DEVELOPMENT OF
ISLAMIC STATE AND SOCIETY
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by
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PREFACE

This book purports to be a social and economic history of the Muslims from the days of early Islam. Many books on Islamic history have been written from time to time, but most of them fail to give a connected picture of the social, political and economic developments of the Islamic nations. An attempt has been made in this book to avoid petty details and concentrate only on the essentials. Therefore, much political history has been left out. But in some cases, it has not been found possible to avoid details. Briefly speaking, no details have been given for periods like those of the Early Caliphs, the Omayyads and the early ‘Abbāsids where the political map was clear. But in periods of political instability, when the picture had become confused owing to the rise of small kingdoms and petty rulers, it was found necessary, in the interest of clarity, to touch upon a few details, so that the confusion might disappear.

Nothing has been said in this book about the Muslims of China, Indonesia and some other countries which remained outside the main centre of Islamic civilisation. The inclusion of such topics would have made the book much too lengthy. Even otherwise, such areas of the Muslim population form a world apart. They have a more or less independent history of their own.

The author is fully conscious that he has not been able to incorporate all the relevant material in this book. But he had a limited time at his disposal and was also handicapped by the inaccessibility of much that would have added to the worth of this history.

Mazheruddin Siddiqi

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Chapter I

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS OF ARABIA ON THE EVE OF ISLĀM

There is a general impression that Islām originated in a nomadic and pastoral society which was completely isolated from the then civilised world. This statement, though true within limits, must be supplemented and qualified by the fact that the Arabs were in full contact with the Persian and Roman Empires and that they had developed extensive trade relations with the surrounding countries. Arabia was no longer a country only of nomads at the birth of Islām. It was the seat of an extensive commerce. Agriculture also flourished in the fertile parts of the country. Thus Arabia on the eve of Islām contained all the three layers of society—the pastoral, the agricultural and the commercial—and was in full contact with the then existing civilisation.

Let us begin with the international relations of Arabia at the time of Islām.

INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS AND ARAB RELATIONS WITH THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

At the time when Islām made its appearance, the Byzantine Empire, to the northwest of Arabia, was in a state of internal confusion. After the death of Justinian in A.D. 563, the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire suffered many attacks from the barbarians and its internal stability was shaken by internecine quarrels. The Persian Empire on the northeast of Arabia, which included ‘Irāq and Mesopotamia, had long been a rival of the Byzantium in the East. The fifty years’ peace agreed on towards the end of the reign of Justinian had not been kept. Taking advantage of the weakness of Byzantium, Khusrau II of Persia declared
war, alleging that he was out to avenge the murder of the Emperor Maurice, who had helped him to gain the throne of Persia. Phocas, who had stepped into the vacancy created by the death of Maurice, was not in a position to ward off the Persian attack and Asia Minor was overrun. In 610, Heraclius, son of the governor of North Africa, replaced Phocas and, after twelve years of preparation, undertook a campaign against the Persians and compelled them to withdraw from Asia Minor, Egypt and Syria, by using his sea power. In 627, Khusrau's palace was captured and sacked; he had to flee from his capital. Peace was made in the following year.

None of these empires, adjacent to Arabia, had ever been able to obtain a firm foothold in the interior of the country. The only instance of an attempted foreign invasion of Arabia was that of the Romans who conducted an expedition from Egypt, under the leadership of Aelius Gallus in 24 B.C. during the reign of Augustus Caesar. The expedition failed to achieve its object, and the decimated Roman army ferried back to the Egyptian shore.

The Arabs of the northeast and northwest on the northern borders of Arabia were, however, under the influence and suzerainty of Persia and Byzantium respectively. Similarly, Yemen, the southern part of Arabia, was coming under the influence of Byzantium through the Christian kingdom of Abyssinia. These were the three channels through which the cultural and spiritual influences of the outside world reached Arabia.

The Ghassānids traced their descent from an ancient South Arabian tribe. They settled in the region southeast of Damascus and displaced the ʿAlīḥ who were the first Arabians to found a kingdom in Syria. The Banū Ghassān were gradually Christianised and Syrianised. They did not, however, abandon their native tongue, Arabic, although they spoke Aramaic also, thus becoming bilingual. They were brought under the Byzantine political influence and used as a buffer state to stop the overflow of Bedouin hordes. "Facing the Byzantine empire as they did, the Ghassānids adopted
a form of Christianity which, though of the local Monophysite variety, still coincided with their political interests." The Ghassânid kingdom reached the highest peak of prosperity in the sixth century after Christ under Al-Ḥārīth II, ibn Jabalah of Ghassân, whom the Byzantine Emperor, Justinian, appointed lord over all the tribes of Syria as a reward for defeating his Lakhmīd rival, Al-Mundhir, who was an ally of the Persians. "On the eve of the rise of Islam the subsidies hitherto paid by Byzantium to the Ghassânids were stopped by Heraclius as a measure of economy .... and the Muslim invaders consequently found Ghassân in a state of resentment and disloyalty to Byzantium."  

There was another Arab kingdom in the northeast bordering on Persia. Its capital was Ḥīra which lay about three miles south of Kūfa. The dynasty at Ḥīra was of South Arabian or Yemenite origin and called itself Tanūkh. The native population of Ḥīra was Christian whom the Arabs called Ḥabād or worshippers.  

In the latter part of the third century A.D., a new dynasty, the Lakhmīds, came to rule over Ḥīra. Among the important kings of the Lakhmid dynasty was Al-Mundhir I (A.D. 418-462) who acquired considerable influence in the affairs of Persia. But the most illustrious ruler of the Lakhmīds was Al-Mundhir III who gave much trouble to Roman Syria. But he was defeated by his Ghassânid rival Al-Ḥārīth who was an ally of Byzantium. The last king of the Lakhmīd dynasty was Al-Nu'mān who became a Christian.  

Though, under Persian suzerainty, the Lakhmīds remained an integral part of the Arab community, they sent delegates to all the great Arab fairs, and their lead carried weight throughout Arabia. Through them the Persian government was able to exercise some supervision over the desert tribes and obtain information as to their movements, and through them a great deal of Hellenistic culture flowed down through Arabia. The

Christians of Ḥira acted as teachers of heathen Arabs, who had acquired the knowledge of Syriac in addition to their own Arabic, and taught them to read and write. Thus the Arabs of Al-Ḥira were not as illiterate as those of Arabia proper.

In 605 the Lakḥīmid dynasty came to an end. Strained relations existed between Nuʿmān and the Persian king and Nuʿmān thought it prudent to take refuge among the desert tribes; then he ventured back to plead his case before Khusrau but was put to death in A.D. 620. The Persian king then appointed Iyas of the tribe of Ṭayy, but this was resented by the Banū Bakr who moved out of their settlements in a body and migrated to Bahrayn, where for some years they lived in open revolt against Persia and thus cut off communication between Persia and the East and South Arabia. This marks the downfall of the Persian imperial expansion in Arabia. After the death of Iyas in 614, Ḥira was taken over by the Persians who began to rule over it directly by appointing their own governor. This was very strongly resented by the Arabs of Ḥira and rendered them disposed to welcome the armies of Islām.

In the southern part of Arabia, known as Yemen, there had been a constant rivalry between Persia and Byzantium to establish their influence over the Arabs. The first Ḥimyarite kingdom was established in Yemen in about 115 B.C. with its capital at Zafār. Its power depended upon commercial prosperity and the monopoly acquired by the South Arabians over the maritime trade of the Red Sea. But when Rome conquered Egypt from the Ptolemies, they introduced their own merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean; this was a heavy blow to the Ḥimyarite commercial activity. About A.D. 300 the second Ḥimyarite dynasty was established in Yemen with its capital at Ṣanʿā. The Ḥimyarite kings of the second period were known as Tubba'. It was in this period that Christianity and Judaism were introduced into Yemen.

The first to send a Christian embassy to South Arabia was Emperor Constantius (A.D. 356). "The real motive
behind the mission lay in the international politics of the day and the rivalry between the Roman and Persian empires for influence of spheres in South Arabia."\(^1\) Najrān became the centre of the Christians in South Arabia. Judaism also gained considerable following in Yemen during this period. In the early part of the sixth century the last Ḥimyarite king, Dḥū Nuwāṣ (a descendant of the Tubbaʿ Asʿad Kāmil), became a Jew. Rivalry between the Arabian Jews and Christians led to active hostility. It is said that Dḥū Nuwāṣ massacred the Christians of Najrān in October 523. Surviving Christians implored Justin I for aid, the Byzantine Emperor at that time being regarded as the protector of Christians everywhere. The Emperor wrote to the Negus (Najāši) of Abyssinia who sent an army across the Red Sea to South Arabia. The campaign was really directed to bring the South Arabian tribes under the Byzantine influence and rouse them against Persia. The Abyssinians fought two battles and were victorious on both occasions. The leader in the second campaign was the famous Abraha. With the success of the Abyssinians, the ancient Ḥimyarite dynasty came to an end.

The Abyssinians remained in control of South Arabia from 525 to 675. Abraha, the Abyssinian viceroy, built in Ṣanʿāʾ one of the most magnificent cathedrals of the age for the purpose of creating a rival to Kaʿba in the north which attracted a very large number of pilgrims every year from all parts of Arabia, and was, therefore, a source of great income to the inhabitants of Mecca. But the move did not succeed whereupon Abraha led a disciplinary expedition against Mecca. The incident took place in the year of the birth of the Prophet and is called ʿĀm al-Fīl, the Year of the Elephant. But the Abyssinian army was miraculously destroyed and Kaʿba was saved.

The Abyssinian rule in South Arabia produced a national reaction against foreign hegemony. Sayf b. Yazdān, a prince of the old Ḥimyar line, sought the aid of Byzantium, but failed because Abyssinia was a Christian power. He then made

approaches to Kisra Anūshirwan, at the Sassānid court in Al-Madā'in. In response to Sayf's prayers, the Persian Emperor, in 575, sent a small army under Wahraz who defeated the Abyssinians. At first a system of joint administration was instituted with Sayf as titular head. But soon Yemen was converted into a Persian province and the South Arabsians realised that they had only exchanged masters. In the conflict between Byzantium and Persia over South Arabia, the Christian inhabitants of the country were naturally pro-Byzantian, while pagan Arabs and the Jews of South Arabia were pro-Persian in their sympathies.

COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY IN PRE-ISLAMIC ARABIA

The pre-Islamic Arabs were the carriers of the international trade of the time. Arabia was famous for its spices and frankincense and the Byzantine cities obtained these commodities through the Arabian traders. "Spices as condiments and for burning as incense had become necessities and had to be procured at all cost: alike in the ceremonial of the court and in the ritual of the church incense was firmly established, and the requisite spices could be obtained only through Arabian and Indian trade."¹ "The Greeks and Romans," says Hitti,² "evidently presumed that all the commodities in which the Arabsians dealt with were native products of their own land, so jealously did the merchants guard the secrets of their other sources in Abyssinia and India and so strict was the monopoly."

We have already seen that the South Arabsians had a monopoly of the Indian trade and they dominated the main maritime route which led from Bāb-al-Mandab to Wādi-al-Hammāmat on the coast of Middle Egypt. The difficulty of navigating this sea, specially in its northern parts, caused the South Arabsians to develop land routes between Yemen and Syria, leading through Mecca and Petra and forking at the northern end to Egypt, Syria and Mesopotamia. Along this south-to-north route a number of South Arabian colonies

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were planted.

Apart from the south-north trade route, there was an east-to-west trade route also through which international trade passed through the hands of the Arabs. This was the silk trade of China. "Even in the best of times the final stage westwards was in Arab hands, and those desert carriers were granted safe conducts (ilaf, cf. Mas'ūdī, Murūj, 3, 121) by the frontier officials on either side, a practice which in later days was exalted by Arab vanity into a legend of alliances sought by Caesar and the Great King. But this exposed merchandise to extortionate charges at the hands of the Arabs: at a later date we find that they considered a hundred per cent a reasonable demand. Meanwhile the Persians, of course, could stop the trade at will. Silk was now so greatly prized in the Byzantine world that these conditions were sorely felt."1 The east-west trade route passed through Palmyra (Tadmur). "Its geographic position, with its plentiful supply of fresh and mineral waters, afforded a rendezvous not only for the eastern and western trade but for the south-to-north commerce starting in South Arabia. The 'chief of the caravan' and the 'chief of the market' figure in inscriptions as leading citizens."2

MECCA AS A COMMERCIAL CENTRE

We have seen that the south-to-north trade of the Yemeni Arabs passed through Mecca. At first the Meccans had no share in this profitable trade. But when the Ḥimyarite power fell into decay, they seized the control of the carrying trade for themselves. In the seventh century the route through Ḥedjāz was entirely in the hands of the Arabs who dwelt there and who made their headquarters at Mecca, receiving goods from the Yemenites but carrying them on their own account to the marts of Syria and Egypt and perhaps also to Persia.

From Mecca onwards the road was practically a Meccan

monopoly and all merchandise had to pass through Meccan hands. Mecca soon developed into a banking centre, where payments could be made to many distant lands, and a clearing house of international commerce.

The leading tribe or federation of tribes at Mecca and that to which the Prophet of Islam himself belonged was that of the Quraysh who were divided into ten clans. All of them dwelt round the well of Zamzam. Other Arabs and aliens occupied the suburbs which spread out beyond this nucleus and probably represent later settlers. "Each tribe retained its tribal constitution and was self-governing in the same way as a desert tribe so that Mecca was rather a collection of tribal camps than a city in the ordinary sense, but all joined together in a confederacy for the purpose of carrying on trade."1 In the carrying trade practically every citizen took part and even the women had a stake in the goods sent forward.

The confederacy of tribes had a Malā' or general assembly at which commercial enterprises were planned and this was on the lines of the Majlis or tribal council traditional among the desert tribes. It seems that there were Byzantine agents in Mecca itself but these were commercial rather than political. There was also an Abyssinian colony at Mecca, although the Abyssinian conquest never reached so far inland. The Meccan merchants, who were preoccupied with commercial affairs, were not disposed to spend their time in police duties or military enterprises and so we find that they maintained a mercenary force known as Aḥābīsh or the Abyssinians. "It is difficult to imagine anything further removed from the traditional picture of Arab life than this wealthy merchant city whose citizens had lost all taste for fighting and were content to employ a hired militia and who had made their city a clearing house and banking centre for the trade of West Asia."2

There were Dalīls or guides in regular employment of trading caravans who knew and showed the paths leading to Syria or

2. Ibid., p. 184.
Persia. Distinct from the Dalil (guide) was the Khafir or escort, usually a Sayyid or a princeling of note, who undertook to convey the caravan with a body of his tribesmen. This seems to have been a lucrative office eagerly sought for by the tribal chiefs. It acted as a kind of insurance because the Khafir undertook to make good any losses due to the attacks of the desert tribes. At Palmyra statues were erected in honour of those who thus acted at their own cost and there it seems that such an act of public generosity was the surest road to political importance. It was the right of the Arabs of Ḥira to provide this convoy for Persian caravans going down into Arabia and their charges became so excessive that the Persians refused to pay them with the result that the Arabs attacked the caravan and defeated the Persian escort. In the time of the Prophet it was customary to fit out two annual caravans which went up into Syria. The heavy expenses of the caravan lay in the equipment, the hiring of guides and camel drivers, the tolls paid to every tribe through whose territory it passed and enough to the Khafir to make him willing to undertake compensation for any losses sustained on the way. The Meccan merchants had no liking for the predatory nomads of the desert. The citizens of Mecca compared the nomads to wild beasts and the Qurʾān itself shows traces of this dislike towards the desert Arabs who were singularly unresponsive to religion. We know that the Abyssinian viceroy, Abraha, was disliked by the Arabs of Yemen who complained of his severities and invited the Persians to conquer South Arabia. One reason why the Arabs did not like the Abyssinian viceroy may probably have been that he tried to police the roads and thus interfered with the traditional rights of the Arab tribes to levy blackmail from travellers through their districts: from the earliest recorded times down to the modern Turkish rule, the unsettled Arabs have consistently offered resistance to every power controlling the country. But the feeling of the settled towns and villages was quite otherwise. They hoped in their own hearts for the success of Abraha’s measures because their normal daily life suffered from the activities of the nomads.
However, they did not openly align themselves with Abraha because they saw very clearly that Byzantium and Persia were eagerly competing for control of Arabia and their interests lay with neither power. Therefore they only tried to play off one power against the other.

**POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF THE ARABS**

The Arabs had no idea of a territorial or national state. There was an incipient sense of nationality among the Arabs, because their common language, Arabic, was a powerful bond of union. But an order of things aloof from the community and acting independently with sovereign power was a thing unknown in Arabia. Tribal allegiance was by far the most powerful social factor. To be tribeless was to be an outlaw. The individual, as such, had no rights and could not have protection, if he was not a member of the tribe. Individuals sought protection (*Ijara*) from the tribes. When once a man was taken under protection by a tribe, every member of the tribe was responsible for his safety. The numerical strength of the tribe and the strategic position occupied by it determined its power and prestige. To augment their numbers, Arabian tribes took strangers as clients (*Maula*) who may either be a free man or a slave. Sometimes the tribes formed alliances and coalesced into confederacies (*Al-Ahraf*) but the tribe did not lose its independence or distinctive individuality in any such alliance and remained the supreme object of allegiance. "Even yet the Bedouin are disposed to think of the Daula, i.e., the Turkish Empire, as a tribe, and to rate its strength by the number of camels (Doughty i, 230). Even in the towns the political unit was not the city but the tribe,—thus, the *Thaqif* in *Ta’if*. The Qurayshites and *Thaqifites* felt that they belonged together politically, even when they lived outside of Mecca or *Ta’if*."

The tribe was held together by the council of its leading men. Among them one was usually recognised as chief, but

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this office, though it might tend to remain in one family, was not hereditary. The holding of it, in fact, depended on ability to take the lead in council and in war. "The chiefs, however, durst not lay commands or penalties on their fellow-tribesmen. Every man ruled himself, and was free to rebuke presumption in others. . . . Loyalty in the mouth of a pagan Arab did not mean allegiance to his superiors, but faithful devotion to his equals."

Each tribe had its recognised district in which it moved as the exigencies of water and pasturage demanded. The possession of the tribe consisted of cattle, sheep and goats, but specially of camels. Horses were much prized but only the wealthy could maintain them and their use was mainly for raids and fighting. It was on his camels that the Bedouin mainly depended. He was largely occupied in breeding and rearing them and from them came most of his simple necessities. Wild animals of the desert offered good hunting at times to those who could afford to take part in it.

The Arabs in general were so thoroughly democratic as to verge on the side of anarchy. They would not submit even to the arbitrary rule of the Shaykh or chief. Hence he had to make his decisions in a council of elders of the tribes. There was no machinery of government, no officials, no offices.

There were very few civil disputes, but crimes took place frequently. In criminal matters, life for life and limb for limb was the recognised principle. There was no state machinery for the punishment of the crime which was an affair of the aggrieved tribe. A murderer within the tribe was handed over to the heirs of the murdered who could put him to death, or set him free on receipt of blood money (Ad-Diyah) or give him liberty by granting a free pardon. If a murderer, who committed a murder within the tribe itself, escaped, he was declared an outlaw (At-Tarid).

"Raiding the enemies' camps or stealing their property

was hailed as an act of heroism. In the tribe itself there were not many thefts; for the tribal affinity or clan spirit (Al-‘Asabīyah) was so strong that improper behaviour, in the face of possible social ostracism, was rare. Cases of theft, if any, were dealt with by the chieftain and elders of the clan who forced the culprit to return the stolen property or to pay the price thereof. When, as in Makkah, a society with large private properties came into being, severe punishment for theft was inflicted. Cutting the hand of a thief, which was prevalent among the Persians, was introduced in Makkah by Al-Walīd bin Mughirah.”

Mecca as the commercial centre of North Arabia had developed a more regular form of political organisation and had become more or less a City-State with a republican form of government. The city was governed by a Council of Elders called Mala‘, a term which often recurs in the Qur‘ān. But the council did not have much coercive authority. According to Al-Fāṣī, none exercised authority unless delegated or kindly permitted to do so. The various functions relating to the administration of pilgrimage to the Ka‘ba were assigned to different leading families. For promoting their commerce, the Meccans negotiated with the adjoining states and obtained from them safe conduct, permitting the free passage of their caravans through specified routes to specified places. These were known as the “guarantee of the Caesar and the Khusrau.” They also entered into agreements with the Negus of Abyssinia and the rulers of Ghassān and Ḥīra. The Meccans levied a tithe on the merchandise which passed through their city. They did not believe in hoarding money but freely invested it in commercial enterprises. There were active partners in business and the sleeping partners who had half of the profit. Even people with smaller incomes took part in these investments.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF NORTH ARABIA

The Quraysh enjoyed the monopoly of political and economic

power in Mecca before the rise of Islam. Their ascendency was first established in Mecca by Qusayy b. Kilab. Prior to this, there was a class of priests which held the highest position in Mecca. It seems that Qusayy had to carry on a long fight against the priests of Mecca before he was able to oust them from power. But once the priests had been dislodged, Qusayy was able to secure power for the Quraysh, who derived much economic benefit from their political ascendency. For example, it was a rule that people living outside the Haram (sanctuary of Ka'ba) could not bring their food with them, nor could they enter the limits of the Ka'ba with their own clothes. Naturally they had to purchase their food and clothes from the Quraysh, who thus enriched themselves at the expense of the pilgrims. Hashim was the first person among the leaders of the Quraysh to have enforced the custom of sending two caravans, one in summer and another in winter, to the adjacent countries. This strengthened the economic position of the Quraysh who became famous as traders. Even the women of the Quraysh took part in the trade. For example, the mother of Abu Jahl used to deal in perfumes. Abu Sufyan's wife, Hinda, had close commercial ties with the Kalbites of Syria. The trading caravans of the Quraysh sometimes included as many as 2,500 camels, accompanied by at least 300 men comprising merchants, guides and the protecting guard. The caravan of the Quraysh which was intercepted at Badr by the Prophet consisted mostly of the investments of the Omayya family. The family of Sa'id b. al-As was the major partner. This family had formed itself into a trading company. Besides him, other Omayyads had contributed about 10,000 dinars. Abu Sufyan himself stated that there was no male or female in the Quraysh with some income who had not a share in this investment. It is not strange that the Quraysh were growing economically prosperous. It is significant to learn that the Quraysh had instituted a regular fund for helping the destitute and incapacitated persons belonging to their tribe out of the proceeds of their caravans.

The Meccan merchandise consisted mostly of hides, skins and raisins, apart from spices and other articles brought from Yemen and obtained through the Indian trade. Mecca and its environs
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had no agriculture. Therefore, hides and skins alone could be exported. From Africa the Qurayş imported ivory and slaves and labourers, whom they called Al{kabish}. In order to ensure the protection of their caravans, the Qurayş had not only to employ armed escorts but also to make payments to the chiefs of the tribes through whose territories they had to pass. They had also to enter into treaty relations with the states in which they sold and purchased their merchandise. After commerce, the next most important occupation of the Qurayş was the breeding and rearing of sheep and camels and leading them to the pasturage. None of the occupations in Mecca was hereditary and every individual was free to choose his profession as he liked. The services of outside experts were also needed and hired. It is said that a Roman (Byzantine) was employed to build the Ka'ba.

The Qurayş had a system of voluntary taxation which was spent on feeding the pilgrims. The chief had no regular source of income. He received only a major share of the booty in war. But he was also entitled to the property of persons who died without leaving heirs. A tax was also levied on the annual fairs held in Arabia by the tribal chief within whose territory the fair was held. We have already noted that a tithe was levied on all foreign merchants entering Mecca. This seems to have been a reciprocal arrangement, as the Arab traders were also liable to a tithe in the outside countries.

The Qurayş also employed hired labour, besides the slaves, in connection with trading caravans. Labourers were also employed for pasturing camels and sheep. Some of the traditions of the Prophet show that the labourers were very badly treated by their employers.

To prevent overpopulation, the Arabs resorted to infanticide. It is said that Musaylema, the false prophet, had laid down a rule that no person having a boy should have sexual relations with his wife.

Usury prevailed on a very extensive scale in Mecca. Money was loaned to needy persons and if they could not repay it at the appointed time, they were required to pay twice the amount, after the period agreed upon. Sometimes money was loaned on
the condition that monthly interest should be paid by the debtor without affecting the principal. ‘Abbās, ‘Othmān and Khalid b. Walid carried on usurious dealings on an extensive scale. Their transactions were not limited to Mecca, as they had dealings also with the people of Ta’if. The three had formed a business partnership. But usury was not a socially approved institution. The virtuous people did not consider it lawful. Tabari relates that a certain Abū Wahāb warned the Quraysh that they should not build the Ka’ba with the money acquired through usury.

Ta’if, at a distance of seventy five miles from Mecca, was another prosperous town, where we find a certain amount of class struggle between landlords and cultivators. The Banū ‘Āmir were the most influential group in Ta’if and owned a large number of agricultural lands. The Banū Thaqīf who occupied the outer environs of the city entered into an agreement with them regarding the cultivation of their land. It was agreed that the Banū Thaqīf would cultivate the lands belonging to the Banū ‘Āmir and give them half of the produce. After this the Banū Thaqīf moved into Ta’if and began to cultivate the lands of Banū ‘Āmir paying the latter half the produce in grapes and fruits, etc. But as the Thaqīf gained numerical strength and became prosperous, they refused to pay their stipulated share of produce to the Banū ‘Āmir who failed to dislodge the Thaqīf from the lands in their possession. As against Mecca, the soil of Ta’if was fertile and the people of Ta’if exported wheat, raisins and wood to Mecca and other cities of Arabia. Tanning was the main industry of Ta’if. Wine was also manufactured on a large scale in Ta’if owing to the abundance of grapes. The Thaqīf were famous for their usurious dealings. They loaned money not only to the people of their own city but also to the Meccans. Ta’if also had a colony of Jews who were mostly traders. They maintained a school where Judaism was taught as a subject of study.

Medina was originally inhabited by the Jews, but some time later the two Yemeni tribes of Aus and Khazraj belonging to the Azd clan migrated to the city. Political power in Medina at first belonged to the Jews but soon the Aus and Khazraj established their supremacy. Cultural and economic supremacy, however,
was still held by the Jews, who formed the only educated section of the population. On the eve of Islām, Medina suffered from anarchic conditions owing to the quarrels of the two Arab pagan tribes, the Aus and the Khazraj. A proposal was mooted for entrusting the supreme power to ʿAbdullāh b. Salāl, a prominent Jewish citizen.

Medina was a purely agricultural colony. Both the Jews and the Arab tribes of Aus and Khazraj were agriculturists. Money was not used in agricultural transactions. The cultivators mostly paid a stipulated share of the produce to the landlords, which sometimes amounted to seventyfive per cent of the produce. The cultivators could also pay their rent in the shape of dates. Sometimes portions of land were earmarked for the cultivator and the landlord, so that the produce of the earmarked portion went to the landlord and the cultivator in accordance with the agreement. Wine was manufactured on a large scale in Medina from grapes, dates, wheat, barley and honey. But dates were the principal source of the wine industry, as grapes were not found in abundance. Medina did not produce enough agricultural commodities for its citizens. The people had to purchase corn from the trading caravans which passed through Medina. The Jews dominated the commerce of Medina. Some of them had extensive dealings stretching to the outermost part of Ḥedjāz.

PRE-ISLAMIC RELIGION

Religion had very little influence on the lives of the pre-Islamic Arabs. They believed vaguely in a supreme God, Allāh, and more definitely in his three daughters, Al-Lāt, Manāt and Al-ʿUzza who were venerated all over Arabia and whose intercession was deemed necessary. There were also numerous idols enjoying high favour among their worshippers, as bringing good luck to them. The Arabs had no sense of real piety. They felt no call to pray to their gods, although they often found them convenient to swear by. Their faith in superstitious ceremonies was much stronger. They did not take their religion too seriously, but they were quick to appreciate its practical advantage. It gave them rest and security during the four sacred months in
which war was forbidden, while the Institution of Meccan Pilgrimage enabled them to take part in a national fete. Commerce went hand in hand with religion.

"The Bedouin view of life was thoroughly hedonistic. Love, wine, gambling, hunting, the pleasures of song and romance, the brief, pointed and elegant expression of wit and wisdom—these things he knew to be good. Beyond this he saw only the grave. It would be a mistake to suppose that these men always, or even generally, passed their lives in the aimless pursuit of pleasure. Some goal they had—earthly, no doubt—such as the accumulation of wealth or the winning of glory or the fulfilment of blood-revenge."¹

O'Leary says that almost every known stratum of religious life seems to have existed in Arabia. "We find survivals of ancient Babylonian culture, evidences of Hellenistic thought with highly critical and scientific tendencies, and elements left over from the stone age, all mixed together in the religion and probably in the whole cultural life of pre-Islamic Arabia."²

To Babylonian influence may be ascribed the worship of the heavenly bodies. Indeed star worship seems to be very much a Mesopotamian development. It appears that the people of Mesopotamia relied on the stars to guide them as to the time of inundation, on which their agriculture depended, and as a result of this they came to regard the heavenly bodies as the cause of the inundation and, therefore, as the givers of their harvest. In Arabia the goddess Al-'Uzza occupied a very prominent place and she was identified with the planet Venus. Al-'Uzza was one of the three sister deities worshipped at Mecca in the Prophet's time. Al-Thauriya, the raingiver, perhaps represents the Pleiads. We know that Shams "the sun" (feminine) was also worshipped. Propably Al-Lat also represents the sun. The name Al-Lat is frequent in Nabataean inscriptions. Behind these personal deities, there were local spirits as Dhū-al-Shara which was worshipped at Petra, animals such

as Nasr, "the vulture," mentioned in the Qur'ān (71, 23) and absolutely impersonal and formless powers such as Maniya or Manā who had a sanctuary at Qudayd and in Mecca.

The Qur'ān mentions other deities such as Wadd, Suwa, Yaghūth and Ya‘qūb which are classed with Nasr. For the most part the deities were exorcised and their influence averted, rather than invoked; the Arabic word tuqa (piety) properly denotes "being on one's guard against."

There was also prevalent in Arabia tree worship and stone worship in which these objects were regarded as the abode of the spirits which, though thus housed, were hardly, if at all, personal in character. The sacred tree figures prominently in Semitic religion. The worship of a monolith (ansāb) as the abode of a spirit was the widest spread form of Semitic religion.

Language itself shows a careful distinction between Wathān, the stone which was the abode of a deity, and Šanām or carved image. Of the former type was the stone worshipped as Al-Lat at Ṭā'īf. Ibn Hishām says that idolatry was introduced into Mecca by 'Amr b. Laḥay from Syria only a short time before the birth of the Prophet. Thus idolatry, i.e. worship of carved images as distinct from monoliths, seems to have been of recent introduction into Arabia and of Syrian origin. This is endorsed by the word šanām which is a loan word from the Aramaic selem (idol).

Of the changes made by the Prophet of Islām in the rites of pilgrimage, we know one that he forbade to make the circuit of Ka'ba in a state of nakedness, so that this was presumably done by the pre-Islamic Arabs and apparently they did so with handclapping, shouting and singing, for this seems to be implied in the Qur'ānic reference to the unbelieving Meccans "that their prayers at the house are nothing else than whistling through the fingers and clapping of hands" (Qur'ān, 8, 35). With this we may compare Saul who prophesied naked (1 Sam XIX, 24) and David "leaping and dancing before the Lord" (1 Sam XI, 16). All this strongly suggests that the foreign intercourse with Arabia was not merely a matter of trade and invasion,
but had a direct bearing on the life and thought of the Arab people, who thus were not so isolated and so untouched as has commonly been supposed.

CHRISTIAN AND JEWISH INFLUENCES ON ARABIA

As a result of the persecution suffered by the Nestorians of Edessa at the hands of the Byzantian authorities, a number of the Nestorian lecturers of the school of Edessa, led by a teacher named Barsauma, crossed into Persian territory and sought the protection of the Persian king. There, under the suzerainty of the Persian king, the Nestorian Church was re-organised on anti-Greek lines. It used Syrian in preference to Greek and took up an attitude of loyalty to the Persian king and of hostility to Byzantium. The Nestorian Church thus presented an orientalised version of Hellenistic philosophy. This produced a new factor in the Armaic(Syriac)-speaking community of Mesopotamia as great attention was paid by the Nestorians to the teaching of philosophy, science and psychology. The Nestorians were great educationists and we have detailed accounts of their curriculum. They were energetic teachers of Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy, translators of theological and philosophical works. They were not exactly an established church but rather a feudal group with much the same rights as a province under a governor appointed by and responsible to the king. In Southern Mesopotamia about Ḥīra they were specially strong and at the time of the Muslim invasion in the seventh century, Ḥīra was almost entirely Christian and Nestorian. No Arabic version of the Scriptures or Arabic liturgy was produced, for Arabic had not yet attained the status of a literary language, but the Christian Armaic, known as Syriac, was employed. As a result, the Arabs of Ḥīra were bilingual and through the medium of Syriac a considerable mass of Hellenistic, scientific, philosophical and theological material was accessible to them.

It ought to be remembered that the Arabs of Ḥīra were an integral part of the Arab community and its recognised leaders. They were acknowledged by Persia to hold a position of suzerainty
over Arabia. We can thus see that Nestorian influence must have percolated into Arabia proper. A trade route connected Ḥīra with Najrān and Ibn Ḥishām reports the tradition that the Christian church of Najrān was founded by a person named Faymiyūn (Phemion) strongly suggesting a Nestorian mission along the trade route to South Arabia.

As the Nestorians were the means of permeating the Arabs of the Persian border, so the Jacobites spread the influence of Hellenism among the Arabs of Syria. The real strength of the Jacobites was in Egypt where, in spite of severe measures by the state, the main body of the church remained Monophysite, but they had a strong following in Syria and Asia Minor and all the Arabs of the Syrian frontier adhered to them.

At the same time the Monophysites counted the Banū Ḥassān and other tribes of the Syrian desert and those Arabs controlled the northern end of the great road up through the Ḫedjāz, while the Abyssinians who invaded South Arabia were also Monophysites. This, no doubt, was a serious obstacle in the way of Christianity as the Arabs could not be favourably disposed towards the religion of the invaders. Also the State Church of the Byzantine Empire (the Greek Church) had a hold in the peninsula of Sinai which is in close contact with the North Ḫedjāz and through which the trade route passes to Egypt. It seems, therefore, that all these main sections of the Christian community were in contact with the Arabs.

The Jews had formed colonies at Taymā’, Fadak, Khaybar and the largest and most important one at Yathrib. They were not found at the commercial centre of Mecca. They may have been Idumaeans or Northern Arabs who had adopted the Jewish religion.

In Yathrib (Medina) the Jewish colonists were grouped in three tribes, all of which bore Arabic names, the Banū Qaymuqā’, the Banū Naḍīr and the Banū Qurayza. The two latter called themselves Kāhinīn (priestly) and so presumably claimed to be of the house of Aaron. Ya‘qūb says that the Jews of Yathrib were Arabs who had turned Jews. We may
surmise that the Banū Qaynuqā' tribe was possibly North Arab and the other two were Judaeans who had moved down into Arabia after the destruction of the temple in A.D. 70 or after the expulsion of the Jews from Judaea by Hadrian in A.D. 132.

In all their colonies in Arabia the Jews formed settled agricultural communities. At Yathrib they also practised the art of working in metal as smiths, armourers and as jewellers. As craftsmen the Jews were welcome to the neighbouring Arabs, but as cultivators of the soil their presence was resented, for agriculture necessarily involved encroachment on the pasture lands of the nomadic Arabs. Near Yathrib there were the two collateral tribes of Aus and Khazraj. Tradition says that they were Yemeni Arabs who had come there about 300 A.D. when the Jews were already established in the city, but allowance must be made for the way in which Yemeni ancestry is claimed. Perhaps it means no more than that the Arabs of Medina were rivals of those in Mecca and the Meccans were pro-Greek, while the men of Medina were pro-Persian and so of the Yemenite party. In the seventh century there was a strong feeling between these Bedouin and the Jewish colonists, because the latter, by extending their agricultural area, were encroaching upon the land which the Bedouins regarded as their own pasture. Gradually the Bedouins got a hold on the city because they were more warlike than the colonists, and reduced the Jews to the semiservile position of the protected aliens under Arab rule. Just before Hijra, the Jewish tribes were in a depressed condition, though still numerous and wealthy. They occupied the northern and eastern quarters of the city, each tribe living in its own quarter and in the same social conditions as their Arab neighbours. Such tribal quarters were practically autonomous villages, each with its own stronghold to which the tribe could retreat and secure its movable property in the times of disturbance. The city was thus a kind of federal group of self-governing tribes, the whole united for defence against external enemies and for the regulation and control of markets to which the Arabs resorted from the other parts of the city. “Thus there were two kinds of law
in force, the customary tribal law and the common law of the market, this latter not of Arab origin but already established by the Jewish colonists and containing a certain measure of the Roman Law which had filtered down through the rabbinical academies of Galilee and Babylon and was an inheritance from the days when the more progressive and flourishing section of Judaism was drawing inspiration from Hellenism.  

The Jews of Yathrib (Medina) were culturally and intellectually much superior to the Arab tribes of Medina. They had a school of their own, the Baytul Midras, where Jewish religion and culture were taught. The Arab pagans looked with reverence to their superiority in religious knowledge and to a certain extent recognised them as an authority on religious matters.

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

W. Robertson Smith in his Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia notes that the ba'al marriage, i.e. in which the husband is "lord" over the wife, was a comparatively recent institution in Arabia. The earlier type of marriage, in which the wife remained in her own tribe, retained the children who became members of her totem and formed only a temporary union which she could dissolve at will, was then passing away and falling into disrepute. "In fact marriage, as we understand now, was already fully developed, at least in the settled communities of Hejaz, and women who followed the older usage were simply classed as harlots. Now this indicates a very fully developed social order and far removed from primitive conditions." It seems that the Arabs at the time of Islam were more and more conforming to the social life of the civilised empires around them and their primitive customs were undergoing a process of increasing modification through intercourse with the surrounding world.

2. Ibid., p. 191.
According to Dr. Nicholson, the position of women in pre-Islamic Arabia was high and their influence was considerable. They were free to choose their husbands and could return, if ill-treated or displeased, to their own people. In some cases they even offered themselves in marriage and had the right of divorce. They inspired the poet to sing and the warrior to fight. "The chivalry of the Middle Ages is, perhaps, ultimately traceable to heathen Arabia."

The above statement can be accepted only with some reservations, as we know that in Arabia marriage was by purchase; the mahr or bride-price being paid to the parent or the guardian. Women were also frequently carried off in raids, becoming the wives of their captors. This implies that women were regarded as property. We are told that they might be inherited as part of the property of their husbands. "They seem to have enjoyed considerable freedom and respect. But they had few rights."

Women and children had no share in inheritance, according to the pre-Islamic customs. The Arabs did not believe that property could be inherited by any person not capable of bearing arms. When daughters were given the right to share the inheritance of their deceased father, the companions of the Holy Prophet seem to have been surprised and their remark was: "Should we give a share of inheritance to the daughters, when they cannot ride a horse and take up arms on behalf of the tribe?" Far from inheriting property, women were themselves considered property. When a man died, his wives passed on to the son, who could marry them, or give them in marriage to some other person, himself obtaining the bride-money. The only exception, of course, was his own mother.

Murder was avenged by the aggrieved family which was free to kill the culprit or to pardon him on receiving blood-money which was originally fixed at ten camels, but seems to have

been raised to one hundred camels by the Prophet's grandfather, 'Abdul Mu'ṭṭalib.

The above is a brief account of the social and economic conditions existing in Arabia on the eve of Islam. It shows that Arabian society from which Islam arose was not, after all, a primitive nomadic society but had been considerably influenced by the civilisations of the adjacent countries. The birthplace of Islam, Mecca, had little of nomadism. It was a settled commercial community. To represent Islamic law or institutions as the outgrowth of a primitive, nomadic or pastoral society is far from truth. Arabia had both agriculture and commerce in the days of Islam and the Bedouin life of nomadism had had no influence on the teachings of the new religion. Economically, Islam had to deal with a far from primitive commercial system. Everything goes to show that the Arabs of the towns were getting tired of tribal strifes and nomadic encroachments, and were anxiously waiting for some unifying force to appear. Religiously, the Arabs, though still immersed in idolatry, had developed a faint notion of monotheism and earnest souls everywhere were spiritually dissatisfied with the superstitions and idol worship around them. The Ḥanīfs, as they were called, were the precursors of Islamic monotheism. The very necessities of commercial and settled life were driving men to give up the worship of innumerable local deities. Arabia had also developed an incipient sense of nationality although this could not break through tribal ties. The Arabic language was the most powerful factor in building this sense of nationality. But another factor which influenced the growth of the national spirit was the rivalry of the Persians and Byzantines for the control of Arabia. What the Arabs lacked was political unity and intellectual culture. The Arabs were democrats by nature but they had no political institution or system of administration, except of a rough primitive nature.
Chapter 2

THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION INITIATED BY THE HOLY PROPHET

We have studied the pre-Islamic conditions of Arabia and have noted that the Arabs lived at a very low stage of intellectual, social and cultural development, even though influences from the outside world had been reaching them and the necessities of commercial and international relations were gradually driving them to the settled and peaceful life possible only under a unified community ruled over by a central and sovereign authority.

This sovereign authority which was gradually to incorporate all lawless elements under a single state authority emerged in the shape of Islam. It is difficult to say what would have happened if the religious and educative influence of Islam had not been the instrument of this socio-political unification. Certainly, if the Arabs had achieved their unity in any other shape, their dynamic energies would have petered out in a transitory imperial flash such as the world witnessed in the conquests of the Mongols during the thirteenth century. But Islam was too much of a civilising and humanising force to have succumbed to the marauding instincts of the Arab race, which raised their head as soon as the Prophet and his first two companions had ceased to exercise their spiritual vigilance.

Islam effected an all-round transformation among the Arabs. While the changes it introduced in institutional life and the social and economic system of the people with whom it dealt were nothing less than a mighty revolution, its main triumph lay in producing a new intellectual and spiritual outlook among the leaders of the people. The Arabs were not a speculative race, like the Greeks. They had little taste for abstract thinking. They were first and foremost men of action and their powers of
intellect were turned towards the practical affairs of life. They had a wonderfully keen sense of observation which is constantly in evidence throughout the pre-Islamic poetry. Detailed and minute descriptions of desert situations, love affairs and animals like the camel, the horse, the cow, etc., on which they had to depend all their life, amply illustrate their keenness of perception. The great work of Islam lay in utilising this power for the creation of a scientific and experimental attitude. In a very vital sense Arab sciences, such as physics, astronomy, medicine and alchemy, owe their inception and development to the Qur'an. But Islam also refined the intellect of the Arabs in another field. It pushed them beyond the particular to a grasp of the universal. It enabled them to take a philosophic view of life. It gave them the rudiments of a metaphysics and a sociology, besides an embryonic legal theory. The concept of a universe governed by impersonal law cannot be grasped by a people at a low stage of intellectual development. The idea of history as a process of selection and elimination in which the morally unfit are destroyed and replaced by the spiritually advanced people must remain foreign to a crude people interested only in the immediate, the particular and the concrete. Yet Islam gave to the more understanding of the Arabs both a sense of the universals underlying particulars and a view of history as a process towards the achievement of greater harmony and better human relationships. The Qur'an contains both a metaphysics and a philosophy of history in their most elementary forms.

The Qur'an is full of passages which emphasise the existence of an impersonal moral order, in which human actions produce their inevitable consequences, both physical and moral, and which takes no account of man's individual desires and prayers or his attempts to enlist the intercession of spiritual intermediaries, whether men or gods. Take a passage like the following:

Not your desires, nor those
Of the People of the Book
(If: a prevail) : whoever
Works evil, will be
Requited accordingly.  
Nor will he find, besides God,  
Any protector or helper.  

(4, 123).

To a people who believed in a capricious fate, who had no idea of the social and moral laws which shape the destiny of individuals and nations and who thought that the consequences of human misdeeds could be averted by resort to charms, rituals and the intercession of subordinate deities, the Qur'an gave the idea of an irrevocable moral order and the conception of a God who was neutral and impartial in His dealings with individuals and nations.

Again, the Qur'an gave the Arabs a rudimentary view of history as a process of eliminating the morally unfit, as a force which vindicates virtue and justice by the defeat and ruin of the unjust and the evil-doers.

Generations before you  
We destroyed when they  
Did wrong: their Apostles  
Came to them with Clear Signs,  
But they would not believe!  
Thus do We requite  
Those who sin!  
Then We made you  
Heirs in the land after them,  
To see how ye would behave!  

(10, 13-14).

Said Moses to his people:  
"Pray for help from God,  
And (wait) in patience and constancy;  
For the earth is God's,  
To give as a heritage  
To such of His servants  
As He pleaseth; and the end  
Is (best) for the righteous."  

(7, 128).

In these lines the Qur'an emphasises the moral factor in shaping the history of nations and shows how the development of human communities is governed by inevitable social and moral laws. The idea that the possession of wealth and kingdom is
a test for their possessors and that nations and communities are invested with authority in order to prove their fitness or otherwise for the work entrusted to them tends to give a view of history quite different from that which sees in it the play-ground of chance or of purely geographical and physical factors. The effect of such teachings on the more intelligent followers of Islam must have been tremendous. It released them from innumerable superstitions and elevated them to a plane of intellectual understanding from where they could grasp the unity of life and history and the universal laws which govern their course. The teachings of Islam were the forerunner of scientific naturalism shorn of its more materialistic elements.

In a world riven by sectarian conflicts, religious disputes and intolerance, a world which lacked the ideal of a common humanity, Islam came as a great intellectualising force. It raised the leaders of the Islamic Arabs far above petty sectarian prejudices, national animosities, religious and racial intolerance, and inspired them with a sense of mission for delivering humanity out of the narrowness of religious and national affiliations. In a word, it taught them to look on all human beings as one whose religious and cultural differences could be accommodated within the framework of an international order. Islam thus brought humanity closer to the idea of one world, one humanity and one supreme reign of justice and equality. The Roman Empire had prepared the necessary geographical and political conditions for such an international set-up. Islam produced the necessary intellectual outlook while furthering the political and geographical unity created by the Romans.

We shall not dwell further on the moral and intellectual transformation brought by Islam, as our main object is to study the social, political, economic and institutional changes introduced by the new religion. So much has been written about the politics of the Holy Prophet, his wars and treaties, etc., that one is apt to forget that the Prophet was first and foremost a religious leader and his main preoccupation was the spiritual and moral reformation of the world through his
own people. For all its political, social and economic transformations, Islām never ceased to be a spiritual and religious movement. If the Prophet found himself forced into politics, it is because he had realised from the very beginning that ethical principles remain ineffective if they are not embodied in social institutions. A healthy moral and spiritual life can subsist only on sound material foundations and a movement which seeks to transform the spiritual outlook of man cannot remain indifferent to political, social and economic injustices. The Prophet of Islām was impelled to his religious mission mainly by the social and economic injustices around him. Mecca, during his early life, displayed the familiar evils of a wealthy commercial society, extremes of wealth and poverty, an underworld of slaves and hirelings, social class-barriers. "It is clear from Mohammed's fervent denunciations of social injustice and fraud that this was one of the deep inner causes of his unsettlement. But the ferment within him did not break out in the preaching of social revolution; it was thrust instead into a religious channel and issued in a deep and unshakable conviction that he was called by God to proclaim to his fellow-citizens the old warning of Semitic prophets: Repent, for the Judgement of God is at hand."\(^1\)

The idea that Muḥammad (peace be on him) abandoned religion for politics since he emigrated to Medina is, therefore, totally mistaken. Even Western writers acknowledge the fact that the Prophet never subordinated religion to politics. Thus Bell says, "There is no doubt that the impulse which set him upon his mission was a religious one, and that the religious aim was with him the overruling motive all through. He sought and wielded power, but it was for the furthering of monotheism and Islam."\(^2\) And Gibb writes in the same strain: "The one certain fact is that his impulse was religious through and through. From the beginning of his career as a preacher his outlook and judgement of persons and events were dominat-

ed by his conceptions of God's government and purposes in
the world of men....¹ There was no break in Mohammed's
own consciousness and conception of his office. Externally, the
Islamic movement assumed a new shape and formed a definite
community organized on political lines under a single chief. But
this merely gave explicit form to what had hitherto been
implicit. In the mind of Mohammed (as in the minds of his
opponents) the new religious association had long been con-
ceived of as a community organized on political lines, not as
a church within a secular state.”²

This, then, was the first problem before the Holy Prophet,
namely, how to evolve a political community of the isolated
and warring tribes of Arabia. This could not be done at
Mecca where formidable political and economic interests had
pitted themselves against him. He had tried peaceful persua-
sion at Mecca but he failed. The opposition of the Meccans
was largely based on political and economic grounds. It was
not merely a doctrinal opposition. Therefore, it could be
broken down only through political and economic pressure.
In Medina his one aim was the internal consolidation of the
Muslim community and the coercion of Mecca. Muhammad's
attitude towards Mecca was not governed by personal feelings.
Mecca was the intellectual and political leader of Western
Arabia. So long as Mecca remained hostile, the Islamic com-
unity was in danger. The Prophet also desired to enlist the
talents of the Meccans because nowhere else in Western Arabia
was there such intellectual grasp or such political ability.

Conditions for building up a new political community were
more favourable in Medina. In Mecca peace and order had pre-
vailed and the Qurayš were able to exercise a kind of suzerainty
over the whole population. The tribal and family ties and the
custom of blood-revenge did not have any great disturbing effect
on the powerful political organisation which the Qurayš had
built up. In Medina there was no central authority to settle the

². Ibid., p. 27.
blood-feuds between the clans. The two Arabian tribes of Aus and Khazraj were bitterly divided against each other and against the Jews. Murder and manslaughter were the order of the day; nobody dared venture out of his quarter without danger. Blood as a bond of union had failed. The Prophet put faith in its place. Since there was no authority, a religious authority took the lead and secured its position by performing what was expected of it. The power of religion, therefore, chiefly appeared as a political force. It created a community, and over it an authority which was obeyed. Allah was the personification of state authority. "What with us is done in the king’s name was done in the name of Allah; the army and the public institutions were called after Allah. The idea of ruling authorities, till then absolutely foreign to the Arabs, was introduced through Allah. In this there was also the idea that no outward or human power, but only a power inwardly acknowledged and standing above mankind, had the right to rule. The theocracy is the negative of the Mulk, or earthly kingdom. The privilege of ruling is not a private possession for the enjoyment of the holder of it; the kingdom belongs to God.”

From the idea of the rule of God, there arose no actual form of constitution. The new factor effected a concentration of elements hitherto disparate. The old ties of blood continued unchanged, though the centre of gravity was transferred from them to the new political community. The framework of the tribes, clans and families was taken over into the new commonwealth. “Muḥammad durst not strike openly at the independence of the tribes, but he destroyed it, in effect, by shifting the centre of power from the tribe to the community; and although the community included Jews and pagans as well as Moslems, he fully recognised, what his opponents failed to foresee, that the Moslems were the active, and must soon be the predominant, partners in the newly founded State.”

Soon after he reached Medina, the Prophet was able to set up

1. Wellhausen, J., The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall, Calcutta 1927, p. 8. [Italics ours].
a state authority by entering into a compact with the Jews and heathens who were incorporated in a new *Ummah* whose object was to establish peace and order in Medina. The *Ummah* consisted in general not of individuals but of alliances. The individual belonged to the *Ummah* only through the medium of the clan and the family. The heads of the families remained in their positions. The families continued, as before, to be liable to expenses which were not of a purely private nature, namely, the payment of blood-money and the ransom of prisoners. Even the important privilege of guaranteed protection, the *Ijāra*, was not restricted; any individual might take a stranger under his protection, and by so doing put the whole community under the same obligation. But the family was forced to yield to the *Ummah* the right of civil feud, that is, feud with the other families of Medina, for the first aim of the *Ummah* was to prevent internal fighting. The revenge for bloodshed could no longer resolve itself into a family feud. The duty of prosecution being taken from the individual and given to the whole marked a very important step, making revenge a duty of the state. Before the conquest of Mecca, the new Islamic State did not include the tribes outside of Medina who remained independent units, often in alliance with the Islamic State. But after the capture of Mecca and the overthrow of the Hawāzins, the tribes were forced to enter the new commonwealth and lose their independence. The acceptance of *Islam* by a tribe meant not only a change of religion, but also its submission to the authority of the central government. Without this there could be no acceptance of *Islam*. But this submission was done not by individual action. The chiefs of the tribes acted for the people. The tribes and their aristocracies still remained, but they were placed under the supervision of the state and were united in a state whose centre was Medina. The Arabian tribes who had no idea of a centrally established state and were jealous of their independence thought that they had sworn allegiance to the Prophet in his personal capacity. After the death of the Holy Prophet, they fell away not from religion as such but from the central government at Medina. In this they were mistaken. *Islam* could not be complete without
submission to the state. This they were made to realise by Abū Bakr and his generals. Thus from the first to the last Islam was and remained a political community and not mere religion.

FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION

When the Prophet organised his new community in Medina, evidently the state had no source of income. In the compact with the Jews and heathens of Medina, there is evidently no mention of any financial obligations to the new state. No taxes seem to have been levied. The system was designed only to prevent internal fighting and ensure external defence. The Muhājirīn or the Emigrants were in no position to make any payments to the state. Nor were the Anṣār placed under any financial obligations to the state. The duty of helping the emigrants was voluntary. The first source of income to the new state, therefore, was the booty captured in the wars which ensued firstly with the Quraysh and secondly with the Jews. The Ghanīmah (booty), according to the pre-Islamic Arab notion, consisted not only of the property captured during the actual course of a war, but also of all the lands, movable property, the slaves and women of the conquered territory. The Prophet introduced a radical reform by confining the Ghanīmah or booty to property captured on the battlefield. When the Jewish tribe of Banū Naḍīr surrendered without their fortifications having fallen to the assailants, the Prophet treated the conquered lands and property not as Ghanīmah but as Fay' (state property). "Of course this was a flagrant breach of the ancient Arabic customs and therefore the cited verses are assumed to give the divine answer to all the criticism raised by the Anṣār."

Perhaps basing their case on the Banū Naḍīr lands and the fact that the lands at Khaybar were treated as Ghanīmah or booty, although part of Khaybar surrendered peacefully, the Muslim warriors who conquered 'Iraq demanded that the conquered territory should be

treated as Ghānimah and divided among the soldiers. ‘Omar refused and thereby finally established the position that all lands and property not captured in the battlefield, whether conquered by force or surrendering peacefully, constitutes Fay’.

In any case, onefifth of the booty went to the Prophet, not in his personal capacity but as the head of the state. The remaining fourfifths went to the army. There was no distinction between a volunteer and a regular soldier or between a private and an officer, all sharing equally. There was also no distinction between those who actually fought and those who were not required to fight. “In the battle of Badr, the Prophet allowed eight persons to share in the booty in spite of their absence from the war-zone. They were employed by the commander for special duties, such as scouting, etc. Women, slaves, minors, non-Muslims, though given a gift for their meritorious work, cannot have equal shares along with Muslim grown-up soldiers. An exception is, however, made regarding non-Muslim soldiers when they form in themselves a formidable force, or without whom the rest of the Muslim army could not be strong enough; then they also share equally with Muslim soldiers.”

Prior to Islam there was no organised central treasury. But with the expansion of Islam and the conquests of the Prophet, the central government instituted a kind of incipient treasury which was not developed on regular lines until the time of ‘Omar. Into this treasury flowed the fiftieth of the Ghānimah reserved by the Prophet to the head of the state, the Fay’, that is, incomes other than Ghānimah, whether in the form of Kharāj, i.e. land tax, or in the form of Jizya, or the poll tax, on the non-Muslims. Besides, there was another item of income, namely, the Zakāt, or the poor tax collected by the Muslims. The income from all these sources was not substantial during the time of the Prophet and there was no regular system of payment to the army or the officials employed by the government. Their services were more or less voluntary.

Taxation in the modern sense of the word did not exist under the Holy Prophet or his successors. The land tax (Kharāj and

1. Ḥamīdullah, M., Muslim Conduct of State, Lahore 1945, pp. 239.-240.
The Islamic Revolution Initiated by the Holy Prophet

(Uṣhr), the capitation tax (Jizya) and the Zakât (poor tax) were the main sources of income.

Of these the Kharaj and Jizya were not new taxes. They were levied both by the Roman and the Persian Empires. Among the Romans Kharaj was called Tributum soli and Jizya was called Tributum capitis. The Persian system of Kharaj, or land tax, reformed in the time of Kisra Anushirwan (531-579). This Persian monarch also reformed the capitation tax (Jizya) which was called Gazit in Iran. "By his reform all males between the ages of twenty and fifty were compelled to pay a poll tax, graded according to each individual's income in yearly amounts of 12, 8, 6 and 4 dirhems. The majority of the people naturally paid the smallest amount, and not everyone had to pay this tax. Specifically exempt were the members of the Seven Families, of which one was the ruling house itself. The Great (al-'uzama' = vuzurgan) who were also administrative chiefs were exempt; and finally, soldiers, priests, secretaries, and individuals in the service of the king paid no poll tax. A sharp distinction was thus made between the privileged classes, consisting of the ruling, military, priestly, and educated aristocracy, and those who were ruled. While in theory the poll tax paid by the latter was to compensate for the royal and priestly duties they were unable to discharge, payment of the tax amounted to a badge of degradation and a mark of social inferiority."¹

The Prophet of Islam seems to have departed from the Persian and Byzantine systems of poll tax (Jizya) by substituting a religious distinction in regard to the payment of this tax for the class distinctions on which the Roman and Byzantine systems were based. But in this departure there seemed to be no desire to humiliate the non-Muslims or treat them as second-class citizens. The fact was that the Prophet was trying to set up a state in which there was to be an ideological unity of all the citizens. That is the reason why the Arabs were expected to embrace Islam. Political subordination to the central authori-

ty at Medina was not considered sufficient; the tribes also had to accept the Islamic ideology. Now, the question remained: What was to be done with the Jews and Christians who could not be forced to embrace Islām? The Prophet did not desire to exile them, but if they were to remain under the Islamic State, obviously they could not be admitted to a position of authority, nor could they be made to take up arms in defence of a state founded on an ideology different from their own. The only method was to take them under protection and accord them all civic rights on payment of the capitation tax (Jīzā). The Muslims did not pay this tax, because, firstly, all of them without exception formed the military class and, secondly, because they were expected to pay Zakāt in addition to ‘Ushr or land tax. There was only one way to avoid the religious distinction on which Jīzā was based, namely, to form a national state without any ideological basis and social programme. But if the Prophet had resorted to this method, he could not have effected any moral and social reform among the Arabs, who would thus have been deprived of the civilising influence of Islām and become pure marauders and military conquerors. A significant departure made by the Prophet from pre-Islamic Arab, Roman and Persian methods of administration was to introduce a full-fledged system of Zakāt to ensure that the poorer sections of the population will not go unsupported and that the community will see to it that no individual is allowed to starve through lack of means, old age, unemployment or physical incapacity. The custom of helping the poor by communal agencies existed in pre-Islamic Arabia and might have existed also in the neighbouring countries. But it had not been raised at the level of a state function and no specific regulations were prescribed to administer social charity. With Islām, the relief of poverty became one of the principal functions of the state. The Prophet drew up rules and regulations for the collection and administration of Zakāt, which could be taken only from the Muslims who had attained the age of majority. It was levied on grains, fruits, dates, grapes, etc., animals, gold, silver, merchandise and mines. A minimum was laid down in each case. The
amount thus collected was spent on (1) the economically backward people, i.e. the needy, (2) collectors of Zakāt, (3) those whose hearts had to be won over to Islām, (4) manumission of slaves, (5) debtors, (6) travellers, (7) general welfare of the community. No amount was fixed for any of these items, so that the ruler’s discretion was a decisive factor. The general welfare of the community included military defence, so that Zakāt funds could be applied for defence purposes also. The debtors were helped to get over their financial troubles, slaves could be helped to purchase their freedom. The Qur’ān and the Holy Prophet do not confine the administration of Zakāt to the Muslims, although they alone had to pay the tax. Thus non-Muslims could also be helped. After the exile of the Jews from Medina, when their power was broken, the Holy Prophet sanctioned regular economic relief for some of the Jews who chose to remain and were economically distressed.¹ According to Imām Abū Yūsuf, ‘Omar interpreted the word Miskīn in the Qur’ān to mean non-Muslims who were economically indigent. Accordingly ‘Omar sanctioned regular economic relief from the proceeds of Zakāt to non-Muslims. Abū Yūsuf says that while ‘Omar was proceeding to Damascus, he came upon a party of Christians suffering from leprosy whereupon he ordered that they should be given economic help from the Zakāt funds.² On the conquest of Ḥira, Khalīd b. Walīd signed an agreement with its inhabitants, which stated, “If an old man is unable to work, or becomes distressed for any other reason, or falls into poverty and is helped by his coreligionists out of charity, he will be exempted from jīzāya and the Muslim exchequer will undertake to maintain his dependents.”³

GENERAL ECONOMIC POLICY

The Prophet of Islām effected a great transformation in the

¹. Ḥamīdullah, M., Political Life of the Prophet (Urdu), Lahore 1369 (1950), p. 339.
Arab conception of property. Hitherto the Arabs had no idea of state property. Absolute right of ownership and possession was generally the rule in Arabia. Islam introduced the idea that all property belongs to God and man is only a trustee. Since God, in the Islamic terminology, stood for the common weal, the Prophet established the principle that in the last resort all property and possession must serve the common interests. In practice, Islam admitted the right of individual ownership but this right was not absolute and unrestricted. "No doubt, the theocratic basis of Muslim polity denies a state of absolute ownership—as distinguished from relative ownership.or trusteeship of God... Islamic jurists have opined that every individual owner has the same Divine authority, and the supervising authority of the state is only a symbol or a manifestation of the collective authority of the community."

It seems, therefore, that the right of ownership is absolute neither for the individual nor for the state; the collective welfare of the community, the common weal, is the decisive factor. The state can encroach on the rights of the individual only if it has established a clear case that the common welfare of the community requires such an action. In many cases, the right of property has been made conditional. A tradition of the Prophet states, "The Adite land belongs to God and to His Messenger. And thereafter does it to you. So whoever colonises a derelict land, it will be his. Yet no one has a right to an enclosure after three years, if he has not developed it." The same attitude is evident in the case of other kinds of landed property, for example, hima or the preserves over which an Arab tribe had absolute right of ownership. "In many cases the hima has been brought under governmental control, and is then ascribed to a single person of the tribe and is made dependent upon the yielding of a tribute. If the tax is not paid the rights are forfeited, and other people may occupy the property... More serious reductions of the tribal hima's [sic.] hardly

1. Ḥamīdullah, M., Muslim Conduct of State, Lahore 1945, p. 80.
2. Ibid., p. 82.
occurred until the *riddah* afforded an opportunity for the government to seize upon more land. For instance, Abū Bakr seems to have robbed Kindah of theirs on that occasion, or at any rate to have left it out of account. Ar-Rabadhah, too, being tribal property, is made State *himā*. Subsequently governmental interference no doubt became more and more frequent. An instance is given of how the government might dig wells in a tribal *himā*, which the owners later on had to ask the rulers to return to them as a *qatifah*.”¹ A rule seems to have been promulgated during the Prophet’s time that nobody could declare anything to be *himā* which God and the Prophet had not declared to be so. “This rule is elaborated in detail so as to give leave to the Khalifahs according to their own judgment (*rā`y*), to declare such areas to be *himā* as are thought analogous to those of the Prophet.”²

The same restricted right of individual ownership appears to have existed in regard to fiefs of land. The fiefs granted by the Holy Prophet were not regarded as inalienable by his successors, and ‘Omar, the second Caliph, seems to have cancelled the grants on more than one occasion. The case of Bilāl b. Ḥārīthah, who had been granted a fief by the Prophet, is a striking instance. ‘Omar also withdrew the possessions of Bajilah, making up for this by a fixed assignment on the state’s treasury.³

Along with this, certain forms of property were declared by the Prophet to belong exclusively to the community. Abyād b. Ḥammāl was given by the Prophet a salt spring in Ma`ārib. But, on being informed that it was an inexhaustible and perennial spring, the Prophet withdrew his permission. The Prophet also prohibited more than once the giving in *jāgīr* (fief) of things in which there is common interest.⁴ The rule was also laid down that ‘all men have common rights in water, fire and grass.’ Proceeding on this basis, Abū Yusuf has declared that all big rivers are common property. External mines with open surface

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² Ibid., p. 34.
³ Ibid., p. 49.
⁴ Ḥamīdullah, M., *Muslim Conduct of State*, Lahore 1945, p. 86.
cannot be given in fief according to Islamic jurisprudence. They are communal and state property. İmam Mālik goes further and declares that all mines of gold, silver, brass, iron, mercury, tar, rubies, etc., belong to the state and no person can claim individual rights in them.¹

The Prophet of İslām also took steps to improve the relationship of landlord and tenant and eliminate all methods calculated to oppress and exploit the cultivator. In Medina, at the time of the Prophet, there were four methods of renting land for cultivation. In one of these, a portion of the land was earmarked for the landlord and all produce from this portion of the land went to the owner of the land, the produce of the remaining part going to the cultivator. The result was sometimes prejudicial to the interests of one or the other party. For example, if, through some natural calamity, the produce of the cultivator’s portion suffered, he had to bear the whole loss and vice versa in the case of the landlord. This form of renting land was prohibited by the Prophet. Another method was to earmark the wet portion of the land for the landlord and the dry portion for the cultivator. This was also prohibited by the Holy Prophet. A third method was for the cultivator to pay the rent in the shape of dates and barley. The fourth consisted in a third, fourth or half of the produce being given to the landlord. Cash rent was unknown in Medina. It seems that the Holy Prophet intended to substitute cash payments for the existing method of giving the rent in agricultural produce, because Rāfi‘ b. Khadij says, “My uncle told me that during the time of the Holy Prophet, people used to rent their lands on the fourth of the agricultural produce or any other portion earmarked by them. The Prophet forbade us to do this.” Rāfi‘ was asked, “What do you think of renting land for money payments?” He replied, “There is no harm in this.”

On the whole, the Prophet appears to have disapproved totally the method of renting land. A tradition quoted by Bukhārī states, “If a person owns a piece of land, he should either cultivate it himself or give it free to his brothers, but if he does

not do this, he should let it lie uncultivated’’ [Bukhārī, Kitābul Ḥīrāt wal-Mazārī]. It should be noted, however, that many of the desired reforms could not be effected by the Prophet for lack of administrative machinery. Islām had started from very simple, primitive conditions and the Islamic State of Medina did not have an administration even of the medieval type. The Baytul-Māl or treasury itself had not been fully organised till the time of `Omar, the second Caliph. The Prophet, therefore, seems to have limited himself to the disapproval of some of the existing forms of exploitation in land.

In commercial dealings, the Prophet prohibited all forms of trade in which there was a considerable element of uncertainty or one of the parties was not able to ascertain the quality of the goods, or the goods were liable to destruction or corruption before delivery. Thus Bay‘-Munābadha and Bay‘-Mulābasā were both prohibited. In the former case, the cloth vendor would just throw the cloth at the purchaser, without his having examined it properly. In the latter case, the dealings were effected before the purchaser was able to touch the cloth. The Prophet also prohibited the purchase and sale of fruits and vegetables before they had become ripe. Hoarding of grain was a normal practice of Arabian merchants. Whenever a caravan of grain merchants came to Medina or Mecca, some of the wealthier merchants went to meet the caravan outside the city and purchased the whole lot and then sold it to the people at excessive prices. This was also forbidden by the Prophet.

The most outstanding reform effected by the Holy Prophet was the prohibition of interest and usury. The Qur‘ān declared that those who were not prepared to give up lending and borrowing of money on interest should be prepared to wage a war against God and His Prophet (2, 279). Interest was explained to include all forms of barter involving excess payments. Although the Prophet expressly prohibited only the exchange of gold, silver, wheat, barley, dates and salt for excess quantities of the same article, the jurists generally apply this prohibition to all forms of barter not effected on the spot and involving excess payment. Of course, when the articles involved are not of the same category,
excess payment is not considered unlawful. For example, if wheat is exchanged for barley, the prohibition does not apply. In order to help the needy who were badly in want of money for their daily necessities, the state treasury, during the time of the Prophet, used to loan out money without interest. Under the Prophet, such instances were rare, but, during ‘Omar’s time, this practice was regularised and loans were granted to citizens even for commercial and industrial purposes.¹

The general economic policy of the Prophet was governed by the desire to pave the way for greater economic equality and prevent concentration of wealth in a few hands. The Qur’an not only condemned the hoarding of wealth but laid special stress on the need of spending money for charitable and social purposes. The Qur’an also made it clear that it does not like an economy in which the predominant portion of national wealth passes into the hands of a few industrialists and a small limited commercial class. Greater diffusion of wealth is the underlying economic idea of the Qur’an:

“What God has bestowed on His Apostle (and taken away) from the people of the townships;—belongs to God,—to His Apostle and to kindred and orphans, the needy and the wayfarer in order that it may not (merely) make a circuit between the wealthy among you.”

It ought to be remembered that the Prophet of Islam was faced with a very primitive society just emerging from the pastoral and agricultural stage and that he had not at his disposal the technical and administrative resources of a modern or even a medieval state. He could, therefore, enforce his policy and implement his ideals only within the narrow limitations forced upon him by his age and people.

SLAVERY AND THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN

Slavery was a worldwide and well-established institution during the age of Islam. It was an international system which no single nation, and least of all a small isolated country like Arabia,

could hope to abolish at a single stroke. The great revolutionary work of the Prophet of Islam lay not in the total abolition of the institution but its limitation and the creation of conditions which might ultimately pave the way for its total suppression. The Prophet of Islam succeeded in severely narrowing down the field and area of slavery and according specific legal rights to the slaves whereby they could ensure a decent, tolerable living for themselves and escape the humiliations and injustices to which they had been exposed under the existing system. The first reform in this connection effected by the Holy Prophet was to abolish all other forms of enslavement except that of the prisoners of war. Thus debt-slavery was completely abolished. As regards the prisoners of war, it was the policy of the Prophet to repatriate and exchange the prisoners where the other party was willing to do so. All the Muslim jurists unanimously agree that if the enemy is willing to repatriate prisoners of war, the Muslim State should not refuse to do so. The Prophet himself agreed to such repatriation, according to Muslim, Abu Da'ud and Tirmidhi.

Having regard to the peculiar conditions of the time, enslavement of women and children war prisoners was often an act of mercy, because, where the manhood of a city or town was completely exterminated, the survivors were left helpless and neither the state nor any other institution was supposed to look after them. Under such conditions, prisoners of war enslaved by the Muslims acquired a certain legal status with specified rights and, by becoming members of the Muslim families, escaped the threat of starvation. “The policy of the Prophet reached a climax when, as is said, he decreed that Arabs could not be enslaved. The Caliph ‘Umar issued orders that peasants, artisans and professionals of belligerent countries should not be enslaved. The Qur’an exhorted liberation of slaves, and provided that the income of the Muslim state should partly be allotted for the manumission of slaves. Another verse was interpreted by the Caliph ‘Umar to mean that if a Muslim slave wanted to work and thus pay off his value to his master, the master was not in a position to refuse the offer.”1 A female slave who bore a child to her master was

legally made free at the death of her husband. The criminal law of the Muslim State made no distinction between a slave and a free man in respect of the right to life, physical safety and social respect. A person who dishonoured a female slave or caused physical injuries to any slave was liable to the same prosecution as in the case of a free man. The civil law granted the slaves absolute right to property. Not even the master could dispose of the property of his slave without his permission. Perfect freedom of religion was secured to the slaves. The Caliph 'Omar had a Christian slave whom he wanted to embrace Islam, but the slave refused to change his religion and 'Omar could do nothing.

Legal rights apart, the Prophet inculcated brotherly love towards the slaves. Abu Dharr Ghafari once abused his slave. The latter complained to the Prophet who expressed great displeasure at the act and said, "Abu Dharr, the habits of the days of ignorance still influence you," and went on to say: "These brothers of yours are your servants whom God has made dependent upon you. So feed and clothe your brothers (slaves) as you feed and clothe yourself. Do not burden them with more work than they are able to do and if you have entrusted them with some hard or heavy work, help them personally." The Qur'an also prescribed manumission of slaves as atonement for many sins committed by the Muslims.

As regards the social and legal status of women, the Prophet can be regarded as the greatest benefactor of the female sex. He abolished the custom of marrying an unlimited number of women. Polygamy was allowed up to four but made conditional on the ability to do equal economic justice to the wives. In a state of society where women were looked upon as property, Islam gave them wide property rights, some of which they have not been able to receive even in modern Western society. A woman can own and manage her own property without the least interference by her husband. She inherits property both from her husband and from her parents. Before the consummation of marriage she must be paid her dowry according to her status. She is equally free to choose her husband and can repudiate a marriage forced upon her by her guardians during her minority. She can get a
divorce from a court of law for ill-treatment by her husband or for any other legitimate reason. At the time of marriage, she can put any conditions in the marriage contract which she considers necessary for safeguarding her position. All this meant an immense advance in the position of women in a society where she did not differ materially from a slave in respect of legal rights. Here, as elsewhere, Islam could not disregard the limitations of time and social conditions but it paved the way towards the complete equality of the sexes, subject to the inevitable limitations put by nature herself on the freedom of the female sex, and the necessity of securing a stable home for children.

WAR AND THE PRISONERS OF WAR

Great changes were made by the Prophet in the aims, methods and rules of warfare. Firstly, all wars not in strict self-defence or for the sake of God (that is, with a view to the setting up of a social system calculated to ensure the freedom and happiness of the people and assuring them of justice) were forbidden. A tradition of the Prophet says, "Wars are of two kinds. If a man wages a war with a view to please God, obeys the central authority, spends his money therein and avoids all disorder and tyranny, he will deserve his reward for all his acts, including sleep. But he who fights for fame or for the sake of worldly goods will be punished in the hereafter." This may not appear of much significance today but undoubtedly such teachings exercised great influence on the minds of the Muslims for a very long period and restrained them from going to war for sordid motives.

The Muslims were told that war is sometimes an evil necessity. But peace is better and every effort should be made, as far as possible, before undertaking a war to try methods of peace. The Qur'an says: "And if they incline to peace, incline thou also to it, and trust in God" (8, 61). And again, "So do not falter, and invite to peace whenever you are the uppermost. And God is with you and He will not grudge the reward of your actions" (47, 35). A tradition of the Prophet says, "Do not desire to meet the enemy, but pray to God for peace. However, when you do face an enemy, fight him wholeheartedly and know that paradise is
under the shade of the sword.”

A later Muslim author says, “Wars are accidents among the happenings of the time, just like sicknesses, in contrast to peace and security, which resemble health for bodies. So it is necessary to preserve health by means of political action, and to shun sickness by means of warlike action, and to busy one’s self in preserving health.”

If a state in treaty relations with the Muslim State violates its agreements, the Islamic Law provides that the former should be presented with a formal ultimatum and given sufficient time to rectify its conduct, before war is actually declared against it. The Qur’an says:

“If you fear treachery from any group, throw back their covenant to them (so as to be) on equal terms: for God does not love the treacherous” (8, 57).

Ibn Ḥajar, Ibn Kathīr and Azhari interpret this verse to mean that a formal notice should be given to the other party that it has broken peace. Not content with this, most Muslim jurists think that a year’s time should be given to enable it to improve its ways.

Belligerents are divided into combatants and noncombatants. All who are incapable of bearing arms cannot be killed during the war. The Prophet once came across the dead body of a woman and ordered Khālid that no woman and no manual worker should be killed in war. Another tradition says, “Do not kill a weak old man, nor a small boy, nor any woman.” Ibn ‘Abbās reports that whenever the Prophet sent an army, he commanded that priests, monks, nuns and other religious men should not be killed. The rule was also laid down by the Prophet that an attack could be launched on the enemy only after the daybreak. The burning of men and women was also forbidden by the Prophet. Once ‘Alī ordered that the Zindīqs (apostates) should be burnt, but ‘Abbās reminded him that the Holy Prophet had forbidden this form of punishment.

Looting of the enemy and the unjust appropriation of
goods after the declaration of peace was also forbidden. After the battle of Khaybar, some of the new recruits of the Muslim army took away the cattle of the Jews. When the complaint was brought before the Prophet he summoned the army and said:

"Does one of you imagine that nothing has been forbidden to you that is not forbidden in the Qur'ān. By God, what I order you and what I forbid you is equally binding upon you and deserving of your obedience. God has not permitted you to enter the homes of the people of the Book without their permission, beat their women, eat their fruits or take away their cattle when they have already delivered to you what was laid down upon them."

Destruction of the enemy's farms, gardens or the commission of incendiary acts was also prohibited. The Qur'ān says, "When he is given authority, his aim is everywhere to spread mischief through the earth and destroy crops and cattle, but God does not love mischief" (2, 205). When Abū Bakr sent his armies to 'Irāq and Syria, he ordered that towns should not be razed, farms should not be destroyed, trees should not be cut down and cattle should not be killed. The Prophet also laid down strict injunctions against the amputation of limbs or the killing of prisoners of war.

Murder of envoys was also declared unlawful. The Muslim jurists held that if a person claims that he has been accredited to the Islamic government by another state, his person, property and even arms should be considered inviolate. Some jurists also hold that if he commits theft or adultery within the Muslim territory, he is not liable to prosecution. When the Arabs undertook a military expedition, they used to block the roads and interfere with the passengers and travellers. The Prophet issued strict orders to refrain from such acts and said, "He who blocked the roads or despoiled a traveller shall not share in the reward of the holy war." The usual advice to the army at the time it started on its march was, "Go forth to fight in the way of God, but commit no deceit or duplicity, do not amputate the enemy nor kill a child." Strict silence was
also maintained in the fighting during a war, as the Arabs used to create much wild uproar, until the word war came to be denoted by waghā, which means uproar. Abū Musa Aḥšā‘arī relates, “We accompanied the Holy Prophet and whenever we reached a valley, we used to cry out and repeat the name of God loudly, whereupon the Prophet said: ‘Walk in a dignified manner. He whom you are calling is neither deaf nor distant from you. He is ever present and hears all.’

The treatment of the prisoners of war was made more humane. “According to Muslim Law, a prisoner qua prisoner cannot be killed. Ibn Rushd even records a consensus of the Companions of the Prophet to this effect. . . . Treatment during captivity has been the subject of liberal provisions. As regards the prisoners of Badr, the Prophet ordered: ‘Take heed of the recommendation to treat the prisoners fairly.’ The consequence was that many Muslim soldiers contented themselves with dates and fed the prisoners in their charge with bread. Abū-Yusuf remarks that prisoners must be fed and well treated until a decision is reached regarding them. They are not to be charged for their food, the cost of which is to be borne by the capturing Muslim state. The Qur’an lays down: ‘Lo! the righteous shall . . . . [go to Paradise] . . . (because) they perform the vow and fear a day whereof the evil is widespreading, and feed with food the needy wretch, the orphan and the prisoner, for love of Him, (saying): we feed you, for the sake of God only, we wish for no reward nor thanks from you.’ Prisoners are to be protected from heat and cold, and the like. If they have no clothes, these might be provided—as was the practice of the Prophet. If they are in any trouble or discomfort, this is to be done away with as far as possible, for which also there is authority of the practice of the Prophet. He has the right to draw up wills for the property at home. Obviously these would be communicated to the enemy authorities through a proper channel. Among prisoners, a mother is not to be separated from her child, nor other near relatives from each other. The position and dignity of prisoners are to be respected according to individual cases. A tradition is also attributed to the Prophet: ‘Pay respect to the
dignity of a nation who is brought low.' There is no evidence in early Muslim history of exacting labour from prisoners. If they tried to escape or otherwise violate discipline, they might be punished. If they succeeded in their attempt to escape and reach safety and are again captured, their previous offence of escaping might not be ground for punishment, except perhaps the breach of parole."

We have reviewed the revolutionary character of the Islamic movement initiated by the Prophet and the changes and transformations it effected in all fields of life. A revolution of this magnitude and such far-reaching consequences for the happiness of mankind has never happened in history. Considering the primitive conditions of Arabia, the lack of intellectual development among the Arabs in particular and the world around in general and having regard to the paucity of the technical, scientific and administrative resources at the disposal of the Prophet of Islam, it seems amazing how much he accomplished single-handed and amidst so much hostility and opposition. If the test of prophethood lies in the revolutionary character of man's achievements and the furtherance of human happiness, equality and freedom, the Prophet of Islam undoubtedly outclassed every leader, religious and non-religious, that humanity has so far produced, and vindicated his claim to be the last and greatest of the prophets of God.

If it is objected that Islam did not give birth to those representative democratic institutions which man devised in later centuries to ensure his equality, dignity and freedom from tyranny and totalitarian curbs on his free self-expression, it should not be forgotten that the conditions faced by the Islamic movement in Arabia and the stage of history at which Islam appeared in the world made it physically impossible to build up such institutions. But Islam it was which sowed the seeds of democratic equality and laid the basis in theory and practice of the representative democracy which came only during the nineteenth century. The Prophet’s great work lies in creating a humanitarian, equalitarian

1. Ḥamīdullah, M., Muslim Conduct of State, Lahore 1945, pp. 206-208.
and international outlook among the leaders of Islam. His farewell speech at the last pilgrimage is an undying testimony to the international and democratic way of life he sought to establish. In this speech he said: "God has spoken to you saying: 'O men, We created you in tribes, families and nations, that you may be recognised from each other, but the best among you in the eyes of God is he who is most Godfearing.' An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab, nor a non-Arab over an Arab, neither a white man over a black man, nor a black man over a white man, except through his moral qualities. O men, go forth, you are free beings. God has destroyed the arrogance of the days of ignorance and its glorification of ancestry. He is not among us who takes his stand on tribal or national affiliations. All men are descended from Adam and Adam was made of clay." On the eve of the conquest of Mecca, Abu Sufyân was so much struck by the power of the Islamic army that he cried out, "What a great imperial authority!" 'Abbâs corrected him at once saying: "This is not empire but prophethood." Once an old woman was walking in a street. The Prophet passed by her. She was overawed and stood motionless. The Prophet turned to her and said: "I am also the son of a woman who used to cook meat. Don't be afraid of me." Another incident of the same nature shows the attitude which the Prophet was inculcating among his people. A person saw the Prophet coming and was overwhelmed with fear. The Prophet said: "Don't fear me, I am not a king." During Omar's rule, the Roman envoy enquired from the people of Medina where their king lived. The people were surprised and said, "We have no king, but only a Caliph." These are small incidents but they bring out the revolutionary character of the mental transformation effected by the Prophet of Islam and the immense advance he made possible in the direction of human equality. If the seeds which he scattered took centuries to germinate and fructify, it is because the Holy Prophet and his teachings were in advance of the times.
Chapter 3

CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

As soon as the Prophet of Islām passed away, the nascent Islamic community was faced with grave problems on which depended the very survival of the new religion. Briefly, these problems were: (1) election of the leader, (2) threat of internal disintegration, (3) the danger of external aggression and (4) the task of educating the Islamic community in the principles of the revolution.

The Prophet had left no instructions as to the manner and method of electing the leader and the Qurʾān too was silent in this respect beyond the bare statement that Muslims should carry on their affairs in consultation with each other. The idea of hereditary succession was foreign to the spirit of Islām and opposed to Arabian traditions. Ābu Bakr’s election as the leader of the new community did not therefore present much difficulty. “Apart from the pretensions of the men of Medīna, which immediately died away, there was in the election neither doubt nor hesitancy. The notion of divine right, or even of preferential claim, resting in the Prophet’s family, was the growth of an altogether later age.”¹ The Qurayṣh, being the most powerful and influential tribe of North Arabia, naturally had the best claim to leadership. Not that Islām sanctioned their prescriptive right, but it was a fact which could be ignored only at a grave peril. Even the Prophet acknowledged their claim to supremacy in a tradition which stated that the leaders would arise from the Qurayṣh. It should be noted in this connection that the Qurayṣh were the most literate, the most intelligent, the most experienced of the North Arabian tribes

and in a society, which had not yet broken away from the idea of traditional authority, they were still looked up to by the rest of the Arabs as the natural leaders of Arabia. "Except, perhaps, by the Khawārij, the leadership of the Quraisḥ was recognised, if somewhat reluctantly, by all sides."¹ Though the Quraysh had also been the leading opponents of Islam, and the Anṣār were numerically superior to them in Medina in the earlier period, the Quraysh made up their strength by accepting Islam after the conquest of Mecca and emigrating in large numbers to Medina which had become the centre and focal point of the Islamic movement. There could, therefore, be no question of admitting the Anṣār's claim to caliphate or allowing them to have their separate rulers, as they proposed to 'Omar, after he had put the situation squarely before them. When 'Omar came forward to greet Abu Bakr as the first Caliph of Islam, there was no further opposition from the Anṣār. Only the Prophet's family were not present on the occasion, but, though they did not like their exclusion from office, they made no protest. On the other hand, both 'Alī and 'Abbās cooperated with the new regime wholeheartedly.

So fast had been the rate of conversion to Islam after the conquest of Mecca that the Prophet was not able to do much towards educating the new converts in the principles and teachings of Islam. He could only gather around him a nucleus of well-grounded men who had fully absorbed the principles of the revolution, but the distant parts of Arabia could not be educated so soon and the Prophet did not live long enough to make the necessary arrangements. "It was a physical impossibility to arrange, in a few months that the Prophet lived after that, for the proper education or training of the masses scattered over a vast territory with very scanty means of intercourse and communication. Those who came in deputation to the Prophet from these distant tribes of the desert, took back a deep impress of Islam, but they were only a drop in the ocean. The Prophet did all that could possibly be done to see that the vast masses might receive some sort of education in the teachings of Islam. From amongst those

who had imbibed the spirit of the faith by sojourn in the Prophet’s company, he would send out missionaries to distant parts. But the supply of such qualified men was by no means adequate to meet the demand. Towards the close of the Prophet’s life, tribe after tribe sent in deputations to declare their allegiance, and Madinah had not enough of men to meet the demand. Nor was it desirable to deplete the seat and centre of the movement of all eminent men. The Qur’an too had forbidden such a course and advised that, rather than disintegrate the force, it must be concentrated, that Madinah must serve as the centre of learning to which selected men from different tribes should come and receive their education and imbibe the spirit of the faith, and thus qualified go back to their own respective tribes and there kindle the light of Islam. But obviously a scheme on these lines could not but take some time to mature, and the Prophet had hardly had any time to do it.”1

With this ignorance of Islam was coupled the tribal structure of Arabia which had not been completely battered down and the Arab character of indiscipline and dislike of socio-political restraints. The Arab was conspicuous for “his hatred and contempt for foreigners; his passion for vengeance; his uncontrollable love of independence under the guise of freedom from all restraint. For a while this was checked by the severe discipline of Islam; but, with the loosening of the religious hold, it reasserted itself.”2 A centralised government claiming and receiving the obedience of the individual had never been known in Arabia, where tribes lived in complete independence forming and dissolving alliances at will. To pay a tax to authority was considered a badge of subjection and for the first time the Arabian tribes were compelled to pay a tax in the form of Zakat to the central treasury at Medina, for Zakat was not voluntary charity, as it came to be understood later, but a regular source of revenue to the government. Naturally, this meant subordination to authority and was disliked by the tribes. Again, “the Arabian tribes thought they had sworn allegiance to the Prophet only, the general view being that

the oath of allegiance bound one only to the person to whom it was made. After his death, they fell away,—not so much from Allah as from Medina.”

Scarcely was Abu Bakr acknowledged Caliph in Medina when almost all the Arabian tribes rose shaking off their allegiance to the central government at Medina to win back their independence. Mecca and Ta‘if alone remained loyal to the Caliph. There is an impression that the Meccans had not adopted Islam sincerely but out of policy. If this were a fact, no better opportunity could have offered itself to these new converts to gain their freedom.

That the people of Mecca and Ta‘if remained loyal while all other parts of Arabia were in revolt is proof positive that their adherence to Islam was sincere. In other parts of Arabia the missionaries and the tax-gatherers of the Prophet were expelled and those followers of Islam who refused to renounce their faith fell victims to popular fury. Some tribes wavered and hesitated, and declared their readiness to keep to Islam, provided they were exempted from payment of the Zakat tax. Medina itself was threatened by the Bedouin hordes, at the head of which stood the powerful tribe of Ghafatân. It tells much for the deep faith of the leaders of Islam in their mission and in the truth of the Holy Prophet that they never wavered or lost hope in this desperate situation. Abu Bakr refused even to postpone the expedition to Syria under Usama b. Zayd which had been prepared by the Prophet shortly before his death.

The rebellion of the Arabian tribes assumed three shapes. First, there was a host of new aspirants to prophethood inspired by the success of the Holy Prophet. Secondly, there was the movement towards apostasy. Thirdly, there was the refusal to pay the Zakat (poor tax), while keeping to the essentials of Islam. This last was in effect a demand for the separation of religion from politics. Some of the companions of the Prophet, finding themselves in a perilous situation, were inclined to compromise on this issue and concede that the tribes could remain Muslims, while denying political allegiance to the government of Islam. But

Abū Bakr remained adamant. He rejected the idea that Islam as a religious movement could be separated from Islam as a political community.

The firstpretender to the prophetic role appeared in Yemen. He was Aswad ‘Ansū. In the year 10 A.H., he subdued Najrān, took the capital of Yemen, Ṣan‘ā, and conquered the entire province of Yemen. But he was killed by a relation of the slain governor of Yemen, though the flames of rebellion kept blazing after his death. Musaylemah was another pretender who arose in Yamāmah. Ṭulayḥa, the chief of Banū Asad, was the third pretender. He was defeated by Khalid and was subsequently pardoned. In the reign of ‘Omar, he fought in the armies of Islam on the Mesopotamian front.

Sajāh, a woman, was the fourth pretender who laid claim to prophethood. She came of the tribe of Banū Ya‘rabū in Central Arabia, but as her people had settled in Mesopotamia among the Christian tribe of Banū Taghlīb, she was brought up a Christian. She marched against Medina at the head of a large army and was joined by her own ancestral tribe, Banū Ya‘rabū, under the leadership of Mālik b. Nuwayrah, on her way to Medina. Finding the Muslims too strong, she lost courage and returned to Mesopotamia. In the reign of Mu‘awiya, she became converted to Islam.

Abū Bakr began his reign by sending expeditions in every direction to quell the rebellion. Khalid b. Walīd was deputed to march first against Ṭulayḥa and then against Mālik ibn Nuwayrah. ‘Ikrima, son of Abū Jahl, was sent against Musaylemah; Shurḥabīl was to reinforce ‘Ikrima and Muhājir ibn Abī Omayya was to invade Yemen and Ḥaḍramaut. One battalion was despatched to keep guard on the Syrian frontier; two were sent out to curb the tribe of Ḥuḍayr, and yet another to fight the Banū Salm and Hawāzin.

It should be noted that, contrary to the general impression, not all the Arabs were involved in the apostasy movement. We have seen that Mecca and Ṭa‘if, though recently converted, remained perfectly calm and there was not a single case of apostasy. But even in such far off parts as Ḥaḍramaut and Bahrayn, the loyalists were there side by side with the rebels.
The people thought that he had divorced them. But 'Omar, it seems, expected aggression from the tribes on the Syrian frontier. Therefore, when the man spoke vaguely, he immediately asked the question whether the tribe of Banū Ghassān (allied to Rome) had moved into Arabia.

We shall not go on to describe the wars which are common history. We shall only dwell on the educative tasks undertaken by Abū Bakr, despite his perilous situation and exclusive preoccupation with law, order and defence, for education in the broadest sense of the word was the mainspring of the Islamic State. As soon as he was voted to power Abū Bakr explained the principles on which he was to guide the destinies of Islām. "Help me," said the Caliph, "if I am in the right. Set me right if I am in the wrong. The weak among you shall be strong in my eye till I have vindicated his just rights, and the strong among you shall be weak in my eye till I have made him fulfil the obligations due from him. No nation abandoned jihād (struggle) in the path of God but God abased it." And he concluded, "Obey me as long as I obey God and His Prophet. In case I disobey God and His Prophet, I have no right to obedience from you." In conducting his wars, Abū Bakr was mindful of the moral and spiritual obligations they involved. He therefore issued special instructions to the army for observing the Islamic code of war. It was laid down that no old man, no child and no woman shall be slain, no hermit shall be molested, nor his place of worship damaged. Corpses of the fallen were not to be mutilated or disfigured, no fruit-bearing tree was to be cut down, no crops were to be burnt and no habitation to be devastated. Stress was laid on the fulfilment of obligations with the people of other faiths and the army was told that those who surrendered should be allowed to enjoy all the rights and privileges of a Muslim subject.

In suppressing the insurrection, Abū Bakr showed exemplary patience, forbearance and clemency. He ordered that no unnecessary blood should be spilled and where a tribe accepted peace, its offer should not be rejected. Such arch-rebels as Ṣulaymān and Sajāh were forgiven and both of them later fought by the side of
the Muslim armies. There were no executions and reprisals throughout the farflung war theatre and, contrary to the general impression that Islam had ordered the execution of apostates, there is not a single instance of any person or tribe being punished for mere apostasy, as distinct from rebellion. Abu Bakr also did a great service to Islam by collecting and arranging the Qur'an, which was written on scattered sheets. He also set an example of Islamic democracy and equality, first by having a civil list fixed for himself with the advice of his colleagues. Beyond this, he did not allow himself a single penny. In the distribution of Zakat and the booty, he refused to make any distinctions between one Muslim and another on grounds of precedence in services. All were paid an equal amount.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WARS OF REBELLION

The wars within Arabia during Abu Bakr's reign produced a great disturbance in the tribal life of the people. "Great armies had never passed through the interior of Arabia, but often, under Khalid's banner, 10,000 Muslims fought. Of many of the Beduin tribes the only worldly possessions consisted of camels, horses, and sheep, and these fell as booty to the conquerors. Under these conditions the agricultural population suffered no less, and it can easily be shown that entire tribes were reduced to utter penury and privation. In the days of heathenism these would have repaired their fortune by predatory expeditions against neighbouring tribes, but this was no longer possible, for Islam had spread the Peace of God among all its believers. To escape privation and misery no other alternative, then, was left to them than to migrate to the north."1

The tribes of Central Arabia were thus set in motion as an inevitable consequence of the wars during Abu Bakr's reign. The wars which followed with Persia and Byzantium, therefore, were not wars only but largescale emigrations. Thus Yamamah tribes supplied the largest portion of the troops advancing towards the Euphrates, Yemen furnished the largest contingent for the Syrian army. "Not merely warriors composed the expedition; entire

tribes joined, with their women and children. It was, indeed, not a campaign but a *Volkerwanderung*.”

‘OMAR’S ACHIEVEMENTS

‘Omar was nominated Caliph by Abū Bakr and accepted by the people. He started reign in A.D. 634. While Abū Bakr consolidated Islam and saved it from extinction, ‘Omar secured its expansion. But his main achievement lies in successfully meeting the new economic, strategic and administrative problems created by the Muslim conquests. Certainly he laid the basis of a firm and progressive administration in a country which did not even the rudiments of statecraft and possessed not even the rud and simple appurtenances of an administrative machinery.

But before we go on to note ‘Omar’s achievements in these realms, let us discuss the reasons why the tiny and ill-organised forces of the Muslim Arabs were able to overthrow so easily the two mightiest empires of the day possessing human, economic and military resources beyond the dream of the Arabs. The usual argument is that the Persian and the Roman Empires had exhausted themselves by mutual warfare, that their power had declined and there was great disaffection among the subjects of the two empires. Religious persecution and economic breakdown are also treated as causes of the Arab conquest. Thus Sir William Muir writes: “The entrance of the Muslims into Syria was much facilitated by a circumstance which had occurred shortly before. The Byzantine Emperor had been in the habit of remitting to the Arab tribes in the south of Palestine an annual subsidy; but from motives of economy, rendered necessary by the expenses incurred in the war with Persia, this had but lately been withdrawn. The tribes, therefore, considered themselves free from their allegiance and threw in their lot with the invaders. The people of Syria, too, apart from the religious persecution to which they had been subjected, suffered from increased taxation, and in consequence remained passive spectators of the invasion of their country, hoping more, indeed, from an occupation by the Arabs, who

abstained from pillage, and whose rule was mild and tolerant, than from the continuance of the \textit{status quo}.\textsuperscript{1}

Among the causes of Arab success, mention must also be made of the frequent charge that the Arabs were moved by the lust for wealth and the desire for worldly riches. All of these causes, true or untrue, cannot suffice to explain the miraculous advance of Islam, unless it is recognised that Islam had become a supreme moral force in the world and that its followers possessed a fire of conviction and a superior code of morals which won the hearts of the people and brought them to the side of the Muslims in the expectation that they would gain far more dignity, equality of opportunity, justice and toleration from the invaders than they could ever hope to receive from their own people. It is true that the Roman and Persian Empires had lost their military strength and were internally divided. Even so, they could not have succumbed so easily to a power like Arabia which was destitute of all material resources. Had these empires been faced with a moderately equipped military power, they would have gone down fighting, but here was no power worth the name, but only an array of ill-armed tribes without the experience of international war or the military equipment of a second-rate power. Had the Arabs attacked a country like Abyssinia or any other smaller power, they might have carried the day by sheer physical courage but they were pitted against two formidable powers, whose resources, experience of war and military prowess, even in their weakness, were more than a match for the Arabs. Again, let us take the charge of worldly avarice. It is possible that the ordinary soldiers of the Muslim army might have in some cases harboured such feelings, but surely they were in no way responsible for the conduct of the military campaigns which were organised and directed by the leaders of Islam like Abu Bakr and Omar who had no love of material gain. It is a fact of history that Abu Bakr placed under a military interdict all those tribes which had rebelled against the central authority at Medina. They could not take any part in the campaigns. The question is why did he prevent these tribes

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{The Caliphate, Its Rise, Decline and Fall}, Edinburgh 1924, pp. 65-66.
from participation in the Persian and Roman war? If he or his associates had been driven by avarice or if their military prowess rested only on the numerical strength of the tribes or their physical prowess, surely it was the height of unwisdom to prevent the erring tribes from taking part in a war with the two biggest empires of the day which required all the strength that they could muster or command. Were they not actuated by a high moral principle and did not like to bring in the field those elements within Arabia who had shown by their previous conduct that they were not well-grounded in the teachings of Islam. Far from rushing eagerly to the battlefront, expecting booty and prisoners, the Arabs stood in dread awe of the Persians and would not be easily persuaded to join the army for the Persian campaign. Thus soon after 'Omar’s accession he found himself at a loss to raise troops for reinforcing Muthanna on the Persian frontier. "Meanwhile," says Muir, "so great a fear of Persian prowess had fallen on the people, that none responded to the call."¹ Is this the conduct of men of whom it is said that the allurements of riches, booty and women drove them to the battlefield? Again, it is an uncontestable fact of history that 'Omar did not like the policy of military expansion and refused many times to sanction further military advance. Thus he did not permit 'Omar b. al-‘Ās to undertake the conquest of Egypt, but acquiesced when he had already entered the Egyptian territory. Similarly after the conquest of Mada’in (Ctesiphon) ‘Omar disliked the idea of further advance. "'Omar was satisfied," says Muir, "as well as he might be, with the success achieved. His old spirit of caution revived, and beyond the plain skirted by the hilly range to the east, he strictly forbade a forward movement."² Again, the same author says, "Ziyād was also the bearer of a petition for leave to pursue the fugitives across the border into Khorasan. 'Omar, content with the present, wisely forbade the enterprise. 'I desire,' he replied, 'that between Mesopotamia and the countries beyond, the hills shall be a barrier, so that the Persians shall not be able to

2. Ibid., p. 119.
get at us, nor we at them. The plain of Al-'Irāk suffices for our wants. I would rather the safety of my people than thousands of spoil and further conquest.' The thought of a world-wide mission was yet in embryo; obligation to enforce Islam by a universal Crusade had not yet dawned upon the Muslim mind; and, in good truth, an empire embracing Syria, Chaldaea, and Arabia might have satisfied the ambition even of an Assyrian or Babylonian monarch. The equal mind of 'Omar, far from being unsteadied by the flash and giddiness of victory, cared first to consolidate and secure the prize already in his hands."1 Thus Sir William Muir, a European author hostile to Islam, repudiates all the charges of expansionism, imperialism and avarice laid at the door of Islam. No better testimony could come from a non-Muslim source, to prove that Islam was neither seeking an economic outlet for the tribes of Arabia, nor tyring to convert the surrounding world and impose its way of life on others. The fact of the matter was that Islam had a great transforming effect on the lives of men directing human affairs. Its effects were not limited to a special class of religious men, monks, priests, mystics and recluses. The moral transformation had taken place in the lives of politicians, soldiers, administrators, statesmen, all those engaged in carrying on worldly life and mundane affairs. When the people of the conquered countries compared the economic injustices, religious persecutions and social inequalities to which they had been subjected by their own people with the high moral conduct of the Muslims, their religious toleration, passion for equality, their scrupulous observance of treaties and compacts, their truthfulness and honesty in everyday dealings, they could not help joining the fold of Islam or at least remaining faithfully attached to their new rulers. Great number of Christians either fought by the side of the Muslims or actively helped them in their movements, a fact which shows how deeply affected they had been by the toleration of Islam and its humane attitude towards them. For example, the battle of Buwayb in Persia (A.D. 634) was won mainly due to the prowess of a Christ-

1. The Caliphate, Its Rise, Decline and Fall, Edinburgh 1924, pp. 120-121.
ian tribe. Muir is struck by this remarkable fact and says, "But the most remarkable was a Christian tribe of the desert, which, without detriment to their faith, threw in their lot with the Muslims." ¹ And again, "The victory is remarkable as gained in part by the valour of a Christian tribe. And yet further, the most gallant feat of the day was achieved by one of another Christian clan."² The Christian chieftain who fell in the battle was mourned by the Muslims as one of themselves. "Al-Muthanna affectionately tended the last moments of both—the Christian and the Muslim—an unwonted sight on these fanatic fields."³ Surely, the Muslims were far above the spirit of fanaticism, for fanaticism and humanity go ill together.

Islamic teachings had transformed the moral life even of the ordinary soldier and the officers of the Muslim army, and instances of their exemplary moral behaviour are frequently to be met with in the pages of history. On the eve of the battle of Yarmûk, the Muslim generals were faced with the question of leaving the city of Ḥimṣ which they had recently occupied. Muʿāwiya's brother, Yazid, was of opinion that the Muslims should leave their women and children inside the city and fight out the war outside the gates of Ḥimṣ. Shuraḥabîl opposed the suggestion saying that the people of the city were Christians and they might maltreat the Muslim women and children. Abū ʿObayda suggested, therefore, that the Christians might be driven out from the city. On this, Shuraḥabîl said that the Muslims had no right to drive out the population, as they had already guaranteed their lives, security and dwelling places. Abū ʿObayda admitted his mistake. It was finally decided that the Muslims should leave the city of Ḥimṣ to its fate and pull out. But the Muslims had already collected the Jizya from the people in lieu of the protection granted to them. So it was decided to return the amount to the people of Ḥimṣ, as the Muslims were no longer in a position to undertake their protection. Every single penny collected not only from Ḥimṣ but also from the surrounding districts and villages was, therefore, returned to the

². Ibid., p. 88.
³. Ibid., p. 89.
inhabitants who simply could not understand this strict regard to treaty rights and prayed that the Muslims might return to rule over them again.

At the conquest of Ctesiphon, unheard of wealth fell into the hands of the Muslim soldiery. When the booty was collected and brought before Sa'd, the Muslim general, he was amazed at the scrupulous honesty of the ordinary soldier and excitedly said how it was possible that the soldiers did not touch such precious articles, jewellery, etc. When the booty reached Medina, 'Omar himself was amazed at the honesty of his soldiers. These are but a few of the examples which show the mental and moral transformation that had come over the Arabs after Islam. It was this moral superiority of the Muslims which was mainly responsible for their amazingly rapid military conquest.

NEW SOCIAL CLASSES

With the progress of Islam a new aristocracy of blood and talents came into existence. The Prophet's Meccan companions, like Abu Bakr, 'Omar, and 'Otubn, who had stood by him in the days of persecution, formed the most influential section of the new ruling class. By the side of them were Anšar, who were numerically superior to them. During the life of the Prophet, the Anšar were about as influential as the Meccans, but, after his death, they lost their position and were comparatively less influential. Their place was taken by the Quraysh emigrants from Mecca, who had been so far the enemies of Islam. The reason for this state of affairs lay in the superior position of the Quraysh who were recognised as the leaders of Arabia by all sections of the population and who were politically far more experienced than the Anšar. Another reason for the continued supremacy of the Quraysh was that the Prophet also came from them.

Side by side with this ruling class, a new class sprang up. This was the army. In the days of the Prophet, there was no distinction between the civil power and the military class. But
with the expansion of the army under the stress of internal and external wars, the ruling class became sharply distinguished from the civil authority. The army lost its supreme position, and the civil power asserted its authority.

"The 'subject-tax, together with the rest of the state revenues, swelled the treasury; the government only gave the Arab warriors pensions from it. It held the purse-strings, the contents of which really belonged to the army. It became independent of the army by the conquests which the army had made, and which were, by right, army spoil, since it did not divide up land and people but annexed their taxation to itself. And the army became dependent upon it through the pensions which it had the power to bestow or withdraw to whatever amount and extent it pleased. The government used to be supported by the army, now the army was supported by the government. No wonder that the Muqattila thought themselves cheated by this villainous state, whose backbone was the treasury by which it exalted itself over them and held the whip hand. They asserted that money collected as tribute belonged to them and not to the state,—that it was Māl al-Muslimīn and not Māl Allāh (Tab. 1, 2858 f.). They held to their claim that the revenues of the Fai ought to be divided; when they got the chance they plundered the provincial treasuries, and could not endure that their surplus should be credited to the state treasury. Their jealousy of the state was naturally directed against its functionaries who had the disposal of its power and its moneys. They felt it an injustice that the latter should, as it were, turn them out of their manger."

ARMY AND THE ADMINISTRATION

"The Muslim State of the first century," writes Von Kremer, "was a purely military State, not unlike the old Sparta—only Islam recognized no aristocracy. The Muslims were a race of warriors to be maintained at the cost of the subject races."

This was an inevitable state of affairs, so long as the new Muslim State was fighting to preserve its existence and engaged in constant wars. 'Omar's system, therefore, was one of military communism in which every Arab Muslim was a soldier and received an annuity from the state treasury in lieu of his services. All the lands, taxes and property belonged to the state and the great mass of Muslim Arabs were severely discouraged from following non-military professions or acquiring wealth in any other form except through the government annuities. "About this time arose the system of military stations which gradually led to the formation of the standing army. The tribes which conquered 'Iraq and Syria formed military camps ('Amšar) which in Syria were christened as Jund and in 'Iraq as 'Askār. Here lived the soldiers as divided into regiments, or, to be absolutely precise, into clans. They renounced their earlier occupation of agriculture and cattle-breeding, and exchanged it, only too willingly, for the military profession. They were religious soldiers. The State paid them a monthly salary, and the subject race supplied them with provisions. Thus arose in 'Iraq the military stations of Kūfa and Baṣra, and in Syria those of Kinnisrin, Damascus, Urđūn, Filistīn."¹ To this list might be added the military station of Fustāṭ in Egypt. The salaries distributed by 'Omar were not uniform as in the time of Abū Bakr. There was a certain order of precedence, the Prophet's closer companions and his family ranked higher than others. The wives and children of the soldiers also received salaries from the state. The slaves too were not excepted. Islām had given them equality and their salary was equal to that of their masters. All the male and female population was registered, but there were separate registers for the regular standing army and for those who could be called up for service in case of necessity. According to Shibīlī, from eight to ten hundred thousand men were kept ready for war. The same author quotes Ibn Sa'd to show that thirty thousand fresh levies were raised every year.² Non-Muslims too were admitted to the

² Shibīlī Nu'mānī, Al-Farūq (Urdu), Lahore n.d., p. 348.
army. Four thousand Daylamites who originally formed part of Yazdagird's army were separately registered and fought with the Muslims after the battle of Qadsīya. Many Indian jats who belonged to the Persian army became converted to Islām and received annuities from the government. Thousands of Magians were enlisted in the volunteer corps and received regular salaries. There was no regular arrangement for supplies before 'Omar. The Muslim soldiers used to obtain their necessities by forays into enemy territory. 'Omar made it incumbent on the conquered people to furnish the army with supplies of corn, etc., at a fixed rate. But this was not liked by the conquered who agreed to give the monetary value of the supplies required from them in kind. After this 'Omar established a full-grown supply department.

'Omar instituted the first regular system of administration. Before his time, there was no separation of the judicial, executive, financial, civil and military branches of the administration. Thus the provinces had each an Āmil or civil officer (the governor), the Katib or the secretary, the collector, the treasury officer, the police officer and the judge or Qādī. There was also a military officer in each province, but usually the civil officer or the governor performed military duties also. Every governor or civil officer was given a letter of appointment stating his powers and duties. Signatures of many witnesses, usually eminent companions of the Prophet, were affixed to the document. The governor was required to read the letter of appointment before the populace of his headquarters so that the people may be aware of his powers and duties and check him in the exercise of his powers. At the time of appointment, a list of property and the personal belongings of the governor was prepared. In case there was an undue increase in his property or personal belongings, he was required to give an explanation. All the governors and high officers of the provinces were called to Medina every year on the occasion of the pilgrimage. Complaints against them were recorded by the Caliph who either decided the matter on the spot or set up a commission of inquiry against the
officer in question. In order to check bribery and corruption 'Omar gave very high salaries to state employees.

LAND POLICY OF 'OMAR

'Omar and, before him, Abū Bakr followed a strict policy of preventing the Arab Muslims from acquiring grants of land from the state. 'Omar did away completely with the pre-Islamic Arabian custom of treating the conquered lands as spoils of war. Thus after the conquest of 'Iraq, the Muslim army clamoured for the division of lands among the soldiers appealing to the precedent of Khaybar whose lands were granted to the Muslim warriors by the Holy Prophet. 'Omar saw clearly that this was not a matter of tribal warfare but one of large conquests of settled territories with a regular administration. If the conquered territories were distributed as fiefs to the soldiers, no stable administration could be built up. Moreover, the Muslims would cease to be a fighting force and become a feudal class attached to land. With the concurrence of the other companions of the Prophet, he, therefore, rejected the claims of the army. In general, the Muslim State, under 'Omar, did not change the land system and property relations of those working on the land. They remained in full possession of their land and had the right to exchange landed property between themselves but not with Muslims. Even the revenue offices and land records remained as formerly, the same language being employed, Persian in Persia, Syriac in Syria and Coptic in Egypt. Moreover, the revenue offices were staffed by former officials in each country. But there were important modifications, of course, necessitated by the new conditions.

To understand the over-all picture of the state of affairs existing at the time, we will have to treat the matter in more detail.

Before the conquest of Persia by the Muslims, the Persians had to pay two kinds of taxes: the land tax and the poll tax. The tax system of Persia had been considerably reformed by Khusrau I Anāshirwān (531-579). He had abolished the pervious tax on land which was proportional to the
harvest and fixed a uniform tax of one dirham on every 
jarīb of grain land. Khusrau had also reformed the poll tax
which had previously been a fixed sum. By his reform all
males between the ages of twenty and fifty were compelled to
pay a poll tax, graded according to each individual’s income in
yearly amounts of 12, 8 and 4 dirhams. Specifically exempt
were members of the Seven Families, one of which was
the ruling house itself. The Great (al-‘Uẓāma) who were also
administrative chiefs were exempt; and finally soldiers, priests,
secretaries, and individuals in the service of the king paid no
poll tax. A sharp distinction was thus made between the
privileged, consisting of the ruling, military, priestly and
educated aristocracy.

The Muslims had initially no intention of conquering Persia
and setting up a permanent administration in that country.
They were content with safeguarding their frontiers. When
Khālid, therefore, conquered Ḥira, he levied a fixed tribute
of 60,000 dirhams on the 7,000 inhabitants of the city,
of whom 1,000 were exempted from the tribute by reason
of physical unfitness. No other taxes were levied. Similar
terms were made with the towns of Ullays and Banqiya.

The situation, however, changed completely with the victory
of Qudsīya and the occupation of Madā’in (Ctesiphon) in the
year 637. Whether they liked it or not the Arabs now had
to establish a permanent government and administration in
Persia.

The arrangements which Khālid had made with Ḥira did
not provide for any direct control by the Arabs who left
that task to the municipal officials. After the victory of
Qudsīya, there was virtually no government over vast areas of
the Persian Empire. It was impossible to demand tribute from
the conquered, for the simple reason that they were not present
to pay. They had either died or fled. The peasants remained on
their lands but, in the absence of the legal owners of lands,
they could not be expected to sign treaties or collect their
own revenue. The Arabs had to do this themselves. The
Muslim army desired that they should take over possession of
the conquered lands. They did not contemplate becoming actual farmers, but proposed to act as landlords. With the support of 'Othmān, 'Ali, Ṭalḥa and Ibn ' Omar, the second Caliph argued that a division of land among the warriors who had won it would deprive the state of the income necessary for the pensioning of other Muslims, poor and orphans and posterity and he claimed Qur'ānic authority to decide against division. He decided that in the interests of all the Muslims, the land of the Sawād should be the inalienable property of the state. He had now four categories of land to deal with: (1) Al-Ḥira and other towns which possessed treaties; (2) estates and villages still in possession of the former owners, usually a dihqān; (3) estates and villages once belonging to the royal family or to the nobility, now without legal owners; and (4) deserted uncultivated land.

In the case of Ḥira, the treaty made by Khūlid remained in force, despite the Persian reconquest and the Arab reoccupation in the course of which the town changed hands twice. Similar was the case with the treaties in respect of Ullays and Banqiya. The people who possessed a treaty providing for the payment of a fixed sum raised this money by whatever means they wished, and after paying it were released from all other demands. They possessed full internal autonomy.

The second category of land comprised land under cultivation belonging to large estates and villages controlled by dahāqin, the nōtables. These men had been charged with the administration of local justice and the collection of taxes by the Sassānids. 'Omar proposed to employ them in the same way. The legal title of their landed property belonged to the Muslim State, but he offered to let them remain in possession on condition that they paid the same taxes as before.

The third and fourth categories of land consisted of the former property of the king, his family, the nobles, the fire temples, etc. The Caliph assumed full ownership of these lands in the name of the Muslim State. He was free to deal with these lands as he pleased, but in practice he reserved the revenue therefrom for public objects rarely giving them in
fiefs. ‘Othmān and his successors, however, used these confiscated lands, Sāwāfi as they were called, to grant fiefs to Muslim citizens. When these lands were held by the Caliph, he usually collected from the peasants the same amounts paid by the Kharāj lands.

A complexity arose when the non-Muslim peasants or dīḥqāns were converted to Islam, because in that case they would be legally exempt both from the Kharāj (land tax) and the poll tax or Jizya. A Muslim holding a piece of land had to pay the Ushr (tithe) but not the Kharāj, which was levied at a higher rate. During the Sassanid times, the upper privileged classes did not pay poll tax and regarded it as a mark of inferiority. But Islam made no distinction between upper class non-Muslims and lower class non-Muslims. Therefore, many dāḥāqīn, rather than pay poll tax, preferred to accept Islam. This raised the first serious financial and social issue for the Muslim State. The evidence suggests that ‘Omar and ‘Alī exempted the converts from poll tax but compelled them to pay the Kharāj as before. Another difficulty arose when people from treaty towns which paid fixed tribute became Muslims. Was the total tribute to remain the same as before? ‘The traditions indicate that ‘Umar was willing to reduce the fixed tribute sum of treaty towns to compensate for conversion, but that he would not compel the assessors of such a town to tax land on the same basis as Kharāj land taken without treaty.’

The situation was regularised by laying down that in the case of territories conquered by force, the convert had to go on paying the Kharāj as before, but he was exempted from the poll tax. Similar was the case in regard to those territories which had a treaty not providing for the payment of a fixed sum. Here also the convert continued to pay the Kharāj. However, if the treaty defined the amount of tribute, the convert escaped both the poll tax and the land tax (Kharāj); his land became ‘Ushr (tithe) land, and the territory in question would secure a corresponding reduction in the amount of tribute.

In Egypt, conditions were different and there existed four types of taxation. Firstly, the Muslims entered into agreement with Coptic communities providing for the payment of a money tax for each adult able-bodied male. In addition, there was a tax on the produce of the land. Secondly, the city of Alexandria, which had been taken by force, was treated as *Kharāj* land at the disposal of the conqueror. Thirdly, the Pentapolis paid a fixed annual sum to be neither increased nor decreased. This territory was known as *‘Ahd* territory. Finally, there were the domain lands of the fallen nobility. The Arabs, therefore, appropriated the estates, as ‘Omar had confiscated the possessions of the Sassānids in the East. From these lands fiefs were later given.

While the language of the records continued to be Greek and many of the former Byzantine officials continued as clerks, the Muslim conquerors radically overhauled Greek system. "The power of the old nobility was shattered, and many of those who had not been killed during their resistance left the country with safe-conduct. Their estates were taken." The complicated hierarchy of officialdom disappeared and the Arab government developed direct contact with the peasants.

We have seen that ‘Omar made the *Kharāj* lands inalienable, forbade their sale to the Muslims and prohibited the latter from acquiring landed property. His idea was to keep the Muslims a purely martial race. But his policy was not followed by his successors and, during the time of ‘Othmān, nearly the whole of *Sawād* (‘Irāq) became the property of the Quraysh.

**DEMOCRACY UNDER ‘OMAR**

Although Islām had not given a full-fledged democratic political constitution to the Arabs, the seeds of democracy and equality had been laid in the hearts of men, and ‘Omar continued to educate the Muslims in the principle of democratic equality. During the reign of ‘Omar there were two con-

sultative bodies. The one was a general assembly which was convened by making a general announcement and in which only affairs of special importance were discussed. The question of the conquered lands in ‘Irāq was dealt with by this assembly. For the conduct of daily business, there was a separate consultative committee. Matters pertaining to the appointment and dismissal of public servants, in addition to others, were discussed by this committee. In addition to the deputies from the capital, there were also invited to these deliberations representatives from the outlying parts of the empire. Non-Muslims were also invited to take part in these consultations. For example, in connection with the administration and taxation of land in ‘Irāq the native Persian chiefs were consulted, and so was the Muqawqis consulted on the administration of Egypt and a Copt was invited to the capital as a deputy to represent that country. As a rule, provincial governors were appointed after consulting the population. In the case of a complaint against a governor by the public, an inquiry commission was usually appointed. Sa‘d was dismissed from the governorship of Kūfa on the complaints of the people. Sometimes the provinces were allowed to choose their own governors. The people of Kūfa, Baṣra and Syria were allowed this freedom. Deputations from the districts were usually called by the Caliph to advise him on local affairs. The Caliph’s emoluments were on the same scale as those of other citizens. If sued, the Caliph appeared to defend himself in the public court of justice as any other defendant. Once in a dispute with Ubayy ibn Ka‘b, the Caliph appeared as a defendant in the court of Zayd ibn Thābit. Zayd wanted to show him respect but ‘Omar expressed displeasure saying that this would mean partiality.

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL REFORMS

‘Omar took vigorous steps to propagate literacy in Arabia and instruct the new converts in the conquered territories in the teachings of the Qur’ān. He was the first to introduce the system of paid instructors and teachers who received regular
salaries from the state. Thus in Medina, primary school teachers received 15 dirhams each per month.\(^1\) Compulsory literacy was introduced for the wandering Bedouins. A person named Ābu Sufyān was appointed by ‘Omar, along with others, to make a tour of the Bedouin tribes and punish anyone who had not committed to memory any part of the Qur’ān.\(^2\) He also sent a few companions of the Prophet to Syria to instruct the people in the Qur’ān. A few sūras of the Qur’ān containing legal injunctions were compulsorily taught to the people and such as passed the test were given regular salaries. But this system of payment was stopped a little later. ‘Omar also instructed the military authorities to prepare a register of Qur’ān-readers in the army and personally inspected these registers.

In his choice of provincial officers, ‘Omar gave special consideration to learning and preferred learned men to others, because they could give a ruling on disputed points of law. He also appointed paid jurists in the provinces to guide the people on matters of law. For this work he selected Ma‘ādh b. Jabal, Ābu Darḍa’, ‘Ībāda b. Ṣāmit, ‘Abdurrahmān b. Ghanam, ‘Imrān b. Ḥusayn and ‘Abdullāh b. Maghfil.

In contrast to the knowledge of the Qur’ān, which he wanted to propagate fully, ‘Omar was very severe on those who reported traditions from the Prophet. He himself refrained from narrating traditions and took to task those who narrated them without adducing sufficient evidence of authenticity. Once he threatened to take severe steps against Ābu Mūsa Ash'ārī, when he returned from the house of ‘Omar after calling him three times. On being questioned by ‘Omar, Ābu Mūsa said that he did so because he had heard from the Prophet that a man should not wait at the house of another if he had called three times and received no reply. ‘Omar asked him to substantiate his statement and bring witnesses. Similarly, once a few companions of the Prophet were going to the provincial capitals. He followed

\(^1\) Shibli Nu’mānī, Al-Fārūq (Urdu), Lahore n.d., p. 373.
\(^2\) Ibid.
them outside Medina and then asked them to desist from reporting traditions, because that would divert the people's attention from the Qur'ān. As a rule, ‘Omar prohibited the companions of the Prophet from leaving Medina and residing in the provinces. He would have them at the centre rather than see them dispersed throughout the empire.

‘Omar also took steps to abolish slavery. Where this was not possible, he minimised the evil to a very large extent. During the wars of rebellion in Abū Bakr’s time, many Arabs had been enslaved. ‘Omar ordered that they should be set free and declared that henceforth no Arab could be enslaved. Despite the pressure of the army, he refused to permit the enslavement of the prisoners of war in Egypt and 'Iraq. Some peasants of Egypt who had fought against the Muslims were brought to Medina as slaves, ‘Omar sent them back to their country and set them free. He also enforced the rule that if a female slave gave birth to a child, she became free after the death of her husband. He interpreted the Qur'ānic injunction about the purchase of freedom by a slave through payment of money as a binding rule, so that if a slave wished to purchase his freedom, the master could not legally refuse his offer. He also sent orders to the army that an agreement entered into by a slave should be regarded as equally binding, as if his master had entered into agreement. Also the rule was enforced that a slave could not be separated from his father, mother, sisters or brothers.

**TREATMENT OF NON-MUSLIMS**

An idea of the treatment meted out to the non-Muslims by the early Caliphs, under the inspiration of Islam, may be gained by the text of the treaty whereby Jerusalem was ceded to the Muslims. It ought to be remembered that the Greek inhabitants of Jerusalem had fought the Muslims tooth and nail and were the main enemies of the Muslims.

The treaty states: “This is the treaty for the people of Aelia. This is the favour which the servant of God, the Commander of the Faithful, grants to the people of Aelia. He
gives them the assurance of the preservation of their lives and properties, their churches and crosses, of those who set up, who display and who honour those crosses. Your churches will not be transformed into dwellings nor destroyed, nor will any one confiscate anything belonging to them, nor the crosses or belongings of the inhabitants. There will be no constraint in the matter of religion, nor the least annoyance. The Jews will inhabit Aelia conjointly with the Christians, and those who live there will require to pay the poll-tax, like the inhabitants of other towns. Greeks and robbers are to leave the town, but will have a safe-conduct until they reach a place of security. Still, those who prefer to remain may do so on condition of paying the same poll-tax as the rest. If any of the people of Aelia desire to leave with the Greeks, taking their goods, but abandoning their chapels and crosses, they will be granted personal safety, until they arrive at a sure place. The strangers in the town may remain on the same condition of paying the tax, or, if they wish, they may also leave with Greeks, and return to their own land. They will have nothing to pay until one harvest shall have been gathered in. All that this treaty contains is placed under the alliance and protection of God, and of His Apostle.”

Even grave charges of conspiracy and sedition against non-Muslims did not deter the Muslim State from following a policy of toleration and kindness towards them. The behaviour of the Jews of Khaybar and the Christians of Najrān was such that any other state would have given them exemplary punishment, for there were grave charges of sedition against them. But ‘Omar only ordered that they should leave Arabia and settle at any place of their choosing in the Muslim Empire. They were paid up the full value of their properties from the public treasury. Orders were issued that they should be allowed special concessions on their way to their new homes and should be exempt from jizya pending their resettlement.

“General orders were then issued that old age pensions must be granted to all the old people among the non-Muslim subjects,
who must also be exempt from the jizyah. Poor-houses for the weak and the disabled were open to the Christians just the same as to Muslims."¹ In the treaty made with the inhabitants of Ḥīrah by Khalid b. Wallīd, we find the following stipulations: “I have accorded them the right that if any old man is disabled from work, or if he meets with an accident, or if he falls into poverty, so that he is thrown on the charity of his co-religionists, he shall be exempted from jizya and he as well as his family shall receive help from the treasury of the Muslims. But if he migrates to non-Muslim territory, Muslims will not be responsible for his financial support.”²

‘Omar was anxious to see that this system of financial subsidy to old and disabled non-Muslim persons should be extended to all parts of the empire. He, therefore, took his stand on the Qur’ān which speaks of help being given to Masākin and Fuqarā’ out of the proceeds of Zakāt. ‘Omar laid it down as an authoritative interpretation that Fuqarā’ means Muslims who are indigent and Masākin refers to the poor among the people of the book.³

The charge has been laid against the early Islamic State that it levied jizya on the non-Muslims and thereby discriminated against them. It is often forgotten that the jizya, i.e. the poll tax, was not an invention of Islam. We have already seen that both Persia and Byzantium levied a poll tax on their subjects but they exempted a privileged class from the payment of this tax. Islam only continued their system of taxation, but abolished the distinction between the privileged and the unprivileged classes. All non-Muslims now paid the jizya, but, as against payment of jizyā, they were made exempt from military duties. But there are cases in which jizyā was waived if the non-Muslims objected to it or if they consented to perform military duties. Thus the Christian tribe of Banu Taghlib was let off, on their agreeing to pay double the amount of the tax. “The people of Jarjoma, for instance, during the Syrian conquests, when Antioch was captured and payment of jizyah was commonly accept-

3. Ibid., p. 401.
ed by the populace, refused to do so on the plea that they were prepared to fight the Muslim battles against their enemy. The condition was accepted and peace concluded accordingly. Neither did they embrace Islam, nor did they pay any jizyah. During the Persian conquests as well, twice was peace made on this very condition, once with the Chief of Jurjân and again with that of Bāb. At these two places, also military service was accepted in lieu of jizyah.\footnote{Ali, M., *Early Caliphate*, Lahore 1947, pp. 104-105.}

**DISORDERLY REIGN OF ‘OTHMĀN**

During the early reign of ‘Othmān, the frontiers of the Muslim State were furthermore extended. The provinces of Fars and Nishāpur were overrun by the Muslims. The country as far as Balkh and Türkistan was forced to acknowledge the suzerainty of Islam. Kirmān, Sijistān, Herāt, Kābul and Ghazna were brought under control. In the north the Muslim arms reached the Caspian Sea and came into contact with the Turks. The first Muslim fleet was equipped against Cyprus whose inhabitants surrendered. They were exempted from the poll tax. In Africa the Muslims carried their arms beyond Tripoli and Barga and even threatened Carthage.

The full consequences of the expansion of the Muslim Empire became apparent during the reign of ‘Othmān. The Muslims had never consciously sought to extend their empire and they had not, therefore, made any preparations to meet this eventuality. Their state system was designed to keep the Arab nation under control, but when vast territories comprising diverse races and peoples came to be included in the empire, the task became too difficult to be managed with the seat of government fixed at Medina far away from the territories to be controlled. Again, the Islamic democracy had remained a social democracy. A political democracy could not function in those days, specially where territories so vast and people so diverse had to be controlled. ‘Omar had allowed the social democracy of Islam to work without hampering his strict control or weakening his authority. ‘Othmān could not cope with the task, because he was temperamentally unfit to combine strict authority with democratic ways of government. And his position too was different from ‘Omar.
He came from the Omayyads, a party among many, whereas 'Omar was neither an Omayyad nor a Hashemite and, therefore, could never be charged with partiality. There were too many interests to be reconciled, the Anṣār against the Muhājīrin, the Hashemites against the Omayyads, the Bedouin tribal military class against the aristocracy of Medina. In a democratic set-up which did not provide for a regular constitutional machinery with well-defined rights and duties, everything depended on the personal quality of the ruler. 'Othmān would have succeeded if he had been a dictator, either temperamentally or constitutionally, or if there had been an adequate constitutional machinery behind the social democracy of Islam. But it was clearly a dangerous situation to have democratic liberties such as the Arabs had, without a strong hand like 'Omar or without a full-fledged democratic constitution, which was inconceivable in an age like that or in a country like Arabia. The main cause of 'Othmān's failure was neither the rivalry of the Omayyads and the Hashemites, nor his own personal weaknesses, but the disaffection in the army and its clash with the ruling aristocracy of Medina made up equally of Muhājirs and Anṣārs and of the Omayyads and the Hashemites. The first serious rivalry occurred not between the house of Omayya and the Banū Hashim but between the Quraysh in general and the army consisting of the Bedouin tribes, assisted by the provincials. Wellhausen traces the troubles of 'Othmān to the policies of 'Omar. He says: 'As a matter of fact it was a protest against Umar's system. For 'Umar it had been who had wrested the Fai' from the hand of the army and passed it over to the state, in defiance of the Quran, though in accordance with a fiscal tendency to a great extent already followed by Muhammed. That the discontent arose and spread not under 'Umar, but under Uthmān, can only be explained not only by the change in the times, but also by the difference in the personality of the ruler. Uthmān rightly said that things were said against him which no one would have dared to say against Umar. He lacked the imperious authority of his predecessor; consequently the despotism and self-seeking of the stattholders and officials showed up more under him than
under Umar, of whom they were afraid, and this looked all
the worse since he was in the habit of appointing them from
among his own relatives. The kingdom seemed to have
altogether become the domain of a few privileged persons.”

Leaving aside the totally incorrect statement that ‘Omar
defied the Qur’an in wrestling Fay’ from the hands of the army
(for it was the Qur’an which had initiated the process by declaring
that Fay’ property was at the disposal of the head of the state in
his public capacity), it is true, as Wellhausen says, that this was
the major cause of disaffection against ‘Othmân.

It is also true that many companions of the Prophet at Medina
were dissatisfied with ‘Othmân’s policy, but it is not true that
they joined hands with the provincials. The movement against
the authority of ‘Othmân began at Kūfa which was the head-
quarters of the army. The Kūfans had many complaints
against the provincial governor, Sa‘id, but ‘Othmân silenced them
by deposing the latter. However, Egypt was also seething with
disaffection. Here ‘Othmân had appointed his cousin ‘Abdullah
b. Abî Sarh as governor, instead of ‘Amr ibn al-‘Ās. The chief
opponents of ‘Othmân in Egypt were Abû Ḥudhayfâ, a foster
son of the Caliph and Muḥammad b. Abî Bakr who was a great
supporter of ‘Alî. In the year 35 A.H., the Egyptians entered
Medina and laid certain demands before the Caliph. Medina
was without any military support, because the Muslim armies
were concentrated in the military stations. ‘Othmân had
absolutely no physical force to back him up, nor would he consent
to employ physical force despite repeated requests by many
companions of the Prophet. But he persuaded the Egyptians to
return. However, they came back to Medina once again and
produced a letter which they had got hold on their way back to
Egypt. It seems that this letter was written by Marwân, the
Caliph’s secretary, and contained orders that the rebels should be
killed. ‘Othmân denied any knowledge of the affair, but matters
got worse every day. Some companions of the Prophet did
everything in their power to defend the person of the Caliph,

while others remained lukewarm. Ultimately the rebels besieged and killed 'Othmān.

The revolt of the provincials against 'Othmān was primarily caused by the growing ascendancy of the Omayyads in the government of the day, an event which was disliked by the eminent companions of the Prophet, who did not, however, take any part in the activities of the rebels or encourage them. Their discontent found expression only in the lukewarm support which they gave to 'Othmān at a time of great peril. However, the anti-Omayyad party was not united and their differences and factions ultimately turned the scales in favour of the Omayyads who were closely united by family sentiments.

After the death of 'Othmān, the Egyptians stayed in Medina to force the election of the new caliph. Their favourite was 'Alī who was compelled by their insistence to take up the mantle of 'Othmān. Ťalḥa and Zubayr, two eminent companions of the Prophet who were united in their opposition to Omayyads, did not like the election and turned against 'Alī. Both of them and 'Āyeshā, the Prophet's wife, were estranged from 'Alī because he could or would not do anything at the moment to punish the rebels who had shed the blood of 'Othmān. They left for Mecca. The Omayyads also were alarmed at the turn of events and took refuge in Mecca or Syria where Mu'āwiya, one of their kinsmen, was firmly established as governor. 'Alī lost the support of two parties. Meanwhile, he had to reckon with Mu'āwiya, who was a kinsman of 'Othmān and the candidate of the Omayyad's party. Against the advice of Mughīra b. Shu'bā who urged upon 'Alī not to make any changes in the provincial set-up, 'Alī effected rapid changes in the provincial administration with a view to govern the provinces with the aid of his trusted men. He also recalled Mu'āwiya, but the latter, sure of his position and the support of the Syrians and Omayyads, refused to obey his orders and remained firmly established in Syria. On the other hand, he called out for vengeance against the blood of 'Othmān. Thus 'Alī was faced by two rival opposition groups, Mu'āwiya and his supporters on the one hand, and Zubayr, Ťalḥa and 'Āyeshā on the other. A third opposition group was to emerge later in the
shape of Khwarrij. Had he acted with foresight and followed the advice of Mughira, he could have neutralised Mu'awiya by confirming him in his position.

Ṭalḥa, Zubayr and 'Ā'yesha had moved to Baṣra to organise their campaign from that place. In the face of this threat, 'Ali felt he could not remain at Medina. He followed them into 'Iraq and fixed his seat of government at Kufa. The event showed that the centre of gravity of the new Muslim State had moved from Medina and the provinces had grown too important to be ruled from a distant seat. As Wellhausen writes, "The sanctity of the Khalifate was gone; the struggle for it depended upon strength, and the strength lay in the provinces. The tribes had mostly emigrated to the towns that were garrisons; Arabia had lost its centre of gravity. The men of Medina themselves put the finishing touch to the situation by calling in the provincials, and letting them do what they pleased in their town, thereby renouncing their hegemony."

After liquidating the forces of Ṭalḥa, Zubayr and 'Ā'yesha at the battle of Camel (December 656), in which Ṭalḥa and Zubayr were killed, 'Ali turned his attention to Mu'awiya. The Syrian province, where Mu'awiya was established, occupied an isolated position. "The Arabs there had mostly come through the Hijra, and had other traditions than those of Kufa and Basra. They had for long been under Graeco-Roman influence, and even before Islam had belonged to a kingdom, that of the Ghassanids, so they were, in some degree, accustomed to order and obedience. They did not rebel against their stattholder, even though he was an Umayyid."

Soon after the battle of Camel, 'Ali marched with his supporters from 'Iraq against Mu'awiya and the two armies faced each other at Siffin. 'Ali was on the point of winning the battle when 'Amr b. 'Ās from the side of Mu'awiya proposed arbitration. 'Ali refused but his indisciplined army insisted on accepting the arbitration, so that 'Ali had to bow to their wishes. After the

2. Ibid., p. 55.
arbitration had gone against 'Ali those very men who had urged him to accept the proposal began to blame him and withdrew their support forming a separate camp at Harūra whence they came to be known as Harūrites or Khārijites. Though 'Ali was supported by 'Irāq (Kūfa and Baṣra) and Muʿāwiya by the Syrians, their relations to their respective supporters were very different. As we have seen, the Syrians had a long tradition of orderly government and the habit of obedience to authority. The Arabs of Syria who had migrated from Yemen depended on Muʿāwiya for their position. Muʿāwiya owed nothing to the Syrians. He had not been raised by them to his existing position. His power was independent of their support. On the other hand, the Arabs of Kūfa and Baṣra knew that 'Ali depended on them for support. They had raised him to caliphate. Being mostly Bedouins, they had little respect for authority and had the Arab preference for democratic equality. After the failure at Ṣīffin to take advantage of the occasion, they did not support him fully and 'Ali failed to rouse them to a second campaign. Thus Muʿāwiya retained a firm hold in Syria and made common cause with 'Amr b. 'Ās who conquered Egypt for him and drove out 'Ali's supporters from the province. After the assassination of 'Ali, the way was clear for the supremacy of the Omayyads who were closely united by a strong tribal affinity and whose leadership was certainly superior to any that 'Ali's party could produce.

The caliphate and, with it, the chief treasury migrated from Kūfa to Damascus. The men of 'Irāq lost their position. "They had been possessors of the kingdom, and now they had sunk to a mere province. The revenue of the land they had conquered was lost to them, and they had to be content with the crumbs of the pension which fell from their masters' table. They were held in check by means of the dole which they could not do without, and which might at will be curtailed or withdrawn. No wonder they thought the rule of the Syrians a heavy yoke, and were ready to shake it off whenever they found a favourable opportunity. The strongest rising against the Umayyids originated in Iraq and was made not by one particular faction, but by the whole of the Arabs of that place, who were at one in their rancour over the loss
of their former autocracy, and in hatred of those who had inherited it. Specially powerful officials were always required to keep the difficult province peaceful and obedient, but finally it could only be managed by the suppression of the native military and the introduction of Syrian garrisons, by the establishment of an actual military government, which had its headquarters no longer in the old capital of the country, but in a newly elected fortified town."

Chapter 4

THE OMAYYAD COUNTER-REVOLUTION

The Omayyad dynasty established by Mu‘āwiya destroyed in many ways but could not destroy completely the work which Islam had begun. The counter-revolution started by Mu‘āwiya and his successors was in many respects the recrudescence of Arab tribalism against the universalism of Islam and its message of the equality of all nations, races and peoples. Ultimately the Islamic ideals proved far more powerful and undermined the Arab supremacy of the Omayyads replacing it by the cosmopolitan ‘Abbasid State in which the Arabs were only one component among the many nations and peoples who shared political and administrative power. The ideals of Islam were slowly making way all the time, despite the resistance of the Arab ruling dynasty.

The Omayyad power rested on tribal alliances and affiliations and mainly on the strength of the Arab feeling for the leading position of the Quraysh. Even during the time of the Prophet and his early successors, the Quraysh were unanimously recognised as the leaders of Arabia. Islam had to respect this sentiment for obvious reasons. To have ignored it would have been to invite anarchy. The result was virtually to disqualify the Ansār for caliphate. After the assassination of ‘Othmān, the two rival Qurayshite claimants belonged one to the Banū Hashim, the family of the Prophet, and the other to the Banū Omayya, the family of Abū Sufyān. To start with, the Banū Hashim had the greater advantage. They had a great moral and spiritual prestige which their opponents lacked. But this advantage was counter-balanced by many other factors. Firstly, the Ansār as a body had virtually no interest in either of the claimants, because they stood
to gain little by the success of either party. Secondly, the religious fervour of the early days was on the decline, as the Prophet was not there and the series of wars with non-Muslim states had come to an end. There was comparative peace and plentiful wealth in the hands of the people and their leaders. Whether it is religious fervour or national enthusiasm, there must be something to keep it alive. Peace and prosperity are hardly contributory to the maintenance of religious and national enthusiasm. During such times the human spirit is not keyed up to high moral standards. It was, therefore, not to be expected that the house of Banū Hashim would get any considerable support merely because of the moral prestige which it had acquired. Again, the representatives of Banū Hashim failed to produce any outstanding leader besides ‘Ali. But ‘Ali was dogged by the blood of Othmaan. If he had been able to bring the culprits to the book, he might have succeeded in neutralising much of the opposition. As it is, he had to face the hostility even of those elements which were unfavourably disposed towards the Banū Omayya. Thus ‘A’yesha, ' Talha and Zubayr, equally with the Omayyads, clamoured for the blood of Othmaan, though they had no affiliation with Mu’awiyah and no intention of supporting his claims. It cannot be said that these three were merely working for their own ends under the pretence of Othmaan’s blood, because the murder of the third Caliph had certainly aroused much genuine resentment and misunderstanding of ‘Ali’s intentions. So ‘Ali’s strength was dissipated in fighting a costly battle with these three distinguished persons. Although he came out victorious in the battle of the Camel (Jamal), his military strength certainly suffered a good deal. Again, ‘Ali had to face the indiscipline of his army at the battle of Siffin when he was on the point of victory. ‘The men of Iraq, amongst the foremost of whom are always to be understood the men of Kufa, held fast, as a whole, to Ali. But his relations to them were different from those of Mu’awia to the Syrians, and not so kindly. Mu’awia was not risen from the ranks, but held the authority of a superior over them; he did not owe his position to his inferiors, but was independent of them,—when he ordered they obeyed. They were also, of course, con-
vinced that he had right on his side in fighting against the murder of Othman, but in any circumstances they would have made his cause their own. They had long known and respected him, and besides, they had been used to a military atmosphere. On the other hand, men could not forget that Ali owed his power to a revolution, and he had neither the time nor the means to make up for this detraction by exceptional personal qualities. The men of Iraq did not forget that it was they who had advanced him; they were too undisciplined, or perhaps too devout, to follow their Khalifa where he led them. They certainly regretted when it was too late that they had lost him the game at Siffin, but they did not make good their error by now strongly assisting him against the Syrians, after the decision by arbitration had passed as a jest and hostilities were renewed. He could not rouse them to a fresh campaign, for they rendered him no obligatory service urgently, as he required it, but allowed Muawia to conquer Egypt, and to harass Iraq by flying squadrons which made inroads as far as Kufa. When they at last gathered together and were ready for a sortie, Ali was killed, and his son and successor, Hasan, felt unequal to the position and sold his claims to Muawia. The latter was now able to make a formal entry into Kufa, and the men of Iraq had to pay him homage."

As against their opponents, who were divided, the Omayyads showed greater unity in their ranks. For one thing, they were not disturbed and divided on religious or ideological issues. Their strength rested on tribal affiliations and Muawia had the necessary political statesmanship to maintain happy relations with the numerous warring tribes. His only difficulty was in dealing with the people of Iraq who had a provincial jealousy against the Syrians and envied them for their supremacy. But the people of Iraq were divided into factions each with its own interests and programme of action. Here the two most outstanding opponents of the Omayyad dynasty were the Khwārij and the Shi'a. But the two differed widely in their political

aims and theological beliefs.

OPPOSITION TO THE OMAYYAD DYNASTY

Let us first deal with the Khwārij. The opposition of the Khwārij was mainly religious and anti-dynastic. They had no political axe to grind. With the rest of the men of 'Iraq, they first maintained the revolution against Muʿāwiya, who did not recognise it, but they continued it also against 'Ali. Although they had helped him to assert his claim, they were not willing to be his party in the sense that the Syrians were the party of Muʿāwiya. The Din (the religion) was to them neither Din-i-Muʿāwiya nor Din-i-'Ali, but Din Allah only. The Khwārij considered that they alone were Muslims. They spilled the blood of other Muslims, for it was against them that they waged the holy war. They were far more tolerant to non-Muslims than to their own brethren of the faith whom they considered heretic. Although their ideas were quite anti-dynastic, still, as representatives of the unity of the congregation of believers, even they had their Khalīfa. They were the first to uphold the principle that Khilāfat was eligible for all Muslims, Arab or non-Arab, slave or freed man, and refused to recognise the supremacy of the Quraysh. In this sense they were Arabs who fought for the rights of non-Arabs. But they were narrowminded and fanatical. Differences of opinion on smaller points caused division amongst them. "All their energy was directed towards an unattainable goal; religion brought them to an active, but absolutely impolitic and desperate polity. They were not unconscious of themselves. They renounced success; their only wish was to save their souls."¹ Thus their nihilistic political activity and extra-piety made them an ineffective arm of the opposition.

The next party in opposition to the Omayyads was the Shiʿite party. Though opposed to the Omayyads, they had very different aims from those of the Khwārij. They hated the Omayyads not because they rejected a dynasty but because they set up the just and lawful dynasty in opposition to the false one.

Thus the Shīʿites were even more anti-democratic than the Omayyads. The name Shīʿa is contracted from Shīʿat-ī-ʿAlī, which means the party of ʿAlī. Even after his death ʿAlī remained for the men of ʿIrāq the symbol of their lost supremacy. Their Shīʿitism was no more than the expression of the feeling of hatred of the subdued province, specially the degraded capital of Kūfah against the Omayyads. “The heads of the tribes and families of Kūfah originally shared this feeling with the rest, but their responsible position compelled them feeling with the rest, but their responsible position compelled them to circumspect. They did not take aught to do with aimless risings, but restrained the crowd when they let themselves be carried away, and in the name of peace and order placed their influence at the service of the government so as not to endanger their own position. In this way they became more and more strangers and foes to the more open and positive Shīʿites, whose attachment to the heirs of the Prophet was not lessened but increased by the failure of romantic declarations. The Shīʿa itself was narrowed and intensified by the opposition to the leading aristocracy of the tribes, and broke off from the majority of the Arabs.”¹ The Shīʿa, it might be added, derived strength from the Īrānian Muslims whose dynastic and legitimistic ideas were akin to their own, and who, having a long tradition of monarchy and a native distaste for Arab rule, were ready to join any opposition to the Omayyads. The Shīʿites attained political importance through Muhkhtār, who was able to rally round him a group known as Tawwābin, that is people who repented their misdeeds in having failed to support Imām Ḥusayn, the son of ʿAlī, in his desperate situation in Karbala. Muhkhtār won over to himself not only the Shīʿites but also the Mawāli, non-Arab Muslims, who claimed equality of position in the name of Islām with the Arabs. Taking advantage of the anarchic conditions in ʿIrāq, he successfully overthrew the Arabian aristocracy in Kūfah and set up there a government with himself at its head, in which Shīʿitism was to wipe out

the difference between Arabs and Persians. His success was, however, shortlived. His Shi'a was suppressed, but he had paved the way for its success later on.

The most formidable opposition to the Omayyads, however, came from Medina which renounced the allegiance given to Yazid and revolted against his authority. Here the opposition centred round Ibn Zubayr who escaped to Mecca and hid himself there. Ibn Zubayr had many advantages on his side. He was supported by the Quraysh in general, by the Ansar and even by the North Arabian tribes collectively known as the Qays. The situation of the Omayyads at this time was really very serious and no better opportunity could have offered itself to the opposition, if their aims had been mutually compatible. The Omayyads had lost hold on 'Iraq, Egypt and Hedjaz. Only Syria remained loyal to him. And even in Syria Dhahtak b. Qays turned against the Omayyads and declared for Ibn Zubayr. But Ibn Zubayr could lend him no help from Mecca and he was defeated by Marwan at Marj Rihat. In 'Iraq, Ibn Zubayr's brother Mus'ab was continually harassed by the Khwariz and the Shi'ites. In Mecca, Ibn Zubayr could neither exploit the differences of Marwan with the other members of the Omayyad family nor arrive at a compromise with the family of Banu Hashim. Instead he used force against the Hashimites and besieged them in the hope that they would be compelled to accept him as Caliph. Finally, when, after the death of Yazid, Husayn b. Numayr proposed to him that he was willing to recognise him as Khalifa if he would stop the fighting in Medina and Mecca and go with him to Syria, so that the seat of government should remain there, Ibn Zubayr flatly refused to budge from his hiding. Finally, he committed the grave mistake of driving out the Omayyads from Medina, from where they moved to Syria, the centre of their government. Apart from the divisions within the ranks of the opposition, the Omayyads' success was thus caused by the inability of Ibn Zubayr to understand the important fact that Medina had long ceased to be the centre and controlling power of the Islamic world, and his
lack of statesmanship in failing to exploit the differences in the Omayyad family.

RESTORATION OF ORDER

Although the Omayyads had regained power, the province of ʿIrāq was never fully reconciled to their rule and continued to be a hotbed of intrigues which slowly undermined their power. The immediate task before ʿAbdul Malik was restoration of law and order in ʿIrāq, where there was complete anarchy and little respect for government authority. There were also incessant tribal feuds among the Arabs which rendered the task of restoring peace much more difficult. The Qays and the Kalb, the former North Arabians, the latter South Arabians, continually fought each other. "Out of it sprang another between the Christian tribe of Taghlib and Suleim, and the tribe of Fezāra was also brought in. The scene of the endless series of acts of vengeance was Mesopotamia, and the feud was carried on with the utmost cruelty. In Al- Başra the feud between Rabīʿa and the Azd on one side and Temīm and Keis on the other spread to Khorāsān, a Başrite colony."

Far more dangerous to the peace of the country were the Khwārij. Muṣaʿb had not been able to crush them in Başra. During this time Muhallab was in the field against Azāriqa. But troops from both Başra and Kūfa used to chronic indiscipline, began to desert him and returned to their homes. "The Azāriqa in the East were not yet subdued when there arose in the beginning of 76 other Khwārij in the west of Iraq, who were distinguished by the fact that they mostly belonged to one tribe, the proud Banū Shaibān of Bakr." Their most famous leader was Shabīb b. Yazīd who routed several government armies and actually reached the gate of the ʿIraq capital. However, Muhallab succeeded in 78 A.D. in crushing

their power and received from Ḥajjāj, the governor of ʿIrāq, the province of Khurāsān. In Baṣra and Kūfā, the new Omayyad governor succeeded in restoring peace by imposing martial law on the two cities. Ḥajjāj has become notorious for his cruelties, but it is difficult to see how he could have subdued the indisciplined and mutinous ʿIrāqīs without such severe methods. Another notable event of Ḥajjāj’s governorship is the rebellion of the army under ʿAbdurrahmān ibn ʿAṣḥāb which severely shook the Omayyad kingdom. Ḥajjāj had commissioned him to deal with Zunbil, a rebel of Sijistān. After subduing a part of the country, ʿAbdurrahmān made a pause but Ḥajjāj ordered him to continue his advance. The ʿIrāqī soldiers who hated Ḥajjāj’s rule rallied round their leader in the hope that he would be able to drive out Ḥajjāj. ʿAbdul Malik had to send a Syrian army and hold out the promise that he would recall Ḥajjāj and equalise the military pensions of the ʿIrāqīans with those of the Syrians, before the rising could be crushed.

TRIBAL BASIS OF THE OMAYYAD RULE

Throughout the Omayyad rule the conflict of Syria and ʿIrāq continued to cause instability. ʿIrāqīs were never fully reconciled to Syrian ascendancy and this was one of the causes of the Omayyad downfall. Another source of conflict and confusion under the Omayyads was the rivalry of the Arab tribes and the dependence of the ruling dynasty and the provincial governors on the support of the powerful tribes. Many Arab tribes, specially the Qaysite (North Arabian tribes), had migrated to Syria as a result of the Muslim conquests. But the South Arabian tribe of Kalb together with ʿUqāfā and the Azd Sarāt formed the majority and they had settled in Syria long before Islām. The influence of the Graeco-Armaic culture, the Christian church, and the Roman kingdom had left its trace on them. A regulated state government and military and political discipline were not new ideas to them. They were, therefore, much more law-abiding and recognised the legitimacy of the existing rule, unlike the tribes of ʿIrāq and Khurāsān. Muʿāwiya was prudent enough to keep them to his
side, but he himself belonged to the North Arabian Qaysite tribe. However, he had married a lady of the South Arabian Kalb tribe. All the Kalbites felt themselves, as it were, the brothers-in-law of the Khalifa and uncles of his successors. There was no danger that the Kalbites might find themselves in an inferior position to the Qaysite conquerors and newcomers, partly because Mu‘awiya had close family relations with them and partly because they accepted Islam very soon after the conquest. The relations of the Omayyads with non-Muslims of Syria were also quite happy. The opposition between the conqueror and the conquered was not so harsh in Syria as it was in 'Iraq during the first century of Islam. The Muslims there did not live apart in colonies specially founded for them, but together with the children of the land. Sometimes they would even share in the use of a place of worship which then became half church and half mosque. Thus Arab tribal rivalry or the opposition of the conquered did not at first influence the fortunes of the Omayyads in Syria. Only later in their reign relations between the Qaysites (North Arabians) and the Yemenites (South Arabians) began to deteriorate.

Very different was the state of affairs in 'Iraq and Khurasan. In Basra there was continual friction between the Tamim and the Rabia. This was increased by the immigration of the Azd 'Uman, which took place during the reign of Yazid. The Rabia allied themselves with the Azd and the Tamim joined the Qays. A feud between these two major groups began after the death of Yazid. These feuds had their influence on the ruling circles, as it was difficult to keep clear of them. What was a provincial governor to do if a particular tribe, the Qays or the Yemenites, claimed him as their own. If he rejected them, he robbed himself of their support and fell between two stools. Even the princes at 'Abdul Malik's court took sides, according as they had leanings through their mothers to the one side or the other. The ruler himself could not keep from involvement in inter-tribal quarrels.

We have seen that Mu‘awiya had given greater prominence to the Kalb, although he was a Qaysite. In the civil war against Ibn Zubayr the Qaysites sided with the latter and worked
against the Omayyads. 'Abdul Malik, recognising their disaffection, endeavoured to keep himself above the parties. The Kalb naturally were displeased and complained that he had gone over from the Kalb to the Qays. However, in Syria many factors were working to reconcile this tribal opposition. The feeling that, if Syria had to retain its ascendancy, the inter-tribal rivalry should not be allowed to influence loyalty to the Omayyads had a softening effect.

There was no such restraining influence on the Arabs of 'Irāq and Khurāsān. Thus we find that Yazīd b. Muhallab, the commissioner of Khurāsān, was not on good terms with Ḥajjāj, the governor of 'Irāq. He relied on his clan, the Azd 'Uman, who had allied themselves, as in 'Irāq, with the Rabi‘a from the Yemen group and the Tamīm with the Qays (Mu‘tar). It was only reluctantly that he set about dealing with the followers of the defeated rebel, Ibn Aṣḥath, and then exercised clemency towards the captive ringleaders, at least towards the Yemenites among them. He deferred the order of Ḥajjāj to expel the rebel Qaysites. It was only with great difficulty that Ḥajjāj at last obtained orders from the Khalīfa to depose him. He was imprisoned by Ḥajjāj, but escaped to Sulaymān, the brother of Walīd b. 'Abdul Malik. Sulaymān interceded with the Khalīfa on his behalf. When Sulaymān came to the throne, Yazīd b. Muhallab was reinstated. Sulaymān was an anti-Qaysite and so his wrath fell on Ḥajjāj. Walīd b. 'Abdul Malik was regarded as a pro-Qaysite, but Sulaymān, on the other hand, was pro-Yemenite. In the reign of Walīd the power of the Qays reached its height; when he died their fall took place immediately and it was a terrible one. Yazīd b. Muhallab sided with the Yemenite party, to whom as an Azdite he belonged. Ḥajjāj, on the other hand, had taken strong action against the Yemenites. Indeed from the very beginning he did not deny his descent from the Thaqīf, who were reckoned as Qaysites, and he chose his entourage from this circle of his friends.

'Omar II tried a policy of neutrality towards the tribes and he showed himself not unfriendly to the Azd although he
put an end to their hegemony. But with his successor there set in a reaction against the party government of Sulaymān after the suppression of the great rebellion which the Muhallabids had stirred in ‘Irāq. Yazīd II made vengeance upon the Muhallabids and their following the chief motive of his reign, and the Azdites of Khurāsān were also made to feel it, though they had not taken part in that rebellion at all. They were expelled from all offices and the Muḍar (North Arabians) again got the supremacy, with the Tamīm at their head.

The tribal structure of the Arab ruling class under the Omayyads was a constant source of misgovernment and instability. The consequences of this were not so serious in ‘Irāq as in Khurāsān which was the storm centre of the kingdom. The tribal feuds in Africa and Spain did not produce much reaction on the nerve centre of the kingdom, but those in Khurāsān had very serious repercussions on the stability of the Omayyad dynasty. Khurāsān was a province that was never pacified and never had fixed boundaries. Here the Arabs were constantly disputing with the Turks and the Īrānians but they employed the interval to rend each other. Exposed as they were, they behaved with exactly the same lack of policy as before in their old home. They felt free and untrammelled in the vast and, to a great extent, desert land. The external danger also failed to unite them. Khurāsān became a second Arabia with this difference that it lay in the enemy territory, had vast and complicated connections and permitted anarchical tendencies to be more freely expressed. The Khurāsān Arabs, and specially the Tamīm, stuck proudly to their nationality and in this eastern province continued the old tribal life and the old songs and sagas about their own doings and experience. But here there was a lack of that sober realism with which the old Arabism was stamped.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE OMAYYADS

For obvious reasons, the Arabs had formed the ruling group in the empire of Islām, under the early Caliphs. The reason was that conversion to Islām of the subject races was a slow process which took a long time to complete. Secondly,
Arabia was still the centre of gravity of the Islamic world. Only after the first two Caliphs did the centre shift to ʿIrāq and Syria. Thirdly, the neo-converts who accepted ʿIslām were culturally different from the Arabs and not yet firmly grounded in a ʿIslām. The early Caliphs could not give them their share of power, unless the cultural barriers had been broken and they had become more closely affiliated to the Islamic teachings. Arabs still formed the brain and heart of ʿIslām and its sword-arm. To have admitted the non-Arabs into a position of equality with them at this stage would have been to alienate the support of the Arabs, whose services were indispensable. This could only be done when Arabs and non-Arabs had developed closer contacts and some cultural affinity had been produced by mutual contact.

An almost identical state of affairs continued under the Omayyads with this difference that the Omayyads being non-religious saw no reason to depart from the existing conditions, even after the rate of conversion had increased and non-Arabs had become culturally and ideologically more akin to the Arab Muslims. Thus the ruling class under the Omayyads consisted of genuine Arabs. By their side stood the class of non-Muslims who had accepted ʿIslām and were theoretically eligible for a position of complete equality. Behind them were ranged the subject races who had secured toleration for themselves and for their religion, and were, on that account, called the ‘protected class.’

The Arab nation, which formed the main support of the Omayyad dynasty, consisted of individual tribes. In every one of these numerous tribes there were prominent families which spoke the decisive word in the affairs of the tribe. Round these leading families gathered the great mass of tribesmen. Their support of the Caliph was largely influenced by the capacity of the ruler to satisfy their worldly ambitions in the division of wealth and office. Under the Omayyads, the army itself was organised upon the tribal basis, and rested entirely on the old tribal organisation. Influential families of the ruling tribes appropriated the most important posts and offices of the state. Not merely personal qualifications, but far more his
descent, the position and influence of his tribe were matters of moment in choosing a man for an appointment. During the reign of ʿAbd al-Malik b. ʿAbdullah al-Qisrī was appointed governor of ʿIrāq, notwithstanding the fact that he ranked below many Arab families, in point of descent. This was rather exceptional and the Caliph reminded him of the special favour done to him.

By the annexation of large territories to the Muslim Empire, the Arab tribes, in a comparatively short time, spread themselves over immense thickly populated countries. This weakened their power of resistance against the government. As they were surrounded by foreign peoples, they were thrown upon the support of the government. In the conquest of Syria, the South Arabian tribes had taken a leading part. The Arab population there was, therefore, predominantly South Arabian. Generally speaking, the Omayyads relied pre-eminently on the Southern group. In ʿIrāq the reverse was the case. Most of the North Arabian tribes emigrated and settle down there. The North Arabian tribes, therefore, preponderated there.

"It was customary for the governor to be chosen from the powerful tribes, loyal to the government. The governor-designate usually took along with him a number of his tribesmen who always were with him... and upon them, in all circumstances, the governor counted for support."

Various causes combined to impart strength to the Arab tribal structure. Islām in its early period made full use of the tribal system for military purposes. Out of this arose the military colonies which were established in important strategic centres. In the beginning these centres were few and far between and it seemed as if the Arab colonists would be lost in the foreign population amidst which they lived. But this fear proved baseless. The colonists multiplied with great rapidity. This was due partly to the system of polygamy. In part, it was the result of largescale conversions to Islām. "With conversion the foreigner acquired the right of citizenship. He made good his claim to State-annuity and shared in all

the privileges of the ruling race. Simultaneously with conversion he renounced his language and nationality, and hastened to exchange them for the Arabic language and the Arab nationality. Moreover, he sought and obtained admission into one of the Arab tribes. And it happened thus: he entered into the relationship of a client and was henceforth known as the client of the tribe of N.N. The descendants of these converts were thoroughly 'arabicized' in the next generation. They even passed for genuine Arabs whose language and manners they adopted and followed. Even slavery largely contributed to the growth of the ruling race. It was a settled rule when foreign nations did not submit or conclude a capitulation but offered resistance and were conquered in open warfare, to kill men and treat the women and children as slaves and divide them as war booty. Four-fifths were divided among the troops; while a fifth fell to the Caliph. We can well imagine what a number of slaves thus passed into the possession of the ruling race. The kind treatment, which Islam enjoined and the Muslims practised towards the slaves, soon won them over to Islam. They accepted the Arabian language, and many of them received their freedom. As freed men they acquired the status of clients with their former master and his family. Thus, like an avalanche, the Arab conquerors grew in numbers as they proceeded further and further in their triumphant career."

These foreigners were accepted into the tribes. Easier still was the absorption of the conquered by the conquerors in countries where the Arabs found kindred races. This was the case both in the Sinai peninsula and 'Iraq, where many Arab tribes had settled long before Islam. Conditions in Persia and Africa were different however. There the Arabs did not find people with any affinity or kinship to them; but there too, their success was sure, for neither the Persians nor the Africans were capable of offering serious resistance to their arms. The conquered Berbers were carefully and systematically trained by the readers of the Qur'an and other religious teachers. In

Persia after three hundred years of Arab rule, the subject nation rose against the Arab domination, and revived their neglected language: for, with the conquest, Arabic had become the official language, the language of the cultivated circles and even of ordinary parlance. Thus Arabic was the language of the people of Nishapur and also of the people of Qum. Even in Merv and Herat the entire correspondence was carried on in Arabic. In Khurasan too, Arabic for a long time supplanted Persian.

THE MAWĀLĪ (NEO-CONVERTS)

The treatment meted out by the Omayyad aristocracy to the growing mass of the new converts to Islām called forth a party which not merely claimed equality with the Arabs but was even disposed to exile the Persians over the Arabs. They relied in support of their contention to the Qur'ān and the traditions of the Prophet. They were called the ‘Friends of Equality’ (Ahl-ul-Taswiyah). The first who conceded equal rights to the Mawālī was ‘Omar b. ‘Abdul ‘Azīz (‘Omar II). He appointed two clients as judges at Cairo which caused a great sensation. Almost as great a sensation was caused when, under ‘Abbās, a new-convert was appointed leader of the prayer at the mosque of Kufa, and later a judge. The clients, however, succeeded in gaining a more or less equal position with the Arabs. They were the first to devote themselves to learned studies and thereby won for themselves great social prestige. They diligently took up theological and juristic studies and soon began to receive appointments as judges and jurisconsults. They also found openings in other fields. Almost the entire tax and accounts departments of the state were monopolised by them. “They rose even in the social scale higher and higher until the distinction from which they suffered—obstinately kept up hitherto—passed away.”1 Islām was evidently far more powerful than the spirit of Arab nationalism.

There was another class of people which though recently converted to Islām had begun to exercise powerful influence in

the Muslim State under the Omayyads. They were the Dihqāns. They were a part of the agrarian feudal system which prevailed in the defunct Persian Empire. A considerable number of land-owners stood at the head of the Persian peasantry. Each of these, in his own domain, was supreme, and had a determining voice in the affairs of its people. He represented the interests of his tenants as against the provincial and central governments. He collected taxes and exercised the rights which a big land-owner exercises over his tenants. When converted to Islam, these Dihqāns succeeded in retaining their power and influence. Moreover, the Arab conquerors who were inexperienced in administrative work left to the Dihqāns the profitable duty of collecting taxes.

Most of the Dihqāns in ‘Iraq had accepted Islam in the time of ‘Omar, the second Caliph. He treated them with the utmost kindness and even allowed them state annuities on a par with Arab Muslims. In the writings of the first centuries the Dihqāns are frequently referred to as a rich and powerful people living prosperously on their estates and enjoying high esteem. In the old fables and poems, the charming daughters of Dihqāns fill a prominent place, and many Muslims deemed it a piece of good fortune to wed one of these.

PROTECTED PEOPLE

People professing other faiths enjoyed a wide toleration. “Without interference they could perform their divine service, deal with the affairs of their community, maintain their churches, cloisters, chapels, except in large towns where their number was limited—in fact they could even build new ones.” The centres of Muslim population were the large towns. In country places, where conversion did not take place on a large scale, the old religions predominated.

The followers of Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism and the Magians—the protected people—flung themselves into political and religious controversies and forced the Muslims to defend and explain their religious doctrines. This shows the wide

measure of freedom which they enjoyed. Among them the Christians were the most influential. They were led by a power-loving, place-seeking clergy. The Christian clergy in the Byzantine Empire had grown considerably in numbers and influence and they were well-endowed. They acquired landed property too and in the country their life was undisturbed by the Muslim conquest. Many trades were carried on in the monasteries which had become the meeting centres of the neighbouring people for markets, fairs and festivals. Not infrequently the monks carried on medical pursuits. In Baghdaed itself there were several Christian churches and cloisters. The Christians in the towns made large fortunes for themselves by commerce, trade and money-lending. They held the entire accounts department and the board of taxes in their hands. In Irak they shared this influence with the Persians and the Dihqans.

Among other religious sects, the Manichaeans stood very prominent. Their religious practices bore a remarkable resemblance to those of Islam. They had a fixed number of daily prayers (4 to 7) and every prayer consisted of a series of prostrations and genuflexions. Like the Muslims they too purified themselves by washing before prayer, and, like them, they observed thirty days' fast. In the beginning, the Manichaeans were mistaken by Muslims for Christians or Zoroastrians, but later they obtained the status of a tolerated sect. However, their proselytising zeal soon brought them into conflict with the state. They had great influence in the eastern provinces of the empire—Persia, Khurasan and Transoxania. In Kufa too there was a small community of Manichaeans. They certainly exerted a powerful intellectual influence, as the Islamic dialectics of the age is full of references to their beliefs and seeks to refute their doctrines. All religious communities and sects had the completest freedom in the management of their social and religious affairs. It appears that even in matters of civil and criminal justice, they were entirely in the hands of their spiritual guides, who enjoyed a prominent social position.

Thus we find that the Nestorian patriarch enjoyed great
respect in Baghda and so great was his position that he was accounted an important political factor.

DEVELOPMENT OF FEUDALISM UNDER THE OMAYYADS

The Arab conquerors belonged to a society steeped in nomadism and tribalism and entirely lacking in agricultural pursuits. It was, therefore, free from all trace of agrarian feudalism. But in the conquered countries, specially Syria and Persia, the agrarian economy was based on feudalism. For a time the early rulers of Islam tried to keep the Arabs from adopting agrarian pursuits or forming themselves into a class of landed aristocrats. This was both necessary and possible only till such time as the wars lasted and military expansion continued. But from the nature of the case, it was impossible that all Arabs and every non-Arab converted to Islam should form the military caste receiving annuities from the government and doing little else except to perform military duties. With the establishment of peace, the cessation of Muslim expansion and the vast increase in the number of converts, it became impossible to stop the movement towards feudalism and the adoption of agricultural pursuits by Arab and non-Arab Muslims.

The early Caliphs had made no change in the existing land system of the conquered countries. Estates deserted by the fleeing landlords, former crown lands, lands of warriors confiscated for active opposition to the Muslims, lands belonging to the fire temples and those whose income was set apart for maintaining the postal service in Persia were declared state property by Caliph ‘Omar and their income went to the central treasury of Islam. Other feudal estates under the Syrians, Egyptians and the Dihqans of Persia were allowed to continue on condition of paying the land tax (Kharaf).

After the conquest, the Muslim army, which then consisted of the entire Arab nation, began to demand the division of lands and estates in the conquered countries. ‘Omar not only refused to do so, but prohibited Muslims from acquiring land even by means of purchase. “In spite of this, in the reign of ‘Uthman, the Quraysh acquired private estates (al-qat‘ai’i). For instance, a large extent
of the property left by the Patricians in Syria and the confiscated lands had passed on to the State. At the request of Mu‘awiyah, ‘Uthmān assigned to him these estates or at least a large part of them. He gave many more estates as fiefs to others also."

This policy of giving fiefs was continued by ‘Abdul Malik and other Omayyad rulers. Sometimes when non-Muslim owners of land died heirless, their Kharāj lands were given to the Muslims as ‘Ushr (tithe) lands. Other Omayyad rulers also granted fiefs to their supporters and allowed Muslims to purchase Kharāj lands from non-Muslims. When such lands became Muslim property, the owner had to pay the state only a tenth (‘Ushr) of produce and hence the revenue of the state suffered. In course of time large tracts of land became Muslim property. The Quraysh in particular established a monopoly over Babylon (As-Sawād). ‘The Sawād is nothing but Quraysh property’ was the remark made by Sa‘īd ibn al-‘Ās. ‘Ali tried to stem the tide by taking back most of the landed property in ‘Irāq, but, by the end of Mu‘awiyah’s reign, a form of feudalism had come to stay in the Muslim Empire. It was no doubt different from Western feudalism in that Islam did not allow the right of primogeniture. Therefore, feudal estates had to be divided after the death of the owner among his heirs. Moreover, the tenants did not suffer from such feudal exactions as they did in Europe, nor were they bound to their land and master in the same inalienable manner. They were by no means like the serfs of Feudal Europe, who could not even marry without the permission of the master.

‘Umayyad Khalīfahs like Mu‘awiyah, ‘Abdu‘l Malik and Hishām and their powerful Viceroyas like Ḥajjāj, Maslamah and Khalid al-Qasrī became the greatest landowners in the Empire. We have seen how ‘Uthmān granted most of the crown lands in Syria to Mu‘awiyah. To this he added other estates like Fadak in Arabia, much bigger ones in Persia and the East and those confiscated from the Romans in Egypt and other parts of Africa.”

This accumulation of estates continued under the successors

2. Ibid., p. 68.
of Mu‘awiya. ‘Abdul Malik accelerated the process. ‘Omar II, however, made a determined effort to stop this process of feudalisation. He returned to the state treasury his own personal estates which he had inherited from his forefathers. Then he forced other members of the Omayyad ruling family to return their estates. This move antagonised the Omayyads and ‘Omar II lost his life in fighting the vested landed interests. After this, the process of feudalisation continued at an accelerated pace and the climax was reached with Hishām.

Hishām and his governor of ‘Iraq, Khalid b. ‘Abdullah al-Qasrī, were the two great landlords in ‘Iraq who monopolised such huge quantities of grains that they could fluctuate the price of the commodity as they liked. They could raise the price by withholding the stock and lower it by releasing it. There was a keen business rivalry between these two great landlords. Khalid al-Qasrī, however, succeeded in draining a large area of marshes in the district of Wasiṭ and big estates were carved out of the newly reclaimed lands.

REFORM OF CURRENCY AND LANGUAGE

‘Abdul Malik was responsible for introducing many reforms, the principal being the adoption of Arabic as the language of administration. He organised an excellent postal service by means of relays of horses, for the conveyance of despatches and travellers. He also reformed the coinage. Before Islam, the Persian and Roman coins were in use in Arabia. The Meccans accepted all coins of pure gold and silver and determined their value by weight. Under the Prophet and Abu Bakr also, the Roman and Persian coins were in general use. Under ‘Omar I, the Muslim Empire became so extensive that all kinds of coins poured in some of which were defective. But no overall measure for introducing a uniform currency was undertaken until the time of ‘Abdul Malik. When ‘Abdul Malik became the sole ruler of the Muslim Empire, he took up the problem of coinage. According to Baladhurī, the Romans got paper from Egypt and the Muslims got dinars from the Romans. Up to the days of ‘Abdul Malik, the Egyptian paper bore Christian inscriptions and the sign of
the cross as the watermark. Under ʿAbdul Malik, the verse ʿSay, He alone is God’ was substituted. The Romans threatened to retaliate by inscribing some blasphemy against the Prophet on the dīnār. ʿAbdul Malik, thereupon, determined to have his coins minted in a.h. 76. The attempt succeeded in introducing uniformity of weight, size and artistic beauty. The ratio between the dīnār and the dirham in weight was 10:1. ʿAbdul Malik put two per cent more gold in his dīnārs to make them attractive to the Romans.

ʿAbdul Malik also introduced a certain measure of uniformity in the administration. Till his time, the entire administration was manned by the Persians in Persia, by the Greeks in Syria and by the Copts in Egypt. They used their own languages, the Persian and the Greek, in the affairs of the administration. Arabic did not possess till then the technical terms necessary for running the administration. Most of the caliphs and the governors thought that the administration could not be carried on in Arabic. One of the difficulties was the defective character of the Arabic script which possessed only the consonants and had no vowels. ʿAbdul Malik’s viceroy in ʿIrāq, Ḥajjāj, who began life as a schoolmaster, exerted himself to promote the use of vowel marks (borrowed from the Syriac) and of the diacritical points placed above or below similar consonants. It was on account of these reforms that all the official records could be translated in Arabic. Henceforward the Arabic language became the medium of administration throughout the Muslim Empire. In spite of this, Persians, Greeks and Copts were not excluded from the administration. They picked up Arabic and continued in the service of the Arab government in large numbers. Another consequence of the language reform was that the understanding of the Qurʾān spread among the foreigners. Hitherto only a few foreigners could read and understand the Qurʾān. But with the use of the vowels and the diacritical marks, the Qurʾān became available to a large number of foreigners who learned Arabic.

RELIGION AND AUTHORITY UNDER THE OMAYYADS

The coming into power of the Omayyads was due primarily
to the dispersion of the religious party built up by the Holy Prophet and its growing lack of internal cohesion. Despite the efforts of 'Omar, the second Caliph, many companions of the Holy Prophet had moved away from Medina and settled in the provinces. Those who remained in Medina did not have a firm leadership capable of maintaining the internal cohesion of the party. The Omayyads, therefore, relied on the principle of Arab nationality, not on religion, to support their government. Naturally, the great mass of religious men did not like this new orientation and were sullenly hostile to the Omayyads. According to Gibb,¹ "the establishment of the Omayyad Caliphate of Damascus (661) was thus the outcome of a coalition or compromise between those who represented the Islamic ideal of a religious community, united by common allegiance to the heritage of the Prophet and the Meccan secular interpretation of unity, against the threat of anarchy implicit in the threat of tribalism." Again, to quote the same author: "Religious factors entered into this process of centralization on both sides, partly in opposition, but partly also in favouring the growth of an organized central authority. Their awareness of the secular tendencies in the Omayyad house, together with the influence of their religious idealism, inclined the religious leaders in a general way against the Omayyad regime, but their difficulty was to find an alternative that would not disrupt the Community. The excesses of the Kharijites and of the activist Shi'iites discredited them with all but a minority, and an anti-Caliphate set up during a second civil war (684-691) proved incapable of maintaining order. At the same time the Omayyad Caliphate itself was moving towards the universalistic Islamic view, as the religious and ethical principles of Islam percolated in the course of the century more deeply into Arab society and affected its outlook and principles of conduct. The outcome of this symbiosis was the emergence of a semi-official interpretation of Islam, supported by a considerable body of religious opinion, and it is noteworthy that the first condemnations for heresy took

place under the later Umayyad Caliphs.”

THE SITUATION IN KHURĀSĀN ON THE EVE OF THE UMAYYAD DOWNFALL

The Omayyad power was destroyed by the revolt of the Khurāsānians, although the revolt was set on foot and engineered from Kūfa. It is, therefore, necessary to take note of the situation in Khurāsān at the time, when the ‘Abbāsids began to organise their movement which led to the eventual disappearance of the Omayyads.

In Khurāsān, the Arab and Īrānian intermixture had proceeded farther than in other parts of the Persian Empire. The Arabs of Khurāsān were not externally separated from the Persians by different dwelling places. Nor did they dwell mainly in the cities. They had estates in the country too. They had Īrānian servants and married Īrānian wives. The Arabs gradually grew accustomed to being Khurāsānites. They felt at one with the people of the country. They wore trousers like the Īrānians and celebrated Persian festivals. They also learned the language of the Persians. In Abū Muslim’s army even the Arabs spoke mostly Persian.

“Neither did the Iranians in Khurasan on their side, take up a stand compactly hostile and repellent towards the Arabs. The blending process had laid hold of them as well. Their position was in general little changed by the conquest, and that scarcely for the worse. The Arabs managed the defence against outside attacks, i.e., against the Turks, more successfully than had been done under the Sasanide regime. They did not interfere much with the internal conditions, but left the government to the Marzbans and Dihqans and only through them came in contact with subjected population. In the army and government towns, too, the native authorities remained side by side with the Arab, having, in fact, to collect the taxes, and being responsible to the conquerors for their correct payment in the proper amount.”

2. Wellhausen, J., Arab Kingdom and Its Fall, Calcutta 1927, p. 494.
The Šīrāzī Mawālī fought with the Arabs against their old national foes—the Turks. But they also fought for Islam against their Sogdian tribesmen, in so far as the latter had allied themselves with the Turks. Islam had sunk deeper in the hearts of the Šīrāzī Mawālīs and they took it more seriously than the Arabs. But the Mawālīs did not gain full equality to which Islam entitled them. When they served in the army, they had to fight on foot. They received pay and a share in the spoils but not regular pensions and they did not appear in the pension list. Although received into the Arab tribes, they were still "people of the villages" as distinguished from "people of the tribes."

The feeling that they had not gained full equality with the Arabs spread much dissatisfaction among the converted Šīrāzīs. Islam gave them courage and a cause to fight for. The fall of the Arab power was thus brought about not by the Transoxanians who had remained Šīrāzī and hostile to the Arabs but by the Khurāsānians. "Islam itself was the ground upon which they began the struggle against the former. It was Islam that united them with those Arabs who, following theocratic principles, opposed the Umayyid government. It was Arabs who first roused and organised the Mawali." 1

The theocratic elements, among the Arabs, consisted of the Murjites, the Khwarīj and the Šīrīʿites. Both the Khwarīj and the Murjites acknowledge no difference in Islam between the Arabs and the Mawālī. They stood for full-fledged democracy. But the Šīrīʿite opposition was legitimist and dynastic. They recognised only the House of the Prophet as being entitled to political power. In the end the Šīrīʿite movement proved stronger and more fatal to the Omayyads.

The Šīʿa in general had their seat in ‘Irāq, and it was from ‘Irāq that the Šīrāzī east was conquered and peopled, and even later the connection was always actively kept up. From ‘Irāq, a new influx kept constantly coming into the Oxus districts, not consisting of the most peaceful elements. The Omayyad officials in ‘Irāq, specially Ziyād and Ḥajjāj, appear to have moved on

the dangerous elements from Kūfa and Baṣra to Khurāsān, in order to frustrate their desire for war. Ḥajjāj kept the Syrians away from it lest they should be infected by the evil spirit. Thus Khurāsān was full of the enemies of the reigning dynasty.

"If the Arabs in Khurasan had held together amongst themselves and with the government the Shia would certainly not have been able to pierce the joints, but as they would not share the power with the Mawali, so they did not bestow it upon each other. The offices and benefices which the government had to dispose of were the source and cause of passionate jealousy between the tribes. The so-called 'Asabīya was a chronic malady of the Arabs, and finally when the throne of the Umayyids began to totter, it became, as we have seen, exceedingly acute. This state of things was taken advantage of by the special Shia with which the Abbasids were in league, since they had separated from the Alids and withdrawn from Medina where they could not compete with them, to Humaima in the mountainous region between Syria and Arabia (ash Sharīṭ)." 1

The Shi'ites belonged to two distinct schools. There was a moderate party which did not differ from the ordinary Muslims except in regard to Khilafat which, it believed, was an exclusive right of the House of the Prophet. But there were the extremist Shi'as, known as Šaba'a'īya. They attained historical significance for the first time through Muḥtār. Their home was Kūfa. They consisted not merely of the Arabs, but mostly of the Mawālī. They believed in the teachings of Ibn Šabā as concerning the return of the same spirit in different bodies, specially the spirit of the Prophet in his heirs. They were rejected by the 'Alīds. So they attached themselves to Muḥammad b. Ḥanafiya, a son of 'Ali by second marriage. He did not openly reject them but neither did he support their claims. After his death, they recognised his son, Abū Ḥāshim, as the next Imām. This Abū Ḥāshim moved his residence to Ḥumayma and there got in league with the 'Abbāsids. When he died in A.H. 98, he is believed to have made over his office to the 'Abbāsid Muḥammad

1. Wellhausen, J., Arab Kingdom and Its Fall, Calcutta 1927, p. 500.
b. ‘Alī, who thus became the recognised Imam of the extremist Shi'as also, in addition to being the leader of the ‘Abbāsids.

The ‘Abbāsids started with the secret intention of turning the labours of the ‘Alīds to their own advantage. From Ḥumayma they carried on their propaganda with the utmost skill. They had genius enough to see that the best soil for their efforts was the distant Kūrāsān, that is, the extensive north-eastern frontiers of the Persian Empire. These countries were inhabited by a brave and high-spirited people who having suffered much from the Omayyad rule were ready to join in any enterprise that gave them hope of relief. Moreover, the Arabs in Kūrāsān were already Persianised: they had Persian wives and even spoke and understood Persian. Starting from Kūfa, the ‘Abbāsid emissaries went to and fro in the guise of the merchants. They had already the support of the extremist Shi'as who were attached to Muḥammad b. Ḥanafiya. Their only problem was to enlist the support of the ‘Alīds. Accordingly, the ‘Abbāsid emissaries were instructed to carry on their propaganda in the name of Ḥāshim, the common ancestor of ‘Abbās and ‘Alī. By this means they gained a free hand in Kūrāsān. The chief architect of ‘Abbāsid victory was Abū Muslim.

The origin of this famous man is obscure but he was not an Arab. In the year 125 A.H., Muḥammad b. ‘Alī, head of the ‘Abbāsid house, with a party of his followers visited Mecca and, anticipating decease, bade his followers to take his son Ibrāhīm as successor. At the same time he purchased Abū Muslim as a likely agent for the service of his house. Abū Muslim, fulfilling thus the office of confidential agent, was kept going to and fro between Kūrāsān and Al-Ḥumayma to promote the ‘Abbāsid cause and report its progress. At last in A.H. 129, he gave so promising an account of the zeal of his adherents, of the importance of the Omayyad rule in Kūrāsān and of the distractions there, that he received from Ibrāhīm the command to delay no longer, but raise at once the banner of revolt. In the month of Ramaḍān, accordingly, Abū Muslim, proceeding to the east, sent forth his emissaries in all directions with instructions when and
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how the rising was to take place. Before the month was over, contingents had begun to pour forth from all quarters. The first religious service took place on Friday, June 15, 747 A.D. The Imam was Suleyman ibn Katbr, an Arab of the Khuza'a tribe, who was still the nominal head of the movement, though effective leadership was in the hands of Abu Muslim. The Umayyad garrisons were expelled from Herat and other cities of the east. Elsewhere, Abu Muslim's agents sought to win over the Munjjar by abusing the Yemeni tribes and the Yemen by the abuse of the Munjjar. He came to Merv in person and succeeded in detaching the Azd from the Arab alliance, but in such a way as not to offend the Munjjar. While the rebellion was in progress, Ibrabim, the 'Abbasid leader, was arrested by the governor of Belka and died shortly afterwards. Thereupon his brother Abul 'Abbas, called Al-Saffah, assumed leadership of the movement. Qahtaba, the general of Abu Muslim, was able to clear Khurasan of the Umayyad armies but the decisive battle took place in A.H. 132 on the banks of the river Zab, where Abdulla, uncle of Al-Saffah, won a brilliant victory over Marwan, the last of the Umayyad rulers.

CAUSES OF THE OMAYYAD DOWNFALL

From one point of view, the conflict between the Umayyads and the 'Abbasids was the conflict between Syria and Iraq. The victory of the 'Abbasids denoted the triumph of the east ('Iraq and Khurasan) over the west (Syria). That is the reason why the 'Abbasid power centred on the eastern parts of the Muslim world. In the west, excepting in Egypt, its authority was never fully acknowledged. Africa became more or less independent under the Aghlabids. In Spain, the Umayyads were able to gain a foothold and carved out an independent kingdom. Iraq and Khurasan remained the principal centres of 'Abbasid power. The capital moved from Damascus to Kufa and thence to Baghdad.

Seen from another point of view, the 'Abbasid victory represented the victory of those elements, Arabs and non-Arabs, who took their stand on the Islamic idea of political equality among all the Muslims, as against the exclusive right of the Arabs
to rule over the Empire. The power of the Omayyads was not broadbased. With the spread of Islām, races and peoples other than Arabs became the more predominant element of the Muslim fraternity and they could not be denied their share of power. Another factor operating in favour of the ʿAbbasids was the tribalism of the Arab ruling race. The conflict between the Muḍar (North Arabs) and Yemen (Southern Arabs) had continued to undermine the power of the Omayyads. A still more important factor was the religious opposition against the Omayyads, who never made a serious effort to arrive at a compromise with the religious classes. The Murjites, the Khārijites and the Shīʿites were equally hostile to the Omayyads. The Omayyads relied mainly on the strength of tribal affiliations and refused to see the emergence of new classes and the powerful hold of religious sentiments on the masses. True, they did not persecute the religious scholars and sects, but they never tried to associate them with their administration or give them a sense of social and political prestige. The religious and intellectual leaders of Islām remained alienated from the Omayyads and this alienation weakened their power and prestige.

**ISLĀM AND THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION**

It has often been argued that the Omayyad counter-revolution destroyed in many respects the glorious achievements of Islām. It brought to an end the democratic structure of Islamic society. It established social and economic distinction between the Arab and the non-Arab Muslims. It led to the growth of feudalism with all its tyranny and class-oppression. The total result was that the Islamic ideal of human equality and social democracy completely failed of realisation and the mission initiated by Islām to better the lot of suffering humanity came to nought. Thus the Omayyad counter-revolution succeeded, whereas the Islamic revolution was a total failure.

This is a far from correct picture of the actual state of affairs. Though the Omayyad counter-revolution destroyed the democracy and socialism of Islām, it could not sweep away all the reforms and improvements effected by the Islamic teachings.
Some of the achievements of Islām were so solid and secure that the changes introduced by the Omayyads made no difference to them. Many of the positive achievements of Islām continued to shed their lustre throughout history.

Let us first take the failure of democracy. It is true that Islām had declared itself opposed to hereditary monarchy. But it had not, by any means, given a full-fledged democratic constitution in the modern sense of the word. Representative democracy, as it is now understood, was the product of mass education, industrial development and progress in the means of communication with consequent facilities of social and intellectual intercourse among people separated by geographical barriers. The appropriate conditions for the establishment of a fully democratic polity, therefore, came to exist only during the nineteenth century. Before this, representative democracy could not have become real, even if it were established. In no country of the world, prior to the nineteenth century, there was or there could be a full-fledged democracy of the modern type. The Athenian democracy was limited to the city of Athens. Rome remained democratic only as long as its political frontiers were limited to Italy. As soon as the Roman hegemony expanded beyond Italy, Roman democracy was destroyed. Much the same happened in Islām. So long as Islām remained confined to Arabia proper, the democracy of Islām continued to function. But with the expansion of the Muslim Empire and the entry of large numbers of non-Arabs in Islām, it could not be made to function, because, firstly, the new problems created by the conquests were so complex that they could not be left to democratic decision in an age when very few people really knew about the intricacies of international statecraft, and, secondly, because the centre of gravity of the Islamic world had shifted from Medina. ‘Alī had to move to Kūfah, Mu‘āwiya to Damascus in order to look after a far-flung empire. Now, it was only in Medina that the Islamic ruling class was concentrated and, therefore, it was impossible for the government at Kūfah or Damascus to devise a machinery for effective consultation with Medina. Means of communication were ill-developed, transport was difficult, there was no press or radio. Therefore, democratic decentralisation was
an impossibility in those days. The extensive empire could be ruled only by a highly centralised government and centralisation generally bodes ill for democracy.

Moreover, the Arabs were a highly indisciplined people. Democracy requires a certain amount of social discipline and a wide measure of education. The Arabs lacked both. They were sturdy individualists apt to be anarchic. The Prophet, during the thirteen years of his life at Medina, did all he could to educate his people and teach them social discipline. But he was so pre-occupied with wars and politics, that he could not wipe out the past completely. Abū Bakr and ‘Omar too found little time to educate their people and make them disciplined. So long as the conquests continued, the energies of the Arabs were devoted to fighting external enemies and a strong current of religious idealism held them together. But the conquests could not go on indefinitely. Therefore, as soon as there was comparative peace, the indiscipline of the Arabs broke out and their surplus energy spent itself in mutual hostilities. Under such circumstances, only a strong hand could save them from going to pieces. A dictatorship of some sort had become necessary.

Despite the failure of democracy, the Omayyad rule was not completely despotic. It had a strong democratic tincture both because Islām had made the people more resistant to despotic rule and also because the Omayyad rule rested on the loyalty of Arab tribes and the tribes were very jealous of their independence. In fact, pure despotism came not with the Omayyads but with the ‘Abbāsids who were under the influence of Persian traditions of monarchy. Even so, neither the ‘Abbāsids nor the Turks, after them, could totally ignore the restrictions on absolutism imposed by the Islamic Shari‘at.

The fall of democracy, while it arrested the process of expanding social equality and economic opportunity initiated by Islām, could not wipe out its positive and abiding achievements in the field of slave emancipation, the higher status of women, the greater economic security of the lower classes, the rise of education, intellectual enlightenment and the spirit of universal toleration.
Slavery continued but the lot of the slaves was immensely improved and the process of slave emancipation was greatly accelerated. Throughout the Islamic world, the slave enjoyed a much improved status and slavery was no longer a mark of degradation. The existence of the slave dynasty of kings in India and the establishment of Mamluk rule in Egypt showed that in Islamic society the slaves could make their way to the highest social position. Feudalism no doubt reappeared under the Omayyads, but there was no trace of servitude in the Islamic world, judged by the standard of medieval European feudalism, where the serf could not even marry without the permission of his master. There being no right of primogeniture in Islam, feudal states were constantly being divided and subdivided.

Islam brought a great widening of the intellectual horizon which neither the Omayyads nor the ‘Abbasids could destroy. There was a devotion to learning, respect for knowledge and a scientific spirit abroad in the Islamic world which the rest of mankind never knew till after the Renaissance in Europe. "No living person can know the extent of the cultural progress of the Muslims for the reason that the bulk of the evidences of their educational attainments has been destroyed by Mongols, Christians and anti-intellectual Muslims. People in the West commonly believe the old canard that the Muslims destroyed the famous library at Alexandria. A certain amount of destruction had been done in street-fighting but the systematic ruination of this celebrated library of Serapis occurred in the year 389 A.D. (nearly two centuries before the birth of Muḥammad) on the order of the Archbishop Theophilus of Alexandria. Many of the wonderful buildings and beautiful sculptures of the ancient Greeks sustained a similar fate at the hands of the Christians. The Crusaders destroyed the splendid library of Tripoli without compunction; they reduced to ashes many of the glorious centers of Saracenic culture and arts. Diercks makes the extreme charge that the ‘Christian religion, wherever it went, checked mental progress and development and suppressed the already existing culture.’ He goes on to assert that the guiding principle kept in mind by Gregory was: ‘Ignorance is the mother of piety.’ Acting on this
precept Gregory 'not only committed to the flames all the mathematical stories (stores) of Rome, but also burned the precious Palatine Library which was founded by the Emperor Augustus. He destroyed the greater part of the writings of Livy; he forbade the study of the classics; he maimed and mutilated the remains of the ancient days.' . . . One of Anatole France's characters remarks: 'The most tragic event in history is that of the battle of Poitiers, when the science, the art and the civilization of Arabia fell before the barbarism of the Franks.' "

It is against this background of obscurantism that the intellectual achievements of Islam should be viewed. To quote the same author, "Captious critics of Islam delight in pointing out that a good deal of what we term Islamic learning was the product of Jewish, Christian and Zoroastrian minds. It can be persuasively argued, however, that it is to the credit of Islam that it provided an atmosphere conducive to productive efforts by such scholars; the facts indicate that absence of discrimination in Islam encouraged free inquiry by students of other faiths." 

Islam again established the principle of religious toleration and a tradition of religious liberty which could not be effaced by the Muslim despots. The Eastern Christians and Jews preferred Muslim to Roman rule. Wismar says: "When the Muslim army reached the valley of the Jordan and Abu 'Ubaidah pitched his tent at Fihl, the Christians of the country informed the Arabs that they preferred them to the Byzantines, although the latter were Christians. The people of Hims closed the gates of their city against the army of Heraclius, declaring that they preferred Muslim justice and government to Byzantine oppression. The Jews of this city swore by the Thorah to sacrifice their lives in the attempt to keep the Emperor from gaining possession of it. Other cities acted similarly and eloquently declared their abhorrence of Byzantine misrule and their approval of Muslim supremacy." 

2. Ibid., p. 53.
"It was not uncommon for outstanding Christian scholars to count more of their pupils from among the Muslims than from their co-religionists. Bartold, a distinguished scholar with 'no axe to grind,' asserts that 'the Mussulmans never indulged in the persecution of those who believed in another religion as the Christians did in Spain.' At the time of the Crusades, if we are to believe the testimony of a Russian historian of the Church, 'the clergy and the masses desired the return of the Muhammadan yoke rather than the continuation of the power of the Latins.'

The status of women was immensely raised by Islam and, in spite of later degeneration, women could not be reverted to their former position. Islam gave them the right to own property, to choose their partners freely, to obtain divorce from their husbands through law courts. Many of these privileges were accorded to women in Europe only late in the nineteenth century. Investigation discloses that women were lecturers as well as students. Women of learning were to be found even in Mecca where Karima lectured to many pupils on Hadith; Shahida was another celebrated teacher of theology. Some of the most famous Spanish surgeons were women.

It ought to be remembered again that although the Muslim Mawali and Iranians were not given their full rights by the Omayyads, it was the Islamic ideal of equality which nerved them to wage a relentless struggle against their Arab rulers. Thousands of Arab Muslims, and religious leaders, supported their cause and the final victory in the 'Abbasiid regime was mainly due to the teachings of Islam. Again, Arab imperialism was not of the type of modern imperialism. Islam had broken down many of their national prejudices. Therefore, the Arab conquerors freely intermarried with their subjects leading to greater social equality among the ruler and the ruled. Wherever they went, the Arabs settled down permanently and established themselves in the conquered lands. They were unlike the European conquerors who never left their homeland, never made their homes in the

1. Gulick (Junior), Robert L., Muhammad the Educator, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore 1953, p. 55.
conquered territories and never intermarried among the subject people. The great assimilation of peoples and races in the Islamic Empire could not take place, if Islamic teachings of toleration and social and racial equality had not struck deep roots.
Chapter 5
THE ‘ABBÂSID STATE AND SOCIETY

NON-NATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE ‘ABBÂSID STATE

With the victory of the 'Abbâsids, there came into existence a Muslim State as opposed to the Arab State, in which all elements of the population had their share of power. "Henceforth," writes Amîr 'Alî,¹ "the non-Arabs, as common subjects of a great and civilised empire, assumed their proper place as citizens of Islam, were admitted to the highest employment of the state, and enjoyed equal consideration with the Arabs. A greater revolution than this has scarcely been witnessed either in ancient or modern times. It gave practical effect to the democratic enunciation of the equality and brotherhood of man. To this mainly is due the extraordinary vitality of the 'Abbâsid Caliphate and the permanence of its spiritual supremacy even after it had lost its temporal authority. The acceptance of this fundamental principle of racial equality among all the subjects helped the early sovereigns of the house of 'Abbâs to build up a fabric which endured without a rival for over five centuries, and fell only before a barbarian attack from without."

The 'Abbâsid State was an empire of neo-Muslims in which the Arabs formed only one of the many component races. "There were also other differences," says Hitti.² "For the first time in its history the caliphate was not coterminous Islam. Spain and North Africa, 'Uman, Sind and even Khurasan did not fully acknowledge the new caliph. Egypt's acknowledgment was more nominal than real. Wâsi't, the Umayyad capital of al-'Iraq, held out for eleven months. Syria was in constant turmoil, chiefly as

1. Quoted by Husaini, S.A.Q. Arab Administration, Madras 1949, p. 149.
a result of the outrages perpetrated against its royal house. The ‘Abbasid-'Alid alliance cemented solely by a feeling of common hatred toward a mighty foe could not long survive the overthrow of that foe. Those ‘Alids who had naively thought the ‘Abbasids were fighting the battle for them were soon to be disillusioned."

POSITION OF THE ARABS IN THE NEW SET-UP

With the Omayyads, the Syrians made their exit also. The seat of government was transferred from Damascus to Kūfa and later to Baghdād. The new empire, therefore, looked towards the east for support and the east was predominantly non-Arab. Syrian Arabs lost their hegemony. ‘Irāq was freed from the yoke of the Syrians. The ‘Abbasids showed their political tendency to be positively ‘Irāqite and anti-Syrian.

"But at the same time it was decidedly all over with the rule of the Arabs, whose supporters the Umaiyyids and the Syrians had been. The old home of the Arabs became so thoroughly savage that the pilgrimage could no longer be made with safety. The Arab tribes were no longer the setting of the theocracy; they lost their privilege entirely. The Mawali were emancipated; the distinction between Arab and non-Arab Muslims vanished. Dislodged from its exclusive position which rested originally upon martial law, Arabism now withdrew into a peaceable and civil sphere and became an international cult in which all Muslims participated. The fundamental part of the cult was the religion, and the Arab religion did not fall to pieces with the Arab nation, but went on gaining strength. The Arab tongue remained the speech of Islam and absorbed the languages of the most important Christian nations in further Asia and Africa. In use by writers and scholars it seemed even to penetrate to the Iranians." ¹

"With the change of dynasty, the internal mode of government also changed. Whether Persian influence had a particular effect upon it may or may not be the case, but it certainly became quite un-Arab. By the conquest the Arabs had become a ruling nobility as distinguished from the vanquished. The genealogical

¹ Wellhausen, J., Arab Kingdom and Its Fall, Calcutta 1927, pp. 557-558.
net of their tribal system extended superficially over the provinces of their kingdom. Under the Umayyids this primitive system still persisted in its fundamentals, though it soon showed itself to be no longer tenable, but under the Abbasids it disappeared along with the difference of the conditions which it presupposed. The Abbasids were not elevated, like the Umayyids, over a wide-spread aristocracy, to which they themselves belonged: the Khurasanites, by whom they were supported, were not their blood, but only their instrument. The whole body of the Muslims stood in the same relation to them, without natural gradations of political right; they alone had the divine right to rule as heirs of the Prophet. From a technical point of view, no obstacles stood in the way of fashioning the government as seemed in conformity with the interest of the cause and their own interest. They brought greater order into the government, especially into the taxation-system and the administration of justice, and they showed themselves zealous in opposing and redressing the grievances of those who applied to them as the supreme court of appeal. But they suppressed the general living interest in politics which in earlier times was part of the religion to a far greater extent than the Umayyids had contrived to do. The Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs, were simply subjects and were no longer allowed to take part in public affairs. They were relegated to the realm of trade or agriculture, and at the most might conspire in the secret.”

Explaining the causes which led to the loss of power of the Arabs, Sir William Muir says, “To their hardy life and martial fire were mainly due the first spread of Islam and material prosperity of the Caliphate. But the race had by this time lost much of its early hardihood and vigour. Enriched with the spoils of the conquered peoples, the temptations to pride and luxury had gradually sapped their warlike virtue, and so they either settled down with well-filled harems, living sumptuously at their ease; or, if they still preferred the field,

1. Wellhausen, J., Arab Kingdom and Its Fall, Calcutta 1927, pp. 559-560.
yielded there to petulance, rivalries, and insubordination, preferring too often the interests of person, family, and tribe, to the interests of Islam. The fervour of religious enthusiasm had in great measure passed away, and self-aggrandisement had taken the place of passion for national glory and extension of the Faith. The Saracen was no longer the conqueror of the world.

"Added to this, the Abbâsids on their accession lost all confidence in their own Arab race; indeed, they had already done so for several years before. They were brought to the throne and supported there, not by them but by levies from Persia and Khorâsân; while of the Umeiyads, the Syrians remained the last support, and the Arab tribes, whether Mo'dar or the Yemen, were ranged upon their side. Ibrâhîm felt this so strongly, that in the letter intercepted by Merwân, in which he chided Abu Muslim for his delay in crushing Naṣr and Al-Kirmâni, he added angrily,—'See that there be no one left in Khorâsân whose tongue is the tongue of the Arabian, but he be slain!' It was among the Arabs of Syria and Mesopotamia that dangerous revolt repeatedly took place against the new dynasty, and so they continued to be looked askance upon. Before long the Caliphs drew their bodyguard entirely from the Turks about the Oxus; and that barbarous race, scenting from afar the delights of the South, was not slow to follow in their wake. Before long they began to overshadow the noble Arab chieftains; and so we soon find the imperial forces officered almost entirely by Turkomans, freedmen, or slaves, of strange descent and uncouth name. In the end the Caliphs became the helpless tools of their rude protectors; and the Arabs, where not already denationalised by city life, retired to roam at will in their desert wilds."

Nicholson, however, expresses a slightly different opinion. He says that the Abbâsids aimed at establishing a balance of power between the Persians and Arabs. "That this policy was not permanently successful will surprise no one who considers the widely diverse characteristics of the two races, but for
the next fifty years the rivals worked together in tolerable harmony, thanks to the genius of Manṣūr and the conciliatory influence of the Barmecides, by whose overthrow the alliance was virtually dissolved. In the ensuing civil war between the sons of Ḥarūn al-Rashīd the Arabs fought on the side of Amin while the Persians supported Ma'mūn, and henceforth each race began to follow an independent path. The process of separation, however, was very gradual, and long before it was completed the religious and intellectual life of both nationalities had become inseparably mingled in the full stream of Moslem civilisation.

"The centre of this civilisation was the province of ʿIrāq (Babylonia), with its renowned metropolis, Baghdād, 'the City of Peace' (Madīnatu ʾl-Salām). Only here could the ʿAbbasids feel themselves at home. Damascus, peopled by the dependants of the Omayyads, was out of the question. On the one hand it was too far from Persia, whence the power of the Abbasids was chiefly derived; on the other hand it was dangerously near the Greek frontier, and from here, during the troubulous reigns of the last Omayyads, hostile incursions on the part of the Christians had begun to avenge former defeats. It was also beginning to be evident that the conquests of Islam would, in the future, lie to the eastward towards Central Asia, rather than to the westward at the further expense of the Byzantines . . . ."  

PERSIAN INFLUENCES

With the coming of the ʿAbbasids, Persian influences began to make themselves felt in all fields of life. "Gradually Persian titles, Persian wines and wives, Persian mistresses, Persian songs, as well as Persian ideas and thoughts, won the day. Al-Manṣūr, we are told, was the first to adopt the characteristic Persian head-gear (pl. qalānīs), in which he was naturally followed by his subjects. Persian influence, it should be noted, softened the

rough edges of the primitive Arabian life and paved the way for a new era distinguished by the cultivation of science and scholarly pursuits. In two fields only did the Arabian hold his own: Islam remained the religion of the state and Arabic continued to be the official language of the state registers.”

The Khurṣānites had helped the ‘Abbāsids to victory. It was natural that they should have gained some position under the ‘Abbāsids. They were organised in a military fashion. They held the chief commands, their officers (Quwād) were allowed to play the part of great lords. They formed the standing army of the Khalīfa. Baghdad was really established not as the capital of an empire, but as the camp of the Khurṣānites in which the Khalīfa wished to reside, far from Kūfah. But in the camp they kept up communication with their home, and the party and army preponderance which they had won in the service of the ‘Abbāsids was passed on to their people and province, to the Iranian East. But a time came soon, when the ‘Abbāsids began to rid themselves of the Khurṣānite influence. They began to increase the Turkish element in their army. “Even the Khurasanites afterwards became inconvenient to the Abbasids. Mansūr shook off the tutelage of Abū Muslim when he did not need him any longer. In his great qualities he was far from being a match for him, but could not outdo him in devilry, and compassed his assassination. But more than anything else the Khurasanites were still indispensable in military affairs, and even later were not to be simply abolished or set aside. An attempt in this direction set on foot after Harun’s death only made for the establishing and strengthening of their power. No more did the Abbasid Khalifas succeed in making themselves independent by buying up in great numbers Berbers, Slavs, Soghdians and Turks, and equipping them and organising them, in order to play them off against the Khurasanites. The only result was that they now came also under the tyranny of these Mamluks, especially the Turkish ones, and in the end were absolutely powerless, and their

kingdom was in pieces:

"For one or two centuries the Iranians maintained their dominating position, but they could not count upon its continuing in their own house. In Transoxania, Tukharistan and Khurasan, they were unable to check the advance of the Turks, which for a while was fended off by the Arabs. And thus in the end the Turks fell heirs to the Islamic kingdom into which they had earlier insinuated themselves as Mamlûks. In a broader sense we may even reckon among them the Mongols, who, however, did not actually become properly at home in Islam but rather passed over it like a devastating storm, without really leaving any but negative traces behind." ¹

CHARACTER OF THE 'ABBĀSID STATE AND ADMINISTRATION

The 'Abbāsīd State introduced fundamental changes in the ideas of the government and the Khilāfāt. Whereas the Omayyads had been little more than heads of a turbulent Arabian aristocracy, their successors reverted to the old type of oriental despotism with which the Persians had been familiar since the days of Darius and Xerxes. Surrounded by a strong bodyguard of troops from Khūrāsān, the 'Abbāsids ruled with absolute authority over the lives and properties of their subjects, as the Sassānids had ruled before them.

At the same time the 'Abbāsīd State introduced a religious halo in the concept of Caliphate. The 'Abbāsīd victory was generally regarded as the substitution of the true conception of Caliphate for the purely secular state (mulk) of the Omayyads. "As a mark of the religious character of his exalted office, the caliph now donned on such ceremonial occasions as the day of his accession and the time of the Friday prayer the mantle (burdāh) once worn by his distant cousin, the Prophet. He surrounded himself with men versed in canon law whom he patronized and whose advice on matters of state affairs he sought. The highly organized machinery for propaganda which helped to

¹. Wellhausen, J., Arab Kingdom and Its Fall, Calcutta 1927, pp. 564-566.
undermine public confidence in Umayyad regime was now cleverly
directed toward permanently entrenching the 'Abbāsid in public
favour. From the very beginning the idea was cultivated that
authority should remain forever in 'Abbāsid hands, to be finally
delivered to Jesus ('Isa), the Messiah. Later the theory was
promulgated that if this caliphate were destroyed the whole
universe would be disorganized." ¹

"As creatures of a strong religious revival, the 'Abbāsid took
great care to lay much emphasis on the religious character and
dignity of their office as an Imāmat (religious leadership). In
about a century after the establishment of the 'Abbāsid dynasty,
the Vicegerent of the Messenger of God (Khalifatu Rasūlillāh)
became the Vicegerent of God (Khalifatullāh) and God's shadow
on the Earth." ² Wellhausen describes the 'Abbāsid Caliphate as
a Caesareopapacy. While the Omayyads, he says, rested upon a
nationality, they supported their government upon a guard and
upon the religion. "They appointed an inquisitor and set up an
inquisition, first against the so-called Zindīqs." ³ It should be
remembered, however, that the 'Abbāsids did not attempt to
prevent the spirit of free inquiry or suppress freedom of belief and
religion. The inquisition against Zindīqs was necessary, because
they were a danger to the stability of the state due to their
political activities.

The 'Abbāsid State shrank into the court. The army, too,
belonged to the court, the nucleus of it being concentrated in the
Khalīfa's residence. In this respect, the 'Abbāsids were much
different from the early Caliphs of Islām and even the Omayyads.
To the court there thronged a crowd of civil officials who did not
coincide with the officers, but were mostly creatures and favour-
ites of the rulers. In place of the aristocracy, there came into
being a fawning class of officials, openly divided into ranks and
controlled through one another. "At the head stood the Wezir
who had control of the exchequer, and in later times the alter ego

3. Wellhausen, J., Arab Kingdom and Its Fall, Calcutta 1927, p. 564.
of the invisible Khalifā, so that the latter then only appeared occasionally as an actor upon the stage, or burst like a thunderstorm out of his pall of clouds. The custom also spread more and more of the stattholders having the provinces in their charge administered by representatives, and themselves staying at the court, specially when they had prerogative of being princes of the blood. The under-officials of the government office were for the most part Christians and Jews, who easily drew upon themselves the heat and envy of the Muslim crowd. Excepting the Wezīr, the executioner was perhaps the most outstanding figure among the official personnel. The Arabs knew no executioner, and the Umayyids kept none; with the Abbasids he was indispensable.”¹

The pattern, Wellhausen says, was taken from the Īrānians, from whom was also taken the office of the court astrologer. “Finally the postmasters are to be remarked as characteristic of the Abbasid regime. They were the feelers of the court of Baghdad stretched out into the provinces, chosen persons of trust who had to keep secret watch over the stattholders. The post was useful for espionage; the information-service in the wide kingdom was organised to the highest degree.”² Finally, “the new era was essentially distinguishable from the old by its relation to the religion. The Abbasids prided themselves upon the fact that they brought into power Islam, which had been suppressed by the Umayyids. They wanted to resuscitate the vanished tradition of the Prophet, as they put it. They encouraged those versed in the divine law to come to them at Baghdad from Medina, their former seat, and always gained their approbation by getting them to deal even with the political questions designedly in legal form, and decide them according to the Qorān and Sunna. But in reality they were only making Islam serve their own ends. They cowed the scholars at their court and got even their most objectionable measures justified by them. They rendered the pious opposition harmless by placing it in power; with the fall of the Umayyids it had reached its goal and was content. Political affairs were in

¹. Wellhausen, J., Arab Kingdom and Its Fall, Calcutta 1927, p. 561.
². Ibid., p. 562.
good hands; the Muslims needed to trouble about them no longer. The theocracy was realised and was bound to cease to be the principle of revolution against the existing power. In this direction the Abbasids guided public opinion fairly successfully, and in that epoch the need of peace after such a series of revolutions and struggle was in their favour. The Arabs had spent their rage and bled to death."  

RELIGION UNDER THE 'ABBĀSIDS

As we have seen above, the 'Abbasids placed a new emphasis on the religious status and functions of the Caliphate. Further, by patronising the religious leaders, they gave an impulse to the creation of an official orthodoxy. They also began to centralise the religious institution under state control. The close association of orthodoxy with the 'Abbasid Caliphate led to the rejection of orthodoxy by sections politically opposed to 'Abbasid rule; For example, the Berbers of North Africa adhered to the doctrine of the Khārijites, while the Arab tribesmen in Arabia and also in the Syrian desert were increasingly attracted to Shi‘ism.

Although the religious group accepted for some time the official interpretation of Islam and supported the official measures for the elimination of heresy, yet there was from the outset a certain amount of opposition to the state control of religion and an insistence on the free personal responsibility of the religious leaders. "The conflict was brought into the open by the attempt of the Caliph Al-Ma‘mūn and his successors to impose the Hellenizing doctrines of the group of religious teachers known as the Mu‘tazila as the 'official interpretation,' and their persecution of the leaders of the opposing orthodox school. The struggle ended with the victory of the orthodox, and proved once and for all that the religious institution of Islam was independent of the Caliphate or any other political institution, that its sources of authority could not be controlled by political governors but were possessed by the Community in its own right, and that the Caliphate itself was only an emanation of that authority and its political symbol."  

Persian monarchical tradition and political ideas brought a conflict of social and political ideals which resulted in the Shu'ubiya movement. This was a reaction against the Arab domination among the Persians. The movement was engineered by the class of secretaries in the government service, whose influence had increased under the `Abbasids owing to the rapid expansion of the bureaucracy and the growing power of the Vazirs and the heads of government departments (Diwans). They imitated the models furnished by the court legislature of Sassanid Persia. The aim of this secretarial class was not only to establish the dominance of the Persian tradition at the court, but also to revive the old Persian social structure with its rigid class divisions and to substitute the spirit of Persian culture for the surviving Arab traditions. This resulted in the revival of Manichaean influences in `Iraq and the spread of religious indifference in wider circles. The Mu'tazila found in Greek philosophical literature the dialectic weapon to counter the growing Manichaean influences. When the Shu'ubiya movement started open attacks on the Arabs and their cultural traditions, religious leadership took up the defence of Arab culture and literature. A new Arabic literature was born steeped in the traditions of Arabia.

"By this victory," writes Gibb, 1 "the Islamic religious institution, which had already rejected any domination of its ideals of faith and order by Arab social traditions, now equally rejected the Persian interpretation of Islam as a state-religion and the dominance of Persian social traditions. But the victory was bought at a price. On the one hand the link between the religious sciences and Arabic philology had now been expanded into something not far from identification of the religious culture of Islam with the Arabic humanities. It is a strange phenomenon that while Islam began as a protest against Arab culture and tradition as a whole, by the end of this period the literary heritage of ancient Arabia was indissolubly linked up with Islam, to be carried

with it to the ends of the old world. On the other hand, the influence of the secretarial class had been strong enough to force a measure of compromise. Several of the principal elements of the Sassanian tradition were incorporated into the literature of the Arabic humanities, and acquired an established and permanent place in Islamic culture in relation to the principles of government, in spite of their conflict with the inner spirit.

"This concession was highly characteristic of an orthodox religious institution, which while standing fast on the principle of its spiritual independence and its right and duty to assert Islamic ethical standards, yet recognized the facts of the actual situation and the dangers of an excessive rigidity to the maintenance of unity."

This catholicity of the Muslim religious orthodoxy remained its permanent characteristics in the periods that followed. "Unlike the fissiparous and exclusive groups which upheld the rejected doctrines, its leaders were unwilling to draw hard and fast lines (beyond the simplest test of adherence to the Community) and tolerated a considerable degree of freedom of interpretation and even divergence in external institutions." ¹

THE 'ABBĀSIDS AND THE SHI'ĪTES

The 'Abbāsids had come to power through the support of the Shi'ites, but they changed their policy when they had achieved their object. Even their special adherents, that is to say, the extereme Shi'ites (Rāwandiyya) were denounced by them. The members of this sect were king worshippers in the old Persian sense, and a body of them travelled to Ḥāshimiya, where the 'Abbāsids had their residence and tried to acclaim Maṁṣūr, the second 'Abbasid Caliph, as a god. He rejected them and cast them into prison. Earlier Maṁṣūr had got rid of the powerful Abū Muslim who had been the architect of 'Abbāsid power. Abū Muslim was killed by Maṁṣūr. The Bermecides, after a brief spell of power and glory, were also removed out of the way by Ḥārūn. Thus the 'Abbāsids progressively turned away from the general body of

the Shi'a. In religion also they turned towards the Arabs and away from the Persians.

In order to understand the causes of this rupture, we will have to study the origins of the Shi'ite movement and its subsequent fortunes. Shi'ism began as a purely Arab political movement, demanding that 'Ali should be the successor of the Prophet. For the first half century of the Islamic era, Shi'ism retained this Arabian and non-religious character. The Shi'ite party made no attempt to gain the sympathy of the subject races. Having failed as an Arab faction, the Shi'a strove to obtain victory as a Muslim sect. The discontents and grievances of the Mawali, the non-Arab converts to Islam, provided a fertile recruiting ground for any revolutionary movement, and once it had turned decisively towards them, the Shi'a sect soon had a large mawla following in many parts of the empire. But the entry of large numbers of superficially Islamised Persians, Aramaeans, Syrians and others necessarily worked a fundamental change in Shi'ism as a doctrine and as a purpose. Soon a welter of strange beliefs, brought over from Christian, Iranian and Old Babylonian heresies, found their way into Shi'i theology. The movement came to be dominated by the mawali and other oppressed classes, and became the instrument of their social and religious revolt against the oppression of the orthodox state.

"Later, however, as the distinction between the Arab and mawla came to correspond less and less with the economic distinction between privileged and unprivileged, the revolutionary Shi'a ceased to represent the mawali as such, and became the mouthpiece of all the oppressed classes. The orthodox Persian Zoroastrians of the upper classes became Sunnī and retained their privileges. The impoverished Arabs of 'Iraq, Syria and Bahraib came under the influence of the extreme Shi'i ideas."

It is at this stage that the Mahdi idea gained prominence in Shi'ism and spread even among the Sunnīs. From being a candidate for Khilafat, the Shi'i Imam became a mysterious figure of great religious importance, at first a Messiah and later an avatar of

divinity among the extremists of the sect. These ideas came from the Marcionites, a Christian heretic sect, and from the followers of Mānī. Greek philosophy and neo-Platonism also contributed much to the doctrines of the extreme Shī′as. Thus the founder of the Bahāʾī sect, ʿAbdulla b. Maymūn, Al-Qaddāsh, is said to have been descended from Daysan, the Dualist, according to Maqrīzī. O'Leary points out that Ibn Daysan of the Arabic writers is the Bar Daysan of Syriac literature. This Bar Daysan was a convert to Christianity and probably he had learned Christian doctrine through the Marcionites who believed in a dualistic system. Marcionites had long retained their hold in Northern Mesopotamia side by side with the Bar Darsaynites.

"Mani shows very much the same views in a Zoroastrian setting, but with a strong element of Marcionite Christianity. Mani's work came some twenty years later than Bar Daisan and he, in his early days, had been a disciple of the Mandeans, the Gnostic sect, which Justin Martyr calls the 'baptists,' from their frequent ablutions, who were settled in the marsh land between Basra and Wasit. All three, Bar Daisan, Marcion and Mani, draw largely from the same source the eclectic mixture of the old Babylonian religion of Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and Christianity, which developed in the lower Euphrates valley, though Marcion claimed to be, and no doubt believed himself, as orthodox member of the Catholic Church, whilst Mani was no less confident in regarding himself as a Zoroastrian. The whole of the different religious ideas of the Euphrates valley were welded together by an element of Greek philosophy of the neo-Pythagorean type, which seems to have filtered through the Jews who were settled there in force, and had shared in the common life of the Hellenistic world at the time when the neo-Pythagorean school was taking form, and showing marked sympathy towards the various forms of Eastern religious speculation. All this kind of eclectic speculation, half religious and half philosophical, lived on, and was still alive in the third century of the Hijra; indeed it had spread and formed a new centre at Harran, quite distinct in its character, but obviously drawing from the same sources, and, moreover, it quickened into new life when the speculations of the neo-Platonic
school were introduced through a Syriac medium. Traditionally all this type of thought prevalent in Mesopotamia was connected with the names of Marcion, Mani and Bar Daisan, though probably very few Muslims had any clear idea of the respective parts these three characters had played, but simply cited them as here-siarchs of exceptional notoriety.”¹

The word Mahdi was first used in a messianic contest in the revolt of Mukhtar (A.H. 66) who preached that Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya, a son of ‘Ali, by a Ḥanfiyya woman, was Messiah. Despite the suppression of Mukhtar and the death of Muḥammad b. Ḥanafiyya, the movement started by Mukhtar began to spread rapidly and many of its adherents believed that Muḥammad b. Ḥanafiyya was not really dead but would eventually return. At the latter’s death in A.H. 81, this party became known as the ‘Kaysanīya.’ They recognised his son Abū Hashim as the Imām until A.H. 98 when he died childless and bequeathed his claims to Muḥammad b. ‘Ali b. ‘Abdulla ibn ‘Abbās. The latter became the head of the ‘Abbāsid party which obtained the Caliphate in A.H. 132. It was under Abū Hashim that the party changed its name from Kaysanīya to Hashimiya. On the accession of the ‘Abbāsids, the Kaysanīya or later the Hashimiya sect ceased to exist. But there was a more important group of the Shī‘a which recognised Ḥusayn as the third Imām and his son, ‘Ali Zaynu‘l-‘Abidin, as his successor. At Zaynu‘l ‘Abidin’s death, however, this party split into two, some following his son Zayd, and others his second son, Muḥammad al-Bāqar. The Zaydite party established itself for a considerable time in North Persia and still maintains itself in South Arabia. Zayd was a friend and pupil of the Mu‘tazila leader, Wāsīl b. ‘Āṣa and the Zaydites have generally been regarded as free-thinkers. The majority of the Shī‘a however, recognised Muḥammad al-Bāqar as the sixth Imām. He was succeeded by Imām Ja‘far Ṣādiq, the seventh Imām. Shahristānī has paid Imām Ja‘far a high tribute. Certainly he was the leading intellectual of his time and, according to Ameer ‘Ali, the

Muʿtazila freethought owed much to him. His knowledge of religion, culture and philosophy of his time was stupendous and he could count, among his pupils, jurists of such outstanding eminence as Abū Ḥanīfa and Malik b. Anas. His relations with the ‘Abbāsids were not happy. Maṣʿūr did not trust him and asked him to settle in ‘Irāq, but Imam Jaʿfar excused himself and lived at Medina. Thus the house of ‘Alī was not in the good books of the ‘Abbāsids. A rising of the ‘Alīids had already taken place in 762. This was headed by Ibrāḥīm and his brother Muḥammad Nafs Zakīya who were descended from Imam Ḥasan, the elder son of ‘Alī. The revolt was crushed and the leaders were executed. In Khurāsān, a Magian, Sunbad (Sinbād), revolted against the ‘Abbāsids ostensibly to revenge the murder of Abū Muslim. Thus the Shīʿa were irreconcilably opposed to the new dynasty. The fault partly lay with the ‘Abbāsids themselves, because they never recognised the part played by the Shīʿa in bringing them to power and failed to accommodate them in the new order. Only one attempt was made to reconcile the Shīʿa. This was done by Maʿmūn not out of love for the Shīʿa but as a matter of policy. Maʿmūn reversed the policy of his predecessors by making Imam Mūsā Kāẓim his heir and successor.

Mūsā Kāẓim was the younger son of Imam Jaʿfar Ṣādiq. There is a story that Imam Jaʿfar Ṣādiq had appointed his eldest son, Iṣmāʿīl, to succeed him, but since the latter was addicted to drinking, Mūsā Kāẓim was given his place and designated by Imam Jaʿfar as the next Imam. This is the belief of the ‘Twelvers,’ Athnaʿ-ʿAshari, among the Shīʿas. But there is another Shīʿī sect, the ‘Seveners’ (Ṣabʿīya) who believe that Iṣmāʿīl could not be deprived of his rightful status by his father and, therefore, he is the legitimate Imam. Since Iṣmāʿīl is said to have died before his father, the line of Imāms comes to an end with him and that is the reason why his followers are called Sabʿīya, because they do not recognise the next five Imāms. The ‘Seveners’ also hold that Iṣmāʿīl did not die before his father, but disappeared and God had concealed him until the time when he should be manifested. “Karmathians, Fatimides, Assassins, and the Iṣmāʿīlīs of India, Persia and Central Asia are groups
through which the Sevener movement finds its place in secular history, but the Druses also and in a way the Mutawila and Nuṣayris may also be traced back to the old Sab'iya.”

In any case, the large majority of the Shi'a (Twelvers) continued to recognise Mūsa Kāẓim as the next Imām after Imām Ja'far. Imām Mūsa Kāẓim knew that, like his father, he was suspect in the eyes of the 'Abbāsid Caliphs who were on the alert to discover in him any signs of disloyalty. Mahdī had him arrested and brought to Bağhḍād. In the Caliphate of Hārūn, Mūsa Kāẓim was repeatedly under suspicion and disfavour.

With the death of Hārūn, a new struggle broke out between the pro-Arab and the pro-Persian parties. Hārūn had destroyed the influence of the Bermeccides. The Arab-loving and Persian-hating Fadl ibn Rabī' again became the Vazīr. And of the Caliph's two sons, Amīn and Mā'mūn, the Arab party was exceedingly eager for the former to succeed. Hārūn had arranged that Amīn should succeed him in Bağhḍād, and rule over the major portion of the kingdom in the west, while Mā'mūn was to rule in the eastern provinces, where the Persian element prevailed. But after Hārūn's death, Amīn refused to acknowledge the rule of Mā'mūn in Khurāsān and Persia, whereupon a civil war broke out. Mā'mūn was supported by his Vazīr, Fadl ibn Sahl, who was devoted to the Persian cause. This man pointed out to his master that he must prepare for a decisive struggle against his brother. "He also reminded him of the powerful influence which Persia had exercised in the elevation of the Abbasids to power in Abu Muslim's days, and, in fine, urged him to strengthen his position by conciliating the Persian people."

It was this advice of Fadl ibn Sahl that finally induced Mā'mūn to attempt to conciliate the Shi'a and the Persians by appointing Imām Mūsa Kāẓim as his heir and successor to the Caliphate. "Shi'ite writers maintain that he was forced to accept Mā'mūn's proposal, but that he had expressed his strong preference to be free from all secular administrative duties." Mā'mūn also gave

1. Encyclopaedia of Islam, article 'Sab'iya.'
3. Ibid., p. 166.
his daughter Ḥabība in marriage to the Imām. This action of Maʿmūn estranged all the members of the Hashimid family who were afraid that Caliphate would pass on to another family. Accordingly, they proclaimed his uncle Ibrāhīm b. Mahdī to be the Caliph in place of Maʿmūn who was deposed by them. It was some time after this that Imām Mūsa Kāẓim died and there is a strong suspicion that he was poisoned. Perhaps Maʿmūn could not ignore the seriousness of the family opposition aroused by his action.

Thus the first and the last attempt of the Abbāsids to reconcile the Shiʿa met with complete failure and ever since then the various offshoots of the Shiʿa movement expressed their dissatisfaction in revolutionary endeavours to overthrow the established rule. Among these attempts, only one, that of the Faṭimids, succeeded. Another similar revolutionary group was that of the Qarmāṭians, but it achieved no positive results beyond causing great disruption in the Islamic world.

According to Bernard Lewis, Abūl Ḥaṣṣāb was the first “to organise a movement of specifically Bāṭinī type.” He further writes, “Thūṣ Baghdādī and Aš‘arī attribute to Ḥaṣṣābīya the characteristically Ṣaḥīḥī doctrine of ‘Silent and Speaking Imāms’ (Ṣāmi’ī and Nāṭiq). This is supported by Maqrīzī. Again, the Ṣaḥīḥī method of Taʿwīl, or allegoric interpretation of the scriptures is attributed to Ḥaṣṣābīs by Ibn Ḥazm.” According to the same author, Ṣaḥīḥī, son of Imām Jaʿfar Ṣādiq, seems to have been closely associated with the extremist revolutionary circles and his deposition by Jaʿfar was due to this association. “During the lifetime of Jaʿfar, Abuʿl-Ḥaṣṣāb and Ṣaḥīḥī, probably in collaboration, elaborated a system of doctrine which served as the basis of the Ṣaḥīḥī religion of later days. . . . On the death of Abuʿl-Ḥaṣṣāb, Ṣaḥīḥī and Jaʿfar, their organisation split into several sub-sects, with conflicting ideas and leaders. These were rallied round the person of Muḥammad b.

2. Ibid., p. 33.
3. Ibid. p. 40.
Ismā‘īl, who succeeded with the aid of various supporters, notably Mubārak and ʿAbdullah b. Maymūn al-Qaddāḥ in welding into one movement most of the followers of Ismā‘īl, including the greater part of the Khaṭṭābīya, whose doctrine was taken over with some modifications. Around Muḥammad b. Ismā‘īl was created the historical Ismā‘īlī movement.  

Admittedly the Ismā‘īlīs worked as a political conspiracy against the ʿAbbāsids. ʿAbdulla b. Maymūn al-Qaddāḥ (the occultist) proved to be their most vigorous missionary. ʿAbdulla was established at Baṣra, whither he had moved from Persia, before 261 A.H. Thence he went to Syria, because the authorities at Baṣra had begun to suspect him and made his headquarters at Salāmiya (Emessa district). From there he sent out missionaries who preached the claims of Muḥammad b. Ismā‘īl b. Jaʿfar Ṣādiq as the concealed Imām and ʿAbdulla himself as the guide or Mahdī who was to prepare men for the return of the Imām to the earth. His son, Aḥmad, succeeded him after his death, as the leader of the new movement. After Aḥmad came his son, Ḥusayn, who died not long afterwards, leaving a son Saʿīd who subsequently took the name of ʿObaydulla al-Mahdī who established the Fāṭimid State in North Africa. There is a story that Saʿīd or ʿObaydulla was the son of an obscure Jewish smith whose widow was married to Ḥusayn. Probably this Jewish legend was associated with the fact that the renegade Jew, Ibn Kittis, encouraged the Fāṭimids to invade Egypt. Ibn Khaldūn totally rejects the theory that the Fāṭimids were of Jewish descent and attributes this invention to the ʿAbbāsids who were anxious to bring the new dynasty into disrepute.

THE FATIMIDS

The political career of the Fāṭimids centres in North Africa and Egypt and commences with the activity of Ibn Ḥaushab who himself never visited these parts. He was a follower of Aḥmad, whom we have seen succeeding his father, ʿAbdulla b.

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Maymūn al-Qaddāh. Aḥmad sent Ibn Ḥawshab as ḍāʿi to Yemen. He soon gained a number of followers. Among those who had attached themselves to Ibn Ḥawshab in Yemen was a certain Abū ʿAbdulla. Ibn Ḥawshab sent him as a missionary (ḍāʿi) to North Africa. Abū ʿAbdulla first made contact with African pilgrims in Mecca. These belonged to the Berber tribe of Katāma. The pilgrims were so impressed by his piety that they insisted on Abū ʿAbdulla to settle with them in the land of Katāma. Here he lived in the valley of Inkijan and began to spread his Mahdī gospel. Soon his reputation was established among the Berber tribes of whom Katāma was the most prominent.

From the earliest period of Muslim history, North Africa had been the home of lost causes, and a field of activity of all the parties opposed to the established government. There had always been very close intercourse between North Africa and South Arabia. The two shared some common peculiarities, even as regards the dialects spoken. The Berbers of North Africa were always disposed to any heresy or rebellion which would give them a good pretext of making war against the ruling Arabs. The Khārijites had appeared in Africa in the second century of Hijra, after they had been exterminated in Asia. The Idrīsids, a dynasty descended from the house of Ḥasan, the son of ‘Alī, founded by Idrīs who escaped from Medina in A.H. 169 from the persecution of the ‘Abbāsids, ruled an independent state in farther Africa. The Omayyads also found a refuge in North Africa, where one of their representatives fleeing from the rage of the victorious ‘Abbāsids crossed into Spain and founded the Omayyad Caliphate in that country. Africa was too remote from the Khalīfas of Baghdad ever to be under effective control. “One after another punitive expeditions marched across North Africa, the disaffected were defeated, the remnants took refuge in the hills and in the course of a few years or even months the former conditions returned. Obviously those western lands offered a promising field to the agitator, whether political rebel or sectarian leader, and Ibn Ḥawshab’s missionaries had evidently
struck a promising vein in the Berber tribe of Katāma."¹

A report of the activities of Abū ʿAbdulla had already reached Ḥibrīm b. ʿAḥmad, the Aḥlabīd Amīr. These Aḥlabīds were hereditary governors of Africa established at Qayrwan about 184 A.D. by the ʿAbbāsids to whom they paid tribute. Ḥibrīm sent an army against Abū ʿAbdulla and defeated him. But soon afterwards Ḥibrīm b. Aḥlab died and the governorship passed to his son Ziyādat Allah who proved completely incompetent. This opened new opportunities and very soon he declared that the Mahdī was now near at hand and would soon appear in Africa. Abū ʿAbdulla now invited Sāʿīd, the son of Iṣmāʿīl, to Africa. Sāʿīd who now called himself ʿObaydulla came to Africa but he was thrown into prison at Sijilmāsah by the ruling prince Al-Yasa b. Midrar whose suspicions had been aroused. Meanwhile, Abū ʿAbdulla had defeated the armies sent by the Aḥlabīd governor of Africa and was soon in a position to liberate ʿObaydulla. In 297 A.H. (909 A.D.), Abū ʿAbdulla placed the Mahdī on the throne of Africa, after the Aḥlabīd governor had fled. Shortly after this Abū ʿAbdulla, like the architect of the ʿAbbāsid dynasty, suffered death at the hand of his master.

The new dynasty was centred at Qayrwan and the task of the new Caliph was to bring under his authority all the territory ruled over by the Aḥlabīds. This was done by the Mahdī’s general Arūba. ʿObaydulla also began building a fleet with a view to conquer Egypt. He was convinced that his kingdom in North Africa was not likely to be stable, just as it had been held precariously by the Arab rulers who preceded him. It was a savage and unsettled country which could be controlled only by military rule. Egypt was likely to be a better centre of the new Caliphate. It was an easy prey too, as the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate was on the decline. The provinces had become semi-independent, in most cases ruled by hereditary Amīrs. Of all the provinces Egypt perhaps was the worst administered and the ripest for falling away from ʿAbbāsid dominions. At this juncture the Khalif of

Baghdad appointed Muḥammad b. Ṭughj the Ikshid, son of Amīr of Syria, as the governor of Egypt. The Ikshids were Turks who claimed to be descended from the ancient kings of Farghana on the Jaxartes, a district inhabited by fighting races from whom Caliph Muʿtasim drew many mercenaries. The establishment of the Ikshids in Egypt prevented ʿObaydullah from making further attempts for the conquest of Egypt. However, the death, in A.H. 356, of Kāfur, a slave of the Ikshids who ruled with a strong hand and brought peace and order to distracted Egypt, enabled the fourth Fatimid Caliph, Al-Muʿizz, to conquer Egypt and thus realise the dream of his forefathers. Egypt was conquered by Jawāhar, another slave, on behalf of his master Al-Muʿizz, in 358 A.H. (A.D. 966). Orders were now issued that all mention of the ‘Abbāsid Caliph in Friday prayer must cease and in place of his name the coinage must bear the inscription “In the name of my master ‘Al-Muʿizz.” At the same time the preachers in the mosques were forbidden to wear the black garments of the ‘Abbāsids, and were ordered to use white. “On Friday, the 8th of Dhul Kaada, in the Khuṭba, the words were added, ‘O my God, bless Mohammed, the Chosen, ‘Ali, the accepted, Faṭima the pure, and al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn, the grandsons of the Apostle, whom thou has freed from stain and thoroughly purified. O my God, bless the pure Imāms, ancestors of the commanders of the faithful’ (Ibn Khal. 1, 344). This was at once the profession of Shiʿite faith, and an assertion of the claim of al-Moizz to be descended from the house of ‘Ali. There is no sign that any appreciable number of the Egyptians became converts to Shiʿite views: for the most part these claims were regarded with complete apathy until the celebration of the great Shiʿite festival of the Muharram, when there was some rioting. The people at large acquiesced in the new rule without paying any attention to its religious claims.”

THE QARMAṬIANS

Another important offshoot of the Ismaʿīlīs were the

Qarmātians who proved a thorn in the side of the ‘Abbāsids and caused much disruption in the empire. The sect was founded by one Ḥamdān b. al-Aṣḥāb al-Qarmātī, who was converted to the movement by a missionary of Aḥmad, son of ‘Abdullā b. Maymūn al-Qaddāḥ. He was chosen to act as head of the branch founded near Kūfa, and he seems to have been diligent in sending out missionaries throughout the whole districts of Sawād where success was easy, as the oppressed Nabataean villagers were still groaning under the tyranny of the Arab colonists of the two camp cities, Kūfa and Bāṣra. Not only were the peasants won over in large numbers, but many of the dissatisfied Arab tribes were also gained: these, it will be understood, were those tribes which had no share in the wealth of upper classes. At first Ḥamdān required each proselyte to pay a piece of silver, corresponding to ḥār or legal alms. Then he exacted a piece of gold from each person. Next he levied a fifth on all their possessions and finally required them to deposit all their goods in a common fund, a reminiscence of the Communism taught in pre-Islamic times by the Persian Mazdak.

“The da‘ī chose in each village a man worthy of confidence and in his charge they placed the property of the inhabitants. By this means clothes were provided for those who were without, and all had their needs supplied so that there was no more poverty. All worked diligently, for rank was made to depend on a man’s utility to the community; no one possessed any private property save swords and arms. Then it is said the da‘ī assembled men and women together on a certain night, and encouraged them to indulge in promiscuous intercourse. After this, assured of their absolute obedience, he began to teach them the more secret doctrines of the sect, and so deprived them of all belief in religion, and discouraged the observance of external rites such as prayer, fasting, and the like. This was the distinctive mark of the Qarmātian branch: the initiated were no longer a small minority living in the midst of their fellow-sectarians who still adhered to the external forms of Islam, but among the Qarmātians all were initiated to the fullest extent in all the teachings of the sect. Before long they began to steal and to commit murders,
so that they produced a reign of terror in the vicinity. Then the *da'is* felt that the time was ripe for open revolt, and selected a village in Sawad called Mahimabad, near the river Euphrates, and within the royal domain as their rallying place or ‘house of flight’: thither they carried large stones, and in a short time surrounded it with a strong wall and erected a building in the midst, in which a great many persons could be assembled and where goods could be stored. This took place in 277.”¹

For ten years the ‘Abbāsid government managed to hold its own. Then a leader arose, Dḥikrawīya by name. The Caliph’s troops were annihilated near Başra in A.D. 900. The alarm was so great in Baghdād that Al-Muktafī sent the Egyptian general Muḥammad to attack the Qarmāṭians. After ravaging North Syria as far as Antioch, the Qarmāṭians were at last beaten. But they reappeared a second time.

In 292 A.H., Syria was ravaged from one end to the other. Urgent appeals were made to Al-Muktafī who sent his generals but without success. Just then Dḥikrawīya emerged from hiding. The Qarmāṭians were filled with such wild enthusiasm that they routed the Caliph’s host slaying 1,500 men and striking terror into the heart of Baghdād. Dḥikrawīya then formed the design of lying in wait between Kūfa and Başra for the caravans just then returning from pilgrimage. The first escaped, but the next two were destroyed and looted with terrible slaughter. At last the Turkish general Wāṣif was sent by the Caliph and exterminated the bloody host.

In 281 A.H., another offshoot of the Qarmāṭians gained possession of Bahrayn. From Bahrayn their chief, Sulaymān, made a diversion in favour of the Fāṣimid ruler in Africa by storming Başra. A few years later in 311 A.H. (923 A.D.) he led another attack on Başra. The pilgrim caravans were again the object of savage attacks. After his success in these expeditions, Sulaymān grew so insolent that he demanded the government of Al-Ahwāz and being refused spread his followers over Mesopota-

nia and Al-'Iraq. Defeated there, he withdrew to Arabia proper and ravaged the holy city of Mecca. The Ka'ba itself was robbed of its precious things and, to crown his depredations, he carried away in 929 A.D. the Black Stone which was not restored till twenty years later. The Fātimid Caliphate whose authority the Qarmāṭians recognised now interfered from the west to stay these scandals. Sulaymān returned to Hejer, and we hear little more of him. But the Qarmāṭians still survived. "Some fifteen or twenty years later they are again mentioned in connection with the struggles that were prolonged for many years in Asia Minor and Egypt; and, strangely enough, it was a Carmathian who ruled in Al-Multān when, in 396 A.H., it was taken by Maḥmūd." 1

DECLINE OF THE 'ABBĀSID

The history of the 'Abbāsid dynasty can be roughly divided in two periods. The first period is marked by a brilliant vigour and all-round prosperity. It includes the reigns of Maṇṣūr, Maḥdī, Harūn, Maʿmūn, Muʿtasim and Wāṣithiq, that is to say, nearly a hundred years in all (754-847 A.D.); the other, more than four times as long, commencing with Mutawakkil (847-861 A.D.), marks the beginning of rapid decline and disintegration. It is in this latter period that we notice the rise of the Īsmāʿīlī propaganda which eventuated in the establishment of the Fātimid Caliphate in Africa and the disastrous activities of the Qarmāṭians. Evidently, the authority of the central government was breaking down even in and about the seat of the government. Indicative of the growing anarchy of the times and the spreading lawlessness was the outbreak of the Zanj rebellion which successfully defied the authority of the central government for a considerable time.

THE ZANJ REBELLION

According to Noldeke,2 'Alī, son of Muḥammad, who started

the rebellion, was a native of the village Verzenin, not far from modern Tehrān. He gave himself out as the descendant of ‘Alī and Fāţima. He first went to Bahrayn seeking followers there, and succeeded in getting a small party of adherents. Several of his followers belonged to that district. Next he sought to gain a footing at Baṣra. Along with some of his followers he was imprisoned by the governor of the city, but with the change of governorship, he escaped from prison.

At a small distance from Baṣra, there were extensive flats, traversed by ditches, in which a great number of slaves, mostly from the east coast of Africa, the land of the Zanj, were employed by rich entrepreneurs of the city in digging away the nitrous surface soils so as to lay bare the fruitful ground underneath and at the same time to obtain the saltpetre that occurred in the upper stratum. ‘Alī recognised the strength latent in these slaves and soon gained their leadership. Unlike other ‘Alīds, he did not appeal to the divine right of his house. Instead, he declared himself for the doctrine of the Khārijites, since they recognised the equal right of all Muslims, even if they were Abyssinian slaves, to become the ruler of the Muslims. Perhaps ‘Alī took into account the fact that in Baṣra the Shi‘ite doctrine was not popular at the time, quite the opposite of what it was in Kūfa. That explains why Ḥamdān Qārmāḥ decided not to connect himself with the negro leader, despite the strength it might have lent him. The Zanj were ignorant of Arabic and ‘Alī used an interpreter with them. Also there were many negroes in the imperial army at that time and they began to desert the government army and join the rebels.

Under ‘Alī, the negroes (Zanj) became so powerful that they defeated an army consisting of the people of Baṣra. They then marched upon Baṣra but citizens, high and low, stood together and completely shattered the rebel army. The citizen army, however, was crushed when it took the offensive against the rebels. ‘Alī built a city near Baṣra, called Mukhtāra (the elect city) and got the necessaries of life from his immediate neighbourhood.

At last the government dispatched the Turkish general Jolan
who was defeated and withdrew. Then the Zanj took Obolla in 870 A.D. People of Abadān also made their submission to the Zanj. Ahwāz, the capital of Khuzistān, was the next to fall. Mu'tamid sent an army against the rebel which was defeated and the Zanj now passed on to Başra. A great number of Bedouins also joined them. In 871 Başra was occupied by the Zanj. But permanent occupation of the city was impossible, and so the Zanj withdrew.

At this time the imperial army withdrew to meet the threat of Ya’qūb Ṣaffār (the coppersmith) who was advancing on Baghdād. Taking advantage of this withdrawal, the Zanj extended themselves further north, where Arab tribes helped them. Mowaffaq, the reigning Caliph, tried to propitiate Ya’qūb Ṣaffār, but without success. But soon Ya’qūb died and the imperial regent was successful in concluding peace with his successor, ‘Amr, so that he was able to lead a heavy expedition against the Zanj. The final war took place in 833 A.D. and ended with the total defeat of the Zanj but the cities and regions of lower Tigris never recovered from the injuries they had suffered.

CAUSES OF CIVIL DISORDERS

We have seen how the Isma’īlīs, the Qarmāṭians and the Zanj kept up a constant turmoil in the ‘Abbāsid Empire and never left it at peace. We have also noted the growing disintegration of the empire and the formation of independent kingdoms which kept up only a nominal show of allegiance to the central authority. Egypt under the Ṭulūnids, Khurāsān under the Ťahrīds, and Africa first under the Idrīsids and then under the Fātimids gradually broke away from the centre. Other independent kingdoms also arose, as we shall describe later. In their own seat of government, the ‘Abbāsids lost their authority and played into the hands of Buwayhids and the Seljūks. The trend towards disintegration synchronises with the introduction of the Turkish element in the empire, which became more and more powerful in comparison both with the Arabs and the Persians and the growing repression of the Shi‘īte parties, as a result of the
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suspcion aroused by the Fā’imids. Let us deal first with the Turks.

THE RISE OF THE TURKISH ELEMENT

"During the ‘Abbāsid regime," writes Hitti, "which, as we have seen before, owed its rise to Persian rather than Arab arms; the Arabian element lost its military, as it did its political, predominance. Under the first Caliphs the bodyguard, the strong arm of the military machine, was largely composed of Khurāsānī troops. The Arab soldiery formed two divisions: one of North Arabs, Mu‘jarite, and the other of South Arabs, Yamanite. New converts to Islam attached themselves to some Arabian tribe as clients and thus formed a part of the military organization of that tribe. Al-Mu‘ṭaṣīm added a new division made of Turks, originally his slaves, from Farghāna and other regions of Central Asia. This new imperial bodyguard soon became the terror of the whole capital, and in 236 the Caliph had to build a new town, Sūmarra, to which he transferred his seat of government. After the death of al-Muntaṣir (86r-2) these Turks began to play the part of a praetorian guard and exercise a determining influence on affairs of the state."

Nicholson thinks that Al-Mu‘ṭaṣīm’s fatal step in introducing the Turkish element can be accounted for by the fact that the Muslims of Ṭiraq had lost their old warlike spirit. They were fine scholars and merchants but poor soldiers. Muir says that they were originally brought to counterbalance the power of the Khurāsānī army which the later ‘Abbāsids had begun to distrust. "Thousands of Memlūks were yearly imported from the North-east," continues Muir. "Some formed the bodyguard, the remainder swelled the army; and such as displayed military talent and presence, gaining the Caliph’s favour, rose rapidly to chief command. Thus were the Arab soldiery, captains as well

as rank and file, rapidly displaced; and, retiring to their deserts, instead of as heretofore pillars of the Caliphate, became a chronic element of disturbance and revolt.”

An incident occurred in Must’ašim’s reign which added to the power of the Turkish element. “‘Ojeif, the Arab chief, who had distinguished himself in the Zoṭṭ campaign, and now commanded the centre columns against the Emperor, was roused to jealousy by the favours lavished on the Turkish generals, and by their insolent bearing towards himself and his fellows. Goaded thus, he conspired against Al-Mo’tašim, and persuaded Al-‘Abbās to aspire to the throne which at first he had renounced. The plot, joined by other Arab leaders, and even by some of the Turks, was delayed till Amorion should fall, and then the distribution of the spoil was to be the signal for slaying the Caliph and his two Turkish favourites, Aṣḥīn and Aṣḥān.”

The conspiracy was foiled but it had the disastrous effect of throwing the Caliph into the hands of his Turkish captains, and of gradually ousting the alienated Arab and Persian leaders from all chief commands. The Caliphs themselves, however, were the worst sufferers from the increased power of the Turks. They became the puppets of their Turkish generals or the helpless victims of military outrage.

The military organisation of the ‘Abbāsids grew weaker owing to the discordant elements of which it was composed. “Al-Manṣūr who was the virtual founder of the ‘Abbāsid dynasty and who took great interest in military matters, seems to have formed three national divisions, namely, the North Arabian Division (Muqar), the South Arabian Division (al-Yaman) and the Khurāsānī Division. This splitting up of the army into national corps was continued under the successors of al-Manṣūr. Al-Mu’tašim added two more divisionss, one consisting of Turks and the other of Africans. The division of the army into these five national corps was intended to prevent a general rising and to counterpoise one unit against another; but this

arrangement brought other evils. It was the homogeneous, well-knit army of the Arab race belonging to a single land and having the same interests and aspirations that won all the victories of early Islam. The splitting up of the army into national corps destroyed the *esprit de corps* of the Muslim army and introduced in its place a spirit of antagonism, jealousy, rivalry and competition for power."\(^1\)

With the entry of the Turks into Muslim society, foreigners widely apart in ideas and traditions found themselves united in the bosom of Islam. Among them naturally flourished the spirit of faction and rivalry, born of the feeling of differing nationalities. Thus the idea of nationality, once fully awakened to life, led to attempts at regaining national independence. The strength of the Caliphate rested on the national cohesion of the Arabs and of all those who had become Arabicised through Islam, but when the Caliphs preferred to rely on the protection of foreign mercenaries and to distrust the original Islamic elements, the power of Caliphate began to decline.

An immediate result was that the Arabs who had been the stabilising element in the Caliphate now became a disturbing element and reverted to their pre-Islamic habits of indiscipline. The early Caliphs of Islam had forged a powerful spiritual discipline which kept the Arabs united. The great civil war after the murder of the third Caliph in which the Arab tribes fought each other struck the first blow at this discipline and cohesion. Then new conditions arose. Permanent military stations were established, and many tribes settled down in large towns or conquered provinces, with the result that the settled Arab population became more and more estranged from Bedouin life. The government, further, relied upon the standing army and the townspeople. The Bedouins, therefore, ceased to be the ruling element of the empire. With the exclusion of the Bedouins from the state and the army, their old spirit of independence and indiscipline reasserted itself. They withdrew to the solitude of the desert and went back to pastoral life. The Arab nation may thus

be divided into two parts: one which lived in the towns and served in the army, and the other which retired to the desert. "Often, indeed, did the latter burst into civilized countries, plundering and devastating, now fighting on the side of the Caliph, and now against him. Their oft-recurring predatory expeditions contributed more than anything else to the decline of civilization and the fall of the Caliphate."\(^1\)

The Qarmāțian movement received much support from these Bedouin tribes. One of the most powerful insurrections against the Caliph Wāthiq was the insurrection of the Bedouin tribes of Najd and Central Arabia (230 A.H., A.D. 844). In the region to the north of Euphrates, the Anzah tribe lived in complete independence and made predatory raids into civilised lands. South of the Euphrates lived the powerful Munṭafīq tribe, who plundered Baṣra under the Caliph Mustarshid.

**RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE**

The early ‘Abbāsid Caliphs were generally tolerant of religious differences and views. Although they did not like extremely heretical views and ultra-conservative opinions, on the whole, they did not try to stamp out such views by force, the only exception being the persecution meted out to Imām Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal by Mā’mūn. Under the early ‘Abbāsids, therefore, Muʿtazilite free thinking made rapid progress. "Muʿtazilism," says Ameer ‘Alī,\(^2\) "spread rapidly among all the thinking and cultured classes in every, part of the Empire and finding its way into Spain took possession of the Andalusian colleges and academies. Mansūr and his immediate successors encouraged Rationalism, but made no open profession of the Muʿtazilite doctrines. Māmūn, who deserves more justly than any other Asiatic sovereign the title of ‘Great,’ acknowledged his adhesion to the Muʿtazilite school; and he and his brother Muʿtaṣim and nephew Wāṣik endeavoured to infuse the rationalistic spirit into the whole Moslem world. Under them Rationalism acquired predominance such as it has not

gained perhaps even in modern times in European countries. The Rationalists preached in the mosques and lectured in the colleges; they had the moulding of the character of the nation’s youth in their hands; they were the chief counsellors of the Caliphs, and it cannot be gainsaid that they used their influence widely. As professors, preachers, scientists, physicians, viziers or provincial governors, they helped in the growth and development of the Saracenic nation. The rise of the Banī-Idris in Western Africa, and the establishment of the Fātimide power imparted a new life to Mu‘tazilaism after its glory had come to an end in Asia.”

But Mutawakkil (847-861 A.D.) reacted sharply against the liberalism of his early predecessors. He was a narrow-minded and fanatical Sunnī. All other sects and particularly the Shī‘as suffered much from his repressive measures. Mutawakkil’s religious policy accorded well with the prevailing temper of the Turkish element which was becoming increasingly powerful. The Turks too were, by national temperament, rigid in matters of religion. Mutawakkil persecuted not only the Shī‘as but also made stringent laws against the Jews and Christians who had up to then enjoyed the greatest amount of toleration. The masses, who had suffered to some extent in the reign of Ma‘mūn and his successors from the religious liberalism of the rulers and their dislike of orthodoxy, now began to avenge themselves. A party of puritan reformists was formed and allowed by the government to pry into the religious beliefs of the people. Not only the Shī‘as but even Sunnīs who did not come up to their rigid standards suffered ill-treatment. According to Gibbon, the reformists in their zeal disturbed the peace and happiness of private life. These conditions lasted till Caliph Rādī (934-940 A.D.) who at last brought the puritans under control.

Writing of this period, Ameer ‘Alī says,1 “Rationalism was the dominating creed among the educated, the intellectual, and influential classes of the community. Sifātism was in force among the lower strata of society, and most of the Kāzis, the preachers, the lawyers of various degree were attached to it. A cruel

drunken sot, almost crazy at times, Mutawakkil had the wit to perceive the advantage of an alliance with the latter party. It would make him at once the idol of the populace, and the model Caliph of the bigots. The fiat accordingly went forth for the expulsion of the party of progress from their offices under government. The colleges and universities were closed; literature, science, and philosophy were interdicted; and the Rationalists were hunted from Bagdad. Mutawakkil at the same time demolished the mausoleum of the Caliph Ali and his sons. The fanatical lawyers, who were now the priests and rabbis of Islam, became the ruling power of the State. Mutawakkil's death and Mustansir's accession gave the victory once more to the Progressists. But their success was short-lived. Under the pitiless and sanguinary Mu'tazid bi'llah the triumph of Patrasticism was complete."

The result of this religious intolerance was that the Shi'as became more and more hostile to the Caliphate and movements like those of the Qarmatians, the Isma'ilis and the Fatimids gained fresh strength. The Fatimids alone were successful in founding a rival Caliphate, but the Qarmatians and the Isma'ilis caused much instability and proved a powerful disintegrating force. A number of petty kingdoms arose both in the East and the West which owed only nominal allegiance to the Caliph. Henceforward the political unity of Islam was rent asunder and was restored only by the Ottoman Turks, but even the Ottoman Turks failed to reunite Persia, India and Afghanistan. Their strength and centre of power lay in the West.

**KINGDOMS OF THE EAST**

Ta'hirids.—The first to form a semi-independent kingdom was Ta'hir b. Husayn of Khurasan, a trusted general of Mahmun. In 820, he was awarded the governorship of Khurasan and lands to the east of Khurasan. Before his death, Ta'hir omitted the mention of Caliph's name in the Friday prayer. His successors extended their sway as far as India. On the whole, they were loyal to the 'Abbäsids whom they paid a regular tribute. They never took advantage of the growing weakness of the Caliphate. They remained in power till 872.
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The Šaffārids.—The Šaffārid dynasty originated in Sijistān and replaced the Taḥrids in Khurāsān. The governor of Sijistān could not maintain peace owing to the activities of the Khārijites. The local population therefore formed a volunteer army to defend themselves. Ya'qūb Šaffār (coppersmith) showed such courage that he was elected leader of the volunteer army. Al-Šaffār eventually succeeded in carving out a dominion for himself and added to his domain almost all Persia and the outskirts of India; even threatening Baghhdād itself under Al-Mu'tamid. He was also responsible for the propagation of Islam in Afghanistān. Ya'qūb and his dynasty were staunch Sunnis and in no sense a product of Persian nationalism. They remained loyal to the Islamic Šari'a, but they were the first dynasty in the Persian lands to break away completely with the Caliphate.

The Šāmānids.—The Šāmānids had their seat of power in Transoxania but during the first half of the tenth century practically the whole of Persia submitted to their authority. It was under the Šāmānids that the final subjugation of Transoxania to Muslim rule was effected. Their capital Bukhārā and their leading city Samarqand almost eclipsed Baghhdād as centres of learning. They encouraged and fostered the development of a national Persian literature which had already begun. They also patronised Arabic scholars like Rāzī and Avicenna. Like the Šaffārids they were staunch Sunnis, but the Ismā'īlī movement seems to have been widespread in their domains. Many of the Šāmānīd chiefs became Qarmatis and even the ruler Naṣr accepted their teachings.1 The 'Ulema, with the help of the Turks who were a powerful party, tried to stage a revolution, but ultimately Naṣr abdicated in favour of his son, Nuh, who was an orthodox Muslim above suspicion.

"Though one of the most enlightened of the Iranian dynasties," writes Hitti,2 "the Šāmānids were not free from elements which proved fatal to others of the same period. To the usual problems presented by a turbulent military aristocracy and a

1. Siddiqi, Dr. Ameer Hasan, Khilāfat and Sultanat (Urdu), Azamgarh 1939, p. 41.
precarious dynastic succession was now added a new danger, that of the Turkish nomads to the north. Even within the state power was gradually slipping into the hands of Turkish slaves with whom the Sāmānids had filled their court. The Sāmānid territory south of Oxus was absorbed in 994 by the Ghaznawids, who rose to power under one of these slaves. The territory north of the river was seized by the so-called Ḫeṣ (Ḫeṣ) Khāns of Turkestan, who in 902 captured Bukhārā and nine years later gave the coup de grâce to the expiring Sāmānid dynasty. Thus for the first but not for the last time we note the Turanian hordes of Central Asia thrusting themselves to the forefront of Islamic affairs. The struggle between Iranians and Turanians for the mastery of the borderland of Islam in the fourth Moslem century was but a prelude to graver developments. We shall hereafter see how many times play an increasingly important role in world affairs until they finally absorb most of the powers of the caliph of Baghdād, in fact until they establish their own caliphate, the Ottoman, in ‘Baghdād on the Bosphorus.’”

The Ghaznawids.—Alaptagīn, a Turkish slave of the Sāmānids, carved out an independent kingdom in Afghānistān. His son-in-law Sābuktigīn (976-97) widened his territory to include Peshawar and Khūrāsān. His son, Maḥmūd, permanently established Muslim influence in the Punjāb. “As regards their religious views,” writes Nicholson,¹ “the Turkish Ghaznevids stand in sharp contrast with the Persian houses of Sāmān and Buwayh. It has been well said that the true genius of the Turks lies in action, not in speculation. When Islam came across their path, they saw that it was a simple and practical creed such as the soldier requires; so they accepted it without further parley. The Turks have always remained loyal to Islam, the Islam of Abū Bakr and ‘Umar.” “The rise of the Ghaznawid dynasty,” writes Hitti, ² “represents the first victory of the Turkish element for ultimate mastery in Islam. Yet the Ghaznawid state did not differ radically from the Sāmānīd or the ‘Affārid state. It was

loosely held by force of arms, and as soon as the powerful hand wielding the sword relaxed the component parts were certain to fall away. This is what happened after Maḥmūd's death. The provinces of the east gradually separated themselves from the capital in the highlands, thus beginning the series of independent Moslem dynasties of India.'

The Buwayhids.—The Buwayhids arose in Western Persia on the ruins of the Sāmānids. The founder, Abū Ṣuḥaj' Buwayh, was a chieftain of Daylam, the mountainous province lying on the southern shores of the Caspian Sea. His three sons 'Alī, Aḥmad and Ḥasan, subdued the provinces of Fars and Khuzistān in 948 A.D. at the head of the Daylamite troops. The Buwayhids were Shī'a and, during their century or so of supremacy, they made and unmade Caliphs at will. The Buwayhid power reached its zenith under 'Aḍud-al-Daulah who was not only the greatest Buwayhid but also the most illustrious ruler of his time. He united in 977 the several petty kingdoms in Persia and 'Īraq, creating an empire approaching that of Ḥārūn al-Raṣḥid. He married the daughter of Caliph Al-Ṭaʿī and had the Caliph marry his daughter.

The Khwārazmshāhs—The kingdom of Khwārazmshāhīs was set up by Atsiz who was one of the vassals of the Saljuq Sultan Sanjar, one of the greatest Saljuq kings after the break up of the Saljuq empire into independent states. Atsiz succeeded his father in 1127 and in his earlier period remained loyal to Sanjar. But soon afterwards he revolted with the help of an army consisting of 10,000 non-Muslim Turks, among others.

In Transoxania at this time, the Qara-Khiṭāya, a non-Moslem Turkish tribe, seems to have been securely established. Sultan Sanjar it was who provoked them to occupy Transoxania with its capital, Bukhārā. Sanjar's defeat was opportune for Atsiz but, despite his efforts, he died a vassal of Sanjar. Nevertheless, "by adding Jand and Manqishlagh to his possessions he brought the neighbouring nomads under subjection to Khorezmia, and, by increasing his military forces by Turkish mercenary divisions, he laid the foundation of a strong and
actually independent kingdom." 1 His son, Ñl-Arslân remained loyal to the Saljuqs. Ñl-Arslân had an opportunity of interfering in Transoxania, where, under the supreme rule of the Qara-Khitâya, the struggles of local lords were going on. But since order was not re-established in Khurâsan, any thought of expelling the Qara-Khitâya from Transoxania was out of the question. Actually the Qara-Khitâya themselves invaded the realm of the Khwârazmshâhs on the plea that the latter had failed to pay the prescribed tribute. Soon after this invasion Ñl-Arslân died in 1172. His eldest son Takâsh succeeded in his authority with the help of the Qara-Khitâya whom he promised to pay the annual tribute.

The Khwârazmshâhs at this time were the neighbours of the Sultâns of Ghûr who ruled over India after the fall of the Ghaznavids. The Ghûrids did not extend their dominions only to the east; in 1175 they occupied Herât, after which they became rivals in Khurâsan to the Khwârazmshâhs. The latter were able to maintain themselves only by the aid of mercenaries; the Ghûrids had not only their Turkish guards but could depend also on the warlike mountaineers of their native land. Again, the Khwârazmshâhs, with all their power, were vassals of the infidel Qara-Khitâya, whereas the Ghûrids were the only independent and strong sovereigns in the eastern part of Muslim Asia, and it was to them that the Muslims of Khurâsan and Transoxania looked.

The Khwârazmshâhs were not on good terms with the Caliph of Baghdad also. Ghiyâsuddîn, the Ghûrid ruler, therefore, undertook a campaign against them in Khurâsan on the advice of the Caliph. The Khwârazmshâh called for the aid of the Qara-Khitâya but was defeated and had to negotiate for peace. The Ghûrid ruler demanded that Takâsh should make his submission to the Caliph and compensate for the loss suffered by the inhabitants from the Qara-Khitâya. At this time Caliph Nasîr himself appealed to Takâsh for help. He was trying to extend his authority at the expense of the Saljuq ruler, Tughrâl. "On March 19, 1194,

Tughral was attacked by the Khwārazmshāh near Rayy and Hamadān and after a brave resistance fell in battle. Takāsh subdued Rayy and Hamadān. The Caliph’s government soon realised that the Khwārazmshāh would be as dangerous an opponent as formerly the Saljuqid Sulṭān had been.\footnote{Barthold, W., *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, London 1928, p. 347.}

At this stage Takāsh died (1200 A.D.) and his place was taken by his second son, Muḥammad. But there was another rival who was supported by the Ghūrid king, Shahābuddin, while Muḥammad had the support of the Qara-Khitāya. This brought collision between Shahābuddin and the Khitāya in which the former suffered defeat. Shahābuddin was now thinking of how he might take vengeance on the Qara-Khitāya and liberate the Muslims of Transoxania from the yoke of the infidel Qara-Khitāya. Vainly did the Caliph Nāṣir entreat Sulṭān Shahābuddin to finish with the Khwārazmshāh first and even to conclude an alliance with the Qara-Khitāya for the purpose. But the Sulṭān failed to act up to this advice and died on March 13, 1206. After the death of Shahābuddin, the Ghūrid dominions were rent asunder by the rivalries of his successors and Muḥammad was able to extend his dominions and annex large parts of the Ghūrid kingdom. In his struggle with his last Muslim rival, Muḥammad enjoyed the assistance of the Qara-Khitāya; but now having attained his aim, he could not be content with the vassalage of these infidel tribes. Like Shahābuddin Ghūrī, he assumed the role of the liberator of Muslims. In 1210 he undertook an expedition against Samarqand, in the territory of Qara-Khitāya. He seems to have been helped by the local princes as they were displeased at the behaviour of Qara-Khitāya officials. But the rejoicings of the Muslims over Muḥammad’s victory did not last long. The former vassals of Qara-Khitāya were soon convinced that the transfer of power from the infidels to the orthodox Khwārazmshāh brought them no advantages. The local ruler, Othmān, determined to exchange the yoke of the Khwārazmshāh for the former yoke and he seemed to be acting in complete accord with the wishes of his people.
The rebellion was, however, crushed and Samarqand became practically the capital of the Khwārazmshāh. Among the Muslim rulers of his time, the Sultan had now no rival. Towards 1215 he annexed to his kingdom all the former territories of the Ghurids and his generals subdued nearly all Persia to his rule. The first and only considerable failure Muḥammad suffered in the west was when he demanded of the Caliph that in Baghād itself the Khūṭba should be introduced in his name and the Caliph should renounce his temporal authority in his favour, as formerly in favour of the Buwayhids and Saljuqs. But the Baghād government returned an uncompromising refusal and made overtures to the chief of the Ismāʿīlites, Jālaluddin Ḥasan, received some fīḍāʿīs from him and used them to remove his enemies. Thus the Khwārazmshāh’s viceroy in ʿIrāq and the Amīr of Mecca were both assassinated by the Ismāʿīlī fīḍāʿīs. Muḥammad sent a division of his army against Baghād but it was destroyed by a snow storm.

News arrived at this point that the Margits driven out by Changez Khān had appeared in the dominions of Khwārazmshāh, whereupon the Sultan moved against them to Jand. Here he learned that the armies of Changez Khān had also arrived in pursuit of the Margits. The Sultan determined to give battle to them. The Mongol leaders were unwilling to fight the Muslims and declared that Changez Khān had sent them only against the Margits. But the Sultan replied that he regarded all infidels as his enemies and forced the Mongols into an indecisive battle.

KINGDOMS OF THE WEST

Egypt.—Aḥmad ibn Տուլուն was a Turkish slave from Farḡāna whose father was sent as a present to Al-Māʾmān in the year 815. In 868 Aḥmad was appointed lieutenant to the governor of Egypt and soon made himself independent. Down to the time of Ibn Տուլուն, as many as a hundred different governors had ruled over Egypt since the rise of Islam. Egypt’s revenues partly went into the central treasury and partly filled the pockets of the governors. Now, for the first time, Egyptian revenues remained in the country, thus leading to greater economic prosperity.
Ibn Ṭūlūn developed a rigid military organisation. His main support was the army which consisted of a bodyguard of Turkish and negro slaves. When in 877 the governor of Syria died, Ibn Ṭūlūn occupied the neighbouring country without much opposition. For the first time since the Ptolemaic dynasty, Egypt became a sovereign state and for the first time since the Pharaohs, it ruled over Syria. Ibn Ṭūlūn built a naval base at ‘Akka with a view to maintain his hold on Syria and did much to improve the irrigation of Egypt.

“The Ṭūlūnid dynasty,” writes Hitti,1 “was the earliest manifestation of a political crystallization in the unruly and hertofore inarticulate Turkish element in the heart of the caliphate. Other and more important Turkish dynasties were soon to follow. The case of Aḥmad ibn-Ṭūlūn was typical of the founders of the many states on the ruins of the caliphate. These states broke off entirely from the central government or remained only nominally dependent upon the caliph in Baghdād. Aḥmad served as an example of what could be done in the matter of achieving military and political power at the expense of a bulky and unwieldy caliphate through the strong-handed and confident ambition of a subject soldier and his slave satellites. But the Ṭūlūnid, as well as the Ikhshīdīd and most of the other dynasties, had no national basis in the lands over which they ruled and therefore were short-lived. Their weakness consisted in the absence of a strong coherent body of supporters of their own race. The rulers were themselves intruders who were obliged to recruit their bodyguards, which were their armies, from various alien sources.”

After the Ṭūlūnids, the ‘Abbāsid rule was re-established in Egypt for a brief period. But then another Turkish dynasty was founded by Muḥammad ibn Tughj (933-46). The title Ikhshīd was bestowed by Caliph Al-Raḍī. In the next two years Muḥammad b. Tughj added Syria-Palestine to his Egyptian domains. Then Mecca and Medina were incorporated. Following Muḥammad b. Tughj, Kafūr, a negro slave, became the practical ruler of Egypt and successfully defended Syria and

Egypt against the rising power of the Ḫamdānids. We have already seen how Egypt was incorporated in the dominions of the Fāṭimids by their able general Jawāhīr, another black slave.

THE ḪAMDĀNIDS IN SYRIA

The Banū Ḫamdān, who succeeded the Ikhsīṣids in northern Syria, took their name from Ḫamdān ibn Ḫamdūn of the Taghlīb tribe, which had been Christian for some time before Islām. Ḫamdān and his successors, after several conflicts and reconciliations with the Caliphs, extended their rule to Mawṣīl, a large part of Mesopotamia and northern Syria. The most famous Ḫamdānī ruler was Abī-al-Ḥasan, who in 944 wrested Aleppo, Antioch and Ḫīms from the Ikhsīṣids and received the title of Sayfuddaulah from the Caliph. His was the only purely Arab dynasty arising out of the decline of the Caliphate. Sayf and his successors were tolerant Shīʿas.

While the Ḫamdānids were great patrons of art and literature, they do not seem to have been free from the financial extortion of their subjects, a feature common to this age of disintegration. According to Margoliouth,1 "They were by far the worst rulers of the century. Compared with them, the Turkish and Persian rulers were angels of benignity. Characteristic of their nomad upbringing was their aversion from trees. When Aleppo in 333/944 held out against the troops of ʿAdududdawlah, they cut down all the beautiful trees in the neighbourhood which, according to the contemporary poet, Sanubari, constituted its most striking charm. They forcibly purchased the greatest portion of the lands in Mesopotamia for a tenth of their actual value. In his long life, Naṣīr-ud-Dawlah is said to have converted the entire district of Moṣul into his private property. He had fruit trees cut down. He replaced them by crops such as cotton, rice and others. Many emigrated. The entire tribe of Banū-Ḥabīb, cousins of the Ḫamdānīs, went over with 22,000 (one MS. has 5,000) horsemen to the Greeks, where they found a friendly welcome and whence they vigorously plundered their quondam, unfortunate home. The property of the unhappy emigrants was naturally confiscated.

by the prince. Many, however, preferred to remain in Muslim countries out of love for their homes where they had spent their youth. But they had to make over half of the entire harvest and the prince assessed and fixed their share of taxes, as he pleased in gold and silver.”

In one respect, however, the Ḥamdānid proved of service to the Muslim power in the west. The Byzantine encroachment on the domains of Islam was assuming a menacing aspect with the progressive decline of the Muslim power and Caliphate. Sayf was the first after a long interval to take up the cudgels seriously against the Byzantines. This Ḥamdānid-Byzantine conflict was the herald of a new conflict which appeared in the shape of the Crusades. But Sayf was not always successful. In 962, he lost even his own capital. This raised an uproar in Baghdad where the populace demanded that the Caliph should lead an expedition in person against the Byzantines. The death of Sayf in 967 which was followed by an internal discord in his dynasty enabled Nicephorous to occupy a large part of Syria. In 968 Nicephorous again captured Aleppo and added Antioch and Ḥimṣ. His successor Zimisces conquered many coastal towns of Syria. The Muslim power in the west had gone so far into decay that Saʿīd-ud-Daulah (991-1001) had to seek the help of Emperor Basil against the menace of Fāṭimid expansion. The Byzantine ruler rushed with 17,000 men to Aleppo and dispersed the enemy for the time being. But Saʿīd had afterwards to acknowledge Fāṭimid suzerainty.

MUSLIMS IN AFRICA AND SPAIN

The population of Africa is mainly Berber, the Arabs are late settlers. This Berber population is of the type known as ‘Mediterranean,’ akin to the races living in southwest Europe. They seem more like sunburnt Spaniards or Sicilians than African natives. It cannot be definitely said whether this Mediterranean race came from Europe or whether it arose on the African soil and spread across the narrow straits into Europe. Remotely it comes from a parent stock which had Semitic kinship, but that was in distant times.
The Phoenicians settled in Africa during the twelfth century B.C. and built up the Carthaginian Empire which was connected with Tyre and Sidon and had little in common with the African hinterland. In the early part of the third century B.C. Carthage was a great power whose dominion extended to Sicily where it clashed with the rising power of the Romans and was completely defeated in the three Punic wars ending in 146 B.C. in which native Libyan troops fought on either side as mercenaries without any interest in the issues at stake. The downfall of Carthage ended an alien power in Africa.

The conquering Romans for some time left the native states in the west, which were known to the Romans as Numidia and Mauretania, under their own kings, but gradually incorporated them in the Roman provinces. Inland, south of the Roman-occupied territory, were the nomadic tribes of Gaetuli, Gramantes, etc., which the Romans left to their own fate. The colonies planted by the Romans in Africa lasted until they were conquered by the Vandals from Spain in 430 A.D. They were recovered by Belisarius for the Byzantine Empire in 533 and remained in Roman hands until the conquests of Islam in 647 A.D.

The Berbers who are the oldest element in the present population of North Africa speak a language of their own which is classed as sub-Semitic. It is not a definitely Semitic language but has certain Semitic affinities. There is no Berber literature but Berber inscriptions have been found written in a script which seems to be of Phoenician origin. The Berbers now profess Islam yet they have certain local peculiarities. The cult of saints is very prominent and so the reverence for Marabout (Murğâbiş) or dervishes, and there is a strong puritan element which was prominent in North-African Christianity before the coming of Islam. With Islam the Arabic language spread rapidly. The Berber race is not intellectual, but it produces splendid fighting men.

When 'Amr b. al-'Ās conquered Egypt for the Muslims, the Romans still held the country west of the Egyptian frontier. 'Amr wished to secure Egypt from a Roman incursion by clearing the nearest district, Barqa, by an expedition across
the border, but this was forbidden by the second Caliph, ‘Omar. But ‘Omar’s successor, ‘Othman, withdrew the prohibition, when his attention was drawn to the disordered state of the province and ‘Abdulla b. Sa‘d b. Abi Sarh led an expedition into Africa. At his approach the Greeks, Latins and native Berber tribes, mostly Zanato, united under Gregory but suffered defeat. The invasion did not lead to a permanent conquest. It was merely a raid.

In 665 A.D., Mu‘awiya ibn Ḥodij led a new army across the western frontier of Egypt. The Romans were defeated but the Muslims did not follow up their success. It was then decided to make the Roman province of Africa a Muslim province under the name of Ifrīqiya and ‘Oqba b. Nafi‘ was appointed governor of this province. A camp city was founded under the name of Qayrawān. ‘Oqba was soon replaced as governor by Abū Muhājir who had to face a Berber revolt which he crushed. In 690 Yazīd b. Mu‘awiya restored ‘Oqba b. Nafi‘. He crossed the Zab and proceeded through Algeria and finally reached Tangier, which still remained an outpost of Byzantium. At Tangier he met the governor of the city, the Visigothic count Julian, and finally reached the shore of Atlantic. The Arabs defeated many Berber tribes of the interior, after which ‘Oqba made a short-cut through Zab on his way back to Qayrawān. Here he was met by a force of Berbers which attacked and defeated him. Report of this disaster soon reached Qayrawān and the Arabs were forced to evacuate the town.

Soon afterwards the Berbers appeared, led by Kosayla, a Berber chieftain, who took possession of Qayrawān and established himself there as a monarch entering into alliance with the Byzantines in the neighbourhood.

In 688 during the reign of ‘Abdul Malik, Zuhayr b. Qays led an army into Africa, defeated and slew Kosayla and so recovered Qayrawān and Ifrīqiya. He drove the Berbers into the far west but unable to get reinforcements suffered a disaster near Barqa in which he and all his men were killed. The Berbers were once again delivered from the Arabs but soon fell into anarchy. In this crisis a woman, Dāhia, daughter of the queen of the Jerwa tribe,
organised the Berbers and led them against the Arabs who called her Kāhīna. Hearing of this Berber opposition, ‘Abdul Malik sent a powerful force to support Ḥassān b. Nu’mān, the governor of Egypt. Again the Arabs were defeated by the Kāhīna. For five years after this, the Berbers held their own west of Barqa. But in 693 with the arrival of the reinforcements, Ḥassān inflicted a decisive defeat on the Kāhīna. Arab authority in Išrīqīya was finally restored by this military triumph. In 707 Ḥassān was replaced by Mūsa ibn Nuṣayr who was appointed independent governor of Išrīqīya, no longer subordinate to the governor of Egypt. He found Išrīqīya in disorder and Berbers in revolt. After pacifying the eastern part of Africa, he reduced many other tribes and took Ceuta from the Visigoths. There he placed an Arab garrison and left many agents in other places from among the Berbers who embraced Islām. Tāriq b. Ziyād, commander of the garrison at Ceuta, was one of these converts. It was he who afterwards prepared the way for the Arab invasion of Spain.

Mūsa had tested the fighting quality of the Berbers. He had also discovered that the Visigothic power in Spain was in decay. He was aware that Roderick, the Duke of Cordova, had usurped the kingdom of Spain and exiled the legitimate heirs of King Wittiza to Tangier and that the latter had their supporters in Spain. He had further learnt that the Jews of Spain had organised a revolt due to the severities imposed on them. The circumstances thus seemed favourable for the conquest of Spain and so, after obtaining the permission of Caliph Walid I, Mūsa sent a large party of 7,000 men under the command of the Berber Tāriq b. Ziyād. The party landed at Jabal Tāriq, so called after the leader of the party, and advanced inland. In 712 A.D. Mūsa himself followed Tāriq and crossed the Straits. From this beginning the complete conquest of Spain proceeded, treaties being made with the various cities. In many cases the terms granted were more favourable than had been the case under the Visigothic rule. Christians and Jews were left completely undisturbed, but they had to pay a fixed tribute. One great advantage gained by them was the right to alienate their property which they had not enjoyed under the Visigoths. The conquered subjects were
mostly Christian, but gradually a number of them accepted Islam, though the Christians remained a majority in most of the country, specially in the north.

The conquest was practically complete by 719 A.D. when the Muslim governor established himself at Cordova as his official capital. Toledo, the former capital, had a predominantly Christian population and retained a certain measure of self-government. The conquerors of Spain are generally known as the Moors, representing the Latin Mauri and the Arabic Magribi. These included Berbers and Arabs, but the Arabs assumed a class superiority and there was very bitter feeling between the two races. The Arabs themselves were divided between the Yemenites and Ma‘adites. The Yemenites were descended from those Arabs who had moved north in the Jahiliya and received a measure of Hellenistic culture on the Syrian frontier, whilst the Ma‘adites were those who had moved north after their conversion to Islam. The latter were despised by the Yemenites as hungry nomads of the desert. At the same time the Berbers were divided by ancient tribal rivalries, though united among themselves by antagonism to Arabs. There were thus from the first seeds of strife among the Moorish invaders of Spain. So far as the Berbers were concerned, and to a great extent the Arabs also, social and political life was largely common between the Magrib of Africa and Spain. The southern part of Spain was called Al-Andalus, but the name is commonly applied to all Muslim Spain. After the conquest of Al-Andalus many Berbers settled there, but from time to time other Berber groups left Andalus and returned to Africa. The invasion and conquest of Spain by the Arab-Berber Moors was directed by the governor at Qayrawan and for some time Spain was treated as a subordinate province attached to Ifriqiya. The Moorish advance in Spain continued and by 721 A.D. they had crossed the Pyrenees and entered Aquitaine. This northward march was checked by Charles Martel when he defeated the Muslims in 732 in a battle between Tours and Poitiers. The Moorish forces had advanced too rapidly and too far from their base and they were divided by racial and tribal rivalries. The Yemenites were everywhere inoculated with Shi‘a ideas; the
Ma‘adites (Mu‘darites or North-Arabians) maintained Sunnī orthodoxy. At the establishment of the ‘Abbāsid dynasty the Yemenites as sympathisers of the ‘Alīd party welcomed the change, others remained loyal to the Omayyads. The Berbers, who, after the Spanish conquest, flooded the Peninsula from Africa where many of them had accepted the Khārijite doctrines and were opposed both to the Omayyads and the ‘Abbāsids, constituted a great disturbing element. They complained that they had borne the brunt of fighting, but the Arabs appropriated for themselves the most fertile parts of Spain leaving them the arid central plateau.

The government of the Peninsula was in the hands of an Amīr who ruled almost independently of Qayrawān. After the fourth Amīr, Al-Samḥ, the governorship became a matter of dispute between the Mu‘darites and Yemenites. The parties finally decided to choose alternately one of their number each year to rule the land. The first choice of the Mu‘darites was one Yūsuf al-Fihrī. At the end of the year, however, Yūsuf refused to accept the Yemenite candidate and continued to rule for ten years. It was at this time that ‘Abdur Raḥmān b. Mu‘awīya, a grandson of Hishām, the tenth Omayyad Caliph, fleeing from the persecution of the ‘Abbāsids, landed on the south coast and conquered Spain for his dynasty. In his wanderings in Africa, ‘Abdur Raḥmān was given refuge by a family of Berbers who were his maternal uncles. Many of the Spanish leaders, who were loyal to the Omayyad house, welcomed the opportunity to rally round ‘Abdur Raḥmān. The Syrian Arabs won the Yemenites to their cause, because they hated the governor Yūsuf. Thus ‘Abdur Raḥmān was able to conquer Spain and put down many Berber and Arab insurrections. In the process of subdued his enemies, ‘Abdur Raḥmān developed a well-disciplined army of mercenary Berbers, imported from Africa. In 773 he discontinued the Khutba delivered in the name of the ‘Abbāsid Caliph, but did not assume the title of Caliph himself. He and his successors down to ‘Abdur Raḥmān II continued to rule as Amīrs or Sulṭāns.

‘Abdur Raḥmān I was followed by his son Hishām I (759-822) and Al-Ḥakam I (796-822). During the latter’s reign there was
revolt against his authority led by a Berber faqīh, who was joined by many neo-Muslims. Spain at that time was under the influence of orthodoxy and the theologians had become very powerful. Ḥakam was accused of intemperate and irreligious habits. The revolt continued until the reign of the next ruler, Abdur Raḥmān II. Several separatist movements caused disturbance throughout his dominions. These were led by Spanish neo-Muslims who posed as nationalist champions in the provinces. One such movement was led by ‘Omar ibn Ḥafṣūn. He started his career as an organiser of a band of brigands and rose to a position of leadership in South Spain against Muslim rule. To the Christians and malcontents, ‘Omar became the champion of a long suppressed nationality. Finally, he succeeded in isolating Cordova and opened negotiations with the ‘Abbāsids and the Aghlabid ruler of North Africa with a view to getting himself appointed as the governor of Spain. Failing in his ambition, he is said to have reverted to Christianity.

It was ‘Abdur Raḥmān III who consolidated the Omayyad power in Spain. He reclaimed all the lost provinces and extended his conquests on all sides. He thus succeeded in pacifying the country, but he had yet to meet the threat of external enemies, the Fatimid kings in the south and the Christian kings of the north. ‘Obaydulla al-Mahdī, the founder of the Fatimid dynasty, had entered into negotiations with Ibn Ḥafṣūn and sent his emissaries and spies in Spain. ‘Abdur Raḥmān III soon realised that his position in Spain could not be safe as long as he had no hold in Africa. Therefore, in 931, he obtained possession of Ceuta and ultimately established his full suzerainty over the Barbary coast. He built a powerful fleet which was strong enough to dispute the sovereignty of the Mediterranean with the Fatimids. He also fought many successful wars against the Christian kings of the North. In 929, ‘Abdur Raḥmān assumed the title of Caliph and thus added one more caliphate to the two already existing, the Omayyad and the Fatimid. ‘Abdur Raḥmān III was followed by Al-Ḥakam II who was succeeded by Hishām II (976-1009), a boy of twelve. Real power in the state was usurped in his reign by Muḥammad ibn Abī ‘Āmir who started his life
as an ordinary letter writer. "To ingratiate himself with ‘Ulema he burned all books in the library of al-Ḥakam dealing with philosophy and other subjects blacklisted by those theologians. The poets he handled properly through bounteous subsidies. He then had his name mentioned in the Friday prayer and on the coinage, wore robes of gold tissue woven with his name—a privilege of royalty—and after 992 had his seal replace the caliph's on all official documents issued from the chancellery. The only thing he did not do was to overthrow the nominal Umayyad caliph and establish an ‘Āmirid caliphate.

"In military affairs ibn-abi-‘Āmir proved as successful as in peaceful undertakings. He first reformed the army, substituting for the ancient tribal organization the regimental system. The removal of the Fāṣimid seat of power farther east to the newly built Cairo (969) and the internecine conflicts among the petty Christian kingdoms of north afforded his armies an opportunity to march triumphantly along the northwestern African coast as well as in the northern parts of the Iberian Peninsula. His victories led him to assume in 981 the honorific title of Mansūr bi-Allāh."  

The Umayyad Caliphate of Spain fell into progressive decay after the death of Ibn ‘Āmir and the Christian kings of the north began to expand at the expense of petty Muslim rulers who had divided the Umayyad kingdom among themselves. At this stage a new Muslim power arose in Africa and intervened in the affairs of Spain. This power is known by the name of Murābitūs.

MURĀBITŪS IN SPAIN

The Murābitūs were led by a chief named ‘Abdulla b. Yāsīn who was a student and disciple of a jurist Abū ‘Amran al-Faṣī. Yāsīn gathered together a number of students of the Joddala tribe in further Maghrib and built them up into a strong brotherhood. Later, the tribe of Letma joined him and his followers. The Murābitūs were so called because they were a semi-monastic order. They were lodged in a species of monastery

called Zawiya in the east but Rabat in the west. In 1054 the Murabıts made an attack on the tribe of Zenata at the call of the citizens of Sijilmasa, but they refused to submit to him. Yasin then marched against Sijilmasa, and placed his kinsman Abu Bakr in charge of the Murabıts army. After this the Murabıts proceeded farther south and conquered the negro kingdom of Awdagarst, thus beginning the extension of Islam in the kingdoms of West Sudan. Yasin was killed in 1059, but the Murabıts had established a powerful state in Africa which spread down into Sudan. In 1062 they founded the city of Marrakas (Morocco) as their capital. In 1067 Yusuf b. Tashfin, the son of Abu Bakr's cousin, succeeded Abu Bakr as commander of the Murabıts. It was under him that the Murabıts community reached its greatest prosperity and Fars was taken by the Murabıts, who now became the greatest power in Africa.

In Andalus the Muslim community, weakened by internal dissensions and lacking a central authority, was hard pressed by the Christian kings who were pressing south. Their condition became desperate at the fall of Toledo to Alfonso VI of Castile and Leon. The leading Amirs of Andalus met and decided to invite Yusuf b. Tashfin, the chieftain of Murabıts. Yusuf came with his Berber army and defeated Alfonso at the battle of Zallaqa in 1086. This victory restored Muslim power in Spain. Then he returned to Africa leaving a part of his army in Spain. But very soon the Spanish Amirs again fell to fighting among themselves and Yusuf returned to Spain in 1088 to reorganise their confederation but this time they were not so well disposed towards him. In 1090 Yusuf came to Spain for the third time, removed the Murabıts government from Africa to Spain and governed Africa as a foreign possession. Yusuf b. Tashfin died in 1106 and was succeeded by his son Ali. Twenty-four years later there was a widespread revolt in Africa led by one 'Abdul Mo'min, the commander of Muwashhids. In 1147 the Muwashhids took the Murabıts capital Marrakas and the Murabıts line came to end.

THE MUWAHHIDS

The Muwashhids movement began with Ibn Tumart who went
to Spain and studied under Ibn Ḥazm. Ibn Ḥazm was a literalist who did not accept the current manuals of law and advised the Muslims to refer back legal matters to the Qur'ān and the Ḥadīth. After completing his education in Spain, Ibn Tūmart visited Damascus and Baghādād where he came under the influence of Ghazālī. From these travels he returned with a wider knowledge of current philosophy. His reforming zeal made him very unpopular in Tripoli and Tunis. So he moved further west among his Berber kinsmen. Here he met a young man ‘Abdūl Mo‘min who became his disciple. Afterwards he moved to the extreme west of Africa and organised his followers into two groups, a supreme committee of ten ‘companions’ and a supporting body of fifty ‘believers,’ the whole assuming the name of Muwāḥḥidūn or Unitarians. Ibn Tūmart then assumed the title of Māhdi and at the same time became the champion of Berber nationalism, preferring to use Berber in place of Arabic in the call to prayer and, it is said, produced a translation of the Holy Qur’ān in the Berber language. He is also said to have composed religious works in Berber and it is understood that a treatise of his is still extant in Arabic called Tawḥīḍ, which claims to be an Arabic translation of a Berber original. He established himself in Tinmāl and with the help of ‘Abdūl Mo‘min organised an army and began to propagate his reforms. He died in 1128 but his work was continued by ‘Abdūl Mo‘min.

The Murābit power in West Africa had fallen into decay. The Muwāḥḥids took Fars in 1146 and Marrakāsh in the following year. Murābit power in Andalus also collapsed in 1145 and two years later Muwāḥḥids took Seville. After this the Muwāḥḥids were supreme in Andalus as well as Africa (west). ‘Abdūl Mo‘min pushed his conquests in 1152 to Algeria, in 1158 to Tunis and in 1160 to Tripoli. Thus for the first time in Muslim history the whole coast from the Atlantic to the frontiers of Egypt became united with Andalus in an independent empire. The Murābit Empire had included, besides Spain, only Morocco and part of Algeria. ‘Abdūl Mo‘min died in 1163. Among his successors, his grandson Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb al-Manṣūr is the most famous. The Muwāḥḥids in Spain were confronted by the rising
power of the Christian kings in the north. The disastrous defeat at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212 resulted in their expulsion from Spain. The battle was fought about seventy miles east of Cordova. All Muslim Spain now lay at the mercy of the Christian conquerors. Gradually it was parcelled out among the Christian kings and local Muslim chiefs. Among the latter the Nasirids of Granada were the last representatives of the Muslim rule in Spain. The final blow came when in 1469 the two main Christian kingdoms of Spain, Castile and Aragon, were united permanently by the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon to Isabella of Castile, and Granada was conquered in 1492.

MUSLIM CIVILISATION IN SPAIN

The Muslim conquest of Spain proved an unmixed blessing to the general population and served to introduce intellectual enlightenment in benighted Europe. The Arab conquerors broke the power of the privileged group, including the nobility and clergy, ameliorated the condition of the servile class and gave the Christian landowners such rights as the alienation of their property which they did not possess under the Visigoths. The Christian communities were allowed complete freedom of faith and were permitted to live under their own ecclesiastical laws and native judges. The Muslim spirit of toleration influenced even the Christians of the north at a time when the rest of Europe suffered from religious intolerance and persecution of a most revolting kind. "Yet the fact of living contact with a Muslim people," says J.B. Trend, "had at least one advantage. It had created in the small cultivated minorities of the Christian kingdoms a spirit of toleration rare in Europe in the Middle Ages. The French Crusaders who had helped Alfonso VIII to win the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) deserted him in disgust when they saw how mildly they treated the conquered Muslims, while Pedro II of Aragon died fighting for the Albigensian 'heretics,' and several monarchs of Castille and Aragon surrounded themselves with learned Moors."

The Muslim population in Spain increased by marriage with the Christians and by conversion. One great inducement for conversion to Islam must have been the lure for freedom. "A slave on becoming Moslem," says Hitti, "was freed. No bondage in Islam." Marriages with Christians took place from the very beginning. The son of Musa ibn Nuşayr and other leaders of the expedition married into the families of Wittiza, the last king of Visigothic Spain, and throughout the country the mothers of the next generation, whether Muslim or Christian, were all Spanish. The Muslims of succeeding generations preferred the mothers of their children to be those fair-complexioned slaves captured in the north of Spain rather than or in addition to their own womenfolk. But the purchase of a slave was not so simple a transaction. It had to be concluded in the presence of a notary, and the purposes for which a female slave was required, as well as her capabilities and treatment, were carefully considered. Women enjoyed more freedom and more consideration under the Omayyads in Spain than under the 'Abbāsids of Baghda'd, yet it was thought highly desirable that those destined to become mothers of children in good families should be fair-complexioned and, if possible, Galicians. The result was that, although the descendants bore the name of their ancestors in the male line only, the purity of Arab race was diminished by crossing with Spanish strains in each successive generation. From the third or fourth generation after the conquest, most Spanish Muslims were bilingual. Besides Arabic, which was the official language, they used a Romance dialect. There were in fact four languages in Arabic Spain: classical Arabic, colloquial Arabic, Ecclesiastical Latin and a Romance dialect.

The Christians who flocked to Islam in mountain regions maintained their traditional culture, but in the cities they adopted the Islamic culture. As neo-Muslims they constituted a social class by themselves, called by the Arabs Muwalladin. In course of time these converts became the most discontented part of the population. Their ranks were recruited mainly from serfs.

and freedmen. They formed the majority of the population in several cities and were the first to take arms against the established authority. Another social class appeared in the form of Mozarabs. These were the Christians who imitated the Muslim way of living and adopted many Arab cultural patterns. They spoke Arabic and wrote in Arabic. In large cities these Arabicised Christians lived in quarters of their own, kept their special magistrates and usually bore double names, one Arabic, the other Spanish or Latin. They even practised circumcision and kept harems.

In the Omayyad period Cordova was the most cultured city in Europe and with Constantinople and Baghdad was one of the three cultural centres of the world. "With its one hundred and thirteen thousand homes, twenty-one suburbs, seventy libraries and numerous bookshops, mosques and palaces," says Hitti,¹ "it acquired international fame and inspired awe and admiration in the heart of the travellers. It enjoyed miles of paved streets illuminated by lights from bordering houses whereas 'seven hundred years after this time there was not so much as one public lamp in London,' and 'in Paris, centuries subsequently whoever stepped over his threshold on a rainy day stepped up to his ankles in the mud.' When the University of Oxford still looked upon bathing as a heathen custom, generations of Cordovan scientists had been enjoying baths in luxurious establishments." The same historian goes on to add that whenever the rulers of Leon, Navarre or Barcelona required a surgeon, an architect, a master singer or a dressmaker, it was to Cordova that they applied.

The Arabs introduced in Spain agricultural methods practised in Western Asia. They dug canals, cultivated grapes, and introduced many plants and fruits. This agricultural development was one of the glories of Spain and one of the Arabs’ lasting gifts to Spain.

But the real glory of Muslim Spain lay in the field of intellectual life. Al-Hakam, himself a great scholar, patronised

learning and established twenty-seven free schools in the capital. Under him the University of Cordova rose to great fame. It attracted students, Christians and Muslims, not only from Spain but from other parts of Europe too. In addition to the University, the capital had a library of the first magnitude. The agents of Al-Ḥakam collected books from all parts of the Muslim world. The books thus collected are said to have numbered 4,00,000, their titles filling a catalogue of forty-four volumes. "The state of culture in Andalusia," says Hitti,¹ "reached such a high level at this time that the distinguished Dutch scholar Dozy, followed by other scholars, went so far as to declare enthusiastically that 'nearly everyone could read and write.' All this whilst in Christian Europe only the rudiments of learning were known....

"Since the destruction of Cordova by the Berbers at the beginning of the eleventh century, Toledo had become the centre of Muslim learning in Spain and it maintained this position after the Christian conquest in 1085. The schools of Toledo attracted scholars from all parts of Europe, including England and Scotland. Among them were Robert, the Englishman, Robertus, the first translator of the Qur'an, Michael Scot and Adelard of Bath."

"The greatest contribution of Muslims in Spain to European thought," says J. B. Trend,² "was (as has been pointed out in another chapter) the work of the philosophers. Though they had adopted the narrowest and most orthodox forms of Muslim theology, they gave free rein to philosophical speculation; and although the Berber rulers—Almoravids³ and Almohades⁴—were inclined to fanaticism, they not only tolerated the speculations of the philosophers but even encouraged them, with certain reservations, so that the philosophers were left free and unhampered in their work of teaching, provided that the teaching was not spread abroad among the people in general.

3. Murābits.
"The great thinkers of Muslim Spain do not belong to the brilliant age of the Caliphate of Cordova, but to the ages of political confusion which followed. They rediscovered Greek philosophy, and above all the works of Aristotle. The historians and the dramatists were apparently unknown to them, but they introduced Aristotle to the West centuries before the revival of Greek scholarship which directly preceded the Renaissance and was one of the causes of the Reformation. They seem hardly ever to have known the Greek texts at first-hand to have translated from them directly; their translations were made as a rule from intermediate versions in Syriac; so that an English or Scottish student who wished to become further acquainted with the works of Aristotle, than was possible from the meagre Latin version at his disposal, found it convenient to travel to Toledo and read his Greek authors in Arabic. The transmission of Greek learning to West began at Baghdad, whence it was forwarded by Jewish or Muslim intermediaries to the Muslims in Spain; and thence, by Jewish intermediaries again, it was conveyed to wandering scholars from Christian Europe."

THE 'ABBĀSID STATE IN THE TENTH CENTURY

"In the 4/10 century," says Margoliouth,1 "the Empire again sank back to its pre-Arab condition. Individual States, with natural as opposed to artificial boundaries were formed." West Iran was Buwayyid, Mesopotamia, Ḥamdānid, Egypt and Syria rendered homage to the Ḥāshidids, Africa to the Fāṭimids, Spain to the Omayyads, Transoxania and Khurāsān to the Ṣāmdānids, South Arabia and Bahrayn to the Qarmātians. Only Baghdad and a portion of Babylonia was under the authority of the Caliph.

The local rulers acknowledged the suzerainty of the Caliph and in the first instance caused prayers to be offered for him in the mosques and purchased their titles from him, and sent annual presents to him. Thus when the Buwayyid, 'Adududdaula, conquered Kirmān in 358/968, he obtained the charter of confirmation from the Caliph. Though he was only a titular

head, the Caliph of Baghdād possessed considerable dignity and prestige. The idea of Caliphate was so overwhelmingly sublime that even the Spanish Omayyads did not assume the title of Caliph. The Fāṭimids were the first to do so. They aspired to be not merely temporal sovereigns but genuine successors of the Prophet. After the conquest of Qāyrawān they assumed the title of the Caliph. When ‘Abdur Raḥmān heard in Spain that the Fāṭimids were calling themselves Caliphs, he too adopted the title in 961.

The Muslim Empire extended in the tenth century from the extreme east at Kāshghar to remote Sās on the Atlantic and required ten months to traverse. “Within these borders the Muslim travelled under the shadow of his faith, and, wheresoever he went, found the very same God, the very same prayer, and the very same laws and customs. There was, so to speak, a practical code of citizenship of this Muslim Empire, for the faithful in all these countries was sure of his personal freedom and could on no account be made slave.”

The Fāṭimid Caliph, however, stood in sharp opposition to the ‘Abbāsid Caliph. Outside Africa, Yemen and Syria recognised his authority. He had his agents in every country. “In the year 401 a Bedouin chief, Shaikh of Agel, who held Anbar and Kūfa, went to the length of causing, under the very nose of the ‘Abbāside, prayers to be offered for the Egyptian Caliph, Al-Ḥakim until he was brought to his senses by the Buwayyid Bahāuddaula. It was some comfort to the Caliph at Baghdād that the newly risen star, Sūltān Maḥmūd of Ghaznī, always showed great respect, announced his victories, detailed his troubles to him.”

The possession of Mecca and Medina was hotly disputed, because the theory was put forward for the first time that the true Caliph was the one who held the holy territory. In the middle of the tenth century the Medinité ‘Alīd conquered Mecca. Thus Mecca, rather than Medina, became the centre of political gravity and the Sharīfs became the custodians of the holy towns.

At the beginning of the 4/10th century, the ‘Abbāsids

2. Ibid., p. 3.
successfully maintained their western frontier against the attacks of the Byzantines, but from 924 onwards the Byzantines began to expand at the expense of Islām. Masʿūdī mourns over the weakness of Islām in his days and laments the victories of the Romans over the faithful; the desolation of the roads and the cessation of the holy war.

In this century the Byzantine Empire had the good fortune of having three able guards, Nicephorus, Zimiskes, and Basil. In 961 Nicephorus conquered Crete. Five years later Cyprus fell and the Muslims no longer remained the undisputed masters of the Mediterranean. In 962 Nicephorus marched into Aleppo. In 968 Ḥamah, Emesa (חימס) and Laodicea were conquered by the same general and even Antioch fell to the Romans. When in the year 972 Mesopotamia was fearfully devastated, and even Nişibin was plundered, the people rose at Baghdād and Syria and Mesopotamian refugees attacked the palace of the Caliph. In the year 974 Baʿalbec and Bayrāt were also captured. Only Damascus escaped on payment of an annual war-tax of 6,000 dinārs.

But the retreat in the west corresponded with a steady advance in the east. In 925 Balūchistān was conquered by the Muslims. In 960 the inmates of 20,000 Turkish tents accepted Islām, and while at the end of the ninth century the last town of the empire, so far as the Turks were concerned, was Asfīqāb, the admission of Bogra Khāns into the circle of Muslim princes pushed the frontier on to the basin of Tarin.

THE MONGOL INVASION

Changez Khān, whose original name was Tamuchin, came into prominence in Eastern Mongolia during the latter part of the twelfth century in the course of Mongol wars against the Tartars. His troops were recruited from among the aristocrats of the Steppes. After his victory over the Tartars, Tamuchin accepted the title of Kagan from his troops and by 1203 he had organised a strong guard which formed the nucleus of his military advisers. The majority of Changez Khān's military generals came from this guard. The organisation of civil administration presented greater
difficulties. The Mongols of Changez were at a very low cultural level. The first representatives of civilisation at the court of Changez Khan were Muslim merchants. The Mongols had no alphabets and their youth had to learn reading and writing from the Uighurs. Thus the first teachers of the Mongols and the first state officials in the Mongol Empire were Uighurs. Both the Qara-Khitayas, of whom we have spoken earlier, and Uighurs in part worshipped the sun and in part were Christians. The first result of the adoption of the Uighur script was the codification of the Mongol customary law (yasâ), which together with the sayings of Changez Khan long remained the highest authority for the Mongol sovereigns. In spite of his acquaintance with men of culture, Changez Khan remained a firm Shamanist, and, on organising his military and civil administration, he appointed a man to the office of biki, i.e. the Shamanite chief priest.

By the end of 1211 the Mongol forces had already reached Semiryechye on the west and had united the northern part of this province into the Mongol Empire, but in the same year war with China began. The victories which Changez Khan won in China crowned by the capture of Peking in 1215 enhanced his reputation more than the union of Mongolian tribes. At this time the Khwarazmshah had also consolidated and expanded his empire and, like other Muslim kings, he had his eyes on China, whose wealth had always attracted the Muslim conquerors. Hearing that the Mongols, under Changez, had already conquered China, he sent a Khorezmian embassy to Changez with a view to ascertain facts. Changez Khan received the Khorezmian embassy very graciously and asked it to inform the Khwarazmshah that he considered him the ruler of the West and desired peace and friendly relations with him. It seems that Changez Khan had to rely upon import trade with the Muslim countries which supplied the Mongols with articles of clothing and even grain. The trade between China and Mongolia was in the hands of Uighurs and Muslims. In this case the interests of Changez Khan fully coincided with those of the Muslim trading class.

There was not the same harmony between the political ambitions of Alauddin Muhammed, the Khwarazmshah, and the
interests of the merchants of his kingdom. In Changez he saw a dangerous rival and had no view of the commercial interests of his subjects, which were considerable. Trade with distant countries like Russia and China brought enormous profits to the Muslim merchants and Muḥammad’s political ambitions were likely to ruin their prospects.

In reply to the Khwārazmshāh’s embassy, Changez Khān also despatched envoys and a trading caravan to the west. In the spring of 1218 the Khwārazmshāh received this embassy in Transoxania. A treaty seems to have resulted from this exchange of envoys. Pleased with the outcome of his efforts, Changez sent a caravan of merchandise from Mongolia consisting of 450 men, all of them Muslims. All the merchants were detained as spies by the Governor of Utrār, the frontier town of Muḥammad’s dominion. Whether or not Muḥammad ordered the execution of the merchants, the governor acting solely from cupidity had the merchants assassinated on charge of spying and seized their possessions and merchandise. Changez again sent his envoys to the Khwārazmshāh to protest against the action of his governor. The Muslim monarch not only refused to entertain the protest but ordered the envoys to be killed. Changez’s expedition into the Khorezmian dominions was thus rendered inevitable.

“Contrary to the view put forward by Muller,” says Barthold,1 “we see no reason for assuming that the collision between the two states was accelerated by an outside influence. The effort made by Chingiz Khan to enter into relations with the empire of the Khwārazmshāh is fully explained by the commercial interests of his influential Muslim advisers; if his envoys, on their sovereign’s order, called the Khwārazmshāh ‘the son of Chingiz Khan,’ this could hardly have been done with the intention of provoking Muḥammad, and even the latter did not put this forward as a causus belli. We can scarcely, therefore, attach any importance to the statement that the Mongols were called in by the Caliph Nāṣir against the Khwārazmshāh. Only in Mīrkhwānd do we find a detailed account of the Caliph’s

1. Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion, London 1928, p. 399.
embassy; in the thirteenth century this report existed only in
the form of rumours, which, in view of the inimical relations
between the Caliph and the Khwarazmshah, could not fail to
arise."

In 1219 Changez appeared before Utrar. At Utrar, probably
before the fall of the town, Badruddin, the governor, went
over to Changez. From Badruddin, Changez obtained detailed
information on the political condition of the country and on the
enmity of Turkân Khâtûn, mother of ‘Alâuddîn Muhammad, and
the military party to the Sultan, of which he afterwards made
use for his own ends. As early as the spring of 1220 Changez
had conquered the whole of Transoxania and had already
taken measures for the restoration of peaceful life. Up till then
the military operations had taken place in the provinces which
were united to the Khorezmian kingdom only under Takâsh
and Muhammad, and had not touched Khorezmia proper. This
province was ruled by Turkân Khâtûn, the mother of the
Khwarazmshah, who stood at the head of the military party.
The behaviour of her adherents in the conquered provinces
was one of the principal causes of the ruin of the Khwarazmshah's
kingdom, but Khorezmia proper was a prosperous province in
which the riches of the conquered provinces had flowed to the
full. Turkân Khâtûn would, therefore, have been able to make a
respectable stand against the Mongols, but she proved unequal to
the occasion and fled. By the summer of 1220 the Mongols
had reached Rayy.

Meanwhile ‘Alâuddîn Muhammad had perished and was
succeeded by Jalâluddîn Khwarazmshah who gained a few
victories, but was pursued and defeated by Changez successively
until he reached the Indus where a decisive battle took place
on 24 November, 1221. Changez Khan abandoned the western
countries before he had succeeded in consolidating his rule, but in
Transoxania and Khorezmia the rule of the Mongols from 1223
onwards was challenged by none.

Changez Khan's sons all returned with their father to the
East, except Juchi who remained in his extensive territories.
Changez died in August 1227 at the age of seventy-two leaving to
his successors not only a vast empire but also the guiding principles of its construction. He was succeeded by his son Ogdai. Meanwhile Jalāluddīn had returned to Khorzemia with the support of the Sulṭān of Delhi and reconquered his dominions. Ogdai sent 3,00,000 men into Khwārazm who defeated the Khwārazmshāh and overran almost unopposed the district of Diarebakar and Mesopotamia ('Irāq). After Ogdai's death, the Mongol Empire passed to Mangu Khān, who was a nephew of Ogdai. On his accession, reports reached Mangu that dissensions had broken out in Persia and he, therefore, sent, under his brother, Ḥalāgū an army to punish the Ismā'īlī assassins who were considered to have caused disorder. After subduing the assassins Ḥalāgū marched on Baghdād. In January 1258 Ḥalāgū was battering the walls of Baghdād. By the tenth of February he had forced his way into the city. The Caliph with his family and court rushed to offer unconditional surrender, but ten days later they were put to death. The city itself was given over to plunder and its population exterminated. For the first time in its history, the Muslim world was left without a Caliph whose name could be cited in the Friday prayers.

In 1260 Ḥalāgū was threatening northern Syria, where he captured Aleppo, Ḥamāh and Ḥarīm. After despatching a general to the siege of Damascus, he returned to Persia, but the army left behind him in Syria was destroyed at 'Ayn Jalāt by Baybars, the general of the Egyptian Mamlūks, who occupied the whole of Syria and brought to an end the onward march of the Mongols.

Ḥalāgū was the founder of the Mongol kingdom of Persia and the first to assume the title of ʻIl-Khān. This title was borne by his successors down to the seventh, Ḡāzān Maḥmūd (1295-1304) who embraced Islām, and consecrated much of his time and energy to the revival of Islamic culture.

CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL ASSIMILATION UNDER THE ʻABBASIDS

The ʻAbbāsid period of Muslim history was one in which a great intermixture of races and peoples took place within the fold of Islām. Arab national exclusiveness broke down before the
democratic ideal of Islam and we find Turks, Persians, Berbers, Jews and Christians and even Indians freely mixing with each other on a footing of equality and contributing to the common economic, cultural and intellectual life of the Islamic civilisation. There is perhaps no other example in the history of the world where an assimilation of cultures and ideas took place on such an enormous scale. Such a thing was made possible only by Islam which brought political and administrative unity to large areas of Asia and Africa and battered down the racial prejudices and exclusiveness of the conquerors as well as the conquered. Without this broad equalitarian and democratic framework constructed by Islam, such cultural assimilation could hardly have taken place. Both Alexander and Rome created a vast empire of many peoples and nations, but because the outlook of the people remained essentially unchanged, the intermixture of races and cultures could not take place on such an extensive scale.

The ‘Abbāsid period was marked by a high level of intellectual activity which had already started under the later Omayyads. “One of the first and most significant indications of the new orientation of Muslim thought,” says O’Leary,1 referring to the ‘Abbāsid period, “was the extensive production of Arabic translations of works dealing with philosophical and scientific subjects, with the result that eighty years after the fall of the ‘Umayyads the Arabic speaking world possessed Arabic translations of the greater part of the works of Aristotle, of the leading neo-Platonic commentators, of some of the works of Plato, of the greater part of the works of Galen, and portions of other medical writers and their commentators, as well as of other Greek scientific works and of various Indian and Persian writings. This period of activity in translating falls into two stages, the first from the accession of the Abbasids to the accession of Al-Ma’mun (A.H. 132-198), when a large amount of work was done by various independent translators, largely Christians, Jews, and recent converts from non-Islamic religions; the second under Al-Ma’mun and his immediate successors, when the work of translation mainly

centered in the academy newly founded at Baghdad, and a consist-
tent effort was made to render the material necessary for philo-
osophical and scientific research available for the Arabic speaking
student."

The fourth century A.H. was the golden period of the Arabic
translators. Although the work was done chiefly by Syriac-
speaking Christians, a very large number of translations were
made directly from the Greek. There were also translators from
Syriac, but they usually come after the translators from the
Greek. In philosophy the whole of the logical Organon was
accessible in Arabic and in this were included the Rhetoric and
Poetics, as well as Porphyry’s Isagoge. The Aristotelian logic
always remained an orthodox and generally accepted science.
The philosophical and theological controversies and the develop-
ments produced by the Arabic philosophers centered mainly on
questions of metaphysics and psychology, and were concerned
particularly with the 12th part of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the
treatise de anima. The psychology of Aristotle was interpreted in
the light of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary, and thus
received a theistic and supernatural colouring which receives its
fuller development in neo-Platonic teaching. Most important
in the fuller development of this neo-Platonic doctrine was the
so-called Theology of Aristotle which appeared in Arabic about
226 A.H. It was in fact an abridged paraphrase of the Enneads
of Plotinus and had nothing to do with Aristotle. By means of
this Theology the fully developed doctrine of the neo-Platonists
was put into general circulation and combined with the teaching
of Alexander of Aphrodisias exercised an enormous influence
on the philosophy of Islam. “In the hands of the philosophers
properly so called,” says O’Leary,1 “it developed an Islamic neo-
Platonism which received its final form at the hands of Ibn Sina
(Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes), and in this form ex-
ercised a powerful influence over Latin scholasticism. Trans-
mitted in another atmosphere it affected Sufism . . . and was
mainly responsible for the speculative theology which that mys-

ticism developed.”

Next to philosophy, the Muslims assimilated much medical knowledge from Hellenism and made further advances in this field of research. But this science, because it came through the medium of the Alexandrian school, had quasi-magical elements interfused with it. “The real impetus came ultimately from transmitted Hellenism,” says O’Leary,¹ “but this influence was derived immediately from the Nestorians in philosophy proper, and from the Nestorians and the Zoroastrian school of Junde-Shapur in medicine. A good deal later comes the influence of the pagan school at Harran, which also had a neo-Platonic tendency.”

The influence of Hellenistic heritage is most apparent in the rationalism of the Mu’tazila school which maintained the doctrine of God’s unity in such a way as to exclude the idea of the eternity of God’s attributes. This fact shows that while the Muslims did receive influences from Hellenistic and Christian sources, they utilised this knowledge in their own original way and were no mere imitators. Thus while the Christians had made use of the Hellenistic philosophical ideas to establish the doctrine of Logos, the Mu’tazila used that very philosophy to reject any notions which might savour of the Christian doctrine. In fact the Mu’tazila charged the Aḫḫa’ira, who believed in the co-eternity of divine attributes, with setting up innumerable gods, in place of the Christian Trinity. Nevertheless, it must be recognised that the dialectical weapons of both the Mu’tazila and Aḫḫa’ira betray clear traces of Hellenistic thought. Sufism was no less influenced by Platonic philosophy in its new form, i.e. neo-Platonism and much of Islamic mysticism is little else than an adaptation of Plotinus. But Hellenistic influences did not reach Islamic jurisprudence and the Western Orientalists, despite frantic efforts, have not been able to give any concrete proof of Hellenism in the field of Muslim Law. O’Leary² has made the following remarks on the subject: “As first conceived, ‘the preferable’ shows the influence of Roman law and Greek

2. Ibid., pp. 75-76.
philosophy, both of which contemplated an objective standard of right and wrong which could be discovered by investigation, the Stoic teaching, predominant in Roman Law, tending to treat this discovery as intuitive. Unsupported by other evidence, we might hesitate to suggest that istihsan necessarily had a Hellenistic basis, but when we compare the ideas of Abu Hanifa with the contemporary teaching of Wasil b. 'Ata (d. 131) in theology, we are forced to the conclusion that the same influences are at work in both, and in Wasil these are certainly derived from Greek philosophy. We are not justified in supposing that Abu Hanifa ever read the Greek philosophers or the Roman law, but he lived at a period when the general principles deduced from these sources were beginning to permeate Muslim thought, though in fact his teaching tends to limit and define the application of the general principles according to a system. The older Muslims supposed that good and evil depend simply on the arbitrary will of God, who commands and forbids as he sees fit: it was the influence of Greek philosophy which brought in the idea that these distinctions are not arbitrary but due to some natural difference existing in nature between good and evil and that God is just in that his decrees conform to this standard."

The only evidence which O'Leary relies upon in the above statement with regard to the influence of Roman and Greek ideas on Islamic Law is that Abū Ḥanīfa lived in a period when these ideas were abroad. But what would he say of Imām Mālik's principle of Istislah which was even more revolutionary in its import than Abū Ḥanīfa's Istiḥsān? Imām Mālik lived in Medina, where such ideas could have hardly reached. Again, O'Leary forgets that the Qur'ān itself may have been the source of such ideas; for the Qur'ānic approach to the problem of good and evil is highly pragmatic and in many verses the Qur'ān takes care to offer a rational justification for its commandments. The arbitrary conception of good and evil is not Qur'ānic.

The selective and integrative character of Islamic civilisation is recognised by many Western writers. "Islamic civilization," says Grunebaum,1 "seems omnivorous but actually is highly

selective. It has admitted, even searched for, contributions from outside as would help it to keep its identity under changed conditions, ... It encouraged foreign skills: the Christian physician, the Indian mathematician, and the Persian administrator and musician could count on appreciation and reward. It tried, and not infrequently preserved, alien forms of organization; the guilds of the ancient world, the financial system of the Sassanian treasury.... But while Islam for many a century continued liberal in accepting information, techniques, objects, and customs from all quarters, it was careful to eliminate or neutralize any element endangering its religious foundation, and it endeavoured consistently to obscure the foreign character of important borrowings and to reject what could not be thus adjusted to its style of thinking and feeling." The same writer again remarks,¹ "The tolerant attitude of Islam to the foreign material and its powers of assimilation are likely to create the impression of lacking originality. But Islam's originality consists exactly in the capacity of adapting the alien inspiration to its needs, of re-creating it in its own garb, and of rejecting the unadaptable. Islam can hardly be called creative in the sense that the Greeks were creative in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. or the Western world since Renaissance, but its flavor is unmistakable on whatever it touched; and, while very little of its conceptual and not too much of its emotional contribution is new or unique, its style of thought and range of feelings are without a real precedent."

The idea that Islam was not as creative as Greece or the modern West is based on a misunderstanding. Different civilisations are creative in different ways. The genius of Islam was not intellectual or artistic as that of Greece or the modern West. Its genius lay in the direction of social and racial equality. It was as creative as Greece and as original as the present West, but its originality and creativity turned in a different direction. It ceaselessly battered down national and racial barriers, eliminated from its followers all feeling of social and national exclusiveness and built a framework of civilisation in which people of widely

different racial and national origins could understand each other, sympathise and cooperate with each other and, while retaining their local and national manners and customs, could meet together on a common spiritual plane and share with each other a common outlook on life and faith in the universal moral values of humanity. Grunebaum himself attests this universal humanitarian aspect of Islamic civilisation when he says\(^1\): “Through emphasis on religion as the principal bond between people, Islam was capable, to a considerable extent, of maintaining the intellectual unity of its area long after political disintegration had set the various sections apart and against one another. The educated Muslim was acceptable everywhere on Muslim territory. The faith, learning based on this faith—although not always in harmony with it—and Arabic as the language of both kept united what the changing fortunes of princes and generals had ripped asunder and constantly re-grouped. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, the famous traveller (d. 1377), a native of Tangier, was made a judge first in Delhi, India, and later in the Maldivian Islands when he happened to pass through those countries. That great historian and statesman, Ibn Ḥaldūn, born in Tunis, served various princes in North Africa and finally sat as Chief Judge in Cairo. The number of non-Turks who on the basis of their Muslim faith rose to high and highest office in the Ottoman Empire is legion. The renowned physician and vizier of the Mongols, Rashid ad-Dīn (d. 1318), in a letter instructs one of his agents in Asia Minor as to the adequate remuneration in money and presents of the learned in the Maghrib … who had written books in his honor. Of these ten, six were resident in Cordova, Sevilla and other parts of Andalusia, and four in Tunis, Tripolis and Qayrawān. Political disunity had as yet left communication of ideas and the travels of the learned men unaffected.”

**CAUSES OF ‘ABBĀSID DECLINE**

The major cause of the ‘Abbāsid decline seems to lie in the character of the military power which supported the state. While the Omayyad military power rested on the feeling of Arab

nationality, the Omayyad army had neither a religious feeling, nor was it united by the sentiment of nationality. As it consisted of all races—the Arabs, the Persians, the Turks and the Negroes—there was no element of underlying unity. More and more it developed into a mercenary army, which could fight for any cause and support any power that gave it money. The introduction of the Turkish guard by Mu‘taṣim further introduced an element of disorder. These Turkish soldiers, although they had become Muslims, still retained their rude and barbaric national spirit. They had no respect for the Caliphs whom they served and soon made themselves into their masters.

"Then there were the social and moral forces of disintegration. The blood of the conquering element became in the course of centuries diluted with that of the conquered, with a subsequent loss of their dominating position and qualities. With the decay of the Arab national life, Arab stamina and morale broke down. Gradually the empire developed into an empire of the conquered. The large harems, made possible by the countless number of eunuchs; the girl and the boy slaves (ghilman), who contributed most to the degradation of womanhood and the degeneration of manhood; the unlimited concubines and the numberless half-brothers and half-sisters in the imperial household with their unavoidable jealousies and intrigues; the luxurious scale of high living with the emphasis on wine and song—all these and other similar forces sapped the vitality of family life and inevitably produced the persistently feeble heirs to the throne. The position of these heirs was rendered still more feeble by their interminable disputes over a right of succession which was never definitely determined."

Again, it should be remembered that the strength of the ‘Abbāsid Empire depended upon its commercial prosperity. As against the Omayyad State which was mainly agrarian, the ‘Abbāsid State was marked by highly developed trade and industry and the emergence of a strong and numerous trading class which formed the backbone of the economic system. But

this commercial prosperity and trading activity suffered a sharp decline owing to the formation of independent states and the internecine warfare in which the whole country was plunged due to the ambition and jealousies of local powers. An idea of the extent of commercial and industrial development of the ʿAbbāsid Empire may be formed from the following account given by Bernard Lewis¹: “The most important industry, both for the numbers employed and the volume of output, was that of textiles, which began under the Umayyads and was now rapidly expanded. All kinds of goods were produced, both for local consumption and for export... Linen was made mainly in Egypt where Copts played an important part in the three main centres Damietta, Tinnīs and Alexandria. Cotton was mainly imported from India, but was soon cultivated in eastern Persia and spread westwards as far as Spain. The manufacture of silk was inherited from the Byzantine and Sassanid Empires and centered in the Persian provinces of Jurjān and Sistān... Paper was first made in China, according to tradition, in the year 105 B.C. In A.D. 751 the Arabs won a victory over some contingents of a Chinese force east of the Jaxartes. Among their prisoners were some Chinese papermakers who brought their craft into the world of Islam. Under Harūn ar-Rashīd paper was introduced into Iraq. Although the use of paper spread rapidly across the Islamic world, reaching Egypt by 800 and Spain by 900, manufacture was at first limited to the eastern provinces where it was first introduced. But from the tenth century onwards there is clear evidence of papermaking in Iraq, Syria and Egypt and even in Arabia, and soon we hear of paper-mills in North Africa and Spain... “The resources of the Empire, and also the vitally important transit trade between Europe and the Further East, made possible an extensive commercial development, assisted by the establishment of internal order and security and peaceful relations with neighbouring countries in place of the incessant wars of conquest of the Umayyads.

“The trade of the Islamic Empire was of vast extent. From

the Persian Gulf ports of Sīrāf, Baṣra and Ubulla and, to a lesser extent, from Aden and the Red Sea ports, Muslim merchants travelled to India, Ceylon, the East Indies and China.

"In Scandinavia, and specially in Sweden, scores of thousands of Muslim coins have been found bearing inscriptions dating from the late seventh to the early eleventh centuries, showing the period of efflorescence of Islamic trade. Many finds of coins along the course of Volga confirm the evidence of literary sources as to an extensive trade between the Islamic Empire and the Baltic via the Caspian, the Black Sea and Russia."

It is quite clear that this extensive trade which was the mainstay of the economic prosperity of the ‘Abbāsid State must have suffered a great deal by the division of the Islamic world into independent kingdoms and the recurring wars which followed it. Such movements as were led by the Ismā‘ilians, the Qarmāţians and the rebellions like those of the Zanj must have greatly handicapped the trading activity. With the decline of commerce due to wars and disorders, the revenues of the ‘Abbāsids correspondingly decreased.

The ‘Abbāsid Caliphs sought the remedy for this state of affairs in a direction which led to the rapid development of feudalism. This resulted in further weakening the state authority. The rulers resorted to the farming out of state revenues, eventually with local governors as tax-farmers. Their duties were to remit an agreed sum to the central government and to maintain local forces and officials. These farmer governors soon became the real rulers of the empire and were rapidly identified with the army commanders. From the time of Mu‘taṣim and Wāthiq (842-847), the Caliphs gradually lost control to their own army commanders and guards who were often able to appoint and depose them at will. These commanders and guards consisted to an increasing extent of Turkish Mamluks. In the year 935 the office of the Amīr al Umara was created in order to indicate the primacy of the commander in the capital over the rest. Finally, in 945, the Persian house of Buwayh, which had already established itself as a virtually independent dynasty in Western Irān, invaded the capital and destroyed the last shreds of the
Caliph’s independence.

Parallel with this development went the creation of military fiefs, which again weakened the central authority as against the local lords. This was necessitated by the border warfare against the Byzantines, who were encroaching on the Muslim dominions. “From the seventh-century onward large parts of the frontier districts are given in fief to a hereditary caste of professional warriors. Islam and the Byzantine Empire know feudalism outside the border provinces, too, but its political importance was the greatest where a permanent state of alertness obtained to ward off the incursions of enemy raiders.”¹ This naturally led to the formation of a class of petty war lords who became increasingly independent of the Caliphs.

Chapter 6

TURKS UNDER ISLĀM

Origins

The region known as Transoxania and the adjoining territories was inhabited by nomadic Turkish tribes long before the Christian era. The principal feature of their nomadic life was to be found in the domination of the territorial aristocracy. There were no monarchs or clergy among the Turks as there were among the Persians. The local rulers were only the first noblemen.

When the Arabs began to extend their conquests to Central Asia, they had to deal with numerous small principalities constantly at war with one another, and with the brave but unorganised class of knights. The slowness of the Arab conquest is explained by the fact that the Arabs themselves were satisfied for a long time with military tribute and had no intention of making a permanent conquest of the country.

Qutayba, the governor of Khurāsān, was the first to undertake a campaign against the Turks. He made use of the dissensions of the natives of Transoxania. But Qutayba’s conquests were not secure and there were repeated rebellions among the subjugated Turks.

The frequent revolts of the Turkish inhabitants of Transoxania are fully explained by the character of the Arab rule. Unlike the ‘Abbāsids, the Omayyads had no broad imperial ideas. They were first and foremost the leaders of the Arab nation in the course of the war for the faith, concerned only to maintain their authority among the Arabs and to collect taxes from the subject peoples and tribute from the vassal rulers. Their governors were only military leaders and collectors of taxes. Alongside of them the native dynasties continued to exist and retained the civil administration in their hands.
The task of propagating Islam among the Turks was undertaken for the first time by the governor of Transoxania in 728, Aḥras b. ʿAbdullāh, who promised that tribute shall not be levied on the converts. The success of the mission exceeded all expectations and roused ill-will among the tax-collectors, the treasury officials and the dihqāns. The latter were anxious to retain their aristocratic privileges over the mass of the people and were afraid of the democratic equality of Islam, which was calculated to destroy social and economic distinctions. Owing to the influence of the treasury officials, a distinction was made between genuine converts and those who had adopted Islam for obtaining exemption from the taxes. The missionaries insisted, however, that all conversions were genuine. Hence the previous orders were reversed and the taxes were levied on all converts. A general revolt resulted. The missionaries who did not approve of the government’s policy made common cause with the rebels.

When Naṣr b. Sayyār became the governor of Khurāsān (738–748) he successfully crushed the revolts of the Turks. By taking advantage of the disintegration of the Western Turkish monarchy he re-established the Arab dominion in Transoxania and in 739 concluded treaties with the rulers of Ushrāsana, Shāsh and Farghāna.

Another period of confusion in Transoxania ensued with the establishment of the ‘Abbasid dynasty. Local Arab chiefs revolted against the ‘Abbasid authority. Simultaneously, the Chinese endeavoured to establish their suzerainty over the Turkish lands. They supported the native rulers in their struggle against the Arab rulers. Thus the Turks intervened in the disorders occurring in Transoxania, the Arab rebels themselves sometimes appealing to them for help. At the same time on the lower reaches of the Sir Darya arose the kingdom of the Qubra, a section of the Western Turks. These nomads did not undertake campaigns of conquest in Transoxania, but limited themselves to making sudden raids and rendering assistance to the native rulers and Arab rebels.

It was Aḥmad b. Abū Khaṣṣāid, a general of the Tāhirids, who began the task of reconquering Transoxania and the
adjoining territories. Kāwus, the ruler of Ushrūsana, was forced to surrender. He went to Baghdad, embraced Islam, and was established as the ruler of the province. He was succeeded by Haydar who became the first noble at the Caliph's court and achieved great renown under the name of Afšān, which was the title of the princes of Ushrūsana. The final subjugation of Transoxania and the adjoining regions was completed by the Sāmānids.

The influx of the Turkish element in Islam appears to have started with Mā'mūn who ordered his envoys to invite important natives to take service under the Caliph. "The same practice was followed to an even greater extent under Mu'tāṣim in whose reign the Turkish guards, among whom were incorporating also emigrants from Sughd, Farghāna, Ushrūsana and Shāsh, formed one of the mainstay of the throne. This circumstance contributed to the definitive assertion of Muslim rule in the country. By the time of Mu'tāṣim the inhabitants of Transoxania may be considered good Muslims and themselves began to do battles 'for the faith,' with their Turkish neighbours. The fact that under the Tāhirids the Caliphs still took some part in the affairs of the country is probably to be explained by the presence of important natives of Transoxania at the court of Baghdad. The Caliph Mu'tāṣim, albeit unwillingly, devoted two million dirhams towards the digging of a large irrigation canal in the Shāsh province: according to 'Auṣfī, it still existed in the thirteenth century. We have seen (above pp. 95, 99) that down to the last years of the reign of Muḥammad b. Tāhir certain lands in Transoxania were considered the private property of the Caliph."\(^1\)

The political causes which inclined the Caliphs to bring into prominence the Turkish element are explained by Bernard Lewis. He says\(^2\): "The Arabs had first met the Turks in central Asia and had for some time imported them to the Muslim Near

\(^1\) Barthold, W., *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, London 1928, p. 212.
\(^2\) *Arabs in History*, London 1950, pp. 146-147.
East as slaves, especially of the type trained from early childhood for military and administrative purposes and later known as Mamluks, to distinguish them from the humbler slaves used for domestic and other purposes. We find occasional Turkish slaves under the early Abbāsid and even under the Umayyads, but the first to use them extensively was Muʿtaṣim (833-842), who collected a large force of Turkish military slaves even before his accession, and later arranged to receive a large number annually as part of the tribute from the eastern provinces. The old Khurāsānī guards of the Abbāsid Caliphs had become Arabised and identified with the local population. The Persian aristocracy had now found its own political outlet in the independent dynasties of Iran, and so the Caliphs found it necessary to seek a new basis of support. They found it in the Turkish Mamluks under their Turkish commanders, expatriates with no local, tribal, family, national or religious affiliations, therefore more devoted to the central government. From the beginning the Turks were noted for their superior military qualities, which seem to have lain mainly in their use of mounted bowmen and the nomadic speed of their cavalry. From this time on the Caliphs relied to an increasing extent on Turkish troops and commanders, to the detriment of the older cultured peoples in Islam, the Arabs and the Persians. The progressive militarisation of the regime increased their strength.

"By the eleventh century the Turks were entering the world of Islam, not only as individuals recruited by capture or purchase, but by the migration of whole tribes of free nomadic Turks still organised in their own traditional way. The consolidation of the Sung regime in China after an interregnum of disorder cut off the route of expansion into China and forced the Central Asian nomads to expand westwards. The Turkish invaders of Islam belong to the Oghuz tribes and are usually known as Seljuqs, after the name of the dominant family of the invaders."

**ADVENT OF THE SALJŪQS**

By the beginning of the tenth century many Turkish peoples had become Muslims. Šārabī (d. 950), a great Muslim philosopher,
was a Turk. But the Ghuzz Turks under Khazar rulers who had accepted Judaism about 740, began to be converted to Islam only in the second half of the tenth century. The Ghuzz chiefs whose title was Yabgu had come under the influence of Judaism through Khazars, although the Ghuzz people as a whole remained Shamanist. In 922, however, one of the Ghuzz nobles, who commanded the armies with the title of Subashi, received an Arab mission. His successor became a Muslim which was a notable event, for Saljuq Subashi, a member of the same family, broke with the Yabgu who remained loyal to the Khazars and led the tribes under his rule in a migration east of Lake Aral to the country of the Muslim Turkomans on the lower Sir Darya. His sons, the Saljuqs, towards the end of the tenth century, became involved in a struggle between the Turkish Muslim Qara Khan dynasty, which ruled the regions of the central Tien Shan and Kashgar, and the Iranian Sasanid dynasty which ruled central Transoxania, the country north-east of the Amu Darya. In the beginning the Saljuqs under their Yabgu Israil aided the Sasanids, but later went over to the side of the Qara Khans and were thus responsible for transferring Transoxania from the Iranian Sasanids to the Turkish Qara Khans in 999.

As a result of the population pressures from the east, the Saljuqs were forced to leave their lands east of the Amu Darya in 1035 and migrate west of that river into Khurasan south-east of the Caspian Sea. Here the Saljuqs came into conflict with the Ghaznawids, who had replaced the Sasanids and who ruled over most of the territory between the Tigris, the Amu Darya, and the Ganges. In 1040 at Dandaqan in Khurasan, the Saljuq brothers, Chagri and Tughril, defeated the Ghaznawids. They thus opened the way to a swift conquest of Iran by the Saljuqs and the foundation of the Saljuq State. In 1055 Tughril entered Baghdad defeating the Buwayhids and incorporating Irak in the Saljuq realm. In a few years the Saljuqs had wrested Syria and Palestine from the local rulers and from the declining Fatimids.

The Saljuqs were Sunni Muslims and their capture of Bagdad was regarded by many as liberation from the Shii
Buwayhids. The Caliphs remained as nominal rulers, but the real sovereigns of the empire, the greater part of which was now united under a single authority, were the Saljuq Sultans who defeated both the Byzantines and the Fatimids in the West. The reigns of Tughril (1037-1063), his nephew and successor, Alp-Arslan (1063-1072) and the latter’s son Malik Shah (1072-1092) cover the most brilliant period of Saljuq ascendance over the Muslim East. In the second year of his reign Alp-Arslan captured Ani, the capital of Christian Armenia, then a Byzantine province. Soon afterwards he defeated the Byzantines at the battle of Manzikart (1071). This was the first time since the decline of the ‘Abbāsids that Muslim arms had prevailed over the Christian Byzantines. Saljuq nomadic tribes began now to settle in the plateau regions of Asia Minor, which henceforth became a part of the world of Islam. These Saljuq Turks laid the basis of the Turkification of Asia Minor.

The first two Saljuq Sultans did not live in Baghdad but exercised their authority through a military resident. Alp never visited or saw the capital. His seat of government was Isfahan, as Merv was the capital of his predecessor. It was not until 1091, shortly before the end of Malik Shah’s reign, that the Saljuq seat of government was moved to the capital of the Caliphs. Under Malik Shah Saljuq power reached its height. It included territories extending from Kashgar at one extreme to Jerusalem at the other. Malik Shah built roads and mosques, repaired wells, dug canals and spent large sums on caravanserais on the pilgrim route to Mecca.

The guiding genius behind Malik Shah’s administration was Nizam-ul-Mulk Tusī, his Persian vizir. Nizam-ul-Mulk was himself a cultured man. He wrote one of the most remarkable Muslim treatises on the art of government, the Siyāsat Nāma. Nizam-ul-Mulk was the first to establish well-organised academies for higher learning. Particularly renowned was his Nizamiyyah founded in 1065-1067 at Baghdad.

After the death of Malik Shah civil wars broke out among his sons and the empire broke up into several independent dominions. The Saljuq Empire was built up on a tribal basis and
could be held together only by a strong man. The main subdivisions of the Saljuqs were three. There were the Saljuqs of Persia among whom Sanjar is the most famous. Then there were the Saljuqs of Rûm. This kingdom was founded by Sulaymân ibn Qultumish, a cousin of Alp. His capital was Nicaea and it was from this city that Qilij Arslân, son and successor of Sulaymân, was driven out by the Crusaders. After 1084 Iconium (Qûniyyah), the richest and the most beautiful Byzantine city in Asia Minor, became the Saljuq capital. A third subdivision was the Saljuq dynasty of Syria (1094-1117) founded by Tüglü, son of Alp-Arslân, in 1094. He checked the advance of the Crusaders as well as that of the Fatimids.

**INSTITUTIONS OF THE SALJUQS**

Under the Saljuqs the ruling family alone was given the title of Sulţân and the honour of five bands (panj naubat), while the vassal Saljuqs were called Malikâs and had the honour of three bands. The Saljuqs further regarded the empire as their ancestral estate, an idea foreign to the Arabs and the Muslims in general. The empire, therefore, could be divided in accordance with the law of inheritance. “The Persian conception of the monarch,” says Barthold, “as the sole ruler of the state was also foreign to the nomads, in whose eyes the empire was the property of the whole family of the Khân. How foreign the idea of an autocratic ruler was at first to the Saljuqids is shown by the fact that in some cities of Khurâsân the Khûba was read in the name of Tughrul, and in others at the same time in the name of his brother Dawûd.”

An institution which the Saljuqs brought with them and which developed under favourable circumstances was the feudal institution. “All the princes of the royal blood had to be provided with some fief (Iqta’). That this was regarded as a right can be inferred from the unsuccessful revolts of Arslân Arghân and Mankubars. The former solicited Khurâsân from Barkiyârûk (son of Malik Shâh) as his fief and the latter finding his income

insufficient for his needs had no alternative but to revolt and claim the Sulţanate in the hope of getting some fief."

The provincial fief-holders were expected to pay a fixed annuity to the central government and to rally round the banner of the Sulţan with their own troops fully equipped in times of war. They, in their turn, sometimes appointed subordinate fief-holders independently of the Sulţan, as the custom of tax-farming was rampant in all parts of the empire. Where the subordinate fief-holders were unable to meet the conditions imposed upon them, the fief-holders frequently administered their fiefs directly through a deputy. The system of military fiefs seems to have proved very injurious to the strength of the Saljūqs. Writing on this subject, Barthold says: "In the Eastern half of the Muslim world this system only became widely developed after the Turkish conquest. Even in the earlier times there were isolated cases of grants of land as a reward to soldiers who had distinguished themselves in service, but these exceptions were so rare that Niẓām-ul-Mulk could assert that former kings had never distributed fiefs and paid their troops in money only. This system was still observed in his day in the Ghaznavid State. In the Saljuqid Empire the grant of a fief (Iqṭa‘) was of common occurrence, but this did not lead to the establishment of a system of servitude. Niẓām-ul-Mulk reminds the owners of fiefs that they are only allowed to take a specified sum from the inhabitants, and have no right beyond this to the persons, property, wives, and children of the population." His remarks further show that the distribution of fiefs resulted in the diminution of the territorial property of the ruler. Most of the troubles of the Saljūqs may be traced to the system of fiefs. "The troops were placed in a precarious position of divided allegiance—nominal to the Sulţan, real to their respective amirs. Inexperienced Sulţans, moreover, often lavishly rewarded ambitious amirs for good services with most flourishing provinces as fiefs, unmindful of the results of this generous but bad policy.

The amīrs, thus becoming more powerful, pursued their own factions and warlike interests in order to annex the fiefs of their lesser fellow-fief-holders and not infrequently even contested the authority of the Sultāns themselves. The latter had to combine with other amīrs to control the overbearing aggressors.”

Interesting sidelight is thrown on the development of feudalism under the Saljuqs by Bernard Lewis. According to him, it was Niẓām-ul-Mulk who developed and systematised the trend towards feudalism that was already inherent in the tax-farming practices of the immediately preceding period. “The misuses of the previous era,” says Lewis, “became the rules of a new social and administrative order based on land instead of money. Land was granted to or taken by officers. In return they furnished a number of armed men. These grants carried rights not merely to a commission on the collection of taxes, but to the revenues themselves. Though occasionally they became hereditary by usurpation, in theory and in usual practice they were granted only for a term of years, and were always revocable. The historian Bundārī, writing in the Saljuq period, points out that this was the only way to give the turbulent Turkish tribesmen and soldiery an interest in the prosperity of agriculture and remarks: ‘It had been the custom to collect money from the country and pay it to the troops and no one had previously had a fief. Niẓām al-Mulk saw that the money was not coming in from the country on account of its disturbed state and that the yield was uncertain because of its disorder. Therefore, he divided it among the troops in fiefs, assigning to them both the yield and the revenue. Their interest in its development increased greatly and it returned rapidly to a flourishing state.’ In these few simple words he has described the long transition from a monetary to a feudal economy.

“Social upheavals in such a period of change were inevitable. Land-owners under the regime were hard hit by the rise of a new class of non-resident feudal lords. Trade withered and declined.

1. Sanaullah, _The Decline of the Saljuqid Empire_, Calcutta 1938, p. 22.
Perhaps the clearest indication of the decline of trade is to be found in the coin hoards of Scandinavia. During the ninth and tenth centuries Arabic and Persian coins are very numerous and indeed predominate in these hoards. During the eleventh century they decrease greatly in numbers; thereafter they disappear."

An institution peculiar to the Saljuqs was the Atābegate which was a necessary corollary to the conception of the empire as a paternal property. Each prince of the blood royal was placed under the care of a Turkish general. During his infancy the Atābeg acted as his regent and after his father's death his mother married, as a matter of course, the prominent Atābeg who in his turn sometimes gave one of his daughters in marriage to his ward. The system had a detrimental effect on the imperial structure as it turned the princes into mere puppets in the hands of the adventurous Amīrs. The Atābegate system was moreover responsible for the investiture of several Saljuq slaves with kingships if their wards suffered premature death. The Atābegs were the real rulers and their wards were so many figureheads. Often an Atābeg deposed one prince and promoted another in order to safeguard his own interest, as he naturally preferred the weak one over whom he could exercise his absolute authority.

"The intervention of women in political disputes is a striking feature of the Saljuqid State. Their political status was almost similar to that of men, as can be shown by the importance attached to matrimonial alliance between the political leaders of the time."¹ Turkān Khātūn, the favourite wife of Malik Shāh, was the most prominent female figure in the civil war following the death of Malik Shāh. She was powerful in the administration even during the lifetime of Malik Shāh. "Even the non-Saljuqid ladies actively associated themselves with politics, perhaps in imitation of their Turkish comrades. The recorded instance of this kind, of a wife's political intrigues is that of Sultan Tughril, a daughter of the late Caliph Qā'im. . . . We even find women holding the important office of fief-holders and taking an active part in battlefields. . . . We sometimes find women

acting as envoys, as was the case of Barkiyaruq's sister who was married to Nasr, the brother of 'Ala'uddaulah, the Sultan of Ghazna.'

CALIPHATE AND SULTANATE

The Sultanate as a political institution, distinct from the Caliphate, was created when the 'Abbasid power was on the wane. Mahmud of Ghazna was the first person to assume the title of Sultan. But the jurisdiction of Caliph and Sultan became coterminous for the first time in the Saljuqid Empire. The Caliph's all-important function, it seems, was the insertion of the legitimate Sultan's name in the Khutbah after his own name. This can safely be inferred from the eagerness of each of the rival claimants to the Sultanate to have his authority legalised by the Caliph during the civil war following the death of Malik Shah. Turkum Khatun, Tasfih, Barkiyaruq and Muhammad all wanted to have their power duly authorised by the Caliph. During this period the Caliph had no temporal control on any part of the empire except the dubious dual administration of Baghdad itself. This was due to the absence of the Sultan from the metropolis. At Baghdad, the Shihnah was the representative of the Sultan, responsible for the preservation of law and order. But when he exceeded his powers and oppressed the people, the Caliph invariably used to intervene in the matter.

The Sultans had to take a formal oath of allegiance to the Caliph, and the latter thus became involved in the political strife of the period. Although everything was decided by the sword, the Caliph nevertheless gave the finishing touch by his legal sanction to the triumphant party. The Caliph's action was tantamount to a modern act of indemnity by which the legislature legalises an illegal act of the executive.

RELIGIOUS SECTARIANISM AND THE RISE OF THE BATINIDS

With the decay of Caliphate, sectarian feelings among the Muslims seem to have grown in strength. In 1095 the Hanafis and Shafis of Nishapur joined hands against the Qarmatians.

After many acts of vandalism had been committed on both sides, including the destruction of the Qarmatian Madrassahs, the Ḥanafīs and the Šafīʿīs got the upper hand. There was great loss of life on both sides. In 1116, there took place another great sectarian riot at the Mašḥad of ʿAlī b. Mūsā al-Riḍā in Ṭūs. A certain ʿAlīd quarrelled with some of the learned jurists which developed into a Sunnī-Shīʿa riot.

Much greater harm was done by the sectarianism of Bāṭinīds, a sect of the Ismāʿīlians who had broken off from their mother branch, that of the Fāṭimidbs. They developed a very strong organisation and acquired many strongholds in the empire. The decline of the strong central government facilitated the promotion and propaganda of the subversive Bāṭinī heresy, which in its turn still more weakened those at the head of the state by murdering the political geniuses of the time. The fidāʿīs who were the lowest in the order of the Ismāʿīlis were so fanatical and devoted to their leaders that they were ready to give their lives at the behest of their superiors and death never scared them. Their first political victim was no less a person than Niẓām-ul-Mulk. In 1100 two Bāṭinīds assassinated Amir Bulkābak, the Shihnah of Iṣfahān. In 1106 the Qāḍī of Niṣapur was murdered by a Bāṭinī.

The Bāṭinīds occupied by force or fraud many mountain fortresses of the empire and established a rule of terror throughout the country, so much so that even the Vizirs and other high officials of the state were in constant danger of loss of life. Bāṭinī elements were discovered even in the army of Barkiyārūq and they intimidated their religious opponents. They were on the verge of mutiny when Barkiyārūq ordered a ruthless suppression of them. All the Bāṭinīds in the army who were identified were executed.

As the Bāṭinīds succeeded in establishing a sort of brigand government within the imperial state, the revenues of the places under the de facto authority of the former were naturally lost to the de jure sovereignty of the latter. This duplication of jurisdiction led to the abject pauperisation of the population and to the deficiency of the imperial Exchequer. So the Sulṭāns resorted to
base means of collecting revenues by imposing illegal customs and excise duties.

THE CRUSADES

Ever since its rise Islam had to face the opposition of the Christian-Hellenistic civilisation in Asia Minor, Africa, and Spain. On the one side was the Greek Church and the Byzantine Empire which had not been completely subjugated and which, in fact, began to expand at the expense of the Muslim Empire during the period of ‘Abbāsid decay, till it was again checked by the Saljuq Turks at the battle of Manzikart. On the other hand was Latin civilisation and the Holy Roman Empire of the West, which began to assert itself with the decay of Muslim Spain, the breakup of the Saljuq Empire after the death of Malik Shāh and the decline of the Fatimids. The peculiarity of the Crusades “is that the Latin Christianity of the West moved over into the East, hitherto secluded from it, and that here it came into contact, on the one hand, and nominally as an ally, with the Greek Church and the Eastern Empire and, on the other, it declared hostility, with the Muhammadans of the East. Perhaps the primary and the most fruitful element in the crusades is the simple fact of the entry of the West into the East. And yet the simple fact has its complications, for the East into which the West made its entry was itself full of complications. Not only Latin Christianity had to make its terms and settle its relations with the Greek Christianity of Byzantium. Muhammadanism also was divided: the Sunnite Turks, who had established themselves in Western Asia from the Black Sea on the north to the Red Sea on the south, were confronted in the debatable land of Syria, by the Shiites of Egypt under the Fatimid dynasty; and the crusading West had to discover, and to use as best as it could, an opposition of which it was hardly aware.”

The eleventh century was a period of the gradual recession of Muslim arms before the advance of the Christians. In Spain the

small Christian powers of the north—Leon, Castile, Aragon and Navarre—embarked on a period of expansion. South of Italy, torn by disputes between Byzantine governors and Arab raiders, fell into the hands of the Normans. Pope Benedict VIII had instigated the Pisans to occupy Sardinia. Genoese and Venetians brought to an end the domination of the Western Mediterranean by Muslim corsairs. Thus a more consolidated West was trying to expand into the Muslim lands. But history showed that the Muslim civilisation, though feeble and decaying, had yet enough reserves of inner strength to meet this challenge. The Turkish race, a newcomer into Islam, was still capable not only of defending Islam but of penetrating into the West.

The immediate cause of the Crusades was the pressure of the Seljûq Turks. Alp Arslân’s general, Atsiz, captured Jerusalem in 1070 from the Fāṭimids who were more tolerant towards the Christians. Similarly, the Byzantine Empire was threatened by the defeat of Manzikart (1070). The needs of Jerusalem and the necessities of Byzantium alike demanded action on the part of the Christian powers.

But there were deeper causes at work also. The social development of feudalism, under the influence of the Church, had created a military society which was always eager for private war. At first the Popes attempted to check it by diverting the knights to the defence of justice and the remedy of oppression, thus helping to create a new chivalry. But Urban II demanded at Clermont in 1095 that the fratricidal abuse of private war should be turned into a Holy War against the world of Islam. The Crusades further promised a solution of the problem of feudal over-population. The younger sons of feudal nobility had little prospects at home. The founding of the Norman kingdom of Sicily and a Latin kingdom of Jerusalem provided an outlet for feudal emigrants. The Crusades, again, afforded a new vent for the commercial ambitions of the growing Italian ports; and the Venetian, Pisan, and Genoese establishments on the Syrian coast, which served as entrepots for the great routes of Asiatic trade, were no small factor in the history of the Latin settlement. Italian ships accompanied and aided the progress even of the
first Crusade; the help of the Italian towns was a necessity in the war of sieges which led to the subsequent growth of the kingdom of Jerusalem; Italian transports carried the annual flow of pilgrims; and both for good and for evil the commercial motive was added to the spiritual impulse of the Crusade."

"By the spring of 1097 some hundred and fifty thousand men, mostly Franks and Normans, had responded. Constantinople was the rendezvous. They bore the cross as a badge; hence the designation Crusaders. The first of the campaigns was thus launched. Its route lay across Asia Minor, then the domain of Qilij Arslān. In June of that year Nicaea, Seljuq headquarters, was captured. In the next month Dorylaeum (modern Eski-Shehr) fell. The victorious march restored to the Byzantine emperor, who had exacted from almost all the crusading leaders an oath of feudal allegiance, the larger portion of Asia Minor."

For the first thirty years the disunity of the Muslim world made things easy for the invaders who marched rapidly down the coast of Syria into Palestine, establishing a chain of Latin feudal principalities, based on Antioch, Edessa, Tripoli and Jerusalem. This period was one of colonisation and assimilation. Conquerors and pilgrims settled in Syria, adopting local dress and customs, intermarrying with the local Christians.

"But even in this first period of success," says Bernard Lewis, "the Crusaders were limited in the main to the coastal plains and slopes, always in close touch with the Mediterranean and Western world. In the interior, looking eastwards to the desert and Iraq, the reaction was preparing. In 1127 Zangī, a Seljuq officer, seized the city of Mosul for himself, and in the following years gradually built up an even stronger Muslim state in northern Mesopotamia and Syria. His progress was at first impeded by the rivalry of other Muslim states and notably of Damascus, the ruler of which did not scruple to ally himself with the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem against the common enemy. In

II47, the Crusaders unwisely broke the alliance, and Nur ad-Din, the son and successor of Zangi, was able to take Damascus in II54, creating a single Muslim state in Syria and confronting the Crusaders for the first time with a really formidable adversary. The issue before the two sides now was the control of Egypt, where the Fatimid Caliphate, in the last stages of decrepitude, was tottering towards its final collapse. The result could not long remain in doubt. A Kurdish officer called Salah ad-Din, better known in the West as Saladin, went to Egypt, where he served as Wazir to the Fatimids while representing the interests of Nur ad-Din. In II7I Saladin declared the Fatimid Caliphate at an end. He restored the mention of the name of the Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad in the Mosque services and on the coinage and established himself as effective ruler of Egypt, professing an uneasy and uncertain allegiance to Nur ad-Din. After the latter's death in II74, leaving a minor as heir, Saladin absorbed his Syrian domains, thus creating a united Syro-Egyptian Muslim Empire. In II87 he felt strong enough to attack the Crusaders. By his death in II93 he had recaptured Jerusalem and expelled them from all but a narrow coastal strip which they held from the towns of Acre, Tyre, Tripoli and Antioch.

"The united Syro-Egyptian state created by Saladin did not last long. Under his successors, the Ayyubids, Syria broke up once again into a number of small states but Egypt remained a strong united monarchy, the chief Muslim power in the Near East and the bulwark of Islam against the West, defeating the repeated attempts of the later Crusades to recapture the Holy Land."

The final blow to the Crusaders was dealt with by the Mamluks of Egypt who followed Salahuddin and his successors. Baybars (1260-1277) inaugurated a series of Sultans who led the war against the Crusaders. Baybars had already distinguished himself under his predecessor Qu TZ uz when at Ayn Jalut he inflicted a crushing defeat on the Tartars. This victory paved the way for there union of Syria and Egypt, a reunion which continued under the Ottoman rulers. Baybars was provoked when he found the Crusaders making common cause with the Uulquid Il-Khans of Persia who were at this time favourably disposed
towards Christianity. From 1263 to 1271 he conducted annual raids against the Crusaders. One after another the Latin establishments yielded. Baybars was succeeded by an equally worthy ruler, Qalawun (1279-1290). He reduced Tripoli in 1289 but died in the midst of his preparations against ‘Akka. His son, Al-Ashraf, stormed this city in 1291. With the fall of ‘Akka half a dozen towns on the coast yielded to the Mamluks. By the end of the thirteenth century Latin Christianity was entirely expelled from the mainland of Asia. But the Crusaders retained their hold on the islands of Cyprus and Rhodes.

Among the direct results of the Crusades was the commercial penetration of the East by the people of the West. "What the crusades did," says Ernest Barker,1 "was to establish a feudal Syrian state—occupied partly by individual feudatories and partly by the feudal chartered companies of the Templars and Hospitallers—to which the commercial impulses, for a time, particularly attached itself, and in which it created for itself the various ‘quarters’ occupied by the Venetians, Genoese, and Pisans in the ports along the coast." Colonies of Western merchants flourished in the Levant ports under crusading rule. They survived under the Muslim reconquest and developed a considerable trade both of export and import.

Another result was the impact of Islam on Latin Christianity, although the influence of Islam was not comparable to that which it exercised from Spain and Sicily. Islam acted more profoundly from its bases in Spain and Sicily than it did from its bases in Mosul, Baghdad and Cairo. There was never established in Syria itself the potent influence of a mixture of cultures, such as was found in Sicily under Roger II and Frederick II. Again, the Latins of Syria were never able to draw upon the riches of the Muslim culture, as the Christians of the Western Mediterranean were able to draw on the culture of Muslim Spain. "The Latin kingdom of Jerusalem," says Ernest Barker,2 "was a rude military

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2. Ibid, p. 54.
settlement without the impulse, or at any rate without the time, for the creation of any achievement of civilisation. It was a foreign legion encamped in castles and barracks: it came into no close contact either with the tillers of the soil in the Syrian village or with the artisans who were busy, then as now, in making carpets and pottery and gold-work in the towns... Nor if they had the power to draw (and their time was too brief, and their footing too precarious and hostile for them to do so) was there any neighbouring Muhammadan civilisation on which they could draw. The Western Mediterranean had the culture of Arabic Spain before its eyes. Here Ibn Rushd, jurist, physician, and philosopher, was teaching till the end of the twelfth century; here the Jews had come into contact with Arabic philosophy, and Maimonides, under its influence, had attempted to reconcile Aristotle with the Old Testament; and here the Latin Christianity of the West learned, about 1200, a deeper knowledge of Aristotle than it had been able to acquire before from the solitary source of Boethius' translation of the Organon. The Mosque Library of Toledo, which fell to the Spaniards with their conquest of the city, became a resort of scholars; and the Arabic Aristotle of Spain was one of the sources of the scholasticism of the thirteenth century. Nor was this all. The border warfare south of the Pyrenees became a theme of poetry; and just as the border warfare of English and Scots produced our own border-ballads, or the struggle of Greeks and Turks in the Taurus produced Byzantine Chansons de Jeste, so the battles of Christian and Paynim in Spain were the theme of the Song of Roland and the legend of the Cid Campeador. It was otherwise in the East. Here Arabic philosophy was beginning to wane by the first Crusade; and no native poetry was stimulated by all the border-battles of the twelfth century. The great Ibn Sinā had died in Hamadan in 1037; Ghazālī, a sceptic who has been accused of destroying philosophy which he professed, died in Khurasan in 1111; in 1150 the Caliph at Baghdad was committing to the flames a philosophical library, and among its contents the writings of Ibn Sinā himself. In days such as these the Latins of the East were hardly likely to become the scholars of the Muhammadans; nor were
they stimulated by the novelty of their surroundings to any original production."

The chief service of the Crusades, according to the writers, seems to have been that it brought Latin Christianity into relations with the Byzantine Empire and Greek Christianity. Before the first Crusade the Church and Empire of the West had been separated from the Church and Empire of the East by a gulf of oblivion. After 1096 the rulers of Byzantium were in constant relations with the powers of the West. At the end of the fourteenth century and during the fifteenth century Byzantine scholars brought to Italy the full wealth of the Greek inheritance and provided the Italian renaissance with its material.

THE MAMLÜKS OF EGYPT

The Mamlûk dynasty in Egypt followed the last Ayyûbid ruler Al-Šâliḥ Najmuddîn Ayyûb who died in 1249 leaving a widow Shajarah-Durr. She proclaimed herself queen. For forty days she ruled alone over Egypt but was then forced to marry her commander-in-chief, ʻIzzuddîn Aybak, who was declared Sulṭân. "Aybak (1250-57) was the first of the Mamlûk Sulṭâns. The series is unique in dynastic annals, for, as the name indicates, this dynasty—if it could be so called—was a dynasty of slaves, slaves of varied races and nationalities constituting a military oligarchy in an alien land. When one of them died, quite often it was not his son but a slave or a mercenary of his who had won distinction and eminence who succeeded him. Thus the bondman of yesterday would become the army commander of today and the Sulṭân of tomorrow. For almost two and three-quarter centuries the slave Sulṭâns dominated by sword, one of the most turbulent areas of the world... Two other services to the cause of Islâm were rendered by them; they cleared Syria and Egypt of the remnants of the Crusaders and they definitely checked the redoubtable advance of the Tartar Mongol hordes of Hulâgû and of Tîmûr (Tamerlane). But for that the entire course of culture and history in Western Asia and Egypt might have been different.

"Originally purchased in the slave-markets of Muslim Russia and the Caucasus to form the personal bodyguard of the Ayyûbid
Al-Ṣāliḥ, the first Mamlūks started a series which is somewhat arbitrarily divided into two dynasties, Baḥrī (1290-1390) and Burjī (1382-1517). The Baḥrīs received their name from the Nile, on an islet in which their barracks stood. They were mostly Turks and Mongols; the Burjīs were largely Circassians."

In the middle of the thirteenth century the power of the Turkish Mamlūks in Cairo was supreme. "The ruling caste of the Mamluk State (1250-1517 = A.H. 648-923)," says Poliak, "was organised as a feudal Cavalry, consisting almost exclusively of foreigners of various origins; in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries mostly natives of the Golden Horde, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries mostly Caucasians and specially Circassians. All of them denoted themselves as 'Turks,' since their common language, which distinguished them from the despised natives, was a Turkish dialect. Their literature written in this language is poor and almost unpublished." Many Mamlūks including some Sultāns could hardly speak Arabic.

The most distinguished ruler of the Mamlūks was a Qipchaq Turk called Baybars. He united Muslim Syria and Egypt into a single state, this time more permanently. He defeated the Mongols and crushed the Crusaders. He also invited a member of the 'Abbāsid family to Cairo with the title of Caliph. The 'Abbāsid Caliphs of Cairo were mere functionaries of the Mamlūk Sultāns. The Mamlūks granted fiefs to the powerless 'Abbāsid Caliphs as pensions. "As a fief-holder the Caliph was considered a member of the military class and he possessed in consequence a coat of arms (rank) . . . when first the Caliph Al-Mutawakkil was exiled to Constantinople after the conquest of Egypt by the Ottomans, he held his Egyptian fief, but afterwards Sultān Salīm I ordered him to divide it with two other exiled 'Abbāsids."

The Mamlūk system of Baybars and his successors was feudal and was an adaptation of the Saljuq feudalism brought into Syria.

3. Ibid, p. 35.
and Egypt by the Ayyūbids. An officer or Amīr received a grant of land in lieu of pay and on condition of maintaining a certain number of Mamlūk soldiers, varying between five and a hundred according to his rank. He normally devoted two-thirds of his revenues to their upkeep. The grants were not hereditary though there were many attempts to make them so. The system was based on the permanent eviction of the Arabised descendants of the Mamlūk officers by newly imported Mamlūks, thus preventing, perhaps deliberately, the formation of a hereditary landed aristocracy. A Mamlūk officer received his grant for life or less. He did not normally reside on his estates, but in Cairo or in the chief town of the district where his fief lay. He was interested in revenue rather than possession. There was no subinfeudation, and even the division of the land in Egypt into fiefs was not permanent, being subject to a periodical redivision. The feudal aristocracy had considerable privileges. The law suits relating to the knights and Amīrs and to their fiefs were settled not by the Qādīs and according to the Islamic law, but by the military judges and according to the laws of Yasa originating from the regulations of Changez Khān. Many offices not necessarily of military character were reserved for knights and Amīrs only, but we often find "men of sword" entrusted with offices which had to be assigned, according to custom, to native civil and religious officers.

The trade with Europe, and particularly the trade between Europe and the Further East via the Near East, was of vital importance to Egypt, both for the trade itself and for the custom revenues derived from it. During periods of strength, Mamlūk governments protected and encouraged this trade, which brought Egypt great prosperity and a new flowering of arts and letters. But the Mongol threat, warded off by Baybars, was not yet averted. In 1400-1401 the Turco-Mongol forces of Tīmūr ravaged Syria and sacked Damascus. Plague, locusts and famines completed the work of the departed Mongols, and the Mamlūk Sulṭanate suffered a blow to its economic and military strength from which it never recovered.

In the fifteenth century economic decline and financial crisis brought a new fiscal policy aimed at extracting the maximum
possible amount of money from the transit trade. The policy adopted was the monopolisation of the chief local and transit products. The rising prices that resulted provoked European retaliation and upset the whole economic life of Egypt.

An important factor was the virtual breakdown of the Mamlûk system of recruitment by purchase. Owing to difficulties in the countries of origin by the Black Sea, new intakes were irregular and of poor quality. The historians of the period paint a vivid picture of the increasing corruption and inefficiency of the regime in its last days.

In 1498 came the crowning disaster. On May 17 of that year the Portuguese navigator Vasco de Gama landed in India, having come by sea around the Cape of Good Hope. In August 1499 he returned to Lisbon with a cargo of spices. He had opened a new route from Europe to the Further East, cheaper and safer than the older one. Other expeditions followed rapidly. The Portuguese established bases in India and developed direct trade, dealing a mortal blow to the Levant route and cutting off the life-blood of the Mamlûk State. The Mamlûks, recognising the immediate consequences of these events and urged to action by their Venetian fellow-sufferers from this diversion, tried by diplomacy and then by war to avert the Portuguese menace. Their efforts were fruitless. The Portuguese fleets, built to face the Atlantic gales, were superior in structure, armament and navigational skill to the Muslims. Soon they were able to defeat the Egyptian squadrons, systematically destroy Arab merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean, and penetrate even to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

The Mamlûk dynasty was finally destroyed by the Ottoman Turks. Rivalry between the Mamlûk and Ottoman Sultanates for supremacy in Western Asia asserted itself in the second half of the fifteenth century. But hostilities did not begin till 1486, when Qâyt-bay contested with the Ottoman Bâyazîd II the possession of Adana, Tarsus and other border towns. Shortly afterwards hostilities began between Ottomans and Persians who had built up a powerful state in Iran under the Šafawids. As a result of war, the Šafawid army was completely destroyed and
Mesopotamia was occupied by Salīm I. Salīm charged that the Mamlūk Ḍanṣawāh Ǧhorī had allied himself to the Ṣafawids in Irān. At Marj Dābiq in 1516 the Mamlūk army was defeated by the Ottomans. Egypt and Ḥedjāz with it were incorporated in the Ottoman Empire.

THE OTTOMAN TURKS

The Ottoman Turks belonged to the Qayī branch of the Ḍughuz tribe. The Ḍughuzes are one of the most important branches of the Turkish people. In the tenth century the Ḍughuzes began to migrate from Central Asia towards the south and the west; they penetrated in large numbers into Irān, Armenia, Anatolia, the Caucasus and Southern Russia, from there crossing the Danube into the Balkans, while others reached Mesopotamia and Syria. The Turkish hosts with the help of which the Saljuqs established their rule over the greater part of the Islamic world were Ḍughuzes.

"According to Turkish traditional history," says Encyclo-pædia Brittanica,¹ "a horde, variously estimated at 2,000 to 4,000, driven originally from their Central Asian homes by the pressure of Mongol invasion, were returning under their chief Suleiman Shah to their native land. They were crossing the Euphrates, not far from the castle of Jaber, when their leader was drowned by accident. Those who had not yet crossed the river decided to remain with Ertoghrul, son of the drowned leader. Ertoghrul first camped at Jessin, east of Erzurum, then obtained from the Seljukian Sultan Alaeddin lands near Ankara. The help afforded by Ertoghrul to the Seljukian monarch on a critical occasion led to the removal of the lord to Sugut for permanent settlement. Here Ertoghrul died in 1288 at the age of 90, being succeeded in the leadership by his son Osman. When exhausted by the onslaughts of Ghazan Mahmud Khan, ruler of Tabriz, and one of Jenghiz Khan's descendants, the Seljukian empire was at the point of dissolution, most of its feudatory vassals helped its downfall in the hope of retaining their fiefs as independent sovereigns. Osman remained firm in his allegiance, conquered

Karaja Hissar (1295) and received investiture of the lands he thus acquired from Sultan Alauddin Kaikobad II. He became master of Aingeul, Bilejek and Yar Hissar, but it was only after the death of his protector that Osman declared his independence, and accordingly the Turkish historians date the foundation of the Ottoman Empire from this event."

POLITICAL CONDITIONS OF ASIA MINOR PRIOR TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

As we have seen, the battle of Manzikart (1071) inflicted a decisive blow on the Byzantine Empire. A few years after this, Turkish bands flooded the whole of Asia Minor and one of their chiefs, the Saljuq prince Sulayman, established himself in Nicaea not far from Constantinople. The Saljuqs do not seem to have had any intention against Byzantium. Even after their victory at Manzikart, their armies did not penetrate much further into Byzantine territory. They treated the emperor with magnanimity and sent him back to his country. Thus the conquest of Asia Minor which followed the battle of Manzikart was not all the work of the Saljuqs. What had happened was that the continuous wars between the Byzantines and the Muslim power led to a special military organisation on both sides of the frontier. Between the military border-lands and the peaceful hinterland on either side, there existed the greatest cultural contrast. The increase of the warlike elements brought together from the most distant parts of the world gave rise on both sides of the frontier to a curious mixture of nationalities and languages, to a population completely different from that of the hinterland. The continuous frontier fighting, again, created warrior clans, faithfully devoted to their chiefs and aspiring to the greatest possible independence. They tended to offer resistance to all administrative interference and specially detested taxation.

On the Muslim side of the frontier the Turkish element became dominant. "The Turks were at this time the main representatives of the military class. They dominated not only the regular armies, but also the widespread popular movement of the Ghazis which appeared at first in the east, in Khurasan and Transoxania. This movement of the Ghazis—that is, the
'Warriors of Faith'—attracted to its banner all the unemployed and discontented warlike elements for the purpose of fighting infidels and heretics."\(^1\)

The defeat of the Byzantine army in 1071 and the confusion which followed led to revolts against the Byzantine central power and the establishment of a number of independent Armenian principalities. The Byzantine system of defence thus collapsed. The Ghāzis became ever more daring. Their success attracted all those Turkish elements which had not yet been incorporated in the Saljuq Empire. The natural leadership of these large and heterogeneous masses lay in the hands of the Ghāzis.

The Saljuqs could not disregard the fact of the conquest of Asia Minor by these Turkish Ghāzis, even though they themselves had no part in it. In order to secure control of the conquered territory, they sent a prince of their own line, Sulaymān b. Qalṭumūṣ to Asia Minor. Sulaymān desired to carve out a dominion for himself not in Asia Minor but in the area of Muslim civilization. "Not until the middle of the fifteenth century did the successors of Sulaymān, established in the country round Konia, learn to renounce their dreams of a career in the old Moslem world and to appreciate Asia Minor as their home and field of action. It is only now that they became in reality what they are called in history: the Seljūks of Rum. This change of attitude on the part of the Konia Saljuks towards Asia Minor involved an unavoidable breach with the Danishmends, who until then had held the undisputed leadership in Turkish Asia Minor."\(^2\)

The Danishmends were the Ghāzīs of the frontier but they had no cultural and political relations with the Muslim kingdoms in the East. On the other hand, the Saljuqs of Rām maintained cultural and political links with the Muslim States of Syria and ʿIrāq which led to the influx of Muslim theologians, merchants and artisans from the East and contributed to the stabilisation of their dynasty. The issue between them and the Danishmends,

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\(^2\) Ibid, p. 21.
therefore, was decided against the latter. The Dānishmands were eliminated. After their extermination, the Ghāzīs were joined by kindred elements from the former Dānishmand possessions and wandered here and there raiding and attacking the frontier towns of Byzantium which could secure no help from their own government and, therefore, fell more and more under the protection of the Saljuqs of Qonia. By the year 204 the state of Qonia had united under its rule the whole of Turkish Asia Minor. After this came the Crusades and the Byzantine Empire was re-established on a firmer basis. For more than half a century the frontier was free from Turkish Ghāzī raids and there was not only peace but an alliance between Qonia and Byzantium. Then came the Mongol invasion which brought large masses of Turkish nomadic tribes and also military bands from dispersed armies towards the state of Qonia. These discontented elements revolted in 1239 under Baba Ishāq. Qonia was growing weak every day. More and more it became the vassal of the Mongols. On the other hand, the borderlands kept their independence and began to sever their ties with Qonia. The Sulṭāns of Qonia now could not hinder them from attacking the Byzantine frontier.

THE OTTOMANS

We have seen the activities of the Ghāzīs in the borderland between Byzantium and Muslim territories. These activities had resulted in the establishment of many independent Amīrates (small kingdoms). Among these Amīrates was also one which was led by the Ottoman Ghāzīs under the leadership of Othmān. Another important Ghāzī Amīrate was that of Karamān. After the disappearance of the Saljuqs of Qonia in about 1300, the Karamāns took possession of the former Saljuq State and made Qonia their capital. Thus the Ghāzī character of the Ottoman State was not peculiar to it. Other Amīrates also owed their origin to the Ghāzī movement. A few words must be said about the aims and methods of this movement.

The Ghāzīs arose in response to the disturbed conditions of the Muslim world and of Asia Minor in particular. In addition to the common battle-cry against the infidels, the Ghāzīs were
characterised by special institutions and regulations by virtue of which they could feel themselves to be distinct from other communities. The Ghāzīs acknowledged the futūwwa which was a canon of rules by means of which the virtuous life, as understood by Islam, might be lived. In addition to the Ghāzīs, there was another futūwwa corporation called Akhīs, which was a brotherhood consisting of artisans and merchants. These futūwwa corporations were re-organised about 1200 by the Caliph Nasir. The Ghāzī movement which arose in response to the Muslims’ struggle against the Crusaders became now in Syria and ‘Irāq an institution comparable to the European knighthood.

Of all the Ghāzī states on the Byzantine border that of the Ottomans alone survived. There were many reasons for this extraordinary vitality of the Ottoman Ghāzī State. The Ottoman State lay in close proximity to the Byzantine capital and while other Ghāzī Amīrates had already consolidated their conquests, the Ghāzīs of ‘Othmān were held by a defensive system which, in the neighbourhood of the Byzantine capital, was carefully maintained. In the struggle with this extraordinary resistance the Ghāzī State of ‘Othmān developed its full strength. During this long period of fighting the Ghāzīs of ‘Othmān were joined by all those warlike elements which, in other Amīrates with definitely established frontiers, found no further occupation. This was another source of the dynamic power of the Ottomans.

Nor should it be forgotten that the Ottomans were situated closer to the districts of Saljuq urban culture than any other Ghāzī State. The Akhī organisation of artisans and merchants already formed an important element in the state of ‘Othmān. “The presence of Akhīs,” writes Wittek,1 “shows that at a very early date numerous urban elements had joined the Ottomans from the hinterland. Of still greater importance are the ‘Ulema, the Moslem clergy, who represented the forces capable of developing an administrative system. Immediately after the conquest of Brusa and Nicaea, schools of theology

(medreses) were erected in these towns. This proves that the 'Ulema had already acquired a strong position in the Ottoman State. The early intervention of the 'Ulema is also of much importance in another way: together with the old Moslem governmental traditions they brought the principle of tolerance towards Christians and Jews, which was closely connected with their financial policy, based on the payment of tribute by the non-Muslims in return for this tolerance. Thus they exercised a very necessary influence over the Ghazi State. For although the Ghazis were very tolerant regarding the civilisation of the conquered country, they themselves having long since taken root in that civilisation, yet they were and remained the relentless 'warriors of the faith,' continually incited by fanatical dervishes to force Islam upon the inhabitants of the conquered country. We may say that while a breach in the civilisation was avoided, thanks to the Ghazi character of the conquerors, it is due to the early intervention of the 'Ulema that this civilisation could continue to exist under the preserving forms of the old creed. This was specially the case in the towns, where the influence of the 'Ulema predominated.'

PROGRESS OF THE OTTOMAN CONQUESTS

Towards the end of his reign, 'Othman deputed the chief command to his younger son, Orkhan, by whom Bruşa was captured in 1326. Orkhan's military powers secured for him the succession, to the exclusion of his elder brother Alauddin who became his grand vizier. At his accession, Orkhan was practically on the same footing as the other independent Amirates which followed the disintegration of the Saljuc State of Qonia and were trying to claim succession to the Saljuqs. Orkhan avoided weakening himself in the struggle for Saljuqian inheritance, preferring at first to consolidate his forces at Bruşa. Thence he continued to win territory from the Byzantines. The whole of the shore of Marmora up to Kartal was conquered by Orkhan and the Byzantines retained, on the continent of Asia Minor only, Ala Shehr and Biga. In 1345 large contingents of Ottoman troops
were sent to Thrace to aid the Emperor John VI Cantacuzenus against his rival John V Palaeologus. The Ghāzīs, returning from this expedition with rich spoil, made it clear to Orkhan in which direction his future conquests lay. The goal was Thrace and Macedonia and the way led over the Dardanelles and the peninsula of Gallipoli. Separated from the Dardanelles by the Ghāzī Amirate of Karasi, the Ottomans took advantage of the internal weakness and dissensions that had seized it. Shortly afterwards Ottoman troops in the service of Cantacuzenus were given a stronghold on Gallipoli by the Emperor, and, a little later, this became the base for their occupation of the whole Gallipoli peninsula, the starting for their further expeditions into the Balkans.

But before the Ottomans undertook these conquering expeditions in the West, they extended their eastern Anatolian positions. Murad I, who had succeeded Orkhan in 1362, had to secure his newly acquired territories against a coalition headed by the Amīr of Karaman. Later on, Murad had once again to fight the Karamans and their allied Amīrs, and he always returned victorious and with additional gains of Anatolian territory. But he also systematically increased his Anatolian possessions by peaceful methods.

Since about 1360, the Ottomans began to invade the Balkans. Again the Ghāzīs pushed forward the frontiers of Islam. Only these actions were no longer spontaneously undertaken by independent Ghāzī hosts, but were deliberate and well-organised state enterprises. The fact that the Ottoman State remained the only real Ghāzī State attracted the entire warlike youth of Anatolia and all those elements who were full of enthusiasm for the religious war. Thus, while the Ottoman State continually grew in power and in size, the other Amīrates were fading away. These Amīrates now joined their forces in a last desperate attempt to wipe off the Ottomans but they were defeated and swept out of existence.

In 1400 the Ottomans had incorporated them all and were masters of almost the whole of Anatolia. By that time they had taken nearly all the European possessions of Byzantium, and there remained only Constantinople. Bulgaria too had been
conquered and Serbia reduced to a small part of her former territory. The Turkish armies were already fighting in Bosnia, Albania in the Peloponnesus and Wallachia; Turkish Ghāzi raiders had penetrated into Hungary. In 1396 Bāyazīd, the son and successor of Murād I, had to fight an army of knights which included the King of Hungary and a grandson of the French King and which was sent to stop the march of Muslim arms. Bāyazīd defeated this European coalition in Bulgaria near Nicopolis. He besieged Constantinople and contemplated the conquest of Syria.

But his intended conquests in the Muslim east brought him into collision with a formidable power. In 1402 Timūr penetrated as far as Angora and defeated the army of Bāyazīd, taking the latter prisoner. The Amīrates of Asia Minor were restored and the remaining Ottoman territory was broken up into several parts. Wittek has the following explanation for the defeat of Bāyazīd. “Not only did Bayezid,” he says,¹ “overlook the fact that his state still lacked internally all that was necessary for the establishment of an empire, but he also failed to perceive the real direction in which development towards an empire lay, the direction followed by his predecessors with unerring instinct. The propitious harmony which had up till then existed between the Ghāzi movement and the traditions of the old Moslem world; between the conquest of Christian countries and extension towards the Muhammadan East was lost under Bayezid. Both his internal and external policy abandoned the traditions of the Ghāzīs and displayed a unilateral inclination towards Islam. The ‘Ulema, now too numerous and too powerful, not only succeeded in winning over the Sultan to the more subtle habits, pleasures and arts of High Islam, but also to their own views on the organisation of the State. This they now endeavoured to fashion according to old Moslem traditions, much too fast and without regard to the existing conditions. Above all, the ‘Ulema converted the Sultan to their ideas of external policy, which naturally, concerned the countries of High Islam, which were their spiritual home. It was this which led to the conflict with Timur and to

¹ The Rise of the Ottoman Empire, London 1938, p. 47.
the catastrophe of Angora. The behaviour of Timur after his victory was remarkable. Though he stayed for several months in Anatolia, he had no intention of incorporating it into his state, but aimed only to re-establish the Ghāzī emirates which had been annexed by Bayezid. There was only one more warlike act which he achieved in Anatolia: he conquered Smyrna, which had been held by the Franks since the days of Ghāzī Umur Beg. After this he withdrew. Timur's behaviour must be understood as a demonstration to the public opinion of Islam that by his intervention in Asia Minor, he had desired nothing more than to recall the Ottomans to their real task—that is, the Ghāzī idea, which they were beginning to renounce. By achieving himself a deed worthy of a Ghāzī in taking Smyrna, he thought to win the approbation of the entire Moslem world. In this way the Ottoman State was saved by the prestige which it possessed as a Ghāzī State."

For some time further disputes between Bāyazīd's sons delayed the Turkish revival. In 1413 Muḥammad I, the survivor, was recognised as Sultan and in his reign of eight years he nearly recovered all his father's territories. Muḥammad I was succeeded by Murād II. Murād remained in Asia to crush a rebellion headed by the Karamāns but his generals continued the wars against the Greeks, Albanians and Walachians. By this time it was widely recognised that a further Turkish advance in Europe could only be prevented by the combined action of the peoples affected. In 1422 a force of Slavs and Magyars under Hunyadi recovered some European possessions of Murād. Meanwhile, again confronted by a rebellion of the prince of Karamān, Murād crossed into Asia and obtained the former's submission granting him honourable terms, in view of the urgency of the peril in Europe. In 1444 a ten years' peace was signed with Hungary, after which the Sultan retired and abdicated in favour of his son. The Pope urged the King of Hungary to take advantage of this opportunity and nineteen days after the truce had been concluded a large army of many nations crossed the Danube under the leadership of the King of Hungary. Murād was prevailed upon to return and had to hasten to Varna where he routed his enemies. Murād is said to have abdicated a second time. The
later years of Murād's reign were troubled by the successful resistance offered to his arms in Albania by Sikanderbeg. In 1448 Hunyadî collected the largest army yet mustered by the Hungarians, but was defeated in the famous battle of Kossovo in 1451. Murād died at Adrianople, being succeeded by his son Muḥammad II. After suppressing a fresh revolt of the prince of Karamān, the new Sulṭān proceeded to fulfil his long-cherished ambition of the conquest of Constantinople. Muḥammad began the siege of Constantinople in 1453. The Byzantine emperor failed to receive any support from the Western powers. On May 29, 1453, the city was carried by assault and the Holy Prophet's prophecy came to its fulfilment. The Sulṭān then proceeded to subdue the southern part of Serbia. Walachia was next reduced to the state of a tributary province. The conquest of Bosnia was also completed. The Turks continued to press the Venetians by land and sea; Albania was overrun and Venice was forced to a treaty. Crimea was the next to suffer subjugation.

 Muḥammad II was the organiser of the fabric of Ottoman administration in the form which it retained practically unchanged until the reforms of Maḥmūd II. Under him the independent Amīrates of Asia Minor were finally subjugated. Many educational and benevolent foundations were endowed by him and it is to Muḥammad II that the organisation of the ʿUlema and the religious class is due.

The Ottoman Empire reached its full height under Sulaymān I, the Magnificent (Al-Qānūnī, the lawgiver, 1520-1566), son of the conqueror of Syria and Egypt, Salīm I. Under Sulaymān the greater part of Hungary was reduced, Vienna was besieged, Rhodes was occupied and North Africa, exclusive of Morocco, acknowledged Ottoman suzerainty. The failure of the second attempt to capture Vienna in 1683 marked the beginning of the end. The empire under Sulaymān extended from Budapest on the Danube to Baghdad on the Tigris and from Crimea to the first cataract of the Nile. The Ottoman State was one of the most enduring Muslim States. From 1300 to 1922, when the empire came to an end, thirty six Sulṭāns, all in the direct male line of ʿOsṭāmān, ruled.
It was Sulṭān Salīm I (1512-1520) who incorporated the Arab world in the Ottoman Empire. After his decisive victory at Marj Dābiq he triumphantly entered Ḥamāh and Ḥims, both of which capitulated. Salīm then received the submission of Tripoli, Ṣafad, Nābuwīs, Jerusalem and Gaza. On his way back from Egypt he lingered long enough in Syria to consolidate his position and organise the new domain. In explanation of Salīm’s eastern conquests, Halide Edid says¹: “Selim the Grim, the grandson of the Conqueror, first detected an inner weakness in the Ottoman State. It was like a mosaic of nations, and the Christian part of the design far outweighed the rest. So the Sultan turned his back to the West and directed his armies to the Moslem East. His cruel treatment of the Shiites during his Persian campaign, though partly due to his relentless nature, was also an attempt to unify Islam within itself. After his conquest of Tabriz he marched to Syria and Egypt and annexed the Arab Moslem world to the Empire. The Moslem block was vastly increased.

“This sudden change of direction in Ottoman expansion is regarded as a pan-Islamist move. But it seems to me far more probable that it was the innate desire for stability in the Ottoman mind which led Selim to attempt to create an equilibrium among the nations of whom the State composed.”

The Caliphate question in Turkey also dates back to Salīm’s conquest of Egypt. The last Caliph was residing in Egypt when Salīm conquered it. The Caliph had lost all temporal power and was only a shadow of his former self. It is said that Salīm brought the Caliph to Istambul and received the title and privileges of the Caliphate from him. But the veracity of this statement has been disputed by some historians.

OTTOMAN STATE SYSTEM

According to Halide Edib,² “The formula which would explain the ingredients that went to the making of the Ottomans as state-builders would be this: ‘Ottoman Turkish strength and nomadic virtues plus Islamic principles of social justice and

¹ Edib, Halide, Conflict of East and West in Turkey, Delhi, 1935, p. 24.
² Ibid., p. 19.
non-discrimination of race plus Greek ideas of bodily training plus
Byzantine organisation plus Roman realism and strength plus
Plato's "Republic."

"In this formula the inclusion of Plato's 'Republic' may
perhaps appear as a far-fetched idea to some. But I am not the
only student of Ottoman history and system who is struck by its
influence. Professor Lyber, the author of 'Suleyman the Magni-
cificent,' a work which I believe to be the most classical and
masterly study of the Ottoman system by a modern writer, comes
to the same conclusion: 'Perhaps, no more daring experiment
has been tried on a large scale upon the face of the earth than
that embodied in the Ottoman ruling institution. Its nearest
idea is found in the "Republic" of Plato.

"Plato would have been delighted with the training of the
Sultan's family. He would have approved of the lifelong
education, the equally careful training of body and mind, the
separation into soldiers and rulers, the relative freedom from
family ties, the system's rigid control of the individual, and,
above all, of the government of the wise. Whether the founders
of the Ottoman system were acquainted with Plato will probably
never be known, but they seem to have come as near to his plan
as it is possible to come to a remarkable scheme. In some
practical ways they improved upon Plato—by avoiding the
uncertainties of heredity, by ensuring a balance of power, and
making their system capable of a vast imperial rule'."

The Ottoman State was a military state par excellence. We
have seen that it was the Ghazi movement which built up the
Ottoman State and forced it to expand westward. Hence its
military character remained the most dominant characteristic of
the Ottoman State. Thus Gibb says,¹ "Owing to the direction
that this expansion took, not only was a certain Byzantinism
impressed from its beginnings on the growing Ottoman State,
but, even more important, its military character was preserved
for good. For though the frontier of Islam was thereby

¹. Gibb, H. A. R., and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, Vol. I,
advanced simultaneously, and it thus remained, as it were, a frontier organisation with all the obligations of military preparedness that this necessitated. Moreover, the expansion was so rapid as to forbid an assimilation of the infidel populations included within the new frontiers. A military government was necessary on this account as well, therefore: to keep the peace between them and hold them down.''

The head of the civil as well as the military government was, of course, the Sulṭān. He was the only individual in the State whose hereditary rights were recognised, but he had no divine rights. He was trained from his early youth and made to serve as a private soldier in his own army and work in the civil administration, in order to get experience before he became a Sulṭān. "Except in so far, then, as the obligation to maintain Seria (Shari'at) was concerned (an obligation for the rest, more loyally accepted by the Ottoman Sultans than by any other previous universal Islamic dynasty), it may be concluded that the general conception of the powers and functions of the monarchy in the Ottoman Empire was but little affected by Islamic ideas. The Seleukids (Saljuqids) had been thoroughly impregnated with Persian doctrines which fitted in but too well with Turkish views based upon the military organisation of the Turkish tribe and these they had passed on to their Ottoman successors. The main function of the 'World-creator'—hünkär, one of the favourite titles of the Ottoman Sultans—was to keep the world on its axis by seeing that his army was paid and that no class of his subjects trespassed upon the rights and duties of any other class. The weaker the personal authority and influence of a Sultan, the more rigidly was he held to the strict observance of traditional customs and usages.'" The Sulṭān had the power to make laws on his own authority if they were not repugnant to the Shari'at. These laws were called Qanuns. The 'Ulema who were the guardians of the Shari'at recognised the personal initiative of the Sulṭān in legislating on matters concerning 'Urf or Customs.

The Ottoman State-system may be divided into two parts:

the Ruling Institution and the Muslim Institution. The Ruling Institution, apart from the Sultan himself, included the officers of his household, the executive officers of his government, the whole body of the army, 'standing' and feudal, and the navy. In the best days of the Ottoman rule all posts in the Ruling Institution except most of those in the feudal army and the navy, were as a rule filled by the personal slaves of the Sultan, either conscripted from the Christian population or acquired in some other manner.

The Muslim Institution consisted of the 'Ulema with the Shaykh-ul-Islam at its head. This was another strong and very definitely trained caste, an independent body whose primary duty was to supervise the religious and judicial affairs of the Muslims. The 'Ulema always had existed in Muslim States. But the Turks were the only people who converted them into a regular institution and incorporated them as part of the State-structure. This regimentation of the religious class had nothing to do with Islam. It was the product of the Turkish national genius, and, therefore, Islam ought not to be blamed for some of the glaring evils which resulted in later times from bureaucratising the upholders of Islamic law and turning them into cogs of the State machinery. In the beginning, however, the 'Ulema played a most commendable and progressive role in the State-structure of the Ottomans. They acted as a moral control over the rigid despotism of the State, because they could depose the Sultan, and no new law could be passed without their approval. They were also the only defenders of the rights of non-Muslims. In more than one instance they stood up against forcible conversion of the Christians. But for the 'Ulema and the Shari'at of Islam, the Ottoman rule would have been purely despotic without the least measure of democracy. This is a fact which should not be forgotten by the opponents of Islam and its Shari'at. Thus, when Salim returned from the Eastern campaign, he proposed to have all the Christians converted by force or persuasion but Shaykh-ul-Islam, Jâmâl Effendi, objected and refused to sanction the proposal on grounds of Islamic teachings in regard to freedom of religion and conscience.
Early in Ottoman history, the Turkish forces had come to fall into two groups: those paid in cash from the Sultan's treasury, and those given land with the right to collect taxes and dues from its inhabitants. And though both of them seem originally to have been composed of free-born Muslims, these gradually ceased to take service in the first, as the employment of slaves became more common. Thus the paid army, as distinct from feudal cavalry (which formed the majority of the land-holding soldiery), came to be almost exclusively a slave corps, the personal property of the Sultans. The purchase and employment of slaves as soldiers was not peculiar to the Ottomans. The system had come into existence during the days of the later 'Abbasids. The Saljuqids from whom the Ottomans had derived many of their traditions had a large feudal army and a small slave bodyguard. But the Ottomans transformed this institution by introducing characteristic features of their own. As the supply of Ghazi volunteers diminished and large-scale fighting in Europe ceased with the consequent fall in the number of captured slaves from the conquered, the Sultans decided to make periodical levies of the unmarried male children of their Christian subjects, taking them from their parents at the age of ten to twenty, reducing them to the status of slaves, and training them for the service of the State. Whereas in the earlier days the administration of the growing Empire had been conducted by free Muslims, now they were replaced almost without exception by the slaves of the Sultans, so that the Muslims of the Empire found themselves excluded from the State administration. "The selection of Christians," says Halide Edib,1 "may have been due to missionary motives, but it is equally obvious that the intention was to detach the child entirely from his environment. Each region had to provide a certain number of children. The recruiting officer went to the village or the town inscribed on his list, studied the registers, asked for the children, and made his choice according to the appearance, manners, physique and intelligence of the candidates. This system is called 'Devshirme'

in Turkish and 'Blood Tribute' by the Western historian. There was no force used. On the contrary, parents were over-anxious to give their children. The Moslems, who were barred from this privilege, often bribed their Christian neighbours to pass theirs as Christian boys. The boy who was selected could become a commander, a governor, a grand vezier.

"These children came to the palace school and underwent a very severe education. The bodily part of it was very much on the Greek or Spartan lines. The mental consisted of a training in the classics, music. Arabic, Persian and Turkish and other subjects were considered unessential part of learning at the time. Every youth, including royal children, had to acquire proficiency in some handicraft as well."

The use of the word 'slave' in this connection must not be misunderstood. As Gibb¹ points out, "their servitude carried with it scarcely any social inferiority. No distinction was made between the sons of slave women born to a free master and those whose mothers were always free. Indeed most of the Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdád, to say nothing of minor dynasts, were born of slave mothers." The Christian boys thus drafted into State service nearly all accepted Islam, not because they were forced to do so, but because they could not otherwise obtain any influential position.

"The employment of slaves in the administration as well as in the army," Gibb² adds, "were nothing new in Islamic history either. But never before had free Muslims been all but entirely excluded from it. No doubt the fact that they were so excluded in this case may be connected with another: namely, that the proportion of non-Muslims in the Ottoman population (particularly before the Asiatic conquests of the sixteenth century) was unprecedentedly high. For the loyalty of these infidels could be expected to be at best but grudging; so that, unloved as they were, at the same time, by so many of the Moslems under their rule, the Sultans were perhaps possessed of relatively fewer dependable

². Ibid; p. 44.
subjects than any of the dynasts their predecessors. The institution of the *Kapi Kullari* (personal slaves of the Sultan), therefore, may be held to have corresponded to a special need. It at once served to protect the Sultans from overthrow by a subject population exceptionally liable to disaffection, and to secure to the non-Moslem section of the population—though by a method well-calculated to obscure the advantage of this privilege to its beneficiaries—a place in the State machine commensurate with its preponderant numbers.

"The Moslems, to be sure, had another institution as their equally exclusive field—that of the *Ulema*, the students of the *Seria*. But the Ottoman empire was a Moslem State in which it was paradoxical that any institution should be reserved for the infidel born. How the Moslems contrived to rebel we shall describe later. Suffice it here to say that by the eighteenth century the whole institution of a slave-manned Ruling Institution had been swept away. For Moslems had captured nearly all the posts it formerly included and with disastrous results."

The *Kapi Kullars* (personal slaves of the Sultan) were not allowed to marry until the age when they retired. Their sons were disqualified for membership in the Institution so that the whole system was non-hereditary. Those who gave promise of mental capacity were trained for the administration. Others who showed no intellectual vigour but only physical fitness were drafted into the personal army of the Sultan. These were the famous Janissaries.

**THE JANISSARIES**

They were called 'Ajam Oghlans (literally, Foreign Boys). Those unable to speak Turkish were first placed under the service of the feudal sipahis in Anatolia, but all were brought sooner or later to Istambul. There they were scrutinised again and appointed to various duties according to their capacities. There are indications that the Janissary organisation was modelled or at least influenced by that of a religious movement to which the Ottoman enterprise owed much of its vigour. This was the Akhī movement. In so far as the first Ottoman conquests were
undertaken from religious motives, many of the townsmen who entertained such motives, including persons closely connected with ‘Oθmān, were members of this movement. Hence it would seem that the Janissaries were first established at a time when there was complete accord between the interests of the Sulṭān and those of his subjects. They were founded as a bodyguard of the Sulṭān and consequently followed him wherever he went. But as the corps increased in size, through a considerable number of troops, continued to be stationed at the Sulṭān’s place of residence, most of them were posted to provincial garrisons, where they were subjected to the command of the local governors. The Sulṭāns always tried to confine the attention of the Janissaries to their proper duties, fighting and the preservation of order. The regulation permitting only persons of slave status into the Janissary troops, after a training begun when such recruits were still of a tender age, insured in them an ignorance of money-making crafts, and was reinforced by another that forbade them later to engage in such crafts and in any form of trade. The government procured all the commodities required for the rationing of the Janissaries direct from the producers, without resorting to civilian middlemen and engaged for those that were sent on campaign, a number of men from those guilds whose members produced such manufactured articles as the Janissaries might need. The artisans so engaged ceased to belong to their original guilds. They were not regarded, however, as forming part of the Janissary establishment, but they enjoyed some of the privileges attaching to Janissary status, such as immunity from arrest and punishment by the civil authorities.

OTTOMAN FEDUALISM

Outside the towns of the greater part of the European dominions and a large part of Asia Minor, fiefs were granted to Muslims who were not slaves of the Sulṭān. The smaller fiefs were hereditary and gaps were filled from volunteers with the army. The fiefholders collected the revenues and exercised seignorial jurisdiction in their estates, but they were officered by the Kullars (slaves) of the Sulṭān. The estates were of different sizes and were reckoned
in three classes: timārs, when the yearly revenue was under 20,000 aspers; zi‘āmets, when it was 20,000 to 1,00,000 aspers; khassses, when it was over 1,00,000 aspers. Timārs might be divided into zi‘āmets, but zi‘āmets could not be divided. Every fief-holder was obliged to appear in person when summoned to war. If the annual income of timārjee (fief-holder) reached 6,000 aspers, he had to bring with him an armed horseman, and another for each additional 3,000 aspers of his revenue. The holder of a larger fief had to bring with him an armed horseman if his income amounted to 10,000 aspers, and another horseman for each additional 5,000 aspers of income. In the sixteenth century this service was strictly exacted. The principle of heredity entered into the distribution of these states but under limitations. One son of the holder of a small fief had a right to the fief; not more than three sons of the holder of a large fief were entitled to small fiefs. The sons of a Kullar (personal slave of the Sulṭān) in high position might receive fiefs large in proportion to their father’s rank. This was one of the ways in which they were honourably conveyed from the ruling institution into the Muslim population. The za‘ims and timāriots, as holders of the corresponding fiefs were called, were a class of country gentlemen, honest, sober, true to the Islamic faith and to the Sulṭān, better in morals than the Kullar, if not so able of intellect. They were the substantial middle class of the empire. It was these who gave the first training to the ‘Ajam-Oghlans (slave boys selected for the Janissary corps), starting them well on the road from Christianity to Islam and preparing them to become members of the Ottoman nation.

There was a special category of fiefs called the khass. These were closely connected with the administration of the provinces. Sometimes the holders of the khass are even confused with the provincial governors. But the idea of khass is in some sense distinct from that of the military fiefs. Some Ottoman writers have distinguished between provinces ruled as Salayāne, a word which means ‘annual’ and the khass provinces. The former were held by governors either in full ownership or for a year at a time. With this system the emoluments of the governors were
deducted from the revenue of the State collected by fiscal officers. But the distinction cannot be taken too literally. Some Sâlyâne governors actually had *khaşş* and the *khaşş* were not all military fiefs. The Khân of Crimea levied 12,00,000 aspers on the customs of Caffa, under the name of *khaşş*. On the other hand, *Sanjaqs* (provincial subdivisions) of different character are found in the same provinces, some Sâlyâne, some *khaşş*. The *khaşş* thus seems to be something larger than a military fief and differs from it in so far as the *khaşş* was attached not to the person but to the position of the governor. The Sultan had also regular private *khaşş*, which were called *khaşş-i-Humâyûnì*.

The *khaşş*-holders were represented by two kinds of high officials, the *beylerbey* and the *sanjaq-bey* (viceroys and provincial governors), both of them holders of *khaşş*. The *beylerbeyes* held *khaşş* the value of the annual revenue of which varied from 50,000 aspers to 12,00,700 and were proportionate to their rank and precedence. Some of the portions of their revenue were exempt from military obligations. The *beylerbeyes* were themselves allowed to issue *berat* conferring the small *timâr*. When a viceroy died, the state gave *timâr* to eleven of his servants. The *sanjaq-bey* (provincial governor) in theory held *khaşş* of at least 2,00,000 aspers of annual revenue. When the holder was an officer of the palace, the minimum was higher and proportional to the dignity. The *Âghâ* of the Janissaries had the highest 5,00,000 aspers.

The augmentation or *teraqqa* of the fiefs of the *sanjaq-bey* was made by a sum of 100 aspers on each 1,000 revenue. When a vacant fief was allotted to a *sanjaq-bey*, who had not yet a right to the whole revenue of it, the surplus went to the State. The high command of the feudatories was exercised by the provincial governors.

In the time of Sulaymân, the system of fiefs had become greatly disarranged. The distribution of them had been left to the local governors and corruption had crept in; the frequent wars also had led to rapid changes and consequent confusion. Moreover, the army always contained a large number of *Gonulu* or volunteers who came at their own expense and fought with the hope of receiving the fiefs of the slain men. It is said that
during the course of a single day one fief changed owners several times. If fiefs were thus granted in the midst of battle, it is not easy to see how a condition of reasonable order could have been preserved in the feudal system. Sulaymān, therefore, by a Qānūn of the year 1530, attached the granting of all fiefs above a certain size once more to the central government. Each holder of such a fief must obtain a ṭeskerah or document from Constantinople in order to have good title. The central treasury administered such estates during vacancies. Only those fiefholders who held a ṭeskerah were entitled to be called sipāhīs. Others were known as timārjis. The feudal sipāhīs of Anatolia were more under the authority of the governor than were the sipāhīs of Europe; they were not so well paid, did not have much practice in fighting and were not so highly esteemed as soldiers.

Local government and the command of feudal sipāhīs was cared for by the officials who belonged to the Sulṭān’s great slave family and who brought with them to their posts a number proportioned to their rank, of the sipāhīs of the Sulṭān, pages, ‘Ajam Oghlans and slaves of their own. The lowest of these officials were the Subashīs or captains, who were in time of peace governors of towns, with enough Janissaries and Azabs (irregular infantry) to police the locality. Next above them were the Alai Beys or colonels, who in time of peace were ready with a company of from 200 to 500 to pass from place to place as required. Above these, again, were the sanjaqbeys who governed important cities and held superior rules over a number of towns and the districts in which they lay. Finally, in the Balkan peninsula and in the Western Asia Minor, there was from old a beylerbey, who had authority over all the beys of this region. Incomes were provided by the assignment of fiefs proportioned in size to each officer’s importance. All of these officers of the local government had a sufficient staff of lieutenants, treasurers, book-keepers and clerks. The beylerbey of Rumelia (Balkans) resided at Constantinople. The beylerbey of Anatolia seems to have spent most of his time in the dominions, although undoubtedly he was often at the capital since he had his regular place in the Diwān or parliament.

In time of war this official scheme, detached from its func-
tion of local government, drew together the feudal sipāhīs, section by section, into a perfectly organised territorial army for each of these two regions. The enrolled feudal troops of Europe numbered about 50,000 and those of Asia, including Anatolia, 30,000. In each case the number should be doubled or tripled to allow for the additional horsemen which all the sipāhīs were required to bring. A considerable number of the feudal troops, sometimes estimated at one-half, remained on duty at home in time of war to protect the provinces.

DECLINE OF THE OTTOMANS

"The keynote of Ottoman administration," writes Gibb,¹ "was conservatism and all the institutions of government were directed to the maintenance of the status quo. Since the Kanuns of Selim and Suleyman were regarded as the embodiment of the highest political wisdom, amelioration could have no meaning except the removal of subsequent abuses. The exercise of public spirit and initiative on the part of governors or lesser officials as thus not so much discounted as maimed and circumscribed, and a vast network of vested interests created by the conquests placed an all but insurmountable obstacle in the way of the would-be reformer."

The Ottoman society was based on medieval conceptions of status. It was neither harsh nor unjust and in many ways it was more progressive than contemporary feudal societies. So far from overburdening their subjects the Sultāns realised that light taxation and simple forms of direct administration were in the interests both of the treasury and the population. Yet, the society lacked mobility and the individual as individual had no place in it. The Sultāns accepted the traditional and recognised division of mankind into a variety of social orders: 'men of the sword,' 'men of pen,' merchants, artisans, cultivators, dhimmīs and slaves. To each order were assigned its functions, and regulations were drawn up to ensure the proper carrying out of those functions, and that none should interfere with or infringe the

functions and rights of others.

The ruling idea in the administration was distrust—fear of treachery or of unregulated ambition on the part of the officers of the Empire—and its methods were directed to centralisation and the balance of forces. The provinces were divided into vilayets, theoretically self-governing under its Pāšā. Though the latter united in himself both the supreme civil and military authority and was responsible for public order and security, for the collection of taxes and the remittance of the stipulated annual tribute, his tenure of office was precarious and by the eighteenth century was renewable from year to year. Even within his province, his capacity for effective control was weakened by a variety of contrivances designed to prevent him from exercising any form of direct administration. The accounts of the pashalik were kept by the daftedar who held his office independently by firman from Istambul. His judicial powers were again limited by the appointment of Qādīs and other religious officers who had the right of sending protests and memorials direct to Istambul.

The armed forces were also not fully under his control. At each headquarters a body of Janissaries and other troops was established as a permanent resident garrison. His authority over them was restricted in various ways: by Qānūns which attached specific duties and rights to particular officers and above all by the provision that the garrison of citadels should be formed of imperial troops under the command of the special officers nominated by the Sulṭān. In Egypt a further restriction was imposed by the institution of a dīwān or council of officers, the principal military officers and religious dignitaries which met four times a week which had to decide matters relating to the public administration. Although the final power rested with the Pāšā, he was not allowed to attend the dīwān in person.

A radical weakness of the Ottoman system was that it lacked any real consideration for the welfare of the subjects. The officers of the administration were led insensibly to adopt a cynical view of their functions and responsibilities. Their world was divided into lūkkām (governors) and reḥāya (subjects), the latter of whom existed to supply the needs of the former. The practical
outcome of this view was the universal substitution of monetary standards for the old standards of efficiency. The good Paşhā was one who remitted promptly and in full the sums and deliveries in kind required by the Imperial Treasury. From this it was but a step towards general corruption. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, it had become the established practice to give promotion by favouritism and bribery, and to put up to auction offices, lands and concessions of all kinds. The impotence of the Paşhās to prevent abuses and the probability that they would be condoned at a price, encouraged lawlessness and rebellion.

The decline of the Ottomans begins with the reign of Sulaymān the Magnificent. Although the empire reached its greatest height in his days, he was too much under the influence of his Russian wife. In order to secure the throne for her degenerate son, she persuaded Sulaymān to adopt the 'Cage' system. The experimental and bodily part of the training of the princes was abandoned. Though they were still taught some classics and given some education, they were obliged to spend their lives in the harem till the moment of their enthronement. Thus they were deprived of the practical experience of the art of government. The consequence was a series of hot-house princes, soft and ignorant of the conditions of the empire.

The seventeenth century saw a long succession of evil Sulṭāns. Their favourite ladies began to sell important offices. The civil service took its cue from the Sulṭān. Merit, which so far had been the sole consideration in promotions and appointments, no longer counted for anything. Very few Sulṭāns died on their beds, for there were chronic military risings and dethronements, often accompanied by assassinations.

The decline in the army proved to be far more fatal. The old recruiting system which had been based on careful selection was abandoned. Instead of the army being recruited from all races, it was now only the Muslims who were asked to contribute. In recruiting the forces and promoting the lower ranks of the soldiers to higher ranks, favouritism played a great part. The army contained not only those who had some function in it, but a vast number of
people who remained outside, but whose names were inscribed in
the registers that they might receive pay or obtain the privileges of
Janissaries. Among them there were even a French Consul and
an Armenian patriarch.

The monastic simplicity of the military order was also dis-
appearing. The Janissaries were now getting married and interest-
ed themselves in outside matters. The fanatical and mystical
belief in the unique importance of the state was losing hold on
men’s minds. Risings became a habit with the army, and, as the
political moves of the palace and parties outside always had to be
carried out with the help of the military, the army became the
sole arbiter in politics.

Again, the ‘Ulema who were an independent religious body
and could even depose the Sultan, if he became too tyrannical, were
persuaded to take advantage of their position and began to co-
operate with the army and meddle in politics. They were no
longer a neutral religious and judicial body. Religion had now be-
come a power in the political game. As regards their role in the
educational field, it is undeniable that as long as medieval
scholasticism dominated man’s outlook, the ‘Ulema did yeoman’s
service in the cause of education. The madrassahs controlled by
them were active centres of learning. But when the West broke
the chain of scholasticism and created new learning and science,
the ‘Ulema failed badly in catching up with modern knowledge.
They took it for granted that human knowledge had not grown be-
yond what was in the thirteenth century, and this attitude
persisted in their educational system and method down to the
middle of the last century. Unlike the Christian Church in the
West, the ‘Ulema did not persecute the new learning. But they
also did not allow the new knowledge to enter the precincts of
their madrassahs. During the age of decline they were so occu-
pied with politics that it seemed easier for them to stick to their
medieval scholastic methods. Therefore the madrassahs remained
up to the end of the last century what they were in the thirteenth
century. No educational reform was ever attempted and the
produce of the madrassahs never came into contact with modern
science and knowledge.
"The difference between the economic position of the Moslem and Christian nations as well as the general economic decline of the Moslems," says Halide Edib,¹ "is one of the most important features of this period . . . As long as agriculture, commerce and industry and transport depended on manual labour, organisation and a realistic grasp of facts rather than on machinery and science, the Ottoman Empire preserved its economic prosperity and there was a balance between its heterogeneous elements, a division of labour. The bulk of the Ottoman Turks were peasants and animal breeders; they supplied the Empire with all the necessary wheat, vegetable, fruit and animals for meat, for transport and domestic use. The Empire exported grains and stock on a large scale. Again, by tradition, Ottoman Moslems, especially the Turks, trained every male child in some profession or craft, be he a prince or an ordinary child. Women were also trained to embroider and to weave, besides attending to the land in the rural districts. The household goods, furniture, clothing, cotton, silk and woollen textiles, leather for bookbinding or trunks, pottery, silverware, carpet and embroidery were mostly made by Moslems. Except silver, all the raw material for these industries existed in the Empire. Trade and hand industry were under highly organised guilds which classified the producers and protected them, controlling at the same time all the commerce within the Empire. All the means of transport, mules and camel caravans as well as sailing vessels, were also in the hands of Moslems and Turks.

"The non-Moslems, though to some degree producers and workers, were in the main intermediaries of export. Naturally, they reaped the greatest benefit from the introduction of machinery, while the Moslem Turks lost their hold over the sea transports, and their hand-made products, though infinitely more beautiful, were unable to compete with the machine-made goods that flooded their markets. In addition to this economic advantage, exemption from military service enabled the Christians to increase and prosper, while Moslem elements, especially the Turks,

¹. Conflict of East and West in Turkey, Delhi 1935, p. 45.
became impoverished, decreased in number and remained in ignorance. The Empire in its decline, just like the Byzantine Empire in its decline, was drawing all its man power mainly from Anatolia."

The economic deterioration of the Empire was accelerated by the system of Capitulations. The Capitulations were commercial treaties made with foreign commercial interests residing in the Empire and granting them exemption from certain taxes and other special rights in judicial matters. The system existed during the period of the Byzantine rule. The Ottomans ratified all such existing rights. Muḥammad, the Conqueror, confirmed the Genoese rights in 1453 and Sulaymān the Magnificent signed a treaty of 'Friendship and Commerce' with France in 1535 and similar commercial treaties were made with other powers.

"But when the Ottoman Empire weakened, the Capitulations which had been mere treaties of commercial adjustment took a different complexion. After each Turkish defeat the victorious power imposed a new clause in the Capitulations in its own favour. These newly acquired privileges were not only commercial; some of them were jurisdictional and legal. The subjects of foreign powers resident in Turkey began to demand special and separate judicial treatment. Some of the Christian subjects of the Empire acquired foreign protection. Any of them assaulting an Ottoman subject was judged by the Consul of the Power sitting as a court. When an Ottoman subject happened to assault a foreigner, quite often the Powers sent their fleets to bully the Sublime Porte. Further, the Sublime Porte could not adopt any economic policy without the Capitullary powers interfering. No tariffs could be raised or abolished without their consent; railways could not be built where they were a necessity, economically or from a strategic point of view. The worst of it was that the powers never agreed among themselves."1

Another source of weakness of the Ottoman Empire was the presence of large Christian majorities in the Balkan countries. As soon as the countries of Western Europe became strong,

prosperous nation States, these Christian groups began to aspire for national independence. They were encouraged by the European powers and thus became pawns in the international game for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The two trump cards of the Powers were religion and nationalism.

ATTEMPTS AT REFORMS

'Abdul Ḥamīd I was the first to perceive the weakness of the Ottoman Empire. In 1774 he managed to engage European experts and artisans to train the Turkish army. The next sovereign to make an attempt at reforming the Empire was Salīm III (1787-1807). He was an ardent admirer of the principles of the French Revolution and he sent one of his friends, Iśḥaq Bey, to study the Western institutions. He also created the nucleus of a new army called 'Naẓm-i-Jadīd' which was formed on Western lines and trained by European experts. He also founded several schools, the first institutions of higher learning and technical education outside the domain of the religious colleges. The school of engineering was one of them. Salīm further attempted to rebuild the civil administration on the principle of local responsibility, the people in the province electing their provincial representatives and having a voice in the management of their own affairs. This brought him into conflict with the provincial governors. Thus Salīm earned the enmity both of the old army authorities and of the established civil service. When his new army marched to the Balkans to put down a rising, the old army at Constantinople rose and killed him.

The new Sultan Mahmūd II (1807-1839) was no less a zealous reformer. He managed to recreate Salīm's new army under another name and to persuade the 'Ulema to proclaim his reforms to be in accordance with the spirit of Islam. Having thus gathered support for his reforms, he exterminated the Janissary Corps. This made a formidable impression and the Reform Party considered it as the beginning of a new era, but the first consequences were disastrous. The strength of the Empire was weakened to a degree which made itself felt in the development
between Russia, Great Britain, France and Prussia about the Greek question (1827) which prevented the Turks from suppressing the Greek insurrection. One of the consequences of the agreement between the Powers was the destruction of the Turco-Egyptian fleet in the Gulf of Navarino (Oct. 1827) without previous declaration of war by the English, French and Russian naval forces. War with Russia followed in 1828. The Russians occupied Rumania, took Kars and occupied Adrianople. By the treaty of Adrianople, Turkey had to accept the complete independence of Greece.

Maḥmūd continued the consolidation of his authority in the interior. The principal agent of his policy was the grand vizier, Rashīd Pāšā. After his death in 1836, he was replaced by Ḥāfiz Pāšā. The latter, unlike Rashīd, was in favour of the introduction of modern tactics into the Turkish army. In his successful expedition north of Mesopotamia, he was accompanied by the Prussian lieutenant, Von Moltke, one of the army instructors sent by the king of Prussia. These military measures of Maḥmūd had also in view the strengthening of the frontier on the Syrian side, in order to be prepared for a new conflict with Muḥammad ʿAlī, the Pāšā of Egypt, who had become independent. In 1839, Ḥāfiz was again appointed as Seri-Askar in Kurdistan. He crossed the Euphrates to fight the Egyptian forces but was completely beaten by the Egyptians under Ibrāhīm Pāšā, son of Muḥammad ʿAlī.

The task which Maḥmūd had set himself of reforming the Empire after European model was beset by enormous difficulties, owing to the traditional views and institutions of the Turkish people. But he succeeded in reforming the army and exterminating the Janissaries who had become the greatest source of trouble. The most useful work was done by the Prussian military instructors. By sending young officers to the military schools of Western Europe, Maḥmūd prepared a more efficient military organisation. In the government there developed a cabinet of ministers after the Western fashion. By a firman of October 1826 Maḥmūd abolished the Sūltān’s right of confiscating the properties of the state functionaries after their death.
THE TANZİMÂT

The Tanzımât were the continuation of the work of Sultan Salîm III and Mahmûd II, undertaken to save the Ottoman State which had become enfeebled internally. Mahmûd II had succeeded by getting rid of the feudal system at home and the reactionary element of the Janissaries, in centralising and consolidating his power in home affairs, but he had been unable to avoid the loss of Greece and Egypt. In the period from 1839 to the end of the Crimean War, the soul of the reforms was Muṣṭafa Raqîd Pasha. In the second period from 1836 the activities of the reformers were directed by ‘Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha; the great figure in the third period (from 1871) was Midhat Pasha.

The Tanzımât began with the royal proclamation known as the Khaṭṭi Șarîf of Gülhane. In it the Sultan announced that he wished the honour and property of all his subjects to be secure; that the farming out of taxes (iltizâm) would be abolished and that recruiting for the army would be done in a more regular fashion; all criminals would be tried in public and all subjects of whatever religion would be considered equal before the law. These measures, it was said, meant a complete break with the ancient principles.

By changing the old structure, the Tanzımât created a host of new problems. Four groups of interests had to be dealt with: (1) Civilian officials and military officers who in the old order had been the slaves of the Sultan. (2) The free Muslim subjects of whom the 'Ulema were the most notable section. (3) Non-Muslim subjects. (4) Foreign interests. The consolation of the first two groups proved more easy; religion united them and Mahmûd II and ’Abdul Majîd had renounced their rights as sovereigns over the lives and property of the officials; the ending of the feudal system by Mahmûd II had also been favourable to the combination of the Muslim elements. But to give the Christian and Jewish subjects equal rights threatened these elements to deprive them of the considerable autonomy which they had enjoyed since Muḥammad the Conqueror. The problems raised by the enrolment
of non-Muslims in the army showed that the Jews and Christians themselves did not regard the granting of equal rights as an unmitigated boon. Again, the realisation of the reforms was bound to be in great part illusory so long as the privileged position of the foreigners known as extra-territoriality continued to exist in striking opposition to the centralisation of power which was the aim of the reforms.

The Tanzimat were thus carried on in a troubled atmosphere. A grand vizier could hardly carry through the programme peacefully. There were sudden falls from power followed by unexpected returns. There were also periods when foreign intervention called for new efforts. This was the case with the deliberations which preceded the Peace Conference in Paris. Turkey's allies then wanted the Sultan to bind himself by an international agreement to carry out the reforms, which were still in abeyance. The result was Kahtti Humayuni of February 1856 which was only nominally a spontaneous act of the Sultan. The Kahtti Humayuni was simply a more detailed confirmation of the promises made in 1839 regarding the equality of the treatment of the non-Muslims; it was particularly laid down that mixed tribunals shall be instituted for law suits between Muslims and non-Muslims and that the laws relating to them shall be codified as soon as possible. One further important point in the Tanzimat was the right conceded to foreign powers to acquire landed property in Turkey.

The work of the Tanzimatists was based on the ideas of the French Revolution which had given birth to the ideals of Nationalism and Democracy. "The Tanzimatists," says Halide Edib, ¹ "took up Democracy. Their hearts rang in passionate response to the declaration of the Rights of Man. And because within their remembrance and their past history Islam only had made as grand a declaration, the ideal they offered to the Empire had its roots in the Islamic and Turkish consciousness. The Christian part of the Ottomans, on the other hand, took to Nationalism. The Tanzimatists never realised or admitted that any such explosive and separatist sentiment could be genuine, regarding it

¹ Conflict of East and West in Turkey, Delhi 1935, p. 58.
as entirely a reaction against bad government. They were convinced that reforms, good government and the preaching and practising of democratic principles would cure the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire of their nationalism. Throughout the Tanzimat period there were no terrorist measures; the new policy of the 'Union of Elements' was to be carried out entirely by persuasion and appeal to interests and loyalties. Therefore, all the efforts and reforms of the Tanzimatists were mostly for the benefit of the prodigal son of the Ottoman State, that is, for the Christian who was no longer content to remain in the Ottoman fold."

In addition to the ideal of democracy, the Tanzimat introduced the idea of individual freedom and created a desire among the educated people to have a voice in the government. The result was that a movement for constitutional government developed with a nucleus of writers and statesmen known as the Young Turks. It was felt that administrative, legal and religious reforms were not sufficient to remedy the evils. The real root of the evil was the autocratic system of government in which the people at large had no voice.

THE YOUNG TURKS

In the later years of 'Abdul 'Azız's rule, the old autocratic spirit of the Sultans began to raise its head. Men began to be exiled for their opinions without trial. But the benevolent despotism of the rulers under the Tanzimat in which there was a large measure of freedom had strengthened the Young Turk Movement; 'Abdul 'Azız was dethroned and 'Abdul Ḥamīd II, who ascended the throne, gave the people their first constitution in 1876. As a prince, 'Abdul Ḥamīd appeared intelligent and liberal. He had gained the confidence of the Young Turks and their leader, Midhat Pasha. But events proved that 'Abdul was deceiving them and utilising their confidence to make his way to the throne.

An International Council consisting of the delegates of all the Powers had assembled in Istanbul, and was discussing the Bosnian, Serbian and Bulgarian questions. It proposed a
Commission of investigation and a Governor-General for all these regions. This was a serious blow to the Ottoman sovereignty, but a war with the Powers would have been fatal to the constitutional form of government, because the first parliament was still in its infancy. This seemed to 'Abdul Ḥamīd an excellent reason for rejecting the proposal. He went to war and dissolved the parliament. Midḥat Pāşı was asked to leave the country, but his ideas spread and gained power every day. 'Abdul Ḥamīd trapped Midḥat Pāşı by asking him to return and accept the governorship of Smyrna. Then the Sulṭān had him arrested and tried for the murder of 'Abdul 'Azīz. It was a sham trial and Midḥat was sentenced to death. Though the Sulṭān modified the death penalty to a life sentence, he had him murdered in the prison at Ṭa'īf. Thus 'Abdul Ḥamīd succeeded in securing despotic power.

Even when Midḥat Pāşı was dead and his followers exiled or sentenced, their ideas continued to dominate the people. 'Abdul Ḥamīd, therefore, tried to establish a censorship, and punish very severely anyone who was found to use such words as "Liberty," "Constitution," "Patriotism." These words were erased even from the dictionary. For thirty years 'Abdul Ḥamīd endeavoured to suppress the Turkish thought through an unparalleled spy system. It would be hard to imagine how oppressive his reign was and how many Turkish youth died in exile.

As against the Turks, 'Abdul Ḥamīd sought support among the non-Turkish Muslim subjects through their leaders. He heaped favours on Kurdish, Arab and Albanian chiefs. Further, to gain the support of the Muslim world outside Turkey and to ingratiate himself with the non-Turkish Muslims, he emphasised the importance of the Caliphate and its religious significance. Thus his policy resulted in driving a wedge between the Turks and the Arabs and giving a bad name to Caliphate as well as İslam. 'Abdul Ḥamīd’s despotism is in fact largely responsible for the revolt of the Turks against the idea of Islamic unity and the radical secularisation of their politics.
The immediate Western answer to 'Abdul Ḥamīd's pan-Islamism was to try to dismember Turkey by encouraging national self-consciousness among the Arabs. The Turks were not unaware of the peril they were facing. There was a Committee of the Young Turks in Paris, but it could exert little influence in home politics except by sending in pamphlets occasionally. But when, after the Bulgarian insurrection, the Sultān accepted a programme of reform for the three provinces, Uskul, Monastir and Salonika, with a Turkish Inspector General and foreign experts, these provinces became relatively free where revolutionary organisations could function without much difficulty. A 'Union and Progress Committee' was formed and very soon won over the young and staff-officer element in the army.

In 1907 while rumours were rife for a new partition plan, the Young Turks proclaimed the constitution in Macedonia and forced 'Abdul Ḥamīd to accord it acceptance. The first freely elected parliament assembled in Istambul in 1908. But a counter-revolution was staged by the reactionary forces with the help of foreign Powers and a great many Young Turks lost their lives. Eventually Maḥmūd Shaukat Pāshā marched on Istambul with a Macedonian army, smashed the reactionary organisations and deposed 'Abdul Ḥamīd.

The efforts of the Young Turks to improve the administration were not very successful. Authority was strictly centralised. It is true that the new rulers had no leisure for reforms. Yet the bitterest enemy of the Young Turks was not European Imperialism but the rising nationalism of the other races. Two courses were open to the Young Turks. They could transform Turkey into a decentralised state of composite nationality, offering autonomy to each constituent people, or they could attempt to force them into a unity. The Young Turks chose the latter course and thereby aroused the hostility of the Balkan peoples and the opposition of the Arab nationalists.

At first Bulgaria threw off Turkish suzerainty. Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Crete followed by attempting
to join Greece. The hardest blow came from Italy which occupied Tripoli. Then followed the Balkan federation of 1912 organised by the nascent Balkan States against Turkey. Each state wanted to snatch for itself that part of Macedonia where people of its own race were living. If the Young Turkish regime had been allowed to develop and grow, Turkey might have stayed permanently in Macedonia. Hence the Balkan States chose a favourable moment to attack Turkey.

At the commencement of hostilities the Western Powers declared that the status quo would not be disturbed, but when Turkey was beaten by the Balkan Confederation, the Western Powers changed their attitude. The first treaty of peace was signed in London in May 1913. But then the Balkan Powers quarrelled among themselves and all combined against Bulgaria which suffered defeat. A second treaty was signed at Bucharest in August 1913.

Meanwhile the nationalist sentiment was rising in the Arab world also. At first Arab nationalism, particularly in Syria, was not distinguishable from the general movement in the Turkish Empire against Ḥamīdīan despotism and centralisation of authority. Both had as their immediate objective the overthrow of ʿAbdul Ḥamīd’s autocracy. Also Arab nationalism in its early stages thought in terms of autonomy within the Empire. It did not aspire for independence. But the Young Turks were not in favour of granting autonomy to the nationalities of the Empire. They wanted a highly unified state. As a result, the movement of unrest in the Arab provinces became more specifically Arab and also more articulate. Before 1908 Arab nationalist movement had not been organised except for a few ineffective societies such as that founded in Paris in 1904. But from 1908 onwards there began to appear fully organised Arab political societies. At first they were public and aimed not at complete independence but administrative reform and decentralisation within the Empire. Such were the ‘Arab Ottoman Brotherhood’ and the ‘Literary Club,’ both established in Constantinople and the ‘Party of Ottoman Decentralisation’ founded in Cairo in 1912. But after a
time secret societies were formed, with complete independence of the Arab provinces as their aim. The most important of them was ‘Al-Fatat’ founded by a group of students in Paris in 1916 and A-‘Ahd’ founded in 1914 and consisting almost entirely of army officers, drawn largely from ‘Irāq. In the previous year the nationalist movement of the Arabs had attracted the notice of the outside world by holding its first congress in Paris. The majority of the delegates were Syrians and Lebanese and half were Christians. The congress demanded full rights for the Arabs and decentralisation within the Empire; but the Turkish government made only a few unimportant concessions.

The Young Turks had considered themselves the successors of the Ottoman Turks. They hoped to stop the disintegration of the Empire by a representative constitutional monarchy. The Young Turks kept away from race ideals as stubbornly as the Ottomans, because they considered such ideals to be incompatible with democracy. But after the Balkan defeats they were forced to think on different lines. The Christians had fought against the idea of a common Ottoman country. Albania and the Muslim non-Turkish majority in Macedonia had been as eager in throwing out the Ottomans. The Arabs were creating decidedly nationalist organisations. The Turks were the only people in the Empire who had shown no trend towards nationalism. But after the Balkan defeat they too had to change their viewpoint. The Balkan defeat aroused the feeling among the Turks that they were different from others in the Empire and isolated as well. The non-Turkish elements, even the Muslims, Arabs, Albanians and Kurds, had their own nationalist clubs. The Turkish youth was finding itself lonely in the Empire specially in the schools.

It was the Turkish students of the University of Istambul, specially of the Medical School, who first founded a Turkish nationalist club under the name of ‘Turk Ojagi.’ It was established entirely on a cultural basis. When these Ojaks multiplied all over Anatolia, greater pressure was brought to bear by the prominent members of the Union and Progress movement to turn it into a political club. They did not succeed
until 1924 when a general congress of all the Ojaks altered the old constitution and transformed them into political clubs.

A wider movement also sprang up at this time. While Turkish nationalism was an ideal to better the conditions of the Turks, the pan-Türanists were propagating the ideal of an empire consisting purely of the Turkish elements, including those Turks who lived under the Tsarist Russia. The different sections of the University of Istanbul always drew students from all over the Muslim world, but specially from among the Turkish subjects of the Tsar. There were many intellectuals among the Russian Turks who settled in Turkey and took active part in the intellectual and political life of the country. This naturally awakened interest in the lives of the vast number of Turks who were Russian subjects but spoke the same language as the Ottoman Turks. A great deal was being written about the pre-Islamic history of the Turks. Apart from the works of Leon Cahun, Germans, Russians, Finns and Hungarians were doing research work in what is called Turcology, with the obvious intention of alienating the Turks from İslam and injecting them with racial pride. As a result of these writings and researches, Turcology found enthusiastic supporters in Turkey and pan-Türanism gained a new momentum. An effort was made by the pan-Türanists to replace the epics of the Islamic period by older heroes, like Chengiz. While England, France and Russia were opposed to pan-Türanism, Germany was supporting the movement.

Pan-Islamism, on the other hand, became discredited because 'Abdul Hamid exploited it to perpetuate his autocracy. However, a few bold spirits, like Anwar Pasha, adhered to it, but pan-Islamism aroused even greater opposition among the European Powers. The Turkish nationalists who disapproved pan-Türanism as well as pan-Islamism seemed to possess a more workable and moderate policy in trying to confine all Turkish energies to Turkey herself.

The greatest achievement of Young Turks regime prior to the Great War was the complete change it effected in the
educational system. The increase in primary schools, the Westernisation of mosque schools, the enlargement and better organisation of the university, with mostly German professors, were among the achievements of the new regime. An outstanding change was effected in the position of women. Turkish women belonging to the high official classes and richer people had always had a good education. From 1908 Turkish women of all classes gained equal chances of education with men. In 1916 the University opened its doors and a large number of women students were sent to Europe. The Great War gave this movement a practical turn. The government departments as well as financial houses and traders began to employ women on a large scale. Not only in the big cities, but also in smaller towns and outlying districts, women had to take up some trade and go into work in order to sustain their family. The large amount of public work that women were obliged to do led to their freedom and the removal of many social restrictions.

A lay judicial system with Western codes and courts under a separate judicial department and Minister of Justice had been in existence. In 1916 the Islamic courts were also placed under the Ministry of Justice, and the Family Law was revised in favour of women. Under the revised law, women could insert into their contracts every right, including that of divorce.

THE GREAT WAR AND THE TURKISH REVOLUTION

In 1913 Anwar Pasha, formerly Enver Bey, became Minister of War. The military organisation continued to be under a German mission. At the commencement of the war, in August 1914, Turkey declared her neutrality but mobilised at the same time. There were war and anti-war factions in the party of the Young Turks. The anti-war faction tried to come to an understanding with the allies, declaring that Turkey would remain neutral if the financial capitulations were modified. But the allies made no commitments. On September 8, 1914, Turkey declared the capitulations abolished which raised protests from all Powers. Immediately afterwards Russia declared war on Turkey at a slight provocation. The Dardanelles
were successfully defended by Turkey, but the Russians took many Turkish towns and marched towards Sivas, while Turkey failed in her attack on the Suez Canal and the British took ‘Iraq including Baghdād. The Communist Revolution led Turkey and her German ally to conclude a peace treaty with Bolshevik Russia at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 by which Russia ceded to her all her lost territory and even those districts which Turkey had ceded to Russia in 1877. But the Arab nationalists supported by England drove out the Turks from Ḥedjāz and the British army occupied Syria. On October 30, 1918, an armistice was signed at Mudros. Although the armistice aimed at ending the World War I, it did not end yet for Turkey which had to fight for four more years against Greece, helped and backed up by the Allies.

The Turks welcomed the armistice as being an end to their great sufferings. But they soon learned that they had more in store. The Allied fleets and armies occupied the Straits and Constantinople. Both in Istanbul and in the provinces, officers and intellectuals met in secret and began to discuss how to secure a tolerable peace, and, as the nationalists appeared in the forefront of the general reaction against the Allies, this agitation received the name of the ‘nationalist movement.’ Meanwhile, the Allies could not come to an agreement among themselves over the terms of Turkish peace. On May 15, 1919, the Greek army was landed in Smyrna under the protection of the British, French and American fleets and the Greeks inaugurated their occupation by massacres committed in full view of the Allied fleets. The Greek landing in Smyrna aroused general indignation in Turkey and lent further strength to the nationalist movement.

Meanwhile the responsible leaders of the Young Turks had escaped to Germany and their party was dissolved. Certain nationalist leaders, like Muştafa Kamāl, were ready to cooperate with Sultan Waḥiduddīn, because of his prestige as the Caliph, in order to stop the disintegration of the country. But Waḥiduddīn brought Daʾūd Farīd Pāsha into power and through him gave the reins of the government to the High Commissioners of the Allies. In Western Anatolia organisations for a national defence against
the Greek invasion were rapidly growing. The Sultan sent Mustafa Kamal Pasha to Eastern Anatolia with a view to control these organisations and disperse them, if necessary. Kamal was already in correspondence with these organisations. He met other leaders of the nationalist movement at Amasya on his way to Erzurum and signed the Amasya protocol on June 19, 1919. This protocol declared the determination of the nationalists to resist both the Allies and the Caliph, who was acting as their instrument. A national congress assembled in Erzurum on July 23, 1919, and Mustafa Kamal Pasha presided over it. Another congress assembled in Sivas on September 4 and reaffirmed the decisions of the Erzurum congress, added plans for the defence of eastern Thrace, and chose a representative body to control the movement in Anatolia. No president was chosen but Mustafa Kamal's leadership was generally recognised. This manifestation of the national will forced the Sultan to dismiss Damad Farid Pasha. In January 1920 a new Parliament assembled in Constantinople containing a nationalist majority. The Parliament issued a National Pact which formulated the demands of the nationalists.

The Allies who were watching the nationalist activities with great anxiety, in conjunction with Sultan Wahiduddin, decided to strike at the nationalist movement. On March 16, 1920, the Allied forces in the capital seized a large number of nationalists and closed the Parliament. Meanwhile, Mustafa Kamal Pasha had issued a proclamation inviting Anatolia to elect its deputies for a new Assembly, which was opened in Ankara. Mustafa Kamal was elected president both of the Assembly and the Government. Thus a new Turkish government came into being over all territories not under foreign occupation. The government of Constantinople, controlled by the Allies, condemned the leading nationalists to death by extraordinary courts and issued a fatwa denouncing them as outlaws. The Anatolian government retaliated similarly. The Sultan's government also sent its forces and roused counter-revolutionary outbreaks which, however, were put down by the nationalists. When
the Allies found their plan thwarted, they accepted the offer of Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos, that the Greek army should advance beyond the area allotted to it. As a result, the Greeks occupied eastern Thrace and marched on to Brusa. On August 10, 1920, the Allies concluded with the Sultan's government the treaty of Sèvres which aimed at destroying the independence of Turkey. In Europe eastern Thrace including Gallipoli was assigned to Greece which was also given Smyrna and a zone around it. A tripartite agreement between England, France and Italy laid out Italian and French spheres of influence in parts of those Anatolian territories which were nominally left to Turkey. This treaty strengthened the nationalist cause by the universal indignation it aroused.

The defeat of Venizelos in Greek elections alienated the Allies, specially France. The Greek army in Anatolia started a new offensive but was twice checked by the Turkish nationalists. The Allies thereupon called a conference at London (February 1921) which included representatives of both the government of the Sultan and that of the nationalists. At this stage differences cropped up between the Allied governments. In consequence, the Allied commissioners at Constantinople declared the neutrality of their governments in the Graeco-Turkish war. On July 10, 1921, the Greek army again took the offensive. Muṣṭafā Kamāl, who was appointed generalissimo, fought the decisive battle of Sakariya, after which the Greeks retired westward.

At this time France signed an agreement with the Ankara government of the nationlists. It recognised the Ankara government and determined the Turko-Syrian frontier. On March 24, 1922, the Allies proposed a truce between Turkey and Greece, but the Turks replied that they could negotiate only after the Greeks had evacuated Anatolia. But since the Greeks did not accept this condition, further battles ensued, with the Allies remaining neutral. The Turks now passed on to the offensive and completely annihilated the Greek armies. Lloyd George threatened the Turks with Allied intervention but the Turkish armies continued
to advance and both France and Italy withdrew their troops from the neutral zone. On September 23, Lord Curzon came to agreement with M. Poincare on the Turkish question as a result of which the Allied Powers invited the Turkish government to a peace conference which the nationalists accepted. On October 13 a military convention was signed at Mudania between the Ankara delegates, the Allied generals in Constantinople and Greek representatives.

The Allies had also invited the Sultan's government to the Peace Conference. Tewfîq Pasha, the last grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire, wrote to the National Assembly at Ankara proposing joint action. This forced the nationalists to face the dilemma of having two governments in the same country. In consequence, the National Assembly separated the Caliphate from the Sultanate. The Caliph remained as the spiritual head of the Muslims but the Sultanate and with it the temporal power of the Caliph was abolished. Thus the house of Osman which had reigned for seven centuries came to an end. Wahiduddin escaped to Malta and was declared deposed. Prince 'Abdul Majid, son of 'Abdul 'Aziz, was elected Caliph. He recognised the sovereignty of the Great National Assembly and gave up his claim to the Sultanate by a written document. The Lausanne Conference which met on November 10, 1922, signed a treaty of peace on July 24. The Capitulations were abolished. To realise racial unity in New Turkey, the Orthodox Greeks in Anatolia were exchanged for the Muslim Turks in Greek Macedonia.

The Ottoman Empire was no more now. The Turks, the principal element in the Empire, had created a new independent state. On October 29, 1923, Turkey was declared a republic and Mu斯塔fa Kamal elected its first President. On March 3, 1924, the Great National Assembly passed three laws at one sitting expelling the Ottoman dynasty, abolishing the Caliphate, the Commissariat of Şarîa and Awqaf and attaching all the educational and scientific institutions including the medressehs to the Commissariat of Public Instruction. By these laws the Turkish
Development of Islamic State and Society

republic became a purely secular state of the Western type. Islam in Turkey failed to achieve a genuine synthesis with the requirements of modern life, because of the incapacity, intellectual and moral, of its religious leadership. Whether such a synthesis can be achieved in any other Muslim country remains to be seen. It depends on the loyalty and the moral and intellectual calibre of sound-hearted Muslims.
Chapter 7

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MUSLIM EAST

We have traced the development of events and institutions in the western part of the Islamic world, particularly the Ottoman Empire. Events in the East flowed differently leading to the emergence of three important Muslim States—Persia, Afghānistān and India. We have seen the part played by the Turkish race in unifying the Islamic world. The Turks played an equally important role in the building up of the Eastern Muslim States of Persia, Afghānistān and India. Maḥmūd Ghaznavī who established the first Muslim kingdom of India was a Turkish slave. The slave dynasty of Aybak and Iltamāsh was also Turkish in origin. Balban and the Tughlaqs as well as the Khiljīs, again, were Turks. The Mughals who laid the permanent foundations of Muslim rule in India were half-Turks. In Persia Shāh Ismā‘īl Ṣafavī rode to power on the strength of Turkish tribes. Nādir Khān prided himself on his Turkish descent and when he invaded India in 1739, he spoke with Muḥammad Shāh in the Turkish language reminding him of his Turkish descent.¹ There was a difference, however, in the developments which took place in Eastern Muslim Asia. The purely Turkish element was not so preponderant here, since peoples of other races like the Mongols and the Persians also made their contribution. Another difference was that, while in Western Asia, Byzantine culture and institutions entered in the shaping of Islamic culture, in the East Persian language and culture achieved a preponderating influence. The Tūrānian elements of Central Asia seem to have been attracted to Muslim India rather than to the Turkish Empire of the Ottomans. In any case, these regions of Muslim Asia had a much

longer contact with Muslims of Central Asia and the Islamic intellectual centres of Bukhara and Samarkand. The hostility of the Ottoman Turks and the Persians must have thrown a barrier between the Turanians of Bukhara and Samarkand and caused their flow towards India rather than Turkey, so that the culture of Muslim India became enriched by many sources—Turkish, Mughal, Persian and Turanian. The purely Arab element was not prominent either in Western Muslim Asia or in the eastern part of the Muslim world. But Arab and Islamic influence had become so deeply embedded in the Persian, Turanian and Turkish thought that it never ceased to exercise decisive influence on the minds of the people of Muslim India.

KHURASAN

We now turn to Khurasan which was the nerve-centre of Muslim political and dynastic activity, before the formation of the three distinct political units to which we referred above.

We have seen the establishment of the Tahirid dynasty under Ma'mun. During the reign of Tahirids the Karajites had resumed their activities, and a band of volunteers with Ya'qub b. Layth as their leader was formed to protect the people from the Karajites. Ya'qub thus became the founder of the Saffarid dynasty. In 867 A.D. he was the master of the whole of Sistan. In 870 he captured Balkh, Baymian, and Kabul as well as Nishapur. He finally settled in Khurasan. The Saffarids were the champions of the orthodox faith and faithful allies of the Caliph. But they gained a limited independence under the Caliphs. They always fought against other Persian rulers, and several times allied themselves with the Caliph against them.

The first Persian dynasty to emerge in Khurasan was that of the Samanids. They claimed descent from Bahram Chubin, a noble family of Rayy. Alberuni upholds this claim as being true. About the end of the third century A.H. their power extended from the Jaxartes to Baghdad and from Khwārazm and the Caspian Sea to the borders of India. The Samanids had a direct and independent relationship from 944 to 999 A.D. when the Buwayhids
gained control of the Caliphate. They were staunch Sunnīs, sought recognition from the Caliphate and applied for a deed of investiture. They waged also holy wars against the Qarmatians. The Sāmānids encouraged the revival of Persian language and literature which had already begun in Khurasan.

The founder of the Buwayhid dynasty was Abū Shujāʾ Buwih who claimed descent from the Sassānian king, Bahram. The real founders of the dynasty were, however, his three sons, ‘Alī, Ḥasan and Aḥmad. In 945 A.D., ‘Alī entered Baghdād and forced Caliph Al-Mustakfi to create him Amīr-ul-Umara’. The Buwayhids were Shīʿas and under them the Caliphate sank to a very low level. They caused the name of Amīr-ul-Umara’, sometimes of his heir-apparent, to be conjoined with that of Caliph in the Khūṭba at Baghdād.

While the Sāmānīd power was still strong, Turkish tribes were moving towards the Sāmānīd territory. We hear of a Turkish invasion of Transoxania in 904. Oghuzz Turkmen settled in the neighbourhood of the Sāmānīds. Another branch of Turkmen under Saljuq was received by the Sāmānīds and settled in Jand. In 992 there was an invasion of the Qara Khānid Turks and the Sāmānīd ruler had to abandon his capital, Buṣkhrā. The Sāmānīd rule, however, was re-established after some time in Transoxania. During the reign of Nuḥ, the Sāmānīds were again threatened by the Qara Khānīd Turks and Nuḥ appealed to Sabuktagan for help. The latter was a member of one of the Turkish tribes and had been purchased as a slave by Alaptagin, the semi-independent ruler of Ghazna during the Sāmānīd period. In 977 Sabuktagan was proclaimed Amīr of Ghazna. Having gained renown by his victories in Afghanistan and India, he now appeared in Transoxania at the invitation of Nuḥ. Sabuktagan concluded peace with the Qara Khānīds as a result of which Syr Darya remained the frontier of the Qara Khānīds. The Sāmānīds were reduced to a small principality and Khurasan passed to Sabuktagan. In 997 Maḥmūd succeeded Sabuktagan after a successful struggle with his younger brother Ismāʿīl. He captured Ghazna, proceeded to Balkh and did homage to the Sāmānīd ruler Maṇṣūr, successor of Nuḥ. Maṇṣūr confirmed him in possession
of the provinces of Balkh, Herat, Tirmidh, Bust, but withheld Khorasan, which Mahmud had to take by force.

Mahmud had to fight against the Qara Khansids to retain possession of Khorasan. He defeated and concluded a treaty of peace with them. The treaty was, however, broken by the Qara Khansids, while Mahmud was engaged on his Indian expeditions. Mahmud also conquered Khorzemia, as the Khwarazm Shah was in alliance with the Qara Khansids. In 1206 Mahmud received envoys from the Caliph Qadir, bringing him a diploma for the provinces conquered by him. In his relations with the Caliph, Mahmud assumed the role of the true heirs of the Samanids, supreme rulers of the entire East; a treaty was concluded between him and the Caliph, by which the latter bound himself not to enter into relations with the Qara Khansids nor to send them gifts except through the agency of Mahmud.

Mahmud’s reign can in no sense be identified with the rise of Persian national feeling. His military forces consisted exclusively of bought slaves and mercenaries. They were not recruited from the soil of Persia. Although Firdausi dedicated his Shah-Nama to Mahmud, Persian was not the language of the government. His Vizier, Maymandi, made efforts once more to make Arabic the language of the official documents. Formerly, all papers were written in Persian but Maymandi allowed the use of Persian only in cases where it became absolutely indispensable.

"From this time," says Barthold,1 "evidently begins the division of the nation into an army to whom the king pays grants, requiring in return faithful service, and subjects whom the king defends from external and internal enemies, requiring from them unconditional obedience and the un murmuring payment of taxes. Neither soldiers nor subjects have the right to oppose their wishes to the will of the sovereign."

Mahmud’s empire soon fell into chaos as none of his successors proved to be competent. During the reign of Mas‘ud, the son and successor of Mahmud, widespread extortion of the people by officers and governors was rampant in Khorasan. The

population was reduced to despair and the aristocracy began to send letters and envoys to Transoxania to the 'leaders of the Turks' with prayers for help. These circumstances were turned to advantage by the Saljuq Turks whose rise we have studied in the previous chapter. The decisive victory of the Saljuqs over Mas'ud at the battle of Dandanqān in 1040 A.D. ended for ever the rule of the Ghaznavids in Khurāsān. Gradually the Saljuqid rule spread to Transoxania and Khorazmia. But the Saljuq Empire was partitioned after the death of Malik Shāh into many subdivisions, each held by some member of the Saljuq family. Khurāsān fell to the share of Barkiyaruq, son of Malik Shāh, who appointed his step-brother, Sanjar, the governor of Khurāsān. Under Sanjar the Saljuqs of Persia attained their greatest expansion. Sanjar had to contend not only against the rebellious governor of Khorazmia, Atsiz, but also against the Qara-Khitay, a new non-Muslim Turkish dynasty which occupied Bukhara in 1141 and subjugated the whole of Transoxania. In order to suppress their rising power, Sanjar marched against the Qara-Khitay but was defeated by them. Atsiz died as the vassal of Sanjar but he laid the foundation of the independence of the Khwārazmshāhs who became in time the masters of Khurāsān as well. It was also at this time that the Ghūr dynasty became a formidable power. The name of Ghūr was borne by the mountainous region situated to the east and south-east of Herāt. The dialect of the mountaineers differed materially from that of Khurāsān. As late as the tenth century the population of Ghūr was for the most part heathen, although the district itself was surrounded on all sides by Muslim territories. The first to penetrate to the interior of the country were the armies of Mas'ud, son of Maḥmūd Ghaznavī. After the conquest of Ghūr, the Ghaznavids left the native dynasty here. In the middle of the twelfth century the Sultāns of Ghūr, like the Khwārazmshāhs, took advantage of the decay of the power of the Saljuqids and Ghaznavids. The two Ghūr brothers Ghayathuddin and Shahabuddin raised their kingdom to the rank of a world power. They conquered not only Baymiyān, Ṭukharistan and Sughnān, but also occupied Herāt in 1175 and subjugated northern India. The Ghūr kings were allies of the Caliph of Baghdad and
rivals of the Khwarazmshahs, who, in turn, were allied to the Qara-Khitaiya. Khurasan was the bone of contention between the Ghurids and the Khwarazmshahs. Shahabuddin Ghurī defeated 'Ala'uddin Muḥammad Khwarazmshah in 1204 but the latter appealed to the Qara-Khitaiya for help as a result of which the Ghurid army suffered a heavy defeat at Ankhund at the hands of the Qara-Khitaiya. The power of the Ghurids declined after the death of Shahabuddin and Khurasan passed to the Khwarazmshahs.

We have described in the previous chapter how the Mongols crushed the power of the Khwarazmshahs and overran Ḥiraq and ʿIrān. Under Halagu the first dynasty of Il-Khāns was established in Iran. The line of Juchi, a son of Chengiz, ruled the Turkish tribes of the Khānate of Qipchaq and finally became the Khāns of Khiva and Būkhārā. The line of Jagharay ruled Transoxania. Halagu’s great work in Iran was to clear the country of the Assassins, a branch of the Ismāʿilīs who were led and organised by Ḥasan b. Ṣabbāḥ. Ḥasan was a contemporary and class-fellow of Niẓām-ʿul-Mulk Tūsī. He went to Egypt in the time of Mustanṣir, the ʿĀṣimid Caliph. Ḥasan having backed up Nazār in opposition to Mustaʿlī in the dispute which arose over the succession of Mustanṣir, had to fly from Egypt. He captured the fort of Alamut north of Qazwīn. Other small forts in the neighbourhood also fell to him and Alamut now became a regular state. From this fortress Ḥasan and his followers spread death and terror. Many important Muslim personalities, including Niẓām-ʿul-Mulk Tūsī, fell a prey to the dagger of the Assassins. Halagu restored peace and order in Iran and Khurasan by giving a deathblow to the organised brigandage of the Assassins. The extirpation of the Assassins won for Halagu Khan the applause of the orthodox Muslims. Gradually the Mongol rulers of Persia learnt the civilisation and culture of Iran. The feudal system of government was retained and the Persians gained ascendancy in the administration. Halagu was succeeded by his son Abaqa who ruled until 1282. Having failed against the Egyptians, Abaqa sought to forge an East-West alliance against the Mamlūk rulers of Egypt and Syria. He sent his emissaries to the courts of
Europe and to the Pope but the Europeans did not take much interest in the matter. It is after this failure that the Mongols turned towards Islam. Takudar, a brother of Aqa, became a convert to Islam but he was murdered and succeeded by Arghun who showed leaning towards Christianity. It must be remembered that the Christian Church was at this time making frantic efforts to bring the Mongols of Persia in the fold of Christianity. A number of missions had been despatched to impress the Mongol rulers and convert them to Christianity. As a result of these efforts, Arghun showed great favour to the Nestorian Christians settled in Iraq and Iran, but Ghazan Khan, a great grandson of Hulagu, who came to the throne in 1295 became a convert to Islam. "Hard pressed between the mounted archers of the wild Mongols in the East and the mailed knights of the Crusaders on the West, Islam in the early part of the thirteenth century seemed for ever lost. How different was the situation in the last part of the same century! The last Crusader had by that time been driven into the sea. The seventh of the Ilkhans, many of whom had been flirting with Christianity, had finally recognized Islam as the State religion."

During the rule of Ghazan Khan good government and economic prosperity were restored in Iran. Taxation was regularised, laws were codified and internal security established. Ten thousand men guarded the main roads along which numerous caravans passed in safety. Both Geneva and Venice had commercial envoys and colonies of merchants resident in Tabriz.

Ghazan Khan died in 1304 and his brother Oljaitu reigned until 1316. As a child Oljaitu had been baptised a Christian, but he later embraced Islam. He was succeeded by Abu Sa'id at the age of twelve. "Mongol power," says Wilber,2 "had now passed its peak in Iran, and it would have taken a greater figure than this ruler, who was a mere youth during most of his reign, to arrest the accelerating decline. The great nobles became increasingly unruly, and sections of the kingdom began to break off from

the main body. The south of Iran had been spared Mongol devastation because its rulers had made huge payments to the invaders, and now the Muzaffarid dynasty of Kerman spread its authority over Fars and most of Western Iran. Abu Sa'id died in 1335. Ghazan Khan had slain many members of the Mongol families, and now the more remote claimants to the throne fought among themselves without decisive results. During the most of the rest of the fourteenth century the country drew in upon itself and petty dynasties held fleeting power, of which the Muzaffarids were the strongest."

The period from the death of Halagu to the end of the reign of Abu Sa'id was extraordinarily rich in literary production and at no other time were so many first-rate histories written in Persian. Considerable work was also done in the fields of medicine, botany, astronomy and the natural sciences. Nāṣiruddīn Ṭūsī, formerly connected with the Assassins, became the courtier of Halagu and persuaded him to found the famous observatory at Maragha. Rūmī and Sa'dī, both poets of world renown, lived and flourished in this period.

During the period of Mongol Il-Khāns of Persia, Transoxania remained in a state of anarchy. This country had been allotted to Chaghtay, the second son of Chengiz Khān. Sometimes later the vast territory was split into two sections, Transoxania proper and Turkestan, which fought against each other until 1370 when Timur, the great-grandson of the head of the Berlas tribes of Turks, who was also the governor of Mongolia, defeated the ruler of Transoxania and annexed the country. In 1380 he began his famous campaigns in Persia. Khurāsān, Herāt and Kābul were reduced but isolated strongholds continued to resist in what is now Afghanistan. In the west Timūr captured Aleppo and Damascus, in the east he overran India as far as Delhi. He also conquered much of Russian Turkestan. "The state which he established was essentially a Turkish kingdom but Iranian culture played the creative and dominant role, for Timur was a fervent Moslem."1 Timur, like many other Turco-Mongol Muslims

represented a synthetic culture. For example, he could speak Turkish, Persian and Mongol languages.

After Timūr his fourth son, Shāh Rukh, gained control of Herāt, Khurasān and Transoxania. From his capital Herāt, Shāh Rukh ruled over all eastern Īrān until 1447. He defeated the Black Sheep at Tabriz and drove them into Armenia. The Black Sheep was a Turkoman tribe which rose to power in the fourteenth century in the country to the south of Lake Van. The Kara Kuynula, as they are called, established themselves in Armenia and Āzerbāijān and finally succeeded in retaining control over Western Īrān. Shāh Rukh was a great ruler. Herāt and Merv in particular benefited from his benevolent activities. He was a great patron of art and letters. Ulugh Beg, the next ruler, was dethroned and killed by his own son. Thereafter the Timūrid kingdom fell into decay. The eastern Timūrid kingdom passed into the hands of a Tartar horde whose racial origin was Mongol but whose cultural traditions were Turkish. Their dynasty was known as the Shaybānī dynasty from the name of Muḥammad Shaybān descended from the fifth son of Juchi, successor of Chengiz Khān, who was granted an appanage between the Ural mountains and the rivers Ilīk and Irghis. In the fifteenth century one of his descendants overran Khwārazm and Turkestan. His son Muḥammad Shābānī finally overthrew the last Timūrids in Īrān. Shaybānī founded the Uzbek kingdom which lasted down till very recent times. The Amir of Bukhārā and the Khāns of Khiva both were lineal descendants of Muḥammad Shaybān. The Uzbeks were finally driven out from Persia by Shāh Ismāʿīl Šafavī, the founder of the Šafavī dynasty. It was the Uzbeks who drove out Bābar from Samarkand where he had installed himself. Their leader Shaybānī Khān, as we saw, acquired easy possession of Khurasān. The Uzbeks even advanced on Qandhār and at their approach Bābar had to retire into Hindustan. But a rebellion occurred at this time in Shaybānī’s dominions which obliged him to leave Qandhār. Bābar thus found an opportunity to establish himself in Kābul and once again tried to capture Samarkand, taking advantage of the defeat inflicted on the Uzbeks by Shāh Ismāʿīl Šafavī who cleared the Persian
territory from the Uzbeks. Although Bābar reduced both Bukhārā and Samarqand in 1511, the sons of Ṣayyānī finally overthrew his power in Central Asia. The people of Samarqand and Bukhārā were staunch Sunnis and Bābar's alliance with Shāh Ismā'īl who was the champion of Shi'as did not please them. In 1512 the Uzbeks inflicted a crushing defeat on Bābar and the Persian force sent to his help by Shāh Ismā'īl suffered a similar defeat. Bābar had to retire to Kābul and give up his dream of reconquering his Central Asian dominions. It was after this that he finally determined to turn south and carve out a kingdom in India.

Henceforth the histories of Persia and India proceed on independent lines and their connection with Central Asian Muslim territories is broken. With the establishment of the Ṣafavids in Iran and of the Mughals in India, these two countries achieved relative freedom to develop on their own lines. We, therefore, now turn to the history of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent to trace the course of events that led to the emergence of Pakistan.

INDO-PAKISTAN MUSLIM HISTORY

The first Muslim invasion of India took place in the early part of the eighth century, while the Arab Empire of the Omayyads was still strong. Muhammad b. Ṭāsim conquered Sind and reached as far as Multan. But the Arab hold on India did not last, as the province of Sind was a desert and yielded little revenue. So long as the Rajputs still held important kingdoms in the north, no permanent Arab rule could be established. The decline in the power of Caliphate seriously affected its possessions abroad and in any case the Arabs were never serious about their Indian dominions. No large-scale migration of the Arabs took place in India as it did in Syria and Africa. Sind remained divided into several petty states which were practically independent. The Arabs who settled in the province married Indian women and established their own dynasties. The chiefs of the Saiyyad families exercised authority over the upper and lower Indus. Though the Arabs left no permanent influences behind them, there was some cultural interaction. "The court at Baghdad
extended its patronage to Indian scholarship, and, during the reign of Mansur (753-774 A.D.), Arab scholars went from India to Baghdad, who carried with them two books, *Brahma Siddhanta* of Brahmagupta and his *Khandakhadyaka*, which were translated into Arabic with the help of Indian scholars . . . . The cause of Hindu learning received much encouragement from the ministerial family of Barmaks during the Khilafat of Harun (786-808 A.D.). They invited Hindu scholars to Baghdad and appointed them as the chief physicians of their hospitals and asked them to translate from Sanskrit into Arabic works on medicine, philosophy, astrology and other subjects."

The next Muslim invasion of India took place during the reign of Maḥmūd of Ghaznī about 1000 A.D. Maḥmūd led many expeditions against the Rajput princes of North India. He conquered Multan from the Qarmāzians whose ruler Dāʾūd fled to an island in the river Indus. Maḥmūd was merciless against the Qarmāzians. He destroyed them wholesale, even their mosques were razed to the ground. The Sūltān next proceeded to conquer Bhatinda, Thanesar, Kanauj and Muttra. In 1021 Maḥmūd also led an expedition against Kashmir but he failed to conquer it. Maḥmūd, however, did not plant the Muslim flag in India firmly. The centre of gravity of his kingdom lay outside India. There was no indigenous element on whose support he could rely. His army was "mainly recruited from Transoxania but as the preponderance of any one element would have been fraught with dangers, Arabs, Afghans, Daylamites, Khurasanis, Ghuris and Indians were also enlisted." Nor did he devote much time to the consolidation of his rule in India or concerned himself with its administration. Although he built a few mosques and appointed a few teachers for the instruction of the converted Hindus, he neither forced conversions on his subjects on a large scale nor did anything of importance for the peaceful propagation of Islam. It is a false charge against him that he destroyed temples. In times

of peace, he did no injury to places of worship.

The permanent foundation of Muslim rule in India was laid by the Ghurids, of whom we have spoken earlier. Having put an end to the Ghaznavid ruler of Lahore, Khusraw Malik, in 1186 A.D., Shahbuddin Ghuri defeated Prithvi Raj in 1197 at the battle of Tarain and conquered Kanauj. Bengal and Bihar were conquered by Muhammad b. Bakhtiyar Khilji during this period and the Muslim rule covered nearly the whole of Northern India. The Ghurids, unlike the Ghaznavids, tried to consolidate their conquests. In this task they were helped by Qubuddin Aybak, one of their Turkish slaves. It was Qubuddin who, after the death of his master, began to rule over India and initiated what is called the "Slave Dynasty," the first purely Muslim Indian dynasty which had no interests abroad and was rooted in the soil of the country. Before we take up the rule of these Turkish slaves, it would be well to discuss the socio-religious conditions of India at the time of the Muslim invasion so as to form an idea as to why Islam was able to penetrate so easily in this country, despite the fact that the Muslim rulers commanded only a handful of civil and military forces which were by no means closely integrated, as they consisted of diverse racial strains.

Socio-Religious Conditions in India

At the time of Muslim invasion the Rajputs held a monopoly of power. The lower-caste Hindus were completely shouldered out: hereafter in Hindu society, Brahmans and Rajputs alone count. The Vaishyas and Sudras had ceased to be citizens. The Rajputs, again, evolved a new cult and laid the foundation of purely military states. They devoted all their energies to matters of war with complete disregard and neglect of the functions of civil life. History shows that the purely military states, devoid of the resources which civil energies alone can provide, do not succeed even in that war for which they have sacrificed everything against a state which combines in itself functions both political and civil. "Fighting along with the lower caste being regarded a disgrace, and association of people of one caste with the other being forbidden, individuals would cook and eat
their meals separately according to their own special rites; and none except co-caste persons would join the funeral ceremony of one dead at home or killed in the field."¹

Again, the chief characteristic of the Rajput army was its feudal character. There were no enlisted forces, and the required number had to be produced at a sudden call for the occasion. The feudal levies having no racial or national unity were torn by dissensions. The Rajputs did not fight pitched battles. Usually they retired into forts to avoid wastage of men. Cut off from the resources of the surrounding country, which came into the hands of the Muslim invaders, the garrison could always be reduced to their last straits. The lower classes were left outside the forts at the mercy of the invaders. To the mass of the people, a change of the masters meant little. Taxes would not be increased, peace would be better maintained, art, craft and industry would receive greater encouragement. To the non-caste, the success of the Turks meant a positive improvement. One oligarchy would succeed another. But the new oligarchy had no reason to exclude them from the village wells or the public street. War increased their employment, their wages rose, and after the war, public works—roads, forts and service in the commissariats—provided them with employment. There can be little doubt that the Turkish conquest of India "raised the non-caste from the status of pigs to the status of bullocks."²

Religion also had a good deal to contribute to the fall of India to the Muslim invaders. It had become the exclusive monopoly of the Brahman class. Ritualism developed to such an extent that the ordinary man could not perform his religious duties without the help of the professional priests. While in the rest of Asia the educated classes were busy in carrying light and knowledge to the multitude under the shadow of mosques; and the sons of farmers, weavers and shopkeepers were receiving education through charitable endowments and waqfs, the Brahmans of India were putting all kinds of restrictions on

¹. ‘Azīz ‘Ahmad, Early Turkish Empire of Delhi, Lahore 1949, p. 45.
². Ibid., p. 46.
knowledge. Again, while the average Muslim throughout the Middle Ages regarded astrology as something dark and irreligious, in India astrology became the basis of popular religion; it was the lever by which Brahmanical scholars controlled and exploited the multitude. The Buddhist doctrine of Ahimsa which had struck deep roots made the ordinary Indian a pacifist and destroyed his warlike qualities.

THE MUSLIM INVADERS

Cultural contacts between the Muslims and the Hindus existed long before Turkish invaders entered upon the scene. Mystics, traders and travellers from Muslim lands undertook a peaceful penetration of the country, for the spirit of travel and missionary zeal was widely diffused among the Muslims, two qualities which distinguished them from all other peoples of the contemporary world. Muslim colonies were found in every large town long before the invasion of Mahmūd of Ghaznī. "The Muslims who came into India made it their home. They lived surrounded by the Hindu people, and a state of perennial hostility with them was impossible. Mutual intercourse led to mutual understanding. Many who had changed their faith differed little from those whom they had left."¹ This was largely due to the missionary efforts of Muslim mystics and the propaganda carried on by Khwāja Mu‘īnuddīn Chishti and his predecessors like ‘Alī Hajwīrī, who had peacefully made the Muslims a community of the soil long before it was subdued by the Gharīds.

The Muslim social system was built around the Quranic conception of God and the practical brotherhood of Islām. By the end of thirteenth century these ideals had declined in force. Nevertheless their power was not completely extinguished and Muslim society afforded equal opportunities of progress to all its members to an extent which was not possible in any other society. The Turkish slave aristocracy stood a governing group apart from others. But apart from this exception, all Muslims were socially equal. In trade, industry and commerce, in litera-

¹ Tarachand, Influence of Islam on Indian Culture, Allahabad 1946, p. 137.
ture and public life, and in the religious profession career was open to all Muslims. No wonder that a large number of Hindus were attracted to Islam because of the opportunity it afforded for gaining social and economic equality. But those who remained Hindus were not completely excluded. It is true that Muslim kings displaced the Hindu Rajas in the important centres of power. But the outlying parts were still ruled over by the Hindu princes. "The new ruler," says Dr. Tarachand,1 "was master of the immediate lands within striking distance of his cavalry encampment; beyond, the petty landholder with his retinue was safe within his mud castle and defied the sovereign power. To reduce all these small chieftains was a task of Sisyphus. Every energetic ruler of the many dynasties that sat upon the throne of Delhi from the times of Qutbuddin Aibak to the spacious days of Akbar had to carry out annual razzias to keep them under control or to collect revenue. In fact the imperial authority masked a surprisingly extensive system of local autonomy which tended continually to break out into anarchy when not kept in check by a Balban, an Alauddin Khilji or a Muhammad Tughlaq.

"Muslim authority was not only restricted in these two ways. It had also to impose upon itself other restraints. The employment of Hindus was a necessity of their rule. Mahmud of Ghazna had a numerous body of Hindu troops who fought for him in Central Asia and his Hindu commander Tilak suppressed the rebellion of his Muslim general Niyaltigin. When Qutbuddin Aibak decided to stay in Hindustan, he had no other choice but to retain the Hindu staff which was familiar with the civil administration, for, without it, all government including the collection of revenue would have fallen into utter chaos. The Muslims did not bring with them from beyond the Indian frontiers artisans, accountants and clerks. Their buildings were erected by Hindus who adapted their ancient rules to newer conditions, their coins were struck by Hindu goldsmiths, and their accounts were kept by Hindu officers. Brahman legists advised the king on the administration of Hindu Law and Brahman astronomers helped

in the performance of their general functions."

A few words must be said about the Turkish slave system, which may be traced to the slaves purchased and trained by the minor Persian dynasties from the days of the Sāmānids. Slave trade had by this time become a most profitable profession. The slave dealer was very careful in the selection and training of the Turkish slaves, who were paid handsomely for the careful training received by them. The best slaves were purchased by the kings and princes and had prospects in life, which were denied to free-born subjects, a feature which we have noted in the Ottoman slave system. The great quality of the Turkish slave was the efficiency of his work. Starting with an education which was seldom within the reach of middle-class freemen, he gradually won his way up to the highest place. In those days of anarchy and confusion, governments were not stable; provincial governors often rebelled against the central authority. A bureaucracy of Turkish slaves was more dependable. Torn away from his tribe and kinsmen and a stranger in a strange land, no consideration interfered with his devotion to his master's person. The whole course of his training inculcated loyalty and submission. The slave was the property of his master. He could not even marry without the master's consent. When he died, he was inherited not by his sons but by the monarch. To be a slave of the king constituted a special title of respect. "The slave of today is the Sultan of tomorrow," was a time-honoured proverb. Everything depended on his merits, intellect and sagacity. No favour or partiality was shown; those who were really competent rose to positions of power.Merit and not favouritism was the standard, and the slave system in a way secured the survival of the fittest.

"The Turkish government of the thirteenth century," says Dr. 'Azīz 'Aḥmad, "was composed of several elements, borrowed from various countries. The king and his courtiers breathed the atmosphere of Persian paganism; the army was organised after the manners of the Mongols and the Turks, and below the central government was the old Hindu system of local government. The

Indian Empire which the early Turkish Sulṭāns inherited from their master, was a ‘flimsy structure.’ Unloved by the people and dependent on a Turkish oligarchy, it had neither the material strength nor the moral prestige, requisite of a permanent government. But the emperor Sulṭāns of Delhi knew of no legal limitations to their power.” Similarly, “Medieval Kingship,” says the same writer,1 “was a hybrid institution non-Muslim and non-Hindu. Maḥmūd of Ghaznah, Shīhābuddīn of Ghūr and Shamsuddīn Iltutmīsh were not inspired by the democratic ideals of the early Saracens. The Muslim Caliph was elected by the faithful; his power originated from the people below, and not from God above. But the Sassanian emperors of Persia had claimed divinity and an exclusive right of their family to the throne. The Muslim king, on the other hand, was symbolically the ‘shadow of God on earth’ (Zillullāh), and not a divine incarnation. Yet the Medieval Kingship was essentially a secular institution; its power was based on Persian tradition and not on Islamic law.

“The new monarchy, however, fared well for some time. The death of Shīhābuddīn and the extinction of his dynasty left his slaves and masters without a master, and the tie of ‘salt and sonship’ was broken. As a consequence a tribal duel commenced between Quṭbuddīn Aibak of Delhi, Nāṣiruddīn Qabācha of Sind and Tājuddīn Yaldız of Ghaznī, and when the Mongols snatched away the dominion of Tājuddīn and Iltutmīsh overpowered Nāṣiruddīn, the Turkish slave aristocrats took to intriguing against each other. Their object as a class was twofold—first, to prevent the crown from becoming too powerful and, secondly, to monopolize the offices of the government. As a result of mystic propaganda of the Chīshkīs and the Suhrawardīs, a large number of Hindus had been converted to Islam by the end of the thirteenth century, and the Shari‘at of Islam gave an equal status to all Mussalmans. But the Turkish aristocracy strictly forbade an equal treatment and held the new Muslims in scorn and contempt.

1. Early Turkish Empire of Delhi, Lahore 1949, p. 7.
The Turkish officers were successful at first, and to a large extent held the crown in check. Qutbuddin died without suppressing his rivals. Shamsuddin Iltutmish could with great difficulty retain his storm-tossed throne but his sons were set up and pulled down with bewildering rapidity... Thus, the reigns following the death of Iltutmish were very much disturbed by the rivalry and insubordination of Turkish Maliks. All was panic and confusion, and Delhi became the scene of a series of tragedies. To reform the corrupt condition of the kingdom and to infuse a fresh vigour in the government, Balban resolved upon devising more effective schemes. For the rebellious Maliks and Amir, he thought the assassin's dagger or poison was the only possible remedy, and got rid of most of the 'Forty' by a liberal use of both, and in order to reduce the remnant to a sense of their inferiority, he made them stand motionless in his presence with folded hands and vexed them with petty rules of etiquette. Frequent executions and even massacres restored the loyalty of the people and their governors, and the State slowly recovered from its ruinous condition.

Balban was after all a Turk and desired the subjection, not the annihilation, of the aristocracy. Soon after his death, the Turkish officers again began their factious intrigues... But circumstances had changed, the Khalji opposition was strong and the revolutionary forces, strengthened by an ever-increasing number of converts, were gaining ascendancy. The Turkish Amir, though divided in many groups, were united by a common hatred of the Khaljis. To the proposed insensate persecution of the Turks, the Khaljis replied with the assassin's dagger. The feeble representation of the once mighty empire of Delhi offered an easy prey to the hardy warriors of the Khalji clan and their low-born Indo-Muslim supporters. One by one the Turkish Amir were assassinated, and Mu'izzuddin Kaliqubad was murdered in the Kila-Khari palace. With him the 'Early Turkish Empire' came to an end. The revolution was complete. The government had passed from the foreign Turks to the Indian Mussalmans and their Hindu allies. India was henceforth to be governed by administrators sprung from the soil. The new aristocracy had
not its origin in slavery, but all the servile conditions were impos-
ed upon servants recruited from a free-born population by the
ruthless ‘Alau’ddin Khalji.”

The Khilji dynasty lasted for about thirty-three years. It
pushed the Muslim frontiers to the south of India and made
way in 1321 for the Tughlaq dynasty, descended from Turkish
slaves. Both the Khiljis and the Tughlaqs were Indianised Turks
descended from Indian mothers. During about ninety years of the
Tughlaq rule, the provinces threw off the allegiance of the central
government at Delhi. The invasion of Timur (1388-1389) dealt a
fatal blow to an authority already crumbling. Power then passed
for a time into the hands of the Saiyyad family, but its rule had no
coherence. A powerful Afghan of the Lodi family succeeded in
founding the first Afghan kingdom in India. The Afghans to whom the Lodis committed the charge of the several districts
were indeed bound to their sovereign by a kind of feudal tenure,
but within the circle of his own charge each of them made his own
will absolute. When the second Lodi king, Sikandar, died the
several important nobles, impatient even of their nominal obe-
dience, resolved to assign to his son, Ibrahim, the kingdom of Delhi
only, and to divide the rest of the kingdom among themselves. A
civil war ensued in which Ibrahim was victorious. “The
classic of the Afghan government,” says Ishwari Prasad,¹
“changed under Ibrahim. He was a man of headstrong and
irritable temper who by his insolence and hauteur alienated
the sympathies of the Afghan nobles. The Afghans looked
upon their king as a comrade and not as a master and
willingly accorded to him the honours of a feudal superior.
Men of the Lohani, Farmuli and Lodi tribes held important
offices in the State. They had always been turbulent and factious;
and their position and influence had enabled them to form con-
spiracies against the crown. Their loyalty to their king fluctuated
according to the strength or weakness of the latter. Sikander
had kept them, under firm control and severely punished them

¹. *A Short History of Muslim Rule in India*, Allahabad 1939,
p. 172.
when they flouted his authority. But when Ibrahim attempted to put down their individualistic tendencies with a high hand in order to make his government strong and efficient, they protested and offered resistance. As Erskine observes, the principal fiefholders looked upon their Jagirs ‘as their own of right, and purchased by their swords rather than as due to any bounty or liberality on the part of the sovereign.’ Ibrahim was confronted with a difficult situation. The territory of the empire had increased in extent; the feudal aristocracy had become ungovernable... His drastic measures provoked the resentment of the half-loyal nobility and paved the way for the disruption of the Afghan empire. But Ibrahim was not wholly to blame. The break-up of the empire was bound to come sooner or later, for even if Ibrahim had kept the nobles attached to themselves, they would have tried to set up small principalities for themselves, and reduced him to the position of a titular king, a mere figure-head in the midst of warring factions and cliques.”

THE MUGHAL EMPIRE

We have mentioned the exploits of Bābar and how he failed to regain his ancestral kingdom from the Uzbeks of Central Asia, and, therefore, turned south towards India. Early in his career as the ruler of Kābul, Bābar foresaw that no invasion of Hindustan could yield fruitful results unless he could secure his base at Qandhār. He spent, therefore, the next two or three years in securing that stronghold and the territory between Ghaznī and Khurāsān. On April 12, 1296, Bābar inflicted a decisive defeat on Ibrāhīm Lodī at the battle of Panipat. But he at once realised that he was the master only of Northern India. The important provinces of Oudh, Jaunpur and Western Bihār had revolted against Ibrāhīm and set up independent kingdom. Similarly Bengal under Nuṣrat Shāh, Gujerat under Sikandar Shāh and Malwa under Sūltān Mahmud were independent. But this was not his only difficulty. Another difficulty was ‘that the Hindu population, never conciliated by the families which had preceded his own, were hostile to the invader. ‘The north of India,’ writes Erskine, ‘still retained much of its Hindu organisation, its system
of village and district administration and government; its division into numerous little chieftainships, or petty local governments; and, in political revolutions, the people looked much more to their own immediate rulers than to the princes who governed in the capital.' In a word, never having realised the working of a well-ordered system emanating from one powerful centre, they regarded the latest conqueror as an intruder whom it might be their interest to oppose.'

The fears of the native population received new strength by the hostile propaganda of the Muslim supporters of the old families. To add to this trouble, there arose a discontent in his army at this period. The men comprising his military forces were, to a great extent, the mountaineers from eastern Afghanistan. They did not like the hot climate of the new country and wished to go back home. In spite of these difficulties Bābar did plant his feet firmly in India. The Rajputs and Afghan princes were crushed, and Bābar ruled over the whole of Northern India including, of course, Kabul, Qandhar and Ghazni. The Afghan power was revived after a time by Sher Shāh but did not last long. Bābar was a Turk like the previous Turkish rulers of India. He hated to call himself a Mughal and spoke Turkish as well as Persian. There was a difference, however. He did not bring with himself a Turkish aristocracy. He was influenced far more by Persian ideas and culture with the result that the Mughal power in India remained more or less under the cultural and ideological influence of Iran. It used Persian as its court and official language. By declaring himself a Padshah instead of Sultan, Bābar showed his preference for the Iranian type of autocratic and centralised rule. Bābar and Humayun had both obtained their kingdoms with the help of the Persian monarchs, Shāh Ismā‘īl Safavi and Shāh Tahmasp respectively and naturally they looked upon the Persians as good allies. The result was a considerable infusion of the Iranian element in the politics and administration of the Mughals.

Neither Bābar nor Humayun could do much towards stabilising

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1. Maleson, Ahbar, Rulers of India Series, Oxford Univ. Press, p. 36.
the Mughal rule. The task was successfully attempted by Akbar who realised very early in his reign that Mughal power could last in India only if it was more broadbased. He was faced with the problem of reconciling the interests of the Rajput Hindu princes with that of the Muslim aristocracy, which itself was composed of the Iranian Shi'as and the Sunni Mughals and Uzbeks of Central Asia as well as the Afghans and Pathans. His acute mind perceived that it was impossible to hold India by old methods of government, by stationing standing armies in the provinces and without taking into account the longings and traditions of the native people. Akbar, therefore, tried to give effect to a policy of religious toleration by abolishing the Jazia on the Hindus and placating the Hindu Rajput aristocracy. For this purpose he treated the Hindu Rajas on an equal footing with the Muslim chiefs. He also wanted to hold the balance between the Iranian (Shi'a) element and the Turanian (Sunni) element. The policy of Akbar was basically sound and if this was all he wanted, he could have secured the support of the 'Ulema, just as the Ottoman rulers were able to secure their support in going beyond the Shari'at legislation. Unfortunately, Akbar involved himself in theological disputations, and, egged on by court sycophants and ambitious self-seekers, he antagonised the Muslim 'Ulema who had a strong influence on the Sunni aristocracy, firstly by acts which cast doubts on his own orthodoxy and showed that he had gone too far in placating the Hindus by adopting some of their idolatrous practices, and, secondly, by trying to set himself up as the infallible interpreter of Islamic law. He wanted, in effect, to be both king and Pope, so that he could also decide doctrinal points. Thus vanity and lack of tactfulness led to the failure of a basically sound religious policy. Akbar also failed to see that the Muslim aristocracy was and would long continue to be the main prop of Muslim power in India and that, whatever the numerical strength of his Hindu subjects, they were not yet in a position to exert a decisive influence on the course of history. However, the main idea behind Akbar's policy, namely, conciliation of his Hindu subjects, was both original and sound but Akbar failed badly in its execution.
Developments in the Muslim East

Akbar's main title to fame rests upon his revenue system which continued to exist with modifications during the British period. The originator of this system was Sher Shāh. Akbar developed and improved this system. "The land," says Maleson, ¹ "was in the earlier part of the reign divided into three classes according to its fertility, and the assessment was fixed on the average production of three bighas, one from each division. The cultivator might, however, if dissatisfied with the average, insist on the valuation of his own crop. Five classifications of land were likewise made to ensure equality of payment in proportion to the quality of land and its immunity from accidents, such as inundation." Gradually, a better principle was introduced to fix the amount payable to the state. Statements of prices for the nineteen years preceding the survey were called from the village heads. From these an average was struck out, and the produce was valued at the current rates. At first these settlements were annual but later they were made for ten years. Akbar went dangerously to the point where he attempted to negotiate directly with the cultivators instead of through the headman of the village. But he ensured justice and prosperity to the rural population which materially contributed to the stability of the Mughal Empire.

He also established a chain of store-houses in each district to supply with food those animals which were the property of the state; to furnish cultivators with grain for sowing purposes; to have at hand a provision in case of famine; and to feed the poor. These store-houses were placed in charge of men specially elected for their trustworthy qualities.

THE MUGHAL FEUDAL SYSTEM

The Mughal feudal system was called the manṣabdarī system. "The only aristocracy in the land was the military peerage graded according to the manṣab, and more than half the population in a court town or a camp was composed of soldiers, their dependants, and camp-followers, i.e. the army. This will go to show the great importance of the army from the political as well as the

social standpoint.

"Again, it is an important feature of the Mughal administration that all civil officers, high and low, were chosen from the holders of the military ranks, i.e. the *manṣabdars*. So we find that the *manṣabdari* system is the army, the peerage and the civil administration all rolled into one. The manṣab, although primarily a military rank, really constituted the terms in which official hierarchy, and incidentally social status was expressed. A manṣab did not by itself imply any particular office. Sometimes the conferment of a manṣab was equivalent to mere grant of income to a person by way of recognition, it may be of purely professional service or skill (as those of a physician or a poet)."  

The *manṣabdārī* system was an interesting institution socially. It was an aristocracy, but it differed from other aristocracies in that the nobility and the Jagīr appertaining to it were held at the pleasure of the emperor, and were in all cases limited to a life-tenure. Not only the Jagīr but all cash and valuables belonging to the nobility escheated, at the death of the holder, to the crown which was in theory the owner and heir of all real and personal property in the country. The descendants of the deceased manṣabdār were occasionally given a small rank by way of opportunity to prove personal merit or some cash or allowance as a means of sustenance.

In its fully developed form a manṣab was expressed thus: *Chahār hazārī zāt wa sīh hazār suwār* which means 4,000 personal and 3,000 horse rank (4000/3000). The zāt and suwār were equal—*Chahār hazārī zāt wa chahār hazār suwār* (4000/4000). The zāt or personal rank was always equal to or higher than the suwār, i.e. horse rank. The former was considered more important, so that 4000/2000 was considered higher than 3000/3000. A zāt rank without suwār merely denoted the amount of salary drawn by the officer without any obligation to keep a troop of horsemen but such a rank was exceedingly rare.

The origin of the *manṣabdārī* system goes back to the Mongol

army organisation, although it existed and was operated by Sher Shâh and was not introduced by Bûbar, as is claimed by some historians. The fact is that the stream of Mongol inroads into Western India which lasted from 1221 to 1327 and the infiltration consequent upon it, familiarised the people with the Mongol principles of organisation.

Chengiz Khân founded his empire on a strictly aristocratic basis. In the same way as an aristocratic family or clan was the head of a tribe, at the head of the Imperial Clan is the emperor who was the chief of his own clan and of the aristocracy that joined him. The emperor was not the head of the people or the nation. Chengiz never conceived of himself as a popular leader. He was and remained the head of an aristocratic clan that had unified all the Mongol aristocracy. The distinguishing feature of the organisational method of Chengiz was its decimal system. Each tribe was divided into ten sections, each section with its commander, nine chiefs of ten men chose the tenth as a centurion, who had, besides his own command of ten, supervision of the hundred; nine centurions similarly chose a battalion commandant, and ten of these latter a divisional commander, who led a body of 10,000 men, in Mongol phrase a tuman. This was the prototype on which the Mughal army was modelled.

The manşabdârî system was a compromise between the ancient system of tribal chieftainship and the medieval feudal system of recruitment. Certain chiefs were made responsible for the levy and the force under each chieftain belonged wholly or mainly to his own clan, at any rate in the earlier period. It thus retained the advantages of both systems. The loyalty of the men to their chief was assured by racial kinship and a large army could be collected without an over-centralised organisation for its recruitment. The manşabdârs holding civil or military offices in the provinces, as distinguished from the courtiers who were also manşabdârs, held their Jâgîrs in their place of appointment. Each unit, from its composition could be utilised precisely for the purpose to which it was best suited. According to Bernier, the Hindu Rajas, who were manşabadârs, were used to keep in check other Rajas, as well as those who refused to pay the tribute or
join the army when summoned by the king. "It is the king's policy," he goes on, "to foment jealousy and discord among the Rajas, and by caressing and favouring some more than others, he often succeeds when desirous of doing so, in kindling wars among them." Again, "They are always at hand to be employed against the Patans, or against any rebellious Omrah or governor."

"Whenever the king of Golkonda," he continues, "withholds his tribute, or evinces an inclination to defend the king of Visapour or any neighbouring Raja whom the Mogol wishes to despoil or render tributory, Rajas are sent against him in preference to Omrah's, who being for the most part Persians are not of the same religion as the Mogol, to wit Sounys, but Chias, as are the kings of Persia and Golkonda."

Further, "The Mogol never finds the Rajas more useful than when he is engaged in hostility with the Persians. His Omrah's, as I have just remarked, are generally of that nation, and shudder at the idea of fighting against their natural king; specially because they acknowledge him as their Imam, their Calife or sovereign pontiff, and the descendant of Aly, to bear arms against whom they therefore consider a great crime.

"The Mogol is also compelled to engage Patans in his service by reasons very similar to those I have assigned for employing Ragipous."

The above policy would have been impossible without a clan system in the units. By making use of tribal patriotism, the mansabdari system encouraged tribal consciousness and inhibited the growth of territorial patriotism.

The way in which the mansabdars were selected and promoted was as follows: Those seeking employment in government service generally attached themselves to a patron of their own race. Mughals became the followers of Mughals, Persians of Persians, Afghans of Afghans and so forth. A noble from Central Asia (Transoxania) recruited none but Mughals; from Iran he might have one-third Mughals and the remainder Saiyyads and Shaykhs. Nobles who were Saiyyads or Shaykhs would enlist

their own tribe or one-sixth they might have Afgãns. Afgãns themselves might have one-half Afgãns and the other half Mughals. Rajputs made up their whole force of Rajputs.

Regarding the position of the Mughals, Bernier says that offices of trust and dignity were not exclusively held by them. The posts, he says, were filled by people of all races and strangers from all countries, the greater part by Persians, some by Arabs and others by Turks. The same writer says\(^1\) : "These armies are composed either of natives, such as Ragipous and Patans or of genuine Mogols and people who, though less esteemed, are called Mogols because white men, foreigners and Mahometans. The court itself does not now consist, as originally, of real Mogols; but it is a medley of Usbecs, Persians, Arabs, and Turks, or descendants from all these people; known, as I said before, by the general appellation of Mogols. It should be added, however, that children of the third and fourth generation, who have the brown complexion and the languid manner of this country of their nativity, are held in much less respect than new-comers, and are seldom invested with official situations."

As regards the Mughal army, it may be stated that it was mainly an army of horsemen. The Mughals who came from beyond the Oxus were accustomed to fight on horseback only: the foot-soldier they despised; and in artillery they never became very proficient. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, when the French and the English had demonstrated the vast superiority of disciplined infantry, the Indian foot-soldier was little more than a night watchman and guardian over baggage.

**SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS UNDER THE MUGHAL RULE**

Unlike their predecessors—the Indo-Bactrians, the Sakas and the Huns—the Muslim conquerors of India were not absorbed by the very elastic and expanding Hinduism. On the other hand, they made large conversions. Not only did Islãm survive the

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impact of Hinduism, it left its own impression on Hindu religion and culture. The anti-caste and anti-Brahman movements in medieval India were due to the influence of Islam. Many Hindu sects arose which tried to harmonise Islam and Hinduism. This was the aim of reformers like Kabir, Dada, Nanak and Chaitanya.

"The cultural unity of India was another enduring achievement of the Muslim Rule. Hindu-Muslim social intercourse, Hindus and Muslims studying side by side in the same schools without any restrictions, compulsory education in Persian, mutual exchange of words, thoughts, and ideas both in arts and literature, adoption and incorporation—all these forces combined and cumulatively contributed to the cultural unity of India during the Muslim Rule."  

Again, the Mughal Empire re-established the contact between India and the outer Asiatic world which had been destroyed with the decline of Buddhism. "Through the passes of the Afghan frontier," says Sir Jadunath Sarkar, 2 "the stream of population and trade flowed peacefully into India from Bukhara and Samarqand, Balkh and Khurasan, Khwarizm and Persia, because Afghanistan belonged to the ruler of Delhi, till near the end of the Mughal empire. Through the Bolan pass leading from India to Qandhar in South Afghanistan and thence to Persia, as many as 14,000 camel-loads of merchandise passed every year in the reign of Jehangir...The trade of the west-coast of India had been their (Arabs') monopoly in the 1st century of the Christian era (as we learn from the periplus of the Erythraean Sea). And now the conversion of the entire Near East and Middle East with parts of the Malay world to their faith and their sacred tongue gave them the greatest advantage in the sea-borne trade of Asia and Africa." The western ports of India carried on a brisk trade with the Middle East, while from the eastern port of Musulipatam ships used to sail for Ceylon, Java, Sumatra, Siam and even China.

By its nature the Mughal State was a military rule and,

therefore, necessarily a centralised despotism. "To the Muslim portion of the population the sovereign was the head of both Church and State, and therefore for them he undertook socialistic functions. But towards his non-Muslim subjects, he followed the policy of the individualistic minimum of interference, i.e. he contented himself with discharging only police duties and the collection of revenue. The support of public education was not a duty of the State,—indeed it was recognised as a national duty even in England as late as 1870."1 If the king spent anything on education it was not an act of the state, but a private benefaction. Some schools were, however, subsidised by the state. Apart from this, the emperors patronised learned men, poets and artists. During the Mughal period education was diffused by the threefold means of (1) schools and colleges, (2) mosques and monasteries and (3) private houses, typifying three forms of education, viz. the university, primary and domestic. Hindu students studied side by side with Muslims and no restrictions were placed. Separate schools existed for female education, but for the most part they received their education at home.

The Mughal administration followed the Persian model, but in details it was modified to suit local conditions. The foreign element in the Mughal administration is evident in the provincial sphere. The Arab distinction of Governor (Amīr) and Treasury Officer ('Āmil) was rigidly maintained. In the Arab administrative system these two offices were separate and were further required to watch each other. Under the Mughals this was exactly the relation between the Subedar (provincial governor) and the Diwan (revenue chief).

The Mughal State was also the largest or rather the sole manufacturer on a large scale in respect of several commodities. The state needed cloth on a very large scale, because the emperor paid a Khilat (robe of honour) to every mansabdar annually and the number of mansabdars in 1690 is given as nearly 7,500. The robe of honour of the higher nobles consisted of several articles

\[x.\] Sarkar, Sir Jadunath, Mughal Administration, Calcutta 1935, pp. 4-5.
of apparel. The supply of required cloth was assured by the state maintaining its own cloth factories. The same thing was done with regard to various articles of consumption and luxury required by the imperial household.

Ship-building was an important Indian industry in the Mughal days. The great bulk of commerce in the Indian seas was carried in ships built in India. Most of them were large ships. "We know that both the English and the Dutch had some of their ships constructed in India."¹ "The industrial condition of India," says S. M. Ja'far,² "during the Mughal period and before has been admirably summed up by the Industrial Commission in the following passage:

"At a time when the west of Europe, the birth-place of modern industrial system, was inhabited by uncivilized tribes, India was famous for the wealth of her rulers and for the high artistic skill of her craftsmen. And even at a much later period, when the merchant adventurers from the West made their first appearance in India, the industrial development of the country was, at any rate, not inferior to that of more advanced European nations.'³"

The economic condition of the common man during the Mughal period was, on the whole, very satisfactory. A European traveller, Coryat, could maintain himself in India with meat, drink and clothes for 1 or 2d. a day. Smith says that a labourer could live quite comfortably on an income of 2½d. per day and concludes that in the time of Akbar and Jahangir "a hired labourer probably had more to eat in ordinary years than he has now."³⁵

While comparing a farmer of Akbar's times with one of the British period, Professor Brij Narain comes to the conclusion that the former was more prosperous than the latter.⁴ As regards the condition of Hindus under Aurangzeb, who is generally regarded as a fanatical Muslim ruler, a European eye-witness, Hamilton,

² Ibid.
³ Ja'far, S. M., Some Cultural Aspects of Muslim Rule in India, Peshawar 1950, p. 231.
⁴ Ibid.
says: "The Gentiles are better contented to live under the Moghul’s laws than under pagan princes, for the Moghul taxes them gently and every one knows what he must pay, but the pagan kings or princes tax at discretion, making their own avarice the standard of equity; besides there were formerly small Rajas, that used, upon frivolous occasions, to pick quarrels with one another, and before they could be made friends again, their subjects were forced to open both their veins and purses to gratify ambition or folly."¹

DECLINE AND FALL OF THE MUGHALS

Like all other empires of the world, the Mughal Empire decayed when it ceased to fulfill the function of uplifting and unifying the people with whose destiny it was charged. The main strength of the Mughal Empire rested on its capacity to absorb fresh elements pouring in from Írân and Central Asia. In its earlier career, it had shown a great absorptive capacity, unlike the Turkish slave dynasty which was a close preserve of a small oligarchy. Gradually, however, the Írânian and Tûránian elements which had formed the backbone of the Empire became Indianised. They adopted many customs and ideas of the Hindus. They married with Hindu women whose social influence must have been considerable. They began to develop a new language of their own, Urdu, which was a composite mixture of Persian, Arabic, and Hindi. Thus in the course of centuries the Indianised Muslims drifted apart from their kith and kin in Central Asia and monopolised all power and wealth, shutting the doors of opportunity on the more vigorous and virile immigrants from foreign Muslim countries. From the seventeenth century onwards, it became increasingly difficult for the Indian Muslims to absorb readily in their society new-comers from Bukhârâ, Persia or Arabia. In short, Indian Muslim society became more and more exclusive and developed into a privileged oligarchy in which no fresh talent was allowed to enter. This state of affairs synchronised with the growth of

national sentiment among the Hindus. If the Mughal structure could secure the support of the Hindu population, particularly its more virile elements, the loss of fresh talents from Central Asia might have been offset. But in the nature of things, this was impossible. Religion, culture and language, everything tended to the growth of separatist tendencies among the Hindus, who were and continued to be poles apart from the Muslims in civilisation and culture.

Another factor which tended towards the disintegration of the Mughal State was the power of the smaller Muslim kingdoms which never fully cooperated with the imperial government. Muslim dominion over India, especially in the distant parts, was spread more by individual chieftains than by the direct action of any organised central power. The Muslim emperors maintained excellent relations with the enterprising adventurers of their own faith, they profited by the bold initiative and zealous exertions of these adventurers without having to spend their own men or money. At the same time they kept them contented by giving them a limited independence.

"This arrangement," says Sir Jadunath Sarkar,¹ "worked well so long as there were fresh lands to conquer. But when the Muslim expansion reached its farthest possible limit eastward and southward, rebellion, intrigue, murder of sovereigns and chaotic wars of succession became frequent, because the old plan of Muslim conquest left as its legacy a centrifugal or disruptive spirit tending to local autonomy. These frequent changes of dynasty and violent civil wars hindered the growth of civilisation, the economic prosperity of the country, and the development of institutions."

Another factor in the decline of the Mughals was the confiscatory policy followed by the Mughal Emperor. Like the Ottoman Turks, the Mughal power did not derive its inspiration from the Islamic Shari'at at which gave distinct rights of life, property and honour to every individual. The Mughals, like the Turks, followed

¹. Mughal Administration, Calcutta 1935, p. 249.
their own primitive institutional practice. Hence the Mughal State allowed no right of property to its nobles and Jagirdars. "Every nobleman's lands and personal effects were confiscated to the State after his death."¹ The prosperity and position built up by an individual noble was levelled to the ground after his death and his son had to begin his career as a common man without being able to take advantage of his father's work.

According to Sir Jadunath Sarkar, the most important cause of the decline of the Mughals was that they lacked democratic support. Only a democracy which allows fresh leaders to arise and gives scope for opposition, criticism and self-correction can ensure a stable order. Oligarchy, despotism and monarchy has always the effect of making men servile and shutting out all ideas and suggestions which might be unpalatable to the rulers. Now the Mughal Empire was a despotism, pure and simple. "Oriental monarchies," says the writer,² "are essentially dependent upon the personality of the sovereigns and to some extent also on the character of the ruling monarchy. The British Empire, on the other hand, is democratic; it is the domination of much of the world by the entire British race and other races absorbed into the British—and not by an individual king or family. Hence, though the ruling British families of one generation may degenerate, in the next, streams of fresh and able rulers of men rise from the ranks of the British race to take their places. In Mughal India, on the other hand, the degeneration of Indian-born Mohammedans was rapid and striking, and nothing could remedy it, as there was no popular education, no public discussion, no social reform. The supply of able adventurers from beyond the Khaibar Pass who had contributed to the glories of the reigns of Akbar and Shah Jahan ceased, and the decay in the ruling families of India could not be arrested by the infusion of new blood either from among the mass of the local people or from the thinned stream of foreign immigrants.

"It was the fatal defect of the Moghul rule that it always

². Ibid., p. 254.
continued to bear the character of a military occupation of the land and did not try to build up a nation or homogeneous State... Under even the best of them (Moghul Emperors), though there were great ministers and generals, the mass of the people remained 'Human sheep' as in the worst days of the past. The Englishmen who overthrew the Indian Nawabs and Maharajahs may have been a handful of men—some of them not even professional soldiers; but they had behind them the enormous reservoir of the British democracy with all its collective talents and resources, while our Nawabs and Maharajahs had behind them none but a few self-seeking followers and hireling troops. They did not lead any national resistance to the foreign conquerors."

STATE OF INDIA AT THE COMING OF THE BRITISH

The financial decline of the Mughal Empire began during the reign of Shāh Jahān. The latter began a series of costly wars in Central Asia in an attempt to conquer Balkh and Badakhshan. The cost of the war amounted to four crores of rupees but not an inch of territory could be annexed. This was followed by the loss of Qandhar which was captured by the Persians in 1649. Shāh Jahān sent three expeditions against Qandhar, all of which ended in failure and cost 12 crore rupees to the Mughal treasury. The costly buildings and monuments, like Taj Mahal, which Shāh Jahān erected during his reign must have involved an enormous expenditure of money. Then came the wars of Aurangzeb against the Muslim kingdoms of the south and the Marathas which again cost much money to the exchequer. Although Aurangzeb succeeded in defeating the southern Muslim kingdoms and the Marathas, this had the effect of distracting his attention from the north, which was the nerve-centre of the Mughal Empire. Aurangzeb's transfer of the capital to Aurangabad in the Deccan resulted in weakening his grip on the north where the new non-Muslim power of the Sikhs was in the making. During the period when Aurangzeb resided in the south the administration of Northern India suffered a good deal. The extension of the Empire to the further south made it unwieldy and uncontrol-
lable by the weak successors of Aurangzeb. If the latter had consolidated his power in the north, and had not divided his resources and energies in the conquest of the south, the Mughal Empire might have prolonged its life.

When Aurangzeb died in 1707, there were three wars of succession which hastened the rate of decline. "An additional cause of weakness," says Lockhart,1 "was the emergence in the reign of Bahadur Shah (1707-1712) of Turanian (Transoxanian or Central Asian), Persian and Hindustani factions." In 1719 a grandson of Bahadur Shāh, Aurangzeb's son and successor, was elevated to the throne under the title of Muḥammad Shāh. It was during the reign of Muḥammad Shāh that the invasion of Nādir Khān took place and led to a further weakening of the Mughal power. The immediate cause of Nādir Khān's invasion was the question of Afghān fugitives against whom Nādir wanted the Indian frontier to be closed. Another reason was the rivalry of the different factions at the court, each of whom wanted to dominate the empire by exploiting the weak emperor. The Hindustānī party at the court was led by Khān Daurān who was all-powerful at the moment being in command of the army. Nizāmul Mulk, the viceroy of the Deccan, represented the Turānian party and Sa'ādat Khān, the Šubedar of Oudh, led the Šūrān or Shi'a party. Both of them are said to have invited Nādir Khān, though the charge cannot be established.

Nādir Khān's invasion left the Mughal Empire in such a state of weakness that any new power could displace the Mughals. "There were two candidates for empire," says Percival Spear,2 "the Afghans in the north, who had become independent of Persia at the death of Nadir Shah and the Marathas in the south. The Afghans under Ahmed Shah Abdali had warlike vigour and the financial sinews of war, but lacked political cohesion. Their once promising Indian empire degenerated into a series of blindings and betrayals. The Marathas possessed military skill and political finesse, but, based on the compara-

2. Twilight of the Mughals, Cambridge 1951, p. 3.
tively infertile Deccan, which had been further impoverished by years of Moghul warfare, they lacked the necessary resources for a continued effort. The result was that when these two powers met in apparently decisive combat at Panipat, the one thing which can with certainty be said of that famous carnage was that it was not decisive. Within a few years the Marathas, who were beaten, had returned to Hindustan and the Afghans, who were victorious, had disappeared permanently from India... Who then was to fill the void created by the retirement of the contending armies. To the north, in the Punjab, the Sikhs venturéd down from the hills into which they had been driven by Bahadur Shah and Farrukhshiyyar fifty years before; in petty conflicts with village zamindars, local Muslim chiefs, and each other, they gradually spread over the country and sorted themselves out into twelve misís, or loose confederacies. To the West, the Rajput chiefs, faint from interminable Maratha depredations, enjoyed a brief respite which their political incapacity prevented them from using effectively. To the south, Central India and Malwa as far as the river Chambal gradually fell into the hands of the Maratha chiefs... To the south-east lay the province of Oudh, whose hereditary governor was the able and ambitious Shuja'uddaula. Due east of Delhi sandwiched between the Ganges and the hills of Kumaun, lay the district of Rohilkand once part of Oudh. It had been occupied by 1740 by the Rohilla tribe of Afghans, who had been driven by Nadir Shah before him into India. As turbulent and enterprising as any of their race, they also proved to be a disintegrating factor throughout the period.”

**I R A N**

The Şafavids

The real history of İrân as an independent kingdom begins with the Şafavi dynasty. The founder of the Şafavids, Şâh Ismâ‘îl, came into prominence as the leader of the seven Turkish tribes of Azerbaijan, collectively known as the Qizilbash. Ismâ‘îl himself was not a Turkish chief but had won respect as the descendant of a long line of religious leaders and the head of an order of dervishes. The progenitor of his line was Şaykh
Şafiyuddin of Ardabil, a Muslim saint and preacher who lived from 1252 until 1334. "Professor Minorsky considers that the Safavids were the direct successors of the Turkoman dynasties of the Black Sheep or Qara Qoyunulu and the White Sheep or Aq Qoyunulu. 'Not improperly,' he writes, 'the early Safavid dynasty may be considered as the third stage of the Turkoman dominion in Persia. The military force of Shah Isma'il with which he defeated the Aq Qoyunulu Alvand and Murad was organised like that of his enemies on purely tribal principles. The great majority of Shah Isma'il's supporters belonged to the tribes from Asia Minor, Syria and Armenia mixed with the tribes detached from the rival Qara Qoyunulu and Aq Qoyunulu... These Turkoman tribes were cattle-breeders and lived apart from the surrounding population. They migrated from winter to summer quarters. They were organised in clans and obeyed their own chieftain. Thus, as with the Seljuqs and with the Mongols, there was a dichotomy between settled and semi-settled or nomadic, and between Persian and non-Persian. Similarly, as had been the case in Seljuq times, the Turkomans proved an unstable basis upon which to rely. Already under Shah Tahmasp (930-984/1524-1576) rivalries among the tribal groups and their unruly natures had endangered the existence of the State, and Shah Tahmasp had started to disband and disperse them.'"

By 1510 Shâh Isma'il had taken over 'Irâq, Fars, Kermân, Hamadân and Khurasân, penetrating as far east as Khiva. The Shi'a sect was proclaimed as the state religion, a step which embittered Persian relations with Turkey. Shi'a İrân now separated the Sunni mass of Central Asia, India and Afghanistan from the Sunnis of 'Irâq, Egypt and Turkey. As a result of religious friction, Ottoman Sultan Selim I invaded İrân and defeated Isma'il near Tabriz. This warfare continued for a long period, and the pressure on İrân from Turkey was a powerful factor in strengthening Persian nationalism and the religious feeling of the Shi'a. It also prevented Turkey from further expansion in Eastern Europe.

After the reign of Shāh Tāhmasp when the Turkish Sultān, Sulaymān the Magnificent, took over ʻIrāq and penetrated as far as Ḳishān and Tabrīz, Shāh ʻAbbās the Great came to the throne in 1587. He had to face both the Ottoman Turks who were in control of ʻĀzīrba‘ījān and the Uzbek Turks who invaded Khorāsān and were in possession of Herāt and Masjhad. Shāh ʻAbbās first signed a treaty confirming the Ottoman gains and then drove out the Uzbeks from Khorāsān, after which he recovered from the Ottomans ʻĀzīrba‘ījān, Armenia and Georgia.

Shāh ʻAbbās reduced Persian kingship to its secular character. "Although it seems strange that a ruler should renounce by his own free will so incomparable a prerogative as the divine nature of his person and his office, the Shāh’s action was premeditated, and he had a distinct political motive for the change. The master—this is old wisdom—depends just as much upon his servant as the servant depends on his master. Being monopolized, so to speak, by his tribal kinsmen and followers meant to Abbas the honour of a bodyguard, yet on the other hand it limited his freedom of action. His idea of power would permit of no barriers, nor would his great conception of melting Iran and the Persians into one powerful unit. He therefore organized other armed forces to neutralize the tribes. As a result of this measure he considerably impaired the influence of the tribal chiefs, but he changed his own position from feudal overlord to absolute monarch."1

Shāh ʻAbbās pushed reforms on every side. In place of an army composed of tribal forces led by tribal chiefs he created a regular paid army which included the "Shāh Sevens" or "Friends of Shāh." Roads, canals and caravanserais were constructed throughout Ḳ̣rd. Turco-Persian antagonism brought Ḳ̣rd into touch with European powers. The policy of the Ottoman Sultāns exerted its pressure on the East, as it did on the West, and so Ḳ̣rd and Europe became natural allies, with the exception of France which preferred friendly relations with Turkey. In 1622 Shāh ʻAbbās allied Ḳ̣rd with a British naval force in the Persian

Gulf to drive the Portuguese from the island of Hormuz and encouraged British and Dutch merchants to trade at Bander Abbās, making it the principal centre for the export of silk. He established diplomatic relations with the European nations. Kurdish tribes were moved to Khurāsān to form a living barrier against the Uzbekns.

Shāh Abbās was followed by Shāh Ṣafi (1629-1642); Shāh Abbās II (1642-1668) and Shāh Sulaymān (1667-1694). During the reign of Shāh Sulṭān Ḥusayn from 1694 until 1742, one of the Afghan tribes, the Ghilzai, revolted at Qandhār and secured their independence. Then at Herat the Abdalī tribe followed their example and in 1772 Mīr Wā’īz led the tribes against Kermān and on to Iṣfahān. Shāh Ḥusayn then abdicated in favour of Maḥmūd, but the country soon fell into disintegration. Maḥmūd and his successor Aṣḥāraf (1725-1730) reigned over Iṣfahān, Fārs, and Kermān. Czarist Russia occupied the western shores of the Caspian and the Ottoman Turks moved into ʻĪrān.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF THE ŠATAVĪDS

Ṣafavi monarchy differed both from the Caliphate and the Seljūq monarchical system. The Caliphate was a form of government based on consultation among the more privileged sections of the community. The Turkish idea of monarchy was based on the acceptance of a measure of equality. The Turkish Khān was only the first and most important person among the tribal leaders. But the Šafavi monarchy was frankly autocratic. The position of the ruler was reinforced by the theory of divine right. Increased absolutism in religion affected the whole range of social and political life. In the field of land tenure the theory of the ruler as the sole landowner, enunciated by Niẓāmūl Mulk Ṭūsī, became more definite. Its practical application, however, was modified by circumstances. The inability of the Šafavīds to provide themselves with adequate military forces once the basis of power had shifted from the tribes, from whom they had originally derived their support, led them, as the failure to pay their military forces had led their predecessors, to alienate large areas from the direct control of the state. At first drafts were
made on the revenue for the military leaders, then the land itself was assigned and, finally, it became the private property of the military aristocracy. Shāh ‘Abbās, however, felt it necessary to constitute his estates into āvaraf in order to enable him to enjoy the income therefrom without being blamed for wrongful acquisition of property. This shows that in practice private persons enjoyed full rights of property.

The provincial governors were really fief-holders. The provincial territory was alienated from the control of the central government and the governor was required to provide military contingents. He was more or less independent in his own province. He and his officers and the troops which he maintained consumed the greater part of the revenue; a part only, in the form of presents and certain dues, was given to the king. In the same way as the king received dues and contributions from the provincial governors, so the provincial governors received similar dues and contributions from those living in their territory. They had the permission to sub-assign the area under them and had complete control. The central government, however, appointed three officials in each province. One of these, known as the Jānashin, was always in the provincial capital with the governor; the second was the vizier or the controller, and the third was the reporter who sent reports of the happenings to the provincial governor. These officials watched the provincial governor and opposed him if he did anything against the interest of the king.

The creation of a new army by Shāh ‘Abbās raised the problem of how they were to be paid. The solution attempted was to divide the army into (1) the regular troops maintained by the ruler, and (2) the militia in the provinces. The latter was paid by land assignments made from Khaṣṣeh (i.e. Khāliṣeh) and the hereditary principle was recognised. In the case of the regular troops the assignments were made to groups of soldiers and not to individuals. In so far as the military forces under the direct control of the ruler increased relative to the contingents provided by the provincial governors, the land under the control of the ruler also increased to that extent. For the rest, crown lands were alienated in part by temporary or life grants to officials and
others, while in part they were retained under the administration of a comptroller who received the revenues on behalf of the Shāh.

In the reign of Shāh Safi (A.D. 1629-1642), his vizier urged him to abandon the policy of maintaining governors in the provinces because this led to the loss of control by the central government. “The Shāh approved of this suggestion and Fars, one of the most important provinces in view of size and riches, but one needing fewer troops since it was not a frontier province, was resumed, as it were, by the central government and an overseer placed in charge of its administration. Shah Abbas II (1052-1077/1642-1667), continuing his father, Shah Safi’s policy, abolished provincial governments in the interior of the kingdom where there was no danger of war... When the danger of war occurred governors were reappointed... Chardin goes on to say that the people objected to this policy on the grounds that it took money out of circulation, enriched only the king and led to oppression by his officials and to military weakness. Chardin believed that the reason why the oppression committed by the provincial governors was less than that committed by the comptrollers of the crown lands was, first, that it was in the interests of the governor that the province should be flourishing since it was in effect his private domain, whereas the interests of comptroller lay in obtaining as much as he could under the pretext of collecting more for the Shah. Secondly, the governor had not to send so many presents to the court nor to increase the sum remitted annually to make his services valuable as the comptroller had to do. Thirdly, the Shah was less ready to put up with extortion committed by a governor than by a comptroller since the royal treasury did not benefit therefrom.”

Nādir Shāh

From the anarchy and foreign rule which followed the defeat by the Afghāns of Shāh Sūltān Ḥusayn in 1722 the country was delivered by Nādir Qulī Shāh who was an Afšār tribesman and

rose from a camel-driver to a robber baron. He became the founder of the Afşar dynasty. “As a political move aimed at ending the division of eastern Islam, he proclaimed Sunnism the official belief of the country, but neither his proclamation nor his persecution of the Shi’ā leaders had any lasting effect.”¹ In 1736 he moved into Afğānīstān, taking Qandhār, Ghazna and Kābul; and then on to India where he entered Delhi and sacked its inhabitants. In 1740 he captured Bukhārā and the entire Uzbek region. He made a serious attempt to establish a fleet at the Persian Gulf and in 1738 annexed Bahrāyn to Īrān. In 1743 he marched against ‘Īraq and seized Moṣul and Baṣra.

The main importance of Nādir’s policy from an economic and social viewpoint lies in his attitude towards the awqāf and the tribes. He adopted the policy of resettling the tribes, in some cases in order to garrison newly conquered territory and in others to lessen the likelihood of the rebellion of disaffected elements. In 1730 he ordered 50,000 to 60,000 families of tribespeople to be transferred from Āzerbā’ījān, Persian ‘Īraq and Fārs to Khurāsān. In 1732 he moved 60,000 Abdālis from the neighbourhood of Herāt to Mashhād, Nīshāpūr and Damghān. When Nādir Shāh reached Tiflis in 1735, he banished 6,000 Georgian families to his opponents of Khurāsān. Nādir Shāh and his successors governed the tribes through their own leaders. Nādir attempted to resume all awqāf property and to this end issued a decree in the last years of his reign. But he did not achieve full success and his successors revoked the decree. However, many lands and estates were taken by the government and were never fully restored.

“To his credit it must be said,” writes Lockhart,² “that he restored order and freedom from attack in many parts of his realm; he did much to secure his north-east frontier against the devastat- ing raids of the Turkomans and Ozbegs by moving Afshars, Bakhtiari, Kurdish and other warlike tribesmen to the border districts; this policy had the additional advantage of splitting up and weakening these powerful tribes, and at the same time it

increased the population and added to the importance of Khurasan...

“Although Nadir did not succeed in founding an enduring dynasty he, like Henry VIII in England, added very considerably to the property of the crown by his wholesale confiscation of religious lands and endowments.”

A period of anarchy and disorder followed the death of Nadir during which Afgānīstan gained its independence. Among the pretenders to the throne was a member of the Turkish Qājur tribe. A branch of this tribe had been settled by Shāh ‘Abbās II in the plains of south-east of the Caspian Sea. From this tribe came the man who established the famous Qājur dynasty which lasted till the rise of Rāja Shāh. However, immediately after the death of Nadir Shāh it was Karīm Khān, of the Zand tribe, in the southern province of Fārs, who was victorious and ruled over Īrān from 1750 to 1779. After the death of Karīm Khān the struggle for throne broke out anew and lasted till Aghā Muḥammad Khān having succeeded in uniting the branches of the Qājur tribe, defeated the last Zand pretender and ascended the throne. “Under Fateh Ali Shah, the nephew and successor of Aga Muhammad Shah, the great drama of Iran begins, in the course of which Iran is drawn deeper and deeper into the net of the European powers—at first as a potential instrument and active partner, later merely as a tool and a victim. The curtain rises after the French Revolution and the coincidence is not only one of time. The real link in between these two events is the person of General Bonaparte. In his plan, as romantic as it was grandiose, to attack by land and by sea the English in India, their most vulnerable point, Iran was given a prominent, if not the central, place. The campaign in Egypt was meant to be the first step on the way. The French Convention had authorised him, probably only ratifying his own proposal, to begin the construction of a canal to link the Mediterranean with the Red Sea. The destruction by Nelson of the French fleet near Alexandria in 1798 put an end to the maritime phase of the project. With even greater fervour Emperor Napoleon resumed the idea General Bonaparte had conceived—to project a land operation against
India, perhaps even with Turkish participation, while Fateh Ali Shāh expected in return French assistance in wresting Georgia from the Russians, who, by occupying this country, had become dangerous neighbours of Iran in the Caucasus.

"The Franco-Persian alliance was of no consequence. Napoleon’s rapprochement with Russia after the Treaty of Tilsit, his preoccupations in Europe and, last but not the least, the effective British counter-measures put an end to the French military mission under General Gardanne. It was replaced by a British mission, one of whose staff members was even appointed commander-in-chief of the Persian army. The disastrous event of Fateh Ali Shāh’s reign was the war with Russia. The two campaigns ended in defeat and proved the vulnerability of the Persian troops to modern arms and tactics. Not only was Iran obliged to cede to the Russians the largest part of her Caucasian territories; the Treaty of Turkoman Chai in 1828 marked the first infringement on Persian sovereignty by enforcing the extra-territorial rights of Russian consular agents on Persian soil, the system of capitulations.”¹

Muḥammad Shāh, the grandson of Fateh ‘Alī Shāh, ruled from 1834 until 1848. During his reign Russia wooed Īrān in order to have a free hand in consolidating her gains in the Caucasus and in Turkestan. Muḥammad Shāh supported by Russia made an attempt to reconquer Herāt which was strongly opposed by Great Britain, which feared Russian influence on her Indian borders. The British even sent an officer to organise the successful resistance of Herāt.

Nāṣiruddīn Shāh Qājār came to the throne in 1847. During his reign Russian influence became firmly established in Īrān. In 1856 the Persian army marched into Afghānistān. Great Britain demanded the evacuation of Herāt and the British Indian government declared war on Īrān. Russia failed to give her support and by the treaty of Paris (1857) Īrān withdrew from Herāt and recognised the independence of Afghānistān. Commercial rivalry between Russia and Great Britain led to a struggle for concessions.

¹ Haas, W. S., Iran, New York 1946, pp. 30-31.
In 1872 a British banker, Reuter, obtained from Naṣiruddin many concessions and rights in Írān including the right to construct railways, exploit minerals and oils for seventy years and manage the customs services for twenty years. In 1890 a British concern was given a tobacco monopoly which had to be cancelled due to strong popular opposition led by the religious leaders. In 1879 Naṣiruddin agreed to the creation of a brigade of Persian Cossacks instructed and commanded by Russian officers. The Discount Bank of Persia, a Russian institution, was opened in Tehran in 1891. In 1865 Russian armies took Taškent, Samarqand, Bukhārā and Khiva on the borders of Írān and in 1882 Persia ceded Merv to the Russians. Naṣiruddin visited Europe more than once during his reign. The motive was to see the West at first hand, whose impact on his country was growing steadily. Among the reforms he introduced was the creation of a council of state which drastically limited the absolute power of the sovereign because it had the right to appoint all government officials. But such reforms were never seriously put into practice and the policy of grafting Western institutions on the traditional society of the East bore little fruit. However, Naṣiruddin continued to be interested in the modernisation of his country, but there was no strong will nor any system behind his interest.

The outstanding event of the reign of Muḥaffaruddin (1896-1906), the successor of Naṣiruddin, was the Persian Revolution which resulted in the grant of a constitution. "The immediate incentives were the Shah’s apparent misgovernment and indignation over the exploitation of the country by high officials and foreigners. In the revolutionary action itself the influential merchant-class, which suffered directly as a result of the misrule, and the clergy, whose power resided in the people, worked together, and liberal ideas familiar to those who had been abroad or had been educated in the missionary schools, shaped the movement and determined its aims. Finally, the support of the British contributed to success. The opening in 1906 of the first Persian parliament was one of the last acts of Muḥaffar ed Din.

"His successor, Mohammed Ali Shah, tried no less than three times to overthrow the constitution. The first time in 1907, he
ceded to the pressure of public opinion and the first sign of armed resistance. In the second effort, in 1908, the Shah acted in conjunction with with Russians, Czar Nicholas having declared that the Shah could save Persia and the throne only by 'dispersing the Majlis (Parliament) and other revolutionary mobs.' Mohammed Ali gathered his troops (including, of course, the Cossack brigade) near Tehran, but the nationalists enforced by the powerful Bakhtiari tribe, who acted on the instigation of the British proved the stronger. The Shah was forced to abdicate and left the country.'

In some respects the Qajar period was a return to the Saljuq practice of government by the ruling Khān and his family. The provincial governorships were given to the members of the ruling family, a practice which had been given up by the Safavids. The military forces of the Qajars were composed of a standing army or rather a royal bodyguard, which was never disbanded, and provincial, mainly tribal contingents. Similarly each prince holding a provincial government had his own bodyguard. Faced by the pressure of Russia and other foreign powers, the Qajars tried to modernise their army, but this required centralisation and the abandonment of the feudal system of decentralisation and payment to troops by assignment of lands. In spite of all the reforms attempted by the Qajars, the army continued to be composed of contingents furnished in times of emergency by tribal leaders and others to whom assignments of land were made. The standing troops or Ghulams employed by the ruler and all the provincial governors were the terror of the country. They lived at free quarters, levied contributions on various pretences in the name of their master and none dared to resist for fear of punishment by the ruler. Thus no regular system existed for paying the standing army.

The Qajars inherited from the Safavīs the absolutist nature of monarchy. The nobles and superior officers of the court, subjected absolutely to the caprice of a tyrant, became in their turn cruel, haughty and imperious to their inferiors and these,

again, were delighted when they could exercise the same petty
tyrannies upon those below them in rank and position. The
increased insecurity of property and the consequent jealousy
among the nobles who vied each other for the pleasure of the
king, was destructive of truthfulness and honesty. Each indi-
vidual tried to amass wealth at the expense of others. No man
worked seriously and honestly firstly because it was not his work
or merit but the pleasure of his superiors, which brought him pro-
motion, and secondly because he always stood in danger of being
deprived of his earnings and the fruits of his toil.

PERSIAN SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT

Commenting on the nature of Persian monarchy, Haas says,1
"Whereas in West the king is apparently the peak of the social
hierarchic pyramid, the ruler in Iran faces a mass of people who
are all equally subjected to his will. The reason for this typically
Asiatic phenomenon is the lack of an aristocracy in the proper
sense of the term, such as we find in all Western countries. There
a mighty hereditary class (which sometimes closely resembled a
caste) with more or less well-established rights and duties, origi-
nally based on landed property, was closely connected with
political offices and monopolised the higher posts . . . By birth
and interests the kings in Europe belong to and depend on this
class, even if at times they lean on the bourgeoisie to neutralise
the influence of an all-too-exigent nobility. On the other hand,
the nobility is always ready to support, if not the person of the
monarch, at least the institution of monarchy. The price the
monarch had to pay for this support varied, but the wearer of the
crown found his bon plaisir limited by the interests of his nobles.

"In Iran no such a distinct nobility has ever developed. The
Persian kings do not feel it necessary to rely on a privileged
class, and they would have resented the mere existence of such a
group limiting their power. Apparently there never developed
among the great landowners who were in Iran, as elsewhere,
designated to form a hereditary nobility, a class consciousness

1. Iran; New York 1946, p. 97.
sufficiently strong even to attempt to impose their will on the king. Individualism prevailed. Otherwise, how could the fact be explained that the great of the kingdom, high officials and landowners, tolerated the traditional practice of the Shah to expropriate a man when his fortune became large enough to make confiscation desirable? No doubt the Shah considered this measure not only an expedient means to increase his treasury but also a right resulting from the principle that everything—the land, the people and their possessions—belonged to him. At the same time it was an infallible means of preventing the formation of a hereditary and mighty class which would threaten the king's monopoly of power."

Representatives of religion exercised great power and influence in Persia. The higher ranks, called Mujtahids, were particularly honoured members of their society, while the lower ranks, the Maulvis and Mulas, held a similar position among the masses. No established differences of rank existed among the representatives of religion, as in the Roman Catholic Church. Personality and knowledge alone raised a man to pre-eminence. The extent of their power may be best illustrated by the well-known fate of the tobacco monopoly when the people protested against the concession granting to the British Imperial Bank of Persia the exclusive control over the production and sale of Persian tobacco. The Mujtahids took the lead of the movement and declared the use of tobacco religiously unlawful. The order was implicitly obeyed and the Shah had to cancel the concession. The religious class, therefore, not only had the power to defend its own rights, but was also able to exercise political influence. It often successfully opposed the intentions of the king. There was only one class which shared the power with the clergy—the merchants. The Middle East was an important agent for trade between India and the West and between the West and the Far East. For this reason the merchant-class of the Islamic countries held a social rank, economic position and political significance which for centuries was superior to that which the same class occupied in the West. The Persian merchant, therefore, was as important as the merchants elsewhere in the Islamic countries. What we call the bourgeoisie
or middle-class in Írán practically consisted of the merchants alone—in sharp contrast to the West, where the liberal professions have formed an essential part of the middle class. The liberal professions in the West—philosophers, scientists, physicians, engineers, writers and authors—became the natural allies of the rising bourgeoisie in their fight for democracy and a new world order.

In the Islamic countries there was no such development. Here tradition, feudal as well as religious, blocked the growth of new ideas and fresh experiments in the art of living. Under such conditions the liberal professions—philosophers, authors, etc.—did not represent the urges of a rising merchant class anxious to explore and try new ways of life and launch into new adventures. The intellectual leaders in the Islamic world remained subservient to the king and the court. The merchant-class itself remained conservative and reactionary in spirit and attitude and may be said to have taken in this respect the place aristocracy occupied in Europe.

**AFGHANISTAN**

**ORIGIN OF THE AFGHANS**

Opinions differ as to the origin of the Afghán nation. According to some, the Afghánns had their origin from the Albanians of Asia who, in consequence of their numerous revolts, were driven from one extremity of Persia to the other and driven into Khurásán. The opinion is supported by the fact that the Persian monarchs always followed the policy of removing from the shores of the Mediterranean or the Black Sea any population that gave them trouble. Another opinion is that the Afghánns were first brought to notice by Pompey at the time of his expedition into the Caucasus. They inhabited the high mountains and the valleys bordering on the Caspian Sea, known as Daghistán and were Christians before they became Muslims. Another school holds that the Afghánns are descended from the people inhabiting Mazanderan, south of the Caspian Sea, and that they were transported to their present country by Timúr who was exasperated at their depredations.

There are Afghan authors who trace their origin to Jewish
ancestors. Some declare that Afghana who gave his name to the Afghans was lineally descended from Abraham and Hagar by Ishmael; others think that he was the grandson of Saul and all agree that the Babylonian monarch, Nebuchadnezzar, must have sent some Jewish prisoners into the mountains of Ghour, when he captured Jerusalem. In support of this claim, Afghan authors point that "when Nadir Shah, marching to the conquest of India arrived at Peshawar, the chiefs of the tribe of the Yoosooofzyes presented him with a Bible written in Hebrew and several articles that had been used in their ancient worship which they had preserved; these articles were at once recognized by the Jews who followed the camp."¹ Even if this story is true, it only shows that only the Yusufza'is spring of the Jewish stock, because all the Afghan tribes do not come from the same race and differ in their racial characteristics, physical as well as moral. "The Afghans of Kabul consider themselves as Indian Afghans, whereas those of Herat say they are Khurasani Afghans; one tribe repudiates another and denies its Afghan origin... The names of Patan, Rohilla, Afghan, which serve at the present time to designate the Afghan nation, are really those of so many distinct races now compounded in one."² It is probable that the Afghan race is descended through intermarriages with the Greeks of Alexander and the Tartar and Persian conquerors who invaded Afghanistan.

AFGHAN TRIBES

Pathans.—The Pathans are the true Afghans and form the principal element in a diverse population. Their language Pushto belongs to the Aryan subdivision of the Indo-European group of languages. They are of the Aryan origin, but their blood is intermingled with that of the Turks, Mongols and others who infiltrated into the country. "According to Raverty the Pathans derived their name from the fact that they were the people who lived behind or at the back of or between the ridges of the

². Ibid., p. 5.
Suleiman Range, the word Pasht in Tajik Persian signifying the back of a mountain range... From this is derived the hard Pakhtun of the northern Afghans, and the general appellation Patan.”1 The Afghans formed part of the Ghaznavid armies. But they were still an obscure mountain race, who in 1030-1040 had to be reduced by the Turkish rulers of Ghazni. By the end of twelfth century they had penetrated into the Kabul area. Ibn Baṭṭūta who passed through Kabul in 1333 found it inhabited by a tribe of Persians called Afghans. At the time of Mughal rule in India the Afghans were still a wild troublesome people with no culture and civilisation. The so-called Afghān kings of Delhi with the possible exception of the Sūrī and Lodi families were of the Turkish origin.

The Ghilzai’s.—The Ghilzai’s are not Pathāns proper but are descended from the Khalaj tribe, a section of the great Khallakht (or Qarbuq) confederacy of tribes. They are, therefore, of Turkish origin. The Khalaj broke away from the Khallakht confederacy in the eighth century and moved southwards across the Oxus. By the middle of the tenth century they spread into Afghānistān. Some of them passed into India and founded in 1288 the famous Khilji dynasty. The Ghilzai’s came into prominence when Shāh ‘Abbās Šafāvī transferred a large section of the rival Abdalī tribe from the Qandhār district to that of Herāt. The removal of Abdalīs increased the power of the Ghilzai’s in the neighbourhood of Qandhār. Early in the eighteenth century they seized Qandhār and became virtually independent. For a period they held even parts of Persia. In 1747 they were forced to submit to Aḥmad Shāh Abdalī and since then have never played a prominent part in Afghān politics, but they have been a constant source of danger to the Afghān ruling house.

The Tajiks.—The Tajiks are of Persian origin and are settled round Kabul and Kohistān. Though gradually conquered by foreign invaders, they continued to hold sway in the mountainous country of Ghur and provided the Ghurī dynasty which replaced the Ghaznavids in India. The modern Tajiks are a peaceful

industrious people of the small farmer class.

The Turkish Tribes.—“To the north of the Hindu Kush a very considerable proportion of the population is composed of tribes of Tartar or Turkish origin though now intermingled with foreign blood. Of these the most important and numerous are the Uzbegs... The Uzbegs are typically Tartar in appearance with broad good-natured faces, and of fairer complexion than the Afghans.”

The Mongol Tribes.—The Hazārāhs are descendants of the Mongol-Tartar regiments or mings brought into the country by Chengiz Khān. The Turkish word ming means a thousand and was transformed into the Persian equivalent hazār. The Afghan Hazārāhs now number 5,50,000. They had formerly a close connection with Persia where there is a colony of Hazārāhs.

AFGHĀNISTĀN’S RELATIONS WITH THE INDO-PAKISTAN SUBCONTINENT

The problem of Afghanistan has always loomed large in the history of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. The Afghāns have had close relations with Persia on the one hand and the Indo-Pakistan regions on the other. Since Maḥmūd of Ghaznī every government which ruled over what is now Pakistan territory had had to deal with the Afghan question. In his essays on Afghanistan, China and Central Asia, Demetrius C. Bougler gives the following sketch of the relations subsisting between the Afghāns and the Indo-Pakistan rulers since the Ghaznavids:

“On two occasions in modern times the problem has been solved at least for a generation or so. The first was when an Afghan dynasty established itself in India in the 15th century; and the second, when Babar, after absorbing Afghanistan and Northern India, was succeeded—after a brief interval, during which his son Humayun was an exile in Persia and Cabul—by his grandson, Akbar. The latter solution was, however, more temporary than the former. The growing strength of Persia, which steadily pushed her encroachments beyond Seistan in

the direction of Helmund and Candhar, was a danger to the
tenure of that important city by the Indian government.
As the effete successors of Akbar grew less and less capable of
exercising imperial power against warlike neighbours and
over-turbulent races, Persia’s advance became more persistent
and more openly declared. At last Candhar itself fell into the
Shah’s possession. Many an army crossed the Suleiman to
regain that all-important city, but despite superior numbers and
resources, the hosts of the Great Mogul were worsted by either
cold, treachery or superior skill. In those days Afghan
patriotism did not exist. There was no country to fight
for, no union, no public cause. The country of the Afghans
was that of the Indian ruler. They were content to be his
most valiant warriors, his most skilled ministers, and his most
accomplished courtiers. But in 1709 the Ghilzai chief, Mir
Vais (Mir Wa’iz) snatched Candhar from the Persians, and
established in southern Afghanistan a form of government
which, whatever its regular method of creation would have
been, was founded on a perception of the necessities that a
great and brave people felt for a sympathetic rule. In modern
times it was the origin of Afghan liberty, and of the Afghan
State. It was then that the Afghans began for the first time
to perceive that they had a national destiny, and that they
could exist in independence of alien sovereigns. The credit of
this discovery was due to the genius of the chief Mir Vais and
to the valour of the Ghilzai tribe."

In 1721 one of the successors of Mir Wa’iz, taking advantage
of the decline of the Safavids in Iran, captured Isfahan and absorbed
nearly the whole of Persia. But the Afghan triumph was
brief. In 1729 Nadir Shah subdued the Abdali Afghan clan of
Herat, many of whose chiefs entered Nadir Shah’s forces. He
then broke the power of the Ghilzai’s who had to evacuate
Isfahan. After the assassination of Nadir Shah by his Persian
troops, the Afghan bodyguard of the deceased king led by Ahmad
Shah Abdali who owed his rapid rise to Nadir Shah’s keen apprecia-
ciation of his military qualities, though greatly outnumbered by
the Persian Qizilbash guards, fought its way out of the royal camp
and reached Qandhar in safety.

Among the Abdalis the leading sections were the Populza'is and the Barkaza'is, of which the most important families were the descendants of Sado and Muhammad. The descendants of these two men, the Sadoza'is and the Muhammadza'is, have been the principal actors in the Afghan drama for the last two hundred years. The Sadoza'is were the first to assume power, and in Ahmad Shah the Afghans found a leader fully equal to the role which he had been called upon to play. His election as the first king of the Afghans followed shortly after his arrival in Qandhar. Under Ahmad Shah the empire of the Durrani Afghans reached its greatest extent. It was he who crushed the rising power of the Marathas at the battle of Panipat. In 1762 Ahmad Shah defeated the Sikh army near Lahore and by the annexation of Kashmir he held dominion over an area which stretched from the Attock river to Delhi and from the borders of Tibet to Indian Ocean. But it was a short-lived empire. It was not possible to retain hold of northern India from Qandhar. In an attempt to arrange settlement of the Punjab, Ahmad Shah recognised in 1742 the Mughal king Shah 'Alam II as emperor at Delhi, while in 1767 he gave up central Punjab to the Sikhs, retaining under his own control Peshawar and the northern Punjab. Ahmad Shah ruled through a council of nine principal Sardars (chiefs) each responsible for his own section of the people. They were consulted on all major matters of state. He carried his people with him and ruled rather as first among his equals than as an autocrat.

At the death of Timur, son of Ahmad Shah, in 1793 the Durrani Empire though much weakened by internecine quarrels still included Kashmir, Lahore, Multan, Peshawar, all Afghanistan south of Indus Kуш, Herat on the west and the provinces of Balkh and Khulm in the Oxus Valley. In addition, Afghan suzerainty was acknowledged by Kalat, Baluchistan and Persian Khurasan. Sind was also an Afghan dependency, although its Talpura rulers had paid no tribute for five years. Of the neighbours of Afghanistan, the Sikhs in the Punjab, where
British power had not been yet felt, were still subordinate to the Afghan influence. In the west the Qajar ruler of Persia had not yet renewed his claim to Khurasan and Herat.

The Sadoza'i ruling house was displaced in 1826 by the Muhammadza'is when Dost Muhammad Khan, the youngest son of Pa'inda Khan, chief of the Muhammadza'is, took over the remnants of Ahmad Shah's empire. In the north Balkh had become independent, Sind and Baluchistan did the same in the south. But the immediate threat to the Afghans came from the Sikhs of the Punjab. Dost Muhammad Khan desired to transfer his capital to Lahore, but he was overruled by his Sardars. He had, therefore, to agree to the request of those Sikhs who had been loyal to the Afghans to choose as governor in future a Sikh in place of an Afghan. Dost Muhammad chose Ranjit Singh, a young chieftain of great promise.

It was at this time that the British power in India became involved in the Afghan affairs. Towards the end of 1837 the Shah of Persia attacked Herat with Russian military support. The British in India were alarmed at the possible expansion of the Russian influence. Although Dost Muhammad was anxious to remain on good terms with the British, the latter wanted to replace him with Shah Shuja' in whom they had greater confidence and who had earlier lost his throne to Dost Muhammad. "The situation had its complexities," writes Sir George Dunbar.1 "Ranjit Singh had taken the Afghan province of Peshawar. Dost Muhammad had recently failed to reconquer it. A year later Dost Muhammad assured the British representative in Kabul that to regain the lost province he would willingly hold it in fief from Ranjit Singh 'if only, as he urged in a final appeal, the Governor-General would 'remedy the grievances of the Afghans and give them a little encouragement and power.' But Auckland, following instructions from Downing Street and blind to the promising opportunity of negotiating on behalf of his Sikh ally, sent a contemptuous reply. Dost Muhammad then turned to the Russian

1. *India and the Passing of Empire*, London 1951, p. 152.
envoy, who made with him and the Kandhar chiefs treaties that were hostile to British interests.

“Auckland having brought this unfriendly act upon himself, now signed a treaty with Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja under which Afghanistan was to be invaded and Shah Shuja reinstated.”

As a result of this invasion, Dost Muhammad lost the throne to Shah Shuja, who was ruled over by the British, chief political officer in Afghanistan supported by the army of the British East India Company. In 1841 there was a revolt in Afghanistan against the British who were expelled from the country. The British allowed Dost Muhammad to regain his throne which was vacant as the result of Shah Shuja’s assassination.

Meanwhile Russian influence in Afghanistan was on the increase. Russian position became strong in consequence of the capture of Bukhara and Samarkand by the Czar. In 1873 Khiva was also incorporated in the Russian Empire. In 1877-1881 the Tekkeh-Turkomans of the Kar-Kum steppes were subjugated by the Russians and in 1884 Russia’s position was rounded off by the voluntary cession of Merv. Russia now sent a military mission to Sher Ali, Dost Muhammad’s son, and won him over to its side. Britain demanded of Sher Ali that he should accept a British embassy with a military escort. When this request was turned down, Lord Roberts advanced into Afghanistan and occupied Kabul and Qandhar. Sher Ali fled to Turkestan where he died, his place being taken by his son Ya’qub who was deposed by the British because of the assassination of the British ambassador in Kabul. His nephew ‘Abdurrahman reached an understanding with the British and became the undisputed master of Afghanistan. “In Britain meanwhile the helm had been taken by Gladstone, who, as a Liberal, abandoned Disraeli’s former imperialist policies; he at once withdrew the British troops and even made the Emir the concession that the British ambassador at his court must always be a Muslim. In this way Afghanistan again achieved a relatively extensive freedom in foreign affairs.”

As the Afghan State, under the efficient rule of ‘Abdurrahman, began to assume a concrete shape and acquire a stability it had
never before possessed, so did the question of fixing its frontiers become a matter of importance. The important sections of the western frontier with Persia were demarcated in 1872, and in 1888, there remained only the southern and eastern frontiers where for 1,200 miles, extending from the Pamirs to the Persian desert, the Afghan boundaries abutted on the territories of the British Indian government. The demarcation took place in 1893 and is called the Durand Agreement as it was signed by Sir Mortimer Durand. It laid down the Durand Line which defined the southern and eastern limits of the Amir’s dominions beyond which his authority should not extend. Each party pledged itself not to exercise interference in the territory of the other lying beyond this line.

In 1901 'Abdurrahman’s eldest son, Amir Habibullah, succeeded his father. The British were anxious to counter the influence of an anti-British party at the court headed by the Amir’s brother Nasrullah and also to prevent the Afghans from accepting Russian overtures. A mission led by Mr. Dane reached Kabul in 1904. Amir Habibullah wanted the British to join in an attack on Russia, but the British were not prepared for this adventure. The Afghan attitude, therefore, stiffened as a result. However, a treaty was signed with the Amir in 1905 under which the British secured full control of the Afghan foreign relations in return for an annual subsidy of Rs. 18 lakh per year. In February 1919 Amir Habibullah was shot dead near Jalalabad and his third son, Amannullah, came to the throne.

Amannullah, realising that the Great War had exhausted the British and that there was internal trouble in India due to the Khilafat Movement, declared a Holy War against the British in 1919. The Amir had intended his attack to coincide with an expected rebellion in India, which was timed to open in Peshawar where the Indian Revolutionary Committee had collected a mob of 7,000. But the war miscarried and the expected rebellion did not occur. So it was with some relief that the British government received and accepted Amannullah’s request for armistice. The British had no desire to pursue a war which might have led
Development of Islamic State and Society

to the disintegration of Afghanistān and the disappearance of the buffer between India and Russia. By the Anglo-Afghan treaty of Rawalpindi (1919) the Afghāns secured full independence in internal and external matters. The treaty was disliked by some elements in Great Britain. As early as 1906 a Secretary of State for India had complained, "The extraordinary and unparalleled relations between Afghanistan and the British Government have often been described; how we are bound to defend the Amir’s country, yet are forbidden to take a single step for defence within its borders, or to send a single officer to reconnoitre the best means for its defence; how we give the Amir an annual subsidy of eighteen and a half lakhs, yet are not allowed to place a European agent at his capital, and even our Asiatic agent is kept under strict surveillance; how even our advice is resented; how we give the Amir arms and allow him to import arms and yet must make the best of much unfriendly behaviour." These considerations could not stand against the Afghan desire for full freedom. Already during the Great War, Britain had been unable to prevent direct dealings between the Amir and the Turkish-German mission in 1915. Under such circumstances nothing short of outright annexation of their country would have induced the Afghāns to renew their subordinate alliance with the British. This was, however, undesirable from the British point of view. For British reputation had already suffered considerably in the Muslim world. The allies were being widely denounced by Muslim world opinion for having instigated the Greek attack on Turkey which still had its Caliph. The Khilafat Movement in India had gathered much force and developed into Hijrat whereby several thousand Indian Muslims emigrated into Afghanistān much to their disappointment. Added to this, the new Soviet Communist government had entered into an alliance with Turkey in order to offset the machinations of the British and had sent in 1920 a mission to Kābul to find with the help of Amir a line of attack on India.

In the realm of foreign policy Amānullah came forward as the champion of Islam and the right of self-determination among

the Islamic peoples. In 1922 the Muslims of Bukhārā were in revolt against the Bolsheviks. The revolt led by Enver Paşā of Turkey was spreading through Bukhārā and Farghānā. Amanullah dreamed of a Central Asian Confederacy under his own leadership but the death of Enver Paşā and the consequent suppression of the Muslim revolt in Bukhārā by the Bolsheviks finally led him to abandon his plans.
Chapter 8

PENETRATION OF THE WEST

The beginning of European expansion in the Islamic East dates back to the Crusades, when Italian city-states such as Venice, Florence, Genoa and Pisa established commercial warehouses in the cities of Asia Minor. From the twelfth to the fifteenth century the Italian cities monopolised the trade routes linking the eastern Mediterranean with Asiatic countries. This commercial expansion into the Middle East was the prelude to and the economic reason for the fifteenth-century European voyages of discovery. But these voyages of discovery were undertaken by such backward countries as Portugal, Spain, England and France, not by the rich Italian cities. The explanation lies in the economics of the times.

"Gold and silver were relatively scarce in medieval Europe. As commerce expanded, the supply of precious metals became so inadequate as to occasion inconvenience, even anxiety, especially in countries which had no mines. Furthermore, the rising national kings needed gold and silver to maintain their courts, to increase their power, to hire soldiers, to pay for wars. Yet it was difficult to obtain precious metals."1

The first voyages were undertaken by Portugal, whose explorers rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and reached India from the south, in 1548. Naturally, they claimed a monopoly of their new routes. Portugal's aim was not colonisation but commercial profit. Trading ports were established along the African coasts, on the shores of the Indian Ocean, at the entrance to Persian Gulf, and, above all, in the spice-producing East Indies. Spain, on the other hand, failed to find a new route to the spice islands, but discovered instead the gold and silver mines of America. For a

time, France and England were content to purchase spices from Lisbon, and sent out a few explorers. The Dutch, at that time subject to Spain, became the chief carriers and distributors of Spanish and Portuguese trade. But, toward the end of the sixteenth century, the Dutch rebelled against Spain and, as Spain and Portugal were united under Phillip V, began to prey on Portugal's colonial empire. The East India Company, chartered by Netherlands in 1602, wrested from Portugal the route round the Cape, the trading ports in the East and East Indies, and for generations monopolised the spice trade, despite persistent efforts of the French and the English to seize a share. The English formed their own East India Company in 1600, when Elizabeth conferred upon it the monopoly of English commerce from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Megallan. The first English vessels reached India in 1608 under Hawkins. Portuguese influence at the court of Jehângîr was, however, so strong that the Emperor refused permission to the English to trade in Gujerat. Dutch hostility was a more serious matter during the long years that Holland held naval supremacy in the East. Though the English factories on the mainland were safe, their position across the Bay of Bengal was precarious. The transformation of the East India Company from an exclusively commercial undertaking began when Charles II granted a new charter in 1661, which empowered the Company to make war and peace, appoint governors and to seize and deport "interlopers."

European expansion, at first purely commercial, was given a fillip by the industrial and mechanical revolutions. Each European nation had a surplus of industrial manufactures which had to be sold abroad. All nations except Great Britain had built around themselves forbidding tariff walls. These nations, consequently, eagerly sought colonies whose markets could be monopolised for the surplus products of their industry. The mechanical revolution came as a timely help. To make colonial produce profitable on a large scale, steamships were needed. To make commercial and military penetration of the interior wilds of Africa and Asia possible, railways were required; to bind colonies to the mother country, the telegraph had to be invented. The
victory of steam and electricity over space made possible the gigantic increase of colonial trade. It also made possible the extension of empires by transporting troops and armaments. Again, the building of railways, the laying of cables and telegraphs, the operation of shipping lines in the colonies were themselves a source of major commercial profit to the new industrialists of Europe. Still another factor was the demand of industrial nations for tropical and subtropical products such as cotton from Egypt and India and rubber from Malaya. "Coffee, cocoa and sugar have also founded empires.... The use of phosphate for fertilization of the soil in France is one of the reasons why France prizes her North African colonies. To obtain tin the French endeavoured to dominate the southernmost part of China. Gold mines caused the British conquest of Transvaal."1 An additional cause was provided by the existence of surplus capital, which could not be profitably reinvested at home. The same capital that earned three or four per cent in agricultural improvements in France brought ten to twenty per cent in agricultural enterprises in the United States and Canada. Sums invested in building new railways in Great Britain would hardly earn two to three per cent profit, but in India, for example, they could earn twenty per cent.

THE BRITISH IN THE INDO-PAK SUBCONTINENT

The foreign conquests of India always took place from the north. The north-western frontiers of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent have always been the gates from which Central Asiatic powers dominated or tried to dominate the subcontinent. The British were the only conquerors who entered the country from the southern and Bengal coastal areas. This is because the British were not conquerors in the full sense of the word. The East India Company was a commercial enterprise whose main object was to export Indian goods to England. It was on the coasts, therefore, that the East India Company had its head offices. Calcutta on the Hooghly was their most important

trading station and the base from which they gradually extended their dominion when the Mughal Empire fell into decay. The Battle of Plassey on June 27, 1757, gave them possession of Bengal. The provincial governor, Sirajuddaula, was utterly defeated and power was consequently divided between a European trading company whose object was to make profits and an Indian ruler with different interests. Neither Mir Ja'far, the nominee and ally of the Company, nor its Fort William Council could give Bengal an efficient government; both became unpopular and the province had no authoritative head.

In 1757 Clive was appointed governor of Bengal on behalf of the Company. Clive urged that the British Government should assume responsibility for the governance of Bengal in order to check the growing maladministration, but the British Ministry refused in view of the Mughal Emperor's technical authority over Bengal. After Clive left India in 1760, the Company's Fort William Council tried to improve the government of the province by changing the Nawab. Mir Ja'far's son-in-law, Mir Qasim, a man of much greater ability and strength of character, was set up in his place. He tried to govern Bengal like an independent ruler. He, therefore, came into conflict with the British, was defeated and took refuge in Oudh. A year later, there was an alliance between Shäh 'Alam, the Mughal Emperor, and the Nawab of Oudh to restore him to his place. But the Battle of Buxar in 1767 resulted in the victory of the British. Meanwhile, Clive had come back as governor a second time. He effected a settlement by restoring the Oudh to Shuja'uddaula in exchange for a large sum in cash; the districts of Allahabad were handed over to the Emperor, who had been promised the entire province; and, in exchange, the Emperor granted to the Company what is known as the Diwāni of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa at a rental of Rs. 26 lakhs annually. Diwāni meant the collection of the revenue of a province and the retention of the surplus after the payment of the annual amount to the Emperor. Thus was established the supremacy of the British in Bengal and the adjoining regions.

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In 1757 Clive was appointed governor of Bengal on behalf of the Company. Clive urged that the British Government should assume responsibility for the governance of Bengal in order to check the growing maladministration, but the British Ministry refused in view of the Mughal Emperor's technical authority over Bengal. After Clive left India in 1760, the Company's Fort William Council tried to improve the government of the province by changing the Nawab. Mir Ja'far's son-in-law, Mir Qasim, a man of much greater ability and strength of character, was set up in his place. He tried to govern Bengal like an independent ruler. He, therefore, came into conflict with the British, was defeated and took refuge in Oudh. A year later, there was an alliance between Shah 'Alam, the Mughal Emperor, and the Nawab of Oudh to restore him to his place. But the Battle of Buxar in 1767 resulted in the victory of the British. Meanwhile, Clive had come back as governor a second time. He effected a settlement by restoring the Oudh to Shuja'uddaula in exchange for a large sum in cash; the districts of Allahabad were handed over to the Emperor, who had been promised the entire province; and, in exchange, the Emperor granted to the Company what is known as the Diwanī of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa at a rental of Rs. 26 lakhs annually. Diwanī meant the collection of the revenue of a province and the retention of the surplus after the payment of the annual amount to the Emperor. Thus was established the supremacy of the British in Bengal and the adjoining regions.

In the south, the Marathas were the leading factor and pivot
of Indian politics. They possessed the advantage that their territories extended across the subcontinent from sea to sea. They had made a rapid recovery after their defeat by Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī. But after the death of Madhu Rao in 1772, intrigue and hostility between the Maratha chiefs had developed. The Maratha confederacy was no longer united, as formerly, under the authority of the Poona government, and the disunited Maratha chiefs had to face the rising power of Ḥyder ʿAlī of Mysore who had usurped in 1760 the throne of the Hindu Raja. However, in 1779, Ḥyder ʿAlī succeeded in bringing the Marathas and the Niẓām of Hyderabad under a triple alliance against the British and, helped by the French, he invaded Carnatic. But Warren Hastings was able to detach the Marathas from their alliance with Mysore. The Treaty of Salbai in 1782 brought peace and friendship between the Marathas and the British who were recognised as a factor to be reckoned with in Indian politics. Ḥyder ʿAlī’s son, Tīpū, was forced to conclude the treaty of Mangalore in 1784 with the British, because France was now at peace with Britain and the Marathas were threatening him. A few years later in 1798 Britain’s position in India was again threatened by Tīpū in alliance with France, but the Marathas and the Niẓām of Hyderabad, who felt endangered by the Mysore ruler, made common cause with the British and Tīpū’s power was liquidated in 1799 when his capital was taken by the British. With the exit of Tīpū the British power was immensely strengthened in South India.

The architect of British supremacy in India was Marquess of Wellesley, appointed governor-general in 1798. Wellesley’s policy was to establish, by treaty, protectorates over the states in contact with the Company and thus assume the position of stabilising authority which the Emperors had lost. The first alliances with the native states of India had been on terms of equality with the contracting parties, but Wellesley had the military power to impose his own conditions. For two generations most of the Indian rulers had no sense of security and this security Wellesley now offered them. All they had
to do was to sign a subsidiary treaty and they would be guaranteed against revolt by their subjects and aggression by their neighbours. But they had to pay a heavy price. They were supported by a force raised and trained under the Company’s control and serving under the orders of the British. And they had to pay too for the upkeep of this force which was completely under the thumb of their foreign masters. By agreeing to the Company’s arbitration in any dispute with a neighbouring power, the princes parted with their independence in foreign politics.

At first Wellesley’s plans to extend British influence went smoothly. Mysore, Hyderabad and Oudh had come into subordinate union of the British Confederation and in 1802 the Gaekwar made his first acknowledgment of the Company’s political supervision in Baroda. But total peace in India depended on the Marathas who were still independent of the British control. Wellesley was determined to gain a commanding influence in their councils and the civil war between Holkar and Scindia in 1800 after the death of Nana Farnavis gave him his opportunity.

The Punjab was the only independent native power left by the end of 1843. Under the stiff control of Ranjit Singh, it had remained on friendly relations with the British Government. The situation changed with the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839. His son was proclaimed Maharaja with Lal Singh as regent. But the real power lay with the army which was utterly lawless. The Sikh generals were in constant fear of open mutiny and the government had no policy beyond making concessions to the troops they were unable to pay. The British defeat in the Afghan War had lessened Sikh respect for the British power. In 1843 came Sir Charles Napier’s campaign against the Sind Mirs which ended in the British annexation of the country. Sind which was ruled by these independent chiefs had lain on the Company’s lines of communication to be forcibly occupied during the Afghan War. Lord Auckland had prevented its conquest by Ranjit Singh some years earlier. The Sikhs, therefore, naturally feared that their
country might be the next British victim. The result was the first Sikh War in which the Sikhs were beaten.

But the British policy was against the annexation of the Punjab, nor could the British support the existing rule by making a subsidiary alliance. The Treaties of Lahore (1846) were a compromise. The British got a strip of frontier territory and a substantial reduction of the Khalsa army, but they disclaimed interference in the internal affairs of the Punjab. By another treaty, the state of Kashmir was established and Gulab Singh, the Raja of Jammu, became its ruler. Kashmir had been taken over by the Company from the Sikhs in lieu of war indemnity. The affairs of the Punjab, however, did not improve and British interference was invited and accepted. The Sikhs, though in a minority of one to six, were determined to maintain their independence. Another war followed, and the Punjab was annexed by the Company in 1849. The annexation of the Punjab brought with it the problem of the North-West Frontier, which had been a source of constant trouble to the Mughals. After the Persian and Afghan invasions, no Indian government was concerned with the Pathan tribes until Ranjit Singh expelled the Afghans and became the guardian of the frontiers. It was now the turn of the British Government to bridle the wild tribes of the north-west.

CONDITION OF THE MUSLIMS UNDER THE COMPANY'S RULE

The advent of the British in India meant a great and unfortunate change in the economic, political and educational conditions of the Muslims. Even Hunter, who wrote *The Indian Musalmans* to prove that the so-called Wahhabi movement led by Syed Ahmad Shahid was directed against the British, is forced to admit the wrongs done to the Muslims of India by the British rulers. He says,1 "There is no use shutting our ears to the fact that the Indian Muhammadans arraign us on a list of charges as serious as was ever brought against a government. They accuse us of having closed every honourable walk of life to professors of their

creed. They accuse us of having introduced a system of education which leaves their whole community unprovided for, and which has landed it in contempt and beggary. They accuse us of having brought misery into thousands of families, by abolishing their Law officers. . . . Above all, they charge us with deliberate malversation of their religious foundations and with misappropriation on the largest scale of their educational funds."

Proceeding further, Hunter describes the condition of Bengal Muslims who formed the majority of the population in the Ganges and Brahmaputra Delta. "If ever," says Hunter, 1 "a people stood in need of a career, it is the Musalman aristocracy of Lower Bengal. Their old sources of wealth have run dry... The administration of the Imperial taxes was the first great source of income in Bengal and the Musalman aristocracy monopolized it. The police was another source of income and the police was officered by Muhammadans. The Courts of Law were a third great source of income, and the Musalmans monopolised them. Above all, there was the army, an army not officered by gentlemen... but a great confederation of conquerors who enrolled their peasantry into troops and drew pay for them as soldiers. A hundred and seventy years ago it was impossible for a well-born Musalman to become poor: at present it is almost impossible for him to continue rich... The first of them, the army, is now completely closed. No Muhammadan gentleman of birth can enter our Regiments; and even if a place could be found for him in our military system, that place would no longer be a source of wealth."

The second support of Musalman aristocracy was the collection of land revenue, according to Hunter, but he admits that the Permanent Settlement seriously damaged the position of the Muslims. For the whole tendency of the settlement "was to acknowledge as the land-holders the subordinate Hindu officers who dealt directly with the husbandmen." 2 The Permanent Settlement elevated the Hindu collectors, who up to

1. The Indian Musalmans, Calcutta 1945, p. 149.
2. Ibid., p. 154.
that time had held but unimportant posts, gave them a proprietary right in the soil, and allowed them to accumulate wealth.

In the judicial department, the Muslims fared well for the first fifty years of the Company’s rule. But during the second half-century the tide turned. “Then the Hindus poured into, and have since completely filled every grade of official life. Even in the District Collectories of Lower Bengal, where it is still possible to give appointments in the old-fashioned friendly way, there are very few young Musalman officials.”

A Calcutta Persian paper, Dürbân, of July 1899, wrote as follows: “All sorts of employments, great and small, are gradually being snatched away from the Muhammadans, and bestowed on men of other races, particularly the Hindus. The Government is bound to look upon all classes of its subjects with an equal eye, yet the time has now come when it publicly singles out the Muhammadans in its Gazettes for exclusion from official posts. Recently, when several vacancies occurred in the office of the Sundarbans Commissioner, that official, in advertising them in the Government Gazette, stated that the appointments would be given to none but Hindus.”

As regards education, Hunter points out that the government had covered Bengal with schools and yet the government schools failed to develop a class of Musalmans who could compete successfully at the University, or find an entrance into any of the professions. The same schools sent forth every year a vast body of well-read, ambitious and intellectual Hindu youths, who distinguished themselves as young men at the University, and in after-life monopolised every avenue to wealth and distinction.

Hunter lays the blame for this state of affairs on the purely secular type of education introduced by the British. “A system of purely secular education is adapted to very few nations. In the opinion of many deeply thinking men, it has signally failed in Ireland, and it is certainly altogether unsuited to the illiterate

2. Ibid., p. 167.
and fanatical peasantry of Muhammadan Bengal.”¹

The British Government even went so far as to appropriate to itself income from Muslim religious endowments devoted to educational purposes. “It is painful,” says Hunter,² “to dwell on this charge of misappropriation, because it is impossible to rebut it. The Muhammadans declare that the English took advantage of irregularities on the part of the first Musalman trustees, to place an Infidel Government in charge of their largest religious endowment; and that they have since aggravated this initial wrong by substituting for the ‘pious objects’ of the Musalman testator, an Institution which is of no service to the Muhammadans whatever.”

The disaffection caused by these policies eventuated in the Mutiny of 1857. “The great mass of the 250,000,000 people of India,”—says Dunbar,—³ “living in the villages scattered over the countryside were passive, as they had usually been in times of disturbance. But it was otherwise with the upper classes. In British India, as it expanded, they had lost their power and influence altogether and in many cases their livelihood. In industry the once world-famous textile trade had been extinguished. In addition to this sense of frustration there was a wider feeling of alarm and anxiety in the view taken of the rapid growth of Westernisation under Dalhousie. Steam had ‘brought England to India’ in more ways than one when the Enterprise helped by her sails came up the Hooghly in 1825. Western ideas were being embodied in the ancient Eastern laws, and they were manifest in the departments of education, public works and the entire essentially British administration. The apparent miracle of the ‘fire carriages,’ the rail service which Dalhousie introduced, threatened pollution to the caste Hindu who might sit in its coaches. The British way of life, ‘the pouring of the new wine of the West, however sound in itself, into the old bottles of the East,’ was looked upon with acute suspicion and

¹. The Indian Musalmans, Calcutta 1945, p. 174.
². Ibid., p. 180.
³. Dunbar, Sir George, India and the Passing Empire, London 1951, p. 182.
resentment."

The Mutiny ended in the defeat of the remnants of the Muslim ruling class, because it had failed to gauge the strength of the West and made no attempt even partially as did the rulers of Turkey and Egypt, to adjust itself to the modern civilisation. This problem of adjustment to modern civilisation still remains to be solved, as far as the Muslim countries are concerned. Wholesale Westernisation, as attempted in Turkey, has not yielded very satisfactory results, because the outlook of modernism has very imperfectly permeated even the ruling classes and the middle classes, not to speak of the Muslim masses, who have become more and more removed from the high and middle-class ways of life owing to the very fact of Westernisation. Moreover, the Western way of living and thinking is confined to a few externals and in no way represents the Western mode of thought and behaviour in its essentials or fundamentals.

THE POST-MUTINY PERIOD

After the Mutiny, the British Government took over the direct responsibility for the administration of India from the East India Company. Its declared policy was to associate Indians increasingly in the administration of the country. In accordance with this declaration, the Indian Councils Acts of 1861 and 1862 were passed enabling non-official Indians to be nominated as members of the Legislative Councils of the Governor-General and of the Provincial Governors. From about 1870 successful Indian candidates began to appear in the Indian Civil Service Examination. The Indian National Congress was founded in 1885. In the beginning the Congress acted as a loyal opposition and pressed in its annual sessions for the further extension to India of parliamentary rights. In its early stages, the Congress also represented Muslim interests and, despite the opposition of Sir Sayyid, it was joined by quite a number of prominent Muslims. But a series of events took place which led the Muslims to organise themselves separately under the Muslim League. A specifically Hindu nationalism was taking shape under the teachings of Swami Dayananda and Swami Vivekananda both of whom asserted the
superiority of Vedic culture and were anti-Western as well as anti-Muslim. Then B.G. Tilak revived the militant Maratha religious and political tradition. The anti-Muslim sentiments generated by these leaders were reinforced by the partition of Bengal in 1905. The Muslims of East Bengal, now East Pakistan, welcomed the partition as liberating them from the Hindu yoke. But the dominant Hindu middle class felt that its supremacy was threatened. There was terrorism and agitation against Curzon’s partition of the province which was finally revoked by the British Government much to the grief and loss of the Muslims. Another significant step towards Muslim separatism was the demand for separate electorates which arose from the Muslim feeling that if representative institutions were to be extended in the country, the Muslim position should be safeguarded by enabling the Muslims to elect their own representatives in the provincial and central legislative councils and other subordinate local councils. The demand was conceded and incorporated in the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909. In the same year a separate political organisation of the Muslims was established. This was the Muslim League.

The Balkan wars and the treatment meted out to Turkey after the first world war gave further impetus to the Muslim nationalism and resulted in the Khilâfat movement whose object was the restoration of the Turkish Caliph’s authority and the safeguarding of the Muslim holy places. Hindu leadership, taking advantage of the Muslim resentment against the British, made an alliance with Muslim Khilâfat leaders. The result was the Non-Cooperation movement headed by Mr. Gandhi and the Muslim leader, Maulâna Muḥammad ‘Ali. The Muslims made immense sacrifices but failed completely in their object. The Turks themselves abolished the Caliphate and the Non-Cooperation movement which was based on non-violence led to widespread disorders. Hindu-Muslim unity founded on an opportunistic alliance broke down. “The years that followed were full of bitter and pointless communal riots between Hindu and Muslim peasants and artisans, and there was increasing struggle between Hindu and Muslim middle classes for jobs in the Indianised services and power under
the new reforms. Never again was the spirit of unity of the Lucknow Pact and the Non-Cooperation movement recaptured.”

In 1935 after a series of Round Table Conferences in London, an Act was passed by the British Parliament conferring full responsible government in the provinces and providing for a Federation at the Centre, if a sufficient number of native states agreed to accede to the Federation. This latter part of the Act was never enforced but elections were held in the provinces in 1937. The Congress came to power in seven provinces and refused to form coalition ministries with the Muslim League. It tried, instead, to make direct contact with the Muslim masses, over the head of the Muslim League leadership. The mass contact movement of the Indian National Congress failed, as the Muslims under the rule of the Congress felt that they were being treated as second-class citizens and their culture and language was threatened with extinction. The Congress rule of seven provinces immensely popularised the Muslim League and the feeling grew among the Muslims of India that no amount of constitutional safeguards could save them from Hindu domination. In 1939, the Lahore Resolution was passed by the Muslim League demanding a separate Muslim State in the north-west and north-east regions of India, where the Muslims formed the bulk of the population.

The impact of the West on India forced both the Hindus and the Muslims to adjust themselves culturally and intellectually to the modern world conditions and to evolve a new synthetic culture by absorbing certain Western elements. But the Hindu effort was preceded by that of the Muslims, who, as the former rulers of the country, reacted sharply against the West which had deprived them of political power and economic resources. Another reason was “that the bulk of Muslim India, in the Punjab and the North-West, came under British influence at least a generation later (and often much more) than the rest of India. In general, Muslim progress towards an Anglo-Islamic synthesis has lagged a good generation behind that of the Anglo-Hindu,

both because the starting point was later, and also because the progress of education was less rapid. There were two other factors retarding the process. Muslims preferred British to Hindu or Sikh rule, and, therefore, were slower to react against it; they felt the weight of the Western challenge less keenly because they possessed more of the Western outlook in their tradition.

"The Anglo-Islamic synthesis was worked out by Sayyid Ahmad Khan in the seventies and eighties of the last century, and was propagated through Aligarh from 1875 onwards. But it was only from 1921 that large-scale education was developed in the Punjab. If Hindus and Muslims both tried to work out a synthesis between their respective cultures and the challenging ideas of the West, it followed that the two cultures being radically different in the first place, the resulting chemical compounds must also be different. This is in fact what happened."¹

In the opinion of the writer, Jinnah’s success in creating Pakistan came from the correct realisation “that Indian Islam was a cultural unit separate from Hinduism, that the Anglo-Islamic synthesis was therefore distinct from the Hindu-British synthesis, and that each must in consequence seek a separate political as well as cultural expression."² To this it might be added that the Hindu-British synthesis as well as the Anglo-Islamic synthesis is still far from complete. Pakistan is still struggling to work out a satisfactory solution to the problem of modernisation and many of its difficulties and complexities arise from the very fact that it has not been able to integrate the Western civilisation within the framework of its Islamic past, which is powerful enough to reassert its force and vitality.

THE WEST IN İRÂN

İrân entered the orbit of modern world politics when Napoleon undertook to destroy British power in Asia. Napoleon formed a joint scheme with the Russians for the invasion of India by French and Russian forces. A Russian expedition into İrân

¹. Spear, Percival, India, Pakistan and the West, London 1949, pp. 206-207.
². Ibid., p. 208.
failed. So Napoleon entered into a direct alliance with the Shāh. The Franco-Iranian Treaty of Finkenstein in 1807 marked the apogee of French influence in Iran. A military mission was also sent to train Iranian troops for modern warfare. But in 1908 Napoleon concluded the Treaty of Tilsit with Russia. The Shāh was offended and felt that he had been betrayed by Napoleon. The French mission was expelled from Iran.

With the passing of French influence, Iran remained face to face with her two neighbours, Russia and Britain (through India). Russia was jealous of the British position in India and began exerting her pressure on Iran. In 1724 she had temporarily occupied Gilan. In the reign of Catherine the Great, Russian pressure increased. There were wars with Iran in 1796 and 1800-1813. A new war was waged in 1826-1828 which resulted in the gradual loss by Iran of her rich Caucasian provinces. The Treaty of Turkomanchai of 1828 crowned this victorious advance by establishing the frontier on Aras river south of the Caucasian range and by subjecting Iran to the political and economic supremacy of Russia which also assumed the role of the protector of the Qajar dynasty. After the Treaty of Turkomanchai of 1828, British influence declined in Iran. In 1856, Iran, following Russian instigation, attacked Herat in Afghan territory. The British in India felt threatened and declared war on Iran. British troops were landed on the coast of the Persian Gulf and Iran was forced to renounce Herat. Thus Russia was deprived of an opportunity to infiltrate this buffer territory. Russia also suffered a defeat in the Crimean War, but the British who could easily have annexed part of the Iranian coast on the Gulf and thus have established a naval base there did not avail themselves of the opportunity. In contrast to Russia with her territorial advances, the British concentrated exclusively on commercial advantages.

Western culture began to penetrate into Iran during the reign of Nasiruddin Qajar. Military missions, British, French, Italian and Austrian, succeeded each other to modernise the Persian army. But the Persian Cossack brigade, formed and armed on the Russian model and commanded by Russian officers, was and
remained the only efficient modern unit. It was designed to safeguard Russian interests, though nominally it was a part of the Persian armed forces. The construction of the telegraph lines since 1864, the concession granted to Baron de Reuter in 1872 for establishing a national bank, the monopoly for the navigation on the Karun river in 1888 were so many attempts made by the British to get a firm foothold in Iran. Naṣiruddin also founded the first modern college in Iran and sent a number of young Persians of the best families to Europe to get there military training, learn engineering and study law and medicine.

Russia's influence reached its peak in the reign of Muḥaffaruddin, successor of Naṣiruddin. It was marked by two Russian loans of a political character, the establishment of a Russian bank in Tehran as a rival institution to the British Imperial Bank, the expansion of Russian trade with Iran, and the recognition by Great Britain of Russia's predominant position in northern Iran. The penetration of Western ideas led to the demand for a democratic constitution which was backed by the British and the Iranian 'Ulema. People educated in the missionary schools and those who had returned from Europe were also behind the agitation. Muḥaffar's successor, Muḥammad 'Alī, tried no less than three times to overthrow the constitution. He was helped by the Russian Czar Nicholas. But the Nationalists, reinforced by the powerful Bakhtiari tribe on the British instigation, proved stronger.

Russian influence declined considerably after the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Germany's power was rising in Europe and had its repercussions on international groupings. In the face of the German threat, Great Britain and Russia succeeded in settling their problems in Asia. Iran was divided into two spheres of influence, the Russian in the north, by far the larger, and the British in the south.

The full impact of the West on Iran made itself felt in the reforms of Raza Šah Pehlevi who became the Prime Minister of Iran and was elected Šah in 1925. His reform was more difficult to accomplish than of his prototype, Muṣṭafa Kamāl. For
centuries preceding Kamāl, the West had been the most important factor and problem in Turkish life and society. In the nineteenth century modern ideas and customs spread rapidly in Turkey. On the other hand, Īrān came under the influence of Western ideas only after 1870. Again, after the Ottoman Empire fell, Turkey was left with a homogeneous people. But the Persians are made of diverse elements. While Turkey had no civilisation that might properly be called her own, and therefore the minds of the Turks were better disposed to change old ways, Īrān had a cultural tradition of her own coming to her from times immemorial.

"With the executive and legislative branches of government in his hands, the Shah began to pull down the structure of traditional society. The solidity of the social edifice had, of course, suffered greatly from the vicissitudes of the preceding decades, but within its still existing framework life had not ceased to exist and renovation might not have been impossible. Rāza Shah demolished it. Titles of nobility were abolished and no new ones were created. Gradually the members of great families were removed from their governmental positions and replaced by men with modern education and professional training. The Shi'a clergy were deprived of their possessions, and thereby they lost their independence. The merchant class was practically turned into a class of government employees, because the state controlled production and prices through its monopolistic societies, it became itself a capitalistic producer through the new industrial plants owned by the state or the Shah, and assumed the task of regulating imports and exports."\(^1\)

Raza Shāh's attitude to religion was sounder than that of Muṣṭaafa Kamāl. While Raza Shāh never hesitated to eliminate the abuses in traditional religious practices which had nothing to do with the broad liberal teachings of Islām, he did not go to the extent of fastening European social institutions and practices on Īrān, as was done by Muṣṭaafa Kamāl who abolished the call to prayer in Arabic, forced the people to wear European dress,

erected statues in the cities and the towns, deprived the people of all means of learning their religion and did, in fact, everything to de-Muslimise the Turks so that they might remain oblivious of their Islamic heritage. In one respect, Raza Shāh acted in a manner diametrically opposite to that of Muṣṭafā Kamāl. While Muṣṭafā Kamāl erected barriers between his own nation and other Muslim nations by abolishing the Arabic script and maintaining a policy of cultural and political aloofness from the rest of the Muslim world, Raza Shāh’s attack on religion was mainly motivated by the desire to bring Írān into the common cultural and political orbit of the Muslim world. He realised that the existing official religion of Írān had become a barrier in the mutual understanding of the Muslim nations. This policy was officially consecrated by marriage of the crown prince with the sister of the King of Egypt, who was a Sunnī. Nevertheless, he did much good to the people by confiscating the religious endowments which had become a source of idle living for the religious classes, and forbade such practices as the taking out of taziehs. He also did much to improve the position of women and make them literate. He put an end to the seclusion of women by abolishing the purdah system. He also put the finishing touches to the modernisation of Írān’s educational system, a process which started in 1839 when the first French school was opened in Tabriz.

MUSLIMS OF SOVIET ASIA

The lands south of Amu Darya (Oxus, Jaihun) up to the Hindū Kush were known to Bābur as Balkh or, farther east, as Badaḵshan, while those north of Syr Darya (Jaxartes, Saihun) were roughly divided into Shash (the country round Tashkent) and Mughalistān. Northern Persia and the western Afghan plateau were and are still known as Khurasān, the Eastern Afghan country was called after its chief towns Kābul, Qandhar and Ghāznī. The upper valley of Syr Darya (Saihun) was called Farghana, which was the native place of Bābur, while the lower stretches of both the great rivers made up the famous delta country of Khorezm. These lands were once the birthplace of the Turkish race and the seat of a renowned
civilisation. From the date of Arab conquest late in the seventh century, Mawarānahr or Transoxania became a part of the Muslim East.

But a curtain of separation fell on Turkestān long before the days of the Soviet rule, even before the Tsars. The Amīrs of Bukhāra were so exclusive and parochial that both Bukhāra and Samarqand became a legend even to the people of Iran and Afghanistan. A few Russian agents were able to visit Khiva or Bukhāra in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but many were caught and enslaved. The enslavement of the Russians by the Khiva Khāns was a prime cause of the wars against that state. With the formation of the five Socialist Soviet Republics of Kazakhs, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirghizia, Turkmenia, the isolation of Eastern Turkestān has been completed. But in extent alone it is impressive. The aggregate territory of these five republics is larger in area than India and Pakistan put together, though much of it is desert.

During the period of Chengiz Khan's successors, Eastern Turkestān had close commercial relations with the Persian Gulf. For a time Herāt became the clearing centre for the trade of Central and Western Asia and a distinguished culture flourished there under the Timurid princes. But with the rounding of the Cape and the formation of the British, Dutch and French companies a century later, the trade by caravan through Turkestān to Europe also died. Except for local commerce, even the Persian Gulf became a backwater.

The Mongols produced no great culture in the region of East Turkestān. Their civilisation, such as it was, became absorbed in the Turkish civilisation of Transoxania. The name of Chaqhtai, the second son of Chengiz Khan, even became that of the literary Turkic language of the Eastern Turks and less than two centuries later Timur who belonged to a Mongol tribe had become a Turk in all essentials. Bābur, descended on his mother's side from Chengiz, wrote in Turkish and in his Memoirs speaks with disdain of the Mughal (Mongol) race.

There were many ramifications of the Turkish tribes
which settled in this region but two are prominent: the Oguz, ancestors of Saljuqs and the Ottomans, and the Kipchak. The Oguz are the fathers of the Western Turks, while the Kipchaks are one of the main tribal components of the Kazak, Uzbek and Nogal clans. Those of the Turkish tribes that became masters of the oases in succession to the Mongol and Timurid houses assimilated some degree of Persianised culture and became known as Uzbeks, while those who remained on the Steppe were called Kazaks. The latter fought under famous Khans in their struggle against the Russian domination, but these Khans were only leaders in the Steppe; they never ruled in Turkestan as did the Uzbeks whose Amir Shayban Khan is mentioned by Buhur as his great enemy. Shayban Khan defeated Buhur and took the whole of Transoxania, Bokhara and part of Khurasan. But he was defeated and killed by Shah Ismail Safavi. Shah Ismail took Bokhara and Samarqand, but later settled terms with the next Shaybaniid prince. Herat and Bokhara went to Persia, the Amu (Oxus) became the limit of the Uzbek rule. The growth of Shi'ism in Safavid Persia set up a theological barrier between the orthodox of Bokhara and Samarqand and the Shi'as of Iran. Shaybaniid power declined in the sixteenth century until in 1540 Nadir Khan absorbed the region in his own kingdom. But his empire over Turkestan did not pass to the Qajars. A dynasty of Mangit Amirs arose in 1784 and lasted until 1921. At the time of Tsarist expansion control of the sedentary population in the Turanian basin was in the hands of the three petty rulers, the Amirs of Bokhara and Khans of Khiva and Kokand; on the Kazak and Turkmen Steppe companies of armed graziers wandered without much cohesion, sometimes becoming united under a Khan to meet emergencies.

In the eighteenth century, as Russia recovered from the Napoleonic invasion, her outposts in Asia gradually moved farther south and in 1853 she was in full control of the waterways of Syr Darya. In 1865 Taschkent was captured. Samarqand, forcibly detached from Bokhara, followed three years later. By 1873 Bokhara had been reduced to vassalage and
there followed in the same year the conquest of Khiva. Russian power was now on the Oxus and up against the Afghan frontier.

The defeat of the Turkmens in 1881 was the first thrust of the final Russian deployment which was to round off the occupation of the entire Turanian basin. Thus were brought face to face two mighty Western powers, the Russians and the British. The former had reached the outer fringes of the mountain barrier south of Turkestan. The British were still able to support an Afghan kingdom behind the Hindu Kush and the Oxus which should be free of Russian influence and act as a buffer to their empire in India. "A bargain between two equal sides was concluded by diplomacy, and the balance swung to rest. The final agreement, signed in July 1887, still left Balkh inhabited by people of Turkish stock and most of Badakhshan, inhabited mainly by Tajiks, to Afghanistan."

The effect of the Russian drive was to bring the whole of the Turanian basin, except Balkh and Bukhara and Khiva satellites, under direct Russian administration from a capital at Tashkent. The Kokand State in Farghana had been destroyed, and Samarkand had been separated from Bukhara, both Samarkand and Farghana becoming Russian territory. Bukhara and Khiva survived as vassal states under close Russian control in external affairs.

During the Tsarist regime, the Eastern Turks had been excluded from Russian military service. Nor had they any share even in the subordinate grades in the working of the communication services, whether railway, telegraph or telephone. Nor had they been admitted to such few industrial organisations as existed, except as labourers under rigid subordination to Russian foremen. Under the Stolypin reforms of 1906 and previous agrarian settlements, the lands of Eastern Turks had been colonised by the inflow of the Russian population, which was rapidly increasing around Farghana at the time of the Soviet expansion. The Russians came both as

skilled industrial workers and also as peasants. This inter-penetration of the Central Asian peoples by a Russian peasantry in the country side, and by a Russian proletariat in the towns and along the lines of communication supplies perhaps the most important clue to an understanding of the colonial policy of Soviet Russia."

The Soviets inherited from Tsardom in Central Asia four units: (1) Steppe territory (northern Kazakhstan of today). (2) The Turkestan province with Farghana Valley, Tashkent and Samarkand. (3) The semi-independent states of Bukhara and Khiva. The directly administered Tsarist province of the Steppe territory and Turkestan had already been included in R. F. S. R. (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic). By May 1925 Khiva, together with most of the old Turkestan province, had become in two full constituent S. S. Rs. (Soviet Socialist Republics) of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia. Thus the ancient states of Bukhara and Khiva ceased to exist. In 1936 Kazakhstan and Kirghizia also qualified as constituent S. S. Rs.

The religious condition of the Muslims under Soviet rule is summarised in the following remarks of Sir Olaf Caroe:

"The conclusion is that, under Bolshevist pressure, religious institutions have for ever lost their old meaning and force in Turkestan, partly because the priesthood failed to stand to their brief, but more because religious endowments had been seized and the Clergy’s authority undermined. Yet Islam, cleansed of its theocratic accretions, lives as a spiritual possession in the hearts of the people. Unlike the Orthodox Church of Russia, it does not meet the Godlessness of Communism in an opportune spirit, but is becoming more and more unified with the traditions in our inmost hearts. It is the time of the peoples’ clergy. In fact Islam has become the spiritual core of the nationalist political creed.”

As to the probable outcome of the pressure of Communism on Islam, Sir Olaf Caroe hazards the opinion:

2. Ibid., p. 240.
3. Ibid., pp. 264-265.
"Christian and Muslim alike subscribe to the *Tauhid*, i.e. belief in one God; to apprehend him both trust to the abandonment of prayer. Just as the encounter between the East and West brought forth these revelations of the past, we may look for a strong and positive response from this new collision. And just because this collision of ideas is so unequal and contrasted at the point where the proletarian system of Russia has met the old world of Islam, it is not impossible that mens' minds will be opened to a new message vouchsafed from just this quarter, a revelation based on the older inspirations but under an original interpretation. Much as the Arabs in the VII Century, following the lead of the Prophet of Islam, liberated the Middle East from the Graeco-Roman and Sassanian yokes, so may their Turkish successors free themselves from the Russian Proletarian chains, marching under a new banner. . . . Looking forward into history, our successors could then say the inert mass of stratified ritual and bigotry, which represented Islam as practised in Transoxania before the Russians came, needed the violent impact of the encounter with Communism to reanimate it and rouse it to a new height of spiritual reaction. The resurrection could be now only at the cost of a descent into hell."

THE ARAB WORLD

EGYPT

The new forces released by the West brought into prominence in Egypt a reforming ruler Muḥammad 'Alī of Macedonian origin. In Egypt the Mamluks still retained power after their conquest by Salīm in 1517. In July 1798 Napoleon undertook the expedition to Egypt with the object of destroying the British hegemony of India by closing her trade route. The Mamluks were defeated but the French position was unstable due to the British command of the sea. The Ottoman power sent a few ships with troops to Egypt which included a contingent provided by Muḥammad 'Alī's uncle. In subsequent warfare which forced
the French to evacuate Egypt in 1801, Muḥammad 'Alī distinguished himself to such an extent that he soon rose to generalship. By 1805 Muḥammad 'Alī had become the *de facto* ruler of Egypt, and the Ottoman Caliph had to recognise him. For a time he allowed the Mamluks to rule in upper Egypt for a high tribute but when they intrigued with the British, he had them massacred.

As in other Muslim countries, the problem of modernising the army faced Muḥammad 'Alī who dissolved his Albanian corps in 1816 and drafted the *fellâḥs* (peasants) into military service. This new army was armed with European weapons and drilled on the French model.

Muḥammad 'Alī soon came into conflict with his overlord, the Ottoman, over the question of Syria which the Caliph had promised him. In 1831 his son, Ibrâhîm, led an army into Syria. Ibrâhîm conquered Palestine and advanced as far as Adana, the capital of Cilicia. The Turkish forces under Ḥusayn Paşâ were defeated thrice. After Ibrâhîm's success at Koniya in 1832, the way to Bosphorus lay open to him. Then the European powers intervened to save Turkey and peace was concluded between the Caliph and his vassal, Syria being given to Muḥammad 'Alī.

In Arabia, Muḥammad 'Alī had to face the rising power of the Wahābis. If Muḥammad 'Alī had turned to the West and adopted its techniques and methods, the reaction of the orthodox Muslims of Arabia was to reject the Western mode of life and turn to the original teachings of Islam for building up their strength. The Wahābi movement was started by Muḥammad ibn 'Abdul Wahhāb, who was a great follower and admirer of Ibn Taymiyyah. He rejected many of the superstitions and customs which had found their way among the Muslims, crusaded against idolatrous practices such as the undue veneration of the saints, and sought to go back to the pure monotheism of early Islam. He gained an important convert in the Shaykh of 'Uyaynah, Muḥammad ibn Sa'ud, who lived in the fortified settlement of Dariyah. From there Wahābi power spread until it began to threaten Baghdad and Damascus. The Sharīf Ghālib of Mecca, whose 'Alid ancestors had ruled the holy city since the tenth century felt powerless against the Wahābis, who were joined by all the Bedouin tribes
of Najd. Ultimately, Muḥammad 'Alī was commissioned by the Caliph to deal with them. Saʻud was dead and his son, 'Abdulla, ruled over Najd. Muḥammad 'Alī now himself moved into Arabia and first seized the Sharīf Ghālib of Mecca, whom he suspected of having secret sympathies with the Wāhābis. Muḥammad 'Alī suffered great losses in the Arabian campaign but finally his son, Ibrāhīm, defeated 'Abdulla and broke the Wāhābī power. A Turkish official was installed as governor of Najd, but the Wāhābī power was revived in Riyād by Turki, a cousin of 'Abdulla.

Great social and economic changes followed from Muḥammad 'Alī's policy of modernisation. In Egypt, prior to Muḥammad 'Alī, the superior administration was Turkish, not Arab. "Foreigners noted with surprise," says Dodwell,1 "the universal sentiment of inferiority and subjection prevailing among the natives of the land." Muḥammad 'Alī tried to replace the Turkish element in the higher administration by the Arabs. In 1826 no less than forty-five young men, sons of Arab Shaykhs and others, were sent to France to be educated there and rendered fit for public employment.

In Turkish times the public accounts were not centralised in Egypt. "Various taxes would be assigned to various services according to the approved Turkish mode. There was no budget nor any possibility of one. ... First came the introduction of budget of receipts and expenditure at the beginning of each year; then the payment of all revenues into central treasury; the complete separation of the power to receive and issue public money; the establishment of the power in the Finance Ministry to sanction or reject proposed expenditure."

One of Muḥammad 'Alī's earliest actions was to appropriate the Mamlūks' lands and to hold an inquiry into the tenures by which the other lands were held. Between 1808 and 1814 he appropriated the whole, giving the tax-farmer pensions instead of lands. He had realised that he could not have a stable government unless he resumed that large proportion of land, amounting

2. Ibid., pp. 207-208.
to nearly three-quarters, which had fallen into private hands.

Muḥammad ‘Alī’s economic policy made him the sole merchant of the country. He not only compelled the fellāh to cultivate but in some areas he determined what crops should be grown, and required the produce to be delivered into the government warehouses at a fixed rate. In the industrial field he set up many factories for the manufacture of sugar and the distillation of rum. A tannery was set up at Rosetta to supply belts, boots and saddles for the army. Mills were built for the manufacture of cotton cloth. Under Muḥammad ‘Alī, Egypt was fast becoming a socialist state. But most of these activities were premature. The state had neither the required amount of capital nor the necessary number of technicians and experts at its disposal. The more elaborate factories were a failure. The machinery was neglected, the running parts left unoiled, the management ignorant and careless.

Muḥammad ‘Alī’s great success lies in the field of modernising education. The introduction of European methods of military organisation and training demanded officers capable of studying European military science, engineering, mathematics. Soon schools arose for training officers to the five branches of military service—the artillery, engineers, cavalry, infantry and marine—under European direction. A number of young Egyptians were sent to France and a few to England. The fruits were seen in 1833 when a polytechnic school was established. This expansion was followed up by the establishment of several primary schools, with two large “preparatory” schools.

Muḥammad ‘Alī was followed by ‘Abbās who put an end to the system of commercial monopolies. His successor Saʿīd Pāša granted Count Ferdinand de Lesseps a concession for the construction of Suez Canal. Lord Palmerston was opposed to the project and his opposition delayed the ratification of the concession by the Sultan of Turkey for two years. The American Civil War having raised the price of Egyptian cotton, Ismāʿīl, the successor of Saʿīd, and the Egyptian landlords took to cotton-growing. This had far-reaching effect on the economic development of Egypt
because henceforward Egyptian economy became dependent on world economic conditions and Egypt was no longer self-sufficient in food. 'Ismā'īl's great achievements lay in the constitutional field. He succeeded in obtaining from the Sultan for his dynasty a direct succession on the European model. The Sultan also conferred on him the Persian title of "Khedive." In 1873 he was given complete independence in administration and legislation. His powers of increasing the army, of concluding non-political treaties with foreign powers and of accepting foreign loans was recognised. Ismā'īl continued the work of developing his country on modern lines. He established new canal irrigation from the Nile. He also developed the sugar industry and built docks and harbours for commerce as well as new railways and telegraph lines. He raised the level of national education by increasing state-supported schools and opened the first girls' school in Egypt and a school of medicine in addition to a military academy.

But the funds required for these public works raised taxation to an abnormal level. At the same time money was recklessly spent in extending the Khedive's dominions in the Sudan and in futile conflicts with Abyssinia. The result was that Ismā'īl borrowed extensively from the European financiers and when he was unable to pay his debts, he had to accept the dual financial control of the British and the French. In 1878 Ismā'īl accepted, in lieu of the dual control, a constitutional ministry which included an English and a French minister. But soon he got rid of his Cabinet by means of a secretly organised riot in Cairo and reverted to his autocratic ways. England and France appealed to the Sultan of Turkey and Ismā'īl was deposed by the latter in favour of his son, Tewfīq.

Tewfīq had to accept many restrictions on his financial sovereignty by the European Commission which had been established for the settlement of debts. When the Commission effected a reduction in the army, the opposition of the army was aroused. But they were prevented from united action by their division into a Turkish and an Egyptian party. From the time of 'Muḥammad 'Alī on, numerous Turks still remained in dominant positions in the army. But now a native Egyptian,
'Arābī, the son of a fellāḥ came forward as the leader of a national movement, which represented the interests of the fellāḥs against the great land-holders of Turkish origin. Under pressure from the National Party, 'Arābī was promoted to the rank of a Cabinet Minister. The National Movement now turned against the foreign exploiters and financial interests, and 'Arābī Pāsha headed a rising against the British and the French. The British forces at once intervened and defeated the Egyptian national leader in the battle of Tell-al-Kabīr in 1882. Egyptian National Movement suffered a serious reverse and Britain assumed full control of the finances and the supreme command of the Egyptian army, in addition to which a permanent British garrison remained in the country. Like the resident at the side of the native rulers of India, in Egypt the British Consul-General, Lord Cromer, stood beside the Khedive as the real ruler of the country.

When Cromer took over Egypt, there was a deep feeling of unrest in Egypt. The introduction of English officials and English influence into all administrative departments was resented by the native officials and the action of irrigation officers in preventing the customary abuses of the distribution of water was resented by great land-owners. Even the fellāḥīn were discontented for the defeat of 'Arābī had enabled the Christian money-lenders to return and insist on the payment of claims. But the British administration was anxious to improve the distressing condition of the fellāḥīn (peasantry). They began by outlawing the practice of flogging which the native Egyptian tax-collectors adopted against those in arrear. The British also abolished the forced labour which was incumbent on the fellāḥīn in cleaning out the canals for the overflow from the Nile. In spite of many reforms, however, the tax burden on Egypt was enormous, since it had to pay the expenses of British occupation in addition to the expenses of its own internal administration. The British tried to achieve greater productivity by pushing forth the cotton production of Egypt. British hydraulic engineers built prodigious dam structures to make possible an irrigation system independent of the hazards of weather. However, such
efforts made no appreciable difference in the economic condition of the people. The Egyptians remained discontented particularly because the foreigners remained in their privileged position and controlled the economic life of the country. Cromer's administration did almost nothing to promote the education of the people, while extensive funds were applied to installations which benefited the imperial interests of Britain.

In 1892 Tewfīq was followed by his son, Khedive ʿAbbas Ḥilmi. The young Khedive aspired to liberate himself from British control and secretly encouraged the nationalist and anti-British agitation in the press. However, the first tendencies towards the formation of a national will did not arise from the Khedive, but from a representative of the bourgeoisie stratum called into being by the British administration. To this belonged Muṣṭafā Kāmil, the son of an Egyptian engineer. Japanese victory over Russia gave further confidence to the nationalist forces. In 1906 occurred the Dinshaway incident. Some British officers at a pigeon shoot in the delta shot a woman, the indignant fellāḥ fell upon them and one of them lost his life. As a result of Nationalist agitation over this issue which filled the Egyptian press and poetry for a long time, Cromer was recalled and replaced by Sir Elgin Gorst. Since Gorst at first attempted to win over the Khedive against the nationalists, Muṣṭafā Kāmil turned against him too and in 1907 convoked a national congress of 1,017 representatives who elected him chairman for life. Muṣṭafā Kāmil's party, however, declined after his death. But he had laid the basis for a hard case of Egyptian nationalism.

During the regime of Lord Kitchener (1911-1914), many reforms were undertaken. The peasantry was given a measure of protection against the money-lenders and the reform of the Waqf department was pushed through. A single Legislative Assembly was constituted in lieu of the two former bodies, but it remained only a consultative and deliberative body. Saʿād Zāghlūl Pāshā, who was now the acknowledged leader of the Nationalists, was elected Vice-President of the new Legislative Assembly. At the commencement of the war the British
Penetration of the West

Government declared Egypt to be a British protectorate. The withdrawal of the British officials, during the war, for service elsewhere opened a wider field for Nationalist propaganda. A dissatisfied civil service regarded the growing number of British officials as a bar to promotion and the Nationalists' ranks were reinforced by the students whose prospects of obtaining state employment were diminished by foreign competition. The principles formulated by President Wilson towards the close of the world war had a far-reaching effect on educated opinion in Egypt. Numerous statements by British statesmen that their country had no intention to occupy Egypt permanently were recalled and the acceptance of the principle of self-determination was cited as having given international sanction to the Egyptian aspirations for complete freedom. When in November 1918 an Anglo-French declaration announced that the Allies contemplated the enfranchisement of the peoples subject to Turkey, the Egyptians regarded their title to manage their affairs to be even stronger than that of Syria and 'Iraq. Zāghlul asked permission to present in London the Egyptian case for full independence. But his request was not accepted. Ultimately a Wafḍ or Nationalist delegation was formed on a democratic basis to represent the Egyptian case in London. The Wafḍ movement had become so serious now that Martial Law was declared and Zāghlul with his three principal supporters was arrested. There were spontaneous outbreaks against the foreign government in Egypt and, as a result of the serious situation, the British Government decided to send the Milner Mission to enquire into the causes of the disorder. After Lord Milner had submitted his report, an Egyptian delegation under 'Adly Pasha proceeded to London to demand the abolition of the protectorate. In February 1922 the British Government agreed to Egypt's independence but it reserved to itself the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt, the defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression and interference, the protection of foreign residents in Egypt and the protection of the minorities. These arrangements lasted till August 1936 when the Cabinet of Naḥās Pasha negotiated a new treaty with Britain which terminated the British occupation of
Egypt and made complete independence of the country definite. All British officials in Egyptian service were to be withdrawn, British forces were to remain in the Suez Zone only until a fully modernised Egyptian army was built up. Finally in October 1954 a new agreement was signed with Britain providing for the withdrawal of all British troops, within twenty months, from the Suez Canal area, but the agreement also laid down that British troops would immediately reoccupy the Suez Zone in the event of an attack on Egypt, any other member state of the Arab League, or Turkey.

The most important event in the history of modern Egypt occurred on July 23, 1952, when a few military officers ousted King Faruq and proclaimed a republic some month later. For many years, power in Egypt had been divided between the British, the Palace and the Wafd (Nationalist Party). The new rulers suspended the constitution, dissolved the old political parties and built up a Liberation Rally as a new supra-party machine.

The original coup was planned and executed by Jamāl ʿAbdul Naṣīr. His leader during the early period was Najib. But now Najib has disappeared as a factor, and the country is ruled by Naṣir. During the past centuries Egypt was uninterrupted ruled by foreigners. Egyptian ruling class even in the last 150 years has been largely alien. If a man rises to be something out of the ordinary, it is assumed that he must be a foreigner. But Naṣir is a pure Egyptian, so that the present Egyptian regime is fully native.

Egypt derives importance from its geographical position as a bridge between three continents, its command of eastern Mediterranean and control of the main sea route from Europe to India and the Far East. Cotton is the most important source of revenue. Egypt produces the finest long-staple cotton in the world and gets not less than four-fifths of its foreign exchange from it. Few countries have such a vulnerable economy.

"The Nasser regime," writes John Gunther,1 "wants, if possible, to broaden the basis of the economy and make it less

critically dependent on one export crop. For instance, a big petroleum-hunt is going on. Nasser wants above all to bridge the yawning, desolate gap in Egypt between rich and poor. But the government cannot begin to share the wealth on any extensive scale until new wealth is created . . . .

"The living standards of the average Egyptian village are probably lower than anywhere else in the civilized world. The average income throughout the country is £31 per year. Eighty-five per cent of the population is altogether landless. Contrast with this the fact that 2,000 rich Pashas own no fewer than 1,200,000 acres; that 36 per cent of all cultivable land is in the hands of one per cent of the population.

"Make more land. Make fewer people. Either of these solutions would alleviate the problem, but neither is easy. The desert is difficult to irrigate and the rank and file of the Egyptians are not educated enough to understand the necessity of birth control.

"When Nasser and Neguib reached power, they tackled the land distribution problem at once. It is too early to estimate the achievements. In principle the big estates are to be broken up and all individual holdings limited to 200 acres." ¹

SYRIA AND PALESTINE

We have seen that Ibrāhīm had occupied Syria during the lifetime of his father, Muḥammad ʿAlī of Egypt. From 1833 to 1840 Greater Syria (which includes Palestine) and a large part of Anatolia were directly governed by Ibrāhīm Paşa as part of Muḥammad ʿAlī’s Egyptian Empire. "Policy, but not liberalism, induced Ibrahim to abolish all distinctions between religious sects; local feuds were put down by his strong arm; robbers disappeared. But the expenses of the administration were enormous; the taxes were raised; the hated conscription was enforced . . . .

¹. While this book is in the press, Naṣir has taken the boldest step of his life by nationalising the Sūèz Canal. The whole Muslim world, including the people of Pakistan, has lent spontaneous support to this step, but the result is still in doubt.
and it was not long before Mohammed Ali introduced Syria to the crushing system of monopoly. . . . Several small towns and villages rebelled."  

The growing interest of the European nations in Syria as a strategically important area, however, soon caused the loss of Syria to Muḥammad 'Alī. After protracted negotiations, Russia, Prussia, Austria and Great Britain came to an agreement with the Ottoman Empire in 1840 that Egypt was to be conferred on Muḥammad 'Alī as a Pāšālik and Southern Syria (Palestine), while the rest of Syria and occupied Anatolia was to remain in the Ottoman Empire. Muḥammad 'Alī having refused the offer, the European powers forcibly expelled the Egyptians from Syria. Syria was now left to the tribesmen except for the walled towns and larger villages where the Ottoman government re-established itself.

It is at this period that Western influences began to spread in Syria. "The reception of Western civilization was helped by the emigration of many thousands of Syrians to other countries. In general they came more often from Lebanon than from other regions and they were more often Christians than Moslems.

"There were two main roads of emigration. The one led to Egypt and the Sudan and, to a lesser extent, the other Arabic-speaking countries. This road had always been open, but it was rendered more active by the establishment of British control over Egypt and Sudan. . . .

"The Syrian-Egyptians are numbered in tens of thousands but those who have followed the other road, to North and South America, to Australia and to others of the more distant parts of the world, must be counted in hundreds of thousands."  

One of the consequences of this emigration was the introduction of new ideas and new ways of life. "Western influences also came by way of education. Students began to go abroad, to seek new learning in the schools of England and America; and Western schools became ever more numerous in the Near East. The

greater number of them were established and maintained by foreign missionary institutions. Jesuit and other Catholic schools had existed since the seventeenth century; but it was only in the eighteen-thirties that conditions arose in which their numbers and influence could increase; and it was during the same decade that American Protestant schools became important.”¹ In 1806 an institution was established which subsequently became the American University of Beyrūt.

Around the missionary schools in Beyrūt gathered a group of Syrian writers, most of them Christians, who set themselves to evolve a modern Arabic idiom and style suitable for the expression of Western ideas, and to use the instrument thus created to familiarise the Arabs with the civilisation of Europe and to render them conscious of their own problems. At the same time another group was being created in Cairo by means of the schools, educational missions, and translations initiated or encouraged by Mūḥammad ʿAlī and his successors; similar to the Beyrūt group in many ways, it differed from it by a greater concern with the question of ʿIslām and modern civilisation and a greater caution in accepting Western ideas.

ARAB NATIONALISM

Arab political consciousness began in opposition to the autocratic rule of Sulṭān ʿAbdul Ḥamīd. The ideas of political association and public opinion did not filter into the Ottoman Empire until the second half of the nineteenth century; and throughout the century police measures and an exceedingly strict consorship made political organisation practically impossible. But not all ʿAbdul Ḥamīd’s repressive policy could prevent the infiltration in one way or another of Western political concepts: democracy, responsible government, the party system, freedom of expression. Nor could it prevent the development of a daily and periodical press in Arabic.

Broadly, there were two movements in Syria. One was the

¹ Hourani, A.H., Syria and Lebanon, Oxford University Press 1946, pp. 35-36.
movement, as throughout the Empire, for the limitation of the Sulṭān’s authority and the restoration of the democratic constitution of 1876; this was the programme of the Young Turks, organised in the “Committee of Union and Progress.” The other was the movement for Arab national unity and self-government. After the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the two movements diverged completely from each other as the Arabs realised that the Young Turks’ regime was no more sympathetic to the Arab national aspirations than that of ʿAbdul Ḥamīd. From 1908 there began to appear many Arab political societies. At first they were public and aimed only at administrative reforms and decentralisation within the Ottoman Empire. But after a time secret societies were formed with complete independence for the Arab provinces as their aim. The most important of them were “al-Fatāṭ” founded in 1911 by a group of students in Paris and “al-‘Aḥd” founded in 1914 and consisting almost entirely of army officers, mainly from ʿIrāq. In 1913 a congress of Arab nationalists was held in Paris, the majority of the delegates being Syrians and Lebanese and half were Christians.

The opening of the first world war found a number of governments and groups who were divided in their ideas about Arab independence. Some aimed at establishing an independent Arab State, others a self-governing Arab kingdom within an Ottoman Federation, yet others a Syrian State loosely linked with other Arabic-speaking regions. Arab nationalist societies in Syria like “al-Fatāṭ” were in touch with Arab nationalists in other Arabic-speaking countries: with ʿIrāqī officers of “al-‘Aḥd”; with the powerful Syrian colonies of Egypt and America; with Sharīf Ḥusayn the ruler, under Turkish suzerainty, of Muslim holy places in Ḥedjāz; and with Ibn Saʿūd, the powerful ruler of Najd.

NON-ARB INTERESTS

There also existed a particularist movement among the Lebanese Christians. They wished the autonomy of Lebanon to be completed and its frontiers extended; they looked to France for help in achieving their aims. Of external powers, France was the most interested in Syria. She had investments,
Christian missions and schools in the country and a traditional connection with the Catholics. In addition, she believed that a foothold in the Levant would strengthen her position in Mediterranean. Great Britain wanted to control the port of Haifa and could not permit the establishment of an unfriendly power on the eastern side of the Suez Canal. The Indian Government wished to use 'Irāq as an outpost for the defence of the Persian oil-fields. Great Britain was also concerned in the recently formed Turkish Petroleum Company which had obtained a concession covering Moṣul and Baghdād, and Syria was the country through which oil was to flow to the Mediterranean.

Then there were the Zionist Jews who wanted to build up a strong Jewish community in Palestine. Some of them, called Practical Zionists, hoped to create the community by direct means; immigration and the purchase of agricultural settlements. But there was another group, the Political Zionists, which wanted the proposed Jewish community in Palestine to have a definite political status and a guarantee. The founder of organised Zionism, Theodore Herzl, having failed to obtain a guarantee and political status for the Jews in Palestine, turned to the European powers.

In 1915 the Damascus protocol was drawn up by Arab Nationalists. It asked for the British recognition of an independent Arab State to include the whole of geographical Syria and 'Irāq. The ideals of the protocol were adopted in the secret correspondence between Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī, Ṣhaṭīf of Mecca, and Sir Henry MacMahon, the British High Commissioner of Egypt, stating the conditions on which Arabs would undertake an armed revolt against Turkey. There was to be Arab independence in a very large area but in Syria there were to be two exceptions, the districts of Mersin and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo. These were the regions mainly inhabited by the Druzes and the Maronite Christians in which French interests were strong and which was later to constitute the independent state of Lebanon. As to whether Palestine could be included in this vague exception, opinions
have differed, the British government holding that Palestine could be excepted and the Arabs maintaining a contrary opinion.

While the Arabs were being given assurances in respect of their independence, a secret agreement—the Sykes-Picot Agreement—was concluded between Britain and France in 1916. This Agreement differed greatly from that which had been concluded with Şarîf Ḥusayn of Mecca. It provided for the division of the Fertile Crescent into a number of zones. In the interior of Syria and the vilâyet of Moşul an Arab independent state was to be formed. In part of this region, including what is now Transjordan, Great Britain was to have rights of priority. In the remainder, France was to have similar rights. In coastal Syria, France was to be at liberty to establish any direct or indirect administration. In the vilayets of Baghdād and Başra Great Britain was to have similar rights. In what is now Palestine, an international administration was to be established. Negotiations had also been proceeding between the Zionist organisations and the British government. They resulted in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 through which the British government pledged itself to create in Palestine a national home for the Jews.

The Arab revolt against Turkey was led by Fayṣal, son of Şarîf Ḥusayn of Mecca. Ḥusayn was recognised as King of Ḥedjâz (1916) but he was unable to carry his claims to other Arab lands. Fayṣal, after an unsuccessful attempt to establish himself at Damascus as King of Syria, became with the British help King of ʿIrāq in 1921. There he was successful in gaining full independence for his country and having the British mandate over ʿIrāq terminated in 1932. The Syrians were less successful. Their country was put under a French mandate and was divided into a predominantly Christian Lebanese republic in the coastal district and a predominantly Muslim hinterland. The independence of these two states (Syria and Lebanon) was achieved only after 1941. Meanwhile Fayṣal's elder brother, ʿAbdulla b. Ḥusayn, who had claimed the Syrian throne after Fayṣal's defeat, had become the ruler of Transjordan under British mandate. With the proclamation
of the independence of Transjordan in 1946, 'Abdulla assumed the title of King and became the senior member of "Hashimite" family of Sharif Husayn of Mecca. In 1949 the name Transjordan was changed officially to the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan. In July 1951 'Abdulla was killed by an Arab assassin.

Husayn ibn 'Ali himself lost his kingdom in 1925 to Ibn Saud who at the head of his Wahabis created in 1932 a unified Arabian peninsula from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea and assumed the title of King of Saudi Arabia. For the first time in over a thousand years the desert obeyed a unified rule which assured and protected commerce. Ibn Saud set out to settle the nomadic population and to modernise the medieval living conditions, a necessarily slow and hard task in which he is helped by royalties derived from American companies.

The Arabs of Palestine were bitterly disappointed with the peace settlement of 1919. Even Sharif Husayn of Mecca regarded Palestine as part of the Arab independent state he hoped for. But at the San Remo Conference (1922) the British Government received Palestine as a mandated territory under the supervision of the League of Nations, and there was no more talk of an international administration as envisaged in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The British Government immediately promulgated a constitution for Palestine in which the British High Commissioner was given almost absolute powers. He could freely dispose of state lands, minerals, treasures, etc., and appoint and dismiss officials. He was to have at his side a legislative council of ten officials and twelve elected members. English, Arabic and Hebrew were to be recognised as official languages. Questions of Jewish immigration were to be decided by a committee of eleven members drawn from the legislative council and differences of opinion between the committee and the High Commissioner were to be decided by the British Foreign Secretary. The constitution at once aroused fears among both the Christian and Muslim Arabs that their political and economic condition was threatened by Jewish immigration, particularly as the first British High Commissioner was a Jew. And in fact Jewish capitalists succeeded in procuring hitherto fallow lands from great Arab landlords, many
of whom lived outside the country, and established Jewish colonies in them. In the cities, particularly in the new foundation of Tel Aviv, Jewish capital created flourishing industries and attracted more and more commerce. The economic prosperity of Palestine greatly increased with the expanding Jewish immigration and the formation of Jewish industries, but the Arabs did not benefit from it.

Differences among the Muslims and Christians prevented the unity of Palestinian Arabs for some time. But an Arab Congress convened in 1928 demanded the creation of a popularly elected representative body. The Jews opposed the proposal and the British Government followed their wishes.

The high tide of Jewish immigration from Germany, which began in 1933 and which swelled to 61,541 in 1935, called forth a violent reaction among the Arabs. The leader of the Muslim Arabs, Mufti al-Ḥusaynī, gained increased influence. A regular civil war developed between the Arabs and the Jews. From 1935 on, Arab volunteers organised themselves to win for the Arabs the right of self-determination. In 1936 Britian sent a Royal Commission in Palestine to investigate into the situation. The Commission in its report of July 1937 proposed the partition of Palestine into three independent states, a Jewish one which would have included 300,000 Arabs, an Arab one and a British mandated state comprising the holy cities of Palestine. The Arabs burst into a storm of indignation, while the British Government remained unconvinced about the feasibility of partition. A conference was called by the British Government in London in 1939 over the Palestine question. The Mufti of Jerusalem, who had escaped to Beyrūṭ before a threat of arrest, did not take part. Syria, ʻIrāq, Egypt and Saʿūdī Arabia were also represented in it. But the Arabs refused to meet with the Jewish delegates and the conference remained inconclusive.

During the second world war, a large number of Jews escaped from Germany and began to flood Palestine. The British Government could not allow Jews in such large numbers to settle in Palestine and reduce the Arabs to a minority. It, therefore, decided to turn them back or transfer them to Cyprus or
Mauritius. This decision met with violent protests from the Jews and acts of terrorism. The Jews, however, got immense support from America, where in the Baltimore Programme the Jews demanded that Palestine should be a Jewish Commonwealth, a Jewish army should be created and unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine should be permitted. When Germany surrendered, the Zionists turned their attention to the Jews in Europe who had escaped Nazi extermination. They demanded that the gates of Palestine should be thrown open to the displaced Jews as a matter of course.

"Support to the extremist attitude was given by the acceptance of the Baltimore Programme by both candidates for the United States Presidency in 1944; by the request addressed to H. M. Government by President Truman that one hundred thousand Jews should be admitted to Palestine; and by the victory of the Labour Party (in Britain), which had always been particularly sympathetic towards the Jewish National Home." ¹

A new approach was made in the form of an enquiry by an Anglo-American Committee which recommended that one hundred thousand Jews should be admitted immediately, as far as possible in 1946. The President of the United States, before anyone had time to study the report of the Committee as a whole, lent vigorous support to the proposal. The British Government, however, wished to know to what extent the United States would be willing to share the additional financial and military responsibilities that would be involved. British experts and an American committee then held conversations in London and produced a plan for a federal Palestine with autonomous Jewish and Arab provinces. The plan, however, was unacceptable to either party. Thereupon the British Government in 1947 referred the Palestine problem to the United Nations. A special committee of the United Nations agreed unanimously in August 1947 that the British mandate should terminate as soon as possible. A majority favoured a partition scheme, while a minority recommended a Federal State.

At this time the British Government announced that it would withdraw from Palestine by mid-May 1948. As soon as the British withdrawal began, a war broke out between the Jews, who proclaimed the establishment of the new State of Israel, and the Arab States.

"After all the promises and expectations of the Palestinian Arabs, the Arab States put into field four armies with no central command, no concerted aim, insufficient stocks of arms and ammunition and no serious and sustained will to win, to face the united ability of Israelis who had proceeded with a total mobilization of their man and woman power on modern lines.

"In spite of the efforts of the United Nations to deal with the situation which was far more serious than they had anticipated, open war was waged on and off for three months. The first United Nations' Truce, from 10 June to 9 July, though it came as a timely relief to 100,000 Jews besieged in Jerusalem, also allowed Israeli agents time to recruit men and armaments, despite the United Nations' arms embargo, to an extent out of all proportion to that managed by the Arab States. Israel's advantage became quickly obvious after the renewal of fighting in July 1948, when areas outside the Jewish State under the November 1947 partition scheme, such as Lydda, Ramleh, and Nazareth, fell to Jewish arms."\(^1\)

It is clear from the above that the whole drama of Palestine was pre-arranged by interested powers and the Jewish State of Israel was foisted on the Muslims of the Middle East by a pre-planned strategy in which the Jews received every conceivable help from outside powers, while all possible impediments were thrown across the Arabs' path. But the Arabs cannot be exonerated. Their own economic and educational backwardness and the rivalries and jealousies among the Arab States made possible the success of international intrigues.

\(\text{IRAQ}\)

"Iraq, which was the first to rise to the dignity of an inde-

pendent Arab State, had led a sort of separate existence within the Ottoman Empire for centuries. The Turkish administration here, as in Egypt, had never fully mastered the difficult conditions; at times the Mamluks (slaves) had wrested the power for themselves, as in Egypt. The Bedouin tribes along the lower Euphrates had banded together around the middle of the eighteenth century, under the name of Muntafiq, into a confederation which gave the Pasha of Baghdad a great deal of trouble. The Shi’ites, settled around the holy cities of Najaf, Kerbala, and Kazimain, were constantly in close touch with their fellow-believers in Persia, and it was only with reluctance that they considered themselves subjects of the heretical Sultan. Intellectual life was very backward among the Sunnites down to the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus the conditions for the development of Arab national feeling were far more unfavourable here than in Syria. Only the officers and functionaries who had received their training in Istanbul came into conflict there with modern ideas; some officers had also been won over while in Syrian garrisons by representatives of the ‘Ahd, and after returning to their homeland founded a few branches there.”

During the first world war Arab leadership devolved on Sharif Ḥusayn of Mecca. His third son, Fayṣal played the leading role as the champion of Arab cause. In 1918 he captured Damascus. He was sent to Paris to plead the Arab cause in the Peace Conference. He presented the Arab and Syrian claim for independence, but the secret agreements of the great powers ruined his cause. He returned to Syria and declared to his people that “Complete independence is never given: it is always taken.” This attitude led to a quarrel with France, for neither Fayṣal nor France were prepared to share authority over Syria. The result was that he lost the throne of Damascus.

The British now suggested that he should accede to the throne of Ḥiṣb, but he would not accept it unless it was offered to him by the Ḥiṣbīs themselves. Fayṣal, moreover, was not

prepared to accept the new throne under a mandate. Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary, promised Fayṣal that Britain’s relations with ‘Irāq would be governed by a treaty of alliance. In this way, Fayṣal not only obtained a new throne for himself but also won for ‘Irāq more advantageous terms from Great Britain. The treaty proposed in 1921 was not acceptable to ‘Irāqī nationalists, but Fayṣal was not prepared to conflict with Britain, as he had done with France in Syria. He followed a moderate policy of taking what was given and asking for more. Since the ‘Irāqī nationalists were not prepared to accept any plan short of complete independence and the abrogation of the Mandate, the treaty was revised in 1923 by a Protocol and in 1926 and 1927 it was replaced by other treaties. However, in 1930 ‘Irāq was given complete independence subject to the imperial interests of Great Britain and was admitted as a member of the League of Nations.

In 1925 the Moṣul dispute with Turkey was peaceably settled. The League of Nations had appointed a Commission of Inquiry which found that economic considerations, on the whole, bound Moṣul to ‘Irāq. The Commission admitted that the bulk of the inhabitants of Moṣul favoured inclusion in ‘Irāq rather than return to Turkey. It recommended, therefore, that the Moṣul province should be united with ‘Irāq, subject to the condition that ‘Irāq should remain under Mandate for twenty-five years and that the racial distinctness of the Kurds should be recognised by the official use of their own language and by the employment of Kurds as administrators, judges and teachers. The decision was implemented in ‘Irāq with great speed. Instructions were issued to carry out the policy of distinguishing Kurdish from Arab areas by the appointment of Kurdish officials in all departments.

The six years which followed the beginning of parliamentary government in ‘Irāq and the settlement of the Moṣul question justified optimism for the future. “Foreign control was progressively reduced, then formally extinguished. Non-Iraqi staffs diminished in numbers and function, and the ‘peculiar situation’ of diarchic rule, as it was accused of being, came to an end. Judicial privileges for foreigners ceased, with Courts and Pro-
Penetration of the West

cedures equal for all. Iraq's international status, already raised by the publicity given to and the outcome of the Mosul controversy, was enhanced by the debates at Geneva, which concerned the country, and by its admission to the League. With its important neighbours, Turkey and Persia, it achieved normal relations: with the Arab world it greatly increased its contacts. Its communications by land and air to foreign lands developed beyond all precedent. The problems presented by the minority communities within Iraq remained, it was true, essentially unsolved; but they changed in character and could offer, to an optimism which the future did not justify, grounds for the hope of peaceful solution. The same is true of the powerful Shi'i block of Euphrates tribesmen. It was clear during these years that tribal resentment at the obligations of orderly government was not extinct, and that instigation to tribal insurrection—most dangerous of weapons—could become a political manoeuvre; but these were less features of this period than of the preceding years. Meanwhile, the means of dealing with tribal unrest were further developed in the form of roads, bridges, organized forces and a closer administrative network. The Army grew and improved, though the puzzling question of compulsory service in it was unsolved. Serious attempts were made to deal with taxation questions, a national currency was planned, the Public Debt substantially liquidated. Land settlement procedures on modern lines were by 1932 on the point of establishment, while a great expansion of pump irrigation transformed the riverain countryside. These progressive features did not prevent the heavy affliction of Iraqi economy by the world crisis of 1929-31, nor halt the steady diminution of the important Persian transit trade; still less did they correct those unfavourable, indeed, menacing features of Iraqi public life which were already apparent, and were henceforth to be prevalent: short-lived cabinets of warring personalities, futile and ephemeral parties, manipulated elections, and unrepresentative parliaments obedient to (because chosen by) the Government of the moment."

In contemporary 'Iraq modernisation is confined to the urban middle and lower middle classes. The poor still live in their old ways. Resistance to the emancipation of women is decreasing and in many classes the veil has been discarded. The immense increase in mobility and travel for all but the poorest has had strong social and psychological effects in modifying the old parochialism and encouraging wider interests.

ARABS AND THE WESTERN CIVILISATION

In the past century or more, the Arab world has been shaken to its foundations by the impact of the West, a phenomenon which is observable in all parts of the Muslim world. Western ideas have changed at least the externals of life. The competition of Western goods has broken the old crafts and opened new economic possibilities. New means of communication are breaking off the closed local community. The administrative machinery which the modern government commands and the extension of the limits of its action are making the old feudal and sectarian organisation unnecessary and even impossible.

The transformation of the old life has brought with it a number of difficulties and dangers. The Arabs, like other peoples in their position, are torn between two ways of life. Sentiment, tradition and the belief that there is something of value in their tradition make them unwilling to break entirely with the old civilisation, even if that were possible.

"It may be that the difficulties will so press upon the Arabs that they will accept self-division as inevitable and give up the attempt to reconcile the new and the old. If that happens, they will become Levantines.

"To be a Levantine is to live in two worlds or more at once, without belonging to either; to be able to go through the external forms which indicate the possession of a certain nationality, religion or culture, without actually possessing it. It is no longer to have a standard of one's own values, not to be able to create but only able to imitate; and so not even to imitate correctly, since that also needs a certain originality. It is to belong to no
community and to possess nothing of one's own.'"\(^1\)

One of the reactions to the impact of the West was to avert one's gaze from the possibilities of the new world and to regard it simply as a hostile force to be resisted. This was the approach of the Wahābīs, but it died out. There were others who were so intoxicated with the splendour of the West that they were prepared to give up all faith in the destiny of Islam and to become uncritically Westernised, as the Turks, under Kâmil, did. But the greater number of Arabs thoughtfully refused to go to either extreme. They realised that there is much that is good in Western civilisation, but they also saw the pitfalls and dangers in the Western mode of life.

The problem thus raised has produced diverse approaches. There are some who claim that what is necessary is not so much a regeneration of the spirit and thought of Islam as an effort to unify and direct the efforts of the Islamic world against Western political penetration. They wish to accept only the externals of Western civilisation, the sources of its economic, and military strength. This was the doctrine of the pan-Islamic movement originated by Jamāluddīn Aflāḥī. There are other movements whose exponents see the necessity not simply for political action, but for a revival of the religious life of Islam, and who believe that Islam is capable of producing such revival out of its own resources. This is the attitude of the Wahābīs.

"But there are other movements which, while not belittling the need for a revival of piety and devotional life, believe also in the necessity for a reconsideration and restatement of Islamic doctrine and for a revision of Islamic jurisprudence; .... The movement originated by Sheikh Mohammed 'Abdū in Egypt, and sometimes called the Islamic Modernist Movement, was in one of its aspects an attempt to respond to the need for a restatement of Islamic doctrine .... But as a movement of thought its effectiveness has been limited by two factors. On the one hand, its knowledge and understanding of Western

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culture are defective; it has been too exclusively concerned with modern science or at least the nineteenth-century 'Scientificism'; and it has not attempted to arrive at a profound understanding of the basic elements in Western thought, Greek philosophy and Christian theology. On the other hand, it has at times been much concerned with polemics, with showing that Islam has something to offer to the world, and that its doctrine is more fully in accordance with the discoveries of modern science than is that of Christianity; it has in consequence lacked the intellectual objectivity which is necessary for constructive thought.'

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Most of the countries of the Middle East have but recently emerged from colonial status. In all of them, the practice of democracy is still in its early stages and leaves much to be desired. Government administration is generally inefficient and corruption in administrative and political affairs is prevalent. The standard of living of the people is generally low. A small minority of rich land-owners and business men, however, are very wealthy and live amidst luxury and moral corruption. The labouring masses of town and country are very poor and ignorant. The middle class is small and weak and consists of salaried business employees and technicians, government officials of the lower grades and members of the liberal professions.

The economy of the Middle Eastern countries is semi-feudal, productivity is low and per capita income is small. In agriculture, the system of land tenure does not allow production to increase because of the lack of incentive for greater efficiency and for capital investment. The peasants are mostly share tenants cultivating the lands of the absentee landlords. The share tenant has no security of tenure on the same plot of land. He is not certain of keeping the land and receiving the fruits of any improvements he might be able to make by greater exertions or by investment of his savings. But even if he is allowed to retain

the same plot of land, there is little incentive for him to increase production since he does not get the full reward of his efforts inasmuch as the landlord would receive his share of any increase in production. In any case, his share of the crop is so small that he is unable to save and invest in improving the land. The peasant, therefore, has neither the ability nor the incentive to increase production from the land.

Consequently, methods of cultivation are generally primitive and in most areas agricultural implements have not been improved for centuries. There is little agricultural machinery in use and scientific agriculture is almost unknown. In general, technology is at an extremely low level and far behind the advanced technologies of the industrialised nations. On the other hand, there is small hope that the landlords will initiate progressive developments in agriculture. The large semi-feudal landowners are satisfied with their share of the products which yields them considerable income without effort and enables them to live an urban life of luxury and idleness. Traditionally, the semi-feudal landlords are lazy and self-satisfied as well as reactionary in their social and political outlook. They are the supporters of the established order and resist any changes which threaten their position. They take part in politics with the purpose of maintaining their position of wealth and social domination. The dependence of the peasant on the landlord is complete. He cannot make a living other than to remain on the land and be subservient to his master. He is frequently indebted to the latter, or to the grain merchant who cooperates with him. Further, he is also socially and politically dependent on his master. Whenever any problem arises which requires intervention with the government administration or the courts, it can only be settled with the landlord’s help or through his influence. During the elections, the peasants vote for their landlord or for candidates supported by him. They dare not vote against him since the secrecy of the ballot is not assured in practice.

The under-developed state of agriculture in the countries of the Middle East sets limits to their capacity for industrialisation. Because of the low purchasing power of the rural population and
the limited market for manufactured goods, there is little scope for large-scale low-cost manufacturing enterprises capable of competing against the products of the industrialised nations. It may be possible to develop some manufacturing industries with the help of tariff protection, but efficient and competitive industries can arise only with a large market to make possible mechanised, low-cost, large-scale production. But the extent of the market in the Middle East is limited, on the one hand, by the relatively small population of countries separated by tariff barriers, and, on the other hand, by the low purchasing power of the majority of the population. The development of industry is also hampered by the insufficiency of capital for investment resulting from the low income of the people and their limited ability to save.

"The establishment of independent national governments is not enough," says a writer on the Middle East. "It is necessary that such governments be truly democratic and representatives of the people. However, reform cannot be effected where, as a result of semi-feudal social structure, governments are controlled by reactionary forces whose interests are threatened by social progress and enlightenment. The basic problem is one of education, by which the emancipation of the people can be gradually achieved. But the reactionary semi-feudal forces in control of the government are generally in opposition to educational programmes and movements which threaten to do away with their authority over the people."

A big factor in the future economy of the Middle East is the steadying expansion of oil production. In the eight years 1938-46, the oil output from the Middle East territories doubled, from 16 million to 32 million tons. Much of the Middle Eastern oil comes from Kuwait and Sa‘ūdī Arabia. The rights of exploitation of these supplies are held by a few foreign companies. The most important of the oil fields which are not as yet fully exploited lie in Bahrayn and Sa‘ūdī Arabia where exclusive rights are

owned by four American companies.

"Under present conditions," says Warriner,¹ "it seems unlikely that this new investment will be related to the general economic development of the Middle East area, for two reasons. One is that most of the new money which investment brings in the form of royalties will go into countries which have almost no other resources, the sparsely populated desert Kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia, and the tiny area of Kuwait, virtually without agriculture or industry. Much of it will doubtless be spent on direct personal consumption and it is unlikely to find its way into long-term investment in the neighbouring countries with large populations and possibilities of agricultural development. The political divisions between the territories of the Middle East thus stand in the way of long-term development; if they were economically and politically more unified, the benefits accruing to the rulers of Sa'udi Arabia and the Sheikhdoms might be spread more evenly, and lead to a long-term rise in living standards. This presupposes, however, a progressive policy on the part of the Governments concerned.

"Another reason why the expansion of oil production is not likely to stimulate general development is that since the companies are foreign all their profits will presumably be invested outside the Middle East territories. The danger is that the main mineral resources of the territories will be drained away, without contributing towards an increase in the supply of capital and the long-term investment needed to provide for a general rise in the standard of living."

ARAB UNITY

The political divisions of the Arabs following independence from Turkish rule have created many complex economic and political problems. While there is an undoubted urge among the people of the Arab States to break down their political and economic barriers, the growth of regional and local nationalism prevents the implementation of Arab unity plans. There is, for example, the

Greater Syria Scheme first sponsored by Amir 'Abdulla of Jordan. Both Syria and Jordan were agreed, in principle, on "Syrian Unity" but they radically disagreed on the form and procedure of achieving that unity. The Syrian objection arose from the fact that Jordan is bound by her treaty relations with Britain. If Jordan and Syria were completely united, the future State of Greater Syria would also be bound by the obligations of this treaty. Secondly, the Syrians objected to the monarchical form of government. The Syrians regard their own republican form of government as an immense advance on Jordan’s undemocratic form of government which makes parliament subservient to the king.

There is another scheme for the unity of Syria and Iraq. But the monarchical form of government in Iraq raises the same difficulty as in the case of the Greater Syria plan. "The rivalry between the Saudi-Egyptian and the Hashimi blocs must be given its due proportion in preventing the achievement of both the Greater Syria and the Syrio-Iraqi unity schemes. While opposition to Greater Syria by the Saudi-Egyptian bloc was justified on the grounds that Jordan, by trying to force her scheme against the wishes of the Syrians, was violating Articles of the Arab Pact, . . . the Saudi-Egyptian bloc has afforded itself freedom of intervention in the Syrio-Iraqi scheme which it denied to the Hashimi bloc. The Zionist threat, which is probably facing the Fertile Crescent more directly than Egypt and Saudi Arabia, was the chief motive which prompted Syria to contemplate joining Iraq. The intervention of the Saudi-Egyptian bloc by offering Syria support against such a threat has undoubtedly postponed, if not indefinitely prevented, the unity of the Fertile Crescent countries."¹

Another difficulty in the success of the plans for Arab unity comes from the opposition of Lebanon which joined the Arab League on the express understanding that Lebanon’s independence within her present geographical frontiers will be fully maintained.

But there are clearly great advantages in these plans for Arab unity. "Apart from the solidarity and strength that might be created against foreign threat, a general Fertile Crescent unity might also help to shift the focus of attention from inter-Arab rivalries into the more constructive and urgently needed social-economic reforms (which have received little attention) by exploiting the inner resources of the area and attracting foreign investment. A political superstructure embracing the various Fertile Crescent entities will not only eliminate the economic barriers among them but might also help to accumulate large native capital for economic development." ¹

Chapter IX

PAKISTAN, AFGHĀNISTĀN AND ĪRĀN

The Fertile Crescent Unity schemes are not matched by corresponding proposals to link up the three adjoining countries of Pakistan, Afgānīstān and Īrān. Yet the three countries have been connected throughout history by geography, culture and religion. It was only Western penetration that made each of them go its own way. Will the withdrawal of the West link up their destiny and forge them into a common unit of history? That is a question as portentous as any for the philosopher of history. But possibilities in that direction cannot be ruled out.

Geographically, West Pakistan is the connecting link between the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and the Middle East including the Tūrānian regions. The partition of India seems to be the natural culmination of a process that made this region throughout history, from Alexander and Muḥammad b. Qāsim to Bābar and Nadīr Shāh, part of the Central Asian and Middle Eastern kaleidoscope. If the present equilibrium of world forces is upset, none can foresee what will happen. But one thing is certain. Pakistan cannot escape being deeply influenced by such changes as might happen in the Middle East or Central Asia. Viewed in this perspective, all her internal problems shade off into virtual colourlessness.

The emergence of Pakistan has been variously explained as being due to religious or economic factors. All such explanations err by overlooking the interpenetration of the diverse life factors. The economic factor is also a religious and spiritual factor at the same time. On a purely economic basis, the Muslims of India would never have asked for a separate state. A socialist state or confederation such as that proposed by the Cabinet Mission would have equally well satisfied Muslim aspirations. That the
Hindus could neither build a socialistic state nor agree to the internal autonomy of the Muslim regions shows that their worldview was far from democratic and modern.

The destiny of Pakistan is thus irremediably linked with the ideals of Islam as a democratic society and order which ensures social justice to all its members. Any growth of radical secularism and political authoritarianism would cut at the roots of Pakistan, for partition would become meaningless if the Muslims are in no sense different from the Hindus in social and religious ideals. As a metaphysical idea, Islam is opposed to the rigid division between the different spheres of life. While each field may enjoy a relative independence, all departments of life are ultimately interdependent and interpenetrate into each other. Therefore the rigid separation of religion, politics and economics is not possible. It is a wrong notion that the economic system or structure of society has a determining effect on religious and spiritual ideals and values. The latter themselves, in part, determine and shape the economic conduct of man.

As regards the differences in the mental outlook of the Hindus and the Muslims, it may be stated that the Hindu mind is much more alien to the modern outlook than the Muslim. "The West," writes Percival Spear, ¹ "is world-accepting; for it, the universe is real and significant. Hindu thought is world-renouncing; for it, the universe is a dream and an illusion, the sport of the gods. Full acceptance of Western ideas of material progress and concentration upon industrial development, with its implied acceptance of the Western scientific outlook, accords ill with the doctrine of maya." As regards the Muslims, the same author says,² "The Western concept of equality finds a Muslim echo in the equality of all believers before God and their fellowship on earth.... Islamic thought, like that of the West, is world-accepting and therefore the Muslim can be as interested as the Westerner in material development without any

¹. India, Pakistan and the West, Oxford University Press 1949, p. 214.
². Ibid., pp. 215-216.
inner conflict of ideas....Hinduism is not emerging from its period of trial and conflict, but just entering upon its most acute phase. It may proceed with westernization in thought and action; it may establish itself as a great materially-minded power; but it will be at the price of a complete break with the past, at the price of ceasing to be Hindu at all."

Apart from the religious and spiritual factor, the force of culture was also operating in the direction of a new and separate Muslim State. Speaking of the Pakistan regions, Mr. Ahmad ‘Ali says: "This region, thus, has remained different from Hindusthan proper in being more Western in its influences and culture from the earliest times. That is why, perhaps, it accepted Islam more readily, the population of Muslims being much greater than that of the Hindus in contradistinction to Hindusthan; and assumed a cultural homogeneity unknown to the Hindu territories. Under the Hindus, the subcontinent never enjoyed uniformity of language, race, culture or religion. The Gonds, the Bhils and the Dravadian peoples, who were the real natives, were pushed southward by the invading Huns and Aryans and were not given any honourable place in society. The Muslims did not believe in the segregation of the peoples or racial groups and mixed freely with all, taking from them whatever was valuable, and giving to them all that was dynamic and lasting in their religion." And again, "It is primarily the Arabic, the Persian and the Turkish achievements that have gone to the making of Pakistani culture and literature. There were Hindu influences also, but they remained subservient to others, and manifested themselves only in the superficial aspects, such as the introduction of local imagery in poetry. But the main trends and the genres of verse came from Persia and Arabia. It should not be thought that Pakistani Muslim literature and culture were not carried back into Iran. On the contrary, Amir Khusro (d. 1325), a Muslim poet and historian of this subcontinent, is rated higher than his contemporaries in Persia, as are the Persian poets and

writers under Akbar, Urfi (d. 1590-91), Fayzi (d. 1595), and Zuhuri (d. 1616).

"Thus, the Muslims coming from all parts of the Muslim world, but mainly from Arabia, Mesopotamia, Turkestan, Iran and Mongolia, were fused into 'one indistinguishable whole, the catalytic being the new environment and cultural atmosphere of India.'"¹

Among the problems faced by Pakistan in the external field is the question of Kashmir whose Maharaja acceded to India against the wishes of his Muslim subjects who form the bulk of the population of Kashmir. Since then the Kashmir question has defied solution. Meanwhile, the internal conditions in Kashmir continue to deteriorate and there is an organised attempt on the part of the Kashmir authorities to convert the Muslim majority into a minority by importing a large number of Hindus and Sikhs. Prime Minister Shyākh 'Abdullah, the leader of Kashmiri Muslims, was dismissed and thrown into prison because he wanted an independent Kashmir. The case was submitted to the Security Council which appointed a Commission in April 1948 to use its good offices in the settlement of the problem, but repeated attempts at mediation failed. India is not prepared to implement the scheme of plebiscite approved by the Security Council except on its own terms.

Meanwhile, the whole prosperity of Western Pakistan is linked with Kashmir. Of the five great rivers which irrigate the West Punjab and Sind, two, the Sutlej and the Ravi, have their headwaters in India. The East Punjab Government some time ago demanded seigniorage charges for the use of these waters in the Pakistan canals, and has claimed the right to divert them. The remaining three great rivers, the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, have their headwaters in Kashmir. Their control by a hostile neighbour would mean ruin for Pakistan. Moreover, Kashmir is necessary also for the defence of West Pakistan. A more pressing problem of foreign policy is that of Pakistan's relations with

Afghanistan. "Relations with Afghanistan, the only nation which opposed Pakistan's entry into the United Nations, have not been very happy. The Kabul Radio and Press have repeatedly urged tribes on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line to rise and create an independent Pathanistan. The Afghan Government has supported the press campaign by distributing presents to the tribesmen. Pakistan has few apprehensions as to the loyalty of the latter, whose standard of living is higher than that on the other side of the Frontier and has no fear of the paid Afghan Army. But many Pakistanis suspect Indian intrigue and money behind this movement in an effort to divert tribal interest from Kashmir. The Afghan dynasty is believed to be precariously balanced between the attacks of Communists on the one hand and those of supporters of the family of ex-King Amanullah on the other and to be attempting to save itself by concentrating attention on external rather than internal affairs."1

Sir Frazer-Tytler is of opinion that Pakistan and Afghanistan will become eventually unified. "History show us," he writes,2 "that he who holds the Hindu Kush holds the key to India, and that the urge to descend from the highlands and possess the rich lands of the plain is sooner or later inevitable.

"It is indeed a strange feature of this complicated situation that there exists, like a canker in the body-politic of northern India, this collection of 'independent' tribes, well armed, intractable and formidable, who may at any time disturb the relations and disrupt the economy of either of the states in whose midst they dwell. It is an anachronism and danger to the stability of northern India and the peace of Central Asia. The remedy is the fusion of the two states of Afghanistan and Pakistan in some way or other. It may be argued that, given the differences in the mental and political outlook of the two states, such fusion is impossible. This may be so; I am in no position to argue the matters. But history suggests that fusion will take place, if not

peaceably, then by force .... The two states, closely integrated, prosperous and peaceful, would have a notable part to play as forming a powerful eastern bastion to the long line of Islamic states which stretch between the Bosphorus and the Pamirs. But if they are not so integrated, if they are divided and torn by political and economic differences, by national antagonism and by the absurdities of the Durand Line, then they will offer that condition favourable to revolution which gives Communism its opportunity.

"For whatever happens in north-western India, there is one great factor in the political development of Central Asia which is likely to increase in importance as time passes. Great areas in Russian territories across the Oxus are being developed and to some extent industrialized. This process will in time lead to a demand for access to the sea, for a port through which Russian merchandise can be exported to the markets of the world, and through which imports may enter Central Asia."

It is difficult to hazard any opinion as to the statement quoted above. But it is true that the Pak-Afghan trade and economy would gain much by mutual cooperation and the political conflict between them could only be of advantage to the Russians.

AFGHANISTAN

When in 1929 Amanulla was ousted from Afghanistān by Bachcha Saqqa, the British Government faced a perplexing situation. They could not refuse passage to Nādir Khān and his brothers and yet they could offer him no help, until he had succeeded in establishing his authority in Afghanistān. The British declaration of neutrality was responsible for a similar policy on the part of Soviet Russia.

Nādir Khān who came to the Afghan throne in October 1929 was a Durrānī Afghan of Muḥammadza’ī branch. He and his brothers were born in India and brought up at Dehra Dun in the U.P. During Amanulla’s regime he was made Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan army and took part in the third Afghan War.
In 1924, Ńādir Khān was relieved of his post and sent to Paris as Afgān ambassador. His great prestige and influence with the tribes made him an object of suspicion to the Amīr. When leaving Kābul, Ńādir Khān prophesied Amanulla’s downfall due to his overhasty reforms. He remained for two years as Afgān Minister in Paris during which time he had many opportunities to study the post-war world of Europe. Reports from Afgānistān served to strengthen him in his opinion about Amanulla and, as his health was severely affected by the conditions within his country, he retired to southern France where he was joined by his brothers Sardār Hasḥim Khān and Sardār Shāh Wali Khān. On arriving in Afgānistān they were joined by their youngest brother, Sardār Shāh Maḥmūd.

After his victory over the rebel, Bachcha Saqqā, Ńādir made a declaration of policy signifying his intention to base the administration on the Islamic Ḥanafī Law and to dissociate the new regime from the frenzied modernism of Amanulla, while at the same time conciliating the religious class. The declaration also foreshadowed a development of education together with the establishment of a military school and arsenal.

To carry out his policy, Ńādir set up a cabinet of ten members in charge of the various departments of state, with his brothers Sardārs Hasḥim Khān and Shāh Maḥmūd, as Prime Minister and War Minister respectively. The remaining ministers were chosen from his own family or from among his friends. He also re-established the Great Assembly composed of delegates from each tribe and province.

During the four years of his rule, Ńādir created an army of 40,000 and dealt successfully with three rebellions. He built a road through Hindū Kush and made the highways of the country safer than they had ever been. Of all his feats of administration, perhaps the most remarkable in its effect on the future development of the country was the building of the Great North Road through the Hindū Kush which was completed in 1933.

The aim of his foreign policy was to rebuild his country and to be at peace with his two great neighbours. In pursuit of this
policy, he adjusted the balance which at the end of Amānulla’s reign had become weighted in favour of Soviet Russia, by the elimination of all Russian personnel. He also refused to accept Soviet proposals for penetration into the country in the guise of commercial missions to be established at various centres. At the same time he did not allow British power to influence Afgān affairs. No British nationals were employed in any capacity throughout the country. Even in educational matters, while the French and German schools established by Amānulla were reopened and restaffed from Europe, the teaching of English was entrusted to Indian teachers.

Nādir Shāh was assassinated in 1932 by the natural son of one Ghulām Nabi, who belonged to the pro-Amānulla Charḵī family and whom Nādir Shāh had executed for fomenting trouble in the southern province. King Zāhir Shāh, the present Afgān ruler, was too young at the time. Therefore, his uncle Sardār Ḥāshim Khān became the Prime Minister and virtual ruler of Afgānistān for upwards of fourteen years.

The most complex problem before the new Afgān regime was that of the tribes. The basis of Afgān society was still tribal. The new social and political order which was growing up leaned for support to the progressive elements among the tribes themselves. But the tribes remained powerful, fanatical, suspicious of progress and priest-ridden. Collectively, they were much more powerful than any Afgān army could deal with and, in combination, they were capable of plunging Afgānistān into chaos and ruin. The task of substituting the normal administrative framework of the civilised state was likely to be prolonged and difficult. There was, therefore, always a risk of too great a cleavage developing between the progressive minority and the static majority. The young men were impatient of conservative controls. The older statesmen who knew the dangers inherent in this attitude tried to put a brake on the young progressive element while slowly building up the structure of progress. Even so it was not always possible to avoid a clash on occasions between a progressive government and its reactionary subjects.
The Ghilza’īs proved to be the most troublesome tribe. They had never taken kindly to the Durrānī rule. In 1935 the establishment of customs posts along the main lines of their migration gave rise to considerable unrest. They had been already hard hit by the introduction of mechanical transport. The introduction of new rules and regulations which they had never known aroused bitter opposition among them. This led in 1937 to an open rebellion which was quickly crushed. Nor was the introduction of a more general type of education without its difficulties. Here the main obstacle was the conservative religious class.

But in spite of all those difficulties progress was continuous throughout the thirties. Schools and factories began to appear, new towns sprang up outside the older walled citadels, communications were developed and improved. Mail services became regular between India and the capital and north along the great new road to Oxus or south and west to Gardez and Ghaznī and Qandhār. Telegraph and telephone communication spread throughout the country.

The Afghan Government was at this time looking for some power with no political interests in Central Asia to back their projects of development. They found the Germans ready and willing. In 1935 a German scientific expedition was permitted to explore the valleys of Nūristān and in 1936 surveys for the establishment of an air route across Afghanistan to China were undertaken by a German company. At the same time German engineers and other experts began to appear in the capital, German machinery and bridging material was in process of erection. The great engineering firm of Siemens opened an agency in Kābul and houses and furniture of German design were much in evidence.

But the second world war came and sadly upset the Afghan progress and development. In 1941 the entry of the British and Russian forces into Persia cut off the last links of the Germans in Afghanistan with their own country, while the stoppage of imports from Europe prevented them from completing the installations of machinery on which they were engaged. The British and the
Russians demanded the removal of German nationals from Afghanistan.

After the end of the war, the Afghans realised that they would be affected by the British decision to quit India. The inevitability of a partitioned India was clear to many Afghans before even the Muslims of India had thought of its possibility. The Afghans understood that the Muslim community of undivided India would never submit to be ruled by a Hindu majority and they "knew that any attempt to impose unity on India must lead to disaster. It was, therefore, with no small measure of relief that they learnt in 1947 of the belated decision to partition India."1

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF AFGHANISTAN

Ninety per cent of the Afghan people are engaged in agricultural pursuits. Their living standards, therefore, depend on the country's agricultural output and the markets for it. Substantial surpluses of fresh and dried fruits, nuts, and, above all, non-processed animal products have been consistently produced and the bulk of them is exported. Sometimes cotton surpluses are also exported. The economic life of Afghanistan, therefore, depends on foreign trade. Exports provide virtually the only market for two important agricultural products: animal skins and fruits. An interruption in the flow of these products causes a substantial drop in income and employment. Because of the absence of any significant domestic market for skins or alternative uses for labour and land devoted to fruit growing, no other income-producing activity can be substituted in an emergency.

This heavy dependence on foreign markets for the sale of a few agricultural products has disturbing implications both for the traders and the government. Both Afghan skins and agricultural exports have been at the mercy of the business cycle in industrialised countries. Since the second world war, the United States has become virtually the only market for Afghan skins,

pending the restoration of Europe's purchasing power. But if South-West African skins continue to improve so greatly as to displace Afghān skins in the American market, Afghānistān's economy will be severely disrupted.

Nevertheless, the long-run outlook for fruit exports to India and Pakistan is good, since Afghān fruits and nuts supplement the deficient diets of Indian and Pakistani inhabitants. Moreover, as economic development projects in India and Pakistan take shape, the purchasing power of the people is sure to be reflected in higher imports from Afghānistān, provided transport facilities can be improved and trade barriers reduced.

Afghānistān's most immediate and acute trade difficulty is its lack of direct access to the sea. All external trade has to go across Pakistan and sometimes India. Karachi's inadequate harbour facilities must often be supplemented by those of Bombay, 500 miles away from the Peshawar railhead.

In agriculture, the problem is one of improving and extending arable land, as the yield per acre of land is very low. Although scanty rainfall throughout the country contributes to low production, the fertile alluvial soil in the northern plains and the wide valleys of the Helmund and other rivers in the south and south-west will lend themselves to considerable recultivation once modern irrigation installations are built and new farmers settled. Government officials estimate that in this way between 7,00,000 and 8,00,000 additional acres can be brought under cultivation within five years.

"The reclamation of irrigable land involves technical and social problems which the Government is attempting to cope with. The danger of excessive salinity, frequently neglected in the Middle East, is being met by drainage facilities which the Morrison-Knudsen engineering firm is installing along with irrigation canals . . . .

"The Government can tap the human reservoir of partly idle nomads who for centuries have migrated seasonally because they could find no year-round grazing land. The nomads' reluctance to settle will be weakened on the one hand by the
limitations put upon migration into Pakistan and profitable activities there, and on the other by Government subsidies to help them get land, tools, seeds, housing. The Government hopes to offer the nomads property rights and tax privileges which are best adapted to the patterns of their past life and at the same time fulfil their expectations for improvement.  

In order to increase agricultural productivity, the government is trying to make available throughout the country modern techniques, equipment and fertilisers. But progress is made difficult by a number of factors. One of them is the prevalence of nomadism. Another difficulty arises from the fact that on the settled lands the proprietary peasants who far out-number the large estate-holders, are hard pressed to meet immediate needs. They can save nothing for making improvements. The large estate-holder is generally too conservative to undertake radical improvements and the numerous prosperous traders depending on farm production have not developed the venturesome attitude.

Afghan industry produces exclusively for domestic consumption. Most of the factories and manufacturing shops process agricultural raw materials: these include sugar refineries, cotton and wool mills, carpet weaving and making of leather goods, etc. Except for the cotton textile mills and the sugar refinery, these enterprises rely on primitive machinery utilising little or no mechanical power.

A generation ago, there was no channel for the accumulation of capital. Earnings were converted into land, houses and hoardings of gold. In order to encourage industrial investment, the government contributed capital and granted monopoly rights to a number of commercial and industrial enterprises founded as joint stock companies and known as skhats. As a channel for investments, the Bank Milli Afghan was organised in 1932. Within a decade, more than 100 shikats were sponsored, promoted or partly financed by the government and Bank Milli. One of the most significant creations of Bank Milli was the Textile Company

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founded in 1935.

Among the requirements of a well-balanced economy is a more dependable supply of fuel and power. In Afgānistān today less than one per cent of the country’s coal reserves is being worked. An American mining engineer has estimated that a five-fold increase in mine output is practicable. In 1938 American geologists located petrolierous formations and gas seeps in northern Afgānistān. The country can secure more than enough electric energy from the largely untapped river waters rushing down the Hindū Kush. Preliminary surveys by American, German, and English engineering firms indicate that high economic rewards would result from two large and three smaller hydro-electric power stations. Contracts for building the first of these power stations, near Girishk (4500 k.w.), and the second near Kābul (30,000 k.w.) have already been negotiated.

Important political factors will directly influence the economic development of Afgānistān. The pacification of the North-Western Frontier tribes is the most important of these. “As long as the underdeveloped agricultural and mineral resources of the region do not provide an adequate stable means of livelihood, the inhabitants will keep their tribal customs, insist on their autonomy, and remain a constant source of political unrest. Without peaceful and harmonious relations between Pakistan and Afgānistān, the latter’s economic future and the former’s benefits from trade are in jeopardy: the danger is that the pre-occupation of the Government and private groups with the tribal issue will divert attention and energy from the more vital task.”

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IRĀN

Since 1926 when he came to the throne, Raḍa Shāh, the first king of the present Pahlavi dynasty, effected far-reaching changes in Irānian society and government. He terminated the capitulation system and put an end to the practice of seeking foreign loans. The right of currency issue was taken away from the British-owned Imperial Bank. The contract with the Anglo-

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Iranian Oil Company was cancelled and replaced with one more advantageous to Īrān. Though deadly opposed to Communism, Raḍa Shāh realised the necessity of maintaining good relations with Russia and concluded several pacts with her. He created a large army and a highly centralised government. Great social and political changes followed from his policy. Nobles lost power and prestige and the use of titles was abolished. The merchants lost freedom of enterprise as they were drawn into the governmental system of controls. The hold of the religious classes was weakened and they lost the control of vast trust funds. Although foreigners were employed as experts, they were no longer given responsible posts.

"Profits from monopolies and income from normal and special taxes furnished the funds for the establishment of state-owned industry, and remarkable progress was made in the construction of factories. Transportation facilities were greatly expanded through the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway, the building of thousands of miles of new roads, and the importation of trucks and passenger cars. On the other hand, agriculture and irrigation were neglected, so that the farming population received little direct benefit from the new industry and suffered a decline in the standard of living."1

After the outbreak of the second world war, Īrān declared her neutrality. But with the outbreak of the Russo-German War in 1941, Īrān's neutrality was violated by the British and the Russians who both feared a German drive to the Middle East through Caucasus. It was also important for Britain and America to protect the supply route to Russia. The British Navy, moreover, was dependent on the output of the oilfields near the head of the Persian Gulf. Raḍa Shāh failed to comply with the request of the allies to expel from Īrān the Nazi agents. Therefore, in August 1941, Russian and British forces forcibly occupied Īrān and Raḍa Shāh abdicated the throne.

Muḥammad Raḍa, the present Īrānian monarch, succeeded

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his father, and concluded the Tripartite Treaty of 1942 with Great Britain and Russia by which the two powers undertook to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of İrân. In November 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met in İrân and issued the Tehran Declaration in which they recognised the aid given by İrân in the war and promised economic assistance to the country.

The new Şâh restored parliamentary democracy in İrân but the country failed to get a stable government. Prime Ministers followed each other after short intervals. Successive cabinets were charged with favouring the interests of foreign nations, with being too conservative or too radical. The new political parties were extremely vocal. In the province of Azerbâ'îjân occupied by Russia, the Tudeh Party was replaced by the Democratic Party of Azerbâ'îjân. This party was separatist in its tendencies and attacked the Central Government's military forces. Government forces rushed in 1945 to reinforce the local army were stopped by the Russians. In December 1945 the Democratic Party of Azerbâ'îjân, encouraged and instigated by Russia, announced the establishment of an autonomous state of Azerbâ'îjân independent of the Central Government.

During the war, the allies had fixed March 2, 1946, as the last date for the total evacuation of İrânian territory. The Americans and the British withdrew their forces by that date, but Russia prevaricated. İrân protested to the Security Council that the U. S. S. R. was still maintaining troops in İrân contrary to the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. But Aḥmad Qavām, the new Prime Minister, succeeded in reaching an agreement with Russia which provided for the withdrawal of Soviet forces within six weeks and for presentation to the İrânian Parliament of a proposal for the formation of a joint İran-Soviet Oil Company to exploit the oil resources of northern İrân and for the peaceful settlement of the Azerbâ'îjân problem. Long drawn-out negotiations followed with the rebel government of Azerbâ'îjân, but to no effect. Early in December 1946, the Central Government dispatch-
ed troops to Azerbā'ījān. The rebel government collapsed and some of its leaders fled to Russia. Thus Russian influence was eliminated from Īrān. Discussions were also carried with the tribal heads of the Kurds, Bakhtiyāris and the Qāshqā'īs. With the latter an agreement was reached which may form the pattern of relations with other tribes. The Qāshqā'īs were to surrender their arms to the Central Government. In return they were to get proportional representation in Parliament and enjoy better educational, medical and transport facilities. Local officials were also to be appointed from among the residents of the area.

ĪRĀNIAN OIL

The oil history of Īrān begins with the grant in 1901 of the Īrānian Government's concession to D'Aracy giving the exclusive right to bore for and to work oil throughout Īrān except in a few provinces. D'Aracy sold his concession to the Burmah Oil Company which in 1909 formed a new syndicate under the name of Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The Company started work in 1912 and discovered a rich and accessible oilfield at Masijid-i-Sulaymān, 145 miles from the Persian Gulf. Further developments rapidly followed. A pipe-line 145 miles long was laid which ran to the island of Abādān on the Persian Gulf. On this island a refinery, one of the biggest in the world and the biggest in the East, was constructed. At present there are three refineries in Īrān, one at Abādān, another at Bunder Shāhpur and a third at Kermānshāh. The total capacity of all the three is about sixteen million tons.

For the development of oil in the five northern provinces of Īrān which were not included in the D'Aracy concession, the Īrānian Government granted many concessions to foreign companies, but no concrete results came forth. In 1946, however, as we have seen, an oil agreement was concluded with Russia providing for the formation of Soviet-Īrānian Oil Company. But the agreement was rejected in October 1947 by the Īrānian Parliament.

It has been estimated that Īrān possesses the second largest oil deposits in the world. But at present only about 0·7 per cent of
this potential supply is obtained, but the İranian oilfields surpass other countries in their productivity. There are in all about 200 oil wells in the whole of İran. As against this, there are 3,18,600 oil wells in the U. S. A. and about 30,000 fresh ones dug every year. There are only three refineries in İran; in the U. S. A. the number is 560. At present İran produces 3.8 per cent of the total world oil output, while the U. S. A. produces 60.4 per cent and Russia 10.6 per cent. The oil industry of İran is an important source of income to the İranian Government. The royalties from the Anglo-Iranian Company have constituted in recent years between 10 and 20 per cent of the total revenues of the İranian Government.

"The pioneers of the oil industry in Iran," says Raj Narain Gupta,1 "in the initial stages, had to endure the hostility of the tribesmen, who placed many difficulties in the way of the Company's operations. But as it is seen now the oil industry is the only considerable large-scale industry in Iran. It provides employment to about 66,000 labourers, including about 3,500 foreigners of whom 1,000 are Indians. Previously a large number of foreign labourers were employed for technical operations. But now their number is being replaced by Iranian labourers who are provided with all sorts of technical jobs and are becoming engineers, technicians and experts.

"There have been numerous other advantages of the industry or the local populace. New towns have been built equipped with substantial dwellings; jungles have been cleared and several prosperous industries established; new roads have been opened out and means of communication improved; schools and hospitals have been opened and amenities of life increased; clubs, playing fields, cinemas, theatres, etc., have also sprung up in the empty desert or on the sides of barren mountains."

LANDLORD AND PEASANT

As in other Muslim countries, the peasantry in İran is oppressed by a small class of feudal landlords. But İran has had no

stable landed aristocracy of the English type. Conditions of recurrent anarchy and dynastic changes prevented the emergence of a stable hereditary landed aristocracy. The modern land-owning class is of recent growth. The old landed proprietors and the tribal Khāns, in so far as they were also land-owners, tended under Raḍā Shāh to lose their lands, on the one hand by confiscation to the state, and, on the other, to the rising class of merchants and contractors, to the new bureaucracy, and to the military classes, all of whom began to acquire land both for its economic value and perhaps even more for the political power and social prestige which its ownership conferred.

The general trend since the grant of the Constitution in 1906 has been to alter the status of the large landed proprietor from that of a petty territorial prince to that of an ordinary land owner. In addition to the reduction in the power of the large landed proprietors, there has also been a tendency towards a reduction in the size of their estates. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the total area owned by the large landed proprietors has sensibly decreased.

Raḍā Shāh’s policy of land confiscation weakened the position and power of the tribal Khāns and reduced their economic status to such an extent that they were forced to sell some of their lands. The land-owning class of the present day can roughly be divided into the following groups. Firstly, there are those whose land holdings go back to several generations. In many cases their family fortunes were laid by government service which enabled a preceding generation in the course of its duties to acquire local influence and land. Secondly, there are the tribal Khāns who have acquired, by purchase, government grant or hereditary transmission estates in their tribal territory. Thirdly, there are the religious classes who became an important element in the land-owning class in Šafavīd times. Fourthly, there are newcomers. There are the bailiffs of large land-owners who have used or misused their influence to acquire estates for themselves. Then there are government servants, civil and military, who have acquired property in the area where they
have held office. Lastly, there are merchants and contractors who have invested their money in land.

"Between the land-owner as a class, no matter what his origin, and the peasant there is a wide gulf. In no sense is there a spirit of cooperation or a feeling of being engaged in mutual enterprise. The land-owner regards the peasant virtually as a drudge, whose sole function is to provide him with his profits and who will, if treated with anything but severity, cheat him of his dues. It is widely believed in land-owning circles that anything above the barest consideration of the well-being of the peasant would be taken by the latter as a sign of weakness and as a result he would not pay the dues of the land-owner. Education, better hygiene, and improved housing for the peasant are similarly regarded as unnecessary."

Many of the landlords are indebted because they live in a patriarchal fashion with a large number of dependents, regard economy as unbecoming to their status and have to remain in constant touch with the Capital personally or through a representative. The more powerful land-owners seek to obtain the appointment of their own nominees to local positions of influence. Since the country is still administered on personal basis, the rise of one group is liable to result in a change of officials right through the administration. There is factional rivalry among landlords which spreads even to small villages where the landowners are sufficiently strong to influence the appointment of government officials; the securing of office by the nominee of one group is frequently followed by the despoliation of the village of the other group.

NEEDS FOR REFORMS

Iran is at present ruled by a thousand families which own four-fifths of the cultivated land and which in their provinces behave like princes. These families provide generals for the army, deputies and senators for the Parliament, governors for the

provinces, ministers for the Central Government and ambassadors for the foreign service. They own vast estates or head the big commercial and banking organisations. They generally have incomes, tax free, exceeding the equivalent of Rs. 1,40,000 a year. Their power over the peasants, while not actually that of life and death, comes near to it. Peasants vote en bloc for the proprietors. Their homes, food and clothing depend on them.

The present Shāh is conscious of the need of urgent reforms. His reform programme includes elimination of corruption from public life, reform of the machinery of justice, tax reforms to make the rich pay as well as the poor, land reform—carving up of big estates and expansion of small owners—and the modernisation of industry and communications. These reforms strike at the root of the power of the dominant families who are, therefore, opposed to their implementation. The Majlis (or the Parliament) recently shelved or emasculated three reform bills. The Shāh is trying to exert his personal influence on the side of the reforms but makes little headway against a Parliament dominated by the thousand families. If a deadlock is reached, the Shāh can dissolve the Parliament and rule by decree or order fresh elections. However, the Shāh is afraid of completely alienating the sympathies of the dominant families for, good or bad, they constitute the main prop of monarchy in Iran.
Chapter X

OUR PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

We have traced the development of Muslim history from the time of the pre-Islamic Arabs. It is a history of great achievements and dismal failures, of a rapid rise and a continuous fall. What was it that made Islām such a tremendous success and then caused its downfall?

The usual explanation is that the Muslims lost their moral fervour after the Early Caliphate due to the inflow of excessive wealth. This is partly true, but does not offer the full explanation. The bulk of the Muslim population in Arabia and other countries remained loyal to the moral ideal of Islām and continued to walk the path of righteousness long after the ruling classes and the high-ups had morally degenerated. The instance of the Khwārij is a case in point. In respect of physical bravery, moral sincerity and steadfastness of belief, very few groups and parties could compare with them. But they failed dismally before their moral inferiors. What does this prove except that intellectual enlightenment and breadth of vision are necessary ingredients of successful belief and that religious convictions or moral sincerity by themselves can achieve nothing, unless accompanied by a higher intellectual understanding of issues and situations. Sheer fanaticism, however much sustained by belief and moral sincerity, cannot work, as the history of Wahhābism in modern times shows. Islām succeeded, because it brought about an all-round improvement in beliefs, morals and, above all, in thought. Dogmatism and blind faith were not characteristic of the early Muslims. They were tolerant, open-minded and able to weigh and judge views opposite to their own. Their beliefs had not yet crystallised into a rigid system, complete and self-contained, in which no outside element could enter. It is the
rigidity and unadaptability of religious beliefs that is partly responsible for the decline of the Muslims. Unless a community is ready to revise its beliefs and convictions in the light of fresh developments in knowledge and historical situations, it cannot mould its actions rightly. So long as Islām, as a system of belief and conduct, was adaptable, it did meet the challenge of the times. Both the Mu'tazila and the Jurists, excepting the Ḥanbalites, proved themselves amenable to this process of revision, but when Islamic theology and law became crystallised into a rigid system, the process of revision ceased and stagnation crept in. This is not to deny that, in matters of fundamental principles, there should be complete rigidity. The tremendous impress left by the personality of the Holy Prophet on the minds of the Muslims became, after some time, a factor which retarded their intellectual progress. True, the Muslims did not deify him, for he had taken great precautions against such a development. But they definitely raised him as far above humanity as could be possible. The jurists took his sayings and actions as a standard for all time, while in the eyes of the Sufis, influenced by Christian and Persian ideas, he approached the frontiers of divinity. The Prophet was not worshipped as an idol; none-the-less, it was but worship to regard everything which he said or did, irrespective of his personal likings and dislikings and the needs of time and circumstance, as binding on Muslim community for all time. Religious sanctity has its own peculiar dangers. Where a person or an object is invested with this kind of sanctity, the intellect and the understanding are paralysed and analytical inquiry comes to a stop. It is also true that religious reverence has a healthy moral effect on the devotees, and irreverence of religious personalities generally proceeds from base motives. The proper attitude is therefore one of respectfulness coupled with an analytical understanding of the situation in which a religious person has to carry out his mission and functions. In their deep reverence for the Holy Prophet, which was fully justified by his great achievements, the critical faculty of the Muslims was completely dulled, with immense intellectual loss. Once this attitude of mind had come to be shaped in respect of the Holy
Prophet, it operated unceasingly with regard to lesser personalities, until the deeds and opinions of every religious person set the standard for thought and action in the Muslim community resulting in great divergences of belief and action which easily took the shape of sectarian conflicts with all their narrow-mindedness, intolerance and attachment to persons instead of principles.

Religious absolutism went hand in hand with political absolutism, leading to a view of predestination and denial of free will totally opposed to the teachings of Islam. As autocracy and despotism increased in Muslim politics, man became more and more degraded. Till the Omayyad period, while there was still some element of democracy at work, the Muslims did not think that man was an utterly helpless creature in the face of an Omnipotent God. The Qadrites and the Mu'tazila were still fighting to uphold the dignity of man as a free creative being who could effect changes and improve or change his social order. This was in accordance with the Qur'anic concept of God Who expressly recognises the causal efficacy of the human will and calls the righteous the friends of God. Such verses as that God does not change a nation which does not change itself or that God will help you if you help Him, give a very different concept of man and God as co-partners in a common moral enterprise than the corresponding concepts of the orthodox Muslim theology, where man is reduced to an absolute nonentity before an Almighty God. As the Abbásids brought Persian concepts of Divine Kingship, the idea of the individual as the vicegerent of God was replaced by that of a political caliphate divinely ordained. The divine right theory of kings and rulers destroyed the last vestige of the concept of human dignity. Henceforth the Muslims were not citizen caliphs in their own right but subjects of an omnipotent ruler.

Islam had destroyed the concept of the Divine Man by insisting that Muhammad was neither more nor less than a man. But as soon as the Muslims came into contact with the Persians, the Syrians and the Egyptians, the idea of the Divine Man re-entered through the backdoor in the shape of the allied idea of the Mehdī, the Perfect Man, or the Deliverer. Sufism contri-
buted a good deal towards the propagation of such ideas. The Şüfi himself strove to be a Perfect Man until sometimes he claimed to be the incarnation of God and sometimes God Himself. Nothing has done more injury to the Muslims than this idea of a future deliverer who will set things by his individual power, without the Muslims having to lift their small finger to improve things. While in Europe and the Western world, men changed and improved their socio-political order by corporate organised activity, the Muslim has been waiting endlessly for the hoped-for Mehdi.

Şüfi theology, again, destroyed the empirical pragmatic attitude towards life inculcated by the Qur’an. The Şüfi way of knowledge lay through intuition and revelation, not through observation and study of external world. Plato and Plotinus had, between them, popularised the ideal of Gnosis—the Ma‘arifat—through ecstasy and contemplation. The Şūfis took up the Neo-Platonic thread and exalted intuitive knowledge as the highest virtue. God as the Will-Force which was the Islamic concept became replaced by God as Consciousness. “To be” was “to be known,” but the Qur’an had declared in so many words that “to be” was “to will” and “to act” and knowledge was but one of the modes of action. Hence the Qur’anic way of knowledge lay through travel, through observation of external nature as well as of the inner self. The Şūfi would have nothing to do with movement, with travel or observation of external life. The supreme ideal of knowledge was for him mystification, another name for ignorance. The clear, the concrete, the individual had no place in the Şūfi system of knowledge. Only the most general, the most absolute and the most ambiguous was held up as the ideal of knowledge. Şūfi absolutism, therefore, destroyed the Qur’anic empiricism. To put it in a nutshell, absolutism was all the rage since the coming of the Abbasids, political absolutism of the Caliphate, orthodox absolutism of the Ash‘arite theology, and Şūfi absolutism of intuitive knowledge.

The Muslim concept of God had been too transcendent from the early times to enable him to adjust himself to a changing world. The Qur’anic God is neither too transcendent nor too
immanent. The Qur'an has a definitely historical outlook, and views the world as a process of changing history. It looks upon even the advent of Islam as a distinct historical event and says in clear terms, "That was a people that hath passed away. They shall reap the fruit of what they did. And ye of what ye do" (ii. 141). And again, "Generations before you We destroyed when they did wrong: their Apostles came to them with clear signs, but they would not believe. Thus do We requite those who sin. Then We made you heirs in the land after them to see how you would behave" (x. 13). But the Muslims, as a general rule, after the Early Caliphate, thought as if the march of history has been arrested and the creative force has exhausted itself, so that no new forms of life are going to spring up requiring social and communal adjustment. Religion became more and more an affair of the individual's adjustment to an outside creator, not the adjustment of the community to the demands of the creative process at work in history. Everything had been finalised: prophethood, theology and jurisprudence. The idea never came to their minds that prophethood may have ended, but the prophetic mission has not ceased, namely, the guidance of the community by its spiritual leaders to the requirements of a changing world. As a result of too much transcendence and of the unhistorical outlook of the Muslim religious leadership, law became crystallised into a rigid code and the door of Ijishad was closed, except in the trivial affairs concerning individual life. Religious absolutism, the offshoot of exaggerated transcendentalism, again invaded another sphere, with its reliance on authority as against individual judgment. Authoritarianism has ever since been the bane of Muslim religion as of Muslim politics.

THE IMPACT OF THE WEST

With all its defects, the Muslim civilisation was still capable of holding its own down to the fifteenth century. It absorbed the shock of Mongol invasions which might have shattered another civilisation and even expanded beyond Eastern Europe under the Turks. Its great point of strength was its assimilative spirit and freedom from race and colour prejudice.
Islam decayed in proportion to the rise of local, sectarian and national separatism. The new peoples and races such as the Turks and the Mongols did not completely identify themselves with Islam. They retained many of their reactionary and pre-Islamic institutions and gave only a restricted allegiance to the Islamic Sharia. We have seen how the slave system of the Ottoman Turks and the Mughals system of the Mughals were based on violation of the Islamic laws of inheritance and the rights which Islam accords to the individual in regard to the protection of his life and property. Under the Turks and the Mughals, neither the life nor the property of the people was safe from despotic encroachment. The principle of human dignity and individual freedom upheld by Islam was never fully applied. It may be said that Islam did not achieve its mission in these respects. This is both true and untrue, because great ideas and principles are never fully realised at the time when they are set forth. The course of history and innumerable social and political obstacles prevent the full realisation of ideas, as they do not work in a vacuum but within very serious historical and material limitations. A great spiritual idea is always in advance of its time. It is the overflow of the spirit over its material surroundings.

Many of the ideals and values for which Islam stood were implemented not by the Islamic civilisation but by the civilisation of the West. Thus Islam had put man on a par with God in its scheme of life. But the discovery of this truth was the work of the Western civilisation, which re-emphasised the importance of man, although it forgot that man could not be complete without God, for God is the terminus and the over-arching unity of the human individuals, and what is not rooted in God is less than human.

The impact of this Western civilisation has brought complex issues before the Muslim world. It is time to assess its merits and define our attitude to it. It is no disparagement of the West that its achievements have been largely negative in the Muslim area of civilisation. It destroyed many useless institutions and modes of behaviour that had outlived their utility, but it failed to replace them by anything positive thus creating a dangerous
vacuum. The Muslim world is still struggling to integrate its past with the present modern civilisation and looks blankly at the future.

But even in its negative aspects the Western civilisation has not been as ruthless as one would have expected. In some parts of the Muslim world, it introduced democratic institutions rather half-heartedly, while in others it made a compromise with the anti-democratic monarchical form of government. It also failed to root out feudalism in the Muslim countries. It weakened but did not destroy the hold of religious orthodoxy. It created scepticism towards established moral and religious values, but this does not go beyond an attitude of bare negation. The Muslim countries have all the paraphernalia of the externals of the Western civilisation, but they have not even partially absorbed the intellectual modes of thought which lie at the back of this civilisation. The scientific, liberal, rational outlook is far from being a fact in modern Muslim countries. The westernisation of administrative, scientific and industrial techniques has come to stay, but it has failed to introduce corresponding changes in the spiritual and intellectual outlook of the Muslims, although it has partially shattered time-worn customs and beliefs.

This disproves Toynbee’s thesis that “initial borrowing of an essential element of an alien civilization necessarily entails in due time the almost complete taking over of all its essential elements—a technical borrowing is bound to bring about changes in attitudes, social as well as intellectual, and those changes in turn will compel further loans on the scientific and philosophical, and ultimately even on the religious levels. It need hardly be stressed that with this assumption Toynbee forsakes the role of the historian for that of the Prophet; for up to the present almost nowhere has Western civilization been carried through to the limits envisaged by Toynbee in consequence of the first borrowing. On the other hand, the history of Islamic civilization provides more than one example where borrowing has not

followed the sequence postulated by Toynbee."  

Prof. Grunebaum refers in the above passage to the borrowing of the Muslims from Greek logic, Iranian administrative patterns and Indian medicine and mathematics. There is a difference, however, which is pointed out by Prof. Grunebaum himself: "The early Abbasid age did not borrow, say, Indian astronomy or even Persian administration, because they viewed foreign achievements as the only means to stave off political or economic infiltration and domination. Islam then was not on the defensive. It adopted alien possibilities for its own ends, and it did so hurriedly; the pressures to which it yielded were germane to its developmental phase, not imposed from outside."  

What is then to be the final outcome of the Western impact on Islam? According to the same author, "As Islam is in no danger of becoming physically instinct owing to the impact of the West, it would seem that its assimilation of Western elements will remain confined to such as may migrate 'from people to people, thanks to the use of technological, practical and applied arts and methods.' The westernization potential of the Muslim world clearly includes 'a higher rationalization of thought and the coordination of economy technique and the State,' but it is not likely to include 'the underlying principles as embodied in religion, philosophy, or rational scientific theory.' In brief Islam is not likely to lose itself in Western civilization to the extinction of its own personality, even though it may use the foreign stimulus as a lever for its own revitalization."  

But, curiously enough, the same author makes the entirely contradictory remark, "Thus, on principle, the West, or Christendom and Judaism, can never expect more than collaboration on the basis of toleration (as opposed to spiritual equality). But an Islam inspired by a revelation reinterpreted as a book of humanist directives stressing morality and not legality as the ethical aim of religion and relegating the obsolete legal, social, economic precepts to the background, will be rid of its two paralyzing

2. Ibid., p. 244.
dilemmas: whether to adopt the attitude of the West to reality, which is at the bottom of its scientific control of nature, or reject it as materialism; and whether to adopt or reject its attitude that holds criticism permissible in the face of an authority."

The question is: If Islām is not likely to lose its personality in contact with Western civilisation, how can it reinterpret the Holy Qur’ān as a book only of humanist directives? This is not to deny that legality has done great harm to the Muslims, but an Islām shorn of its legal content can hardly maintain its individuality. The confusion arises from regarding legality and morality as two mutually exclusive concepts, while, in fact, they are complementary, with morality being the more primary factor. The weakness of the Muslim is not that he combines morality with legality, but that he regards morality as being subordinate to legality, whereas it is legality which should be governed by ethics. Western thought is generally apt to overlook the fact that ethical life is rooted in society. It is a social not an individual phenomenon, just as law itself arises from social necessities. Therefore, ethics and legality must and do interact, and an ethics which does not influence the legal structure of a society can have only a shadowy existence.

Nor is the fear well grounded that Islām which retains its legal forms cannot adopt the Western attitude to life, because the Western attitude is not all of one piece. The Muslims cannot reject Westernism as wholly materialistic. There are spiritual trends in the Western life which they can appropriate without losing their identity. The scientific materialism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the West is rapidly giving place to a more spiritual outlook in harmony with the fundamentals of Islām.

Briefly, then, there are three alternatives before the Muslims in regard to westernisation. The first is to reject the West wholesale and retain the traditional, legal and social institutions of Islām unchanged. This is impossible in the face of modern knowledge and technical development. The second is to reject Islām as a social and legal order, but maintain its ethical and

spiritual directives. This is wholesale westernisation and the Herodian way of facing the Western challenge, in the words of Toynbee. The success of this method is, however, very questionable, because the ethical and spiritual directives of Islam cannot stand by themselves without a legal superstructure. Ethical and spiritual precepts are, after all, meant to regulate human relations and if they are allowed to perform this function, they will, of necessity, evolve a corresponding legal order.

The third alternative is to incorporate as much of Western thought and institutions as fit in with the spiritual and ethical directives of Islam and to regard these directives as overriding principles of life to which all specific laws and social institutions of Islam must subject themselves. If through the passage of time or changes in technology, some of the Islamic laws and institutions have outlived their necessity and utility or have ceased to correspond to the purposes of those overriding ethical directives, which we have posited as having final authority, then they should be modified or cancelled as the case may be. This entails a view of Revelation in which a distinction will have to be made between the higher and the lower levels of the revealed scripture. According to this view, the parts of the Holy Qur'an which deal with the principles of law and ethical directives possess a higher authority than the specific rules and regulations laid down by the Holy Book, which, of necessity, were determined, though not wholly, by the specific historical situation in which the law was revealed. Such legal principles as Isti‘hân (preference) and Istislah (public weal) already imply the view we are advocating. Western laws and institutions which can be proved to accord with the legal principles and ethical directives of Islam can be taken over as being fully Islamic.

Unless some such attitude is finally adopted by the Muslim world, there will be no other alternative to wholesale westernisation, for the complete rejection of the West is impossible. With Toynbee, we believe that neither the zealot's attitude of complete rejection nor the Herodian attitude of abject self-surrender is likely to win final acceptance of the Muslim world.
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