in this fine array was visible from the British position; but all that Napoleon could see was a long bare slope, with four farmhouses, and behind them a thin line of infantry along the crest of the rise; the reserves were invisible beyond the slope. In all, Wellington had on the field 67,000 men. But only 24,000 of them were British, and half the remainder were untrustworthy troops, whom he dared hardly use.

Napoleon's plan of battle was simplicity itself. He despised the fighting power of the British soldier, and the military ability of Wellington; and he proposed to thrust through or trample down the thin opposing line by mere mass and weight, hurling at it columns of his tried veterans, who would have an overwhelming superiority of numbers at the chosen points of attack. For seven long hours, from 11.30 until 6.30, these unceasing attacks were withstood by the troops in line, and by the garrisons which held the farms of Hougoumont in front of the right wing, and of La Haye Sainte in front of the centre. In one attack four massive columns, each containing eight battalions, were hurled against Wellington's centre; they were stopped, they wavered, and then a cavalry charge sent them hurtling down the slope again. In another, masses of cavalry charged the line; the British troops formed squares and beat them off; and then beat off a second onslaught, though not without heavy loss. But still the attacks continued; and by 6.30 the situation had become critical; La Haye Sainte had been lost, and all the reserves had been thrown into line.

Where were the Prussians, who had promised to be on the field before noon? Their advance guard had been sighted as early as 1.30, and Napoleon had told off 10,000 men to form a flank on his right and hold them at bay until he should have finished with Wellington. But it was four
o'clock before they were seriously in action, and 6.30 before they made contact with the British left. They had come at the eleventh hour, but still in time. Their advent enabled Wellington to withdraw troops from his left wherewith to repel a new attack. It was the last; and it was delivered by the Old Guard, Napoleon's staunchest veterans. Under a hail of musketry the Guards advanced up the slope in three hollow squares. As they drew near, the wearied British line rose to meet them, and advanced firing. A comparatively fresh division attacked them on the flank. The cavalry burst down upon them. They wavered, broke, and fled; and the battle was won. Almost at the same moment Prussian and British troops reached the centre of Napoleon's position. There was no further possibility of resistance.

Napoleon made his way to Paris. He talked wildly of a *levée en masse*, and resistance to the uttermost. But his ministers and marshals told him that France would stand no further fighting. He left Paris, a fugitive. If he fell into the hands of the Bourbons, they would have no mercy on him. Blücher had ordered his capture, dead or alive, and had promised that he should be promptly shot. He made his way to Rochefort, with a vague hope of finding some means of escape to America. But off Rochefort hung a squadron of the British navy, carrying on that ceaseless vigil which was now to be relieved for a hundred years. Napoleon resolved to throw himself upon the mercy of his most unbending foe, and surrendered himself to the captain of the *Bellerophon*. By an act of poetic justice it was the British navy, which had throughout the long struggle been the chief buttress of resistance, that in the end received the submission of the great adventurer.

What to do with him was a puzzle which perplexed the Powers of Europe. They argued that he must be regarded as their common captive, and that he must be placed beyond all possibility of return. The lonely rock of St. Helena was chosen for his place of exile; and there, amid the limitless seas which had always baffled and defied him, he ate out his heart for the remaining six years of his life. Surrounded by a little group of devoted friends, he read, and gardened, and quarrelled with his gaolers, and wrote fragments of an autobiography, and talked endlessly, reviewing his marvelous career, finding excuses for this and explanations of that, and striving to build up a picture of himself as an enlightened statesman and a crusader of liberty. The picture of Prometheus chained to his rock haunted the
imagination of the world; and this, and the record of his talk preserved by his friends, helped to create a Napoleonic Legend, far different from the facts, which was, five-and-thirty years later, to make possible the disasters of the second Napoleonic régime.

So ended the most marvellous career in human history. For an epitaph upon it, we cannot do better than take the words of a great Frenchman, de Tocqueville: 'He was as great as a man can be without virtue.'

BOOK IX

NATIONAL AND IMPERIAL RECONSTRUCTION
AND THE TRIUMPH OF INDUSTRIALISM
(A.D. 1815-1852)
The footnote references in the text to atlas plates are to *Philips' New School Atlas of Universal History* and *Philips' Historical Atlas, Mediaeval and Modern*, Sixth Edition.
INTRODUCTION

There has been no era in the history of the British Commonwealth of deeper significance than the generation after the Napoleonic war, which is surveyed in the following Book. For during that generation the political system of the homeland was recast, the transformation of its social order was carried further by the triumph of industrialism, and a beginning was made in the attempt to regain social health after the terrible dislocation which the industrial change had involved; while at the same time the organisation of all the great colonies and of India was radically reconstructed, and the relations between the mother-country and the other members of the Commonwealth were wholly changed. It was in this generation that the modern Commonwealth, as we know it to-day, took shape, as a fellowship or partnership of free and self-governing peoples.

Throughout the years when this immense work of reconstruction was being carried on there was a constant fear of revolution in Britain; and when we realise how dreadful were the conditions which had been produced by the coincidence of an industrial revolution with a long and exacting war, the wonder is, not that there was a danger of revolution, but that the danger did not become a reality.

The danger was averted, however. What averted it was a generous use of the medicine of liberty; and by the end of the period quiescence and content had been restored. This, indeed, is the outstanding feature of the history of the Commonwealth during this period—a swift expansion of liberty both at the centre and in all the members. And this was what distinguished the history of the Commonwealth from the contemporaneous history of Europe. In Europe, as in Britain, reconstruction had become necessary, and powerful forces making for change were at work. But the medicine to which the monarchs of Europe trusted was forcible repression. The results were, first, that Europe was disturbed by a succession of revolutionary upheavals, progressively more violent, in 1820, in 1830 and in 1848; and,
secondly, that Europe saw no such orderly and progressive development as both Britain and her colonies enjoyed. A further result was that an attempt made at the beginning of the period to ensure the permanent maintenance of peace among the European Powers turned out a complete failure. The main reason for this failure was that the League of Peace was turned into a League of Repression. From the moment when this change in its character became apparent (1822) Britain withdrew from the League; and throughout the remainder of the period Britain stood as the diplomatic champion of liberty in Europe.

It was the character and direction of the reconstruction in Britain which determined the character of the development in all the colonies. Their future hung upon the course of events in Britain; and the stages in their development correspond with the stages in the movement of change in Britain. In Britain there was, to begin with, a short period of reaction (1815-22), which never went so far as on the continent of Europe; then followed a period of partial and conservative reform (1822-29); and finally, after the downfall of the Tory oligarchy which had governed Britain since 1784, there began, with the fight for the Reform Bill (1830-32) a prolonged and complex period of legislative activity, which filled the rest of the period, and to which we have given the name of the Liberal Reconstruction. This does not mean that it was exclusively the work of one political party. That was far indeed from being the case; both political parties, and many different schools of thought, contributed to it. But it is rightly described as 'liberal,' because the expansion of liberty was its dominating principle.

In the history of the colonies and of India something like the same stages can be discriminated. There was first a period when no important changes were made. Then came a period of tentative advance, when, for example, the despotic power of the Governors in Australia and South Africa was qualified, and when, in India, the introduction of western education began. Finally, after 1830, a period of great and far-reaching changes opened, and a complete departure was made from the old traditions of British colonial policy. A new attitude of consideration for the backward races appeared. A policy of organised and systematic emigration was undertaken, the results of which were that Australia ceased to be a mere penal settlement, the French lost their preponderance in Canada, and New Zealand became a British colony. At the same time great
advances were made towards responsible self-government in all the colonies save those where backward peoples predominated; and the last traces of the old commercial monopoly of the mother-country were swept away. At the close of the period it is not too much to say that the British Empire had wholly changed its character. It had been, in the strict sense, an Empire in 1815; by 1852 it had become a Commonwealth of free peoples, or was in a fair way towards that goal.
CHAPTER I
THE RESETTLEMENT OF EUROPE AND THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANISE PEACE
(A.D. 1815-1830)

§ 1. The Reconstruction of the Map of Europe.

When the diplomats of Europe gathered at Vienna in 1814, after Napoleon’s first abdication, and when they resumed their interrupted discussions after Waterloo, they had before them a tremendous task, and a correspondingly great opportunity. They had to reconstruct a dislocated world; and so many ancient landmarks had been swept away by the tempest, that bold schemes of reconstruction were possible. The world expected, and the diplomats themselves hoped, that they would be able to secure permanent peace, and to give some kind of organised expression to the ideal of international solidarity which had been preached by many thinkers during the eighteenth century, from St. Pierre,¹ through Leibniz, Voltaire, and Rousseau, to Kant.

But there were two powerful bodies of ideas of which they would have to take account if their settlement was to have any elements of stability. The spirit of nationalism had grown to great strength during the revolutionary war; it was fermenting actively in Germany and Poland, and more quietly in Italy, in Hungary, in Bohemia, and among the suppressed Christian nationalities of the Balkan Peninsula, notably the Greeks and the Serbs. The liberal ideal also—the desire for individual freedom of action, speech and belief, and the demand for the institutions of self-government—had been implanted in every part of Europe by the fierce apostles of the Revolution. These two bodies of ideas, nationalism and liberalism, were to be the most potent creative and disruptive factors in the life of Europe during the nineteenth century; and unless the settlement could give them some satisfaction, or some freedom of development, there could be little hope that it would supply a basis for lasting peace.

¹ See Vol. i. p. 670.
THE RESETTLEMENT OF EUROPE

The Congress of Vienna, which undertook the immense task of reconstructing Europe after the storm, was beyond comparison the most representative assembly which had ever been gathered in European history, the nearest approach to a complete representation of western civilisation. Every European State save the Turkish Empire had its spokesmen; and round the skirts of the Congress hung a crowd of representatives of the many little principalities which had been displaced during the long wars. But in fact the general sessions of the Congress had little or nothing to say in the settlement. All the operative decisions were made in private conclave by the representatives of the four Great Powers which had played the chief part in the overthrow of Napoleon—Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia; and the dominating personalities of the Congress were the Tsar Alexander of Russia, Metternich the Chancellor of Austria, and Castlereagh the Foreign Secretary of Britain.

The Great Powers were not blind to the importance of nationalist and liberal ideas, but they differed sharply in their views of the way in which they should be treated. The Tsar, though himself a despot with a high sense of his own prerogative, had sentimental leanings towards the ideas of the Revolution; and as early as 1804, when the Third Coalition was being formed, he had contended, in a despatch to Pitt, that Europe would never have stable peace until national sentiments were recognised, and until Governments were brought into accord with the needs of the governed. Alexander won the sobriquet of 'the crowned Jacobin'; and in a tepid and wavering way his influence was exercised in favour of a liberal view. On the other hand Metternich, the spokesman of Austria, regarded the nationalist and liberal movements with aversion, as expressions of the revolutionary spirit which had brought so many woes upon Europe. This attitude was natural to the representative of Austria, an empire which included many discordant peoples, and which would be broken into fragments if the nationalist cause should triumph. And because Metternich was resolute and uncompromising, while Alexander's liberalism was only skin-deep, it was the Austrian view which on the whole prevailed. Prussia played the jackal to Russia; her King had vaguely promised a constitution to his people, and vaguely hoped that if Germany were united, Prussia would be the gainer. Britain, as represented by Castlereagh, was not unfavourable to liberalism in moderation: she had, for example, persuaded Sicily to set up a parliamentary
system in 1812. But she desired, more than anything else, settlement and peace; and, distrusting the ambitious projects of Russia and Prussia, gave her support, on the whole, to Austria.

Thus, though the principles of nationality and liberalism had some influence in shaping the settlement, they were in no sense adopted as its guiding principles. On the other hand, the Great Powers did not definitely adopt the dangerous principle of legitimism, or mere restoration. Though they restored many petty princes in Germany and Italy, and re-established the Bourbons in France, Spain and Naples, they disregarded a multitude of legitimist claims, especially in Germany, which emerged from the settlement divided into thirty-nine States, whereas before the Revolution she had been split into more than three hundred.

There were, in truth, no clear guiding principles in the settlement. On many points the Great Powers were tied by agreements which they had made with one another or with other States during the war. Thus, Russia having conquered Finland from Sweden in 1808, and being unwilling to restore it, some compensation had to be offered to Sweden as the price of her participation in the final attack on Napoleon. She was promised Norway, which had been attached to Denmark for more than four centuries; and this bargain was carried out without any consultation of the Norse people, against whom force had to be used before they would submit. This was the worst instance of disregard of national feeling which the settlement displayed; and it is noteworthy that Alexander of Russia, the sentimental liberal, was responsible for it.

It is to the credit of the Great Powers that they showed real moderation in their treatment of defeated France. France was allowed to retain the frontiers of 1792, and thus to preserve Alsace and Lorraine, which she had conquered in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: these provinces were indeed loyal to French in sentiment, though their inhabitants largely spoke German. An indemnity was exacted from France, and armies of occupation were planted on her soil until it was paid; but it was so reasonable in amount that it was paid off within three years, and France quickly took her place again as one of the leading members of the European comity. As a safeguard against any revival of French aggressiveness, what was meant to be a strong Power was set up on her northern frontier. Belgium, which had been
an Austrian province before the Revolution, was annexed to Holland. The Belgian people were not consulted about this arrangement, which lasted only for fifteen years. But at the moment it seemed to be rational and workable: Belgium and Holland had been under a single government in the sixteenth century, and there were close affinities of race and tongue between the Dutch and the Flemings.

Apart from war-time bargainings and the necessity of guarding against danger from France, the ambitions of the four Great Powers, and their mutual jealousies, were the main factors in the shaping of the settlement.

Russia obtained not only Finland but almost the whole of Poland, pledging herself to maintain the distinct national existence of each, and to endow them with liberal institutions. In the case of Poland the pledge was fully honoured for less than ten years; it was finally cancelled in less than half a century (1863). These acquisitions brought Russia into more intimate contact with Europe; throughout the nineteenth century she exercised a formidable influence, far greater than at any earlier period; and her prestige was at its height during the fifty years following the Congress.

Prussia had to yield to Russia most of the territories which she had acquired in the second and third partitions of Poland. But this made her an almost purely German power, and she got very great compensation in Germany—notably the rich Rhineland and Westphalia, where Napoleon had cleared away a litter of tiny principalities. The possession of the Rhineland, which is the heart of the true Germany, indicated Prussia as the future leader of a united German people. Moreover, being now the next neighbour of France, she was henceforward to be the protagonist in the secular rivalry between the French and German peoples. That position Austria had held for three centuries; in effect she resigned it when she gave up Belgium. Henceforward it is Prussia and not Austria which is the watchful rival of France.

Austria had assented to Prussia’s aggrandisement reluctantly, being acutely conscious of the danger that she might lose the hegemony of Germany. Her own acquisitions of territory were small in extent, being confined to Venetia and Lombardy in Italy, and the Adriatic province of Dalmatia. But most of the other principalities of Italy were held by princes who recognised their dependence upon

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 71.
2 See the map, Atlas, Plate 67.
3 See the maps, Atlas, Plates 39 (c) and 40 (a).
Austria; Italy was almost as completely dominated by Austria as during the revolutionary war it had been dominated by France. In Germany Austria made no important territorial gains. But she succeeded (or hoped she had succeeded) in checkmating the ambitions of Prussia, and the dangerous nationalist ardours of the German people, by an ingenious constitutional rearrangement in Germany which was embodied in the treaties, and therefore placed under the guardianship of all the Powers. A Germanic Confederation, including Austria and Prussia and all the lesser States, was established under the permanent presidency of the Austrian Emperor. On the surface this looked like a concession to the German nationalist movement. In reality it was the deadliest blow that movement could have received; for the Confederation guaranteed the absolute independence of all its member-States, and pledged them to combine against any attempt to disturb the system. It was a means of creating unity, but of crystallising disunity and making it permanent.

Thus Austria had put herself in a position to defeat the nationalist aspirations of both Germany and Italy, and had made herself the inevitable foe of nationalists in both countries. In both cases these ingenious, artificial and short-sighted arrangements lasted only for half a century, and in the end they brought upon Austria the greatest humiliations of her history. But in the meanwhile it was to the interest of Austria, more than of any other Power, to render the treaty settlement of Vienna sacred and unalterable; and this made her, during the next generation, the chief supporter of reaction and of resistance to all change.

Britain was the only one of the four Great Powers who made no important territorial acquisitions in Europe. She retained Heligoland, Malta, and the Ionian Islands, which she had occupied during the war; the last-named she was later (1864) to transfer voluntarily to Greece. The kingdom of Hanover returned to its connexion with the British Crown; but this unnatural connexion had no advantage for either side, and it was a fortunate thing for Britain when, on the accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, the Hanoverian Crown passed in the male line to her uncle, the Duke of Cumberland; for if this had not happened Britain must have been involved in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866.

Britain did not even retain all her conquests overseas; she restored to France her West Indian Islands and her

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 72 (c).
West African and Indian trading-posts, without demanding any compensation; she even allowed France to resume fishing-rights off the coast of Newfoundland; she restored their West Indian possessions to Denmark and Holland, and gave back to Holland the rich island of Java, which she had held for five years. She was the only Great Power that gave up any territory held at the close of the war. She kept, indeed, Cape Colony and Ceylon, because of their importance as commanding the ocean route to India; but she paid to Holland a large sum of money for Cape Colony. This was the only instance in which any of the Great Powers paid compensation for any of their acquisitions; and the payment was made by the only Power which had held her own and made conquests throughout the war. It cannot be said that Britain made a greedy use of her complete ascendency on the seas, seeing that there was no power on earth which could have prevented her from keeping all she had won, had she chosen to do so; and her statesmen deserve credit for moderation in peace as well as for tenacity in war. But Britain might well be content. With the unchallenged dominion of the seas, with Canada, Australia and South Africa, with the splendid empire of India, with supremacy in the West Indies, and with the possession of trading-posts scattered about the world, she was the centre of an extra-European empire of unexampled magnitude and variety, in comparison with which the acquisitions of the European allies seemed paltry and insignificant.

Britain's prestige was indeed at its height. She alone had never bent the knee to France during twenty-two years of war; she alone had never suffered either conquest or revolution. Her institutions were at once the most stable and the most free that existed in the Old World, and they were regarded with as much admiring envy as her inexhaustible wealth and her unapproachable supremacy in industry and trade. She was unquestionably the greatest Power in the world. Her only rival was Russia; and there could not be a more pungent contrast that that between the huge continuous landlocked empire which stretched from Central Europe to the Pacific, and the ocean commonwealth which girdled the globe—between the most unlimited of despotisms and the mother of free institutions. This contrast was to be expressed in a sharp rivalry which continued throughout the nineteenth century.

On the remaining aspects of the territorial settlement of 1815 we need not dwell. The most noteworthy fact was
that no attempt was made to deal with the decrepit empire of Turkey, which seemed to be on the verge of dissolution. The Powers did not dare to open this question, lest it should awaken the mutual jealousies of Austria and Russia, both of whom hoped to enter into the Turkish inheritance; and the Eastern Question remained unsolved, to vex Europe for a century to come. It was thus anything but a clear, stable or logical territorial settlement which emerged from the discussions of Vienna. It gave little promise of that permanent peace of which Europe was dreaming: the history of the next sixty years was to be mainly filled with the violent undoing of nearly all the arrangements so painfully and elaborately made by the little-great men of Vienna.

§ 2. The League of Peace and its Breakdown.

Yet it was upon this treacherous foundation that the Powers hoped and attempted to rear a structure which should ensure the permanent maintenance of peace. And it was a quite sincere attempt: they genuinely desired to substitute the reign of Law for that of Force. Their method was twofold. In the first place they obtained from every State a solemn pledge to maintain the treaty settlement of Vienna inviolate. If that pledge were observed, the danger of war would be immensely reduced. For the enforcement of this pledge, the statesmen of 1815 trusted to common action on the part of the five Great Powers. Acting together, they could forbid any breach of the peace by other States; and their mutual watchfulness could, it was thought, be trusted to preserve the Balance of Power among the Great Five themselves. But the drawback of this device was that it would stereotype the Vienna arrangements; and as time went on, the progressive elements in Europe more and more recognised that the Vienna arrangements must be altered. Hence the League of Peace came to be regarded as an obstacle in the way of progress, an engine of tyranny and reaction; and this was its ruin. In the second place the Great Powers arranged to hold periodic conferences for the settlement of vexed questions which might lead to war. This scheme of conferences for the prevention of war, instead of merely for the determination of its results, represented a real advance. But it had two defects. The Conferences were limited to the Great Powers, three of which were despotic monarchies; and, with the memory of the Revolution ever present in their
minds, these Powers were tempted to regard every liberal or national movement in every country as a danger to peace, and to use their overwhelming strength to suppress it. This turned the League of Peace into what the British statesman, Canning, called 'a league of despots to bind Europe in chains.' For these reasons the League of Peace soon broke down, and it was necessary for the progress of civilisation that it should break down. But the effort was not wholly wasted. From it survived what came to be known as the Concert of Europe—the habit of discussion among the representatives of the Great Powers to find the means of averting dangers to peace. The Concert of Europe, though an imperfect instrument, continued to work during the next hundred years, and gave to Europe two longer periods of peace than she had ever known before.

Meanwhile the sentimental Tsar, in the enthusiasm of the time, had invited the princes of Europe to join a 'Holy Alliance' whose members were to pledge themselves to observe 'the sacred principles of the Christian religion' in their relations with one another and with their subjects. With the exception of Britain, who did not wish to endorse a vague undertaking that might mean anything or nothing, all the sovereigns accepted the Tsar's invitation. The 'Holy Alliance' was a mere rhetorical flourish, and never had, or could have, any practical results; it was an expression of the generous emotions with which many besides the Tsar looked forward to an era of peace and just dealing. But its name came to be applied, in bitter irony, to the very different and much more practical organisation of the Great Powers for the rigid maintenance of the treaty settlement.

In 1818, at Aix-la-Chapelle, the first of the projected series of conferences was held; and France, having paid her indemnity, was formally readmitted to the comity of nations, and took her place among the Great Powers. The occasion was felt to mark the triumph of the great System of Peace; and with a florid magniloquence that reads strangely in a formal diplomatic document, it was officially proclaimed to the world that 'the era of permanent peace' had begun. Alas! for the hopes of men. In this very conference the first rift in the lute had appeared. On behalf of Britain, Castlereagh had taken up the position that the co-operation of the Powers must be limited to the maintenance of the treaty, and that there must be no interference in the internal affairs of any State. Metternich had taken the opposite view, that it might be the duty of the Powers to interfere
for the purpose of dealing with a state of things which might endanger peace. The issue had been made plain between the liberal doctrine of non-intervention, which was supported by Britain, and the interventionist doctrine which was to lead to much mischief in the coming years. And Metternich had won a real victory: he had obtained the support of Russia and Prussia, and had laid the foundations of a combination between the three Eastern despotisms which was to be a dominating fact in European politics throughout the period covered by this Book. In 1819 unrest in Germany—mainly among university students—gave him the pretext for introducing in that country a system of rigid repression under the authority of the Germanic Confederation, and at the same time confirmed his ascendancy over Russia and Austria. The Tsar had by this time shed his sentimental liberalism, and henceforth the three Eastern monarchies acted in close harmony. The League of Peace was passing into a League of Despots.

In 1820 and 1821 events took place which made the issue yet clearer. A series of futile revolutions broke out, almost simultaneously, in Spain, Portugal, Southern and Northern Italy; and the Greeks rose in rebellion against their Turkish oppressors. Three conferences, at Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821), and Verona (1822), were held to discuss what should be the attitude of the Powers on these questions. The three Eastern monarchies all supported intervention to crush the revolutions in Italy and Spain. Britain, at first with some support from France, protested against intervention, but hesitated to go so far as to withdraw from co-operation with the other Powers. Austria stamped out the revolutions in Italy with the greatest ease; and in 1823 France agreed to act as the mandatory of the Powers, and sent an army into Spain to crush revolution there.

Meanwhile a ministerial change of great importance had taken place in Britain. Castlereagh died in 1822; and his place as Foreign Secretary was taken by his old rival Canning, who, while accepting the main lines of Castlereagh's policy, did not share his reluctance to break with the European Powers. Canning openly denounced the action of the Powers, and in effect withdrew from co-operation with them. His attitude won for Britain the gratitude of all continental liberals, and made her appear the sole bulwark of liberty in a continent given over to despotism and reaction. And soon an opportunity for more vigorous action offered itself. The Spanish-American colonies were in revolt
against the misgovernment of the mother-country. Having crushed the revolution in Spain, the Eastern Powers next conceived the idea of completing their task by sending a fleet and an army to South America to bring the colonists back to obedience. But this was a question upon which Britain could speak the decisive word. She could not attempt to fight all the Powers on European soil. But they could not reach South America if the British fleet forbade: and Canning gave a very direct negative to the project. A little later he recognised the South American republics as independent States, 'calling a new world into existence to redress the balance of the old.' The tyranny of the Holy Alliance, like the tyranny of Napoleon, stopped at high-water mark; and the British navy secured the freedom of the South American republics.

Before he recognised the independence of the Spanish colonies, Canning had suggested, through the American envoy in London, that the United States should publicly adopt a similar attitude. The result was that in December 1823 President Monroe sent a message to Congress—the origin of the famous Monroe Doctrine—in which he announced that the United States would resist any attempt at intervention in South America by the European Powers. Thus the Monroe Doctrine was in its origin a declaration of support for British policy; though at the same time it was, and was meant to be, a warning to Britain, as well as to the other Powers, not to try to extend her power in the New World. It is significant that Jefferson (who had been hostile to Britain during the revolutionary war) urged at this juncture that the United States and Britain should 'sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing,' he added, 'could tend more to knit our affection than to be fighting once more side by side in the same cause.' The reactionary policy of Metternich had not only failed as soon as it reached the freedom-giving seas, it had brought about the beginning of a reconciliation between the two great branches of the English-speaking peoples.

Soon another difficulty arose to strain the cohesion of Metternich's reactionary combination. The Greek revolt had since 1821 received widespread sympathy in Western Europe. Volunteers from Britain and France had flocked to help the insurgents; and among them was the romantic figure of Lord Byron, the only English poet who has ever won great contemporary fame in Europe; his death at Mesolonghi, in the cause of Greek freedom, was worth an
army to the Greeks. And their gallant fight on sea and land during the first four years of the rising had aroused a great enthusiasm, and had everywhere stimulated nationalist feeling. This was highly alarming to Metternich; and even more perturbing was the fact that popular feeling in Russia was passionately in favour of intervention in favour of the Greeks. There was no reason why Russia should not intervene, since the Turkish Empire was not covered by the Treaty of Vienna. But a successful attack by Russia upon Turkey was the last thing which Metternich wished to see; and his influence with the Tsar was now so great that he succeeded in persuading him to stand aloof, on the ground that the Greek revolt was a revolutionary resistance to constituted authority. The Greeks were left to themselves; and it was only the disorganisation of the Turkish army which enabled them to hold their own until 1825, with the aid of volunteers from the West.

In 1825, however, two things happened which changed the situation. The Sultan brought himself to ask aid from his nominal vassal, Mehemet Ali of Egypt; and an Egyptian fleet and army under Mehemet's son Ibrahim attacked the Greeks with such success that they seemed likely to be not merely defeated but exterminated. The second event of 1825 was that Alexander of Russia died; and his successor, Nicholas I., though a sterner reactionary than his brother, was not the man to allow his policy to be dictated by Metternich. In 1826 he made an agreement with Britain and France, whereby the three Powers undertook to compel the Sultan to grant autonomy to the Greeks. In 1827 a joint fleet, sent to enforce these demands under the British admiral, Codrington, destroyed the Egyptian fleet at Navarino; and this battle secured the freedom of Greece. In 1828 a British fleet and a French army cleared the Morea, while a Russian army advanced through the Balkans, and the Sultan was compelled to yield. The independence of Greece—the first of the free nation-States to which the nineteenth century was to give birth—was established by the Convention of London (1829) under the joint protection of Britain, France, and Russia.

Thus the union of the Great Powers had broken down. And the cleavage which had now appeared among them took place just in time to give a chance of success to the revolutions of 1830. These revolutions marked the first serious breach in the Vienna settlement. They were also the beginning of a very clearly marked period, in British
as well as in European history; and we must postpone consideration of them to a later chapter.

The years from 1815 to 1830, whose European events we have surveyed, were in British politics, as we shall see, years of reaction. But the part which Britain played in foreign affairs, where she appeared as the only bulwark against a threatened tyranny, suggests—what is indeed the truth—that the post-war reaction in Britain was far less harsh than in Europe.

[Grant and Temperley, Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries; Hazen, Europe since 1815; Seignobos, Political History of Contemporary Europe; Fyffe, History of Modern Europe; Alison Phillips, Modern Europe and The Confederation of Europe; Webster, Congress of Vienna; Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe 1814-1878; Bourgeois, Manuel Historique de Politique Étrangère; Memoirs of Metternich (Eng. trans.); Stewart, Memoirs of Castlereagh; Marriott, Castlereagh; Brodrick and Fotheringham, Political History of England 1801-1837; Finlay, History of Greece; Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy; R. W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe: British Foreign Policy 1789-1914; Temperley and Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy 1792-1902; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh (1812-15) and Foreign Policy of Castlereagh (1815-22); Temperley, Foreign Policy of Canning; Oakes and Mowat, Great European Treaties of the 19th Century; E. Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty; G. P. Gooch, Early Correspondence of Lord John Russell; E. L. Woodward, Age of Reform 1815-70 (Oxford History of England).]
CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL PROBLEM IN BRITAIN AND THE FERMENT OF IDEAS

§ 1. Social Disorganization.

On a superficial view, by the showing of the kind of statistics by which the strength of a nation is usually measured, Britain emerged from the long war incomparably stronger and richer than she had ever been before, in spite of the vast public debt with which she was burdened. Her empire girdled the globe. Her ships carried the trade of half the world. She had a monopoly of the new methods of mechanical production, by means of which wealth could be produced at a pace and on a scale hitherto unparalleled. Yet the generation following the war saw such distress and suffering in Britain as she had never known in the course of modern history. This period of acute suffering was to have a profound effect upon the history of the British Commonwealth. It nearly brought about a violent revolution. It necessitated a far-reaching social and political reconstruction, wherein the British peoples, ahead of the rest of the world, had to feel their way blindly towards a new order appropriate to the new economic foundations upon which civilised society was henceforward to rest: the process has been going on, slowly and painfully, ever since. And meanwhile the rapid increase of population was to bring about an immense movement of emigration, which mainly accounted for the swift growth of the new dominions overseas.

Since 1793 the population of Britain had grown at an unprecedented rate. In 1815 the United Kingdom contained about 19,000,000 inhabitants—about 11,000,000 in England and Wales, about 2,000,000 in Scotland and about 6,000,000 in Ireland. This represented an increase of about 5,000,000, or more than 35 per cent., since 1793; the corresponding increase in France was less than 12 per cent. Many students regarded the increase as abnormal and
dangerous. Malthus, in his famous *Essay on Population* (published in 1798, when the problem of the food-supply was causing great perplexity), had argued that the growth of population must always press closely on the means of subsistence; and this was held to account for the widespread and acute poverty which was one of the most distressing features of the time.

But this conclusion was not justified by the facts. Scientific agriculture, industrial machinery, the use of steam-power, the development of British resources in coal and iron, and the expansion of oversea trade, had increased the power of the British people to produce wealth far more rapidly than their numbers had grown. It might have been expected, therefore, that material well-being would have been more widely diffused than ever. Yet the reverse was the case. Never in the course of modern history had there been such widespread distress in the British Islands as there was during the last years of the war and the generation which followed it. It is plain, therefore, that the new wealth had not been diffused over the community as a whole. It had, in fact, mainly gone to enrich two relatively small classes, the landowners on the one hand, the capitalist organisers of industry and trade on the other.

The landowners had seen their rent-rolls grow with every expansion of the area brought under cultivation, and with every rise in the price of corn. They had also taken tribute of the new industries, drawing royalties on every ton of coal extracted from their land, and receiving high prices for the ground on which the factories and the cramped and ugly towns of the industrial areas were built. They were thus immensely richer than they had been half a century before. But a still greater volume of new wealth went to the capitalist organisers of the new industry—a numerous body of men, mostly risen from the ranks, and constantly recruited thence. Relatively little of their wealth was spent on personal ostentation or public munificence. A very high proportion of it was saved, and used as capital; and the rapid development of the new industrial system, and the remarkable improvements in transport, which took place during the next generation, were only rendered possible by this wholesale creation of capital. But this meant that a growing economic power was passing into the hands of those who owned this huge fund of capital. Between them, landowners and industrial capitalists controlled most of the means whereby the nation earned its livelihood.
A substantial proportion of the new wealth came also to
the large and growing middle-class, the farmers, the pro-
fessional men, the merchants, shopkeepers and other
distributive agents, the managers and other administrative
officers of industry. This was perhaps the healthiest
element in the nation. From it sprang most of the creative
minds in whom lay the hope of the future—poets, thinkers,
scientific investigators, inventors; and from it the control-
ling classes were steadily recruited.

There was no sharp cleavage between the middle-class
and the controlling classes; but a very definite cleavage
was opening between both and the labouring mass who
formed the great majority of the nation. For the workers
in town and country alike were progressively being cut off,
as the economic change advanced, from that direct and
personal concern in the methods and results of their work
which their fathers had enjoyed. They were becoming a
‘proletariat,’ earning their livelihood by the sale of their
labour, and having no interest in its products. Most of
them were condemned to live in unwholesome and degrading
surroundings; for the farm labourer’s cottage was often an
overcrowded hovel which it was nobody’s business to keep
in repair, while the mean streets of the ugly new industrial
towns had generally been built without supervision, often
back to back, lacking the most rudimentary care for
sanitation, and without access even to a supply of pure
water: the conditions in which the rising generation was
being bred did not promise to produce a virile and self-
respecting population. Moreover, in all industries the
hours of labour were terribly long: not only the men, but
their wives and even their little children, were subject to
unending drudgery. Amid all the horrors of this black
time the worst were the sufferings of children—underclad
children working in the fields in all weathers, and often
herded together at night in bare barns; children labouring
like beasts of burden underground in the mines; children
clambering through the suffocating soot to clean rich men’s
chimneys; children torn in thousands from their parents,
at eight and even five years old, to labour for fourteen or
fifteen hours a day in cotton factories, without rest, without
tendance, and without hope.

Yet with all this unending toil, and in spite of the wretched
conditions of life which they had to endure, multitudes
could not earn enough to keep the breath in their bodies.
It is the most poignant commentary on the condition of
Britain that (according to the state of trade) from one-tenth to one-fourth of the population of England and Wales were paupers, drawing allowances from the poor-rates to supplement their wages, because these were insufficient to maintain life. What was worst of all, by the receipt of poor-relief men were forced to submit themselves and their families to a sort of slavery to the poor-law authorities, who could hire them out in gangs to work on what terms they chose, or arbitrarily take the children from their wretched homes to be banished to the distant factory towns, with no prospect of ever seeing their parents again. British liberty had become a very unreal thing for those who were subjected to such conditions.

§ 2. The Condemnation of the Ruling Class.

To find remedies for these evils was the heaviest obligation which rested upon the leaders of the British community during the following generations. But remedies could only be discovered when the causes of the evil were understood; and nobody had yet obtained any clear understanding of them.

It was natural that those who suffered, and those who burned with indignation at their sufferings, should lay all the blame upon the wickedness and selfishness of the dominant classes, who seemed to profit by the miseries of the mass; and this easy explanation has been constantly repeated. But even if it were true, it is unhelpful. To indict a whole class is as foolish as to indict a whole nation, since both will consist of men and women of average virtue; and when a class becomes exceptionally oppressive, the important thing is to understand what has made it so. In truth the evils from which British society was suffering were due to causes beyond the control of any governing class. The governing class could not be blamed for the economic transformation, which was inevitable. It was the adoption of large-scale production in both agriculture and industry which was crushing out the small men, and turning them into ‘proletarians’; and the introduction of large-scale production was in itself a real and solid advance. Again, the governing class cannot fairly be blamed for the failure of the State to intervene for the protection of those who suffered by the change; for this was primarily due to the reigning economic doctrine which condemned all State interference with the conduct of industry, except in regard
to foreign trade. The predominance of this doctrine of laissez faire has frequently been attributed to the influence of Adam Smith and the economists of his school, and it has been assumed that its ascendancy was greatest in the middle of the nineteenth century. But this is a mistaken view. Throughout the eighteenth century this theory had held the field; and the old laws whereby Elizabeth and the Stewarts had tried to regulate wages, prices and the conditions of labour had fallen into desuetude. Laissez faire was at its height during the half-century from 1780 to 1830, after which it began to be qualified by factory legislation and in other ways. The governing class cannot fairly be condemned for having failed to regulate a vast economic change which was beyond their comprehension, and with which the most enlightened opinion of the time forbade them to meddle.

Least of all can they fairly be blamed for the bitter aggravation of social distress which resulted from the French Revolution and the long wars that it caused. These wars had seriously restricted the outlet for the new manufactures, and had therefore produced unemployment, and prevented the natural rise of wages; they had restricted the import of food-stuffs, and made it necessary to stimulate home-production to the maximum extent, with the result that the agrarian revolution was accelerated, and food-prices were raised out of proportion to wages; they had brought about a stoppage of cash payments (1797-1821) and a consequent depreciation in the purchasing power of paper-money, to such an extent that a labourer with 9s. a week was only able to purchase 7s. 6d. worth of goods. Finally, the fear of revolutionary conspiracy (perhaps unreasonable, but not unnatural) had led to the prohibition of combinations among work-people, which might have modified the sufferings of the time. In every way the revolution and the war had intensified the distress of the labouring classes, and widened the gulf between them and the controlling classes.

But all the more because of this widening gulf, it was natural that the governing class should be held responsible for the intolerable ills under which the people were groaning. The question of responsibility had, on the whole, been little discussed during the war: perhaps the war was to blame, or Napoleon, or his Continental System. But when these possible explanations had been removed—when the war was over and things became worse instead of better—other scapegoats had to be found; and loyalty to the whole
system of government, and to the whole social order, began to be undermined as it never had been undermined during the war.

And indeed there were other grounds of complaint for which the ruling class could far more reasonably be held responsible than for the unhealthy economic condition of the country, and which justified the demand for a change of system. All political power rested with the limited class of landowners, now markedly out of touch with the feelings and needs of the bulk of the nation. They held their power by means of a grossly unrepresentative electoral system, and used it to endow themselves and their families with pensions and offices. The whole system of society seemed to be organised for their advantage. Their sons, brothers, and protégés held the richest livings in the Church, often without performing the duties of their offices; the prizes of the law fell to them also. The whole legal system seemed to exist to buttress the power of this small, rich, ascendant class, and to keep the mass of the nation in subjection. Thus the Corn Laws were regarded as a device for enriching landlords by raising the price of poor men’s bread; and though this complaint had no force in regard to the Corn Laws of the war period, which had not increased the price of bread, it had greater validity in regard to the Corn Law of 1815, which was passed in order that agriculture might not be ruined by the sudden fall of prices after the war. The Game Laws, again, seemed to show that the lives and limbs of poor men mattered nothing in comparison with the pleasures of the rich. Year by year these laws were made more ferocious, because starving men were seeking food in rich men’s coverts, and the rich men saw in this the evidence of a revolutionary spirit. Thus an Act of 1816, passed through Parliament without a word of comment, provided the penalty of transportation for seven years for being found at night in possession of any contrivance for trapping rabbits. And this was only of a piece with the hideous ferocity of the penal code, to which new barbarities were constantly added. The death sentence was ordained for no less than two hundred offences, such as sheepstealing, or stealing linen from a bleaching-ground. These futile ferocities defeated themselves, because juries refused to convict when conviction would lead to such disproportionate penalties. Yet Parliament went on inventing new ferocities, and refused to listen to the protests of Romilly and Mackintosh, who strove to mitigate the cruelties of the
code; because the governing class believed, as it had believed ever since 1792, that there was a constant danger of violent revolution, which only terrorism could hold in check.

Such an attitude, however, challenged the very danger which it feared. What but hatred could be aroused by such a system? By making and tolerating such laws the governing class made it appear reasonable to regard them as the source of all the nation's ills. To sweep them away, by violence if need be, seemed to a growing number of men the first step towards a better order. This is the sort of temper which produces destructive upheavals; and it was widely prevalent in Britain in the years following the Great War. 'My views of the state of England,' wrote Earl Grey in 1819, 'are more and more gloomy. Everything is tending, and has for some time been tending, to a complete separation between the higher and lower orders of Society—a state of things which can only end in the destruction of liberty, or in a convulsion which may too probably produce the same result.'

§ 3. Schools of Political Thought.

These miseries and protests challenged thought, and led to a great deal of fruitful if bewildered speculation about the problems of national reconstruction. The literature of the period was deeply influenced by this ferment of thought; it exercised the minds of politicians and publicists of every school; and out of it sprang several distinct currents of political and social theory.

In the dominant landowning class the hidebound Toryism of the revolutionary age still held the upper hand, and for seven years after the peace dictated national policy. Obstinate resistance to all change, a deep distrust of all popular movements, and a readiness to resort to forcible repression on the least provocation, formed the barren creed of this school. But some of the younger Tories, notably Canning, Huskisson and Peel, were growing out of this stagnant reactionism. Though they were averse from any large change, they recognised the existence of grave abuses, held that the existing system could only justify itself by removing them, and had given some study to modern economic and political theories. The Whigs, who included many of the more open-minded members of the governing class, were timid and bewildered; but they were genuinely opposed to mere blind repression, and there
was a genuinely liberal wing amongst them, ready for substantial changes.

The noisiest school of reformers consisted of the Radicals. Almost unrepresented in Parliament, where their chief representative was the superficial and self-advertising Sir Francis Burdett, Radicalism was a strong and growing force in the country. The Radicals advocated manhood suffrage and annual Parliaments as a sure remedy for every ill; but they had no constructive social programme, no idea of the use they would make of political power if they got it, no solidly based knowledge of the complex social organism whose diseases had to be dealt with. Their creed was as barren as the Toryism of Lord Eldon; and their victory would have brought mere chaos. The most effective of the Radical leaders was William Cobbett, a journalist of genius and a very typical Englishman. Full of prejudices and whimsies, Cobbett was a lover of justice and a hater of tyrannies and shams; but he was incapable of constructive thought. He loved beef and beer and a good horse and the English countryside; he loathed factories and towns and tea-drinkers and army-contractors; and he had become a Radical because he believed that borough-mongers and holders of national debt were driving his beloved England to the dogs. In 1816 he suddenly reduced the price of his Political Register to twopence; and as he could write English with a masculine vigour and lucidity which never failed to hold the attention of the reader, he quickly obtained a portentous influence, especially among the factory-workers of the North, who were stirred into political activity by his full-blooded denunciations. With him may be linked the fluent mob-orator Hunt, who moved about the country stirring up anger and enthusiasm; and the veteran Major Cartwright, salt of the earth and most consummate of bores, who devoted himself to founding Hampden Clubs, which were regarded by the governing class as hotbeds of revolutionary frenzy.

There was little that was constructive in all this Radical tub-thumping; but it gave a vent to the dissatisfactions of the time, and stimulated solider minds to remedial thinking. There were certain small groups of intellectuals at work, whose thought was to exercise a profound influence during the course of the next generation, though their writings had, of course, no such vogue as Cobbett's. This was the age of the Classical Economists. Malthus, Ricardo, M'Culloch and

1 There is a good short life of Cobbett by E. I. Carlile.
others were developing the doctrine of Adam Smith, turning Political Economy into the 'dismal science' of Economics, and laying down the stony tables of a body of economic law which claimed almost the validity of the law of gravitation. We cannot pause to analyse their contributions to economic thought, some of which, such as Ricardo's law of rent, were of permanent value. Their work was mainly analytic; but in effect they preached a doctrine of reconstruction, the doctrine that the welfare of the community is best served when the maximum degree of freedom is allowed to individual energy and initiative, and when every man is made to feel his personal responsibility for his own well-being.

Closely linked with the Economists were the group of social and legal reformers who looked to Jeremy Bentham as their leader, and whose theories led towards very much the same kind of conclusions as those of the Economists. In 1815 Bentham was a precise, methodical, vain old bachelor of sixty-seven, very much of a recluse, who had devoted his life to the study of law, and of the principles upon which law could be made to serve what he defined as the supreme end of society, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number.' This formula, according to the Benthamite creed, supplied an infallible test of the validity of all laws and institutions; and the true path of reform could be marked out with almost mathematical certainty by a sort of calculus of pains and pleasures based on tables drawn up by the prophet Jeremy. A corollary from Bentham's main doctrine was even more important than the main doctrine itself. It was that 'every man is the best judge of his own happiness'; from this plausible but highly disputable assertion it seemed to follow that the State ought not to dictate how the happiness of its citizens should be attained, and that, in regard to those functions which the State necessarily undertook, every man should be consulted, since his happiness was involved. This was, in truth, the doctrine of individualist democracy, based not on abstract rights, but on utility.

More important, however, than the Benthamite doctrines were the methods of minute and painstaking study which the Benthamites applied to the problems with which they dealt. They may almost be described as the founders of scientific social and political investigation; and their work and example in this sphere were to be of immense value in the vast labours of reconstruction which lay ahead. The professed Benthamites were always few in number, and they
had, and deserved, the reputation of being arid and pedantic. But they wielded, thanks to their industry and their solid knowledge, an influence out of all proportion to their number or their public fame. Most of the detailed administrative reform of the next generation was largely due to them. The practice of holding detailed and systematic inquiries as a preliminary to legislation, which was so marked a feature of the next era, was an application of Benthamite methods; and in some of the most important of these inquiries the leading part was played by disciples of Bentham, such as Francis Place and Edwin Chadwick, who were in their element in such work.

Alongside of the Economists and the Benthamites, whose speculations led to individualist conclusions, other writers were at work who saw no hope of improvement save in the co-operative action of the community. Their conclusions were as yet vague, conflicting, and uncertain; they dealt with visions of a happier order rather than with the hard facts of the moment; but just for that reason, though they had little influence upon the directing classes, they aroused an enthusiastic interest among the working classes. They were the founders of the school of Socialist thought in Britain.

One among them, a Newcastle workman named Thomas Spence, had been preaching land nationalisation as the only path to national well-being ever since 1775. In the ferment of the years following 1815 his theories obtained a sudden vogue; and a mushroom growth of Spencean Societies aroused acute alarm among the governing class of landowners. But the greatest of these pioneers of Socialist thought was Robert Owen, a successful cotton manufacturer, who, not being content to make wealth unless he could also make happiness for his workpeople, had created a model factory and village at New Lanark in Scotland, which became a place of pilgrimage for visitors from all parts of Europe. In 1815, moved by the spectacle of wretchedness which Britain presented, he began to propound remedies; and his opinions developed so rapidly that by 1817 he had become definitely a Socialist, though the word was not coined until some years later. He convinced himself that a system which stimulated each individual to aim at the maximum profit for himself would never lead to a just distribution of the wealth produced, or render possible the increased prosperity for all men which the great mechanical inventions ought to have brought about; and he concluded that Government
ought to undertake both the production and the distribution of wealth. How this was to be done, he never worked out with any definiteness, for he was not a clear or systematic thinker. His thought had little direct influence upon the actual constructive work that was soon to begin. But it stirred the thinking members of the working classes.

After Owen a succession of writers, some of them Owen's superiors in clearness and trenchancy, followed along his track; and the work of such men as William Thompson, Thomas Hodgskin, and Piercy Ravenstone contained within it the germs of most later Socialist teaching: it has even been held that all the main doctrines of Karl Marx are to be found in these early British Socialists. Hodgskin, formerly a naval lieutenant, notably broke away from the generous tolerance which Owen had displayed, and preached class-war for the overthrow of the existing social order.

The first years of peace were thus a time when new ideas on political and social problems were very actively fermenting in Britain. From all sides the old order was threatened; the Economists and the Benthamites, equally with the Radicals and the Socialists, were demanding the overthrow of the landowning oligarchy; and it is not surprising, in face of all these new doctrines, and of widespread unrest, that the dominant classes should feel that the very foundations of society were threatened.

§ 4. Literature and the Social Problem.

The decade which followed Waterloo was not only a time of active political thought, it was one of the supreme ages of English literature. Wordsworth and Coleridge were still in their prime. Scott had just begun (1814) the great series of Waverley Novels, the richest body of imaginative prose that has ever come from a single brain. Jane Austen's delicately ironical studies of English rural life were being published. Lamb, De Quincey, Landor, and Hazlitt were adding to the riches of English prose. And, greatest glory of the time, this decade saw the flowering of the genius of three young poets, Keats, Shelley, and Byron. Scarcely even the Elizabethan age can present so dazzling a galaxy of great names.

But in one respect this age presents a marked contrast to the Elizabethan age. With two exceptions all its great writers were deeply preoccupied with the problems of political and social organisation. Alone among the poets,
Keats could dwell in visions of beauty undisturbed by the turmoil of political controversy; and no reader of Jane Austen would suspect that the placid society she described was on the verge of revolution. But the work of all the rest was deeply coloured by the hopes and fears, the compassion or the indignation, inspired by the problems of the time. There never was a great age of literature more saturated with thoughts and dreams about the common weal and the common woe.

Most significant was the contrast between the older writers and the younger. The young men, who had no memory of the ardent hopes and bitter disillusionment of the French Revolution, were inspired by the spirit of revolt. Byron and Shelley—both themselves born of the governing class—were apostles of revolution. They flouted not merely the social injustices but the normal conventions of their time, and expatriated themselves from a land whose evils seemed to them intolerable. Byron wrote with bitter scorn of the ruling class:—

For what were all these country patriots born?  
To hunt, and vote, and raise the price of corn!

Shelley's protest went deeper, and struck at the whole social order:—

Men of England, wherefore plough  
For the lords who lay you low?  
Wherefore weave with toil and care  
The rich robes your tyrants wear? ...  
Rise like lions after slumber  
In unvanquishable number!  
Shake your chains to earth, like dew!  
Ye are many, they are few!

This was the very temper of blind revolutionary fury, such as filled many men in the England of 1819. It was fine rhetoric; but it gave little guidance as to the mode in which the unvanquishable lions were to secure either freedom or happiness when they had got rid of their chains, and devoured their keepers.

The older writers, who remembered the Reign of Terror and the tyranny of Napoleon, were more conscious of the futility of blind revolution; but they were not for that reason less conscious of the evil plight into which their country had fallen. Coleridge bemoaned 'a population mechanismed into engines for the manufactory of new rich men; yea, the machinery of the wealth of the nation made
up of the wretchedness, disease and depravity of those who should constitute the strength of the nation.' Southey denounced competition as the reason why 'the poverty of one part of the nation seems to increase in the same ratio as the riches of another part.' 'There is no stability anywhere,' he lamented; 'a nation on the move from village to town, from town to newer countries.' Coleridge and Southey were Tories. They longed for stability, as a condition of social health, and had no patience with the frothy outcries of the Radicals. But they were far indeed from the Toryism of the Eldonian school. Coleridge was to be the prophet of a reaction against the arid dogmas of the Economists and the Benthamites; and two schools of thought which counted for a good deal in the next generation, the Christian Socialists and the Oxford neo-Catholics, traced a part of their inspiration to Coleridge's teaching.

Scott represented another type of Toryism. Lamenting the unrest of his time, he took refuge in the past, and made his generation feel the charm of ages which men had been content to dismiss as dark and unprogressive: the beauty of loyalty, of faith, of stability, of content even amid poverty. He thus helped to destroy the self-complacency of the Age of Reason, and led men to ask themselves whether, after all, they had been so much more successful than their ancestors in making life a worthy and noble thing. This was part of a healthy challenge and criticism of the new order which might help to better it.

If Britain was restless and unhappy in these years, her intellect and her imagination were alive. It was not only in the machinery of wealth-production that she was rich, but in the nobler stuff of ideas. And this gave hope that she would find her way out of the morass into which she had been plunged by the coincidence of a tremendous social transformation with a world-shaking war.

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CHAPTER III

THE YEARS OF REACTION AND THE FIRST MOVEMENTS OF REFORM

(A.D. 1815-1830)

§ 1. Unintelligent Reaction, 1815-1822.

The seven years which followed Waterloo were a gloomy and unhappy time, which gave no promise of the reconstruction that Britain sorely needed. They were all the more gloomy because men had expected that prosperity would return with peace, and were proportionately disappointed when things became worse instead of better. Merchants had accumulated stocks, in expectation of a large demand from Europe; but Europe was too impoverished to buy. At the same time the conclusion of peace brought to an end the large war-orders of the British and Allied Governments. Factories had to be closed down; while disbanded soldiers and sailors had to be provided for. Wages fell; and the labouring class, already existing on the margin of subsistence, was thrown into grave distress. Poor relief was their only refuge, and the ruinous allowance-system was more and more extended, while the rates rose by leaps and bounds. There were frequent food-riots, and rick-burnings, and attacks on machinery; indeed, the prevailing misery was so great that the surprising thing is, not that disorders took place, but that they did not take place on a wider scale. Even agriculture suffered. The price of corn suddenly fell 40 per cent., and many farmers, who had made their calculations on the basis of war prices, were ruined.

No Government, however enlightened, could have found immediate and effectual remedies for this state of things. But the reactionary Tory Government of 1815 made no attempt even to alleviate any part of the distress save the sufferings of farmers and landowners, for whose benefit it obtained from Parliament a new Corn Law forbidding the importation of corn when the home price was below 80s. a
quarter. But this appeared, to the mass of starving workpeople, a heartless aggravation of their sufferings: cheaper bread was the one bright spot in the gloom, and even this was to be taken from them. Encouraged by the prevailing distress, Radical agitation became feverishly active. Cobbett reduced the price of his paper; Orator Hunt addressed great mass meetings; Major Cartwright found many recruits for his Hampden Clubs; and Spencean Societies sprang into being to advocate Spence’s panacea of land nationalisation. In the eyes of good Tories, hag-ridden by the nightmare of revolution, all this ferment seemed to prove that there was a systematic, nation-wide conspiracy for the overthrow of the British constitution. Government interpreted every cry of distress as a threat of violent revolution; and instead of taking any measure for the alleviation of distress, they persuaded themselves that they had to defend their country against anarchy, and launched a campaign of repression which almost gave reality to the imaginary peril they feared. For the peril was imaginary. The deepest impression which remains after any close study of the period is a sense of the stolid patience of the British people under grave sufferings, and their steadfast avoidance, except in very rare instances, of any resort to violence.

Popular opinion laid the blame for the policy of Government mainly upon three ministers, Eldon, Castlereagh, and Sidmouth, and no British ministers have in modern times been the objects of such intense detestation as these three. Yet they were neither malignant nor cruel; they were only unimaginative and blinded by preconceived prejudices. The ultimate result of their policy was to bring about a great change in the sentiments of large sections of the nation which had at first shared their fears of revolution, and to convince the sober middle classes of the necessity for large political changes.

It was Sidmouth, as Home Secretary, who was directly responsible for the repressive system; and it was the methods which he adopted that turned public feeling against Government. For Sidmouth depended for his information mainly upon paid spies and informers, who were often tempted to fabricate evidence wherewith to earn their pay. Evidence of the existence of a revolutionary conspiracy such as would stand investigation was conspicuously lacking.

Thus in 1816 there was a riot after a Radical meeting in Spa Fields, and a London jury was asked to believe, on the
unsupported evidence of an informer, that the leaders of the riot had intended to seize the Tower of London and were guilty of high treason. It contumaciously refused to convict. Yet on the strength of this episode, Habeas Corpus was suspended. Again, in 1817, the spies promised an insurrection in Lancashire; but all that happened was a pitiful procession of a few hundred starving workmen who set out to march to London, equipped with blankets, in order to present a petition to the Regent. They were turned back by troops, and some of them were imprisoned for months without trial. Later in the year there were futile little risings, by handfuls of men, in Derbyshire and Yorkshire; but it was proved in court that these miserable victims (some of whom were hanged) had actually been persuaded to take up arms by an infamous Government spy named Oliver. But the culmination came in 1819, when a perfectly orderly and unarmed crowd, attending a Radical demonstration in St. Peter's Fields (Peterloo), Manchester, was charged by yeomanry and hussars. Instead of reprimanding the magistrates who had ordered this criminal folly, or even investigating the case, Government promptly congratulated them on their vigour and resolution, and then proceeded to pass through Parliament a series of six Acts, designed to make Radical agitation impossible. The Six Acts were the culmination of the period of reaction. They forbade public meetings unless summoned by a Lord-Lieutenant, a Mayor, or five justices, and increased the taxes on popular literature. Yet it is noteworthy that even at the height of the repression no attempt was made to restrict the freedom of the press. At the very worst the British people enjoyed a higher degree of liberty both of speech and of the press than existed in most European countries.

In 1820 two episodes at last occurred which gave some colour of justification to the action of Government. A group of some thirty desperate men formed a mad plot, known as the Cato Street Conspiracy, to murder the Cabinet; and a number of Glasgow Radicals, after creating a panic in that city, offered resistance to a body of troops in what was called the Battle of Bonnymuir. But these events happened after a stupid and maddening system of repression had been maintained for five years. Many held that it was the policy of Government which had caused these troubles; and for that reason these episodes did not undo the impression created by Peterloo and the Six Acts. The whole series of events aroused a fierce indignation throughout the country;
and it was not Radicalism but the Tory reaction which received its death-blow from the infamies of Oliver and the brutalities of Peterloo. The solid opinion of the country began to forget its fear of revolution, and to come round to the view that far-reaching political changes were necessary.

Meanwhile the confidence of the nation in its institutions was being undermined in another way by the character and conduct of the royal family. George III. had lost his reason, his sight and his hearing, and had been in complete seclusion since 1810. The Prince of Wales, who acted as Regent until George III.'s death in 1820, when he succeeded to the throne as George IV., was a mean, profligate, elderly fop, for whom nobody could feel any respect. He had long lived apart from his indiscreet and foolish wife. Such respect for royalty as survived had centred in his only child, the gentle Princess Charlotte, to whose accession people had looked forward with hope. But her death, in 1817, had destroyed these hopes. There remained the six younger brothers of the Regent, none of whom commanded public respect—Shelley described them as 'the dregs of their dull race.' But none of them had recognised children, and until a daughter, Princess Victoria, was born to the Duke of Kent in 1819, the very succession to the throne seemed insecure. Many prophesied that within a few years monarchy would be extinct in Britain.

The prestige of the monarchy reached its lowest ebb when, on the accession of George IV., his errant Queen returned from her unconventional wanderings on the continent to claim her royal rights, and the King not merely refused them, but instituted proceedings for a divorce in the House of Lords. It is needless to dwell upon this ugly and squalid dispute, which engrossed the public mind during 1820, and disgusted all decent people. Popular sympathy was all on the side of the Queen, but it arose less from belief in her innocence than from contempt for the King. And as the ministerial party supported the Divorce Bill, their already heavy load of unpopularity was increased. Crown and Government had alike sunk into public odium.

§ 2. Progressive Toryism and the Beginning of Reform, 1822-1829.

In 1822 the dismal period of unqualified reaction came to an end. Lord Castlereagh committed suicide; Lord Sidmouth resigned; and, in the reconstruction of the ministry
which followed, the younger and more progressive Tories obtained the upper hand. They were opposed to any far-reaching constitutional change; but they believed that the ascendancy of the landowning class could only be maintained by means of a liberal and reforming policy. They now got an opportunity of testing the validity of this conception. They were helped by a revival of trade, which for a time put an end to the troubles of the previous years, and they unquestionably did good and useful work.

Canning became Foreign Secretary; and we have already observed the vigour with which he made Britain the champion of freedom against continental despotism. Canning's friend Huskisson, who was a student of Adam Smith and a disciple of Ricardo, became President of the Board of Trade, and began to carry into effect the ideas of the Economists. Already, in 1819, the extent of Ricardo's influence had been shown when a committee of which Huskisson was a member and Peel chairman recommended, on the strength of Ricardo's demonstration, the resumption of cash payments, which at once raised the purchasing power of all wages. Now Huskisson took a step towards freedom of trade by a bold revision of the tariff, and by modifying the Navigation Acts so as to make reciprocal arrangements with other Powers possible. This was noteworthy as the first breach in the exclusive trade-policy upon which the British imperial system had been based ever since Charles II. Meanwhile Sir Robert Peel, as Home Secretary, had swept away Sidmouth's wretched system of espionage. He also took in hand the long overdue revision of the Penal Code, guided largely by Bentham's legal studies. No less than one hundred capital offences were abolished, and English law was relieved in a large measure from the savagery which had disgraced it.

These were real and substantial reforms—inspired, let it be noted, by the teachings of the Economists and the Benthamites. But far more important was another reform which was primarily due not to any minister, but to Francis Place, the diligent and learned tailor of Charing Cross, who was one of Bentham's most intimate disciples. Place had given close study to the Trade Union movement, and was impressed by the injustice and the mischievous results of the Combination Acts, which forbade Trade Unions to work

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1 Above, Chap. i. p. 308.
2 There is a good short life of Peel, by J. R. Thursfield, in the 'Twelve English Statesmen' Series.
Working through his friend, Joseph Hume, a Benthamite member of Parliament, he got Huskisson to appoint a parliamentary committee on trade combinations and the export of machinery (which had hitherto been prohibited). Place organised so skilfully the evidence of masters and men which was laid before the committee that a unanimous report in favour of the repeal of the Combination Acts was adopted, and a bill giving effect to this recommendation passed almost unnoticed through Parliament (1824). But there followed such an activity in the formation of Unions, and such an epidemic of strikes, that many employers protested, and Huskisson appointed a second committee of inquiry, whose report was intended to recommend the cancellation of the repeal. Place and Hume, however, once again presented the case and arranged the evidence with such skill that though a second Act, modifying the first, was introduced in 1825, it did not interfere with the right to form Trade Unions, which henceforth became perfectly legal organisations, though their scope was restricted. It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the importance of the repeal of the Combination Acts in the social history of the British people. We shall see some of its results in later chapters.

The work of the reconstituted Tory ministry between 1822 and 1827 had done much to redeem the discredit of the previous years, and seemed to justify Canning’s belief that the old political system could, if intelligently directed, restore health to the body politic. But the Tory oligarchy was restive and uneasy. Its members felt that they were being led along dangerous paths. They disliked and distrusted the foreign policy of Canning and the economic policy of Huskisson. Nor were they much more in sympathy with the ideas of Peel; but Peel was less dangerous than the others, because he was a staunch opponent of Catholic Emancipation, which Canning and Huskisson supported; and, as we shall presently see, Catholic Emancipation was becoming a very urgent problem. Even between 1822 and 1827, therefore, it was evident that no large measures of reform would be possible so long as the Tory oligarchy controlled Parliament. The events of 1827-30 drove this moral home more clearly, and at the same time paved the way for greater changes by breaking up the solid phalanx of Toryism.

In 1827 the colourless Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool,

1 See above, Bk. viii. chap. vi. p. 220.
was disabled by illness, and Canning succeeded to his office. But Peel refused to serve under Canning, because of their difference on Catholic Emancipation; the more extreme Tories went into open opposition; and Canning was only able to form a ministry with the support of the Whigs, who contributed members to a cabinet for the first time since 1807. This was the beginning of the crumbling away of the Tory ascendancy. But the breach in the party did not last long. Canning died after holding office for only four months (August); an attempt to continue the ministry under his friend, Lord Goderich, failed; and in January 1828 the Old Tories were back in power, with the Duke of Wellington as Prime Minister. What is more, they were reunited; for the Canningites under Huskisson joined the ministry. But relations between the two wings were now so strained that in three months the Canningites were out again and had practically joined the Whigs. Among them were two men, Lord Palmerston and William Lamb (later Lord Melbourne), who were to become Whig Prime Ministers.

Wellington and Peel, however, still had a majority, for the Canningites were a party of leaders without followers. And Peel was able to go on with the policy of Tory reform. In 1828 he carried two measures of real importance. He repealed the Test and Corporation Acts, and thus relieved the Dissenters at last from the political disabilities under which they had suffered since the Restoration. And he carried out an invaluable reorganisation of the metropolitan police system, creating a disciplined force in place of the absurd little bodies of watchmen under a variety of different authorities which had hitherto played with the maintenance of order. His system was rapidly imitated in other large towns; and the names of 'Bobbies' and 'Peelers' which are affectionately bestowed upon these guardians of the law are a pleasant memorial of the man who founded their fine tradition.

Whether the Tories would have suffered this reforming activity to continue it is impossible to say. For in 1829 their unity was suddenly strained and broken by an unexpected blow. It came, with a fine irony, from Ireland, whose claims had been overridden in 1801, and neglected ever since.

§ 3. The Irish Problem and the Disruption of the Tory Party.

The Act of Union might possibly have brought peace to Ireland if it had been promptly followed by ameliorative
measures, and especially if the tacit pledge that it would be followed by Catholic Emancipation had been honoured. Because this pledge was broken, the Union brought not peace but a sword.

The evils from which Ireland suffered were of two kinds, sectarian and economic, but it was the sectarian questions which alone received attention from the politicians. Most of the disabilities imposed upon Catholics after the Revolution of 1689 had been removed between 1778 and 1793, but they were still excluded from Parliament, and from all important public offices; and though this directly affected only the well-to-do Catholics, it was resented by all as a stigma of inferiority. An even more important source of discontent was the privileged position of the Anglican Church in Ireland, and especially the payment of tithe, which was exacted from the starving peasantry for the support of an alien Church. Tithe was, indeed, one of the chief causes of the incessant agrarian outrages from which Ireland suffered, and Grattan had recognised that a Tithes Act must be an essential element in any reconciliatory legislation. The tithe problem was, in fact, the link between sectarian and economic grievances.

Fundamentally the economic problem was more important and more dangerous than the sectarian problem. The population of Ireland had outgrown the capacity of the country to supply means of subsistence; it had grown to 7,000,000 in 1821. This increase had taken place almost wholly among the desperately poor peasantry, whose sole means of livelihood was agriculture; and the competition for land was so fierce that the tenants were utterly at the mercy of their landlords, who were mostly Protestants and often absentee, or of the numerous sub-tenants or middle-men who intervened between landlord and cultivator. The terror of eviction hung over their heads; to retain a chance of livelihood they had to pay excessive rents which left them nothing but the barest subsistence; they had themselves to carry out improvements which in England were undertaken by the landlord, and submit to see their rents raised because of their own improvements; while those who had the vote (as many had since 1793) had to use it as the landlord ordered, lest they should be evicted. A vicious economic system thus seemed to ensure the political predominance of the Protestant landlord class. What was more, it kept a whole nation in the most abject poverty. This was why the Irish lived upon potatoes, almost the
cheapest form of human food; for 100 acres of land under potatoes will support four times as many people as 100 acres of land under wheat. It followed that any serious failure of the potato crop must produce terrible consequences, since the peasantry, living in utter penury, had no reserves to fall back upon. There was a serious famine in 1822; and, as we shall see, it had important political consequences. A further consequence of these terrible conditions was that (as might be expected) agrarian outrage was almost endemic in Ireland, large parts of which were in an almost lawless condition. Time and again Habeas Corpus was suspended, and Insurrection Acts, which practically established martial law, were passed at intervals. These were merely attempts to suppress the symptoms of a deep-seated malady. But nobody attempted to diagnose the disease or find a remedy for it, not even the Irish reformers. All their interest was reserved for the question of Catholic Emancipation.

Since 1801 a Catholic Board, sitting in Dublin, had kept the Catholic question alive by petitions to Parliament and in other ways. In 1805 the leadership of the movement was assumed by Daniel O'Connell, a barrister of good family, who combined extraordinary gifts of popular oratory with great tactical skill. O'Connell was no revolutionary. Educated in France during the revolutionary era, he had learnt to loathe the methods of brute force, and all his influence was used to keep the movement within constitutional channels. Nor was he an enemy of the British connexion; he wanted to see Ireland, freed of her disabilities, a partner in the British Commonwealth. His eloquence and organising skill were to make him the leader of a peaceful revolution whose results were almost as important for Britain as for Ireland.

From 1810 onwards Catholic Emancipation was repeatedly debated in the House of Commons. It was supported by all the Whigs, and by progressive Tories of the Canningite school; and this was why Canning and his friends were so much distrusted by most Tories, who regarded sound 'Protestant' views as the test of Tory orthodoxy. More than once there was a favourable majority in the House of Commons; but, as the House of Lords was steadily hostile, the question remained an academic one.

In 1823 it suddenly ceased to be academic. For O'Connell, deeply moved by the famine of 1822, had resolved to bring

1 There is a good short life of O'Connell by R. Dunlop in the 'Heroes of the Nations' Series.
the peasantry into a movement which had hitherto been mainly middle-class. He formed a Catholic Association which held great public debates; he invited contributions, under the name of Catholic Rent, from all classes, and an extraordinarily high proportion of the population, led by the priests, subscribed their monthly pence. No such nationwide public agitation had ever been seen before in the British realms. O'Connell became a popular hero, the accepted leader of a whole nation. But the Orange North was also stirred into activity, and Orange Societies revived. Government took alarm, and in 1825 passed an Act suppressing the organisations on both sides. With a lawyer's skill, O'Connell dissolved his association and formed a new one in accordance with the law. And in 1826 he gave a dramatic demonstration of his power. He put up a candidate pledged to the Catholic cause against the powerful Beresford interest in Waterford, and triumphantly carried the day. If the Beresfords could be defeated, the political ascendancy of the Protestant landlords was threatened. This made the Catholic question an urgent one in British politics; and this was why, in 1827, the Tories refused to support the ministry of Canning, who was favourable to the Catholic cause.

But a more sensational blow came in 1828. There was a bye-election in Clare; and O'Connell, though legally ineligible, became a candidate and was triumphantly elected. What had happened in Clare might happen in three-fourths of the Irish constituencies. Moreover, excitement was rising in Ireland to a dangerous pitch. The Lord-Lieutenant reported that nothing could avert civil war save a concession to the Catholic claims.

Wellington and Peel were driven to the conclusion that the concession must be made. Peel, having throughout his career opposed concession, was anxious to resign, as a matter of personal honour. But Wellington, who looked at the situation like a soldier compelled to retire from a position which he has defended as long as possible, felt that if the retreat was to be safely conducted, the commanding officers must stick to their posts. And he was right: only his and Peel's prestige could have carried the bill against the angry opposition of the outraged Tories, who held that their leaders had sold the pass. In 1829, therefore, Catholic Emancipation was forced through Parliament with the aid of the Whigs and the Canningites, and Catholics were admitted to Parliament, and, with three exceptions, to all public offices.
But the passage of Catholic Emancipation shattered the Tory party. It had not had time to get over its intestine feuds when in 1830 George IV. died, and was succeeded by his brother, William IV., an honest, breezy, whimsical prince, and the most popular member of the royal family. The succession of a new King automatically brought a general election; and with that election a new period in British politics began.

[Spencer Walpole, History of England since 1815 (6 vols.) ; Twiss, Life of Eldon ; Temperley, Canning ; Stewart, Memoirs of Castlereagh ; Bamford, Passages in the Life of a Radical ; Bruton, Peterloo ; Peel, Memoirs ; Parker, Peel ; Stapleton, Political Life of Canning (1822 to 1827) ; Greville Memoirs; Creevey Papers ; Croker Papers ; Maxwell, Life of Wellington ; Dunlop, Daniel O'Connell ; Lecky, Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland (O'Connell) ; Sheil, Sketches ; O'Brien (ed.), Two Centuries of Irish History ; Wallace, Life of Place ; Webb, History of Trade Unionism ; Halévy, History of the English People ; Darvall, Popular Disturbance and Public Order in Regency England ; Trevelyan, British History in the 19th Century ; Feiling, The Second Tory Party ; Aspinall, Politicians and the Press and Lord Brougham and the Whig Party ; Brady, Huskisson and Liberal Reform ; Woodward, Age of Reform ; Eryant, Age of Elegance.]
CHAPTER IV

THE NEW BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE ERA OF REACTION

(A.D. 1815-1830)


For more than two centuries the external history of the British Commonwealth had been dominated by an acute rivalry for colonial power and trade ascendency, first with Spain and Portugal, then with Holland, finally with France and Spain. With the close of the Napoleonic War this rivalry came to an end. The rival empires had almost been destroyed: Spain’s colonies were in revolt; the Portuguese Empire of Brazil was soon to follow; France had lost everything save the West Indian islands, and the Indian trading posts, which Britain voluntarily restored to her at the end of the war; Holland, having lost Cape Colony and Ceylon, was content with Java, restored to her by the same omnipotent mistress of the seas. Britain, on the other hand, emerged from the war with an empire the like of which history had never seen, an empire of continents and sub-continents, India, Australia, Canada, South Africa, linked together by innumerable islands and trading posts that girdled the globe. She was not only the first, she was almost the only, great colonising Power.

For two generations she retained a practical monopoly of colonising activity. Russia, indeed, was consolidating her vast Asiatic empire during these years, and the United States were expanding to the Pacific coast. But in the seafaring activities to which the European Powers had devoted so much of their thought, Britain was left practically alone, save for some spasmodic and unimportant ventures by her old rival France. Europe seemed to be content to leave the fortunes of the extra-European world in British hands, partly because her attention was engrossed by wars and
revolutions, by nationalist struggles and attempts to attain self-government; partly because, after the extraordinary collapse of the European empires which had taken place during the half-century preceding 1815, the belief was widespread that colonial possessions were not worth the cost and trouble of acquisition.

During this interval of two generations Britain was left undisturbed to consolidate and organise her amazing Empire, and to work out new principles of imperial government, the development of which was to be among the most remarkable of her achievements during the nineteenth century. The formulation of the new imperial policy did not begin until the great period of reconstruction opened in 1830; we shall have to study it in a later chapter. But even during the period of reaction certain new forces which were to have an important influence upon this process of reconstruction were clearly emerging, and it is our business, in this chapter, to analyse them.

The first of these new factors was the beginning of that immense stream of emigration which has poured out of Europe into the non-European world during the last hundred years.

The early colonising activities of the European nations had not been due, in any large degree, to the pressure of surplus population; for until the nineteenth century population grew slowly, and the European peoples were able to support themselves by the produce of their own soil. But the Industrial Revolution brought about, in most countries where it established itself, a rapid increase of population and a growing demand both for food and raw materials; while the dislocation which it caused uprooted thousands from their traditional modes of life. Emigration offered a relief for these distresses; and the growing demand for the produce of the new countries made it easy for the emigrants to find work and livelihood in their new homes. For the first time in modern history there was, during the nineteenth century, a serious pressure of population upon the means of subsistence in the old and settled countries of Europe. As the century progressed, and the Industrial Revolution extended its range, this pressure grew; with the result that the overflow of the European peoples into the non-European world took place on a scale unparalleled in earlier history, and the empty regions of the world were rapidly organised, settled, and brought under European influence.

1 Below, Chap. x. p. 419.
This vast movement of population began in Britain, because Britain was the starting-point of the Industrial Revolution. It was not until about 1845 that the other European peoples took any large part in the movement, because it was not until then that the Industrial Revolution deeply affected them. But from Britain a continuous stream of emigrants was pouring forth during the distressful years after 1815. It turned first, as was natural, towards the United States, and rendered possible the rapid settlement of the Mississippi Valley, where five new States were organised between 1815 and 1830. But an even larger stream flowed into Canada, though many of the Canadian immigrants passed over the frontiers into the United States. Some 20,000 settlers entered Canada yearly; in some years the figure rose to 50,000. Large numbers came from the Highlands of Scotland, where agrarian revolution was in progress; many came from Southern Ireland, especially after the famine of 1822, which began the stream of Irish emigration on a large scale; many more were sent out at the expense of English poor-law authorities. Settlers of an excellent type were also brought out during the 'twenties by the Canadian Land Company, which obtained a grant of over 1,000,000 acres in Ontario, and sold lots at low prices to intending emigrants. Its successful experience helped to encourage the scientific emigration of the next period.

Towards distant Australia flowed a much thinner stream, still mainly consisting of transported convicts; but the growing prosperity of the sheep-breeding industry brought a certain number of free immigrants, and from 1824 onwards two Land Companies, like that of Canada, were bringing out free settlers to New South Wales and Tasmania. And in 1827-29 the first wholly free settlement in Australia was established at Swan River, on the hitherto untouched western coast, by a group of projectors who obtained a large grant of land from the British Government on condition that they paid for the transport of emigrants. The Swan River Colony did not prosper, however; it is important only as an early example of organised and assisted emigration under the encouragement of Government.

Meanwhile, Government had directly taken in hand the plantation of a large number of settlers in South Africa, partly as a means of relieving the distress at home, and partly to strengthen the hold of Britain over the Cape. In 1819 £50,000 were voted for this purpose by Parliament; and in the following years some 5000 emigrants were taken
out. They were planted mostly in the eastern part of Cape Colony, near Port Elizabeth, which is still the most British part of the colony.¹ The unquestionable success of this experiment greatly encouraged the schemes of systematic colonisation which distinguished the next period.

The movement of emigration was but in its infancy in the era of reaction, nor had the problem of financing emigration yet been scientifically studied. But already it was apparent that the pressure of population at home was bringing about a new activity in colonising work. It was apparent also that the sudden inrush of new-comers was creating certain difficulties in the colonies in which they settled. In Canada the older French settlements were alarmed at the prospect of being swamped by an English-speaking majority, and this was one of the causes of the distressing friction which grew up between the two races, and which ultimately led to the rebellion of 1837. In Australia the coming of free immigrants made it impossible to maintain the original system of government, which was that appropriate for a gaol. During the long governorship of Captain Macquarie (1809-1821) New South Wales was in effect transformed from a penal settlement into a colony; the area of settlement was widely extended; schools and churches were opened; the first bank was started and the first newspaper published. But in these conditions the despotic power of the Governor could no longer be maintained. In 1824, therefore, a nominated Legislative Council was established for New South Wales; in 1825 Tasmania (where there had been a settlement since 1803) was separated from New South Wales and endowed with a similar Council; in 1828 these bodies obtained control over taxation; and meanwhile regular law courts had taken the place of the rough and ready martial law of early days. All this was the result of the incoming of free settlers. In South Africa, again, the plantation of English colonists alongside of the Boers, who had for a century and a half lived a life apart, was one of the causes, though by no means the chief cause, of the unhappy hostility between the two races which was to produce momentous results in the next period.² In every colony, in short, the stream of immigration was producing new problems which were left for the statesmen of the 'thirties to solve.

¹ See the map, Atlas, Plate 89 (6).
² See below, Chap. x. p. 426 ff.

The second new factor which made itself strongly felt during this period was the influence of the humanitarian movement, and of the many-sided missionary activity which began in the last years of the eighteenth century.¹

Humanitarianism had already won one triumph in the prohibition of the slave-trade, so far as British subjects were concerned, in 1807;² and in 1815 and 1822 the British Government succeeded in obtaining from the Great Powers a general condemnation of this traffic. Not satisfied with these victories, the humanitarian leaders forthwith began to labour for the abolition of slavery throughout the British Empire. It was estimated that there were 750,000 slaves within the empire, chiefly in the West Indies and Guiana, in Cape Colony, and in Mauritius. In 1823 a resolution was introduced by Fowell Buxton in the House of Commons condemning slavery as ‘repugnant to the principles of the British constitution and the Christian religion,’ and urging that it should be gradually abolished by declaring all children born after a certain date to be free. Parliament did not adopt this resolution; but on the motion of Canning it resolved that the slaves must be protected by regulations, and educated in preparation for emancipation. In accordance with these resolutions the slave-owning colonies were urged to adopt certain regulations. But this suggestion aroused indignation among the planters, who complained that their prosperity was being sacrificed to fanaticism. Jamaica threatened to secede from the Empire; Demerara suppressed the despatch, lest it should excite the negroes.

But among the Demerara slaves a rumour spread that the British Government was going to help them. A pitiful little insurrection broke out in one plantation. It was mercilessly crushed; and when it was over, a Nonconformist missionary, the Rev. John Smith, was tried under martial law for having incited the slaves to rebellion. The charge was quite unjust; yet, after a parody of justice, Smith was condemned to death. He died of exhaustion before the sentence could be carried out. But the story of his sufferings rang through Britain, and did more than all the eloquence of the abolitionists to discredit the institution of negro slavery.

Between 1826 and 1830 the Colonial Office showed a good

¹ See above, Bk. viii. chap. vi. p. 222. ² See above, pp. 222, 232.
deal of vigour in imposing regulations for the protection of slaves upon all the Crown colonies. But they could not be imposed upon the self-governing colonies; the regulations proposed by Jamaica were so ineffective that the home Government refused to confirm them; and the recalcitrance of the planters completed the conversion of British opinion. By 1830 the British people had resolved that slavery must cease to exist wherever the British flag flew; and in 1833 this resolve was translated into the noble Act whereby slavery was abolished throughout the British Empire.\(^1\) It had taken twenty years (1787-1807) to obtain the abolition of the slave-trade—not a very long period, considering the magnitude of the interests involved. But from the date of Fowell Buxton's resolution of 1823, it took only ten years to achieve the abolition of slavery, at an immense cost to the British taxpayer. Nothing could more trenchantly demonstrate the strength of the humanitarian movement than this remarkable achievement.

So swift a movement of opinion needs explanation; but there is no difficulty in explaining it. The rapid awakening of conscience in regard to the treatment of subject and backward peoples was primarily due to the activity of Christian missionaries. Smith of Demerara, whose sufferings had had so great an effect, was only one of an army of missionaries who had been sent out from Britain to preach Christianity in every part of the earth, since the foundation of the great missionary societies in the last years of the eighteenth century;\(^2\) they were at work everywhere among the backward peoples; and they naturally made it their business to stand up for their simple flocks. In the slave-owning colonies their chief work lay among the slaves, and they saw at close quarters what slavery meant. They were supported by the subscriptions of every Church in Britain; their doings were followed with keen interest by the whole church-going population, and at that date the British people were eminently a church-going people. Letters and messages from missionaries could be, and were, read from every pulpit. There could not be a more effective method of influencing public opinion; and the opinion thus formed was so powerful that no statesman dared disregard it. The British people were acquiring a new interest in the lands in which missionary labours were being carried on; and they were learning to look at the problems of empire from a new angle—from the standpoint of the friends and protectors of

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\(^1\) See below, pp. 387, 420.  
\(^2\) Above, Bk. viii. chap. vi. p. 222.
the primitive peoples, who had hitherto had no spokesmen. Beyond a doubt, the immense and growing missionary activities of all the British Churches constituted one of the most potent factors in shaping the new imperial policy which was formulated during the next generation. On the whole the influence of the missionaries was salutary and beneficent. But in some colonies it had some unfortunate results, notably in South Africa, where, as we shall see in a later chapter, the bitter feud which raged between the missionaries and the Boers was the principal cause of a disastrous alienation between the two white races.

The influence of the missionaries was especially effective because they had strong sympathisers among the permanent officials who directed the policy of the Colonial Office; and the growth of the power of the Colonial Office constitutes yet another of the new factors in imperial affairs which were becoming powerful during this period.

Throughout the history of the British Empire there had been no elaborate central organisation for dealing with colonial problems. From the Revolution period until 1768 there had been a Board of Trade and Plantations, but it was definitely subordinated to one of the Secretaries of State, and, as the name of the Board indicated, colonial questions were during that period regarded largely in connexion with trade policy. A special Colonial Secretaryship had been established in 1768, but it was abolished on the loss of the American colonies in 1782, and the old system was practically re-established. During the French Revolutionary War, however, colonial questions became important in connexion with war policy. In 1794, therefore, a Secretaryship of State for War and Colonies was instituted, to which, in 1801, all the colonial functions of the Board of Trade were transferred, the Board henceforward confining itself to questions of trade policy. Thus the clear separation of colonial questions from trade questions was one of the distinctive notes of the new period; and this implied a real change of outlook.

The colonial department of the office of War and Colonies had a distinct staff, and a separate organisation; and as the political chief of the office was nominally responsible for both departments, and few politicians knew much about the innumerable scattered dependencies now included in the British Empire, the permanent officials of the Colonial Office were able to wield a great deal of practically inde-
pendent power. Some of these officials were men of great ability and decided views. Perhaps the ablest of them was Sir James Stephen, who was, during the 'twenties, legal adviser to the Colonial Office, and later (1836) became Permanent Under-Secretary. Even in the 'twenties his was the dominating personality in the office, and he was very nearly the ruler of the colonial empire. Stephen was a member of the 'Clapham sect' of Evangelical Churchmen, who played so great a part in the attack on slavery and in the foundation of the missionary societies; and his influence ensured that the power of the Colonial Office should be uniformly exercised in support of the causes advocated by the Evangelicals, and in accordance with the ideas of the missionaries.

An able, industrious, serious-minded man, Stephen naturally tended to magnify his own office. It was in his time, and in the sphere of colonial administration, that the independent power of what is called 'bureaucracy' first attracted protest and criticism. And it is undoubtedly true that the Colonial Office in this period kept a very tight hold upon colonial Governors, and left them very little freedom to adjust their policy to meet colonial opinion. Nor was it enthusiastic about colonial self-government. An efficient bureaucracy is very apt to be jealous of political liberty, because it is sure that it knows what is good for the people it rules, better than the people themselves. In the earlier history of the British Commonwealth representative institutions after the British model had been set up as a matter of course in every new colony as soon as it was founded. Fifteen new colonies had been acquired since the Colonial Office obtained full control of colonial questions in 1801; and in not one of these had representative institutions been established.

This departure from the established tradition of British colonial policy was so striking that it demands explanation. It was due partly to the unwillingness to give up power which marks all bureaucracies. But there was also a better reason. All the new colonies were in tropical or sub-tropical lands, where a small dominant class of white men lived amid a subject population of slaves or backward peoples. In an earlier age there had been no hesitation in entrusting self-governing powers to the white men in such cases, because there was no general feeling of responsibility for the protection of the subject peoples. But the new generation, inspired by missionary and humanitarian zeal, was determined
that British power should be used to secure justice for the defenceless subjects; and for that reason it was held to be dangerous to permit unqualified authority to the white settlers in any tropical colony. In all new colonies, therefore, in which backward peoples predominated, representative institutions were withheld, and these colonies were administered as Crown Colonies, under the direct control of the home Government.

The old ideal of political liberty was coming into conflict with the new ideal of social justice. Somehow the two had to be reconciled; and this was not the least of the problems which now faced the British Commonwealth. The great tradition whereby every British land was a land of political freedom had to be revived. But it also had to be adjusted to the new ideal of justice to subject races which was springing from the work and teachings of missionaries and humanitarians.

§ 3. The Completion of the Conquest of India.

In India the years we have been surveying were of the most critical importance: they saw the completion of the fabric of British power, the final establishment of the reign of peace, and the undertaking of a great work of administrative reorganisation.

In an earlier chapter we saw how nearly Wellesley had completed his self-appointed task of making the British power paramount in India; how he was interrupted when he had almost completed the overthrow of the Mahrattas; and how his successors, Cornwallis and Barlow, were instructed to undo as much as possible of his work, to return to the old disastrous policy of 'non-intervention,' and in particular to leave the Mahrattas to themselves. The result was an interval of eight years (1805-1813) highly discreditable to the British power.

The Mahratta Powers had always existed by and for plunder, and had never displayed either the capacity or the will to establish a system of just and competent government. If they had made good their supremacy throughout India, as at one time had seemed likely, nothing but misery and endless violence could have resulted. Warren Hastings had checked this danger. Wellesley had scotched it. He had nearly succeeded in breaking up the Mahratta confederacy; but the reversal of his policy gave the Mahratta chieftains a respite, and encouraged them to dream of reviving their old

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1 Above, Bk. viii. chap. iv. p. 194 ff.
ambitions of supremacy. Meanwhile they gave their protection to bands of irregular marauders who, from their bases in the Mahratta States, incessantly raidcd and plundered a great part of India, including States which were under the protection of the East India Company. Some of these bands were Pathans, drawn from among the fierce Mohammedan warriors of the North-Western hills. Others, known as Pindaris, were drawn from among the miscellaneous irregulars who had followed Mahratta armies in the field. They numbered some 30,000. They were divided into bands who claimed to be attached to one or other of the principal Mahratta chiefs; and the Mahratta chiefs, though they repudiated all responsibility, gave them shelter, and probably took a share of the plunder.

It was profoundly discreditable to the British power that these murderous gangs, whose ferocity surpassed belief, should have been left free to wreak destruction not only over the whole area not subject to British supremacy, but even over regions nominally under British protection. But the Directors refused to allow any measures to be taken against them, lest the result should be a new Mahratta war. The consequence was that British prestige, raised to its acme by Wellesley, underwent a serious decline; and while the Pindaris became every year more insolent and destructive, others also were encouraged to attack this supine power; thus the Gurkhas of Nipal began to make aggressive raids in Northern Bengal and in Oudh. In the end non-intervention did not prevent war; after exposing India to a decade of misery it forced on the biggest war which the British power had yet waged in India.

Lord Minto, who served as Governor-General during the years 1807-1813, when the Napoleonic war was at its height, was an able and honourable man who hated the necessity of tolerating this state of things. But he was debarred from action partly by the strict injunctions of the home authorities and partly by the necessity for using his military resources in an attack on the possessions of France and her vassals. It was under his direction that Java was conquered from the Dutch, and Mauritius and its sister islands from the French. In India he confined himself to establishing treaty relations with the Sikh power under Ranjit Singh in the far North-West, and with the Amir of Afghanistan beyond; these negotiations were dictated by the fear of a possible Franco-Russian attack on India by land.

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 80.
In 1813, however, there arrived in India a new Governor-General who was to bring about great changes, during a tenure of power which extended over ten years. This was Lord Moira, later Marquis of Hastings, a man of fifty-nine, known chiefly as a boon companion of the Prince Regent, and as a reckless spendthrift; but he possessed gifts both for war and statesmanship which made him a worthy successor of Warren Hastings and the Marquis Wellesley. His first task was to deal with the aggressions of the Gurkhas of Nipal. It took three campaigns among the high Himalayas to compel these doughty warriors to sue for peace. But in 1816 they made a treaty which has never since been broken, and became staunch allies of the British power. The kingdom of Nipal ceded the mountain district of Kumaon, but retained its independence; and from that day to this the gallant Gurkhas have supplied willing recruits to fight under the British flag in many hard-fought wars.

The Gurkha war had just been ended (1816) when a Pindari raid took place on so large a scale and of so outrageous a character that even the Directors were shaken out of their lethargy, and forced to recognise that this pest must be firmly dealt with.\(^1\) A band burst into Guntur in the distant province of Madras, a British district which had enjoyed unbroken peace for fifty years; and in twelve days plundered 339 villages, murdered 182 people with hideous tortures, and wounded or tortured 4000 more. This brought clearly home what had been going on in territories beyond the British limits; and Hastings succeeded, to his infinite satisfaction, in getting permission to crush out the Pindari bands once and for all, and to give the boon of peace to the harassed peoples of Central India.

His instructions were to avoid, if possible, a war with the Mahratta princes, the protectors of these murderous raiders; and he did his best to secure their quiescence, and, if possible, their co-operation. The Peshwa of Poona, head of the Mahratta confederacy, might be kept quiet by the influence of the British Resident at his court, and (still more) by the presence of a British subsidiary force at Poona. Bhonsla, the master of Nagpur, was persuaded to sign a treaty of alliance; Sindhia, the most powerful of the group, was reluctantly persuaded to promise his help. But Hastings did not trust Mahratta promises. He organised two great armies, the largest yet put in the field in India, which were to converge from the north and the south upon the fast-

\(^1\) For what follows, see the map, Atlas, Plate 80.
nesses of the Pindaris in the Narbada Valley, and also to prevent the Mahratta chieftains from moving.

It was well that he took these precautions. For the Mahratta chiefs could not resist the temptation to use the opportunity of striking a blow for independence or supremacy. The Peshwa made a sudden treacherous attack upon the Resident at Poona (1817), but his 25,000 men were ignominiously defeated by a British force of less than 3000 on the field of Kirki, just outside the Mahratta capital, and finally overthrown at Ashti in 1818. Bhonsla, disregarding his recent pledges, made a similar attack upon the Residency at Nagpur (1817), but was beaten off and defeated at Sitabaldi by a force less than one-tenth as strong as his own. Sindhia remained quiet, but only because he was overawed by large forces which dominated his fortresses. The armies of Holkar (himself a minor) were put into the field to help the Pindaris, and beaten in the biggest battle of the war, at Mahidpur. Meanwhile the Pindari bands had been destroyed; and India was relieved of a nightmare.

These decisive victories enabled Lord Hastings to carry out a settlement of all that part of India which had not yet been definitely brought under British supremacy, as far as the line of the Sutlej and the Indus. The treacherous Peshwa was deposed, and his lands went to form the modern Presidency of Bombay; he was pensioned off, and went to live near Cawnpore, where he adopted a son who afterwards won infamy as the Nana Sahib. The other Mahratta princes were allowed to retain their thrones; but they lost some territory, and they were compelled to abandon all claims of supremacy or tribute over the lesser princes who had so long suffered from their tyranny, and to accept treaties whereby they definitely admitted the supremacy of the British power. Finally treaties were made with the numerous princes of Rajputana and Central India, whereby they all willingly accepted British supremacy, and, in return for protection, undertook never to wage war without the consent of the suzerain power.

In effect the long process of conquest was completed by these events. Henceforward unbroken peace, such as in all her history India had never known, reigned over all the vast regions from the Indus to Cape Comorin. The long centuries of anarchy and turmoil were at an end. India had become a single realm, all but the valley of the Indus; and that was to be brought under the Pax Britannica during the next generation.
The period of conquest which had been forced on by the results of non-intervention did not end with the defeat of the Gurkhas and the overthrow of the Mahrattas. After Lord Hastings had left India in 1823, his successor Lord Amherst was drawn into conflict with Burma, a land quite distinct from India, geographically and racially. Two successive Burmese kings had been extending their power on all hands since 1782. They had annexed the coastal district of Arakan, which lay next to Bengal, and Arakanese refugees, pouring over the border, had stirred up a good deal of trouble. In 1821 the Burmese conquered Assam, a province closely united with Bengal, and Indian in character. Embassies from Calcutta tried in vain to establish friendly relations; they were always treated with studied insolence. The Burmese avowed the intention of conquering Bengal and Calcutta, and had intrigued with the Mahrattas. In 1823, intoxicated with success, they began an attack upon Bengal. They had to be taught a lesson, and Lord Amherst undertook an expedition against them. It was ill-managed, and dragged on through three campaigns. But the Burmese armies had to admit defeat, and their King was forced to cede the province of Assam, and the two long coastal strips of Arakan and Tenasserim.¹ (Treaty of Yandabo, 1826.)

These acquisitions brought the British power beyond the limits of India, into what came to be known as Further India: Tenasserim made it a neighbour of Siam and the Malay Peninsula. In this region British influence had already been established since the acquisition of Penang in 1782. When the Dutch possessions were conquered during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, it had appeared as if British power were about to become preponderant in this region also. That expectation was disappointed by the restoration of the Dutch possessions in 1816, under the terms of the Treaty of Vienna. But Sir Stamford Raffles, who had brilliantly administered Java during the British occupation, was resolved to retain a foothold in these waters. In 1819 he negotiated with the Sultan of Johore for the island of Singapore, which, situated on the very highway of the trade-route to China, was destined to become one of the greatest of the world's ports. Five years later (1824) a fresh agreement was made with the Dutch. The East India Company withdrew from Sumatra, where they had long maintained a trading station, and undertook to abstain from interference in that island. In return the Dutch restored the port of

¹ See the map, Atlas, Plate 80.
Malacca, in the Straits, and undertook not to interfere in the Malay Peninsula. In effect, from this date, the Malay States passed under a British protectorate, though this was not formally recognised till much later; and the importance of this development was recognised, in 1826, by the organisation of the Straits Settlements as a separate Presidency under the Governor-General of Bengal. They remained in this position until they were turned into a distinct Crown Colony in 1867.


If this period was important in regard to the consolidation of British power in the East, it was still more important in that it saw the adoption of a new point of view in regard to the problems of Indian government. Perhaps it would be more just to say that there was a return to the principles of Warren Hastings, the wisest of all British rulers in India. For Warren Hastings had always respected Indian laws and usages, and had done his best to study and understand them, and to adapt them to the needs of the new régime; he had held that the British Empire in India should be governed as an Indian Power, and, so far as possible, through Indian agency.

The immense acquisitions of territory which had been made first by Wellesley and then by the Marquis of Hastings called for great labours of organisation. To meet this need there appeared perhaps the most remarkable group of scholar-statesmen who have ever honoured the British Government in India by their service. Among them were James Tod, long Resident in Rajputana, whose fascinating *Annals of Rajasthan* is the classic history of the Rajput princes; James Grant-Duff, who placed the history of the Mahrattas on firm foundations while working among them; Brian Houghton Hodgson, who first seriously explored the literature of Buddhism while serving as Resident in Nipal; H. H. Wilson and James Prinsep, who were among the founders of the Western study of Sanskrit literature.

But the great glory of the period was to be found in the work of four statesmen of a high order, Sir Thomas Munro, who reorganised the corrupt province of Madras; Charles Metcalfe, who settled much of the North-West Provinces, acquired by Wellesley; Sir John Malcolm, soldier, administrator and historian; and Mountstuart Elphinstone, perhaps the greatest of the group, who was responsible for the organisation of the Peshwa’s territories, and the Presidency
of Bombay. All these men brought to their great tasks a profound interest in and respect for the history and traditions of India. They strove to preserve and strengthen whatever was sound in Indian usage, and to work in comradeship with Indians.

They necessarily had to undertake, in the newly acquired provinces, the organisation of the land-revenue system, on which the whole structure of Indian government rested. And with one accord, though they acted independently, they broke away from the system of Permanent Settlement which had been advocated by Francis, and established in Bengal by Cornwallis.¹ Their systems varied, and this is not the place for any attempt to analyse the complexities of Indian land-systems. But, like Warren Hastings before them, they tried to base their work upon Indian usages, instead of endeavouring to assimilate the Indian land-system to that of England. They saw also (especially Elphinstone) the value of the Indian system of village self-government, which the Permanent Settlement had almost destroyed in Bengal.

But while, in this and other ways, this remarkable generation of administrators respected Indian usages and tradition, they were not blind to the need of introducing the invigorating force of western ideas into Indian life. In 1824, at a time when high reaction was reigning in Europe and was only beginning to be qualified in Britain, Sir Thomas Munro could urge the necessity of giving Indians 'a higher opinion of themselves, by placing more confidence in them ... and rendering them eligible to almost every office.' This was a return to the methods of Warren Hastings, and a departure from those of his successors, who had laid it down that Indians must not be admitted to positions of responsibility. 'We should look upon India,' Munro wrote, 'not as a temporary possession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently, until the natives shall have abandoned most of their prejudices, and become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, and to conduct and preserve it.'

For a period of almost world-wide reaction, these are words of a singular enlightenment. They meant that, in the judgment of some of the ablest of its servants, the British power in India ought not to be a mere dominion, maintained for dominion's sake, but ought to be a means of serving and training the teeming millions whom fate had brought under its influence. The gifts of peace and justice, which were

¹ Above, Bk. vii. chap. xi. p. 142.
accruing to India from the establishment of British supremacy were great gifts; but they were not enough. They must be reinforced by the vitalising influence of new ideas, capable of stirring an ancient civilisation out of its long stagnation. The stirring was to come from the introduction of western learning; and it was in this period that the Indian peoples, especially in Bengal, began to be introduced to the science and criticism of the West. The work was begun by the English missionaries, who had made their way into India, for the first time, at the end of the eighteenth century. Their advent was at first regarded with some distrust by Government; and the first missionaries in Bengal, Carey, Marshman, and Ward, had to betake themselves to the Danish settlement at Serampore in order to escape from Government restraints. It was the missionaries who first introduced the printing-press for the dissemination of vernacular literature. It was the missionaries who opened the first schools of western learning and began the teaching of English as the key to modern knowledge. The innovation was regarded with distrust by some of the most enlightened British officials, partly because they feared the unsettling effects of missionary activity and of the acrimonies which it might arouse, partly because they held that India should develop her own great tradition of learning instead of borrowing slavishly from the West. For this reason, when, in 1813, Government made its first grant for educational purposes, the money was for a time left unspent, and then devoted wholly to oriental learning. But there were some progressive Indians who did not share these misgivings. In 1819 a brave Brahmin, Raja Ram Mohun Roy, who had, at great sacrifice, broken away from the rigid rules of caste and convinced himself that the awakening of India could only come by way of western science, joined hands with some Englishmen to found a school of western learning in Calcutta free from missionary or sectarian influence. The first particles of leaven had been introduced into the mass; and the powerful working of this leaven was to be, for a century to come, a more momentous factor in the transformation of India than all the wars and laws and policies with which we shall be concerned in later chapters.

[Kingsford, History of Canada; Rusden, History of Australia; Muir, Making of British India; Roberts, Historical Geography of India; Hastings, Private Diary; Gleig, Life of Munro; Arbuthnot, Munro's Minutes; Woodward, Age of Reform; Cambridge History of the British Empire; Cambridge History of India; A. B. Keith, Constitutional History of India; Thompson and Garratt, Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India.]
CHAPTER V

THE TRIUMPH OF INDUSTRIALISM

(A.D. 1815-1851)

§ 1. The Transformation of Industry.

Far-reaching changes had taken place in British industry before and during the Great War. But it was in the generation after the peace that the new methods captured most of the great industries, and affected most deeply, for good or for ill, the life of the whole nation.

The essence of the Industrial Revolution was the adoption of large-scale production, by means of power-driven machinery in great factories, which could only be established and maintained by a large expenditure of capital, and only worked by organised gangs of wage-earning 'hands.' Before 1815 these methods had fully conquered only one great industry, that of spinning in cotton and (less completely) in wool. During the generation following 1815 they rapidly took possession of one great industry after another; and in all the great industries their victory was complete by 1851, when the Great Exhibition proclaimed to the world the triumph of British industry. It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the expenditure of energy, industry and inventiveness which brought about these results. We cannot here follow the process in detail, or tell the story of the myriad inventions which made these results possible. We must limit ourselves to considering the nature of the change in a few of the principal industries.

It was in the textile industries that the revolution had started. But in the weaving branch of these industries its progress was slow. Before 1815 the power-loom had only been applied to the coarser kinds of cotton stuffs which could be easily standardised; in the weaving of more delicate and complex fabrics the hand-loom weaver still held his own, though his rates of pay were being beaten down by the standards of cheapness set by power-loom production. The hand-loom weavers carried on their desperate struggle down to the 'forties and even later, especially in the woollen trade.
But their defeat was inevitable. It was ensured by a succession of ingenious inventions—notably the French invention of the Jacquard loom—which made it possible to weave the most complex patterns on machines. By 1851 the triumph of the machines and of the factories was all but complete in all the weaving industries, cotton, woollen, linen and silk.

In some aspects the change was, no doubt, a change for the worse. It meant that there was less of individual craftsmanship, and that (in theory at any rate) the workman was less his own master. But in practice the hand-loom weaver had long worked for capitalist employers. And there were unquestionable compensations. The big factory provided better conditions of labour than the small home-workshops; it could also be more easily regulated and supervised, and, as we shall see, the State was in this period undertaking the duty of supervision, which it had never been able to exercise in the era of domestic manufacture. Moreover the workpeople, when grouped in factories, found it far easier to organise themselves for mutual protection; the Trade Union movement has always thriven most in those industries which are organised for large-scale production. Even on the social side, therefore, the change was not all loss; on the economic side it meant a colossal increase in the amount of wealth produced and available for use by the community.

In the metal industries the change was as great as in the textiles. Before 1815 most of the hardware trades that centred in Sheffield and Birmingham had been mainly carried on in very small workshops; to some extent that is still the case. Large-scale production was steadily extending its range in this sphere after 1815. But, more important, a practically new industry based upon the use of iron was springing into first-rate importance. The demand for the numerous and complex machines employed in all the industries, and for the engines to supply power for working them, was creating the immense industry of engineering, which was necessarily carried on from the first in large establishments, and demanded the employment of substantial capital. After 1825, when the export of machinery was first permitted by law, the expansion of the engineering industry became very rapid, for all the world wanted to buy British machines. Engineering was thus coming into its own, as the key-industry of the modern world, which lives by machinery.

1 Below, Chap. viii. p. 394 ff.
All this involved an immense increase in the use of iron, and therefore in iron-mining, in smelting and in the manufacture of steel—processes which could only be carried on upon a great scale. And the increase in the output of coal was yet more striking than the increase in the production of iron; for all the new industries, and the iron industries most of all, depended absolutely upon coal, while the demand for it was further increased by the fact that the use of coal-gas as an illuminant, just beginning in 1815, had become practically universal in every important centre of population before 1851. It was during this generation that coal became the essential foundation of the whole industrial life of Britain.

It was these rapidly expanding industries which at once brought about, and gave employment to, the rapidly growing population of Britain. For in the first generation after the peace population was growing even more swiftly than in the previous generation; the population of England and Wales alone, in spite of increasing emigration, grew from 10,000,000 in 1811 to 18,000,000 in 1851; and practically the whole of this increase was to be found either in London or on the great coal-fields where the new industries were concentrated, and where towns were springing up like mushrooms.

Agriculture accounted for very little of the increase; for in spite of all that the dominant landowning class could do, by means of Corn Laws and in other ways, British agriculture was passing through a period of depression. Yet even in agriculture the tendency towards large-scale production under capitalist direction was very marked. The very depression of the period helped the process. For the farmer only held his own by making use of labour-saving appliances and new chemical methods of fertilisation; the first introduction of these devices belongs to this time. And as only the man with capital could use these methods, the crushing out of the small man went on more rapidly than ever. In 1842 and in 1845 General Enclosure Acts were passed, which provided cheap and easy means of bringing under enclosure the parishes which had hitherto succeeded in resisting the process. It was in this generation that the process, begun in the eighteenth century, was completed, whereby the soil of Britain passed into the hands of a small number of great landowners, while the work of cultivation was almost everywhere conducted by farmers owning capital, and the labourers on the soil were divorced
from direct interest in the result of their labours. It was in this generation that the English peasantry, after one last despairing outbreak of revolt, settled down into that stagnation which has since marked them.

It had now become unmistakably plain that the wealth and strength of Britain depended upon her manufacturing industries and her foreign commerce, not upon her agriculture. The agricultural interest itself had obviously become largely dependent upon the industrial interests. Landlords drew compensation for the reduction of agricultural rents in the vastly increased revenues which they derived from mining royalties and from the sale or lease of the land on which the new urban population was growing up. The most thriving farmers were those who were within easy reach of the town markets. On the other hand the industrialists were not, or did not think themselves, dependent upon British agriculture. If only artificial restrictions on the import of corn could be got rid of, they believed that they could buy abroad, with the products of their looms and forges, all the food they needed. British agriculture might go to utter ruin, and still, it would seem, British wealth would continue to increase. And in face of these facts the political predominance which the landowning interest still retained, down to and even after 1832, seemed more unreasonable than ever, and conflict between the old order and the new was inevitable.

§ 2. The Introduction of New Methods of Transport.

There was one thing which agriculture and industry had in common. Both depended for their prosperity upon the development of more efficient methods of transport. The new centres of population could not have existed if they had been compelled to depend upon the slow and expensive transport methods of the eighteenth century; they could not have been fed, still less could they have brought to market the weighty and bulky products of their factories. The invention of new facilities for transport was perhaps the greatest material achievement of this astonishing period.

We have seen\(^1\) how the first advance of the Industrial Revolution had been made possible by improvements in roads and waterways, the old traditional modes of locomotion which men had used since the beginning of time. In 1815 it was still upon these devices that the best brains

\(^1\) Above, pp. 122-3.
in civil engineering were at work. The canal system was almost completed; tens of thousands of 'navvies' had been at work upon it for two generations. And now the road system of Britain was being re-made by a series of engineers of whom Telford was the greatest. New methods of road-making gave a hard and firm surface such as the old roads had never possessed. On these beautiful roads it was possible to carry loads which would have been unthinkable a generation earlier; while stage-coaches, travelling ten miles an hour, were making passenger traffic easier than it had ever been.

But already mechanical power, which had transformed industry, was beginning to be applied to transport. In 1812 the first steamboat, the *Comet*, had appeared on the Clyde. Within a few years steamboats were being used freely for coasting traffic, and in 1840 the first regular transatlantic service was started. But it was only very gradually that steam ousted sails from sea-going traffic, because so great a part of the cargo-space in steamships had to be given up to coals; and for this reason mechanical transport by land, though it began later, succeeded far more quickly than mechanical transport by sea.

In the endeavour to find means of dealing with the transport problem on land, inventive men had long been at work upon two distinct ideas, on the one hand the use of steam-power for traction by road, and on the other hand the use of steel rails, laid on a level track, whereon even the horse could draw loads far greater than would be possible under ordinary conditions. The combination of these two ideas produced the railway. In 1825 a railway between Stockton and Darlington was opened, and at once a score of railway projects were set on foot. In 1830 a railway between Liverpool and Manchester was completed, and the success of the engine designed by George Stephenson, the engineer of the Stockton-Darlington line, convinced the trading world that the solution of the problem had been found.

It was applied with an amazing energy. Many railway companies were organised. By 1837 the main features of the modern railway system were already blocked out. By 1843 over 1800 miles of railway track were opened; by 1851 the figure had risen to 6500. All over the country armies of 'navvies' were at work, scoring the land with embankments, cuttings and tunnels; there were nearly 200,000 of them employed towards the end of the period. It is impossible not to admire the fierce energy of this achievement,
by which 6000 miles of railway were built in twenty years. Sentimentalists bemoaned it; superior persons sneered at it, and said 'I told you so' when a commercial panic followed the wild speculation which resulted from the railway mania; Oxford dons, Eton masters and solemn territorial magnates put obstacles in the way, and insisted that the vile thing should be kept aloof from them. But the steel rails were riveting the new social order upon the land of Britain. They were linking up the parts of the industrial system into an organised whole. They were turning Britain into a smaller and a more closely united community. They were making the population mobile. They were bringing home to everybody observing mind the dependence of the new social order upon mechanism.

The railway system was brought into existence in a haphazard, unregulated way, by a multitude of separate companies, often at cross-purposes and fiercely competitive. There were some who held that the development of this vitally important system of national communications ought to be undertaken by the State, or at least in accordance with an orderly plan devised by the State. Gladstone was one of these: as President of the Board of Trade, in 1844, he definitely anticipated the acquisition of the railways by the State, and provided for it. But this was, in fact, impracticable. The new order had come upon the country with such swiftness that it was in being before men had fully realised its significance or the range of its influence.

§ 3. The Supply and Organisation of Capital.

No one can reflect upon the enormous and febrile activities of these years without asking himself, Whence came the immense resources in wealth which were necessary for carrying them out? Who found the means for the erection of all the great factories, the construction of the innumerable and costly machines, the payment of all the armies of navvies who were laying out thousands of miles of railway? And these questions become still more challenging when it is remembered that during the same period British wealth was developing the resources of the new colonies, starting land-companies and paying the expenses of emigrants during the period when they had not begun to support themselves; and that, at the same time, it was to Britain that foreign Governments turned for loans, because London had become the financial capital of the world, the apparently inex-
haustible source from which wealth could be drawn for all sorts of purposes.

There is only one explanation of these facts. It is that the British people were not consuming all the wealth which they were creating, but were laying aside a very high proportion of it to be used as 'capital' for the creation of new wealth. It was this fact, and this alone, which rendered possible the incessant increase of wealth-production, the working out of new devices, the opening up of new countries. Britain was making new wealth with accumulating rapidity on the tacit condition that she should not spend or use more of it than was necessary, but should put it aside for reproductive purposes, just as the farmer who wants to increase his crops must put aside a larger proportion of each year's yield for seed.

So far as the major portion of the British peoples was concerned this abstinence or thrift was involuntary. The great labouring mass spent little because it got but a small proportion of the product to spend. In the growing middle class of professional men, distributive agents and managers, the habit of thrift was voluntary and deeply rooted, and it was greatly stimulated during this period by improved facilities for investment. Saving for investment had become an almost universal practice among the middle classes, and it was from this source that a large proportion of the capital required for railway construction and other purposes was drawn. Among the wealthy classes—the landowners and the organisers of the great industries to whom the name of 'capitalists' is (rather loosely) commonly applied—the wholesale creation of new capital was encouraged by three facts:—many of them had incomes so large that they could not spend them; the habit of personal ostentation was (in the manufacturing classes) restrained by social usage, and by the prevalence of the idea that a man's value was to be measured by the amount of his accumulated wealth; and the fascination of industrial enterprise and the pride of power formed with many of the ablest a yet stronger motive. These motives did not affect the landowning classes as powerfully as they affected the industrial classes, because the landowning classes had inherited a tradition of splendour of life which was reflected in the great palaces they had scattered over the face of the country, and because they had a wider range of tastes and interests than the new manufacturing class. It was therefore mainly the men of this class who created and controlled the immense body of new
capital by whose means the world was being remodelled. And this fact increased their resentment against the land-
owners' ascendancy in the political sphere.

Amongst the most important advances of the period was the development of means for 'canalising' the nation's un-
spent wealth, and making the savings of all available for the maintenance and expansion of industry. Two things espe-
cially contributed to this end, the use of joint-stock companies and the rapid development of banking. Both took enormous strides during this generation, and both stimulated the growth of the habit of saving and investment.

All the railways, gas undertakings and other public utilities were organised as 'Public Companies,' established by Act of Parliament. This fact gave confidence to investors, and these companies from the first largely drew their capital from a multitude of small investors. But there was also a rapid increase in the number of 'Private Companies,' which began to be used for the organisation of industrial enterprises too big for the individual capitalist. The Eighteenth Century had looked askance at this form of organisation, because it was held that there ought to be one man or a small group who could be held directly responsible in every industrial undertaking; and trading joint-stock companies had been practically prohibited by the 'Bubble Company,' Act of 1720. It was only in 1825 that this Act was repealed, though it had long been almost a dead letter. But investment in trading concerns was discouraged by the fact that the shareholder was regarded by the law as a partner in the concern, responsible in all his property for its undertakings, in spite of the fact that he could have no effective voice in controlling its operations. Investors were therefore inclined to be shy of industrial concerns until in 1837 an Act permitted the formation of Limited Liability Companies, in which the investor risked only the amount of his investment.

The development of the banking system was even more important as a means of stimulating industry than the growth of joint-stock companies; for when men acquired the habit of depositing their money in banks instead of keeping it in strong-boxes, the bankers could keep it con-
stantly employed in making advances to traders. When the period opened there were already some hundreds of banks in England. But they were all, except the Bank of England, small private banks, whose proprietors often had not enough capital to give adequate security to their cus-
tomers. The creation of joint-stock banks was prohibited
by law, in order to prevent any rivalry with the Bank of England. In 1826 Huskisson removed the prohibition from districts more than sixty-five miles from London, and in 1833 this limitation was withdrawn. The result was that joint-stock banks, backed by adequate capital, grew up in large numbers, and the whole of the richer and middle classes quickly acquired the habit of depositing their money with the banks. The average amount of deposits in the banks rose until it reached almost £300,000,000 in 1851. And most of this was available for advances to industry. In a very large degree the rapid progress of British industry during this period was due to the increase of banking facilities.

The development of joint-stock companies and the growth of the banking system between them secured that almost the whole of the unconsumed wealth of Britain was constantly available for use, instead of being locked up in unproductive forms. Capital became more and more fluid and easily handled, and this made vast enterprises possible which in any earlier age would have been out of the question.

Thus the two great factors which have rendered possible the gigantic undertakings of the modern world, engineering skill and freely disposable capital, were simultaneously being brought into operation. And because this had happened in Britain before it happened in any other country, Britain became for a time not only the world's workshop, but the world's financial centre; and it was mainly in London that the levers were worked by which the processes of trade and industry throughout the world were regulated. It was to London that foreign Governments turned when they wanted to float loans; and bills on London were becoming the means whereby commercial transactions in all parts of the world were carried on. Moreover, it was mainly through London, and the delicate and flexible machinery of finance which London controlled, that the means were found for rapidly opening up and developing the new countries of the world, for bringing the surplus population to the fields which awaited their labour, for equipping these lands with railways and other modern facilities, and for organising the marketing of their products.

§ 4. The Paradox of Popular Distress.

In the country which was displaying all this boundless energy and fertility of resource, and which was heaping up this colossal pyramid of wealth and economic power, a very
large proportion of the population—now multiplying at a pace hitherto unparalleled in history—were suffering from distresses such as their ancestors had never known. Tens of thousands of them were annually pouring out of the country in the hope of finding happier homes elsewhere; and those who remained seemed, throughout this generation, to be always on the verge of violent revolt. Here is a paradox which needs to be explained; and the best minds of that generation were much exercised by the attempt to explain it.

Some took refuge in mere fatalism. These distresses, they held, were the inevitable price that had to be paid for progress; 'the poor ye have always with you'; 'population always presses hard on the means of subsistence.' Others, with an optimism almost as deadening as this fatalism, held that these evils were the necessary result of a rapid transition, but that they would disappear if only the economic forces which were transforming society were allowed free play, and emancipated from outworn restrictions and from the well-meaning but mischievous meddlings of Government. Yet others, distressed by the spectacles of ugliness and cruelty which surrounded them, contented themselves with reviling the whole process which had brought about such results, with denouncing mechanism and the 'cash nexus,' and with praying vaguely but fervently for the coming of some kingly man who should, in some undefined way, lead the people back into happiness. The most intelligent among the labouring and suffering mass were convinced that the whole system of society was fundamentally awry, and must be completely reconstructed; and, indeed, it was obvious to the point of platitude that there was something radically wrong in an order of things in which the creation of immense wealth was not bringing well-being to those whose labour created it. But the revolutionary leaders whose guidance the working-class was accepting during this period were too often content merely to revile the greed of 'capitalists,' not realising that the moral condemnation of a whole class is always unhelpful. They did not suggest how the needful capital could be set aside if the existing methods were abandoned. They demanded vaguely that Society should be reconstructed, but had no clear plans for reconstruction. Indubitably the wealth which the British nation was creating was not justly divided among its members. If it had been justly divided, it is certain that nearly all of it would have been consumed as fast as it was created; there
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would have been little or no capital available for expansion, and therefore no increase in the divisible wealth. This is not a justification of injustice; it is the statement of a hard fact, which had to be recognised. The rapid increase of British wealth was perhaps unhealthy. But it was due to the immense scale on which new capital was created, and this in its turn was partly due to the inequality of distribution.

Why was the distribution so grossly unequal? Why was so great an increase of wealth accompanied by so much suffering? The causes were manifold, and not simple or easily removed. There was a tradition of low wages and of a low standard of life, which descended from the Great War, and was maintained by the ruinous influence of the Poor Law system; and this influence was not overcome until some time after the new Poor Law had been enacted in 1834. The extraordinary increase of population, in conjunction with the incessant invention of new labour-saving devices, meant that there was always a surplus of labour which kept wages low. Combination among the workpeople for collective bargaining (which was the only available remedy for these conditions) was prohibited by law until 1825; after 1825, and until 1848, the power of industrial combination was mainly used to forward vague and visionary schemes of wholesale revolution, and it was not until the next period that the Trade Unions settled solidly down to win improved conditions in one trade after another. The very swiftness with which the economic change was taking place necessarily involved acute suffering. It is hard to see by what means the agonies of the hand-loom weavers, for example, could have been mitigated during the period when their trade was being destroyed by the competition of the machines. No device could have done more than prolong the agony, like stimulants administered to a dying man. And finally, the new economic order was subject to oscillations, to cycles of good and bad trade, unlike anything that had earlier been known. Men had not seriously begun to study or understand this cyclical movement of trade, and until that was done no effective measures could be taken to guard against the recurrent periods of distress and unemployment.

All these considerations help to account for the cruel paradox of the juxtaposition of misery with increasing wealth. But they could not justify the acceptance of such conditions, as part of the order of nature; rather they formed a challenge to the wisdom and humanity of the whole com-
munity—a challenge which had to be taken up, if the British people were to regain social health and freedom. We shall see that the challenge was not disregarded, though the finding of the true remedies was to prove a slow and toilsome task.

CHAPTER VI

EUROPE IN REVOLUTION

(A.D. 1830-1850)

§ 1. Britain and the Continent.

In 1830 Britain and Europe suddenly and simultaneously entered upon a new political era. Britain overthrew the Tory oligarchy, and embarked upon twenty years of strenuous reconstructive work, national and imperial. Europe revolted against Metternich's repressive system, and passed into a period of violent and largely futile revolutions. In many ways the European revolutions affected the British reconstruction; they also influenced deeply the relations between Britain and her neighbours, and the direction of British foreign policy; they formed a very significant background to the reforming activity which we shall survey in the following chapters.

Since 1815 the reactionary Powers, led by Metternich, had succeeded in keeping Europe in the strait waistcoat of the Vienna settlement, and in repressing the liberal and nationalist movements which menaced its stability. But these movements were by no means quelled; they were growing stronger year by year; and they were now to show their potency in two revolutionary outbursts, the first of which, in 1830, affected a great part of Europe, achieved definite results in two countries, and brought about the first serious breaches in the settlement of 1815; while the second, in 1848, seemed for a moment to have brought down the whole system of absolutism in ruins, everywhere outside Russia. The interval between these outbreaks was disturbed by acute diplomatic controversies; while, underground, revolutionary agitation went on without a pause.

On the surface there was a remarkable correspondence between the course of events on the Continent and the course of events in Britain. The Tory ascendancy in Britain from 1815 to 1830 ran parallel with the ascendancy of the Metternich system on the Continent. The European revolutions of 1830 took place at the same moment as the fall of the
Tories. The revolutionary agitation which was at work in Europe between 1830 and 1848 had its parallel in the working-class agitations, especially the Chartist movement, which were at work in Britain. And the European revolutions of 1848 synchronised with the final demonstration of the Chartists.

But the resemblances between Britain and the Continent were less significant than the differences. Even the years 1815-1822 saw no such silencing of discussion in Britain as took place on the Continent; and there was no continental parallel to the useful reforms of the younger Tories between 1822 and 1830. The British revolution of 1830-32 was effected by constitutional means, and (apart from a little rioting) without violence; whilst its results were permanent, and were loyalty accepted by the defeated party. Unlike the revolutionary agitation on the Continent, the Chartist movement in Britain was not driven underground by any suppression of speech or writing, but was carried on openly and publicly, as a national debate. And the result was that when in 1848 soldiers were out and barricades were up in the streets of most of the capitals of Europe, all that happened in Britain was a big public meeting and the passage of three cabs through the streets of London with a petition to Parliament. The contrast between the results attained was even more striking than the contrast between the methods of discussion pursued on the Continent and in the Islands. For while the wars and tumults of Europe seemed to lead to very little definite result, in Britain there had been achieved, by 1850, a real transformation of the political and social order.

This led to a great increase in the prestige of Britain. Her institutions appeared to possess a stability and an elasticity which became the envy of other peoples. They had already shown their stability during the long wars. Now, at a time when fevered violence reigned everywhere else, they showed not only stability but a capacity for orderly and considered progress which gave far better results than violence was able to obtain anywhere else. British institutions therefore became the model upon which most of the European States reconstructed their systems during the years following 1850.

§ 2. The Revolutions of 1830.

The signal for the revolutions of 1830 was given by France, the acknowledged torch-bearer of revolution. Charles x.,
the second of the restored Bourbon kings, unwilling to submit to the restraints of the parliamentary régime which had been established by charter in 1814, issued a series of Ordinances (July 1830) which overrode some vital provisions of the charter. Thereupon a sudden revolt flamed up in Paris; barricades were raised in the narrow streets; in four days the resistance of Government collapsed; and Charles x. fled to Britain, the refuge equally of exiled monarchs and of banished agitators. In his place Louis Philippe, head of the Orleanist branch of the Bourbon line, was raised to the throne by a parliamentary vote. The leaders of this swift and peaceful revolution prided themselves upon the closeness with which they had followed the British model of 1689; they made the minimum of change, but they substituted for a divine-right king a king dependent upon Parliament. France had become a liberal State.

The revolution of July gave an immediate stimulus to revolutionary outbreaks in Belgium, Poland, Italy and Germany. But it also had important effects in Britain. It took place at the moment of the critical parliamentary election of 1830; and the quietness with which it was effected, and the moderation with which it was used, showed that constitutional change need not necessarily be followed by September Massacres and Reigns of Terror, and thus destroyed a bugbear which had long been an obstacle to reform. The Whig victory in the election of 1830 was partly due to the events in France. Moreover the Whig Government in Britain hastened to make friends with the new Government in France, and for the next ten years the entente between the two liberal Powers of the West was one of the determining factors in the politics of Europe. Lord Palmerston, the Whig Foreign Secretary, was a disciple of Canning, and, like Canning, he hated the Metternich system. But Palmerston went further than Canning. He adopted with zest the policy of giving support to both liberal and nationalist movements; and the entente with France greatly strengthened his hands.

The first test of the value of the entente was afforded by the Belgian revolution, which broke out as soon as the signal of revolt was given in Paris. Belgian national feeling was united in opposition to the subordination to Holland which had been imposed upon Belgium by the Treaty of Vienna. Encouraged by the success of the revolution in France, the Belgians suddenly broke into revolt, declared their independence, and set up a parliamentary system modelled on
that of Britain. The authority of the Dutch Government collapsed. But if the League of Powers to preserve the Vienna settlement had been intact, the Belgians would not have been able to make good their independence. As it was, France and Britain united in supporting them, while Austria and Russia were occupied by revolts in Italy and Poland. The problem was discussed at a conference at London, and the Eastern Powers reluctantly consented (1831) to recognise the independence of Belgium, with the proviso (which was meant as a safeguard against French aggression) that Belgium should be made a permanently neutral State like Switzerland, under the conjoint guarantee of the Great Powers. The King of Holland would not for some years accept this settlement, claiming the inviolable Treaty of Vienna as his warrant, and a French army and a British fleet had to be put in motion ere he would submit. But in 1839 the settlement of 1831 was, with slight modifications, confirmed. The first great breach in the Vienna settlement had been made; and it had been made by the co-operation of France and Britain.

There were revolutionary movements also in Italy, Germany and Poland; but here the Western Powers could not intervene, and the movements failed. In Poland, indeed, Tsar Nicholas seized upon the excuse to suppress the Polish system of government, which had been guaranteed by the Treaty of Vienna; and thus a second breach was made in that sacrosanct document. But the Belgian breach, made under the protection of the Western Powers, was a change in the direction of liberalism; the Polish breach, made by an agreement among the Eastern Powers, was a change in the direction of absolutism. Henceforward exiled Poles became the fanatical advocates of revolution in every European country.

Indeed, the chief results of the revolutions of 1830 and 1831 was the definite breakdown of the combination of Europe to maintain the sanctity of the settlement of 1815. The great League of Powers of 1815 was broken into two sharply contrasted groups: the two Western Powers were the proclaimed friends of liberal and nationalist causes; the three Eastern Powers were their declared enemies.

The leaders of the two groups were Britain and Russia, which now stood forth in a marked rivalry that was to last throughout the nineteenth century. Tsar Nicholas I., master of the vast landlocked Russian Empire, was a more stern and unbending defender of absolutism than Metternich him-
self. Lord Palmerston, who controlled British foreign policy during the greater part of the next period, was a restless and self-confident man, eager to have a finger in every pie, and ready to encourage every liberal movement on the Continent, though he was quite indifferent to reform movements at home; and the monarchs of Europe learnt to regard him with fear and distaste, as the fomenter of unrest. The general rivalry of Russia and Britain was made more acute by Russia's steady advance in Central Asia, where her progress aroused the alarm of the Government of India; while in Europe Nicholas was bent upon fulfilling the ancient ambition of Russia, by establishing his ascendancy over the Turkish Empire. So acute did the rivalry become between the continental despotism and the oceanic commonwealth that the diplomatic history of the next five-and-twenty years has been described as a long duel between Palmerston and Nicholas, the one representing liberalism, the other autocracy. That is an exaggerated way of stating the case, but it is not without an element of truth.

§ 3. The Eastern Question in a New Phase.

During the half-century from 1830 to 1880 the subject on which the rivalry of Britain and Russia was most constantly displayed was the Eastern Question, the problem of the future of the Turkish Empire. Except for a moment under Pitt, Britain had never taken any deep interest in the Turkish problem. Now, under the impulse of her fear of Russia, she came to regard the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire as a vital British interest, almost the main principle of her foreign policy. This policy was enthusiastically adopted by Palmerston, and was maintained by all his successors, of both parties, until Gladstone broke away from it in 1878; and it is necessary to understand how it came to be adopted.

In 1830 the Turkish Empire seemed to be on the eve of dissolution. It had been helpless against the Greek revolt, until the Sultan called in the aid of his very independent vassal, Mehemet Ali of Egypt. It had been still more helpless against the invading Russian armies of 1828 and 1829, and had been forced to accept a humiliating peace, and to promise an indemnity which it had no means of paying. Dissolution threatened the Turkish Empire on two sides: on the one side was the menace of Russia, on the other the am-

1 See above, Bk. vii. chap. viii. p. 114.
bition of the Sultan's unruly vassal, Mehemet Ali of Egypt. Since the time of Catherine II. it had been the aim of Russian policy to get control over Constantinople. Nicholas I. shared this ambition, but he knew that the other Powers would not willingly allow him to attain his end by conquest. He aimed, therefore, at bringing Turkey under a sort of Russian protectorate; and the threatening power of Mehemet Ali offered him an opportunity of achieving this aim.

Mehemet Ali was a ruthless oriental despot, but he was also a very able man. He had brought all the resources of Egypt under his control, and he devoted all the wealth which he drew from a pitiless exploitation of his subjects to the organisation of a great military power. Seen from a distance, his rule seemed to compare very favourably with that of the Sultan, or any other Eastern potentate. The French, who had taken a special interest in Egypt ever since Napoleon's expedition, made him their protégé, and hoped through him to establish their influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Mehemet's military and naval strength had been shown in the Greek war, when his son Ibrahim would have drowned the Greek rising in blood if Russia, France and Britain had not intervened. For his help in Greece Mehemet had demanded a high reward from his suzerain the Sultan. He had already received Crete, but Syria also had been promised to him. In 1831 his son Ibrahim invaded Syria and easily overran it. The Sultan declared him a rebel, but Ibrahim defeated the armies sent against him, marched into Asia Minor, and threatened Constantinople. Having no other means of defence, the Sultan could only appeal to the Powers for aid. Russia sent a fleet to defend Constantinople, while France used her influence with Mehemet, and persuaded him to be content with Syria, and to withdraw his troops. But the cession of Syria was a bitter pill for the Sultan. Looking forward to vengeance, he consented to a treaty of defensive alliance with the Tsar (Unkiar-Skelessi, 1833), by which Russia was permitted to send ships of war through the Bosphorus, and practically acquired a protectorate over Turkey.

But at this the other Powers took alarm. During the next few years a many-sided diplomatic struggle was waged in Constantinople, and the Sultan found himself surrounded by professed well-wishers all of whom assured him that they bore him a far more disinterested affection than Russia. Henceforth, for eighty years, Constantinople was to be the
scene of incessant intrigues, and the Turk acquired a very pretty skill in playing off his friends one against the other. The Tsar was forced to recognise that it would be impossible to exercise the single-handed protectorate for which he had hoped; and Turkey passed under the singularly ineffective joint guardianship of all the Great Powers. On the whole she was inclined to give most of her favour to Britain, who enjoyed for a generation predominant influence at Constantinople, especially after 1842, when the embassy at Constantinople was given to Stratford Canning, who showed a remarkable power of holding his own in the web of intrigue, and of winning the confidence of the Turkish ministers.

In 1838 the Sultan thought he was strong enough to deal with Mehemet Ali, and his armies were ordered to drive that usurper out of Syria. They met with as little good fortune as in 1832, and once more an Egyptian army threatened Constantinople. But now Mehemet had to deal with the Concert of Europe. The Tsar was too wise to act on the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi; but he saw a chance of driving a wedge between France and Britain, whose entente was inconvenient to the Eastern monarchies. France was anxious to make the best terms for Mehemet, and to secure for him a large and independent empire. Palmerston, on the other hand, regarded Mehemet as the source of disturbance; he was perturbed by Mehemet’s aggressive activity not only in Syria but in Arabia, where his conquests provided the occasion for the British occupation of Aden (1839); and he had persuaded himself that the strength of the Turkish Empire must be maintained as a safeguard against Russia, and that it could reorganise itself with British help. He demanded that Mehemet should be limited to Egypt, and kept in a state of vassalage. The other Powers agreed; and, without any consultation with France, these terms were forcibly imposed upon Mehemet.

The consequences of this solution were twofold. On the one hand, Turkey learnt to regard Britain as her friend and protector, and during the next ten years pretentious and ineffectual projects of reform were set on foot by an Anglo-phil Vizier, Reshid Pasha. They came to nothing; but even Stratford Canning, who knew his Turk, seems to have believed in them. On the other hand, the Franco-British entente was broken. France was so much wounded that for a moment, in 1840, she was on the point of going to war. This folly was avoided; but the fruitful partnership of the two liberal Powers was dissolved in bitterness.
§ 4. The Revolutionary Movement in Europe, and the Revolutions of 1848.

While the Governments of Europe were engrossed by the Eastern Question and many other diplomatic problems on which we need not touch, there was going on, beneath their feet and almost unmarked, a movement of opinion which was soon to bring about an upheaval more sudden and more widespread than even that of 1789. The ideal of Nationalism and the vision of Democracy were taking possession of the minds and hearts not merely of a few students and poets but of great masses of people in all the countries of Western Europe; and alongside of them another ferment was beginning to work, though as yet less potently—the ferment of Socialism.

Some part of this stir of ideas was due to men of learning, whose writings seemed to have no direct revolutionary bearing: the studies of historians, philologists, and political philosophers in Germany, Italy, France and other countries, were stimulating the sense of national pride, reviving the ardours of 1789, and providing new arguments for the apostles of democracy. But far more important was the underground revolutionary movement which went on in innumerable secret societies in almost every European country. It was secret because in almost every country save Britain no real freedom of discussion was allowed, either in the press or in meetings. The suppression of discussion was held to be a safeguard against revolution. It was, in truth, the very opposite, for the wildest dreams and projects flourished in obscurity, unrestrained by the healthy winds of criticism. There was ferment in Britain as on the Continent. But it went on openly, unchecked; it was subject to criticism, and made reasonable thereby; and for that reason it led to no violence. And if, in the end, the British agitation seemed to have achieved nothing, that was but a superficial impression, for the long public controversy impressed upon the mind of the nation a sense of the ills which had led to it.

In general this vast underground propaganda preached, with a sanguine faith, the doctrine of complete democracy as a sure avenue to the Millennium. But with this doctrine was linked, in all the lands which were disunited or subject to foreign dominion, the yet more inspiring vision of national unity and freedom. It was in these years that nationalism became a powerful motive force in European history, and
began to rule the minds of thousands like a religion. The most striking feature of the movement was that it was international in its character; and this was due to the fact that the repressive policy of the reactionary Governments drove the most active spirits into exile. They naturally took refuge in the few places where freedom was allowed to thrive; and there, comparing notes and drawing inspiration from one another, they turned the many national conspiracies into one great international conspiracy. They gathered in Paris, in Brussels, in Switzerland. But above all they gathered in London; for, in defiance of the protests of European Governments, Britain opened her hospitable gates to all political refugees, so long as they observed the laws. It was the gathering of these polyglot, cosmopolitan enthusiasts and conspirators in common centres that accounted for the simultaneity with which the revolution, when it came, broke out in every part of Europe as soon as the signal was given.

Among all these exiles the greatest was the noble and selfless Italian patriot, Joseph Mazzini, to whom, more than to any other man, was due the definition of the doctrine of nationality in its most exalted form. He had taken up the cause of Italian unity in 1830; he had spent six years as a hunted exile in France and Switzerland; and in 1837 he took refuge in London, where he spent most of the remainder of his life, writing and contriving forlorn hopes; his influence was deeply felt in Britain. Mazzini's faith in democracy was as fervent as his belief in nationality: the two causes were inseparable in his mind. But his nationalism was by no means exclusively Italian. He dreamed of a Europe that should consist of a brotherhood of free nations, living together in peace and mutual respect; and it was the loftiness of this ideal which won for him the reverence of thousands of generous-minded men in all countries.

The twin causes of Nationalism and Liberalism (whose future conflicts the dreamers did not foresee) afforded the main inspiration of the revolutionary movement. But alongside of them was emerging the new gospel of Socialism. The Industrial Revolution was spreading from Britain to Europe; and wherever it was at work the discontents which it had already evoked in Britain found expression. There were many Utopian projects, and many little Socialist groups were at work during these years, though their influence as yet was not great. But now two writers appeared who had definite programmes to offer. In France
Louis Blanc published in 1839 a work on the *Organisation of Labour*, in which he advocated the organisation of industries in factories financed by the State, but controlled by the workmen instead of by capitalist entrepreneurs. The book went through six editions between 1839 and 1848, and had a powerful influence in the French revolution of the latter year. In 1847, on the eve of the revolution, a far more important work appeared: *The Communist Manifesto*, written by an exiled German-Jew, Karl Marx. It proclaimed the grim and desolate creed that all history consisted of the struggles of classes for economic supremacy; that the next struggle must be between the 'proletarians' or wage-earners and the 'capitalists' who (in Marx's view) took most of the wealth created by the proletarians' labour without contributing anything themselves; that this struggle necessitated 'a violent overturning of all existing social order'; and that, to this end, the proletarians of all lands must disregard national distinctions, and unite in a common cause. The *Manifesto* fell flat at the moment; but its appearance was a portent.

Ere long (1849) Marx had to take refuge in Britain, the one safe harbour for exiles and dreamers, where he spent the rest of his life. In London he made the acquaintance of Mazzini; but the prophets of the two most explosive ideas which have been at work in modern Europe had the lowest opinion of one another. Marx, an unflinching materialist, felt nothing but contempt for the idealism of the Italian prophet; Mazzini, on his part, distrusted a man of whom he felt that 'hatred outweighs love in his heart.'

Suddenly, in the spring of 1848, all this preparation bore fruit in a simultaneous outburst of revolution which affected almost every European State from the Straits of Dover to the Vistula. Everywhere the resistance of the constituted Governments collapsed as easily as the walls of Jericho fell before the trumpets of the Israelites. Everywhere democratic systems were set up; and across a continent that seemed to be dissolved in chaos two great undisturbed States looked at one another: Britain, preserved from disorder by her own expanding freedom, and watching with sympathy the struggles of other peoples to be free; and Russia, safeguarded by the stern despotism of her master, and waiting for an opportunity to intervene in behalf of absolutism. For a time it seemed that complete democracy was going to triumph throughout Europe, and the revolutionary leaders, in the intoxication of victory, felt nothing but con-
tempt for the slow and cautious advance which Britain had made. But the new national and democratic States collapsed as quickly as they had arisen. Within three years they had all fallen, and the old Governments had resumed their sway, sobered and alarmed, but secure. Once more, violent revolution had proved to be the most treacherous and uncertain path towards liberty.

We cannot here attempt even the baldest summary of the complex and intricate events which filled the years 1848 and 1849. But some of their broad results may be noted, because of their importance for the future. In France a system of the most complete democracy, based upon universal suffrage, was easily established. But when the President of the new republic came to be elected by popular vote, an overwhelming majority of votes was cast for Louis Napoleon, nephew of the great conqueror. This ominous event was partly due to the dangerous situation which had been created in Paris by a misconceived attempt to put into effect a parody of the project of Louis Blanc; for a mob of armed workmen, collected in Paris by the promise of State-organised work, became so formidable that hard fighting and heavy loss of life were incurred in reducing them to obedience. After three years of conflict with the democratic Assembly, the President established his personal power by a coup d'état, restored the despotic system of his uncle, and then obtained an overwhelming plebiscite vote in support of what he had done (1852). Democracy based upon universal suffrage had been established among a people untrained in self-government; and the first use which it made of its powers was to destroy itself, and to establish a despotism which in twenty years brought France to ruin. In Italy an almost simultaneous rising swept away all the petty princes; but the revolutionary leaders could not agree among themselves, and by the summer of 1849 the old régime had been everywhere restored. Real heroism was displayed in many of the episodes of the Italian revolution, notably in Garibaldi's defence of Rome; but there was only one of all the Italian States which preserved the liberal institutions set up in 1848. This was the little kingdom of Sardinia; and its brave liberalism made it the nucleus of the future united Italy. In the Austrian Empire all the discordant races struck for their national freedom, and the populace of Vienna drove the Emperor to take refuge in the Tyrol. But the mutual jealousies of the various peoples led to their undoing; Hungary, the last among them to hold out, was
defeated partly by the hatred of its Slav subjects, partly by an army which the Tsar sent across the Carpathians, at the critical moment, to stamp out the embers of revolution. Finally, in Germany the revolution began with the simultaneous establishment or promise of democracy in all the thirty-nine States, including even Prussia; while a democratic Parliament was elected to draft a constitution for united Germany, in place of Metternich's futile Confederation. But provincial jealousies, the rivalry of Prussia and Austria, and the unpractical policy of the revolutionary leaders, ruined these fair hopes. By 1850 the vision of united Germany had been dissipated; the Confederation was re-established under the presidency of Austria; Prussia had been humiliated; and all that remained from the revolution was the existence of more or less ineffective parliamentary systems in a number of the States—notably in Prussia, which now first entered the ranks of the parliamentary countries.

In 1850, reaction once more reigned in most of the European States; and the revolution which had been so long in preparation, and which had opened with such brilliant success, seemed to have wrought more harm than good. This was not wholly true, for in many ways the memory of the great uprising of the peoples influenced the minds of their rulers, and modified their policy. But at least the conclusion seemed to be established that violent revolution formed a terribly uncertain mode of attaining useful results. Belief in revolution as a quick way of reaching the Millennium had haunted the mind of Europe since 1789. The disasters of 1848 destroyed this belief; and the European peoples turned to other modes of satisfying their desires. Nothing more contributed to this process of conversion than the spectacle of what had meanwhile been happening in Britain. For Britain also had had her revolutionary movement; but instead of closing the safety-valves, she had let it blow itself off, nay, she had used it to gain driving-power for great labours of reform.

[Grant and Temperley, Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries; Hazen, Europe since 1815; Seignobos, Political History of Contemporary Europe; Vander Linden, Belgium; Cameron, Egypt in the Nineteenth Century; Frost, Secret Societies of the European Revolution; Berlin, Karl Marx; Namier, 1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe; Temperley and Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy; Bell, Life of Palmerston; Temperley, England and the Near East: 1. The Crimea; A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy and The Italian Problem in European Diplomacy 1847-9; Whyte, Evolution of Modern Italy; Trevelyan, Garibaldi’s Defence of the Roman Republic and Manin and the Venetian Revolution of 1848.]
CHAPTER VII

THE GREAT REFORM ACT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

(A.D. 1830-1832)

§ 1. The Fight for Reform.

When George IV. died it had become evident that a strong and sustained attack was about to be made upon the entrenched power of the landowning oligarchy. But it was still doubtful whether the necessary changes would be made by constitutional or by revolutionary means. The difficulties in the way of constitutional action seemed overwhelmingly great; for this would mean that the oligarchy, which controlled both Houses of Parliament, would have to consent to its own overthrow. There had been many reform motions in Parliament; they had led to nothing save the cancellation of the electoral privilege in a couple of exceptionally corrupt boroughs. The Whigs, it is true, had adopted the cause of parliamentary reform. But the Whigs were great landowners and borough-owners like the Tories; nobody expected much from them. Moreover, though the election of 1830 increased their numbers in the House of Commons, they had no secure majority. The Duke of Wellington was still able to go on for a time; and his attitude towards the question of the day (which was the attitude of most Tories) was expressed in a speech in the House of Lords, in which he announced that he would 'always feel it his duty to resist' parliamentary reform, and made the famous declaration that if he had to frame a legislature, 'I do not mean to assert that I could form such a legislature as you possess now, for the nature of man is incapable of reaching such excellence at once; but my great endeavours would be to form some description of legislature which would produce the same results.'

The Duke's Government was defeated, but only by a combination of the Whigs with those extreme Tories who could not forgive Catholic Emancipation. Earl Grey, the
Whig leader, formed a ministry; but it had a very precarious majority, and it was a characteristically Whig junto—there were only two members of the cabinet who were not peers or the sons of peers, and these two were great landowners. What chance was there that such a cabinet, in such a Parliament, would carry any real measure of reform? The sole chance seemed to lie in violent revolution; and the ease and swiftness with which a revolution had just been effected in France reconciled many moderate men to the prospect.

Revolution, indeed, was in the air in 1830. The Home Office was deluged with warnings of an intended rising in London. The Radicals were holding crowded nightly meetings, and mouthing loud threats. It was thought unsafe to let the new King drive through the streets to the opening of Parliament. In Birmingham a great Political Union had been organised by Thomas Attwood at the beginning of the year, and it was enrolling thousands of recruits, many of whom were drawn from the normally conservative middle class. In the North there was an epidemic of strikes; there was a great project to combine all the Trade Unions for the overthrow of 'capitalism'; there was talk of a march on London by 40,000 men. In the Southern counties a Peasants' Revolt broke out in this year. Beginning in Kent in August, it spread rapidly into Sussex, Hampshire, Wiltshire and Berkshire. The sky was aflame with the reflection of burning ricks; threshing-machines were destroyed; threatening letters signed by 'Captain Swing' were received by landowners and farmers; for a time some districts were at the mercy of the rebels. This movement, it is true, had no political aims. It was a blind protest by the rural labourers against the misery to which they had been reduced by the agrarian revolution and the Poor Law system. But it was highly alarming to the land-owning oligarchy. The first task which fell to the new Whig Government was that of suppressing this pitiful revolt; and under the direction of the Home Secretary, Lord Melbourne, it was sternly done. Special commissions of judges were sent down to deal with the affected regions; and after trials whose records are harrowing to read, many ignorant and misguided men were hanged, and scores were shipped off as convicts to Australia.

Thus everywhere revolution seemed to be afoot. This was the atmosphere, an atmosphere of strain and apprehension, amid which Lord Grey's ministry, with its pre-
carious majority, with its own aristocratic traditions, and
without the backing of any enthusiasm in the country, took
up the task of guiding Britain out of her troubles. The
proud governing class, which had never yielded to any
threats even from Napoleon at his mightiest, knew that
revolution was in the air, and most of them were ready to
meet it with defiance. Could a more excellent way be
found? Could the governing class have the magnanimity
to recognise that the day of their domination was over, and
themselves throw open the gates of the citadel, not as to
a conquering enemy, but as to fellow-citizens? On the
answer to that question depended the future of Britain and
of the British Commonwealth.

(Earl Grey, the Whig Prime Minister upon whom this
heavy responsibility rested, was the same Charles Grey who
had twice introduced reform proposals in the House of
Commons in the dark days of anti-revolutionary obscurant-
ism. An aristocrat to his finger-tips, dignified, courageous,
punctiliously honourable, and distrustful of all extravagance
in word or deed, he was no believer in democracy; but he
did believe in liberty and equal laws, and he felt the injustice
of entrenched class privilege.) One of his first acts was to
appoint a cabinet committee to draft a Reform Bill. The
chairman was Grey's son-in-law, Lord Durham, an able,
hot-tempered, generous-minded young man, whose advanced
opinions had earned for him the sobriquet of Radical Jack.
His two chief colleagues were Lord John Russell, son of
the Duke of Bedford, a zealous young reformer; and
Lord Althorp, son of Earl Spencer, also a proclaimed re-
former, and a man of transparent sincerity and scrupulous
honour. These men were of the bluest blood of the Whig
aristocracy; but they were also the young men, the bold
men, of the party; and Grey had given them their chance.
They produced their proposals; the Cabinet gasped, but
swallowed them; and Lord John Russell was given the task
of introducing the bill in the House of Commons.

When Lord John rose in his place on March 1, 1831,
nobody inside or outside of Parliament expected from the
Whigs any drastic proposals of change. Everybody was
therefore startled, and either delighted or horrified, by the
magnitude of the scheme. It proposed to admit copy-
holders and leaseholders, besides freeholders, to the county
franchise. It proposed to sweep away the anomalies of the
borough franchise by conferring the vote upon every tenant

1 See above, pp. 165 and 169.
of premises worth £10 a year—only 4s. a week. This would disfranchise many voters in the very few democratic constituencies like Westminster and Preston, but it would place supreme political power in the hands of a new political class. But, most sensational of all, the bill proposed to deprive fifty-five close boroughs of the right of returning two members, and to strip fifty more of one of their members, while forty-two populous boroughs were to be represented. This was the part of the Bill which most impressed the public imagination. The 'borough-owner' was smitten hip and thigh. The hoary abuse of the 'pocket-borough,' the very symbol of irresponsible class-ascendancy, was to disappear from the British system.

In Parliament the first feeling was one of consternation and incredulity. One hundred and fifty members heard that the constituencies for which they sat were to be abolished. The Whigs had betrayed their order. On the other hand the country was captivated by the magnitude and courage of the scheme. The debates in Parliament were followed with a closeness never known before. Newspapers could find space for nothing but the great discussion. Crowds came out from the towns to meet the stage-coaches and get early news. All the talk of revolution came to an end, save among a very few irreconcilable extremists. The Whigs had become the leaders of an almost united nation; and the danger of a class-war for the possession of political power was averted, because one section of the governing class had frankly taken the lead on the popular side.

But the forces of resistance were very powerful, and the struggle was a long one. The second reading of the bill was carried by only one vote. Then Parliament was dissolved; and so great was the public enthusiasm that even in the unreformed constituencies the Government obtained a very large majority. Reintroduced, the bill was carried through the new House of Commons by majorities of over 100. It went up to the House of Lords (September 1831), while the public agitation for 'the Bill, the whole Bill, and nothing but the Bill' grew more vehement, and there was talk of forcible resistance if the Lords should reject the bill. The Lords did reject the bill, by a majority of 41; though many who hated it abstained from voting because they recognised the danger of rejecting it. Feeling in the country mounted to fever-height. Consols fell. Merchants and bankers met to express their 'grief, surprise and dismay.' There were vast meetings and processions in London
and the big towns, and serious riots at Derby and Nottingham, while at Bristol the mob sacked the Mansion-house and the Bishop’s palace, and burnt down the gaols. A very little might have brought a violent upheaval. Sydney Smith, the witty Whig parson, rendered a real public service when he awakened the popular sense of humour by an apologue which made the whole nation laugh. He compared the House of Lords to Mrs. Partington, striving with her mop to sweep a high tide out of her house. ‘The Atlantic was roused. Mrs. Partington’s spirit was up. But I need not tell you the contest was unequal. The Atlantic Ocean beat Mrs. Partington. Gentlemen, be at your ease—be quiet and steady. You will beat Mrs. Partington.’

In December 1831 the bill was introduced for a third time, and passed through the Commons; and in March 1832 it once more came up to the Lords. The waverers, who feared revolution, had increased in number, and the bill passed its second reading by 9 votes. But in committee the opposition carried the postponement of the clauses disfranchising the pocket-boroughs. Thereupon Grey resigned, and the final storm began. Wellington tried to form a ministry; public feeling would have none of him. There were plans for an open revolt. Francis Place, who was in the thick of it, began to organise a run on the Bank of England, and covered the hoardings of London with placards: ‘Go for Gold and Stop the Duke.’ But before the excitement passed into tumult Wellington gave up his hopeless task, and Grey resumed office, armed by a reluctant promise from the King that he would create sufficient peers to carry the bill. Anxious to avoid this necessity, the King wrote to Wellington suggesting that abstentions in the Lords would save the situation; and Wellington, recognising as a soldier when a position was untenable, withdrew from the discussion, followed by many others. In doing so he recognised what henceforth became a doctrine of the constitution—that the House of Lords must not persist in opposition when the will of the nation was clear. The battle was won. Revolution had been averted by the good sense and public spirit of the ruling oligarchy, one half of which had voluntarily opened the gates of the citadel, while the other half, after fighting hard, had withdrawn from the conflict, not without dignity. On June 7, 1832, the royal assent was given to the greatest new departure yet deliberately made in British government; and the field was clear for the work of reconstruction.
§ 2. The Significance of the Reform Act.

The real significance of the Reform Act was that it broke away from prescription and precedent, which had hitherto governed British constitutional development, and deliberately altered the foundations of government: even the Revolution of 1688 was based upon prescription, since it was justified by the assertion that James II. had disregarded established and customary laws. To get rid of the tyranny of prescription was the first step in a process of conscious reconstruction. It is to the credit of the governing class that it frankly accepted and acted upon this change of principle. For that reason it was permitted to retain the leadership of the nation; but it was leadership, and not mastery, which it now enjoyed. Its continued leadership was no doubt in part due to snobbishness. But snobbishness means not only an exaggerated deference for one's 'social superiors,' it also induces an eager imitation of their ways. In so far as these ways are admirable, snobbishness may be a useful social force. The British ruling class had, through long training, acquired many qualities which were invaluable for the conduct of public affairs; and these were carefully mimicked by the new strata which successively made their way to active participation in power. Some of the best traditions of British government, its dignity, its sense of the importance of 'good form' and of 'fair play,' its loyalty to agreements once arrived at, and, perhaps above all, the participation in public life of a higher proportion of men of education and leisure than are to be found in the public life of most other countries, have been due to the way in which a long tradition was saved from any sudden breach in 1832.

Because the Act of 1832 established the principle that no prescriptive rights may prevail against the national will, it affected not only the House of Commons, to which it directly referred, but the Crown and the House of Lords. The Crown lost the power of influencing the composition of ministries: the last occasion on which the Crown attempted to use this power was in 1834, when William IV. dismissed the Melbourne Ministry because he disapproved of some of its members, though it commanded a majority in the House of Commons. A general election reversed his decision; he had to submit; and thenceforward—and especially after the accession of Queen Victoria in 1837—the Crown accepted the decision of the popular vote on these questions. Again,
the House of Lords had recognised the limits of its power in 1832. Henceforward it was, on the whole, careful to observe them, always giving way in face of a manifest expression of the public will; and to this it owed its survival through a period of rapid change.

It is usual to say that the Act of 1832 gave political power to the middle class. This is scarcely an accurate statement, since many thousands who could afford houses worth 4s. a week could not, in any ordinary use of the term, be described as belonging to the middle class. But it was undoubtedly with this class that preponderant power was vested, and it was their favour that politicians strove to win. The governing opinion of Britain during the next generation was the opinion of people of moderate means, neither rich nor poor, industrious but not overworked, and generally thrifty, unadventurous, conventional, unimagination, soberly religious and anxiously respectable. They fixed the character of the next era. Political philosophers from Aristotle to Lecky have sung the praises of the middle class. One quality we may at least allow to them: putting a high value upon minute social distinctions among themselves, they are free from any unified class-consciousness, and by that fact are emancipated from the grosser temptations of class ascendancy. This was why they willingly accepted the leadership of the older ruling class. This was why, after thirty-five years of supremacy, they voluntarily abdicated their control of political power, and opened the gates of the citadel to the class of manual workers, who had meanwhile ceased to be obstreperous and menacing.

(The Act of 1832 not only changed the balance of power in national politics, it also brought a great change in the character of the two historic political parties.) The Whigs, who after their great victory held almost a monopoly of power for nearly ten years, had been an aristocratic 'connexion'; and their successive ministries were still very exclusive in character, consisting almost wholly of peers and the sons of peers. But their following in the new Parliament was very different from the old Whig 'connexion.' It included Philosophic Radicals of the school of Bentham, popular Radicals like Cobbett, Irish Repealers led by O'Connell, spokesmen of the 'dissenting interest,' representatives of the great industries, and enthusiasts for reform in many special fields. Many of them were restive under Whig leadership, though they kept the ministry in power; and indeed the impetus for the reforming activity of the
next years came from these groups, not from the Whig magnates. The name of Whig, though it was still used, no longer suited this variegated host of reformers. The ministries were Whig, but the driving force behind them, to which the constructive work of the period was mainly due, cannot be accurately described by that name; and we shall not hesitate to use the word Liberal as the only appropriate designation for the composite party of reform, though it did not begin to be habitually employed until the later 'thirties, as an umbrella to cover both Whigs and Radicals. In truth, the British Liberal party, which has always included many groups bound together by no rigid creed, began its existence in 1832.

An equally marked change was coming over the Tories, some of whom submitted to the new order sulkily and with resentment, while others accepted it frankly. Among the latter was Sir Robert Peel, who was not merely the ablest of the Tories, but beyond comparison the ablest and the strongest man in either party. Peel was the most characteristically British of nineteenth-century statesmen. Upright and public-spirited, with a strong grasp of the facts that came within his horizon, and a great gift of massive and persuasive argument, he seldom looked far ahead, and was distrustful of doctrines and theories. Three times in his career, on Catholic Emancipation, on Parliamentary Reform, on Free Trade, he was forced by the logic of events to discard the views he had held, and to change his course. He did so frankly and openly, although on two occasions this involved shattering his party; yet he preserved the trust and esteem of his fellow-citizens. As soon as the first reformed Parliament met, he announced that he regarded the decision of 1832 as irrevocable, and that, far from resisting all change, he desired to reform every admitted abuse, but to do so cautiously and gradually, so as to make the least possible breach of continuity. This attitude was still more clearly expressed in the manifesto which he issued to his constituents at Tamworth in the election of 1834. Peel's attitude was resented by many of the older Tories, but it won for him the confidence of a growing body of opinion in the country, drawn from all sections of the community. The party which Peel led was not to resist, but to be a partner in, the work of reconstruction. Even in opposition this was so: as leader of the opposition Peel gave real help in the reconstructive measures of the decade following 1832; and when at length he obtained effective
power, the measures which he carried were as essentially liberal in character as those which had been introduced by the Whig ministries. For a policy of this kind the name of Tory seemed to be inappropriate. It was henceforward used only for the extreme reactionaries; and the name Conservative came into use in its place.

Between the two parties thus reconstructed there was no absolute cleavage. Both recognised the need for change, and both were largely influenced by the ideas of the Benthamites and the Economists, which in the main dictated the character of the reconstructive legislation. Hence this work, which we shall analyse in the next chapter, had a marked unity of character, whether it was carried by Liberal or Conservative ministries; and we shall deal with the whole process under the title of 'The Liberal Reconstruction,' because it was inspired by the essential liberal ideal, that, as human progress and social health depend upon individual character, ability and energy, all means should be adopted which will free individuality from needless restraints, and enable it to work for its own advantage and that of the community.

Because there was no fundamental cleavage between the two main parties, they obtained, especially from 1834 onwards, an almost equal degree of support from the electorate. Majorities were never large, and the party in power always had to give weight to the criticism of the party in opposition. Party ties were by no means rigid, and men passed easily from one side to the other: the real tug was between the reactionary Tories on the one side, and the eager Radicals on the other, each striving to influence the solid body of moderate opinion. This state of things had one very healthy result. As the party in opposition could always hope that it would soon be called upon to govern, it was always active in criticism, but its criticism was always weighted by a sense of responsibility, and was seldom merely negative or destructive. 'Her Majesty's Opposition' thus became as essential an element in the working of the national system as Her Majesty's Government itself; and for that reason the system enjoyed a high degree of purity and stability which more than counterbalanced such defects as it possessed; while the results arrived at were genuinely agreed results, the outcome of real discussion.

But it was not only Parliament or its parties which shared in the legislative activity of this period. One of the outstanding features of the period was the immense amount of
work that was done by Royal Commissions or Parliamentary Committees appointed to inquire into large public problems before legislative action was taken. Practically all the important enactments of the time were based upon the reports of such bodies, which collected great masses of material, and heard vast numbers of witnesses. The most active part in these bodies was frequently taken by comparatively unknown men, often not even members of Parliament, but selected on the ground of their special knowledge. Some of these men (such as Edwin Chadwick, the real author of the new Poor Law) were keen disciples of Bentham, and carried into politics Bentham's love of system, and his passion for detailed and scientific investigation. They deserve no small part of the credit for the legislative work of the period.

For these reasons—because both parties were broadly working in the same direction, and because much of the best work was done independently of party—the questions of party strategy and the vicissitudes of party warfare, which bulk so largely in most narratives of the period, were really of minor importance; and in the next chapter we shall for the most part put them aside, in order to survey in a coherent way the legislative work of the period; we shall also disregard the undercurrent of revolutionary agitation which went on throughout the reconstructive period, leaving it for treatment in a later chapter. But it will be convenient to summarise very briefly here the changes of ministry which took place between 1832 and 1852, for convenience of reference.

Grey did not long retain the office of Prime Minister after his victory of 1832. He retired in 1834, and the ministry was reconstructed under Lord Melbourne. But William iv., objecting to some of the arrangements which Melbourne proposed, forced him to resign in spite of his large majority, and called Sir Robert Peel to power. Peel, of course, demanded a dissolution, the result of which was to restore the Whigs to power, but with a greatly reduced majority. Becoming gradually more impotent and ineffective, Melbourne's Government lasted into the reign of Queen Victoria, and it fell to him to render the invaluable service of training the young Queen in the duties of a constitutional monarch. Melbourne resigned in 1839, but Peel, once more Prime Minister, held office only for a moment, owing to a dispute with the Queen as to whether the Ladies of the Bedchamber should be changed when one party succeeded
another in office; and the Whigs, now both weak and discredited, lingered on till 1841. Then came Peel's great ministry, his first real tenure of power. His Repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 broke his party, and was followed by his defeat; and from 1846 until 1852 the Whigs, now led by Lord John Russell, carried on the government in dependence upon the support of the small group of Peel's personal followers, who were ultimately to be merged in the Liberal party, and to 'unwhig' it finally. In the course of these twenty years there were two periods of first-rate importance, 1832-1836, and 1841-1846; but between and after these more exciting spells, the stream of reconstructive legislation went on incessantly; and the period is most conveniently treated as a single whole.

[Butler, Passing of the Great Reform Bill; Trevelyan, Lord Grey of the Reform Act; Greville Memoirs; Spencer Walpole, History of England from 1815 and Life of Lord J. Russell; Porritt, Unreformed House of Commons; Parker, Sir R. Peel; Russell, Recollections and Reflections; Brougham, Memoirs of His Own Times; Lecky, Democracy and Liberty; Maxwell, Life of Wellington; Reid, Life of Lord Durham; Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution; May, Constitutional History of England; Molesworth, History of England from 1830; Aspinall, Politicians and the Press and Lord Brougham and the Whig Party; Feiling, Second Tory Party; Davis, Age of Grey and Peel; Keir, Constitutional History of Modern Britain; Halévy, History of the English People and Growth of Philosophical Radicalism; Maccoby, English Radicalism; Woodward, Age of Reform; Smellie, Hundred Years of British Government.]
CHAPTER VIII

THE LIBERAL RECONSTRUCTION

(A.D. 1832-1852)

§ I. Multifarious Legislative Activity.

With the Reform Act of 1832 began an activity in reconstructive legislation, to which there had been no parallel in any earlier period of British history. Almost every aspect of the old prescriptive and traditional system, in Church and State, was overhauled; and although in some fields the revision was tentative and uncertain, in others it was bold and drastic. We shall best gain a clear idea of its range and variety by disregarding strict chronological order, and grouping the reconstructive measures according to their character.

Some of the most remarkable work of the period belonged to the realm of imperial policy; these years were as important in the definition of the principles on which the modern Commonwealth was to be organised, as the reign of Charles II. was in the definition of the old colonial policy. We shall deal in later chapters ¹ with the significance and results of the Abolition of Slavery, the momentous India Act of 1833, the Durham Report on Canada and the legislation which arose from it, the establishment of parliamentary government in Australia and New Zealand. But it is well to remember that these great measures were inspired by the same principles which guided the process of reconstruction in the homeland.

A very important group of measures dealt with the organisation of finance and of those public utilities upon which all industry depends; and here the influence of the scientific economists was all-powerful. In the first place, the British system of banking received its modern form during these years. The Bank Act of 1833 destroyed the last relics of the monopoly of the Bank of England, and encouraged the growth of joint-stock banks (which could give greater security than private banks) in every

¹ Chaps. x. and xi. below.
part of the country; whilst Peel’s Bank Act of 1844 laid down the general principles of British banking as they have since, in the main, been upheld, and in particular regulated the issue of bank-notes. In the second place a very important departure in the organisation of trading concerns was taken when, in 1837, the first tentative permission was given to form companies with limited liability. It was not until 1862 that this system took its final shape; but it started in the era of reconstruction, and its value in encouraging the flow of capital into industry, and in diffusing widely an interest in commercial concerns, was of social as well as of economic importance. In the third place, it was during these years that the railway system was being created, and that its vital importance for the economic life of the country was being realised. The Railways Act of 1844, for which Gladstone was responsible, defined the relation of the State to the railways, placing these powerful corporations under State regulation, and making their rates and fares subject to parliamentary control. In the same group of measures may be included the establishment of a universal system of penny postage in 1840, and the reduction of the tax on newspapers from 4d. to 1d., which made possible the rise of a popular press.

Other measures were inspired by the humanitarian spirit. The reform of the Penal Code, begun by Peel, was greatly extended by Russell. Russell’s Acts of 1837 and 1841 abolished the death penalty for all but the gravest crimes; imprisonment for debt almost came to an end; and persons charged with felonies were for the first time allowed to be represented by counsel. With these advances in humanity may be coupled the almost complete abolition of flogging in the army, and the disuse of the pressgang for manning the navy.

It was a corollary of the attack upon the exclusive privileges of the landowning oligarchy that there should also be an attack upon the exclusive privileges of the Established Church in England and Ireland. To the measures which related to the Irish Church we shall refer later; they were part of the Irish policy of the Liberals. In England an Act of 1836 swept away the claim of the Church to the sole control over marriages and over the registration of births and deaths. Marriages in dissenting churches were legalised; and a secular system of registration was set up throughout the country. Another Act commuted the vexatious payment of tithes into money payments on a fixed scale.
Again, an attempt was made to deal with the abuses which had arisen in the disposal of Church property. Some bishops drew enormous revenues from the estates of their sees, while others were underpaid. In 1838 an Ecclesiastical Commission was set up, to which the administration of all episcopal estates was transferred, and the Commissioners were instructed to equalise episcopal salaries. In the next year the scandal of pluralism, whereby many clergymen held two or three benefices together, and often paid no attention to any of them, was prohibited by law. These reforms certainly purified and strengthened the Church. But the mere fact that they were enacted by the secular power aroused a storm of protest. For while the Whigs, Erastian by tradition, asserted the right of the State to interfere in Church matters, High Churchmen repudiated this claim with passion, and they were backed by the Tories and the House of Lords. The Liberals were labelled as the party of irreligion; and reaction against Liberalism had much to do with the Oxford High Church movement, of which we shall have something to say in another place.\footnote{Below, chap. xii. p. 469.}

The resentment of Churchmen was intensified by the fact that in this period the State began, timidly and tentatively, to meddle in the sphere of popular education, which had hitherto been left almost wholly to the Churches. The development of popular education (which began with the Sunday-school movement of 1782)\footnote{Above, p. 132.} had received a great stimulus since the beginning of the nineteenth century through the application of the rival educational theories of Andrew Bell and Joseph Lancaster, both of whom maintained that the extension of public education could best be accelerated by the cheap method of the pupil-teacher system, that is, by setting the children to teach one another. Churchmen had adopted Bell’s ideas, Dissenters had taken up Lancaster’s; and two great school societies, the National (supported by the Church) and the British and Foreign (supported by the Dissenters) had taken in hand the development of the system and the training of teachers. In 1833 the Liberal Government set aside the sum of £20,000 \textit{per annum} for grants-in-aid to the two societies. It was a ludicrously inadequate sum; but it was steadily increased, and had by 1851 risen to £150,000. But a very important consequence followed from these modest grants. In 1839 a Committee of the Privy Council was appointed to super-

the two societies; and this was the modest origin of a State department of education. The Committee was served by a staff of inspectors, who visited and reported on the schools; and these inspectors were the germ of the powerful educational bureaucracy, which has been mainly responsible for shaping the modern system of education. Here, as in other spheres, we may note the beginning of a departure from *laisser faire*, and, as a consequence, the beginning of the creation of a bureaucratic public service, interfering in matters which had hitherto been left to private enterprise.

But important as were some of the reforms we have already summarised, they were dwarfed by three great measures or groups of measures which profoundly influenced the life and organisation of the nation: the Municipal Reform Act, the New Poor Law, and the Factories and Mines Acts. All these were, or became the means to, great social reforms; all contributed to raise the British people out of the morass into which they had been plunged by the Industrial Revolution. It is sometimes said that the Liberal reconstruction concerned itself purely with political and not with social reforms. There could not be a more misleading generalisation.

§ 2. Municipal Reform, the New Poor Law, and Public Health.

In two generations the Industrial Revolution had transformed the British people from a predominantly rural to a predominantly urban people; but nothing had yet been done to adapt the organs of government to the needs of the ugly towns which had grown up with such rapidity, and whose inhabitants had no common traditions, and no habits of association for common ends. Some boroughs possessed ancient charters, but their governments were mostly 'close corporations' whose members took no responsibility for the well-being of the community as a whole, but regarded themselves as concerned only with the rights and properties of the small body of privileged freemen; and many of these close corporations were as corrupt as they were negligent of public needs. The towns which did not possess ancient charters were in a still worse plight; for they depended for government mainly upon the cumbrous and antiquated machinery of the mediæval manorial court. Special bodies with rating powers had indeed been established in many places, by private Acts, to light or pave the streets or to
lay down drains. But their powers were always strictly limited. Amid this chaos of ineffective authorities there existed none which was held responsible for the general welfare of the community; and a large part of the miseries of the working population of Britain was due to this state of things. Until it was rectified, there was no chance of social health for a town-dwelling people, such as the British people were rapidly becoming.

One of the first acts of the Government of 1832 was to appoint a Royal Commission on this problem; and its very full and able report formed the basis of the Municipal Reform Act of 1835—a measure which, when all its consequences are considered, probably deserves the first place among the reconstructive enactments of this era. In every considerable town this Act set up an elected municipal council, to be chosen by the whole body of ratepayers; and in all ancient boroughs the new councils took over the rights and properties of the old corporations. This was violently opposed by the reactionary Tories; but Peel showed what he meant by Conservatism by giving his support to Government, and this enabled the bill to pass through both Houses substantially unchanged, save only that a group of aldermen were added to each council by the House of Lords, as a safeguard against the 'democracy' of the elected councillors. The powers at first conferred upon the municipal councils were limited. But this was easily rectified. Parliament could confer special powers by private Acts upon any town that asked for them; and hundreds of Acts of this kind, promoted by individual towns, were passed during the following generation. Thus the towns early began to develop along their own lines, and to make instructive experiments: there was to be no rigid uniformity in the British municipal system.

The new system was a success from the outset. In every town many of the best men gave their time, without reward, to the great task of bringing order, decency, and dignity into town life; and what is specially noteworthy is that this work, which involved the expenditure of very large funds, was carried out with an extraordinary absence of corruption. Corruption had been rampant under the old system; it was, and has ever since been, practically non-existent under the new. By 1850 an immense improvement had been brought about in the condition of the British towns. They were for the first time adequately policed, drained and lighted. Some had obtained drastic powers for the demoli-
tion of insanitary houses, and were laying down strict building rules. A few were beginning to equip themselves with great public halls, with parks, with museums, libraries and galleries of art—all unknown luxuries in the days before municipal reform. Thanks to the labours of an army of public-spirited citizens, some elements of decency and dignity were beginning to qualify the conditions under which British working folk had to live. No greater reform illustrated this era of reform.

The second of the great restorative measures of the period was the new Poor Law of 1834, which was designed to undo the all but irreparable mischief that had been caused to the whole framework of British society, and especially to the labouring classes, by the way in which the Poor Law system had been worked since 1795.¹ In 1832 a strong Commission was appointed to inquire into the problem. Its ablest member was a young disciple of Bentham, Edwin Chadwick. Bentham had himself written on the Poor Law problem, and it was in the main his scheme of reform which the Commission recommended, and which was embodied in the Poor Law Reform Act of 1834. The primary aim of the Act (which was later extended, with modifications, to both Scotland and Ireland) was to emancipate the labourers, especially in the rural districts, from the degradation and servitude into which the old system had brought them, to leave them free to earn their own livelihood in self-respect, and to thrust upon them the responsibility for doing so. It was with the able-bodied man, pauperised in spite of himself, that this Act was primarily concerned; not with the children, the old and the sick. It provided that, after a transitional period of two years, no outdoor relief should be given to able-bodied workers: if they could get no employment elsewhere, they were to be relieved only on condition of going to a workhouse, where the conditions were to be such as to make any form of employment seem preferable. Outdoor relief was to be given only to those who could not work for their own livelihood.

In the main, drastic as they were, these provisions were salutary. They bred an unwillingness to 'go on the rates' which helped to restore the spirit of independence; they forced employers to pay at any rate a subsistence wage; they put an end to the ugly system of servitude to the poor-law authorities into which many British working people had been drawn; and they cut down the rates, in a few

¹ See above, pp. 216, 260, 514.
years, by one-half. But in the first instance they inflicted cruel hardships upon the vast numbers who had been taught to rely upon poor-relief. Two years did not form a long enough interval to let wages rise sufficiently to balance the withdrawal of allowances; and what made things worse was that by an unhappy chance the new Poor Law came into effect at a time of very bad trade. It seemed, and it was, a hard thing that the man who could obtain no work should be punished for his misfortune by the stony severity of the new Workhouses. The new Poor Law therefore earned the hatred of all the working-classes, and, more than any other cause, drove men by the thousand into the Chartist agitation. Yet in the end, harsh—perhaps needlessly harsh—though it was, the new system helped to drain the morass into which the labouring men of Britain were being dragged, and to restore their self-respect. It could not remedy all the evils of their lot; other means had to be found for that end, and the task of finding them was no easy one. But the drastic medicine of the Poor Law was, so far as it went, a real social reform.

The Act had also another important aspect. To carry out its provisions a whole series of new authorities had to be established. They were known as Boards of Guardians, and among them they covered the whole country. They took over the functions in regard to poor relief which had hitherto been performed by the Justices of the Peace and the Parish Vestries. But, unlike the Justices and the Vestries, they were in the main representative bodies elected by the rate-payers; and throughout rural England this was the first introduction of representative local government—the first step towards the creation of a new system of local government to replace the old traditional system, which had manifestly broken down. The Boards of Guardians presided over Poor Law administration for groups or ‘unions’ of neighbouring parishes. But somebody had to arrange the grouping of parishes. For this purpose a body of Poor Law Commissioners was appointed, in the first instance, for five years only; and the Commissioners also undertook the duty of guiding and supervising the Guardians in the application of the new system. These functions became so important that the Commissioners’ appointment was renewed from time to time; and in 1847 they became the Poor Law Board, which was ultimately (1871) merged in the Local Government Board. The controlling mind among the Commissioners was Edwin Chadwick; and Chadwick, like his
master Bentham, had a profound belief in centralised control. His zeal and ability were impatient of the stupidities often displayed by local bodies. He allowed the Guardians very little freedom of action; and it was he, by a rain of orders, circulars, and reports, who really shaped the new system.

Here was a new thing in British government: local representative bodies closely supervised and controlled by a central bureaucracy. The tradition of British government had always been to leave to local governments an almost unqualified autonomy, and this principle had been followed in the case of the municipal councils. But Chadwick's system represented a complete departure from this principle; it represented the introduction of centralised bureaucratic control. Probably it led to swifter progress than might otherwise have been attained. But one thing is certain: the Boards of Guardians, thus checked, were never so attractive to men of vigour and ability as the municipal corporations of the towns.

Chadwick was a man of devouring zeal and energy; and he was not content with his Poor Law work. He also had control of the new system of registration of births, marriages and deaths, established in 1836. In both capacities he was brought in contact with the appalling sanitary conditions which existed in all populous areas, and which were among the chief causes of the miseries of the poor. Two cholera epidemics showed the danger of these conditions; and Chadwick undertook a great campaign for the improvement of Public Health. In 1848 he obtained a Public Health Act, which set up a central Board of Public Health, and enabled it to establish local Boards of Health with large powers. These new bodies, like the Guardians, worked under the supervision of a strong and enlightened central bureaucracy. The work which they did was of the first importance for the improvement of the condition of the British people; and the Public Health Acts were among the most beneficent of social reforms. They formed a sharp departure from the system of *laisser faire*.

§ 3. *Factory Legislation and the Breach with 'Laisser Faire.'*

But a still more important and salutary breach with the *laisser faire* system was embodied in the series of Factory Acts which were among the most significant innovations of this period. Attempts at legislation for the protection of
child-workers in textile factories had been made before—in 1802, in 1819, and in several Acts during the 'twenties. But all these Acts had been inoperative, because their enforcement was left to the Justices of the Peace, who were quite incapable of performing this function. In 1830 an agitation had begun among the factory operatives of Yorkshire and Lancashire for the restriction of the hours of children's labour to ten. A bill for this purpose was introduced in the Parliament of 1831 by Michael Sadler, Tory member for Leeds, in a speech which deeply moved the House of Commons. Sadler lost his seat in the election of 1832; but the cause was taken up by a young Tory of high rank, Lord Ashley, afterwards Earl of Shaftesbury, who now entered upon that long and devoted career which made him the most venerated philanthropist of nineteenth-century England. The code of legislation for the protection of the workers was indeed in a very large degree the work of Shaftesbury; and the part which he played, and the support which he received from many Tory landowners, who hated the manufacturers, has led to the often repeated assertion that the factory code was due to the Tories and resisted by the Liberals. But the assertion is far from the truth. It is true that the Factory Acts were opposed by many Liberal manufacturers; but it is also true that the great Act of 1833, which was the foundation of the whole code, was adopted by a Parliament which had an overwhelming Liberal majority, and that most of its successors were due to Liberal ministries. Moreover Shaftesbury's bill was taken over by Government, and recast by them on the advice of a Royal Commission which they appointed. And the most important of the changes was the introduction of the very provision which made the Act effective: the appointment of a staff of factory inspectors to see that its terms were carried out. Once again, the creation of a central bureaucratic staff was the means of making State intervention really operative; and the reports of the inspectors provided the main stimulus which led to the gradual development of the code.

The Act of 1833 dealt only with the labour of children in textile factories, forbidding the employment of any children under 9 years old, and limiting the hours of children under 13 to nine, and of 'young persons' under 18 to twelve. But neither the workpeople nor Lord Ashley were satisfied with these provisions. They next demanded the limitation of the hours of work to ten, not only for 'young persons'
but for women; and their hope was that this would involve a corresponding limitation of men's labour also, since the work done by women and children was essential.

In 1844, under Peel's ministry, a measure which went some distance in this direction was passed; in 1847, with the support of the Liberal Government then in power, Ashley secured a new Act which fixed the hours of work for 'women and young persons' at ten, in such a way that the factories could not be kept open except during these hours; and in 1850 these provisions were made secure and definite, and a Saturday half-holiday was obtained. The Home Office inspectors were made responsible for seeing that all these Acts were enforced; and thus the hours of labour in the textile trades were regulated by the State, and the factories were placed, for some important purposes, under the supervision of State officials.

Meanwhile State intervention had been extended to other spheres. In 1840, again on the initiative of Lord Ashley, the employment of children in the sweeping of chimneys was prohibited. In the same year a Royal Commission was appointed to report on the employment of women and children in mines. Its report, published in 1842, drew so ugly a picture of cruelty and degradation that the conscience of the nation was aroused. Ashley at once introduced a Mines Bill which prohibited the employment of boys under 13 or of women: and, though the bill was somewhat watered down, it became law. Its enforcement was entrusted to Government inspectors, whose visits to the mines, like those of their colleagues to the factories, led to many important consequences.

Thus the twenty years following 1832 saw a very great departure in the attitude of the State towards industry. Under the guidance of a noble and self-sacrificing philanthropist, Britain had definitely broken away from the principle of *laisser faire*, and had adopted the view that it is the duty of the community to ensure that the process of wealth-making shall not be conducted in such a way as to be ruinous to the minds and bodies of those who are engaged in it. The principle was as yet applied only in the cases of women and children, and mainly in regard to hours of work. But it was not to stop there. The Inspector was abroad, taking notes; and his influence was continuous and persistent.
§ 4. Ireland: O’Connell, the Famine, and the Revival of Revolutionism.

If reconstruction was needed in Britain, it was still more needed in Ireland. The unjust privileges of the Anglican Church demanded curtailment; the grievances of tithe called for redress; above all, the economic problem which arose from over-population and from an utterly bad land-system, and which led to incessant agrarian outrages, cried aloud for remedial treatment. The Liberals of 1832 were not blind to the need for reform in Ireland. An extraordinarily large proportion of the time of Parliament was devoted to Irish questions. But the measures proposed only tinkered with the surface of the problem; and the steadfast opposition of the House of Lords deprived even these measures of effect.

In 1833 the revenues of the Church of Ireland were drastically dealt with, and it was proposed that part of them should be devoted to education and other public objects; but the House of Lords would not consent to such sacrament. Year after year bills for the commutation of tithe and the transfer of some of the proceeds to public objects were introduced; but the House of Lords would not agree to any diversion of Church funds, and it was only by dropping this proposal that the Government obtained a Tithe Act in 1839. A Municipal Corporations Bill, on the model of the English Act, was proposed for Ireland; but the House of Lords would only consent to the introduction of such a system in a few of the largest towns. And the resistance of the House of Lords could not be overcome, because there was in England no strong body of opinion on Irish questions, and Irish opinion did not count. Meanwhile Coercion Acts, to deal with the incessant agrarian outrages of Ireland, were passed swiftly and easily, in face of the protests of most of the Irish members. Ireland was nearly always under exceptional legislation; and though these powers were not often used by the Liberal Governments, they were in existence. No Irishman could fail to feel that his country was still treated as a subject realm, and that the united Parliament did nothing to remedy her grievances.

Yet a great opportunity of reconciliation was open in these years. O’Connell, the great Irish leader, hated violence, called himself a Liberal, steadily supported the Liberal Governments, and pinned his hopes upon liberal reforms. If he had been made Chief Secretary for Ireland, the mere
fact of his appointment would have had great effect. But his appointment would have created a storm: when two of his followers were appointed to minor posts, an outcry was raised against the Government for appointing Irish Papists. And the real control of Ireland rested with the Protestant officials of Dublin Castle, despite the fact that Irish Catholics sat in the House of Commons. It is not surprising that, in face of these facts, Ireland was dissatisfied with her participation in a Parliament where her representatives were uniformly voted down on Irish questions, and that a clamorous demand was raised for the Repeal of the Union. O'Connell had started a Repeal agitation on the morrow of Catholic Emancipation, and in 1832 there were forty Repealers in the House of Commons. But during the period of Liberal ascendancy the Repeal agitation flagged, because O'Connell was trusting to the Liberals. And the result was that he lost his hold upon the loyalty of his countrymen.

For the young intellectuals of Ireland were losing patience with O'Connell and his constitutional methods. The enthusiasm of nationalism, at work in all the continental lands during these years, was seizing Ireland also. In 1842 a band of young men, Gavan Duffy and Thomas Davis chief among them, founded a newspaper with the significant title of *The Nation*. Written with passion and fire, it strove to touch the imagination of the Irish people by appeals to their history, to the long pitiful story of Irish sufferings. These young enthusiasts despised the slow and seemingly hopeless methods of persuasion; they sang the praises of rebellion, the nobility of sacrificing the individual life for the life of a nation.

But O'Connell himself was losing patience. In 1840, when the Melbourne ministry was obviously about to fall, he founded a Repeal Association on the model of the Catholic Association of the 'twenties, and began to collect a Repeal Rent like the old Catholic Rent. His ascendancy soon revived. In 1842 the Association was so vigorous that a triumph like that of 1829 seemed within grasp, and O'Connell promised that 1843 should be the Year of Repeal. Immense and enthusiastic meetings were held in all parts of the country. For 1843 the Liberator planned a gigantic demonstration at Clontarf, which was to have been, in the Repeal movement, what the Dungannon Conference had been in Grattan's campaign for legislative independence.¹ But Peel, now in power, prohibited the meeting, sent troops to

¹ Above, p. 96.
occupy the site, sent a fleet to guard the coast; and O'Connell, always resolute to avoid violence, submitted and cancelled the meeting. This ended his constitutional agitation. Nevertheless he was prosecuted for sedition, and condemned by a packed jury; the sentence was later scornfully reversed in the House of Lords. O'Connell's long ascendancy was over: henceforward the party of violence held the upper hand in Ireland.

Peel was too great a man to be content with a policy of mere repression: he made a serious attempt to grapple with some of Ireland's ills. In spite of a No-Popery outcry, he forced through Parliament a large grant to the Catholic seminary at Maynooth, and established non-sectarian Queen's Colleges at Belfast, Cork and Galway, to afford university education to Irishmen excluded from Trinity College, Dublin. And he appointed a Commission (the Devon Commission) to inquire into the Irish land problem; its report was the beginning of serious attention to the root cause of Irish discontent. But when Peel introduced a bill to give effect to some of the Commission's recommendations, it was strangled in the House of Lords as an invasion of the rights of property; even a Conservative ministry could not carry through that House the modest instalments of reform which it designed for Ireland. Yet Peel had shown a clearer sense of the realities of the Irish problem than the Whigs had ever displayed; and it is possible that, if Fate had permitted, he might have begun a real policy of amelioration.

But at this moment Ireland was struck by the most appalling disaster in all her piteous history. In 1845, and again in 1846, the potato crop failed. Half the population, living always on the very edge of starvation, were deprived of their only means of subsistence. Government did all that it could to meet the sudden crisis, and its efforts were supplemented by immense charitable funds raised in all the big British towns. But the catastrophe was too vast for any improvised remedies. Many thousands died of sheer starvation; thousands more poured out of the country, crowding into the slums of Liverpool, Glasgow and Manchester; other thousands thronged emigrant ships bound for the United States and Canada. The malady of over-population had begun to remedy itself in a very terrible way. There were 8,300,000 inhabitants in Ireland in 1845: when the census was taken in 1851 they had shrunk to 6,600,000, and this was only the beginning of a long process
of depopulation. No country of Western Europe has in modern times gone through such an agony as Ireland endured from 1845 to 1848. And the traces which it left were indelible. Every emigrant carried with him, when he said farewell to the Green Island, an inextinguishable bitterness. He wasted none of it on economic forces: it was all reserved for England.

An almost worse horror than the famine followed on its heels. The wretched cottiers were unable to pay their rents; and thousands of them were evicted from their cottages in order that their tiny patches of land, often cleared of stones and made cultivable by the endless toil of the outgoing tenant, might be combined into larger farms. A war began between landlord and tenant more relentless than anything that had gone before; and agrarian outrage became more prevalent than ever. The Liberals, again in power (though with a precarious majority) thought a Coercion Act necessary (1847): they got it without difficulty. But when they asked for power to control evictions and to secure compensation for improvements made by the tenant, their majority vanished.

Amid these horrors, the overwrought minds of the leaders of Young Ireland turned to violence and rebellion. The United Irishman, a paper run by a passionate young patriot, Mitchel, was filled with talk of pikes and barricades and bombs. Smith O'Brien, once O'Connell's comrade, went to Paris to ask for aid from the leaders of the 1848 Revolution. But the Irish '48 was a dismal failure. A hundred prospective rebels were arrested; Mitchel was sentenced to penal servitude; Smith O'Brien and two colleagues, who had gathered a band of armed men, were captured and transported. Order was restored; and Ireland, enfeebled and depopulated, sank back again into torpor, with one more bitter memory added to the long list that severed her from her partner-island. While Britain was beginning to find a way out of her troubles, Ireland's had become fivefold worse. As at every stage in British history, her tragic figure stood like a skeleton at a feast, rebuking self-complacency.

§ 5. Cobden, Peel, and the Establishment of Free Trade.

Amid all their legislative activities, the Liberal ministries of 1832-41 had been markedly unsuccessful in two important spheres. They had been inefficient in administration, and especially in co-ordinating the work of the various depart-
ments of State; and they had been unsuccessful in the management of the national finances. In particular they had disappointed most of their followers by their failure to carry into effect the doctrines of the economists in regard to the freedom of foreign trade. These aspects of the work of reconstruction—administrative efficiency and fiscal reform—were left to Sir Robert Peel, and formed the outstanding achievements of his great ministry of 1841-1846.

In regard to fiscal reform, however, Peel was driven forward more rapidly than he could ever have anticipated by the pressure of a great public agitation carried on by the Anti-Corn-Law League. This organisation had been started by a group of Lancashire manufacturers in 1838, at the beginning of a period of exceptionally severe trade depression which lasted until 1843, and gave to 'the hungry Forties' their dismal appellation. The orators of the League argued that the Corn Laws were the chief cause of popular distress, by raising the price of food, by reducing everybody's purchasing power, and by discouraging the export of manufactured goods which would take place as a means of paying for imported corn. But though they made the Corn Laws the chief object of their attack, they preached with equal vehemence the necessity of universal Free Trade. The heart and soul of the agitation was Richard Cobden, a man of untiring zeal and genuinely unselfish devotion, and a master of lucid and persuasive exposition. With him was linked his intimate friend John Bright, the noblest and most winning British orator of the nineteenth century. From 1838 to 1846 these two, with an army of helpers, moved about the country preaching the doctrine of Free Trade as a sort of gospel, and a cure for every ill; as a sure path not only to national prosperity, but to peace among the nations. It was for them a moral as well as an economic question. In their unfailing belief in the virtue of unrestricted competition they went beyond even the orthodox economists. John Bright, the most compassionate of men, opposed Factory Acts on principle; and there was only one important economist of the nineteenth century who ever took this line. Cobden and Bright were the prophets of what came to be known as the Manchester School; but there was nothing novel in their doctrine save the whole-heartedness of its assertion that the free interchange of goods was not merely one of the roots, but the very tap-root, of national well-being. Like their economic antithesis, Karl Marx, they preached a materialist creed in an idealist
spirit: the Millennium was to be reached by buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest. The sheer force of their unwavering belief made their ideas the most potent factor in British politics for a generation to come.

When Peel came to power in 1841 the Anti-Corn-Law League was in full vigour; carrying on its propaganda with such tireless energy, such ingenuity, and such persuasiveness, that the landowning class was gravely alarmed, and looked to Peel to avert what they believed would be utter ruin. Peel came to power as a Protectionist, and an opponent of the League. But his was an open and teachable mind; as we shall see, it moved rapidly during the five years of his ministry; and in the end it was Peel who carried Cobden’s flag to victory.

Two features mainly distinguished this ministry, and made it a turning-point in British history. The first of these was Peel’s administrative efficiency. No Prime Minister has ever excelled him in the specific work of a Prime Minister—that of keeping in touch with all departments of government, and ensuring that every question of national policy received the proper degree of cabinet attention. He brought the cabinet system to a pitch of perfection never equalled before or since: under him the cabinet worked as a team, and its collective responsibility was a reality.

But the outstanding feature of Peel’s ministry, and his main contribution to the work of national reconstruction, was the far-reaching revision of the national system of finance which he carried out. He came to power at a time of acute commercial depression, and was faced by a serious deficit inherited from the Whigs. He found in existence a universal protective system, with a tariff that included duties on some 1200 separate articles, quite apart from the Corn Law, which submitted imported corn to a sliding scale of dues varying inversely with the home price. In 1842 he passed a new Corn Law with a reduced scale, which satisfied neither the League nor the country gentlemen. But his main achievement in this year was a remarkable Budget, wherein he imposed an income-tax in order to turn the deficit into a surplus, and then proceeded to abolish the duties on nearly 400 articles, and to make substantial reductions on the rest. Three years’ experience showed him that he was getting a better yield from the reduced duties than from the higher ones, because greater cheapness encouraged the people to buy. Meanwhile the propaganda of the Anti-
Corn-Law League was going on more vigorously than ever; and its arguments seemed to be justified by Peel's financial experience. Moreover it was being borne in upon him that it was no longer possible for Britain to be a self-supporting country; and it was only as a means of enabling the country to support itself that the Corn Laws could be defended. Peel's views were definitely moving in Cobden's direction when the Irish Potato Famine suddenly came in the autumn of 1845, and made the very notion of excluding foreign corn, or discouraging its importation at the lowest possible rates, appear intolerable. The only rational course was to repeal the Corn Laws.

The announcement of Peel's conversion shattered his party. Deserted by some of his leading colleagues, he resigned; but Lord John Russell, who had meanwhile declared for Free Trade, could not form a ministry, and Peel had to return to power. As in 1829, it fell to him to carry a fundamental change of policy which he had been pledged to oppose. The majority of his party, wild with fury, threw themselves into violent opposition under Lord George Bentinck and Benjamin Disraeli, who won their hearts by the unbridled invectives which they poured upon their erstwhile leader. It was only with the support of the Liberals that Peel could carry his proposals through the House of Commons; but with their support he carried not only the repeal of the Corn Laws, but a Budget which greatly extended the reduction of the duties on other commodities, and in effect established general Free Trade. It might have been expected that the House of Lords would have resisted the repeal of the Corn Laws, which most of its members regarded as involving the ruin of the country and the final downfall of their own class. Yet they accepted it with extraordinary ease, thanks to the influence of the Duke of Wellington, who now, as in 1829, was convinced that it would be dangerous to resist a measure which he personally detested.

On the very night on which the Corn Bill passed the House of Lords, Peel was defeated in the Commons on an Irish Coercion Act, on which the revolting Tories voted with the Liberals. He was succeeded by a Liberal ministry under Lord John Russell which held office for six years, depending always upon the support of the group of progressive Conservatives who followed Peel. The Liberals were now whole-hearted Free Traders, and they carried still further the bold change of policy which Peel had begun.
in 1849, they repealed the Navigation Acts, which had been the keystone of British trade policy for two centuries. This was the final breach with the long tradition of trade-protection: Britain had become definitely and unmistakably a Free Trade country.

It is not our business to discuss the theoretical merits or defects of this policy. But there is no room for doubt that, in the circumstances of the time, it brought to Britain an immediate and rapid expansion of trade, and ended the long period of acute distress which had, with brief intervals, lasted since the close of the Napoleonic War. Three figures are enough to indicate its results. In 1815 the declared value of British exports was just under £50,000,000. Twenty-seven years later, when Peel began his attack on the Protective system, it had fallen to £47,250,000. But after another interval of twenty-seven years, in 1869, it had risen to £190,000,000. Nor did agriculture suffer, as might have been expected. The generation following 1815 had been a period of agricultural distress, which the Corn Laws had failed to remedy. The generation following 1846 was a period of agricultural revival; and it was not until the seventies, when the produce of the virgin lands of North America began to pour in on a large scale, that a new period of decline began. Distress and revolutionary agitation filled the generation between 1815 and 1850; prosperity and political quiescence distinguished the next generation. This contrast was due to many causes; but the most important among them was the new fiscal policy, which broke down the only barriers that prevented Britain from becoming the central market and workshop of the world.

§ 6. The Results of the Liberal Reconstruction.

It is but a bald and arid summary which we have had space to give of the great changes which took place between 1830 and 1850; and their significance is apt to be obscured by the dryness of a catalogue of enactments. Seldom has any great society undergone within so short a time a greater change in structure and in spirit. In 1830 Britain was ruled by a privileged oligarchy; her whole social system was frostbound by prescription and rigid traditionalism; and her people, suffering bitter distresses, seemed to be on the eve of a blind and destructive upheaval. Without any violent disruption the entrenched power of the oligarchy was overthrown; the frost was melted without a burst;
and within twenty years the British people had entered upon
an era of prosperity and contentment.

Two or three broad features emerge clearly from the
detail of reforming activity which we have attempted to
survey. The first of these, and the most important, was
that the British people had regained the habit of self-govern-
ment, and were engaged in creating new machinery for its
exercise. Parliament had become representative, not yet
of the whole nation, but of a very substantial part of the
nation; and the old governing class, while it still retained
its traditional leadership, had learnt that it was not its will
but the nation's will (whenever it was clearly expressed)
that must in the end prevail. Self-government had become
real in the towns also, and they were using their power to
regain some measure of decency and health. Even in the
rural districts Boards of Guardians and Boards of Health
were beginning, though in an imperfect way, to give expres-
sion to the common will.

The second broad feature of the period was that, while
laying the utmost emphasis upon individual ability and
energy as the chief creative force in human society, and
while using (as in the new Poor Law) even harsh means of
bringing home to every man the sense of individual re-
sponsibility, the British people were at the same time break-
ing away from the barren creed of laissez faire, and were
accepting the principle that it is the duty of the community
to protect the weak against the strong, and to compel all
to observe certain minima of decency in their relations with
their fellows. But in order to enforce these obligations a
great departure in government was being made: a pro-
fessional administrative class was being created to supervise
in various ways the activities of individual citizens; and
these agents of the national Government were beginning to
interfere in the conduct of factories, mines, schools, and
local governing bodies, in a way which the eighteenth cen-
tury would never have contemplated.

On the other hand Britain was breaking away from her
own traditions and the common practice of the modern
world by abandoning the attempt to control through tariffs
the movements of foreign trade. She had ceased to strive
after the ideal of national self-sufficiency; she was content
to depend for many essentials upon the process of inter-
change with other nations; she was inviting all the world
to enter her markets freely, in the belief that, the more
goods other people sent, the more goods they would be
bound to take in exchange. On the increasing intimacy in
the relations of peoples which this process of interchange
was likely to bring about, Britain was beginning to base
sanguine hopes of growing peace and international fellow-
ship; and the great International Exhibition of 1851, which
ended this period, was hailed as the emblem and harbinger
of an era of peaceful industry. Moreover, having abandoned
her long-held belief in the possibility of drawing advantage
from artificially enforced monopolies, Britain was entering,
as we shall see, upon a new system of relationship with her
daughter-lands, a relationship not based upon the cash-
exus.

Some of these hopes were to be justified by the course of
events, others were to be falsified. But the acceptance of
these new political conceptions, and their embodiment in
laws and institutions, make this period one of the most
momentous in British history.

[Walpole, History of England from 1815; Greville Memoirs; Dicey, Law
and Public Opinion in England; Peel, Memoirs; Parker, Sir R. Peel;
Walpole, Life of Lord J. Russell; Russell, Recollections and Suggestons;
Morley, Life of Cobden; Trevelyan, Life of Bright; Morley, Life of Gladstone;
Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli; Disraeli, Life of Lord G. Bentinck;
Letters of Queen Victoria; Mackay, History of the English Poor Law; Webb,
English Poor Law Policy; Hutchins and Harrison, History of Factory
Legislation; Hodder, Life of Shaftesbury; Dunlop, Life of O'Connell; Duffy,
Young Ireland and My Life in Two Hemispheres; Trevelyan, The Irish
Crisis; Mill, England and Ireland; Halévy, History of the English People;
Woodward, Age of Reform; Clapham, Economic History of Modern Britain;
Kitson Clark, Peel and the Conservative Party; Hill, Toryism and the People.]
CHAPTER IX
THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN BRITAIN
(A.D. 1830-1850)

§ I. The Character of the Movement and the First Attempt at Direct Action.

The legislative activity which we have surveyed in the last chapter was accompanied by a popular movement outside of Parliament, which aimed, not at the gradual adjustment of the existing social and political order, but at the establishment of a wholly new order, to be constructed in accordance with the vague and often contradictory theories of a group of revolutionary thinkers. For this reason it may rightly be described as a 'revolutionary' movement, in spite of the fact that most of those who took part in it, far from advocating or desiring any blind outburst of violence, were scrupulously constitutional in their methods.

The leaders of this movement drew their inspiration from the wholesome anger by which they were filled when they contemplated the miseries which a large proportion of the people were enduring; and from the equally wholesome conviction that the organised power of a civilised community ought to be capable of remedying these miseries. Their ideas were often crude and ill thought-out. They had little sense of the immense complexity of the living social organism which they wanted to carve into a new form. Their plans of reconstruction were very hazy, and many of them were too prone to imagine that all the ills of which they complained were merely due to the wickedness and selfishness of the master-class, and that, if the existing order were once destroyed, justice and plenty would come as surely as day follows night. For that reason they failed, and it was well that they failed; for their victory could have brought nothing but chaos and ruin. But their efforts were not wasted. They taught working people to think about and to work for the amelioration of their own lot by co-operative action; and they forced men of all classes to realise the existence of great evils, and the necessity for great reforms.
The movement captured the greater part of the working class, especially in the North of England; and its phrases and catchwords were almost universally adopted. At some moments there seemed to be a real danger of the most horrible form of civil war—a war of classes, a war of the 'Have-nots' against the 'Haves,' in which ideals would inevitably disappear in a brute struggle for material resources that could only lead to the destruction of the wealth which was fought for. This horrible conclusion was averted by three happy circumstances upon which the British people had a right to congratulate themselves. In the first place, most of the leaders of the movement were determined to avoid violence; in the second place, a free vent was given to discussion, and Government resisted, on the whole, the temptation to resort to mere repression; and, in the third place, the acute distresses which were the main cause of all the ferment were gradually amended by the working of the reconstructive measures which we have already outlined.

There was a great variety of doctrine and opinion among the social thinkers who won the ear of the working classes during these years. But most of it may be described as vaguely Socialist in character, and there were certain broad principles which were widely accepted as axiomatically true. The chief of these was that labour is the source of all wealth, a statement that is only valid if the term 'labour' be held to include directive and inventive ability; and these factors the revolutionary leaders were too apt to minimise or disregard. Even in this sense 'labour' is helpless without the use of stored-up wealth, or capital; and the revolutionary leaders seldom stopped to ask themselves how this wealth was to be made available unless those who stored it or saved it were encouraged by payment for doing so. The second axiom was that 'labour' has a right to the whole product of its toil; which was held by many unthinking men to mean that the manual labourers alone should share the product of industry. A third axiom was that, as Society was organised, the rich were daily becoming richer and the poor poorer, because the rich were compelling the poor to work for them for a bare subsistence allowance. The facts of the period seemed to support this doctrine; which was later adopted by Karl Marx, at a time when events were already proving it to be manifestly false. And the conclusion of the whole matter—a conclusion also adopted by Marx—was that the interests of the manual workers were
in conflict with those of all the rest of the community, and
that a better state of things could only be attained by a
class-war, a war of the wage-earners against the masters,
and against the Government which the masters controlled.

As to the way in which this war should be conducted, and
as to the use which should be made of victory, there were
wide differences, and much hazy thinking. Some, notably
the followers of Robert Owen, thought that the workers
should disregard politics and try to organise a sort of co-
operative communism for themselves. Others held that the
workers, through their Unions, should, by the use of the
strike weapon, destroy the power of capital and take pos-
session of the factories for themselves; this was in some
degree an anticipation of modern Syndicalism. But the
great majority, attributing to Government the responsi-
ability for the system under which they suffered, and credit-
ing the State with a power little short of omnipotence, were
bent upon seizing political control, as the necessary means
for creating a new social order. It was from this line of
thought that Chartism arose, reviving the old political pro-
gramme of the Radicals. But, unlike the earlier Radicals,
most of the Chartists never conceived of political equality
as an end in itself, or adopted the doctrines of individualism.
Democracy was for them the means to a social revolution.
Ninety-nine of every hundred Chartists were believers in a
vague, unanalysed Socialism, and looked to a democratic
State to secure for them economic security and prosperity.

The ferment of revolutionary ideas was already at work
from 1825 onwards, and in 1830, when the Whig Govern-
ment came to power, it seemed to be menacing. The
Reform agitation for a time diverted the current; but when
the Reform Act came into operation, it proved to be a dis-
appointment; and the revolutionary movement resumed
its independent course. It now took the form of what may
be called, in modern phraseology, a Syndicalist attempt to
get control of the machinery of production by direct action.
As early as 1830 the project of a general association of
workpeople in all trades—a Trades Union as distinct from
separate Trade Unions—had been set on foot in Manchester.
This grandiose conception was put into operation on an
elaborate scale when in January 1834 Robert Owen launched
the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union, and an-
nounced that great changes were about to come suddenly
upon Society like a thief in the night.’ All the working
classes were to be included in a single vast organisation;
‘all individual competition is to cease; all manufactures are to be carried on by National Companies.’ The success of the scheme was at first impressive. Half-a-million members, including thousands of agricultural labourers and many women, joined in a few weeks; and an extraordinary epidemic of strikes broke out during the spring and summer.

The governing class was not unnaturally alarmed by these proceedings; but the Liberal Government refused, to its credit, to introduce repressive legislation like the Six Acts of 1819. Nevertheless in various places actions for conspiracy were brought by employers against their workpeople. The most iniquitous of these was the prosecution of six Dorsetshire agricultural labourers who had formed a lodge of the Trades Union in the village of Tolpuddle. They had administered an oath of secrecy to their members; and this was made the ground of a prosecution under an Act of 1797, which had been passed at the time of the Mutiny of the Nore to prevent secret conspiracies. The six labourers were sentenced to seven years’ transportation; and, to the indelible shame of Lord Melbourne and the Liberal ministry, this monstrous sentence was carried out, in spite of a rain of petitions and remonstrances. Nothing did more to alienate the working classes from the Government which they had helped to carry into power than this savage treatment of the Dorsetshire labourers. Two years later Government came to its senses again, pardoned the labourers, and brought them back from Australia. But the mischief had been done. The ‘base, bloody and brutal Whigs,’ as one of the Chartist leaders later called them, had lost the confidence of working people.

Meanwhile the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union had collapsed as swiftly as it had risen. Its collapse was due, not to prosecutions, but to its own inherent weakness. The innumerable strikes which its establishment had encouraged were all unrelieved failures. Its funds were exhausted. Before the end of the year it had sunk into complete discredit, and its failure had ruined the influence of Robert Owen. The first great experiment in Direct Action had come to nothing; and the leaders of revolution turned to new methods.

In the very year of the Grand National fiasco, the new Poor Law had been enacted; and this completed the discredit of the Liberal Government, and aroused the fierce anger of the working classes against the wielders of power who had been enthroned in 1832. To the average workman
the outstanding feature of the Act was that it treated poverty as a crime, and robbed him of the one source of help to which he had been accustomed to resort in times of distress, the one sign that the community recognised his right to the means of livelihood. For this apparent cruelty Government was directly and obviously responsible. To get control of Government seemed therefore the only path-way to a better order of things. Political action took the place of industrial action; and the Chartist movement was born. Its progress, like that of the Anti-Corn-Law League, was stimulated by the cycle of bad trade which began in 1837.

§ 2. The First Phase of the Chartist Movement.

Although it led to no immediate results, the Chartist movement was of momentous importance, because it was the first sustained movement in the modern world which was conducted by the working class. For ten years it kept Britain in a ferment of agitation and discussion. In conjunction with the contemporary propaganda of the Anti-Corn-Law League, it set on foot a nation-wide discussion such as had never been known before, and such as no European Government save the Liberal Government of 1832 would have permitted. It was a revolutionary movement, because it aimed at a complete recast of the social and political order. But in another sense it was anything but revolutionary. The most striking feature of the whole agitation was the sobriety and moderation with which it was on the whole conducted; and this was balanced by the restraint and absence of panic that marked the conduct of Government.

The roots of Chartism lay in the old Radical movement, in the Socialist propaganda of Owen, Thompson, Hodgskin and the rest, and in the Trade Union movement. It gathered all these into a focus, and drew strength also from the Ten Hours' agitation in the Northern factory towns, from the opposition to the Poor Law, from the fads and fancies of currency quacks like Attwood of Birmingham, from the activity of dissenting lay preachers, from the growing thirst for education, from the temperance movement, from every protest against injustice and every aspiration after public well-being that fermented in the minds of a restless and unhappy people. It became a sort of religion; it inspired an exalted fervour of belief; for a time every vague hope and project of reform was brought under the Chartist banner.
Though it had many ramifications, Chartism as Chartism definitely took its origin in 1836 and 1837, almost simultaneously in London, in Birmingham, and in Yorkshire. In London a group of self-educated artisans of the better class founded in 1836 the London Working Men’s Association to agitate for democratic reform. The greatest man in this group was William Lovett, a cabinet-maker, and a man of real intellectual power, sound judgment, and single-minded devotion. It was he who played the main part in drafting the People’s Charter, a draft bill which embodied the Six Points of Radicalism, universal suffrage, annual parliaments, secret ballot, equal electoral districts, the abolition of property qualifications, and payment of members. The Charter was published in May 1838, after consultation with some of the Radical members of Parliament; and it was decided to organise a vast petition in its favour from all parts of the country. Meanwhile, in Leeds, Feargus O’Connor, a hot-headed Irish landowner and a born rebel, had started an agitation on his own account: he had no patience with Lovett and his group, who were too moderate and restrained for his taste. In November 1837 O’Connor founded the Northern Star, which became the central organ of the Chartist movement. In May of the same year the Birmingham Political Union, which had played so active a part in the Reform Bill agitation, was revived by its founder, Thomas Attwood. It was in Birmingham that the petition was drawn up. It included only five of the Six Points, for Attwood would have nothing to do with equal electoral districts. From these beginnings the agitation spread with extraordinary swiftness during 1838. Mass meetings were held in all the industrial districts. New leaders appeared, fiery orators such as the dissenting parson J. R. Stephens, trenchant journalists such as the Irishman Bronterre O’Brien. The whole country seemed to take flame. To focus the movement it was decided to summon a National Convention, to which delegates were elected by huge mass meetings in all parts of the country; while (in imitation of O’Connell’s methods in Ireland) a National Rent was to be raised.

The Convention met in London in February 1839, in Westminster Palace Yard, close by the Houses of Parliament. What would Pitt or Castlereagh have said to the assemblage of a body under such a title, in such a place? Fortunately the precedents of Pitt and Castlereagh had

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1 See above, p. 377.
been discarded; and the Convention was allowed to meet and carry on its discussions without interference. From the outset there appeared a sharp conflict between two parties among the Chartists. All were agreed on the presentation to Parliament of the great petition for which signatures were being collected by the hundred thousand. But what should happen if, as was to be expected, the petition was rejected by Parliament? Lovett and his friends were for continuing the methods of peaceful agitation and education. But Feargus O’Connor and most of the men from the North were for violent action; for the immediate declaration of a universal strike; for the arming of the people, and the raising of barricades in the continental fashion. And there is no doubt that the physical force party was numerous. The Northern Star was threatening blood and thunder. A series of articles on revolutionary tactics, by a Polish exile, appeared in the London Democrat. Pamphlets giving detailed instructions for the construction of barricades were openly on sale. Pikes were being made, and old muskets furbished up.

Yet Government remained quiet; there was no interference with the Northern Star or other advocates of violence, there were no prosecutions for seditious language, even when the more violent orators urged excited mass meetings to arm themselves. Though it was denounced for its supineness, Government preferred to trust to the inherent sanity and good sense of the British people. ‘The people have a right to meet,’ Lord John Russell said, a month after the assembly of the Convention. ‘If they had no grievances, common sense would put an end to their meetings. It is not from free discussion that governments have anything to fear. There was fear when men were driven by force to secret combinations. There was the fear, there was the danger, and not in free discussion.’ But, of course, precautions had to be taken against the real danger of a rising in force. Troops were drafted into the North of England; but they were warned to avoid chances of conflict. They were placed under the command of Sir Charles Napier, a generous-minded man who sympathised with the grievances from which Chartism had sprung, and who was determined to avoid bloodshed if it were possible to do so. Some of the Chartists misinterpreted the quiescence of the troops, attributing it to fear: Napier took some of them in a friendly manner to see the guns, and showed them the hopelessness of any violent outbreak. Sanity prevented the explosion
which a spark might have caused. The explosion would have failed; but it would have caused far-reaching ruin, and left a heritage of bitterness.

In May, 1839, the Convention transferred its sittings to Birmingham. Here the physical force party definitely got the upper hand, and passed fiery resolutions demanding a national strike, the withdrawal of all gold from the banks, and the arming of the people for revolt. Riots broke out in the town; several of the leading Chartists were arrested; and for a few days the military had to take control. These disturbances were, in Napier's opinion, due to hasty and panic-struck action on the part of the magistrates. They showed how easily disorder might have broken out if the forces of order had not been generally handled with temper and restraint.

In July the great petition, with its 1,250,000 signatures, was laid before Parliament by Attwood of Birmingham. It was quite seriously discussed, and rejected by 235 votes to 46. What should the Convention do now? Its members realised the hopelessness of armed revolt. They tried to call a general strike, but there was little response. Some hundreds of the more vehement spirits were arrested in various parts of the country, and soon afterwards released; this probably prevented outbreaks, and broke up the secret organisation which seems to have been formed by a group of extremists. Only in South Wales was a futile little insurrection attempted, when some 3000 Chartists armed with muskets and pikes marched on Newport, with the intention of releasing the orator Vincent, who was imprisoned there. They were dispersed by a single volley of musketry; and the great agitation of 1839 came to an end. Assuredly there was no other country in Europe where a revolutionary movement would have been given so much rope, or where it could have been so quietly extinguished. Freedom of discussion is the best prophylactic against violence.

§ 3. The Later Phases of the Chartist Movement.

The failure of 1839 did not put a stop to the Chartist movement. The People's Charter still represented an ideal, a Utopia, to thousands of honest men, and the rejection of the great petition by Parliament was taken as a proof that the rulers of the country cared nothing for the sufferings of the People. A National Charter Association was founded to keep the agitation in being, and there was some activity
at elections, especially in the General Election of 1841, when all the strength of the Chartists was thrown against the Liberals. But there were deep divisions among the leaders, and the history of the movement is largely filled with their disputes.

In 1842, which was a year of exceptionally acute distress, the movement once again became very lively. A second petition was drawn up. It was far bolder in its terms than the first, claiming the franchise as a ‘natural and inalienable right,’ but laying the main emphasis no longer upon political but upon social demands. Signed by no less than 3,300,000 persons, it was, like its predecessor, introduced in the House of Commons, and rejected by an immense majority. Among the few who voted in its favour was Richard Cobden, whom most Chartists regarded as a representative and spokesman of the hated capitalist class.

As in 1839, the rejection of the Charter was followed by disturbances. A national strike was proclaimed; and for some weeks in the autumn it was almost effective in Yorkshire and Lancashire. Some of the Chartist leaders were for organising a rebellion. But the policy of physical force had now few supporters, and the most striking feature of the strike was its orderly character. The general strike failed, as it was bound to fail. But it gravely alarmed the Government—now the Conservative Government of Sir Robert Peel. In their anxiety, Government forgot the restraint which the Liberal Government had preserved in 1839, when the danger of open revolt had been far greater. Wholesale arrests were made, perhaps as many as 1500 in all; nearly all the Chartists and Trade Union leaders were laid by the heels. Some 500 were sentenced to terms of imprisonment; 79 were transported to Australia. But these disproportionate sentences were unnecessary. The movement had already broken down.

With the disaster of 1842 Chartism practically collapsed. Only a few thousand remained members of any formal Chartist organisation. There were miserable quarrels and suspicions among the leaders. The cause was a dying cause; and soon a real revival of trade extinguished it. The final flicker took place in 1848, when the success of the revolution in France galvanised the torpid movement. Once more there were mass meetings and colossal demonstrations. Once more a National Convention was elected, and a petition drawn up for signature. Feargus O’Connor took the lead, and there was talk of establishing a democratic republic with
O'Connor as its president. There was much violent decla-
mation, with which nobody interfered, and much secret
buying of arms. It was decided that this third petition
should be taken to Parliament at the head of a vast armed
procession; and April 10 was fixed for the great day.
Government drafted troops to London, and enrolled thou-
sands of special constables. The organisers were told that
there was no objection to their holding a meeting, but that
the procession to Parliament would not be permitted. The
meeting was held. The leaders, losing heart, dismissed it,
and took the petition to Parliament in three cabs. It was
claimed that more than £4 million signatures had been
obtained. But the actual number was less than two million,
and vast numbers of these were false. The ridicule aroused
by these discoveries pricked the bubble of the feverish and
unreal excitement of 1848. Chartism had been dying since
1842; the final episode snuffed out its guttering flame. And
the working classes of Britain turned away from the methods
of revolution, and devoted themselves henceforward to more
practical and profitable methods of achieving the great
reforms for which they rightly thirsted. By doing so they
trained themselves in the arts of self-government, and pre-
pared themselves for democracy, which was to come, in less
than twenty years, not by way of revolution or even as the
result of violent agitation, but as a natural and easy develop-
ment.

§ 4. The Indirect Results of Chartism.

Chartism passed away, but not without producing a deep
effect upon the generation which saw its rise and fall. It
had done much to educate the working people; it did yet
more to educate the more prosperous classes and the leaders
of thought.

The stir of emotion which it produced had profound
effects upon the literature of the period. Hood's Song of
the Shirt and Mrs. Browning's Cry of the Children express a
new spirit of compassionate indignation at the sufferings of
the victims of the industrial machine; and the same spirit
is perceptible in many novels of the period. The distress
and agitation of the poor, the Chartist movement itself,
became the subject-matter of great novels; Disraeli's Sibyl,
Mrs. Gaskell's Mary Barton, Charles Kingsley's Yeast and
Alton Locke are only the most outstanding examples in this
kind. Carlyle, now becoming the accepted prophet-voice
of his time, turned his stormy eloquence upon what he
called 'the condition of England question,' in Chartism and Past and Present; and though he had no clearer guidance to give than any other as to the true pathway out of distress, at least he denounced mere laissez faire, and trumpeted the need of constructive work for the re-establishment of national health.

Even John Stuart Mill, now the hereditary chief of what remained of the Benthamite sect, the chief expounder of orthodox economics and an acknowledged prophet of Liberalism, was driven by the discussions of the period and by the spectacle of public misery and resentment, to a position far indeed from that of the orthodox laissez faire doctrine of the 'twenties. In his Political Economy, published in 1848—a book which henceforth became the standard of Liberal orthodoxy—he urged that the iron laws of economic science apply only to the process of production, and that it was for the community to seek justice in the distribution of the wealth which it produced. And in considering how this justice was to be attained, he went far in the direction of Socialism, advocating legislation for the equalisation of wealth and the limitation of the right of bequest; in his later years he practically became an advocate of land nationalisation. It would be a mistake, no doubt, to attribute this striking change in the trend of economic thought wholly or even mainly to the influence of the Chartist movement. But it was beyond question hastened by the deep sense of the injustices of the existing social order which the Chartist agitation drove into the minds of that generation.

Again, it was from the Chartist movement that the direct impetus came which produced the teachings of the little group of Christian Socialists—F. D. Maurice, Charles Kingsley, Thomas Hughes, J. M. Ludlow—who drew much of their inspiration from Coleridge. They were able to achieve very little directly. But they supplied a new element of vitality in the life and in the work of the Church of England, and a new strain in the variegated texture of the liberalism of that age.

Finally it was from Chartism that the Tories, through their future leader Disraeli, derived the conception of a new line of advance. In the debate on the first Chartist petition Disraeli had declared that though he disapproved of the Charter, he sympathised with the Chartists. 'The Chartists,' he said, 'are in hostility against the middle classes, they make no attack on the aristocracy nor on the Corn Laws; they attack the new class, but not the old.' Here was the
germ of the idea which was to be the inspiration of Disraeli's Young England party, and ultimately of Tory democracy—the idea that the old aristocracy should place itself at the head of democracy to fight against the iniquities of industrialism and the dominance of the middle class.

Chartism failed to achieve its immediate aims, and it was well that it failed; for the sudden enthronement of an untrained democracy would assuredly have led to many evils, as it did in France. But though it failed, Chartism profoundly modified the outlook and aims of every party and school of thought in the British society. In a free society in which the movement of opinion is allowed free play, no honest beliefs, no sincere and zealous advocacy of reforms, will ever be wholly fruitless. If it can resist the temptation to resort to the unconvincing argument of brute force, it will not fail of its effect.

[Beer, History of British Socialism; Podmore, Life of Owen; S. and B. Webb, History of Trade Unionism; Hovell, The Chartist Movement; West, Chariot; Lovett, Autobiography; Cole and Postgate, The Common People; Clapham, Economic History of Modern Britain; Halévy, Growth of Philosophical Radicalism and History of the English People; Maccoby, English Radicalism; Woodward, Age of Reform; Russell, Freedom and Organization.]
CHAPTER X

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY

(A.D. 1830-1855)

§ 1. The Sources of the New Colonial Policy: the Radical Imperialists.

Great as were the changes which were brought about in Britain during the twenty years following 1830, they were less striking than the revolution in colonial policy which was effected in the same period. The methods of the old colonial policy, which had been observed since 1660, were finally cast aside; the foundations of the modern Commonwealth were laid; and the two guiding principles which have moulded the modern history of the Commonwealth were clearly established. The first of these is the principle that progressive and civilised communities are entitled to the fullest degree of self-government, and to the most complete responsibility for shaping their own destinies. The second is the principle that backward peoples, unfit for self-government, must not be exploited for the advantage of the ruling race, as they had too often been during all the earlier history of European colonisation; but that the controlling Power must regard itself as standing in the relation of a trustee for the interests of its subjects. These two principles have not always been easy to reconcile; indeed, as we shall see, they have sometimes come into violent conflict; and in the West Indies, in South Africa, in New Zealand—wherever, indeed, white men and backward peoples live side by side—this conflict of principles has been the chief source of difficulty. But it is the acceptance and the application of these principles which have given to the history of the Commonwealth its chief significance and value; and it is necessary to understand how and why they came to be adopted during these years before we turn to study their effects in the history of the various colonies.

The new policy in regard to the backward peoples was the outcome of the missionary and humanitarian movement, on which we have already dwelt.¹ This policy won its supreme triumph with the abolition of slavery in 1833—

¹ Above, Chap. iv. p. 341.
the first important enactment of the reformed Parliament. The Act provided that after a brief period of apprenticeship every slave in the British Empire should be emancipated; and the immense sum of £20,000,000 was provided at the cost of the British taxpayer to compensate the owners of the slaves for the loss thus inflicted upon them. In view of the load of debt and the economic distress from which Britain was suffering, this was a truly magnanimous act of national reparation, to which it would be hard to find a parallel. But it should not be forgotten that in passing this Act the Imperial Parliament was overriding the powers of self-government which some of the slave-owning colonies possessed. Left to themselves, Jamaica and Barbados would never willingly have freed their slaves; and in legislating over their heads the mother-country was going far beyond any exercise of sovereign power which she had ever displayed in the struggle with the American colonies. Here, at the very outset of the new era, the principle of colonial self-government and the principle of protection for backward peoples came into sharp conflict.

The new policy in regard to colonies mainly peopled by progressive and civilised inhabitants was due to more complex causes. In part it was the outcome of the reigning economic ideas of the time; in part it was due to a belief, widely held in Britain as on the continent, that colonial possessions were not worth the trouble and cost they involved. But it is the greatest of blunders to assume that the new policy was wholly due to indifference. The main influence in the formulation of the new policy was a body of doctrine strongly held and eagerly pressed by a group of enthusiasts.

The essential foundation of the Old Colonial System had been the regulation of inter-imperial trade. This regulation was conceived, not in the interest of the mother-country alone, but in the interest of all the members of the empire. But it was necessarily defined by the Imperial Parliament, as the central legislative body of the empire; and this involved a considerable degree of interference with the life of all the colonies. The system received its death-blow with the triumph of the economic doctrines of Adam Smith and his followers. Adam Smith had argued that the expectation of wealth based upon a monopoly of colonial trade was wholly fallacious; he had even gone so far as to assert that 'Great Britain derives nothing but loss from the dominion which she exercises over her colonies.' The school
of Adam Smith achieved its triumph when Free Trade was established by Peel’s budgets of 1842-6; and the system of colonial monopoly was finally extinguished when, in 1849, the Liberals repealed the Navigation Acts, which had been regarded as the corner-stone of British imperial policy. Henceforward Britain claimed no power of forcing colonial trade into the channels she desired; and the traders of all nations were admitted to her colonial markets (so far as she controlled them) on equal terms with the traders of the mother-country.

But in the judgment of most men the logical inference from these doctrines was that colonies were not worth acquiring or maintaining; and men of most schools of thought held that the existing colonies should be encouraged and assisted to go their own way as rapidly as possible, and that no new colonies should be established. Disraeli expressed the view of most Tories when he said in 1852 that the colonies were no better than ‘millstones round our necks.’ The Radicals of the Manchester School were of the same opinion. The Chartists of the working class took no interest in colonial questions. There was thus a widespread indifference about the colonies which certainly facilitated the rapid development of colonial self-government. What was more important, this indifference left the field clear for the small group of enthusiasts to whom the definition of the new colonial policy was mainly due.

For the new policy was not the result of mere indifference or of drift. It was the outcome of hard thinking and tireless work by a small group of zealous and able men, mostly drawn from among the more advanced Liberals: they may be described as the Radical Imperialists, the ancestors of Dilke and of Chamberlain. They never numbered more than a handful; but they changed the course of their country’s history, and shaped the character of the modern British Commonwealth. History presents few more striking examples of the results that can be attained, in a free society, by the persistent efforts of a few men fired by great ideas.

Their policy had two sides. On the one hand they saw Britain filled with a crowded population which was suffering from many ills, while vast and fertile lands under British control lay empty, waiting to be turned to advantage by human strength and skill. Systematic and scientific colonisation seemed to them to be the only remedy for this double evil; but systematic colonisation would only be possible if
it were wisely directed, and if the empire were treated as a unity. On the other hand, being convinced Liberals, they had a sincere belief in the virtues of self-government, and a profound mistrust of the increasingly tight control exercised by the Colonial Office. Against this deadening bureaucracy they opened the vials of their sarcasm, not always quite fairly: Charles Buller, in particular, scarified Sir James Stephen and the Colonial Office in his mordant satire upon the pedantries of 'Mr. Mother-Country.' But they neither expected nor desired that the colonies would shake off the connexion with the mother-country: this would have defeated their plans of scientific colonisation. They rather looked forward to the planting of British institutions in the daughter-lands as the link which would bind together a fellowship of free peoples, united by ties of sentiment, of tradition and of interest. They were the prophets and designers of the British Commonwealth in its twentieth-century form.

The chief inspirer of this remarkable group was Edward Gibbon Wakefield, a Benthamite Radical who, being a man of energy and ideas, would probably in normal circumstances have made a name in British politics. But in 1826 his career had apparently been ruined by a disreputable adventure: he had been sentenced to three years' imprisonment in Newgate for abducting an heiress from school and persuading her to marry him. This episode closed to Wakefield the possibility of a political career in Britain: indeed, it was not until 1849 that he ventured to put his disgraced name upon the title-page of any of his books, and no Government ever dared to employ him. But while he was in gaol, in the hope of making a fresh start in a new land, he had devoured every book about the colonies which he could obtain. As he read, personal aims were swamped by the enthusiasm of a great idea. When he was released he founded (1830) a Colonisation Society, in which he gathered about him a group of men whom he infected with his own enthusiasm. Chief among them was Lord Durham, the 'Radical Jack' of the Reform Act, who was later to take Wakefield with him to Canada, and there to work out the classic exposition of one side of their creed. With them were Sir William Molesworth and Charles Buller, two very able young Liberals who were to make their mark in the House of Commons. These four were the chief inspirers of the new colonial school. But some of the more outstanding Liberal statesmen, notably Lord John Russell and Lord
Howick (later the third Earl Grey) were deeply influenced by their ideas; and John Stuart Mill, now the chief prophet of the Benthamites, gave them his hearty backing.

Wakefield's own main contribution to the theory of colonisation was a plan for overcoming the two main difficulties which stood in the way of successful settlement. If colonial land were given away freely, every man would desire to possess his own land, without considering whether he could command either the capital or the labour necessary for working it, and much of the land thus occupied would lie derelict. Again, if emigration were left to chance, many desirable emigrants would be unable to pay the cost of transit. Wakefield's plan was that Government should only sell colonial land at a good price, and that the proceeds should be spent in defraying the cost of helping emigrants who would work on the land of others till they could save enough to buy land of their own. By such a method the mother-country and the colonies would become 'partners in a new industry, the creation of happy human beings; one country furnishing the raw material, that is the land—the dust of which man is made; the other furnishing the machinery, that is, men and women to convert the unpeopled soil into living images of God.' It was his belief that 'in this honourable and glorious co-partnership, the interest of the mother-country would be greater than that of the colony, and a rupture of their relations would be most injurious to the former.' Wakefield's theories were never fully applied; but they were nearly realised in the settlement of South Australia and New Zealand, and they influenced the land systems of other colonies.

The doctrines of this able group of men on colonial self-government obtained their clearest expression in Durham's Report on Canada, which is a classic treatise not only on Canadian problems, but on colonial policy as a whole. 'It is not by weakening but by strengthening the influence of the people on its government—by confining within much narrower bounds, and not by extending, the interference of the imperial authorities in the details of colonial affairs—that harmony is to be restored where dissension has so long prevailed.' In these words Durham expressed, with faith and courage, the fundamental doctrine of the Commonwealth. Like Burke in 1775 he appealed to 'the spirit of the British constitution' as the cure for grave political maladies: 'it needs but to follow out consistently the principles of the British constitution,' he insisted; and,
unlike Burke, he and his fellows did not preach in vain. They believed also that in this policy lay the one hope of maintaining imperial unity. They held that ties of the old rigid kind were both fragile and irritating, and that a far stronger bond would be found in a common pride in the same institutions and traditions of liberty. This conviction inspires every page of Durham's Report; it inspires Wakefield's bold project for the government of South Australia; it is to be found also in the speech in which, in 1850, Lord John Russell introduced a bill empowering the Australian colonies to frame their own constitutions, and in the despatch in which, in 1855, he welcomed the new system they had established. The dream of Burke was to come true; the British Commonwealth was to be held together not by trade regulations, and not by the 'letters of office and instructions' of a Colonial Secretary, but by 'ties which, though light as air, are as strong as links of iron'; by the 'participation of freedom, that sole bond, which originally made, and must still preserve, the unity of the Empire.'

In tracing the history of the individual colonies through this critical and formative period, we shall see at work the powerful moulding ideas which we have attempted to analyse, but we shall see them working with different effects in different colonies. We shall first consider those colonies—the West Indies and South Africa—wherein backward peoples were numerous, and wherein, for that reason, the predominant influence was that of the missionaries, backed by all the authority of the Colonial Office. In these lands the colonial reformers of the Wakefield school took little interest. They found their principal field in the great empty lands to which we shall later turn, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. But in all the colonies alike we shall see the influence of the new economic policy—the abandonment of any attempt to enforce a regulated system of inter-imperial trade.

§ 2. The Tropical Colonies of the West.

There is no more pointed illustration of the contrast between the colonial policy of the eighteenth century and that of the nineteenth than is afforded by the West Indies and West Africa. The West Indies had been the pride of the old colonial system, the main pillar of the empire's trade. No part of the empire had drawn greater profit from the system of trade regulation and monopoly; while the traffic

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1 See below, p. 440.
with West Africa had brought an abundant supply of cheap labour. The riches and greatness of the West Indies had in truth rested upon an artificial and unhealthy basis; they had been built up on slavery and protection. And when slavery was abolished and protection was replaced by free trade, the West Indies sank into relative insignificance, by a transition as painful as it was abrupt; while West Africa practically ceased to have any value. In short, to these colonies the new colonial policy brought nothing but ruin; and the planters bitterly felt that they were being made the victims of humanitarian fads on the one hand, and of new-fangled economic theories on the other.

Blow after blow was struck at the foundations of their well-being: first the abolition of the slave-trade; then the competition of beet-sugar grown in Europe; then, worst of all, the abolition of slavery. Compensation was, indeed, paid for the emancipated slaves, but only at the rate of £19 a head, and the market price averaged £35. This meant bankruptcy for many. And the freed slaves—habituated to live on a bare minimum, which the tropical soil easily produced—showed no eagerness to work. Many plantations had to be left derelict, because the labour necessary for working them could not be obtained. A final blow came with the establishment of Free Trade, when Britain admitted to her markets, on the same terms as West Indian sugar, the sugar grown in Brazil and other colonies where slavery still existed. This was the cruelest stroke of all. The West Indian planters felt they had been betrayed: they were not only ruined and disheartened, they were seriously disaffected to the home Government. And they had a real grievance. The system under which they had thriven was bad and unhealthy; it had to disappear. But it had been created by the deliberate policy of the home Government, steadily pursued during nearly two centuries; and the victims of a sudden change of policy might reasonably urge that no sufficient thought had been given to the difficult problem of building up a new and healthier system.

Under the new order yet another difficulty emerged. The white residents in the West Indies could not easily abandon their long-acustomed ascendancy, or the methods of government they had employed, when they found themselves at the mercy of an overwhelming majority of negroes, now free men, but illiterate, debased by long usage of slavery, and full of resentful memories. The white settlers in Jamaica, Barbados and the Leeward Islands still possessed
self-governing powers; but the exercise of these powers was attended by real dangers, and was regarded with distrust by the home Government. Friction with the Colonial Office was incessant in all the self-governing islands; in the other islands no progress towards self-government was permitted; and in the next era even the older colonies were to submit to large restrictions upon their autonomy. The principle of self-government was at war with the principle of protection for backward peoples.

To the West Indies, at any rate, the new colonial policy seemed to have brought nothing but ruin; impoverishment, stagnation and disheartenment were the lot of the islands which had once been the proudest of British possessions. Evidently the pathway of humanitarianism in colonial policy was a stony one, beset with many thorns. One thing alone had been gained. The canker of slavery had been eradicated. But it had left its poison behind.

§ 3. South Africa: the Native Problem and the Great Trek.

In South Africa, as in the West Indies, the greatest difficulties arose from the fact that a white minority dwelt among an overwhelming majority of backward peoples whom they were accustomed to regard as inferiors and to employ as slaves. But the problem was infinitely more complex than that of the West Indies. In addition to the slave population (who were nearly as numerous as their masters) there was a still larger population of free negroes, warlike, virile and aggressive. And the bulk of the white population consisted of the Dutch Boers, who were separated from their British rulers by barriers of race and language, and even more by the fact that they still adhered to the view of the relation between white men and their coloured subjects which every Englishman had accepted without question in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Boers regarded their negro neighbours as Sons of Ham, natural slaves, with no claims to civil rights; the British, or at any rate the missionaries and the Colonial Office, were inclined to claim for the negro an absolute equality with the white man before the law.

It was indeed this difference of view as to the right mode of treating backward peoples which forbade harmony between the two European peoples on whom the destiny of

1 See below, Bk. x. chap. v. p. 535.
South Africa depended; and the humanitarian doctrine, which the British had only adopted during the last generation, was the root cause of the friction that brought so many troubles. The problem of attaining harmony between the Dutch and the British, if it had stood alone, would no doubt have presented difficulties; but it would have been solved, as the corresponding problem was solved in Canada, by the exercise of self-government. The co-existence of the native problem forbade this solution; for the home Government, unwilling to leave the subject peoples at the mercy of a white minority, withheld self-governing powers. Until 1833 the colony was under the despotic rule of a Governor; and even in 1833 his power was only qualified by the addition of a small nominated Legislative Council. Behind the Governor was the Colonial Office, which left him little discretion. And the Colonial Office was in this period completely under the influence of the missionaries: the Secretary of State, Lord Glenelg, and the permanent head of the office, Sir James Stephen, were both fervent Evangelicals, who looked at all South African questions through the eyes of the missionaries. They regarded the protection of the native peoples as their first duty; and they were too ready to assume that in any difference between white men and black, the white men were sure to be in the wrong.

Now there is no doubt that the missionaries had earned a right to be heard. With admirable courage they had made their way among many savage tribes, and had begun to exercise over some of them a real civilising influence. Dreading the effects upon their flocks of contact with the white man, they wanted to keep them as far as possible aloof from every white influence save their own; and this became in a large degree the policy of the British Government. But it is clear that the missionaries conveyed a false impression of the character of the South African natives; and that they also created an unhappy prejudice against the Boer farmers, against whom they wrote with extreme bitterness. In particular, a book published in 1829 by Dr. Philip, Superintendent of the London Missionary Society at Cape Town, did more than any other single cause to produce misunderstanding between the two white races. The Boers were slave-owners, and no doubt they were often brutal and harsh, like all pioneers in a wild land. But the Kaffirs were far indeed from being innocent and inoffensive victims of the white man's greed, as they were pictured by the sedentary officials of the Colonial Office. They were
just as aggressive as the Boers; and it was the wildest nonsense to imagine that, left to themselves, they would live in peace. The Kaffirs were the advance-guard of the warlike Bantu peoples who had long been pressing southwards from Central Africa, and they incessantly raided and harried the eastern frontiers of Cape Colony. There had been Kaffir wars in 1779, in 1789, in 1799; and even since the British occupation two formidable Kaffir invasions had taken place, in 1812 and 1819. Behind the Kaffirs were the still fiercer Zulus; away in the north, far beyond the limits of the colony, were the savage Matabele; and the incessant warfare in which these peoples spent their time was so murderous that it is estimated that at least 1,000,000 human beings had been slaughtered by Zulu and Matabele in the first generation of the nineteenth century. Boer farmers, dwelling in scattered homesteads, knew too well the dangers that threatened them from these ferocious warriors to regard with any patience the sentimental view of the home Government. They felt that they were unjustly used, and that their interests were uniformly disregarded for the sake of savages whom they both hated and despised. In truth, the Boers’ view of the native tribes was nearer the truth than Glenelg’s and Stephen’s: the Bantu peoples were incapable of living in peace except under compulsion; and the one hope of quietude for South Africa was firm government such as only white men could organise.

Already this difference of view as to the treatment of natives had produced serious trouble. In 1815 a farmer at Schlachter’s Nek had refused to obey a summons issued by a district court at the instance of one of his own Hottentots; an attempt to arrest him brought about a little revolt, in which lives were lost; and the episode ranked, as a sign that the British Government was taking the side of the blacks. But in 1834 two events took place which brought relations between the Dutch farmers and the British Government to the breaking-point.

The first of these was the compulsory emancipation of all slaves by the edict of the distant British Parliament. The abolition of slavery was a noble act; but it could not seem so to the Dutch. For two centuries they had practised a system of domestic slavery widely different from the cruel plantation-slavery of the West Indies; and they regarded the system as both natural and of divine ordinance. What increased their anger was that the compensation offered them was quite inadequate: the value of the South African
slaves was estimated at £3,000,000; the compensation available was only £1,250,000. And the freed slaves drifted into vagrancy, could not be got to work, and became a nuisance and a danger.

Emancipation by itself, however, would not have led to an irreparable breach. Far more serious was the British Government's treatment of the Kaffir problem. At the end of 1834, when the exasperation about emancipation was at its height, the Kaffirs made the most formidable incursion that had yet been recorded. Along a line extending fifty miles inland from the sea, 12,000 fighting men burst over the frontiers, burning farm-houses, killing the farmers, and driving off cattle. Fortunately an able Governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, had recently assumed office. He drove back the invaders, annexed the area beyond the Fish River,¹ and organised it as a frontier-province, leaving the Kaffirs undisturbed so long as they behaved peaceably (1835). It was a sound settlement. The Boer farmers felt that Government was at last dealing sensibly with a real danger.

But the home Government, inspired by some of the missionaries, took a different view. Lord Glenelg, sitting at ease in London, could not believe that the Kaffirs were the 'merciless barbarians' whom D'Urban's despatches described; for him they were the victims of 'systematic injustice,' driven by despair to 'extort by force that redress which they could not otherwise obtain.' Accordingly he cancelled D'Urban's annexation (1835), withdrew the frontier to the old line, and recalled the vigorous Governor (1837). Upon which the Dutch farmers, already sore about the emancipation of their slaves, came to the conclusion that the British Government could not be trusted even to protect their lives and their cattle against their savage neighbours, and resolved in large numbers that they had better abandon their homes, and move out into the wilderness, where they would at least be free to protect themselves. Thus an obstinate sentimentalist in London, inspired by a generous but misguided view of his duty, brought about the crucial event which has determined the subsequent history of South Africa—the Great Trek of the Boer farmers (1836).

We do not know the number of the voluntary exiles who began to pour out of Cape Colony in the spring of 1836: the total has been variously estimated from 5000 to 10,000; in any case they were a small proportion of the Dutch population of the colony. They set forth in small parties, with

¹ See the map, Atlas, Plate 89 (b).
their families and belongings in tented wagons, driving their cattle before them; and thus began the most extraordinary and heroic Odyssey in modern history. There was very little organisation or leadership in the movement; the parties joined and separated again in a confusing way; and they never succeeded in establishing any effective central government. But for all that, they achieved astounding things. Passing northwards, over the Orange River, they moved on into the northern part of what later became the Orange Free State; some of them pressed onwards as far as the Zoutpansberg, in the north of the Transvaal. All this rolling upland country, eminently suited for the pastoral life which the Boers loved, was nearly empty; but it was under the sovereignty of the fierce Matabele warriors of the chief Mosilikatze. With grim resolution the farmers faced and defeated Mosilikatze's hosts, and drove him beyond the Vaal, and even beyond the Limpopo. They had broken a powerful savage empire (1837); and at Winburg, whose name commemorated their victory, they established the centre of a new free republic, laying down a simple constitution which included a significant prohibition of all dealings with the London Missionary Society. But the constitution did not establish any effective central authority. The scattered groups of settlers, especially those who were thinly spread over the vast area of the Transvaal, went their own ways, uncontrolled.

It was a wide and rich land which they had acquired, substantially larger than England and Wales. But this did not content the wanderers, bitten now by the gaddfly of adventure, and torn asunder by jealousies between rival leaders. To the east of their main settlement, beyond the Drakensberg Mountains, lay the beautiful land of Natal, left almost empty by the ravages of the Zulus. A few British traders who had settled on the coast at Durban had vainly petitioned the Government at Cape Town for the annexation of these lands. In 1838, after a promise of friendship from the Zulu king, Dingaan, a band of Boers came down into Natal. But a large party of them were treacherously murdered by the Zulus on the Tugela River, at Weenen, 'the place of weeping.' The brave Boers refused to be driven out. With some help from the few British settlers, they made war against the terrible Zulus, broke their military power at the battle of the Blood River (1838), and enthroned a new Zulu king as a vassal of their own (1840).
Natal became, for a short season, the second main centre of the wanderers, with Pieter-Maritzburg as their capital. Within three years this handful of untrained farmers had broken two great savage empires, and won for themselves a wide and rich domain.

The British Government had watched these events with bewilderment and misgiving. The Boers were still technically subjects of the British Crown. They were stirring up a dangerous unrest among the native peoples beyond the borders. They were restless, aggressive, and inspired by hostility to the British power. And now, by the conquest of Natal, they had taken up a position on the sea-coast, where they might be doubly dangerous. What was to be done with them? In 1841 the Natal Boers began to attack the Kaffir tribes who lay between them and the old colony. This threatened to drive the Kaffirs into the colony. Thereupon Government reluctantly resolved to annex Natal (1842). The Boers at first showed fight; but resistance was useless, and most of them retired over the Drakensberg, back into the Orange Free State. Natal, now a British colony, was once more left empty. It was filled up rapidly by native refugees, who flocked to take advantage of British protection against the Zulus; and it was not until the last years of our period, between 1848 and 1851, that a few thousands of British immigrants were brought into the colony, which was to become the most British part of South Africa.

Britain had thus been driven into the annexation of new territory. But her rulers were eager to avoid further responsibilities of this kind. During the next decade their attitude towards the Boers and the natives wavered in a way that reflected their bewilderment. First, on the advice of the chief missionary leader, Dr. Philip of Cape Town, they resolved upon the creation of a ring of protected native states under missionary guidance, which should secure the natives against oppression, and form a barrier between the colony and the restless Boers. Four such States were set up between the Kalahari Desert and Natal: Griqualand West, under the chief Waterboer, head of a tribe of Dutch-Hottentot half-castes; the Eastern Griquas, in the southern part of what is now the Orange Free State; Basutoland, farther east; and Pondoland on the coast (1843). But this well-meant arrangement broke down almost immediately: the native tribes were quite incapable of orderly and peaceful

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 89 (a).
government. Quarrels broke out between the Eastern Griquas and the white settlers in the country allotted to them, and in 1845 a British Commissioner had to be sent to Bloemfontein to maintain the peace. Next year, 1846, a new Kaffir invasion, the worst of the series, showed that the policy of non-intervention in native affairs was a complete failure.

Accordingly a return was made to the policy of D’Urban, the reversal of which had led to such far-reaching results; and Sir Harry Smith, who had been D’Urban’s right hand man, was sent to clear up the mess. He annexed British Kaffraria (1847), thus returning to D’Urban’s methods; and the readiness with which the Kaffirs settled down under British rule showed that annexation was the only key to peace. Smith also revised the treaty arrangements with the Basutos; and as the only mode of preventing conflict between white settlers and natives, in 1848 he annexed the territory between the Orange and the Vaal, under the title of the Orange River Sovereignty. Some of the Boers offered resistance; they were defeated at Boomplaat, and the irreconcilables withdrew into the Transvaal. But the majority of the Boer farmers in this region willingly accepted British government, glad to have order maintained, now that the disastrous native policy of Lord Glenelg had been abandoned. For six years a British agent at Bloemfontein ruled over an apparently contented population, while the more restless Boers preserved their chaotic independence in the Transvaal, broken into several mutually jealous States.

But this was not the end of vacillation. The home Government had very reluctantly assented to the latest annexations. It wanted no further responsibilities; and held the view that the Boers had a moral right to independence if they desired it. In 1852, by the Sand River Convention, the complete independence of the Transvaal was formally recognised. Two years later, by the Bloemfontein Convention (1854), the Orange River Sovereignty was abandoned, and became the Orange Free State. Independence was, in truth, almost forced upon the Orange Boers, many of whom protested against the withdrawal of British protection.

Thus ended twenty years of confusion and vacillation, which had produced results of momentous importance to the future of South Africa. The single colony of 1830 had expanded into two colonies, two independent republics, and several protected native States. A racial cleavage and
memories of bitterness separated the republics from the two colonies; and both republics were in a state of anarchy. This was the outcome of a generous and well-meaning policy, guided too much by sentimentality, and too little by exact knowledge of facts. But very manifestly South Africa could not remain permanently in the condition in which it had been left by the agreements of 1852 and 1854. The British view as to native rights had been a good deal modified by events. But even in its modified form, it had not been accepted by the Boers; and after a placid interval, fresh difficulties were to break out upon this fundamental issue.


While South Africa presented in its most difficult form the problem of adjusting the relations between white and coloured races, it was in Canada that the problem of colonial government was first and most clearly raised. Canada is the classic land of colonial self-government: it was on her soil that the principles were established which determined the lines of later development in all the self-governing dominions.

In 1830 all the Canadian colonies—Upper and Lower Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland—possessed the traditional and characteristic institutions of British colonies, like those which had existed in all the American colonies before the Revolution: they all had representative assemblies with control of legislation and taxation, alongside of Governors sent out from Britain, and executive councils nominated by the Governors. And, as in the American colonies before the Revolution, there was growing friction between the assemblies on the one hand and the executives on the other. The assemblies were beginning to resent the limitations on their power. Being denied responsibility, they were acting irresponsibly, and using their control over laws and taxes to make government very difficult. Indeed, in two respects the situation was worse than it had been in the American colonies; for on the one hand the Governors were subject to a far more detailed control by the Colonial Office than the eighteenth century had known; and on the other hand they were largely in the hands of small and almost hereditary cliques in the several colonies, who monopolised effective power, and sometimes corruptly misused it.
The friction was least in the Maritime Provinces, though in Nova Scotia there was an opposition made bitter by a sense of its own impotence. In Upper Canada (Ontario) there was strong hostility to the ruling clique, known as the Family Compact; and the nearness of the United States, together with the immigration of a good many Americans, had produced a movement for annexation. But it was in French Canada (Quebec) that the friction was most serious, for here it had taken on a nationalist complexion. The Executive Council was entirely British, the Assembly overwhelmingly French. Government had almost reached a deadlock, for the Assembly refused to pass even necessary laws when they were asked for by the Executive. Nationalist feeling had reached a dangerous pitch of intensity, stimulated by the fear that the growing British immigration would swamp the French nationality of Quebec. No French jury could be trusted to do justice in a case in which an Englishman was involved; and social relationship between the two peoples was practically non-existent. There was a demand that Quebec should be kept purely French, a willingness to repudiate the authority of the British Crown, and to strike for complete independence. The chief spokesman of this movement was Louis Papineau, a florid orator who, ten years earlier, had spoken loud panegyrics on the blessings of British rule. He was supported by the lawyers who filled the Assembly, and who were the intellectual leaders of the unlettered habitants of the villages in which they practised. This racial conflict was not only politically mischievous, it was economically ruinous. Canada was stagnant and unprogressive, presenting a poignant contrast to the abounding energy of the United States; and a large proportion of the emigrants who arrived from Britain made haste to cross the border, and became American citizens.

In 1836 the deadlock in Lower Canada was so serious that a commission of inquiry was sent out. It reported, in effect, that nothing could be done; and on this Lord John Russell announced that, if necessary funds were refused by the Assembly (as had been done), its action would have to be overridden. This produced intense excitement in both Upper and Lower Canada; and in both colonies abortive rebellions broke out (1837). The rising in Quebec, under Papineau, was the more serious. But the influence of the Roman Catholic bishops prevented it from becoming general, and it was easily crushed by Sir John Colborne. In Upper Canada the Scottish leader of the opposition, W. L. Mac-
kenzie, tried to raise a revolt, and for a moment threatened Toronto. But the sentiment of the colony was strongly loyalist, and the rising came to nothing. A later attack, made from the United States by a band of adventurers whom Mackenzie had collected in Buffalo (1838), was equally unavailing.

But merely to crush the risings was not enough; and the reprisals in which the ascendancy parties in both provinces indulged were highly dangerous. The British Government had the good sense to see this. They sent out Lord Durham as Governor and High Commissioner with large powers, to inquire into the whole situation in all the Canadian colonies. It was an admirable choice. Durham was a high-spirited man, and had made enemies. But he was the one British statesman of the first rank who had given serious thought to colonial problems; and he believed in freedom as the secret of political harmony. He took out with him Wakefield and Charles Buller. The colonial reformers were to have their chance.

Durham arrived in Canada in May 1838. He had to deal with two problems: the immediate difficulties created by the rebellion, and the future government of Canada. He found the gaols full of prisoners who could not be tried, because no jury would convict them; while Papineau and other leaders had fled to the United States. Durham issued an ordinance condemning the fugitives to death if they should return, transported eight others to the Bermudas (over which he had no jurisdiction), and released the rest. His somewhat high-handed action laid him open to attack; his ordinances were disallowed by the home Government; and on November 1 he resigned, having held office for less than six months. His career was ended; and he died in 1840, apparently a failure.

But during these brief six months he and his colleagues had been strenuously at work, investigating the conditions and problems of all the Canadian colonies. The result was the great *Report on Canada*, which he presented on his return to England in February 1839. If ever a piece of writing had the quality of an act of statesmanship, the *Report on Canada* deserves this description. For it placed the problems of colonial government in a new light. No one who read it could ever again think of them in the old narrow way. It defined the principles upon which the modern Commonwealth was to be reconstructed.

The greater part of this classic of colonial policy was
devoted to an incisive and unflinching examination of the situation in Canada, in which no one was spared, French or British, governments or oppositions; and the root cause of every evil was traced to a vicious system, which failed to bring home to all citizens their responsibility for the common welfare. French and English must learn that Fate had made them partners, and cease to fight against one another. For that purpose Durham recommended that Upper and Lower Canada should be united; he hoped that this would lead to the merging of the two races. He looked forward also to the ultimate unification of all the North American colonies, and therefore urged that it should be made easy for the Maritime Colonies to unite with Canada proper. He advocated the construction of railways and canals as a means of bringing them together. But the main burden of his message was that responsibility must be thrust upon the peoples, by giving supreme power to their representatives and ensuring that the executive government should be responsible to the legislatures. He made light of the argument that this would endanger the unity of the empire: nothing would be more dangerous to the unity of the empire than that it should seem to be identified with defiance of the public will. Moreover, he held that it would be easy to distinguish between questions of local concern and questions of imperial concern; and under the latter head he enumerated foreign policy, defence, the regulation of trade, and the control of public lands. In regard to public lands he fully shared Wakefield's view that the wise direction of emigration would only be possible if all public lands within the empire were centrally controlled; in regard to trade he anticipated the attempt which was later made to establish a system of Free Trade within the empire. On these points the later development of the Commonwealth has moved away from Durham's position. But his main contention—that it is only by making each community directly responsible for its own welfare that social and political health can be attained—became the foundation-principle of a reconstructed British Commonwealth.

One of Durham's recommendations was immediately carried out. In 1840 an Act was passed through the British Parliament uniting Upper and Lower Canada under a two-chamber legislature, a Legislative Council whose members sat for life, and a House of Assembly with an equal number of members from each province. But the greater step of making the executive responsible to the legislature was not
yet taken. Britain was not ready for it; the Duke of Wellington, whose party came into power in 1841, declared that ‘local responsible government and the sovereignty of Great Britain are completely incompatible.’ Probably Canada also was not yet ready for it, for racial hostility was still keen, and governments and oppositions might have been divided on racial lines. The first three Governors under the Act, Sydenham (1839-41), Bagot (1841-43), and Metcalfe (1843-46), acted as their own Prime Ministers. They were supported by a Government party, and opposed by an organised opposition which happily included both Englishmen and Frenchmen, and was led by two capable men, Baldwin and Lafontaine, who worked amicably together. The racial cleavage was beginning to heal; and the party organisation which could make parliamentary government possible was taking shape on non-racial lines.

In 1846 a new Liberal Government came into power in Britain; and its Colonial Secretary, Lord Grey, having frankly adopted the principle of responsible government, proceeded to put it into operation. His first despatch instructed the Governor of Nova Scotia to choose his ministries in accordance with the majority in the elected house, and to stand outside party, taking, like the Queen in Britain, no personal responsibility for the acts of his ministry. For the governorship of United Canada, Grey selected Lord Elgin, a son-in-law of Durham, and a convinced believer in his doctrines; and it was under Elgin—not by enactment, but, in the British way, by mere custom—that the usage of responsible government became fully established. In 1849 the new system was put to a dramatic test. The ministry proposed to pay compensation to those who had suffered during the rebellion of 1837. There was a furious outcry from the ‘Loyalists,’ who demanded that the Governor should veto the bill. Elgin firmly refused, even when the Parliament House was burned down, and he himself was pelted with stones and rotten eggs. He stuck to the fundamental principle that the ministry must be responsible. They might make mistakes; but it is only by letting men make mistakes and accept the consequences that they will be enabled to learn the responsibility of liberty. At home Elgin was vehemently criticised: Carlyle pilloried him as a cowardly and feeble ruler. But his action was a piece of courageous statesmanship, which crowned the work of Durham, and made responsible government a reality.

During the years when this momentous departure in
colonial government was being made, two long-vexed boundary disputes with the United States were settled, not without difficulty. They were settled by Britain, and Canadians have sometimes complained that their interests were sacrificed; but there does not seem to be any justification for the complaint. The first question was that of the Maine boundary, which had been a subject of controversy since 1783. In 1831 the United States were persuaded to refer the matter to arbitration, but they refused to accept the award when they found that it did not yield their claims. In 1838-9 frontier disputes nearly brought on a war; but at last, in 1842, a compromise was reached, in the Ashburton Treaty, whereby both sides sacrificed their extreme claims. The result was violently criticised both in Canada and in Maine. The second question was that of Oregon. In 1818, after long negotiations, it had been agreed that the boundary should run along the 49th parallel of latitude from the Great Lakes to the Rocky Mountains. But beyond the Rocky Mountains, in the region which now includes British Columbia, Oregon and Washington, both Englishmen and Americans had been active, and no boundary had been fixed. America claimed the whole Pacific coast, and threatened war (1839-41) unless her claims were conceded in full; she twice refused to consent to arbitration. In 1846, however, when America was on the verge of war with Mexico, the Oregon Treaty was concluded, on the rational lines of continuing the 49th parallel as the boundary as far as the Pacific, with a southward dip to include on the British side the whole island of Vancouver. The result of these treaties was to fix the longest undefended and indefensible frontier which divides any two countries in the world; yet on the two sides of this imaginary line two great free communities have been able to live for three-quarters of a century in unbroken peace. Even if the Canadian claims had been irrefutable, some sacrifice would have been worth while for so remarkable a result.

The new colonial policy had achieved a genuine triumph in Canada within twenty years. It had established the fullest measure of self-government ever enjoyed by any colony in history. It had restored harmony and made co-operation possible between the two partner-races, recently in open conflict. It had opened an era of glowing prosperity, after an era of depression. These were great achievements. They set a model for the future development of the British Commonwealth.

The problems of Australia were widely different from those of South Africa or of Canada. Australia had no racial difficulties. All her immigrants were British. Her aborigines were few and of a degraded type; they avoided the regions occupied by the white man; and they never gave any serious trouble. It was the difficulty of getting rid of the convicts, and the difficulty of persuading free settlers to cross 12,000 miles of ocean, that alone stood in the way of Australia's growth. She is the only great country in the world that has never been disturbed by war or violent revolution.

In 1830 the Australian continent included three colonies, two of which, New South Wales and Tasmania, were still predominantly convict settlements. Convicts formed 40 per cent. of the population of New South Wales in 1833, and most of the remainder consisted of freed convicts and their children; in Tasmania the proportion of convicts was still higher. Western Australia, the only free colony, had just been established, but it was in a very precarious condition, and seemed likely to die of inanition. Free emigrants were still very few: between 1821 and 1827 they had averaged only 600 per annum, and even the assisted emigration of 1828-9 had only brought the average up to 1500. The cost of the journey was so great, and the reputation of a convict settlement so deterrent, that it was scarcely to be hoped that any large stream of emigration would turn towards Australia when Canada and the United States lay so much nearer at hand. Australia could do nothing to help herself; the possibility of healthy growth depended wholly upon what the mother-country might do.

Between 1830 and 1855 these conditions were strikingly transformed. The struggling penal settlements were turned into thriving colonies of free men, endowed with a high degree of self-government. At the same time there was great activity in exploration,¹ and the main features of the Australian continent were disclosed by a gallant band of discoverers, Sturt, Mitchell, Eyre, Leichhardt and others, who traced the course of the Murray and its tributaries, revealed the beauty and fertility of Victoria, explored the interior of Queensland and the shores of the Gulf of Carpentaria, and indicated the character of the huge barren region which occupies the centre of the continent.

¹ See the map, Atlas, Plate 87 (a), where the main routes are shown.
But the main achievement of the period was the attraction of large numbers of immigrants of a good type; upon that everything depended. And the success which was attained was very largely due to the group of colonial reformers of whom Wakefield was the centre. In 1831 the Colonial Office adopted Wakefield’s main idea, prohibited free grants of land, and ordered that land must be sold at a minimum price of 5s. per acre, and that the proceeds must be devoted to assisting emigrants: in 1842 the price was raised to £1 per acre, in order to discourage the purchase of holdings too large to be worked by the purchaser. This still left it open to ‘squatters’ to occupy waste lands for sheep-breeding at a small quit-rent; and it long remained a vexed question how far the rights of the ‘squatters’ extended, and whether they should be allowed to prevent intensive settlement. The funds derived from the sale of lands brought a good many immigrants; and the British Government also expended considerable annual sums in assisting emigration. The immigrants, however, were not very eager to settle among convicts, and hence one of the results of the growing stream of immigration was the foundation of two new colonies, free from the convict taint—in 1835 Victoria (which was under New South Wales until 1852), and in 1836 South Australia, which was from the first a distinct settlement.

Victoria was at first peopled from New South Wales and Tasmania, largely by men who wanted to get away from the convicts; but after 1838 an inrush of British immigrants began, helped from the funds created by sales of land; and under the vigorous if autocratic rule of Sir George Gipps the colony rapidly took root and thrived.

South Australia was started as an experiment in scientific colonisation on Wakefield’s lines, by a company which Wakefield organised in 1830. According to Wakefield’s plan, the company was to be free from Colonial Office meddling; it was to sell its land at good prices, and use the money to bring out emigrants; no convicts were to be admitted; and as soon as the settlers numbered 10,000 they were to receive the fullest self-governing powers on democratic lines. Unfortunately the Colonial Office would not give up its control, and was frightened by Wakefield’s democratic schemes. After long delays, some of Wakefield’s chief provisions were omitted. Authority was divided between a body of Commissioners in London and a Governor responsible to the Colonial Office; and Wakefield was not
even appointed a Commissioner. It is not surprising that the colony did not fulfil Wakefield’s hopes. The first two Governors squandered money recklessly; and solvency was only restored by the firm and clear-headed administration of George Grey (1841-5), who now entered upon his great career as a colonial statesman. In 1842 the Commissioners were swept away, and the ordinary form of Crown Colony government was set up under the control of the Colonial Office. Wakefield’s critics asserted that his theories had been shown to be fallacious. But in truth they had not been fairly tested; and even so, they had been the means of bringing out 16,000 settlers in a very short time, and planting them prosperously on the land.

The result of all this activity was that the number of free immigrants soon swamped the convict element of the Australian population. The 1,500 immigrants of 1830 rose to 14,000 in 1838, and to 32,000 in 1841. But the more the free population grew, the more obvious it became that the system of transporting convicts must be brought to an end. This was all the more necessary because the character of the convicts was changing. In the old days, when a man might be transported for stealing five shillings’ worth of cloth, many of the convicts had been anything but irredeemable criminals. But now that Peel and Russell had reformed the English penal code, only real criminals came out. The new immigrants demanded the abolition of the system; and the colonial reformers at home took up the cause with enthusiasm. In 1837 a Parliamentary Committee presided over by Sir William Molesworth, pronounced strongly against the system. In 1840 it was abolished for New South Wales, and in 1853 for Tasmania. The change brought about by immigration on the one hand, and by the abolition of transportation on the other, may be indicated by two figures. In 1833 the population of New South Wales was 60,000, of whom 40 per cent. were convicts: in 1850 the population was 265,000, and less than 1 per cent. were convicts.

So long as Australia was primarily a convict settlement, she obviously could not enjoy self-government. But the changes we have described enabled her to enter upon her natural inheritance as a British community. In 1842 the nominated Legislative Council which had existed in New South Wales since 1824 was transformed into a body two-thirds of whose members were elected on a democratic suffrage. But Australia was developing so rapidly that the colonists—with the example of Canada before their eyes—
demanded responsible self-government. And they were met with extraordinary readiness by the Government of Lord John Russell, and by Lord Grey as Colonial Secretary. Grey conceived the project (1847) of creating a federal system for the Australian group of colonies. If his ideas had been carried out, Australia would in this regard have taken the lead of all the British dominions. But Grey was ahead of his time, and some features of his scheme were much disliked by the colonists. In 1850, however, Lord John Russell introduced into the British Parliament a measure of so striking a character that it may be said to mark, even more fully than the Durham Report, the triumph of the ideal of colonial self-government. The Act separated Victoria from New South Wales, and provided for the future separation of Queensland. But its main provision was of a kind to which no parallel can be found in the relations between a supreme Government and a dependent community created and nurtured by itself. It actually empowered each colonial council to draft a constitution for itself, subject to the approval of the Privy Council; and it also empowered the colonial legislatures to levy what duties they saw fit, upon British as well as foreign goods. This was in effect a proclamation that the Australian colonies had come of age, and must henceforth enjoy complete and responsible control of their own destinies.

Under the terms of this Act New South Wales, Tasmania, Victoria, and South Australia created their own democratic systems, which were confirmed and endorsed by Acts of the British Parliament in 1855. They modelled their systems closely upon that of the mother-country; and, in moving the adoption of the bill to confirm them, Russell expressed the true spirit of the new colonial policy when he pointed out that the colonists' "avowed desire to assimilate their institutions to those of the mother-country" arose from "a deliberate attachment to the ancient laws of the community from which their own was sprung." He prophesied that "they would combine with 'their independent course of progress and prosperity'... the jealouś maintenance of ties thus cemented at once by feeling and principle." Russell prophesied well. The Australian group of colonies entered upon their career as free self-governing States, not less but more loyal members of the British Commonwealth because its heritage of political liberty had been so unstintingly shared with them.

The youngest of the great British dominions, New Zealand owes her organisation as a colony to this period of systematic colonisation. Her development was more rapid than that of any other colony, for within a dozen years of the first settlement on her shores she was equipped with the full system of responsible government. Into these few years was crowded a great deal of instructive experience; for New Zealand was the only colony in which the two chief constructive forces of the period, the missionaries and the scientific colonisers, met and clashed.

Captain Cook had annexed the islands when he rediscovered them in 1769; but nothing had been done to enforce the claim thus created, and for more than a generation the native inhabitants had been left undisturbed. These were the Maoris, of the handsome and charming Polynesian stock, the most attractive and intelligent of the primitive peoples. There were about 100,000 of them in the North Island when British settlement began, but only a few hundred in the South Island, which was almost an empty land. Virile, chivalrous and romantic, the numerous Maori tribes spent their time with gusto in incessant war; eager to taste all new experiences, they gave a ready and fearless welcome to the first white visitors. From the end of the eighteenth century there was a growing drift to the islands of traders and sealers, escaped convicts and runaway sailors, some of whom adopted the Maori way of life, and were known as pahekas. These vagrom settlers, who were not the most reputable representatives of Western civilisation, numbered about 1000 in 1830.

Meanwhile a better type of Englishmen had begun to appear. In 1814, Samuel Marsden, a trading chaplain from Sydney, led the way in missionary enterprise; and soon there were a good many representatives of the Church Missionary Society, and later some Wesleyans. The missionaries established a remarkable influence over the Maoris. Though they were unable to wean most of the tribes from their passion for war, or even from their abominable habit of eating their defeated foes, they made many converts, opened numerous schools, and won the confidence of most of the chiefs. Some of the missionaries were not above misusing their position to obtain immense grants of land. But they were beyond question a real civilising power.
They dreamed of building up in New Zealand a sort of theocracy; they reasonably distrusted the influence of the class of white settlers who had hitherto appeared in the islands; and they desired to keep the Maoris as free as possible from contact with white men. In 1833 they succeeded in obtaining for this purpose the appointment of a British Resident, to keep traders and other interlopers in order. But this did not imply annexation, and the Resident had no real power.

It was impossible, however, that European influence should be kept at arm's-length from these beautiful and fertile lands: the only question was whether this influence was to be brought under effective organisation and control, or left to operate irregularly. During the 'twenties land-speculators and other adventurers were beginning to get a foothold. During the 'thirties, and especially in 1838, there were many signs that the French (who in that year occupied Tahiti, where British missionaries had long been at work) were contemplating intervention in New Zealand. Meanwhile, in Britain, Wakefield and his group were urging the importance of annexing and colonising the country. It was 'the fittest country in the world for colonisation,' Wakefield told a parliamentary committee in 1836; and he pointed out that it was already being settled in an unregulated way which could only lead to injustice to the Maoris. Wakefield and Durham founded a New Zealand Association, and strove to obtain the consent of the Colonial Office for a scheme of colonisation which Wakefield drafted. But the Church Missionary Society offered strenuous opposition; and the Colonial Secretary was an officer of the Society.

At length, in 1839, the Wakefield group resolved to take action themselves, since Government would do nothing; and they started a Company with Durham as chairman, and a capital of £1,000,000. Wakefield's brother and son were sent out to buy land and make other arrangements, in preparation for a large party of emigrants who were to follow. But Colonel Wakefield was hampered by the persistent opposition of the missionaries; he did not understand the complexities of Maori land-tenure; and although his instructions were to take the utmost pains to avoid unfairness, his bargains were in some cases open to question. When the first party of immigrants, an admirably selected body of 1300, reached their destination, they found themselves embroiled in all sorts of difficulties.

The action of Wakefield and his Company forced the hands
of Government; and in January 1840 Captain Hobson was sent from Sydney to effect the annexation of New Zealand in the name of the British Crown, and to act as the first Lieutenant-Governor, under the Governor of New South Wales. With the aid of the missionaries, Hobson held a congress of Maori chiefs, and concluded the Treaty of Waitangi, whereby the chiefs yielded all rights of sovereignty to Her Majesty, and in return were guaranteed full possession of all their lands, and the rights of British subjects. The aim of this treaty was to do justice to the Maoris; but it went needlessly far in recognising 100,000 Maoris as the owners of 65,000,000 acres of land, nine-tenths of which were unoccupied.

With the Treaty of Waitangi began a decade of friction and confusion. On the one hand were the Company and its emigrants, whose object was colonisation, and who were a little apt to ride roughshod over the complicated Maori rules of land-tenure. On the other hand were the Maoris, who enjoyed quarrelling for its own sake, and the missionaries, whose object was to prevent colonisation, and who were less than fair to the settlers. In these circumstances the process of settlement was harassed and difficult. The Company established settlements at Wellington and Taranaki in the North Island, and at Nelson in the South Island, while a Government settlement was made at Auckland. But there was incessant friction with the Maoris; and after many minor troubles, in 1848 a rebellion blazed out in the North Island, in which the Maoris fought with remarkable gallantry. This continual unrest did not encourage immigration; even before the rising of 1848, Wakefield's Company was at the end of its resources, and the outlook seemed desperate.

Happily a man with a genius for such problems was appointed Governor in 1845. Sir George Grey, having saved the situation in South Australia, came to save it in New Zealand. His governorship, which extended over eight years, planted the new colony fairly on the road to prosperity. He won the hearts of the Maoris by studying their customs, and speaking to them in their own tongue; but he was firm with them, and insisted that they must live at peace with their neighbours. With the land question, the root of most of the trouble, he dealt skilfully by making huge purchases from the Maori chiefs, mainly in unoccupied regions, and transferring them to the Company for settlement. Far indeed from sharing the missionaries' desire to

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 87 (b).
keep the Maoris aloof from western civilisation, he was as enthusiastic for British settlement as Wakefield himself. By 1850 the friction with the Maoris was at an end: Maori chiefs were making roads at their own expense, and petitioning the Queen to appoint Grey Governor for life. The Company also had learnt to avoid its early blunders. It had turned its attention to the empty lands of the South Island, and had enlisted the co-operation of the Churches. Under the auspices of the Free Church of Scotland a Scottish colony was founded in the hilly province of Otago, which is more like Scotland than most other regions of the world; while the English Society for the Propagation of the Gospel brought out admirable bodies of English settlers to the fertile and English-seeming province of Canterbury.

Having achieved this work, which fulfilled the dream of Wakefield in a higher degree than any of his other schemes, the New Zealand Company resigned its charter (1852). It had made mistakes; but it had carried out the process of settlement so well that, only twelve years after the landing of the first shipload of emigrants, the new colony was ready to stand on its own feet. It already included over 30,000 settlers. But they were scattered in six distinct settlements, at Auckland, Taranaki and Wellington in the North Island, and at Nelson, Canterbury and Otago in the South Island. This fact was recognised in a constitution which was drafted by Earl Grey, and revised by Sir George Grey (1852). Each of the six provinces was given a Provincial Council, while a General Assembly was set up to deal with common affairs, to administer Crown lands, and to levy customs duties; but as a means of protecting the Maoris, the Crown still reserved the sole right of buying lands from native owners, and the power to uphold native institutions in the Maori districts. This was a reasonable settlement, appropriate to the stage of development which New Zealand had attained. It was a fair adjustment of the two principles upon which the new colonial system was founded—the protection of native rights, and the conferment of self-governing powers upon organised bodies of civilised settlers. Within a short compass, the first dozen years of the history of New Zealand had, in truth, illustrated all the new ideas which were reshaping the British Commonwealth.

§ 7. The Significance of the New Colonial Policy.

By 1852 the main features of the new colonial system had emerged from the various and many-sided activities which
had filled the two decades of reconstruction; and during
the Russell ministry, which occupied the last years of this
period, Lord Grey, at the Colonial Office, gave form and
body to the new order. It was Grey whose instructions
made responsible government a reality in Canada; who
ended for a time the turmoil of South Africa by recognising
the independence of the two Dutch republics; who tried
to federate Australia and, when that failed, empowered the
Australian colonies to define their own constitutions; and
who endowed the infant settlements of New Zealand with
the institutions of self-government. The character of the
modern Commonwealth was fixed. It was to be a fellow-
ship of self-governing peoples, and its unity was to be
voluntary rather than compulsory; but at the same time
it was to be the means of protecting backward and subject
peoples in the exercise of their rights. In the case of the
white settlements the ideal of partnership, in the case of
backward peoples the ideal of trusteeship, had replaced the
older ideal of mere dominion.

The establishment of these ideas implied nothing less than
a revolution in the conceptions underlying imperial power.
The credit of this revolution does not belong to any one
man. It must be shared by a multitude of men and women
who seldom saw eye to eye, and often reviled one another:
by missionaries, by philanthropists, by theoretical econo-
mists, by practical enthusiasts such as Wakefield, by admin-
istrators such as Sir James Stephen, by statesmen such as
Durham and the two Greys and Russell. But among them
they had achieved a complete recast of the principles upon
which the relations of the British Commonwealth had
hitherto been determined; they had given an altogether
new content and significance to the term Empire.

[Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions; Todd, Parliamentary
Government in the British Colonies; Egerton, Short History of British
Colonial Policy; Wakefield, Art of Colonization; Garnett, Life of E. G.
Wakefield; Buller, Responsible Government; Egerton, Selected Speeches of
Sir W. Molesworth; Cornewall Lewis, Government of Dependencies; Durham,
Report on Canada; Reid, Life of Durham; Fawcett, Life of Molesworth;
Grey (3rd Earl), Colonial Policy of Lord J. Russell’s Administration;
Lucas, Historical Geography of the West Indies and Historical Geography of
South Africa; Theal, History of South Africa; Egerton and Grant, Constitu-
tional History of Canada; Kingsford, History of Canada; Rogers, Historical
Geography of Australasia; Jenks, The Australasian Colonies; Reeves, Long
White Cloud; Henderson, Life of Sir G. Grey; Cambridge History of the
British Empire; Walker, History of South Africa and The Great Trek;
Knowles, Economic Development of the Overseas Empire.]
CHAPTER XI

RECONSTRUCTION AND EXPANSION IN INDIA: AND
THE FIRST CONFLICT WITH CHINA

(A.D. 1830-1850)

§ 1. The Act of 1833 and the New Policy in India.

In India, as in the English-speaking colonies, the era of liberal reconstruction brought great changes in outlook and policy. Ever since the conquests of Wellesley had made Britain the paramount Power in India, an enlarged sense of responsibility for the welfare of the Indian peoples had been growing among Anglo-Indian administrators. But in Britain also ideas about India were changing. It was impossible, in the temper of the time, that the East India Company should any longer be regarded primarily as a means of bringing wealth and trade to the home country. The new spirit found expression in the India Act of 1833, which opened the second era of British Indian history. The first era had been that of conquest; the second was to be that of reorganisation and penetration.

By a happy chance, the Charter of the East India Company fell to be renewed in 1833; and in accordance with custom a strong parliamentary committee was set up to review the working of the Company's system. Its searching and voluminous report laid down new principles of legislation, and formed the basis of the momentous Act of 1833. There was some talk of suppressing the Company, and transferring its political authority to the Crown. This course was not adopted, because it was felt that the Board of Directors, possessing special knowledge and being free from the considerations of party interest which are apt to have undue weight in Parliament, formed a valuable factor in the system. But the Committee strongly urged that if the Company was to continue to exercise political powers, it must cease to be a profit-making organisation, and must make the welfare of its subjects, not the dividends of its shareholders, its primary concern. 'It is recognised as an
indisputable principle,' asserted the Committee in a striking passage, 'that the interests of the native subjects are to be consulted in preference to those of Europeans whenever the two come in conflict.' The assertion of this principle—to which it would be hard to find a parallel in the records of the dominion of one people over another—raised the whole problem of Indian government to a different plane. The Committee was equally emphatic in the assertion that India must be governed in accordance with Indian ideas. They urged that 'the principles of British law could never be made the basis of an Indian code'; and they condemned the practice of excluding Indians from responsible office, which had been followed since the time of Cornwallis.

The India Act of 1833 was inspired by these ideas. It forbade the Company to engage in trade at all, and thus brought to an end the association of government with profit-making. It recognised the unity of the Indian Empire by giving to the Governor-General the title of 'Governor-General of India,' in place of the absurd traditional title of 'Governor-General of Fort William in Bengal'; it deprived the minor Presidencies of any shadow of independence; and it empowered the Governor-General, with his Council of four members, to make laws for the whole of British India, subject only to the supreme overriding power of the Imperial Parliament. For the first time a single central Government was to be the source of all authority throughout British India. The Act also provided for a systematic codification of Indian law, which was to pay due regard 'to the rights, feelings and peculiar usages of the people'; and it added for this purpose a new Legal Member to the Governor-General's Council. For the first time in her long history India was to be endowed with a single uniform system of law, clearly defined and not capable of being arbitrarily modified. Again, the principle was laid down that no Indian might 'by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent or colour, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment under the Company.' Finally, free access to all parts of India was granted to all Europeans, who had hitherto only been admitted under special license. The influence of the West was to be allowed to play freely upon India; and in particular an open field was offered to the missionaries and their schools of Western learning, hitherto regarded with distrust as disturbing factors. But lest missionaries or traders should abuse the prestige of the ruling race, the Governor-General was required to draft
regulations for the protection of Indians ' from insults and outrages in their persons, religions or opinions.'

The first Governor-General under the Act was Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, who had been in office since 1828; and it is with his name that the era of reform which now began is associated. The first Legal Member under the Act was Macaulay. It was under his direction that the task of drawing up the Indian Code was undertaken; but he built upon the foundations laid fifty years before by Hastings and Impey,1 whom he was to defame. There were many reforms in the administrative system, and many offices were thrown open to Indians. A stricter supervision over the protected native States was also inaugurated; and two of them, Coorg and Mysore, were brought under direct British administration as the only cure for misgovernment. Coorg remains a British province; Mysore was restored in 1881 to the government of its hereditary Maharaja. But the most distinctive feature of Bentinck's administration was that he boldly attacked certain Indian usages which Western morality condemned, but with which no interference had hitherto been attempted, lest Indian religious sentiment should be outraged. The most important of these interferences (1829) was the prohibition of the practice of sati—the self-immolation of widows, as a religious duty, upon the funeral pyres of their husbands. With this may be linked the beginning of a systematic campaign against thagi, an organised conspiracy of murder and robbery carried on by men who professed to regard their crimes as sacrifices to the Goddess of Destruction, and whose operations were assisted by the superstitious terror of the population. It took twenty years to root out thagi.2

But these signs of the coming of a new spirit into British rule in India were of less importance than the rapid development of Western education, which was the outstanding feature of the years following 1833. Hitherto Government had hesitated to give encouragement or support to the modest schools of Western learning which had come into being since Wellesley's time. The small funds which it assigned to educational purposes were devoted to the traditional learning of India, conveyed by Hindu pandits and Moslem maulvis through the classical tongues of Sanscrit, Arabic and Persian. But there had long been a sharp division of opinion on this subject, among both Englishmen

1 See above, Bk. vii. chap. vi. p. 81.
2 Read Meadows Taylor's Adventures of a Thug.
and Indians; and a strong minority in the Government Committee of Public Instruction advocated the diffusion of Western learning, with English as the medium of instruction. Scarcely anybody urged the use of the vernaculars for advanced education, partly because the vernaculars are so numerous—there are 147 recognised languages in India—but mainly because these tongues were not sufficiently developed to be used for such a purpose. In 1835 Macaulay was appointed chairman of the Committee of Public Instruction; and the downright and uncompromising arguments which he advanced in his famous Education Minute of that year ensured the victory of the Western school. From 1835 Government grants, which steadily increased in amount, were devoted to the provision or assistance of schools and colleges in which Western science was taught in the English language; while the educational activities of the missionaries were encouraged and aided.

During the following generation the influence of the new learning slowly permeated the leading members of the old ruling classes, especially among the Hindus. It is impossible to exaggerate the significance of this process for the history of India; we shall have to trace some of its consequences in later chapters. It was to bring to an end the age-long intellectual isolation of India. It was to give to educated Indians of different provinces a common medium of communication: English has been to India what Latin was to mediaeval Europe, the means of enabling men of varied races to feel common interests and to take common action. It was to introduce Indians to the literature which is beyond all others the literature of liberty, and to teach them the vocabulary of free politics, without which political thinking is impossible. None of the changes which British rule has brought to India has been more momentous than the introduction of English education.

§ 2. The North-West Frontier and the Russian Menace.

The work of reform, begun under Bentinck, was not interrupted under his successors. But under the three Governors-General who immediately succeeded Bentinck—Auckland (1836-42), Ellenborough (1842-44) and Hardinge (1844-48), the main interest in Indian history was transferred to the military sphere. A new period of conquest began, in the course of which the frontiers of British India were extended

\[\text{footnote} 1\text{ See below, Bk. x. chap. vi. p. 558; Bk. xi. chap. v. p. 666.}\]
to their natural limits, in the great mountain-barriers of the North-West. This period of warfare was the direct outcome of affairs in Europe. It arose from the acute rivalry between Britain and Russia which produced, in the minds of British statesmen, and notably of Lord Palmerston, a nightmare dread of a Russian attack on India.

Since 1818 the frontier of the British raj had roughly corresponded with the line of the Sutlej and the Indus. But beyond this far from defensible frontier lay three important independent Powers; the Sikhs in the Punjab, the Amirs of Sind in the lower Indus valley, and, behind both, the wild mountain tribes of Afghanistan, who controlled the gateways into India through which, for untold centuries, successive invaders had passed. These States formed a barrier against invasion from the landward side; and it was felt to be essential for the safety of India that friendly relations with them should be maintained.

The most formidable of these frontier Powers seemed to be Afghanistan. The Afghan kingdom had threatened invasion as recently as the time of Wellesley. But since then it had broken up. The heir of the old ruling house, Shah Shuja, was an exile in India; and Dost Mohammed, head of the family which had ousted him, could control little more than the city of Kabul and its neighbourhood. In the fertile territory of the Punjab, the land of the five rivers, a highly organised military power had been built up by the Sikhs, who were not a distinct people, but rather a religious sect, a sort of Puritan offshoot of Hinduism, whose votaries were confined to this part of India. Even in the Punjab they formed a small minority of the population. But a Sikh leader of remarkable ability, Ranjit Singh, had built up an empire which included the whole of the Punjab, had borrowed European officers to train his armies, and was able to carry on an equal conflict with the Afghans. Finally, isolated among the deserts of the lower Indus valley, were the Mohammedan Amirs of Sind. They threatened nobody; but their lands were crossed by the roads which led to the southern passes into Afghanistan; they could interrupt the river traffic of the Indus; and for these reasons they were important.

The British Government had anxiously cultivated friendly relations with the trans-Indus States ever since 1809, when, after the Treaty of Tilsit, the first alarm was raised of a Russian attack on India. In the thirties, when Palmerston

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1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 80.
and the Tsar were competing for influence at Constantinople, Russia was steadily adding to her dominions in Central Asia,¹ and establishing her influence at the court of Persia. These events awakened the old fear of a Russian attack on India; and when it was learnt that Russian agents had obtained a friendly reception at Kabul, the suspicion and dread of Russia became keen. The Governor-General, Lord Auckland, who was a disciple of Palmerston, resolved that a friendly prince must be placed upon the throne of Afghanistan. For this purpose he fixed upon the futile old exile, Shah Shuja; he organised an army to escort him to Kabul; and he made treaties with the Sikhs and the Amirs of Sind to secure a free passage for these forces (1838). The expedition thus undertaken was not only imprudent in the highest degree, it was an act of needless aggression.

At first the expedition seemed to be wholly successful. Shah Shuja was placed upon the throne of Kabul under the protection of a British army and a British Resident. But the Afghans for the most part remained loyal to his fugitive rival, Dost Mohammed. These fierce warriors were not likely to accept a king imposed upon them by foreign bayonets. At first they stood sullenly aloof. Then they became increasingly hostile. The army in Kabul was isolated. Towards the end of 1841 the Resident found it necessary to negotiate with the rebel chiefs for permission to retreat. He was murdered; and the doomed army had to fight its way back, in the dead of winter, through the grim defiles of the Khyber region. In this dreadful ordeal they were disorganised and finally destroyed. This was the most complete and humiliating disaster that had ever befallen British arms in India.

A new Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough, was sent out to redeem the disgrace. He showed a good deal of courage and vigour. Kabul was reconquered, only to be promptly evacuated, as soon as the Afghans released their British captives; and Afghanistan was left to itself. Unfortunately Ellenborough was so much impressed by the necessity of restoring the damaged prestige of Britain that he was tempted to make blunders. The rhetorical tone of his proclamations offended British taste. He brought back from Ghazni the spurious Gates of Somnath with an absurd solemnity. Worst of all, he succumbed to the temptation of showing British strength by an attack upon Sind.

¹ See the map, Atlas, Plates 82 and 83.
Sind is the only British acquisition in India of which it may fairly be said that it was not necessitated by circumstances, and that its conquest was therefore an act of pure aggression. It is true that the country was ill governed, and that the Amirs had not observed their promises in regard to the free navigation of the Indus. But these were not sufficient reasons for the high-handed treatment which they received from Sir Charles Napier, the Governor-General's representative. This treatment goaded them into an attack upon the Residency at Hyderabad, where Colonel Outram represented the British authority; and this gave the excuse which was desired. In the battle of Miani (1843) the Sindians were routed by Napier, and their country was annexed. But the episode left a bad taste; and the chivalrous Outram went home to plead the cause of the exiled Amirs, who had 'never contemplated opposing our power, and were only driven to do so from desperation.' His protests were vain; and, indeed, annexation brought nothing but good to the people of Sind. The whole story was admirably summed up by Napier himself as 'a very advantageous, useful and humane piece of rascality.'

Nor was this the end of the reactions which resulted from the ill-advised Afghan adventure. In the Maharatta State of Gwalior the Maharaja's army of 40,000 men got out of hand, and two battles had to be fought (1843) before order was restored. Meanwhile there was growing restlessness among the Sikhs in the Punjab. Since Ranjit Singh's death in 1839 the Sikh realm had been steadily sinking into anarchy. The Government was impotent. The great Sikh army was completely out of hand. It was the most formidable and the best organised army that any Indian Power had ever possessed. It numbered nearly 90,000 men, had been trained by skilful European officers, and was supported by well equipped and abundant artillery. Full of pride in its own fighting power, it had been taught by the Afghan disasters to think lightly of the British capacity for resistance. The danger of conflict was therefore very great.

The British Government was determined to avoid a clash with the Sikhs if it were possible. In 1844 the hot-headed Ellenborough was recalled; and his successor, Lord Hardinge, a distinguished veteran of the Peninsular War, went out with the fixed resolve that the Sikhs must be left to enjoy their independence, and that no interference in their
affairs must be attempted. It was necessary, of course, to maintain forces on the frontier as a protection against the danger of a Sikh attack; but Hardinge was so eager to avoid anything that might cause irritation that he reduced the frontier armies to a dangerous extent.

At the end of 1845 the Sikh army suddenly crossed the Sutlej, hoping to take the British unawares. They numbered some 60,000 brave and well-trained fighting men; and it was only after a series of the most desperate battles in the history of British India—Mudki, Ferozeshah, Aliwal and Sobraon—that they were driven back. (January, February, 1846.) After the final victory of Sobraon the Governor-General dictated peace in the Sikh capital of Lahore. It was a very moderate peace. The Sikhs were compelled to pay a small indemnity and to cede the beautiful land of Kashmir (one of Ranjit Singh's conquests), as well as certain strips of frontier territory. Sikh government was re-established under the young Maharaja Dhulip Singh; and a British Resident, Sir Henry Lawrence, was placed at Lahore to help the Government in establishing order and instituting a civilised system of administration.

But the Sikh chieftains resented their subordination to an English protectorate; and the Sikh army had not given up hope of reversing the decision of 1846. In 1848 the Diwan of the fortress of Multan revolted from the Lahore Government; and his initial success tempted the army to rise. Lord Hardinge had recently left India. His successor, Lord Dalhousie, recognised that a final war with the Sikhs was inevitable. This second war was almost as hard-fought as the first. At Chilianwala, in January 1849, a desperate indecisive battle showed that the fighting-power of the Sikhs was still very great; and a second great battle had to be fought at Gujerat before they admitted defeat. It was now manifestly of no avail to re-establish the protectorate system which Hardinge had set up; and Dalhousie rightly decided that outright annexation was the only practicable course. As we shall see in a later chapter, he was to turn the Punjab into a model province; and from that day to this the land which had produced the valorous fighting men of Ferozeshah and Chilianwala has been the chief recruiting ground for the armies of British India.

A decade of almost uninterrupted warfare, from the expedition to Kabul to the annexation of the Punjab, had thus...

1 Blk. x. chap. vi. p. 545.
resulted in the annexation of the whole valley of the Indus, and had brought the Indian Empire to its natural frontier in the great barrier of mountains and deserts on the North-West. The process of unifying India by conquest was completed; the long process which had begun at Plassey had reached its culmination; and India, for the first time in all her troubled history, had become a single great Empire, within whose guardian seas and mountains unbroken peace reigned.

The rapid process of expansion did not cease, however, even with the attainment of the natural frontiers of India proper. Away in the east, on the other side of the Bay of Bengal, Dalhousie was in 1852 drawn into a second war with the Burmese Empire.

British traders, who had settled in Rangoon under the protection of the treaty of 1826, made many complaints of the oppressions and the interruptions of trade to which they had to submit. A naval officer, sent with a frigate to demand redress and compensation, declared a blockade of the Burmese ports, and was fired upon. Thereupon Dalhousie despatched an ultimatum; and when no answer was received, a perfectly organised expedition was sent to obtain redress by force. In a masterly eight-weeks' campaign, Rangoon and Prome were captured; and since the barbaric court of Ava refused to treat, Dalhousie proclaimed the annexation of the rich deltaic province of Pegu or Lower Burma to the Indian Empire. From the moment of annexation the new province enjoyed an abounding prosperity, and Rangoon rapidly became one of the great ports of Asia. The new conquest shut off the Burmese Empire from the sea. It linked up the coastal strips of Arakan and Tenasserim, conquered in 1826, and gave to the British power control over the whole eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal. And (what was still more important) it brought the expanding British Commonwealth into more intimate contact with the yellow-skinned peoples of the Far East. With the greatest of these peoples, the Chinese, an independent series of events had already established a new relationship, which was to be so important in its consequences that it must not pass unnoticed.

§ 3. The First Conflict with China.

While the first serious impact of Western ideas was reaching the ancient civilisation of India, China also had to open

1 Above, p. 348.
her gates to the West. It fell to Britain to play the chief part in breaching the barriers by which the disdained barbarians of the outer world had hitherto been kept aloof from the Celestial Empire. And it was because the East India Company lost in 1833 the monopoly of British trade with China that open friction began.

For more than two centuries European traders had striven to open up trade with the ports of China, and especially with Canton, the great emporium of the South. They had only been able to do so under strict and humiliating restrictions; and had always found themselves faced by an impenetrable barrier of pride. The Chinese refused to deal with the European traders as equals. When embassies were sent to arrange terms of equal intercourse, they were required to submit to the degradation of the kotow, knocking their heads nine times on the ground in the presence of the Emperor, or even of his portrait; and even when they submitted, they got no further. Official China barely condescended to recognise the existence of the foreigner, and declined to allow him any regular privileges of trade, however much he might abuse himself.

Nevertheless European trade persisted, mainly at Canton, where the mandarins winked at it, because they made profit out of it. During the eighteenth century, and still more since the revolutionary war, a practical monopoly of this trade had fallen to the British East India Company. The main commodities dealt in were, on the Chinese side, tea, silk, and porcelain; and on the British side Indian stuffs, British manufactures, and Indian opium. The opium traffic was the most valuable, yielding to the East India Company an annual profit of about £1,000,000. But the Chinese Government had prohibited the importation of opium in 1796, and the trade was carried on by smuggling with the connivance of the mandarins, many of whom engaged in it. It was to get a share in this lucrative traffic that independent traders began to flock to Canton in 1833, when the East India Company’s monopoly of the Chinese trade was abolished.

But the abolition of the monopoly had two unfortunate results. The East India Company, as a monopolist, had been able to regulate and control it, and, being only a trading company, had no objection to paying the exaggerated deference which the Chinese officials demanded. The Crown agent who took the Company’s place when the monopoly was abolished had no means of controlling the
crowd of independent traders, and could not stoop to negotiate with the mandarins in the prescribed forms. Hence difficulties at once began to arise; while the opium traffic, in private hands, grew by leaps and bounds. The Chinese Government, resolving to suppress the traffic, sent down a vigorous mandarin, who imprisoned all the British traders in Canton, and demanded that all their opium should be handed over for destruction. The British agent acceded to this demand; but this did not stop the smuggling of opium. Nothing could have stopped it, short of a prohibition of export by the Government of India, at a heavy cost to the Indian taxpayer. Relations with the Chinese became more and more strained. Rational negotiations were impossible, because the mandarins would not treat on equal terms; and in the end a wretched war broke out in 1840, which lasted for two years.

The quarrel was a sordid one; and the war has always been known as the Opium War—not quite fairly, since the British Government never questioned the right of China to prohibit opium, or did anything to force opium upon her. In reality it was a war against the Chinese resolve to exclude all European trade, and to treat the European peoples as barbarians without the law. In the end China was compelled to recognise the barbarians (1842), and to allow the entry to her markets to be forced open. She consented to admit European traders to five Treaty Ports, and to cede to Britain the island of Hong Kong, whose splendid harbour soon became an emporium not only for Western goods but for all sorts of Western influence. Sordid as it was, the war of 1840 marked an important stage in the penetration of the world by Western civilisation.

[Muir, Making of British India; Roberts, Historical Geography of India; Ilbert, Government of India; Boulger, Lord W. Bentinck; Trevelyan, Life of Macaulay; Marshman, History of India; Cunningham, The Sikhs; Napier, Conquest of Sind; Douglas, Europe and the Far East; lives of Auckland, Ellenborough, and Hardinge in the 'Rulers of India' Series; Cambridge History of India; Keith, Constitutional History of India; Thompson and Garratt, Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India; Costin, Great Britain and China.]
CHAPTER XII
THE EARLY VICTORIAN AGE
§ 1. The Re-establishment of Content.

During the generation whose achievements have been surveyed in the foregoing chapters, Britain and the British Commonwealth had undergone a greater and a far more deliberate process of change and reconstruction than any earlier period of British history records. As a result of these changes the menace of violent revolution which loomed so darkly in the years following 1815 had been dispelled, and forebodings and misgivings had given way to an optimism that bordered on self-complacency. The Great Exhibition of 1851, in its glittering Crystal Palace in Hyde Park, expressed at once the pride and confidence which now reigned in the British communities and the abounding energy on which this confidence was based. It is worth while to analyse the moral and intellectual outlook of the nation at this resting-point in its history, this quiet-flowing pool below the cataracts. And in making this attempt we shall confine ourselves to Britain. For the mother-country was still, in a very full degree, the heart and brain of the whole Commonwealth; and the influence not merely of her power, but of her outlook and ideas, dominated all the daughter-States, which had scarcely begun to possess an independent life of their own.

The main outcome of this era of reconstruction was that the British people had regained contentment with their system of government, and even, though not so fully, with their social order. One of the most striking signs of the change was the new position of the Crown. In 1820, and throughout the period of threatened revolution, the King and almost all his family had been the objects of public scorn, and their dull vices and sordid quarrels seemed to be symbolic of the rottenness of the ruling order. But now the throne was occupied by a young and virtuous Queen, whose person challenged a chivalrous loyalty; a girl-queen,
happily married, a model of all the domestic virtues, a mirror of the proprieties which the British public loved; and her court was stainless—so impeccably correct that already the tawdry riotings of the Regency seemed to have the unreality of a bad dream. What was more, the Queen was (or appeared to be) the model of a constitutional monarch; no one suspected her of striving after personal power, or of being influenced by backstairs intrigue. Helped by the shrewd guidance of Lord Melbourne, and by the earnestness of her admirable Consort, she had raised the Crown out of the sphere of controversy, above the disputes of factions, and made it the very symbol of the nation's unity, the symbol also of that unity of sentiment which bound the whole Commonwealth together in spite of the growing independence of its members. She had found for the Crown a new function in the life of the Commonwealth; not that of ruling, but that of embodying the sentiment of unity, and of representing the long pedigree of freedom.

Parliament, too, had more than regained its old ascendancy over the mind of the nation. The new machinery of local government was working smoothly and well; and on the whole the nation was content with the system it had wrought out for itself. An equal content with the broadening freedom which had been granted them marked all the self-governing dominions; and if there were unsolved problems in Ireland and South Africa, these vexed lands were for the moment quiescent. A full tide of economic prosperity was flowing in Britain; there was work for all, wages were rising, and the bitter cleavage between rich and poor which had been so formidable seemed to be healing. Careers seemed to be open to talent; fortunes were easily made; the self-made man was common enough to challenge ambition, and most men were ready to believe that the gospel of self-help, which was the reigning philosophy of the time in the economic sphere, might well bring about general well-being.

The old ruling-class had lost their entrenched ascendancy. But in its stead they enjoyed a willingly conceded leadership, and they did much to deserve it, both by their activity in politics and by the large share which they took in the religious and humanitarian enterprises of the time. The social ascendancy of the aristocracy was as great as it had ever been, especially because the old abuses of corruption and patronage had come to an end, and because Society, like the Court, on the whole reflected the sober prosperity
of the middle class. For it was the middle class, sober, religious, conventional and self-respecting, who dictated the tone of English life in this era, and indirectly influenced the standards of Society as definitely as they shaped the course of politics, without, in either case, taking any very direct part. Even the working classes, so recently on the verge of revolt, seemed to have settled down, and to have adopted the sedate and decent ideals of the dominant class.

§ 2. The Influence of Religious Movements.

The supreme interests of the British people were four—business, religion, politics and sport; imaginative, aesthetic or purely intellectual interests lagged far behind with all but a very few. Business came first; and the virtues most esteemed and most cultivated were the self-regarding virtues of the business man, industry, enterprise, honesty and thrift, the virtues that make for material success. The reigning opinion of that time had no misgivings about the entire worthiness of a life primarily devoted to acquisition, for the accepted philosophy taught that it was by pursuing his own interests by honest means that a man could best serve the community.

But religion came next, among a surprisingly high proportion of the population, and it was in and through the multi-form co-operative activities of the Churches that men found the corrective for the fierce individualist competition of the time. And if religion itself was, with many, conventional and somewhat material, a matter of making the best of both worlds, that was not surprising, nor was it universal. There never was a time when the Churches were more active, or played a greater part in the lives of average citizens. New churches and chapels were rising on every hand. They were drawing under their influence thousands who had regarded them with indifference. Great evangelical revivals took place from time to time. A growing army of missionaries in all the dark places of the earth was maintained by the pennies of the faithful, and the missionary-box had become a familiar sight in thousands of middle-class homes. Nor were the dark places of the homeland altogether neglected. The elementary schools maintained by the subscriptions of the Churches were becoming so numerous that when at last the State assumed the function of education it was a relatively small gap which had to be filled. The spontaneous outpouring of charity increased in volume year by year;
hospitals, orphanages, philanthropic societies of every kind, increased and multiplied.

There is no doubt about the genuineness of the religious life which showed itself in these and many other ways. It was not merely a religion of self-cultivation; in a remarkable degree, as the subscription lists of missions and schools and hospitals proved, the duty of giving had been impressed upon men and women of all classes. But there was an element of rigidity and narrowness in the temper of the time. There was a strong flavour of Puritanism in Victorian England, which had both good and bad influences. One feature of it was a very strict Sabbatarianism. It was in this period that the grim Sunday-silence which impresses foreigners in British towns became most marked; we do not hear of it earlier. Cabinet meetings ceased to be held on Sundays, and Sunday parties fell out of use: an attempt was even made in Parliament to fine bishops found guilty of driving to church; and Sunday letters were stopped. It was the Puritan public opinion of the time that put an end to duelling, which had still been incumbent upon men of honour in the first part of the period; the practice was killed by public disapprobation. Self-indulgence and lavish living were regarded with disfavour; and in this way the Puritan temper encouraged that worship of thrift, as one of the highest of virtues, which contributed so greatly to the economic prosperity of the country. Cards and the theatre came to be looked upon as dangerous and immoral. Of course this temper was not universal. But it was the normal temper of the time. One of its results was that the art of the theatre was almost extinguished: though the age was marked by many great names in literature, it did not produce a single dramatic writer who deserves to be remembered. Another result was the growth of that mealy-mouthed propriety, that refusal to recognise or mention unsavoury subjects, which we associate with the name of Mrs. Grundy. The novelists, like Thackeray, might protest; Mrs. Grundy had taken her place upon the throne of Britain, side by side with Queen Victoria, and she wielded a despotic sway.

But it would be unjust to suggest that the religious and moral atmosphere of the time was insincere or merely formalist. An intense and even passionate interest was taken not only in philanthropic but in religious and ecclesiastical questions. One sign of this was the absurd excitement which was raised in 1850 when the Pope appointed a number of Roman Catholic prelates with titles drawn from
the British districts which they were to supervise. This showed that the old bitter fear of Rome still existed. But it did not lead to any real intolerance. Another sign was the vehemence of the controversies which raged over the appointment of the Broad Church Hampden to the chair of divinity at Oxford, and over the Gorham judgment in 1850. There were, however, far deeper religious issues than these; and the period was ennobled by two deep and vital spiritual movements, the Tractarian or Oxford Movement in England, and the Disruption of the Church of Scotland; both of which, while they raised great controversies, helped to deepen the spiritual life of the nation.

It is impossible, in a brief paragraph, to convey any just sense of the significance of the Oxford Movement. It began in 1833, with a sermon on 'National Apostasy' preached by the saintly poet Keble; it gained the name of Tractarian from a series of tracts which its leaders issued between that year and 1841. In its first form it was a protest against the whole Liberal movement, and in particular against what seemed to be the impiety of State interference with the endowments and organisation of the Church, such as the Liberal Governments had undertaken. Its essence was an insistence upon the Church as a living society, divinely founded and divinely guided, and joined in a mystical continuity with the days of its foundation through Apostolic Succession. This deep sense of the living organism of the Church was in sharp conflict with the exclusive concern about individual salvation characteristic of the Evangelical school, and it easily linked itself with a protest against the individualist thought of the day in politics and economics; to the Tractarian as to the Socialist the Undying Society seemed to be more important than the restless self-assertion of the individual. For this sacred society the Tractarians naturally claimed freedom from State control. Their passionate sense of the continuity of the Divine Society led many Tractarians to abhor the crudity and violence by which the sixteenth century Reformation had been defiled; and eventually this feeling drove some of the noblest spirits among them into the arms of the ancient Church, which alone seemed to have preserved its freedom from the sacrilegious hands of the lay power. Newman, the orator of the movement, joined the Church of Rome in 1845. Manning led a second secession in 1851, when the Gorham judgment had shown the Privy Council actually presuming to determine questions of doctrine. But the main result of the movement was its influ-
ence upon a multitude of parish clergy, in exalting their sense of the augustness of their own office, and impelling many of them to devoted labour among their flocks. Widely sundered as were the ideas and beliefs of the Scottish Presbyterians from those of the Oxford leaders, there is one aspect in which there is a close resemblance between the Oxford Movement and the Scottish Disruption of 1843: both repudiated State control in the sphere of religion. A new vitality had come into the religious life of Scotland, as is evident in the fact that over 200 new churches were built in the six years before 1841; and one of the forms which were assumed by this more active spiritual life was a protest against lay patronage in the appointment of ministers. The General Assembly asserted the right of congregations to veto ministers appointed by lay patrons. The law-courts, including the House of Lords, upheld the rights of the patrons. The Assembly repudiated the right of any lay court, even of Parliament itself, to interfere in a purely spiritual question; and when compromise was found impossible, half the clergy of Scotland, with a self-forgetful courage which compels respect, left their churches, their manses, and their comfortable livings, to establish the Free Church of Scotland. Within a year 500 new churches had been built for them; and almost from the morrow of the great secession the new body maintained, from the free gifts of its adherents, missions, colleges and all the organisation of a great national Church, on a scale as ample as the undivided Church had maintained them before 1843. Here was a still bolder and clearer repudiation of the claim of the State to sovereignty in a sphere which did not concern it.

It is only when one realises the strength and sincerity of the beliefs which showed themselves in such ways, and which might be illustrated, if less dramatically, from the achievements of other religious communities in Britain, that one can fully appreciate how profound and how vital was the influence wielded by the Churches over the life of the British peoples. This was the main ideal force that helped to shape the course of events; and it influenced the trend of policy at home as clearly as it determined some of the principal features of the new policy in the treatment of backward peoples which distinguished this age.

§ 3. The Early Victorian Age in Literature.

It might be expected that a frame of mind such as we have described would not be favourable to the cultivation
of the arts; and, indeed, this was so in most spheres of artistic endeavour. Art is of all things the most individual; and machinery and large-scale production are not kind to it. Nor were the whole-hearted pursuit of material success, and the acceptance of rigid moral conventions, which marked this age, compatible with an undistracted pursuit of beauty. We have already noted how Puritanism had reduced the art of the theatre to a dead level of stagnation. The art of music scarcely existed in Victorian Britain, except in concert performances of foreign music. The period scarcely produced a single painter whose work is still valued. The best architecture of the time was imitative, not original, being inspired by two deliberate and artificial revivals, classic and Gothic; and the fine and dignified tradition of English domestic architecture was killed by these revivals.

But there was one sphere in which the achievements of this time were so great as to challenge comparison with all but the greatest ages of the past; the sphere of imaginative literature, wherein the volume and richness of the work done by this generation seem all the more remarkable by contrast with its poverty in other spheres of creative art. Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the fact that imaginative literature is necessarily concerned with moral issues, about which this age was deeply exercised.

One of the most curious features of the Victorian Age in literature was the sharpness of the cleavage which separated it from its predecessors. The dividing line came, with quite extraordinary clearness, about the year 1830. Before that year, the three marvellous young poets of the earlier age of storm, Keats, Shelley and Byron, had all died; Scott was just at the close of his career; Wordsworth was a survivor from the past whose best work was done; Coleridge had ceased to write poetry, and had become a vague prophet-voice, dimly heard of through the reports of the votaries who sat at his feet in his Highgate retreat. But in or soon after 1830 a whole galaxy of new luminaries suddenly appeared in the sky. Tennyson issued his first independent volume of poems in 1830; by 1850, with the publication of In Memoriam, he had reached almost the acme of his fame. Browning's first poem appeared in 1833, and although he had not gained great fame, much of his best work was written before 1850. Dickens was publishing the Sketches by Boz in 1833, and by 1850 the whole dazzling series from Pickwick to David Copperfield had appeared, and their writer had captured the hearts of the English-speaking
world. Thackeray's career as a writer began in 1837, and by 1850 his greatness had been established by the publication of *Vanity Fair* and *Pendennis*. Macaulay was issuing his brilliant essays in the *Edinburgh Review* in 1830, and in 1848 the first two volumes of his great *History* appeared. Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus* came out in 1833, and his *French Revolution* in 1837, and by 1850 all the books and pamphlets which caused him to be regarded as the inspired prophet of his generation had been given to the world. Ruskin's first published essay appeared in 1834, when he was fifteen; before 1850 nearly all his work in art-criticism had been published. This is a sufficiently remarkable catalogue of achievement; it becomes still more remarkable when it is added that the novels of the Brontës, of Disraeli, of Kingsley, belonged to the same years, and that they saw also the publication of Grote's and Thirlwall's *Histories of Greece*, of Mill's *Logic* and *Political Economy*, and of a score of other works still used and valued.

Assuredly the generation which produced this rich harvest of literature and thought was as fecund in that domain as it was in industry and in politics. And widely varied as this harvest was, the character of the generation which produced it was deeply impressed upon it. To begin with, all these writers alike were marked by a note of moral earnestness, which sometimes became a little oppressive. The exuberant, irrepressible gaiety of Dickens was tinged with it as plainly as the prophetic fervour of Carlyle; it was in the tender satire of Thackeray as in the orderly and lucid reasoning of Mill; in the mellifluous strains of Tennyson as in the deliberate ruggedness of Browning; it dominated and distorted the art-criticism of Ruskin. And the standards of moral judgment which all these writers applied were, in essentials, the standards of their age, of the sober, philanthropic, hard-working, conventional Victorian time. In most of these writers, too, there was the Victorian note of optimism. It seldom rose to the jaunty self-complacency of Macaulay, but it produced a certain smugness in Tennyson, was visible behind the half-rueful smile of Thackeray, inspired the boisterous and ebullient humanity of Dickens, and was present even in the dry, doctrinaire judgments of Grote. Only, perhaps, in the dyspeptic Carlyle was this note of optimism quenched by prophetic gloom, and replaced by the prophet-like denunciations which that serious-minded generation loved none the less though its confidence remained unshaken.
In all these writers, again, there was an intense pre-occupation with the problems of political and social organisation, natural to a generation which was witnessing immense labours of reconstruction. Most of them were well enough content with the trend of political change in their own time; they were Liberals of their day, and like Tennyson watched complacently 'the stream of freedom slowly broadening down,' or like Macaulay gloried in exuberant statistics of exports and population. But there were signs among them of a different temper, of a rising protest against the heartless philosophy of the Economists. Dickens lost his geniality when he wrote of Gradgrind, his type of the heartless factory-owner. Carlyle opened his vials of wrath against a society that was content to drift, with no clear view of the path to be followed towards health and justice. Ruskin, fresh from his studies in the morality of the arts, was beginning to look out with distaste upon a world made needlessly ugly and barbarous, and was preparing to desert the teaching of art for the teaching of a new political economy which might make a living art once more possible in a healthy social order. These protests, which were to be heard, more or less clearly formulated, in most of the great writers of the time (except Macaulay), sprang from that humanitarian temper which dominated the writing of the time, as (in spite of the cruelties of the industrial system) it dominated its social life. A passionate humanity, an eager protest against cruelty and injustice, was indeed the noblest note of the writing of this time. It captured even the cynic Disraeli, when he wrote in Sibyl of 'the two nations' of rich and poor. It drove Kingsley to write Yeast and Allon Locke, pamphlets in novel form. It inspired the fiery eloquence and the rugged pathos of Carlyle. Even the august and elegant muse of Tennyson was its servant. But its purest embodiment was in the robust, generous, full-blooded kindliness of Dickens, who made his readers delight in a host of simple, absurd folk in spite of their absurdities; who had infinite compassion for all who suffer, and fierce anger only for those who oppress; whose works are brimful of jolly human kindliness, and are peopled by a world of quaint lovable figures, almost all drawn from among the humble and obscure.

This galaxy of great writers rendered their country a service not less real than that which was rendered by her statesmen and the organisers and workers of her industry.
They helped to create, to refine, and to intensify a spirit which made progress in good-will more possible. They shaped the thinking and the emotions of all the English-speaking peoples in their generation, and, by enabling them to think and feel in harmony, did more than any laws or regulations to link them together in unity. Their spell is still upon us, far as we have drifted from the spirit and outlook of the Victorian age. But none of them made a more glorious gift to his people than the genial and generous soul of Dickens, the most essentially English of all great writers, who, in an age of machines and doctrinaire economics, gave to the English a new idea of themselves, and made them realise that they loved laughter still, that they valued kindness above efficiency, good sense above logic, and generosity above even justice. Dickens was no mere man of letters. He was the very voice of the great, vulgar, kindly, humorous English people; and he gave them their own true portrait to console them in a time of cruel change.

[Strachey, Queen Victoria and Eminent Victorians; Letters of Queen Victoria; Martin, Life of the Prince Consort; Traill, Social England; Church, Oxford Movement; Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua; Wakeman, History of the Church of England; Hanna, Memorials of Chalmers; Dale, History of Congregationalism; Saintsbury, English Literature in the Nineteenth Century; G. M. Young (ed.), Early Victorian England; Trevelyan, English Social History; Judges (ed.), Pioneers of English Education; Cecil, Early Victorian Novelists; Woodward, Age of Reform; Cambridge History of English Literature.]
BOOK X


(A.D. 1852-1880)
The footnote references in the text to atlas plates are to *Philips' New School Atlas of Universal History* and *Philips' Historical Atlas, Mediaeval and Modern*, Sixth Edition.
INTRODUCTION

In the history of Europe the middle years of the nineteenth century formed a period of intense conflict and rapid change; they saw the unification of Italy and Germany, the deposition of France from the leadership of Europe, the break-up of the Turkish power in Europe, and the establishment of parliamentary government in every country save Russia and Turkey. The forces of Nationalism and Liberalism, which had struggled in vain for satisfaction during the previous period, seemed to have achieved an all but complete triumph; and the settlement of Vienna was torn to shreds. In the United States of America also there was fierce conflict; the Union was almost broken into two rival States, representing two opposing conceptions of civilisation, and the Civil War, with the painful process of reconstruction which had to follow it, retarded the advance of the great republic.

But amid these storms and conflicts the peoples of the British Commonwealth, with two exceptions, enjoyed an almost unbroken peace and a steady increase of prosperity. The exceptions were New Zealand, which was afflicted by a series of Maori wars, tedious but not dangerous; and India, which was visited by the sudden and terrible storm of the Mutiny, but thereafter settled down to a spell of placid peace such as she had never enjoyed in all her earlier history. Even vexed South Africa had an interval of peace between two periods of storm, and during this interval she acquired the rights of self-government, and began to think of the possibility of federation. Canada was united, and began her history as a single nation; Australia made very rapid progress in population and wealth, and discovered in a series of remarkable explorations the full extent of her resources. The daughter-nations of the Commonwealth were coming of age.

The mother-country also enjoyed a spell of placidity and peace, which caused her people to congratulate themselves upon their good fortune, when they compared their lot with that of their neighbours. Britain was at the height
of her industrial and commercial pre-eminence. Her institutions, which, alone in all the world, seemed to have combined stability with progress, had become the admired models upon which the other European peoples were re-shaping their systems. Her prestige has never stood higher than it did during this period. She was, beyond competition, the first nation of the world. And not unnaturally a great self-complacency took possession of her people.

But self-complacency did not long remain undisturbed. It was beginning to be shaken before the end of the period. For one thing, the social contentment which seemed (but only seemed) to have resulted from the reconstructive labours of the preceding age began to be undermined. Ireland began to be restless—more restless, in spite of the first serious attempts at remedial legislation, than she had ever been during the nineteenth century. The great scientific discoveries of the age were beginning to reach the minds of ordinary men, and to unsettle long-accepted beliefs; they were also promising new revolutions in industrial life. There were ominous signs, before the end of the period, that Britain's commercial supremacy would not long be left without serious challenge. The nations of Europe, when they began to settle down after their conflicts, were at once addressing themselves to the industrial problem, and looking about for new worlds to conquer. And in unknown Africa a remarkable series of discoveries, due in the main to British explorers, were disclosing a vast field for these ambitions, which promised a new era of acute rivalry and of insecure peace for the near future.

The short age of gold (or gilded bronze) which had followed the distresses of the era of reconstruction was in truth only a stretch of level water in the course of a rushing stream of change. When the 'eighties opened, the waters were already beginning to be turbulent; and the moving stream was to run over a long series of rapids for a generation, until finally it plunged over the cataract of 1914.
CHAPTER I

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE

(A.D. 1852-1880)

§ 1. Napoleon III. and the Crimean War.

Between 1815 and 1853 there had been peace among the States of Europe; but it was a disturbed peace, perpetually menaced by the revolutionary movements of nationalism and liberalism. On the whole these movements had been held in check, and (except in Belgium and Poland) the system of 1815 had been maintained unbroken. Between 1853 and 1878 there was a succession of great wars, the result of which was to tear the Vienna settlement into shreds, to secure the triumph of the nationalist cause in Germany and Italy, and to bring about the all but universal establishment of liberal and parliamentary institutions. There could not be a greater contrast than that which distinguished these two periods. The main reason for the contrast was that powerful organised Governments now placed themselves at the head of the nationalist movement in both Germany and Italy, and won for it victories such as revolutionary methods had never been able to attain. Having thus secured the confidence of their peoples, these Governments found it wise to take them into partnership. Other States followed the same course, for a variety of reasons. And the result was that, in twenty-five years, the political aspect of Europe was transformed. By the end of this short period the nation-State, governed by parliamentary institutions, had become the normal and accepted type of Western civilisation.

We have seen 1 that in the revolutionary era from 1815 to 1850 there was at least a superficial parallelism between the course of events in Britain and on the continent of Europe. In the era of nationalist wars with which we are now concerned even this superficial parallelism wholly disappears. While Euruone was being transformed, Britain was enjoying

1 Above, Bk. ix. chap. vi. p. 364.
the most placid era in her modern history. Her very placidity increased the prestige of her system, and helped to persuade the other States of Europe to imitate her institutions. She looked on with sympathy at the great events which were taking place on the European stage; but, except by occasional diplomatic interventions, she took little part in them. She stood aloof from the European imbroglio, freed now from all entangling connexions, since Hanover had ceased to be attached to the British Crown. For that reason we need only touch in the most general way upon most of these thrilling and momentous events. The results which flowed from the unification of Germany and the downfall of France were indeed to be of profound importance for the British Commonwealth; but in the process by which these results were attained Britain was scarcely concerned, and the other members of the Commonwealth not at all.

To this generalisation, however, there is one considerable exception. There was one European problem in which British statesmen conceived that the interests of their country were deeply and directly involved. This was the Eastern Question, the problem of the future destiny of the Turkish Empire; on which Britain had committed herself (largely through fear of Russia) to the view that her interests demanded the maintenance of the integrity of the Turkish Empire. On this question alone she was drawn into active participation in European affairs; first at the very beginning of the period, when she was involved in the only European war in which she took part between 1815 and 1914; and again at the close of the period, when she was nearly involved in another war, and when a great national debate took place on this question, which in the end led to a reversal of the traditional British policy.

At the opening of this stirring and eventful period the dominating personality in the politics of Europe was the enigmatic figure of Napoleon III., Emperor of the French. Elected President of the French Republic by a popular vote in 1848, he had, by an unscrupulous coup d'état, overthrown the republic and established his personal rule. His system was a pure despotism, only partially concealed by the existence of powerless deliberative bodies. As closely as possible, it reproduced the system of his famous uncle. It rested upon popular support, expressed in repeated plebiscites by enormous majorities voting by universal suffrage; an untrained democracy deliberately
destroyed political liberty. But there was one popular ideal in which Napoleon III. quite genuinely believed. He was a convinced upholder of the national idea; and he was to play an important part in stimulating nationalist movements, especially in Italy and in Rumania. His advent to power was regarded with deep distrust by the Eastern monarchies, and especially by Russia. But, perhaps for that very reason, Palmerston, who was the chief figure in the direction of British foreign policy, hastened to make friends with him; and for a number of years the entente between France and Britain became more effective than ever. This informal alliance with Napoleon III. had unfortunate results for Britain. Napoleon believed that his position needed the strength that would be drawn from a vigorous and dramatic foreign policy. He wanted to force himself upon the attention of Europe. A victorious war, waged in alliance with Britain, would serve his purpose better than anything else. He saw in the Eastern Question, and in the acute rivalry between Britain and Russia, the most hopeful opportunity for such an enterprise; and the miserable sequence of events which led up to the Crimean War was in no small degree due to his restless ambition.

It was an unhappy thing that Napoleon should have provided a disturbing factor at this moment; for the Tsar of Russia, having been taught by the events of the last twenty years ¹ that Europe would not permit him to make himself master of the Turkish Empire, was anxious to arrive at a peaceful solution of the Turkish problem. During a visit to England in 1844 he had urged upon Sir Robert Peel and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, that if Britain and Russia could only agree, the rest of Europe would fall in with their solution; and he renewed the suggestion to the British ambassador at St. Petersburg in 1853. His plan was the creation of a series of autonomous Christian States in the Balkan peninsula, owing suzerainty to the Sultan, but under a sort of Russian protectorate. To this project British statesmanship could not agree. The Tsar's scheme might have been made the basis of a settlement, if an international protectorate had been substituted for a Russian protectorate; but British distrust of the Russian despotism was too strong to make any discussion on these lines possible, all the more because, with the encouragement of the British ambassador, the Turkish Government in

¹ See above, Bk. IX. chap. vi. p. 369.
these years seemed to be making a serious attempt to introduce large political reforms.

Britain's suspicion of Russia gave Napoleon III. his clue; and he found his chance in a long and dreary dispute which had been going on between the Greek and the Roman Churches over the custody of the Holy Places at Jerusalem. He demanded and obtained from the Sultan a recognition of the Roman claims. Thereupon the Tsar demanded that his position as the protector of all the Greek-Christian subjects of the Sultan should be recognised, in accordance with the vague terms of the treaty of Kainardji in 1774.¹ The Sultan refused to admit these claims. He saw himself in the lucky position of being able to count upon the support of the two great Western Powers in the event of a conflict; and in these circumstances he was by no means eager to avoid war. Russian troops occupied the Danubian Principalities (modern Rumania). France and Britain protested and threatened. Austria and Prussia vainly tried to mediate. The British cabinet drifted and vacillated: it was deeply divided—one section, headed by Aberdeen and Gladstone, being eager to avoid war, while another, led by Palmerston, was as eager to seize the opportunity of checking Russian aggression. Meanwhile Napoleon's influence was steadily employed to bring about the war of prestige which he desired. The result was that in March 1854 Britain and France joined hands with Turkey, which had been formally at war since October 1853; and the Crimean War began.

It is needless to narrate in detail the events of this futile and wasteful conflict, which lasted for two years. As it was impossible to strike any vital blow against the vast mass of the Russian Empire, the allies practically confined themselves to an attack on Sebastopol, the Russian naval arsenal in the Crimea.² Though the campaign was illustrated by much heroic fighting, at the Alma, at Balaklava, at Inkerman, and in the final attack upon the fortress, as a whole it was ill-conducted. Opportunities were sacrificed; terrible sufferings were inflicted upon the British troops by the mismanagement of the medical and supply services, which was only remedied by the noble self-sacrifice and masterful competence of Florence Nightingale. Sebastopol fell in the end, and the Russians themselves destroyed the fleet which lay in its harbour. But these successes amounted

¹ See above, Bk. vii. chap. ii. p. 22.
² See the map, Atlas, Plate 68 (a).
to little. It was only because her finances were disorganised, and because she feared disturbances in Poland and elsewhere, that Russia made up her mind to yield in the spring of 1856. Napoleon won the prestige he wanted when Paris was fixed upon as the scene of the European Conference that settled the terms of peace. But he was the only gainer. Six hundred thousand human lives had been sacrificed. And what were the results?

The Conference of Paris was to have solved the Eastern Question, but it only delayed the solution, and made it more difficult. The Powers guaranteed the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire, which thus passed under an international protectorate. But the guarantee remained effective for little more than twenty years; and its chief result was that no change could be made in these unrestful lands without agreement among the Powers—an agreement which it was all but impossible to attain. Even in this pro-Turkish settlement a breach was made in the Turkish Empire by the recognition of the 'Danubian Principalities,' Moldavia and Wallachia, as autonomous; and before many years had passed they were united to form the principality of Rumania (1861), which borrowed a German prince in 1866. Thus the friends of Turkey themselves hastened the inevitable process whereby European Turkey was divided into a number of Christian States. Again, Russia was forbidden to maintain a fleet in the Black Sea; but this quite unreasonable prohibition remained effective only for fourteen years. It can scarcely be contended that these arrangements were a sufficient justification for the sacrifice of 600,000 lives.

§ 2. The Unification of Italy and of Germany.

The Crimean War was the prelude to a series of short, vigorous, decisive wars which changed the aspect of Europe within a dozen years, and established a new 'balance of power' that was to last for nearly half a century. The modern State-system of Europe was, in truth, created in the twelve years from 1859 to 1871.

First came the inspiring and gallant achievement of the union of Italy, every stage of which was followed in Britain with enthusiastic sympathy. Three revolutionary upheavals had failed to free the Italian people from the deadening control of Austria and of the despotic princelets

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 86.
whom Austria supported and controlled. The military power of Austria had to be overthrown before Italy could be emancipated. Persuaded by Cavour, the subtle and daring Italian patriot who had taken charge of the affairs of Sardinia, Napoleon III. undertook this task (1859), partly because he genuinely cared about the Italian cause, partly because he longed to win victories in the field where some of the first Napoleon’s most dazzling triumphs had been won, and against Austria, the first Napoleon’s most frequent victim. But after winning two victories, at Magenta and Solferino, and driving the Austrians behind their fortresses, he lost his nerve. Dreading an attack from Prussia in the north, he withdrew before his self-appointed task was half completed. But he had started an avalanche. The little duchies of Northern Italy drove out their monarchs, and by enthusiastic plebiscites voted for incorporation with Sardinia and Lombardy. At this stage the steady diplomatic support given by Britain to the Italian cause was of high value, because it prevented a possible intervention by other European Powers. Next year (1860) the romantic hero Garibaldi, on his own responsibility but with Cavour’s connivance, set out at the head of a handful of Red-shirts upon a daring filibustering expedition to Sicily, and with incredible ease and speed brought about the downfall of the Bourbon despotism in the kingdom of Naples and Sicily. A Sardinian army, sent from the north to support Garibaldi and to guard against his indiscretions, received the allegiance not only of Naples and Sicily but of the greater part of the Papal States. By the end of 1860 all Italy save Rome and Venice and their immediate districts had been brought under the rule of Victor Emmanuel, King of Sardinia; the Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed at Turin in 1861; and within ten years the structure of United Italy was completed by the acquisition of Venice in 1866 and of Rome in 1870. Only small fragments of the true Italy—the Alpine valley of Trent, and the port of Trieste with its neighbourhood—now remained ‘unredeemed,’ irredenta: in an astonishingly short time the long-baffled nationalist movement in Italy had achieved an all but complete victory.

Apart from the initial conflict between France and Austria (which made all the rest possible), it was a victory won not by force of arms but by a genuine expression of

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 33 (a).
2 See the map, Atlas, Plate 39 (c).
popular feeling, which made resistance impossible: at every stage the process of unification was ratified by immense plebiscite majorities. And the united realm from the first assumed the guise of a liberal and parliamentary State, with institutions closely modelled on those of Britain. The unification of Italy was the purest and most unalloyed triumph of the liberal and the nationalist ideals, which here alone were fully harmonised; and when liberated Italy took her place as one of the Great Powers, it was plain that the era of reaction and repression was at an end.

The union of Italy was almost immediately followed by a yet more portentous event: the unification of Germany, which had been broken up since 1815 into thirty-nine States. Like the unification of Italy, the unification of Germany, having been attempted in vain by revolutionary means, was to be attained under the leadership of a single State, and under the direction of a powerful personality: Prussia and Bismarck were to play in Germany the parts which Sardinia and Cavour had played in Italy. But the methods pursued in Germany were poles asunder from the methods pursued in Italy. Not popular enthusiasm, but naked brute force, wielded in defiance of public opinion, was to be the means of winning victory in Germany; popular enthusiasm was captured by success, after the event. What is more, the German movement, unlike the Italian, owed nothing at all to external sympathy or aid. It was watched in Britain with a certain sympathy, indeed, but with none of the warm-hearted enthusiasm which the Italian movement had aroused. Bismarck’s methods evoked a reluctant admiration, mixed with distaste.

While the Italians were winning their victory, between 1859 and 1861, the Prussian monarchy was carrying on a desperate and seemingly a losing struggle against the forces of liberalism. Since 1850 Prussia had possessed a parliamentary system; but the Crown claimed that Parliament had no right to interfere with the King’s control over the army, or to withhold whatever funds the Supreme War Lord might regard as necessary for military purposes. The Crown had embarked upon a large increase and a reorganisation of the Prussian army; Parliament refused to find the money; and it seemed to depend upon the issue of this conflict whether Prussia was to become a genuinely free State or not. In 1862 victory seemed to be assured for the Liberals; the King was on the point of abdicating; and, as a last resource, he called to power the
stern and able Junker Conservative, Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck defied Parliament, collected the taxes without its consent, suppressed newspapers which dared to oppose, and completed the reorganisation of the army. His policy was violently opposed in Prussia, throughout Germany, throughout Western Europe; but he knew what he meant to do, and he went on defiantly. He told the Prussian Parliament that the unity of Germany was to be won, not by speeches and resolutions, but by ‘blood and iron’; and by these means he won it.

This is not the place for any description of the three deliberately engineered wars whereby he attained his ends. First came the war of 1864, waged in alliance with Austria against little Denmark, which ultimately gave Prussia the provinces of Sleswig and Holstein, and (what was more important) gave Bismarck a pretext for quarrelling with his Austrian ally. Next followed the war of 1866 against Austria and nearly all the other States of the Germanic Confederation—a civil war wherein the sentiment of Germany was largely ranged against Prussia. Yet, after a dazzling campaign of a few weeks, Prussia’s victory was complete. Austria had to withdraw from intervention in German affairs. She had to look on while Prussia made her dominion over Northern Germany nearly absolute, and while she annexed the kingdom of Hanover, the electorate of Hesse, and the free city of Frankfort, whose sole crime was that they had fulfilled their duty as members of the Confederation by joining to resist the breaker of the peace. The Austrian war and its results startled Europe, and forced her to recognise that Prussia was now a tenfold more formidable Power than she had been in the past. Still more startling were the results of the third war of the series, the war of 1870 against France, whose armies were broken beyond the possibility of recovery within two months of the opening of the campaign, while her proud capital had to submit to the horrors of a siege and the bitterness of surrender, and her northern provinces had to endure the brutalities of a military occupation. For three centuries France and Austria had been the acknowledged leaders of the European comity. Both had been brought down in ruin within five years; and in their places Germany, now united as a federal empire under the King of Prussia, strode to the hegemony of Europe—a terrible and menacing Power, efficient, ruthless and unconquerable.

Three features of this swift and trampling progress of
conquering Prussia deserve comment. The first was that the Concert of Europe was quite unable to check or interfere with these dramatic events. The Sleswig-Holstein question—a complex subject into which we need not enter, and which afforded the pretext for the Danish War of 1864—had been dealt with by agreement among the Great Powers in 1852; yet none of the parties to this settlement intervened when it was disregarded by Prussia and Austria. Britain, indeed, protested, and even raised expectations among the Danes that she would come to their aid; but she could do nothing alone, and neither Russia nor France would take action. In face of resolute and unflinching action the Concert of Europe broke down. Again, the action of Prussia in 1866 was a direct defiance of the Vienna settlement; yet none of the Powers took any action. The war was begun and ended too swiftly to make any effective action possible. Moreover, Bismarck had bought off Russia by helping to suppress a rebellion of the unfortunate Poles which broke out in 1863; he had guarded against any danger from France by a secret and vague promise of ‘compensations’ to Napoleon if Austria should be defeated; he had secured the active alliance of Italy by promising Venetia as the price of her help—a promise which he strictly fulfilled. Britain did not dream of interfering. Her sympathies were, indeed, rather with Prussia than with Austria; and since her connexion with Hanover had fortunately been severed, she was no longer directly concerned in German affairs. Finally, none of the Powers made any attempt to interfere in the Franco-Prussian War, or in the settlement which followed it. France had been on the verge of making an alliance with Austria and Italy for common defence; but the war came so suddenly that nothing came of these negotiations. And Bismarck had beforehand very skilfully isolated his destined victim, using for this purpose the suggestions of ‘compensations’ for France which he had himself encouraged Napoleon to propose. One of Napoleon’s suggestions had been that France might annex Belgium; the publication of this suggestion completely alienated British opinion from France. British action during this war was in fact confined to extracting from both belligerents a treaty undertaking to respect the neutrality of Belgium; apart from this Britain observed the strictest neutrality. In face of a determined and masterful Power, the machinery which Europe had devised for the preservation of peace thus broke down altogether.
A second striking consequence of these events was that the mind of Germany was dazzled and captivated by Bismarck's success. The dreams of peace, justice and freedom, to which German theorists had clung during the first half of the century, seemed to have been of no avail; the bitter opposition which Bismarck's policy had at first aroused was replaced by fervent admiration; and the soul of Germany, swept and empty after the failure of the democratic rising of 1848 and the collapse of parliamentary Liberalism in 1862, was taken possession of by the seven devils of militarism. Blood and iron, force and fraud, seemed to be the true path to national greatness; and even the philosophers and historians of Germany devoted themselves to idealising the traditional methods of Prussia, of which Bismarck's policy was the latest and the supreme embodiment.

Unchecked, therefore, by any common action on the part of Europe, and unhampered by the misgivings with which her own people had watched the early development of the new policy, Germany forced her way into the leadership of Europe, from which she had succeeded in hurling France and Austria. Armed, efficient, ruthless, exultant in her own unity and strength, and confident that a future yet more brilliant than her past lay ahead, she henceforth dominated European affairs. She was to fix the character of the next era.

§ 3. The Universal Establishment of Parliamentary Government.

The great events which had transformed the political situation in Europe between 1859 and 1871 also brought about profound changes in the systems of government both of the peoples most immediately concerned, and of other States. In Germany a new imperial constitution had to be created. By setting up a democratic Reichstag, Bismarck appeared to have satisfied the demands of the Liberals. But the Reichstag never had much power. It was overshadowed by the Bundesrat or Federal Council, which was practically under the control of the Emperor and his Chancellor; while the powers, especially of control over the army, which were reserved to the Emperor were so great that in effect Germany became for many purposes almost an autocratic State.

France also had to undertake a reconstruction of her
system. The Napoleonic Empire had collapsed with the first defeats, and a Republic had been proclaimed. But it was not until 1875 that its constitution was defined; because the discordant monarchist parties had a majority in the Assembly that had been elected during the war, and were loth to abandon the hope of a restoration. It was no longer with the old confident optimism of 1789 or 1848 that France now addressed herself to the task of reconstruction. She had fallen from her high place; she had had to suffer the agonies of civil disturbance in addition to those of foreign conquest, for a terrible Communist rising broke out in Paris in 1871, and had to be crushed with heavy slaughter; she had lost two of her provinces, Alsace and Lorraine—both mainly German in race and largely in speech, but both devoted to the French tradition; she had no friends or allies in the world, and she seemed to lie at the mercy of Germany, who, indeed, threatened her with a fresh onslaught in 1875, merely because she seemed to be recovering too quickly. It was in a subdued and sober mood that she framed her new system, which was as nearly as possible modelled on that of Britain. Yet it was to show greater stability than any of the many frames of government she had known since 1789; and after nearly forty years was to carry her safely through a yet greater ordeal than that of 1870.

Austria, the other fallen Great Power, was driven by her defeats to abandon the system of centralised autocracy to which she had hitherto clung. She might have secured for herself a happier future had she recognised the nationalist aspirations of her many sundered peoples—Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, Rumans, Croats, Serbs—by means of a federal system. But after much discussion and many experiments during the years 1859-1867, she abandoned that idea; and in the 'Compromise' of 1867 the Empire became a Dual Monarchy, in each half of which—Austria and Hungary—a dominant race, the Germans in the one case, the Magyars in the other, lorded it over a group of subject peoples. From that were to come many future troubles. But each half of the Dual Monarchy henceforward enjoyed, at any rate in form, a democratic parliamentary system.

Italy, as we have already noted, had adopted the parliamentary system of government from the beginning of her career as a unified State. The other European countries rapidly followed in the same track. Greece became a parliamentary State in 1863, Denmark, Sweden and Rumania in 1866, Serbia in 1869; while Spain, the victim of an endless
series of revolutionary disturbances, set up a parliamentary system in 1869, and reached something like a lasting settlement of her political problems in 1874. In 1852 genuine popular government had scarcely existed in Europe, save in Britain, Belgium, Holland and Switzerland. Twenty-five years later this system had, in one form or another, been adopted by every European country save Russia and Turkey, and had come to be regarded as the right and normal form of organisation for a civilised State. There has been no period in which so rapid an advance has been made by so many States in the same direction. If we consider this political change in conjunction with the transformation of the European State-system which was involved in the unification of Germany and Italy, it is not too much to say that these twenty-five years form the most remarkable period of constructive political activity that Europe has ever known.

§ 4. The Eastern Question Reopened, 1876-78.

But there was still another to be added to the series of great changes which we have reviewed. The Eastern Question was to be reopened, with momentous results.

In 1856 the Great Powers had taken the Turkish Empire under their protection. They had guaranteed its integrity, but had stipulated for reforms; and during the following twenty years the Concert of Europe made the Sultan’s life a burden to him, with their criticisms, complaints, and constantly changing proposals. There even came into being a reforming Young Turk party, and a short-lived experiment was made with a representative Parliament. But all these large plans came to nothing. Slipshod inefficiency, variegated by bursts of outrage, continued to be the character of Turkish administration; it was made worse rather than better by the incessant meddling of the Powers. Within twenty years of the Crimean War Europe had almost abandoned hope of a reformed Turkey; only Britain still clung tenaciously to her old faith. And now the balance of power in Europe no longer ensured the maintenance of the settlement of 1856. France was too weak to count; Germany was anxiously friendly to Russia; Austria dared not move alone. Russia had already seized the opportunity afforded by the Franco-Prussian War to defy the prohibition which had been imposed upon her in regard to the maintenance of a fleet in the Black Sea. She was ready to
take independent action if an occasion presented itself; and her agents were at work fomenting discontent among the Christian subjects of the Sultan. In 1875 a revolt against the Turks broke out in Herze-govina, a subject province inhabited by Serbs. Montenegro and Serbia came to the aid of the rebels; they were defeated, but the rebellion was not suppressed. The unrest spread to Bulgaria (1876); and the Turkish Government dealt with it by turning loose a horde of fierce irregulars, the Bashi-Bazuks, who slaughtered, raped and plundered on a scale which horrified Europe. The 'Bulgarian Atrocities' completed the revulsion of feeling which had been growing since 1856. As we shall see, even Britain began to waver, under the influence of Gladstone. The way was now clear for Russia; and in 1877 a Russian army invaded the Balkans. By January 1878 the last Turkish army had been put to flight; overwhelming Russian forces threatened Constantinople; and the Sultan was compelled to yield to the terms which the Tsar dictated to him.

These terms were embodied in the Treaty of San Stefano. They required the Sultan to recognise the complete independence of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, which had long enjoyed self-government under his suzerainty; to recognise also a new Christian State, Bulgaria, with a wide territory extending from the Danube to the Ægean Sea; and to promise a separate administration for Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was not an ideal settlement of the Balkan problem: it did not deal fairly with Serbia, and it left many thousands of Greeks under the Turkish yoke. But it might have been made the basis of a lasting settlement. Its defect was that it did not go far enough. The British Government, however, fearing that Russia would dominate the new States, objected to it on the ground that it went much too far; and, contending that since 1856 the Balkan problem was the concern of all the Powers, Britain insisted that the treaty should be revised at a Conference of the Powers. We shall have more to say on this controversy as it affected British politics. Here it is enough to say that a new war between Britain and Russia was very near before Russia consented to submit the question to a Congress summoned at Berlin (1878). The choice of Berlin was as great a tribute to the power of Germany as the choice of Paris had been, in 1856, to the power of Napoleon III.

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 86.
2 Below, Chap. ix. p. 596.
3 See the map, Atlas, Plate 86.
At this moment the statesmanship of Europe had a real chance of finding a permanent solution of the long- vexed Eastern Question. It failed to do so, because the mutual jealousies of the Powers blinded them to the need. Instead of improving upon the Treaty of San Stefano, the Treaty of Berlin made it more unsatisfactory. It cut down Bulgaria to very modest limits, left it still subject to the suzerainty of Turkey, and ensured future troubles by restoring the district of Macedonia to the Turk. By placing under Austrian administration Bosnia and Herzegovina, two provinces whose inhabitants were of Serbian race, it made Austria the inevitable foe of the Serbian nationalist movement, and laid the train of the long disputes which ended in the war of 1914. The seed of many future wars and alarms of war lay in this inconclusive settlement; and it must be recognised that its unsatisfactory character was largely due to the persistence with which Britain clung to the belief that the preservation of Turkish power in Europe was necessary as a safeguard against Russia.

Yet when all is said, the Congress of Berlin formed a not unworthy conclusion of an era of rapid reconstruction. At least it marked the resumption of the practice of common deliberation among the Powers of Europe, after a period of strenuous warfare, during which the Concert of Europe had fallen into the background; and though it was an imperfect instrument, the Concert of Europe was at least a recognition of the necessity of some organisation for maintaining peace and fostering the fellowship of free nations into which Europe had at last been organised.

CHAPTER II
THE UNITED STATES AND THE CIVIL WAR
(a.d. 1815-1865)

§ 1. The Westward Expansion of the United States.

During the forty-five years following the peace of 1815, the expansion of the United States had gone forward at an ever-accelerating pace. Emigrants began to pour out from the Old World as never before, hundreds of thousands in each year. They came at first mainly from Britain; then uncounted thousands began to stream in from unhappy Ireland, after the famine of 1822, and in yet greater numbers after the awful tragedy of 1845-6; and in the later years of the period, after the collapse of the Revolution of 1848, a great tide set in from Germany and Northern Europe. Many of these newcomers, especially the Irish, settled in the cities of the eastern coast, where they presented a new political problem. Being ignorant and unversed in political life, they readily fell into the hands of demagogues and political organisers, to whom their advent gave great opportunities; and the elaborate machine-politics of America came into being. Others joined themselves to the steady current of westward emigration.

This current, in growing volume, flowed from the older States over the Alleghanies into the great central plain; it even flowed over the Rockies to the Pacific slope, to Oregon, and still more to California, where the discovery of gold in 1848 brought a sudden irruption. The world had never seen such a spectacle of ebullient energy and adventurous advance as this generation of American history displayed. Perhaps the best indication of the rapidity with which the continent was being peopled and civilised is afforded by the rate at which it was brought under organised government. In the forty-five years between 1815 and 1860 no less than thirteen new States were added to the Union; and of the thirty-one States included in the Union in 1860, no less than sixteen lay west of the Alleghanies.
The men who were opening out these vast new lands were inspired with boundless self-confidence and optimism. They knew and cared little about world affairs; and their chief sentiments about the older world were an easy contempt for its 'effete monarchies,' and a hatred of Britain, derived from a distorted tradition of the War of Independence, and fed by the Irish immigration. They were pioneers, rude, often turbulent, self-reliant, and fiercely democratic. They had shaken off the traditions which were still strong in the Atlantic States, and the long-accepted leadership of the cultivated classes who still dominated the life of Massachusetts and Virginia. The rapid settlement of the Great West was in truth changing the character of political life in America. It was creating a new democracy, vigorous, self-confident, intolerant, ignorant, and easily led captive by phrases and sentimentalities. The new democracy of the West was prone to a flamboyant and self-assertive patriotism which did not ease relations with other States; and this accounted for the hectoring note of American diplomacy on the boundary questions in Maine and in Oregon, and long delayed their solution. But the domineering temper of a high-spirited and self-confident people was in nothing more clearly shown than in the events which led up to the Mexican War of 1846-1848.

A number of American frontiersmen had settled in the province of Texas, which was part of the Mexican Republic. Dissatisfied with the Mexican government, they proclaimed Texas a republic, and applied for admission to the American Union. The application was granted (1843). The Texan squatters claimed, however, a south-western frontier which Mexico refused to admit. Without any serious attempt at negotiation, American troops were sent to enforce the claim; and this brought on a two-years' war, in which the Mexicans were easily vanquished. Thereupon a vast region extending from Texas to the Pacific, and including the paradise of California with its scattered Spanish settlers, was taken from Mexico as the price of defeat. Unquestionably it was a good thing for the world that this rich and beautiful region, equal in area to several European States, should be brought under the aegis of the United States; but the manner in which it was annexed was undeniably high-handed.

1 See above, p. 438.  
2 See the map, Atlas, Plates 78 and 79.
§ 2. The Growing Cleavage between North and South.

The rapid westward expansion of the United States emphasised and intensified a cleavage which had long existed in the American community. This cleavage was already apparent when the thirteen colonies asserted their independence: the social and economic system of the Southern States rested upon slavery, while in the Northern States, though slavery existed, it was an accident and an excrescence. As time passed, the contrast became more marked, because slavery had wholly died out in the Northern States by 1815. A sharp contrast had thus emerged between two distinct civilisations, which rested on two conflicting assumptions. Between the slave-holding society south of the Potomac, and the free society north of that river, there were fundamental and ineluctable differences of social ideals, and of economic interest, which made conflict between them inevitable; and this conflict formed the core of American history down to the Civil War which was its culmination.

The bulk of the immigration from Europe flowed into the Northern States, because there was practically no place for the working immigrant in the slave-holding States, where manual work was regarded as the province of the negro. Hence the Southern civilisation saw itself faced by the prospect of being swamped; and the prospect was alarming to the proud planter-aristocracy. Their fear for the future of a whole social order to which they were genuinely attached affected the political action of the Southerners in a very marked way. It led them to lay great stress upon the rights of the individual States as against the central Government, because they saw in State-rights the main safeguard of their system. They claimed for each State the right to determine for itself whether any particular act of the central Government was or was not inconsistent with the compact on which the Union rested; and, in the last resort, they asserted the right of any State to secede. The Northerners, on the other hand, while recognising the rights of the States under the constitution, regarded the Union as a whole as the real unit of sovereignty, and refused to admit any right of secession. This conflict of political doctrine showed itself very early. Thus in 1832, South Carolina, being opposed to the adoption of a new protective tariff, simply declared the Tariff Act null and void, refused to enforce it, and had to be forced into submission.
But Southern misgivings were especially shown in an endeavour to ensure that the distinctive civilisation of the South, and the slavery on which it rested, should be, so far as possible, extended to the new lands of the West. For a long time the Southerners succeeded in making a drawn battle on this subject. In 1820, after Missouri had been admitted as a slave-State, a compromise was agreed to, whereby all States to the south of latitude 36° 30' were henceforth to be organised as slave-States. This meant that America was to be divided between the two contrasted civilisations by an imaginary line running east and west. But it was into the areas north of this line that the bulk of the new population flowed; and the likelihood that sooner or later the slave-civilisation would be outweighed or swamped became greater as the stream of immigration grew in volume. It was largely the desire of Southern statesmen, under a Southern President, to enlarge the area open to slavery which led to the high-handed annexations from Mexico in 1848. Mexico had abolished slavery, which had indeed almost disappeared from the civilised world; but the lands taken from Mexico—Texas, New Mexico and Arizona—were organised as slave-States. If the South could have had its way, California would have had the same fate. But the rough pioneers who flocked to the gold-mines refused to admit slavery. They insisted that California must be ‘free-soil’; and they had their way, for by that time (1848) the Missouri compromise had broken down.

It was, indeed, a losing battle that the South was fighting during these long years. Numbers, energy, and the love of freedom were all arrayed against it. It was only able to hold its own because the public men of the North dreaded the possibility of a schism, loved the Union more than they hated slavery, and were ready to make concessions to pacify Southern sentiment. Hence a new compromise was made in 1850. One of its features was an enactment which gave slave-owners the power to reclaim fugitive slaves who had taken refuge in free States. But when this began to be put into operation, the effect upon popular sentiment was profound. Hitherto there had been few outright Abolitionists, and these few were regarded as unpractical fanatics. Now their numbers increased; and an elaborate secret organisation was created to aid the escape of slaves to Canada, where, under the British flag, no man could be treated as a slave, or legally claimed as property by any master.

Yet there were few Northerners, even when the war
began, who seriously advocated that slavery should be wholly abolished, as it had been throughout the British Empire in 1833. The Constitution forbade any such action; for though it rested on the proclamation of the inalienable right of all men to liberty, it had left to the individual States the power of deciding whether they would permit slavery or not. What Northern sentiment demanded was that the area within which slavery was permitted should not be extended. But many men were being irresistibly driven to the conclusion that this was an illogical position. One such was Abraham Lincoln, a gaunt giant of Illinois who had been bred in poverty, yet had trained himself to a profound simplicity and directness of thought and speech which marked him as a leader of men. He had become a lawyer and a politician; and in the course of a campaign in Illinois he had put the position with such irrefutable clarity that he had become a figure of national importance. 'A house divided against itself,' he said, 'cannot stand. I believe this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved; I do not expect the house to fall; but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other.' Lincoln did not advocate legal abolition, which would have involved the overriding of State-rights. But he expressed the mind of the North when he asserted that it was necessary to 'arrest the further spread' of slavery, and to 'place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction.'

For a long time party divisions had been wavering and uncertain, especially in the North; and the Democratic party, which drew its strength from the South and took a high view of State-rights, had been able to control the Government and to elect successive Presidents. In the late 'fifties the rival groups coalesced into the Republican party; and in the presidential election of 1860 they succeeded in electing Abraham Lincoln, though only by a minority vote. The election of Lincoln was taken by the South as a sign that it could no longer hold its own in national politics. Rather than submit, the Southern leaders resolved to secede. Acting on their view of State-sovereignty, the Southern States one after another formally declared their withdrawal from the Union, and established a new Confederation of their own. If they were to have their way,

1 There is a good life of Lincoln for English readers by Lord Charnwood.
the great Republic would be split into two Powers, standing for two sharply contrasted views of human rights and social relationship. The North refused to accept this situation, or to admit the existence of any right of self-determination on the part of the Southern States. It was prepared to take all risks for the maintenance of the Union; and on this ground the field was cleared for a gigantic war.

§ 3. The Civil War and its Consequences.

It is needless to trace in detail the course of the desperate conflict, which lasted for four years, caused a far greater loss of life than any of the wars of this period in Europe, and ended in the abolition of slavery. The corresponding change was brought about in the British Empire at a relatively small cost, and without any use of force or sacrifice of life; the contrast was due to the rigidity of the American constitution, which left no means but force available for the overthrow of a vicious system that it had authorised.

All the weight of numbers and of wealth lay on the side of the North; its resolution was unshakable, and was embodied in the noble fortitude of Lincoln, who stood unwavering even in the darkest days. But the South fought with desperate gallantry, and it succeeded in producing two generals of the first rank, Lee and Jackson, against whom the North could place no one of at all equivalent quality, until Grant and Sherman emerged in the later stages of the war. The most desperate fighting was in Virginia, in the country that lay between the two rival capitals, Washington and Richmond.1 In Kentucky and Tennessee, the border States west of the Alleghanies, the fighting was only less desperate. In both fields, and especially in Virginia, the South held out successfully during the first three campaigns; and in 1863 Lee even ventured to strike north into Pennsylvania. But after a terrible inconclusive slaughter at Gettysburg (1863), the South began to be exhausted. While Grant wore down Lee in a series of dogged and murderous battles, Sherman, having won the upper hand in Tennessee, marched across the hills and down through Georgia, thus cutting the Confederation in half, and threatening the rear of the main Confederate army. This combined strategic movement decided the issue of the war; and in 1865 the resist-

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 81.
ance of the South came to an end. The victory had cost more than a million lives, and an incalculable amount of money.

But the more difficult problem of reconstruction had still to be solved. Unhappily it was not left to the upright and generous spirit of Lincoln to carry out the settlement in the magnanimous temper which he would certainly have displayed; for he was assassinated by a Southern fanatic almost in the moment of victory. Had he lived, he would have softened the bitterness of defeat for the proud South. He had always understood the Southern mind, and had abstained from venom even in the height of the conflict. The lesser men who took on the task were not above the mean temptations of revenge. Held down by Northern armies, the Southern States were forced to assent to an amendment of the Constitution, whereby slavery was abolished for ever in all the lands of the United States; and this, no doubt, was necessary and right. But slave-owners received no compensation for the loss of what public law had encouraged them to acquire as property, and many honourable families found themselves suddenly reduced to penury. The newly-emancipated slaves, quite incapable of exercising political rights, were enfranchised, and used as the instruments of a party vendetta. The Southerners, in despair, took their vengeance by organising a secret conspiracy of violence, known as the Ku Klux Klan, whose proceedings terrorised much of the South for some years. In the end quiescence returned, and time was to show that free labour brought a more genuine economic prosperity than forced labour had ever done.

But the embitterment of race-hatred which had been stirred by the war and its sequel remained; the negroes found themselves, by one device or another, excluded from all effective political power; and the problem of relationship between the two races became with the passage of time not less but more acute. The North had been right in refusing to admit slavery as a possible form of relationship between a higher and a lower race. But it had swung too violently to the opposite extreme in asserting in theory a political and social equality which could not be carried into effect in practice. It had failed to attain the just mean of a fair system of tutelage, under which the more backward race might receive (what it never attains under nominal equality) a full chance of developing all its capacities.
§ 4. America and Britain.

The Civil War raised many difficult problems for the Governments of other nations, and especially for the British Government. Some European observers regarded it as a heaven-sent means of reducing the formidable and growing power of the United States. This was the attitude of Napoleon III., who seized the opportunity to challenge the Monroe Doctrine by establishing a Latin Empire in Mexico under his protectorate (1863), with an Austrian Archduke as its Emperor; but the attempt was an unredeemed failure, and Napoleon had to withdraw his troops ignominiously, leaving the unhappy Maximilian to his tragic fate (1867). Long afterwards the German Bernhardi condemned the folly of Britain in losing this opportunity for the destruction of a commercial rival. But no responsible body of opinion in Britain adopted this attitude. It is true that sympathy with the South, and a belief in its ultimate victory, were general in London society. This was due in part to class-sympathy with the planter-aristocracy; in part to a vague belief that the South was fighting for its constitutional rights, for freedom to manage its affairs in its own way; in part to the fact that the South stood for Free Trade; in part to the dependence of British industry upon the supplies of raw cotton which the Southern States afforded. But the feeling of Britain as a whole was strongly on the side of the North. Hatred of slavery, which had long been one of the governing principles of British policy, was enough to ensure this. Even in the most acute distress of the Lancashire cotton-trade, which was caused by the interruption of supplies, masters and men never wavered in their support of the Northern cause; and Lincoln himself bore witness to the splendid generosity of Lancashire's attitude.

Nor did the sympathy of the British governing class for the South lead to any departure from strict neutrality. The Confederates were recognised as belligerents; but so they were by the United States Government. Britain might plausibly have protested against the blockade of the whole Southern coast by the Northern navy, on the ground that so long a coastline could not be 'effectively' blockaded, just as the United States had protested against the British blockade of the shorter coastline from the Seine to the Elbe during the Napoleonic War. But the blockade was accepted, in spite of the fact that it was causing dire distress
in Lancashire. An immense and lucrative smuggling trade grew up between British West Indian islands and the Confederate ports. The Federal Government strove to stop it by intercepting British vessels on the high seas, and confiscating cargoes consigned to Nassau or other British ports, on the ground that their ‘ultimate destination’ was some Confederate port. This was the assertion of a new principle in international law, the principle of ‘continuous voyage’; yet Britain accepted the principle, though it ran counter to all her own immediate interests. She was to make use of it herself in the Great War against Germany, not without American protests.

But there were two questions upon which friction became very acute. One was the seizure, by an American warship, of two Confederate envoys travelling on a British vessel. This was a definite breach of international law, yet the Federal Government at first refused to restore its illegitimate captives, and for a moment war seemed to be in sight. In the end the Federal Government gave way. The other issue was more serious. Just as France, during the Napoleonic War, had had a number of privateers built and launched for her in America, so the Confederates, shut off from the sea, tried to get commerce-raiders constructed in private British shipyards. For the most part these vessels were stopped by the British Government. But four of them escaped; and one of these, the notorious Alabama, which did a vast deal of damage, got away from Liverpool just before the order for its arrest came down. Government had been warned by the American embassy, but its action had been delayed by the illness of an official. When the war was over, the American Government claimed compensation for all the losses inflicted by the Alabama. There was no valid precedent for such a claim; no such claim had been put forward, for example, in respect of the Napoleonic privateers which had been built in, and allowed to sail from, American ports. But, after long negotiations, the two Governments agreed to refer the matter to arbitration (1871). The arbitrators gave their award against Britain. They enormously reduced the original American claims; but the balance was still so large that, after every legitimate claim had been met, part of it still remains unexpended in the American treasury.

The reference of this vexed question to arbitration, and the prompt acceptance of the award, formed the greatest triumph which the principle of arbitration had yet achieved.
But it did not avail to remove the widespread hostility to Britain which existed among the American people. This hostility, based upon a distorted view of the past, was in fact intensified by the Civil War; and in 1865 the two great English-speaking peoples seemed to be as far asunder in sentiment as they had ever been.

[McMaster, History of the People of the United States; Roosevelt, The Winning of the West; Rhodes, History of the United States from 1850; Formby, American Civil War; Henderson, Stonewall Jackson; Charnwood, Abraham Lincoln; Mahan, Life of Farragut; Morley, Life of Gladstone; Taylor, Running the Blockade; Trevelyan, Life of Bright; S. E. Morison, History of the United States; F. L. Paxson, The American Civil War.]
CHAPTER III

BRITAIN: PROSPEROUS, QUIESCENT, SELF-COMPLACENT
( A.D. 1852-1867 )

§ I. The Era of Self-Complacency.

While Europe was being turned upside down, and America torn asunder by civil war, Britain was enjoying a period of abounding prosperity and political calm, after the labours of reconstruction and the threats of revolution which had filled the years from 1830 to 1850. She dominated the commerce of the world to an extent which has never been equalled, before or since, by any single State. Although there were financial panics in 1857 and 1866, and although the cotton famine due to the American War caused much distress in Lancashire, the period as a whole was one of expansion and prosperity. Employment was abundant, wages rose steadily, and prices fell. In these circumstances the working classes ceased to take interest in the projects of social reconstruction which had earlier filled their minds. The revolutionary movement was dead; and the political energy of working men was finding more profitable channels in organisations for self-help, on which we shall have something to say later in this chapter.

The parliamentary system set up in 1832 was working smoothly, and commanded the confidence of the nation. The newspapers were filled with reports of parliamentary proceedings, which were followed with interest; the House of Commons was felt to be the real centre of national life; and the career of politics was recognised as the highest that men could follow. There were as yet no misgivings about the excellence of the system. During these years two classical treatises appeared, Mill's Representative Government (1860), and Bagehot's English Constitution (1867), which sang the praises of the British system as having all but attained perfection; and it seemed natural and right that most of the States of the civilised world should be engaged
in remodelling their institutions after the British pattern. The British people were as self-complacent about their system of government as they were about their unquestioned supremacy in industry, commerce and finance.

It was even more important for the daily well-being of the community that the new system of municipal government was working well, and bringing about a real improvement in the conditions of the big towns. The towns were taking a healthy pride in their own government; they were striving to get rid of the evils which had attended their earlier growth; they were introducing sound methods of sanitation, demolishing unhealthy dwellings, equipping themselves with parks and water-supplies, public halls, libraries and galleries of art. And all this work was being carried on, with real public spirit and a remarkable freedom from corruption, by the labours of thousands of unpaid citizens.

There were dangers in the self-complacency which arose from these conditions. Those who appraised the life either of the country as a whole or of its towns by any ideal standard could see little ground for self-complacency, for the British people were still far from having reached a condition of social health; and a searching criticism of the smug ideals of the time was already being expressed, by Ruskin from one point of view, by Matthew Arnold from another, and by many other prophets of discontent. But those who were content to contrast the Britain of 1860 or 1870 with the Britain of 1820 or 1840 might well feel that there was ground for satisfaction. The self-complacency of the time was not unnatural. For the reforms of the previous period had brought real progress, and had, in a large degree, restored stability and contentment.

The general placidity of the period was reflected in politics by the absence of any great and stirring issues which aroused deep public feeling. Between 1846 and 1867 there was no discussion of principles which stirred men's passions as they had been stirred by the discussion of the Reform Act, or Chartism, or the Repeal of the Corn Laws. There were consequently no very sharp dividing lines between political parties. The Conservative party, which had seemed to be entering upon a long period of power when Peel took office in 1841, had been shattered by the Repeal of the Corn Laws. A small group of Peelites, or Free Trade Conservatives, strove in vain to maintain its separate existence; but it joined with the Liberals to form Lord Aberdeen's coalition
ministry of 1852-55, and thereafter was completely merged in the Liberal party. The great bulk of the Conservatives reorganised themselves under Lord Derby in the House of Lords and Disraeli in the House of Commons. But throughout the greater part of this period they were kept out of office by the suspicion that they were unsound on Free Trade, which had definitely been accepted as a fundamental principle of national policy. During the twenty-eight years between 1846 and 1874 the Conservatives were in office three times, but in each case only because of a division among their opponents; and their total tenure of power amounted to less than five years. In 1852 they held office for ten months; in 1858-9 for seventeen; in 1866-8 for two years and a half. Apart from these intervals, the period was one of continued Liberal ascendancy. But in reality the differences between the two parties were slight, though their extreme wings, Radicals on the one side, Tories on the other, represented fundamentally different outlooks. Free Trade gradually ceased to be a dividing line, for the Conservatives were careful not to raise the question. There were sharp divisions of opinion upon foreign policy, but these cut across party lines. Yet in spite of the absence of clear-cut lines of division, the party system worked well, and played its part in making Government efficient; it ensured that Government should always be exposed to well-informed and responsible criticism by an organised body of men who weighed their words because they aimed at winning power themselves.

Until his death in 1865 the characteristic and dominating figure of the period was Lord Palmerston: his indifference to domestic problems and his suspicion of large projects of reform both reflected and maintained the absence of exciting issues. Foreign Secretary in all the Whig ministries between 1830 and 1851, Palmerston had long been a figure of European celebrity; and he stood for a view of Britain's part in the affairs of Europe which was highly popular, but which aroused strong opposition among both Tories and Radicals. It was Palmerston who had established the tradition of unresting hostility to Russia and of patronage of Turkey, which was the keynote of British foreign policy for fifty years. But his enmity to Russia was not based solely upon a narrow view of British interests; he distrusted her government as the very type of despotism and reaction, and he honestly conceived it to be the duty of Britain to play the part of the standard-bearer of liberty.
in Europe. This was the motive of his incessant and meddlesome activity. In 1850 he had won the greatest triumph of his career, when he repelled a combined attack by all his critics—Gladstone, Cobden, and Disraeli among them. The occasion of the attack was the high-handed way in which Palmerston had forced Greece to satisfy the claims of a number of British subjects, one of whom was a Levantine Jew, Don Pacifico. Palmerston used the opportunity to expound, with spirited eloquence, his view of the relation of Britain to Europe. He asserted that it was Britain's right and duty to uphold free government everywhere; and he made the proud claim that every British subject, wherever he might be, must be enabled to take to himself the old boast, *civis Romanus sum*, in the sure confidence that the strong arm of Britain would protect him. When St. Paul (also a Levantine Jew) claimed the privilege of a *civis Romanus*, Rome was the mistress of the civilised world. The superb insolence of this analogy delighted the heart of the British people; it was perhaps the highest note of that self-complacency which marked the mid-century.

As Home Secretary in the Aberdeen ministry, Palmerston had been the most eager advocate of the Crimean War. When its misconduct of the war brought about the fall of the ministry in 1855, Palmerston was the inevitable Prime Minister; and from that date until his death in 1865, except during the brief interval of the Derby ministry of 1858-1859, he retained the leadership of Government. So long as the supremacy of the gay, eutheptic old man continued, quiescence lasted in English politics, and eager reformers had to restrain their impatience. Yet there were strong and vital personalities upon the political stage. Gladstone was Chancellor of the Exchequer under Aberdeen and again under Palmerston; his ardent and intense temperament, poles asunder from that of his chief, chafed under his ascendancy; but he had to be content with the sphere of finance, to which during these years his whole strength was given. Cobden, master of lucid and cogent statement, and his friend the silver-tongued Bright, were at the height of their powers and of their public influence; but their Radicalism excluded them from office. The sphinx-like Disraeli was engaged in educating his party, and evolving a new conception of Toryism; his matchless gift of irony, his mastery of the arts of politics, and the cool and humorous detachment with which he could regard
the great game he loved, made him an inimitable chief in opposition; but to opposition he was confined. In these men there were deeper wells of imagination and of feeling than Palmerston ever revealed. But their time had not yet come. It was Palmerston who expressed the limited, kindly, self-satisfied outlook of the time.


In the absence of burning questions in domestic politics, the chief work of this period lay in the working out of principles already established, especially in the financial and economic sphere.

The outstanding feature of the time was the dominance of the school of economic thought represented by Cobden and Bright, who held that the secret of international peace and of domestic prosperity lay in the securing of the maximum degree of economic freedom. For a time it seemed as if the civilised world was going to imitate Britain's fiscal policy as well as her political system. Almost every European economist of standing was an advocate of Free Trade. Prussia had adopted a substantially Free Trade policy, and some of the lesser States of Europe were moving in the same direction. Even France made a significant advance, and France had always been staunchly protectionist. In 1860 Napoleon III. concluded a commercial treaty with Britain, which opened the French market to British goods. With singular appropriateness Cobden was the negotiator of this treaty; and he believed, and the world believed with him, that his triumph heralded the coming victory of free interchange. On that expectation Cobden and his generation based the most glowing hopes for the future of humanity. But these hopes were short-lived. The treaty of 1860 was for ten years only. It expired almost at the moment of Napoleon's fall; and the Republic which succeeded him refused to renew it. Soon a reaction against Free Trade began in Germany and in other countries. Britain was left to advance almost alone in the path she had chosen; even her own colonies would not follow her; and the prospect that commerce would soon be as free throughout the realm of civilisation as within the boundaries of each State never again seemed to be so near as it did during the 'sixties.

On the Treasury Bench the gospel of economic freedom had a convinced and ardent apostle in Gladstone, who was winning for himself, by a series of great budgets, the name
of the greatest financier of the century, with the possible exception of his master, Peel. Gladstone's budgets perfected the Free Trade system, and established the principle that no tax ought ever to be imposed which would have the effect of enriching individuals at the expense of the community. And in other ways besides this Gladstone contributed to define the methods of public finance. The most rigid of financial purists, he held that laxity in the expenditure of public funds was one of the gravest of political offences, that wealth could best fructify if it was left at the disposal of private energy, and that the State ought not to take from the citizen one penny more than was demonstrably necessary for public purposes. Under his direction the supervision of the Treasury over the spending departments, and the general control of the House of Commons over national finance, were more close and effective than at any earlier or later period. The duty of thrift, which was for that generation the first of the economic commandments, was practised as well as preached by the national Government. Private thrift, also, and widespread investment, were stimulated by legislation: Gladstone was the founder of the Post Office Savings Bank; and in 1862 the system of Limited Liability, tentatively introduced in 1837, was given its final definition in the Companies Act, which led to a great increase of investment in industrial concerns.

The dominance of Cobdenite economics was seen in other spheres besides that of finance. It influenced international relations, which were thought of perhaps too exclusively in terms of trade; and, as we shall see in the next chapter, it encouraged a scepticism regarding the value and permanence of the tie between the mother-country and the colonies far different from the attitude of the colonial reformers who had been so active during the preceding generation. It is commonly held that the economic ideas of the time also dictated an attitude of rigid individualism or laissez faire in the social and economic life of the nation. But this is far indeed from being the truth. Though Cobden, and still more Bright, were inclined to this view, and were, in spite of their passionate humanity, sceptical about the value of factory legislation, on this point the feeling of their generation was not with them; and the departure from pure laissez faire in regard to industrial organisation, which had begun in the previous generation, was carried much further in this.
Indeed the most solid legislative achievement of this time was to be found precisely in this sphere: the principles embodied in the first Factory Acts were expanded into a whole legislative code, which won general acceptance, except from a minority of employers. The early Factory Acts\(^1\) had applied only to the textile trades, which were most easily dealt with because in them large bodies of workpeople were gathered in great mills. But regulation was just as much needed in other industries which were less highly organised. A series of reports by the Factory Inspectors, by parliamentary committees, and by Royal Commissions (notably a great commission on the employment of children which sat from 1863 to 1867) investigated the whole problem; and a long series of Acts (1850, 1855, 1860, 1861, 1862, 1864, 1867) extended the range of the system of regulation and the sphere of action of the inspectors to one trade after another. It culminated in two great Acts of 1867, one of which applied to all factories employing more than fifty persons, while the other applied to workshops employing less than fifty persons. In intention, and largely in effect, the whole range of industry was thus brought under State regulation; and the State definitely assumed the obligation of ensuring that all its citizens engaged in industry, more especially children, should be guaranteed a reasonable degree of safety, some protection against unhealthy conditions of work, and a rational limitation of the hours of toil. Thanks to these inquiries and discussions, men began to realise that over-work is economically as well as morally unsound, and that a regular day of ten hours is more productive as well as more humane than a regular day of thirteen hours.

This valuable code was not the result of party conflict, nor can any party claim sole credit for it. Perhaps Conservatives played a greater part in initiating these measures than Liberals; but all the Acts we have enumerated were passed by Liberal ministries except the two Acts of 1867, which were based upon the report of a Commission appointed by Palmerston’s Government. There was never a party debate on any of these measures: it was not to any party, but to the spirit of the age, that the community owed the creation of this remarkable code of laws.

Whatever may be said in criticism of this prosaic age, it placed a high value upon efficiency and purity of administration; and this was the inspiration of a modest reform which

\(^1\) See above, Bk. ix. chap. viii. pp. 594-6.
was of greater value than many measures that have attracted more attention. Public officials had hitherto been appointed solely by nomination, and the right of nomination had been habitually used for the purpose of strengthening the party in power. It is true that this abuse was never carried so far as in America; an in-coming Government in Britain never dismissed the officials who had been appointed by its predecessors. But the system led to the appointment of many incompetent men, and undermined public confidence in the public service; and this was becoming more important as the activities of the State and the functions of its officers grew. Yet it was commonly assumed that the system was unalterable; that Government could not be worked except by the use of patronage; and that (as one eminent person put it) a certain amount of corruption and inefficiency was the price that had to be paid for popular government. In 1853, however, Gladstone secured the appointment of a Civil Service Commission. The Commissioners recommended that all posts in the Civil Service should be filled by competitive examination. Neither Parliament nor the departments were yet ready for so drastic a change, and it was not until Gladstone’s ministry, sixteen years later, that the recommendation was put into effect. But from 1855 onwards the Civil Service Commission required all nominees to undergo a qualifying examination before being admitted to the posts for which they were nominated.

§ 3. Co-operation and Trade Unionism.

In permanent importance to the life of the British community, the work of Parliament was during these years overshadowed by the remarkable achievements of spontaneous organisation among the working classes. These achievements fell into two main groups, the organisation of co-operative societies, and the adoption of new methods and a new policy in the Trade Union movement. In both respects the British workman led the world; and his leaders showed a degree of solid capacity, and even of statesmanship, which augured well for the future.

The idea that groups of workpeople might, by co-operation, dispense with the capitalist employer was an old one; it had been preached by Robert Owen. But the experiments of Owen’s followers came to nothing, because they
were not sufficiently definite and practical. The real beginning of co-operation dates from 1844, when twenty-eight working men opened a modest shop in Toad Lane, Rochdale, with the idea that they would supply their own needs, and intercept the middleman's profits for their own advantage. The Rochdale Pioneers achieved a rapid and a great success. Their plan was soon taken up in other places; and during the period with which we are concerned, Co-operative Stores of the Rochdale type were rapidly springing up in all parts of England, especially in the North. The movement was an admirable practical example of self-help and mutual help. It encouraged thrift; it taught the value of common effort; and it gave an invaluable training to many thousands of men and women in the art of managing common interests with honesty and good feeling.

Co-operation after the Rochdale pattern confined itself to the work of distribution. But concurrently an attempt was being made to apply the same principle to the work of production. The initiative here was taken by the group of liberal Churchmen who called themselves Christian Socialists. In 1850 they borrowed from France the idea of 'self-governing workshops,' in which the workmen were to supply their own capital, choose their own managers, and divide the profits among themselves. During the years following 1850 many 'self-governing workshops' of this type were started. They never achieved much success; but they were a sign of healthy enterprise among working people, and they showed a sense of the need for social experiment.

Far more important was the new start which was made by Trade Unionism in these years. Since membership of a Trade Union had ceased to be a crime, by the repeal of the Combination Acts in 1824-5,1 multitudes of little trade clubs and societies had sprung up, some of which devoted themselves exclusively to the organisation of strikes for better wages, while others also performed the functions of friendly societies. During the generation following 1825, however, most of these little bodies had been mainly engrossed in the large and vague aims of the revolutionary movement: they had been linked up with Owen's Grand National Trades Union in the 'thirties; then they had thrown themselves into the Chartist movement; and, dominated by the idea of a total reconstruction of economic society, they had been anything but successful in the more practical struggle for improved conditions of work.

1 Above, Bk. ix. chap. iii. p. 330.
But with the failure of the Chartist agitation, and the coming of the wave of prosperity which began in the later 'forties, their aims and outlook underwent a rapid change. They began to be shy of meddling with politics, to distrust vague promises of the Millennium, and to concentrate their attention upon immediate practical issues. In this spirit a new generation of Trade Union statesmen took in hand the reconstruction of labour policy. They saw that the little local clubs, managed in spare moments by men actually at work, could not deal effectively with large problems of policy, or be strong enough to hold their own with the employers; and they set themselves to create powerful national organisations, served by officials who would give their whole time to their work, and become masters of it. The first of these organisations was the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, organised in 1851 by the coalescence of several smaller bodies; and its rules were so carefully compiled that it became a model for all the rest. It demanded a weekly subscription of £1. from all its members, and was thus able to command large funds; it offered very considerable benefits, and emphasised the friendly-society aspect of its work even more than the trade-protection side. William Allan, the sagacious and practical-minded Scot who wrought out the details of this powerful organisation, was in truth the initiator of a highly important new development; and he and his friend Robert Applegarth, who organised a Carpenters' Union on the same lines, were for some years the most influential leaders of the Trade Union movement. Other great trades followed on similar lines. In 1863 and the following years Alexander Macdonald, one of the ablest of the labour statesmen of this period, succeeded in bringing the miners into a national organisation; and cotton spinners, weavers, and other great groups, also found their way to unity. The day of the small local trade society, managed in an amateur way, was over; the day of the powerful and wealthy national organisation, directed by men of great ability and sound judgment, who gave their whole time to administrative work, had opened. The leaders of the new Unionism did not conceive of themselves as engaged in an endless struggle to destroy the existing order. They disapproved of the policy of constant strikes, which they regarded as wasteful and harmful. They looked forward to the establishment of conciliation boards in which the men, through their powerful Unions and their capable officials, would be able
to deal on equal terms with the employers, and, in effect, to share a sort of co-operative control of industrial policy.

The creation of these powerful and well-managed bodies was a real and solid contribution to social reconstruction. But most employers, having always regarded Trade Unions with suspicion, saw this striking development with alarm, and began to organise a vehement anti-Trade-Union agitation. And the course of events seemed to play into the hands of the enemies of the new movement. The tide of prosperity, which had flowed almost uninterruptedly since 1846, received a serious check in 1857. Wage-rates were reduced on all hands; and an epidemic of strikes broke out, which lasted for some years. Most of the strikes were organised, not by the great National Unions, but by the older and smaller bodies, which still clung to the view that the strike was the primary purpose for which they existed. But this distinction was not generally understood. The whole Trade Union movement was blamed for the widespread unrest. Strikes in times of bad trade (as the best leaders of Trade Unions well knew) are seldom successful; and in the bitterness of defeat some of the men took to violence against those of their comrades who chose to work on the employers’ terms. These outbreaks were worst in Sheffield, which was for some years disturbed at intervals by criminal acts. Not content with ‘rattening,’ or destroying the tools, of the obnoxious men, the criminals even resorted to murder; and a sort of reign of terror was established. It was later proved that these atrocities had been deliberately organised by a few of the small local Grinders’ Unions; but public opinion laid the blame upon Trade Unionism at large. It was in vain that the leaders of the national Unions denounced these crimes in public; judgment seemed to have gone against them in the court of public opinion, and in 1867 a Royal Commission was appointed to inquire into the whole Trade Union question.

Meanwhile the Trade Unions had been forced to realise that their position was very insecure. All that the repeal of the Combination Acts had done for them in 1825 was to make them no longer illegal institutions; it had not legalised their normal methods of procedure. And the law courts habitually acted on the doctrine that any combination in restraint of trade was an illegal conspiracy, and that an agreement to persuade men to leave their work was a combination in restraint of trade. On the other
hand, Trade Unions as such were not recognised by the law; they could not sue or be sued in court. This might mean that they would have no remedy against an official who embezzled their funds. To guard against this danger they had registered themselves as Friendly Societies. But in 1867, when an official of one of the Unions was prosecuted for embezzlement, it was laid down in the Court of Queen's Bench that the Friendly Societies Act did not apply to Trade Unions.

Thus, in more ways than one, the law of the land, as it stood, was hostile to the useful lines of development which Trade Union statesmanship was pursuing. The law of the land could only be altered by Parliament; and Parliament was controlled by the middle class, which had been brought by the strikes and the Sheffield outrages into an attitude of distrust towards Trade Unionism. Evidently further progress could only be made if political power changed hands. And therefore the Unions were drawn on to abandon that attitude of aloofness from politics which they had adopted since the decline of Chartism. They threw themselves into the advocacy of Parliamentary Reform; and their weight contributed in no small degree to the adoption of the Reform Act of 1867.

Thus, in this period of political calm, a great social change was already maturing; and it was becoming evident that in the next period living issues of a new kind would be raised.

§ 4. The Fenian Movement.

It was not only in the industrial sphere that new problems were shaping themselves during the placid Palmerstonian régime. The eternal Irish question also was beginning to assume a new form.

No attempt had been made, since the tragedy of the great famine, to investigate the causes of Irish misery, or to find a remedy. But since that dreadful event hundreds of thousands of Irishmen had emigrated to America, where many of them had won success. Nearly all of these emigrants carried with them a hatred of Britain: and it was among these exiles that a new and horrible method of directing attention to the woes of Ireland was wrought out. In 1858 James O'Mahony founded in New York the Fenian Brotherhood; and James Stephens was appointed to organise a conspiracy in Ireland, which was to be financed from America. From first to last the movement was Irish-
American; it got scarcely any support from the Irish peasantry, and none at all from the priesthood. The conspirators were busily at work enrolling supporters between 1863 and 1865. But it was after 1865, when men became available who had been trained to arms on both sides in the American Civil War, that the campaign became serious. The Irish Government, warned by an informer, was able to prevent the conspiracy from assuming formidable dimensions by arresting many of the leaders, who were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. But the danger was not at an end. Stores of pikes and cartridges were discovered; *Habeas Corpus* had to be hurriedly suspended in 1866; and during 1867 there were scattered outbreaks by bands of Irish-Americans in Kerry, Dublin, Drogheda, Limerick, and Cork. On the whole, however, the attempt to raise a rebellion in Ireland was a failure; the peasantry would not move.

But the Fenians did not limit their activities to Ireland. In 1866, 1200 Irish-Americans made a sudden raid into Canada, across the river Niagara. The invaders were repelled by Canadian volunteers. The American Government tardily repudiated the disturbers of the peace whom it ought to have prevented; but refused to contemplate the payment of compensation, or to admit that there was any analogy between the Fenian invasion and the *Alabama* case. Finally, in January 1867, the Fenians resolved to 'carry the war into England.' In February some 500 of them assembled in Chester, intending to attack the Castle; but Government was forewarned, and the attempt came to nothing. In September two suspected burglars, arrested in Manchester, were discovered to be Fenians, and sent to the city gaol; but on the way, in the public street, the prison van was attacked by a band of men armed with revolvers, and when the sergeant in charge of the prisoners refused to give up the key, he was murdered by a shot through the key-hole. Twenty-six of the gang, however, were captured, with the aid of the crowd, and three of them were hanged. They are known as the 'Manchester Martyrs.' Finally, in December of the same year, two Fenians tried to blow up Clerkenwell Gaol. The explosion killed twelve and injured about 100 inhabitants of a poor street beside the gaol, but had no other effect.

These cowardly and abominable outrages formed a poor mode of serving any cause, and they aroused in Britain a just indignation. Yet they served a purpose which more
legitimate methods might have failed to serve. They made men think again, and more seriously, of the neglected problem of Ireland, and of the shame which it brought upon the name of Britain. In especial, the problem of Ireland took possession of the mind of Gladstone, which it was to dominate for the remainder of his life.


Thus in several ways it was becoming apparent that the placidity of the Palmerstonian age would not last much longer. The death of the old statesman (1865) would in any case have been followed by a new period of political activity. But this activity was rendered far greater, and given a new direction, by the fact that it began with a measure of parliamentary reform so considerable that it may fairly be described as marking the beginning of democracy in Britain. There is a marked contrast between the events which led up to the first Reform Act, and those which led up to the second. The old ruling class had resisted to the last before it accepted the Act of 1832; and the agitation for reform (which started in 1769) had been going on for sixty-three years before it won success. But the middle class, which was enthroned in 1832, was far less obstinate. Its tenure of power had lasted only thirty-five years when the franchise was thrown open to the artisans of the towns; and the concession almost bore the aspect of a voluntary abdication. Though there was no violent demand for political change, both political parties vied in hastening it, and the House of Lords itself offered no opposition. Assuredly the middle class showed no jealousy of power.

Throughout this period, indeed, there was a succession of Reform Bills in which nobody took much interest, but which showed the existence of a feeling that the system of 1832 could not be permanent. Lord John Russell, the author of the 1832 Act and the purest of Whigs, introduced mild and tepid bills in 1852 and 1854; the first was killed by the fall of his ministry, the second by the outbreak of the Crimean War. John Bright did his best, after the war, to rouse the working classes, and to convince them that they were being wronged by their exclusion from political power. But even his moving eloquence could not arouse any strong feeling. In 1859 Disraeli, the Conservative leader, tried his hand, producing a complex set of proposals which led to the defeat of the Government on an amendment to enlarge the scope
of the bill. Next year Lord John Russell again returned to the attack; but the Palmerston Parliament showed such apathy, and the public out of doors such indifference, that the bill was withdrawn. In 1864 the question was revived by a Liberal private member; and the occasion was memorable because it drew from Gladstone the declaration that 'every man who is not presumably incapacitated . . . is morally entitled to come within the pale of the Constitution.' The assertion marked Gladstone's definite transition to political Liberalism; but his chief, Lord Palmerston, had no taste for reform, and this bill died like its predecessors. Once again, in 1865, John Bright took up the cause on public platforms. He got more response than before, but still the public interest was no more than tepid. There was assur- edly no vehement demand for political change. Men of all parties had advanced schemes of reform; and each in turn had been blanketed by complete indifference. There could be no more striking illustration of the deadness of political life during the Palmerstonian era.

After Palmerston's death, Russell and Gladstone introduced a new measure (1866), so moderate that it would only have enfranchised some 400,000 electors. They knew they had to deal with the Palmerstonian House of Commons; and even this modest measure was met by a violent opposition, in which the Conservatives were reinforced by a 'Cave of Adullam,' as Bright called them, of Liberal malcontents, led, with much eloquence and vigour, by Robert Lowe. The discussion was far more vigorous than any of its predecessors; and it ended in the defeat and resignation of Russell's Government. At last the interest of the country was aroused. Suddenly the British people realised that they wanted reform; and with remarkable promptitude wrought themselves into a state of excitement. Bright's platform speeches no doubt helped; but the main cause of the changed temper was that the Trade Unions had made up their minds that political action was necessary. Leagues and demonstrations were organised; there were processions and mass meetings, and when the authorities tried to prevent a demonstration in Hyde Park by closing the gates, fifty yards of railings were pushed down by a high-spirited and perfectly good-humoured crowd.

The Liberal ministry, defeated on reform by Conservative votes, was succeeded by a Conservative ministry; whose first action was—to introduce a Reform Bill; for Disraeli had resolved to secure if possible for his own party the
leadership of the new electorate. In its first form the bill proposed to confer the franchise on all householders in towns if they paid their own rates, and on all occupiers in the country who were rated at £15; but to pacify the Conservatives, educational and property qualifications were added, and allowed to confer upon their holders a second vote. But the Liberal opposition, led by Gladstone, swept away these qualifications, conferred the vote on lodgers, and lowered the county franchise; and the bill emerged from the discussions a far more democratic measure than any that had earlier been introduced. Many Conservatives were indignant that such a measure should have been passed by their party; Lord Cranborne (later Lord Salisbury) denounced it as a 'political betrayal which has no parallel in our annals'; and Lord Derby himself described it as 'a leap in the dark.'

In this strange way Britain entered upon her career as a democracy; and the definition of the new electorate was as much the work of the Liberals as of the Conservatives. Both of the leaders who now faced one another as rivals in the House of Commons accepted the new order of things without dismay. For Gladstone had become a whole-hearted Liberal; while Disraeli, who was never a Liberal, but a believer in Race, had always disliked middle-class rule; had said as long since as 1846 that he would prefer to rely upon 'the invigorating energies of an educated and enfranchised people'; and now looked forward with confidence to the scheme of Tory democracy which he had invented—of a democracy, that is, which, he hoped, would loyally accept the leadership of a traditional ruling class. It was indeed a new era, of more imagination and greater courage, upon which the British people were now entering.

[Low and Sanders, Political History of England 1837-1900; Walpole, History of Twenty-five Years; Paul, History of Modern England; McCarthy, History of our own Times; Buxton, Finance and Politics; Morley, Life of Gladstone, Life of Cobden, Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli; Guedalla, Palmerston; Trevelyan, Life of Bright and Letters of Queen Victoria; Holyoake, History of the Rochdale Pioneers; Fay, Cooperation; Hutchins and Harrison, History of Factory Legislation; Webb, History of Trade Unionism; Woodward, Age of Reform; Gillespie, Labour and Politics in England 1850-70; Guedalla, Gladstone and Palmerston; Clapham, Economic History of Modern Britain; Trevelyan, British History in the 19th Century; Young (ed.), Early Victorian England.]
CHAPTER IV
THE ADOLESCENCE OF THE DAUGHTER-NATIONS
(A.D. 1850-1880)

§ 1. British Colonial Policy in the Palmerstonian Era.

In the greater British colonies, as in the mother-country, a quiet period of consolidation and of expanding prosperity, devoid of exciting incidents, followed upon the active reconstructive work of the decades after 1830. But, quiet as it was, this was a time of very great importance in all the great colonies. They were reaching the stage of maturity, and, without losing their attachment to the Commonwealth, were learning to value their independent statehood, and beginning to think of themselves as nations.

What especially stimulated this development was that, having now acquired self-governing powers, they were in an extraordinary degree left to themselves. The group of enthusiastic colonial reformers,¹ who had done so much to fix the character of the new colonial policy during the previous era, had either died or ceased to exercise much influence; and with them disappeared, for a time, their zeal for the ideal of an intimate partnership of free peoples. The belief that soon or late, and better soon than late, the colonies must become independent States, was accepted by the statesmanship of this generation almost as an axiom. It was held not by Cobden or by Gladstone only, but by Palmerston and (until the later years of the period) by Disraeli. Lord Blachford, who was Permanent Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office from 1860 to 1871, has expressed this view with great frankness. ‘I had always believed,’ he writes, ‘that the destiny of our colonies is independence; and that in this point of view the function of the Colonial Office is to secure that our connexion, while it lasts, shall be as profitable to both parties, and our separation, when it comes, as amicable, as possible.’

The prevalence of this view had drawbacks, but it also had advantages. It avoided all friction in the settlement of the colonies’ claim to fiscal independence. Lord Grey

¹ Above, Bk. ix. chap. x. p. 421-4.
had striven to establish complete Free Trade within the Empire, but the colonies had regarded this policy as a restriction of their liberty. Lord Grey's successors raised no objection when Canada set up a tariff against Britain in 1859, or when some of the Australian colonies began to follow the same course. Again, the view was accepted that the colonies must provide for their own defence. In 1862 Parliament decided that all regular troops stationed in the colonies (there had been as many as 50,000 in 1859) should be gradually withdrawn, and the process was practically completed in 1873; while in 1865 an Act was passed empowering the colonies to organise naval forces for their own defence. Officers were sent out to Canada in 1868 and to Australia in 1875 to aid these colonies in organising their defensive system. But no attempt was made to discuss the general problem of imperial defence, because this problem was never considered as a whole by a generation which took it for granted that the imperial tie must in course of time be dissolved.

But it was only for a short time, and mainly in the 'sixties, that these doctrines wielded an unchallenged ascendancy in British politics. As early as 1866 Charles Dilke, intellectual heir of the Radical Imperialists of the previous generation, published a book under the challenging title of *Greater Britain*, which ran through several editions; while in the 'seventies another Radical, W. E. Forster, began the public advocacy of Imperial Federation. Disraeli, also, who in 1852 had spoken of the colonies as 'millstones round our necks,' was in 1872 denouncing his opponents for having striven 'by continuous, subtle and energetic efforts...to effect the disintegration of the British Empire,' and was asserting that 'self-government ought to have been conceded as part of a great policy of imperial consolidation.' Neither the indifference of the 'sixties, nor the revived interest of the 'seventies in the ideal of a commonwealth of free peoples, was the monopoly of any political party. Each was the outcome of the reigning temper of the time; and perhaps each represented a necessary stage in the development of the Commonwealth. But in this period, more than in any other, the history of the various colonies is disparate and disconnected.


Canada had been stagnant and unprogressive until she received the boon of responsible self-government; but
from that moment her progress was swift. Her population grew from a million and a half in 1840 to more than three millions and a half in 1871. She was showing a feverish energy in the construction of roads, canals, and railways wherewith to weld together her widely scattered settlements. As late as 1851 she had only 66 miles of railway; by 1867 she had more than 2000 miles, and after the federation which was achieved in that year progress was still more rapid. New centres of population were beginning to spring up in the West.¹ The great central plain, indeed, was practically closed to settlement by the Hudson Bay Company, and the only plantation in this vast area was the little Scottish colony which had been founded on the Red River (Manitoba) by Lord Selkirk in 1811. But beyond the Rocky Mountains colonisation had begun. The Hudson Bay Company had a small station on Vancouver Island, which obtained a representative assembly in 1856; next year (1857) gold was discovered on the Fraser River, on the mainland of British Columbia; and this led to the organisation of a new colony in 1858, which was in 1866 united with Vancouver.

But there were certain aspects of the condition of the Canadian colonies in the 'sixties which caused a good deal of perturbation to their leaders. They were falling into economic dependence upon the United States. The links of trade did not bind the colonies to one another, they bound each group separately to its nearest American neighbours. The main trade-routes ran north and south, not east and west. And this dependence was increased when in 1854 a reciprocity treaty with America was negotiated, and when in 1859 a tariff against British goods was imposed. It was this trade dependence which made many people believe that the absorption of Canada in the United States was ultimately inevitable; and in the 'sixties there were many Americans who were inclined to take even violent means to hasten this process. But nine out of ten Canadians disliked the idea of absorption in the United States. The tradition of the United Empire Loyalists of 1782 was still alive, and 1812 was unforgotten. Canada's aim, though it was not yet very clearly formulated, was the status of a free nation within the British Commonwealth. But if the Canadian colonies were to be made strong enough to resist the powerful attraction of their great neighbour, they must combine their resources. The

¹ See the map, Atlas, Plates 78 and 79.
idea of federation had long been entertained. It had been advocated by Lord Durham in 1839. It was adopted as a definite policy by the Canadian Conservative party in 1858; and within ten years it was a realised fact.

This rapid achievement was due to the fact that a political deadlock had arisen, for which federation seemed the only solution. The Act of 1840, which united Quebec and Ontario, had produced admirable results in forcing the French and the English to work together. But it rested upon an equipoise between the British and the French provinces, which had an equal number of representatives. The inrush of new immigrants, however, threatened to disturb this balance. Most of them went to the British settlements in Ontario, which not unreasonably demanded that their increased population should be reflected in an increased representation; and the French feared that this would involve a re-establishment of British racial ascendancy. To separate the provinces, and to federate them, seemed to be the only fair mode of dealing with this difficulty. Moreover the two political parties were so nearly balanced that ministries changed constantly; and in their rivalry they were tempted to appeal to the racial feeling of the two provinces, the Liberals being strongest in Ontario, the Conservatives in Quebec.

Happily the rival party leaders were wise enough to see that a scheme of federation might at once provide them with a way out of these difficulties, and at the same time strengthen Canada against the United States. In 1864 a conference was held which included representatives from both parties and both races in Canada proper, and from all the maritime colonies. They succeeded in arriving at a complex agreement in seventy-two clauses, in the framing of which the leading part was played by the supple mind of Mr. (afterwards Sir) John Macdonald, the Conservative leader. The scheme was submitted to and adopted by the various Parliaments, though not without violent opposition, especially in Nova Scotia. Then a final conference was held in London; and in 1867 the British North America Act was passed through the British Parliament without alteration. Canada had become a nation.

The Canadian scheme of federation—the first of a series which have marked stages in the development of the British Commonwealth—was marked by two outstanding features. The first was that it deliberately avoided the model of the United States. Taught by the Civil War, Canadian states-
manship determined not to allow the component States to claim too high a degree of independence. Hence, while in the United States the central Government was only allowed certain defined powers, all residual powers remaining with the individual States, in Canada the central Government reserved all powers that were not specifically allotted to the subordinate bodies; and, to underline the distinction, the component members of the federation were described not as 'States' but as 'Provinces.' The second distinctive feature of the Canadian system was that it avoided the American plan of drawing a sharp distinction between the spheres of the executive and the legislature, and followed the British plan of making the executive directly dependent upon the legislature. This method (which was later followed by Australia and South Africa) has made it easy for the great members of the British Commonwealth to work in harmony; for all can be represented by Prime Ministers who speak for majorities in their respective Parliaments.

The Act of 1867 was the charter of Canadian nationhood. But much had to be done before this great Dominion was effectively wrought into a single State. Some of the colonies were slow to join: Manitoba was organised as a province in 1870, British Columbia came in in 1871, Prince Edward Island not until 1873; and Newfoundland has never joined at all. In Nova Scotia there was a reaction against federation, so strong that for some years a majority of the Nova Scotian representatives were pledged to work for a repeal of the Act. It was only the steady progress of the Dominion in other ways that overcame this reluctance.

In 1869 a great step forward was made when, with the aid of the British Government, the Hudson Bay Company was bought out, and, while retaining its trading rights, ceded to the Dominion Government the vast and almost unpeopled area which it had controlled. But there was some trouble where the Government's authority was fully established. A French half-breed, Louis Riel, organised a rebellion among the lawless and adventurous half-breed trappers who had settled alongside of the Scots on the Red River. Riel's aim seems to have been the establishment of a French Catholic State; but he was backed by a body of American conspirators who wanted to seize this fertile territory for the United States. He held his own against the officers sent from Ottawa to administer the territory; and the rebellion did not collapse until a British force was sent to deal with it under Colonel (afterwards Lord) Wolseley.
in the spring of 1870. Then the Province of Manitoba was constituted; and the settlement of the Great West began. The maintenance of order and justice in this vast wilderness was no easy task for a young Government; and it was made more difficult by the fact that bands of Red Indians were fleeing over the frontier from the United States to claim the protection of the British flag. Yet the task was admirably performed, and the Canadian West never suffered from anything like the savage Indian wars and the sordid lawlessness which long disfigured the American West. The reasons for this were two. One was that ever since 1763 a sound tradition of fair dealing with the Indians had been enforced by the home Government; and this tradition was maintained by the Dominion Government. The second cause of success was the magnificent work of the North-West Mounted Police, a small and finely-disciplined force, which was created in 1874. Largely recruited from among the adventurous youth of the mother-country, the 'Riders of the Plains' won for themselves an all but stainless reputation for daring, energy, and resourcefulness in the enforcement of justice.

But before the scattered colonies could be welded into a single State, they had to be bound together by effective communications; and it was no easy or profitable task to drive railway lines through the wooded wilderness that separated the maritime provinces from central Canada, or across the immense western plains. The work could not be left to private enterprise; the resources of the State had to be employed. As soon as the federation was established, a railway from the maritime provinces to Quebec and Montreal was undertaken. The main link in this line (which was known as the Intercolonial Railway) was completed in 1876. Still more important was the task of linking the central provinces with the Pacific coast. British Columbia came into the Dominion in 1871 on a definite promise that a Pacific railway should be constructed, and plans for such a railway were promptly set on foot by Sir John Macdonald. A company, which was to be backed by support from Government, was organised; but the project was wrecked by the discovery that Macdonald had been receiving large sums from the company for electioneering purposes. This scandal postponed the great undertaking for ten years, and it was not until 1881 that it was seriously begun. Thus the task of welding half a continent into a single State, though

1 Above, Bk. vii. chap. xi. p. 135.
it had been well begun, was still far from being completed: the real establishment of Canadian nationhood remained to be achieved in the next period.

§ 3. Australia: the Gold-Finds and their Consequences.

Australia was a full stage of development behind Canada, and she had not yet reached the stage at which unification could be attempted. Indeed, it was only in this period that the tale of her separate colonies was completed: Victoria was separated from New South Wales in 1852, and Queensland not until 1859. Still almost an empty land, Australia's greatest need was a rapid increase of population. But the Wakefield system, whereby so large an immigration had been brought about during the 'forties, was abandoned after the establishment of responsible government, and none of the colonies save Queensland had any scheme of assisted emigration. With America and Canada so much more easily accessible, it might have been expected that, in the absence of all special inducements, Australia would have attracted little of the stream of emigration from the motherland. This expectation was largely realised in Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia. It would have been realised also in Victoria and New South Wales but for the discovery, in 1851 and the following years, of rich deposits of gold, which brought an extraordinary irush of adventurers.

The first find was in New South Wales, but far richer discoveries soon followed in Victoria; and towards these gold-fields a rush of diggers poured in, first from the towns and the neighbouring settlements, and then from Britain. The population increased by leaps and bounds. That of Victoria rose from 77,000 in 1851 to 237,000 in 1854, 538,000 in 1860, and 720,000 in 1870; while New South Wales rose from 187,000 in 1851 to 348,000 in 1860. In 1867 a less valuable gold-field was opened in Queensland, and the population, which had stood at 20,000 in 1859, rose to 125,000 in 1871.

It was an unruly and turbulent population which was thus suddenly drawn into the gold-bearing colonies. In 1854 there was even a little rebellion among the diggers of Victoria, in protest against the enforcement of a charge for license to dig; and the atmosphere of lawlessness produced an outburst of 'bushranging,' which raged in both Victoria and New South Wales as late as 1860. At first,
also, there was a serious dislocation of agriculture and industry in all the colonies, thousands of settlers deserting their occupations in the hope of becoming rapidly rich. But the early confusion soon came to an end. By 1860 the lawless diggers had been for the most part displaced by organised mining companies, which put the industry upon a more stable footing. And even before this happened, it became apparent that the gold-rush had given a healthy stimulus to both agriculture and manufacture. For the mining population had to be fed and clothed; and the demand thus created stimulated agriculture not only in New South Wales and Victoria, but also in South Australia. Agriculture increased so steadily that it began to press upon the lands hitherto devoted to sheep-runs, and occupied by ‘squatters’ who paid only a modest quit-rent; and the difficult land-problem of Australia—the problem of opening suitable lands for arable farming without disturbing the wool trade and doing injustice to the ‘squatter’—began to be acute.

The rapid growth of population also made it necessary to open up the country by means of roads and railways. As in Canada, private enterprise, unaided, could not successfully cope with the task of opening up almost virgin lands. The early private companies nearly all failed; and, almost from the outset, the Australian colonies were driven to embark upon State undertakings on a very large scale. For this purpose loans were raised in a somewhat reckless way. Before 1850 none of the Australian colonies had any public debt; by 1880 the five leading colonies had built up public debts to an aggregate of more than £65,000,000, almost wholly for railways and other public works. A good deal of this expenditure was wastefully administered, and much of it could not bring in an early return; and the result was that there were at intervals serious financial crises. Thus in 1866 Queensland was on the verge of State-bankruptcy: she could not pay her railway contractors, and bands of wageless navvies were marching on Brisbane, vowing to hang all the ministers and loot the town. But despite these troubles, all the Australian colonies save Western Australia had made very great advances, and were on a fair road to prosperity, by 1880.

Meanwhile the heroic age of Australian exploration, which extended from 1857 to 1874, had mapped out the whole continent; 1 even the terrors of the great central desert

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 87 (a), where the main routes are shown.
were faced and overcome. We cannot pause to describe this work in detail; but no record of the achievement of the British peoples should omit mention of the heroic and tragic expedition of Burke and Wills across the central desert from south to north (1860–1), or of Stuart’s successful accomplishment of this journey in 1862, or of the bold journeys of Forrest and of Giles, in the ‘seventies, by several routes across the torrid wastes of Western Australia.

During this period of development the institutions of self-government, set up in 1855, were receiving their trial. At first they did not work very well; and the British statesman Robert Lowe, who had spent many years in Australia, used its constitutional squabbles, in the discussions on the Reform Bills of 1866 and 1867, as a terrible illustration of the dangers of democracy. Ministries were everywhere unstable and little respected. There was incessant conflict between the two houses of the legislatures, during which the lower houses were sometimes tempted to override violently the powers of the upper houses; and the Governors, sent out from Britain, had to use infinite tact in dealing with these situations. The Australian settlements were, in truth, naturally marked out for complete democracy, being quite free from sharp social distinctions; and as a result of these conflicts they developed during this period into the most democratic communities in the world. Everywhere the widest franchise was adopted: everywhere the second chamber was reduced to comparative insignificance; and all the colonies save backward Western Australia had made themselves ready, by 1880, for those bold and far-reaching experiments in State Socialism which were to attract the attention of the world in the next period.


Of New Zealand the same story has to be told as of Canada and Australia; a story of growing strength and unity. When responsible government was established in 1856 the white population was considerably under 60,000; by 1878 it had reached about 350,000. In 1856 the population was so scattered that six self-governing provinces were established, three in the North Island, and three in the South Island, with a central federal legislature which met at Auckland; and the provincial bodies were far stronger than the federal body, because the links between the provinces were exceedingly slight. By 1876 the
provinces had been so much more closely welded together that the continued existence of the provincial legislatures was felt to be superfluous; and in 1876 they were abolished, and New Zealand became a single unitary State, with its capital at Wellington, the most central point for the two islands. The process of unification had thus been carried much further than in Australia; further even than in Canada.

But it is significant that the bulk of the new population in this period went, not to the North Island, where the process of settlement had begun, but to the South Island: in 1856 the North Island had three-fifths of the total white population; in 1874 it had little more than one-third. The reason for this was that the North Island was the land of the Maoris, and for more than ten dreary years, 1860-1871, there was almost incessant war between the Maoris and the settlers.¹

The trouble was caused, in the main, by disputes about land-sales; the complex and vexatious land-tenures of the Maoris were too readily disregarded. But the Maoris' love of fighting contributed to prolong the struggle. To guard themselves against the gradual process of expropriation, a number of Maori clans in the central part of the North Island formed themselves into a loose confederacy under an elected king, and took up arms against the encroaching settlers; and for ten years the central region of the North Island was the scene of incessant fighting. In the rough and wooded country where they were at home, the Maoris held out with great gallantry, often against overwhelming odds, offering a splendid defence in their stockaded forts against considerable bodies of regular troops as well as large forces of colonial volunteers. During the greater part of this long Iliad they showed as much chivalry as gallantry, risking their lives, for example, to bring water to their prisoners; and it was only in the later and more desperate phases of the struggle that some of them dropped their Christianity and revived old superstitions and ferocities. But the war was not a bloody one on either side: in ten years the Maoris' loss in battle was only estimated at a total of 3000—less than they lost by an epidemic of measles in a single year. In the end they were driven to peace by sheer weariness. But they had fought long enough and well enough to win the respect of their adversaries. The colonists themselves agreed that four Maori representatives

¹ See the map, Atlas, Plate 87 (b).
should sit in the colonial assembly. And a wise and tactful land-minister, Sir Donald McLean, overcame the root difficulty by arranging terms for the sale of lands which at once salved the pride of the chiefs and secured that the Maori should keep possession of a sufficient amount of land.

The long and dragging Maori war checked the progress of the North Island, except its northern extremity, which was undisturbed. But it interfered very little with the advance of the South Island. For gold was discovered on the west coast in 1856 and 1864, and in the highlands of Otago, round Lake Wakatipu, in 1861-2; while coal also was found in the hilly south. Dunedin became a great exporting centre; the rich province of Canterbury developed its agriculture to feed the new mining population; and roads and (later) railways began to be built to supply these demands. In the North Island also both gold and coal were found. Once the Maori wars were ended, development became rapid. There were only seven miles of railway in New Zealand in 1870; there were twelve hundred miles in 1880. As in Australia, railway development was only possible under State control; and it was financed, as in Australia, by very large loans. This policy of lavish capital expenditure was begun by Sir Julius Vogel between 1869 and 1876. It brought great immediate prosperity, and a large increase of immigration; and though it was followed by a long period of depression in the years after 1878, it launched New Zealand, like Australia, upon a series of bold experiments in social legislation in advance of what had been attempted elsewhere in the world.

But in 1878, at the close of the period with which we are now concerned, these experiments, though foreshadowed, had scarcely yet begun; the main results of the period were that the infant colony of 1856 had attained political unity and a large degree of prosperity, had overcome its troubles with the Maoris, and had reached the stage of adolescence.

§ 5. South Africa: Twenty Years of 'Laisser Aller' and its Effects.

Even in vexed South Africa these were years of quiescence and prosperity; an interval of calm between two periods of trouble. Since the conventions of 1852 and 1854, the two Dutch republics had been left to go their own way. Despairing of finding a solution of the complex problems

¹ See above, Bk. ix. chap. x. p. 432.
presented by the differences between Dutch and British, and by the rival claims of blacks and whites, the British Government had done its best to wash its hands of the whole business; and Lord Grey had gone so far as to say that Britain had no interest in South Africa beyond the maintenance of a naval station in Table Bay. For a time this policy of *laisser aller* seemed to be successful. It gave to South Africa an interval of rest from controversy, during which the four States—Cape Colony, Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal—seemed to have a distinct and separate development. But even during this interval events in all four were converging, and forces were at work which were to bring about a new period of trouble. South Africa could not be divided into water-tight compartments; what affected the interests of one settlement affected the interests of all.

In Cape Colony the period was one of real advance and prosperity. The white population grew from 76,000 in 1849 to 237,000 in 1875. The most amicable relations existed between Dutch and British. There was, indeed, a new Kaffir war in 1850-53, but on the whole the frontier was kept in order by an efficient frontier police; while the native population within the colony was learning to live peaceably under the ordinary machinery of law, and the missionaries were carrying on among them an admirable system of training. Above all, this period saw the establishment, at last, of representative government in Cape Colony; a legislature of the familiar pattern being instituted by an Act of the British Parliament in 1853. The most striking feature of the system was that it gave equal political rights to blacks and whites, under a moderate property qualification. Few blacks, it is true, actually exercised the franchise; but the contrast between this system and that of the two Dutch republics, where every coloured man was excluded from civil rights, was significant. The new system worked reasonably well, though there was a good deal of friction between 1862 and 1872. In the latter year full responsible government was established. Thus Cape Colony took its place beside Canada, the Australian colonies, and New Zealand, in the fellowship of free States.

As in Canada, partnership in self-government eased racial friction; and the experience that this was so led to the suggestion that a federal system should be established for the four South African States. The project was put forward in 1858 by Sir George Grey, who had been sent to vexed South Africa
after his successful work in South Australia and New Zealand. If it could have been carried out, South Africa would have been saved from an infinity of future trouble. And in 1858 the prospects of success seemed rosy. Natal would have raised no objection; the Orange Free State was willing to join; even the Transvaal was conscious of its own weakness. One great advantage of a federal scheme would have been that it would have ensured a uniform policy towards the independent native tribes. But the home Government, loth to assume new responsibilities in relation to the Boer republics, refused its assent; and the favourable moment passed. The idea of federation did not die, but it became more difficult of achievement as time passed.

While Cape Colony had at last attained full self-government, the younger colony of Natal remained throughout this period—and, indeed, until 1893—under a Crown Colony system, with a Lieutenant-Governor and a small Council partly nominated and partly elected (1856). The reason for this slow development was that the white settlers were very few (less than 8000 out of a total population of 172,000 in 1852), and were mainly concentrated in two towns; while the bulk of the population consisted of Bantu tribes which, instead of being brought (like the natives at the Cape) under the ordinary machinery of the law, were left under the rule of their own chiefs in large native reservations. This system was cheap and easily managed. But it had its dangers, which were illustrated in 1873–4, when one of the chiefs broke into revolt on being called to account for smuggling arms. He had been in communication with other tribes; and the episode formed a warning of the ever present danger of native risings.

This danger was especially great in Natal, because its territory bordered on the land of the formidable Zulus, whose power was being reorganised during these years by the able chief Cetywayo. During his father’s life-time Cetywayo had built up again (1856-72) the old military system of Chaka, which the Boers had broken; and when he became king in 1872, there was real ground for fearing that he might become an active danger. His warlike preparations must be meant for some use; and his only possible foes were his neighbours, Natal on the one side, and the Transvaal on the other. The situation in the Transvaal, as we shall see, invited his attack. But whether

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1 See map, Atlas, Plate 89 (d).
2 See above, Bk. IX, chap. ii, p. 430.
he turned his strength against the Boers or the British colony, a Zulu war was certain to raise far-reaching disturbances. To the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, who had charge of relations with the Zulus, the policy of the Transvaal Boers was a matter of constant anxiety. Nothing showed, more clearly than the Zulu problem, the difficulty of treating South Africa as if it were divided into watertight compartments; and it was partly because of the Zulu danger, and the possibility of its being stirred up by the Transvaal, that the Government of Natal was less hostile to a scheme of federation than the Government of any of the other South African States.

A similar danger was apparent in the Orange Free State, which suffered from serious disorganisation during the ten years following the independence that had been forced upon it in 1854. South-east of the Free State, between it and Natal, lay the lands of the warlike Basutos. It was the desire for protection against the Basutos which had made many of the Free State Boers reluctant to accept the gift of independence in 1854; and the legitimacy of their fears was shown by the fact that in the years following 1858 they had to face four successive wars with the Basutos. They had the worst of it in the first two of these wars, thanks to their own disorganisation; and it was this which made them ready for federation.

In 1864, however, an able President, J. H. Brand, took control of affairs in the Free State. Under his competent rule the Free State settled down to the enjoyment of quiet prosperity, and became the model of a peaceful farmer-State. But before this was possible, Brand had to undertake the fourth and last of the Basuto wars. He was so successful that he almost succeeded in conquering and annexing the whole Basuto territory. The Basutos, however, appealed to the Governor of Cape Colony; and as they had formerly been a protected State, the Governor interfered, and concluded with the Free State a treaty whereby Basutoland, reduced in area, was formally recognised as a British protectorate (1869). Since that date the Basutos have lived in peace in their mountain valleys, supervised at first by the Cape government, and later (1884) by a British Resident, learning the rudiments of civilisation from the missionaries, but keeping other white men at arm's-length. This was an excellent solution of the problem. But not unnaturally the Free Staters felt that they had been robbed of the fruits of victory; they felt they had a grievance against
the British power; and now that the Basuto peril was removed, their desire for federation evaporated.

And ere long they were given a new and more solid grievance. An event full of portent for the future history of South Africa happened in 1867-1868. Diamonds were found in the valley of the lower Vaal, and by 1870 crowds of diggers and speculators, mostly Englishmen, were flocking into a country which had hitherto been purely pastoral and agricultural. The diamond-fields lay on the western border of the Free State, round the modern Kimberley, in a thinly-peopled region where no precise boundaries had ever been drawn.¹ Ownership was claimed both by the Free State and by the native State of the Western Griquas. The Free State set up a temporary system of administration, but it did not work well. Then the Griqua chief, Waterboer, offered the sovereignty of the district to Queen Victoria; and in October 1871 the offer was accepted, on the assumption that the Griqua claim was valid, Griqualand West was annexed, and the British Government assumed the responsibility of maintaining order among the rough population of the diamond-fields. The Free State protested in vain; all it got (1876) was the sum of £90,000 as compensation. But the very payment of compensation seemed to be an acknowledgment of its claim; the whole transaction bore an aspect of high-handed greed; and the Free State was seriously alienated. Yet there was something to be said in favour of the British Government's action. It was the only power in South Africa which could effectively control the rough mining population; a farmer-State without a police force or an army was ill-equipped for such a task; and the British Government neither made nor hoped to make any profit out of the diamond-fields. But a new and ominous factor had appeared to add to the difficulties and misunderstandings of South African politics.

Meanwhile trouble of another kind was brewing in the Transvaal. Its settlers had been the most restless and adventurous among the original trekkers of 1836. Though, even as late as 1877, they numbered only 8000 or 10,000, they had spread themselves in scattered groups over a very wide area, and they had never succeeded in establishing a system of orderly government. Until 1860 they were divided into four distinct republics, constantly at strife with one another, and with their neighbours of the

¹ See the map, Atlas, Plate 89 (a).
Free State, whose territory they actually invaded in 1857. After 1860 there was civil war for four years, at the end of which Martin Pretorius as President, and Paul Kruger as military commandant, began the task of creating some sort of unified authority. But they had little success. The republic was bankrupt; it could not collect its taxes or pay its officers; there were no roads, and the rivers were unbridged; and the burghers obeyed orders, or not, as they thought fit.

This might not have mattered if the Transvaal had been an isolated region. But it was surrounded by native tribes, with whom there was perpetual friction. The powerless Government could not control its subjects. It could not stop slave-raiding, which undoubtedly went on, or prevent such episodes as the onslaught upon the Bechuana tribe among whom Livingstone was working, when his house was pillaged in his absence—perhaps, as he believed, by the Boers. On all sides the Transvaal Boers were stirring up trouble among the African peoples, and it was felt that their restless anarchy was a menace to all the white settlers. And, owing to their divisions, they were far from successful in their native wars. Between 1865 and 1868 they were driven out of a large region in the northern Transvaal, known as the Zoutpansberg. Then they waged wars against the Baralong tribes in the west until their raids were checked by a definition of the frontier (1870) in an award by Keate of Natal. In 1876 they entered upon war with King Sekukuni in the eastern Transvaal, which was currently believed to have been conducted with such atrocious cruelty that it called forth repeated remonstrances from the British High Commissioner and the Secretary of State. They were stirring up all South Africa. Distant chieftains sent complaints and petitions to the British Government. King Khama wrote from the far north of Bechuanaland to beg for the protection of the Queen. 'There are three things which distress me very much,' he wrote, 'war, selling people, and drink. All these I shall find in the Boers.' Even Lobengula, king of the remote Matabele, sent a message to the High Commissioner to report his fears of a Boer attack.

But the most dangerous fact of all was that there was constant friction between the Boers and the formidable Zulu, Cetywayo. The Boers had occupied territory (Utrecht and Vryheid) which Cetywayo regarded as part of his do-
minions. They asserted their supremacy over the Swazis, whom Cetywayo regarded as his vassals. Throughout the 'seventies it was only the influence of the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal which staved off war between the Transvaal Boers and the Zulus; and it was becoming more and more difficult to hold Cetywayo in restraint. If a war with the Zulus should break out, all native Africa might take flame. All native Africa (influenced by the missionaries) looked to the British Government to deal with the situation.

It was becoming increasingly evident that the interests of all the South African States were inextricably intertwined; that the folly of any one of them might endanger all the rest; and that their policy towards the natives ought to be guided by uniform principles. Evidently the policy of strict non-intervention which had been adopted in the 'fifties had its dangerous side. In 1874 the ministry of Disraeli came to power in Britain; and Disraeli's Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, inaugurated a new policy. He was convinced that federation, which Sir George Grey had vainly advocated sixteen years before, was the only solution of the South African problem. In 1874 he sent the historian Froude on a propagandist mission to South Africa, with no useful results. In 1876 he summoned a conference in London to discuss the problem; it came to nothing, for the South African States, with the exception of Natal, refused to consider the project. But Carnarvon would not accept defeat; and he obtained from Parliament a permissive federal Act to make action easy if the temper of South Africa should change. And in 1876 he appointed to the Governorship of Cape Colony and to the High Commissionship of South Africa perhaps the ablest man whom that country had yet welcomed—Sir Bartle Frere, an Anglo-Indian administrator of wide experience, and a convinced supporter of the policy of federation, which he was instructed to do everything in his power to realise.

Meanwhile Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal, who knew more about South African native questions than any other man, had poured into Carnarvon's ears his misgivings about the Zulus and the Transvaal Boers; and, independently of Frere, Shepstone returned to Africa with a commission to inquire into conditions in the Transvaal, and with large powers to take such action as he might think best. Shepstone went to the Transvaal. He found it bankrupt and in a state of anarchy; and he also found that many of the more respon-

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 89 (d).
sibleburghers, including the President, Burgers, regarded with dread the prevalent confusion and the prospect of a Zulu war. Some of them petitioned to be taken under British protection; and Shepstone, giving more weight to the opinions he liked than to those he disliked, decided that the only way of averting a catastrophe was to throw the aegis of British power over the Transvaal. In April 1877 he declared that country annexed to the British Crown, and promised that it should be endowed with full self-governing powers under a scheme of federation. The annexation was meant partly as a step towards federation, partly as a warning to Cetywayo not to attack; erelong it brought the onslaught of his fierce impis upon the British power.

The annexation of the Transvaal ended one epoch in the history of South Africa, and opened another. It ended the epoch of non-intervention, which had indeed yielded an interval of peace, but which had, in the opinion of many, led to a complicated and dangerous situation. Now the policy of non-intervention was to be reversed, and replaced by a policy of federation. South Africa was to be invited to reconcile its differences in a free self-governing federal union, wherein the rights of Dutch and British, of blacks and whites, were all to be reconciled under the aegis of the British Commonwealth. A sincere and lofty ideal inspired this change of policy. But it failed to take account of the passion of independence and the strong racial feeling which forty years of strife had engendered among the Boers. Instead of peace, the new policy brought a sword: the annexation of the Transvaal, far from bringing unification, was the beginning of a generation of friction, conflict and embitterment.

The history of the British colonies during this period of quiescence is almost devoid of romantic or exciting episodes; and for that reason its significance has been too much disregarded. In truth a great thing had been insensibly achieved during these years. The colonies had reached the stage of adolescence; they had taken up the responsibility for their own welfare; they were becoming conscious of themselves not as subordinate and dependent settlements, but as communities with distinct personalities of their own. Canada and New Zealand had achieved unity as well as freedom; Australia was manifestly tending in the same direction; even in divided and distracted South Africa the
ideal of unity had come to birth. These young and vigorous peoples were ceasing to be colonies; they were becoming nations.

CHAPTER V

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TROPICS

§ 1. The Revival of Interest in the Tropics.

In the early days of British colonial expansion it was towards tropical or sub-tropical lands that attention was most eagerly turned, because these lands supplied goods which the temperate zone could not produce for itself. In the nineteenth century a great change in values took place. The abolition of the slave-trade, followed by the abolition of slavery, produced a revolution in tropical trade. Most of the tropical or sub-tropical commodities needed for British industry, notably raw cotton, could be got in the way of trade without any necessity for conquering and administering the territories on which they were grown. What were now mainly needed were markets for British manufactures, and homes for the surplus population of the crowded islands; and temperate lands offered at once the best markets for manufactured goods and the only suitable fields for emigration.

During the generation after 1815, therefore, British interest in the tropical regions was greatly diminished; or, rather, it became mainly philanthropic instead of mainly commercial. To stamp out the slave-trade, or to give protection and encouragement to the hundreds of heroic missionaries who had found their way to every corner of the heathen world, had become the chief motives which prompted British statesmanship to interfere in the affairs of tropic lands. And these motives did not seem to necessitate annexation of territory. The missionaries were inclined for a long time to argue that the primitive peoples should be left undisturbed, to find their way to civilisation under missionary guidance. The tropics fell into the background; those tropical colonies which Britain already possessed were neglected, and no new ones were acquired. But about the middle of the century a change began to come about. The reasons for this change were partly
commercial, partly philanthropic, and for some time the philanthropic motive had the greater force.

The commercial motive for taking a new interest in tropical lands was the need of new tropical products for the purposes of industry. In this period only one such product had yet become important. This was oil, which was wanted for the lubrication of steam engines and machinery, and for the manufacture of the soap that was being used in increasing quantities by the growing populations of grimy towns. Oil was obtained from the palms and ground-nuts of the West Coast of Africa, and from the copra (dried coco-nut kernels) of the Pacific Islands; and these lands therefore became of increasing importance to industry.

The philanthropic motive was supplied by a change in the attitude of the missionaries. They had lost faith in the efficacy of leaving primitive peoples undisturbed, and had come to believe that firm and just government by a civilised Power was necessary to protect the primitive peoples from their own barbarism, as well as from the unscrupulous exploitation of the worst type of traders. The missionaries had therefore become, in many regions, strong advocates of annexation. Most of the petitions to be taken under British protection, which came in surprising numbers from African or Polynesian chiefs during this period, were inspired by the missionaries. Moreover, when missionaries and explorers penetrated more deeply into savage Africa, they found that the iniquities of the old West African slave-trade were as nothing in comparison with the ugliness of the slave-traffic that went on in the interior of Africa. Against this traffic the navy could do little or nothing; the only remedy was annexation, followed by firm and just government. In the Pacific also a new labour-traffic was growing up, which in its worst forms was practically a sort of slave-trade. The British Government, which had laid upon itself the task of putting an end to the traffic in slaves, was therefore called upon to annex new lands in pursuance of this aim. It resisted the call as long as it could. But in some instances this motive for the increase of territory exercised a real influence.

For these reasons there was a revival of interest in tropical territories during the quarter of a century following 1850; and it had its effect both in the policy adopted towards the old tropical colonies and in the acquisition of new ones.
§ 2. The West Indies: Governor Eyre and the Reaction against Self-Government.

The old splendour and riches of the West Indies had received their death-blow when slavery was abolished in 1833, and West Indian trade was never again to possess the importance which had belonged to it in the eighteenth century. But after the middle of the nineteenth century the West Indies began slowly to revive. The revival was stimulated by the introduction of free labour. Indian coolies, mostly of low Hindu castes, were brought in under a system of indentures carefully supervised by the Government of India. When their term of service was over, most of them remained and sent for their wives; and within a generation Indians had become a substantial element in the population of some of the West Indian colonies. By 1875 over 170,000 Indians were permanently settled in the West Indies, and most of them were thriving and content. They form to-day about one-third of the population in British Guiana and Trinidad.

The West Indies were in truth passing through a transition from one economic order to another. The transition was not an easy one. But with one exception it caused no outbreak of unrest. The exception was Jamaica, where in 1865 a brief but violent negro insurrection broke out in one small corner of the island. The rising seems to have been due to economic distress, and it took the form of a demand for the abolition of rent. Martial law was proclaimed by the Governor, Mr. E. J. Eyre; and the rising was stamped out in a few days. But martial law was maintained longer than was necessary, and under its cover some serious injustices were committed. The episode aroused a storm of controversy in England, where some, amongst them John Stuart Mill, denounced Governor Eyre as a tyrant, and stigmatised his action as an example of the brutal disregard of the rights of a subject race by a dominant oligarchy; whilst others, like Thomas Carlyle, defended Eyre as a heroic saviour of society. Both judgments were exaggerated. But it is true that Eyre went too far, under the influence of the panic-struck aristocracy of planters who lived in dread of negro revolt.

The discussion about Governor Eyre's action had one important result—it convinced men that representative government was unsuitable for any land in which a small number of members of a ruling race were set among an
overwhelming majority of backward and ignorant subjects. And the Jamaica planters had come, from a different point of view, to the same conclusion. They did not wish to be made responsible, in the eyes of the excitable negroes, for all the acts of Government; still less did they wish to admit the negroes to political power; and they therefore resolved to sacrifice the self-governing powers which they had enjoyed since the seventeenth century, and petitioned Parliament to abolish the representative system and to substitute a Crown Colony form of government. This was done by an Act of 1866.

But Jamaica did not stand alone. In 1870 British Honduras, and in 1876 St. Vincent, Grenada and Tobago, petitioned for the abolition of representative government; and the petitions were granted. The only West Indian colonies in which representative government survived this period were the Leeward Islands and Barbados; and even in these cases the executive was not responsible to the legislature. The principle which was implicit in these changes was that representative government is unsuited for lands in which backward and primitive peoples predominate. Henceforward this principle was applied in all the tropical colonies. The seventeenth century had unhesitatingly given self-governing powers to the small groups of white men who lorded it in tropic lands: the nineteenth century broke away from this practice precisely because it denied that the interests of the white man were alone to be considered, while it recognised that the backward peoples were not yet ripe for self-government.

§ 3. West Africa: the Beginning of a New Development.

If the abolition of slavery made a break in the history of the British West Indies, the abolition of the slave-trade in 1807 made a still more definite break in the history of the West African settlements, which had existed mainly as bases for this traffic. At that date there were three distinct British settlements, all purely coastal trading-stations. There was a port at the mouth of the Gambia River—the only West African river which is navigable from its mouth by ocean-going vessels; there was a settlement at Sierra Leone, the best harbour on the West Coast, which had been founded as a place of refuge for emancipated slaves; and there were several stations on the Gold Coast, which had always been the principal centre of European trading
activities. The Gold Coast stations, of which Cape Coast Castle was the chief, were sandwiched between Dutch and Danish settlements; and behind them lay the powerful and ferocious native kingdom of Ashanti, which constantly threatened their existence. All these settlements were in the hands of the Africa Company, which was wound up in 1821. If the West African stations were to be preserved, Government would have to maintain them. This seemed scarcely worth while. Many urged that they should be abandoned; and this would have been done if it had not been that these posts formed useful bases for the campaign against the slave-trade, in which the navy was incessantly engaged; while missionaries had started work in all the settlements, and were trusting to British protection. So far as trade was concerned, the settlements seemed to have no value; they were merely a burden and a cause of needless expenditure.

In 1827 the Gold Coast forts were handed over to a committee of London merchants. Their agent, George Maclean, contrived to establish so great an influence over all the coast tribes that in effect an informal British protectorate was established, under whose shelter the missionaries did admirable work, while the trade in palm-oil began to be valuable. But about 1840 reports began to come to England that stores were being supplied to foreign slave-dealers; and under pressure of public opinion Government had to assume direct control once more (1843), not only over the forts on the coast, but over the tribes behind, who had learnt to resort voluntarily to British justice. In the next year the tribes between the Ashanti kingdom and the coast made voluntary agreements to renounce human sacrifice, and to refer all serious crimes to the jurisdiction of the Queen's officers. This is an illustration of the way in which the authority of a civilised government expands when it is brought into contact with primitive barbarism.

In 1850 the Danish Government sold its forts on the Gold Coast to Britain, and in 1871 the Dutch Government, whose Gold Coast forts entailed a dead loss of £20,000 per annum, made a similar arrangement. The British Government now controlled all the Gold Coast ports, and could levy customs duties to meet part of the cost of administration. A small force of native troops was organised to maintain order. Domestic slavery was brought to an end among the native tribes. The British Protectorate, extending some forty

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1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 89 (c).
miles inland, was learning the benefits of peace and law. And the trade in palm-oil, now rising into importance, was bringing prosperity to the native owners of the palm trees.

But this development alarmed the inland warrior-kingdom of the Ashanti. The Ashanti king had thriven on the slave-trade; and Britain had brought it to an end. He had been accustomed to raid or plunder the coast-tribes; and Britain was protecting them. The Dutch had paid him tribute; but now the Dutch had disappeared from the coast. In 1873 this savage potentate made an attack upon the British Protectorate with 40,000 men, overran the lands of the protected tribes, and was with difficulty driven back from the coastal forts. To remove this menace once for all, an expedition was organised under Sir Garnet Wolseley, which invaded the Ashanti kingdom, burnt its blood-stained capital of Coomassie, and forced its king to renounce his claims on the Protectorate, to abandon human sacrifice, and to give free access to trade. The Ashanti power was broken; its subject tribes revolted; and the trade-routes to the interior were thrown open. Henceforward the Gold Coast colony was a thriving centre of trade; while, under the protection of a strong Government, missionaries laboured to civilise the savage tribes.

Meanwhile a new settlement had been established farther east. The island of Lagos, commanding the only outlet for a network of rivers and lagoons, had long been the haunt of piratical slave-dealers. In 1861 Lagos was occupied as a means of waging war against the slave-trade. But it soon turned out to be a valuable commercial centre; it gave access to a rich palm-bearing region, and became the port for what were known as the Oil Rivers. Britain had insensibly become the dominating Power on the West Coast. Nearly all the trade of the coast was in her hands. She had no European rivals save France, who still clung to her old settlement of Senegal; but Senegal was of insignificant value in comparison with Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Lagos. It is true that the direct authority of the Governors of these four colonies extended only a few miles from the coast. But traders and missionaries carried British influence far inland; and for almost all the tribes of this region Britain represented the civilisation of the West.

The story of the expansion of the West African colonies during this period of quiescence is a characteristic story. It took place in spite of the real unwillingness of the home
Government to assume new responsibilities. As late as 1865 the House of Commons resolved that no new treaties or annexations ought to be made in West Africa, and that the evacuation of all the settlements ought to be the ultimate aim of British policy. That was a sincerely held opinion. But a civilised and progressive Power, brought into contact with barbarism, could not fail to advance. However reluctant it might be, philanthropy and trade combined to force upon it a steady increase of power and responsibility.

§ 4. The Pacific Islands and the Annexation of Fiji.

Among the lovely isles of the Pacific, as on the malarial coast of Africa, Britain was being reluctantly drawn during this period into the assumption of political authority; and, in the one case as in the other, the impelling forces were primarily philanthropy and secondarily trade.

It was the missionaries who first brought the islanders into contact with European civilisation. The London Missionary Society sent out thirty missionaries as early as 1796 to Tahiti and Tonga; soon native catechumens, trained by them, were spread far and wide among the islands; in no region of the world were missionary efforts more eagerly welcomed or more rapidly successful. Other missionary bodies joined in the work, mainly in the southern or Polynesian Islands. Some Roman Catholics from France joined in; and their efforts were made the ground for a French annexation of Tahiti (1843) and New Caledonia (1853). But the bulk of the work was due to British missionaries of all the sects, who wielded a powerful influence over their converts. In 1849 and onwards the Church Missionary Society undertook the conversion of the fiercer islanders of Melanesia, and its work was ennobled by the tireless energy and courage of two great missionary bishops, Selwyn and Patteson. Under the guidance of such men, Western civilisation made its appeal to the islanders in the happiest form.

But alongside of the missionary came the trader, seeking first of all sandal-wood, which was sent to China to be turned into tea-chests, and there exchanged for tea to be sold in Australia. Then a trade in coco-nut oil grew up; it was greatly expanded when an ingenious German firm invented copra (dried coco-nut), which could be easily stored and easily carried (1868), and from this time onwards Germans shared the trade with British merchants. The Americans also
were active; and the British monopoly which had existed in the beginning of the century had already come to an end by 1870. Nevertheless Britain held an overwhelming preponderance in the trade of the South Pacific, as in its religious and civilising activities. In the eyes of the islanders Britain was the supreme representative of the power and wisdom of the white man; and when other European nations began to show an eagerness to annex islands, many chieftains petitioned to be taken under British protection. To all these requests the British Government was deaf.

The traders who haunted the islands were often rough and high-handed; they were seldom on good terms with the missionaries; they often cheated or misused the islanders. Hence the missionaries became advocates of annexation as a means of keeping the traders in order. The Australians and New Zealanders, too, awoke to a keen interest in the islands: the island trade was mainly carried on from Sydney and Auckland, and they did not wish to see it checked or diverted by a foreign Government which would impose protective duties, as the French had done in Tahiti. In 1870 a conference of the Australasian colonies demanded a British protectorate over Fiji, over Polynesia, over Melanesia and New Guinea. But still the British Government remained obdurate.

Yet another motive for annexation was afforded by the labour-trade, whereby 'Kanakas,' as the islanders were called, were transported as indentured servants for work of various kinds. Often enough this traffic (which became active in the 'sixties) was carried on quite justly, by voluntary agreements with the labourers. But it lent itself to abuses; at its worst it was little better than the slave-trade of West Africa; and many iniquities were perpetrated by brutal traders. The result was that the natives of some of the islands learned to hate and to fear the coming of the white man, and often revenged their wrongs upon the innocent. In 1871 the heroic Bishop Patteson was murdered in one of the islands of the Santa Cruz group as a result of the misconduct of one of the labour-traders; and Government was driven to action. What island petitions, and missionary representations, and Australian conferences had failed to obtain was made inevitable by the tragedy of Nukapu.

An Act of Parliament was passed (1872) condemning kidnapping, requiring licenses for the transport of labourers,
and defining the procedure for trying offenders. A second Act appointed a High Commissioner for the Western Pacific to enforce these provisions, and gave him jurisdiction over all British subjects in all the islands, and power to hold local courts and make regulations. But the High Commissioner must have a headquarters. In 1874 the chiefs of Fiji once more begged for annexation. The opportunity was taken; and Fiji became a British colony, and the seat of a High Commissioner exercising some sort of jurisdiction over all the islands of Polynesia and Melanesia not already annexed by other Powers. These far-scattered archipelagoes were not annexed; there was nothing to prevent other Powers from annexing them; but in effect they passed under a British protectorate.

Once again the spreading British Empire had been expanded into a new sphere, in spite of the extreme reluctance of the mother-country.

§ 5. The Exploration of Tropical Africa.

It is a strange fact that although the outline of Africa was disclosed to Europe earlier than that of any other continent, it was the last of the continents to yield up the secrets of its interior. During three and a half centuries an endless succession of European sailors of all nations had circumnavigated its coast on the way to India and the East; every trading nation had planted trading stations on its shores; but the process of exploration was very slow until the middle of the nineteenth century. Before 1850, indeed, the course of the Nile was known beyond Khartoum; Mungo Park had traced most of the course of the Niger, and his successors, Clapperton and Lander, had completed the exploration of that river; missionary explorers in South Africa had reached the Limpopo; the Sahara had been crossed; Timbuktu had been reached; and some Portuguese travellers had crossed the continent from Mozambique to Angola, but had left no effective record of their discoveries. Apart from these journeys the vast and populous territories of Central and Northern Africa were unknown; the great lakes were only a rumour; the Congo and the Zambezi were only known at their mouths. But in little more than a quarter of a century after 1850 all these mysteries were revealed, and Africa was laid open, ready to be exploited, during the next period, by the European Powers. As we have already seen, the interior of Australia was explored
during the same period; and with these two achievements to its credit this quarter of a century deserved to rank as the greatest in the history of exploration, next to the generation which began with Columbus's great voyage.

It is a legitimate ground for pride that the lion’s share in these remarkable achievements belonged to British explorers. Many Frenchmen, Portuguese, and Germans took part, and names like Duveyrier, Nachtigal, Yunker and Schweinfürth will always rank high in the history of African exploration. Some of the greatest German explorers, Barth, Krapf, and Rebmann, worked in the service of Britain. But the supreme names of African exploration are British names: Livingstone, Burton, Speke, Baker, Grant, Cameron, Stanley. It was they who unrolled the curtain which hid Africa from the eyes of the world. And the greatest of them all was David Livingstone.¹

The son of pious and thrifty Scottish working folk, David Livingstone had devoted himself to that missionary career which thousands of British people regarded as the noblest on earth; and he had earned the cost of his training by working at the loom. In 1840 the London Missionary Society sent him to Kuruman in Bechuanaland, the northernmost of their stations, far beyond the limits of Cape Colony. From the first he was not content to develop existing work: he was eager to carry the Christian message farther afield, and pushed forward into Northern Bechuanaland. Here he saw and suffered from the raids of the lawless Transvaal Boers: his anger flamed at their cruelties, and he longed to see them brought under effective control. He saw also the savagery and degradation of the African tribes, the endless bloodshed, the iniquities of slavery; and he burned to bring them to an end. The first step was to open up Africa. ‘Who will open up Africa?’ was the burden of his early letters; and he took the task on his own shoulders. While still stationed in Bechuanaland, he made his way to Lake Ngami (1849), and beyond it to the Zambezi River, with only such resources as could be afforded by his exiguous salary and the friendship of the natives. Then, having persuaded his paymasters to allow him to strike farther afield, and having put himself under the tutelage of the Astronomer-Royal at Cape Town so that his observations might be scientific, he struck due north to Linyanti on the upper waters of the Zambezi (1853), explored that river almost

¹ There is a short life of Livingstone in the ‘English Men of Action’ Series by Thomas Hughes.
to its source, made his way to Loanda on the Atlantic shore of Portuguese Angola, and thence, returning to the Zambezi, followed it to its mouth in the Indian Ocean (1856). With amazingly slight resources he had crossed unknown Africa from shore to shore. This journey alone would have placed him in the front rank of the world's explorers. Between 1858 and 1864 he was at work, under a commission from the British Government, exploring the Zambezi valley, its tributary the Shiré, and the noble Lake Nyasa, the southernmost of the great lakes of Eastern Africa. Finally, in 1866, he set forth upon the last and longest of his journeys, which ended only with his death in 1873. In this great journey he mapped out a great part of East Central Africa and the upper waters of the Congo.

Livingstone's wonderful career disclosed to the world immense, fertile and populous regions, and aroused the interest of all the civilised peoples. But the explorer's inspiration was not the desire for fame, or even for knowledge. He longed to bring justice and peace into the darkness of Africa; and he regarded his own work as only a preparation, and as a challenge to the civilised peoples—more especially to his own people—to take in hand this great task, which in Livingstone's view could only be carried out if civilised governments were set up in these backward lands. His adventures, his letters and his books did more than any other single cause to destroy that shrinking from the assumption of new responsibilities which had held the process of expansion in check. Soon, when the material wealth of the dark continent began to be revealed, these noble motives were to be reinforced by lower but perhaps more potent incitements; trade interests were to strengthen and overlay the appeal of philanthropy. The mad rush of the European Powers to seize territories in Africa began within ten years of Livingstone's lonely death in its remote uplands.

Contemporaneously with Livingstone's great discoveries other explorations, only less remarkable, had revealed the secrets of other sections of the African interior. Only a few of the more outstanding among many journeys can be mentioned. In 1850 Henry Barth and James Richardson made their way from Tripoli across the Sahara to Lake Chad, the upper waters of the Niger, and the mysterious city of Timbuktu. In 1854 Richard Burton and J. H. Speke explored Somaliland; and four years later they discovered the great lakes Tanganyika and Victoria. Between
1860 and 1864 Speke and J. A. Grant traced the main stream of the Nile from Lake Victoria to Khartoum, while Sir Samuel Baker found Lake Albert and explored much of the upper Nile valley. In 1873 Lieutenant Cameron, going out to seek Livingstone, struck across East Africa from Zanzibar to Lake Tanganyika, and then straight across what later became the Congo Free State to Benguela on the Atlantic shore. In 1869-74 a great German explorer, Nachtigal, mapped out much of the Sahara Desert, and made his way from Lake Chad eastwards to the Nile.

Finally, in 1874-7, H. M. Stanley, who had made his name by an earlier journey for the relief of Livingstone, made a series of discoveries which aroused greater excitement in Europe than any other explorations save Livingstone's. After a thorough exploration of Lakes Victoria and Tanganyika, he started down the great river whose upper waters Livingstone had discovered; and, following its course in the teeth of terrible obstacles, found that it led, in an immense majestic curve, right across Africa to the Atlantic. It was the mighty Congo; and the tale of its discovery, and of the wealth which its immense valley contained, set all Europe humming, and started that zealous competition to share in the wealth of unknown Africa which dominated the politics of Europe for a generation to come.

The era of indifference to colonial possessions and to the resources of the tropics was at an end; Britain was no longer to be left to exploit or neglect the outer world as she preferred; once more, as in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, all the European peoples were a fire to get their share of the wealth of the tropics.

[Lucas and Aitchison, Historical Geography of the West Indies; Lucas, Historical Geography of West Africa; Rogers, Historical Geography of Australasia and the Pacific; Brown, Story of Africa; Johnston, European Colonisation of Africa; Ellis, History of the Gold Coast; Wolseley, Story of a Soldier's Life; Blakie, Life of Livingstone; Livingstone, Missionary Travels and Expedition to the Zambesi; Stanley, How I found Livingstone and Through the Dark Continent; Johnston, Livingstone and the Exploration of Central Africa; Cooper, Fiji; Supan, Die Territoriale Entwicklung der Europäischen Colonien; Cambridge History of the British Empire.]
CHAPTER VI

INDIA UNDER DALHOUSSIE: MUTINY AND RECONSTRUCTION

(A.D. 1848-1880)

§ 1. The Administration of Dalhousie.

While the English-speaking members of the British Commonwealth were enjoying a period of steady and peaceful progress in material prosperity and political freedom, India was undergoing a terrible strain. She also was making progress, but it was so rapid as to be unsettling. The introduction of Western methods and ideas, begun in the previous period, was pushed forward with such devouring zeal that it led to a violent reaction. The terrible Mutiny of 1857 followed. When its turmoil had been quelled, there came an interval of twenty quiet years; but under a placid exterior the forces of change continued to work with growing potency. This was, indeed, a crucial period in the history of India. Modern India, a strange compost of East and West, was coming into being; and the ferment that began in the next period was in preparation.

From this point of view high importance belongs to the eight years of Lord Dalhousie's Governor-Generalship, 1848-1856. Dalhousie was a man of immense ability and energy, tireless industry, inflexible will, absolute honesty of purpose, and real devotion to the public service. For sheer force of personality two only among the long line of British rulers in India, Warren Hastings and Wellesley, deserve to be compared with him. His health was frail, but his imperious will had as little pity for his own physical weakness as for the deficiencies of his subordinates. Possessed by a sense of the magnitude of the services which Britain could render to India, and intolerant of abuses and delays, he laboured with fierce zeal to accelerate the introduction of Western civilisation, and at the same time to

1 There is a short life of Dalhousie by Sir W. W. Hunter in the 'Rulers of India' Series.
get rid, so far as possible, of the anomalies of dependent and often misgoverned States.

His first years were largely engrossed by the Sikh War, which ended in the conquest of the Punjab, and by the Burmese War, which ended in the annexation of Lower Burma and the completion of British control over the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal. These events have been touched upon in an earlier chapter, as the culmination of the process whereby the British raj gave political unity to India. Here we are concerned with the constructive labours by which these preliminaries were followed.

The conquest of the Punjab gave Dalhousie the opportunity of showing how a model province should be organised. Under the direction first of a commission of three, which included the brothers Henry and John Lawrence, and then of John Lawrence alone, he sent into the new province the picked men of the civil and military services; but his was the controlling mind in all their work. In a few years they had mastered anarchy, bridled the unruly frontier tribes with a line of forts, opened up the whole province by roads and bridges, stamped out thagi and gang-robbery, settled the land revenue on a basis which halved the burden of the peasantry, established impartial courts of law in every district, and so won the loyalty of the whole province that within ten years of the conquest the defeated Sikhs, who had been such formidable foes, were supplying forces to aid in crushing the Mutiny. The settlement of the Punjab—a province equal in size to one of the larger European States—was an achievement in itself sufficient to establish the fame of any statesman.

The man who could conceive and execute such a work of reconstruction was bound to regard with impatient disdain the inefficiency and the frequent tyranny which marked many of the Indian Native States. But these States were protected by treaties which guaranteed their princes against disturbance, and left them free to misgovern. The treaties could not be annulled, but in Dalhousie's view it was the duty of the supreme Power to seize every legitimate opportunity of bringing these territories under its direct control. Hindu custom permitted an adopted son, in default of direct heirs, to succeed to his adoptive father's rights. In the case of vassal princes, however, it had always been understood that the succession of an adopted son depended upon the consent of the superior Power. Dalhousie laid

1 Above, Bk. ix. chap. xi. p. 455.
down the principle that when any such case arose in a dependent State (though not in the highest class of Native States, which were known as ‘protected allies’), consent to the succession of an adopted son should be invariably refused, and the State should ‘lapse’ to the suzerain Power. Several cases of this kind occurred during Dalhousie’s governorship, and, with the assent of the home Government, he carried out his principle rigidly. No less than seven States, with a total area of 150,000 square miles, were thus brought under direct British rule. The inevitable result was to create a feeling of alarm and insecurity among the other Native States.

Some of the States thus annexed were of importance. The largest was Nagpur, the modern Central Provinces, which had been the greatest of the surviving Mahratta Powers. Another was Sattara, a little State held by the descendant of Sivaji, the founder of the Mahratta empire. It happened also that Baji Rao, the last of the Peshwas, who had been deposed and pensioned in 1819, died during Dalhousie’s reign; and the Governor-General refused, very rightly, to continue the pension to Baji Rao’s adopted son, the Nana Sahib, who was already a rich man. To Hindus who remembered how near the Mahrattas had come to establishing a Hindu dominion over all India, these things looked like a deliberate attempt to obliterate all that survived of the Mahratta tradition. Nana Sahib, now the chief representative of that tradition, did not forget his grievances. His opportunity for revenge came in 1857.

But the most important of Dalhousie’s annexations had nothing to do with the doctrine of ‘lapse.’ The State of Oudh was the oldest ally of the British power. Its king was, with the exception of the Nizam of Hyderabad, the only considerable Mohammedan prince reigning in India. But his realm was, and had long been, in a state of anarchy. His talukdars or feudal nobles were uncontrolled; his army was mutinous; and the misery of his subjects cannot be exaggerated. Time and again Governors-General had protested, and insisted upon reform; the chaos only grew worse. At length the home Government decided that the King of Oudh must be deposed, and his State brought under direct British rule. It fell to Dalhousie to carry out this order in 1856, just before his retirement. Beyond a doubt the annexation meant an immediate and immense amelioration of the condition of the peoples of Oudh. But

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 80.
2 Above, Bk. ix. chap. iv. p. 347.
the talukdars were restless at the prospect of being brought under control. Other native princes were alarmed at this suppression of an allied State, which was not even justified by the doctrine of 'lapse.' And Mohammedans were disturbed by the disappearance of one of the last remaining relics of their one-time Indian supremacy. Mohammedan sentiment was further hurt when it was announced that the heir of the ancient Mogul, the nominal Emperor of India, was only to be allowed to succeed to this title if he left the ancient palace of Delhi, once the scene of the splendours of Shah Jehan and Aurangzib. All these acts were inspired by zeal for efficiency and economy, and by impatience of shams. But they aroused widespread perturbation among both Hindus and Mussulmans. They made it appear that the British power, now that it had become supreme, was setting itself to sweep away every relic of the older political systems of India.

Dalhousie's downright and practical mind made little of the irrational sentiments which were hurt by all these changes. What he cared about most was the equipment of India with the material apparatus of a modern State. To help in this work, he created a new scientific Public Works Department, and kept it busy. Magnificent roads were made, notably the Grand Trunk road from Peshawar to Calcutta. Flotillas of steamboats appeared on the rivers. New harbours were built. The Governor-General himself drew up a scheme for a well-planned railway system under State control; and before he retired he had the satisfaction of opening the first few miles of Indian railway. He began the construction of telegraph lines, and pushed it forward with such vigour that in little over two years 4000 miles of telegraph were working. A postal service at extraordinarily cheap rates was organised. The construction of great works of irrigation was undertaken, and large areas of fertile land were made available for the production of food. The natural resources of India, its coal, its iron deposits, were explored. The scientific preservation of forests was taken in hand, and in a hundred ways efforts were made to improve the methods of Indian agriculture, to develop the cultivation of tea, of cotton, of silk and of flax, and to improve the breed of cattle, sheep and horses. Never had there been a more strenuous and systematic endeavour by a Government to stimulate the cultivation of a country's natural resources and to increase its power of producing wealth. India felt that she was being hustled out of her ancient grooves. She did not like the process.
More important than even these large contributions towards the equipment of India with the material apparatus of Western civilisation was the work which was set on foot during Dalhousie's administration in the development and expansion of education, both in English and in the vernaculars. In 1854 a despatch from Sir Charles Wood, then President of the Board of Control, laid down a scheme for the organisation of a complete educational system, elementary, secondary and university, in which private effort was to be encouraged by subsidies to come to the aid of government action. Three universities, one for each Presidency, were to crown the structure; and every province was to have a special department of government set apart for the organisation of educational work. Hitherto educational work along Western lines had been sporadic, experimental, and confined to the more advanced provinces. Henceforward it was to be systematic and general. The projected universities were not yet established when Dalhousie left India, but schemes for their organisation were under discussion.

§ 2. Persian and Chinese Wars.

During the last years of Dalhousie's restless activity, and during the year after his retirement, Britain found herself engaged in a series of wars, which had material effects upon the situation in India, both directly and indirectly.

First came the Crimean War, which lasted for more than two years. To supply the forces needed for this struggle considerable bodies of British troops were withdrawn from India, and the proportion of British to Indian regiments was lower in 1856 than it had ever been before.

Then followed a little war with Persia, a sort of aftermath of the conflict with Russia. Persian forces were besieging Herat, in Western Afghanistan, and Palmerston believed that Russia was behind Persia. To check this danger a combined naval and military force was sent from Bombay to the Persian Gulf. It served its end, and Persia withdrew from Afghanistan. But the forces for this expedition were drawn from the Indian cantonments; the sepoys saw the British garrison still further denuded; before the troops returned the Mutiny had begun.

Finally, a new war with China broke out early in 1857. It was an indefensible and disgraceful war, due to the arrog-

1 See the map, Atlas, Plates 82 and 83.
ance of Palmerston and of the British agent at Hong-Kong. Its occasion was the arrest by Chinese officers, on a charge of piracy, of the Chinese crew on board the 'Iorcha,' Arrow, a Chinese ship improperly flying the British flag. On the pretext that the British flag had been insulted a war was begun which lasted three years; France joined her forces to those of Britain; Canton was bombarded; Western troops marched on Pekin and sacked the summer-palace of the Emperor; and in the end China had to assent to the effective fulfilment of the promises she had made after the first Chinese War, and to admit Western traders and missionaries freely (1860). The Treaty of Pekin is important as marking the date when the obstinate exclusiveness of China was definitely broken down. But it had its importance for India also. The spectacle of Britain forcing Western influence upon China had its significance, at a moment when India was restive under the same process. Still more significant was the fact that the rulers of India evidently had their hands full, with wars on every side.

The Chinese War had but just begun, and British troops were actually on the high seas on their way to take part in the campaign, when the Indian Mutiny broke out.

§ 3. The Sepoy Mutiny, 1857-1858.

Consider what must have been the state of opinion in India during 1856 and the spring of 1857, and what sort of talk must have been going on in the bazaars and in the cantonments.

Oudh had just been annexed in face of the protests of its king. It was seething with unrest. Not far away, near Cawnpore, dwelt the Nana Sahib, the disappointed heir of the deposed Peshwa. He was rich; he gave lavish entertainments to British officers and their wives; but he was a centre of underground intrigues, he could, as the representative of the Mahratta tradition, play upon Hindu sentiment, and his smooth smile covered a longing for revenge. Away at Delhi the bedraggled court of the old Mogul was humming with anger at the knowledge that it was soon to be expelled from these scenes of ancient splendour. The last days of Moslem power seemed to have come. Moslem and Hindu alike were full of resentments. Everywhere there was uneasiness, a sense that the foreign conqueror, now that he was omnipotent, was at last showing his true character and threatening all the ancient traditions.
of India. A new Governor, Lord Canning, had just arrived: it was said that he brought orders to force all Hindus and Mussulmans to become Christians. Rumours flew in the bazaars, and magnified themselves. Mysterious messengers passed from village to village, leaving behind them *chapati* cakes and instructions that they should be passed on: to this day no Englishman knows what these cakes meant, but they meant something. It was nearly a century since the power of the British had been established at Plassey (1757): would it outlast the century? Their power rested—it had always rested—upon their army. Now they were engaged in wars on all sides, and the camps were almost emptied of white soldiers; the sepoys, whom they had trained and armed, outnumbered them by five to one—233,000 against 45,000 in 1856. The sepoys too were beginning to be unrestful: mysterious lotus-flowers, carrying some unknown message, were passing from cantonment to cantonment.

Into the midst of all this unrest came a horrible story. A new rifle had been introduced. The cartridges used in it had to be bitten by the soldiers. And the cartridges were greased with animal fat—with pigs’ fat which would defile the Mohammedan, with cows’ fat which would cause the Hindu to lose caste. The worst of it was that, owing to some terrible blunder made at Woolwich, the rumour was true. Naturally the excited sepoys believed that this was a malignant design against their religion: a device to force them to be Christians. Official India was serenely unaware of all this ferment. Even a few sporadic mutinies in various regiments during the early part of 1857 did not cause serious alarm. And the sudden outbreak came like a bombshell.

On Sunday, 10th May, 1857, three native regiments at Meerut murdered their officers and marched to Delhi. The Delhi garrison, consisting wholly of sepoys, joined them; every European who could be discovered in the city was murdered. But in the confusion two heroic deeds were done which perhaps saved the situation: a telegraph operator flashed the news along the new wires to the Punjab until he was cut down at his post; a gallant handful of British soldiers blew up the great magazine, and died in its ruins. The mutineers burst into the Fort and proclaimed the poor old Mogul once more Emperor of India; and the great revolt had begun.

Then came a strange pause of almost three weeks, as if the mutineers were stunned by their own success. It was
a fortunate pause for the British raj. It gave John Lawrence and John Nicholson, forewarned by the telegraph, time to disarm the sepoy regiments in the Punjab; and as the Sikhs remained loyal, and the Afghans failed to seize the opportunity for invasion, it became possible to organise the Punjab as a base for the reconquest of Delhi. The interval gave time also to make the situation safe in Bengal and Bihar, where only minor risings took place, and to hold on to the great fortress of Allahabad. This became the south-eastern base for the attack on the mutineers, as the Punjab was the north-western base.¹

In the early days of June the Mutiny flamed out over all the wide and populous region between these two points—over all the Upper Ganges Valley, the real heart of historic India; it spread also southwards, into Bundelkhand and Central India, though here it was never so serious. In the main it was concentrated in the region now known as the United Provinces, from Delhi and Agra to Lucknow and Cawnpore. Throughout this region every outlying British officer with his family was exposed to murder; those who escaped it did so by the loyalty of their Indian servants, or the help of the peasants; and men shuddered at the thought of what had happened in a hundred lonely stations. Yet even in these regions there was no general rising. Except in the city of Delhi, and in Oudh, the mutiny was purely a military movement; and the peasants looked on at it as they had looked on at so many devastating conquests.

There were two focus-points: the one Delhi, the seat of the Mogul Empire, to which flocked the mutineers from far and wide; the other Lucknow and Cawnpore. In Cawnpore the mutineers, egged on by the Nana Sahib, laid siege to an indefensible entrenchment within which a small British force, encumbered by many women and children, strove in vain to defend itself. Cawnpore had surrendered (June 27) on a promise of honourable treatment from the Nana Sahib, its garrison had been massacred, and its 125 women and children were awaiting a still more hideous fate, before the siege of Lucknow began (July 1). There the Residency was beset by a swarming throng. Its heroic chief, Sir Henry Lawrence, was wounded on the second day of the siege, and died two days later; but the desperate defence went on.

The first and most thrilling part of the story of the

¹ See the map, Atlas, Plate 80.
Mutiny filled the summer months from June to September, when the handful of British troops available in India had to fight, alongside of the loyal Sikhs and Gurkhas, through the heat of an Indian summer, against overwhelming odds, to save the existence of the raj, and to prevent the relapse of India into utter chaos. The mutineers had no clear plans; they made no serious attempt to combine their operations, or to extend the revolt into other parts of India. They merely awaited attack from the little British forces whom they outnumbered by five to one, and who had to advance against them, far from their bases, through more than half-hostile country. That the attacks should have been delivered at all in these circumstances was wonderful enough; that they should have succeeded seems merely miraculous.

From the Punjab, heedless of risk, Lawrence sent all the troops he could scrape together to attack the great walled city of Delhi. Through the scorching heat of June and July a little army of 5000 men hung on to the low ridge of rock that lies just outside the city of Delhi, constantly beating off fierce attacks by 30,000 foes; their long endurance has made the Ridge one of the sacred spots of the British people. In August the hero, John Nicholson, came down with all the reinforcements that the Punjab could send, and insisted upon immediate attack. On September 14 the Kashmir Gate was blown in, the British troops stormed through the gap, and John Nicholson was shot down at their head. Six days' hard fighting gave the city to the British troops; and the Mutiny lost its chief centre. The old Mogul was taken prisoner; and when the troubles were over he was exiled to Rangoon, where he died in 1862, the last of the line of Akbar.

Meanwhile, away in the South-East, a still more desperate conflict had been going on. On July 7, Henry Havelock had set out from Allahabad with 2000 men for the relief of Lucknow. He had to fight his way, under the sun of an Indian July, against desperate and well-armed enemies who outnumbered him by ten to one. After four pitched battles he reached Cawnpore, only to find that the day before his arrival the women and children had been slaughtered by the order of Nana Sahib, their protector. Their bodies had been flung into a well. The men who

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1 There is a short life of John Nicholson by Captain Trotter.
2 There is a short life of Havelock in the 'English Men of Action' Series, by Archibald Forbes.
stood by that well forgot weariness, forgot mercy, forgot everything but the passion of revenge.

Lucknow was still forty miles away; and in the Lucknow Residency the defence, maintained against terrible odds, was becoming desperate. Havelock tried to force his way through (July 25); but though he won three victories, his little army was so weakened by losses in action, by sunstroke, and by dysentery, that he had to fall back and await the reinforcements which were being hurried up under Outram. Then once more the advance began; and after two more victories Havelock forced his way into Lucknow on September 25, a few days after the capture of Delhi. The fall of Delhi and the relief of Lucknow broke the back of the Mutiny—broke it before the armies which were being hurried out from Britain had time to arrive.

But there was still a great deal of heavy fighting to be done. Havelock had relieved Lucknow only to be besieged in it himself. Once more the siege had to be raised (November 16); and thereafter all Oudh and Rohilkhand had to be reconquered in detail. These tasks fell to Sir Colin Campbell; and they were not completed till the fall of Bareilly in May 1858, after the mutiny had lasted a year. Meanwhile a new and serious rising had broken out in Central India, where the army of the loyal prince Sindhia revolted, occupied Gwalior, and proclaimed the Nana Sahib as Peshwa (May 1858). This would have added gravely to the danger if it had happened a year earlier. Now it came too late. Sir Hugh Rose, who had been carrying on a brilliant campaign in this region against the Mahratta leader Tantia Topi, met and crushed this fresh danger in June; and with that victory the Mutiny may be said to have reached its end, though it smouldered for some months more in outlying districts.


No bald summary of events such as we have set forth in the last section can give any impression of the splendour of heroism with which the crisis of the Mutiny was met by the few thousands of British men and women in India who found themselves plunged into sudden catastrophe, and isolated among uncounted myriads of possible foes; or of the horror, the fierce anger, the thirst for vengeance, which possessed those who had seen the mutilated bodies of Cawnpore, or
read of the long agony of Lucknow. The faithfulness of thousands of Indians, the comradeship of brave Sikhs and Gurkhas, the steady support of nearly all the ruling princes, were too readily forgotten; and if people at home and in India could have had their way, there would have been an orgy of revenge which would have left wounds that could not have been healed. Happily the reins of government were in the hands of a man who could keep his balance in a time of fierce emotion. Lord Canning made mistakes; but his steadfast moderation, for which he was at the time bitterly reproached, was not one of them, and the nickname of 'Clemency Canning,' given in scorn, has become a title of honour. Even when the very existence of the Indian Empire seemed to be at stake, Canning could realise that the outburst had not been the result of any deep-laid plan or calculated treachery, but of misunderstandings, of not unreasonable apprehensions, of sudden panic such as may easily master masses of ignorant and superstitious men; and his wisdom made it possible for the wounds to heal with astonishing rapidity.

For although there had been plottings and intrigues, the Mutiny was no thought-out, organised movement. It had no real leadership. If there had been in it any strong guiding spirit, the suddenness with which it broke out, and the unpreparedness of the Government, must have ensured it at least a temporary victory. But victory could have led to no good results; it would have brought desolation to great parts of India, and at the best it could only have resulted in a renewal of the anarchy of the eighteenth century, from which India had been rescued by the rise of the British power. There could have been no cohesion between the disparate and destructive ambitions of the Mogul court on the one hand and of the Mahratta Brahmins on the other; and there was in all India no power save that of Britain which could have made itself respected, or established any semblance of order. The Mutiny was in no sense a national movement; for India, united for the first time in her history only on the eve of the outbreak, had not even begun to dream of nationhood.

But it was not all waste. It gave to many Indians a glimpse of the abyss of anarchy from which impartial government preserved them. It produced a change of temper on the part of the Government of India, a greater caution even in the pursuit of aims that were wholly inspired by a desire for the welfare of India, and a greater
tenderness for the rights of Indian States. And it led to the abolition of the East India Company, and the direct assumption of responsibility for the government of India by the Crown and Parliament of Britain—a change which had always had its advocates, since Clive wrote to urge this course upon Pitt in 1759.

By an Act of Parliament of 1858, the long, romantic history of the East India Company was brought to an end; and its powers were transferred to an additional Secretary of State, who was to act with the advice of a Council of India of fifteen members sitting in London. At the same time a Proclamation, wisely conceived and nobly written, was issued over the signature of Queen Victoria. It reassured the Indian princes, alarmed by recent annexations; proclaiming that ‘We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions, . . . we shall respect the rights, dignity and honour of native princes as our own.’ It promised that all religions should ‘alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law,’ and announced the royal will that ‘our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service.’

It has long been customary to say that the abolition of the East India Company marked the beginning of a new and better era in the connexion between Britain and India. But this is scarcely true. There was nothing in the Queen’s proclamation that had not earlier been embodied either in legislation or in the practice of Indian government; and the Company was justified in asserting, in the dignified remonstrance with which it accepted its deposition, that it had done nothing to deserve extinction. In so far as the change made any difference, it was a difference for the worse; for the Directors of the Company had at least been a body of men with knowledge of India who had to be consulted before action was taken, while the Council of India, which was supposed to perform this function, was liable to be overridden, and has often been overridden, by Secretaries of State quite ignorant of Indian conditions. Moreover it had been a real advantage that at the renewals of the Company’s charter, which took place every twenty years, there was a detailed survey of its work, followed by legislation to deal with any defects which might have been discovered. Henceforward no such regular and searching reviews took place; and the affairs of India were far less efficiently and carefully considered when Parliament was nominally responsible for them than they had been in the
days when they were in the charge of an external but dependent body, which had to submit its work to searching and detailed criticism at regular intervals.

§ 5. The Era of Peace, 1858-1876.

After the Mutiny came a period of eighteen years of almost unbroken peace, covering five unexciting vice-royalties.¹ No political events of importance broke the calm of these years; yet under this placid surface developments of profound importance were taking place.

In the first place, a substantial reconstruction of the civil and military system was quietly carried into effect. The Indian army was amalgamated with the royal army; the proportion of British to Indian troops was increased; while nearly all the artillery was made over to the charge of British troops. Again, changes were made in the structure of government. In 1861 a distinction was for the first time drawn between the executive and the legislature, and a Legislative Council, including non-official members appointed by the Viceroy, was established. This was the first tentative step towards the creation of a parliamentary system in India. The judicial system also was recast; and in the same year, 1861, the Supreme Courts and the Company's Indian Courts of Appeal were merged in new High Courts of Justice for each Presidency. Thus, after eighty years, was carried into effect the reform which Warren Hastings had striven to realise in 1780, and for which he had been impeached.

In the sphere of government, indeed, this was a time of steady, quiet efficiency. The days of romance, of great conquests and sweeping reconstructions, and of immense responsibilities and opportunities thrust by fate upon lonely men, were over. The administrative machine slowly wrought out since the time of Warren Hastings had almost attained perfection; and the District Officer, the pivot of the whole system, was carrying on his multifarious and beneficent labours in every part of India. Since 1853 new recruits to the Civil Service had been selected by competitive examination, and by the end of this period few officers survived who had been brought in by any other means. Competitive examination produced a high average level of ability, and of competence in the

¹ Canning, 1858-62; Elgin, 1862-3; Lawrence, 1864-9; Mayo, 1860-1872; Northbrook, 1872-6.
performance of the regular work of administration. There were no means of telling whether it could produce men of exceptional power and constructive vision such as the older system had never failed to produce. For in the post-Mutiny generation calm routine held sway, and there was no such challenge to the exceptional man as the eras of crisis had offered. Moreover circumstances were materially reducing the freedom of action and the sense of immediate responsibility which had been thrust upon local administrators. The rules of government by which officials were controlled were growing more elaborate. The railway and the telegraph brought every officer more directly under the control of the central Government; while the submarine cable, and the steamship route through the Suez Canal, were in the same way bringing the Government of India under the close control of a Secretary of State in London, who commonly knew little or nothing of India. For these reasons the system of Indian government was becoming not merely more efficient and more punctiliously exact, it was becoming gradually more mechanical, more formal, and more impersonal. There were many advantages in the increasing precision and regularity thus obtained. But the East is accustomed to personal government; it prefers to deal with a man rather than a system; and the growing formalism of the system had its dangers.

Three main features of this period of peaceful advance deserve to be noted: the emergence of the problem of famine administration, the rapid development of railways and other Western innovations, and the deeply significant expansion of Western education.

A monsoon country like India is always liable to local famines, when there is a failure of the rains in any district; and throughout Indian history famines have inevitably been of frequent occurrence. Until the modern era they were merely endured as sent by Fate. Little could be done to guard against them; for as each district only produced supplies for its local market, there was no large surplus available for transference to a famine-struck area; and there were no adequate means of transport. The development of British power during the nineteenth century affected the famine problem in two ways. On the one hand, assured peace brought a rapid increase of population, which increased the danger of famine. But on the other hand irrigation opened up new supplies; the steamship opened a world-market to the Indian cultivator, and
encouraged him to produce a surplus for export, which could be diverted to the stricken areas in time of famine; while the railway made it possible to move these stores quickly from one region to another. All these new factors began to come actively into operation during the generation following the Mutiny; and for this reason the problem of famine became a soluble problem, capable of being dealt with by organisation. It was in this period, during the terrible famines of 1861, 1865, and 1876, that famine organisation began to be studied, though at first with little success.

The peaceful era which followed the Mutiny was filled with constructive activity in those great works of engineering which Dalhousie had begun and the Mutiny had interrupted. This was, in particular, the Railway Age in India; and the construction of the main trunk lines which Dalhousie had planned belongs to these years. The work was carried on by British companies, whose capital was raised in Britain. The fact that interest has to be paid on the capital thus sunk in the development of India has since been treated as a grievance by Indian critics, who regard it as a 'drain' on the wealth of India. But the increase which this work has brought about in the wealth of India enormously outweighs the charges imposed to meet it. Not only that; railways have contributed in a very high degree to weld India into a unity.

Unity of another and a deeper kind was meanwhile being forwarded by the working out of an educational system on the lines of the Despatch of 1854. Not much, it is true, was done in the sphere of elementary education, for the Indian masses had not yet begun to want it. But there was an exceedingly rapid expansion in the provision of secondary schools, which were used by the traditional literate castes; and by the end of the period it was already true that, in the more advanced provinces, a large proportion of these classes had some knowledge of English, and could therefore communicate with one another with an ease unknown to their fathers. Still more important was the development of the Universities. The three Presidency Universities of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay were established in 1857, not as teaching bodies, but merely as institutions empowered to examine the students of affiliated colleges, and to grant degrees. Their examinations regulated and dictated the work done in colleges, some of which were provided by Government, others by the missionaries; and at the end of the period Indians
were beginning to open colleges of their own. All the work of the colleges was carried on in the English language. Ali followed singularly uniform lines. And the result was that a generation of Western-educated Indians was being produced whose minds were saturated with English literature and with British political theories; and who formed a body spread over every part of India which shared the same outlook and ideas. They were not as yet very numerous; but their influence was altogether out of proportion to their numbers. They included all the lawyers who practised before the High Courts and the District Magistrates; all the schoolmasters; all the administrative officers holding subordinate Government posts in every district; all the journalists who produced the increasing number of newspapers in English and the vernaculars. The creation of this powerful and vocal class, whose members, in every part of India, shared the same body of ideas, and could communicate with one another, was a fact of portentous political importance. It was the biggest thing that had happened in the history of modern India.

But the significance of these things was as yet scarcely perceived. The railway, the one-anna post, the newspaper, the school, the university, the wide diffusion of English—these things were creating in divided India new elements of unity. It was as yet only a superficial unity, based upon the assimilation of some of the methods and some of the ideas of the West; it did not seriously qualify the divisions of race, language, caste and religion by which India was more deeply sundered than any other country on the face of the globe. Nevertheless it was a portentous though an unappreciated fact; and it has dominated the subsequent history of India.

§ 6. The Imperial Title and the Second Afghan War.

The prosaic period which we have been surveying was brought to an end when Disraeli assumed control of the home Government (1874), and sent out to India Lord Lytton, a man of his own temper, with a high sense of British greatness, and a taste for the dramatic and the grandiose.

Disraeli had resolved to express the assumption of supreme power in India by the introduction of a new royal title. The title Empress of India, Kaisar-i-Hind, which he devised (1876), was the object of a good deal of satirical criticism. But Disraeli's judgment was right. He had the imagination to see that the suzerainty of the British Crown over the
princes of India was made much more natural and acceptable if the homage demanded from them was rendered to the Empress of India than if it was rendered to the Queen of a distant and alien land; and it may be added that the assumption of this title was the first step towards an acceptance of the view that India ought to be regarded not as a mere subject dominion of the British State, but as a partner realm. Lytton's first task as Viceroy was to arrange a stately and ceremonious Durbar at which to announce to the assembled princes the assumption of the new title, and to receive their homage (January 1877). It was an assemblage such as Akbar or Aurangzib might have held; for the first time the British raj assumed the robes of ceremony, and put aside the businesslike drabness of a mercantile concern.

Alongside of these splendours, the Viceroy had to deal with the problem of finding modes of relief for the gravest of a series of famines which afflicted India during this period (1876-1878). It is his highest claim to respect that he showed greater insight and courage in dealing with famine than any of his predecessors. He was the first responsible statesman to grasp the problem of Indian famine as a whole, and to realise that the difficulties could not be dealt with from hand to mouth as they arose, but that an enlightened Government must realise their inevitable recurrence and be prepared with a policy for dealing with them. It was a Commission appointed by Lytton which first seriously dealt with the famine question as a whole, analysed the ways in which famines should be dealt with in various provinces according to their circumstances, and laid down the principles upon which the famine policy of the next period was wrought out.

But what most markedly distinguished the viceroyalty of Lord Lytton was the revival of the Afghan question, and the outbreak of the second Afghan War. Since the disasters of the first Afghan War, the Government of India had been chary of any interference with the prickly mountaineers. During the lifetime of Dost Mohammed, the Amir whom Lord Auckland had tried to overthrow in 1839, relations of distant friendliness were maintained, and the Amir had kept back his fighting men when the troubles of the Mutiny might have tempted them to invade India. But Dost Mohammed died in 1863, and there was a period of civil war in Afghanistan before his son Sher Ali secured the throne (1868). During these years Russia was steadily extending her power

1 Above, Bk. ix. chap. xi. p. 453.
in Central Asia. In 1868 she established her control over the Khanate of Bokhara, which brought her to the very borders of Afghanistan; and the Khanate of Khiva, farther west, was soon to follow (1873). The Amir saw himself being crushed between the two European Powers. He asked for a promise of British protection (1869 and 1873); it was refused him, because Britain was resolved to advance no farther. Thereupon he turned to Russia; and by 1876 it appeared that the holder of the gates of India was definitely hostile to the British power. What action should that Power take? On this question there were two sharply-opposed bodies of opinion, the one urging a forward policy, the other urging restraint. But these were years in which the old British fear of Russia had been brought once more to fever-heat by events in Europe. Disraeli was struggling against the extension of Russian power in the Balkans; the extension of Russian influence over Afghanistan seemed still more dangerous.

In 1876, to guard against these dangers, Lytton declared a protectorate over the barren land of Baluchistan, which lies to the south of Afghanistan. He took control of the Bolan Pass, and established an advanced military station at Quetta, from which it would be easy, if need be, to take Afghanistan on the flank. Quetta is still one of the pivotal points of Indian frontier-defence. In 1878 the Amir of Afghanistan, after receiving a Russian envoy with great honour, refused to admit a British envoy to his dominions. 1878 was the year when anti-Russian feeling in Britain was at its height. The consequence was a declaration of war against Afghanistan.

The war began with a brilliant threefold advance on Kabul, which drove the Amir to flight, and forced his successor to accept the British terms. The frontier was revised so as to secure to India the control of the passes. Afghanistan practically became a vassal State, precluded from following an independent foreign policy; and a British Resident took up his abode at Kabul. But as in 1840, so in 1879, initial success was only the herald of fresh trouble. The British Resident was murdered; the Amir had to flee to the British camp; and the war had to be fought all over again. The Afghans offered a vigorous resistance; General Roberts, after occupying Kabul afresh, had to fall back for a time; a detached British force in the west was seriously defeated at Maiwand and penned into

1 See the map, Atlas, Plates 78 and 79.
2 See the map, Atlas, Plate 80.
Kandahar; and in order to relieve it, Roberts had to make the great march of 300 miles from Kabul to Kandahar through a hostile and difficult country, which established his military reputation (1880). Evidently adventures amongst the fierce clansmen of the mountains were costly and dangerous; and in the end Lyttton's forward policy was reversed by the Gladstone ministry of 1880, the British forces were withdrawn, and the Amir Abdurrahman was left to establish his authority by iron methods over his unruly subjects, under a guarantee of his frontiers against foreign attack. Abdurrahman was a very vigorous barbarian; he would be no dependent vassal; he meant to hold his own independently between the two European Powers, and in a remarkable degree he succeeded in doing so.

In effect the Afghans were henceforward left to themselves. But the second Afghan War had one important result; it gave to India control over the mountain wall which formed her defence on the north-west; the keys were no longer in untrustworthy hands; and Quetta had been established as a military outpost to guard the frontier line.

One further feature marked the Viceroyalty of Lord Lyttton; a feature ominous of the future. During the Russo-Turkish War (1877-8) a part of the vernacular press in India began to denounce the Government with virulence, to extol Russia, and to preach the necessity of overthrowing the British raj. To curb this license, a Vernacular Press Act was passed in 1878, which empowered Government to exact bonds of security from the publishers of vernacular newspapers. The Act aroused an angry outcry among the new educated classes of India, as a restraint upon the freedom of the press, and it was withdrawn four years later. But the significant thing was the emergence of the new temper which showed itself both in the kind of writing against which the Act was directed, and in the protest against the Act itself. A new era was plainly dawning in India, in which submission to authority was no longer to be the dominant note of its thought, as it had been for untold centuries. The ferment of the West was working.

[Lee Warner, Dalhousie; Rice Holmes, History of the Indian Mutiny; Marshman, Havelock; Cunningham, Lord Canning; Trevelyan, Cawnpore; Edwardes, Life of Sir H. Lawrence; Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence; Kaye and Malleson, History of the Mutiny; Ilbert, Government of India; Roberts, Forty-One Years in India; Adye, Indian Frontier Policy; Lady B. Balfour, History of Lyttton's Indian Administration; Thompson and Garratt, Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India; Cambridge History of India.]
CHAPTER VII

THE AGE OF SCIENCE

§ 1. The Literary Protest against Self-Complacency.

The word 'Mid-Victorian' carries an aroma of smug and self-complacent conventionality, of contentment with low ideals, and of unaspiring morality; and we have seen that there is much in the character of the period which is in accord with this suggestion. But the literature of the period assuredly does not reflect this character; perhaps because the vital literature of any age is never a mere echo of its ruling temper, but is rather inspired by the new ideals that are just beginning to sprout through the soil, and that are to become the inspiration of a later time.

The dominant literary figures of the period were the great five who survived from the previous period, and made it appear that there was scarcely any change in the main current of thought. Tennyson (Laureate since 1850) and Browning were both at the height of their fame and of their powers throughout this period and far into the next; the later work of Thackeray, who died in 1863, and of Dickens, who died in 1870, both fell into the Mid-Victorian time; and Carlyle, though he had produced all his best work, and was wasting his years on a gigantic monument to Frederick the Great, was still regarded as the greatest of prophets. But the literary character of the time was fixed by a group of younger writers whose work mainly or wholly belonged to it: Swinburne, Matthew Arnold, William Morris, George Meredith, Dante and Christina Rossetti among the poets; George Eliot, George Meredith, Mrs. Gaskell, and Anthony Trollope among the novelists; John Stuart Mill, Matthew Arnold, Sir Henry Maine, Huxley, Bagehot, and T. H. Green among the essayists and reflective writers. And to these may be added the second Ruskin; for the Ruskin who was primarily a student and critic of the arts completed his main work with the publication of The Stones of Venice in 1851, and was succeeded by a different Ruskin, the preacher of a new economic gospel.
Now it cannot be said of any of these (except perhaps of Trollope) that they were the exponents of a conventional morality, or that the self-complacency of the age is echoed in their pages. Rather they expressed a many-sided revolt against conventionality, and were agog to stab complacency into wakefulness and self-reproach. They denounced with Ruskin the arid ugliness and cruelty of an industrialised society; or with Morris took refuge in imagining simpler and happier societies in the past or the future; or with Swinburne hymned the praises of sensuous beauty; or with Matthew Arnold grew melancholy and caustic at the spectacle of the Philistine's insensitiveness to sweetness and light; or with Meredith satirised the unrealities of sentimentalism and demanded a bracing contact with the clean and stern earth; or with Christina Rossetti found content in a quietism that shut out the world. Not one of them exulted in the happiness of his own time; they were all preachers of one form or another of revolt or retreat or discontent; and to them at least, whatever the average mind of the time may have thought, there seemed little ground for satisfaction either with the facts or with the aims of their own time. The most vital creative minds of the mid-Victorian era were not content with life as it was; they were reaching forward towards some other and happier mode of life; and in the midst of the self-complacency of their age were preparing the way for the active, restless, unhappy time that was to follow.

It has been observed that a change seemed to come over the temper of English thought and writing of the imaginative kind somewhere about the middle of the 'sixties; after about 1865 there was less creative work of the highest quality, and what there was took on a more sombre tone. 1865 was the year of the death of Palmerston, which brought to a close the era of satisfied quiescence in politics; 1866 was the year in which the armed, alert, remorseless figure of Prussia strode clanking to the foremost place among the Powers of Europe, and 'bLOOD AND IRON,' backed by science, were declared the master-forces of the world; 1867 was the year in which the veiled figure of Demos took command in Britain, against a background of Fenian outrages and Sheffield rattennings. No doubt these things, and the vague emotions they inspired, counted for a good deal.

But there was something else which counted for more. By 1865 the significance of Darwin's *Origin of Species,*
published in 1859, had been driven by clamorous controversy into the imagination even of unscientific men. Man, it seemed, was not a unique creature, but only the last link in a long chain of evolution. Thereafter the aspect of the world seemed changed, and the poet and the thinker had to revise their outlook. The old certainties were undermined; the new dogmas seemed chill and forbidding. Man's Place in Nature (Huxley published his brilliant book on this subject in 1863) appeared to be no longer that of a triumphant master, but of a helpless creature in the grip of blind forces which he might modify, but which he could not control. Science, a harsh governess, had taken mankind into her school; and Science is not only destructive of self-complacency, it seemed that she insisted upon the revision of all sorts of comfortable presuppositions.

§ 2. The Conquests of Science.

It was in the 'sixties, then, that average men of intelligence (whose normal education as yet included no element of natural science) were forced by the strident controversy about Darwinism to realise that the patient investigations of the men of science were changing the whole aspect of the universe, and transforming accepted values. While on the one hand they were conferring on man new powers over Nature, on the other hand they were dethroning him from his high place as Nature's lord, and teaching him that his highest achievements had neither finality nor permanent validity, but were only a stage in an indefinite process whose laws might be discoverable, but whose goal could not be perceived. The Darwinian controversy aroused an intensity of interest such as no purely scientific discussion had ever before aroused; even Disraeli took a hand in it, declaring to a delighted body of clergy at Oxford that if the question was whether man came from the apes or from the angels, he was 'on the side of the angels.' But the question was too deep to be settled by ministerial witticisms or episcopal denunciations. The self-complacent generation was brought face to face with a total recast of some of its most fundamental conceptions.

For it was not only Darwin, or his theory of natural selection, that was in question. Darwin's work was only one aspect of an immense process of scientific exploration which had been carried out during the previous half-century; in that half-century greater additions had been made to
man's knowledge of the world in which he lives than in all the earlier centuries of the Christian era. This work, which had been carried on by a multitude of investigators in all countries, had as yet left the ordinary thought of the age comparatively untouched; and, although the British Association had been at work for a generation, it was in the mid-century that the significance of the new knowledge began to be realised, thanks to the stimulus of the Darwinian controversy, and the work of a group of great expositors, notably Huxley, Tyndall and Herbert Spencer.

It would be beyond our function or power to give an adequate account of the amazing new revelation of the world which scientific investigation had gradually displayed during the first half of the nineteenth century. But some attempt must be made to indicate the stages by which these inquiries had ceased to be the concern only of philosophers, and had, in Bacon's phrase, 'come home to men's business and bosoms.'

During most of the eighteenth century scientific inquiry had been largely devoted to working out the implications of Newton's doctrines, and to investigating the mechanics of the solar system. But mathematical physics is a subject too abstruse to be intelligible to ordinary thought. In the later eighteenth century Hutton had laid the foundations of scientific geology by insisting that the formation of the strata of the earth-crust must be traced to known and demonstrable forces; while Cavendish, Priestley and Lavoisier had made the first serious researches into the chemical composition of matter. But these inquiries, pregnant as they were with consequences for humanity, had made little impact upon the general thought of the time; nor did they seem to have any practical consequences of importance.

With the nineteenth century began an extraordinary series of investigations, progressively more fruitful, which touched 'men's business' through their practical consequences, and 'men's bosoms' through their revolutionary effect upon thought. There were two main parallel lines of inquiry, always closely related with one another; the one, research into the composition and constitution of matter and the forces at work in the physical universe; the other, research into the history and circumstances of organic life upon the earth-crust.

Dalton's atomic theory (1804) supplied the doctrine of chemical composition which illuminated the whole process of chemical analysis and synthesis, the relation of all forms
of matter to their constituent elements; and the work of Humphry Davy had brought home to the public imagination some sense of the significance of these inquiries. Already during the Mid-Victorian age some impressive demonstrations had been given of the new power which this kind of knowledge gave to man: Liebig’s analysis of the fertilising factors in soils, and Perkin’s discovery of coal-tar dyes, may be taken as obvious illustrations. By the middle of the century chemical science had long ceased to be a subject of mere theoretic interest; it had become the means of turning the gifts of Nature to the service of man in innumerable ways.

Again, in the sphere of physics, the study of the forces at work in nature, an immense revelation had been made. The study of light, and its analysis by the spectrum, were among the great achievements of the period: and the dullest of minds could appreciate one consequence of these studies in the invention of photography. Alongside of this went the study of heat as a form of energy. Joule demonstrated between 1840 and 1850 the principle of the Conservation of Energy, showing that the amount of heat producible by a given amount of energy is invariable; and on this basis Thomson (afterwards Lord Kelvin), Helmholtz and others worked out the principles of Thermodynamics, placed the hitherto empirical art of engineering upon a scientific basis, and made possible its immense later progress.

Meanwhile the phenomena of electro-magnetism had been investigated by Faraday and a host of other scholars. Already some of the practical results of these were apparent: the telegraph had been invented in 1837, uncounted thousands of miles of wire had been erected in all parts of the world, and by 1866 the submarine cable had united the two shores of the Atlantic and was annihilating distance. A new era in industrial invention had opened. The inventions of the eighteenth century had been empirical; even the locomotive engine had been the result merely of ingenuity, not of the deliberate working out of demonstrated principles. Now Science was telling man just where and how to look for the power he wished to control. Man was learning that he lived in a Universe governed by fixed laws which could be discovered and turned to account; forethought and exact knowledge were increasingly being required from him in place of rule-of-thumb, if he were to hold his own. The progressive realisation of these facts came very poignantly ‘home to man’s business.’
But he had to learn also that he was a part of Nature, governed by those same laws which he was learning to study and utilise. This teaching 'came home to his bosom' with unpleasant force, and what especially brought it home were the investigations of the geologists and the biologists. Geology came to maturity as a science with the publication of Lyell's *Principles of Geology*, 1830-1833. Lyell showed that the laws by which the Earth had been shaped were the same laws which were still at work; that the strata of the earth-crust could be arranged in a sequence of time, which ran back immeasurably behind the accepted date for the creation of the Earth; and that the sequence of strata showed also a sequence of life-forms, in which Man took his place as 'part of the fauna of the earth-crust.' Darwin's infinitely patient and cautious inquiries were the natural outcome of this line of thought. What he strove to disclose was the process of development, under natural laws, whereby various forms of organic life had been gradually differentiated; and Man had to take his place as a product of that process, the descendant and the kin of the beasts that perish. The Darwinian theory has been exposed to an infinity of criticism better-founded than the easy epigrams of Disraeli; but the demonstration that Man is a creature of the same evolutionary process which had produced all the other forms of life was the essence of his doctrine, and the source of all the outcry; and this, so far as Man's physical frame is concerned, remains unchallengeably true. There was yet another sphere of biological investigation in which an advance of momentous importance was made during this period. In 1855 Louis Pasteur had begun to disclose the enormous importance of the part played by micro-organisms in determining the conditions of life, and in particular in producing diseases and showing the way to combat them. A whole new sphere, whose very existence was unsuspected, but whose vital significance became more obvious the more it was studied, was thus thrown open to investigation; and no series of discoveries has been more fruitful of results, whether to medicine or to commerce. Already Lister had been enabled, by the use of this knowledge, to inaugurate a new era in surgery.

But Pasteur's epoch-marking work was for a long time little regarded. It was the Darwinian controversy which compelled men to realise what the discoveries of Science implied, and what a new view of the world and of life they were disclosing. It is no wonder that there was
perturbation and excitement when all the accepted orthodoxies, the taken-for-granted schemes of the universe, with which men had rested content, were thus challenged. Science seemed to be setting forth a new and bleak creed: a fatalist view of the world, as governed by rigid, invariable, non-moral laws, which could be studied and used, but never deflected; a horribly materialist view, which left no place for the working of the Spirit; for even the workings of the mind and soul of Man were traced, by some enthusiasts, to the operation of physical factors. In the first enthusiasm of this revelation, its limitations and imperfections were not yet perceived; and in the main it led, on the one hand to angry and ineffective denunciation, on the other to the setting up of a new Scientific Orthodoxy, whose priests were apt to be as pedantic and intolerant as any other priesthood. It produced, also, a new philosophy; and in a long series of lucid, bloodless, doctrinaire volumes, the first of which appeared in 1855, Herbert Spencer set himself to define the philosophy of the scientific era, and to account for all organic development, and all the achievements of the mind of Man, on mechanical principles, as 'a change from a state of homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity.' Almost before his gigantic work was completed, the narrow dogmas on which it rested had been rejected as insufficient by the movement of enlightened thought; for as scientific exploration penetrated more deeply, the mysteries by which it was faced were found to be more impenetrable; and the truly scientific mind revolted against confident dogmatism about ultimate principles. But for a generation the mechanical view of the Universe, which seemed to be the outcome of the first two generations of scientific exploration, wielded a great influence over men's minds.

§ 3. The Scientific Spirit in the Study of Man.

The method of exact and patient inquiry and collection of facts which had produced such remarkable results in physical and biological science were now being applied also to the study of Man and his civilisation. Anthropology, the link between biology and history, which deals with primitive Man, his types and his social organisation, began as an organised science in the middle of the nineteenth century; archaeology, which investigates Man's buried relics, and strives to reconstruct the forgotten civilisations of which these are often the only memorials, made amazing
advances; scientific philology, which studies languages and their relations, received a new birth, especially owing to the labours of a group of great German scholars; the study of comparative law, and the investigation of its sources in ancient and primitive custom, cast a flood of light upon the background of history, and the work of scholars like Sir Henry Maine brought out the shallowness and unreality of doctrinaire theories about society. These studies were of especial value at a time when Europe, and especially Britain, were being brought into intimate contact with the backward races. They were converging lines of inquiry; and they went to show that human society, like everything else in the world, is subject to an unending evolutionary change; that it is impossible to define any scheme of social organisation as inherently right and universally valid; and that no system of government can work unless it is in accord with the stage of social development which the people subject to it have attained. The sciences of human society seemed to declare against all cut-and-dried formulae for the organisation of social well-being.

History, too, underwent a great change under the influence of the prevailing spirit. Here, as in philology, the lead was taken by the Germans, amongst whom a remarkable group of scholars, led by Ranke and Mommsen, inaugurated a new scientific method, based upon the exhaustive analysis and criticism of all the available original documents, a re-examination of all traditional judgments, and a resolute determination to avoid preconceptions. History was no longer to be written merely as an interesting story, or as a means of buttressing a particular school of thought; it was to be severely objective. In Britain, Macaulay had written in the spirit of a Whig pamphleteer, Carlyle in the temper of a preacher. Froude, the greatest master of pure narrative in history whom Britain has yet produced, was of the new school in so much as he devoted infinite pains to the collection of material; but he wrote as a furious partisan, and as the advocate of a political theory. His great book—great in spite of its defects—belongs to these years, and it may be said to mark the transition from the old mode of treatment to the new. Meanwhile the State had undertaken the systematic publication both of the surviving chronicles and written narratives of early British history, and of a selection from the archives and official documents which have been preserved in Britain.
in greater abundance than in any other country. The work of editing these materials trained a new school of historical investigators. The most remarkable product of these methods was Stubbs's *History of the English Constitution*, which showed the English system of government as the outcome of a process of gradual evolution; and Stubbs became the acknowledged master of a school of writers who aimed beyond all things at regarding the course of history scientifically and objectively.


The new scientific revelation was the outcome of an unorganised co-operation among all the civilised peoples; its results were the common heritage of civilisation, the greatest and noblest proof of the growing unity of the world. But British scholars had taken their full share, and in most fields far more than their share, in the combined effort. Among the greatest names, a disproportionately large number were British during the first half of the century.

This was all very well. But in the coming time the fortunes of nations would depend not solely upon the rare supreme men of great original genius, but upon an army of men able to apply and to extend the results of the great discoveries. It fell to each nation to devise for itself the means of training such an army, and thereby utilising the new knowledge. Under the new conditions an efficient national system of education had become more vitally important than it had ever been in the past. The triumph of science and the triumph of democracy had come about almost at the same moment, and both demanded for their service an educated nation; both threatened disaster to the nation which was not educated.

In this respect Britain was undeniably behind other great nations. She was far behind Germany, who had long since provided herself with an organised national system; she was behind America; in many vital respects she was behind France. For England possessed, as yet, no organised system of education. Scotland, indeed, had such a system, with her four universities, her numerous Academies or secondary schools, and her parish schools whose promising boys went on in large numbers through the higher stages; though even Scotland was slow to adapt herself to the new knowledge. In England there-
were multitudes of schools, but no system. There were
elementary schools, and elementary education was soon to
be made universal and compulsory. There were great
public schools, with a fine tradition, the training-ground
of the governing class; but they clung to the educational
methods which had descended from the Renascence, and
would have nothing to do with the new knowledge. There
were many old grammar schools, dependent upon mediæval
benefactions; in 1864 a Royal Commission investigated
their condition, and drew generous plans whereby they
might be made the basis of a national system of secondary
education; but England was not yet ripe for such a step,
and all that was done (1869) was to empower an Endowed
Schools Commission to revise the trusts of these schools—a
useful step, so far as it went; but not a step towards the
creation of an organised system. In any case there was
no sort of relation between the elementary and the secondary
schools. Again, there were many Mechanics’ Institutes
and evening schools of science, where young men picked
up some training after working hours. They were helped
by grants from a Department of Science and Art which
had been set up at South Kensington in 1853. In effect
these classes represented the only means of obtaining
acquaintance with the new learning which was open to the
vast majority of the nation; and they were singularly
ineffective means.

But the greatest of English educational deficiencies was
the lack of university training, especially in the new scientific
learning. And this was serious—more serious even than the
shortcomings of the schools; for it is in the adolescent stage
that serious scientific training is most effective, and if the
army of trained men whom the needs of the future would
demand were not produced by the universities, they would
not be produced at all. Oxford and Cambridge maintained
all their old prestige, and in many respects deserved it;
but they clung to the old ways and were contemptuous of
the new learning. The University of London was merely
an examining body; and the colleges which prepared can-
didates for its examinations were too poorly endowed to do
the true work of a university, though some of them con-
tained great teachers. Durham, founded in 1837 from the
surplus revenues of the richest of English sees, was devoted
almost exclusively to the training of clergymen. This was
the equipment with which England was content; while
Germany had sixteen universities supported by the State,
in which both the old knowledge and the new were generously treated; and in America lavishly endowed universities were arising in every State. There was only one modest sign, during this period, of any awakening to a sense of the importance of this need: in 1851 a Manchester merchant left his fortune to found a modest centre of learning in his native city. But that was only a beginning, and a very inadequate one. Blinded by self-complacency, the British people entered upon the new era unequipped in an essential respect.

[Gregory, Discovery; Gooch, Annals of Politics and Culture; Buckley, Short History of Science; Lubbock, Fifty Years of Science; Traill, Social England; Darwin, Life of Darwin; Huxley, Life of Huxley; Saintsbury, English Literature in the Nineteenth Century; Cambridge History of English Literature; Butterfield, Origins of Modern Science; Russell, History of Western Philosophy and Freedom and Organisation; Dampier-Whetham, History of Science; Archer, Secondary Education in the 19th Century; Peterson, Hundred Years of Education; Judges, Pioneers of English Education; Adamson, English Education 1789-1902.]
CHAPTER VIII

THE ZENITH OF BRITISH INDUSTRIAL SUPREMACY

§ 1. The Factors in British Trade Supremacy.

The foundation of the self-complacency which we have noted as a feature of British life in this period was the fact that Britain's industrial supremacy seemed to be so overwhelming as to be impregnable. It was only in the last decade of the period that this belief began to be qualified by misgivings.

There were many reasons for this overwhelming supremacy. To begin with, Britain had obtained a generation's start over all her rivals in the use of the mechanical methods of production, which her sons had invented. When the continental peoples began to address themselves to the organisation of modern industrial methods, their achievements were at first on a very modest scale; they had to buy their machinery mainly from Britain, and in a large degree to borrow British experts and workmen to set it going. Except in Belgium, which was the first European country to be industrialised, it was not until the 'forties that mechanical production began to establish itself, and not until the 'fifties and 'sixties that it played a large part in the life of France and Germany. Moreover the great new inventions still came mainly from Britain. For example, the Bessemer process of making steel from non-phosphoric iron was introduced in 1856. This process immensely cheapened steel-production, led to the substitution of steel for iron for a multitude of purposes, and greatly strengthened British supremacy in the whole group of trades that depend upon iron and steel.

In the next place, Britain had obtained an almost equally clear lead over her rivals in the development of railways; and the creation of an efficient railway system is an almost more important stage in the economic organisation of a country than the introduction of mechanical methods of
production. The main features of the British system were already clearly marked out by 1850. At that date, though Belgium had made a good start, France and Germany were still laying out their trunk lines; the other European countries had scarcely begun the work; while in America the task was so gigantic in scale that it necessarily took a long time. During the thirty years following 1850 railway construction was going on at a furious pace all over the world. But the fact that Britain was so far ahead of all competitors in this field not only gave an advantage to her industries, it opened to her a new field of highly profitable activity. She became in a large degree the railway constructor for the world. Her factories produced a large proportion of the needful rails, locomotives and rolling-stock; her contractors undertook (especially in the less developed countries) a large part of the work of construction; her investors supplied a large proportion of the needful capital. In railway construction, as in the provision of machinery, she was playing a great part in introducing to the rest of the world the industrial system which had first grown up within her own borders. This was a very profitable undertaking. What was more, it strengthened her hold over the world's commerce; for she received, in the form of imports, an annually growing interest on the capital she laid out; she was becoming the supreme creditor-power of the world.

Again, no country had begun to rival the British production of coal, the very foundation of modern industry; though here also Belgium was (in proportion to her size) in advance of every other European country. France had a very poor supply, and, such as it was, she had not yet learnt to make the most of it. The immense coal deposits of America were only beginning to be developed; the rich deposits of Germany, which are far greater than those of England, were but gradually being opened up. Though Germany made great progress in this field between 1850 and 1870, her production in 1871 was less than 34,000,000 tons, while France and Belgium produced 13,000,000 apiece. The British production in that year was over 110,000,000—almost double the combined production of the three chief coal-producing countries of Europe. Cheap and abundant coal gave an immeasurable advantage to British manufacturers. It gave an equally marked advantage to shipping, now that steam was taking the place of sails.
The ascendancy of British shipping formed yet another contributory factor, and one of the most important. Down to the time of the Civil War, the United States had been a serious rival. The American mercantile marine (on the open seas) was then the second in the world, counting in 1850 1½ million tons against the British 3½ million, while France came next with less than 700,000 tons. Twenty years later the British tonnage had risen to over 5½ million tons; the American tonnage was practically stationary, the French tonnage had risen till it was nearly on a level with the American, and the Germans were not far behind. In the next decade the advance of British shipping was still more remarkable. It rose to 7½ million tons, while America and France declined, and Germany made a modest increase. This means that it was in this period that Britain made her supremacy in shipping absolute and apparently unassailable: she owned nearly half of the shipping on all the seas of the world. There were two main reasons for this triumph. One was the substitution of iron and steel for wooden ships, and of steam for sails. Britain had been handicapped in the construction of wooden ships by the fact that she had to import most of the timber she used; whereas she had every advantage in the construction of steel ships, and an abundant supply of the best steam coal. The other reason was that, since she had adopted Free Trade, the merchandise of all the world poured into her open harbours; she had become the central entrepôt as well as the central workshop of the world. Moreover she did most of the world's carrying trade; her ten thousand ships were to be seen on every sea and in every port. For these services she was paid by a tribute of goods from every land; and the growing excess of her imports over her exports represented in part the price of these services, and in part the interest on the immense capital she had invested abroad, both in her own dominions and in foreign lands.

But none of these achievements would have been possible if Britain had not been of all countries the most active in the creation of capital; if her people had not consistently set aside a large proportion of the wealth they created for use in the creation of fresh wealth. The habit of saving and investment was almost universal in the middle and upper grades of her society; and with the growth of prosperity, and the development of Savings Banks, Friendly Societies, Trade Unions, and Co-operative Societies, it was growing also among her labouring classes. Two
things especially facilitated the process. The first was the growth of the Limited Liability Company, which offered an immense range of opportunity to the investor. The second was the development of the banking system, which was steadily increasing its range; all the well-to-do sections of the community had fully acquired the habit of depositing their earnings with the banks, which could thus use, for advances to industry, the whole of the floating wealth of the country. There were occasional financial crises, notably in 1857 and 1866, which were due to over-speculation; but these crises, though they caused momentary alarm, did not undermine confidence in the system, or impair its stability. Moreover, owing to the world-wide commercial connexions of Britain, owing to the fact that her open ports were the standard markets of the world, and owing to her secure reputation for solidity and good faith, London had become the financial capital of the world; and bills on London had become a universally accepted part of the mechanism of world-commerce. This was not only in itself a source of profit; it gave strength and prestige to the British trader wherever he went.

Even the political events of the period helped to make British industrial and financial supremacy more secure. The principal nations of Europe, and the United States of America, were using up much of their available capital for warlike purposes. This retarded their industrial development, and stimulated an increased demand for many British products, notably steel and warlike munitions. Because of the political troubles of her destined rivals, Britain was thus enabled, for the best part of a generation, to maintain her lonely supremacy, and to conceal from herself the fact that she could not hope permanently to preserve this supremacy over peoples who commanded natural resources quite as great as her own.


Meanwhile the structure of economic society in Britain had been undergoing a gradual and almost imperceptible process of change. What is called the 'capitalist' system was being gradually modified. 'Capitalism' means, if it means anything, a system wherein industry is carried on under the complete control, and in the sole interest, of
the owners of the capital invested in it. In that sense, the term truly describes the system which had existed in Britain during the eighteenth century and the first third of the nineteenth, when all important industrial concerns were in the hands of individual entrepreneurs or small groups of active partners, who provided the necessary capital, risked all they possessed in their undertakings, hired labour at the lowest rate at which they could get it, managed their factories as they thought fit, and took all the profits. In the mid-century this system was changing in many ways.

To begin with, the Limited Liability system had brought into being an immense class of purveyors of capital whose risks were limited, and who took no direct share in the management of the concern, though they exercised a certain control, rather theoretical than practical, over the actual directors. A distinction was emerging between the investor and the director, between Capital and Management; and capital, and the share of control which it exercised, were coming to be distributed over a very wide range. In a strict sense, the capitalist class now included not a few hundreds or thousands, but possibly millions of citizens, drawn from all classes; while the director class was no longer limited to those who owned the bulk, or even any very large proportion, of the capital employed. This was a change of profound social significance.

In the second place, neither the shareholders nor the directors were now permitted an exclusive and unrestricted control over the conditions under which industry was conducted. On the one hand, the State had asserted its right to intervene, and had, in a long series of Factory Acts, defined hours of labour, regulated the conditions of work, and appointed a body of Inspectors who, in effect, shared in the control of industry in these regards. On the other hand the powerful amalgamated Trade Unions which grew up during this period were asserting with some success a claim to be consulted in the determination of wage-rates and other conditions; they were establishing a sort of divided control over industry which was to become more effective during the next era. Thus several distinct factors were claiming a share in the control of industry—the directive class, the shareholder class, organised labour, and the State. Insensibly economic society was gradually moving away from the régime of pure capitalist domina-
tion, though the trend of this development was scarcely yet perceived.

Finally new forms of industrial organisation, definitely non-capitalist in character, were struggling into existence. Consumers' control was being organised in the Distributive Co-operative Societies after the pattern of the Rochdale Pioneers; Public Trusts, not working for a profit, were beginning to appear in such an instance as the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, established in 1857; communal enterprises were being undertaken both by the State (which took over the telegraphs in 1870) and by the more progressive municipalities, which had substituted municipal organisation for private companies in the supply of water and in some cases of gas. These developments had not yet gone very far; but they had already gone far enough to make it no longer true that British industry was conducted under a purely capitalist system. Already it was marked by a considerable variety of method and experiment.

During the years when these changes were beginning to be apparent, a German exile, Karl Marx, was working out, in the British Museum, his theory of economic society: the first volume of *Das Kapital* (the only one ever completed by its author) was published in 1867. Marx's theories led him to certain conclusions which bore very directly upon the facts we have just noted. He asserted, first, that there must be a progressive concentration of capital in a diminishing number of hands, and, secondly, that this process must be accompanied by increasing misery, poverty, and degradation among a propertyless proletariat. Both conclusions were flagrantly in conflict with the actual facts as they were unfolding themselves before Marx's eyes. The creation and ownership of capital were being more and more widely diffused; a good deal of it, in Co-operative Societies, in Trade-Union investments, and in private savings, was held by the 'proletariat' itself; and, far from becoming more degraded and more miserable, the proletariat was steadily becoming more prosperous. The average rate of 'real' wages (i.e. wages measured by their purchasing power) rose about 20 per cent. in Britain between 1850 and 1870, while the hours of work were being reduced, the conditions of labour were being ameliorated, and the health and amenity of the towns in which the 'proletariat' lived were being steadily improved. Marx's practical conclusion was that there must be an inevitable
conflict between Capital, developing as he imagined it, and the Proletariat, also developing as he imagined it; and this became the creed of revolutionary Socialists in all countries. But the development in both cases was actually following the opposite direction to that which Marx insisted it must follow: capital was becoming more diffused instead of more concentrated, and the control of its owners over industry was becoming less instead of more absolute; while the 'proletariat' was claiming a share of control, was itself, in modest ways, accumulating capital, and was thus becoming less 'proletarian.' It is not surprising, therefore, that the British labour movement paid, during this period, no attention to Marx and his doctrines. Powerful and wealthy bodies like the Amalgamated Society of Engineers were, half-blindly, pursuing rather the aim of a sort of partnership in the regulation of industry than that of a violent overthrow of the economic order for the purpose of substituting the dictatorship of one class for that of another.

§ 3. Foreshadowings of a New Era.

During the 'seventies it began to be evident that the era of unchallenged British ascendancy in industry and commerce was drawing to a close. The wars of nationality in Europe were almost over, and the nations were settling down to make up for lost time. Germany, in particular, exultant in the pride of her new greatness, and masterfully guided by Bismarck and the able Prussian bureaucracy, was setting herself to repeat in the economic sphere the triumphs she had already won in the sphere of war and politics. The rocketlike rise of German trade, which was to be the most impressive feature of the next generation, was beginning: we shall have to touch upon it in a later chapter. America also was obviously becoming a serious competitor. She had overcome the troubles of the Civil War; she had digested and organised her vast domain, and equipped it with modern communications; and she was about to enter upon the systematic development of her immeasurable resources, helped by the inventive fertility of her citizens.

Faced by such rivals, Britain would have to encounter henceforth a fierce competition for the trade of the world such as she had not known before. Already its effects were beginning to be perceptible. The later 'seventies were a period of trade-depression, and a whole generation was to
pass were the figures for export trade of the early 'seventies were exceeded. A new era was opening, in the economic as in the political sphere; but its significance was not yet fully realised.

The outstanding feature of the new era was to be the growing economic interdependence of the whole world; during the next generation the world was to be turned into a single economic unit, and prices everywhere were to be regulated no longer by local conditions but by the world-market. Britain, because she was the first of the modern nations to be industrialised, had been the first to recognise and accept this fact of economic interdependence. She could not feed her people from her own resources; she drew the main materials for her industry from abroad; her very existence depended upon foreign trade. And, ultimately, this had been the foundation of the Cobdenite doctrine, and the justification of unqualified freedom of trade; Britain had been compelled by the force of events, first among all the nations, to abandon the old ideal of economic self-sufficiency.

Her dependence upon foreign trade became more marked during the 'seventies; because the development of the virgin corn-lands of the American West, and the improvement of ocean-transport, brought to her markets vast supplies of American food, which reduced the cost of living for her urban population, but inflicted a very severe blow upon her agriculture. Despite the gloomy prognostications of the agricultural interest in 1846, English farming had been prosperous during the thirty years following the repeal of the Corn Laws—more prosperous than in the preceding generation. But the flooding of the market with cheap American grain in the 'seventies brought a great change. All but the best corn-land was increasingly put out of cultivation and devoted to pasture; and the proportion of her indispensable food-supplies which Britain had to draw from abroad grew very rapidly. More patently than ever, the existence of the British nation depended upon foreign trade; and this fact became the key-note of all British policy.

Other nations were slow to follow in her steps. They regarded with dread the possibility that their national existence might come to be at the mercy of other peoples; and with one accord they set themselves to avoid this danger, and pursued with desperation the old ideal of national self-sufficiency. This was the accepted doctrine of France, of
Germany, of almost every European country; and it led them to adopt a policy of strict protection. Even America adopted the same view, and, in spite of her inexhaustible natural resources, adopted a tariff policy of strict protection, with the idea of ensuring the upgrowth within her own borders of every necessary industry. Even the British colonies increasingly followed the same course; and during the next generation Britain was to find herself left almost alone in the policy of free imports, and in the frank abandonment of the ideal of national self-sufficiency which this policy implied.

But it was impossible for any nation, once it had entered upon the path of industrialism, to avoid dependence upon foreign trade. However obstinate the national spirit might be, it was forced to recognise that an industrial community is necessarily dependent upon the outer world, and that to such a community foreign trade is not a mere inessential though desirable adjunct to the national well-being, but a necessary foundation of it. Thus the growth of industrialism, and of the enormous system of commercial interchange which it involved, was forcing upon the whole civilised world a realisation of the interdependence of all its members. And not only were the civilised communities dependent upon one another; they were all, as men were slowly beginning to realise, dependent upon the supplies of raw materials which came from the tropical lands, while these lands in turn were dependent upon the industrial peoples for the material apparatus of civilisation without which progress was impossible for them. Here again, because she was the first industrialised nation, Britain had been the first to realise these facts, however dimly; and she alone, as we have seen, had shown any considerable activity in the development of tropical trade. But in this, as in other respects, the era of unquestioned British supremacy was drawing to a close. Soon there was to begin an eager competition for a share in tropical trade; and as the greater nations still clung to the ideal of national self-sufficiency, it became their object to obtain not merely a share in trade, but political control over the lands with which this trade was conducted. The result was the rush for colonial possessions which marked the next period.

Already in the 'seventies there were foreshadowings of what was to come: foreshadowings of the coming competition between industrial rivals for the trade of the world; foreshadowings also of the coming colonial rivalry. And
one result was a gradual change in the character and direction of British policy, some signs of which we shall see in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IX
GLADSTONE AND DISRAELI
(A.D. 1868-1880)

§ I. The Rival Leaders: Gladstone’s First Ministry.

There are few greater paradoxes in political history than the passage of the Reform Act of 1867, which enthroned democracy in Britain, and opened a new era in her political development. For this momentous ‘leap in the dark’ was not the result of any vehement agitation; it was taken by a Parliament elected to support Palmerston, who hated the very idea of large political changes, and it was taken under a Conservative ministry which only held power because the Liberal majority had been broken by a far more modest proposal of reform in the previous year.

What made this bundle of paradoxes possible was the fact that British politics had come under the domination of two powerful personalities, who, though they were as sharply contrasted as any pair of political opponents who have ever faced one another, and though their political ideals differed as widely as their characters, were nevertheless both men of immense courage, and adventurous even to recklessness. Disraeli was the most daring of political calculators; and, hating the prosaic middle class, he calculated that democracy would accept the leadership of an aristocracy, and respond more readily than the middle class to an imaginative conception of national policy. Gladstone, when he had once adopted a belief, scarcely calculated at all. He was never half-hearted; and he had now become, in the political sphere at any rate, a convinced Liberal. These two men shared the responsibility for the Act of 1867 in the form which it finally assumed, because, for different reasons, neither feared democracy. Henceforward their personalities dominated the political scene, and gave to its controversies a new vitality. It has been said that they reintroduced into British politics two potent appeals, the one the appeal of Righteousness, the other the appeal of Romance. The
antithesis is perhaps too epigrammatic; but at least it is true
that, while these two great men held the stage, politics could
never be mean, and could never be dull.

They assumed the leadership of their respective parties
almost at the same moment. In 1868 Lord Derby resigned
the office of Prime Minister and was succeeded by Disraeli;
whilst Lord Russell, the Liberal leader, had recently an-
nounced his withdrawal from public life, and left the
succession to Gladstone. The gage of battle was flung
down almost immediately after the passage of the Reform
Act, when Gladstone introduced a series of resolutions
declaring for the disestablishment of the Irish Church.
The grievances of Ireland, so long neglected, had taken
possession of his mind; to discover remedies for them had
become his main political aim; and on this aim he was
able to reunite the Liberals, to defeat his great rival, and
to force a dissolution of Parliament. The new democratic
electorate was called upon to choose between the rival
leaders. Their choice went for Gladstone, who returned
to Westminster with a majority of 120.

Gladstone’s ministry of 1868 has been described as the
first Liberal administration, because it was the first which
was not dominated by the Whig love of compromise. And
assuredly there was nothing compromising or half-hearted
about the work which it undertook. It introduced such
sweeping changes, and raised such fierce controversies, that
within five years it had worn out its strength; and its
leader, in spite of all his eloquence, earnestness, and vitality,
seemed to be a spent force. Gladstone had the defects of
his qualities, and the intensity which was his greatest
strength was incompatible with some of the most useful
gifts of a party chief. He was apt to be wholly engrossed
by some cause to which his heart was given; and for
that reason, in keeping a finger upon the pulse of his
followers, and in judging how the fickle gusts of public
opinion veered and changed, he was far inferior to his
rival.

It was Ireland which now engrossed his mind. He had
resolved to remove the causes of Irish unrest. Three main
factors seemed to him to lie at the root of the Irish problem,
and he tried to deal with each of them in turn. The first
was religious inequality: the privileged position of the
Anglican Church, which counted among its adherents less
than one-eighth of the population, seemed the sign and
token of racial ascendance. The second was economic
distress; and the root of this lay in the land system. The third was academic intolerance, which excluded Irish Catholics from the privileges and rewards of the highest education.

In 1869 the Irish Church was disestablished, and deprived of all endowments earlier in date than 1660—thus losing nearly half of its total income of £16,000,000. The withdrawn revenues were set apart for the relief of exceptional distress in Ireland. This measure aroused more passionate controversy than any bill introduced into Parliament since 1846. Most Anglicans regarded it as sheer sacrilege and spoliation, and never forgave its author. But there are few to-day who would not acknowledge that the disestablishment of the Irish Church was a wise act of statesmanship.

In 1870 Gladstone turned to the Irish land problem, and in dealing with it made a bold departure from the principles of laissez faire. Adopting as his foundation the tenant-right custom of Ulster, he enacted that no tenant should be evicted so long as he paid his rent, and that he should be entitled, on leaving his holding, to full compensation for all improvements he had made. Arbitrary evictions, and the confiscation by the landlord of improvements made by the tenant, had been the worst iniquities of the Irish land-system. But the Act of 1870 was an insufficient remedy. So fierce was the competition for land in Ireland that rents were universally excessive, and multitudes of tenants were in arrears. The Act gave no protection against eviction in such cases; and therefore largely failed of its purpose. Gladstone's third Irish Bill, to deal with the problems of university education, was an ill-designed measure, which pleased nobody and had to be withdrawn.

In these three measures Gladstone had made the boldest attempt which had yet been undertaken to remove the causes of Irish unrest. So eager was he to create an atmosphere of peace that he released all the imprisoned Fenians. But neither this nor his three bills brought content to Ireland. The released prisoners returned to America to plan further conspiracies. Ireland was neither pacified nor grateful. Agrarian outrage continued, and even increased: it was worse in 1870 and 1871 than at any time since 1853. A Peace Preservation Act had to be passed alongside of the Land Act in 1870; and in 1871 a band of Irish-Americans, known as Ribbonmen, created
such a reign of terror in Westmeath that a special Act had to be hurried through Parliament empowering the Lord-Lieutenant to commit suspected persons without trial. The Irish problem was no nearer solution; and Disraeli was able to taunt his rival with being driven to resort to repressive laws after having ‘legalised confiscation, consecrated sacrilege, and condoned high treason.’

While Gladstone’s attention was mainly concentrated upon the Irish question, his colleagues were engaged upon a large programme of legislative and administrative reforms in other spheres: the five years from 1868 compare, indeed, in the range and importance of their legislative output, not unfavourably with the years following 1832.

First place belongs to the Education Act of 1870, which laid the foundations of a national system of elementary education in England. In spite of the activities of voluntary schools and the increased subsidies from the State (which now paid one-third of the cost of recognised and inspected schools) less than half of the children of school age were attending school at all, and little more than one-quarter of them were attending efficient and inspected schools. But the problem of filling this large gap could not be raised without stirring up the acrimonies of religious controversy. Many Churchmen held that education was exclusively a function of the Churches, and should be left to them, with aid from, but without control by, the State. Political Nonconformists, on the other hand, urged that public money should not be used for denominational teaching, and demanded a national system, which should be universal, compulsory, and non-sectarian. This view was vigorously advocated by the Birmingham Education League, under the leadership of Joseph Chamberlain, a very able and uncompromising young Radical, who now began to play an important part in national politics. To steer an even course between these opposing views was no easy task. W. E. Forster, the minister to whom the task was assigned, held that his first duty was to set up good schools everywhere, and to get the children into them. His Act established School Boards, elected by the ratepayers, in every part of the country where the existing provision was inadequate, empowered them to levy rates, and imposed upon them the duty of providing facilities for every child. He did not propose to disregard the voluntary schools; on the contrary, he increased their grants. The School Boards were merely to fill gaps; and it was at first proposed
that even they should be left free in the matter of religious instruction. This aroused a storm which was only partially allayed by the introduction of a provision that religious instruction in Board Schools should be undenominational. In this form the Act passed. But it was assailed by vehement criticism from Churchmen on the one side, and from Nonconformists on the other; and though it was a contribution of the highest value to the welfare of the nation, it seriously weakened the Government which was responsible for it.

An equally thorny task was undertaken by Edward Cardwell, Secretary for War, in the reconstruction of the British military system. Cardwell was, in fact, the creator of the modern British army; he was the first administrator to tackle in a scientific way the peculiar military problem of Britain, which is different from that of any other State, since Britain must be ready at all times to send an efficient force to any part of the globe for the defence of her widely scattered dominions, and therefore needs a highly-trained professional army capable of easy expansion in case of need. Cardwell substituted a system of short service with the colours, followed by a period in the reserve, for the older long-service system. He organised the army on a territorial basis, allotting a recruiting area to each regular regiment, and linking both the militia and the volunteers of each area with the regulars. He introduced the system of linked battalions, one serving abroad while the other remained at home. And finally, in 1871, he abolished the hoary abuse (dating from the Restoration) whereby commissions in the army were purchasable, and were thus in effect limited to the wealthy classes. All these reforms (whose value has been proved by time) were vehemently opposed. But it was the abolition of purchase which aroused the greatest storm, because it was an attack upon one of the last preserves of aristocratic privilege. To avoid defeat in the House of Lords, purchase (having been originally established by Royal Warrant) was abolished by the same means. This was denounced as unconstitutional; and the Cardwell reforms added to the rising tide of protest against the restless activity of the Liberal ministry.

Other important changes were the abolition of religious tests at the Universities, except for theological chairs (1871); the adoption of competitive examination for appointments to all Government offices save the Foreign Office (1870), which completed the reform begun by the establishment of
the Civil Service Commission in 1855; the creation of a new department of government, the Local Government Board (1871), which was made responsible for poor law and public health work, and in general for most of those functions in which the national Government found itself brought into contact with local authorities; and the introduction of vote by ballot (1872), long since demanded by the Chartists. Even the dusty purloins of the law were invaded by the ruthless Liberal broom; and the Lord Chancellor, Lord Selborne, carried out a far-reaching reconstruction of the complex traditional system of justice, unifying all the overlapping courts into a single High Court with separate branches for different kinds of work. This great achievement was not completed until after the ministry had fallen; but it formed an essential part, and not the least valuable part, of its notable record of work.

Finally there were two important measures which bore upon the problems of social reform. By the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1871 the grievances of the Trade Unions were largely remedied. They were recognised as legal bodies, and enabled to protect themselves against misconduct by their own officers. But the Act also tried to define 'picketing,' and to distinguish between lawful and unlawful modes of persuading men to abstain from working. These clauses were interpreted by some of the judges in such a way as to make the organisation of a strike almost impossible; and the Trade Unions were angered and alienated. A Licensing Bill, introduced in 1871, won for the Government still greater unpopularity. Its aim was to reduce the excessive number of public-houses, and this ensured for it the furious opposition of brewers and publicans: every public-house in the country became a centre of anti-government propaganda. But the temperance enthusiasts denounced the bill with equal fervour, because it allowed ten years' grace to the publicans in lieu of compensation, and fixed a number of houses in proportion to population below which reduction should not go. Attacked (like the Education Act) from both sides, the bill had to be withdrawn.

§ 2. Foreign and Imperial Policy.

The strenuous legislative activity of the five years from 1868 necessarily brought a reaction. Disraeli was no doubt using the picturesque language of political invective when he described his opponents (1874) as having 'harassed every
trade, worried every profession, and assailed or menaced every class, institution, and species of property in the country'; but undoubtedly many classes and interests were made restive and uneasy by this multifarious activity. By 1873, and still more by 1874, the Liberals were exhausted and divided, and Gladstone's personal prestige had fallen to a low ebb.

But what contributed still more to the discredit of the Liberal Government was the widespread feeling, which Disraeli did his best to encourage, that Britain's prestige in the counsels of Europe was being impaired by their foreign policy. And it is true that the high-spirited and somewhat dictatorial tone to which Palmerston had accustomed the British people was no longer heard. There were, indeed, only four points at which the foreign policy of the Government seemed to have importance. When the Franco-Prussian War broke out (1870), Britain preserved careful neutrality, though each side charged her with showing favour to the other. But there was one possibility which aroused alarm: the neutrality of Belgium might be threatened by one side or the other. Regarding the obligations of the treaty of 1839 as of vital importance, Gladstone and his foreign minister, Lord Granville, negotiated identical treaties with France and Germany, whereby Britain pledged herself in the event of a violation of Belgium by one party, to join the other in remediying the wrong. Unquestionably this contributed to preserve Belgian neutrality inviolate. Again, it was this Government which, after long negotiations, concluded the treaty of arbitration with America on the Alabama question, and paid the compensation awarded by the arbitrators. In the eyes of many, including Disraeli, this involved a lowering of the national honour. To this Government also fell the task of dealing with Russia's repudiation (1870) of the provision of the Treaty of Paris, by which she had been forbidden to maintain a fleet in the Black Sea.1 As France was out of action, and Austria and Prussia were prepared to accept Russia's demand, all that could be done was to protest, and to insist that the cancellation of a treaty must be carried out by an agreement of all the Powers, not by the action of a single party. The satisfaction thus obtained (at the Conference of London, 1871) was formal rather than real; but, short of a war with Russia, nothing else could be done, and Disraeli himself, who spoke of Britain's honour as being impaired,

1 See above, Chap. i. p. 477.
would scarcely have gone to war on such an issue. Finally, the Government had to deal with the advance of Russia in Central Asia, which in 1869 reached the frontiers of Afghanistan. Afghanistan asked for British protection, which was refused, because it would have entailed indefinite obligations; but negotiations were opened with Russia, wherein both Powers undertook to respect the independence of Afghanistan. On all these points it cannot be said that the foreign policy of the period presented much ground for attack: it was pacific and unexciting. The real ground of complaint lay in the fact that Britain was not playing the leading part in European affairs which Palmerston had accustomed her to play, and which Disraeli, with his love of the dramatic, longed to resume.

But there was another field in which Disraeli’s criticism was more valid. Gladstonian Liberalism took little interest in colonial problems, and had no definite imperial policy; it was content to leave the colonies to go their own way. As we have seen, there were no exciting events or great questions of principle in any of the colonies during these years; the establishment of responsible government in Cape Colony (1872) and the transference of the Great West to Canada (1868) were perhaps the only colonial decisions of moment which the Government was called upon to make. But in many small ways its negative attitude was made plain; notably in its persistent refusal to accept new responsibilities in the Pacific or in Africa. Hence Disraeli was able to appeal to, and to stimulate, the pride of empire which was beginning to come to birth in Britain. Long before, in 1866, he had spoken of Britain as having ‘outgrown the European continent,’ as ‘the metropolis of a great maritime empire extending to the bounds of the farthest ocean,’ and as being ‘more of an Asiatic than a European power.’ Now, in 1874, when Gladstone’s ministry was about to fall, Disraeli emerged as the champion of the imperial idea. ‘Self-government in distant colonies,’ he proclaimed, ‘when it was conceded, ought to have been conceded as part of a great policy of imperial consolidation. It ought to have been accompanied by an imperial tariff . . . and by a military code. . . . It ought further to have been accompanied by the institution of some representative council in the metropolis which would have brought the colonies into constant and intimate relations with the home government.’

Towards these large aims Disraeli was not, in fact, to
take any definite steps during his own ministry, which was now about to commence. But at least he had raised the standard of an ideal different from that of his great rival. In place of a policy of political reconstruction, he offered a programme of foreign prestige and imperial consolidation. He offered also, in vague terms, a policy of social reform—'the amelioration of the condition of our people.' It was thus a sharp and clear-cut antithesis which was set before the British electorate when the Gladstone ministry fell in the beginning of 1874, and Demos was called upon for the second time to give his judgment between the rival claimants for his confidence.

§ 3. Disraeli in Power: Social Reform and the Imperial Spirit.

In the light of later events, the most instructive feature of the Parliament of 1874 was that it showed portents of coming change. For the first time two working men—both miners—were returned to Westminster, the advance guard of a future Labour party. They acted with the Liberals; but their appearance was a sign that it was not only on paper that democracy had been established. For the first time, also, a solid body of Irish members, fifty-eight in number, refused to be labelled as members of either of the recognised parties, but took their stand as Home Rulers: their declared aim was to break up the Parliament of which they were members by establishing Irish autonomy, and to that end all other considerations were to be subordinated. At first, however, the full significance of this event was obscured by the fact that Isaac Butt, the leader of the Home Rulers, was a moderate man, not prepared to go to extremes. But behind Butt sat a new member, a Protestant landlord, Charles Stewart Parnell, a man of one idea, reserved, silent, inflexible and unafraid, who was soon to apply new methods of ventilating the Irish problem which all but brought down the parliamentary system in ruins.

As yet, however, Parnell was watching and waiting, mastering the rules of parliamentary procedure; and the Home Rulers gave as little trouble as the Labour members. In the eyes of contemporaries the outstanding feature of the new Parliament was that it had a clear Conservative majority of fifty, the first clear Conservative majority since 1846—perhaps we should even say (since Sir Robert Peel had been in all essentials a Liberal) the first clear Con-
servative majority since 1832. The long Liberal ascendency had come to an end; the Liberal party was divided and disheartened, and its great chief had announced his retirement from parliamentary life. Disraeli, enjoying real power for the first time in his long career, had his chance of showing what were his conceptions of government, and what was the meaning of the Tory Democracy which he had long preached.

Three main aims guided Disraeli's policy. The first was the aim of raising British prestige in the eyes of the world by means of a 'spirited foreign policy.' The second was the stimulation of the pride of empire among the British people. The third was the substitution of social reform for political reconstruction. It was not until the later years of his government, from 1876 to 1880, that the revival of the Eastern question gave an opportunity for a 'spirited foreign policy' like that which Palmerston had pursued. But it was in his first two years that the imperialist spirit of which he was the mouthpiece, and the ideas as to social reform which he had long expounded in general terms, got their clearest expression.

The development of the social policy of Tory Democracy was entrusted, in the main, to the Home Secretary, Richard Cross, a Lancashire man of real ability and wide sympathies. He did not share the current suspicion of Trade Unions; and in the Employers and Workmen Act of 1875 he gave them the charter of freedom which made possible the rapid expansion of their power during the next period. This Act swept away once and for all the possibility of hampering Trade Union action by prosecutions for conspiracy, by providing that in any trade dispute no action taken by two or more persons could be treated as a conspiracy unless it would have been a crime if taken by an individual. It was with the Act of 1875 that the experimental period of Trade Unionism came to an end, and that these powerful organisations were assured of their place as one of the most potent factors in national life.

Cross was also responsible for the first serious attempt to deal with the housing problem. His Workmen's Dwellings Act (1875) enabled the Council of any town of more than 25,000 inhabitants to acquire insanitary areas by compulsory purchase, and if need be to throw upon the rates the cost of demolishing and reconstructing slum dwellings. This was not the beginning of communal activity in housing reform, for some of the more progressive
municipalities, such as Liverpool, had already undertaken such work under powers obtained by private Acts. But it was the first national recognition of the importance of the problem. Again, Cross carried out two valuable and important measures of codification. In the Public Health Act he gathered together, clarified and expanded all the piecemeal legislation which had been passed since Edwin Chadwick began Public Health work in the 'forties. And, with the aid of a Commission appointed in 1876, he simplified and codified the multifarious and divergent factory legislation of the previous forty-five years, in the Factories and Workshops Acts of 1878. One further enactment of this group must not be omitted, though the credit for it belongs mainly to a private member. While the workpeople in factories were being safeguarded, no thought had been given to the conditions under which sailors pursued their perilous calling in British ships: they were permitted to be sent to sea in unseaworthy or overloaded vessels by employers whose own interests were safeguarded by insurance. Samuel Plimsoll made the remediing of this injustice his life-work; and in 1875, by means of a disorderly outbreak in Parliament which did him nothing but honour, he forced Government to pass a Merchant Shipping Act, which was made permanent in 1876.

Of the imperial spirit which Disraeli expounded and stimulated we have already seen illustrations in earlier chapters. His colonial secretary, Lord Carnarvon, strove to bring about the federation of South Africa,¹ and was also responsible for the first establishment of British power in the Pacific by the annexation of Fiji and the appointment of a High Commissioner for the Western Pacific. But it was India which made the strongest appeal to Disraeli's romantic imagination. He sent the Prince of Wales on tour through India (1875), thus making the British monarchy a living reality to the princes and the peoples of that vast land; he invented the sonorous title of Empress of India, and ordained that all the princes should be assembled in a great Durbar to render homage; he sent out Lord Lytton, a romantic poet, to break away from the prosaic calm of the régime of Lawrence and Northbrook, and to initiate the aggressive frontier policy which led to the second Afghan War.² Interest in India was also the inspiring motive of the most dramatic and successful of Disraeli's coups, when in November 1875 he seized upon a transient chance and

purchased from the bankrupt Khedive of Egypt his holding of nearly half of the shares in the Suez Canal Company for £5,000,000. It turned out to be a very profitable commercial speculation. And, what was more important, it brought Britain for the first time into direct contact with the affairs of Egypt, where she was to play so important a part.

§ 4. Spirited Foreign Policy: a Conflict of Ideals.

The last four years of the government of Disraeli (who became Earl of Beaconsfield in 1876) were filled with wars and rumours of war: the new crisis in the Balkans,¹ and all the excitement that followed from it, until it was settled (for the time being) at the Congress of Berlin (1878); the outbreak of the second Afghan War ² (1878), which was still raging when the Beaconsfield ministry came to an end in 1880; the annexation of the Transvaal in 1877,³ and the outbreak of the Zulu War in 1879. Once more Britain found herself in the grip of great and exciting events; popular passion and national pride were aroused to fever-heat; and Beaconsfield, becoming for a season one of the outstanding figures not merely of British but of European politics, showed that he was the true heir of the tradition of Palmerston—of the Palmerston who feared and hated Russia, and who, inspired by that motive, drew Britain into the mountains of Afghanistan to resist the Russian peril there, and into the Crimea to defend the integrity of the Turkish Empire. For Beaconsfield, as for Palmerston, the checking of Russia and the maintenance of the Turkish Empire formed a vital British interest, 'a righteous cause,' which would justify, if need were, even the sacrifice and waste of war. In adopting this attitude, Beaconsfield was undoubtedly following a long established tradition of British foreign policy. He succeeded in avoiding war in Europe, though only by a hair's-breadth; and at Berlin he scored a real diplomatic triumph. But for his intervention, the Turkish dominions in Europe would have been reduced within the narrowest limits: almost the whole of the Christian populations of the Balkans would have been emancipated from the Turkish yoke a generation before they actually achieved their liberty; and perhaps the incessant unrest and intrigue which made the Balkan Peninsula the danger-point of Europe throughout that generation might have been avoided. Whether this triumph brought

¹ Above, p. 485. ² Above, p. 561. ³ Above, p. 550.
any advantage to civilisation or to Britain is a question upon which opinions may differ. Lord Salisbury, who was Beaconsfield’s colleague at Berlin, long afterwards confessed that ‘we put our money on the wrong horse.’

But for British politics the interest of this crisis was that the traditional policy of defending Turkey was no longer accepted without challenge. Gladstone, who had seemed to be an extinct volcano, was drawn from his retirement. In a fiery pamphlet and a series of impassioned speeches he denounced the unspeakable Turk, pleaded that Britain should once more stand forth as the defender of oppressed peoples, and demanded the expulsion of the Turk, ‘bag and baggage,’ from the provinces which he had misgoverned and oppressed. This breach with a long tradition of policy at first embarrassed Gladstone’s political colleagues, for very few among the leading members of his late ministry shared his views on this issue. He had to fight, moreover, against a strong current of popular opinion and an all but unanimous press. But, disregarding all these considerations, he carried on his impassioned campaign with superb and vehement eloquence, until (helped by the normal ‘swing of the pendulum’) he had converted a majority of the electorate, for a time at any rate, to his point of view. The Liberal victory of 1880 was essentially the result of this campaign, in the course of which two sharply contrasted views of national policy were set before the British people.

The conflict began in 1876, when the revolt of Bosnia was followed by a Serbian and Montenegrin war against Turkey, by an outbreak of anarchy among the Turks themselves, and by the atrocious savagery with which a Bulgarian rising was suppressed. The Powers—responsible for Turkey under the treaty of 1856—spoke of joint action. Beaconsfield stipulated that there must be no interference by force, since this would impair Turkish sovereignty; and, perhaps encouraged by the British attitude, the Sultan would do nothing except under duress. Gladstone insisted that the Powers ought to take joint action, by force if need be, since the first duty of civilisation was to put an end to iniquitous oppression, and to help subject peoples struggling for freedom. Then came the intervention of Russia (1877). Beaconsfield dreaded the expansion of Russian power; Gladstone regarded Russia, in this instance, as the minister of justice. Russia defeated Turkey and imposed upon her the Treaty of San Stefano. Beaconsfield insisted that, under the Treaty of 1856, any treaty affecting the integrity
of Turkey must be considered by the Powers in Congress, and that, in any case, the Russian terms reduced Turkey to a dangerous condition of impotence. War nearly resulted: Beaconsfield hurried troops to the Mediterranean, and made a secret treaty with Turkey whereby Cyprus was handed over to Britain (under tribute) in return for a promise to defend Asia Minor. In the end Lord Salisbury and the Russian ambassador came to a secret agreement as to the readjustment of the San Stefano treaty, and the Congress of Berlin was summoned to endorse the arrangement (1878). Gladstone maintained that the San Stefano terms were just, that war on such an issue would be a crime, and that if the Powers were guardians of the integrity of Turkey, the cession of Cyprus and the secret agreement with Russia were breaches of this obligation every whit as serious as the San Stefano treaty; and he denounced the Berlin compromise as a shameful handing back of misgoverned provinces to a tyrant Power.

Never was there a more violent conflict of judgment, or a debate on national policy which disclosed deeper differences of principle. And this debate was conducted, not behind closed doors, but on public platforms, in speeches that were reported in every newspaper. The British people were called upon to give their verdict upon the most fundamental principles of national policy. Their verdict wavered. It went for Beaconsfield in 1878; it went for Gladstone in 1880, but not for very long.

Beaconsfield's was the judgment of Realpolitik. He cared little for the fate of the semi-barbarous peoples of the Balkans, so long as the security and the honour of Britain were maintained unimpaired; and he held that, in the conflict and rivalry of the Powers, Britain's security would be imperilled if Russia were aggrandised or the Turkish barrier weakened; Britain's honour tarnished if she failed to uphold her undertakings to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire. Gladstone's was the judgment of abstract morality, for which many hold that there is no place in international relations. In one of his Midlothian orations he laid down what he held to be the sound principles of foreign policy. They were, that the supreme national interest was not glory or prestige but peace; that for this end the best ultimate means must be the cordial co-operation of all the Powers of Europe; that entangling engagements and obligations, such as Britain had undertaken in regard to Turkey, should be
avoided; that all nations should be regarded as having equal rights, none, not even Britain, being entitled to claim a pre-eminent right to be consulted; and that the policy of Britain should always be inspired by a love of freedom and a sympathy with the oppressed. These principles are far removed from the calculations of Realpolitik; in some respects they are, no doubt, counsels of perfection. The judgment of events would seem to have decided that on the Turkish problem, at any rate, Gladstone was right, and Beaconsfield wrong. But on the deeper conflict of ideals which underlay this great debate, it cannot be said that history has yet given its decisive verdict. In the vexed and troublous generation of international rivalry which opened on the morrow of this long discussion, not Britain alone, but all the world, were to be called upon to shape their course by one or the other of these sets of ideals.

[Morley, Life of Gladstone; Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli; Cecil, Life of Salisbury; Trevelyon, Life of Bright; Lang, Life of Iddesleigh; Low and Sanders, History of England, 1837-1900; Walpole, History of Twenty-Five Years; Paul, History of Modern England; Webb, History of Trade Unionism; Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question; Ensor, England 1870-1914; Guedalla, The Queen and Mr. Gladstone; Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill; Temperley and Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy.]
BOOK XI

THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM AND THE RIVALRY OF WORLD-POWERS

(A.D. 1880-1904)
INTRODUCTION

A very sudden and marked change came about in the politics of the world, and consequently of the British Commonwealth, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The primary cause of this change was that the greater European States had largely solved the problems which had distracted them since 1815; they had achieved national unity and set up stable systems of representative government; and they were now able to devote their attention to industrial development, and to the exploitation of the non-European world. At the same time the United States, having in the Civil War brought to an end the conflict between two types of civilisation which had long retarded their development, entered upon a period of very rapid industrial expansion, and showed a growing readiness to play a part in world affairs. The era of liberalism and nationalism was succeeded by the era of commercialism and imperialism; and Britain found herself faced by acute rivalry in the two spheres—trade and colonisation—in which she had enjoyed, for two generations, an almost unchallenged supremacy.

The most unhappy and unhealthy aspect of this great change was the division of Europe by a rivalry more intense and more dangerous than had been known in any earlier period of European history. The Continent was divided between two hostile and watchful groups of Great Powers, armed to the teeth. They looked forward to future armed conflict as almost inevitable; and in the meanwhile they fought one another, in peace, with commercial weapons, each nation striving after the unattainable ideal of national self-sufficiency. At the same time they launched into an eager competition for extra-European dominions, striving to construct world-empires on the foundations of nation-States. The result was that, with extraordinary rapidity, all the unoccupied regions of the world were brought under the dominion of the European Powers; and the whole round globe was brought within a single unhappy and precarious political system, whose instability made the possibility of a universal war an ever-present peril.
In this transformed and dangerous world, the British Commonwealth could no longer enjoy the self-complacent placidity which had characterised its life during the middle of the nineteenth century. Not the motherland only, but all the members of the Commonwealth, felt themselves imperilled, and were inevitably drawn into a more intimate involvement in world-politics than they had known since the Napoleonic era, if even then. They were also drawn more closely together than before; and the indifference to imperial questions that had marked the mid-century gave place to a strong sentiment of unity, which was expressed in a multitude of ways, but most notably in the common effort of the South African War. For the British people, as for Europe, this was an era of imperialism. After a period of hesitation, they joined in the race for new dominions; and their advantages in this competition were so great that they acquired territories amounting to three and a half million square miles in area—a new empire, very swiftly acquired, to which we may give the name of the Third British Empire.

The somewhat flamboyant imperialism of this period was accompanied, in the British lands as in the European countries, by a growing social unrest, which contributed, as much as the international dangers of the time, to kill the rather stagnant self-complacency of the previous period. New social aspirations were only beginning to stir in Britain, but in New Zealand and Australia they found expression in a series of remarkable experiments.

It is a period of momentous importance for the history of the world, and of varied and enchaining interest, with which we have to deal in this Book. It is still too near us to allow of final or measured judgments; the issues which it raised are still in controversy. But we cannot avoid the responsibility of trying to understand it, for in many ways it provides the keys of later developments. For the British Commonwealth its culminating points were the South African War and the long debate on Ireland; and on these events feeling is still intense, and opinions differ widely. We must strive to narrate such events as these with a cool and steady loyalty to facts, remembering always that no man is entitled to express an opinion upon any controversial question until he can understand how men as able and honest as himself can hold opinions widely different from his own.
CHAPTER I

GERMAN HEGEMONY AND THE ARMED PEACE

(A.D. 1878-1895)

§ 1. The Armed Peace.

After the Congress of Berlin in 1878 Europe might reasonably have looked forward to a prolonged period of peace, for most of the causes of disturbance by which her peoples had been troubled since 1815 had now been removed. Europe did obtain an interval of peace, longer than she had ever known before. If the vexed region of the Balkan Peninsula be disregarded, no hostile army crossed any European frontier for thirty-six years after the Congress of Berlin, and so much cannot be said of any period of equal duration in the history of modern times. But the peace of these years was the most anxious and unrestful peace that civilisation had ever known. Throughout this generation all the nations were watching one another with suspicion and distrust; all were training their whole manhood for war, and squandering their wealth upon military armaments on a scale never approached in any earlier age. The fear of war became an obsession which, in the end, helped to precipitate the dreaded catastrophe, like the vertigo that overcomes a man who looks down into an abyss.

The result of this unhappy state of things was that the long peace did not do for Europe what it ought to have done: it did not enable her to adjust her social order easily to the new economic conditions which now dominated the world; and it did not help the newly established institutions of self-government to take root and to win the confidence of the peoples they existed to serve. The social problem was accentuated by a colossal waste of wealth upon unproductive expenditure, and by the suspicions which this created; while the system of self-government, which demands openness and trust, was vitiated by the constant anticipation of war, which necessitates secrecy and
inspires distrust. To this was partly due the fact that in every country there was a growing movement of revolt, a growing decay of belief in the validity of the existing social and political order, and a growing menace of blind revolution. Every country suffered from these conditions, even the British Commonwealth, whose peoples had hitherto been able to hold themselves aloof from the troubles of Europe; and their fortunes became more and more involved with the fortunes of civilisation as a whole.

§ 2. Commercialism and Imperialism.

The most outstanding fact about European civilisation in this era was that the methods of large-scale mechanical production which had been first developed in Britain, and the high organisation of credit and finance which Britain had carried further than any other country, were now being imitated everywhere. As soon as the national wars in Europe and the Civil War in America came to an end, industrial development advanced by leaps and bounds. New methods and forces were brought into play. The age of electricity began; the telephone first came into serious use at the end of the 'seventies, the dynamo, invented in 1867, was becoming practicable at about the same time, and the use of electricity for traction began early in the 'eighties. The age of oil was also beginning: the world's production of mineral oils was quadrupled between 1880 and 1895. In the rapid expansion of industrial activity which began in the seventies, Britain was only one among several almost equal competitors. The most remarkable feature of the period was the rise of two great new industrial powers, America and Germany.

So illimitable were the resources of America in coal and iron, in all the metals, in oil, in timber, that it was inevitable she should take the lead as soon as these resources began to be seriously developed. By 1880 she had effectively opened up her vast area by railway construction. Her population also had immensely increased: in 1880 she was already far ahead of the mother-country in numbers, and by 1900 her population was practically twice that of the United Kingdom. Her industrial growth was proportionate. In 1880 it was estimated that in the total volume of industrial production she ranked fourth among the nations. Long before 1900 she ranked definitely first. But she was in the main, as yet, a self-contained nation, consuming almost the whole
of her own industrial products, and exporting principally food and raw materials. Except in regard to ingenious contrivances for saving labour, she was not yet a serious competitor in the world markets; and she practically did not possess a mercantile marine.

The rise of Germany was even more remarkable than that of America. It was mainly due to her great natural resources in coal, which surpassed those of Britain, to the systematic industry of her people, and, perhaps above all, to the strength she drew from the scientific training provided in her schools and universities. This enabled her to take a commanding lead in the newer and more scientific industries. The electrical industries she made her own from the first; in the fine chemical trades she was almost equally strong, and her men of science enabled her to obtain control over the coal-tar dyeing industry, which arose from the discoveries of a British chemist. But her greatest strength lay in iron and steel, the key-industries of the modern world. Two figures are enough to illustrate her amazing progress in this field. In 1880 she produced 1½ million tons of steel, against 3½ million tons produced by Britain. In 1895 she produced over 7½ million tons, Britain less than 6 million tons. She had definitely taken the first place in Europe, and ranked next to the United States, whose progress had been still more rapid. Equally remarkable was the development of German shipping. In 1880 Germany had only 216,000 tons of steam shipping, and was surpassed by both France and Spain: Britain's figure in that year (for steam tonnage only) was 2,700,000. By 1900 the German total had risen to 1,348,000—a sixfold multiplication in twenty years. The British figure had meanwhile risen to over 7,000,000 tons, so that British leadership in this sphere was still secure. But the German mercantile marine had definitely become the second in the world, and the great shipping lines of Hamburg and Bremen were extending their enterprises to every part of the globe.

The astonishing advance of German industry and trade during the last quarter of the nineteenth century was a very remarkable achievement, which naturally swelled the pride and self-confidence that had already been bred in the German people by their military triumphs. Other nations shared in the advance: France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Austria, even Russia, were all making haste to turn themselves into industrial countries. None of them could rival the swift advance of Germany and America. But the
result of their combined activities was that all Europe was following the trail blazed by Britain; and the amount of material wealth both produced and consumed by the world was increasing almost in geometrical progression.

This was in itself a good thing. It meant that there was more wealth to divide; and one of its inevitable consequences was that the whole world was becoming economically interdependent, so that the prosperity of each depended upon the prosperity of all. But the European nations were tempted to regard one another as rivals and enemies in this fierce industrial competition. Each wanted to buy as little as possible from its rivals, and to sell as much as possible to them; the old desire for national self-sufficiency still survived, in spite of the fact that in the conditions of modern industry it is wholly unrealisable. In the hope of securing these ends, the nations began to raise tariff-barriers against one another, making their own peoples pay higher prices in order to give a monopoly to the home producer. Germany adopted a protectionist system in 1880, and gradually developed it during the next twenty years: by 1900 the average duty on British manufactured goods imported into Germany was 25 per cent. of their cost. America, also, the one country that could be almost self-sufficient, gradually raised her tariff until, under the McKinley tariff of 1890, the average duty on British imports was 73 per cent. France’s Méline tariff of 1892 was more modest—the average rate was about 34 per cent.; Russia’s duties reached the preposterous average rate of 131 per cent. Complex negotiations and bargainings accompanied this competition in exclusiveness; there were also direct tariff-wars between particular States, as between France and Italy in the years following 1888. Every nation was bent upon getting the better of every other nation; and not one of the great trading countries, save Britain, was willing to throw its markets open to all comers. The fact that Britain was fast losing her one-time pre-eminence was held to prove the folly of her policy. Yet Britain was getting her share of the increased volume of world-trade; and she could not ultimately hope to obtain a larger volume of trade than would be proportionate to her natural resources and to the number, industry, thrift, skill and knowledge of her people. That, after all, was the ultimate criterion; tariffs or no tariffs, the industrial development of every country depended upon its natural resources and the number and character of its people.

But what all this meant was that, instead of making for
peace, industrialism and commercialism were making for international jealousy and friction; and Cobden's confident expectation that the growth of international commerce would lead to mutual understanding among the nations was being woefully disappointed. Indeed, it appeared that war and violence might be made the foundation of industrial progress. Germany, at least, was convinced that this was so. It was only since her victories in the field that she had begun to win the more lucrative triumphs of the forge, the factory, and the dockyard. Her ascendency in iron and steel rested largely upon the rich iron deposits of Lorraine, which she had torn from France, and some of her most thriving textile factories were in the conquered province of Alsace. War and industry were not, it seemed, incompatible, as Cobden had believed: war could lay the foundations of industrial success; and industry, in its turn, could supply the materials of war. With her great steel and chemical industries, Germany would be stronger for war than ever before. The other nations accepted these conclusions. They too must nurture to prosperity the industries on which war depended; and that was one of the motives for striving after industrial self-sufficiency.

Closely connected with the commercial causes of international friction was the keen competition for colonial possessions which formed one of the most marked features of this era. It was so important in its results, and affected so intimately the fortunes of the British Commonwealth, that we must devote to it a special chapter. Here two points about it may be noticed. It was largely due to the fierce commercial rivalry of the age. The nations wanted territories which would supply them with raw materials under their own control; this was a corollary of the desire for national self-sufficiency. They wanted also to enlarge the range of the markets that were restricted to their own trade; therefore, as we shall see, they did not, in most cases, open their dependent territories as Britain did to the traders of all nations, but surrounded them with tariff-walls; and so extended the friction of tariff-war over the face of the globe. And another consequence followed from the swift colonial expansion of the 'eighties and 'nineties. In every part of the world the jealous European rivals found themselves brought face to face, competing for territorial possessions; so that any dispute arising in any corner of the earth might cause a general conflagration.

1 Chapter ii. below, p. 620.
When the nineteenth century, so full of generous hopes, reached its close, the world was dominated by a group of giant empires armed to the teeth and watching for opportunities to take advantage of one another. Naturally their main preoccupation was to see that their fighting resources were efficient. Hence imperialism of the new pattern was a cause of international friction, and a menace to peace, even more serious than commercialism.

§ 3. The Hegemony of Germany: Militarism.

But behind the factors of commercial and colonial rivalry, colouring them, intensifying them, poisoning them, lay the political situation in Europe. This, after all, was the main cause of the grim armed peace: this, and the spirit which now seemed to animate the relations of the European peoples, the spirit of militarism, the belief that brute force is the ultimate determining factor in human affairs.

The outstanding fact in the politics of Europe during the generation following the Franco-German War was the strength of the position of Germany. Under her formidable Chancellor, who dominated all his contemporaries, she unquestionably enjoyed the hegemony of Europe. After her dazzling victories, her prestige was unbounded: no single Power would have dared to measure arms with her. And her prestige grew as the years passed, and as she added the victories of commerce to those of war. She held a position not unlike that of France in the time of Louis XIV., and was all too humbly accepted as the leader of Europe in thought and learning, as well as in the arts of war. Bismarck, indeed, always maintained that, having achieved her ends, Germany was the most pacific of Powers; and until 1890 or even later, it seemed to be so. She was, so Bismarck said, 'a satiated power.' She needed peace to consolidate and digest her gains, and to build up her industries. Bismarck himself was loth to allow her even to enter the lists in the colonial rivalry of the period; it was only the pressure of the young colonial party that led him to annex colonial territories. But the ease with which he did so—laying the foundations, within two years, with the deferential assent of the other Powers, of an empire of a million square miles—was evidence of the ascendancy which Germany enjoyed; as was the fact that it was in Berlin that the Conference was held (1884) which laid down the lines of the partition of Africa.
It might seem that Germany had no need to fear any rivals; and Bismarck boasted to the Reichstag that she 'feared God, and nothing else in the world.' Yet Bismarck himself lived in dread: he was 'haunted by the nightmare of coalitions': he could never banish the fear that others might deal with Germany as he himself had dealt with the obstacles in her path to glory; nor could he forget that Napoleon III. had almost concluded an alliance with Austria and Italy in 1870. If Bismarck's fears were genuine, as they seem to have been, their only possible object was France, the proud nation whom he had rolled in the dust in 1870, whom he had been on the point of attacking again in 1875, merely because she was recovering from her wounds too rapidly, and who 'never forgot and never mentioned' the lost provinces. Yet it might have seemed that the Power which 'feared God and nothing else in the world' had small reason to be afraid of France, now. She was disheartened. Her population was dwindling, while that of Germany was mounting by millions every decade. Lacking coal, and having lost her best ironfield when she lost Lorraine, she had little share in the triumphal industrial progress which Germany was making. She was torn asunder by royalist, Bonapartist, and republican factions. Her ministries rose and fell with disconcerting rapidity; her politicians were discredited by scandals and rumours of corruption. And she had no allies.

Yet Bismarck feared her. He encouraged her to throw herself into colonising schemes, in the hope that she would forget Alsace-Lorraine, and quarrel with the other colonising Powers. He laboured to detach from her all possible allies. First of all he made friends with Austria, whom he had treated with careful lenience in 1866. In 1879 he concluded a secret defensive alliance with Austria, whereby Germany's help was pledged to her if she should be attacked by Russia. This alliance became a permanence; and though nominally only defensive, in reality it turned Austria into Germany's vassal, for Austria feared Russia, was gravely weakened by the quarrels of her nationalities, and wanted to devote her attention to Balkan affairs. Another possible ally for France was Italy. Bismarck strove to make this alliance impossible when, at the Berlin Congress, he encouraged France to annex Tunis, on which Italy had set her heart. The French occupation of Tunis drove Italy to join the Austro-German combination (1882).

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And now the Triple Alliance, which Germany dominated, stretched from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, and made any hostile European combination all but impotent. Long afterwards Germany complained that the Triple Entente ‘encircled’ her: she had begun by ‘excircling’ the Powers which later formed it.

But Bismarck had no desire to break with Russia. Friendship with Russia had been the sheet-anchor of Prussian diplomacy ever since 1763; and there was no nightmare which frightened the timid Chancellor more than the possibility that the ‘wire to St. Petersburg’ might be cut. Russia must not be allowed to make friends with France. In 1884, in spite of his existing defensive alliance with Austria (which was not published until 1888) Bismarck negotiated a secret treaty with Russia which he called the Reinsurance, and by which he pledged Germany not to join Austria in an attack on Russia. So long as this treaty lasted (and it lasted until after Bismarck’s fall in 1890), Germany controlled the relations between Austria and Russia, and the possibility of war in the Balkans; neither Power could move without her permission.

The only other possible source of danger was Britain. Bismarck knew well enough that any aggressive action by Britain on the Continent was out of the question, if for no other reason, because Britain did not possess an army on the continental scale. But it was worth while to detach her from France. In 1878 he urged Disraeli to annex Egypt. Disraeli was wise enough not to swallow the bait, knowing that this would fatally alienate France. But the purpose was served when, as we shall see, the chapter of accidents brought Britain into Egypt, and France, fearful of entanglements and with the German peril always before her eyes, refused to join her in common action. For twenty years thereafter, France and Britain were on the worst of terms. And the colonial schemes of France served the same end: as we shall see, they made Britain feel that France was her enemy. Throughout the period of Bismarck’s rule, and indeed until much later, Britain docilely accepted the German view of the European situation, regarded Germany with friendliness as a pacific Power, and looked upon France as the disturber of the peace.

No single Power (save Napoleon for a few years) has ever held so dominant a position in Europe as Germany held between 1879 and 1895. Her army was unsurpassable;

she was the head of the most powerful standing alliance which Europe had ever known, an alliance whose compact territories stretched across Europe from sea to sea, and separated all the other Powers from one another. She had a secret alliance with Russia in the East, and a friendly understanding with Britain in the West; her only possible foe was completely isolated. She was the pivot upon which European politics turned, and no serious action could be taken without her assent.

In these circumstances it might seem that Germany could have afforded to reduce her warlike panoply, and to abandon or modify the system of universal military service which she had been the first to introduce, and which her example had forced upon all the other Powers. She alone could safely take such a step, because it was unthinkable that any other Power would dare to attack her. But she never thought of taking it. She had already extended the Prussian military system to all the other German States. At intervals she passed new Army Acts, increasing her standing forces, on the plea that they must always bear a fixed proportion to her growing population. Compulsory military service was, in truth, one of the foundations of the whole German system. It was the main buttress of the Emperor's power over his people, the means of training the German people to regard themselves as a nation in arms, who must be prepared to fight for the glory of the nation whenever the Supreme War-Lord commanded. As fully as in the days of the old Mark or of Frederick the Great, modern Germany, for all her industrial development, was primarily a military Power, which regarded force as the sole secure foundation of national greatness.

Throughout this period Treitschke, Professor of History at Berlin from 1874 to 1896, was making himself the mouthpiece of the Prussian doctrine of militarism; and he was an accepted national prophet. He taught that the essence of the State, and its raison d'être, is not Justice but Power; and that the expansion of its power is its 'highest moral obligation,' against which no restraints are valid. He taught that War is the means by which the State expands its power, that it is 'a biological necessity,' and 'the divinely appointed medicine of humanity'; and that it is the destiny of small States to be devoured by great States. The history of Prussia seemed to justify this creed, which is the creed of pure militarism. And in spite of all Bismarck's elaborate, and probably sincere, protestations that he desired only
peace, this was the real creed of the governing elements in Germany. This was the source of the malady from which Europe was suffering. She was dominated by an exultant, progressive and formidable nation which, while unthreatened by any danger that could reasonably be feared, and supported by powerful alliances, was nevertheless armed to the teeth. In the face of this, no other nation, least of all broken France, could safely disarm. We have given to this chapter the title of 'German Hegemony and the Armed Peace.' Is it not apparent that the reason why Peace went panoplied in clanking armour was that Germany held the hegemony of Europe? Under Bismarck she used it wisely and with restraint. But the power she wielded was dangerously great. With the traditions of Prussia in her heart, and the teachings of Treitschke in her ears, she might be tempted to misuse it. And there was one region of Europe which presented continual occasions: more than ever before, the Balkans were simmering with unrest.

§ 4. The Problems of the Balkans.

It was one of Bismarck's apothegms that the Balkans were 'not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier'; and it may be claimed for him that, by means of his strange double agreement with Austria and Russia, he prevented these Powers from being drawn by the politics of the Balkans into a war which might have involved all Europe. Doubtless, peace was his chief aim; but by the time of his fall it is noteworthy that the influence of Russia had been reduced to a minimum in all the Balkan States, and that the most powerful influence, throughout the distressful peninsula, had come to be that of Austria and Germany.

The ink of the Treaty of Berlin was scarcely dry when it began to be apparent that, far from solving the problems of the Balkans, the diplomats who drew up the treaty had only added to the complexity and difficulty of these problems. Throughout this period the Eastern Question was more thorny than it had ever been; the Concert of Europe was called upon, almost every year, to solve one puzzle or another, and to exhibit its own singular futility. Not Constantinople only, but Bucharest, Athens, Belgrad, Sofia became nests of intrigue; for there was not one of the new States which had not its own grievances, and not one which was not worked upon by the intrigues of Great
Powers. It is impossible to narrate in detail the sordid and romantic story of these years. There were intrigues and conspiracies, assassinations and kidnappings, depositions and coups d'état, diplomatic strokes and counter-strokes—a complete scenario for a whole library of Rutian novels. To many Western observers it all seemed as unreal and as unimportant as comic opera. But it was of profound significance for the future of the world. The seeds of strife which were germinating in the Balkans during these years were to bear fruit in the Great War.

We cannot here attempt to follow the complicated story of Balkan politics, or analyse all the causes of friction which arose from the defects of the Treaty of Berlin, and from the unsatisfied aspirations of all the Balkan States. But certain broad results of the period must be noted. Rumania, long the staunch ally of Russia, had been alienated by Russia's seizure of the province of Bessarabia in 1878; and under her Hohenzollern king she learnt to look to Austria and, still more, to Germany for protection. Serbia had been embittered by her failure to acquire Serb territories in 1878, and her nationalist party was hostile to Austria because Austria had occupied the Serb provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina; but her successive kings and their courts were, down to 1903, Austrian creatures, and were bound to Austria by a secret treaty (1881). Bulgaria, which had been Russia's special protégé in 1878, had been alienated by the high-handed behaviour of the Russian agents, and by the way in which Russia had treated her first prince, Alexander of Battenberg: her second prince, Ferdinand of Coburg, belonged to a German ruling house and had been an officer in the Austrian army; and though he made peace with Russia, it was to Germany and Austria that he chiefly looked. Greece had been angered by the refusal of Russia to obtain for her some of the Greek-speaking lands of the Sultan: in 1889 her heir-apparent married the sister of the German Emperor. Thus every one of the Christian States of the Balkans had been brought directly or indirectly under the influence of Germany and Austria; and the influence of Russia had fallen to the nadir.

Meanwhile Turkey had been undergoing a curious revival. The establishment of Rumania and Serbia as independent States, and the concession of autonomy to Bulgaria, had not really weakened her, but had set up an effective barrier between her and Russia; and the mutual jealousies of

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1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 86.
the Great Powers afforded her a still further protection. Her throne was now occupied (since 1876) by Abdul Hamid II., a shifty and timid man, but a consummate master of intrigue and evasion. For a generation Abdul Hamid played the Powers off one against another with such dexterity that he enjoyed a freedom to misgovern which none of his predecessors, for a very long time, had known.

Abdul Hamid was not content merely to stave off European interference. He had no patience with the talk about reforms with which Turkey had so long been pestered, and he swept into limbo the beginnings of Western methods of government which had been introduced at the time of the Russo-Turkish War. A great ambition dominated him: he would be the leader of a Mohammedan revival, and make the hopes and dreams of Moslems in all parts of the world once more centre on Constantinople, and on himself as the Caliph, or head of the Moslem faith. From the Yildiz Kiosk, therefore, Abdul Hamid pulled the strings of a vast movement of propaganda, whose influence, almost unperceived by the Western Powers, spread over every part of the Mohammedan world, and stirred the old hatred of the Christians.

The moment was favourable for such an attempt, for various revivalist movements had long been at work in the Islamic world. In a remote oasis of the Libyan desert two prophets, Mohammed ben Senussi and his son Senussi el Mahdi, had founded a mysterious religious order, whose monasteries were widely spread through the Moslem world, especially in Africa. Only one European had ever visited the centre of this organisation: the German explorer, Dr. Nachtigal. The aim of the Senussi was to revive the purity and fervour of the early days of Islam, to weld the whole Moslem world together, and, after spiritual regeneration had been achieved, to liberate Islam from Christian domination. The Senussi had no dealings with Abdul Hamid, but they prepared the soil for him. Meanwhile another Moslem prophet, the Persian Djemal-ed-din, had travelled over every part of the Moslem world, preaching the fundamental antipathy between Christendom and Islam. In 1880 he played a part in the rising of Arabi Pasha, which brought about the British intervention in Egypt. Then he found his way to Constantinople, where he was welcomed by Abdul Hamid, and became the chief organiser of the Sultan's Pan-Islamic propaganda, until his death in 1896.
When a movement of this vast purport was afoot, it was unlikely that the Sultan would allow his policy to be controlled by any of the three European Powers which had hitherto taken turns in directing the policy of the Turks; for Russia, France, and Britain were the three Powers whose conquests had subjugated the world of Islam. But Turkey needed Western military science and Western financial organisation if her power was to be effectively revived. In 1883 she began to borrow German officers to reorganise her army, and invited a German financier to improve her fiscal system.

Plainly the Eastern Question was undergoing a transformation. Its importance no longer lay solely in the rivalry of this Power and that for dominant influence at Constantinople; the problem had become much deeper, and much more variegated. No doubt it is true that Bismarck's diplomacy helped to prevent any serious explosion: he had taken the keys of the powder-magazine, and put them in Germany's keeping. But so far as European politics were concerned, the significant thing was that Britain and Russia, the protagonists of 1878, had ceased to be the main figures in the Balkan scene. When Bismarck fell from power in 1890, the European Powers whose influence counted for most, whether among the little Christian States or with the Turk, were Germany and Austria. And Russia could not but realise the fact.


In 1888 a new ruler ascended the throne of the German Empire, the Kaiser Wilhelm II. Young, ardent, ineffably self-confident, he reflected the proud temper of the generation which had grown to manhood since Germany became the first Power in Europe. He did not share Bismarck's fears and misgivings, which came from the time when Prussia was a Power of the second rank, with her way to make in the world; he was not afraid of coalitions; he was not, like Bismarck, a 'no-colony man,' or a disbeliever in the desirability of adding naval to military power. Like the men of his generation, he put no limit to the future greatness to which his mighty and prosperous empire might aspire; and he had in his blood the Prussian tradition that greatness depends upon force. He differed from the great Chancellor on many things, on social policy, on colonial policy, and also (though more vaguely) on
foreign policy. Being unquestioned master of his own ship, he dropped the old pilot (1890) and took the helm himself.

At once it became apparent that the temper and methods of German policy were to be changed; and Germany's position in the world was such that this was of the first moment to every nation. One of the first results of the change was that Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, which expired in 1891, was not renewed. The guarantee that Germany would not use her formidable power to Russia's detriment disappeared; and with it disappeared the strongest buttress of European peace which Bismarck had created. Remained only the other part of Bismarck's work: Germany's unsurpassable military power, and her headship of an alliance more formidable than any that Europe had yet known.

Russia was already sore at the imperceptible steps by which—mainly, no doubt, through her own folly—her influence in the Balkans had been weakened, and that of her rival Austria had grown. She now knew that the Austro-German alliance was both solid and permanent. She felt her isolation and looked about for allies. There was another isolated power, France, who lived in dread of her terrible neighbour across the Rhine. The two threatened Powers began to draw together. It seemed unnatural that the mother of the Revolution should become the partner of the most unqualified and oppressive of despotisms, and there was a delay of some years before any formal alliance was concluded. But it was always inevitable that the creation of a group so powerful as the Triple Alliance should bring a counterpoise into being; otherwise the existence of every other land-power must depend upon the discretion of the leaders of this group. In 1891 the rapprochement between France and Russia began; in 1895 the existence of a definite defensive alliance between them was revealed. The malady of Europe was reaching a more acute stage: the Continent was divided between two great confederations, each armed cap-à-pie, each perpetually in dread lest the other should take advantage of it, each therefore apt to be tempted to seize upon any favourable opportunity of deciding the issue in its favour. Alone among the Great Powers, Britain stood aloof, in 'splendid isolation,' holding (perhaps) the balance between the hostile arrays.

It was a new thing in European history that the Great Powers should be divided into two standing alliances, jealous and fearful of one another; a new thing that the
whole manhood of civilised nations should be trained for war; a new thing that the men who controlled the issues of peace and war should have in their hands forces so potent as those with which science, modern industry, and organised finance endowed them. It was a yet greater portent that these vast powers were being employed, as we shall see in the next chapter, to bring all the unorganised regions of the world under the control of these armed nations, and to extend to every part of the globe their dangerous rivalries. Nor did this end the list of startling transformations which cause the student of this period to feel that he is observing the passage of civilisation into a fresh stage of its development. It was in these same years that Japan emerged as a Great Power, not to be disregarded by the arbiters of world-affairs. And the emergence of Japan was at once a proof of the triumph of European civilisation, and an evidence that the control of the destinies of the now unified world was not to be a monopoly of the Western peoples.

§ 6. The Emergence of Japan as a Great Power.

There is nothing in human history more astonishing than the swiftness and success with which, in the course of a very few years, Japan discarded the forms of an ancient and admirable civilisation under which she had lived contentedly for many centuries, and, by an extraordinary effort of the national will, adopted, and adapted to her own needs, a totally different system.

Content with her ancient feudal order, which was based upon a rigid system of castes, Japan had excluded the civilisation and the trade of the West even more completely than China, until, in the middle of the nineteenth century, she was forced to realise the formidable power of the Europeans. Her awakening began with the visit of an American naval squadron in 1853, followed by a second American mission, which insisted upon, and obtained, a concession of trading rights (1858). Britain and other European peoples followed, and the Japanese began to get an insight into the methods of the West. At first there was a natural reaction. But European fleets (British, American, French and Dutch) appeared once and again off Japanese ports, and on two occasions (1863) bombarded them. This completed the demonstration of Western superiority. Japan recognised that in one way or another Western methods must win the ascendancy. By an extraordinary national resolve, she
made up her mind to carry out the necessary changes herself, in her own way; and in 1868 the most astonishing of revolutions began.

The sacred person of the Mikado emerged from his long seclusion to give the sanction of the religion of nationality which he represented to the greatest of national enterprises. Under his venerated ægis, a group of reformers carried out an amazing transformation. The feudatory States lost their governing power. The military caste of the Samurai sacrificed their pensions and privileges. The chaos of feudal usages was replaced by a system of civil and criminal law based on European models. Englishmen were brought in to create a navy, and to build railways and lighthouses; Frenchmen to recast the laws and train the army; Americans to organise education and the postal service; Germans to train medical men and organise local government. Within ten years Japan was well on the way to possessing the full equipment of a Western State; and the suppression of a revolt in 1877 against this dizzy series of changes ended the first stage of the transformation. By the date of the Congress of Berlin Japan had definitely launched herself upon her new career.

Europe could not believe that a transformation so rapidly effected could be permanent; and as late as 1885 The Mikado was a possible title for a Gilbert and Sullivan opera. Indeed, there was much still to be done. The whole structure of the national life had to be adjusted to the new conditions. Industries had to be organised; a banking system and a new currency had to be created; the whole machinery of government had to be adjusted. These labours occupied the next ten years, and more; the culmination came when in 1890 a new constitution was promulgated, and Japan entered the ranks of the parliamentary countries. It is true that her executive still remained, like that of Germany, under the control of the Emperor. But a representative Assembly, elected without regard to the ancient distinctions of caste, was given control over legislation and taxation. Here was a voluntary abandonment of power, by a monarchy which had been absolute since the beginning of things, to which no other country’s history presents any parallel. Within twenty-five years an Oriental nation, organised on a caste basis, and governed by a theocratic monarchy and a feudal aristocracy, had so transformed itself that it was ready to take its place among the self-governing industrial nations of the West. Almost without violence it had carried out,
in this short space of time, a transformation which in Europe had taken centuries of war and turmoil.

Europe had still to be persuaded of the reality of this miracle. What brought conviction home was the war between China and Japan, which broke out in 1894 over the question whether Korea was to be regarded as a Chinese dependency or a free State.

China, like Japan, had borrowed some of the externals of Western civilisation. She had created a navy, and re-organised her army, on Western lines. But she had not Westernised her mind, or her system of administration. Her navy and her army were on paper stronger than those of Japan. Yet they were completely defeated; because, unlike the navy and army of Japan, they were not guided by minds which had been trained to use their new instruments. Japan's victory was as swift and efficient as any European Power could have achieved: indeed, the competence with which the whole business was conducted stands in sharp contrast with the ineffectiveness of the earlier British and French campaigns in China. China was compelled, after a campaign of a few months, to recognise the independence of Korea, to cede the island of Formosa, and to hand over to Japan the strategically important Liao-Tang Peninsula, which commands the sea-highways towards Peking.

Europe was startled. The Governments realised that they had to deal with a new Power. And the discovery brought on a period of anxious diplomacy.

CHAPTER II
THE RACE FOR COLONIAL POSSESSIONS
(A.D. 1878-1904)

§ 1. The Birth of Imperialism.

We have seen that after the Franco-German and Russo-
Turkish Wars the politics of Europe underwent a marked
and rapid change. Not less marked and not less rapid
was the change which came about during the same years
in the relations between Europe and the non-European
world. Suddenly, now that the nationalist and the liberal
ideals had won their victory, the European nations shed
that indifference to oversea possessions which had marked
them ever since 1815. Their new industrial activity and
their eagerness for national self-sufficiency led them to
desire territories under their own control, whence they
could draw supplies of raw materials, and whose markets
they could reserve to their own traders. They realised
also that while Europe had been immersed in its domestic
problems, three great world-empires had come into being
which seemed to dwarf the European nation-States as
completely as the unified France and Spain of the sixteenth
century had dwarfed the Italian city-States. These three
were the Russian Empire, which extended in a solid mass
from Central Europe to the Pacific; the United States,
which stretched across a whole continent from ocean to
ocean; and the British Empire, which sprawled over the
world, on every continent and in every ocean. To attain
the rank of world-States came to seem an indispensable
sign of greatness. The great European States set out,
therefore, upon this career, and a period of intense rivalry
began, more intense even than that of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. So strenuous were the colonising
activities of these years that within two decades practically
all the available territories of the world were parcelled out,
and the destinies of humanity seemed to lie in the hands
of a group of half-a-dozen huge world-empires, whose
interests came into conflict with one another in every part of the earth.

In face of this eager imperialism, Britain rapidly abandoned the attitude of unwillingness to extend her imperial responsibilities which she had adopted during the middle years of the century. At first she stood aloof, and even welcomed the advent of other Powers as partners in the task of civilising the backward races. Then, realising that wide lands in which her trade had hitherto been dominant were passing under the control of Governments which would exclude her traders by tariff walls, she woke up, and took a very active part in the scramble. And her advantages were so great that she acquired new dominions more extensive than any of her rivals save France, and far more valuable than those of France. All these new dominions were in tropical lands inhabited by primitive and backward peoples—a kind of responsibility which Britain had hitherto been very loth to assume. They were so distinctive in character, and so vast in extent, that they may be described as the Third British Empire.

The awakening of Europe to the value of oversea possessions came just at the moment when the labours of great explorers, which we have described in an earlier chapter,¹ had revealed the rich potentialities of Africa. It was to Africa, therefore, that the conquering Powers first turned; and the engineering skill and medical knowledge with which science had endowed them enabled them to overcome, with extraordinary ease, the obstacles which had hitherto kept Europe aloof from the dark continent.

§ 2. The First Stages of the Partition of Africa and the Conference of Berlin.

From the point of view of its relations with Europe, Africa falls into two distinct sections.² The Northern or Mediterranean coastal belt has been, throughout the course of history, almost a part of Europe: it was all included in the Roman Empire, and later in the successive Mohammedan Empires with which Europe has long had close relations. But this coastal belt was separated from the main mass of Africa by a broad belt of desert, the most impenetrable of geographical barriers. For that reason the adventures of European Powers on the Northern Coast

¹ Above, Bk. x. chap. v. p. 540.
² See the map, Atlas, Plate 88.
have been far more directly connected with European politics than their adventures in the main mass of the continent; and it will be convenient to touch upon Northern Africa first.

In this region France had long been deeply concerned. She had conquered Algeria during the years following 1830, and had carried out there a great work of reorganisation. She had also taken a special interest in the politics of Egypt ever since the time of Napoleon. When she began to recover from the terrible blow she had endured in 1870-1871, it was to Northern Africa that she turned for consolation, and for the means of reviving her power and prestige. As we have seen, she annexed Tunis in 1881. But the immediate result of the annexation was that Italy was driven into the arms of Germany, and France’s isolation in Europe became worse than ever. Evidently North Africa was a dangerous field for colonial activity. This was the main reason why France, fearing European complications, declined to join hands with Britain in intervening to restore order in Egypt in 1882. The British occupation of Egypt has had such remarkable and important results that we must devote to it a separate chapter,¹ and shall not deal with it here. But it was the chief cause of twenty years of friction between France and Britain. Thus intervention in Northern Africa was shown to be so dangerous, because of its nearness to Europe, that no Power ventured to touch it again until after 1904; and then, as we shall see,² the intervention of France in Morocco and of Italy in Tripoli were to prove just as fruitful of discord as the earlier intervention in Tunis and Egypt had been.

But in tropical Africa there was a clearer field; and it was here that the competition was most furious. It was begun, curiously enough, by Leopold, King of the Belgians. In 1876 Leopold summoned an unofficial conference at Brussels to consider how the opening up of Africa could best be carried out. He seems sincerely to have desired that the work should be done on an international basis; and if this had been possible many future troubles would have been avoided. An International African Association was established, with Leopold as its President, and branches for each country. But the branches thought of nothing but their national interests, and the main body became in practice a purely Belgian organisation. When H. M.

¹ Below, Chap. iv. p. 652.
² Below, Bk. xii. chap. iii.
Stanley returned in 1878 from his remarkable exploration of the Congo, Leopold engaged him to return to the Congo, and to organise there a system of administration under the auspices of the Association. This was the beginning of the Congo Free State (1879).

But Leopold's enterprise, professedly international as it was, was not allowed to go unchallenged. A French explorer, de Brazza, had been investigating the lands north of the Congo, and, with the support of the French Government, he proceeded to lay claim to these lands (1880); it was only with difficulty that conflict between him and Stanley was avoided. Meanwhile the Portuguese had put forward a claim that all this coast belonged to them, by right of ancient settlement; they even claimed that their dominion extended right across Africa, from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, because they had decaying settlements on both coasts. Here were already the beginnings of serious trouble. The scramble had fairly begun.

Nor was this all. The French had retained, in 1815, a post at the mouth of the Senegal River, on the West Coast, and their explorers had long been gradually pushing their way up the river's course. It led them into the heart of the Western Sudan. 'Sudan' is the Arab name for 'negroland,' and the vast region known by that name stretches almost across Africa, south of the desert belt, from Cape Verde to Abyssinia. Parts of it, especially in the upper valley of the Niger, about Timbuctu, and round Lake Chad, are fertile and populous; and here France saw the possibility of acquiring a great tropical empire, which might eventually extend from ocean to ocean. Between 1880 and 1884 she made innumerable treaties with native chiefs on the West Coast, whereby they accepted her protection. The British merchants on the coast took alarm. They feared especially that they might lose the valuable oil-trade of the lower Niger. In 1879, led by Sir George Taubman Goldie, they had consolidated their interests in a United African Company. By 1884 they had bought out the French traders, and established British influence on the lower Niger.

Italy also was beginning to be active: in 1882 she planted herself on the Red Sea Coast, in the region which afterwards grew into the colony of Eritrea. And a more serious competitor had also entered the lists. Germany had held back at first because Bismarck did not believe in colonies.

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 88.
2 See the map, Atlas, Plate 89 (c).
But an active colonial party had grown up in Germany, and under its pressure Bismarck began to take action. In 1883 a German merchant named Lüderitz landed on the coast of South-West Africa, near the British settlement of Walvis Bay, where some German missionaries were at work, and made a treaty with a native chief. Cape Colony was alarmed; but the British Government made no objection, and in 1884 Germany formally announced that she had taken 'the territory belonging to Mr. Lüderitz' under her protection. In 1884 also the famous German explorer, Dr. Nachtigal, visited the West Coast to inquire into 'the condition of German trade,' and the British Government was formally notified of his mission. Its real purpose was revealed when he concluded a treaty with the King of Togoland whereby that monarch placed himself under German protection, and a whole series of treaties with the chiefs of the Cameroons, who had repeatedly begged in vain for British protection. This aroused the British Government, which promptly declared a protectorate over the coast of Nigeria, the chief sphere of British trade in that region (1884).

Thus, within five years of the time when King Leopold despatched Stanley to the Congo, half-a-dozen European Powers had pegged out claims in various parts of Africa; and there was room for infinite controversy and friction among the rivals. To avoid this danger, a Conference was summoned at Berlin at the end of 1884. It was attended by representatives of fourteen Powers, including the United States; and it devoted itself, in three months of strenuous discussion, to laying down the rules of the game of partition.

The Conference of Berlin had before it the opportunity of doing a noble piece of work. It might have established a sort of trusteeship on behalf of the civilised world over the lands inhabited by the backward peoples. It might have safeguarded the primitive peoples against exploitation, and at the same time insisted upon an open door for the trade of all nations; and if these principles could have been laid down, and some means found for enforcing them, the process of colonisation would have been wholly beneficial to the world, and the danger of conflict between the colonising Powers would have been reduced to a minimum. It did not venture upon any such ambitious programme; perhaps it could not have done so, in the then state of European ideas about international trade rivalry.

1 The extent of these claims at this stage in the process of partition is indicated on the map, Atlas, Plate 88.
Yet the Conference achieved much. It required the maintenance of free trade in the Congo valley, though not elsewhere; it laid down the rules of navigation on the great rivers; and it defined the principles on which the game of empire-making should in future be conducted. It recognised the annexations already made, including the Congo Free State, which differed from the rest in that it was not directly annexed to any single State. It ordained that every Power, on assuming a protectorate, should notify all the rest, and that no occupation should be valid unless it was 'effective.' This debarred such vast and vague claims as had been put forward by Portugal. But it also ensured that all the Powers should make haste to make their occupation 'effective' over as large an area as possible, and therefore opened a decade of extraordinary activity and of feverish diplomacy. This much at least may be claimed for the Europe of the 'eighties, that it succeeded in carrying out peacefully an amazing work of partition which in any earlier period would assuredly have led to war.

§ 3. The Process of Partition in Africa.

It is needless to attempt any detailed survey of the strenuous work of the twenty years following the Conference of Berlin, during which the whole of Africa, except Abyssinia, Liberia, Tripoli and Morocco, was partitioned out among the Powers. But the main feature of the period was that after about 1886 Britain played a more active part than any of the other Powers. She had at first been loth to intervene; she had even welcomed the participation of the other Powers, and notably of Germany. For the Gladstone ministry, which was in power in Britain from 1880 to 1885, still clung to the view that it was undesirable to assume further imperial responsibilities. It had gone into Egypt, it is true, but with the sincere intention of withdrawing at the earliest possible moment; and it had insisted upon the abandonment of the Egyptian Sudan. It had assumed a protectorate over the Nigerian coast, but only under heavy pressure from commercial interests. Its attitude was clearly expressed in the negotiations with Germany about East Africa in 1885.

At the end of 1884, while the Conference of Berlin was sitting, Karl Peters and two other young Germans, disguised as mechanics, had landed on the coast opposite to Zanzibar with a number of blank treaty-forms, for which
they proceeded to obtain the signatures of chiefs. All this
territory was regarded as subject to the Sultan of Zanzibar.
Its trade had been almost wholly in the hands of British
and Indian merchants; and the Sultan and the chiefs had
in vain petitioned to be taken under British protection.
In spite of the vehement protestations of the Sultan, the
German Government declared a protectorate over the lands
which its unauthorised agents had acquired (1885), and sent
a fleet to enforce its claims. Britain, far from opposing,
declared through Lord Granville that she 'viewed with
favour these schemes, the realisation of which will entail
the civilisation of large tracts over which hitherto no Euro-
pean influence has been exercised.'

Meanwhile, farther north, a group of British merchants,
alarmed at the prospect of losing a valuable trade, had begun
to make treaties with chiefs in the Kenya district: they
were the pioneers of the British East Africa Company. The
British Government refused to support them until it was
assured that Germany made no objection; and in 1886
the line of division between the two spheres was defined by
agreement between Britain and Germany. Thus the four
German colonies in Africa—South-West Africa, Togoland,
the Cameroons and East Africa—were all acquired in regions
where British trade had hitherto been predominant, and
with Britain's full concurrence.

In 1886, however, the Gladstone ministry was replaced
by that of Lord Salisbury, and a different temper appeared.
It was under Salisbury's guidance, in truth, that what we
have called 'the Third British Empire' was acquired. The
rapid expansion of this period was mainly due to a significant
revival of the methods of the seventeenth century by the
establishment of Chartered Companies, three of which (the
Royal Niger Company, the East Africa Company, and the
South Africa Company) played an extremely important part
in obtaining concessions from native chieftains, and in opening
up the occupied country for trade and settlement. But
they were heartily backed by the British Government; and
their acquisitions were secured by treaties with the various
Powers engaged in the game of empire-building. As Britain
was the only Power whose interests were engaged in every
part of Africa, she had to make treaty settlements with all
the colonising Powers—with Germany, France, Portugal,
Italy and the Congo Free State; and these treaties formed
the chief factors in the process of partition.

With Germany the settlement was early and easily made.
A treaty of 1890 defined the limits of the three chief German colonies, and allotted to Britain a protectorate over British East Africa and Uganda; she was also recognised as suzerain of the Sultan of Zanzibar, in return for the cession of Heligoland. In 1894 a treaty between France and Germany completed the definition of the German dominions. As the result of ten years' work Germany had acquired, with extraordinary ease and without friction or opposition, an empire of nearly 1,000,000 square miles.

Agreement between Britain and France was found to be much more difficult, for the interests of France and Britain came much more sharply into conflict. In 1885 France asserted a sort of protectorate over the rich and beautiful island of Madagascar, though she did not actually subjugate it until 1895. But British traders and missionaries had been very active in Madagascar, and in 1865 Britain and France had agreed to recognise the independence of the island. Here was one cause of friction. Again, in North-West Africa the French claims were so far-reaching—extending from the Mediterranean to the Guinea Coast—that French territory threatened to hem in the far older British possessions, reducing them to mere isolated enclaves; on the Niger, especially, the competition of the two Powers was fierce and continuous. In 1890, however, a treaty was negotiated which settled both of these disputes. The French protectorate over Madagascar was recognised; the position of the British West African colonies as mere enclaves within the French Empire was in effect accepted; but Britain emerged from the negotiations in control of a magnificent domain in Nigeria, the richest trading region of that part of Africa.\footnote{See the map, Atlas, Plate 88.}

But the treaty of 1890 by no means brought the friction with France to an end. The northern boundary of Nigeria had not been laid down; and on this question friction became so acute that in 1898 it very nearly led to open conflict. A treaty of that year settled this problem; but the ink of the signatures was scarcely dry when a new and far more serious controversy broke out. Having now acquired most of the Central as well as the Western Sudan, France conceived the ambition of extending her empire over the Eastern Sudan, until it should reach the Red Sea. But between 1896 and 1898 British and Egyptian forces were reconquering the Eastern, or Egyptian, Sudan.\footnote{See below, Chap. iv. p. 658.} To anticipate them, Major Marchand was sent with a small
force from French Congoland across to the Nile valley, where he raised the French flag at Fashoda in July 1898, only a few weeks before Lord Kitchener shattered the Mahdi's host at Omdurman and occupied Khartoum. It was held that no foreign Power could be permitted to control the Upper Nile, whose waters are the very life-blood of Egypt. Kitchener was therefore sent post-haste to Fashoda, where he politely insisted upon the lowering of the French flag. This episode aroused such intense feeling in France that for some weeks war with Britain appeared to be inevitable; no event in the partition of Africa came so near to precipitating a European conflict. But France gave way; and the treaty whereby she recognised British control of the Nile valley (1899) practically marked the conclusion of the feverish process by which a whole continent had been parcelled out among a group of Powers. France was left with an African empire of nearly 4,000,000 square miles, almost all in a single coherent mass.

Meanwhile there had been sharp conflict between Britain and her ancient ally Portugal, who insisted on her claim to control the whole continent from East to West, south of the Congo basin. This claim included the whole valley of the Zambezi, which Livingstone had discovered, the rich countries of Matabeleland and Mashonaland, and the district of Lake Nyasa, where British missionaries were doing admirable work.1 The British Government in 1887 formally refused to admit Portugal's claim. In 1888 a British commissioner signed a protectorate treaty with Lobengula, King of the Matabele; and in 1889 the bold and masterful Cecil Rhodes obtained from the British Government a charter for the British South Africa Company, which proceeded to occupy and organise the wide and rich country of Matabeleland and Mashonaland, later known as Rhodesia. In the same year a British protectorate was also declared over Nyasaland. These events made it necessary to reach some understanding with Portugal; and in 1890 and 1891, though Portugal struggled and protested, she was compelled to accept a settlement whereby the limits of her domains on the East Coast and on the West were clearly defined. The settlement left her with an African empire of more than three-quarters of a million square miles.

The last of the colonising Powers in Africa of whom mention need be made was Italy. She had established a post on the Red Sea coast in 1882; she extended it, with

1 See the map, Atlas, Plates 88 and 89 (a).
British support, into the colony of Eritrea during the following years; and in 1889 and 1890 she proclaimed a protectorate over the greater part of Somaliland, the horn of Africa. Between her two colonies lay a part of Somaliland opposite to Aden, which Britain had annexed in 1884-1886. Treaties of 1891 and 1894 between Britain and Italy defined the limits of these various colonies. But Eritrea and Somaliland lay on either side of the mountain kingdom of Abyssinia, a Christian State, and the one semi-civilised Power which Africa contained. Italy’s hope was that she might bring this fine country under her control. In 1889, after some years of sharp fighting, she thought she had achieved her aim, for the Emperor of Abyssinia signed a treaty which could be construed as the acceptance of a protectorate. But the hope was doomed to disappointment: the Emperor denounced the treaty, war broke out afresh, and in 1896 Italy suffered a disastrous defeat at Adowa, which compelled her to abandon her ambitions. This was the only defeat inflicted upon any of the colonising Powers during these years of aggressive activity; and Abyssinia was the only African State which was able, by its own strength, to maintain its independence.

§ 4. Effects of the Partition of Africa.

The partition of Africa, which was carried out between 1880 and 1900, was no mere paper partition. With remarkable rapidity the conquering Powers introduced the elements of law and government over vast regions which no white man had ever visited when the period began. The incessant warfare of savage tribes was for the most part brought to an end. The slave-trade, if it was not wholly destroyed, at any rate ceased to be openly carried on. Many cruel and barbarous usages were prohibited. Modern communications opened up the country: roads were made, railways began to be built, steamboats plied on the rivers and the great lakes. Reversing the usual order, the trader and the missionary followed in the wake of the administrator; schools and churches were opened; science tackled the diseases of the tropics; the primitive peoples of Africa were introduced to new ways of life, and invited to earn by peaceful labour the means of buying new comforts and conveniences which they had never known before. In all these ways the subjugation of Africa by Europe was unquestionably a good
thing. It brought within the pale of civilisation a great region of the earth, whose inhabitants had been stagnant in barbarism for innumerable centuries, and showed no sign of emancipating themselves by their own efforts.

But a transformation so great and so rapid could not be effected without evil as well as good results. It was not pure philanthropy which brought the European peoples into Africa. They thought primarily of their own advantage; and precautions were necessary if the primitive peoples were to be safeguarded against exploitation and oppression. It was impossible for Governments to keep effective control even over their own agents, not to speak of irresponsible traders, in the vast regions they had taken under their care. European administrators were tempted to be unduly impatient with the usages of their primitive subjects, and to sweep them too lightly aside. Moreover the elaborate machinery of European government was costly, and the attempt to make the subject populations pay the cost was apt to lead to oppression.

The justice and efficiency of the new administrations varied widely from one colony to another. There were difficulties everywhere; that was inevitable. But the worst evils occurred in the regions controlled by countries which had no experience of dealing with backward peoples. In the Congo Free State Leopold of Belgium, who was practically an autocrat, seems to have begun with the highest intentions. But after the first decade of his administration he succumbed to the temptation of making wealth quickly; and he introduced a pitiless system of forced labour, supported by cruel punishments, which after a time aroused the conscience of Europe. The plain truth was that colonial possessions in Africa could not be made to yield great profits—could not even be made to pay their way—without forcing the bewildered natives into modes of life which they resented and disliked.

In the German colonies the same thing was exhibited in a different way. The stiff and unbending German official, with his elaborate rules and his insistence upon precise obedience, could not win the affection of his puzzled and frightened subjects. There were repeated revolts in East Africa, in the Cameroons, and in South-West Africa; and they were crushed with cruel harshness. German colonial government was in many ways highly efficient. But it was always military, and involved the training of large bodies of natives to arms. And it was excessively costly; none of
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the German colonies, save Togoland, was ever able to pay its way, even though practical freedom of trade was allowed in order to encourage rapid development.

The French have always shown skill and tact in dealing with subject peoples, and they succeeded in a remarkable degree in winning the confidence of their subjects throughout their vast African empire. But, like the Germans, they were very military in their methods, enlisting and training far larger bodies of men than were needed for the maintenance of order. They definitely meant to use their colonies as a means of enlarging their man-power for war. Moreover the French Government imposed upon their vast empire a rigidly protectionist policy. Regarding themselves as trustees, not on behalf of the civilised world, but solely on behalf of the French people, they strove by means of high tariffs to reserve their colonial markets for French traders. The result was that the trade of their empire grew slowly, and its revenues were quite inadequate to meet the cost of administration. The French colonies have proved a continual drain on the resources of the mother-country—like the German colonies, though for somewhat different reasons.

There were cases of commercial exploitation and of insufficient tenderness for native usages in the new British dominions, as in other lands. But there is no doubt that the British colonial system was, on the whole, far more successful than its rivals. It would have been surprising if this had not been so, seeing that Britain had a far wider experience of the problem than any other State. Two principles had become, as we have seen, part of the British colonial tradition during the nineteenth century. The one, implanted by the missionaries, was that it was the duty of the supreme Government to safeguard the rights and property of natives, and to protect their usages so far as they were not immoral; and in every British protectorate the representatives of the home Government were bound always to keep this principle in mind. The other principle, which flowed from the economic policy adopted by the mother-country herself, was that the traders of all nations ought to be admitted on equal terms, and that tariffs should be imposed for revenue only, not for the creation of monopolies. These principles were the secret of Britain’s success in the intense rivalry of this period. On the one hand, the native subjects found that, while they were forced to behave peaceably, they were less interfered with than under other Governments, and they learnt to appreciate the reign of
law without identifying it with vexatious restrictions. Except among the Matabele and in Somaliland, there were no risings or rebellions of any importance in any part of the new British empire. On the other hand, the traders of all nations, being freely admitted to the markets of these British dominions, were fain to recognise that the annexation of lands by Britain did not involve for them any restrictions, but rather an increase of facilities for trade. And that is why there was so little objection to the enormous expansion which this generation witnessed in Britain’s already immense empire.

Our experience of European administration in Africa is still too short to justify confident generalisations about its results. But when we reflect upon the ugly and stagnant barbarism which had been revealed by Livingstone and his great colleagues in exploration; when we realise that in some degree the reign of law has been established, that cruel and degraded usages have been prohibited, and that the worst iniquities of the slave-trade have been brought to an end, it seems reasonable to assert that the evils by which the process of European conquest was accompanied have been far more than balanced by the good which it has wrought. The volume of human suffering has been diminished; the resources of a vast continent have been made available for the service of man. Whatever its motives, and whatever its methods, the European conquest of Africa was a great achievement, and a long step towards the unification of the world.

§ 5. Farther India, the Malay Archipelago, and the Pacific.

The rivalry of the European Powers was by no means limited to Africa. It extended to every region where unoccupied territories were available for exploitation.

In Farther India, a British protectorate was willingly accepted by a group of States in the Malay Peninsula, which came to be known as the Federated Malay States; and even those States which remained outside the federation recognised a vague British suzerainty. On the other side of the Indo-Chinese peninsula, France was very active in Annam, Tongking and Cochin China, where she had had interests since the eighteenth century. A hard-fought and costly war in Tongking (1882-5) ended in the recognition of a French protectorate over these lands. But the
extension of French influence did not stop here, and ten years later a new war of conquest brought France into violent conflict with the kingdom of Siam. Peace was made in 1893; but it seemed likely that Siam would pass entirely under French influence. In 1896, however, a treaty between France and Britain defined the boundaries of the three Powers in this region, and secured the independence of Siam by placing it under the guarantee of a European treaty.

In the Malay Archipelago Holland, stimulated by the fear that the aggressive Powers might invade a sphere which she had hitherto kept to herself, showed great activity in extending her authority over all the islands of the archipelago, and in improving her system of administration. She had but one rival in this field; but this rival was the omnipresent power of Britain, which, beside holding Singapore and the Malay Peninsula, had got a foothold in the great island of Borneo. As early as 1841 a remarkable Englishman, Sir James Brooke, had established himself as Raja of Sarawak on the north-east coast of Borneo, and he and his successors had achieved a striking success in organising peace and law over a wide expanse of territory. Sarawak, while retaining its independent administration, was brought under a British protectorate. So was its neighbour, the tiny Sultanate of Brunei. And in 1881 a British North Borneo Company was organised to develop a large territory of some 30,000 square miles. The whole extent of the northeast coast of Borneo thus passed under British control.1

There remained the innumerable islands of the Pacific, the last field open for colonial development. Here Britain had hitherto been almost omnipotent, though she had as yet annexed nothing but Fiji. France had taken New Caledonia, which, to the indignation of the Australians, she had turned into a penal settlement; she had also annexed Tahiti and the Marquesas Islands. The United States exercised an informal protectorate over the islands of Hawaii. But all the other innumerable scattered gems were unoccupied. Many of them were afflicted by the labour-trade, of which we have said something in an earlier chapter;2 and those who had given most attention to the subject insisted that the only remedy for this evil was the establishment in all the islands of responsible and efficient government. Britain had hitherto refused to listen to this argument, being loth to take upon her laden shoulders the responsibility for

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1 See the map, Atlas, Plates 82 and 83.
2 Bk. x. chap. v. p. 539.
lands and peoples so remote. But she was not permitted to act on this view of her interests. Other British realms were concerned in the Pacific. Australia and New Zealand, thinly peopled and conscious of the difficulty of defending themselves against attack, were resolved that no other Power should be permitted to plant itself among the Pacific Isles, and perhaps to turn them into naval bases. It was the pressure of Australia and New Zealand which led to British annexations in this region; and their special concern was recognised by the transfer to them of responsibility for the administration of many of these new territories.

But what began the process was the appearance of Germany in these waters. In 1882 a German colonial society began to agitate for the annexation of Eastern New Guinea as the foundation of a colonial empire. Queensland, next neighbour to New Guinea, took alarm, demanded that the British Government should annex, and sent an official to carry out a provisional annexation; while the other Australian colonies and New Zealand backed the demand, and asked for the annexation of Pacific islands as well. But the British Government would not act, even in face of a joint protest by all the agents-general of the colonies. Then Bismarck announced his intention of annexing Northern New Guinea, upon which Britain promptly responded by declaring a protectorate over the south coast (1884). The German flag was hoisted not only in New Guinea but in the islands now christened the Bismarck Archipelago; and New Britain and New Ireland changed their names to New Pomerania and New Hanover. This was followed by a treaty like those which had marked the stages in the partition of Africa (1886); a group of archipelagoes in the north were assigned to the German sphere, Samoa and two other islands were left neutral, and Germany agreed not to interfere elsewhere in the Pacific.

During the Salisbury régime Britain began to be busy in the annexation of islands within this vast ‘sphere of influence.’ Between 1886 and the end of the century more than a hundred Pacific islands were annexed to the British Empire. Many of them were placed under the control of New Zealand, which became the centre of a far-scattered island-empire. But in 1899 Samoa, which had become dear to the English-speaking world as the home of R. L. Stevenson, was annexed by Germany and the United States, with Britain’s assent. Meanwhile the United States had formally annexed the Hawaiian group in the Northern Pacific.

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 83.
(1898), where her influence had been dominant since 1875. All the myriad islands of the great ocean were now divided among six Powers—Britain, France, Germany, the United States, Spain and Chile. A final change came in 1898 when the United States went to war with Spain, and, as the fruits of victory, annexed Porto Rico in the West Indies, and the Philippine Archipelago in the China Sea. Thus America, coming for a moment out of her isolation, took her place among the imperialist Powers.

The partition of the Pacific took place much more quietly, and aroused far less discussion, than the contemporaneous partition of Africa. But it was still more complete, and on the whole its results were beneficent. Peace and law now reigned among the islands, many of which had been disturbed by tribal wars, and many by the cruelties which had accompanied the Kanaka labour-traffic. These evils disappeared; and perhaps this was a compensation for the fact that in the romantic Pacific, as in almost every other part of the world, the rival world-empires now watched one another suspiciously and in arms.

There now remained no fields in which the imperialist ambitions of Europe could find further satisfaction save South America, which was barred to them by the Monroe doctrine, the Near East, where the decrepit Turkish Power was showing a new vigour under the influence of the Mohammedan revival, and the Far East, where the new Power of Japan was just rising above the horizon. But the problems raised in these regions were so wide in their range, that they will be best left to a later chapter.¹ In them lay some of the seeds of trouble which produced the Great War.

§ 6. The Third British Empire and the World-States.

Even a brief and desiccated summary of the feverish colonising activity of the European Powers during the last twenty years of the nineteenth century, such as we have given above, brings out in bold relief one outstanding fact. Britain had very completely shaken off the unwillingness to assume new imperial responsibilities which had marked her policy during the middle years of the century. Entering upon the competition with reluctance, she had ended by taking a richer and more valuable share of the unoccupied regions of the world than any of her rivals. In actual area, indeed, France had obtained a larger share, adding some

¹ Below, Chap. ix. p. 720.
4,000,000 square miles to her existing extra-European dominions during the twenty years; but a large part of this great total consisted of the barren and useless Sahara desert. The additions made to the British Empire during the same period amounted to some 3,500,000 square miles; but these territories were, for the most part, far more valuable than those of France, and much more varied in character. Germany, the latest of the competitors in the colonial sphere, had acquired, in Africa and the Pacific, about 1,000,000 square miles—less than one-third of the new additions to the already gigantic British Empire, and only about one-quarter of the acquisitions of her defeated rival, France. It was natural that in an era when the ambition of world-power had taken possession of men's minds, and when the European stage had come to seem relatively insignificant, patriotic Germans should be dissatisfied with the share of the earth's surface which had fallen to their lot, and should feel that it did not correspond with the might, the wealth and the energy of their country.

In particular it might well seem that the British Commonwealth, already the most gigantic political structure that human history had known, had got more than its fair share. In Western Africa it had secured (in addition to substantial enlargements of the old colonies of Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast) the great new colony and protectorate of Nigeria, which offered the richest opportunities for trade in all that part of the continent. In the south-central region it had secured the lake district of Nyasaland, and the wide lands of Rhodesia, the southern part of which was one of the few remaining regions suitable for the settlement of white men. In the east it had acquired the fertile uplands of British East Africa (now Kenya colony), the protectorate of Uganda, which controlled the sources of the Nile, and the coastal region of Somaliland. To all this it had added an irregular but effective control over Egypt over the Eastern Sudan, much of which is a fertile and well-watered region: thus the whole valley of the Nile, from source to mouth, was under British control; and, apart from the interruption presented by German East Africa, there was a continuous expanse of territory under British control, stretching from the north to the extreme south of the continent. Already, before the century closed, the dream of a Cape-to-Cairo railway, which the grandiose imagination of Cecil Rhodes had conceived, had been brought long stages towards realisation, and the
steel rails which were one day to bind all Africa together
had been brought far up the valley of the Nile at one end
of the line, and northwards as far as Rhodesia at the other
end. And to the African lands had to be added the Malay
Peninsula, the rich coast-lands of Borneo, a large section of
New Guinea, and more than one hundred islands in the
Pacific—all brought within the British Empire during these
twenty years.

In two respects this third empire differed from its pre-
decessors. Its lands (apart from Egypt, which did not
strictly belong to it) were inhabited by backward peoples;
it included neither white men's lands like Canada and
Australia, nor realms of ancient civilisation like India.
Hitherto the British Commonwealth had included scarcely
any territories so exclusively occupied by uncivilised tribes;
and therefore the problems which the new empire presented
were largely of a new kind. The second new feature was
the fact that substantial parts of these lands had been ac-
quired because of the insistence of the adolescent daughter-
nations, and were governed in intimate relationship with
them. British New Guinea was placed under the direct
control of Queensland; many of the Pacific Islands were
handed over to New Zealand; and the British South
Africa Company, which controlled Rhodesia, though not
directly connected with the Government of Cape Colony,
was linked with that Dominion through its founder, Cecil
Rhodes.

When the nineteenth century came to its end, a trans-
formation of a remarkable kind had taken place in the
political system of the world. The European peoples
appeared to have taken control of the whole world's destiny,
and to have brought all the peoples of the earth within the
orbit of a single political system; in external and material
things, at any rate, the civilisation of Europe had become
the civilisation of the world. Five great world-States
divided between them more than half of the land-surface
of the globe, and the fortunes of all the other peoples de-
dpended in no small degree upon the relations of these five.

In area and in population alike the British Commonwealth
was far the greatest of the five; its 12,000,000 square miles
formed nearly one-quarter of the world's area, and its
400,000,000 inhabitants nearly one-quarter of the world's
population. Next came the Russian Empire, with 8,500,000
square miles, inhabited by about one-twelfth of the human
race. The United States ranked third in population, with
about one-sixteenth of the human race, and over 3,500,000 square miles of area, but with a vague hegemony over the whole continent of South America. France had taken the fourth place, with nearly 4,500,000 square miles, and a population of 95,000,000; Germany the fifth, with only 1,250,000 square miles and a population of some 70,000,000, but with a strong and dominating position at the head of a great European alliance.

We have set forth these crude figures because they give a very vivid impression of the emergence of a group of giant empires, girdling the globe, which was the greatest portent of the end of the nineteenth century. These figures, though they give a not unjust conception of the share of responsibility for the governance of the world which these vast political structures had undertaken, give, of course, no guidance at all as to the relative strength, weight, influence and leadership which belonged to them. Moreover they leave out of account the Mohammedan peoples of the Near East, in the Turkish and Persian Empires, politically decrepit and disorganised, but strong with the binding force of their religion, which was reviving something of its old fervour. They leave out of account, also, the great yellow races of China and Japan, more than 400,000,000 souls of high civilisation and unexhausted industry and vitality.

The next era of human history was to be concerned with the complicated interrelations of the five great world-States which the European peoples had built up, and their dealings with the Mohammedan peoples and with the peoples of China and Japan. The history of civilisation was definitely passing, as the nineteenth century drew to a close, out of the European stage, and into a greater stage in which the interdependence of all the peoples of the world was to be more and more clearly demonstrated. And in that gigantic drama the world-wide British Commonwealth, forced out of its comparative isolation, could not but play a momentous part.

[Keltie, Partition of Africa; Johnston, Colonisation of Africa; Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty; Lugard, Rise of our East African Empire; Lady Lugard, A Tropical Dependency; Williams, Cecil Rhodes; Thomson, The Fijians; Rogers, Historical Geography of Australasia; Lucas, Historical Geography of West Africa; Clifford, Further India; Swettenham, British Malaya; Wiart, Les Grandes Compagnies Coloniales Anglaises au XIXe Siècle; Cambridge History of the British Empire; Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy; Theal, History of South Africa; Gearie, Nigeria under British Rule.]
CHAPTER III

THE DOWNFALL OF LIBERALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF IRELAND

(A.D. 1880-1895)

§ 1. The Second Gladstone Ministry.

When Gladstone won his great electoral triumph in 1880 and formed his second ministry, most men believed that the long spell of Liberal ascendancy, which had been temporarily broken in 1874, was going to be resumed. Gladstone’s personal prestige was at its height. Though he was over seventy, his powers seemed to be undimmed. He stood forth, not only in Britain but in the eyes of all Europe, as the supreme exponent of a view of national policy antithetical to that of Bismarck; he seemed to have convinced a majority of his countrymen that their true interests lay not in the assertion and extension of their power, but in the maintenance of peace, in domestic reform, and in abstention from all avoidable enlargements of their external responsibilities. He was at the head of an enthusiastic and well-disciplined party; since 1877 an elaborate party organisation had been wrought out, which covered every part of the country with an efficiency previously unknown. His Cabinet included an unusual number of men of exceptional ability; and among these the Birmingham Radical, Joseph Chamberlain, promised to be a fighting leader scarcely inferior to Gladstone himself. There seemed to be every reason to anticipate that the ministry of 1880 would have a triumphant career, and win the lasting loyalty of the democracy.

In the result these expectations were completely falsified. The Parliament of 1880 saw the beginning of the downfall of Liberalism, and was the prelude to a long period of Conservative ascendancy. This was in the main due to the emergence of new forces and problems which sharply

1 See above, p. 597.
differentiated the last quarter of the nineteenth century from the preceding age, and in face of which traditional Liberalism was bewildered and divided. In British politics, as clearly as in European and extra-European affairs, there was a marked change of atmosphere which became fully perceptible during the 'eighties.

The most obvious change was the new form which the eternal Irish problem was assuming under the guidance of Parnell. From 1880 onwards Irish questions dominated British politics, and the Irish difficulty was to be the chief means of breaking the powerful Liberal party into fragments. We shall deal with this engrossing and bewildering problem in the next section of this chapter.

But even if there had been no Irish problem, the changing conditions of the time would have strained and perhaps broken Gladstonian Liberalism. The age of imperialism had begun; the European peoples, as we have seen, were entering upon an era of fierce competition for extra-European dominion; and this very fact was stimulating among the British peoples an imperial temper which was out of key with the Gladstonian tradition. Foreign and, still more, colonial questions insisted upon occupying the forefront of the stage, and in spite of themselves Gladstone and his colleagues were compelled to give a great deal of their attention to these issues. They had to settle the Afghan difficulty, left unsolved by Disraeli. They felt themselves constrained to introduce a new departure in the government of India, which aroused bitter controversy. They had to deal with a rebellion in the Transvaal (1880). They were drawn reluctantly into Egypt (1882), and had to decide what was to be done with Mahdism in the Sudan. They were faced by a sudden danger from Russia (1884). They had to deal with the sudden outburst of colonising fever among the European Powers in Africa and in the Pacific. With the last of these questions we have already dealt, and the others will be discussed in later chapters. What we are here concerned to note is that the circumstances of the time made it impossible to attain the Gladstonian ideal of concentration upon domestic reforms, and abstention from foreign entanglements. And it is undeniable that the spirit in which this succession of difficult problems was handled was not in accord with the rising imperialist temper of the British people. More particularly, Gladstone's treatment of the South African problem, his apparent desertion of Gordon in the Sudan, and his complaisance towards Ger-
many and France in Africa, and towards Germany in the Pacific, aroused against him an angry hostility.

Not less disturbing was the growing strength of a demand for social reorganisation. We shall discuss in a later chapter\(^1\) the rise of a new Socialist movement which is one of the most interesting features of this time. In the early 'eighties it had not yet begun seriously to affect national politics. But the spirit which gave rise to it obtained some expression in the advanced Radicalism of which Joseph Chamberlain was the chief exponent. Throughout the years 1880-1885 there was acute friction between the moderates and the radicals in the cabinet, which was not always concealed from public view, and which added very greatly to the difficulties of Government. It became overt when in the general election of 1885 Chamberlain boldly put forward an 'unauthorised programme,' and engaged in an unseemly platform duel with his Whig colleague, Lord Hartington. The 'unauthorised programme' was Radical indeed, and aroused fierce indignation among tepid Whigs as well as among staid Conservatives. Chamberlain was dreaded as a demagogue even more dangerous than his chief. His programme included disestablishment, free education, drastic differential taxation of the rich, and a bold agricultural policy which promised the creation on a vast scale of small holdings—'three acres and a cow'—for rural labourers; and it was accompanied by pungent and virulent denunciations of the House of Lords, and of the rich 'who toil not neither do they spin.' Gladstone, though he was not afraid of bold proposals, had little sympathy with the ideas of this school; the Socialist tendencies of the younger generation were as much out of harmony with his mode of thought as its imperialism.

These differences and difficulties made it almost impossible to carry out any large, coherent legislative programme. But there was another, and, at the moment, a more perturbing difficulty. The machinery of parliamentary government seemed to be breaking down. The Irish under Parnell's leadership were pursuing a policy of systematic obstruction. A little group of Conservatives known as the Fourth Party and led by Lord Randolph Churchill, set themselves to imitate the methods of the Irish, and introduced an acrimony into discussion such as had not been known since 1846. And, by an unlucky chance, the demand of the atheist Bradlaugh to be allowed to make an affirmation

\(^1\) Below, Chap. vi. p. 681.
instead of taking an oath on his election for Northampton introduced a topic on which an incredible amount of time and fury was wasted. The proceedings of the House of Commons were degraded, as never before, by incessant scenes of disorder; the rules of procedure had to be drastically revised, and the old dignity and freedom of debate disappeared. One consequence of these events was that the prestige of Parliament, which had been at its height during the previous generation, began to decay. This process was assisted by the fact that the chief arena of debate on public policy was increasingly being transferred from Parliament to the platform; and Gladstone himself, by his great oratorical tours, contributed in no small degree to this result. It was assisted also by the growing rigidity of party organisation which marked this period, and which was, perhaps, the inevitable outcome of the creation of a very large electorate.

In spite of all these difficulties Government succeeded in obtaining the assent of Parliament to a number of useful measures, such as an Act against corrupt practices in parliamentary elections (1883), an Act making employers liable for accidents to their workmen (1880), and a Married Women's Property Act (1882), which remedied a great injustice. But, putting Irish legislation apart, it was only able to carry one measure of first-rate importance—the third Reform Act (1884), with its accompanying Redistribution Act (1885).

The Act of 1884 was of the first importance, because it practically established democracy. Twice as many new voters were added by this Act as had been added by the Act of 1867; in effect it conferred the franchise upon every male head of a household; and for the first time the agricultural labourer was endowed with political powers. Yet, significantly enough, there had been no loud public demand for the enlargement of the franchise. For a moment the House of Lords threatened resistance, and an agitation for the 'mending or ending' of that chamber seemed about to begin. But the Lords contented themselves with insisting that the extension of the franchise should be accompanied by an agreed measure of redistribution; and the Act of 1885 was the result. In some respects the Redistribution Act was even more important than the Franchise Act. It divided Britain for the first time into equal electoral districts, each represented by a single member. The districts, in order to be equal, had to be artificial areas, existing solely for the purpose of the election. They could not correspond with
real communities that possessed a character and tradition of their own. This was a departure which broke away from the ancient tradition which gave to the House of Commons (communes) its very name. At the same time, the system of single-member constituencies increased the power of the party machines; no candidate, in such a constituency, could have much chance of election unless he was put forward by a party organisation. It is possible that these consequences of the new system helped to produce the slowly growing sense that there was a certain unreality in the parliamentary system.

§ 2. The Irish Problem and the First Home Rule Bill.

But all other issues of this period shrink into insignificance in comparison with the growing menace and difficulty of the Irish problem. The new phase into which this ancient problem now passed was due to three things: to the continued existence of the party of violence; to the organisation of a formidable agrarian campaign; and to the personality and policy of Charles Stewart Parnell, who was chosen in 1880 as the leader of the Home Rule party, which was 61 strong in the new Parliament.

The party of violence, which aimed at securing the independence of Ireland by means of outrage and terrorism, drew its main strength from America. From 1880 to 1884 it was continually engaged in forming dynamite plots, which invariably came to nothing. But the constant reports of these dastardly plots had a profound effect upon British opinion; and Irish events were interpreted in the light of them. They were organised and financed mainly by the American Clan-na-Gael, which spent some £25,000 on them.

The agrarian agitation of these years was only the latest of a long series of such troubles, on which we have had to comment from time to time. Like its predecessors, it was due to the acute distress from which the Irish peasantry were still suffering, and which the well-meant Land Act of 1870 had done little or nothing to remedy. Agricultural distress was serious in England as well as in Ireland in the late seventies; there were bad harvests, and cheap American corn was beginning to pour in. In both countries corn-land was turned to pasture, on a large scale. In Ireland there were wholesale evictions to make this process possible, and the 1870 Act did not avail to prevent them, because it only

1 Above, pp. 89, 202, 333, 398, 509, 586.
gave security to tenants whose rents were paid, and nearly all the Irish peasantry, being heavily over-rented, were deep in arrears. In 1879 a Land League was formed, to encourage tenants to resist. Part of its policy was the use of the 'boycott,' so called from an agent named Boycott, who was the first victim of the method: the owner or agent who evicted a tenant, and the new holder who took the farm, were excluded under this system from all human fellowship. But the agitation was not limited to the comparatively pacific methods of the boycott. Outrages of various kinds, ranging from the maiming of cattle to murder, took place on the largest scale. Those who took part in these outrages, even if they were discovered, were certain to be acquitted by an Irish jury.

Quite distinct from these campaigns was the policy of securing Home Rule, or legislative independence, which Parnell and his Irish colleagues had set before themselves. Parnell was a young Protestant landlord of English descent, who had sat in Parliament since 1875. He was not a man of great intellectual power or constructive ability. But he was a man of inflexible will, an icy fanatic, not to be deflected by any power on earth from the object he had set before himself, reserved and unapproachable, but strong in his utter contempt for the opinion of the world. He made himself the absolute master of his party, and brought them to regard themselves as sitting in Parliament not in order to forward the welfare of the United Kingdom, but singly and solely in order to secure independence for Ireland by proving to the English that Ireland could not be governed in defiance of its own will. One way of proving this was to show that Irish members both could and would, if they were forced to attend at Westminster, reduce parliamentary government to derision. For this end he had mastered parliamentary procedure, and brought obstruction to a fine art. About the form of Ireland's self-government he did not greatly care, so long as Ireland was left free to manage her own affairs. Sometimes (in America) he spoke of severing every link with England; at other times he seemed to be content with the control of local affairs.

Parnell early realised that if he was to have the whole force of national feeling behind him, he must come to an agreement with the other movements. He went to America to persuade the American-Irish to finance his movement, and to drop the hopeless policy of outrage, which he despised. He was never completely successful; though he
got large funds. But his relations with the murder-organisation in America naturally exposed him to criticism. He also took up the agrarian agitation, and became President of the Land League; not so much because he cared about the land-question in itself, as because he saw how useful the agitation was in demonstrating the failure of British rule.

Such was the situation with which Government was faced in 1880; though the facts were by no means understood, and in the popular view Parnell and his colleagues were identified with the dynamiters and the moonlighters. A twofold remedy seemed to be necessary. On the one hand, in view of the impotence of the ordinary machinery of law, special powers must be taken to deal with agrarian crime; on the other hand, a serious attempt must be made to remove the causes of the evil, by a bold treatment of the land question. For the first purpose the Chief Secretary, W. E. Forster, obtained powers, for a short period, to arrest and imprison suspected persons without trial. Hundreds of suspects were arrested; but without effect. For the second purpose, Gladstone introduced a drastic Land Bill (1881), which was strongly attacked, but carried. It practically turned the tenant into a joint proprietor with the landlord; it provided that his rent might be fixed, not by competition, but by a Land Court; that he should have fixity of tenure so long as this judicial rent was paid; and that he should be free to sell his interest in his holding. When the Land Courts were established, it was found that they reduced existing rents, on an average, by about 25 per cent. This was a real and solid boon to the Irish peasantry. But it did not appease them; outrage still continued.

Meanwhile Forster, in desperation, had suppressed the Land League as a criminal organisation, and imprisoned Parnell and some of his colleagues. This had no effect in reducing agrarian crime: as Parnell predicted, his place at the head of the Land League was taken by 'Captain Moonlight.' Evidently the policy of repression was a failure. Chamberlain opened communications with Parnell, who undertook to co-operate in restoring peace if the interned men were released and arrears of rent were dealt with. The undertaking was accepted; both Chamberlain and Gladstone were beginning to think of the possibility of establishing a generous system of local self-government in Ireland; and Forster was replaced as Chief Secretary by Lord Frederick Cavendish, who was to inaugurate a new régime. But the hopes of peace were blighted by the news that the new Chief
Secretary and his principal permanent official, Mr. Burke, had been murdered in broad daylight while crossing Phœnix Park (1882). The murder-gang had intervened to prevent reconciliation. Parnell, genuinely shocked, offered to resign his seat, and the offer led Gladstone to change his opinion of the Irish leader. But after this outrage a new Crimes Act seemed to be necessary; and once more passions were aroused to intensity on both sides. Yet the attempt to remove the causes of distress was not abandoned. A drastic measure for the cancellation of arrears of rent was passed; and the cabinet discussed a proposal for setting up in Ireland elected County Councils, with a National Council to which should be transferred most of the powers of the Dublin Castle bureaucracy.

From 1882 to 1885 the Crimes Act (which gave powers of summary arrest to the police, and allowed grave crimes to be tried by three judges without a jury) was firmly enforced; and crime undoubtedly diminished, partly for that reason, but partly because the Land Act and the Arrears Act were easing the situation. But the demand for Home Rule was not weakening. Parnell, who had definitely quarrelled with the American extremists, replaced the Land League in 1882 by a National League, whose sole aim was Home Rule. When the Reform Act was under discussion in 1884, there was strong opposition to its extension to Ireland; but Gladstone indignantly refused to deny equal rights of citizenship to the Irish people merely because some of them were criminals, and Ireland obtained the enlarged franchise, which everybody knew would increase the strength of the Parnellite party.

In 1885 the Liberal Government was defeated on the budget, and the Conservatives under Lord Salisbury, though in a minority, assumed office for a few months, pending a dissolution. In the coming election much would depend upon the Irish vote in England. The Conservative leaders gave out that they were prepared to govern Ireland without exceptional legislation. Their Viceroy, Lord Carnarvon, with Lord Salisbury's knowledge, had a private interview with Parnell, in which he conveyed the impression that he was prepared to go far in the direction of Irish self-government. The order therefore went forth that all Irish votes were to be given to the Conservatives.

During the election, and even before it, Gladstone's mind was evidently moving towards Home Rule. He sounded some of his colleagues as to the possibility of a settlement
'on colonial lines.' But he made no definite public pronouncement on the question, beyond asking for a clear majority not dependent on Irish votes. The result of the election was to demonstrate Parnell's complete ascendancy in Catholic Ireland: 86 out of 103 Irish members returned pledged to Home Rule. It was no longer possible to deny that the Irish people (apart from Ulster) had made up its mind on this subject; 86 against 17 was a very different proportion from 61 against 42. The British elections gave the Liberals a majority of 86 over the Conservatives; and this meant that the Irish members held the balance, and that they could make parliamentary government impossible. In face of these facts, Gladstone made up his mind that Home Rule in some form must be granted. But knowing the difficulty of carrying it, he let Lord Salisbury know that he could count upon Liberal support if he would attempt the settlement of the Irish problem, which could plainly only be solved by agreement. Salisbury refused to discuss the matter. His ministry, in due course, was defeated and resigned; and Gladstone resumed office, to undertake the heaviest task of his life, at the age of seventy-seven.

From the outset it was made plain that he could not hope to carry his party with him. The Whigs, led by Hartington, deserted him. Some of the Radicals, led by Chamberlain, came into the ministry, but withdrew when they saw the nature of the measure proposed. A great party was cleft in twain; social ostracism was the lot of those who adhered to Gladstone; his policy was widely regarded as sheer treason, motives solely by greed for power. But the old man persisted, introducing, with the help of his Chief Secretary, John Morley, not only a very bold proposal for the establishment of an independent legislature in Ireland, but a vast scheme for the buying out of the Irish landlords at a cost of £50,000,000 and the creation of a peasant proprietary. It is needless to discuss the details of these measures. Their fate was sealed beforehand. After intense and passionate debates, in which the opposition was mainly conducted by Gladstone's late colleagues, the first Home Rule Bill was thrown out on the second reading by a majority of 30. But the old man refused to submit to his defeat. He went to the country; and in a second election within nine months the bewildered electorate decided against him, giving to the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists a majority of 118 over the Liberals and Parnellites combined. The Liberal ascendancy was at an end. A long period of Conservative govern-
ment began, and the possibility of the conferment of self-government upon Ireland receded into the distance.

§ 3. The Salisbury Government and the Second Home Rule Bill.

The Liberal débâcle of 1886 put the Conservatives, under Lord Salisbury, into power for six years, though they depended upon the support of the Liberal Unionists. Salisbury’s second ministry was a successful and competent Government. On its bold and aggressive imperial policy we have already said something, and shall have more to say in a later chapter. It also passed some useful measures of social reform. But its most outstanding legislative achievement may be described as a long overdue completion of the Liberal policy of political reorganisation. The Local Government Act of 1888, which was based upon a scheme drawn up by Sir Charles Dilke, Gladstone’s President of the Local Government Board, was in truth the counterpart and sequel of the Municipal Reform Act of 1835. It set up elected Councils in every county, to which were transferred the functions hitherto exercised by the Justices of the Peace; and, by constituting Greater London an administrative county, it gave to the metropolis, for the first time, a unified system of administration. No measure of the second half of the nineteenth century has had more beneficent effects than this great Act, which was followed by a reforming activity on the part of the new Councils comparable to that which had resulted from the municipal Act of 1835. With its sequel, the Parish Councils Act of 1894, it completed the framework of English self-government, reduced to order the administrative confusion which had been created by the piecemeal legislation of the previous half-century, and provided the machinery which made possible the social and educational reforms of the next generation.

But the Irish question still dominated everything: ‘politics are Ireland,’ said Lord Salisbury in 1887; and throughout these years Irish questions occupied the greater part of the time of Parliament, and drastic changes in procedure had to be adopted in order to make the transaction of business possible. The Conservative recipe for Ireland was ‘twenty years of resolute government’; and for six years, at any rate, the recipe had a fair trial. A new Crimes

1 Above, pp. 626 ff.; below, p. 678.
2 Below, p. 684.
3 Below, p. 650.
Act (1887) showed how impossible it was to govern Ireland without exceptional powers, in opposition to the sentiments of the majority of the people. It was firmly and suavely enforced by Mr. Arthur Balfour in the teeth of unresting criticism, no longer from the Parnellite group alone, but from the whole opposition; and an attempt to carry on a new rent agitation under the name of the Plan of Campaign was resolutely suppressed. But 'resolute government' was accompanied by restorative measures:—a new Land Law (1887), extending the scope of that of 1881; a land-purchase Act (1891), whereby the treasury undertook to advance to the tenant the money necessary to purchase his holding whenever the landlord was willing to sell; and a series of relief works in the congested and poverty-stricken area of the west. Home Rule was to be killed by firmness and kindness.

But Home Rule was not killed. The agitation went on, backed now by the Liberals, and it appeared from the bye-elections that Britain was being gradually converted. For Gladstone, in particular, Home Rule had become a passion, the supreme object of his life; and his spell over the electorate seemed to be reviving. Two events profoundly influenced this movement of opinion. The first was the publication in The Times of a series of articles purporting to prove, with the aid of letters, a connexion between Parnell and his followers and the Fenian conspirators. These allegations were the subject of a prolonged inquiry before three judges in 1888 and 1889; and when it was discovered that the damnatory letters were forgeries by a wretched and debased Irish journalist, the revulsion of feeling in Parnell's favour was very great, even though the judges reported that the Irish party had been engaged in a conspiracy to bring about separation from Britain. But the effect of this inquiry was undone, and far more than undone, when in 1890 Parnell failed to offer any defence when charged as a co-respondent in a divorce case. The 'Nonconformist Conscience' was aroused. Parnell, invited to retire from the leadership of his party, flatly refused to do so; after heart-rending discussions he was deserted by the majority of his followers, but continued to fight fiercely and bitterly for his own hand in Ireland until his death in 1891, at the age of forty-six; and the revulsion of feeling in Britain was immense.

Only a year after Parnell's death, Parliament was dissolved. Gladstone, now eighty-two years old, had hoped
for a majority sufficiently large to enable him to crown his life-work by passing a measure which would, as he believed, reconcile Britain and Ireland. The divorce case had shattered that hope, if it had ever been justified. He obtained a majority, indeed; but it depended on the Irish vote, and even with Irish aid amounted only to 40. Yet he assumed office, and at the age of eighty-three introduced the second Home Rule Bill with his old fire and intensity, and fought it through the long debates in Committee with almost his old tenacity and skill. But this was futile heroism, for the fate of the bill was sealed beforehand; it passed the House of Commons, but was contemptuously rejected by the House of Lords. Gladstone would have been ready to go once more to the country; but his colleagues knew that this was hopeless; and in 1894 the old man, accepting his defeat, gave up his office and quietly left the scenes in which he had been such a brilliant and dominating figure for sixty-three years.

The ‘transient and embarrassed’ Liberal ministry lasted until 1895, under the premiership of Lord Rosebery. It carried out a bold scheme of taxation in the Harcourt budget of 1894; it passed an Act establishing District and Parish Councils; it introduced bills for the disestablishment of the Welsh Church, for local option in the licensing of public-houses, and for enlarging the liability of employers for accidents to workmen. But most of these labours were a futile ploughing of the sands. There was no strength left in the Liberal party; and when the Government fell in 1895, its own members were relieved.


For another decade Liberals remained in the wilderness; and the prospect of the enactment of Home Rule seemed more remote than ever. Once more the medicine of firmness and kindness was applied; but now kindness increasingly predominated over firmness. In 1896 an ambitious land-purchase Act, which Gladstone might have fathered, was passed; in 1903 it was supplemented by a still more sweeping measure, whereby £100,000,000 were advanced by the British treasury to buy out progressively all the Irish landlords. In 1898 Ireland was endowed with a full system of representative county government. The Irish Agricultural Society, under the guidance of Sir Horace
Plunkett, set itself to stimulate co-operative enterprise. Land-purchase and co-operation between them brought a rapid increase of prosperity in Ireland; when the twentieth century opened, the old miseries had almost disappeared.

But the desire for self-government had not disappeared. The Irish Nationalist party, once more united and now working in intimate harmony with the British Liberals, still kept its hold over the Irish electorate. What was more striking, a large section of the southern Irish landowners, hitherto staunch Unionists, began to hanker after self-government, and to co-operate with some of the Nationalist leaders. In 1904 they went so far as to demand a scheme of devolution, whereby an Irish Financial Council was to have the expenditure of large funds for purely Irish purposes. This produced a violent reaction among the more extreme Unionists, who forced the Government to disavow these projects, and to throw overboard the Chief Secretary, George Wyndham, who had encouraged them.

It seemed as if a spirit of reconciliation was growing up. But the reverse was true. The demand for complete legislative independence was so far from being dead or even weakened that it began to take a new form. A trial had been given to the constitutional method of proceeding by parliamentary action. It had promised well at first. It had converted one of the great British political parties. But nearly twenty years had passed since the first Home Rule Bill was introduced, and Home Rule seemed more distant than ever. A group of Irish enthusiasts decided that the only true course for Ireland to pursue was to hold aloof altogether from British politics, to cultivate self-reliance, to revive the language and traditions of Ireland, to develop its industries, to stimulate among its young men a hatred of Britain, and to await the moment when Britain should be otherwise engaged, and when it should be possible to strike for complete independence. Sinn Fein was born just at the moment when the policy of killing by kindness seemed to be succeeding. It was born of the long failure to obtain the concession of Home Rule by constitutional means.

[Morley, Life of Gladstone; Cecil, Life of Salisbury; Crewe, Life of Rosebery; O'Brien, Life of Parnell and A Hundred Years of Irish History; Eversley, Gladstone and Ireland; Barker, Ireland in the Last Fifty Years; Macdonagh, The Home Rule Movement; Henry, Evolution of Sinn Fein; Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill; Ensor, England 1870-1914; Guedalla, The Queen and Mr. Gladstone; Curtis, History of Ireland; Gwynn, History of Ireland.]
CHAPTER IV
EGYPT AND THE EGYPTIAN SUDAN
(A.D. 1882-1904)

§ 1. The Causes of British Intervention in Egypt.

In all the long story of the British Commonwealth there is no episode more extraordinary, more romantic, or, on the whole, more creditable, than the rapid and brilliant work of regeneration which was carried out in Egypt and the Sudan by a small group of British administrators during the last twenty years of the nineteenth century. Begun in an accidental and haphazard way, with no anticipation of what was to follow, it was carried out in the teeth of varied difficulties; yet in the course of two short decades, under the direction of a man of genius, it achieved results that appear all but incredible.

We have seen 1 how Mehemet Ali had tried, by the methods of oriental despotism, to force upon Egypt the material organisation of Western civilisation, and how, until the European Powers intervened in 1840, he had striven to extend his military power on every side. Among his conquests one alone survived: a great part of the Sudan remained a subject possession of Egypt, and was ruled from Khartoum. 2 But it was a costly possession, involving a continual drain upon the Egyptian treasury. Indeed, all Mehemet Ali’s achievements were costly to his subjects. The mass of the Egyptian fellahin, performing forced labour under the lash, forced into the army by the same persuasive methods, and taxed until they were left with nothing but the barest subsistence, suffered the extremes of wretchedness. Only the dominant classes of Turkish and Arab foreigners, who were the instruments of Mehemet’s tyranny, shared in his wealth.

After an interval during which much of Mehemet Ali’s work was undone, his Westernising policy was resumed by Said Pasha (1854-63), who began the construction of rail-

1 Above, Bk. ix. chap. vi. p. 369.
2 See the map, Atlas, Plate 88 (b).
ways and authorised the Suez Canal, and still more by Ismail Pasha (1863-79), a reckless spendthrift of vague and grandiose ambitions. One of these ambitions was the extension of Egyptian power in the Sudan, which was subjugated as far to the south as the great lakes and the borders of Abyssinia. For the conquest and administration of these Equatorial Provinces Ismail trusted to two adventurous Englishmen, first to Sir Samuel Baker (1869-1873), the explorer of the sources of the Nile; and then (1874-1879) to a still more brilliant and romantic figure, Charles Gordon,¹ a Scottish soldier who was known as 'Chinese Gordon' because of his dazzling exploits as commander of a Chinese army against the Tai-ping rebels in 1863-1864. Gordon was one of the noblest and most heroic men whom Britain has ever given to the world: 'the hero of heroes' as Gladstone called him. A mystic and a saint, pure-hearted and single-minded, he was also a born leader of men, and especially of simple and primitive men, whom he could inspire with a devoted trust in himself. But he was a creature of impulse, who trusted absolutely to his own varying intuitions, without being able to justify them; for this reason he could not easily work in harness, and was always a difficult colleague. In five years Gordon established an extraordinary personal ascendancy among the wild tribes of the Sudan; and he waged relentless war against the cruel slave-trade by which these lands were desolated. When he left the Sudan in 1879, he had planted it on the path to peace and order, and garrisons of Egyptian troops, widely distributed, held the vast province in some sort of obedience. But there was a good deal of unrest among the fierce chieftains whom he had bitted and bridled, and this unrest grew rapidly under Gordon's incapable Egyptian successor. The continuance of progress in the Sudan depended upon Egypt; and meanwhile Egypt was falling into chaos.

The Khedive Ismail had discovered that he could borrow money from European financiers. He borrowed cheerfully and recklessly, raising the public debt of Egypt in thirteen years from £3,000,000 to nearly £100,000,000; while the unhappy fellahin were subjected to an indescribable tyranny, fleeced of all their earnings under the lash, and continually subject to forced labour. Some of the money raised by loans was spent on railways and roads, and on a Nile dam, which was not put to use; but most of it was merely wasted,

¹ There is a short life of Gordon by Sir W. Butler in the 'English Men of Action' Series, and an essay by G. L. Strachey in Eminent Victorians.
swallowed up by the hordes of European, Turkish and Arab adventurers who haunted Ismail’s spendthrift court. The European bondholders took alarm, and in 1876 Ismail was forced to agree to the establishment of an international *Caisse de la Dette*, to which, as security for the bondholders’ interest, some of the principal sources of Egyptian revenue were to be paid direct, instead of going into the treasury. For nearly thirty years this international body had its finger in Egyptian finance, and offered the greatest obstacle to systematic reforms. But this was not the end of European interference. The French and British bondholders, who held most of the debt, realised that it was not enough merely to sequester half of the revenues. If Egypt was to be saved from bankruptcy, her finances must be regulated; and they therefore secured the appointment of two Controllers-general of Egyptian finance, one French and one British. Ismail resented his reduction to impotence, intrigued against the Controllers, and even suborned a military mutiny against his own ministers. The European Powers, on the initiative of Germany, thereupon began to interfere again; and in 1879 they got the Sultan, as suzerain of Egypt, to depose Ismail and to replace him by his young son Tewfik. Up to this point the British Government had played little part, though the British bondholders had been active.

Meanwhile a secret conspiracy was astir among the Egyptians. Its nominal leader was Ahmad Arabi, an officer in the Egyptian army, of *fellah* origin, and the movement of which he was the spokesman was primarily a protest against the monstrous misgovernment from which Egypt was suffering. But it was also a nationalist movement, aimed against the ascendancy of the Turkish ruling class, and, in a secondary degree, against European influence. As it went on, the anti-European element became stronger; it was encouraged by the influence of the fanatical Mohammedan revival which Abdul Hamid was fostering, and whose prophet, Djemal-ed-Din, was busy in Cairo. The centre of this dangerous movement of disaffection was the disorganised and unruly Egyptian army. Ismail had encouraged the movement for his own purposes. Under his son Tewfik it became overt. The Khedive was compelled to accept a ministry drawn from among the revolutionaries, with Arabi as War Minister (1882). But the revolutionaries had no capacity for government. They could only create anarchy. They were playing with the dangerous explosives of racial and religious hatred. And the position of the many thou-
sands of Europeans in Egypt became exceedingly unsafe. Some action was necessary. Gambetta, then Prime Minister of France, suggested to Britain that the two Powers should intervene jointly. Gladstone's Government reluctantly agreed. French and British ships appeared off Alexandria, as a precaution. There was a massacre of Europeans by the Egyptian mob. The British fleet thereupon bombarded the forts, and marines were landed to protect the European population. The French fleet took no action, its Government, after the fall of Gambetta, having changed its mind; and henceforth France stood aloof.

Intervention could not stop with a naval demonstration. After a conference of ambassadors at Constantinople, and a refusal by the Sultan to send troops to Egypt, Britain announced that she would intervene single-handed, but would withdraw as soon as she had restored order and re-established the Khedive's authority. An army was promptly sent to Egypt under Sir Garnet Wolseley. Arabi's disorderly troops were overwhelmed at Tel-el-Kebir (September 1882); a tiny squadron of cavalry daringly pushed on to Cairo and received the submission of the capital; Arabi and his allies were taken prisoners, and subsequently banished to Ceylon; and the revolt was over. The revolt was over; but the restoration of order and stability had still to be undertaken.

Meanwhile grave events had been happening in the Sudan since Gordon's departure. A fanatic had arisen in the southern part of the provinces, proclaiming himself the Mahdi or Messiah (1881). He was gathering adherents, and his Khalifas, or generals, were subjugating tribe after tribe with ruthless cruelty. By the time the British authority was established in Egypt, he had made great progress. The security of the Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan was threatened. Egypt itself, whose army was now broken and disbanded, might be endangered. The problem which faced the British Government was therefore not merely the problem of restoring order in Egypt, but also the more difficult question, What was to be done with the Sudan? Britain had undertaken a vastly more difficult task than she had anticipated.

§ 2. The Tragedy of Khartoum and Baring's Work at Cairo.

The position now occupied by Britain in Egypt was both irregular and delicate. Her army occupied the country, and was its only defence. But her representatives had no
formal authority. Britain was not the suzerain power: that position belonged to Turkey, which often made difficulties. The Khedive and his ministers were nominally responsible for the conduct of government; all that the British agent could do was to offer advice, though it is true that the presence of the army gave his advice a certain quality of emphasis. And alongside the Khedive's Government was the *Caisse de la Dette*, which controlled half the revenues of the country, regarded with the utmost jealousy every exercise of British influence, and often created needless difficulties. Finally, France, bitterly disappointed at the loss of her hitherto dominating influence in Egypt, was always watchfully critical; and a good many Frenchmen were employed in various Egyptian government services. It is impossible to conceive a more anomalous or a more thorny position than that which the British agent had to occupy; and to carry out, from such a position, the re-organisation of a bankrupt and totally disorganised State was a task which seemed beyond human powers. But a man was found to perform this incredible task. His name was Evelyn Baring, afterwards Lord Cromer; and he was the chief hero of the wonderful achievement which we have to record in this chapter.

The first problem which had to be solved was the problem of the Sudan. In 1883 an Egyptian force of 10,000 under a British officer, Hicks Pasha, was sent by the Khedive's Government to crush the Mahdi's revolt: this army was annihilated; and a smaller force which sallied out from Suakin under Valentine Baker Pasha was equally unfortunate. These disasters increased the dependence of Egypt upon British protection; and they also showed that the Sudan could not be reconquered by Egyptian resources. If a British army were employed, the task might occupy years; and it would delay the evacuation of Egypt, to which the British Government was pledged, and which it was honestly anxious to carry out at the earliest moment. The only possible conclusion seemed to be that the Sudan must be abandoned, and in this conclusion, after Hicks' defeat, Baring fully concurred. But the Egyptian garrisons could not be left to the mercy of the Mahdi. They must be withdrawn. Who could perform this task? Who, if not Gordon? In January 1884 the Government in London asked Gordon if he would undertake the definite mission of evacuation. He undertook it; left London the same night; and arrived in Khartoum a month later.
But once in Khartoum, the problem presented itself to the generous and impulsive soldier in a new light. He shrank from complete abandonment; yet he issued a proclamation announcing that it was to take place, and by doing so aggravated his own difficulties. He bombarded Baring with contradictory telegrams. He demanded that Zobeir, a Sudanese chieftain and slave-trader then confined in Cairo, whose son Gordon himself had killed, should be sent to succeed him. London was perplexed. There were delays and discussions, but Gordon took no definite steps towards evacuation; and meanwhile the Mahdi's forces were gathering. By April escape from Khartoum had become impossible, and now the problem was, how Gordon could be relieved. The experts in London and Cairo differed as to whether an attempt should be made across the desert from Suakin, or up the Nile. 1 Precious months were wasted. When the Nile route was decided upon, boats had to be built; and it was not until November that a force under Wolseley began to advance to the relief of the beleaguered hero. A small advance-guard, pushing eagerly ahead, came in sight of Khartoum on January 28, 1885. They saw only ruins: Gordon had been killed only two days before, after a desperate lonely fight against swarming savages. The death of the hero deeply moved the British people, to whom Khartoum became a holy place. After these events the Sudan was necessarily left to the murderous and devastating rule of the Mahdi, and after his death in 1885 to his successor the Khalifa, whose tyranny is said to have reduced the population, in a dozen years, from 12,000,000 to 2,000,000.

Meanwhile Baring and his colleagues were labouring at the difficult uphill task of restoring Egypt. During the first years they had to strain every nerve merely to avoid bankruptcy and to reconstruct the army. Rigid economy in everything but irrigation achieved the first end; a handful of young British officers carried out the task of recreating an Egyptian army and restoring its self-respect; and a few British engineers, by means of admirable irrigation works, laid the foundations of future prosperity. By 1888 the budget had been made to balance, and it was possible to undertake great works of restoration on a large scale. Railways were constructed; schools were opened; scientific sanitation was introduced; hospitals were built; the whole system of justice was overhauled and freed from corruption;

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 88 (a).
the abuse of power by local officials was checked; the *fellahin* were freed from the terrors of the lash; the taxes were greatly reduced, and collected fairly. For the first time in many centuries the *fellah* found himself treated as a free man with rights; and meanwhile the productivity of his holding was doubled by irrigation, and lands previously waste were brought under cultivation. Within a dozen years Egypt had been turned into a land of flourishing prosperity, and her industrious peasantry had been enabled to enjoy the fruits of their own toil. And during the same period the Egyptian army had been recreated, and had repeatedly shown its quality in frontier fighting against the dervishes of the Sudan. It is not easy to find in all history the record of a work so beneficent and so swift. It was done by a little group of men who held no position of definite authority, but nominally acted merely as advisers to the various Egyptian ministries, while they were hampered at every turn by vexatious restrictions imposed by the international body which controlled the *Caisse de la Dette*.

§ 3. The Reconquest of the Sudan, and the Entente of 1904.

By 1896 the time had come when it was possible to think of rescuing the Sudan from the hideous barbarism into which it had been plunged. Europeans who had suffered imprisonment in the hands of the Khalifa had brought back terrible stories of their own sufferings and of the misery of the countryside. Not only for the sake of the Sudan itself, but as a condition of security for Egypt, reconquest seemed to be necessary. The Egyptian army was ready for the task, and it was now under the command of a Sirdar, Sir Herbert Kitchener, who had spent laborious years in shaping the instrument he was to use, and who was soon to prove himself a master of patient organisation.

In three campaigns, 1896, 1897, and 1898, Kitchener secured the line of the Nile from Wady Halfa to Khartoum, building a railway line as he advanced to supply his troops, and boldly carrying it across the desert to avoid a great loop of the river. In every fight which the Khalifa dared to offer, the Egyptian forces, backed by a small contingent of British troops, fought with steady gallantry. Finally, on September 2, 1898, at Omdurman, opposite Khartoum, Kitchener fought a decisive battle against the Khalifa's host, routed him with heavy losses, captured his capital, and ended the ugly tyranny which had desolated the Sudan
for seventeen years. The total cost of this supremely efficient campaign was under £2,500,000; and more than half of this represented the cost of constructing a railway line which is a permanent addition to the country's resources. £800,000 of the total was met by the British treasury; the rest was defrayed out of the surplus which Baring had built up in Egypt, without the addition of one penny to the burden of taxation.

A new difficulty now presented itself. Kitchener learnt at Khartoum of the arrival of a French force at Fashoda, far away in the Equatorial Provinces, where Baker and Gordon had long before ruled. One of the main justifications for the conquest of the Sudan was the importance, for the welfare of Egypt, of controlling the upper waters of the Nile, upon which the very existence of Egypt depends. On that ground the occupation of any part of this region by another Power was held to be undesirable; and for that reason the French had to be persuaded to withdraw.¹

The great task still remained of reorganising the whole vast area of the Sudan. Before the outbreak of Mahdism, the Sudan had been a part of the realm of Egypt. But it had been reconquered by a joint effort of Egypt and Britain; and this was recognised by the proclamation of a joint sovereignty, which had one great advantage, that it saved the new province from being subjected to the vexatious international control which had worked so much harm in Egypt. In reality the main responsibility for organisation and government fell upon a few British officers, with Kitchener, and later Sir F. R. Wingate, at their head. In a very few years they effected a regeneration as remarkable as that which Baring had achieved in Egypt. They made no attempt to Anglicise or Egyptianise the population. But they rooted out the slave-trade; they put an end to tribal wars; they fostered agriculture and trade; they gave complete toleration to all beliefs; they introduced schools; they set up courts of justice. All this was carried out with taxes at a very low level; yet without any increase in taxation, the revenue increased almost tenfold in ten years. Ten years after this beneficent work began it was possible for a visiting officer to report, after a tour of inspection, 'I do not suppose that there is any part of the world in which the mass of the population have fewer unsatisfied wants.' If there be any who doubt whether European government brings benefits to backward peoples, the

¹ See above, Chap. ii. p. 627.
record of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan supplies a sufficient answer.

Meanwhile in Egypt the work of Baring, now Lord Cromer, had been consolidated and extended, and when the new century opened the prosperity as well as the safety of Egypt seemed to be secure. It might now be contended, not without apparent reason, that Britain's task in Egypt was done, and that she might safely withdraw. This was persistently maintained by France; it was felt by the young Khedive Abbas Hilmi, who succeeded to the throne in 1892, and promptly began to work against British influence; it was urged by educated Egyptians, convinced that they were now ready for self-government, and a nationalist and anti-British movement was already rising in the 'nineties. But the work which had been so swiftly done might be as swiftly undone; and would infallibly be undone unless a scheme of government could be devised which would provide adequate safeguards. It was already evident, when the new century opened, that vexed and difficult questions would soon be raised.

One thing, however, had become plain. So long as the existing régime lasted, there could be no further need for the financial supervision exercised by the Caisse de la Dette in the interests of foreign bondholders; for the credit of Egypt was now as good as that of most European countries. But such a system, once established, is difficult to uproot. It was maintained especially by the unappeased annoyance of France, who could not forget that she might have been the dominant Power in Egypt, and who was persuaded that she had been tricked by British hypocrisy.

Throughout the period of regenerative work which had transformed the condition of Egypt, France and Britain had been separated by a multitude of petty causes of friction. In 1904, drawn together by causes which will be analysed in a later chapter, they settled all their outstanding difficulties; and one of the main subjects of their agreement was Egypt. France recognised the special position of Britain in Egypt, while Britain declared that she had no intention of altering the political status of the country, that is to say, of bringing it under her direct control. At the same time France agreed to the issue of a Khedivial decree whereby the powers of the Caisse de la Dette to interfere in the machinery of government were abolished, and Egypt resumed full command of her own resources. The

1 Below, Chap. ix. p. 720
Caisse remained, but only to receive and distribute the funds necessary to pay the interest on the debt. The agreement was communicated to the other Powers represented on the Caisse, Germany, Austria and Italy, and obtained their assent. The period of chaos, of foreign interference, of international wrangling and of internal misgovernment was thus brought to an end. This was only twenty-one years from the time when Evelyn Baring arrived as a British agent accredited to the Government of a bankrupt country on the verge of anarchy.

[Cromer, Modern Egypt; Milner, England in Egypt; Colvin, Making of Modern Egypt; Wingate, Mahdism and the Eastern Sudan; Churchill, River War; Arthur, Life of Kitchener; Gleichen, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan; Temperley and Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy; Hauser, Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe; Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy.]
CHAPTER V
FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND NATIONALIST ASPIRATIONS IN INDIA
(A.D. 1880-1904)

§ 1. The North-West Frontiers and the Annexation of Burma.

Safe behind her all but impregnable barriers of mountain and sea, solidly organised in a political unity which she had never known before, and efficiently administered under a system which had been gradually perfected during a century of experiment, it might have been expected that India would have enjoyed an era of untroubled peace, unaffected by the rivalries of the European Powers, or the political controversies of the West. But in two ways the last two decades of the nineteenth century brought troubles to India. On the one hand, the fear of Russia continued to be acute, and caused the problems of defence on the North-West Frontier to occupy the minds of her statesmen; while in the North-East the advance of the French in Indo-China helped to force on a new war, which ended in the conquest and annexation of the great province of Burma. On the other hand, the political ideas of the West, diffused by schools and colleges of Western learning, began to work actively among the educated classes, and gave rise to an era of political unrest which was to become yet more acute in the next period.

The fear of Russian advance against the North-West Frontier had led to the second Afghan War (1878), in which Lord Lytton had striven either to bring Afghanistan as a whole under British influence, or to break it into three States. In 1880 Lord Ripon was sent by the Gladstone ministry to reverse this policy. As soon as the war had been brought to an end, an agreement was made with the Amir whereby Afghanistan was to be left entirely to itself, without even a British Resident; but the Government of India undertook to pay a regular allowance to the Amir,

1 See above, Bk. x. chap. vi. p. 560-2.
and guaranteed his frontiers against an attack from without. It soon became apparent that this guarantee was not to be a mere form of words. In 1884 Russia, pursuing her conquests, occupied the city of Merv, on the north-west frontier of Afghanistan; and in the next year a Russian force suddenly attacked the Afghan frontier post of Panjdeh. War was narrowly avoided; and in the next few years this part of the Afghan frontier was defined by agreement. But the episode kept alive the fear of Russia, both in India and in Afghanistan; and even when the undefined part of the frontier among the high mountains of the Pamirs had been delimited by a joint commission (1895), the fear did not disappear. For Russia was busily engaged in pushing forward railway lines through Central Asia towards the Afghan frontier; and the problem of frontier defence continued to be one of the dominant problems of Indian politics.  

Between Afghanistan and the territory under effective British control lay a belt of hill-country, inhabited by warlike frontier tribes, the Afridis, the Waziris and others, whom nobody had ever been able to control: this belt, indeed, through which runs the all-important route of the Khyber Pass, was and still is the most turbulent and disorderly region in the world. In 1893 the Amir agreed to recognise British suzerainty over these tribes, and a commission headed by Sir Mortimer Durand drew an agreed frontier-line (often referred to as 'the Durand line') between Afghanistan and the Indian Empire, which included this belt. But attempts to keep the tribes in check only brought on a series of frontier campaigns, in the most important of which, that of Tirah (1897) not less than 40,000 troops had to be employed; and at the end the subjugation of the tribes seemed as far off as ever.

It was left to Lord Curzon (1899-1905) to find a solution of this problem. He dealt with it by creating a special North-West Frontier Province, whose administrators would devote themselves specially to this problem. British troops were withdrawn from all the more advanced positions, where their presence irritated the tribesmen; and the maintenance of order, especially in the Khyber Pass, was entrusted to a force raised among the tribesmen themselves, and known as the Khyber Rifles. On the whole this system has been successful; but the fierce warrior clans of the frontier are always a danger, especially when they are under the influence of religious fanaticism. Hence the revival of

1 See the maps, Atlas, Plates 80, 82 and 83.
Mohammedan ardour, which was growing in force during these years, threatened, if it should gain a strong hold either in Afghanistan or among the frontier tribes, to give serious trouble to India.

Alongside the revision of frontier policy went a revision of the Indian military system. Until 1895 there had been a separate army for each of the three old Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay. This arrangement no longer corresponded with real needs. In 1895 the whole of the military forces were brought under a single command, while their numbers were considerably enlarged. The chief native princes, who had shown eager loyalty during the Panjdeh crisis, were encouraged to form bodies of Imperial Service troops. And in 1903 and the following years Lord Kitchener, as Commander-in-Chief, carried out a far-reaching reorganisation of the whole system, whereby everything was made to pivot upon the defence of the North-West Frontier.

It was the fear of Russia which had primarily caused these large rearrangements. The same fear led to a remarkable expedition to Tibet in 1904: a Russian envoy had been received in that mysterious country, and, fearing lest Russia was preparing to outflank India on the north, Lord Curzon sent a force over passes 19,000 feet high to negotiate a treaty with the Grand Lama of Tibet. There was some fighting before the treaty was signed. But it had no influence upon the course of events.

Meanwhile fear of another European Power than Russia had led to a very important acquisition of territory in the East. The Burmese Empire had twice challenged war with the East India Company (1823, 1852), and on each occasion it had lost territory. It was now a purely inland state, limited to the upper valley of the Irrawaddy; and beyond its vague and ill-defined boundaries lay China in the North, the recent French conquests of Indo-China farther South, and, finally, the kingdom of Siam, on which France was beginning to exercise pressure. In 1878 a new king, Thibaw, had ascended the Burmese throne: a bloodthirsty tyrant, who signalised his accession by a massacre of other members of the royal house. From the beginning of his reign British relations with Burma were strained, treaties allowing free access to British or Indian traders were disregarded, and the British agent had to be withdrawn. Early in 1885 Thibaw concluded an ominous treaty with

1 See above, pp. 318 and 455.
France, whereby that country obtained substantial privileges, and became the dominant influence in the country. A little later Thibaw imposed a monstrous fine upon the Bombay and Burma Trading Company, and threw its agents into prison. Lord Dufferin, then Viceroy, promptly despatched an ultimatum: and when the Burmese King refused to give satisfaction, a British force was sent by river to Mandalay. In a fortnight the Burmese resistance was overpowered; Thibaw was deposed and deported to India; and Burma was annexed to the Indian Empire. The main reason for this drastic action was unquestionably a fear that France was about to take possession of Burma.

Five years of difficult irregular jungle fighting against bands of plunderers had to be faced before Burma was reduced to order; for the country had long suffered from the ravages of these dacoits, and the disbanded soldierly added to their strength. But while this struggle went on, the process of organisation was carried forward; and in a very short space of time this rich and fertile land was enjoying a prosperity such as it had never known before. Between 1890 and 1900 the population increased by nearly 20 per cent., and the amount of land under cultivation by more than 50 per cent.

§ 2. The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon.

Important as were the military problems which India presented during this period, they were of very minor significance in face of the vital fact that the new wine of Western ideas was at length fermenting to some purpose in the ancient wineskins of Indian civilisation; and two generations of English education were beginning to bear their fruit. Indian nationalism came to birth.

It was in the viceroyalty of Lord Ripon (1880-84) that this pregnant change began. Ripon was not a man of commanding ability; but he had been sent out by Gladstone to inaugurate a new Liberal policy, not only on the North-West Frontier, but in the internal government of India. And as the new policy came at a moment when India was ripe for change, it brought about immense results. For that reason Ripon’s viceroyalty ranks among the most important in the long series. He left India in 1884 amid an outburst of popular enthusiasm such as none of his predecessors or successors has ever enjoyed, and in the regard of Indians he ranks first among all the Viceroyals.
Four acts of Ripon's contributed to produce this remarkable effect. In the first place, he repealed Lytton's Vernacular Press Act,¹ and gave full license to the Indian newspaper press, which, as we shall see, made ample use of its opportunities. In the second place, he took the first step towards the establishment of a system of self-government, by setting up, in 1882, elected municipalities in the towns and District Boards in the rural districts, for the declared purpose of providing the Indian peoples with a training in self-government in preparation for the future. These local bodies were endowed with substantial powers of administration and taxation, though they were left under the supervision of the District Officers. They have not worked well. But they were hailed as a substantial step towards the establishment of autonomy, which Western-educated Indians were beginning to demand.

Ripon's third innovation was even more important in its consequences. He appointed a Commission to inquire into the educational system, and on its report introduced great changes in the educational policy of the Government of India. Hitherto the schools and colleges of Western learning had been almost all under the control either of Government or of the missionaries. After the Education Commission of 1883-4 Government began to withdraw from the provision of educational facilities, and to encourage District Boards or private organisations to take up the work, with the support of Government grants. The immediate result was an extraordinarily rapid increase in the number of schools and colleges under purely Indian management, and a correspondingly rapid increase in the number of students. Hitherto the Indians who received a Western education had been a small proportion even of the traditionally literate castes, and they had obtained their training mainly from Englishmen, in small classes. Within twenty years of the introduction of the new policy it had come about that a training in English high schools, and in colleges preparing for university degrees, had become the normal training for nearly all members of the traditionally literate castes; and most of these thousands of new pupils were receiving their training entirely from Indian teachers. When the twentieth century opened the educated classes of every part of India were linked together by the possession of a common language—English—and a common body of ideas and aspirations conveyed through that language.

¹ See above, p. 562.
This was a remarkable and in many ways an inspiring development. But it had its dangers. The new schools and colleges were for the most part undedowed and very poorly equipped; they could not afford to pay for competent teachers, except when (as sometimes happened) the teachers were inspired by pure zeal for their work; nor could they provide adequate facilities in the way of libraries or laboratories for an efficient and critical training. For the most part they confined themselves to coaching their pupils for the examinations conducted by the Universities, which were purely examining boards. And the thousands of graduates whom they turned out found it increasingly difficult to obtain appointments suitable to the training they had undergone, especially as this training was for the most part purely literary in character, and did not help those who received it to offer the multiform practical services of which their country stood in need. An immense new class was thus being created, which was full of ideas drawn from Western sources, and many members of which had good grounds for discontent. In yet another way the results of the new departure were disappointing. Ripon and his advisers had hoped that the new District Boards would use the powers vested in them to develop a system of elementary education for the masses of the people. They did not do so; for though they showed zeal for education, it was mainly for the kind of education wanted by the literate castes, to which the members of the District Boards themselves mostly belonged. The amazing expansion of the number of Western-educated Indians, mainly Hindus of the old dominant castes, which took place during the twenty years following Ripon’s viceroyalty, was one of the most significant things which had happened in the modern history of India; for the existence of this large, influential and vocal class constituted a factor in Indian politics which henceforth could not be disregarded.

The fourth important measure of Ripon’s Government to which we need here refer was an attempt to make a change in the administration of justice which aroused a storm of controversy and led to a very grave embitterment of racial feeling. Europeans in India had possessed the right of being tried only by British magistrates. In 1883 a bill (known as the Ilbert Bill) was introduced in the Legislative Council which proposed to put an end to this privilege, and to place Indian magistrates in all respects on a level with their British colleagues. The outcry among European
traders and planters was so loud that these provisions had to be withdrawn. But the withdrawal aroused the most intense and bitter feeling among Indians; it seemed to them to be a proclamation of their own inferiority in their own country. And the effects of this controversy lasted long after the actual storm had died down.

§ 3. The Birth of Indian Nationalism.

All these events combined to stir into activity the national self-consciousness of the Indian educated classes; for now that India had been politically unified under British rule, and now that they themselves possessed a common medium of communication and a common body of ideas derived from the schools of Western learning, it was possible for educated Indians to feel a sense of unity which had never before been possible in divided India; possible, also, for them to aspire after the institutions of political liberty, in which Britain had taught them to believe. In 1885 these sentiments led to the summons of the first meeting of what came to be known as the Indian National Congress; and year after year thereafter Congresses met in one or another of the chief Indian cities, to make speeches and pass resolutions claiming political privileges like those enjoyed by the self-governing colonies. Throughout this period the Congress proclaimed its gratitude and loyalty to the British power, while demanding the liberties which Britain had fostered in other countries: 'new light has been poured on us' said Dadabhai Naoroji, the President of the second Congress, 'teaching us the new lesson that kings are made for the people, not peoples for their kings; and this lesson we have learned amid the darkness of Asiatic despotism only by the light of free English civilisation.' The Congress was not, and could not be, an elected representative body; it consisted mainly of delegates sent by various societies, and all comers were welcomed. Moreover it was a purely Hindu body: the Mohammedans stood aloof from it. But its proceedings marked a very important stage in the political development of India.

Alongside of the National Congresses, which concerned themselves solely with politics, there was a series of National Social Conferences, whose aim was to weaken or destroy the social evils which arose from the rigidity of the Hindu caste system. In face of the profound inequalities prescribed by caste—in face of the existence of 50,000,000 Indians who
were branded as 'untouchable'—there were many reformers who felt that the propagation of democratic ideas was difficult: 'you cannot be fit to exercise political rights,' said one of the greatest among them, Mr. Justice Ranade, 'unless your social system is based on reason and justice.' But the social conferences led to no definite result, and had little influence; because it was felt that the raising of these questions might weaken the political agitation by causing divisions. The 'untouchables' still remain untouchable.

The Congress movement was inspired by Western ideas, and aimed at introducing a Western political system into India. But on its nationalist side it drew strength also from various Hindu religious movements which, far from preaching Western ideas, insisted that India was inherently superior to the West. Thus a great Bengali prophet, Swami Vivekananda, who died in 1902, taught that 'the world must be conquered by India,' by her spiritual force; and the belief in Indian spiritual superiority became almost an axiom among Indian patriots. Thus, again, a prophet of Gujerat, Dayanand Saraswati, founded a powerful sect, known as the Arya Samaj, to preach the necessity of a return to the primitive wisdom of ancient India. The Arya Samaj, which had nearly 100,000 adherents in 1900, taught that primitive India had known all and more than all that the West now knew; and it became, especially in the North-West, a powerful preacher of national pride and sometimes of racial antipathy.

Thus the Westernising political and social movement was accompanied by a strong current of anti-Western feeling; and though they were inherently incompatible, these two streams of thought combined to produce, among a part of the educated class, a formidable ferment of nationalist sentiment. It was the anti-Western note which predominated in popular propaganda. A large section of the Indian press devoted itself to plangent assertions that British rule had done nothing but harm to India; that it was responsible for the poverty of the peasantry, for the recurrent famines, for the dread visitation of plague; that it was draining India of all her wealth, which was being exhausted on the salaries of British officials (only 5000 in number), and on the interest on British capital invested in India (which had equipped the country with its railway system, and many other sources of wealth). These doctrines were nowhere more vigorously preached than in the Mahratta country, where an able Brahmin, B. G. Tilak, taught the readers of
his newspaper to turn back to the glorious deeds of the warlike Sivaji, the founder of the Mahratta Empire. Sivaji had murdered a Moslem general, a foreign ruler, at a conference: his deed was glorified, and the moral was drawn from it.

Under the influence of such teaching, unrest was becoming more and more serious in some parts of India during the 'nineties; and in 1896 a shortage of rain and an outburst of bubonic plague in Bombay came to intensify the unrest. In that year two young Brahmins at Poona murdered two British officials who were engaged in trying to quell the plague. A beginning had thus been made of resort to the argument of assassination.

§ 4. The Eve of Great Changes.

As yet it was but a negligible minority of the educated class which had adopted this attitude of bitter opposition to British rule; and the educated class as a whole formed less than one per cent. of the vast population of India. The political demands of the Congress, the preachings of Dayanad, the ravings of Tilak, seemed to be no more than a local ruffling of the surface-waters of a profound ocean. But the ferment was natural, and in many of its manifestations healthy. It was the inevitable consequence of the introduction of the new wine of the West into the old wine-skins of the East. And it was bound to grow, because the classes among which it had begun, though not numerous, wielded an immense influence. They held the ancient priestly leadership of the sacred Brahmin caste; and to this they added the control of all the newspapers, and of all the schools, and they included the whole legal profession. There were deep differences among them as to the extent to which change should go, and the forms which it should take. Few of them realised that the democratic idea was irreconcilably hostile to the fundamental tenets of Hinduism, and to the social order which Hinduism maintained. There could be no deeper difference than that which separated those who ultimately wished to repudiate and discard Western influences, and those who wished to reshape India in accord with Western ideas. But these differences were obscured so long as all could combine in criticism of the existing system of government.

Government was not blind to the significance of these movements or to their dangers. It did not believe that
in the then condition of India any sudden introduction of the institutions of self-government was feasible. But it made some concessions. In 1892 a representative element was for the first time introduced into the legislative councils. But this gave no satisfaction, because the elected representatives were outnumbered by official nominees; the real and effective control of Indian affairs still rested with the British administrators.

And, on the whole, the system of government still worked smoothly and well. In some ways it reached its apogee in the viceroyalty of Lord Curzon (1899-1905), when the splendour and pride of empire found a more grandiose expression than at any earlier time. The superb Durbar of 1903, held for the purpose of proclaiming the accession of Edward VII. to the imperial throne of India, outdid in magnificence anything that even India had ever seen; and to those who witnessed these splendours, and the display of loyalty by which they were accompanied, the Congress agitation and the ineffectual venom of the vernacular press must have seemed wholly negligible. Nor did Lord Curzon confine himself to the display of splendour and power. We have seen how a great military reorganisation and a reconstruction of frontier policy were effected under his régime. At the same time every department of administration was revised and overhauled, and the system attained a degree of efficiency unknown since Dalhousie’s time. Moreover Lord Curzon undertook a new function hitherto strangely neglected: he devoted money, thought and energy to repairing and tending the monuments of Indian history; and the tombs and palaces of the Mogul Emperors, the buried relics of the great Asoka at Sarnath, the remains of the great artistic achievements of the Buddhist period, were tended with a reverence never known before.

But there were two of the activities of this vigorous vice-royalty which aroused a bitter controversy that showed the strength of the Indian nationalist movement. Lord Curzon tried to reform the Universities (1903-4). They desperately needed reform. But it was unfortunate that the reform should have taken the shape of a tightened control by Government; for this was the sphere in which the educated classes were most deeply interested. Again, purely with a view to increased efficiency of administration, Lord Curzon divided the immense province of Bengal into two. The partition of Bengal, as it was called, was held by many Bengalis to be a violation of Bengali national sentiment.
Bengal, the province in which Western education had been carried furthest, and in which the abuses of the University system were at their worst, became the centre of a violent agitation which burst into flame immediately after Lord Curzon’s departure from India, and gave the keynote of the period of strain which was to follow.

CHAPTER VI

THE NEW IMPERIALISM; AND THE RISE OF
SOCIALISM

§ 1. The Sources of the Imperialist Movement.

It is very evident that during the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century the character of the reigning political ideals
by which men's minds were influenced was undergoing a
rapid change, not only in Europe but in Britain and through-
out the British Commonwealth. The aspirations after
national independence and popular self-government, which
had been the chief driving forces of the earlier part of the
century, though not less powerful than before, were falling
into the background, because in most cases they had largely
been satisfied. Their place, as the dominant motives of
political action, was being taken by different ideals, by the
pride of empire on the one hand, and on the other by a
desire to use the power of the State for the purpose of
carrying out large schemes of social reconstruction. These
new ideals were not incompatible with one another, any more
than the nationalism and the liberalism of the earlier part
of the century had been. Both influenced the thought of
all political parties in all countries, in a greater or less
degree. Both could inspire a genuine idealist fervour; both,
in their more vulgar forms, were liable to be debased
into a gross materialism.

In the British lands the imperialist temper of the time
showed itself in two forms. It led to the complete aban-
donment of that unwillingness to assume new imperial re-
sponsibilities which had been so strongly marked during
the previous period, and to the rapid annexation of vast
territories in Africa, the Pacific, and the Far East which we
have noted in an earlier chapter.¹ There was much that
was repellent in the eagerness to acquire territory for the
mere sake of acquiring it, the delight in 'painting the map
red,' which helped to stimulate the immense imperial

¹ Chap. ii. p. 620.
activity of the time; and there was too exclusive a concentration upon the profits that might be made out of colonial possessions. Alongside of these motives others were at work, a desire to keep existing markets open, a real sense of the obligation of carrying civilisation to the backward peoples, which Kipling called 'the White Man's burden,' and a still powerful sentiment, inspired by the missionaries, that the primitive savage ought to be protected in his rights and led gently into a better way of life. But the grosser motives on the whole predominated; and for that reason many felt that there was hypocrisy in the emphasis laid by poets and politicians upon the more exalted motives, and swung back into an indignant repudiation of imperialism and all its ways.

But alongside of the imperialism of acquisition, which naturally bulked large in the era of partition, there was another imperialism, the imperialism of unification. With a sort of shock of delight the men of this generation rediscovered the British Empire. They began to take pride in the marvellous achievement which had brought one quarter of the population of the earth into a single fellowship of peace. They saw themselves as citizens of something far wider than a little nation-State, concentrated exclusively upon the pursuit of its own interests. They realised that they were bound by an infinite diversity of mutual obligations to people of almost every race and creed and colour. They recaptured something of the ideal which had inspired the Radical Imperialists of the 'thirties, Durham, Molesworth and Wakefield, the ideal of a partnership of free peoples united by the common enjoyment of the institutions of political liberty; and, regarding no longer with complacency but with dismay the idea of a dissolution of this august fellowship, they set themselves to give greater reality to the haphazard and accidental bonds by which alone it seemed to be held together.

In truth the Commonwealth ideal had never died out, even in the period of self-complacency when it seemed to have been forgotten in high places. It had been strongest in the colonies, because they were conscious of their weakness: the tradition of the United Empire Loyalists never died in Canada; from Australia suggestions of imperial federation came as early as the 'fifties. Even in Britain, despite all appearances, the sense of imperial unity, as we have already noted,¹ never vanished. But it was in the

¹ Above, Bk. x. chap. iv. p. 514.
'eighties, when all the world was competing for colonial dominions, that the imperial idea began to take possession, no longer merely of a few enthusiasts, but of the national mind in Britain. In this change of outlook no small part was played by a little book, Seeley's *Expansion of England* (1883), a lucid and suggestive review of the long process, extending over three centuries, whereby the British Empire had been established. Disencumbered of detail, it brought out in bold outline the nature and significance of this astonishing achievement; and it impressed upon its myriad readers the conviction that the growth of the Empire had been the outcome not of a deliberate lust for power, but of the undirected and fecund energy of the British people. With Seeley's book may be coupled *The Influence of Sea-Power in History* (1890), by an American naval officer, Captain Mahan, which shed a new light on modern history by bringing out the supreme importance of the part played by the British Navy in the rivalries of the European Powers, and by exhibiting sea-power as the support of oversea dominion. A still more powerful literary force appeared with the publication of Rudyard Kipling's stories and poems in the years following 1886; for Kipling had a power of appealing to ordinary men which no great literary craftsman since Dickens had equalled, and he drew his inspiration from the imaginative appeal of the British Empire. His vivid and virile tales and verses threw the glamour of romance round the obscure deeds of soldiers on the Indian frontiers, of administrators grappling with difficult tasks in loneliness, of bridge-builders and road-makers, of pioneers in strange places, of rough sailormen in tramp steamers. The reader of these glowing tales was made to feel pride in the work of his race-fellows upon an infinite variety of manful tasks in many climes and in the service of all manner of men.

The politicians were also at work. In 1884 an Imperial Federation Society was founded; it had for its first Presidents the Radical Forster and the Liberal Lord Rosebery. The tradition of the old Radical Imperialism was reviving, and henceforth there was always a powerful imperialist element among the Liberals, though the Liberal party as a whole was less sympathetic to these ideas than its rival, and for some years (1898-1906) there was a definite cleavage in the party on this issue.

Formal schemes of imperial federation, indeed, made no headway. But the sentiment which inspired them
other modes of expression. In 1887 Queen Victoria celebrated the jubilee of her accession to the throne; and this was made the occasion of a pageant of empire such as had never been seen in the world before, not even in the greatest days of Rome. The amazing procession of princes and fighting-men, drawn from every part of the world, which passed through the streets of London, brought home to the popular imagination, as nothing else could have done, the pride and pomp of empire. The Crown, as the symbol of the long history of the British peoples, and as the sole formal link which bound them all together, was the natural centre of this demonstration; and a succession of stately royal ceremonials drove home the impression created by the pageant of 1887: the Diamond Jubilee of 1897, the funeral of Queen Victoria in 1901, the Coronation of King Edward VII. in 1902, the magnificent Durbar in which the King's succession to the imperial throne of India was proclaimed in 1903, the tours of the Prince of Wales in various parts of the empire, all contributed to impress the popular imagination with a sense of the magnitude and variety of the amazing fabric of power which had been built up during three centuries by the peoples of the islands.

Moreover these celebrations were used as occasions for conference between the leading statesmen of Britain and those of the self-governing dominions; and there was also a conference of colonial ministers at Ottawa in 1894. These Colonial Conferences (1887, 1897, 1902) had, of course, neither legislative nor executive power. But they were the first occasions on which the statesmen of the empire took counsel together; they helped mutual understanding; they caused all the members of the Commonwealth to think of it as a single whole. The colonies began to advocate a system of imperial preference. Some of them, notably Australia and South Africa, began to make voluntary contributions to the upkeep of the navy, the whole burden of which had hitherto fallen upon the mother-country. Increased attention began to be paid to inter-imperial communications, whether by cable or by steamship routes.

The leading statesmen of the great colonies became familiar figures in Britain, and the names and persons of Laurier, Seddon and Reid were better known than those of many British ministers. But the outstanding and typical figure of the time was Cecil Rhodes, whose whole public career, from his election to the Cape Parliament in 1880 to his death in 1902, fell within the period under review.
This millionaire idealist, this combination of visionary, company-promoter and chauvinist, who used gigantic commercial undertakings as instruments for the extension of empire, who conceived such grandiose projects as the proposed railway from the Cape to Cairo, and whose whole life and strength were given to the ideal he had conceived, with a devotion as simple and unreserved as that of any saint or missionary, was the very embodiment of the reigning idea of his time. We shall have to deal elsewhere \(^1\) with his work in South Africa, and its momentous consequences; here we are concerned with him only as the standard-bearer of an idea. At the age of nineteen, during a long journey over the veld, he had undergone an experience almost like that of religious conversion; he had become convinced that the best hope of peace and justice for the world lay in its being brought under the leadership of the English-speaking peoples, and he solemnly vowed himself to the service of this astonishing aim, from which he never swerved. It was not of mere world-dominion that he dreamt. He insisted upon complete local freedom in his own colony of South Africa; he believed that the strength of the British system lay in its combination of freedom with unity; and for this reason he subscribed largely to the funds of the Irish Nationalist party, holding that the concession of a generous measure of Home Rule was in accord with the true imperial tradition, and would strengthen instead of weakening the Empire. The ideal which inspired him was that of a world-girdling partnership of freedom and peace, in which he hoped that America and Germany might become willing partners with the British Commonwealth; but the means whereby he pursued this aim were not always scrupulous. He had at the same time a real sympathy with the native peoples, as he showed both in Cape Colony and in Matabeleland; but he held that it was essential for their own welfare that they should be brought under European, and preferably under British, control: he wanted all Africa to be British. It was to find the means for achieving these ends that he built up his colossal fortune, for he was himself a man of very simple tastes; and when he died it was found that he had left the bulk of his fortune to turn his beloved Oxford, which he regarded as the very hearth and altar of the English spirit, into a centre for the training in comradeship of the best men from all the Dominions, from America, and from Germany. There was nothing mean or cowardly.

\(^1\) Below, Chap. viii. p. 712 ff.
about Cecil Rhodes: he served the cause to which he gave his allegiance with the self-abandonment, and also with the adaptability of method, of a Jesuit missioner.

§ 2. Imperialism in Action.

The date at which the imperial idea became the dominant factor in British policy is very clearly fixed: it was the moment when, after the defeat of the first Home Rule Bill in 1886, Gladstone's ministry gave way to a Conservative ministry under Salisbury. The defeat of Home Rule was itself, in part, an expression of imperialism: one of the grounds on which Home Rule was most strongly denounced was that it would involve 'the disruption of the Empire.' The Salisbury Government entered vigorously into the scramble for Africa, and secured for Britain territories far more valuable than those obtained by any other Power; it arranged the imperial pageant of 1887, and summoned the first Colonial Conference; it laid the foundations of the modern British navy by the Naval Defence Act of 1889, which was based upon the standard that the navy must be superior to those of any two other Powers.

The Liberal ministry of 1892-1895 followed in the footsteps of its predecessor; for Lord Rosebery, who was at first Foreign Secretary and then Prime Minister, was as keen an imperialist as Lord Salisbury. But the Liberals were divided on these questions; and the division was one of the causes which weakened them. It was because he disapproved of the large programme of naval construction adopted by his colleagues in 1894 that Gladstone retired from the premiership; and the cleavage between imperialists and anti-imperialists broke the Liberal party in twain during the following years.

But the high tide of imperialism came with the formation of the administration of 1895, in which the Liberal Unionists joined forces with the Conservatives. This ministry reconquered the Sudan, drove France out of Fashoda, sent Lord Curzon to India to define a new frontier policy, held the great pageants of 1897, 1901 and 1902, fought the South African War, and swept the country in what came to be known as the 'khaki election' of 1900. The South African War was, indeed, the culmination of the imperialist era. We shall discuss it elsewhere, in relation with the history of South Africa.1 But it was far more than a South African

1 Below, Chap. vii. p. 714 ff.
event. It demonstrated the reality of imperial unity, by bringing volunteer forces from all the great Dominions to fight in a common cause; and for the first time in history the spectacle was offered of men gathered from every continent, from Europe, Africa, Asia, America, Australasia, in the conviction that they must stand or fall together. This impressive demonstration—all the more impressive because the sentiment of the civilised world was almost unanimously hostile—had a lasting effect; it was the first common effort of the whole Commonwealth, and it was not to be the last. But if in this sense the South African War marked the apogee of the imperialist movement, it also brought about a reaction. It had a sobering as well as a stimulating effect; there were many who, rightly or wrongly, felt nothing but shame at the crushing of the Boer republics, and learnt to think of Empire as a sort of Juggernaut to which cruel sacrifices had to be made; the humiliations and the long delays of the war damped down the exultant and flamboyant temper of the 'nineties; and, like men becoming sober after a carouse, many Englishmen began to be ashamed of the rather blatant chauvinism of that period.

The dominant figure in British politics during these years of high imperialism was Joseph Chamberlain, the stormy Radical of 1885. Even in his Radical days he had always been an imperialist; though he vigorously supported the Gladstonian policy in the Transvaal and the Sudan, he was, according to John Bright, 'the only Jingo' in the cabinet of 1880. He did not forget his early zeal for social reforms, and the reforming measures or promises of the Salisbury Government owed a good deal to his influence; but now his social enthusiasm was merged in, and dwarfed by, the imperialist ardour of which he became the spokesman. He came to believe that not only freedom and power, but economic welfare and social health, depended upon the pursuit of an imperial rather than a national policy.

In 1895 Chamberlain could have had almost any office he chose, for he was now recognised as the most forceful personality in British politics. He chose the Colonial Secretaryship, hitherto regarded as a post of secondary importance; and the very fact that the most commanding figure in the ministry was the spokesman of the colonies implied a vital change in the attitude of Government toward imperial problems. It is not possible to name any specific legislative or administrative act of Chamberlain's period of office which could be described as initiating a new
departure in policy; yet his tenure of the Colonial Office did genuinely mark a turning-point in the relations between the mother-country and the daughter-nations. The tone of his despatches and speeches, the spirit in which he welcomed proposals from the colonies, his persistence in keeping imperial problems in the foreground, his emphasis upon the necessity of 'thinking imperially,' on the one hand kept the mind of the British people awake to the fact that they were not an isolated nation, but one member in a great partnership of nations; while on the other hand these things dispelled the belief, hitherto widespread in the colonies, that Britain was indifferent to their welfare. The conviction grew that New Zealand and Jamaica were just as intimately members of the British Commonwealth as Devon and Lothian; and this conviction had a great deal to do with the zealous loyalty of the Dominions during the South African War, when the sentiment of the civilised world was almost unanimously hostile to the British cause.

When the ordeal of war came to an end, Chamberlain was eager to find some means of consolidating and strengthening the imperial unity which common effort had fostered. With the example of Germany in his mind, he conceived the idea of an imperial Zollverein, like that which had given to Prussia her first hold over the other North German States. In effect he was returning, though in a new form, to the old idea of basing imperial unity upon a system of trade relations, which Britain had pursued from 1660 to 1782. The first step towards a Zollverein would be a system of imperial preference. Already several of the Dominions had made suggestions which pointed in this direction. In 1887 Cape Colony had proposed that a duty of 2 per cent. should be levied upon foreign imports into every part of the Empire, the proceeds to go towards the upkeep of the navy. In 1897 Canada had given a substantial preference on imports from Britain or other Dominions, and Cape Colony, Australia and New Zealand later granted similar preferences. But Britain could make no response without abandoning her free-trade methods. Chamberlain resolved that she must be persuaded to do so. In 1903 he resigned from the ministry in order to devote himself to the advocacy of this cause; and for several years a fierce controversy on 'tariff reform' engrossed the attention of the British electorate. As Chamberlain himself frankly acknowledged, no preferential tariff would be of much use to the Dominions unless it included duties on food-stuffs, which formed the staple
Dominion exports to Britain. Even if the country had been ready to abandon the system of Free Trade, the proposal to tax food would have ensured the failure of the scheme, especially at a time when, as in the years following the war, trade was bad; and the chief result of Chamberlain's great campaign was to give to the Liberals an unprecedented majority in the election of 1906.

That election marked, indeed, the end of the period of exultant imperialism. Some results of the imperialist period were lasting; the British people had acquired a new conception of what empire might mean, and had realised more clearly than ever before the significance and the value of a partnership of free and kindred peoples. But the more grandiose and flamboyant ambitions of the previous decade had lost their attractiveness. In the light of the humiliations of the war, the incompetence which it revealed, and the difficulty of the problems which it left for solution, the confidence of a Kipling or a Rhodes in the inherent capacity of the British people to rule the world seemed a little absurd. Moreover other interests and ideals were demanding attention. Large claims of social reconstruction had been getting a progressively clearer expression throughout the imperialist period; from 1906 onwards they exacted the first place in the thoughts not only of Britain but of all the British lands.

§ 3. The Growing Demand for Social Change.

Throughout the imperialist period, and in every civilised country, there was a continuous and persistent agitation for large measures of social reconstruction, and a long series of experiments in social legislation. Everywhere democracy had been established, in form if not in fact; everywhere the democracy had obtained, through popular education, access to the keys of knowledge; and the educated democracies were not content to be used as mere tools in the process of wealth-making for the benefit of the few, but were beginning to demand that the power of the democratic State should be used to bring about a more equal distribution of wealth, and to secure for all men a fuller enjoyment of the good things of life.

It was in this period, as we shall see,¹ that the remote and comparatively isolated communities of New Zealand and Australia took the lead of the rest of the world in a remarkable series of social experiments. In this period also

¹ Below, Chap. vii. pp. 696 and 700.
Bismarck was so much alarmed by the progress of the Social Democrats in Germany that he devoted all his strength to combating them, first by means of repressive measures (1878), and then by endeavouring to outbid the popular Socialists by means of a bold policy of State Socialism, which included schemes of State insurance against sickness (1883), accidents (1884), and old age (1891). Yet the German Social Democrats, who took the doctrines of Marx as their creed, progressed with astonishing rapidity; the votes which they cast in Reichstag elections rose from 400,000 in 1878 to 3,000,000 in 1903. Germany had, in fact, become the centre of the Socialist movement, just because, owing to Government opposition, the Socialist party was better organised in Germany than elsewhere. But the movement was almost equally active among the manufacturing populations in every other advanced European State; and the Socialist demand—the demand that the power of the State should be unflinchingly used to bring about an economic readjustment among its members—had everywhere become, by the end of the century, the most living problem of domestic politics.

This was quite as true of Britain as of any other State. 'We are all Socialists now,' said Sir William Harcourt in 1888; and Harcourt was a Gladstonian Liberal, as little in sympathy with the more advanced social movements of his time as with its imperialist temper. He did not mean, of course, that Socialism was generally accepted in the narrow sense in which it advocates State ownership of all the means of production. He meant that the old doctrinaire objection to any State intervention in economic questions was dead; and in face of the long series of Factory Acts and Workmen's Compensation Acts; in face of the Poor Law and the Education Acts: in face of all the drastic Irish Land Acts which the Liberals themselves had passed; in face of the infinitely varied activities of municipal bodies in all parts of Britain, which were, at the cost of the rate-payers, placing within the reach of every man facilities in some respects greater than rich men could command two generations earlier, the statement was justified in the sense in which he made it. In truth even the Liberals, despite their individualist traditions, were undergoing during this period a progressive change of attitude; many of them were learning that their trust in individual character and ability as the source of human progress could not be justified by a mere removal of restrictions on individual effort, since
that must have the effect of leaving the weak at the mercy of the strong; they were beginning to hold that (to use the phrase of the Liberal philosopher, T. H. Green) 'it is the business of the State to maintain the conditions without which a free exercise of the human faculties is impossible'; and the implications of this judgment may be far-reaching.

The humanitarian spirit, still actively at work, but becoming more sensitive, was no longer content with mere charity; it demanded fellowship and mutual comprehension between the more and the less fortunate members of society. This temper found expression when in 1883 the Oxford scholar, Arnold Toynbee, took up his abode in the east end of London, in the hope of studying the social problem, not as a theorist or statistician, but with the knowledge of friendship. From this beginning sprang the University Settlement movement, with the foundation of Toynbee Hall in 1885; its results have been great, though not measurable. Sympathetic social inquiries began to be undertaken, of the kind of which Charles Booth's monumental *Life and Labour of the People in London* (1889-1913) was the greatest example. In all this work there was an implicit assumption that destitution and degradation were preventible maladies, which ought not to be regarded with self-complacent pity, or dealt with by a condescending and unavailing charity; maladies of the social order, which affected all classes, and which must be healed by communal action, based upon scientific study. And alongside of these intellectual and humanitarian activities there was a religious revival which powerfully tended in the same direction. In 1878 William Booth gave a military organisation, and the name of the Salvation Army, to a Christian mission which he had been conducting for some years. Booth had a genius for inspiration and organisation comparable with that of John Wesley; and although the sensational methods which he employed were regarded with disdain by the cultivated, they had an astonishing success among unlettered and degraded men and women, many of whom were inspired to miracles of self-devotion. In 1890 Booth added a social side to his wide-ranging work, and the book, *In Darkest England*, in which he demonstrated the need and defined the methods of his campaign for the rescue of the 'submerged tenth,' had a potent influence in destroying the self-complacency of the previous era, and in bringing home the conviction that there was something wrong with the social order which permitted the cruelties, the ugliness and the misery he described. From 1890
onwards the Salvation Army was engaged in heroic and revealing labours among the most wretched elements of the people, the dregs and sediment of an industrial society; and its labours were extended to almost every part of the world.

The Unionist Governments of 1886 and 1895 were not unsympathetic to the demand for social reform, which was thus growing in strength. Social reform as a substitute for political change was in the Disraelian tradition; the young Tory Democrats who found, for a time, a leader in Lord Randolph Churchill, were ready to go far in undefined directions; and Chamberlain had not lost the zeal for Radical reforms which had led him to enunciate the 'unauthorised programme' of 1885. The Government of 1886 introduced free education; it passed a new Factory Act which reduced the hours of labour for women and forbade the employment of children under the age of eleven; and it empowered the new County Councils, which it had set up in 1888, to borrow money for the purpose of creating agricultural small holdings. This Act had very little effect; but it was the first step towards the revival of a self-respecting peasantry in England. In the election of 1895 Chamberlain promised a system of old-age pensions: the promise was not fulfilled, the question being referred to a series of commissions and committees, whose conflicting reports formed an excuse for inactivity. But, indeed, the ministry of 1895 was too much engrossed in difficult problems of imperial and foreign policy to have much thought to spare for the problems of social reconstruction; and the only outcome of its zeal for this cause was a generous Workmen's Compensation Act (1897). After the 'khaki' election of 1900, and the conclusion of the South African War in 1902, there was greater opportunity for work of this kind, and two important enactments were passed between 1902 and 1905. The first was the Education Act of 1902, a measure of momentous importance, which for the first time created a coherent educational system in England; but its significance was obscured by the virulence of the opposition it aroused by its treatment of the religious problem. The second was the Licensing Act of 1904, which dealt with a social problem repeatedly but unsuccessfully tackled by the Liberals since 1871. It had the effect of reducing very considerably the number of public-houses licensed to sell alcohol; but in doing so it endowed the licensee, for the first time, with a legal right of property in his license, and this was the subject of bitter controversy.

Meanwhile there was arising a demand for something much more sweeping than the piecemeal and empirical legislation of the older political parties: a demand for a complete reconstruction of the social order. During the 'eighties Socialism began to be actively preached in a sense far more precise and doctrinaire than that in which Sir William Harcourt used the term: and during the 'nineties the new gospel rapidly captured many of the Trade Unions. A fermentation of ideas began among the working classes of Britain like that which had marked the 'twenties and 'thirties; but with this difference, that in the 'eighties and 'nineties the fermentation was world-wide.

The beginning of the new movement may be traced to the American theorist, Henry George, whose book, Progress and Poverty (1880), had an immense circulation, and who popularised his theories by lecturing tours in Britain during the following years. George traced most social ills to a single cause, the system of private ownership of land: and he proposed a single remedy, the progressive taxation of land-values. He founded a school which still has many disciples; and his proposals, which seemed so simple, made men ready to contemplate the use of the power of the State with equal boldness in other spheres. Meanwhile, in 1881, H. M. Hyndman and others—later joined by the poet William Morris—had founded the Social Democratic Federation, which soon adopted the whole doctrine of Karl Marx, and looked forward to a complete and sudden transformation of the social order, perhaps by violent means. The Social Democratic Federation never included more than a few thousand members; and these differed so widely among themselves that, as early as 1884, they split into two separate and hostile organisations. They despised the Trade Unions, which would have nothing to do with them; for the leaders of the great Trade Unions in this period were cautious-minded men, and mostly convinced Liberals. The leading members of the 'S.D.F.' were largely, at first, enthusiasts of means and social standing. But they were able men and effective speakers, and they carried on a vigorous campaign which influenced many of the younger Trade Unionists, impatient of the old-fashioned Trade Union leadership. Among these were some young workmen of fire and vigour, notably John Burns. In 1886 and 1887, when trade was bad
and unemployment was rife, the agitation became so vigorous that some of the leaders hoped the revolution was at hand. They held excited demonstrations in Trafalgar Square; and in 1887 John Burns and his aristocratic comrade Cunninghame Graham were arrested and imprisoned for addressing such a meeting after it had been forbidden by the police.

Meanwhile, in 1883, another Socialist organisation, the Fabian Society, had been founded in London. As its name suggests, it was far indeed from desiring revolution; its aim was, by persistent and steady effort, and by the power of organised knowledge, to permeate gradually the whole governmental system, and to bring the Socialist State into being quietly and by constitutional means. The Fabian Society was always a small body. It worked not by declamation and mass meetings, but by investigation and research, as the Benthamites had done; and its leading members (notably Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb) were able to influence both legislation and administration in a remarkable degree, because they were always armed with full and exact knowledge on the subjects in which they were interested. Mr. and Mrs. Webb’s *History of Trade Unionism* (to take a single example) put the whole Trade Union Movement in a new light, and deeply affected the policy of Governments in regard to it. While the Social Democrats were demonstrating in Trafalgar Square, the Fabians were permeating both political parties with their ideas, or with some of them. The leading Fabians were definitely Socialist in the sense that their ultimate aim was to bring industry under the direct control of the State. But they did not think of Capitalism as a fixed and static system that would or could be suddenly overthrown, but as something that was already changing, and could be gradually transformed by constitutional means.

In 1888 and 1889 a new element made itself felt. Trade Unionism, hitherto successful only in the more highly developed industries which could demand substantial contributions from their members and offer them solid benefits, suddenly extended its influence to the more depressed and unorganised industries. The match-girls and the gas-workers, previously unorganised, won great successes by means of strikes. And in 1889 the London Dock labourers, a group among whom effective organisation seemed to be impossible, because they were mostly casual and unskilled labourers, won a resounding victory in a great
strike which lasted for some weeks. They won because their needs and sufferings appealed to public support, which showed itself in very large contributions to the strike-funds. But they won also because they were led with immense fire and ability by John Burns and other ardent Socialist leaders.

The London Dock strike of 1889 had far-reaching results. It brought about a rapid expansion of Trade Unionism among the less-skilled and lower-paid trades, which had hitherto been regarded as hopeless. But the Unions in these trades could not exact large subscriptions from their members, and therefore could not depend upon their own strength like old and rich organisations such as the Amalgamated Society of Engineers; political action seemed to present the only means whereby they could achieve their aim of improving their conditions of work. The New Unionism would inevitably have been driven to adopt a programme of political action—of relying on the State for betterment, and using their votes to compel the State to take the action they desired—even if their leaders had not been inspired by the ideas of State Socialism. And meanwhile, even in the older Unions, the younger men were beginning to revolt against the staid and conservative policy of their leaders, who held the view that Trade Unions should confine themselves to trade questions, and leave their members, as citizens, to support whatever party they preferred.

In 1892, inspired by this changing situation, a group of men, including the gentle and eccentric enthusiast Keir Hardie, founded yet another Socialist organisation, the Independent Labour Party. They were definite and proclaimed Socialists; but, unlike the Social Democratic Federation, they did not aim at a sudden revolution on Marxian lines. Nor did they despise the Trade Unions. Their aim was to create a distinct Labour party which should proceed by political action to capture the now democratic State; and their chief desire was to persuade the Trade Unions to identify themselves with this party, and thus to use the whole power of organised labour for the purpose of winning for their class, by constitutional means, control over the machinery of government. The Independent Labour Party, like the Social Democratic Federation, never had many members; and their first electioneering experiments, in 1895 and in 1900, were very unsuccessful, though in 1892 Keir Hardie had been elected, and had shocked
the House of Commons by arriving in a cloth cap and a scarlet tie, under the escort of a brass band.

But meanwhile a great change was coming over the Trade Unions; the new unskilled Unions had joined the Trade Union Congress; the younger men were gradually getting the upper hand in the older Unions; and the influence of the leaders of the Independent Labour Party was steadily exercised among them. Few of them were yet ready to commit themselves to a complete Socialist programme such as the ‘I.L.P.’ had adopted. But they were slowly coming to the view that independent political action was desirable. In 1899 the Trade Union Congress passed a resolution in favour of such action, and appointed a Labour Representation Committee to draw up a programme of action. Next year (1900) the Labour party came into existence.

Thus, when the twentieth century opened, a new party, resting on very different foundations from the older parties, and drawing its resources from the contributions of myriads of workpeople, many of whom did not share its beliefs, had entered the political arena, and was ready to play its part in the next appeal to the electorate. The new departure was not taken without misgivings. There was opposition not only from the representatives of the older unionism, which had held that Trade Unions as such should take no part in politics, but even from some of the younger men. John Burns, who had been imprisoned for preaching revolutionary Socialism in Trafalgar Square in spite of police prohibitions, and who had led the Dock Labourers to their unexpected victory, was the strongest critic of the new policy, precisely because it emphasised instead of undermining class distinctions. ‘I am getting tired,’ he said, ‘of working-class boots, working-class trains, working-class houses and working-class magazines. I believe . . . we should not be prisoners to class prejudice, but should consider parties and politics apart from all class organisations.’

But this sounded like a voice from the past; and in domestic politics, as well as in foreign relations, Britain was visibly on the eve of great changes when the twentieth century opened.

[Jeyes, Life of Chamberlain; Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill; Williams, Cecil Rhodes; Parkin, Imperial Federation; Egerton, Short History of British Colonial Policy; Beer, History of British Socialism; S. and B. Webb, History of Trade Unionism; Ensor, England 1870-1914; Cole, History of the Labour Movement; Stewart, Kier Hardie; Snowden, Autobiography; Pease, History of the Fabian Society; Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism; Halévy, History of the English People (Epilogue); Russell, Freedom and Organization.]
CHAPTER VII

NATIONALITY AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN THE GREAT DOMINIONS

(A.D. 1880-1905)

§ I. The Nationhood of the Dominions.

The self-governing colonies had reached the stage of adolescence during the third quarter of the nineteenth century; during its fourth quarter they came of age, and they entered on the testing time of the twentieth century as free nations, full of pride in their nationhood. The consolidation of the national spirit in Canada, Australia and New Zealand is the main theme of this chapter; the troubled story of South Africa must have a chapter to itself.

But the growth of the national spirit did not involve any weakening of attachment to the mother-country, or of zeal for the ideal of imperial unity; only it was a unity of comradeship, not a unity of obedience, that was now pursued. The strength of the imperial sentiment was displayed not merely by participation in imperial celebrations like the jubilees, or in colonial conferences; not merely by offers of trade preference and of contributions to the upkeep of the Navy, the buckler and the pride of the whole Commonwealth; it was shown in the sending of small contingents to the Sudanese war, and still more in the common efforts and sacrifices of the South African War, the first British war in which all the partner-nations took a share. All the long generations in which the Empire seemed to be held together by the accepted authority of the mother-country had never seen any common effort that could be compared with this, in which the daughter-nations took part not under any compulsion, but of their own free will.

The mother-country, and the great Dominions themselves, now alike recognised that the Dominions had ceased to be dependent colonies, and had become free nations, each proud of its own distinctive character and modes of life. This was expressed by certain changes in nomenclature made at the beginning of the new century, which had more
than a verbal significance. The conference of 1902 was the last Colonial Conference; its successor in 1907 was denominated the Imperial Conference. The word 'colonies' was banished from the official vocabulary, so far as concerned the great Dominions, as no longer representing the facts. And when King Edward VII. came to the throne, his titles underwent a significant alteration. 'The Dominions beyond the Seas' were named, alongside of the United Kingdom and the Indian Empire, as distinctive members of the great fellowship over which the successor of Alfred the Great and Robert Bruce was now called to preside. These may seem petty things, but they meant much: in a community so tenacious of ancient forms and usages as the British, such verbal changes are always the expression and recognition of profound changes of fact.

Nor must it be forgotten that the generation during which the self-governing Dominions came of age was filled with the rivalries of Great Powers in every corner of the earth. Foreign policy was more complex and more dangerous than ever before: an unsolved difficulty in any part of the world might plunge the whole Commonwealth into war. Realising this, the Dominions began to demand that they should be more fully consulted in the determination of foreign policy, especially on issues in which they were directly involved. The numerous vexed questions which had to be discussed with the United States were no longer decided by the British Foreign Office alone: Canada had her own representatives to serve with those of the mother-country. Australia and New Zealand insisted, with success, on making their voices heard in the determination of the problems of the Pacific. Cape Colony realised with a shock that negotiations in which she had no share had given her as an immediate neighbour the formidable military power of Germany. The necessity and the methods of participation by the Dominions in the direction of foreign policy had not yet become fully apparent when the twentieth century opened; but the problem was being raised. It was already plain, before this period ended, that the British Commonwealth was rapidly assuming a new form, for which nothing in history afforded either analogy or guidance.

§ 2. Canada: Material Expansion and Political Stability.

One of the most remarkable features in the political history of Canada has been the extraordinary stability of
the Dominion Government, and the long life of its ministries; and this in spite of the fact that no rigid party organisation has grown up comparable with that of the United States, or even with that of modern Britain. Sir John Macdonald, at the head of the Conservative party, held power from 1878 till his death in 1891, and the Conservatives, though weakened by his death, succeeded in retaining power until 1896. Then Sir Wilfrid Laurier formed a Liberal ministry which held office continuously until 1911, when a new Conservative ministry was formed under Sir Robert Borden, which lasted until the end of the Great War.

There is no parallel in any other country under parliamentary government, except New Zealand, to these long ministries; and the ministries in the provinces were, in many cases, equally long-lived. The explanation of this striking and distinctive feature of Canadian politics casts much light upon political conditions in the Dominion. One reason is that the Canadians have been content with the two traditional parties, both of which draw their adherents from all classes and from all parts of the country, and therefore equally represent the solidarity of the nation. There was no strong Socialist movement in Canada, no attempt to form a class-party of Labour; and perhaps this was due to the fact that Canada had very little poverty, and very few huge fortunes. The strongest element in the Canadian people has always consisted of the class of small farmers working their own land; and even when manufacturing and mining industries became important, as they did during this period, although there were Trade Unions and strikes, there was no such class-bitterness between employers and employed as existed in other countries.

A further reason for the long tenure of ministries is that there was no sharp cleavage of opinion between the parties, no deep difference of principle. For both parties the supreme aim was national consolidation and development; and whether Liberals or Conservatives were in power, Canada was engrossed chiefly in the opening up of the country by the construction of new railways, and in the exploration of its mineral and other resources. These were the supreme questions of the period; and the epoch-marking event, in internal policy, was the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, begun in 1881 and completed in 1885—a momentous and gigantic enterprise which was only made possible by liberal support from Government. It was in part the failure of the Liberal Government of 1873-1878 to carry
out this great design which brought Sir John Macdonald into power; and his success in bringing it to fruition was an important factor in consolidating his power. For the Canadian Pacific Railway not only opened up a vast area of inexhaustible riches, it bound the wide Dominion together with links of steel, and vitally helped to turn it into a united nation.

The building of the Canadian Pacific line made possible the development of the enormous and fertile plains which stretch from the Great Lakes to the Rockies, and thus united British Columbia with the Eastern provinces. It was not until the 'nineties that the settlement of these great corn-lands seriously began, and not until the opening of the twentieth century that their development became rapid. Before this could happen, some troubles had to be faced with the half-breeds who were thinly settled in these regions. In 1885 they broke into revolt, and Louis Riel, the rebel of Manitoba in 1870, returned from his refuge in the United States to lead the rising. In 1870 British troops had to be borrowed to quell the rebellion; that of 1885 was suppressed by contingents drawn from all the provinces of the Dominion; and this first united campaign did something to strengthen the sentiment of Canadian nationality.

There was, indeed, only one question of principle on which there was any real division between the two political parties: the Liberals were inclined to favour Free Trade, or at any rate lower duties, while the Conservatives definitely advocated Protection. Sir John Macdonald’s first act, when he came to power in 1878, was to set up a high protective tariff, which has proved the basis of the Canadian fiscal system ever since. Every successive election showed that the national mind accepted the policy of protection, which was advocated mainly as a means to national consolidation and development. Without it most Canadians felt that their country must fall into economic dependence upon the United States, which before the enactment of Macdonald’s tariff had flooded the country with its products while refusing to admit Canadian goods; and it was complained that a large proportion of the immigrants into Canada were attracted over the frontier by the prospect of employment in American factories with which Canadian manufacturers could not compete. For a long time the Liberals were inclined to adopt the view that it was impossible for Canada to avoid economic dependence upon the

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United States; and in 1887 and the following years they advocated an economic union of the two countries under a common tariff, or, failing that, an arrangement for reciprocity. But the national sentiment of Canada would have nothing to do with these proposals, which seemed to run counter to the twofold political ideal of Canada, national independence, and partnership in the British Commonwealth. It was not until the Liberals had changed their attitude on this question that they were permitted to regain power in 1896; and the Liberal Prime Minister, Laurier, acted in accord with national sentiment when he maintained the tariff that protected Canada from subordination to the United States, while giving a preference to Britain of 12½ per cent. of the amount of the duty (1897): this was later increased first to 25 and then to 33½ per cent.

A resolute determination not to be brought into any subordination to her great neighbour was thus one of the keynotes of Canada’s policy during these years; and it was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that the attitude of watchful suspicion which this determination inspired began to be abated. There were many controversies between the two countries, and a series of conferences, in which Britain had to play the delicate part of supporting the Canadian claims without quarrelling with the United States. In 1886 there was a dispute over the seal-fishery in the Bering Sea, where American cruisers had arrested Canadian fishers sixty miles from the shore: it was ended by an amicable adjustment whereby the rules of seal-fishery were laid down. The fishing rights of Americans in Canadian waters formed another subject of controversy in 1887; and Joseph Chamberlain crossed the Atlantic to act with Canadian representatives in a new conference. Their labours were wasted, because the United States Senate refused to ratify the agreement which was reached. In 1897 an attempt was made to settle a number of outstanding differences; but this also came to nothing, because the prolonged deliberations were interrupted by a new dispute, which suddenly became acute in 1903. A rich gold-field had been discovered at Klondyke in the Arctic Canadian territory of the Yukon, in the remote North-West. The only outlet was through the long strip of Alaska which runs down the western coast of Canada, and which had passed under American control when the United States purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867. Canada was eager to have access to the head of one of the long inlets which
pierce the coast; and an acute controversy raged as to whether this point was within Alaskan territory or not. In the end the question was settled by a joint arbitration, in which two Canadians and the British jurist Lord Alverstone were ranged against three Americans. Canadian opinion was indignant at the decision, which left the disputed point in the possession of America; the two Canadian arbitrators refused to sign the award; and there were bitter complaints that Canadian interests had been sacrificed by the mother-country to suit the purposes of her own diplomacy. But there is little doubt that the award (which turned upon the interpretation of a treaty between Britain and Russia in 1825) was substantially just; and since that date there have been no further disputes between the two neighbour nations, who thrive side by side separated by a purely artificial frontier three thousand miles long—the longest unfortified frontier in the world.

In some of these negotiations the attitude of the United States was needlessly unbending and exacting; and indeed there was always a substantial body of opinion in the United States which wished to use their economic strength and their other advantages to force Canada, with all its immense undeveloped resources, into the Union; the imperialist spirit was as strong in America during the 'nineties as in the European countries. But by 1904 these ambitions had been, for the most part, abandoned. They had been abandoned just because Canada had succeeded in consolidating her national life and in securing her economic independence. Her illimitable resources had begun to be seriously exploited; her rich grain-lands, capable of feeding half the world, were being peopled by enterprising farmers; her coal-fields, unsurpassed by any country in the world save her great neighbour, were beginning to be developed; her inexhaustible wealth in all the metals was being revealed; her unsurpassable wealth of water-power, and her magnificent waterways, were being turned to use; and the tide of immigration, which had somewhat slackened during the previous years, was turning in full volume towards her shores. No country in the world has a more splendid economic future than Canada; and the Canadian people, proud of their country's greatness, were equally proud of her institutions and her traditions. Canada had become a nation. She was no longer a mere colony in British leading-strings; nor had she any intention of allowing her nationhood to be merged in the mighty republic her neighbour.
Her function seemed to be that of a link and a mediator between the British Commonwealth and its eldest but long-alienated child.

§ 3. New Zealand: Bold Social Experiments.

The smallest and the most remote of the great Dominions, New Zealand is also the most purely British of them all, and perhaps the most passionately loyal to the imperial connexion. In size, in climate, and in physical characteristics these lovely oceanic isles more closely resemble the parent-land than any other country; and their people are of almost purely English and Scottish stock. There is no country in the world more fit to breed a stalwart, healthy and independent race.

In the crucial period of development with which we are now concerned, New Zealand formed a sort of link between Canada and Australia. She resembled Canada in the facts that she had already achieved her unity; that the bulk of her people were engaged in agricultural and pastoral work, only a very small proportion of them dwelling in large towns; that there was a wide diffusion of comfort among her people, and an almost complete absence of the class-bitterness which was beginning to play so important a part in the life of Australia and of Britain; and that, for this reason, no class-party arose to complicate her politics, which continued to be controlled by the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties, both drawing their adherents from every section of society. On the other hand, she resembled Australia in the boldness of the social experiments which she launched during these years; in her unwillingness to welcome immigrants, even of British origin, who might possibly lower the standard of life of her people; and in the zeal with which she pursued the ideal of national self-sufficiency. In the pursuit of this national policy her statesmen, of both parties, showed no lack of courage. Untied by allegiance to any doctrinaire theories, and unhampered by rooted traditions or obstinate vested interests, they boldly splashed out into the deep waters of political experiment, feeling that their distant and happy isles offered an ideal field for these endeavours, which could be easily reversed if they proved unsuccessful.

This period of New Zealand history falls into two very clearly marked sections, a time of stagnation and depression (1879-1895), when the population was almost stationary, immigration ceased, and even the birth-rate fell in an
THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM

an alarming way; and a time of rapidly growing prosperity and increasing population during the decades following 1895. During the first period New Zealand was suffering from reaction after the over-rapid and partly fictitious development of the previous period, when the population had been multiplied fivefold in twenty years. This swift expansion had been largely due to a lavish expenditure of borrowed capital; and it was inevitably followed by a time of slow recuperation, during which Conservative ministries pursued a policy of cautious economy.

But in 1891 the Liberals came to power, at a moment when the Trade Unions were beginning to put forward distinct Labour candidates; and, perhaps incited by this fact, entered upon a remarkable programme of financial and social reconstruction, which attracted to New Zealand the attention of the whole world. The Prime Ministers responsible for these bold departures were John Ballance (1891-1893) and Richard Seddon (1893-1906). Seddon was one of the most remarkable figures among colonial statesmen of the period. A Lancashire working-lad, who had tossed about the world and followed many trades, he had no knowledge of history or economics, and the working out of the measures with which his Government was associated was due mainly to some of his colleagues, notably W. P. Reeves. But Seddon was a man of irrepressible and ebullient energy, and of unbounded self-confidence; he had a rough, hearty, downright kind of eloquence which was exceedingly effective; he knew how to deal with men, and did not disdain to play upon their weaknesses; and his restless vigour, and fearlessness in dealing with complex subjects which he had never studied, had much to do with the rapidity with which the new policy was put into effect. It may be added that he was a flamboyant imperialist; and when he came to England for the Colonial Conference of 1897, he made a marked impression. He, and the Canadian Laurier, and the South African Rhodes, gave to many home-keeping Britons a new impression of what the British Empire meant.

The social experiments of the Ballance-Seddon ministry fall under four main heads, those dealing with land, those dealing with industrial regulation, those dealing with finance, and those dealing with immigration.

The main aim of the land-policy was to prevent the formation of very large estates, to break up those that already

1 Above, p. 523.
existed, to encourage closer land-settlement, and to prevent speculation in land. For these purposes a progressive land-tax was imposed, rising from nothing on small holdings of less than 500 acres to 3d. in the pound on the capital value of very large estates—the land being assessed apart from buildings. Thus the large landowner had to pay heavily, while the small landowner got off scot-free. At the same time municipalities were also empowered to levy a rate on the unimproved value of urban land. With this scheme of taxation (which tended to make the holding of large estates unprofitable, especially if they were left idle) was combined a method of letting unoccupied Crown lands, instead of selling them, the State thus retaining ultimate proprietorship; while a system of compulsory purchase of land for small holdings was applied on a large scale, the funds being advanced by the State. Within twenty years of these enactments there were over 25,000 State tenants in New Zealand as against 45,000 freeholders; but the State tenants were all agitating for the right to purchase their holdings. There can be no doubt that this system encouraged closer settlement, and brought about a great increase in the number of small farms.

The industrial policy of the Seddon Government was even more distinctive than its land-policy. Its aim was to encourage the growth of Trade Unions, and at the same time to put an end to strikes. Conciliation Boards, including representatives of employers and employed, were established to facilitate settlements of industrial disputes by agreement; but if they should fail, the questions were referred to a national Arbitration Court, which had power to settle wage-rates, hours of labour, and all the other conditions of industry, its awards having the force of law: any employer, workman, or Trade Union that disregarded them was made subject to heavy penalties. The system has not fulfilled all the expectations of its devisers; but it has by no means been a complete failure. It has raised money-wages to a high level, and defined the hours and conditions of labour in one trade after another on terms very favourable to the worker.

Meanwhile many other sweeping measures of reform had been undertaken. A system of old-age pensions was established; the State undertook insurance work; it bought and worked coal-mines for the supply of its railways; it borrowed money on an immense scale for the construction of railways and other public works, increasing the public
debt from £25,000,000 in 1880 to £70,000,000 in 1904; but most of this represented reproductive expenditure. The burden of taxation necessary to meet all these charges was very heavy. It was met in part by a progressive income-tax, and by heavy death-duties on large fortunes—fiscal devices which were almost contemporaneously introduced in Britain. But it was also met by a high protective tariff, which was in any case necessary if the high wage-rates were to be paid without killing industry. High tariffs meant high prices; so that most of what was gained in wages was lost by their diminished purchasing power. But the system fostered the rise of certain manufacturing industries, which became important during this period.

When the twentieth century opened, New Zealand was enjoying, like Canada, a wave of prosperity, and the standard of life of her people was as high as that of any other country. This may have been due, and probably was in part due, to the agrarian and industrial policy which she had adopted, though Canada had attained equally good results by different methods. But, rejoicing in their widely-diffused comfort, the New Zealanders adopted a policy in regard to immigration the very opposite of that which Canada was following. They deliberately discouraged immigration, lest their standards of life should be beaten down. An Immigration Act passed in 1890 helped them to exclude Chinamen, Japanese and South Sea Islanders: they were resolved to keep their stock pure. But they also discouraged European and, to some extent, even British immigration. They thus retarded the rate at which the country could be peopled, especially as the birth-rate fell in proportion as the standard of comfort rose. Numbering only three-quarters of a million when the twentieth century opened, they set themselves to reserve for their own use a land far larger than they could fully occupy, and far larger than they could defend if they should be attacked; with the result that, though only sixty years had passed since the first white settlement, actually over 90 per cent. of the population were New Zealand-born at the time of the Great War. A very distinctive social life, and a very pure racial type, were thus being established in the most remote, beautiful and homelike of the British Dominions.

§ 4. The Unification of Australia and her Social Problems.

It was not until almost the end of our period (1900) that, following in the wake of Canada, Australia adopted a
measure of federation and became a single nation. For that reason, the story of Australian development during these years is more confused than that of the other Dominions. Yet, with one exception, the conditions of the six colonies were so similar that it is possible to describe in general terms the main features of their history.

The exception was Western Australia, which had been a poor, small and stagnant community ever since its foundation in 1827, because almost the whole of its vast extent consists of desert land, offering no such opportunities for tillage or pasture as the more fertile lands of the eastern colonies. In 1880 the population of Western Australia was still under 30,000, and she had not yet obtained responsible government. But during the 'eighties and 'nineties rich gold-fields were discovered in the heart of the desert; and by the end of the century Western Australia had outstripped all her sisters in gold-production. This involved a rapid inrush of population, mainly from among the miners of the other colonies; it involved also the construction of railways; and it encouraged agriculture in the narrow cultivable belt on the coast. By the end of the century the population had risen to nearly 200,000; and this sudden change in the character of the colony brought with it (in 1890) the establishment of responsible government; the Cinderella of the Australian family had taken her place beside her sisters.

In Australia, as in New Zealand, the period falls into two clearly marked sections; but the 'eighties (when New Zealand was suffering from depression) were a time of great though somewhat factitious prosperity; the 'nineties (when New Zealand was reviving) were a time of grave economic disturbance, when acute labour troubles, financial panic, and drought combined to bring about serious depression. This contrast between the two decades was reflected in the history of Australian politics. One of its consequences was a marked decline of immigration. In the 'eighties the number of immigrants was higher than in any decade since the gold discoveries of the 'fifties; in the 'nineties and the early years of the twentieth century immigration almost ceased. This startling change was due in the first instance to the deterrent effects of economic troubles; but these were presently reinforced by the adoption of a deliberate policy of discouraging even European immigrants, lest they should lower the Australian standard of life, or compete with Australian labour.
During the prosperous period of the 'eighties, the course of politics in the various States followed customary lines. There were conflicts, especially in Victoria, between the two Houses of Parliament, ending in the reduction of the second chambers to subordination. There were the usual disputes between the 'ins' and the 'outs,' for no fundamental difference of principle separated the two parties from one another on any question but that of tariff policy. On the whole, Free Trade had the upper hand in New South Wales down to 1900; whilst the other States, especially Victoria, had adopted a definitely protectionist policy. Perhaps the most important achievement of the period was that, without losing her pre-eminence in sheep-breeding, Australia developed into one of the most important corn-growing regions of the world: the area under tillage was multiplied threefold in Victoria, and nearly fourfold in New South Wales, between 1881 and 1901. This was largely due to changes in the land-laws, which rendered more intensive settlement possible.

Yet in spite of this healthy development, Australia presented a feature unique among young countries in the extraordinarily high proportion of her population congregated in a few big towns. One fifth of the total population is to be found in the four capital cities, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Brisbane, in which the manufacturing industries are concentrated, and which (since all of them are seaports) control the bulk of the export trade: Melbourne for a long time included practically half of the whole population of Victoria. Of the remainder, a substantial proportion consists of the mining population, which is large in all the States, and which is mostly congregated in compact masses. The results are, not only that the capital cities dominate their States to an extent unknown in other countries (for even in industrial lands there are many rivals to the capitals), but that the industrial and mining population wields an influence out of proportion to its weight in the life of the community. These facts have largely contributed to determine the modern history of Australia.

In such conditions, Trade Unions were certain to be strong, well-organised, and centralised; and during the second part of the period they began to dominate the political situation. When the inevitable reaction took place after the exaggerated prosperity of the 'eighties, the wage-rates of the boom years had to come down. But naturally the workmen did not see why this should happen; and a period
of acute and violent trade conflict opened. It began as early as 1884, among the coal-miners of New South Wales. In 1890 it developed into the nearest approach to a universal strike which any country had yet seen; even the shearers on the sheep-runs were called out. It has been suggested that the remarkable strikes of 1890 were largely influenced by the success of the London Dock strike of the previous year, to which the Australian Unions had made very generous contributions. But strikes in periods of bad trade never have much prospect of success; the formidable movement of the whole Australian Trade Union world was completely defeated; and the Trade Unionists began to turn their thoughts to other means of attaining their ends.

It is possible that the labour unrest (which did not end in 1890—there were new strikes of a serious kind in 1892 and 1894) contributed to the next calamity which fell upon Australia: a general collapse of credit, which began in 1893, made investors in all parts of the world shy of trusting their money to Australian concerns, and produced ruin. And to this had to be added a series of dry years, culminating in the terrible drought of 1902, which decimated the flocks. It is not surprising that in these circumstances emigration to Australia should have come to a standstill.

Such were the conditions which brought about, during the 'nineties, two very important new departures in Australian politics: the formation of Labour parties in each of the colonies, for the purpose of achieving by political means what strikes had failed to achieve; and the initiation of new methods of dealing with labour disputes, similar to those adopted during the same years in New Zealand.

The first considerable achievement of an organised Labour party was in New South Wales, at the election of 1891, when thirty-five Labour members were elected; but the other colonies quickly followed the New South Wales example, and when the first Commonwealth Parliament was elected (1901), a Labour party made its appearance there also. Neither in the Commonwealth nor in any of the States had Labour won a majority before the close of the period with which we are concerned in this chapter; but by playing off the two older parties one against the other, and holding the balance between them, Labour was largely able, from the first, to dictate the course of policy. Two features of the Australian Labour party deserve to be noted. In the first place it was quite definitely a class party, controlled by the Trade Councils; in South Australia it was even laid down
that none but manual labourers might be admitted. In the second place, Australian Labour devised a system of discipline more rigid, and more destructive of free deliberation, than any party organisation (save the Irish party in Britain) has ever conceived. Every Labour member was required to take a pledge to vote according to the decisions arrived at beforehand by the caucus—to disregard, that is to say, whatever facts or arguments might be advanced during the course of a debate. The rigidity of this pledge was later modified, so far as the Commonwealth Parliament was concerned; but it was a new thing in British politics.

Legislation on trade disputes began in Victoria in 1896, when an Act was passed setting up Wages Boards and a Court of Industrial Appeals, which were given powers to fix wages in defined trades for defined areas; South Australia followed the Victorian precedent in 1900; while New South Wales in 1901 and Western Australia in 1900 and 1902 passed Acts more closely modelled on the New Zealand method. Finally, in 1904 the Commonwealth Parliament established an Arbitration Court for disputes affecting more than one State, the Court to consist of a Judge of the High Court. These varied systems had merely been brought into operation, and had scarcely yet had time to show how they would work, when our period came to an end.

But, interesting and important as they were, all these experiments are of minor importance in comparison with the great achievement of the period, the federation of the six States to form the Commonwealth of Australia. The desirability of federation had long been felt; it had been advocated as early as the 'fifties, and provision for it had been deliberately introduced into the Acts whereby the Imperial Parliament established responsible government in Australia. A Federal Council, indeed, had been formed; but it was rendered of no effect by the facts that it was purely deliberative, and that New South Wales persisted in standing aloof from it. Closely kindred as they were, the colonies had been so widely separated that the working of a central government would have been difficult. Now improved communications were bringing them more closely together; the need for welding them yet more closely by inter-State railways was felt; and the community of their problems and of their interests was yearly becoming more manifest. But the factor which made combination seem most obviously necessary was the appearance of other European Powers in the Pacific, and the rise of the power of Japan.
Serious discussion of the proposal to federate began as early as 1891, and continued throughout the 'nineties. Many obstacles had to be overcome, notably the unwillingness of New South Wales to abandon her Free Trade system, which she knew would have to be sacrificed once federation was achieved. But at length, in July 1900, an agreed scheme was submitted to, and accepted by, the Imperial Parliament; and on January 1, 1901, the first day of the new century, Australia began her career as a single united nation.

The frame of government of the Australian Commonwealth in some respects followed more closely the model of the United States than that of Canada. It reserved a higher degree of independence to the States than the Canadian system, giving to the federal Government only certain specific powers defined in the Act, and leaving all others to the subordinate legislatures; and the use of the term 'State' in place of the Canadian term 'province' was a sign of greater tenderness for State rights. It established also a Senate on the American pattern, consisting of an equal number of representatives from each of the component States, and a High Court, not unlike that of the United States, which, besides deciding appeals, would have the function of interpreting the constitution. In all these respects the American rather than the Canadian model was followed. But there were two important points in which American precedent was disregarded, and one of these was of fundamental importance. An easy mode of altering the constitution was defined—by a vote of Parliament confirmed by a majority of States and a majority of the total electorate—in place of the reference to the British Parliament provided by the Canadian Act. And, yet more important, the essence of the British system, and the main distinction between it and the American system, was preserved by making the executive dependent upon the legislature. This meant that a Prime Minister of Australia, like a Prime Minister of Canada, would be able to speak in the name of a majority of the representative body, and to count upon its support in carrying out any recommendations he might put forward; whereas an American President may, and often does, find himself in conflict with, and his action nullified by, a hostile majority in either House of Congress. And because of this—because all the British lands have adopted the same principle in determining the relationship between the executive and the legislature—it
has been made possible for all the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Dominions to act jointly with the Prime Minister of Britain in advising the Crown on questions of common imperial concern.

The third of the great Acts of Federation which have shaped the modern British Commonwealth had thus been adopted at the opening of the new century. The fourth, that of South Africa, was soon to follow; but not until after many troubles.

[EGERTON, British Colonial Policy; DILKE, Problems of Greater Britain; KEITH, Responsible Government in the Dominions; BOURLINOT, Constitutional History of Canada; EGERTON AND GRANT, Canadian Constitutional Development; PORRITT, Sixty Years of Protection in Canada; GRANT, History of Canada; PARKIN, Sir John Macdonald; REEVES, State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand; ROGERS, Historical Geography of Australasia; DRUMMOND, Life of R. S. Seddon; LYNE, Life of Sir H. Parkes; BRYCE, Modern Democracies; Cambridge History of the British Empire.]
CHAPTER VIII

THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE CRISIS OF THE COMMONWEALTH

(A.D. 1879-1902)

At each stage in the history of the British Commonwealth during the nineteenth century, South Africa has demanded more of our attention than any other of the great Dominions, because her double racial problem created difficulties more complex than those presented by any other colony. In 1878 there seemed to be reason for hoping that these troubles were nearing their end. Cape Colony had at last obtained responsible government, and its Dutch and British settlers were working together harmoniously; Natal was peaceful; the native tribes, apart from the Zulus, had accepted the reign of law; the Orange Free State, under Brand's wise rule, had become the model of an orderly and peaceable farmer-State; the anarchic and unruly burghers of the Transvaal, hitherto the chief source of unrest, had been brought under British control and promised self-government; and a federation of the South African States under the British Crown, which Sir Bartle Frere had been sent out to organise, seemed to be within reach.

But these hopes were doomed to disappointment. The twenty years following 1878 were full of anxiety; the alarms and controversies with which they were filled had their culmination in a difficult and trying war, which for a time seemed to endanger the existence of the British power in South Africa; and the common effort on the part of the whole British Commonwealth which it demanded ended one era, and opened another, in British history.

§ 1. The Zulu War, Majuba, and the South African Republic.

The trouble began with the Zulus. When the Transvaal Boers were taken under British protection (1877), King Cetywayo felt that his prey had been snatched away from

1 See above, Bk. x. chap. iv. p. 530.
him. He became restless and aggressive; his war-bands, organised for conquest, were straining at the leash. The High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, thought it necessary for the safety of South Africa to demand a change in the Zulu military system; and when Cetywayo refused to attend to this demand, war began (1879). But the first episodes of the Zulu war were unfortunate. A disaster at Isandhlwana threatened to expose Natal to the horrors of a Zulu invasion; perhaps the threat would have materialised but for the heroism of the defenders of Rorke’s Drift; and though the Zulu army was crushed at Ulundi (1879) and Cetywayo was deposed, British military prestige was seriously impaired.

Meanwhile the Transvaal Boers were becoming more and more resentful of British control, to which many of them had given only the most unwilling assent. The promised establishment of self-government was delayed; farmers who had refused to pay taxes to their own Government were angered by the strictness with which payment was now exacted; and the British administration under Sir Owen Lanyon was anything but tactful. In two ways, also, the Zulu war helped to precipitate a crisis: on the one hand it removed the danger of a Zulu attack which had persuaded many Boers to assent to annexation, while on the other hand it seemed to show that the military power of Britain was not very formidable.

When, in 1880, Disraeli was succeeded in office by Gladstone, who had strongly condemned the annexation, the Boers hoped that their independence would be at once restored. But this hope was disappointed. Gladstone, being assured that most of the Transvaalers were content, would not cancel the annexation, but would only promise self-government as part of a scheme of federation. Thereupon the more irreconcilable of the Boers broke into revolt, set up a provisional Government, isolated the small and scattered British garrisons in the Transvaal, and prepared to invade Natal. It seemed mere madness for these untrained farmers, who at this date numbered not more than 8000 or 10,000, thus to challenge the British Empire. In truth, they were quite unaware of the magnitude of the power they were attacking; and their resistance must inevitably have been crushed if the war had been fought out.

But Gladstone hated war, and hated still more the idea

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 89 (d).
of forcibly imposing British dominion upon unwilling subjects. As soon as the revolt began, he made haste to open negotiations, which went on alongside of the early fighting. In the rough mountain-country of the Natal border, the Boers showed themselves to be both brave and skilful fighters, and their admirable marksmanship, combined with their cleverness in using natural cover, enabled them to outmanoeuvre the little British army of some 1400 men, with which General Colley was trying to defend the frontier until larger forces could be brought into the field. After several minor successes, the hardy farmers scored a sensational victory on February 27, 1881. The mountain of Majuba, which commanded the important pass of Laing’s Nek, had been occupied on the previous night by Colley with some 500 men; and the gallant Boers, crawling up the steep slope under cover, succeeded in overwhelming this little force, and killing the general and some 90 of his men. In itself the fight of Majuba had no military importance. So insignificant a check could have done nothing to prevent the victory of the armies that were already beginning to arrive in South Africa. But the Boers did not realise this; and when the British Government refused to allow the negotiations to be broken off merely for the sake of proving the strength of Britain at the cost of many lives, the Boers not unnaturally concluded that fear rather than magnanimity was their motive.

Five months after Majuba a peace was concluded, whereby the Boers were granted complete autonomy under British suzerainty, with the proviso that their relations with foreign States should be subject to the control of the British Government. Not only the Boers themselves, but all South Africa, regarded this treaty as an abject surrender on the part of Britain; and there seems little reason to doubt that what was meant as a healing act of magnanimity actually helped to produced the friction which filled the following years. Three years later (1884) the terms of the settlement were revised in favour of the Transvaal by a new document known as the Convention of London, which omitted all reference to suzerainty except in the preamble, but preserved the stipulation that the Boers should make no treaty with any other ‘State, nation or tribe,’ save the Orange Free State, without the approval of the Crown. Apart from this provision the Transvaal was left in complete independence; and it was allowed to assume the style of

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1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 89 (d).
the ‘South African Republic,’ a name which ominously suggested the large ambitions that were fermenting in the minds of its leaders.

The settlement of 1881 and 1884 definitely put an end, for twenty years, to the project of a federated South Africa. Once again, and more obviously than before, the Transvaal, which now enjoyed a prestige such as had never before belonged to it, became the centre of Dutch racial feeling; and South African politics were increasingly embittered by racial animosities. Even in Cape Colony, where harmony seemed to have been established, a Dutch organisation known as the Afrikander Bond was instituted in 1882. It had its annual conferences, its branches in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and its special newspapers preaching racial antipathy. South Africa seemed to be in danger of being plunged back into the almost forgotten bitterness of the 'thirties.

§ 2. Paul Kruger and Cecil Rhodes.

The ten years following 1884 saw the gradual development of two conflicting ideals for the future of South Africa; and the spokesmen and standard-bearers of these rival aims were two men who resembled one another in nothing save their courage, their determination, their masterful wills, and the obstinacy with which they clung to the vast and ambitious projects they had formed. These men were Paul Kruger the Dopper Boer, and Cecil Rhodes the millionaire imperialist.

Kruger, as a boy of twelve, had been among the earliest of the Boer trekkers from Cape Colony in 1836, and had played his part in all the turbulent story of the Transvaal. He had been present on Dingaan’s Day, when the migratory farmers had broken the Zulu host; 1 he had taken part in many fierce attacks on native tribes; he had been a commandant in the raiding band which sacked Livingstone’s mission station; he had been one of the leaders of the Transvaalers who had tried in 1857 to force the Orange Free State into subjection; he had fought against President Burgers’ attempts to introduce order in the Transvaal; he had protested against the British annexation, yet had for a time held office under the British Crown; he had been the leading spirit in the revolt of 1880, and one of the triumvirate who constituted the provisional Government. Now,

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1 See above, Bk. ix. chap. x. p. 430
in 1883, he became President of the young republic; and continued to hold that office, not without opposition, until the republic was brought to an end in the second Boer War. He was the very embodiment of the Transvaal tradition. Shrewd, masterful and obstinate, he drew his inspiration from the Bible, and especially from the Old Testament. He belonged to the Doppers, the most narrow and bigoted of the three sects into which the Dutch Reformed Church was divided; and he instinctively compared his own people with the Chosen People who had come out of Egypt, the Bantu tribes with the Canaanites whom it was their divinely appointed task to enslave or destroy, and the British power with Pharaoh, King of Egypt. The dream of his heart was to make all South Africa Dutch, and to drive the British into the sea.

Though he had strength and obstinacy, Kruger was not a great administrator; and during the first years of his rule (which was disliked and opposed by the more enlightened Boers) the Transvaal seemed to be falling back into the old lawless confusion. There were raids on all sides, as in the old days, in defiance of the boundaries defined by the Convention of London. One body of Boers made their way into Zululand, and founded what they called the New Republic¹ (1884): Britain recognised the New Republic, which was incorporated in the Transvaal four years later (1888), but thought it necessary to annex Zululand as a means of preventing further aggression. Other expeditions ² gradually subjugated Swaziland (1886-1894), though the independence of this region had been expressly recognised by the London Convention. Yet other bands of raiders entered Bechuanaland on the west, and founded the republic of Stellaland and Goshen (1883); but the British Government intervened, and sent an expedition to set up a protectorate over Bechuanaland (1885) at the request of the Bechuanas. On the north, expansion into Matabeleland was also planned, though it was anticipated (as we shall see) by the British South Africa Company; while on the east Kruger was eager to gain possession of the coast, in order to have a port free from British control. Meanwhile, within the limits of the republic, the native peoples, who enjoyed in Cape Colony equal political rights with the white settlers, were denied every right of citizenship by an express provision of the constitution. Nor (with one exception)

¹ See the map, Atlas, Plate 89 (d).
would the obstinate President enter into any defined relations with the other South African States. When in the 'nineties Cape Colony, Natal and the Orange Free State formed a customs union, Kruger flatly declined to enter it, lest it might prove the means of extending British influence. But in 1889, after the death of President Brand, he persuaded the Orange Free State to sign a defensive treaty of alliance with him; and thenceforward the two independent Dutch republics were linked together over against the two British colonies.

So long as the Transvaal remained a disorganised and almost bankrupt republic of farmers, it might cause unrest, but it could not be formidable. But its independence had scarcely been established when discoveries were made which radically transformed the situation. In the very year of the Convention of London gold was discovered at Barberton (1884); and two years later the still more productive gold-field of the Witwatersrand—the richest gold-field in the world—was opened up. Thousands of gold-diggers, followed by other thousands of traders and shopkeepers and professional men, began to flock to Johannesburg, which, with a swiftness that surpassed even the records of California and Australia, sprang from nothing into a rich and prosperous city, with banks, churches, exchanges and newspaper offices. Johannesburg had 3000 inhabitants in 1887, 25,000 in 1890, and over 100,000 in 1896; and the immigration into some other parts of the Transvaal was only less sensational in its volume and rapidity. The overwhelming majority of the immigrants were Englishmen, Scotsmen and Australians. Thanks to their activity the wealth of the country increased in geometrical progression. Within ten years the newcomers owned almost one-third of the land, numbered more than half of the population, and were paying almost the whole of the taxes. The South African Republic ceased to be an all but bankrupt State; it could dispose of immense resources, and equip itself, if need be, with armaments on the modern scale; and the younger generation of Boers were drawn out of isolation into the fertile and restless civilisation of the West, which Kruger hated.

Manifestly there was a danger that the Dutch farmers would be swamped by the newcomers, and that the country would be Anglicised. This would certainly happen if the immigrants were allowed political rights. Hitherto citizenship had been conferred on easy terms, as was natural in a
new country. In 1882, indeed, Kruger had raised the qualifying period of residence from two years to five. Now, in 1890 and the following years, he easily persuaded his Volksraad (Parliament) to stiffen the conditions progressively, in such a way as to exclude practically the whole of the new population. Not only were they denied the franchise, they were not even allowed the rights of municipal self-government in the city which they had created out of nothing; and in a city almost purely English the use of Dutch was insisted upon in the public schools. Petitions were in vain; equally vain were the remonstrances of the British Government. ‘This is my country,’ said Kruger in reply to a deputation of ‘Uitlanders’ or foreigners, ‘these are my laws. Those who do not like to obey my laws can leave my country.’

Nor was this all. Under the new conditions, men accustomed to modern methods had to be employed in administration. For this purpose Dutchmen and Germans were imported from Europe, notably a very able young Dutchman named Leyds, who obtained a great ascendancy over the shrewd old President. Profitable monopolies (the sale of dynamite, for example, which was indispensable for the mines) were granted to these men; and the construction of the necessary railway facilities was entrusted to a group of Dutch or German concessionaires, who set themselves to divert the whole traffic of the Transvaal away from the Cape and towards the Portuguese ports in Delagoa Bay. When the mineowners tried to protect themselves against the prohibitive rates charged for transit from the Cape railways by organising waggon-transport, Kruger responded by closing the ‘drifts’ or fords across the Vaal.

Many of the Boers, perhaps a majority, disliked and opposed this policy. In 1893 they put up a rival candidate for the Presidency, but though it was widely believed that he had obtained a clear majority, the declared result gave a small majority to Kruger. By that time the Uitlanders, who were creating the country’s wealth but had no political rights save that of paying heavy taxes, were becoming desperate; they had formed a Reform Union, which was at first joined, not by the mining magnates (who feared to anger the old President), but mainly by artisans and professional men; and they were demanding equal political rights, and claiming the protection of Britain as the suzerain Power.

From the Transvaal it is instructive to turn to the two
British colonies, where complete equality of civil rights existed between the two white races, while in Cape Colony (though not in Natal) natives were admitted to the franchise. In 1893, when her population included some 50,000 whites, Natal obtained responsible government. Being the most British of the South African States, and the nearest neighbour of the Transvaal, Natal watched with anxiety the development of Kruger’s policy. But in the Cape this anxiety was yet greater; for there was good reason to fear that the racial antipathies which Kruger was fomenting might find an echo in the parent settlement; and the activities of the Afrikander Bond threatened to make politics turn upon questions of race. The chief safeguard against this danger was the existence of complete political equality between the two white races. Moreover the leader of the Bond, J. H. Hofmeyr, was a man of great shrewdness and real moderation, by no means blind to the advantages of partnership in the British Commonwealth: it was he who suggested in 1887 the levying of a duty throughout the empire for the support of the navy.

But the dominating factor in Cape politics during these years was Cecil Rhodes.¹ He had set before himself the aim of making British influence supreme throughout South Africa, an aim to which Kruger and his policy formed the greatest obstacles. His chief weapon was commercial organisation. Already a power in the diamond-fields of Kimberley, he was also deeply concerned in the gold-mining industry of Johannesburg, was intimately in touch with all that went on in that restless city, and sympathised keenly with the grievances of the Uitlanders. But his supreme interests were political rather than commercial. It was his influence which persuaded the British Government in 1885 to proclaim a protectorate over Bechuanaland. Though it is an unfertile region, Bechuanaland has been described as the key of South Africa: it separated the Transvaal from the recent German settlement in South-West Africa, and it opened the way to the rich territories of the Zambezi valley. Already European prospectors and Boer explorers were making their way into this region, which Livingstone’s journeys had revealed, and were trying to extort concessions from LobENGULA, the warrior-king of the Matabele. In 1888 a British agent succeeded in obtaining from LobENGULA a grant of the exclusive right to exploit minerals throughout his territories; and next year, 1889, Rhodes established

¹ For a sketch of Rhodes, see above, Chap. vi. p. 677.
the British South Africa Company, with a charter from the British Government, and power to open up and colonise a vast and vaguely defined territory extending from the northern borders of the Transvaal to Lake Tanganyika. During the following years agents of the Company, notably Dr. L. S. Jameson, were at work founding settlements, opening mines, erecting telegraphs, and pushing forward railway lines towards the Portuguese coast on the East. Kruger was outflanked and encircled; and a Boer raid across the Limpopo, attempted in 1891, was firmly turned back. What with the Uitlanders within the Transvaal, and this movement of encirclement beyond its borders, patriotic Boers might well feel that their cherished civilisation was threatened with extinction.

Meanwhile Rhodes had become, in 1890, Prime Minister of Cape Colony. Firmly believing in equality of rights between the two white races as the only foundation of healthy development in South Africa, he made an alliance with Hofmeyr, the leader of the Afrikander Bond; and being thus able to count upon the support of both races in Cape Colony, he wielded for six years almost dictatorial power. Undeniably he used his power well. He spared no pains to cultivate friendly relations between Dutch and English. He took a keen interest in education. He worked out a sympathetic and enlightened native policy. These six years, 1890-1896, were in truth the crown of Rhodes’s career. Cape Colony was prosperous and undisturbed; Natal and the Orange Free State were joined with it in a Customs Union, and all three were impatient of Kruger’s impracticable obscurantism. Away in the north the great new realm of the South Africa Company was developing rapidly; in 1893 a revolt of the Matabele, who were impatient of finding their standing victims, the Mashonas, withdrawn from their attacks, was brilliantly crushed, and the Company’s sway was unchecked; in 1895 this great dominion was christened Rhodesia in honour of its founder—an honour the like of which no other man has ever received in his lifetime. Kruger and Krugerism were penned in on every side; and the Transvaal Boers of the younger generation were becoming impatient of Kruger’s methods. Time and patience, it seemed, were alone needed, and Rhodes’s ideal of an equal partnership of the two races, united together in a great federation under the ægis of the British Crown, would come to realisation.

But Rhodes was wilful, autocratic, impatient, ever
haunted by a sense of the shortness of life. He could not wait upon the course of events. The Uitlanders in the Transvaal were planning an armed rising to secure redress for their wrongs. Rhodes lent himself to the plot, and helped to supply the plotters with money and arms, while his friend Jameson assembled a small force in the Company’s territories near to the border. The plan was that the Uitlanders were to seize Johannesburg and Pretoria, while Jameson was to come to their aid. But Jameson recklessly invaded before the conspirators were ready, and on January 2, 1896, was ignominiously forced to surrender, while all the Johannesburg leaders were arrested. This mad filibustering expedition had in truth ruined the Uitlanders’ cause; and it directly played into Kruger’s hands.

§ 3. The Causes of the South African War.

The Jameson raid was a turning-point. It brought Rhodes’s political career to an end. It aroused the sympathies of the Cape Dutch for their fellows in the Transvaal, and closed the era of friendly co-operation between the two races. It restored Kruger’s dwindling prestige; for it persuaded the reforming Boers in the Transvaal that their freedom was threatened, and caused them to draw together. It discredited Britain in the eyes of the world; for though the British Government had no knowledge of the miserable plot, and though the High Commissioner issued a strong proclamation forbidding British subjects to take part as soon as he heard the news, the world naturally regarded the episode as a proof that Britain was aiming at the destruction of Boer independence; and the later course of events was universally interpreted in the light of this sordid episode. But the most significant fact of the moment was the despatch by the German Emperor of a telegram in which he congratulated Kruger upon having dealt with the raid ‘without appealing to the help of friendly Powers.’ This phrase was equivalent to an announcement that in the event of future trouble, the Transvaal might count upon German support; and, so construed, it contributed to determine the direction of Kruger’s policy during the next four years. At the same time it was a warning to Britain that Germany, towards whom she had been anxiously friendly, must be regarded as a possible enemy.

For a time the disastrous fiasco of the Jameson raid kept the Uitlanders quiet about their grievances; it had put
them out of court. But inevitably the agitation revived; and in January 1899 21,000 British subjects in the Transvaal forwarded a petition to the Queen asking for protection and redress. Their demand was for equal political rights for all white men, such as existed in every British dominion, including Cape Colony. But the British Government was faced by a serious difficulty in putting forward this demand: the Convention of London, though it vaguely referred to 'suzerainty' in the preamble, did not give to Britain any power of interference in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, and Kruger, and indeed the whole Boer people, refused to admit any claim of suzerainty. Sir Alfred (later Lord) Milner, who had been High Commissioner since 1897, urged that Britain should formally demand a five-years' franchise for the Uitlanders, and this policy was adopted by Chamberlain and the home Government. On the other hand, Kruger demanded that any question in dispute should be referred to arbitration, which implied that the Transvaal was an entirely independent State. Between these positions compromise was almost impossible.

It seems plain that Kruger was prepared for war, and desired it, being confident that he could drive the British into the sea: he was sure of the Orange Free State, and with its aid could dispose of 80,000 or 90,000 men—a far larger force than Britain could easily bring into the field; he had accumulated great stores of munitions; he underestimated the military power of Britain; and he counted upon German help. At a conference with Sir Alfred Milner at Bloemfontein (June) he showed himself quite unyielding. The British Government, having expected him to give way, awoke suddenly to the realisation that the attitude it had adopted was leading it into a difficult and serious war, though even yet it did not understand how serious; and it began to send troops to South Africa, which was almost undefended. In October Kruger launched an ultimatum demanding the immediate withdrawal of the British troops, and requiring an answer within forty-eight hours. To such a demand there could be no answer. The day after the ultimatum expired Boer troops invaded Cape Colony; and the most serious ordeal by which the British Commonwealth had been faced during the nineteenth century had begun.

§ 4. The South African War.

The most striking feature of the war which thus began was the sharp conflict between the opinions about its causes
and aims which were held on the one hand by the majority throughout the British Commonwealth, and on the other hand by a minority in these lands and by the weight of foreign opinion in all countries. To the greater part of the civilised world, and to a substantial minority in Britain, the war appeared to be a cynical attack by a vast and powerful empire upon two little farmer-republics, an attack which was engineered by mining magnates and financiers for the purpose of getting possession of valuable gold-fields. To the majority of British people it appeared as a war for equality of rights, and against the iniquity of racial ascendancy; a war of defence, moreover, against a small but restless and aggressive State which had been a source of disturbance for many years. There has never been a time when Britain has been the object of a more virulent or contemptuous anger: that was one side of the picture. But, on the other side, there had never before been displayed so remarkable a voluntary rally of free peoples to a common cause, or so unwavering and impressive a demonstration of loyalty and comradeship, as the action of the great Dominions exhibited; for all of them sent contingents of volunteers, and continued their support steadfastly till the end.

Britain realised with a shock that, apart from her own daughter-nations, she had no friends in the world, and that, but for her mastery of the seas, she might have been exposed to a combined onslaught by the other imperialist Powers, like that which had nearly ruined her in the crisis of the American War of Independence. Her isolation seemed anything but 'splendid,' and the South African War was soon followed by a change of policy. On the other hand she learnt that the imperial tie was infinitely stronger than any one had expected; and this lesson also had lasting effects. In this sense the war was the culmination of British imperialism; but in another sense it marked the beginning of reaction. Men asked whether this destructive and wasteful conflict could not have been avoided; whether it was not in part due to the arrogant spirit bred by the easy conquests and annexations of the previous decade; whether even the causes for which it was professedly fought would not have been better served by patience; whether it was in accord with British traditions to strive to destroy a little nation that had struggled to preserve its nationhood, even if it was in some respects reactionary and intolerant. The flamboyant temper of the previous era went out of fashion; and much bitter feeling was stirred.
We shall not attempt any detailed narrative of the war, which lasted two and a half years. It fell into three clearly marked periods. The first, which lasted four months (October 1899-February 1900), saw the Boers taking the aggressive, and winning marked successes. They attacked the British colonies in four directions, besieging Mafeking and Kimberley in the west, invading Cape Colony in the south, and bursting into Natal in the east. The Natal campaign was the most important: the Boer leaders seem to have hoped to overrun that colony swiftly, and to reach the sea, and a striking success of this kind might have had momentous results: it might have raised Cape Colony, and possibly brought about European intervention. This hope was not fulfilled. But White's army was penned into Ladysmith, and Buller's attempt to relieve it was held up at Colenso; while in the west a British army despatched to relieve Kimberley was stopped dead at Magersfontein, and in the centre another army was beaten at Stormberg. These three staggering blows were all struck in the second week of December, while the three besieged towns, Mafeking, Kimberley and Ladysmith, were holding their own with difficulty. This 'black week' had a sobering effect upon the British people, who had expected an easy victory; and British prestige underwent an eclipse. Yet the plain fact was that the Boer advance had spent itself; it made no further progress; and this meant that the ultimate defeat of the Boers was assured.

These checks produced an immense outburst of warlike enthusiasm both in Britain and in the Dominions. Large forces of volunteers were raised; contingents poured in from the Dominions; and Roberts and Kitchener, the most famous of living British soldiers, were put in command of the greatest armies that Britain had ever placed in the field. In February they were ready to advance. They swept up through the Orange Free State, relieving Kimberley on the way; caught and annihilated the main western army of the Boers at Paardeberg; caused the relief of Ladysmith by this pressure in the west; and captured Bloemfontein (March, 1900). The possibility of a Boer victory had vanished, and the two Presidents sought peace on the basis of the status quo ante; but they were refused, and Roberts's advance continued. He pressed on into the Transvaal, and occupied Johannesburg and Pretoria (June 5). By October all the main centres in both republics were in British occupation.

1 See the maps, Atlas, Plate 89 (a) and (d).
and Kruger had fled to Europe. The second phase of the war was over; the annexation of both republics to the British Empire was proclaimed; and Lord Roberts returned to England, having, to all appearance, accomplished his task.

But the brave Boers were far indeed from acknowledging defeat, or accepting the destruction of their national existence. They broke up their field armies; but with a multitude of small commandoes they waged a brilliant and baffling guerilla, whose heroes were Botha, the commander-in-chief, De Wet, and De La Rey. This phase of the struggle, which was extended to the western part of Cape Colony, lasted for a year and a half, and was extraordinarily difficult to deal with. Every farmhouse was a place of refuge for the elusive Boers; farmhouses therefore were burnt in scores, and the women and children were removed to concentration camps. In the end an elaborate system of blockhouses formed the basis of a new plan of campaign by means of which Kitchener wore down the heroic resistance of the farmers; and on May 31, 1902, the Boer leaders accepted the Peace of Vereeniging. The terms of this treaty were significant. The Boer farmers became citizens of the empire against which they had been fighting. They were guaranteed against any infringement of their liberty or their property. They were promised the establishment of a system of self-government in the future. And the victors, far from receiving any recompense or indemnity for their immense sacrifices of life and money, actually undertook to supply £3,000,000 for the purpose of re-establishing the burghers in their farms.

It is not easy to find the record of any other treaty of peace in which the conqueror, without claiming any material advantage for himself, undertook to pay tribute to the vanquished. It may be said that Britain acquired the territory of the two republics; but she acquired them only in a nominal sense; she made, and could make, no profit out of them; and she pledged herself to restore them freely to their possessors as soon as the bitterness of war had died down. One thing alone was gained by this war: the establishment of equal political rights for both of the white races in the Transvaal as fully as it had existed in Cape Colony; and, by that means, the winning of a chance to banish that racial antipathy which had poisoned the history of South Africa ever since 1836. This had been, on the British side, the declared purpose of the war, and it was won at the cost
of an immense outlay of treasure, and the sacrifice of many lives. Perhaps, with patience, it might have been won without war; but it is also possible that if the war had not been fought when it was fought, South Africa would later have been the scene of a more dreadful conflict in which Germany might have taken a part.

South Africa could now look forward to a union of races and of States such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand had achieved. But this union, if it was to be real, could not be imposed by force; and though force had created the conditions which made it possible, it had inevitably left a bitterness which must form a grave obstacle. Many believed that at least a generation must pass ere the problem could be solved. It remained for the statesmanship of the next era to act courageously upon a more sanguine view.

(Lucas, Historical Geography of South Africa; Greswell, Our South African Empire; Theal, South Africa ('Story of the Nations'); Worsfold, South Africa; Doyle, Great Boer War; Maurice and Grant, History of the War in South Africa; Kruger, Memoirs; Williams, Cecil Rhodes; Bryce, Impressions of South Africa; Spender, Life of Campbell-Bannerman; Headlam, Milner Papers; Garvin, Life of Chamberlain; Temperley and Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy; Halévy, History of the English People (Epilogue).]
CHAPTER IX

UNSTABLE EQUILIBRIUM IN WORLD-POLITICS

(A.D. 1895-1905)

§ I. The Failure of Isolation: Britain and the United States.

In an earlier chapter we have seen how the world was gradually overshadowed, during the years from 1880 to 1895, by the menace of war which arose from acute commercial competition, from intense colonial rivalry, and above all from the heaping up of armaments by all the Great Powers of Europe except Britain. From 1895 onwards this vague menace became an ever present danger. No year was free from alarms. One after another vexed and difficult problems arose, now in the Far East, now in the Balkans, again in South America or the Pacific or South Africa.

In the course of these anxious years the British Commonwealth was forced to realise that the political isolation upon which it had prided itself was attended by grave dangers. During the early part of the South African War the Boers had good reason to hope that one or more of the European Powers would intervene in their favour; and if such intervention had taken place Britain would have had no friends or helpers save her daughter-nations, most of whom would have been exposed to serious dangers. The experience of these years led to a remarkable reversal of British policy, which showed itself first in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, and then in the entente with France in 1904. Now that international politics were no longer limited to Europe, but extended to every part of the globe, it had ceased to be possible to stand aloof from their complications. For good or for ill, as a result of the imperialist era, the world had become a single political system.

1 Chap. i. p. 605.
Even the United States of America, in spite of their powerful tradition of aloofness from foreign entanglements, were being drawn into the sphere of world-politics, and were being captured by the imperialist spirit which dominated the rest of the world. The first important evidence of this took, indeed, the form of a reassertion of the Monroe doctrine, which warned off Europe from meddling in American affairs; but it was reasserted in a novel form, and in an imperialist spirit. For more than half a century a dispute had been dragging on between Britain and the disorderly South American Republic of Venezuela regarding the boundary between that State and British Guiana; Venezuela referred the matter to the United States (1895), which announced through its Secretary of State, Mr. Olney, that '3000 miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between an European and an American State unnatural and inexpedient'—a doctrine which challenged the very existence of the British Commonwealth, and was not likely to be acceptable, for example, to Canada. 'To-day,' Mr. Olney continued in still more challenging phrases, 'the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.' This pronouncement for a moment brought war with America within the range of possibility, especially when the United States appointed a commission to define its 'fiat' upon the question in dispute. Fortunately the question was solved by a treaty of arbitration, whereunder two British and two American lawyers, under the presidency of a Russian jurist, gave a unanimous award (1899) strongly in favour of the British claims; and it is worth noting that the procedure of this tribunal became the model for the permanent system of arbitration set up in the same year by The Hague Conference.

Meanwhile, in another sphere, events had happened which at once illustrated the growth of the imperialist spirit in America, and helped to re-establish friendly relations between the two English-speaking Powers. In 1898 the United States were drawn into a war with Spain on the question of the misgovernment of Cuba. The sentiment of the whole world, save Britain and the British colonies, was as hostile to the United States in this war as to Britain in the South African struggle which began in the following year; and the practical manifestations of British sympathy with the United States did much to restore good feeling.

See the map, Atlas, Plate 76 (b).
At the end of the Spanish War, the United States assumed a sort of protectorate over the republic of Cuba, and directly annexed Porto Rico in the West Indies, and the Philippine Islands in the China Sea. The United States had thus definitely entered the ranks of the imperialist Powers; and when, in the same year, they formally annexed Hawaii, which they had long informally controlled, and in the following year (1899) divided the Samoan group with Germany, it seemed that they had definitely broken with their long-standing tradition of isolation, and must henceforth play their part in the complex problems of world-politics. If they had frankly done so, the course of events during the next period might have been very different.

The American tradition of political aloofness was too strong to be so quickly broken. Yet there was one sphere of world-politics from which America could not wholly stand aloof, especially now that she had become a Power in the Pacific. This was the question of the Far East, the problem of China, in which during these years the European Powers had begun to busy themselves. Here the attitude of the United States was very much akin to that of Britain; for both desired that China should be left undisturbed to develop in her own way, while the other Powers were apparently eager to make use of the weakness of China for their own aggrandisement. If the English-speaking Powers could have frankly co-operated on this problem, both China and the world might have been saved from many ills. But apparently this was impossible; and the Far Eastern problem developed in such a way that it produced momentous and far-reaching consequences in world-history.


Japan's sensational victory over China in 1894 came at a moment when the European Powers, having almost completed the partition of Africa and the Pacific, were looking about for fresh fields for their enterprise. Russia, in particular, who had been building the Trans-Siberian railway since 1891, was anxious to establish her foothold in the Pacific; France, having conquered Tongking, dreamed of

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 83 (a).
2 See above, Chap. i. p. 619.
bringing Southern China under her influence; Germany, now eager for colonial possessions, was disappointed with what she had already obtained. These three Powers, therefore, in spite of their bitter rivalry in Europe, combined to order Japan to give up the Liao-tung Peninsula and the harbour of Port Arthur, on the ground that the owner of Port Arthur was the master of Peking. Britain stood aloof from this demonstration. Japan had to give way.

The three Powers had posed as protectors of the integrity of China. But the insincerity of this profession was soon demonstrated. In 1897 two German missionaries were murdered in the rich province of Shantung. On this pretext Germany despatched a fleet to seize the fine harbour of Kiaochau in that province, and demanded that this port should be leased to her, that she should be given valuable mining and railway rights, and that her expenses in occupying Kiaochau should be paid: the blood of the martyrs was to be the seed of—the Empire. Russia followed by obtaining a lease of Port Arthur—the very position which she had refused to allow Japan to take, on the ground that this would be ruinous to Chinese independence. France demanded the harbour of Kwangchau in Southern China. Britain, after vainly protesting, took her share in the scramble and obtained a lease of Wei-hai-wei, opposite to Port Arthur, for the purpose of creating a naval base from which to watch the proceedings of the Russians. Even Italy tried to obtain a lease; this was the only one of the European demands which the Chinese Government felt itself strong enough to refuse. It looked as if China was about to be partitioned: already the Great Powers were beginning to talk about 'spheres of influence.'

But the process was checked by the outbreak (1899) of a confused rising against Western interference known as the Boxer Rebellion. Missionaries and Christian converts were murdered. The legations of the European Powers in Peking were besieged (1900). A composite force of several nationalities, including the Japanese, found some difficulty in relieving them. An international punitive expedition, of which Germany insisted that she must appoint the commander, was sent to teach the Chinese to pay proper respect to Europeans; and the Kaiser, figuring himself as the captain of Europe against Asia, designed an enormous allegorical picture of the war against the Yellow Peril. In the end (1901) China of course had to give way; she had
seen her palaces sacked by European troops; she dismissed her anti-Western ministers; she paid a large indemnity; and peace was restored.

Now every obstacle to European exploitation seemed to have broken down. Germany was systematically fortifying Kiao-chau and developing the resources of Shantung; Russia was making Port Arthur impregnable, and securing her grip on Manchuria with railways and garrisons; Japan was looking on in bitterness, longing for revenge against the Muscovite, but afraid to challenge the combined might of Europe; Britain and the United States were protesting futilely against the manifest drift towards partition, but unsupported protests were of no avail.

Then, in 1902, came a diplomatic act which suddenly changed the whole situation. An alliance between Britain and Japan was concluded, and announced to the world. This alliance was of momentous importance. It was Britain’s first departure from her traditional policy of avoiding standing alliances. It was the first alliance that had been made in modern times between a European and an Oriental State on equal terms. It definitely brought Japan into the ranks of the Great Powers. And it had the immediate effect of stopping the process of partition in China. The allies pledged themselves to maintain the *status quo* in the Far East; and each undertook to go to the aid of the other in the event of an attack by more than one Power. This was equivalent to a formal announcement to France and Germany that if war should break out between Russia and Japan, the intervention of either of them would bring Britain into the field; and as neither France nor Germany could do anything in the Far East against the opposition of the British fleet, in effect the treaty ensured that, if war should come, Russia and Japan would have to fight their battle alone.

War came within two years; and its results, as we shall see, were far-reaching. If ever a war was inevitable, the Russo-Japanese war deserves that description. Yet it might have been prevented, in one or other of two ways. If the European Powers, including Britain, had agreed to partition China, they could not have been resisted. They did not and could not agree, partly because of their mutual jealousies, partly because Britain held that the partition of an ancient and civilised country such as China was an altogether different thing from the partition of backward and savage Africa. On the other hand, the war could have
been prevented if the English-speaking peoples could have offered a firm and united front in defence of the integrity of China during the last five years of the nineteenth century. But this also was impossible, mainly because the United States made it plain that they would not go beyond diplomatic protests, to which nobody paid any attention.

§ 3. The Problems of the Balkans: Germany and Turkey.

While new problems were arising in the Far East, the Near East was also giving constant trouble. It was the danger-point of Europe, whence at any moment a conflagration might start which would involve the civilised world. The unsatisfied national aspirations of the little Balkan States, and the unrest of the Christian territories still subject to Turkish rule, formed one source of disturbance; another was supplied by the subterranian intrigues of the Sultan Abdul Hamid, and by the revival of Mohammedan fanaticism which he encouraged.

The Concert of Europe laboured assiduously but ineffectually to keep these disturbing factors in check. Though the Powers were able to stave off the outbreak of war, except when Greece attacked Turkey in 1897, they were unable to establish any real settlement, or any hope of lasting peace. And the main reason for this failure was that they were disunited. Russia had lost all her influence with the Balkan States, and seemed to have washed her hands of the Balkan imbroglio: when she was urged in 1897 to intervene for the protection of Armenia, she cynically replied that she had no wish to create another Bulgaria—another protégé who would desert and oppose her. France and Britain no longer possessed any influence at Constantinople; they were the conquerors of Moslems, the natural foes of the Mohammedan revival. The European Powers whose influence was now predominant throughout the Balkan Peninsula were Germany and Austria, and these Powers, acting in close accord, could in fact render ineffectual every attempt of the other Powers.

Austrian or German influence reigned in Serbia (until 1903), in Rumania, and in Bulgaria; while Germany was steadily strengthening her influence among the Turks. German officers trained the Turkish army, and led it to victory over the Greeks in 1897. The German Kaiser him-

1 See the map, Atlas, Plate 86,
self paid two state visits to the Sultan, in 1889 and in 1898: they were the first visits that had ever been paid to the Turk by a European sovereign. After his second visit, the Kaiser went on to Damascus and Jerusalem; and in the course of his tour made a speech in which he announced himself as the protector of all the 300,000,000 Mohammedans throughout the world. Most of these were subjects of Britain, France and Russia; and the plain implication of the speech was that Germany was willing to use for political purposes the great religious revival which was stirring the whole Mohammedan world.

More practical results also followed from these friendly relations between Germany and Turkey. Germany obtained the right to build a great railway line from Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf, a project which she began to put into operation in 1902-1903. Its result would be to make German influence all-powerful throughout that vast, rich and neglected region. Already the outlines were emerging of the grandiose project of empire whereby a continuous territory, stretching from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, was to be brought under a single economic régime, and (in effect) under a single political control. This project was the keystone of the lofty imperial dreams which the German people were beginning to entertain. Its foundation was the reigning influence of Germany at Constantinople, and of Austria at Belgrad, Sofia and Bucharest. And the fear of weakening this precarious fabric of power forbade Germany and Austria to act frankly with the other Powers on Balkan questions.

There was, for example, incessant disorder and misgovernment in Macedonia, the unhappy province which the Congress of Berlin had restored to Turkish rule: Bulgars, Serbs and Greeks all had claims to this region, and kept it in unrest by ceaseless raids and intrigues, while the slipshod tyranny of the Turk rather increased than qualified the anarchy. The Powers tinkered with the Macedonian problem, but did no good. There was only one remedy—autonomy; and to that neither Germany nor Austria would have agreed.

Again, there was a rebellion against Turkish misrule in Crete (1896), whose Christian population, led by Venizelos, clamoured to be united with the motherland of Greece. The Powers carried out a pacific blockade of Crete, and eventually established a system of autonomy under a Greek prince, subject to Turkish suzerainty. They could
do so because Crete was an island, easily dealt with by fleets. But their action involved a disregard of Turkish sovereignty; Germany and Austria therefore refused to act with the other Powers. In 1897 Greece plunged into a mad war with Turkey, in the hope of gaining some of the Greek territories withheld from her in 1878, and European volunteers flocked to her aid, almost as in Byron's days. But she was defeated in a thirty days' campaign by a Turkish army under German officers. The Powers succeeded in saving her from the worst results of her indiscretion; but the prestige of Turkey had been re-established.

In 1894 and the following years Mohammedan fanaticism was deliberately stirred up against the Armenian Christians, and an appalling series of massacres took place, not only in Armenia, but even in Constantinople itself, within sight of the European embassies. These outrages were far more prolonged and far more destructive than the Bulgarian atrocities which had awakened the conscience of Europe in 1876. They were encouraged and even directed by Turkish officials, and the worst offender received honour from the Sultan. Yet they produced no result save ineffective protests; even Russia remained inactive. Never before had the Turk ventured to show such cynical indifference to the complaints of Europe. He was evidently conscious of a new strength when he ventured upon such boldness. The massacres were at their worst in 1897 and 1898; and it was in 1898 that the German Kaiser revisited Constantinople as the guest of Abdul Hamid, who was responsible for these crimes; it was in 1898 that he announced that he had taken all Mohammedans under his protection.

It is not surprising that the Concert of Europe could not keep the Turk in order, or find stable solutions for the problems of the Balkans; for the Balkans had now become a sort of appanage of the Triple Alliance. In the next period Balkan troubles were to become more and more acute, until they led to the outbreak of the Great War. Already in 1903 there was a foretaste of the coming difficulties. The young King and Queen of Serbia were brutally murdered by a group of military conspirators. This ugly episode seemed to Western Europe only a proof of the untamed barbarism of the Balkan peoples. It was much more than that. The Serbian monarchs were in effect the agents of Austria for keeping Serbia in subjection to Austrian policy. They were
replaced by a prince of another line, Peter Karageorgevitch, who was the representative of a national and anti-Austrian policy. Austrian ascendancy in the Balkans was threatened by the independent policy which Serbia now began to pursue; and from this moment Serbia was exposed to the unresting enmity of Austria. Eleven years later this situation was to form the immediate cause of the Great War.

§ 4. The Entente between France and Britain.

It is plain that Germany, the most formidable military Power in the world, was changing her attitude and her aims in world-politics. She was no longer, in Bismarck’s phrase, a ‘satiated’ Power; she was bent upon becoming a world-Power, and was seeking in every direction for opportunities to augment her dominions. She looked with yearning eyes towards South America, where (especially in Brazil) many German colonists had settled. Here the Monroe Doctrine stood in the way; she would have been glad to challenge it if she could have got the aid of Britain. But wherever she turned, save in Turkey, naval strength seemed to be necessary as a condition of further expansion; and naval strength she did not possess.

Bismarck, indeed, had held that no State could be strong enough to pursue at once military and naval supremacy, and he had been content to leave Germany in the third rank of naval Powers. The new generation, and the Kaiser who was its spokesman, refused to be content with this position. Mahan’s books on the influence of sea-power were nowhere more seriously studied than in Germany; and they taught that sea-power was the greatest source of national strength. To make Germany as powerful on the seas as she already was on land became the chief ambition of Wilhelm II.; and during these years he took the first long steps towards this objective. In 1895 the Kiel Canal was opened; by making it easy to transfer fleets from the Baltic to the North Sea, or vice versa, it almost doubled the available strength of the German navy. In 1897 the German Navy League was formed, to teach Germans the vital importance of a great fleet. The Kaiser backed its propagandist labours by pointed speeches, in which he asserted that Germany’s future lay on the ocean, that the trident must be in her hands, that she must claim the Admiralty of the Atlantic. Britain, who had wielded the trident for three hundred
years, and depended upon it for her very existence, could not listen to these assertions unperturbed. Nor did they remain idle words. In 1898 the Reichstag passed an Act which provided funds for the creation of a powerful navy. In 1900 a second Act doubled the rapidity of construction; and this during the crisis of the South African War, when every German newspaper was full of virulent denunciations of Britain.

Hitherto Britain had been persistently friendly towards Germany; her strongest imperialists, Chamberlain and Rhodes, had even dreamed of an alliance between Britain, America and Germany, which was to dominate and pacify the world; and France had been generally regarded as Britain’s most dangerous foe. But the trend of events in European and world-politics, as well as the declared naval ambitions of Germany, produced a change of attitude; and two years after the conclusion of the Boer War an entente cordiale was established between France and Britain (1904). Part of the credit for this achievement belongs to the tact of King Edward VII., who created the atmosphere which made reconciliation possible. But the actual diplomatic arrangements were due to Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary who had negotiated the Anglo-Japanese alliance two years earlier; and both agreements were the outcome of the course of events. Neither would have been thinkable ten years earlier.

The entente of 1904 was in no sense an alliance. It involved no formal promise of mutual assistance for the future. It merely removed the numerous causes of friction which had kept France and Britain on bad terms in the past; and there was no reason why a similar agreement should not have been made by either party with Germany or with any other Power. Several old-standing disputes, such as that about the Newfoundland fisheries, were healed; but the most important parts of the agreement were that France recognised the position of Britain in Egypt, and promised to raise no further difficulties there, while Britain recognised the special interests of France in the unrestful country of Morocco. At the same time as these agreements, the two countries—who had, during nine centuries, fought one another more often than any other two countries in the world—set a new example to the world by signing an arbitration treaty, whereby they agreed to refer to arbitration every cause of dispute arising between them which did not affect their fundamental interests or their honour.
In essence, then, the entente of 1904 was not an alliance, or an understanding aimed at any Power, but a purely pacific agreement, which might have been made at any time, and might to the great advantage of the world have been extended to include every European Power. But in fact it was made at this juncture because both France and Britain felt themselves threatened by a common danger, and were anxious to remove causes of difference. The source of this threat was Germany; and from 1904 onwards, during ten unhappy and distressful years, Britain and France were found continually acting in co-operation to check the ever-growing aggressiveness of Germany and her allies.

§ 5. The Movement for Peace and the First Hague Conference.

It is not to be supposed that Europe regarded with indifference or complacency the steadily increasing intensity of international rivalry, the instability of the world’s peace, or the lavish expenditure on armaments which was devouring so much of the world’s growing wealth, forbidding social amelioration, and making the prospect of war tenfold more hideous than it had ever been. The transformation of Europe into a vast armed camp was regarded by the best men in most countries with a sort of helpless and bewildered exasperation, because it seemed to be in conflict with the natural movement of civilisation. Many well-meaning people were tempted to lay all the blame upon the wilful wickedness of statesmen, drawing no distinction between the statesmen of one country and those of another; many others glibly attributed the evil to capitalism, or to imperialism, or to any other ‘ism’ which they happened to dislike. Few were content to trace these unhealthy conditions to their manifest and immediate causes—to the example of Germany, which other countries were compelled to follow in self-defence, and to the doctrine, which Bismarck’s victories seemed to have established, that brute force is the ultimate determinant in human affairs.

Yet in truth the opposite doctrine—the doctrine that Law, and not Force, ought to regulate the relations of States—was by no means dead, but exercised a growing power. The international spirit, which had been strong at the end of the Napoleonic War, had been strengthened by the developments of the nineteenth century. Improved
communications and growing commerce had brought all the nations into closer relations with one another. The social usages of all the European peoples were being more and more assimilated; from Galway to Athens and from Stockholm to Cadiz men wore clothes of the same style, behaved in much the same way, and were faced by much the same social problems. Science was international, and the dominion of science was growing every day; the work of the great writers of each country was translated into the languages of all the rest, and Ibsen, Tolstoi, Anatole France were read by the intelligent in every land.

Moreover, despite appearances, the international spirit had made itself felt, with progressive force, in the sphere of politics. The Concert of Europe still worked. It might seem an ineffective body, yet it had achieved much; it had maintained peace in Europe for a long time, in face of great difficulties; it had carried out the partition of Africa without actual conflict, a thing which would have been impossible in any earlier age. Despite their mutual jealousies, the European States had learned to take joint action for many purposes. They had a common set of rules for the treatment of the wounded in war, drawn up at Geneva by general agreement; they regulated their postal systems in accord, they had established an international system of copyright, they controlled (for example) the navigation of the Danube through an international commission. More important, the nations were learning to refer their disputes to arbitration, rather than to the more dangerous arbitration of war. The modern use of arbitration for the settlement of international differences began with a treaty between Britain and the United States in 1794.\footnote{See above, p. 267.} But it had grown steadily during the nineteenth century. There were eight instances of international arbitration between 1820 and 1840, thirty between 1840 and 1860, forty-four between 1860 and 1880, and ninety between 1880 and 1900. It is worthy of note that Britain had made more use of this method than any other Power; the United States came next; France, Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands followed in that order. Many of the questions thus settled were small disputes, which would not in any case have led to war; but some, like the Alabama question, or the Venezuela question in 1899, were of much more serious importance. The nations were acquiring the habit of resorting to
judicial rather than military methods of settling their differences. And they were doing so in face of real difficulties; for on each separate question the Governments concerned had first to agree to arbitrate, and then to create a special tribunal for the purpose. Evidently the time had come when some regular method of settling such questions might be arrived at by agreement: the rapid increase in the number of arbitrations showed the need for such an advance.

Thus two hostile conceptions were working at the same time within the mind of the civilised world: on the one hand the pursuit of domination by brute force, on the other the attempt to extend the Reign of Law from the relations between individuals to the relations between States. No greater question lay before Europe and the world than the question which of these conceptions was to triumph. In the last days of the nineteenth century, when the menace of war seemed to be looming in every quarter of the world, an event took place which raised the hopes of those who believed in the substitution of law for force as the controlling factor in international relations. In 1898 the Tsar of Russia sent to the Governments of all the great and most of the small States an eloquent message, in which he urged them to consider the ruin that was being brought upon the world by the intolerable burden of armaments, and invited them to send delegates to a conference which should deliberate upon the means of removing the nightmare, and of finding methods of avoiding war. And in 1899 the representatives of twenty-six nations gathered at The Hague for the first Peace Conference, in response to the Tsar’s invitation.

To those who had built glowing hopes upon the summons of The Hague Conference its results were a disappointment. It did nothing for the limitation of armaments; the difficulties were too great, since nothing could be done unless every nation was willing to allow the forces it might maintain to be defined for it; and few of the nations, and Germany least of all, would contemplate submitting to such dictation. Yet it was something that the sentiment of the civilised world should be expressed in an organised way, as it was in the discussions. And one important and valuable achievement stood to the credit of the Conference. It set up a permanent tribunal, a panel of arbitrators, from among whom nations willing to resort to arbitration might select; and it defined the modes in which international
arbitrations should be conducted. The existence of this system did much to encourage the next great step forward, when Britain and France adopted in 1904 a general arbitration treaty, whereby they agreed to refer all controversies between them, not affecting their national honour or vital interests, to this mode of settlement. How plainly the sentiment of humanity was setting in this direction was shown by the fact that in the four years following the Franco-British treaty of 1904 no less than sixty treaties of the same type were signed by various Powers. The world, or the major part of the world, wanted organised peace and preferred law to brute force.


But assuredly the era of peace had not arrived. In the very year of The Hague Conference the war in South Africa began; and for a time it even seemed likely that a general war would grow out of it. And two years after the close of the South African War came a still more desperate conflict—the war between Russia and Japan (1904), which would almost certainly have involved Europe if the Anglo-Japanese treaty had not held the ring for the combatants. The outcome of this titanic conflict startled the world, and changed the aspect of world-politics. Little Japan, by heroic sacrifices and efforts, defeated the Russian colossus both on sea and on land; and securely established her position among the Great Powers. All over Asia this victory of an Oriental over a European Power had profound reactions. It caused a rapid decline in the prestige of Europe, it stimulated nationalist and anti-Western movements in India and elsewhere, and its influence in this regard is still potent. In European politics the effects of the Russian débâcle were still deeper; and they were increased by the outbreak of revolution in Russia, which for a time reduced her to impotence. Russia's strength had long been over-estimated; now, for a time, it was under-estimated. Germany and Austria felt that they could proceed to bolder action in the Balkans and elsewhere without fear. France felt that the ally to whom she had pinned her hopes, and on whom she had lavished her thrifty savings, could no longer be trusted to protect her; she became the more eager to cultivate her new friendship with Britain. And Britain herself had no longer any reason to dread Russia as a menace to the safety of India. The way
was prepared for a new orientation of world-polity, which came about during the next decade, and ended in the First Great War.

BOOK XII.
AN EPILOGUE: THE ORDEAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH.
(A.D. 1905-1933)
EPILOGUE (1933-1939)
BOOK XII.

A N EXPLANATION OF THE

COMMODATION

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INTRODUCTION

The last thirty years of our long story, which are dealt with in the present book, witnessed some of the most tremendous events in human history. They constitute a period of upheaval and confusion even more difficult, and more far-reaching in its effects, than the period of the French Revolution or the Reformation. We are still too near to these earth-shaking events to be able to take a cool, measured and impartial view of them. But it is essential that we should try to understand them, because our lives and our children's lives will inevitably be governed by them. We have the privilege (if it be a privilege) of living in the most momentous era of human history; an era in which the whole world has been brought within a single economic and political system; an era in which humanity has a tremendous choice imposed upon it. If the rulers of the world's peoples guide them rightly, we may be on the eve of an era of established peace and universally diffused well-being; but if they guide them wrongly, civilisation may crash in utter and final ruin. Plainly it is important that we should understand as well as we can the course of events which has led to this great alternative, even if it is as yet impossible to reach final and indisputable conclusions about these events.

The period seems at first sight to be broken in two by the gigantic tragedy of the Great War, and it often seems as if there were an impassable gulf between the pre-war and the post-war eras. In reality this is not so. All that happened before the war is apt to seem only a preface to that tragedy, and all that has happened since to be its outcome and consequence. But in truth the war only quickened or distorted great movements of change that were already going on.

In all countries, and especially in Britain, a great process of social reorganisation designed to improve the lot of the mass of the people was at work in the pre-war period. In some respects the war quickened this process and strengthened the demand for a great advance; in other respects it put very great difficulties in the way of the process by causing acute economic distress. It led to at least one immense revolutionary experiment, in Russia; and it sowed the seeds of the revolutionary spirit in many countries.
Before the war, political liberty and the democratic system of government seemed to have been almost universally established. It was asserted that one of the principal results of the war ought to be 'to make the world safe for democracy'; and when it ended there was an immense and sudden expansion of democratic institutions or aspirations in every part of the world. Since then there has been a violent reaction; and it is clear that the ideals of democracy and political liberty are faced by a struggle for their very existence.

Before the war, the member-nations of the British Commonwealth seemed to be moving steadily towards a closer co-operation. The war itself was the most severe test that had ever been applied to the Commonwealth, and it stood the test with amazing success. Since the war, this great partnership of peoples has seemed to be drifting asunder; and in 1926, instead of working out methods of dealing more effectively with common needs, its leaders agreed to a statement which reduces it to a very loose alliance, whose members are bound by no definite obligations to one another.

Before the war, the mutual dependence of all the nations and races on the face of the earth was yearly becoming more obvious; they were all bound together by a myriad interlacing filaments of trade; and they were feeling their way, through arbitration treaties and in other ways, to the means of preventing war between them. The war demonstrated their mutual dependence, since every people on the earth was directly or indirectly involved in it; and when peace came, this mutual dependence was expressed in the establishment of the League of Nations. But since the war nearly all nations have been struggling to resist their dependence upon their fellows and to make themselves self-sufficient; and the methods which they have adopted for this end have nearly brought them all to a common ruin.

Nobody can foretell what the results of the next generation will be—for Britain, for the British Commonwealth, or for the world. But it is clear that, for good or ill, the next generation will have to make some of the most momentous decisions in human history. These decisions cannot be wisely made without some understanding of the tremendous events surveyed in the present book. May God help us all to make them wisely; for we are all involved, and we are all responsible.
CHAPTER I

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH ON THE EVE OF THE CATAclySM

§ 1. Growing Imperial Unity: the Imperial Conferences

The outstanding feature of the history of the British Commonwealth during the early years of the twentieth century was that the great Dominions, now fully autonomous in all their internal affairs, and having attained the status of free nations, were showing a great eagerness to draw more closely to one another and to the motherland. This desire found expression in many vague projects for the creation of new imperial ties, some of which were debated in Imperial Conferences; and in the years just before the war there was a revival of the old project of a formal imperial federation, stimulated especially by a group of able young men, who called themselves the Round Table, published an excellent review to advocate their views, and started corresponding groups in many parts of the Empire. Nothing came, or could come, of these more formal schemes; they were incompatible with the autonomous nationhood which every one of the Dominions cherished, and they could not find a suitable place for India. It was by more informal and elastic methods that the growing unity and co-operation of these years expressed itself; and most notably by the working of the Imperial Conferences.

The first three Colonial Conferences of 1887, 1897 and 1902 had been almost accidental conclaves, held in connexion with great ceremonial occasions, the two jubilees of Queen Victoria and the coronation of King Edward VII. The Imperial Conferences of 1907 and 1911 were specially summoned, and it was agreed in 1907 that they should be regularly held at intervals of four years. They were equipped with a permanent secretariat, and with elaborate agenda; they were presided over, not by the Colonial Secretary, but by the British Prime Minister; and their
proceedings were recorded, and discussed in all the Parlia-
ments of the Empire. What is more, they dealt with
matters of pith and moment, and their deliberations led
to very important action.

In 1907 the problems of imperial defence were discussed
with a fulness never before attempted, and in conjunc-
tion with the experts of the Imperial Defence Committee.
The Conference recommended the establishment of an
Imperial General Staff, with branches in all the Dominions
working in close contact with one another; it emphasised
the importance of ensuring that uniform methods of organi-
sation and equipment should be followed in the military
forces of all the Dominions, so as to make co-operation easy
in case of need; and in order to work out fully these highly
important suggestions, a subsidiary Defence Conference
was held in the next year, 1908. Out of these discussions
sprang the defence programmes which the Dominions
undertook in 1909 and 1910; and these measures pre-
pared the way for their easy military co-operation with the
mother-country in the Great War, which was to save the
Commonwealth and the world. In the Conference of
1911 the statesmen of the Dominions were admitted to
the fullest knowledge of the arcana of foreign affairs,
and took part in an intimate discussion of British policy
at a moment when, as we shall see, the European outlook
was very dangerous. When the catastrophe came, the
responsible leaders of the Dominions knew how it had
come, and knew that they had not been led into it blind-
fold. In no small degree the whole-hearted comradeship
of all the members of the Commonwealth, which was
among the most glorious features of the war, was due
to the growing intimacy of co-operation that had been
achieved during the ten years preceding the war.

It was not only with defence and foreign policy that
the Conferences dealt, though their contribution to the
discussion of these problems was their greatest achieve-
ment. They discussed also many other modes of common
action. Thus a special subsidiary conference in 1910
led to the adoption of a uniform practice in regard to
copyright; the Conference of 1911 found a mode of admit-
ting naturalised foreigners to the rights of citizenship
throughout the Empire; and there was much valuable
discussion, both in 1907 and in 1911, on commercial ques-
tions, on imperial communications, on the organisation of
the imperial courts of appeal, and on many other themes.
Other conferences of a less august kind, which were summoned during these years, contributed in an equal degree to bring home to the citizens of the Commonwealth a sense of their fellowship in a noble communion of free peoples; such were a conference of universities, a conference of teachers, a conference of journalists.

In short, the character of the British Commonwealth of Nations was getting itself defined in forms which would have delighted the prophetic soul of Burke, and which fulfilled the dreams of Durham. Unlike any other human society that had ever existed on the earth, it was displaying itself as one State and many States at the same time: one State under a single crown, with a single citizenship, a single ultimate appeal at law, offering a common front to all enemies, and providing for common military action under a single command in case of need; but at the same time many States, each having unrestricted control over its own destinies, and each co-operating with the rest, in the last resort, only because it shared the same traditions and the same ideals. This was a type of human comradeship unexemplified in human history. It offered to an unrestful world a model of what could be achieved in equal comradeship when jealousy and mutual suspicion were banished.

§ 2. The Union of South Africa, and the Prosperity of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Even more remarkable than the development of imperial unity was the unification of South Africa, the region of the Commonwealth wherein conflict had been most frequent, and friction most bitter, for seventy years. After the close of the South African War in 1902, the High Commissioner, Lord Milner, with a brilliant band of helpers, spent three years in the reconstruction of the two annexed republics, which had been disorganised by three years of fighting. At the beginning of 1905 the time seemed ripe for the establishment of a system of representative government, such as had been promised when peace was made, and draft constitutions were promulgated for the two conquered colonies. It was proposed to concede representative but not responsible government; even this might appear courageous only three years after the conclusion of a bitterly-contested war. But before the proposal could be brought into effect, a Liberal Government had come into power in Britain, under Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman; and, with splendid faith in the virtues of self-government, it was decided to take the bold step of establishing a fully responsible system in the Transvaal at once (December 1906).

The courage and magnanimity of this step, taken only four years after the war, surpassed even the gift of self-government to Canada after the rebellion of 1837. But it brought its own immediate and great reward. Though the first election (1907) gave a majority to the Dutch in both of the conquered colonies, and though a Dutch majority was simultaneously returned in the Cape Parliament, there was no attempt to revive the exclusive racial policy of Kruger. On the contrary, the first result of the change was the rise of a spontaneous demand among both British and Dutch for the unification of all South Africa, an end towards which Grey and Frere, Carnarvon and Gladstone, had striven in vain. In 1908 a National Convention, consisting of Dutch and British delegates from all the four States, met at Durban to work out a scheme of union; and for the first time for seventy years the two white peoples of South Africa were found co-operating in harmony for the common advantage. The scheme which they drafted went beyond federation; it established a single unitary State, governed by a single cabinet and Parliament; the colonies, now renamed provinces, retaining only provincial councils with limited powers which are entirely subject to the central Parliament. Thus the most divided region of the British Commonwealth, left free to choose, adopted a more completely unified form of government than either Canada or Australia; and modelled its institutions as closely as might be upon those of the mother-country. The new constitution, approved by the four Parliaments, was ratified by the Imperial Parliament in 1909; and in 1910 South Africa, after all its troubles, entered upon its history as a united State under the British Crown.

There could not have been a braver or a more convincing demonstration of the sincerity of the British trust in political freedom; and the demonstration was completed when the Governor-General, Lord Gladstone, entrusted the task of forming the first ministry to the Transvaal Dutchman, Louis Botha, who had been Commander-in-Chief of the Boer armies. Four years later the ordeal of the Great War was to prove that in this case, as in so many others, freedom was the strongest foundation of con-
radeship. It seemed that the medicine of liberty had cured one of the greatest difficulties by which the modern Commonwealth had been hampered.

But the original difficulty, from which all the long troubles had arisen, still survived—the difference of view upon the treatment of the native population. During the discussions on the constitution, Cape Colony had striven to persuade the other States to adopt her method of allowing the franchise to coloured people on an educational qualification; she had failed to do more than maintain her practice within her own borders, and this denial of civic rights to the native population was the one feature of the constitution which aroused adverse comment in the Imperial Parliament. Yet the difficulty was no longer so acute as it had been in the days when the memory of slavery was still fresh; the Union Government was not unaware of its responsibilities; and General Smuts has told us that in dealing with the problem of native government, and in recognising, as it does, the right of the native population to special measures of protection, South Africa has learnt much from the past experiments of the British Government.

The racial problem was also presenting itself, however, in a new and more difficult form during these years. Many thousands of Indians had found their way into Natal and the Transvaal. Resolved to prevent the accentuation of its already complex racial problems, the Union Government set itself from the first to restrict Indian immigration, and imposed upon the existing Indian settlers a strict form of registration which they regarded as humiliating. The Indians claimed equal rights as British subjects; their cause was taken up by a remarkable agitator, M. K. Gandhi, who has since made himself the leader of a formidable movement in India; and throughout the pre-war period there was constant trouble on the subject, which was discussed at the Imperial Conference in 1911. It is, indeed, a very difficult imperial problem, which arises also, though in a less acute form, in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the West Indies and East Africa. The Dominions have an undeniable right to determine the character of the immigration which they will permit; but the policy which they have followed has certainly helped to embitter the Indian Nationalist movement to which we shall have to refer later.

Of the other great Dominions little need be said in so
brief a survey as we are here attempting. During the
decade preceding the war Canada, Australia and New
Zealand were all enjoying a high tide of prosperity; and
in all three the flood of immigration from the home country
had reached a much higher level than in the previous
period. It is significant of the growing unity of the Empire
that, while in 1900 only 30 per cent. of the emigrants from
Britain went to the British Dominions, by 1911 the per-
centage had risen to 80. In other words, the surplus
population of the crowded homeland had almost ceased
to go to the United States or to other lands, and was find-
ing its way almost wholly to the British realms, at the
rate of about 250,000 per annum.

Most of this tide of emigration flowed, during these
years, into Canada; she was prospering as she had never
prospered before, for the rich corn lands of the West were
being opened out, thanks to an exuberant energy in the
construction of railways. When one reflects upon the
wealth and population of Alberta and Saskatchewan,
now the greatest granaries of the Empire, it is difficult
to realise that they were only admitted as provinces of
the Dominion so recently as 1905. Immigrants were flock-
ing into Canada, before the war, at the rate of two or
three hundred thousand a year. Nearly half of these new-
comers came from the United States. The relations between
Canada and the United States were thus becoming in-
creasingly intimate; and in 1910 and 1911 Laurier's
Liberal Government in Canada revived the old project of
a treaty of reciprocity with the States. But this revived
the old fears of subordination to the great republic, all
the more because some American politicians indiscreetly
boasted that the result would be annexation. The boast
aroused fears in Canada for her two dearest ideals, her own
free nationhood and her membership of the British Com-
monwealth. And the result was that in 1911 Laurier's long-
lived ministry came to an end, and was replaced by a
Conservative Government, under Sir Robert Borden. Its
most distinctive undertaking was the project of a navy,
which was to be built and administered in consultation
with the British Admiralty, and to be worked in conjunc-
tion with the Royal Navy in time of war. The project
had not been carried into effect when the Great War broke
out. But, taken in conjunction with the military reorganisa-
tion which was carried out after the Conferences of 1907 and
1908, it was a proof of the reality of imperial co-operation.
In Australia and New Zealand these years saw a prosperity only less marked than that of Canada, and a renewal of the tide of British immigration, which had been almost suspended during the previous period. Both countries had adopted the fixed resolution to maintain the purity of their race, and jealously excluded Asiatic immigrants: the catchword 'White Australia' represented a principle from which no minister or party would have dared to depart. Both also had adopted, with variations, the policy which has been called 'the new protection'—a policy of combining tariff-protection for the employer with price-regulation for the consumer and the control of wages for the workman. It is a policy more easy to conceive than to execute, but Australia is convinced that it is practicable. Both countries were afflicted, especially during the later years of the period, by labour-troubles, which their bold devices of arbitration and conciliation did not avail to prevent. Australia presented in these years, both in the Commonwealth and in the States, the first examples of purely Labour Governments directing great affairs, and carrying out far-reaching projects of social reconstruction which space does not permit us to analyse. But the Labour Governments were as resolute as their rivals to maintain and strengthen the ties which bound Australia to the Commonwealth; in the Imperial Conferences Australia was only surpassed by New Zealand in the zeal with which she advocated methods of strengthening the imperial ties. And—perhaps because of their remoteness and the extent to which they were exposed to the possibility of foreign attack—both Australia and New Zealand surpassed the other Dominions in the zeal with which they threw themselves into projects of defence, in accordance with the general principles laid down by the Imperial Conference. Both adopted universal military training; both invited Lord Kitchener, in 1909-10, to visit them and advise them on military organisation. Australia created her own navy, with the proviso that it should be at the disposal of the Admiralty in time of war, and offered Dreadnoughts to the mother-country during the naval alarm of 1909; New Zealand also offered to pay for a Dreadnought, and made large annual contributions towards the fleet. There was no shadow of doubt that these distant lands valued the loyalty of the Commonwealth as they valued their own free nationhood, and took no mean view of their responsibilities.
§ 3. The Nationalist Movements in Egypt and India.

We turn from the self-governing Dominions to Egypt and India; and here a very different story has to be told: a story of unrest, of clamorous demands for enlarged political privileges, and of sedulously fostered race-hatred. The East was beginning to revolt against the ascendancy of the West, and to deny or minimise the value of what the West had given it.

After nearly a quarter of a century of inestimable service, Lord Cromer ceased to be the British agent in Egypt in 1907. His retirement may be said to end the period of reconstruction; and it almost synchronised with the beginning of a period of vehement nationalist agitation, which had for its declared object the extrusion of British influence from the country, and the establishment of a system of parliamentary government. There had long been an under-current of discontent and opposition among the once dominant classes of Turks and Arabs, who had misruled Egypt in the period before the British occupation. But the movement became overt, and began to extend itself to the peasantry, in 1906, when a group of British officers, having shot some pigeons in the village of Denshawai without obtaining leave from the village headman, were attacked by a mob; one of them was killed, while another was seriously wounded. The extreme severity with which this riot was punished formed the text for a press-campaign of invective against British tyranny, and of demands for Egyptian freedom. Some part of the impetus to this campaign came from the Mohammedan revival, of which we have elsewhere said something; and the troubles of Morocco, the Italian war with Turkey in 1911, and the Balkan War of 1912, kept Moslem agitation at fever-heat: the whole Moslem world was falling into a ferment of anti-European feeling. But alongside of this was a genuine resentment of foreign domination, and a demand for the institutions of self-government: when in 1908 even Turkey set up a parliamentary system, Egyptians felt that they were being left far behind. In Egypt the Khedive and his ministers nominally had full legislative as well as executive power, but they notoriously had to do as they were bidden by their British advisers: there were, indeed, a partly-elected Legislative Council, and a General Assembly, but these

1 Above, Bk. xi. chap. i. p. 614.
were negligible bodies, having only advisory powers. The agitation was persistent and vehement between 1906 and 1911; it even took to assassination; the Prime Minister, Boutros Pasha, was murdered in 1910. From 1911 to 1914, when Lord Kitchener was British Agent, the agitation quietened under his firm and suave handling. But it was by no means dead; and its leaders, inspired by Moslem sentiment, looked for support to Turkey, and to Turkey’s patron, Germany.

Far more serious than the Egyptian agitation was the turmoil into which India was plunged during these years. We have earlier seen ¹ how the Nationalist movement had gradually gained strength during the later years of the nineteenth century. It now began to assume a violent and a dangerous form, stimulated especially by the spectacle of the Japanese victory over Russia. An Eastern people had proved themselves the superiors of a Western empire: why should not India take a lesson from Japan, and achieve her own national freedom? And the attitude of the self-governing Dominions towards Indian immigrants intensified the resentment against Western supremacy.

As yet these ideas affected only the educated classes, a minute proportion of the vast population of India, the great mass of whom took no interest in politics; but the educated classes were the vocal classes, controlling the press, the schools, the law-courts and the local governing bodies. There was, indeed, a large body of moderate opinion which recognised that among the innumerable heterogeneous races, religions and castes of India, the first need was the maintenance of peace and justice, which the British system had secured; and that progress towards self-government must be gradual, and could only be healthy if it went hand-in-hand with steady social and educational advance. This conservative element at first included almost the whole of the Mohammedan community, led (till his death in 1898) by Sir Sayyid Ahmad, and afterwards by the Aga Khan. But a multitude of eager and excitable voices, mainly Hindu, clamoured for the immediate endowment of India with the full rights of self-government enjoyed by Canada and Australia; and many among them used the press and the platform to preach race-hatred against the British rulers, who were made responsible for every ill from which India suffered.

The immediate occasion for the outburst of violent

¹ Bk. xi. chap. v. p. 668.
agitation was what was known as the Partition of Bengal (1905): a division of that immense province into two parts, for the sake of administrative efficiency, which Lord Curzon had carried out shortly before his retirement. The new arrangement was welcomed by the Mohammedans, who formed an overwhelming majority in the new province of Eastern Bengal; it was denounced by the Hindus as an outrage to the national sentiment of Bengal, and as a device to weaken the most progressive of the provinces. An attempt was made to organise a boycott of British goods, and to persuade Indian purchasers to buy only Indian products; but this swadeshi movement, as it was called, soon broke down. More serious was the organisation of a secret campaign of outrage and assassination, whose recruits were mainly drawn from among college students and schoolboys in Bengal. In 1908 two English ladies were murdered by a bomb; and from that time the campaign of outrage went on steadily—being mainly directed against Indian police officers, but including also witnesses who gave evidence against the murderers, and innocent Indians whose money was needed for the manufacture of bombs and the purchase of pistols. Though the murders were not very numerous, the terror they created was such that the ordinary machinery of justice began to break down: even eye-witnesses of crimes dared not give evidence. This conspiracy of outrage was still going on in Bengal when the war began. But it was not confined to Bengal. In the Bombay Presidency, the inflammatory writings of B. G. Tilak were creating a dangerous ferment. And in 1907 there was a dangerous movement in the Punjab—the province from which the army is mainly recruited; it is probable that a serious outbreak was only averted by the sudden deportation of two leading agitators, who had been striving to undermine the loyalty of the troops.

The Liberal Government in Britain resolved to meet this dangerous agitation by granting the largest advance towards self-government that seemed to be practicable in the conditions of India. In 1909 Lord Morley, after long consultations with the Viceroy, Lord Minto, introduced changes which profoundly modified the Indian system of government. A substantial representative element (though not a majority) was introduced into the Imperial Legislative Council; an elected Indian majority was brought into the Provincial Legislative Councils, which
were given power to discuss legislation and finance, though not to control or dismiss the Executive Government; an Indian member was added to the Viceroy’s Executive Council, and other Indian members to the Executive Councils in the provinces; while two Indian members were appointed to the Indian Secretary’s Council in London. These changes did not introduce, and were not intended to introduce, responsible government on the colonial model into India; Lord Morley very clearly explained that such a step seemed to him to be impossible in the conditions of India, and likely to remain impossible until these conditions were profoundly changed. They were intended to ensure that the influence of Indian opinion should be fully and continuously felt in the Government of India.

But the Morley-Minto reforms, though they were at first welcomed, did not satisfy the more eager reformers. Perhaps they even heightened the discontent; for the members of the Legislative Councils, having no responsibility, mainly confined themselves to negative and hostile criticism of the action of Government, and this gave a new authority to the incessant attacks of the Press. The more advanced reformers continued to press for full self-government. And in 1913 the Hindu advocates of this change were joined by many of the Mohammedans, who had hitherto stood aloof from the agitation. The Islamic revival had begun to stir the Indian Moslems. They were deeply moved by the successive blows which were struck at the power of Turkey during the years immediately preceding the war; they had begun to look to the Sultan of Turkey as the head of their faith, though in earlier days the claim of the Sultan to the Khalifate or headship of Islam had aroused no enthusiasm among Indian Moslems. And this religious emotion was beginning to drive them into hostility to the British Government, now that it had departed from its old friendship with the Turk. The Mohammedans were not united in this attitude; but their more aggressive leaders had begun to join hands with the Hindus in demanding self-government, and the Moslem League, once a conservative, was tending to become a revolutionary organisation.

In 1911 King George v. visited India, and formally ascended the Imperial throne at Delhi. This was the first visit of a reigning British sovereign to the Indian Empire. It made a profound impression, and for a time greatly eased the tension; all the more so because the occasion
was seized to rearrange the administrative divisions of Bengal in a way which made a real concession to Bengali sentiment. But though India had again attained a condition of calm in 1914, the agitation for full self-govern-
ment was still active in the National Congress and in the Press; the anarchist movement was still afoot in Bengal; and away in Paris, in Berlin, in America, there were knots of impassioned Indian agitators tirelessly preaching the wrongs of India and the tyranny of the British raj, and helping to keep the Nationalist movement active by pamphlets, which they sent to Indian colleges: pamphlets which had to be written in English, because that was the only language which would be generally intelligible among the divided peoples of India. Perhaps it was not a wholly unreasonable expectation that, in the event of war, India would rise in revolt against her oppressors. Certainly this was one of the calculations which made the Great War seem more easy and inviting to those who launched it. It was a calculation which forgot that these agitations, important as they were, were no more than a ruffling of waves upon the surface of an ocean: the real heart of India was as yet little affected by them.
CHAPTER II

POLITICAL CONTROVERSY IN BRITAIN

§ 1. The New Era of 1906.

From the more distant members of the Commonwealth we turn to the motherland, still the heart and centre of the whole, still the home of more than four-fifths of its English-speaking inhabitants. On the eve of the fourth and the most terrible of the struggles for existence in which the British Commonwealth has been engaged during the modern era, it was still as true as it ever had been that the welfare of the whole depended upon the strength, vigour and social health of Britain.

The dominant fact of the pre-war period in British history was the general election of 1906, which brought to an end the twenty years' ascendancy of the Conservatives, and established a revivified Liberal party in power, with an unprecedented majority. The Liberals in this Parliament outnumbered all other parties in combination; but the Government was also able generally to reckon upon the support of 83 Irish Nationalists, and of 51 Labour members, giving them an unwieldy majority of over 300. The election of so large a number of Labour members was perhaps the most impressive feature of this Parliament, the clearest token that British politics were entering upon a new era. The democratic age had genuinely begun.

In the history of British parliamentary politics there had never been so complete and so sudden a reversal of fortune as this election represented: even when allowance has been made for the fact that the balance of parties in Parliament did not truly represent the balance of opinion in the country, it was evident that there had been a real change in the national mind. In part this was due to an emphatic repudiation of Chamberlain's demand for 'Tariff Reform'—Britain was still unmistakably loyal to Free Trade. But behind this lay a deeper feeling, which
was loosely expressed in the common phrase that Britain had rejected Imperialism. The phrase was worse than misleading if it meant that the British people had become indifferent to the fortunes of the Commonwealth as a whole: as the Imperial Conferences showed, this was far indeed from being the case. But the centre of interest had swung back from foreign adventures and territorial acquisitions to the problems of domestic reform: the Parliament of 1906, and the electors who returned it, wanted to be quit of foreign entanglements, and to devote the strength of the nation to the task of social reorganisation.

As we shall see, Fate would not permit this. Like the Government of 1880, the Government of 1905 was forced, despite itself, to give its most anxious attention to the very dangerous international situation which was maturing during these years; it had to reorganise the army, to find vast sums for the navy, to thread its way through thorny international complications whose details could not be made public. This fact alienated many of its most ardent supporters, who resented the inevitable reserve with which foreign difficulties had to be handled, and were impatient that wealth which might have been used for social reforms was being expended on armaments. On the other hand, the growing public realisation of the international peril, and a suspicion that Government was not giving its whole heart to the task of guarding against this peril, largely accounted for the remarkable decline in the strength of the Liberals, which resulted from the elections of 1910. The foreign situation (which we shall consider in the next chapter) thus greatly intensified the difficulty of those enterprises of social reconstruction which eager reformers were burning to undertake. The world was not yet safe for democracy.

Nevertheless this ministry succeeded in achieving an enormous amount of legislative work. Under the premiership first of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and then (from April 1908) of Mr. H. H. Asquith, it introduced a body of social reforms of a more sweeping character than anything which British history had yet seen; it assumed on behalf of the community obligations in regard to the welfare of the mass of the people which the Liberals of the mid-nineteenth century would have regarded with profound alarm; and alongside of these changes it was

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1 Above, Bk. xi. chap. iii. p. 640.
responsible for great measures of political reconstruction. Its proposals, drastic beyond precedent, aroused an intensity of political controversy which had been unknown since the days of the first Home Rule struggle; and when the war broke in upon these discussions, party acrimony, class-bitterness, and national feeling had been stirred to such a pitch that the enemy might well calculate upon finding the power of Britain reduced to impotence. The calculation was utterly at fault. At the first clang of the war-tocsin all the strife was stilled as if by magic; and the nation, like the Commonwealth as a whole, realised with a sort of solemn pride that beneath all these differences it was one.

The eight years of this ministry's existence before the war were divided into two clearly marked parts by the elections of 1910, and the vehement controversy over the budget of 1909 from which they resulted: after 1910 the conflict was yet more intense and bitter than before. And this division of the home controversy corresponds, as we shall see, to an equally clearly marked division of the international problem: after 1910, while British controversies were becoming more intense, the set of European events towards the catastrophe of 1914 was becoming more ominous. In this chapter it is our business to describe in outline the social and political changes that were afoot in Britain, and the conflicts which arose from them; disregarding for the moment the deepening international danger which added to their intensity, and strained the nerves of those who took part in them.


There were some political controversies of old standing with which the new Government was bound to deal. The greatest of these, the question of Irish Home Rule, was indeed, by agreement, withheld from discussion during the Parliament of 1906, and did not emerge again until after the elections of 1910. But an unsuccessful attempt was made to extend Irish autonomy by an Irish Councils Bill; the Irish University problem, which Gladstone had unsuccessfully tackled in 1871, was solved by a useful measure of 1908, which set up new universities in Belfast for the Protestants and in Dublin for the Catholics; three unsuccessful attempts were made to deal with the problem of religious education which had been raised by the Act
of 1902; Welsh disestablishment was proposed in 1909, only to be rejected by the House of Lords; and there was a serious endeavour to deal with the long-vexed question of the licensing of public-houses on the basis of local option: it was summarily rejected by the House of Lords, but at a later date (1913) a measure granting Local Option to Scotland was forced through. On the whole, these old problems and controversies remained unsettled; but the way in which some of them had been treated by the House of Lords, in face of the overwhelming majorities with which they had been carried in the Commons, added strength to the demand for a restriction of the power of the Lords, which reached its culmination in 1909.

Again, it was necessary to deal with the legal position of the Trade Unions, which had been seriously impaired by a legal judgment (Taff Vale) that had made Trade Unions liable at law for the actions of their members during industrial disputes. Government introduced a Bill which would exempt the Trade Unions from liability for any act not done under their own direct authority. On the demand of the Labour members this qualification was removed; the House of Lords did not venture to touch the Act; and the Trade Unions were thus endowed with immensely enlarged powers, and freed from any fear of being called to account in the courts even for their own actions in industrial disputes. They thus became privileged bodies. It may be convenient here to touch upon another Trade Union problem which arose later, and which belongs more properly to the second period of this ministry's history. The new Labour party depended for its resources upon a levy collected by the Trade Unions from their members. In 1909 a judgment of the courts in effect made it possible for a member of a Trade Union to restrain his Union from levying funds for political purposes; and the decision seemed likely to destroy the very foundations of the Labour party's organisation. In 1912 an Act was passed to meet the difficulty: it legalised any political levy authorised by a vote of a majority of the members of a Union, but empowered any member to claim exemption if he had the courage to do so. This Act legalised the political action of the Trade Unions; and the two Acts taken together formed the foundations of the industrial and political power which the Trade Unions subsequently exercised, and turned them into one of the strongest forces in the State. Meanwhile, in 1911, the position of work-
ing-men members of Parliament had been greatly eased by the introduction of payment of members—a political change of the first moment, which was nevertheless adopted with extraordinary quietness.

Alongside of these measures were a number of others which would have excited great attention in a less active Parliament: the establishment of a Court of Criminal Appeal; the enactment of a drastic measure against certain modes of commercial corruption; the bringing of the whole London Dock estate under the control of a public authority; the institution of a Public Trustee. All these were valuable reforms. But they faded into insignificance over against the code of social legislation which was introduced during these years.

First place belongs to a remarkable series of measures aimed at general social well-being. In 1908 the project of Old Age Pensions, long talked about, was carried into effect on a non-contributory basis: every resourceless person over seventy years of age was given a pension of 5s. a week at the cost of the State. Childhood as well as age was brought under communal care: by the Provision of Meals Act (1906) education authorities were empowered to feed children who came to school hungry; by the Medical Inspection Act (1907), all the children of the nation were brought under medical supervision; while by the Children's Bill (1908) many forms of protection for children were enacted, and, in particular, a special system of jurisdiction was instituted for juvenile criminals. Even more beneficent than these measures—in potentiality at any rate—was the Housing and Town-planning Act of 1909, which endowed local authorities with large powers for the demolition of insanitary, and the construction of healthy, houses for the people; and which also made a new departure in British usage by imposing upon urban authorities the duty of working out a sound plan for their towns, and of seeing to their systematic and orderly development.

A second group of measures related to the organisation of industry and the conditions of industrial labour. For the first time, under an Act of 1906, a Census of Production was carried out, giving the basis for scientific study of these problems. Coal-miners got an eight-hours’ day (1908). The conditions under which shop-assistants had to carry on their work were defined and regulated (1910). A Workmen's Compensation Act (1906) extended to all trades the principles which had been applied
to a limited number of trades in 1897. A momentous departure was taken in 1909 when, by the Sweated Industries Act, the regulation of wages and conditions of work in certain badly paid industries wherein Trade Union action was difficult, was entrusted to Trade Boards, consisting of representatives of employers and workmen with certain additional members appointed by the Board of Trade. The awards of these bodies, when adopted by the Board of Trade, became legally enforcible. This represented the most complete reversal of the policy of industrial laissez faire that Britain had yet witnessed; and in another respect also it marked the beginning of a new departure in industrial organisation—the organised and enforced co-operation of employers and employed in the definition of industrial conditions, under the authority and supervision of the State. Finally, in 1909, a whole network of Labour Exchanges was set up in every part of the country, with a view to facilitating the organisation of the labour-market, and as a preparation for dealing with the immense problem of unemployment which the Government next proposed to attack.

A third group of measures were concerned with agriculture and the land, and represented the most serious attempt which had yet been made to bring hope and enterprise once more into the life of the British peasantry. The Small Holdings Act of 1907 imposed upon County Councils the duty of providing small agricultural holdings for those who desired them, and endowed the Councils with substantial powers for the compulsory purchase of land for this purpose. This Act led to a rapid increase in the number of small holdings and allotments; but many other reforms were necessary ere a real revival of prosperity among a rural peasantry could be effected. The land problem also raised the question of the valuation of land, and the notorious fact that the purchase-price of land required for public purposes was generally found to be many times greater than was represented by the rates which its owner paid for public services. This problem was first raised as early as 1907, in the Land Values (Scotland) Bill, which proposed to introduce the practice, already adopted in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, of levying rates on the value of the land apart from the buildings it carried. The proposal aroused a fierce controversy, which prepared the way for the more violent storm raised by the land-tax proposals in the Budget of 1909.
All these many-sided measures represented a very great enlargement of the functions of the State and of public authorities. Some of them necessitated the appointment of great numbers of officials. The number of public officials and the extent of their interference in the affairs of individuals had, as we have seen, been steadily growing ever since 1832; but this sudden increase raised, especially in the years after 1910, an outcry about bureaucracy. This great series of measures of social reconstruction also necessarily involved an immense outlay of public money, and brought about large changes in the methods of public finance. There was, in truth, no sphere of public affairs in which the spirit of the new democracy was more patently displayed; and it was ultimately upon finance that the bitterest controversy was to turn. The budgets for which Mr. Asquith was responsible as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1906, 1907, 1908), besides redeeming much of the debt which had been accumulated during the South African War, reduced the cost of some articles of universal consumption, and at the same time prepared to meet the cost of Old Age Pensions and the other expensive social reforms of these years. The most novel feature of these budgets was the introduction of a distinction between ‘earned’ and ‘unearned’ incomes, incomes under £2000 drawn from salary or profits paying a lower rate of tax than incomes derived from investments. At the same time the death-duties on accumulated fortunes were increased. The tendency of these charges was to make the richer part of the community pay the cost of social reform, to the advantage of the poorer part of the community, and in this way to use taxation as a means of partly redistributing the total income of the nation.

But important as were these changes, they were far surpassed by the Budget of 1909, for which Mr. Lloyd George was immediately responsible. This immense measure may not unfairly be described as the most revolutionary series of financial proposals which had ever been laid before a British Parliament. It carried very much further the tendency to lay upon great wealth the main burden of social reform, levying upon large incomes a super-tax, over and above the income-tax, and giving further relief to incomes of the lower grades. But the Budget of 1909 was not solely concerned with pure finance; it was linked up with a whole programme of social legislation for which it was to find the means, and some part of which was embodied
in itself. The part of this vast scheme which aroused the most furious controversy was the proposal of a system of new taxes on land. All the land of the country was to be valued, apart from buildings; a tax was to be levied (as in New Zealand and elsewhere) upon its capital value; and a further tax, called increment duty, was devised to intercept for the State part of all increases of value which were not due to the enterprise or capital of the owner, but to the growth of towns or other similar causes. On these proposals a fierce controversy raged, which assumed the form of a vehement attack upon the land-owning class. So passionate were the feelings which it aroused that the House of Lords, taking its courage in its hands, rejected the budget in defiance of the usage of two centuries; and by doing so assumed to itself the power of dismissing the ministry, since no ministry can survive if it is denied the necessary supplies for carrying on government. Thus was raised the largest and the most exciting constitutional issue that had been discussed in Britain since 1832. Reinforced presently by other great issues, and by the new social programme, it plunged the British people into a passionate political controversy, which engaged their attention down to the outbreak of the Great War.

§ 3. Acute Political Controversy, 1909-1914.

There has never been a more intense or a more vital conflict of opinion than that into which the British electorate was plunged in the election of January 1910. The constitutional problem alone was of the deepest import. On the one hand, it was urged that the powers of the House of Lords must be curtailed; not merely because it had an unvarying and overwhelming Conservative majority which gave no chance to Liberal or Labour legislation, but also because stable government would be impossible if two Houses had the power of dismissing ministries. On the other hand, it was contended that the Budget proposals were revolutionary and ruinous, and that a Second Chamber had no utility if it could not deal with proposals of such moment. The air was full of schemes for reconstructing the House of Lords or for redefining its powers; some were for abolishing it altogether. The whole system of British government was brought under review, and the bad working of the parliamentary system, the growth of bureaucracy, the rigidity of party and the despotism
of the cabinet were all raised for discussion before a bewildered electorate. The land system, the past and future social policy of the Liberals, Tariff Reform as an alternative means of social betterment, also played their part in the eager debate. And alongside of all this were grave warnings that the very existence of the nation was being imperilled by the German menace, for there had been serious alarm about the growth of the German navy in 1909. In the event the Government returned with a greatly reduced majority; the Liberals practically had the same number of members as the Conservatives, and the forty-one Labour men and the eighty-two Irish Nationalists held the balance.

The great debate on the constitutional problem had scarcely begun when King Edward VII died. An attempt was made to find an agreed solution of the constitutional problem by a conference of party leaders; but after twenty-one meetings it failed to reach an agreement. Meanwhile the Liberals had put forward a series of resolutions embodying their proposals for limiting the veto of the House of Lords, as a preliminary to reconstructing that body; and on this issue (complicated by all the rest) a second election was fought at the end of the year; its verdict was practically the same as that of the first. In the session of 1911 the Liberal proposals were introduced as a Parliament Bill. The duration of Parliament was to be cut down to five years; the House of Lords was to be deprived of the power of dealing with money-bills, bills falling under this head being certified by the Speaker of the House of Commons; other bills they were to have the right of rejecting twice, but on a bill being presented a third time substantially unaltered, it was to be submitted for the Royal Assent whatever the House of Lords might say. This gave a chance of forcing Liberal measures through, at the price of wasting the time of Parliament by discussing them three times. After furious and bitter debates, disfigured by scenes of violence, the bill passed the House of Commons. The House of Lords reluctantly gave way; and the constitutional problem received a partial solution, pending the introduction of the promised measure for the reconstruction of the Second Chamber.

But this by no means ended the bitter political conflicts of these years. First came the new social programme. A Development Commission was set up, with large funds, to set on foot schemes of afforestation, and to en-
courage rural industries and agricultural development. A Road Board was created to take in hand the reconstruction of the main national highways, in view of the growth of motor-transport. But immeasurably the most important of these schemes was the creation of a gigantic system of State Insurance, designed to banish insecurity, so far as possible, from the lives of working people. On the one hand, there was a vast scheme of health insurance, which included all wage-earners, and was devised on a contributory basis with subsidies from the State; it involved very complicated arrangements with doctors, chemists and friendly societies, and the creation of a whole series of local authorities under a powerful central bureaucracy. On the other hand, there was a scheme of insurance against unemployment, limited at first to certain trades, but intended eventually to be universal. These huge projects were mainly due to Mr. Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and they aroused an infinite amount of criticism and discussion.

The overthrow of the Lords' veto also made it practicable to introduce two old Liberal measures which the Lords had always resisted: Home Rule and Welsh Disestablishment. Both aroused fierce controversy, and had to go through the lengthy process of enactment and re-enactment prescribed by the Parliament Bill, so that they took up an inordinate amount of parliamentary time. On the third Home Rule Bill, in particular, passion was aroused as it had never been aroused even in 1886. The men of Ulster, knowing that they could not now trust to the House of Lords, prepared to resist in arms, organised volunteers, took to smuggling in arms from abroad, and even set up a Provisional Government under an eminent King's Counsel; and they had the ardent support of the Conservative leaders. On the other side it was maintained that this was in effect the last opportunity of settling the Irish question by peaceful and constitutional means. The Sinn Fein movement, which derided constitutional and parliamentary action, and held that Ireland must win her freedom by disregarding British law and the British Government, was growing in strength; if this attempt failed, the hope of a peaceful and legal solution must vanish. The hope of a peaceful solution seemed in any case to be slight. Nationalists as well as Ulstermen were arming and drilling. Negotiations for a compromise seemed to be wholly unavailing: on the very
eve of the outbreak of the Great War, and with the knowledge of its imminence, a conference of political leaders from both sides, summoned by the King, had to break up without reaching a solution. Civil war appeared to be practically inevitable.

It is not surprising that those who were speculating on the probability of war should have thought it likely that Britain would stand aloof, helpless; since the test came to her at a moment when she was immersed in some of the deepest and most difficult political controversies in which she had ever been engaged. Nor was this all. She was suffering still more from a succession of paroxysms of Labour unrest. Labour was not satisfied with what Parliament was doing in the sphere of social reform. It was suffering from a rise of prices which more than balanced such increase in wages as it was able to earn: the real wages of labour, measured by purchasing power, which had never ceased to advance since 1846, were actually declining in the years following 1897. In some industries, as on the railways, wage-rates were, indeed, scandalously low. And these conditions had encouraged the preaching of the more extreme forms of Socialist doctrine, which were in these years being widely diffused, especially among the railwaymen and the miners. Crude versions of the theories of Marx were being eagerly propounded; and there were advocates of the more modern French doctrine of Syndicalism, which demands that the workers in each industry should control it and take all its proceeds. The Syndicalists taught that these ends must be attained by violent measures—by the use of the strike weapon not for specific and limited purposes, but for the attainment of large and ambitious ends. These ideas were getting a hold, not indeed among the mass of men, but among some of the more active and able of the younger men. The more vehement spirits were beginning to throw over the leadership of the Trade Union officials, and were ready to repudiate bargains made on their behalf. Confidence in parliamentary action had been undermined by the fact that the Labour members were very ineffective in Parliament, and acted as if they were merely a wing of the Liberal party. All the reform measures which had been put on the statute-book since 1906 seemed to some enthusiasts no better than pills to cure an earthquake; they wanted a complete recast of society. This was not the temper of the mass of work-people. But even they were affected by the
general atmosphere of unrest; they were hard hit by the rise in the cost of living; they were bewildered by the clamorous discussion of a multitude of public issues far removed from the questions about which they cared most. And the result was that in 1910 and the following years Britain found herself involved in a series of industrial conflicts such as she had never known in all her history. There were incessant disputes in many industries; there were prolonged and serious strikes in the mines, which in 1912 were only temporarily healed by the hurried passage of a minimum wage bill for three years; while in 1911 there was an almost total dislocation of railway traffic, and of dock-work at some of the ports, which seemed to bring the menace of revolution nearer than it had ever been. So widespread was the strike-fever in that year, that children even began to strike against going to school.

Meanwhile, throughout all this stormy time, with a vehemence which grew year by year, women were adopting methods of violence to advocate their claim to the franchise. They were interrupting meetings, breaking shop-windows, chaining themselves to railings, slashing knives through pictures in public galleries, burning down houses and churches, refusing food when imprisoned, and in general using every possible means of proving their capacity for the duties of responsible citizenship. To many Englishmen in these years it seemed that the foundations of society were being loosened, and that the British tradition of law-abiding freedom was at an end.

But the truth was that a great nation, fundamentally sober, was engaged in examining the very foundations of its political and social order. It could not do so without rousing deep feeling. And if this feeling seemed to be mounting to hysteria, the grim future was soon to prove that this was not the real temper of the nation.
CHAPTER III

THE WORLD ON THE EDGE OF THE CATARACT

§ 1. The Desire of the World for Organised Peace.

steadily, and with growing momentum, the world was drifting during these years towards Niagara; and those who saw the danger were powerless to avert it. Yet the settled desire of most of the nations was for peace. They showed it by the eagerness with which they hastened, during the years following 1904, to conclude arbitration treaties one with another, on the model of that which Britain and France had adopted when they removed their outstanding differences. They showed it also by the readiness with which they took part in the second Hague Conference in 1907, a conference whose principal object was to give form and body to the general movement towards a substitution of judicial methods of settlement for brute force. But there were two Great Powers, Germany and Austria, which did not share in this general sentiment of the civilised world. They still maintained the view that force must be the ultimate determinant in international affairs. They had taken practically no part in the arbitration movement; and though they sent delegates to The Hague, it was with instructions to check and hamper the whole movement.

The attempt to come to an agreement on disarmament, which had been the purpose of the first Hague Conference, had been wrecked on the opposition of Germany; and the rebuffs which Britain had since received, in repeated attempts to persuade Germany to agree to naval disarmament, showed that it would be fruitless to revive the proposal. But the second Conference strove, in three distinct ways, to encourage and expand the arbitration movement. It proposed to draw up a universal arbitration treaty, which all nations should be asked to sign; Germany met the proposal with a flat negative. It proposed to define the types of questions which ought always to be submitted to arbitration, leaving aside non-justiciable questions of
'fundamental interest or honour,' and a list of twenty-four subjects was submitted; Germany and Austria voted against every one of the twenty-four. Finally, it was proposed that the nations should bind themselves, even on questions of fundamental interest or honour, not to go to war until a Commission of Inquiry had been appointed, and had reported on the subject in dispute. But this proposal was shelved, as impracticable. Later—in 1914—a treaty embodying these ideas was concluded between the United States and Britain, the two Powers which have most often employed arbitration as a mode of settling disputes; and, in effect, the methods thus discussed in 1907 were the methods of preserving peace subsequently embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Most of the world was ready to adopt them. The main obstacle was the obstinate resistance of Germany, who was still wedded to the doctrine of power.

In a striking speech delivered in 1911, when the international crisis was beginning to be acute, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, pointed out that the movement towards a peaceful mode of settling international disputes would only triumph if the Powers which favoured this method would band themselves together for mutual defence and the maintenance of peace; and that, until this happened, there could not be great hope of disarmament. This was an anticipation of the idea of the League of Nations, but it could not yet be adopted. In the meantime there were two methods which could be used towards this end, and, under Sir Edward Grey's guidance, Britain tried to use both. One was the employment of the Concert of Europe to avert dangers of war as they arose. It was employed with success in one crisis after another during these years. It would almost certainly have been successful in the final crisis, but Germany refused to allow it to be brought into operation. The other was the conclusion of agreements for the removal of causes of friction. Britain had made one such agreement with France in 1904; she made another with her old enemy, Russia, in 1907. Neither of these agreements was in any sense an alliance, or excluded the possibility of similar agreements with other Powers; if they were followed by common action, this was only because the three Powers felt themselves equally threatened. Britain strove persistently to reach a similar agreement with Germany. But she strove in vain.
The movement of arbitration, for which the world was ready, was wrecked by Germany. The working of the Concert of Europe was in the end stopped by Germany. The attempt to reach understandings which would remove causes of friction found unyielding resistance in Germany. There is no escaping from the conclusion that, while the natural trend of civilisation was towards some form of organised mutual guarantee of peace, Germany, still clinging to her belief in brute force as the ultimate determinant, was the obstacle in the way, and therefore the cause of the world-catastrophe. The sequence of diplomatic events during the nine unhappy years which preceded the war fully bears out this conclusion.

§ 2. The Successive Crises of 1905-1914.

It is not necessary to narrate in detail here the successive crises which filled these years; but it is impossible to convey any just sense of the difficulties of the time without some survey of them.

In 1905, when Russia had been put out of action by the disasters of the Japanese War, and by her domestic revolution, and when, therefore, France was dangerously isolated, a sudden crisis was raised by the high-handed action of Germany in the affairs of Morocco. There seemed reason to fear that she was striving to fix a quarrel upon France; and if that had been so, Britain could not, in her own interests, have stood by and seen France ruined. The danger of war seemed so near that, with the assent of the British Prime Minister, the military experts of France and Britain took counsel as to the part that Britain should play in the event of her being drawn into war; and their consultations disclosed the fact that, as the British army was then organised, it would have been impossible for any effective aid to be given to France in time. The danger passed off; perhaps Germany was unwilling to risk a conflict with the British navy while her own brand-new fleet was still unready. A Conference of the Powers was held at Algeciras (1906) to decide the Morocco question; and at this Conference Germany found herself so isolated, and the award was so much in favour of her rival, that she learned to regard the episode as a bitter diplomatic defeat. The first crisis had been staved off by the action of the Concert of Europe, and by the firm attitude of Britain.

Next year, 1907, Britain came to an agreement with
her age-long rival Russia, whereby the causes of friction between the two Powers in Asia were smoothed away. No kind of military agreement or alliance was implied in this arrangement; it was merely a healing of old troubles; but it made it possible for Russia, France and Britain to act in concord during the difficulties which were soon to arise. Their diplomatic co-operation came to be known as the **Triple Entente**, but Britain was not tied in any way to act with either France or Russia, and she acted with them only for the maintenance of peace. Germany, however, chose to regard the agreement as aimed against herself, and complained that she was being 'encircled' by the Machiavellian intrigues of King Edward VII. and Sir Edward Grey. And there was thus much of substance in her complaint, that Britain, in face of Germany's strenuous naval preparations and consistent refusal even to discuss mutual disarmament or delay in construction, felt that she was threatened, and was glad to join with Russia and France in trying to safeguard the peace of Europe. It was in this year that The Hague Conference was held; and Germany's uncompromising attitude at the Conference deepened the alarm.

In 1908 a revolution broke out in Turkey. Abdul Hamid was deposed; a constitutional régime was established; and for a time Germany's dominating influence in Turkey, upon which great projects depended, seemed to be imperilled. But it was only for a time. Within a year the unreality of the new constitution had been displayed; and the leaders of the Young Turks were hand in glove with the German ambassador. Meanwhile Austria had seized the opportunity to annex the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in defiance of the Treaty of Berlin (1878), whereby she had merely been entrusted with the administration of these provinces. Both provinces were inhabited by Serbs, and Serbia, thus robbed of her hopes of national unity, protested bitterly. Russia also protested. But Germany announced that if necessary she would support her ally in arms. Russia had to give way; all the more because Britain made it plain that she would not contemplate the possibility of war on a Balkan question. This was a German-Austrian triumph; but it also marked the beginning of a passionate hostility to Austria among the Serbs. Aware of this, Austria determined that Serbia must be crushed, and her ambassador at Belgrad prepared a forged set of documents to justify an attack. But the attack
was not delivered; perhaps Germany forbade. It was the first of four Austrian projects of attack upon the little Power of Serbia; the fourth was the immediate occasion of the Great War.

Meanwhile the naval rivalry between Germany and Britain had become intense. Britain had in vain proposed mutual restriction; she had even dangerously retarded her own construction as an evidence of good faith; but Germany's only response was to push on at greater speed. In 1909 Britain took alarm; some critics held that unless prompt action were taken, the German fleet would soon be stronger than the British. In spite of the protests of economists and social reformers, the naval programme was substantially increased, and the British Dominions offered gifts of Dreadnoughts lest British naval supremacy should be impaired. But there was one safeguard. The Dreadnought type of battleship, recently introduced, had altered all the standards of naval construction, and it was too large to pass through the Kiel Canal. As Germany's naval strength depended upon her being able to transfer her ships freely from the Baltic to the North Sea, she had to undertake the enlargement of the canal, which occupied several years. This may have been part of the reason why she held Austria back from attacking Serbia. The widening of the canal was completed in June 1914; and in the next month Austria addressed to Serbia the ultimatum which began the Great War.

There was an interval of uneasy quiet in 1910. But in 1911 there was a double crisis. Italy annexed Tripoli and went to war with Turkey; this strained the loyalty of Turkey to the Triple Alliance, endangered for a time the dominance of the Central Powers in the Balkans, and showed that Italy was an uncertain member of the alliance. Yet more important was the second Morocco crisis, which arose in this year. France had taken military action in Morocco, for reasons into which we need not enter. Germany asserted that France's action was a breach of the Algeciras arrangements. But instead of appealing to the other Powers which had been parties to that agreement, or asking for a fresh conference, she sent a warship to the Morocco coast, and made it plain that the question must be settled between France and herself. This was an intolerable flouting of the Concert of Europe, and a plain attempt to bully France. Through the mouth of Mr. Lloyd George, Britain made it clear that she at any rate did not intend
to be disregarded. For some weeks war seemed imminent. Once more, as in 1906, British and French military experts took counsel together as to the action to be taken if Britain should be involved in war; but in order to make it clear that Britain was not committed to any definite action until Parliament should approve, formal letters to this effect were exchanged between the British and French Governments. Though Britain acted diplomatically with France, she was determined to keep her hands free, and not to allow either France or Russia to assume that they could count upon her support; for if they thought this, they might be less ready to maintain peace. In the end the danger of war was averted; commercial interests in Germany seem to have protested against it. But Germany forced France to cede territories to her in Central Africa as the price of her withdrawal from opposition in Morocco.

In spite of this, Germany regarded herself as having suffered a diplomatic defeat; and she began to prepare to take her revenge in another way. In 1911 she adopted an Army Act by which she greatly increased her army; in 1912 she increased it again, by a second Army Act; and in 1913 she increased it yet again by a third Army Act, raising a levy on capital to meet the cost of her enormous outlay. What was the purpose of this extraordinary activity? No Power menaced Germany. Naturally this fever of military preparation alarmed the other Powers. Russia worked hard at the construction of military railways and armament factories; France lengthened the period of compulsory service imposed upon all her manhood. Most significant of all, neutral Belgium, in a secret session of Parliament, resolved in 1913 to adopt compulsory military service; but the decision came too late to be of use. As for Britain, she decided that her n. in naval force must henceforward be concentrated in the North Sea, where the whole naval strength of Germany was massed. She withdrew most of her forces from the Mediterranean (1912), while France concentrated her ships in that sea. This arrangement, which was publicly known and discussed in Parliament, bound Britain in honour, though not formally, at the very least to defend the Atlantic coast of France if France should be attacked. The Great Powers of Europe were ominously drawing their forces into battle array.

In 1912 events took place which gravely threatened the great Eastern projects of Germany and Austria. Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria formed the Balkan League, and attacked
and overthrew Turkey. The fall of Turkey was obviously a blow to Germany's ambitions; and the formation of the Balkan League meant that the Balkan States were escaping from her influence. The three allies, without consulting Germany or Austria, had arranged beforehand the distribution of the spoil. But Austria intervened, and forbade Serbia to take the territory which had been assigned to her, because it would have given her direct access to the sea. Once again there was a grave menace of war. It was averted by the Concert of Europe, at a congress held in London under the presidency of Sir Edward Grey; and Germany gave her support, not being yet ready for war. But Austria got her way. Serbia, deprived of the territory for which she had fought, was given compensation at the expense of Bulgaria; and Bulgaria, embittered, declared war against her recent allies (1913). The miserable second Balkan War broke up the Balkan League. This result was a disaster for European peace, but it was in every way advantageous to Germany and Austria.

Thus crisis after crisis had arisen and been with difficulty avoided. At the beginning of 1914 the sky seemed clearer than for a long time past. But the third German Army Act was being carried into effect; and the Kiel Canal was nearing completion. Moreover Austria still regarded with deep distaste the increased power of Serbia. She had been on the verge of delivering an attack in 1912, and again in 1913. In each case she had been restrained. Was she likely to leave Serbia free to consolidate and organise her recent acquisitions of territory? It was a sanguine view which Mr. Lloyd George expressed when he said, early in 1914, that peace was more secure than it had been, and that it would soon be possible to reduce armaments; it was a view scarcely likely to be shared by some of his colleagues. If Germany meant war, the circumstances were, indeed, singularly favourable to her in 1914. Ireland was on the verge of civil war. In France there had been alarming revelations about the unreadiness of the army. In Russia there were great revolutionary strikes, dislocating industry. And the Kiel Canal was nearly ready.

§ 3. British Preparations for the Conflict.

In face of all these successive crises and of this growing menace, what steps had Britain taken, in the midst of her own vehement political controversies, to guard against the danger that threatened her existence?
Her policy had been systematically a policy of peace. By the testimony of all Europe, including Germany, her Foreign Secretary had played the chief part, time and again, in averting the imminent danger of war. She had healed her own causes of quarrel with France and Russia, and had co-operated diplomatically with these Powers; but she had also co-operated with Italy, and once or twice with Germany, in the negotiations which preserved the peace. And she had been scrupulously careful to avoid committing herself to any formal military agreement. The nearest approach to such an agreement was the naval arrangement of 1912, which seemed the only means of ensuring her naval security; and this arrangement did not involve any undertaking of a formal kind. Her aim had been to stand aloof from the two great alliances, and to let each realise that her face was set against aggressive action. But she had also striven to come to an agreement with Germany. She had put up with several rebuffs in her endeavours to reduce the ruinous competition in naval armaments. In 1912, feeling that Germany might be afraid that there was a secret alliance with France and Russia, the Cabinet sent Lord Haldane to Berlin with a formal assurance that Britain had not made, and would not make, any agreement with any other Power for action against Germany: the German response was in substance a suggestion that Britain should pledge herself to remain neutral in the event of a European war. Finally, feeling that Germany had a legitimate grievance in regard to the comparatively small area of her colonial possessions, Britain had opened negotiations for a treaty on colonial questions: it was by means of treaties on colonial questions that she had established friendly relations with France and Russia. The negotiations were completed in 1914, and their result was such that one of the greatest colonial enthusiasts in Germany described it as conceding everything that Germany could fairly ask. The treaty was never signed, because Sir Edward Grey refused to conclude any treaty without the consent of Parliament, and Germany refused to allow this treaty to be made public. If it had been made public it would have been impossible to convince the German people that they were being excluded from their 'place in the sun.'

Undeniably Britain had striven for peace. But had she prepared for the possibility of war? Her fleet had been kept at a high pitch of efficiency: as it showed by taking
and keeping the mastery of the seas from the first day of the war. She had made plans in co-operation with French military experts. Her regular army had been completely reorganised by the assiduous work of Lord Haldane, with such efficiency that in 1914 it could be transported to France, with full equipment, in a few days: an achievement in organisation of the highest order. It was a small army, but it was perhaps the most perfect that has ever been seen. Behind it stood the Territorial Army, organised during these years: a very different force from the volunteers whom it replaced; a fully organised force, without which the line could not have been held during the first winter of the war. Officers’ training corps had been organised in all the great schools and in the universities; without them the great new armies enlisted for the war could scarcely have been created. For the first time in British military history an efficient General Staff had been organised. This General Staff had branches in all the Dominions. And the Dominions, in consultation with the Committee of Imperial Defence, had reorganised their military systems, on a basis uniform with that of the mother-country, so as to make co-ordinated action easy. These preparations, which alone made it possible for Britain to hold her own in the coming ordeal, had been made quietly, and without ostentation, to avoid giving any reasonable ground for alarm which could be used by the militarists of Germany as an excuse for precipitating war. But there are some who have felt that, in view of the magnitude of the peril, conscription ought to have been adopted. Universal training for war was in fact urged by Lord Roberts, the most beloved of British soldiers, during these anxious years. But Lord Roberts urged it primarily for defence against invasion; and the event proved that the navy could guard against this danger. Nobody had ever conceived it possible that Britain should maintain both a supreme navy and an army on the continental scale, or play any such part in a continental campaign as Fate ultimately imposed upon her. The General Staff, however, had examined the possibility of conscription; and had reported that even if the nation could be persuaded to adopt it, its adoption would for some years lead to such a dislocation of the military system as to weaken the army, and to invite attack from any Power which wanted to anticipate the moment when the change would be complete. Up to the limits of military action that had ever been contemplated
as reasonably likely, Britain was not unready when the war-clouds burst. But she was very far from ready for the magnitude of the tempest to which she was presently exposed.

§ 4. The Precipitation of the World-War.

In June 1914, when the international horizon seemed clearer than it had been for many a day, an Austrian archduke was murdered on Austrian territory by an Austrian subject, belonging to the Serb race: Austria had many Serb subjects, most of whom hated her rule. The Austrian Government remained quiet for a month. Then it sent to the Government of Serbia a sudden ultimatum in which, without even inviting discussion, it assumed Serbia’s responsibility for the murder, and made a series of demands so outrageous that no free State could have submitted to them; they were manifestly intended to lead to war. Two days were given to Serbia in which to accept these monstrous demands. Within a fortnight all the Great Powers of Europe were at war. The plunge over Niagara, when it came, was appallingly sudden. The war came, indeed, at the end, as suddenly as an earthquake shock; and in a moment the British Commonwealth found itself battling against the most terrible danger to which it had ever been exposed.

Germany asserted that she was unaware of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. But she backed her ally without qualification. She used no restraining influence, such as she had used in 1909, in 1912, in 1913. She talked of ‘localising the conflict,’ which meant leaving Serbia at the mercy of Austria. But she knew, as Austria knew, that Russia could not and would not desert a little Slav State which trusted to her protection, and that France was bound by treaty to fight with Russia. Germany and Austria therefore deliberately faced the probability, indeed the certainty, of a general war.

Under pressure from Russia, France and Britain, Serbia yielded on every point save two, and offered to submit these two to The Hague Tribunal. Austria took this as a rejection of her ultimatum and declared war. Then followed ten strenuous and desperate days of negotiation in the hope of averting universal war, in which the leading part was played by Sir Edward Grey, strongly supported by France, Russia and Italy: Germany and Austria obstinately refused to take a step towards peace. Grey urged that the question
should be discussed by a conference of ambassadors, representing the Concert of Europe, such as had successfully averted earlier menaces of war: Germany and Austria refused. He begged Germany to make any suggestion that would make for peace, promising to support it, and to have nothing to do with France and Russia unless they also gave their support: Germany made no reply. Austria mobilised against Serbia; upon which Russia mobilised against Austria, but at the same time begged Germany to believe that mobilisation did not necessarily involve war. The Tsar implored Germany to agree to a reference of the question to The Hague Tribunal; Germany gave no reply. At the last moment Austria, apparently losing her nerve, agreed to discuss the Serbian question with Russia, and there was a gleam of hope. Thereupon Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia, demanding the instant demobilisation of the Russian army; and the greatest of wars began. Beyond any shadow or semblance of doubt, it was deliberately precipitated by Germany and Austria. The circumstances of the moment were utterly insufficient to justify their action. They were not thinking primarily of Serbia. They were thinking of world-power, and of the chance of ruining all their rivals: the vast military activity of the last three years had done its work, and the German army was at its maximum; the German navy, also, was ready, and the Kiel Canal was open. The world was faced by an attempt to secure world-domination more dangerous than that of Philip II. or Louis XIV., more dangerous even, as time was to show, than that of Napoleon. And it was the plain destiny of the British Commonwealth that she should play in this conflict the same part which she had played in the other three. Once more she must stand in the breach to defend the world's freedom.

Repeatedly, during the course of the negotiations, France and Russia had begged Sir Edward Grey to declare himself openly on their side, urging that this alone might make Germany hesitate in her headlong course. He had steadily refused, primarily because it was impossible to take so momentous a step without consulting Parliament, but also because he did not wish to do anything that might make France and Russia less earnest in pursuing peace. But at the same time he gave to Germany four plain and unmistakable warnings, that if a general war should come, Britain would have to be reckoned with: the warnings had no effect.
But there was one possibility of the war which would necessarily involve Britain: a breach of the neutrality of Belgium, which she was pledged by treaty to uphold—as Germany and Austria were also pledged. When a general war seemed all but inevitable, Sir Edward Grey, following the example of Gladstone in 1870, addressed identical notes to France and Germany, asking for assurances that the neutrality of Belgium would be respected. France gave an instantaneous and affirmative reply. Germany replied that she could not answer without disclosing her plan of campaign. Three days later German troops began to cross the Belgian frontier, thus violating a solemn pledge, and making the faith of treaties of no avail. Thereupon a British ultimatum, with twenty-four hours' grace, was sent to Berlin. When it was delivered to the German Chancellor, who seems still to have hoped that Britain's home troubles would keep her neutral, he exclaimed against the folly of going to war 'for a scrap of paper.' But it was not for any scrap of paper that the British Commonwealth entered, reluctantly but resolutely, upon the most terrible ordeal in its history: it was for good faith and honour; for the survival of freedom in the world; for the chance of carrying further that victory of Law over Force which is the essence of civilised progress; for the very existence and the future development of its own vast fellowship of varied peoples, which is the noblest embodiment of law and liberty that history has moulded.

Period 1904-14.


[Foreign Affairs:—Trevelyan, Grey of Fallden; Grey, Twenty-five Years; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe; Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy; Morley, Memorandum on Resignation; Lloyd George, War Memoirs; Churchill, The World Crisis; Gooch, Before the War, Studies in Diplomacy, History of Modern Europe, Recent Revelations in European Diplomacy and Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft; Hauser, Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe; Brandenburg, From Bismarck to the World War.]
CHAPTER IV

THE GREAT WAR (1914–1918)

§ 1. The British Part in the War.

In previous European wars in which Britain had played a part, her contribution had been, in the main, threefold. She had held the seas and exercised the pressure of naval power; she had subsidised her allies with grants of money; and she had sent small armies to play a minor part in the land fighting in regions where they could easily be withdrawn by sea if need be, as in the Peninsular and the Crimean wars. In the greatest of all wars the part which fell to her was far greater and more difficult.

From the first hour of the war to the last, the British navy held command of the seas, with the aid of the fleets of France and later of Italy and the United States. It was endangered by the terrible menace of the submarine; but it never failed. If it had failed, the war on land could not have been carried on, not merely by Britain herself, but by her allies. The stranglehold which the navy obtained upon the commerce of the enemy was one of the main causes of his ultimate collapse. It denied to the enemy countries, and it secured to the allies, supplies from all the world.

Upon Britain also fell the main burden of supplying the allied countries with food, and with munitions of war; and in the carriage of these goods her mercantile marine was exposed to perils such as it had never had to face before, and suffered gigantic losses. Her manufacturing resources were strained to equip her own armies and those of her allies with munitions. In order to concentrate upon these tasks she had to sacrifice, for the time being, the bulk of the foreign trade by which she lived: much of it fell into other hands, and could not be regained when peace came. She had not merely to supply grants of money to the

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1 This chapter is reproduced from *British History*, by the same author. A series of maps to illustrate it will be found in *Philips' Atlas of Mediaeval and Modern History.*
weaker among the allies, she had in a large degree to finance their foreign purchases of foodstuffs and munitions; and for this purpose she had to sacrifice a large proportion of her accumulated foreign investments, which passed largely into the possession of the United States. At the end of the war she was burdened with a colossal debt, mainly owed to her own citizens, but a substantial part of it to the United States. If she had paid only for her own part in the war, the burden would have been relatively easy to bear: it was the debts which she had incurred on behalf of her allies which made the burden a crippling one, and made her recovery difficult.

But in addition to all this, she and her daughter nations had to place armies in the field on a scale never before known, and never anticipated. She had to conduct campaigns simultaneously in many different parts of the world. Besides the huge forces which had to be maintained throughout the war on the long defensive line in France, large British and Dominion forces—in some cases greater than any British armies that had ever been put in the field before—had to be maintained, at various periods of the war, in Italy, in Macedonia, at Gallipoli, in Egypt and Palestine, in Mesopotamia, in India, in China, in East Africa, in South Africa, and in West Africa. To maintain these vast armies, besides manning the fleet and the mercantile marine, she had to call out her whole manhood, as fully as the countries which had long been habituated to compulsory military service. Canada and New Zealand offered their manhood as completely as the mother country, and Australia, though she did not adopt conscription, sent almost as high a proportion; India and South Africa also sent very large contingents, though in their cases universal service was impracticable.

It had never been anticipated as possible, either in Britain or in the Dominions, that a military effort on this scale would ever be required. Even those who before the war had advocated compulsory military training had demanded it only for home defence—for which, thanks to the navy, no armies were needed. Hence almost the whole of these vast armies had to be enrolled, trained, and equipped after the war began, while women, boys, and old men took part in the labour of the munitions factories; and this made the effort all the more remarkable. For this reason, the British share in the land-war did not reach its full dimensions until the third year of struggle; but from that time onwards the
British peoples bore as large a part of the shock as any of the allies.

During the first two years men were still recruited on a voluntary basis. It was only in 1916 that compulsory service was enacted. Perhaps the most remarkable fact of all is that, until a late stage, there were more volunteers than could be equipped and trained. They came from the ends of the earth, sacrificing their careers to offer their lives: they poured into the recruiting stations from the mine, the factory, the classroom, the office, the slum doss-house, and the country mansion. In all the long history of Britain there has been nothing more noble than the spectacle of these myriads of young men, torn from their normal lives, and undergoing voluntarily the tedium of drill and the discomfort of the camp in order to fit themselves for the misery and agony of the trenches. In Britain alone not less than five million men voluntarily offered themselves. A terribly high proportion of them had to be rejected as physically unfit. This was the legacy of a century of industrialism and of city slums. The best, under this system, were the first to go, and had to face the worst ordeal for the longest time. For that reason Britain probably lost a higher proportion of her finest manhood than other countries. A million of them were killed or crippled. That loss throws a double burden of responsibility upon those who follow them.

The Great War was, indeed, unlike any other war that has ever been fought in history. It was a war not of armies and fleets but of whole nations. Millions of men—from beginning to end, something like fifty millions—were engaged, and the battle fronts extended for hundreds of miles. The slaughter was on a scale never before known or imagined. Behind the lines, the whole energy of the combatant nations was enlisted in the service of the war. New methods of warfare added new horrors. The lurking submarine made every sea voyage perilous; airships and aeroplanes not only extended the battle into the upper air, but rained death upon cities; myriads of guns belched forth explosive shells on a scale never anticipated, using in a day a supply of munitions that would have served for whole campaigns in any earlier war; and clouds of poison gas completed the inferno. It seemed as if the civilised world had sunk back into savagery, but it was a savagery that was armed with all the weapons of science. Yet myriads of men endured these horrors steadfastly for more than four years. The world must never forget their agonies.
§ 2. The First Campaign: 1914.

The war began with Austria's attack upon Serbia. Against overwhelming odds, Serbia repelled two attacks, and was still holding on among her mountains when winter came to put an end to the campaign. But the struggle in Serbia, heroic as it was, was dwarfed by the clash of gigantic armies in the west and in the east.

Germany, whose General Staff had prepared the plan of campaign long beforehand, calculated that Russia would be slow to get her huge armies into motion, and therefore planned to throw four-fifths of her forces into a sudden attack upon France, confidently expecting to crush her in a few weeks and then be free to deal with the eastern campaign. But, being unwilling to attack the highly fortified frontier between France and Germany, she had long since planned to send her strongest forces sweeping through the neutral territory of Belgium, and thence down upon Paris. France, on her side, massed her strongest forces in Lorraine, intending to attack the Germans in that region: if this plan had been successful, the German attack on Belgium might have failed.

But the French attack in Lorraine was a disastrous failure. And the Germans, sweeping down upon Belgium, captured the great fortress of Liége after a twelve days' siege; swept before them the small Belgian army, which took refuge behind the forts of Antwerp; and within three weeks of the opening of the war had the greater part of Belgium at their mercy. They secured their position by a reign of terror. Thousands of Belgian refugees poured across the Channel to Britain, where they remained throughout the war.

A line of French armies lay along the Franco-Belgian frontier. On their extreme left, at Mons, was the British Expeditionary Force of 80,000 men, under Sir John French, which had been swiftly and silently moved into France in the first days of the war. The German avalanche burst upon them on August 23rd, when there was fierce fighting at Mons. On their right the French had been forced to fall back, for the Germans had swiftly captured the fortress of Namur, which was to have been the pivot of the line of defence, and beaten the French at Charleroi. On the left also the British army was in danger of being outflanked by overwhelming German forces. There was nothing for it but retreat. A retreat in face of a superior enemy flushed with
victory is an extremely difficult operation. It was only made possible by a gallant rear-guard action fought at Le Cateau, by the corps commanded by Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. Then followed a terrible week, during which it seemed that the finest army ever sent out by Britain was shattered and useless. The French also were retreating, and it was extremely difficult to maintain contact. It was the aim of the Germans either to destroy the British army, or to drive it into a fortress, where it could be overwhelmed at leisure. The army escaped from this trap; and falling back behind the river Grand Morin, was quickly reorganised and made ready for fresh fighting.

Meanwhile, the Germans were sweeping down upon Paris; on September 2nd the French Government had to evacuate the city, and take refuge in Bordeaux. Then came one of the critical moments in history. General von Kluck, commanding the westernmost of the German armies, began to swing round towards the south-east, evidently meaning to encircle the French. Thereupon the French generalissimo, Joffre, launched a fierce attack upon von Kluck’s exposed flank, sending out every available man from Paris in taxis, omnibuses, and every other means of transport. Kluck wavered and stopped. The long line of French armies, and the reorganised British army, turned upon the German lines, forced open a gap in them, and in the five-day battle of the Marne compelled them to fall back.

This was the first turning-point of the war. Paris was never again seriously threatened. The Germans took up a position on the line of the Aisne, from which hard hammering failed to dislodge them. A long line of trenches came into being, and the stationary trench war, which lasted until 1918, began. The greater part of this line, from Switzerland to Laon, remained almost unaltered for nearly four years, and hundreds of thousands of men held grimly on to the line on both sides amid the mud, the blood, and the constant alarms of the trenches.

By the beginning of October, the Germans had been immobilised on the line of the Aisne. They next turned northwards. Bringing up fresh reserves from Lorraine and elsewhere, they directed a fierce attack on Antwerp, where the remnants of the Belgian army held out. Their huge siege-guns shattered the Antwerp forts. Two half-trained British naval brigades were hurriedly sent to help the Belgians, while a British force boldly advanced from France into western Belgium. But Antwerp could not be saved.
on October 9th, and the remnant of the Belgian army fell back along the coast, to a position behind the River Yser; the dykes were cut to help them in resisting the Germans; and here the little Belgian army clung on to a last tiny strip of Belgian territory for four years.

Meanwhile, the Germans had begun to make a push for the coast: if they could have captured the ports on the Straits of Dover, they might have made British co-operation difficult. A race for the coast filled October, each side extending its line northwards and trying to outflank the other. As a part of this movement, the British army was transferred northward, so as to hold the part of the line next to the Belgians and nearest to Calais and Boulogne. Ypres and Armentières—names which became dreadfully familiar to all British folk—were the chief points in the new British line. They were held throughout the war, and more British blood has been shed round the salient of Ypres than in any other place on the face of the earth. Here the army, after all the battering it had suffered, had to submit to a new and very fierce German onslaught; there was no more desperate fighting during the war than in the First Battle of Ypres (October 19th—November 14th). The picked troops of the German army were hurled into the attack in immense numbers; and the line was only just held. After this battle, the fighting quietened for the winter; the line of trenches from the sea to Switzerland was gradually stabilised. The Germans had failed to crush France, which they had confidently hoped to do.

Meanwhile, in the east, the Russians had come into the field, far earlier than they were expected. In a gallant endeavour to relieve the pressure upon France, they invaded East Prussia (August). But they were caught, in the confused country of the Masurian lakes, by the old German general Hindenburg, who knew the country intimately; and at Tannenberg (August 26th) they suffered an appalling disaster, losing 100,000 prisoners. During the autumn the Russians had hard fighting against German and Austrian armies in Poland; Warsaw was for a moment threatened, though the invaders were repelled. But in the south of the long eastern line, the Russians achieved great though temporary successes, overrunning the greater part of the Austrian province of Galicia. When winter descended, it seemed that deadlock had come in the west; but in the east it was hoped that a great Russian advance would bring victory to the allies. Men pinned their hopes to ‘the Russian steam-roller.’
While the autumn fighting was going on in the west and east, a new combatant entered the arena. At the beginning of the war, two German warships, the Goeben and the Breslau, then in the Mediterranean, had escaped from pursuing British ships and taken refuge in Constantinople. Their guns, commanding the city, perhaps helped to persuade the Turks to join the German side in the war, though Turkey had long been under German influence. On October 29th Turkey declared war. This made it impossible for the allies to send munitions or other help to Russia by the Black Sea; and the Baltic was already closed by the German fleet. It also exposed Egypt and the Suez Canal to attack, and the Suez Canal is one of the main arteries of British imperial trade; while India might be threatened by way of the Bagdad railway and the Persian Gulf. These menaces greatly affected the course of the fighting in the next year, and drew off forces that might otherwise have been employed in France.

Meanwhile, there had been campaigns in distant regions of the world, several of which would have ranked as important wars at any other time. In China a Japanese army, with a contingent from India, seized the German fortress of Kiaochau. Forces from Australia occupied German New Guinea, and forces from New Zealand took German Samoa. In South Africa there was a rebellion among the more discontented Boers, which was suppressed by Generals Botha and Smuts, who, twelve years earlier, had led armies against Britain in South Africa. In West Africa joint French and British forces attacked Togoland and the Cameroons; while in German East Africa a long and difficult campaign began, which was not ended until 1917.

Germany could send no aid to her outlying possessions scattered over the world. But their fate must depend upon the issue of the struggle in Europe; and at the end of the first campaign, Germany had the better of the struggle in Europe, though she had failed in her main aim. On the seas, however, the supremacy of the allies seemed to be securely established. The main German fleet did not venture to come out; but in August a squadron of German cruisers was severely handled by Admiral Beatty in Heligoland Bight, and three of them were sunk. From its main base at Scapa Flow in the Orkneys the British Grand Fleet commanded the entrance to the North Sea. In these stormy waters many ships were engaged in an unresting vigil to cut off the trade of Germany, while squadrons based on other naval
ports patrolled the North Sea. The blockade did not at first hurt Germany as much as had been hoped, partly because America resented interference with her trade, and partly because a stream of goods found access to Germany through Holland and the Scandinavian countries. German submarines caused some alarm, even from the first days of the war, especially when, in September, a single submarine sank three British cruisers. But the submarines were no more able than the main German fleet to interfere with the constant passage of troops from England to France, or with the inflow of supplies for the allies from all the world.

In more distant seas, however, some German ships, which were at large when the war began, notably the gallant *Emden*, did a great deal of damage, sinking many British trading ships. And in November two powerful German cruisers, isolated in the Pacific, after escaping from British and Japanese pursuers, came upon a squadron of light-armed and slow-sailing British cruisers, and, after a grim battle off Coronel, on the coast of Chile, sank them and their crews. Vengeance soon came. A month later, Admiral Sturdee intercepted the German cruisers off the Falkland Islands, and sank them both. By the end of 1914 the allies held the seas securely; and though they were later to be threatened by the menace of the submarine, the control of the seas was to prove, in the long run, the decisive factor of the war.

Throughout these first months of the war, and throughout the dismal winter, hundreds of thousands of men were drilling in every part of Britain and the Dominions. They were the New Armies, which Lord Kitchener (who had been made War Secretary) was getting ready. At first there were neither arms nor uniforms for them: on these the factories were busy. A few of them, including the first drafts of Canadians, began to appear in the field in 1915, and large numbers of Australians and New Zealanders came to Egypt to complete their training; there they could help in the defence of the Suez Canal, which the Turks vainly attacked early in 1915. But it was not until 1916 that the New Armies were ready in strength. Till then the Old Army and the Territorials had to hold the line. To help them, troops were brought from India; but the Sikhs and the Gurkhas suffered terribly from the cold and the wet. Fitter fields for their valour were to be found later, in Mesopotamia and in Palestine.
§ 3. The Campaign of 1915.

1915 was a year of disappointments for the allies. In the west several attempts were made to break through the German lines, notably at Neuve Chapelle and Loos. In spite of a terrible expenditure of life, they all failed. The Germans, on their side, made a fierce attempt to break through, in the Second Battle of Ypres (April). They nearly succeeded, thanks to the use of poison gas, which they introduced for the first time. Waves of deadly fumes rolled down upon the British lines, and reduced the troops to impotence, for no preparations had been made for dealing with this loathsome mode of attack, which all the nations had forswn. But even against this horror the courage of the army held out; and the Canadians, who now first appeared in the fighting line, showed great gallantry in helping to close the gap. Some ground was lost; but the terrible salient of Ypres was still held.

It now became necessary not only to devise and manufacture masks for the troops as a safeguard against gas, but also to create appliances for carrying on chemical warfare on the allied side. Here was a new demand upon the factories at home. Moreover, the battles of the spring showed that the expenditure of shells was on a vastly greater scale than had ever been anticipated, and that the army's equipment in heavy artillery, field guns, and machine guns must be multiplied many fold. There was an outcry in Britain; the cheap press began to cry treason; Lord Haldane, who had done more than any other man to make ready for the war, was hounded out of office; the ministry was reconstituted as a coalition of all parties, Mr. Asquith retaining the Premiership; and a new Ministry of Munitions was created, with Mr. Lloyd George at its head. With unlimited credit, it set to work to turn every factory capable of being so utilised into the service of the army: the whole manufacturing power of Britain was turned to the production of guns, shells, aeroplanes, and all the other innumerable engines of war. The traditional trade union restrictions upon output were abandoned. Thousands of men and women were withdrawn from other trades. The export trade, by which Britain lives, was for the time being abandoned. More and more, as the months wore on, the whole strength of the nation and of the Empire was concentrated upon the one supreme aim of winning the war. Unlimited orders were also placed in America. To pay for
them British credit was deeply pledged. But it took time for this gigantic effort to mature. It was not until late in 1916 that its results were at all fully felt. They were still growing in volume when the war ended.

One great encouragement came to the allies in the west in this year. Italy, though a member of the Triple Alliance, had refused to join her allies on the outbreak of war, because she thought the war unjust. She had remained neutral. But a powerful popular movement sprang up, to demand her participation against Germany and Austria. It was inspired partly by indignation at the conduct of Germany in Belgium and at her methods of warfare, but still more by a desire to conquer from Austria the ' unredeemed ' Italian territories of Trent and Trieste. The entry of Italy (May 1915) aroused high hopes on the allied side. But the Italian campaign had to be conducted on extremely difficult and highly defensible ground, in the High Alps and on the plateau of Gorizia. The Italians made slow progress. Nevertheless they kept a large Austrian force tied up during a critical period. But for the intervention of Italy, which came at a very difficult time, the issue of the war might have been different.

The 'ramshackle empire' of Austria would have been gravely imperilled by the Italian attack, if the Russians had been able to keep up the pressure which they had begun in the previous autumn. Then they had overrun a great part of Galicia, and in the early spring of 1915 they completed the conquest of Galicia and began to cross the passes of the Carpathians into Hungary. If this attack could have been pressed home, Austria would have collapsed, and Germany, alone, would have been unable to hold out. Therefore the main German campaign of this year was directed against the Russians. Thanks to their superiority in guns and munitions, the Germans were able to draw large forces from the western front; and in April and May, and on through the summer, they dealt a series of hammer blows against the Russians, first in Galicia, and then, farther north, in Poland. Ill-armed, and ill-supplied with guns, shells, and rifles, the Russians were driven back like sheep, fighting desperately but hopelessly, often without weapons. More than a million Russians were killed or captured. The captives were employed, like thousands of Belgian captives, to till the fields and man the factories of Germany. By September the Germans had conquered all Galicia, all Poland including its capital, Warsaw, and all Lithuania. The Russian armies were reconstituted on a new line, far
back in Russian territory, behind the line of the Pripet marshes. But they had lost irreplaceable guns and rifles. Their strength was broken, unless they could be supplied with munitions by their western allies.

It was the urgent need of helping and saving Russia which led to the main British effort of this year, the attack on the Dardanelles. If the Dardanelles could be forced, Constantinople would have to submit; there would be a clear passage for supplies to Russia by the Black Sea, and the Russian armies could be re-equipped. Moreover, the Balkan States, which were anxiously watching the course of events, would probably then come in on the side of the allies, and Serbia would be saved. The plan was a sound one, but it was ruined by bad execution. The military authorities insisted at first that they could not spare troops, since every man was needed for the western front. A purely naval attack was therefore made in March. It failed; but it was clear that it would have succeeded had a sufficient force been available for disembarkation. Accordingly, next month, an attack by land and sea was begun, with a magnificent force of British, Australian, and New Zealand troops, aided by a small French contingent. But the enemy was warned, and the task had now become too hard. With heroic gallantry two landings were made on the rocky coast in face of a storm of firing, one at Point Helles, at the tip of the peninsula, the other farther north, at the point which became famous as Anzac—a name derived from the initials of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. No episode in all the war was more heroic than the way in which the troops hung on to these exposed positions, constantly under fire, tormented by heat and dust and flies, and having to draw all their food and even water from the ships—also under fire.

In August a fresh landing was made at Suvla Bay, by a force mainly drawn from the New Army. A very vigorous attack was made, which came within an ace of success, as the German general in command of the Turkish defenders later admitted. Some of the troops actually reached the summit of the ridge, and looked over to the sea on the other side. But the attack just failed. After that, the gallant army still hung on to their positions, in circumstances of incredible difficulty, until the end of the year. But there was no further use in sacrificing life. It was decided to evacuate the Dardanelles. The whole force was, with great skill, withdrawn without loss (December and January). All
its galantry seemed to have been wasted. Yet it had kept 300,000 Turks occupied during a critical period; it had greatly weakened the Turkish army; and perhaps the later victories of the allies over the Turks, which helped to bring the war to an end, were partly due to this heroic misadventure.

The army of the Dardanelles was needed elsewhere. For there had been other disasters in the east. When the failure of the Dardanelles expedition was manifest (October 1915), Bulgaria, hitherto neutral, decided to throw in her lot with Germany. She attacked the gallant Serbians—already worn out by repeated Austrian attacks—while an Austrian and German army swept upon them from the north. The Serbians were overwhelmed. Their country was conquered. Only a remnant of their army could be withdrawn by way of Albania. This was a very grave alteration of the situation in the east. There was a danger that the Germans and Austrians with their Turkish and Bulgarian allies might force Greece into their confederacy; the Greek king had German sympathies. To guard against this danger, an allied force was sent to hold the important port of Salonika, so as to secure at least some foothold for future operations in the Balkans.

Meanwhile, another attack against the Turks had begun well but had led to disaster. At the end of 1914 a small force had been sent from India to Basra, at the head of the Persian Gulf, to guard the end of an important oil pipe-line. Finding little opposition, it had been tempted, with inadequate resources, to push up the Tigris valley and occupy Lower Mesopotamia. All the best Turkish forces were occupied in the Dardanelles, and so the Mesopotamian army was able to secure unexpected success, and to win several victories over the Turkish levies. In November, General Townshend, against his better judgment, was persuaded to make a dash for Baghdad. But by that time the failure of the Dardanelles campaign was known, and Turkish reinforcements were available for Mesopotamia. At Ctesiphon Townshend was defeated. He had to fall back upon Kut-el-amara; and there, in December, he and his army were besieged by far superior Turkish forces.

Thus, in all the record of 1915, there was little to encourage the allies. Overseas, indeed, German South-West Africa had been conquered by Botha and Smuts, and the last of the surface raiders had been disposed of. But the submarines had become more menacing. In May 1915, the great
American liner *Lusitania* was sunk off the south coast of Ireland; and many other merchant vessels met a similar fate. Nevertheless, the stranglehold of the navy was still complete, and its pressure was gradually becoming more effective.


The Germans had won great victories, both in the west and in the east. But they had not yet won Victory. They were feeling the strain of the pressure by land and sea. Soon the superiority in equipment and preparation which they had enjoyed in the first stages of the war would pass from them. It was essential that they should burst through the bonds of steel that were strangling them.

In May 1916, their great fleet at last ventured out from its fortified harbours. Off the coast of Jutland it was attacked, rather recklessly, by Admiral Beatty with his squadron of battle-cruisers. Four of these great ships, in which defensive strength was sacrificed to speed, were sunk. But when the main British fleet under Jellicoe came up, the Germans avoided battle, and retreated under the cover of smoke-screens, helped by a mist which had arisen. If the battle had been fought out, it is probable that the German fleet would have been destroyed. Jellicoe has been blamed for not pressing on at all risks. He preferred to avoid the risk of being led into minefields and submarine traps, and of endangering the Grand Fleet which was the main pillar of the allies' fortunes. The German fleet made good its escape, having inflicted heavier losses than it received. But it never came out again; and this was almost as good a result as the most crushing victory could have yielded.

Meanwhile, the Germans had resolved on a desperate attempt to break through the allied line in France, being now able to bring back large numbers of troops from the eastern front. For their main attack they chose Verdun. Here, in February, they began a fierce onslaught, in which almost every division of their western army was at one time or another thrown into the fray, and 4000 guns were employed. At a colossal cost of life, they gained some territory on both sides of the Meuse, and captured the two important forts of Douaumont and Vaux. But the French stood firm. The onslaught was a failure. This had become clear by June; so much so that the Germans removed their chief
of staff, and gave the supreme command to the heroes of the eastern front, Hindenburg and Ludendorff. It was the failure at Verdun that first gave to the Germans a chill sense of the hopelessness of their task; especially when, in October, the French regained Forts Douaumont and Vaux.

The allies did everything in their power to relieve the pressure on Verdun. The Italians made a great offensive against Austria: they forced the line of the Isonzo River, and captured Gorizia. And this success greatly helped the Russians, who in spite of their recent disasters, being now relieved from the German pressure, made a gallant attack on the Austrians in Galicia, and won some striking successes, taking 300,000 prisoners.

But the main counter-attack fell to the British armies, co-operating with the French on their right. For the New Armies, from Britain and the Dominions, were at last in the field, and were supported, at last, by unlimited artillery and munitions, and by great numbers of aeroplanes. They had, also, a new weapon to introduce—the steel-clad Tanks, which were expected to overcome the difficulties of trench-warfare. Although these expectations were not fully realised, the Tanks certainly surprised the enemy. In the spring the new armies took over a great part of the French line, thus materially helping the French. Even then, they held a far shorter length of line than the French; but it was the part of the line against which the German forces were most heavily massed, and on which (apart from Verdun) the heaviest fighting took place.

On July 1st, 1916, Sir Douglas Haig, who had succeeded French as commander-in-chief, launched, after a terrific artillery preparation, the biggest attack which the allies had yet attempted: the Battle of the Somme. It went on, without cessation, until it was stopped by the mud of winter. At a colossal cost of lives, it made a great bulge in the German line; and if it could have been followed up, there might have been a break-through. But the Germans, foreseeing this danger, were meanwhile preparing an elaborately fortified and much shorter series of defences, which came to be known as the Hindenburg Line. When the time came to renew the advance, the allies found that the Germans had slipped away to these new defences, devastating the intervening country, and strewing it with mines and other obstacles to their advance.

Nevertheless, when the campaign of 1916 closed, the
position of the allies, after the German failure at Verdun and the victories of the Somme and of Gorizia, was far more favourable than at any earlier date; and for the first time the prospect of defeat began to loom before the Germans.

Elsewhere, however, things had not gone so well. In August 1916, Rumania, encouraged by the victories of the Russians, entered the war on the allied side, and invaded Transylvania, thus once again threatening the Austrian Empire. The combined allied force at Salonika, now strengthened by the remnants of the Serbian army, struck northwards to assist them and to distract the Bulgarians. But German and Austrian forces were swiftly thrown into Transylvania, and beat back the Rumanian invaders, while the Bulgarians attacked Rumania from the south. Before the end of the year, Rumania had lost her capital, and was driven back to a strip of territory on the Russian border; while the Salonika force was held up in the difficult country round Monastir and Lake Doiran.

Meanwhile, in Mesopotamia, the ill-fated little army at Kut-el-amara was forced to surrender (April), despite repeated desperate attempts to relieve it. After this disaster, very vigorous efforts were made to restore the situation. Troops were poured into Mesopotamia from India, with vast supplies, which would have saved the situation a year earlier. A very able commander, Sir Stanley Maude, took command. He was to bring about a rapid reversal of fortune. But he was not ready to move until the end of the year. Again, in Egypt, preparations were being made for an advance into Palestine. A railway and a water-pipe line were quietly laid across the desert of Sinai. By the end of the year all was ready for an invasion of Palestine; and meanwhile a young Oxford don, Colonel Lawrence, was at work among the Bedouin of Arabia, stimulating a great rebellion against the Turks. The downfall of Turkey was to be brought about by the twofold attack in Mesopotamia and in Palestine.

These things were all known to the German High Command. Whether they looked east or west, the outlook for them was gloomy at the end of 1916. They made up their minds to resort to desperate remedies. But people at home did not know all this. To them the slow advance and the heavy carnage on the Somme (which cost 400,000 casualties), the humiliating surrender at Kut—not yet avenged—and the Rumanian disaster seemed to prove that no progress was being made. There was widespread disheartenment, in the allied countries as well as in Germany. And the staying
power of the nations was to be yet more severely tested in the next year.

In Britain there was a change of ministry. Mr. Asquith ceased to be Prime Minister. His place was taken by Mr. Lloyd George, whose energy, vigour, and confidence did much to inspire the nation. He now introduced an innovation in government, setting up a small War Cabinet of ministers without special departmental responsibility to devote themselves wholly to the conduct of the war. One of them was General Smuts, once the commander of a Boer army against Britain. The Prime Ministers of the Great Dominions were also called into consultation. In the last desperate paroxysm of the war, the British Empire showed a greater unity of purpose and policy than ever before.

§ 5. The Campaign of 1917.

The new year began with an evidence of the desperation of the German High Command. On January 31st they announced that the British Islands were in a state of blockade, and that any ship, allied or neutral, which entered these waters was liable to be sunk at sight. They had realised that unless Britain, now the mainstay of the allies, could be beaten to her knees, their defeat was inevitable. In order to defeat her, they outraged all the laws and customs of civilised warfare (which had always insisted upon mercy for non-combatants) and all the rights of neutral powers. They knew that this action was likely to bring America into the fray. But they calculated that their submarines could inflict so much damage upon British and other shipping before the Americans could enter the war that it would be impossible to transport an American army, or the food and munitions necessary for carrying on the war. They calculated, also, that the terrors of this new kind of attack would frighten the sailors of all nations.

The first few months of 'unrestricted' submarine war were alarming—far more alarming than the public was ever allowed to know. The monthly toll of tonnage lost rose by leaps and bounds, until it was nearly 600,000 tons in April; and, of course, sorely needed cargoes were also lost. Yet in spite of this new terror, the courage of the mercantile marine never flinched. Torpedoed sailors, rescued from the sea, promptly signed on for new ships: many of them were torpedoed half a dozen times or more. This was a
new kind of peril, against which new measures had to be taken. In the first place the whole nation had to be rationed. Every household was limited as to the amount of food it might buy; and this was done without respect to rank or wealth. The American ambassador, Walter Page, was deeply impressed when he found the king and his guests limiting themselves to even stricter rations than the rest of the nation. Meanwhile every device was used to combat the submarines. New inventions were made for dealing with them. Swarms of fishing-trawlers and motor-boats, armed with guns and depth-charges, were sent out to hunt for them. Mystery-ships, known as Q-boats, lured them to rise by appearing as harmless traders, and then sank them by gun-fire. Great nets guarded important passages. Huge minefields were laid, notably one that stretched from Scotland to Scandinavia. Merchant ships sailed in convoys under the escort of destroyers or swift cruisers. Methods of painting ships were devised to deceive the eyes of the pirates. By all these means the menace of the submarines was gradually mastered. By the end of the year they were no longer formidable. And meanwhile, both in Britain and in America, new shipping was constructed at so unprecedented a pace that new ships were launched faster than old ones were sunk. The 'unrestricted' submarine attack was a desperate gambler's device. And it failed.

But it brought the United States into the war, with whole-hearted zeal. She declared war against Germany in April 1917; millions of men were put into training; and the American fleet crossed the Atlantic to join hands with the allies. All difficulties about the blockade of Germany now disappeared, and the pressure became more and more severe. Above all, America was able to share the financial burden of supporting the allies, under which Britain was beginning to stagger. It was, of course, long before the American armies could take the field: they were only actively engaged in fighting during the last five months of the war. But it is significant of the completeness with which the submarine menace was overcome that the great American armies were transported to France without loss, mainly in British ships.

The submarine attack and its overthrow was the main event of the year, and one of the decisive events of the war. But 1917 was full of other great events, mostly unfavourable to the allies. In March a revolution broke out in Russia, and the Tsar was deposed. The Liberal Government which at first took his place, and the moderate Socialist
Government under Kerensky which succeeded it, were both resolute to carry on the war; but the upheaval disorganised the armies, which soon became a mere rabble, whom the Germans easily drove before them. At the end of the year, however, the Bolshevik extremists, led by Lenin and Trotsky, seized power. Their aim was nothing less than world-revolution, and their first object was to destroy all the old elements of leadership in Russia. To be free for this purpose, they were ready to make peace with Germany on the most humiliating terms. This peace was concluded at Brest-Litovsk in December. It left the Germans in control of Poland and the Baltic provinces. What was more important, it left them free to withdraw all their forces from the eastern front in 1918, and to concentrate the whole of their strength upon a last desperate attack in the west. But for the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, it is possible that the war might have been brought to an end in 1917.

Unhappily the campaign in the west was also badly handled. A new commander-in-chief, Nivelle, had been appointed for the French army. Instead of following up the Somme victory, as Joffre and Haig had meant to do, he worked out a plan for a great French attack in Champagne, which was to be the decisive victory, leaving to the British army only subsidiary attacks. But the Champagne attack was a disastrous failure. The losses were so heavy that it was stopped in a fortnight, and alarming mutinies broke out in the French army. The British army had meanwhile made a successful advance at Vimy. But in order to draw off the German attacks from the disorganised French line, it became necessary to start a very vigorous onslaught in the north, from the Ypres salient. The object of this attack was, if possible, to reach Ostend and the Belgian coast, so as to check the submarines. But it only reached the Passchendaele ridge. In dismal weather, which turned the fields of Belgium into swamps, it had to be carried on, month after month, with terrible loss of life, until finally it came to an end in the rains of October. In the next month a brilliant success was won, by new methods of attack (in which tanks were freely used), near Cambrai. But the first success was not followed up, and much of the ground won was regained by German counter-attacks. Thus 1917, which was to have been the year of victory, turned out to be, on the western front, a year of disillusionment and demoralisation.

And this was not the worst. In October a sudden on-
slaught by the Austrians, stiffened by six German divisions, broke through the Italian line at Caporetto. All that had been gained in two years was lost; the rout was only stayed, far into Italy, on the line of the Piave River; and British and French divisions had to be hurriedly despatched from the hard-pressed French front to restore the Italian situation. What with the submarine menace, the Russian Revolution, the fruitless campaigns in France, and the disaster in Italy, the year ended in the deepest gloom for the allies.

From the east, however, came better news. The downfall of Turkey was beginning. In Mesopotamia Maude's skilful advance had begun at the close of the previous year. Kut was recaptured after sharp fighting in February. In March, Maude was once more on the field of Ctesiphon, where Townshend had suffered defeat; there was a three days' battle, and the great historic city of Baghdad fell into British hands. The Turks were driven far to the north. Their power in Mesopotamia was broken. Then, in Palestine, Allenby, now in command, took up the running. He captured Beersheba (October). He cut the communications of the Turkish army that held Gaza and the cities of Philistia. He took Hebron, while in the desert on his right Lawrence and his wild Bedouins threatened the enemy's communications. Finally, just before Christmas, he entered Jerusalem—the first Christian general to be master of that sacred city since the Crusaders lost it in the twelfth century. When the gloomy year 1917 came to an end, the Turkish Empire was manifestly on the verge of collapse.

§ 6. The Campaign of 1918.

When 1918 opened, the German High Command knew that, in spite of their brilliant successes in the previous year, their doom was certain unless they could quickly win a crowning victory. The submarine war had failed. The Americans were already pouring into France, and although they still needed many months of training, their numbers were bound to go on growing. The Turkish Empire was visibly breaking up. The Austrian Empire was terribly overstrained, and its heterogeneous peoples were ready for revolt. Even in Germany there was an alarming growth of discontent: the blockade was causing very severe suffering; and there had been a mutiny in the idle navy at the
end of 1917. Unless the British and French armies could be shattered by swift and crushing blows, the end was inevitable. For this final, desperate venture the complete breakdown of resistance on the eastern front gave an opportunity. The whole strength of Germany could be, and must be, used for one final onslaught.

It came, in the spring of 1918, in three successive hammer blows, into which every available ounce of strength was thrown. The first attack was directed, on March 21st, against the southern end of the British line near St. Quentin—a part of the line which had recently been taken over from the French, and which was too lightly held. The line was broken; in a few terrible days all that had been gained in the hard fighting of the Somme, and more, was lost; the losses in men, guns, and material of all kinds were terrific. The great railway junction of Amiens was threatened: if it had been lost the French and the British armies would have been separated. But the German effort spent itself just before this crucial point was reached. Fresh troops, including even half-trained boys, and unlimited supplies of guns and munitions, were rushed across from Britain; and by heroic efforts the line was reconstituted. But the terrible days of March were the darkest of the whole war. The stone seemed to have rolled down once more to the bottom of the hill.

The second attack was directed in April against the northern end of the British line, before the historic salient of Ypres: it is known as the Battle of the Lys. All that had been won by the grim fighting of 1917 was lost, and for a moment it seemed as if even the Channel ports would be threatened. But the line, though badly bent, did not break; and the Ypres salient, though made more acute, still remained in British hands.

The third onslaught was delivered against the French line between Rheims and Soissons, in May. This line, which had been held ever since the autumn of 1914, was broken; the Aisne was crossed; and the invaders penetrated deep into French territory, reaching the Marne once more, at Château Thierry. They were now within forty miles of Paris, which suffered bombardment from the giant gun, Big Bertha.

These three successive and terrific blows had all achieved remarkable success, but not decisive success. They had nearly, but not quite, reached vital points—Amiens, the Channel ports, Paris. But in delivering them the Germans had spent their force. They had no more strength in
reserve. And now the allies’ turn had come. They had at last learnt wisdom from adversity, and had agreed to unity of command, under the great French soldier, Marshal Foch. In the four months from July to November the situation was reversed by an extraordinary series of successive blows, not only in France, but all along the allied lines—in Italy, in Macedonia, in Palestine and Mesopotamia. Never, in all history, has there been a more sudden or a more dramatic reversal of fortune.

The undaunted spirit of the allies had already been shown, even at the darkest moment, by a marvellous piece of naval heroism, which a French admiral described as ‘the finest feat of arms in all naval history of all times and all countries.’ On St. George’s Day (April 23rd) the Dover Patrol set out to seal up the most dangerous nests of submarines, at Zeebrugge and Ostend. Under cover of a screen of smoke, a group of out-of-date cruisers, ferry-boats and submarines boldly entered the harbour of Zeebrugge; two of them were sunk to block the channel; and the Mole was badly damaged. A few nights later the harbour of Ostend was also partly blocked.

In July the great counter-attack began, when French and American forces broke into the salient created by the recent German advance to Château Thierry, and regained all the lost land. A little later an American army wiped out the salient of St. Mihiel on the Meuse, which had been held by the Germans since 1914; and began a dogged advance through the wooded country of the Argonne.

But the main attacks were left to the British armies in co-operation with the French on their immediate right. There had been some doubt whether any army could venture upon a great offensive so soon after it had endured such staggering blows as those of March and April. But Haig knew the stuff of which his men were made. The advance began on August 8th, near Amiens. Soon the lost ground was regained. Stage by stage the attack was extended northward. By the end of August the advancing forces were up against the ‘Hindenburg line,’ which had baffled them in 1917. On September 2nd the Hindenburg defences were broken. Then the line began to move forward in the far north, Belgian and British troops moving together into Belgian territory that had been under German control since August 1914. In September and October the whole line was in movement, from Soissons to the sea. The old trench systems were crossed for the last time.
The whole German line was yielding, cracking. It was, on a gigantic scale, like that final charge at Waterloo which followed the last attack of the Imperial Guards.

And while the iron lines in the west bent and broke, everywhere else the defences of the Central Powers gave way. In Macedonia, after long waiting, the combined forces of Serbians, Greeks, French, and British moved up against the entrenched armies of Bulgaria. A fortnight of hard fighting, and the Bulgarian resistance broke. By the end of September Bulgaria had asked for an armistice: she was the first of the enemy Powers to yield; and her surrender isolated Turkey. The hard-tried Serbians, who had faced the first shock of the war, were the first to taste the triumph of victory.

Meanwhile, in Palestine, Allenby had with brilliant strategy pushed home his successes of the previous year. He was delayed by having to send his best troops to the west to make good the disasters of the spring, but reinforcements came to him from India, while Lawrence and his Bedouins swept round to harass the Turks from the desert on the east. In September the crucial attack was launched against the Turkish army. The Turks were completely routed. Damascus was captured on October 1st. Beirut and the other ports of the Syrian coast were occupied in turn; Aleppo fell on October 26th. Meanwhile, the army of Mesopotamia, pressing northward, was at the gates of Mosul. On October 30th the Turks also asked for an armistice. They had collapsed as suddenly as the Bulgarians.

A still more dramatic break had also taken place in Italy. On the anniversary of Caporetto, the Italian army, with its British and French allies, once more took the offensive. It was a British contingent that led the way, crossing the Piave under Lord Cavan. At first the Austrians fought hard. But their resistance weakened at every step. Their line was broken. Their discontented subjects were in revolt. On November 4th Austria in her turn sued for peace.

Germany was now left alone. But despair had at last taken possession of her people and her leaders. While the army was forced back fighting towards the Rhine, revolution broke out, first in the navy, then in the cities. The Kaiser deserted the nation whose trust he had abused, and fled to Holland. The possibility of German resistance was at an end.
At dawn on November 11th the British army, in its advance, had reached Mons, where the long agony began more than four years earlier. At eleven o'clock on that day the order to cease fire was given. The Germans had signed an armistice. The war was at an end; and all along the hundreds of miles of the fighting lines, and in every town and village of the belligerent countries, half-incredulous cheers and tears and prayers welcomed the lifting of the nightmare that had overhung the world.
CHAPTER V

THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR

§ I. A New Era opened by a Hurried Compromise.

The war was over; but the problem of settlement after the great upheaval remained. It was not a question merely of imposing terms upon defeated enemies; though some took that view, and there was a great deal of talk about hanging the Kaiser, and making Germany pay the whole cost of the war. Something like a new world-order had to be attempted: for the peoples had been promised that this should be a war to end war; that the world should be made safe for democracy; that their country should be made a land fit for heroes to live in. It was perhaps sanguine to expect these consequences from four years of hatred, carnage, and wholesale destruction. Nevertheless men felt that humanity was entering upon a new era, and they expected the tired and overstrained leaders, to whom fell the task of negotiation, to fix the character of this new era. Hopes were especially pinned upon the American President Wilson, who had enunciated many noble sentiments during the later years of the war, and whose Fourteen Points had been accepted by both sides as the basis for the armistice that put a stop to the fighting. Wilson was eagerly welcomed when he came to Europe to take part in the settlement. No man has ever possessed so much power to shape the affairs of the world as President Wilson seemed—but only seemed—to possess at the beginning of 1919. The whole world looked to him to lead it into a new era of secure peace and general prosperity, out of the chaos and misery into which the war had plunged it.

It was in truth a new era into which the world was passing: the era of interdependence, in which no country would ever again be able to achieve either security or prosperity by its own efforts alone, since all the races and peoples of the earth were now unalterably members one of another, and the well-being of each depended upon the well-being
of all. In the preceding pages we have seen many indications of the coming of this state of things during the previous generation. The war was the culmination of this process. It demonstrated the interdependence of the whole human race. Ugly and cruel as it was, it was the first event in human history in which all the peoples of the earth were not merely concerned, but knew that they were concerned. It had brought civilisation to the verge of ruin, and no people had been able to resist the suction of the whirlpool, not even those that nominally remained at peace. This was because the political interdependence of the world was a reflection of its economic interdependence, and every country now depended upon supplies drawn from every part of the world. Everybody recognised that if another serious conflict should break out, all peoples must be directly or indirectly involved in it; and, with the increased powers of destruction which science was placing at the disposal of men, such a conflict must end in the utter ruin and downfall of the civilisation which had brought mankind within sight of a sort of unity.

An immense responsibility thus rested upon those who had to frame the settlement: their task was nothing less than that of shaping a new world-order. But there was no time for the deliberate discussion of this gigantic task; for unless swift action was taken, chaos threatened to overwhelm Europe. Three great empires had collapsed: the Russian, the Austrian, and the Turkish. Red revolution was raging in Russia, and threatened to spread to Central Europe unless order and stability were quickly restored. In all the western part of the old Russian empire, and throughout the extent of the old Austrian empire, there was political confusion, while in Germany the old régime had been suddenly overthrown and there was reason to fear a complete break-up of social order. Even in the victorious States, there could be no return of normal conditions, nor could trade enjoy a healthy revival, until some stability had been restored in Europe. Outside of Europe, the prestige of European civilisation had been terribly undermined by the war, which had made it appear an evil thing. The Mohammedan world was in a state of ferment. In India and in Egypt there was a vehement movement of revolt against western supremacy; in China there was chaos, of which Japan was making profit. Clearly there was no possibility of delay for reasoned discussion about the new world-order. Decisions had to be made quickly,
even if they were only makeshifts. In the meantime, while the leading statesmen were hurriedly devising their plans, a series of Commissions appointed by the victor-powers did useful work in averting a total breakdown of law and order, and in helping to keep the wretched populations of Europe from starvation, mainly at the cost of America and Britain.


The conference which had to make these momentous decisions, and which met at Paris at the beginning of 1919, was the most widely representative body that had ever assembled in history. It is true that the defeated powers—Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey—were not included: their part was limited to submitting to the decisions of the rest. The few neutrals were also omitted—Holland, Spain, the Scandinavian countries, and Switzerland. The conference was limited to the 'Allied and Associated Powers.' But almost every other country in the world had joined the allies in the last stages of the war, and though most of them had taken no part in the fighting they were entitled as allies to be consulted. Thus the republics of South and Central America, and the Asiatic countries of China, Siam, and the Hedjaz (Arabia) were included. So were India and the British Dominions; and their representation as separate States marked a very important stage in the development of the British Empire: they now ranked as independent States, no longer as subjects of Great Britain. Finally, there were present, as hangers-on, spokesmen of the new States which had sprung into being on the ruins of the Austrian and the Russian empires. Their business was to get as full a recognition of their claims as possible.

It was obviously impracticable that the immense and complicated work of framing a settlement could be discussed in detail, or indeed discussed at all, by so large and heterogeneous an assemblage, speaking so many different tongues. Their function was limited (apart from incessant wire-pulling) to giving final and formal approval to proposals drafted by smaller bodies. At first the real work was undertaken by a Council of Ten, consisting of the two chief representatives of the five principal powers: America, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. Then the American
President and the European Prime Ministers took the decisions into their own hands; Japan stood aloof, being unconcerned in the affairs of Europe; Italy, after a time, withdrew, being dissatisfied with the way in which her claims were met; and thus the real decision rested with three men: Wilson, the American President; Clemenceau, the Prime Minister of France; and Lloyd George, the Prime Minister of Britain. Wilson was a doctrinaire and an idealist, but not a very skilful negotiator; moreover, he could not ensure the acceptance by his country of the decisions reached. Clemenceau, the 'Old Tiger,' was very much of a realist, whose chief interest was to make sure that Germany should never again be able to imperil France. Lloyd George, the most subtle-minded of the three, was awake to the importance of making a real and lasting peace, not a mere source of new rancours and difficulties; but his hands were tied by the promises he had given in the recent British election (1918) and by the angry temper which reigned among his supporters. The Big Three, as they were called, were assisted by a large number of committees and commissions of experts: they had at their command all the expert knowledge of the world, and it was by these experts that the detailed proposals were drafted for discussion by the Big Three. In the nature of things the final result was a compromise. It was a compromise made in a hurry; but it was based upon a greater mass of knowledge than any earlier peace settlement.

The settlement was embodied in a long series of treaties. These were, first of all, the main treaties with each of the defeated powers: the Treaties of Versailles with Germany, of St. Germain with Austria, of the Trianon with Hungary, of Neuilly with Bulgaria. A treaty with Turkey (known as the Treaty of Sèvres) was also drawn up, but it was destroyed by a successful war which Turkey waged against the Greeks in 1922, and the final settlement was not reached until 1923 at Lausanne. Secondly, there was a group of treaties with Russia, made outside of the conference, by the new States which had been formed out of the western part of the old Russian Empire. And, thirdly, there was a series of 'minority' treaties, made with the countries which included large minorities of alien stocks, and placed under the guardianship of the League of Nations. It will be convenient to treat this bunch of treaties as all forming parts of a single general settlement.
§ 3. The League of Nations.

The greatest contribution made by the Conference of Paris to the formation of a new world-order was the establishment of the League of Nations—the first organisation ever created to deal with the common affairs of the whole human race. Its constitution, or 'Covenant,' formed the first part of each of the principal peace treaties. Another document, establishing an International Labour Organisation for the purpose of creating better labour conditions throughout the world, and of enabling the nations to advance in step towards this end, was also incorporated as the last section of each of the chief peace treaties.

The primary purpose of the League was to preserve the peace of the world, and to prevent the recurrence of any new war like the last. Each of the nations which joined the League pledged itself to join in defending the rest against aggression, if need be, and not to resort to war itself until it had exhausted the means of peaceful settlement provided by the League. These were: (1) for cases capable of being settled by judicial means, an International Court, which was provided for in the Covenant, and set up at The Hague during the League's first year; and (2) for political and 'non-justiciable' cases, an enquiry by the Council or Assembly of the League, all members being bound to wait until three months after the report before taking military action. If this system had existed, and had been honestly used, in 1914, the Great War would never have taken place. The Covenant of the League did not absolutely banish the possibility of war; but it made it extremely improbable if the pledges given by the nations were observed.

The League was also charged with the duty of bringing about an all-round disarmament of the nations; and it was hoped that the security which the League system offered would convince the nations that they need not waste their substance on preparation for war. Germany and the other defeated countries had been compulsorily disarmed by the treaties, and a solemn pledge had been given to them that this was only the first step towards a general disarmament. Unfortunately, the framers of the peace treaties failed to use an opportunity which was in their hands to carry disarmament further. When they established the new States on the old territory of the Russian and Austrian Empires, they might reasonably have imposed upon them a limitation
of their armaments; but this was not even suggested. These States consequently proceeded to establish universal military service, and to equip themselves with armaments on the largest scale, with the result that the number of men under arms in Europe was soon as great as it had been on the eve of the war, despite the disarmament of the defeated powers. The reason for this failure was that the allies, especially France, wanted to make sure that Germany, should she ever revive her old ambitions, would be faced by armed powers on the east and south as well as on the west. In other words, the world’s statesmen did not themselves trust the system they had set up.

The first members of the League were to be the victorious allies, together with the neutral States, who were all invited to join, and all accepted the invitation: the defeated powers were to be allowed to join later, when they had carried out the terms imposed upon them. Unfortunately America refused to become a member of the League, though President Wilson had been largely responsible for founding it: Wilson was necessarily a party man, and had made no attempt to carry the other party with him; so the defeat of his party involved the abstention of America from the League and crippled that organisation at the outset. Russia also stood aloof; and as the effectiveness of the League’s guarantee of peace depended largely upon its universality, it started upon its career in a maimed condition, lacking the two most formidable powers in the world. The position of Russia and her large army seemed to justify her neighbours, and consequently also their neighbours, in maintaining their armaments, and therefore added to the difficulty of disarmament.

The structure of the League, like its very existence, seemed to mark the opening of a new era. Before the war, the common affairs of Europe, in so far as they were discussed at all, were handled by the ‘Concert of Europe,’ in which only the six Great Powers played a part. Now every power, great or small, not only in Europe but throughout the world, was to have a voice in the annual Assembly of the League. Its executive body, the Council, included the Great Powers as permanent members, but alongside of them were to sit representatives of the lesser powers. The dictatorship of the Great Powers was at an end.

The constitution and powers of the League were drawn up with the utmost care. Its framers had to guard against the fear that it would be a super-State, overriding the sovereign powers of the individual member-States: they made it very
plain that it was only a League of States, each one of which retained every right of sovereignty except what it voluntarily abandoned. In order to ensure this, it had to be provided that every important decision must be unanimous, since sovereign States must not be forced to do anything against their own will. Since unanimity is always difficult to obtain, this might seem to sentence the League to ineffectiveness. In truth, no new world-order could be created unless the individual States were willing to abandon something of their sovereign freedom to do exactly as they liked. To some extent they did so by the mere fact of joining the League; and every subsequent agreement, voluntarily reached, must be a further limitation of their sovereignty: if they should come to agreement on disarmament, for example, they would in fact be abandoning their freedom to create whatever armaments they liked. For this reason America refused to join the League, asserting that she would not submit her independent sovereignty to any external limitation or control, and maintaining that, whatever its advocates might say, the League would become a sort of super-State.

In actual fact, the League, as it was designed, was not a super-State, an authority set over the other States. It was merely an organised machinery of co-operation, the effectiveness of which must depend upon the willingness of its members to use it, and the way in which they used it. This should be remembered by those who charge the League with having failed to establish real peace throughout the world, or with having made very slow progress. The blame lies not with the machinery for co-operation, but with the Governments who failed to use it.

The League, in short, was necessarily an imperfect instrument for the regulation of world affairs, because all the nations were jealous of any invasion of their independent sovereignty, their freedom to do as they liked. Nevertheless its creation, and the constant consultations which it involved, showed that the statesmen of 1919 had in some degree realised the political interdependence of the world, and the fact that no country could henceforth make itself safe by its own efforts alone. But it did not occur to them to endow the League, or any other body, with any functions in the economic sphere, save the regulation of labour conditions through the International Labour Organisation. They had not yet realised that trade and monetary policy were matters of international concern, and that no nation could ever again attain prosperity by its own efforts alone.
In other words, they had not grasped the fact of the world’s economic interdependence, which is even more important than its political interdependence. Years of confusion and suffering were necessary to teach this lesson.

§ 4. The Penal Clauses.

In the eyes of many, the most important and practical part of the settlement consisted of the penal clauses, whereby punishments were inflicted upon Germany and the other defeated powers, as a warning to all potential lawbreakers. Germany and her allies were to be made incapable of waging war on the same scale again.

These punishments were justified by a clause, included in the treaty, whereby the whole guilt of the war was attributed to Germany. If the pre-war ruling caste in Germany had been less arrogant, no doubt the war could have been staved off; but the ruling caste was not the German people; it had been overthrown, and its chief, the Kaiser, was in ignominious exile. Moreover, the real ultimate cause of the war was not so much the action of any individual power as the state of military, colonial, and commercial rivalry, and the mutual fear and distrust among the nations, into which Europe had drifted during the previous generation. It was to end this state of things that a new world-order was needed; and it was a bad beginning to inspire in a great nation, which had endured terrible sufferings, and which would have to be one of the pivots of the new order, a sense of humiliation and injustice. The Germans accepted this war-guilt clause only under compulsion and after passionate protests.

It had been laid down in the treaty that the Kaiser and other German ‘war-criminals’ were to be brought to justice. This came to nothing. Holland, where the Kaiser had taken refuge, refused to surrender him. A few officers who had abused their positions in war prisons and the like were tried before German courts; but no attempt was made to punish the men who ruled Germany in 1914 and might be held responsible for the war. The real penalties were inflicted not upon individuals, but upon the German people as a whole; and they were more ferociously severe than had ever been inflicted upon any defeated enemy in modern history. The contrast between the penalties inflicted upon France in 1815, after she had kept Europe
in turmoil for twenty-two years, and those inflicted upon Germany in 1919, was all to the credit of the statesmen of 1815, who realised that France and the rest of Europe had to live together.

To begin with, the new territorial arrangements bore hardly upon all the defeated powers. As we shall see, the new map of Europe was drawn mainly upon national lines, but in all cases of doubt the balance went against the defeated powers. The national principle involved the disappearance from the map of the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires: Germany, being a consolidated national state, could not be so drastically dealt with. But German-Austria was reduced to the narrowest possible dimensions; on the plea of strategic necessity, she lost a substantial area of German-speaking Tyrol to Italy; her great capital, Vienna, which had been the commercial and administrative centre of a large empire, was left like a head without a body, cut off from the area it had served; and Austria was forbidden to seek union with Germany, though this would have been in accord with the national principle, lest Germany should be strengthened. Hungary was compelled to see a very large proportion of Hungarians or Magyars under the rule of Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. As for Germany, in the east she lost the province of West Prussia, which was transferred to Poland as a ‘corridor’ to the sea. It is true that the population of this province was largely Polish, but it had been included in Prussia almost as long as German-speaking Lorraine had been included in France, and its transfer separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany. She lost half of the rich coalfields of Silesia, also to Poland; after a plebiscite she lost the northern part of Schleswig to Denmark; and, in the west, she lost to France Lorraine with its ironfields, and Alsace with its cotton-mills, and to Belgium two small frontier districts; while for a period of years the valuable mineral area of the Saar, which was economically linked with the industrial region of the Ruhr, was cut off from Germany, and all its coal was made available for France. If many Frenchmen could have had their way, she would also have lost the Rhine provinces; and, although this plan was baffled, intrigues for the creation of an independent State in the Rhineland were fomented during the first years after the signature of the peace treaties. These losses were not enough to reduce Germany to an impotence like that of Austria and Hungary; but
they were enough to create among her people a rankling sense of injustice.

In the second place, Germany and the other enemy States were very completely disarmed. Germany was compelled to surrender her whole navy, her big guns, her aeroplanes, and great masses of lesser weapons; while her army was reduced to a maximum strength of 100,000 men. Meanwhile the new States to the east and south were allowed to arm themselves to the teeth, while France on the west retained her huge army; Germany, reduced to impotence, was surrounded by armed foes. Moreover, the western provinces of Germany were demilitarised, which means that no fortresses or troops were to be kept in them, so that they would be defenceless against attack. There were those who thought that this would be a guarantee of peace: what it did ensure was that the Germans, instead of accepting the new order, soon began to dream of vengeance. If, indeed, the other nations should carry out their solemn pledge to disarm themselves as they had disarmed Germany, all might still be well. But what if they failed to do so? Into what frenzy might not the German people be driven?

In the third place, it was decided that the defeated powers should be made to pay the whole, or as much as possible, of the cost of the war. It was soon found, however, to be impossible to exact anything from bankrupt Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria: they had rather to be helped with large loans, to save them from falling into a revolutionary chaos that might prove infectious. Nor did anybody propose to impose any reparation payments upon the new States whose citizens had fought on the German side in the war. They were not held to be responsible for the war; though indeed it might be argued that the great mass of peasants and factory workers in Germany and Austria were just as little responsible. Thus the bulk of the burden of 'reparation' was imposed upon Germany; and fantastic calculations were made by bankers and economists as to the amount that could be got out of Germany. A sum of £24,000,000,000 was actually named by responsible experts. Scarcely anybody asked how these fabulous sums could be paid. They could not be paid in gold—there was not enough gold in the world; and if they had been paid in German goods, the world would have been flooded with cheap German goods, and all the competing industries of other countries would have been
put out of action. Fortunately the treaty-makers were persuaded not to name a particular figure in the treaty: they set up a Reparation Commission, to fix the maximum that Germany could pay, and this made it possible to carry out repeated downward revisions, until in the end these payments were practically wiped out altogether (1932). In addition to these vast money payments, Germany was forced to make huge payments in kind. She had to hand over almost the whole of her mercantile marine—with the result that British shipyards were left without work to do, while German shipyards became active in replacing the lost vessels. She had to make huge free deliveries of coal to France and Italy, with the result that British miners were thrown out of work.

The penal clauses constituted the gravest blunders of the whole settlement, and they did much to cause the economic distresses from which Europe was to suffer in the following years. They were only possible because those who framed them had not realised the economic interdependence of the modern world. The spirit which they expressed was incompatible with any rational or just system of international relations. And in the meanwhile, the expectation of immense receipts, which they created in the victor countries, encouraged the Governments of these countries to undertake large expenditure at a time when they should have been putting their houses in order.

§ 5. The New Map of Europe.

There has never been, after any great war, so complete a recast of the political geography of Europe as the peacemakers of 1919 had to endorse. The break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Russia’s surrender, in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1917), of all the western provinces conquered since the time of Peter the Great, gave an opportunity of settling that part of Europe in which the national principle had never been established. Already, in the last stages of the war and the confusion which followed it, the suppressed nationalities of this region had asserted their claims. The Poles, whose lands had been disintegrated by the partitions of the eighteenth century, had seized the opportunity of reconstituting their ancient realm: the Czechs of Bohemia, subjugated by the Austrians since the seventeenth century, had proclaimed their independence, and demanded that their kindred neighbours, the Slovaks,
should be united with them. The Rumanians had seized Transylvania; the Serbs had joined forces with their race-fellows of Croatia and Slavonia, with whom they could never have hoped for union so long as the Austrian Empire survived; and the little peoples of the Russian Baltic provinces—Estonians, Livonians, and Lithuanians—had seized upon a chance of independence such as they could never have dreamed of. In effect, the treaty-makers were faced with accomplished facts. But they had to undertake the delicate and difficult task of adjusting the boundaries of these new States.

In making these adjustments, the treaty-framers were in the main guided by the principle of nationality—that is, they tried so far as possible to ensure that the inhabitants of each of the new States should be of the same stock; and they took language, which is only one of the elements in nationality, and not always the most important, as their criterion. In a few doubtful cases a plebiscite, or vote of the people concerned, was taken. Some exceptions to this principle were admitted; but only (as we have already seen) where they told to the disadvantage of the defeated powers, or to the advantage of the victors. Throughout south-eastern Europe, however, races and languages are so intermixed that it is impossible to draw any clear line of division between them. In some cases, in the Balkan peninsula, this difficulty was met by a transfer of populations, uprooted Turks, for example, being dumped in Turkish territory, and Greeks from Asia Minor transferred to Greece. But this drastic method was not generally practicable. It therefore became necessary to impose upon those countries which had large bodies of alien population a series of minority treaties whereby they were made to pledge themselves to give just treatment to the minorities. These treaties were placed under the guardianship of the League of Nations, but the League was never able to do much to enforce them: at the most it could give publicity to serious abuses.

The result of the new political arrangement of Europe was that where there had been twenty-one States, there were now twenty-six, all fully sovereign, with their national armies and their tariff walls: all aiming at military and economic self-sufficiency as essential to their sovereign independence. Some of the new tariff walls, especially in the area of the old Austrian Empire, barred old-established lines of trade. It had not occurred to the framers of the
new system to make any attempt to avoid this result, which greatly added to the economic confusion of Europe in the post-war years.

Another consequence of the territorial changes was a striking shift in the balance of power in Europe. Before the war there had been six Great Powers in Europe, each with a population of over 30,000,000—Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Austrian Empire, and Russia—and only one power of the second rank, with a population of over 10,000,000—Spain. Now the Austrian Empire had vanished and Russia had withdrawn from the European system. But there were now five Powers of the second rank—Spain, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. This meant that the supremacy of the Great Powers was far less overwhelming than it had been; and that co-operation through the League of Nations was both more necessary and (perhaps) more likely than if the old balance had been reproduced. Moreover, the fact that the political geography of Europe was now (with whatever minor defects) defined upon national lines gave some promise of more peaceful conditions for the future; for the aspirations of divided or subject nationalities had long been the most fruitful source of war, while the States that had been organised on national lines had always been the most stable.

Regarding the settlement as a whole, therefore, it may be said that while it was marked, especially in its penal clauses, by some grave defects which promised trouble in the future, and while the failure of the peace-makers to take any adequate steps towards disarmament, or to recognise the economic interdependence of the European peoples, also foreboded future trouble, there were two outstanding features that distinguished this settlement favourably from any earlier post-war settlement. The first was that territorial adjustments were mainly made in accordance with a principle—the principle of nationality—and not merely to satisfy the greed of the victors. The second was that in the League of Nations a means of organised and regular co-operation between the nations had been established. Among the functions assigned to the League was that of bringing about peaceful revisions of treaties which had ceased to represent the needs of the time; and although the possibility of doing this did not seem to be great, yet it can be said that this was the first post-war settlement in history which made some provision for rectifying its own defects.
§ 6. The Transformation of the Moslem World.

The war had brought revolutionary changes to Europe; but it brought still more revolutionary changes to the Islamic world, which had fought Christendom on equal terms from the seventh century to the eighteenth, and had since then apparently fallen into a condition of decadence and stagnation. Ever since the days of Mohammed, the most essential feature of the Islamic world was that in theory, and largely in practice, it was a theocratic unity, subject to the absolute sway of the Caliph, the successor of the Prophet. Even when the barbarian Turks from Central Asia overthrew the Arab empire, and rapidly extended their sway over almost its whole extent, this theocratic unity remained in theory: the Sultan of the Turks took the office and power of Caliph, and his religious authority was the main buttress of his power from Morocco to Persia. The Arabs of Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Syria might be disobedient; the Moslems of northern Africa—Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Libya, and Egypt—might enjoy practical independence, or submit to European rulers; the Moslems of Afghanistan, India, and Central Asia might be too remote to be under control; but they all accepted the spiritual authority of the Caliph at Constantinople. Only the Moslems of Persia, who had never recognised the orthodox Caliph but belonged to the Shiite sect, disregarded this supreme spiritual authority. The world of Islam was a unity even more fully than Latin Christendom had been a unity in the Middle Ages. Even in the days of Turkish weakness, Abdul Hamid, the massacrer of the Armenians, had tried to make play with this spiritual unity by fostering a Pan-Islamic movement; and Germany had for a moment dreamed that she might through Turkey bring the whole Moslem world under her protectorate. This subordination of national or racial to religious feeling still prevailed during the war. The portentous thing that happened after the war, and as a result of the upheaval which it caused, was that the unity of Islam was suddenly shattered by the suppression of the Caliphate and the creation of a number of nation-States, just as the unity of Latin Christendom was shattered at the end of the Middle Ages by the rise of nation-States.

The course of events by which this momentous revolution was carried out can only be baldly summarised. When the military power of the Turks had been broken in 1918 by
the campaigns of Mesopotamia and Palestine, the allies saw before them the chance of completely reorganising the derelict Turkish Empire. Their plan was that the Turk was to be excluded altogether from Europe; that Constantinople and the Straits (Dardanelles and Bosporus) were to be internationalised under the control of the League of Nations; that the western part of Asia Minor (which had been inhabited largely by Greeks since the time of Homer) was to be given, with the islands, to Greece; that the south-western part was to go to Italy, who had already, in 1911, taken Rhodes and other islands; while the south-eastern part, Cilicia, was to go to France, leaving the Turks penned into the interior of Asia Minor. Syria was claimed by France; Mesopotamia, with its great oilfields, by Britain; Palestine was to become a 'national home' for the Jews under British protection, in accordance with a pledge given in the name of Britain by Lord Balfour; and Egypt, already declared a British protectorate during the war, was to become definitely British. Only the deserts of Arabia would be left under independent Arab rule. The main features of this scheme were embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres, which the Sultan—powerless in the hands of the allies at Constantinople—was compelled to sign.

These plans were defeated, in a remarkable way, by simultaneous outbursts, not (as in the past) of religious zeal, but of national sentiment, among the Turks, among the Arabs, and among the Egyptians.

Of these risings, the most remarkable was that of the Turks, led by Mustapha Kemal, who was certainly one of the most striking figures of the post-war period. They repudiated the authority of the Sultan, and set up a republic with Mustapha as its dictatorial President and generalissimo. Though they had been almost continuously at war since 1911, the Turks burst down upon the Greeks in 1922, and drove them into the sea with great slaughter, burning the great trading city of Smyrna. France hastened to make terms with them, and withdrew her claim to Cilicia. Britain for a time hesitated; her little force at Chanak on the Dardanelles was in danger of being overwhelmed, but she, too, had to give way, and the discredit of this episode helped to bring about the fall of the powerful Lloyd George coalition in 1922. Next year, 1923, after tedious negotiations, a treaty was concluded at Lausanne, which left Turkey as an independent national State, controlling the whole of Asia Minor, and still preserving a
fothold in Europe, at Constantinople, and control over
the Straits, which were demilitarised. During the following
years, Mustapha Kemal proceeded to provide the Turkish
nation with the organisation of a western State, a parlia-
ment, a code of laws, and the rest. He moved the capital
to Angora in Asia Minor. The Latin was substituted for the
Arabic script. Even the traditional fez was prohibited.
The Caliphate itself was abolished, and the Islamic world
was left without a head. Women were emancipated from
purdah and allowed to go about unveiled. These changes
might have been expected to send a shudder throughout the
Islamic world; but they were accepted very quietly.

Meanwhile a strong national movement was at work
among the Arabs of Arabia, Mesopotamia (Iraq), and
Syria—throughout the area which had always been the
home of the Semitic peoples. The Arabs had never loved
the Turks. Under the stimulus of Colonel Lawrence and
others, they had joined the British side in the later stages
of the war. They had looked to receive as their reward
the establishment of a great Arab realm, under the headship
of the Sultan of Hedjaz, whose kingdom included the sacred
cities of Mecca and Medina, and who dreamed of becoming
the Caliph. But these hopes were destroyed by the arrange-
ments made by the allies. Though the Emir Feisal, son of the
Sultan of Hedjaz, put himself at the head of an Arab move-
ment in Syria, France insisted upon her claim to that
province. She had some sharp fighting before she suc-
cceeded in establishing her power; but she was able to play
off certain non-Arab and Christian tribes in the Lebanon
against the Arabs. A throne was found for Feisal in Iraq
(Mesopotamia) under a British protectorate, and Feisal’s
brother was provided with another State in the lands
beyond Jordan, also under a British protectorate. In
Palestine yet another British protectorate was set up to
render possible the establishment of the promised Jewish
National Home; but the Arabs of Palestine resented the
coming of these immigrants, and gave a good deal of
trouble to the British administration. All these territories
—French Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq—were
brought under the mandatory system established by the
League of Nations, of which more will be said later. Only
the great desert-land of Arabia was left wholly independent;
and here the Sultan of Hejaz, who had entertained such
grandiose ambitions, was soon to lose his throne: his
dealings with the western powers, and his desire for the Caliphate, had apparently aroused against him the hostility of the orthodox, and his realm was conquered by the more fanatical Arabs of inner Arabia.

The later fortunes of Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan will claim our attention in a subsequent chapter, as part of the story of the British Commonwealth. To that chapter must also be deferred the story of the formidable national movement in Egypt, and the revival of serious trouble in Afghanistan, both of which may be regarded as parts of the upheaval that was turning the world of Islam upside down in the years following the war. One Moslem realm has not as yet been referred to: the Persian Empire, which largely stood apart from the rest, because its people belonged to the Shiite sect. On the eve of the Great War, Persia had seemed to be doomed to partition between Russia and Britain; an agreement between the two powers as to their respective 'spheres of influence' in Persia had been the chief element in the Anglo-Russian entente of 1907. During the war Persia had seen a good deal of fighting, and British forces had carried on a romantic campaign against the Bolsheviks on the shores of the Caspian sea. Persia was rich in oil; and an Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which the British government held shares, had been formed to exploit these resources for the service of the navy and of commerce. In 1923, however, a remarkable national movement in Persia—encouraged by the reluctance of both Russians and British to undertake fresh adventures—established a new régime, and Persia, like Turkey, stood forth as an independent nation-State, and obtained membership of the League of Nations.

The outcome of all the movements which we have cursorily surveyed in the foregoing pages was that the political system of the Middle East was transformed. The spiritual unity of Islam under its Caliph had been broken. The Turkish Empire had disappeared, but the Turkish nation had shown an unexpected vitality. Just as Christendom had been broken into a series of sovereign nation-States, so the seamless garment of Islam had been torn into nine shreds, nine national States. Four of them were as yet under European protectorates—Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq—but all four aspired ultimately to secure their independence, a development which was contemplated in the mandates for these lands issued by the League of Nations. The other five—Turkey, Egypt, Arabia, Persia,
and Afghanistan—had secured, or were soon to secure, full independence; they were, in fact, much freer from European influence than any of them had been for a long time. The national spirit had spread from Europe, its birthplace, to the ancient lands of the Middle East; and none could foretell its effects.


The war had brought about a remarkable transformation in the Islamic world, which had to be recognised in the treaty settlements. Indirectly it also brought about, or accentuated, equally great changes in the ancient civilisations of the east, China and India. But the changes in these lands lay outside the purview of the treaty-makers. They (and especially the national uprising in India) will be discussed in a later chapter.

The treaty-makers were, however, more directly concerned with those parts of the non-European world in which the European powers had been so active in the creation of colonial empires during the previous generation—Africa and the Pacific Islands. Here the main change was that the whole of Germany’s colonial empire was taken from her and divided among the allies. This drastic action contrasted in a marked way with the policy pursued by Bismarck when France lay at his mercy in 1871. He had encouraged her to form colonial ambitions, as an outlet for her energy and a compensation for her defeated hopes. In 1919, on the other hand, Germany—truncated, disarmed, and loaded with impossible obligations—was deprived of any outlet for her energies in the non-European world.

The powers that profited by the destruction of the German colonial empire were Britain and the British Dominions, France, and Japan; but the British Empire took the lion’s share. Britain herself took German East Africa (now named Tanganyika)—the most valuable of the German possessions; she also took half of Togoland, and added a strip of the German Cameroons to Nigeria. South Africa obtained German South-West Africa; Australia obtained German New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago; New Zealand obtained German Samoa. To France fell the bulk of the German Cameroons, which consolidated her empire in Central Africa, together with half of Togoland. Japan took the small archipelagoes of the Northern Pacific,
except that the rich little island of Nauru was assigned to Britain.

This partition among the victors of a defeated empire was just like the partitions that had followed earlier wars. But there was one difference, a tribute to the new era. All these wide territories were to be held by their new masters not merely by right of conquest, but under mandates from the League of Nations. The same principle was applied to the European protectorates established in the territories that had formed part of the Turkish Empire. All these lands were to be under the protection of the League; and their rulers were to render regular reports on their administration to the League, showing that the conditions defined in the mandates had been fulfilled. The introduction of the system of mandates, conveying the idea that the rulers of these regions owed some responsibility to the civilised world as a whole for the way in which they used their power, embodied a new and fruitful idea, which was capable of great expansion.

The mandates were of three classes. One form of mandate referred to territories which might be expected to become independent and self-governing in course of time, and in which the primary duty of the mandatory power was to train their subjects for self-government. The lands taken from Turkey—Syria, Iraq, Palestine—fell into this category. A second form of mandate referred to lands which might be expected to be incorporated in the ruling State: South-West Africa, whose geographical position would naturally suggest its absorption in the Union of South Africa, fell into this category. The third form of mandate related to lands occupied mainly by backward peoples, who could not be expected to be ready for self-government for a long time to come. In these cases the mandatory power was put under the obligation of abolishing slavery, the traffic in arms and drugs, and other forms of ruinous exploitation; of protecting the rights of the native populations; of abstaining from the enrolment of more troops than were necessary for local police purposes; and of securing equal access to the resources of these countries for the traders of all lands.

There was a noble idea implicit in these provisions, an idea which, if it had been made universal, would genuinely have marked a new era in the relations between the civilised countries and the backward peoples. If Britain and France, now the two great colonising powers, had taken the lead,
all the colonising powers might have been persuaded to bring under the mandatory system such of their possessions as had not reached the stage of self-government. But nobody thought of so bold and drastic a step, which would have brought all the backward peoples of the world under the aegis of organised civilisation. Nor did it occur to anybody that the mandatory system would have made it safe to leave some of her colonies to Germany, since in case of abuse the mandate could have been withdrawn. Nor was it suggested that under this system other nations, besides the few which had hitherto monopolised the task, might take a share in the work of extending a common civilisation over the face of the globe. It is true that America was asked to undertake an onerous mandate for Armenia, which would have imposed upon her an obligation to protect the remnants of that slaughtered race against the Turks and the Kurds. She refused; and the Armenians were left at the mercy of their fierce neighbours.

Like other aspects of the world-settlement, the settlement of the backward peoples was imperfect, and suggested possible dangers for the future; but there were gleams in it of generous ideas about a new world-order.
CHAPTER VI
THE WORKING OF THE NEW SYSTEM

Because the whole world is now interdependent, it is impossible to understand the development of any one country without understanding in some degree the development of other countries; and, therefore, before turning to the history of Britain and the British Empire in the post-war years, it is necessary to trace in outline the complicated story of the world, and especially of Europe, during these years.

The post-war years, down to 1933, fall into three clearly marked sections. The first, from 1918 to about 1924, was a period of great political confusion, and of economic chaos, during which it often seemed as if stability and settled peace were almost unattainable. The second, from about 1924 to 1929, afforded an interval of peace, during which the new system seemed to be establishing itself, and trade was reviving all over the world. The third, beginning in 1929, was a period of economic collapse. We shall consider in the present chapter the first two of these periods, leaving the third for a later chapter.

§ 1. The World after the War.

In almost every part of the world political chaos followed the war. In China, most of the provinces were controlled by Tuchuns, or generals, constantly at war with one another; while two rival governments, in Pekin and in Canton, claimed to speak for the divided country; the Nationalists of Canton, led by Dr. Sun-yat-sen, seemed to be falling under the control of the Russian Bolsheviks, and anti-western feeling was growing to a dangerous height. In India (as we shall see later) the Hindus under Gandhi were joining forces with the Moslems, and the new system of government set up in 1919 could not be made to work. Persia was repudiating western influence; the Arabs were putting forward great claims; the Turks, led by Mustapha
Kemal, had repudiated the settlement imposed upon them by the victorious powers and won their way after remarkable victories in 1922; the Egyptians were asserting their independence with such vehemence that Britain had to abandon the protectorate she had established during the war.

In Europe the new States were establishing themselves, not without difficulty, and in great fear lest they should lose their new-won freedom and unity. In the new State of Yugoslavia, the Serbs were on bad terms with the Croats. In Czechoslovakia the Slovaks resented the supremacy of the Czechs. In Hungary there was a Bolshevik revolution for a few months in 1920, and in the next year an attempted restoration of the Habsburgs nearly brought about a renewal of war. In the enlarged Rumania, Magyars and other foreign elements were harshly treated, and the minority races in Poland complained bitterly of the treatment given them. There was conflict between Poland and Lithuania, because Poland had seized Vilna, the chief Lithuanian city. More serious, in 1920 there was war between Poland and Russia, and French aid had to be given to the Poles before their invaders could be repelled.

In all the new countries, and in most of the old ones, the war was followed by the establishment of complete democracy; and these new and untrained democracies had to tackle problems of inordinate difficulty. In most cases they adopted the method of voting, not for individuals, but for party lists; a system which accentuated party differences and increased the power of party caucuses. Everywhere the old régimes had collapsed, and the old recognised leaders had disappeared: new and untrained men had to take the reins of power.

What made the confusion worse, and brought the risk of blind revolution, was that everywhere the economic order seemed to be breaking down. In the first year after the war whole populations were only saved from starvation by vast relief organisations, financed by America, Britain, and France. The course of trade had been completely dislocated by the war; political insecurity made it very difficult to set to work again the machinery of production; and in almost every country which had been engaged in the war, the monetary system had broken down. Before the war, all the most important countries had kept their money stable in relation to that of other countries by maintaining the Gold Standard: that is, by guaranteeing that their money should always be equivalent in value to a fixed
weight of gold. During the war this had been impossible, and most governments had met their obligations by simply printing notes. But the more they printed, the less valuable their money became; and the less valuable it became, the more they had to print, in order to meet their obligations. After the war, this method was continued on an even greater scale, because of the necessity of providing for vast numbers of unemployed or starving people. And the fact that, from month to month, the value of the money of so many countries was constantly changing made trade exceedingly difficult, both within each country and, still more, between the various countries. Many governments were threatened with national bankruptcy. Of them all, Austria and Hungary seemed to be in the worst plight: they had both been reduced to tiny States, each with a huge capital city designed to serve a wide area, and they were walled in by the high tariffs which their neighbours, once their subjects, had erected against them.

§ 2. Russia, Italy, Germany.

It is impossible to survey the vicissitudes of these years in all the countries of Europe. But something must be said about the course of events in three countries, Russia, Italy, and Germany, because of their influence upon European affairs as a whole.

In Russia the Tsarist government, even before the war, had been inefficient, corrupt, and very oppressive. It had collapsed suddenly and completely in 1917; and all the old machinery of government, in every part of the country, had broken down. A very remarkable man, Lenin, with a little group of followers, who had seized power at the end of 1917, found that they must create a whole new system if total anarchy was to be avoided. They added to their difficulties by endeavouring, at one stroke, to put into operation the complete system of Marxian Socialism or Communism. They repudiated all the debts which had been created either by the Russian State or by private concerns. They confiscated all factories and all privately owned capital, while the peasants took possession of their holdings, and, in many cases, slaughtered their landlords. It became a crime to be an owner of capital; and new authorities had to be set up to take the place of the old owners, directors, and managers. A positive reign of terror
was necessary to instal this new régime: it was organised by the terrible secret police, the Cheka.

In order to be free to carry out their plans, the Bolsheviks had concluded a humiliating peace with Germany in 1917, whereby they had given up all the western regions of the Russian Empire. This had immediately released the eastern German armies for the western front; while ultimately it made possible the creation of five new States in eastern Europe. The western allies, thus deserted, were deeply alarmed by the revolutionary ideas which the Bolsheviks were putting into practice, and by their declared intention of bringing about a world-wide revolution—for which, in the existing state of Europe, many European countries might seem to be ready. They therefore declared war against the Bolshevik régime. They gave every possible support to the reactionary forces which were trying in Russia to resist the revolution; and British troops were landed on the shores of the White Sea, in Murmansk, while Japanese and American troops occupied the Pacific shore of Siberia. But this foreign intervention only strengthened the Bolsheviks—all the more so because the White Armies (as they were called, to distinguish them from the Red Army) were at once so incompetently led and so outrageously cruel that they alienated all the support they might have won.

Lenin’s chief lieutenant, Leon Trotsky, succeeded in creating for the new régime an efficient army, which easily disposed of the Whites. By the middle of 1920 all the elements of resistance had been disposed of; the western powers had realised they had better withdraw; and it had become obvious that the great Lenin and his henchmen alone had the power and resolution to save Russia from chaos.

In order to do so, they had to find some means of putting an end to the breakdown of economic life which had resulted from revolutionary changes accompanied by civil war. The driving force of the old system, which had been the desire of profit and the fear of loss by individuals, could not be suddenly removed without disastrous effects. In 1921, Russia, one of the granaries of the world, was struck by an appalling famine, because the peasants, prevented from earning profits, grew no more than would meet their own needs. Lenin, though a doctrinaire, was also a realist. While he did not abandon hope of ultimately establishing a complete Communist system, and even of extending it to the whole world, he recognised that for the present some compromise must be made with the universal habits of
mankind in all parts of the world; he recognised also that Russia must have help from the more highly developed countries if she was to be able to reconstruct her economic life. So he started what was called the New Economic Policy (1921) whereby the peasants were left free to manage their farms in their own way, private enterprise was permitted over a considerable range in domestic trade, the deadening control of headquarters' bureaucracy was relaxed, and agreements with great foreign concerns were initiated in order to enlist their co-operation in the economic reconstruction of Russia. The result was that, in the next few years, a gradual improvement took place. The western countries also began to qualify their uncompromising hostility. In 1921 trade relations were resumed between Britain and Russia, and ere long most European countries followed suit. Lenin also tightened up his political system; the chaotic control by Soviets of workers came to an end; the Trade Unions and the Co-operative Societies were brought under strict control; the terrors of the Cheka were replaced by the more intelligent tyranny of the Ogpu; and the new constitution of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, adopted in 1923, established an efficient despotism under the absolute control of a disciplined party. In a series of agreements with the frontier States, Russia accepted the boundaries defined by the war. By the year 1924, which marks the close of our first period, Russia had definitely escaped from mere chaos; and although her new régime was still regarded with profound suspicion by other countries, it seemed to have taken root; while she was beginning to re-enter the economic life of the world, and her representatives were beginning to take counsel with the representatives of other countries.

One feature of the Russian Revolution had been a contemptuous repudiation of democracy, and the substitution for it of a despotism wielded by a highly disciplined party, with the suppression of all free criticism and discussion. A similar change, used for widely different ends, was carried out during these years in Italy; and the two anti-democratic revolutions, taken together, contributed to undermine confidence in the democratic system which all the European countries had established after the war. In Italy the parliamentary system of government had not worked well. It seemed to be incapable of grappling with serious disorders which broke out immediately after the war, when bands of Communist workers had seized various factories, and
tried very unsuccessfully to run them themselves. To resist these movements, bands of young men organised themselves under the name of Fascisti, and for a time a sort of civil war raged. Benito Mussolini, an able young Socialist journalist, who had at first supported these Communist movements, joined up with the Fascisti, and, having great gifts of leadership, inspired them with the ideal of restoring the strength and virility of Italy by forcibly crushing all "unpatriotic" movements. The troubles in the factories had been brought to an end by 1921, but Italy was still unhappy, and the Government had not regained its prestige, when in October 1921 Mussolini organised a Fascist march on Rome, to seize the reins of power. He had the support, not only of the Fascist bands, but of all those who dreaded a Communist revolution. His bold stroke was successful; and during the following years he organised a Fascist dictatorship, with a sham parliamentary façade. All criticism, by speech or in the press, was suppressed. As in Russia, all independent bodies such as Trade Unions and Employers' Associations were brought under the control of the State; Parliament was reduced to a sham, and elections became little more than a farce. The Fascist system unquestionably inspired millions of young Italians with a new passion of patriotism; and this nationalist fervour rose so high that it seemed to endanger the peace of Europe. Mussolini also grappled boldly with the economic difficulties of Italy, undertook great projects of public works, and increased the efficiency of the public services. But he did this at the expense of the sacrifice of freedom, a sacrifice which in the long run leads to stagnation and decay. It was one of the defects of his system, as of all despotisms, that the government could not be changed except by a violent upheaval. By 1924 the Fascist system was well established in Italy. It was beginning to attract the admiration of many people who instinctively prefer government by dictation to government by persuasion; and it had introduced a new possible element of unrest into Europe.

It was Germany that was the real centre of the political troubles of these years. There could be no genuine peace in Europe until this great nation had accepted its new position, and taken its place in the new order. But the late allies did not make this easy. At the end of the war a real revolution had taken place in Germany: before the close of 1918, the Kaiser had abdicated and fled, the princes
of the little States had followed him into exile, and the field was clear for the construction of a democratic State. At that moment there is no doubt that the great mass of the German people had lost all faith in the old ruling class, and in the militarism which that class had upheld. There was at first, inevitably, a great deal of confusion. There were extremists who wanted to introduce the Russian system, and these had to be put down by force. But in January 1919 a Constituent Assembly was elected by universal suffrage to frame a new constitution. It met at Weimar and by August it had completed its work. The Constitution of Weimar established a genuinely democratic and Liberal system, with a responsible government controlled by the Reichstag.

Unfortunately the first task that fell to the new régime was the acceptance of the terms of peace imposed by the allies, including the 'war-guilt' clause which every German repudiated, and the intolerable burden of reparations. There was no alternative to the acceptance of the terms, for Germany was helpless and at the mercy of the allies. But the Government which accepted them was inevitably weakened and discredited in the eyes of the German people. The Germans had to look on while the German navy and mercantile marine were carried off to their enemies; they had to see the Rhineland occupied by foreign armies; they had to face the prospect of crushing burdens for an indefinite future; and it was the new democratic Republic which had accepted and submitted to all this.

The new régime was opposed from two sides, by the Communists and by the Nationalists. In 1920 there was a formidable attempt to restore the old régime, led by Dr. Kapp, an official, and supported by all the reactionary forces: it was defeated by a general strike of workers, who remained loyal to the Republic. In 1923 Adolf Hitler, who had started in Munich a new National Socialist party, joined hands with Ludendorff, the war general, in a plan to march on Berlin and overthrow the Republic; but the plan was a ludicrous failure. The mass of the German people were loyal to the Republic and to democratic institutions. How, then, did it come about that eleven years after this humiliating failure, Hitler was able to make himself master of Germany, and the old spirit of nationalism was once again rampant? The answer is to be found in the way in which Germany was treated, and the problems of settlement were handled, during these years.
§ 4. The Problems of Reparations and Debts.

It was not held to be the business of the League of Nations, but of the Supreme Council of the Allies, to carry the treaties into effect. For this purpose no less than eighteen conferences were held between the end of the Peace Conference and the conference at Genoa in 1922, which was the last of the series; the most important being the Spa Conference in 1921, which fixed the share of German reparation payments to be taken by each of the allies when (or if) Germany paid up, and the Genoa Conference in 1922, which was the nearest approach to a general conference of the whole series, and in which an attempt was made in vain to reach an agreement as to the steps which ought to be taken for the economic recovery of Europe.

A multitude of subjects were discussed in these conferences; but they were all dominated by the problem of German reparations. How much was Germany to pay, and how much could she pay? Simultaneously the Reparations Commission appointed under the peace treaties was engaged in tabulating the claims of all the allied powers, and in working out the modes in which payment should be made. In 1921 the sum was finally fixed, at a figure which was soon proved to be utterly impracticable, and the allies issued an ultimatum in which they threatened to occupy the great industrial area of the Ruhr unless before a fixed date Germany accepted the impossible obligations imposed upon her. Germany had, of course, no choice: she accepted. During the next two years she struggled to pay, and the more sincerely she struggled, the more unpopular her new Government became. At last, in 1923, France and Belgium, acting alone on their own interpretation of the treaty, occupied the Ruhr valley, and started upon the hopeless task of trying to make a bankrupt pay large sums by prodding him with bayonets.

In the course of these interminable discussions, a cleavage had been gradually appearing between two points of view. One was the point of view, strongly held in France, that the first necessity was to carry out the treaty literally, especially its penal clauses, to ensure that Germany was completely disarmed and forced to pay the costs of the war, so as to disable her from ever repeating her aggression, to which, on this view, all the miseries of the world were to be attri-
buted. This view was dominant in France until 1924, and its chief exponent was M. Poincaré. Under the influence of this view, France during these years showed an unbending attitude on reparations; she was suspicious of all German action; she formed alliances with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania to keep Germany in subjection; she was always ready to encourage movements that tended to weaken Germany, such as the spurious 'separatist' movement in the Rhineland. It was this view which led her into the Ruhr adventure in 1923—one of the turning-points in post-war history.

The other view was that the primary necessity was the economic restoration of Europe, and that reparations and all other questions ought to be considered in the light of this need. This view was gradually gaining ground in Britain during the years 1919-24. It was expressed with growing clearness by Mr. Lloyd George in the series of conferences, and especially in the Conference of Genoa in 1922, the declared object of which was the economic restoration of Europe, including Russia. British influence was increasingly though mainly exercised to moderate the claims for German reparations; because it was apparent that nothing that could be got from Germany could compensate for the dislocation of trade which this endless controversy involved. Not only did the controversy impede the restoration of confidence, which is essential for trade recovery: the Germans could only pay by means of a colossal export of their goods in excess of the imports they received, and this would involve the ruin of the export trade of other countries.

During this first period, the French view won the day over the British view. The Conference of Genoa was wrecked by the obstinacy and suspicion of M. Poincaré; and its failure was soon followed (January 1923) by the French occupation of the Ruhr, which demonstrated the unsoundness of the French view, and therefore opened a new period.

With the question of reparations was wrapped up the kindest question of inter-allied debts. During the war Britain had made vast loans to all the European allies, including France; France had made loans to other allies; and in the last two years America had made immense loans to all the allies, including Britain. If all these debts had been paid, America would have received vast sums, Britain would have received a great deal more than she
would have paid to America, and the other allies would have been heavily burdened. But it was impossible that these debts should be paid in full. The attempt to exact them would have caused all-round bankruptcy; and they could only have been paid, like German reparations, by huge exports from the debtor countries, unbalanced by imports, which would have disorganised all the trade of the world.

Realising this, Britain proposed that all these loans should be regarded as part of the lenders' contribution to the war, and should be cancelled. If this had been done, France and other countries might have been ready to make a more reasonable arrangement with Germany; but so long as these vast debts overhung them, the allies could not be expected to forgo or reduce their claims on Germany. America, however, refused to assent to cancellation. Thereupon Britain announced, in the famous Balfour Note (1921), that she would only ask her debtors to pay her such sums as would, when added to her share of German reparations, suffice to pay her debt to America: in other words, she herself would forgo all compensation in cash for her war losses. It followed that the amount which the European allies would have to pay to Britain would depend upon the amount which Britain would have to pay to America. It was hoped that the whole question of debts would be settled internationally. But in 1922, after the fall of Mr. Lloyd George's government, Mr. Stanley Baldwin went to America and accepted very onerous terms for the payment of the British debt to America—far more onerous than the terms subsequently granted by America to the other allies. The result was that France knew she would have to make heavy payments both to America and to Britain; and this stiffened her determination to get the maximum possible out of Germany.

The occupation of the Ruhr, which lasted eight months, was a disastrous failure. France did not get enough to cover the cost of the expedition. The German workers in the Ruhr refused to work; the German Government encouraged them to resist, and found the money to enable them to do so. But the result of this, combined with the disorganisation of German trade and revenue which resulted from deadlock in so great an industrial centre, and the heavy strain on German finances which had taken place during the previous years, was that German credit and the German monetary system completely collapsed. The mark, which had been 20 to the pound before the war,
was 48,000 to the pound when the Ruhr occupation began in January 1923; it was 480,000 to the pound in June; it was 480,000,000 to the pound in September. The result of this was that the savings of everybody in Germany were wiped out, unless they were invested in land or goods—tangible things that kept their value. Even a man who had £20,000 (100,000 marks) invested in Government Stocks before the war, found that his fortune at the end of 1923 was worth about the hundredth part of a halfpenny. Wages, of course, had risen as the mark fell; but it was little consolation to a man to know that he had drawn the pre-war equivalent of £10,000 as his week’s wages if, before the week was out, this was insufficient to buy a loaf of bread. The suffering caused by this great inflation was so terrible that it has left an indelible mark upon the minds of the German people. But it was not Germany only that suffered. The value of the French franc also declined alarmingly, though not in such a catastrophic way. And the currencies of almost every country in Europe had already collapsed in much the same manner. Foolish politics produced terrible results for ordinary people; and it was evident that, somehow or other, the statesmen of the world must find a way to restore stability, unless they were all to be condemned and hurled from their high places.

§ 5. The League of Nations and Disarmament.

Meanwhile, what had the League of Nations been doing? It was excluded, as we have seen, from dealing with the peace settlement; and during these years, when the Supreme Council of the Allies was still at work, it could not be the arena of the main discussions. It was working out its own machinery, setting up the International Court, and creating an admirable staff of Permanent Officials. It was able to settle one or two difficult questions, such as a dispute between Sweden and Finland about the Åland Islands, and to deal with some thorny questions referred to it by the Supreme Council, such as the partition of Silesia. Its system was put to a severe strain when in 1923 Italy seized the Greek island of Corfu because some Italian officers had been murdered in Greek territory. Could the League restrain violent action by a Great Power? The question was not answered, because the Council of Ambassadors in Paris took the matter out of the hands of the League; but
the unanimity of all the nations represented at Geneva was at least a powerful expression of world opinion.

On the main problem referred to it, that of Disarmament, the League was steadily at work, but had as yet reached no conclusions. Recognising that the nations were not likely to give up armaments until they could feel that they were safe without them, it drew up a draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which it hoped all nations would adopt; but this proposal was turned down by the British government (1923), as was a more elaborate scheme for universal compulsory arbitration under a universal guarantee, known as the Protocol, which was put forward in the following year.

The disarmament of Germany and her Allies had been carried out; the disarmament of other countries was slow to follow. Indeed, the only real progress in disarmament made during these years was due, not to the League, but to the United States, which in 1921 summoned to Washington a conference of the principal naval powers, and put before them a bold scheme for the proportionate reduction of big battleships, which was accepted. No reduction of lesser vessels—cruisers, submarines, etc.—was attempted, though they formed the most dangerous elements in modern warfare; but it was something that in one sphere at any rate a real reduction had been achieved.

The Washington Conference also led to other agreements, still more important, which promised to establish a state of secure peace in the Pacific Ocean, now one of the main centres of civilised activity. The Nine Powers interested in the Pacific agreed to forbid the erection of naval bases in the Pacific Islands. They agreed also to respect the integrity of China, and thus to leave her free to find her way to a new order. This co-operative settlement brought to an end the special alliance of Japan with Britain which had lasted since 1902: there were to be no more special alliances, but a general agreement to preserve the peace. Thus the main achievements of these years in world pacification took place outside of the League.

The League had not been endowed, by its Covenant, with any definite functions in the economic sphere, which was obviously becoming the most important aspect of international relations. Nevertheless it was in this sphere that the League’s best work was done. In 1920 it summoned an international conference at Brussels to deal especially with questions of currency; and the recommendations of this conference, adopted by nation after nation during the
following years, were largely responsible for the improved conditions of the next period. Yet more important, it undertook to deal with the disorganisation which had befallen two unhappy countries, Austria and Hungary. They could not help themselves; and no single country could help them without seeming to reduce them to dependence. In 1922 the League undertook an enquiry into the financial situation in Austria, produced a scheme of reform, and raised an international loan to enable the plan to be carried out; and in the next year it rendered the same service to Hungary. These were the first successful examples of international co-operation for the restoration of countries in a state of extreme distress. They showed that it was by the way of international co-operation that the troubles of an interdependent world could alone be healed. But the nations were slow to learn.

§ 6. A Period of Relative Peace.

The failure of the Ruhr adventure opened a better period in international relations, a period in which the ideal of the League of Nations began to come alive, and there was, for five years, a return to prosperity.

France, having learnt her lesson, agreed at the end of 1923 to the appointment of a commission of experts to decide how much Germany could pay; and the Dawes Commission (1924) reduced the claim for reparations to what seemed a practicable amount. Experience was to show that the figure was still too high; it had to be revised by another commission in 1929—the Young Commission. But these were scientific enquiries, carried out by impartial bodies, the chairmen of both being Americans. The fantastic claims of the peace treaty, and the paraphernalia of the Reparations Commission, passed into limbo.

Then the problem of inter-allied debts was tackled. America made separate agreements with each of her debtors on much more generous terms than she had given to Britain. Britain also fixed the amount to be paid by her debtors, knowing now how much she could expect from Germany, and how much she must pay to America. Time was to show that all these settlements were unsound, and that it was impossible to make these great payments between country and country without disorganising trade; but in the meanwhile the uncertainty which had overhung
the world during the previous years seemed to have gone, and this was good for the revival of trade.

Then, one by one, and quite rapidly, all the countries with disorganised currencies set their monetary systems in order, on the lines laid down by the Brussels Conference in 1920. All of them set up Central Banks to manage their monetary systems. All of them fixed their currencies to gold, in one way or another. This meant that their relative value was fixed, so that the process of trade between them was made easier; and during the next five years there was a steady and even rapid improvement in world trade. Some of them, like Germany—the first to act—practically cancelled their depreciated money altogether as being valueless, and made a fresh start. This meant that the national debts of these countries were in effect repudiated; but it also meant that the savings of the whole nation, and especially of the middle classes, were wiped out, and the provision of fresh capital for industrial purposes became very difficult. The ruined middle and professional classes of Germany henceforward afforded a recruiting ground for new revolutionary movements. Other countries, such as France and Italy, kept their old currency, but greatly reduced its old value in relation to gold: in France, for example, the franc was valued roughly at 2d. instead of at the old value of 10d. This meant that four-fifths of the national debt, and of other fixed burdens, was wiped out. Only Britain, who had never allowed her money to drop so far below its old value as other countries, resolved to restore the pound to its pre-war value in gold. On these terms she returned to the Gold Standard in 1925. We shall have to consider the consequences of this action, and of the way in which it was brought about, in the next chapter. The general establishment of the Gold Standard, and the consequent fixing of the value of the money of all countries in relation to one another, gave a great encouragement to the revival of trade.

§ 7. The Problem of Tariffs and Trade Barriers.

There was, however, one kind of obstacle to trade which was not diminished, but rather increased, during this period of improvement—the obstacle of high tariff walls, which prevented the world's abundance from flowing freely to the peoples who needed and wanted it.

These barriers were far more serious in the post-war world
than they had been before the war, and this for several reasons. During the war the industrial countries which had chiefly supplied the world’s needs had been engrossed in war work; and consequently new industries had sprung up in countries where they had not formerly existed. After the war these countries raised high tariffs to prevent their ‘infant industries’ from being destroyed by competition from the older industrial countries. Again, during the war every country had learnt that, to be safe in war time, it must be as nearly as possible self-sufficient, especially in foodstuffs and in the military industries, such as iron and steel or chemicals; they therefore set themselves to attain self-sufficiency by means of tariffs—that is to say, to make their people pay more for the products of these industries in order to keep them at work. Again, the war had created, both in Europe and in Asia, a number of new States; and they all proceeded to erect tariff walls against their neighbours. Again, after the war, as we have seen, the currencies of nearly all European countries went down in value. But when a country’s money becomes less valuable, the result is at first, and for a time, advantageous to its producers, because they have to produce fewer goods to pay for their overhead charges, which are largely fixed, and because wages always rise less rapidly than the value of money falls. The consequence was that countries with depreciated currencies obtained a temporary advantage in the world’s markets; and other countries strove to counterbalance this by increasing their tariffs. Yet again, as we have seen, the heavy obligations laid by reparations upon Germany, and by inter-allied debts upon other countries, could only be met by large exports from these countries. This was regarded with alarm by the other countries, which wanted to be paid, but did not want to be paid in the only possible way, by goods; so they raised their tariffs to prevent their debtors from paying them in this way. On the other hand, the debtor countries, having to secure a surplus of exports in order to pay their debts, thought that they must discourage imports; and tariffs seemed to be the best way of doing this. All these causes worked together to produce a tariff mania throughout the world, which gravely impeded the movement of trade, and needlessly raised the cost of living.

In 1927 the League of Nations summoned a conference at Geneva to consider this question. All important countries were represented, mainly by economic and financial experts.
They came to a unanimous agreement that the world was impoverishing itself by these devices, and that if real prosperity was to be secured, the tariff movement which had been so vigorous since the war must be reversed. But no results followed from this unanimous agreement. The nations were still bent upon self-sufficiency. They were all still convinced that they could all enrich themselves at one another's expense by shutting out one another's goods. In 1929—on the eve of the economic blizzard that was to bring the world to the verge of ruin—an attempt was made to persuade the nations to agree to a tariff truce—to promise at least that they would not raise fresh tariffs; but it was quite unsuccessful. Almost all the nations had made up their minds to pursue a policy of self-sufficiency in an interdependent world; and in tariffs, as in armaments, nationalism still had the upper hand of internationalism. In spite of this failure, however, the years from 1924 to 1929 were years of real economic revival throughout the world. They were consequently also years of political appeasement; because it is when men's livelihood is impaired that they become ready for political upheavals.

§ 8. The Strengthening of the System of Peace.

During these years the League of Nations seemed to be coming into its own. The Supreme Council of the Allies, which had dominated the situation during the preceding period, had fallen into the background; the meetings of the League Council and Assembly were regularly attended by Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries, who had hitherto stood aloof, and these meetings became the principal arena of international discussion. Still more important, the greatest source of insecurity and of danger to the peace of the world—the continued existence of ill-feeling between Germany and her neighbours—seemed to have been conjured away in these years.

In 1925, following upon the settlement of the reparations question, France, Belgium, and Germany entered into a mutual pledge, at Locarno, that they would never go to war over their long-disputed frontier, but would settle all subjects of dispute by arbitration; Britain and Italy guaranteed this agreement by undertaking to intervene against any power that broke it; similar though less binding agreements were made between Germany and the powers on her eastern
frontier; and the whole arrangement was placed under the guardianship of the League of Nations. In 1926 Germany was admitted as a member of the League: Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria had been already admitted.

The reactionary forces that had been dominant in France had fallen from power, and that 'great European,' Aristide Briand, directed the foreign policy of France through many changes of ministry. In Germany political stability seemed to have been restored after the confusion of the previous period, and the Liberal Stresemann for some years directed foreign affairs. Briand and Stresemann, with Sir Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary, continued the happy association they had begun at Locarno, and, attending every meeting of the League Council, co-operated to maintain the peace and progress of the world. Briand even adumbrated the idea of a sort of United States of Europe, which might have a common tariff system; and although nothing came of this, it was a sign that the idea of international co-operation was becoming stronger. The German payments under the Dawes Scheme were regularly made for several years, as were also the payments due from the Allies to one another and to Britain. The allied armies of occupation in the Rhineland were gradually withdrawn, in advance of the times fixed in the treaty; the last of them were withdrawn in 1930. It appeared that a real settlement was at last being reached; that Germany had regained her position among the powers by loyally accepting the new order; and that the conception of organised international co-operation was at last being given a fair trial.

Nor was this all. During these years, both before and after the Treaties of Locarno, a surprisingly large number of arbitration treaties were concluded between various powers, many of them embodying agreements to use arbitration for all purposes, with no exception for cases of 'vital interest and honour' such as had marked most pre-war arbitration treaties. Germany was among the most active of the powers in concluding treaties of this kind. Britain was almost the only Great Power which stood aloof. Moreover, nearly all the European countries signed what was known as the 'optional clause,' whereby they pledged themselves to refer to the International Tribunal at the Hague all questions capable of being decided by a judicial tribunal: Britain, in 1929, was almost the last of the powers to accept this clause. It did genuinely appear as if the world's course was fairly set towards organised peace.
What was yet more valuable, both America and Russia, the two Great Powers not included in the League, showed a growing readiness to co-operate with the League in many of its activities. Russia was signing pacts of non-aggression with her neighbours, and in 1928 she put forward a challenging if impracticable demand for the simultaneous total disarmament of all nations. In the same year, in response to a proposal put forward by Briand, the United States, through her Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg, invited all countries to sign an agreement which became known as the Pact of Paris or the Kellogg Pact, whereby they were to pledge themselves never to use war as an instrument of policy; and every power in the world accepted this undertaking. Unfortunately 'defensive wars' were excluded from the scope of the agreement, and almost every war has been described as defensive by the countries engaged in it; in Germany's eyes the war of 1914 was a 'defensive' war. Unfortunately, also, no machinery was provided or even suggested for restraining or punishing any power which might break the agreement; and for that reason the Pact of Paris did little to increase the sense of security throughout the world which was necessary to persuade the nations to disarm. Nevertheless the world-wide acceptance of this agreement was, at the least, a sign that the peoples of the earth wanted peace.


But the progress made during these years towards a more settled order rested upon insecure foundations.

In the first place, despite the increased prestige of the League, and the apparent zeal of all the nations for peace, no progress was made in disarmament, which meant that the nations had not yet learnt to trust the collective system for the preservation of their rights. In 1924 an ambitious project, known as the Protocol, for making the Covenant water-tight against war, ensuring arbitration in all disputes, defining aggression, and guaranteeing joint action against the aggressor, was enthusiastically adopted by the Assembly of the League. But, like the Treaty of Mutual Assistance in the previous year, it was turned down by Britain, who—apart from all other objections—was unwilling to accept the obligations of this plan so long as two Great Powers, America and Russia, remained outside it. Since sweeping plans of this sort were impracticable, it remained only to attempt to
bring about disarmament by negotiation; and experience showed that whenever the experts tried to agree on proportional disarmament, each country always had special reasons for maintaining this or that type of armaments, and none of the others would lag behind it: disarmament discussions were apt to turn into armament discussions.

In 1927 a naval conference was held at Geneva, in the hope of extending to the lesser types of warships restrictions like those which had been imposed at Washington on big battleships. The conference was a failure; no agreement could be reached. In 1928 a Preparatory Commission on Disarmament was appointed by the League to prepare a programme of action for a big international Disarmament Conference, which did not meet until 1932. Ten years after the conclusion of the war, nine years after the signature of the treaties in which a solemn pledge had been given to Germany and her allies that their disarmament should be followed by the disarmament of the rest of the world, the nations were still only beginning to talk about the subject. Germany, now readmitted to the world society, still lay defenceless within a ring of powers armed to the teeth. If they did not soon disarm, it would be impossible to prevent Germany from rearming; and the longer this state of things continued, the greater became the danger of reaction in Germany, and of the overthrow of the pacific and democratic system which had been maintained through the troubles of the previous years.

Equally perturbing was the failure of the attempt made in 1927 to bring about a general reduction of tariffs, to which we have already referred. Economic disarmament was as necessary as military disarmament for the creation of a peaceful and prosperous world. The working of the tariff system was, indeed, endangering the settlement of reparations, debts, and currencies, which was the chief cause of increased prosperity.

Although the instalments of German reparations under the Dawes Scheme, and the payments of inter-allied debts which largely depended upon them, were being regularly made during these years, the payments were very insecure. The debtor countries could not pay in the natural way, by exporting their products to the creditor countries, because they were prevented by high tariffs: in 1922 America had greatly increased her tariffs, and other countries had done the same thing. The debts had to be paid either in gold or in the money of the creditor countries. There was
consequently a tendency for the world’s gold to be drawn into the coffers of the creditor countries. This drift had not yet assumed alarming proportions, because America, enjoying a period of economic prosperity, had been pouring capital into Germany and other countries. Indirectly, and in effect, the German reparations payments, and therefore also the allied debt payments, were mainly made with American capital. If this should stop—and it stopped in 1929—the whole system was likely to crash. And this was true equally of the restored currencies of Europe. They depended upon gold; they could only be maintained if each country had an adequate stock of gold; they must break down if the gold was drained away by the refusal of the creditor countries, through the imposition of high tariffs, to accept payment in goods.

Thus the improvement in international relations and in world trade, which marked the years 1924-29, was precarious, and rested upon insecure foundations. The world had still to pass through a profound economic crisis, as severe in its way as the political crisis of the war, before it would learn—if even this experience could teach it—what were the conditions upon which life could be made safe and pleasant for the peoples of an interdependent world. That testing crisis will be discussed in a later chapter.
CHAPTER VII

BRITAIN AFTER THE WAR

1. Effects of the War upon the British People.

The Great War brought about great changes in the life of the British people—in their trade and their ways of living, in the distribution of wealth among the various classes of the population, in their social conditions, in their institutions, and in their ideas and aspirations. These changes were among the problems with which Governments had to deal after the war, not always understanding them; and therefore we must begin by getting some general ideas about them before we turn to describe the work of successive governments.

First we must consider the cost of the war, in manhood and in wealth. Nearly a million men were killed, in the prime of their manhood; and under the system of voluntary enlistment, the best went first and were sacrificed in disproportionate numbers. Many hundreds of thousands returned physically or mentally disabled, incapable of playing their proper part in the life of their country, and condemned to be burdens upon society. Even those who came back sound had spent in unnatural conditions the years in which they ought to have been finding their niches in life, and had great difficulty in establishing themselves—especially as a period of trade collapse soon followed the end of the war. Nobody can measure how much Britain, like other countries, lost in this way during the next generation. The natural leaders of the nation, in every aspect of its life, had been destroyed before their time; and the functions of leadership had to be too much left to older men who had been above military age when the war came.

As for the loss of wealth, Britain had had to bear a great part of the financial burden of her allies as well as her own. To a greater extent than any other belligerent State she had striven to meet this burden by taxation rather than by borrowing, and this meant that the level of taxation was
extremely high—higher, per head of the population, than in any other country. But she had also had to borrow, on a colossal scale, both from her own people and from America, and she had thrown into the war furnace a great part of the foreign investments of her people, from which she had derived a great part of her national income. At the end of the war, she found herself staggering under a debt of £7,000,000,000, the interest of which would have to be paid indefinitely, and taken out of what the people earned: this was bound to be a crippling burden on the industry of the country.

During the war, and for a short time after it, this burden was not much felt. Money had to be poured out like water in war time, and therefore it was plentiful. But this plentiful supply of money did not mean that the people were creating abundant wealth: most of the things they made were made only to be destroyed. Plentiful money meant high prices, because when money is more abundant than goods, more money has to be paid for a given amount of goods. The plentiful money was not being earned by the creation of wealth; it was being got by mortgaging the future, a process which could not go on long. Because prices were high, the government had to borrow more money to pay for the things it needed; and because it had to borrow so much, it was compelled to pay high rates of interest. But because prices were high, the people who received this interest were not able to buy more goods than they could have bought in normal times with lower interest. When prices went down, however (as they did rapidly after 1920), this did not reduce the burden of the debt—it increased it; for the government had to pay the same amount in interest as before, having contracted to do so; but the producers of goods, from whom the money had to be taken, had to make more goods in order to get the same amount of money with which to pay their taxes. The more prices fell, therefore, the heavier became the burden of the national debt, and the more severe became the burden on industry. Ordinary people did not readily see this; and when the bad times came, after this lavish spending of borrowed money, they were inclined to say ‘We could afford to spend money freely in time of war: why cannot we spend it as freely to make people happy in time of peace?’ This very common attitude made the process of getting back to normal and healthy conditions far more difficult.
In Britain, more than in any other country, the main burden of taxation was imposed upon the rich. This had some important consequences. In particular, many of the owners of large landed estates found it impossible to keep up their estates, and this caused a decline of agriculture. Many were forced to sell their land, which was bought by the farmers; but in order to do so the farmers often had to use up their capital, which was needed for working the land, and to mortgage the land; and that also led to bad farming. The decrease and impoverishment of large landowners, and the closing of great country houses, or the use of them for schools and other purposes, were among the most striking social changes brought about by the war. Farming had received a forced encouragement during the last years of the war, because of the shortage of food; but there was a rapid collapse after the war.

The war had compelled an enormous development of certain industries needed for war purposes, such as iron and steel, engineering, shipbuilding, and chemicals. These were over-developed, while other industries were neglected. It was exceedingly difficult to divert labour from these industries into others, when peace came; and it was in them that unemployment was greatest in the post-war years. The great export trade whereby Britain lives had almost been brought to a standstill during the war, because all workers not needed for war work were in the trenches, and all the shipping was needed for the transport of troops and of food and munitions for ourselves and our allies. Consequently the countries to whom we used to sell our goods had either begun to produce them themselves (and they went on doing so under the shelter of tariffs) or had bought them from other countries, such as America and Japan. During the fifteen years following the war, Britain was never able to regain more than four-fifths of her pre-war export trade. Even of this, a large proportion was in new industries such as electrical appliances and motor-cars: the old staple export trades of cotton, coal, woollens, iron and steel, were very hard hit, and suffered terribly from unemployment.

Again, during the war some of the great industries had been brought under the direct control of government, the most outstanding instances being shipping (because all the ships were needed for war purposes), railways (because war needs dominated the transport both of goods and people), and coal-mining (because coal had to be produced
both for ourselves and our allies, the French and Belgian coal mines being in the possession of the Germans). These industries had not been worked, and could not be worked, on the basis of paying their way: the sole object had been to get from them the maximum production, or the maximum service, irrespective of cost. They now had to be brought back into normal conditions, and made to pay their way when there was no longer the exceptional demand of wartime. The change was an exceedingly difficult one, and led to very serious disputes, because the war-time rates of wages could not be paid in the new conditions; and this difficulty was greatly increased by the fact that oil and electric power were rapidly taking the place of coal, and that motor transport was seriously competing with the railways. Many Socialists thought that the State ought to have kept control of these industries, and attributed the difficulties that followed to the failure to do this; but the problem of getting these industries on to a self-supporting basis would have been just as great if the State had retained control.

It is clear, then, that Britain was faced by enormous difficulties in the post-war period, and that her rulers and industrial leaders would have to grapple with problems such as their predecessors had never known. And these problems were made all the more difficult because the people were expecting to have greatly improved conditions secured to them. The standard of living among working people had been remarkably bettered during the war, in spite of the hardships sometimes caused by the shortage of food, which had been strictly rationed, so that the rich were generally no better fed than the poor. The men who were kept at home to make munitions, etc., had enjoyed very high wage rates, because no stoppage could be allowed. And although the men in the trenches received a mere pittance, their wives and families had generous separation allowances, and the women could earn high wages. The consequence was that the people as a whole were better fed and better clothed and generally better off during the war than they had ever been. They had learnt a new standard of living, and they expected it to be maintained. This represented a real advance; but it was very difficult to maintain it.

Moreover the enrolment of men for military service had shown that a terribly high proportion of British manhood was physically unfit, owing to the conditions in which they
had been forced to live in our industrial civilisation; and everybody agreed that this must be mended. The worst of these conditions were due to slums and bad housing; but while the food and clothing of the people had improved during the war, the provision of housing had gravely deteriorated, because the building of houses had practically stopped, even the annual provision to replace worn-out houses having fallen short, not to speak of the erection of new ones to meet the growing population. When the men came home from the 'front' to take up life again in the land for which they had sacrificed so much, this shortage of houses was bound to be very serious, and there was a danger that the owners of existing houses would seize the opportunity to demand exorbitant rents. This danger was met by a Rent Restriction Act, forbidding increase of rents. The housing problem could not but be exceedingly serious after the war: not only had a great deficiency to be met, but a higher standard of housing than that which had produced so many 'C3' soldiers must be aimed at. And this at a time when the prices of all building materials were so high that it was impossible to build a decent house to let at a rent which the workman could afford; and when, also, there was a great shortage of building workers, because the trade had not been recruited during the war.

The war had torn millions of men of every type out of the ordinary routine of life, and thrown them together in the intimacy of the camp and the trenches, in many distant countries. This could not but shake the habit of taking things for granted. It could not but cause a ferment of crude ideas about the monstrosity of war, the wrongness of the system that made it possible, and the unfairness of many aspects of our social life: it could not but give birth, among the best men, to dreams of a state of society from which war and injustice would be banished, and in which everybody would get a 'square deal.' At the same time these millions of men had been accustomed to the use of force as the means of attaining desirable ends, and had learned to value life at a low price. This might have serious consequences.

Moreover the womanhood of the country had been drawn out of their accustomed ways of life. They had worked in thousands on the land and in the munitions' factories and as clerks in banks and offices, taking the place of the absent men; they had nursed in war hospitals, and driven motor-cars at home and behind the trenches. With-
out them, the war could not have been carried on. They had been emancipated from the old conventions, had enjoyed a new freedom, and played an equal part alongside of their brothers. The emancipation of women was, indeed, one of the most remarkable social consequences of the war.

It had its inevitable result in their political emancipation, for which they had long agitated in vain. In an Act of 1918, passed just before the end of the war, women received the vote, not yet on equal terms with men—that did not come until 1928—but on a large scale. At the same time the method of getting the vote was simplified for men also. When the war ended, therefore, the control of the destinies of Britain was in the hands of democracy in a fuller sense than ever before: every man over twenty-one, and a large proportion of women, had a share of ultimate control.

At the end of the war a formidable new party organisation had made its appearance, and was ready to offer to the vague fermenting hopes and aspirations of the time a plan for a better social order. The Labour Party had indeed been in existence since 1900, but it had not yet counted for much. In November 1918, at the moment when the war ended, it adopted a new constitution, invited the enrolment of members on a new basis, and pledged itself to a reorganisation of the whole social system by the nationalisation of all the means of production, distribution and exchange. The commitment of the party to the complete programme of Socialism, and to the immense upheaval and revolution which this would involve, was a new thing. At the same time there was issued a vague but glowing pamphlet, called 'Labour and the New Social Order,' which drew a roseate picture of the better world which, by the application of its formula, the Labour Party hoped to create.

The main strength of the Labour Party came from its close association with the Trade Unions; and during, and just after, the war the Trade Unions had received an immense accession of strength. Their numbers, which were not much more than 2,000,000 on the eve of the war, rose to 5,250,000 in 1919 and 6,500,000 in 1920, or about one-third of the total wage-earning population. The leaders of these powerful and disciplined organisations were very conscious of their power, and much depended upon whether they were prepared to co-operate with the employers in facing the problems of the time, or whether they intended
to engage in war against 'the capitalist system.' They believed that they could bring the economic life of the nation to a standstill if need be, and that this gave them the power to dictate terms. In the years after the war, they were tempted to use this power to obtain their ends, instead of waiting for the tardy results of political action through Parliament. Industrial strife therefore became more acute in the years 1919 to 1926 than it had ever been before; and this seriously added to the difficulty of bringing about a rapid restoration of the nation's normal life.

With the disorganisation of the country's trade system and means of livelihood which the war had caused; with the immense burden of debt and taxes crippling industry; with the higher standards of living that had been attained during the war, and the large expectations which men and women had formed, the leaders of the new democracy which came into power at the end of the war had no easy task to perform.

§ 2. The Coalition Government.

The government which led Britain through the last stages of the war was a coalition under Mr. Lloyd George, a man of ebullient energy and of infinite courage and resource, who had held office continuously since 1905, and had supplied the driving force for the great schemes of social reform carried through in the years before the war. Once hated by all Conservatives as a sort of demon of destruction, he was now their idol, and indeed the idol of the greater part of the nation, as the Man who Won the War. His government was partly Liberal and partly Conservative; it had also included Labour members, but these were withdrawn when the war ended in order that the Labour Party should be free to pursue its own aims. A section of the Liberal Party in Parliament, led by Mr. Asquith, and a majority of the Liberals in the country, were very critical of Mr. Lloyd George and his policy.

Even while the war raged, the government had looked forward to the work of reconstruction which would be necessary when it ended. It had passed the Franchise Act, to which reference has already been made; it had passed a great Education Act, the work of Mr. H. A. L. Fisher as Minister of Education, but this was never fully carried into effect because of the period of bad trade which began in 1920. It had made plans for the systematic encouragement
of agriculture, which also had to be scrapped when the bad times began. It had set up a commission under Lord Haldane to plan a more efficient governing machine. It had created a temporary Ministry of Reconstruction, which poured forth plans of reform.

The Parliament which was sitting when the war came to an end had been elected in 1910; its term had been prolonged to avoid a general election during the war, and it could fairly be said that this Parliament could not represent or express the new outlook which the war had created. The government therefore decided that a general election, under the new franchise, must take place immediately, in order that it might have a fresh 'mandate' for the conclusion of peace and the work of reconstruction. Unfortunately, in the heat of the election, the Prime Minister was tempted to make promises which were very dangerous, and which hampered him later both at home and abroad. Unfortunately also he was led to use his immense prestige for the purpose of destroying those who had criticised him, with the result that both the Labour and the Independent Liberal parties were gravely weakened, and their most responsible leaders, notably Mr. Asquith, were excluded from Parliament. The election gave the government an overwhelming parliamentary majority of nearly four to one, predominantly Conservative; and this, combined with the absence of competent critics, gave dictatorial powers to Mr. Lloyd George and his colleagues—they could do what they liked. But the parliamentary result did not correspond with the balance of opinion in the country, for little more than half of the votes cast were given to the government. The result was that the more impatient advocates of change, feeling that they were not represented in Parliament, were tempted to resort to non-parliamentary methods of getting their way.

The Prime Minister was necessarily engrossed mainly in international problems—first in the Peace Conference, and then in the eighteen conferences which took place between 1920 and 1922, in all of which he was a dominating figure: for a time he was almost the dictator of Europe, as well as of England. But he found time and energy also for the enormous range of reconstructive measures which this government undertook; its work mainly bore the impress of his bold, eager, and experimental temperament.

Several new ministries were created to take charge of various branches of the work of reconstruction. A Ministry
of Health (replacing the old Local Government Board) was made responsible for the health of the nation, and in particular for carrying out a great housing scheme. Its plans involved a new standard of comfort and decency in working-class houses; but they were so expensive that they had to be drastically cut down when the bad times came, in 1921. A Ministry of Transport was created to reorganise the railway system, now withdrawn from government control, and to plan and create a system of national roads suitable for the age of motors. The railways were amalgamated into four great groups; and during the following years the road system of Britain was transformed, largely by the use of the Road Fund drawn from the special taxation of motors.

To bring about effective co-operation between employers and their workers was one of the main aims of the constructive work of these years, and a Ministry of Labour was created largely for this purpose. In 1919 a great conference of employers and workers was called, to initiate the era of co-operation; it passed resolutions, but achieved little. In the same year an Industrial Court was established, to provide means for settling disputes by arbitration. For some years the Ministry of Labour was very active in urging the various trades to organise themselves in Joint Industrial Councils, along the lines suggested by the Whitley Commission, appointed by Mr. Asquith in 1916; and in unorganised trades, a large number of Trade Boards was established to fix minimum wage rates by agreement. In 1921, when the slump in trade brought a sudden increase in the number of the unemployed, the system of Unemployment Insurance (originally designed for a few trades only) was extended to cover practically the whole range of industry; and, since the war had made it impossible for multitudes of men to contribute the premiums which would be necessary for a strict insurance scheme, these men were provided for by a system of 'unavowed benefit'—which was really unemployment relief, and not insurance at all. The scheme was administered by the Ministry of Labour through the Labour Exchanges which had been set up all over the country. A hastily improvised scheme of this kind could not but suffer from defects; and successive governments struggled with this problem without ever dealing with it in a clear and coherent way. But it unquestionably diminished very greatly the hardships which bad trade inflicted: it may even have saved the country from revolution.
§ 3. Industrial Unrest.

All these well-meant plans, however, did not avail to avert industrial strife. There were incessant disputes, because after the good times which workers had enjoyed during the war, it was hard for them to reconcile themselves to the lean times of peace; and also because the Trade Unions were so conscious of their power that they thought they could dictate their own terms, and force up wages even when trade was shrinking. The number of working days (and wages) lost through industrial disputes during the seven years after the war was four times as great as the number lost in the seven years before the war, though that had been a time of unprecedented strife.

Unrest was greatest among the railwaymen, the transport workers and the miners, perhaps because they felt that the nation would not tolerate a stoppage in these services. In 1919 there was a brief general stoppage on the railways. It lasted only a few days; it was brought to an end through the intervention of the Prime Minister, by an agreement which conceded to the railwaymen a full recognition of their Unions by the Companies, an elaborate system of joint discussion of wages and other conditions being established by Act of Parliament. The miners, in the same year, resenting the abandonment of State control over the mines, demanded a reduction of hours, an increase of wages, and the nationalisation of the mines. The Government appointed a Royal Commission, under Mr. Justice Sankey, to consider the subject; and when it reported in favour of a seven-hour day and an increase of wages, enforced these concessions by an Act of Parliament. On the question of nationalisation the commission later presented four conflicting reports, two of which (supported by a majority of one) recommended some form of nationalisation. The government refused to act on this; but it offered to acquire all mineral rights and mining royalties on behalf of the State, and it passed a Mines Act which would (if both sides had agreed to work it) have established an elaborate system of joint consultation in every pit, in each area, and in the country as a whole. The mineowners were willing to work this scheme; the miners' leaders refused to accept it, being satisfied that they could impose their own will upon the nation.

In 1919 they had formed a Triple Alliance with the railwaymen and the transport workers, whereby these power-
ful organisations promised one another mutual support. A simultaneous stoppage in these three industries would have brought the whole economic life of the nation to a standstill. In 1920 the use of this weapon was threatened for political purposes, as a means of forcing the government to change its policy in regard to Russia, but nothing came of the threat. In 1921 the miners, angered at the refusal of the government to nationalise the mines, brought about a general stoppage throughout the coal industry, and applied to the other two unions for joint action under the terms of their alliance. The other unions refused, and the nation was saved from the menace of a general forced cessation of all industrial activity; but the fear of such a crisis continued to hang over their heads until 1926. The miners' strike went on; it was obstinate and prolonged, inflicted great hardships upon the miners themselves, and caused terrible losses to all the coal-using industries at a critical time. In the end the miners had to accept substantial defeat, and to be content with a new basis for settling wages. They were now ready to work the Mines' Act; but the mine-owners refused. The settlement of 1921 brought no solution for the coal problem, which was one of the most difficult of the post-war period. But it showed that one element in the community could not dictate to the rest; and, unhappily, it also showed that friendly cooperation between employers and workers was still unattained.

§ 4. The Irish Problem.

The coalition government, because it was a coalition, found it possible to dispose of certain old subjects of controversy. One of these was the disestablishment of the Welsh Church, which had been passed before the war, but held up. With some modifications to meet the objections of Conservatives, it was now carried into effect. The Anglican Church in Wales has been more vigorous since it lost its privileged position than ever it had been before.

Another ancient subject of controversy which at last received a solution was that of Irish self-government, on which bitter conflict had raged since 1886. The solution reached in 1922 was far more sweeping than the proposals of Gladstone, which would have satisfied Ireland forty years before; and it was only reached as the result of bitter strife, which might have been avoided.
A Home Rule Bill had been adopted on the eve of the war, but it had been held in suspense. This disappointment of Irish hopes had made it impossible to obtain from Ireland anything like the support which came from other parts of the British Commonwealth during the war; and the Irish Nationalist Party, led by Redmond, lost support in Ireland precisely because they warmly espoused the British cause in the war, and because they were regarded in Ireland as having allowed themselves to be tricked. Popular support rapidly passed from them to the Sinn Fein party, whose aim was to sever Ireland wholly from Britain, and to develop its independent civilisation. At Easter, 1916, at a critical period of the war, there was an overt rebellion in Dublin, just as there had been Irish risings during the Napoleonic war, the wars against Louis XIV., and the Elizabethan war against Spain. The rebellion was suppressed; but the Sinn Fein movement spread all the more rapidly because of its suppression.

The sweep of Irish opinion was shown in the election of 1918, when the Irish Nationalist Party was practically extinguished, and Sinn Feiners were elected in their place. But the Sinn Feiners refused to take their seats. They repudiated the British connection altogether; the machinery of government in Ireland rapidly broke down. A sort of irregular civil war began, in which there were no pitched battles or formal fighting; the Sinn Fein leaders, backed by public opinion, simply disregarded British authority and set up authorities of their own. They committed many atrocious acts of murder and arson against those who remained loyal to the British connection. The coalition government tried two methods of dealing with this difficult situation. In the first place, it passed an Irish Government Act, establishing two Parliaments, one for the Protestant counties of Ulster, the other for the rest of Ireland, with machinery for co-operation, and for ultimate union by agreement. But the Sinn Feiners would have nothing to do with it. They declared Ireland a Republic, and set up their own Parliament, known as the Dail Eireann; and the irregular civil war became more intense. To deal with it, the government recruited a special force from among the demobilised soldiers, known from their uniforms as the Black-and-Tans, who met guerilla with guerilla, and outrage with outrage. But there was no solution on these lines; and the spectacle of the British Government encouraging these methods alienated opinion in Britain.
At length, in 1921, the Prime Minister persuaded some of the most successful of the Irish guerilla leaders, notably Michael Collins (who had become a popular hero) and Arthur Griffith, the originator of Sinn Fein, to meet him during his holiday in the Highlands, and talked out with them a plan whereby Southern Ireland was to have the reality of independence under the forms of Dominion Status—a plan which went far beyond anything that Gladstone had ever proposed. On these lines, after long discussions in which the Conservative leaders shared, a draft treaty was drawn up, which had to be ratified both by the British Parliament and by Dail Eireann. A formidable party in Ireland, however, under the leadership of Eamon de Valera, would not accept even these generous terms; and a fresh civil war, in the course of which Michael Collins was killed, raged for some time in Ireland. The treaty was not formally ratified until 1924; one of its provisions being that the Irish farmers should continue to pay their instalments of the money that had been advanced to them by the British Treasury to enable them to buy out their landlords. The new Irish constitution, drawn up by the Irish themselves, fortunately included provisions whereby, under a system of proportional representation, the recalcitrants would be represented according to their voting strength. This persuaded them to play their part in the new system; and during the following years, under the guidance of President Cosgrave, Ireland seemed to be settling down, and friendly relations with the neighbouring island seemed to be growing up, in spite of the fact that Ireland now had—and used—the power of raising tariffs against British imports.

Such were the results of the long delay in agreeing to the reasonable demand of the Irish for the right of managing their own affairs.

§ 5. A Period of Political Confusion.

The coalition had lived a strenuous life, and made many mistakes, but at least it had tackled great problems of reconstruction with a good deal of courage.

In 1922, however, the Conservatives, who formed the great majority of the supporters of the government, decided to withdraw their support from it. They felt that the government was too much dominated by the Prime Minister with his radical ideas; and it was losing popularity. Bad trade and unemployment were part of the cause of its un-
popularity; the failure of the adventure in Asia Minor, when the Turks drove the Greeks into the sea, did it grave harm; the conduct of the Black-and-Tans had disgusted liberal-minded people; while the concession of an extreme form of Home Rule to Ireland was a bitter pill for Conservatives.

So the coalition fell, and Mr. Bonar Law, the Conservative leader, became Prime Minister. Mr. Bonar Law appealed to the country for a period of tranquillity; he hoped that if there was no more government meddling, and if the Trade Union leaders would be less aggressive, things would come right of themselves. In the general election of 1922, the Conservatives obtained a substantial parliamentary majority over all parties, though they only obtained 38 per cent. of the votes; the Labour Party substantially increased its strength; and the Liberals, now divided into two bitterly opposed groups, numbered only 117 all told. The attempt at national reconstruction came to an end. The only important events of this government were the French occupation of the Ruhr, which further disorganised European trade, though for the moment it improved the British export of coal; and the settlement of the British debt to America by Mr. Stanley Baldwin, on very onerous terms, which so deeply perturbed the Prime Minister that he thought of repudiating the agreement. But Mr. Bonar Law was a very sick man, unfit for the cares of office. With death before him, he had to retire; and Mr. Baldwin took his place.

Mr. Baldwin had convinced himself that the supreme issue of the time was the state of British trade, and the volume of unemployment. He had convinced himself that the only remedy for these ills was the adoption of a protectionist system, from which he was debarred by a pledge given by Mr. Bonar Law at the previous election. He therefore precipitated another election, on this issue.

In the election of 1923 the country showed that it was still loyal to Free Trade. The Conservatives obtained 38 per cent. of the votes cast, as they had done in 1922; but instead of getting a parliamentary majority of 100, they found themselves in a minority of 70. They were still the largest single party; the Labour Party came second with 191 members; the Liberal Party, now reunited, had 158. But, having appealed for a majority for protection and been refused it, the Conservatives went out of office on a vote of no confidence; and Mr. Ramsay
MacDonald as leader of the second largest party became Prime Minister of the first Labour Government. The Liberals gave general but critical support to this government, on the principle that the King's government should always be supported until it did wrong.

This government, which lasted for less than a year, had as little to propose of a constructive kind as its predecessor. It had claimed in the election that it had a 'positive remedy' for unemployment, but it had no proposals to lay before Parliament on this subject. Its only important measures were an increase of the navy, which was supported by the Conservatives, and an increase of the subsidies for working-class houses, which was supported by the Liberals. It had no clear majority; and this was given as a reason for not making any constructive proposals. In the sphere of foreign politics Mr. MacDonald did useful service in facilitating the adoption of the Dawes Report on German reparations, and thus helping to initiate the better spirit in international relations which (as we have seen) marked the years 1924-29. It was also proposed to make a large loan to Russia. This would have been defeated; but the Government chose rather to accept defeat upon a minor issue. The Prime Minister then claimed, and was granted, a dissolution; but it was a new, and not a good, precedent that a dissolution should take place before it had been proved that no alternative government could be formed without one.

The election of 1924 was the third within two years. The people were tired of these incessant appeals and of the failure to press forward with constructive work at a time when it was sorely needed. During the election contest a letter was published which purported to come from a Russian Communist leader, and which urged methods whereby the Communist revolution could be forwarded in Britain. This strengthened the already inevitable reaction; and the Conservative poll increased from 38 per cent. to 49 per cent. of the votes cast. The Conservatives were still in a minority in the country; but in Parliament they obtained a majority of two to one; and, being assured of the steady support of the House of Lords, were free to carry out unchecked their policy for the restoration of the country's prosperity. The Labour Party retained 150 members; the Liberal party was almost destroyed, being held responsible on the one hand for supporting Labour, and on the other for defeating it.

The Baldwin government of 1924-29 held office during a period when confidence was returning, and trade was reviving, in Europe. It helped this revival by the part which it played in the Locarno treaties (see above, p. 833), and by its co-operation in the policy of reconciliation which Briand and Stresemann were pursuing at Geneva. But while world trade was improving, Britain had little share in the revival. Her great staple export trades were still suffering acutely: in particular, the coal trade, the foundation of British industry, was in a very distressed condition: mines were closing down in great numbers, and the unemployment figures in that industry reached terrible dimensions. The gross figures for unemployment remained steadily about 1,000,000.

The government made no attempt to deal directly with unemployment. It refused to embark on any large programme of public works, such as France and Italy were carrying out with good effect; save that a good deal of work was being done on the roads, under the schemes worked out by the coalition. Nor did it attempt to devise any plans for the reorganisation of the coal industry; it allowed the coal problem to reach a crisis before it took any action. It trusted in the main to three means of restoring prosperity: (1) economy—the reduction of public expenditure in order to reduce the burden of taxation; (2) monetary stabilisation; and (3) the stimulation of selected industries by protection or subsidies.

As for economy, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Winston Churchill, had announced his intention of reducing expenditure by a progressive £10,000,000 a year. This promise was never fulfilled; the expenditure of the State at the end of this government's period of office was much greater than at the beginning. This was due to several causes. The General Strike and the coal stoppage of 1926 put a very severe strain upon the exchequer. The high figures for unemployment involved heavy expenditure on relief, much of which was met by borrowing, and no serious attempt was made to put the finances of the unemployment insurance scheme on a sound footing. Moreover, some of the government's main measures involved very heavy new expenditure. Its first important Act was the establishment of a system of pensions for widows and
orphans, and the grant of old age pensions at 65 to all subscribers to health insurance. This was a valuable addition to the system of social insurance; but it imposed a new and heavy burden upon the Exchequer. Many millions were spent upon subsidies for the home production of sugar from beet, in competition with the cane sugar of the tropics: under this scheme the taxpayer paid as much, for every pound of sugar produced, as the purchaser paid over the counter. Again, in its last year the government carried a far-reaching scheme for the relief of industry and agriculture from the burden of rates: industrial concerns were exempted from three-quarters of their rates, and agricultural land from the whole, while the local authorities which levied the rates were compensated by grants from the Treasury, amounting to more than £30,000,000 a year. A real relief was thus given to industry, at the expense of the taxpayer; but unfortunately a large proportion of the money went to prosperous concerns in low-rated areas, and the scheme did nothing to encourage the starting of new industries in the hardest-hit areas, where there were derelict factories and thousands of unemployed workers. It cannot therefore be said that this government achieved much in the sphere of economy.

The government was right in thinking that monetary stability was of supreme importance for the revival of trade. All the European governments were struggling to stabilise their money by returning, in one form or another, to the Gold Standard—that is, by guaranteeing that their money should always be equal in value to a defined weight of gold. But most of them were content to fix this gold value far below what it had been before the war. In 1925 Britain returned to the Gold Standard at the pre-war parity—that is, she guaranteed that each pound should be of the same value in gold as before the war. In order to raise the value of the pound to this level, the amount of money in use had to be greatly reduced, by a policy of what is called ‘deflation’; and this meant that prices were forced down, because, when money is relatively scarce, it buys more goods. Therefore all producers got less money for the goods they produced. But the owners of national debt and other fixed securities still had to be paid the same amount of money; consequently the producer had to make more goods in order to pay his taxes and the interest on much of his capital. Moreover wages, protected by the Trade Unions, did not go down in proportion to the fall of
prices; and the manufacturer therefore had to make more goods to pay the same wages. In other words, his costs of production were increased, and the export trade was still further crippled, while the burden of debt was increased. This was probably the main reason why Britain got so small a share of the revival of world trade, which took place during these years.

The government's third device for the revival of trade was the protection by tariffs of certain selected industries, under what was known as the 'safeguarding' scheme. These favoured industries were protected by high duties (usually 33⅓ per cent.) against foreign competition, while they were still free to buy their requirements at the lowest price in the world market. The selected industries were of two types: two great modern industries, artificial silk and motors, which were in any case bound to expand, were treated in this way; along with a number of minor industries, such as lace, cutlery, buttons and certain kinds of pottery. Nothing was or perhaps could be done in this way for the great staple industries, such as coal and cotton, in which foreign imports were non-existent or negligible. The system was very popular in the favoured trades, and it made many people look more favourably at protection; but it did not bring about any decrease in the total volume of unemployment.


Early in its period of office, the Baldwin government was called upon to deal with a very grave industrial crisis, which arose from the situation in the coal industry. It had long been obvious that the settlement reached in 1921 was no solution of the problems of the industry. The competition of oil and electricity had hit it hard; some of the markets lost in 1921 had never been regained; the extra cost of the Seven Hours' Day (reasonable as it was in itself) had reduced the power of Britain to sell abroad; and the agreement of 1921, whereby wages were fixed on the basis of the total earnings of all the mines, good or bad, in each district, had brought them in many cases so low that they were insufficient to support life. There had been a temporary revival when France occupied the Ruhr and for the time put an end to German competition. But when that ended, things became worse than ever. The miners demanded redress. The Trade Union Congress supported them,
threatening a general strike unless their demands were met. In the summer of 1925 a crisis was reached. To buy time, Mr. Baldwin promised a subsidy to the mining industry until an enquiry could be carried out, which might possibly have been undertaken beforehand. The subsidy lasted for eight months, and cost the taxpayers £23,000,000. While it was running, a Royal Commission under Sir Herbert Samuel investigated the problems of the industry, and made a series of proposals, some of which involved legislation, while others depended upon agreement between miners and mine-owners. But the miners and the mine-owners both rejected the scheme, and in the absence of agreement the government refused to legislate, except that it restored the Eight Hours’ Day. Thereupon the Trade Union Congress again intervened, with a definite threat of a General Strike unless a satisfactory solution was reached before May 2nd; but they had no clear ideas as to what the solution was to be. There were two days of fevered negotiation; and at midnight on May 2nd the long dreaded General Strike began.

It was not really a General Strike, for only the workers in certain key industries were called out. But practically all the railwaymen, transport workers, miners and printers stopped work; and the ordinary machinery of life was almost brought to a standstill. Even a few days of this inflicted immense damage and loss. But the threat to the life of the nation failed. Tens of thousands of volunteer workers presented themselves. All the arrangements for feeding London and the other big cities had been worked out beforehand, and, although there was great inconvenience, there was no real suffering. What was still more remarkable, the struggle was carried on, on both sides, with admirable temper. At the end of a week the Trade Union leaders knew that they were beaten, and on the tenth day they surrendered and called the strike off. The episode had discredited Trade Unionism in the eyes of the nation, and shaken the loyalty of myriads of Trade Union members. The funds of the Unions were exhausted, and their membership underwent a rapid decline.

But the coal stoppage still went on. It lasted for seven months; many iron-works were brought to a stop; other concerns had to import coal from abroad, at heavy cost. In the end, the miners were completely defeated; the wage-levels which they had to accept were in many cases cruelly low; their union funds were exhausted; markets
for British coal had been lost which were not easily recovered, and one-sixth of the miners found themselves permanently out of work. The distress in the mining areas became intense. Some of them became completely derelict; and the necessity of maintaining the families of so many unemployed workers raised the rates in these districts to unendurable levels.

These troubles naturally added to the difficulties of all the other industries, and especially of the staple industries, which used great quantities of coal—iron and steel, engineering, shipbuilding, cotton and wool. Their plight grew worse and worse, and the government could do nothing to help them. The figures for unemployment went on increasing. The distress was greatest in the north and west, the home of the industrial revolution and of the great export trades. In London and the south and east there was comparative prosperity, because many new trades, mostly luxury trades, were growing up in that region—largely because the burden of rates was less there. The movement of the nineteenth century seemed to be being reversed, and industry, wealth and population were moving southwards.

Although it had failed to take any effective steps to remedy the distresses of the time, this government deserves credit for three important achievements. It set on foot an elaborate scheme under public control for organising the supply of electric power, on a uniform basis, cheaply and efficiently in every part of the country; and the whole system was brought under the control of a Statutory Commission, not working for profit. It also took over the system of broadcasting, and brought it under government control, maintaining the monopoly system which distinguishes British from American broadcasting. How important government control of this powerful means of influencing public opinion might be, was shown by the General Strike, when the government nightly spoke to the homes of the people. It is perhaps worth noting that these were the first large schemes of 'nationalisation' which any government had laid before Parliament since the Liberals nationalised the telegraph and the telephones. Finally, in 1928, this government completed the structure of democracy, by enfranchising women on equal terms with men. This change was bound to be followed by a General Election, which took place in 1929, and brought the life of the government to an end.

During the previous years, and especially since 1926, the non-government parties had sharply criticised the failure of the government to grapple with the economic problem, and had put forward programmes of their own. The Labour proposals were embodied in a pamphlet which was carefully moderate, and closely resembled in its main features the much more detailed proposals which the Liberals had set forth in a series of reports, based upon enquiries by eminent economists and others: the most important of these was a volume entitled Britain's Industrial Future. Both parties, but especially the Liberals, led now by Mr. Lloyd George, laid great emphasis upon the importance of using a period of slack trade for the strengthening of the nation's equipment, employing for this purpose idle labour and idle capital, and thus not only alleviating the volume of unemployment, but making ready to take advantage of a revival of trade when it came.

It was mainly on this issue that the election of 1929 was fought. The nation seemed to have made up its mind that the Liberal Party was too weak to be worth supporting. That party obtained only one-quarter of the votes cast, and only one-tenth of the seats in the House of Commons. But the Labour Party, despite the discredit of the General Strike, emerged for the first time as the largest of the three parties; and the second Labour government was formed, with Mr. Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister. It did not enjoy a clear majority; but on a vigorous policy it could count upon the support of the Liberals.

Nevertheless the second Labour government proved to be almost as ineffective as the first. Although there were endless discussions, it produced no plan for setting the unemployed to work; and its only contribution to the problem of unemployment relief, which was becoming a financial bugbear, was to add to the allowances made to the unemployed. It introduced a Coal Bill, the chief features of which were (1) a system of 'quotas' to which pits and districts were limited, so that the most efficient mines were prevented from producing their economic maximum; and (2) a scheme for encouraging exports by selling coal cheaply abroad at the expense of the home consumer. It also produced a big scheme for unifying the transport system of London under public control, which was ultimately carried into law by the next government.
It was the misfortune of this government that its access to power almost coincided with the beginning of the economic blizzard which swept over the world in 1929 and the following years, bringing ruin in its train. Party spirit attributed to the government responsibility for the decline in trade, the increase in unemployment, and the financial difficulties which followed from the world crisis. The character of the crisis, and its effects upon the British people, will be discussed in a later chapter. Here it is enough to say that during the first two years of its development, the government took no steps to deal with it or to anticipate its consequences. When, in 1931, it brought a financial crisis in Britain, the government was bewildered and overwhelmed, and had to make way for a national government drawn from all parties.
CHAPTER VIII

EFFECTS OF THE WAR UPON THE BRITISH EMPIRE

§ 1. Changing Structure of the Empire.

The British Empire was drawn into the Great War at a critical time in its development: at a time when the great Dominions were both conscious and jealous of their separate nationhood; at a time when Egypt (which, though not a part of the Empire, had come within its orbit) and India were full of aspirations to attain the dignity of self-governing nationhood; at a time when the backward peoples, so recently conquered, were only beginning to adjust themselves to the upheaval in their modes of life which western civilisation had brought. It was expected by many observers that the loose structure of the Empire would not stand the strain of war, but that it would break into fragments. The reverse was the case. The war demonstrated the extraordinary strength of the bonds, ‘light as air, yet strong as links of iron,’ which had been forged by the common enjoyment of freedom. Canada, Australia and New Zealand sacrificed their manhood as lavishly as the mother country; in South Africa, after a Dutch rising had been crushed by Dutch loyalists, troops were found to conquer South-West Africa and later to play a great part in the conquest of German East Africa, and South African troops also fought gallantly in France. In India troops were recruited on a greater scale than in any earlier epoch of Indian history, and they fought in France, in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Egypt, in East Africa and in China; the Indian princes offered contingents, and made generous gifts in money and kind; India was almost denuded of British troops, yet the country remained quiet, and there was no attempt to ‘throw off the British yoke.’ Egypt—declared a British protectorate at the beginning of the war—remained quiet even when Turkish forces twice attacked the Suez Canal. The backward peoples of Africa and the Pacific not only showed no desire to revolt, but made touching gifts to help
the suzerain power. In short, the Empire stood the strain of the greatest ordeal it had ever endured with a toughness that could not have been anticipated.

Until the war came, the Empire countries had been content to leave to the mother country the responsibility for foreign policy, and almost the whole responsibility for defence. But, now that they had all been drawn into a war which involved colossal burdens, it was no longer possible that they should be content with this arrangement. They had been taken into close counsel in the Imperial Conferences of 1907 and 1911. In the later stages of the war, their leaders had been members of an Imperial War Cabinet, in which the King's Ministers in all his Dominions took counsel together as to the policy to be pursued: the fact that this was possible was a remarkable proof of the elasticity of the British system. But when the war ended it was inevitable that a new system should be worked out.

This new system took two forms. In the first place, the Dominions and India appeared alongside of the mother country at the Peace Conference; although they largely acted together, they were in fact recognised as distinct sovereign States, and to some this seemed like a sign that the unity of the Empire was breaking up. In the organisation of the League of Nations, a subtler arrangement was embodied. The British Empire as a whole, represented mainly by Britain, became a permanent member of the Council; the Dominions and India, alongside of Britain, became members of the Assembly. This seemed to express the peculiar character of the British Empire, as one State and many States at the same time. It meant that, if the League should become (as it was meant to become) the main arena for the discussion of foreign policy, the Dominions and India would have their full share in these discussions, while the whole Empire, if it could create adequate machinery for dealing with common interests, might by acting jointly exercise great weight in the discussions of the League. In that event, participation in the League would help to unite the Empire; but in the absence of common machinery, it might be a step towards disintegration.

No very definite steps were taken during the years following the war towards the creation of any permanent machinery of consultation, either on foreign policy, defence, or economic policy. Two Imperial Conferences were held, in 1923 and 1926. But at the first the most important subject discussed was the possibility of closer economic union. The Dominions
demanded preferences in the British market; but as this was incompatible with the general policy of Free Trade, which Britain was still pursuing, it was not granted; instead Britain undertook to spend £1,000,000 per annum, through an Empire Marketing Board, in forwarding the sale of Empire products, by advertisement and in other ways, in the British market. Between 1923 and 1926 a change of temper appeared. Southern Ireland, now enjoying Dominion status, was anxious to reduce to the minimum the bonds that linked her to Britain; in South Africa the Dutch Nationalist Party, led by General Hertzog, had gained the upper hand (1924), and Hertzog, without desiring to leave the Empire, wanted to make it clear to his followers that South Africa was a completely sovereign State, free to secede whenever her interests might seem to dictate this course. In 1931, therefore, a new definition was adopted by the statute of Westminster, establishing complete equality of status between Britain and the Dominions. The British Empire was thus reduced (so far as the Dominions were concerned) to a very loose alliance of equal States, bound together only by the formal link of the Crown, and without any such clearly defined mutual obligations as all undertook when they became members of the League of Nations. Meanwhile the Dominions had begun to appoint their own diplomatic representatives in various countries.

The absence of any regular method of consultation between the members of the Empire was illustrated by three episodes during these years. In 1922 Britain was almost drawn into a single-handed war with the Turks which would have involved all the Dominions; yet they were not formally consulted. In 1923, when peace with the Turks was finally concluded, Britain gave Turkey a guarantee regarding the demilitarised zone on the Straits which might in the future involve the Dominions in a war, just as the guarantee given to Belgium in 1839 had helped to involve them in the war of 1914; yet still they were not consulted. In 1925 the Treaties of Locarno imposed upon Britain a definite obligation which might prove to be of the most serious moment. The Dominions were not consulted, and it was announced that the guarantee affected Britain alone; but if a war should ever result from these commitments, the Dominions could only avoid involvement in it by withdrawing from the Empire.
§ 2. Additions to the Empire: the Mandated Territories.

The war and the treaties of peace brought further increases of territory to the already immense British Empire. Egypt became a protectorate; and a large proportion of the territories of the German and the Turkish Empires were brought under the control either of Britain or of the Dominions, under mandates from the League of Nations. These acquisitions have already been enumerated (p. 815). Some of them presented problems of great difficulty during the following years.

The acquisition of German East Africa, henceforward known as Tanganyika, made it possible to aim at the organisation of a consolidated Empire in Eastern Africa, including Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika and Nyasaland; and there were projects of a federal system for this group of colonies. The chief difficulty was the difference between the status of the mandated territory of Tanganyika and that of the other colonies; a difficulty which might have been overcome by bringing the other colonies also under the mandate system, but this was never proposed.

The most important colony of this group is Kenya, which has extensive uplands suitable for white settlement. Even before the war, and still more after it, there was a substantial emigration to Kenya of Englishmen, mainly of the governing class, who obtained large estates. To work these plantations, they needed an abundant supply of native labour; and there was a danger that the native population would be (as in South Africa) reduced to be mere labourers for white masters. To guard against this danger, large reserves (mostly in the more tropical regions) were set apart for the natives, in which they could pursue their accustomed modes of life, while also providing labour for the immigrants’ estates. The white residents were tempted to bring pressure upon the local government to force the natives into employment, by taxation and in other ways, and a vigorous controversy arose on this subject: a sharp contrast seemed to be growing up between the native policy of Kenya and that of the West African colonies, notably Nigeria, where native ownership and cultivation were sedulously encouraged and western exploitation restricted. The home government strove to hold the balance justly between the claims of the natives and those of the settlers, and in 1923 it was formally declared that the first obligation of the
government was to act as a trustee for the rights of the natives.

A further difficulty in Kenya was created by the immigration of large numbers of Indians who, as in Natal, got into their hands the bulk of the retail trade. The European settlers agitated for a system of representative government limited to themselves; the Indians also—more numerous than the Europeans—claimed self-governing rights. In the interests of the native population, the government declined to surrender its authority to a representative body thus constituted. But a representative body with a government majority was set up; it included Europeans and Indians, together with certain nominated spokesmen for the natives. Because of the mixture of races and their conflicting interests, the administration of Kenya has afforded one of the most difficult problems of colonial administration since the war, and the discovery of gold in some of the native reserves has not made the problem easier.

There was trouble in South-West Africa also, under the administration of the Union of South Africa, which was criticised by the Mandates Commission of the League for the severity of its suppression of a rising among the Bondelswarts. In the colony of Northern Rhodesia the post-war years saw a rapid development of mineral resources by native labour; and here also the problems of native government were made more difficult. The sister colony of Southern Rhodesia, which had attracted many white settlers, rose in these years to the dignity of a self-governing colony: its responsible Parliament began its career in 1924.

§ 3. Palestine and Iraq.

Far more difficult were the problems raised in the new Asiatic territories taken from the Turks—Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq. In all these the new-born national spirit of the Arabs was a source of continuous trouble.

In Palestine the difficulty was to reconcile the promise to create a 'Jewish national home' with the promise, contained in the same document, that 'nothing shall be done to prejudice the rights of non-Jewish communities.' The Arabs, forming the vast majority of the three-quarters of a million of souls who inhabited the country at the end of the war, resented the coming of large numbers of Jews, whose immigration was organised and financed by Zionist organisations in every part of the world. All the land
occupied by the Jews was, of course, purchased on fair terms from its Arab owners; and the Jewish settlers, who displayed great energy and industry, provided work for many unemployed Arabs. But the prosperity of the Jewish settlements did not reconcile the Arabs to the coming of these strangers; rather it embittered them. In 1920, before the new system of government had been set on foot, there were serious Arab riots; and the constant undercurrent of hostility between the two races formed the greatest difficulty of Sir Herbert Samuel, the first British Governor of the Province. The institution in 1922 of a representative council of 22 members, of whom 10 were government officials, while 8 Arabs, 2 Jews, and 2 Christians were elected, did nothing to appease the discord. In 1927 such serious disturbances broke out that the League of Nations instituted an enquiry into the whole position.

In spite of these troubles, Palestine has attained a new prosperity. But it seems an insecure prosperity, for beyond the limits of Palestine is the ferment constantly at work in the Arab world: there may at any time burst forth from Arabia a new outbreak of Mohammedan fanaticism, which will stir up trouble in all these Arab States. Such an outbreak seemed to have come in 1925, when the fanatical Wahabi from Central Arabia overthrew the King of Hejaz, the ally of Britain during the war, who had dreamed of assuming the Caliphate, and whose sons had been placed upon the thrones of Transjordan and Iraq. During the following years there was a good deal of anxiety lest a jihad (holy war) coming from Arabia might turn the Near East upside down. But the Wahabi chief consented to sign boundary treaties, and the danger was averted.

It proved to be yet more difficult to reach a satisfactory settlement in Iraq (Mesopotamia) than in Palestine. This region, the scene of some of the world’s most ancient civilisations, the legendary site of the Garden of Eden, the home of the wonderful Sumerians whose remains have been recently revealed at Abraham’s city of Ur, the region of the Assyrian and Babylonian Empires, and later of the Saracen Empire in the days of its greatest splendour, was capable, as its history showed, of great prosperity; but it had long suffered under Turkish domination. Its people were mostly Arabs by sentiment, whatever their racial origins; but in the vilayet of Mosul, in the hill country to the north which bordered on the Turkish realm, there were other peoples, notably the Assyrian Christians and Kurds.
When in 1917 General Maude conquered Baghdad, he gave a promise to the Arabs that their aspirations should be satisfied; and in 1918 the French and British governments promised that native governments should be established. The Arabs had hoped that this would mean the creation of a great Arab Empire, including Syria and Iraq. When they found that the French were to be masters of Syria and the British of Iraq (as well as Palestine), and when these arrangements were placed under the authority of the League of Nations by the issue of mandates, their disappointment was acute. Feisal, son of the King of Hejaz, placed himself at the head of an Arab revolt in Syria, and had to be driven out by the French; while the Bedouin tribes of Iraq also broke into revolt, and had to be suppressed by force.

In 1921 Britain proposed that Feisal, now an Arab national hero, should be elected King of Iraq; and a plebiscite showed a vote of 96 per cent. in his favour. Since Feisal had played an active part on the British side during the war, it was hoped that he would be amenable. But he could not make himself the instrument of foreign control without alienating the affections of his subjects. On the other hand, his position was very insecure. He was threatened by the Turks from the north, who claimed that they had never agreed to surrender the vilayet of Mosul, and from that hilly region they might have him at their mercy; on the south he was threatened by the Wahhabi who were soon to drive out his father from Hejaz. He needed the protection of British arms. But he disliked the mandate and the powers it gave to Britain; he would have preferred a Treaty of Alliance.

The need of British protection was shown in 1922, when the Turks attacked in Mosul: two campaigns had to be fought to keep them in check, and they would have been fought in vain without British aid. But the Turks refused to surrender their claim to Mosul: even in the Treaty of Lausanne, which ended the war between Turkey and the Allies (1924), this frontier had to be left undefined. In 1925, at the request of Britain, the League of Nations sent a frontier commission to define the boundary. The commission did its work thoroughly: it assigned Mosul to Iraq, but pointed out that the non-Arab peoples in that province stood in need of protection, and imposed upon Britain, as the mandatory power, the responsibility for seeing that they were fairly treated. In the same year, Britain signed a
treaty with Iraq, under which she promised military aid to that State. The treaty was to last for twenty-five years, unless before the end of that period Iraq was admitted as a member of the League of Nations. In 1926 Turkey at last accepted the accomplished fact, and signed a treaty of peace in which she recognised Mosul as part of Iraq. Next year, 1927, now that the Turkish danger was removed (the danger from Arabia had been removed by a treaty of 1925), Britain signed a new treaty with Iraq, in which she recognised Iraq as an independent State and promised to use her good offices to obtain her admission to the League. This was at last accomplished in 1932, when the British mandate came to an end.

The bald summary of events set forth above covers a long story of difficult and delicate relations. Iraq had been, for twelve years, part of the British Empire, as a mandatory protectorate. During these twelve years she depended largely upon British forces (mainly air-squadrons) to protect her and to maintain order among her unruly subjects. She depended also upon a staff of British officials to bring her system of government and of education into existence, and to equip her with the machinery of a modern State, and some of these still serve her. Iraq has been the first of all the mandatory States to rise to the dignity of independent statehood. Time alone can show whether this new State, erected on the ruin of historic empires, will be able to stand securely on her own feet. It is perturbing to find that in 1933, within a year of her admission to the League, Iraq has seen the slaughter of some hundreds of those Assyrian Christians for whose well-being the commissioners of the League expressed so much anxiety in 1925.

§ 4. The Independence of Egypt.

The relations between Egypt and the British Empire were among the most difficult problems of the post-war period. Before the war Egypt had been, in form, a vassal of Turkey, though in effect she was ruled by British officials, who had lifted her out of bankruptcy into prosperity. But even before the war, as we have seen (p. 654), there had been a strong nationalist movement in Egypt, which resented foreign control. On the eve of the war, Lord Kitchener, then the British agent, had worked out a scheme of representative government; but the war came before it was put into operation, and in any case it would not have satisfied
the growing demands of the Egyptians. When Turkey declared war in October 1914, the continued recognition of her suzerainty, even in name, became impossible; because it would have implied that every Egyptian was an enemy. For that reason a British protectorate was proclaimed. During the war, Egypt was in effect under military rule, and the country was so full of British, Australian, and Indian troops—at first to defend the Suez Canal against Turkish attacks, and later because Egypt was the base for the advance into Palestine—that no expressions of public dissatisfaction were possible. Moreover, during the war, Egypt enjoyed unprecedented prosperity: her cotton crop commanded very high prices. The decline of this prosperity after the war contributed to cause discontent.

No sooner was the war at an end than the nationalist agitation broke out with fury, and there were riots so serious that Lord Allenby, the conqueror of Palestine, was sent to take control. He had no difficulty in suppressing the riots, but not in quenching the nationalist movement, which had now taken hold not merely of the educated classes, but of the peasantry. Its leader was Saad Zaghlul, an uncompromising nationalist, who refused to recognise the British protectorate in any form, and demanded that a Wafd, or delegation, should be sent to the Peace Conference on behalf of Egypt: the Wafd party became the nucleus of nationalist fervour. Instead of allowing the delegation to go to Paris, where it might have learned something of the complexity of the problem, the government deported Zaghlul to Malta; whereupon the agitation became more intense.

At the end of 1919, the British government sent out a commission under Lord Milner (who had served in Egypt in the early days of the British occupation) to enquire into the whole problem, and to discuss it with the Egyptian leaders. The Milner Mission was boycotted by all the leading Egyptians: complete and unqualified independence alone would satisfy them, and they refused to recognise the right of any British mission to determine the future of Egypt. Nevertheless the Milner Mission reported in favour of the recognition of Egyptian independence, subject to certain safeguards. This report, however, did nothing to reconcile the Egyptians. It was followed by a fresh outbreak of rioting; and Zaghlul, who had been allowed to return when the Milner Mission was sent out, was once more deported.
It was manifestly impossible to govern a country against the will of its whole population: it might, indeed, have been done by force, and perhaps in time the Egyptians might have been reconciled. But the British people, so soon after the war, were not prepared for such an undertaking; nor would it have been likely to achieve success. In 1922, therefore, the British government decided to accept the situation, and issued a declaration recognising the independence of Egypt, with reservations on four points: first, the Suez Canal must not be under Egyptian control; secondly, a British garrison must be retained in Egypt to safeguard this indispensable line of imperial communications; thirdly, there must be adequate safeguards for foreigners in Egypt; and, fourthly, Egypt must not control the Sudan, which had been nursed back to prosperity by a quarter of a century of British administration. The Wafd party was not prepared to accept these limitations. But the Sultan, accepting the fact of political independence, proceeded to draw up a new parliamentary constitution in consultation with the Wafd. In 1924 the first elections took place; the Wafd party obtained an overwhelming majority, and Zaghlul became Prime Minister. Almost his first step was to visit London in the hope of negotiating with the Labour government, then in power, a favourable settlement of the four reserved points. But even the Labour government found Zaghlul wholly impracticable, and the negotiations came to nothing. In November of that year Sir Lee Stack, then the British agent, was murdered.

Thereupon the British government took a firm stand. It demanded the punishment of the assassins, and the payment of an indemnity. It demanded also that all Egyptian troops should be withdrawn from the Sudan, hitherto governed as a condominium by Britain and Egypt. The Egyptian government had to give way; and for a time anti-British agitation died down. The extremist Wafd party was by now largely discredited. Two years later, the Sultan took the reins of power into his own hands, and the theoretically democratic system set up in 1924 was reduced to a shadow. Time alone can tell how this system will work, and whether Egypt can save herself from a renewal of the corruption and oppression from which she suffered before 1880.

Thus in Egypt, as in Iraq, the rising nationalist temper of the oriental peoples, and their determination to shake
off the domination of the west, had made the continuance of British control impossible. Britain remains, however, in control of the Suez Canal; she has accepted responsibility for safeguarding European residents in Egypt; and she has assumed, in form as well as in fact, control of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and of the upper waters of the Nile, upon the proper handling of which the prosperity of Egypt depends.

§ 5. The Problem of India.

The most gigantic and the most difficult of all the problems of government which faced the British people after the war was the problem of India, where the whole position had been transformed by the war.

The first effect of the outbreak of war was to still all the vehement controversies which had been raging in the previous years. India became quiet; there was a remarkable outburst of loyalty to the Empire; and huge forces were raised without difficulty for service in many fields.

The second effect was to bring about a great industrial development in India. No longer able to obtain the goods that had come from Britain, India began to produce cotton goods, coal, and iron and steel for herself. This was encouraged by the development of a protectionist system, especially aimed at British competition: the British government, which had always insisted upon free entry for British goods, was fain to submit to this change under the pressure of war. But while the Indian industrial magnates throve, the mass of the people, always near the margin of subsistence, were hard hit by the rise of prices which the war brought, and which protection increased. Thus there was discontent among the mass of the people, while a small class, rapidly enriched, saw the source of their prosperity in the exclusion of English goods. These economic factors were favourable to an anti-British movement.

In the later years of the war, the demand for self-government once again became active. Hitherto this agitation had been strongest among the Hindus. But the Moslems also were now in a state of excitement. From 1917 onwards they were watching with anxiety the collapse of the Turkish Empire, to whose Sultan they had always looked as the head of their religion. Many of them were now ready to join hands with the Hindus. Their feelings were so strong that when in 1919 the Afghans attacked the
north-western frontier, some of the Indian Moslem leaders were ready to welcome the invader. Among the Hindus also there had emerged a leader capable of appealing to the deepest instincts of Hinduism. M. K. Gandhi was a saintly visionary and ascetic. He had already played an active part in defending the claims of the Indians of South Africa. Though he had received a western education, he dreamed of returning to the primitive simplicity of early India, and regarded the influence of western civilisation as vicious and a cause of the decay of spirituality in India. Thus there were, in the Indian unrest, which came to a head as soon as the war was over, many irreconcilable elements. The Moslems dreamed of restoring the old Moslem supremacy; the Hindus of Gandhi’s school wanted to return to primitive Hinduism; the western-educated classes wanted to imitate western democracy; the manufacturers and traders wanted to shut out western goods, but only that they might enjoy a monopoly in the production of modern commodities by modern methods. But all these discordant elements were at one in desiring to get rid of western supremacy. The prestige of the west had been gravely undermined, first by the success of Japan against Russia, and then by the hideous spectacle of the great carnage which seemed to be a condemnation of the methods of the west.

The Morley-Minto system of government (see p. 748) was visibly a failure. Refusing responsibility to the Indian members of the legislative councils, it encouraged irresponsibility in the use of the powers of criticism which it conferred upon them. Now that Indians had played so great a part in a war whose aim was declared to be ‘self-determination’ for all peoples, they were naturally tempted to ask why they should be denied the rights of self-determination. The British government recognised that some big advance was indispensable. In 1917 it announced the intention of proceeding by definite stages towards the establishment of a system of responsible self-government in India. The Secretary of State, Mr. E. S. Montagu, went to India to join with the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, in working out a scheme.

It was a colossal task which they had undertaken. Nowhere in the world was there a land whose peoples displayed such diversities of race, language, religion, and grades of civilisation; nowhere else was the institution of caste, which is in itself the very negation of democracy, so deeply rooted; nowhere had the democratic system been applied
to a population so vast, save in China, where the attempt to establish it had produced chaos. But the gadfly of a desire for liberty, coming from England, had stung into life the inert masses, accustomed to submission for so many centuries; and it was impossible for Britain to deny such a demand. The problem was to find a system which would be workable, and which would not cause confusion.

The scheme adopted was based upon a plan which had been devised by a brilliant Englishman, Mr. Lionel Curtis. It was called Dyarchy, and its essence was a division of authority between ministers responsible to representative bodies, and the old power of the Viceroy and the Civil Service. In each of the Provinces (some of which are as big as the larger European States) a substantial majority in the legislative body was given to elected representatives; and, in view of the clash between various religious communities in India, separate 'communal representation' was given to each of the chief groups. Certain subjects were to be 'transferred' to responsible ministers, dependent upon these assemblies; certain other subjects, notably police, were 'reserved' for the Governor of the Province and his officers. The Governor was given power to 'certify' certain measures—that is, to pass them over the heads of the majority if need be; and power was retained to suspend the whole system in the event of a serious breakdown. But no element of responsibility was introduced in the central government for India as a whole, which was to control the army, foreign policy and customs duties, though an elected majority was set up in the central Legislative Assembly.

This hybrid system, with its attempt to combine responsible with non-responsible government, was embodied in an India Act, adopted by the British Parliament in 1919. But the new scheme had a very unfortunate beginning. Before it was brought into operation, serious disturbances broke out, stirred up by the Rowlatt Acts, which proposed to establish a system of secret trials for cases of sedition, because people who gave evidence in such cases were frequently murdered. The disturbances were most serious in the warlike province of the Punjab, where at one moment all the railway lines and telegraph lines that centred in the city of Lahore were simultaneously cut. In the neighbouring city of Amritsar there were deeds of violence against Englishmen, and the officer in command in that city, General Dyer, having only a handful of troops at
his disposal, thought prompt and drastic action necessary. When a crowd gathered in an enclosed space where meetings had been forbidden, he opened fire upon them with machine-guns, causing heavy loss of life; and all Indians passing down the street in which an Englishwoman had been murdered, were compelled to crawl on the ground. Though an enquiry was held, and General Dyer was discharged, these episodes aroused a fever of resentment throughout India.

At this dangerous moment the Amir of Afghanistan suddenly invaded India through the passes of the North-West. Afghanistan had remained steadily peaceful throughout the war; but the Amir Habibullah was assassinated in 1919, and his successor Amanullah thought he saw a chance of triumph in the unrestful state of India, especially as some of the Indian Moslems declared that they were ready to join him. Large forces had to be hurried up to deal with this, the third, Afghan War. The campaign lasted from May till August; the Afghans were driven back; and in the peace which concluded the war, the Indian government withdrew its claim to control the foreign policy of Afghanistan, and at the same time withdrew the subsidy which had been paid to the Amir for many years. Henceforth Afghanistan was left to itself, a possible source of danger if disorder should triumph in India.

It was in these circumstances that the new system of government had to be set to work. It had not a chance from the outset. The members of the Indian National Congress boycotted it, and the elections were quite unreal: this may have made things easier for the moment, since the extremists were absent, but the system could not take root in such circumstances. Gandhi launched a plan of 'non-violent non-co-operation,' whereby all Indians were to refuse to take any part in the working of the system—lawyers, teachers, students, and minor officials of all kinds going on strike, so as to bring about a deadlock. The plan had some success; but it was not easy to avoid violence in the excited condition of the country, and there were many conflicts between the police and the crowds. In 1921 the Mohammedan Moplahs of the west coast broke out, and wreaked their vengeance with great ferocity upon those whom they regarded as their natural enemies, the Hindus: a British force was necessary to subdue the disorder, and Gandhi, who hated all violence, fasted to express his aversion from these consequences of his policy. The disastrous consequences of public disorder frightened
moderate men; Gandhi’s astonishing prestige began to decline, and in 1922 it was thought safe to imprison him: with his imprisonment the movement of non-co-operation broke down.

During the troublous years 1921-26 the patient and tactful government of Lord Reading brought about a gradual improvement in the situation. But nothing could make the system of dyarchy acceptable to the Indian people. Even the most moderate bodies of Indian opinion insisted that the system must be revised, and that in some form full responsible self-government must be introduced. The India Act of 1919 had promised that the system should be revised at intervals of ten years; but it was obvious that some change would have to be made at an earlier date.

In 1926 the British government decided to send out a parliamentary commission, under Sir John Simon, to study the whole problem. But the fact that there were no Indian members on the commission, which suggested that the British Parliament intended to legislate without consulting Indian opinion, stultified the commission from the outset. It was widely boycotted; and its wanderings through India during two years actually intensified instead of alleviating anti-British feeling. Fortunately a wise and patient Viceroy, Lord Irwin, held the reins during these years (1926-31); he was able even to reach friendly terms with Gandhi. The Simon Commission presented an admirable analysis of the Indian situation. It proposed that full responsibility should be established in the Provinces, but not in the central government, unless and until the Indian Princes (who are in direct relation with the Viceroy) were ready to come into the system on some sort of federal basis. But the Simon scheme was stillborn, owing to the ill-feeling which it had aroused in India.

The publication of the report was followed by fresh troubles in India. The National Congress declared openly for complete independence; but its prestige was rapidly declining. In 1930 Gandhi started a new ‘non-violent non-co-operation’ movement, without much success. He undertook a salt-making enterprise to show his defiance of the government, much of whose revenue was derived from a monopoly of salt; and the impracticable saint had once more to be placed in confinement. In the same year, carrying out a suggestion contained in the Simon Report, the British government called a Round Table Conference of leading Indians (though the Congress party refused to take part),
along with representatives of all the British political parties, not to consider the Simon Report, but to review the whole problem afresh. The whole atmosphere was changed when the Indian Princes announced that, on satisfactory terms, they were willing to come into a federal system for all India: only the Provinces of British India had hitherto been considered. On this basis an element of responsibility at the centre as well as in the Provinces began to appear feasible. The difficulties were still tremendous. But since 1930 a series of Round Table Conferences has been engaged in endeavouring to work out a practicable scheme; the work was still uncompleted when these lines were written, and discussion was proceeding on the basis of a White Paper submitted by the British government. There are strong elements of opposition to these proposals both in Britain and in India. Whether they will surmount these difficulties; whether they will reconcile Indian opinion; whether there will emerge a system of government which will secure to the myriads of India peace, liberty, and equal laws—to all these questions time alone can give an answer. But at least a serious attempt has been made to grapple with one of the most difficult problems of government ever posed in human history.
CHAPTER IX

THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS

§ I. Nature of the Crisis.

In 1929 and the following years the whole world was involved in an economic crisis of unprecedented severity; when these lines were written, in 1933, the crisis had not yet been overcome. Trade between nations was almost brought to a standstill: in three years it decreased by two-thirds. In all the industrial countries unemployed workers were counted by millions: the total number was estimated by the economic experts of the League of Nations at 30,000,000. Producers, especially of foodstuffs and raw materials, could not obtain a price that would cover their costs of production; and while millions went short, great quantities of the goods which they wanted were burnt, or lay rotting in warehouses, because nobody could buy them. Debtor countries were unable to meet their obligations to their creditors; debtor and creditor countries alike were hard put to it to make both ends meet, and government after government was brought to the verge of bankruptcy. The whole basis of the trade revival of the years 1924-29 collapsed: reparation payments and inter-allied debts could not be collected; and the monetary system of the world, so painfully re-established on the Gold Standard during the previous years, fell once more into complete confusion, thus adding yet another obstacle to the movement of trade.

This extraordinary collapse, which affected every country on the face of the earth, was not due to any catastrophe of Nature, or to any failure of the earth to produce the things that men needed for prosperity; on the contrary, it seemed to be producing too much—far more than mankind was able to use—and it was commonly said that the trouble was due to ‘over-production,’ which implies that the world had to starve because it had more than enough of everything that it needed. Nor was the crisis due to any deficiency of energy or inventiveness on the part of men in
making use of the abundance which Nature offered; on the contrary, there was such rapid progress in the methods of making things more cheaply and distributing them more swiftly, that many people concluded that this was a main cause of unemployment: machines were replacing human hands. In short, the beneficence of Nature and the ingenuity of man were producing all that was needed for human well-being so cheaply and in such abundance that, for the first time in human history, there was enough to banish poverty and overwork from the face of the earth; and yet everywhere there was distress. Many persuaded themselves that the cause of all these ills was the 'breakdown of the capitalist system'; yet the capitalist system was producing, or could produce, enough to meet all the needs of mankind; whereas its rival, the communist system in Russia, working in a land which had been one of the great granaries of the world, could not produce enough to keep its people from starvation.

It was neither the niggardliness of Nature, nor the bad working of the machinery of production, that caused this crisis: it was the mistaken policy of governments, of nearly all the governments in the world, which prevented mankind from enjoying the plenty its industry had created. The rulers of the world had not yet realised in the economic sphere the dominating fact of the interdependence of all peoples; they had scarcely begun to recognise it in the political sphere. Each government, pursuing what it conceived to be the interest of its own country without regard to the rest, and striving to enrich its own country at the expense of the rest, failed to recognise that it was only through the co-operation of all, or many, governments that any country could now attain either prosperity or safety; and the result was that all alike were reduced to distress, at a time when all alike might have been enjoying prosperity. The root cause of the world's economic troubles lay in what came to be called 'economic nationalism,' just as the root cause of the world's political troubles lay in political nationalism. And the one reacted upon the other. It was largely because all the nations distrusted one another politically that they could not co-operate economically; and the distress caused by their failure to co-operate in the economic sphere only increased their fears of one another, and retarded the appeasement of the world. That this was so will be made clear by a brief survey of the course of the crisis.
§ 2. Course of the Economic Crisis.

The trouble began in America, which had been enjoying since 1921 a prosperity that dazzled the world. Her production of goods passed all records; and her people were so highly paid that they could buy and use this plenty. She was drawing tribute, in the form of debt payments, from the impoverished countries of Europe. She had developed an immense export trade since the war. But her high tariffs made it impossible for either debts or the value of her exports to be paid to her in the goods of the countries which owed the debts or received the exports. Partly payment came in gold; America had in her cellars far more gold than she needed for monetary purposes, and most of it was useless—it was wealth that gave no return. Largely she allowed the payments for her exports to remain, in the form of loans, in the countries to which they were sent; but she got little advantage from these loans, because the interest on them could not be paid in goods. It was largely these loans that enabled America’s debtors to pay her; she was lending her debtors the money wherewith to meet their obligations to her. Thus the foundations of her prosperity were insecure.

Nevertheless her people believed that their prosperity would go on increasing whatever happened to the rest of the world; and in this belief they paid prices for industrial securities far above their real value, expecting them all to go up. Meanwhile everybody was buying all sorts of things on the hire-purchase system, confident that they would always be able to pay the instalments. In October 1929 the huge bubble burst; the prices of securities dropped rapidly, and their holders were ruined. Confidence suddenly evaporated. And now nobody was ready to lend money abroad, and the stream of American money, which had largely kept the economic system of Europe at work, suddenly dried up. Next year the American Congress resorted to the usual device for dealing with bad trade: it made a sudden and large increase in the tariff, to keep out foreign goods more completely than ever. The result was that export trade dwindled rapidly and unemployment mounted, while it became more than ever impossible for her debtors to pay her in goods. They had to sell their products, wherever possible, for gold, and send the gold to America, whose stacks of useless yellow metal went on increasing. France
also was a great creditor country; France also was determined to keep out foreign goods by high tariffs; and therefore a stream of gold poured into her coffer's only less great in volume than that which flowed to America.

But the accumulation of so much gold in two countries—three-quarters of the world's total supply by 1931—meant that the other countries were left without enough gold to work the Gold Standard properly. In order to remain on the Gold Standard, and to be able to sell gold for their notes, they had to restrict the amount of money and credit in circulation. But when money becomes scarce, prices fall. So the great fall of prices began, all over the world, including France and America.

As prices fell, governments began to be anxious about the inflow of 'cheap foreign goods,' especially the countries that were trying to grow wheat in competition with the prairie lands of the new world. Their remedy was to raise their tariffs higher and higher, till their people were paying far more for their food than they need have done. But this restricted the markets of the grain-growing countries. Their only device was to sell their stuff at any sacrifice, and at the same time to raise tariffs against the manufacturing countries. Thus prices were forced still lower; the growers were unable to make a profit, or to buy the manufactures they needed; and more and more workers were thrown out of employment. The United States and Canada tried to stem the fall by holding back crops from the market at the cost of the State; but this made all other countries fear that, when these large reserves were thrown on the market, there would be a worse slump than ever; and so prices went on falling.

Governments also became alarmed about their 'balance of trade'; for a country is said to have a favourable balance when it sells more goods and services than it buys, and an unfavourable balance when it buys more than it sells. Obviously it is impossible for every country to sell more than it buys. But every government strove to reduce the amount that its people bought; and to increase the amount that they sold. They could reduce their imports by means of tariffs, but they could not increase their exports when everybody else was shutting them out; no country can sell its goods unless it is willing to take other goods in exchange, or give credit to its purchasers on a reckless scale, as America had done. Even the highest tariffs were found insufficient. Many countries, determined to reduce their imports at all
costs, introduced the system of ‘quotas,’ whereby the amount that could be bought of certain commodities from certain countries was restricted by law; and this method limited trade even more effectually than tariffs. The debtor countries (including not only the countries that owe political debts, such as reparations, but also the countries that have to pay interest on foreign loans, such as Britain has made to many countries) could only pay in gold, or goods, or the money of the country to which they were indebted: tariffs made payment in goods more difficult; they did not want to be drained of their gold; so they forbade their people to export the money which they might have obtained by the sale of their products. These ‘exchange restrictions’ made it almost impossible for foreign merchants to obtain payment of the commercial debts due to them; so they naturally ceased to trade.

In all these ways the combined efforts of the governments of the world were bringing about a strangulation of international trade. As trade declined, the revenue of the governments declined also—especially that of those governments which mainly depended upon duties on imports; the more successful they were in keeping out imports, the less revenue they obtained. It became increasingly difficult to keep national budgets balanced. Moreover, as prices fell, the burden of all public debts increased, since the same amount of money had to be paid in interest, but the same amount of money represented a greatly increased amount of goods which had to be produced by industry to obtain this money. And as trade shrank, unemployment increased, and the unemployed had to be maintained in one way or another.

In the hope of avoiding bankruptcy, and being able to meet their obligations, some governments felt themselves compelled to reduce expenditure, by cutting down wages and salaries. Germany went farther in this respect than any other country, in her desperate endeavour to meet her reparation obligations; the result was that her democratic government became more and more unpopular. But in all countries, even if governments did not take action, employers were compelled to reduce wages, since they could not go on producing at a loss. But this meant, first, that popular distress was increased, and, secondly, that the people had less to spend, and therefore the home trade declined as well as the foreign trade.

And the more governments strove to restore their pro-
sperity by restricting their trade, the worse things became. The whole world seemed to be racing to ruin.

Britain necessarily suffered acutely from the disorganisation of world-trade, upon which her prosperity depended. Her export trade, already reduced by the war and prevented from recovering by the way in which she had returned to the Gold Standard, was still further reduced by the tariffs of other countries. On the other hand, as she was now the only great open market remaining in the world, there was a fear (never realised) that she would be ‘swamped with foreign goods,’ and this caused alarm about her ‘balance of trade.’ The rapid decline of overseas trade involved a serious decline of her shipping; it involved also a great decrease in her earnings from the financing of foreign trade, in which she had long taken the lead; while the interest on her foreign investments was reduced by the incapacity of the producing countries to find the wherewithal to pay. The number of her unemployed, and the cost of maintaining them, were rising in an alarming way, though not so sensationally as those of America; while the yield of her taxes was sinking. By the spring of 1931, there was reason to fear that she would be unable to balance her Budget; and although she was by no means peculiar in this, since the American Budget, and indeed the Budgets of most countries, were hopelessly unbalanced, yet a failure by Britain to balance her Budget would be regarded by the rest of the world as more serious than a similar failure by other countries, and would very gravely impair her credit as the centre of the world’s financial system. In the early summer of 1931 a report on her financial position, more frank and unflinching than perhaps any other country would have dared to publish to the world, was issued by a Special Committee, known as the May Committee: it showed that there would be a serious deficit in the next year’s Budget, and a still more serious one in that of the following year.

§ 3. The Financial Crisis in Austria, Germany, and Britain.

In 1931 a financial crisis was added to, and indeed sprang from, the economic crisis; and the world’s monetary system, which had been restored with so much difficulty in the previous period, once again fell into confusion.

The financial crisis began in Austria, where a great bank
failed to meet its obligations: a complete financial collapse in Austria was only averted by powerful aid from the Bank of England. German banks were deeply involved in the Austrian trouble. They had been borrowing money freely, for short periods, from other countries, and notably from the English banks, which were unable, owing to the bad state of trade, to employ their funds advantageously at home. Some of these advances seem to have been rather recklessly made, being attracted by high rates of interest. If these funds had been suddenly recalled from Germany, a financial collapse might have taken place which would have had serious effects throughout the world. Indeed, the situation in Germany was so serious that very prompt action had to be taken. The American President Hoover proposed a moratorium, whereby the payment of reparations, and of all inter-governmental debts, was suspended for a year; while the bankers of all countries who had lent money to the German banks agreed not to recall their money when it fell due. It is noteworthy that the chief financial countries dared not permit a collapse to take place in Germany, for fear of its effects upon themselves: the bankers, at least, realised the interdependence of all countries in finance. For the time being the German situation was saved; but it became very clear that the payment of reparations was not likely to be resumed for a long time, if ever; and nobody could guess how long it would be before the lending banks could hope to be repaid.

The trouble next spread to Britain. Practically all countries kept large sums of money on deposit in London, partly for trading purposes, and partly because of Britain's reputation for financial solidity and integrity. But these depositors now began to be doubtful about Britain's financial security. They knew that huge sums of British money were locked up in Germany, from which they could not now be recalled. They read the alarmist view of British finance taken by the May Committee. They knew that Britain was maintaining her unemployed partly with borrowed money. They felt that their own money might be needed at home, if the insecurity spread. So they claimed repayment, either in gold, or in their own money, or in French francs or American dollars, which were supposed to be safe because of the immense gold reserves which France and America held. In August a serious run on the Bank of England began. The bank had not enough gold to stand the strain. It borrowed £50,000,000 in francs
and dollars from France and America; and once more the interdependence of the world's finance was displayed, for France and America could not afford to let Britain collapse.

But the drain was so severe that in a few days the £50,000,000 was almost exhausted. The French and American bankers, sharing the general uncertainty about Britain's financial condition, made it clear that they would not make any further advances unless they were satisfied that the position would be restored, that the Budget would be balanced (though neither the French nor the American Budget was balanced), and, in particular, that the supposedly lavish expenditure upon the unemployment 'dole' in which Britain was believed to indulge, would be cut down. This, of course, depended upon the government. The Labour government was bewildered and unhappy when it was faced with this problem. Its members had apparently no clear ideas as to how the situation should be handled. They agreed to drastic cuts in expenditure; but the majority would not agree to any reduction of unemployment pay, though the Prime Minister and three other members of the Cabinet supported this course.

On this issue the Labour ministry broke up. The leaders of the other parties had already been in consultation with the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and had promised full support if the government would undertake to carry out what they regarded as the necessary steps. They now combined with the Prime Minister and those of his colleagues who shared his views to form a National government, for the express purpose of restoring financial stability. An advance of £80,000,000 was obtained from France and America; a new Budget was framed, whereby borrowing for unemployment pay was stopped, sharp reductions (embodied in an Economy Act) were made in the pay of soldiers, sailors, policemen, and other public employees, the amounts payable for unemployment relief were reduced, and heavy new taxes were imposed to ensure a balance of income against expenditure.

But before these measures could be carried through, the £80,000,000 of borrowed money had gone the same way as the £50,000,000 which preceded it; and on September 20th, 1931, Britain was constrained to abandon the Gold Standard, for the preservation of which so great sacrifices had been made. The Bank of England was empowered to refuse to give gold in return for its notes, and this meant that there
was no guarantee that British money was worth a defined weight in gold.

The most alarming pictures had been drawn of the consequences that were likely to follow if Britain went off gold. But the actual consequences were far from alarming. The value of the pound in foreign countries fell rapidly to the equivalent in gold of thirteen or fourteen shillings: its value wavered according to the course of trade, now that it was no longer fixed to gold, but it remained pretty steady round about fourteen shillings. It was only in foreign trade that this decline took place: at home the pound could still buy practically the same amount of goods, and ordinary people noticed very little difference. But the effect of the change in foreign trade was considerable. A pound had now to be paid for about fourteen shillings worth of imported goods; and therefore fewer imported goods were bought, and imports declined. But the foreign buyer could now get £1 worth of British goods for about fourteen shillings of his money, and therefore he bought more: exports rapidly went up, and unemployment, which was worst in the export trades, went down. In short, the handicap which had been inflicted on trade by the return to gold at too high a level in 1925, was removed. In spite of all the outcry, the departure from gold brought greater advantages than disadvantages.

Very soon, however, other countries began to follow the British example, and in a few months half the world had left the Gold Standard. So far as these countries were concerned, this diminished, though it did not destroy, the British advantage in export trade. But it seemed to expose the world to the risk of violently fluctuating currencies, which would make trading difficult. Many of the countries that had deserted gold tried to secure the stability of their money by keeping it in relation with the pound, which became a new standard of value. There were now three groups of countries, so far as money was concerned: the gold countries (America, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Switzerland); the 'sterling' countries (Britain, the Scandinavian countries, and others); and the countries that let their money fluctuate, without binding it either to gold or to sterling, such as Japan. So the world was back again in a state of monetary confusion.
§ 4. The National Government in Britain.

Meanwhile, in Britain, the Conservatives were strongly demanding a General Election to give the country a chance of declaring its support of the National government; they were also maintaining that Britain, like the rest of the world, must adopt a tariff policy if she was to escape from her difficulties. It is probable that the greater part of the country had now come to the view that Britain could no longer adhere to Free Trade in a Protectionist world. The election took place in October, and resulted in the return of an overwhelming majority of Conservatives. The Labour Party was discredited by its failure to grapple with the crisis, and by the desertion of some of its best known leaders; it obtained 7,000,000 votes, but only fifty seats. The Liberals were deeply divided, one section under Sir John Simon being ready to support the tariff policy of the Conservatives, while a second, under Sir Herbert Samuel, supported the National government but remained loyal to Free Trade, and a third, under Mr. Lloyd George, opposed the government outright on the ground that it intended to abandon Free Trade. A small group of Labour supporters of the government only obtained their seats with the aid of Conservative and Liberal votes. The result of the election was therefore to give to the government a predominantly Conservative complexion, and it was reconstituted accordingly.

Its main business was the introduction of a complete system of Protection in Britain, after nearly ninety years of Free Trade. The advocates of Protection hoped by this means to achieve a number of distinct objects: to rectify the balance of trade, which was already being rectified by the departure from the Gold Standard; to raise a large revenue; to put an end to unemployment by fostering British industries. Unfortunately none of these ends was even partially achieved during the first year of Protection, possibly because of the continued decline of world trade, or possibly, as some contended, because Protection could not be expected to achieve these ends in Britain when it had totally failed to achieve them in other countries. Unemployment, which had declined after the abandonment of the Gold Standard, rose again after the establishment of full Protection in March 1932; the revenue yielded by tariffs was far smaller than had been anticipated: and
(if imports and exports of gold were included, as they had always been) the balance of trade was more adverse in 1932 than it had been in 1931. Moreover the introduction of protective tariffs inevitably had the effect of diminishing shipping by reducing both inward and outward cargoes, while it also increased the difficulty of getting payment on foreign investments, because the debtor countries could not so easily send their goods in payment. These were part of the price which necessarily had to be paid for the benefits of Protection.

The main measure whereby Protection was established in Britain came into force in March 1932. It imposed a general duty of 10 per cent. upon all goods imported from foreign countries, with a few named exceptions. At the same time a Tariff Commission of three members was set up, with power to fix duties at higher levels on selected imports—a power which was widely and rapidly used. The creation of this commission was a remarkable invasion of the control of Parliament over taxation; its object was to take tariffs out of the arena of party politics, and to ensure, if possible, that the corruption which is often encouraged by a protectionist system should be avoided. The range of goods covered by the new British tariffs was wider than that of most protectionist countries, though the level of most duties was lower than that of the high protectionist countries, such as America.

From all these duties, products coming from any part of the British Empire were provisionally exempted, pending an Imperial Economic Conference, which was held at Ottawa in the summer of 1932. The declared object of this conference was to bring about a general lowering of tariffs throughout the Empire, and so to set an example to the rest of the world. It cannot be said to have had this effect.

Empire countries were still free to send all their products into Britain without duty; but this was not held to be sufficient, and Britain undertook to impose new tariffs, or to raise the existing tariffs, against foreign countries in order to give a greater advantage to the Dominions. In the case of Britain, therefore, the result of the conference was a further increase of tariffs. On their side the Dominions refused to contemplate giving free admission to British products. Canada, who had recently increased her tariffs to almost prohibitive levels, agreed to reduce slightly some of these duties in Britain’s favour, though
not to the old level, but this was more than balanced by special duties which were imposed on British goods to counteract the depreciation of the pound. Australia reduced no duties, but undertook to increase her tariffs against non-British goods. She also abolished the prohibition of certain imports which she had introduced as an emergency measure.

A further result of the Ottawa Conference was that the non-self-governing colonies were called upon to give preferential treatment to Empire goods. This was a very important departure from the system whereby the trade of all these lands had been thrown open on equal terms to the traders of all nations, a policy which had reconciled the world to the immense proportion of the earth's surface brought under British control.

There had been some who hoped that the British Empire might be turned into a single economic system, with complete freedom of trade between its members, and a common tariff against the rest of the world. This plan made no progress at Ottawa; it was wrecked upon the determined economic nationalism of the Dominions; and the net result of the Ottawa Conference was to increase the barriers to the free movement of trade throughout the world. The Liberals under Sir Herbert Samuel regarded the Ottawa agreements as so serious a departure from sound principle that they withdrew from the government.

One of the main objects of the National government was to bring about a revival of British agriculture, which was in a very bad way. But it seemed impossible to do this by means of tariffs, partly because taxes on food are unpopular, still more because the products of the Dominions, the chief competitors of the British farmer, could not be taxed. As the farmer was being taxed already on his implements, fertilisers and feeding stuffs, some method of helping him must be found. In the case of wheat, the method adopted was that of a subsidy: the wheat grower was guaranteed a minimum price of about 45s. for every quarter of millable wheat he produced; the market price of wheat being about 26s. a quarter, this meant that nearly £1 a quarter had to be got somewhere. It was got by a levy on every sack of flour sold in the country, whether it came from Britain, the Dominions, or a foreign country: the cost, of course, fell upon the consumer; during the first year it amounted to about £5,000,000.

For other agricultural products a different method, that
of the quota, was employed. The government undertook to decide how much of each kind of food was to be produced at home, and how much was to be imported from each Dominion or foreign country from which supplies were derived. The effect, and indeed the purpose, of these arrangements was to raise prices by producing an artificial scarcity, and thereby to encourage home production. The system necessitated a high degree of control over the home producer. Government control over trade and industry had, in fact, never before been carried so far; and there were some who doubted whether any government could efficiently perform such complicated functions. On the other hand, there were many who welcomed the introduction of this method of State control, and hoped that it would be extended gradually over the whole range of industry and would lead to a 'planned economy,' in which government control would be substituted for unregulated liberty of production. When these pages were written, the system was still in its infancy; time alone will show what its results will be. But one of its first results was necessarily the creation of still further obstacles to the free movement of world-trade.

The most remarkable achievement of the National government was the conversion of War Loan, whereby a very large annual saving was made. The holders of a great mass of 5 per cent. War Loan, which was repayable between 1929 and 1947, were given the option either of accepting new stock bearing interest at 3½ per cent. in place of their 5 per cent. stock, or of being paid off in cash. Nearly all of them accepted the new stock, at the sacrifice of almost one-third of their income. Many accepted it for patriotic reasons; others because, in the deplorable condition of industry, they could see no alternative investment which would be equally safe. It was thus mainly the bad condition of British industry which made this great transaction—the greatest of its kind in financial history—practicable. But even with this large saving, and with the revenue from tariff duties, the Chancellor of the Exchequer found it no easy matter to keep his Budget balanced in 1933. There was no reduction of taxation, except on beer; and this was only made possible by the suspension of the Sinking Fund for the redemption of debt. Nevertheless, stability had been restored in British finance; the credit of Britain had been re-established; and foreign depositors once more began to send their money to Britain.
§ 5. Political Difficulties: Japan; Disarmament.

While all the governments in the world were distracted by the economic chaos which had resulted from their own mistaken policies, political issues of the gravest kind were also arising, which threatened ruin to the whole system of peace designed in 1919.

In September 1931, Japan, under some provocation, suddenly took the aggressive in the great province of Manchuria, which formed a part of the Chinese Empire and was almost wholly peopled by Chinese. Her pretext was that she had to guard the chief Manchurian railway, which she controlled. Manchuria was rapidly overrun, its capital, Mukden, was occupied, and a puppet State, called the Republic of Manchukuo, was set up under Japanese protection. This high-handed action was a manifest breach of the Covenant of the League; it was a breach of the Pact of Paris, whereby Japan had pledged herself not to use war as an instrument of policy; and it was a breach of the Nine Power Treaty, whereby Japan (with other countries) had pledged herself to respect the integrity of China. If the collective system of peace was to have any meaning at all, and if the nations were to have any confidence in the League, this defiance by a Great Power would have to be firmly withstood.

But when an appeal was made to the League, the principal powers, not wishing to be involved in trouble with Japan, took the view that a state of war, such as would bring the provisions of the League into operation, did not exist, since neither side had formally declared war. Even when the Japanese attacked the Chinese in the great city of Shanghai, imperilling the lives of thousands of European residents; even when Japanese aeroplanes bombed the camps in which the refugees from terrible Chinese floods had been collected under an officer appointed by the League, the powers took no action. They contented themselves with sending out a special mission, under Lord Lytton, with members from America, France, Germany, and Italy, to report on the whole situation: its enquiries occupied many months.

A militarist party had seized the reins of power in Japan, and they had chosen the moment skilfully for the initiation of a policy of conquest. China was in a state of grave disorganisation; her most fertile regions had been devastated.
by great floods; and all the Great Powers were so much occupied with their own troubles that they were not likely to interfere. Thus in the midst of the economic crisis, the whole system of the League was openly challenged.

In January 1932 the United States addressed a protest to Japan, in which she refused to recognise any acquisition of territory made by force in contravention of the Pact of Paris. She invited the other powers, and in particular Britain, as the power most deeply concerned in the Far East, to support this action. Britain definitely refused to do so, giving as her reason that Japan had promised not to interfere with British trade in Manchuria; but the real reason was that she feared to be drawn into a war with Japan, which might endanger Singapore and Hong Kong. Thus Japan was given clearly to understand that the nations would do nothing to check her action, and would not bring into being the 'sanctions' provided by the Covenant. When the Lytton Mission presented a unanimous report which, after making every allowance for the disturbed condition of China, unmistakably condemned the action of Japan, and proposed practicable measures for dealing with the situation, the League, after some delay, endorsed the report; but it did no more—it did not even consider whether anything more could be done; 'in the interests of peace,' it left the aggressor to profit by his aggression. Japan contempituously resigned from the League; but meanwhile she continued her conquests, overrunning the rich province of Jehol, crossing the Great Wall, and threatening Peking itself. Not only had China learnt that the League would do nothing for her; every other country had learnt that, when it had to deal with a strong and ruthless power, the League seemed to be a broken reed. These events may prove to have been a turning-point in history, marking the breakdown of the first great attempt to organise world peace. The responsibility for them rests not with the League system, but with the failure of the powers to use that system, and their unwillingness to take any risks for peace.

It was in the atmosphere created by the Japanese defiance of the whole system of peace that the great Disarmament Conference, for which the League's officials and committees had been so long preparing, met in February 1932; and although at the date of its meeting the full extent of the failure was not yet apparent, the discussions of disarmament were almost from the first condemned to futility. The friends
of peace throughout the world had hoped that, at the least, the nations might agree to abandon the 'aggressive weapons' which had been forbidden to Germany—big battleships, submarines, mobile big guns, tanks, and bombing aeroplanes; for all nations knew what ruin could be wrought by these instruments of destruction, against some of which there is no effective defence. Italy actually proposed the abolition of aggressive weapons; France proposed to provide the League with a powerful force; America proposed that every country should cut down its armaments by one-third; Britain urged the abolition of submarines, but she would not abandon big battleships, against which other countries regarded submarines as the best defence; she was willing to abandon large tanks, larger than all but the biggest she possessed; she was willing to abandon bombing aeroplanes, provided that she was free to use them in frontier wars. But no agreement was reached upon any of these proposals; the conference lost itself in a maze of technical arguments, and concluded its first session, after months of discussion, with a series of pious resolutions, which had no practical effect.

In the second session (1932-33), realising the grave results that might follow from a total failure, Britain put forward a modest programme upon which it was hoped that agreement might be reached. But by this time the seriousness of Japan's defiance had become clear; since the League system seemed to have broken down, no country was willing to strip itself of its defences; and the second session was as devoid of practical results as the first.

§ 6. Revolution in Germany.

Meanwhile a situation of gravity had arisen nearer home than China. The German people were reaching the limit of their endurance. Their savings had been wiped out by the great inflation. They had more than 6,000,000 unemployed workers. Their wages and salaries had been drastically reduced. The prices of all necessaries had been greatly increased by tariffs on imported food. Their foreign trade had been almost destroyed by tariffs, quotas, and other restrictions—'their own and other peoples'. They had lost confidence in the pacific and democratic system which had been established in 1919. It is true that Stresemann's and Brüning's policy of international co-operation had brought some advantages. But it had not saved the German people
from a distress that was deeper than that of any other country. They were still loaded with an intolerable burden of reparation payments, which would last for half a century. They seemed to be on the verge of national bankruptcy, and they dreaded another inflation like that of 1923. And they were still disarmed and defenceless in the midst of armed neighbours; no step had been taken towards the fulfilment of the promise that their compulsory disarmament should be followed by the disarmament of other countries, and the discussions on the Disarmament Conference seemed to indicate that no advance was likely. They put forward a demand for ‘equality of status’ in armaments, which meant that if the other countries would not disarm, Germany would rearm.

In one respect, indeed, the situation was clarified in 1932. The payment of reparations and debts had been (as we have seen) suspended for a year in July 1931, because they manifestly could not be paid without producing chaos. During this year’s respite, the question had to be finally settled if chaos was to be avoided. The governments (because of elections first in France and then in Germany) had postponed the consideration of these problems until the eleventh hour. In June 1932 a conference on reparations and debts met at Lausanne; and in view of the world’s desperate plight, even France was brought to agree that the continued exaction of reparations was impossible. Germany was let off with one final payment; even this was not to be made until her financial situation had improved; and even then it was to go, not to the allies, but to a fund for the reconstruction of Europe. This was an immense advance: if it had been made a few years earlier, it would have changed the whole situation.

But if no more reparations were to be paid, how were Britain, France, and the other countries to meet their debts to America? These countries therefore added to the Lausanne Treaty a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ wherein they declared that the settlement of reparations was conditional upon the settlement of international debts. America, however, would not accept this condition. She insisted upon payment in full; and when the time came for the payment of the next instalment, in December 1932, Britain paid only under protest, as a contribution to a final settlement; while France refused to pay at all. But these difficulties did not affect the Lausanne agreement. Nothing was more certain than that Germany would never pay another penny: her
people were already resolved on this, so that the Lausanne agreement did not appear to them as a valuable concession.

Germany, indeed, was ripe for revolution. The choice seemed to be between a Communist revolution, which would range her with Russia; or a Nationalist revolution like that of Italy, which might turn her into a disturbing factor in Europe, and perhaps bring very near the menace of war. The League of Nations, having failed to deal with Japan, could obviously be disregarded. In every part of Germany recruits, especially young men, were enrolling themselves in the National-Socialist, or Nazi Party, under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, an eloquent demagogue, who preached that Germany must rely upon her own strength, regain her old fighting spirit, and abandon the futile attempt to obtain justice by international co-operation; she must rearm, and fight for her rights, since her enemies would not disarm. Evidently the régime of moderation and pacific methods, initiated in 1919, was doomed to failure. Its last upholder was Brüning, a man of integrity and devotion, who did his best. But he had to do unpopular things. He had no majority in the German Parliament; repeated elections only weakened his position, and strengthened both the Nazis and the Communists. For a time he tried to govern by edicts, without Parliament, backed by President Hindenburg. But he failed. Hindenburg then gave office to the Conservatives; but they also had no majority, for the Nazis and the Communists, the two revolutionary parties, though neither was strong enough to govern through Parliament, were strong enough to make other governments impossible.

Finally, the President had to give office to Hitler, who became Chancellor of the German Reich. Hitler at once demanded a new election (February 1933), and prepared for it by arbitrarily arresting the Communist and Socialist leaders, and by forbidding all the democratic parties to hold meetings. On the eve of the election, the Reichstag building was burnt down. The outrage was officially attributed to the Communists; and this was made the excuse for a more ferocious persecution of Communists and others. A reign of terror was established by the brown-shirted braves of the Nazi party. The result of the election was a foregone conclusion. Installed in effective power, Hitler and his colleagues proceeded to suppress all criticism, by speech or in the press, and initiated a brutal persecution not only of Communists but of Socialists, Liberals, internationalists, and, more particularly, of the Jews, who were ousted from every position,
and at the same time forbidden to leave the country; murders, arbitrary floggings, wholesale imprisonments without any pretence of legal justification, became things of everyday occurrence; every party organisation except that of the Nazis was compulsorily wound up. The wheel had come full circle. Germany was in a still more violently militarist temper than before the war, and the democratic system, which had promised to turn her into a pacific nation, had been effectively destroyed. She had joined Russia and Italy in the abolition of the fundamental liberties of thought and speech and voluntary association which had seemed to be firmly established as essential marks of a free State.

It was futile to talk of controlling this dangerous upheaval through the League of Nations; for the League was discredited by the failure of its leading members to deal firmly with Japan, and by the futility of the discussions in the Disarmament Conference. Only one thing might still amend this dangerous situation. If the nations, recognising at last their mutual dependence, could come to some agreement for co-operation in the economic sphere, whereby the currents of trade could be set flowing again, and men could be enabled to enjoy the abundance which was within their reach, these excitements, mainly born of economic distress, might die down.

§ 7. The World Economic Conference.

At the Conference of Lausanne, when the reparation settlement was reached, the powers there represented had agreed to ask the League of Nations to summon a World Economic Conference, to discover what could be done by co-operation to rescue the world from its distresses. The League appointed a preliminary commission of experts to draw up the agenda, and this commission gave to the world a clear exposition of what needed to be done to restore prosperity. Prices must be raised to a level which would be remunerative to producers, and enable them to buy the manufactured goods they needed. The problem of international debts, which had greatly contributed to dislocate the world's economic system, must be solved. Stability must be restored to the world's monetary system. And the existing barriers to trade—tariffs, quotas, exchange restrictions, and so forth—must be greatly reduced or abolished.
But the low level of prices was due partly to monetary confusion, and partly to the trade barriers which prevented producers from selling their goods. The difficulty of paying debts was, at least in part, due to the fact that the creditor countries, by means of trade barriers, would not allow their debtors to pay them in goods. The breakdown of the Gold Standard was due to the same fact, because the world's gold was all going to the creditor countries that refused to accept goods. And thus it appeared that the root of the whole problem was to be found in the obstacles to trade created by governments that were striving after self-sufficiency, and ruining themselves and one another in the process. Would the nations be prepared to abandon, or to qualify, their fierce economic nationalism in face of the distress to which it had condemned them all? On the answer to that question depended the possibility of success for the conference.

The meeting of the conference was postponed for a whole year by the American Presidential Election. This election took place in November 1932, when, by a sweeping turnover of votes, the Democratic candidate, Franklin Roosevelt, was elected; but by a curious provision of the American constitution, the newly elected President could not assume office until the following March. He made it clear that the question of debts must not be discussed in the conference; each debtor must make his own arrangements with America; and when the next instalment became due in June, France once again: refused to pay anything, while Britain made a nominal or token payment, without prejudice to the ultimate settlement. Thus one of the vital issues was withdrawn from the purview of the conference. President Roosevelt at once launched out upon immense schemes for the recovery of America, without regard to the rest of the world. One of his early acts was the abandonment of the Gold Standard, not under any such pressure as had forced Britain to take this step, but as a deliberately adopted method for raising home prices, and improving the competitive power of America in the export trade; and this made the stabilisation of currencies—the second vital issue of the conference—more difficult to attain. He also undertook a huge programme of public works, as the best way of finding work for America's 12,000,000 unemployed, and of getting idle money into circulation.

When the conference met in London in July 1933, it was universally felt that it must not be allowed to fail; and the
chief American delegate declared that any country which took the responsibility of impeding its success would deserve the execration of humanity. But a few weeks sufficed to show that nothing of value could be achieved. International debts were ruled out. On the subject of money, the countries still on gold were eager for at least a temporary stabilisation of the various currencies: they held that this was the most vital issue of all; they could not see that neither the Gold Standard nor any other international standard could work in a tariff-ridden world, and that the same causes which had brought about the breakdown of the arrangements of 1924-29 would bring about the breakdown of any other arrangement. America refused to agree to any stabilisation until she had seen what could be done by a depreciation of the dollar to cure her own troubles; Britain proclaimed her desire for stabilisation by a return to the Gold Standard, but insisted that this would be impossible until prices had been raised. There are two ways of raising prices. One is by increasing the demand for goods on the part of consumers everywhere; but this involved a reduction of trade barriers, though it might be helped by public works. Many countries, including America, were anxious that all countries should agree to undertake public works on a large scale, in order to get idle money into the hands of the people; but Britain declared, through Mr. Runciman, that she would have nothing to do with this scheme. The other way of raising prices is to create an artificial scarcity, and this, on the whole, was the method preferred by the conference, few of whose members were willing to contemplate a reduction of trade barriers. In fact, the only practical outcome of the conference—reached after it had adjourned—was an agreement by the great grain-exporting countries to reduce the amount they produced for export by a uniform 15 per cent.

As for the removal of obstacles to international trade (which had been the chief cause of all the trouble), this was not seriously discussed. Britain said she was in favour of the reduction of excessive tariffs, but no attempt was made to define the word excessive: each country clung to the belief that while the tariffs of other countries might be excessive, its own tariffs were just and necessary means of defence. Britain also declared her disbelief in any attempt to reduce tariffs either by general agreement or by agreements between groups of countries; she held that the best results could be obtained by agreements between individual
countries. Nor could any common view be reached on quotas and other forms of trade restriction: Britain maintained that while ‘arbitrary’ quotas were mischievous, ‘production or marketing’ quotas were beneficial. There is no quota system which might not be described as designed to affect production or marketing; and none that its authors would consent to describe as ‘arbitrary’.

The result of the discussions was that apparently nothing could be done by international agreement to restore the currents of world trade. Like the Disarmament Conference, the Economic Conference did not dissolve; it adjourned, in the hope of meeting again in more favourable circumstances, and for that reason it was held not to have failed completely.

The failure of the Economic Conference was soon followed by a breakdown of the Disarmament Conference. In the third session of the conference, in the autumn of 1933, it had seemed that agreement might be reached upon a modest programme which would, in the course of five years, bring down the armaments of the heavily armed powers to something like a level with those of Germany, while all countries were to be brought under a form of international supervision. But the alarm aroused by the militarist temper of the new government in Germany led to a proposal that the process of reduction should be delayed. Thereupon Germany withdrew from the conference, and announced her intention of withdrawing from the League of Nations. These successive blows to the cause of peace and of international cooperation seemed to make it clear that, in their existing temper, the rulers of the world were incapable of obtaining by common agreement either the security or the prosperity which cannot be obtained in any other way.

For the present, therefore, our story has to close on a record of failure, leaving Britain, and the British Commonwealth, and the whole world, tormented, unhappy, and uncertain of the future. The world has to choose between the recognition and acceptance of its interdependence, which will assure to it established peace and a widely diffused prosperity; or a continuance of the jealous rivalry of mutually suspicious nations, alike in arms and in trade, which can only end in the ruin of civilisation. For the moment it seems to have chosen the second course. But the best minds in all lands know that the first is the line of safety. The world waits and longs for leadership: it ‘sees the better course and approves it,’ even if it ‘follows
the worse course.' It is to Britain, beyond all other countries, that it looks for leadership. And the greatest question of to-day is this:—Can Britain and the British Commonwealth point the way? They have shown by their own achievements the possibility of assured peace among a multitude of very various peoples. Can they also demonstrate the possibility of organised co-operation in the pursuit of well-being and justice?
EPILOGUE 1933-1939

I

The last edition of this book ended at a depressing moment. In 1933 the trade depression was at its worst; the World Economic Conference had failed to take any steps to relieve it; the Disarmament Conference had broken down; and Hitler and his Nazis had established their power in Germany. The New Order initiated in 1919 had evidently failed to bring either secure peace or prosperity to the World.

During the following six years the situation became steadily worse. It became more and more evident that a formidable challenge was being directed against democracy and all the liberties which it embodies. The reign of law, freedom of discussion, the control of peoples over their Governments, toleration of religious and political differences, the growing kindliness of man towards man, and the growing recognition of the rights and claims of the mass of working people—all these things, which had been the greatest achievements in the progress of civilisation during the modern age, were repudiated by the 'totalitarian' forms of despotic government which had already been established in Russia and in Italy, and which had now been established in Germany also. At the same time, the sanctity of treaties and agreements between nations, which is the only foundation of security in international relations, was cynically disregarded by the totalitarian States. If this ugly reaction towards mere barbarism were allowed to triumph, the essentials of a civilised way of life would be destroyed; the slow advance of centuries would be undone; and the world would relapse into the conditions of the jungle.

It was in Nazi Germany that this ugly reaction was seen at its worst; and this was the more serious because Germany is, and must be, the pivotal State of Europe. There is something in the character of the German people, as it has been moulded by history, which seems to make them peculiarly liable to be carried away by a strange ferocity, and to condone brutal and uncivilised conduct if it seems to bring them material success. To go no further back
than the last forty years of the nineteenth century, Bismarck had created German unity by the methods of 'blood and iron,' and by waging three successive wars of naked aggression; and the German people had eagerly acclaimed his success. In the Great War of 1914-1918, Imperial Germany had displayed a callous disregard of civilised usage which was with difficulty resisted by the more civilised peoples; and the German people had accepted these methods without question. And now this worship of brute force, this unrestrained cruelty, this repudiation of all restraints in the imposition of their power, had once again taken control of the German people, in a more violent and dangerous form than ever, so that it threatened not only the peace of the world but the very survival of civilisation.

The unflinching barbarity of the Nazi regime aroused the horror of the world even in its early manifestations within Germany itself. But the civilised peoples were very slow to realise the danger which this evil spirit threatened to themselves and to civilisation. Even in the democratic countries there were many who rejoiced to see the establishment of 'firm government' in a disordered country, and who strove to convince themselves that German Nazism would be a bulwark against what they regarded as the worse horror of Russian Bolshevism. Instead of checking the evil at the outset, as they might easily have done, they allowed it to grow; and, in their dread of being drawn into another war, looked on while Nazism won one easy triumph after another, and even helped it to win its successes. It was not until the insatiable ambitions of the ruthless masters of Germany were fully revealed in 1939, not until Germany had almost won the domination of Europe, that Britain and France realised the danger, and plucked up their courage to resist.

The rapid development of the German menace was the outstanding fact of the years from 1933 to 1939. Although many other great events were taking place in these years—in India, in Palestine, in China, as well as in the development of British social and political institutions at home—they were all dwarfed by this supreme menace. We make, therefore, no excuse for concentrating attention upon it.

Yet the statesmen of the world had little excuse for their blindness. Their own errors of policy had made the rise of Hitler possible. They ought to have realised that Germany had reached a stage in which she was ripe for revolution.
Her government was discredited. She had 6,000,000 unemployed. Her middle class, the most stable element in the country, had been ruined by the great inflation. The young men of that class, hopeless about the future, were enrolling themselves in the Nazi gangs by thousands, and were ready for any violence. The great German industrialists, fearful of democracy, were ready to finance an attempt to overthrow it. And the German tradition favoured violence. All these factors provided materials for the reckless fanaticism of Hitler.

What is more, Hitler himself had defined his ideas and aims, even before he came to power, with a fulness never paralleled by any revolutionary leader, in a book which became the Nazi Bible—*Mein Kampf*. Strangely enough, the statesmen of the democracies paid no attention to this illuminating revelation: perhaps they regarded it as the indiscretion of a politician out of power, which would be forgotten when he reached office. But even Hitler's first acts were so much in accord with the spirit of *Mein Kampf* that it ought to have been studied.

This book, the first part of which was written during Hitler’s imprisonment after the humiliating failure of his first attempt to seize power in 1923, still forms the fullest exposition of the aims of the Nazi system. Hitler has been distinguished by his faithlessness to all the most solemn pledges and undertakings he has given, for he regards such pledges as merely temporary devices to throw dust in the eyes of his intended victims. But he has never wavered in his adherence to the main ideas embodied in *Mein Kampf*. If we would understand the real nature of the crisis of civilisation into which we have been plunged, we must first attempt to grasp the governing ideas of the Nazi creed, as they have been expounded in *Mein Kampf*, and subsequently developed in action.

II

Hitler's dominating idea, the inspiration of all his thinking, was a belief in the purity and greatness of the German race, and in its divinely appointed destiny to rule the world. This was, of course, unscientific nonsense, for the German people, like all others, are of very mixed stock. But it was an idea which was readily welcomed among a people suffering from the humiliation of defeat. Hitler assured his hearers (and he was a demagogue of genius) that the Germans were
invincible, and that their apparent defeat in 1918 had been due to treason from within; Jews, Communists, Socialists, Liberals and other contemptible people had stabbed her in the back in the moment of her trial. If she was to regain her rightful position in the world, she must get rid of these dangerous elements without pity; and trust, not to Leagues of Nations and other sentimental notions, but to her own strong right arm. Nor must any lesser race be allowed to stand in the way of the fulfilment of her destiny. Other races had no rights at all, if they impeded the victory of the Germans, who must harden their hearts and be merciless in dealing with them. The immediate need of the Germans was more lebenstraum, living-space, which must be got at the expense of neighbouring but inferior peoples; and no sentiment of pity must prevent their being cleared out to make room for the noble Germans.

The vast majority even of the Germans were, in Hitler’s view, quite incapable of ruling themselves. They were mere sheep, whose minds were being poisoned by the ideas of democracy. They must be led, or driven, to the fulfilment of their destiny by a Führer who could control not only their actions but their very thoughts; and a lordly class of Herren, chosen without regard to descent or wealth, must be trained to be hard and merciless so that they might be fitting instruments for the Führer’s will, fitting masters for the sheep-like people.

To bring the people into the right attitude of submissiveness, all instruments were legitimate. The people must be preserved from the infection of other ideas by being shut off from every influence coming from the rest of the world; their ears must be closed to the wireless news, and their eyes to the newspapers, of other countries. The whole of their own press must be turned into a mere echo of their Führer’s ideas.

No political writer has ever shown a more profound belief in the efficacy of propaganda than Hitler. The object of propaganda for him was, not to diffuse a knowledge of the truth, but to hammer into men’s minds by constant repetition (without any possibility of contradiction) the ideas which their Führer wanted them to hold; and if lies served the purpose lies must be used—the bigger the lie, the more effective it might be, provided that it was unflaggingly asserted and no contradiction was permitted. In Goebbels Hitler found a very efficient instrument for the execution
of this plan, which he cynically confesses in Mein Kampf. The greatness and prevailing power of truth is to Hitler as much a figment as justice, honour or faithfulness to obligations.

But propaganda, however skilful, was not enough: it had to be reinforced by terror. A gigantic force of secret police, the Gestapo, using the horrors of concentration camps, and backed by armies of young braves who had learnt to identify brutality with manliness, must bring the powerful influence of fear to work upon the minds of the people, to make them abject; children must be made to act as informers against their parents, so that all might learn to avoid even whispered criticism of their masters. In Himmler Hitler found a police chief more ingenious and more pitiless than Fouché, Napoleon's terrible secret service chief.

Finally the whole system of education, and the whole machinery of compulsory service not only in the army but in labour battalions and in other ways, must be employed to indoctrinate the whole nation, and especially its youth, with the same body of ideas. All must learn to think alike, to accept the duty of utter submission, to recognise that the individual has no rights at all against the State. The worship of the State has never been carried to so high a point as under the Nazi regime. And, since religion has always been the most potent influence against this kind of idolatry, both the Roman Catholic and the Protestant communions must be forced to make themselves the instruments of State-idolatry, or suffer persecution. There was even talk about the creation of a new nationalist religion, drawing its inspiration from the old pagan gods. Race-idolatry and State-idolatry must become the real religion of the Germans.

Thus tamed and enslaved, the great German people were to be turned into a mighty army, with all its powers and all its resources concentrated upon a single end, the subjugation first of Europe and ultimately of the world. It took some time to convert the German people to this point of view; but terrorism and propaganda, ruthlessly and scientifically directed, had an amazing effect; and every success that Hitler won increased his hold upon the minds and the imaginations of the subjects whose very souls he was poisoning.

It was difficult for the statesmen and peoples of civilised countries to believe that designs so vast, destructive and malign could be harboured by the rulers and people of a
great country. It was all the more difficult because, from the moment of his advent to power, Hitler constantly posed as a lover of peace. The sincerity of this pose may be measured by his statement, in *Mein Kampf*, that those who desire peace should strive for a German victory; for this means, if it means anything, that there would be no hope of peace until Germany had conquered the world.

Yet there is a sense in which Hitler did desire peace. He desired, and hoped, to win his victories without having to fight for them. This expectation, which was for several years amazingly fulfilled, was based upon a shrewd estimation of the European situation.

In the first place he saw that there were many small States in Europe—mostly neighbours of Germany—which were individually too weak to resist pressure from a Great Power. In most of them there were groups of German-speaking citizens, who could be used to create disorders and represented as the victims of oppression. These small States, whose independence had been loyally respected during the nineteenth century (until Germany invaded Belgium in 1914), had hoped to be protected by the system of collective security envisaged by the League of Nations. Once they lost this hope, they could have no refuge but a declaration of neutrality, which could be as easily broken as the neutrality of Belgium. The existence of these little States offered, indeed, a positive temptation to aggressors.

For dealing with small States Hitler worked out a skilful technique of treachery. First he would lull them into a false confidence by giving them the most positive assurances of his peaceful intentions, or even (as in the case of Poland) by signing a treaty of non-aggression for a long period of years. Then, at a convenient moment, he would stir up unrest among the German-speaking inhabitants of the doomed country, and let loose the controlled German press in a campaign of virulent abuse and protest against the imaginary oppression of Germans. Meanwhile he would have armies secretly mobilised; and when the right moment came, without warning, but with loud assertions that his patience was exhausted, he would overrun the territory of his victim.

This method, he believed, would be successful, because he was convinced that the great democracies hated the idea of war, and were utterly decadent. Some of the dominant elements in them even sympathised with him. They would
not attempt to fulfil their obligations under the Covenant of the League; in any case, they would not be able to act in time; and, when presented with an accomplished fact, they would submit to it with feeble protests. Every time this happened, the prestige of the democracies would decline, the small nations would be more unready to trust to their protection, and the power of Germany would grow, until finally no resistance would be possible. Maps were even allowed to be printed and circulated in Germany showing the dated stages in which Europe was to be conquered.

These Machiavellian plans were not, indeed, openly displayed in Mein Kampf. They were revealed gradually in the course of events; but they were entirely in accord with the programme of Mein Kampf. They won for Hitler a succession of easy triumphs, which secured the hold he had established over the German people by means of propaganda and terrorism. He seems to have persuaded himself that victory would always be as easy, and was driven to paroxysms of fury when at length, in 1939, Britain and France resolved that a stand must be made, and showed themselves inflexible.

It is necessary to trace the stages in the growth of this ugly and threatening power, which menaced the survival of all the advances that civilisation had made during the modern age.

III

The accession of the Nazis to power at the beginning of 1933 was almost accidental. The influence of the party was rapidly declining in 1932, as was shown in the results of the elections in that year. The party was almost bankrupt, and a great deal of money was required to support the huge gangs of bravoes upon which its strength depended. The President of the Republic, old Hindenburg, now almost senile, distrusted them. He was a Conservative Junker of the old school, who wanted to see the government of Germany in the hands of the Junkers. But the Conservative elements could not carry on, being in a small minority in the Reichstag. Their leader, von Papen, thought he could use the Nazis as tools; and, as Hitler would accept no office less than that of Chancellor, von Papen persuaded Hindenburg to confer that office upon him, surrounding him with a Cabinet in which the Conservative elements predominated.
Hitler had no intention of being a tool. He demanded a new election, in which all the resources of the Nazis and the terror of their gangs were to be used to secure a clear majority. In preparation for the election the Reichstag building was burnt down, and the blame was laid upon the Communists, who were the second largest party in the State. On this plea, all Communist members were excluded from the new Reichstag, and this ensured to the Nazis a fictitious majority. The majority was used to pass an Enabling Act, which empowered the Government to act upon its own authority, without consulting the Reichstag.

Thus entrenched in power, Hitler proceeded to employ the immense powers of a modern government with unflinching vigour. One by one all the other parties were forcibly dissolved, leaving the Nazis as the only legal party; and the Reichstag became a body of yes-men, summoned only to hear the dictates of their master. All the private armies which had been reducing Germany to chaos were suppressed—except the Nazi gangs, who became petty tyrants, carrying out the system of terrorism in every part of the country, without semblance of law. Huge concentration camps were constructed, in which Jews, Communists and all critics and opponents of the new régime were imprisoned, tortured, and often slain, without trial. The Reign of Terror had begun.

Even now, Hitler was not quite secure. Old Hindenburg was still President, and had to be consulted. The Conservatives, who had fondly hoped that Hitler would be their tool, were restless and discontented. Even in the Nazi Party itself there was a strong opposition element, headed by Ernst Roehm, Hitler’s earliest friend, and the chief organiser of his gangs, and Gregor Strasser, who had been thought of as Chancellor. In 1934, Hitler overcame these limitations upon his absolutism. Hindenburg died, and Hitler had himself elected as his successor, combining the offices of President and Chancellor; but he preferred to be known as the Führer or Leader. The other obstacles he got rid of by wholesale murders, in June, 1934: the hundreds of victims included some of his earliest friends, as well as some of the Conservative leaders, such as Schleicher, who had been Chancellor. All the leading personalities who could do so escaped from the country; and the possible leaders of an opposition, the possible organisers of an alternative government, were now either dead, or in exile, or undergoing the tortures of a concentration camp.
The German people found themselves the subjects of an unlimited and ruthless despotism, the vilest that had ever existed in any European country. Many of them submitted willingly, especially as they were not allowed to know what went on in the concentration camps. Many others, perhaps a majority until they were dazzled by Hitler’s brilliant successes in the realm of foreign conquest, waited for an opportunity of revolt. But revolt is not easy against the power that controls the machine-guns, and the system of terror was extremely efficient. The Trade Unions were suppressed, and all workers were brought under severe discipline. The Clergy were whipped into submission, with a few exceptions such as Pastor Niemöller on the Protestant side, and some of the more courageous Catholic leaders like Cardinal Faulhaber. Every element of opposition was forcibly subdued; and when the German people were called upon to cast their votes for the election of a Reichstag or in a plebiscite, they gave nearly a hundred per cent of their votes in support of the régime: it demanded heroism to give a negative vote under the eyes of the Gestapo. Hitler was able to demonstrate to the world that he had the whole German nation behind him—or under his heel.

IV

Meanwhile Hitler had begun to demonstrate his daring plans for the restoration of German strength, and this (together with the discipline of the schools) won for him the almost idolatrous devotion of youth. With a contemptuous gesture, he withdrew from the League of Nations. Defying the Treaty of Versailles, which he lost no opportunity of denouncing, he re-established universal compulsory military service, which won for him the support of the army chiefs, and set on foot gigantic schemes of rearmament; even earlier he had begun the creation of a colossal air-force, which was calculated to give pause to any powers that objected to his proceedings. Rearmament, combined with vast road-making schemes and other public works, brought unemployment to an end, and reconciled many of the workers to the loss of their liberties and the reduction of their standards of living. Complaints about the shortage of foodstuffs were met by the assertion that ‘guns are more important than butter.’ The German people were being disciplined to endure hardship, and to throw all their strength into
preparation for the far-reaching plans of conquest which Hitler envisaged.

Hitler's first objective was the incorporation of Austria in the German Reich. A few years earlier Austria might have welcomed an economic, though scarcely a political, union; but the spectacle of the Nazi tyranny was deterrent, and, on a free vote, a majority of the Austrians (especially the very numerous Jews) would have rejected union with Germany. The Austrian Chancellor, Dollfuss, strongly took this line, and made friends with Fascist Italy, which had no desire to have Germany as its immediate neighbour. Unhappily Dollfuss engaged in a fierce struggle with the Austrian Socialists, who were as much opposed to Nazism as Dollfuss himself; and the forces of resistance were divided. There was a small but noisy Nazi party in Austria. It was encouraged from Germany to create disorder; and finally attempted to seize the Government, and murdered Dollfuss (1934). At once Italian troops were massed on the Austrian frontier; and as the new German army was only in process of formation, and as yet unable to face a struggle with a first-class power, Hitler disowned the assassins, whom he later acclaimed as heroes and martyrs. For the moment Austria was safe; Hitler's first enterprise had failed.

V

But now a new distraction changed the European situation. In 1935 Mussolini, eager for the glory which would reconcile his subjects to the loss of their liberty, undertook the conquest of Abyssinia. This was a highly dishonourable enterprise, for Italy had sponsored the introduction of Abyssinia into the League of Nations, had concluded a treaty of arbitration with her, and had no real ground of complaint against her. It was also a very risky enterprise, for it involved the locking up of Italian armies in the Red Sea, where it would be very difficult to supply them, and where they could easily be cut off.

This was a supreme test of the efficacy of the League of Nations. If Italy had been warned beforehand that the machinery of the League would be brought into operation, and in particular that Britain and her navy would play their part, it is probable that she would have abandoned her scheme. She had doubtless calculated that Britain and
France, who wanted her support against Germany, would not interfere.

But when the campaign was about to begin, and it was too late for Mussolini to withdraw without a ruinous loss of prestige, the League of Nations, led by Britain, resolved to take action against Italy. The decision was received with enthusiasm, and fifty nations agreed to join in imposing "economic sanctions" against the aggressor. Nowhere was the enthusiasm greater than in Britain, where belief in the League of Nations was stronger than in any other country. The Government made use of this enthusiasm to precipitate a General Election, in which they obtained a huge majority for the policy of upholding the League, and for rearmament to make this policy effective.

Within a month of the election, the British and French foreign secretaries were planning to buy off Mussolini with half of Abyssinia. There was an outcry, and the British foreign minister had to resign. But this projected betrayal had killed enthusiasm. There was one 'sanction' which might have ensured the defeat of Italy. If she had been deprived of oil, she could not have used fully the aeroplanes and tanks with which she overwhelmed the almost unarmed Abyssinians. But this 'sanction' was not imposed, because Britain and France did not want to press Mussolini too hard. It was largely with oil supplied by British concerns that Abyssinia was overrun—though not subjugated.

In a few months, the League, once again led by Britain, acknowledged defeat and withdrew the sanctions. As a means of preventing aggression, the League seemed to be impotent. Mussolini trumpeted his triumph. He had learnt to despise Britain and France. He turned towards Germany, and the anti-German combination, for whose sake the League had been sacrificed, was broken up. These were the results of vacillating policy.

VI

Meanwhile Hitler had taken advantage of the opportunity afforded by the Abyssinian controversy. Under the Treaty of Versailles, the German Rhineland had been 'demilitarised,' that is to say, the Germans had been forbidden to raise fortifications or maintain troops in that region, as a safeguard against a new German attack upon France. This provision had been confirmed, and voluntarily accepted
by Germany, in the Locarno Treaties; and Hitler had spontaneously given a pledge that he would observe the Locarno Treaties 'with his whole heart.' This was an example of his technique of giving pledges in order to throw dust in the eyes of his opponents.

He now resolved upon a sudden military occupation of the Rhineland. The German generals warned him that this would be very dangerous. The new German army was not ready, and (it was estimated) would not be ready until 1940; it was short of officers, arms and munitions; and if Britain and France, or even France alone, should move, resistance would be impossible. Trusting to the reluctance of the democracies to engage in war, Hitler nevertheless took the risk of sending his ill-equipped armies into the Rhineland.

France and Britain took no action, save verbal protests against the one-sided repudiation of a solemn treaty. If they had acted, it is probable that the Hitler régime would have collapsed; for propaganda and terrorism had not yet done their work in Germany, and there were powerful elements of opposition. It was this first bloodless victory which later made it possible for Hitler to construct the Siegfried Line, to keep the western powers at bay while he worked his will in the East.

VII

An opportunity soon arrived to test the new friendship between Germany and Italy. Early in 1936 a general election in Spain gave power to a left-wing Government. The Liberals were the largest element among the supporters of the Government; there was also a substantial element of Socialists, and a handful of Communists. At first a coalition, the Government soon became Liberal. It was merely absurd to represent this regime as Communist or Bolshevik. Spain had suffered for a century from the oppressions of a reactionary landowning class, and an over-powerful obscurantist Church, which controlled the educational system. The new Government set to work to turn Spain into a modern, efficient democracy. But the old ruling class, and the army whose officers belonged to that class, broke into revolt, with the secret encouragement of Germany and Italy, and set up a dictatorial government. A civil war, marked by ferocity on both sides, began; but
the rebels did not win the early success that was anticipated.

Britain and France, acting together, urged that all the powers should agree upon a policy of non-intervention, and leave the Spaniards to settle their own concerns. Both Germany and Italy joined in this agreement. But while France and Britain refused to sell arms to either side (though the Spanish Government was entitled under international law to buy arms for its own defence), Italy and Germany from the first flouted the non-intervention agreement, and poured tanks and aeroplanes and technicians and even divisions of regular troops into Spain to help the rebels. The justification which they gave for this action was that they were fighting against Bolshevism. But their real aim was to extend the system of dictatorship, and, in preparation for a coming war against the democracies, to ensure that Spain, under a friendly government, should be in a position to close the Mediterranean to British and French ships, and to cut the communications between Britain and France and their oversea-empires.

Britain and France, in face of this brazen violation of the non-intervention agreement, might justly have repudiated the agreement, and, without sending troops to the aid of the Spanish Government, might have sold it the munitions which it desperately needed. If they had done so, the Spanish Government might very well have been victorious. But the British and French governments were so terrified of being drawn into war that they pretended to be unaware of what was happening, and even looked on idly while British ships, carrying not munitions but food to Spain, were bombed and sunk by Italian aeroplanes. The only power which sent any effectual aid to Spain was Russia; and even this help came to an end when the Spanish Government made it clear that it did not intend to pursue a Communist policy.

The British Government had come to the conclusion that the best way of averting a general war was to "appease" the dictators; and the policy of "appeasement" apparently required that they should be left free to work their will in Spain. So, after more than two years of desperate fighting, the Spanish Government was overwhelmed; and Spain fell under the rule of a dictatorship, closely linked to Italy and Germany.
Italy had played the chief part in the conquest of Spain. Germany had meanwhile been otherwise occupied. For, now that Italy was his friend, there was no reason why Hitler should not proceed with his interrupted designs against Austria. He pursued with great success the technique he had already worked out. He gave solemn pledges to respect the independence of Austria. He encouraged the Austrian Nazis to create disturbances, which made peaceful government very difficult. He demanded that the Austrian Chancellor, Schuschnigg, who had succeeded Dollfuss, should admit Nazis to key-positions in his Government, as a means of cultivating friendly relations; these men were in constant communication with Hitler. The German Press was used to suggest that the Austrian Nazis were being cruelly oppressed. Then Schuschnigg was persuaded to visit Hitler in his mountain fastness at Berchtesgaden, in order to talk things over in a friendly way. Hitler raved and stormed at him until the unhappy man completely lost his nerve; realising that the destruction of Austria was planned, and that no help could be expected from Italy. In order to show that the Austrian people did not wish to be absorbed in Germany, Schuschnigg announced a plebiscite. At once orders came from Hitler that the plebiscite must be abandoned, and threats that there would be an immediate invasion unless Schuschnigg resigned.

Meanwhile German troops, tanks and aeroplanes had been massed on the Austrian frontiers, and Italy had been persuaded to abandon her opposition. Once more the German generals protested that this was a very dangerous adventure, since France and Britain would certainly resist. But Hitler had taken the measure of the French and British Governments, both in the Rhineland and in Spain. He persisted in his course; the armies poured in (March 1938) under skies black with aeroplanes; resistance would have been futile and Austria was annexed to Germany. The armies were followed by the secret police, and by hordes of Nazi gangsters; the reign of terror was established in Austria in an even more horrible form than in Germany; and the numerous Jews of Vienna were subjected to nameless cruelties and humiliations. France and Britain, as before, contented themselves with verbal protests. This was Hitler's first important addition to the territory of Germany,
and his second bloodless victory. The ease with which it
was achieved greatly strengthened his hold upon the German
people, who began to think that their Fuhrer was always
right.

IX

The conquest of Austria exposed Czechoslovakia to
attack, and Czechoslovakia was Hitler's next objective:
it was now surrounded by Germany on three sides. But
Czechoslovakia looked like being a much harder nut to
rack than Austria. It had an admirable army, and some
of the finest munition factories in Europe. It had a superb
defensive frontier in the mountains of Bohemia, which had
been elaborately fortified. This mountain-frontier was what
Hitler especially coveted; for it was not only the defence of
Czechoslovakia, but the principal barrier in the way of a
German advance into south-eastern Europe, which Hitler
intended to dominate. Czechoslovakia also had defensive
alliances with both France and Russia; an attack upon it
might involve Hitler in war on both his eastern and his
western fronts, which he was determined to avoid.

Another reason why Hitler desired to overthrow Czecho-
slovakia was that it was a highly successful democracy,
the only true democracy east of the Rhine; and had become
a place of refuge for fugitives from Germany. Like the
other States of South-eastern Europe, it was inhabited by
mixed races, whom it was striving to weld into a single State
by the methods of democratic freedom rather than by those
of oppression. The most important of the minority peoples
were the so-called 'Sudeten Germans'—German-speaking
people of mixed race, who dwelt mainly along the mountain
frontiers of Bohemia. They had never been German sub-
jects, but had dwelt alongside of the Czechs for a thousand
years. During the three centuries when Austria dominated
the Czechs, they had been the instruments of Austrian
supremacy, and they resented their subordination when
the Czechs won their freedom in 1919. Perhaps the Czechs
might have treated them more generously. But they had
complete freedom of speech and of the press; they controlled
the government of their own towns; they had schools in
which their children were taught in their own language;
and they were fully represented in the Czechoslovak parlia-
ment. In short, they were far better off than the Germans
over the border, and there is no evidence that they had any wish to be incorporated in Germany, though they would have liked to have been associated with Austria.

Hitler's plan for mastering Czechoslovakia was to stir up the 'Sudeten Germans', and to represent them as cruelly oppressed. He could not attack the fortified frontier without having to face very heavy losses, which might alienate the German people; and he could not face also a war with France and Russia if these countries were true to their alliances. But he still believed that the democracies would go to any lengths to avoid war, and he knew that Russia, for geographical reasons, would find it difficult to give direct help to Czechoslovakia.

There were, of course, among the Sudeten Germans, excitable young braves who were captivated by the idea of being citizens of a conquering Germany, and they, supported by imported agitators from Germany, could be used to stir up trouble. But the majority of the Sudetens were so far from desiring to be subjects of Nazi Germany that Hitler's own agent, Henlein, in order to keep his hold over them, had to make speeches asserting their loyalty to the democracy of Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless the controlled German press was unleashed in a campaign of virulent abuse of the Czechoslovak Government, and unfounded assertions about the oppression from which the Sudeten Germans were alleged to be suffering.

In May, 1938, only three months after the subjugation of Austria, Hitler evidently thought that it was worth while to make an attempt. Huge forces were massed on the Czechoslovak borders. But the Czechs were prompt to mobilise their forces and to man their defences. France, Britain and Russia all made strong representations, and it was evident that Italy was unlikely to join in the fray on Germany's side.

Hitler therefore recoiled for the moment. He hurriedly began to construct fortified lines on his western front, in case France should be true to her obligations. But he still went on with his plan.

If Britain and France had realised the gravity of the issue, and had resolved to resist this iniquitous attack, they could probably, in conjunction with Russia, have built up a formidable combination of the Balkan powers and Poland, which knew very well that if Czechoslovakia fell their turn would come next. The result might have been
that the war against Germany would have been precipitated a year earlier; but it would have been fought in far more favourable conditions than in 1939, with the Siegfried line still only in embryo, with the fine army and fortifications of Czechoslovakia enlisted on the Allied side, and perhaps with the aid of other States including Russia. But they made no attempt to build up such a combination. They trusted rather to 'appeasement,' and strove to persuade themselves that Sudetenland really ought to be German territory.

Hitler mouthed threats, and seemed to be ready to face a general war. Whether he would have done so in fact is, and must remain, uncertain. But the democracies trembled at the thought, and strove, through Lord Runciman who had been sent to Czechoslovakia as a pacificator, to persuade the Czechoslovak Government to make concessions. They made concession after concession; every concession was followed by new demands, and meanwhile the German press rose to hysteria in its dictated denunciations. Hitler was convinced that his opponents were on the run.

Finally Hitler made it known that if his demands were not conceded before the end of September, he would attack, his patience being exhausted. Thereupon the British Prime Minister flew to Berchtesgaden to interview the tyrant. He returned with a demand that Sudetenland should be ceded by Czechoslovakia to Germany. The British and French leaders met, and agreed that Czechoslovakia must give way, in order to preserve the peace of Europe. At a terrible midnight interview, the British and French ambassadors in Prague insisted that Czechoslovakia must yield up her fortified frontiers, and leave herself defenceless at the mercy of Germany—making it clear that, unless she did so, she would get no help from the democratic powers; but that if she yielded, her remaining territories would be guaranteed. Czechoslovakia mournfully yielded.

Armed with this surrender, the British Prime Minister flew again to meet the tyrant, this time at Godesberg. He found that Hitler's demands had risen again, and was presented with a map showing the new demands, which included a good deal of pure Czech territory. These claims were so outrageous that even the chief apostle of appeasement could not accept them. War was very near, a war which would probably engulf the whole of Europe. But Hitler seems to have thought that he had carried his bluff
too far. At the last moment it was announced that, on the mediation of his friend Mussolini, Hitler had agreed to yet another conference, in which the Prime Ministers of Britain and France should meet the Dictators of Germany and Italy.

The Conference was held at Munich. The Czechs, whose very existence was at stake, were not allowed to be present. Russia also was pointedly excluded. Under the guidance of her foreign minister, Litvinoff, she had for some years been making advances to the democracies. She had joined the League of Nations; she had made a defensive alliance with France; she had framed a democratic-seeming constitution, though it did not seriously qualify the power of her dictator, Stalin; and, both in the previous May and in the immediate crisis, she had shown readiness to join in the defence of Czechoslovakia. Now she was offered the cold shoulder; and she did not forget.

The Munich Conference came to an agreement which very closely resembled the unacceptable terms offered at Godesberg. It was agreed that a Commission of the four powers should settle all doubtful points; it settled them all in favour of Germany. The powers agreed to guarantee the independence of what remained of the Czechoslovak State. Hitler and the British Prime Minister signed a paper in which they promised future friendly relations. The British Prime Minister flew back to London, and, waving Hitler's worthless 'scrap of paper' in the air, proudly proclaimed that he had secured 'peace for our time.'

Hitler had won another bloodless victory; a victory so great that it almost made him the master of Europe. His belief seemed to be justified that the Western democracies would stand anything rather than go to war. This dazzling success, in which the democracies, instead of opposing him, had actually made his path to victory easy, reduced to silence the grumblings and questions of the German people, and convinced them that their Fuhrer was infallible.

X

The peace for which so terrible a price had been paid did not last long. Less than six months after its conclusion, Hitler's armies marched into defenceless Czechoslovakia, whose independence he and the democracies had guaranteed, and declared it a protectorate of Germany. The democracies
did not even think of trying to fulfil their guarantee. The familiar system of terrorism and concentration camps, the familiar régime of the Gestapo, or secret police, and of the Nazi gangs of bullies, was instituted; and the country was plundered of all its removable resources.

A little later Hitler occupied the territory of Memel, which had been given to Lithuania by the Treaty of Versailles; while Mussolini, who felt that he was not getting a fair share of the plunder, invaded and occupied the little State of Albania, from which he could threaten both Greece and Yugoslavia.

These events at last opened the eyes of Britain and France. They had tolerated Hitler’s breaches of good faith, so long as they were directed against little States. But now there was a shameless breach of solemn engagements with them. They had persuaded themselves that Hitler aimed only at the inclusion within his Reich of purely German territories, and on this assumption it was possible to argue that the annexation of Austria and Sudetenland was defensible. Hitler had, indeed, proclaimed that he did not want foreigners, and Czechs in particular, in his Reich. The conquest of defenceless Czechoslovakia—which France and Britain had persuaded to strip herself of her defences—proved that Hitler’s word could never be relied upon, and that the talk about not wishing to include foreigners was no more than a pretence.

They realised, now, the full horror of the régime of merciless persecution which they had helped to bring upon the Czechs, and which they had done nothing to prevent in Austria. They perceived, at last, that the ambitions of this brutal tyrant were unlimited; that he aimed at nothing less than the conquest of Europe, which (with their connivence) he had come near to achieving, and ultimately at the domination of the world. They saw that the very foundations of western civilisation were imperilled—good faith among nations, the rule of law, the rights of the individual, freedom of speech and of the press—indeed all the liberties which Europe had slowly attained through centuries of struggle. They realised that if the career of conquest of this pitiless tyrant could not be checked, all Europe would be subject to a reign of terror and injustice such as history had never seen. They saw, at last, that every concession to Hitler had added to his strength, and weakened the prestige and the power of the democracies.
Tardily, but perhaps not too late, they determined to resist, and to bring to an end this nightmare of horror.

They set to work to re-create the system of collective security which had been destroyed in 1935; and to form a combination of States that would be able to check the ambitions of Germany. But it was too late. The nations had lost confidence in the steadfastness of the great democracies. Poland, indeed, gladly accepted a defensive alliance with Britain and France, because she knew that she was the next indicated victim, and had no confidence in the treaty of non-aggression for ten years which Hitler had concluded with her in 1934. Turkey also—far from the probable scene of strife—accepted a defensive alliance, with the condition that she should not be involved in war with Russia. Greece and Rumania were willing to accept guarantees, but not to assume any definite obligations on their own parts. They, and other nations, were by this time all trembling before the ruthless might of Germany, now almost at the peak of her reorganised military strength. If Czechoslovakia had been still erect, these States might have been ready to unite behind her fortified barrier; but Czechoslovakia was ruined.

Most important of all, Russia appeared strangely reluctant to make any close agreement. She remembered how she had been cold-shouldered at (and before) Munich. She feared that the Western Powers meant to involve her in war with Germany, and then leave her in the lurch. Britain and France engaged in long negotiations with her. She made all sorts of difficulties. Meanwhile Litvinoff, the advocate of friendship with the democracies, had been ousted from the Foreign Secretaryship.

Suddenly, when it was already clear that Germany was about to attack Poland, the staggering announcement was made that Germany and Russia had concluded a non-aggression agreement, which meant that Russia would not go to the aid of Poland. How much more it meant, the course of events alone could reveal.

XI

Safe from attack on his eastern front, Hitler felt that he could now carry out with impunity his onslaught upon Poland, for which he had made the usual preparations with a lying campaign about the oppression of Germans
in Poland. The doomed country had no strong lines of defence. Attacked suddenly by masses of aeroplanes, which destroyed its railway junctions, and by immense numbers of tanks, the Poles were rapidly forced back to the line of the Vistula, where they could have held out. But at this moment large Russian forces invaded in their rear, and overran the eastern part of the country. The position was hopeless; and Poland succumbed. Germany and Russia divided her whole territory between them; and a reign of terror began which outdid all the horrors of Austria and Czechoslovakia. Poland was "crucified between two thieves."

It was on September 1, 1939, that the German attack upon Poland began. On September 3rd Britain and France declared war upon Germany, and the Second German war began. But they could do nothing to help Poland, whose downfall was ensured before the end of the month. The French, indeed, started an attack upon the outposts of the German Siegfried line, but this did nothing to check the murderous advance of Germany in Poland. The British and French navies at once instituted a close blockade of Germany; but this could only have a gradual effect. Once again Hitler had won an easy victory, and the Allies had done nothing to stop him. The remaining small powers, in the Danube valley and in Scandinavia, trembled more than ever, and clung to the frail defence of neutrality.

Hitler hoped that, as before, the Allies would accept the accomplished fact, and would recognise that they could do nothing to rescue either Poland or Czechoslovakia. In October he made an insolent offer of peace, on the basis of his retaining all his conquests. But the eyes of Britain and France were at last open. They saw that peace with this merciless and treacherous tyrant would be no more than a truce; and that the survival of freedom in Europe was at stake. The proffered peace terms were rejected; and it was plainly declared that no peace was possible so long as the Nazi régime continued in Germany. Hitler was forced to realise that he was committed to a struggle of life and death.

XII

He realised also that his cynical pact with Russia had weakened his position. For six years he had been declaring
his fundamental antipathy to Bolshevism; he had even said, in Mein Kampf, that any agreement between Germany and Russia would spell the ruin of Germany. It was on this basis that he had concluded his alliance with Italy, with the recently established dictatorship in Spain, and with Japan. All these States, on whose aid he had counted when the conflict with the western democracies began, were outraged by his sudden volte face. The Pope, also, was indignant not only with the Bolshevik agreement, but even more with the cruel treatment of the Catholics of Poland; and this fortified Mussolini's attitude. Italy remained, not neutral, for she maintained her friendship with Germany, but 'non-belligerent'—watchful to guard against any Russo-German attack upon the Balkans; and Spain took the same line. Hitler, therefore, was isolated, having no friend but Russia, which deeply distrusted him.

The price which Germany had paid for Russia's attitude was soon revealed. The little Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, whose upper classes were largely German, were compelled to submit to a sort of vassalage to Russia, and Hitler undertook to remove all the Germans, who had been settled in these countries for centuries, to new homes in Poland.

Then Russia made intolerable demands on Finland. The Finns resisted: they were the first of the small nations, except Poland, to offer resistance to the dictators. With an utter disregard for every obligation, Russia proceeded to attack Finland, expecting as easy a victory as Germany had obtained in Poland. But the Finns, though vastly outnumbered, and ill-equipped with the munitions of war, held out with such heroism that, if they had received adequate help, they might have driven back the invaders. The League of Nations called upon all its members to help her, and some of them did so. But Sweden and Norway, her natural helpers, were so terrified by the prospect of German intervention, that they not only gave no effective aid, but refused permission to Britain and France to send troops (as they were ready to do) to the aid of Finland, across their territory, which was the only possible means of access. After three months' heroic resistance, the Finns were compelled to accept hard terms of peace.

This was the fourth small state to succumb to the attacks of the dictators, without receiving any effective aid from Britain and France, the champions of liberty in Europe.
Thus began a conflict of momentous importance for the fortunes of the civilised world. The successes of Hitler had been so unbroken, his power seemed so irresistible, especially now that he had the backing of Russia, that all the lesser States of Europe trembled before him, while his own people were held in abject submission by terror and by the unending iteration of his lying propaganda. With the exception of Turkey, and the peoples of south-western Asia, the western world lay numb before him, and dared do nothing to offend him—dared do nothing except make feeble protests when his submarines sank their ships and murdered their sailors. So completely had the scheme of collective security broken down that Britain and France were left alone to resist him. This was the consequence of their failure to check the growth of this dreadful power when it was still possible.

XIII

Outside Europe, the opinion of the whole civilised world was almost unanimous in condemnation of Hitler’s methods, and of the dreadful cruelties perpetrated under his régime. In the United States, where the tardiness of Britain and France in taking arms against his tyranny had been vigorously condemned, there was an almost universal belief that, unless Hitlerism could be destroyed, the outlook for the whole world was grim indeed, and a universal hope that the Allies would be victorious. But America did not feel that she had any share of responsibility for the salvaging of civilisation. She had intervened in the previous war, and in the framing of the settlement which ended it. The results had been unsatisfactory, and she had not been repaid the moneys she had expended. Safe beyond the Atlantic, she was determined not to be again involved in a European war. She preserved a strict neutrality, an anxious impartiality between what most of her citizens believed to be right and what they believed to be wrong. At first she even forbade the sale of warlike supplies to any of the belligerents; but this was modified by the permission to sell supplies to any power which paid for them “on the nail,” and took them away in their own ships—no American ships were to be allowed to enter the war-zone lest they should become victims. An attempt was made to extend the limit of territorial waters round the American coasts from
three miles to three hundred miles. This one-sided alteration in international law could not, however, be upheld.

XIV

There was a marked contrast between the attitude of the United States, and the attitude of the British Dominions. They were as far removed from the scene of strife as the United States, and, under the Statute of Westminster, they were free to stand aloof if they chose to do so. But, unlike the United States, they realised from the first the magnitude and the world-wide significance of the issues of this war. In South Africa, indeed, the Prime Minister, General Hertzog, was in favour of a declaration of neutrality; but he was defeated in the Parliament that had been elected to support him; and, under his successor, General Smuts, South Africa threw herself into the war on the side of the Allies. Without any shadow of hesitation, Canada, Australia and New Zealand had already adopted the same course; armies were raised and transported either to France or to Egypt, Palestine, and other parts of south-western Asia, to which it was expected that the war might extend. The only Dominion which stood aloof was Eire (Irish Free State), which refused to make friends with Britain until Northern Ireland should have been forced to accept a union with Eire, which she disliked as much as Eire disliked union with Britain.

The dependent colonies were as loyal as they had been in the last war: they had reason to dread the German menace, for they knew how Germany had treated her colonies when she possessed them; they knew also the attitude of the Nazis towards the rights of what they regarded as inferior races—the Negroe, said Hitler in Mein Kampf, was a sort of ape; they knew the spirit in which the Nazis treated peoples who had the misfortune to fall under their dominion.

The most remarkable result of the declaration of war was its effect in Palestine. That country had been kept in turmoil for years by strife between the Jews, who had been brought in to help in building up a Jewish National Home, and the Arab population, which had resented the coming of the Jews, even though they brought a new prosperity to the country. There had been a state of guerilla war in Palestine for two years or more before the outbreak of the European war. But the moment war began, these troubles ceased:
and soon mixed forces, in which Jews and Arabs were enrolled and trained side by side, were being raised. It is not impossible that their common effort in the defence of liberty may lead to better relations between the two peoples, and the war in Europe may bring peace in Palestine.

It was not surprising that the Jews should be fiercely anti-German, in view of the way in which their race-fellows had been treated in Germany itself, and in all the German conquests. The readiness of the Arabs to throw themselves into the struggle was more remarkable. But it extended over the whole Moslem world, to Syria, to Iraq, to Egypt. The Arabs knew that they could expect from Britain and France far juster treatment than Nazi Germany would ever give them. One of Dr. Goebbels' favourite propaganda subjects, the supposed tyranny exercised by Britain over the Arabs, was taken out of his mouth.

XV

The only part of the British Empire in which there was any hesitation about supporting the allied cause was India; and here the hesitation was due, not to any sympathy with Nazi Germany, but to the eagerness of the Indian Nationalist party to use the opportunity to force Britain to consent to the concession either of complete independence, or of that qualified form of independence which is called Dominion Status.

Since the India Act of 1935, full powers of self-government have been enjoyed by representative bodies (elected on a very narrow franchise) in eleven Indian provinces. In eight of these provinces governments had been formed by members of the 'Congress Party,' who accept the policy laid down by the Indian National Congress. The Indian National Congress cannot be said to represent the peoples of India. It represents mainly the educated classes of the upper Hindu castes. Its aim is to secure for India complete independence, or, at the least, Dominion Status, under a system which would give a large majority to the Hindus, who under the caste system are dominated by the upper castes. But most of the Mohammedans, though they want independence, will not accept the Congress system. They have even proposed that an independent Moslem State should be made out of the provinces in which they have a majority. The Depressed Classes, who form a very large element of the
population and are just beginning to be vocal, do not want the Congress system. The warlike races, from whom the army is recruited, are inclined to look down upon the Congressmen. And the Indian Princes, whose position depends upon their treaties with the British Crown, distrust and fear Congress domination.

The British Government has declared, through the Viceroy, that it is prepared to agree to Dominion Status (which would practically mean British withdrawal from India); but not until the various sections of Indian opinion have agreed as to the way in which it should be organised. In the absence of such an agreement, the result might be chaos in India.

Many foreigners, in neutral countries, are inclined to think that Britain is behaving in a high-handed way; and that the denial of Dominion Status stultifies Britain's claim to be defending the democratic ideal. They seldom understand the complexity of the subject, and the difficulty of establishing a complete system of democratic self-government in India.

India is a country as big as all Europe, leaving out Russia, and its inhabitants form about one-sixth of the total population of the world. Democracy has never been attempted on any such scale, except in China, where its theoretical establishment produced chaos.

This vast land is inhabited by an extraordinary variety of races, from the most primitive to the most advanced; and, while in other countries the mixed races of which all nations are formed have more or less completely blended, in India the races remain distinct, kept apart by the institution of caste. Twice as many languages are spoken in India as in the whole of Europe, and they have no common medium of communication, except English, which is spoken by the small educated classes, whom it enables to act together. Differences of language have always been an obstacle to unity.

Differences of religion are still more serious. They go far deeper than the distinctions between Christian sects which have often stood in the way of unity in European countries. Disregarding the minor religions (which are numerous and sharply differentiated), the conflict between the two main religions, Hinduism and Mohammedanism, is sharper than between any other religions in the world. Mohammedanism is strictly monotheist, and abhors images
and idols; Hinduism recognises an uncountable number
of gods, and represents them by images. Mohammedanism
is a proselytising religion; nobody can be converted to
Hinduism, he must be born into it. Mohammedanism has
a clear and definite creed; not so Hinduism—a man may
believe almost anything, or nothing, and still be a Hindu,
if he was born a Hindu. Mohammedanism is a democratic
faith, in as much as it teaches the equality of all believers;
the essence of Hinduism is the caste-system, which keeps
men, from birth to death, in a position of unalterable
inferiority or superiority to their neighbours; for no man can
rise, or fall, out of the caste into which he is born: that
is the difference between caste and class.

The caste-system is, indeed, the essence of Hinduism,
which is far more a social system than a body of religious
belief. It sentences 50,000,000 Indians to the degradation
of being 'untouchable,' which means that if their very
shadow falls upon the food of a high-caste man, he will
starve rather than eat it. It is not possible to imagine a
more fundamental incompatibility than that between
democracy and the caste-system. If they are to exist
side by side, there must be a conflict to the death between
them. Already the low-caste and out-caste (or 'untouch-
able') Hindus are beginning to awaken to a sense of the
injustice of the system. Who can predict the results if
this spreads?

These are the reasons why many lovers of India fear
that a sudden plunge into complete democracy might easily
bring about chaos in India, with conflict between the Princes
and the Congress leaders, between the Hindus and the
Mohammedans (who cannot forget that for centuries they
were the rulers of the greater part of India), between the
warlike peoples and the unwarlike, between the degraded
castes and those who have hitherto dominated them. One
of the main functions of the British Government has been
to act as impartial arbiter between the rival races, creeds
and castes of this vast land. Until the wide differences
that keep the Indian peoples in a frozen disunity have some-
how been overcome—which will need time and patience—
some arbitral authority is surely necessary.

The period of British rule has brought great boons to
India. It has given her political unity, for the first time
in her history. It has given her a surcease of internal
strife, which has been unending for centuries, and freedom
from external attack. It has given her equal and impartial laws, based upon Indian usages, in place of the arbitrary awards of despot and their agents. It has given her a common medium of communication, for all her educated classes. It has given her freedom of speech and of the press—freedom to criticise the Government, which has been largely used. It has given her the aspiration after political liberty, which her peoples had never entertained during the long centuries of their history. It has introduced her to western knowledge, and the material conveniences of western civilisation.

It is natural that educated Indians should resent alien rule, and desire to get rid of it. But it is equally natural that the British should fear lest the boons already conferred might be sacrificed by too sudden a change. British Governments have long made the gradual extension of self-governing institutions a principal aim of their policy in India. But, realising, as Indians themselves cannot easily do, the magnitude of the difficulties in the way, and the defencelessness of India against foreign conquest should she fall into chaos, Englishmen feel deeply the necessity for a gradual and careful advance. Democracy means more than the universal diffusion of the right of marking crosses on ballot-papers. It can only work well among peoples who are not divided by fundamental disunity of purpose, and who have been trained in the habits of self-government. The problem of Indian government will continue to be one of the most difficult problems in the world even when the present mortal combat between liberty and tyranny has reached its appointed end.

In this epilogue, we have concentrated all our attention upon the gigantic conflict in which the British Commonwealth is involved. This conflict dwarfs all other issues, and the events that have led up to it have filled the minds of men for seven years, to the exclusion of all else. It is right that this should be so; for upon the issue of this conflict depends the future, nay the very existence, of the British Commonwealth. Upon it depend also the continuance and expansion of freedom and justice in the world, and the hope of an era in which peace and justice may reign. We have the privilege of living in one of the most momentous and decisive eras in the history of humanity. May we be worthy of that privilege!
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